G.R. Nos. 186184 & 186988.1 September 20, 2010.
* Petitioners Lauro Santiago and Rogelio Gutierrez, in substitution of their now deceased
CELESTINO SANTIAGO substituted by LAURO SANTIAGO and ISIDRO GUTIERREZ
substituted by ROGELIO GUTIERREZ, petitioners, vs. AMADA R. ORTIZ-LUIS substituted by
JUAN ORTIZ-LUIS, JR., respondent.
Agrarian Reform Law; Right of Retention; The right of retention, as protected and
enshrined in the Constitution, balances the effect of compulsory land acquisition by granting the
landowner the right to choose the area to be retained subject to legislative standards.—The
right of retention, as protected and enshrined in the Constitution, balances the effect of
compulsory land acquisition by granting the landowner the right to choose the area to be
retained subject to legislative standards.
Same; Same; Landowners who have not yet exercised their retention rights under
Presidential Decree No. 27 are entitled to new retention rights provided for by Republic Act No.
6657.—In Association of Small Landowners in the Philippines, Inc. v. Secretary of Agrarian
Reform, 175 SCRA 343 (1989), the Court held that landowners who have not yet exercised their
retention rights under P.D. No. 27 are entitled to “new retention rights provided for by R.A.
No. 6657 . . .” In Heirs of Aurelio Reyes v. Garilao, 605 SCRA 294 (2009), however, the Court
held that the limitations under LOI No. 474 still apply to a landowner who filed an
application under R.A. 6657.
Same; Same; Section 9 (d) of Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) Administrative
Order No. 05 is inconsistent with Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 27, as amended by Letter of
Instruction (LOI) No. 474, insofar as it removed the limitations to a landowner’s retention
rights.—Letter of Instruction (LOI) No. 474 amended P.D. No. 27 by removing “any right of
retention from persons who own other agri-
_______________
1 This petition only pertains to G.R. No. 186184. As per inquiry with the Court’s Docket
Section, G.R. No. 186988 was inadvertently assigned since the challenged decision of the Court
of Appeals stemmed from consolidated cases.
* THIRD DIVISION.
671
VOL. 630, SEPTEMBER 20, 2010 671
Santiago vs. Ortiz-Luis
cultural lands of more than 7 hectares, or lands used for residential, commercial,
industrial or other purpose from which they derive adequate income to support themselves and
their families.” Section 9 (d) of DAR Administrative Order No. 05, on which the Court of Appeals
in part anchored its ruling, is inconsistent with P.D. No. 27, as amended by LOI No. 474, insofar
as it removed the limitations to a landowner’s retention rights. It is well-settled that administrative
officials are empowered to promulgate rules and regulations in order to implement a statute.
The power, however, is restricted such that an administrative regulation cannot go beyond what
is provided in the legislative enactment. It must always be in harmony with the provisions of the
law, hence, any resulting discrepancy between the two will always be resolved in favor of the
statute.
PETITION for review on certiorari of a resolution of the Court of Appeals.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
Carlitos N. Encarnacion II for petitioners.
Yambao Law Office for respondent.
CARPIO-MORALES, J.:
respective fathers Celestino Santiago and Isidro Gutierrez, challenge the August 22, 2008
Decision of the Court of Appeals 2respecting the retention rights under Republic Act No.
66573 (R.A. 6657) of Amada R. Ortiz-Luis (Amada), substituted by her son-herein respondent
Juan, Jr.
Juan and Amada Ortiz Luis (Spouses Ortiz Luis) were the owners of 7.1359 hectares of
tenanted riceland situated in
_______________
2 Penned by Associate Justice Portia Aliño-Hormachuelos with the concurrence of
Associate Justices Hakim S. Abdulwahid and Teresita Dy-Liacco Flores, Rollo, pp. 17-41.
3 Otherwise known as “Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law.”
672
672 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Santiago vs. Ortiz-Luis
Barangay San Fernando Sur, Cabiao, Nueva Ecija and covered by TCT No. NT-10798 (the
property).
Pursuant to Presidential Decree No. 27 (P.D. No. 27), “Decreeing the Emancipation of
Tenants from the Bondage of the Soil, Transferring to them the Ownership of the Land they Till
and Providing the Instruments and Mechanism Therefor,” which took effect on October 21,
1972, the property was placed under Operation Land Transfer (OLT).
Despite the inclusion of the property under the OLT, the Spouses Ortiz-Luis, by Deed of
Absolute Sale dated June 16, 1979, transferred it to their children Rosario, Teresita, Simplicio
and Antonio, all surnamed Ortiz-Luis. The children were able to have the property transferred
under their names on June 25, 1992.
The children later filed an Application for Retention under P.D. No. 27 before the
Department of Agrarian Reform Regional Office (DARRO) which was denied by Order dated
February 28, 1997 in this wise:
“It bears stressing that the Transfer Certificate of Title evidencing the conveyance in favor
of herein petitioners-appellants was registered only on 25 June 1992, hence the subject land is
still considered under the ownership of Spouses Ortiz Luis (pursuant to Memorandum dated
January 9, 1973 and Department Memorandum Circular No. 8, Series of 1974) insofar as
coverage under OLT is concerned.
xxxx
Upon conducting a careful investigation of the records presented, this Office concludes
beyond any iota of doubt that the landholding in issue was indeed conveyed to petitioners-
appellants after October 21, 1972 which is a clear violation of agrarian laws, rules and
regulations.”4 (underscoring supplied)
_______________
4 CA Rollo (CA-G.R SP. No. 100439), pp. 54-55.
673
VOL. 630, SEPTEMBER 20, 2010 673
Santiago vs. Ortiz-Luis
In light of the denial of her children’s application for retention, Amada filed on July 14, 1999
an Application for Retention over the property under R.A. 6657 before the DARRO.
By Decision of November 24, 1999, the Provincial Agrarian Reform Adjudicator (PARAD),
to which the application was referred for determination of the validity of TCT No. NT-189843
issued to the children, ordered the cancellation of said title and reinstated the spouses’ Ortiz-
Luis’ title. Amada’s application for retention was thus given due course by DARRO.
Provincial Agrarian Reform Officer (PARO) Rogelio M. Chavez recommended the denial of
Amada’s application upon the ground that “an owner of tenanted rice and corn lands may not
retain those lands if he, as of October 21, 1972, owned more than 24 hectares of tenanted rice
or corn lands.”5 It appears that Spouses Ortiz Luis owned 178.8092 hectares, only 88.4513 of
which were placed under OLT.The PARO’s recommendation notwithstanding, DARRO, by
Order of May 23, 2000,6 granted Amada’s application for retention, it holding that her failure to
exercise her retention rights under P.D. No. 27 entitled her to the benefit of retention under R.A.
6657.
Farmer-beneficiaries Celestino (petitioner Lauro’s father) and Isidro (petitioner Rogelio’s
father), having been granted on May 20, 1994 emancipation patents covering 2.9424 hectares
and 2.0238 hectares of the property, respectively, moved for reconsideration of the DARRO
May 23, 2000 Order. DARRO denied the motion by Order of October 4, 2000. On the
assumption that no appeal was filed, DARRO issued a Memorandum dated October 24, 2000
to implement its Orders.
_______________
5 CA Rollo (CA-G.R SP. No. 100439), p. 58.
6 Id., at pp. 58-59.
674
674 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Santiago vs. Ortiz-Luis
Amada subsequently filed on March 2, 2001 a petition for cancellation of Celestino and
Isidro’s emancipation patents before the PARAD. The farmer-beneficiaries did not file their
Answer, despite notice, and failed to appear during the hearings of the petition. After the ex-
parte presentation of Amada’s evidence, Adjudicator Napoleon Baguilat, by Decision of April
11, 2001,7 ordered the cancellation of Celestino and Isidro’s Emancipation Patents:
“WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered as follows:
1. Declaring the private respondents[-herein petitioners] as lessees over the retained area
of the petitioner;
2. Declaring [herein petitioners’] TCT Nos. EP 74278 and 74276 to have lost its force and
effect upon the rendition of this decision;
3. Declaring the Municipal Agrarian Reform Office of Cabiao, Nueva Ecija to cause the
execution of leasehold contract between the petitioner and the private respondents[-
herein petitioners];
4. Directing the Register of Deeds for the Province of Nueva Ecija to cancel the TCT Nos.
EP 74278 and 74276 registered in the names of Celestino Santiago and Isidro
Gutierrez.”8
Two (2) days after the issuance of the PARAD April 11, 2001 Decision or on April 14, 2001,
Celestino and Isidro filed their Answer/Motion for Reconsideration which was denied by Order
of June 21, 2001.
On appeal, the Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board (DARAB), by Decision
of April 5, 2005, ruled in favor of petitioners:
_______________
7 CA Rollo (C.A.-G.R. SP No. 97071), pp. 46-50.
8 Id., at p. 49.
675
VOL. 630, SEPTEMBER 20, 2010 675
Santiago vs. Ortiz-Luis
“Under Administrative Order No. 4, Series of 1991, the authority to issue a certificate of
retention on landholdings covered under R.A. 6657 lies exclusively with the Regional Director.
It likewise provides that “the Order of the Regional Director approving or denying the application
for retention shall become final fifteen (15) days from receipt of the same, unless appeal is made
to the DAR Secretary.” In the case at bar, Private Respondents (petitioners) were able to appeal
the Order of Retention issued by Regional Director Atty. Acosta to the DAR Secretary. The
appeal is still pending before the Office of the Director of the Bureau of Agrarian Legal
Assistance (BALA), Department of Agrarian Reform, Diliman, Quezon City, as per certification
dated February 21, 2005.
In view thereof, the cancellation of subject EPs is not warranted on the ground that the
Order of Retention has not attained finality.” 9 (emphasis and underscoring supplied)
Juan Ortiz-Luis, Jr. (respondent), who substituted for Amada after she passed away on
December 8, 2001, filed a petition for review before the Court of Appeals following the denial
by the DARAB of his motion for reconsideration of its April 5, 2005 Decision. The petition was
docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 97071.
In time, Celestino and Isidro’s appeal to the DAR Secretary respecting the DARRO Orders
which granted retention rights to Amada was denied by DAR Secretary Roberto Pagdanganan
by Order of October 24, 2003 (Pagdanganan Order). 10 Celestino and Isidro filed a motion for
reconsideration. Pending resolution of the motion, Celestino died 11 and was thereupon
substituted by petitioner Lauro.
Secretary Pagdanganan’s successor-in-interest, Secretary Nasser Pangandaman, granted
Celestino and Isidro’s Motion for Reconsideration and accordingly reversed the Pagdanga-
_______________
9 DARAB Records, p. 196.
10 CA Rollo (CA-G.R. SP. No. 100439), pp. 62-67.
11 Id., at p. 15.
676
676 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Santiago vs. Ortiz-Luis
nan Order by Order of October 24, 2005 (Pangandaman Order) in this wise: 12
“It must be stressed that when spouses Juan and Amada Ortiz-Luis filed an Application for
Retention on 14 July 1999, PARO Rogelio M. Chavez of South Nueva Ecija recommended for
the denial of the said Application for Retention pursuant to M.C. No. 18-81 and A.O. No. 4,
Series of 1991, considering the fact also that the spouses owned an aggregate landholding of
178.8092 hectares where the 7.1358 hectare subject landholdings from the aggregate 88. 5413
hectares of which are rice and corn land were already covered under OLT pursuant to P.D. No.
27 and E.O. No. 228.
L.O.I. No. 474 clearly finds application to the present case, and, having established that
applicants-appellees own other agricultural lands seven (7) hectares or more, there can be no
question that they are not entitled to retention under P.D. No. 27.” 13
His motion for reconsideration having been denied, respondent appealed to the Office of
the President (OP) which, by Decision of May 9, 2007, reversed and set aside the
Pangandaman Order and reinstated the Pagdanganan Order upholding the grant to Amada of
her retention rights.
Petitioners thereupon elevated the matter to the Court of Appeals via petition for review,
docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 100439. This petition was consolidated with respondent’s above-
mentioned petition in CA-G.R. SP No. 97071 (assailing the DARAB Resolution setting aside
the cancellation of petitioners’ E[mancipation] P[atents].
By the assailed Decision of August 22, 2008, the Court of Appeals, in CA-G.R. SP No.
100439, upheld the Decision of the OP, clarifying, however, that:
“x x x in the implementation of this Decision, the Department of Agrarian Reform through
the Municipal Agrarian Reform Office (MARO) is hereby ORDERED to fully accord ARBs
Celestino Santiago and Isidro Gutierrez as substituted by Lauro Santi-
_______________
12 Id., at pp. 74-81.
13 Id., at pp. 78-79.
677
VOL. 630, SEPTEMBER 20, 2010 677
Santiago vs. Ortiz-Luis
ago and Rogelio Gutierrez, respectively, their rights under Section 6 of Republic Act No. 6657
and DAR Administrative Order No. 05-00 as already discussed.”14 (underscoring supplied)
The appellate court dismissed CA-G.R. No. 97071 which respondent did not challenge.
In the present petition, petitioners assail the appellate court’s upholding of Amada’s right of
retention in CA-G.R. SP No. 100439 and citing DAR Administrative Order (AO) No. 05, Series
of 2000.15
The petition is impressed with merit.
The relevant provision of AO No. 05, Series of 2000 reads:
“SEC. 9. Retention Area—The area allowed to be retained by the landowner shall be as
follows:
(a) Landowners covered by PD 27 are entitled to retain seven (7) hectares, except those
whose entire tenanted rice and corn lands are subject of acquisition and distribution
under OLT. An owner of tenanted rice and corn lands may not retain those lands under
the following cases:
1. If he, as of 21 October 1972, owned more than twenty-four (24) hectares of tenanted
rice and corn lands; or
2. By virtue of Letter of Instruction (LOI) No. 474, if he, as of 21 October 1972, owned less
than twenty-four (24) hectares of tenanted rice and corn lands but additionally owned
the following:
i. other agricultural lands of more than seven (7) hectares, whether tenanted or
not, whether cultivated or not, and regardless of the income derived therefrom;
or
_______________
14 Rollo, p. 40.
15 Revised Rules and Procedures for the Exercise of Retention Right by Landowners.
677
VOL. 630, SEPTEMBER 20, 2010 677
Santiago vs. Ortiz-Luis
ii. lands used for residential, commercial, industrial or other urban purposes from
which he derives adequate income to support himself and his family.
xxxx
(d) Landowners who filed their applications after the 27 August 1985 deadline and did not
comply with LOI No. 41, 45 and 52 shall only be entitled to a maximum of five (5)
hectares as retention area. Landowners who failed to qualify to retain under paragraph
(a) of this Section shall also be allowed to retain a maximum of five (5) hectares in
accordance with RA 6657. (underscoring supplied)
The right of retention, as protected and enshrined in the Constitution, balances the effect
of compulsory land acquisition by granting the landowner the right to choose the area to be
retained subject to legislative standards.16
The legislative standards are set forth in Section 6 of R.A. 6657, thus:
“Section 6. Retention Limits.—Except as otherwise provided in this Act, no person may
own, or retain, directly or indirectly, any public or private agricultural land, the size of which shall
vary according to factors governing a viable family-size, such as commodity produced, terrain,
infrastructure, and soil fertility as determined by the Presidential Agrarian Reform Council
(PARC) created hereunder, but in no case shall retention by the landowner exceed five (5)
_______________
16 Article XIII, Sec. 4. The State shall, by law, undertake an agrarian reform program
founded on the right of farmers and regular farmworkers, who are landless, to own directly or
collectively the lands they till or, in the case of other farmworkers, to receive a just share of the
fruits thereof. To this end, the State shall encourage and undertake the just distribution of all
agricultural lands, subject to such priorities and reasonable retention limits as the Congress
may prescribe, taking into account ecological, developmental or equity considerations and
subject to the payment of just compensation. In determining retention limits, the State shall
respect the right of small landowners. The State shall further provide incentives for voluntary
land-sharing.
679
VOL. 630, SEPTEMBER 20, 2010 679
Santiago vs. Ortiz-Luis
hectares. Three (3) hectares may be awarded to each child of the landowner, subject to the
following qualifications: (1) that he is at least fifteen (15) years of age; and (2) that he is actually
tilling the land or directly managing the farm; Provided, That landowners whose land have been
covered by Presidential Decree No. 27 shall be allowed to keep the area originally retained by
them thereunder, Provided, further,That the original homestead grantees or direct compulsory
heirs who still own the original homestead at the time of the approval of this Act shall retain the
same areas as long as they continue to cultivate said homestead.
The right to choose the area to be retained, which shall be compact or contiguous, shall pertain
to the landowner. Provided, however, That in case the area selected for retention by the
landowner is tenanted, the tenant shall have the option to choose whether to remain therein or
be a beneficiary in the same or another agricultural land with similar or comparable features. In
case the tenant chooses to remain in the retained area, he shall be considered a leaseholder
and shall lose his right to be a beneficiary under this Act. In case the tenant chooses to be a
beneficiary in another agricultural land, he loses his right as a lease-holder to the land retained
by the landowner. The tenant must exercise this option within a period of one (1) year from the
time the landowner manifests his choice of the area for retention.” (underscoring supplied)
 Section 6 implies that the sole requirement in the exercise of retention rights is that the area
chosen by the landowner must be compact or contiguous. In the recent case of Heirs of Aurelio
Reyes v. Garilao,17however, the Court held that a landowner’s retention rights under R.A. 6657
are restricted by the conditions set forth in Letter of Instruction (LOI) No. 474 issued on October
21, 1976 which reads:
To: The Secretary of Agrarian Reform.
WHEREAS, last year I ordered that small landowners of tenanted rice/corn lands with areas of
less than twenty-four hectares but above seven hectares shall retain not more than seven
hectares of such lands except when they own other agricultural lands containing
_______________
17 G.R. No. 136466, November 25, 2009, 605 SCRA 294.
680
680 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Santiago vs. Ortiz-Luis
more than seven hectares or land used for residential, commercial, industrial or other urban
purposes from which they derive adequate income to support themselves and their families;
WHEREAS, the Department of Agrarian Reform found that in the course of implementing my
directive there are many landowners of tenanted rice/corn lands with areas of seven hectares
or less who also own other agricultural lands containing more than seven hectares or lands
used for residential, commercial, industrial or other urban purposes where they derive adequate
income to support themselves and their families;
WHEREAS, it is therefore necessary to cover said lands under the Land Transfer Program of
the government to emancipate the tenant-farmers therein.
