FIRST DIVISION

[G.R. No. 145368. April 12, 2002]

SALVADOR H. LAUREL, petitioner, vs. HON. ANIANO A. DESIERTO, in his capacity as
Ombudsman, respondent.
DECISION
KAPUNAN, J.:
On June 13, 1991, President Corazon C. Aquino issued Administrative Order No. 223 constituting
a Committee for the preparation of the National Centennial Celebration in 1998. The Committee was
mandated to take charge of the nationwide preparations for the National Celebration of the Philippine
Centennial of the Declaration of Philippine Independence and the Inauguration of the Malolos Congress. [1]
Subsequently, President Fidel V. Ramos issued Executive Order No. 128, reconstituting the
Committee for the preparation of the National Centennial Celebrations in 1998. It renamed the Committee
as the National Centennial Commission. Appointed to chair the reconstituted Commission was Vice-
President Salvador H. Laurel. Presidents Diosdado M. Macapagal and Corazon C. Aquino were named
Honorary Chairpersons.[2]
Characterized as an ad-hoc body, the existence of the Commission shall terminate upon the
completion of all activities related to the Centennial Celebrations.[3] Like its predecessor Committee,
the Commission was tasked to take charge of the nationwide preparations for the National Celebration of
the Philippine Centennial of the Declaration of Philippine Independence and the Inauguration of the
Malolos Congress.
Per Section 6 of the Executive Order, the Commission was also charged with the responsibility to
prepare, for approval of the President, a Comprehensive Plan for the Centennial Celebrations within six
(6) months from the effectivity of the Executive Order.
E.O. No. 128 also contained provisions for staff support and funding:
Sec. 3. The Commission shall be provided with technical and administrative staff support by a Secretariat
to be composed of, among others, detailed personnel from the Presidential Management Staff, the
National Commission for Culture and the Arts, and the National Historical Institute. Said Secretariat shall
be headed by a full time Executive Director who shall be designated by the President.
Sec. 4. The Commission shall be funded with an initial budget to be drawn from the Department of
Tourism and the presidents Contingent Fund, in an amount to be recommended by the Commission, and
approved by the President. Appropriations for succeeding years shall be incorporated in the budget of the
Office of the President.
Subsequently, a corporation named the Philippine Centennial Expo 98 Corporation (Expocorp)
was created.[4] Petitioner was among the nine (9) Expocorp incorporators, who were also its first
nine (9) directors. Petitioner was elected Expocorp Chief Executive Officer.
On August 5, 1998, Senator Ana Dominique Coseteng delivered a privilege speech in the Senate
denouncing alleged anomalies in the construction and operation of the Centennial Exposition Project at
the Clark Special Economic Zone. Upon motion of Senator Franklin Drilon, Senator Cosetengs privilege
speech was referred to the Committee on Accountability of Public Officers and Investigation (The Blue
Ribbon Committee) and several other Senate Committees for investigation.
On February 24, 1999, President Joseph Estrada issued Administrative Order No. 35, creating an ad
hoc and independent citizens committee to investigate all the facts and circumstances surrounding
the Philippine centennial projects, including its component activities. Former Senator Rene A.V.
Saguisag was appointed to chair the Committee.
On March 23, 1999, the Senate Blue Ribbon Committee filed with the Secretary of the Senate its
Committee Final Report No. 30 dated February 26, 1999. Among the Committees recommendations was
the prosecution by the Ombudsman/DOJ of Dr. Salvador Laurel, chair of NCC and of EXPOCORP
for violating the rules on public bidding, relative to the award of centennial contracts to AK (Asia
Construction & Development Corp.); for exhibiting manifest bias in the issuance of the NTP
(Notice to Proceed) to AK to construct the FR (Freedom Ring) even in the absence of a valid
contract that has caused material injury to government and for participating in the scheme to
preclude audit by COA of the funds infused by the government for the implementation of the said
contracts all in violation of the anti-graft law.[5]
Later, on November 5, 1999, the Saguisag Committee issued its own report. It recommended the
further investigation by the Ombudsman, and indictment, in proper cases of, among others, NCC Chair
Salvador H. Laurel for violations of Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019, Section 4(a) in relation to Section
11 of R.A. No. 6713, and Article 217 of the Revised Penal Code.
The Reports of the Senate Blue Ribbon and the Saguisag Committee were apparently referred to the
Fact-finding and Intelligence Bureau of the Office of the Ombudsman. On January 27, 2000, the Bureau
issued its Evaluation Report, recommending:
1. that a formal complaint be filed and preliminary investigation be conducted before the
Evaluation and Preliminary Investigation Bureau (EPIB), Office of the Ombudsman against
former NCC and EXPOCORP chair Salvador H. Laurel, former EXPOCORP President
Teodoro Q. Pea and AK President Edgardo H. Angeles for violation of Sec. 3(e) and (g) of
R.A. No. 3019, as amended in relation to PD 1594 and COA Rules and Regulations;
2. That the Fact Finding and Intelligence Bureau of this Office, act as the nominal complainant. [6]
In an Order dated April 10, 2000, Pelagio S. Apostol, OIC-Director of the Evaluation and Preliminary
Investigation Bureau, directed petitioner to submit his counter-affidavit and those of his witnesses.
On April 24, 2000, petitioner filed with the Office of the Ombudsman a Motion to Dismiss questioning
the jurisdiction of said office.
In an Order dated June 13, 2000, the Ombudsman denied petitioners motion to dismiss.
On July 3, 2000, petitioner moved for a reconsideration of the June 13, 2000 Order but the motion
was denied in an Order dated October 5, 2000.
On October 25, 2000, petitioner filed the present petition for certiorari.
On November 14, 2000, the Evaluation and Preliminary Investigation Bureau issued a resolution
finding probable cause to indict respondents SALVADOR H. LAUREL and TEODORO Q. PEA
before the Sandiganbayan for conspiring to violate Section 3(e) of Republic Act No. 3019, in
relation to Republic Act No. 1594. The resolution also directed that an information for violation of the
said law be filed against Laurel and Pea. Ombudsman Aniano A. Desierto approved the resolution with
respect to Laurel but dismissed the charge against Pea.
In a Resolution dated September 24, 2001, the Court issued a temporary restraining order,
commanding respondents to desist from filing any information before the Sandiganbayan or any court
against petitioner for alleged violation of Section 3(e) of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act.
On November 14, 2001, the Court, upon motion of petitioner, heard the parties in oral argument.
Petitioner assails the jurisdiction of the Ombudsman on the ground that he is not a public officer
because:
A.
EXPOCORP, THE CORPORATION CHAIRED BY PETITIONER LAUREL WHICH UNDERTOOK
THE FREEDOM RING PROJECT IN CONNECTION WITH WHICH VIOLATIONS OF THE ANTI-
GRAFT AND CORRUPT PRACTICES WERE ALLEGEDLY COMMITTED, WAS A PRIVATE
CORPORATION, NOT A GOVERNMENT-OWNED OR CONTROLLED CORPORATION.
B.
THE NATIONAL CENTENNIAL COMMISSION (NCC) WAS NOT A PUBLIC OFFICE.
C.
PETITIONER, BOTH AS CHAIRMAN OF THE NCC AND OF EXPOCORP WAS NOT A PUBLIC
OFFICER AS DEFINED UNDER THE ANTI-GRAFT & CORRUPT PRACTICES ACT. [7]
In addition, petitioner in his reply [8] invokes this Courts decision in Uy vs. Sandiganbayan,[9] where it
was held that the jurisdiction of the Ombudsman was limited to cases cognizable by the Sandiganbayan,
i.e., over public officers of Grade 27 and higher. As petitioners position was purportedly not classified as
Grade 27 or higher, the Sandiganbayan and, consequently, the Ombudsman, would have no jurisdiction
over him.
This last contention is easily dismissed. In the Courts decision in Uy, we held that it is the prosecutor,
not the Ombudsman, who has the authority to file the corresponding information/s against petitioner in the
regional trial court. The Ombudsman exercises prosecutorial powers only in cases cognizable by the
Sandiganbayan.
In its Resolution of February 22, 2000, the Court expounded:
The clear import of such pronouncement is to recognize the authority of the State and regular provincial
and city prosecutors under the Department of Justice to have control over prosecution of cases falling
within the jurisdiction of the regular courts. The investigation and prosecutorial powers of the Ombudsman
relate to cases rightfully falling within the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan under Section 15 (1) of R.A.
6770 (An Act Providing for the Functional and Structural Organization of the Office of the Ombudsman,
and for other purposes) which vests upon the Ombudsman primary jurisdiction over cases cognizable by
the Sandiganbayan And this is further buttressed by Section 11 (4a) of R.A. 6770 which emphasizes that
the Office of the Special Prosecutor shall have the power to conduct preliminary investigation and
prosecute criminal cases within the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan. Thus, repeated references to the
Sandiganbayans jurisdiction clearly serve to limit the Ombudsmans and Special Prosecutors authority to
cases cognizable by the Sandiganbayan. [Emphasis in the original.]
