Assignment in Civil Procedure

By: GUILLER C. MAGSUMBOL

Student No: 2015-0373

1. Discuss the relevant provisions in Civil Code in relation to

Support Pendente Lite and illustrate using three jurisprudence
after the enactment of the Civil Code.

The relevant provision of the Civil Code in relation to Support Pendete Lite is embodied in Title IX
thereof, as follows:

TITLE IX
SUPPORT

Article 290. Support is everything that is indispensable for sustenance, dwelling, clothing and
medical attendance, according to the social position of the family.

Support also includes the education of the person entitled to be supported until he completes his
education or training for some profession, trade or vocation, even beyond the age of majority.
(142a)

Article 291. The following are obliged to support each other to the whole extent set forth in the
preceding article:

(1) The spouses;

(2) Legitimate ascendants and descendants;

(3) Parents and acknowledged natural children and the legitimate or illegitimate descendants
of the latter;

(4) Parents and natural children by legal fiction and the legitimate and illegitimate
descendants of the latter;

(5) Parents and illegitimate children who are not natural.

Brothers and sisters owe their legitimate and natural brothers and sisters, although they are only of
the half-blood, the necessaries for life, when by a physical or mental defect, or any other cause not
imputable to the recipients, the latter cannot secure their subsistence. This assistance includes, in a
proper case, expenses necessary for elementary education and for professional or vocational
training. (143a)
Article 292. During the proceedings for legal separation, or for annulment of marriage, the spouses
and children, shall be supported from the conjugal partnership property. After the final judgment of
legal separation, or of annulment of marriage, the obligation of mutual support between the spouses
ceases. However, in case of legal separation, the court may order that the guilty spouse shall give
support to the innocent one, the judgment specifying the terms of such order. (n)

Article 293. In an action for legal separation or annulment of marriage, attorney's fees and
expenses for litigation shall be charged to the conjugal partnership property, unless the action fails.
(n)

Article 294. The claim for support, when proper and two or more persons are obliged to give it,
shall be made in the following order:

(1) From the spouse;

(2) From the descendants of the nearest degree;

(3) From the ascendants, also of the nearest degree;

(4) From the brothers and sisters.

Among descendants and ascendants the order in which they are called to the intestate succession of
the person who has a right to claim support shall be observed. (144)

Article 295. When the obligation to give support falls upon two or more persons, the payment of
the same shall be divided between them in proportion to the resources of each.

However, in case of urgent need and by special circumstances, the judge may order only one of
them to furnish the support provisionally, without prejudice to his right to claim from the other
obligors the share due from them.

When two or more recipients at the same time claim support from one and the same person legally
obliged to give it, and the latter should not have sufficient means to satisfy all, the order established
in the preceding article shall be followed, unless the concurrent obligees should be the spouse and a
child subject to parental authority, in which case the latter shall be preferred. (145)

Article 296. The amount of support, in the cases referred to in the five numbers of article 291,
shall be in proportion to the resources or means of the giver and to the necessities of the recipient.
(146a)

Article 297. Support in the cases referred to in the preceding article shall be reduced or increased
proportionately, according to the reduction or increase of the needs of the recipient and the
resources of the person obliged to furnish the same. (147) ARTICLE 298. The obligation to give
support shall be demandable from the time the person who has a right to receive the same needs it
for maintenance, but it shall not be paid except from the date it is extrajudicially demanded.

Payment shall be made monthly in advance, and when the recipient dies, his heirs shall not be
obliged to return what he has received in advance. (148a)
Article 299. The person obliged to give support may, at his option, fulfill his obligation either by
paying the allowance fixed, or by receiving and maintaining in his house the person who has a right
to receive support. The latter alternative cannot be availed of in case there is a moral or legal
obstacle thereto. (149a)

Article 300. The obligation to furnish support ceases upon the death of the obligor, even if he may
be bound to give it in compliance with a final judgment. (150)

Article 301. The right to receive support cannot be renounced; nor can it be transmitted to a third
person. Neither can it be compensated with what the recipient owes the obligor.

However, support in arrears may be compensated and renounced, and the right to demand the
same may be transmitted by onerous or gratuitous title. (151)

Article 302. Neither the right to receive legal support nor any money or property obtained as such
support or any pension or gratuity from the government is subject to attachment or execution. (n)

Article 303. The obligation to give support shall also cease:

(1) Upon the death of the recipient;

(2) When the resources of the obligor have been reduced to the point where he cannot give
the support without neglecting his own needs and those of his family;

(3) When the recipient may engage in a trade, profession, or industry, or has obtained work,
or has improved his fortune in such a way that he no longer needs the allowance for his
subsistence;

(4) When the recipient, be he a forced heir or not, has committed some act which gives rise
to disinheritance;

(5) When the recipient is a descendant, brother or sister of the obligor and the need for
support is caused by his or her bad conduct or by the lack of application to work, so long as
this cause subsists. (152a)

Article 304. The foregoing provisions shall be applicable to other cases where, in virtue of this
Code or of any other law, by will, or by stipulation there is a right to receive support, save what is
stipulated, ordered by the testator or provided by law for the special case. (153a)

This can be best illustrated using the following jurisprudence showing various defenses on the merit
that one has when an application for support pendente lite is filed against him:

A. Denial of Paternity

As the obligation to render support arises from the relationship of parent and
child, husband and wife, legitimate ascendants and descendants and brothers and
sisters, a denial of the relationship from which the obligation to give support arises
will be considered a valid defense against an action for support. Thus, where a
 minor, through a guardian ad litem, brings an action for support on the ground that
he is a son of the defendant, and the defendant denies his paternity, the Supreme
Court has declared that the court has no jurisdiction to award support pendente lite.
The Supreme court observed that as the civil status of being a child has been denied
and has therefore become an issue in the case, it would be apparent that no effect
could be given to such a claim until an authoritative declaration be made as to the
existence of the cause. (Francisco vs. Zandueta, 61 Phil. 752).

B. Non-existence of Marriage

Obligation to give support also arises from the relationship of spouses, the
absence of such relationship would therefore defeat any claimi for support. Thus, if
the answer of the defendant denies the marriage between him and plaintiff, thus
putting in issue the very status of the plaintiff, support pendente lite should not be
allowed, until the marriage is established as fact. (Yangco vs. Rhode, 1Phil.
404)

C. Improper Conduct of Person seeking Support

This improper conduct that would extinguish the obligation to give support are:
(1) recipient, be he a forced hire or not, has committed some act which gives rise
to disinheritance; (2) when the recipient is a descendant, brother or sister of the
obligor and the need for support is caused by his or her bad conduct (3) adultery.
For this purpose, for example, a mother who delivered her child to a couple and
since then never took care of her, completely abandoning her, cannot later ask for
support from the child. (Castillo vs. Castillo, O.G., March 17, 1941). Other
example is an action by the wife against the husband for support, based upon a
written contract, but the Court held that adultery is a good defense. (Quintana v.
Lerma, 24 Phil. 285)

D. Other grounds such as Death of Recipient, if applicable can also be availed,

because under the law, obligation to give support shall cease upon the death of
recipient

2. In paragraph form, discuss the duties of clerk of court of the

MTC, RTC, CA and SC;

a) Appeal by Notice of Appeal

MTC to RTC:
Duty of Clerk of Court which Rendered the judgment or Final Order appealed from:
 Within the period of taking an appeal from MTC to RTC, when the appellant filed a notice
of appeal to the court that rendered the judgment or final order appealed from, the Clerk of
Court of the court which rendered the judgment or final order appealed from shall receive
payment from appellant the full amount of the appellate court docket and other lawful fees.
(Sec. 5, Rule 40). Within 15 days from the perfection of the appeal, the clerk of curt or the
branch clerk of court of the lower court of MTC shall transmit the original record, together with
the transcripts and exhibits, which he shall certify as complete, to the proper RTC. A copy of his
letter or transmittal of records to the appellate court shall be furnished the parties. (Sec. 6, Rule
40)

Duty of Clerk of Court of the Appellate Court (here the RTC)

Proof of payment of docket fees and other lawful fees upon filing of application of notice
of appeal shall be received by the clerk of court of the appellate court. (Sec. 5, Rule 40) The
appeal is taken by filing a notice of appeal with the court (through clerk of court) that rendered
the judgment or final order appealed from.. (Sec. 3, Rule 40) Upon receipt of the complete
record, the clerk of RTC shall notify the parties of such fact. (Sec. 7, Rule 40)

RTC to CA:
Duty of Clerk of Court of RTC:
The appeal to CA in cases decided by the RTC (in the exercise of its original jurisdiction)
shall be taken by filing a notice of appeal with the clerk of court of the court which rendered the
judgment or final order appealed from and serving a copy thereof upon the adverse party. (Sec.
2(a) Rule 41). Within the period for taking an appeal, the clerk of court (which rendered the
judgment or final order appealed from) shall receive from the appellant full amount of the
appellate court docket and other lawful fees. Proof of payment of said fees and original record
shall be transmitted to the appellate court. (Sec. 4, Rule 41) Within 30 days after perfection of
all the appeals, it shall be the duty of the clerk of court of the lower court to:
a. verify the correctness of the original record or the record on appeal, as the case may be,
and to make certification of its correctness;
b. verify the completeness of the records that will be transmitted to the appellate court;
c. If found to be incomplete, take such measures as may be required to complete the
records, availing of the authority that he or the court may exercise for this purpose
d. transmit the records to the appellate court.

If the efforts to complete the records fail, he shall indicate in his letter of transmittal the
exhibits or transcripts not included in the records being transmitted to the appellate court, the
reasons for their non-transmittal, and the steps taken or that could be taken to have them
available. The clerk of court shall furnish the parties with copies of his letter of transmittal of
the records to the appellate court. (Sec. 10, Rule 41)

Upon the perfection of the appeal, the clerk shall immediately direct the stenographers
concerned to attach to the record of the case 5 copies of the transcripts of the testimonial
evidence referred to in the record on appeal. (Sec. 11, Rule 41) The transcripts prepared by
 stenographers shall be transmitted to the clerk of the trial court who shall thereupon arrange the
same in the order in which the witnesses testified at the trial, and shall cause the pages to be
numbered consecutively. (Sec. 11, Rule 41)

Clerk of TC shall transmit to the appellate court the original record or the approved
record on appeal within 30 days from the perfection of the appeal, together with the proof of
payment of the appellate court docket and other lawful fees, a certified true copy of the minutes
of the proceedings, the order of approval, the certificate of correctness, the original
documentary evidence referred to therein, and the original and 3 copies of the transcripts.
Copies of the transcripts and certified true copies of the documentary evidence shall remain in
the lower court for the examination of the parties.

Duty of Clerk of Court of CA:

Upon receiving the original record or the record on appeal, together with accompanying
docs. and exhibits transmitted by the lower court, as well as the proof of payment of docket and
other lawful fees, the clerk of court of the CA shall docket the case and notify the parties
thereof. (Sec. 4, Rule 44).

b) Appeal by Record on Appeal

MTC to RTC:
Duties of Clerk of Court of MTC:
During the appeal from MTC to RTC, the appellant shall file a notice of appeal and a
record on appeal within 30 days after notice of the judgement or final order. A record on appeal
shall be required only in special proceedings and in other cases of multiple or separate appeals.
Within 15 days from the perfection of the appeal, the clerk of curt or the branch clerk of court of
the lower court of MTC shall transmit the original record or the record on appeal, together with
the transcripts and exhibits, which he shall certify as complete, to the proper RTC. A copy of his
letter or transmittal of records to the appellate court shall be furnished the parties. (Sec. 6, Rule
40)

Duties of Clerk of Court of RTC:

Proof of payment of docket fees and other lawful fees upon filing of application of notice
of appeal shall be received by the clerk of court of the appellate court (RTC) together with the
original record or the record on appeal, as the case may be. (Sec. 5, Rule 40).Upon receipt of
the complete record or the record on appeal, the clerk of RTC shall notify the parties of such
fact. (Sec. 7, Rule 40)

RTC to CA:
Duties of Clerk of Court of RTC:
Record on appeal shall be required in special proceedings and other cases of multiple or
separate appeals where the law or Rules of Court so require. In such cases, the record on appeal
 shall be filed with the clerk of court which rendered the judgment or final order appealed from
(i.e. RTC), and served copy thereof upon the adverse party. (Sec. 2 (a), Rule 41)

Within 10 days form receipt by appellant of notice from clerk of court that the latter
received the original record or the record on appeal, plus accompanying documents etc., the
appellant, in appeals by record on appeal, shall file with the clerk of court 7 clearly legible copies
of the approved record on appeal, together with the proof of service of 2 copies thereof upon the
appellee. (Sec. 4, Rule 44)

Within the period for taking an appeal, the clerk of court (which rendered the judgment
or final order appealed from) shall receive from the appellant shall payment full amount of the
appellate court docket and other lawful fees. Proof of payment of said fees and original record or
the record on appeal shall be transmitted to the appellate court. (Sec. 4, Rule 41)

Duties of Clerk of Court of CA:

Where the record of the docketed case is incomplete, the clerk of court of the Court of Appeals shall so
(a) inform said court and (b) recommend to it measures necessary to complete the record. (Sec. 5, Rule 44)

c) Appeal by Petition for Review

RTC to CA:

Clerk of CA shall receive the corresponding docket and other lawful fees from a party
who desires to appeal from a decision of the RTC (which rendered judgment in the exercise of
its appellate jurisdiction) by filing a verified a petition for review with the CA. (Sec. 1, Rule 42)

Clerk of court of RTC shall certified correct the true copies of the judgments or final
orders of such court. The certified true copy of the judgments or final orders of RTC shall be
filed by petitioner along with 7 copies of its verified petition for review. (Sec. 2, Rule 42)

Clerk of Court of the RTC may also ordered by CA , if it is deem necessary to elevate the
original record of the case including the oral and documentary evidence within 15 days from
notice. (Sec. 7, Rule 42)

d) Appeal by Petition for Review under Rule 43

The clerk of court of the CA shall receive the payment of the petitioner (on docketing
and other lawful fees and deposit in the sum of P500.00 for costs) upon the latter’s filing of the
petition for review under Rule 43. However, payment of docketing and other lawful fees and
the deposit for costs may be granted by the CA upon a verified motion setting forth valid
grounds therefor. (Sec. 5, Rule 43)

e) Appeal under Rule 45

 Clerk of court of the Supreme Court shall receive petitioner’s payment of corresponding
docket and other lawful fees and deposit in the amount of P500.00 for costs at the time of filing
of the petition. (Sec. 3, Rule 45)

Clerk of Court of the court a quo must certify true copy of the judgment or final order
or resolution which is the subject of the petition. (Sec. 4 (d), Rule 45)

3. Discuss and illustrate the concept of "Due course" for each

mode of appeal. (Use three cases to illustrate)

Rule 42. Petition for Review Sec.6. Due Course. If (1) upon the filing of the comment or such other
pleadings as the court may allow or require, or (2) after the expiration of the period for the filing thereof without
such comment or pleading having been submitted,

 the Court of Appeals finds prima facie that the lower court has committed an error of fact or law that
will warrant a reversal or modification of the appealed decision, it may accordingly give due course to the
petition.

If the petition is given due course, the Court of Appeals may:

a. set the case for oral argument or

b. require the parties to submit memoranda within a period of fifteen (15) days from notice.

The case shall be deemed submitted for decision upon the filing of the last pleading or memorandum required by
these Rules or by the court itself. (Rule 42, Sec. 9)

Rule 43. Appeals from CTA and other Quasi-Judicial Agencies. Sec. 10. Due Course. If (a) upon the filing
of the comment or such other pleadings or documents as may be required or allowed by the Court of Appeals or (b)
upon the expiration of the period for the filing thereof, and on the basis of the petition or the records, the Court of
Appeals finds prima facie that the court or agency concerned has committed errors of fact or law that would warrant
reversal or modification of the award, judgment, final order or resolution sought to be reviewed, it may give due
course to the petition; otherwise, it shall dismiss the same. The findings of fact of the court or agency concerned,
when supported by substantial evidence, shall be binding on the Court of Appeals.

If the petition is given due course, the Court of Appeals may set the case for oral argument or require the parties to
submit memoranda within a period of fifteen (15) days from notice. (Rule 43, Sec. 13)

Rule 45. Appeal by Certiorari to SC. Section 8. Due course; elevation of records. — If the petition is given due
course, the Supreme Court may require the elevation of the complete record of the case or specified parts thereof
within fifteen (15) days from notice. (2a)

Related Cases:

In Tanenglian v. Lorenzo (573 Phil. 472 (2008)) the Court recognized the broader interest of justice
and gave due course to the appeal even if it was a wrong mode of appeal and was even filed
beyond the reglementary period provided by the rules. The Court reasoned that:
“We have not been oblivious to or unmindful of the extraordinary situations that merit liberal
application of the Rules, allowing us, depending on the circumstances, to set aside technical
infirmities and give due course to the appeal. In cases where we dispense with the technicalities, we
do not mean to undermine the force and effectivity of the periods set by law. In those rare cases
where we did not stringently apply the procedural rules, there always existed a clear need to prevent
the commission of a grave injustice. Our judicial system and the courts have always tried to
maintain a healthy balance between the strict enforcement of procedural laws and the
guarantee that every litigant be given the full opportunity for the just and proper disposition
of his cause”.

In case of PBCOM vs. CA (GR No. 218901 dated Feb. 15, 2017), PBCOM is asking the Court to
rule on the correctness of the CA's dismissal of its Petition for Certiorari and Mandamus on the
grounds that (1) a petition for certiorari is a wrong mode of appeal and (2) in any event, PBCOM
failed to comply with the mandatory requirement of a motion for reconsideration.

PBCOM argues that the CA should have given due course to its Petition for Certiorari and
Mandamus because it is the proper remedy to question the Order dated June 2, 2011 of the RTC
denying its Notice of Appeal and that a motion for reconsideration is not required when the order
assailed of is a patent nullity for having been issued without jurisdiction.

The Court finds PBCOM's arguments impressed with merit. In Neplum, Inc. v. Orbeso (433 Phil.
844, 854 (2002)) ,this Court ruled that a trial court's order disallowing a notice of appeal, which is
tantamount to a disallowance or dismissal of the appeal itself, is not a decision or final order from
which an appeal may be taken. The suitable remedy for the aggrieved party is to elevate the matter
through a special civil action under Rule 65.29 Clearly, contrary to the CA's finding, PBCOM availed
itself of the correct remedy in questioning the disallowance of its notice of appeal.

4. Digest all the cases on Memory Aide 2016 edition regarding

Appeals.

STOLT-NIELSEN MARINE SERVICES, INC. vs. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS

COMMISSION, LABOR ARBITER ARIEL C. SANTOS, RICARDO O. ATIENZA and
RAMON ALPINO, Respondents.

G.R. No. 147623

December 13, 2005

Facts:

To seek the reversal of the decision of the Court of Appeals and its Resolution which denied
petitioner's motion for reconsideration, a petition for review under Rule 45 was filed. The
assailed decision, however, was affirmed in a 1997 NLRC Resolution denying this time
petitioner’s Urgent Motion to Reduce or be Exempted from Filing an Appeal Bond.
In 1978, Stolt, a corporation based in Connecticut, U.S.A., employed Alpino as motorman for its
vessel "M/T Stolt Sincerity." Respondent’s employment lasted until 1984. Thereafter, he was
repatriated to the Philippines after being diagnosed with Cardiac Enlargement, Pulmonary
Hypertension and Acute Psychotic Reaction and declared unfit for sea duty.