NOW, THEREFORE, I, PRESIDENT FERDINAND E. MARCOS, President of the Philippines,
do hereby order the following:
“1. You shall undertake to place under the Land Transfer Program of the government pursuant
to Presidential Decree No. 27, all tenanted rice/corn lands with areas of seven hectares or less
belonging to landowners who own other agricultural lands of more than seven hectares in
aggregate areas or lands used for residential, commercial, industrial or other urban purposes
from which they derive adequate income to support themselves and their families.”
(underscoring supplied)
DAR Memorandum Circular No. 11, Series of 197818provided for the implementing
guidelines of LOI No. 474:
“Tenanted rice/corn lands with areas of seven hectares or less shall be covered by
Operation Land Transfer if those lands belong to the following landowners:
a.) Landowners who own other agricultural lands of more than seven hectares in
aggregate areas, whether tenanted or not, cultivated or not, and regardless of the
income derived therefrom;
_______________
18 Issued on April 21, 1978.
681
VOL. 630, SEPTEMBER 20, 2010 681
Santiago vs. Ortiz-Luis
b.) Landowners who own lands used for residential, commercial, industrial or other urban
purposes from which they derive an annual gross income of at least five thousand
(P5,000.00) pesos. (underscoring supplied)
In Association of Small Landowners in the Philippines, Inc. v. Secretary of Agrarian
Reform,19 the Court held that landowners who have not yet exercised their retention rights under
P.D. No. 27 are entitled to “new retention rights provided for by R.A. No. 6657 . . .”20 In Heirs
of Aurelio Reyes v. Garilao, however, the Court held that the limitations under LOI No. 474
still apply to a landowner who filed an application under R.A. 6657.
Amada is thus not entitled to retention rights. As noted by the PARO in recommending
denial of her application which was eventually heeded in the Pangandaman Order, while
Spouses Ortiz Luis owned aggregate landholdings equivalent to 178.8092 hectares, only a
portion thereof—88.5413 hectares—were placed under OLT. A Certification dated May 7,
200121 issued by the Municipal Agrarian Reform Office (MARO) affirms that as of even date,
Spouses Ortiz Luis still owned 162.1584 hectares of land in Cabiao, Nueva Ecija.
Letter of Instruction (LOI) No. 474 amended P.D. No. 27 by removing “any right of retention
from persons who own other agricultural lands of more than 7 hectares, or lands used for
residential, commercial, industrial or other purpose from which they derive adequate income to
support themselves and their families.”22
_______________
19 G.R. Nos. 78742, 79310, 79744 and 79777, July 14, 1989, 175 SCRA 343.
20 Id., at p. 392
21 CA Rollo, (CA-G.R. S.P. 100439), p. 73.
22 Vide note 17, at 305, citing Association of Small Landowners in the Philippines, Inc. v.
Secretary of Agrarian Reform, G.R. No. 78742, July 14, 1989, 175 SCRA 343, 362.
682
682 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Santiago vs. Ortiz-Luis
Section 9 (d) of DAR Administrative Order No. 05, on which the Court of Appeals in part
anchored its ruling, is inconsistent with P.D. No. 27, as amended by LOI No. 474, insofar as
it removed the limitations to a landowner’s retention rights.
It is well-settled that administrative officials are empowered to promulgate rules and
regulations in order to implement a statute. The power, however, is restricted such that an
administrative regulation cannot go beyond what is provided in the legislative enactment. It must
always be in harmony with the provisions of the law, hence, any resulting discrepancy between
the two will always be resolved in favor of the statute.23
WHEREFORE, the challenged Court of Appeals Decision dated August 22, 2008 in C.A.-
G.R. S.P. No. 100439 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Order dated October 24, 2005 of
Agrarian Reform Secretary Nasser Pangandaman is REINSTATED.
SO ORDERED.
Peralta,** Bersamin, Villarama, Jr. and Sereno, JJ., concur.
Judgment reversed and set aside.
Note.—There can be no claim of more than one right of retention per landowner. (Roman
Catholic Archbishop of Caceres vs. Secretary of Agrarian Reform, 541 SCRA 304 [2007])
——o0o——
_______________
23 Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Fortune Tobacco Corporation, G.R. Nos. 167274-
75, July 21, 2008, 559 SCRA 160.
** Additional member per Special Order No. 885 dated September 1, 2010 in lieu of
Associate Justice Arturo D. Brion.
 VOL. 474, OCTOBER 25, 2005 113
Danan vs. Court of Appeals
G.R. No. 132759. October 25, 2005.*
ALEJANDRO DANAN, et al., petitioners, vs. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and
ESTRELLA ARRASTIA, respondents.
G.R. No. 132866. October 25, 2005.*
THE COURT OF APPEALS and THE DEPARTMENT OF AGRARIAN REFORM
ADJUDICATION BOARD, petitioners, vs. ESTRELLA ARRASTIA, respondent.
Agrarian Reform Law; Tenancy; Mere occupation or cultivation of an agricultural land
does not automatically convert a tiller or farmworker into an agricultural tenant recognized under
agrarian laws.—Mere occupation or cultivation of an agricultural land does not automatically
convert a tiller or farmworker into an agricultural tenant recognized under agrarian laws. The
essential requisites of a tenancy relationship are: (1) the parties are the landowner and the
tenant; (2) the subject is agricultural land; (3) there is consent among the parties; (4) the purpose
is agricultural production; (5) there is personal cultivation; and (6) there is sharing of harvests.
All these requisites must concur in order to create a tenancy relationship between the parties.
In the case at bar, it has not been sufficiently established that private petitioners’ occupation
and cultivation of the disputed property was with the consent of the landowners.
116
116 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Danan vs. Court of Appeals
Same; Same; Constitutional Law; The right of retention is a constitutionally guaranteed
right, which is subject to qualification by the legislature. For as long as the area to be retained
is compact or contiguous and does not exceed the retention ceiling of five (5) hectares, a
landowner’s choice of the area to be retained must prevail.—The right of retention is a
constitutionally guaranteed right, which is subject to qualification by the legislature. It serves to
mitigate the effects of compulsory land acquisition by balancing the rights of the landowner and
the tenant and by implementing the doctrine that social justice was not meant to perpetrate an
injustice against the landowner. A retained area, as its name denotes, is land which is not
supposed to anymore leave the landowner’s dominion, thus sparing the government from the
inconvenience of taking land only to return it to the landowner afterwards, which would be a
pointless process. For as long as the area to be retained is compact or contiguous and does
not exceed the retention ceiling of five (5) hectares, a landowner’s choice of the area to be
retained must prevail. Moreover, Administrative Order No. 4, series of 1991, which supplies the
details for the exercise of a land-owner’s retention rights, likewise recognizes no limit to the
prerogative of the landowner, although he is persuaded to retain other lands instead to avoid
dislocation of farmers. Therefore, there is no legal and practical basis to order the
commencement of the administrative proceedings for the placement of respondent Arrastia’s
land under the CARP since her property’s land area falls below the retention limit of five (5)
hectares.
PETITIONS for review on certiorari of the decision and resolution of the Court of Appeals.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
Anselmo M. Carlos for petitioner in G.R. No. 132759.
Ida R. Makalinao-Javier and Mylene T. Marcia-Creencia for private respondent.
TINGA, J.:
This deals with two separate Rule 45 petitions, later consolidated, filed by the Department of
Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board (“DARAB”) and Alfredo Danan, et al. Both petitions seek
the reversal of the Court of Appeals’ Decision in CA-G.R. SP No. 33796, which reversed and
set aside the DARAB Decision in DARAB Case
117
VOL. 474, OCTOBER 25, 2005 117
Danan vs. Court of Appeals
No. 1551 and its Resolution denying petitioners’ motion for reconsideration.
Petitioners (“private petitioners”) in G.R. No. 132759 are all residents of Lubao, Pampanga,
claiming to be cultivating a vast landholding owned by the heirs of Teodorica Reinares Arrastia,
Leticia Arrastia Montenegro and Juanita Arrastia (“Arrastia heirs”). Said property has an
aggregate area of approximately three hundred (300) hectares and is situated at
the Barangays of Lourdes, Baruya, and San Isidro, all within the Municipality of Lubao,
Pampanga. The records of the case show that the landholding had been subdivided and
distributed among the Arrastia heirs and the corresponding certificates of titles issued
accordingly.
Petitioner in G.R. No. 132866 is the DARAB, the adjudication arm of the Department of
Agrarian Reform (“DAR”) that is tasked to implement the government’s comprehensive agrarian
reform program (“CARP”).
The common respondent in both petitions is Estrella Arrastia, one of the Arrastia heirs and
a co-owner of the disputed property. Respondent Arrastia own 4.4630 hectares of the disputed
property.
The factual antecedents are as follows:
Sometime in 1976, a certain Rustico Coronel leased the subject property for a period of
twelve (12) years or until the crop year 1987 to 1988. 1 On September 27, 1986, persons claiming
to be farmers and residents of Barangay Lourdes and Barangay San Rafael signed a joint
resolution as members of the Aniban ng mga Manggagawa sa Agrikultura (“AMA”) to enter and
lease the subject property from the Arrastia heirs. Then Pampanga Governor Brien Guiao
favorably endorsed the resolution to then Minister of Environment and Natural Resources
Heherson Alvarez. On the basis of said resolution but without the consent of the landowners,
the AMA members, who are herein petitioners, entered the disputed land, cleared portions
thereof and planted various crops thereon. This culminated in a violent confrontation on May
21,
_______________
1 CA Decision, p. 5; G.R. No. 132866, Rollo, p. 40.
118
118 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Danan vs. Court of Appeals
1988 that led to the filing of criminal charges against AMA members.2
On June 2, 1988, the AMA filed a complaint with petitioner DARAB, docketed as DARAB
Case No. 0001, praying that respondent Arrastia be prevented from destroying standing crops
on the disputed property and from fencing said property and that petitioners be allowed to
continue with their farming thereon. On August 15, 1988, the DARAB ordered the DAR Regional
Director to conduct an ocular inspection on the disputed property. 3 The inspection team
submitted an Ocular/Investigation Report with the observation that there were no substantially
significant plantings on the disputed property. The Municipal Agrarian Reform Officer (“MARO”)
of Lubao, Pampanga also submitted a report dated September 21, 1989, recommending the
disqualification of private petitioners from availing of the benefits under the CARP. 4
On October 5, 1988, the DARAB issued an order denying AMA’s motion for authority to
cultivate. The order became final and executory on July 29, 1989, after the DARAB denied
AMA’s motion for reconsideration.5
On behalf of her co-heirs and co-owners, Arrastia instituted an action against private
petitioners for violation of Section 73(b) of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 6657 on October 9, 1989.
Arrastia’s complaint, docketed as Agrarian Case No. 2000, was raffled to Branch 48 of the
Regional Trial Court of San Fernando, Pampanga on October 9, 1989. The trial court, sitting as
a special agrarian court (“SAC”), issued a temporary restraining order, and subsequently a
preliminary injunction, both enjoining private petitioners from entering and cultivating the
disputed property.
On November 29, 1989, private petitioners filed a complaint for injunction and damages
before the Provincial Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board (“PARAD”) against Arrastia, alleging
that they
_______________
2 CA Decision, p. 6; id., at p. 41.
3 Ibid.
4 CA Decision, p. 7; id., at p. 42.
5 Ibid.
119
VOL. 474, OCTOBER 25, 2005 119
Danan vs. Court of Appeals
were actual tillers of the disputed property who were forcibly evicted by Arrastia from their
tenanted lots through the use of armed men. In their complaint, docketed as DARAB Regional
Case No. 161-P’ 89, they prayed that Arrastia be restrained from preventing them from
reoccupying the property in question. Upon referral of the matter to the respective Barangay
Agrarian Reform Committees (“BARC”) of the Barangays of Lourdes, San Isidro, and San
Rafael, BARC officials reported that the dispute could no longer be settled amicably. In
particular, the BARC of Barangay San Rafael (Baruya), Lubao informed the hearing officer that
private petitioners were tenants or actual tillers of the disputed property. The Lubao MARO also
submitted the reports of other BARC officials.6
On the basis of the reports submitted by BARC officials and private petitioners’ affidavits,
the hearing officer issued on December 9, 1990 an order granting a preliminary injunction to
restrain Arrastia from disturbing private petitioners in the tilling of the disputed property. The
PARAD hearing officer also directed the MARO to act on the petition for the coverage of the
disputed property under the CARP.7
Meanwhile, on January 30, 1991, Arrastia filed an omnibus motion in DARAB Case No.
0001, questioning the jurisdiction of the hearing officer to issue an order of injunction. The
DARAB denied said motion and subsequently issued the writ of injunction on September 22,
1992.
Arrastia filed an answer in DARAB Regional Case No. 161-P’ 89, interposing the defense
that the disputed land was not devoted to agriculture and that private petitioners were not
tenants thereof.
After due hearing, the PARAD rendered a decision in DARAB Regional Case No. 161-P’
89 on May 13, 1993, declaring that the subject property is covered by the CARP and that private
petitioners are qualified beneficiaries of the program. The adjudicator also issued an injunction
prohibiting Arrastia from disturbing private
_______________
6 PARAD Decision, p. 3; G.R. No. 132759, Rollo, p. 68.
7 PARAD Decision, p. 4; id., at p. 69.
120
120 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Danan vs. Court of Appeals
petitioners’ occupation of the property. The dispositive portion of the decision reads:
“WHEREFORE, PREMISES CONSIDERED, this Board hereby renders judgment:
1. (1)Confirming and declaring that the subject landholding with an area of 300 hectares,
more or less, situated at Barangays Lourdes, San Isidro and San Rafael (Baruya),
Lubao, Pampanga, owned by the defendant and her co-owners are agricultural land
subject to the coverage of RA No. 6657, and that plaintiffs are qualified beneficiaries
who enjoy the benefits of agrarian laws including the right to an award of the lands
they actually till in accordance with the procedure therein;
2. (2)Making the preliminary injunction hereto forthwith issued, prohibiting the defendant
and her co-owners and all other persons claiming any right or title under them, from
continuing to exclude plaintiffs and from re-entry and re-occupation of the subject
landholding as agricultural tenants and their restoration thereat, final and
permanent; and
3. (3)Ordering the defendant and her co-owners to pay plaintiffs the amount of
P10,000.00 as attorney’s fees, plus costs.” 8
Arrastia appealed the aforementioned decision to petitioner DARAB. The appeal was docketed
as DARAB Case No. 1551. On March 28, 1994, the DARAB rendered its decision modifying the
appealed judgment, the dispositive portion of which reads:
“WHEREFORE, premises considered, the appeal is DISMISSED. The judgment of the
Provincial Adjudicator is hereby modified as follows:
1. 1.Declaring Dominador Flores, Rodrigo Serrano, Oscar Salazar, Alejandro Danan,
Tirso Lingad, Francisco Santos, Dante Danan, Jesus Castro, Amado Escueta,
Marcos Susi, Francisco Bernate, Felix Escueta, Ladislao Danan, Lamberto Danan,
Carlito Santos, Orlando Santos, Jose Manansala, Eulalio Danan, Eddie Escueta,
Conrado Castro, Pedro Tala and Victorino Tala to be agricultural lessees on their
respective tillages, and ordering their reinstatement on the land;
2. 2.Ordering the rest of the Plaintiffs-Appellees to be reinstated on the land and to
possess and occupy their respective areas of cultivation;
_______________
8 PARAD Decision, p. 17; id., at p. 82.
121
VOL. 474, OCTOBER 25, 2005 121
Danan vs. Court of Appeals
1. 3.Ordering the Regional Director of the Department of Agrarian Reform, Region III,
San Fernando, Pampanga, the Provincial Agrarian Reform Officer for the Province
of Pampanga and the Municipal Reform Officer for the Municipality of Lubao,
Province of Pampanga to immediately undertake administrative processes for the
coverage of the land under Republic Act No. 6657 and other applicable agrarian
 laws, DAR Administrative Order No. 1, Series of 1993, DAR Department
Memorandum Circular No. 04, Series of 1993 and other DAR rules and regulations
taking into consideration the qualifications of Appellees to be beneficiaries of the
program as well as the right of retention of the owners of the subject landholding
and the last paragraph of Section 6, Republic Act No. 6657 which provides:
Upon the effectivity of this Act, any sale, disposition, lease, management contract or transfer of
possession of private lands executed by the original landowner in violation of this Act shall be
null and void; Provided, however, That those executed prior to this Act shall be valid only when
registered with the Register of Deeds within the period of three (3) months after the effectivity
of this Act. Thereafter, all Register of Deeds shall inform the DAR within thirty (30) days of any
transaction involving agricultural lands in excess of five (5) hectares.
1. 4.Ordering Defendant-Appellant, or any person or persons acting for and in behalf, to
refrain from committing any act or acts which will disturb or in any way adversely
interfere with the peaceful possession, occupation and farming activities of
Appellees on the land itself;
2. 5.Ordering Defendant-Appellant to pay Plaintiff-Appellees the reasonable amount of
Twenty Thousand Pesos (P20,000.00) as attorney’s fees plus costs of the suit; and
3. 6.Ordering the Regional Sheriff of the DAR Regional Adjudication Board, Region III,
to implement this Order and submit a return to this Board within seven (7) days from
receipt of this Order. This decision is immediately executory pursuant to Section 50
of Republic Act No. 6657.”9
Aggrieved, Arrastia elevated the controversy to the Court of Appeals, which reversed and set
aside the decision of the DARAB.
_______________
9 DARAB Decision, p. 30; id., at pp. 114-115.
122
122 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Danan vs. Court of Appeals
On the issue of whether private petitioners are qualified beneficiaries under the CARP, the
appellate court ruled in the negative mainly on the basis of the report of MARO Josefina Vidal
which was quoted at length in its Decision. In the said report, the MARO recommended the
disqualification of private petitioners from the coverage of the CARP in view of their continued
violation of Sections 22 and 23 of Executive Order No. 229, under which persons, associations,
or entities which prematurely enter lands covered by agrarian reform shall be permanently
disqualified from CARP coverage and cited for contempt, respectively. The Court of Appeals
also found private petitioners guilty of violating the temporary restraining order and preliminary
injunction issued by the SAC in Agrarian Case No. 2000 and also the temporary restraining
issued by the Court of Appeals itself on April 13, 1994. The appeals court denied the motions
for reconsideration separately filed by private petitioners. Hence, the petitions before this Court.