The foregoing ruling in Uy, however, was short-lived. Upon motion for clarification by the
Ombudsman in the same case, the Court set aside the foregoing pronouncement in its Resolution dated
March 20, 2001. The Court explained the rationale for this reversal:
The power to investigate and to prosecute granted by law to the Ombudsman is plenary and
unqualified. It pertains to any act or omission of any public officer or employee when such act or
omission appears to be illegal, unjust, improper or inefficient. The law does not make a distinction
between cases cognizable by the Sandiganbayan and those cognizable by regular courts. It has been
held that the clause any illegal act or omission of any public official is broad enough to embrace any crime
committed by a public officer or employee.
The reference made by RA 6770 to cases cognizable by the Sandiganbayan, particularly in Section 15(1)
giving the Ombudsman primary jurisdiction over cases cognizable by the Sandiganbayan, and Section
11(4) granting the Special Prosecutor the power to conduct preliminary investigation and prosecute
criminal cases within the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan, should not be construed as confining the
scope of the investigatory and prosecutory power of the Ombudsman to such cases.
Section 15 of RA 6770 gives the Ombudsman primary jurisdiction over cases cognizable by the
Sandiganbayan. The law defines such primary jurisdiction as authorizing the Ombudsman to take over,
at any stage, from any investigatory agency of the government, the investigation of such cases. The grant
of this authority does not necessarily imply the exclusion from its jurisdiction of cases involving public
officers and employees by other courts. The exercise by the Ombudsman of his primary jurisdiction over
cases cognizable by the Sandiganbayan is not incompatible with the discharge of his duty to investigate
and prosecute other offenses committed by public officers and employees. Indeed, it must be stressed
that the powers granted by the legislature to the Ombudsman are very broad and encompass all kinds of
malfeasance, misfeasance and non-feasance committed by public officers and employees during their
tenure of office.
Moreover, the jurisdiction of the Office of the Ombudsman should not be equated with the limited authority
of the Special Prosecutor under Section 11 of RA 6770. The Office of the Special Prosecutor is merely a
component of the Office of the Ombudsman and may only act under the supervision and control and upon
authority of the Ombudsman. Its power to conduct preliminary investigation and to prosecute is limited
to criminal cases within the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan. Certainly, the lawmakers did not
intend to confine the investigatory and prosecutory power of the Ombudsman to these types of
cases. The Ombudsman is mandated by law to act on all complaints against officers and employees of
the government and to enforce their administrative, civil and criminal liability in every case where the
evidence warrants. To carry out this duty, the law allows him to utilize the personnel of his office and/or
designate any fiscal, state prosecutor or lawyer in the government service to act as special investigator or
prosecutor to assist in the investigation and prosecution of certain cases. Those designated or deputized
to assist him work under his supervision and control. The law likewise allows him to direct the Special
Prosecutor to prosecute cases outside the Sandiganbayans jurisdiction in accordance with Section 11
(4c) of RA 6770.
The prosecution of offenses committed by public officers and employees is one of the most
important functions of the Ombudsman. In passing RA 6770, the Congress deliberately endowed the
Ombudsman with such power to make him a more active and effective agent of the people in ensuring
accountability in public office. A review of the development of our Ombudsman law reveals this
intent. [Emphasis in the original.]
Having disposed of this contention, we proceed to the principal grounds upon which petitioner
relies. We first address the argument that petitioner, as Chair of the NCC, was not a public officer.
The Constitution[10] describes the Ombudsman and his Deputies as protectors of the people, who
shall act promptly on complaints filed in any form or manner against public officials or employees of the
government, or any subdivision, agency or instrumentality thereof, including government-owned or
controlled corporations. Among the awesome powers, functions, and duties vested by the
Constitution[11] upon the Office of the Ombudsman is to [i]nvestigate any act or omission of any public
official, employee, office or agency, when such act or omission appears to be illegal, unjust, improper, or
inefficient.
The foregoing constitutional provisions are substantially reproduced in R.A. No. 6770, otherwise
known as the Ombudsman Act of 1989. Sections 13 and 15(1) of said law respectively provide:
SEC. 13. Mandate. The Ombudsman and his Deputies, as protectors of the people shall act promptly on
complaints file in any form or manner against officers or employees of the Government, or of any
subdivision, agency or instrumentality thereof, including government-owned or controlled corporations,
and enforce their administrative, civil and criminal liability in every case where the evidence warrants in
order to promote efficient service by the Government to the people.
SEC. 15. Powers, Functions and Duties. The Office of the Ombudsman shall have the following powers,
functions and duties:
(1) Investigate and prosecute on its own or on complaint by any person, any act or omission of any public
officer or employee, office or agency, when such act or omission appears to be illegal unjust, improper or
inefficient. It has primary jurisdiction over cases cognizable by the Sandiganbayan and, in the exercise of
this primary jurisdiction, it may take over, at any stage, from any investigatory agency of Government, the
investigation of such cases;
x x x.
The coverage of the law appears to be limited only by Section 16, in relation to Section 13, supra:
SEC 16. Applicability. The provisions of this Act shall apply to all kinds of malfeasance, misfeasance and
non-feasance that have been committed by any officer or employee as mentioned in Section 13 hereof,
during his tenure of office.
In sum, the Ombudsman has the power to investigate any malfeasance, misfeasance and
non-feasance by a public officer or employee of the government, or of any subdivision, agency or
instrumentality thereof, including government-owned or controlled corporations. [12]
Neither the Constitution nor the Ombudsman Act of 1989, however, defines who public officers are. A
definition of public officers cited in jurisprudence [13] is that provided by Mechem, a recognized authority on
the subject:
A public office is the right, authority and duty, created and conferred by law, by which, for a given
period, either fixed by law or enduring at the pleasure of the creating power, an individual is
invested with some portion of the sovereign functions of the government, to be exercised by him
for the benefit of the public. The individual so invested is a public officer. [14]
The characteristics of a public office, according to Mechem, include the delegation of sovereign
functions, its creation by law and not by contract, an oath, salary, continuance of the position,
scope of duties, and the designation of the position as an office.[15]
Petitioner submits that some of these characteristics are not present in the position of NCC Chair,
namely: (1) the delegation of sovereign functions; (2) salary, since he purportedly did not receive any
compensation; and (3) continuance, the tenure of the NCC being temporary.
Mechem describes the delegation to the individual of some of the sovereign functions of
government as [t]he most important characteristic in determining whether a position is a public
office or not.
The most important characteristic which distinguishes an office from an employment or contract is that the
creation and conferring of an office involves a delegation to the individual of some of the sovereign
functions of government, to be exercised by him for the benefit of the public; that some portion of the
sovereignty of the country, either legislative, executive or judicial, attaches, for the time being, to be
exercised for the public benefit. Unless the powers conferred are of this nature, the individual is not a
public officer.[16]
Did E.O. 128 delegate the NCC with some of the sovereign functions of government? Certainly, the
law did not delegate upon the NCC functions that can be described as legislative or judicial. May the
functions of the NCC then be described as executive?
We hold that the NCC performs executive functions. The executive power is generally defined as
the power to enforce and administer the laws. It is the power of carrying the laws into practical operation
and enforcing their due observance.[17] The executive function, therefore, concerns the implementation of
the policies as set forth by law.
The Constitution provides in Article XIV (Education, Science and Technology, Arts, Culture, and
Sports) thereof:
Sec. 15. Arts and letters shall enjoy the patronage of the State. The State shall conserve, promote, and
popularize the nations historical and cultural heritage and resources, as well as artistic creations.
In its preamble, A.O. No. 223 states the purposes for the creation of the Committee for the National
Centennial Celebrations in 1998:
Whereas, the birth of the Republic of the Philippines is to be celebrated in 1998, and the centennial
presents an important vehicle for fostering nationhood and a strong sense of Filipino identity;
Whereas, the centennial can effectively showcase Filipino heritage and thereby strengthen Filipino
values;
Whereas, the success of the Centennial Celebrations may be insured only through long-range planning
and continuous developmental programming;
Whereas, the active participation of the private sector in all areas of special expertise and capability,
particularly in communication and information dissemination, is necessary for long-range planning and
continuous developmental programming;
Whereas, there is a need to create a body which shall initiate and undertake the primary task of
harnessing the multisectoral components from the business, cultural, and business sectors to serve as
effective instruments from the launching and overseeing of this long-term project;
x x x.
E.O. No. 128, reconstituting the Committee for the National Centennial Celebrations in 1998, cited
the need to strengthen the said Committee to ensure a more coordinated and synchronized celebrations
of the Philippine Centennial and wider participation from the government and non-government or private
organizations. It also referred to the need to rationalize the relevance of historical links with other
countries.
