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CASE DIGESTS:

1. DE LA SALLE UNIVERSITY VS. COURT OF APPEALS, HON.WILFREDO D.


REYES, in his capacityas Presiding Judge of Branch 36, Regional Trial
Court of Manila, THE COMMISSION ON HIGHER EDUCATION, THE
DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION CULTURE AND SPORTS, ALVIN AGUILAR,
JAMES PAUL BUNGUBUNG, RICHARD REVERENTE and
ROBERTO VALDES, JR., G.R. No. 127980, December 19, 2007
REYES, R.T., J.:
THE FACTS:
PRIVATE respondents Alvin Aguilar, James Paul Bungubung, Richard Reverente and
Roberto Valdes, Jr. are members of Tau Gamma Phi Fraternity who were expelled by
the De La Salle University (DLSU) and College of Saint Benilde (CSB) [1][1] Joint
Discipline Board because of their involvement in an offensive action causing injuries to
petitioner James Yap and three other student members of Domino Lux Fraternity.

On March 29, 1995, James Yap was eating his dinner alone in Manang’s Restaurant
near La Salle, when he overheard two men bad-mouthing and apparently angry at
Domino Lux. He ignored the comments of the two. When he arrived at his boarding
house, he mentioned the remarks to his two other brods while watching television.
These two brods had earlier finished eating their dinner at Manang’s. Then, the three,
together with four other persons went back to Manang’s and confronted the two who
were still in the restaurant. By admission of respondent Bungubung in his testimony,
one of the two was a member of the Tau Gamma Phi Fraternity. There was no rumble
or physical violence then.

After this incident, a meeting was conducted between the two heads of the fraternity
through the intercession of the Student Council. The Tau Gamma Phi Fraternity was
asking for an apology. “Kailangan ng apology” in the words of respondent Aguilar. But
no apology was made.
On March 25, 1995, Ten minutes before his next class at 6:00 p.m., James Yap went
out of the campus using the Engineering Gate to buy candies across Taft Avenue. As
he was about to re-cross Taft Avenue, he heard heavy footsteps at his back. Eight to
ten guys were running towards him. He panicked. He did not know what to do. Then,
respondent Bungubung punched him in the head with something heavy in his hands –
“parang knuckles.” Respondents Reverente and Lee were behind Yap, punching
him. Respondents Bungubung and Valdes who were in front of him, were also
punching him. As he was lying on the street, respondent Aguilar kicked him. People
shouted; guards arrived; and the group of attackers left. Yap could not recognize the
other members of the group who attacked him. With respect to respondent Papio, Mr.
Yap said “hindi ko nakita ang mukha niya, hindi ko nakita sumuntok siya.” What Mr.
Yap saw was a long haired guy also running with the group.

The mauling incidents were a result of a fraternity war. The victims, namely: petitioner
James Yap and Dennis Pascual, Ericson Cano, and Michael Perez, are members of the
“Domino Lux Fraternity,” while the alleged assailants, private respondents Alvin Aguilar,
James Paul Bungubung, Richard Reverente and Roberto Valdes, Jr. are members of
“Tau Gamma Phi Fraternity,” a rival fraternity.

The next day, March 30, 1995, petitioner Yap lodged a complaint [2][7] with the Discipline
Board of DLSU charging private respondents with “direct assault.” Similar
complaints[3][8] were also filed by Dennis Pascual and Ericson Cano against Alvin Lee
and private respondents Valdes and Reverente. Thus, cases entitled “De La Salle
University and College of St. Benilde v. Alvin Aguilar (AB-BSM/9152105), James Paul
Bungubung (AB-PSM/9234403), Robert R. Valdes, Jr. (BS-BS-APM/9235086), Alvin
Lee (EDD/9462325), Richard Reverente (AB-MGT/9153837) and Malvin A. Papio (AB-
MGT/9251227)” were docketed as Discipline Case No. 9495-3-25121.
The Director of the DLSU Discipline Office sent separate notices to private respondents
Aguilar, Bungubung and Valdes, Jr. and Reverente informing them of the complaints
and requiring them to answer. Private respondents filed their respective answers.[4][9]

Said notices issued by De La Salle Discipline Board uniformly stated as follows:

Please be informed that a joint and expanded Discipline Board had been constituted to
hear and deliberate the charge against you for violation of CHED Order No. 4 arising
from the written complaints of James Yap, Dennis C. Pascual, and Ericson Y. Cano.
You are directed to appear at the hearing of the Board scheduled on April 19, 1995 at
9:00 a.m. at the Bro. Connon Hall for you and your witnesses to give testimony and
present evidence in your behalf. You may be assisted by a lawyer when you give your
testimony or those of your witnesses.
On or before April 18, 1995, you are further directed to provide the Board, through the
Discipline Office, with a list of your witnesses as well as the sworn statement of their
proposed testimony.
Your failure to appear at the scheduled hearing or your failure to submit the list of
witnesses and the sworn statement of their proposed testimony will be considered a
waiver on your part to present evidence and as an admission of the principal act
complained of.