In its petition, DARAB raised the following issues:
1. 1.1.THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED WHEN IT SET ASIDE THE
ENTIRETY OF THE DECISION APPEALED FROM, TO INCLUDE THE ORDER
TO PLACE THE DISPUTED LANDHOLDINGS UNDER CARP COVERAGE, ON
THE SOLE BASIS OF THE FINDING THAT PRIVATE RESPONDENTS
(FARMERS) THEREIN WERE DISQUALIFIED AS FARMER BENEFICIARIES;
2. 1.2.THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED WHEN IT RULED ON THE
DISQUALIFICATION OF ALL THE FARMERS (PRIVATE RESPONDENTS
THEREIN), IRRESPECTIVE OF WHETHER THEY (OR SOME) ARE
AGRICULTURAL TENANTS OR NOT, ON THE SOLE BASIS OF A FIELD
REPORT THAT WAS PREPARED AND SUBMITTED WITHOUT THE FARMERS
AT LEAST GIVEN OPPORTUNITY TO BE HEARD, THUS, VIOLATIVE OF DUE
PROCESS.10
In turn, private petitioners in their petition impute the following errors to the Court of Appeals:
_______________
10 Id., at p. 37.
123
VOL. 474, OCTOBER 25, 2005 123
Danan vs. Court of Appeals
1. 1.RESPONDENT COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN NOT GIVING FIRST DUE
COURSE TO THE PETITION IN CA-G.R. NO. 33796 AND REQUIRED THE
DARAB TO ELEVATE TO IT THE RECORDS OF DARAB CASE NO. 1551
INCLUDING ALL THE EVIDENCE PRESENTED SO IT COULD HAVE FULLY
APPRECIATED ALL THE FACTS INSTEAD OF MERELY RELYING ON THE
PLEADINGS FILED BEFORE IT.
2. 2.THE RESPONDENT COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN IGNORING FUNDAMENTAL
RULES OF ADMINISTRATIVE DUE PROCESS BY ITS FAILURE AND REFUSAL
TO CONSIDER SUBSTANTIVE EVIDENCE INTRODUCED BY PETITIONERS IN
THE PROCEEDINGS IN DARAB CASE NO. 161-P’89 AND DARAB CASE NO.
1551 RESULTING IN FINDINGS WHICH ARE NOT ONLY CONTRARY TO LAW
AND THE EVIDENCE ON RECORD BUT ARE FURTHER PATENTLY PARTIAL
TO PRIVATE RESPONDENTS.
3. 3.THE RESPONDENT COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN MAKING CONCLUSIONS
FROM ITS REVIEW OF THE DARAB DECISION IN DARAB CASE NO. 1551
WITHOUT ANY BASIS ON THE DECISION ITSELF THUS CITING ERRORS IN
THE SAID DECISION WHICH WERE NOT ACTUALLY MADE BY THE DARAB.
4. 4.THE RESPONDENT COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN REVERSING THE FINDINGS
OF FACTS OF THE DARAB WITHOUT DUE REGARD TO EVIDENCE
PRESENTED BEFORE THE LATTER.11
The two petitions advance two main arguments: first, the Court of Appeals’ finding that private
petitioners are ineligible to become CARP beneficiaries is without factual or evidentiary
basis; second, the Court of Appeals’ reversal of the DARAB’s order to undertake administrative
proceedings for the acquisition of the subject property for agrarian reform purposes is
premature.
Private petitioners contend that the Court of Appeals’ declaration that they are not qualified
beneficiaries of the CARP has no evidentiary basis because it failed to order the transmittal of
the DARAB records, particularly the reports of the different BARC officials establishing tenancy
relationship between private petitioners and the owners of the disputed property. For its part,
DA-
_______________
11 G.R. No. 132866, Rollo, p. 20.
124
124 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Danan vs. Court of Appeals
RAB denies having categorically declared in its decision in DARAB Case No. 1551 that private
petitioners are qualified beneficiaries because the administrative proceeding to determine the
beneficiaries entitled under R.A. No. 6657 was yet to be undertaken not by DARAB but by the
administrative officials of DAR. DARAB also describes as arbitrary and unilateral the MARO
report quoted by the appellate court in support of its ruling that private petitioners prematurely
entered the disputed property.
The resolution of the issue on private petitioners’ eligibility under the CARP calls for a
review of the evidence on record to determine whether or not the conclusion of the Court of
Appeals has factual basis. At the outset, it should be noted that the jurisdiction of this Court in
a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court is limited to reviewing only
errors of law, as it is not a trier of facts. It is a settled doctrine that findings of fact of the Court
of Appeals are binding and conclusive upon this Court, not to be disturbed unless: (1) the
conclusion is a finding grounded entirely on speculation, surmise and conjecture; (2) the
inference made is manifestly mistaken; (3) there is grave abuse of discretion; (4) the judgment
is based on a misapprehension of facts; (5) the findings of fact are conflicting; (6) the Court of
Appeals went beyond the issues of the case and its findings are contrary to the admissions of
both appellant and appellees; (7) the findings of fact of the Court of Appeals are contrary to
those of the trial court; (8) said findings of fact are conclusions without citation of specific
evidence on which they are based; (9) the facts set forth in the petition as well as in the
petitioner’s main and reply briefs are not disputed by the respondents; and (10) the findings of
fact of the Court of Appeals are premised on the supposed absence of evidence and
contradicted by the evidence on record.12
The DARAB and the Court of Appeals’ findings in respect to the status of private petitioners
are conflicting. The DARAB found that private petitioners are either agricultural lessees paying
rentals to
_______________
12 Baricuatro, Jr. v. Court of Appeals, 382 Phil. 15; 325 SCRA 137 (2000).
125
VOL. 474, OCTOBER 25, 2005 125
Danan vs. Court of Appeals
the landowners or actual tillers in possession of distinct portions of the subject property. The
Court of Appeals, however, found private petitioners as not qualified to become CARP
beneficiaries on account of certain violations they committed and considered it unnecessary to
ascertain their status as agricultural lessees or tillers. In view of the divergent opinions, the
Court must review the evidence relied upon by the DARAB and the Court of Appeals in arriving
at their respective conclusions.
The Court affirms factual findings and conclusions of the Court of Appeals.
The appellate court’s conclusion that private petitioners committed particular violations
warranting their disqualification from the CARP is based on the MARO report which has not
been disputed by all the private petitioners. The MARO who prepared the report enjoys the
presumption of regularity in the performance of her functions. Absent any showing that the Court
of Appeals committed grave abuse of discretion in giving evidentiary weight to said report, said
factual findings are generally deemed conclusive on this Court, which is not a trier of facts. 13
Anent DARAB’s contention that the MARO report was made unilaterally and without giving
private petitioners the opportunity to be heard, the circumstances not nullify said report for lack
of due process. The essence of due process is simply an opportunity to be heard or, as applied
to administrative proceedings, an opportunity to explain one’s side or an opportunity to seek
reconsideration of the action or ruling complained of. 14 Private petitioners cannot claim denial
of due process simply because they had ample opportunity to rebut the MARO’s findings and
present contrary evidence in the proceedings before the PARAD, the DARAB, or the Court of
Appeals.
_______________
13 Alipat v. Court of Appeals, et al., 368 Phil. 264; 308 SCRA 781 (1999).
14 CMP Federal Security Agency v. National Labor Relations Commission, et al., 362 Phil.
439; 303 SCRA 99 (1999).
126
126 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Danan vs. Court of Appeals
Private petitioners insist that they are bona fide agricultural tenants of the disputed property. It
is unnecessary to pass upon this issue in the light of the categorical finding of the appellate
court that private petitioners are no longer entitled to avail of the benefits under the CARP. In
any event, however, the claim is not well-founded.
A perusal of the decision in DARAB Case No. 1551 reveals that DARAB classified two (2)
sets of farmworkers, i.e., those who cultivated the land and paid corresponding rentals, and
those who occupied and cultivated portions of the disputed property since 1986 as certified by
BARC officials.
Mere occupation or cultivation of an agricultural land does not automatically convert a tiller
or farmworker into an agricultural tenant recognized under agrarian laws. The essential
requisites of a tenancy relationship are: (1) the parties are the landowner and the tenant; (2) the
subject is agricultural land; (3) there is consent among the parties; (4) the purpose is agricultural
production; (5) there is personal cultivation; and (6) there is sharing of harvests. All these
requisites must concur in order to create a tenancy relationship between the parties. 15 In the
case at bar, it has not been sufficiently established that private petitioners’ occupation and
cultivation of the disputed property was with the consent of the landowners.
DARAB assails the Court of Appeals in reversing the DARAB decision in its entirety. It
contends that the determination of private petitioners’ eligibility under R.A. No. 6657 has no
bearing on its order to commence administrative procedure for the acquisition of the disputed
property.
As borne by the case records,16 respondent Arrastia owns only 4.4630 hectares of the
subject property, which is below the reten-
_______________
15 Victorio v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 110012, March 28, 2001, 355 SCRA 520.
16 CA Rollo, p. 125.
127
VOL. 474, OCTOBER 25, 2005 127
Danan vs. Court of Appeals
tion limit under Section 617 of R.A. No. 6657 granting a right of
_______________
 17 SECTION 6. Retention Limits.—Except as otherwise provided in this Act, no person may
own or retain, directly or indirectly, any public or private agricultural land, the size of which shall
vary according to factors governing a viable family-size farm, such as commodity produced,
terrain, infrastructure, and soil fertility as determined by the Presidential Agrarian Reform
Council (PARC) created hereunder, but in no case shall retention by the landowner exceed five
(5) hectares. Three (3) hectares may be awarded to each child of the landowner, subject to the
following qualifications: (1) that he is at least fifteen (15) years of age; and (2) that he is actually
tilling the land or directly managing the farm: Provided, That landowners whose lands have
been covered by Presidential Decree No. 27 shall be allowed to keep the areas originally
retained by them thereunder: Provided, further, That original homestead grantees or their direct
compulsory heirs who still own the original homestead at the time of the approval of this Act
shall retain the same areas as long as they continue to cultivate said homestead.
The right to choose the area to be retained, which shall be compact or contiguous, shall
pertain to the landowner: Provided, however, That in case the area selected for retention by the
landowner is tenanted, the tenant shall have the option to choose whether to remain therein or
be a beneficiary in the same or another agricultural land with similar or comparable features. In
case the tenant chooses to remain in the retained area, he shall be considered a leaseholder
and shall lose his right to be a beneficiary under this Act. In case the tenant chooses to be a
beneficiary in another agricultural land, he loses his right as a leaseholder to the land retained
by the landowner. The tenant must exercise this option within a period of one (1) year from the
time the landowner manifests his choice of the area for retention.
In all cases, the security of tenure of the farmers or farmworkers on the land prior to the
approval of this Act shall be respected.
Upon the effectivity of this Act, any sale, disposition, lease, management, contract or
transfer of possession of private lands executed by the original landowner in violation of the Act
shall be null and void: Provided, however, That those executed prior to this Act shall be valid
only when registered with the Register of Deeds within a period of three (3) months after the
effectivity of this Act. Thereafter, all Registers of Deeds shall inform the Department of Agrarian
Reform (DAR) within thirty (30)
128
128 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Danan vs. Court of Appeals
retention of up to a maximum of five (5) hectares of agricultural land in favor of a landowner
whose property may be acquired for distribution to agrarian reform beneficiaries. Consequently,
a landowner may keep his entire covered landholding if its aggregate size does not exceed the
retention limit of five (5) hectares. His land will not be covered at all by the operation land transfer
program although all requisites for coverage are present.
The right of retention is a constitutionally guaranteed right, which is subject to qualification
by the legislature. It serves to mitigate the effects of compulsory land acquisition by balancing
the rights of the landowner and the tenant and by implementing the doctrine that social justice
was not meant to perpetrate an injustice against the landowner. A retained area, as its name
denotes, is land which is not supposed to anymore leave the landowner’s dominion, thus
sparing the government from the inconvenience of taking land only to return it to the landowner
afterwards, which would be a pointless process.18 For as long as the area to be retained is
compact or contiguous and does not exceed the retention ceiling of five (5) hectares, a
landowner’s choice of the area to be retained must prevail. Moreover, Administrative Order No.
4, series of 1991, which supplies the details for the exercise of a land-owner’s retention rights,
likewise recognizes no limit to the prerogative of the landowner, although he is persuaded to
retain other lands instead to avoid dislocation of farmers. 19 Therefore, there is no legal and
practical basis to order the commencement of the administrative proceedings for the placement
of respondent Arrastia’s land under the CARP since her property’s land area falls below the
retention limit of five (5) hectares.
WHEREFORE, both petitions in G.R No. 132759 and G.R. No. 132866 are DENIED.
The Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 33796 is AFFIRMED. Costs against
private petitioners.
_______________
days of any transaction involving agricultural lands in excess of five (5) hectares.
18 Eudosia Daez and/or Her Heirs v. Court of Appeals, et al., 382 Phil. 742; 325 SCRA
856 (2000).
19 Ibid.
129
VOL. 474, OCTOBER 25, 2005 129
Ramatek Philippines, Inc. vs. De los Reyes
SO ORDERED.
Puno (Chairman), Austria-Martinez and Callejo, Sr., JJ., concur.
Chico-Nazario, J.,On Leave.
Both petitions in G.R. No. 132759 and G.R. No. 132866 denied, judgment affirmed.
Notes.—Unless the requisite elements of tenancy concur in order to create a tenancy
relationship between the parties, the Court cannot bring the matter within the purview of tenancy
under CARL. (Romero vs. Tan, 424 SCRA 108 [2004])
Elements of agrarian tenancy relationship are: (1) the subject matter should be agricultural
land; (2) the purpose should be agricultural production; and (3) there should be personal
cultivation done by the tenants themselves. (Romero vs. Tan, Ibid.)
G.R. No. 133507. February 17, 2000.*
EUDOSIA DAEZ AND/OR HER HEIRS, REP. BY ADRIANO D. DAEZ, petitioners, vs. THE
HON. COURT OF APPEALS MACARIO SORIENTES, APOLONIO MEDIANA, ROGELIO
MACATULAD and MANUEL UMALI, respondents.
Agrarian Reform Law; Presidential Decree No. 27; Requisites for coverage under the
Operation Land Transfer.—P.D. No. 27, which implemented the Operation Land Transfer (OLT)
Program, covers tenanted rice or corn lands. The requisites for coverage under the OLT
program are the following: (1) the land must be devoted to rice or corn crops; and (2) there must
be a system of share-crop or lease-tenancy obtaining therein. If either requisite is absent, a
landowner may apply for exemption. If either of these requisites is absent, the land is not
covered under OLT. Hence, a landowner need not apply for retention where his ownership over
the entire landholding is intact and undisturbed.
Same; Same; Requisites for the exercise by the landowner of his right of retention.—On
the other hand, the requisites for the exercise by the landowner of his right of retention are the
following: (1) the land must be devoted to rice or corn crops; (2) there must be a system of
share-crop or lease-tenancy obtaining therein; and (3) the size of the landholding must not
exceed twenty-four (24) hectares, or it could be more than twenty-four (24) hectares provided
that at least seven (7) hectares thereof are covered lands and more than seven (7) hectares of
it consist of “other agricultural lands.”
 Same; Same; Same; Landowners who have not yet exercised their retention rights under
Presidential Decree No. 27 are entitled to the new retention rights under Republic Act No.
6657.—In the landmark case of Association of Small Landowners in the Phil., Inc. v. Secretary
of Agrarian Reform, we held that landowners who have not yet exercised their retention rights
under P.D. No. 27 are entitled to the new retention rights under R.A. No. 6657. We disregarded
the August 27, 1985 deadline imposed by DAR Administrative Order No. 1, series of 1985 on
landowners covered by OLT. However, if a landowner filed his application for retention after
________________
* SECOND DIVISION.
857
VOL. 325, FEBRUARY 17, 2000 857
Daez vs. Court of Appeals
August 27, 1985 but he had previously filed the sworn statements required by LOI Nos.
41, 45 and 52, he is still entitled to the retention limit of seven (7) hectares under P.D. No. 27.
Otherwise, he is only entitled to retain five (5) hectares under R.A. No. 6657.
PETITION for review on certiorari of a decision of the Court of Appeals.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
Pio T. Rodulfo III for petitioner.
Orquillas and Associates for private respondents.
DE LEON, JR., J.:
Before us is a petition for review on certiorari of the Decision 1 of the Court of Appeals2 dated
January 28, 1998 which denied the application of petitioner heirs of Eudosia Daez for the
retention of a 4.1685-hectare riceland pursuant to Republic Act (R.A.) No. 6657, otherwise
known as the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law, 3 thereby reversing the Decision4 of then
Executive Secretary Ruben D. Torres and the Order 5 of then Deputy Executive Secretary
Renato C. Corona, both of which had earlier set aside the Resolution 6 and Order7 of then
Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) Secretary Ernesto D. Garilao denying exemption of the
same riceland from coverage under Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 27.
The pertinent facts are:
__________________
1 Penned by Associate Justice Delilah Vidallon-Magtolis and concurred in by Associate
Justices Salome A. Montoya and Rodrigo V. Cosico, Rollo, pp. 42-50.
2 Eighth Division.
3 R.A. No. 6657 took effect on June 15, 1988.
4 In O.P. Case No. 6072, dated July 5, 1996, Rollo, pp. 87-91.
5 Dated October 23, 1996, Rollo, pp. 270-271.
6 Dated August 26, 1994, Court of Appeals (CA), Rollo, pp. 80-85.
7 Dated January 19, 1995, CA. Rollo, pp. 86-87.
858
858 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Daez vs. Court of Appeals
Eudosia Daez, now deceased, was the owner of a 4.1685-hectare riceland in Barangay Lawa,
Meycauayan, Bulacan which was being cultivated by respondents Macario Soriente, Rogelio
Macatulad, Apolonio Mediana and Manuel Umali under a system of share-tenancy. The said
land was subjected to the Operation Land Transfer (OLT) Program under Presidential Decree
(P.D.) No. 278 as amended by Letter of Instruction (LOI) No. 474. 9 Thus, the then Ministry of
Agrarian Reform acquired the subject land and issued Certificates of Land Transfer (CLT) on
December 9, 1980 to private respondents as beneficiaries.
