EN BANC
[G.R. No. L-14595. May 31, 1960.]
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner, v.
HONORABLE GREGORIO MONTEJO, Judge, Court
of First Instance, Zamboanga City and Basilan City,
MAYOR LEROY S. BROWN, DETECTIVE JOAQUIN R.
POLLISCO, PATROLMAN GRACIANO LACERNA
alias DODONG, PATROLMAN MOHAMAD HASBI,
SPECIAL POLICEMAN DIONISIO DINGLASA,
SPECIAL POLICEMAN HADJARATIL, SPECIAL
POLICEMAN ALO, and SEVERAL JOHN
DOES, Respondents.
Acting City Atty. Perfecto B. Querubin for Petitioner.
Hon. Gregorio Montejo in his own behalf.
C. A. S. Sipin, Jr. for the other respondents.
SYLLABUS
1. CRIMINAL PROCEDURE; LATITUDE OF PARTIES
IN THEIR PRESENTATION OF EVIDENCE; CASE AT
BAR. — It is elemental that all parties in a criminal action
are entitled to a reasonable opportunity to establish their
respective theories. In the case at bar, the issue of the
guilt or innocence of the accused is bound to hinge
heavily upon the veracity of the opposing witnesses and
the weight attached to their respective testimony. Hence,
the parties should be allowed a certain latitude in the
presentation of their evidence, lest they may be so
hampered that the ends of justice may eventually be
defeated or appear to be defeated. The danger of
landing to such result must be avoided.
2. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; PROHIBITION AGAINST
SENATORS AND MEMBERS OF THE HOUSE OF
REPRESENTATIVES FROM APPEARING AS
COUNSEL IN CERTAIN CRIMINAL CASES; WHEN
PROHIBITION APPLIES EVEN IF THE CRIME
CHARGED IS MURDER. — Although public office is not
an element of the crime of murder in abstract, where the
offense charged in the information is intimately
connected with the respective offices of the accused,
and was allegedly perpetrated while they were in the
performance, though improper or irregular, of their
official functions, the constitutional provision that no
Senator or Member of the House of Representatives
shall "appear as counsel . . . in any criminal case
wherein an officer or employee of the Government is
accused of an offense committed in relation to his office .
. . (Article VI, Section 17, Constitution of the Philippines),
is applicable thereto.
DECISION
CONCEPCION, J.:
This is a special civil action for certiorari, with mandamus
and preliminary injunction, against Hon. Gregorio
Montejo, as Judge of the Court of First Instance of the
cities of Zamboanga and Basilan, and the defendants in
Criminal Case No. 672 of said court.
In the petition herein, which was filed by the prosecution
in said criminal case, it is prayed that, pending the final
determination thereof, a writ of preliminary injunction
issue, enjoining respondent Judge from proceeding with
the trial of said case; that, after due hearing, the rulings
of respondent Judge, rejecting some evidence for the
prosecution therein and not permitting the same to
propound certain questions, be set aside; that said
respondent Judge be ordered to admit the
aforementioned evidence and permit said questions; and
that Senator Roseller Lim be declared, contrary to
another ruling made by respondent Judge, disqualified
by the Constitution from appearing as counsel for the
accused in said criminal case. Soon, after the filing of
the petition, we issued the writ of preliminary injunction
prayed for, without bond.
In their respective answers, respondents alleged, in
substance, that the ruling complained of are in
conformity with law.
Respondents Leroy S. Brown, Mayor of Basilan City,
Detective Joaquin R. Pollisco, Patrolman Graciano
Lacerna (alias Dodong) and Mohamad Hasbi, Special
Policemen Dionisio Dinglasa, Moro Yakan, Hadjaratil,
Moro Alo, and several John Does, are charged, in said
Criminal Case No. 672, with murder. It is alleged in the
information therein that, during May and June, 1958, in
the sitio of Tipo-Tipo, district of Lamitan, City of Basilan,
Mayor Brown "organized groups of police patrol and
civilian commandoes", consisting of regular and special
policemen, whom he "armed with pistols and high power
guns", and then "established a camp", called sub-police
headquarters — hereinafter referred to as sub-station —
at Tipo-Tipo, Lamitan, which was placed under his
command, orders, direct supervision and control, and in
which his codefendants were stationed; that criminal
complaints were entertained in said sub-station, in which
defendant Pollisco acted as investigating officer and
exercised authority to order the apprehension of persons
and their detention in the camp, for days or weeks,
without due process of law and without bringing them to
the proper court; that, on or about June 4, and 5, 1958;
one Yakan Awalin Tebag was arrested by order of
Mayor Brown, without any warrant or complaint filed in
court, and then brought to, and detained in, the
aforementioned sub-station; that while on the way
thereto, said Awalin Tebag was maltreated, pursuant to
instructions of Mayor Brown, concurred in by Pollisco, to
Page 1 of 168
the effect that Tebag be mauled until such time as he
shall surrender his gun; that, once in the sub-station,
Tebag, whose hands were securely tied, was subjected,
by defendants Lacerna, Hasbi, Pollisco, Dinglasa, and
other special policemen, to further and more severe
torture, in consequence of which Tebag died; that, in
order to simulate that Tebag had been killed by peace
officers in the course of an encounter between the latter
and a band of armed bandits of which he formed part,
the body of Tebag was brought, early the next morning,
to a nearby isolated field, where defendant Hasbi fired
twice at said dead body from behind, and then an old
Japanese rifle, supplied by Mayor Brown, was placed
beside said body; and that, in furtherance of the
aforementioned simulation, a report of said imaginary
encounter, mentioning Tebag as the only member of a
band of armed bandits whose identity was known, was
submitted and respondent Hasbi caused one of his
companions to shoot him on the left arm.
During the trial of said criminal case, respondent Judge
rejected the following evidence for the prosecution
therein:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
1. Exhibit A — A report of Capt. F. G. Sarrosa,
Commanding Officer of the PC Detachment in Basilan
City, who investigated the case, showing that on June 5,
1958, he and Lt. Clemente Antonio, PAF, found nine (9)
detainees in the Tipo-Tipo sub-station. This was part of
the chain of evidence of the prosecution to prove that
persons used to be detained in the aforementioned sub-
station by the main respondents herein, without either a
warrant or arrest or a complaint filed in court.
2. Exhibit C — Letter of Atty. Doroteo de Guzman to the
officer in charge of the sub-station, dated June 4, 1958,
inquiring as to the whereabouts of Awalin Tebag, who,
according to the letter, was arrested in his house, by
policemen, on June 4, 1958. Capt. Sarrosa took
possession of this letter in the course of his
aforementioned investigation.
3. Exhibits G, G-1, G-2 and G-3 — These are the
transcript of the testimony of Tebag’s mother, before the
City Fiscal of Basilan City, when she asked an autopsy
of the body of her son.
4. Exhibits J to V — Consisting of the following, namely:
a sketch of the sub-station; pictures of several huts
therein, including their relative positions and distances; a
picture depicting how the body of Tebag was taken from
a camarin in the sub-station; a picture showing how
Patrolman Hasbi was shot by a companion, at his
request; and a picture, Exhibit T, demonstrating how
Mayor Brown allegedly gave the Japanese rifle, Exhibit
Y, to Hasbi, to be planted beside Tebag’s body.
Although referred to by Yakan Carnain, Arit, Lianson,
Kona Amenola, and Asidin, in the course of their
testimony as witnesses for the prosecution, these
exhibits were not admitted in evidence, which were
presented to show how they were able to observe the
movements in the sub-station, the same being quite
small.
5. Exhibits X (a "barong") and X-1 (a scabbard) —
Amenola said that these effects were given to him by
Mayor Brown in the latter’s office, and that he then saw
therein the Japanese rifle, Exhibit Y, which was later
placed beside the dead body of Awalin Tebag.
6. Exhibits DD, DD-1, FF, JJ., KK and LL — These show
that on April 28, 1958, Yakan Kallapattoh and Fernandez
(Pilnandiz) executed affidavits admitting participation in a
given robbery; that an information therefor (Exh. KK)
was filed against them on May 2, 1958, with the
municipal court of Basilan City (Criminal Case No.
1774); and that, in compliance with warrants for their
arrest then issued, they were apprehended and detained
in the sub-station, thus corroborating the testimony of
prosecution witness Yakans Amenola, Carnain Asidin
and Arip to the effect that Kallapattoh and Fernandez
(Pilnandiz) were, together with them, in the
aforementioned sub-station, when Tebag was
maltreated and died therein, on June 4, 1958, as well as
confirming Pollisco’s statement, Exhibit TT-18, before
the City Fiscal of Basilan City, on June 21, 1958,
admitting that Fernandez was in the sub-station on June
5, 1958, on account of the warrant of arrest adverted to.
Through the exhibits in question the prosecution sought,
also, to bolster up it theory that Kallapattoh and
Fernandez disappeared from the sub-station after
Tebag’s death, because the main respondents herein
illegally released them to prevent them from revealing
the circumstances surrounding said event.
7. Exhibits II, II-1, and MM — These are sketches of a
human body and pictures purporting to show the points
of entrance, as well as of exit, of two (2) bullet wounds
found on the body of Tebag. Respondent Judge rejected
these exhibits and did not allow Dr. Rosalino Reyes,
Chief of the Medico-Legal Section of the National
Bureau of Investigation, to answer questions asked by
the prosecution, to establish that the trajectories of said
bullet wounds were parallel to each other, which, the
prosecution claims, would have been impossible had
Tebag been alive when he sustained said wounds.
8. Respondent Judge sustained, also, the objections to
certain questions propounded to said Dr. Reyes, to show
that the injuries sustained by Tebag in the large
intestines must have been inflicted when Tebag was
dead already, and did not allow Dr. Reyes to draw lines
on Exhibits II and MM, indicating the connection
between the points of entrance and those of exit of said
wounds.
9. Exhibits Z, Z-1, Z-2 — These are records of the office
of the City Fiscal of Basilan City showing that the
Japanese rifle, Exhibit Y, two rounds of ammunitions and
Page 2 of 168
one empty shell were received by said Office from the
Police Department of Basilan City on June 17, 1958.
These exhibits were presented to show that said rifle
tallies with the description thereof given by prosecution
witness Kona Amenola, in his affidavit, dated June 14,
1958, when said weapon was still in the possession of
respondent Pollisco, and, hence, to establish Amenola’s
veracity.
Likewise, the following rebuttal evidence for the
prosecution were rejected by respondent Judge,
viz:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
1. Exhibits OO to OO-8 — These are daily records of
events of the police department, Lamitan District,
Basilan City, including the Tipo- Tipo region. They do not
mention the killing therein, by the police patrol, of any
outlaw on June 5, 1958, thereby contradicting the
reports (Exhs. 12 and 12-A) of respondent Pollisco and
Hasbi about it. Respondent Judge did not allow the
record clerk of the City Fiscal’s office to identify said
exhibits, upon the ground that it was too late to present
him although when the exhibits were marked by the
prosecution it reserved the right to identify them as part
of official records.
2. Exhibits PP, QQ to QQ-3 — Respondent Pollisco had
testified that on June 4, 1958, Hadji Aisa inquired about
one Awalin; that he told Aisa that Awalin was taken by
Mayor Brown to the seat of the city government; and that
he (Pollisco) suggested that Datu Unding be advised not
to worry, because there was no evidence against Awalin.
To impeach the veracity of Pollisco, the prosecution
presented the exhibits under consideration, for the same
show that one Dong Awalin (who is different from Awalin
Tebag) was apprehended on May 27, 1958, and
released on bail on June 23, 1958; that Pollisco could
not have truthfully informed Aisa on June 4, 1958, what
Dong Awalin had been taken by Mayor Brown to the
seat of the city government and that there was no
evidence against him; for he was then a detention
prisoner; and that Pollisco could not have had in mind,
therefore, said Dong Awalin as the Awalin about whom
Aisa had inquired. Indeed, Exhibits TT-13 to TT-16 show
that, testifying before the City Fiscal, respondent Pollisco
said that he twice ordered Patrolman Lacerna on June 4,
1958, to bring Awalin Tebag to him (Pollisco) for
investigation.
3. Exhibits SS to SS-7 — These are the testimonies
before the City Fiscal, of defense witness Mohammad
Sali who, on cross examination by the prosecution,
denied having given it. Thus the predicate thereof was
established by the prosecution which sought thereby to
impeach Sali’s veracity.
4. Exhibits TT, TT-1 to TT-25 — These are the
testimonies, before the City Fiscal of the main
respondents herein, who gave a different story before
respondent Judge. The prosecution thus sought to
impeach their veracity as witnesses in their own behalf,
after laying down the predicate in the course of their
cross examination.
5. Exhibits UU, UU-1 to UU-3 — These are sworn
statements made by defendant Hasbi before the City
Fiscal. They were presented in rebuttal, after laying
down the predicate, to impeach his testimony in court.
6. Exhibits RR, RR-1, XX and XX-1 — With these
exhibits the prosecution tried to rebut Pollisco’s
testimony to the effect that prosecution witness Lianson
Arip had a grudge against him, he (Pollisco) having
charged him with theft in the City Fiscal’s Office. It
appears from said exhibits that Arip’s affidavit,
implicating Pollisco, was dated June 8, 1958, whereas
Pollisco’s affidavit, charging Arip with theft, was dated
June 20, 1958, so that said statement of Arip could not
have been influenced by Pollisco’s subsequent act.
In contrast with the severe and rigorous policy used by
respondent Judge in dealing with the aforementioned
evidence for the prosecution, petitioner herein cites the
liberality with which the lower court admitted, as
evidence for the defense, records of supposed
achievements of the Tipo-Tipo sub-station (Exhibits 9 to
9-G, 10 to 10-I, 17 to 17-C, 19 to 19-A, 20 to 20-I, 21
and 22), a congratulatory communication (Exh. 24), and
a letter of commendation to a peace officer assigned
thereto (Exh. 7), including an article in the Philippine
Free Press (Exhs. 23 and 23 A).
Upon a review of the record, we are fully satisfied that
the lower court had, not only erred, but, also, committed
a grave abuse of discretion in issuing the resolutions
complained of, in rejecting the aforementioned direct and
rebuttal evidence for the prosecution, and in not
permitting the same to propound the questions already
adverted to. It is obvious to us that said direct and
rebuttal evidence, as well as the aforementioned
questions, are relevant to the issues involved in Criminal
Case No. 672. Although it is not possible to determine
with precision, at this stage of the proceedings, how far
said exhibits may affect the outcome of that case, it is
elemental that all parties therein are entitled to a
reasonable opportunity to establish their respective
pretense. In this connection it should be noted that, in
the light of the allegations of the amended information in
said case and of the records before us, the issue of the
guilt or innocence of the accused therein is bound to
hinge heavily upon the veracity of the opposing
witnesses and the weight attached to their respective
testimony. Hence, the parties should be allowed a
certain latitude in the presentation of their evidence lest
they may be so hampered that the ends of justice may
eventually be defeated or appear to be defeated. The
danger of leading to such result must be avoided,
particularly in cases of the nature, importance and
significance of the one under consideration.
Page 3 of 168
With respect to the question whether or not Senator
Roseller Lim may appear as counsel for the main
respondents herein, as defendants in said criminal case,
the Constitution provides that no Senator or Member of
the House of Representatives shall "appear as counsel .
. . in any criminal case wherein an officer or employee of
the Government is accused of an offense committed in
relation of his office . . . (Art. VI, Sec. 17, Const. of the
Phil.) . The issue, therefore, is whether the defendants in
Criminal case No. 672 are "accused of an offense
committed in relation" to their office.
Such is not the situation obtaining in the case at bar.
Wherefore, the rulings complained of are set aside and
reversed and respondent Judge is hereby enjoined to
admit the aforementioned direct and rebuttal evidence
for the prosecution, as well as to permit the formulation,
of the questions already referred to, with costs against
the respondents herein. It is so ordered.

A mere perusal of the amended information therein

readily elicits an affirmative answer. It is alleged in said
amended information that "Leroy S. Brown, City Mayor
of Basilan City, as such, has organized groups of police
patrol and civilian commandoes consisting of regular
policemen and . . . special policemen, appointed and
provided by him with pistols and high power guns" and
then "established a camp . . . at Tipo-Tipo," which is
under his "command, . . . supervision and control,"
where his codefendants were stationed, entertained
criminal complaints and conducted the corresponding
investigations, as well as assumed the authority to arrest
and detain persons without due process of law and
without bringing them to the proper court, and that, in
line with this set-up established by said Mayor of Basilan
City as such, and acting upon his orders, his
codefendants arrested and maltreated Awalin Tebag,
who died in consequence thereof.

It is apparent from these allegations that, although public

office is not an element of the crime of murder in
abstract, as committed by the main respondents herein,
according to the amended information, the offense
therein charged is intimately connected with their
respective offices and was perpetrated while they were
in the performance, though improper or irregular, of their
official functions. Indeed, they had no personal motive to
commit the crime and they would not have committed it
had they not held their aforesaid offices. The co-
defendants of respondent Leroy S. Brown, obeyed his
instructions because he was their superior officer, as
Mayor of Basilan City.

The case of Montillo v. Hilario and Crisologo, 90 Phil.,

49, relied upon by respondent Judge, in overruling the
objection of the prosecution to the appearance of
Senator Roseller Lim, is not in point, for, as stated in the
decision therein:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"From the allegations of the information it does not

appear that the official positions of the accused were
connected with the offense charged. In fact, the
attorneys for the prosecution stated that the motives for
the crimes were personal with political character. It does
not even appear, nor is there assertion, that the crimes
were committed by the defendants in line of duty or in
the performance of their official functions." (Italics
supplied.)
Page 4 of 168
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-62075 April 15, 1987
NATIVIDAD CORPUS, AURORA FONBUENA, JOSIE
PERALTA, CRESENCIA PADUA, DOMINADOR
BAUTISTA, LEOLA NEOG, EPIFANIO CASTILLEJOS
AND EDGAR CASTILLEJOS, petitioners,
vs.
TANODBAYAN OF THE PHILIPPINES, FISCAL JUAN
L. VILLANUEVA, JR., AND ESTEBAN
MANGASER, respondents.
Simplicio M. Sevilleja for respondent E. Mangaser.
RESOLUTION
CORTES, J.:
Petitioners Natividad Corpuz, Aurora Fonbuena, Josie
Peralta, Cresencia Padua, Dominador Bautista and
Leola Neog were members of the Citizens Election
Committee of Caba, La Union in the January 30, 1980
elections; petitioner Epifanio Castillejos was Director of
the Bureau of Domestic Trade and petitioner Edgar
Castillejos was then a candidate and later elected mayor
in the same election. Private respondent Esteban
Mangaser, an independent candidate for vice. mayor of
the same municipality sent a letter to President
Ferdinand E. Marcos charging the petitioners with
violation of the 1978 Election Code, specifically for
electioneering and/or campaigning inside the voting
centers during the election. On instruction from the
Commission on Elections (COMELEC) the Regional
Election Director of San Fernando, La Union, conducted
a formal investigation and on September 29, 1981
submitted its report recommending to the COMELEC the
dismissal of the complaint. On October 29, 1981, private
respondent Mangaser formally withdrew his charges
filed with the COMELEC stating his intention to refile it
with the Tanodbayan. On November 26, 1981 the
COMELEC dismissed the complaint for insufficiency of
evidence.
Subsequently the assistant provincial fiscal started a
preliminary investigation of a complaint filed by
Mangaser with the Tanodbayan against the same parties
and on the same charges previously dismissed by the
COMELEC. The COMELEC Legal Assistance Office
entered its appearance for the respondents (except
Director Epifanio Castillejos and Edgar Castillejos) and
moved for dismissal of the complaint. The motion was
denied. The TANODBAYAN asserting exclusive
authority to prosecute the case, stated in a letter to the
COMELEC Chairman that a lawyer of the COMELEC if
not properly deputized as a Tanodbayan prosecutor has
no authority to conduct preliminary investigations and
prosecute offenses committed by COMELEC officials in
relation to their office. (Rollo, p. 102) A motion for
reconsideration was denied. Hence, the present petition
for certiorari and preliminary injunction. This Court after
considering the pleadings filed and deliberating on the
issues raised considered the comment of the Solicitor
General an Answer to the petition and considered the
case submitted for decision.
In the landmark case of the De Jesus v. People (No. L-
61998, February 28, 1983, 120 SCRA 760) this Court
dealt with the following question of first impression
relative to the rival claim of jurisdiction over election
offenses committed by public officials:
Which of these entities have the power
to investigate, prosecute and try election
offenses committed by a public officer in
relation to his office — the Commission
on Elections and the Court of First
Instance (now the regional trial court) or
the Tanodbayan and the
Sandiganbayan?
This Court rejected the assertion that no tribunal other
than the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over offenses
committed by public officers and employees in relation to
their office, thus:
The grant to the COMELEC of the
power, among others, to enforce and
administer all laws relative to the
conduct of election and the concomittant
authority to investigate and prosecute
election offenses is not without
compelling reason. The evident
constitutional intendment in bestowing
this power to the COMELEC is to insure
the free, orderly and honest conduct of
elections, failure of which would result in
the frustration of the true will of the
people and make a mere Idle ceremony
of the sacred right and duty of every
qualified citizen to vote. To divest the
COMELEC of the authority to investigate
and prosecute offenses committed by
public officials in relation to their office
would thus seriously impair its
effectiveness in achieving this clear
constitutional mandate.
From a careful scrutiny of the
constitutional provisions relied upon by
the Sandiganbayan, We perceived
Page 5 of 168
 neither explicit nor implicit grant to it and
its prosecuting arm, the Tanodbayan, of
the authority to investigate, prosecute
and hear election offenses committed by
public officers in relation to their office
as contradistinguished from the clear
and categorical bestowal of said
authority and jurisdiction upon the
COMELEC and the courts of first
instance under Sections 182 and 184,
respectively, of the Election Code of
1978.

An examination of the provisions of the Constitution and

the Election Code of 1978 reveals the clear intention to
place in the COMELEC exclusive jurisdiction to
investigate and prosecute election offenses committed
by any person, whether private individual or public officer
or employee, and in the latter instance, irrespective of
whether the offense is committed in relation to his official
duties or not. In other words, it is the nature of the
offense and not the personality of the offender that
matters. As long as the offense is an election offense
jurisdiction over the same rests exclusively with the
COMELEC, in view of its all-embracing power over the
conduct of elections.

WHEREFORE, inasmuch as the charge of

electioneering filed against the petitioners had already
been dismissed by the COMELEC for insufficiency of
evidence, the petition is hereby granted and the
complaint filed by private respondent being investigated
anew by the Tanodbayan charging the petitioners with
the same election offense, DISMISSED.

SO ORDERED.

Page 6 of 168
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. Nos. 111771-77 November 9, 1993
ANTONIO L. SANCHEZ, petitioner,
vs.
The Honorable HARRIET O. DEMETRIOU (in her
capacity as Presiding Judge of Regional Trial Court,
NCR, Branch 70, Pasig), The Honorable FRANKLIN
DRILON (in his capacity as Secretary of Justice),
JOVENCITO R. ZUÑO, LEONARDO C. GUIYAB,
CARLOS L. DE LEON, RAMONCITO C. MISON,
REYNALDO J. LUGTU, and RODRIGO P. LORENZO,
the last six respondents in their official capacities as
members of the State Prosecutor's
Office), respondents.
Mario E. Ongkiko and Marciano P. Brion, Jr. for
petitioner.
The Solicitor General for respondents.
CRUZ, J.:
There is probably no more notorious person in the
country today than Mayor Antonio L. Sanchez of
Calauan, Laguna, who stands accused of an
unspeakable crime. On him, the verdict has already
been rendered by many outraged persons who would
immediately impose on him an angry sentence. Yet, for
all the prejudgments against him, he is under our
Constitution presumed innocent as long as the contrary
has not been proved. Like any other person accused of
an offense, he is entitled to the full and vigilant protection
of the Bill of Rights.
Sanchez has brought this petition to challenge the order
of the respondent judge denying his motion to quash the
informations for rape with homicide filed against him and
six other persons. We shall treat it as we would any
other suit filed by any litigant hoping to obtain a just and
impartial judgment from this Court.
The pertinent facts are as follows:
On July 28, 1993, the Presidential Anti-Crime
Commission requested the filing of appropriate charges
against several persons, including the petitioner, in
connection with the rape-slay of Mary Eileen Sarmenta
and the killing of Allan Gomez.
Acting on this request, the Panel of State Prosecutors of
the Department of Justice conducted a preliminary
investigation on August 9, 1993. Petitioner Sanchez was
not present but was represented by his counsel, Atty.
Marciano Brion, Jr.
On August 12, 1993, PNP Commander Rex Piad issued
an "invitation" to the petitioner requesting him to appear
for investigation at Camp Vicente Lim in Canlubang,
Laguna. It was served on Sanchez in the morning of
August 13,1993, and he was immediately taken to the
said camp.
At a confrontation that same day, Sanchez was
positively identified by Aurelio Centeno, and SPO III
Vivencio Malabanan, who both executed confessions
implicating him as a principal in the rape-slay of
Sarmenta and the killing of Gomez. The petitioner was
then placed on "arrest status" and taken to the
Department of Justice in Manila.
The respondent prosecutors immediately conducted an
inquest upon his arrival, with Atty. Salvador Panelo as
his counsel.
After the hearing, a warrant of arrest was served on
Sanchez. This warrant was issued on August 13, 1993,
by Judge Enrico A. Lanzanas of the Regional Trial Court
of Manila, Branch 7, in connection with Criminal Cases
Nos. 93-124634 to 93-124637 for violation of Section 8,
in relation to Section 1, of R.A. No. 6713. Sanchez was
forthwith taken to the CIS Detention Center, Camp
Crame, where he remains confined.
On August 16, 1993, the respondent prosecutors filed
with the Regional Trial Court of Calamba, Laguna, seven
informations charging Antonio L. Sanchez, Luis
Corcolon, Rogelio Corcolon, Pepito Kawit, Baldwin
Brion, Jr., George Medialdea and Zoilo Ama with the
rape and killing of Mary Eileen Sarmenta.
On August 26, 1993, Judge Eustaquio P. Sto. Domingo
of that court issued a warrant for the arrest of all the
accused, including the petitioner, in connection with the
said crime.
The respondent Secretary of Justice subsequently
expressed his apprehension that the trial of the said
cases might result in a miscarriage of justice because of
the tense and partisan atmosphere in Laguna in favor of
the petitioner and the relationship of an employee, in the
trial court with one of the accused. This Court thereupon
ordered the transfer of the venue of the seven cases to
Pasig, Metro Manila, where they were raffled to
respondent Judge Harriet Demetriou.
Page 7 of 168
On September 10, 1993, the seven informations were Q. So far, there are no
amended to include the killing of Allan Gomez as an other statements.
aggravating circumstance.
A. If there is none then,
On that same date, the petitioner filed a motion to quash we will not submit any
the informations substantially on the grounds now raised counter-affidavit
in this petition. On September 13, 1993, after oral because we believe
arguments, the respondent judge denied the motion. there is nothing to rebut
Sanchez then filed with this Court the instant petition or countermand with all
for certiorari and prohibition with prayer for a temporary these statements.
restraining order/writ of injunction.
Q. So, you are waiving
The petitioner argues that the seven informations filed your submission of
against him should be quashed because: 1) he was counter-affidavit?
denied the right to present evidence at the preliminary
investigation; 2) only the Ombudsman had the A. Yes, your honor,
competence to conduct the investigation; 3) his unless there are other
warrantless arrest is illegal and the court has therefore witnesses who will
not acquired jurisdiction over him, 4) he is being charged come up soon. 3
with seven homicides arising from the death of only two
persons; 5) the informations are discriminatory because
Nonetheless, the head of the Panel of Prosecutors,
they do not include Teofilo Alqueza and Edgardo
respondent Jovencito Zuño, told Atty. Brion that he could
Lavadia; and 6) as a public officer, he can be tried for
still file a counter-affidavit up to August 27, 1993. No
the offense only by the Sandiganbayan. such counter-affidavit was filed.

The respondents submitted a Comment on the petition,

During the hearing on August 1'3, 1993, respondent
to which we required a Reply from the petitioner within a
Zuño furnished the petitioner's counsel, this time Atty.
non-extendible period of five days.1 The Reply was filed Salvador Panelo, with copies of the sworn statements of
five days late. 2 The Court may consider his non- Centeno and Malabanan, and told him he could submit
compliance an implied admission of the respondents'
counter-affidavits on or before August 27, 1993. The
arguments or a loss of interest in prosecuting his
following exchange ensued:
petition, which is a ground for its dismissal.
Nevertheless, we shall disregard this procedural lapse
and proceed to discuss his petition on the basis of the ACSP Zuño:
arguments before us.
For the record, we are
The Preliminary Investigation. furnishing to you the
sworn statement of
witness Aurelio Centeno
The records of the hearings held on August 9 and 13, y Roxas and the sworn
1993, belie the petitioner's contention that he was not
statement of SPO3
accorded the right to present counter-affidavits.
Vivencio Malabanan y
Angeles.
During the preliminary investigation on August 9, 1993,
the petitioner's counsel, Atty. Marciano Brion, manifested Do I understand from
that his client was waiving the presentation of a counter-
you that you are again
affidavit, thus:
waiving the submission
of counter-affidavit?
Atty. Brion, Jr.:
Atty. Panelo:
[W]e manifest that after reviewing them
there is nothing to rebut or countermand
Yes.
all these statements as far as Mayor
Sanchez is concerned, We are not going
to submit any counter-affidavit. ACSP Zuño:

ACSP Zuño to Atty. Brion: So, insofar as the

respondent, Mayor
Antonio Sanchez is
xxx xxx xxx
Page 8 of 168
 concerned, this case is
submitted for
resolution. 4
On the other hand, there is no support for the petitioner's
subsequent manifestation that his counsel, Atty. Brion,
was not notified of the inquest held on August 13, 1993,
and that he was not furnished with the affidavits sworn to
on that date by Vivencio Malabanan and Aurelio
Centeno, or with their supplemental affidavits dated
August 15, 1993. Moreover, the above-quoted excerpt
shows that the petitioner's counsel at the hearing held on
August 13, 1993, was not Atty. Brion but Atty. Panelo.
The petitioner was present at that hearing and he never
disowned Atty. Panelo as his counsel. During the entire
proceedings, he remained quiet and let this counsel
speak and argue on his behalf. It was only in his tardy
Reply that he has suddenly bestirred himself and would
now question his representation by this lawyer as
unauthorized and inofficious.
Section 3, Paragraph (d), Rule 112 of the Rules of Court,
provides that if the respondent cannot be subpoenaed
or, if subpoenaed, does not submit counter-affidavits, the
investigating officer shall base his resolution on the
evidence presented by the complainant.
Just as the accused may renounce the right to be
present at the preliminary investigation5, so may he
waive the right to present counter-affidavits or any other
evidence in his defense.
At any rate, it is settled that the absence of a preliminary
investigation does not impair the validity of the
information or otherwise render the same defective and
neither does it affect the jurisdiction of the court over the
case or constitute a ground for quashing the
information.6
If no preliminary investigation has been held, or if it is
flawed, the trial court may, on motion of the accused,
order an investigation or reinvestigation and hold the
proceedings in the criminal case in abeyance. 7 In the
case at bar, however, the respondent judge saw no
reason or need for such a step. Finding no arbitrariness
in her factual conclusions, we shall defer to her
judgment.
Jurisdiction of the Ombudsman
Invoking the case of Deloso v. Domingo, 8 the petitioner
submits that the proceedings conducted by the
Department of Justice are null and void because it had
no jurisdiction over the case. His claim is that it is the
Office of the Ombudsman that is vested with the power
to conduct the investigation of all cases involving public
officers like him, as the municipal mayor of Calauan,
Laguna.
The Ombudsman is indeed empowered under Section
15, paragraph (1) of R.A. 6770 to investigate and
prosecute, any illegal act or omission of any public
official. However, as we held only two years ago in the
case of Aguinaldo v. Domagas, 9 this authority "is not an
exclusive authority but rather a shared or concurrent
authority in. respect of the offense charged."
Petitioners finally assert that the
information and amended information
filed in this case needed the approval of
the Ombudsman. It is not disputed that
the information and amended
information here did not have the
approval of the Ombudsman. However,
we do not believe that such approval
was necessary at all. In Deloso v.
Domingo, 191 SCRA. 545 (1990), the
Court held that the Ombudsman has
authority to investigate charges of illegal
or omissions on the part of any public
official, i.e., any crime imputed to a
public official. It must, however, be
pointed out that the authority of the
Ombudsman to investigate "any [illegal]
act or omission of any public official"
(191 SCRA at 550)
is not an exclusiveauthority but rather a
shared or concurrent authority in respect
of the offense here charged, i.e., the
crime of sedition. Thus, the non-
involvement of the office of the
Ombudsman in the present case does
not have any adverse legal
consequence upon the authority the
panel of prosecutors to file and
prosecute the information or amended
information.
In fact, other investigatory agencies, of the government
such as the Department of Justice, in connection with
the charge of sedition, 10 and the Presidential
Commission on Good Government, in ill-gotten wealth
cases,11 may conduct the investigation,
The Arrest
Was petitioner Sanchez arrested on August 13, 1993?
"Arrest" is defined under Section 1, Rule 113 of the
Rules of Court as the taking of a person into custody in
order that he may be bound to answer for the
commission of an offense. Under Section 2 of the same
Rule, an arrest is effected by an actual restraint of the
person to be arrested or by his voluntary submission to
the custody of the person making the arrest.
Page 9 of 168
Application of actual force, manual touching of the body,
physical restraint or a formal declaration of arrest is not,
required. It is enough that there be an intent on the part
of one of the parties to arrest the other and an intent
onthe part of the other to submit, under the belief and
impression that submission is necessary. 12
The petitioner was taken to Camp Vicente Lim,
Canlubang, Laguna, by virtue of a letter-invitation issued
by PNP Commander Rex Piad requesting him to appear
at the said camp for investigation.
In Babst v. National Intelligence Board 13 this Court
declared:
Be that as it may, it is not idle to note
that ordinarily, an invitation to attend a
hearing and answer some questions,
which the person invited may heed or
refuse at his pleasure, is not illegal or
constitutionally objectionable. Under
certain circumstances, however, such
an invitation can easily assume a
different appearance. Thus, where the
invitation comes from a powerful group
composed predominantly of ranking
military officers issued at a time when
the country has just emerged from
martial rule and when the suspension of
the privilege of the writ of habeas
corpus has not entirely been lifted,
and the designated interrogation site is a
military camp, the same can be easily
taken, not as a strictly voluntary
invitation which it purports to be, but as
an authoritative command which one
can only defy at his peril. . . . (Emphasis
supplied)
In the case at bar, the invitation came from a high-
ranking military official and the investigation of Sanchez
was to be made at a military camp. Although in the guise
of a request, it was obviously a command or an order of
arrest that the petitioner could hardly he expected to
defy. In fact, apparently cowed by the "invitation," he
went without protest (and in informal clothes and slippers
only) with the officers who had come to fetch him.
It may not be amiss to observe that under R.A. No.
7438, the requisites of a "custodial investigation" are
applicable even to a person not formally arrested but
merely "invited" for questioning.
It should likewise be noted that at Camp Vicente Lim, the
petitioner was placed on "arrest status" after he was
pointed to by Centeno and Malabanan as the person
who first raped Mary Eileen Sarmenta. Respondent
Zuño himself acknowledged during the August 13, 1993
hearing that, on the basis of the sworn statements of the
two state witnesses, petitioner had been "arrested."
We agree with the petitioner that his arrest did not come
under Section 5, Rule 113 of the Rules of Court,
providing as follows:
Sec. 5. Arrest without warrant; when
lawful. — A peace officer or a private
person may, without a warrant, arrest a
person:
(a) When, in his presence, the person to
be arrested has committed, is actually
committing, or is attempting to commit
an offense;
(b) When an offense has in fact just
been committed and he has personal
knowledge of facts indicating that the
person to be arrested has committed it;
and
(c) When the person to be arrested is a
prisoner who has escapes from a penal
establishment or place where he is
serving final judgment or temporarily
confined while his case is pending, or
has escaped while being transferred
from one confinement to another.
It is not denied that the arresting officers were not
present when the petitioner allegedly participated in the
killing of Allan Gomez and the rape-slay of Mary Eileen
Sarmenta. Neither did they have any personal
knowledge that the petitioner was responsible therefor
because the basis of the arrest was the sworn
statements of Centeno and Malabanan. Moreover, as
the rape and killing of Sarmenta allegedly took place on
June 28-June 29, 1993, or forty-six days before the date
of the arrest, it cannot be said that the offense had "in
fact just been committed" when the petitioner was
arrested.
The original warrantless arrest of the petitioner was
doubtless illegal. Nevertheless, the Regional Trial Court
lawfully acquired jurisdiction over the person of the
petitioner by virtue of the warrant of arrest it issued on
August 26, 1993 against him and the other accused in
connection with the rape-slay cases. It was belated, to
be sure, but it was nonetheless legal.
Even on the assumption that no warrant was issued at
all, we find that the trial court still lawfully acquired
jurisdiction over the person of the petitioner. The rule is
that if the accused objects to the jurisdiction of the court
over his person, he may move to quash the information,
but only on that ground. If, as in this case, the accused
Page 10 of 168
raises other grounds in the motion to quash, he is
deemed to have waived that objection and to have
submitted his person to the jurisdiction of that court.14
The Court notes that on August 13, 1993, after the
petitioner was unlawfully arrested, Judge Lanzanas
issued a warrant of arrest against Antonio L. Sanchez in
connection with Criminal Cases Nos. 93-124634 to 93-
124637 for violation of R.A No. 6713. 15 Pending the
issuance of the warrant of arrest for the rape-slay cases,
this first warrant served as the initial justification for his
detention.
The Court also adverts to its uniform ruling that the filing
of charges, and the issuance of the corresponding
warrant of arrest, against a person invalidly detained will
cure the defect of that detention or at least deny him the
right to be released because of such defect. * Applicable
by analogy to the case at bar is Rule 102 Section 4 of
the Rules of Court that:
Sec, 4. When writ is not allowed or
discharge authorized. — If it appears
that the person alleged to be restrained
of his liberty is in the custody of an
officer under process issued by a court
or judge or by virtue of a judgment or
order of a court of record, and that the
court or judge had jurisdiction to issue
the process, render the judgment, or
make the order, the writ shall not be
allowed; or if the jurisdiction appears
after the writ is allowed, the person shall
not be discharged by reason of any
informality or defect in the process,
judgment, or order. Nor shall, anything
in this rule be held to authorize the
discharge of a person charged with or
convicted of an offense in the
Philippines or of a person suffering
imprisonment under lawful judgment.
In one case, 16 the petitioner, sued on habeas corpus on
the ground that she had been arrested by virtue of a
John Doe warrant. In their return, the respondents
declared that a new warrant specifically naming her had
been issued, thus validating her detention. While
frowning at the tactics of the respondents, the Court
said:
The, case has, indeed, become moot
and academic inasmuch as the new
warrant of arrest complies with the
requirements of the Constitution and the
Rules of Court regarding the particular
description of the person to be arrested.
While the first warrant was
unquestionably void, being a general
warrant, release of the petitioner for that
reason will be a futile act as it will be
followed by her immediate re-arrest
pursuant to the new and valid warrant,
returning her to the same prison she will
just have left. This Court will not
participate in such a meaningless
charade.
The same doctrine has been consistently followed by the
Court, 17 more recently in the Umil case. 18
The Informations
The petitioner submits that the seven informations
charging seven separate homicides are absurd because
the two victims in these cases could not have died seven
times.
This argument was correctly refuted by the Solicitor
General in this wise:
Thus, where there are two or more
offenders who commit rape, the
homicide committed on the occasion or
by reason of each rape, must be
deemed as a constituent of the special
complex crime of rape with homicide.
Therefore, there will be as many crimes
of rape with homicide as there are rapes
committed.
In effect, the presence of homicide
qualifies the crime of rape, thereby
raising its penalty to the highest degree.
Thus, homicide committed on the
occasion or by reason of rape, loses its
character as an independent offense,
but assumes a new character, and
functions like a qualifying circumstance.
However,by fiction of law, it merged with
rape to constitute an constituent element
of a special complex crime of rape with
homicide with a specific penalty which is
in the highest degree, i.e. death
(reduced to reclusion perpetua with the
suspension of the application of the
death penalty by the Constitution).
It is clearly provided in Rule 110 of the Rules of Court
that:
Sec. 13. Duplicity of offense. A
complaint or information must charge
but one offense, except only in those
cases in which existing laws prescribe a
simple punishment for various offenses.
Page 11 of 168
Rape with homicide comes within the exception under The possible exception is where there is an
R.A. 2632 and R.A. 4111, amending the Revised Penal unmistakable showing of a grave abuse of discretion that
Code. will justify judicial intrusion into the precincts of the
executive. But in such a case the proper remedy to call
The petitioner and his six co-accused are not charged for such exception is a petition
with only one rape committed by him in conspiracy with for mandamus, not certiorari or prohibition.22 Moreover,
the other six. Each one of the seven accused is charged before resorting to this relief, the party seeking the
with having himself raped Sarmenta instead of simply inclusion of another person as a co-accused in the same
helping Sanchez in committing only one rape. In other case must first avail itself of other adequate remedies
words, the allegation of the prosecution is that the girl such as the filing of a motion for such inclusion.23
was raped seven times, with each of the seven accused
taking turns in abusing her with the assistance of the At any rate, it is a preposterous contention that because
other six. Afterwards, their lust satisfied, all seven of no charges have been filed against Alqueza and
them decided to kill and thus silence Sarmenta. Lavadia, the charges against the petitioner and his co-
accused should also be dropped.
Every one of the seven accused is being charged
separately for actually raping Sarmenta and later killing Jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan
her instead of merely assisting the petitioner in raping
and then slaying her. The separate informations filed The petitioner argued earlier that since most of the
against each of them allege that each of the seven accused were incumbent public officials or employees at
successive rapes is complexed by the subsequent the time of the alleged commission of the crimes, the
slaying of Sarmenta and aggravated by the killing of cases against them should come under the jurisdiction of
Allan Gomez by her seven attackers. The separate the Sandiganbayan and not of the regular courts. This
rapes were committed in succession by the seven contention was withdrawn in his Reply but we shall
accused, culminating in the slaying of Sarmenta. discuss it just the same for the guidance of all those
concerned.
It is of course absurd to suggest that Mary Eileen
Sarmenta and Allan Gomez were killed seven times, but Section 4, paragraph (a) of P.D. No, 1606, as amended
the informations do not make such a suggestion. It is the by P.D. No.1861, provides:
petitioner who does so and is thus hoist by his own
petard. Sec. 4. Jurisdiction. — The
Sandiganbayan shall exercise:
The Alleged Discrimination
a) Exclusive original jurisdiction in all
The charge of discrimination against the petitioner cases involving:
because of the non-inclusion of Teofilo Alqueza and
Edgardo Lavadia in the informations must also be
(1) Violations of
dismissed. Republic Act No. 3019,
as amended, otherwise
While the prosecuting officer is required by law to charge known as the Anti-Graft
all those who in his opinion, appear to be guilty, he and Corrupt Practices
nevertheless cannot be compelled to include in the Act, Republic Act No.
information a person against whom he believes no 1379, and Chapter II,
sufficient evidence of guilt exists. 19 The appreciation of Section 2, Title VII of
the evidence involves the use of discretion on the part of the Revised Penal
the prosecutor, and we do not find in the case at bar a Code:
clear showing by the petitioner of a grave abuse of such
discretion. 20
(2) Other offenses or
felonies committed by
The decision of the prosecutor may be reversed or public officers and
modified by the Secretary of Justice or in special cases employees in relation to
by the President of the Philippines. 21 But even this Court their office, including
cannot order the prosecution of a person against whom those employed in
the prosecutor does not find sufficient evidence to government-owned or
support at least a prima facie case. The courts try and controlled corporations,
absolve or convict the accused but as a rule have no whether simple or
part in the initial decision to prosecute him. complexed with other
crimes, where the
Page 12 of 168
 penalty prescribed by
law is higher
than prision
correccional or
imprisonment for six (6)
years, or a fine of
P6,000.00. . . .
(Emphasis supplied)
The crime of rape with homicide with which the petitioner
stands charged obviously does not fall under paragraph
(1), which deals with graft and corruption cases. Neither
is it covered by paragraph (2) because it is not an
offense committed in relation to the office of the
petitioner.
In Montilla v, Hilario,24 this Court described the "offense
committed in relation to the office" as follows:
[T]he relation between the crime and the
office contemplated by the Constitution
is, in our opinion, direct and not
accidental. To fall into the intent of the
Constitution, the relation has to be such
that, in the legal sense, the offense
cannot exist without the office. In other
words, the office must be a constituent
element of the crime as defined in the
statute, such as, for instance, the crimes
defined and punished in Chapter Two to
Six, Title Seven, of the Revised Penal
Code.
Public office is not of the essence of
murder. The taking of human life is
either murder or homicide whether done
by a private citizen or public servant,
and the penalty is the same except
when the perpetrator. being a public
functionary took advantage of his office,
as alleged in this case, in which event
the penalty is increased.
But the use or abuse of office does not
adhere to the crime as an element; and
even as an aggravating circumstance,
its materiality arises not from the
allegations but on the proof, not from the
fact that the criminals are public officials
but from the manner of the commission
of the crime
There is no direct relation between the commission of
the crime of rape with homicide and the petitioner's office
as municipal mayor because public office is not an
essential element of the crime charged. The offense can
stand independently of the office. Moreover, it is not
even alleged in the information that the commission of
the crime charged was intimately connected with the
performance of the petitioner's official functions to make
it fall under the exception laid down in People v.
Montejo. 25
In that case, a city mayor and several detectives were
charged with murder for the death of a suspect as a
result of a "third degree" investigation held at a police
substation. The appearance of a senator as their
counsel was questioned by the prosecution on the
ground that he was inhibited by the Constitution from
representing them because they were accused of an
offense committed in relation to their office. The Court
agreed. It held that even if their position was not an
essential ingredient of the offense, there was
nevertheless an intimate connection between the office
and the offense, as alleged in the information, that
brought it within the definition of an offense "committed
in relation to the public office."
As Chief Justice Concepcion said:
It is apparent from these allegations
that, although public office is not an
element of the crime of murder in
abstract, as committed by the main
respondents herein, according to the
amended information, the offense
therein charged is intimately
connected with their respective offices
and was perpetrated while they were in
the performance, though improper or
irregular, of their official functions.
Indeed they had no personal motive to
commit the crime and they would not
have committed it had they not held their
aforesaid offices. The co-defendants of
respondent Leroy S. Brown, obeyed his
instructions because he was their
superior officer, as Mayor of Basilan
City. (Emphasis supplied).
We have read the informations in the case at bar and
find no allegation therein that the crime of rape with
homicide imputed to the petitioner was connected with
the discharge of his functions as municipal mayor or that
there is an "intimate connection" between the offense
and his office. It follows that the said crime, being an
ordinary offense, is triable by the regular courts and not
the Sandiganbayan.
Conclusion
As above demonstrated, all of the grounds invoked by
the petitioner are not supported by the facts and the
applicable law and jurisprudence. They must, therefore,
all be rejected. In consequence, the respondent judge,
who has started the trial of the criminal cases against the
petitioner and his co-accused, may proceed therewith
without further hindrance.
Page 13 of 168
It remains to stress that the decision we make today is
not a decision on the merits of the criminal cases being
tried below. These will have to be decided by the
respondent judge in accordance with the evidence that is
still being received. At this time, there is yet no basis for
judgment, only uninformed conjecture. The Court will
caution against such irrelevant public speculations as
they can be based only on imperfect knowledge if not
officious ignorance.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED. The

respondent judge is DIRECTED to continue with the trial
of Criminal Cases Nos. 101141, 101142, 101143,
101144, 101145, 101146 and 101147 and to decide
them with deliberate dispatch.

SO ORDERED.

Page 14 of 168
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. 71163-65 November 9, 1990
CARLITO P. BONDOC, petitioner,
vs.
THE HONORABLE SANDIGANBAYAN AND THE
HONORABLE TANODBAYAN, respondents.
Lorenzo G. Timbol for petitioner.
NARVASA, J.:
Section 4 (paragraph 3) of Presidential Decree No.
1606, as amended, provides in part that 1 —
In case private individuals are charged
as co-principals, accomplices or
accessories with public officers or
employees, including those employed in
government-owned or controlled
corporations, they should be tried jointly
with said public officers or employees.
Whether or not compliance with this requirement is
mandatory in every instance, and is indeed so essential
as to cause the Sandiganbayan to lose jurisdiction over
a specific criminal case in the event of its non-fulfillment,
is the main issue presented by the special civil action
of certiorari at bar. The issue is raised in the context of
the undisputed facts hereunder narrated.
Two (2) employees of the Central Bank — Manuel
Valentino and Jesus Estacio — and nine (9) private
individuals, were charged with several felonies of estafa
thru falsification of public documents in three (3)
separate informations filed by the Tanodbayan with the
Sandiganbayan on April 15, 1982. The actions were
docketed as Criminal Cases Numbered 5949 to 5951.
They were assigned to the Second Division of the
Sandiganbayan.
Before the prosecution rested its case, the Tanodbayan
filed with the Sandiganbayan on August 23, 1984,
another set of three (3) indictments, this time against
Carlito P. Bondoc (Assistant Manager of the Greenhills
Branch of CITIBANK) and Rogelio Vicente, also a
private individual, charging them with the same crimes
involved in Cases No. 5949 to 5951 as principals by
indispensable cooperation. The actions against Bondoc
and Vicente were docketed as Criminal Cases
Numbered 9349 to 9351. They were assigned to the
Third Division of the Sandiganbayan.
Bondoc moved to quash the informations on January 3,
1985 on the basic theory that as a private individual
charged as co-principal with government employees, he
should be tried jointly with the latter pursuant to Section
4 (paragraph 3) of PD 1606, as amended, supra; hence,
the separate proceedings commenced against him were
invalid, for lack of jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan over
the offenses and his person.
The Third Division denied Bondoc's motion to quash, by
Resolution dated February 22, 1985. 2 It ruled that (a)
the joint trial of private individuals and public employees
charged as co-principals, dealt with in the cited provision
of law, is not a jurisdictional requirement; (b) Bondoc's
theory would practically make the Court's "jurisdiction
over a private individual charged as co-principal,
accomplice or accessory with a public officer or
employee dependent upon such private individual" (as
by evading service of legal processes until "joint trial is
no longer feasible"); and (c) it is the intention of the law,
manifested in the same Section 4, "to avert split
jurisdiction (and) thus avoid multiplicity of suits."
Bondoc moved for reconsideration on March 4, 1985.
His motion was denied by Resolution dated March 28,
1985. However, in order to obviate his objection to a
separate trial, which was the principal basis of his motion
to quash, the Third Division, in the same resolution,
referred Bondoc's cases (No. 9349 to 9351) to the
Second Division for consolidation with Cases Numbered
5949 to 5951.3
But by that time, the trial of Criminal Cases No. 5949 to
5951 had been terminated. The Second Division thus
resolved, on June 4, 1985, 4 to deny the proposed
consolidation of the actions and to return Criminal Cases
No. 9349 to 9351 to the Third Division. In its Resolution,
the Second Division also made the following
observation, to wit:
In Our resolution dated April 9,1985, We
accepted the transfer of these cases
and directed the accused and counsel to
ascertain the advisability of having them
consolidated and jointly tried with
Criminal Cases Nos. 5949 to 5951
which have been previously ordered
reopened. However, at the hearing held
on April 1, 1985, counsel for accused
Rogelio G. Vicente manifested that there
is no possibility of the instant cases
being consolidated with Criminal Cases
Nos. 5949 to 5951 or the adoption of
prosecution's evidence adduced in said
cases, as well as the fact that said
Page 15 of 168
 accused has a pending motion for
reinvestigation with the Tanodbayan ...
On receiving the criminal cases back from the Second
Division, the Third Division set the cases for arraignment
and trial on August 1 and 2, 1985.
On June 26, 1985, Bondoc filed with this Court the
petition for certiorari and prohibition at bar.
He argues that the Sandiganbayan acted with grave
abuse of discretion in seeking to try him separately from
the Central Bank employees:
1. In accordance with the clear
phraseology of paragraph 3, Section 4,
PD 1606, it is required that he shall be
tried jointly with the government
employees involved in the same
offenses, namely: Manuel Valentino and
Jesus Estacio; the language is
mandatory, the requirement
jurisdictional.
2. Being mandatory and jurisdictional,
the provision should be given a strict
construction, citing American
authorities, 5 to the effect that if
mandatory provisions prescribed by law
are not followed, the proceedings to
winch they relate are illegal and void.
3. Since the Sandiganbayan is a special
court, with jurisdiction over special
cases which are removed from the
jurisdiction of regular courts; and since
the governing law allows only one
appeal from its judgments of conviction
and therefore the defendant's chances
of eventual acquittal is thereby
lessened, the law creating said
Sandiganbayan should be subject to
strict interpretation because in
derogation of general jurisdiction and of
rights of individuals. 6
4. In sum, before the Sandiganbayan
may lawfully try a private individual
under PD 1606, the following requisites
must be satisfied:
a) he must be charged
with a public
officer/employee, and
b) he must be tried
jointly.
Otherwise, ordinary courts should have
jurisdiction. Any other interpretation
would render the provision in question
'useless, meaningless and nugatory.
5. The Third Division itself recognized
the need for a joint trial when it referred
his cases to the Second Division for
consolidation.
6. Since a joint trial was then already
impossible, said mandatory and
jurisdictional provision can no longer be
complied with; therefore, the
Sandiganbayan cannot exercise
jurisdiction over the offense and the
person of the petitioner.
7. Under these circumstances, the
petitioner has a right to be tried by civil
courts where his chances of acquittal
are greater considering that therein,
there are at least two levels of appeal.
8. The prosecution should have
amended the informations in Criminal
Cases No. 5949 to 5951 to include
Bondoc as additional accused (this
being only an amendment in form); then
it could ask for suspension of the
proceedings, so the evidence can be re-
introduced as against Bondoc.
9. Finally, the only public employee
charged in Criminal Cases 5949-5951 is
janitor-messenger, Estacio. The other
Central Bank employee, Valentino, had
already been discharged as a state
witness. He (Bondoc) was being made
to stand trial in the Sandiganbayan
simply because an "errand boy" in the
Central Bank has also been accused of
some complicity in the crime.
The Solicitor General, for his part —
1) brands as absurd the petitioner's argument that the
Sandiganbayan may acquire jurisdiction only by a joint
trial, this being contrary to the rule that in criminal cases
jurisdiction of the person is acquired by his arrest (or
voluntary submission to the Court), and over the offense,
by the filing of the indictment; and
2) asserts that Section 4 (3), PD 1606 merely prescribes
the procedure when a private individual is charged with a
public officer or employee; once jurisdiction is acquired,
it is not lost by procedural error (Ramos, et al., v. CB, 41
SCRA 565; Dioquino v. Cruz, et al., 116 SCRA 451).
Page 16 of 168
Section 4 of Presidential Decree No. 1606 vests the
Sandigan-bayan with exclusive original jurisdiction over
specific crimes and, as the Sandiganbayan has pointed
out, supra, provides against split jurisdiction as regards
the civil liability arising from the crime. It declares that
the Sandiganbayan shall have—
Exclusive original jurisdiction in all cases
involving:
(1) Violations of Republic Act No. 3019,
as amended, otherwise known as the
Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act,
Republic Act No. 1379, and Chapter II,
Section 2, Title VII of the Revised Penal
Code;
(2) Other offenses or felonies committed
by public officers and employees in
relation to their office, including those
employed in government-owned or
controlled corporations, whether simple
or complexed with other crimes, where
the penalty prescribed by law is higher
than prision correccional or
imprisonment for six (6) years, or a fine
of P6,000.00.
It also declares that —
Any provision of law or the Rules of
Court to the contrary notwithstanding,
the criminal action and the
corresponding civil action for the
recovery of civil liability arising from the
offense charged shall at all times be
simultaneously instituted with, and jointly
determined in the same proceeding by
the Sandiganbayan or the appropriate
courts (also vested with jurisdiction over
crimes committed by public officers and
employees), the filing of the criminal
action being deemed to necessarily
carry with it the filing of the civil action,
and no right to reserve the filing of such
civil action separately from the criminal
action shall be recognized; Provided,
However, That where the civil action had
heretofore been filed separately but
judgment therein has not yet been
rendered, and the criminal case is
hereafter filed with the Sandiganbayan
or the appropriate court, said civil action
shall be transferred to the
Sandiganbayan or the appropriate court,
as the case may be, for consolidation
and joint determination with the criminal
action, otherwise the separate civil
action shall be considered abandoned.
Now, the crime with which Bondoc is charged as co-
principal by indispensable cooperation with the Central
Bank employees above mentioned (Valentino and
Estacio)—in each of the three (3) indictments against
him is the complex felony of estafa thru falsification of
public documents under Article 171 7 in relation to
Articles 315 8 and 48 9 of the Revised Penal Code.
The crimes are "offenses or felonies committed by public
officers and employees in relation to their office," in
confabulation and conspiracy with him (Bondoc) and
other private persons. The penalty prescribed by law for
each of the three offenses is higher than the penalty set
out in Section 4 of PD 1606 above cited, i.e., prision
correccionalor six years, or a fine of P6,000.00. 10 Each
offense is therefore within the exclusive original
jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan.
It is indisputable that the Sandiganbayan acquired
jurisdiction of the offenses charged in the informations
against Bondoc and his co-accused, based on the
nature of the crimes as described in the indictments and
the penalty prescribed therefor by law. Also
incontrovertible is that the Sandiganbayan acquired
jurisdiction of the persons of the accused through their
arrest by virtue of a warrant, or voluntary submission to
the Court's authority.
It is true that the law requires that Bondoc and Vicente,
as private individuals charged as co-principals with
public officers or employees, "be tried jointly with said
public officers or employees." Given the peculiar
circumstances of their cases, i.e., they (Bondoc and
Vicente) were not investigated and indicted until long
after the criminal proceedings against their co-principals
had commenced, and the latter's cases had already
been submitted for decision when Bondoc's and
Vicente's own cases came up for trial-the question that
now raises is whether or not the declaration of the
Sandiganbayan that it was no longer possible or legally
feasible to try them jointly with the government
employees accused of the same offenses, had the effect
of causing the Sandiganbayan to lose jurisdiction over
Bondoc's cases, and whether or not, as a consequence,
those cases became cognizable by the regular courts
and should be transferred thereto for trial and
adjudgment.
It must at once be evident that the seeming impossibility
of a joint trial cannot and does not alter the essential
nature of the crimes in question, as felonies perpetrated
by public officers or employees in confabulation with
private persons. It should be as obvious, too, that
assuming it is correct to construe the law in a strictly
literal sense, the indicated course of action would be to
insist on holding a joint trial regardless of whatever
circumstances may appear to make such a joint trial
inappropriate, inconvenient, unfeasible. Thus, for
instance, the cases in the Second Division, although
Page 17 of 168
already submitted for decision, should be reopened to correccional or imprisonment of six years, or a fine of
allow for the consolidation of Bondoc's cases with those P6,000.00, committed by government employees in
of the defendants therein, and the reception of evidence conspiracy with private persons, including Bondoc.
against and for Bondoc. Indeed, even in the extreme These crimes are within the exclusive, original
hypothesis of appeal having already been taken by jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan. They simply cannot
Bondoc's co-accused, the course of action dictated by a be taken cognizance of by the regular courts, apart from
literal construction of the provision on joint trial is the the fact that even if the cases could be so transferred, a
remand of the appealed case to the Sandiganbayan so joint trial would nonetheless not be possible.
that the joint trial may be conducted.
As to Bondoc's only other argument, that his cases
To construe the law in the manner indicated, however, should be transferred to the regular courts because he
would be unreasonable, if not absurd (what of the case, would there have two levels of appeal (i.e., the Court of
for instance, where the accused public officers or Appeals, and then the Supreme Court), unlike in the
employees have already been convicted and have Sandiganbayan where his appellate recourse is only
appealed, or are already serving sentence, or have been one, to the Supreme Court, it suffices to point out, as the
acquitted), and settled is the rule that courts should not Sandiganbayan has, that the matter has long since been
give a statute a meaning that would lead to laid to rest, in Nunez v. Sandiganbayan. 14
absurdities; 11 general terms of a statute should be so
limited in their application as precisely to avoid WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED for lack of merit,
absurdities, and it will always be presumed that the with costs against petitioner.
legislature intended exceptions to its language which
would avoid consequences of this character. 12 The
SO ORDERED.
provision in question should thus be read as requiring
that private individuals accused in the Sandiganbayan,
together with public officers or employees, must be tried
jointly with the latter unless the attendant circumstances
have made impossible or impracticable such a joint trial,
as in the cases at bar, in which event the trial of said
private persons may proceed separately from the public
officers or employees whose own trials have been
concluded.