In early 1985, a complaint was filed by the respondent before the Philippine Overseas and
Employment Agency (POEA) for claims for recovery of sickness, disability benefits and personal
belongings and a claim for underpayment of wages against petitioner. Petitioner offered an
amicable settlement for these money claims which the respondent accepted through his sister
and attorney-in-fact Anita Alpino who was authorized under a Special Power of Attorney (SPA)
to execute a "Receipt and Release" and acknowledged the receipt of ₱130,000.00 as payment
for respondent’s claims and damages and on the basis of such "Receipt and Release," POEA
dismissed the case. In December 1987, another complaint against petitioner was lodged by
respondent before the POEA for the same causes of action (recovery of sickness and disability
benefits and claim for personal belongings and underpayment of wages) but was dismissed by
the POEA on ground of res judicata.

Respondent filed another complaint against petitioner with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) at
Quezon City for the Annulment of the Receipt and Release. In his complaint, respondent alleged
that he was mentally incapacitated to execute the SPA in favor of his sister Anita Alpino. In
1993, the RTC dismissed the case for insufficiency of evidence. Therefrom, respondent went to
the Court of Appeals which affirmed the RTC’s judgment of dismissal and his motion for
reconsideration was also denied by the same court.

In 1994, respondent filed a case against petitioner with the POEA for recovery of sickness and
disability benefits, allegedly arising from his sickness while under the latter’s employ. With the
passage of Republic Act 8042, otherwise known as the Migrant Workers and Overseas Filipinos
Act of 1995 said case was transmitted to the NCR-Arbitration Branch of the NLRC for decision
with respondent Labor Arbiter Ariel Santos. In 1997, Labor Arbiter Santos rendered a decision
declaring "invalid and ineffectual" the SPA executed by respondent in favor of his sister Anita
and the subsequent Receipt and Release signed by the latter in behalf of her brother reasoning
that there were flaws in the special power of attorney executed by the claimant’s sister and the
subsequent Receipt and Release are invalid and are shot with loopholes that would render it
voidable and unenforceable. Without petitioner’s controverting the merit of respondent’s claim
for sickness and disability benefits, for relying mainly on the invalid Receipt and Release in
dismissing such claims, with an indication that the documents were prepared with haste and
haphazardly, finding Receipt and Release was not even executed under oath so that its due
execution is put under a cloud of doubt, declaring further it is oppressive, unreasonable and
unconscionable, invoking public policy in the consideration of a public document, during which
time the respondent was declared to be mentally unfit, the consideration of P130,000.00 paid
by petitioner to his attorney-in-fact corresponds only to claim for lost luggages and without
settling the claims for sickness and disability benefits under an insurance health coverage
before any seaman can board any foreign vessel, the Labor Arbiter decided in favor of
respondent Alipio finding the subject documents invalid and ineffectual. Stolt-Nielsen was
directed to pay for the respondent’s claims for sickness and disability benefits. The Arbiter also
instructed Ricardo Atienza, one of the respondents, to make proper computations totaling to an
award of US$45,806.348 for the sought claims.

On July 25, 1997, or seven days after its receipt of the aforementioned Labor Arbiter’s decision,
petitioner filed with the respondent NLRC its Appeal with Attached Urgent Motion to Reduce or
be Exempted from Filing Appeal Bond. Petitioner argued therein that the money claims of
respondent Alpino were already barred by prescription; that said claims should have been
dismissed by the Labor Arbiter on ground of res judicata; and that the validity of the Receipt
and Release and the Special Power of Attorney had already been passed upon by the RTC of
Quezon City being affirmed by the Court of Appeals. In a 1997 Resolution, respondent NLRC
affirmed the Labor Arbiter’s decision and denied petitioner’s Urgent Motion to Reduce or be
Exempted from Filing an Appeal Bond on account of petitioner’s failure to post cash or surety
bond within the reglementary period. In so ruling, the NLRC reasoned Sections 6 and 7, Rule VI
of the New Rules of Procedure of the NLRC that provides the requirement for monetary awards
the perfection of an appeal only upon the posting of a cash or surety bond issued by a
reputable bonding company duly accredited by the Commission or the Supreme Court, in an
amount equivalent to the monetary award and the rule on “no motion or request for the
extension of the period within which to perfect an appeal shall be allowed.” Said filing of the
appeal and the posting of a cash or surety bond must be made within the period of ten (10)
days. The filing of a Motion to Reduce Bond will not suspend the running of the ten (10) days
period. The NLRC also reasoned out that “if at all, the movant should have secured the approval
of the Commission for the reduction of bond within the same period allowed by law” and
“Considering that the movant failed to comply with the requirements for perfecting an appeal,
said motion is therefore denied.” Hence, petitioner was denied in the perfection of said appeal
and NLRC affirmed the Arbiter’s decision. Petitioner’s motion for reconsideration was also
denied by the NLRC so the petitioner elevated the case in the Supreme Court via a petition for
certiorari, which later referred to the Court of Appeals in harmony with its decision in St. Martin
Funeral Home vs. National Labor Relations Commission.

Issue:

Whether or not the petitioner has complied with all the requirements in the perfection of an
appeal pursuant to NLRC New Rules of Procedure.

Held:

No. The petition lacks merit.

The law is clear. An appeal, per article 223 of the Labor Code, shall be perfected only upon
posting of a cash or surety bond in cases involving monetary award. On perfection of appeal, it
is well entrenched in this jurisdiction that perfection of an appeal within the period and in the
manner prescribed by law is jurisdictional and non-compliance with such requirement is fatal
and has the effect of rendering the judgment final and executory.

In implementing article 223, respondent NLRC however laid down the rule allowing reduction of
the amount of bond which it can approve in meritorious cases. There is a caveat however that
the filing of the motion to reduce bond does not stop the running of the period to perfect
appeal.

The plain import of article 223 of the Labor Code and the amended section 6, Rule VI of the
New Rules of Procedure is that the reduction of the bond should be approved within the ten
(10) day appeal period and the appellant should exert its utmost diligence to obtain the
approval of respondent NLRC before the lapse of the period or else there is a big risk that the
appeal will be dismissed for non-perfection of the appeal due to the absence of the appeal
bond. This is evident form the last sentence of Section 6, Rule VI that "the filing xxx of the
motion to reduce bond shall not stop the running of the period to perfect appeal." Thus the
present rule is unequivocal that the filing of the motion does not toll the running of the period
of appeal and the logical implication and inevitable result is the dismissal of the appeal if the
reduction is denied. xxx. Thus respondent NLRC correctly affirmed the decision of Arbiter
Santos since the appeal was not perfected due to lack of an appeal bond.

Time and again, it has been held that the right to appeal is not a natural right or a part of due
process, but merely a statutory privilege and may be exercised only in the manner and in
accordance with the provisions of the law. The party who seeks to avail of the same must
comply with the requirements of the rules, failing in which the right to appeal is lost.14 The
Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the Court of Appeals, stressing further that, “A mere
notice of appeal without complying with the other requisites aforestated shall not stop the
running of the period for perfecting an appeal” with the specification of the requirement for a
bond by posting of a cash or surety bond issued by a reputable bonding company duly
accredited by the Commission or the Supreme Court in an amount equivalent to the monetary
award, exclusive of moral and exemplary damages and attorney's fees. The employer as well as
counsel shall submit a joint declaration under oath attesting that the surety bond posted is
genuine and that it shall be in effect until final disposition of the case. The Commission may, in
meritorious cases and upon Motion of the Appellant, reduce the amount of the bond. The filing,
however, of the motion to reduce bond shall not stop the running of the period to perfect
appeal. (As amended on November 5, 1996)

The Court disagreed over the petitioner’s insistence that its Motion to Reduce Bond constitutes
a substantial compliance of the requirement for perfecting an appeal under Article 223 of the
Labor Code and the NLRC Rules of Procedure while it received the decision of the Labor Arbiter
on July 18, 1997, the petitioner within the limited 10-day period to perfect its appeal filed its
memorandum of appeal on July 25, 1997. However, in lieu of the required cash or surety bond,
petitioner filed a motion to reduce or be exempted from filing an appeal bond. The NLRC denied
the motion and consequently dismissed the appeal for non-perfection.

The requirement of a cash or surety bond for the perfection of an appeal from the
Labor Arbiter’s monetary award is not only mandatory but jurisdictional as well, and
non-compliance therewith is fatal and has the effect of rendering the award final and
executory.18 The Court explained in this language:

“… [T]he obvious and logical purpose of an appeal bond is to insure, during the period of
appeal, against any occurrence that would defeat or diminish recovery under the judgment if
subsequently affirmed; it also validates and justifies, at least prima facie, an interpretation that
would limit the amount of the bond to the aggregate of the sums awarded other than in the
concept of moral and exemplary damages.”

The mandatory filing of a bond for the perfection of an appeal is evident from the aforequoted
provision of Article 223 of the Labor Code which explicitly states that the appeal may be
perfected only upon the posting of cash or surety bond. The word "only" makes it perfectly
clear that the lawmakers intended the posting of a cash or surety bond to be the exclusive
means by which an employer’s appeal may be perfected. This requirement is intended to
dissuade employers from using the appeal to delay, or even evade, their obligation to satisfy
their employee’s just and lawful claims.

Further, the implementing rules of respondent NLRC are unequivocal in saying that "the filing of
the motion to reduce bond shall not stop the running of the period to perfect appeal." Thus,
petitioner should have seasonably filed the appeal bond within the ten-day reglementary period
following its receipt of the decision of Labor Arbiter Ariel Santos in order to forestall the finality
of said decision. Since petitioner failed to post an appeal bond within the reglementary period,
no appeal was perfected from the decision of Labor Arbiter Santos, for which reason, the
decision sought to be appealed to the NLRC had become final and executory and therefore
immutable.

As regard to liberal interpretation of the Rules, it is true that the requirement of posting a bond
on appeals involving monetary awards has been given a liberal interpretation in certain cases.
However, relaxation of this rule can only be done where there was substantial compliance of
the NLRC Rules of Procedure or where the party involved, at the very least, demonstrated
willingness to abide by the rules by posting a partial bond.

Petitioner did not post a full or partial appeal bond within the prescribed period. Petitioner could
have even paid a moderate and reasonable sum as premium for such bond as the law does not
require outright payment but merely the posting of a bond to ensure that the award will be
eventually paid should the appeal be dismissed, but still, petitioner failed to do so. Hence, we
find no cogent reason to apply the same liberal interpretation in this case.

Doctrine:

The right to appeal is not a natural right or a part of due process, but merely a statutory
privilege and may be exercised only in the manner and in accordance with the provisions of the
law. The party who seeks to avail of the same must comply with the requirements of the rules,
failing in which the right to appeal is lost.

Beatingo vs. Gasis

G.R. NO. 179641
FEBRUARY 9, 2011

FACTS:
Petitioner Beatingo bought a piece of land from Flora G. Gasis on May 19, 1998. Petitioner went
to the Register of Deeds to have the sale registered. She, however, failed to obtain registration
as she could not produce the owner’s duplicate certificate of title. She, thus, filed a petition for
the issuance of the owner’s duplicate certificate of title but was opposed by respondent Lilia Bu
Gasis, claiming that she was in possession of the Original Certificate of Title (OCT) as she
purchased the subject property from Flora on January 27, 1999.

Petitioner filed a Complaint for Annulment and Cancellation of Sale, Reconveyance, Delivery of
Title and Damages against respondent before the Regional Trial Court. Respondent claimed that
she purchased the subject property from Flora without knowledge of the prior sale of the same
subject property to petitioner, which makes her an innocent purchaser for value.

The RTC considered the controversy as one of double sale and since the two sales – that of
petitioner and that of respondent – were not registered with the Registry of Property, the RTC
held that whoever was in possession had the better right. Hence, it decided in favor of
respondent.

Petitioner elevated the matter to the CA via a Notice of Appeal. However, due to pressures of
work in equally important cases with other clients, counsel for petitioner requested for an
extension of ninety (90) days within which to file the brief. Instead of filing the Appellant’s Brief
within the extended period, petitioner twice moved for extension of time to file the brief.

The CA denied the motions for extension to file brief. Thus, for failure to file the Appellant’s
Brief, the appellate court dismissed the appeal.
ISSUE:

Did the CA err in not reviewing the merits of the appeal

HELD:
Evidently, petitioner’s counsel was negligent in failing to file the required brief not only within
45 days from receipt of the notice but also within the extended period of ninety (90) days
granted by the appellate court.

The excuse forwarded above is unacceptable. An attorney is bound to protect his client’s
interest to the best of his ability and with utmost diligence. Failure to file brief certainly
constitutes inexcusable negligence, more so if the delay results in the dismissal of the appeal.

The failure to file the Appellant’s Brief, though not jurisdictional, results in the abandonment of
the appeal which may be the cause for its dismissal.

Nevertheless, to put an end to the controversy, the Court carefully perused the records of the
case and reached the conclusion that the decision dated December 29, 2005 of the RTC is in
perfect harmony with law and jurisprudence. The rules on double sales, as discussed above,
apply.

ENRICO B. VILLANUEVA and EVER PAWNSHOP vs. SPS. ALEJO SALVADOR

and VIRGINIA SALVADOR
G.R. No. 139436 | 25 January 2006

Facts:

On December 20, 1991, respondents Sps. Salvador secured a loan of P7,650.00 from petitioner
Ever Pawnshop owned and managed by co-petitioner Villanueva. On January 23, 1992, the
Salvadors took out a second loan of P5,400.00 pledging, just like in the first loan transaction,
jewelry items. Pawnshop Ticket No. 29919, covering the first loan, indicated April 10, 1992 as
the last day to redeem the jewelries pawned, whereas the redemption period for the items
given as security for the second loan under Pawnshop Ticket No. 30792 fell on May 22, 1992.

The separate redemption periods came and went, but the Salvadors failed to redeem the
pawned pieces of jewelry. Nonetheless, their son paid Ever Pawnshop P7,000.00, the amount to
be applied against the first loan of P7,650.00. On account of this development, Pawnshop
Ticket No. 29919 was cancelled and replaced by Pawnshop Ticket No. 34932. As

JESUS G. CRISOLOGO vs. JUDGE MARIVIC TRABAJO DARAY

GR NUMBER
A.M. No. RTJ-07-2036 (Formerly OCA IPI No. 07-2543-RTJ) August 20, 2008

FACTS:
This is in relation to a complaint against the respondent judge Marivic Daray for
gross ignorance of the law and grave misconduct with Gross Misconduct, Undue Delay in
Rendering a Decision or Order and Gross Ignorance of the Law of Procedure relative to
the denial of the Motion for Intervention in a consolidated case filed by complainant.
Marina Crisologo, Jr. filed a complaint to Declare Documents Null and Void and Set Aside
Auction Sale and Attorney’s Fees against Victor Callao and the Rural Bank of Tagum,
Inc. (RBTI). The case docketed as Civil Case No. 3220 was raffled to RTC-Branch 19.
in Digos City Afterward, on September 10, 1996, Salvador Crisologo filed an action for
Annulment of Real Estate Mortgage, Documents, Reconveyance, Damages and
Attorneys Fees against Marina, Jr. and RBTI. The case docketed as Civil Case No. 3387
was raffled to RTC-Branch 19 and consolidated with Civil Case No. 3220. The parties
entered in a compromised agreements by which is in favor of RBTI, which Salvador and
Marina ceded ownership. after being inform of the situation and circumstance, On
February 13, 2004, soon after being informed of the existence of the compromise
agreement, complainant Jesus G. Crisologo and his sister Carolina C. Abrina,
represented by Atty. Rodolfo Ta-asan, moved to intervene in the civil cases alleging they
were co-owners and indispensable parties to the case having rights over the said lot
property. April 21, 2004, Atty. Ta-asan withdrew his appearance as counsel for
complainant and Carolina, and was substituted by Atty. Jenette Marie Crisologo. Atty.
Crisologo’s entry of appearance was acknowledged by Respondent Judge in an Order
dated May 17, 2004.

However, the intervention was denied. The complainants move for

reconsideration being that they are indispensable party to the subject matter. The
matter was denied as well and the notice was sent to Atty. Ta-asan and not to Atty.
Crisologo. The other parties moved for the execution, which was erroneously given to
Atty. Ta-asan again, after such notice they moved for complainant filed an Urgent
Manifestation and Notice of Appeal decrying the lack of notice to him of the trial courts
Order and appealing the denial of his motion for intervention to the Court of
Appeals. On the same date, complainant also filed an Urgent Motion for Voluntary
Inhibition of respondent Judge in the civil cases on the ground of lack of impartiality
which the said judge did not act on the notice of appeal and contended that the failure
to furnish copies, was a honest mistake of the court personnel. Court referred the
complaint to the Executive Justice of the CA, Cagayan de Oro City station, for
investigation, report and recommendation, which finds the respondent judge was found
guilty of undue delay and gross ignorance of the law.

ISSUE:
WON the Respondent Judge guilty of gross misconduct and displayed gross ignorance of the
rules.
HELD:
The Court concur with the Investigating Justices finding that respondent is not guilty of
gross misconduct, we are not in agreement with his recommendation that respondent be held
administratively liable for undue delay in rendering a decision or order and gross ignorance of
the law or procedure. As matter of policy, the acts of a judge in his judicial capacity are not
subject to disciplinary action. He cannot be subjected to liability civil, criminal or administrative
for any of his official acts, no matter how erroneous, as long as he acts in good faith. However,
the judges inexcusable failure to observe the basic laws and rules will render them
administratively liable.
There is no doubt that respondent was cognizant of the rule on intervention, and she
complied with it in good faith. In fact, respondent has explained that she denied the motion for
intervention because it would only delay, to the prejudice of the original parties, the civil cases
which had already been pending for almost a decade. That the failure to act on the notice of
appeal does not constitute negligence on the part of the judge. Since, notice of appeal does not
require the approval of the court. The function of the notice of appeal is merely to notify the
trial court that the appellant was availing of the right to appeal, and not to seek the courts
permission that he be allowed to pose an appeal. Appeal, in this case is petition for certiorari
with the CA, is perfected by filing of notice of appeal and paying proper docket fees.

Estate of Felomina G. Macadangdang vs. Gaviola

G.R. No. 156809

Facts:
- On 18 January 2000, Petitioners filed an action for Unlawful Detainer with Damages against
the respondents.
- Respondents were occupying, by mere tolerance, portions of four parcels of land of the
petitioners in Davao City.
- The Municipal Trial Court in Cities (MTCC) ruled in favor of petitioner while defendant’s
counterclaims being compulsory are dismissed.
- Then respondents appealed from the MTCC’s Decision.
- In an Order dated 14 September 2000, the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Davao City dismissed
the appeal for respondents’ failure to file an appeal memorandum.
- On petitioner’s motion, the RTC remanded the case to the MTCC for execution of judgment in
which the respondents filed a Motion for Reconsideration/New Trial in which then the RTC
denied and ruled that it no longer had jurisdiction over the motion after the dismissal of
respondents’ appeal.
- Respondents then filed a petition for review before the Court of Appeals assailing the RTC’s
Order.
- The Court of Appeals set aside the Order and remanded the case to the RTC and ruled that
failure to file a notice of appeal within the reglementary period would result to failure of the
appellate court to obtain jurisdiction over the appealed decision. Thus, the assailed decision
would become final and executory upon failure to move for reconsideration. On the other hand,
failure to file the appeal memorandum within the period granted by the appellate court would
only result to abandonment of appeal, which could lead to its dismissal upon failure to move for
its reconsideration. Thus, the RTC erred in denying respondents’ motion for reconsideration on
the ground of lack of jurisdiction. Hence, the petition before the Supreme Court.