However, on May 31, 1981, private respondents signed an affidavit, allegedly under duress,
stating that they are not share tenants but hired laborers10 Armed with such document, Eudosia
Daez applied for the exemption of said riceland from coverage of P.D. No. 27 due to non-
tenancy as well as for the cancellation of the CLTs issued to private respondents.
In their Affidavit dated October 2, 1983, Eudosia Daez and her husband, Lope, declared
ownership over 41.8064 hectares of agricultural lands located in Meycauayan, Bulacan and
fourteen (14) hectares of riceland, sixteen (16) hectares of forestland, ten (10) hectares of
“batuhan” and 1.8064 hectares of residential lands 11 in Penaranda, Nueva Ecija. Included in
their 41.8064-hectare landholding in Bulacan, was the subject 4.1685-hectare riceland in
Meycauayan.
On July 27, 1987, DAR Undersecretary Jose C. Medina issued an Order denying Eudosia
Daez’s application for exemption upon finding that her subject land is covered under LOI
__________________
8 Promulgated by then President Ferdinand E. Marcos on October 21, 1972, entitled,
“Decreeing the emancipation of tenants from the bondage of the soil, transferring to them the
ownership of the land they till and providing the instruments and mechanism therefor.”
9 Issued on October 21, 1976.
10 Annex “B” of Respondents’ Memorandum, Rollo, p. 179.
11 Rollo, p. 179.
859
VOL. 325, FEBRUARY 17, 2000 859
Daez vs. Court of Appeals
No. 474, petitioner being owner of the aforesaid agricultural lands exceeding seven (7)
hectares.12
On June 29, 1989, Eudosia Daez wrote a letter to DAR Secretary Benjamin T. Leong
requesting for reconsideration of Undersecretary Medina’s order. But on January 16,
199213 Secretary Leong affirmed the assailed order upon finding private respondents to be
bonafide tenants of the subject land. Secretary Leong disregarded private respondents’ May
31, 1981 affidavit for having been executed under duress because he found that Eudosia’s son,
Adriano, who was then the incumbent Vice-Mayor of Meycauayan, pressured private
respondents into signing the same.
Undaunted, Eudosia Daez brought her case on February 20, 1992 to the Court of
Appeals via a petition for certiorari. The Court of Appeals, however, sustained the order of
Secretary Leong in a decision dated April 29, 1992. Eudosia pursued her petition before this
court but we denied it in a minute resolution dated September 18, 1992. We also denied her
motion for reconsideration on November 9, 1992.
Meantime, on August 6 and 12, 1992, the DAR issued Emancipation Patents (EPs) to
private respondents. Thereafter, the Register of Deeds of Bulacan issued the corresponding
Transfer Certificates of Title (TCTs).
Exemption of the 4.1685 riceland from coverage by P.D. No. 27 having been finally denied
her, Eudosia Daez next filed an application for retention of the same riceland, this time under
R.A. No. 6657.
In an order dated March 22, 1994, DAR Region III OIC-Director Eugenio B. Bernardo
allowed Eudosia Daez to retain the subject riceland but he denied the application of her eight
(8) children to retain three (3) hectares each for their failure to prove actual tillage of the land or
direct management thereof as required by law.14 Aggrieved, they appealed to the DAR.
________________
12 Annex “A” of Respondents’ Memorandum, id., pp. 175-176.
13 Annex “B” of supra, id., pp. 177-187.
14 Annex “J” of Respondents’ Memorandum, Rollo, pp. 237-239.
860
860 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Daez vs. Court of Appeals
On August 26, 1994, then DAR Secretary Ernesto D. Garilao, set aside the order of Regional
Director Bernardo in a Resolution,15 the decretal portion of which reads, viz.:
“WHEREFORE, premises considered, this Resolution is hereby issued setting aside
with FINALITY the Order dated March 22, 1994 of the Regional Director of DAR Region III.
The records of this case is remanded to the Regional Office for immediate implementation
of the Order dated January 16, 1992 of this office as affirmed by the Court of Appeals and the
Supreme Court.
SO ORDERED.”
Eudosia Daez filed a Motion for Reconsideration but it was denied on January 19, 1995. 16
She appealed Secretary Garilao’s decision to the Office of the President which ruled in her
favor. The dispositive portion of the Decision17 of then Executive Secretary reads:
“WHEREFORE, the resolution and order appealed from are hereby SET ASIDE and judgment
is rendered authorizing the retention by Eudosia Daez or her heirs of the 4.1685-hectare
landholding subject thereof.
SO ORDERED.”18
Aggrieved, private respondents sought from the Court of Appeals, a review of the decision of
the Office of the President.
On January 28, 1999, the said Decision of the Office of the President was reversed. The
Court of Appeals ordered, thus:
“WHEREFORE, the assailed decision of July 5, 1996 and Order dated October 23, 1996 of the
public respondents are RE-
_________________
15 Annex “L” of Respondents’ Memorandum, id., pp. 243-250.
16 Annex “M” of Respondents’ Memorandum, id., pp. 249-250.
17 Annex “N” of Respondents’ Memorandum, Rollo, pp. 251-255.
18 Decision of the Court of Appeals dated January 28, 1999, p. 9; Rollo, p. 50.
861
VOL. 325, FEBRUARY 17, 2000 861
Daez vs. Court of Appeals
VERSED AND SET ASIDE, and the Resolution and Order of DAR Secretary Ernesto D. Garilao
respectively dated August 26, 1994 and January 19, 1995 are REINSTATED.
SO ORDERED.”
Hence, this petition which assigns the following errors:
1. “I.THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED WHEN IT RULED THAT
DISTINCTION BETWEEN EXEMPTION FROM AGRARIAN REFORM
COVERAGE AND THE RIGHT OF RETENTION OF LANDOWNERS IS ONLY A
MATTER OF SEMANTICS THAT AN ADVERSE DECISION IN THE FORMER
WILL FORECLOSE FURTHER ACTION TO ENFORCE THE LATTER
CONSIDERING THAT THEY CONSTITUTE SEPARATE AND DISTINCT CAUSES
OF ACTION AND, THEREFORE, ENFORCEABLE SEPARATELY AND IN
SEQUEL.
2. II.THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED WHEN IT APPLIED THE
PRINCIPLE OF RES JUDICATA DESPITE THE FACT THAT THE PREVIOUS
CASE CITED (EXEMPTION FROM COVERAGE DUE TO NON-TENANCY) AND
THE PRESENT CASE (RETENTION RIGHT) ARE OF DIFFERENT CAUSES OF
ACTION.
3. III.THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED WHEN IT RULED/OPINED
THAT THERE WAS A CUT-OFF DATE (AUGUST 27, 1985) FOR LANDOWNERS
TO APPLY FOR EXEMPTION OR RETENTION UNDER PD 27 AND THOSE WHO
FAILED TO FILE THEIR APPLICATIONS/PETITIONS ARE DEEMED TO HAVE
WAIVED THEIR RIGHTS. III. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED
IN DECLARING THAT PETITIONERS (RESPONDENTS THEREIN) ARE GUILTY
OF ESTOPPEL.
4. IV.THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED WHEN IT RULED THAT THE
LAND SUBJECT OF THIS CASE IS NO LONGER OWNED BY PETITIONERS
SINCE PRIVATE RESPONDENTS HAVE ALREADY BEEN ISSUED NOT ONLY
THEIR RESPECTIVE CERTIFICATES OF LAND TRANSFER BUT ALSO THEIR
INDIVIDUAL CERTIFICATES OF TITLE OVER THE DISPUTED AREA. 19
_______________
19 Petition, pp. 8-9, Rollo, pp. 23-24.
862
862 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Daez vs. Court of Appeals
We grant the petition.
First. Exemption and retention in agrarian reform are two (2) distinct concepts.
P.D. No. 27, which implemented the Operation Land Transfer (OLT) Program, covers
tenanted rice or corn lands. The requisites for coverage under the OLT program are the
following: (1) the land must be devoted to rice or corn crops; and (2) there must be a system of
share-crop or lease-tenancy obtaining therein. If either requisite is absent, a landowner may
apply for exemption. If either of these requisites is absent, the land is not covered under OLT.
Hence, a landowner need not apply for retention where his ownership over the entire
landholding is intact and undisturbed.
P.D. No. 27 grants each tenant of covered lands a five (5) hectare lot, or in case the land
is irrigated, a three (3) hectare lot constituting a family size farm. However, said law allows a
covered landowner to retain not more than seven (7) hectares of his land if his aggregate
landholding does not exceed twenty-four (24) hectares. Otherwise, his entire landholding is
covered without him being entitled to any retention right. 20
Consequently, a landowner may keep his entire covered landholding if its aggregate size
does not exceed the retention limit of seven (7) hectares. In effect, his land will not be covered
at all by the OLT program although all requisites for coverage are present. LOI No. 474 clarified
the effective coverage of OLT to include tenanted rice or corn lands of seven (7) hectares or
less, if the landowner owns other agricultural lands of more than seven (7) hectares. The term
“other agricultural lands” refers to lands other than tenanted rice or corn lands from which the
landowner derives adequate income to support his family.
Thus, on one hand, exemption from coverage of OLT lies if: (1) the land is not devoted to
rice or corn crops even if it is
______________
20 DAR Memorandum on the Interim Guidelines on Retention By Small Landowners, issued
on July 10, 1975.
863
VOL. 325, FEBRUARY 17, 2000 863
Daez vs. Court of Appeals
tenanted; or (2) the land is untenanted even though it is devoted to rice or corn crops.
On the other hand, the requisites for the exercise by the landowner of his right of retention
are the following: (1) the land must be devoted to rice or corn crops; (2) there must be a system
of share-crop or lease-tenancy obtaining therein; and (3) the size of the landholding must not
exceed twenty-four (24) hectares, or it could be more than twenty-four (24) hectares provided
that at least seven (7) hectares thereof are covered lands and more than seven (7) hectares of
it consist of “other agricultural lands.”
Clearly, then, the requisites for the grant of an application for exemption from coverage of
OLT and those for the grant of an application for the exercise of a landowner’s right of retention,
are different.
Hence, it is incorrect to posit that an application for exemption and an application for
retention are one and the same thing. Being distinct remedies, finality of judgment in one does
not preclude the subsequent institution of the other. There was, thus, no procedural impediment
to the application filed by Eudosia Daez for the retention of the subject 4.1865-hectare riceland,
even after her appeal for exemption of the same land was denied in a decision that became
final and executory.
Second. Petitioner heirs of Eudosia Daez may exercise their right of retention over the
subject 4.1685 riceland.
The right of retention is a constitutionally guaranteed right, which is subject to qualification
by the legislature.21 It serves to mitigate the effects of compulsory land acquisition by balancing
the rights of the landowner and the tenant and by implementing the doctrine that social justice
was not meant to perpetrate an injustice against the landowner. 22 A retained area, as its name
denotes, is land which is not sup-
________________
21 Sec. 4, Art. XIII, 1987 Constitution.
22 Cabatan v. Court of Appeals, 95 SCRA 323, 357 (1980); Dequito v. Llamas, 66 SCRA
504, 510 (1975).
864
864 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Daez vs. Court of Appeals
posed to anymore leave the landowner’s dominion, thus sparing the government from the
inconvenience of taking land only to return it to the landowner afterwards, which would be a
pointless process.
In the landmark case of Association of Small Landowners in the Phils., Inc. v. Secretary of
Agrarian Reform,23 we held that landowners who have not yet exercised their retention rights
under P.D. No. 27 are entitled to the new retention rights under R.A. No. 6657. 24 We disregarded
the August 27, 1985 deadline imposed by DAR Administrative Order No. 1, series of 1985 on
landowners covered by OLT. However, if a landowner filed his application for retention after
August 27, 1985 but he had previously filed the sworn statements required by LOI Nos. 41, 45
and 52, he is still entitled to the retention limit of seven (7) hectares under P.D. No.
27.25 Otherwise, he is only entitled to retain five (5) hectares under R.A. No. 6657.
Sec. 6 of R.A. No. 6657, which provides, viz.:
SECTION 6. Retention Limits—Except as otherwise provided in this Act, no person may own
or retain, directly or indirectly, any public or private agricultural land, the size of which shall vary
according to factors governing a viable family-size, such as commodity produced, terrain,
infrastructure, and soil fertility as determined by the Presidential Agrarian Reform Council
(PARC) created hereunder, but in no case shall retention by the landowner exceed five (5)
hectares. Three (3) hectares may be awarded to each child of the landowner, subject to the
following qualifications: (1) that he is at least fifteen (15) years of age; and (2) that he is actually
tilling the land or directly managing the farm; Provided, That landowners whose land have been
covered by Presidential Decree No. 27 shall be allowed to keep the area originally retained by
them thereunder, further, That original homestead grantees or direct compulsory heirs
________________
23 175 SCRA 343 (1989).
24 Id., p. 392.
25 Administrative Order No. 4, series of 1991, issued on April 26, 1991 entitled,
“Supplemental guidelines governing the exercise of retention rights by landowners under P.D.
No. 27.”
865
VOL. 325, FEBRUARY 17, 2000 865
Daez vs. Court of Appeals
who still own the original homestead at the time of the approval of this Act shall retain the same
areas as long as they Continue to cultivate said homestead.
The right to choose the area to be retained, which shall be compact or contiguous, shall
pertain to the landowner. Provided, however, That in case the area selected for retention by the
landowner is tenanted, the tenant shall have the option to choose whether to remain therein or
be a beneficiary in the same or another agricultural land with similar or comparable features. In
case the tenant chooses to remain in the retained area, he shall be considered a leaseholder
and shall lose his right to be a beneficiary under this Act. In case the tenant chooses to be a
beneficiary in another agricultural land, he loses his right as a lease-holder to the land retained
by the landowner. The tenant must exercise this option within a period of one (1) year from the
time the landowner manifests his choice of the area for retention.
In all cases, the security of tenure of the farmers or farmworkers on the land prior to the
approval of this Act shall be respected.
Upon the effectivity of this Act, any sale, disposition, lease, management contract or
transfer of possession of private lands executed by the original landowner in violation of this Act
shall be null and void; Provided, however, That those executed prior to this Act shall be valid
only when registered with the Register of Deeds within a period of three (3) months after the
effectivity of this Act. Thereafter, all Register of Deeds shall inform the DAR within thirty (30)
days of any transaction involving agricultural lands in excess of five (5) hectares.” 26
defines the nature and incidents of a landowner’s right of retention. For as long as the area to
be retained is compact or contiguous and it does not exceed the retention ceiling of five (5)
hectares, a landowner’s choice of the area to be retained, must prevail. Moreover,
Administrative Order No. 4, series of 1991,27which supplies the details for the exercise of a
landowner’s retention rights, likewise recognizes no limit to the prerogative of the landowner,
although he is persuaded to retain other lands instead to avoid dislocation of farmers.
________________
26 Emphasis and underscoring ours.
27 Ibid.
866
866 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Daez vs. Court of Appeals
Without doubt, this right of retention may be exercised over tenanted land despite even the
issuance of Certificate of Land Transfer (CLT) to farmer-beneficiaries.28 What must be
protected, however, is the right of the tenants to opt to either stay on the land chosen to be
retained by the landowner or be a beneficiary in another agricultural land with similar or
comparable features.29
Finally. Land awards made pursuant to the government’s agrarian reform program are
subject to the exercise by a landowner, who is so qualified, of his right of retention.
Under P.D. No. 27, beneficiaries are issued CLTs to entitle them to possess lands.
Thereafter, they are issued Emancipation Patents (EPs) after compliance with all necessary
conditions. Such EPs, upon their presentation to the Register of Deeds, result in the issuance
of the corresponding transfer certificates of title (TCT) in favor of the beneficiaries mentioned
therein.30
Under R.A. No. 6657, the procedure has been simplified 31 Only Certificates of Land
Ownership Award (CLOAs) are issued, in lieu of EPs, after compliance with all prerequisites.
Thereafter, upon presentation of the CLOAs to the Register of Deeds, TCTs are issued to the
designated beneficiaries. CLTs are no longer issued.
The issuance of EPs or CLOAs to beneficiaries does not absolutely bar the landowner from
retaining the area covered thereby. Under Administrative Order No. 2, series of 1994,32 an EP
or CLOA may be cancelled if the land covered is later found to be part of the landowner’s
retained area.
A certificate of title accumulates in one document a comprehensive statement of the status
of the fee held by the
__________________
28 Tenants of the Estate of Dr. Jose Sison v. Court of Appeals, 210 SCRA 545, 552-553
(1992).
29 Sec. 6, R.A. No. 6657.
30 P.D. No. 266, issued on August 4, 1973; Vinzons-Magana v. Estrella, 201 SCRA 536,
540 (1992).
31 Sec. 24, R.A. 6657.
32 Issued on March 7, 1994.
867
VOL. 325, FEBRUARY 17, 2000 867
Daez vs. Court of Appeals
owner of a parcel of land.33 As such, it is a mere evidence of ownership and it does not constitute
the title to the land itself. It cannot confer title where no title has been acquired by any of the
means provided by law.34
Thus, we had, in the past, sustained the nullification of a certificate of title issued pursuant
to a homestead patent because the land covered was not part of the public domain and as a
result, the government had no authority to issue such patent in the first place.35 Fraud in the
issuance of the patent, is also a ground for impugning the validity of a certificate of title.36 In
other words, the invalidity of the patent or title is sufficient basis for nullifying the certificate of
title since the latter is merely an evidence of the former.
In the instant case, the CLTs of private respondents over the subject 4.1685-hectare
riceland were issued without Eudosia Daez having been accorded her right of choice as to what
to retain among her landholdings. The transfer certificates of title thus issued on the basis of
those CLTs cannot operate to defeat the right of the heirs of deceased Eudosia Daez to retain
the said 4.1685 hectares of riceland.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby GRANTED. The Decision of the Court of
Appeals, dated January 28, 1998, is REVERSED and SET ASIDE and the Decision of the Office
of the President, dated July 5, 1996, is hereby REINSTATED. In the implementation of said
decision, however, the Department of Agrarian Reform is hereby ORDERED to fully accord to
private respondents their rights under Section 6 of R.A. No. 6657.
No costs.
