Beruflich Dokumente
Kultur Dokumente
Although referred to by Yakan Carnain, Arit, Lianson, 9. Exhibits Z, Z-1, Z-2 — These are records of the office
Kona Amenola, and Asidin, in the course of their of the City Fiscal of Basilan City showing that the
testimony as witnesses for the prosecution, these Japanese rifle, Exhibit Y, two rounds of ammunitions and
Page 2 of 168
one empty shell were received by said Office from the impeach their veracity as witnesses in their own behalf,
Police Department of Basilan City on June 17, 1958. after laying down the predicate in the course of their
These exhibits were presented to show that said rifle cross examination.
tallies with the description thereof given by prosecution
witness Kona Amenola, in his affidavit, dated June 14, 5. Exhibits UU, UU-1 to UU-3 — These are sworn
1958, when said weapon was still in the possession of statements made by defendant Hasbi before the City
respondent Pollisco, and, hence, to establish Amenola’s Fiscal. They were presented in rebuttal, after laying
veracity. down the predicate, to impeach his testimony in court.
Likewise, the following rebuttal evidence for the 6. Exhibits RR, RR-1, XX and XX-1 — With these
prosecution were rejected by respondent Judge, exhibits the prosecution tried to rebut Pollisco’s
viz:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library testimony to the effect that prosecution witness Lianson
Arip had a grudge against him, he (Pollisco) having
1. Exhibits OO to OO-8 — These are daily records of charged him with theft in the City Fiscal’s Office. It
events of the police department, Lamitan District, appears from said exhibits that Arip’s affidavit,
Basilan City, including the Tipo- Tipo region. They do not implicating Pollisco, was dated June 8, 1958, whereas
mention the killing therein, by the police patrol, of any Pollisco’s affidavit, charging Arip with theft, was dated
outlaw on June 5, 1958, thereby contradicting the June 20, 1958, so that said statement of Arip could not
reports (Exhs. 12 and 12-A) of respondent Pollisco and have been influenced by Pollisco’s subsequent act.
Hasbi about it. Respondent Judge did not allow the
record clerk of the City Fiscal’s office to identify said In contrast with the severe and rigorous policy used by
exhibits, upon the ground that it was too late to present respondent Judge in dealing with the aforementioned
him although when the exhibits were marked by the evidence for the prosecution, petitioner herein cites the
prosecution it reserved the right to identify them as part liberality with which the lower court admitted, as
of official records. evidence for the defense, records of supposed
achievements of the Tipo-Tipo sub-station (Exhibits 9 to
2. Exhibits PP, QQ to QQ-3 — Respondent Pollisco had 9-G, 10 to 10-I, 17 to 17-C, 19 to 19-A, 20 to 20-I, 21
testified that on June 4, 1958, Hadji Aisa inquired about and 22), a congratulatory communication (Exh. 24), and
one Awalin; that he told Aisa that Awalin was taken by a letter of commendation to a peace officer assigned
Mayor Brown to the seat of the city government; and that thereto (Exh. 7), including an article in the Philippine
he (Pollisco) suggested that Datu Unding be advised not Free Press (Exhs. 23 and 23 A).
to worry, because there was no evidence against Awalin.
To impeach the veracity of Pollisco, the prosecution Upon a review of the record, we are fully satisfied that
presented the exhibits under consideration, for the same the lower court had, not only erred, but, also, committed
show that one Dong Awalin (who is different from Awalin a grave abuse of discretion in issuing the resolutions
Tebag) was apprehended on May 27, 1958, and complained of, in rejecting the aforementioned direct and
released on bail on June 23, 1958; that Pollisco could rebuttal evidence for the prosecution, and in not
not have truthfully informed Aisa on June 4, 1958, what permitting the same to propound the questions already
Dong Awalin had been taken by Mayor Brown to the adverted to. It is obvious to us that said direct and
seat of the city government and that there was no rebuttal evidence, as well as the aforementioned
evidence against him; for he was then a detention questions, are relevant to the issues involved in Criminal
prisoner; and that Pollisco could not have had in mind, Case No. 672. Although it is not possible to determine
therefore, said Dong Awalin as the Awalin about whom with precision, at this stage of the proceedings, how far
Aisa had inquired. Indeed, Exhibits TT-13 to TT-16 show said exhibits may affect the outcome of that case, it is
that, testifying before the City Fiscal, respondent Pollisco elemental that all parties therein are entitled to a
said that he twice ordered Patrolman Lacerna on June 4, reasonable opportunity to establish their respective
1958, to bring Awalin Tebag to him (Pollisco) for pretense. In this connection it should be noted that, in
investigation. the light of the allegations of the amended information in
said case and of the records before us, the issue of the
3. Exhibits SS to SS-7 — These are the testimonies guilt or innocence of the accused therein is bound to
before the City Fiscal, of defense witness Mohammad hinge heavily upon the veracity of the opposing
Sali who, on cross examination by the prosecution, witnesses and the weight attached to their respective
denied having given it. Thus the predicate thereof was testimony. Hence, the parties should be allowed a
established by the prosecution which sought thereby to certain latitude in the presentation of their evidence lest
impeach Sali’s veracity. they may be so hampered that the ends of justice may
eventually be defeated or appear to be defeated. The
4. Exhibits TT, TT-1 to TT-25 — These are the danger of leading to such result must be avoided,
testimonies, before the City Fiscal of the main particularly in cases of the nature, importance and
respondents herein, who gave a different story before significance of the one under consideration.
respondent Judge. The prosecution thus sought to
Page 3 of 168
With respect to the question whether or not Senator
Roseller Lim may appear as counsel for the main Such is not the situation obtaining in the case at bar.
respondents herein, as defendants in said criminal case,
the Constitution provides that no Senator or Member of Wherefore, the rulings complained of are set aside and
the House of Representatives shall "appear as counsel . reversed and respondent Judge is hereby enjoined to
. . in any criminal case wherein an officer or employee of admit the aforementioned direct and rebuttal evidence
the Government is accused of an offense committed in for the prosecution, as well as to permit the formulation,
relation of his office . . . (Art. VI, Sec. 17, Const. of the of the questions already referred to, with costs against
Phil.) . The issue, therefore, is whether the defendants in the respondents herein. It is so ordered.
Criminal case No. 672 are "accused of an offense
committed in relation" to their office.
SO ORDERED.
Page 6 of 168
Republic of the Philippines connection with the rape-slay of Mary Eileen Sarmenta
SUPREME COURT and the killing of Allan Gomez.
Manila
Acting on this request, the Panel of State Prosecutors of
EN BANC the Department of Justice conducted a preliminary
investigation on August 9, 1993. Petitioner Sanchez was
not present but was represented by his counsel, Atty.
Marciano Brion, Jr.
G.R. Nos. 111771-77 November 9, 1993
On August 12, 1993, PNP Commander Rex Piad issued
ANTONIO L. SANCHEZ, petitioner, an "invitation" to the petitioner requesting him to appear
vs. for investigation at Camp Vicente Lim in Canlubang,
The Honorable HARRIET O. DEMETRIOU (in her Laguna. It was served on Sanchez in the morning of
capacity as Presiding Judge of Regional Trial Court, August 13,1993, and he was immediately taken to the
NCR, Branch 70, Pasig), The Honorable FRANKLIN said camp.
DRILON (in his capacity as Secretary of Justice),
JOVENCITO R. ZUÑO, LEONARDO C. GUIYAB, At a confrontation that same day, Sanchez was
CARLOS L. DE LEON, RAMONCITO C. MISON, positively identified by Aurelio Centeno, and SPO III
REYNALDO J. LUGTU, and RODRIGO P. LORENZO, Vivencio Malabanan, who both executed confessions
the last six respondents in their official capacities as implicating him as a principal in the rape-slay of
members of the State Prosecutor's Sarmenta and the killing of Gomez. The petitioner was
Office), respondents. then placed on "arrest status" and taken to the
Department of Justice in Manila.
Mario E. Ongkiko and Marciano P. Brion, Jr. for
petitioner. The respondent prosecutors immediately conducted an
inquest upon his arrival, with Atty. Salvador Panelo as
The Solicitor General for respondents. his counsel.
The petitioner was taken to Camp Vicente Lim, Sec. 5. Arrest without warrant; when
Canlubang, Laguna, by virtue of a letter-invitation issued lawful. — A peace officer or a private
by PNP Commander Rex Piad requesting him to appear person may, without a warrant, arrest a
at the said camp for investigation. person:
In Babst v. National Intelligence Board 13 this Court (a) When, in his presence, the person to
declared: be arrested has committed, is actually
committing, or is attempting to commit
Be that as it may, it is not idle to note an offense;
that ordinarily, an invitation to attend a
hearing and answer some questions, (b) When an offense has in fact just
which the person invited may heed or been committed and he has personal
refuse at his pleasure, is not illegal or knowledge of facts indicating that the
constitutionally objectionable. Under person to be arrested has committed it;
certain circumstances, however, such and
an invitation can easily assume a
different appearance. Thus, where the
(c) When the person to be arrested is a
invitation comes from a powerful group
prisoner who has escapes from a penal
composed predominantly of ranking
establishment or place where he is
military officers issued at a time when
serving final judgment or temporarily
the country has just emerged from confined while his case is pending, or
martial rule and when the suspension of has escaped while being transferred
the privilege of the writ of habeas
from one confinement to another.
corpus has not entirely been lifted,
and the designated interrogation site is a
military camp, the same can be easily It is not denied that the arresting officers were not
taken, not as a strictly voluntary present when the petitioner allegedly participated in the
invitation which it purports to be, but as killing of Allan Gomez and the rape-slay of Mary Eileen
an authoritative command which one Sarmenta. Neither did they have any personal
can only defy at his peril. . . . (Emphasis knowledge that the petitioner was responsible therefor
supplied) because the basis of the arrest was the sworn
statements of Centeno and Malabanan. Moreover, as
the rape and killing of Sarmenta allegedly took place on
In the case at bar, the invitation came from a high- June 28-June 29, 1993, or forty-six days before the date
ranking military official and the investigation of Sanchez
of the arrest, it cannot be said that the offense had "in
was to be made at a military camp. Although in the guise
fact just been committed" when the petitioner was
of a request, it was obviously a command or an order of
arrested.
arrest that the petitioner could hardly he expected to
defy. In fact, apparently cowed by the "invitation," he
went without protest (and in informal clothes and slippers The original warrantless arrest of the petitioner was
only) with the officers who had come to fetch him. doubtless illegal. Nevertheless, the Regional Trial Court
lawfully acquired jurisdiction over the person of the
petitioner by virtue of the warrant of arrest it issued on
It may not be amiss to observe that under R.A. No. August 26, 1993 against him and the other accused in
7438, the requisites of a "custodial investigation" are connection with the rape-slay cases. It was belated, to
applicable even to a person not formally arrested but
be sure, but it was nonetheless legal.
merely "invited" for questioning.
Even on the assumption that no warrant was issued at
It should likewise be noted that at Camp Vicente Lim, the all, we find that the trial court still lawfully acquired
petitioner was placed on "arrest status" after he was jurisdiction over the person of the petitioner. The rule is
pointed to by Centeno and Malabanan as the person
that if the accused objects to the jurisdiction of the court
who first raped Mary Eileen Sarmenta. Respondent
over his person, he may move to quash the information,
Zuño himself acknowledged during the August 13, 1993
but only on that ground. If, as in this case, the accused
Page 10 of 168
raises other grounds in the motion to quash, he is reason will be a futile act as it will be
deemed to have waived that objection and to have followed by her immediate re-arrest
submitted his person to the jurisdiction of that court.14 pursuant to the new and valid warrant,
returning her to the same prison she will
The Court notes that on August 13, 1993, after the just have left. This Court will not
petitioner was unlawfully arrested, Judge Lanzanas participate in such a meaningless
issued a warrant of arrest against Antonio L. Sanchez in charade.
connection with Criminal Cases Nos. 93-124634 to 93-
124637 for violation of R.A No. 6713. 15 Pending the The same doctrine has been consistently followed by the
issuance of the warrant of arrest for the rape-slay cases, Court, 17 more recently in the Umil case. 18
this first warrant served as the initial justification for his
detention. The Informations
The Court also adverts to its uniform ruling that the filing The petitioner submits that the seven informations
of charges, and the issuance of the corresponding charging seven separate homicides are absurd because
warrant of arrest, against a person invalidly detained will the two victims in these cases could not have died seven
cure the defect of that detention or at least deny him the times.
right to be released because of such defect. * Applicable
by analogy to the case at bar is Rule 102 Section 4 of This argument was correctly refuted by the Solicitor
the Rules of Court that:
General in this wise:
[T]he relation between the crime and the As Chief Justice Concepcion said:
office contemplated by the Constitution
is, in our opinion, direct and not It is apparent from these allegations
accidental. To fall into the intent of the that, although public office is not an
Constitution, the relation has to be such element of the crime of murder in
that, in the legal sense, the offense abstract, as committed by the main
cannot exist without the office. In other respondents herein, according to the
words, the office must be a constituent amended information, the offense
element of the crime as defined in the therein charged is intimately
statute, such as, for instance, the crimes connected with their respective offices
defined and punished in Chapter Two to and was perpetrated while they were in
Six, Title Seven, of the Revised Penal the performance, though improper or
Code. irregular, of their official functions.
Indeed they had no personal motive to
Public office is not of the essence of commit the crime and they would not
murder. The taking of human life is have committed it had they not held their
either murder or homicide whether done aforesaid offices. The co-defendants of
by a private citizen or public servant, respondent Leroy S. Brown, obeyed his
and the penalty is the same except instructions because he was their
when the perpetrator. being a public superior officer, as Mayor of Basilan
functionary took advantage of his office, City. (Emphasis supplied).
as alleged in this case, in which event
the penalty is increased. We have read the informations in the case at bar and
find no allegation therein that the crime of rape with
But the use or abuse of office does not homicide imputed to the petitioner was connected with
adhere to the crime as an element; and the discharge of his functions as municipal mayor or that
even as an aggravating circumstance, there is an "intimate connection" between the offense
its materiality arises not from the and his office. It follows that the said crime, being an
allegations but on the proof, not from the ordinary offense, is triable by the regular courts and not
fact that the criminals are public officials the Sandiganbayan.
but from the manner of the commission
of the crime Conclusion
There is no direct relation between the commission of As above demonstrated, all of the grounds invoked by
the crime of rape with homicide and the petitioner's office the petitioner are not supported by the facts and the
as municipal mayor because public office is not an applicable law and jurisprudence. They must, therefore,
essential element of the crime charged. The offense can all be rejected. In consequence, the respondent judge,
stand independently of the office. Moreover, it is not who has started the trial of the criminal cases against the
even alleged in the information that the commission of petitioner and his co-accused, may proceed therewith
the crime charged was intimately connected with the without further hindrance.
Page 13 of 168
It remains to stress that the decision we make today is
not a decision on the merits of the criminal cases being
tried below. These will have to be decided by the
respondent judge in accordance with the evidence that is
still being received. At this time, there is yet no basis for
judgment, only uninformed conjecture. The Court will
caution against such irrelevant public speculations as
they can be based only on imperfect knowledge if not
officious ignorance.
SO ORDERED.
Page 14 of 168
Republic of the Philippines Numbered 9349 to 9351. They were assigned to the
SUPREME COURT Third Division of the Sandiganbayan.
Manila
Bondoc moved to quash the informations on January 3,
EN BANC 1985 on the basic theory that as a private individual
charged as co-principal with government employees, he
G.R. No. 71163-65 November 9, 1990 should be tried jointly with the latter pursuant to Section
4 (paragraph 3) of PD 1606, as amended, supra; hence,
CARLITO P. BONDOC, petitioner, the separate proceedings commenced against him were
invalid, for lack of jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan over
vs.
THE HONORABLE SANDIGANBAYAN AND THE the offenses and his person.
HONORABLE TANODBAYAN, respondents.
The Third Division denied Bondoc's motion to quash, by
Lorenzo G. Timbol for petitioner. Resolution dated February 22, 1985. 2 It ruled that (a)
the joint trial of private individuals and public employees
charged as co-principals, dealt with in the cited provision
of law, is not a jurisdictional requirement; (b) Bondoc's
theory would practically make the Court's "jurisdiction
NARVASA, J.: over a private individual charged as co-principal,
accomplice or accessory with a public officer or
Section 4 (paragraph 3) of Presidential Decree No. employee dependent upon such private individual" (as
1606, as amended, provides in part that 1 — by evading service of legal processes until "joint trial is
no longer feasible"); and (c) it is the intention of the law,
In case private individuals are charged manifested in the same Section 4, "to avert split
as co-principals, accomplices or jurisdiction (and) thus avoid multiplicity of suits."
accessories with public officers or
employees, including those employed in Bondoc moved for reconsideration on March 4, 1985.
government-owned or controlled His motion was denied by Resolution dated March 28,
corporations, they should be tried jointly 1985. However, in order to obviate his objection to a
with said public officers or employees. separate trial, which was the principal basis of his motion
to quash, the Third Division, in the same resolution,
Whether or not compliance with this requirement is referred Bondoc's cases (No. 9349 to 9351) to the
mandatory in every instance, and is indeed so essential Second Division for consolidation with Cases Numbered
as to cause the Sandiganbayan to lose jurisdiction over 5949 to 5951.3
a specific criminal case in the event of its non-fulfillment,
is the main issue presented by the special civil action But by that time, the trial of Criminal Cases No. 5949 to
of certiorari at bar. The issue is raised in the context of 5951 had been terminated. The Second Division thus
the undisputed facts hereunder narrated. resolved, on June 4, 1985, 4 to deny the proposed
consolidation of the actions and to return Criminal Cases
Two (2) employees of the Central Bank — Manuel No. 9349 to 9351 to the Third Division. In its Resolution,
Valentino and Jesus Estacio — and nine (9) private the Second Division also made the following
individuals, were charged with several felonies of estafa observation, to wit:
thru falsification of public documents in three (3)
separate informations filed by the Tanodbayan with the In Our resolution dated April 9,1985, We
Sandiganbayan on April 15, 1982. The actions were accepted the transfer of these cases
docketed as Criminal Cases Numbered 5949 to 5951. and directed the accused and counsel to
They were assigned to the Second Division of the ascertain the advisability of having them
Sandiganbayan. consolidated and jointly tried with
Criminal Cases Nos. 5949 to 5951
Before the prosecution rested its case, the Tanodbayan which have been previously ordered
filed with the Sandiganbayan on August 23, 1984, reopened. However, at the hearing held
another set of three (3) indictments, this time against on April 1, 1985, counsel for accused
Carlito P. Bondoc (Assistant Manager of the Greenhills Rogelio G. Vicente manifested that there
Branch of CITIBANK) and Rogelio Vicente, also a is no possibility of the instant cases
private individual, charging them with the same crimes being consolidated with Criminal Cases
involved in Cases No. 5949 to 5951 as principals by Nos. 5949 to 5951 or the adoption of
indispensable cooperation. The actions against Bondoc prosecution's evidence adduced in said
and Vicente were docketed as Criminal Cases cases, as well as the fact that said
Page 15 of 168
accused has a pending motion for Otherwise, ordinary courts should have
reinvestigation with the Tanodbayan ... jurisdiction. Any other interpretation
would render the provision in question
On receiving the criminal cases back from the Second 'useless, meaningless and nugatory.
Division, the Third Division set the cases for arraignment
and trial on August 1 and 2, 1985. 5. The Third Division itself recognized
the need for a joint trial when it referred
On June 26, 1985, Bondoc filed with this Court the his cases to the Second Division for
petition for certiorari and prohibition at bar. consolidation.
He argues that the Sandiganbayan acted with grave 6. Since a joint trial was then already
abuse of discretion in seeking to try him separately from impossible, said mandatory and
the Central Bank employees: jurisdictional provision can no longer be
complied with; therefore, the
Sandiganbayan cannot exercise
1. In accordance with the clear
jurisdiction over the offense and the
phraseology of paragraph 3, Section 4,
PD 1606, it is required that he shall be person of the petitioner.
tried jointly with the government
employees involved in the same 7. Under these circumstances, the
offenses, namely: Manuel Valentino and petitioner has a right to be tried by civil
Jesus Estacio; the language is courts where his chances of acquittal
mandatory, the requirement are greater considering that therein,
jurisdictional. there are at least two levels of appeal.
4. In sum, before the Sandiganbayan 1) brands as absurd the petitioner's argument that the
may lawfully try a private individual Sandiganbayan may acquire jurisdiction only by a joint
under PD 1606, the following requisites trial, this being contrary to the rule that in criminal cases
must be satisfied: jurisdiction of the person is acquired by his arrest (or
voluntary submission to the Court), and over the offense,
a) he must be charged by the filing of the indictment; and
with a public
officer/employee, and 2) asserts that Section 4 (3), PD 1606 merely prescribes
the procedure when a private individual is charged with a
b) he must be tried public officer or employee; once jurisdiction is acquired,
jointly. it is not lost by procedural error (Ramos, et al., v. CB, 41
SCRA 565; Dioquino v. Cruz, et al., 116 SCRA 451).
Page 16 of 168
Section 4 of Presidential Decree No. 1606 vests the Now, the crime with which Bondoc is charged as co-
Sandigan-bayan with exclusive original jurisdiction over principal by indispensable cooperation with the Central
specific crimes and, as the Sandiganbayan has pointed Bank employees above mentioned (Valentino and
out, supra, provides against split jurisdiction as regards Estacio)—in each of the three (3) indictments against
the civil liability arising from the crime. It declares that him is the complex felony of estafa thru falsification of
the Sandiganbayan shall have— public documents under Article 171 7 in relation to
Articles 315 8 and 48 9 of the Revised Penal Code.
Exclusive original jurisdiction in all cases
involving: The crimes are "offenses or felonies committed by public
officers and employees in relation to their office," in
(1) Violations of Republic Act No. 3019, confabulation and conspiracy with him (Bondoc) and
as amended, otherwise known as the other private persons. The penalty prescribed by law for
Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, each of the three offenses is higher than the penalty set
Republic Act No. 1379, and Chapter II, out in Section 4 of PD 1606 above cited, i.e., prision
Section 2, Title VII of the Revised Penal correccionalor six years, or a fine of P6,000.00. 10 Each
Code; offense is therefore within the exclusive original
jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan.
(2) Other offenses or felonies committed
by public officers and employees in It is indisputable that the Sandiganbayan acquired
relation to their office, including those jurisdiction of the offenses charged in the informations
employed in government-owned or against Bondoc and his co-accused, based on the
controlled corporations, whether simple nature of the crimes as described in the indictments and
or complexed with other crimes, where the penalty prescribed therefor by law. Also
the penalty prescribed by law is higher incontrovertible is that the Sandiganbayan acquired
than prision correccional or jurisdiction of the persons of the accused through their
imprisonment for six (6) years, or a fine arrest by virtue of a warrant, or voluntary submission to
of P6,000.00. the Court's authority.
It also declares that — It is true that the law requires that Bondoc and Vicente,
as private individuals charged as co-principals with
public officers or employees, "be tried jointly with said
Any provision of law or the Rules of
public officers or employees." Given the peculiar
Court to the contrary notwithstanding,
circumstances of their cases, i.e., they (Bondoc and
the criminal action and the
corresponding civil action for the Vicente) were not investigated and indicted until long
recovery of civil liability arising from the after the criminal proceedings against their co-principals
had commenced, and the latter's cases had already
offense charged shall at all times be
been submitted for decision when Bondoc's and
simultaneously instituted with, and jointly
Vicente's own cases came up for trial-the question that
determined in the same proceeding by
now raises is whether or not the declaration of the
the Sandiganbayan or the appropriate
courts (also vested with jurisdiction over Sandiganbayan that it was no longer possible or legally
crimes committed by public officers and feasible to try them jointly with the government
employees accused of the same offenses, had the effect
employees), the filing of the criminal
of causing the Sandiganbayan to lose jurisdiction over
action being deemed to necessarily
Bondoc's cases, and whether or not, as a consequence,
carry with it the filing of the civil action,
those cases became cognizable by the regular courts
and no right to reserve the filing of such
civil action separately from the criminal and should be transferred thereto for trial and
adjudgment.
action shall be recognized; Provided,
However, That where the civil action had
heretofore been filed separately but It must at once be evident that the seeming impossibility
judgment therein has not yet been of a joint trial cannot and does not alter the essential
rendered, and the criminal case is nature of the crimes in question, as felonies perpetrated
hereafter filed with the Sandiganbayan by public officers or employees in confabulation with
or the appropriate court, said civil action private persons. It should be as obvious, too, that
shall be transferred to the assuming it is correct to construe the law in a strictly
Sandiganbayan or the appropriate court, literal sense, the indicated course of action would be to
as the case may be, for consolidation insist on holding a joint trial regardless of whatever
and joint determination with the criminal circumstances may appear to make such a joint trial
action, otherwise the separate civil inappropriate, inconvenient, unfeasible. Thus, for
action shall be considered abandoned. instance, the cases in the Second Division, although
Page 17 of 168
already submitted for decision, should be reopened to correccional or imprisonment of six years, or a fine of
allow for the consolidation of Bondoc's cases with those P6,000.00, committed by government employees in
of the defendants therein, and the reception of evidence conspiracy with private persons, including Bondoc.
against and for Bondoc. Indeed, even in the extreme These crimes are within the exclusive, original
hypothesis of appeal having already been taken by jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan. They simply cannot
Bondoc's co-accused, the course of action dictated by a be taken cognizance of by the regular courts, apart from
literal construction of the provision on joint trial is the the fact that even if the cases could be so transferred, a
remand of the appealed case to the Sandiganbayan so joint trial would nonetheless not be possible.
that the joint trial may be conducted.
As to Bondoc's only other argument, that his cases
To construe the law in the manner indicated, however, should be transferred to the regular courts because he
would be unreasonable, if not absurd (what of the case, would there have two levels of appeal (i.e., the Court of
for instance, where the accused public officers or Appeals, and then the Supreme Court), unlike in the
employees have already been convicted and have Sandiganbayan where his appellate recourse is only
appealed, or are already serving sentence, or have been one, to the Supreme Court, it suffices to point out, as the
acquitted), and settled is the rule that courts should not Sandiganbayan has, that the matter has long since been
give a statute a meaning that would lead to laid to rest, in Nunez v. Sandiganbayan. 14
absurdities; 11 general terms of a statute should be so
limited in their application as precisely to avoid WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED for lack of merit,
absurdities, and it will always be presumed that the with costs against petitioner.
legislature intended exceptions to its language which
would avoid consequences of this character. 12 The
SO ORDERED.
provision in question should thus be read as requiring
that private individuals accused in the Sandiganbayan,
together with public officers or employees, must be tried
jointly with the latter unless the attendant circumstances
have made impossible or impracticable such a joint trial,
as in the cases at bar, in which event the trial of said
private persons may proceed separately from the public
officers or employees whose own trials have been
concluded.
Page 18 of 168
THIRD DIVISION Ancla. The Warrant of Garnishment was received by
accused Azarcon on June 17, 1985.[5]
Page 19 of 168
of the PICOP concession. By the time the order to bar the voluntarily offered himself to act as custodian of one
trucks exit was given, however, it was too late.[8] Isuzu Dumptruck (sic) with Motor No. E120-
22958, Chasis No. SPZU 50-1772440, and number
Regional Director Batausa responded in a letter CXL-6 and was authorized to be such under the
dated May 27, 1986, to wit: authority of the Bureau of Internal Revenue, has become
a responsible and accountable officer and said motor
An analysis of the documents executed by you reveals vehicle having been seized from Jaime C. Ancla in
that while you are (sic) in possession of the dump truck satisfaction of his tax liability in the total sum of EIGHTY
owned by JAIME ANCLA, you voluntarily assumed the THOUSAND EIGHT HUNDRED THIRTY ONE PESOS
liabilities of safekeeping and preserving the unit in behalf and 59/100 (P80,831.59) became a public property and
of the Bureau of Internal Revenue. This is clearly the value thereof as public fund, with grave abuse of
indicated in the provisions of the Warrant of confidence and conspiring and confederating with said
Garnishment which you have signed, obliged and Jaime C. Ancla, likewise, a private individual, did then
committed to surrender and transfer to this office. Your and there wilfully, (sic) unlawfully and feloniously
failure therefore, to observe said provisions does not misappropriate, misapply and convert to his personal
relieve you of your responsibility.[9] use and benefit the aforementioned motor vehicle or the
value thereof in the aforestated amount, by then and
Thereafter, the Sandiganbayan found that there allowing accused Jaime C. Ancla to remove,
retrieve, withdraw and tow away the said Isuzu
On 11 June 1986, Mrs. Marilyn T. Calo, Revenue Dumptruck (sic) with the authority, consent and
Document Processor of Revenue Region 10 B, Butuan knowledge of the Bureau of Internal Revenue, Butuan
City, sent a progress report to the Chief of the Collection City, to the damage and prejudice of the government in
Branch of the surreptitious taking of the dump truck and the amount of P80,831.59 in a form of unsatisfied tax
that Ancla was renting out the truck to a certain liability.
contractor by the name of Oscar Cueva at PICOP
(Paper Industries Corporation of the Philippines, the CONTRARY TO LAW.
same company which engaged petitioners earth moving
services), Mangagoy, Surigao del Sur. She also The petitioner filed a motion for reinvestigation
suggested that if the report were true, a warrant of before the Sandiganbayan on May 14, 1991, alleging
garnishment be reissued against Mr. Cueva for whatever that: (1) the petitioner never appeared in the preliminary
amount of rental is due from Ancla until such time as the investigation; and (2) the petitioner was not a public
latters tax liabilities shall be deemed satisfied. x x x officer, hence a doubt exists as to why he was being
However, instead of doing so, Director Batausa filed a charged with malversation under Article 217 of the
letter-complaint against the (herein Petitioner) and Ancla Revised Penal Code.[13] The Sandiganbayan granted the
on 22 January 1988, or after more than one year had motion for reinvestigation on May 22, 1991.[14] After the
elapsed from the time of Mrs. Calos report.[10] reinvestigation, Special Prosecution Officer Roger
Berbano, Sr., recommended the withdrawal of the
Provincial Fiscal Pretextato Montenegro forwarded information[15] but was overruled by the Ombudsman.[16]
the records of the complaint x x x to the Office of the
A motion to dismiss was filed by petitioner on March
Tanodbayan on May 18, 1988. He was deputized
25, 1992 on the ground that the Sandiganbayan did not
Tanodbayan prosecutor and granted authority to conduct
preliminary investigation on August 22, 1988, in a letter by have jurisdiction over the person of the petitioner since he
Special Prosecutor Raul Gonzales approved by was not a public officer.[17] On May 18, 1992, the
Sandiganbayan denied the motion.[18]
Ombudsman (Tanodbayan) Conrado Vasquez. [11]
When the prosecution finished presenting its
Along with his co-accused Jaime Ancla, petitioner
evidence, the petitioner then filed a motion for leave to file
Azarcon was charged before the Sandiganbayan with the
crime of malversation of public funds or property under demurrer to evidence which was denied on November 16,
Article 217 in relation to Article 222 of the Revised Penal 1992, for being without merit.[19] The petitioner then
commenced and finished presenting his evidence on
Code (RPC) in the following Information[12]filed on
February 15, 1993.
January 12, 1990, by Special Prosecution Officer Victor
Pascual:
That on or about June 17, 1985, in the Municipality of The Respondent Courts Decision
Bislig, Province of Surigao del Sur, Philippines, and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, accused
Alfredo L. Azarcon, a private individual but who, in his On March 8, 1994, respondent
capacity as depository/administrator of property seized Sandiganbayan[20] rendered a Decision,[21] the dispositive
or deposited by the Bureau of Internal Revenue, having portion of which reads:
Page 20 of 168
WHEREFORE, the Court finds accused Alfredo Azarcon [B]
y Leva GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt as principal of
Malversation of Public Funds defined and penalized His appointment as a depositary was not by virtue of a
under Article 217 in relation to Article 222 of the Revised direct provision of law, or by election or by appointment
Penal Code and, applying the Indeterminate Sentence by a competent authority.
Law, and in view of the mitigating circumstance of
voluntary surrender, the Court hereby sentences the
III. No proof was presented during trial to prove that the
accused to suffer the penalty of imprisonment ranging distrained vehicle was actually owned by the accused
from TEN (10) YEARS and ONE (1) DAY of prision
Jaime Ancla; consequently, the governments right to the
mayor in its maximum period to SEVENTEEN (17)
subject property has not been established.
YEARS, FOUR (4) MONTHS and ONE (1) DAY
of Reclusion Temporal.To indemnify the Bureau of
Internal Revenue the amount of P80,831.59; to pay a IV. The procedure provided for in the National Internal
fine in the same amount without subsidiary imprisonment Revenue Code concerning the disposition of distrained
in case of insolvency; to suffer special perpetual property was not followed by the B.I.R., hence the
disqualification; and, to pay the costs. distraint of personal property belonging to Jaime C.
Ancla and found allegedly to be in the possession of the
petitioner is therefore invalid.
Considering that accused Jaime Ancla has not yet been
brought within the jurisdiction of this Court up to this
date, let this case be archived as against him without V. The B.I.R. has only itself to blame for not promptly
prejudice to its revival in the event of his arrest or selling the distrained property of accused Jaime C. Ancla
voluntary submission to the jurisdiction of this Court. in order to realize the amount of back taxes owed by
Jaime C. Ancla to the Bureau.[24]
SO ORDERED.