Issue: whether the Court of Appeals erred in reversing the RTC’s dismissal of respondents’
appeal for failure to file an appeal memorandum.

Held: Yes. Respondents were not deprived of due process of law. The right to appeal is not a
natural right or a part of due process. It is merely a statutory privilege and may be exercised
only in the manner and in accordance with the provisions of the law. The Court notes that in
their memoranda, respondents admitted that they signed an agreement that they would vacate
the land they occupy not later than 28 February 1998. They refused to vacate the land only
because they were not relocated as promised by the owner. Respondents claimed that the land
was later declared alienable and disposable, and the decision was affirmed by this Court.
Hence, respondents alleged that petitioner no longer had the right to drive them out of the
land. However, respondents did not even indicate the case number and title, as well as the date
of promulgation of the alleged Supreme Court decision, in their memoranda.

Case Title, GR #: ROSARIO LACSAMANA, FLORENCIO BAUTISTA, QUIRICO

PACLIBAR, EDUARDO OCAMPO, JULIO BARIZO, PEDRO PANGILINAN v.
Intermediate Appellate Court, G.R. No. 73146-53

Facts:
A decision was rendered against Lacsamana et.al, - petitioners, by the RTC in an appeal from
decision of MTC. Copy of said decision was received by counsel of the petitioners on September
30, 1985. October 11, 1985, counsel for petitioners filed a motion to extend for fifteen days on
the ground that they needed additional time to finalize the pleading. Together with the filing of
the motion for extension, petitioners paid the necessary docket fees. However, on October 16,
1985, a decision was promulgated terminating the case for failure to file within the period. The
decision was hinged on the doctrine laid in the case of Habaluyas Enterprises, Inc. v. Judge
Japzon, ruling that the period for appealing for Motion for Reconsideration cannot be extended.
Issue:
Whether or not the fifteen-day period within which a party may file a motion for reconsideration
of a final order or ruling of the Regional Trial Court may be extended
Held:
Yes. The period of filing can be extended.
1.) Beginning one month after the promulgation of this Resolution, the rule shall be strictly
enforced that no motion for extension of time to file a motion for new trial or
reconsideration may be filed with the Metropolitan or Municipal Trial Courts, the Regional Trial
Courts, and the Intermediate Appellate Court. Such a motion may be filed only in cases pending
with the Supreme Court as the court of last resort, which may in its sound discretion either
grant or deny of the extension requested.
2.) In appeals in special proceedings under Rule 109 of the Rules of Court and in other cases
wherein multiple appeals are allowed, a motion for extension of time to file the record on
appeal may be filed within the reglementary period of thirty (30) days. If the court denies the
motion for extension, the appeal must be taken within the original period, inasmuch as such a
motion does not suspend the period for appeal. The trial court may grant said motion after the
expiration of the period for appeal provided it was filed within the original period.
All appeals heretofore timely taken, after extensions of time were granted for the filing of a
motion for new trial or reconsideration, shall be allowed and determined on the merits.

Neypes vs. Court of Appeals

G.R. No. 141524

September 14, 2005

Facts:

Petitioners Domingo Neypes et. al. filed an action for annulment of judgment and titles
of land and/or reconveyance and/or reversion with preliminary injunction before the Regional
Trial Court against the Bureau of Forest Development, Bureau of Lands, Land Bank of the
Philippines and the heirs of Bernardo del Mundo. The trial court, presided by public respondent
Judge Antonio N. Rosales, resolved the various motions, filed by both parties, as follows: (1)
the petitioners’ motion to declare respondents Bureau of Lands and Bureau of Forest
Development in default was granted for their failure to file an answer, but denied as against the
respondent heirs of del Mundo because the substituted service of summons on them was
improper; (2) the Land Bank’s motion to dismiss for lack of cause of action was denied because
there were hypothetical admissions and matters that could be determined only after trial, and
(3) the motion to dismiss filed by respondent heirs of del Mundo, based on prescription, was
also denied because there were factual matters that could be determined only after trial. The
trial court dismissed petitioners’ complaint on the ground that the action had already
prescribed. The petitioners allegedly received a copy of the order of dismissal on March 3, 1998
and, on the 15th day thereafter or on March 18, 1998, filed a motion for reconsideration which
was also dismissed on July 22. On July 27, the petitioners filed a notice of appeal and paid the
fees on August 3 but the said appeal was denied by the court wherein it held that the appeal
was filed eight days late. A motion for reconsideration was filed but it was likewise denied.
Through a petition for certiorari and mandamus the petitioners assailed the dismissal of the
notice of appeal in the Court of Appeals, stating that the 15-day reglementary period to appeal
started to run only on July 22, 1998 since this was the day that the petitioners received the final
order of the trial court denying their motion for reconsideration; thus, when they filed their
notice of appeal on July 27, it was within the reglementary period for appeal. The Court of
Appeals (CA) dismissed the petition stating that the 15-day period reckoned from the day they
received the February 12 order dismissing the complaint. The appellate court held that the said
order was the referred “final order appealable under the Rules. The petitioners filed a petition
for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court
Issue: Whether or not the notice of appeal by the petitioners was filed within the 15-day
reglementary period to appeal
Held:

According to Rule 41, Sec. 3 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, “The appeal shall be
taken within fifteen (15) days from the notice of the judgment or final order appealed from.” A
final judgment or order is one that finally disposes of a case, leaving nothing more for the court
to do with respect to it. It is an adjudication on the merits which, considering the evidence
presented at the trial, declares categorically what the rights and obligations of the parties are;
or it may be an order or judgment that dismisses an action. According to jurisprudence, the
Court held that it was the denial of the motion for reconsideration of an order of dismissal of a
complaint which constitutes the final order as it was what ended the issues raised there. To wit,
the order dated July 1, 1998 denying their motion for reconsideration was the final
order contemplated in the Rules. The Supreme Court in order to standardize the appeal periods
provided in the Rules and to afford litigants fair opportunity to appeal their cases, the Court
deems it practical to allow a fresh period of 15 days within which to file the notice of appeal in
the Regional Trial Court, counted from receipt of the order dismissing a motion for a new trial
or motion for reconsideration. Thus, a party litigant may either file his notice of appeal within
15 days from receipt of the Regional Trial Court’s decision or file it within 15 days from receipt
of the order (the "final order") denying his motion for new trial or motion for reconsideration. In
this case, the petitioners seasonably filed their notice of appeal within the fresh period of 15
days, counted from July 22, 1998. Furthermore, the use of the disjunctive word “or” in Rule 41,
Sec. 3 of the Rules implies that the notice of appeal may be filed within 15 days from the notice
of judgment or within 15 days from notice of the "final order," which we already determined to
refer to the July 1, 1998 order denying the motion for a new trial or reconsideration.

ROMAN CATHOLIC ARCHBISHOP OF MANILA, petitioner, vs. COURT OF

APPEALS, SPS. ERNESTO REYES and LORNA REYES, respondents.

258 SCRA 186 | G.R. No. 111324

July 05, 1996

FACTS

The case at bar springs from a lease agreement executed by petitioner-lessor, the Roman
Catholic Archbishop of Manila, and private respondent-lessees, spouses Ernesto and Lorna
Reyes over a parcel of land located in Intramuros, Manila. Intending to have a fire wall
constructed, private respondents allegedly had the property relocated. As a result they
discovered that the adjacent owner’s concrete fence abutted on and encroached upon the
leased property. Private respondents requested petitioner to make adjustments in order to
correct the encroachment problem but the petitioner has failed to take any action on their
demand. Consequently, Sps. Reyes decided to withhold rental payments as leverage against
petitioner and to force the latter to make corrections or adjustments in the area of subject land.
Petitioner informed private respondents in a letter of its intention to sell the leased property.
Although the Reyeses conveyed their interest in buying the property, no deal was finalized.
When no agreement was reached, Sps. Reyes filed an action for specific performance and
damages before the RTC of Manila. The correction or adjustment of the encroached portion of
the property constituted their first cause of action. For their second cause of action, the spouses
Reyes prayed that petitioner be compelled to sell the leased premises to them at P1,600.00 per
square meter, claiming that there was already a contract of sale between the parties.

The trial court issued an Order denying petitioner’s motion to dismiss insofar as the first cause
of action is concerned but granted it for the second cause of action. In effect, the case was
allowed to proceed with respect to the first cause of action, the request for correction in the
encroachment problem, but not with the second cause of action to compel petitioner to sell the
property to the spouses Reyes. The lower court held that private respondent spouses were
indeed obligated to pay rent after having admitted that they deliberately defaulted in payments.
Private respondent spouses filed a notice of appeal and elevated the case to the Court of
Appeals.

Petitioner moved to dismiss the appeal on the ground that the case raises only pure questions
of law and that respondent appellate court had no jurisdiction over the same. The latter court
denied petitioner’s motion to dismiss and motion for reconsideration. Respondent court ruled
that private respondent spouses, raised factual issues on the offer and acceptance regarding
the sale of the lot in question and on the trial court’s order to pay back rentals. “These factual
issues revolt against the appellee’s conclusion that the issues on appeal are purely questions of
law.” Respondent court likewise stated that the case before it is a single appeal and does not
necessitate multiple appeals even if it involves an Order and a Partial Judgment. Hence, even if
only a notice of appeal was filed without a record on appeal, the appeal was effectively
perfected.

ISSUE/s of the CASE

Whether the case involves multiple appeals, where a record on appeal is necessary to perfect
the appeal.

HELD

No. The case at bar is not one where multiple appeals can be taken or are necessary. Multiple
appeals are allowed in special proceedings, in actions for recovery of property with accounting,
in actions for partition of property with accounting, in the special civil actions of eminent
domain and foreclosure of mortgage. The rationale behind allowing more than one appeal in
the same case is to enable the rest of the case to proceed in the event that a separate and
distinct issue is resolved by the court and held to be final.

The disputes in the case for specific performance have arisen from the demand to make
adjustments on the property where the adjacent owner is alleged to have usurped a part
thereof, the exercise of the right of pre-emption and the payment of rental arrearages. A ruling
on the issue of encroachment will perforce be determinative of the issue of unpaid rentals.
These two points do not arise from two or more causes of action, but from the same cause of
action. Hence, this suit does not require multiple appeals. There is no ground for the splitting of
appeals in this case, even if it involves an Order granting (and denying) a motion to dismiss and
a Partial Judgment granting a motion for judgment on the pleadings. The subject matter
covered in the Order and in the Partial Judgment pertain to the same lessor-lessee relationship,
lease contract and parcel of land. Splitting appeals in the instant case would, in effect, be
violative of the rule against multiplicity of appeals.

Bonifacio Mejillano vs Enrique Lucillo

G.R. No. 154717

Facts: Faustino Loteriña died leaving two parcels of land. He sired three children by his first
marriage and another three during his subsequent marriage.
Tranquilino, one of the surviving children from the first marriage, sold Lot No. 9014 to Jesus
Lorente. The conflict arose when the children from the second claimed that Lot No. 9014 is
their inheritance from their late father. Hence, Jesus Lorente could not have validly bought it
from Tranquilino.
The conflicting claims to occupy and use the disputed property led Jesus Lorente to file an
action for recovery of possession with the RTC Legaspi. The RTC dismissed the complaint and
declared that the children from second marriage are co-heirs or co-owners of Lot No. 9014.
Thereafter, children from second marriage sold to respondent Enrique Lucillo their one-half (½)
share in Lot No. 9014.
When respondent Lucillo was about to enter said property, he discovered that petitioner was
occupying the lot. He then filed an action for recovery of possession of real property against
petitioner with the MTC.
The MTC ordered the defendant Bonifacio Mejillano to relinquish possession of Lot No. 9014
and to turn-over the peaceful possession thereof to plaintiff Enrique Lucillo.
Aggrieved, petitioner seasonably appealed the decision to the RTC, but failed to file an appeal
memorandum. Consequently, respondent judge dismissed petitioner’s appeal for failure of
appellant to file a memorandum pursuant to the mandatory requirement of Rule 40, Sec. 7(b)
of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.
Petitioner, through new counsel, filed a motion for reconsideration attaching thereto the appeal
memorandum alleging that his failure to file the required memorandum on time was due to
ignorance, the untimely demise of his former counsel and the mistaken notion that what was
needed in the appeal was merely a notice of appeal and nothing more.
In its Order, the RTC of Legaspi City ruled that the Court cannot accept petitioner’s claim of
ignorance for the records will show that he personally made the Answer to the Complaint and
the Notice of Appeal.
Petitioner went to the Court of Appeals on a petition for certiorari. The Court of Appeals
dismissed the petition, ruling that respondent judge did not act with grave abuse of discretion
in dismissing the appeal.
Hence, this petition. Petitioner avers that his failure to file his memorandum on time was due to
his lawyer’s untimely death. He avers that he received the notice to file his memorandum, but
because he is not a lawyer, he did not fully understand the tenor of such notice. It was only
later after he talked with a Public Attorney’s Office district lawyer that he came to file, albeit
belatedly, his appeal memorandum. He insists on a liberal application of the rules, arguing that
in a long line of cases, this Court ruled that dismissals of appeals on purely technical grounds
are frowned upon and that rules of procedure are used only to help secure not override
substantial justice.

Issue: Whether the appellate court committed reversible error in affirming the order of the RTC
dismissing petitioner’s appeal for failure to file on time his memorandum on appeal.

Held: We find the petition bereft of merit.

Section 7 (b), Rule 40 of the Revised Rules of Court expressly states:
(b) Within fifteen (15) days from such notice, it shall be the duty of the appellant to
submit a memorandum which shall briefly discuss the errors imputed to the lower court,
a copy of which shall be furnished by him to the adverse party. Within fifteen (15) days
from receipt of the appellant’s memorandum, the appellee may file his memorandum.
Failure of the appellant to file a memorandum shall be a ground for dismissal of the
appeal.
The rule is clear. It is obligatory on the part of petitioner to file his memorandum on appeal
within fifteen days from receipt of the notice to file the same; otherwise, his appeal will be
dismissed. Under the express mandate of said Rule, the appellant is duty-bound to submit his
memorandum on appeal. Such submission is not a matter of discretion on his part. His failure to
comply with this mandate or to perform said duty will compel the RTC to dismiss his appeal.
In appeals from inferior courts to the RTC, the appellant’s brief is mandatory since only errors
specifically assigned and properly argued in the appeal memorandum will be considered in the
decision on the merits.
In this case, the fundamental cause of the dismissal of petitioner’s appeal was his failure to file
the obligatory appeal memorandum on time. Petitioner only filed his memorandum on appeal
when the dismissal of his appeal had already been ordered. Resultantly, the trial court acted
accordingly when it dismissed petitioner’s appeal pursuant to the clear mandate of the Rules of
Court.
Further, we cannot subscribe to petitioner’s tenacious insistence to relax the application of the
Rules of Court so as not to defeat his rights.
Time and again, we have ruled that procedural rules do not exist for the convenience of the
litigants. Rules of Procedure exist for a purpose, and to disregard such rules in the guise of
liberal construction would be to defeat such purpose. Procedural rules were established
primarily to provide order to and enhance the efficiency of our judicial system. It has been
jurisprudentially held that, while the rules of procedure are liberally construed, the provisions on
reglementary periods are strictly applied, indispensable as they are to the prevention of
needless delays, and are necessary to the orderly and speedy discharge of judicial business.
Also, the right to appeal is neither a natural right nor a part of due process; it is merely a
statutory privilege, and may be exercised only in the manner and in accordance with the
provisions of law. An appeal being a purely statutory right, an appealing party must strictly
comply with the requisites laid down in the Rules of Court. In other words, he who seeks to
avail of the right to appeal must play by the rules. This, the petitioner failed to do when he did
not submit his memorandum on appeal.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DENIED.

MELBA MONCAL ENRIQUEZ, petitioner, vs. HON. COURT OF APPEALS and

VICTORINA TIGLE, respondents
G.R. No. 140473. January 28, 2003

Facts:
1. On February 29, 1996, respondent Victorina Tigle filed an action for unlawful detainer
against herein petitioner Melba Moncal Enriquez before the MCTC of Bayawan-Basay,
Negros Oriental.
2. Tigle filed a complaint alleging that on December 14, 1994, she bought a parcel of land
known as Lot No. 377, located at Tinego, Bayawan, Negros Oriental from Engracia
Macaraya.
3. Prior to the sale, Enriquez was staying at said lot by mere tolerance of Macaraya.
Enriquez was given an option to buy said lot but she refused to exercise it. After the
sale, Tigle then made demands on Enriquez to vacate the property, but Enriquez
adamantly refused.
4. Enriquez averred that the subject property was owned in common by the hers of Feliz
Moncal and any sale by Macaraya (one of the heirs of Felix Moncal) could only refer to
Macarayas undivided 1/7 share of the lot. Since said 1/7 share of Macaraya is still
unidentified, the same cannot be a subject of ejectment pursuant to Article 4341[5] of
the Civil Code.
5. The Lower Court rendered judgment in favor of Tigle to be in physical, actual and prior
possession of the subject land.
6. Enriquez appealed to the RTC of Dumaguete City. The RTC directed respective counsel
for the parties to submit within fifteen (15) days from receipt of this order their
respective memoranda and/or briefs. The RTC stated that upon expiration of the period
to submit memoranda, it shall decide the case on the basis of the entire record of the
proceedings in the court of origin and/or such brief(s) as may have been filed
 7. Counsel of Enriquez failed to submit a memorandum. Hence, RTC dismissed the appeal
of Enriquez for failure to file and submit a memorandum within the reglementary period
as required by Rule 40, Section 7(b) of Rules of Court.
8. Enriquez elevated the matter to the Court of Appeals but the CA dismissed the same.
Issue: Whether or not the Court of Appeals committed a reversible error in sustaining the order
of the RTC which dismissed her appeal for failure to file a memorandum on appeal
Ruling:
1. No. Rule 40, Section 7 (b) provides that, it shall be the duty of the appellant to submit a
memorandum and failure to do so shall be a ground for dismissal of the appeal. The use
of the word shall in a statute or rule expresses what is mandatory and compulsory.
Further, the Rule imposes upon an appellant the duty to submit his memorandum. A
duty is a legal or moral obligation, mandatory act, responsibility, charge, requirement,
trust, chore, function, commission, debt, liability, assignment, role, pledge, dictate,
office, (and) engagement. Thus, under the express mandate of said Rule, the appellant
is duty-bound to submit his memorandum on appeal. Such submission is not a matter of
discretion on his part. His failure to comply with this mandate or to perform said duty
will compel the RTC to dismiss his appeal.
2. It is true that the Rules should be interpreted so as to give litigants ample opportunity to
prove their respective claims and that a possible denial of substantial justice due to legal
technicalities should be avoided. But it is equally true that an appeal being a purely
statutory right, an appealing party must strictly comply with the requisites laid down in
the Rules of Court. In other words, he who seeks to avail of the right to appeal must
play by the rules. This the petitioner failed to do when she did not submit her
memorandum of appeal in this case as required by Rule 40, Section 7 of the 1997 Rules
of Civil Procedure. That she lost her case is not the trial courts fault but her own.
3. In sum, the SC finds that the Court of Appeals committed no reversible error of law
when it upheld (a) the order of the RTC dismissing herein petitioners appeal in Civil Case
No. 12044, and (b) its order denying reconsideration.