The NCC was precisely created to execute the foregoing policies and objectives, to carry
them into effect. Thus, the Commission was vested with the following functions:
(a) To undertake the overall study, conceptualization, formulation and implementation of
programs and projects on the utilization of culture, arts, literature and media as vehicles for
history, economic endeavors, and reinvigorating the spirit of national unity and sense of
accomplishment in every Filipino in the context of the Centennial Celebrations. In this
regard, it shall include a Philippine National Exposition 98 within Metro Manila, the original
eight provinces, and Clark Air Base as its major venues;
(b) To act as principal coordinator for all the activities related to awareness and celebration of
the Centennial;
(c) To serve as the clearing house for the preparation and dissemination of all information about
the plans and events for the Centennial Celebrations;
(d) To constitute working groups which shall undertake the implementation of the programs and
projects;
(e) To prioritize the refurbishment of historical sites and structures nationwide. In this regard, the
Commission shall formulate schemes (e.g. lease-maintained-and-transfer, build-operate-
transfer, and similar arrangements) to ensure the preservation and maintenance of the
historical sites and structures;
(f) To call upon any government agency or instrumentality and corporation, and to invite private
individuals and organizations to assist it in the performance of its tasks; and,
(g) Submit regular reports to the President on the plans, programs, projects, activities as well as
the status of the preparations for the Celebration. [18]
It bears noting the President, upon whom the executive power is vested, [19] created the NCC
by executive order. Book III (Office of the President), Chapter 2 (Ordinance Power), Section 2 describes
the nature of executive orders:
SEC. 2. Executive Orders. Acts of the President providing for rules of a general or permanent character
in implementation or execution of constitutional or statutory powers shall be promulgated in executive
orders. [Underscoring ours.]
Furthermore, the NCC was not without a role in the countrys economic development, especially in
Central Luzon. Petitioner himself admitted as much in the oral arguments before this Court:
MR. JUSTICE REYNATO S. PUNO:
And in addition to that expounded by Former President Ramos, dont you agree that the task of
the centennial commission was also to focus on the long term over all socio economic
 development of the zone and Central Luzon by attracting investors in the area because of
the eruption of Mt. Pinatubo.
FORMER VICE PRESIDENT SALVADOR H. LAUREL:
I am glad Your Honor touched on that because that is something I wanted to touch on by lack of
material time I could not but that is a very important point. When I was made Chairman I
wanted the Expo to be in Batangas because I am a Batangeo but President Ramos said
Mr. Vice President the Central Luzon is suffering, suffering because of the eruption of Mt.
Pinatubo let us try to catalize [sic] economic recovery in that area by putting this Expo in
Clark Field and so it was done I agreed and Your Honor if I may also mention we wanted to
generate employment aside from attracting business investments and employment. And
the Estrada administration decided to junk this project there 48, 40 thousand people who
lost job, they were employed in Expo. And our target was to provide 75 thousand jobs. It
would have really calibrated, accelerated the development of Central Luzon. Now, I think
they are going back to that because they had the airport and there are plan to revive the
Expo site into key park which was the original plan.
There can hardly be any dispute that the promotion of industrialization and full employment is a
fundamental state policy.[20]
Petitioner invokes the ruling of this Court in Torio vs. Fontanilla[21] that the holding by a municipality of
a town fiesta is a proprietary rather than a governmental function. Petitioner argues that the holding of a
nationwide celebration which marked the nations 100 thbirthday may be likened to a national fiesta which
involved only the exercise of the national governments proprietary function. [22] In Torio, we held:
[Section 2282 of the Chapter on Municipal Law of the Revised Administrative Code] simply gives authority
to the municipality to [celebrate] a yearly fiesta but it does not impose upon it a duty to observe
one. Holding a fiesta even if the purpose is to commemorate a religious or historical event of the town is
in essence an act for the special benefit of the community and not for the general welfare of the public
performed in pursuance of a policy of the state. The mere fact that the celebration, as claimed, was not to
secure profit or gain but merely to provide entertainment to the town inhabitants is not a conclusive
test. For instance, the maintenance of parks is not a source of income for the town, nonetheless it is [a]
private undertaking as distinguished from the maintenance of public schools, jails, and the like which are
for public service.
As stated earlier, there can be no hard and fast rule for purposes of determining the true nature of an
undertaking or function of a municipality; the surrounding circumstances of a particular case are to be
considered and will be decisive. The basic element, however beneficial to the public the undertaking
may be, is that it is government in essence, otherwise, the function becomes private or propriety
in character. Easily, no governmental or public policy of the state is involved in the celebration of
a town fiesta.
Torio, however, did not intend to lay down an all-encompassing doctrine. Note that the Court
cautioned that there can be no hard and fast rule for purposes of determining the true nature of an
undertaking or function of a municipality; the surrounding circumstances of a particular case are to be
considered and will be decisive. Thus, in footnote 15 of Torio, the Court, citing an American case,
illustrated how the surrounding circumstances plus the political, social, and cultural backgrounds could
produce a conclusion different from that in Torio:
We came across an interesting case which shows that surrounding circumstances plus the political,
social, and cultural backgrounds may have a decisive bearing on this question. The case of Pope v. City
of New Haven, et al. was an action to recover damages for personal injuries caused during a Fourth of
July fireworks display resulting in the death of a bystander alleged to have been caused by defendants
negligence. The defendants demurred to the complaint invoking the defense that the city was engaged in
the performance of a public governmental duty from which it received no pecuniary benefit and for
negligence in the performance of which no statutory liability is imposed. This demurrer was sustained by
the Superior Court of New Haven Country. Plaintiff sought to amend his complaint to allege that the
celebration was for the corporate advantage of the city. This was denied. In affirming the order, the
Supreme Court of Errors of Connecticut held inter alia:
Municipal corporations are exempt from liability for the negligent performance of purely public
governmental duties, unless made liable by statute.
A municipality corporation, which under permissive authority of its charter or of statute, conducted a public
Fourth of July celebration, including a display of fireworks, and sent up a bomb intended to explode in the
air, but which failed to explode until it reached the ground, and then killed a spectator, was engaged in the
performance of a governmental duty. (99 A.R. 51)
This decision was concurred in by three Judges while two dissented.
At any rate the rationale of the Majority Opinion is evident from [this] excerpt:
July 4th, when that date falls upon Sunday, July 5th, is made a public holiday, called Independence Day,
by our statutes. All or nearly all of the other states have similar statutes. While there is no United States
statute making a similar provision, the different departments of the government recognize, and have
recognized since the government was established, July 4th as a national holiday. Throughout the country
it has been recognized and celebrated as such. These celebrations, calculated to entertain and instruct
the people generally and to arouse and stimulate patriotic sentiments and love of country, frequently take
the form of literary exercises consisting of patriotic speeches and the reading of the Constitution,
accompanied by a musical program including patriotic air sometimes preceded by the firing of cannon and
followed by fireworks. That such celebrations are of advantage to the general public and their promotion a
proper subject of legislation can hardly be questioned. x x x
Surely, a town fiesta cannot compare to the National Centennial Celebrations. The Centennial
Celebrations was meant to commemorate the birth of our nation after centuries of struggle against our
former colonial master, to memorialize the liberation of our people from oppression by a foreign
power. 1998 marked 100 years of independence and sovereignty as one united nation. The Celebrations
was an occasion to reflect upon our history and reinvigorate our patriotism. As A.O. 223 put it, it was a
vehicle for fostering nationhood and a strong sense of Filipino identity, an opportunity to showcase Filipino
heritage and thereby strengthen Filipino values. The significance of the Celebrations could not have been
lost on petitioner, who remarked during the hearing:
Oh, yes, certainly the State is interested in the unity of the people, we wanted to rekindle the love for
freedom, love for country, that is the over-all goal that has to make everybody feel proud that he is a
Filipino, proud of our history, proud of what our forefather did in their time. x x x.
Clearly, the NCC performs sovereign functions. It is, therefore, a public office, and petitioner,
as its Chair, is a public officer.
That petitioner allegedly did not receive any compensation during his tenure is of little
consequence. A salary is a usual but not a necessary criterion for determining the nature of the
position. It is not conclusive. The salary is a mere incident and forms no part of the office. Where a
salary or fees is annexed, the office is provided for it is a naked or honorary office, and is supposed to be
accepted merely for the public good. [23] Hence, the office of petitioner as NCC Chair may be characterized
as an honorary office, as opposed to a lucrative office or an office of profit, i.e., one to which salary,
compensation or fees are attached.[24] But it is a public office, nonetheless.
Neither is the fact that the NCC was characterized by E.O. No. 128 as an ad-hoc body make said
commission less of a public office.
The term office, it is said, embraces the idea of tenure and duration, and certainly a position which is
merely temporary and local cannot ordinarily be considered an office. But, says Chief Justice Marshall, if
a duty be a continuing one, which is defined by rules prescribed by the government and not by contract,
which an individual is appointed by government to perform, who enters on the duties pertaining to his
station without any contract defining them, if those duties continue though the person be changed, -- it
seems very difficult to distinguish such a charge or employment from an office of the person who
performs the duties from an officer.
At the same time, however, this element of continuance can not be considered as indispensable,
for, if the other elements are present it can make no difference, says Pearson, C.J., whether there
be but one act or a series of acts to be done, -- whether the office expires as soon as the one act
is done, or is to be held for years or during good behavior. [25]
Our conclusion that petitioner is a public officer finds support in In Re Corliss.[26] There the
Supreme Court of Rhode Island ruled that the office of Commissioner of the United States Centennial
Commission is an office of trust as to disqualify its holder as elector of the United States President and
Vice-President. (Under Article II of the United States Constitution, a person holding an office of trust or
profit under the United States is disqualified from being appointed an elector.)
x x x. We think a Commissioner of the United States Centennial Commission holds an office of trust under
the United States, and that he is therefore disqualified for the office of elector of President and Vice-
President of the United States.