In fine, the fundamental issue is whether the
Sandiganbayan had jurisdiction over the subject matter of
Petitioner, through new counsel,[22] filed a motion for
the controversy. Corollary to this is the question of
new trial or reconsideration on March 23, 1994, which was
whether petitioner can be considered a public officer by
denied by the Sandiganbayan in its Resolution[23] dated reason of his being designated by the Bureau of Internal
December 2, 1994. Revenue as a depositary of distrained property.
Hence, this petition.
Page 21 of 168
SEC. 4. Jurisdiction. -- The Sandiganbayan shall competent authority, shall take part in the performance
exercise: of public functions in the Government of the Philippine
Islands, or shall perform in said Government or in any of
(a) Exclusive original jurisdiction in all cases involving: its branches public duties as an employee, agent, or
subordinate official, of any rank or classes, shall be
deemed to be a public officer.
(1) Violations of Republic Act No. 3019, as amended,
otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices
Act, Republic Act No. 1379, and Chapter II, Section 2, Thus,
Title VII of the Revised Penal Code;
(to) be a public officer, one must be --
(2) Other offenses or felonies committed by public
officers and employees in relation to their office, (1) Taking part in the performance of public functions in
including those employed in government-owned or the government, or
controlled corporations, whether simple or complexed
with other crimes, where the penalty prescribed by law is Performing in said Government or any of its
higher than prision correccional or imprisonment for six branches public duties as an employee, agent, or
(6) years, or a fine of P6,000.00: PROVIDED, subordinate official, of any rank or class; and
HOWEVER, that offenses or felonies mentioned in this
paragraph where the penalty prescribed by law does not
(2) That his authority to take part in the performance of
exceed prision correccional or imprisonment for six (6)
public functions or to perform public duties must be --
years or a fine of P6,000.00 shall be tried by the proper
Regional Trial Court, Metropolitan Trial Court, Municipal
Trial Court and Municipal Circuit Trial Court. a. by direct provision of the law, or
Page 23 of 168
WHEREFORE, the questioned Resolution and
Decision of the Sandiganbayan are
hereby SET ASIDE and declared NULL and VOID for
lack of jurisdiction. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Page 24 of 168
EN BANC by the Deputy Ombudsman for Military Affairs, Bienvenido
Blancaflor, to investigate the incident. This panel later
absolve from any criminal liability all the PNP officers and
personnel allegedly involved in the May 18, 1995 incident,
[G.R. No. 128096. January 20, 1999] with a finding that the said incident was a legitimate police
operation.[1]
However, a review board led by Overall Deputy
Ombudsman Francisco Villa modified the Blancaflor
PANFILO M. LACSON, petitioner vs. THE EXECUTIVE panels finding and recommended the indictment for
SECRETARY, THE SANDIGANBAYAN, multiple murder against twenty-six (26) respondents,
OFFICE OF THE SPECIAL PROSECUTOR, including herein petitioner and intervenors. This
THE DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, MYRNA recommendation was approved by the Ombudsman,
ABALORA, NENITA ALAP-AP, IMELDA except for the withdrawal of the charges against Chief
PANCHO MONTERO, and THE PEOPLE OF Supt. Ricardo de Leon.
THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.
Thus, on November 2, 1995, petitioner Panfilo
ROMEO M. ACOP and FRANCISCO G. ZUBIA, Lacson was among those charged as principal in eleven
JR., petitioners-intervenors. (11) informations for murder[2] before
the Sandiganbayans Second Division, while intervenors
DECISION Romeo Acop and Francisco Zubia, Jr. were among those
charged in the same informations as accessories after-
MARTINEZ, J.:
the-fact.
The constitutionality of Sections 4 and 7 of Republic Upon motion by all the accused in the 11
Act No. 8249 an act which further defines the jurisdiction informations,[3] the Sandiganbayan allowed them to file a
of the Sandiganbayan is being challenged in this petition motion for reconsideration of the Ombudsmans action. [4]
for prohibition and mandamus.Petitioner Panfilo Lacson,
After conducting a reinvestigation, the Ombudsman
joined by petitioners-intervenors Romeo Acop and
filed on March 1, 1996 eleven
Francisco Zubia, Jr., also seeks to prevent
(11) amended informations[5] before the Sandiganbayan,
the Sandiganbayan from proceeding with the trial of
wherein petitioner was charged only as an accessory,
Criminal Cases Nos. 23047-23057 (for multiple murder)
together with Romeo Acop and Francisco Zubia, Jr. and
against them on the ground of lack of jurisdiction.
others. One of the accused[6] was dropped from the case.
The antecedents of this case, as gathered from the
On March 5-6, 1996, all the accused filed separate
parties pleadings and documentary proofs, are as follows:
motions questioning the jurisdiction of the
In the early morning of May 18, 1995, eleven (11) Sandiganbayan, asserting that under the amended
persons believed to be members of the Kuratong informations, the cases fall within the jurisdiction of the
Baleleng gang, reportedly an organized crime syndicate Regional Trial Court pursuant to Section 2 (paragraphs a
which had been involve in a spate of bank robberies in and c) of Republic Act No. 7975.[7] They contend that the
Metro Manila, were slain along Commonwealth Avenue in said law limited the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan to
Quezon City by elements of the Anti-Bank Robbery and cases where one or more of the "principal accused are
Intelligence Task Group (ABRITG) headed by Chief government officials with Salary Grade (SG) 27 or higher,
Superintendent Jewel Canson of the Philippine National or PNP officials with the rank of Chief Superintendent
Police (PNP). The ABRITG was composed of police (Brigadier General) or higher. The highest
officers from the Traffic Management Command (TMC) ranking principal accused in the amended informations
led by petitioner-intervenor Senior Superintendent has the rank of only a Chief Inspector, and none has the
Francisco Zubia, Jr.; Presidential Anti-Crime Commission equivalent of at least SG 27.
Task Force Habagat (PACC-TFH) headed by petitioner
Thereafter, in a Resolution[8] dated May 8, 1996
Chief Superintendent Panfilo M. Lacson; Central Police
(promulgated on May 9, 1996), penned by Justice
District Command (CPDC) led by Chief Superintendent
Demetriou, with Justices Lagman and de Leon
Ricardo de Leon; and the Criminal Investigation
concurring, and Justices Balajadia and Garchitorena
Command (CIC) headed by petitioner-intervenor Chief
dissenting,[9] the Sandiganbayan admitted the amended
Superintendent Romeo Acop.
information and ordered the cases transferred to the
Acting on a media expose of SPO2 Eduardo delos Quezon City Regional Trial Court which has original and
Reyes, a member of the CIC, that what actually transpired exclusive jurisdiction under R.A. 7975, as none of the
at dawn of May 18, 1995 was a summary execution (or a principal accused has the rank of Chief Superintendent or
rub out) and not a shoot-out between the Kuratong higher.
Baleleng gang members and the ABRITG, Ombudsman
Aniano Desierto formed a panel of investigators headed
Page 25 of 168
On May 17, 1996, the Office of the Special To recapitulate, the net result of all the foregoing is that
Prosecutor moved for a reconsideration, insisting that the by the vote of 3 to 2, the court admitted the Amended
cases should remain with the Sandiganbayan. This was Informations in these cases and by the unanimous
opposed by petitioner and some of the accused. vote of 4 with 1 neither concurring nor dissenting,
retained jurisdiction to try and decide the
While these motions for reconsideration were cases.[16] [Emphasis supplied]
pending resolution, and even before the issue of
jurisdiction cropped up with the filing of the amended
informations on March 1, 1996, House Bill No. Petitioner now questions the constitutionality of
2299[10] and No. 1094[11] (sponsored by Representatives Section 4 R.A. No. 8249, including Section 7 thereof
Edcel C. Lagman and Neptali M. Gonzales II, which provides that the said law shall apply to all cases
respectively), as well as Senate Bill No. pending in any court over which trial has not begun as of
844[12] (sponsored by Senator Neptali Gonzales), were the approval hereof. Petitioner argues that:
introduced in Congress, defining/expanding the
jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan. Specifically, the said a) The questioned provision of the statute were
bills sought, among others, to amend the jurisdiction of introduced by the authors thereof in bad faith as it was
the Sandiganbayan by deleting the word principal from made to precisely suit the situation in which petitioners
the phrase principal accused in Section 2 (paragraphs a cases were in at the Sandiganbayan by restoring
and c) of R.A. No. 7975. jurisdiction thereover to it, thereby violating his right to
procedural due process and the equal protection clause
These bills were consolidated and later approved of the Constitution. Further, from the way
into law as R.A. No. 8249[13]. The law is entitled, AN ACT the Sandiganbayan has foot-dragged for nine (9) months
FURTHER DEFINING THE JURISDICTION OF the resolution of a pending incident involving the transfer
THE SANDIGANBAYAN, AMENDING FOR THE of the cases to the Regional Trial Court, the passage of
PURPOSE PRESIDENTIAL DECREE NO. 1606, AS the law may have been timed to overtake such
AMENDED, PROVIDING FUNDS THEREFOR, AND resolution to render the issue therein moot, and frustrate
FOR OTHER PURPOSES. It took effect on February 25, the exercise of petitioners vested rights under the
1997.13 by the President of the Philippines on February old Sandiganbayan law (RA 7975)
5, 1997.
Subsequently, on March 5, 1997, b) Retroactive application of the law is plain from the fact
the Sandiganbayan promulgated a Resolution[14] denying that it was again made to suit the peculiar circumstances
the motion for reconsideration of the Special Prosecutor, in which petitioners cases were under, namely, that trial
ruling that it stands pat in its resolution dated May 8, 1996. had not yet commenced, as provided in Section 7, to
make certain that those cases will no longer be
On the same day,[15] the Sandiganbayan issued an remanded to the Quezon City Regional Trial Court, as
ADDENDUM to its March 5, 1997 Resolution, the the Sandiganbayan alone should try them, thus making it
pertinent portion of which reads: an ex post factolegislation and a denial of the right of
petitioner as an accused in Criminal Case Nos. 23047
After Justice Lagman wrote the Resolution and Justice 23057 to procedural due process
Demetriou concurred in it, but before Justice de Leon,
Jr. rendered his concurring and dissenting opinion, the c) The title of the law is misleading in that it contains the
legislature enacted Republic Act 8249 and the President aforesaid innocuous provisions in Sections 4 and 7
of the Philippines approved it on February 5, which actually expands rather than defines the
1997. Considering the pertinent provisions of the old Sandiganbayan law (RA 7975), thereby violating the
new law, Justices Lagman and Demetriou are now in one-title-one-subject requirement for the passage of
favor of granting, as they are now granting, the statutes under Section 26(1), Article VI of the
Special Prosecutors motion for Constitution.[17]
reconsideration. Justice de Leon has already done
so in his concurring and dissenting opinion. For their part, the intervenors, in their petition-in-
intervention, add that while Republic Act No. 8249
xxxxxxxxx innocuously appears to have merely expanded the
jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan, the introduction of
Considering that three of the accused in each of Sections 4 and 7 in said statute impressed upon it the
these cases are PNP Chief Superintendents: namely, character of a class legislation and an ex-post
Jewel T. Canson, Romeo M. Acop and Panfilo M. facto statute intended to apply specifically to the accused
Lacson, and that trial has not yet begun in all these in the Kuratong Baleleng case pending before
cases in fact, no order of arrest has been issued this the Sandiganbayan.[18] They further argued that if their
court has competence to take cognizance of these case is tried before the Sandiganbayan their right to
cases. procedural due process would be violated as they could
no longer avail of the two-tiered appeal to
Page 26 of 168
the Sandiganbayan, which they acquired under R.A. the latest amendments introduced by Section 4 of R.A.
7975, before recourse to the Supreme Court. No. 8249, the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over the
following cases:
Both the Office of the Ombudsman and the Solicitor
General filed separate pleadings in support of the
constitutionality of the challenged provisions of the law in SEC. 4. Section 4 of the same decree [P.D. No. 1606, as
question and praying that both the petition and the amended] is hereby further amended to read as follows:
petition-in-intervention be dismissed.
SEC. 4. Jurisdiction The Sandiganbayan shall
This Court then issued a Resolution[19] requiring the exercise exclusive original jurisdiction in all cases
parties to file simultaneously within involving:
a nonextendible period of ten (10) days from notice
thereof additional memoranda on the question of whether a. Violations of Republic Act No. 3019, as amended,
the subject amended informations filed in Criminal Cases otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices
Nos. 23047-23057 sufficiently alleged the commission by Act, Republic Act No. 1379, and Chapter II, Section 2,
the accused therein of the crime charged within the Title VII, Book II of the Revised Penal Code, where one
meaning Section 4 b of Republic Act No. 8249, so as to or more of the accused are officials occupying the
bring the said cases within the exclusive original following positions in the government, whether in a
jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan. permanent, acting or interim capacity, at the time of the
The parties, except for the Solicitor General who is commission of the offense:
representing the People of the Philippines, filed the
required supplemental memorandum within the (1) Officials of the executive branch occupying the
nonextendible reglementary period. positions of regional director and higher, otherwise
classified as Grade 27 and higher, of the Compensation
The established rule is that every law has in its favor and Position Classification Act of 1989 (Republic Act No.
the presumption of constitutionality, and to justify its 6758), specifically including:
nullification there must be a clear and unequivocal breach
of the Constitution, not a doubtful and argumentative
one.[20] The burden of proving the invalidity of the law lies (a) Provincial governors, vice-governors, members of
with those who challenge it. That burden, we regret to say, the sangguniang panlalawigan, and provincial
was not convincingly discharged in the present case. treasurers, assessors, engineers, and other provincial
department heads;
The creation of the Sandiganbayan was mandated in
Section 5, Article XIII of the 1973 Constitution, which (b) City mayors, vice-mayors, members of
provides: the sangguniang panlungsod, city treasurers, assessors,
engineers, and other city department heads;
SEC. 5. The Batasang Pambansa shall create a special
court, to be known as Sandiganbayan, which shall have (c) Officials of the diplomatic service occupying the
jurisdiction over criminal and civil cases involving graft position of consul and higher;
and corrupt practices and such other offenses committed
by public officers and employees including those in (d) Philippine Army and air force colonels, naval
government-owned or controlled corporations, in relation captains, and all officers of higher rank;
to their office as may be determined by law."
(e) Officers of the Philippine National Police while
The said special court is retained in the new (1987) occupying the position of provincial director and those
Constitution under the following provision in Article XI, holding the rank of senior superintendent or higher;
Section 4:
(f) City and provincial prosecutors and their assistants,
Section 4. The present anti-graft court known as and officials and prosecutors in the Office of the
the Sandiganbayan shall continue to function and Ombudsman and special prosecutor;
exercise its jurisdiction as now or hereafter may be
provided by law.
(g) Presidents, directors or trustees, or managers of
government-owned or controlled corporations, state
Pursuant to the constitutional mandate, Presidential universities or educational institutions or foundations;
Decree No. 1486[21] created
the Sandiganbayan. Thereafter, the following laws on
the Sandiganbayan, in chronological order, were (2) Members of Congress or officials thereof classified
enacted: P.D. No. 1606,[22] Section 20 of Batas as Grade 27 and up under the Compensation and
Pambansa Blg. 129,[23] P.D. No. 1860,[24] P.D. No. Position Classification Act of 1989;
1861,[25] R.A. No. 7975,[26] and R.A. No. 8249.[27] Under
Page 27 of 168
(3) Members of the Judiciary without prejudice to the In case private individuals are charged as co-principals,
provisions of the Constitution; accomplices or accessories with the public officers or
employees, including those employed in government-
(4) Chairman and members of the Constitutional owned or controlled corporations, they shall be tried
Commissions, without prejudice to the provisions of the jointly with said public officers and employees in the
Constitution; proper courts which shall exercise exclusive jurisdiction
over them.
(5) All other national and local officials classified as
Grade 27 or higher under the Compensation and x x x x x x x x x. (Emphasis supplied)
Position Classification Act of 1989. Section 7 of R.A. No. 8249 states:
b. Other offenses or felonies whether simple or SEC. 7. Transitory provision. This act shall apply to all
complexed with other crimes committed by cases pending in any court over which trial has not
the public officials and employees mentioned in begun as of the approval hereof. (Emphasis supplied)
Subsection a of this section in relation to their office.
The Sandiganbayan law prior to R.A. 8249 was R.A.
c. Civil and criminal cases filed pursuant to and in 7975. Section 2 of R.A. 7975 provides:
connection with Executive Order Nos. 1, 2, 14 and 14-A,
issued in 1986.
SEC. 2. Section 4 of the same decree [Presidential
Decree No. 1606, as amended] is hereby further
In cases where none of the accused are occupying amended to read as follows:
positions corresponding to salary Grade 27 or higher, as
prescribed in the said Republic Act 6758, or military and
PNP officers mentioned above, exclusive original SEC. 4. Jurisdiction The Sandiganbayan shall
jurisdiction thereof shall be vested in the proper regional exercise exclusive original jurisdiction in
trial court, metropolitan trial court, municipal trial court, all cases involving:
and municipal circuit trial court, as the case may be,
pursuant to their respective jurisdictions as provided a. Violations of Republic Act No. 3019, as amended,
in Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, as amended. otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices
Act, Republic Act No. 1379, and Chapter II, Section 2,
The Sandiganbayan shall exercise exclusive appellate Title VII, Book II of the Revised Penal Code, where one
jurisdiction over final judgment, resolution or orders of or more of the principal accused are officials occupying
the regional trial courts whether in the exercise of their the following positions in the government, whether in a
own original jurisdiction of their appellate jurisdiction as permanent, acting or interim capacity, at the time of the
herein provided. commission of the offense:
"The Sandiganbayan shall have exclusive original (1) Officials of the executive branch occupying the
jurisdiction over petitions of the issuance of the writs of positions of regional director and higher, otherwise
mandamus, prohibition, certiorari, habeas corpus, classified as Grade 27 and higher, of the Compensation
injunctions, and other ancillary writs and processes in and Position Classification Act of 1989 (Republic Act No.
aid of its appellate jurisdiction and over petitions of 6758), specifically including:
similar nature, including quo warranto, arising or that
may arise in cases filed or which may be filed under (a) Provincial governors, vice-governors, members of
Executive Order Nos. 1, 2, 14 and 14-A, issued in the sangguniang panlalawigan, and provincial
1986: Provided, That the jurisdiction over these petitions treasurers, assessors, engineers, and other provincial
shall not be exclusive of the Supreme Court. department heads;
The procedure prescribed in Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, (b) City mayors, vice-mayors, members of
as well as the implementing rules that the Supreme the sangguniang panlungsod, city treasurers, assessors,
Court has promulgated and may hereafter promulgate, engineers, and other city department heads;
relative to appeals/petitions for review to the Court of
Appeals, shall apply to appeals and petitions for review (c) Officials of the diplomatic service occupying the
filed with the Sandiganbayan. In all cases elevated to position of consul and higher;
the Sandiganbayan and from the Sandiganbayan to the
Supreme Court, the Office of the Ombudsman, through (d) Philippine Army and air force colonels, naval
its special prosecutor, shall represent the People of the captains, and all officers of high rank;
Philippines, except in cases filed pursuant to Executive
Order Nos. 1, 2, 14 and 14-A, issued in 1986.
Page 28 of 168
(e) PNP chief superintendent and PNP officers of proper courts which shall have exclusive jurisdiction over
higher rank; them.
(f) City and Provincial prosecutors and their assistants, x x x x x x. (Emphasis supplied)
and officials and prosecutors in the Office of the
Ombudsman and special prosecutor; Section 7 of R.A. No. 7975 reads:
(g) Presidents, directors or trustees, or managers of SEC. 7. Upon the effectivity of this Act, all criminal cases
government-owned or controlled corporations, state which trial has not begun in the Sandiganbayan shall be
universities or educational institutions or foundations; referred to the proper courts.
(2) Members of Congress or officials thereof classified Under paragraphs a and c, Section 4 of R.A. 8249,
as Grade 27 and up under the Compensation and the word principal before the word accused appearing in
Position Classification Act of 1989; the above-quoted Section 2 (paragraphs a and c) of R.A.
7975, was deleted. It is due to this deletion of the word
principal that the parties herein are at loggerheads over
(3) Members of the judiciary without prejudice to the the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan. Petitioner and
provisions of the Constitution; intervenors, relying on R.A. 7975, argue that the Regional
Trial Court, not the Sandiganbayan, has jurisdiction over
(4) Chairman and members of the Constitutional the Subject criminal cases since none of
Commissions, without prejudice to the provisions of the the principal accused under the amended information
Constitution; has the rank of Superintendent[28] or higher. On the other
hand, the Office of the Ombudsman, through the Special
(5) All other national and local officials classified as Prosecutor who is tasked to represent the People before
Grade 27 or higher under the Compensation and the Supreme Court except in certain cases,[29] contends
Position Classification Act of 1989. that the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction pursuant to R.A.
8249.
b. Other offenses or felonies committed by the public A perusal of the aforequoted Section 4 of R.A. 8249
officials and employees mentioned in Subsection a of reveals that to fall under the exclusive original jurisdiction
this section in relation to their office. of the Sandiganbayan, the following requisites must
concur: (1) the offense committed is a violation of (a) R.A.
c. Civil and criminal cases filed pursuant to and in 3019, as amended (the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices
connection with Executive Order Nos. 1, 2, 14 and 14-A. Act), (b) R.A. 1379 (the law on ill-gotten wealth), (c)
Chapter II, Section 2, Title VII, Book II of the Revised
In cases where none of the principal accused are Penal Code (the law on bribery),[30] (d) Executive Order
occupying positions corresponding to salary Grade 27 or Nos. 1, 2, 14, and 14-A, issued in 1986 (sequestration
higher, as prescribed in the said Republic Act 6758, or cases),[31] or (e) other offenses or felonies whether simple
PNP officers occupying the rank of superintendent or complexed with other crimes; (2) the offender
or higher, or their equivalent, exclusive jurisdiction committing the offenses in items (a), (b), (c) and (e) is a
thereof shall be vested in the proper regional trial public official or employee[32] holding any of the positions
court, metropolitan trial court, municipal trial court, and enumerated in paragraph a of Section 4; and (3) the
municipal circuit trial court, as the case may be, pursuant offense committed is in relation to the office.
to their respective jurisdictions as provided in Batas
Pambansa Blg. 129. Considering that herein petitioner and intervenors
are being charged with murder which is a felony
punishable under Title VIII of the Revised Penal Code, the
The Sandiganbayan shall exercise exclusive appellate governing provision on the jurisdictional offense
jurisdiction on appeals from the final judgments, is not paragraph but paragraph b, Section 4 of R.A.
resolutions or orders of regular courts where all the 8249. This paragraph b pertains to other
accused are occupying positions lower than grade 27, or offenses or felonies whether simple or complexed with
not otherwise covered by the preceding enumeration. other crimes committed by the public officials and
employees mentioned in subsection a of [Section 4, R.A.
xxxxxxxxx 8249] in relation to their office. The phrase other offenses
or felonies is too broad as to include the crime of murder,
In case private individuals are charged as co-principals, provided it was committed in relation to the accuseds
accomplices or accessories with the public officers or official functions. Thus, under said paragraph b, what
employees, including those employed in government- determines the Sandiganbayans jurisdiction is
owned or controlled corporations, they shall be tried the official position or rank of the offender that is,
jointly with said public officers and employees in the whether he is one of those public officers or employees
Page 29 of 168
enumerated in paragraph a of Section 4. The offenses paragraph a of Section 4 provides that it shall apply to all
mentioned in paragraphs a, b and c of the same Section cases involving" certain public officials and, under the
4 do not make any reference to the criminal participation transitory provision in Section 7, to all cases pending in
of the accused public officer as to whether he is charged any court. Contrary to petitioner and intervenors
as a principal, accomplice or accessory. In enacting R.A. arguments, the law is not particularly directed only to
8249, the Congress simply restored the original the Kuratong Baleleng cases. The transitory provision
provisions of P.D. 1606 which does not mention the does not only cover cases which are in
criminal participation of the public officer as a requisite to the Sandiganbayan but also in any court. It just
determine the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan. happened that the Kuratong Baleleng cases are one of
those affected by the law. Moreover, those cases where
Petitioner and intervenors posture that Section 4 and trial had already begun are not affected by the transitory
7 of R.A. 8249 violate their right to equal protection of the provision under Section 7 of the new law (R.A. 8249).
law[33] because its enactment was particularly directed
only to the Kuratong Balelengcases in In their futile attempt to have said sections nullified,
the Sandiganbayan, is a contention too shallow to heavy reliance is premised on what is perceived as bad
deserve merit. No concrete evidence and convincing faith on the part of a Senator and two Justices of
argument were presented to warrant a declaration of an the Sandiganbayan[38] for their participation in the
act of the entire Congress and signed into law by the passage of the said provisions. In particular, it is stressed
highest officer of the co-equal executive department as that the Senator had expressed strong sentiments against
unconstitutional. Every classification made by law is those officials involved in the Kuratong Baleleng cases
presumed reasonable. Thus, the party who challenges during the hearings conducted on the matter by the
the law must present proof of arbitrariness.[34] committee headed by the Senator. Petitioner further
contends that the legislature is biased against him as he
It is an established precept in constitutional law that claims to have been selected from among the 67 million
the guaranty of the equal protection of the laws is not other Filipinos as the object of the deletion of the word
violated by a legislation based on reasonable principal in paragraph a, Section 4 of P.D. 1606, as
classification. The classification is reasonable and not amended, and of the transitory provision of R.A.
arbitrary when there is concurrence of four elements, 8249.[39] R.A. 8249, while still a bill, was acted,
namely: deliberated, considered by 23 other Senators and by
(1) it must rest on substantial distinction; about 250 Representatives, and was separately approved
(2) it must be germane to the purpose of the by the Senate and House of Representatives and, finally,
law; by the President of the Philippines.
(3) must not be limited to existing conditions On the perceived bias that
only, and the Sandiganbayan Justices allegedly had against
(4) must apply equally to all members of the petitioner during the committee hearings, the same would
same class,[35] not constitute sufficient justification to nullify an otherwise
all of which are present in this case. valid law. Their presence and participation in the
legislative hearings was deemed necessary by Congress
The challengers of Sections 4 and 7 of R.A. 8249 since the matter before the committee involves the graft
failed to rebut the presumption of constitutionality and court of which one is the head of the Sandiganbayan and
reasonableness of the questioned provisions. The the other a member thereof. The Congress, in its plenary
classification between those pending cases involving the legislative powers, is particularly empowered by the
concerned public officials whose trial has not yet Constitution to invite persons to appear before it
commenced and whose cases could have been affected whenever it decides to conduct inquiries in aid of
by the amendments of the Sandiganbayan jurisdiction legislation.[40]
under R.A. 8249, as against those cases where trial had
already started as of the approval of the law, rests on Petitioner and intervenors further argued that the
substantial distinction that makes real differences.[36] In retroactive application of R.A. 8249 to the Kuratong
the first instance, evidence against them were not yet Baleleng cases constitutes an ex post facto law[41] for
presented, whereas in the latter the parties had already they are deprived of their right to procedural due process
submitted their respective proofs, examined witness and as they can no longer avail of the two tiered appeal which
presented documents. Since it is within the power of they had allegedly acquired under R.A. 7975.
Congress to define the jurisdiction of courts subject to the Again, this contention is erroneous. There is
constitutional limitations,[37] it can be reasonably nothing ex post facto in R.A. 8249. In Calder v.
anticipated that an alteration of that jurisdiction would Bull,[42] an ex post facto law is one
necessarily affect pending cases, which is why it has to
provide for a remedy in the form of a transitory (a)which makes an act done criminal before the
provision. Thus, petitioner and intervenors cannot now passing of the law and which was innocent
claim that Sections 4 and 7 placed them under a different when committed, and punishes such action;
category from those similarly situated as them. Precisely, or
Page 30 of 168
(b) which aggravates a crime or makes it adjective statutes may be made applicable to actions
greater that when it was committed; or pending and unresolved at the time of their passage.[54]
(c) which changes the punishment and inflicts a In any case, R.A. 8249 has preserved the accuseds
greater punishment than the law annexed to right to appeal to the Supreme Court to review questions
the crime when it was committed, of law.[55] On the removal of the intermediate review facts,
the Supreme Court still has the power of review to
(d) which alters the legal rules of evidence and determine if the presumption of innocence has been
receives less or different testimony than the convincingly overcome.[56]
law required at the time of the commission of
the offense in order to convict the Another point. The challenged law does not violate
defendant.[43] the one-title-one-subject provisions of the
Constitution. Much emphasis is placed on the wording in
(e) Every law which, in relation to the offense or the title of the law that it defines
its consequences, alters the situation of a the Sandiganbayan jurisdiction when what it allegedly
person to his disadvantage.[44] does is to expand its jurisdiction. The expansion in the
This Court added two more to the list, namely: jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan, if it can be considered
as such, does not have to be expressly stated in the title
(f) that which assumes to regulate civil rights of the law because such is the necessary consequence of
and remedies only but in effect imposes a the amendments. The requirement that every bill must
penalty or deprivation of a right which when only have one subject expressed in the title[57] is satisfied
done was lawful; if the title is comprehensive enough, as in this case, to
include subjects related to the general purpose which the
(g) deprives a person accused of crime of some
statute seeks to achieve.[58] Such rule is severally
lawful protection to which he has become
interpreted and should be given a practical rather than a
entitled, such as the protection of a former
technical construction. There is here sufficient
conviction or acquittal, or a proclamation of
compliance with such requirement, since the title of R.A.
amnesty.[45]
8249 expresses the general subject (involving the
Ex post facto law, generally, prohibits retrospectivity jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan and the amendment of
of penal laws.[46] R.A. 8249 is not a penal law. It is a P.D. 1606, as amended) and all the provisions of the law
substantive law on jurisdiction which is not penal in are germane to that general subject.[59] The Congress, in
character. Penal laws are those acts of the Legislature employing the word define in the title of the law, acted
which prohibit certain acts and establish penalties for their within its powers since Section 2, Article VIII of the
violations;[47] or those that define crimes, treat of their Constitution itself empowers the legislative body
nature, and provide for their punishment.[48] R.A. 7975, to define, prescribe, and apportion the jurisdiction of
which amended P.D. 1606 as regards various courts.[60]
the Sandiganbayans jurisdiction, its mode of appeal and
There being no unconstitutional infirmity in both the
other procedural matters, has been declared by the Court
subject amendatory provision of Section 4 and the
as not a penal law, but clearly a procedural statute, i.e.
retroactive procedural application of the law as provided
one which prescribes rules of procedure by which courts
in Section 7 R.A. No. 8249, we shall now determine
applying laws of all kinds can properly administer
whether under the allegations in the Informations, it is
justice.[49] Not being a penal law, the retroactive
the Sandiganbayan or Regional Trial Court which has
application of R.A. 8249 cannot be challenged as
jurisdiction over the multiple murder case against herein
unconstitutional.
petitioner and intervenors.
Petitioners and intervenors contention that their right
The jurisdiction of a court is defined by the
to a two-tiered appeal which they acquired under R.A.
Constitution or statute. The elements of that definition
7975 has been diluted by the enactment of R.A. 8249, is
must appear in the complaint or information so as to
incorrect. The same contention has already been rejected
ascertain which court has jurisdiction over a case.Hence
by the court several times[50] considering that the right to
the elementary rule that the jurisdiction of a court is
appeal is not a natural right but statutory in nature that
determined by the allegations in the complaint or
can be regulated by law. The mode of procedure provided
information,[61] and not by the evidence presented by the
for in the statutory right of appeal is not included in the
parties at the trial.[62]
prohibition against ex post facto laws.[51] R.A. 8249
pertains only to matters of procedure, and being merely As stated earlier, the multiple murder charge against
an amendatory statute it does not partake the nature of petitioner and intervenors falls under Section 4
an ex post facto law. It does not mete out a penalty and, [paragraph b] of R.A. 8249. Section 4 requires that the
therefore, does not come within the offense charged must be committed by the offender in
prohibition.[52] Moreover, the law did not alter the rules of relation to his office in order for the Sandiganbayan to
evidence or the mode of trial.[53] It has been ruled that have jurisdiction over it.[63] This jurisdictional requirement
is in accordance with Section 5, Article XIII of the 1973
Page 31 of 168
Constitution which mandated that set forth in the complaint with reasonable
the Sandiganbayan shall have jurisdiction over criminal particularity of time, place, names (plaintiff and
cases committed by public officers and employees, defendant) and circumstances. In short, the
including those in government-owned or controlled complaint must
corporations, in relation to their office as may be contain a specific allegation of every
determined by law. This constitutional mandate was fact and circumstance necessary to constitute
reiterated in the new (1987) Constitution when it declared the crime charged. (Emphasis supplied)
in Section 4 thereof that the Sandiganbayan shall
continue to function and exercise its jurisdiction as It is essential, therefore, that the accused be
now or hereafter may be provided by law. informed of the facts that are imputed to him as he is
The remaining question to be resolved then is presumed to have no independent knowledge of the
whether the offense of multiple murder was committed in facts that constitute the offense.[70]
relation to the office of the accused PNP officers. Applying these legal principles and doctrines to the
In People vs. Montejo,[64] we held that an offense is present case, we find the amended informations for
said to have been committed in relation to the office if it murder against herein petitioner and intervenors wanting
(the offense) is intimately connected with the office of the of specific factual averments to show the intimate
offender and perpetrated while he was in the performance relation/connection between the offense charged and
of his official functions.[65] This intimate relation between the discharge of official function of the offenders.
the offense charged and the discharge of official In the present case, one of the eleven (11) amended
duties must be alleged in the Information.[66] informations[71] for murder reads:
As to how the offense charged be stated in the
information, Section 9, Rule 110 of the Revised Rules of AMENDED INFORMATION
Court mandates:
The undersigned Special Prosecution Officer III, Office
SEC. 9. Cause of Accusation. The acts or omissions of the Ombudsman hereby accuses CHIEF INSP
complained of as constituting the offense must be stated MICHAEL RAY AQUINO, CHIEF INSP ERWIN T.
in ordinary and concise language without repetition not VILLACORTE SENIOR INSP JOSELITO T.
necessarily in the terms of the statute defining the ESQUIVEL. INSP RICARDO G. DANDAN SPO4
offense, but in such form as is sufficient to enable a VICENTE P. ARNADO, SPO4 ROBERTO F.
person of common understanding to know what offense LANGCAUON, SPO2 VIRGILIO V. PARAGAS, SPO2
is intended to be charged, and enable the court to ROLANDO R. JIMENEZ, SPO1 WILFREDO C.
pronounce proper judgment.(Emphasis supplied) CUARTERO, SPO1 ROBERTO O. AGBALOG, SPO1
OSMUNDO B. CARINO, CHIEF SUPT. JEWEL F.