_______________
33 Halili v. Court of Industrial Relations, 257 SCRA 174, 184 (1996).
34 Tan v. Lim, 296 SCRA 455, 476 (1998).
35 Balangcad v. Justices of the Court of Appeals, 206 SCRA 169, 174 (1992); Mendoza v.
Navarette, 214 SCRA 337, 349 (1992); Reyes, et al. v. Court of Appeals, 295 SCRA 296, 312
(1998).
36 Meneses v. Court of Appeals, 246 SCRA 162, 173 (1995).
868
868 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Daez vs. Court of Appeals
SO ORDERED.
Bellosillo (Chairman) and Mendoza, JJ., concur.
Quisumbing, J., No part. Prior official action.
Buena, J., On leave.
Petition granted, judgment reversed and set aside. Decision of Office of the President
reinstated.
Note.—The exercise of the rights of ownership are subject to limitations that may be
imposed by law, such as the Tenancy Act and Presidential Decree No. 27. (Philippine National
Bank vs. Court of Appeals, 275 SCRA 70 [1997])
G.R. No. 203204. November 20, 2013.*
HEIRS OF ROMULO D. SANDUETA, namely: GLORIA SANDUETA ELOPRE, HEIRS OF
JOSEPHINE S. NADALA, represented by ROY S. NADALA, HOFBOWER SANDUETA,
NERISA SANDUETA MICUBO, OSCAR SANDUETA, MARILYN SANDUETA VELASCO,
RONALD SANDUETA, and NAPOLEON SANDUETA, petitioners, vs. DOMINGO ROBLES,
HEIRS OF TEODORO ABAN, namely: NERIO ABAN, VIRGINIO ABAN, SUSANA ABAN, and
DAVID ABAN; HEIRS OF EUFRECENA** GALEZA, namely: CESAR GALEZA, NESTOR
GALEZA, ANGELA GALEZA, JUSTO GALEZA, KIA GALEZA PONCE, PORFERIA GALEZA
NALZARO, ROSARIO GALEZA VELASCO, HERMINIA GALEZA GUERRERO, and NONA
GALEZA NACARIO, respondents.
 Agrarian Reform; Right of Retention; The right of retention, as protected and enshrined
in the Constitution, balances the effects of compulsory land acquisition by granting the
landowner the right to choose the area to be retained subject to legislative standards.―The
right of retention, as protected and enshrined in the Constitution, balances the effects of
compulsory land acquisition by granting the
_______________
* SECOND DIVISION.
** “Eufrecina” in some parts of the records. See CA Rollo, p. 63.
492landowner the right to choose the area to be retained subject to legislative standards.
Necessarily, since the said right is granted to limit the effects of compulsory land acquisition
against the landowner, it is a prerequisite that the land falls under the coverage of the OLT
Program of the government. If the land is beyond the ambit of the OLT Program, the landowner
need not — as he should not — apply for retention since the appropriate remedy would be for
him to apply for exemption. As explained in the case of Daez v. CA (Daez), 325 SCRA 856
(2000): Exemption and retention in agrarian reform are two (2) distinct concepts. P.D. No. 27,
which implemented the Operation Land Transfer (OLT) Program, covers tenanted rice or corn
lands. The requisites for coverage under the OLT program are the following: (1) the land must
be devoted to rice or corn crops; and (2) there must be a system of share-crop or lease-tenancy
obtaining therein. If either requisite is absent, a landowner may apply for exemption. If either
of these requisites is absent, the land is not covered under OLT. Hence, a landowner
need not apply for retention where his ownership over the entire landholding is intact
and undisturbed.
Same; Same; Section 6 of RA 6657 states that covered landowners are allowed to retain
a portion of their tenanted agricultural land not, however, to exceed an area of five (5) has. and,
further thereto, provides that an additional three (3) has. may be awarded to each child of the
landowner, subject to the following qualifications: (1) that he is at least fifteen (15) years of age;
and (2) that he is actually tilling the land or directly managing the farm.―If the land is covered
by the OLT Program which hence, renders the right of retention operable, PD 27 — issued on
October 21, 1972 — confers in favor of covered landowners who cultivate or intend to cultivate
an area of their tenanted rice or corn land the right to retain an area of not more than seven (7)
has. thereof. Subsequently, or on June 10, 1998, Congress passed RA 6657 which modified
the retention limits under PD 27. In particular, Section 6 of RA 6657 states that covered
landowners are allowed to retain a portion of their tenanted agricultural land not, however, to
exceed an area of five (5) has. and, further thereto, provides that an additional three (3) has.
may be awarded to each child of the landowner, subject to the following qualifications: (1) that
he is at least fifteen (15) years of age; and (2) that he is actually tilling the land or directly
managing the farm.
Same; Same; While landowners who have not yet exercised their retention rights
493under PD 27 are entitled to new retention rights provided for by RA 6657, the
limitations under LOI 474 would equally apply to a landowner who filed an application under RA
6657.―It may be readily observed that LOI 474 amended PD 27 by removing any right of
retention from persons who own: (a) other agricultural lands of more than seven (7) has.
in aggregate areas; or (b) lands used for residential, commercial, industrial or other urban
purposes from which they derive adequate income to support themselves and their families. To
clarify, in Santiago v. Ortiz-Luis, 630 SCRA 670 (2010), the Court, citing the cases of Ass’n. of
Small Landowners in the Phils., Inc. v. Hon. Secretary of Agrarian Reform, 175 SCRA 343
(1989), and Heirs of Aurelio Reyes v. Garilao, 605 SCRA 294 (2009), stated that while
landowners who have not yet exercised their retention rights under PD 27 are entitled to new
retention rights provided for by RA 6657, the limitations under LOI 474 would equally apply to a
landowner who filed an application under RA 6657.
PETITION for review on certiorari of a decision of the Court of Appeals, Cagayan de Oro City.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
Benedicto O. Cainta for petitioners.
Osias Ochavo for respondents.
RESOLUTION
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:
Assailed in this petition for review on certiorari1 is the Decision2 dated April 26, 2012 of the
Court of Appeals, Cagayan de Oro City (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 03333 which affirmed DARCO
Order No. RT-0911-4143dated November 24, 2009 (November 24, 2009
_______________
1 Rollo, pp. 10-30.
2 Id., at pp. 31-38. Penned by Associate Justice Edgardo T. Lloren, with Associate Justices
Zenaida T. Galapate-Laguilles and Maria Elisa Sempio Diy, concurring.
3 CA Rollo, pp. 37-43. Signed by Secretary Nasser C. Pangandaman.
494DARCO Order) issued by former Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) Secretary Nasser
C. Pangandaman (Secretary Pangandaman).
The Facts
Petitioners are the heirs of Romulo and Isabel Sandueta (Sps. Sandueta) who died intestate
in 1987 and 1996, respectively, and accordingly inherited several agricultural lands situated in
Dipolog City, Zamboanga del Norte, with a total land area of 18.7433 hectares (has.). 4 One of
these parcels of land is Lot No. 3419, with an area of 13.7554 has.5 covered by Transfer
Certificate of Title (TCT) No. T-5988.6 The 4.6523-hectare riceland portion (subject portion) of
the foregoing lot was tenanted by Eufrecena Galeza, Teodoro Aban, and Domingo
Pableo7 (tenants) who were instituted as such by the original owner, Diosdado Jasmin, prior to
its sale to Sps. Sandueta.8
The subject portion was placed under the government’s Operation Land Transfer (OLT)
Program pursuant to Presidential Decree No. (PD) 27 9 and consequently awarded to the above-
named tenants who were issued the corresponding Emancipation Patents (EPs). 10
_______________
4 Id., at p. 23.
5 Id., at p. 38.
6 Id., at p. 62. Including the dorsal portion.
7 Id., at pp. 23-24.
8 Id., at p. 25.
9 “DECREEING THE EMANCIPATION OF TENANTS FROM THE BONDAGE OF THE SOIL,
TRANSFERRING TO THEM THE OWNERSHIP OF THE LAND THEY TILL AND PROVIDING THE
INSTRUMENTS AND MECHANISM THEREFOR.”
10 CA Rollo, pp. 23-24.
495The Proceedings Before the DAR
On July 7, 2005, petitioners filed before the DAR District Office in Dipolog City a
petition11 seeking to exercise their right of retention over the subject portion pursuant to Section
6 of Republic Act No. (RA) 6657,12known as the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law of 1988,
and as enumerated in the case of Ass’n. of Small Landowners in the Phils., Inc. v. Hon.
Secretary of Agrarian Reform13 (Ass’n. of Small Landowners). They also sought to annul the
EPs of the tenants as well as compel the tenants to pay back rentals. 14
The Provincial Protest Application and Resolution Unit referred the case to the Municipal
Agrarian Reform Officer of Dipolog City who, after investigation, recommended the denial of the
petition.15 On the other hand, the Provincial Agrarian Reform Officer (PARO), while similarly
recommending the denial of the petition for retention, nevertheless recommended the grant of
a 5-hectare retention area for petitioners to be taken from the portion of Lot No. 3419 not
covered by the OLT Program.16
On April 5, 2006, the DAR Regional Office No. IX, through Regional Director Julita R.
Ragandang (Director Ragandang) issued an Order 17 (April 5, 2006 Order) adopting the PARO’s
recommendation. Director Ragandang explained that a landowner who failed to exercise his
right of retention under PD 27 can avail of the right to retain an area not exceeding 5 has.
_______________
11 Id., at pp. 52-59. Dated June 30, 2005.
12 “AN ACT INSTITUTING A COMPREHENSIVE AGRARIAN REFORM PROGRAM TO PROMOTE
SOCIAL JUSTICE AND INDUSTRIALIZATION, PROVIDING THE MECHANISM FOR ITS IMPLEMENTATION,
AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES.”
13 256 Phil. 777; 175 SCRA 343 (1989).
14 CA Rollo, pp. 56-57.
15 Id., at pp. 32-33.
16 Id., at p. 39.
17 Id., at pp. 22-30.
496pursuant to Section 6 of RA 6657,18 adding that this award is different from that which may
be granted to the children of the landowner, to the extent of 3 has. each, in their own right as
beneficiaries.19 However, to be entitled thereto, each child must meet the age qualification and
requirement of actual cultivation of the land or direct management of the farm under Section 6,
as well as the other conditions under Section 2220 of RA 6657. As petitioners were absentee
landowners who
_______________
18 Id., at p. 27.
19 Id., at p. 29.
20 SEC. 22. Qualified Beneficiaries.—The lands covered by the CARP shall be
distributed as much as possible to landless residents of the same barangay, or in the absence
thereof, landless residents of the same municipality in the following order of priority:
(a) agricultural lessees and share tenants;
(b) regular farm workers;
(c) seasonal farm workers;
(d) other farm workers;
(e) actual tillers or occupants of public lands;
(f) collective or cooperatives of the above beneficiaries; and
(g) others directly working on the land.
Provided, however, That the children of landowners who are qualified under Section 6 of
this Act shall be given preference in the distribution of the land of their parents; and: Provided,
further, that actual tenant-tillers in the landholding shall not be ejected or removed therefrom.
Beneficiaries under Presidential Decree No. 27 who have culpably sold, disposed of, or
abandoned their land are disqualified to become beneficiaries under their program.
A basic qualification of a beneficiary shall be his willingness, aptitude and ability to cultivate
and make land as productive as possible. The DAR shall adopt a system of monitoring the
record or performance of each beneficiary, so that any beneficiary guilty of negligence or misuse
of the land or any support extended to him shall forfeit his right to continue as such beneficiary.
The DAR shall submit periodic reports on the performance of the beneficiaries to the PARC.
497had left the cultivation of the subject portion entirely to the tenants, Director Ragandang
therefore concluded that they are not entitled to exercise retention rights thereon 21 and, hence,
denied their petition for retention. Despite such denial, Director Ragandang granted the
decedent Romulo Sandueta the right to retain 5 has. from the portion of Lot No. 3419 not
covered by the OLT Program.
Dissatisfied, petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration, essentially arguing that their right
to choose the retention area is guaranteed by Section 6 of RA 6657. In an Order 22 dated July
14, 2006, Director Ragandang denied the motion and explained that landowners covered by
PD 27 who failed to exercise their right of retention which subsequently led to the distribution of
the EPs to the tenants, have no right to choose the area to be retained. 23 Moreover, she pointed
out that under Letter of Instruction No. 474 (LOI 474), landowners who own less than 24 has.
of tenanted rice lands but additionally own more than 7 has. of other agricultural lands may not
retain their tenanted rice lands.24 Since petitioners failed to exercise their right or manifest their
intention of retention prior to the issuance of their tenants’ EPs and considering further that they
own about 14.0910 has. of other agricultural
_______________
If, due to landowner’s retention rights or to the number of tenants, lessees, or workers on
the land, there is not enough land to accommodate any or some of them, they may be granted
ownership of other lands available for distribution under this Act, at the option of the
beneficiaries.
Farmers already in place and those not accommodated in the distribution of privately-
owned lands will be given preferential rights in the distribution of lands from the public domain.
21 CA Rollo, p. 29.
22 Id., at pp. 32-36.
23 Id., at p. 35. In consonance with DAR Administrative Order No. 05, series of 2000
(Revised Rules and Procedures for the Exercise of Retention Right by Landowners).
24 Id., at p. 34.
498lands, Director Ragandang declared them to have no right to choose their retained area of
5 has., which can be accommodated in their other landholdings not covered under the OLT
Program.25
On appeal, Secretary Pangandaman issued the November 24, 2009 DARCO Order
affirming in toto Director Ragandang’s April 5, 2006 Order.
The CA Ruling
In a Decision26 dated April 26, 2012, the CA (a) held that the subject portion was
appropriately covered by the OLT Program pursuant to LOI 474; (b) declared that petitioners
do not have the absolute right to choose their retention area considering their ownership of
14.0910 has. of other agricultural lands; and (c) affirmed Secretary Pangandaman’s dismissal
of the petition for retention under Section 6 of RA 6657.27
On May 31, 2012, petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration 28 which was denied by the
CA in a Resolution29 dated August 14, 2012. Hence, the instant petition.
The Issue Before the Court
 The essential issue in this case is whether or not petitioners are entitled to avail of any
retention right under Section 6 of RA 6657.
_______________
25 Id., at pp. 34-35.
26 Rollo, pp. 31-38.
27 Id., at pp. 37-38.
28 CA Rollo, pp. 156-160. Dated May 21, 2012.
29 Id., at pp. 39-40. Penned by Associate Justice Edgardo T. Lloren, with Associate
Justices Edgardo A. Camello and Maria Elisa Sempio Diy, concurring.
499
The Court’s Ruling
The right of retention, as protected and enshrined in the Constitution, balances the effects
of compulsory land acquisition by granting the landowner the right to choose the area to be
retained subject to legislative standards.30 Necessarily, since the said right is granted to limit
the effects of compulsory land acquisition against the landowner, it is a prerequisite that the
land falls under the coverage of the OLT Program of the government. If the land is beyond the
ambit of the OLT Program, the landowner need not — as he should not — apply for retention
since the appropriate remedy would be for him to apply for exemption. As explained in the case
of Daez v. CA31 (Daez):
Exemption and retention in agrarian reform are two (2) distinct concepts.
P.D. No. 27, which implemented the Operation Land Transfer (OLT) Program,
covers tenanted rice or corn lands. The requisites for coverage under the OLT program
are the following: (1) the land must be devoted to rice or corn crops; and (2) there must
be a system of
_______________
30 Santiago v. Ortiz-Luis, G.R. Nos. 186184 & 186988, September 20, 2010, 630 SCRA
670, 678, citing Section 4, Article XIII of the 1987 Philippine Constitution which reads as follows:
“The State shall, by law, undertake an agrarian reform program founded on the right of farmers
and regular farmworkers, who are landless, to own directly or collectively the lands they till or,
in the case of other farmworkers, to receive a just share of the fruits thereof. To this end, the
State shall encourage and undertake the just distribution of all agricultural lands, subject to
such priorities and reasonable retention limits as the Congress may prescribe, taking into
account ecological, developmental or equity considerations and subject to the payment of just
compensation. In determining retention limits, the State shall respect the right of small
landowners. The State shall further provide incentives for voluntary land-sharing.” (Emphasis
supplied)
31 382 Phil. 742; 325 SCRA 856 (2000).
500share-crop or lease-tenancy obtaining therein. If either requisite is absent, a
landowner may apply for exemption. If either of these requisites is absent, the land
is not covered under OLT. Hence, a landowner need not apply for retention where
his ownership over the entire landholding is intact and undisturbed. (Emphasis
and underscoring supplied)
If the land is covered by the OLT Program which hence, renders the right of retention
operable, PD 27 — issued on October 21, 1972 — confers in favor of covered landowners who
cultivate or intend to cultivate an area of their tenanted rice or corn land the right to retain an
area of not more than seven (7) has. thereof. 32Subsequently, or on June 10, 1998, Congress
passed RA 6657 which modified the retention limits under PD 27. In particular, Section 6 of RA
6657 states that covered landowners are allowed to retain a portion of their tenanted agricultural
land not, however, to exceed an area of five (5) has. and, further thereto, provides that an
additional three (3) has. may be awarded to each child of the landowner, subject to the following
qualifications: (1) that he is at least fifteen (15) years of age; and (2) that he is actually tilling the
land or directly managing the farm.33 In the case of Heirs of
_______________
32 PD 27 provides:
xxxx
The tenant farmer, whether in land classified as landed estate or not, shall be
deemed owner of a portion constituting a family-size farm of five (5) hectares if not
irrigated and three (3) hectares if irrigated;
In all cases, the landowner may retain an area of not more than seven (7) hectares
if such landowner is cultivating such area or will now cultivate it;
x x x x.
33 SEC. 6. Retention Limits.—Except as otherwise provided in this Act, no person may
own or retain, directly, any public or private agricultural land, the size of which shall vary
according to factors governing a viable family-sized farm, such as commodity produced,
501Aurelio Reyes v. Garilao34 (Reyes), however, the Court held that a landowner’s retention
rights under RA 6657 are restricted by the conditions set forth in LOI 474 issued on October 21,
1976 which reads:
WHEREAS, last year I ordered that small landowners of tenanted rice/corn lands
with areas of less than twenty-four hectares but above seven hectares shall
retain not more than seven hectares of such lands except when they own other
agricultural lands containing more than seven hectares or land
_______________
terrain, infrastructure, and soil fertility as determined by the Presidential Agrarian Reform
Council (PARC) created hereunder, but in no case shall the retention by the landowner exceed
five (5) hectares. Three (3) hectares may be awarded to each child of the landowner, subject to
the following qualifications: (1) that he is at least fifteen (15) years of age; and (2) that he is
actually tilling the land or directly managing the farm: Provided, That landowners whose lands
have been covered by Presidential Decree No. 27 shall be allowed to keep the area originally
retained by them thereunder; Provided, further, That original homestead grantees or direct
compulsory heirs who still own the original homestead at the time of the approval of this Act
shall retain the same areas as long as they continue to cultivate said homestead.