The commission was created under a statute of the United States approved March 3, 1871. That statute
provides for the holding of an exhibition of American and foreign arts, products, and manufactures, under
the auspices of the government of the United States, and for the constitution of a commission, to consist
of more than one delegate from each State and from each Territory of the United States, whose functions
shall continue until close of the exhibition, and whose duty it shall be to prepare and superintend the
execution of the plan for holding the exhibition. Under the statute the commissioners are appointed by the
President of the United States, on the nomination of the governor of the States and Territories
respectively. Various duties were imposed upon the commission, and under the statute provision was to
be made for it to have exclusive control of the exhibit before the President should announce, by
proclamation, the date and place of opening and holding the exhibition. By an act of Congress approved
June 1st, 1872, the duties and functions of the commission were further increased and defined. That act
created a corporation, called The Centennial Board of Finance, to cooperate with the commission and to
raise and disburse the funds. It was to be organized under the direction of the commission. The seventh
section of the act provides that the grounds for exhibition shall be prepared and the buildings erected by
the corporation, in accordance with plans which shall have been adopted by the United States Centennial
Commission; and the rules and regulations of said corporation, governing rates for entrance and
admission fees, or otherwise affecting the rights, privileges, or interests of the exhibitors, or of the public,
shall be fixed and established by the United States Centennial Commission; and no grant conferring
rights or privileges of any description connected with said grounds or buildings, or relating to said
exhibition or celebration, shall be made without the consent of the United States Centennial Commission,
and said commission shall have power to control, change, or revoke all such grants, and shall appoint all
judges and examiners and award all premiums. The tenth section of the act provides that it shall be the
duty of the United States Centennial Commission to supervise the closing up of the affairs of said
corporation, to audit its accounts, and submit in a report to the President of the United States the financial
results of the centennial exhibition.
It is apparent from this statement, which is but partial, that the duties and functions of the commission
were various, delicate, and important; that they could be successfully performed only by men of large
experience and knowledge of affairs; and that they were not merely subordinate and provisional, but in
the highest degree authoritative, discretionary, and final in their character. We think that persons
performing such duties and exercising such functions, in pursuance of statutory direction and authority,
are not to be regarded as mere employees, agents, or committee men, but that they are, properly
speaking, officers, and that the places which they hold are offices. It appears, moreover, that they were
originally regarded as officers by Congress; for the act under which they were appointed declares, section
7, that no compensation for services shall be paid to the commissioners or other officers, provided for in
this act, from the treasury of the United States. The only other officers provided for were the alternates
appointed to serve as commissioners when the commissioners were unable to attend.
Having arrived at the conclusion that the NCC performs executive functions and is, therefore,
a public office, we need no longer delve at length on the issue of whether Expocorp is a private or
a public corporation. Even assuming that Expocorp is a private corporation, petitioners position
as Chief Executive Officer (CEO) of Expocorp arose from his Chairmanship of the
NCC. Consequently, his acts or omissions as CEO of Expocorp must be viewed in the light of his
powers and functions as NCC Chair.[27]
Finally, it is contended that since petitioner supposedly did not receive any compensation for his
services as NCC or Expocorp Chair, he is not a public officer as defined in Republic Act No. 3019 (The
Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act) and is, therefore, beyond the jurisdiction of the Ombudsman.
Respondent seeks to charge petitioner with violation of Section 3 (e) of said law, which reads:
SEC. 3. Corrupt practices of public officers. In addition to acts or omissions of public officers already
penalized by existing law, the following shall constitute corrupt practices of any public officer and are
hereby declared to be unlawful:
xxx
(e) Causing any undue injury to any party, including the Government, or giving any private party any
unwarranted benefits, advantage or preference in the discharge of his official, administrative or judicial
functions through manifest partiality, evident bad faith or gross inexcusable negligence.This provision
shall apply to officers and employees of offices or government corporations charged with the grant of
licenses or permits or other concessions.
A public officer, under R.A. No. 3019, is defined by Section 2 of said law as follows:
SEC. 2. Definition of terms. As used in this Act, the term
xxx
(b) Public officer includes elective and appointive officials and employees, permanent or temporary,
whether in the classified or unclassified or exemption service receiving compensation, even nominal,
from the government as defined in the preceding paragraph. [Emphasis supplied.]
It is clear from Section 2 (b), above, that the definition of a public officer is expressly limited
to the application of R.A. No. 3019. Said definition does not apply for purposes of determining the
Ombudsmans jurisdiction, as defined by the Constitution and the Ombudsman Act of 1989.
Moreover, the question of whether petitioner is a public officer under the Anti-Graft and Corrupt
Practices Act involves the appreciation of evidence and interpretation of law, matters that are best
resolved at trial.
To illustrate, the use of the term includes in Section 2 (b) indicates that the definition is not restrictive.
[28]
The Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act is just one of several laws that define public officers. Article
203 of the Revised Penal Code, for example, provides that a public officer is:
x x x any person who, by direct provision of law, popular election or appointment by competent authority,
takes part in the performance of public functions in the Government of Philippines, or performs in said
Government or in any of its branches public duties as an employee, agent or subordinate official, of any
rank or class.
Section 2 (14) of the Introductory Provisions of the Administrative Code of 1987, [29] on the other hand,
states:
Officer as distinguished from clerk or employee, refers to a person whose duties not being of a
clerical or manual nature, involves the exercise of discretion in the performance of the functions
of the government. When used with reference to a person having authority to do a particular act or
perform a particular person in the exercise of governmental power, officer includes any
government employee, agent or body having authority to do the act or exercise that function.
It bears noting that under Section 3 (b) of Republic Act No. 6713 (The Code of Conduct and Ethical
Standards for Public Officials and Employees), one may be considered a public official whether or not one
receives compensation, thus:
Public Officials include elective and appointive officials and employees, permanent or temporary,
whether in the career or non-career service including military and police personnel, whether or
not they receive compensation, regardless of amount.
Which of these definitions should apply, if at all?
Assuming that the definition of public officer in R.A. No. 3019 is exclusive, the term compensation,
which is not defined by said law, has many meanings.
Under particular circumstances, compensation has been held to include allowance for personal expenses,
commissions, expenses, fees, an honorarium, mileage or traveling expenses, payments for services,
restitution or a balancing of accounts, salary, and wages. [30]
How then is compensation, as the term is used in Section 2 (b) of R.A. No. 3019, to be interpreted?
Did petitioner receive any compensation at all as NCC Chair? Granting that petitioner did not receive
any salary, the records do not reveal if he received any allowance, fee, honorarium, or some other form of
compensation. Notably, under the by-laws of Expocorp, the CEO is entitled to per diems and
compensation.[31] Would such fact bear any significance?
Obviously, this proceeding is not the proper forum to settle these issues lest we preempt the trial
court from resolving them.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED. The preliminary injunction issued in the Courts
Resolution dated September 24, 2001 is hereby LIFTED.
SO ORDERED.
Puno, and Ynares-Santiago, JJ., concur.
Davide, Jr., C.J., (Chairman), no part due to close relation to a party.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. 166715 August 14, 2008
ABAKADA GURO PARTY LIST (formerly AASJS)1 OFFICERS/MEMBERS SAMSON S. ALCANTARA,
ED VINCENT S. ALBANO, ROMEO R. ROBISO, RENE B. GOROSPE and EDWIN R.
SANDOVAL, petitioners,
vs.
HON. CESAR V. PURISIMA, in his capacity as Secretary of Finance, HON. GUILLERMO L.
PARAYNO, JR., in his capacity as Commissioner of the Bureau of Internal Revenue, and HON.
ALBERTO D. LINA, in his Capacity as Commissioner of Bureau of Customs, respondents.
DECISION
CORONA, J.:
This petition for prohibition1 seeks to prevent respondents from implementing and enforcing Republic Act
(RA) 93352 (Attrition Act of 2005).
RA 9335 was enacted to optimize the revenue-generation capability and collection of the Bureau
of Internal Revenue (BIR) and the Bureau of Customs (BOC). The law intends to encourage BIR and
BOC officials and employees to exceed their revenue targets by providing a system of rewards and
sanctions through the creation of a Rewards and Incentives Fund (Fund) and a Revenue Performance
Evaluation Board (Board).3 It covers all officials and employees of the BIR and the BOC with at least six
months of service, regardless of employment status.4
The Fund is sourced from the collection of the BIR and the BOC in excess of their revenue targets for the
year, as determined by the Development Budget and Coordinating Committee (DBCC). Any incentive or
reward is taken from the fund and allocated to the BIR and the BOC in proportion to their contribution in
the excess collection of the targeted amount of tax revenue. 5
The Boards in the BIR and the BOC are composed of the Secretary of the Department of Finance (DOF)
or his/her Undersecretary, the Secretary of the Department of Budget and Management (DBM) or his/her
Undersecretary, the Director General of the National Economic Development Authority (NEDA) or his/her
Deputy Director General, the Commissioners of the BIR and the BOC or their Deputy Commissioners, two
representatives from the rank-and-file employees and a representative from the officials nominated by
their recognized organization.6
Each Board has the duty to (1) prescribe the rules and guidelines for the allocation, distribution and
release of the Fund; (2) set criteria and procedures for removing from the service officials and employees
whose revenue collection falls short of the target; (3) terminate personnel in accordance with the criteria
adopted by the Board; (4) prescribe a system for performance evaluation; (5) perform other functions,
including the issuance of rules and regulations and (6) submit an annual report to Congress. 7
The DOF, DBM, NEDA, BIR, BOC and the Civil Service Commission (CSC) were tasked to promulgate
and issue the implementing rules and regulations of RA 9335, 8 to be approved by a Joint Congressional
Oversight Committee created for such purpose.9
Petitioners, invoking their right as taxpayers filed this petition challenging the constitutionality of RA 9335,
a tax reform legislation. They contend that, by establishing a system of rewards and incentives, the law
"transform[s] the officials and employees of the BIR and the BOC into mercenaries and bounty hunters"
as they will do their best only in consideration of such rewards. Thus, the system of rewards and
incentives invites corruption and undermines the constitutionally mandated duty of these officials
and employees to serve the people with utmost responsibility, integrity, loyalty and efficiency.