FIVE STAR MARKETING CO., INC. V. BOOC

[GR. No. 1143331; October 5, 2007]
“Remedies when a motion to set aside judgment is denied. Remedy can be either Rule 38 or
Rule 65.”
Facts:
 Five Star Marketing Co. is incorporated by the children of the late Antonio Booc and Ong
Chuy Tiok, namely, Sheikding, Rufino, Felisa, Salvador, Jose, and Roque.
o They decided to create a corporation, Five Star Marketing Company, Inc., whose
shares of stock reflected the amount of their contribution in purchasing the subject
property.
 In 1982, when the existing structure in the subject property was completely razed by fire,
petitioner constructed thereon a four-storey building financed mainly by a loan secured from
Northern Mindanao Development Bank using the subject property as collateral.
 o The entire ground floor and the fourth floor were allotted to Rufino, the second floor
to the family matriarch, Ong Chuy Tiok, and the third floor to Sheikding, all of whom
occupied the same rent-free.
 After several years later of rent-free rate, the board of directors of petitioner passed and
approved a resolution terminating the free-rental privilege given to all the occupants of the
building
o On March 15, 1999, petitioner notified all the occupants that it had withdrawn all
privileges granted to them.
o It likewise notified them of the rental rates of the units concerned and further
required any interested occupant to negotiate and enter into a lease agreement with
petitioner.
 On May 25, 1999, petitioner filed an action for unlawful detainer against respondent before
the MTCC, Iligan City.
 The issue of the controversy arose on the fact the counsel of the defendant was asking for a
postponement due to unpostponable personal engagement. This was denied as there was
no proper service of such motion to the petitioner.
o On July 24, 1999, respondent, through counsel, sent petitioner a telegram asking for
a postponement of the preliminary conference set on August 3, 1999.
o On July 26, 1999, respondent's counsel filed a Motion to Reset the preliminary
conference set for August 3, 1999 to August 24, 1999.
o Petitioner, through counsel, opposed the motion arguing that the motion violated the
provision of Sec. 11, Rule 13 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.
o On August 3, 1999, the scheduled preliminary conference pushed through. Petitioner
and its counsel appeared but respondent and his counsel failed to appear despite
due notice.
o On August 18, 1999, the MTCC issued an Order denying respondent's motion to
reset on the grounds that it failed to comply with the required explanation why
service was not done personally pursuant to Sec. 11, Rule 13 of the Rules and that
counsel failed to establish that his motion is meritorious.
 Consequently, the court ruled on the basis of the facts alleged in the complaint.
o Respondent appealed the decision to the RTC.
 On January 14, 2000, the RTC issued an Order setting aside the decision appealed from, as
well as the order denying respondent's motion for reconsideration and consequently
remanding the case to the court of origin.
o The RTC reiterated that judgment by default is frowned upon because it is
something which is only a little less than a denial of due process.
o Hence petitioner filed a petition under Rule 45 to the SC arguing that respondent's
motion to reset the preliminary conference and his subsequent motion for
reconsideration of its denial are violative of the Rules on Summary Procedure and
the Rules of Court, particularly Rule 70, Sec. 13 regarding prohibited pleadings and
motions.
Issue/s:
 Issue 1: Whether a direct appeal on the decision of the RTC’s decision, as an appellate
court, under Rule 45 to SC on the ground of pure question of law is allowed? – No.
 Issue 2: Whether it was correct for the RTC to remand the case back to the MTCC.

Held/Ratio:
 In several cases, the Court had the occasion to clarify the three modes of appeal from
decisions of the RTC, namely:
o a) ordinary appeal or appeal by writ of error, where judgment was rendered in a civil
or criminal action by the RTC in the exercise of its original jurisdiction;
 The first mode of appeal is governed by Rule 41, and is taken to the CA on
questions of fact or mixed questions of fact and law.
o b) petition for review, where judgment was rendered by the RTC in the exercise of
its appellate jurisdiction; and
 The second mode, covered by Rule 42, is brought to the CA on questions of
fact, of law, or mixed questions of fact and law.
o c) petition for review to this Court.
 The third mode provided for by Rule 45, is elevated to this Court only on
questions of law.
 A question of law arises when there is doubt as to what the law is on a certain state of
facts, while there is a question of fact when the doubt arises as to the truth or falsity of the
alleged facts.
o For a questions to be one of law, the same must not involve an examination of the
probative value of the evidence presented by the litigants or any of them.
o The resolution of the issue must rest solely on what the law provides on the given
set of circumstances.
 In the present case, petitioner comes before this Court raising a pure question of law. It
impugns the propriety of decision of the RTC which would remand the ejectment case to the
MTCC for the reception of evidence and for further proceedings on the issue of ownership of
the subject property.
 Clearly, petitioner raises only questions of law which require the interpretation and
application of the rules of procedure laid down by the Rules of Court.
o However, considering that the assailed decision was rendered by the RTC in the
exercise of its appellate jurisdiction as it was brought before it from the MTCC,
petitioner should have elevated the case to the CA under Rule 42 via the second
mode of appeal, instead of appealing directly before this Court under Rule 45.
As a wrong appeal was filed, the case should have been dismissed, but in interest of justice, the
SC also discussed it based on merits.

Case # 12
ANGELINA PAHILA-GARRIDO, Petitioner, vs. ELIZA M. TORTOGO, et. al, Respondents.
G.R. No. 156358 August 17, 2011
DOCTRINE: The distinction between the final order and an interlocutory order is well known.
The first disposes of the subject matter in its entirety or terminates a particular proceeding or
action, leaving nothing more to be done except to enforce by execution what the court has
determined, but the latter does not completely dispose of the case but leaves something else to
be decided upon. An interlocutory order deals with preliminary matters and the trial on the
merits is yet to be held and the judgment rendered.
FACTS:
Domingo Pahila commenced in the MTCC an action for ejectment with prayer for preliminary
and restraining order to evict several defendants, including the respondents herein, from his
properties. He amended the complaint to implead the spouses of some of the defendants,
however, he died during the pendency of the action, and his surviving spouse, herein petitioner
Angelina Pahila-Garrido, was substituted for him.
MTCC amended its decision to correct typographical errors in the description of the properties
involved. None of the parties objected to or challenged the corrections. Later, MTCC issued the
writ of execution upon the petitioner’s motion. The writ of execution was duly served upon all
the defendants, including the respondents, as the sheriffs return of service indicated.
Respondents filed a motion to quash against the writ of execution and its aliases, and a motion
to stay the execution of the decision.
Pahila-Garrido sought a clarificatory order moving that the TRO be vacated due to its being
effective for only twenty (20) days and because such effectivity could neither be extended nor
be made indefinite. She complained that her hands had already been tied for a year from
executing the decision and from availing herself of the writ of demolition; and pleaded that it
was time to give her justice in order that she could already enjoy the possession of the
property.
Respondents moved for the early resolution of the case and for the issuance of the writ of
prohibitory injunction. RTC issued the assailed writ of preliminary prohibitory injunction.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the RTC lawfully issued the TRO and the writ of preliminary prohibitory
injunction to enjoin the execution of the already final and executory decision of the MTCC.
HELD:
No. Under the circumstances, the principle of immutability of a final judgment must now be
absolutely and unconditionally be applied against the respondents. They could not anymore be
permitted to interminably forestall the execution of the judgment through their interposition of
new petitions or pleadings. The RTC Judge’s issuance of the assailed order granting the
respondents’ application for the writ of preliminary prohibitory injunction constituted manifestly
grave abuse of discretion.
Generally, injunction, being a preservative remedy for the protection of substantive rights or
interests, is not a cause of action in itself but merely a provisional remedy, an adjunct to a main
suit. It is resorted to only when there is a pressing necessity to avoid injurious consequences
that cannot be redressed under any standard of compensation. A writ of preliminary injunction
is an extraordinary event and is the strong arm of equity or a transcendent remedy. It is
granted only to protect actual and existing substantial rights. Without actual and existing rights
on the part of the applicant, and in the absence of facts bringing the matter within the
conditions for its issuance, the ancillary writ must be struck down for being issued in grave
abuse of discretion. Thus, injunction will not issue to protect a right not in esse, which is merely
contingent, and which may never arise, or to restrain an act which does not give rise to a cause
of action.
Here, the respondents did not establish the existence of an actual right to be protected by
injunction. They did not, to begin with, hold any enforceable claim in the property subject of
the MTCC decision and of the writ of execution. Presumably well aware that the respondents
held absolutely no valid and existing right in the land, the RTC Judge had plainly no factual and
legal bases for enjoining the enforcement of the writ of execution through the TRO and the writ
of preliminary injunction. He obviously acted arbitrarily and whimsically, because injunction
protected only an existing right or actual interest in property. Thus, he was guilty of committing
manifestly grave abuse of discretion, and compounded his guilt by stopping the enforcement of
a final and executory decision of the MTCC.

Fernandez v. CA and Olivares

GR 131094

Doctrine:

1. The residual jurisdiction of the trial court is available at a stage in which the court is
normally deemed to have lost jurisdiction over the case or the subject matter involved in
the appeal. This stage is reached upon the perfection of the appeals by the parties or
upon the approval of the records on appeal, but prior to the transmittal of the original
records or the records on appeal. Considering that no appeal was perfected in this case
and the records of the case have not yet been transmitted to the CA, the case has not
yet attained the residual jurisdiction stage so as to say that the trial court already lost
the jurisdiction it first acquired and that it is left with only its residual powers.

2. A motion for new trial must be filed during the period for filinf an appeal and that such
period cannot be extended.

Facts:

Case for unlawful detainer by Olivares was dismissed by the MTC for lack of sufficient
cause of action. On appeal, was reversed by the RTC ordering Fernandez to pay costs.

On July 12, 1994, or 14 days after receipt of decision, Fernandez filed a Motion for
reconsideration. Denied, on Dec. 1, 1994 he filed with the CA Motion for Extension of Time to
File Petition for review. Motion granted Dec. 12, 1994.
 Days prior, on Dec. 9, Fernandez filed a Motion for New Trial with the RTC, and on Dec.
29, withdrew his CA Petition for Review.

RTC denied Motion for New trial, saying CA jurisdiction has already attached. Motion for
Reconsideration was denied. Olivares meanwhile moved for the execution of judgment per
Revised Rules of Summary Procedure. Olivares granted, Fernandez denied. Hence, a Petition for
Certiorari and Mandamus with prayer for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction and
temporary restraining order. CA acted on temporary restraint, until it affirmed the RTC stance.
Motion for reconsideration denied. Thus, the SC petition.

Issue:

Whether or not the mere filing by petitioner of a motion for extension of time to file petition for
review, which was later withdrawn, automatically divested the RTC of its jurisdiction over the
case as to entertain a motion for new trial.

Held:

The RTC have not lost totally its jurisdiction, but Fernandez by filing his motion for new trial
beyond the period to appeal, had unwittingly sealed his fate and stripped himself of any further
relief.

Case Title: Philippine Nails and Wires Corporation vs. Malayan

Insurance Company, Inc.

GR Number: 143933. February 14, 2003.*

Facts:
Philippine Nails (Petitioner) filed a complaint in RTC for recovery of contractual liability (for the
sum of P2,698,637.00, representing the insured value of the lost/undelivered 377.168 metric
tons of Prime Newly Hot Rolled Steel Billets) against Malayan Insurance (Respondent) under its
Marine Cargo Policy. Respondent filed a motion to dismiss on grounds of failure to state a cause
of action and improper venue. RTC dismissed respondent’s motion to dismiss. Responsive
pleading was not able to file by respondent on the deadline set by RTC, thus it was declared by
in default. Reception of petitioner’s evidence ex parte, then followed. Respondent only filed
their answer to the complaint after a default order was rendered by RTC against it (the
respondent). A week later, Respondent instituted with RTC a petition for prohibition, entreating
the court to dismiss petitioner’s complaint on the ground of improper venue. However, RTC
denied such petition for prohibition for failure to attach an affidavit of non-forum shopping. In
the meantime, Petitioner filed before RTC an ex-parte motion to expunge from the records
Respondent’s answer. This was granted by RTC. RTC, thereafter gave judgment in favor of
Petitioner. Aggrieved by the judgment, Respondent filed a Notice of Appeal against said verdict.
But before such notice of appeal, Petitioner already moved for execution of the judgment
pending appeal. Such motion for execution of judgment pending appeal was opposed by the
Respondent. RTC granted the motion for execution, correspondingly writ of execution was
issued. Upon filing of surety bond by Petitioner, the sheriff served on Respondent’s bank a
notice of garnishment. Respondent then filed the instant petition for certiorari to the CA. It filed
with the RTC motion to stay the execution and to approve its supersedeas bond, but it was
denied by such court. The CA issued a TRO enjoining petitioner and RTC from implementing the
order of garnishment. CA ruled that RTC gravely abused its discretion when it issued an order
granting Petitioner’s Motion for Execution Pending Appeal. Petitioner’s contention before the CA
is that the alleged dilatory tactics employed by respondent are sufficient reasons to grant
Petitioner’s Motion for Execution Pending Appeal. However, the Respondent argues that RTC
did not have the authority to rule on whether the appeal is dilatory and such that the filing of
supersedeas bond per se prevent the execution of judgment pending appeal. CA annulled the
writ of execution. CA also held that the trial judge improvidently issued the default order
against the Respondent. It concluded that the date on which the respondent received it allowed
the latter to file an answer on a date way beyond the deadline set by the judge. Hence, CA
granted Respondent an opportunity to file its responsive pleading, so that the case could be
properly evaluated and adjudicated on the basis of every piece of evidence adduced the both
parties.
Issue:
1. Whether or not the RTC is justified to allow an execution pending appeal based on the
ground that the Respondent’s appeal is frivolous and dilatory (which according to Petitioner
satisfied the requirement of “good reasons” to grant execution pending appeal).
2. Whether or not Petition for Certiorari lies against an order of execution pending appeal where
the same is not founded upon good reasons.

Held:
1. No. Although the Rules grant the trial court the discretion to order the execution of a
judgment or a final order even before the expiration of the period to appeal, also upon “good
reasons” stated in a special order after due hearing, such discretion, however, is allowed only
while the trial court still has “jurisdiction over the case and is in possession of either the original
record, or the record on appeal, as the case may be, at the time of the filing of such motion.”
Petitioner avers that respondent’s appeal, being purely dilatory, satisfies the requirement of
“good reasons” prescribed by the above-quoted Section. SC disagreed. Jurisprudence teaches
that the trial court cannot pass upon the question of whether an appeal is frivolous or dilatory.
That prerogative belongs to the appellate tribunal. The authority of appellate court to pass upon
the issue of whether an appeal is frivolous and dilatory is upheld. Thus, a trial court has no
power to order an execution pending appeal on that ground. Indeed, the originating court
cannot pass judgment upon the purity of its own decision and declare that an appeal therefrom
is purely dilatory. That would be an arrant display of extravagance and self-importance.

2. Yes. Certiorari lies against an order granting execution pending appeal where the same is not
founded upon good reasons; Appeal is not a speedy and adequate remedy that can relieve the
losing party from the immediate effects of an improvident execution pending appeal
Other matters:
Q: Is mere filing of bond by successful party a good reason for ordering execution
pending appeal?
A: No. The mere filing of a bond by the successful party is not a good reason for ordering
execution pending appeal, as ‘a combination of circumstances is the dominant consideration
which impels the grant of immediate execution[;] the requirement of a bond is imposed merely
as an additional factor, no doubt for the protection of the defendant’s creditor.’ ”

Mary Louise Anderson v. Enrique Ho,

G.R. No. 172590
January 7, 2013

Facts:
This is a complaint for ejectment case that was dismissed by the MeTC. The case was appealed
to the RTC which also dismissed the same without prejudice. Anderson filed an MR but the
same was denied by the RTC. Intending to file with the CA a Petition for Review under Rule 42
of the Rules of Court, Anderson’s counsel, Atty. Rommel V. Oliva (Atty. Oliva), filed a Motion for
Extension of Time of 15 days within which to file a petition allegedly due to the revisions
required in the initial draft and on account of heavy pressure of work. This was granted by the
CA. Subsequently, said counsel sought another extension of 15 days, this time claiming that the
petition had already been finalized and sent to Anderson in Hawaii, U.S.A. for her to read as
well as sign the certification and verification portion thereof.

However, as of the last day of the extended period, the petition has not yet been sent back,
hence, the additional extension being sought. In the interest of justice, the CA once again
granted the said motion for extension. On June 20, 2005, Atty. Oliva was finally able to file the
Petition for Review but the certification against forum shopping attached thereto was signed by
him on Anderson’s behalf without any accompanying authority to do so. Hence, the CA
dismissed the case as the certification of forum shopping was signed not by the petitioner
herself but by her counsel without authority to do so. A motion for reconsideration was filed
which was also denied by the CA.

Thus, petitioner now invokes before the SC the liberal interpretation of the rules of procedure.

Issue:

Whether or not the rules on certification against forum shopping may be relaxed in this case.

Ruling:

Certification against forum shopping; SPA designating counsel to sign must be executed if
party-pleader cannot sign. The need to abide by the Rules of Court and the procedural
requirements it imposes has been constantly underscored by this Court. One of these
procedural requirements is the certificate of non-forum shopping which, time and again, has
been declared as basic, necessary and mandatory for procedural orderliness.

In Vda. De Formoso v. Philippine National Bank, the Court reiterated the guidelines respecting
non-compliance with or submission of a defective certificate of non-forum shopping, the
relevant portions of which are as follows:

4) As to certification against forum shopping, non-compliance therewith or a defect therein,

xxx, is generally not curable by its subsequent submission or correction thereof, unless there is
a need to relax the Rule on the ground of ‘substantial compliance or presence of ‘special
circumstances or compelling reasons’.

xxxx

6) Finally, the certification against forum shopping must be executed by the party pleader, not
by his counsel. If, however, for reasonable or justifiable reasons, the party-pleader is unable to
sign, he must execute a Special Power of Attorney designating his counsel of record to sign on
his behalf.

The requirement that it is the petitioner, not her counsel, who should sign the certificate of
non-forum shopping is due to the fact that a “certification is a peculiar personal representation
on the part of the principal party, an assurance given to the court or other tribunal that there
are no pending cases involving basically the same parties, issues and causes of action.
Obviously, it is the petitioner, and not always the counsel whose professional services have
been retained for a particular case, who is in the best position to know whether [she] actually
filed or caused the filing of a petition in that case.” Per the above guidelines, however, if a
petitioner is unable to sign a certification for reasonable or justifiable reasons, she must execute
an SPA designating her counsel of record to sign on her behalf. A certification which had been
signed by counsel without the proper authorization is defective and constitutes a valid cause for
dismissal of the petition.

In this light, the Court finds that the CA correctly dismissed Anderson’s Petition for Review on
the ground that the certificate of non-forum shopping attached thereto was signed by Atty.
Oliva on her behalf sans any authority to do so. While the Court notes that Anderson tried to
correct this error by later submitting an SPA and by explaining her failure to execute one prior
to the filing of the petition, this does not automatically denote substantial compliance. It must
be remembered that a defective certification is generally not curable by its subsequent
correction. And while it is true that in some cases the Court considered such a belated
submission as substantial compliance, it “did so only on sufficient and justifiable grounds that
compelled a liberal approach while avoiding the effective negation of the intent of the rule on
non-forum shopping.”

While at first blush Donato appears to be similar with the case at bench, a deeper and
meticulous comparison of the two cases reveals essential differences.

In Donato, the Court held that it was impossible for the petition to have been prepared and
sent to the therein petitioner in the USA; for him to travel from Virginia to the nearest Philippine
Consulate in Washington D.C.; and for the petition to be sent back to the Philippines within the
15-day reglementary period.