During the proceedings before the Board on April 19 and 28, 1995, private respondents
interposed the common defense of alibi. No full-blown hearing was conducted nor the
students allowed to cross-examine the witnesses against them.
On May 3, 1995, the DLSU-CSB Joint Discipline Board issued a Resolution[5][18] finding
private respondents guilty. They were meted the supreme penalty of automatic
expulsion,[6][19]pursuant to CHED Order No. 4.[7][20] The dispositive part of the resolution
reads:

WHEREFORE, considering all the foregoing, the Board finds respondents ALVIN
AGUILAR (AB-BSM/9152105), JAMES PAUL BUNGUBUNG (AB-PSM/9234403),
ALVIN LEE (EDD/94623250) and RICHARD V. REVERENTE (AB-MGT/9153837) guilty
of having violated CHED Order No. 4 and thereby orders their automatic expulsion.

In the case of respondent MALVIN A. PAPIO (AB-MGT/9251227), the Board acquits


him of the charge.

I SSUE

Were private respondents accorded due process of law because there was no full-
blown hearing nor were they allowed to cross-examine the witnesses against them?

H E L D:
Private respondents’ right to due process of law was not violated.
In administrative cases, such as investigations of students found violating school
discipline, “[t]here are withal minimum standards which must be met before to satisfy
the demands of procedural due process and these are: that (1) the students must be
informed in writing of the nature and cause of any accusation against them; (2) they
shall have the right to answer the charges against them and with the assistance if
counsel, if desired; (3) they shall be informed of the evidence against them; (4) they
shall have the right to adduce evidence in their own behalf; and (5) the evidence must
be duly considered by the investigating committee or official designated by the school
authorities to hear and decide the case.”[8][66]
Where a party was afforded an opportunity to participate in the proceedings but failed to
do so, he cannot complain of deprivation of due process.[9][67] Notice and hearing is the
bulwark of administrative due process, the right to which is among the primary rights
that must be respected even in administrative proceedings. [10][68] The essence of due
process is simply an opportunity to be heard, or as applied to administrative
proceedings, an opportunity to explain one’s side or an opportunity to seek
reconsideration of the action or ruling complained of.[11][69] So long as the party is given
the opportunity to advocate her cause or defend her interest in due course, it cannot be
said that there was denial of due process.[12][70]
A formal trial-type hearing is not, at all times and in all instances, essential to due
process – it is enough that the parties are given a fair and reasonable opportunity to
explain their respective sides of the controversy and to present supporting evidence on
which a fair decision can be based.[13][71] “To be heard” does not only mean
presentation of testimonial evidence in court – one may also be heard through
pleadings and where the opportunity to be heard through pleadings is accorded, there is
no denial of due process.[14][72]

Private respondents were duly informed in writing of the charges against them by the
DLSU-CSB Joint Discipline Board through petitioner Sales. They were given the
opportunity to answer the charges against them as they, in fact, submitted their
respective answers. They were also informed of the evidence presented against them
as they attended all the hearings before the Board. Moreover, private respondents
were given the right to adduce evidence on their behalf and they did. Lastly, the
Discipline Board considered all the pieces of evidence submitted to it by all the parties
before rendering its resolution in Discipline Case No. 9495-3-25121.

Private respondents cannot claim that they were denied due process when they were
not allowed to cross-examine the witnesses against them. This argument was already
rejected in Guzman v. National University[15][73] where this Court held that “x x x the
imposition of disciplinary sanctions requires observance of procedural due
process. And it bears stressing that due process in disciplinary cases involving
students does not entail proceedings and hearings similar to those prescribed for
actions and proceedings in courts of justice. The proceedings in student discipline
cases may be summary; and cross examination is not, x x x an essential part thereof.

2. G.R. No. 97827 February 9, 1993

UNIVERSITY OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,


vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, HONORABLE RODOLFO A. ORTIZ, Presiding Judge,
Regional Trial Court (Branch 89), National Capital Region, Quezon City,
Metro Manila, MANUEL ELIZALDE, BALAYEM, MAHAYAG, DUL and LOBO,
respondents.

Facts:

The facts which have drawn the University of the Philippines (UP) from the quiet
groves of academia to the judicial arena are as follows:

On August 15-17, 1986, the "International Conference on the Tasaday


Controversy and Other Urgent Anthropological Issues" was held at the Philippine
Social Science Center in Diliman, Quezon City.

Jerome Bailen, Professor of the University of the Philippines, Department of


Anthropology, was the designated conference chairman. He presented therein
the "Tasaday Folio," a collection of studies on Tasadays done by leading
anthropologists who disputed the authenticity of the Tasaday find and suggested
that the "discovery" in 1971 by a team led by former Presidential Assistant on
National Minorities (PANAMIN) Minister Manuel Elizalde, Jr. was nothing more
than a fabrication made possible by inducing Manobo and T'boli tribesmen to
pose as primitive, G-stringed, leaf-clad cave dwellers.

In the same conference, UP history professor, Zeus Salazar, traced in a


publication the actual genealogy of the Tasadays to T'boli and Manobo ethnic
groups. He likewise presented ABC's "20/20" videotaped television documentary
showing interviews with natives claiming to have been asked by Elizalde to pose
as Tasadays.

In July 1988, UP allegedly sent Salazar and Bailen to Zagreb, Yugoslavia to


attend the 12th International Congress of Anthropological and Ethnological
Sciences. There, Salazar and Bailen reiterated their claim that the Tasaday find
was a hoax. Their allegations were widely publicized in several dailies.