The right to choose the area to be retained, which shall be compact or contiguous, shall
pertain, to the landowner: Provided, however, That in case the area selected for retention by
the landowner is tenanted, the tenant shall have the option to choose whether to remain therein
or be a beneficiary in the same or another agricultural land with similar or comparable features.
In case the tenant chooses to remain in the retained area, he shall be considered a leaseholder
and shall lose his right to be a beneficiary under this Act. In case the tenant chooses to be a
beneficiary in another agricultural land, he loses his right as a leaseholder to the land retained
by the landowner. The tenant must exercise this option within a period of one (1) year from the
time the landowner manifests his choice of the area for retention.
34 See G.R. No. 136466, November 25, 2009, 605 SCRA 294, 304.
502used for residential, commercial, industrial or other urban purposes from
which they derive adequate income to support themselves and their families;
 WHEREAS, the Department of Agrarian Reform found that in the course of
implementing my directive there are many landowners of tenanted rice/corn lands with
areas of seven hectares or less who also own other agricultural lands containing more
than seven hectares or lands used for residential, commercial, industrial or other urban
purposes where they derive adequate income to support themselves and their families;
WHEREAS, it is therefore necessary to cover said lands under the Land Transfer
Program of the government to emancipate the tenant-farmers therein.
NOW, THEREFORE, I, FERDINAND E. MARCOS, President of the Philippines, do
hereby order the following:
1. You shall undertake to place under the Land Transfer Program of the
government pursuant to Presidential Decree No. 27, all tenanted rice/corn
lands with areas of seven hectares or less belonging to landowners who own
other agricultural lands of more than seven hectares in aggregate areas or lands
used for residential, commercial, industrial or other urban purposes from which
they derive adequate income to support themselves and their families.
2. Landowners who may choose to be paid the cost of their lands by the Land Bank
of the Philippines shall be paid in accordance with the mode of payment provided in
Letter of Instructions No. 273 dated May 7, 1973.35(Emphases and underscoring
supplied)
_______________
35 LOI 474 dated October 21, 1976. See also Ministry Memorandum Circular No. 18-81
entitled, “Clarificatory Guidelines on Coverage of P.D. No. 27 and Retention by Small
Landowners.”
503Based on the above-cited provisions, it may be readily observed that LOI 474 amended
PD 27 by removing any right of retention from persons who own:
(a) other agricultural lands of more than seven (7) has. in aggregate areas; or
(b) lands used for residential, commercial, industrial or other urban purposes from
which they derive adequate income to support themselves and their families.
To clarify, in Santiago v. Ortiz-Luis,36 the Court, citing the cases of Ass’n. of Small
Landowners37 and Reyes,38 stated that while landowners who have not yet exercised their
retention rights under PD 27 are entitled to new retention rights provided for by RA 6657, the
limitations under LOI 474 would equally apply to a landowner who filed an application under RA
6657.
In this case, records reveal that aside from the 4.6523-hectare tenanted riceland covered
by the OLT Program, i.e., the subject portion, petitioners’ predecessors-in-interest, Sps.
Sandueta, own other agricultural lands with a total area of 14.0910 has. which therefore triggers
the application of the first disqualifying condition under LOI 474 as above-highlighted. As such,
petitioners, being mere successors-in-interest, cannot be said to have acquired any retention
right to the subject portion. Accordingly, the subject portion would fall under the complete
coverage of the OLT Program hence, the 5 and 3-hectare retention limits as well as the
landowner’s right to choose the area to be retained under Section 6 of RA 6657 would not apply
altogether.
Nevertheless, while the CA properly upheld the denial of the petition for retention, the Court
must point out that the November 24, 2009 DARCO Order inaccurately phrased Romulo
Sandueta’s entitlement to the remaining 14.0910-
_______________
36 Supra note 30, at p. 681.
37 Supra note 13, at p. 826; p. 392.
38 Supra note 34, at p. 313.
504hectare landholding, outside of the 4.6523-hectare subject portion, as a vestige of his
retention right. Since the 14.0910-hectare landholding was not shown to be tenanted and hence,
outside the coverage of the OLT Program, there would be no right of retention, in its technical
sense, to speak of. Keeping with the Court’s elucidation in Daez, retention is an agrarian reform
law concept which is only applicable when the land is covered by the OLT Program; this is not,
however, the case with respect to the 14.0910-hectare landholding. Thus, if only to correct any
confusion in terminology, Romulo Sandueta’s right over the 14.0910-hectare landholding should
not be deemed to be pursuant to any retention right but rather to his ordinary right of ownership
as it appears from the findings of the DAR that the landholding is not covered by the OLT
Program.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. Accordingly, the Decision dated April 26, 2012 of
the Court of Appeals, Cagayan de Oro City in CA-G.R. SP No. 03333 insofar as it upheld the
denial of the petition for retention in this case is hereby AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
Carpio (Chairperson), Brion, Del Castillo and Perez, JJ., concur.
Petition denied, judgment affirmed.
Notes.―The right of retention, as protected and enshrined in the Constitution, balances
the effect of compulsory land acquisition by granting the landowner the right to choose the area
to be retained subject to legislative standards. (Santiago vs. Ortiz-Luis, 630 SCRA 670 [2010])
Landowners who have not yet exercised their retention rights under Presidential Decree
No. 27 are entitled to new retention rights provided for by Republic Act No. 6657. (Ibid.)
G.R. No. 199008. November 19, 2014.*
DANILO ALMERO, TERESITA ALAGON, CELIA BULASO, LUDY RAMADA, REGINA
GEGREMOSA, ISIDRO LAZARTE, THELMA EMBARQUE, FELIPE LAZARTE, GUILERMA
LAZARTE, DULCESIMA BENIMELE, petitioners, vs. HEIRS OF MIGUEL PACQUING, as
represented by LINDA PACQUINGFADRILAN, respondents.
Remedial Law; Civil Procedure; Appeals; Under Rule 43 of the Rules of Court, an appeal
from the awards, judgments, final orders or resolutions of or authorized by any quasi-judicial
agency such as the Office of the President (OP), in the exercise of its quasi-judicial functions
shall be filed to the Court of Appeals (CA) within a period of fifteen (15) days from notice of,
publication or denial of a motion for new trial or reconsideration.—Under Rule 43 of the Rules
of Court, an appeal from the awards, judgments, final orders or resolutions of or authorized by
any quasi-judicial agency such as the Office of the President, in the exercise of its quasi-judicial
functions shall be filed to the CA within a period of fifteen (15) days from notice of, publication
or denial of a motion for new trial or reconsideration. The appeal may involve questions of fact,
of law, or mixed questions of fact and law.
Same; Same; Same; A direct resort to the Supreme Court (SC) may be allowed in cases
where only questions of law are raised.—A
_______________
* SECOND DIVISION.
210
210 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Almero vs. Heirs of Miguel Pacquing
 direct resort to this Court, however, may be allowed in cases where only questions
of law are raised. A question of law exists when the doubt or controversy concerns the correct
application of law or jurisprudence to a certain set of facts; or when the issue does not call for
an examination of the probative value of the evidence presented, the truth or falsehood of facts
being admitted.
Agrarian Reform; Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law; Republic Act (RA) No. 6657 or
the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law (CARL) of 1988 covers all public and private
agricultural lands as provided in Proclamation No. 131 and Executive Order (E.O.) No.
229, including other lands of the public domain suitable for agriculture.—R.A. No. 6657 or the
Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law (CARL) of 1988 covers all public and private agricultural
lands as provided in Proclamation No. 131 and E.O. No. 229, including other lands of the public
domain suitable for agriculture. Section 4 of R.A. 6657, as amended, specifically lists the lands
covered by the CARP, which include: (a) All alienable and disposable lands of the public domain
devoted to or suitable for agriculture. No reclassification of forest or mineral lands to agricultural
lands shall be undertaken after the approval of this Act until Congress, taking into account
ecological, developmental and equity considerations, shall have determined by law, the specific
limits of the public domain; (b) All lands of the public domain in excess to the specific limits as
determined by Congress in the preceding paragraph; (c) All other lands owned by the
Government devoted to or suitable for agriculture; and (d) all private lands devoted to or suitable
for agriculture regardless of the agricultural products raised or that can be raised thereon.
Same; Same; Section 10 of Republic Act (RA) No. 6657, as amended, expressly provides
for the lands exempted or excluded from the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program
(CARP).—Section 10 of R.A. 6657, as amended, expressly provides for the lands exempted or
excluded from the CARP, namely: (a) Lands actually, directly and exclusively used for parks,
wildlife, forest reserves, reforestation, fish sanctuaries and breeding grounds, watersheds and
mangroves shall be exempt from the coverage of this Act; (b) Private lands actually, directly
and exclusively used for prawn farms and fishponds shall be exempt from the coverage of this
Act: Provided, that said prawn farms and fishponds have not been distributed and Certificate of
Land Ownership (CLOA) issued under the Agrarian Reform Pro-
211
VOL. 741, NOVEMBER 19, 2014 211
Almero vs. Heirs of Miguel Pacquing
gram; and x x x x (c) Lands actually, directly and exclusively used and found to be
necessary for national defense, school sites and campuses, including experimental farms
stations operated by public or private schools for educational purposes, seeds and seedlings
research and pilot production centers, church sites and covenants appurtenant thereto, mosque
sites and Islamic centers appurtenant thereto, communal burial grounds and cemeteries, penal
colonies and penal farms actually worked by the inmates, government and private research and
quarantine centers and all lands with eighteen percent (18%) slope and over, except those
already developed, shall be exempt from the coverage of this Act.
Same; Same; Homesteads; Conditions for Retention of Homestead by the Grantees or
their Compulsory Heirs.—In order for the homestead grantees or their direct compulsory heirs
to retain or keep their homestead, the following conditions must first be satisfied: (a) they must
still be the owners of the original homestead at the time of the CARL’s effectivity, and (b) they
must continue to cultivate the homestead land. In this case, Linda, as the direct compulsory heir
of the original homestead grantee, is no longer cultivating the subject homestead land. The OP
misinterpreted our ruling in Paris v. Alfeche, 364 SCRA 110 (2001), when it held that Linda’s
mere expression of her desire to continue or to start anew with the cultivation of the land would
suffice to exempt the subject homestead land from the CARL.
Leonen, J., Dissenting Opinion:
Remedial Law; Civil Procedure; Appeals; Petition for Review on Certiorari; Court of
Appeals; View that under Rule 43 of the Rules of Court, decisions of the Office of the President
(OP) are appealed before the Court of Appeals (CA) through a Petition for Review raising
questions of fact, of law, or mixed questions of fact and law.—Under Rule 43 of the Rules of
Court, decisions of the Office of the President are appealed before the Court of Appeals through
a Petition for Review raising questions of fact, of law, or mixed questions of fact and law. The
Appeal must be filed within 15 days from notice of the decision or resolution denying the Motion
for Reconsideration as provided in Rule 43, Sections 1 and 4.
212
212 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Almero vs. Heirs of Miguel Pacquing
Same; Same; Same; Same; View that under Rule 45, Section 2 of the Rules of Court, a
Petition for Review on Certiorari must be filed within fifteen (15) days from notice of the assailed
Decision or Resolution.—It is true that a Petition for Review on Certiorari may be directly filed
before this court if the Petition raises pure questions of law. However, even assuming that
Almero, et al.’s Petition raises pure questions of law, this court should have dismissed outright
Almero, et al.’s Petition for having been filed out of time. Under Rule 45, Section 2 of the Rules
of Court, a Petition for Review on Certiorari must be filed within 15 days from notice of the
assailed Decision or Resolution.
Agrarian Reform; Words and Phrases; View that agrarian reform is the “redistribution of
lands, regardless of crops or fruits produced, to farmers and regular farmworkers who are
landless.”—Agrarian reform is the “redistribution of lands, regardless of crops or fruits produced,
to farmers and regular farmworkers who are landless.” It includes not only the physical
redistribution of lands but also other alternative arrangements, such as production or profit-
sharing, labor administration, and the redistribution of shares of stock all aimed to lift the
economic status of the property’s farmer-beneficiaries.
Same; View that as a general rule, all agricultural lands, whether public or private, are
covered by the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program (CARP).—As a general rule, all
agricultural lands, whether public or private, are covered by the Comprehensive Agrarian
Reform Program. An agricultural land refers to land devoted to any of the following agricultural
activities: cultivation of the soil, planting of crops, growing of fruit trees, raising of livestock,
poultry or fish, including the harvesting of such farm products, and other farm activities and
practices performed by a farmer in conjunction with such farming operations done by persons
whether natural or juridical.
Same; Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law; View that Section 10 of the
Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law (CARL) provides for the properties exempt from agrarian
reform coverage.—As for the properties exempt from agrarian reform coverage, Section 10 of
the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law provides: SEC. 10. Exemptions and Exclusions.—
Lands actually, directly and exclusively used and
213
VOL. 741, NOVEMBER 19, 2014 213
 Almero vs. Heirs of Miguel Pacquing
found to be necessary for parks, wildlife, forest reserves, reforestation, fish sanctuaries
and breeding grounds, watersheds and mangroves, national defense, school sites and
campuses including experimental farm stations operated by public or private schools for
educational purposes, seeds and seedlings research and pilot production centers, church sites
and convents appurtenant thereto, mosque sites and Islamic centers appurtenant thereto,
communal burial grounds and cemeteries, penal colonies and penal farms actually worked by
the inmates, government and private research and quarantine centers and all lands with
eighteen percent (18%) slope and over, except those already developed shall be exempt from
the coverage of this Act.
Same; Constitutional Law; View that under Article XIII, Section 6 of the Constitution,
distribution of lands through agrarian reform is “subject to prior rights, homestead rights of small
settlers, and the rights of indigenous cultural communities to their ancestral lands.”—Although
a social justice measure, agrarian reform is subject to limitations. Under Article XIII, Section 6
of the Constitution, distribution of lands through agrarian reform is “subject to prior rights,
homestead rights of small settlers, and the rights of indigenous cultural communities to their
ancestral lands”: Section 6. The State shall apply the principles of agrarian reform or
stewardship, whenever applicable in accordance with law, in the disposition or utilization of
other natural resources, including lands of the public domain under lease or concession suitable
to agriculture, subject to prior rights, homestead rights of small settlers, and the rights of
indigenous cultural communities to their ancestral lands.
Same; Homesteads; View that under Section 12 of the Public Land Act, an applicant
“may enter a homestead of not exceeding twenty-four (24) hectares of agricultural land of the
public domain.”—Chapter IV of Commonwealth Act No. 141 or the Public Land Act governs the
grant of homestead patents. Under Section 12 of the law, an applicant “may enter a homestead
of not exceeding twenty-four hectares of agricultural land of the public domain.” A homestead
patent or title to the homestead is issued only if the applicant has improved and cultivated at
least one-fifth of the agricultural land applied for.
214
214 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Almero vs. Heirs of Miguel Pacquing
Same; Same; View that the state grants homestead rights “to encourage residence upon
and the cultivation and improvement of [agricultural lands] of the public domain.”—The state
grants homestead rights “to encourage residence upon and the cultivation and improvement of
[agricultural lands] of the public domain.” In Jocson v. Soriano, 45 Phil. 375 (1923), this court
further explained the purpose of granting and protecting homesteads: [The object of homestead
laws] is to provide a home for each citizen of the Government, where his family may shelter and
live beyond the reach of financial misfortune, and to inculcate in individuals those feelings of
independence which are essential to the maintenance of free institutions. Furthermore, the state
itself is concerned that the citizens shall not be divested of a means of support, and reduced to
pauperism. The conservation of a family home is the purpose of homestead laws. The policy of
the state is to foster families as the factors of society, and thus promote general welfare. The
sentiment of patriotism and independence, the spirit of free citizenship, the feeling of interest in
public affairs, are cultivated and fostered more readily when the citizen lives permanently in his
own home, with a sense of its protection and durability.
Same; Same; View that the Supreme Court (SC) affirmed the Court of Appeals’ (CA’s)
Decision, ruling that “parcels of land covered by homestead patents are not automatically
exempt from the operation of land reform.”—This court affirmed the Court of Appeals’ Decision,
ruling that “parcels of land . . . covered by homestead patents [are] not automatically exempt . .
. from the operation of land reform.” Section 6 of the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law
allows homesteaders to retain their land “as long as they continue to cultivate [their]
homestead.” Therefore, “it is the fact of continued cultivation by the original grantees or their
direct compulsory heirs that shall exempt their lands from land reform coverage.”
Same; Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law; View that in providing that homesteaders
may retain their land “as long as they continue to cultivate said homestead,” Section 6 of the
Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law (CARL) is unconstitutional.—In providing that
homesteaders may retain their land “as long as they continue to cultivate said homestead,”
Section 6 of the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law is unconstitutional. The Constitution does
not require homesteaders to show their intention to cultivate their land before
215
VOL. 741, NOVEMBER 19, 2014 215
Almero vs. Heirs of Miguel Pacquing
their properties are exempted from agrarian reform coverage. Under the law, homestead
patents are granted only if the applicants have proven to the satisfaction of the Director of Lands
that they have entered, improved, and cultivated the land applied for. It must therefore be
presumed that grantees of homestead patents cultivate their land.
Same; Same; View that in the alternative, this case must be elevated to the court En
Banc considering that the constitutionality of Section 6 of the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform
Law (CARL) is at issue in this case.—In the alternative, this case must be elevated to the
court En Banc considering that the constitutionality of Section 6 of the Comprehensive Agrarian
Reform Law is at issue in this case. Rule 2, Section 3(a) of the Internal Rules of the Supreme
Court provides: Section 3. Court En Banc matters and cases.—The Court En Banc shall act on
the following matters and cases: (a) cases in which the constitutionality or validity of any treaty,
international or executive agreement, law, executive order, presidential decree, proclamation,
order, instruction, ordinance, or regulation is in question[.]
PETITION for review on certiorari of the decision and resolution of the Office of the President.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
Benjamin T. Etulle for petitioners.