The same could not, however, be said in this case. It must be remembered that on top of the
15-day reglementary period to file the petition, Atty. Oliva sought and was granted a total
extension of 30 days to file the same. Hence, Anderson had a total of 45 days to comply with
the requirements of a Petition for Review as against the 15 days afforded to the petitioner in
Donato. To this Court, the said period is more than enough time for Anderson to execute an
SPA before the nearest Philippine Consulate, which again unlike in Donato, was located in the
same state where Anderson was (Hawaii), and thereafter to send it to the Philippines. Anent
her allegation that her health condition at that time hindered her from going to the proper
authorities to execute an SPA, the same deserves scant consideration as no medical certificate
was submitted to support this. “Indeed, the age-old but familiar rule is that he who alleges
must prove his allegations.”

Moreover, simultaneous with the filing of a Motion for Reconsideration, the proper certificate of
non-forum shopping was submitted by the petitioner in Donato. Notably in this case, the SPA
was submitted two months after the filing of Anderson’s Motion for Reconsideration. It took that
long because instead of executing an SPA before the proper authorities in Hawaii and sending
the same to the Philippines, Anderson still waited until she came back to the country and only
then did she execute one. It thus puzzles the Court why Anderson opted not to immediately
submit the SPA despite her awareness that the same should have been submitted
simultaneously with the Petition for Review. Hence, it cannot help but conclude that the delay in
the submission of the SPA is nothing but a product of Anderson’s sheer laxity and indifference
in complying with the rules.

It is well to stress that “[r]ules are laid down for the benefit of all and should not be made
dependent upon a suitor’s sweet time and own bidding.” They should be faithfully complied
with42 and may not simply be ignored to suit the convenience of a party.43 Although they are
liberally construed in some situations, there must, however, be a showing of justifiable reasons
and at least a reasonable attempt at compliance therewith, which unfortunately are not
obtaining in this case.

In view of the foregoing, this Court affirms the CA’s dismissal of Anderson’s Petition for Review.

Case Title, GR #: MERCURY DRUG CORPORATION and AURMELA GANZON, v. RAUL

DE LEON, G.R. No. 165622

Facts:
Respondent Raul T. De Leon noticed that his left eye was reddish. Upon his friend’s
prescription, he went to Mercury Drug to buy the prescribed drug. However, the assistant
pharmacist had issued Cortisporin Otis Solution – an ear drop, instead of Cortisporin
Ophthalmic, the prescribed eye drop. De Leon, unaware of the mistake, requested the sheriff to
assist him in using the supposed eye drop. He in effect, felt searing pain instead of relief. De
Leon went to Mercury Drug, but instead of apologies, the assistant pharmacist brazenly replied
that she was unable to read the prescription and had accommodated him as he is a regular
customer.
De Leon filed a complaint for damages against Mercury Drug for negligence. RTC rendered
judgment in favor of De Leon. Mercury Drug elevated the matter to CA. Raising technical
grounds, De Leon moved for the appeal’s dismissal. The motion filed by Mercury is wanting as
to page references to the records as required in Sec 13 of Rule 44 thus, CA granted De Leon’s
motion to dismiss and dismissed Mercury’s appeal.
Issue:
Whether or not CA committed grave abuse of discretion in dismissing Mercury Drug’s appeal
despite substantial compliance with Sec 1 (f) Rule 60 and Sec 13, Rule 44 of the Rules of Court.

Held:
Yes. Dismissal of an appeal under Rule 50 is discretionary. The absence of page reference to
the record is a ground for dismissal. It is a requirement intended to ultimately aid the appellate
court in arriving at a just and proper conclusion of the case. However, such dismissal is not
mandatory, but discretionary on the part of the appellate court. Te Court held that the failure to
properly cite reference to the original records is not a fatal procedural lapse.
In the case under review, although there were no page references to the records, Mercury Drug
referred to the exhibits, TSN, and attachments of the case. Despite its deficiencies, the brief is
sufficient in form and substance as to apprise the appellate court of the essential facts, nature
of the case, the issues raised, and the laws necessary for the disposition of the same.
The petition is PARTIALLY GRANTED. The Decisions of the CA and the RTC in Paranaque City
are AFFIRMED WITH MODIFICATION, in that the award of moral and exemplary damages has
been reduced.

Doctrine:
The ground for dismissal under Section 1 of Rule 50 is discretionary and not mandatory. Sound
discretion must be exercised in consonance with the tenets of justice and fair play, keeping in
mind the circumstances obtained in the case.

Duty Free Philippines vs. Bureau of Internal Revenue

G. R. No. 197228, October 8, 2014

Facts:
Duty Free Philippines (petitioner) is a merchandising system established by then by
ministry of Tourism through Philippine Tourism Authority pursuant to EO 46. As a government
instrumentality, petitioner filed a request for refund of the withholding tax on certain payments
made by credit card companies and remitted to the BIR. BIR denied the request and the
request for reconsideration. The ruling prompted the petitioner to file an appeal with the
Department of Finance where it affirmed the BIR Ruling. A petition for Review was filed with
the CTA and after trial CTA Special First Division rendered decision in favour of the respondent.
Petitioner directly appealed to SC under Rule 45 assailing the decision and Resolution of the
CTA Division. Respondent raised the issue of mode of appeal of petitioner alleging that
petitioner chose the wrong mode of appeal by directly availing itself of the remedies before SC
without first elevating the case to the CTA en banc as provided under Rule 16 of the Revised
Rules of the CTA.

Issue:
Whether or not the petitioner chose the wrong mode of appeal by directly availing itself
of the remedies before SC without first elevating the case to the CTA en banc.

Held:
Yes, the Petition is flawed with procedural infirmity.
The CTA came into being with the passage of R.A. No. 1125 on 16 June 1954. Section
18 of this law provides for the manner in which an appeal from the decision of the CTA to the
Supreme Court is made. However, the enactment of R.A. No. 9282 which took effect on 23 April
2004, elevated the rank of the CTA to the level of a collegiate court, making it a co-equal body
of the Court of Appeals. The appeal of a CTA decision under Section 18 of R.A. No. 1125 was
also amended by R.A. No. 9282. Section 19 was added, and it reads:
Section 11. Section 18 of the same Act is hereby amended as follows:
SEC. 18. Appeal to the Court of Tax Appeals En Banc. - No civil
proceeding involving matter arising under the National Internal Revenue Code,
the Tariff and Customs Code or the Local Government Code shall be maintained,
except as herein provided, until and unless an appeal has been previously filed
with the CTA and disposed of in accordance with the provisions of this Act.
A party adversely affected by a resolution of a Division of the CTA on a motion
for reconsideration or new trial, may file a petition for review with the CTA en
banc.
SEC. 19. Review by Certiorari. - A party adversely affected by a decision or
ruling of the CTA en banc may file with the Supreme Court a verified petition for
review on certiorari pursuant to Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.
Furthermore, Section 2, Rule 4 of the Revised Rules of the CTA reiterates the exclusive
appellate jurisdiction of the CTA en banc relative to the review of the court divisions’ decisions
or resolutions on motion for reconsideration or new trial in cases arising from administrative
agencies such as the BIR. This Court has no jurisdiction to review the Decision and Resolution
rendered by the Special First Division of the CTA. Thus, the instant Petition must fail.

Doctrine:
An appeal is neither a natural nor a constitutional right, but is merely statutory. The
implication of its statutory character is that the party who intends to appeal must always
comply with the procedures and rules governing appeals; or else, the right of appeal may be
lost or squandered. Neither is the right to appeal a component of due process. It is a mere
statutory privilege and may be exercised only in the manner prescribed by, and in accordance
with, the provisions of law
JOWETT K. GOLANGCO, Petitioner, versus ATTY. JONE B. FUNG, Respondent.
OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN, Petitioner, versus HON. COURT OF APPEALS and
ATTY. JONE B. FUNG,
Respondents.
G.R. No. 147640 and G.R. No. 147762 | 2006-10-12

Facts:
Atty. Fung is an employee of the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration (POEA), who
is tasked to conduct an on-the-spot investigation of the activities of G&M (Phil.) Inc. and to
verify in particular the placement fee being charged as alleged in the letter-complaint.
Respondent was likewise directed to conduct a discreet surveillance of the recruitment agency.

As a result of their surveillance, the operatives recommended that an entrapment operation be

conducted on the employees of the agency that leads to the arrest of Encenada and Golangco..

Aggrieved by his arrest, petitioner Golangco filed a criminal complaint against respondent
before the Office of the Ombudsman for arbitrary detention and violation of Section 3,
paragraphs (a) and (e) of Republic Act No. 3019. An administrative complaint for oppression,
abuse of authority, gross inefficiency, gross neglect of duty and grave misconduct arising from
the same incident was likewise filed against respondent.

The criminal complaint was initially dismissed but eventually approved by the Ombudsman
finding Atty. Fung guilty of the administrative charges filed against him. Ombudsman Desierto
disapproved Graft Investigation Officer Onos' Resolution recommending the dismissal of the
administrative complaint against respondent, which, had already been approved by Assistant
Ombudsman Aportadera by authority of then Acting Ombudsman Villa.

With the Ombudsman's approval of the Information prepared by De Guzman, said information
was subsequently filed before the RTC, Branch 38, Manila.

A Petition for Review on Certiorari with this Court impugning the validity of the foregoing
Resolution and Order adjudging him guilty of oppression, gross inefficiency, gross neglect of
duty and grave misconduct. The petition, was later referred to the Court of Appeals based on
the doctrine laid down in Fabian v. Hon. Desierto which vested in the Court of Appeals the
appellate jurisdiction over decisions of the Ombudsman pertaining to administrative disciplinary
cases.

In a Decision dated 24 August 2000, the Court of Appeals reversed the ruling of the
Ombudsman. It likewise directed the Ombudsman to cause the withdrawal of the information
filed with the RTC of Manila, Branch 38, in the criminal case filed against respondent.
Petitioner Golangco and the Office of the Ombudsman separately filed motions for
reconsideration of the decision. These motions were denied by the Court of Appeals in a
Resolution dated 28 March 2001.

Hence, these petitions.

Issue: a) Whether or not the Appellate Court erred in annulling the Resolution of the
Ombudsman?
b) Whether or not the Appellate Court a Quo has jurisdiction to review the findings of probable
cause by the Ombudsman in the criminal case, much less direct the latter to withdraw said case
already filed with RTC.

Held: a) No, the Court of Appeals did not err when it held that respondent is not liable for the
administrative charge hurled against him.

The Court defined Oppression, Gross inefficiency, Gross neglect of duty or Gross Negligence
and Misconduct and from the disquisition of the court, the conduct of respondent in arresting
petitioner Golangco was far from being oppressive, malicious, grossly negligent, inefficient or
abusive. On the contrary, respondent was just doing his legal duty as a government official
tasked with enforcing the law.

b.) No. Court of Appeals has jurisdiction over orders, directives and decisions of the Office of
the Ombudsman in administrative disciplinary cases only. It cannot, therefore, review the
orders, directives or decisions of the Office of the Ombudsman in criminal or non-administrative
cases.

In the case under consideration, the Court of Appeals, instead of confining itself to the
administrative case appealed before it, reviewed the decision of the Office of the Ombudsman
in OMB-0-93-0407 finding probable cause against respondent. The Court of Appeals further
ordered the Office of the Ombudsman to withdraw the criminal information filed by the same
with the RTC of Manila docketed as Criminal Case No. 96-149144. Such act by the Court of
Appeals cannot be countenanced. It is settled that a judgment rendered by a court without
jurisdiction over the subject matter is void. Since the Court of Appeals has no jurisdiction over
decisions and orders of the Ombudsman in criminal cases, its ruling on the same is void.

G.R. No. 165125 November 18, 2005

CESAR T. VILLANUEVA, PEDRO S. SANTOS, and ROY C. SORIANO, Petitioners,

- versus –

MAYOR FELIX V. OPLE and VICE-MAYOR JOSEFINA R. Contreras, Respondents.

Facts:

On December 8, 2003, Petitioners Cesar T. Villanueva, Pedro S. Santos, and Roy C. Soriano filed
a Joint Affidavit-Complaint before the Office of the Ombudsman. They charged incumbent
Mayor Felix V. Ople and Vice-Mayor Josefina R. Contreras of Hagonoy, Bulacan, of violation of
Section 3(e) of RA No. 3019 or the "Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act," in relation to Sections
305-(a), 318 and 351 of the Local Government Code (LGC).

Petitioners alleged that the annual budget for Fiscal Year (FY) 2003 of the Municipality of
Hagonoy had been submitted by Mayor Ople -- through Vice-Mayor Contreras -- to the
Sangguniang Bayan of Hagonoy, only on June 11, 2003, instead of on October 16 of the
preceding year, as mandated by Section 318, paragraph 2 of Book II, Title V, Chapter III of the
LGC. They added that Vice-Mayor Contreras had failed to refer the budget to the chief legal
counsel of the municipality; and that, together with the other incumbent members of the
Sangguniang Bayan, she had instead sought the approval of the alleged "Illegal Annual Budget
for 2003."

On the theory that no enabling resolution had been enacted authorizing expenditures of the
municipality to be based on the annual budget for the preceding year, petitioners claimed that
the disbursement of public funds during the period January 1, 2003 to July 11, 2003]and/or
August 27, 2003 had been illegal. They therefore prayed that respondents be held liable for the
illegal disbursements done in the discharge of official functions, through evident bad faith
and/or gross negligence that had caused undue injury to the Municipality of Hagonoy, Bulacan.

Respondents filed their respective Counter-Affidavits, both dated February 27, 2004, and
practically identical in form and substance. They stated that the proposed budget had actually
been submitted on June 26, 2003, and not June 11, 2003. It was submitted only on that date,
because Commission on Audit (COA) Circular No. 2002-2003, otherwise known as the "New
Government Accounting System," had mandated the revision of accounting procedures. In
compliance with that Circular, the municipality had to review and modify almost all of its
financial transactions beginning January 1, 2002. In order to prepare a feasible budget, they
allegedly had to know the locality's financial position for the prior year, data on which had to
come from the accounting department.

According to respondents, the Sangguniang Bayan of Hagonoy and the Sangguniang

Panlalawigan of Bulacan eventually passed and approved the proposed budget, whose
effectivity date was January 1, 2003. They averred that the Local Government Code had not
required the vice-mayor to submit the budget to the legal officer of the municipality for review.

Finally, respondents claimed that the disbursements of public funds during the absence of an
approved budget were legal under Section 323 of RA 7160 or the LGC.

In their Reply and Supplemental Reply, petitioners reiterated their allegations in their Joint
Affidavit-Complaint, in which they stressed that Section 323 of the LGC had required the mayor
to submit the budget for the coming fiscal year not later than October 16 of the current FY.

Ruling of the Deputy Ombudsman :

The Office of the Deputy Ombudsman for Luzon (OMB-Luzon) found no probable cause against
respondents. It noted that the charge was premised on allegedly illegal disbursements that had
caused undue injury to the government. Yet, petitioners failed to specify which disbursements
had been made illegally. Besides, there was no proof that the expenditures unduly benefited
certain individuals or were made pursuant to the regular operations of the municipality.

The OMB-Luzon also held that Section 323 of the LGC had authorized the reenactment of the
budget for the preceding year to allow the municipal government to function and carry out its
mandate. Hence, the disbursements made during the questioned period when the new budget
had not yet been approved could not have been illegal

In denying petitioners' Motion for Reconsideration, the OMB-Luzon pointed out that the alleged
undue injury should have been specified, quantified, and proven to the point of moral
certainty. It found no reason to set the case for clarificatory hearings or to issue subpoenas.

Hence, this Petition.

Issue :

Whether or not the admitted flagrant violation of Respondent Mayor Felix V. Ople of
Section 318, LGC, aided and abetted by co-respondent Vice Mayor Josefina R.
"(A) Contreras, has been and can be validated by Section 323 of the LGC.

Whether or not there is any specific LGC [provision] which could be claimed as the
"(B) legal remedy in validating Respondent Mayor Felix V. Ople's admitted flagrant violation
of Section 318, LGC.

Whether or not at the National Government level there are comparable constitutional
mandatory provisions (a) that no money shall be paid out of the treasury except in
"(C) pursuance of an appropriation made by law; (b) when the preceding year's budget is
deemed reenacted; and (c) deadline of President's constitutional duty to submit
proposed budget.

Whether or not disbursements of municipal money out of the municipal treasury even
"(D) in the absence of legally adopted annual budget cannot be characterized as 'undue
injury' because:

"It is illogical, if not absurd, to assume that a municipal government no longer has
the capacity to function and carry out its mandate only because its annual budget
has not been approved."

Whether or not when [petitioners], in seeking preliminary investigation in OMB-L-C-03-

1550-L, are precluded at the same time from seeking OMB's broad fact-finding
"(E) investigatory power, function and duty to find the truth of the exact amount of illegal
disbursements of municipal funds during the fiscal year 2003 when there was no
legally enacted 2003 annual budget pursuant to:
 '(E.1) Sections 12 and 13, Article XI of the 1987 Constitution;

'(E.2) Section 13, 15, 23, 26 and 31 of the OMB Act of 1989; and

Rule II, Sections 1, 2, 3, 4-(f) and Rule III, ADO-7, Rules of Procedure of
'(E.3)
the OMB, April 10, 1990.

Whether or not clear and serious legal error is committed by the OMB in denying
clarificatory hearing to ascertain material facts to find the true and exact amount of
"(F) illegal disbursements of municipal money during the fiscal year 2003 when there was
no legally enacted 2003 annual budget pursuant to OMB's broad investigative power,
function and duty.

Whether or not it is clear and serious legal error for OMB-Luzon in denying issuance of
subpoena to the 2 municipal officials, listed by the [petitioners] in their 'Joint
Complaint-Affidavit' as witnesses to be subpoenaed in the investigation, to certify or
"(G)
affirm the exact amount of disbursements during the fiscal year 2003 when there was
no legally enacted annual budget, on the ground that issuance of the subpoena would
make OMB-Luzon engage in 'fishing expedition.'"

Held :

The Petition is bereft of merit.

Preliminary Matter:
Wrong Remedy Instituted

The proper remedies in questioning decisions and resolutions of the Office of the Ombudsman
(OMB) have already been settled in a catena of cases.

Fabian v. Desierto held that appeals from the orders, directives, or decisions of the OMB in
administrative disciplinary cases were cognizable by the Court of Appeals. Tirol v. Del
Rosario clarified that, in non-administrative cases in which the OMB had acted with grave abuse
of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, a petition for certiorari under Rule 65
may be filed directly with this Court. Accordingly, Kuizon v. Desierto held that this Court had
jurisdiction over petitions for certiorari questioning the resolutions or orders of the ombudsman
in criminal cases.

Thus, petitioners committed a procedural error in resorting to a Petition for Review under Rule
45 of the Rules of Court. To challenge the dismissal of their Complaint and to require the OMB
to file an information, petitioners should have resorted to a petition for certiorari under Rule 65
of the Rules of Court. The only ground upon which this Court may entertain a review of the
OMB's resolution is grave abuse of discretion, not reversible errors.
Main Issue:
No Grave Abuse of Discretion

A special civil action for certiorari is the proper remedy when a government officer has acted
with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction; and there is no plain,
speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. But even assuming that the
present Petition may be treated as one for certiorari, the case must nevertheless be dismissed.

Grave abuse of discretion implies a capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment tantamount
to lack or excess of jurisdiction. The exercise of power must have been done in an arbitrary or
a despotic manner by reason of passion or personal hostility. It must have been so patent and
gross as to amount to an evasion of positive duty or a virtual refusal to perform the duty
enjoined or to act at all in contemplation of law.