With these acts and utterances of Bailen and Salazar as well as newspaper
reports and commentaries on the matter as bases, on October 27, 1988, Elizalde
and Tasaday representatives Balayem, Mahayag, Dul and Lobo, filed a
complaint for damages and declaratory relief against Salazar and Bailen before
the Quezon City Regional Trial Court.

On November 24, 1988, UP filed a motion to intervene with supporting


memorandum asserting that, having authorized the activities of Bailen and
Salazar, it had a duty to protect them as faculty members for acts and utterances
made in the exercise of academic freedom. Moreover, it claimed that it was itself
entitled to the right of institutional academic freedom.

At the hearing on the motion to intervene on November 28, 1988, the lower court
required UP to submit its answer in intervention "to enable the Court to better
appreciate the issue of whether or not the motion for leave to intervene . . .
should be granted."

On December 5, 1988, Salazar and Bailen filed a motion to dismiss the complaint
on the grounds that: the complaint failed to state a cause of action; the cause of
action, if any, had already prescribed; they are protected by the guarantees of
free speech and academic freedom; the court had no jurisdiction to grant
declaratory relief in a civil action and no justiciable controversy exists.
Said motion to dismiss was denied by the lower court on January 9, 1989. The
same court order held that there was no necessity to appoint a guardian ad litem
for the Tasaday plaintiffs, granted UP's motion for leave to intervene and
admitted UP's answer in intervention dated December 8, 1988.

In the meantime, on February 15, 1989, UP filed a motion to dismiss the


complaint but it was stricken off the record in the Order of February 16, 1989. A
subsequent motion for reconsideration was likewise denied.

On March 12, 1991, the Court of Appeals rendered a decision dismissing the
petition and lifting the temporary restraining order it had earlier issued. It held that
the motion to dismiss may not be granted on the ground of insufficiency of cause
of action predicated on matters not raised in the complaint. It ruled that the lower
court had jurisdiction over the complaint for damages as the action was aimed at
recovering relief arising from alleged wrongful acts of the defendants.

Issues:

1)Whether the acts of the defendants are within the protective mantle of
academic freedom guaranteed by the Constitution for which they cannot be
made liable for damages.

2)Whether the Tasaday ethnic group is a hoax as the defendants had claimed in
a public discussion.

3)Whether Bailen and Salazar infringed on plaintiffs' civil and human rights when
they maliciously and falsely spoke and intrigued to present plaintiffs Tasaday as
fakers and impostors collaborating in a hoax or fraud upon the public with and
under the supervision of plaintiff Elizalde.

Held:

Unique Set-up on procedural problem

We are confronted here with a situation wherein an intervenor who made


common cause with the defendants moved to dismiss the complaint after filing an
answer in intervention and after the original defendants' motion to dismiss the
complaint had been denied. What is more striking is the fact that the same
intervenor sought the dismissal of a complaint where its interest is not apparent.
Moreover, the intervenor founded its motion to dismiss on an extraneous matter
which is not even obliquely alluded to in the complaint.

With this unique set-up, we cannot subscribe to private respondents' contention


that the resolution of this petition is foreclosed by the principle of res judicata.

While it is true that the instant petition and that in G.R. No. 87248 revolve around
the issue of whether or not the lower court correctly denied the motion to dismiss
the complaint in Civil Case No. Q-88-1028, there is an aspect of the case which
takes it out of the ambit of the principle of res judicata.

The said principle applies when there is, among others, identity of parties and
subject matter in two cases. Concededly, the fact that UP is the petitioner herein
while Salazar and Bailen were the petitioners in G.R. No. 87248 is not a
hindrance to the application of res judicata because the situation is akin to the
adding of other parties to a case which had been finally resolved in a previous
one. UP was not an original party-defendant in Civil Case No. Q-88-1028, but it
intervened and made common cause with Bailen and Salazar in alleging that the
case should be dismissed in order to hold inviolate academic freedom, both
individual and institutional. There is, therefore, a resultant substantial identity of
parties, as both UP, on the one hand, and Bailen and Salazar, on the other hand,
represent the same interests in the two petitions.

Following the provisions of Section 5, Rule 16 of the Rules of Court which states
that any of the grounds for dismissal provided for in Section I of the same
Rule "except improper venue, may be pleaded as an affirmative defense," UP
filed a motion for a preliminary hearing on the special defenses, specifically lack
of cause of action and lack of jurisdiction over the nature of the action which it
pleaded in its answer in intervention. As Section 5 provides, the result would be
the same — "as if a motion to dismiss had been filed." It was the lower court's
Order of May 15, 1989 ascribing no merit to UP's special defenses, which was
first presented to this Court for nullification on the ground of grave abuse of
discretion, through the petition for certiorari and prohibition docketed as G.R. No.
88664. The petition having been referred to the Court of Appeals, the propriety of
the same Order of May 15, 1989 was resolved against UP by said appellate court
on March 12, 1991.

Thus, to hold that res judicata applies to herein facts would be stretching to its
limits the requirement of identity of subject matter. Moreover, the fact that the
resolution of Civil Case No. Q-88-1028 would inevitably create an impact, not
only on the academic community but also on the cultural minorities, we need to
scrutinize more closely the validity of the Order denying the motion to dismiss. It
bears stressing that res judicata may not be held applicable where justice may
have to be sacrificed for the rigid rules of technicality.