Besides, there is nothing so sacrosanct or important

about a joint trial as to justify a radical deviation from
ordinary, orderly court processes in order to have it, or
as to affect the very jurisdiction of the Court required to
conduct it. The evidence of the State or of the accused
does not become weaker or stronger whether presented
at a joint or separate trial; the rights of the accused are
not enhanced or diluted by the character of a trial as joint
or separate; the procedure prescribed in either situation
is essentially the same. Indeed, it is a gauge of the
importance of a joint trial, in the eyes of trial attorneys
and of the law itself, that there are as many lawyers
moving for a separate trial as there are, for a joint trial,
and that courts are granted the discretion, in cases
where two or more accused are jointly charged with an
offense, to order separate trials instead of a joint trial, on
motion of the fiscal or any accused. 13

Furhermore, it is not legally possible to transfer Bondoc's

cases to the Regional Trial Court, for the simple reason
that the latter would not have jurisdiction over the
offenses. As already above intimated, the inability of the
Sandiganbayan to hold a joint trial of Bondoc's cases
and those of the government employees separately
charged for the same crimes, has not altered the nature
of the offenses charged, as estafa thru falsification
punishable by penalties higher than prision

Page 18 of 168
 THIRD DIVISION
[G.R. No. 116033. February 26, 1997]
ALFREDO L. AZARCON, petitioner,
vs. SANDIGANBAYAN, PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES and JOSE C.
BATAUSA, respondents.
DECISION
PANGANIBAN, J.:
Does the Sandiganbayan have jurisdiction over a
private individual who is charged with malversation of
public funds as a principal after the said individual had
been designated by the Bureau of Internal Revenue as a
custodian of distrained property? Did such accused
become a public officer and therefore subject to the graft
courts jurisdiction as a consequence of such designation
by the BIR?
These are the main questions in the instant petition
for review of respondent Sandiganbayans Decision[1] in
Criminal Case No. 14260 promulgated on March 8, 1994,
convicting petitioner of malversation of public funds and
property, and Resolution[2] dated June 20, 1994, denying
his motion for new trial or reconsideration thereof.
The Facts
Petitioner Alfredo Azarcon owned and operated an
earth-moving business, hauling dirt and ore.[3] His
services were contracted by the Paper Industries
Corporation of the Philippines (PICOP) at its concession
in Mangagoy, Surigao del Sur. Occasionally, he engaged
the services of sub-contractors like Jaime Ancla whose
trucks were left at the formers premises.[4] From this set
of circumstances arose the present controversy.
x x x It appears that on May 25, 1983, a Warrant of
Distraint of Personal Property was issued by the Main
Office of the Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR)
addressed to the Regional Director (Jose Batausa) or his
authorized representative of Revenue Region 10,
Butuan City commanding the latter to distraint the goods,
chattels or effects and other personal property of Jaime
Ancla, a sub-contractor of accused Azarcon and, a
delinquent taxpayer. The Warrant of Garnishment was
issued to accused Alfredo Azarcon ordering him to
transfer, surrender, transmit and/or remit to BIR the
property in his possession owned by taxpayer
Ancla. The Warrant of Garnishment was received by
accused Azarcon on June 17, 1985.[5]
Petitioner Azarcon, in signing the Receipt for Goods,
Articles, and Things Seized Under Authority of the
National Internal Revenue, assumed the undertakings
specified in the receipt the contents of which are
reproduced as follows:
(I), the undersigned, hereby acknowledge to have
received from Amadeo V. San Diego, an Internal
Revenue Officer, Bureau of Internal Revenue of the
Philippines, the following described goods, articles, and
things:
Kind of property --- Isuzu dump truck
Motor number --- E120-229598
Chassis No. --- SPZU50-1772440
Number of CXL --- 6
Color --- Blue
Owned By --- Mr. Jaime Ancla
the same having been this day seized and left in (my)
possession pending investigation by the Commissioner
of Internal Revenue or his duly authorized
representative. (I) further promise that (I) will faithfully
keep, preserve, and, to the best of (my) ability, protect
said goods, articles, and things seized from defacement,
demarcation, leakage, loss, or destruction in any
manner; that (I) will neither alter nor remove, nor permit
others to alter or remove or dispose of the same in any
manner without the express authority of the
Commissioner of Internal Revenue; and that (I) will
produce and deliver all of said goods, articles, and things
upon the order of any court of the Philippines, or upon
demand of the Commissioner of Internal Revenue or any
authorized officer or agent of the Bureau of Internal
Revenue.[6]
Subsequently, Alfredo Azarcon wrote a letter dated
November 21, 1985 to the BIRs Regional Director for
Revenue Region 10 B, Butuan City stating that
x x x while I have made representations to retain
possession of the property and signed a receipt of the
same, it appears now that Mr. Jaime Ancla intends to
cease his operations with us. This is evidenced by the
fact that sometime in August, 1985 he surreptitiously
withdrew his equipment from my custody. x x x In this
connection, may I therefore formally inform you that it is
my desire to immediately relinquish whatever
responsibilities I have over the above-mentioned
property by virtue of the receipt I have signed. This
cancellation shall take effect immediately. x x x .[7]
Incidentally, the petitioner reported the taking of the truck
to the security manager of PICOP, Mr. Delfin Panelo, and
requested him to prevent this truck from being taken out
Page 19 of 168
of the PICOP concession. By the time the order to bar the
trucks exit was given, however, it was too late.[8]
Regional Director Batausa responded in a letter
dated May 27, 1986, to wit:
An analysis of the documents executed by you reveals
that while you are (sic) in possession of the dump truck
owned by JAIME ANCLA, you voluntarily assumed the
liabilities of safekeeping and preserving the unit in behalf
of the Bureau of Internal Revenue. This is clearly
indicated in the provisions of the Warrant of
Garnishment which you have signed, obliged and
committed to surrender and transfer to this office. Your
failure therefore, to observe said provisions does not
relieve you of your responsibility.[9]
Thereafter, the Sandiganbayan found that
On 11 June 1986, Mrs. Marilyn T. Calo, Revenue
Document Processor of Revenue Region 10 B, Butuan
City, sent a progress report to the Chief of the Collection
Branch of the surreptitious taking of the dump truck and
that Ancla was renting out the truck to a certain
contractor by the name of Oscar Cueva at PICOP
(Paper Industries Corporation of the Philippines, the
same company which engaged petitioners earth moving
services), Mangagoy, Surigao del Sur. She also
suggested that if the report were true, a warrant of
garnishment be reissued against Mr. Cueva for whatever
amount of rental is due from Ancla until such time as the
latters tax liabilities shall be deemed satisfied. x x x
However, instead of doing so, Director Batausa filed a
letter-complaint against the (herein Petitioner) and Ancla
on 22 January 1988, or after more than one year had
elapsed from the time of Mrs. Calos report.[10]
Provincial Fiscal Pretextato Montenegro forwarded
the records of the complaint x x x to the Office of the
Tanodbayan on May 18, 1988. He was deputized
Tanodbayan prosecutor and granted authority to conduct
preliminary investigation on August 22, 1988, in a letter by
Special Prosecutor Raul Gonzales approved by
Ombudsman (Tanodbayan) Conrado Vasquez. [11]
Along with his co-accused Jaime Ancla, petitioner
Azarcon was charged before the Sandiganbayan with the
crime of malversation of public funds or property under
Article 217 in relation to Article 222 of the Revised Penal
Code (RPC) in the following Information[12]filed on
January 12, 1990, by Special Prosecution Officer Victor
Pascual:
That on or about June 17, 1985, in the Municipality of
Bislig, Province of Surigao del Sur, Philippines, and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, accused
Alfredo L. Azarcon, a private individual but who, in his
capacity as depository/administrator of property seized
or deposited by the Bureau of Internal Revenue, having
voluntarily offered himself to act as custodian of one
Isuzu Dumptruck (sic) with Motor No. E120-
22958, Chasis No. SPZU 50-1772440, and number
CXL-6 and was authorized to be such under the
authority of the Bureau of Internal Revenue, has become
a responsible and accountable officer and said motor
vehicle having been seized from Jaime C. Ancla in
satisfaction of his tax liability in the total sum of EIGHTY
THOUSAND EIGHT HUNDRED THIRTY ONE PESOS
and 59/100 (P80,831.59) became a public property and
the value thereof as public fund, with grave abuse of
confidence and conspiring and confederating with said
Jaime C. Ancla, likewise, a private individual, did then
and there wilfully, (sic) unlawfully and feloniously
misappropriate, misapply and convert to his personal
use and benefit the aforementioned motor vehicle or the
value thereof in the aforestated amount, by then and
there allowing accused Jaime C. Ancla to remove,
retrieve, withdraw and tow away the said Isuzu
Dumptruck (sic) with the authority, consent and
knowledge of the Bureau of Internal Revenue, Butuan
City, to the damage and prejudice of the government in
the amount of P80,831.59 in a form of unsatisfied tax
liability.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
The petitioner filed a motion for reinvestigation
before the Sandiganbayan on May 14, 1991, alleging
that: (1) the petitioner never appeared in the preliminary
investigation; and (2) the petitioner was not a public
officer, hence a doubt exists as to why he was being
charged with malversation under Article 217 of the
Revised Penal Code.[13] The Sandiganbayan granted the
motion for reinvestigation on May 22, 1991.[14] After the
reinvestigation, Special Prosecution Officer Roger
Berbano, Sr., recommended the withdrawal of the
information[15] but was overruled by the Ombudsman.[16]
A motion to dismiss was filed by petitioner on March
25, 1992 on the ground that the Sandiganbayan did not
have jurisdiction over the person of the petitioner since he
was not a public officer.[17] On May 18, 1992, the
Sandiganbayan denied the motion.[18]
When the prosecution finished presenting its
evidence, the petitioner then filed a motion for leave to file
demurrer to evidence which was denied on November 16,
1992, for being without merit.[19] The petitioner then
commenced and finished presenting his evidence on
February 15, 1993.
The Respondent Courts Decision
On March 8, 1994, respondent
Sandiganbayan[20] rendered a Decision,[21] the dispositive
portion of which reads:
Page 20 of 168
WHEREFORE, the Court finds accused Alfredo Azarcon
y Leva GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt as principal of
Malversation of Public Funds defined and penalized
under Article 217 in relation to Article 222 of the Revised
Penal Code and, applying the Indeterminate Sentence
Law, and in view of the mitigating circumstance of
voluntary surrender, the Court hereby sentences the
accused to suffer the penalty of imprisonment ranging
from TEN (10) YEARS and ONE (1) DAY of prision
mayor in its maximum period to SEVENTEEN (17)
YEARS, FOUR (4) MONTHS and ONE (1) DAY
of Reclusion Temporal.To indemnify the Bureau of
Internal Revenue the amount of P80,831.59; to pay a
fine in the same amount without subsidiary imprisonment
in case of insolvency; to suffer special perpetual
disqualification; and, to pay the costs.
Considering that accused Jaime Ancla has not yet been
brought within the jurisdiction of this Court up to this
date, let this case be archived as against him without
prejudice to its revival in the event of his arrest or
voluntary submission to the jurisdiction of this Court.
SO ORDERED.
Petitioner, through new counsel,[22] filed a motion for
new trial or reconsideration on March 23, 1994, which was
denied by the Sandiganbayan in its Resolution[23] dated
December 2, 1994.
Hence, this petition.
The Issues
The petitioner submits the following reasons for the
reversal of the Sandiganbayans assailed Decision and
Resolution:
I. The Sandiganbayan does not have
jurisdiction over crimes committed solely by
private individuals.
II. In any event, even assuming arguendo that
the appointment of a private individual as a
custodian or a depositary of distrained
property is sufficient to convert such
individual into a public officer, the petitioner
cannot still be considered a public officer
because:
[A]
There is no provision in the National Internal Revenue
Code which authorizes the Bureau of Internal Revenue
to constitute private individuals as depositaries of
distrained properties.
[B]
His appointment as a depositary was not by virtue of a
direct provision of law, or by election or by appointment
by a competent authority.
III. No proof was presented during trial to prove that the
distrained vehicle was actually owned by the accused
Jaime Ancla; consequently, the governments right to the
subject property has not been established.
IV. The procedure provided for in the National Internal
Revenue Code concerning the disposition of distrained
property was not followed by the B.I.R., hence the
distraint of personal property belonging to Jaime C.
Ancla and found allegedly to be in the possession of the
petitioner is therefore invalid.
V. The B.I.R. has only itself to blame for not promptly
selling the distrained property of accused Jaime C. Ancla
in order to realize the amount of back taxes owed by
Jaime C. Ancla to the Bureau.[24]
In fine, the fundamental issue is whether the
Sandiganbayan had jurisdiction over the subject matter of
the controversy. Corollary to this is the question of
whether petitioner can be considered a public officer by
reason of his being designated by the Bureau of Internal
Revenue as a depositary of distrained property.
The Courts Ruling
The petition is meritorious.
Jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan
It is hornbook doctrine that in order (to) ascertain
whether a court has jurisdiction or not, the provisions of
the law should be inquired into.[25] Furthermore, the
jurisdiction of the court must appear clearly from the
statute law or it will not be held to exist. It cannot be
presumed or implied.[26] And for this purpose in criminal
cases, the jurisdiction of a court is determined by the law
at the time of commencement of the action.[27]
In this case, the action was instituted with the filing of
this information on January 12, 1990; hence, the
applicable statutory provisions are those of P.D. No.
1606, as amended by P.D. No. 1861 on March 23, 1983,
but prior to their amendment by R.A. No. 7975 on May 16,
1995. At that time, Section 4 of P.D. No. 1606 provided
that:
Page 21 of 168
SEC. 4. Jurisdiction. -- The Sandiganbayan shall
exercise:
(a) Exclusive original jurisdiction in all cases involving:
(1) Violations of Republic Act No. 3019, as amended,
otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices
Act, Republic Act No. 1379, and Chapter II, Section 2,
Title VII of the Revised Penal Code;
(2) Other offenses or felonies committed by public
officers and employees in relation to their office,
including those employed in government-owned or
controlled corporations, whether simple or complexed
with other crimes, where the penalty prescribed by law is
higher than prision correccional or imprisonment for six
(6) years, or a fine of P6,000.00: PROVIDED,
HOWEVER, that offenses or felonies mentioned in this
paragraph where the penalty prescribed by law does not
exceed prision correccional or imprisonment for six (6)
years or a fine of P6,000.00 shall be tried by the proper
Regional Trial Court, Metropolitan Trial Court, Municipal
Trial Court and Municipal Circuit Trial Court.
xxxxxxxxx
In case private individuals are charged as co-principals,
accomplices or accessories with the public officers or
employees, including those employed in government-
owned or controlled corporations, they shall be tried
jointly with said public officers and employees.
x x x x x x x x x.
The foregoing provisions unequivocally specify the
only instances when the Sandiganbayan will have
jurisdiction over a private individual, i.e. when the
complaint charges the private individual either as a co-
principal, accomplice or accessory of a public officer or
employee who has been charged with a crime within its
jurisdiction.
Azarcon: A Public Officer or A Private Individual?
The Information does not charge petitioner Azarcon
of being a co-principal, accomplice or accessory to a
public officer committing an offense under the
Sandiganbayans jurisdiction.Thus, unless petitioner be
proven a public officer, the Sandiganbayan will have no
jurisdiction over the crime charged. Article 203 of the RPC
determines who are public officers:
Who are public officers. -- For the purpose of applying
the provisions of this and the preceding titles of the
book, any person who, by direct provision of the law,
popular election, popular election or appointment by
competent authority, shall take part in the performance
of public functions in the Government of the Philippine
Islands, or shall perform in said Government or in any of
its branches public duties as an employee, agent, or
subordinate official, of any rank or classes, shall be
deemed to be a public officer.
Thus,
(to) be a public officer, one must be --
(1) Taking part in the performance of public functions in
the government, or
Performing in said Government or any of its
branches public duties as an employee, agent, or
subordinate official, of any rank or class; and
(2) That his authority to take part in the performance of
public functions or to perform public duties must be --
a. by direct provision of the law, or
b. by popular election, or
c. by appointment by competent authority.[28]
Granting arguendo that the petitioner, in signing the
receipt for the truck constructively distrained by the BIR,
commenced to take part in an activity constituting public
functions, he obviously may not be deemed authorized by
popular election. The next logical query is whether
petitioners designation by the BIR as a custodian of
distrained property qualifies as appointment by direct
provision of law, or by competent authority.[29] We answer
in the negative.
The Solicitor General contends that the BIR, in
effecting constructive distraint over the truck allegedly
owned by Jaime Ancla, and in requiring the petitioner
Alfredo Azarcon who was in possession thereof to sign
a pro forma receipt for it, effectively designated petitioner
a depositary and, hence, citing U.S. vs. Rastrollo,[30] a
public officer.[31] This is based on the theory that
(t)he power to designate a private person who has actual
possession of a distrained property as a depository of
distrained property is necessarily implied in the BIRs
power to place the property of a delinquent tax payer
(sic) in distraint as provided for under Sections 206, 207
and 208 (formerly Sections 303, 304 and 305) of the
National Internal Revenue Code, (NIRC) x x x.[32]
We disagree. The case of U.S. vs. Rastrollo is not
applicable to the case before us simply because the facts
therein are not identical, similar or analogous to those
obtaining here. While the cited case involved
a judicial deposit of the proceeds of the sale of attached
Page 22 of 168
property in the hands of the debtor, the case at bench
dealt with the BIRs administrative act of effecting
constructive distraint over alleged property of taxpayer
Ancla in relation to his back taxes, property which was
received by petitioner Azarcon. In the cited case, it was
clearly within the scope of that courts jurisdiction and
judicial power to constitute the judicial deposit and give
the depositary a character equivalent to that of a public
official.[33] However, in the instant case, while the BIR had
authority to require petitioner Azarcon to sign a receipt for
the distrained truck, the NIRC did not grant it power to
appoint Azarcon a public officer.
It is axiomatic in our constitutional framework, which
mandates a limited government, that its branches and
administrative agencies exercise only that power
delegated to them as defined either in the Constitution or
in legislation or in both.[34] Thus, although the appointing
power is the exclusive prerogative of the President, x x
x[35] the quantum of powers possessed by an
administrative agency forming part of the executive
branch will still be limited to that conferred expressly or by
necessary or fair implication in its enabling act. Hence,
(a)n administrative officer, it has been held, has only such
powers as are expressly granted to him and those
necessarily implied in the exercise thereof.[36] Corollarily,
implied powers are those which are necessarily included
in, and are therefore of lesser degree than the power
granted. It cannot extend to other matters not embraced
therein, nor are not incidental thereto.[37] For to so extend
the statutory grant of power would be an encroachment
on powers expressly lodged in Congress by our
Constitution.[38] It is true that Sec. 206 of the NIRC, as
pointed out by the prosecution, authorizes the BIR to
effect a constructive distraint by requiring any person to
preserve a distrained property, thus:
xxxxxxxxx
The constructive distraint of personal property shall
be effected by requiring the taxpayer or any person
having possession or control of such property to
sign a receipt covering the property distrained and
obligate himself to preserve the same intact and
unaltered and not to dispose of the same in any
manner whatever without the express authority of
the Commissioner.
xxxxxxxxx
However, we find no provision in the NIRC
constituting such person a public officer by reason of such
requirement. The BIRs power authorizing a private
individual to act as a depositary cannot be stretched to
include the power to appoint him as a public officer. The
prosecution argues that Article 222 of the Revised Penal
Code x x x defines the individuals covered by the term
officers under Article 217[39] x x x of the same
Code.[40] And accordingly, since Azarcon became a
depository of the truck seized by the BIR he also became
a public officer who can be prosecuted under Article 217
x x x.[41]
The Court is not persuaded. Article 222 of the RPC
reads:
Officers included in the preceding provisions. -- The
provisions of this chapter shall apply to private
individuals who, in any capacity whatever, have charge
of any insular, provincial or municipal funds, revenues,
or property and to any administrator or depository of
funds or property attached, seized or deposited by public
authority, even if such property belongs to a private
individual.
Legislative intent is determined principally from the
language of a statute. Where the language of a statute is
clear and unambiguous, the law is applied according to its
express terms, and interpretation would be resorted to
only where a literal interpretation would be either
impossible or absurd or would lead to an injustice.[42] This
is particularly observed in the interpretation of penal
statutes which must be construed with such strictness as
to carefully safeguard the rights of the defendant x x
x.[43] The language of the foregoing provision is clear. A
private individual who has in his charge any of the public
funds or property enumerated therein and commits any of
the acts defined in any of the provisions of Chapter Four,
Title Seven of the RPC, should likewise be penalized with
the same penalty meted to erring public officers. Nowhere
in this provision is it expressed or implied that a private
individual falling under said Article 222 is to be deemed a
public officer.
After a thorough review of the case at bench, the
Court thus finds petitioner Alfredo Azarcon and his co-
accused Jaime Ancla to be both private individuals
erroneously charged before and convicted by
Respondent Sandiganbayan which had no jurisdiction
over them. The Sandiganbayans taking cognizance of
this case is of no moment since (j)urisdiction cannot be
conferred by x x x erroneous belief of the court that it had
jurisdiction.[44] As aptly and correctly stated by the
petitioner in his memorandum:
From the foregoing discussion, it is evident that the
petitioner did not cease to be a private individual when
he agreed to act as depositary of the garnished dump
truck. Therefore, when the information charged him and
Jaime Ancla before the Sandiganbayan for malversation
of public funds or property, the prosecution was in fact
charging two private individuals without any public
officer being similarly charged as a co-
conspirator. Consequently, the Sandiganbayan had no
jurisdiction over the controversy and therefore all the
proceedings taken below as well as the Decision
rendered by Respondent Sandiganbayan, are null and
void for lack of jurisdiction.[45]
Page 23 of 168
 WHEREFORE, the questioned Resolution and
Decision of the Sandiganbayan are
hereby SET ASIDE and declared NULL and VOID for
lack of jurisdiction. No costs.
SO ORDERED.

Page 24 of 168
 EN BANC
[G.R. No. 128096. January 20, 1999]
PANFILO M. LACSON, petitioner vs. THE EXECUTIVE
SECRETARY, THE SANDIGANBAYAN,
OFFICE OF THE SPECIAL PROSECUTOR,
THE DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, MYRNA
ABALORA, NENITA ALAP-AP, IMELDA
PANCHO MONTERO, and THE PEOPLE OF
THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.
ROMEO M. ACOP and FRANCISCO G. ZUBIA,
JR., petitioners-intervenors.
DECISION
MARTINEZ, J.:
The constitutionality of Sections 4 and 7 of Republic
Act No. 8249 an act which further defines the jurisdiction
of the Sandiganbayan is being challenged in this petition
for prohibition and mandamus.Petitioner Panfilo Lacson,
joined by petitioners-intervenors Romeo Acop and
Francisco Zubia, Jr., also seeks to prevent
the Sandiganbayan from proceeding with the trial of
Criminal Cases Nos. 23047-23057 (for multiple murder)
against them on the ground of lack of jurisdiction.
The antecedents of this case, as gathered from the
parties pleadings and documentary proofs, are as follows:
In the early morning of May 18, 1995, eleven (11)
persons believed to be members of the Kuratong
Baleleng gang, reportedly an organized crime syndicate
which had been involve in a spate of bank robberies in
Metro Manila, were slain along Commonwealth Avenue in
Quezon City by elements of the Anti-Bank Robbery and
Intelligence Task Group (ABRITG) headed by Chief
Superintendent Jewel Canson of the Philippine National
Police (PNP). The ABRITG was composed of police
officers from the Traffic Management Command (TMC)
led by petitioner-intervenor Senior Superintendent
Francisco Zubia, Jr.; Presidential Anti-Crime Commission
Task Force Habagat (PACC-TFH) headed by petitioner
Chief Superintendent Panfilo M. Lacson; Central Police
District Command (CPDC) led by Chief Superintendent
Ricardo de Leon; and the Criminal Investigation
Command (CIC) headed by petitioner-intervenor Chief
Superintendent Romeo Acop.
Acting on a media expose of SPO2 Eduardo delos
Reyes, a member of the CIC, that what actually transpired
at dawn of May 18, 1995 was a summary execution (or a
rub out) and not a shoot-out between the Kuratong
Baleleng gang members and the ABRITG, Ombudsman
Aniano Desierto formed a panel of investigators headed
by the Deputy Ombudsman for Military Affairs, Bienvenido
Blancaflor, to investigate the incident. This panel later
absolve from any criminal liability all the PNP officers and
personnel allegedly involved in the May 18, 1995 incident,
with a finding that the said incident was a legitimate police
operation.[1]
However, a review board led by Overall Deputy
Ombudsman Francisco Villa modified the Blancaflor
panels finding and recommended the indictment for
multiple murder against twenty-six (26) respondents,
including herein petitioner and intervenors. This
recommendation was approved by the Ombudsman,
except for the withdrawal of the charges against Chief
Supt. Ricardo de Leon.
Thus, on November 2, 1995, petitioner Panfilo
Lacson was among those charged as principal in eleven
(11) informations for murder[2] before
the Sandiganbayans Second Division, while intervenors
Romeo Acop and Francisco Zubia, Jr. were among those
charged in the same informations as accessories after-
the-fact.
Upon motion by all the accused in the 11
informations,[3] the Sandiganbayan allowed them to file a
motion for reconsideration of the Ombudsmans action. [4]
After conducting a reinvestigation, the Ombudsman
filed on March 1, 1996 eleven
(11) amended informations[5] before the Sandiganbayan,
wherein petitioner was charged only as an accessory,
together with Romeo Acop and Francisco Zubia, Jr. and
others. One of the accused[6] was dropped from the case.
On March 5-6, 1996, all the accused filed separate
motions questioning the jurisdiction of the
Sandiganbayan, asserting that under the amended
informations, the cases fall within the jurisdiction of the
Regional Trial Court pursuant to Section 2 (paragraphs a
and c) of Republic Act No. 7975.[7] They contend that the
said law limited the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan to
cases where one or more of the "principal accused are
government officials with Salary Grade (SG) 27 or higher,
or PNP officials with the rank of Chief Superintendent
(Brigadier General) or higher. The highest
ranking principal accused in the amended informations
has the rank of only a Chief Inspector, and none has the
equivalent of at least SG 27.
Thereafter, in a Resolution[8] dated May 8, 1996
(promulgated on May 9, 1996), penned by Justice
Demetriou, with Justices Lagman and de Leon
concurring, and Justices Balajadia and Garchitorena
dissenting,[9] the Sandiganbayan admitted the amended
information and ordered the cases transferred to the
Quezon City Regional Trial Court which has original and
exclusive jurisdiction under R.A. 7975, as none of the
principal accused has the rank of Chief Superintendent or
higher.
Page 25 of 168
 On May 17, 1996, the Office of the Special
Prosecutor moved for a reconsideration, insisting that the
cases should remain with the Sandiganbayan. This was
opposed by petitioner and some of the accused.
While these motions for reconsideration were
pending resolution, and even before the issue of
jurisdiction cropped up with the filing of the amended
informations on March 1, 1996, House Bill No.
2299[10] and No. 1094[11] (sponsored by Representatives
Edcel C. Lagman and Neptali M. Gonzales II,
respectively), as well as Senate Bill No.
844[12] (sponsored by Senator Neptali Gonzales), were
introduced in Congress, defining/expanding the
jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan. Specifically, the said
bills sought, among others, to amend the jurisdiction of
the Sandiganbayan by deleting the word principal from
the phrase principal accused in Section 2 (paragraphs a
and c) of R.A. No. 7975.
These bills were consolidated and later approved
into law as R.A. No. 8249[13]. The law is entitled, AN ACT
FURTHER DEFINING THE JURISDICTION OF
THE SANDIGANBAYAN, AMENDING FOR THE
PURPOSE PRESIDENTIAL DECREE NO. 1606, AS
AMENDED, PROVIDING FUNDS THEREFOR, AND
FOR OTHER PURPOSES. It took effect on February 25,
1997.13 by the President of the Philippines on February
5, 1997.
Subsequently, on March 5, 1997,
the Sandiganbayan promulgated a Resolution[14] denying
the motion for reconsideration of the Special Prosecutor,
ruling that it stands pat in its resolution dated May 8, 1996.
On the same day,[15] the Sandiganbayan issued an
ADDENDUM to its March 5, 1997 Resolution, the
pertinent portion of which reads:
After Justice Lagman wrote the Resolution and Justice
Demetriou concurred in it, but before Justice de Leon,
Jr. rendered his concurring and dissenting opinion, the
legislature enacted Republic Act 8249 and the President
of the Philippines approved it on February 5,
1997. Considering the pertinent provisions of the
new law, Justices Lagman and Demetriou are now in
favor of granting, as they are now granting, the
Special Prosecutors motion for
reconsideration. Justice de Leon has already done
so in his concurring and dissenting opinion.
xxxxxxxxx
Considering that three of the accused in each of
these cases are PNP Chief Superintendents: namely,
Jewel T. Canson, Romeo M. Acop and Panfilo M.
Lacson, and that trial has not yet begun in all these
cases in fact, no order of arrest has been issued this
court has competence to take cognizance of these
cases.
To recapitulate, the net result of all the foregoing is that
by the vote of 3 to 2, the court admitted the Amended
Informations in these cases and by the unanimous
vote of 4 with 1 neither concurring nor dissenting,
retained jurisdiction to try and decide the
cases.[16] [Emphasis supplied]
Petitioner now questions the constitutionality of
Section 4 R.A. No. 8249, including Section 7 thereof
which provides that the said law shall apply to all cases
pending in any court over which trial has not begun as of
the approval hereof. Petitioner argues that:
a) The questioned provision of the statute were
introduced by the authors thereof in bad faith as it was
made to precisely suit the situation in which petitioners
cases were in at the Sandiganbayan by restoring
jurisdiction thereover to it, thereby violating his right to
procedural due process and the equal protection clause
of the Constitution. Further, from the way
the Sandiganbayan has foot-dragged for nine (9) months
the resolution of a pending incident involving the transfer
of the cases to the Regional Trial Court, the passage of
the law may have been timed to overtake such
resolution to render the issue therein moot, and frustrate
the exercise of petitioners vested rights under the
old Sandiganbayan law (RA 7975)
b) Retroactive application of the law is plain from the fact
that it was again made to suit the peculiar circumstances
in which petitioners cases were under, namely, that trial
had not yet commenced, as provided in Section 7, to
make certain that those cases will no longer be
remanded to the Quezon City Regional Trial Court, as
the Sandiganbayan alone should try them, thus making it
an ex post factolegislation and a denial of the right of
petitioner as an accused in Criminal Case Nos. 23047
23057 to procedural due process
c) The title of the law is misleading in that it contains the
aforesaid innocuous provisions in Sections 4 and 7
which actually expands rather than defines the
old Sandiganbayan law (RA 7975), thereby violating the
one-title-one-subject requirement for the passage of
statutes under Section 26(1), Article VI of the
Constitution.[17]
For their part, the intervenors, in their petition-in-
intervention, add that while Republic Act No. 8249
innocuously appears to have merely expanded the
jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan, the introduction of
Sections 4 and 7 in said statute impressed upon it the
character of a class legislation and an ex-post
facto statute intended to apply specifically to the accused
in the Kuratong Baleleng case pending before
the Sandiganbayan.[18] They further argued that if their
case is tried before the Sandiganbayan their right to
procedural due process would be violated as they could
no longer avail of the two-tiered appeal to
Page 26 of 168
the Sandiganbayan, which they acquired under R.A.
7975, before recourse to the Supreme Court.
Both the Office of the Ombudsman and the Solicitor
General filed separate pleadings in support of the
constitutionality of the challenged provisions of the law in
question and praying that both the petition and the
petition-in-intervention be dismissed.
This Court then issued a Resolution[19] requiring the
parties to file simultaneously within
a nonextendible period of ten (10) days from notice
thereof additional memoranda on the question of whether
the subject amended informations filed in Criminal Cases
Nos. 23047-23057 sufficiently alleged the commission by
the accused therein of the crime charged within the
meaning Section 4 b of Republic Act No. 8249, so as to
bring the said cases within the exclusive original
jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan.
The parties, except for the Solicitor General who is
representing the People of the Philippines, filed the
required supplemental memorandum within the
nonextendible reglementary period.
The established rule is that every law has in its favor
the presumption of constitutionality, and to justify its
nullification there must be a clear and unequivocal breach
of the Constitution, not a doubtful and argumentative
one.[20] The burden of proving the invalidity of the law lies
with those who challenge it. That burden, we regret to say,
was not convincingly discharged in the present case.
The creation of the Sandiganbayan was mandated in
Section 5, Article XIII of the 1973 Constitution, which
provides:
SEC. 5. The Batasang Pambansa shall create a special
court, to be known as Sandiganbayan, which shall have
jurisdiction over criminal and civil cases involving graft
and corrupt practices and such other offenses committed
by public officers and employees including those in
government-owned or controlled corporations, in relation
to their office as may be determined by law."
The said special court is retained in the new (1987)
Constitution under the following provision in Article XI,
Section 4:
Section 4. The present anti-graft court known as
the Sandiganbayan shall continue to function and
exercise its jurisdiction as now or hereafter may be
provided by law.
Pursuant to the constitutional mandate, Presidential
Decree No. 1486[21] created
the Sandiganbayan. Thereafter, the following laws on
the Sandiganbayan, in chronological order, were
enacted: P.D. No. 1606,[22] Section 20 of Batas
Pambansa Blg. 129,[23] P.D. No. 1860,[24] P.D. No.
1861,[25] R.A. No. 7975,[26] and R.A. No. 8249.[27] Under
the latest amendments introduced by Section 4 of R.A.
No. 8249, the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over the
following cases:
SEC. 4. Section 4 of the same decree [P.D. No. 1606, as
amended] is hereby further amended to read as follows:
SEC. 4. Jurisdiction The Sandiganbayan shall
exercise exclusive original jurisdiction in all cases
involving:
a. Violations of Republic Act No. 3019, as amended,
otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices
Act, Republic Act No. 1379, and Chapter II, Section 2,
Title VII, Book II of the Revised Penal Code, where one
or more of the accused are officials occupying the
following positions in the government, whether in a
permanent, acting or interim capacity, at the time of the
commission of the offense:
(1) Officials of the executive branch occupying the
positions of regional director and higher, otherwise
classified as Grade 27 and higher, of the Compensation
and Position Classification Act of 1989 (Republic Act No.
6758), specifically including:
(a) Provincial governors, vice-governors, members of
the sangguniang panlalawigan, and provincial
treasurers, assessors, engineers, and other provincial
department heads;
(b) City mayors, vice-mayors, members of
the sangguniang panlungsod, city treasurers, assessors,
engineers, and other city department heads;
(c) Officials of the diplomatic service occupying the
position of consul and higher;
(d) Philippine Army and air force colonels, naval
captains, and all officers of higher rank;
(e) Officers of the Philippine National Police while
occupying the position of provincial director and those
holding the rank of senior superintendent or higher;
(f) City and provincial prosecutors and their assistants,
and officials and prosecutors in the Office of the
Ombudsman and special prosecutor;
(g) Presidents, directors or trustees, or managers of
government-owned or controlled corporations, state
universities or educational institutions or foundations;
(2) Members of Congress or officials thereof classified
as Grade 27 and up under the Compensation and
Position Classification Act of 1989;
Page 27 of 168
(3) Members of the Judiciary without prejudice to the
provisions of the Constitution;
(4) Chairman and members of the Constitutional
Commissions, without prejudice to the provisions of the
Constitution;
(5) All other national and local officials classified as
Grade 27 or higher under the Compensation and
Position Classification Act of 1989.
b. Other offenses or felonies whether simple or
complexed with other crimes committed by
the public officials and employees mentioned in
Subsection a of this section in relation to their office.
c. Civil and criminal cases filed pursuant to and in
connection with Executive Order Nos. 1, 2, 14 and 14-A,
issued in 1986.
In cases where none of the accused are occupying
positions corresponding to salary Grade 27 or higher, as
prescribed in the said Republic Act 6758, or military and
PNP officers mentioned above, exclusive original
jurisdiction thereof shall be vested in the proper regional
trial court, metropolitan trial court, municipal trial court,
and municipal circuit trial court, as the case may be,
pursuant to their respective jurisdictions as provided
in Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, as amended.
The Sandiganbayan shall exercise exclusive appellate
jurisdiction over final judgment, resolution or orders of
the regional trial courts whether in the exercise of their
own original jurisdiction of their appellate jurisdiction as
herein provided.
"The Sandiganbayan shall have exclusive original
jurisdiction over petitions of the issuance of the writs of
mandamus, prohibition, certiorari, habeas corpus,
injunctions, and other ancillary writs and processes in
aid of its appellate jurisdiction and over petitions of
similar nature, including quo warranto, arising or that
may arise in cases filed or which may be filed under
Executive Order Nos. 1, 2, 14 and 14-A, issued in
1986: Provided, That the jurisdiction over these petitions
shall not be exclusive of the Supreme Court.
The procedure prescribed in Batas Pambansa Blg. 129,
as well as the implementing rules that the Supreme
Court has promulgated and may hereafter promulgate,
relative to appeals/petitions for review to the Court of
Appeals, shall apply to appeals and petitions for review
filed with the Sandiganbayan. In all cases elevated to
the Sandiganbayan and from the Sandiganbayan to the
Supreme Court, the Office of the Ombudsman, through
its special prosecutor, shall represent the People of the
Philippines, except in cases filed pursuant to Executive
Order Nos. 1, 2, 14 and 14-A, issued in 1986.
In case private individuals are charged as co-principals,
accomplices or accessories with the public officers or
employees, including those employed in government-
owned or controlled corporations, they shall be tried
jointly with said public officers and employees in the
proper courts which shall exercise exclusive jurisdiction
over them.
x x x x x x x x x. (Emphasis supplied)
Section 7 of R.A. No. 8249 states:
SEC. 7. Transitory provision. This act shall apply to all
cases pending in any court over which trial has not
begun as of the approval hereof. (Emphasis supplied)
The Sandiganbayan law prior to R.A. 8249 was R.A.
7975. Section 2 of R.A. 7975 provides:
SEC. 2. Section 4 of the same decree [Presidential
Decree No. 1606, as amended] is hereby further
amended to read as follows:
SEC. 4. Jurisdiction The Sandiganbayan shall
exercise exclusive original jurisdiction in
all cases involving:
a. Violations of Republic Act No. 3019, as amended,
otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices
Act, Republic Act No. 1379, and Chapter II, Section 2,
Title VII, Book II of the Revised Penal Code, where one
or more of the principal accused are officials occupying
the following positions in the government, whether in a
permanent, acting or interim capacity, at the time of the
commission of the offense:
(1) Officials of the executive branch occupying the
positions of regional director and higher, otherwise
classified as Grade 27 and higher, of the Compensation
and Position Classification Act of 1989 (Republic Act No.
6758), specifically including:
(a) Provincial governors, vice-governors, members of
the sangguniang panlalawigan, and provincial
treasurers, assessors, engineers, and other provincial
department heads;
(b) City mayors, vice-mayors, members of
the sangguniang panlungsod, city treasurers, assessors,
engineers, and other city department heads;
(c) Officials of the diplomatic service occupying the
position of consul and higher;
(d) Philippine Army and air force colonels, naval
captains, and all officers of high rank;
Page 28 of 168
(e) PNP chief superintendent and PNP officers of
higher rank;
(f) City and Provincial prosecutors and their assistants,
and officials and prosecutors in the Office of the
Ombudsman and special prosecutor;
(g) Presidents, directors or trustees, or managers of
government-owned or controlled corporations, state
universities or educational institutions or foundations;
(2) Members of Congress or officials thereof classified
as Grade 27 and up under the Compensation and
Position Classification Act of 1989;
(3) Members of the judiciary without prejudice to the
provisions of the Constitution;
(4) Chairman and members of the Constitutional
Commissions, without prejudice to the provisions of the
Constitution;
(5) All other national and local officials classified as
Grade 27 or higher under the Compensation and
Position Classification Act of 1989.
b. Other offenses or felonies committed by the public
officials and employees mentioned in Subsection a of
this section in relation to their office.
c. Civil and criminal cases filed pursuant to and in
connection with Executive Order Nos. 1, 2, 14 and 14-A.
In cases where none of the principal accused are
occupying positions corresponding to salary Grade 27 or
higher, as prescribed in the said Republic Act 6758, or
PNP officers occupying the rank of superintendent
or higher, or their equivalent, exclusive jurisdiction
thereof shall be vested in the proper regional trial
court, metropolitan trial court, municipal trial court, and
municipal circuit trial court, as the case may be, pursuant
to their respective jurisdictions as provided in Batas
Pambansa Blg. 129.
The Sandiganbayan shall exercise exclusive appellate
jurisdiction on appeals from the final judgments,
resolutions or orders of regular courts where all the
accused are occupying positions lower than grade 27, or
not otherwise covered by the preceding enumeration.
xxxxxxxxx
In case private individuals are charged as co-principals,
accomplices or accessories with the public officers or
employees, including those employed in government-
owned or controlled corporations, they shall be tried
jointly with said public officers and employees in the
proper courts which shall have exclusive jurisdiction over
them.
x x x x x x. (Emphasis supplied)
Section 7 of R.A. No. 7975 reads:
SEC. 7. Upon the effectivity of this Act, all criminal cases
which trial has not begun in the Sandiganbayan shall be
referred to the proper courts.
Under paragraphs a and c, Section 4 of R.A. 8249,
the word principal before the word accused appearing in
the above-quoted Section 2 (paragraphs a and c) of R.A.
7975, was deleted. It is due to this deletion of the word
principal that the parties herein are at loggerheads over
the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan. Petitioner and
intervenors, relying on R.A. 7975, argue that the Regional
Trial Court, not the Sandiganbayan, has jurisdiction over
the Subject criminal cases since none of
the principal accused under the amended information
has the rank of Superintendent[28] or higher. On the other
hand, the Office of the Ombudsman, through the Special
Prosecutor who is tasked to represent the People before
the Supreme Court except in certain cases,[29] contends
that the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction pursuant to R.A.
8249.
A perusal of the aforequoted Section 4 of R.A. 8249
reveals that to fall under the exclusive original jurisdiction
of the Sandiganbayan, the following requisites must
concur: (1) the offense committed is a violation of (a) R.A.
3019, as amended (the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices
Act), (b) R.A. 1379 (the law on ill-gotten wealth), (c)
Chapter II, Section 2, Title VII, Book II of the Revised
Penal Code (the law on bribery),[30] (d) Executive Order
Nos. 1, 2, 14, and 14-A, issued in 1986 (sequestration
cases),[31] or (e) other offenses or felonies whether simple
or complexed with other crimes; (2) the offender
committing the offenses in items (a), (b), (c) and (e) is a
public official or employee[32] holding any of the positions
enumerated in paragraph a of Section 4; and (3) the
offense committed is in relation to the office.
Considering that herein petitioner and intervenors
are being charged with murder which is a felony
punishable under Title VIII of the Revised Penal Code, the
governing provision on the jurisdictional offense
is not paragraph but paragraph b, Section 4 of R.A.
8249. This paragraph b pertains to other
offenses or felonies whether simple or complexed with
other crimes committed by the public officials and
employees mentioned in subsection a of [Section 4, R.A.
8249] in relation to their office. The phrase other offenses
or felonies is too broad as to include the crime of murder,
provided it was committed in relation to the accuseds
official functions. Thus, under said paragraph b, what
determines the Sandiganbayans jurisdiction is
the official position or rank of the offender that is,
whether he is one of those public officers or employees
Page 29 of 168
enumerated in paragraph a of Section 4. The offenses
mentioned in paragraphs a, b and c of the same Section
4 do not make any reference to the criminal participation
of the accused public officer as to whether he is charged
as a principal, accomplice or accessory. In enacting R.A.
8249, the Congress simply restored the original
provisions of P.D. 1606 which does not mention the
criminal participation of the public officer as a requisite to
determine the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan.
Petitioner and intervenors posture that Section 4 and
7 of R.A. 8249 violate their right to equal protection of the
law[33] because its enactment was particularly directed
only to the Kuratong Balelengcases in
the Sandiganbayan, is a contention too shallow to
deserve merit. No concrete evidence and convincing
argument were presented to warrant a declaration of an
act of the entire Congress and signed into law by the
highest officer of the co-equal executive department as
unconstitutional. Every classification made by law is
presumed reasonable. Thus, the party who challenges
the law must present proof of arbitrariness.[34]
It is an established precept in constitutional law that
the guaranty of the equal protection of the laws is not
violated by a legislation based on reasonable
classification. The classification is reasonable and not
arbitrary when there is concurrence of four elements,
namely:
(1) it must rest on substantial distinction;
(2) it must be germane to the purpose of the
law;
(3) must not be limited to existing conditions
only, and
(4) must apply equally to all members of the
same class,[35]
all of which are present in this case.
The challengers of Sections 4 and 7 of R.A. 8249
failed to rebut the presumption of constitutionality and
reasonableness of the questioned provisions. The
classification between those pending cases involving the
concerned public officials whose trial has not yet
commenced and whose cases could have been affected
by the amendments of the Sandiganbayan jurisdiction
under R.A. 8249, as against those cases where trial had
already started as of the approval of the law, rests on
substantial distinction that makes real differences.[36] In
the first instance, evidence against them were not yet
presented, whereas in the latter the parties had already
submitted their respective proofs, examined witness and
presented documents. Since it is within the power of
Congress to define the jurisdiction of courts subject to the
constitutional limitations,[37] it can be reasonably
anticipated that an alteration of that jurisdiction would
necessarily affect pending cases, which is why it has to
provide for a remedy in the form of a transitory
provision. Thus, petitioner and intervenors cannot now
claim that Sections 4 and 7 placed them under a different
category from those similarly situated as them. Precisely,
paragraph a of Section 4 provides that it shall apply to all
cases involving" certain public officials and, under the
transitory provision in Section 7, to all cases pending in
any court. Contrary to petitioner and intervenors
arguments, the law is not particularly directed only to
the Kuratong Baleleng cases. The transitory provision
does not only cover cases which are in
the Sandiganbayan but also in any court. It just
happened that the Kuratong Baleleng cases are one of
those affected by the law. Moreover, those cases where
trial had already begun are not affected by the transitory
provision under Section 7 of the new law (R.A. 8249).
In their futile attempt to have said sections nullified,
heavy reliance is premised on what is perceived as bad
faith on the part of a Senator and two Justices of
the Sandiganbayan[38] for their participation in the
passage of the said provisions. In particular, it is stressed
that the Senator had expressed strong sentiments against
those officials involved in the Kuratong Baleleng cases
during the hearings conducted on the matter by the
committee headed by the Senator. Petitioner further
contends that the legislature is biased against him as he
claims to have been selected from among the 67 million
other Filipinos as the object of the deletion of the word
principal in paragraph a, Section 4 of P.D. 1606, as
amended, and of the transitory provision of R.A.
8249.[39] R.A. 8249, while still a bill, was acted,
deliberated, considered by 23 other Senators and by
about 250 Representatives, and was separately approved
by the Senate and House of Representatives and, finally,
by the President of the Philippines.
On the perceived bias that
the Sandiganbayan Justices allegedly had against
petitioner during the committee hearings, the same would
not constitute sufficient justification to nullify an otherwise
valid law. Their presence and participation in the
legislative hearings was deemed necessary by Congress
since the matter before the committee involves the graft
court of which one is the head of the Sandiganbayan and
the other a member thereof. The Congress, in its plenary
legislative powers, is particularly empowered by the
Constitution to invite persons to appear before it
whenever it decides to conduct inquiries in aid of
legislation.[40]
Petitioner and intervenors further argued that the
retroactive application of R.A. 8249 to the Kuratong
Baleleng cases constitutes an ex post facto law[41] for
they are deprived of their right to procedural due process
as they can no longer avail of the two tiered appeal which
they had allegedly acquired under R.A. 7975.
Again, this contention is erroneous. There is
nothing ex post facto in R.A. 8249. In Calder v.
Bull,[42] an ex post facto law is one
(a)which makes an act done criminal before the
passing of the law and which was innocent
when committed, and punishes such action;
or
Page 30 of 168
 (b) which aggravates a crime or makes it
greater that when it was committed; or
(c) which changes the punishment and inflicts a
greater punishment than the law annexed to
the crime when it was committed,
(d) which alters the legal rules of evidence and
receives less or different testimony than the
law required at the time of the commission of
the offense in order to convict the
defendant.[43]
(e) Every law which, in relation to the offense or
its consequences, alters the situation of a
person to his disadvantage.[44]
This Court added two more to the list, namely:
(f) that which assumes to regulate civil rights
and remedies only but in effect imposes a
penalty or deprivation of a right which when
done was lawful;
(g) deprives a person accused of crime of some
lawful protection to which he has become
entitled, such as the protection of a former
conviction or acquittal, or a proclamation of
amnesty.[45]
Ex post facto law, generally, prohibits retrospectivity
of penal laws.[46] R.A. 8249 is not a penal law. It is a
substantive law on jurisdiction which is not penal in
character. Penal laws are those acts of the Legislature
which prohibit certain acts and establish penalties for their
violations;[47] or those that define crimes, treat of their
nature, and provide for their punishment.[48] R.A. 7975,
which amended P.D. 1606 as regards
the Sandiganbayans jurisdiction, its mode of appeal and
other procedural matters, has been declared by the Court
as not a penal law, but clearly a procedural statute, i.e.
one which prescribes rules of procedure by which courts
applying laws of all kinds can properly administer
justice.[49] Not being a penal law, the retroactive
application of R.A. 8249 cannot be challenged as
unconstitutional.
Petitioners and intervenors contention that their right
to a two-tiered appeal which they acquired under R.A.
7975 has been diluted by the enactment of R.A. 8249, is
incorrect. The same contention has already been rejected
by the court several times[50] considering that the right to
appeal is not a natural right but statutory in nature that
can be regulated by law. The mode of procedure provided
for in the statutory right of appeal is not included in the
prohibition against ex post facto laws.[51] R.A. 8249
pertains only to matters of procedure, and being merely
an amendatory statute it does not partake the nature of
an ex post facto law. It does not mete out a penalty and,
therefore, does not come within the
prohibition.[52] Moreover, the law did not alter the rules of
evidence or the mode of trial.[53] It has been ruled that
adjective statutes may be made applicable to actions
pending and unresolved at the time of their passage.[54]
In any case, R.A. 8249 has preserved the accuseds
right to appeal to the Supreme Court to review questions
of law.[55] On the removal of the intermediate review facts,
the Supreme Court still has the power of review to
determine if the presumption of innocence has been
convincingly overcome.[56]
Another point. The challenged law does not violate
the one-title-one-subject provisions of the
Constitution. Much emphasis is placed on the wording in
the title of the law that it defines
the Sandiganbayan jurisdiction when what it allegedly
does is to expand its jurisdiction. The expansion in the
jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan, if it can be considered
as such, does not have to be expressly stated in the title
of the law because such is the necessary consequence of
the amendments. The requirement that every bill must
only have one subject expressed in the title[57] is satisfied
if the title is comprehensive enough, as in this case, to
include subjects related to the general purpose which the
statute seeks to achieve.[58] Such rule is severally
interpreted and should be given a practical rather than a
technical construction. There is here sufficient
compliance with such requirement, since the title of R.A.
8249 expresses the general subject (involving the
jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan and the amendment of
P.D. 1606, as amended) and all the provisions of the law
are germane to that general subject.[59] The Congress, in
employing the word define in the title of the law, acted
within its powers since Section 2, Article VIII of the
Constitution itself empowers the legislative body
to define, prescribe, and apportion the jurisdiction of
various courts.[60]
There being no unconstitutional infirmity in both the
subject amendatory provision of Section 4 and the
retroactive procedural application of the law as provided
in Section 7 R.A. No. 8249, we shall now determine
whether under the allegations in the Informations, it is
the Sandiganbayan or Regional Trial Court which has
jurisdiction over the multiple murder case against herein
petitioner and intervenors.
The jurisdiction of a court is defined by the
Constitution or statute. The elements of that definition
must appear in the complaint or information so as to
ascertain which court has jurisdiction over a case.Hence
the elementary rule that the jurisdiction of a court is
determined by the allegations in the complaint or
information,[61] and not by the evidence presented by the
parties at the trial.[62]
As stated earlier, the multiple murder charge against
petitioner and intervenors falls under Section 4
[paragraph b] of R.A. 8249. Section 4 requires that the
offense charged must be committed by the offender in
relation to his office in order for the Sandiganbayan to
have jurisdiction over it.[63] This jurisdictional requirement
is in accordance with Section 5, Article XIII of the 1973
Page 31 of 168
Constitution which mandated that
the Sandiganbayan shall have jurisdiction over criminal
cases committed by public officers and employees,
including those in government-owned or controlled
corporations, in relation to their office as may be
determined by law. This constitutional mandate was
reiterated in the new (1987) Constitution when it declared
in Section 4 thereof that the Sandiganbayan shall
continue to function and exercise its jurisdiction as
now or hereafter may be provided by law.
The remaining question to be resolved then is
whether the offense of multiple murder was committed in
relation to the office of the accused PNP officers.
In People vs. Montejo,[64] we held that an offense is
said to have been committed in relation to the office if it
(the offense) is intimately connected with the office of the
offender and perpetrated while he was in the performance
of his official functions.[65] This intimate relation between
the offense charged and the discharge of official
duties must be alleged in the Information.[66]
As to how the offense charged be stated in the
information, Section 9, Rule 110 of the Revised Rules of
Court mandates:
SEC. 9. Cause of Accusation. The acts or omissions
complained of as constituting the offense must be stated
in ordinary and concise language without repetition not
necessarily in the terms of the statute defining the
offense, but in such form as is sufficient to enable a
person of common understanding to know what offense
is intended to be charged, and enable the court to
pronounce proper judgment.(Emphasis supplied)
As early as 1954, we pronounced that the factor that
characterizes the charge is the actual recital of the
facts.[67] The real nature of the criminal charges is
determined not from the caption or preamble of the
information nor from the specification of the provision of
law alleged to have been violated, they being
conclusions of law, but by the actual recital of facts in
the complaint or information.[68]
The noble object of written accusations cannot be
overemphasized. This was explained in U.S. v.
Karelsen:[69]
The object of this written accusations was First, To
furnish the accused with such a description of the
charge against him as will enable him to make his
defense, and second, to avail himself of his
conviction or acquittal for protection against a
further prosecution for the same cause, and third, to
inform the court of the facts alleged so that it may
decide whether they are sufficient in law to support
a conviction if one should be had. In order that
this requirement may be satisfied, facts must be
stated, not conclusions of law Every crime is
made up of certain acts and intent these must be
set forth in the complaint with reasonable
particularity of time, place, names (plaintiff and
defendant) and circumstances. In short, the
complaint must
contain a specific allegation of every
fact and circumstance necessary to constitute
the crime charged. (Emphasis supplied)
It is essential, therefore, that the accused be
informed of the facts that are imputed to him as he is
presumed to have no independent knowledge of the
facts that constitute the offense.[70]
Applying these legal principles and doctrines to the
present case, we find the amended informations for
murder against herein petitioner and intervenors wanting
of specific factual averments to show the intimate
relation/connection between the offense charged and
the discharge of official function of the offenders.
In the present case, one of the eleven (11) amended
informations[71] for murder reads:
AMENDED INFORMATION
The undersigned Special Prosecution Officer III, Office
of the Ombudsman hereby accuses CHIEF INSP
MICHAEL RAY AQUINO, CHIEF INSP ERWIN T.
VILLACORTE SENIOR INSP JOSELITO T.
ESQUIVEL. INSP RICARDO G. DANDAN SPO4
VICENTE P. ARNADO, SPO4 ROBERTO F.
LANGCAUON, SPO2 VIRGILIO V. PARAGAS, SPO2
ROLANDO R. JIMENEZ, SPO1 WILFREDO C.
CUARTERO, SPO1 ROBERTO O. AGBALOG, SPO1
OSMUNDO B. CARINO, CHIEF SUPT. JEWEL F.
CANSON, CHIEF SUPT. ROMEO M. ACOP, CHIEF
SUPT. PANFILO M. LACSON, SENIOR SUPT.
FRANCISCO G. ZUBIA, JR., SUPT. ALMARIO A.
HILARIO, CHIEF INSP. CESAR O. MANCAO III, CHIEF
INSP. GIL L. MENESES, SENIOR INISP. GLENN
DUMLAO, SENIOR INSP. ROLANDO ANDUYAN, INSP.
CEASAR TANNAGAN, SPO3 WILLY NUAS, SPO3
CICERO S. BACOLOD, PO2 NORBERTO LASAGA,
PO2 LEONARDO GLORIA and PO2 ALEJANDRO G.
LIWANAG of the crime of Murder as defined and
penalized under Article 248 of the Revised Penal
Code committed as follows:
That on or about May 18, 1995 in Mariano Marcos
Avenue, Quezon City, Philippines and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the accused CHIEF
INISP. MICHAEL RAY AQUINO, CHIEF INSP. ERWIN
T. VILLACORTE, SENIOR INSP. JOSELITO T.
ESQUIVEL, INSP. RICARDO G. DANDAN, SPO4
VICENTE P. ARNADO SPO4 ROBERTO F.
LANGCAUON, SPO2 VIRGILIO V. PARAGAS, SPO2
ROLANDO R. JIMENEZ, SPO1 WILFREDO C.
CUARTERO, SPO1 ROBERTO O. AGBALOG, and
SPO1 OSMUNDO B. CARINO all taking advantage of
their public and official positions as officers and
Page 32 of 168
members of the Philippine National Police
and committing the acts herein alleged in relation to
their public office, conspiring with intent to kill and
using firearms with treachery, evident premeditation and
taking advantage of their superior strengths did then and
there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously shoot JOEL
AMORA, thereby inflicting upon the latter mortal wounds
which caused his instantaneous death to the damage
and prejudice of the heirs of the said victim.
That accused CHIEF SUPT. JEWEL F. CANSON CHIEF
SUPT. ROMEO M. ACOP CHIEF SUPT. PANFILO M.
LACSON, SENIOR SUPT. FRANCISCO G. ZUBIA, JR.
SUPT. ALMARIO A. HILARIO, CHIEF INSP. CESAR O.
MANCAO II CHIEF INSP. GIL L. MENESES, SENIOR
INSP. GLENN DUMLAO, SENIOR INSP. ROLANDO
ANDUYAN, INSP. CEASAR TANNAGAN SPO3 WILLY
NUAS SPO3 CICERO S. BACOLOD, PO2 ALEJANDRO
G. LIWANAG committing the acts in relation to
office as officers and members of the Philippine
National Police are charged herein as accessories
after-the-fact for concealing the crime herein above
alleged by among others falsely representing that
there were no arrests made during
the raid conducted by the accused herein at
Superville Subdivision, Paraaque, Metro Manila on or
about the early dawn of May 18, 1995.
CONTRARY TO LAW
While the above-quoted information states that the
above-named principal accused committed the crime of
murder in relation to their public office, there is,
however, no specific allegation of facts that the
shooting of the victim by the said principal accused
was intimately related to the discharge of their official
duties as police officers. Likewise, the amended
information does not indicate that the said accused
arrested and investigated the victim and then killed the
latter while in their custody.
Even the allegations concerning the criminal
participation of herein petitioner and intervenors as
among the accessories after-the-fact, the amended
information is vague on this. It is alleged therein that the
said accessories concealed the crime herein-above
alleged by, among others, falsely representing that there
were no arrests made during the raid conducted by the
accused herein at Superville Subdivision, Paraaque,
Metro Manila, on or about the early dawn of May 18,
1995. The sudden mention of the arrests made during
the raid conducted by the accused surprises the
reader. There is no indication in the amended
information that the victim was one of those arrested
by the accused during the raid. Worse, the raid and
arrests were allegedly conducted at Superville
Subdivision, Paraaque, Metro Manila but, as alleged in
the immediately preceding paragraph of the amended
information, the shooting of the victim by the principal
accused occurred in Mariano Marcos Avenue, Quezon
City. How the raid, arrests and shooting happened in two
places far away from each other is puzzling. Again, while
there is the allegation in the amended information that the
said accessories committed the offense in relation to
office as officers and members of the (PNP), we, however,
do not see the intimate connection between the offense
charged and the accuseds official functions, which, as
earlier discussed, is an essential element in determining
the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan.
The stringent requirement that the charge be set
forth with such particularity as will reasonably indicate the
exact offense which the accused is alleged to have
committed in relation to his office was, sad to say, not
satisfied. We believe that the mere allegation in the
amended information that the offense was committed by
the accused public officer in relation to his office is not
sufficient. That phrase is merely a conclusion of law, not
a factual averment that would show the close intimacy
between the offense charged and the discharge of the
accuseds official duties.
In People vs. Magallanes,[72] where the jurisdiction
between the Regional Trial Court and
the Sandiganbayan was at issue, we ruled:
It is an elementary rule that jurisdiction is determined by
the allegations in the complaint or information and not by
the result of evidence after trial.
In (People vs. ) Montejo (108 Phil 613 [1960] ), where
the amended information alleged
Leroy S. Brown, City Mayor of Basilan City, as such, has
organized groups of police patrol and civilian
commandos consisting of regular policemen and x x x
special policemen, appointed and provided by him with
pistols and high power guns and then established a
camp x x x at Tipo-tipo which is under his command x x
x supervision and control where his co-defendants were
stationed, entertained criminal complaints and
conducted the corresponding investigations, as well as
assumed the authority to arrest and detain persons
without due process of law and without bringing them to
the proper court, and that in line with this set-up
established by said Mayor of Basilan City as such, and
acting upon his orders his co-defendants arrested and
maltreated Awalin Tebag who died in consequence
thereof.
we held that the offense charged was committed in
relation to the office of the accused because it was
perpetrated while they were in the performance, though
improper or irregular of their official functions and would
not have been committed had they not held their office,
besides, the accused had no personal motive in
committing the crime, thus, there was an intimate
connection between the offense and the office of the
accused.
Page 33 of 168
Unlike in Montejo, the informations in Criminal Cases
Nos. 15562 and 15563 in the court below do not indicate
that the accused arrested and investigated the victims
and then killed the latter in the course of the
investigation. The informations merely allege that the
accused, for the purpose of extracting or extorting the
sum of P353,000.00 abducted, kidnapped and detained
the two victims, and failing in their common purpose,
they shot and killed the said victims. For the purpose of
determining jurisdiction, it is these allegations that
shall control, and not the evidence presented by the
prosecution at the trial.

In the aforecited case of People vs. Montejo, it is

noteworthy that the phrase committed in relation to public
office does not appear in the information, which only
signifies that the said phrase is not what determines the
jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan. What is controlling is
the specific factual allegations in the information that
would indicate the close intimacy between the discharge
of the accuseds official duties and the commission of the
offense charged, in order to qualify the crime as having
been committed in relation to public office.
Consequently, for failure to show in the amended
informations that the charge of murder was intimately
connected with the discharge of official functions of the
accused PNP officers, the offense charged in the subject
criminal cases is plain murder and, therefore, within the
exclusive original jurisdiction of the Regional Trial
Court,[73] not the Sandiganbayan.
WHEREFORE, the constitutionality of Sections 4
and 7 of R.A. 8249 is hereby sustained. The Addendum
to the March 5, 1997 Resolution of the Sandiganbayan is
REVERSED. The Sandiganbayan is hereby directed to
transfer Criminal Cases Nos. 23047 to 23057 (for multiple
murder) to the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City which
has exclusive original jurisdiction over said cases.
SO ORDERED.