Chato & Vinzons-Chato for respondents.
BRION, J.:
Before this Court is a petition for review on certiorari1 filed under Rule 45 of the Rules of
Court directly assailing the February 16, 2011 decision2 and July 19, 2011 resolution3 of the
Office of the President (OP) in OP Case No. 10-C-152. The OP recalled and cancelled the
Certificate of Land Ownership
_______________
1 Dated November 11, 2011; Rollo, pp. 35-49.
2 Id., at pp. 51-55.
3 Id., at pp. 68-69.
 216
216 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Almero vs. Heirs of Miguel Pacquing
Awards (CLOAs) issued to the petitioners covering certain homestead lots that formed part
of the Pacquing Estate, a 23.6272-hectare property located in Cuambogan, Tagum City.
Factual Antecedents
Miguel Pacquing acquired agricultural lands (the property) with a total area of 23.6272
hectares in Cuambogan, Tagum City through Homestead Patent No. V-33775. These lands
were registered on January 6, 1955 with the Register of Deeds under Original Certificate of Title
No. (P-2590) P-653.
The records show that, on August 5, 1991, the Municipal Agrarian Reform Officer (MARO)
sent Miguel’s representative a Notice of Coverage placing the Pacquing Estate under the
Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program (CARP). Miguel failed to reply to the notice and,
instead filed a Voluntary Offer to Sell (VOS) with the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) on
August 31, 1991. Miguel, however, died during the pendency of the VOS proceedings. Miguel’s
wife, Salome, had died five years earlier.
In January 1992, respondent Linda Pacquing-Fadrilan, sole heir of the spouses Pacquing,
executed an affidavit adjudicating to herself ownership of the property. In August of the same
year, she filed an application for retention with the DAR Regional Director who denied Linda’s
application in an order dated December 14, 1993. The order denying Linda’s application for
retention later became final and executory.
On June 25, 1994, certain individuals, including the present petitioners who were earlier
identified as farmer-beneficiaries of the subject land, were issued CLOAs over their respective
cultivated portions of the property.
On October 20, 1999, Linda, through her attorney-in-fact, Samuel Osias, filed with the
Office of the Provincial Adjudicator in Tagum City a petition to cancel the petitioners’ CLOAs.
The Provincial Adjudicator later dismissed the petition due to Linda’s failure to file her position
paper. She appealed the217
VOL. 741, NOVEMBER 19, 2014 217
Almero vs. Heirs of Miguel Pacquing
dismissal with the Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board (DARAB).
It appears that, in the meantime, Transfer Certificates of Title (TCTs) covering portions of
the property were issued to Napoleon Villa, Sr., et al., who had been contracted by Linda, under
an agricultural leasehold agreement, to cultivate the lands.
In a resolution dated June 29, 2001, the DARAB nullified the TCTs issued to Napoleon
Villa, Sr., et al. and reinstated Linda’s title to the property. At the same time, the DARAB
ordered the generation and issuance of titles to the petitioners and other farmer-
beneficiaries of the subject land. In a subsequent resolution dated September 28, 2001, the
DARAB validated the TCTs issued to the following individuals: Danilo Almero, Celia Bulaso,
Ludy Ramada, Isidro Lazarte, Cepriano Lazarte, Thelma Emorque, Domingo Juanico, Candido
Labeste and Renato Benimate.
Root of the present petition: Petition to Recall and Cancel the petitioners’ CLOAs
Linda again sought to recall and cancel the petitioners’ CLOAs by filing a petition with the
DAR, which the latter endorsed to the DAR Regional Office. Linda argued that the DARAB erred
in distributing portions of the land to the petitioners because the entire property was supposed
to be exempt from CARP coverage. The petitioners opposed Linda’s petition.
In an order dated December 18, 2008, the DAR Regional Director ruled that the Pacquing
Estate was subject to CARP and that the CLOAs issued to the petitioners were valid. Linda filed
an appeal to the DAR Secretary.
In an order dated August 18, 2009, former DAR Secretary Nasser C. Pangandaman denied
Linda’s appeal under the following terms:
218
218 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Almero vs. Heirs of Miguel Pacquing
“x x x, under Section 6 of R.A. No. 6657, there are two requisites to exempt homestead
lands from CARP coverage. First, the homestead grantee or his direct compulsory heir(s) still
own the original homestead at the time of the effectivity of R.A. No. 6657 on 15 June 1988;
and second, the original homestead grantee or his direct compulsory heir(s) was cultivating the
homestead as of 15 June 1988 and continues to cultivate the same.
In this case, it is undisputed that the subject landholdings were still owned by the
original homestead grantees at the time of the effectivity of R.A. No. 6657. However, the
said homestead grantees no longer cultivate the same. Therefore, on this score, the
subject landholdings cannot be exempted from CARP coverage.” (Emphasis ours)
Linda appealed the DAR Secretary’s August 18, 2009 order to the OP.
In a decision dated February 16, 2011, the OP, through Executive Secretary Paquito N.
Ochoa, Jr., reversed the DAR Secretary’s August 18, 2009 Order and recalled and cancelled
the petitioners’ CLOAs. The OP held that:
“x x x, the fact that petitioners-appellants (referring to the respondent Linda), since the
beginning, have always protested the issuance of the CLOAs to the respondents-appellees
(referring to the petitioners) is a clear demonstration of their willingness to continue with the
cultivation of the subject landholdings, or to start anew with the cultivation or even to direct the
management of the farm.
Given the foregoing, petitioners-appellants should be given the chance to exercise their
rights as heirs of the homestead grantee to continue to cultivate the homestead lots either
personally or directly managing the farm pursuant to the pronouncement in the Paris case. They
still own the original homestead issued to their predecessor-in-interest and have manifested
their in-
219
VOL. 741, NOVEMBER 19, 2014 219
Almero vs. Heirs of Miguel Pacquing
tention to continue with the cultivation of the homestead lots.”4 (Emphasis supplied)
The petitioners moved to reconsider the decision, but the OP denied their motion in a
resolution5 dated July 19, 2011.
With no appeal or petition for review filed with the Court of Appeals within the fifteen (15)-
day appeal period, the DAR Bureau of Agrarian Legal Assistance issued on August 22,
2011 a Certificate of Finality6 declaring as final and executory the OP’s February 16, 2011
decision and July 19, 2011 resolution. The petitioners, however, contest the finality of the
OP’s decision and allege that their counsel only received a certified copy of the OP’s resolution
denying their motion for reconsideration on September 29, 2011.
On November 14, 2011, the petitioners directly filed with this Court a petition for review
on certiorari under Rule 45 assailing the subject OP’s decision and resolution.
The Petition
The petitioners raise the following issues:
I. WHO WILL ISSUE A CERTIFICATE OF FINALITY OF THE DECISION WHEN THE
DECISION OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCY IS REVERSE (sic) ON APPEAL BY THE
OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT?
II. ARE LANDS UNDER THE HOMESTEAD GRANT, EXEMPT FROM AGRARIAN
REFORM COVERAGE UNDER SECTION 6 OF R.A. 6657, EVEN IF THE HEIR OF THE
PATENTEE IS NOT CULTIVATING THE LAND, BUT AND HAD EVEN
_______________
4 Id., at p. 11.
5 Supra note 3.
6 Rollo, pp. 73-74.
220
220 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Almero vs. Heirs of Miguel Pacquing
OFFERED THE SAME UNDER THE VOLUNTARY OFFER TO SELL SCHEME?
III. IN CARP COVERAGE, IS DEPOSIT OF LANDOWNER’S COMPENSATION WITH
LAND BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES ENOUGH TO TRANSFER TITLE TO THE STATE, EVEN
IF THE OWNER DOES NOT ACCEPT THE SAME?7 (Emphasis supplied)
Pleadings Subsequent to the Petition
In her comment dated March 16, 2012,8 Linda counter-argues that the present petition
should be denied outright for being an improper mode of appeal: the appeal from the OP’s
assailed decision and resolution should have been filed with the CA via a petition for review
under Rule 43 and not directly with this Court via a petition for review on certiorari under Rule
45.
The petitioners filed their counter-comment/reply9asking this Court to decide the present
case not on technicalities but based on its merits, and that the Court, instead, treat their petition
as a special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65.
Our Ruling
We see MERIT in the present petition.
First, we address the procedural issue raised by the respondent.
Under Rule 43 of the Rules of Court, an appeal from the awards, judgments, final orders or
resolutions of or authorized by any quasi-judicial agency such as the Office of the President, in
the exercise of its quasi-judicial functions shall
_______________
7 Id., at p. 41.
8 Id., at pp. 188-192.
9 Dated June 10, 2013; Rollo, pp. 211-213.
221
VOL. 741, NOVEMBER 19, 2014 221
Almero vs. Heirs of Miguel Pacquing
be filed to the CA10 within a period of fifteen (15) days from notice of, publication or denial
of a motion for new trial or reconsideration.11 The appeal may involve questions of fact, of law,
or mixed questions of fact and law.12
A direct resort to this Court, however, may be allowed in cases where only questions
of law are raised.13 A question of law exists when the doubt or controversy concerns the correct
application of law or jurisprudence to a certain set of facts; or when the issue does not call for
an examination of the probative value of the evidence presented, the truth or falsehood of facts
being admitted.14
In the present petition, the petitioners raised valid questions of law that warranted the direct
recourse to this Court. Basically, they question the OP’s application of the law and jurisprudence
on the issue of whether the Pacquing Estate should be exempt from CARP coverage. In this
case, no further examination of the truth or falsity of the facts is required. Our review of the case
is limited to the determination of whether the OP has correctly applied the law and jurisprudence
based on the facts on record.
We now proceed to the merits of the case.
R.A. No. 6657 or the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law (CARL) of 1988 covers all public
and private agricultural lands as provided in Proclamation No. 131 15 and E.O. No.
229,16 including other lands of the public domain suitable for
_______________
10 Section 1, Rule 43 of the Rules of Court.
11 Section 4, Rule 43 of the Rules of Court.
12 Section 3, Rule 43 of the Rules of Court.
13 Section 2(c), Rule 41 of the Rules of Court.
14 Bukidnon Doctors’ Hospital, Inc. v. Metropolitan Bank & Trust Co., G.R. No. 161882,
July 8, 2005, 463 SCRA 222, 233.
15 Instituting a Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program; approved July 22, 1987.
16 Providing the Mechanism for the Implementation of the Comprehensive Agrarian
Reform Program; approved July 22, 1987.
222
222 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Almero vs. Heirs of Miguel Pacquing
agriculture. Section 4 of R.A. 6657, as amended,17specifically lists the lands covered by the
CARP, which include:
(a) All alienable and disposable lands of the public domain devoted to or suitable for
agriculture. No reclassification of forest or mineral lands to agricultural lands shall be undertaken
after the approval of this Act until Congress, taking into account ecological, developmental and
equity considerations, shall have determined by law, the specific limits of the public domain;
(b) All lands of the public domain in excess to the specific limits as determined by Congress
in the preceding paragraph;
(c) All other lands owned by the Government devoted to or suitable for agriculture; and
 (d) All private lands devoted to or suitable for agriculture regardless of the agricultural
products raised or that can be raised thereon.
And Section 10 of R.A. 6657, as amended,18 expressly provides for the lands exempted or
excluded from the CARP, namely:
(a) Lands actually, directly and exclusively used for parks, wildlife, forest reserves,
reforestation, fish sanctuaries and breeding grounds, watersheds and mangroves shall be
exempt from the coverage of this Act;
(b) Private lands actually, directly and exclusively used for prawn farms and fishponds shall
be exempt from the coverage of this Act: Provided, that said prawn farms and fishponds have
not been distributed and Certificate of Land Ownership (CLOA) issued under the Agrarian
Reform Program; and
xxxx
_______________
17 As amended by R.A. No. 9700.
18 As amended by R.A. No. 7881.
223
VOL. 741, NOVEMBER 19, 2014 223
Almero vs. Heirs of Miguel Pacquing
(c) Lands actually, directly and exclusively used and found to be necessary for national
defense, school sites and campuses, including experimental farms stations operated by public
or private schools for educational purposes, seeds and seedlings research and pilot production
centers, church sites and covenants appurtenant thereto, mosque sites and Islamic centers
appurtenant thereto, communal burial grounds and cemeteries, penal colonies and penal farms
actually worked by the inmates, government and private research and quarantine centers and
all lands with eighteen percent (18%) slope and over, except those already developed, shall be
exempt from the coverage of this Act.
The subject land, being agricultural in nature, is clearly not exempt from CARP
coverage.
But Linda argues that the subject land is exempt from CARP primarily because it was
acquired by her father via a homestead patent. She claims that the rights of homestead grantees
have been held superior to those of agrarian reform tenants and, thus, her right to the subject
land must be upheld. The OP, agreeing with the respondent, stated that:
“There can be no question that, weighed against each other, the rights of a homesteader
prevail over the rights of the tenants guaranteed by agrarian reform laws.
As early as the case of Patricio v. Bayog, it has been held that the more paramount and
superior policy consideration is to uphold the right of the homesteader and his heirs to own and
cultivate personally the land acquired from the State without being encumbered by tenancy
relations.
224
224 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Almero vs. Heirs of Miguel Pacquing
Just right after the promulgation of Republic Act No. 6657, otherwise known as the
Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law (CARL), the doctrine enunciated in Patricio was applied
in Alita v. Court of Appeals where it was held that Presidential Decree No. 27 cannot be invoked
to defeat the very purpose of the enactment of the Public Land Act or Commonwealth Act No.
141. It was further pointed out that even the Philippine Constitution respects the superiority of
the homesteaders’ rights over the rights of the tenants guaranteed by the Agrarian Reform
statute.”19 (Citations omitted)
The right of homestead grantees to retain or keep their homestead is, however, not
absolutely guaranteed by law. Section 6 of R.A 6657 provides that:
Section 6. Retention Limits.—Except as otherwise provided in this Act, no person may
own or retain, directly or indirectly, any public or private agricultural land, the size of which shall
vary according to factors governing a viable family-size farm, such as commodity produced,
terrain, infrastructure, and soil fertility as determined by the Presidential Agrarian Reform
Council (PARC) created hereunder, but in no case shall retention by the landowner exceed five
(5) hectares. Three (3) hectares may be awarded to each child of the landowner, subject to the
following qualifications: (1) that he is at least fifteen (15) years of age; and (2) that he is actually
tilling the land or directly managing the farm: provided, that landowners whose lands have been
covered by Presidential Decree No. 27 shall be allowed to keep the areas originally retained by
them thereunder: provided, further, that original homestead grantees or their direct
compulsory heirs who still own the original homestead at the time of the approval of this
Act shall retain the same areas as long as they continue to cultivate said
homestead. (Emphasis ours)
_______________
19 Rollo, p. 10.
225
VOL. 741, NOVEMBER 19, 2014 225
Almero vs. Heirs of Miguel Pacquing
Thus, in order for the homestead grantees or their direct compulsory heirs to retain or keep
their homestead, the following conditions must first be satisfied: (a) they must still be the owners
of the original homestead at the time of the CARL’s effectivity, and (b) they must continue to
cultivate the homestead land.
In this case, Linda, as the direct compulsory heir of the original homestead grantee, is no
longer cultivating the subject homestead land. The OP misinterpreted our ruling in Paris v.
Alfeche20 when it held that Linda’s mere expression of her desire to continue or to start anew
with the cultivation of the land would suffice to exempt the subject homestead land from the
CARL. On the contrary, we specifically held in Paris v. Alfeche that:
“Indisputably, homestead grantees or their direct compulsory heirs can own and retain the
original homestead, only for ‘as long as they continue to cultivate’ them. That parcels of land
are covered by homestead patents will not automatically exempt them from the operation of
land reform. It is the fact of continued cultivation by the original grantees or their direct
compulsory heirs that shall exempt their lands from land reform coverage.”21(Emphasis
supplied)
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, we hereby:
(a) REVERSE and SET ASIDE the February 16, 2011 Decision and July 19, 2011
Resolution of the Office of the President in OP Case No. 10-C-152;
(b) RECALL and REVOKE the August 22, 2011 Certificate of Finality issued by the
Department of Agrarian Reform Bureau of Agrarian Legal Assistance; and
_______________
20 G.R. No. 139083, August 30, 2001, 364 SCRA 110.
21 Id., at p. 118.
226
226 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Almero vs. Heirs of Miguel Pacquing
(c) AFFIRM the August 18, 2009 Order of the Department of Agrarian Reform Secretary in
DARCO Order No. MS-0908-295, Series of 2009, A-999-10-CLT-028-09.
SO ORDERED.
Carpio (Chairperson), Del Castillo and Mendoza, JJ., concur.
Leonen, J., See Dissenting Opinion.
DISSENTING OPINION
LEONEN, J.:
I dissent on two points. First, the Office of the President’s February 16, 2011 Decision 1 is
already final and executory. This court, therefore, may no longer review the Decision.
Second, the property in this case is covered by a homestead patent. Thus, it is exempt from
agrarian reform coverage. The heirs of the original homesteader must be given the chance to
cultivate their land.
I It is true that a Petition for Review on Certiorari may be directly filed before this court if the
This court may no longer review the final and executory Decision of the Office of the
President
Under Rule 43 of the Rules of Court, decisions of the Office of the President are appealed
before the Court of Appeals through a Petition for Review raising questions of fact, of law, or
mixed questions of fact and law.2 The Appeal must be filed within 15 days from notice of the
decision or resolution denying the Motion for Reconsideration as provided in Rule 43, Sections
1 and 4:
_______________
1 Rollo, pp. 8-12.
2 Rules of Court, Rule 43, Sec. 3.
227
VOL. 741, NOVEMBER 19, 2014 227
Almero vs. Heirs of Miguel Pacquing
Section 1. Scope.—This Rule shall apply to appeals from judgments or final orders of the
Court of Tax Appeals and from awards, judgments, final orders or resolutions of or authorized
by any quasijudicial agency in the exercise of its quasi-judicial functions. Among these agencies
are the Civil Service Commission, Central Board of Assessment Appeals, Securities and
Exchange Commission, Office of the President, Land Registration Authority, Social Security
Commission, Civil Aeronautics Board, Bureau of Patents, Trademarks and Technology
Transfer, National Electrification Administration, Energy Regulatory Board, National
Telecommunications Commission, Department of Agrarian Reform under Republic Act No.