As early as 1954, we pronounced that the factor that CANSON, CHIEF SUPT. ROMEO M. ACOP, CHIEF
characterizes the charge is the actual recital of the SUPT. PANFILO M. LACSON, SENIOR SUPT.
facts.[67] The real nature of the criminal charges is FRANCISCO G. ZUBIA, JR., SUPT. ALMARIO A.
determined not from the caption or preamble of the HILARIO, CHIEF INSP. CESAR O. MANCAO III, CHIEF
information nor from the specification of the provision of INSP. GIL L. MENESES, SENIOR INISP. GLENN
law alleged to have been violated, they being DUMLAO, SENIOR INSP. ROLANDO ANDUYAN, INSP.
conclusions of law, but by the actual recital of facts in CEASAR TANNAGAN, SPO3 WILLY NUAS, SPO3
the complaint or information.[68] CICERO S. BACOLOD, PO2 NORBERTO LASAGA,
PO2 LEONARDO GLORIA and PO2 ALEJANDRO G.
The noble object of written accusations cannot be LIWANAG of the crime of Murder as defined and
overemphasized. This was explained in U.S. v. penalized under Article 248 of the Revised Penal
Karelsen:[69] Code committed as follows:
The object of this written accusations was First, To That on or about May 18, 1995 in Mariano Marcos
furnish the accused with such a description of the Avenue, Quezon City, Philippines and within the
charge against him as will enable him to make his jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the accused CHIEF
defense, and second, to avail himself of his INISP. MICHAEL RAY AQUINO, CHIEF INSP. ERWIN
conviction or acquittal for protection against a T. VILLACORTE, SENIOR INSP. JOSELITO T.
further prosecution for the same cause, and third, to ESQUIVEL, INSP. RICARDO G. DANDAN, SPO4
inform the court of the facts alleged so that it may VICENTE P. ARNADO SPO4 ROBERTO F.
decide whether they are sufficient in law to support LANGCAUON, SPO2 VIRGILIO V. PARAGAS, SPO2
a conviction if one should be had. In order that ROLANDO R. JIMENEZ, SPO1 WILFREDO C.
this requirement may be satisfied, facts must be CUARTERO, SPO1 ROBERTO O. AGBALOG, and
stated, not conclusions of law Every crime is SPO1 OSMUNDO B. CARINO all taking advantage of
made up of certain acts and intent these must be their public and official positions as officers and
Page 32 of 168
members of the Philippine National Police City. How the raid, arrests and shooting happened in two
and committing the acts herein alleged in relation to places far away from each other is puzzling. Again, while
their public office, conspiring with intent to kill and there is the allegation in the amended information that the
using firearms with treachery, evident premeditation and said accessories committed the offense in relation to
taking advantage of their superior strengths did then and office as officers and members of the (PNP), we, however,
there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously shoot JOEL do not see the intimate connection between the offense
AMORA, thereby inflicting upon the latter mortal wounds charged and the accuseds official functions, which, as
which caused his instantaneous death to the damage earlier discussed, is an essential element in determining
and prejudice of the heirs of the said victim. the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan.
The stringent requirement that the charge be set
That accused CHIEF SUPT. JEWEL F. CANSON CHIEF forth with such particularity as will reasonably indicate the
SUPT. ROMEO M. ACOP CHIEF SUPT. PANFILO M. exact offense which the accused is alleged to have
LACSON, SENIOR SUPT. FRANCISCO G. ZUBIA, JR. committed in relation to his office was, sad to say, not
SUPT. ALMARIO A. HILARIO, CHIEF INSP. CESAR O. satisfied. We believe that the mere allegation in the
MANCAO II CHIEF INSP. GIL L. MENESES, SENIOR amended information that the offense was committed by
INSP. GLENN DUMLAO, SENIOR INSP. ROLANDO the accused public officer in relation to his office is not
ANDUYAN, INSP. CEASAR TANNAGAN SPO3 WILLY sufficient. That phrase is merely a conclusion of law, not
NUAS SPO3 CICERO S. BACOLOD, PO2 ALEJANDRO a factual averment that would show the close intimacy
G. LIWANAG committing the acts in relation to between the offense charged and the discharge of the
office as officers and members of the Philippine accuseds official duties.
National Police are charged herein as accessories
after-the-fact for concealing the crime herein above In People vs. Magallanes,[72] where the jurisdiction
alleged by among others falsely representing that between the Regional Trial Court and
there were no arrests made during the Sandiganbayan was at issue, we ruled:
the raid conducted by the accused herein at
Superville Subdivision, Paraaque, Metro Manila on or It is an elementary rule that jurisdiction is determined by
about the early dawn of May 18, 1995. the allegations in the complaint or information and not by
the result of evidence after trial.
CONTRARY TO LAW
In (People vs. ) Montejo (108 Phil 613 [1960] ), where
While the above-quoted information states that the the amended information alleged
above-named principal accused committed the crime of
murder in relation to their public office, there is, Leroy S. Brown, City Mayor of Basilan City, as such, has
however, no specific allegation of facts that the organized groups of police patrol and civilian
shooting of the victim by the said principal accused commandos consisting of regular policemen and x x x
was intimately related to the discharge of their official special policemen, appointed and provided by him with
duties as police officers. Likewise, the amended pistols and high power guns and then established a
information does not indicate that the said accused camp x x x at Tipo-tipo which is under his command x x
arrested and investigated the victim and then killed the x supervision and control where his co-defendants were
latter while in their custody. stationed, entertained criminal complaints and
Even the allegations concerning the criminal conducted the corresponding investigations, as well as
participation of herein petitioner and intervenors as assumed the authority to arrest and detain persons
among the accessories after-the-fact, the amended without due process of law and without bringing them to
information is vague on this. It is alleged therein that the the proper court, and that in line with this set-up
said accessories concealed the crime herein-above established by said Mayor of Basilan City as such, and
alleged by, among others, falsely representing that there acting upon his orders his co-defendants arrested and
were no arrests made during the raid conducted by the maltreated Awalin Tebag who died in consequence
accused herein at Superville Subdivision, Paraaque, thereof.
Metro Manila, on or about the early dawn of May 18,
1995. The sudden mention of the arrests made during we held that the offense charged was committed in
the raid conducted by the accused surprises the relation to the office of the accused because it was
reader. There is no indication in the amended perpetrated while they were in the performance, though
information that the victim was one of those arrested improper or irregular of their official functions and would
by the accused during the raid. Worse, the raid and not have been committed had they not held their office,
arrests were allegedly conducted at Superville besides, the accused had no personal motive in
Subdivision, Paraaque, Metro Manila but, as alleged in committing the crime, thus, there was an intimate
the immediately preceding paragraph of the amended connection between the offense and the office of the
information, the shooting of the victim by the principal accused.
accused occurred in Mariano Marcos Avenue, Quezon
Page 33 of 168
Unlike in Montejo, the informations in Criminal Cases
Nos. 15562 and 15563 in the court below do not indicate
that the accused arrested and investigated the victims
and then killed the latter in the course of the
investigation. The informations merely allege that the
accused, for the purpose of extracting or extorting the
sum of P353,000.00 abducted, kidnapped and detained
the two victims, and failing in their common purpose,
they shot and killed the said victims. For the purpose of
determining jurisdiction, it is these allegations that
shall control, and not the evidence presented by the
prosecution at the trial.
Page 34 of 168
EN BANC The facts, as gathered from t he records, are as
follows:
There is no question that Municipal Mayors are classified On July 14, 1995, petitioner filed an Addendum to
as Grade 27 under the compensation & Position Petition (To allow the introduction of alternative reliefs),
Classification Act of 1989. Since, at the time of the praying that, should this Court hold that the
commission of the offenses charged in he above-entitled Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over the cases, the
cases, the accused Mayor Jejomar C. Binay was a criminal cases filed against him be dismissed just the
Municipal Mayor, although in an acting or interim same on the ground that the long delay of the preliminary
capacity, the Sandiganbayan, has, under Section 4 (e) 5, investigation before the Ombudsman prior to the filing of
original jurisdiction over the cases therein filed against the informations, deprived him of his right to due process;
him. The allegation that Mayor Binay ought to have been and that, moreover, there was no probable cause to
classified with a salary grade lower than Grade 27, warrant the filing of the informations.
because at the time of the commission of the offenses
charged he was paid a salary which merits a grade lower
than Grade 27 does not hold water. In 1986 when the G.R. No. 128136
herein offenses were committed by the accused, the
Compensation & Position Classification Act of 1989 was
not as yet in existence. From the very definition of he Petitioner Mario Magsaysay is the Mayor of the
very Act itself, it is evident that the Act was passed and Municipality of San Pascual, Batangas. Save for
had been effective only in 1989. The Grade classification petitioner Vicente dela Rosa, all of Mayor Magsaysays co-
of a public officer, whether at the time of the commission petitioners are officials of the same municipality.
of the offense or thereafter, is determined by his
classification under the Compensation & Position In a complaint dated April 16, 1994, Victor Cusi, then
Classification Act of 1989. Thus since the accused Vice-Mayor of San Pascual, Batangas, charged
Mayor Jejomar C. Binay was a Municipal Mayor at the petitioners along with Elpidia Amada, Jovey C. Babago,
time of the commission of the offenses and the and Brigido H. Buhain, also officials of San Pascual
Compensation & Position Classification Act of 1989 Batangas, with violation of R.A. No. 3019, as
classifies Municipal Mayors as Grade 27, it is a amended. The complaint charged the respondent
conclusion beyond cavil that the Sandiganbayan has municipal officials of overpaying Vicente de la Rosa of
jurisdiction over the accused herein. TDR Construction for the landscaping project of the San
Pascual Central School. This was docketed in the Office
As of July 1, 1989, when Republic Act No. 6758 took of the Ombudsman as OMB-1-94-1232.
effect, Municipal Mayor Jejomar C. Binay had begun In a Resolution dated June 14, 1995, Graft
receiving a monthly salary of P15,180.00 which is Investigation Officer Lourdes A. Alarilla recommended the
equivalent to Grade 28 under the salary scale provided filing of an information for violation of Section 3(e) and (g)
for in Section 27 of the said Act. Under the Index of of R.A. No. 3019, as amended, against petitioners with
Occupational Services, the position titles and salary the Sandiganbayan. Director Elvis John S. Asuncion
grades of the Compensation & Position classification concurred in the resolution, and Manuel C. Domingo,
system prepared by the Department of Budget and Deputy Ombudsman for Luzon, recommended approval
Management pursuant to Section 6 of Republic [A]ct No. of the same. The resolution was approved by then Acting
6758, the position of Municipal Mayor had been Ombudsman Francisco A. Villa with the following
classified as Grade 27.[11] marginal note:
Page 36 of 168
Authority is given to the deputy Ombudsman for Luzon the RTC, had jurisdiction over the case. On July 3, 1996,
to cause the preparation of the information and to the RTC issued an order holding in abeyance the
approve the same for filing with the proper court.[12] resolution of the motion to refer the case since the issue
of jurisdiction was pending before the Sandiganbayan.
On August 11, 1995, an Information for violatiion of Back at the Sandiganbayan, the prosecution, on July
Section 3 (e) and (g) was filed against petitioners and 24, 1996, filed a motion for reconsideration of the
Jovey C. Babago, not with the Sandiganbayan per the Sandiganbayans Order dated June 21, 1996. On August
June 14, 1995 Resolution, but with the RTC of Batangas 2, 1996, filed their own motion for the reconsideration of
City. The information was signed by a Lourdes A. Alarilla, the same order. On October 22, 1996, the
the same Graft Investigation Officer who recommended Sandiganbayan granted the motion for reconsieration
the filing of the information with the Sandiganbayan. filed by the prosecution and set the case for
In the meantime, a group denominated as the arraignment. Petitioners moved for a reconsideration of
Concerned Citizens of San Pascual, Batangas filed a the October 22, 1996 Resolution ordering their
complaint before the Ombudsman against petitioners, arraignment, which motion was denied on February 17,
and Elpidia Amada and Brigido Buhain, with violations of 1997.
R.A. No. 3019. The complaint also alleged, among others, On February 27, 1997, the accused filed the present
the overpricing of the landscaping project of San Pascual petition.
Central School. The case was docketed as OMB-0-94-
0149. On October 1, 1997, the Court resolved to issue a
temporary restraining order to prevent respondents from
In a Resolution dated July 27, 1995, Graft further proceeding with Crim. Case No. 23278 of the
Investigation Officer Ernesto M. Nocos recommended the Sandiganbayan.
filing of an information charging petitioners with violation
of Section 3(e) and (g) of R.A. No. 3019, as amended with The petition raises the following issues:
proper court. The resolution, which was recommended for
approval by Nicanor J. Cruz, OIC-Deputy Ombudsman for I
Luzon, and approved by Ombudsman Aniano A. Desierto,
adopted the findings and conclusions in the resolution in Had the Sandiganbayan been ousted of its jurisdiction
OMB-1-94-1232 that the landscaping project was over the case of municipal mayor after the passage of
overpriced. Republic Act No. 7975, coupled with the filing earlier of
an information for the same offense before the Regional
On Febraury 9, 1996, another Information for Trial Court having territorial jurisdiction and venue of the
violation of Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019, as amended, commission of the offense?
was filed against petitioners for the overpricing of the
landscaping project, this time before the
II
Sandiganbayan. The information was subsequently
amended on May 17, 1996. Except for the date the
alleged crime was committed, the information charged Are the respondents Ombudsman and the prosecutors
essentially the same inculpatory facts as the information estopped by laches or waiver from filing and prosecuting
filed in the RTC. The case was docketed in the the case before respondent Sandiganbayan after the
Sandiganbayan as Crim. Case No. 22378. filing earlier of the information in the proper court,
thereafter repudiating it, seeking another court of the
On June 1, 1996, the accused filed with the same category and finally to respondent court?
Sandiganbayan a motion to quash the information in
Crim. Case No. 22378 on the following grounds: that the III
Sandiganbayan had no jurisdiction over the case; that the
accused were charged with the same offense in two
Whether or not the filing of two (2) informations for the
informations; and that the proceedings in the
same offense violated the rule on duplicity of
Sandiganbayan would expose petitioners to double
information?
jeopardy. The Sandiganbayan denied the accuseds
motion to quash in a Resolution dated June 21, 1996. The
court, however, suspended proceedings in the case until IV
the Supreme Court resolved the question of the
Sandiganbayans jurisdiction involved in the Binay Whether or not the trial to be conducted by respondent
petition. court, if the case shall not be dismissed, will expose the
petitioners who are accused therein to double jeopardy?
Meanwhile, on June 7, 1996, Prosecutor Eric
Mallonga filed a motion before the RTC to refer the R.A.
V
No. 3019 case pending therein to the Sandiganbayan,
arguing that under R.A. No. 7975 the Sandiganbayan, not
Page 37 of 168
Under the circumstances, are the respondent a. Violations of Republic Act No. 3019, as amended,
Ombudsman and the prosecutors guilty of forum otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices
shopping?[13] Act, Republic Act No. 1379, and Chapter II, Section 2,
Title VII of the Revised Penal Code, where one or more
On October 6, 1997, the Court resolved to of the principal accused are officials occupying the
consolidate G.R. No. 128136 (the Magsaysay petition) following positions in the government, whether in a
with G.R. Nos. 120681-83 (the Binay petition). permanent, acting or interim capacity, at the time of the
commission of the offense:
In resolving these consolidated petitions, the Court
shall first addrress the common question of the (1) Officials of the executive branch occupying the
Sandiganbayans jurisdiction. positions of regional director and higher, otherwise
I classified as grade 27 and higher, of the Compensation
and Position Classification Act of 1989 (Republic Act No.
The Court rules that it is the Sandiganbayan which 6758), specifically including:
has jurisdiction over the subject cases.
The informations against Mayor Binay were filed in (a) Provincial governors, vice-governors, members of
the Sandiganbayan on July 7, 1994, pursuant to the sangguniang panlalawigan, and provincial
Presidential Decree No. 1606,[14] as amended by treasurers, assessors, engineers, and other provincial
Presidential Decree No. 1861,[15] the pertinent provisions department heads;
of which state:
(b) City mayors, vice-mayors, members of
SEC. 4. Jurisdiction. - The Sandiganbayan shall the sangguniang panlungsod, city treasurers, assessors,
exercise: engineers, and other city department heads;
(a) Exclusive original jurisdiction in all cases involving: (c) Officials of the diplomatic service occupying the
position of consul and higher;
(1) Violations of Republic Act No. 3019, as amended,
otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices (d) Philippine army and air force colonels, naval
Act, Republic Act No. 1379, and Chapter II, Section 2, captains, and all officers of higher rank;
Title VII of the Revised Penal Code;
(e) PNP chief superintendent and PNP officers of higher
(2) Other offenses or felonies committed by public rank;
officers and employees in relation to their office,
including those employed in government-owned or (f) City and provincial prosecutors and their assistants,
controlled corporations, whether simple or complexed and officials and prosecutors in the Office of the
with other crimes, where the penalty prescribed by law is Ombudsman and special prosecutor;
higher than prision correccional or imprisonment for six
(6) years, or a fine of P6,000.00; PROVIDED, (g) Presidents, directors or trustees, or managers of
HOWEVER, that offenses or felonies mentioned in this government-owned or controlled corporations, state
paragraph where the penalty prescribed by law does not universities or educational institutions or foundations;
exceed prision correccional or imprisonment for six (6)
years or a fine of P6,000.00 shall be tried by the proper (2) Members of Congress and officials thereof classified
Regional Trial Court, Metropolitan Trial Court, Municipal as Grade 27 and up under the Compensation and
Trial Court and Municipal Circuit Trial Court. Position Classification Act of 1989;
xxx.
(2) Members of Congress and officials thereof classified
While the cases against petitioners were pending in as Grade 27 and up under the Compensation and
this Court, congress enacted R.A. No. 8249, again Position Classification Act of 1989;
redefining the jurisdiction of the Anti-Graft Court. This law
took effect, per Section 10 thereof, on February 23, 1997, (3) Members of the judiciary without prejudice to the
fifteen days after its complete publication on February 8, provisions of the Constitution;
1997 in the Journal and Malaya, two newspapers of
general circulation. (4) Chairmen and members of Constitutional
As further amended by Section 4 of R.A. No. 8249, Commissions, without prejudice to the provisions of he
Section 4 of P.D. No. 1606 now reads: Constitution; and
SEC. 4. Jurisdiction. - The Sandiganbayan shall exercise (5) All other national and local officials classified as
exclusive original jurisdiction in all cases involving: Grade 27 and higher under the Compensation and
Position Classification Act of 1989.
a. Violations of Republic Act No. 3019, as amended,
otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices b. Other offenses or felonies whether simple or
Act, Republic Act No. 1379, and Chapter II, Section 2, complexed with other crimes committed by the public
Title VII, Book II of the Revised Penal Code, where one officials and employees mentioned in subsection (a) of
or more of the accused are officials occupying the this section in relation to heir office.
following positions in the government, whether in a
permanent, acting or interim capacity, at he time of the d. Civil and criminal cases filed pursuant to and in
commission of the offense: connection with Executive Order Nos. 1, 2, 14 and 14-A,
issued in 1986.
(1) Officials of the executive branch occupying the
position of regional director and higher, otherwise In cases where none of the accused are occupying
classified as grade 27 and higher, of the Compensation positions corresponding to salary grade 27 or higher, as
and Position Classification Act of 1989 (Republic Act No. prescribed in the said Republic Act No. 6758, or military
6758), specifically including: and PNP officers mentioned above, exclusive original
jurisdiction thereof shall be vested in the proper regional
(a) Provincial governors, vice-governors, members of trial court, metropolitan trial court, municipal trial court,
the sangguniang panlalawigan, and provincial and municipal circuit trial court, as the case may be,
treasurers, assessors, engineers, and other provincial pursuant to their respective jurisdictions as provided
department heads; in Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, as amended.
(b) City mayors, vice-mayors, members of Petitioners contend that they do not come under the
the sangguniang panlungsod, city treasurers, assessors, exclusive original jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan
engineers, and other city department heads; because:
Page 39 of 168
(1) At the alleged time of the commission of the The Congress shall provide for the standardization of
crimes charged, petitioner municipal mayors were not compensation of government officials, including those in
classified as Grade 27. government-owned or controlled corporations with
original charters, taking into account the nature of the
(2) Municipal mayors are not included in the responsibilities pertaining to, and the qualifications
enumeration in Section 4a(1) of P.D. No. 1606, as required for their positions.
amended by R.A. No. 7975.
(3) Congressional records reveal that the law did not Corollary thereto, Republic Act No. 6758[20] provides
intend municipal mayors to come under the exclusive in Section 2 thereof that differences in pay are to be based
original jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan. upon substantive differences in duties and
responsibilities, and qualification requirements of the
positions. In short, the nature of an officials position
A should be the determining factor in the fixing of his or her
salary. This is not only mandated by law but dictated by
logic as well.
In support of his contention that his position was not Consistent with these policies, the law employs the
that of Grade 27, Mayor Binay argues: scheme known as the grade defined in Presidential
Decree No. 985[21] as including
xxx. The new laws consistent and repeated
reference to salary grade show[s] an intention to xxx all classes of positions which, although different with
base the separation of jurisdiction between the respect to kind or subject matter of work, are sufficiently
Sandiganbayan and the regular courts on pay equivalent as to level of difficulty and responsibilities and
scale.Grades are determined by compensation. The level of qualification requirements of the work to warrant
essence of grades is pay scales. Therefor, pay the inclusion of such classes of positions within one
scales determine grades.[16] range of basic compensation.[22]
Mayor Binay, thus, presented a Certification [17] from The grade, therefore, depends upon the nature of
the City Personnel Officer of Makati stating that petitioner ones position -- the level of difficulty, responsibilities, and
as mayor received a monthly salary of only P10,793.00 qualification requirements thereof -- relative to that of
from March 1987 to December 31, 1988. This amount another position. It is the officials Grade that determines
was supposedly equivalent to Grade 22 under R.A. No. his or her salary, not the other way around.
6758.
It is possible that a local government officials salary
Mayor Magsaysay, for his part, submitted a similar may be less than that prescribed for his Grade since his
Certification[18] from the Municipal Treasurer of San salary depends also on the class and financial capability
Pascual, Batangas, stating: of his or her respective local government
unit.[23] Nevertheless, it is the law which fixes the officials
x x x that the basic monthly salary received by Mario C. grade.
Magsaysay, Municipal Mayor of San Pascual, Batangas
with Salary Grade 27 is ELEVEN THOUSAND EIGHT Thus, Section 8 of R.A. 6758 fixes the salary grades
HUNDRED TWENTY EIGHT PESOS (P11,828.00) per of the President, Vice-President, Senate President,
month as of November 3, 1993 equivalent only to Grade Speaker, Chief Justice, Senators, Members of the House
25, Step 5 of RA 6758, the Compensation and Position of Representatives, Associate Justices of the Supreme
Classification Act of 1989. Court, as well as the Chairmen and Members of the
Constitutional Commissions. Section 8 also authorizes
the Department of Budget and Management (DBM) to
Section 444(1) (Grad[e] 27) of RA 6758 is not as yet determine the officials who are of equivalent rank to the
implemented due to budgetary constraints. This foregoing officials, where applicable and to assign such
certification is issued to Mayor Mario C. Magsaysay this officials the same Salary Grades subject to a set of
30th day of May 1996 at San Pascual, Batangas for guidelines found in said section.
whatever legal purpose and/or purposes it may serve.
For positions below those mentioned under Section
The Court does not subscribe to the manner by 8, Section 9 instructs the DBM to prepare the Index of
which petitioners classify Grades. Occupational Services guided by the Benchmark Position
prescribed in Section 9 and the factors enumerated
The Constitution[19] states that in providing for the therein.
standardization of compensation of government officials
and employees, Congress shall take into account the To determine whether an official is within the
nature of the responsibilities pertaining to, and the exclusive original jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan,
qualifications required for their positions, thus: therefore, reference should be made to R.A. No. 6758 and
Page 40 of 168
the Index of Occupational Services, Position Titles and impossible, for Congress to list down each position
Salary Grades. Salary level is not determinative. An created or will be created pertaining to grades 27 and
officials grade is not a matter of proof, but a matter above. The same rationale applies to the enumeration in
of law of which the Court must take judicial notice.[24] Section 4a(1). Clearly, the law did not intend said
enumeration to be an exhaustive list.
As both the 1989 and 1997 versions of the Index of
Occupational Services, Position Titles and Salary Grades Should there be any doubts as to whether petitioner
list the municipal Mayor under Salary Grade 27, petitioner mayors are under the category of Grade 27, Section
mayors come within the exclusive original jurisdiction of 444(d) of the Local Government Code settles the matter:
the Sandiganbayan. Petitioner mayors are local officials
classified as Grade 27 and higher under the The municipal mayor shall receive a minimum monthly
Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989, compensation corresponding to Salary Grade twenty-
under the catchall provision, Section 4a(5) of P.D. No. seven (27) as prescribed under R.A. No. 6758 and the
1606, as amended by R.A. No. 7975. More accurately, implementing guidelines issued pursuant thereto.
petitioner mayors are [o]fficials of the executive branch
occupying the positions of regional director and higher, In the Courts Resolution in Rodrigo dated July 2,
otherwise classified as grade 27 and higher, of the
1999 denying the motion for reconsideration, we treated
Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989,
the above provision as confirmatory of the Salary Grade
under Section 4a(1) of P.D. No. 1606, as amended by
assigned by the DBM to Municipal Mayors.
R.A. No. 7975.[25]
C
B
xxx xxx xxx The term proper courts, as used in Section 7, means
courts of competent jurisdiction, and such jurisdiction is
defined in Section 4 of P.D. No. 1606, as amended by
Senate Bill No. 1353 modifies the present jurisdiction of R.A. No. 7975. The former should not be read in isolation
the Sandiganbayan such that only those occupying but construed in conjunction with the latter.
high positions in Government and the military fall
under the jurisdiction of the court.[31] The term proper courts as used in Section 7,
therefore, is not restricted to regular courts, but includes
It is not clear, however, whether Senator Roco meant as well the Sandiganbayan, a special court. If the intent of
that all municipal officials are excluded fro mthe Congress were to refer all cases the trials of which have
jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan. In any case, courts are not begun to the regular courts, it should have employed
not bound by a legislators opinion in congressional the term proper regular courts or regular courts instead of
debates regarding the interpretation of a particular proper courts. Accordingly, the law in the third paragraph
legislation. It is deemed a mere personal opinion of the of Section 4 P.D. No. 1606, as amended by Section 2 of
legislator.[32] Such opinions do not necessarily reflect the R.A. No. 7975, uses the term regular courts, not proper
view of the entire Congress.[33] courts:
In any case, whatever seeming ambiguity or doubt (c) If the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over a case
regarding the application of Section 7 of R.A. No. 7975 pending before a regular court, the latter loses
should be laid to rest by Section 7 of R.A. No. 8249, which jurisdiction and the same shall be referred to the
states: Sandiganbayan.
Sec. 7. Transitory Provision. - This Act shall apply to all (d) If a regular court has jurisdiction over a case pending
cases pending in any court over which trial has not before it, then said court retains jurisdiction.
begun as of the approval hereof.
Thus, under both R.A. Nos. 7975 and 8429, the
The latter provision more accurately expresses the Sandiganbayan retains jurisdiction over said cases.
legislatures intent and in any event should be applied in
this case, R.A. No. 8249 having superseded R.A. No. II
7975.
Petitioner Binay avers in his Addendum to Petition
In Panfilo M. Lacson vs. The Executive Secretary, et that his right to speedy disposition has been violated by
al.,[36] The Court explained the purpose of the foregoing the inordinate delay in the resolution of the subject cases
provision. by the Ombudsman.
Article III of the Constitution provides that:
x x x it can be reasonably anticipated that an alteration
of [Sandiganbayans] jurisdiction would necessarily affect
Sec. 16. All persons shall have the right to a speedy
pending cases, which is why it has to provide for a
disposition of their cases before all judicial, quasi-
remedy in the form of a transitory provision. x x x. The
judicial, or administrative bodies.
transitory provision does not only cover cases which are
in the Sandiganbayan but also in any court. x x
x. Moreover, those cases where trial had already begun The constitutional right to a speedy disposition of
are not affected by the transitory provision under Section cases is not limited to the accused in criminal proceedings
7 of the new law (RA 8249). [Emphasis in the original.] but extends to all parties in all cases, including civil and
administrative cases, and in all proceedings, including
judicial and quasi-judicial hearings.[37] Hence, under the
The possible disruptive effect of the amendments to
Constitution, any party to a case may demand expeditious
the Sandiganbayans jurisdiction on pending cases was,
action on all officials who are tasked with the
therefore, not lost on the legislature. Congress has,
administration of justice.[38]
furthermore, deemed the commencement of the trial as
the crucial point in determining whether a court retains a However, the right to a speedy disposition of a case,
case pending before it or lose the same on the ground of like the right to speedy trial,[39] is deemed violated only
lack of jurisdiction per the provisions of R.A. 8249. The when the proceedings is attended by vexatious,
law obviously does not want to waste the time and effort capricious, and oppressive delays; or when unjustified
Page 43 of 168
postponements of the trial are asked for and secured, or Feliciano Basam, Maria Chan, Romeo
when without cause or justifiable motive a long period of Barrios, Azucena Diaz, Virgilio Clarete,
time is allowed to elapse without the party having his case Godofredo Marcelo, Armando San Miguel,
tried.[40] Equally applicable is the balancing test used to Salvador Pangilinan and John Does of the
determine whether a defendant has been denied his right following offenses: (a) Massive Malversation
to a speedy trial, or a speedy disposition of a case for that of Public Funds; (b) Multiple Falsification of
matter, in which the conduct of both the prosecution and Public Documents; (c) Usurpation of Official
the defendant is weighed, and such factors as the length Functions; (d) Violation of Election Law; and
of the delay, the reasons for such delay, the assertion or (e) Violation of Sec. 3(e) of R.A. 3019.
failure to assert such right by the accused, and the
prejudice caused by the delay.[41] The concept of speedy 1.1. Brillantes complaint was based on
disposition is a relative term and must necessarily be a the initial findings and observations of
flexible concept.[42] the COA on the examination of the
cash and accounts covering
A mere mathematical reckoning of the time involved, transactions from April 1, 1987 to
therefore, would not be sufficient.[43] In the application of January 4, 1988 and Post-Audit of
the constitutional guarantee of the right to speedy Selected Accounts for the last quarter
disposition of cases, particular regard must also be taken of 1987 of the Municipality of Makati
of the facts and circumstances peculiar to each case.[44] contained in its Report dated January
11, 1988. The COA furnished the
In Tatad vs.Sandiganbayan,[45] the Court held that Tanodbayan a copy of this report on
the length of delay and the simplicity of the issues did not August 1, 1988 upon request of the
justify the delay in the disposition of the cases latter.
therein. The unexplained inaction[46] of the prosecutors
called for the dismissal of the cases against petitioner 1.2. In the letter of the COA transmitting
Tatad. a copy of the report, the Tanodbayan
was informed that this COA audit
In Alvizo vs. Sandiganbayan,[47] the Court also ruled report of January 11, 1988 is not yet
that there was no violation of the right to speedy released since the Mayor of Makati
disposition. The Court took into account the reasons for was given thirty days within which to
the delay, i.e., the frequent amendments of procedural explain/clarify the findings in the report
laws by presidential decrees, the structural and is subject to change or
reorganizations in existing prosecutorial agencies and the modification depending upon the
creation of new ones by executive fiat, resulting in explanation/clarification to be
changes of personnel, preliminary jurisdiction, and the submitted by the Mayor of
functions and powers of prosecuting agencies. The Court Makati. Because of this information
likewise considered the failure of the accused to assert from the COA the preliminary
such right, and the lack of prejudice caused by the delay investigation was held in abeyance
to the accused. until the submission of the final report.