Page 34 of 168
 EN BANC
[G.R. Nos. 120681-83. October 1, 1999]
JEJOMAR C. BINAY, petitioner, vs. HON.
SANDIGANBAYAN (Third Division) and the
DEPARTMENT OF INTERIOR AND LOCAL
GOVERNMENT, respondents.
[G.R. No. 128136. October 1, 1999]
MARIO C. MAGSAYSAY, FRANCISCO B. CASTILLO,
CRISTINA D. MABIOG, REGINO E. MALAPIT,
ERLINDA I. MASANGCAY and VICENTE DE
LA ROSA, petitioners, vs. HON.
SANDIGANBAYAN, HON. OMBUDSMAN and
its PROSECUTOR WENDELL BARERRAS-
SULIT and STATE PROSECUTORS ERIC
HENRY JOSEPH F. MALLONGA and GIDEON
C. MENDOZA, respondents.
DECISION
KAPUNAN, J.:
Pursuant to Section 4, Article XIII of the 1973
Constitution, Presidential Decree No. 1486 created an
Anti-Graft Court known as the Sandiganbayan. Since
then the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan has under
gone various changes,[1] the most recent of which were
effected through Republic Act Nos. 7975[2] and
8249.[3] Whether the Sandiganbayan, under these laws,
exercises exclusive original jurisdiction over criminal
cases involving municipal mayors accused of violations of
Republic Act No. 3019[4] and Article 220 of the Revised
Penal Code[5] is the central issue in these consolidated
petitions.
In G.R. Nos. 120681-83, petitioner Jejomar Binay
seeks to annul, among others, the Resolution of the
Sandiganbayan denying his motion to refer Criminal Case
Nos. 21001, 21005 and 21007 to the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) of Makati and declaring that the Sandiganbayan
has jurisdiction over said cases despite the enactment of
R.A. No. 7975.
In G.R. No. 128136, petitioner Mario C.
Magsaysay, et al. assail the October 22, 1996 Resolution
of the Sandiganbayan, reversing its Order of June 21,
1996 which suspended the proceedings in Criminal Case
No. 23278 in deference to whatever ruling this Court will
lay down in the Binay cases.
The facts, as gathered from t he records, are as
follows:
G.R. Nos. 120681-83
On September 7, 1994, the Office of the
Ombudsman filed before the Sandiganbayan three
separate informations against petitioner Jejomar Binay,
one for violation of Article 220 of the Revised Penal
Code,[6] and two for violation of Section 3(e) of R.A. No.
3019.[7] The informations, which were subsequently
amended on September 15, 1994, all alleged that the acts
constituting these crimes were committed in 1987 during
petitioners incumbency as Mayor of Makati, then a
municipality of Metro Manila.
Thereafter, petitioner moved to quash the
informations. He contended that the six-year delay from
the time the charges were filed in the Office of the
Ombudsman on July 27, 1988 to the time the informations
were filed in the Sandiganbayan on September 7, 1994
constituted a violation of his right to due
process. Arraignment of the accused was held in
abeyance pending the resolution of this motion.
On March 29, 1995, the Sandiganbayan issued a
Resolution denying petitioners motion to
quash. Petitioners motion for reconsideration, which was
opposed by the prosecution, was likewise denied by the
Sandiganbayan. The resolution denying the motion for
reconsideration, however, was issued before the
petitioner could file a reply to the prosecutions opposition
to the motion for reconsideration.
In the meantime, on March 31, 1995, the prosecution
filed a Motion to Suspend Accused Pendente Lite. The
Sandiganbayan, in a Resolution dated April 25, 1995,
granted the motion and ordered the suspension of
petitioner for ninety days from receipt of the
resolution. The court ruled that the requisites for
suspension pendente lite were present as petitioner was
charged with one of the offenses under Section 13 of R.A.
No. 3019[8] and the informations containing these charges
had previously been held valid in the resolution denying
the motion to quash and the resolution denying the motion
for reconsideration.
Petitioner thus filed before this Court a petition
for certiorari,[9] to set aside the resolution denying his
motion for reconsideration, claiming that he was denied
due process when the Sandiganbayan ordered his
suspension pendente lite before he could file a reply to
the prosecutions opposition to his motion for
reconsideration of the resolution denying the motion to
quash. In a Resolution dated April 28, 1995, the Court
directed the Sandiganbayan to, among other things,
permit petitioner to file said reply.
Page 35 of 168
 After allowing and considering petitioners reply, the
Sandiganbayan, on June 6, 1995, issued a Resolution
reiterating the denial of his motion for reconsideration of
the denial of the motion to quash. On the same day, the
Sandiganbayan issued another resolution reiterating the
order suspending petitioner pendente lite.
Meanwhile, R.A. No. 7975, redefining the jurisdiction
of the Sandiganbayan, took effect on May 16, 1995.[10]
On June 13, 1995, petitioner filed before the
Sandiganbayan a motion to refer his cases to the proper
court for further proceedings, alleging that when the two
Resolutions, both dated June 6, 1995, were issued by the
Anti-Graft Court, it had already lost jurisdiction over the
subject cases. The Sandiganbayan, in a Resolution dated
July 4, 1995, denied petitioners motion, holding thus:
There is no question that Municipal Mayors are classified
as Grade 27 under the compensation & Position
Classification Act of 1989. Since, at the time of the
commission of the offenses charged in he above-entitled
cases, the accused Mayor Jejomar C. Binay was a
Municipal Mayor, although in an acting or interim
capacity, the Sandiganbayan, has, under Section 4 (e) 5,
original jurisdiction over the cases therein filed against
him. The allegation that Mayor Binay ought to have been
classified with a salary grade lower than Grade 27,
because at the time of the commission of the offenses
charged he was paid a salary which merits a grade lower
than Grade 27 does not hold water. In 1986 when the
herein offenses were committed by the accused, the
Compensation & Position Classification Act of 1989 was
not as yet in existence. From the very definition of he
very Act itself, it is evident that the Act was passed and
had been effective only in 1989. The Grade classification
of a public officer, whether at the time of the commission
of the offense or thereafter, is determined by his
classification under the Compensation & Position
Classification Act of 1989. Thus since the accused
Mayor Jejomar C. Binay was a Municipal Mayor at the
time of the commission of the offenses and the
Compensation & Position Classification Act of 1989
classifies Municipal Mayors as Grade 27, it is a
conclusion beyond cavil that the Sandiganbayan has
jurisdiction over the accused herein.
As of July 1, 1989, when Republic Act No. 6758 took
effect, Municipal Mayor Jejomar C. Binay had begun
receiving a monthly salary of P15,180.00 which is
equivalent to Grade 28 under the salary scale provided
for in Section 27 of the said Act. Under the Index of
Occupational Services, the position titles and salary
grades of the Compensation & Position classification
system prepared by the Department of Budget and
Management pursuant to Section 6 of Republic [A]ct No.
6758, the position of Municipal Mayor had been
classified as Grade 27.[11]
On July 7, 1995, petitioner filed the present petition
for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus questioning the
jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan over Criminal Case
Nos. 21001, 21005 and 21007. He prayed, among others,
that the Court anuul and set aside: (1) the Resolution of
the Sandiganbayan dated June 6, 1995 reiterating the
denial of the motion for reconsideration of the motion to
quash; (2) the Resolution of the same court also dated
June 6, 1995 reiterating the order suspending
petitioner pendente lite; and (3) the Resolution of the
Sandiganbayan dated July 4, 1995 denying the motion to
refer case to the RTC. Petitioner also asked that the Court
issue a temporary restraining order preventing the
suspension and arraignment of petitioner.
The Court on July 7, 1995, resolved, among others,
to issue the temporary restraining order prayed for.
On July 14, 1995, petitioner filed an Addendum to
Petition (To allow the introduction of alternative reliefs),
praying that, should this Court hold that the
Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over the cases, the
criminal cases filed against him be dismissed just the
same on the ground that the long delay of the preliminary
investigation before the Ombudsman prior to the filing of
the informations, deprived him of his right to due process;
and that, moreover, there was no probable cause to
warrant the filing of the informations.
G.R. No. 128136
Petitioner Mario Magsaysay is the Mayor of the
Municipality of San Pascual, Batangas. Save for
petitioner Vicente dela Rosa, all of Mayor Magsaysays co-
petitioners are officials of the same municipality.
In a complaint dated April 16, 1994, Victor Cusi, then
Vice-Mayor of San Pascual, Batangas, charged
petitioners along with Elpidia Amada, Jovey C. Babago,
and Brigido H. Buhain, also officials of San Pascual
Batangas, with violation of R.A. No. 3019, as
amended. The complaint charged the respondent
municipal officials of overpaying Vicente de la Rosa of
TDR Construction for the landscaping project of the San
Pascual Central School. This was docketed in the Office
of the Ombudsman as OMB-1-94-1232.
In a Resolution dated June 14, 1995, Graft
Investigation Officer Lourdes A. Alarilla recommended the
filing of an information for violation of Section 3(e) and (g)
of R.A. No. 3019, as amended, against petitioners with
the Sandiganbayan. Director Elvis John S. Asuncion
concurred in the resolution, and Manuel C. Domingo,
Deputy Ombudsman for Luzon, recommended approval
of the same. The resolution was approved by then Acting
Ombudsman Francisco A. Villa with the following
marginal note:
Page 36 of 168
Authority is given to the deputy Ombudsman for Luzon
to cause the preparation of the information and to
approve the same for filing with the proper court.[12]
On August 11, 1995, an Information for violatiion of
Section 3 (e) and (g) was filed against petitioners and
Jovey C. Babago, not with the Sandiganbayan per the
June 14, 1995 Resolution, but with the RTC of Batangas
City. The information was signed by a Lourdes A. Alarilla,
the same Graft Investigation Officer who recommended
the filing of the information with the Sandiganbayan.
In the meantime, a group denominated as the
Concerned Citizens of San Pascual, Batangas filed a
complaint before the Ombudsman against petitioners,
and Elpidia Amada and Brigido Buhain, with violations of
R.A. No. 3019. The complaint also alleged, among others,
the overpricing of the landscaping project of San Pascual
Central School. The case was docketed as OMB-0-94-
0149.
In a Resolution dated July 27, 1995, Graft
Investigation Officer Ernesto M. Nocos recommended the
filing of an information charging petitioners with violation
of Section 3(e) and (g) of R.A. No. 3019, as amended with
proper court. The resolution, which was recommended for
approval by Nicanor J. Cruz, OIC-Deputy Ombudsman for
Luzon, and approved by Ombudsman Aniano A. Desierto,
adopted the findings and conclusions in the resolution in
OMB-1-94-1232 that the landscaping project was
overpriced.
On Febraury 9, 1996, another Information for
violation of Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019, as amended,
was filed against petitioners for the overpricing of the
landscaping project, this time before the
Sandiganbayan. The information was subsequently
amended on May 17, 1996. Except for the date the
alleged crime was committed, the information charged
essentially the same inculpatory facts as the information
filed in the RTC. The case was docketed in the
Sandiganbayan as Crim. Case No. 22378.
On June 1, 1996, the accused filed with the
Sandiganbayan a motion to quash the information in
Crim. Case No. 22378 on the following grounds: that the
Sandiganbayan had no jurisdiction over the case; that the
accused were charged with the same offense in two
informations; and that the proceedings in the
Sandiganbayan would expose petitioners to double
jeopardy. The Sandiganbayan denied the accuseds
motion to quash in a Resolution dated June 21, 1996. The
court, however, suspended proceedings in the case until
the Supreme Court resolved the question of the
Sandiganbayans jurisdiction involved in the Binay
petition.
Meanwhile, on June 7, 1996, Prosecutor Eric
Mallonga filed a motion before the RTC to refer the R.A.
No. 3019 case pending therein to the Sandiganbayan,
arguing that under R.A. No. 7975 the Sandiganbayan, not
the RTC, had jurisdiction over the case. On July 3, 1996,
the RTC issued an order holding in abeyance the
resolution of the motion to refer the case since the issue
of jurisdiction was pending before the Sandiganbayan.
Back at the Sandiganbayan, the prosecution, on July
24, 1996, filed a motion for reconsideration of the
Sandiganbayans Order dated June 21, 1996. On August
2, 1996, filed their own motion for the reconsideration of
the same order. On October 22, 1996, the
Sandiganbayan granted the motion for reconsieration
filed by the prosecution and set the case for
arraignment. Petitioners moved for a reconsideration of
the October 22, 1996 Resolution ordering their
arraignment, which motion was denied on February 17,
1997.
On February 27, 1997, the accused filed the present
petition.
On October 1, 1997, the Court resolved to issue a
temporary restraining order to prevent respondents from
further proceeding with Crim. Case No. 23278 of the
Sandiganbayan.
The petition raises the following issues:
I
Had the Sandiganbayan been ousted of its jurisdiction
over the case of municipal mayor after the passage of
Republic Act No. 7975, coupled with the filing earlier of
an information for the same offense before the Regional
Trial Court having territorial jurisdiction and venue of the
commission of the offense?
II
Are the respondents Ombudsman and the prosecutors
estopped by laches or waiver from filing and prosecuting
the case before respondent Sandiganbayan after the
filing earlier of the information in the proper court,
thereafter repudiating it, seeking another court of the
same category and finally to respondent court?
III
Whether or not the filing of two (2) informations for the
same offense violated the rule on duplicity of
information?
IV
Whether or not the trial to be conducted by respondent
court, if the case shall not be dismissed, will expose the
petitioners who are accused therein to double jeopardy?
V
Page 37 of 168
Under the circumstances, are the respondent
Ombudsman and the prosecutors guilty of forum
shopping?[13]
On October 6, 1997, the Court resolved to
consolidate G.R. No. 128136 (the Magsaysay petition)
with G.R. Nos. 120681-83 (the Binay petition).
In resolving these consolidated petitions, the Court
shall first addrress the common question of the
Sandiganbayans jurisdiction.
I classified as grade 27 and higher, of the Compensation
The Court rules that it is the Sandiganbayan which
has jurisdiction over the subject cases.
The informations against Mayor Binay were filed in
the Sandiganbayan on July 7, 1994, pursuant to
Presidential Decree No. 1606,[14] as amended by
Presidential Decree No. 1861,[15] the pertinent provisions
of which state:
SEC. 4. Jurisdiction. - The Sandiganbayan shall
exercise:
(a) Exclusive original jurisdiction in all cases involving:
(1) Violations of Republic Act No. 3019, as amended,
otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices
Act, Republic Act No. 1379, and Chapter II, Section 2,
Title VII of the Revised Penal Code;
(2) Other offenses or felonies committed by public
officers and employees in relation to their office,
including those employed in government-owned or
controlled corporations, whether simple or complexed
with other crimes, where the penalty prescribed by law is
higher than prision correccional or imprisonment for six
(6) years, or a fine of P6,000.00; PROVIDED,
HOWEVER, that offenses or felonies mentioned in this
paragraph where the penalty prescribed by law does not
exceed prision correccional or imprisonment for six (6)
years or a fine of P6,000.00 shall be tried by the proper
Regional Trial Court, Metropolitan Trial Court, Municipal
Trial Court and Municipal Circuit Trial Court.
xxx.
On May 16, 1995, R.A. No. 7975 took effect. At this
time, Mayor Binay had not yet been arraigned in the
Sandiganbayan. On the other hand, R.A. No. 7975 was
already in effect when the information against Mayor
Magsaysay et al., was filed on August 11, 1995 in the
RTC of Batangas City.
Section 2 of R.A. No. 7975 amended Section 4 of
P.D. No. 1606 to read as follows:
Sec. 4. Jurisdiction. -- The Sandiganbayan shall exercise
original jurisdiction in all cases involving:
a. Violations of Republic Act No. 3019, as amended,
otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices
Act, Republic Act No. 1379, and Chapter II, Section 2,
Title VII of the Revised Penal Code, where one or more
of the principal accused are officials occupying the
following positions in the government, whether in a
permanent, acting or interim capacity, at the time of the
commission of the offense:
(1) Officials of the executive branch occupying the
positions of regional director and higher, otherwise
and Position Classification Act of 1989 (Republic Act No.
6758), specifically including:
(a) Provincial governors, vice-governors, members of
the sangguniang panlalawigan, and provincial
treasurers, assessors, engineers, and other provincial
department heads;
(b) City mayors, vice-mayors, members of
the sangguniang panlungsod, city treasurers, assessors,
engineers, and other city department heads;
(c) Officials of the diplomatic service occupying the
position of consul and higher;
(d) Philippine army and air force colonels, naval
captains, and all officers of higher rank;
(e) PNP chief superintendent and PNP officers of higher
rank;
(f) City and provincial prosecutors and their assistants,
and officials and prosecutors in the Office of the
Ombudsman and special prosecutor;
(g) Presidents, directors or trustees, or managers of
government-owned or controlled corporations, state
universities or educational institutions or foundations;
(2) Members of Congress and officials thereof classified
as Grade 27 and up under the Compensation and
Position Classification Act of 1989;
(3) Members of the judiciary without prejudice to the
provisions of the Constitution;
(4) Chairmen and members of Constitutional
Commissions, without prejudice to the provisions of the
Constitution; and
(5) All other national and local officials classified as
Grade 27 and higher under the Compensation and
Position Classification Act of 1989.
Page 38 of 168
b. Other offenses or felonies committed by the public
officieals and employees mentioned in subsection (a) of
this section in relation to their office.
c. Civil and criminal cases filed pursuant to and in
connection with Executive Order Nos. 1, 2, 14 and 14-A.
In cases where none of the principal accused are
occupying positions corresponding to salary grade 27 or
higher, as prescribed in the said Republic Act No. 6758,
or PNP officers occupying the rank of superintendent or
higher, or their equivalent, exclusive jurisdiction thereof
shall be vested in the proper Regional Trial Court,
Metropolitan Trial Court, Municipal Trial Court, and
Municipal Circuit Trial Court, as the case may be,
pursuant to their respective jurisdiction as provided in
Batas Pambansa Blg. 129.
xxx.
While the cases against petitioners were pending in
this Court, congress enacted R.A. No. 8249, again
redefining the jurisdiction of the Anti-Graft Court. This law
took effect, per Section 10 thereof, on February 23, 1997,
fifteen days after its complete publication on February 8,
1997 in the Journal and Malaya, two newspapers of
general circulation.
As further amended by Section 4 of R.A. No. 8249,
Section 4 of P.D. No. 1606 now reads:
SEC. 4. Jurisdiction. - The Sandiganbayan shall exercise
exclusive original jurisdiction in all cases involving:
a. Violations of Republic Act No. 3019, as amended,
otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices
Act, Republic Act No. 1379, and Chapter II, Section 2,
Title VII, Book II of the Revised Penal Code, where one
or more of the accused are officials occupying the
following positions in the government, whether in a
permanent, acting or interim capacity, at he time of the
commission of the offense:
(1) Officials of the executive branch occupying the
position of regional director and higher, otherwise
classified as grade 27 and higher, of the Compensation
and Position Classification Act of 1989 (Republic Act No.
6758), specifically including:
(a) Provincial governors, vice-governors, members of
the sangguniang panlalawigan, and provincial
treasurers, assessors, engineers, and other provincial
department heads;
(b) City mayors, vice-mayors, members of
the sangguniang panlungsod, city treasurers, assessors,
engineers, and other city department heads;
(c) Officials of the diplomatic service occupying the
position of consul and higher;
(d) Philippine army and air force colonels, naval
captains, and all officers of higher rank;
(e) Officers of the Philippine National Police while
occupying the position of provincial director and those
holding the rank of senior superintendent or higher;
(f) City and provincial prosecutors and their assistants,
and officials and prosecutors in the office of the
Ombudsman and special prosecutor;
(g) Presidents, directors or trustees, or managers of
government-owned or controlled corporations, state
universities or educational institutions or foundations.
(2) Members of Congress and officials thereof classified
as Grade 27 and up under the Compensation and
Position Classification Act of 1989;
(3) Members of the judiciary without prejudice to the
provisions of the Constitution;
(4) Chairmen and members of Constitutional
Commissions, without prejudice to the provisions of he
Constitution; and
(5) All other national and local officials classified as
Grade 27 and higher under the Compensation and
Position Classification Act of 1989.
b. Other offenses or felonies whether simple or
complexed with other crimes committed by the public
officials and employees mentioned in subsection (a) of
this section in relation to heir office.
d. Civil and criminal cases filed pursuant to and in
connection with Executive Order Nos. 1, 2, 14 and 14-A,
issued in 1986.
In cases where none of the accused are occupying
positions corresponding to salary grade 27 or higher, as
prescribed in the said Republic Act No. 6758, or military
and PNP officers mentioned above, exclusive original
jurisdiction thereof shall be vested in the proper regional
trial court, metropolitan trial court, municipal trial court,
and municipal circuit trial court, as the case may be,
pursuant to their respective jurisdictions as provided
in Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, as amended.
Petitioners contend that they do not come under the
exclusive original jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan
because:
Page 39 of 168
 (1) At the alleged time of the commission of the
crimes charged, petitioner municipal mayors were not
classified as Grade 27.
(2) Municipal mayors are not included in the
enumeration in Section 4a(1) of P.D. No. 1606, as
amended by R.A. No. 7975.
(3) Congressional records reveal that the law did not
intend municipal mayors to come under the exclusive
original jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan.
A should be the determining factor in the fixing of his or her
In support of his contention that his position was not
that of Grade 27, Mayor Binay argues:
xxx. The new laws consistent and repeated
reference to salary grade show[s] an intention to
base the separation of jurisdiction between the
Sandiganbayan and the regular courts on pay
scale.Grades are determined by compensation. The
essence of grades is pay scales. Therefor, pay
scales determine grades.[16]
Mayor Binay, thus, presented a Certification [17] from
the City Personnel Officer of Makati stating that petitioner
as mayor received a monthly salary of only P10,793.00
from March 1987 to December 31, 1988. This amount
was supposedly equivalent to Grade 22 under R.A. No.
6758.
Mayor Magsaysay, for his part, submitted a similar
Certification[18] from the Municipal Treasurer of San
Pascual, Batangas, stating:
x x x that the basic monthly salary received by Mario C.
Magsaysay, Municipal Mayor of San Pascual, Batangas
with Salary Grade 27 is ELEVEN THOUSAND EIGHT
HUNDRED TWENTY EIGHT PESOS (P11,828.00) per
month as of November 3, 1993 equivalent only to Grade
25, Step 5 of RA 6758, the Compensation and Position
Classification Act of 1989.
Section 444(1) (Grad[e] 27) of RA 6758 is not as yet
implemented due to budgetary constraints. This
certification is issued to Mayor Mario C. Magsaysay this
30th day of May 1996 at San Pascual, Batangas for
whatever legal purpose and/or purposes it may serve.
The Court does not subscribe to the manner by
which petitioners classify Grades.
The Constitution[19] states that in providing for the
standardization of compensation of government officials
and employees, Congress shall take into account the
nature of the responsibilities pertaining to, and the
qualifications required for their positions, thus:
The Congress shall provide for the standardization of
compensation of government officials, including those in
government-owned or controlled corporations with
original charters, taking into account the nature of the
responsibilities pertaining to, and the qualifications
required for their positions.
Corollary thereto, Republic Act No. 6758[20] provides
in Section 2 thereof that differences in pay are to be based
upon substantive differences in duties and
responsibilities, and qualification requirements of the
positions. In short, the nature of an officials position
salary. This is not only mandated by law but dictated by
logic as well.
Consistent with these policies, the law employs the
scheme known as the grade defined in Presidential
Decree No. 985[21] as including
xxx all classes of positions which, although different with
respect to kind or subject matter of work, are sufficiently
equivalent as to level of difficulty and responsibilities and
level of qualification requirements of the work to warrant
the inclusion of such classes of positions within one
range of basic compensation.[22]
The grade, therefore, depends upon the nature of
ones position -- the level of difficulty, responsibilities, and
qualification requirements thereof -- relative to that of
another position. It is the officials Grade that determines
his or her salary, not the other way around.
It is possible that a local government officials salary
may be less than that prescribed for his Grade since his
salary depends also on the class and financial capability
of his or her respective local government
unit.[23] Nevertheless, it is the law which fixes the officials
grade.
Thus, Section 8 of R.A. 6758 fixes the salary grades
of the President, Vice-President, Senate President,
Speaker, Chief Justice, Senators, Members of the House
of Representatives, Associate Justices of the Supreme
Court, as well as the Chairmen and Members of the
Constitutional Commissions. Section 8 also authorizes
the Department of Budget and Management (DBM) to
determine the officials who are of equivalent rank to the
foregoing officials, where applicable and to assign such
officials the same Salary Grades subject to a set of
guidelines found in said section.
For positions below those mentioned under Section
8, Section 9 instructs the DBM to prepare the Index of
Occupational Services guided by the Benchmark Position
prescribed in Section 9 and the factors enumerated
therein.
To determine whether an official is within the
exclusive original jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan,
therefore, reference should be made to R.A. No. 6758 and
Page 40 of 168
the Index of Occupational Services, Position Titles and
Salary Grades. Salary level is not determinative. An
officials grade is not a matter of proof, but a matter
of law of which the Court must take judicial notice.[24]
As both the 1989 and 1997 versions of the Index of
Occupational Services, Position Titles and Salary Grades
list the municipal Mayor under Salary Grade 27, petitioner
mayors come within the exclusive original jurisdiction of
the Sandiganbayan. Petitioner mayors are local officials
classified as Grade 27 and higher under the
Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989,
under the catchall provision, Section 4a(5) of P.D. No.
1606, as amended by R.A. No. 7975. More accurately,
petitioner mayors are [o]fficials of the executive branch
occupying the positions of regional director and higher,
otherwise classified as grade 27 and higher, of the
Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989,
under Section 4a(1) of P.D. No. 1606, as amended by
R.A. No. 7975.[25]
B
Petitioners, however, argue that they are not
included in the enumeration in Section 4a(1). They invoke
the rule in statutory construction expressio unius est
expressio alterius. As what is not included in those
enumerated is deemed excluded, municipal officials are
excluded from the Sandiganbayans exclusive original
jurisdiction.
Resort to statutory construction, however, is not
appropriate where the law is clear and
unambiguous.[26] The law is clear in this case. As stated
earlier, Section 4a(1) of P.D. No. 1606, as amended by
R.A. No. 7975, speaks of [o]fficials of the executive
branch occupying the positions of regional director and
higher, otherwise classified as grade 27 and higher, of the
compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989.
The Court fails to see how a different interpretation
could arise even if the plain meaning rule were
disregarded and the law subjected to interpretation.
The premise of petitioners argument is that the
enumeration in Section 4a(1) is exclusive. It is not. The
phrase specifically including after [o]fficials of the
executive branch occupying the positions of regional
director and higher, otherwise classified as grade 27 and
higher, of the Compensation and Position Classification
Act of 1989 necessarily conveys the very idea of non-
exclusivity of the enumeration.The principle of expressio
unius est exclusio alterius does not apply where other
circumstances indicate that the enumeration was not
intended to be exclusive,[27] or where the enumeration is
by way of example only.[28] In Conrado B. Rodrigo, et al.
vs. The Honorable Sandiganbayan (First Division),
supra, the Court held that the catchall in Section 4a(5)
was necessary for it would be impractical, if not
impossible, for Congress to list down each position
created or will be created pertaining to grades 27 and
above. The same rationale applies to the enumeration in
Section 4a(1). Clearly, the law did not intend said
enumeration to be an exhaustive list.
Should there be any doubts as to whether petitioner
mayors are under the category of Grade 27, Section
444(d) of the Local Government Code settles the matter:
The municipal mayor shall receive a minimum monthly
compensation corresponding to Salary Grade twenty-
seven (27) as prescribed under R.A. No. 6758 and the
implementing guidelines issued pursuant thereto.
In the Courts Resolution in Rodrigo dated July 2,
1999 denying the motion for reconsideration, we treated
the above provision as confirmatory of the Salary Grade
assigned by the DBM to Municipal Mayors.
C
Petitioner Binay cites previous bills[29] in Congress
dealing with the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan. These
bills supposedly sought to exclude municipal officials from
the Sandiganbayans exclusive original jurisdiction to
relieve these officials ,especially those from the
provinces, of the financial burden brought about by trials
in Manila.
The resort to congressional records to determine the
proper application of the law in this case is unwarranted
in this case for the same reason that the resort to the rule
of inclusio unius est expressio alterius is inappropriate.
Verily, the interpretation of the law desired by the
petitioner may be more humane but it is also an
elementary rule in statutory construction that when the
words and phrases of the statute are clear and
unequivocal, their meaning must be determined from
language employed and the statute must be taken to
mean exactly what it says. (Baranda v. Gustilo, 165
SCRA 758-759 [1988]). The courts may not speculate as
to the probable intent of the legislature apart from the
words (Aparri v. CA, 127 SCRA 233 [1984]). When the
law is clear, it is not susceptible to interpretation. It must
be applied regardless of who may be affected, even if
the law may be harsh or onerous. (Nepomuceno, et al. v.
FC, 110 Phil. 42). And even granting that exceptions
may be conceded, the same as a general rule, should be
strictly but reasonably construed; they extend only so far
as their language fairly warrants, and all doubts should
be resolved in favor of the general provisions rather than
the exception. Thus, where a general rule is established
by statute, the court will not curtail the former nor add to
the latter by implication (Samson v. CA., 145 SCRA 654
[1986]).[30]
Page 41 of 168
 Thus, in Rodrigo, petitioners therein argued in their
motion for reconsideration:
x x x that the inclusion of Municipal Mayors within the
jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan would be inconvenient
since the witness in their case would come from Baguio
City and San Nicolas, Pangasinan.This, according to
petitioners, would defeat one of the purposes of R.A. No.
7975, that is, the convenience of the accused.
The Court, in denying the motion for reconsideration,
held, among others, that:
The legislature has nevertheless chosen the mode and
standard by which to implement its intent, and courts
have no choice but to apply it. Congress has willed that
positions with Grade 27 and above shall come within the
jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan and this Court is duty-
bound to obey the congressional will.
Petitioner Binay also quotes the Sponsorship
Speech of Senator Roco, stating:
Since February 1979, when the Sandiganbayan was
established up to the present, the Court has been
confronted with the problem of those accused who are of
limited means who stand trial for petty crimes, the so-
called small fry -- the barangay officials, the municipal
officials and employees, postal clerks and letter
carriers and the like -- who are involved with nickel-and-
dime cases and money-related cases such as
malversation, estafa and theft. xxx
xxx xxx xxx
Senate Bill No. 1353 modifies the present jurisdiction of
the Sandiganbayan such that only those occupying
high positions in Government and the military fall
under the jurisdiction of the court.[31]
It is not clear, however, whether Senator Roco meant
that all municipal officials are excluded fro mthe
jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan. In any case, courts are
not bound by a legislators opinion in congressional
debates regarding the interpretation of a particular
legislation. It is deemed a mere personal opinion of the
legislator.[32] Such opinions do not necessarily reflect the
view of the entire Congress.[33]
D jurisidction on appeals from the final judgments,
From the foregoing discussion, it is clear that the
cases against petitioner Binay cannot be referred to the
regular courts under Section 7 of R.A. No. 7975, which
provides:
Sec. 7. Upon effectivity of this Act, all criminal cases in
which trial has not begun in the Sandiganbayan shall be
referred to the proper courts.
In construing the correct import of Section 7, it may
be helpful to refer to the guidelines in determining
jurisdiction laid down in Bengzon vs. Inciong:[34]
The rule is that where a court has already obtained and
is exercising jurisdiction over a controversy, its
jurisdiction to proceed to the final determination of the
cause is not affected by new legislation placing
jurisdiction over such proceedings in another
tribunal. The exception to the rule is where the statute
expressly provides, or is construed to the effect that it is
intended to operate as to actions pending before its
enactment. Where a statute changing the jurisdiction of
a court has no retroactive effect, it cannot be applied to a
case that was pending prior to the enactment of the
statute.
R.A. No. 7975, by virtue of Section 7, belongs to the
excepetion rather than the rule. The provision is transitory
in nature and expresses the legislatures intention to apply
its provisions on jurisdiction to criminal cases in which trial
has not begun in the Sandiganbayan. To this extent, R.A.
7975 is retroactive.
Such a transitory provision is not peculiar to R.A. No.
7975; similar provisions are found in other laws
reallocating the jurisdiction of the courts.[35] There is no
reason why Section 7 of R.A. No. 7975 should be any
different.
The term proper courts, as used in Section 7, means
courts of competent jurisdiction, and such jurisdiction is
defined in Section 4 of P.D. No. 1606, as amended by
R.A. No. 7975. The former should not be read in isolation
but construed in conjunction with the latter.
The term proper courts as used in Section 7,
therefore, is not restricted to regular courts, but includes
as well the Sandiganbayan, a special court. If the intent of
Congress were to refer all cases the trials of which have
not begun to the regular courts, it should have employed
the term proper regular courts or regular courts instead of
proper courts. Accordingly, the law in the third paragraph
of Section 4 P.D. No. 1606, as amended by Section 2 of
R.A. No. 7975, uses the term regular courts, not proper
courts:
The Sandiganbayan shall exercise exclusive appellate
resolutions or orders of regular courts where all the
accused are occupying positions lower than salary grade
27, or not otherwise covered by the preceding
enumeration. [Underscoring supplied.]
Construed thus, the effects of Section 7 may be
summarized as follows:
Page 42 of 168
1. If trial of cases before the Sandiganbayan has already
begun as of the approval of R.A. No. 7975, R.A. No.
7975 does not apply.
2. If trial of cases before the Sandiganbayan
has not begun as of the approval of R.A. No. 7975, then
R.A. No. 7975 applies.
(a) If by virtue of Section 4 of P.D. No. 1606, as
amended by Section 2 of R.A. No. 7975, the
Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over a case before it,
then the case shall be referred to the Sandiganbayan.
(b) If by virtue of Section 4 of P.D. No. 1606, as
amended by Section 2 of R.A. No. 7975, the
Sandiganbayan has no jurisdiction over a case before it,
the case shall be referred to the regular courts.
The trial of the cases involving Mayor Binay had not
yet begun as of the date of the approval of R.A. 7975;
consequently, the Anti-Graft Court retains jurisdiction over
the said cases.
In any case, whatever seeming ambiguity or doubt
regarding the application of Section 7 of R.A. No. 7975
should be laid to rest by Section 7 of R.A. No. 8249, which
states:
Sec. 7. Transitory Provision. - This Act shall apply to all
cases pending in any court over which trial has not
begun as of the approval hereof.
The latter provision more accurately expresses the
legislatures intent and in any event should be applied in
this case, R.A. No. 8249 having superseded R.A. No.
7975.
In Panfilo M. Lacson vs. The Executive Secretary, et
al.,[36] The Court explained the purpose of the foregoing
provision.
x x x it can be reasonably anticipated that an alteration
of [Sandiganbayans] jurisdiction would necessarily affect
pending cases, which is why it has to provide for a
remedy in the form of a transitory provision. x x x. The
transitory provision does not only cover cases which are
in the Sandiganbayan but also in any court. x x
x. Moreover, those cases where trial had already begun
are not affected by the transitory provision under Section
7 of the new law (RA 8249). [Emphasis in the original.]
The possible disruptive effect of the amendments to
the Sandiganbayans jurisdiction on pending cases was,
therefore, not lost on the legislature. Congress has,
furthermore, deemed the commencement of the trial as
the crucial point in determining whether a court retains a
case pending before it or lose the same on the ground of
lack of jurisdiction per the provisions of R.A. 8249. The
law obviously does not want to waste the time and effort
already devoted to the presentation of evidence if trial had
already begun. On the other hand, not much disruption
would be caused if the amendment were made to apply to
cases the trials of which have not yet to start.
The ramifications of Section 7 of R.A. No. 8249 may
be stated as follows:
1. If trial of the cases pending before whatever court has
already begun as of the approval of R.A. No. 8249, said
law does not apply.
2. If trial of cases pending before whatever court
has not begun as of the approval of R.A. No. 8249, then
said law applies.
(a) If the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over a case
pending before it, then it retains jurisdiction.
(b) If the Sandiganbayan has no jurisdiction over a case
pending before it, the case shall be referred to the
regular courts.
(c) If the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over a case
pending before a regular court, the latter loses
jurisdiction and the same shall be referred to the
Sandiganbayan.
(d) If a regular court has jurisdiction over a case pending
before it, then said court retains jurisdiction.
Thus, under both R.A. Nos. 7975 and 8429, the
Sandiganbayan retains jurisdiction over said cases.
II
Petitioner Binay avers in his Addendum to Petition
that his right to speedy disposition has been violated by
the inordinate delay in the resolution of the subject cases
by the Ombudsman.
Article III of the Constitution provides that:
Sec. 16. All persons shall have the right to a speedy
disposition of their cases before all judicial, quasi-
judicial, or administrative bodies.
The constitutional right to a speedy disposition of
cases is not limited to the accused in criminal proceedings
but extends to all parties in all cases, including civil and
administrative cases, and in all proceedings, including
judicial and quasi-judicial hearings.[37] Hence, under the
Constitution, any party to a case may demand expeditious
action on all officials who are tasked with the
administration of justice.[38]
However, the right to a speedy disposition of a case,
like the right to speedy trial,[39] is deemed violated only
when the proceedings is attended by vexatious,
capricious, and oppressive delays; or when unjustified
Page 43 of 168
postponements of the trial are asked for and secured, or
when without cause or justifiable motive a long period of
time is allowed to elapse without the party having his case
tried.[40] Equally applicable is the balancing test used to
determine whether a defendant has been denied his right
to a speedy trial, or a speedy disposition of a case for that
matter, in which the conduct of both the prosecution and
the defendant is weighed, and such factors as the length
of the delay, the reasons for such delay, the assertion or
failure to assert such right by the accused, and the
prejudice caused by the delay.[41] The concept of speedy
disposition is a relative term and must necessarily be a
flexible concept.[42]
A mere mathematical reckoning of the time involved,
therefore, would not be sufficient.[43] In the application of
the constitutional guarantee of the right to speedy
disposition of cases, particular regard must also be taken
of the facts and circumstances peculiar to each case.[44]
In Tatad vs.Sandiganbayan,[45] the Court held that
the length of delay and the simplicity of the issues did not
justify the delay in the disposition of the cases
therein. The unexplained inaction[46] of the prosecutors
called for the dismissal of the cases against petitioner
Tatad.
In Alvizo vs. Sandiganbayan,[47] the Court also ruled
that there was no violation of the right to speedy
disposition. The Court took into account the reasons for
the delay, i.e., the frequent amendments of procedural
laws by presidential decrees, the structural
reorganizations in existing prosecutorial agencies and the
creation of new ones by executive fiat, resulting in
changes of personnel, preliminary jurisdiction, and the
functions and powers of prosecuting agencies. The Court
likewise considered the failure of the accused to assert
such right, and the lack of prejudice caused by the delay
to the accused.
In Santiago vs. Garchitorena,[48] the complexity of
the issues and the failure of the accused to invoke her
right to speedy disposition at the appropriate time spelled
defeat to her claim to the constitutional guarantee.
In Cadalin vs. POEAs Administrator,[49] the Court,
considering also the complexity of the cases (not run-of-
the-mill variety) and the conduct of the parties lawyers,
held that the right to speedy disposition was not violated
therein.
In petitioner Binays case, the Court finds that there
was no undue delay in the disposition of the subject
cases. The proceedings conducted before the Office of
the Tanodbayan, and later with the Office of the
Ombudsman, adequately explains the length of the delay:
1. That on July 27, 1988 Bobby Brillante filed
with the Office of the Tanodbayan an
affidavit-complaint charging, Jejomar Binay,
Sergio Santos, Roberto Chang, Delfin
Almeda, Nelson Irasga, Nicasio Santiago,
Feliciano Basam, Maria Chan, Romeo
Barrios, Azucena Diaz, Virgilio Clarete,
Godofredo Marcelo, Armando San Miguel,
Salvador Pangilinan and John Does of the
following offenses: (a) Massive Malversation
of Public Funds; (b) Multiple Falsification of
Public Documents; (c) Usurpation of Official
Functions; (d) Violation of Election Law; and
(e) Violation of Sec. 3(e) of R.A. 3019.
1.1. Brillantes complaint was based on
the initial findings and observations of
the COA on the examination of the
cash and accounts covering
transactions from April 1, 1987 to
January 4, 1988 and Post-Audit of
Selected Accounts for the last quarter
of 1987 of the Municipality of Makati
contained in its Report dated January
11, 1988. The COA furnished the
Tanodbayan a copy of this report on
August 1, 1988 upon request of the
latter.
1.2. In the letter of the COA transmitting
a copy of the report, the Tanodbayan
was informed that this COA audit
report of January 11, 1988 is not yet
released since the Mayor of Makati
was given thirty days within which to
explain/clarify the findings in the report
and is subject to change or
modification depending upon the
explanation/clarification to be
submitted by the Mayor of
Makati. Because of this information
from the COA the preliminary
investigation was held in abeyance
until the submission of the final report.
1.3. On March 1, 1989, the first part of
the Final Report on Audit of Makati
was received by the Office of the
Ombudsman and was transmitted for
purposes of the ensuring preliminary
investigation to the Tanodbayan which
received the same on March 22, 1989.
1.4. This first part of the Final Report
contained the fifteen (15) adverse
findings, above elsewhere stated as
the basis of Bobby Brillantes
complaint.
1.5. Eleven (11) COA auditors
participated in the documentation and
analysis of its findings and preparation
of the final report.
1.6. The first part of the final report was
followed by a Supplemental Report on
Findings No. 1 and 3. This
Page 44 of 168
 Supplemental Report is dated July 3,
1989.
2. After securing machine copies of the
voluminous documents supporting the COA
findings, Pros. Margarito Gervacio,
Chairman of the Panel of Prosecutors,
issued the corresponding subpoena
directing the respondents to submit their
respective counter-affidavits.
2.1. In compliance with the subpoena,
Mayor Jejomar Binay submitted his
counter-affidavit on May 18, 1990,
Marissa Chan, Feliciano Bascon,
Nicanor Santiago, Jr. on June 19,
1990, Renato Manrique on June 4,
1990, Alfredo Ignacio on June 6, 1990,
Roberto Chang on August 27,
1990. Feliciano Bascon submitted his
Supplemental Affidavit on November
22, 1990.
2.2. Thereafter, clarificatory
examinations were conducted on
September 27, 1990, October 26,
1990, November 8, 9, 14, 22, 1990.
3. On January 15, 1991 Mayor Jejomar Binay
submitted a copy of this Petition for Certiorari
in G.R. No. 92380 which he and the
municipality of Makati filed with the Supreme
Court against COA Chairman, Eufemio
Domingo and the Commission on Audit, with
a manifestation that said petition is
submitted to support Binays stand as regard
COA Finding No. 9 aforestated.
4. On April 2, 1992 respondent Marissa Chan
filed an affidavit containing allegations
incriminating Jejomar Binay;
5. Upon being ordered to comment on the said
April 2, 1992 affidavit of Marissa Chan,
Jejomar Binay submitted his comment
thereto on April 30, 1992.
6. On August 4, 1993, the Investigation Panel
submitted to the Deputy Special Prosecutor
its Resolution disposing the preliminary
investigation of the case.
6.1. On August 10, 1993 the said
Resolution was approved by the
Special Prosecutor, who forwarded
the same and the entire records to the
Office of the Ombudsman for review
and/or final action.
6.2. On August 16, 1994, the Review
Panel of the Ombudsman submitted to
the latter its review action for approval.
6.3. On August 19, 1994, the
Ombudsman approved some of the
recommendations of the Review
Panel and directed the preparation
and filing of the informations.[50]
Furthermore, the prosecution is not bound by the
findings of the Commission on Audit (COA); it must rely
on its own independent judgment in the determination of
probable cause. Accordingly, the prosecution had to
conduct it s own review of the COA findings. Judging from
said findings, we find that the cases were sufficiently
complex, thus justifying the length of time for their
resolution. As held by the Sandiganbayan in its
Resolution dated March 29, 1995 denying the Motion to
Quash:
2. Ten charges are involved in these cases and
the prosecution, unable to rely on the raw
findings of the Commission on Audit in 15
reports caused the investigation and
examination of thousands of vouchers,
payrolls, and supporting documents
considering that no less than the Chairman
of the Commission on Audit, assisted by a
team supervisor and 10 team members had
to take part in the conduct of a final audit
consisting of evaluation and analysis of the
initial findings in the 15 raw reports, the
cases must have involved complicated legal
and factual issues which do warrant or justify
a longer period of time for preliminary
investigation.
xxx
5. In the TATAD case, the preliminary
investigation was resolved close to three (3)
years from the time all the counter-affidavits
were submitted to the Tanodbayan,
notwithstanding the fact that very few
documentary and testimonial evidence were
involved. In the above-entitled cases, the
preliminary investigation of all ten (10) cases
was terminated in merely two (2) years and
four (4) months from the date Mayor Binay
filed his last pleading, on April 30, 1992.[51]
Petitioner claims that the Resolution of the
Sandiganbayan ordering his suspension pendente lite is
unwarranted since the informations charging him were not
valid. This contention, however, must fail in view of our
pronouncement that there was no delay in the resolution
of the subject cases in violation of his right to speedy
disposition. Accordingly, the informations in question are
valid an petitioners suspension pendente lite must be
upheld.
Finally, whether or not there is probable cause to
warrant the filing of the subject cases is a question best
left to the discretion of the Ombudsman. Absent any
grave abuse of such discretion, the Court will not interfere
Page 45 of 168
in the exercise thereof.[52] Petitioner in this case has failed
to establish any such abuse on the part of the
Ombudsman.
III
Having ruled that the criminal case against
petitioners in G.R. No. 128136 is within the exclusive
original jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan, the Court will
now dispose of the following issues raised by them:
(1) The Sandiganbayan was ousted of its jurisdiction
by the filing of an information alleging the same facts with
the Regional Trial Court.
(2) Respondents are estopped from filing an
information before the Sandiganbayan considering that
they had already filed another information alleging the
same facts before the Regional Trial Court.
(3) The filing of the information before the
Sandiganbayan constitutes double jeopardy.
The Court tackles these arguments successively
then deals with the questions of duplicity of information
and forum shopping.
Petitioners invoke the rule that the jurisdiction of a
court once it attaches cannot be ousted by subsequent
happenings or events, although of such character which
would have prevented jurisdiction from attaching in the
first instance.[53] They claim that the filing of the
information in the Sandiganbayan was a subsequent
happening or event which cannot oust the RTC of its
jurisdiction.
This rule has no application here for the simple
reason that the RTC had no jurisdiction over the
case. Jurisdiction never attached to the RTC. When the
information was filed before the RTC, R.A. No. 7975 was
already in effect and, under said law, jurisdiction over the
case pertained to the Sandiganbayan.
Neither can estoppel be successfully invoked. First,
jurisdiction is determined by law, not by the consent or
agreement of the parties or by estoppel.[54] As a
consequence of this principle, the Court held in Zamora
vs. Court of Appeals[55] that:
It follows that as a rule the filing of a complaint with one
court which has no jurisdiction over it does not prevent
the plaintiff from filing the same complaint later with the
competent court. The plaintiff is not estopped from doing
so simply because it made a mistake before in the
choice of the proper forum. In such a situation, the only
authority the first court can exercise is to dismiss the
case for lack of jurisdiction. This has to be so as a
contrary conclusion would allow a party to divest the
competent court of its jurisdiction, whether erroneously
or even deliberately, in derogation of the law.
It is true that the Court has ruled in certain
cases[56] that estoppel prevents a party from questioning
the jurisdiction of the court that the party himself
invoked. Estoppel, however, remains the exception rather
than the rule, the rule being that jurisdiction is vested by
law.[57] Even in those instances where the Court applied
estoppel, the party estopped consistently invoked the
jurisdiction of the court and actively participated in the
proceedings, impugning such jurisdiction only when faced
with an adverse decision. This is not the case here. After
discovering that a similar information had earlier been
filed in the RTC, respondents promptly asked the trial
court to refer the case to the Sandiganbayan, which
motion was followed by a motion to resolve the previous
motion. There was no consistent invocation of the RTCs
jurisdiction. There were no further proceedings after the
filing of the information save for the motion to refer the
case precisely on the ground of lack of jurisdiction, and
the motion to resolve the earlier motion. Finally, the trial
court had not rendered any decision, much less one
adverse to petitioners.
Second, petitioners cannot hold respondents in
estoppel for the latter are not themselves party to the
criminal action. In a criminal action, the State is the
plaintiff, for the commission of a crime is an offense
against the State. Thus, the complaint or information filed
in court is required to be brought in the name of the
People of the Philippines.[58] Even then, the doctrine of
estoppel does not apply as against the people in criminal
prosecutions.[59] Violations of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt
Practices Act, like attempted murder,[60] is a public
offense. Social and public interest demand the
punishment of the offender; hence, criminal actions for
public offenses can not be waived or condoned, much
less barred by the rules of estoppel.[61]
The filing of the information in the Sandiganbayan
did not put petitioners in double jeopardy even though
they had already pleaded not guilty to the information
earlier filed in the RTC. The first jeopardy never attached
in the first place, the RTC not being a court of competent
jurisdiction. There can be no double jeopardy where the
accused entered a plea in a court that had no
jurisdiction.[62] The remedy of petitioners, therefore, was
not to move for the quashal of the information pending in
the Sandiganbayan on the ground of double
jeopardy.[63] Their remedy was to move for the quashal of
the information pending in the RTC on the ground of lack
of jurisdiction.[64]
The contention that the filing of the information in the
Sandiganbayan violated the rule against duplicitous
informations is patently unmeritorious. That rule
presupposes that there is one complaint or information
charging not one offense, but two or more offenses. Thus,
Rule 110 of the Rules of Court states:
Sec. 13. Duplicity of offense. - A complaint or information
must charge but one offense, except only in those cases
in which existing laws prescribed a single punishment for
various offenses.
Page 46 of 168
Non-compliance with this rule is a ground for quashing the
duplicitous complaint or information under Rule 117:

Sec. 3. Grounds. - The accused may move to quash the

complaint or information on any of the following grounds:

xxx

(e) That more than one offense is charged except in

those cases in which existing laws prescribe a single
punishment for various offenses;

xxx
Here, petitioners are faced not with one
information charging more than one offense but
with more than one information charging one offense.
The Court does not find the prosecution guilty of
forum-shopping. Broadly speaking, forum shopping exists
when, as a result of an adverse opinion in one forum, a
party seeks a favorable opinion (other than by appeal
or certiorari) in another, or when he institutes two or more
actions or proceedings grounded on the same cause, on
the gamble that one or the other court would make a
favorable disposition.[65]We discern no intent on the part
of the State, in filing two informations in two different
courts, to gamble that one or the other court would make
a favorable disposition.
Obviously, respondents got their signals
crossed. One set of officials, after investigating a
complaint filed by the Vice-Mayor of San Pascual,
Batangas charging petitioners of overpricing, filed the
information for violation of Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019
in the RTC. Another set of officials investigated another
complaint from the Concerned Citizens Group accusing
petitioners of, among others, overpricing the same project
subject of the previous complaint. Finding probable
cause, the second set of officials instituted the criminal
action, charging the same offense and alleging essentially
the same facts as the first, this time in the
Sandiganbayan. Later learning of the procedural faux
pas, respondents without undue delay asked the RTC to
refer the case to the Sandiganbayan.
WHEREFORE, the consolidated petitions are
hereby DISMISSED.

Page 47 of 168
 FIRST DIVISION

[G.R. Nos. 122297-98. January 19, 2000]

CRESCENTE Y. LLORENTE, JR., petitioner,

vs. SANDIGANBAYAN and PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, respondents.

DECISION

PARDO, J.:

The case before the Court is a special civil action

for certiorari[1] assailing the jurisdiction of the
Sandiganbayan over the criminal cases against then
municipal mayor Crescente Y. Llorente, Jr. for violations
of Republic Act No. 3019, as amended.

Petitioner Crescente Y. Llorente, Jr. was elected

municipal mayor of Sindangan, Zamboanga in 1988 and
1992. On May 8, 1995, he was a candidate for
congressman, second district of Zamboanga del Norte,
and was duly elected.

On August 6, 1993, the Office of the Special

Prosecutor[2] filed with the Sandiganbayan an
information[3] against Crescente Y. Llorente, Jr.,
municipal mayor of Sindangan, Zamboanga del Norte,
P/Sgt. Juanito Caboverde and Jose Dy for violation of
Section 3 (e), Republic Act No. 3019, as amended,
committed as follows:

"That on or about June 12, 1989, in the

Municipality of Sindangan, Zamboanga
del Norte, and within the jurisdiction of
this Honorable Court, accused
Crescente Y. Llorente, Jr., Municipal
Mayor of Sindangan, Zamboanga del
Norte and P/Sgt. Juanito Cadoverde of
the defunct Integrated National Police
and as such public officers and the other
accused Jose Dy, a private individual,
conspiring with each other and acting
with evident bad faith, did then and
there, willfully, unlawfully and criminally
seized (sic) 930 sawn knockdown
wooden boxes owned by Godofredo M.
Diamante without any search and
seizure warrant and without issuing any
receipt of seizure thereby causing undue
damage and injury to said Godofredo M.
Diamante and this offense was
committed in relation to the office of the
said public officers.

"CONTRARY TO LAW.

"Manila, August 6, 1993.

Page 48 of 168
On February 2, 1994, the three accused were arraigned
before the Sandiganbayan and pleaded not
guilty.

On March 31, 1995, the Office of the Ombudsman[5] filed

with the Sandiganbayan another information[6] against
petitioner for violation of Section 3 (f), Republic Act No.
3019, as amended, committed as follows:

"That on or about July 5, 1993, and for

sometime subsequent thereto, in
Sindangan, Zamboanga del Norte,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of
this Honorable Court, the above-named
accused, a public officer, being then the
Municipal Mayor of Sindangan,
Zamboanga del Norte, with grave abuse
of authority, did then and there wilfully,
unlawfully and criminally refuse to issue
Mayors permit to the ice plant and
resawmill/box factory of R. F. Diamante
and family, without sufficient justification,
after due demand and payment of
license fees were made, said refusal to
grant Mayors permit being not only
personal but for the purpose of giving
undue advantage to similar businesses
in town and as an act of discriminating
against the interest of the complainant to
the latters damage and prejudice.

"CONTRARY TO LAW.
The trial of both criminal cases before the
"Manila, Philippines, March 31, 1995 Sandiganbayan has not begun.

On May "16, 1995, Congress enacted Republic Act No.

(
7975,[8] amending Section 4 of Presidential Decree No.
s
1606,[9] providing:
/
t
) "SEC. 4. Jurisdiction The
Sandiganbayan shall exercise original
D
jurisdiction in cases involving:
A
N
I "a. Violations of Republic Act No. 3019,
E as amended, otherwise known as the
L Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act,
B Republic Act 1379, and Chapter II,
. Section 2, Title VII of the Revised Penal
J Code, where one or more of the
O principal accused are officials occupying
V the following positions in the
A government, whether in a permanent,
C acting or interim capacity, at the time of
O the commission of the offense:
N
, "(1) Officials of the executive branch
J occupying the positions of regional
R director or higher, otherwise classified
Page 49 of 168
as Grade "27" and higher, of the
Compensation and Position
Classification Act of 1989 (Republic Act
No. 6758), specifically including:
"(a) Provincial governors, vice
governors, members of the sangguniang
panlalawigan, and provincial treasurers,
assessors, engineers, and other
provincial department heads;
"(b) City mayors, vice mayors, members
of the sangguniang panglungsod, city
treasurers, assessors, engineers, and
other city department heads;
"(c) Officials of the diplomatic service
occupying the position of consul and
higher;
"(d) Philippine army and air force
colonels, naval captains, and all other
officials of higher rank;
"(e) PNP chief superintendent and PNP
officers of higher rank;
"(f) City and provincial prosecutors and
their assistants, and officials and
prosecutors in the Office of the
Ombudsman and special prosecutor;
"(g) Presidents, directors, or trustees, or
managers of government-owned or
controlled corporations, state
universities or educational institutions of
foundations.
"(2) Members of Congress and officials
thereof classified as Grade "27" and up
under the Compensation and Position
Classification Act of 1989;
"(3) Members of the judiciary without
prejudice to the provisions of the
Constitution;
"(4) Chairmen and members of
Constitutional Commissions, without
prejudice to the provisions of the
Constitution; and
"(5) All other national and local officials
classified as Grade "27" and higher
under the Compensation and Position
Classification Act of 1989.
"b. Other offenses or felonies committed
by the public officials and employees
mentioned in subsection (a) of this
section in relation to their office.
"c. Civil and criminal cases filed
pursuant to and in connection with
Executive Order Nos. 1, 2, 14 and 14-A.
"In cases where none of the principal
accused are occupying positions
corresponding to salary grade "27" or
higher, as prescribed in the said
Republic Act No. 6758, or PNP officers
occupying the rank of superintendent or
higher, or their equivalent, exclusive
jurisdiction thereof shall be vested in the
proper Regional Trial Court,
Metropolitan Trial Court, Municipal Trial
Court, and Municipal Circuit Trial Court,
as the case may be, pursuant to their
respective jurisdiction as provided in
Batas Pambansa Blg.
129."[10]
On July 10, 1995, petitioner filed with the
Sandiganbayan, Third Division, a motion to dismiss or
transfer Criminal Case No. 19763 to the Regional Trial
Court, Sindangan, Zamboanga.
On the same date, petitioner filed with the
Sandiganbayan, First Division, a motion to refer Criminal
Case No. 22655 to the Regional Trial Court, Sindangan,
Zamboanga.
Petitioner averred that the enactment of Republic Act
No. 7975 divested the Sandiganbayan of its jurisdiction
over criminal cases against municipal mayors for
violations of Republic Act No. 3019, as amended, who
receive salary less than that corresponding to Grade 27,
pursuant to the Index of Occupational Services prepared
by the Department of Budget and Management (DBM).
On September 7, 1995, the Sandiganbayan, First
Division[11] denied the motion to refer Criminal Case No.
22655 to the Regional Trial Court. On October 10, 1995,
the Sandiganbayan denied petitioners motion for
reconsideration.[12]
On September 14, 1995, Sandiganbayan, Third
Division[13] also denied the motion to transfer Criminal
Case No. 19763 to the Regional Trial Court.
Hence, petitioner filed these petitions for certiorari.[14]
On December 27, 1995, the Court consolidated the two
cases.[15]
Page 50 of 168
On February 23, 1997, Congress enacted Republic Act
No. 8249, an act redefining the jurisdiction of
Sandiganbayan.[16]

On September 1, 1999, we gave due course to the

petitions.[17]

The issue raised in these two cases is whether or not

Republic Act No. 7975 divested the Sandiganbayan of
its jurisdiction over violations of Republic Act No. 3019,
as amended, against municipal mayors.

We have resolved this issue in recent cases ruling that

the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over violations of
Republic Act No. 3019, as amended, against municipal
mayors.[18]

There is no merit to petitioners averment that the salary

received by a public official dictates his salary grade.
"On the contrary, it is the officials grade that determines
his or her salary, not the other way around."[19] "To
determine whether the official is within the exclusive
jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan, therefore, reference
should be made to Republic Act No. 6758 and the Index
of Occupational Services, Position Titles and Salary
Grades. An officials grade is not a matter of proof, but a
matter of law which the court must take judicial
notice."[20]

Section 444 (d) of the Local Government Code provides

that "the municipal mayor shall receive a minimum
monthly compensation corresponding to Salary Grade
twenty-seven (27) as prescribed under Republic Act No.
6758 and the implementing guidelines issued pursuant
thereto." Additionally, both the 1989 and 1997 versions
of the Index of Occupational Services, Position Titles
and Salary Grades list the municipal mayor under Salary
Grade 27.[21] Consequently, the cases against petitioner
as municipal mayor for violations of Republic Act No.
3019, as amended, are within the exclusive jurisdiction
of the Sandiganbayan.

WHEREFORE, we hereby DISMISS the consolidated

petitions at bar, for lack of merit.

No costs.

SO ORDERED.

Page 51 of 168
 EN BANC
G.R. No. 143047 July 14, 2004
RICARDO S. INDING, petitioner,
vs.
THE HONORABLE SANDIGANBAYAN and THE
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.
DECISION
CALLEJO, SR., J.:
This is a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the 1997
Rules of Civil Procedure for the nullification of the
September 23, 1999 Resolution1 of the Sandiganbayan
(Second Division), which denied the petitioner's omnibus
motion with supplemental motion, and its Resolution
dated April 25, 2000, denying the petitioner's motion for
the reconsideration of the same.
The Antecedents
On January 27, 1999, an Information was filed with the
Sandiganbayan charging petitioner Ricardo S. Inding, a
member of the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Dapitan
City, with violation of Section 3(e) of Republic Act No.
3019,2committed as follows:
That from the period 3 January 1997 up to 9
August 1997 and for sometime prior or
subsequent thereto, in Dapitan City, Philippines,
and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, the above-named accused Ricardo S.
Inding, a high-ranking public officer, being a
Councilor of Dapitan City and as such, while in
the performance of his official functions,
particularly in the operation against drug abuse,
with evident bad faith and manifest partiality, did
then and there, willfully, unlawfully and
criminally, faked buy-bust operations against
alleged pushers or users to enable him to claim
or collect from the coffers of the city government
a total amount of P30,500.00, as reimbursement
for actual expenses incurred during the alleged
buy-bust operations, knowing fully well that he
had no participation in the said police operations
against drugs but enabling him to collect from
the coffers of the city government a total amount
of P30,500.00, thereby causing undue injury to
the government as well as the public interest.3
The case was docketed as Criminal Case No. 25116
and raffled to the Second Division of the
Sandiganbayan.
On June 2, 1999, the petitioner filed an Omnibus
Motion4 for the dismissal of the case for lack of
jurisdiction over the officers charged or, in the
alternative, for the referral of the case either to the
Regional Trial Court or the Municipal Trial Court for
appropriate proceedings. The petitioner alleged therein
that under Administrative Order No. 270 which
prescribes the Rules and Regulations Implementing the
Local Government Code of 1991, he is a member of
the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Dapitan City with Salary
Grade (SG) 25. He asserted that under Republic Act No.
7975, which amended Presidential Decree No. 1606, the
Sandiganbayan exercises original jurisdiction to try
cases involving crimes committed by officials of local
government units only if such officials occupy positions
with SG 27 or higher, based on Rep. Act No. 6758,
otherwise known as the "Compensation and Position
Classification Act of 1989." He contended that under
Section 4 of P.D. No. 1606, as amended by Section 2 of
Rep. Act No. 7975, the RTC, not the Sandiganbayan,
has original jurisdiction over the crime charged against
him. The petitioner urged the trial court to take judicial
notice of Adm. Order No. 270.
In its comment on the omnibus motion, the Office of the
Special Prosecutor asserted that the petitioner was, at
the time of the commission of the crime, a member of
the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Dapitan City,
Zamboanga del Norte, one of those public officers who,
by express provision of Section 4 a.(1)(b) of P.D. No.
1606, as amended by Rep. Act No. 7975,5 is classified
as SG 27. Hence, the Sandiganbayan, not the RTC, has
original jurisdiction over the case, regardless of his
salary grade under Adm. Order No. 270.
On September 23, 1999, the respondent Sandiganbayan
issued a Resolution denying the petitioner's omnibus
motion. According to the court, the Information alleged
that the petitioner has a salary grade of 27. Furthermore,
Section 2 of Rep. Act No. 7975, which amended Section
4 of P.D. No. 1606, provides that the petitioner, as a
member of the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Dapitan
City, has a salary grade of 27.6
On October 27, 1999, the petitioner filed a Supplemental
Motion to his omnibus motion,7 citing Rep. Act No. 8294
and the ruling of this Court in Organo v.
Sandiganbayan,8 where it was declared that Rep. Act
No. 8249, the latest amendment to the law creating the
Sandiganbayan, "collated the provisions on the exclusive
jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan," and that "the original
jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan as a trial court was
made to depend not on the penalty imposed by law on
the crimes and offenses within its jurisdiction but on the
Page 52 of 168
rank and salary grade of accused government officials
and employees."
In the meantime, the petitioner was conditionally
arraigned on October 28, 1999 and entered a plea of not
guilty.9
On November 18, 1999, the petitioner filed a Motion for
Reconsideration of the Sandiganbayan's September 23,
1999 Resolution.10 The motion was, however, denied by
the Sandiganbayan in a Resolution promulgated on April
25, 2000.11
Dissatisfied, the petitioner filed the instant petition for
certiorari, contending as follows:
A. That Republic Act [No.] 8249 which took
effect last 05 February 1997 made the
jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan as a trial court
depend not only on the penalty imposed by law
on the crimes and offenses within its jurisdiction
but on the rank and salary grade of accused
government officials and employees.
B. That the ruling of the Supreme Court in "Lilia
B. Organo versus The Sandiganbayan and the
People of the Philippines," G.R. No. 133535, 09
September 1999, settles the matter on the
original jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan as a
trial court which is over public officials and
employees with rank and salary grade 27 and
above.
The petitioner contends that, at the time the offense
charged was allegedly committed, he was already
occupying the position of Sangguniang
Panlungsod Member I with SG 25. Hence, under Section
4 of Rep. Act No. 8249, amending Rep. Act No. 7975, it
is the RTC and not the Sandiganbayan that has
jurisdiction over the offense lodged against him. He
asserts that under Adm. Order No. 270,12 Dapitan City is
only a component city, and the members of
the Sangguniang Panlungsod are classified
as Sangguniang Panlungsod Members I with SG 25.
Thus, Section 4 a.(1)(b) of P.D. No. 1606, as amended
by Section 2 of Rep. Act No. 7975, and retained by
Section 4 of Rep. Act No. 8249, does not apply to him.
On the other hand, the respondents, through the Office
of the Special Prosecutor, contend that Section 4
a.(1)(b) of P.D. No. 1606, as amended by Section 2 of
Rep. Act No. 7975, expressly provides that the
Sandiganbayan has original jurisdiction over violations of
Rep. Act No. 3019, as amended, committed by the
members of the Sangguniang Panlungsod, without
qualification and regardless of salary grade. They argue
that when Congress approved Rep. Act No. 7975 and
Rep. Act No. 8249, it was aware that not all the positions
specifically mentioned in Section 4, subparagraph (1)
were classified as SG 27, and yet were specifically
included therein, viz:
It is very clear from the aforecited provisions of
law that the members of the sangguniang
panlungsod are specifically included as among
those falling within the exclusive original
jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan.
A reading of the aforesaid provisions, likewise,
show that the qualification as to Salary Grade 27
and higher applies only to such officials of the
executive branch other than the regional director
and higher and those specifically enumerated.
To rule, otherwise, is to give a different
interpretation to what the law clearly is.
Moreover, had there been an intention to make
Salary Grade 27 and higher as the sole factor to
determine the exclusive original jurisdiction of
the Sandiganbayan then the lawmakers could
have simply stated that the officials of the
executive branch, to fall within the exclusive
original jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan,
should have been occupying the positions with a
Salary Grade of 27 and higher. But the express
wordings in both RA No. 7975 and RA No. 8249
specifically including the members of the
sangguniang panlungsod, among others, as
those within the exclusive original jurisdiction of
the Sandiganbayan only means that the said
sangguniang members shall be within the
exclusive original jurisdiction of the said court
regardless of their Salary Grade.
In this connection too, it is well to state that the
lawmakers are very well aware that not all the
positions specifically mentioned as those within
the exclusive original jurisdiction of the
Sandiganbayan have a Salary Grade of 27 and
higher. Yet, the legislature has explicitly made
the officials so enumerated in RA No. 7975 and
RA No. 8249 as falling within the exclusive
original jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan
because of the nature of these officials' functions
and responsibilities as well as the power they
can wield over their respective area of
jurisdiction.13
The threshold issue for the Court's resolution is whether
the Sandiganbayan has original jurisdiction over the
petitioner, a member of the Sangguniang Panlungsod of
Dapitan City, who was charged with violation of Section
3(e) of Rep. Act No. 3019, otherwise known as the Anti-
Graft and Corrupt Practices Act.
The Court rules in the affirmative.
Page 53 of 168
Rep. Act No. 7975, entitled "An Act to Strengthen the
Functional and Structural Organization of the
Sandiganbayan, Amending for that Purpose Presidential
Decree No. 1606," took effect on May 16, 1995. Section
2 thereof enumerates the cases falling within the original
jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan. Subsequently, Rep.
Act No. 7975 was amended by Rep. Act No. 8249,
entitled "An Act Further Defining the Jurisdiction of the
Sandiganbayan, Amending for the Purpose Presidential
Decree No. 1606, as Amended, Providing Funds
Therefor, and for Other Purposes." The amendatory law
took effect on February 23, 1997 and Section 4 thereof
enumerates the cases now falling within the exclusive
original jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan.
For purposes of determining which of the two laws, Rep.
Act No. 7975 or Rep. Act No. 8249, applies in the
present case, the reckoning period is the time of the
commission of the offense.14 Generally, the jurisdiction of
a court to try a criminal case is to be determined by the
law in force at the time of the institution of the action, not
at the time of the commission of the crime.15 However,
Rep. Act No. 7975, as well as Rep. Act No. 8249,
constitutes an exception thereto as it expressly states
that to determine the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan
in cases involving violations of Rep. Act No. 3019, the
reckoning period is the time of the commission of the
offense. This is plain from the last clause of the opening
sentence of paragraph (a) of these two provisions which
reads:
a. Violations of Republic Act No. 3019, as
amended, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft
and Corrupt Practices Act, Republic Act No.
1379, and Chapter II, Section 2, Title VII of the
Revised Penal Code,19 where one or more of the
principal accused are officials occupying the
following positions in the government, whether in
a permanent, acting or interim capacity, at the
time of the commission of the offense:
(1) Officials of the executive branch
occupying the positions of regional
director and higher, otherwise classified
as grade 27 and higher, of the
Compensation and Position
Classification Act of 1989 (Republic Act
No. 6758), specifically including:
(a) Provincial governors, vice-
governors, members of the
sangguniang panlalawigan, and
provincial treasurers, assessors,
engineers, and other provincial
department heads;
(b) City mayors, vice-mayors,
members of the sangguniang
panlungsod, city treasurers,
assessors, engineers, and other
city department heads;20

Sec. 4. Jurisdiction. The Sandiganbayan shall

(c) Officials of the diplomatic
exercise [exclusive]16 original jurisdiction in all
service occupying the position
cases involving:
of consul and higher;

a. Violations of Republic Act No. 3019, as

(d) Philippine army and air force
amended, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft
colonels, naval captains, and all
and Corrupt Practices Act, Republic Act No.
officers of higher rank;
1379, and Chapter II, Section 2, Title VII, [Book
II]17 of the Revised Penal Code, where one or
more of the principal accused are officials (e) PNP chief superintendent
occupying the following positions in the and PNP officers of higher
government, whether in a permanent, acting or rank;21
interim capacity, at the time of the commission of
the offense: (f) City and provincial
prosecutors and their assistants,
… and officials and prosecutors in
the Office of the Ombudsman
and special prosecutor;
In this case, as gleaned from the Information filed in the
Sandiganbayan, the crime charged was committed from
the period of January 3, 1997 up to August 9, 1997. The (g) Presidents, directors or
applicable law, therefore, is Rep. Act No. 7975. Section trustees, or managers of
2 of Rep. Act No. 7975 expanded the jurisdiction of the government-owned or controlled
Sandiganbayan as defined in Section 4 of P.D. No. corporations, state universities
1606, thus: or educational institutions or
foundations;
Sec. 4. Jurisdiction. The Sandiganbayan shall
exercise original jurisdiction in all cases (2) Members of Congress and officials
involving:18 thereof classified as Grade "27" and up
Page 54 of 168
 under the Compensation and Position
Classification Act of 1989;
(3) Members of the judiciary without
prejudice to the provisions of the
Constitution;
(4) Chairmen and members of
Constitutional Commissions, without
prejudice to the provisions of the
Constitution; and
(5) All other national and local officials
classified as Grade "27" and higher
under the Compensation and Position
Classification Act of 1989.
b. Other offenses or felonies committed by the
public officials and employees mentioned in
subsection (a) of this section in relation to their
office.22
c. Civil and criminal cases filed pursuant to and
in connection with Executive Order Nos. 1, 2, 14
and 14-A.
In cases where none of the principal accused
are occupying positions corresponding to salary
grade "27" or higher, as prescribed in the said
Republic Act No. 6758, or PNP officers
occupying the rank of superintendent or higher,
or their equivalent, exclusive jurisdiction thereof
shall be vested in the proper Regional Trial
Court, Metropolitan Trial Court, Municipal Trial
Court, and Municipal Circuit Trial Court, as the
case may be, pursuant to their respective
jurisdiction as provided in Batas Pambansa Blg.
129.23
A plain reading of the above provision shows that, for
purposes of determining the government officials that fall
within the original jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan in
cases involving violations of Rep. Act No. 3019 and
Chapter II, Section 2, Title VII of the Revised Penal
Code, Rep. Act No. 7975 has grouped them into five
categories, to wit:
(1) Officials of the executive branch occupying
the positions of regional director and higher,
otherwise classified as grade 27 and higher. . .
(2) Members of Congress and officials thereof
classified as Grade "27" and up under the
Compensation and Position Classification Act of
1989;
(3) Members of the judiciary without prejudice to
the provisions of the Constitution;
(4) Chairmen and members of Constitutional
Commissions, without prejudice to the provisions
of the Constitution; and
(5) All other national and local officials classified
as Grade "27" and higher under the
Compensation and Position Classification Act of
1989.
With respect to the first category, i.e., officials of the
executive branch with SG 27 or higher, Rep. Act No.
7975 further specifically included the following officials
as falling within the original jurisdiction of the
Sandiganbayan:
(a) Provincial governors, vice-governors,
members of the sangguniang panlalawigan, and
provincial treasurers, assessors, engineers, and
other provincial department heads;
(b) City mayors, vice-mayors, members of the
sangguniang panlungsod, city treasurers,
assessors, engineers, and other city department
heads;
(c) Officials of the diplomatic service occupying
the position of consul and higher;
(d) Philippine army and air force colonels, naval
captains, and all officers of higher rank;
(e) PNP chief superintendent and PNP officers
of higher rank;
(f) City and provincial prosecutors and their
assistants, and officials and prosecutors in the
Office of the Ombudsman and special
prosecutor;
(g) Presidents, directors or trustees, or
managers of government-owned or controlled
corporations, state universities or educational
institutions or foundations;
The specific inclusion of the foregoing officials
constitutes an exception to the general qualification
relating to officials of the executive branch as "occupying
the positions of regional director and higher, otherwise
classified as grade 27 and higher, of the Compensation
and Position Classification Act of 1989." In other words,
violation of Rep. Act No. 3019 committed by officials in
the executive branch with SG 27 or higher, and the
officials specifically enumerated in (a) to (g) of Section 4
a.(1) of P.D. No. 1606, as amended by Section 2 of Rep.
Act No. 7975, regardless of their salary grades, likewise
fall within the original jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan.
Page 55 of 168
Had it been the intention of Congress to confine the
original jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan to violations of
Rep. Act No. 3019 only to officials in the executive
branch with SG 27 or higher, then it could just have
ended paragraph (1) of Section 4 a. of P.D. No. 1606, as
amended by Section 2 of Rep. Act No. 7975, with the
phrase "officials of the executive branch occupying the
positions of regional director and higher, otherwise
classified as grade 27 and higher, of the Compensation
and Position Classification Act of 1989." Or the category
in paragraph (5) of the same provision relating to "[a]ll
other national and local officials classified as Grade '27'
and up under the Compensation and Classification Act
of 1989" would have sufficed. Instead, under paragraph
(1) of Section 4 a. of P.D. No. 1606, as amended by
Section 2 of Rep. Act No. 7975, Congress included
specific officials, without any reference as to their salary
grades. Clearly, therefore, Congress intended these
officials, regardless of their salary grades, to be
specifically included within the Sandiganbayan's original
jurisdiction, for had it been otherwise, then there would
have been no need for such enumeration. It is axiomatic
in legal hermeneutics that words in a statute should not
be construed as surplusage if a reasonable construction
which will give them some force and meaning is
possible.24
That the legislators intended to include certain public
officials, regardless of their salary grades, within the
original jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan is apparent
from the legislative history of both Rep. Acts Nos. 7975
and 8249. In his sponsorship speech of Senate Bill No.
1353, which was substantially adopted by both Houses
of Congress and became Rep. Act No. 7975, Senator
Raul S. Roco, then Chairman of the Committee on
Justice and Human Rights, explained:
Senate Bill No. 1353 modifies the present
jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan such that only
those occupying high positions in the
government and the military fall under the
jurisdiction of the court.
As proposed by the Committee, the
Sandiganbayan shall exercise original
jurisdiction over cases assigned to it only in
instances where one or more of the principal
accused are officials occupying the positions of
regional director and higher or are otherwise
classified as Grade 27 and higher by the
Compensation and Classification Act of 1989,
whether in a permanent, acting or interim
capacity at the time of the commission of the
offense. The jurisdiction, therefore, refers to a
certain grade upwards, which shall remain with
the Sandiganbayan.
The President of the Philippines and other
impeachable officers such as the justices of the
Supreme Court and constitutional commissions
are not subject to the original jurisdiction of the
Sandiganbayan during their incumbency.
The bill provides for an extensive listing of other
public officers who will be subject to the
original jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan. It
includes, among others, Members of Congress,
judges and justices of all courts.25
More instructive is the sponsorship speech, again, of
Senator Roco, of Senate Bill No. 844, which was
substantially adopted by both Houses of Congress and
became Rep. Act No. 8249. Senator Roco explained the
jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan in Rep. Act No. 7975,
thus:
SPONSORSHIP OF SENATOR ROCO
…
By way of sponsorship, Mr. President – we will
issue the full sponsorship speech to the
members because it is fairly technical – may we
say the following things:
To speed up trial in the Sandiganbayan,
Republic Act No. 7975 was enacted for that
Court to concentrate on the "larger fish" and
leave the "small fry" to the lower courts. This law
became effective on May 6, 1995 and it provided
a two-pronged solution to the clogging of the
dockets of that court, to wit:
It divested the Sandiganbayan of
jurisdiction over public officials whose
salary grades were at Grade "26" or
lower, devolving thereby these cases to
the lower courts, and retaining the
jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan only
over public officials whose salary grades
were at Grade "27" or higher and over
other specific public officials holding
important positions in government
regardless of salary grade;26
Evidently, the officials enumerated in (a) to (g) Section 4
a.(1) of P.D. No. 1606, amended Section 2 of Rep. Act
No. 7975, were specifically included within the original
jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan because the
lawmakers considered them "big fish" and their positions
important, regardless of their salary grades.
This conclusion is further bolstered by the fact that some
of the officials enumerated in (a) to (g) are not classified
as SG 27 or higher under the Index of Occupational
Services, Position Titles and Salary Grades issued by
the Department of Budget and Management in 1989,
Page 56 of 168
then in effect at the time that Rep. Act No. 7975 was
approved. For example:
Category
16. FOREIGN RELATIONS SERVICE
Foreign Service
Foreign Service Officer,
Foreign Service Officer,
18. EXECUTIVE SERVICE
Local Executives
City Government Department Head
City Government Department Head
Provincial Government Department
Noticeably, the vice mayors, members of
the Sangguniang Panlungsod and prosecutors, without
any distinction or qualification, were specifically included
in Rep. Act No. 7975 as falling within the original
New Positionjurisdiction
Gradeof the Sandiganbayan. Moreover, the
Title consuls, city department heads, provincial department
heads and members of the Sangguniang
…
Panlalawigan, albeit classified as having salary grades
26 or lower, were also specifically included within the
…
Sandiganbayan's original jurisdiction. As correctly
posited by the respondents, Congress is presumed to
Class II27 have been2328aware of, and had taken into account, these
officials' respective salary grades when it deliberated
Class I29 upon the
30
24amendments to the Sandiganbayan
jurisdiction. Nonetheless, Congress passed into law
Rep. Act …No. 7975, specifically including them within the
original jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan. By doing so, it
obviously… intended cases mentioned in Section 4 a. of
P.D. No. 1606, as amended by Section 2 of Rep. Act No.
…
7975, when committed by the officials enumerated in (1)
(a) to (g) thereof, regardless of their salary grades, to be
I 2431
tried by the Sandiganbayan.
II 2632
Indeed, it is a basic precept in statutory construction that
the intent
… of the legislature is the controlling factor in the
interpretation of a statute.37 From the congressional
records25and
33 the text of Rep. Acts No. 7975 and 8294,

Head the legislature undoubtedly intended the officials

enumerated in (a) to (g) of Section 4 a.(1) of P.D. No.
1606, as…amended by the aforesaid subsequent laws, to
be included within the original jurisdiction of the
City Vice Mayor I Sandiganbayan.
26

City Vice Mayor II Following28 this disquisition, the paragraph of Section 4

which provides that if the accused is occupying a
City Mayor I 34
position28lower than SG 27, the proper trial court has
jurisdiction,38 can only be properly interpreted as
City Mayor II applying30to those cases where the principal accused is
occupying a position lower than SG 27 and not among
19. LEGISLATIVE SERVICE those specifically included in the enumeration in Section
4 a. (1)(a) to (g). Stated otherwise, except for those
Sangguniang Members officials…specifically included in Section 4 a. (1) (a) to
(g), regardless of their salary grades, over whom the
Sangguniang Panlungsod Member I 25
Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction, all other public officials
below SG 27 shall be under the jurisdiction of the proper
Sangguniang Panlungsod Member II 27 "where none of the principal accused are
trial courts
occupying positions corresponding to SG 27 or higher."
Sangguniang Panlalawigan Member 35
By this 26
construction, the entire Section 4 is given effect.
The cardinal rule, after all, in statutory construction is
Office of the City and Provincial that the particular words, clauses and phrases should
Prosecutors36 not be studied as detached and isolated expressions,
but the whole and every part of the statute must be
Prosecutor IV 29 in fixing the meaning of any of its parts and
considered
in order to produce a harmonious whole.39 And courts
Prosecutor III 28
should adopt a construction that will give effect to every
part of a statute, if at all possible. Ut magis valeat quam
Prosecutor II pereat or27that construction is to be sought which gives
effect to the whole of the statute – its every word.40
Prosecutor I 26

Page 57 of 168
In this case, there is no dispute that the petitioner is a
member of the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Dapitan City
and he is charged with violation of Section 3 (e) of Rep.
Act No. 3019. Members of the Sangguniang
Panlungsod are specifically included as among those
within the original jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan in
Section 4 a.(1) (b) of P.D. No. 1606, as amended by
Section 2 of Rep. Act No. 7975,41 or even Section 4 of
Rep. Act No. 824942 for that matter. The Sandiganbayan,
therefore, has original jurisdiction over the petitioner's
case docketed as Criminal Case No. 25116.