6657, Government Service Insurance System, Employees’ Compensation Commission,
Agricultural Inventions Board, Insurance Commission, Philippine Atomic Energy Commission,
Board of Investments, Construction Industry Arbitration Commission, and voluntary arbitrators
authorized by law.
Sec. 4. Period of appeal.—The appeal shall be taken within fifteen (15) days from notice
of the award, judgment, final order or resolution, or from the date of its last publication, if
publication is required by law for its effectivity, or of the denial of petitioner’s motion for new trial
or reconsideration duly filed in accordance with the governing law of the court or agency a quo.
Only one (1) motion for reconsideration shall be allowed. Upon proper motion and the payment
of the full amount of the docket fee before the expiration of the reglementary period, the Court
of Appeals may grant an additional period of fifteen (15) days only within which to file the petition
for review. No further extension shall be granted except for the most compelling reason and in
no case to exceed fifteen days.
Petitioners Danilo Almero, Teresita Alagon, Celia Bulaso, Ludy Ramada, Regina
Gegremosa, Isidro Lazarte, Thelma Embarque, Felipe Lazarte, Guilerma Lazarte, and
Dulcesima Benimele (Almero, et al.) availed themselves of the wrong remedy against the Office
of the President’s Decision. Instead
228
228 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Almero vs. Heirs of Miguel Pacquing
of directly appealing before this court, Almero, et al. should have filed a Petition for Review
before the Court of Appeals under Rule 43.
Petition raises pure questions of law.3 However, even assuming that Almero, et al.’s Petition
raises pure questions of law, this court should have dismissed outright Almero, et al.’s Petition
for having been filed out of time. Under Rule 45, Section 2 of the Rules of Court, a Petition for
Review on Certiorari must be filed within 15 days from notice of the assailed Decision or
Resolution:
Sec. 2. Time for filing; extension.—The petition shall be filed within fifteen (15) days from
notice of the judgment or final order or resolution appealed from, or of the denial of the
petitioner’s motion for new trial or reconsideration filed in due time after notice of the judgment.
On motion duly filed and served, with full payment of the docket and other lawful fees and the
deposit for costs before the expiration of the reglementary period, the Supreme Court may for
justifiable reasons grant an extension of thirty (30) days only within which to file the petition.
Almero, et al., had notice of the Office of the President’s Resolution denying their Motion
for Reconsideration on September 29, 2011. Thus, Almero, et al., had until October 14, 2011 to
file their Appeal. Yet, Almero, et al., appealed before this court only on November 14, 2011,
which was beyond 15 days from their notice of the Resolution denying their Motion for
Reconsideration. Their filing of the Petition, therefore, did not toll the reglementary period for
filing an appeal. The Decision of the Office of the President has become final and executory as
of October 15, 2011, and this court may no longer review the Decision.
_______________
3 Rules of Court, Rule 41, Sec. 2(c).
229
VOL. 741, NOVEMBER 19, 2014 229
 Almero vs. Heirs of Miguel Pacquing
II
The property is exempt from coverage of the
Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program
Agrarian reform is the “redistribution of lands, regardless of crops or fruits produced, to
farmers and regular farmworkers who are landless.” 4 It includes not only the physical
redistribution of lands but also other alternative arrangements, such as production or profit-
sharing, labor administration, and the redistribution of shares of stock all aimed to lift the
economic status of the property’s farmer-beneficiaries.5
As a general rule, all agricultural lands, whether public or private, are covered by the
Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program.6 An agricultural land refers to land devoted to any
of the following agricultural activities: cultivation of the soil, planting of crops, growing of fruit
trees, raising of livestock, poultry or fish, including the harvesting of such farm products, and
other farm activities and practices performed by a farmer in conjunction with such farming
operations done by persons whether natural or juridical. 7 Section 4 of the Comprehensive
Agrarian Reform Law enumerates properties covered by the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform
Program:
SEC. 4. Scope.—The Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law of 1988 shall cover,
regardless of tenurial arrangement and commodity produced, all public and private agricultural
lands as provided in Proclamation No. 131 and Executive Order No. 229, including other lands
of the public domain suitable for agriculture.
More specifically, the following lands are covered by the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform
Program:
_______________
4 Rep. Act No. 6657, Sec. 3(a).
5 Id.
6 Rep. Act No. 6657, Sec. 4.
7 Rep. Act No. 6657, Sec. 3(b).
230
230 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Almero vs. Heirs of Miguel Pacquing
a. All alienable and disposable lands of the public domain devoted to or suitable for
agriculture. No reclassification of forest or mineral lands to agricultural lands shall be undertaken
after the approval of this Act until Congress, taking into account ecological, developmental and
equity considerations, shall have determined by law, the specific limits of the public domain;
b. All lands of the public domain in excess of the specific limits as determined by Congress
in the preceding paragraph;
c. All other lands owned by the Government devoted to or suitable for agriculture; and
d. All private lands devoted to or suitable for agriculture regardless of the agricultural
products raised or that can be raised thereon.
As for the properties exempt from agrarian reform coverage, Section 10 of the
Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law provides:
SEC. 10. Exemptions and Exclusions.—Lands actually, directly and exclusively used and
found to be necessary for parks, wildlife, forest reserves, reforestation, fish sanctuaries and
breeding grounds, watersheds and mangroves, national defense, school sites and campuses
including experimental farm stations operated by public or private schools for educational
purposes, seeds and seedlings research and pilot production centers, church sites and
convents appurtenant thereto, mosque sites and Islamic centers appurtenant thereto,
communal burial grounds and cemeteries, penal colonies and penal farms actually worked by
the inmates, government and private research and quarantine centers and all lands with
eighteen percent (18%) slope and over, except those already developed shall be exempt from
the coverage of this Act.
231
VOL. 741, NOVEMBER 19, 2014 231
Almero vs. Heirs of Miguel Pacquing
In the present case, the majority ruled that the property of the Heirs of Manuel Pacquing is
covered by the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program, the property being an agricultural
land.
I disagree with the majority. The property in this case is exempt from agrarian reform,
having been granted to Manuel Pacquing through a homestead patent.
Although a social justice measure,8 agrarian reform is subject to limitations. Under Article
XIII, Section 6 of the Constitution, distribution of lands through agrarian reform is “subject to
prior rights, homestead rights of small settlers, and the rights of indigenous cultural communities
to their ancestral lands”:
Section 6. The State shall apply the principles of agrarian reform or stewardship,
whenever applicable in accordance with law, in the disposition or utilization of other natural
resources, including lands of the public domain under lease or concession suitable to
agriculture, subject to prior rights, homestead rights of small settlers, and the rights of
indigenous cultural communities to their ancestral lands. (Emphasis supplied)
Chapter IV of Commonwealth Act No. 141 or the Public Land Act governs the grant of
homestead patents. Under Section 12 of the law, an applicant “may enter a homestead of not
exceeding twenty-four hectares of agricultural land of the public domain.” A homestead patent
or title to the homestead is issued only if the applicant has improved and cultivated at least one-
fifth of the agricultural land applied for. Section 14 of the Public Land Act provides:
_______________
8 Association of Small Landowners in the Phils., Inc. v. Secretary of Agrarian Reform, 256
Phil. 777; 175 SCRA 343 (1989) [Per J. Cruz, En Banc].
232
232 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Almero vs. Heirs of Miguel Pacquing
Sec. 14. No certificate shall be given or patent issued for the land applied for until at least
one-fifth of the land has been improved and cultivated. The period within which the land shall
be cultivated shall not be less than one nor more than five years from and after the date of the
approval of the application. The applicant shall, within the said period, notify the Director of
Lands as soon as he is ready to acquire the title. If at the date of such notice, the applicant shall
prove to the satisfaction of the Director of Lands, that he has resided continuously for at least
one year in the municipality in which the land is located, or in a municipality adjacent to the
same, and has cultivated at least one-fifth of the land continuously since the approval of the
application, and shall make affidavit that no part of said land has been alienated or encumbered,
and that he has complied with all the requirements of this Act, then upon the payment of five
pesos, as final fee, he shall be entitled to a patent.
The state grants homestead rights “to encourage residence upon and the cultivation and
improvement of [agricultural lands] of the public domain.” 9 In Jocson v. Soriano,10 this court
further explained the purpose of granting and protecting homesteads:
[The object of homestead laws] is to provide a home for each citizen of the Government,
where his family may shelter and live beyond the reach of financial misfortune, and to inculcate
in individuals those feelings of independence which are essential to the maintenance of free
institutions. Furthermore, the state itself is concerned that the citizens shall not be divested of
a means of support, and reduced to pauperism.
The conservation of a family home is the purpose of homestead laws. The policy of the
state is to foster fami-
_______________
9 Patricio v. Bayog, 197 Phil. 728, 733; 112 SCRA 41, 46 (1982) [Per J. Aquino, Second
Division], citing Aquino v. Director of Lands, 39 Phil. 850, 861 (1919) [Per J. Malcolm, En Banc].
10 45 Phil. 375 (1923) [Per J. Johnson, En Banc].
233
VOL. 741, NOVEMBER 19, 2014 233
Almero vs. Heirs of Miguel Pacquing
lies as the factors of society, and thus promote general welfare. The sentiment of patriotism and
independence, the spirit of free citizenship, the feeling of interest in public affairs, are cultivated
and fostered more readily when the citizen lives permanently in his own home, with a sense of
its protection and durability.11 (Citations omitted)
In 1982, this court had the opportunity to resolve the issue of who has the better right to a
homestead — the homesteader or the tenant tilling the land. In Patricio v. Bayog,12 this court
said that “the more paramount and superior policy consideration is to uphold the right of the
homesteader and his heirs to own and cultivate personally the land acquired from the State
without being encumbered by tenancy relations.” 13
In Alita v. Court of Appeals,14 this court categorically ruled that lands obtained through
homestead patents are not covered by the agrarian reform program, the rights of homesteaders
being “superior”15 to the rights of tenants. This court said that the provisions of Presidential
Decree No. 72, Series of 1972, then governing agrarian reform, “cannot be invoked to defeat
the very purpose of the enactment of the Public Land Act or Commonwealth Act No.
141.”16 Citing Patricio:
The Homestead Act has been enacted for the welfare and protection of the poor. The law
gives a needy citizen a piece of land where he may build a modest house for himself and family
and plant what is necessary for subsistence and for the satisfaction of life’s other
_______________
11 Id., at p. 379.
12 Patricio v. Bayog, supra note 9.
13 Id., at pp. 732-733; p. 45.
14 252 Phil. 733; 170 SCRA 706 (1989) [Per J. Paras, Second Division].
15 Id., at p. 735; p. 709.
16 Id.
234
234 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Almero vs. Heirs of Miguel Pacquing
needs. The right of the citizens to their homes and to the things necessary for their subsistence
is as vital as the right to life itself. They have a right to live with a certain degree of comfort as
become human beings, and the State which looks after the welfare of the people’s happiness
is under a duty to safeguard the satisfaction of this vital right. 17
In ruling for the homesteader in Alita, this court relied on Article XIII, Section 6 of the
Constitution. This court went on to state that even the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law of
1988 recognizes the “inapplicability of [agrarian reform laws] to lands covered by homestead
patents.”18 This court referred to the proviso in Section 6 of the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform
Law:
Section 6. Retention Limits.—Except as otherwise provided in this Act, no person may
own or retain, directly or indirectly, any public or private agricultural land, the size of which shall
vary according to factors governing a viable family-size farm, such as commodity produced,
terrain, infrastructure, and soil fertility as determined by the Presidential Agrarian Reform
Council (PARC) created hereunder, but in no case shall retention by the landowner exceed five
(5) hectares. Three (3) hectares may be awarded to each child of the landowner, subject to the
following qualifications: (1) that he is at least fifteen (15) years of age; and (2) that he is actually
tilling the land or directly managing the farm: Provided, That landowners whose lands have
been covered by Presidential Decree No. 27 shall be allowed to keep the area originally retained
by them thereunder: Provided, further, That original homestead grantees or their direct
compulsory heirs who still own the original homestead at the time of the approval of this Act
shall retain the same areas as long as they continue to cultivate said homestead. (Emphasis
supplied)
_______________
17 Id.
18 Id., at p. 736; p. 710.
235
VOL. 741, NOVEMBER 19, 2014 235
Almero vs. Heirs of Miguel Pacquing
However, contrary to the Alita ruling, this court used Section 6 as legal basis to rule that
homesteads are covered by the agrarian reform program. In the 2001 case of Paris v.
Alfeche,19 the state granted Florencia Paris a homestead patent over a parcel of land in Paitan,
Quezon, Bukidnon. Emancipation patents were subsequently issued to the tenants tilling her
property, depriving Paris and her children of their right to personally cultivate their property.
To recover her property, Paris filed an application to retain at least five (5) hectares of her
property in Bukidnon. Since her property was covered by a homestead patent, Paris argued,
among others, that she and her children have the better right to cultivate their land as this court
ruled in Patricio and Alita.
The Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudicator ruled in favor of Paris and cancelled the
emancipation patents issued to the tenants. On appeal, however, the Department of Agrarian
Reform Adjudication Board reversed the Adjudicator and declared the tenants as “full owners
of the land they till.”20 The Court of Appeals agreed with the Department of Agrarian Reform
Adjudication Board and affirmed its Decision.
 This court affirmed the Court of Appeals’ Decision, ruling that “parcels of land . . . covered
by homestead patents [are] not automatically exempt . . . from the operation of land reform.”
Section 6 of the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law allows homesteaders to retain their land
“as long as they continue to cultivate [their] homestead.”21 Therefore, “it is the fact of continued
cultivation by the original grantees or their direct compulsory heirs that shall exempt their lands
from land reform coverage.”22
_______________
19 416 Phil. 473; 364 SCRA 110 (2001) [Per J. Panganiban, Third Division].
20 Id., at p. 478; p. 114.
21 Id., at p. 484; p. 118.
22 Id.
236
236 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Almero vs. Heirs of Miguel Pacquing
Finding that Paris and her children were not personally cultivating their homestead, this
court denied Paris’ application for retention.
On Paris’ contention that she and her children, as homesteaders, had the better right to
cultivate their land, this court held that Patricio and Alita did not apply to Paris’ case. The
homesteaders in Patricio and Alita showed their intention to continue cultivating their
homesteads.23 Thus, this court allowed the homesteaders to retain their properties
in Patricio and Alita.
Unlike the homesteaders in Patricio and Alita, this court found that Paris and her children
never personally cultivated their homestead, and they never expressed their intention to do so.
For these reasons, this court denied Paris’ application for retention and surmised that Paris and
her children would “undoubtedly continue to be absentee landlords”: 24
[T]he rulings in both Patricio and Alita, which are in line with the state objective of fostering
owner cultivatorship and of abolishing tenancy, would be inapplicable to the present case. Since
petitioner and her heirs have evinced no intention of actually cultivating the lands or even
directly managing the farm, they will undoubtedly continue to be absentee landlords. Therefore,
to blindly and indiscriminately apply the ruling in the cited cases would be tantamount to
encouraging feudalistic practices and going against the very essence of agrarian reform. This
we cannot sanction.25 (Citation omitted)
Despite this court’s ruling in Paris, I maintain that the property should be exempt from
agrarian reform. As this court held in Patricio and Alita, the right of tenants to own the land they
till through agrarian reform is subject to the
_______________
23 Id., at p. 485; p. 118.
24 Id., at p. 486; p. 120.
25 Id., at pp. 486-487; pp. 119-120.
237
VOL. 741, NOVEMBER 19, 2014 237
Almero vs. Heirs of Miguel Pacquing
right of homesteaders to personally cultivate their property. This right of homesteaders is
guaranteed by no less than the Constitution.
In providing that homesteaders may retain their land “as long as they continue to cultivate
said homestead,” Section 6 of the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law is unconstitutional.
The Constitution does not require homesteaders to show their intention to cultivate their land
before their properties are exempted from agrarian reform coverage. Under the law, homestead
patents are granted only if the applicants have proven to the satisfaction of the Director of Lands
that they have entered, improved, and cultivated the land applied for. 26 It must therefore be
presumed that grantees of homestead patents cultivate their land.
In any case, the Heirs of Manuel Pacquing must be allowed to retain their homestead,
similar to the homesteaders in Patricio and Alita. As this court declared in Paris, homesteaders
are allowed to retain their property if they show their intention to continue cultivating their
property.27 As the Office of the President found, the Heirs of Manuel Pacquing have shown their
intention to continue cultivating their property by protesting the issuance of certificates of land
ownership award to Almero, et al. The Heirs of Manuel Pacquing “should be given the chance
to exercise their rights as heirs of the homestead grantee to continue to cultivate the homestead
lots either personally or directly managing the farm pursuant to the pronouncement in
the Paris case.”28
III
This case must be elevated to the court En Banc
_______________
26 Public Land Act, Sec. 14.
27 Supra note 19 at p. 485; p. 118.
28 Rollo, p. 11. Office of the President’s Decision dated February 16, 2011.
238
238 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Almero vs. Heirs of Miguel Pacquing
In the alternative, this case must be elevated to the court En Banc considering that the
constitutionality of Section 6 of the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law is at issue in this case.
Rule 2, Section 3(a) of the Internal Rules of the Supreme Court provides:
Section 3. Court En Banc matters and cases.—The Court En Banc shall act on the
following matters and cases:
(a) cases in which the constitutionality or validity of any treaty, international or executive
agreement, law, executive order, presidential decree, proclamation, order, instruction,
ordinance, or regulation is in question[.]
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, I vote to DENY the Petition for Review on Certiorari. The
Office of the President’s Decision dated February 16, 2011 must be AFFIRMED.
Judgment and resolution reversed and set aside; Certificate of Finality recalled and
revoked; Order of Department of Agrarian Reform dated August 18, 2009 affirmed.
Notes.—A petition for review under Rule 43 is the prescribed mode for appeal from a
decision rendered by the Office of the President. (Republic vs. Heirs of Cecilio and Moises
Cuizon, 692 SCRA 626 [2013])
Under RA 6657, the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program (CARP) shall cover all
public and private agricultural lands, including other lands of the public domain suitable for
agriculture, regardless of tenurial arrangement and commodity produced; Lands devoted to
livestock, poultry, and swine raising are classified as industrial, not agricultural lands and, thus,
exempt from agrarian reform. (Department of Agrarian Reform vs. Court of Appeals, 706
SCRA 213 [2013])