In Santiago vs. Garchitorena,[48] the complexity of 1.3. On March 1, 1989, the first part of
the issues and the failure of the accused to invoke her the Final Report on Audit of Makati
right to speedy disposition at the appropriate time spelled was received by the Office of the
defeat to her claim to the constitutional guarantee. Ombudsman and was transmitted for
In Cadalin vs. POEAs Administrator,[49] the Court, purposes of the ensuring preliminary
considering also the complexity of the cases (not run-of- investigation to the Tanodbayan which
the-mill variety) and the conduct of the parties lawyers, received the same on March 22, 1989.
held that the right to speedy disposition was not violated 1.4. This first part of the Final Report
therein. contained the fifteen (15) adverse
In petitioner Binays case, the Court finds that there findings, above elsewhere stated as
was no undue delay in the disposition of the subject the basis of Bobby Brillantes
cases. The proceedings conducted before the Office of complaint.
the Tanodbayan, and later with the Office of the 1.5. Eleven (11) COA auditors
Ombudsman, adequately explains the length of the delay: participated in the documentation and
1. That on July 27, 1988 Bobby Brillante filed analysis of its findings and preparation
with the Office of the Tanodbayan an of the final report.
affidavit-complaint charging, Jejomar Binay, 1.6. The first part of the final report was
Sergio Santos, Roberto Chang, Delfin followed by a Supplemental Report on
Almeda, Nelson Irasga, Nicasio Santiago, Findings No. 1 and 3. This
Page 44 of 168
Supplemental Report is dated July 3, 6.3. On August 19, 1994, the
1989. Ombudsman approved some of the
recommendations of the Review
2. After securing machine copies of the Panel and directed the preparation
voluminous documents supporting the COA and filing of the informations.[50]
findings, Pros. Margarito Gervacio,
Chairman of the Panel of Prosecutors, Furthermore, the prosecution is not bound by the
issued the corresponding subpoena findings of the Commission on Audit (COA); it must rely
directing the respondents to submit their on its own independent judgment in the determination of
respective counter-affidavits. probable cause. Accordingly, the prosecution had to
conduct it s own review of the COA findings. Judging from
2.1. In compliance with the subpoena, said findings, we find that the cases were sufficiently
Mayor Jejomar Binay submitted his complex, thus justifying the length of time for their
counter-affidavit on May 18, 1990, resolution. As held by the Sandiganbayan in its
Marissa Chan, Feliciano Bascon, Resolution dated March 29, 1995 denying the Motion to
Nicanor Santiago, Jr. on June 19, Quash:
1990, Renato Manrique on June 4,
1990, Alfredo Ignacio on June 6, 1990, 2. Ten charges are involved in these cases and
Roberto Chang on August 27, the prosecution, unable to rely on the raw
1990. Feliciano Bascon submitted his findings of the Commission on Audit in 15
Supplemental Affidavit on November reports caused the investigation and
22, 1990. examination of thousands of vouchers,
payrolls, and supporting documents
2.2. Thereafter, clarificatory considering that no less than the Chairman
examinations were conducted on of the Commission on Audit, assisted by a
September 27, 1990, October 26, team supervisor and 10 team members had
1990, November 8, 9, 14, 22, 1990. to take part in the conduct of a final audit
3. On January 15, 1991 Mayor Jejomar Binay consisting of evaluation and analysis of the
submitted a copy of this Petition for Certiorari initial findings in the 15 raw reports, the
in G.R. No. 92380 which he and the cases must have involved complicated legal
municipality of Makati filed with the Supreme and factual issues which do warrant or justify
Court against COA Chairman, Eufemio a longer period of time for preliminary
Domingo and the Commission on Audit, with investigation.
a manifestation that said petition is xxx
submitted to support Binays stand as regard
COA Finding No. 9 aforestated. 5. In the TATAD case, the preliminary
investigation was resolved close to three (3)
4. On April 2, 1992 respondent Marissa Chan years from the time all the counter-affidavits
filed an affidavit containing allegations were submitted to the Tanodbayan,
incriminating Jejomar Binay; notwithstanding the fact that very few
5. Upon being ordered to comment on the said documentary and testimonial evidence were
April 2, 1992 affidavit of Marissa Chan, involved. In the above-entitled cases, the
Jejomar Binay submitted his comment preliminary investigation of all ten (10) cases
thereto on April 30, 1992. was terminated in merely two (2) years and
four (4) months from the date Mayor Binay
6. On August 4, 1993, the Investigation Panel filed his last pleading, on April 30, 1992.[51]
submitted to the Deputy Special Prosecutor
its Resolution disposing the preliminary Petitioner claims that the Resolution of the
investigation of the case. Sandiganbayan ordering his suspension pendente lite is
unwarranted since the informations charging him were not
6.1. On August 10, 1993 the said valid. This contention, however, must fail in view of our
Resolution was approved by the pronouncement that there was no delay in the resolution
Special Prosecutor, who forwarded of the subject cases in violation of his right to speedy
the same and the entire records to the disposition. Accordingly, the informations in question are
Office of the Ombudsman for review valid an petitioners suspension pendente lite must be
and/or final action. upheld.
6.2. On August 16, 1994, the Review Finally, whether or not there is probable cause to
Panel of the Ombudsman submitted to warrant the filing of the subject cases is a question best
the latter its review action for approval. left to the discretion of the Ombudsman. Absent any
grave abuse of such discretion, the Court will not interfere
Page 45 of 168
in the exercise thereof.[52] Petitioner in this case has failed the jurisdiction of the court that the party himself
to establish any such abuse on the part of the invoked. Estoppel, however, remains the exception rather
Ombudsman. than the rule, the rule being that jurisdiction is vested by
law.[57] Even in those instances where the Court applied
III estoppel, the party estopped consistently invoked the
Having ruled that the criminal case against jurisdiction of the court and actively participated in the
petitioners in G.R. No. 128136 is within the exclusive proceedings, impugning such jurisdiction only when faced
original jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan, the Court will with an adverse decision. This is not the case here. After
now dispose of the following issues raised by them: discovering that a similar information had earlier been
filed in the RTC, respondents promptly asked the trial
(1) The Sandiganbayan was ousted of its jurisdiction court to refer the case to the Sandiganbayan, which
by the filing of an information alleging the same facts with motion was followed by a motion to resolve the previous
the Regional Trial Court. motion. There was no consistent invocation of the RTCs
jurisdiction. There were no further proceedings after the
(2) Respondents are estopped from filing an
filing of the information save for the motion to refer the
information before the Sandiganbayan considering that
case precisely on the ground of lack of jurisdiction, and
they had already filed another information alleging the
the motion to resolve the earlier motion. Finally, the trial
same facts before the Regional Trial Court.
court had not rendered any decision, much less one
(3) The filing of the information before the adverse to petitioners.
Sandiganbayan constitutes double jeopardy.
Second, petitioners cannot hold respondents in
The Court tackles these arguments successively estoppel for the latter are not themselves party to the
then deals with the questions of duplicity of information criminal action. In a criminal action, the State is the
and forum shopping. plaintiff, for the commission of a crime is an offense
against the State. Thus, the complaint or information filed
Petitioners invoke the rule that the jurisdiction of a in court is required to be brought in the name of the
court once it attaches cannot be ousted by subsequent People of the Philippines.[58] Even then, the doctrine of
happenings or events, although of such character which estoppel does not apply as against the people in criminal
would have prevented jurisdiction from attaching in the prosecutions.[59] Violations of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt
first instance.[53] They claim that the filing of the Practices Act, like attempted murder,[60] is a public
information in the Sandiganbayan was a subsequent offense. Social and public interest demand the
happening or event which cannot oust the RTC of its punishment of the offender; hence, criminal actions for
jurisdiction. public offenses can not be waived or condoned, much
This rule has no application here for the simple less barred by the rules of estoppel.[61]
reason that the RTC had no jurisdiction over the The filing of the information in the Sandiganbayan
case. Jurisdiction never attached to the RTC. When the did not put petitioners in double jeopardy even though
information was filed before the RTC, R.A. No. 7975 was they had already pleaded not guilty to the information
already in effect and, under said law, jurisdiction over the earlier filed in the RTC. The first jeopardy never attached
case pertained to the Sandiganbayan. in the first place, the RTC not being a court of competent
Neither can estoppel be successfully invoked. First, jurisdiction. There can be no double jeopardy where the
jurisdiction is determined by law, not by the consent or accused entered a plea in a court that had no
agreement of the parties or by estoppel.[54] As a jurisdiction.[62] The remedy of petitioners, therefore, was
consequence of this principle, the Court held in Zamora not to move for the quashal of the information pending in
vs. Court of Appeals[55] that: the Sandiganbayan on the ground of double
jeopardy.[63] Their remedy was to move for the quashal of
the information pending in the RTC on the ground of lack
It follows that as a rule the filing of a complaint with one of jurisdiction.[64]
court which has no jurisdiction over it does not prevent
the plaintiff from filing the same complaint later with the The contention that the filing of the information in the
competent court. The plaintiff is not estopped from doing Sandiganbayan violated the rule against duplicitous
so simply because it made a mistake before in the informations is patently unmeritorious. That rule
choice of the proper forum. In such a situation, the only presupposes that there is one complaint or information
authority the first court can exercise is to dismiss the charging not one offense, but two or more offenses. Thus,
case for lack of jurisdiction. This has to be so as a Rule 110 of the Rules of Court states:
contrary conclusion would allow a party to divest the
competent court of its jurisdiction, whether erroneously Sec. 13. Duplicity of offense. - A complaint or information
or even deliberately, in derogation of the law. must charge but one offense, except only in those cases
in which existing laws prescribed a single punishment for
It is true that the Court has ruled in certain various offenses.
cases[56] that estoppel prevents a party from questioning
Page 46 of 168
Non-compliance with this rule is a ground for quashing the
duplicitous complaint or information under Rule 117:
xxx
xxx
Here, petitioners are faced not with one
information charging more than one offense but
with more than one information charging one offense.
The Court does not find the prosecution guilty of
forum-shopping. Broadly speaking, forum shopping exists
when, as a result of an adverse opinion in one forum, a
party seeks a favorable opinion (other than by appeal
or certiorari) in another, or when he institutes two or more
actions or proceedings grounded on the same cause, on
the gamble that one or the other court would make a
favorable disposition.[65]We discern no intent on the part
of the State, in filing two informations in two different
courts, to gamble that one or the other court would make
a favorable disposition.
Obviously, respondents got their signals
crossed. One set of officials, after investigating a
complaint filed by the Vice-Mayor of San Pascual,
Batangas charging petitioners of overpricing, filed the
information for violation of Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019
in the RTC. Another set of officials investigated another
complaint from the Concerned Citizens Group accusing
petitioners of, among others, overpricing the same project
subject of the previous complaint. Finding probable
cause, the second set of officials instituted the criminal
action, charging the same offense and alleging essentially
the same facts as the first, this time in the
Sandiganbayan. Later learning of the procedural faux
pas, respondents without undue delay asked the RTC to
refer the case to the Sandiganbayan.
WHEREFORE, the consolidated petitions are
hereby DISMISSED.
Page 47 of 168
FIRST DIVISION
DECISION
PARDO, J.:
"CONTRARY TO LAW.
"CONTRARY TO LAW.
The trial of both criminal cases before the
"Manila, Philippines, March 31, 1995 Sandiganbayan has not begun.
"(a) Provincial governors, vice "c. Civil and criminal cases filed
governors, members of the sangguniang pursuant to and in connection with
panlalawigan, and provincial treasurers, Executive Order Nos. 1, 2, 14 and 14-A.
assessors, engineers, and other
provincial department heads; "In cases where none of the principal
accused are occupying positions
"(b) City mayors, vice mayors, members corresponding to salary grade "27" or
of the sangguniang panglungsod, city higher, as prescribed in the said
treasurers, assessors, engineers, and Republic Act No. 6758, or PNP officers
other city department heads; occupying the rank of superintendent or
higher, or their equivalent, exclusive
"(c) Officials of the diplomatic service jurisdiction thereof shall be vested in the
occupying the position of consul and proper Regional Trial Court,
higher; Metropolitan Trial Court, Municipal Trial
Court, and Municipal Circuit Trial Court,
as the case may be, pursuant to their
"(d) Philippine army and air force
respective jurisdiction as provided in
colonels, naval captains, and all other
Batas Pambansa Blg.
officials of higher rank;
129."[10]
"(e) PNP chief superintendent and PNP
On July 10, 1995, petitioner filed with the
officers of higher rank;
Sandiganbayan, Third Division, a motion to dismiss or
transfer Criminal Case No. 19763 to the Regional Trial
"(f) City and provincial prosecutors and Court, Sindangan, Zamboanga.
their assistants, and officials and
prosecutors in the Office of the
On the same date, petitioner filed with the
Ombudsman and special prosecutor;
Sandiganbayan, First Division, a motion to refer Criminal
Case No. 22655 to the Regional Trial Court, Sindangan,
"(g) Presidents, directors, or trustees, or Zamboanga.
managers of government-owned or
controlled corporations, state
Petitioner averred that the enactment of Republic Act
universities or educational institutions of
No. 7975 divested the Sandiganbayan of its jurisdiction
foundations.
over criminal cases against municipal mayors for
violations of Republic Act No. 3019, as amended, who
"(2) Members of Congress and officials receive salary less than that corresponding to Grade 27,
thereof classified as Grade "27" and up pursuant to the Index of Occupational Services prepared
under the Compensation and Position by the Department of Budget and Management (DBM).
Classification Act of 1989;
On September 7, 1995, the Sandiganbayan, First
"(3) Members of the judiciary without Division[11] denied the motion to refer Criminal Case No.
prejudice to the provisions of the 22655 to the Regional Trial Court. On October 10, 1995,
Constitution; the Sandiganbayan denied petitioners motion for
reconsideration.[12]
"(4) Chairmen and members of
Constitutional Commissions, without On September 14, 1995, Sandiganbayan, Third
prejudice to the provisions of the Division[13] also denied the motion to transfer Criminal
Constitution; and Case No. 19763 to the Regional Trial Court.
"(5) All other national and local officials Hence, petitioner filed these petitions for certiorari.[14]
classified as Grade "27" and higher
under the Compensation and Position
On December 27, 1995, the Court consolidated the two
Classification Act of 1989.
cases.[15]
Page 50 of 168
On February 23, 1997, Congress enacted Republic Act
No. 8249, an act redefining the jurisdiction of
Sandiganbayan.[16]
No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Page 51 of 168
EN BANC The case was docketed as Criminal Case No. 25116
and raffled to the Second Division of the
G.R. No. 143047 July 14, 2004 Sandiganbayan.
The Antecedents In its comment on the omnibus motion, the Office of the
Special Prosecutor asserted that the petitioner was, at
the time of the commission of the crime, a member of
On January 27, 1999, an Information was filed with the
the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Dapitan City,
Sandiganbayan charging petitioner Ricardo S. Inding, a
Zamboanga del Norte, one of those public officers who,
member of the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Dapitan
by express provision of Section 4 a.(1)(b) of P.D. No.
City, with violation of Section 3(e) of Republic Act No.
1606, as amended by Rep. Act No. 7975,5 is classified
3019,2committed as follows:
as SG 27. Hence, the Sandiganbayan, not the RTC, has
original jurisdiction over the case, regardless of his
That from the period 3 January 1997 up to 9 salary grade under Adm. Order No. 270.
August 1997 and for sometime prior or
subsequent thereto, in Dapitan City, Philippines,
On September 23, 1999, the respondent Sandiganbayan
and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
issued a Resolution denying the petitioner's omnibus
Court, the above-named accused Ricardo S.
motion. According to the court, the Information alleged
Inding, a high-ranking public officer, being a
that the petitioner has a salary grade of 27. Furthermore,
Councilor of Dapitan City and as such, while in
Section 2 of Rep. Act No. 7975, which amended Section
the performance of his official functions,
4 of P.D. No. 1606, provides that the petitioner, as a
particularly in the operation against drug abuse,
member of the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Dapitan
with evident bad faith and manifest partiality, did
City, has a salary grade of 27.6
then and there, willfully, unlawfully and
criminally, faked buy-bust operations against
alleged pushers or users to enable him to claim On October 27, 1999, the petitioner filed a Supplemental
or collect from the coffers of the city government Motion to his omnibus motion,7 citing Rep. Act No. 8294
a total amount of P30,500.00, as reimbursement and the ruling of this Court in Organo v.
for actual expenses incurred during the alleged Sandiganbayan,8 where it was declared that Rep. Act
buy-bust operations, knowing fully well that he No. 8249, the latest amendment to the law creating the
had no participation in the said police operations Sandiganbayan, "collated the provisions on the exclusive
against drugs but enabling him to collect from jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan," and that "the original
the coffers of the city government a total amount jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan as a trial court was
of P30,500.00, thereby causing undue injury to made to depend not on the penalty imposed by law on
the government as well as the public interest.3 the crimes and offenses within its jurisdiction but on the
Page 52 of 168
rank and salary grade of accused government officials specifically mentioned in Section 4, subparagraph (1)
and employees." were classified as SG 27, and yet were specifically
included therein, viz:
In the meantime, the petitioner was conditionally
arraigned on October 28, 1999 and entered a plea of not It is very clear from the aforecited provisions of
guilty.9 law that the members of the sangguniang
panlungsod are specifically included as among
On November 18, 1999, the petitioner filed a Motion for those falling within the exclusive original
Reconsideration of the Sandiganbayan's September 23, jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan.
1999 Resolution.10 The motion was, however, denied by
the Sandiganbayan in a Resolution promulgated on April A reading of the aforesaid provisions, likewise,
25, 2000.11 show that the qualification as to Salary Grade 27
and higher applies only to such officials of the
Dissatisfied, the petitioner filed the instant petition for executive branch other than the regional director
certiorari, contending as follows: and higher and those specifically enumerated.
To rule, otherwise, is to give a different
interpretation to what the law clearly is.
A. That Republic Act [No.] 8249 which took
effect last 05 February 1997 made the
jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan as a trial court Moreover, had there been an intention to make
depend not only on the penalty imposed by law Salary Grade 27 and higher as the sole factor to
on the crimes and offenses within its jurisdiction determine the exclusive original jurisdiction of
but on the rank and salary grade of accused the Sandiganbayan then the lawmakers could
government officials and employees. have simply stated that the officials of the
executive branch, to fall within the exclusive
B. That the ruling of the Supreme Court in "Lilia original jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan,
B. Organo versus The Sandiganbayan and the should have been occupying the positions with a
People of the Philippines," G.R. No. 133535, 09 Salary Grade of 27 and higher. But the express
September 1999, settles the matter on the wordings in both RA No. 7975 and RA No. 8249
original jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan as a specifically including the members of the
sangguniang panlungsod, among others, as
trial court which is over public officials and
those within the exclusive original jurisdiction of
employees with rank and salary grade 27 and
the Sandiganbayan only means that the said
above.
sangguniang members shall be within the
exclusive original jurisdiction of the said court
The petitioner contends that, at the time the offense regardless of their Salary Grade.
charged was allegedly committed, he was already
occupying the position of Sangguniang
Panlungsod Member I with SG 25. Hence, under Section In this connection too, it is well to state that the
lawmakers are very well aware that not all the
4 of Rep. Act No. 8249, amending Rep. Act No. 7975, it
is the RTC and not the Sandiganbayan that has positions specifically mentioned as those within
jurisdiction over the offense lodged against him. He the exclusive original jurisdiction of the
Sandiganbayan have a Salary Grade of 27 and
asserts that under Adm. Order No. 270,12 Dapitan City is
higher. Yet, the legislature has explicitly made
only a component city, and the members of
the Sangguniang Panlungsod are classified the officials so enumerated in RA No. 7975 and
as Sangguniang Panlungsod Members I with SG 25. RA No. 8249 as falling within the exclusive
Thus, Section 4 a.(1)(b) of P.D. No. 1606, as amended original jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan
because of the nature of these officials' functions
by Section 2 of Rep. Act No. 7975, and retained by
and responsibilities as well as the power they
Section 4 of Rep. Act No. 8249, does not apply to him.
can wield over their respective area of
jurisdiction.13
On the other hand, the respondents, through the Office
of the Special Prosecutor, contend that Section 4
The threshold issue for the Court's resolution is whether
a.(1)(b) of P.D. No. 1606, as amended by Section 2 of
the Sandiganbayan has original jurisdiction over the
Rep. Act No. 7975, expressly provides that the
petitioner, a member of the Sangguniang Panlungsod of
Sandiganbayan has original jurisdiction over violations of
Dapitan City, who was charged with violation of Section
Rep. Act No. 3019, as amended, committed by the
members of the Sangguniang Panlungsod, without 3(e) of Rep. Act No. 3019, otherwise known as the Anti-
qualification and regardless of salary grade. They argue Graft and Corrupt Practices Act.
that when Congress approved Rep. Act No. 7975 and
Rep. Act No. 8249, it was aware that not all the positions The Court rules in the affirmative.
Page 53 of 168
Rep. Act No. 7975, entitled "An Act to Strengthen the a. Violations of Republic Act No. 3019, as
Functional and Structural Organization of the amended, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft
Sandiganbayan, Amending for that Purpose Presidential and Corrupt Practices Act, Republic Act No.
Decree No. 1606," took effect on May 16, 1995. Section 1379, and Chapter II, Section 2, Title VII of the
2 thereof enumerates the cases falling within the original Revised Penal Code,19 where one or more of the
jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan. Subsequently, Rep. principal accused are officials occupying the
Act No. 7975 was amended by Rep. Act No. 8249, following positions in the government, whether in
entitled "An Act Further Defining the Jurisdiction of the a permanent, acting or interim capacity, at the
Sandiganbayan, Amending for the Purpose Presidential time of the commission of the offense:
Decree No. 1606, as Amended, Providing Funds
Therefor, and for Other Purposes." The amendatory law (1) Officials of the executive branch
took effect on February 23, 1997 and Section 4 thereof occupying the positions of regional
enumerates the cases now falling within the exclusive director and higher, otherwise classified
original jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan. as grade 27 and higher, of the
Compensation and Position
For purposes of determining which of the two laws, Rep. Classification Act of 1989 (Republic Act
Act No. 7975 or Rep. Act No. 8249, applies in the No. 6758), specifically including:
present case, the reckoning period is the time of the
commission of the offense.14 Generally, the jurisdiction of (a) Provincial governors, vice-
a court to try a criminal case is to be determined by the governors, members of the
law in force at the time of the institution of the action, not sangguniang panlalawigan, and
at the time of the commission of the crime.15 However, provincial treasurers, assessors,
Rep. Act No. 7975, as well as Rep. Act No. 8249, engineers, and other provincial
constitutes an exception thereto as it expressly states department heads;
that to determine the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan
in cases involving violations of Rep. Act No. 3019, the
(b) City mayors, vice-mayors,
reckoning period is the time of the commission of the
members of the sangguniang
offense. This is plain from the last clause of the opening
panlungsod, city treasurers,
sentence of paragraph (a) of these two provisions which
assessors, engineers, and other
reads: city department heads;20
That the legislators intended to include certain public To speed up trial in the Sandiganbayan,
officials, regardless of their salary grades, within the Republic Act No. 7975 was enacted for that
original jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan is apparent Court to concentrate on the "larger fish" and
from the legislative history of both Rep. Acts Nos. 7975 leave the "small fry" to the lower courts. This law
and 8249. In his sponsorship speech of Senate Bill No. became effective on May 6, 1995 and it provided
1353, which was substantially adopted by both Houses a two-pronged solution to the clogging of the
of Congress and became Rep. Act No. 7975, Senator dockets of that court, to wit:
Raul S. Roco, then Chairman of the Committee on
Justice and Human Rights, explained: It divested the Sandiganbayan of
jurisdiction over public officials whose
Senate Bill No. 1353 modifies the present salary grades were at Grade "26" or
jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan such that only lower, devolving thereby these cases to
those occupying high positions in the the lower courts, and retaining the
government and the military fall under the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan only
jurisdiction of the court. over public officials whose salary grades
were at Grade "27" or higher and over
As proposed by the Committee, the other specific public officials holding
Sandiganbayan shall exercise original important positions in government
jurisdiction over cases assigned to it only in regardless of salary grade;26
instances where one or more of the principal
accused are officials occupying the positions of Evidently, the officials enumerated in (a) to (g) Section 4
regional director and higher or are otherwise a.(1) of P.D. No. 1606, amended Section 2 of Rep. Act
classified as Grade 27 and higher by the No. 7975, were specifically included within the original
Compensation and Classification Act of 1989, jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan because the
whether in a permanent, acting or interim lawmakers considered them "big fish" and their positions
capacity at the time of the commission of the important, regardless of their salary grades.
offense. The jurisdiction, therefore, refers to a
certain grade upwards, which shall remain with This conclusion is further bolstered by the fact that some
the Sandiganbayan. of the officials enumerated in (a) to (g) are not classified
as SG 27 or higher under the Index of Occupational
The President of the Philippines and other Services, Position Titles and Salary Grades issued by
impeachable officers such as the justices of the the Department of Budget and Management in 1989,
Page 56 of 168
then in effect at the time that Rep. Act No. 7975 was Noticeably, the vice mayors, members of
approved. For example: the Sangguniang Panlungsod and prosecutors, without
any distinction or qualification, were specifically included
in Rep. Act No. 7975 as falling within the original
Category New Positionjurisdiction
Gradeof the Sandiganbayan. Moreover, the
Title consuls, city department heads, provincial department
heads and members of the Sangguniang
16. FOREIGN RELATIONS SERVICE …
Panlalawigan, albeit classified as having salary grades
26 or lower, were also specifically included within the
Foreign Service …
Sandiganbayan's original jurisdiction. As correctly
posited by the respondents, Congress is presumed to
Foreign Service Officer, Class II27 have been2328aware of, and had taken into account, these
officials' respective salary grades when it deliberated
Foreign Service Officer, Class I29 upon the
30
24amendments to the Sandiganbayan
jurisdiction. Nonetheless, Congress passed into law
Rep. Act …No. 7975, specifically including them within the
original jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan. By doing so, it
18. EXECUTIVE SERVICE obviously… intended cases mentioned in Section 4 a. of
P.D. No. 1606, as amended by Section 2 of Rep. Act No.
Local Executives …
7975, when committed by the officials enumerated in (1)
(a) to (g) thereof, regardless of their salary grades, to be
City Government Department Head I 2431
tried by the Sandiganbayan.
City Government Department Head II 2632
Indeed, it is a basic precept in statutory construction that
the intent
… of the legislature is the controlling factor in the
interpretation of a statute.37 From the congressional
Provincial Government Department records25and
33 the text of Rep. Acts No. 7975 and 8294,
Page 57 of 168
In this case, there is no dispute that the petitioner is a
member of the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Dapitan City
and he is charged with violation of Section 3 (e) of Rep.
Act No. 3019. Members of the Sangguniang
Panlungsod are specifically included as among those
within the original jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan in
Section 4 a.(1) (b) of P.D. No. 1606, as amended by
Section 2 of Rep. Act No. 7975,41 or even Section 4 of
Rep. Act No. 824942 for that matter. The Sandiganbayan,
therefore, has original jurisdiction over the petitioner's
case docketed as Criminal Case No. 25116.
SO ORDERED.
Page 58 of 168
THIRD DIVISION 1, 2000, amounting to NINETY ONE THOUSAND NINE
HUNDRED FIFTY-FOUR and 64/100 (₱91,954.64),
G.R. No. 158187 February 11, 2005 Philippine Currency, to Tiong Bi Medical Center, Tiong
Bi, Inc. despite clear provision in the Deed of Conditional
MARILYN GEDUSPAN and DRA. EVANGELYN Sale executed on November 27, 1999, involving the sale
FARAHMAND, petitioners, of West Negros College, Inc. to Tiong Bi, Inc. or Tiong Bi
Medical Center, that the possession, operation and
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES and management of the said hospital will be turned over by
SANDIGANBAYAN, respondents. West Negros College, Inc. to Tiong Bi, Inc. effective
January 1, 2000, thus all collectibles or accounts
receivable accruing prior to January 1, 2000 shall be due
DECISION to West Negros College, Inc., thus accused MARILYN C.
GEDUSPAN in the course of the performance of her
CORONA, J.: official functions, had given unwarranted benefits to
Tiong Bi, Inc., Tiong Bi Medical Center, herein
Does the Sandiganbayan have jurisdiction over a represented by accused DR. EVANGELINE C.
regional director/manager of government-owned or FARAHMAND, to the damage and injury of West Negros
controlled corporations organized and incorporated College, Inc.
under the Corporation Code for purposes of RA 3019,
the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act? Petitioner CONTRARY TO LAW.
Marilyn C. Geduspan assumes a negative view in the
instant petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules Both accused filed a joint motion to quash dated July 29,
of Court. The Office of the Special Prosecutor contends 2002 contending that the respondent Sandiganbayan
otherwise, a view shared by the respondent court. had no jurisdiction over them considering that the
principal accused Geduspan was a Regional Director of
In the instant Rule 65 petition for certiorari with prayer for Philhealth, Region VI, a position classified under salary
a writ of preliminary injunction and/or issuance of a grade 26.
temporary restraining order, Geduspan seeks to annul
and set aside the resolutions1 dated January 31, 2003 In a resolution dated January 31, 2003, the respondent
and May 9, 2003 of the respondent Sandiganbayan, court denied the motion to quash. The motion for
Fifth Division. These resolutions denied her motion to reconsideration was likewise denied in a resolution
quash and motion for reconsideration, respectively. dated May 9, 2003.
(1) Officials of the executive branch occupying the a. Violations of Republic Act No. 3019, as amended,
positions of regional director and higher, otherwise otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices
classified as Grade "27" and higher, of the Act, Republic Act No. 1379, and Chapter II, Section 2,
Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989 Title VII, Book II of the Revised Penal Code, where one
(Republic Act No. 6758); specifically including; or more of the accused are officials occupying the
following positions in the government, whether in a
xxx xxx xxx permanent, acting or interim capacity, at the time of the
commission of the offense;
(5) All other national and local officials classified as
Grade "27" and higher under the Compensation and (1) Officials of the executive branch occupying the
Position Classification Act of 1989. positions of regional director and higher, otherwise
classified as Grade ‘Grade 27’ and higher, of the
The petition lacks merit. Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989
(Republic Act No. 6758), specifically including:
The records show that, although Geduspan is a Director
of Region VI of the Philhealth, she is not occupying the (a) xxx xxx xxx
position of Regional Director but that of Department
Manager A, hence, paragraphs (1) and (5) of Section 4 (b) xxx xxx xxx
of RA 8249 are not applicable.
(c) xxx xxx xxx
It is petitioner’s appointment paper and the notice of
salary adjustment that determine the classification of her (d) xxx xxx xxx
position, that is, Department Manager A of Philhealth.
(e) xxx xxx xxx
Petitioner admits that she holds the position of
Department Manager A of Philhealth. She, however,
(f) xxx xxx xxx
contends that the position of Department Manager A is
classified under salary grade 26 and therefore outside
the jurisdiction of respondent court. She is at present (g) Presidents, directors or trustees, or managers of
assigned at the Philhealth Regional Office VI as government-owned and controlled corporations,
Regional Director/Manager. state universities or educational institutions or
foundations." (Underscoring supplied).
Petitioner anchors her request for the issuance of a
temporary restraining order on the alleged disregard by It is of no moment that the position of petitioner is merely
respondent court of the decision of this Court in Ramon classified as salary grade 26. While the first part of the
Cuyco v. Sandiganbayan.3 above–quoted provision covers only officials of the
executive branch with the salary grade 27 and higher,
the second part thereof "specifically includes" other
However, the instant case is not on all fours with Cuyco.
executive officials whose positions may not be of grade
In that case, the accused Ramon Cuyco was the
27 and higher but who are by express provision of law
Regional Director of the Land Transportation Office placed under the jurisdiction of the said court.
(LTO), Region IX, Zamboanga City, but at the time of the
commission of the crime in 1992 his position of Regional
Director of LTO was classified as Director II with salary Hence, respondent court is vested with jurisdiction over
grade 26. Thus, the Court ruled that the Sandiganbayan petitioner together with Farahmand, a private individual
had no jurisdiction over his person. charged together with her.
In contrast, petitioner held the position of Department The position of manager in a government-owned or
Director A of Philhealth at the time of the commission of controlled corporation, as in the case of Philhealth, is
the offense and that position was among those within the jurisdiction of respondent court. It is the
enumerated in paragraph 1(g), Section 4a of RA 8249 position that petitioner holds, not her salary grade, that
over which the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction: determines the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan.
Page 60 of 168
This Court in Lacson v. Executive Secretary, et
al. 4 ruled:
SO ORDERED.
Page 61 of 168
THIRD DIVISION The records disclosed that while Philippine Postal
Savings Bank is a subsidiary of the Philippine Postal
G.R. Nos. 147706-07 February 16, 2005 Corporation which is a government owned corporation,
the same is not created by a special law. It was
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, organized and incorporated under the Corporation Code
which is Batas Pambansa Blg. 68. It was registered with
vs.