IN LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the petition is

DISMISSED. The Resolutions of the Sandiganbayan
dated September 23, 1999 and April 25, 2000 are
AFFIRMED. No costs.

SO ORDERED.

Page 58 of 168
 THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 158187 February 11, 2005
MARILYN GEDUSPAN and DRA. EVANGELYN
FARAHMAND, petitioners,
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES and
SANDIGANBAYAN, respondents.
DECISION
CORONA, J.:
Does the Sandiganbayan have jurisdiction over a
regional director/manager of government-owned or
controlled corporations organized and incorporated
under the Corporation Code for purposes of RA 3019,
the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act? Petitioner
Marilyn C. Geduspan assumes a negative view in the
instant petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules
of Court. The Office of the Special Prosecutor contends
otherwise, a view shared by the respondent court.
In the instant Rule 65 petition for certiorari with prayer for
a writ of preliminary injunction and/or issuance of a
temporary restraining order, Geduspan seeks to annul
and set aside the resolutions1 dated January 31, 2003
and May 9, 2003 of the respondent Sandiganbayan,
Fifth Division. These resolutions denied her motion to
quash and motion for reconsideration, respectively.
On July 11, 2002, an information docketed as Criminal
Case No. 27525 for violation of Section 3(e) of RA 3019,
as amended, was filed against petitioner Marilyn C.
Geduspan and Dr. Evangeline C. Farahmand, Philippine
Health Insurance Corporation (Philhealth) Regional
Manager/Director and Chairman of the Board of
Directors of Tiong Bi Medical Center, Tiong Bi, Inc.,
respectively. The information read:
That on or about the 27th day of November, 1999, and
for sometime subsequent thereto, at Bacolod City,
province of Negros Occidental, Philippines, and within
the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, above-named
accused MARILYN C. GEDUSPAN, a public officer,
being the Regional Manager/Director, of the Philippine
Health Insurance Corporation, Regional office No. VI,
Iloilo City, in such capacity and committing the offense in
relation to office, conniving, confederating and mutually
helping with DR. EVANGELINE C. FARAHMAND, a
private individual and Chairman of the Board of Directors
of Tiong Bi Medical Center, Tiong Bi, Inc., Mandalangan,
Bacolod City, with deliberate intent, with evident bad
faith and manifest partiality, did then and there wilfully,
unlawfully and feloniously release the claims for
payments of patients confined at L.N. Memorial Hospital
with Philippine Health Insurance Corp., prior to January
1, 2000, amounting to NINETY ONE THOUSAND NINE
HUNDRED FIFTY-FOUR and 64/100 (₱91,954.64),
Philippine Currency, to Tiong Bi Medical Center, Tiong
Bi, Inc. despite clear provision in the Deed of Conditional
Sale executed on November 27, 1999, involving the sale
of West Negros College, Inc. to Tiong Bi, Inc. or Tiong Bi
Medical Center, that the possession, operation and
management of the said hospital will be turned over by
West Negros College, Inc. to Tiong Bi, Inc. effective
January 1, 2000, thus all collectibles or accounts
receivable accruing prior to January 1, 2000 shall be due
to West Negros College, Inc., thus accused MARILYN C.
GEDUSPAN in the course of the performance of her
official functions, had given unwarranted benefits to
Tiong Bi, Inc., Tiong Bi Medical Center, herein
represented by accused DR. EVANGELINE C.
FARAHMAND, to the damage and injury of West Negros
College, Inc.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
Both accused filed a joint motion to quash dated July 29,
2002 contending that the respondent Sandiganbayan
had no jurisdiction over them considering that the
principal accused Geduspan was a Regional Director of
Philhealth, Region VI, a position classified under salary
grade 26.
In a resolution dated January 31, 2003, the respondent
court denied the motion to quash. The motion for
reconsideration was likewise denied in a resolution
dated May 9, 2003.
Hence, this petition.
Petitioner Geduspan alleges that she is the Regional
Manager/Director of Region VI of the Philippine Health
Insurance Corporation (Philhealth). However, her
appointment paper and notice of salary
adjustment2 show that she was appointed as Department
Manager A of the Philippine Health Insurance
Corporation (Philhealth) with salary grade 26. Philhealth
is a government owned and controlled corporation
created under RA 7875, otherwise known as the
National Health Insurance Act of 1995.
Geduspan argues that her position as Regional
Director/Manager is not within the jurisdiction of the
Sandiganbayan. She cites paragraph (1) and (5),
Section 4 of RA 8249 which defines the jurisdiction of
the Sandiganbayan:
Section 4. Jurisdiction. The Sandiganbayan shall
exercise original jurisdiction in all cases involving:
a. Violations of Republic Act No. 3019, as amended,
otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices
Act, Republic Act No. 1379, and Chapter II, Section 2,
Page 59 of 168
Title VII, Book of the Revised Penal Code, where one or
more of the accused are officials occupying the following
positions in the government, whether in a permanent,
acting or interim capacity, at the time of the commission
of the offense:
(1) Officials of the executive branch occupying the
positions of regional director and higher, otherwise
classified as Grade "27" and higher, of the
Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989
(Republic Act No. 6758); specifically including;
xxx xxx xxx
(5) All other national and local officials classified as
Grade "27" and higher under the Compensation and
Position Classification Act of 1989.
The petition lacks merit.
The records show that, although Geduspan is a Director
of Region VI of the Philhealth, she is not occupying the
position of Regional Director but that of Department
Manager A, hence, paragraphs (1) and (5) of Section 4
of RA 8249 are not applicable.
It is petitioner’s appointment paper and the notice of
salary adjustment that determine the classification of her
position, that is, Department Manager A of Philhealth.
Petitioner admits that she holds the position of
Department Manager A of Philhealth. She, however,
contends that the position of Department Manager A is
classified under salary grade 26 and therefore outside
the jurisdiction of respondent court. She is at present
assigned at the Philhealth Regional Office VI as
Regional Director/Manager.
Petitioner anchors her request for the issuance of a
temporary restraining order on the alleged disregard by
respondent court of the decision of this Court in Ramon
Cuyco v. Sandiganbayan.3
However, the instant case is not on all fours with Cuyco.
In that case, the accused Ramon Cuyco was the
Regional Director of the Land Transportation Office
(LTO), Region IX, Zamboanga City, but at the time of the
commission of the crime in 1992 his position of Regional
Director of LTO was classified as Director II with salary
grade 26. Thus, the Court ruled that the Sandiganbayan
had no jurisdiction over his person.
In contrast, petitioner held the position of Department
Director A of Philhealth at the time of the commission of
the offense and that position was among those
enumerated in paragraph 1(g), Section 4a of RA 8249
over which the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction:
Section 4. Section 4 of the same decree is hereby
further amended to read as follows:
Section 4. Jurisdiction. The Sandiganbayan shall
exercise original jurisdiction in all cases involving:
a. Violations of Republic Act No. 3019, as amended,
otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices
Act, Republic Act No. 1379, and Chapter II, Section 2,
Title VII, Book II of the Revised Penal Code, where one
or more of the accused are officials occupying the
following positions in the government, whether in a
permanent, acting or interim capacity, at the time of the
commission of the offense;
(1) Officials of the executive branch occupying the
positions of regional director and higher, otherwise
classified as Grade ‘Grade 27’ and higher, of the
Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989
(Republic Act No. 6758), specifically including:
(a) xxx xxx xxx
(b) xxx xxx xxx
(c) xxx xxx xxx
(d) xxx xxx xxx
(e) xxx xxx xxx
(f) xxx xxx xxx
(g) Presidents, directors or trustees, or managers of
government-owned and controlled corporations,
state universities or educational institutions or
foundations." (Underscoring supplied).
It is of no moment that the position of petitioner is merely
classified as salary grade 26. While the first part of the
above–quoted provision covers only officials of the
executive branch with the salary grade 27 and higher,
the second part thereof "specifically includes" other
executive officials whose positions may not be of grade
27 and higher but who are by express provision of law
placed under the jurisdiction of the said court.
Hence, respondent court is vested with jurisdiction over
petitioner together with Farahmand, a private individual
charged together with her.
The position of manager in a government-owned or
controlled corporation, as in the case of Philhealth, is
within the jurisdiction of respondent court. It is the
position that petitioner holds, not her salary grade, that
determines the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan.
Page 60 of 168
This Court in Lacson v. Executive Secretary, et
al. 4 ruled:

A perusal of the aforequoted Section 4 of R.A. 8249

reveals that to fall under the exclusive jurisdiction of the
Sandiganbayan, the following requisites must
concur: (1) the offense committed is a violation
of (a) R.A. 3019, as amended (the Anti-Graft and
Corrupt Practices Act), (b) R.A. 1379 (the law on ill-
gotten wealth), (c) Chapter II, Section 2, Title VII, book II
of the Revised Penal Code (the law on
bribery), (d) Executive Order Nos. 1,2, 14 and 14-A,
issued in 1986 (sequestration cases), or (e) other
offenses or felonies whether simple or complexed with
other crimes; (2) the offender committing the offenses in
items (a), (b), (c) and (e) is a public official or employee
holding any of the positions enumerated in paragraph a
of section 4; and (3) the offense committed is in relation
to the office.

To recapitulate, petitioner is a public officer, being a

department manager of Philhealth, a government-owned
and controlled corporation. The position of manager is
one of those mentioned in paragraph a, Section 4 of RA
8249 and the offense for which she was charged was
committed in relation to her office as department
manager of Philhealth. Accordingly, the Sandiganbayan
has jurisdiction over her person as well as the subject
matter of the case.

WHEREFORE, petition is hereby DISMISSED for lack of

merit.

Costs against petitioner.

SO ORDERED.

Page 61 of 168
 THIRD DIVISION
G.R. Nos. 147706-07 February 16, 2005
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,
vs.
THE HONORABLE SANDIGANBAYAN (Fifth Division)
and EFREN L. ALAS, respondents.
DECISION
CORONA, J.:
Does the Sandiganbayan have jurisdiction over
presidents, directors or trustees, or managers of
government-owned or controlled corporations organized
and incorporated under the Corporation Code for
purposes of the provisions of RA 3019, otherwise known
as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act? The
petitioner, represented by the Office of the Special
Prosecutor (OSP), takes the affirmative position in this
petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court.
Respondent Efren L. Alas contends otherwise, together
with the respondent court.
Pursuant to a resolution dated September 30, 1999 of
the Office of the Ombudsman, two separate
informations1 for violation of Section 3(e) of RA 3019,
otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices
Act, were filed with the Sandiganbayan on November 17,
1999 against Efren L. Alas. The charges emanated from
the alleged anomalous advertising contracts entered into
by Alas, in his capacity as President and Chief Operating
Officer of the Philippine Postal Savings Bank (PPSB),
with Bagong Buhay Publishing Company which
purportedly caused damage and prejudice to the
government.
On October 30, 2002, Alas filed a motion to quash the
informations for lack of jurisdiction, which motion was
vehemently opposed by the prosecution. After
considering the arguments of both parties, the
respondent court ruled that PPSB was a private
corporation and that its officers, particularly herein
respondent Alas, did not fall under Sandiganbayan
jurisdiction. According to the Sandiganbayan:
After a careful consideration of the arguments of the
accused-movant as well as of that of the prosecution, we
are of the considered opinion that the instant motion of
the accused is well taken. Indeed, it is the basic thrust of
Republic Act as well as (sic) Presidential Decree No.
1606 as amended by President Decree No. 1486 and
Republic Act No. 7975 and Republic Act No. 8249 that
the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction only over public
officers unless private persons are charged with them in
the commission of the offenses.
The records disclosed that while Philippine Postal
Savings Bank is a subsidiary of the Philippine Postal
Corporation which is a government owned corporation,
the same is not created by a special law. It was
organized and incorporated under the Corporation Code
which is Batas Pambansa Blg. 68. It was registered with
the Securities and Exchange Commission under SEC
No. AS094-005593 on June 22, 1994 with a lifetime of
fifty (50) years. Under its Articles of Incorporation the
purpose for which said entity is formed was primarily for
business, xxx
Likewise, a scrutiny of the seven (7) secondary purposes
of the corporation points to the conclusion that it exists
for business.l^vvphi1.net Obviously, it is not involved in
the performance of a particular function in the exercise
of government power. Thus, its officers and employees
are not covered by the GSIS and are under the SSS law,
and actions for reinstatement and backwages are not
within the jurisdiction of the Civil Service Commission
but by the National Labor Relations Commission
(NLRC).
The Supreme Court, in the case of Trade Unions of the
Philippines and Allied Services vs. National Housing
Corp., 173 SCRA 33, held that the Civil Service now
covers only government owned or controlled
corporations with original or legislative charters, those
created by an act of Congress or by special law, and not
those incorporated under and pursuant to a general
legislation. The Highest Court categorically ruled that the
Civil Service does not include government-owned or
controlled corporation which are organized as
subsidiaries of government-owned or controlled
corporation under the general corporation law.
In Philippine National Oil Company – Energy
Development Corporation vs. Leogardo, 175 SCRA 26,
the Supreme Court emphasized that:
The test in determining whether a government-owned or
controlled corporation is subject to the Civil Service Law
is the manner of its creation such that government
corporation created by special charter are subject to its
provision while those incorporated under the general
corporation law are not within its coverage.
Likewise in Davao City Water District vs. Civil Service
Commission, 201 SCRA 601 it was held that "by
government-owned or controlled corporation with original
charter we mean government-owned or controlled
corporation created by a special law and not under the
Corporation Code of the Philippines" while in Llenes vs.
Dicdican, et al., 260 SCRA 207, a public officer has been
ruled, as a person whose duties involve the exercise of
discretion in the performance of the function of
government.
Page 62 of 168
Clearly, on the basis of the foregoing pronouncements of
the Supreme Court, the accused herein cannot be
considered a public officer. Thus, this Court may not
exercise jurisdiction over his act.2
Dissatisfied, the People, through the Office of the
Special Prosecutor (OSP), filed this petition3 arguing, in
essence, that the PPSB was a government-owned or
controlled corporation as the term was defined under
Section 2(13) of the Administrative Code of
1987.4 Likewise, in further defining the jurisdiction of the
Sandiganbayan, RA 8249 did not make a distinction as
to the manner of creation of the government-owned or
controlled corporations for their officers to fall under its
jurisdiction. Hence, being President and Chief Operating
Officer of the PPSB at the time of commission of the
crimes charged, respondent Alas came under the
jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan.1awphi1.nét
Quoting at length from the assailed resolution dated
February 15, 2001, respondent Alas, on the other hand,
practically reiterated the pronouncements made by the
respondent court in support of his conclusion that the
PPSB was not created by special law, hence, its officers
did not fall within the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan. 5
We find merit in the petition.
Section 2(13) of EO 2926 defines government-owned or
controlled corporations as follows:
Sec. 2. General Terms Defined – Unless the specific
words of the text or the context as a whole or a particular
statute, shall require a different meaning:
xxx xxx xxx
(13) government owned or controlled corporations refer
to any agency organized as a stock or non-stock
corporation vested with functions relating to public needs
whether governmental or proprietary in nature, and
owned by the government directly or indirectly or through
its instrumentalities either wholly, or where applicable as
in the case of stock corporations to the extent of at least
51% of its capital stock: provided, that government
owned or controlled corporations maybe further
categorized by the department of the budget, the civil
service commission and the commission on audit for the
purpose of the exercise and discharge of their respective
powers, functions and responsibilities with respect to
such corporations.
From the foregoing, PPSB fits the bill as a government-
owned or controlled corporation, and organized and
incorporated under the Corporation Code as a subsidiary
of the Philippine Postal Corporation (PHILPOST). More
than 99% of the authorized capital stock of PPSB
belongs to the government while the rest is nominally
held by its incorporators who are/were themselves
officers of PHILPOST. The creation of PPSB was
expressly sanctioned by Section 32 of RA 7354,
otherwise known as the Postal Service Act of 1992, for
purposes of, among others, "to encourage and promote
the virtue of thrift and the habit of savings among the
general public, especially the youth and the marginalized
sector in the countryside xxx" and to facilitate postal
service by "receiving collections and making payments,
including postal money orders."7
It is not disputed that the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction
over presidents, directors or trustees, or managers of
government-owned or controlled corporations with
original charters whenever charges of graft and
corruption are involved. However, a question arises
whether the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over the
same officers in government-owned or controlled
corporations organized and incorporated under the
Corporation Code in view of the delimitation provided for
in Article IX-B Section 2(1) of the 1987 Constitution
which states that:
SEC. 2. (1) The Civil Service embraces all branches,
subdivisions, instrumentalities, and agencies of the
government, including government-owned or controlled
corporations with original charters.
It should be pointed out however, that the jurisdiction of
the Sandiganbayan is separate and distinct from the
Civil Service Commission. The same is governed by
Article XI, Section 4 of the 1987 Constitution which
provides that "the present anti-graft court known as the
Sandiganbayan shall continue to function and exercise
its jurisdiction as now or hereafter may be provided by
law." This provision, in effect, retained the jurisdiction of
the anti-graft court as defined under Article XIII, Section
5 of the 1973 Constitution which mandated its creation,
thus:
Sec. 5. The Batasang Pambansa shall create a special
court, to be known as Sandiganbayan, which shall have
jurisdiction over criminal and civil cases involving graft
and corrupt practices and such other offense committed
by public officers and employees, including those in
government-owned or controlled corporations, in relation
to their office as may be determined by law. (Italics ours)
On March 30, 1995, Congress, pursuant to its authority
vested under the 1987 Constitution, enacted RA
79758maintaining the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan
over presidents, directors or trustees, or managers of
government-owned or controlled corporations without
any distinction whatsoever. Thereafter, on February 5,
1997, Congress enacted RA 82499 which preserved the
subject provision:
Page 63 of 168
Section 4, Jurisdiction. The Sandiganbayan shall
exercise exclusive original jurisdiction in all cases
involving:
a. Violations of Republic Act No. 3019, as amended,
otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices
Act, Republic Act No. 1379, and Chapter II, Section, Title
VII, Book II of the Revised Penal Code, where one or
more of the accused are officials occupying the following
positions in the government, whether in a permanent,
acting or interim capacity, at the time of the commission
of the offense,
(1) Officials of the executive branch occupying the
positions of regional director, and higher, otherwise
classified as grade "27" and higher, of the Compensation
and Position Classification Act of 1989 (Republic Act No.
6758) specifically including:
xxx xxx xxx
(g) Presidents, directors or trustees, or managers of
government-owned or controlled corporations, state
universities or educational institutions or foundations.
(Italics ours)
provisions of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act.
Otherwise, as we emphasized therein, a major policy of
Government, which is to eradicate, or at the very least
minimize, the graft and corruption that has permeated
the fabric of the public service like a malignant social
cancer, would be seriously undermined. In fact, Section
1 of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act embodies
this policy of the government, that is, to repress certain
acts not only of public officers but also of private persons
constituting graft or corrupt practices or which may lead
thereto.
The foregoing pronouncement has not outlived its
usefulness. On the contrary, it has become even more
relevant today due to the rampant cases of graft and
corruption that erode the people’s faith in government.
For indeed, a government-owned or controlled
corporation can conceivably create as many subsidiary
corporations under the Corporation Code as it might
wish, use public funds, disclaim public accountability and
escape the liabilities and responsibilities provided by
law. By including the concerned officers of government-
owned or controlled corporations organized and
incorporated under the Corporation Code within the
jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan, the legislature
evidently seeks to avoid just that.

The legislature, in mandating the inclusion of WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the petition is
"presidents, directors or trustees, or managers of hereby GRANTED and the assailed resolution dated
government-owned or controlled corporations" within the February 15, 2001 of the respondent court is hereby
jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan, has consistently REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
refrained from making any distinction with respect to the
manner of their creation.
SO ORDERED.
The deliberate omission, in our view, clearly reveals the
intention of the legislature to include the presidents,
directors or trustees, or managers of both types of
corporations within the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan
whenever they are involved in graft and corruption. Had
it been otherwise, it could have simply made the
necessary distinction. But it did not.

It is a basic principle of statutory construction that when

the law does not distinguish, we should not
distinguish. Ubi lex non distinguit nec nos distinguere
debemos. Corollarily, Article XI Section 12 of the 1987
Constitution, on the jurisdiction of the Ombudsman (the
government’s prosecutory arm against persons charged
with graft and corruption), includes officers and
employees of government-owned or controlled
corporations, likewise without any
distinction.1awphi1.nét

In Quimpo v. Tanodbayan,10 this Court, already mindful

of the pertinent provisions of the 1987 Constitution, ruled
that the concerned officers of government-owned or
controlled corporations, whether created by special law
or formed under the Corporation Code, come under the
jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan for purposes of the
Page 64 of 168
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. Nos. 146646-49. March 11, 2005
ROGELIO M. ESTEBAN, Petitioners,
vs.
THE SANDIGANBAYAN and THE PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, Respondents.
DECISION
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J.:
Before us is a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the
1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended, assailing
the Resolution1 dated December 18, 2000 of the
Sandiganbayan (1st Division) and Order2 dated January
11, 2000 in Criminal Cases Nos. 24703-04.
The instant petition stemmed from the sworn
complaint3 of Ana May V. Simbajon against Judge
Rogelio M. Esteban, filed with the Office of the City
Prosecutor, Cabanatuan City on September 8, 1997,
docketed as I.S. Nos. 9-97-8239.
In her complaint, Ana May alleged that she was a casual
employee of the City Government of Cabanatuan City.
Sometime in February 1997, she was detailed with the
Municipal Trial Court in Cities (MTCC), Branch 1,
Cabanatuan City, upon incessant request of Presiding
Judge Reogelio Esteban, herein petitioner.
After her detail with Branch 1, the item of bookbinder
became vacant. Thus, she applied for the position but
petitioner did not take any action on her application. On
July 25, 1997, when she approached petitioner in his
chambers to follow up her application, he told her, "Ano
naman ang magiging kapalit ng pagpirma ko rito? Mula
ngayon, girlfriend na kita. Araw-araw papasok ka dito sa
opisina ko, at araw-araw, isang halik." ("What can you
offer me in exchange for my signature? From now on,
you are my girlfriend. You will enter this office everyday
and everyday, I get one kiss.")4 Ana May refused to
accede to his proposal as she considered him like her
own father.
Petitioner nonetheless recommended her for
appointment. Thereafter, he suddenly kissed her on her
left cheek. She was shocked and left the chambers,
swearing never to return or talk to petitioner.
On August 5, 1997, at around 9:30 in the morning,
Virginia S. Medina, court interpreter, informed Ana May
that petitioner wanted to see her in his chambers
regarding the payroll. As a subordinate, she complied.
Once inside, petitioner asked her if she has been
receiving her salary as a bookbinder. When she
answered in the affirmative, he said, "Matagal na pala
eh, bakit hindi ka pumapasok dito sa kuwarto ko? Di ba
sabi ko say iyo, girlfriend na kita?"("So you’ve been
getting the salary for sometime already. Why didn’t you
report here in my office? Didn’t I tell you, you’re my
girlfriend.")5
Again, Ana May protested to his proposal, saying he is
like a father to her and that he is a married man with two
sons.
Petitioner suddenly rose from his seat, grabbed her and
said, "Hindi pwede yan, mahal kita." ("I can’t allow that
for I love you.") He embraced her, kissing her all over
her face and touching her right breast.
Ana May freed herself and dashed out of the chambers
crying. She threw the payroll on the table of her co-
employee, Elizabeth Q. Manubay. The latter sensed
something was wrong and accompanied Ana May to the
restroom. There she told Elizabeth what happened.
On March 9 and July 1, 1998, two Informations for
violation of R.A. 7877 (the Anti-Sexual Harassment Law
of 1995) were filed against petitioner with the
Sandiganbayan, docketed therein as Criminal Cases
Nos. 24490 and 24702.
Also on July 1, 1998, two Informations for acts of
lasciviousness were filed with the same court, docketed
as Criminal Cases. 24703-04.
On September 18, 1998, petitioner filed a motion to
quash the Informations in Criminal Cases Nos. 24703-04
for acts of lasciviousness on the ground that he has
been placed four (4) times in jeopardy for the same
offense.
The Sandiganbayan denied the motion to quash but
directed the prosecution to determine if the offenses
charged in Criminal Cases Nos. 24703-04 were
committed in relation to petitioner’s functions as a judge.
On September 3, 1999, the prosecution filed Amended
Informations in Criminal Cases Nos. 24703 and 24704
quoted as follows:
Criminal Case No. 24703:
That on or about the 5th day of August 1997 in
Cabanatuan City, Nueva Ecija, Philippines and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named
accused, JUDGE ROGELIO M. ESTEBAN, a public
officer, being then the Presiding Judge of Branch 1 of
the Municipal Trial Court in Cabanatuan City, who after
Page 65 of 168
having been rejected by the private complainant, Ana
May V. Simbajon, of his sexual demands or solicitations
to be his girlfriend and to enter his room daily for a kiss
as a condition for the signing of complainant’s
permanent appointment as a bookbinder in his Court,
thus in relation to his office or position as such, with lewd
design and malicious desire, did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously planted a kiss on her left
cheek against her will and consent, to her damage and
detriment.
CONTRARY TO LAW.6
Criminal Case No. 24704
That on or about the 25th day of June 1997 in in
Cabanatuan City, Nueva Ecija, Philippines and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named
accused, JUDGE ROGELIO M. ESTEBAN, a public
officer, being then the Presiding Judge of Branch 1 of
the Municipal Trial Court in Cabanatuan City, who after
having been rejected by the private complainant, Ana
May V. Simbajon, of his sexual demands or solicitations
to be his girlfriend and to enter his room daily for a kiss
as a condition for the signing of complainant’s
permanent appointment as a bookbinder in his Court,
thus in relation to his office or position as such, with lewd
design and malicious desire, did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously planted a kiss on her left
cheek against her will and consent, to her damage and
detriment.
CONTRARY TO LAW.7
On September 29, 1999, petitioner filed a motion to
quash the Amended Informations on the ground that the
Sandiganbayan has no jurisdiction over the crimes
charged considering that they were not committed in
relation to his office as a judge.
On November 22, 1999, before the Sandiganbayan
could resolve the motion to quash, the prosecution filed
the following Re-Amended Information in Criminal Case
No. 24703:
"That on or about the 5th day of August 1997 in
Cabanatuan City, Nueva Ecija, Philippines and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named
accused, JUDGE ROGELIO M. ESTEBAN, a public
officer, being then the Presiding Judge of Branch 1 of
the Municipal Trial Court in Cabanatuan City, who after
having been rejected by the private complainant, Ana
May V. Simbajon, of his sexual demands or solicitations
to be his girlfriend and to enter his room daily for a kiss
as a condition for the signing of complainant’s
permanent appointment as a bookbinder in his Court,
thus in relation to his office or position as such, with lewd
design and malicious desire, did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously grab private complainant, kiss
her all over her face and touch her right breast against
her will and consent, to her damage and detriment.
CONTRARY TO LAW."8
which was admitted by the Sandiganbayan.
On December 18, 2000, the Sandiganbayan denied
petitioner’s motion to quash the Amended Informations,
holding that "the act of approving or indorsing the
permanent appointment of complaining witness was
certainly a function of the office of the accused so that
his acts are, therefore, committed in relation to his
office."9
Petitioner then moved for a reconsideration, but was
denied by the Sandiganbayan in its Order dated January
11, 2001.
Hence, the instant petition for certiorari.
The sole issue for our resolution is whether the
Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over Criminal Cases
Nos. 24703-04 for acts of lasciviousness filed against
petitioner.
Petitioner contends that the alleged acts of
lasciviousness were not committed in relation to his
office as a judge; and the fact that he is a public official
is not an essential element of the crimes charged.
The Ombudsman, represented by the Office of the
Special Prosecutor, maintains that the allegations in the
two (2) Amended Informations in Criminal Cases Nos.
24703-04 indicate a close relationship between
petitioner’s official functions as a judge and the
commission of acts of lasciviousness.
The petition is bereft of merit.
Section 4 of Presidential Decree No. 1606, as amended
by Republic Act No. 8249,10 reads in part:
SEC. 4. Jurisdiction. – The Sandiganbayan shall
exercise exclusive original jurisdiction in all cases
involving:
xxx
b. Other offenses or felonies whether simple or
complexed with other crime committed by the public
officials and employees mentioned in subsection a of
this section in relation to their office.
In People v. Montejo,11 we ruled that an offense is said
to have been committed in relation to the office if the
Page 66 of 168
offense is "intimately connected" with the office of
the offender and perpetrated while he was in the
performance of his official functions. This intimate
relation between the offense charged and the discharge
of official duties must be alleged in the
Information.12 This is in accordance with the rule that the
factor that characterizes the charge is the actual recital
of the facts in the complaint or information.13 Hence,
where the information is wanting in specific factual
averments to show the intimate relationship/connection
between the offense charged and the discharge of
official functions, the Sandiganbayan has no jurisdiction
over the case.14

Under Supreme Court Circular No. 7 dated April 27,

1987,15 petitioner, as presiding judge of MTCC, Branch
1, Cabanatuan City, is vested with the power to
recommend the appointment of Ana May Simbajon as
bookbinder. As alleged in the Amended Informations in
Criminal Cases Nos. 24703-04, she was constrained to
approach petitioner on June 25, 1997 as she needed his
recommendation. But he imposed a condition before
extending such recommendation - she should be his
girlfriend and must report daily to his office for a kiss.
There can be no doubt, therefore, that petitioner used
his official position in committing the acts complained of.
While it is true, as petitioner argues, that public office is
not an element of the crime of acts of lasciviousness,
defined and penalized under Article 336 of the Revised
Penal Code, nonetheless, he could not have committed
the crimes charged were it not for the fact that as the
Presiding Judge of the MTCC, Branch I, Cabanatuan
City, he has the authority to recommend the appointment
of Ana May as bookbinder. In other words, the crimes
allegedly committed are intimately connected with his
office.

The jurisdiction of a court is determined by the

allegations in the complaint or information.16 The
Amended Informations in Criminal Cases Nos. 24703-04
contain allegations showing that the acts of
lasciviousness were committed by petitioner in relation
to his official function.

Accordingly, we rule that the Sandiganbayan did not

gravely abuse its discretion amounting to lack or excess
of jurisdiction in admitting the Amended Informations for
acts of lasciviousness in Criminal Cases Nos. 24703-04.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED. The assailed

Resolution and Order of the Sandiganbayan dated
December 18, 2000 and January 11, 2001, in Criminal
Cases Nos. 24703-04 are AFFIRMED. Costs against the
petitioner.

SO ORDERED.

Page 67 of 168
 SECOND DIVISION
[G.R. Nos. 161784-86. April 26, 2005]
DINAH C. BARRIGA, petitioner, vs. THE HONORABLE
SANDIGANBAYAN (4TH DIVISION) and THE
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.
DECISION
CALLEJO, SR., J.:
This is a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the
Rules of Court for the nullification of the Resolution[1] of
the Sandiganbayan in Criminal Case Nos. 27435 to
27437 denying the motion to quash the Informations filed
by one of the accused, Dinah C. Barriga, and the
Resolution denying her motion for reconsideration
thereof.
The Antecedents
On April 3, 2003, the Office of the Ombudsman filed
a motion with the Sandiganbayan for the admission of the
three Amended Informations appended thereto. The first
Amended Information docketed as Criminal Case No.
27435, charged petitioner Dinah C. Barriga and Virginio
E. Villamor, the Municipal Accountant and the Municipal
Mayor, respectively, of Carmen, Cebu, with malversation
of funds. The accusatory portion reads:
That in or about January 1996 or sometime prior or
subsequent thereto, in the Municipality of Carmen,
Province of Cebu, Philippines and within the jurisdiction
of this Honorable Court, above-named accused
VIRGINIO E. VILLAMOR and DINAH C.
BARRIGA, both public officers, being then the Municipal
Mayor and Municipal Accountant, respectively, of the
Municipality of Carmen, Cebu, and as such, had in their
possession and custody public funds amounting to
TWENTY- THREE THOUSAND FORTY-SEVEN AND
20/100 PESOS (P23,047.20), Philippine Currency,
intended for the payment of Five (5) rolls of Polyethylene
pipes to be used in the Corte-Cantumog Water System
Project of the Municipality of Carmen, Cebu, for which
they are accountable by reason of the duties of their
office, in such capacity and committing the offense in
relation to office, conniving and confederating together
and mutually helping each other, did then and there
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously misappropriate, take,
embezzle and convert into their own personal use and
benefit said amount of P23,047.20, and despite
demands made upon them to account for said amount,
they have failed to do so, to the damage and prejudice of
the government.
CONTRARY TO LAW.[2]
The inculpatory portion of the second Amended
Information, docketed as Criminal Case No. 27436,
charging the said accused with illegal use of public funds,
reads:
That in or about the month of November 1995, or
sometime prior or subsequent thereto, in the Municipality
of Carmen, Province of Cebu, Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of the Honorable Court, above-named
accused VIRGINIO E. VILLAMOR and DINAH C.
BARRIGA, both public officers, being then the Municipal
Mayor and Municipal Accountant, respectively, of the
Municipality of Carmen, Cebu, and as such, had in their
possession and control public funds in the amount of
ONE THOUSAND THREE HUNDRED FIVE PESOS
(P1,305.00) Philippine Currency, representing a portion
of the Central Visayas Water and Sanitation Project
Trust Fund (CVWSP Fund) intended and appropriated
for the projects classified under Level I and
III particularly the construction of Deep Well and Spring
Box for Level I projects and construction of water works
system for Level III projects of specified barangay
beneficiaries/recipients, and for which fund accused are
accountable by reason of the duties of their office, in
such capacity and committing the offense in relation to
office, conniving and confederating together and
mutually helping each other, did then and there, willfully
unlawfully and feloniously disburse and use said amount
of P1,305.00 for the Spring Box of Barangay Natimao-
an, Carmen, Cebu, a barangay which was not
included as a recipient of CVWSP Trust Fund, thus,
accused used said public fund to a public purpose
different from which it was intended or appropriated, to
the damage and prejudice of the
government, particularly the barangays which were
CVWSP Trust Fund beneficiaries.
CONTRARY TO LAW.[3]
The accusatory portion of the third Amended
Information, docketed as Criminal Case No. 27437,
charged the same accused with illegal use of public funds,
as follows:
That in or about the month of January 1997, or
sometime prior or subsequent thereto, in the Municipality
of Carmen, Province of Cebu, Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, above-named
accused Virginio E. Villamor and Dinah C.
Barriga, both public officers, being then the Municipal
Mayor and Municipal Accountant, respectively, of the
Municipality of Carmen, Cebu, and as such, had in their
possession and control public funds in the amount
of TWO HUNDRED SIXTY-SEVEN THOUSAND FIVE
Page 68 of 168
HUNDRED THIRTY-SEVEN and 96/100 (P267,537.96)
PESOS, representing a portion of the Central Visayas
Water and Sanitation Project Trust Fund (CVWSP
Fund), intended and appropriated for the projects
classified under Level I and Level III, particularly the
construction of Spring Box and Deep Well for Level I
projects and construction of water works system for
Level III projects of specified barangay beneficiaries/
recipients, and for which fund accused are accountable
by reason for the duties of their office, in such capacity
and committing the offense in relation to office, conniving
and confederating together and mutually helping each
other, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously disburse and use said amount
of P267,537.96 for the construction and expansion
of Barangay Cantucong Water System, a project falling
under Level II of CVWSP, thus, accused used said
public funds to a public purpose different from which it
was intended and appropriated, to the damage and
prejudice of the government, particularly the barangay
beneficiaries of Levels I and III of CVWSP.
CONTRARY TO LAW.[4]
The Sandiganbayan granted the motion and
admitted the Amended Informations. The petitioner filed a
Motion to Quash the said Amended Informations on the
ground that under Section 4 of Republic Act No. 8294, the
Sandiganbayan has no jurisdiction over the crimes
charged. She averred that the Amended Informations
failed to allege and show the intimate relation between the
crimes charged and her official duties as municipal
accountant, which are conditions sine qua non for the
graft court to acquire jurisdiction over the said offense.
She averred that the prosecution and the Commission on
Audit admitted, and no less than this Court held in Tan v.
Sandiganbayan,[5] that a municipal accountant is not an
accountable officer. She alleged that the felonies of
malversation and illegal use of public funds, for which she
is charged, are not included in Chapter 11, Section 2, Title
VII, Book II, of the Revised Penal Code; hence, the
Sandiganbayan has no jurisdiction over the said crimes.
Moreover, her position as municipal accountant is
classified as Salary Grade (SG) 24.
The petitioner also posited that although the
Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over offenses committed
by public officials and employees in relation to their office,
the mere allegation in the Amended Informations that she
committed the offenses charged in relation to her office is
not sufficient as the phrase is merely a conclusion of law;
controlling are the specific factual allegations in the
Informations that would indicate the close intimacy
between the discharge of her official duties and the
commission of the offenses charged. To bolster her
stance, she cited the rulings of this Court in People v.
Montejo,[6] Soller v. Sandiganbayan,[7] and Lacson v.
Executive Secretary.[8] She further contended that
although the Amended Informations alleged that she
conspired with her co-accused to commit the crimes
charged, they failed to allege and show her exact
participation in the conspiracy and how she committed the
crimes charged. She also pointed out that the funds
subject of the said Amended Informations were not under
her control or administration.
On October 9, 2003, the Sandiganbayan issued a
Resolution[9] denying the motion of the petitioner. The
motion for reconsideration thereof was, likewise, denied,
with the graft court holding that the applicable ruling of this
Court was Montilla v. Hilario,[10] i.e., that an offense is
committed in relation to public office when there is a
direct, not merely accidental, relation between the crime
charged and the office of the accused such that, in a legal
sense, the offense would not exist without the office; in
other words, the office must be a constituent element of
the crime as defined in the statute. The graft court further
held that the offices of the municipal mayor and the
municipal accountant were constituent elements of the
felonies of malversation and illegal use of public funds.
The graft court emphasized that the rulings of this Court
in People v. Montejo[11] and Lacson v. Executive
Secretary[12] apply only where the office held by the
accused is not a constituent element of the crimes
charged. In such cases, the Information must contain
specific factual allegations showing that the commission
of the crimes charged is intimately connected with or
related to the performance of the accused public officers
public functions. In fine, the graft court opined, the basic
rule is that enunciated by this Court in Montilla v.
Hilario, and the ruling of this Court in People v. Montejo is
the exception.
The petitioner thus filed the instant petition
for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, seeking
to nullify the aforementioned Resolutions of the
Sandiganbayan. The petitioner claims that the graft court
committed grave abuse of its discretion amounting to
excess or lack of jurisdiction in issuing the same.
In its comment on the petition, the Office of the
Special Prosecutor averred that the remedy of filing a
petition for certiorari, from a denial of a motion to quash
amended information, is improper. It posits that any error
committed by the Sandiganbayan in denying the
petitioners motion to quash is merely an error of judgment
and not of jurisdiction. It asserts that as ruled by the
Sandiganbayan, what applies is the ruling of this Court
in Montilla v. Hilario and not People v.
Montejo. Furthermore, the crimes of malversation and
illegal use of public funds are classified as crimes
committed by public officers in relation to their office,
which by their nature fall within the jurisdiction of the
Sandiganbayan. It insists that there is no more need for
the Amended Informations to specifically allege intimacy
between the crimes charged and the office of the accused
since the said crimes can only be committed by public
officers. It further claims that the petitioner has been
charged of malversation and illegal use of public funds in
conspiracy with Municipal Mayor Virginio E. Villamor, who
occupies a position classified as SG 27; and even if the
Page 69 of 168
petitioners position as municipal accountant is only
classified as SG 24, under Section 4 of Rep. Act No. 8249,
the Sandiganbayan still has jurisdiction over the said
crimes. The Office of the Special Prosecutor further avers
that the petitioners claim, that she is not an accountable
officer, is a matter of defense.
The Ruling of the Court
The petition has no merit.
We agree with the ruling of the Sandiganbayan that
based on the allegations of the Amended Informations
and Rep. Act No. 8249, it has original jurisdiction over the
crimes of malversation and illegal use of public funds
charged in the Amended Informations subject of this
petition.
Rep. Act No. 8249,[13] which amended Section 4 of
Presidential Decree No. 1606, provides, inter alia, that the
Sandiganbayan has original jurisdiction over crimes and
felonies committed by public officers and employees, at
least one of whom belongs to any of the five categories
thereunder enumerated at the time of the commission of
such crimes.[14] There are two classes of public office-
related crimes under subparagraph (b) of Section 4 of
Rep. Act No. 8249: first, those crimes or felonies in which
the public office is a constituent element as defined by
statute and the relation between the crime and the offense
is such that, in a legal sense, the offense committed
cannot exist without the office;[15] second, such offenses
or felonies which are intimately connected with the public
office and are perpetrated by the public officer or
employee while in the performance of his official
functions, through improper or irregular conduct.[16]
The Sandiganbayan has original jurisdiction over
criminal cases involving crimes and felonies under the
first classification. Considering that the public office of the
accused is by statute a constituent element of the crime
charged, there is no need for the Prosecutor to state in
the Information specific factual allegations of the intimacy
between the office and the crime charged, or that the
accused committed the crime in the performance of his
duties. However, the Sandiganbayan likewise has original
jurisdiction over criminal cases involving crimes or
felonies committed by the public officers and employees
enumerated in Section (a) (1) to (5) under the second
classification if the Information contains specific factual
allegations showing the intimate connection between the
offense charged and the public office of the accused, and
the discharge of his official duties or functions - whether
improper or irregular.[17] The requirement is not complied
with if the Information merely alleges that the accused
committed the crime charged in relation to his office
because such allegation is merely a conclusion of law.[18]
Two of the felonies that belong to the first
classification are malversation defined and penalized by
Article 217 of the Revised Penal Code, and the illegal use
of public funds or property defined and penalized by
Article 220 of the same Code. The public office of the
accused is a constituent element in both felonies.
For the accused to be guilty of malversation, the
prosecution must prove the following essential elements:
(a) The offender is a public officer;
(b) He has the custody or control of funds or property by
reason of the duties of his office;
(c) The funds or property involved are public funds or
property for which he is accountable; and
(d) He has appropriated, taken or misappropriated, or
has consented to, or through abandonment or
negligence, permitted the taking by another person of,
such funds or property.[19]
For the accused to be guilty of illegal use of public
funds or property, the prosecution is burdened to prove
the following elements:
(1) The offenders are accountable officers in both
crimes.
(2) The offender in illegal use of public funds or property
does not derive any personal gain or profit; in
malversation, the offender in certain cases profits from
the proceeds of the crime.
(3) In illegal use, the public fund or property is applied to
another public use; in malversation, the public fund or
property is applied to the personal use and benefit of the
offender or of another person.[20]
We agree with the ruling of the Sandiganbayan that
the public office of the accused Municipal Mayor Virginio
E. Villamor is a constituent element of malversation and
illegal use of public funds or property. Accused mayors
position is classified as SG 27. Since the Amended
Informations alleged that the petitioner conspired with her
co-accused, the municipal mayor, in committing the said
felonies, the fact that her position as municipal accountant
is classified as SG 24 and as such is not an accountable
officer is of no moment; the Sandiganbayan still has
exclusive original jurisdiction over the cases lodged
against her. It must be stressed that a public officer who
is not in charge of public funds or property by virtue of her
official position, or even a private individual, may be liable
for malversation or illegal use of public funds or property
if such public officer or private individual conspires with an
accountable public officer to commit malversation or
illegal use of public funds or property.
In United States v. Ponte,[21] the Court, citing Viada,
had the occasion to state:
Page 70 of 168
Shall the person who participates or intervenes as co-
perpetrator, accomplice or abettor in the crime of
malversation of public funds, committed by a public
officer, have the penalties of this article also imposed
upon him? In opposition to the opinion maintained by
some jurists and commentators (among others the
learned Pacheco) we can only answer the question
affirmatively, for the same reasons (mutatis mutandis)
we have already advanced in Question I of the
commentary on article 314. French jurisprudence has
also settled the question in the same way on the ground
that the person guilty of the crime necessarily aids the
other culprit in the acts which constitute the crime. (Vol.
2, 4th edition, p. 653)
as part of his duties he received public money for which
he is bound to account and failed to account for it, is the
factor which determines whether or not malversation is
committed by the accused public officer or employee.
Hence, a mere clerk in the provincial or municipal
government may be held guilty of malversation if he or she
is entrusted with public funds and misappropriates the
same.
IN LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the petition is
DENIED for lack of merit. Costs against the petitioner.
SO ORDERED.

The reasoning by which Groizard and Viada support

their views as to the correct interpretation of the
provisions of the Penal Code touching malversation of
public funds by a public official, is equally applicable in
our opinion, to the provisions of Act No. 1740 defining
and penalizing that crime, and we have heretofore, in the
case of the United States vs. Dowdell (11 Phil. Rep., 4),
imposed the penalty prescribed by this section of the
code upon a public official who took part with another in
the malversation of public funds, although it was not
alleged, and in fact clearly appeared, that those funds
were not in his hands by virtue of his office, though it did
appear that they were in the hands of his co-principal by
virtue of the public office held by him.[22]

The Court has also ruled that one who conspires with
the provincial treasurer in committing six counts of
malversation is also a co-principal in committing those
offenses, and that a private person conspiring with an
accountable public officer in committing malversation is
also guilty of malversation.[23]
We reiterate that the classification of the petitioners
position as SG 24 is of no moment. The determinative fact
is that the position of her co-accused, the municipal
mayor, is classified as SG 27, and under the last
paragraph of Section 2 of Rep. Act No. 7975, if the
position of one of the principal accused is classified as SG
27, the Sandiganbayan has original and exclusive
jurisdiction over the offense.
We agree with the petitioners contention that under
Section 474 of the Local Government Code, she is not
obliged to receive public money or property, nor is she
obligated to account for the same; hence, she is not an
accountable officer within the context of Article 217 of the
Revised Penal Code. Indeed, under the said article, an
accountable public officer is one who has actual control of
public funds or property by reason of the duties of his
office. Even then, it cannot thereby be necessarily
concluded that a municipal accountant can never be
convicted for malversation under the Revised Penal
Code. The name or relative importance of the office or
employment is not the controlling factor.[24] The nature of
the duties of the public officer or employee, the fact that
Page 71 of 168
 FIRST DIVISION However, in a Resolution dated April 25, 2005, the
Sandiganbayan reversed its earlier resolution. It held
G.R. No. 169328 October 27, 2006 that the AFP-RSBS is a government-owned or controlled
corporation thus subject to its jurisdiction. It also found
JULIAN A. ALZAGA, MEINRADO ENRIQUE A. that the positions held by Alzaga and Bello, who were
BELLO, and MANUEL S. SATUITO, petitioners, Vice Presidents, and Satuito who was an Assistant Vice
President, are covered and embraced by, and in fact
vs.
HONORABLE SANDIGANBAYAN (2nd Division) and higher than the position of managers mentioned under
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents. Section 4 of P.D. No. 1606, as amended, thus under the
jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan.

Petitioners’ Motion for Reconsideration8 was denied,

hence, this petition raising the following issues:
DECISION
I

THE COURT A QUO COMMITTED GRAVE

ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO
LACK OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTION IN
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.: DECIDING A QUESTION OF SUBSTANCE IN A
MANNER NOT ACCORD WITH LAW AND
This Petition for Certiorari assails the April 25, 2005 and APPLICABLE JURISPRUDENCE THAT IT HAS
August 10, 2005 Resolutions1 of the Sandiganbayan in JURISDICTION OVER THE PERSON OF THE
Criminal Case Nos. 25681-25684, which respectively PETITIONERS
reversed the May 27, 2004 Resolution2 of the court a
quo and denied petitioners’ Motion for Reconsideration.3 II

On October 7, 1999,4 four separate Informations for THE COURT A QUO COMMITTED GRAVE
violation of Section 3(e) of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 3019 ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO
were filed against petitioners Julian A. Alzaga, Meinrado LACK OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTION IN
Enrique A. Bello and Manuel S. Satuito relative to DECIDING A QUESTION OF SUBSTANCE IN A
alleged irregularities which attended the purchase of four MANNER NOT IN ACCORD WITH LAW OR
lots in Tanauan, Batangas, by the Armed Forces of the JURISPRUDENCE THAT THE ARMED
Philippines Retirement and Separation Benefits System FORCES RETIREMENT AND SEPARATION
(AFP-RSBS). Alzaga was the Head of the Legal BENEFITS SYSTEM (AFP-RSBS) IS A
Department of AFP-RSBS when one of the lots was GOVERNMENT-OWNED OR CONTROLLED
purchased. Bello was a Police Superintendent and he CORPORATION
succeeded Alzaga as Head of the Legal Department. It
was during his tenure when the other three lots were
III
purchased. Both were Vice Presidents of AFP-RSBS.
On the other hand, Satuito was the Chief of the
Documentation and Assistant Vice President of the AFP- THE COURT A QUO COMMITTED GRAVE
RSBS.5 ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO
LACK OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTION IN
DECIDING A QUESTION OF SUBSTANCE IN A
Petitioners filed their respective Motions to Quash and/or
MANNER NOT IN ACCORD WITH LAW OR
Dismiss the informations alleging that the
JURISPRUDENCE THAT PETITIONERS
Sandiganbayan has no jurisdiction over them and their
ALZAGA AND BELLO[,] WHO WERE BOTH
alleged offenses because the AFP-RSBS is a private
entity created for the benefit of its members and that VICE-PRESIDENTS OF THE AFP-RSBS[,] AND
PETITIONER SATUITO[,] WHO WAS
their positions and salary grade levels do not fall within
ASSISTANT VICE-PRESIDENT OF THE AFP-
the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan pursuant to
RSBS[,] ARE COVERED AND EMBRACED BY
Section 4 of Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1606
THE POSITION "MANAGERS" MENTIONED
(1978),6 as amended by R.A. No. 8249 (1997).7
UNDER SECTION 4 a (1) (g) OF PD NO. 1606,
AS AMENDED.9
On May 27, 2004, the Sandiganbayan granted
petitioners’ motions to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction.
The petition is without merit.

Page 72 of 168
The AFP-RSBS was established by virtue of P.D. No.
361 (1973)10 in December 1973 to guarantee continuous
financial support to the AFP military retirement system,
as provided for in R.A. No. 340 (1948).11 It is similar to
the Government Service Insurance System (GSIS) and
the Social Security System (SSS) since it serves as the
system that manages the retirement and pension funds
of those in the military service.12
The AFP-RSBS is administered by the Chief of Staff of
the AFP through a Board of Trustees and Management
Group,13 and funded from congressional appropriations
and compulsory contributions from members of the AFP;
donations, gifts, legacies, bequests and others to the
system; and all earnings of the system which shall not
be subject to any tax whatsoever.14
Section 4 of P.D. No. 1606, as further amended by R.A.
No. 8249, grants jurisdiction to the Sandiganbayan over:
a. Violations of Republic Act No. 3019, as
amended, otherwise known as the Anti-graft and
Corrupt Practices Act, Republic Act No. 1379,
and Chapter II, Section 2, Title VII, Book II of the
Revised Penal Code, where one or more of the
accused are officials occupying the following
positions in the government whether in a
permanent, acting or interim capacity, at the time
of the commission of the offense:
(1) Officials of the executive branch occupying
the positions of regional director and higher,
otherwise classified as Grade ‘27’ and higher, of
the Compensation and Position Classification
Act of 1989 (Republic Act No. 6758), specifically
including:
xxxx
(g) Presidents, directors or trustees, or
managers of government-owned or controlled
corporations, state universities or educational
institutions or foundations;
In People v.Sandiganbayan,15 where herein petitioners
Alzaga and Satuito were respondents, this Court has
ruled that the character and operations of the AFP-
RSBS are imbued with public interest thus the same is a
government entity and its funds are in the nature of
public funds. In Ramiscal, Jr. v. Sandiganbayan,16 we
held that the AFP-RSBS is a government-owned and
controlled corporation under R.A. No. 9182, otherwise
known as The Special Purpose Vehicle Act of 2002.
These rulings render unmeritorious petitioners’ assertion
that the AFP-RSBS is a private entity.
There is likewise no merit in petitioners’ claim that the
Sandiganbayan has no jurisdiction over them since their
positions as vice presidents and assistant vice president
are not covered nor embraced by the term "managers"
under section 4 of RA. No. 8249.
We held in Geduspan v. People,17 that while the first part
of section 4 covers only officials of the executive branch
with the salary grade 27 and higher, the second part
"specifically includes" other executive officials whose
positions may not be of grade 27 and higher but who are
by express provision of law placed under the jurisdiction
of the said court. In the latter category, it is the position
held and not the salary grade which determines the
jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan. Thus, presidents,
directors or trustees, or managers of government owned
and controlled corporations, are under the jurisdiction of
the Sandiganbayan.
In the instant case, petitioners Alzaga and Bello were
Head of the Legal Department while petitioner Satuito
was Chief of the Documentation with corresponding
ranks of Vice Presidents and Assistant Vice President.
These positions are not specifically enumerated in RA.
No. 8249; however, as correctly observed by the
Sandiganbayan, their ranks as Vice Presidents and
Assistant Vice President are even higher than that of
"managers" mentioned in RA. No. 8249.
In sum, the Sandiganbayan correctly ruled that the AFP-
RSBS is a government-owned and controlled
corporation and that it has jurisdiction over the persons
of petitioners who were Vice Presidents and Assistant
Vice President when the charges against them were
allegedly committed.
WHEREFORE, the instant Petition
for Certiorari is DISMISSED. The assailed Resolution of
the Sandiganbayan dated April 25, 2005 that the AFP-
RSBS is a government-owned and controlled
corporation and that it has jurisdiction over the persons
of the petitioners and the Resolution dated August 10,
2005 denying petitioners’ motion for reconsideration, are
AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
Page 73 of 168
 THIRD DIVISION Check No. : 326317PR
Drawn Against : Asian Savings
Bank
ISIDRO PABLITO M. PALANA, G.R. No. 149995 P
Petitioner, a
Present: s
Ynares-Santiago, J. (Chairperson), e
- versus - Austria-Martinez, o
C d
hico- e
Nazario R
, o
N x
achura, a
and s
R B
eyes, J r
J. a
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, n
Respondent. Promulgated: c
h
September 28, 2007 In the amount of : P590,000.00
Postdated : February 15, 1988
x ------------------------------------------------------------------------- Payable to : Dr. Alex B. Carlos
--------------- x
said accused well knowing that at the
DECISION time of issue, he did not have sufficient
funds in or credit with the drawee bank
for the payment in full of the face amount
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.: of such check when presented for
payment within (90) days from the date
thereof, was subsequently dishonored by
For review is the Decision of the Court of Appeals the drawee bank for the reason Drawn
Against Insufficient Funds and despite
in CA-G.R. CR No. 21879 dated September 17, receipt of notice of such dishonor, the
2001,[1] affirming the September 23, 1997 Decision of the accused failed to pay said payee the face
Regional Trial Court of Makati City, Branch 63, in Criminal amount of said check or make
arrangement for full payment within five
Case No. 91-5617 convicting petitioner Isidro Pablito
(5) banking days after receiving notice.[2]
Palana with violation of Batas Pambansa (B.P.) Blg. 22
otherwise known as the Bouncing Checks Law.
On January 30, 1992, the case was archived due
to petitioners non-apprehension despite the issuance of a
On August 19, 1991, petitioner was charged with
warrant for his arrest.[3] On June 27, 1995, the warrant of
violation of B.P. Blg. 22 in an Information which reads as
arrest was recalled and set aside[4] after petitioner posted
follows:
the required bail. He was arraigned on July 25,
1995 when he pleaded not guilty to the offense charged.[5]

That on or about September Private complainant Alex B. Carlos testified that

1987, in the Municipality of Makati, Metro sometime in September 1987, petitioner and his wife
Manila, Philippines, a place within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the borrowed money from him in the amount
above-named accused did, then and of P590,000.00. To secure the payment of the loan,
there, willfully, unlawfully and knowingly petitioner issued a postdated check for the same amount
make or draw and issue to Alex B. Carlos
to apply on account or for the value the in favor of the complainant.[6] However, when the check
check described below: was presented for payment, it was dishonored by the bank
for insufficiency of funds. Subsequent demand
Page 74 of 168
notwithstanding, petitioner failed to make good the said
dishonored check.[7]
Petitioner alleged that the amounts given to him by private
complainant was an investment by the latter who was his
business partner. He argued that the subject check was
not issued in September 1987 to guarantee the payment
of a loan since his checking account was opened only
on December 1, 1987.[8] He claimed that
complainant cajoled him to issue a check in his favor
allegedly to be shown to a textile supplier who would
provide the partnership with the necessary
materials. Petitioner alleged that when the check was
issued sometime in February 1988,[9] complainant knew
that the same was not funded.[10]
After trial on the merits, the Regional Trial Court rendered
on September 23, 1997 a Decision[11] finding petitioner
guilty as charged, the dispositive portion of which reads:
Wherefore, this court finds the
accused Isidro Pablito M. Palana guilty
as charged and sentences him to a
prison term of Six (6) months and to
indemnify the private complainant the
sum of P590,000.00 plus legal interest
from filing of this case until full payment.
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN
AFFIRMING THE FINDING OF THE
LOWER COURT DISREGARDING THE
DEFENSE OF THE ACCUSED THAT
THE ISSUANCE OF THE SUBJECT
ASIAN BANK CHECK, WAS NOT FOR A
CONSIDERATION OR FOR VALUE, AS
THE ACCUSED WAS ONLY TRICKED
BY THE PRIVATE COMPLAINANT TO
ISSUE THE SAID CHECK AS A MEANS
OF BINDING THE ACCUSED TO
RETURN HIS INVESTMENT IN THE
private PARTNERSHIP WHICH WAS THEN
SUFFERING FROM BUSINESS
REVERSALS.
raw II.
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN
AFFIRMING THE FINDINGS OF THE
LOWER COURT THAT THE REGIONAL
TRIAL COURT HAS JURISDICTION
OVER THE CASE, DESPITE THE FACT
THAT AT THE TIME THE ACCUSED
WAS ARRAIGNED ON JULY 25, 1995
R.A. 7691 EXPANDING THE
JURISDICTION OF THE
METROPOLITAN TRIAL COURT WAS
ALREADY IN EFFECT.[14]
The issues to be resolved are: 1) whether petitioner was
guilty of violation of B.P. Blg. 22; and 2) whether the
Regional Trial Court has jurisdiction over the case.

SO ORDERED. Petitioners argument that it is the Metropolitan

Trial Court and not the Regional Trial Court which has
Petitioner appealed but it was dismissed by the Court of jurisdiction over the case pursuant to R.A. 7691 is without
Appeals which affirmed the trial courts decision in toto.[12] merit.