Petitioners also claim that limiting the scope of the system of rewards and incentives only to officials and
employees of the BIR and the BOC violates the constitutional guarantee of equal protection. There is
no valid basis for classification or distinction as to why such a system should not apply to officials and
employees of all other government agencies.
In addition, petitioners assert that the law unduly delegates the power to fix revenue targets to the
President as it lacks a sufficient standard on that matter. While Section 7(b) and (c) of RA 9335
provides that BIR and BOC officials may be dismissed from the service if their revenue collections fall
short of the target by at least 7.5%, the law does not, however, fix the revenue targets to be achieved.
Instead, the fixing of revenue targets has been delegated to the President without sufficient standards. It
will therefore be easy for the President to fix an unrealistic and unattainable target in order to dismiss BIR
or BOC personnel.
Finally, petitioners assail the creation of a congressional oversight committee on the ground that it
violates the doctrine of separation of powers. While the legislative function is deemed accomplished
and completed upon the enactment and approval of the law, the creation of the congressional oversight
committee permits legislative participation in the implementation and enforcement of the law.
In their comment, respondents, through the Office of the Solicitor General, question the petition for being
premature as there is no actual case or controversy yet. Petitioners have not asserted any right or
claim that will necessitate the exercise of this Court’s jurisdiction. Nevertheless, respondents
acknowledge that public policy requires the resolution of the constitutional issues involved in this case.
They assert that the allegation that the reward system will breed mercenaries is mere speculation and
does not suffice to invalidate the law. Seen in conjunction with the declared objective of RA 9335, the law
validly classifies the BIR and the BOC because the functions they perform are distinct from those of the
other government agencies and instrumentalities. Moreover, the law provides a sufficient standard that
will guide the executive in the implementation of its provisions. Lastly, the creation of the congressional
oversight committee under the law enhances, rather than violates, separation of powers. It ensures the
fulfillment of the legislative policy and serves as a check to any over-accumulation of power on the part of
the executive and the implementing agencies.
After a careful consideration of the conflicting contentions of the parties, the Court finds that petitioners
have failed to overcome the presumption of constitutionality in favor of RA 9335, except as shall hereafter
be discussed.
Actual Case And Ripeness
An actual case or controversy involves a conflict of legal rights, an assertion of opposite legal claims
susceptible of judicial adjudication.10 A closely related requirement is ripeness, that is, the question must
be ripe for adjudication. And a constitutional question is ripe for adjudication when the governmental act
being challenged has a direct adverse effect on the individual challenging it. 11Thus, to be ripe for
judicial adjudication, the petitioner must show a personal stake in the outcome of the case or an
injury to himself that can be redressed by a favorable decision of the Court. 12
In this case, aside from the general claim that the dispute has ripened into a judicial controversy by the
mere enactment of the law even without any further overt act, 13 petitioners fail either to assert any
specific and concrete legal claim or to demonstrate any direct adverse effect of the law on them.
They are unable to show a personal stake in the outcome of this case or an injury to themselves.
On this account, their petition is procedurally infirm.
This notwithstanding, public interest requires the resolution of the constitutional issues raised by
petitioners. The grave nature of their allegations tends to cast a cloud on the presumption of
constitutionality in favor of the law. And where an action of the legislative branch is alleged to have
infringed the Constitution, it becomes not only the right but in fact the duty of the judiciary to settle the
dispute.14
Accountability of
Public Officers
Section 1, Article 11 of the Constitution states:
Sec. 1. Public office is a public trust. Public officers and employees must at all times be
accountable to the people, serve them with utmost responsibility, integrity, loyalty, and efficiency,
act with patriotism, and justice, and lead modest lives.
Public office is a public trust. It must be discharged by its holder not for his own personal gain but for the
benefit of the public for whom he holds it in trust. By demanding accountability and service with
responsibility, integrity, loyalty, efficiency, patriotism and justice, all government officials and employees
have the duty to be responsive to the needs of the people they are called upon to serve.
Public officers enjoy the presumption of regularity in the performance of their duties. This presumption
necessarily obtains in favor of BIR and BOC officials and employees. RA 9335 operates on the basis
thereof and reinforces it by providing a system of rewards and sanctions for the purpose of encouraging
the officials and employees of the BIR and the BOC to exceed their revenue targets and optimize their
revenue-generation capability and collection.15
The presumption is disputable but proof to the contrary is required to rebut it. It cannot be overturned by
mere conjecture or denied in advance (as petitioners would have the Court do) specially in this case
where it is an underlying principle to advance a declared public policy.
Petitioners’ claim that the implementation of RA 9335 will turn BIR and BOC officials and
employees into "bounty hunters and mercenaries" is not only without any factual and legal basis;
it is also purely speculative.
A law enacted by Congress enjoys the strong presumption of constitutionality. To justify its nullification,
there must be a clear and unequivocal breach of the Constitution, not a doubtful and equivocal one. 16 To
invalidate RA 9335 based on petitioners’ baseless supposition is an affront to the wisdom not only of the
legislature that passed it but also of the executive which approved it.
Public service is its own reward. Nevertheless, public officers may by law be rewarded for
exemplary and exceptional performance. A system of incentives for exceeding the set
expectations of a public office is not anathema to the concept of public accountability. In fact, it
recognizes and reinforces dedication to duty, industry, efficiency and loyalty to public service of
deserving government personnel.
In United States v. Matthews,17 the U.S. Supreme Court validated a law which awards to officers of the
customs as well as other parties an amount not exceeding one-half of the net proceeds of forfeitures in
violation of the laws against smuggling. Citing Dorsheimer v. United States,18 the U.S. Supreme Court
said:
The offer of a portion of such penalties to the collectors is to stimulate and reward their zeal and
industry in detecting fraudulent attempts to evade payment of duties and taxes.
In the same vein, employees of the BIR and the BOC may by law be entitled to a reward when, as a
consequence of their zeal in the enforcement of tax and customs laws, they exceed their revenue targets.
In addition, RA 9335 establishes safeguards to ensure that the reward will not be claimed if it will be either
the fruit of "bounty hunting or mercenary activity" or the product of the irregular performance of official
duties. One of these precautionary measures is embodied in Section 8 of the law:
SEC. 8. Liability of Officials, Examiners and Employees of the BIR and the BOC. – The officials,
examiners, and employees of the [BIR] and the [BOC] who violate this Act or who are guilty of
negligence, abuses or acts of malfeasance or misfeasance or fail to exercise extraordinary
diligence in the performance of their duties shall be held liable for any loss or injury suffered by
any business establishment or taxpayer as a result of such violation, negligence, abuse,
malfeasance, misfeasance or failure to exercise extraordinary diligence.
Equal Protection
Equality guaranteed under the equal protection clause is equality under the same conditions and
among persons similarly situated; it is equality among equals, not similarity of treatment of
persons who are classified based on substantial differences in relation to the object to be
accomplished.19When things or persons are different in fact or circumstance, they may be treated in law
differently. In Victoriano v. Elizalde Rope Workers’ Union,20 this Court declared:
The guaranty of equal protection of the laws is not a guaranty of equality in the application of the
laws upon all citizens of the [S]tate. It is not, therefore, a requirement, in order to avoid the
constitutional prohibition against inequality, that every man, woman and child should be affected
alike by a statute. Equality of operation of statutes does not mean indiscriminate operation on
persons merely as such, but on persons according to the circumstances surrounding them. It
guarantees equality, not identity of rights. The Constitution does not require that things which
are different in fact be treated in law as though they were the same. The equal protection
clause does not forbid discrimination as to things that are different. It does not prohibit
legislation which is limited either in the object to which it is directed or by the territory within
which it is to operate.
The equal protection of the laws clause of the Constitution allows classification. Classification in
law, as in the other departments of knowledge or practice, is the grouping of things in speculation
or practice because they agree with one another in certain particulars. A law is not invalid
because of simple inequality. The very idea of classification is that of inequality, so that it goes
without saying that the mere fact of inequality in no manner determines the matter of
constitutionality. All that is required of a valid classification is that it be reasonable, which
means that the classification should be based on substantial distinctions which make for
real differences, that it must be germane to the purpose of the law; that it must not be
limited to existing conditions only; and that it must apply equally to each member of the
class. This Court has held that the standard is satisfied if the classification or distinction is
based on a reasonable foundation or rational basis and is not palpably arbitrary.