In the present case, petitioners do not even allege that the OMB gravely abused its discretion in
issuing its questioned Resolution. A perusal of the issues they submitted reveals that the crux
of the controversy revolves around the finding of the deputy ombudsman that there was no
probable cause against respondents. They allege that he committed legal errors in arriving at
his findings and conclusions and had in fact no basis for dismissing their Complaint. The OMB's
judgment may or may not have been erroneous, but it has not been shown to be tainted with
arbitrariness, despotism or capriciousness amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.

No Prima Facie Evidence

Under the present factual milieu, petitioners clearly failed to establish the following elements of
a violation of Section 3(e) of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act:

"1. The accused is a public officer or a private person charged in conspiracy with former;

"2. That he or she causes undue injury to any party, whether the government or a private
party;

"3. That said public officer commits the prohibited acts during the performance of his or her
official duties or in relation to his or her public positions;

"4. Such undue injury is caused by giving unwarranted benefits, advantage or preference to
such parties; and

"5. That the public officer has acted with manifest partiality, evident bad faith, or gross
inexcusable negligence."
A preliminary investigation constitutes a realistic judicial appraisal of the merits of a case. The
complainant must adduce sufficient proof of guilt as basis for a criminal charge in court. As
discussed earlier, the present petitioners did not submit any proof in support of their
accusations against respondents.

Hence, the Court is bound to respect the deputy ombudsman's professional judgment in finding
the case dismissible, absent a showing of grave abuse of discretion. Government resources and
the time and effort of public officials would be needlessly wasted if the courts allow
unmeritorious cases to be filed and given due course. It would be better to dismiss a case, like
the present one in which the circumstances blatantly show that the act complained of does not
constitute the offense charged.

WHEREFORE, the Petition is hereby DENIED, and the assailed Resolution and Order
are AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioners.

SO ORDERED.

SALVADOR VS. MAPA,

G.R. NO. 135080, November 28, 2007
DOCTRINE: The remedy from the adverse resolution of the Ombudsman is a petition for
certiorari under Rule 65, not a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45.

FACTS
On October 8, 1992 then President Fidel V. Ramos issued Administrative Order No. 13 creating
the Presidential Ad Hoc Fact-Finding Committee on Behest Loans.

Several loan accounts were referred to the Committee for investigation, including the loan
transactions between Metals Exploration Asia, Inc. (MEA), now Philippine Eagle Mines, Inc.
(PEMI) and the Development Bank of the Philippines (DBP).

After examining and studying the documents relative to the loan transactions, the Committee
determined that they bore the characteristics of behest loans, as defined under Memorandum
Order No. 61 because the stockholders and officers of PEMI were known cronies of then
President Ferdinand Marcos; the loan was under-collateralized; and PEMI was undercapitalized
at the time the loan was granted.

Consequently, Atty. Orlando L. Salvador, Consultant of the Fact-Finding Committee, and

representing the Presidential Commission on Good Government (PCGG), filed with the Office of
the Ombudsman (Ombudsman) a sworn complaint for violation of Sections 3(e) and (g) of
Republic Act No. 3019, or the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, against the respondents.

After considering the Committee’s allegation, the Ombudsman handed down the assailed
Resolution, dismissing the complaint. The Ombudsman conceded that there was ground to
proceed with the conduct of preliminary investigation. Nonetheless, it dismissed the complaint
holding that the offenses charged had already prescribed.

The Committee filed a Motion for Reconsideration, but the Ombudsman denied it on July 27,
1998.

ISSUE
What is the remedy from the adverse resolution of the Ombudsman?
RULING
The remedy from the adverse resolution of the Ombudsman is a petition for certiorari under
Rule 65, not a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45.

Indeed, what was filed before this Court is a petition captioned as Petition for Review on
Certiorari. We have ruled, time and again, that a petition for review on certiorari is not the
proper mode by which resolutions of the Ombudsman in preliminary investigations of criminal
cases are reviewed by this Court. However, though captioned as a Petition for Review on
Certiorari, we will treat this petition as one filed under Rule 65 since a reading of its contents
reveals that petitioner imputes grave abuse of discretion to the Ombudsman for dismissing the
complaint. The averments in the complaint, not the nomenclature given by the parties,
determine the nature of the action. In previous rulings, we have treated differently labeled
actions as special civil actions for certiorari under Rule 65 for reasons such as justice, equity,
and fair play.

Rovira vs Heirs of Jose Deleste GR 160825

Doctrine: Record on appeal required in cases where multiple appeals are allowed

FACTS:

This Petition for Review on Certiorari assails the Decision of the Court of Appeals (CA) which set
aside and vacated the Orders of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Iligan City. Also assailed is
the Resolution denying the motion for reconsideration. The CA found that the RTC gravely
abused its discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction when it recalled its Order
granting the notice of appeal despite having been already divested of its jurisdiction.

The RTC of Iligan City issued an Order granting the motion of Atty. Rovira and awarded him
attorney's fees of 25% of the 17-hectare portion adjudicated to Dr. Deleste. The respondents
filed a Notice of Appeal. Atty. Rovira filed a Motion for Writ of Execution and to Dismiss Appeal
to which the respondents filed their opposition. RTC granted the Notice of Appeal of the
respondents and further instructed: "Let the order of this Court granting attorney's fees to Atty.
Rovira together with his testimony be transmitted to the CA." However, Atty. Rovira filed a
motion for reconsideration alleging among others that the respondents' notice of appeal failed
to comply with the requirements of Rule 13 of the Rules of Court.

Issue: Whether or not in cases involving multiple appeals, is a record on appeal necessary to
perfect the appeal?

Held: Multiple appeals are allowed in special proceedings, in actions for partition of property
with accounting, in the special civil actions of eminent domain and foreclosure of mortgage. The
rationale behind allowing more than one appeal in the same case is to enable the rest of the
case to proceed in the event that a separate and distinct issue is resolved by the court and held
to be final. In such a case, the filing of a record on appeal becomes indispensable since only a
particular incident of the case is brought to the appellate court for resolution with the rest of
the proceedings remaining within the jurisdiction of the trial court.

Since the case has not been made out for multiple appeals, a record on appeal is unnecessary
to perfect the appeal. The only requirement to perfect the appeal in the present case is the
filing of a notice of appeal in due time. This the respondents did. Concededly, the respondents
did not strictly follow Rule 13, Sec. 11 on priorities on modes of service. However, since rules of
procedure are mere tools designed to facilitate the attainment of justice, their strict and rigid
application which would result in technicalities that tend to frustrate rather than promote
substantial justice must be avoided. The relaxation of the rules on service is all the more proper
in the present case, where petitioner had already received his copy of the notice of appeal by
registered mail, since the Court has previously ruled that a litigant’s failure to furnish his
opponent with a copy of his notice of appeal is not a sufficient cause for dismissing it and that
he could simply have been ordered to furnish appellee with a copy of his appeal.

Case Title: Jose Luis Angel B. Orosa vs. Alberto C. Roa

GR Number: 140423, dated July 14, 2006

Facts:
Jose Luis Orosa, (Petitioner), dentist by profession, filed a case against Albert C. Roa
(Respondent), likewise a dentist, for a crime of libel allegedly committed by the latter against
the former. The complaint is stemmed from an article entitled “Truth vs. Rumors: Questions
against Dr. Orosa”, which was written by the respondent and published in Dental Trading Post,
a bi-monthly publication of the Dental Exchange Co., Inc. In gist, the article delved into the
possibility of a father, who happened to be an examiner in a licensure examination for dentistry,
where his sons were examinees, manipulating the examinations or the results thereof to enable
his children to top the same. Petitioner alleged that the said article is defamatory as it
besmirched his honor and reputation as a dentist and as the topnotcher in the dental board
examinations held in May 1994. For the respondent, however, he claimed that the article
constitutes fair and accurate report on a matter of both public and social concern, and that such
article was not written with malice but with a sincere desire to contribute to the improvement of
the integrity of professional examinations. After preliminary investigation, the city prosecutor
issued a resolution dismissing the petitioner’s complaint, stating that the said publication is a
bona fide communication on matters of public concern, made without malice and that it is
privilege matters in favor of respondent. Petitioner appealed it to DOJ. Acting on appeal, the
chief state prosecutor issued a resolution setting aside the findings of city prosecutor and
directing the latter to file information for libel against the respondent. Accordingly, in the RTC,
an information for libel was filed against respondent. Adversely affected, respondent appealed
to the Secretary of Justice. Justice Secretary reversed the chief state prosecutor’s resolution and
directed the City prosecutor to withdraw the information earlier filed in the RTC. Petitioner
seasonably moved for reconsideration but the same was denied, thus, petitioner went to CA on
a Petition for Review under Rule 43. CA dismissed the petitioner’s Petition for Review stating
that the City Prosecution Office and the DOJ are not among the quasi-judicial agencies included
in Sec. 1 of Rule 43 whose final orders or resolutions are subject to review by CA.
Issue:
Whether or not a Petition for Review under Rule 43 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure is a
proper mode of appeal from a resolution of the Secretary of Justice directing the prosecutor to
withdraw an information in a criminal case.

Held:
No. Although the enumeration under Sec. 1 of Rule 43 is not exclusive of the agencies therein
listed (because Sec. 1 uses the phrase “among these agencies”), there still a compelling reason
to believe that the exclusion of DOJ from the list is deliberate, being in consonance with the
constitutional power of control lodge in the President over executive departments, bureaus and
offices. This power of control (which even Congress cannot limit or withdraw) means the power
of the Chief Executive to review, alter, modify, nullify or set aside what a subordinate (e.g.
Cabinet members and Heads of Line Agencies) had done in the performance of their duties and
to subordinate the judgment of the former for that of the latter. Thus, being under the control
of the President, the Sec. of Justice’s decision is subject to review of the former. In fine,
recourse from the decision of the Secretary of Justice should be to the President, instead of the
CA, under the established principle of exhaustion of administrative remedies. Immediate
recourse to the court would be premature and precipitate; subject to defined exception, a case
is susceptible of dismissal for lack of cause of action should a party failed to exhaust
administrative remedies.

Notably, Sec. 1 of Rule 43 includes the Office of the President in the agencies named therein,
thereby accentuating the fact that appeals from the rulings of department heads must first be
taken to and resolved by that office before any appellate recourse may be resorted to.

Other matters:
Q: Is a preliminary investigation a quasi-judicial proceeding?
A: No. The prosecutor in a preliminary investigation does not determine the guilt or innocence
of the accused. He does not exercise adjudication nor rule-making functions. Preliminary
Investigation is merely inquisitorial, and is often the only means of discovering the persons who
may be reasonably charged with a crime to enable the prosecutor to prepare his complaint or
information. It is not a trial of the case on the merits and has no purpose except that of
determining whether a crime has been committed and whether there is a probable cause to
believe that the accused is guilty thereof. While the prosecutor makes that determination, he
cannot be said to be acting as a quasi-court, for it is the courts, ultimately that pass judgment
on the accused, not the prosecutor.

Q: Aside from appeal, what will be the proper remedy by the Petitioner, now that his
complaint is being withdrawn as per the directive from Sec. of Justice?
A: From the time that the information was filed in the RTC, the said trial court has now the
control of the case. The remedy of the petitioner is to reiterate the reasons or grounds alleged
in his present petition by way of an appropriate opposition to City Prosecution Office’s Motion to
Withdraw Information filed in compliance with Sec. of Justice’s directive. Having control of the
case, the trial court can look into the claim of petitioner. This will enable the trial court to rule
on the matters first without the precipitate intervention of higher court.

ST. MARTIN FUNERAL HOME VS. NLRC

G.R. NO. 130866, 16 September 1998
DOCTRINE: Judgments and final orders or resolutions of the NLRC are reviewable by the
Court of Appeals in an original action for certiorari under Rule 65.

FACTS
Bienvenido Aricayos alleged that he started working as Operations Manager of petitioner St.
Martin Funeral Home on February 6, 1995. However, there was no contract of employment
executed between him and petitioner nor was his name included in the semi-monthly payroll.,
He was dismissed from his employment for allegedly misappropriating ₱38,000.00 which was
intended for payment by St. Martin Funeral Home of its value added tax (VAT) to the Bureau of
Internal Revenue (BIR).

St. Martin Funeral Home on the other hand claims that Aricayos was not its employee but only
the uncle of Amelita Malabed, the owner of petitioner St. Martin's Funeral Home. Aricayos, who
was formerly working as an overseas contract worker, asked for financial assistance from the
mother of Amelita. Since then, as an indication of gratitude, private respondent voluntarily
helped the mother of Amelita in overseeing the business.

The labor arbiter rendered a decision in favor of St. Martin Funeral Home declaring that no
employer-employee relationship existed between the parties and, therefore, his office had no
jurisdiction over the case.

Not satisfied with the said decision, private respondent appealed to the NLRC.

The NLRC rendered a resolution setting aside the questioned decision and remanding the case
to the labor arbiter for immediate appropriate proceedings. St. Martin Funeral Home then filed
a motion for reconsideration which was denied by the NLRC.

ISSUE
What is the remedy from the adverse judgments and final orders of the NLRC?

RULING
The remedy of the aggrieved party is to timely file a motion for reconsideration as a
precondition for any further or subsequent remedy, and then seasonably avail of the special
civil action of certiorari under Rule 65, for which said Rule has now fixed the reglementary
period of sixty days from notice of the decision
Under the present state of the law, there is no provision for appeals from the decision of the
NLRC. The present Section 223, as last amended by Section 12 of R.A. No. 6715, instead
merely provides that the Commission shall decide all cases within twenty days from receipt of
the answer of the appellee, and that such decision shall be final and executory after ten
calendar days from receipt thereof by the parties.

When the issue was raised in an early case on the argument that this Court has no jurisdiction
to review the decisions of the NLRC, and formerly of the Secretary of Labor, since there is no
legal provision for appellate review thereof, the Court nevertheless rejected that thesis. It held
that there is an underlying power of the courts to scrutinize the acts of such agencies on
questions of law and jurisdiction even though no right of review is given by statute; that the
purpose of judicial review is to keep the administrative agency within its jurisdiction and protect
the substantial rights of the parties; and that it is that part of the checks and balances which
restricts the separation of powers and forestalls arbitrary and unjust adjudications.

Curiously, although the 10-day period for finality of the decision of the NLRC may already have
lapsed as contemplated in Section 223 of the Labor Code, it has been held that this Court may
still take cognizance of the petition for certiorari on jurisdictional and due process
considerations if filed within the reglementary period under Rule 65.

The Court of Appeals shall have the power to try cases and conduct hearings, receive evidence
and perform any and all acts necessary to resolve factual issues raised in cases falling within its
original and appellate jurisdiction, including the power to grant and conduct new trials or
further proceedings. Trials or hearings in the Court of Appeals must be continuous and must be
completed within, three (3) months, unless extended by the Chief Justice.

Case Title: Alonzo v Rosario

GR Number: L-12309

Doctrine: A motion to dismiss interrupts the time to plead.

Facts:

This is a petition for certiorari seeking to set aside among others, the resolution of the Court of
Appeals dismissing defendant's appeal from the decision of the trial court.

This petition stems from an action for partition instituted by plaintiffs, now respondents, against
defendants, now petitioners, before the Court of First Instance of Ilocos Sur. Petitioners
interposed as a defense that the property sought to be partitioned is paraphernal of Juana
Alonzo and hence respondents have no interest in the same.
Counsel for petitioners failed to appear on trial date and thus respondents were allowed to
present evidence and on April 11, 1955, the trial court rendered decision declaring the property
conjugal in nature and decreeing its partition. A motion to set aside was filed and was denied
hence the appeal to CA.

On February 5, 1957, counsel for petitioners received notice to file their brief within 45 days
from receipt. However, on February 10, 1957, the same counsel received a copy of a motion to
dismiss the appeal filed by respondents. On February 20, 1957, counsel for petitioners received
copy of a resolution of the CA directing him to answer the motion to dismiss within 10 days
from notice. On March 1, 1957, counsel filed his opposition to the motion to dismiss as ordered
praying at the same time that, in view of the time to be spent incident to the motion to dismiss,
he be allowed to file the brief of petitioners from the time of notice is received of the resolution
of the court if the same is denegatory. On April 2, 1957, CA issued a resolution denying the
motion to dismiss, but it also denied the motion of counsel for extension of time to file brief.
Upon receipt of this resolution, counsel filed an urgent petition for reconsideration praying that,
if the same is denied, he be given at least 15 days, to be computed from said date, within
which to file petitioner's brief. The Court of Appeals not only denied this motion but also
dismissed the appeal in a resolution entered on April 12, 1957, which is now subject of the
present appeal. Petitioner’s, despite the resolution filed the brief on April 17, 1957.

Issue: Whether the CA erred in dismissing petitioner’s motion to extend time to file brief in
view of the time to be spent incident to the motion to dismiss.

Held:

Yes. We find the denial of this petition to be improper. Under Section 4, Rule 8, of the Rules of
Court, insofar as actions in the courts of first instance are concerned, a motion to dismiss
"interrupts the time to plead", and in Torres vs. Ribo, 83 Phil., 642; 46 Off. Gaz., Supp. 11, 95,
this Court said: "A bona-fide motion to dismiss an election protest suspends the period within
which the protestee should file his answer until said motion is finally decided, for the reason
that should said motion for dismissal prosper there would be no need for protestee to answer."

Although the rules concerning proceedings in the Court of Appeals do not contain a similar
provision, the same ruling may be applied by analogy for the reason that if the motion to
dismiss the appeal is granted, there will be no need for the appellant to submit his brief.
Otherwise, the result would be that appellant would have unnecessarily undergone the work of
preparing the brief and incurred the expenses incident thereto. Our ruling, therefore, is that the
period consumed during the pendency of the motion to dismiss should be excluded from the
period given to petitioners to submit their brief, and if this is done, the brief submitted by them
on April 17, 1957 may be deemed presented in due time.

Wherefore, the resolution of the Court of Appeals dated April 12, 1957 dismissing the appeal is
hereby set aside. The case is remanded to said court for decision on the merits. No costs.

Case Title: Alonzo v Rosario

GR Number: L-12309
Doctrine: A motion to dismiss interrupts the time to plead.

Facts:

This is a petition for certiorari seeking to set aside among others, the resolution of the Court of
Appeals dismissing defendant's appeal from the decision of the trial court.

This petition stems from an action for partition instituted by plaintiffs, now respondents, against
defendants, now petitioners, before the Court of First Instance of Ilocos Sur. Petitioners
interposed as a defense that the property sought to be partitioned is paraphernal of Juana
Alonzo and hence respondents have no interest in the same.

Counsel for petitioners failed to appear on trial date and thus respondents were allowed to
present evidence and on April 11, 1955, the trial court rendered decision declaring the property
conjugal in nature and decreeing its partition. A motion to set aside was filed and was denied
hence the appeal to CA.

On February 5, 1957, counsel for petitioners received notice to file their brief within 45 days
from receipt. However, on February 10, 1957, the same counsel received a copy of a motion to
dismiss the appeal filed by respondents. On February 20, 1957, counsel for petitioners received
copy of a resolution of the CA directing him to answer the motion to dismiss within 10 days
from notice. On March 1, 1957, counsel filed his opposition to the motion to dismiss as ordered
praying at the same time that, in view of the time to be spent incident to the motion to dismiss,
he be allowed to file the brief of petitioners from the time of notice is received of the resolution
of the court if the same is denegatory. On April 2, 1957, CA issued a resolution denying the
motion to dismiss, but it also denied the motion of counsel for extension of time to file brief.
Upon receipt of this resolution, counsel filed an urgent petition for reconsideration praying that,
if the same is denied, he be given at least 15 days, to be computed from said date, within
which to file petitioner's brief. The Court of Appeals not only denied this motion but also
dismissed the appeal in a resolution entered on April 12, 1957, which is now subject of the
present appeal. Petitioner’s, despite the resolution filed the brief on April 17, 1957.