THE HONORABLE SANDIGANBAYAN (Fifth Division) the Securities and Exchange Commission under SEC
and EFREN L. ALAS, respondents. No. AS094-005593 on June 22, 1994 with a lifetime of
fifty (50) years. Under its Articles of Incorporation the
purpose for which said entity is formed was primarily for
DECISION business, xxx
Page 62 of 168
Clearly, on the basis of the foregoing pronouncements of held by its incorporators who are/were themselves
the Supreme Court, the accused herein cannot be officers of PHILPOST. The creation of PPSB was
considered a public officer. Thus, this Court may not expressly sanctioned by Section 32 of RA 7354,
exercise jurisdiction over his act.2 otherwise known as the Postal Service Act of 1992, for
purposes of, among others, "to encourage and promote
Dissatisfied, the People, through the Office of the the virtue of thrift and the habit of savings among the
Special Prosecutor (OSP), filed this petition3 arguing, in general public, especially the youth and the marginalized
essence, that the PPSB was a government-owned or sector in the countryside xxx" and to facilitate postal
controlled corporation as the term was defined under service by "receiving collections and making payments,
Section 2(13) of the Administrative Code of including postal money orders."7
1987.4 Likewise, in further defining the jurisdiction of the
Sandiganbayan, RA 8249 did not make a distinction as It is not disputed that the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction
to the manner of creation of the government-owned or over presidents, directors or trustees, or managers of
controlled corporations for their officers to fall under its government-owned or controlled corporations with
jurisdiction. Hence, being President and Chief Operating original charters whenever charges of graft and
Officer of the PPSB at the time of commission of the corruption are involved. However, a question arises
crimes charged, respondent Alas came under the whether the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over the
jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan.1awphi1.nét same officers in government-owned or controlled
corporations organized and incorporated under the
Quoting at length from the assailed resolution dated Corporation Code in view of the delimitation provided for
February 15, 2001, respondent Alas, on the other hand, in Article IX-B Section 2(1) of the 1987 Constitution
practically reiterated the pronouncements made by the which states that:
respondent court in support of his conclusion that the
PPSB was not created by special law, hence, its officers SEC. 2. (1) The Civil Service embraces all branches,
did not fall within the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan. 5 subdivisions, instrumentalities, and agencies of the
government, including government-owned or controlled
We find merit in the petition. corporations with original charters.
Section 2(13) of EO 2926 defines government-owned or It should be pointed out however, that the jurisdiction of
controlled corporations as follows: the Sandiganbayan is separate and distinct from the
Civil Service Commission. The same is governed by
Article XI, Section 4 of the 1987 Constitution which
Sec. 2. General Terms Defined – Unless the specific
provides that "the present anti-graft court known as the
words of the text or the context as a whole or a particular
Sandiganbayan shall continue to function and exercise
statute, shall require a different meaning:
its jurisdiction as now or hereafter may be provided by
law." This provision, in effect, retained the jurisdiction of
xxx xxx xxx the anti-graft court as defined under Article XIII, Section
5 of the 1973 Constitution which mandated its creation,
(13) government owned or controlled corporations refer thus:
to any agency organized as a stock or non-stock
corporation vested with functions relating to public needs Sec. 5. The Batasang Pambansa shall create a special
whether governmental or proprietary in nature, and court, to be known as Sandiganbayan, which shall have
owned by the government directly or indirectly or through jurisdiction over criminal and civil cases involving graft
its instrumentalities either wholly, or where applicable as and corrupt practices and such other offense committed
in the case of stock corporations to the extent of at least by public officers and employees, including those in
51% of its capital stock: provided, that government government-owned or controlled corporations, in relation
owned or controlled corporations maybe further to their office as may be determined by law. (Italics ours)
categorized by the department of the budget, the civil
service commission and the commission on audit for the
purpose of the exercise and discharge of their respective On March 30, 1995, Congress, pursuant to its authority
powers, functions and responsibilities with respect to vested under the 1987 Constitution, enacted RA
79758maintaining the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan
such corporations.
over presidents, directors or trustees, or managers of
government-owned or controlled corporations without
From the foregoing, PPSB fits the bill as a government- any distinction whatsoever. Thereafter, on February 5,
owned or controlled corporation, and organized and 1997, Congress enacted RA 82499 which preserved the
incorporated under the Corporation Code as a subsidiary subject provision:
of the Philippine Postal Corporation (PHILPOST). More
than 99% of the authorized capital stock of PPSB
belongs to the government while the rest is nominally
Page 63 of 168
Section 4, Jurisdiction. The Sandiganbayan shall provisions of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act.
exercise exclusive original jurisdiction in all cases Otherwise, as we emphasized therein, a major policy of
involving: Government, which is to eradicate, or at the very least
minimize, the graft and corruption that has permeated
a. Violations of Republic Act No. 3019, as amended, the fabric of the public service like a malignant social
otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices cancer, would be seriously undermined. In fact, Section
Act, Republic Act No. 1379, and Chapter II, Section, Title 1 of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act embodies
VII, Book II of the Revised Penal Code, where one or this policy of the government, that is, to repress certain
more of the accused are officials occupying the following acts not only of public officers but also of private persons
positions in the government, whether in a permanent, constituting graft or corrupt practices or which may lead
acting or interim capacity, at the time of the commission thereto.
of the offense,
The foregoing pronouncement has not outlived its
(1) Officials of the executive branch occupying the usefulness. On the contrary, it has become even more
positions of regional director, and higher, otherwise relevant today due to the rampant cases of graft and
classified as grade "27" and higher, of the Compensation corruption that erode the people’s faith in government.
and Position Classification Act of 1989 (Republic Act No. For indeed, a government-owned or controlled
6758) specifically including: corporation can conceivably create as many subsidiary
corporations under the Corporation Code as it might
xxx xxx xxx wish, use public funds, disclaim public accountability and
escape the liabilities and responsibilities provided by
law. By including the concerned officers of government-
(g) Presidents, directors or trustees, or managers of owned or controlled corporations organized and
government-owned or controlled corporations, state incorporated under the Corporation Code within the
universities or educational institutions or foundations. jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan, the legislature
(Italics ours) evidently seeks to avoid just that.
The legislature, in mandating the inclusion of WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the petition is
"presidents, directors or trustees, or managers of hereby GRANTED and the assailed resolution dated
government-owned or controlled corporations" within the February 15, 2001 of the respondent court is hereby
jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan, has consistently REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
refrained from making any distinction with respect to the
manner of their creation.
SO ORDERED.
The deliberate omission, in our view, clearly reveals the
intention of the legislature to include the presidents,
directors or trustees, or managers of both types of
corporations within the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan
whenever they are involved in graft and corruption. Had
it been otherwise, it could have simply made the
necessary distinction. But it did not.
On November 22, 1999, before the Sandiganbayan The petition is bereft of merit.
could resolve the motion to quash, the prosecution filed
the following Re-Amended Information in Criminal Case Section 4 of Presidential Decree No. 1606, as amended
No. 24703: by Republic Act No. 8249,10 reads in part:
"That on or about the 5th day of August 1997 in SEC. 4. Jurisdiction. – The Sandiganbayan shall
Cabanatuan City, Nueva Ecija, Philippines and within the exercise exclusive original jurisdiction in all cases
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named involving:
accused, JUDGE ROGELIO M. ESTEBAN, a public
officer, being then the Presiding Judge of Branch 1 of xxx
the Municipal Trial Court in Cabanatuan City, who after
having been rejected by the private complainant, Ana b. Other offenses or felonies whether simple or
May V. Simbajon, of his sexual demands or solicitations complexed with other crime committed by the public
to be his girlfriend and to enter his room daily for a kiss officials and employees mentioned in subsection a of
as a condition for the signing of complainant’s this section in relation to their office.
permanent appointment as a bookbinder in his Court,
thus in relation to his office or position as such, with lewd
In People v. Montejo,11 we ruled that an offense is said
design and malicious desire, did then and there willfully,
to have been committed in relation to the office if the
Page 66 of 168
offense is "intimately connected" with the office of
the offender and perpetrated while he was in the
performance of his official functions. This intimate
relation between the offense charged and the discharge
of official duties must be alleged in the
Information.12 This is in accordance with the rule that the
factor that characterizes the charge is the actual recital
of the facts in the complaint or information.13 Hence,
where the information is wanting in specific factual
averments to show the intimate relationship/connection
between the offense charged and the discharge of
official functions, the Sandiganbayan has no jurisdiction
over the case.14
SO ORDERED.
Page 67 of 168
SECOND DIVISION they have failed to do so, to the damage and prejudice of
the government.
CONTRARY TO LAW.[2]
[G.R. Nos. 161784-86. April 26, 2005]
The inculpatory portion of the second Amended
Information, docketed as Criminal Case No. 27436,
charging the said accused with illegal use of public funds,
DINAH C. BARRIGA, petitioner, vs. THE HONORABLE reads:
SANDIGANBAYAN (4TH DIVISION) and THE
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents. That in or about the month of November 1995, or
sometime prior or subsequent thereto, in the Municipality
DECISION of Carmen, Province of Cebu, Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of the Honorable Court, above-named
CALLEJO, SR., J.:
accused VIRGINIO E. VILLAMOR and DINAH C.
BARRIGA, both public officers, being then the Municipal
This is a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Mayor and Municipal Accountant, respectively, of the
Rules of Court for the nullification of the Resolution[1] of Municipality of Carmen, Cebu, and as such, had in their
the Sandiganbayan in Criminal Case Nos. 27435 to possession and control public funds in the amount of
27437 denying the motion to quash the Informations filed ONE THOUSAND THREE HUNDRED FIVE PESOS
by one of the accused, Dinah C. Barriga, and the (P1,305.00) Philippine Currency, representing a portion
Resolution denying her motion for reconsideration of the Central Visayas Water and Sanitation Project
thereof. Trust Fund (CVWSP Fund) intended and appropriated
for the projects classified under Level I and
III particularly the construction of Deep Well and Spring
The Antecedents Box for Level I projects and construction of water works
system for Level III projects of specified barangay
beneficiaries/recipients, and for which fund accused are
On April 3, 2003, the Office of the Ombudsman filed accountable by reason of the duties of their office, in
a motion with the Sandiganbayan for the admission of the such capacity and committing the offense in relation to
three Amended Informations appended thereto. The first office, conniving and confederating together and
Amended Information docketed as Criminal Case No. mutually helping each other, did then and there, willfully
27435, charged petitioner Dinah C. Barriga and Virginio unlawfully and feloniously disburse and use said amount
E. Villamor, the Municipal Accountant and the Municipal of P1,305.00 for the Spring Box of Barangay Natimao-
Mayor, respectively, of Carmen, Cebu, with malversation an, Carmen, Cebu, a barangay which was not
of funds. The accusatory portion reads: included as a recipient of CVWSP Trust Fund, thus,
accused used said public fund to a public purpose
That in or about January 1996 or sometime prior or different from which it was intended or appropriated, to
subsequent thereto, in the Municipality of Carmen, the damage and prejudice of the
Province of Cebu, Philippines and within the jurisdiction government, particularly the barangays which were
of this Honorable Court, above-named accused CVWSP Trust Fund beneficiaries.
VIRGINIO E. VILLAMOR and DINAH C.
BARRIGA, both public officers, being then the Municipal CONTRARY TO LAW.[3]
Mayor and Municipal Accountant, respectively, of the
Municipality of Carmen, Cebu, and as such, had in their The accusatory portion of the third Amended
possession and custody public funds amounting to Information, docketed as Criminal Case No. 27437,
TWENTY- THREE THOUSAND FORTY-SEVEN AND charged the same accused with illegal use of public funds,
20/100 PESOS (P23,047.20), Philippine Currency, as follows:
intended for the payment of Five (5) rolls of Polyethylene
pipes to be used in the Corte-Cantumog Water System That in or about the month of January 1997, or
Project of the Municipality of Carmen, Cebu, for which sometime prior or subsequent thereto, in the Municipality
they are accountable by reason of the duties of their of Carmen, Province of Cebu, Philippines, and within the
office, in such capacity and committing the offense in jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, above-named
relation to office, conniving and confederating together accused Virginio E. Villamor and Dinah C.
and mutually helping each other, did then and there Barriga, both public officers, being then the Municipal
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously misappropriate, take, Mayor and Municipal Accountant, respectively, of the
embezzle and convert into their own personal use and Municipality of Carmen, Cebu, and as such, had in their
benefit said amount of P23,047.20, and despite possession and control public funds in the amount
demands made upon them to account for said amount, of TWO HUNDRED SIXTY-SEVEN THOUSAND FIVE
Page 68 of 168
HUNDRED THIRTY-SEVEN and 96/100 (P267,537.96) charged, they failed to allege and show her exact
PESOS, representing a portion of the Central Visayas participation in the conspiracy and how she committed the
Water and Sanitation Project Trust Fund (CVWSP crimes charged. She also pointed out that the funds
Fund), intended and appropriated for the projects subject of the said Amended Informations were not under
classified under Level I and Level III, particularly the her control or administration.
construction of Spring Box and Deep Well for Level I
projects and construction of water works system for On October 9, 2003, the Sandiganbayan issued a
Level III projects of specified barangay beneficiaries/ Resolution[9] denying the motion of the petitioner. The
recipients, and for which fund accused are accountable motion for reconsideration thereof was, likewise, denied,
by reason for the duties of their office, in such capacity with the graft court holding that the applicable ruling of this
and committing the offense in relation to office, conniving Court was Montilla v. Hilario,[10] i.e., that an offense is
and confederating together and mutually helping each committed in relation to public office when there is a
other, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and direct, not merely accidental, relation between the crime
feloniously disburse and use said amount charged and the office of the accused such that, in a legal
of P267,537.96 for the construction and expansion sense, the offense would not exist without the office; in
of Barangay Cantucong Water System, a project falling other words, the office must be a constituent element of
under Level II of CVWSP, thus, accused used said the crime as defined in the statute. The graft court further
public funds to a public purpose different from which it held that the offices of the municipal mayor and the
was intended and appropriated, to the damage and municipal accountant were constituent elements of the
prejudice of the government, particularly the barangay felonies of malversation and illegal use of public funds.
beneficiaries of Levels I and III of CVWSP. The graft court emphasized that the rulings of this Court
in People v. Montejo[11] and Lacson v. Executive
Secretary[12] apply only where the office held by the
CONTRARY TO LAW.[4] accused is not a constituent element of the crimes
charged. In such cases, the Information must contain
The Sandiganbayan granted the motion and specific factual allegations showing that the commission
admitted the Amended Informations. The petitioner filed a of the crimes charged is intimately connected with or
Motion to Quash the said Amended Informations on the related to the performance of the accused public officers
ground that under Section 4 of Republic Act No. 8294, the public functions. In fine, the graft court opined, the basic
Sandiganbayan has no jurisdiction over the crimes rule is that enunciated by this Court in Montilla v.
charged. She averred that the Amended Informations Hilario, and the ruling of this Court in People v. Montejo is
failed to allege and show the intimate relation between the the exception.
crimes charged and her official duties as municipal
accountant, which are conditions sine qua non for the The petitioner thus filed the instant petition
graft court to acquire jurisdiction over the said offense. for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, seeking
She averred that the prosecution and the Commission on to nullify the aforementioned Resolutions of the
Audit admitted, and no less than this Court held in Tan v. Sandiganbayan. The petitioner claims that the graft court
Sandiganbayan,[5] that a municipal accountant is not an committed grave abuse of its discretion amounting to
accountable officer. She alleged that the felonies of excess or lack of jurisdiction in issuing the same.
malversation and illegal use of public funds, for which she
In its comment on the petition, the Office of the
is charged, are not included in Chapter 11, Section 2, Title
Special Prosecutor averred that the remedy of filing a
VII, Book II, of the Revised Penal Code; hence, the petition for certiorari, from a denial of a motion to quash
Sandiganbayan has no jurisdiction over the said crimes.
amended information, is improper. It posits that any error
Moreover, her position as municipal accountant is
committed by the Sandiganbayan in denying the
classified as Salary Grade (SG) 24.
petitioners motion to quash is merely an error of judgment
The petitioner also posited that although the and not of jurisdiction. It asserts that as ruled by the
Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over offenses committed Sandiganbayan, what applies is the ruling of this Court
by public officials and employees in relation to their office, in Montilla v. Hilario and not People v.
the mere allegation in the Amended Informations that she Montejo. Furthermore, the crimes of malversation and
committed the offenses charged in relation to her office is illegal use of public funds are classified as crimes
not sufficient as the phrase is merely a conclusion of law; committed by public officers in relation to their office,
controlling are the specific factual allegations in the which by their nature fall within the jurisdiction of the
Informations that would indicate the close intimacy Sandiganbayan. It insists that there is no more need for
between the discharge of her official duties and the the Amended Informations to specifically allege intimacy
commission of the offenses charged. To bolster her between the crimes charged and the office of the accused
stance, she cited the rulings of this Court in People v. since the said crimes can only be committed by public
Montejo,[6] Soller v. Sandiganbayan,[7] and Lacson v. officers. It further claims that the petitioner has been
Executive Secretary.[8] She further contended that charged of malversation and illegal use of public funds in
although the Amended Informations alleged that she conspiracy with Municipal Mayor Virginio E. Villamor, who
conspired with her co-accused to commit the crimes occupies a position classified as SG 27; and even if the
Page 69 of 168
petitioners position as municipal accountant is only Article 217 of the Revised Penal Code, and the illegal use
classified as SG 24, under Section 4 of Rep. Act No. 8249, of public funds or property defined and penalized by
the Sandiganbayan still has jurisdiction over the said Article 220 of the same Code. The public office of the
crimes. The Office of the Special Prosecutor further avers accused is a constituent element in both felonies.
that the petitioners claim, that she is not an accountable
officer, is a matter of defense. For the accused to be guilty of malversation, the
prosecution must prove the following essential elements:
We agree with the ruling of the Sandiganbayan that (c) The funds or property involved are public funds or
based on the allegations of the Amended Informations property for which he is accountable; and
and Rep. Act No. 8249, it has original jurisdiction over the
crimes of malversation and illegal use of public funds
(d) He has appropriated, taken or misappropriated, or
charged in the Amended Informations subject of this
has consented to, or through abandonment or
petition.
negligence, permitted the taking by another person of,
Rep. Act No. 8249,[13] which amended Section 4 of such funds or property.[19]
Presidential Decree No. 1606, provides, inter alia, that the
Sandiganbayan has original jurisdiction over crimes and For the accused to be guilty of illegal use of public
felonies committed by public officers and employees, at funds or property, the prosecution is burdened to prove
least one of whom belongs to any of the five categories the following elements:
thereunder enumerated at the time of the commission of
such crimes.[14] There are two classes of public office- (1) The offenders are accountable officers in both
related crimes under subparagraph (b) of Section 4 of crimes.
Rep. Act No. 8249: first, those crimes or felonies in which
the public office is a constituent element as defined by
(2) The offender in illegal use of public funds or property
statute and the relation between the crime and the offense
does not derive any personal gain or profit; in
is such that, in a legal sense, the offense committed
malversation, the offender in certain cases profits from
cannot exist without the office;[15] second, such offenses
the proceeds of the crime.
or felonies which are intimately connected with the public
office and are perpetrated by the public officer or
employee while in the performance of his official (3) In illegal use, the public fund or property is applied to
functions, through improper or irregular conduct.[16] another public use; in malversation, the public fund or
property is applied to the personal use and benefit of the
The Sandiganbayan has original jurisdiction over offender or of another person.[20]
criminal cases involving crimes and felonies under the
first classification. Considering that the public office of the We agree with the ruling of the Sandiganbayan that
accused is by statute a constituent element of the crime the public office of the accused Municipal Mayor Virginio
charged, there is no need for the Prosecutor to state in E. Villamor is a constituent element of malversation and
the Information specific factual allegations of the intimacy illegal use of public funds or property. Accused mayors
between the office and the crime charged, or that the position is classified as SG 27. Since the Amended
accused committed the crime in the performance of his Informations alleged that the petitioner conspired with her
duties. However, the Sandiganbayan likewise has original co-accused, the municipal mayor, in committing the said
jurisdiction over criminal cases involving crimes or felonies, the fact that her position as municipal accountant
felonies committed by the public officers and employees is classified as SG 24 and as such is not an accountable
enumerated in Section (a) (1) to (5) under the second officer is of no moment; the Sandiganbayan still has
classification if the Information contains specific factual exclusive original jurisdiction over the cases lodged
allegations showing the intimate connection between the against her. It must be stressed that a public officer who
offense charged and the public office of the accused, and is not in charge of public funds or property by virtue of her
the discharge of his official duties or functions - whether official position, or even a private individual, may be liable
improper or irregular.[17] The requirement is not complied for malversation or illegal use of public funds or property
with if the Information merely alleges that the accused if such public officer or private individual conspires with an
committed the crime charged in relation to his office accountable public officer to commit malversation or
because such allegation is merely a conclusion of law.[18] illegal use of public funds or property.
Two of the felonies that belong to the first In United States v. Ponte,[21] the Court, citing Viada,
classification are malversation defined and penalized by had the occasion to state:
Page 70 of 168
Shall the person who participates or intervenes as co- as part of his duties he received public money for which
perpetrator, accomplice or abettor in the crime of he is bound to account and failed to account for it, is the
malversation of public funds, committed by a public factor which determines whether or not malversation is
officer, have the penalties of this article also imposed committed by the accused public officer or employee.
upon him? In opposition to the opinion maintained by Hence, a mere clerk in the provincial or municipal
some jurists and commentators (among others the government may be held guilty of malversation if he or she
learned Pacheco) we can only answer the question is entrusted with public funds and misappropriates the
affirmatively, for the same reasons (mutatis mutandis) same.
we have already advanced in Question I of the
commentary on article 314. French jurisprudence has IN LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the petition is
also settled the question in the same way on the ground DENIED for lack of merit. Costs against the petitioner.
that the person guilty of the crime necessarily aids the SO ORDERED.
other culprit in the acts which constitute the crime. (Vol.
2, 4th edition, p. 653)
The Court has also ruled that one who conspires with
the provincial treasurer in committing six counts of
malversation is also a co-principal in committing those
offenses, and that a private person conspiring with an
accountable public officer in committing malversation is
also guilty of malversation.[23]
We reiterate that the classification of the petitioners
position as SG 24 is of no moment. The determinative fact
is that the position of her co-accused, the municipal
mayor, is classified as SG 27, and under the last
paragraph of Section 2 of Rep. Act No. 7975, if the
position of one of the principal accused is classified as SG
27, the Sandiganbayan has original and exclusive
jurisdiction over the offense.
We agree with the petitioners contention that under
Section 474 of the Local Government Code, she is not
obliged to receive public money or property, nor is she
obligated to account for the same; hence, she is not an
accountable officer within the context of Article 217 of the
Revised Penal Code. Indeed, under the said article, an
accountable public officer is one who has actual control of
public funds or property by reason of the duties of his
office. Even then, it cannot thereby be necessarily
concluded that a municipal accountant can never be
convicted for malversation under the Revised Penal
Code. The name or relative importance of the office or
employment is not the controlling factor.[24] The nature of
the duties of the public officer or employee, the fact that
Page 71 of 168
FIRST DIVISION However, in a Resolution dated April 25, 2005, the
Sandiganbayan reversed its earlier resolution. It held
G.R. No. 169328 October 27, 2006 that the AFP-RSBS is a government-owned or controlled
corporation thus subject to its jurisdiction. It also found
JULIAN A. ALZAGA, MEINRADO ENRIQUE A. that the positions held by Alzaga and Bello, who were
BELLO, and MANUEL S. SATUITO, petitioners, Vice Presidents, and Satuito who was an Assistant Vice
President, are covered and embraced by, and in fact
vs.
HONORABLE SANDIGANBAYAN (2nd Division) and higher than the position of managers mentioned under
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents. Section 4 of P.D. No. 1606, as amended, thus under the
jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan.
On October 7, 1999,4 four separate Informations for THE COURT A QUO COMMITTED GRAVE
violation of Section 3(e) of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 3019 ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO
were filed against petitioners Julian A. Alzaga, Meinrado LACK OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTION IN
Enrique A. Bello and Manuel S. Satuito relative to DECIDING A QUESTION OF SUBSTANCE IN A
alleged irregularities which attended the purchase of four MANNER NOT IN ACCORD WITH LAW OR
lots in Tanauan, Batangas, by the Armed Forces of the JURISPRUDENCE THAT THE ARMED
Philippines Retirement and Separation Benefits System FORCES RETIREMENT AND SEPARATION
(AFP-RSBS). Alzaga was the Head of the Legal BENEFITS SYSTEM (AFP-RSBS) IS A
Department of AFP-RSBS when one of the lots was GOVERNMENT-OWNED OR CONTROLLED
purchased. Bello was a Police Superintendent and he CORPORATION
succeeded Alzaga as Head of the Legal Department. It
was during his tenure when the other three lots were
III
purchased. Both were Vice Presidents of AFP-RSBS.
On the other hand, Satuito was the Chief of the
Documentation and Assistant Vice President of the AFP- THE COURT A QUO COMMITTED GRAVE
RSBS.5 ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO
LACK OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTION IN
DECIDING A QUESTION OF SUBSTANCE IN A
Petitioners filed their respective Motions to Quash and/or
MANNER NOT IN ACCORD WITH LAW OR
Dismiss the informations alleging that the
JURISPRUDENCE THAT PETITIONERS
Sandiganbayan has no jurisdiction over them and their
ALZAGA AND BELLO[,] WHO WERE BOTH
alleged offenses because the AFP-RSBS is a private
entity created for the benefit of its members and that VICE-PRESIDENTS OF THE AFP-RSBS[,] AND
PETITIONER SATUITO[,] WHO WAS
their positions and salary grade levels do not fall within
ASSISTANT VICE-PRESIDENT OF THE AFP-
the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan pursuant to
RSBS[,] ARE COVERED AND EMBRACED BY
Section 4 of Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1606
THE POSITION "MANAGERS" MENTIONED
(1978),6 as amended by R.A. No. 8249 (1997).7
UNDER SECTION 4 a (1) (g) OF PD NO. 1606,
AS AMENDED.9
On May 27, 2004, the Sandiganbayan granted
petitioners’ motions to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction.
The petition is without merit.
Page 72 of 168
The AFP-RSBS was established by virtue of P.D. No. positions as vice presidents and assistant vice president
361 (1973)10 in December 1973 to guarantee continuous are not covered nor embraced by the term "managers"
financial support to the AFP military retirement system, under section 4 of RA. No. 8249.
as provided for in R.A. No. 340 (1948).11 It is similar to
the Government Service Insurance System (GSIS) and We held in Geduspan v. People,17 that while the first part
the Social Security System (SSS) since it serves as the of section 4 covers only officials of the executive branch
system that manages the retirement and pension funds with the salary grade 27 and higher, the second part
of those in the military service.12 "specifically includes" other executive officials whose
positions may not be of grade 27 and higher but who are
The AFP-RSBS is administered by the Chief of Staff of by express provision of law placed under the jurisdiction
the AFP through a Board of Trustees and Management of the said court. In the latter category, it is the position
Group,13 and funded from congressional appropriations held and not the salary grade which determines the
and compulsory contributions from members of the AFP; jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan. Thus, presidents,
donations, gifts, legacies, bequests and others to the directors or trustees, or managers of government owned
system; and all earnings of the system which shall not and controlled corporations, are under the jurisdiction of
be subject to any tax whatsoever.14 the Sandiganbayan.
Section 4 of P.D. No. 1606, as further amended by R.A. In the instant case, petitioners Alzaga and Bello were
No. 8249, grants jurisdiction to the Sandiganbayan over: Head of the Legal Department while petitioner Satuito
was Chief of the Documentation with corresponding
a. Violations of Republic Act No. 3019, as ranks of Vice Presidents and Assistant Vice President.
amended, otherwise known as the Anti-graft and These positions are not specifically enumerated in RA.
Corrupt Practices Act, Republic Act No. 1379, No. 8249; however, as correctly observed by the
and Chapter II, Section 2, Title VII, Book II of the Sandiganbayan, their ranks as Vice Presidents and
Revised Penal Code, where one or more of the Assistant Vice President are even higher than that of
accused are officials occupying the following "managers" mentioned in RA. No. 8249.
positions in the government whether in a
permanent, acting or interim capacity, at the time In sum, the Sandiganbayan correctly ruled that the AFP-
of the commission of the offense: RSBS is a government-owned and controlled
corporation and that it has jurisdiction over the persons
(1) Officials of the executive branch occupying of petitioners who were Vice Presidents and Assistant
the positions of regional director and higher, Vice President when the charges against them were
otherwise classified as Grade ‘27’ and higher, of allegedly committed.
the Compensation and Position Classification
Act of 1989 (Republic Act No. 6758), specifically WHEREFORE, the instant Petition
including: for Certiorari is DISMISSED. The assailed Resolution of
the Sandiganbayan dated April 25, 2005 that the AFP-
xxxx RSBS is a government-owned and controlled
corporation and that it has jurisdiction over the persons
(g) Presidents, directors or trustees, or of the petitioners and the Resolution dated August 10,
2005 denying petitioners’ motion for reconsideration, are
managers of government-owned or controlled
AFFIRMED.
corporations, state universities or educational
institutions or foundations;
SO ORDERED.
In People v.Sandiganbayan,15 where herein petitioners
Alzaga and Satuito were respondents, this Court has
ruled that the character and operations of the AFP-
RSBS are imbued with public interest thus the same is a
government entity and its funds are in the nature of
public funds. In Ramiscal, Jr. v. Sandiganbayan,16 we
held that the AFP-RSBS is a government-owned and
controlled corporation under R.A. No. 9182, otherwise
known as The Special Purpose Vehicle Act of 2002.
These rulings render unmeritorious petitioners’ assertion
that the AFP-RSBS is a private entity.
Both the trial court and the Court of Appeals found It is hornbook doctrine that jurisdiction to try a
that the check was issued as a guaranty for the loan, criminal action is determined by the law in force at the time
thereby rejecting petitioners investment theory. In ruling of the institution of the action[15] and not during the
against the existence of a partnership between them, the arraignment of the accused. The Information charging
trial court noted that the so-called partnership venture, petitioner with violation of B.P. Blg. 22 was filed on August
Palanas General Merchandising, was registered 19, 1991. At that time, the governing law determinative of
on December 1, 1987 only in the name of jurisdiction is B.P. Blg. 129[16] which provides:
petitioner.[13] The Court of Appeals also held that the act
Sec. 20. Jurisdiction in criminal
of lending money does not necessarily amount to an cases. Regional Trial Courts shall
investment of capital. exercise exclusive original jurisdiction in
Hence, the instant petition raising the following all criminal cases not within the exclusive
jurisdiction of any court, tribunal or body,
issues:
except those now falling under the
exclusive and concurrent jurisdiction of
I.
Page 75 of 168
the Sandiganbayan which shall hereafter petitioners case. Where a court has already obtained and
be exclusively taken cognizance by the
latter. is exercising jurisdiction over a controversy, its jurisdiction
to proceed to the final determination of the cause is not
xxxx affected by new legislation placing jurisdiction over such
proceedings in another tribunal unless the statute
Sec. 32. Jurisdiction of Metropolitan Trial
Courts, Municipal Trial Courts and expressly provides, or is construed to the effect that it is
Municipal Circuit Trial Courts in Criminal intended to operate on actions pending before its
Cases. Except in cases falling within the
enactment. Indeed, R.A. No. 7691 contains retroactive
exclusive original jurisdiction of Regional
Trial Courts and the Sandiganbayan, the provisions. However, these only apply to civil cases that
Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial have not yet reached the pre-trial stage. Neither from an
Courts, and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts express proviso nor by implication can it be construed that
shall exercise:
R.A. No. 7691 has retroactive application to criminal
xxxx cases pending or decided by the Regional Trial Courts
prior to its effectivity.[20] The jurisdiction of the RTCover
(2) Exclusive original jurisdiction
over all offenses punishable the case attached upon the commencement of the action
with imprisonment of not exceeding by the filing of the Information and could not be ousted by
four years and two months, or a fine the passage of R.A. No. 7691 reapportioning the
of not more than four thousand pesos,
jurisdiction of inferior courts, the application of which to
or both such fine and imprisonment,
regardless of other imposable accessory criminal cases is prospective in nature.[21]
or other penalties, including the civil
liability arising from such offenses or After a careful review of the records, this Court
predicated thereon, irrespective of kind,
nature, value or amount thereof: sustains petitioners conviction for violation of B.P. Blg.