Academic freedom vs legal procedures

As its first ground for the allowance of the petition, UP contends that the
allegations in the complaint regarding the acts and statements of Bailen and
Salazar are "protected by the mantle of the institutional academic freedom of UP
and are therefore privileged communications which cannot give rise to any cause
of action for damages under Article 26 of the Civil Code in favor of the herein
private respondents."

Actually, this ground is a restatement of the two affirmative defenses cited by the
petitioner in its answer in intervention. The lower court and the Court of Appeals
correctly interpreted these defenses as falling within the purview of Section 1(g),
Rule 16 of the Rules of Court which considers as a ground for a motion to
dismiss failure of the complaint to state a cause of action.

On the other hand, a cause of action against Bailen and Salazar can be made
out from the complaint: their acts and utterances allegedly besmirched the
reputation of the plaintiffs as they were shown therein to have staged a fraud.
The fact that the "hoax" was played up in the media allegedly aggravated the
situation.

This is not to say, however, that UP's intervention was improper. In fact, it
eventually proned to be necessary. Coming to the defense of its faculty
members, it had to prove that the alleged damaging acts and utterances of
Bailen and Salazar were circumscribed by the constitutionally-protected principle
of academic freedom. However, it should have championed the cause of Bailen
and Salazar in the course of the trial of the case.

This procedural lapse, notwithstanding, no irremediable injury has been inflicted


on the petitioner as, during the trial, it may still invoke and prove the special
defense of institutional academic freedom as defined in Tangonan v. Paño and in
Garcia v. The Faculty Admission Committee, Loyola School of Theology.

Since Bailen and Salazar had defaulted and thereby forfeited their right to notice
of subsequent proceedings and to participate in the trial, petitioner's answer in
intervention shall be the gauge in determining whether issues have been joined.
The fact that the defenses raised in said answer were denied grounds for a
motion to dismiss does not affect their value as affirmative defenses in an answer
to a complaint within the purview of Section 5(b), Rule 6 of the Rules of Court.
The Order of May 15, 1989 merely "denied" petitioner's affirmative defenses as
grounds for a motion to dismiss. Moreover, under Section 4, Rule 18 of the Rules
of Court, the failure of some defendants to answer cannot prevent the court from
trying the case noon the answer filed and thereafter rendering judgment on the
basis of the evidence presented.

Scientific breakthrough vs legal procedures

With respect to the prayer of the complaint for "judgment declaring plaintiff
Tasadays to be a distinct ethnic community within the territory defined under
Presidential Proclamation No. 995" the lower court is cautioned that the same is
akin to a prayer for a judicial declaration of Philippine citizenship which may not
be granted in a petition for declaratory relief. 26 As private respondents
themselves declare in their comment, "(t)he complaint was filed mainly to
vindicate plaintiffs' dignity and honor, and to protect them from further vexation.

More explicitly in their comment in CA-G.R. SP No. 18074 before the Court of
Appeals, they declared:

Plaintiffs below do not ask the court to rule on so-called scientific or


anthropological issues, nor to interpret scientific or anthropological findings
pertaining to the Tasaday. They merely ask the court to find from the evidence to
be presented below — Whether or not Bailen and Salazar infringed on plaintiffs'
civil and human rights when they maliciously and falsely spoke and intrigued to
present plaintiffs Tasaday as fakers and impostors collaborating in a hoax or
fraud upon the public with and under the supervision of plaintiff Elizalde.

Indeed, it is not the province of the court to make pronouncements on matters


beyond its ken and expertise. To be sure, in resolving the complaint for
damages, the court may find congruence in what is justiciable and what falls
within the field of the sciences. Still, it is best to keep in mind that its proper role
and function is the determination of legal issues.

WHEREFORE, the questioned Order of the lower court and the Decision of the
Court of Appeals are hereby AFFIRMED. The lower court is directed to
PROCEED with the hearing of the case with DISPATCH even as it observes
caution in the resolution of Civil Case No. Q-88-1028. No-costs.