Both the trial court and the Court of Appeals found It is hornbook doctrine that jurisdiction to try a
that the check was issued as a guaranty for the loan, criminal action is determined by the law in force at the time
thereby rejecting petitioners investment theory. In ruling of the institution of the action[15] and not during the
against the existence of a partnership between them, the arraignment of the accused. The Information charging
trial court noted that the so-called partnership venture, petitioner with violation of B.P. Blg. 22 was filed on August
Palanas General Merchandising, was registered 19, 1991. At that time, the governing law determinative of
on December 1, 1987 only in the name of jurisdiction is B.P. Blg. 129[16] which provides:
petitioner.[13] The Court of Appeals also held that the act
Sec. 20. Jurisdiction in criminal
of lending money does not necessarily amount to an cases. Regional Trial Courts shall
investment of capital. exercise exclusive original jurisdiction in
Hence, the instant petition raising the following all criminal cases not within the exclusive
jurisdiction of any court, tribunal or body,
issues:
except those now falling under the
exclusive and concurrent jurisdiction of
I.
Page 75 of 168
 the Sandiganbayan which shall hereafter
be exclusively taken cognizance by the
latter.
xxxx
Sec. 32. Jurisdiction of Metropolitan Trial
Courts, Municipal Trial Courts and
Municipal Circuit Trial Courts in Criminal
Cases. Except in cases falling within the
exclusive original jurisdiction of Regional
Trial Courts and the Sandiganbayan, the
Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial
Courts, and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts
shall exercise:
xxxx
(2) Exclusive original jurisdiction
over all offenses punishable
with imprisonment of not exceeding
four years and two months, or a fine
of not more than four thousand pesos,
or both such fine and imprisonment,
regardless of other imposable accessory
or other penalties, including the civil
liability arising from such offenses or
predicated thereon, irrespective of kind,
nature, value or amount thereof:
Provided, however, That in offenses
involving damage to property through
criminal negligence they shall have
exclusive original jurisdiction where the
imposable fine does not exceed twenty
thousand pesos.
Violation of B.P. Blg. 22 is punishable with
imprisonment of not less than 30 days but not more than
one year or by a fine of not less than but not more than
double the amount of the check which fine shall in no case
exceed P200,000.00, or both fine and imprisonment[17] at
the discretion of the court. In the present case, the fine
imposable is P200,000.00 hence, the Regional Trial Court
properly acquired jurisdiction over the case.[18] The
Metropolitan Trial Court could not acquire jurisdiction over
the criminal action because its jurisdiction is only for
offenses punishable with a fine of not more
than P4,000.00.
The subsequent amendment of B.P. 129 by R.A.
No. 7691, An Act Expanding the Jurisdiction of the
Municipal Trial Courts, Municipal Circuit Trial Courts and
the Metropolitan Trial Court[19] on June 15, 1994 cannot
divest the Regional Trial Court of jurisdiction over
petitioners case. Where a court has already obtained and
is exercising jurisdiction over a controversy, its jurisdiction
to proceed to the final determination of the cause is not
affected by new legislation placing jurisdiction over such
proceedings in another tribunal unless the statute
expressly provides, or is construed to the effect that it is
intended to operate on actions pending before its
enactment. Indeed, R.A. No. 7691 contains retroactive
provisions. However, these only apply to civil cases that
have not yet reached the pre-trial stage. Neither from an
express proviso nor by implication can it be construed that
R.A. No. 7691 has retroactive application to criminal
cases pending or decided by the Regional Trial Courts
prior to its effectivity.[20] The jurisdiction of the RTCover
the case attached upon the commencement of the action
by the filing of the Information and could not be ousted by
the passage of R.A. No. 7691 reapportioning the
jurisdiction of inferior courts, the application of which to
criminal cases is prospective in nature.[21]
After a careful review of the records, this Court
sustains petitioners conviction for violation of B.P. Blg.
22. The elements of the offense penalized under B.P. Blg.
22 are as follows: (1) the accused makes, draws, or
issues any check to apply on account or for value; (2) the
accused knows at the time of issue that he does not have
sufficient funds in or credit with the drawee bank for the
payment of such check in full upon its presentment; and
(3) the check is subsequently dishonored by the drawee
bank for insufficiency of funds or credit or would have
been dishonored for the same reason had not the drawer,
without any valid reason, ordered the bank to stop
payment.
Each element of the offense was duly proven by
the prosecution. Petitioner admitted that at the time he
issued the subject check, he knew that he does not have
sufficient funds in or credit with the drawee bank for
payment of such check. Consequently, when the check
was presented for payment, it was dishonored by the
drawee bank for insufficiency of funds. Thereafter, he
received demand letters to pay the amount of the check
from private complainant but he did not comply with it.[22]
In ruling that the amount of the check was for
consideration or value, both the trial court and the Court
Page 76 of 168
of Appeals upheld private complainants claim that the
check was issued as a guaranty for the loan and rejected
petitioners investment theory. The issue as to whether the
amount of the subject check represents the amount of the
money loaned by private complainant to petitioner or as
an investment in the alleged partnership is a factual
question involving the credibility of witnesses. Where the
issue is one of credibility, the appellate court will not
generally disturb the findings of the lower court
considering that it is in a better position to settle that issue
since it had the advantage of hearing the witnesses and
observing their conduct during the trial, which
circumstances carry great weight in assessing their
credibility. In the present case, we see no reason to
reverse the finding of the trial court as affirmed by the
Court of Appeals that the amount of the subject check was
a loan and not an investment.[23]
Upon issuance of a check, in the absence of
evidence to the contrary, it is presumed that the same was
issued for valuable consideration, which may consist
either in some right, interest, profit or benefit accruing to
the party who makes the contract, or some forbearance,
detriment, loss or some responsibility, to act, or labor, or
service given, suffered or undertaken by the other
side. Since it was established that petitioner received
money from private complainant in various
amounts,[24] petitioner cannot now claim that the checks
were not issued for value.[25]
The allegation that the check was intended to be
shown to potential suppliers is not a valid
defense. In Cueme v. People,[26] the Court held thus:
The allegation of petitioner that
the checks were merely intended to be
shown to prospective investors of her
corporation is, to say the least, not a
defense. The gravamen of the offense
punished under B.P. Blg. 22 is the act of
making or issuing a worthless check or a
check that is dishonored upon its
presentment for payment. The law has
made the mere act of issuing a bad check
malum prohibitum, an act proscribed by
the legislature for being deemed
pernicious and inimical to public welfare.
Considering the rule in mala
prohibita cases, the only inquiry is
whether the law has been
breached. Criminal intent becomes
unnecessary where the acts are
prohibited for reasons of public policy,
and the defenses of good faith and
absence of criminal intent are unavailing.
The checks issued, even
assuming they were not intended to be
encashed or deposited in a bank,
produce the same effect as ordinary
checks. What the law punishes is the
issuance of a rubber check itself and not
the purpose for which the check was
issued nor the terms and conditions
relating to its issuance. This is not
without good reasons. To determine
the purpose as well as the terms and
conditions for which checks are issued
will greatly erode the faith the public
reposes in the stability and commercial
value of checks as currency substitutes,
and bring about havoc in the trading and
banking communities. Besides, the law
does not make any distinction as to the
kind of checks which are the subject of its
provisions, hence, no such distinction
can be made by means of interpretation
or application. What is important is the
fact that petitioner deliberately issued the
checks in question and those checks
were dishonored upon presentment for
payment.
Hence, the agreement surrounding the issuance of a
check is irrelevant to the prosecution and conviction of the
petitioner.[27]
The alleged inconsistency in the date of issuance
of the subject check is likewise immaterial. Issuance, as
defined under the Negotiable Instruments Law, is the first
delivery of the check.[28] In the case at bar, the Information
alleged that the check was postdated February 15,
1988 although issued in or about September
1987. During trial, petitioner testified that the Checking
Account was opened only on December 1, 1987 and that
the check was issued sometime in February 1988.
The rule is that a variance between the allegation
in the information and proof adduced during trial shall be
fatal to the criminal case if it is material and prejudicial to
the accused so much so that it affects his substantial
rights.[29] In a prosecution for violation of B.P. 22, the time
of the issuance of the subject check is material since it
Page 77 of 168
forms part of the second element of the offense that at the
time of its issuance, petitioner knew of the insufficiency of
funds. However, it cannot be said that petitioner was
prejudiced by such variance nor was surprised by
it. Records show that petitioner knew at the time he issued
the check that he does not have sufficient funds in the
bank to cover the amount of the check. Yet, he proceeded
to issue the same claiming that the same would only be
shown to prospective suppliers, a defense which is not
valid.

Moreover, there is no merit in petitioners allegation that

private complainant knew that the check is not
funded. Both the trial court and the Court of Appeals
found that the subject check was issued as guaranty for
payment of the loan hence, was intended to apply for
account or for value. As such, it was incumbent upon
petitioner to see to it that the check is duly covered when
presented for payment.

Pursuant to Supreme Court Administrative

Circular No. 12-2000, as clarified by Administrative
Circular No. 13-2001, the alternative penalty of fine may
be imposed in lieu of imprisonment considering that the
prosecution failed to prove or allege that petitioner is not
a first-time offender.[30] Hence, in lieu of imprisonment, a
fine of P200,000.00 shall be imposed upon petitioner.[31]
WHEREFORE, the assailed decision of the Court
of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 21879 dated September
17, 2001, finding petitioner ISIDRO PABLITO M. PALANA
guilty of violating Batas Pambansa Blg. 22, is AFFIRMED
with MODIFICATION. Petitioner is ordered to pay private
complainant the amount of P590,000.00, representing the
value of the check, with six (6%) percent interest from
date of filing of the Information until the finality of the
decision, the amount of which, inclusive of the interest, is
subject to twelve percent (12%) interest, from finality of
the decision until fully paid. In lieu of imprisonment,
petitioner is ordered to pay a fine of P200,000.00.

SO ORDERED.

Page 78 of 168
 SECOND DIVISION
JEFFREY RESO DAYAP, G.R. No. 177960 Reckless Imprudence resulting to Homicide, Less Serious
Physical Injuries, and Damage to Property. The pertinent
Petitioner,
portion of the information reads:
Present:

QUISUMBING, J., That at about 11:55 oclock in

the evening of 28 December 2004 at
Chairperson, Brgy. Maslog, Sibulan, Negros Oriental,
- versus - CORONA,* Philippines, and within the jurisdiction
of this Honorable Court, the above-
CARPIO MORALES, named accused, did then and there,
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously drive
TINGA, and
in a reckless and imprudent manner a
CHICO- 10-wheeler cargo truck with plate
NAZARI number ULP-955, color blue, fully
O,** JJ. loaded with sacks of coconut shell,
registered in the name of Ruben
PRETZY-LOU SENDIONG, Villabeto of Sta. Agueda Pamplona,
Negros Oriental, thereby hitting an
GENESA SENDIONG, ELVIE Promulgated:
automobile, a Colt Galant with plate
SY and DEXIE DURAN, number NLD-379 driven by Lou Gene
R. Sendiong who was with two female
Respondents. January 29, 2009 passengers, namely: Dexie Duran and
Elvie Sy, thus causing the
x--------------------------------------------------------------------------
instantaneous death of said Lou Gene
-x
R. Sendiong, less serious physical
injuries on the bodies of Dexie Duran
and Elvie Sy and extensive damage to
DECISION the above-mentioned Colt Galant which
is registered in the name of Cristina P.
TINGA, J.: Weyer of 115 Dr. V. Locsin St.,
Dumaguete City, to the damage of the
heirs of the same Lou Gene R.
Sendiong and the other two offended
Before us is a petition for review[1] on certiorari of the parties above-mentioned.

Decision[2] dated 17 August 2006 and Resolution[3] dated

25 April 2007 by the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. An act defined and penalized by Article
365 of the Revised Penal Code.
01179 entitled, Pretzy-Lou P. Sendiong, Genesa R.
Sendiong, Elvie H. Sy and Dexie Duran v. Hon. Judge
Cresencio Tan and Jeffrey Reso Dayap.

The case had its origins in the filing of an

Information[4] on 29 December 2004 by the Provincial
On 10 January 2005, before the Municipal Trial Court
Prosecutors Office, Sibulan, Negros Oriental, charging
(MTC) of Sibulan, Negros Oriental, petitioner was
herein petitioner Jeffrey Reso Dayap with the crime of
arraigned and he pleaded not guilty to the charge.[5]
Page 79 of 168
 allegations in the Information. Pertinent portions of the
order state:
On 17 January 2005, respondents Pretzy-Lou P.
Sendiong, Genesa Sendiong and Dexie Duran filed a
motion for leave of court to file an amended An examination of the allegations in the
information and comparing the same
information.[6] They sought to add the allegation of
with the evidence presented by the
abandonment of the victims by petitioner, thus: The driver prosecution would reveal that the
evidence presented has not
of the 10-wheeler cargo truck abandoned the victims, at a established said allegations. The facts
time when said [Lou-Gene] R. Sendiong was still alive and circumstances constituting the
allegations charged have not been
inside the car; he was only extracted from the car by the proven. It is elementary in the rules of
evidence that a party must prove his
by-standers.[7]
own affirmative allegations.

xxxx

On 21 January 2005, however, the Provincial Prosecutor

Nowhere in the evidence of the
filed an Omnibus Motion praying that the motion to amend
prosecution can this Court find that it
the information be considered withdrawn.[8] On 21 was the accused who committed the
crime as charged. Its witnesses have
January 2003, the MTC granted the withdrawal and the never identified the accused as the one
motion to amend was considered withdrawn.[9] who has committed the crime. The
prosecution never bothered to establish
if indeed it was the accused who
committed the crime or asked
questions which would have proved the
Pre-trial and trial of the case proceeded. Respondents elements of the crime. The prosecution
testified for the prosecution. After the prosecution had did not even establish if indeed it was
the accused who was driving the truck
rested its case, petitioner sought leave to file a demurrer at the time of the incident. The Court
to evidence which was granted. Petitioner filed his simply cannot find any evidence which
would prove that a crime has been
Demurrer to Evidence[10] dated 15 April 2005 grounded committed and that the accused is the
person responsible for it. There was no
on the prosecutions failure to prove beyond reasonable
evidence on the allegation of the death
doubt that he is criminally liable for reckless imprudence, of Lou Gene R. Sendiong as there was
no death certificate that was offered in
to which respondents filed a Comment[11] dated 25 April evidence. The alleged less serious
2005. physical injuries on the bodies of Dexie
Duran and Elvie Sy were not also
proven as no medical certificate was
presented to state the same nor was a
doctor presented to establish such
In the Order[12] dated 16 May 2005, the MTC injuries. The alleged damage to the
granted the demurrer and acquitted petitioner of the crime [C]olt [G]alant was also not established
in any manner as no witness ever
of reckless imprudence. The MTC found that the evidence testified on this aspect and no
presented by respondents failed to establish the documentary evidence was also
presented to state the damage. The
prosecution therefore failed to establish
if indeed it was the accused who was
Page 80 of 168
responsible for the death of Lou Gene
R. Sendiong and the injuries to Dexie
Duran and Elvie Sy, including the
damage to the Colt Galant. The mother
of the victim testified only on the
expenses she incurred and the shock
she and her family have suffered as a
result of the incident. But sad to say,
she could not also pinpoint if it was the
accused who committed the crime and
be held responsible for it. This Court
could only say that the prosecution has
practically bungled this case from its
inception.
Every criminal conviction
requires of the prosecution to prove two
thingsthe fact of the crime, i.e., the
presence of all the elements of the
crime for which the accused stands
charged, and the fact that the accused
is the perpetrator of the crime. Sad to
say, the prosecution has miserably
failed to prove these two things. When
the prosecution fails to discharge its
burden of establishing the guilt of the
accused, an accused need not even
offer evidence in his behalf.

xxxx
xxxx

The defense furthermore

argued that on the contrary, the
prosecutions [evidence] conclusively
show that the swerving of vehicle 1 [the
Colt Galant] to the lane of vehicle 2 [the
cargo truck] is the proximate cause of
WHEREFORE, premises considered,
the accident. The court again is inclined
the demurrer is granted and the
to agree with this argument of the
accused JEFFREY RESO DAYAP is
defense. It has looked carefully into the
hereby acquitted for insufficiency of
sketch of the accident as indicated in
evidence. The bail bond posted for his
the police blotter and can only conclude
temporary liberty is also hereby
that the logical explanation of the
cancelled and ordered released to the
accident is that vehicle 1 swerved into
accused or his duly authorized
the lane of vehicle 2, thus hitting the
representative.
latters inner fender and tires. Exhibit 7
which is a picture of vehicle 2 shows the
extent of its damage which was the
effect of vehicle 1s ramming into the SO ORDERED.[13]
rear left portion of vehicle 2 causing the
differential guide of vehicle 2 to be cut,
its tires busted and pulled out together
with their axle. The cutting of the
differential guide cause[d] the entire
housing connecting the tires to the truck Respondents thereafter filed a petition for
body to collapse, thus causing vehicle 2
certiorari under Rule 65,[14] alleging that the MTCs
to tilt to its left side and swerve towards
the lane of vehicle 1. It was this dismissal of the case was done without considering the
accident that caused the swerving, not
of [sic] any negligent act of the accused. evidence adduced by the prosecution. Respondents
added that the MTC failed to observe the manner the trial
of the case should proceed as provided in Sec. 11, Rule
xxxx
119 of the Rules of Court as well as failed to rule on the
civil liability of the accused in spite of the evidence

Page 81 of 168
presented. The case was raffled to the Regional Trial Both parties filed their motions for reconsideration
Court (RTC) of Negros Oriental, Br. 32. of the RTC order, but these were denied for lack of merit
in the order[17] dated 12 September 2005.

In the order[15] dated 23 August 2005, the RTC

affirmed the acquittal of petitioner but ordered the remand
Respondents then filed a petition for review with the Court
of the case to the MTC for further proceedings on the civil
of Appeals under Rule 42, docketed as CA-G.R. SP. No.
aspect of the case. The RTC ruled that the MTCs recital
01179. The appellate court subsequently rendered the
of every fact in arriving at its conclusions disproved the
assailed decision and resolution. The Court of Appeals
allegation that it failed to consider the evidence presented
ruled that there being no proof of the total value of the
by the prosecution. The records also demonstrated that
properties damaged, the criminal case falls under
the MTC conducted the trial of the case in the manner
the jurisdiction of the RTC and the proceedings before
dictated by Sec. 11, Rule 119 of the Rules of Court,
the MTC are
except that the defense no longer presented its evidence
after the MTC gave due course to the accuseds demurrer
to evidence, the filing of which is allowed under Sec. 23,
Rule 119. The RTC however agreed that the MTC failed
to rule on the accuseds civil liability, especially since the null and void. In so ruling, the appellate court cited Tulor
judgment of acquittal did not include a declaration that the v. Garcia (correct title of the case is Cuyos v.
facts from which the civil liability might arise did not Garcia)[18] which ruled that in complex crimes involving
exist. Thus, the RTC declared that the aspect of civil reckless imprudence resulting in homicide or physical
liability was not passed upon and resolved to remand the injuries and damage to property, the jurisdiction of the
issue to the MTC. The dispositive portion of the decision court to take cognizance of the case is determined by the
states: fine imposable for the damage to property resulting from
the reckless imprudence, not by the corresponding

WHEREFORE, the questioned penalty for the physical injuries charged. It also found
order of the Municipal Trial Court of support in Sec. 36 of the Judiciary Reorganization Act of
Sibulan on accuseds acquittal is
AFFIRMED. The case is REMANDED 1980 and the 1991 Rule 8 on Summary Procedure, which
to the court of origin or its successor for govern the summary procedure in first-level courts in
further proceedings on the civil aspect
of the case. No costs. offenses involving damage to property through criminal
negligence where the imposable fine does not

SO ORDERED.[16] exceed P10,000.00. As there was no proof of the total

value of the property damaged and respondents were
claiming the amount of P1,500,000.00 as civil damages,

Page 82 of 168
the case falls within the RTCs jurisdiction. The dispositive
portion of the Decision dated 17 August 2006 reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered,
judgment is hereby rendered by Us
REMANDING the case to the Regional
Trial Court (RTC), Judicial Region,
Branch 32, Negros Oriental for proper
disposition of the merits of the case.
SO ORDERED.[19]
Petitioner moved for reconsideration of the Court of
Appeals decision,[20] arguing that jurisdiction over the
case is determined by the allegations in the information,
and that neither the 1991 Rule on Summary Procedure
nor Sec. 36 of the Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980
can be the basis of the RTCs jurisdiction over the
case. However, the Court of Appeals denied the motion
for reconsideration for lack of merit in the Resolution
dated 25 April 2007.[21] It reiterated that it is the RTC that
has proper jurisdiction considering that the information
alleged a willful, unlawful, felonious killing as well as
abandonment of the victims.
In the present petition for review, petitioner argues that
the MTC had jurisdiction to hear the criminal case for
reckless imprudence, owing to the enactment of Republic
Act (R.A.) No. 7691,[22] which confers jurisdiction to first-
level courts on offenses involving damage to property
through criminal negligence. He asserts that the RTC
could not have acquired jurisdiction on the basis of a
legally unfiled and officially withdrawn amended
information alleging abandonment. Respondents are also
faulted for challenging the MTCs order acquitting
petitioner through a special civil action for certiorari under
Rule 65 in lieu of an ordinary appeal under Rule 42.
The petition has merit. It should be granted.
The first issue is whether the Court of Appeals erred in
ruling that jurisdiction over the offense charged pertained
to the RTC.
Both the MTC and the RTC proceeded with the
case on the basis of the Information dated 29 December
2004 charging petitioner only with the complex crime of
reckless imprudence resulting to homicide, less serious
physical injuries and damage to property. The Court of
Appeals however declared in its decision that petitioner
should have been charged with the same offense but
aggravated by the circumstance of abandonment of the
victims. It appears from the records however that
respondents attempt to amend the information by
charging the aggravated offense was unsuccessful as the
MTC had approved the Provincial Prosecutors motion to
withdraw their motion to amend the information. The
information filed before the trial court had remained
unamended.[23] Thus, petitioner is deemed to have been
charged only with the offense alleged in the original
Information without any aggravating circumstance.
Article 365 of the Revised Penal Code punishes any
person who, by reckless imprudence, commits any act
which, had it been intentional, would constitute a grave
felony, with the penalty of arresto mayor in its maximum
period to prision correccional in its medium period. When
Page 83 of 168
such reckless imprudence the use of a motor vehicle,
resulting in the death of a person attended the same
article imposes upon the defendant the penalty of prision
correccional in its medium and maximum periods.
The offense with which petitioner was charged is
reckless imprudence resulting in homicide, less serious
physical injuries and damage to property, a complex
crime. Where a reckless, imprudent, or negligent act
results in two or more grave or less grave felonies, a
complex crime is committed.[24] Article 48 of the Revised
Penal Code provides that when the single act constitutes
two or more grave or less grave felonies, or when an
offense is a necessary means for committing the other,
the penalty for the most serious crime shall be imposed,
the same to be applied in its maximum period. Since
Article 48 speaks of felonies, it is applicable to crimes
through negligence in view of the definition of felonies in
Article 3 as acts or omissions punishable by law
committed either by means of deceit (dolo) or fault
(culpa).[25] Thus, the penalty imposable upon petitioner,
were he to be found guilty, is prision correccional in its
medium period (2 years, 4 months and 1 day to 4 years)
and maximum period (4 years, 2 months and 1 day to 6
years).
Applicable as well is the familiar rule that the
jurisdiction of the court to hear and decide a case is
conferred by the law in force at the time of the institution
of the action, unless such statute provides for a retroactive
application thereof.[26] When this case was filed on 29
December 2004, Section 32(2) of Batas Pambansa Bilang
129 had already been amended by R.A. No. 7691. R.A.
No. 7691 extended the jurisdiction of the first-level courts
over criminal cases to include all offenses punishable with
imprisonment not exceeding six (6) years irrespective of
the amount of fine, and regardless of other imposable
accessory or other penalties including those for civil
liability. It explicitly states
that in offenses involving damage to property
through criminal negligence, they shall have exclusive or
iginal
jurisdiction thereof. It follows that criminal cases for reckl
ess
imprudence punishable with prision correccional in its
medium and maximum periods should fall within the
jurisdiction of the MTC and not the RTC. Clearly,
therefore, jurisdiction to hear and try the same pertained
to the MTC and the RTC did not have original jurisdiction
over the criminal case.[27] Consequently, the MTC of
Sibulan, Negros Oriental had properly taken cognizance
of the case and the proceedings before it were valid and
legal.
As the records show, the MTC granted petitioners
demurrer to evidence and acquitted him of the offense on
the ground of insufficiency of evidence. The demurrer to
evidence in criminal cases, such as the one at bar, is filed
after the prosecution had rested its case, and when the
same is granted, it calls for an appreciation of the
evidence adduced by the prosecution and its sufficiency
to warrant conviction beyond reasonable doubt, resulting
in a dismissal of the case on the merits, tantamount to an
acquittal of the accused.[28] Such dismissal of a criminal
case by the grant of demurrer to evidence may not be
appealed, for to do so would be to place the accused in
double jeopardy.[29] But while the dismissal order
Page 84 of 168
consequent to a demurrer to evidence is not subject to
appeal, the same is still reviewable but only by certiorari
under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court.Thus, in such case,
the factual findings of the trial court are conclusive upon
the reviewing court, and the only legal basis to reverse
and set aside the order of dismissal upon demurrer to
evidence is by a clear showing that the trial court, in
acquitting the accused, committed grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction or a
denial of due process, thus rendering the assailed
judgment void.[30]
Accordingly, respondents filed before the RTC
the petition for certiorari alleging that the MTC gravely
abused its discretion in dismissing the case and failing to
consider the evidence of the prosecution in resolving the
same, and in allegedly failing to follow the proper
procedure as mandated by the Rules of Court. The RTC
correctly ruled that the MTC did not abuse its discretion in
dismissing the criminal complaint. The MTCs conclusions
were based on facts diligently recited in the order thereby
disproving that the MTC failed to consider the evidence
presented by the prosecution. The records also show that
the MTC correctly followed the procedure set forth in the
Rules of Court.
The second issue is whether the Court of Appeals
erred in ordering the remand of the case of the matter of
civil liability for the reception of evidence.
We disagree with the Court of Appeals on
directing the remand of the case to the RTC for further
proceedings on the civil aspect, as well as with the RTC
in directing a similar remand to the MTC.
The acquittal of the accused does not
automatically preclude a judgment against him on the civil
aspect of the case. The extinction of the penal action does
not carry with it the extinction of the civil liability where: (a)
the acquittal is based on reasonable doubt as only
preponderance of evidence is required; (b) the court
declares that the liability of the accused is only civil; and
(c) the civil liability of the accused does not arise from or
is not based upon the crime of which the accused is
acquitted. [31] However, the civil action based on delict
may be deemed extinguished if there is a finding on the
final judgment in the criminal action that the act or
omission from which the civil liability may arise did not
exist[32] or where the accused did not commit the acts or
omission imputed to him.[33]
Thus, if demurrer is granted and the accused is
acquitted by the court, the accused has the right to
adduce evidence on the civil aspect of the case unless the
court also declares that the act or omission from which the
civil liability may arise did not exist.[34] This is because
when the accused files a demurrer to evidence, he has
not yet adduced evidence both on the criminal and civil
aspects of the case. The only evidence on record is the
evidence for the prosecution. What the trial court should
do is issue an order or partial judgment granting the
Page 85 of 168
demurrer to evidence and acquitting the accused, and set WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The
the case for continuation of trial for the accused to adduce Court of Appeals Decision dated 17 August 2006 and
evidence on the civil aspect of the case and for the private Resolution dated 25 April 2007 in CA-G.R. SP. No. 01179
complainant to adduce evidence by way of are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Order dated 16
rebuttal. Thereafter, the court shall render judgment on May 2005 of the Municipal Trial Court of Sibulan, Negros
the civil aspect of the case.[35] Oriental in Criminal Case No. 3016-04 granting the
Demurrer to Evidence and acquitting petitioner Jeffrey
Reso Dayap of the offense charged therein is
A scrutiny of the MTCs decision supports the REINSTATED and AFFIRMED.
conclusion that the acquittal was based on the findings
that the act or omission from which the civil liability may
arise did not exist and that petitioner did not commit the SO ORDERED.
acts or omission imputed to him; hence, petitioners civil
liability has been extinguished by his acquittal. It should
be noted that the MTC categorically stated that it cannot
find any evidence which would prove that a crime had
been committed and that accused was the person
responsible for it. It added that the prosecution failed to
establish that it was petitioner who committed the crime
as charged since its witnesses never identified petitioner
as the one who was driving the cargo truck at the time of
the incident. Furthermore, the MTC found that the
proximate cause of the accident is the damage to the rear
portion of the truck caused by the swerving of the Colt
Galant into the rear left portion of the cargo truck and not
the reckless driving of the truck by petitioner, clearly
establishing that petitioner is not guilty of reckless
imprudence.Consequently, there is no more need to
remand the case to the trial court for proceedings on the
civil aspect of the case, since petitioners acquittal has
extinguished his civil liability.

Page 86 of 168
 EN BANC

x--------------------------------------------------------------------------
-x

FELICISIMO F. LAZARTE, JR., G.R. No. 180122

Petitioner,

Present:
DECISION
PUNO, C.J.,*

QUISUMBING,**
TINGA, J.:
YNARES-SANTIAGO,

CARPIO,

- versus - AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, This is a Petition for Certiorari[1] under Rule 65 of the 1997

CORONA, Rules of Civil Procedure assailing the

Resolution[2] dated 2 March 2007 of the First Division of
CARPIO MORALES,
the Sandiganbayan in Criminal Case No. 26583
TINGA,
entitled, People of the Philippines v. Robert P. Balao, et
CHICO-NAZARIO,
al., which denied petitioner Felicisimo F. Lazarte, Jr.s
V Motion to Quash. The Resolution[3]dated 18 October
E
L 2007 of said court denying petitioners motion for
A reconsideration is likewise challenged in this petition.
S
C
O
,
The antecedents follow.
J
R
.
,
In June 1990, the National Housing Authority (NHA)
SANDIGANBAYAN (First Division) NACHURA,
awarded the original contract for the infrastructure works
and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, LEONARDO DE CASTRO,on the Pahanocoy Sites and Services Project, Phase 1

Respondents. BRION, and in BacolodCity to A.C. Cruz Construction. The project,

PERALTA, JJ. with a contract cost of P7,666,507.55, was funded by the
World Bank under the Project Loan Agreement forged
on 10 June 1983between the Philippine Government and
the IBRD-World Bank.[4]
Promulgated:

March 13, 2009

Page 87 of 168

A.C. Cruz Construction commenced
infrastructure works on 1 August 1990.[5] In April 1991, the
complainant Candido M. Fajutag, Jr.(Fajutag, Jr.) was
designated Project Engineer of the project.
A Variation/Extra Work Order No.
approved for the excavation of unsuitable materials and
road filling works. As a consequence, Arceo Cruz of A.C.
Cruz Construction submitted the fourth billing and Report
of Physical Accomplishments on 6 May 1991. Fajutag,
Jr., however, discovered certain deficiencies. As a result,
he issued Work Instruction No. 1 requiring
supporting documents, such as: (1) copy of approved
concrete pouring; (2) survey results of original ground and
finished leaks; (3) volume calculation of earth fill actually
rendered on site; (4) test results as to the quality of
materials and compaction; and (5) copy of work
instructions attesting to the demolished
structures.[6]
The contractor failed to comply with the work instruction.
Upon Fajutag, Jr.s further verification, it was established
that there was no actual excavation and road filling works
undertaken by A.C. Cruz Construction. Fajutag, Jr.s
findings are summarized as follows:
1. No topographic map was
appended, even if the same is necessary
in land development works; a discarded
drawing sheet: Spot Elevations and
Existing Gradelines of the project site
was found, but this contrasted
significantly with the alleged joint-survey
results in support of the Variation/Extra
Work Order No. 1;
2. No laboratory tests were conducted to
the
ascertain unsuitability of materials, even
if the same should have been required as
essential basis thereof;
3. There were no records of the
excavation and disposal of unsuitable
materials and of road filling works having
1 was been made by the previous engineers,
Rodolfo de los Santos and Noel Lobrido
at the time said activities were allegedly
executed;
4. The excavation of unsuitable materials
and road filling works were
some overestimated to the prejudice of the
government:
a. in a 10.00 meter right-of-way (ROW)
road, the entire width of 10.00 meters
was used in calculating the volume of cut
of unsuitable materials when the
undisturbed natural grounds on both
concrete sides of the road was only 6.00 meters;
b. the mathematical calculation in
determining the volume of cut of
unsuitable materials are contrary to the
contracts technical specifications which
provides for cut measurements, i.e.[,] by
end-area method;
c. in a 10.00 ROW road, an effective
width of 8.70 meters was used in
calculating the volume of road fill when
the undisturbed natural grounds on both
sides of the road was only 6.00 meters
apart;
d. the mathematical calculations in
determining the volume of roadfill are
contrary to the contracts technical
specifications, specifically Section 3.11
thereof, i.e., by end-area method.
Page 88 of 168

5. No laboratory test was made to
ascertain the quality of imported road fill
materials.[7]
In a Memorandum dated 27 June 1991, the Project Office
recommended the termination of the infrastructure
contract with A.C. Construction.[8]
In its Report dated 12 August 1991, the Inventory
and Acceptance Committee determined the
accomplishment of the contractor at 40.89%,
representing P3,433,713.10 out of the total revised
contract amount of P8,397,225.09 inclusive of Variation
Order No. 1 in the amount of P710,717.54. Thereafter,
said Committee recommended that the temporary project
suspension imposed by the contractor, which incurred
delays in the project completion, be referred to the Legal
Department for appropriate action.[9]
On 19 August 1991, the Manager of the Legal
Department issued a Memorandum addressed to the
General Manager of NHA endorsing approval of the
Regional Projects Departments (RPDs) recommendation.
The NHA General Manager through a letter dated 29
August 1991 informed the contractor of the rescission of
his contract for the development of the said project upon
his receipt thereof without prejudice to NHAs enforcing its
right under the contract in view of the contractors
unilateral and unauthorized suspension of the contract
works amounting to abandonment of the project. Despite
the rescission notice issued by the NHA per letter
dated 29 August 1991, the contractor continued working
intermittently with very minimal workforce until such time
as the award of remaining infrastructure works is effected
by NHA to another contractor.[10]
In March 1992, the NHA Board of Directors, per
Resolution No. 2453, approved the mutual termination of
the A.C. Cruz Construction contract and awarded the
remaining work to Triad Construction and Development
Corporation (Triad). The contract amount for the
remaining work was P9,554,837.32.[11] Thereafter,
representatives from A.C. Cruz Construction, Triad and
NHA-Bacolod conducted a joint measurement at the site
to determine the total accomplishment of A.C. Cruz
Construction inclusive of accomplishments after NHA
total
inventory.
The Project Office was subsequently informed by the
Central Office that the accomplishments made by A.C.
Cruz Construction after the NHA inventory would be paid
directly to said contractor by Triad. As of 27 March 1992,
Triad had issued checks in favor of A.C. Cruz
Construction amounting to One Million Pesos
(P1,000,000.00) which were received by Arceo M. Cruz
per Official Receipt No. 3003.[12]
In its Memorandum dated 22 June 1992, the Regional
Projects Department recommended to the General
Manager that the fund settlement to A.C. Cruz
Construction be effected.[13]
Thereafter, Triad discovered that certain work items that
had been in under the inventory report as accomplished
and acceptable were in fact non-existent. Fajutag, Jr.
Page 89 of 168
 JOSEPHINE O. ANGSICO, JOSEPHINE
brought these irregularities to the attention of the
T. ESPINOSA, NOEL H. LOBRIDO AND
Commission on Audit (COA). ARCEO C. CRUZ for VIOLATION OF
SECTION 3 (e) of REPUBLIC ACT No.
3019, AS AMENDED (THE ANTI-GRAFT
AND CORRUPT PRACTICES ACT),
After its special audit investigation, the COA uncovered committed as follows:

some anomalies, among which, are ghost activities,

specifically the excavation of unsuitable materials and That in or about the
road filling works and substandard, defective month of March, 1992 at
Bacolod City, Province
workmanship. Laboratory tests confirmed the of Negros Occidental,
irregularities.[14] Philippines and within
the jurisdiction of this
Further, according to the COA, while it is true that the Honorable Court, above-
named accused,
fourth billing of A.C. Cruz Construction had not been paid ROBERT P. BALAO,
its accomplishments after the August 1991 inventory JOSEPHINE C.
ANGSICO, VIRGILIO V.
found acceptable by NHA amounting to P896,177.08
DACALOS,
were paid directly by Triad. Effectively, A.C. Cruz FELICISIMO F.
LAZARTE, JR.,
Construction had been overpaid by as much
JOSEPHINE T.
as P232,628.35, which amount is more than the net ESPINOSA, and
payment due per the computation of the unpaid fourth NOEL H. LOBRIDO,Pub
lic Officers, being the
billing.[15]
General Manager, Team
Head, Visayas Mgt.
Office, Division Manager
Consequently, petitioner, as manager of the Regional (Visayas), Manager,
RPD, Project Mgt.
Projects Department and Chairman of the Inventory and Officer A and
Acceptance Committee, and other NHA officials were Supervising Engineer,
Diliman, Quezon City, in
charged in an Information[16] dated 5 March 2001, worded such capacity and
as follows: committing the offense in
relation to office and
while in the performance
of their official functions,
conniving, confederating
and mutually helping
with each other and with
accused ARCEO C.
CRUZ, a private
individual and General
Manager of A.C. Cruz
INFORMATION
Construction with
address at 7486
Bagtikan Street, Makati
The undersigned Ombudsman City with deliberate
Prosecutor II of the Office of the intent, with manifest
Ombudsman-Visayas, accuses partiality and evident bad
ROBERT P. BALAO, FELICISIMO F. faith, did then and there
LAZARTE, JR., VIRGILIO V. DACALOS, willfully, unlawfully and
Page 90 of 168
 feloniously cause to be
accusations against them have been violated by the
paid to A.C. Construction
public funds in the inadequacy of the information; and (4) the prosecution
amount of TWO
failed to determine the individual participation of all the
HUNDRED THIRTY
TWO THOUSAND SIX accused in the information in disobedience with the
HUNDRED TWENTY Resolution dated 27 March 2005.[18]
EIGHT PESOS and
THIRTY FIVE
CENTAVOS
(P232,628.35)
On 2 March 2007, the Sandiganbayan issued the first
PHILIPPINE
CURRENCY, assailed resolution denying petitioners motion to quash.
supposedly for the
We quote the said resolution in part:
excavation and
roadfilling works on the
Pahanocoy Sites and
Services Project in Among the accused-movants, the public
Bacolod City despite the officer whose participation in the alleged
fact no such works were offense is specifically mentioned in the
undertaken by A.C. May 30, 2006 Memorandum is accused
Construction as Felicisimo Lazarte, Jr., the Chairman of
revealed by the Special the Inventory and Acceptance
Audit conducted by the Committee (IAC), which undertook the
Commission on Audit, inventory and final quantification of the
thus accused public accomplishment of A.C. Cruz
officials in the Construction. The allegations of Lazarte
performance of their that the IAC, due to certain constraints,
official functions had allegedly had to rely on the reports of the
given unwarranted field engineers and/or the Project Office
benefits, advantage and as to which materials were actually
preference to accused installed; and that he supposedly affixed
Arceo C. Cruz and A.C. his signature to the IAC Physical
Construction and Inventory Report and Memoranda dated
themselves to the August 12, 1991 despite his not being
damage and prejudice of able to attend the actual inspection
the government. because he allegedly saw that all the
members of the Committee had already
signed are matters of defense which he
CONTRARY TO can address in the course of the trial.
LAW.[17] Hence, the quashal of the information
with respect to accused Lazarte is denied
for lack of merit.

WHEREFORE, in view of the

foregoing, the Court hereby resolves as
On 2 October 2006, petitioner filed a motion to quash the follows:
Information raising the following grounds: (1) the facts
charged in the information do not constitute an offense; (1) Accused Robert Balao,
(2) the information does not conform substantially to the Josephine Angsico and Virgilio
Dacalos Motion to Admit Motion
prescribed form; (3) the constitutional rights of the
to Quash dated October 4, 2006
accused to be informed of the nature and cause of the is GRANTED; the Motion to
Page 91 of 168
 Quash dated October 4, 2006
attached thereto,
is GRANTED. Accordingly, the
case is
hereby DISMISSED insofar as
the said accused-movants are
concerned.
(2) The Motion to Quash
dated October 2, 2006 of
accused
Engr. Felicisimo F. Lazarte, Jr. is
hereby DENIED for lack of merit.
Let the arraignment of the
accused proceed as scheduled
on March 13, 2007.
SO ORDERED. [19]
Subsequently, the Sandiganbayan issued the
second assailed resolution denying petitioners motion for
reconsideration. Pertinently, it held:
The Motion for Reconsideration of
accused Lazarte, Jr. merely reiterated the
grounds and arguments which had been
duly considered and passed upon in the
assailed Resolution. Nonetheless, after a
careful review of the same, the Court still
finds no cogent reason to disturb the finding
of probable cause of the Office of the
Ombudsman to indict accused Lazarte, Jr.,
Espinosa, Lobrido and Cruz of the offense
charged. In its Memorandum dated July 27,
2004 and May 30, 2006, the prosecution
was able to show with sufficient particularity
the respective participation of the
aforementioned accused in the commission
of the offense charged. The rest of the
factual issues by accused Lazarte, Jr. would
require the presentation of evidence in the
course of the trial of this case.
The Court also maintains the validity and
sufficiency of the information against
accused Lazarte, Jr., Espinosa, Lobrido
and Cruz. The information has particularly
alleged the ultimate facts constituting the
essential elements of the offense charged
which are as follows:
1. that accused Lazarte, Jr.,
Espinosa, and Lobrido are public officers
being the Department Manager, Project
Management Officer A, and Supervising
Engineer of the NHA during the time
material in the criminal information; and
2. that the said accused, in their
respective official capacities and in
conspiracy with accused Cruz, a private
individual and the General manager of
A.C. Cruz Construction, have acted with
manifest partiality or evident bad faith
and have given unwarranted benefits,
preference, and advantage to Arceo C.
Cruz and A.C. Cruz Construction or have
caused damage and prejudice to the
government, by [causing] to be paid A.C.
Cruz Construction public funds in the
amount of Two Hundred Thirty Two
Thousand Six Hundred Twenty Eight
Pesos and Thirty Five Centavos
(P232,628.35) supposedly for the
excavation and roadfilling works on the
Pahanocoy Sites and Services Project in
Bacolod City despite the fact that no such
works were undertaken by A.C. Cruz
Construction as revealed by the Special
Audit conducted by the Commission on
Audit.
The other factual details which
accused Lazarte, Jr. cited are matters of
evidence best threshed out in the course
of the trial.[20]
Hence, the instant petition which is a reiteration of
petitioners submissions. Petitioner ascribes grave abuse
of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction to
the Sandiganbayan in: (1) upholding the validity and
sufficiency of the Information despite its failure to make
out an offense and conform to the prescribed form; (2)
Page 92 of 168
denying his motion to quash considering that the ultimate facts; the reasons therefor are to be proved
remaining averments in the Information have been during the trial.[24] The Ombudsman moreover maintains
rendered unintelligible by the dismissal of the charges that the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over petitioner.
against some of his co-accused; and (3) using as bases The Ombudsman argues that it is of no moment that
the Prosecutions Memoranda dated 27 July 2004 and 30 petitioners position is classified as
May 2006 to supplement the inadequacies of the
salary grade 26 as he is a manager within the legal
Information. In addition, petitioner avers that his
contemplation of paragraph 1(g), Section 4(a) of Republic
constitutional right to be informed of the nature and cause
Act No. 8249.[25]
of the accusation against him had been violated for failure
of the Information to specify his participation in the
commission of the offense. Petitioner also argues that the
In his Reply[26] dated 9 October 2008, petitioner
facts charged in the Information do not constitute an
strongly asseverates that, according to the Constitution,
offense as no damage or injury had been made or caused
in a conspiracy indictment the participation of each
to any party or to the government. Finally, petitioner
accused in the so-called conspiracy theory should be
maintains that the Sandiganbayan lost its jurisdiction over
detailed in order to apprise the accused of the nature of
him upon the dismissal of the charges against his co-
the accusation against them in relation to the participation
accused as the remaining accused are public officers
of the other accused. A general statement that all the
whose salary grade is below 27.
accused conspired with each other without stating the
participation of each runs afoul of the
Constitution.[27] Petitioner adds that the ultimate facts
In its Comment[21] dated 21 December 2007, the
intended by law refer to determinate facts and
Office of the Ombudsman, through the Office of the
circumstances which should become the basis of the
Special Prosecutor, counters that separate allegations of
cause of action; statement of facts which would be in
individual acts perpetrated by the conspirators are not
complete accord with the constitutional requirement of
required in an Information and neither should they be
giving the accused sufficient information about the nature
covered by evidence submitted to establish the existence
and the cause of the accusation against him.[28] Petitioner
of probable cause. Allegations regarding the nature and
also avers that the Ombudsmans reliance on and citation
extent of petitioners participation and justification for his
of the cases of Ingco v. Sandiganbayan[29] and Domingo
acts which constitute the offense charged are evidentiary
v. Sandiganbayan[30] is misplaced and misleading.
matters which are more properly addressed during trial.
The Ombudsman reiterates our ruling in Ingco v.
Sandiganbayan[22] that the fundamental test in reflecting
Petitioners main argument is that the Information
on the viability of a motion to quash is the sufficiency of
filed before the Sandiganbayan insufficiently averred the
the averments in the information that is, whether the facts
essential elements of the crime charged as it failed to
asseverated, if hypothetically admitted, would establish
specify the individual participation of all the accused.
the essential elements of the crime defined by law. And
relying on the case of Domingo v. Sandiganbayan,[23] the
Ombudsman states that informations need only state the

Page 93 of 168

The Court is not persuaded. The Court affirms the
resolutions of the Sandiganbayan.
At the outset, it should be stressed that the denial
of a motion to quash is not correctible by certiorari. Well-
established is the rule that when a motion to quash in a
criminal case is denied, the remedy is not a petition for
certiorari but for petitioners to go to trial without prejudice
to reiterating the special defenses invoked in their motion
to quash. Remedial measures as regards interlocutory
orders, such as a motion to quash, are frowned upon and
often dismissed. The evident reason for this rule is to
avoid multiplicity of appeals in a single court.[31]
This general rule, however, is subject to certain
exceptions. If the court, in denying the motion to dismiss
or motion to quash acts without or in excess of jurisdiction
or with grave abuse of discretion, then certiorari or
prohibition lies.[32] And in the case at bar, the Court does
not find the Sandiganbayan to have committed grave
abuse of discretion.
The fundamental test in reflecting on the viability
of a motion to quash on the ground that the facts charged
do not constitute an offense is whether or not the facts
asseverated, if hypothetically admitted, would establish
the essential elements of the crime defined
law.[33] Matters aliunde will not be considered.[34]
Corollarily, Section 6 of Rule 110 of the Rules of
Court states that:
SEC. 6. Sufficiency of complaint or
information.A complaint or information is
sufficient if it states the name of the
accused, the designation of the offense
by the statute, the acts or omissions
complained of as constituting the
offense; the name of the offended party;
the approximate time of the commission
of the offense, and the place wherein the
offense was committed.
When an offense is committed by
more than one person, all of them shall
be included in the complaint or
information.
The acts or omissions complained of must be
alleged in such form as is sufficient to enable a person of
common understanding to know what offense is intended
to be charged and enable the court to know the proper
judgment. The Information must allege clearly and
accurately the elements of the crime charged. What facts
and circumstances are necessary to be included therein
must be determined by reference to the definition and
elements of the specific crimes.[35]
The test is whether the crime is described in
intelligible terms with such particularity as to apprise the
accused, with reasonable certainty, of the offense
charged. The raison detre of the rule is to enable the
accused to suitably prepare his defense.[36] Another
purpose is to enable accused, if found guilty, to plead his
in
conviction in a subsequent prosecution for the same
offense. The use of derivatives or synonyms or
allegations of basic facts constituting the offense charged
is sufficient.[37]
Pertinently, Section 3(e) of Republic Act No.
3019, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt
Practices Act, reads:
Page 94 of 168

SEC. 3. Corrupt practices of public
officers.In addition to acts or omissions of
public officers already penalized by
existing law, the following shall constitute
corrupt practices of any public officer and
are hereby declared to be unlawful:
xxx
(e) Causing any undue injury to any
party, including the Government, or
giving any private party any unwarranted
benefits, advantage or preference in the
discharge of his official, administrative or
judicial functions through manifest
partiality, evident bad faith or gross
inexcusable negligence. This provision
shall apply to officers and employees of
offices or government corporations
charged with the grant of licenses or
permits or other concessions.[38]
The essential elements for violation of Section
3(e) of R.A. No. 3019 are as follows:
1. The accused is a public officer
or private person charged in conspiracy
with him;
2. Said public officer commits the
prohibited acts during the performance of
his official duties or in relation to his
public position;
3. He causes undue injury to any
party, whether the government or private
party;
4. Such undue injury is caused
by giving unwarranted benefits,
advantage or preference to such parties;
and
5. The public officer has acted
with manifest partiality, evident bad faith
or gross inexcusable negligence.[39]
The Court finds that the Information in this case
alleges the essential elements of violation of Section 3(e)
of R.A. No. 3019. The Information specifically alleges that
petitioner, Espinosa and Lobrido are public officers being
then the Department Manager, Project Management
Officer A and Supervising Engineer of the NHA
respectively; in such capacity and committing the offense
in relation to the office and while in the performance of
their official functions, connived, confederated and
mutually helped each other and with accused Arceo C.
Cruz, with deliberate intent through manifest partiality and
evident bad faith gave unwarranted benefits to the latter,
A.C. Cruz Construction and to themselves, to the damage
and prejudice of the government. The felonious act
consisted of causing to be paid to A.C. Cruz Construction
public funds in the amount of P232,628.35 supposedly for
excavation and road filling works on the Pahanocoy Sites
and Services Project in Bacolod City despite the fact that
no such works were undertaken by said construction
company as revealed by the Special Audit conducted by
COA.
Page 95 of 168

On the contention that the Information did not
detail the individual participation of the accused in the
allegation of conspiracy in the Information, the Court
underscores the fact that under Philippine law, conspiracy
should be understood on two levels. Conspiracy can be a
mode of committing a crime or it may be constitutive of
the crime itself. Generally, conspiracy is not a crime in our
jurisdiction. It is punished as a crime only when the law
fixes a penalty for its commission such as in conspiracy
to commit treason, rebellion and sedition.[40]
When conspiracy is charged as a crime, the act of
conspiring and all the elements of said crime must be set
forth in the complaint or information. But when conspiracy
is not charged as a crime in itself but only as the mode of
committing the crime as in the case at bar, there is less
necessity of reciting its particularities in the Information
because conspiracy is not the gravamen of the offense
charged. The conspiracy is significant only because it
changes the criminal liability of all the accused in the
conspiracy and makes them answerable as co-principals
regardless of the degree of their participation in the crime.
The liability of the conspirators is collective and each
participant will be equally responsible for the acts of
others, for the act of one is the act of all.[41]
Notably, in People v. Quitlong,[42] as pointed out
by respondent, the Court ruled on how conspiracy as a
mode of committing the offense should be alleged in the
Information, viz:
x x x Where conspiracy exists
and can rightly be appreciated, the
individual acts done to perpetrate the
felony becomes of secondary
importance, the act of one being
imputable to all the others. Verily, an
accused must know from the information
whether he faces a criminal responsibility
not only for his acts but also for the acts
of his co-accused as well.
A conspiracy indictment need
not, of course, aver all the components of
conspiracy or allege all the details
thereof, like the part that each of the
parties therein have performed, the
evidence proving the common design or
the facts connecting all the accused with
one another in the web of the
conspiracy. Neither is it necessary to
describe conspiracy with the same
degree of particularity required in
describing a substantive offense. It is
enough that the indictment contains a
statement of facts relied upon to be
constitutive of the offense in ordinary and
concise language, with as much certainty
as the nature of the case will admit, in a
manner that can enable a person of
common understanding to know what is
intended, and with such precision that the
accused may plead his acquittal or
conviction to a subsequent indictment
based on the same facts. It is said,
generally, that an indictment may be held
sufficient if it follows the words of the
statute and reasonably informs the
accused of the character of the offense
he is charged with conspiring to commit,
or, following the language of the statute,
contains a sufficient statement of an overt
act to effect the object of the conspiracy,
or alleges both the conspiracy and the
contemplated crime in the language of
the respective statutes defining them
(15A C.J.S. 842-844).
x x x Conspiracy arises when two
or more persons come to an agreement
concerning the commission of a felony
and decide to commit it. Conspiracy
comes to life at the very instant the
plotters agree, expressly or impliedly, to
commit the felony and forthwith to
actually pursue it. Verily, the information
must state that the accused have
Page 96 of 168
 confederated to commit the crime or that
there has been a community of design, a
unity of purpose or an agreement to
commit the felony among the
accused. Such an allegation, in the
absence of the usual usage of the words
conspired or confederated or the phrase
acting in conspiracy, must aptly appear in
the information in the form of definitive
acts constituting conspiracy. In fine, the
agreement to commit the crime, the unity
of purpose or the community of design
among the accused must be conveyed
such as either by the use of the term
conspire or its derivatives and synonyms
or by allegations of basic facts
constituting the conspiracy. Conspiracy
must be alleged, not just inferred, in the
information on which basis an accused
can aptly enter his plea, a matter that is
not to be confused with or likened to the
adequacy of evidence that may be
required to prove it. In establishing
conspiracy when properly alleged, the
evidence to support it need not
necessarily be shown by direct proof but
may be inferred from shown acts and
conduct of the accused.[43]
In addition, the allegation of conspiracy in the Information
should not be confused with the adequacy of evidence
that may be required to prove it. A conspiracy is proved
by evidence of actual cooperation; of acts indicative of an
agreement, a common purpose or design, a concerted
action or concurrence of sentiments to commit the felony
and actually pursue it. A statement of the evidence on the
conspiracy is not necessary in the Information.[44]
The other details cited by petitioner, such as the absence
of any damage or injury caused to any party or the
government, likewise are matters of evidence best raised
during trial.
As to the contention that the residual averments in the
Information have been rendered unintelligible by the
dismissal of the charges against some of his co-accused,
the Court finds that the Information sufficiently makes out
a case against petitioner and the remaining accused.
With regard to the alleged irregular use by the
Sandiganbayan of the Prosecutions Memoranda
dated 27 July 2004 and 30 May 2006 to supplement the
inadequacies of the Information, the Court finds adequate
its explanation in the first assailed resolution, to wit:
It may be recalled that a
reinvestigation of the case was ordered
by this Court because the prosecution
failed to satisfactorily comply with an
earlier directive of the former
Chairperson and Members of the First
Division, after noting the inadequacy of
the information, to clarify the
participation of each of the accused. In
ordering the reinvestigation, the Court
noted that the prosecutions July 27,
2004 Memorandum did not address the
apprehensions of the former
Chairperson and Members of the First
Division as to the inadequacy of the
allegations in the information.
This time, despite a
reinvestigation, the prosecutions
Memorandum dated May 30, 2006 still
failed to specify the participation of
accused-movants Balao, Angsico and
Dacalos. The most recent findings of the
prosecution still do not address the
deficiency found by the Court in the
information. The prosecution avers that
pursuant to Section 3, Rule 117 of the
Rules of Court, in determining the
viability of a motion to quash based on
the ground of facts charged in the
information do not constitute an offense,
the test must be whether or not the facts
asseverated, if hypothetically admitted,
would establish the essential elements
Page 97 of 168
 of the crime as defined by law. The
prosecution contends that
matter aliunde should not be
considered. However, in the instant
case, the Court has found the
information itself to be inadequate, as it
does not satisfy the requirements of
particularly alleging the acts or
omissions of the said accused-movants,
which served as the basis of the
allegation of conspiracy between the
aforementioned accused-movants and
the other accused, in the commission of
the offense charged in the
information.[45]
Finally, the Court sustains the Sandiganbayans
jurisdiction to hear the case. As correctly pointed out by
the Sandiganbayan, it is of no moment that petitioner
does not occupy a position with Salary Grade 27 as he
was a department manager of the NHA, a government-
owned or controlled corporation, at the time of the
commission of the offense, which position falls within the
ambit of its jurisdiction. Apropos, the Court held in the
case of Geduspan v. People[46] which involved a regional
Manager/Director of Region VI of the Philippine Health
Insurance Corporation (Philhealth) with salary grade 26,
to wit:
It is of no moment that the position of
petitioner is merely classified as salary
grade 26. While the first part of the
abovequoted provision covers only
officials of the executive branch with the
salary grade 27 and higher, the second
part thereof specifically includes other
executive officials whose positions may
not be of grade 27 and higher but who are
by express provision of law placed under
the jurisdiction of the said court.
Hence, respondent court is
vested with jurisdiction over petitioner
together with Farahmand, a private
individual charged together with her.
The position of manager in a
government-owned or controlled
corporation, as in the case of Philhealth,
is within the jurisdiction of respondent
court. It is the position that petitioner
holds, not her salary grade, that
determines the jurisdiction of the
Sandiganbayan.
This Court in Lacson v. Executive
Secretary, et al. ruled:
A perusal of the aforequoted Section 4 of
R.A. 8249 reveals that to fall under the
exclusive jurisdiction of the
Sandiganbayan, the following requisites
must concur: (1) the offense committed
is a violation of (a) R.A. 3019, as
amended (the Anti-Graft and Corrupt
Practices Act), (b) R.A. 1379 (the law on
ill-gotten wealth), (c) Chapter II, Section
2, Title VII, book II of the Revised Penal
Code (the law on bribery), (d) Executive
Order Nos. 1,2, 14 and 14-A, issued in
1986 (sequestration cases), or (e) other
offenses or felonies whether simple or
complexed with other crimes; (2) the
offender committing the offenses in items
(a), (b), (c) and (e) is a public official or
employee holding any of the positions
enumerated in paragraph a of section 4;
and (3) the offense committed is in
relation to the office.
To recapitulate, petitioner is a
public officer, being a department
manager of Philhealth, a government-
owned and controlled corporation. The
position of manager is one of those
mentioned in paragraph a, Section 4 of
RA 8249 and the offense for which she
was charged was committed in relation to
her office as department manager of
Philhealth. Accordingly, the
Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over her
person as well as the subject matter of
the case.[47]
Page 98 of 168
 WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant
petition is DISMISSED. The Resolutions dated 2 March
2007 and 18 October 2007 of the First Division of the
Sandiganbayan are AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.

Page 99 of 168
 Republic of the Philippines
Supreme Court On January 31, 2003, Julieta F. Ortega (Julieta)

Manila filed a letter complaint[3] before the Ombudsman-Vizayas,

THIRD DIVISION Primo C. Miro (Miro), charging Judge Rodolfo B. Garcia,

then Presiding Judge of the MCTC, Calatrava-Toboso,

RODOLFO B. GARCIA,
G.R. No. 167409 Negros Occidental, and Ricardo Liyage (Liyage),
Retired Municipal Circuit
Trial Court Judge, ambulance driver, Municipality of Calatrava, Negros
Calatrava-Toboso,
Negros Occidental, Occidental, with the crime of murder and the
Petitioner,
Present: administrative offenses of grave misconduct and abuse of
YNARES-
- versus - authority.
SANTIAGO, J.,
Chairperson,
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,
PRIMO C. MIRO, TINGA,* The complaint arose from the death of Julietas
OMBUDSMAN-VISAYAS, LEONARDO-DE
Cebu City; DANIEL CASTRO,** AND husband, Francisco C. Ortega, Jr., on November 12,
VILLAFLOR, PERALTA, JJ.
PROVINCIAL 2002, as a result of a vehicular mishap between a Toyota
PROSECUTOR, Bacolod
City; HON. FRANKLIN M. Land Cruiser driven by the petitioner and the motorcycle
COBBOL, Acting Promulgated:
Presiding Judge, MCTC, driven by the deceased.[4]
Calatrava-Toboso, March 20, 2009
Negros Occidental; and
JULIETA F. ORTEGA, The letter complaint was treated as two (2)
Respondents.
x---------------------------------------- separate criminal and administrative complaints docketed
----------x
as OMB-V-C-03-0076-B and OMB-V-A-03-0051-B,

DECISION respectively.