Provided, however, That in offenses 22. The elements of the offense penalized under B.P. Blg.
involving damage to property through 22 are as follows: (1) the accused makes, draws, or
criminal negligence they shall have
exclusive original jurisdiction where the issues any check to apply on account or for value; (2) the
imposable fine does not exceed twenty accused knows at the time of issue that he does not have
thousand pesos. sufficient funds in or credit with the drawee bank for the
payment of such check in full upon its presentment; and
Violation of B.P. Blg. 22 is punishable with (3) the check is subsequently dishonored by the drawee
imprisonment of not less than 30 days but not more than bank for insufficiency of funds or credit or would have
one year or by a fine of not less than but not more than been dishonored for the same reason had not the drawer,
double the amount of the check which fine shall in no case without any valid reason, ordered the bank to stop
exceed P200,000.00, or both fine and imprisonment[17] at payment.
the discretion of the court. In the present case, the fine
imposable is P200,000.00 hence, the Regional Trial Court Each element of the offense was duly proven by
properly acquired jurisdiction over the case.[18] The the prosecution. Petitioner admitted that at the time he
Metropolitan Trial Court could not acquire jurisdiction over issued the subject check, he knew that he does not have
the criminal action because its jurisdiction is only for sufficient funds in or credit with the drawee bank for
offenses punishable with a fine of not more payment of such check. Consequently, when the check
than P4,000.00. was presented for payment, it was dishonored by the
drawee bank for insufficiency of funds. Thereafter, he
The subsequent amendment of B.P. 129 by R.A. received demand letters to pay the amount of the check
No. 7691, An Act Expanding the Jurisdiction of the from private complainant but he did not comply with it.[22]
Municipal Trial Courts, Municipal Circuit Trial Courts and
the Metropolitan Trial Court[19] on June 15, 1994 cannot In ruling that the amount of the check was for
divest the Regional Trial Court of jurisdiction over consideration or value, both the trial court and the Court
Page 76 of 168
of Appeals upheld private complainants claim that the whether the law has been
breached. Criminal intent becomes
check was issued as a guaranty for the loan and rejected unnecessary where the acts are
petitioners investment theory. The issue as to whether the prohibited for reasons of public policy,
amount of the subject check represents the amount of the and the defenses of good faith and
absence of criminal intent are unavailing.
money loaned by private complainant to petitioner or as
an investment in the alleged partnership is a factual The checks issued, even
question involving the credibility of witnesses. Where the assuming they were not intended to be
encashed or deposited in a bank,
issue is one of credibility, the appellate court will not
produce the same effect as ordinary
generally disturb the findings of the lower court checks. What the law punishes is the
considering that it is in a better position to settle that issue issuance of a rubber check itself and not
since it had the advantage of hearing the witnesses and the purpose for which the check was
issued nor the terms and conditions
observing their conduct during the trial, which relating to its issuance. This is not
circumstances carry great weight in assessing their without good reasons. To determine
credibility. In the present case, we see no reason to the purpose as well as the terms and
conditions for which checks are issued
reverse the finding of the trial court as affirmed by the will greatly erode the faith the public
Court of Appeals that the amount of the subject check was reposes in the stability and commercial
a loan and not an investment.[23] value of checks as currency substitutes,
and bring about havoc in the trading and
banking communities. Besides, the law
Upon issuance of a check, in the absence of does not make any distinction as to the
evidence to the contrary, it is presumed that the same was kind of checks which are the subject of its
issued for valuable consideration, which may consist provisions, hence, no such distinction
can be made by means of interpretation
either in some right, interest, profit or benefit accruing to or application. What is important is the
the party who makes the contract, or some forbearance, fact that petitioner deliberately issued the
detriment, loss or some responsibility, to act, or labor, or checks in question and those checks
were dishonored upon presentment for
service given, suffered or undertaken by the other payment.
side. Since it was established that petitioner received Hence, the agreement surrounding the issuance of a
money from private complainant in various check is irrelevant to the prosecution and conviction of the
amounts,[24] petitioner cannot now claim that the checks petitioner.[27]
were not issued for value.[25]
The alleged inconsistency in the date of issuance
The allegation that the check was intended to be of the subject check is likewise immaterial. Issuance, as
shown to potential suppliers is not a valid defined under the Negotiable Instruments Law, is the first
defense. In Cueme v. People,[26] the Court held thus: delivery of the check.[28] In the case at bar, the Information
alleged that the check was postdated February 15,
The allegation of petitioner that
the checks were merely intended to be 1988 although issued in or about September
shown to prospective investors of her 1987. During trial, petitioner testified that the Checking
corporation is, to say the least, not a Account was opened only on December 1, 1987 and that
defense. The gravamen of the offense
punished under B.P. Blg. 22 is the act of the check was issued sometime in February 1988.
making or issuing a worthless check or a
check that is dishonored upon its The rule is that a variance between the allegation
presentment for payment. The law has
in the information and proof adduced during trial shall be
made the mere act of issuing a bad check
malum prohibitum, an act proscribed by fatal to the criminal case if it is material and prejudicial to
the legislature for being deemed the accused so much so that it affects his substantial
pernicious and inimical to public welfare.
rights.[29] In a prosecution for violation of B.P. 22, the time
Considering the rule in mala
prohibita cases, the only inquiry is of the issuance of the subject check is material since it
Page 77 of 168
forms part of the second element of the offense that at the
time of its issuance, petitioner knew of the insufficiency of
funds. However, it cannot be said that petitioner was
prejudiced by such variance nor was surprised by
it. Records show that petitioner knew at the time he issued
the check that he does not have sufficient funds in the
bank to cover the amount of the check. Yet, he proceeded
to issue the same claiming that the same would only be
shown to prospective suppliers, a defense which is not
valid.
SO ORDERED.
Page 78 of 168
SECOND DIVISION
JEFFREY RESO DAYAP, G.R. No. 177960 Reckless Imprudence resulting to Homicide, Less Serious
Physical Injuries, and Damage to Property. The pertinent
Petitioner,
portion of the information reads:
Present:
xxxx
xxxx
xxxx
Page 81 of 168
presented. The case was raffled to the Regional Trial Both parties filed their motions for reconsideration
Court (RTC) of Negros Oriental, Br. 32. of the RTC order, but these were denied for lack of merit
in the order[17] dated 12 September 2005.
WHEREFORE, the questioned penalty for the physical injuries charged. It also found
order of the Municipal Trial Court of support in Sec. 36 of the Judiciary Reorganization Act of
Sibulan on accuseds acquittal is
AFFIRMED. The case is REMANDED 1980 and the 1991 Rule 8 on Summary Procedure, which
to the court of origin or its successor for govern the summary procedure in first-level courts in
further proceedings on the civil aspect
of the case. No costs. offenses involving damage to property through criminal
negligence where the imposable fine does not
Page 82 of 168
the case falls within the RTCs jurisdiction. The dispositive petitioner through a special civil action for certiorari under
portion of the Decision dated 17 August 2006 reads: Rule 65 in lieu of an ordinary appeal under Rule 42.
Petitioner moved for reconsideration of the Court of Both the MTC and the RTC proceeded with the
Appeals decision,[20] arguing that jurisdiction over the case on the basis of the Information dated 29 December
case is determined by the allegations in the information, 2004 charging petitioner only with the complex crime of
and that neither the 1991 Rule on Summary Procedure reckless imprudence resulting to homicide, less serious
nor Sec. 36 of the Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980 physical injuries and damage to property. The Court of
can be the basis of the RTCs jurisdiction over the Appeals however declared in its decision that petitioner
case. However, the Court of Appeals denied the motion should have been charged with the same offense but
for reconsideration for lack of merit in the Resolution aggravated by the circumstance of abandonment of the
dated 25 April 2007.[21] It reiterated that it is the RTC that victims. It appears from the records however that
has proper jurisdiction considering that the information respondents attempt to amend the information by
alleged a willful, unlawful, felonious killing as well as charging the aggravated offense was unsuccessful as the
abandonment of the victims. MTC had approved the Provincial Prosecutors motion to
withdraw their motion to amend the information. The
information filed before the trial court had remained
In the present petition for review, petitioner argues that unamended.[23] Thus, petitioner is deemed to have been
the MTC had jurisdiction to hear the criminal case for charged only with the offense alleged in the original
reckless imprudence, owing to the enactment of Republic Information without any aggravating circumstance.
Act (R.A.) No. 7691,[22] which confers jurisdiction to first-
level courts on offenses involving damage to property
through criminal negligence. He asserts that the RTC Article 365 of the Revised Penal Code punishes any
could not have acquired jurisdiction on the basis of a person who, by reckless imprudence, commits any act
legally unfiled and officially withdrawn amended which, had it been intentional, would constitute a grave
information alleging abandonment. Respondents are also felony, with the penalty of arresto mayor in its maximum
faulted for challenging the MTCs order acquitting period to prision correccional in its medium period. When
Page 83 of 168
such reckless imprudence the use of a motor vehicle, No. 7691 extended the jurisdiction of the first-level courts
resulting in the death of a person attended the same over criminal cases to include all offenses punishable with
article imposes upon the defendant the penalty of prision imprisonment not exceeding six (6) years irrespective of
correccional in its medium and maximum periods. the amount of fine, and regardless of other imposable
accessory or other penalties including those for civil
liability. It explicitly states
The offense with which petitioner was charged is that in offenses involving damage to property
reckless imprudence resulting in homicide, less serious through criminal negligence, they shall have exclusive or
physical injuries and damage to property, a complex iginal
crime. Where a reckless, imprudent, or negligent act jurisdiction thereof. It follows that criminal cases for reckl
results in two or more grave or less grave felonies, a ess
complex crime is committed.[24] Article 48 of the Revised
imprudence punishable with prision correccional in its
Penal Code provides that when the single act constitutes
medium and maximum periods should fall within the
two or more grave or less grave felonies, or when an
jurisdiction of the MTC and not the RTC. Clearly,
offense is a necessary means for committing the other,
therefore, jurisdiction to hear and try the same pertained
the penalty for the most serious crime shall be imposed,
to the MTC and the RTC did not have original jurisdiction
the same to be applied in its maximum period. Since
over the criminal case.[27] Consequently, the MTC of
Article 48 speaks of felonies, it is applicable to crimes
Sibulan, Negros Oriental had properly taken cognizance
through negligence in view of the definition of felonies in
of the case and the proceedings before it were valid and
Article 3 as acts or omissions punishable by law
legal.
committed either by means of deceit (dolo) or fault
(culpa).[25] Thus, the penalty imposable upon petitioner,
were he to be found guilty, is prision correccional in its
As the records show, the MTC granted petitioners
medium period (2 years, 4 months and 1 day to 4 years)
demurrer to evidence and acquitted him of the offense on
and maximum period (4 years, 2 months and 1 day to 6
the ground of insufficiency of evidence. The demurrer to
years).
evidence in criminal cases, such as the one at bar, is filed
after the prosecution had rested its case, and when the
same is granted, it calls for an appreciation of the
Applicable as well is the familiar rule that the
evidence adduced by the prosecution and its sufficiency
jurisdiction of the court to hear and decide a case is
to warrant conviction beyond reasonable doubt, resulting
conferred by the law in force at the time of the institution
in a dismissal of the case on the merits, tantamount to an
of the action, unless such statute provides for a retroactive
acquittal of the accused.[28] Such dismissal of a criminal
application thereof.[26] When this case was filed on 29
case by the grant of demurrer to evidence may not be
December 2004, Section 32(2) of Batas Pambansa Bilang
appealed, for to do so would be to place the accused in
129 had already been amended by R.A. No. 7691. R.A.
double jeopardy.[29] But while the dismissal order
Page 84 of 168
consequent to a demurrer to evidence is not subject to proceedings on the civil aspect, as well as with the RTC
appeal, the same is still reviewable but only by certiorari in directing a similar remand to the MTC.
under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court.Thus, in such case,
the factual findings of the trial court are conclusive upon
the reviewing court, and the only legal basis to reverse
and set aside the order of dismissal upon demurrer to
evidence is by a clear showing that the trial court, in
acquitting the accused, committed grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction or a The acquittal of the accused does not
denial of due process, thus rendering the assailed automatically preclude a judgment against him on the civil
judgment void.[30] aspect of the case. The extinction of the penal action does
not carry with it the extinction of the civil liability where: (a)
the acquittal is based on reasonable doubt as only
Accordingly, respondents filed before the RTC preponderance of evidence is required; (b) the court
the petition for certiorari alleging that the MTC gravely declares that the liability of the accused is only civil; and
abused its discretion in dismissing the case and failing to (c) the civil liability of the accused does not arise from or
consider the evidence of the prosecution in resolving the is not based upon the crime of which the accused is
same, and in allegedly failing to follow the proper acquitted. [31] However, the civil action based on delict
procedure as mandated by the Rules of Court. The RTC may be deemed extinguished if there is a finding on the
correctly ruled that the MTC did not abuse its discretion in final judgment in the criminal action that the act or
dismissing the criminal complaint. The MTCs conclusions omission from which the civil liability may arise did not
were based on facts diligently recited in the order thereby exist[32] or where the accused did not commit the acts or
disproving that the MTC failed to consider the evidence omission imputed to him.[33]
presented by the prosecution. The records also show that
the MTC correctly followed the procedure set forth in the
Rules of Court. Thus, if demurrer is granted and the accused is
acquitted by the court, the accused has the right to
adduce evidence on the civil aspect of the case unless the
The second issue is whether the Court of Appeals court also declares that the act or omission from which the
erred in ordering the remand of the case of the matter of civil liability may arise did not exist.[34] This is because
civil liability for the reception of evidence. when the accused files a demurrer to evidence, he has
not yet adduced evidence both on the criminal and civil
aspects of the case. The only evidence on record is the
We disagree with the Court of Appeals on
evidence for the prosecution. What the trial court should
directing the remand of the case to the RTC for further
do is issue an order or partial judgment granting the
Page 85 of 168
demurrer to evidence and acquitting the accused, and set WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The
the case for continuation of trial for the accused to adduce Court of Appeals Decision dated 17 August 2006 and
evidence on the civil aspect of the case and for the private Resolution dated 25 April 2007 in CA-G.R. SP. No. 01179
complainant to adduce evidence by way of are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Order dated 16
rebuttal. Thereafter, the court shall render judgment on May 2005 of the Municipal Trial Court of Sibulan, Negros
the civil aspect of the case.[35] Oriental in Criminal Case No. 3016-04 granting the
Demurrer to Evidence and acquitting petitioner Jeffrey
Reso Dayap of the offense charged therein is
A scrutiny of the MTCs decision supports the REINSTATED and AFFIRMED.
conclusion that the acquittal was based on the findings
that the act or omission from which the civil liability may
arise did not exist and that petitioner did not commit the SO ORDERED.
acts or omission imputed to him; hence, petitioners civil
liability has been extinguished by his acquittal. It should
be noted that the MTC categorically stated that it cannot
find any evidence which would prove that a crime had
been committed and that accused was the person
responsible for it. It added that the prosecution failed to
establish that it was petitioner who committed the crime
as charged since its witnesses never identified petitioner
as the one who was driving the cargo truck at the time of
the incident. Furthermore, the MTC found that the
proximate cause of the accident is the damage to the rear
portion of the truck caused by the swerving of the Colt
Galant into the rear left portion of the cargo truck and not
the reckless driving of the truck by petitioner, clearly
establishing that petitioner is not guilty of reckless
imprudence.Consequently, there is no more need to
remand the case to the trial court for proceedings on the
civil aspect of the case, since petitioners acquittal has
extinguished his civil liability.
Page 86 of 168
EN BANC
x--------------------------------------------------------------------------
-x
Petitioner,
Present:
DECISION
PUNO, C.J.,*
QUISUMBING,**
TINGA, J.:
YNARES-SANTIAGO,
CARPIO,
- versus - AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, This is a Petition for Certiorari[1] under Rule 65 of the 1997
Page 87 of 168
2. No laboratory tests were conducted to
A.C. Cruz Construction commenced the
ascertain unsuitability of materials, even
infrastructure works on 1 August 1990.[5] In April 1991, the if the same should have been required as
essential basis thereof;
complainant Candido M. Fajutag, Jr.(Fajutag, Jr.) was
designated Project Engineer of the project.
3. There were no records of the
excavation and disposal of unsuitable
materials and of road filling works having
A Variation/Extra Work Order No. 1 was been made by the previous engineers,
approved for the excavation of unsuitable materials and Rodolfo de los Santos and Noel Lobrido
at the time said activities were allegedly
road filling works. As a consequence, Arceo Cruz of A.C. executed;
Cruz Construction submitted the fourth billing and Report
of Physical Accomplishments on 6 May 1991. Fajutag,
4. The excavation of unsuitable materials
Jr., however, discovered certain deficiencies. As a result, and road filling works were
he issued Work Instruction No. 1 requiring some overestimated to the prejudice of the
government:
supporting documents, such as: (1) copy of approved
concrete pouring; (2) survey results of original ground and
finished leaks; (3) volume calculation of earth fill actually a. in a 10.00 meter right-of-way (ROW)
road, the entire width of 10.00 meters
rendered on site; (4) test results as to the quality of was used in calculating the volume of cut
materials and compaction; and (5) copy of work of unsuitable materials when the
undisturbed natural grounds on both
instructions attesting to the demolished concrete sides of the road was only 6.00 meters;
structures.[6]
Page 88 of 168
as the award of remaining infrastructure works is effected
5. No laboratory test was made to by NHA to another contractor.[10]
ascertain the quality of imported road fill
materials.[7]
Page 92 of 168
denying his motion to quash considering that the ultimate facts; the reasons therefor are to be proved
remaining averments in the Information have been during the trial.[24] The Ombudsman moreover maintains
rendered unintelligible by the dismissal of the charges that the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over petitioner.
against some of his co-accused; and (3) using as bases The Ombudsman argues that it is of no moment that
the Prosecutions Memoranda dated 27 July 2004 and 30 petitioners position is classified as
May 2006 to supplement the inadequacies of the
salary grade 26 as he is a manager within the legal
Information. In addition, petitioner avers that his
contemplation of paragraph 1(g), Section 4(a) of Republic
constitutional right to be informed of the nature and cause
Act No. 8249.[25]
of the accusation against him had been violated for failure
of the Information to specify his participation in the
commission of the offense. Petitioner also argues that the
In his Reply[26] dated 9 October 2008, petitioner
facts charged in the Information do not constitute an
strongly asseverates that, according to the Constitution,
offense as no damage or injury had been made or caused
in a conspiracy indictment the participation of each
to any party or to the government. Finally, petitioner
accused in the so-called conspiracy theory should be
maintains that the Sandiganbayan lost its jurisdiction over
detailed in order to apprise the accused of the nature of
him upon the dismissal of the charges against his co-
the accusation against them in relation to the participation
accused as the remaining accused are public officers
of the other accused. A general statement that all the
whose salary grade is below 27.
accused conspired with each other without stating the
participation of each runs afoul of the
Constitution.[27] Petitioner adds that the ultimate facts
In its Comment[21] dated 21 December 2007, the
intended by law refer to determinate facts and
Office of the Ombudsman, through the Office of the
circumstances which should become the basis of the
Special Prosecutor, counters that separate allegations of
cause of action; statement of facts which would be in
individual acts perpetrated by the conspirators are not
complete accord with the constitutional requirement of
required in an Information and neither should they be
giving the accused sufficient information about the nature
covered by evidence submitted to establish the existence
and the cause of the accusation against him.[28] Petitioner
of probable cause. Allegations regarding the nature and
also avers that the Ombudsmans reliance on and citation
extent of petitioners participation and justification for his
of the cases of Ingco v. Sandiganbayan[29] and Domingo
acts which constitute the offense charged are evidentiary
v. Sandiganbayan[30] is misplaced and misleading.
matters which are more properly addressed during trial.
The Ombudsman reiterates our ruling in Ingco v.
Sandiganbayan[22] that the fundamental test in reflecting
Petitioners main argument is that the Information
on the viability of a motion to quash is the sufficiency of
filed before the Sandiganbayan insufficiently averred the
the averments in the information that is, whether the facts
essential elements of the crime charged as it failed to
asseverated, if hypothetically admitted, would establish
specify the individual participation of all the accused.
the essential elements of the crime defined by law. And
relying on the case of Domingo v. Sandiganbayan,[23] the
Ombudsman states that informations need only state the
Page 93 of 168
accused, the designation of the offense
The Court is not persuaded. The Court affirms the
by the statute, the acts or omissions
resolutions of the Sandiganbayan. complained of as constituting the
offense; the name of the offended party;
the approximate time of the commission
of the offense, and the place wherein the
At the outset, it should be stressed that the denial offense was committed.
SEC. 6. Sufficiency of complaint or 3019, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt
information.A complaint or information is Practices Act, reads:
sufficient if it states the name of the
Page 94 of 168
4. Such undue injury is caused
by giving unwarranted benefits,
advantage or preference to such parties;
and
xxx
Page 95 of 168
whether he faces a criminal responsibility
On the contention that the Information did not
not only for his acts but also for the acts
detail the individual participation of the accused in the of his co-accused as well.
allegation of conspiracy in the Information, the Court
underscores the fact that under Philippine law, conspiracy
should be understood on two levels. Conspiracy can be a
mode of committing a crime or it may be constitutive of
the crime itself. Generally, conspiracy is not a crime in our A conspiracy indictment need
jurisdiction. It is punished as a crime only when the law not, of course, aver all the components of
conspiracy or allege all the details
fixes a penalty for its commission such as in conspiracy
thereof, like the part that each of the
to commit treason, rebellion and sedition.[40] parties therein have performed, the
evidence proving the common design or
the facts connecting all the accused with
one another in the web of the
When conspiracy is charged as a crime, the act of conspiracy. Neither is it necessary to
describe conspiracy with the same
conspiring and all the elements of said crime must be set degree of particularity required in
forth in the complaint or information. But when conspiracy describing a substantive offense. It is
enough that the indictment contains a
is not charged as a crime in itself but only as the mode of
statement of facts relied upon to be
committing the crime as in the case at bar, there is less constitutive of the offense in ordinary and
concise language, with as much certainty
necessity of reciting its particularities in the Information
as the nature of the case will admit, in a
because conspiracy is not the gravamen of the offense manner that can enable a person of
charged. The conspiracy is significant only because it common understanding to know what is
intended, and with such precision that the
changes the criminal liability of all the accused in the accused may plead his acquittal or
conspiracy and makes them answerable as co-principals conviction to a subsequent indictment
based on the same facts. It is said,
regardless of the degree of their participation in the crime. generally, that an indictment may be held
The liability of the conspirators is collective and each sufficient if it follows the words of the
statute and reasonably informs the
participant will be equally responsible for the acts of accused of the character of the offense
others, for the act of one is the act of all.[41] he is charged with conspiring to commit,
or, following the language of the statute,
contains a sufficient statement of an overt
act to effect the object of the conspiracy,
Notably, in People v. Quitlong,[42] as pointed out or alleges both the conspiracy and the
contemplated crime in the language of
by respondent, the Court ruled on how conspiracy as a the respective statutes defining them
mode of committing the offense should be alleged in the (15A C.J.S. 842-844).
Information, viz:
Page 97 of 168
of the crime as defined by law. The together with Farahmand, a private
prosecution contends that individual charged together with her.
matter aliunde should not be
considered. However, in the instant
case, the Court has found the The position of manager in a
information itself to be inadequate, as it government-owned or controlled
does not satisfy the requirements of corporation, as in the case of Philhealth,
particularly alleging the acts or is within the jurisdiction of respondent
omissions of the said accused-movants, court. It is the position that petitioner
which served as the basis of the holds, not her salary grade, that
allegation of conspiracy between the determines the jurisdiction of the
aforementioned accused-movants and Sandiganbayan.
the other accused, in the commission of
the offense charged in the
information.[45]
This Court in Lacson v. Executive
Secretary, et al. ruled:
Page 98 of 168
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant
petition is DISMISSED. The Resolutions dated 2 March
2007 and 18 October 2007 of the First Division of the
Sandiganbayan are AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
Page 99 of 168
Republic of the Philippines
Supreme Court On January 31, 2003, Julieta F. Ortega (Julieta)
DECISION respectively.
PERALTA, J.:
On February 21, 2003, Deputy Ombudsman Miro
appropriate action.[7]
be difficult on the part of the prosecutors to conduct the information be quashed and be referred to this Court for
Prosecutor of Negros Occidental also manifested that On August 25, 2004, the MCTC issued an
they would inhibit if the case would be returned to Order[15] granting the motion and, consequently, quashing
appropriate if the Office of the Ombudsman would Respondents filed a motion for reconsideration,
conduct the necessary investigation.[8] which the court granted in an Order[16] dated November
23, 2004. The court opined, among other things, that the
Corollarilly, on March 8, 2003, petitioner case had nothing to do with the performance of petitioners
compulsory retired from the service.[9] official functions and that an administrative complaint
After the preliminary investigation, GIO Yap found of referring cases against judges and court personnel to
the existence of probable cause for the crime of Reckless the Supreme Court has already been
Imprudence Resulting to Homicide in OMB-V-C-03-0076- served.[17] Accordingly, the MCTC set aside its earlier
B. In a Resolution[10] dated August 12, 2003, he order and denied petitioners motion to quash, the decretal
recommended the filing of the corresponding charges portion of which reads as follows:
form; (2) that the court trying the case has no jurisdiction
Hence, the petition.
over the offense charged and over his person; and, (3)
petition was directly filed before this Court, in utter tribunal of the land. We stressed that -
disregard of the rule on the hierarchy of courts which, thus [t]his Courts original jurisdiction to
issue writs of certiorari (as well as
warrants its outright dismissal. In Vergara, Sr. v. prohibition, mandamus, quo
warranto, habeas corpus and
Suelto,[21] this Court stressed that [w]here the issuance of
injunction) is not exclusive. x x x It is
an extraordinary writ is also within the competence of the also shared by this Court, and by the
Regional Trial Court, with the Court of
Court of Appeals or a Regional Trial Court, it is in either Appeals x x x. This concurrence of
jurisdiction is not, however, to be
of these courts that the specific action for the writs taken as according to parties seeking
any of the writs an absolute,
procurement must be presented, thus: unrestrained freedom of choice of the
court to which application therefor will
The Supreme Court is a court of last be directed. There is after all a
resort, and must so remain if it is to hierarchy of courts. That hierarchy is
satisfactorily perform the functions determinative of the venue of appeals,
assigned to it by the fundamental and should also serve as a general
charter and immemorial tradition. It determinant of the appropriate forum
cannot and should not be burdened with for petitions for the extraordinary
the task of dealing with causes in the first writs. A becoming regard for that judicial
instance. Its original jurisdiction to hierarchy most certainly indicates that
issue the so-called extraordinary writs petitions for the issuance of extraordinary
should be exercised only where writs against first level x x x courts should
absolutely necessary or where be filed with the Regional Trial Court, and
serious and important reasons exist those against the latter, with the Court of
therefor. Hence, that jurisdiction should Appeals. A direct invocation of the
generally be exercised relative to actions Supreme Courts original jurisdiction
or proceedings before the Court of to issue these writs should be allowed
Appeals, or before constitutional or other only when there are special and
tribunals, bodies or agencies whose acts important reasons therefor, clearly
for some reason or another are not and specifically set out in the
controllable by the Court of petition. This is established policy. It
Appeals. Where the issuance of an is a policy that is necessary to prevent
extraordinary writ is also within the inordinate demands upon the Courts
competence of the Court of Appeals or time and attention which are better
a Regional Trial Court, it is in either of devoted to those matters within its
these courts that the specific action exclusive jurisdiction, and to prevent
for the writs procurement must be further over-crowding of the Courts
presented. This is, and should docket. x x x.
continue, to be the policy in this
regard, a policy that courts and
lawyers must strictly observe.[22]
Notwithstanding the dismissibility of the instant
complaint before the Office of the Ombudsman and an Thus, the Ombudsman may not
initiate or investigate a criminal or
administrative complaint before this Court over the same administrative complaint before his office
against petitioner judge, pursuant to his
incident. When the Ombudsman denied the motion of power to investigate public officers.The
Ombudsman must indorse the case to
Judge Caoibes to refer the case to the Supreme Court, he the Supreme Court, for appropriate
action.
filed a petition for certiorari before this Court seeking the
Article VIII, Section 6 of the
reversal of the order. In granting the petition, the Court Constitution exclusively vests in the
Supreme Court administrative
held that: supervision over all courts and court
personnel, from the Presiding Justice of
the Court of Appeals to the lowest
Under Section 6, Article VIII of the
municipal trial court clerk.
Constitution, it is the Supreme Court
which is vested with exclusive
administrative supervision over all courts
and its personnel. Prescinding from this
premise, the Ombudsman cannot
determine for itself and by itself whether
Page 103 of 168
Hence, it is the Supreme Court that
is tasked to oversee the judges and court
personnel and take the The undersigned Graft Investigation
proper administrative action against Officer of the Office of the Ombudsman-
them if they commit any violation of the Visayas, accuses JUDGE RODOLFO B.
laws of the land. No other branch of GARCIA, of the crime of RECKLESS
government may intrude into this power, IMPRUDENCE RESULTING TO
without running afoul of the HOMICIDE, defined and penalized under
independence of the judiciary and the ARTICLE 365 OF THE REVISED PENAL
doctrine of separation of powers. CODE, committed as follows:
Petitioners questioned order That on or about the
directing the attachment of government 12th day of November, 2002, at
property and issuing a writ of execution about 5:15 o'clock in the
were done in relation to his office, well afternoon, at Sitio Tunga,
within his official functions. The order Barangay Bantayanon,
may be erroneous or void for lack or Municipality of Calatrava, Province
excess of jurisdiction. However, whether of Negros Occidental, Philippines,
or not such order of execution was valid and within the jurisdiction of this
under the given circumstances, must be Honorable Court, above-named
inquired into in the course of the judicial accused JUDGE RODOLFO B.
action only by the Supreme Court that is GARCIA, a public officer, being
tasked to supervise the courts. No other then the Municipal Judge of the
entity or official of the Government, not Municipal Circuit Trial Court of
the prosecution or investigation service Calatrava-Toboso, Negros
of any other branch, not any functionary Occidental, with Salary Grade 26,
thereof, has competence to review a then driving a Land Cruiser Toyota
judicial order or decision--whether final bearing Plate No. FDB-193, along
and executory or not--and pronounce it the road at Sitio Tunga, Barangay
erroneous so as to lay the basis for a Bantayanon, Calatrava, Negros
criminal or administrative complaint for Occidental, a public highway, did
rendering an unjust judgment or then and there drive or operate
order. That prerogative belongs to the said vehicle in a reckless,
courts alone.[31] negligent and imprudent manner
without taking the necessary
precaution considering the grade,
visibility and other conditions of
Indeed, supervision over all inferior courts and the highway, nor due regard to the
traffic rules and ordinances in
court personnel, from the Presiding Justice of the Court of order to prevent accident to
persons or damage to property,
Appeals to the lowest ranked court employee, is vested
thereby causing by such
by the Constitution in the Supreme Court. However, that recklessness, negligence and
imprudence the said vehicle to hit
prerogative only extends to administrative supervision. As and bump the motorcycle driven
by Francisco C. Ortega, Jr.,
such, the Ombudsman cannot encroach upon this Courts bearing Plate No. FH-2324, with
Josemarie Paghubasan as his
task to oversee judges and court personnel and take the backrider, thereby causing upon
Francisco C. Ortega, Jr. the
proper administrative action against them if they commit following physical injuries, to with
[sic]:
any violation of the laws of the land.
xxxx
In the case at bar, the criminal case filed against which injuries resulted to the death
of Francisco C. Ortega, Jr.
petitioner was in no way related to the performance of his
CONTRARY TO LAW.[32]
duties as a judge. The Information reveals:
Page 104 of 168
damage to property through
criminal negligence, they shall
From the foregoing, the filing of the criminal have exclusive original
jurisdiction thereof.
charges against the petitioner before the MCTC was
of the Revised Penal Code, the penalty for the crime of As such, the jurisdiction of the MCTC over the
from two (2) years, four (4) months and one (1) day to six Moreover, contrary to petitioners allegation, the
(6) years. Section 32 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, as administrative aspect of the case against him was
amended by Section 2 of Republic Act No. endorsed by the Ombudsman-Visayas to the OCA for
x----------------------------------------
In an Information[6] dated 26 April 1995, the Office of the
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x
Special Prosecutor charged Balaba with the crime of
Malversation of Public Funds.[7] The Information against
RESOLUTION
Balaba reads as follows:
On 14 January 2003, Balaba filed his Notice of Appeal, The petition has no merit.
The Office of the Solicitor General, instead of filing an Act No. 8249 (RA 8249),[14]which further defined the
An appeal erroneously
taken to the Court of
Appeals shall not be
transferred to the
appropriate court but
shall be dismissed
outright. (Emphasis
ours)
Resolution[2] of the Sandiganbayan (Third Division) Information[3] with the Sandiganbayan accusing Victoria
dated February 28, 2005 dismissing Criminal Case No. Amante of violating Section 89 of P.D. No. 1445, which
This Court rules in the affirmative. the action, not at the time of the commission of the offense
applies in this present case. Since the present case was
The applicable law in this case is Section 4 of instituted on May 21, 2004, the provisions of R.A. No.
P.D. No. 1606, as amended by Section 2 of R.A. No. 7975 8249 shall govern.Verily, the pertinent provisions of P.D.
which took effect on May 16, 1995, which was again No. 1606 as amended by R.A. No. 8249 are the following:
amended on February 5, 1997 by R.A. No. 8249. The
Sec. 4. Jurisdiction. -- The
alleged commission of the offense, as shown in the Sandiganbayan shall exercise original
jurisdiction in all cases involving:
Information was on or about December 19, 1995 and the
filing of the Information was on May 21, 2004. The A. Violations of Republic Act No.