SO ORDERED.
3. THE UNIVERSITY OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. HON. RUBEN AYSON
Facts:
This is a petition for certiorari, with urgent prayer for the issuance of a temporary
restraining order, seeking to annul the Orders of respondent Judge dated May 25, 1989
and June 14, 1989 in Civil case No. 1748-R entitled, "UP College Baguio High School
Foundation, Inc., et al., v. The University of the Philippines, et al., "restraining petitioners
from implementing the decision of the Board of Regents to phase out the UP
College Baguio High School (UPCBHS) and the Memorandum of petitioner Dean
Patricio Lazaro directing the principal of UPCBHS not to accept new incoming freshmen
for the school year 1989-1990.
Sometime in 1972, the UP Board of Regents approved the establishment
of UPCBHS as an integral part of the graduate program in education to serve, among
others, as a laboratory and demonstration school for prospective teachers. Provided,
however, that UPCBHSmust be self-supporting and should not entail any subsidy from
the budget of the UP.
In 1978, the Board of Regents provided for the establishment of a Division of Education
in UP College Baguio (UPCB) which shall be composed of a Department of
Professional Education and a High School Department. However, the Department of
Professional Education was never organized, although the High School Department has
been in continuous operation.
In 1981, the Committee to Review Academic Program recommended the abolition of
the UPCBHS. In 1985, the Program Review Committee likewise asked the UPCB to
look into the viability of its secondary education program on account of
limited financial resources plus the fact that UPCBHS failed to serve as a laboratory
school for teacher training program as UPCB does not offer programs in
Education. Subsequently, various discussions were held on the proposed phase-out of
the UPCBHS.
On January 30, 1989, the UP Board of Regents approved the proposed phase-out of
UPCBHS on the grounds, inter alia, that only an insignificant number of UPCBHS
graduates qualified for admission and actually enrolled in UPCB and that UPCBHS is
not serving as a laboratory or demonstration school for prospective teachers much
less a self-supporting unit. Subsequently, petitioner Dean Patricio Lazaro issued a
memorandum directing the UPCBHS Principal not to accept new incoming high school
freshmen for the school year 1989-1990.
On May 25, 1989, respondent UP College Baguio High School
Foundation Inc., represented by its president, filed a petition with the Regional Trial
Court of Baguio, Br. VI, presided by respondent Judge against herein petitioners, for
Injunction with preliminary preventive and mandatory injunction with prayer for the
issuance of a temporary restraining order, docketed as Civil Case No. 1748-R, alleging
among others, that the decision of the UP Board of Regents to phase out the UPCBHS
is without legal basis and unconstitutional.
Thereafter, respondent Judge issued the assailed Orders restraining petitioners from
implementing the Board's decision to phase out UPCBHS and the memorandum of
Dean Patricio Lazaro. Petitioners' motion to dismiss Civil Case No. 1748-R was denied
by respondent Judge.
Hence, this petition.
On June 27, 1989, this Court issued a Temporary Restraining Order enjoining the
implementation of the assailed orders of respondent Judge.
Petitioners contend, among other things, that the decision of the UP Board of Regents
to phase out the UPCBHS is an exercise of academic freedom guaranteed by the
constitution (Art. XIV, Sec. 5, par. 2).
Respondents, on the other hand, take issue not with the exercise of academic freedom
but rather on the right to quality education (Art. XIV, Sec. 1) and free public secondary
education (Art. XIV, Sec. 2, par. 2) mandated by the Constitution and Rep. Act No.
6655, otherwiseknown as "Free Public Secondary Education Act of
1988". Respondents contend that the abolition of the UPCBHS would be violative of
said rights.
The conflict of the present petition pits the concept of academic freedom as against the
right to free public secondary education. Art. XIV, Section 2 [2] of the Constitution,
provides: "The State shall establish and maintain a system of free public education in
the elementary and high school levels. Without limiting the right of natural parents to
rear their children, elementary education is compulsory for all children of school age."
On the other hand, Art. XIV, Section 5 [2], provides: "Academic freedom shall be
enjoyed in all institutions of higher learning."
Issue:
Is secondary public education demandable in an institution of higher learning
such as the University of the Philippines?

Rulings:
It is beyond cavil that the UP, as an institution of higher learning, enjoys
academic freedom -- the institutional kind.
In Garcia v. The Faculty Admission Committee, Loyola School of Theology (68 SCRA
277 [1975]), the Court had occasion to note the scope of academic freedom recognized
by the Constitution as follows:
"(I)t is to be noted that the reference is to the "institutions of higher learning" as the
recipients of this boon. It would follow then that the school or college itself is possessed
of such a right. It decides for itself its aims and objectives and how best to attain
them. It is free from outside coercion or interference save possibly when the overriding
public welfare calls for some restraint. It has a wide sphere of autonomy certainly
extending to the choice of students. This constitutional provision is not to be construed
in a niggardly manner or in a grudging fashion. That would be to frustrate its purpose,
nullify its intent.
It is the business of a university to provide that atmosphere which is most conducive to
speculation, experiment and creation. It is an atmosphere in which there prevail the
'four essential freedoms' of a university --- to determine for itself on academic
grounds who may teach, what may be taught, how it shall be taught, and who may be
admitted to study'" (Underscoring supplied; citing Sinco, Philippine Political Law, 491,
(1962) and the concurring opinion of Justice Frankfurter in Sweezyv. New
Hampshire (354 US 234 [1957]).
Rep. Act No. 6655, otherwise known as the "Free Public Secondary Education Act of
1988," includes in its coverage state colleges and universities (SCUs) offering
secondary courses. Respondents contend that since a secondary course is being
offered in UPCB, petitioners cannot unilaterally withdraw therefrom, otherwise, the said
Act would be nothing but a mere nullity for all other SCUs. Besides, respondents
contend, petitioners already recognized the applicability of Rep. Act No. 6655 when they
implemented the same at the UPCBHS for School Year 1988-89 and petitioners'
assertion that UPCBHS was established only if it would be "self-supporting and should
not entail any subsidy from the budget of UP" is but a lame excuse.
At this juncture, it must be pointed out that UPCBHS was established subject to a
number of conditionalities, e.g., it must be self-supporting, it can serve as a feeder for
the UP at Baguio, it can serve as a laboratory and demonstration school for prospective
teachers, failing in which the University can order its abolition on academic grounds,
specially where the purposes for which it was established was not satisfied.
Specifically, the University of the Philippines was created under its Charter (Act No.
1870 [1908], as amended) to provide advanced tertiary education and not secondary
education. Section 2 of said Act states that "the purpose of said University shall be to
provide advanced instruction in literature, philosophy, the sciences, and arts, and to
give professional and technical training."
It is apparent that secondary education is not the mandated function of the University of
the Philippines; consequently, the latter can validly phase out and/or abolish the
UPCBHS especially so when the requirements for its continuance have not been met,
Rep. Act No. 6655 to the contrary notwithstanding. The findings of facts by the Board of
Regents which led to its decision to phase out the UPCBHS must be accorded respect,
if not finality. Acts of an administrative agency within their areas of competence must
not be casually overturned by the courts. It must be emphasized that UPCBHS was
established as a component of the tertiary level, i.e., the teacher/training program. As it
turned out however, the latter program was not viable in UPCB thereby necessitating
the phasing out of UPCBHS, the rationale being its reasons for existence no longer
exists. On this score, UPCBHS differs from the other UP high schools
inIloilo, Diliman, Cebu and Los Baños. The latter schools serve as laboratory schools
for the College of Education in said areas, whereas, in Baguio, there is no College of
Education.
A careful perusal of Rep. Act No. 6655 could not lend respondents a helping hand
either. Said Act implements the policy of the State to provide free public secondary
education (Sec. 4) and vests the formulation of a secondary public education
curriculum (Sec. 5), the nationalization of public secondary schools (Sec. 7) and the
implementation of the rules and regulations thereof (Sec. 9) upon the Secretary of the
Department of Education, Culture and Sports (DECS). Rep. Act No. 6655 complements
Sec. 2 (2), Article XIV of the Constitution which mandates that the State shall establish
and maintain a system of free public secondary education. However, this mandate is
not directed to institutions of higher learning like UP but to the government through the
Department of Education, Culture and Sports (DECS). As an institution of higher
learning enjoying academic freedom, the UP cannot be compelled to provide for
secondary education. However, should UP operate a high school in the exercise of its
academic freedom, Rep. Act No. 6655 requires that the students enrolled therein "shall
be free from payment of tuition and other school fees."
In view of the foregoing, respondents do not have a clear legal right to UP secondary
education.