PERALTA, J.:
On February 21, 2003, Deputy Ombudsman Miro

approved a Joint Evaluation Report[5] dated February 12,

This is a petition for prohibition with prayer for
2003. In said evaluation report, Graft Investigation Officer
issuance of writ of preliminary injunction. The petition
(GIO) Antonio B. Yap found the letter complaint to be
seeks to impugn the Orders dated November 23,
sufficient in form and substance. He concluded that the
2004[1] and January 26, 2005[2] issued by the Municipal
offense charged is not related to the functions of petitioner
Circuit Trial Court (MCTC) of Calatrava-Toboso, Negros
as a judge and can be the subject of preliminary
Occidental.
investigation.[6] With regard to the administrative aspect of

the case, GIO Yap recommended that the case be

The antecedents are as follows:
indorsed to the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) for

appropriate action.[7]

Page 100 of 168

 GIO Yap also received information that it would to do so.[14]Ultimately, petitioner prayed that the

be difficult on the part of the prosecutors to conduct the information be quashed and be referred to this Court for

investigation because they regularly appear before appropriate action.

the sala of petitioner for their cases. The Provincial

Prosecutor of Negros Occidental also manifested that On August 25, 2004, the MCTC issued an

they would inhibit if the case would be returned to Order[15] granting the motion and, consequently, quashing

them. Consequently, he deemed that it would be more the information.

appropriate if the Office of the Ombudsman would Respondents filed a motion for reconsideration,

conduct the necessary investigation.[8] which the court granted in an Order[16] dated November

23, 2004. The court opined, among other things, that the

Corollarilly, on March 8, 2003, petitioner case had nothing to do with the performance of petitioners

compulsory retired from the service.[9] official functions and that an administrative complaint

against him had already been filed, as such, the purpose

After the preliminary investigation, GIO Yap found of referring cases against judges and court personnel to

the existence of probable cause for the crime of Reckless the Supreme Court has already been

Imprudence Resulting to Homicide in OMB-V-C-03-0076- served.[17] Accordingly, the MCTC set aside its earlier

B. In a Resolution[10] dated August 12, 2003, he order and denied petitioners motion to quash, the decretal

recommended the filing of the corresponding charges portion of which reads as follows:

against the petitioner but dismissed the charges against

Liyage.[11]
On January 27, 2004, an Information[12] for
Reckless Imprudence Resulting to Homicide was filed
against the petitioner before the MCTC Calatrava-
Toboso, Negros Occidental, which was later docketed as
Criminal Case No. 5982-C.
WHEREFORE, in view of the
foregoing considerations, the subject
motion for reconsideration filed by the
prosecution is granted. Accordingly, the
order of this court dated August 25, 2004,
granting the accuseds motion to quash
the information is hereby reconsidered
and set aside and, therefore, the
accuseds motion to quash the
information is denied.
SO ORDERED.[18]

Petitioner then filed his Motion for

On March 1, 2004, petitioner filed a Motion to
Reconsideration,[19] which was denied in the
Quash the Information[13] on the following grounds: (1)
Order[20] dated January 26, 2005.
that it does not conform substantially to the prescribed

form; (2) that the court trying the case has no jurisdiction
Hence, the petition.
over the offense charged and over his person; and, (3)

that the officer who filed the information had no authority

Page 101 of 168
 At the outset, it is apparent that the present
petition was directly filed before this Court, in utter
disregard of the rule on the hierarchy of courts which, thus
warrants its outright dismissal. In Vergara, Sr.
Suelto,[21] this Court stressed that [w]here the issuance of
an extraordinary writ is also within the competence of the
Court of Appeals or a Regional Trial Court, it is in either
of these courts that the specific action for the writs
procurement must be presented, thus:
The Supreme Court is a court of last
resort, and must so remain if it is to
satisfactorily perform the functions
assigned to it by the fundamental
charter and immemorial tradition. It
cannot and should not be burdened with
the task of dealing with causes in the first
instance. Its original jurisdiction to
issue the so-called extraordinary writs
should be exercised only where
absolutely necessary or where
serious and important reasons exist
therefor. Hence, that jurisdiction should
generally be exercised relative to actions
or proceedings before the Court of
Appeals, or before constitutional or other
tribunals, bodies or agencies whose acts
for some reason or another are not
controllable by the Court of
Appeals. Where the issuance of an
extraordinary writ is also within the
competence of the Court of Appeals or
a Regional Trial Court, it is in either of
these courts that the specific action
for the writs procurement must be
presented. This is, and should
continue, to be the policy in this
regard, a policy that courts and
lawyers must strictly observe.[22]
Later, we reaffirmed such policy in People v.
Cuaresma[23] after noting that there is a growing tendency
on the part of litigants and lawyers to have their
applications for the so-called extraordinary writs, and
sometimes even their appeals, passed upon and
adjudicated directly and immediately by the highest
tribunal of the land. We stressed that -
[t]his Courts original jurisdiction to
issue writs of certiorari (as well as
v. prohibition, mandamus, quo
warranto, habeas corpus and
injunction) is not exclusive. x x x It is
also shared by this Court, and by the
Regional Trial Court, with the Court of
Appeals x x x. This concurrence of
jurisdiction is not, however, to be
taken as according to parties seeking
any of the writs an absolute,
unrestrained freedom of choice of the
court to which application therefor will
be directed. There is after all a
hierarchy of courts. That hierarchy is
determinative of the venue of appeals,
and should also serve as a general
determinant of the appropriate forum
for petitions for the extraordinary
writs. A becoming regard for that judicial
hierarchy most certainly indicates that
petitions for the issuance of extraordinary
writs against first level x x x courts should
be filed with the Regional Trial Court, and
those against the latter, with the Court of
Appeals. A direct invocation of the
Supreme Courts original jurisdiction
to issue these writs should be allowed
only when there are special and
important reasons therefor, clearly
and specifically set out in the
petition. This is established policy. It
is a policy that is necessary to prevent
inordinate demands upon the Courts
time and attention which are better
devoted to those matters within its
exclusive jurisdiction, and to prevent
further over-crowding of the Courts
docket. x x x.
Notwithstanding the dismissibility of the instant
petition for failure to observe the doctrine on the hierarchy
of courts, this Court will proceed to entertain the case
grounded as it is on a pure question of law.
Petitioner argues that respondents violated this
Courts pronouncements in Caoibes, Jr. v.
Ombudsman,[24] directing the Ombudsman to refer all
Page 102 of 168

cases against judges and court personnel filed before his
office to the Supreme Court;[25] and, in Fuentes v. Office
of the Ombudsman-Mindanao,[26] restricting not only the
Ombudsman and the prosecution arm of the government,
but also other official and functionary thereof in initiating
or investigating judges and court personnel.[27]
Petitioners contentions are misplaced.
As correctly pointed out by the Solicitor General,
the two cases cited by the petitioner involve the
performance of administrative and professional duties of
the judges that were involved. Caoibes concerns the
judges dealings with his fellow member of the Bench,
while Fuentes touches on the acts of a judge in the
In Fuentes, the issue was whether the Ombudsman may
exercise of his official functions, particularly the issuance
conduct an investigation over the acts of a judge in the
of a writ of execution.
exercise of his official functions alleged to be in violation
of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, in the absence
In Caoibes, two members of the judiciary got
of an administrative charge for the same acts before the
entangled in a fight within court premises over a piece of
Supreme Court.[30] According to this Court:
office furniture. One of the judges filed a criminal
complaint before the Office of the Ombudsman and an
administrative complaint before this Court over the same
incident. When the Ombudsman denied the motion of
Judge Caoibes to refer the case to the Supreme Court, he
filed a petition for certiorari before this Court seeking the
reversal of the order. In granting the petition, the Court
held that:
Under Section 6, Article VIII of the
Constitution, it is the Supreme Court
which is vested with exclusive
administrative supervision over all courts
and its personnel. Prescinding from this
premise, the Ombudsman cannot
determine for itself and by itself whether
a criminal complaint against a judge, or
court employee, involves an
administrative matter. The Ombudsman
is duty bound to have all cases against
judges and court personnel filed before
it, referred to the Supreme Court for
determination as to whether an
administrative aspect is involved therein.
xxxx
Maceda[28] is emphatic that by virtue of its
constitutional power of administrative
supervision over all courts and court
personnel, from the Presiding Justice of
the Court of Appeals down to the lowest
municipal trial court clerk, it is only the
Supreme Court that can oversee the
judges and court personnels compliance
with all laws, and take the
proper administrative action against them
if they commit any violation thereof. No
other branch of government may intrude
into this power, without running afoul of
the doctrine of separation of powers.[29]
Thus, the Ombudsman may not
initiate or investigate a criminal or
administrative complaint before his office
against petitioner judge, pursuant to his
power to investigate public officers.The
Ombudsman must indorse the case to
the Supreme Court, for appropriate
action.
Article VIII, Section 6 of the
Constitution exclusively vests in the
Supreme Court administrative
supervision over all courts and court
personnel, from the Presiding Justice of
the Court of Appeals to the lowest
municipal trial court clerk.
Page 103 of 168
 Hence, it is the Supreme Court that
is tasked to oversee the judges and court
personnel and take the
proper administrative action against
them if they commit any violation of the
laws of the land. No other branch of
government may intrude into this power,
without running afoul of the
independence of the judiciary and the
doctrine of separation of powers.
Petitioners questioned order
directing the attachment of government
property and issuing a writ of execution
were done in relation to his office, well
within his official functions. The order
may be erroneous or void for lack or
excess of jurisdiction. However, whether
or not such order of execution was valid
under the given circumstances, must be
inquired into in the course of the judicial
action only by the Supreme Court that is
tasked to supervise the courts. No other
entity or official of the Government, not
the prosecution or investigation service
of any other branch, not any functionary
thereof, has competence to review a
judicial order or decision--whether final
and executory or not--and pronounce it
erroneous so as to lay the basis for a
criminal or administrative complaint for
rendering an unjust judgment or
order. That prerogative belongs to the
courts alone.[31]
Indeed, supervision over all inferior courts and
court personnel, from the Presiding Justice of the Court of
Appeals to the lowest ranked court employee, is vested
by the Constitution in the Supreme Court. However, that
prerogative only extends to administrative supervision. As
such, the Ombudsman cannot encroach upon this Courts
task to oversee judges and court personnel and take the
proper administrative action against them if they commit
any violation of the laws of the land.
In the case at bar, the criminal case filed against
petitioner was in no way related to the performance of his
duties as a judge. The Information reveals:
The undersigned Graft Investigation
Officer of the Office of the Ombudsman-
Visayas, accuses JUDGE RODOLFO B.
GARCIA, of the crime of RECKLESS
IMPRUDENCE RESULTING TO
HOMICIDE, defined and penalized under
ARTICLE 365 OF THE REVISED PENAL
CODE, committed as follows:
That on or about the
12th day of November, 2002, at
about 5:15 o'clock in the
afternoon, at Sitio Tunga,
Barangay Bantayanon,
Municipality of Calatrava, Province
of Negros Occidental, Philippines,
and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, above-named
accused JUDGE RODOLFO B.
GARCIA, a public officer, being
then the Municipal Judge of the
Municipal Circuit Trial Court of
Calatrava-Toboso, Negros
Occidental, with Salary Grade 26,
then driving a Land Cruiser Toyota
bearing Plate No. FDB-193, along
the road at Sitio Tunga, Barangay
Bantayanon, Calatrava, Negros
Occidental, a public highway, did
then and there drive or operate
said vehicle in a reckless,
negligent and imprudent manner
without taking the necessary
precaution considering the grade,
visibility and other conditions of
the highway, nor due regard to the
traffic rules and ordinances in
order to prevent accident to
persons or damage to property,
thereby causing by such
recklessness, negligence and
imprudence the said vehicle to hit
and bump the motorcycle driven
by Francisco C. Ortega, Jr.,
bearing Plate No. FH-2324, with
Josemarie Paghubasan as his
backrider, thereby causing upon
Francisco C. Ortega, Jr. the
following physical injuries, to with
[sic]:
xxxx
which injuries resulted to the death
of Francisco C. Ortega, Jr.
CONTRARY TO LAW.[32]
Page 104 of 168
 damage to property through
criminal negligence, they shall
From the foregoing, the filing of the criminal have exclusive original
jurisdiction thereof.
charges against the petitioner before the MCTC was

warranted by the above circumstances. Under Article 365

of the Revised Penal Code, the penalty for the crime of As such, the jurisdiction of the MCTC over the

reckless imprudence resulting in homicide is prision case is beyond contestation.

correccional in its medium and maximum periods ranging

from two (2) years, four (4) months and one (1) day to six Moreover, contrary to petitioners allegation, the

(6) years. Section 32 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, as administrative aspect of the case against him was

amended by Section 2 of Republic Act No. endorsed by the Ombudsman-Visayas to the OCA for

7691,[33] provides as follows: appropriate action.[34] In addition, an administrative

complaint against petitioner involving the same facts was

SEC. 32. Jurisdiction of filed by Julieta Ortega with the OCA. The case was
Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial
Courts and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts docketed as Administrative Matter OCA IPI No. 03-1403-
in Criminal Cases. Except in cases
falling within the exclusive original MTJ, and is still pending to date. Petitioner cannot feign
jurisdiction of Regional Trial Courts and
of the Sandiganbayan, Metropolitan Trial ignorance of this fact considering that he filed a Comment
Courts, Municipal Trial Courts,
and Answer to the Complaint-Affidavit of Mrs. Julieta
and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts shall
exercise: Ortega,[35] dated March 21, 2003. Thus, the Courts
(1) Exclusive original
mandate, as laid down in Caoibes, was more than
jurisdiction over all violations
of city or municipal ordinances satisfactorily complied with.
committed within their
respective territorial
jurisdiction; and
To reiterate, the case filed against petitioner

before the MCTC is a criminal case under its own

jurisdiction as prescribed by law and not an administrative

case. To be sure, trial courts retain jurisdiction over the

(2) Exclusive original
jurisdiction over all offenses criminal aspect of offenses committed by judges of the
punishable with
imprisonment not exceeding lower courts.[36]
six (6) years irrespective of
the amount of fine, and
regardless of other imposable IN LIGHT OF THE FOREGOING, the petition
accessory or other penalties,
including the civil liability is DENIED. The Municipal Circuit Trial Court of Calatrava-
arising from such offenses or
predicated thereon, Toboso, Negros Occidental, is ORDERED to proceed
irrespective of kind, nature,
value or amount with the trial of Criminal Case No. 5982-C with dispatch.
thereof: Provided, however,
That in offenses involving

Page 105 of 168

SO ORDERED.

Page 106 of 168

 the accountable officers of the Municipality of
FIRST DIVISION
Guindulman, Bohol. The State Auditors discovered a
cash shortage of P56,321.04, unaccounted cash tickets
of P7,865.30 and an unrecorded check of P50,000
IRENORIO B. BALABA, G.R. No. 169519
payable to Balaba, or a total shortage
Petitioner,
of P114,186.34. Three demand letters were sent to
Present:
Balaba asking him to explain the discrepancy in the

PUNO, C.J., Chairperson, accounts. Unsatisfied with Balabas explanation, Graft

- versus - CARPIO, Investigation Officer I Miguel P. Ricamora recommended
CORONA,
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, and BERSAMIN, JJ. that an information for Malversation of Public Funds, as
defined and penalized under Article 217 of the Revised
Penal Code, be filed against Balaba with the
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Promulgated:
Respondent. July 17, 2009 Sandiganbayan.[5]

x----------------------------------------
In an Information[6] dated 26 April 1995, the Office of the
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x
Special Prosecutor charged Balaba with the crime of
Malversation of Public Funds.[7] The Information against
RESOLUTION
Balaba reads as follows:

That on or about October 19, 1993, in the

Municipality of Guindulman, Bohol,
CARPIO, J.: Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of
this Honorable Court, the said accused,
Assistant Municipal Treasurer of
Guindulman, Bohol and accountable
This petition for review[1] assails the 15 December 2004
public officer for the funds collected and
Decision[2] and 24 August 2005 Resolution[3] of the Court received by virtue of his position, willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously
of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 27178. In its 15 December
misappropriate, embezzle and take away
2004 Decision, the Court of Appeals dismissed petitioner from said funds, the total amount
Irenorio B. Balabas (Balaba) appeal of the 9 December of P114,186.34, which he converted to
his personal use and benefit, to the
2002 Decision[4] of the Regional Trial Court of Loay, damage and prejudice of the
Bohol, Branch 50 (trial court), finding him guilty of government.

Malversation of Public Funds. In its 24 August 2005

Resolution, the Court of Appeals denied Balabas motion CONTRARY TO LAW.[8]
for reconsideration.

On 18 and 19 October 1993, State Auditors Arlene

Mandin and Loila Laga of the Provincial Auditors Office
conducted an examination of the cash and accounts of

Page 107 of 168

During his arraignment on 17 May 1996, Balaba entered In its 15 December 2004 Decision, the Court of Appeals
a plea of not guilty. Trial soon followed. dismissed Balabas appeal. The Court of Appeals
declared that it had no jurisdiction to act on the appeal
because the Sandiganbayan has exclusive appellate
jurisdiction over the case.

On 9 December 2002, the trial court found Balaba

guilty. The dispositive portion of the 9 December 2002
On 27 January 2005, Balaba filed a Motion for
Decision reads:
Reconsideration and asked that he be allowed to pursue
his appeal before the proper court, the
PREMISES CONSIDERED, the Court Sandiganbayan.[13] In its 24 August 2005 Resolution, the
resolves that the prosecution has proved
Court of Appeals denied Balabas motion.
beyond reasonable doubt the guilt of the
accused. Accordingly, pursuant to law,
On 7 October 2005, Balaba filed his present petition
the Court has no recourse but to
sentence the accused, Irenorio B. before this Court where he raised the sole issue of
Balaba, to an indeterminate sentence of
whether the Court of Appeals erred in dismissing his
10 YEARS AND ONE DAY as minimum,
to 17 YEARS, 4 MONTHS AND ONE appeal instead of certifying the case to the proper
DAY of Reclusion Temporal as court. Balaba claims that it was due to inadvertence that
maximum. He shall suffer the penalty of
perpetual special disqualification and a the notice of appeal was filed before the Court of Appeals
fine equal to the amount of the funds instead of the Sandiganbayan.Balaba adds that his
malversed which is P114,186.34.
appeal was dismissed on purely technical
grounds. Balaba asks the Court to relax the rules to afford
SO ORDERED.[9] him an opportunity to correct the error and fully ventilate
his appeal on the merits.

On 14 January 2003, Balaba filed his Notice of Appeal, The petition has no merit.

where he indicated that he would file his appeal before the

Court of Appeals.[10] On 6 August 2003, Balaba filed his
Upon Balabas conviction by the trial court, his remedy
Appellants Brief.[11]
should have been an appeal to the
Sandiganbayan. Paragraph 3, Section 4(c) of Republic

The Office of the Solicitor General, instead of filing an Act No. 8249 (RA 8249),[14]which further defined the

Appellees Brief, filed a Manifestation and jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan, reads:

Motion[12] praying for the dismissal of the appeal for being

improper since the Sandiganbayan has exclusive The Sandiganbayan shall
exercise exclusive appellate
jurisdiction over the appeal.
jurisdiction over final judgments,
resolutions or orders of the regional trial
courts whether in the exercise of their

Page 108 of 168

 own original jurisdiction or of their
appellate jurisdiction as herein provided.
(Emphasis ours)
There is nothing in said paragraph which can conceivably
justify the filing of Balabas appeal before the Court of
Appeals instead of the Sandiganbayan. Clearly, the Court
of Appeals is bereft of any jurisdiction to review the
judgment Balaba seeks to appeal.
In Melencion v. Sandiganbayan,[15] we ruled:
January 2003. The Court of Appeals issued the Decision
declaring its lack of jurisdiction on 15 December
2004. Balaba tried to correct the error only on 27 January
2005, clearly beyond the 15-day period to appeal from the
decision of the trial court. Therefore, the Court of Appeals
did not commit any error when it dismissed Balabas
appeal because of lack of jurisdiction.
WHEREFORE, we DENY the petition. We AFFIRM the
15 December 2004 Decision and 24 August 2005
Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No.
27178.

An error in designating the appellate

court is not fatal to the appeal. However,
the correction in designating the proper
SO ORDERED.
appellate court should be made within
the 15-day period to appeal. Once made
within the said period, the designation of
the correct appellate court may be
allowed even if the records of the case
are forwarded to the Court of
Appeals. Otherwise, the second
paragraph of Section 2, Rule 50 of the
Rules of court would apply. The second
paragraph of Section 2, Rule 50 of the
Rules of Court reads:

An appeal erroneously
taken to the Court of
Appeals shall not be
transferred to the
appropriate court but
shall be dismissed
outright. (Emphasis
ours)

In this case, Balaba sought the correction of the error in

filing the appeal only after the expiration of the period to
appeal. The trial court promulgated its Decision on 9
December 2002. Balaba filed his notice of appeal on 14

Page 109 of 168

 THIRD DIVISION
on December 22, 1995, Toledo City Auditor Manolo V.
Tulibao issued a demand letter to respondent Amante
PEOPLE OF G.R. No. 167304
THE PHILIPPINES, asking the latter to settle her unliquidated cash advance
Petitioner, Present: within seventy-two hours from receipt of the same
CARPIO demand letter. The Commission on Audit, on May 17,
MORALES, J.,* 1996, submitted an investigation report to the Office of the
-versus- CHICO-
NAZARIO, Deputy Ombudsman for Visayas (OMB-Visayas), with the
Acting
recommendation that respondent Amante be further
Chairperson,**
VELASCO, JR., investigated to ascertain whether appropriate charges
SANDIGANBAYAN NACHURA, and
(THIRD PERALTA, JJ. could be filed against her under Presidential Decree
DIVISION) and VICTORIA (P.D.) No. 1445, otherwise known as The Auditing Code
AMANTE, Promulgated:
Respondents. August 25, 2009 of the Philippines. Thereafter, the OMB-Visayas,
on September 30, 1999, issued a Resolution
x--------------------------------------------------------------------------
---------------x recommending the filing of an Information for
Malversation of Public Funds against respondent Amante.
DECISION The Office of the Special Prosecutor (OSP), upon review
of the OMB-Visayas' Resolution, on April 6, 2001,
PERALTA, J.: prepared a memorandum finding probable cause to indict
respondent Amante.

Before this Court is a petition[1] under Rule 45 of

the Rules of Court seeking to reverse and set aside the On May 21, 2004, the OSP filed an

Resolution[2] of the Sandiganbayan (Third Division) Information[3] with the Sandiganbayan accusing Victoria

dated February 28, 2005 dismissing Criminal Case No. Amante of violating Section 89 of P.D. No. 1445, which

27991, entitled People of the Philippines v. Victoria reads as follows:

Amante for lack of jurisdiction. That on or about December 19,

1995, and for sometime prior or
subsequent thereto at Toledo City,
The facts, as culled from the records, are the Province of Cebu, Philippines, and within
the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court,
following:
the abovenamed accused VICTORIA
Victoria Amante was a member of AMANTE, a high-ranking public officer,
being a member of the Sangguniang
the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Toledo City, and
Panlungsod of Toledo City, Province of Cebu at the time committing the offense in relation to
office, having obtained cash advances
pertinent to this case. On January 14, 1994, she was able from the City Government of Toledo in
to get hold of a cash advance in the amount of P71,095.00 the total amount of SEVENTY-ONE
THOUSAND NINETY-FIVE PESOS
under a disbursement voucher in order to defray seminar (P71,095.00), Philippine Currency, which
she received by reason of her office, for
expenses of the Committee on Health and Environmental
which she is duty-bound to liquidate the
Protection, which she headed. As of December 19, 1995, same within the period required by law,
with deliberate intent and intent to gain,
or after almost two years since she obtained the said cash did then and there, wilfully, unlawfully and
advance, no liquidation was made. As such, criminally fail to liquidate said cash

Page 110 of 168

 advances of P71,095.00, Philippine
Currency, despite demands to the to the OSP, the language of the law is too plain and
damage and prejudice of the government unambiguous that it did not make any distinction as to the
in aforesaid amount.
salary grade of city local officials/heads.
CONTRARY TO LAW.

The Sandiganbayan, in its

Resolution[6] dated February 28, 2005, dismissed the
The case was raffled to the Third Division of the
case against Amante, the dispositive portion of which
Sandiganbayan. Thereafter, Amante filed with the said
reads:
court a MOTION TO DEFER ARRAIGNMENT AND
MOTION FOR REINVESTIGATION[4] dated November
WHEREFORE, IN VIEW OF ALL
18, 2004 stating that the Decision of the Office of the THE FOREGOING, this case is hereby
dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. The
Ombudsman (Visayas) dated September 14, 1999 at
dismissal, however, is without prejudice
Cebu City from of an incomplete proceeding in so far that to the filing of this case to the proper
court.
respondent Amante had already liquidated and/or
refunded the unexpected balance of her cash advance, The Motion for Reinvestigation
filed by the movant is hereby considered
which at the time of the investigation was not included as moot and academic.
the same liquidation papers were still in the process of
evaluation by the Accounting Department of Toledo City SO ORDERED.

and that the Sandiganbayan had no jurisdiction over the

said criminal case because respondent Amante was then Hence, the present petition.

a local official who was occupying a position of salary

grade 26, whereas Section 4 of Republic Act (R.A.) No. Petitioner raises this lone issue:

8249 provides that the Sandiganbayan shall have original

WHETHER OR NOT THE
jurisdiction only in cases where the accused holds a SANDIGANBAYAN HAS
position otherwise classified as Grade 27 and higher, of JURISDICTION OVER A CASE
INVOLVING A SANGGUNIANG
the Compensation and Position Classification Act of PANLUNGSOD MEMBER WHERE THE
CRIME CHARGED IS ONE
1989, R.A. No. 6758.
COMMITTED IN RELATION TO
OFFICE, BUT NOT FOR VIOLATION OF
RA 3019, RA 1379 OR ANY OF THE
The OSP filed its Opposition[5] dated December FELONIES MENTIONED IN CHAPTER
8, 2004 arguing that respondent Amante's claim of II, SECTION 2, TITLE VII OF THE
REVISED PENAL CODE.
settlement of the cash advance dwelt on matters of
defense and the same should be established during the
trial of the case and not in a motion for reinvestigation. As In claiming that the Sandiganbayan has
to the assailed jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan, the jurisdiction over the case in question, petitioner disputes
OSP contended that the said court has jurisdiction over the former's appreciation of this Court's decision in Inding
respondent Amante since at the time relevant to the case, v. Sandiganbayan.[7] According to petitioner, Inding did
she was a member of the Sangguniang not categorically nor implicitly constrict or confine the
Panlungsod of Toledo City, therefore, falling under those application of the enumeration provided for under Section
enumerated under Section 4 of R.A. No. 8249. According
Page 111 of 168
4(a)(1) of P.D. No. 1606, as amended, exclusively to
cases where the offense charged is either a violation
of R.A. No. 3019, R.A. No. 1379, or Chapter II, Section 2,
Title VII of the Revised Penal Code. Petitioner adds that
the enumeration in Section (a)(1) of P.D. No. 1606, as
amended by R.A. No. 7975 and R.A. No. 8249, which was
made applicable to cases concerning violations of R.A.
No. 3019, R.A. No. 1379 and Chapter II, Section 2, Title
VII of the Revised Penal Code, equally applies to offenses
committed in relation to public office.
Respondent Amante, in her Comment[8] dated
January 16, 2006, averred that, with the way the law was
phrased in Section 4 of P.D. No. 1606, as amended, it is
obvious that the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan was
defined first, enumerating the several exceptions to the
general rule, while the exceptions to the general rule are
provided in the rest of the paragraph and sub-paragraphs
of Section 4. Therefore, according to respondent Amante,
the Sandiganbayan was correct in ruling that the latter has
original jurisdiction only over cases where the accused is
a public official with salary grade 27 and higher; and in
cases where the accused is public official below grade 27
but his position is one of those mentioned in the
enumeration in Section 4(a)(1)(a) to (g) of P.D. No. 1606,
as amended and his offense involves a violation of R.A.
No. 3019, R.A. No. 1379 and Chapter II, Section 2, Title
VII of the Revised Penal Code; and if the indictment
involves offenses or felonies other than the three
aforementioned statutes, the general rule that a public
official must occupy a position with salary grade 27 and
higher in order that the Sandiganbayan could exercise
jurisdiction over him must apply. The same respondent
proceeded to cite a decision[9] of this Court where it was
held that jurisdiction over the subject matter is conferred
only by the Constitution or law; it cannot be fixed by the
will of the parties; it cannot be acquired through, or
waived, enlarged or diminished by, any act or omission of
the parties, neither is it conferred by acquiescence of the
court.
In its Reply[10] dated March 23, 2006, the OSP
reiterated that the enumeration of public officials in
Section 4(a)(1) to (a) to (g) of P.D. No. 1606 as falling
within the original jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan
should include their commission of other offenses in
relation to office under Section 4(b) of the same P.D. No.
1606. It cited the case of Esteban v. Sandiganbayan, et
al.[11] wherein this Court ruled that an offense is said to
have been committed in relation to the office if the offense
is intimately connected with the office of the offender and
perpetrated while he was in the performance of his official
functions.
The petition is meritorious.
The focal issue raised in the petition is the
jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan. As a background, this
Court had thoroughly discussed the history of the
conferment of jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan
in Serana v. Sandiganbayan, et al.,[12] thus:
x x x The Sandiganbayan was created by
P.D. No. 1486, promulgated by then
President Ferdinand E. Marcos on June
11, 1978. It was promulgated to attain
the highest norms of official conduct
required of public officers and
employees, based on the concept that
public officers and employees shall serve
with the highest degree of responsibility,
integrity, loyalty and efficiency and shall
remain at all times accountable to the
people.[13]
P.D. No. 1486 was, in turn,
amended by P.D. No. 1606 which was
promulgated on December 10, 1978.
P.D. No. 1606 expanded the jurisdiction
of the Sandiganbayan.[14]
P.D. No. 1606 was later
amended by P.D. No. 1861 on March 23,
1983, further altering
the Sandiganbayan jurisdiction. R.A. No.
Page 112 of 168
 7975 approved on March 30, 1995 made
succeeding amendments to P.D. No.
1606, which was again amended on
February 5, 1997 by R.A. No. 8249.
Section 4 of R.A. No. 8249 further
modified the jurisdiction of
the Sandiganbayan. x x x
Specifically, the question that needs to be
resolved is whether or not a member of the Sangguniang
Panlungsod under Salary Grade 26 who was charged
with violation of The Auditing Code of the Philippines falls
within the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan.
This Court rules in the affirmative.
The applicable law in this case is Section 4 of
P.D. No. 1606, as amended by Section 2 of R.A. No. 7975
which took effect on May 16, 1995, which was again
amended on February 5, 1997 by R.A. No. 8249. The
alleged commission of the offense, as shown in the
Information was on or about December 19, 1995 and the
filing of the Information was on May 21, 2004. The
jurisdiction of a court to try a criminal case is to be
determined at the time of the institution of the action, not
at the time of the commission of the offense.[15] The
exception contained in R.A. 7975, as well as R.A. 8249,
where it expressly provides that to determine the
jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan in cases involving
violations of R.A. No. 3019, as amended, R.A. No. 1379,
and Chapter II, Section 2, Title VII of the Revised Penal
Code is not applicable in the present case as the offense
involved herein is a violation of The Auditing Code of the
Philippines. The last clause of the opening sentence of
paragraph (a) of the said two provisions states:
Sec. 4. Jurisdiction. --
The Sandiganbayan shall exercise
exclusive original jurisdiction in all cases
involving:
A. Violations of Republic Act No.
3019, as amended, other known as the
Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act,
Republic Act No. 1379, and Chapter II,
Section 2, Title VII, Book II of the Revised
Penal Code, where one or more of the
accused are officials occupying the
following positions in the government,
whether in a permanent, acting or interim
capacity, at the time of the commission
of the offense:
The present case falls under Section 4(b) where
other offenses and felonies committed by public officials
or employees in relation to their office are involved. Under
the said provision, no exception is contained. Thus, the
general rule that jurisdiction of a court to try a criminal
case is to be determined at the time of the institution of
the action, not at the time of the commission of the offense
applies in this present case. Since the present case was
instituted on May 21, 2004, the provisions of R.A. No.
8249 shall govern.Verily, the pertinent provisions of P.D.
No. 1606 as amended by R.A. No. 8249 are the following:
Sec. 4. Jurisdiction. -- The
Sandiganbayan shall exercise original
jurisdiction in all cases involving:
A. Violations of Republic Act No.
3019, as amended, otherwise known as
the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act,
Republic Act No. 1379, and Chapter II,
Section 2, Title VII of the Revised Penal
Code, where one or more of the principal
accused are officials occupying the
following positions in the government,
whether in a permanent, acting or interim
capacity, at the time of the commission of
the offense:
(1) Officials of the
executive branch
occupying the positions of
regional director and
higher, otherwise
classified as grade 27 and
higher, of the
Compensation and
Position Classification Act
of 1989 (Republic Act No.
6758), specifically
including:
(
a)
Provincia
l
governor
Page 113 of 168
s, vice- e army
governor and air
s, force
member colonels,
s of the naval
sangguni captains,
ang and all
panlalaw officers
igan and of higher
provincia rank;
l
treasurer (
s, e) PNP
assessor chief
s, superinte
engineer ndent
s, and and PNP
other city officers
departm of higher
ent rank;
heads;
(
( f) City
b) City and
mayors, provincia
vice- l
mayors, prosecut
member ors and
s of the their
sangguni assistant
ang s, and
panlungs officials
od, city and
treasurer prosecut
s, ors in the
assessor Office of
s, the
engineer Ombuds
s, and man and
other city Special
departm Prosecut
ent or;
heads.
(
( g)
c) Presiden
Officials ts,
of the directors
diplomati or
c service trustees,
occupyin or
g the manager
position s of
of consul governm
and ent-
higher; owned or
controlle
( d
d) corporati
Philippin ons,
Page 114 of 168
 state
universiti Revised Penal Code. In order for the Sandiganbayan to
es or acquire jurisdiction over the said offenses, the latter must
educatio
nal be committed by, among others, officials of the executive
institutio branch occupying positions of regional director and
ns or
foundatio higher, otherwise classified as Grade 27 and higher, of
ns; the Compensation and Position Classification Act of
(2) Members of 1989. However, the law is not devoid of
Congress and officials
exceptions. Those that are classified as Grade 26 and
thereof classified as
Grade 27 and up under below may still fall within the jurisdiction of the
the Compensation and
Position Classification Act Sandiganbayan provided that they hold the positions thus
of 1989; enumerated by the same law. Particularly and exclusively

(3) Members of enumerated are provincial governors, vice-governors,

the judiciary without members of the sangguniang panlalawigan, and
prejudice to the
provisions of the provincial treasurers, assessors, engineers, and other
Constitution;
provincial department heads; city mayors, vice-mayors,
(4) Chairmen and members of the sangguniang panlungsod, city treasurers,
members of
Constitutional assessors, engineers , and other city department heads;
Commissions, without officials of the diplomatic service occupying the position
prejudice to the
provisions of the as consul and higher; Philippine army and air force
Constitution; and colonels, naval captains, and all officers of higher rank;
(5) All other PNP chief superintendent and PNP officers of higher
national and local officials
rank; City and provincial prosecutors and their assistants,
classified as Grade 27
and higher under the and officials and prosecutors in the Office of the
Compensation and
Position Classification Act Ombudsman and special prosecutor; and presidents,
of 1989. directors or trustees, or managers of government-owned

B. Other offenses or felonies, or controlled corporations, state universities or

whether simple or complexed with other educational institutions or foundations. In connection
crimes committed by the public officials
and employees mentioned in subsection therewith, Section 4(b) of the same law provides that other
(a) of this section in relation to their office. offenses or felonies committed by public officials and
C. Civil and criminal cases filed employees mentioned in subsection (a) in relation to their
pursuant to and in connection with
office also fall under the jurisdiction of the
Executive Order Nos. 1, 2, 14 and 14-A.
Sandiganbayan.

The above law is clear as to the composition of

By simple analogy, applying the provisions of the
the original jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan. Under
pertinent law, respondent Amante, being a member of
Section 4(a), the following offenses are specifically
the Sangguniang Panlungsod at the time of the alleged
enumerated: violations of R.A. No. 3019, as amended,
commission of an offense in relation to her office, falls
R.A. No. 1379, and Chapter II, Section 2, Title VII of the
within the original jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan.

Page 115 of 168


However, the Sandiganbayan, in its Resolution,
dismissed the case with the following ratiocination:
x x x the ruling of the Supreme Court in
the Inding case, stating that the
Congress' act of specifically including the
public officials therein mentioned,
obviously intended cases mentioned in
Section 4 (a) of P.D. No. 1606, as
amended by Section 2 of R.A. No. 7975,
when committed by the officials
enumerated in (1)(a) to (g) thereof,
regardless of their salary grades, to be
tried by the Sandiganbayan. Obviously,
the Court was referring to cases involving
violation of R.A. No. 3019, R.A. No. 1379
and Chapter II, Section 2, Title VII of the
Revised Penal Code only because they
are the specific cases mentioned in
Section 4 (a) of P.D. No. 1606 as
amended, so that when they are
committed even by public officials below
salary grade '27', provided they belong to
the enumeration, jurisdiction would fall
under the Sandiganbayan. When the
offense committed however, falls under
Section 4(b) or 4(c) of P.D. No. 1606 as
amended, it should be emphasized that
the general qualification that the public
official must belong to grade '27' is a
requirement so that the Sandiganbayan
could exercise original jurisdiction over
him. Otherwise, jurisdiction would fall to
the proper regional or municipal trial
court.
In the case at bar, the accused is
a Sangguniang Panlungsod member, a
position with salary grade '26'. Her office
is included in the enumerated public
officials in Section 4(a) (1) (a) to (g) of
P.D. No. 1606 as amended by Section 2
of R.A. No. 7975. However, she is
charged with violation of Section 89 of
The Auditing Code of
the Philippines which is not a case falling
under Section 4(a) but under Section 4(b)
of P.D. No. 1606 as amended. This being
the case, the principle declared in Inding
is not applicable in the case at bar
because as stated, the charge must
involve a violation of R.A. No. 3019, R.A.
No. 1379 or Chapter II, Section 2, Title VII
of the Revised Penal Code. Therefore, in
the instant case, even if the position of
the accused is one of those enumerated
public officials under Section 4(a)(1)(a) to
(g), since she is being prosecuted of an
offense not mentioned in the aforesaid
section, the general qualification that
accused must be a public official
occupying a position with salary grade
'27' is a requirement before this Court
could exercise jurisdiction over her. And
since the accused occupied a public
office with salary grade 26, then she is
not covered by the jurisdiction of the
Sandiganbayan.
Petitioner is correct in disputing the above ruling
of the Sandiganbayan. Central to the discussion of the
Sandiganbayan is the case of Inding v.
Sandiganbayan[16] where this Court ruled that the officials
enumerated in (a) to (g) of Section 4(a)(1) of P. D. No.
1606, as amended are included within the original
jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan regardless of salary
grade. According to petitioner, the Inding case did not
categorically nor implicitly constrict or confine the
application of the enumeration provided for under Section
4(a)(1) of P.D. No. 1606, as amended, exclusively to
cases where the offense charged is either a violation of
R.A. No. 3019, R.A. No. 1379, or Chapter II, Section 2,
Title VII of the Revised Penal Code. This observation is
true in light of the facts contained in the said case. In
the Inding case, the public official involved was a member
of the Sangguniang Panlungsod with Salary Grade 25
and was charged with violation of R.A. No. 3019. In ruling
that the Sandiganbayan had jurisdiction over the said
public official, this Court concentrated its disquisition on
the provisions contained in Section 4(a)(1) of P.D. No.
1606, as amended, where the offenses involved
are specifically enumerated and not on Section 4(b)
where offenses or felonies involved are those that are in
relation to the public officials' office. Section 4(b) of P.D.
No. 1606, as amended, provides that:
b. Other offenses or felonies
committed by public officials and
employees mentioned in subsection (a)
of this section in relation to their office.
Page 116 of 168

A simple analysis after a plain reading of the
above provision shows that those public officials
enumerated in Section 4(a) of P.D. No. 1606, as
amended, may not only be charged in the Sandiganbayan
with violations of R.A. No. 3019, R.A. No. 1379 or Chapter
II, Section 2, Title VII of the Revised Penal Code, but also
with other offenses or felonies in relation to their office.
The said other offenses and felonies are broad in scope
but are limited only to those that are committed in relation
to the public official or employee's office. This Court had
ruled that as long as the offense charged in the
information is intimately connected with the office and is
alleged to have been perpetrated while the accused was
in the performance, though improper or irregular, of his
official functions, there being no personal motive to
commit the crime and had the accused not have
committed it had he not held the aforesaid office, the
accused is held to have been indicted for an offense
committed in relation to his office.[17] Thus, in the case
of Lacson v. Executive Secretary,[18] where the crime
involved was murder, this Court held that:
The phrase other offenses or
felonies is too broad as to include the
crime of murder, provided it was
committed in relation to the accuseds
official functions. Thus, under said
paragraph b, what determines
the Sandiganbayans jurisdiction is the
official position or rank of the offender
that is, whether he is one of those public
officers or employees enumerated in
paragraph a of Section 4. x x x.
Also, in the case Alarilla v.
Sandiganbayan,[19] where the public official was charged
with grave threats, this Court ruled:
x x x In the case at bar, the amended
information contained allegations that the
accused, petitioner herein, took
advantage of his official functions as
municipal mayor of Meycauayan,
Bulacan when he committed the crime of
grave threats as defined in Article 282 of
the Revised Penal Code against
complainant Simeon G. Legaspi, a
municipal councilor. The Office of the
Special Prosecutor charged petitioner
with aiming a gun at and threatening to
kill Legaspi during a public hearing, after
the latter had rendered a privilege
speech critical of petitioners
administration. Clearly, based on such
allegations, the crime charged is
intimately connected with the discharge
of petitioners official functions. This was
elaborated upon by public respondent in
its April 25, 1997 resolution wherein it
held that the accused was performing his
official duty as municipal mayor when he
attended said public hearing and that
accuseds violent act was precipitated by
complainants criticism of his
administration as the mayor or chief
executive of the municipality, during the
latters privilege speech. It was his
response to private complainants attack
to his office. If he was not the mayor, he
would not have been irritated or angered
by whatever private complainant might
have said during said privilege speech.
Thus, based on the allegations in the
information, the Sandiganbayan
correctly assumed jurisdiction over the
case.
Proceeding from the above rulings of this Court,
a close reading of the Information filed against respondent
Amante for violation of The Auditing Code of
the Philippinesreveals that the said offense was
committed in relation to her office, making her fall
under Section 4(b) of P.D. No. 1606, as amended.
According to the assailed Resolution of the
Sandiganbayan, if the intention of the law had been to
extend the application of the exceptions to the other cases
over which the Sandiganbayan could assert jurisdiction,
then there would have been no need to distinguish
between violations of R.A. No. 3019, R.A. No. 1379 or
Chapter II, Section 2, Title VII of the Revised Penal Code
on the one hand, and other offenses or felonies committed
by public officials and employees in relation to their office
Page 117 of 168
on the other. The said reasoning is misleading because a
distinction apparently exists. In the offenses involved in
Section 4(a), it is not disputed that public office is essential
as an element of the said offenses themselves, while in
those offenses and felonies involved in Section 4(b), it is
enough that the said offenses and felonies were
committed in relation to the public officials or employees'
office. In expounding the meaning of offenses deemed to
have been committed in relation to office, this Court held:
qualification as to the public officials involved. It simply
stated, public officials and employees mentioned in
subsection (a) of the same section. Therefore, it refers to
those public officials with Salary Grade 27 and above,
except those specifically enumerated.It is a well-settled
principle of legal hermeneutics that words of a statute will
be interpreted in their natural, plain and ordinary
acceptation and signification,[21] unless it is evident that
the legislature intended a technical or special legal

In Sanchez v. Demetriou [227 meaning to those words.[22] The intention of the

SCRA 627 (1993)], the Court elaborated lawmakers who are, ordinarily, untrained philologists
on the scope and reach of the term
offense committed in relation to [an and lexicographers to use statutory phraseology in
accuseds] office by referring to the such a manner is always presumed.[23]
principle laid down in Montilla v.
Hilario [90 Phil 49 (1951)], and to an
exception to that principle which was WHEREFORE, the Petition dated April 20,
recognized in People v. Montejo [108
Phil 613 (1960)]. The principle set out 2005 is hereby GRANTED and the Resolution of the
in Montilla v. Hilario is that an offense
Sandiganbayan (Third Division) dated February 28,
may be considered as committed in
relation to the accuseds office if the 2005 is NULLIFIED and SET ASIDE. Consequently, let
offense cannot exist without the office
such that the office [is] a constituent the case be REMANDED to the Sandiganbayan for
element of the crime x x x. In People v. further proceedings.
Montejo, the Court, through Chief Justice
Concepcion, said that although public
office is not an element of the crime of SO ORDERED.
murder in [the] abstract, the facts in a
particular case may show that

x x x the offense therein

charged is intimately
connected with [the
accuseds] respective
offices and was
perpetrated while they
were in the
performance, though
improper or irregular, of
their official functions.
Indeed, [the accused]
had no personal motive
to commit the crime and
they would not have
committed it had they
not held their aforesaid
offices. x x x[20]

Moreover, it is beyond clarity that the same

provision of Section 4(b) does not mention any
Page 118 of 168
 Republic of the Philippines
Supreme Court THE FACTUAL ANTECEDENTS
Baguio City

On May 14, 2003, the Office of the Ombudsman filed an

information for multiple frustrated murder and double
THIRD DIVISION
attempted murder against several accused, including
Magno, who were public officers working under the
National Bureau of Investigation.[7]
ANGELITO P. MAGNO, G.R. No. 171542
Petitioner,
During the scheduled arraignment, Magno, in open court,
Present:
CARPIO MORALES, J., Chairperson, objected to the formal appearance and authority of Atty.
BRION, Sitoy, who was there as private prosecutor to prosecute
- versus - BERSAMIN,
VILLARAMA, JR., and the case for and on behalf of the Office of the
SERENO, JJ. Ombudsman.[8] The oral objection was reduced to writing
on July 21, 2003 when Magno filed an opposition[9] before
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Branch 56 of the RTC of Mandaue City, citing the
MICHAEL MONSOD, ESTHER LUZ
provisions of Section 31 of Republic Act (RA) No. 6770.[10]
MAE GREGORIO, GIAN CARLO
CAJOLES, NENETTE CASTILLON, Promulgated:
DONATO ENABE and ALFIE
FERNANDEZ,
Respondents. April 6, 2011 The Office of the Ombudsman submitted its
x-------------------------------------------------------------------------- comment,[11] while the accused submitted their joint
---------------x
opposition.[12] The respondents likewise submitted their
comments to the opposition of the other co-accused.[13]
DECISION

BRION, J.: On September 25, 2003, the RTC issued an Order, ruling
that the Ombudsman is proper, legal and authorized entity
to prosecute this case to the exclusion of any other
Through a petition for review
entity/person other than those authorized under R.A.
on certiorari,[1] petitioner Angelito P. Magno seeks the
6770.[14]
reversal of the Amended Decision of the Court of Appeals
(CA), dated September 26, 2005[2] in People of
In open court, the Office of the Ombudsman moved for the
the Philippines, et al. v. Hon. Augustine A. Vestil,
reconsideration of the Order, which the RTC later denied
Presiding Judge, RTC Mandaue City, Br. 56, et
in its October 1, 2003 Order.[15]
al. (docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 79809), and its
Resolution dated February 6, 2006[3] denying respondents
Proceedings before the CA
motion for reconsideration.[4] The assailed rulings denied
the petition for certiorari filed under Rule 65 of the Rules
On October 13, 2003, the respondents, through
of Court and upheld the ruling[5] of the Regional Trial Court
the Ombudsman for the Visayas and Atty. Sitoy, filed a
(RTC) of Mandaue City, which precluded Atty. Adelino B.
petition for certiorari before the CA.[16] They contended
Sitoy from acting as private prosecutor in Criminal Case
that the RTC committed a grave abuse of discretion in
No. DU-10123.[6]
prohibiting the appearance of Atty. Sitoy as counsel for the

Page 119 of 168

private offended parties, as the Rules of Court expressly
provides that a private offended party may intervene, by Magno submits that the CA did not have
counsel, in the prosecution of offenses.[17] jurisdiction to entertain the petition for certiorari; the power
to hear and decide that question is with the
Magno, in his comment[18] filed on December 15, 2003, Sandiganbayan.[28] To support this contention, Magno
insisted that what he questioned before the RTC was the invokes Engr. Teodoto B. Abbot v. Hon. Judge Hilario I.
appearance and authority of the private prosecutor to Mapayo, etc., et al.[29] where the Court held that the
prosecute the case in behalf of the Ombudsman.[19] He Sandiganbayan has the exclusive power to issue petitions
stressed that while the Office of the Ombudsman can for certiorari in aid of its appellate jurisdiction.[30]
designate prosecutors to assist in the prosecution of
criminal cases, its authority in appointing, deputizing or
Even if the Court were to set aside this procedural
authorizing prosecutors to prosecute cases is confined
lapse, Magno adds, the private prosecutor cannot be
only to fiscals, state prosecutors and government
allowed to intervene for the respondents as it would violate
lawyers. It does not extend to private practitioners/private
Section 31 of RA No. 6770.[31] Section 31 limits the
prosecutors.[20] He further stressed that while the Order of
Ombudsmans prerogative to designate prosecutors to
the RTC states that the Office of the Ombudsman is the
fiscals, state prosecutors and government lawyers. It does
proper legal and authorized entity to prosecute the case, it
not, Magno maintains, allow the Ombudsman to deputize
did not affect the right to intervene personally, as the Office
private practitioners to prosecute cases for and on behalf
of the Ombudsman can take the cudgels for the private
of the Office of the Ombudsman.[32]
respondents in prosecuting the civil aspect of the case. [21]

On February 16, 2005, the CA, in its original Decision, RESPONDENTS ARGUMENTS
declared that the private prosecutor may appear for the
petitioner in the case, but only insofar as the prosecution
of the civil aspect of the case is concerned.[22] The Office of the Ombudsman, through the Office of the
Special Prosecutor, submitted its memorandum
on February 8, 2008. Substantively, the Ombudsman
The respondents moved for the reconsideration [23] of the
maintains that Atty. Sitoy may intervene in the case
CA decision. On September 26, 2005, the CA amended its
pursuant to Section 16, Rule 110 of the Rules of Court,
decision,[24] ruling that the private prosecutor may appear
which reads:
for the petitioner in Criminal Case No. DU-10123 to
intervene in the prosecution of the offense charged in
Sec. 16. Intervention of the
collaboration with any lawyer deputized by the offended party in criminal action. Where
Ombudsman to prosecute the case.[25] the civil action for recovery of civil liability
is instituted in the criminal action
pursuant to Rule 111, the offended party
Failing to obtain a reconsideration[26] of the may intervene by counsel in the
prosecution of the offense.
amended CA decision, Magno elevated the dispute to this
Court through the present petition for review
on certiorari[27] filed under Rule 45 of the Rules of The Ombudsman maintains that Section 31 of RA No.
Procedure. 6770 did not amend Section 16, Rule 110 of the Rules of
Court.[33] Section 31 merely allows the Ombudsman to
PETITIONERS ARGUMENTS designate and deputize any fiscal, state prosecutor or
Page 120 of 168

lawyer in the government service to act as special
investigator or prosecutor to assist in the investigation and
prosecution in certain cases.[34] The Ombudsman opines
that the two provisions of law are not diametrically
opposed nor in conflict,[35] as a private prosecutor may
appear for the private offended complainants in the
prosecution of an offense independent of the exclusive
right of the Ombudsman to deputize.[36] The Ombudsman,
however, did not address the contention that the
Sandiganbayan, not the CA, has appellate jurisdiction over
Section 4. Jurisdiction. The
Sandiganbayan shall exercise exclusive
original jurisdiction in all cases involving:
A. Violations of Republic Act No. 3019, as
amended, otherwise known as the Anti-
Graft and Corruption Practices Act,
Republic Act No. 1379, and Chapter II,
Section 2, Title VII, of the Revised Penal
Code, where one or more of the accused
are officials occupying the following
positions in the government, whether in a
permanent, acting or interim capacity, at
the time of the commission of the offense:

the RTC in this case. xxxx

B. Other offenses or felonies whether

THE COURTS RULING simple or complexed with other crimes
committed by the public officials and
employees mentioned in subsection of
We resolve to grant the petition.
this section in relation to their office.

The C. Civil and criminal cases filed pursuant

Sandig to and in connection with Executive
anbaya Order Nos. 1, 2, 14 and 14-A, issued in
n, not 1986.
the CA,
has In cases where none of the accused are
appella occupying positions corresponding to
te Salary Grade 27 or higher, as prescribed
jurisdic in the said Republic Act No. 6758, or
tion military or PNP officers mentioned
over above, exclusive original jurisdiction
the thereof shall be vested in the proper
RTCs regional trial court, metropolitan trial
decisio court, municipal trial court, and municipal
n not circuit trial court, as the case may be,
to pursuant to their respective jurisdictions
allow as provided in Batas Pambansa Blg. 129,
Atty. as amended.
Sitoy
to The Sandiganbayan shall exercise
prosec exclusive appellate jurisdiction over
ute the final judgments, resolutions or orders
case of regional trial courts whether in the
on exercise of their own original
behalf jurisdiction or of their appellate
of the jurisdiction as herein provided.
Ombud
sman The Sandiganbayan shall have
exclusive original jurisdiction over
petitions for the issuance of the writs
Presidential Decree (PD) No. 1606 created the of mandamus, prohibition, certiorari,
Sandiganbayan. Section 4 thereof establishes the habeas corpus, injunctions, and other
ancillary writs and processes in aid of
Sandiganbayans jurisdiction: its appellate jurisdiction and over
petitions of similar nature, including
quo warranto, arising or that may
arise in cases filed or which may be
Page 121 of 168
filed under Executive Order Nos. 1, 2,
14 and 14-A, issued in 1986: Provided,
That the jurisdiction over these This is clear: the Sandiganbayan has exclusive appellate
petitions shall not be exclusive of the jurisdiction over resolutions issued by RTCs in the
Supreme Court.
exercise of their own original jurisdiction or of their
The procedure prescribed in Batas appellate jurisdiction.
Pambansa Blg. 129, as well as the
implementing rules that the Supreme
Court has promulgated and may
hereafter promulgate, relative to We reaffirmed this rule in Abbot.[37] In that case,
appeals/petitions for review to the Court
petitioner Engr. Abbot filed a petition for certiorari before
of Appeals, shall apply to appeals and
petitions for review filed with the the CA, claiming that the RTC gravely abused its
Sandiganbayan. In all cases elevated to discretion for not dismissing the information for
the Sandiganbayan and from the
Sandiganbayan to the Supreme Court, Malversation thru Falsification of Public Document. The
the Office of the Ombudsman, through its CA refused to take cognizance of the case, holding that
special prosecutor, shall represent the
People of the Philippines, except in the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over the
cases filed pursuant to Executive Order petition. Recognizing the amendments made to PD No.
Nos. 1, 2, 14 and 14-A, issued in 1986.
1606 by RA No. 7975,[38] we sustained the CAs position
In case private individuals are charged as since Section 4 of PD No. 1606 has expanded the
co-principals, accomplices or Sandiganbayans jurisdiction to include petitions
accessories with the public officers or
employees, including those employed in for mandamus, prohibition, certiorari, habeas corpus,
government-owned or controlled injunction, and other ancillary writs and processes in aid
corporations, they shall be tried jointly
with said public officers and employees in of its appellate jurisdiction.[39]
the proper courts which shall exercise
exclusive jurisdiction over them.
In the present case, the CA erred when it took
Any provision of law or Rules of Court to cognizance of the petition for certiorari filed by Magno.
the contrary notwithstanding, the criminal
While it is true that the interlocutory order issued by the
action and the corresponding civil action
for the recovery of civil liability shall at all RTC is reviewable by certiorari, the same was incorrectly
times be simultaneously instituted with, filed with the CA. Magno should have filed the petition
and jointly determined in, the same
proceeding by the Sandiganbayan or to for certiorari with the Sandiganbayan, which has
appropriate courts, the filing of the exclusive appellate jurisdiction over the RTC since the
criminal action being deemed to
necessarily carry with it the filing of civil accused are public officials charged of committing crimes
action, and no right to reserve the filing of in their capacity as Investigators of the National Bureau of
such civil action separately from the
Investigation.[40]
criminal action shall be recognized:
Provided, however, That where the civil
action had theretofore been filed The CA should have dismissed the petition
separately but judgment therein has not
yet been rendered, and the criminal case outright. Since it acted without authority, we overrule
is hereafter filed with the Sandiganbayan the September 26, 2005 Amended Decision of the CA
or the appropriate court, said civil action
shall be transferred to the and the subsequent denial of Magnos motions for
Sandiganbayan or the appropriate court, reconsideration.
as the case may be, for consolidation and
joint determination with the criminal
Jurisdiction is conferred by law, and
action, otherwise the separate civil action
the CAs judgment, issued without
shall be deemed abandoned." [emphasis
jurisdiction, is void.
and underscoring supplied]

Page 122 of 168

 Ombud
sman
There is no rule in procedural law as basic as the
cannot
precept that jurisdiction is conferred by law,[41] and any rely on
judgment, order or resolution issued without it is the
principl
void[42] and cannot be given any effect.[43] This rule e of
applies even if the issue on jurisdiction was raised for the estopp
el to
first time on appeal or even after final judgment.[44] cure
the
jurisdic
We reiterated and clarified the rule further
tional
in Felicitas M. Machado, et al. v. Ricardo L. Gatdula, et defect
al.,[45] as follows: of its
petition
Jurisdiction over a subject matter before
is conferred by law and not by the parties the CA
action or conduct. Estoppel generally
does not confer jurisdiction over a cause
of action to a tribunal where none, by law, The Ombudsman cannot rely on the principle
exists. In Lozon v. NLRC, we declared
of estoppel in this case
that:
since Magno raised the issue of jurisdiction before the
Lack of jurisdiction over the CAs decision became final. Further, even if the issue had
subject matter of the suit is yet
another matter. Whenever it been raised only on appeal to this Court, the CAs lack of
appears that the court has no jurisdiction could still not be
jurisdiction over the subject
matter, the action shall be cured. In Machado,[48] citing People of the Philippines v.
dismissed. This defense may Rosalina Casiano,[49] we held:
be interposed at any time,
during appeal or even after In People v. Casiano, this Court, on the
final judgment. Such is issue of estoppel, held:
understandable, as this kind of
jurisdiction is conferred by law The operation of the principle of
and not within the courts, let estoppel on the question of jurisdiction
alone the parties, to themselves seemingly depends upon whether the
determine or conveniently set lower court actually had jurisdiction or
aside. not. If it had no jurisdiction, but the
case was tried and decided upon the
theory that it had jurisdiction, the
parties are not barred, on appeal,
We note that Magno had already raised in his from assailing such jurisdiction, for
supplemental motion for reconsideration before the the same must exist as a matter of
law, and may not be conferred by
CA[46] the ground of lack of jurisdiction before the CAs consent of the parties or by
Decision became final. The CA did not even consider this estoppel. However if the lower court
had jurisdiction, and the case was heard
submission, choosing instead to brush it aside for its
and decided upon a given theory, such,
alleged failure to raise new or substantial grounds for for instance, as that the court had no
reconsideration.[47]Clearly, however, its lack of jurisdiction jurisdiction, the party who induced it to
adopt such theory will not be permitted,
is a new and substantial argument that the CA should on appeal, to assume an inconsistent
have passed upon. position that the lower court had
jurisdiction.
The
Office
of the
Page 123 of 168
 WHEREFORE, we DENY the petitioners petition
for review on certiorari, and DECLARE the Amended
Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No.
79809, promulgated on September 26, 2005, as well as
its Resolution of February 6, 2006, NULL AND VOID for
having been issued without jurisdiction. The respondents
are hereby given fifteen (15) days from the finality of this
Decision within which to seek recourse from the
Sandiganbayan. No costs.

SO ORDERED.

Page 124 of 168

 FIRST DIVISION
Report[6] dated January 4, 1999, the National Bureau of
RUPERTO A. AMBIL, JR., G.R. No. 175457
Investigation (NBI) recommended the filing of criminal
Petitioner,
charges against petitioner Ambil, Jr. for violation of
Section 3(e)[7] of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 3019, otherwise
- versus -
known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, as
amended. On September 22, 1999, the new President of
SANDIGANBAYAN and PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, the IBP, Eastern Samar Chapter, informed the
Respondent.
Ombudsman that the IBP is no longer interested in
x- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x
pursuing the case against petitioners. Thus, he
ALEXANDRINO R. APELADO, SR., G.R. No. 175482
recommended the dismissal of the complaint against
Petitioner,
Present:
petitioners.[8]
CORONA, C.J.,
- versus - Chairperson, [9]
CARPIO,* Nonetheless, in an Information dated January 31, 2000,
BERSAMIN,petitioners Ambil, Jr. and Alexandrino R. Apelado, Sr.
DEL CASTILLO, and
were
VILLARAMA, JR.,charged
JJ. with violation of Section 3(e) of R.A. No.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, 3019, together with SPO3 Felipe A. Balano. Upon
Respondent. Promulgated:
reinvestigation, the Office of the Ombudsman issued a
July 6, 2011
Memorandum[10] dated August 4, 2000, recommending
the dismissal of the complaint as regards Balano and the
x----------------------------------------
- - - - - - - - - - -x amendment of the Information to include the charge of
Delivering Prisoners from Jail under Article 156[11] of
DECISION
the Revised Penal Code, as amended, (RPC) against the
VILLARAMA, JR., J.: remaining accused. The Amended Information[12] reads:

Before us are two consolidated petitions for review on
certiorari filed by petitioner Ruperto A. Ambil, Jr.[1] and
petitioner Alexandrino R. Apelado Sr.[2] assailing the
Decision[3] promulgated on September 16, 2005 and
Resolution[4] dated November 8, 2006
Sandiganbayan in Criminal Case No. 25892.
The present controversy arose from a letter[5] of Atty.
David B. Loste, President of the Eastern Samar Chapter
of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP), to the Office
of the Ombudsman, praying for an investigation into the
alleged transfer of then Mayor Francisco Adalim, an
accused in Criminal Case No. 10963 for murder, from the
provincial jail of Eastern Samar to the residence of
petitioner, then Governor Ruperto A. Ambil, Jr. In a
That on or about the 6th day of
September 1998, and for sometime prior
[or] subsequent thereto, [in] the
Municipality of Borongan, Province of
Eastern Samar, Philippines, and within
the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court,
[the] above-named accused, Ruperto A.
of the Ambil, Jr.[,] being then the Provincial
Governor of Eastern Samar, and
Alexandrino R. Apelado, being then the
Provincial Warden of Eastern Samar,
both having been public officers, duly
elected, appointed and qualified as such,
committing the offense in relation to
office, conniving and confederating
together and mutually helping x x x each
other, with deliberate intent, manifest
partiality and evident bad faith, did then
and there wilfully, unlawfully and
criminally order and cause the release
from the Provincial Jail of detention
prisoner Mayor Francisco Adalim,
accused in Criminal Case No. 10963, for
Page 125 of 168
 Murder, by virtue of a warrant of Arrest
issued by Honorable Arnulfo P. Bugtas,
Presiding Judge, RTC-Branch 2,
Borongan, Eastern Samar, and
thereafter placed said detention prisoner
(Mayor Francisco Adalim) under accused
RUPERTO A. AMBIL, JR.s custody, by
allowing said Mayor Adalim to stay at
accused Ambils residence for a period of
Eighty-Five (85) days, more or less which
act was done without any court order,
thus accused in the performance of
official functions had given unwarranted
benefits and advantage to detainee
Mayor Francisco Adalim to the prejudice
of the government.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
BAIL BOND
RECOMMENDED: P30,000.00 each.[13]
On arraignment, petitioners pleaded not guilty and posted
bail.
At the pre-trial, petitioners admitted the allegations in the
Information. They reason, however, that Adalims transfer
was justified considering the imminent threats upon his
person and the dangers posed by his detention at the
provincial jail. According to petitioners, Adalims sister,
Atty. Juliana A. Adalim-White, had sent numerous
prisoners to the same jail where Mayor Adalim was to be
held.
Consequently, the prosecution no longer offered
testimonial evidence and rested its case after the
admission of its documentary exhibits. Petitioners filed a
Motion for Leave to File Demurrer to Evidence with
[14]
Reservation to Present Evidence in Case of Denial
the same was denied.
At the trial, petitioners presented three witnesses:
petitioner Ambil, Jr., Atty. Juliana A. Adalim-White and
Mayor Francisco C. Adalim.
Petitioner Ambil, Jr. testified that he was the Governor of
Eastern Samar from 1998 to 2001. According to him, it
was upon the advice of Adalims lawyers that he directed
the transfer of Adalims detention to his home. He cites
poor security in the provincial jail as the primary reason
for taking personal custody of Adalim considering that the
latter would be in the company of inmates who were put
away by his sister and guards identified with his political
opponents.[15]
For her part, Atty. White stated that she is the District
Public Attorney of Eastern Samar and the sister of Mayor
Adalim. She recounted how Mayor Adalim was arrested
while they were attending a wedding in Sulat, Eastern
Samar, on September 6, 1998. According to Atty. White,
she sought the alternative custody of Gov. Ambil, Jr. after
Provincial Warden and herein petitioner Apelado, Sr.
failed to guarantee the mayors safety.[16]
Meanwhile, Francisco Adalim introduced himself as the
Mayor of Taft, Eastern Samar. He confirmed his arrest on
September 6, 1998 in connection with a murder case filed
against him in the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Borongan, Eastern Samar. Adalim confirmed Atty. Whites
account that he spotted inmates who served as
bodyguards for, or who are associated with, his political
rivals at the provincial jail. He also noticed a prisoner,
Roman Akyatan, gesture to him with a raised clenched
fist. Sensing danger, he called on his sister for
help. Adalim admitted staying at Ambil, Jr.s residence for
almost three months before he posted bail after the
but charge against him was downgraded to homicide.[17]
Petitioner Apelado, Sr. testified that he was the Provincial
Jail Warden of Eastern Samar. He recalls that on
September 6, 1998, SPO3 Felipe Balano fetched him at
home to assist in the arrest of Mayor Adalim. Allegedly,
Atty. White was contesting the legality of Mayor Adalims
Page 126 of 168
arrest and arguing with the jail guards against booking him failure to turn over Adalim despite advice from Assistant
for detention. At the provincial jail, petitioner was Secretary Jesus Ingeniero of the Department of Interior
confronted by Atty. White who informed him that he was and Local Government.
under the governor, in the latters capacity as a provincial
jailer. Petitioner claims that it is for this reason that he Consequently, the Sandiganbayan sentenced petitioner
submitted to the governors order to relinquish custody of Ambil, Jr. to an indeterminate penalty of imprisonment for
Adalim.[18] nine (9) years, eight (8) months and one (1) day to twelve
(12) years and four (4) months. In favor of petitioner
Further, petitioner Apelado, Sr. described the physical Apelado, Sr., the court appreciated the incomplete
condition of the jail to be dilapidated and justifying circumstance of obedience to a superior order
undermanned. According to him, only two guards were and sentenced him to imprisonment for six (6) years and
incharge of looking after 50 inmates. There were two cells one (1) month to nine (9) years and eight (8) months.
in the jail, each housing 25 inmates, while an isolation cell
of 10 square meters was unserviceable at the time. Also, Hence, the present petitions.
there were several nipa huts within the perimeter for use
during conjugal visits.[19] Petitioner Ambil, Jr. advances the following issues for our
consideration:
On September 16, 2005, the Sandiganbayan, First
I
Division, promulgated the assailed Decision[20] finding
WHETHER OR NOT SECTION 3(e)
petitioners guilty of violating Section 3(e) of R.A. No. REPUBLIC ACT NO. 3019, AS
3019. The court ruled that in moving Adalim to a private AMENDED, APPLIES TO
PETITIONERS CASE BEFORE THE
residence, petitioners have conspired to accord him SANDIGANBAYAN.
unwarranted benefits in the form of more comfortable
II
quarters with access to television and other privileges that
other detainees do not enjoy. It stressed that under the WHETHER OR NOT A PUBLIC
OFFICER SUCH AS PETITIONER IS A
Rules, no person under detention by legal process shall PRIVATE PARTY FOR PURPOSES OF
SECTION 3(e), REPUBLIC ACT NO.
be released or transferred except upon order of the court
3019, AS AMENDED.
or when he is admitted to bail.[21]
III

The Sandiganbayan brushed aside petitioners defense WHETHER OR NOT PETITIONER

ACTED WITH DELIBERATE INTENT,
that Adalims transfer was made to ensure his safety. It MANIFEST PARTIALITY, EVIDENT
observed that petitioner Ambil, Jr. did not personally verify BAD FAITH OR GROSS INEXCUSABLE
NEGLIGENCE IN THE CONTEXT OF
any actual threat on Adalims life but relied simply on the SAID SECTION 3(e).
advice of Adalims lawyers. The Sandiganbayan also
IV
pointed out the availability of an isolation cell and nipa
huts within the 10-meter-high perimeter fence of the jail WHETHER OR NOT PETITIONER AS
PROVINCIAL GOVERNOR AND JAILER
which could have been used to separate Adalim from UNDER SECTIONS 1730 AND 1733,
ARTICLE III, CHAPTER 45 OF THE
other prisoners. Finally, it cited petitioner Ambil, Jr.s
ADMINISTRATIVE CODE OF 1917 AND
Page 127 of 168
 SECTION 61, CHAPTER V, REPUBLIC
ACT 6975 HAS THE AUTHORITY TO The issues raised by petitioner Ambil, Jr. can be summed
TAKE CUSTODY OF A DETENTION up into three: (1) Whether he is guilty beyond reasonable
PRISONER.
doubt of violating Section 3(e), R.A. No. 3019; (2)
V Whether a provincial governor has authority to take

WHETHER OR NOT PETITIONER IS
ENTITLED TO THE JUSTIFYING
CIRCUMSTANCE OF FULFILLMENT
OF A DUTY OR THE LAWFUL
EXERCISE OF A RIGHT OR OFFICE.
personal custody of a detention prisoner; and (3) Whether
he is entitled to the justifying circumstance of fulfillment of
duty under Article 11(5)[24] of the RPC.