In the exercise of its power to make classifications for the purpose of enacting laws over matters
within its jurisdiction, the state is recognized as enjoying a wide range of discretion. It is not
necessary that the classification be based on scientific or marked differences of things or in their
relation. Neither is it necessary that the classification be made with mathematical nicety. Hence,
legislative classification may in many cases properly rest on narrow distinctions, for the equal
 protection guaranty does not preclude the legislature from recognizing degrees of evil or harm,
and legislation is addressed to evils as they may appear. 21 (emphasis supplied)
The equal protection clause recognizes a valid classification, that is, a classification that has a reasonable
foundation or rational basis and not arbitrary. 22 With respect to RA 9335, its expressed public policy is the
optimization of the revenue-generation capability and collection of the BIR and the BOC. 23 Since the
subject of the law is the revenue- generation capability and collection of the BIR and the BOC, the
incentives and/or sanctions provided in the law should logically pertain to the said agencies. Moreover,
the law concerns only the BIR and the BOC because they have the common distinct primary function of
generating revenues for the national government through the collection of taxes, customs duties, fees and
charges.
The BIR performs the following functions:
Sec. 18. The Bureau of Internal Revenue. – The Bureau of Internal Revenue, which shall be
headed by and subject to the supervision and control of the Commissioner of Internal Revenue,
who shall be appointed by the President upon the recommendation of the Secretary [of the DOF],
shall have the following functions:
(1) Assess and collect all taxes, fees and charges and account for all revenues collected;
(2) Exercise duly delegated police powers for the proper performance of its functions and duties;
(3) Prevent and prosecute tax evasions and all other illegal economic activities;
(4) Exercise supervision and control over its constituent and subordinate units; and
(5) Perform such other functions as may be provided by law. 24
xxx xxx xxx (emphasis supplied)
On the other hand, the BOC has the following functions:
Sec. 23. The Bureau of Customs. – The Bureau of Customs which shall be headed and subject to
the management and control of the Commissioner of Customs, who shall be appointed by the
President upon the recommendation of the Secretary[of the DOF] and hereinafter referred to as
Commissioner, shall have the following functions:
(1) Collect custom duties, taxes and the corresponding fees, charges and penalties;
(2) Account for all customs revenues collected;
(3) Exercise police authority for the enforcement of tariff and customs laws;
(4) Prevent and suppress smuggling, pilferage and all other economic frauds within all ports of
entry;
(5) Supervise and control exports, imports, foreign mails and the clearance of vessels and
aircrafts in all ports of entry;
(6) Administer all legal requirements that are appropriate;
(7) Prevent and prosecute smuggling and other illegal activities in all ports under its jurisdiction;
(8) Exercise supervision and control over its constituent units;
(9) Perform such other functions as may be provided by law. 25
xxx xxx xxx (emphasis supplied)
Both the BIR and the BOC are bureaus under the DOF. They principally perform the special
function of being the instrumentalities through which the State exercises one of its great inherent
functions – taxation. Indubitably, such substantial distinction is germane and intimately related to
the purpose of the law. Hence, the classification and treatment accorded to the BIR and the BOC
under RA 9335 fully satisfy the demands of equal protection.
Undue Delegation
Two tests determine the validity of delegation of legislative power: (1) the completeness test and (2) the
sufficient standard test. A law is complete when it sets forth therein the policy to be executed, carried
out or implemented by the delegate.26 It lays down a sufficient standard when it provides adequate
guidelines or limitations in the law to map out the boundaries of the delegate’s authority and prevent the
delegation from running riot.27 To be sufficient, the standard must specify the limits of the delegate’s
authority, announce the legislative policy and identify the conditions under which it is to be implemented. 28
RA 9335 adequately states the policy and standards to guide the President in fixing revenue targets and
the implementing agencies in carrying out the provisions of the law. Section 2 spells out the policy of the
law:
SEC. 2. Declaration of Policy. – It is the policy of the State to optimize the revenue-generation
capability and collection of the Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR) and the Bureau of Customs
(BOC) by providing for a system of rewards and sanctions through the creation of a Rewards and
 Incentives Fund and a Revenue Performance Evaluation Board in the above agencies for the
purpose of encouraging their officials and employees to exceed their revenue targets.
Section 4 "canalized within banks that keep it from overflowing" 29 the delegated power to the President to
fix revenue targets:
SEC. 4. Rewards and Incentives Fund. – A Rewards and Incentives Fund, hereinafter referred to
as the Fund, is hereby created, to be sourced from the collection of the BIR and the BOC in
excess of their respective revenue targets of the year, as determined by the Development
Budget and Coordinating Committee (DBCC), in the following percentages:
Excess of Collection of the Percent (%) of the Excess Collection to Accrue
Excess the Revenue Targets to the Fund
30% or below – 15%
More than 30% – 15% of the first 30% plus 20% of the
remaining excess
The Fund shall be deemed automatically appropriated the year immediately following the year
when the revenue collection target was exceeded and shall be released on the same fiscal year.
Revenue targets shall refer to the original estimated revenue collection expected of the
BIR and the BOC for a given fiscal year as stated in the Budget of Expenditures and
Sources of Financing (BESF) submitted by the President to Congress. The BIR and the
BOC shall submit to the DBCC the distribution of the agencies’ revenue targets as allocated
among its revenue districts in the case of the BIR, and the collection districts in the case of the
BOC.
xxx xxx xxx (emphasis supplied)
Revenue targets are based on the original estimated revenue collection expected respectively of the BIR
and the BOC for a given fiscal year as approved by the DBCC and stated in the BESF submitted by the
President to Congress.30 Thus, the determination of revenue targets does not rest solely on the President
as it also undergoes the scrutiny of the DBCC.
On the other hand, Section 7 specifies the limits of the Board’s authority and identifies the conditions
under which officials and employees whose revenue collection falls short of the target by at least 7.5%
may be removed from the service:
SEC. 7. Powers and Functions of the Board. – The Board in the agency shall have the following
powers and functions:
xxx xxx xxx
(b) To set the criteria and procedures for removing from service officials and employees
whose revenue collection falls short of the target by at least seven and a half percent
(7.5%), with due consideration of all relevant factors affecting the level of collection as
provided in the rules and regulations promulgated under this Act, subject to civil service laws,
rules and regulations and compliance with substantive and procedural due process:
Provided, That the following exemptions shall apply:
1. Where the district or area of responsibility is newly-created, not exceeding two years in
operation, as has no historical record of collection performance that can be used as basis
for evaluation; and
2. Where the revenue or customs official or employee is a recent transferee in the middle
of the period under consideration unless the transfer was due to nonperformance of
revenue targets or potential nonperformance of revenue targets: Provided, however, That
when the district or area of responsibility covered by revenue or customs officials or
employees has suffered from economic difficulties brought about by natural calamities
or force majeure or economic causes as may be determined by the Board, termination
shall be considered only after careful and proper review by the Board.
(c) To terminate personnel in accordance with the criteria adopted in the preceding paragraph:
Provided, That such decision shall be immediately executory: Provided, further, That the
application of the criteria for the separation of an official or employee from service under
this Act shall be without prejudice to the application of other relevant laws on
accountability of public officers and employees, such as the Code of Conduct and Ethical
Standards of Public Officers and Employees and the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act;
xxx xxx xxx (emphasis supplied)
Clearly, RA 9335 in no way violates the security of tenure of officials and employees of the BIR and the
BOC. The guarantee of security of tenure only means that an employee cannot be dismissed from the
service for causes other than those provided by law and only after due process is accorded the
employee.31 In the case of RA 9335, it lays down a reasonable yardstick for removal (when the revenue
collection falls short of the target by at least 7.5%) with due consideration of all relevant factors affecting
the level of collection. This standard is analogous to inefficiency and incompetence in the performance of
official duties, a ground for disciplinary action under civil service laws. 32 The action for removal is also
subject to civil service laws, rules and regulations and compliance with substantive and procedural due
process.
At any rate, this Court has recognized the following as sufficient standards: "public interest," "justice and
equity," "public convenience and welfare" and "simplicity, economy and welfare." 33 In this case, the
declared policy of optimization of the revenue-generation capability and collection of the BIR and the BOC
is infused with public interest.
Separation Of Powers
Section 12 of RA 9335 provides:
SEC. 12. Joint Congressional Oversight Committee. – There is hereby created a Joint
Congressional Oversight Committee composed of seven Members from the Senate and seven
Members from the House of Representatives. The Members from the Senate shall be appointed
by the Senate President, with at least two senators representing the minority. The Members from
the House of Representatives shall be appointed by the Speaker with at least two members
representing the minority. After the Oversight Committee will have approved the implementing
rules and regulations (IRR) it shall thereafter become functus officio and therefore cease to exist.
The Joint Congressional Oversight Committee in RA 9335 was created for the purpose of approving the
implementing rules and regulations (IRR) formulated by the DOF, DBM, NEDA, BIR, BOC and CSC. On
May 22, 2006, it approved the said IRR. From then on, it became functus officio and ceased to exist.
Hence, the issue of its alleged encroachment on the executive function of implementing and enforcing the
law may be considered moot and academic.
This notwithstanding, this might be as good a time as any for the Court to confront the issue of the
constitutionality of the Joint Congressional Oversight Committee created under RA 9335 (or other similar
laws for that matter).