3019, as amended, otherwise known as
jurisdiction of a court to try a criminal case is to be the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act,
determined at the time of the institution of the action, not Republic Act No. 1379, and Chapter II,
Section 2, Title VII of the Revised Penal
at the time of the commission of the offense.[15] The Code, where one or more of the principal
exception contained in R.A. 7975, as well as R.A. 8249, accused are officials occupying the
following positions in the government,
where it expressly provides that to determine the whether in a permanent, acting or interim
capacity, at the time of the commission of
jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan in cases involving
the offense:
violations of R.A. No. 3019, as amended, R.A. No. 1379,
(1) Officials of the
and Chapter II, Section 2, Title VII of the Revised Penal executive branch
Code is not applicable in the present case as the offense occupying the positions of
regional director and
involved herein is a violation of The Auditing Code of the higher, otherwise
Philippines. The last clause of the opening sentence of classified as grade 27 and
higher, of the
paragraph (a) of the said two provisions states: Compensation and
Sec. 4. Jurisdiction. -- Position Classification Act
The Sandiganbayan shall exercise of 1989 (Republic Act No.
exclusive original jurisdiction in all cases 6758), specifically
involving: including:
The phrase other offenses or a close reading of the Information filed against respondent
felonies is too broad as to include the Amante for violation of The Auditing Code of
crime of murder, provided it was
committed in relation to the accuseds the Philippinesreveals that the said offense was
official functions. Thus, under said committed in relation to her office, making her fall
paragraph b, what determines
the Sandiganbayans jurisdiction is the under Section 4(b) of P.D. No. 1606, as amended.
official position or rank of the offender
that is, whether he is one of those public
officers or employees enumerated in According to the assailed Resolution of the
paragraph a of Section 4. x x x.
Sandiganbayan, if the intention of the law had been to
Also, in the case Alarilla v. extend the application of the exceptions to the other cases
Sandiganbayan,[19] where the public official was charged over which the Sandiganbayan could assert jurisdiction,
with grave threats, this Court ruled: then there would have been no need to distinguish
between violations of R.A. No. 3019, R.A. No. 1379 or
x x x In the case at bar, the amended
information contained allegations that the Chapter II, Section 2, Title VII of the Revised Penal Code
accused, petitioner herein, took on the one hand, and other offenses or felonies committed
advantage of his official functions as
municipal mayor of Meycauayan, by public officials and employees in relation to their office
Bulacan when he committed the crime of
Page 117 of 168
on the other. The said reasoning is misleading because a qualification as to the public officials involved. It simply
distinction apparently exists. In the offenses involved in stated, public officials and employees mentioned in
Section 4(a), it is not disputed that public office is essential subsection (a) of the same section. Therefore, it refers to
as an element of the said offenses themselves, while in those public officials with Salary Grade 27 and above,
those offenses and felonies involved in Section 4(b), it is except those specifically enumerated.It is a well-settled
enough that the said offenses and felonies were principle of legal hermeneutics that words of a statute will
committed in relation to the public officials or employees' be interpreted in their natural, plain and ordinary
office. In expounding the meaning of offenses deemed to acceptation and signification,[21] unless it is evident that
have been committed in relation to office, this Court held: the legislature intended a technical or special legal
BRION, J.: On September 25, 2003, the RTC issued an Order, ruling
that the Ombudsman is proper, legal and authorized entity
to prosecute this case to the exclusion of any other
Through a petition for review
entity/person other than those authorized under R.A.
on certiorari,[1] petitioner Angelito P. Magno seeks the
6770.[14]
reversal of the Amended Decision of the Court of Appeals
(CA), dated September 26, 2005[2] in People of
In open court, the Office of the Ombudsman moved for the
the Philippines, et al. v. Hon. Augustine A. Vestil,
reconsideration of the Order, which the RTC later denied
Presiding Judge, RTC Mandaue City, Br. 56, et
in its October 1, 2003 Order.[15]
al. (docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 79809), and its
Resolution dated February 6, 2006[3] denying respondents
Proceedings before the CA
motion for reconsideration.[4] The assailed rulings denied
the petition for certiorari filed under Rule 65 of the Rules
On October 13, 2003, the respondents, through
of Court and upheld the ruling[5] of the Regional Trial Court
the Ombudsman for the Visayas and Atty. Sitoy, filed a
(RTC) of Mandaue City, which precluded Atty. Adelino B.
petition for certiorari before the CA.[16] They contended
Sitoy from acting as private prosecutor in Criminal Case
that the RTC committed a grave abuse of discretion in
No. DU-10123.[6]
prohibiting the appearance of Atty. Sitoy as counsel for the
On February 16, 2005, the CA, in its original Decision, RESPONDENTS ARGUMENTS
declared that the private prosecutor may appear for the
petitioner in the case, but only insofar as the prosecution
of the civil aspect of the case is concerned.[22] The Office of the Ombudsman, through the Office of the
Special Prosecutor, submitted its memorandum
on February 8, 2008. Substantively, the Ombudsman
The respondents moved for the reconsideration [23] of the
maintains that Atty. Sitoy may intervene in the case
CA decision. On September 26, 2005, the CA amended its
pursuant to Section 16, Rule 110 of the Rules of Court,
decision,[24] ruling that the private prosecutor may appear
which reads:
for the petitioner in Criminal Case No. DU-10123 to
intervene in the prosecution of the offense charged in
Sec. 16. Intervention of the
collaboration with any lawyer deputized by the offended party in criminal action. Where
Ombudsman to prosecute the case.[25] the civil action for recovery of civil liability
is instituted in the criminal action
pursuant to Rule 111, the offended party
Failing to obtain a reconsideration[26] of the may intervene by counsel in the
prosecution of the offense.
amended CA decision, Magno elevated the dispute to this
Court through the present petition for review
on certiorari[27] filed under Rule 45 of the Rules of The Ombudsman maintains that Section 31 of RA No.
Procedure. 6770 did not amend Section 16, Rule 110 of the Rules of
Court.[33] Section 31 merely allows the Ombudsman to
PETITIONERS ARGUMENTS designate and deputize any fiscal, state prosecutor or
Page 120 of 168
Section 4. Jurisdiction. The
lawyer in the government service to act as special
Sandiganbayan shall exercise exclusive
investigator or prosecutor to assist in the investigation and original jurisdiction in all cases involving:
prosecution in certain cases.[34] The Ombudsman opines
A. Violations of Republic Act No. 3019, as
that the two provisions of law are not diametrically amended, otherwise known as the Anti-
opposed nor in conflict,[35] as a private prosecutor may Graft and Corruption Practices Act,
Republic Act No. 1379, and Chapter II,
appear for the private offended complainants in the Section 2, Title VII, of the Revised Penal
prosecution of an offense independent of the exclusive Code, where one or more of the accused
are officials occupying the following
right of the Ombudsman to deputize.[36] The Ombudsman,
positions in the government, whether in a
however, did not address the contention that the permanent, acting or interim capacity, at
Sandiganbayan, not the CA, has appellate jurisdiction over the time of the commission of the offense:
SO ORDERED.
Before us are two consolidated petitions for review on That on or about the 6th day of
September 1998, and for sometime prior
certiorari filed by petitioner Ruperto A. Ambil, Jr.[1] and [or] subsequent thereto, [in] the
Municipality of Borongan, Province of
petitioner Alexandrino R. Apelado Sr.[2] assailing the
Eastern Samar, Philippines, and within
Decision[3] promulgated on September 16, 2005 and the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court,
[the] above-named accused, Ruperto A.
Resolution[4] dated November 8, 2006 of the Ambil, Jr.[,] being then the Provincial
Sandiganbayan in Criminal Case No. 25892. Governor of Eastern Samar, and
Alexandrino R. Apelado, being then the
Provincial Warden of Eastern Samar,
The present controversy arose from a letter[5] of Atty. both having been public officers, duly
elected, appointed and qualified as such,
David B. Loste, President of the Eastern Samar Chapter committing the offense in relation to
of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP), to the Office office, conniving and confederating
together and mutually helping x x x each
of the Ombudsman, praying for an investigation into the other, with deliberate intent, manifest
alleged transfer of then Mayor Francisco Adalim, an partiality and evident bad faith, did then
and there wilfully, unlawfully and
accused in Criminal Case No. 10963 for murder, from the criminally order and cause the release
from the Provincial Jail of detention
provincial jail of Eastern Samar to the residence of
prisoner Mayor Francisco Adalim,
petitioner, then Governor Ruperto A. Ambil, Jr. In a accused in Criminal Case No. 10963, for
Page 125 of 168
Murder, by virtue of a warrant of Arrest
issued by Honorable Arnulfo P. Bugtas, Petitioner Ambil, Jr. testified that he was the Governor of
Presiding Judge, RTC-Branch 2, Eastern Samar from 1998 to 2001. According to him, it
Borongan, Eastern Samar, and
thereafter placed said detention prisoner was upon the advice of Adalims lawyers that he directed
(Mayor Francisco Adalim) under accused the transfer of Adalims detention to his home. He cites
RUPERTO A. AMBIL, JR.s custody, by
allowing said Mayor Adalim to stay at poor security in the provincial jail as the primary reason
accused Ambils residence for a period of for taking personal custody of Adalim considering that the
Eighty-Five (85) days, more or less which
act was done without any court order, latter would be in the company of inmates who were put
thus accused in the performance of
away by his sister and guards identified with his political
official functions had given unwarranted
benefits and advantage to detainee opponents.[15]
Mayor Francisco Adalim to the prejudice
of the government.
For her part, Atty. White stated that she is the District
CONTRARY TO LAW.
Public Attorney of Eastern Samar and the sister of Mayor
BAIL BOND Adalim. She recounted how Mayor Adalim was arrested
RECOMMENDED: P30,000.00 each.[13]
while they were attending a wedding in Sulat, Eastern
Samar, on September 6, 1998. According to Atty. White,
On arraignment, petitioners pleaded not guilty and posted she sought the alternative custody of Gov. Ambil, Jr. after
bail. Provincial Warden and herein petitioner Apelado, Sr.
failed to guarantee the mayors safety.[16]
At the pre-trial, petitioners admitted the allegations in the
Information. They reason, however, that Adalims transfer Meanwhile, Francisco Adalim introduced himself as the
was justified considering the imminent threats upon his Mayor of Taft, Eastern Samar. He confirmed his arrest on
person and the dangers posed by his detention at the September 6, 1998 in connection with a murder case filed
provincial jail. According to petitioners, Adalims sister, against him in the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Atty. Juliana A. Adalim-White, had sent numerous Borongan, Eastern Samar. Adalim confirmed Atty. Whites
prisoners to the same jail where Mayor Adalim was to be account that he spotted inmates who served as
held. bodyguards for, or who are associated with, his political
rivals at the provincial jail. He also noticed a prisoner,
Consequently, the prosecution no longer offered Roman Akyatan, gesture to him with a raised clenched
testimonial evidence and rested its case after the fist. Sensing danger, he called on his sister for
admission of its documentary exhibits. Petitioners filed a help. Adalim admitted staying at Ambil, Jr.s residence for
Motion for Leave to File Demurrer to Evidence with almost three months before he posted bail after the
[14]
Reservation to Present Evidence in Case of Denial but charge against him was downgraded to homicide.[17]
the same was denied.
WHETHER OR NOT PETITIONER IS personal custody of a detention prisoner; and (3) Whether
ENTITLED TO THE JUSTIFYING he is entitled to the justifying circumstance of fulfillment of
CIRCUMSTANCE OF FULFILLMENT
OF A DUTY OR THE LAWFUL duty under Article 11(5)[24] of the RPC.
EXERCISE OF A RIGHT OR OFFICE.
IN THE ABSENCE OF COMPETENT to his duty as a Provincial Jailer under the Administrative
PROOF BEYOND REASONABLE Code of 1917.Considering this, petitioner believes himself
DOUBT OF CONSPIRACY BETWEEN
ACCUSED AMBIL AND HEREIN entitled to the justifying circumstance of fulfillment of duty
PETITIONER, THE LATTER SHOULD or lawful exercise of duty.
BE ACCORDED FULL CREDIT FOR
THE JUSTIFYING CIRCUMSTANCE
UNDER PARAGRAPH 6, ARTICLE 11
Petitioner Apelado, Sr., on the other hand, denies
OF THE REVISED PENAL CODE.
allegations of conspiracy between him and petitioner
III
Ambil, Jr. Petitioner Apelado, Sr. defends that he was
THE COURT A QUOS BASIS IN merely following the orders of a superior when he
CONVICTING BOTH ACCUSED AMBIL
AND HEREIN PETITIONER OF HAVING transferred the detention of Adalim. As well, he invokes
GIVEN MAYOR ADALIM
immunity from criminal liability.
UNWARRANTED BENEFITS AND
ADVANTAGE TO THE PREJUDICE x x
x OF THE GOVERNMENT IS, AT THE
MOST, SPECULATIVE.[23] For the State, the Office of the Special Prosecutor (OSP)
points out the absence of jurisprudence that restricts the
SEC.
Petitioners were charged with violation of Section 3(e) of 4. Jurisdiction.The Sandiganbayan shall
exercise exclusive original jurisdiction in
R.A. No. 3019 or the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices all cases involving:
Act which provides:
a. Violations of Republic Act No.
Section. 3. Corrupt practices of 3019, as amended, otherwise known as
public officers. - In addition to acts or the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act,
omissions of public officers already Republic Act No. 1379, and Chapter II,
penalized by existing law, the following Section 2, Title VII, Book II of the Revised
shall constitute corrupt practices of any Penal Code, where one or more of the
public officer and are hereby declared to accused are officials occupying the
be unlawful: following positions in the government,
whether in a permanent, acting or interim
xxxx capacity, at the time of the commission of
the offense:
(e) Causing any undue injury to
any party, including the Government, or (1) Officials of the
giving any private party any unwarranted executive branch occupying the
benefits, advantage or preference in the positions of regional director and
discharge of his official, administrative or higher, otherwise classified as
judicial functions through manifest Grade 27 and higher, of the
partiality, evident bad faith or gross Compensation and Position
inexcusable negligence. This provision Classification Act of 1989
shall apply to officers and employees of (Republic Act No.
offices or government corporations 6758), specifically including:
charged with the grant of licenses or
permits or other concessions. (a) Provincial
governors, vice-
Page 129 of 168
governors, members of
the sangguniang In Sison v. People,[30] we defined partiality, bad faith and
panlalawigan and gross negligence as follows:
provincial treasurers,
assessors, engineers Partiality is synonymous with
and other provincial bias which excites a disposition to see
department heads[;] and report matters as they are wished for
rather than as they are. Bad faith does
xxxx not simply connote bad judgment or
negligence; it imputes a dishonest
In cases where none of the accused are purpose or some moral obliquity and
occupying positions corresponding to conscious doing of a wrong; a breach of
Salary Grade 27 or higher, as prescribed sworn duty through some motive or intent
in the said Republic Act No. 6758, or or ill will; it partakes of the nature of fraud.
military and PNP officers mentioned Gross negligence has been so defined as
above, exclusive original jurisdiction negligence characterized by the want of
thereof shall be vested in the proper even slight care, acting or omitting to act
regional trial court, metropolitan trial in a situation where there is a duty to act,
court, municipal trial court, and municipal not inadvertently but wilfully and
circuit trial court, as the case may be, intentionally with a conscious
pursuant to their respective jurisdiction indifference to consequences in so far as
as provided in Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, other persons may be affected. It is the
as amended. omission of that care which even
inattentive and thoughtless men never
xxxx fail to take on their own property. x x x[31]
Thus, the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan over In this case, we find that petitioners displayed manifest
petitioner Ambil, Jr. is beyond question. The same is true partiality and evident bad faith in transferring the detention
as regards petitioner Apelado, Sr. As to him, a of Mayor Adalim to petitioner Ambil, Jr.s house. There is
[29]
Certification from the Provincial Government no merit to petitioner Ambil, Jr.s contention that he is
Department Head of the HRMO shows that his position as authorized to transfer the detention of prisoners by virtue
Provincial Warden is classified as Salary Grade of his power as the Provincial Jailer of Eastern Samar.
22. Nonetheless, it is only when none of the accused are
occupying positions corresponding to salary grade 27 or Section 28 of the Local Government Code draws the
higher shall exclusive jurisdiction be vested in the lower extent of the power of local chief executives over the units
courts. Here, petitioner Apelado, Sr. was charged as a co- of the Philippine National Police within their jurisdiction:
principal with Governor Ambil, Jr., over whose position the
SEC. 28. Powers of Local Chief
Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction. Accordingly, he was Executives over the Units of the
Philippine National Police.The extent of
correctly tried jointly with said public officer in the proper operational supervision and control of
court which had exclusive original jurisdiction over them local chief executives over the police
force, fire protection unit, and jail
the Sandiganbayan. management personnel assigned in their
respective jurisdictions shall be governed
by the provisions of Republic Act
The second element, for its part, describes the three ways Numbered Sixty-nine hundred seventy-
five (R.A. No. 6975), otherwise known
by which a violation of Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019 may
as The Department of the Interior and
be committed, that is, through manifest partiality, evident Local Government Act of 1990, and the
rules and regulations issued pursuant
bad faith or gross inexcusable negligence. thereto.
06 October 1996
Likewise amply established beyond reasonable doubt is
GOVERNOR RUPERTO AMBIL
the third element of the crime. As mentioned above, in
Provincial Capitol
Borongan, Eastern Samar order to hold a person liable for violation of Section 3(e),
Dear Sir: R.A. No. 3019, it is required that the act constituting the
offense consist of either (1) causing undue injury to any
This has reference to the letter of Atty.
Edwin B. Docena, and the reports party, including the government, or (2) giving any private
earlier received by this Department, party any unwarranted benefits, advantage or preference
relative to your alleged action in taking
into custody Mayor Francisco Aising in the discharge by the accused of his official,
Adalim of Taft, that province, who has
administrative or judicial functions.
been previously arrested by virtue by a
An accepted badge of conspiracy is when the accused by petitioner Ambil, Jr. of imprisonment for nine (9) years,
their acts aimed at the same object, one performing one eight (8) months and one (1) day to twelve (12) years and
part of and another performing another so as to complete four (4) months is in accord with law. As a co-principal
it with a view to the attainment of the same object, and without the benefit of an incomplete justifying
their acts although apparently independent were in fact circumstance to his credit, petitioner Apelado, Sr. shall
Apelado, Sr.s willful cooperation in executing petitioner petitioners Ruperto A. Ambil, Jr. and Alexandrino R.
Ambil, Jr.s order to move Adalim from jail, despite the Apelado, Sr. guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violating
absence of a court order. Petitioner Apelado, Sr., a law Section 3(e), R.A. No. 3019. Petitioner Alexandrino R.
graduate, cannot hide behind the cloak of ignorance of the Apelado, Sr. is, likewise, sentenced to an indeterminate
law. The Rule requiring a court order to transfer a person penalty of imprisonment for nine (9) years, eight (8) months
under detention by legal process is elementary. Truth be and one (1) day to twelve (12) years and four (4) months.
ABAD,
The Facts:
- versus - MENDOZA, and
SERENO,* * JJ.
The case stemmed from the arrest of
complainants Alberto Mina, Nilo Jay Mina and Ferdinand
WILHELMINA WAGAN, Presiding Judge
Caasi on February 27, 2000 along an alley, Interior
of the
332, Edang Street, PasayCity, by petitioners-police
Regional Trial Court
officers. They were reported to have been caught in
of Branch III, Pasay City, Promulgated:flagrante delicto drinking liquor in a public place. The
Public Respondent. complainants alleged that their arrest was unlawful and
July 13, 2011was only upon the inducement and unjustifiable
ALBERTO MINA, NILO JAY MINA AND accusation of Ferdinand Cruz and Mariano Cruz (the
FERDINAND CAASI,
Cruzes).[4] Thereafter, they were charged before
Private Respondents. the Metropolitan Trial Court of Pasay City (MeTC) with a
violation of City Ordinance No. 265 (Drinking Liquor in
Public Places), which was docketed as Criminal Case No.
X ------------------------------------------------------------------------ 00-621.
----------- X
At bench is a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 Office (CPO) and the Office of the
as petitioners Police Chief Inspector (PCI) Fernando Ombudsman (Ombudsman) for Unlawful Arrest and
Billedo, Senior Police Officer 3 (SPO3) Rodrigo Domingo, Violation of R.A. No. 7438 (Act Defining Rights of Person
Police Officer 3 (PO3) Jorge Lopez, Ferdinand Cruz, and Under Custodial Investigation). The CPO dismissed the
Mariano Cruz (petitioners), allege grave abuse of case for lack of merit while the Ombudsman, in its Joint
guilty by the MeTC for Violation of City Ordinance No. issues raised based on competent proof.
among others, that under Article 269 of the Revised Considering the circumstances surrounding
Penal Code, the crime of unlawful arrest is punishable the case, the public respondent opined that the case
by arresto mayor and a fine not exceeding 500 pesos did not fall in any of the two cited situations. Thus, she
which, under R.A. No. 7691, falls within the jurisdiction wrote:
By reason of the dismissal of the
of appropriate Metropolitan Trial Court or Municipal
criminal complaint for unlawful arrest
Trial Court, as the case may be, contrary to the during the preliminary investigation
stage, there was no criminal action for
movants claim that it was the Sandiganbayan which unlawful arrest, from which the instant
civil case was based, that was ultimately
has jurisdiction over the ancillary action for damages.
filed with
the Metropolitan Trial Court of Pasay Cit
y, the appropriate court to hear and try
Public respondent further explained that had such offense under R.A.
8249. Consequently, there is no
there been a criminal case for unlawful arrest filed appropriate court to which the instant
before the MeTC, the civil case for damages should case should be transferred as mandated
under Section 4 of R.A. 8294. There
have been transferred to it, but, there was none. She should not have been any problem had
the criminal case for unlawful arrest
also stated that the movant failed to attach certified prospered or reached the appropriate
copies of resolutions/orders dismissing the complaint court as ratiocinated by this Court in its
Order dated May 8, 2006. But there was
for unlawful arrest. Thus, she could not simply rely on none.
Page 138 of 168
with said public officers and employees in
the proper courts which shall exercise
xxxx jurisdiction over them.
issue to be resolved entails an interpretation of Section In this petition, the petitioners presented this
4, R.A. No. 8249, otherwise known as the lone
Sandiganbayan Act, which provides:
ISSUE
Section 4. Section 4 of the same
decree is hereby further amended to read WHETHER OR NOT THE
as follows: REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OR
ANY OTHER COURTS HAS
THE JURISDICTION TO TRY
xxx CIVIL CASE NO. 00-0089
GIVEN THE MANDATORY
SIMULTANEOUS
In case private individuals are INSTITUTION AND JOINT
charged as co-principal, accomplices or DETERMINATION OF A CIVIL
accessories with the public officers or LIABILITY WITH THE
employees, including those employed in CRIMINAL ACTION AND THE
government-owned or controlled EXPRESS PROHIBITION TO
corporations, they shall be tried jointly FILE THE SAID CIVIL ACTION
SEPARATELY FROM THE
Page 139 of 168
CRIMINAL ACTION AS
PROVIDED FOR UNDER petitioners were dismissed at the preliminary stage. A
SECTION 4 OF REPUBLIC ACT
reading of the latter part of Section 4 of R.A. No. 8294
8249?[18]
suggests that the civil case will only be considered
After a careful review of the records, the Court finds no abandoned if there is a pending criminal case and the
commission of a grave abuse of discretion which can civil case was not transferred to the court trying the
be attributed to the public respondent in issuing the criminal case for joint determination.
2006 and August 26, 2006. The criminal charges against petitioners might have
As correctly pointed out by the public respondent, the probable cause, but it does not mean that the civil case
subject civil case does not fall within the purview of instituted prior to the filing of the criminal complaints is
Section 4 of R.A. No. 8249 as the latter part of this already baseless as the complainants can prove their
provision contemplates only two (2) situations. These cause of action in the civil case by mere
before the Sandiganbayan or the appropriate courts While the dismissal of the criminal cases
after the requisite preliminary investigation, and the against them for Violation of R.A. No. 7438 (Acts
corresponding civil liability must be simultaneously Defining Rights of Persons Under Custodial
instituted with it; and Second, the civil case, filed Investigation) and unlawful arrest and the conviction of
ahead of the criminal case, is still pending upon the the complainants for Violation of City Ordinance No.
filing of the criminal action, in which case, the civil case 265 (Drinking Liquor in Public Place),[19] might be
should be transferred to the court trying the criminal factors that can be considered in their favor, the
case for consolidation and joint determination. petitioners should have proceeded with the trial of the
Evidently, Section 4 of R.A. No. 8249 finds no instead of filing this petition.
single appeal.[22]
SO ORDERED.
merits ensued.
In an Information[3] dated November 15, 1994,
Evidence for the Defense recourse and appealing the decision of the RTC before
in cases of erroneous modes of appeal, are proscribed. Paragraph 3, Section 4 (c) of Republic Act No.
Petitioner filed a Motion for Sandiganbayan. There is nothing in said paragraph which
Reconsideration,[12] but was denied in the can conceivably justify the filing of petitioners appeal
Resolution[13] dated October 17, 2006. before the Court of Appeals instead of the
Hence, the petition raising the sole error: any jurisdiction to review the judgment petitioner seeks to
appeal.[17]
WHETHER THE HONORABLE COURT
OF APPEALS ERRED IN DISMISSING
THE PETITIONERS APPEAL
It must be emphasized, however, that the
OUTRIGHT INSTEAD OF CERTIFYING
THE CASE TO THE PROPER designation of the wrong court does not necessarily affect
COURT.[14]
the validity of the notice of appeal. However, the
Petitioner maintains that he inadvertently filed the
designation of the proper court should be made within the
notice of appeal before the Court of Appeals instead of
15-day period to appeal. Once made within the said
the Sandiganbayan. Petitioner implores that the Court
period, the designation of the correct appellate court may
exercise its sound discretion and prerogative to relax
be allowed even if the records of the case are forwarded
compliance to sound procedural rules and to decide the
to the Court of Appeals. Otherwise, Section 2, Rule 50 of
case on the merits, considering that from the beginning,
the Rules of Court would apply,[18] the relevant portion of
he has been candid and straightforward about the fact that
which states:
the case was wrongfully filed with the Court of Appeals
Sec. 2. Dismissal of improper
instead of the Sandiganbayan.
appeal to the Court of Appeals. x x x
In the case at bar, petitioner sought correction of violating his constitutional right to be informed of the
the error in filing the appeal way beyond the expiration of accusations against him. He maintains that the
the period to appeal the decision. The RTC promulgated Information clearly charged him with intentional
its Decision on August 31, 2005. Petitioner filed his Notice malversation and not malversation through negligence,
of Appeal on September 8, 2005. Petitioner tried to which was the actual nature of malversation for which he
correct the error only on February 10, 2006 when he filed was convicted by the trial court. This too lacks merit.
15-day period to appeal from the decision of the trial Malversation may be committed either through a
court. Therefore, the CA did not commit any reversible positive act of misappropriation of public funds or
error when it dismissed petitioners appeal for lack of property, or passively through negligence.[22] To sustain a
Besides, even if we look into the merits of his facts of a case may not show that deceit attended the
arguments, the case is doomed to fail. Contrary to commission of the offense, it will not preclude the
petitioners argument, We find that he is an accountable reception of evidence to prove the existence of
officer within the contemplation of Article 217[20] of the negligence because both are equally punishable under
Revised Penal Code, hence, is untenable. Article 217 of the Revised Penal Code.[23]
of Article 217 of the Revised Penal Code, is one who has More in point, the felony involves breach of public
custody or control of public funds or property by reason of trust, and whether it is committed through deceit or
the duties of his office.[21] The nature of the duties of the negligence, the law makes it punishable and prescribes a
public officer or employee, the fact that as part of his uniform penalty therefor. Even when the Information
duties he received public money for which he is bound to charges willful malversation, conviction for malversation
account and failed to account for it, is the factor which through negligence may still be adjudged if the evidence
determines whether or not malversation is committed by ultimately proves the mode of commission of the
the accused public officer or employee. Hence, a school offense.[24] Explicitly stated
SO ORDERED.
Disini challenges the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan c. Civil and criminal cases filed pursuant to and
in connection with Executive Order Nos. 1, 2, 14
over the offenses charged in Criminal Case No. 28001
and 14-A, issued in 1986. (Bold emphasis
and Criminal Case No. 28002.He contends that: (1) the
supplied)
informations did not allege that the charges were being
filed pursuant to and in connection with Executive Order
(E.O.) Nos.1, 2, 14 and 14-A; (2) the offenses charged In cases where none of the accused are occupying
were not of the nature contemplated by E.O. Nos. 1, 2, positions corresponding to salary grade ‘27’ or higher, as
14 and 14-A because the allegations in the informations prescribed in the said Republic Act No. 6758, or military
neither pertained to the recovery of ill-gotten wealth, nor or PNP officers mentioned above, exclusive original
involved sequestration cases; (3) the cases were filed by jurisdiction thereof shall be vested in the proper regional
the Office of the Ombudsman instead of by the PCGG; trial court, metropolitan trial court, municipal trial court
and (4) being a private individual not charged as a co- and municipal circuit trial court, as the case may be,
principal, accomplice or accessory of a public officer, he pursuant to their respective jurisdiction as provided in
should be prosecuted in the regular courts instead of in Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, as amended.
the Sandiganbayan.
xxxx
The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) counters that
the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over the offenses In case private individuals are charged as co-principals,
charged because Criminal Case No. 28001 and Criminal accomplices or accessories with the public officers or
Case No. 28002 were filed within the purview of Section employees, including those employed in government-
4 (c) of R.A. No. 8249; and that both cases stemmed owned or controlled corporations, they shall be tried
from the criminal complaints initially filed by the PCGG jointly with said public officers and employees in the
pursuant to its mandate under E.O. Nos. 1, 2, 14 and 14- proper courts which shall exercise exclusive jurisdiction
A to investigate and file the appropriate civil or criminal over them. x x x x
cases to recover ill-gotten wealth not only of the
Marcoses and their immediately family but also of their It is underscored that it was the PCGG that had initially
relatives, subordinates and close associates. filed the criminal complaints in the Sandiganbayan, with
the Office of the Ombudsman taking over the
We hold that the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over investigation of Disini only after the Court issued in
Criminal Case No. 28001 and Criminal Case No. 28002. Cojuangco, Jr. the directive to the PCGG to refer the
criminal cases to the Office of the Ombudsman on the
Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1606 was the law that ground that the PCGG would not be an impartial office
established the Sandiganbayan and defined its following its finding of a prima facie case being
jurisdiction. The law was amended by R.A. No. 7975 and established against Disini to sustain the institution of
R.A. No. 8249. Under Section 4 of R.A. No. 8249, the Civil Case No. 0013.
a. Violations of Republic Act No. 3019, as amended, (4) Chairmen and members of Constitutional
otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Commissions, without prejudice to the provisions
Act, Republic Act No.1379, and Chapter II, Section 2, of the Constitution; and
Title VII, Book II of the Revised Penal Code, where one
or more of the accused are officials occupying the (5) All other national and local officials classified
following positions in the government whether in a as Grade ‘27’and higher under the
permanent, acting or interim capacity, at the time of the Compensation and Position Classification Act of
commission of the offense: 1989. b. Other offenses or felonies whether
simple or complexed with other crimes
(1) Officials of the executive branch occupying committed by the public officials and employees
the positions of regional director and higher, mentioned in subsection a of this section in
otherwise classified as Grade ‘27’ and higher, of relation to their office. (bold emphasis supplied)
the Compensation and Position Classification
Act of 1989(Republic Act No. 6758), specifically xxxx
including:
Page 153 of 168
Unquestionably, public officials occupying positions the amendment, the prescriptive period was only 10
classified as Grade 27 or higher are mentioned only in years. It became settled in People v.
Subsection 4a and Subsection 4b,signifying the plain Pacificador,28 however, that the longer prescriptive
legislative intent of limiting the qualifying clause to such period of 15years would not apply to crimes committed
public officials. To include within the ambit of the prior to the effectivity of Batas Pambansa Blg. 195,
qualifying clause the persons covered by Subsection 4c which was approved on March 16, 1982, because the
would contravene the exclusive mandate of the PCGG to longer period could not be given retroactive effect for not
bring the civil and criminal cases pursuant to and in being favorable to the accused. With the information
connection with E.O. Nos. 1, 2, 14 and 14-A. In view of alleging the period from 1974 to February1986 as the
this, the Sandiganbayan properly took cognizance of time of the commission of the crime charged, the
Criminal Case No. 28001 and Criminal Case No. 28002 applicable prescriptive period is 10 years in order to
despite Disini’s being a private individual, and despite accord with People v. Pacificador .
the lack of any allegation of his being the co-principal,
accomplice or accessory of a public official in the For crimes punishable by the Revised Penal Code,
commission of the offenses charged. Article 91 thereof provides that prescription starts to run
from the day on which the crime is discovered by the
3. offended party, the authorities, or their agents. As to
offenses punishable by R.A. No. 3019, Section 2 of R.A.