VI Meanwhile, petitioner Apelado, Sr.s assignment of errors

can be condensed into two: (1) Whether he is guilty
WHETHER OR NOT PETITIONER
SHOULD HAVE BEEN ACQUITTED beyond reasonable doubt of violating Section 3(e), R.A.
BECAUSE THE PROSECUTION
EVIDENCE DID NOT ESTABLISH HIS No. 3019; and (2) Whether he is entitled to the justifying
GUILT BEYOND REASONABLE circumstance of obedience to an order issued by a
DOUBT.[22]
superior for some lawful purpose under Article 11(6)[25] of
the RPC.
For his part, petitioner Apelado, Sr. imputes the following
errors on the Sandiganbayan: Fundamentally, petitioner Ambil, Jr. argues that Section
I 3(e), R.A. No. 3019 does not apply to his case because
THERE WAS MISAPPREHENSION OF the provision contemplates only transactions of a
FACTS AND/OR MISAPPLICATION OF
pecuniary nature. Since the law punishes a public officer
THE LAW AND JURISPRUDENCE IN
CONVICTING ACCUSED APELADO, who extends unwarranted benefits to a private person,
EITHER AS PRINCIPAL OR IN
CONSPIRACY WITH HIS CO- petitioner avers that he cannot be held liable for extending
ACCUSED AMBIL. a favor to Mayor Adalim, a public officer. Further, he
II claims good faith in taking custody of the mayor pursuant

IN THE ABSENCE OF COMPETENT to his duty as a Provincial Jailer under the Administrative
PROOF BEYOND REASONABLE Code of 1917.Considering this, petitioner believes himself
DOUBT OF CONSPIRACY BETWEEN
ACCUSED AMBIL AND HEREIN entitled to the justifying circumstance of fulfillment of duty
PETITIONER, THE LATTER SHOULD or lawful exercise of duty.
BE ACCORDED FULL CREDIT FOR
THE JUSTIFYING CIRCUMSTANCE
UNDER PARAGRAPH 6, ARTICLE 11
Petitioner Apelado, Sr., on the other hand, denies
OF THE REVISED PENAL CODE.
allegations of conspiracy between him and petitioner
III
Ambil, Jr. Petitioner Apelado, Sr. defends that he was
THE COURT A QUOS BASIS IN merely following the orders of a superior when he
CONVICTING BOTH ACCUSED AMBIL
AND HEREIN PETITIONER OF HAVING transferred the detention of Adalim. As well, he invokes
GIVEN MAYOR ADALIM
immunity from criminal liability.
UNWARRANTED BENEFITS AND
ADVANTAGE TO THE PREJUDICE x x
x OF THE GOVERNMENT IS, AT THE
MOST, SPECULATIVE.[23] For the State, the Office of the Special Prosecutor (OSP)
points out the absence of jurisprudence that restricts the

Page 128 of 168

application of Section 3(e), R.A. No. 3019 to transactions
of a pecuniary nature. The OSP explains that it is enough
to show that in performing their functions, petitioners have
accorded undue preference to Adalim for liability to attach
under the provision. Further, the OSP maintains that
Adalim is deemed a private party for purposes of applying
Section 3(e), R.A. No. 3019 because the unwarranted
benefit redounded, not to his person as a mayor, but to
his person as a detention prisoner accused of murder. It
suggests further that petitioners were motivated by bad
faith as evidenced by their refusal to turn over Adalim
despite instruction from Asst. Sec. Ingeniero. The OSP
also reiterates petitioners lack of authority to take custody
of a detention prisoner without a court order. Hence, it
concludes that petitioners are not entitled to the benefit of
any justifying circumstance.
After a careful review of this case, the Court finds the
present petitions bereft of merit.
Petitioners were charged with violation of Section 3(e) of
R.A. No. 3019 or the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices
Act which provides:
Section. 3. Corrupt practices of
public officers. - In addition to acts or
omissions of public officers already
penalized by existing law, the following
shall constitute corrupt practices of any
public officer and are hereby declared to
be unlawful:
xxxx
(e) Causing any undue injury to
any party, including the Government, or
giving any private party any unwarranted
benefits, advantage or preference in the
discharge of his official, administrative or
judicial functions through manifest
partiality, evident bad faith or gross
inexcusable negligence. This provision
shall apply to officers and employees of
offices or government corporations
charged with the grant of licenses or
permits or other concessions.
In order to hold a person liable under this provision, the
following elements must concur: (1) the accused must be
a public officer discharging administrative, judicial or
official functions; (2) he must have acted with manifest
partiality, evident bad faith or gross inexcusable
negligence; and (3) his action caused any undue injury to
any party, including the government, or gave any private
party unwarranted benefits, advantage or preference in
the discharge of his functions.[26]
As to the first element, there is no question that petitioners
are public officers discharging official functions and that
jurisdiction over them lay with the
Sandiganbayan.Jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan over
public officers charged with violation of the Anti-Graft Law
is provided under Section 4 of Presidential Decree No.
1606,[27] as amended by R.A. No. 8249.[28] The pertinent
portions of Section 4, P.D. No. 1606, as amended, read
as follows:
SEC.
4. Jurisdiction.The Sandiganbayan shall
exercise exclusive original jurisdiction in
all cases involving:
a. Violations of Republic Act No.
3019, as amended, otherwise known as
the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act,
Republic Act No. 1379, and Chapter II,
Section 2, Title VII, Book II of the Revised
Penal Code, where one or more of the
accused are officials occupying the
following positions in the government,
whether in a permanent, acting or interim
capacity, at the time of the commission of
the offense:
(1) Officials of the
executive branch occupying the
positions of regional director and
higher, otherwise classified as
Grade 27 and higher, of the
Compensation and Position
Classification Act of 1989
(Republic Act No.
6758), specifically including:
(a) Provincial
governors, vice-
Page 129 of 168
 governors, members of
the sangguniang
panlalawigan and
provincial treasurers,
assessors, engineers
and other provincial
department heads[;]
xxxx
In cases where none of the accused are
occupying positions corresponding to
Salary Grade 27 or higher, as prescribed
in the said Republic Act No. 6758, or
military and PNP officers mentioned
above, exclusive original jurisdiction
thereof shall be vested in the proper
regional trial court, metropolitan trial
court, municipal trial court, and municipal
circuit trial court, as the case may be,
pursuant to their respective jurisdiction
as provided in Batas Pambansa Blg. 129,
as amended.
xxxx
Thus, the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan over
petitioner Ambil, Jr. is beyond question. The same is true
as regards petitioner Apelado, Sr. As to him, a
[29]
Certification from the Provincial Government
Department Head of the HRMO shows that his position as
Provincial Warden is classified as Salary Grade
22. Nonetheless, it is only when none of the accused are
occupying positions corresponding to salary grade 27 or
higher shall exclusive jurisdiction be vested in the lower
courts. Here, petitioner Apelado, Sr. was charged as a co-
principal with Governor Ambil, Jr., over whose position the
Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction. Accordingly, he was
correctly tried jointly with said public officer in the proper
court which had exclusive original jurisdiction over them
the Sandiganbayan.
The second element, for its part, describes the three ways
by which a violation of Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019 may
be committed, that is, through manifest partiality, evident
bad faith or gross inexcusable negligence.
In Sison v. People,[30] we defined partiality, bad faith and
gross negligence as follows:
Partiality is synonymous with
bias which excites a disposition to see
and report matters as they are wished for
rather than as they are. Bad faith does
not simply connote bad judgment or
negligence; it imputes a dishonest
purpose or some moral obliquity and
conscious doing of a wrong; a breach of
sworn duty through some motive or intent
or ill will; it partakes of the nature of fraud.
Gross negligence has been so defined as
negligence characterized by the want of
even slight care, acting or omitting to act
in a situation where there is a duty to act,
not inadvertently but wilfully and
intentionally with a conscious
indifference to consequences in so far as
other persons may be affected. It is the
omission of that care which even
inattentive and thoughtless men never
fail to take on their own property. x x x[31]
In this case, we find that petitioners displayed manifest
partiality and evident bad faith in transferring the detention
of Mayor Adalim to petitioner Ambil, Jr.s house. There is
no merit to petitioner Ambil, Jr.s contention that he is
authorized to transfer the detention of prisoners by virtue
of his power as the Provincial Jailer of Eastern Samar.
Section 28 of the Local Government Code draws the
extent of the power of local chief executives over the units
of the Philippine National Police within their jurisdiction:
SEC. 28. Powers of Local Chief
Executives over the Units of the
Philippine National Police.The extent of
operational supervision and control of
local chief executives over the police
force, fire protection unit, and jail
management personnel assigned in their
respective jurisdictions shall be governed
by the provisions of Republic Act
Numbered Sixty-nine hundred seventy-
five (R.A. No. 6975), otherwise known
as The Department of the Interior and
Local Government Act of 1990, and the
rules and regulations issued pursuant
thereto.
Page 130 of 168
In particular, Section 61, Chapter 5 of R.A. No. 6975[32] on
the Bureau of Jail Management and Penology provides:
Sec. 61. Powers and Functions. - The
Jail Bureau shall exercise supervision
and control over all city and municipal
jails. The provincial jails shall be
supervised and controlled by the
provincial government within its
jurisdiction, whose expenses shall be
subsidized by the National Government
for not more than three (3) years after the
effectivity of this Act.
The power of control is the power of an officer to alter or
modify or set aside what a subordinate officer had done
in the performance of his duties and to substitute the
judgment of the former for that of the latter.[33] An officer
in control lays down the rules in the doing of an act. If they
are not followed, he may, in his discretion, order the act
undone or re-done by his subordinate or he may even
decide to do it himself.[34]
On the other hand, the power of supervision means
overseeing or the authority of an officer to see to it that
the subordinate officers perform their duties.[35] If the
subordinate officers fail or neglect to fulfill their duties, the
official may take such action or step as prescribed by law
to make them perform their duties. Essentially, the power
of supervision means no more than the power of ensuring
that laws are faithfully executed, or that subordinate
officers act within the law.[36] The supervisor or
superintendent merely sees to it that the rules are
followed, but he does not lay down the rules, nor does he
have discretion to modify or replace them.[37]
Significantly, it is the provincial government and not the
governor alone which has authority to exercise control
and supervision over provincial jails. In any case, neither
of said powers authorizes the doing of acts beyond the
parameters set by law. On the contrary, subordinates
must be enjoined to act within the bounds of law. In the
event that the subordinate performs an act ultra vires,
rules may be laid down on how the act should be done,
but always in conformity with the law.
In a desperate attempt to stretch the scope of his powers,
petitioner Ambil, Jr. cites Section 1731, Article III of
the Administrative Code of 1917 on Provincial jails in
support.Section 1731 provides:
SEC. 1731. Provincial governor
as keeper of jail.The governor of the
province shall be charged with the
keeping of the provincial jail, and it
shall be his duty to administer the
same in accordance with law and the
regulations prescribed for the
government of provincial prisons. The
immediate custody and supervision of
the jail may be committed to the care of a
jailer to be appointed by the provincial
governor. The position of jailer shall be
regarded as within the unclassified civil
service but may be filled in the manner in
which classified positions are filled, and if
so filled, the appointee shall be entitled to
all the benefits and privileges of classified
employees, except that he shall hold
office only during the term of office of the
appointing governor and until a
successor in the office of the jailer is
appointed and qualified, unless sooner
separated. The provincial governor
shall, under the direction of the
provincial board and at the expense of
the province, supply proper food and
clothing for the prisoners; though the
provincial board may, in its discretion, let
the contract for the feeding of the
prisoners to some other person.
(Emphasis supplied.)
This provision survived the advent of the Administrative
Code of 1987. But again, nowhere did said provision
designate the provincial governor as the provincial jailer,
or even slightly suggest that he is empowered to take
personal custody of prisoners. What is clear from the cited
provision is that the provincial governors duty as a jail
keeper is confined to the administration of the jail and the
procurement of food and clothing for the prisoners. After
Page 131 of 168

all, administrative acts pertain only to those acts which are
necessary to be done to carry out legislative policies and
purposes already declared by the legislative body or such
as are devolved upon it[38] by the Constitution. Therefore,
in the exercise of his administrative powers, the governor
can only enforce the law but not supplant it.
Besides, the only reference to a transfer of prisoners in
said article is found in Section 1737[39] under which
prisoners may be turned over to the jail of the neighboring
province in case the provincial jail be insecure or
insufficient to accommodate all provincial
prisoners. However, this provision has been superseded
by Section 3, Rule 114 of the RevisedRules of Criminal
Procedure, as amended. Section 3, Rule 114 provides:
SEC. 3. No release or transfer
except on court order or bail.-No person
under detention by legal process shall be
released or transferred except upon
order of the court or when he is admitted
to bail.
Indubitably, the power to order the release or transfer of a
person under detention by legal process is vested in the
court, not in the provincial government, much less the
governor.This was amply clarified by Asst. Sec. Ingeniero
in his communication[40] dated October 6, 1998
addressed to petitioner Ambil, Jr. Asst. Sec. Ingeniero
wrote:
06 October 1996
GOVERNOR RUPERTO AMBIL
Provincial Capitol
Borongan, Eastern Samar
Dear Sir:
This has reference to the letter of Atty.
Edwin B. Docena, and the reports
earlier received by this Department,
relative to your alleged action in taking
into custody Mayor Francisco Aising
Adalim of Taft, that province, who has
been previously arrested by virtue by a
warrant of arrest issued in Criminal Case
No. 10963.
If the report is true, it appears that your
actuation is not in accord with the
provision of Section 3, Rule 113 of the
Rules of Court, which mandates that an
arrested person be delivered to the
nearest police station or jail.
Moreover, invoking Section 61 of RA
6975 as legal basis in taking custody of
the accused municipal mayor is
misplaced. Said section merely speaks of
the power of supervision vested unto the
provincial governor over provincial jails. It
does not, definitely, include the power to
take in custody any person in detention.
In view of the foregoing, you are hereby
enjoined to conduct yourself within the
bounds of law and to immediately deliver
Mayor Adalim to the provincial jail in order
to avoid legal complications.
Please be guided accordingly.
Very truly yours,
(SGD.)
JESUS I. INGENIERO
Assistant Secretary
Still, petitioner Ambil, Jr. insisted on his supposed
authority as a provincial jailer. Said petitioners usurpation
of the court's authority, not to mention his open and willful
defiance to official advice in order to accommodate a
former political party mate,[41] betray his unmistakable
bias and the evident bad faith that attended his actions.
Likewise amply established beyond reasonable doubt is
the third element of the crime. As mentioned above, in
order to hold a person liable for violation of Section 3(e),
R.A. No. 3019, it is required that the act constituting the
offense consist of either (1) causing undue injury to any
party, including the government, or (2) giving any private
party any unwarranted benefits, advantage or preference
in the discharge by the accused of his official,
administrative or judicial functions.
Page 132 of 168
 In the case at hand, the Information specifically
accused petitioners of giving unwarranted benefits and
advantage to Mayor Adalim, a public officer charged with
murder, by causing his release from prison and detaining
him instead at the house of petitioner Ambil, Jr. Petitioner
Ambil, Jr. negates the applicability of Section 3(e), R.A.
No. 3019 in this case on two points. First, Section 3(e) is
not applicable to him allegedly because the last sentence
thereof provides that the provision shall apply to officers
and employees of offices or government corporations
charged with the grant of licenses, permits or other
concessions and he is not such government officer or
employee. Second, the purported unwarranted benefit
was accorded not to a private party but to a public officer.
However, as regards his first contention, it appears that
petitioner Ambil, Jr. has obviously lost sight, if he is not
altogether unaware, of our ruling in Mejorada v.
Sandiganbayan[42] where we held that a prosecution for
violation of Section 3(e) of the Anti-Graft Law will lie
regardless of whether or not the accused public officer is
charged with the grant of licenses or permits or other
concessions. Following is an excerpt of what we said
in Mejorada,
Section 3 cited above enumerates in
eleven subsections the corrupt practices
of any public officers (sic) declared
unlawful. Its reference to any public
officer is without distinction or
qualification and it specifies the acts
declared unlawful. We agree with the
view adopted by the Solicitor General
that the last sentence of paragraph
[Section 3] (e) is intended to make clear
the inclusion of officers and employees of
officers (sic) or government corporations
which, under the ordinary concept of
public officers may not come within the
term. It is a strained construction of the
provision to read it as applying
exclusively to public officers charged with
the duty of granting licenses or permits or
other concessions.[43] (Italics supplied.)
In the more recent case of Cruz v.
Sandiganbayan,[44] we affirmed that a prosecution for
violation of said provision will lie regardless of whether the
accused public officer is charged with the grant of licenses
or permits or other concessions.[45]
Meanwhile, regarding petitioner Ambil, Jr.s second
contention, Section 2(b) of R.A. No. 3019 defines a public
officer to include elective and appointive officials and
employees, permanent or temporary, whether in the
classified or unclassified or exemption service receiving
compensation, even nominal from the
government. Evidently, Mayor Adalim is one. But
considering that Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019 punishes
the giving by a public officer of unwarranted benefits to a
private party, does the fact that Mayor Adalim was the
recipient of such benefits take petitioners case beyond the
ambit of said law?
We believe not.
In drafting the Anti-Graft Law, the lawmakers opted to use
private party rather than private person to describe the
recipient of the unwarranted benefits, advantage or
preference for a reason. The term party is a technical
word having a precise meaning in legal parlance[46] as
distinguished from person which, in general usage, refers
to a human being.[47]Thus, a private person simply
pertains to one who is not a public officer. While a private
party is more comprehensive in scope to mean either a
private person or a public officer acting in a private
capacity to protect his personal interest.
In the present case, when petitioners transferred Mayor
Adalim from the provincial jail and detained him at
petitioner Ambil, Jr.s residence, they accorded such
privilege to Adalim, not in his official capacity as a mayor,
but as a detainee charged with murder. Thus, for
Page 133 of 168
purposes of applying the provisions of Section 3(e), R.A.
No. 3019, Adalim was a private party.
Moreover, in order to be found guilty under the second
mode, it suffices that the accused has given unjustified
favor or benefit to another in the exercise of his official,
administrative or judicial functions.[48] The word
unwarranted means lacking adequate or official support;
unjustified; unauthorized or without justification or
adequate reason.Advantage means a more favorable or
improved position or condition; benefit, profit or gain of
any kind; benefit from some course of action. Preference
signifies priority or higher evaluation or desirability; choice
or estimation above another.[49]
Without a court order, petitioners transferred Adalim and
detained him in a place other than the provincial jail. The
latter was housed in much more comfortable quarters,
provided better nourishment, was free to move about the
house and watch television. Petitioners readily extended
these benefits to Adalim on the mere representation of his
lawyers that the mayors life would be put in danger inside
the provincial jail.
As the Sandiganbayan ruled, however, petitioners were
unable to establish the existence of any risk on Adalims
safety. To be sure, the latter would not be alone in having
unfriendly company in lockup. Yet, even if we treat
Akyatans gesture of raising a closed fist at Adalim as a
threat of aggression, the same would still not constitute a
special and compelling reason to warrant Adalims
detention outside the provincial jail. For one, there were
nipa huts within the perimeter fence of the jail which could
have been used to separate Adalim from the rest of the
prisoners while the isolation cell was undergoing
repair. Anyhow, such repair could not have exceeded the
85 days that Adalim stayed in petitioner Ambil, Jr.s
house. More importantly, even if Adalim could have
proven the presence of an imminent peril on his person to
petitioners, a court order was still indispensable for his
transfer.
The foregoing, indeed, negates the application of the
justifying circumstances claimed by petitioners.
Specifically, petitioner Ambil, Jr. invokes the justifying
circumstance of fulfillment of duty or lawful exercise of
right or office. Under paragraph 5, Article 11 of the RPC,
any person who acts in the fulfillment of a duty or in the
lawful exercise of a right or office does not incur any
criminal liability. In order for this justifying circumstance to
apply, two requisites must be satisfied: (1) the accused
acted in the performance of a duty or in the lawful exercise
of a right or office; and (2) the injury caused or the offense
committed be the necessary consequence of
the due performance of duty or the lawful exercise of such
right or office.[50] Both requisites are lacking in petitioner
Ambil, Jr.s case.
As we have earlier determined, petitioner Ambil, Jr.
exceeded his authority when he ordered the transfer and
detention of Adalim at his house. Needless to state, the
resulting violation of the Anti-Graft Law did not proceed
from the due performance of his duty or lawful exercise of
his office.
In like manner, petitioner Apelado, Sr. invokes the
justifying circumstance of obedience to an order issued
for some lawful purpose. Under paragraph 6, Article 11 of
the RPC, any person who acts in obedience to an order
issued by a superior for some lawful purpose does not
incur any criminal liability. For this justifying circumstance
to apply, the following requisites must be present: (1) an
order has been issued by a superior; (2) such order must
be for some lawful purpose; and (3) the means used by
Page 134 of 168
the subordinate to carry out said order is lawful.[51] Only
the first requisite is present in this case.
While the order for Adalims transfer emanated from
petitioner Ambil, Jr., who was then Governor, neither said
order nor the means employed by petitioner Apelado, Sr.
to carry it out was lawful. In his capacity as the Provincial
Jail Warden of Eastern Samar, petitioner Apelado, Sr.
fetched Mayor Adalim at the provincial jail and, unarmed
with a court order, transported him to the house of
petitioner Ambil, Jr. This makes him liable as a principal
by direct participation under Article 17(1)[52] of the RPC.
An accepted badge of conspiracy is when the accused by
their acts aimed at the same object, one performing one
part of and another performing another so as to complete
it with a view to the attainment of the same object, and
their acts although apparently independent were in fact
concerted and cooperative, indicating closeness of
personal association, concerted action and concurrence
of sentiments.[53]
Conspiracy was sufficiently demonstrated by petitioner
Apelado, Sr.s willful cooperation in executing petitioner
Ambil, Jr.s order to move Adalim from jail, despite the
absence of a court order. Petitioner Apelado, Sr., a law
graduate, cannot hide behind the cloak of ignorance of the
law. The Rule requiring a court order to transfer a person
under detention by legal process is elementary. Truth be
told, even petitioner governor who is unschooled in the
intricacies of the law expressed reservations on his power
to transfer Adalim. All said, the concerted acts of
petitioners Ambil, Jr. and Apelado, Sr. resulting in the
violation charged, makes them equally responsible as
conspirators.
As regards the penalty imposed upon petitioners, Section
9(a) of R.A. No. 3019 punishes a public officer or a private
person who violates Section 3 of R.A. No. 3019 with
imprisonment for not less than six (6) years and one (1)
month to not more than fifteen (15) years and perpetual
disqualification from public office. Under Section 1 of
the Indeterminate Sentence Law or Act No. 4103, as
amended by Act No. 4225, if the offense is punished by a
special law, the court shall sentence the accused to an
indeterminate sentence, the maximum term of which shall
not exceed the maximum fixed by said law and the
minimum shall not be less than the minimum term
prescribed by the same.
Thus, the penalty imposed by the Sandiganbayan upon
petitioner Ambil, Jr. of imprisonment for nine (9) years,
eight (8) months and one (1) day to twelve (12) years and
four (4) months is in accord with law. As a co-principal
without the benefit of an incomplete justifying
circumstance to his credit, petitioner Apelado, Sr. shall
suffer the same penalty.
WHEREFORE, the consolidated petitions are DENIED. The
Decision of the Sandiganbayan in Criminal Case No. 25892
is AFFIRMED WITH MODIFICATION. We find
petitioners Ruperto A. Ambil, Jr. and Alexandrino R.
Apelado, Sr. guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violating
Section 3(e), R.A. No. 3019. Petitioner Alexandrino R.
Apelado, Sr. is, likewise, sentenced to an indeterminate
penalty of imprisonment for nine (9) years, eight (8) months
and one (1) day to twelve (12) years and four (4) months.
With costs against the petitioners.
SO ORDERED.
Page 135 of 168
 THIRD DIVISION
discretion on the part of the Judge Wilhelmina
Wagan (public respondent) of the Regional Trial Court,
P/CHIEF INSPECTOR FERNANDO G.R. No. 175091
Branch 111, Pasay City (RTC), in issuing the Orders
BILLEDO,
dated: (1) May 8, 2006;[1] (2) July 12,
SPO3 RODRIGO DOMINGO, PO3 JORGE
Present: 2006,[2] and (3) August 26, 2006,[3] in Civil Case No. 00-
LOPEZ, FERDINAND CRUZ,
0089, entitled Nilo Jay Mina, et al. v. Mariano Cruz, et al.
and MARIANO CRUZ,
for damages. The assailed orders denied the Motion to
Petitioners, CARPIO,* J.
Dismiss filed by one of the petitioners, Ferdinand Cruz.
VELASCO, JR., Chairperson,

ABAD,
The Facts:
- versus - MENDOZA, and

SERENO,* * JJ.
The case stemmed from the arrest of
complainants Alberto Mina, Nilo Jay Mina and Ferdinand
WILHELMINA WAGAN, Presiding Judge
Caasi on February 27, 2000 along an alley, Interior
of the
332, Edang Street, PasayCity, by petitioners-police
Regional Trial Court
officers. They were reported to have been caught in
of Branch III, Pasay City, Promulgated:flagrante delicto drinking liquor in a public place. The
Public Respondent. complainants alleged that their arrest was unlawful and
July 13, 2011was only upon the inducement and unjustifiable
ALBERTO MINA, NILO JAY MINA AND accusation of Ferdinand Cruz and Mariano Cruz (the
FERDINAND CAASI,
Cruzes).[4] Thereafter, they were charged before
Private Respondents. the Metropolitan Trial Court of Pasay City (MeTC) with a
violation of City Ordinance No. 265 (Drinking Liquor in
Public Places), which was docketed as Criminal Case No.

X ------------------------------------------------------------------------ 00-621.
----------- X

On March 20, 2000, after the said incident, the

DECISION
complainants filed Civil Case No. 00-0089 against the
petitioners for damages.
MENDOZA, J.:
Subsequently, criminal complaints were also filed
against the petitioners before the City Prosecution

At bench is a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 Office (CPO) and the Office of the

as petitioners Police Chief Inspector (PCI) Fernando Ombudsman (Ombudsman) for Unlawful Arrest and

Billedo, Senior Police Officer 3 (SPO3) Rodrigo Domingo, Violation of R.A. No. 7438 (Act Defining Rights of Person

Police Officer 3 (PO3) Jorge Lopez, Ferdinand Cruz, and Under Custodial Investigation). The CPO dismissed the

Mariano Cruz (petitioners), allege grave abuse of case for lack of merit while the Ombudsman, in its Joint

Page 136 of 168

Resolution dated October 13, 2000,[5] dismissed both and circumstances surrounding their arrest were
complaints for lack of probable cause, but recommended
clearly spelled out in the Affidavit of Arrest of the police
the filing of 3 corresponding criminal informations for
officers. While it may be argued that the Cruzes may
Violation of Section 3(e), R.A. No. 3019. Thus:
have been biased, there appeared to be a semblance

of truth to their report when private respondents were

WHEREFORE, premises
considered, it is hereby recommended arrested by the police officers. Besides, the
that an Information of VIOLATION OF subsequent filing of the corresponding information
R.A. 3019, SEC. 3 (e), for three (3)
counts be FILED in court after the inquest investigation for a violation of a city
against SPO3 RODRIGO
DOMINGO, PO3 JORGE ordinance, is per se an imprimatur of the legality of
LOPEZ, MARIANO
their arrest.
CRUZ and FERDINAND CRUZ. While
the other respondents, P/CINSP.
FERNANDO BILLEDO and SPOI
DANIEL OCAMPO be ABSOLVED from On August 29, 2001, the Ombudsman recommended
any criminal liability for lack of sufficient
the approval of the CPO Resolution. Specifically, the
evidence. Further, there being an
administrative case filed before Review and Recommendation[7] of the Ombudsman
the PLEB-Pasay Cityagainst police
respondents, let the said forum continue reads:
its proceedings, and that the same be
considered CLOSED and TERMINATE After giving a careful look at the
D, insofar as this Office is concerned. records of the case and the facts and
incidents that transpired, the
undersigned Ombudsman Prosecutor
agrees with prosecutor Vibandor that
SO RESOLVED.
there is doubtful merit of the offenses
filed for Violation of Section 3 (e), RA
3019 against the accused. It appears that
the arresting policemen have in fact filed
a case for Violation of Ordinance against
After the criminal informations for Violation of the three (3) complainants which was
R.A. No. 3019 were filed, the cases were remanded to the indorsed for Inquest Investigation and
later filed in court. This shows that there
CPO for the conduct of the new preliminary investigation was substantial basis, of their
on motion of the accused. performance of official duty, for
otherwise, it would not have passed the
inquest. Hence, the presence of manifest
partiality or evident bad faith is gravely
On July 27, 2001, the CPO recommended questionable to warrant filing of Violation
of Section 3(e), RA 3019.
the dismissal of the cases for lack of
PREMISES CONSIDERED,
merit.[6] Pertinently, 2nd Assistant City Prosecutor undersigned respectfully recommends
Joselito Vibandor explained that there was no fault on for the APPROVAL of the instant
Resolution of Atty. Vibandor and
the part of the Cruzes when they reported a group of the RECALL of the Informations filed
with the Pasay City Regional Trial Court.
individuals drinking along an alley which prompted the

police officers to respond to a call of duty. The facts

Page 137 of 168
 Meanwhile, the complainants were found
guilty by the MeTC for Violation of City Ordinance No.
265.[8] Their conviction was affirmed by the RTC,
Branch 114, PasayCity.[9] Complainants Motion for
Reconsideration was denied.[10]
Civil Case No. 00-0089, on the other hand,
proceeded with the trial with the complainants
presenting their first witness. Before cross-
examination, Ferdinand A. Cruz, one of the petitioners,
filed his Motion to Dismiss,[11] alleging therein that it is
the Sandiganbayan which has jurisdiction over the civil
case and not the RTC; and that conformably to Section
4 of R.A. No. 8249,[12] the complainants are barred
from filing a separate and independent civil action.
Public respondent denied the motion to
dismiss in her assailed May 8, 2006 Order stating,
among others, that under Article 269 of the Revised
Penal Code, the crime of unlawful arrest is punishable
by arresto mayor and a fine not exceeding 500 pesos
which, under R.A. No. 7691, falls within the jurisdiction
of appropriate Metropolitan Trial Court or Municipal
Trial Court, as the case may be, contrary to the
movants claim that it was the Sandiganbayan which
has jurisdiction over the ancillary action for damages.
Public respondent further explained that had
there been a criminal case for unlawful arrest filed
before the MeTC, the civil case for damages should
have been transferred to it, but, there was none. She
also stated that the movant failed to attach certified
copies of resolutions/orders dismissing the complaint
for unlawful arrest. Thus, she could not simply rely on
bare assertions or conjectures but must resolve the
issues raised based on competent proof.
Petitioner Ferdinand Cruz then filed a motion
for reconsideration[13] but it was denied in the
assailed July 12, 2006 Order.[14] Public respondent
wrote that the situation was not within the purview of
Section 4 of R.A. No. 8249. The provision suggests of
two (2) situations. First, a criminal action has been
instituted before the Sandiganbayan or the appropriate
courts after the requisite preliminary investigation, and
the corresponding civil liability must be simultaneously
instituted with it. Second, the civil case, filed ahead of
the criminal case, is still pending upon the filing of the
criminal action, in which case, the civil case should be
transferred to the court trying the criminal case for
consolidation and joint determination.
Considering the circumstances surrounding
the case, the public respondent opined that the case
did not fall in any of the two cited situations. Thus, she
wrote:
By reason of the dismissal of the
criminal complaint for unlawful arrest
during the preliminary investigation
stage, there was no criminal action for
unlawful arrest, from which the instant
civil case was based, that was ultimately
filed with
the Metropolitan Trial Court of Pasay Cit
y, the appropriate court to hear and try
such offense under R.A.
8249. Consequently, there is no
appropriate court to which the instant
case should be transferred as mandated
under Section 4 of R.A. 8294. There
should not have been any problem had
the criminal case for unlawful arrest
prospered or reached the appropriate
court as ratiocinated by this Court in its
Order dated May 8, 2006. But there was
none.
Page 138 of 168

xxxx
Well-settled in our jurisprudence
is the rule that a cause of action for
damages arising from the acts or
omission complained of as an offense is
different and distinct from the prosecution
of the offense itself. Extinction of the
penal action does not carry with it the
extinction of the civil action, unless the
extinction proceeds from a declaration in
a final judgment that the fact from which
the civil liability might arise did not
exist. Besides, it is elementary that an
accused may be civilly liable even if
acquitted of the crime charged.[15]
A Second Motion for Reconsideration[16] was
filed but it was also denied by public respondent in her
questioned August 26, 2006 Order.[17]
Aggrieved, petitioners come before this
Court. While they admit that they are aware of the
principle of the hierarchy of the courts, they opted to
directly appeal before this Court considering that the
issue to be resolved entails an interpretation of Section
4, R.A. No. 8249, otherwise known as the
Sandiganbayan Act, which provides:
Section 4. Section 4 of the same
decree is hereby further amended to read
as follows:
xxx
In case private individuals are
charged as co-principal, accomplices or
accessories with the public officers or
employees, including those employed in
government-owned or controlled
corporations, they shall be tried jointly
with said public officers and employees in
the proper courts which shall exercise
jurisdiction over them.
Any provisions of law or Rules of
Court to the contrary notwithstanding, the
criminal action and the corresponding
civil action for the recovery of civil liability
shall at all times be simultaneously
instituted with and jointly determined in,
the same proceeding by the
Sandiganbayan or the appropriate
courts, the filing of the criminal action
being deemed to necessarily carry with it
the filing of the civil action, and no right to
reserve the filing of such civil action
separately from the criminal action shall
be recognized: Provided, however, that
where the civil action had heretofore
been filed separately but judgment
therein has not yet been rendered, and
the criminal case is hereafter filed with
the Sandiganbayan or the appropriate
court, said civil action shall be transferred
to the Sandiganbayan or the appropriate
court, as the case may be, for
consolidation and joint determination with
the criminal action, otherwise, the
separate civil action shall be deemed
abandoned. [Emphasis Supplied]
In this petition, the petitioners presented this
lone
ISSUE
WHETHER OR NOT THE
REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OR
ANY OTHER COURTS HAS
THE JURISDICTION TO TRY
CIVIL CASE NO. 00-0089
GIVEN THE MANDATORY
SIMULTANEOUS
INSTITUTION AND JOINT
DETERMINATION OF A CIVIL
LIABILITY WITH THE
CRIMINAL ACTION AND THE
EXPRESS PROHIBITION TO
FILE THE SAID CIVIL ACTION
SEPARATELY FROM THE
Page 139 of 168
 CRIMINAL ACTION AS
PROVIDED FOR UNDER petitioners were dismissed at the preliminary stage. A
SECTION 4 OF REPUBLIC ACT
reading of the latter part of Section 4 of R.A. No. 8294
8249?[18]
suggests that the civil case will only be considered

After a careful review of the records, the Court finds no abandoned if there is a pending criminal case and the

commission of a grave abuse of discretion which can civil case was not transferred to the court trying the

be attributed to the public respondent in issuing the criminal case for joint determination.

challenged Orders dated May 8, 2006, July 12,

2006 and August 26, 2006. The criminal charges against petitioners might have

been dismissed at the preliminary stage for lack of

As correctly pointed out by the public respondent, the probable cause, but it does not mean that the civil case

subject civil case does not fall within the purview of instituted prior to the filing of the criminal complaints is

Section 4 of R.A. No. 8249 as the latter part of this already baseless as the complainants can prove their

provision contemplates only two (2) situations. These cause of action in the civil case by mere

were correctly pointed out by the public respondent as preponderance of evidence.

follows: First, a criminal action has been instituted

before the Sandiganbayan or the appropriate courts While the dismissal of the criminal cases

after the requisite preliminary investigation, and the against them for Violation of R.A. No. 7438 (Acts

corresponding civil liability must be simultaneously Defining Rights of Persons Under Custodial

instituted with it; and Second, the civil case, filed Investigation) and unlawful arrest and the conviction of

ahead of the criminal case, is still pending upon the the complainants for Violation of City Ordinance No.

filing of the criminal action, in which case, the civil case 265 (Drinking Liquor in Public Place),[19] might be

should be transferred to the court trying the criminal factors that can be considered in their favor, the

case for consolidation and joint determination. petitioners should have proceeded with the trial of the

civil case pending before the public respondent

Evidently, Section 4 of R.A. No. 8249 finds no instead of filing this petition.

application in this case. No criminal action has been

The rule is that an order denying a motion
filed before the Sandiganbayan or any appropriate
to dismiss is merely interlocutory and, therefore, not
court. Thus, there is no appropriate court to which the
appealable,[20] even on pure questions of
subject civil case can be transferred or consolidated as
law.[21] Neither can it be subject of a petition for review
mandated by the said provision.
on certiorari. Such order may only be reviewed in the

ordinary course of law by an appeal from the judgment

It is also illogical to consider the civil case as
after trial. The rule is founded on considerations of
abandoned simply because the criminal cases against
Page 140 of 168
orderly procedure, to forestall useless appeals and

avoid undue inconvenience to the appealing party by

having to assail orders as they are promulgated by the

court, when all such orders may be contested in a

single appeal.[22]

All told, the Court finds that the public

respondent committed no grave abuse of discretion

amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in issuing

the assailed orders.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED.

SO ORDERED.

Page 141 of 168

 Republic of the Philippines
Supreme Court Court (RTC), Branch 42, Virac, Catanduanes, the
Manila
accusatory portion of which reads:

THIRD DIVISION That on or about the 27th day of

April 1994, or sometime subsequent
thereto, in the Municipality of Virac,
JESUS TORRES, G.R. No. 175074Catanduanes, Philippines and within the
Petitioner, Present: jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the
VELASCO, JR., above-named
J., Chairperson,accused, a public officer,
PERALTA, being then the Principal of Viga Rural
ABAD, Development High School, Viga,
MENDOZA, and Catanduanes, and as such by reason of
- versus - SERENO,* JJ. his office and duties is responsible and
Promulgated: accountable for public funds entrusted to
and received by him, to wit: PNB Checks
August 31, 2011 (sic) Nos. C-983182-Q for P42,033.32;
C-983183-Q for P95,680.89; C-983184-
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Q for P58,940.33, all dated April 26, 1994
Respondent. in the total amount of ONE HUNDRED
NINETY-SIX THOUSAND SIX
HUNDRED FIFTY-FOUR PESOS and
FIFTY-FOUR CENSTAVOS
(P196,654.54), Philippine Currency,
representing salaries, salary differentials,
x---------------------------------------- additional compensation allowance and
- - - - - - - - - - -x Personal Emergency Relief Allowance
from January to March 1994 of the
employees of the said school, taking
DECISION advantage of his position and committing
the offense in relation to his office,
encashed said checks with the Philippine
National Bank, Virac, Catanduanes
PERALTA, J.: Branch and once in possession of the
money, did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously and with grave
abuse of confidence, misapply,
This is a petition for review on certiorari seeking misappropriate, embezzle and convert to
his personal use and benefit the
to reverse and set aside the aforementioned amount of money, to the
[1] damage and prejudice of the
Resolution dated September 6, 2006 and Resolution
Government.
dated October 17, 2006[2] of the Court of Appeals (CA) in
Contrary to law.
CA-G.R. CR No. 29694.

The factual and procedural antecedents are as

Upon his arraignment, petitioner pleaded not
follows:
guilty to the crime charged. Consequently, trial on the

merits ensued.
In an Information[3] dated November 15, 1994,

petitioner Jesus U. Torres was charged with the crime of

Evidence for the Prosecution
Malversation of Public Funds before the Regional Trial
[Petitioner] Jesus Torres y Uchi
was the principal of Viga Rural
Development High School (VRDHS). On
Page 142 of 168
 April 26, 1994, he directed Edmundo
Lazado, the schools collection and
disbursing officer, to prepare the checks
representing the teachers and
employees salaries, salary differentials,
additional compensation allowance
(ACA) and personal emergency relief
allowance (PERA) for the months of
January to March, 1994. Lazado
prepared three (3) checks in the total
amount of P196,654.54, all dated April
26, 1994, viz: PNB Check Nos. C-
983182-Q for P42,033.32; C-983183-Q
for P95,680.89; C-983184-Q
for P58,940.33 (Exhs. A, B and C). The
[petitioner] and Amador Borre, Head
Teacher III, signed the three (3) checks
(TSN, Aug. 30, 2001, pp. 4-8).
Upon the instruction of the
[petitioner], Lazado endorsed the checks
and handed them to the accused. It was
the custom in the school for Lazado to
endorse the checks representing the
teachers salaries and for the accused to
encash them at PNB, Virac Branch and
deliver the cash to Lazado for distribution
to the teachers (Id., pp. 12-17).
The following day, April 27,
1994, the accused encashed the three
(3) checks at PNB, Virac Branch but he
never returned to the school to deliver the
money to Lazado (Id., pp. 8-9).[4]
Evidence for the Defense
The [petitioner] admitted that he
encashed the subject checks at PNB,
Virac Branch in the morning of April 27,
1994 but instead of going back to the
school, he proceeded to the airport and
availed of the flight to Manila to seek
medical attention for his chest pain. Two
(2) days after, around 4:30 oclock in the
morning of April 29, 1994, while he and
his nephew were on the road waiting for
a ride, three (3) armed men held them up
and took his bag containing his personal
effects and the proceeds of the subject
checks. He reported the incident to the
police authorities, but he failed to recover
the money (TSN, Nov. 12, 2002, pp. 11-
25).[5]
On August 31, 2005, after finding that the
prosecution has established all the elements of the
offense charged, the RTC rendered a
Decision[6] convicting petitioner of the crime of
Malversation of Public Funds, the decretal portion of
which reads:
WHEREFORE, the Court finds
the accused Jesus Torres y Uchi GUILTY
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of
malversation of public funds as defined
and penalized under Article 217 of the
Revised Penal Code, and hereby
sentences him to suffer the indeterminate
penalty of imprisonment ranging from 12
years and 1 day of reclusion temporal, as
minimum, and to 18 years, 8 months and
1 day of reclusion temporal, as
maximum; to suffer the penalty of
perpetual special disqualification; and to
pay the fine of P196,654.54 with
subsidiary imprisonment in case of
insolvency.
SO ORDERED.[7]
On September 8, 2005, petitioner filed his Notice
of Appeal,[8] where it was indicated that he was seeking
recourse and appealing the decision of the RTC before
the Court of Appeals.
On February 10, 2006, petitioner filed a
Manifestation and Motion[9] acknowledging that he filed
the appeal before the wrong tribunal. Petitioner eventually
prayed, among other things, that the case be referred to
the Sandiganbayan for appropriate action.
In its Comment[10] filed on June 29, 2006, the
Office of the Solicitor General prayed that the appeal be
Page 143 of 168
dismissed outright, since transmittal to the proper court,

in cases of erroneous modes of appeal, are proscribed. Paragraph 3, Section 4 (c) of Republic Act No.

8249 (RA 8249),[15] which defined the jurisdiction of the

On September 6, 2006, the CA issued a Sandiganbayan, provides:

Resolution dismissing the appeal, the dispositive portion

The Sandiganbayan shall
of which reads: exercise exclusive appellate
jurisdiction over final judgments,
resolutions or orders of the regional trial
WHEREFORE, pursuant to the courts whether in the exercise of their
provisions of Section 2, Rule 50 of own original jurisdiction or of their
the Rules and Section 4 of SC Circular No. appellate jurisdiction as herein
2-90, the instant appeal hereby is provided.[16]
DISMISSED OUTRIGHT for lack of
jurisdiction.

SO ORDERED.[11] Hence, upon his conviction, petitioners remedy

should have been an appeal to the

Petitioner filed a Motion for Sandiganbayan. There is nothing in said paragraph which

Reconsideration,[12] but was denied in the can conceivably justify the filing of petitioners appeal

Resolution[13] dated October 17, 2006. before the Court of Appeals instead of the

Sandiganbayan. Clearly, the Court of Appeals is bereft of

Hence, the petition raising the sole error: any jurisdiction to review the judgment petitioner seeks to

appeal.[17]
WHETHER THE HONORABLE COURT
OF APPEALS ERRED IN DISMISSING
THE PETITIONERS APPEAL
It must be emphasized, however, that the
OUTRIGHT INSTEAD OF CERTIFYING
THE CASE TO THE PROPER designation of the wrong court does not necessarily affect
COURT.[14]
the validity of the notice of appeal. However, the
Petitioner maintains that he inadvertently filed the
designation of the proper court should be made within the
notice of appeal before the Court of Appeals instead of
15-day period to appeal. Once made within the said
the Sandiganbayan. Petitioner implores that the Court
period, the designation of the correct appellate court may
exercise its sound discretion and prerogative to relax
be allowed even if the records of the case are forwarded
compliance to sound procedural rules and to decide the
to the Court of Appeals. Otherwise, Section 2, Rule 50 of
case on the merits, considering that from the beginning,
the Rules of Court would apply,[18] the relevant portion of
he has been candid and straightforward about the fact that
which states:
the case was wrongfully filed with the Court of Appeals
Sec. 2. Dismissal of improper
instead of the Sandiganbayan.
appeal to the Court of Appeals. x x x

An appeal erroneously taken

The petition is without merit. to the Court of Appeals shall not be
Page 144 of 168
 transferred to the appropriate court,
but shall be dismissed outright.[19]
In the case at bar, petitioner sought correction of
the error in filing the appeal way beyond the expiration of
the period to appeal the decision. The RTC promulgated
its Decision on August 31, 2005. Petitioner filed his Notice
of Appeal on September 8, 2005. Petitioner tried to
correct the error only on February 10, 2006 when he filed
his Manifestation and Motion. Clearly, this is beyond the
15-day period to appeal from the decision of the trial
court. Therefore, the CA did not commit any reversible
error when it dismissed petitioners appeal for lack of
jurisdiction.
Besides, even if we look into the merits of his
arguments, the case is doomed to fail. Contrary to
petitioners argument, We find that he is an accountable
officer within the contemplation of Article 217[20] of the
Revised Penal Code, hence, is untenable.
An accountable public officer, within the purview
of Article 217 of the Revised Penal Code, is one who has
custody or control of public funds or property by reason of
the duties of his office.[21] The nature of the duties of the
public officer or employee, the fact that as part of his
duties he received public money for which he is bound to
account and failed to account for it, is the factor which
determines whether or not malversation is committed by
the accused public officer or employee. Hence, a school
principal of a public high school, such as petitioner, may
be held guilty of malversation if he or she is entrusted with
public funds and misappropriates the same.
Petitioner also posits that he could not be
convicted under the allegations in the Information without
violating his constitutional right to be informed of the
accusations against him. He maintains that the
Information clearly charged him with intentional
malversation and not malversation through negligence,
which was the actual nature of malversation for which he
was convicted by the trial court. This too lacks merit.
Malversation may be committed either through a
positive act of misappropriation of public funds or
property, or passively through negligence.[22] To sustain a
charge of malversation, there must either be criminal
intent or criminal negligence, and while the prevailing
facts of a case may not show that deceit attended the
commission of the offense, it will not preclude the
reception of evidence to prove the existence of
negligence because both are equally punishable under
Article 217 of the Revised Penal Code.[23]
More in point, the felony involves breach of public
trust, and whether it is committed through deceit or
negligence, the law makes it punishable and prescribes a
uniform penalty therefor. Even when the Information
charges willful malversation, conviction for malversation
through negligence may still be adjudged if the evidence
ultimately proves the mode of commission of the
offense.[24] Explicitly stated
x x x [E]ven on the putative assumption
that the evidence against petitioner
yielded a case of malversation by
negligence, but the information was for
intentional malversation, under the
circumstances of this case, his conviction
under the first mode of misappropriation
Page 145 of 168
 would still be in order. Malversation is
committed either intentionally or by
negligence. The dolo or
the culpa present in the offense is only a
modality in the perpetration of the
felony. Even if the mode charged differs
from mode proved, the same offense of
malversation is involved and conviction
thereof is proper. x x x[25]

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition

is DENIED. The Resolutions dated September 6,

2006 and October 17, 2006 of the Court of Appeals in CA-

G.R. CR No. 29694 are AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.

Page 146 of 168

 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. Nos. 166948-59 August 29, 2012
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner,
vs.
MEINRADO ENRIQUE A. BELLO, MANUEL S. SA
TUITO, **** MINVILUZ S. CAMINA, JOELITA
TRABUCO, ABEL,IO JUANEZA, ROSALINDA D.
TROPEL, FELIPE Y. VILLAROSA, RAUL APOSAGA,
HERMIE BARBASA and ROSARIO BARBASA-
PERLAS, Respondents.
DECISION
ABAD, J.:
This case is about the Sandiganbayan's criminal
jurisdiction over graft charges filed against the Legal
Department Head of the Armed Forces of the
Philippines-Retirement and Separation Benefit System
(AFP-RSBS) and his co-accused.
The Facts and the Case
In 1998 the Senate Blue Ribbon Committee (the
Committee) inquired into alleged anomalies at the AFP-
RSBS. After investigation, the Committee found that
when acquiring lands, the AFP-RSBS would execute two
sets of deeds of sale: one, an unnotarized bilateral deed
of sale that showed a higher price and the other, a
unilateral deed of sale that showed a discounted
purchase price. The first would be kept by the AFP-
RSBS Legal Department while the second would be held
by the vendors. The latter would then use these
unilateral deeds of sale in securing titles in the name of
AFP-RSBS. This was done, according to the Committee,
to enable the AFP-RSBS to draw more money from its
funds and to enable the vendors to pay lesser taxes.
The Committee recommended to the Ombudsman
(OMB) the prosecution of General Jose Ramiscal, Jr.
(Ret.), former AFP-RSBS president, who signed the
unregistered deeds of sale covering acquisitions of lands
in General Santos, Tanauan, Calamba, and Iloilo for
falsification of public documents or violation of Article
172, paragraph 1, in relation to Article 171, paragraphs 4
to 6 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC), and violation of
Republic Act (R.A.) 3019,1 Sections 3(e) and 3(g).
Acting on the Committee’s recommendation, the OMB
filed with respect to the acquisition of lands in Iloilo City
informations before the Sandiganbayan in Criminal
Cases 26770-75 and 26826-31 against respondents
Meinrado Enrique A. Bello, Manuel S. Satuito, Rosario
Barbasa-Perlas, Hermie Barbasa, Minviluz Camina,
Joelita Trabuco, Rosalinda Tropel, Felipe Villarosa,
Abelio Juaneza, and Raul Aposaga for six counts of
violation of R.A. 3019, Section 3(e), and six counts of
falsification of public documents under Article 171, RPC.
Satuito and Bello filed a motion to dismiss and a motion
to quash the informations on the ground that the
Sandiganbayan had no jurisdiction over the case. On
February 12, 2004 the Sandiganbayan granted the
motions and ordered the remand of the records to the
proper courts, hence, this petition by the People of the
Philippines, represented by the OMB, which challenges
such order.
The Issue Presented
The only issue presented in this case is whether or not
the Sandiganbayan erred in holding that it has no
jurisdiction over offenses involving the heads of the legal
departments of government-owned and controlled
corporations.
The Ruling of the Court
In its February 12, 2004 decision, the Sandiganbayan
held that, not being a stock or non-stock corporation,
AFP-RSBS cannot be regarded as a government-owned
and controlled corporation. Consequently, respondent
AFP-RSBS legal department officers did not fall under
Section 4(a)(1)(g) of R.A. 8249 that defines the
jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan.2 On motion for
reconsideration by the prosecution, however, the
Sandiganbayan changed its position and ruled that AFP-
RSBS is after all a government-owned and controlled
corporation, having been created by special law to
perform a public function.
Still, the Sandiganbayan held that Section 4(a)(1)(g)
cannot apply to the accused since Bello, who held the
highest rank among those who allegedly conspired to
commit the crime charged, did not hold any of the
government positions enumerated under that section,
the pertinent portion of which reads:
Sec. 4. Section 4 of the same decree is hereby further
amended to read as follows:
Sec. 4. Jurisdiction. – The Sandiganbayan shall exercise
exclusive original jurisdiction in all cases involving:
a. Violations of Republic Act No. 3019, as amended,
otherwise known as the Anti-graft and Corrupt Practices
Act, Republic Act No. 1379, and Chapter II, Section 2,
Title VII, Book II of the Revised Penal Code, where one
or more of the accused are officials occupying the
following positions in the government, whether in a
Page 147 of 168
permanent, acting or interim capacity, at the time of the
commission of the offense:
xxxx
(g) Presidents, directors or trustees, or managers of
government-owned or controlled corporations, state
universities or educational institutions or foundations.
(Emphasis ours)
Notably, in its February 2, 2005 Resolution, the
Sandiganbayan defined the word "manager" used above
as one who has charge of a corporation and control of its
businesses or of its branch establishments, and who is
vested with a certain amount of discretion and
independent judgment.
The Sandiganbayan cited Black’s Law Dictionary,
Revised 4th Ed., 1968 to support this definition.3
After a quick check of the same dictionary source but of
a later edition, however, the Court finds this additional
definition of "manager:"
A manager is one who has charge of corporation and
control of its businesses, or of its branch establishments,
divisions, or departments, and who is vested with a
certain amount of discretion and independent judgment.4
The Sandiganbayan apparently overlooked the above
definition that includes "divisions, or departments," which
are corporate units headed by managers. The United
States case of Braniff v. McPherren5 also referred to
"divisions" and "departments" in relation to the position
of "manager." Under this definition, respondent Bello
would fit into the term "manager," he having charge of
the AFP-RSBS Legal Department when the questioned
transactions took place.
In clarifying the meaning of the term "manager" as used
in Section 4(a)(1)(g), the Sandiganbayan also invoked
the doctrine of noscitur a sociis. Under this doctrine, a
proper construction may be had by considering the
company of words in which the term or phrase in
question is founded or with which it is associated.6 Given
that the word "manager" was in the company of the
words "presidents, directors or trustees," the clear intent,
according to the Sandiganbayan, is to limit the meaning
of the term "manager" to officers who have overall
control and supervision of government-owned and
controlled corporations.
But as the OMB puts it, the enumeration of the officials
in each of the categories in Section 4(a)(1) should be
understood to refer to a range of positions within a
government corporation. By the variety of the functions
they perform, the "presidents, directors or trustees, or
managers" cannot be taken to refer only to those who
exercise "overall" control and supervision of such
corporations.1âwphi1
The directors or trustees of government-owned and
controlled corporations do not, for example, exercise
overall supervision and control; when they act
collectively as a board, the directors or trustees merely
lay down policies for the operating officers to implement.
Since "managers" definitely do not have the same
responsibilities as directors and trustees or as
presidents, they belong to a distinct class of corporate
officers that, under the definition above, has charge of a
corporation’s "divisions or departments." This brings
Bello’s position within the definition.
Respondent Bello also argues that the Sandiganbayan
does not exercise jurisdiction over him because his rank
at the time of the acts complained of was merely that of
Police Superintendent in the Philippine National Police.
But the criminal information does not charge him for
offenses relating to the regular police work of a police
officer of his rank. He is rather charged for offenses he
committed in relation to his office, namely, that of a
"manager" of the Legal Department of AFP-RSBS, a
government-owned and controlled corporation.
What is needed is that the public officials mentioned by
law must commit the offense described in Section 3(e) of
R.A. 3019 while in the performance of official duties or in
relation to the office being held.7 Here, the OMB charged
Bello of using his office as Legal Department Head to
manipulate the documentations of AFP-RSBS land
acquisitions to the prejudice of the government.
WHEREFORE, the Court GRANTS the
petition, REVERSES the Sandiganbayan decision dated
February 12, 2004 and resolution dated February 2,
2005 in Criminal Cases 26770-75 and 26826-31,
and DIRECTS the Sandiganbayan to REINSTATE these
cases, immediately ARRAIGN all the accused, and
resolve accused Raul Aposaga’s motion for
reinvestigation.
SO ORDERED.
Page 148 of 168
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. Nos. 169823-24 September 11, 2013
HERMINIO T. DISINI, Petitioner,
vs.
THE HON. SANDIGANBAYAN, FIRST DIVISION, AND
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondents.
x-----------------------x
G.R. Nos. 174764-65
HERMINIO T. DISINI, Petitioner,
vs.
SANDIGANBAYAN, FIRST DIVISION, AND THE
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondents.
DECISION
BERSAMIN, J.:
The Sandiganbayan has exclusive original jurisdiction
over the criminal action involving petitioner
notwithstanding that he is a private individual
considering that his criminal prosecution is intimately
related to the recovery of ill-gotten wealth of the
Marcoses, their immediate family, subordinates and
close associates.
The Case
Petitioner Herminio T. Disini assails via petition for
certiorari there solutions promulgated by the
Sandiganbayan in Criminal Case No. 28001and Criminal
Case No. 28002, both entitled People v. Herminio T.
Disini, on January 17, 2005 (denying his motion to quash
the informations)1 and August 10, 2005 (denying his
motion for reconsideration of the denial of his motion to
quash),2 alleging that the Sandiganbayan (First Division)
thereby committed grave abuse of discretion amounting
to lack or excess of jurisdiction.
Antecedents
The Office of the Ombudsman filed two informations
dated June 30,2004 charging Disini in the
Sandiganbayan with corruption of public officials,
penalized under Article 212 in relation to Article 210 of
the Revised Penal Code (Criminal Case No. 28001), and
with a violation of Section 4(a) of Republic Act 3019
(R.A. No. 3019), also known as the Anti-Graft and
Corrupt Practices Act (Criminal Case No. 28002).
The accusatory portions of the informations read as
follows:
Criminal Case No. 28001
That during the period from 1974 to February 1986, in
Manila, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, accused HERMINIO T. DISINI,
conspiring together and confederating with the then
President of the Philippines Ferdinand E. Marcos, did
then and there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously offer,
promise and give gifts and presents to said Ferdinand E.
Marcos, consisting of accused DISINI’s ownership of two
billion and five hundred (2.5 billion) shares of stock in
Vulcan Industrial and Mining Corporation and four billion
(4 billion)shares of stock in The Energy Corporation, with
both shares of stock having then a book value of
₱100.00 per share of stock, and subcontracts, to
Engineering and Construction Company of Asia, owned
and controlled by said Ferdinand E. Marcos, on the
mechanical and electrical construction work on the
Philippine Nuclear Power Plant Project("Project") of the
National Power Corporation at Morong, Bataan, all for
and in consideration of accused Disini seeking and
obtaining for Burns and Roe and Westinghouse
Electrical Corporation (Westinghouse), the contracts to
do the engineering and architectural design and to
construct, respectively, the Project, as in fact said
Ferdinand E. Marcos, taking undue advantage of his
position and committing the offense in relation to his
office and in consideration of the aforesaid gifts and
presents, did award or cause to be awarded to said
Burns and Roe and Westinghouse, the contracts to do
the engineering and architectural design and to construct
the Project, respectively, which acts constitute the crime
of corruption of public officials.
CONTRARY TO LAW.3
Criminal Case No. 28002
That during the period 1974 to February 1986, in Manila,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of the Honorable
Court, accused HERMINIO T. DISINI, conspiring
together and confederating with the then President of the
Philippines, Ferdinand E. Marcos, being then the close
personal friend and golfing partner of said Ferdinand E.
Marcos, and being further the husband of Paciencia
Escolin-Disini who was the first cousin of then First Lady
Imelda Romualdez-Marcos and family physicianof the
Marcos family, taking advantage of such close personal
relation, intimacy and free access, did then and there,
willfully, unlawfully and criminally, in connection with the
Philippine Nuclear Power Plant (PNPP)Project
("PROJECT") of the National Power Corporation (NPC)
at Morong, Bataan, request and receive from Burns and
Roe, a foreign consultant, the total amount of One
Million U.S. Dollars ($1,000,000.00),more or less, and
also from Westinghouse Electric
Page 149 of 168
Corporation(WESTINGHOUSE), the total amount of DO NOT APPLY SINCE
Seventeen Million U.S. Dollars($17,000,000.00), more or THEINFORMATIONS WERE "FILED
less, both of which entities were then having business, PURSUANT TO E.O. NOS. 1,2, 14 AND
transaction, and application with the Government of the 14-A".
Republic of the Philippines, all for and in consideration of
accused DISINI securing and obtaining, as accused 2. THE RESPONDENT COURT
Disini did secure and obtain, the contract for the said GRAVELY ERRED WHEN ITASSUMED
Burns and Roe and Westinghouse to do the engineering JURISDICTION WITHOUT HAVING
and architectural design, and construct, respectively, the MET THEREQUISITE UNDER
said PROJECT, and subsequently, request and receive SECTION 4 OF R.A. 8249 THAT
subcontracts for Power Contractors, Inc. owned by THEACCUSED MUST BE A PUBLIC
accused DISINI, and Engineering and Construction OFFICER.
Company of Asia (ECCO-Asia), owned and controlled by
said Ferdinand E. Marcos, which stated amounts and B. THE RESPONDENT COURT ACTED WITH
subcontracts constituted kickbacks, commissions and SUCH GRAVEABUSE OF DISCRETION WHEN
gifts as material or pecuniary advantages, for securing
IT EFFECTIVELY IGNORED, DISREGARDED,
and obtaining, as accused DISINI did secure and obtain,
AND DENIED
through the direct intervention of said Ferdinand E.
PETITIONER’SCONSTITUTIONAL AND
Marcos, for Burns and Roe the engineering and
STATUTORY RIGHT TOPRESCRIPTION.
architectural contract, and for Westinghouse the
construction contract, for the PROJECT.
1. THE RESPONDENT COURT
GRAVELY ERRED INDETERMINING
CONTRARY TO LAW.4
THE APPLICABLE PRESCRIPTIVE
PERIOD.
On August 2, 2004, Disini filed a motion to
quash,5 alleging that the criminal actions had been
2. THE RESPONDENT COURT
extinguished by prescription, and that the informations
GRAVELY ERRED INDETERMINING
did not conform to the prescribed form. The Prosecution
THE COMMENCEMENT OF
opposed the motion to quash.6 THEPRESCRIPTIVE PERIOD.

On September 16, 2004, Disini voluntarily submitted

himself for arraignment to obtain the Sandiganbayan’s
favorable action on his motion for permission to travel
abroad.7 He then entered a plea of not guilty to both
informations.
As stated, on January 17, 2005, the Sandiganbayan
(First Division) promulgated its first assailed resolution
denying the motion to quash.8
Disini moved for the reconsideration of the resolution
dated January 17, 2005,9 but the Sandiganbayan (First
Division) denied his motion on August 10, 2005 through
the second assailed resolution.10
3. THE RESPONDENT COURT
GRAVELY ERRED INDETERMINING
THE POINT OF INTERRUPTION OF
THEPRESCRIPTIVE PERIOD.
C. BY MERELY ASSUMING THE PRESENCE
OF GLARINGLYABSENT ELEMENTS IN THE
OFFENSES CHARGED TOUPHOLD THE
‘SUFFICIENCY’ OF THE INFORMATIONS
INCRIMINAL CASE NOS. 28001 AND 28002,
THE RESPONDENTCOURT DEMONSTRATED
ITS PREJUDGMENT OVER THE SUBJECT
CASES AND ACTED WITH GRAVE ABUSE OF
ITSDISCRETION.