The scholarly discourse of Mr. Justice (now Chief Justice) Puno on the concept of congressional
oversight in Macalintal v. Commission on Elections34 is illuminating:
Concept and bases of congressional oversight
Broadly defined, the power of oversight embraces all activities undertaken by Congress to
enhance its understanding of and influence over the implementation of legislation it has
enacted. Clearly, oversight concerns post-enactment measures undertaken by Congress:
(a) to monitor bureaucratic compliance with program objectives, (b) to determine whether
agencies are properly administered, (c) to eliminate executive waste and dishonesty, (d) to
prevent executive usurpation of legislative authority, and (d) to assess executive
conformity with the congressional perception of public interest.
The power of oversight has been held to be intrinsic in the grant of legislative power itself and
integral to the checks and balances inherent in a democratic system of government. x x x x x x x
xx
Over the years, Congress has invoked its oversight power with increased frequency to check the
perceived "exponential accumulation of power" by the executive branch. By the beginning of the
20th century, Congress has delegated an enormous amount of legislative authority to the
executive branch and the administrative agencies. Congress, thus, uses its oversight power to
make sure that the administrative agencies perform their functions within the authority delegated
to them. x x x x x x x x x
Categories of congressional oversight functions
The acts done by Congress purportedly in the exercise of its oversight powers may be divided
into three categories, namely: scrutiny, investigation and supervision.
a. Scrutiny
Congressional scrutiny implies a lesser intensity and continuity of attention to
administrative operations. Its primary purpose is to determine economy and efficiency of
the operation of government activities. In the exercise of legislative scrutiny, Congress
 may request information and report from the other branches of government. It can give
recommendations or pass resolutions for consideration of the agency involved.
xxx xxx xxx
b. Congressional investigation
While congressional scrutiny is regarded as a passive process of looking at the facts that
are readily available, congressional investigation involves a more intense digging of facts.
The power of Congress to conduct investigation is recognized by the 1987 Constitution
under section 21, Article VI, xxx xxx xxx
c. Legislative supervision
The third and most encompassing form by which Congress exercises its oversight power is thru
legislative supervision. "Supervision" connotes a continuing and informed awareness on the part
of a congressional committee regarding executive operations in a given administrative area.
While both congressional scrutiny and investigation involve inquiry into past executive branch
actions in order to influence future executive branch performance, congressional supervision
allows Congress to scrutinize the exercise of delegated law-making authority, and permits
Congress to retain part of that delegated authority.
Congress exercises supervision over the executive agencies through its veto power. It typically
utilizes veto provisions when granting the President or an executive agency the power to
promulgate regulations with the force of law. These provisions require the President or an agency
to present the proposed regulations to Congress, which retains a "right" to approve or disapprove
any regulation before it takes effect. Such legislative veto provisions usually provide that a
proposed regulation will become a law after the expiration of a certain period of time, only if
Congress does not affirmatively disapprove of the regulation in the meantime. Less frequently, the
statute provides that a proposed regulation will become law if Congress affirmatively approves it.
Supporters of legislative veto stress that it is necessary to maintain the balance of power between
the legislative and the executive branches of government as it offers lawmakers a way to
delegate vast power to the executive branch or to independent agencies while retaining the
option to cancel particular exercise of such power without having to pass new legislation or to
repeal existing law. They contend that this arrangement promotes democratic accountability as it
provides legislative check on the activities of unelected administrative agencies. One proponent
thus explains:
It is too late to debate the merits of this delegation policy: the policy is too deeply
embedded in our law and practice. It suffices to say that the complexities of modern
government have often led Congress-whether by actual or perceived necessity- to
legislate by declaring broad policy goals and general statutory standards, leaving the
choice of policy options to the discretion of an executive officer. Congress articulates
legislative aims, but leaves their implementation to the judgment of parties who may or
may not have participated in or agreed with the development of those aims.
Consequently, absent safeguards, in many instances the reverse of our constitutional
scheme could be effected: Congress proposes, the Executive disposes. One safeguard,
of course, is the legislative power to enact new legislation or to change existing law. But
without some means of overseeing post enactment activities of the executive branch,
Congress would be unable to determine whether its policies have been implemented in
accordance with legislative intent and thus whether legislative intervention is appropriate.
Its opponents, however, criticize the legislative veto as undue encroachment upon the
executive prerogatives. They urge that any post-enactment measures undertaken by the
legislative branch should be limited to scrutiny and investigation; any measure beyond
that would undermine the separation of powers guaranteed by the Constitution. They
contend that legislative veto constitutes an impermissible evasion of the President’s veto authority
and intrusion into the powers vested in the executive or judicial branches of government.
Proponents counter that legislative veto enhances separation of powers as it prevents the
executive branch and independent agencies from accumulating too much power. They submit
that reporting requirements and congressional committee investigations allow Congress to
scrutinize only the exercise of delegated law-making authority. They do not allow Congress to
review executive proposals before they take effect and they do not afford the opportunity for
ongoing and binding expressions of congressional intent. In contrast, legislative veto permits
 Congress to participate prospectively in the approval or disapproval of "subordinate law" or those
enacted by the executive branch pursuant to a delegation of authority by Congress. They further
argue that legislative veto "is a necessary response by Congress to the accretion of policy control
by forces outside its chambers." In an era of delegated authority, they point out that legislative
veto "is the most efficient means Congress has yet devised to retain control over the evolution
and implementation of its policy as declared by statute."
In Immigration and Naturalization Service v. Chadha, the U.S. Supreme Court resolved the
validity of legislative veto provisions. The case arose from the order of the immigration judge
suspending the deportation of Chadha pursuant to § 244(c)(1) of the Immigration and Nationality
Act. The United States House of Representatives passed a resolution vetoing the suspension
pursuant to § 244(c)(2) authorizing either House of Congress, by resolution, to invalidate the
decision of the executive branch to allow a particular deportable alien to remain in the United
States. The immigration judge reopened the deportation proceedings to implement the House
order and the alien was ordered deported. The Board of Immigration Appeals dismissed the
alien’s appeal, holding that it had no power to declare unconstitutional an act of Congress. The
United States Court of Appeals for Ninth Circuit held that the House was without constitutional
authority to order the alien’s deportation and that § 244(c)(2) violated the constitutional doctrine
on separation of powers.
On appeal, the U.S. Supreme Court declared § 244(c)(2) unconstitutional. But the Court shied
away from the issue of separation of powers and instead held that the provision violates the
presentment clause and bicameralism. It held that the one-house veto was essentially legislative
in purpose and effect. As such, it is subject to the procedures set out in Article I of the Constitution
requiring the passage by a majority of both Houses and presentment to the President. x x x x x x
xxx
Two weeks after the Chadha decision, the Court upheld, in memorandum decision, two lower
court decisions invalidating the legislative veto provisions in the Natural Gas Policy Act of 1978
and the Federal Trade Commission Improvement Act of 1980. Following this precedence, lower
courts invalidated statutes containing legislative veto provisions although some of these
provisions required the approval of both Houses of Congress and thus met the bicameralism
requirement of Article I. Indeed, some of these veto provisions were not even
exercised.35(emphasis supplied)
In Macalintal, given the concept and configuration of the power of congressional oversight and
considering the nature and powers of a constitutional body like the Commission on Elections, the Court
struck down the provision in RA 9189 (The Overseas Absentee Voting Act of 2003) creating a Joint
Congressional Committee. The committee was tasked not only to monitor and evaluate the
implementation of the said law but also to review, revise, amend and approve the IRR promulgated by the
Commission on Elections. The Court held that these functions infringed on the constitutional
independence of the Commission on Elections.36
With this backdrop, it is clear that congressional oversight is not unconstitutional per se, meaning, it
neither necessarily constitutes an encroachment on the executive power to implement laws nor
undermines the constitutional separation of powers. Rather, it is integral to the checks and balances
inherent in a democratic system of government. It may in fact even enhance the separation of powers as
it prevents the over-accumulation of power in the executive branch.
However, to forestall the danger of congressional encroachment "beyond the legislative sphere," the
Constitution imposes two basic and related constraints on Congress. 37 It may not vest itself, any of its
committees or its members with either executive or judicial power. 38 And, when it exercises its legislative
power, it must follow the "single, finely wrought and exhaustively considered, procedures" specified under
the Constitution,39 including the procedure for enactment of laws and presentment.
Thus, any post-enactment congressional measure such as this should be limited to scrutiny and
investigation. In particular, congressional oversight must be confined to the following:
(1) scrutiny based primarily on Congress’ power of appropriation and the budget hearings
conducted in connection with it, its power to ask heads of departments to appear before and be
heard by either of its Houses on any matter pertaining to their departments and its power of
confirmation40 and
(2) investigation and monitoring41 of the implementation of laws pursuant to the power of
Congress to conduct inquiries in aid of legislation.42
Any action or step beyond that will undermine the separation of powers guaranteed by the Constitution.
Legislative vetoes fall in this class.
Legislative veto is a statutory provision requiring the President or an administrative agency to present the
proposed implementing rules and regulations of a law to Congress which, by itself or through a committee
formed by it, retains a "right" or "power" to approve or disapprove such regulations before they take effect.