Issue: Whether the CA erred in dismissing petitioner’s motion to extend time to file brief in
view of the time to be spent incident to the motion to dismiss.

Held:

Yes. We find the denial of this petition to be improper. Under Section 4, Rule 8, of the Rules of
Court, insofar as actions in the courts of first instance are concerned, a motion to dismiss
"interrupts the time to plead", and in Torres vs. Ribo, 83 Phil., 642; 46 Off. Gaz., Supp. 11, 95,
this Court said: "A bona-fide motion to dismiss an election protest suspends the period within
which the protestee should file his answer until said motion is finally decided, for the reason
that should said motion for dismissal prosper there would be no need for protestee to answer."
Although the rules concerning proceedings in the Court of Appeals do not contain a similar
provision, the same ruling may be applied by analogy for the reason that if the motion to
dismiss the appeal is granted, there will be no need for the appellant to submit his brief.
Otherwise, the result would be that appellant would have unnecessarily undergone the work of
preparing the brief and incurred the expenses incident thereto. Our ruling, therefore, is that the
period consumed during the pendency of the motion to dismiss should be excluded from the
period given to petitioners to submit their brief, and if this is done, the brief submitted by them
on April 17, 1957 may be deemed presented in due time.

Wherefore, the resolution of the Court of Appeals dated April 12, 1957 dismissing the appeal is
hereby set aside. The case is remanded to said court for decision on the merits. No costs.

MACARIA ABARRIENTOS VDA. DE CAPULONG, et. al, petitioners

Vs
WORKMEN'S INSURANCE CO., INC. and the COURT OF APPEALS, respondents
G.R. No. L-30960 October 5, 1989

Doctrines:
[1] The trial court has the power and discretion to extend the period for filing the record on
appeal in the interest of justice, if it appears that the appellant has no sufficient time to prepare
and file it within the period limited by law, either because the remaining period is very short, or
the record on appeal is voluminous, or because of some other justifiable reasons, provided the
motion for extension is filed before the expiration of the period fixed by law
[2] When the order granting extension of time is issued and notice thereof served after the
expiration of the period fixed by law, said extension of time must be counted from the date
notice of the order granting it is received

Facts:
The private respondent received a copy of the decision against it on January 4, 1969. On
February 3, 1969, the last day for perfecting its appeal, it filed a motion for an extension of "at
least thirty (30) days from the receipt of the Order of this Honorable Court within which to file
the Record on Appeal." The late Judge Federico C. Alikpala of the Court of First Instance of
Manila, who rendered the decision, issued an order on February 4,1969, granting an extension
but only for ten days and without indicating when it would commence. This order was received
by the private respondent on February 7, 1969, and seven days later, on February 14, 1969, it
filed the record on appeal.
In disapproving the record on appeal, Judge Alikpala held that it had been filed out of time as
the extension should have been counted immediately after the last day of the 30-day period for
appeal, to wit, February 3, 1969. The 10-day extension expired on February 13,1969; hence,
the record on appeal was filed one date late.
Hence, this petition for certiorari.

Issue:
1. Was the record on appeal filed on time, that is, within the extension?
2. When should the 10-day extension start to run?
Held:
1. The respondent court correctly held that the judgment of the trial court had yet become final
and executory because the period for the filing of the record on appeal had been validly
extended. As we stressed in the early case of Moya v. Barton, "the trial court has the power
and discretion to extend the period for filing the record on appeal in the interest of justice, if it
appears that the appellant has no sufficient time to prepare and file it within the period limited
by law, either because the remaining period is very short, or the record on appeal is
voluminous, or because of some other justifiable reasons, provided the motion for extension is
filed before the expiration of the period fixed by law." There is no dispute that the proviso was
satisfied in the case at bar as the motion for extension was filed on February 3, 1969, the last
day of the reglementary period.

2. As a rule, the extension should be tacked to the original period and commence immediately
after the expiration of such period. But that rule will not apply in the case at bar because the
private respondent specifically moved that it be given "at least thirty days from receipt of the
order" of the court allowing such extension.

The Order of the court simply read "Granting an extension only of ten (10) days," without more.
As it merely reduced the period but made no modification of its date of effectivity, the extension
should be counted from the date the order was received, viz., February 7, 1969. This would be
conformable to the rule laid down in Alejandro v. Endencia, where we held:
That when the order granting extension of time is issued and notice thereof served
after the expiration of the period fixed by law, said extension of time must be
counted from the date notice of the order granting it is received. (Emphasis
supplied.)

PHILIPPINE COCONUT AUTHORITY VS. CORONA INT’L INC. GR 139910

Facts:
Corona filed a case against PCA for the recovery of the sum of P9,082,221.14 which was
allegedly the unpaid balance of the purchase price of communication and computer facilities
sold by the Corona to PCA including the interest and damages. PCA raised the following
defenses in its answer: that the installation of said equipment was not done in accordance with
good engineering standards and practices; that some of the equipment delivered were not
those specified in the bid; that Corona failed to install the communication system it undertook
to put up; and that the certificate of acceptance issued to Corona was entered either through
misrepresentation or collusion. The trial court ruled in favor of Corona, ordering PCA to pay said
amount plus interest and damages. PCA elevated the case to CA while Corona filed a Motion to
Dismiss on the grounds: (1) failure of the petitioner to comply with the mandatory requirements
of Section 13, paragraphs (a), (c), (d) and (f) of Rule 44 of the Rules of Court; and (2) the
palpable dilatory character of the appeal. CA granted Corona’s Motion to Dismiss, to which PCA
sought reconsideration, which was likewise denied.
Issue:
Whether or not the appellant’s brief complied with the Requirements prescribed for its contents
Ruling:
Yes, while the “Statement of the Case" does not strictly adhere to that requirements of Rule 43,
section 13 (c), nonetheless, we should not lose sight of the purpose of Section 13 ( c) which is
to apprise the court as to the nature of the case before it. Despite its deficiencies, the nature of
the case is easily discernible from a reading of the pleading.
The requirements laid down in Section 13, Rule 43 are intended to aid the appellate court in
arriving at a just and proper conclusion of the case. However, despite its deficiencies
petitioner's appellant's brief is sufficient in form and substance as to apprise the appellate court
of the essential facts and nature of the case as well as the issues raised and the laws necessary
for the disposition of the same.
Doctrine:
Technical and procedural rules are intended to help secure, and not to suppress, substantial
justice. A deviation from a rigid enforcement of the rules may thus, be allowed to attain the
prime objective for, after all, the dispensation of justice is the core reason for the existence of
courts.

Case # 31

JOSE T. LLOREN vs. THE HON. JESUS DE VEYRA, ETC., ET AL

G.R. NO. L-13929, March 28, 1962

Facts: Petitioner Lloren, as Justice of the Peace of Itogon, Benguet, went to the office of the
chief of police of the Baguio Gold Mining Company at Itogon situated within its compound after
obtaining a permission from Alan A. Bakewell, general superintendent of the company, to
conduct a preliminary examination of the witnesses living there who could not afford to go to
the municipal hall of Itogon to testify in Criminal Case No. 894 filed in his court. In connection
with said examination, Bakewell interrupted the proceedings by insulting a witness who was
then under investigation for which reason Lloren suspended the proceedings and cited Bakewell
to appear and show cause why he should not be held in contempt for his misbehavior.
Bakewell, instead of appearing personally, submitted thru a counsel a written explanation of his
behavior which the justice of the peace considered improper and contemptuous. Considering
the submission of said written explanation not a sufficient compliance with his order, Justice of
the Peace Lloren set a date for hearing requiring Bakewell, or his counsel, to appear regarding
the incident, and having both failed to do so, Lloren issued an order directing that Bakewell be
brought before him on February 7, 1958 pursuant to Section 3, Rule 64, of the Rules of Court.
The warrant having been served upon Bakewell, the latter was placed under the custody of the
Itogon police force. But in the afternoon of the same day, Bakewell was released by virtue of a
writ of preliminary injunction issued by the court of first instance as a result of a petition for
certiorari which Bakewell filed imputing to Justice of the Peace Lloren the commission of a
grave abuse of discretion (Special Civil Action No. 752).

After this case had been heard, with due notice to respondent, the court, Honorable Jesus De
Veyra, presiding, rendered decision holding that respondent justice of the peace committed an
abuse of discretion in issuing the warrant of arrest against petitioner Alan A. Bakewell thereby
ordering that the writ of preliminary injunction issued against said justice of the peace be made
permanent. Copy of this decision was received by respondent on March 18, 1958. On April 2,
1958, he filed a motion for reconsideration, which was denied on April 14, 1958. Copy of the
order of denial was received by respondent before the close of office hours in the afternoon of
April 16, 1958. Immediately thereafter, he notified the clerk of court of his intention to appeal,
and after having raised the necessary cash bond, he tendered it to said clerk of court, but
because it was no longer within office hours the clerk of court advised respondent to make the
deposit on the following day and file in due form his notice of appeal. The next morning, April
17, 1958, respondent filed his appeal bond and notice of appeal as suggested by the clerk of
court, but on April 21, 1958, Judge De Veyra, sustaining the opposition of petitioner, denied the
appeal on the ground that the same was not perfected within the reglementary period.
Whereupon, respondent interposed the present petition for mandamus.

It appears that the decision rendered by respondent court dated March 14, 1958 was received
by Justice of the Peace Lloren on March 18, 1958. On April 2, 1958, Lloren filed a motion for
reconsideration, which was denied on April 14, 1958. Copy of the order of denial was received
by Lloren before the close of office hours in the afternoon of April 16, 1958. He filed his appeal
bond and written notice of appeal on April 17, 1958.

ISSUE: Whether or not the appeal was perfected outside the reglamentary period of 15 days?

HELD: NO

It is contended by petitioner Lloren that from March 18, 1958 to April 2, 1958 there is an
intervening period of 15 days, and having filed his motion for reconsideration on April 2, the
exact number of days that has actually elapsed was only 14 days, because he filed his motion
for reconsideration on exactly the 15th day. This day was interrupted and so when he received
copy of the order denying his motion for reconsideration he was entitled to at least 1 more day
within which to appeal. Applying the rule of computation prescribed in Rule 28 that the first day
should be excluded and the last included, it follows that when he filed his notice of appeal and
appeal bond on April 17, 1958, the same were filed exactly within the reglementary period of 15
days.
Counsel for respondent, however, sustains the contrary view. He argues: "By mathematical
operation, we find that from March 18 (when petitioner received a copy of decision) to April 17,
1958 when he filed his notice of appeal and appeal bond) there were actually 30 days, March
18 being excluded and April 17 being included in the counting. In the same manner, we find
that from April 2, 1958 (when petitioner filed his motion for reconsideration) to April 16, 1958
(when he received a copy of the order denying his motion for reconsideration) there are
actually 14 days, April 2 being excluded, and April 16 included in the counting. Deducting,
therefore, 14 days from 30 days the result is 16 days. This means that petitioner (respondent
below) filed his notice of appeal and appeal bond on the 16th day or one day late, tardiness
which is sufficient to bar the appeal. "This method of computation is in accordance with the rule
followed by this Court in the case of Federal Films, Inc. v. Judge of the First Instance of Manila,
78 Phil., 472, which expressly modified the method of computation adopted in the case
of Taroma v. Cruz and Galinato, 68 Phil., 281.

After a mature deliberation, where the members of the Court delved once more into the
methods of computation discussed in the cases mentioned by counsel for respondent, the Court
resolved not to follow the ruling in either of them and to adhere strictly to the rule of
computation embodied in Rule 28 of our rules. The idea that prevailed is that since petitioner
Lloren filed his motion for reconsideration on the 15th day of the period within which he may
perfect his appeal, that day should be excluded so that when he received copy of the order
denying his motion for reconsideration he had still 1 day within which to perfect his appeal. This
period of one day should be computed again in accordance with the rule above cited by
excluding the day of receipt and including the next day, which in this case is April 17, 1958.
Hence, the Court concluded that the appeal interposed by petitioner Lloren was still within the
reglementary period.

WHEREFORE, petition is granted. Respondent court is ordered to give course to petitioner's

appeal, with costs against respondent Alan A. Bakewell.

G.R. No. 148423 December 6, 2006

ESPERANZA G. FRONDARINA, joined by her husband, PEDRO A. FRONDARINA, petitioners,
vs.
NAPOLEON MALAZARTE and LAURA P. MALAZARTE, respondents.

DOCTRINE: It is clear under Section 1, Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure that
petitions for review on certiorari shall ONLY raise questions of law. Questions of fact are not
permitted because generally, the findings of fact of the CA are final, conclusive, and cannot be
reviewed on appeal. The reason behind the rule is that the Court is not a trier of facts and it is
not its duty to review, evaluate, and weigh the probative value of the evidence adduced before
the lower courts

Facts:

1. Flordelina Santos acquired Lot 5, Block 15-B, in Gordon Heights Subdivision, Olongapo City
fromnIlluminado Amar.
2. The property was then transferred by Santos to Cirila Gongora, sister of Esperanza
Frondarina then transferred the said to lot to her sister (Frondarina) as evidenced by the Waiver
or Renunciation of rights and paid the real estate taxes due on said property.
3. Meanwhile, respondent Malazartes alleged that on March 1, 1988, they bought the said lot
from Romeo Valencia
4. On the said date, respondents immediately started the construction of their house on the lot
without a building permit, as their application was denied due to petitioners’ complaint
5. When confronted by petitioners Frondarinas on why they entered petitioners’ lot,
respondents replied that they got permission to enter the land from Mr. Valencia, as they had
bought it from him.
6. Aggrieved, the petitioners filed a complaint in Olongapo MTCC, and it ruled in favor of Sps.
Frondarina.
7. Malarte then appealed the case to the RTC and it ruled that Malazartes were in actual and
physical possession of the disputed lot through Valencia.
8. Sps. Frondarina elevated the case to the CA but it ruled against them saying they failed to
prove that they were in actual and physical possession of the disputed lot.
9. Sps. Frondarina then filed a petition for Review under Rule 45 to the Supreme Court.
ISSUE:

WON the appeal is proper under Rule 45 and WON Sps. Frondarina are entitled to possession of
the Lot

Ruling:

The petition (appeal) is GRANTED. Sps. Frondarina are entitled to possession as they and their
predecessors-in-interest had been in peaceful, physical possession of the said lot.

Ratio:

A close perusal of the three issues presented for review before the Court readily reveals a lone
issue––who between petitioners Frondarina spouses and respondents Malazarte spouses have
prior possession of the disputed lot. Undeniably, this is a question of fact which is proscribed by
Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.

It is clear under Section 1, Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure that petitions for review
on certiorari shall ONLY raise questions of law. Questions of fact are not permitted because
generally, the findings of fact of the CA are final, conclusive, and cannot be reviewed on appeal.
The reason behind the rule is that the Court is not a trier of facts and it is not its duty to review,
evaluate, and weigh the probative value of the evidence adduced before the lower courts.

The bar on factual issues, however, admits of certain reasonable deviations like when the
judgment is based on misappreciation of facts or when the findings of facts of the CA are
conflicting or contrary to the trial court’s own findings.

Sps. Frondarina went to the lot 3 or 4 times a week and exercised acts of ownership and
possession over it by fencing the sides of the lot with barbwire, planting vegetables like camote,
okra, and others, and by tending two (2) mango trees and one (1) coconut tree planted by
Esperanza’s sister, Cirila Gongora

Although tax declarations or real estate payments of property are not conclusive evidence of
ownership, nevertheless, they are good indicia of possession in the concept of an owner

Since the Malazartes were informed by Frondarinas that the disputed lot was owned by them
and had the right of over said lot, but still, Malazartes persisted in building their house on it,
Malazartes are therefore declared builders in bad faith and shall lose their house without any
right to reimbursement

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The March 13, 2001 Decision of the Court of Appeals in
CA-G.R. SP No. 61335 and the September 13, 2000 Decision of the Olongapo City Regional Trial
Court in Civil Case No. 192-0-2000 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE; and the February 28, 2000
Decision of the Olongapo City MTCC in Civil Case No. 2853 is hereby REINSTATED

DOCTRINE: It is clear under Section 1, Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure that
petitions for review on certiorari shall ONLY raise questions of law. Questions of fact are not
permitted because generally, the findings of fact of the CA are final, conclusive, and cannot be
reviewed on appeal. The reason behind the rule is that the Court is not a trier of facts and it is
not its duty to review, evaluate, and weigh the probative value of the evidence adduced before
the lower courts

Nombrefia vs. People

G.R. No. 157919
Facts:
Petitioner Celia Q. Nombrefia was the Chairman of the Board of Election Inspectors of Precinct
4, Barangay 4 of Poblacion, Baler, Aurora. On the second day of the elections, after Nombrefia
finished reading the first bundle of ballots, she took the next bundle and began flipping through
them, marking several ballots with a ballpen. A witness called the attention of one of the poll
watchers and left the precint to inform Nelia Laroza, an LDP watcher. When Laroza, her brother
and Celia Abordo went to the precint they saw Nombrefia putting ballots on her lap and leafing
through them. When Nombrefia was asked what she was doing, she simply ignored them.
Laroza confronted the petitioner when she saw the petitioner’s right hand moving as if writing X
marks, Nombrefia denied writing anything despite holding a pen in her hand. Nombrefia was
charged with violation of Section 261 of B.P. Blg. 881 before the RTC. The trial court found the
petitioner guilty beyond reasonable doubt. When raised to the Court of Appeals, it affirmed the
trial court’s decision finding the petitioner as the author of the marks or erasure on the ballots
which were distinguishable in which they were similarly and hastily made. The appellate court
also took into account testimonies of prosecution witnesses. Thus, the petition with the
Supreme Court was made.

Issue: Whether or not the findings of fact of the Court of Appeals can be reviewed by
this Honorable Court in this review proceeding under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.

Held:
No. Generally, findings of fact of the Court of Appeals are not reviewable by this Court in
a petition for review. The findings of Court of Appeals are final and conclusive if they are borne
out by record or based on substantial evidence. The exceptional circumstances enumerated in
the rules and jurisprudence whereby review is permitted are: 1) When the conclusion is a
finding grounded entirely on speculations, surmise or conjecture; (2) When the inference made
is manifestly absurd, mistaken or impossible; (3) When there is grave abuse of discretion in the
appreciation of facts; (4) When the judgment is premised on a misapprehension of facts; (5)
When the findings of fact are conflicting; (6) When the Court of Appeals in making its findings
went beyond the issues of the case and the same are contrary to the admission of both
appellants and appellees; (7) When the findings of fact of the Court of Appeals are at variance
with those of the trial court, the Supreme Court has to review the evidence in order to arrive at
the correct findings based on the record; (8) When the findings of fact are conclusions without
citation of specific evidence on which they are based; (9) When the facts set forth in the
petition as well as in the petitioners main and reply briefs are not disputed by the respondents;
(10) The findings of fact of the Court of Appeals are premised on the supposed absence of
evidence and are contradicted by the evidence on record; and (11) When certain material facts
and circumstances had been overlooked by the trial court which, if taken into account, would
alter the result of the case in that they would introduce an element of reasonable doubt which
would entitle the accused to acquittal. The petitioner was unable to show that any of the
exceptional circumstances were applicable; thus, the findings of the Court of Appeals cannot be
disturbed by the Supreme Court.