The offenses charged in the No. 332629 states:
informations have not yet prescribed
Section 2. Prescription shall begin to run from the day of
In resolving the issue of prescription, the following must the commission of the violation of the law, and if the
be considered, namely: (1) the period of prescription for same be not known at the time, from the discovery
the offense charged;(2) the time when the period of thereof and the institution of judicial proceedings for its
prescription starts to run; and (3) the time when the investigation and punishment.
prescriptive period is interrupted.23
The prescription shall be interrupted when proceedings
The information in Criminal Case No. 28001 alleged that are instituted against the guilty person, and shall begin
Disini had offered, promised and given gifts and to run again if the proceedings are dismissed for reasons
presents to Ferdinand E. Marcos; that said gifts were in not constituting double jeopardy.
consideration of Disini obtaining for Burns & Roe and
Westinghouse Electrical Corporation (Westinghouse) the The ruling on the issue of prescription in Presidential Ad
contracts, respectively, to do the engineering and Hoc Fact-Finding Committee on Behest Loans v.
architectural design of and to construct the PNPPP; and Desierto30 is also enlightening, viz:
that President Marcos did award or cause to be awarded
the respective contracts to Burns & Roe and Generally, the prescriptive period shall commence to run
Westinghouse, which acts constituted the crime of on the day the crime is committed. That an aggrieved
corruption of public officials.24 person "entitled to an action has no knowledge of his
right to sue or of the facts out of which his right arises,"
The crime of corruption of public officials charged in does not prevent the running of the prescriptive period.
Criminal Case No. 28001 is punished by Article 212 of An exception to this rule is the "blameless ignorance"
the Revised Penal Code with the" same penalties doctrine, incorporated in Section 2 of Act No. 3326.
imposed upon the officer corrupted."25 Under the second Under this doctrine, "the statute of limitations runs only
paragraph of Article 210 of the Revised Penal Code upon discovery of the fact of the invasion of a right which
(direct bribery),26 if the gift was accepted by the officer in will support a cause of action. In other words, the courts
consideration of the execution of an act that does not would decline to apply the statute of limitations where
constitute a crime, and the officer executes the act, he the plaintiff does not know or has no reasonable means
shall suffer the penalty of prision mayor in its medium of knowing the existence of a cause of action." It was in
and minimum periods and a fine of not less than three this accord that the Court confronted the question on the
times the value of the gift. Conformably with Article 90 of running of the prescriptive period in People v. Duque
the Revised Penal Code,27 the period of prescription for which became the cornerstone of our 1999 Decision in
this specie of corruption of public officials charged Presidential Ad Hoc Fact-Finding Committee on Behest
against Disini is 15 years. Loans v. Desierto (G.R. No. 130149), and the
subsequent cases which Ombudsman Desierto
As for Criminal Case No. 28002, Disini was charged with dismissed, emphatically, on the ground of prescription
a violation of Section 4(a) of R.A. No. 3019. By express too. Thus, we held in a catena of cases, that if the
provision of Section 11 of R.A. No. 3019, as amended by violation of the special law was not known at the time of
Batas Pambansa Blg. 195, the offenses committed its commission, the prescription begins to run only from
under R.A. No. 3019 shall prescribe in 15 years. Prior to
Page 154 of 168
the discovery thereof, i.e., discovery of the unlawful Revised Penal Code34 and the ruling in Panaguiton, Jr.
nature of the constitutive act or acts. v. Department of Justice,35 the filing of the criminal
complaints in the Office of the Ombudsman effectively
Corollary, it is safe to conclude that the prescriptive interrupted the running of the period of prescription.
period for the crime which is the subject herein, According to Panaguiton:36
commenced from the date of its discovery in 1992 after
the Committee made an exhaustive investigation. When In Ingco v. Sandiganbayan and Sanrio Company Limited
the complaint was filed in 1997, only five years have v. Lim, which involved violations of the Anti-Graft and
elapsed, and, hence, prescription has not yet set in. The Corrupt Practices Act(R.A. No. 3019) and the Intellectual
rationale for this was succinctly discussed in the 1999 Property Code (R.A. No. 8293),which are both special
Presidential Ad Hoc Fact-Finding Committee on Behest laws, the Court ruled that the prescriptive period is
Loans, that "it was well-high impossible for the State, the interrupted by the institution of proceedings for
aggrieved party, to have known these crimes committed preliminary investigation against the accused. In the
prior to the 1986EDSA Revolution, because of the more recent case of Securities and Exchange
alleged connivance and conspiracy among involved Commission v. Interport Resources Corporation, the
public officials and the beneficiaries of the loans." In yet Court ruled that the nature and purpose of the
another pronouncement, in the 2001 Presidential Ad Hoc investigation conducted by the Securities and Exchange
Fact-Finding Committee on Behest Loans v. Desierto Commission on violations of the Revised Securities Act,
(G.R. No. 130817), the Court held that during the another special law, is equivalent to the preliminary
Marcos regime, no person would have dared to question investigation conducted by the DOJ in criminal cases,
the legality of these transactions. (Citations omitted)31 and thus effectively interrupts the prescriptive period.
Accordingly, we are not persuaded to hold here that the The following disquisition in the Interport Resources
prescriptive period began to run from 1974, the time case is instructive, thus:
when the contracts for the PNPP Project were awarded
to Burns & Roe and Westinghouse. Although the While it may be observed that the term "judicial
criminal cases were the offshoot of the sequestration proceedings" in Sec. 2 of Act No. 3326 appears before"
case to recover ill-gotten wealth instead of behest loans investigation and punishment" in the old law, with the
like in Presidential Ad Hoc Fact-Finding Committee on subsequent change in set-up whereby the investigation
Behest Loans v. Desierto, the connivance and of the charge for purposes of prosecution has become
conspiracy among the public officials involved and the the exclusive function of the executive branch, the term
beneficiaries of the favors illegally extended rendered it "proceedings" should now be understood either
similarly well-nigh impossible for the State, as the executive or judicial in character: executive when it
aggrieved party, to have known of the commission of the involves the investigation phase and judicial when it
crimes charged prior to the EDSA Revolution in 1986. refers to the trial and judgment stage. With this
Notwithstanding the highly publicized and widely-known clarification, any kind of investigative proceeding
nature of the PNPPP, the unlawful acts or transactions in instituted against the guilty person which may ultimately
relation to it were discovered only through the PCGG’s lead to his prosecution should be sufficient to toll
exhaustive investigation, resulting in the establishment prescription.
of a prima facie case sufficient for the PCGG to institute
Civil Case No. 0013 against Disini. Before the discovery, Indeed, to rule otherwise would deprive the injured party
the PNPPP contracts, which partook of a public the right to obtain vindication on account of delays that
character, enjoyed the presumption of their execution
are not under his control.
having been regularly done in the course of official
functions.32
The prevailing rule is, therefore, that irrespective of
whether the offense charged is punishable by the
Considering further that during the Marcos regime, no
Revised Penal Code or by a special law, it is the filing of
person would have dared to assail the legality of the
the complaint or information in the office of the public
transactions, it would be unreasonable to expect that the
prosecutor for purposes of the preliminary investigation
discovery of the unlawful transactions was possible prior
that interrupts the period of prescription. Consequently,
to 1986. prescription did not yet set in because only five years
elapsed from 1986, the time of the discovery of the
We note, too, that the criminal complaints were filed and offenses charged, up to April 1991, the time of the filing
their records transmitted by the PCGG to the Office of of the criminal complaints in the Office of the
the Ombudsman on April 8, 1991for the conduct the Ombudsman.
preliminary investigation.33 In accordance with Article 91
of the The informations were sufficient in form and substance
The informations in Criminal Case No. 28001 (corruption The second element of corruption of public officers
of public officials) and Criminal Case No. 28002 simply required the public officer to be placed under
(violation of Section 4(a) of RA No.3019) have circumstances, not absolute certainty, that would make
sufficiently complied with the requirements of Section 6, him liable for direct or indirect bribery. Thus, even
Rule110 of the Rules of Court, viz: without alleging that President Marcos received or
accepted Disini’s offers, promises and gifts – an
Section 6. Sufficiency of complaint or information. — A essential element in direct bribery – the allegation that
complaint or information is sufficient if it states the name President Marcos caused the award of the contracts to
of the accused; the designation of the offense given by Burns & Roe and Westinghouse sufficed to place him
the statute; the acts or omissions complained of as under circumstances of being liable for direct bribery.
constituting the offense; the name of the offended party;
the approximate date of the commission of the offense; The sufficiency of the allegations in the information
and the place where the offense was committed. charging the violation of Section 4(a) of R.A. No. 3019 is
similarly upheld. The elements of the offense under
When the offense is committed by more than one Section 4(a) of R.A. No. 3019 are:
person, all of them shall be included in the complaint or
information. 1. That the offender has family or close personal
relation with a public official;
The information in Criminal Case No. 28001 alleging
corruption of public officers specifically put forth that 2. That he capitalizes or exploits or takes
Disini, in the period from 1974 to February 1986 in advantage of such family or close personal
Manila, Philippines, conspiring and confederating with relation by directly or indirectly requesting or
then President Marcos, willfully, unlawfully and receiving any present, gift, material or pecuniary
feloniously offered, promised and gave gifts and advantage from any person having some
presents to President Marcos, who, by taking undue business, transaction, application, request or
advantage of his position as President, committed the contract with the government;
offense in relation to his office, and in consideration of
the gifts and presents offered, promised and given by 3. That the public official with whom the offender
Disini, President Marcos caused to be awarded to Burns has family or close personal relation has to
& Roe and Westinghouse the respective contracts to do intervene in the business transaction,
the engineering and architectural design of and to application, request, or contract with the
construct the PNPPP. The felonious act consisted of government.
causing the contracts for the PNPPP to be awarded to
Burns & Roe and Westinghouse by reason of the gifts
The allegations in the information charging the violation
and promises offered by Disini to President Marcos.
of Section 4(a) of R.A. No. 3019, if hypothetically
admitted, would establish the elements of the offense,
The elements of corruption of public officials under considering that: (1) Disini, being the husband of
Article 212 of the Revised Penal Code are: Paciencia Escolin-Disini, the first cousin of First Lady
Imelda Romualdez-Marcos, and at the same time the
1. That the offender makes offers or promises, family physician of the Marcoses, had close personal
or gives gifts or presents to a public officer; and relations and intimacy with and free access to President
SO ORDERED.
The Information filed against respondent is an offshoot On March 10, 2005, the SB issued an Order, to wit:
of this Court's Decision3 in Agan, Jr. v. Philippine
International Air Terminals Co., Inc. which nullified the The prosecution is given a period of ten (10) days from
various contracts awarded by the Government, through today within which to show cause why this case should
the Department of Transportation and Communications not be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction over the person
(DOTC), to Philippine Air Terminals, Co., Inc. (PIATCO) of the accused considering that the accused is a private
for the construction, operation and maintenance of the person and the public official Arturo Enrile, his alleged
Ninoy Aquino International Airport International co-conspirator, is already deceased, and not an accused
Passenger Terminal III (NAIA IPT III). Subsequent to the in this case.5
above Decision, a certain Ma. Cecilia L. Pesayco filed a
complaint with the Office of the Ombudsman against The prosecution complied with the above Order
several individuals for alleged violation of R.A. 3019. contending that the SB has already acquired jurisdiction
Among those charged was herein respondent, who was over the person of respondent by reason of his voluntary
then the Chairman and President of PIATCO, for having appearance, when he filed a motion for consolidation
supposedly conspired with then DOTC Secretary Arturo and when he posted bail. The prosecution also argued
Enrile (Secretary Enrile) in entering into a contract which that the SB has exclusive jurisdiction over respondent's
is grossly and manifestly disadvantageous to the case, even if he is a private person, because he was
government. alleged to have conspired with a public officer.6
On September 16, 2004, the Office of the Deputy On April 28, 2005, respondent filed a Motion to
Ombudsman for Luzon found probable cause to indict, Quash7 the Information filed against him on the ground
among others, herein respondent for violation of Section that the operative facts adduced therein do not constitute
3(g) of R.A. 3019. While there was likewise a finding of an offense under Section 3(g) of R.A. 3019.
probable cause against Secretary Enrile, he was no Respondent, citing the show cause order of the SB, also
longer indicted because he died prior to the issuance of contended that, independently of the deceased
the resolution finding probable cause. Secretary Enrile, the public officer with whom he was
alleged to have conspired, respondent, who is not a
Thus, in an Information dated January 13, 2005, public officer nor was capacitated by any official
respondent was charged before the SB as follows: authority as a government agent, may not be prosecuted
for violation of Section 3(g) of R.A. 3019.
On or about July 12, 1997, or sometime prior or
subsequent thereto, in Pasay City, Metro Manila, The prosecution filed its Opposition.8
Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, the late ARTURO ENRILE, then Secretary of the
Page 158 of 168
On June 2, 2005, the SB issued its assailed Resolution, (g) Entering, on behalf of the Government, into any
pertinent portions of which read thus: contract or transaction manifestly and grossly
disadvantageous to the same, whether or not the public
Acting on the Motion to Quash filed by accused Henry T. officer profited or will profit thereby.
Go dated April 22, 2005, and it appearing that Henry T.
Go, the lone accused in this case is a private person and The elements of the above provision are:
his alleged co-conspirator-public official was already
deceased long before this case was filed in court, for (1) that the accused is a public officer;
lack of jurisdiction over the person of the accused, the
Court grants the Motion to Quash and the Information
(2) that he entered into a contract or transaction
filed in this case is hereby ordered quashed and
on behalf of the government; and
dismissed.9
(3) that such contract or transaction is grossly
Hence, the instant petition raising the following issues, to
and manifestly disadvantageous to the
wit:
government.11
Indeed, it is not necessary to join all alleged co- However, when in resolute execution of a common
conspirators in an indictment for conspiracy.15 If two or scheme, a felony is committed by two or more
more persons enter into a conspiracy, any act done by malefactors, the existence of a conspiracy assumes
any of them pursuant to the agreement is, in pivotal importance in the determination of the liability of
contemplation of law, the act of each of them and they the perpetrators. In stressing the significance of
are jointly responsible therefor.16 This means that conspiracy in criminal law, this Court in U.S. vs. Infante
everything said, written or done by any of the and Barreto opined that
conspirators in execution or furtherance of the common
purpose is deemed to have been said, done, or written While it is true that the penalties cannot be imposed for
by each of them and it makes no difference whether the the mere act of conspiring to commit a crime unless the
actual actor is alive or dead, sane or insane at the time statute specifically prescribes a penalty therefor,
of trial.17 The death of one of two or more conspirators nevertheless the existence of a conspiracy to commit a
does not prevent the conviction of the survivor or crime is in many cases a fact of vital importance, when
survivors.18 Thus, this Court held that: considered together with the other evidence of record, in
establishing the existence, of the consummated crime
x x x [a] conspiracy is in its nature a joint offense. One and its commission by the conspirators.
person cannot conspire alone. The crime depends upon
the joint act or intent of two or more persons. Yet, it does Once an express or implied conspiracy is proved, all of
not follow that one person cannot be convicted of the conspirators are liable as co-principals regardless of
conspiracy. So long as the acquittal or death of a co- the extent and character of their respective active
conspirator does not remove the bases of a charge for participation in the commission of the crime or crimes
conspiracy, one defendant may be found guilty of the perpetrated in furtherance of the conspiracy because in
offense.19 contemplation of law the act of one is the act of all. The
foregoing rule is anchored on the sound principle that
The Court agrees with petitioner's contention that, as "when two or more persons unite to accomplish a
alleged in the Information filed against respondent, criminal object, whether through the physical volition of
which is deemed hypothetically admitted in the latter's one, or all, proceeding severally or collectively, each
Motion to Quash, he (respondent) conspired with individual whose evil will actively contributes to the
Secretary Enrile in violating Section 3 (g) of R.A. 3019 wrong-doing is in law responsible for the whole, the
and that in conspiracy, the act of one is the act of all. same as though performed by himself alone." Although it
Hence, the criminal liability incurred by a co-conspirator is axiomatic that no one is liable for acts other than his
is also incurred by the other co-conspirators. own, "when two or more persons agree or conspire to
commit a crime, each is responsible for all the acts of the
Moreover, the Court agrees with petitioner that the others, done in furtherance of the agreement or
avowed policy of the State and the legislative intent to conspiracy." The imposition of collective liability upon the
repress "acts of public officers and private persons alike, conspirators is clearly explained in one case where this
which constitute graft or corrupt practices,"20 would be Court held that x x x it is impossible to graduate the
frustrated if the death of a public officer would bar the separate liability of each (conspirator) without taking into
prosecution of a private person who conspired with such consideration the close and inseparable relation of each
public officer in violating the Anti-Graft Law. of them with the criminal act, for the commission of
which they all acted by common agreement x x x. The
crime must therefore in view of the solidarity of the act
In this regard, this Court's disquisition in the early case
and intent which existed between the x x x accused, be
of People v. Peralta21 as to the nature of and the
regarded as the act of the band or party created by
principles governing conspiracy, as construed under
them, and they are all equally responsible x x x
Philippine jurisdiction, is instructive, to wit:
SO ORDERED.
After the Office of the Special Prosecutor (OSP) filed its On April 10, 2013, we required the respondents to
opposition and Inocentes filed his reply, the comment on Inocentes' petition, and deferred action on
Sandiganbayan issued the first assailed resolution. The the issuance of a temporary restraining order and/or writ
Sandiganbayan maintained its jurisdiction over the case of preliminary injunction.
because Section 4 of P.D. 1606, as amended by R.A.
No. 8249,9specifically includes managers of GOCCs - In its comment, the OSP counters that what Inocentes
whose position may not fall under Salary Grade 27 or asks at this point is for this Court to examine and weigh
higher - who violate R.A. No. 3019. It also ruled that the all the pieces of evidence and thereafter absolve him of
informations in this case sufficiently allege all the all charges without undergoing trial.
essential elements required to violate Section 3(e) of
R.A. No. 3019. The OSP said that the Office of the Ombudsman did not
act arbitrarily in conducting the preliminary investigation
Further, it said that it already determined the existence and finding probable cause. Moreover, the
of probable cause when it issued the warrant of arrest in Sandiganbayan likewise found probable cause after
its minute resolution dated May 10, 2012. considering all the pleadings and documents submitted
before it and saw no sound reason to set aside its
Lastly, it held that the delay in this case was excusable finding.
considering that the records of this case were
transferred from the Regional Trial Court in Tarlac City, On the other hand, the Office of the Solicitor General
where the case was first filed. filed a manifestation saying that it will no longer submit
its comment as the OSP, pursuant to its expanded
In his motion for reconsideration, Inocentes reiterated mandate under R.A. No. 6770,10 shall represent the
the same arguments he raised in his omnibus motion. In People before this Court and the Sandiganbayan.
addition, he asserted that the present case against him
should be dismissed because the Office of the OUR RULING
Ombudsman dismissed the estafa case against him for
the same transactions. He also filed a supplemental We find the present petition meritorious.
motion attaching a copy of the affidavit of a certain
Monico Imperial to show (1) that there existed political Preliminary Considerations
persecutions within the GSIS against the critics of then
President and General Manager Winston F. Garcia, and The Constitution, under Section 1, Article VIII, empowers
(2) that the GSIS branch manager relies on the the courts to determine whether or not there has been a
recommendation of his subordinates in approving or grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
disapproving real estate loan applications. jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of
the Government.11 This is an overriding authority that
The Sandiganbayan remained unconvinced. On the cuts across all branches and instrumentalities of
contents of the affidavit, it agreed with the prosecution government and is implemented through the petition
that these are matters of defense that must stand for certiorari that Rule 65 of the Rules of Court
scrutiny in a full-blown trial. With respect to the dismissal provides.12chanrobleslaw
of the estafa case against him, the Sandiganbayan said
that the dismissal of that case does not necessarily Inocentes, through this remedy, comes before this Court
result in the dismissal of the present case because the asserting that there was grave abuse on the part of the
same act may give rise to two (2) or more separate and Sandiganbayan when it exercised its discretion in
distinct offenses. denying his omnibus motion. This extraordinary writ
solely addresses lower court actions rendered without or
To contest the denial of his motion for reconsideration, in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion
Inocentes filed the present petition asserting, among amounting to lack of jurisdiction. Grave abuse of
others, that the quantum of evidence required to discretion is a circumstance beyond the legal error
establish probable cause for purposes of holding a committed by a decision-making agency or entity in the
person for trial and/or for the issuance of a warrant of exercise of its jurisdiction; this circumstance affects even
arrest was not met in this case. He argued that absent the authority to render judgment.13chanrobleslaw
any allegation of his specific acts or evidence linking him
to the anomalous transactions, probable cause can Under these terms, if the Sandiganbayan merely legally
hardly exist because it would be imprudent to insinuate erred while acting within the confines of its jurisdiction,
Page 164 of 168
then its ruling, even if erroneous, is not the proper conspiracy is significant only because it changes the
subject of a petition for certiorari. If, on the other hand, criminal liability of all the accused in the conspiracy and
the Sandiganbayan ruling was attended by grave abuse makes them answerable as co-principals regardless of
of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, the degree of their participation in the crime. The
then this ruling is fatally defective on jurisdictional liabilities of the conspirators is collective and each
ground and should be declared null and participant will be equally responsible for the acts of
void.14chanrobleslaw others, for the act of one is the act of all. In People v.
Quitlong, we ruled how conspiracy as the mode of
In the present case, the Sandiganbayan denied committing the offense should be alleged in the
Inocentes' omnibus motion (1) to judicially determine the information, viz:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
existence of probable cause; (2) quash the information A conspiracy indictment need not, of course, aver all the
that was filed against him; and/or (3) dismiss the case components of conspiracy or allege all the details
against him for violation of his right to speedy trial. In thereof like the part that each of the parties therein have
determining whether the Sandiganbayan committed performed, the evidence proving the common design or
grave abuse in the exercise of its discretion, we shall the facts connecting all the accused with one another in
review the Sandiganbayan's judgment denying the the web of conspiracy. Neither is it necessary to
omnibus motion in the light of each cited remedy and the describe conspiracy with the same degree of particularity
grounds presented by Inocentes to support them. required in describing a substantive offense. It is enough
that the indictment contains a statement of facts relied
The Sandiganbayan hardly committed any grave upon to be constitutive of the offense in ordinary and
abuse of discretion in denying the motion to quash concise language, with as much certainty as the nature
the information. of the case will admit, in a manner that can enable a
person of common understanding to know what is
Inocentes is unyielding in his position that the intended, and with such precision that the accused may
informations filed against him should be quashed based plead his acquittal or conviction to a subsequent
on the following grounds: (1) that all the information indictment based on the same facts.
alleged is that Inocentes conspired and confederated
xxx xxx xxx
with his co-accused without specifying how his specific
acts contributed to the alleged crime; and (2) that the Again, following the stream of our own jurisprudence, it
Sandiganbayan has no jurisdiction over Inocentes is enough to allege conspiracy as a mode in the
because he was occupying a position with a salary commission of an offense in either of the following
grade less than 27. manner: (1) by use of the word, "conspire," or its
derivatives or synonyms, such as confederate, connive,
On the contention that the informations did not detail
collude, etc; or (2) by allegations basic facts constituting
Inocentes' individual participation in the conspiracy, we
the conspiracy in a manner that a person of common
have underscored before the fact that under our laws
understanding would know what is intended, and with
conspiracy should be understood on two levels, i.e., a
such precision as would enable the accused to
mode of committing a crime or a crime in competently enter a plea to a subsequent indictment
itself.15chanrobleslaw
based on the same facts.17 [italics supplied]
In Estrada v. Sandiganbayan,16 we explained that when With these guidelines in mind, Inocentes' challenge with
conspiracy is charged as a crime, the act of conspiring respect to the informations filed against him necessarily
and all the elements and all the elements must be set fails as he could gather that he is one of those GSIS
forth in the information, but when it is not and conspiracy officials who conspired in approving the anomalous
is considered as a mode of committing the crime, there transactions. Accordingly, the informations filed against
is less necessity of reciting its particularities in the Inocentes in this case are valid because they adequately
information because conspiracy is not the gravamen of provide the material allegations to apprise him of the
the offense, to wit:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary nature and cause of the charge.
To reiterate, when conspiracy is charged as a crime, the
act of conspiring and all the elements of said crime must On the issue on jurisdiction, it is of no moment that
be set forth in the complaint or information. Inocentes does not occupy a position with a salary grade
of 27 since he was the branch manager of the GSIS'
xxx xxx xxx field office in Tarlac City, a government-owned or -
controlled corporation, at the time of the commission of
The requirements on sufficiency of allegations are the offense, which position falls within the coverage of
different when conspiracy is not charged as a crime in the Sandiganbayan's jurisdiction.
itself but only as the mode of committing the crime as in
the case at bar.There is less necessity of reciting its The applicable law provides that violations of R.A. No.
particularities in the information because conspiracy is 3019 committed by presidents, directors or trustees,
not the gravamen of the offense charged. The or managers of government-owned or -controlled
Page 165 of 168
corporations, and state universities shall be within the whether or not he has made a correct ascertainment of
exclusive original jurisdiction of the the existence of probable cause in a case, is a matter
Sandiganbayan.18 We have clarified the provision of law that the trial court itself does not and may not be
defining the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan by compelled to pass upon.
explaining that the Sandiganbayan maintains its
jurisdiction over those officials specifically enumerated in The judicial determination of probable cause, on the
(a) to (g) of Section 4(1) of P.D. No. 1606, as amended, other hand, is one made by the judge to ascertain
regardless of their salary grades.19 Simply put, those that whether a warrant of arrest should be issued against the
are classified as Salary Grade 26 and below may still fall accused. The judge must satisfy himself that based on
within the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan, provided the evidence submitted, there is necessity for placing the
they hold the positions enumerated by the law.20 In this accused under custody in order not to frustrate the ends
category, it is the position held, not the salary grade, of justice. If the judge finds no probable cause, the judge
which determines the jurisdiction of the cannot be forced to issue the arrest warrant.
Sandiganbayan.21chanrobleslaw
Corollary to the principle that a judge cannot be
Furthermore, as the Sandiganbayan correctly held, even compelled to issue a warrant of arrest if he or she deems
low-level management positions fall under the that there is no probable cause for doing so, the judge in
jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan. We settled this point turn should not override the public prosecutors'
in Lazarte v. Sandiganbayan22 and Geduspan v. determination of probable cause to hold an accused for
People23. trial on the ground that the evidence presented to
substantiate the issuance of an arrest warrant was
Based on the foregoing, we find that the Sandiganbayan insufficient. It must be stressed that in our criminal
was correct in denying Inocentes' motion to quash; justice system, the public prosecutor exercises a wide
hence, there was no grave abuse in the exercise of its latitude of discretion in determining whether a criminal
discretion regarding this matter. case should be filed in court, and that courts must
respect the exercise of such discretion when the
A redetermination of a judicial finding of probable information filed against the person charged is valid on
cause is futile when the accused voluntarily its face, and that no manifest error or grave abuse of
surrenders to the jurisdiction of the court. discretion can be imputed to the public prosecutor.
In the present case, the Office of the Ombudsman and Thus, absent a finding that an information is invalid on its
the Sandiganbayan separately found that probable face or that the prosecutor committed manifest error or
cause exists to indict and issue a warrant of arrest grave abuse of discretion, a judge's determination of
against Inocentes. However, what Inocentes brings probable cause is limited only to the judicial kind or for
before this Court right now is only the finding of the the purpose of deciding whether the arrest warrants
Sandiganbayan of probable cause for the issuance of a should be issued against the accused. [Emphasis
warrant of arrest. supplied; citations omitted]
Under this ruling, we made it clear that the judge does
Under our jurisdiction, any person may avail of this
not act as an appellate court of the prosecutor and has
remedy since it is well-established in jurisprudence that
no capacity to review the prosecutor's determination of
the court may, in the protection of one's fundamental
probable cause; rather, he makes a determination of
rights, dismiss the case if, upon a personal assessment probable cause independently of the prosecutor's
of evidence, it finds that the evidence does not establish finding.26 Despite the fact that courts should avoid
probable cause.24chanrobleslaw
reviewing an executive determination of probable cause,
we are not completely powerless to review this matter
In People v. Castillo,25cralawred we discussed the two
under our expanded judicial power under the
kinds of determination of probable cause,
Constitution.
thus:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
There are two kinds of determination of probable cause: We are aware, however, that Inocentes availed of this
executive and judicial. The executive determination of
remedy after he had posted bail before the
probable cause is one made during preliminary
Sandiganbayan which, in our jurisdiction, is tantamount
investigation. It is a function that properly pertains to the
to voluntary surrender.27 Simply put, questioning the
public prosecutor who is given a broad discretion to
findings of probable cause by the Sandiganbayan at this
determine whether probable cause exists and to charge point would be pointless as it has already acquired
those whom he believes to have committed the crime as jurisdiction over Inocentes.
defined by law and thus should be held for trial.
Otherwise stated, such official has the quasi-judicial
It is well-settled that jurisdiction over the person of the
authority to determine whether or not a criminal case
accused is acquired upon (1) his arrest or apprehension,
must be filed in court. Whether or not that function has
with or without a warrant, or (2) his voluntary
been correctly discharged by the public prosecutor, i.e.,
Page 166 of 168
appearance or submission to the jurisdiction of the court.
For this reason, in Cojuangco, Jr. v. In Tatad v. Sandiganbayan,32 we held that the long delay
Sandiganbayan28 we held that even if it is conceded that of close to three (3) years in the termination of the
the warrant issued was void (for nonexistence of preliminary investigation conducted by the Tanodbayan
probable cause), the accused waived all his rights to constituted a violation not only of the constitutional right
object by appearing and giving a of the accused under the broad umbrella of the due
bond, viz:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary process clause, but also of the constitutional guarantee
On this score, the rule is well-settled that the giving or to "speedy disposition" of cases as embodied in Section
posting of bail by the accused is tantamount to 16 of the Bill of Rights, viz:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
submission of his person to the jurisdiction of the court. We find the long delay in the termination of the
[...] preliminary investigation by the Tanodbayan in the
instant case to be violative of the constitutional right
By posting bail, herein petitioner cannot claim exemption of the accused to due process. Substantial
from the effect of being subject to the jurisdiction of adherence to the requirements of the law governing
respondent court. While petitioner has exerted efforts the conduct of preliminary investigation, including
to continue disputing the validity of the issuance of substantial compliance with the time limitation
the warrant of arrest despite his posting bail, his prescribed by the law for the resolution of the case
claim has been negated when he himself invoked the by the prosecutor, is part of the procedural due
jurisdiction of respondent court through the filing of process constitutionally guaranteed by the
various motions that sought other affirmative fundamental law. Not only under the broad umbrella
reliefs.29 [omission and emphasis ours] of the due process clause, but under the
constitutional guarantee of "speedy disposition" of
Therefore, at this point, we no longer find it necessary to
cases as embodied in Section 16 of the Bill of Rights
dwell on whether there was grave abuse on the part of
(both in the 1973 and the 1987 Constitutions), the
the Sandiganbayan in finding the existence of probable
inordinate delay is violative of the petitioner's
cause to issue a warrant of arrest. Had Inocentes
constitutional rights. A delay of close to three (3) years
brought this matter before he posted bail or without
cannot be deemed reasonable or justifiable in the light of
voluntarily surrendering himself, the outcome could have
the circumstance obtaining in the case at bar. We are
been different. But, for now, whether the findings of
not impressed by the attempt of the Sandiganbayan to
probable cause was tainted with grave abuse of
sanitize the long delay by indulging in the speculative
discretion - thereby making the warrant of arrest void -
does not matter anymore as even without the warrant assumption that "the delay may be due to a painstaking
the Sandiganbayan still acquired jurisdiction over the and gruelling scrutiny by the Tanodbayan as to whether
the evidence presented during the preliminary
person of Inocentes.
investigation merited prosecution of a former high
ranking government official." In the first place, such a
The Sandiganbayan should have granted Inocentes'
statement suggests a double standard of treatment,
motion to dismiss for violation of his right to speedy
disposition of cases; it took seven long years before which must be emphatically rejected. Secondly, three
the information was filed before it. out of the five charges against the petitioner were for his
alleged failure to file his sworn statement of assets and
liabilities required by Republic Act No. 3019, which
The Office of the Ombudsman, for its failure to resolve
certainly did not involve complicated legal and factual
the criminal charges against Inocentes for seven (7)
years, violated Inocentes' constitutional right to due issues necessitating such "painstaking and gruelling
process and to a speedy disposition of the case against scrutiny" as would justify a delay of almost three years in
terminating the preliminary investigation. The other two
him, as well as its own constitutional duty to act promptly
charges relating to alleged bribery and alleged giving of
on complaints filed before it.
unwarranted benefits to a relative, while presenting more
substantial legal and factual issues, certainly do not
A person's right to a speedy disposition of his case is
guaranteed under Section 16, Article III of the warrant or justify the period of three years, which it took
Constitution:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary the Tanodbayan to resolve the case.33[emphasis ours]
All persons shall have the right to a speedy disposition of The Sandiganbayan insists that the delay in this case is
their cases before all judicial, quasi-judicial, or justifiable because the informations were initially filed
administrative bodies. before the RTC in Tarlac City. However, after going over
This constitutional right is not limited to the accused in the records of the case, we find that the period of time in
between the incidents that could have contributed to the
criminal proceedings but extends to all parties in all
delay were unreasonable, oppressive, and vexatious.
cases, be it civil or administrative in nature, as well as in
all proceedings, either judicial or quasi-judicial.30 In this
According to the Sandiganbayan, the complaint in the
accord, any party to a case may demand expeditious
action of all officials who are tasked with the case at bar was filed sometime in 2004. After the
administration of justice.31chanrobleslaw preliminary investigation, on September 15, 2005, the