4. UP BOARD OF REGENTS v. CA

G.R. No. 134625


August 31, 1999
313 SCRA 404

FACTS: Respondent Arokiaswamy William Margaret Celine enrolled in the doctoral


program in Anthropology of the UP CSSP Diliman. She already completed the units of
course work required and finished her dissertation and was ready for oral defense.

After going over her dissertation, Dr. Medina informed CSSP Dean Paz that she
committed plagiarism. However, respondent was allowed to defend her dissertation.
Four out of the five panelists gave a passing mark except Dr. Medina.

UP held meeting against her case and some of the panels indicated disapproval.
Hence, she expressed her disappointments over the CSSP administration and warned
Dean Paz. However, Dean Paz request the exclusion of Celine’s name from the list of
candidates for graduation but it did not reach the Board of Regents on time, hence
Celine graduated.

Dr. Medina formally charged private respondent with plagiarism and recommended that
the doctorate granted to her be withdrawn. Dean Paz informed private respondent of the
charges against her.

CSSP College Assembly unanimously approved the recommendation to withdraw


private respondent's doctorate degree.

The Board sent her a letter indicating that they resolved to withdraw her Doctorate
Degree recommended by the University Council.
She sought an audience with the Board of Regents and/or the U.P. President, which
request was denied by President

Hence, Celine then filed a petition for mandamus with a prayer for a writ of preliminary
mandatory injunction and damages, alleging that petitioners had unlawfully withdrawn
her degree without justification and without affording her procedural due process.

ISSUE: Whether or not Arokiaswamy William Margaret Celine was deprived of her right
to substantive due process.

RULING: No. Respondent Arokiaswamy William Margaret Celine was indeed heard
several times.

Several committees and meetings had been formed to investigate the charge that
private respondent had committed plagiarism and she was heard in her defense.

In administrative proceedings, the essence of due process is simply the opportunity to


explain one's side of a controversy or a chance seek reconsideration of the action or
ruling complained of. A party who has availed of the opportunity to present his position
cannot tenably claim to have been denied due process.

In the case at bar, Celine was informed in writing of the charges against her and given
opportunities to answer them. She was asked to submit her written explanation which
she submiited. She, as well, met with the U.P. chancellor and the members of the
Zafaralla committee to discuss her case. In addition, she sent several letters to the U.P.
authorities explaining her position.

It is not tenable for private respondent to argue that she was entitled to have an
audience before the Board of Regents. Due process in an administrative context does
not require trial-type proceedings similar to those in the courts of justice. It is noteworthy
that the U.P. Rules do not require the attendance of persons whose cases are included
as items on the agenda of the Board of Regents.

5. GARCIA VS. FACULTY ADMISSION


FACTS:
Petitioner has been barred from being allowed re-admission into the respondent
school, which is a seminary for the priesthood in collaboration with the ateneo de manila
university. Petitioner was taking her studies leading to an M.A in theology at the time,but
was no longer allowed to enroll in the academic year of 1975-1976.
Petioner contends that the reason behind the respondent refusal to re-admit her
(as stated in a letter from the respondent), which is due to the fact that the frequent
questions and difficulties that were slowing down the progress of the class, does not
constitute valid legal ground for expulsion for they neither present any violation of any of
the school regulation
6. Montemayor v. Araneta University, 77 SCRA 321 (1977)

Lack of Due Process in Termination of Employment Remedied by Hearing in the NLRC.