Issues D. THE RESPONDENT COURT ACTED WITH

GRAVE ABUSE OFDISCRETION IN
Undaunted, Disini commenced this special civil action for REFUSING TO QUASH THE
certiorari, alleging that: INFORMATIONSDESPITE THEIR UTTER
FAILURE TO COMPLY WITH
A. THE RESPONDENT COURT HAS NO THEPRESCRIBED FORM, THUS
JURISDICTION OVER THEOFFENSES EFFECTIVELY DENYING THEACCUSED HIS
CHARGED. CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY
RIGHTTO BE INFORMED OF THE NATURE
AND CAUSE OF THEACCUSATION AGAINST
1. THE RESPONDENT COURT
HIM.11
GRAVELY ERRED WHEN ITRULED
THAT SECTION 4, PARAGRAPHS (A)
AND (B) OFREPUBLIC ACT NO. 8249 Ruling
Page 150 of 168
The petition for certiorari has no merit.
1.Preliminary Considerations
To properly resolve this case, reference is made to the
ruling of the Court in G.R. No. 175730 entitled Herminio
Disini v. Sandiganbayan,12 which involved the civil action
for reconveyance, reversion, accounting, restitution, and
damages (Civil Case No. 0013 entitled Republic v.
HerminioT. Disini, et al.) filed by the Presidential
Commission on Good Government(PCGG) against
Disini and others.13 The amended complaint in Civil
Case No. 0013 alleged that Disini had acted in unlawful
concert with his co-defendants in acquiring and
accumulating ill-gotten wealth through them is
appropriation of public funds, plunder of the nation’s
wealth, extortion, embezzlement, and other acts of
corruption,14 as follows:
4. Defendant HERMINIO T. DISINI is a close associate
of defendant Ferdinand E. Marcos and the husband of
the first cousin of Defendant Imelda R. Marcos. By
reason of this relationship xxx defendant Herminio Disini
obtained staggering commissions from the
Westinghouse in exchange for securing the nuclear
power plant contract from the Philippine government.
xxxx
13. Defendants Herminio T. Disini and Rodolfo Jacob, by
themselves and/or in unlawful concert, active
collaboration and willing participation of defendants
Ferdinand E. Marcos and Imelda R. Marcos, and taking
undue advantage of their association and influence with
the latter defendant spouses in order to prevent
disclosure and recovery of ill-gotten assets, engaged in
devices, schemes, and stratagems such as:
xxxx
(c) unlawfully utilizing the Herdis Group of Companies
and Asia Industries, Inc. as conduits through which
defendants received, kept, and/or invested improper
payments such as unconscionably large commissions
from foreign corporations like the Westinghouse
Corporation; (d) secured special concessions, privileges
and/or benefits from defendants Ferdinand E. Marcos
and Imelda R. Marcos, such as a contract awarded to
Westinghouse Corporation which built an inoperable
nuclear facility in the country for a scandalously
exorbitant amount that included defendant’s staggering
commissions – defendant Rodolfo Jacob executed for
HGI the contract for the aforesaid nuclear plant;15
Through its letter dated April 8, 1991,16 the PCGG
transmitted the records of Criminal Case No. 28001 and
Criminal Case No. 28002 to then Ombudsman Conrado
M. Vasquez for appropriate action, to wit:
In line with the decision of the Supreme Court in the
case of EduardoM. Cojuangco, Jr. versus the PCGG
(G.R. Nos. 92319–92320) dated October 2, 1990, we
are hereby transmitting to your Office for appropriate
action the records of the attached criminal case which
we believe is similar to the said Cojuangco case in
certain aspects, such as: (i) some parts or elements are
also parts of the causes of action in the civil complaints[-
]filed with the Sandiganbayan; (ii) some properties or
assets of the respondents have been sequestered; (iii)
some of the respondents are also party defendants in
the civil cases.
Although the authority of the PCGG has been upheld by
the Supreme Court, we are constrained to refer to you
for proper action the herein-attached case in view of the
suspicion that the PCGG cannot conduct an impartial
investigation in cases similar to that of the Cojuangco
case. x x x
Ostensibly, the PCGG’s letter of transmittal was
adverting to the ruling in Cojuangco, Jr. v. Presidential
Commission on Good Government (Cojuangco,
Jr.),17 viz:
x x x The PCGG and the Solicitor General finding a
prima facie basis filed a civil complaint against petitioner
and intervenors alleging substantially the same illegal or
criminal acts subject of the subsequent criminal
complaints the Solicitor General filed with the PCGG for
preliminary investigation. x x x.
Moreover, when the PCGG issued the sequestration and
freeze orders against petitioner’s properties, it was on
the basis of a prima facie finding that the same were ill-
gotten and/or were acquired in relation to the illegal
disposition of coconut levy funds. Thus, the Court finds
that the PCGG cannot possibly conduct the preliminary
investigation of said criminal complaints with the "cold
neutrality of an impartial judge," as it has prejudged the
matter. x x x18
xxxx
The Court finds that under the circumstances of the
case, the PCGG cannot inspire belief that it could be
impartial in the conduct of the preliminary investigation of
the aforesaid complaints against petitioner and
intervenors. It cannot possibly preside in the said
preliminary investigation with an even hand.
The Court holds that a just and fair administration of
justice can be promoted if the PCGG would be
prohibited from conducting the preliminary investigation
of the complaints subject of this petition and the petition
for intervention and that the records of the same should
be forwarded to the Ombudsman, who as an
independent constitutional officer has primary jurisdiction
Page 151 of 168
over cases of this nature, to conduct such preliminary
investigation and take appropriate action.19 (Bold
emphasis supplied)
It appears that the resolutions of the Office of the
Ombudsman, following its conduct of the preliminary
investigation on the criminal complaints thus transmitted
by the PCGG, were reversed and set aside by the Court
in Presidential Commission on Good Government v.
Desierto,20
with the Court requiring the Office of the Ombudsman to
file the informations that became the subject of Disini’s
motion to quash in Criminal Case No.28001 and
Criminal Case No. 28002.
2.
Sandiganbayan has exclusive and
original jurisdiction over the offenses charged
Disini challenges the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan
over the offenses charged in Criminal Case No. 28001
and Criminal Case No. 28002.He contends that: (1) the
informations did not allege that the charges were being
filed pursuant to and in connection with Executive Order
(E.O.) Nos.1, 2, 14 and 14-A; (2) the offenses charged
were not of the nature contemplated by E.O. Nos. 1, 2,
14 and 14-A because the allegations in the informations
neither pertained to the recovery of ill-gotten wealth, nor
involved sequestration cases; (3) the cases were filed by
the Office of the Ombudsman instead of by the PCGG;
and (4) being a private individual not charged as a co-
principal, accomplice or accessory of a public officer, he
should be prosecuted in the regular courts instead of in
the Sandiganbayan.
The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) counters that
the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over the offenses
charged because Criminal Case No. 28001 and Criminal
Case No. 28002 were filed within the purview of Section
4 (c) of R.A. No. 8249; and that both cases stemmed
from the criminal complaints initially filed by the PCGG
pursuant to its mandate under E.O. Nos. 1, 2, 14 and 14-
A to investigate and file the appropriate civil or criminal
cases to recover ill-gotten wealth not only of the
Marcoses and their immediately family but also of their
relatives, subordinates and close associates.
We hold that the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over
Criminal Case No. 28001 and Criminal Case No. 28002.
Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1606 was the law that
established the Sandiganbayan and defined its
jurisdiction. The law was amended by R.A. No. 7975 and
R.A. No. 8249. Under Section 4 of R.A. No. 8249, the
Sandiganbayan was vested with original and exclusive
jurisdiction over all cases involving:
a. Violations of Republic Act No. 3019, as
amended, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft
and Corrupt Practices Act, Republic Act
No.1379, and Chapter II, Section 2, Title VII,
Book II of the Revised Penal Code, where one
or more of the accused are officials occupying
the following positions in the government
whether in a permanent, acting or interim
capacity, at the time of the commission of the
offense:
xxxx
b. Other offenses or felonies whether simple or
complexed with other crimes committed by the
public officials and employees mentioned in
subsection (a) of this section in relation to their
office.
c. Civil and criminal cases filed pursuant to and
in connection with Executive Order Nos. 1, 2, 14
and 14-A, issued in 1986. (Bold emphasis
supplied)
In cases where none of the accused are occupying
positions corresponding to salary grade ‘27’ or higher, as
prescribed in the said Republic Act No. 6758, or military
or PNP officers mentioned above, exclusive original
jurisdiction thereof shall be vested in the proper regional
trial court, metropolitan trial court, municipal trial court
and municipal circuit trial court, as the case may be,
pursuant to their respective jurisdiction as provided in
Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, as amended.
xxxx
In case private individuals are charged as co-principals,
accomplices or accessories with the public officers or
employees, including those employed in government-
owned or controlled corporations, they shall be tried
jointly with said public officers and employees in the
proper courts which shall exercise exclusive jurisdiction
over them. x x x x
It is underscored that it was the PCGG that had initially
filed the criminal complaints in the Sandiganbayan, with
the Office of the Ombudsman taking over the
investigation of Disini only after the Court issued in
Cojuangco, Jr. the directive to the PCGG to refer the
criminal cases to the Office of the Ombudsman on the
ground that the PCGG would not be an impartial office
following its finding of a prima facie case being
established against Disini to sustain the institution of
Civil Case No. 0013.
Page 152 of 168
Also underscored is that the complaint in Civil Case No.
0013 and the informations in Criminal Case No. 28001
and Criminal Case No. 28002involved the same
transaction, specifically the contracts awarded through
the intervention of Disini and President Marcos in favor
of Burns & Roe to do the engineering and architectural
design, and Westinghouse to do the construction of the
Philippine Nuclear Power Plant Project (PNPPP). Given
their sameness in subject matter, to still expressly aver
in Criminal Case No.28001 and Criminal Case No.
28002 that the charges involved the recovery of ill-gotten
wealth was no longer necessary.21 With Criminal Case
No.28001 and Criminal Case No. 28002 being
intertwined with Civil Case No.0013, the PCGG had the
authority to institute the criminal prosecutions against
Disini pursuant to E.O. Nos. 1, 2, 14 and 14-A.
That Disini was a private individual did not remove the
offenses charged from the jurisdiction of the
Sandiganbayan. Section 2 of E.O. No.1, which tasked
the PCGG with assisting the President in "the recovery
of all ill-gotten wealth accumulated by former President
Ferdinand E. Marcos, his immediate family, relatives,
subordinates and close associates, whether located in
the Philippines or abroad, including the takeover or
sequestration of all business enterprises and entities
owned or controlled by them, during his administration,
directly or through nominees, by taking undue advantage
of their public office and/or using their powers, authority,
influence, connections or relationship," expressly
granted the authority of the PCGG to recover ill-gotten
wealth covered President Marcos’ immediate family,
relatives, subordinates and close associates, without
distinction as to their private or public status.
Contrary to Disini’s argument, too, the qualifying clause
found in Section 4 of R.A. No. 824922
applied only to the cases listed in Subsection 4aand
Subsection 4b of R.A. No. 8249, the full text of which
follows:
xxxx
a. Violations of Republic Act No. 3019, as amended,
otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices
Act, Republic Act No.1379, and Chapter II, Section 2,
Title VII, Book II of the Revised Penal Code, where one
or more of the accused are officials occupying the
following positions in the government whether in a
permanent, acting or interim capacity, at the time of the
commission of the offense:
(1) Officials of the executive branch occupying
the positions of regional director and higher,
otherwise classified as Grade ‘27’ and higher, of
the Compensation and Position Classification
Act of 1989(Republic Act No. 6758), specifically
including:
(a) Provincial governors, vice-governors,
members of the sangguniang
panlalawigan and provincial treasurers,
assessors, engineers and other
provincial department heads;
(b) City mayors, vice-mayors, members
of the sangguniang panlungsod, city
treasurers, assessors engineers and
other city department heads;
(c) Officials of the diplomatic service
occupying the position of consul and
higher;
(d) Philippine army and air force
colonels, naval captains, and all officers
of higher rank;
(e) Officers of the Philippine National
Police while occupying the position of
provincial director and those holding the
rank of senior superintendent or higher;
(f) City and provincial prosecutors and
their assistants, and officials and
prosecutors in the Office of the
Ombudsman and special prosecutor;
(g) Presidents, directors or trustees, or
managers of government-owned or -
controlled corporations, state
universities or educational institutions or
foundations;
(2) Members of Congress and officials thereof
classified as Grade‘27’ and up under the
Compensation and Position Classification Act of
1989;
(3) Members of the judiciary without prejudice to
the provisions of the Constitution;
(4) Chairmen and members of Constitutional
Commissions, without prejudice to the provisions
of the Constitution; and
(5) All other national and local officials classified
as Grade ‘27’and higher under the
Compensation and Position Classification Act of
1989. b. Other offenses or felonies whether
simple or complexed with other crimes
committed by the public officials and employees
mentioned in subsection a of this section in
relation to their office. (bold emphasis supplied)
xxxx
Page 153 of 168
Unquestionably, public officials occupying positions
classified as Grade 27 or higher are mentioned only in
Subsection 4a and Subsection 4b,signifying the plain
legislative intent of limiting the qualifying clause to such
public officials. To include within the ambit of the
qualifying clause the persons covered by Subsection 4c
would contravene the exclusive mandate of the PCGG to
bring the civil and criminal cases pursuant to and in
connection with E.O. Nos. 1, 2, 14 and 14-A. In view of
this, the Sandiganbayan properly took cognizance of
Criminal Case No. 28001 and Criminal Case No. 28002
despite Disini’s being a private individual, and despite
the lack of any allegation of his being the co-principal,
accomplice or accessory of a public official in the
commission of the offenses charged.
3.
The offenses charged in the
informations have not yet prescribed
In resolving the issue of prescription, the following must
be considered, namely: (1) the period of prescription for
the offense charged;(2) the time when the period of
prescription starts to run; and (3) the time when the
prescriptive period is interrupted.23
The information in Criminal Case No. 28001 alleged that
Disini had offered, promised and given gifts and
presents to Ferdinand E. Marcos; that said gifts were in
consideration of Disini obtaining for Burns & Roe and
Westinghouse Electrical Corporation (Westinghouse) the
contracts, respectively, to do the engineering and
architectural design of and to construct the PNPPP; and
that President Marcos did award or cause to be awarded
the respective contracts to Burns & Roe and
Westinghouse, which acts constituted the crime of
corruption of public officials.24
The crime of corruption of public officials charged in
Criminal Case No. 28001 is punished by Article 212 of
the Revised Penal Code with the" same penalties
imposed upon the officer corrupted."25 Under the second
paragraph of Article 210 of the Revised Penal Code
(direct bribery),26 if the gift was accepted by the officer in
consideration of the execution of an act that does not
constitute a crime, and the officer executes the act, he
shall suffer the penalty of prision mayor in its medium
and minimum periods and a fine of not less than three
times the value of the gift. Conformably with Article 90 of
the Revised Penal Code,27 the period of prescription for
this specie of corruption of public officials charged
against Disini is 15 years.
As for Criminal Case No. 28002, Disini was charged with
a violation of Section 4(a) of R.A. No. 3019. By express
provision of Section 11 of R.A. No. 3019, as amended by
Batas Pambansa Blg. 195, the offenses committed
under R.A. No. 3019 shall prescribe in 15 years. Prior to
the amendment, the prescriptive period was only 10
years. It became settled in People v.
Pacificador,28 however, that the longer prescriptive
period of 15years would not apply to crimes committed
prior to the effectivity of Batas Pambansa Blg. 195,
which was approved on March 16, 1982, because the
longer period could not be given retroactive effect for not
being favorable to the accused. With the information
alleging the period from 1974 to February1986 as the
time of the commission of the crime charged, the
applicable prescriptive period is 10 years in order to
accord with People v. Pacificador .
For crimes punishable by the Revised Penal Code,
Article 91 thereof provides that prescription starts to run
from the day on which the crime is discovered by the
offended party, the authorities, or their agents. As to
offenses punishable by R.A. No. 3019, Section 2 of R.A.
No. 332629 states:
Section 2. Prescription shall begin to run from the day of
the commission of the violation of the law, and if the
same be not known at the time, from the discovery
thereof and the institution of judicial proceedings for its
investigation and punishment.
The prescription shall be interrupted when proceedings
are instituted against the guilty person, and shall begin
to run again if the proceedings are dismissed for reasons
not constituting double jeopardy.
The ruling on the issue of prescription in Presidential Ad
Hoc Fact-Finding Committee on Behest Loans v.
Desierto30 is also enlightening, viz:
Generally, the prescriptive period shall commence to run
on the day the crime is committed. That an aggrieved
person "entitled to an action has no knowledge of his
right to sue or of the facts out of which his right arises,"
does not prevent the running of the prescriptive period.
An exception to this rule is the "blameless ignorance"
doctrine, incorporated in Section 2 of Act No. 3326.
Under this doctrine, "the statute of limitations runs only
upon discovery of the fact of the invasion of a right which
will support a cause of action. In other words, the courts
would decline to apply the statute of limitations where
the plaintiff does not know or has no reasonable means
of knowing the existence of a cause of action." It was in
this accord that the Court confronted the question on the
running of the prescriptive period in People v. Duque
which became the cornerstone of our 1999 Decision in
Presidential Ad Hoc Fact-Finding Committee on Behest
Loans v. Desierto (G.R. No. 130149), and the
subsequent cases which Ombudsman Desierto
dismissed, emphatically, on the ground of prescription
too. Thus, we held in a catena of cases, that if the
violation of the special law was not known at the time of
its commission, the prescription begins to run only from
Page 154 of 168
the discovery thereof, i.e., discovery of the unlawful
nature of the constitutive act or acts.
Corollary, it is safe to conclude that the prescriptive
period for the crime which is the subject herein,
commenced from the date of its discovery in 1992 after
the Committee made an exhaustive investigation. When
the complaint was filed in 1997, only five years have
elapsed, and, hence, prescription has not yet set in. The
rationale for this was succinctly discussed in the 1999
Presidential Ad Hoc Fact-Finding Committee on Behest
Loans, that "it was well-high impossible for the State, the
aggrieved party, to have known these crimes committed
prior to the 1986EDSA Revolution, because of the
alleged connivance and conspiracy among involved
public officials and the beneficiaries of the loans." In yet
another pronouncement, in the 2001 Presidential Ad Hoc
Fact-Finding Committee on Behest Loans v. Desierto
(G.R. No. 130817), the Court held that during the
Marcos regime, no person would have dared to question
the legality of these transactions. (Citations omitted)31
Accordingly, we are not persuaded to hold here that the
prescriptive period began to run from 1974, the time
when the contracts for the PNPP Project were awarded
to Burns & Roe and Westinghouse. Although the
criminal cases were the offshoot of the sequestration
case to recover ill-gotten wealth instead of behest loans
like in Presidential Ad Hoc Fact-Finding Committee on
Behest Loans v. Desierto, the connivance and
conspiracy among the public officials involved and the
beneficiaries of the favors illegally extended rendered it
similarly well-nigh impossible for the State, as the
aggrieved party, to have known of the commission of the
crimes charged prior to the EDSA Revolution in 1986.
Notwithstanding the highly publicized and widely-known
nature of the PNPPP, the unlawful acts or transactions in
relation to it were discovered only through the PCGG’s
exhaustive investigation, resulting in the establishment
of a prima facie case sufficient for the PCGG to institute
Civil Case No. 0013 against Disini. Before the discovery,
the PNPPP contracts, which partook of a public
character, enjoyed the presumption of their execution
having been regularly done in the course of official
functions.32
Considering further that during the Marcos regime, no
person would have dared to assail the legality of the
transactions, it would be unreasonable to expect that the
discovery of the unlawful transactions was possible prior
to 1986.
We note, too, that the criminal complaints were filed and
their records transmitted by the PCGG to the Office of
the Ombudsman on April 8, 1991for the conduct the
preliminary investigation.33 In accordance with Article 91
of the
Revised Penal Code34 and the ruling in Panaguiton, Jr.
v. Department of Justice,35 the filing of the criminal
complaints in the Office of the Ombudsman effectively
interrupted the running of the period of prescription.
According to Panaguiton:36
In Ingco v. Sandiganbayan and Sanrio Company Limited
v. Lim, which involved violations of the Anti-Graft and
Corrupt Practices Act(R.A. No. 3019) and the Intellectual
Property Code (R.A. No. 8293),which are both special
laws, the Court ruled that the prescriptive period is
interrupted by the institution of proceedings for
preliminary investigation against the accused. In the
more recent case of Securities and Exchange
Commission v. Interport Resources Corporation, the
Court ruled that the nature and purpose of the
investigation conducted by the Securities and Exchange
Commission on violations of the Revised Securities Act,
another special law, is equivalent to the preliminary
investigation conducted by the DOJ in criminal cases,
and thus effectively interrupts the prescriptive period.
The following disquisition in the Interport Resources
case is instructive, thus:
While it may be observed that the term "judicial
proceedings" in Sec. 2 of Act No. 3326 appears before"
investigation and punishment" in the old law, with the
subsequent change in set-up whereby the investigation
of the charge for purposes of prosecution has become
the exclusive function of the executive branch, the term
"proceedings" should now be understood either
executive or judicial in character: executive when it
involves the investigation phase and judicial when it
refers to the trial and judgment stage. With this
clarification, any kind of investigative proceeding
instituted against the guilty person which may ultimately
lead to his prosecution should be sufficient to toll
prescription.
Indeed, to rule otherwise would deprive the injured party
the right to obtain vindication on account of delays that
are not under his control.
The prevailing rule is, therefore, that irrespective of
whether the offense charged is punishable by the
Revised Penal Code or by a special law, it is the filing of
the complaint or information in the office of the public
prosecutor for purposes of the preliminary investigation
that interrupts the period of prescription. Consequently,
prescription did not yet set in because only five years
elapsed from 1986, the time of the discovery of the
offenses charged, up to April 1991, the time of the filing
of the criminal complaints in the Office of the
Ombudsman.
The informations were sufficient in form and substance
Page 155 of 168
It is axiomatic that a complaint or information must state
every single fact necessary to constitute the offense
charged; otherwise, a motion to dismiss or to quash on
the ground that the complaint or information charges no
offense may be properly sustained. The fundamental
test in determining whether a motion to quash may be
sustained based on this ground is whether the facts
alleged, if hypothetically admitted, will establish the
essential elements of the offense as defined in the
law.37 Extrinsic matters or evidence aliunde are not
considered.38
The test does not require absolute certainty as to the
presence of the elements of the offense; otherwise,
there would no longer be any need for the Prosecution to
proceed to trial.
The informations in Criminal Case No. 28001 (corruption
of public officials) and Criminal Case No. 28002
(violation of Section 4(a) of RA No.3019) have
sufficiently complied with the requirements of Section 6,
Rule110 of the Rules of Court, viz:
Section 6. Sufficiency of complaint or information. — A
complaint or information is sufficient if it states the name
of the accused; the designation of the offense given by
the statute; the acts or omissions complained of as
constituting the offense; the name of the offended party;
the approximate date of the commission of the offense;
and the place where the offense was committed.
When the offense is committed by more than one
person, all of them shall be included in the complaint or
information.
The information in Criminal Case No. 28001 alleging
corruption of public officers specifically put forth that
Disini, in the period from 1974 to February 1986 in
Manila, Philippines, conspiring and confederating with
then President Marcos, willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously offered, promised and gave gifts and
presents to President Marcos, who, by taking undue
advantage of his position as President, committed the
offense in relation to his office, and in consideration of
the gifts and presents offered, promised and given by
Disini, President Marcos caused to be awarded to Burns
& Roe and Westinghouse the respective contracts to do
the engineering and architectural design of and to
construct the PNPPP. The felonious act consisted of
causing the contracts for the PNPPP to be awarded to
Burns & Roe and Westinghouse by reason of the gifts
and promises offered by Disini to President Marcos.
The elements of corruption of public officials under
Article 212 of the Revised Penal Code are:
1. That the offender makes offers or promises,
or gives gifts or presents to a public officer; and
2. That the offers or promises are made or the
gifts or presents are given to a public officer
under circumstances that will make the public
officer liable for direct bribery or indirect bribery.
The allegations in the information for corruption of public
officials, if hypothetically admitted, would establish the
essential elements of the crime. The information stated
that: (1) Disini made an offer and promise, and gave gifts
to President Marcos, a public officer; and (2) in
consideration of the offers, promises and gifts, President
Marcos, in causing the award of the contracts to Burns &
Roe and Westinghouse by taking advantage of his
position and in committing said act in relation to his
office, was placed under circumstances that would make
him liable for direct bribery.39
The second element of corruption of public officers
simply required the public officer to be placed under
circumstances, not absolute certainty, that would make
him liable for direct or indirect bribery. Thus, even
without alleging that President Marcos received or
accepted Disini’s offers, promises and gifts – an
essential element in direct bribery – the allegation that
President Marcos caused the award of the contracts to
Burns & Roe and Westinghouse sufficed to place him
under circumstances of being liable for direct bribery.
The sufficiency of the allegations in the information
charging the violation of Section 4(a) of R.A. No. 3019 is
similarly upheld. The elements of the offense under
Section 4(a) of R.A. No. 3019 are:
1. That the offender has family or close personal
relation with a public official;
2. That he capitalizes or exploits or takes
advantage of such family or close personal
relation by directly or indirectly requesting or
receiving any present, gift, material or pecuniary
advantage from any person having some
business, transaction, application, request or
contract with the government;
3. That the public official with whom the offender
has family or close personal relation has to
intervene in the business transaction,
application, request, or contract with the
government.
The allegations in the information charging the violation
of Section 4(a) of R.A. No. 3019, if hypothetically
admitted, would establish the elements of the offense,
considering that: (1) Disini, being the husband of
Paciencia Escolin-Disini, the first cousin of First Lady
Imelda Romualdez-Marcos, and at the same time the
family physician of the Marcoses, had close personal
relations and intimacy with and free access to President
Page 156 of 168
Marcos, a public official; (2) Disini, taking advantage of
such family and close personal relations, requested and
received $1,000,000.00 from Burns & Roe and
$17,000,000.00 from Westinghouse, the entities then
having business, transaction, and application with the
Government in connection with the PNPPP; (3)
President Marcos, the public officer with whom Disini
had family or close personal relations, intervened to
secure and obtain for Burns & Roe the engineering and
architectural contract, and for Westinghouse the
construction of the PNPPP.

WHEREFORE, the Court DISMISSES the petition for

certiorari; AFFIRMS the resolutions promulgated on
January 17, 2005 and August 10, 2005 by the
Sandiganbayan (First Division) in Criminal Case No.
28001 and Criminal Case No. 28002; and DIRECTS
petitioner to pay the costs of suit.

SO ORDERED.

Page 157 of 168

 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. 168539 March 25, 2014
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner,
vs.
HENRY T. GO, Respondent.
DECISION
PERALTA, J.:
Before the Court is a petition for review on certiorari
assailing the Resolution1 of the Third Division2 of the
Sandiganbayan (SB) dated June 2, 2005 which quashed
the Information filed against herein respondent for
alleged violation of Section 3 (g) of Republic Act No.
3019 (R.A. 3019), otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and
Corrupt Practices Act.
The Information filed against respondent is an offshoot
of this Court's Decision3 in Agan, Jr. v. Philippine
International Air Terminals Co., Inc. which nullified the
various contracts awarded by the Government, through
the Department of Transportation and Communications
(DOTC), to Philippine Air Terminals, Co., Inc. (PIATCO)
for the construction, operation and maintenance of the
Ninoy Aquino International Airport International
Passenger Terminal III (NAIA IPT III). Subsequent to the
above Decision, a certain Ma. Cecilia L. Pesayco filed a
complaint with the Office of the Ombudsman against
several individuals for alleged violation of R.A. 3019.
Among those charged was herein respondent, who was
then the Chairman and President of PIATCO, for having
supposedly conspired with then DOTC Secretary Arturo
Enrile (Secretary Enrile) in entering into a contract which
is grossly and manifestly disadvantageous to the
government.
On September 16, 2004, the Office of the Deputy
Ombudsman for Luzon found probable cause to indict,
among others, herein respondent for violation of Section
3(g) of R.A. 3019. While there was likewise a finding of
probable cause against Secretary Enrile, he was no
longer indicted because he died prior to the issuance of
the resolution finding probable cause.
Thus, in an Information dated January 13, 2005,
respondent was charged before the SB as follows:
On or about July 12, 1997, or sometime prior or
subsequent thereto, in Pasay City, Metro Manila,
Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, the late ARTURO ENRILE, then Secretary of the
Department of Transportation and Communications
(DOTC), committing the offense in relation to his office
and taking advantage of the same, in conspiracy with
accused, HENRY T. GO, Chairman and President of the
Philippine International Air Terminals, Co., Inc.
(PIATCO), did then and there, willfully, unlawfully and
criminally enter into a Concession Agreement, after the
project for the construction of the Ninoy Aquino
International Airport International Passenger Terminal III
(NAIA IPT III) was awarded to Paircargo
Consortium/PIATCO, which Concession Agreement
substantially amended the draft Concession Agreement
covering the construction of the NAIA IPT III under
Republic Act 6957, as amended by Republic Act 7718
(BOT law), specifically the provision on Public Utility
Revenues, as well as the assumption by the government
of the liabilities of PIATCO in the event of the latter's
default under Article IV, Section 4.04 (b) and (c) in
relation to Article 1.06 of the Concession Agreement,
which terms are more beneficial to PIATCO while
manifestly and grossly disadvantageous to the
government of the Republic of the Philippines.4
The case was docketed as Criminal Case No. 28090.
On March 10, 2005, the SB issued an Order, to wit:
The prosecution is given a period of ten (10) days from
today within which to show cause why this case should
not be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction over the person
of the accused considering that the accused is a private
person and the public official Arturo Enrile, his alleged
co-conspirator, is already deceased, and not an accused
in this case.5
The prosecution complied with the above Order
contending that the SB has already acquired jurisdiction
over the person of respondent by reason of his voluntary
appearance, when he filed a motion for consolidation
and when he posted bail. The prosecution also argued
that the SB has exclusive jurisdiction over respondent's
case, even if he is a private person, because he was
alleged to have conspired with a public officer.6
On April 28, 2005, respondent filed a Motion to
Quash7 the Information filed against him on the ground
that the operative facts adduced therein do not constitute
an offense under Section 3(g) of R.A. 3019.
Respondent, citing the show cause order of the SB, also
contended that, independently of the deceased
Secretary Enrile, the public officer with whom he was
alleged to have conspired, respondent, who is not a
public officer nor was capacitated by any official
authority as a government agent, may not be prosecuted
for violation of Section 3(g) of R.A. 3019.
The prosecution filed its Opposition.8
Page 158 of 168
On June 2, 2005, the SB issued its assailed Resolution,
pertinent portions of which read thus:
Acting on the Motion to Quash filed by accused Henry T.
Go dated April 22, 2005, and it appearing that Henry T.
Go, the lone accused in this case is a private person and
his alleged co-conspirator-public official was already
deceased long before this case was filed in court, for
lack of jurisdiction over the person of the accused, the
Court grants the Motion to Quash and the Information
filed in this case is hereby ordered quashed and
dismissed.9
Hence, the instant petition raising the following issues, to
wit:
I At the outset, it bears to reiterate the settled rule that
WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY
ERRED AND DECIDED A QUESTION OF SUBSTANCE
IN A MANNER NOT IN ACCORD WITH LAW OR
APPLICABLE JURISPRUDENCE IN GRANTING THE
DEMURRER TO EVIDENCE AND IN DISMISSING
CRIMINAL CASE NO. 28090 ON THE GROUND THAT
IT HAS NO JURISDICTION OVER THE PERSON OF
RESPONDENT GO.
II
WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY
ERRED AND DECIDED A QUESTION OF SUBSTANCE
IN A MANNER NOT IN ACCORD WITH LAW OR
APPLICABLE JURISPRUDENCE, IN RULING THAT IT
HAS NO JURISDICTION OVER THE PERSON OF
RESPONDENT GO DESPITE THE IRREFUTABLE
FACT THAT HE HAS ALREADY POSTED BAIL FOR
HIS PROVISIONAL LIBERTY
III
WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY
ERRED WHEN, IN COMPLETE DISREGARD OF THE
EQUAL PROTECTION CLAUSE OF THE
CONSTITUTION, IT QUASHED THE INFORMATION
AND DISMISSED CRIMINAL CASE NO. 2809010
The Court finds the petition meritorious.
Section 3 (g) of R.A. 3019 provides:
Sec. 3. Corrupt practices of public officers. – In addition
to acts or omissions of public officers already penalized
by existing law, the following shall constitute corrupt
practices of any public officer and are hereby declared to
be unlawful:
xxxx
(g) Entering, on behalf of the Government, into any
contract or transaction manifestly and grossly
disadvantageous to the same, whether or not the public
officer profited or will profit thereby.
The elements of the above provision are:
(1) that the accused is a public officer;
(2) that he entered into a contract or transaction
on behalf of the government; and
(3) that such contract or transaction is grossly
and manifestly disadvantageous to the
government.11
private persons, when acting in conspiracy with public
officers, may be indicted and, if found guilty, held liable
for the pertinent offenses under Section 3 of R.A. 3019,
in consonance with the avowed policy of the anti-graft
law to repress certain acts of public officers and private
persons alike constituting graft or corrupt practices act or
which may lead thereto.12 This is the controlling doctrine
as enunciated by this Court in previous cases, among
which is a case involving herein private respondent.13
The only question that needs to be settled in the present
petition is whether herein respondent, a private person,
may be indicted for conspiracy in violating Section 3(g)
of R.A. 3019 even if the public officer, with whom he was
alleged to have conspired, has died prior to the filing of
the Information.
Respondent contends that by reason of the death of
Secretary Enrile, there is no public officer who was
charged in the Information and, as such, prosecution
against respondent may not prosper.
The Court is not persuaded.
It is true that by reason of Secretary Enrile's death, there
is no longer any public officer with whom respondent can
be charged for violation of R.A. 3019. It does not mean,
however, that the allegation of conspiracy between them
can no longer be proved or that their alleged conspiracy
is already expunged. The only thing extinguished by the
death of Secretary Enrile is his criminal liability. His
death did not extinguish the crime nor did it remove the
basis of the charge of conspiracy between him and
private respondent. Stated differently, the death of
Secretary Enrile does not mean that there was no public
officer who allegedly violated Section 3 (g) of R.A. 3019.
In fact, the Office of the Deputy Ombudsman for Luzon
found probable cause to indict Secretary Enrile for
infringement of Sections 3 (e) and (g) of R.A.
3019.14 Were it not for his death, he should have been
charged.
Page 159 of 168
The requirement before a private person may be indicted
for violation of Section 3(g) of R.A. 3019, among others,
is that such private person must be alleged to have
acted in conspiracy with a public officer. The law,
however, does not require that such person must, in all
instances, be indicted together with the public officer. If
circumstances exist where the public officer may no
longer be charged in court, as in the present case where
the public officer has already died, the private person
may be indicted alone.
Indeed, it is not necessary to join all alleged co-
conspirators in an indictment for conspiracy.15 If two or
more persons enter into a conspiracy, any act done by
any of them pursuant to the agreement is, in
contemplation of law, the act of each of them and they
are jointly responsible therefor.16 This means that
everything said, written or done by any of the
conspirators in execution or furtherance of the common
purpose is deemed to have been said, done, or written
by each of them and it makes no difference whether the
actual actor is alive or dead, sane or insane at the time
of trial.17 The death of one of two or more conspirators
does not prevent the conviction of the survivor or
survivors.18 Thus, this Court held that:
x x x [a] conspiracy is in its nature a joint offense. One
person cannot conspire alone. The crime depends upon
the joint act or intent of two or more persons. Yet, it does
not follow that one person cannot be convicted of
conspiracy. So long as the acquittal or death of a co-
conspirator does not remove the bases of a charge for
conspiracy, one defendant may be found guilty of the
offense.19
The Court agrees with petitioner's contention that, as
alleged in the Information filed against respondent,
which is deemed hypothetically admitted in the latter's
Motion to Quash, he (respondent) conspired with
Secretary Enrile in violating Section 3 (g) of R.A. 3019
and that in conspiracy, the act of one is the act of all.
Hence, the criminal liability incurred by a co-conspirator
is also incurred by the other co-conspirators.
Moreover, the Court agrees with petitioner that the
avowed policy of the State and the legislative intent to
repress "acts of public officers and private persons alike,
which constitute graft or corrupt practices,"20 would be
frustrated if the death of a public officer would bar the
prosecution of a private person who conspired with such
public officer in violating the Anti-Graft Law.
In this regard, this Court's disquisition in the early case
of People v. Peralta21 as to the nature of and the
principles governing conspiracy, as construed under
Philippine jurisdiction, is instructive, to wit:
x x x A conspiracy exists when two or more persons
come to an agreement concerning the commission of a
felony and decide to commit it. Generally, conspiracy is
not a crime except when the law specifically provides a
penalty therefor as in treason, rebellion and sedition.
The crime of conspiracy known to the common law is not
an indictable offense in the Philippines. An agreement to
commit a crime is a reprehensible act from the view-
point of morality, but as long as the conspirators do not
perform overt acts in furtherance of their malevolent
design, the sovereignty of the State is not outraged and
the tranquility of the public remains undisturbed.
However, when in resolute execution of a common
scheme, a felony is committed by two or more
malefactors, the existence of a conspiracy assumes
pivotal importance in the determination of the liability of
the perpetrators. In stressing the significance of
conspiracy in criminal law, this Court in U.S. vs. Infante
and Barreto opined that
While it is true that the penalties cannot be imposed for
the mere act of conspiring to commit a crime unless the
statute specifically prescribes a penalty therefor,
nevertheless the existence of a conspiracy to commit a
crime is in many cases a fact of vital importance, when
considered together with the other evidence of record, in
establishing the existence, of the consummated crime
and its commission by the conspirators.
Once an express or implied conspiracy is proved, all of
the conspirators are liable as co-principals regardless of
the extent and character of their respective active
participation in the commission of the crime or crimes
perpetrated in furtherance of the conspiracy because in
contemplation of law the act of one is the act of all. The
foregoing rule is anchored on the sound principle that
"when two or more persons unite to accomplish a
criminal object, whether through the physical volition of
one, or all, proceeding severally or collectively, each
individual whose evil will actively contributes to the
wrong-doing is in law responsible for the whole, the
same as though performed by himself alone." Although it
is axiomatic that no one is liable for acts other than his
own, "when two or more persons agree or conspire to
commit a crime, each is responsible for all the acts of the
others, done in furtherance of the agreement or
conspiracy." The imposition of collective liability upon the
conspirators is clearly explained in one case where this
Court held that x x x it is impossible to graduate the
separate liability of each (conspirator) without taking into
consideration the close and inseparable relation of each
of them with the criminal act, for the commission of
which they all acted by common agreement x x x. The
crime must therefore in view of the solidarity of the act
and intent which existed between the x x x accused, be
regarded as the act of the band or party created by
them, and they are all equally responsible x x x
Verily, the moment it is established that the malefactors
conspired and confederated in the commission of the
Page 160 of 168
felony proved, collective liability of the accused
conspirators attaches by reason of the conspiracy, and
the court shall not speculate nor even investigate as to
the actual degree of participation of each of the
perpetrators present at the scene of the crime. Of
course, as to any conspirator who was remote from the
situs of aggression, he could be drawn within the
enveloping ambit of the conspiracy if it be proved that
through his moral ascendancy over the rest of the
conspirators the latter were moved or impelled to carry
out the conspiracy.
In fine, the convergence of the wills of the conspirators in
the scheming and execution of the crime amply justifies
the imputation to all of them the act of any one of them.
It is in this light that conspiracy is generally viewed not
as a separate indictable offense, but a rule for
collectivizing criminal liability.
xxxx
x x x A time-honored rule in the corpus of our
jurisprudence is that once conspiracy is proved, all of the
conspirators who acted in furtherance of the common
design are liable as co-principals. This rule of collective
criminal liability emanates from the ensnaring nature of
conspiracy. The concerted action of the conspirators in
consummating their common purpose is a patent display
of their evil partnership, and for the consequences of
such criminal enterprise they must be held solidarily
liable.22
This is not to say, however, that private respondent
should be found guilty of conspiring with Secretary
Enrile. It is settled that the absence or presence of
conspiracy is factual in nature and involves evidentiary
matters.23 Hence, the allegation of conspiracy against
respondent is better left ventilated before the trial court
during trial, where respondent can adduce evidence to
prove or disprove its presence.
Respondent claims in his Manifestation and Motion24 as
well as in his Urgent Motion to Resolve25 that in a
different case, he was likewise indicted before the SB for
conspiracy with the late Secretary Enrile in violating the
same Section 3 (g) of R.A. 3019 by allegedly entering
into another agreement (Side Agreement) which is
separate from the Concession Agreement subject of the
present case. The case was docketed as Criminal Case
No. 28091. Here, the SB, through a Resolution, granted
respondent's motion to quash the Information on the
ground that the SB has no jurisdiction over the person of
respondent. The prosecution questioned the said SB
Resolution before this Court via a petition for review on
certiorari. The petition was docketed as G.R. No.
168919. In a minute resolution dated August 31, 2005,
this Court denied the petition finding no reversible error
on the part of the SB. This Resolution became final and
executory on January 11, 2006. Respondent now argues
that this Court's resolution in G.R. No. 168919 should be
applied in the instant case.
The Court does not agree. Respondent should be
reminded that prior to this Court's ruling in G.R. No.
168919, he already posted bail for his provisional liberty.
In fact, he even filed a Motion for Consolidation26 in
Criminal Case No. 28091. The Court agrees with
petitioner's contention that private respondent's act of
posting bail and filing his Motion for Consolidation vests
the SB with jurisdiction over his person. The rule is well
settled that the act of an accused in posting bail or in
filing motions seeking affirmative relief is tantamount to
submission of his person to the jurisdiction of the court. 27
Thus, it has been held that:
When a defendant in a criminal case is brought before a
competent court by virtue of a warrant of arrest or
otherwise, in order to avoid the submission of his body to
the jurisdiction of the court he must raise the question of
the court’s jurisdiction over his person at the very earliest
opportunity. If he gives bail, demurs to the complaint or
files any dilatory plea or pleads to the merits, he thereby
gives the court jurisdiction over his person. (State ex rel.
John Brown vs. Fitzgerald, 51 Minn., 534)
xxxx
As ruled in La Naval Drug vs. CA [236 SCRA 78, 86]:
"[L]ack of jurisdiction over the person of the defendant
may be waived either expressly or impliedly. When a
defendant voluntarily appears, he is deemed to have
submitted himself to the jurisdiction of the court. If he so
wishes not to waive this defense, he must do so
seasonably by motion for the purpose of objecting to the
jurisdiction of the court; otherwise, he shall be deemed
to have submitted himself to that jurisdiction."
Moreover, "[w]here the appearance is by motion for the
purpose of objecting to the jurisdiction of the court over
the person, it must be for the sole and separate purpose
of objecting to said jurisdiction. If the appearance is for
any other purpose, the defendant is deemed to have
submitted himself to the jurisdiction of the court. Such an
appearance gives the court jurisdiction over the person."
Verily, petitioner’s participation in the proceedings before
the Sandiganbayan was not confined to his opposition to
the issuance of a warrant of arrest but also covered
other matters which called for respondent court’s
exercise of its jurisdiction. Petitioner may not be heard
now to deny said court’s jurisdiction over him. x x x.28
In the instant case, respondent did not make any special
appearance to question the jurisdiction of the SB over
his person prior to his posting of bail and filing his Motion
Page 161 of 168
for Consolidation. In fact, his Motion to Quash the
Information in Criminal Case No. 28090 only came after
the SB issued an Order requiring the prosecution to
show cause why the case should not be dismissed for
lack of jurisdiction over his person.

As a recapitulation, it would not be amiss to point out

that the instant case involves a contract entered into by
public officers representing the government. More
importantly, the SB is a special criminal court which has
exclusive original jurisdiction in all cases involving
violations of R.A. 3019 committed by certain public
officers, as enumerated in P.D. 1606 as amended by
R.A. 8249. This includes private individuals who are
charged as co-principals, accomplices or accessories
with the said public officers. In the instant case,
respondent is being charged for violation of Section 3(g)
of R.A. 3019, in conspiracy with then Secretary Enrile.
Ideally, under the law, both respondent and Secretary
Enrile should have been charged before and tried jointly
by the Sandiganbayan. However, by reason of the death
of the latter, this can no longer be done. Nonetheless, for
reasons already discussed, it does not follow that the SB
is already divested of its jurisdiction over the person of
and the case involving herein respondent. To rule
otherwise would mean that the power of a court to
decide a case would no longer be based on the law
defining its jurisdiction but on other factors, such as the
death of one of the alleged offenders.

Lastly, the issues raised in the present petition involve

matters which are mere incidents in the main case and
the main case has already been pending for over nine
(9) years. Thus, a referral of the case to the Regional
Trial Court would further delay the resolution of the main
case and it would, by no means, promote respondent's
right to a speedy trial and a speedy disposition of his
case.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The

Resolution of the Sandiganbayan dated June 2, 2005,
granting respondent's Motion to Quash, is hereby
REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Sandiganbayan is
forthwith DIRECTED to proceed with deliberate dispatch
in the disposition of Criminal Case No. 28090.

SO ORDERED.

Page 162 of 168

 SECOND DIVISION
G.R. Nos. 205963-64, July 07, 2016
AMANDO A. INOCENTES, Petitioner, v. PEOPLE OF
THE PHILIPPINES, HON. ROLAND B. JURADO, IN
HIS CAPACITY AS CHAIRPERSON,
SANDIGANBAYAN, FIFTH DIVISION, HON.
CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES, IN HER CAPACITY
AS OMBUDSMAN, AS COMPLAINANT; AND HON.
FRANCIS H. JARDELEZA, OFFICE OF THE
SOLICITOR GENERAL (OSG), IN ITS CAPACITY AS
COUNSEL FOR THE PEOPLE, Respondents.
DECISION
BRION, J.:
We resolve the Petition1 filed under Rule 65 of the Rules
of Court by petitioner Amando A. Inocentes (Inocentes),
assailing the Resolutions dated February 8, 20132 and
October 24, 20123 of the Sandiganbayan in Criminal
Case Nos. SB-12-CRM-0127-0128 entitled People of the
Philippines v. Amando A. Inocentes, et. al.
THE FACTUAL ANTECEDENTS
Inocentes, together with four (4) others, was charged
with violating Section 3(e) or Republic Act (R.A.) No.
3019,4 as amended. The informations
read:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
That on or about October 2001 or immediately prior or
subsequent thereto, in Tarlac City, Tarlac, Philippines
and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the
above-named accused, Amando A. Inocentes, Celestino
Cabalitasan, Ma. Victoria Leonardo and Jerry Balagtas,
all public officers, being the Branch Manager, Division
Chief III, Property Appraiser III, and Senior General
Insurance Specialist, respectively, of the Government
Service Insurance System, Tarlac City Field Office,
committing the crime herein charged in relation to and in
taking advantage of their official functions, conspiring
and confederating with Jose De Guzman, through
manifest partiality, evident bad faith or gross inexcusable
negligence; did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
criminally [gave] undue preference, benefit or advantage
to accused Jose De Guzman by processing and
approving the housing loans of Four Hundred Ninety-
One (491) borrowers of [Jose De Guzman] 's housing
project under the GSIS Bahay Ko Program, with a total
amount of loans amounting to Two Hundred Forty-One
Million Fifty-Three Thousand Six Hundred Pesos
(Php241,053,600.00), knowing fully well that the said
borrowers/grantees were not qualified and were not
under the territorial jurisdiction of the Tarlac City Field
Office, thereby giving said borrowers/grantees
unwarranted benefit and causing damage and prejudice
to the government and to public interest in the aforesaid
amount.
CONTRARY TO LAW.5chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
and
[...] processing, approving and granting loans under the
GSIS Bahay Ko Program to Fifty-Three (53) borrowers
of [Jose De Guzman]'s land development project known
as Teresa Homes amounting to Fifty-Two Million and
One Hundred Seven Thousand Pesos
(Php52,107,000.00), despite the knowledge of the fact
that the lots covered were intended for commercial
purposes and by causing the over-appraisal in the
amount of Thirty-Three Million Two Hundred Forty
Thousand Eight Hundred Forty-Eight Pesos and Thirty-
Six Centavos (Php33,242,848.36) of the land and
buildings offered as collaterals, thus causing undue
injury to the Government.
CONTRARY TO LAW.6chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
On May 10, 2012, the Sandiganbayan issued a minute
resolution finding probable cause and ordered the
issuance of a warrant of arrest against all the
accused.7 To avoid incarceration, Inocentes immediately
posted hail.
On July 10, 2012, Inocentes filed an omnibus motion (1)
for judicial determination of probable cause; (2) to quash
the informations filed against him; and (3) to dismiss the
case for violating his right to the speedy disposition of
this case (omnibus motion).8 In this motion, he argued as
follows:
chanRoblesvirtualLawlibraryFirst, the informations filed
against him were fatally defective because they did not
allege the specific acts done by him which would have
constituted the offense. All that was alleged in the
informations was that he conspired and cooperated in
the alleged crime.
Second, there is no evidence showing how he
cooperated or conspired in the commission of the
alleged offense. The findings of the investigating unit
revealed that the connivance was perpetuated by the
marketing agent and the borrowers themselves by
misrepresenting their qualifications. The GSIS Internal
Audit Service Group Report even said that it was the
marketing agent who had the opportunity to tamper and
falsify the documents submitted before Inocentes' office.
Third, the informations filed against him should be
quashed because the Sandiganbayan does not have
jurisdiction over the case. At the time of the commission
of the alleged offense, Inocentes held a position with a
Salary Grade of 26. He likewise claims that he cannot
fall under the enumeration of managers of GOCCs
because his position as department manager cannot be
placed in the same category as the president, general
manager, and trustee of the GSIS.
Fourth, Innocentes insisted that the case against him
Page 163 of 168
must be dismissed because his right to the speedy
disposition of this case had been violated since seven
(7) years had lapsed from the time of the filing of the
initial complaint up to the time the information was filed
with the Sandiganbayan.
After the Office of the Special Prosecutor (OSP) filed its
opposition and Inocentes filed his reply, the
Sandiganbayan issued the first assailed resolution. The
Sandiganbayan maintained its jurisdiction over the case
because Section 4 of P.D. 1606, as amended by R.A.
No. 8249,9specifically includes managers of GOCCs -
whose position may not fall under Salary Grade 27 or
higher - who violate R.A. No. 3019. It also ruled that the
informations in this case sufficiently allege all the
essential elements required to violate Section 3(e) of
R.A. No. 3019.
Further, it said that it already determined the existence
of probable cause when it issued the warrant of arrest in
its minute resolution dated May 10, 2012.
Lastly, it held that the delay in this case was excusable
considering that the records of this case were
transferred from the Regional Trial Court in Tarlac City,
where the case was first filed.
In his motion for reconsideration, Inocentes reiterated
the same arguments he raised in his omnibus motion. In
addition, he asserted that the present case against him
should be dismissed because the Office of the
Ombudsman dismissed the estafa case against him for
the same transactions. He also filed a supplemental
motion attaching a copy of the affidavit of a certain
Monico Imperial to show (1) that there existed political
persecutions within the GSIS against the critics of then
President and General Manager Winston F. Garcia, and
(2) that the GSIS branch manager relies on the
recommendation of his subordinates in approving or
disapproving real estate loan applications.
The Sandiganbayan remained unconvinced. On the
contents of the affidavit, it agreed with the prosecution
that these are matters of defense that must stand
scrutiny in a full-blown trial. With respect to the dismissal
of the estafa case against him, the Sandiganbayan said
that the dismissal of that case does not necessarily
result in the dismissal of the present case because the
same act may give rise to two (2) or more separate and
distinct offenses.
To contest the denial of his motion for reconsideration,
Inocentes filed the present petition asserting, among
others, that the quantum of evidence required to
establish probable cause for purposes of holding a
person for trial and/or for the issuance of a warrant of
arrest was not met in this case. He argued that absent
any allegation of his specific acts or evidence linking him
to the anomalous transactions, probable cause can
hardly exist because it would be imprudent to insinuate
that Inocentes knew of the criminal design when all he
did was only to approve the housing loan applications.
Obviously relying on his subordinates, Inocentes claimed
that he could not have conspired with them when he had
no personal knowledge of any defect.
On April 10, 2013, we required the respondents to
comment on Inocentes' petition, and deferred action on
the issuance of a temporary restraining order and/or writ
of preliminary injunction.
In its comment, the OSP counters that what Inocentes
asks at this point is for this Court to examine and weigh
all the pieces of evidence and thereafter absolve him of
all charges without undergoing trial.
The OSP said that the Office of the Ombudsman did not
act arbitrarily in conducting the preliminary investigation
and finding probable cause. Moreover, the
Sandiganbayan likewise found probable cause after
considering all the pleadings and documents submitted
before it and saw no sound reason to set aside its
finding.
On the other hand, the Office of the Solicitor General
filed a manifestation saying that it will no longer submit
its comment as the OSP, pursuant to its expanded
mandate under R.A. No. 6770,10 shall represent the
People before this Court and the Sandiganbayan.
OUR RULING
We find the present petition meritorious.
Preliminary Considerations
The Constitution, under Section 1, Article VIII, empowers
the courts to determine whether or not there has been a
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of
the Government.11 This is an overriding authority that
cuts across all branches and instrumentalities of
government and is implemented through the petition
for certiorari that Rule 65 of the Rules of Court
provides.12chanrobleslaw
Inocentes, through this remedy, comes before this Court
asserting that there was grave abuse on the part of the
Sandiganbayan when it exercised its discretion in
denying his omnibus motion. This extraordinary writ
solely addresses lower court actions rendered without or
in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack of jurisdiction. Grave abuse of
discretion is a circumstance beyond the legal error
committed by a decision-making agency or entity in the
exercise of its jurisdiction; this circumstance affects even
the authority to render judgment.13chanrobleslaw
Under these terms, if the Sandiganbayan merely legally
erred while acting within the confines of its jurisdiction,
Page 164 of 168
then its ruling, even if erroneous, is not the proper
subject of a petition for certiorari. If, on the other hand,
the Sandiganbayan ruling was attended by grave abuse
of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction,
then this ruling is fatally defective on jurisdictional
ground and should be declared null and
void.14chanrobleslaw
In the present case, the Sandiganbayan denied
Inocentes' omnibus motion (1) to judicially determine the
existence of probable cause; (2) quash the information
that was filed against him; and/or (3) dismiss the case
against him for violation of his right to speedy trial. In
determining whether the Sandiganbayan committed
grave abuse in the exercise of its discretion, we shall
review the Sandiganbayan's judgment denying the
omnibus motion in the light of each cited remedy and the
grounds presented by Inocentes to support them.
The Sandiganbayan hardly committed any grave
abuse of discretion in denying the motion to quash
the information.
Inocentes is unyielding in his position that the
informations filed against him should be quashed based
on the following grounds: (1) that all the information
alleged is that Inocentes conspired and confederated
with his co-accused without specifying how his specific
acts contributed to the alleged crime; and (2) that the
Sandiganbayan has no jurisdiction over Inocentes
because he was occupying a position with a salary
grade less than 27.
On the contention that the informations did not detail
Inocentes' individual participation in the conspiracy, we
have underscored before the fact that under our laws
conspiracy should be understood on two levels, i.e., a
mode of committing a crime or a crime in
itself.15chanrobleslaw
In Estrada v. Sandiganbayan,16 we explained that when
conspiracy is charged as a crime, the act of conspiring
and all the elements and all the elements must be set
forth in the information, but when it is not and conspiracy
is considered as a mode of committing the crime, there
is less necessity of reciting its particularities in the
information because conspiracy is not the gravamen of
the offense, to wit:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
To reiterate, when conspiracy is charged as a crime, the
act of conspiring and all the elements of said crime must
be set forth in the complaint or information.
xxx xxx xxx
The requirements on sufficiency of allegations are
different when conspiracy is not charged as a crime in
itself but only as the mode of committing the crime as in
the case at bar.There is less necessity of reciting its
particularities in the information because conspiracy is
not the gravamen of the offense charged. The
conspiracy is significant only because it changes the
criminal liability of all the accused in the conspiracy and
makes them answerable as co-principals regardless of
the degree of their participation in the crime. The
liabilities of the conspirators is collective and each
participant will be equally responsible for the acts of
others, for the act of one is the act of all. In People v.
Quitlong, we ruled how conspiracy as the mode of
committing the offense should be alleged in the
information, viz:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
A conspiracy indictment need not, of course, aver all the
components of conspiracy or allege all the details
thereof like the part that each of the parties therein have
performed, the evidence proving the common design or
the facts connecting all the accused with one another in
the web of conspiracy. Neither is it necessary to
describe conspiracy with the same degree of particularity
required in describing a substantive offense. It is enough
that the indictment contains a statement of facts relied
upon to be constitutive of the offense in ordinary and
concise language, with as much certainty as the nature
of the case will admit, in a manner that can enable a
person of common understanding to know what is
intended, and with such precision that the accused may
plead his acquittal or conviction to a subsequent
indictment based on the same facts.
xxx xxx xxx
Again, following the stream of our own jurisprudence, it
is enough to allege conspiracy as a mode in the
commission of an offense in either of the following
manner: (1) by use of the word, "conspire," or its
derivatives or synonyms, such as confederate, connive,
collude, etc; or (2) by allegations basic facts constituting
the conspiracy in a manner that a person of common
understanding would know what is intended, and with
such precision as would enable the accused to
competently enter a plea to a subsequent indictment
based on the same facts.17 [italics supplied]
With these guidelines in mind, Inocentes' challenge with
respect to the informations filed against him necessarily
fails as he could gather that he is one of those GSIS
officials who conspired in approving the anomalous
transactions. Accordingly, the informations filed against
Inocentes in this case are valid because they adequately
provide the material allegations to apprise him of the
nature and cause of the charge.
On the issue on jurisdiction, it is of no moment that
Inocentes does not occupy a position with a salary grade
of 27 since he was the branch manager of the GSIS'
field office in Tarlac City, a government-owned or -
controlled corporation, at the time of the commission of
the offense, which position falls within the coverage of
the Sandiganbayan's jurisdiction.
The applicable law provides that violations of R.A. No.
3019 committed by presidents, directors or trustees,
or managers of government-owned or -controlled
Page 165 of 168
corporations, and state universities shall be within the
exclusive original jurisdiction of the
Sandiganbayan.18 We have clarified the provision of law
defining the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan by
explaining that the Sandiganbayan maintains its
jurisdiction over those officials specifically enumerated in
(a) to (g) of Section 4(1) of P.D. No. 1606, as amended,
regardless of their salary grades.19 Simply put, those that
are classified as Salary Grade 26 and below may still fall
within the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan, provided
they hold the positions enumerated by the law.20 In this
category, it is the position held, not the salary grade,
which determines the jurisdiction of the
Sandiganbayan.21chanrobleslaw
Furthermore, as the Sandiganbayan correctly held, even
low-level management positions fall under the
jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan. We settled this point
in Lazarte v. Sandiganbayan22 and Geduspan v.
People23.
Based on the foregoing, we find that the Sandiganbayan
was correct in denying Inocentes' motion to quash;
hence, there was no grave abuse in the exercise of its
discretion regarding this matter.
A redetermination of a judicial finding of probable
cause is futile when the accused voluntarily
surrenders to the jurisdiction of the court.
In the present case, the Office of the Ombudsman and
the Sandiganbayan separately found that probable
cause exists to indict and issue a warrant of arrest
against Inocentes. However, what Inocentes brings
before this Court right now is only the finding of the
Sandiganbayan of probable cause for the issuance of a
warrant of arrest.
Under our jurisdiction, any person may avail of this
remedy since it is well-established in jurisprudence that
the court may, in the protection of one's fundamental
rights, dismiss the case if, upon a personal assessment
of evidence, it finds that the evidence does not establish
probable cause.24chanrobleslaw
In People v. Castillo,25cralawred we discussed the two
kinds of determination of probable cause,
thus:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
There are two kinds of determination of probable cause:
executive and judicial. The executive determination of
probable cause is one made during preliminary
investigation. It is a function that properly pertains to the
public prosecutor who is given a broad discretion to
determine whether probable cause exists and to charge
those whom he believes to have committed the crime as
defined by law and thus should be held for trial.
Otherwise stated, such official has the quasi-judicial
authority to determine whether or not a criminal case
must be filed in court. Whether or not that function has
been correctly discharged by the public prosecutor, i.e.,
whether or not he has made a correct ascertainment of
the existence of probable cause in a case, is a matter
that the trial court itself does not and may not be
compelled to pass upon.
The judicial determination of probable cause, on the
other hand, is one made by the judge to ascertain
whether a warrant of arrest should be issued against the
accused. The judge must satisfy himself that based on
the evidence submitted, there is necessity for placing the
accused under custody in order not to frustrate the ends
of justice. If the judge finds no probable cause, the judge
cannot be forced to issue the arrest warrant.
Corollary to the principle that a judge cannot be
compelled to issue a warrant of arrest if he or she deems
that there is no probable cause for doing so, the judge in
turn should not override the public prosecutors'
determination of probable cause to hold an accused for
trial on the ground that the evidence presented to
substantiate the issuance of an arrest warrant was
insufficient. It must be stressed that in our criminal
justice system, the public prosecutor exercises a wide
latitude of discretion in determining whether a criminal
case should be filed in court, and that courts must
respect the exercise of such discretion when the
information filed against the person charged is valid on
its face, and that no manifest error or grave abuse of
discretion can be imputed to the public prosecutor.
Thus, absent a finding that an information is invalid on its
face or that the prosecutor committed manifest error or
grave abuse of discretion, a judge's determination of
probable cause is limited only to the judicial kind or for
the purpose of deciding whether the arrest warrants
should be issued against the accused. [Emphasis
supplied; citations omitted]
Under this ruling, we made it clear that the judge does
not act as an appellate court of the prosecutor and has
no capacity to review the prosecutor's determination of
probable cause; rather, he makes a determination of
probable cause independently of the prosecutor's
finding.26 Despite the fact that courts should avoid
reviewing an executive determination of probable cause,
we are not completely powerless to review this matter
under our expanded judicial power under the
Constitution.
We are aware, however, that Inocentes availed of this
remedy after he had posted bail before the
Sandiganbayan which, in our jurisdiction, is tantamount
to voluntary surrender.27 Simply put, questioning the
findings of probable cause by the Sandiganbayan at this
point would be pointless as it has already acquired
jurisdiction over Inocentes.
It is well-settled that jurisdiction over the person of the
accused is acquired upon (1) his arrest or apprehension,
with or without a warrant, or (2) his voluntary
Page 166 of 168
appearance or submission to the jurisdiction of the court.
For this reason, in Cojuangco, Jr. v.
Sandiganbayan28 we held that even if it is conceded that
the warrant issued was void (for nonexistence of
probable cause), the accused waived all his rights to
object by appearing and giving a
bond, viz:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
On this score, the rule is well-settled that the giving or
posting of bail by the accused is tantamount to
submission of his person to the jurisdiction of the court.
[...]
By posting bail, herein petitioner cannot claim exemption
from the effect of being subject to the jurisdiction of
respondent court. While petitioner has exerted efforts
to continue disputing the validity of the issuance of
the warrant of arrest despite his posting bail, his
claim has been negated when he himself invoked the
jurisdiction of respondent court through the filing of
various motions that sought other affirmative
reliefs.29 [omission and emphasis ours]
Therefore, at this point, we no longer find it necessary to
dwell on whether there was grave abuse on the part of
the Sandiganbayan in finding the existence of probable
cause to issue a warrant of arrest. Had Inocentes
brought this matter before he posted bail or without
voluntarily surrendering himself, the outcome could have
been different. But, for now, whether the findings of
probable cause was tainted with grave abuse of
discretion - thereby making the warrant of arrest void -
does not matter anymore as even without the warrant
the Sandiganbayan still acquired jurisdiction over the
person of Inocentes.
The Sandiganbayan should have granted Inocentes'
motion to dismiss for violation of his right to speedy
disposition of cases; it took seven long years before
the information was filed before it.
The Office of the Ombudsman, for its failure to resolve
the criminal charges against Inocentes for seven (7)
years, violated Inocentes' constitutional right to due
process and to a speedy disposition of the case against
him, as well as its own constitutional duty to act promptly
on complaints filed before it.
A person's right to a speedy disposition of his case is
guaranteed under Section 16, Article III of the
Constitution:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
All persons shall have the right to a speedy disposition of
their cases before all judicial, quasi-judicial, or
administrative bodies.
This constitutional right is not limited to the accused in
criminal proceedings but extends to all parties in all
cases, be it civil or administrative in nature, as well as in
all proceedings, either judicial or quasi-judicial.30 In this
accord, any party to a case may demand expeditious
action of all officials who are tasked with the
administration of justice.31chanrobleslaw
In Tatad v. Sandiganbayan,32 we held that the long delay
of close to three (3) years in the termination of the
preliminary investigation conducted by the Tanodbayan
constituted a violation not only of the constitutional right
of the accused under the broad umbrella of the due
process clause, but also of the constitutional guarantee
to "speedy disposition" of cases as embodied in Section
16 of the Bill of Rights, viz:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
We find the long delay in the termination of the
preliminary investigation by the Tanodbayan in the
instant case to be violative of the constitutional right
of the accused to due process. Substantial
adherence to the requirements of the law governing
the conduct of preliminary investigation, including
substantial compliance with the time limitation
prescribed by the law for the resolution of the case
by the prosecutor, is part of the procedural due
process constitutionally guaranteed by the
fundamental law. Not only under the broad umbrella
of the due process clause, but under the
constitutional guarantee of "speedy disposition" of
cases as embodied in Section 16 of the Bill of Rights
(both in the 1973 and the 1987 Constitutions), the
inordinate delay is violative of the petitioner's
constitutional rights. A delay of close to three (3) years
cannot be deemed reasonable or justifiable in the light of
the circumstance obtaining in the case at bar. We are
not impressed by the attempt of the Sandiganbayan to
sanitize the long delay by indulging in the speculative
assumption that "the delay may be due to a painstaking
and gruelling scrutiny by the Tanodbayan as to whether
the evidence presented during the preliminary
investigation merited prosecution of a former high
ranking government official." In the first place, such a
statement suggests a double standard of treatment,
which must be emphatically rejected. Secondly, three
out of the five charges against the petitioner were for his
alleged failure to file his sworn statement of assets and
liabilities required by Republic Act No. 3019, which
certainly did not involve complicated legal and factual
issues necessitating such "painstaking and gruelling
scrutiny" as would justify a delay of almost three years in
terminating the preliminary investigation. The other two
charges relating to alleged bribery and alleged giving of
unwarranted benefits to a relative, while presenting more
substantial legal and factual issues, certainly do not
warrant or justify the period of three years, which it took
the Tanodbayan to resolve the case.33[emphasis ours]
The Sandiganbayan insists that the delay in this case is
justifiable because the informations were initially filed
before the RTC in Tarlac City. However, after going over
the records of the case, we find that the period of time in
between the incidents that could have contributed to the
delay were unreasonable, oppressive, and vexatious.
According to the Sandiganbayan, the complaint in the
case at bar was filed sometime in 2004. After the
preliminary investigation, on September 15, 2005, the
Page 167 of 168
Office of the Ombudsman issued a resolution finding
probable cause to charge Inocentes. Following the
denial of his motion for reconsideration on November 14,
2005, the prosecution filed the informations with the RTC
of Tarlac City. However, on March 14, 2006, the Office
of the Ombudsman ordered the withdrawal of the
informations filed before the RTC. From this point, it took
almost six (6) years (or only on May 2, 2012) before the
informations were filed before the Sandiganbayan.
To our mind, even assuming that transfers of records
from one court to another oftentimes entails significant
delays, the period of six (6) years is too long solely for
the transfer of records from the RTC in Tarlac City to the
Sandiganbayan. This is already an inordinate delay in
resolving a. criminal complaint that the constitutionally
guaranteed right of the accused to due process and to
the speedy disposition of cases. Thus, the dismissal of
the criminal case is in order.34chanrobleslaw
Moreover, the prosecution cannot attribute the delay to
Inocentes for filing numerous motions because the
intervals between these incidents are miniscule
compared to the six-year transfer of records to the
Sandiganbayan.
The prosecution likewise blames Inocentes for not
seasonably invoking his right to a speedy disposition of
his case. It claims that he has no right to complain about
the delay when the delay is because he allegedly slept
on his rights.
We find this argument unworthy of merit, in the same
way we did in Coscolluela v.
Sandiganbayan:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
Records show that they could not have urged the
speedy resolution of their case because they were
unaware that the investigation against them was still
ongoing. They were only informed of the March 27, 2003
resolution and information against them only after the
lapse of six (6) long years, or when they received a copy
of the latter after its filing with the SB on June 19, 2009.
In this regard, they could have reasonably assumed that
the proceedings against them have already been
terminated. This serves as a plausible reason as to why
petitioners never followed up on the case altogether.
Instructive on this point is the Court's observation
in Duterte v. Sandiganbayan,
to wit:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
Petitioners in this case, however, could not have urged
the speedy resolution of their case because they were
completely unaware that the investigation against them
was still ongoing. Peculiar to this case, we reiterate, is
the fact that petitioners were merely asked to comment,
and not file counter-affidavits which is the proper
procedure to follow in a preliminary investigation. After
giving their explanation and after four long years of being
in the dark, petitioners, naturally, had reason to assume
that the charges against them had already been
dismissed.
On the other hand, the Office of the Ombudsman failed
to present any plausible, special or even novel reason
which could justify the four-year delay in terminating its
investigation. Its excuse for the delay - the many layers
of review that the case had to undergo and the
meticulous scrutiny it had to entail - has lost its novelty
and is no longer appealing, as was the invocation in the
Tatad case. The incident before us does not involve
complicated factual and legal issues, specially (sic) in
view of the fact that the subject computerization contract
had been mutually cancelled by the parties thereto even
before the Anti-Graft League filed its complaint.
Being the respondents in the preliminary
investigation proceedings, it was not the petitioners'
duty to follow up on the prosecution of their case.
Conversely, it was the Office of the Ombudsman's
responsibility to expedite the same within the
bounds of reasonable timeliness in view of its
mandate to promptly act on all complaints lodged
before it. As pronounced in the case of Barker v.
Wingo:
chanRoblesvirtualLawlibraryA defendant has no duty
to bring himself to trial: the State has that duty as
well as the duty of insuring that the trial is
consistent with due
process.35chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Plainly, the delay of at least seven (7) years before the
informations were filed skews the fairness which the
right to speedy disposition of cases seeks to maintain.
Undoubtedly, the delay in the resolution of this case
prejudiced Inocentes since the defense witnesses he
would present would be unable to recall accurately the
events of the distant past.
Considering the clear violation of Inocentes' right to the
speedy disposition of his case, we find that the
Ombudsman gravely abused its discretion in not acting
on the case within a reasonable time after it had
acquired jurisdiction over it.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, Inocentes' petition
is GRANTED. The resolutions dated February 8, 2013
and October 24, 2012 of the Sandiganbayan in Criminal
Case Nos. SB-12-CRM-0127-0128 are
hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. For violating
Inocentes' right to a speedy disposition of his case, the
Sandiganbayan is hereby ORDERED to DISMISS the
case against him.
SO ORDERED.chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
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