Doctrine:
Generally that the findings of fact of the Court of Appeals are not reviewable by this
Court in a petition for review; they are final and conclusive on us if they are borne out by the
record or are based on substantial evidence.

METROPOLITAN BANK & TRUST COMPANY, petitioner, vs. ABSOLUTE MANAGEMENT

CORPORATION, respondent.

688 SCRA 225 | G.R. No. 170498

January 09, 2013

FACTS

Sherwood Holdings Corporation, Inc. (SHCI) filed a complaint for sum of money against
Absolute Management Corporation (AMC). SHCI alleged in its complaint that it made advance
payments to AMC for the purchase of plywood and plyboards covered by Metrobank checks
which were all crossed, and were all made payable to AMC. These checks were given to Chua,
AMC’s General Manager, in 1998. Chua died in 1999, and a special proceeding for the
settlement of his estate was commenced before the RTC which was pending at the time AMC
filed its answer with counterclaims and third-party complaint. In its answer, AMC averred that it
had no knowledge of Chua’s transactions with SHCI and it did not receive any money from the
latter. AMC also asked the RTC to hold Metrobank liable for the subject checks in case it is
adjudged liable to SHCI.

In its present petition for review on certiorari, Metrobank asserts that it should be allowed to file
a fourth-party complaint against Chua’s estate in the proceedings before the RTC; its fourth-
party complaint was filed merely to enforce its right to be reimbursed by Chua’s estate in case
Metrobank is held liable to AMC. Hence, Section 11, Rule 6 of the Rules of Court should apply.
AMC, in its comment, maintains the line that the CA and the RTC rulings should be followed,
i.e., that Metrobank’s claim is a quasi-contract that should be filed as a claim under Section 5,
Rule 86 of the Rules of Court. AMC also challenges the form of Metrobank’s petition for failure
to comply with Section 4, Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. This provision requires petitions filed
before the Supreme Court to be accompanied by “such material portions of the record as would
support the petition[.]” According to AMC, the petition’s annexes are mostly Metrobank’s
pleadings and court issuances. It did not append all relevant AMC pleadings before the RTC and
the CA. For this reason, the petition should have been dismissed outright.

ISSUE/s of the CASE

Whether the petition for review on certiorari filed by Metrobank before the Supreme Court
complies with Section 4, Rule 45 of the Rules of Court
HELD

Yes. The present petition complies with Section 4, Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. In F.A.T. Kee
Computer Systems, Inc. v. Online Networks International, Inc., Online Networks International,
Inc. similarly assailed F.A.T. Kee Computer Systems, Inc.’s failure to attach the transcript of
stenographic notes (TSN) of the RTC proceedings, and claimed this omission to be a violation of
Section 4, Rule 45 of the Rules of Court that warranted the petition’s dismissal. The Court held
that the defect was not fatal, as the TSN of the proceedings before the RTC forms part of the
records of the case. Thus, there was no incurable omission that warranted the outright
dismissal of the petition.

The Court significantly pointed out in F.A.T. Kee that the requirement in Section 4, Rule 45 of
the Rules of Court is not meant to be an absolute rule whose violation would automatically lead
to the petition’s dismissal. The Rules of Court has not been intended to be totally rigid. In fact,
the Rules of Court provides that the Supreme Court “may require or allow the filing of such
pleadings, briefs, memoranda or documents as it may deem necessary within such periods and
under such conditions as it may consider appropriate”; and “[i]f the petition is given due
course, the Supreme Court may require the elevation of the complete record of the case or
specified parts thereof within fifteen (15) days from notice.” These provisions are in keeping
with the overriding standard that procedural rules should be liberally construed to promote their
objective and to assist the parties in obtaining a just, speedy and inexpensive determination of
every action or proceeding.

Under this guiding principle, we do not see Metrobank’s omission to be a fatal one that should
warrant the petition’s outright dismissal. To be sure, the omission to submit the adverse party’s
pleadings in a petition before the Court is not a commendable practice as it may lead to an
unduly biased narration of facts and arguments that masks the real issues before the Court.
Such skewed presentation could lead to the waste of the Court’s time in sifting through the
maze of the parties’ narrations of facts and arguments and is a danger the Rules of Court seeks
to avoid.

Our examination of Metrobank’s petition shows that it contains AMC’s opposition to its motion to
admit fourth-party complaint among its annexes. The rest of the pleadings have been
subsequently submitted as attachments in Metrobank’s Reply. A reading of these pleadings
shows that their arguments are the same as those stated in the orders of the trial court and the
Court of Appeals. Thus, even if Metrobank’s petition did not contain some of AMC’s pleadings,
the Court still had the benefit of a clear narration of facts and arguments according to both
parties’ perspectives. In this broader view, the mischief that the Rules of Court seeks to avoid
has not really been present. If at all, the omission is not a grievous one that the spirit of
liberality cannot address.

NAGKAHIUSANG MAMUMUO SA PICOP RESOURCES, INC. – SOUTHERN

PHILIPPINES FEDERATION OF LABOR (NAMAPRI – SPFL), ARTEMIO Q. AVILA, ET
AL., Petitioners,
G.R. Nos. 148839-40

Facts
This Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition puts to use both Rules 45 and 65 of the Rules of
Court, to reverse the March 7, 2001 Resolution of the Court of Appeals which enjoined the
enforcement of the November 20, 2000 Writ of Execution of the Secretary of Labor and
Employment; and its July 4, 2001 Resolution which granted the writ of preliminary injunction to
respondent PICOP Resources, Inc. and likewise denied the Motion for Reconsideration filed by
petitioner.

Issue
WON petitioner’s instant action as one under Rule 45 which is an appeal by certiorari from a CA
decision to the Supreme Court and simultaneously, also a special civil action under Rule 65
based on alleged grave abuse of discretion in a decision of the CA is valid

Held
NO. Petitioner however relented and decided to stick it out with Rule 45 as the procedural rule
to govern its petition.

As provided in Sec. 1, Rule 45, the petition for review must be from a judgment or final order or
resolution of the CA, Sandiganbayan, Regional Trial Court, and other courts, whenever
authorized by law. Since a petition for review is a mode of appeal, the judgment, order, or
resolution must be one that completely disposes of the case or of a particular matter in it. It is
clear however, that the assailed March 7, 2001 and July 4, 2001 CA Resolutions are merely
interlocutory orders or provisional remedies. The aggrieved party must await the final decision
in the petition and then appeal from the adverse judgment, in the course of which the party
may question the issuance of the interlocutory orders as errors of judgment. As there was still
no final judgment from the CA at the time of the filing of the petition, then a petition for review
under Rule 45 is not the appropriate remedy.

In the present case, petitioner NAMAPRI-SPFL miserably failed to demonstrate even an iota of
the alleged capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment on the part of the court a quo.
Without such showing, the grant of the extraordinary writ of certiorari has no basis.1âwphi1
The monetary award to the NAMAPRI-SPFL members is fully secured by the PhP 50 million bond
posted by respondent PICOP. The resort to Rule 45 is premature as petitioner could still
question the said interlocutory orders once the CA case has been decided on the merits.

Pates vs COMELEC, G.R. No. 18915

June 30, 2009
Facts: February 1, 2008 The COMELEC First Division issued its Resolution (assailed in the
petition); February 4, 2008 The counsel for petitioner Nilo T. Pates (petitioner) received a copy
of the February 1, 2008 Resolution; February 8, 2008 The petitioner filed his motion for
reconsideration (MR) of the February 1, 2008 Resolution (4 days from receipt of
the February 1, 2008 Resolution). September 18, 2008 The COMELEC en banc issued a
Resolution denying the petitioners MR (also assailed in the petition). September 22, 2008, the
petitioner received the COMELEC en banc Resolution of September 18, 2008

Under this chronology, the last day for the filing of a petition for certiorari, i.e., 30 days from
notice of the final COMELEC Resolution, fell on a Saturday (October 18, 2008), as the petitioner
only had the remaining period of 26 days to file his petition, after using up 4 days in preparing
and filing his Motion for Reconsideration. Effectively, the last day for filing was October 20,
2008 the following Monday or the first working day after October 18, 2008. The petitioner filed
his petition with us on October 22, 2008 or two days late; hence, our Resolution of dismissal
of November 11, 2008.

The Motion for Reconsideration

The petitioner asks us in his Urgent Motion for Reconsideration with Reiteration for the
Issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order to reverse the dismissal of his petition, arguing
that the petition was seasonably filed under the fresh period rule enunciated by the Supreme
Court in a number of cases decided beginning the year 2005. The fresh period refers to the
original period provided under the Rules of Court counted from notice of the ruling on the
motion for reconsideration by the tribunal below, without deducting the period for the
preparation and filing of the motion for reconsideration.

He claims that, historically, the fresh period rule was the prevailing rule in filing petitions
for certiorari. This Court, he continues, changed this rule when it promulgated the 1997 Rules
of Civil Procedure and Circular No. 39-98, which both provided for the filing of petitions within
the remainder of the original period, the remainder being the original period less the days
used up in preparing and filing a motion for reconsideration. He then points out that
on September 1, 2000 or only three years after, this Court promulgated A.M. No. 00-02-03-
SC bringing back the fresh period rule. According to the petitioner, the reason for the change,
which we supposedly articulated in Narzoles v. National Labor Relations Commission,[1] was the
tremendous confusion generated by Circular No. 39-98.

The fresh period rule, the petitioner further asserts, was subsequently applied by this Court in
the following cases:

(1) Neypes v. Court of Appeals[2] which thenceforth applied the fresh period rule to ordinary
appeals of decisions of the Regional Trial Court to the Court of Appeals;
(2) Spouses de los Santos v. Vda. de Mangubat[3] reiterating Neypes;
(3) Active Realty and Development Corporation v. Fernandez[4] which, following Neypes,
applied the fresh period rule to ordinary appeals from the decisions of the Municipal Trial Court
to the Regional Trial Court; and
(4) Romero v. Court of Appeals[5] which emphasized that A.M. No. 00-02-03-SC is a curative
statute that may be applied retroactively.
A reading of the ruling in these cases, the petitioner argues, shows that this Court has
consistently held that the order or resolution denying the motion for reconsideration or new trial
is considered as the final order finally disposing of the case, and the date of its receipt by a
party is the correct reckoning point for counting the period for appellate review.

The Respondents Comment

We asked the respondents to comment on the petitioners motion for reconsideration. The
Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), citing Section 5, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court and its
related cases, asked via a Manifestation and Motion that it be excused from filing a separate
comment. We granted the OSGs manifestation and motion.

For her part, respondent Emelita B. Almirante (respondent Almirante) filed a comment stating
that: (1) we are absolutely correct in concluding that the petition was filed out of time; and (2)
the petitioners reliance on Section 4, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court (as amended by A.M. No.
00-02-03-SC) is totally misplaced, as Rule 64, not Rule 65, is the vehicle for review of
judgments and final orders or resolutions of the COMELEC. Respondent Almirante points out
that Rule 64 and Rule 65 are different; Rule 65 provides for a 60-day period for filing petitions
for certiorari, while Rule 64 provides for 30 days.

ISSUE: Whether or not the petitioner’s motion for reconsideration should be granted.

HELD: NO

As a Matter of Law

Section 7, Article IX-A of the Constitution provides that unless otherwise provided by the
Constitution or by law, any decision, order, or ruling of each Commission may be brought to the
Court on certiorari by the aggrieved party within 30 days from receipt of a copy thereof. For this
reason, the Rules of Court provide for a separate rule (Rule 64) specifically applicable only to
decisions of the COMELEC and the Commission on Audit. This Rule expressly refers to the
application of Rule 65 in the filing of a petition for certiorari, subject to the exception clause
except as hereinafter provided. Rule 64, however, cannot simply be equated to Rule 65 even if
it expressly refers to the latter rule.
Rule 64, however, cannot simply be equated to Rule 65 even if it expressly refers to the latter
rule. Procedurally, the most patent difference between the two – i.e., the exception
that Section 2, Rule 64 refers to – is Section 3 which provides for a special period for
the filing of petitions for certiorari from decisions or rulings of the COMELEC en
banc. The period is 30 days from notice of the decision or ruling (instead of the 60
days that Rule 65 provides), with the intervening period used for the filing of any
motion for reconsideration deductible from the originally-granted 30 days (instead
of the fresh period of 60 days that Rule 65 provides).
Significantly, the petitioner presented no exceptional circumstance or any compelling reason to
warrant the non-application of Section 3, Rule 64 to his petition. He failed to explain why his
filing was late. Other than his appeal to history, uniformity, and convenience, he did not explain
why we should adopt and apply the fresh period rule to an election case.
SEC. 3. Time to file petition.The petition shall be filed within thirty (30) days from notice of the
judgment or final order or resolution sought to be reviewed. The filing of a motion for new trial
or reconsideration of said judgment or final order or resolution, if allowed under the procedural
rules of the Commission concerned, shall interrupt the period herein fixed. If the motion is
denied, the aggrieved party may file the petition within the remaining period, but which shall
not be less than five (5) days in any event, reckoned from notice of denial.

As a Matter of Policy

The reason, as made clear above, is constitutionally-based and is no less than the importance
our Constitution accords to the prompt determination of election results. This reason far
outweighs convenience and uniformity.

Julian v Development Bank of the Philippines GR 174193

Doctrine: Non observance of docket fee payment would be tantamount to no appeal
being filed thereby rendering the challenged decision, resolution or order final and
executory.
FACTS:

Petition for Review on Certiorari of the Resolution of the Court of Appeals (CA) which dismissed
petitioner’s appeal. Also assailed is the CA’s Resolution which denied the Motion for
Reconsideration thereto.

Petitioner seeks to reverse the aforesaid Resolutions of the CA and direct the latter to admit the
payment for the docket fees enclosed in his Motion for Reconsideration so that his appeal may
be given due course, or, in the alternative, to remand the case to the court a quo for further
proceedings.

Issue: Whether or not the court of appeals erred in applying strictly the rules on docket fees.

Held: The petition lacks merit.

Payment of full docket fees within the prescribed period for taking an appeal is mandatory.

It is well-established that "[t]he right to appeal is a statutory privilege and must be exercised
only in the manner and in accordance with the provisions of the law." "Thus, one who seeks to
avail of the right to appeal must strictly comply with the requirements of the rules, and failure
to do so leads to the loss of the right to appeal."

The applicable rule for appeals from judgments issued by the RTC in the exercise of its original
jurisdiction is Rule 41 of the Rules of Court, Section 4 of which provides:

Section 4. Appellate court docket and other lawful fees. - Within the period for taking an
appeal, the appellant shall pay to the clerk of the court which rendered the judgment or final
order appealed from, the full amount of the appellate court docket and other lawful fees. Proof
of payment of said fees shall be transmitted to the appellate court together with the original
record or the record on appeal.

The Rules also provide that failure of the appellant to pay the docket and other lawful fees is a
ground for dismissal of the appeal.

The Court has consistently ruled in a number of cases that the payment of the full amount of
docket fees within the prescribed period is both mandatory and jurisdictional. It is a condition
sine qua non for the appeal to be perfected and only then can a court acquire jurisdiction over
the case. The requirement of an appeal fee is not a mere technicality of law or procedure and
should not be undermined except for the most persuasive of reasons. Non-observance would be
tantamount to no appeal being filed thereby rendering the challenged decision, resolution or
order final and executory.

Admittedly, this rule is not without recognized qualifications. The Court has declared that in
appealed cases, failure to pay the appellate court docket fee within the prescribed period
warrants only discretionary as opposed to automatic dismissal of the appeal and that the court
shall exercise its power to dismiss in accordance with the tenets of justice and fair play and with
great deal of circumspection considering all attendant circumstances.

In the case at bench, the justifications presented by petitioner for the non-payment of the
docket fees are oversight and the lack of advice from his counsel. Unfortunately, the reasons
presented are neither convincing nor adequate to merit leniency. Petitioner submits that he only
found out about the requirement to pay the docket fees when he received the CA Resolution
denying his appeal on April 22, 2005 or three days short of one year from filing of the said
appeal. This Court finds this not to be logically true to human experience. It is unusual for
petitioner’s counsel not to advice him of the required docket fees. More often than not, counsels
are aware of the docket fees required to be paid to the courts, and will ask clients for the said
amount prior to filing pleadings in court. This is so because counsels are not expected to
shoulder or advance payment for their clients. Assuming arguendo that petitioner’s counsel did
not inform him of the requirement to pay the docket fees to perfect the appeal, what we find
incredible is that petitioner apparently failed to communicate with his counsel after the filing of
said appeal. This Court has repeatedly held that "litigants, represented by counsel, should not
expect that all they need to do is sit back, relax and await the outcome of their case. "It is the
duty of a party-litigant to be in contact with his counsel from time to time in order to be
informed of the progress of his case. Moreover, the counsel’s negligence binds petitioner and,
for that reason alone the loss of his remedy was caused by his own negligence. Consequently, a
relaxation of the rule cannot be granted. The bitter consequence of such grave inadvertence is
to render the trial court’s order final and executory.

G.R. No. 129910 September 5, 2006

THE INTERNATIONAL CORPORATE BANK, INC., petitioner,

vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and PHILIPPINE NATIONAL BANK, respondents.
Doctrine: Appeals; Petitioners may not delegate upon the court the task of determining under
which rule the petition should fall; A petition cannot be subsumed simultaneously under Rule 45
and Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, and neither may petitioners delegate upon the court the task
of determining under which rule the petition should fall

Doctrine 2: Certiorari; The remedies of appeal and certiorari are mutually exclusive and not
alternative or successive; However, this Court may set aside technicality for justifiable reasons
and in the interest of justice, we will treat the petition as having been filed under Rule 45.

Facts:

1. The case originated from an action for collection of sum of money filed by the International
Corporate Bank, Inc. (petitioner) against the Philippine National Bank ("respondent")
2. The Ministry of Education and Culture issued 15 checks drawn against respondent which
petitioner accepted for deposit on various dates.
3. However, on 14 October 1981, respondent returned all the checks to petitioner without
clearing them on the ground that they were materially altered. Thus, petitioner instituted an
action for collection of sums of money against respondent to recover the value of the checks.
4. The trial court ruled in favor of the Respondent PNB and held that petitioner is not entitled to
recover the value of the checks from respondent.
5. The Court of Appeals reversed the trial court’s Decision and held that checks that have been
materially altered shall be returned within 24 hours after discovery of the alteration.
6. Respondent filed a motion for reconsideration of the 10 October 1991 Decision. In its 9
August 1994 Amended Decision, the Court of Appeals reversed itself and affirmed the Decision
of the trial court dismissing the complaint.
7. Petitioner then appeal the case to the SC by filing the petition under Rule 45 and Rule 65.

Issue: WON the filing of the Petition under both Rules 45 and 65 is a ground for dismissal.

Ruling:

Petition is granted. SC rule that respondent Philippine National Bank is liable to petitioner
International Corporate Bank, Inc.

Respondent asserts that the petition should be dismissed outright since petitioner availed of a
wrong mode of appeal. Respondent cites Ybañez v. Court of Appeals13 where the Court ruled
that "a petition cannot be subsumed simultaneously under Rule 45 and Rule 65 of the Rules of
Court, and neither may petitioners delegate upon the court the task of determining under which
rule the petition should fall.

The remedies of appeal and certiorari are mutually exclusive and not alternative or successive.
However, this Court may set aside technicality for justifiable reasons. The petition before the
Court is clearly meritorious. Further, the petition was filed on time both under Rules 45 and 65.
Hence, in accordance with the liberal spirit which pervades the Rules of Court and in the
interest of justice,16 we will treat the petition as having been filed under Rule 45