Facts:
Petitioner was a professor at the Araneta University Foundation. On 7/8/74, he was
found guilty of making homosexual advances on one Leonardo De Lara by a faculty
investating committee. On 11/8/74, another committee was appointed to investigate
another charge of a similar nature against petitioner. Petitioner, through cousel, asked
for the postponement of the hearing set for 11/18 and 19, 1974, but the w/c motion was
denied. The committe then proceeded to hear the testimony of the complainants and
on 12/5/74, submitted its report recommending the separation of petitioner from the
University. On 12/12/74, the University applied w/ the NLRC for clearance to terminate
petitioner's employment. Meanwhile, petitioner filed a complaint w/ the NLRC for
reinstatement and backwages. Judgement was rendered in petitioner's favor, but on
appeal to the Sec. of Labor, the latter found petitioner's dismissal to be justified. Hence,
this petition for certiorari.

HELD: The Consti. assures to workers security of tenure. In the case of petitioner, this
guarantee is reinforced by the provision on academic freedom. In denying petitioner's
motion for postponement of the hearing, the committee did not accord procedural due
process to the petitioner. This was, however, remedied at the mediation conference
called at the Dept. of Labor during w/c petitioner was heard on his evidence. There he
was given the fullest opportunity to present his case. Petition dismissed.

Petitioner filed a MFR contending that the hearing in the NLRC did not conform
to ther requirements of due process as the witnesses against petitioner were not called
so that petitioner could cross-examine them.

HELD: Pettioner did not object to the presentation of the testimony of the complainant
and the witnesses at the school investigation and did not assert his right to cross-
examine them. Petitioner waived his right to confront the witnesses, relying solely on
the strength of his evidence. Nor was it incumbent on resp. to present the witnesses in
the NLRC. Petitioner's only right is to be heard.

Montemayor vs Araneta University Foundation GR 44251 31 May 1977

Facts: Felix Montemayor was a faculty of Araneta University Foundation serving as


Head of Humanities and Psychology Department. The Chaplain filed a complaint of
immorality against him. A committee was created to investigate the allegation. With the
assistance of counsel, he filed a motion to dismiss or to hold the hearing in abeyance.
The committee found him responsible of the act complained of and recommended for
his demotion by one degree. The President adopted such recommendation and
thereafter referred the same to the Board of Trustees of private respondent for
appropriate action. Subsequently new charges was filed by different faculty members
against him and a new committee was formed to investigate the allegations.
Montemayor asked for postponement of the hearing and was denied. The hearing
proceeded without him and found him guilty of the same charges and recommended for
the discontinuance of his service. He then filed a complaint with NLRC. NLRC decided
in favour of the Foundation. Hence the present petition.
Issue: Whether or not the proceeding relating to Montemayor’s dismissal was done in
violation of due process?
Decision: Petition dismissed. In Montemayor’s absence the matter was heard and was
sufficiently found by the committee to be guilty of his conduct unbecoming and
recommended his removal. Such deficiency was remedied when Montemayor was able
to present his case with the Labour Commission. Records will show that after all efforts
on conciliation had failed parties agreed to submit their dispute for compulsory
arbitration. Several hearings were conducted. he legal aspect as to the procedural due
process having been satisfied was then summarized by the Solicitor General thus: “All
the foregoing clearly shows that petitioner was afforded his day in court. Finally, and
more significant, is the fact that petitioner claims denial of due process in the
proceeding had before the investigating committees and not in the proceedings before
the NLRC wherein, as shown heretofore, he was given the fullest opportunity to present
his case.

7. G.R. No. 69198. April 17, 1985 VENECIO VILLAR, INOCENCIO F. RECITIS,
NOVERTO BARRETO, RUFINO G. SALCON, JR., EDGARDO DE LEON, JR.,
REGLOBEN LAXAMANA, and ROMEO GUILATCO, JR., petitioners, vs.
TECHNOLOGICAL INSTITUTE OF THE PHILIPPINES (TIP)
FACTS:
Petitioners Villar, Recitis, Barreto, Salcon, de Leon, Laxamana and Guilatco
were all refused enrollment at the Technological Institute of the Philippines (TIP) due to
their exercise of their constitutional right to freedom of assembly. As held in
MALABANAN vs RAMENTO, petitioners cannot be barred from enrollment for their
exercise of their freedom of assembly. In opposition to the petition filed by petitioners,
respondent made reference to the academic records of petitioners, invoking the
constitutional provision on academic freedom enjoyed by institutions of higher learning
.Petitioners Barreto, de Leon, Jr. and Laxamana all obtained failing grades while
petitioners Villar, Salcon, Guilatco and Recitis met the requirements for retention in the
said institute, entitling them to the writs of certiorari and prohibition against TIP.
ISSUE:
1. Whether or not petitioners can be barred from enrollment for their
exercise of their freedom of assembly.
2. Whether or not TIP is under no obligation to admit the students with
failing grades under the constitutional provision on academic freedom
regarded to institution of higher learning.
HELD:
1. NO. Petitioners have a valid cause for complaint if the exercise of the
constitutional rights to free speech and peaceable assembly was visited by their
expulsion from respondent College.
2. YES. The academic freedom enjoyed by "institutions of higher learning"
includes the right to set academic standards to determine under what circumstances
failing grades suffice for the expulsion of students. Once it has done so, however, that
standard should be followed meticulously. It cannot be utilized to discriminate against
those students who exercise their constitutional rights to peaceable assembly and free
speech. If it does so, then there is a legitimate grievance by the students thus
prejudiced, their right to the equal protection clause being disregarded. To that extent
therefore, there is justification for excluding three of the aforementioned petitioners
because of their marked academic deficiency.

8. MALABANAN V. RAMENTO
Facts: Petitioners were officers of the Supreme Student Council of Respondent
University. They sought and were granted by the school authorities a permit to hold a
meeting from 8am to 12am. Pursuant to such permit, along with other students, they
held a general assembly at the Veterinary Medicine and Animal Science
(VMAS) Basketball Court. The place indicated in such permit, not in the basketball court
as therein stated, but at the second floor lobby. At such gathering, they manifested in
vehement and vigorous language their opposition to the proposed merger of the
Institute of Animal Science. They continued their language severely critical of the
university authorities and using megaphones in the process. There was, as a result,
disturbance of classes being held. Also, non academic employees within hearing
distance, stopped their work because of noise created. They were asked to explain why
they should not be held liable for holding an assembly.

Issue: Whether or not the suspension of students for one academic year was violative of
the constitutional rights of freedom of assembly and free speech?

Decision: Yes, necessarily their exercise to discuss matters affecting their welfare or
involving public interest is not subjected to previous restraint or subsequent punishment
unless there be a showing of clear and present danger to a substantive evil that the
State has a right to prevent. The peaceable character of an assembly could be lost,
however, by an advocacy or disorder. If assembly is to be held in school premises,
permit must be sought from its school authorities who are devoid to deny such request.
In granting such permit, there may be conditions as to the time and place of an
assembly to avoid disruption of classes or stoppage of work of non-academic
personnel. However, in violation of terms, penalty incurred should not be
disproportionate to the offense.

9. BELENA VS. PMI

10. CASE DIGEST: ALCUAZ V. PHILIPPINE SCHOOL OF BUSINESS


ADMINISTRATION

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SOPHIA ALCUAZ, ET AL., petitioners vs. PHILIPPINE SCHOOL OF BUSINESS


ADMINISTRATION Quezon City Branch ET AL, respondents
May 2, 1988

FACTS:

In 1986, some PSBA students, herein petitioners Alcuaz et. al. staged demonstrations
in the premises of the school. In order for the demonstration to be settled, an agreement
was entered into among others the regulations for the conduct of protest action. In spite
of the agreement, it was alleged that the petitioners, committed tumultuous and
anarchic acts within the premises of the school, fanned by the cooperation of the
intervening professors, causing disruption of classes to the prejudice of the majority
students. The school took administrative sanctions upon them in view of their
participation in the demonstration. The students and the intervening professors were
sanctioned. They were dismissed and terminated.

ISSUE:

Whether or not there has been a deprivation of constitutional rights of expression and
assembly and of due process of law of the students who have been barred from re-
enrollment.

HELD:

The Supreme Court held that due process in disciplinary cases such as the case at bar
does not entail proceedings and hearings similar to those prescribed for actions and
proceedings in the courts of justice. The Court has already recognized the right of the
school to refuse re-enrollment of students for academic delinquency and violation of
disciplinary regulations. In the school’s administrative process, both students and
professors were given three (3) days from receipt of letter to explain in writing why the
school should not take administrative sanction against them. With respect to the
academic activities of the students and the teaching loads of the teachers, the
respondent school has created new class for the petitioners and the intervening
professors during and when the investigation was going on.
The Court then upheld that there is no denial of due process where all requirements of
administrative due process were met by the school and the students were given the
opportunity to be heard and that the right of expression and assembly are not absolute
especially when parties are bound to certain rules under a contract.

11. TANGONAN VS CRUZ PANOCASE DIGEST:

Petitioner brought suit for mandamus to compel the Capitol Medical Center School of
Nursing to admit her for the academic year 1976-1977.She had been previously
provisionally admitted the previous schoolyear, but she failed in Psychiatric
Nursing. She tried to take the courseagain in another school, but she was refused
admission bec. she tried to bribe the dean of the school. When she tried to re-enrol at
the CapitolMedical Center, she was denied admission. She brought the matter on
certiorari. VV.ISSUE: WON the school can be compelled by the court to re-admit
petitioner. NO.HELD: Any duty on the part of the school to enrol pet. is not merely a
ministerial duty but one w/c involves the exercise of discretion notcompellable by
Mandamus. Capitol was perfectly justified in refusing to admit her, its refusal
(being) sanctioned by the Manual ofRegulations of Priv. Schools w/c considers
academic delinquency & violation of disciplinary regulations as valid grounds for
refusingenrollment of a student.Further, to grant relief to pet. would be doing violence to
the academic freedom enjoyed by Capitol enshrined under Act. XV sec. 8(2)
Consti. Academic freedom includes not only the freedom of professionally qualified
persons to inquire, discover, publish & teach the truthas they see it in the field of their
competence subject to no control or authority except of rational methods by w/c truths
and conclusions aresought and established in these disciplines, but also the right of the
school or college to decide for itself how best to attain them - the grantbeing to
institutions of higher learning - free from outside coercion or interference save possibly
when the over-riding public welfare calls forsome restraint. It has a wide spread of
autonomy certainly extending to the choice of students. Said constitutional provision is
not to beconstrued in a niggardly manner or in a grudging fashion. That would be to
frustrate its purpose and nullify its intent