As such, a legislative veto in the form of a congressional oversight committee is in the form of an inward-
turning delegation designed to attach a congressional leash (other than through scrutiny and
investigation) to an agency to which Congress has by law initially delegated broad powers. 43 It radically
changes the design or structure of the Constitution’s diagram of power as it entrusts to Congress a direct
role in enforcing, applying or implementing its own laws.44
Congress has two options when enacting legislation to define national policy within the broad horizons of
its legislative competence.45 It can itself formulate the details or it can assign to the executive branch the
responsibility for making necessary managerial decisions in conformity with those standards. 46 In the
latter case, the law must be complete in all its essential terms and conditions when it leaves the hands of
the legislature.47 Thus, what is left for the executive branch or the concerned administrative agency when
it formulates rules and regulations implementing the law is to fill up details (supplementary rule-making) or
ascertain facts necessary to bring the law into actual operation (contingent rule-making). 48
Administrative regulations enacted by administrative agencies to implement and interpret the law which
they are entrusted to enforce have the force of law and are entitled to respect. 49 Such rules and
regulations partake of the nature of a statute 50 and are just as binding as if they have been written in the
statute itself. As such, they have the force and effect of law and enjoy the presumption of constitutionality
and legality until they are set aside with finality in an appropriate case by a competent court. 51 Congress,
in the guise of assuming the role of an overseer, may not pass upon their legality by subjecting them to its
stamp of approval without disturbing the calculated balance of powers established by the Constitution. In
exercising discretion to approve or disapprove the IRR based on a determination of whether or not they
conformed with the provisions of RA 9335, Congress arrogated judicial power unto itself, a power
exclusively vested in this Court by the Constitution.
Considered Opinion of
Mr. Justice Dante O. Tinga
Moreover, the requirement that the implementing rules of a law be subjected to approval by Congress as
a condition for their effectivity violates the cardinal constitutional principles of bicameralism and the rule
on presentment.52
Section 1, Article VI of the Constitution states:
Section 1. The legislative power shall be vested in the Congress of the Philippines which
shall consist of a Senate and a House of Representatives, except to the extent reserved to
the people by the provision on initiative and referendum. (emphasis supplied)
Legislative power (or the power to propose, enact, amend and repeal laws) 53 is vested in Congress which
consists of two chambers, the Senate and the House of Representatives. A valid exercise of legislative
power requires the act of both chambers. Corrollarily, it can be exercised neither solely by one of the two
chambers nor by a committee of either or both chambers. Thus, assuming the validity of a legislative veto,
both a single-chamber legislative veto and a congressional committee legislative veto are invalid.
Additionally, Section 27(1), Article VI of the Constitution provides:
Section 27. (1) Every bill passed by the Congress shall, before it becomes a law, be
presented to the President. If he approves the same, he shall sign it, otherwise, he shall veto it
and return the same with his objections to the House where it originated, which shall enter the
objections at large in its Journal and proceed to reconsider it. If, after such reconsideration, two-
thirds of all the Members of such House shall agree to pass the bill, it shall be sent, together with
the objections, to the other House by which it shall likewise be reconsidered, and if approved by
two-thirds of all the Members of that House, it shall become a law. In all such cases, the votes of
each House shall be determined by yeas or nays, and the names of the members voting for or
against shall be entered in its Journal. The President shall communicate his veto of any bill to the
House where it originated within thirty days after the date of receipt thereof; otherwise, it shall
become a law as if he had signed it. (emphasis supplied)
Every bill passed by Congress must be presented to the President for approval or veto. In the absence of
presentment to the President, no bill passed by Congress can become a law. In this sense, law-making
under the Constitution is a joint act of the Legislature and of the Executive. Assuming that legislative veto
is a valid legislative act with the force of law, it cannot take effect without such presentment even if
approved by both chambers of Congress.
In sum, two steps are required before a bill becomes a law. First, it must be approved by both Houses of
Congress.54 Second, it must be presented to and approved by the President. 55 As summarized by Justice
Isagani Cruz56 and Fr. Joaquin G. Bernas, S.J.57, the following is the procedure for the approval of bills:
A bill is introduced by any member of the House of Representatives or the Senate except for
some measures that must originate only in the former chamber.
The first reading involves only a reading of the number and title of the measure and its referral by
the Senate President or the Speaker to the proper committee for study.
The bill may be "killed" in the committee or it may be recommended for approval, with or without
amendments, sometimes after public hearings are first held thereon. If there are other bills of the
same nature or purpose, they may all be consolidated into one bill under common authorship or
as a committee bill.
Once reported out, the bill shall be calendared for second reading. It is at this stage that the bill is
read in its entirety, scrutinized, debated upon and amended when desired. The second reading is
the most important stage in the passage of a bill.
The bill as approved on second reading is printed in its final form and copies thereof are
distributed at least three days before the third reading. On the third reading, the members merely
register their votes and explain them if they are allowed by the rules. No further debate is allowed.
Once the bill passes third reading, it is sent to the other chamber, where it will also undergo the
three readings. If there are differences between the versions approved by the two chambers, a
conference committee58 representing both Houses will draft a compromise measure that if ratified
by the Senate and the House of Representatives will then be submitted to the President for his
consideration.
The bill is enrolled when printed as finally approved by the Congress, thereafter authenticated
with the signatures of the Senate President, the Speaker, and the Secretaries of their respective
chambers…59
The President’s role in law-making.
The final step is submission to the President for approval. Once approved, it takes effect as law
after the required publication.60
Where Congress delegates the formulation of rules to implement the law it has enacted pursuant to
sufficient standards established in the said law, the law must be complete in all its essential terms and
conditions when it leaves the hands of the legislature. And it may be deemed to have left the hands of the
legislature when it becomes effective because it is only upon effectivity of the statute that legal rights and
obligations become available to those entitled by the language of the statute. Subject to the indispensable
requisite of publication under the due process clause, 61 the determination as to when a law takes effect is
wholly the prerogative of Congress.62 As such, it is only upon its effectivity that a law may be executed
and the executive branch acquires the duties and powers to execute the said law. Before that point, the
role of the executive branch, particularly of the President, is limited to approving or vetoing the law. 63
From the moment the law becomes effective, any provision of law that empowers Congress or any of its
members to play any role in the implementation or enforcement of the law violates the principle of
separation of powers and is thus unconstitutional. Under this principle, a provision that requires Congress
or its members to approve the implementing rules of a law after it has already taken effect shall be
unconstitutional, as is a provision that allows Congress or its members to overturn any directive or ruling
made by the members of the executive branch charged with the implementation of the law.
Following this rationale, Section 12 of RA 9335 should be struck down as unconstitutional. While there
may be similar provisions of other laws that may be invalidated for failure to pass this standard, the Court
refrains from invalidating them wholesale but will do so at the proper time when an appropriate case
assailing those provisions is brought before us.64
The next question to be resolved is: what is the effect of the unconstitutionality of Section 12 of RA 9335
on the other provisions of the law? Will it render the entire law unconstitutional? No.
Section 13 of RA 9335 provides:
SEC. 13. Separability Clause. – If any provision of this Act is declared invalid by a competent
court, the remainder of this Act or any provision not affected by such declaration of invalidity shall
remain in force and effect.
In Tatad v. Secretary of the Department of Energy,65 the Court laid down the following rules:
 The general rule is that where part of a statute is void as repugnant to the Constitution, while
another part is valid, the valid portion, if separable from the invalid, may stand and be enforced.
The presence of a separability clause in a statute creates the presumption that the legislature
intended separability, rather than complete nullity of the statute. To justify this result, the valid
portion must be so far independent of the invalid portion that it is fair to presume that the
legislature would have enacted it by itself if it had supposed that it could not constitutionally enact
the other. Enough must remain to make a complete, intelligible and valid statute, which carries
out the legislative intent. x x x
The exception to the general rule is that when the parts of a statute are so mutually dependent
and connected, as conditions, considerations, inducements, or compensations for each other, as
to warrant a belief that the legislature intended them as a whole, the nullity of one part will vitiate
the rest. In making the parts of the statute dependent, conditional, or connected with one another,
the legislature intended the statute to be carried out as a whole and would not have enacted it if
one part is void, in which case if some parts are unconstitutional, all the other provisions thus
dependent, conditional, or connected must fall with them.
The separability clause of RA 9335 reveals the intention of the legislature to isolate and detach any invalid
provision from the other provisions so that the latter may continue in force and effect. The valid portions
can stand independently of the invalid section. Without Section 12, the remaining provisions still constitute
a complete, intelligible and valid law which carries out the legislative intent to optimize the revenue-
generation capability and collection of the BIR and the BOC by providing for a system of rewards and
sanctions through the Rewards and Incentives Fund and a Revenue Performance Evaluation Board.
To be effective, administrative rules and regulations must be published in full if their purpose is to enforce
or implement existing law pursuant to a valid delegation. The IRR of RA 9335 were published on May 30,
2006 in two newspapers of general circulation66 and became effective 15 days thereafter.67 Until and
unless the contrary is shown, the IRR are presumed valid and effective even without the approval of the
Joint Congressional Oversight Committee.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby PARTIALLY GRANTED. Section 12 of RA 9335 creating a Joint
Congressional Oversight Committee to approve the implementing rules and regulations of the law is
declared UNCONSTITUTIONAL and therefore NULL and VOID. The constitutionality of the remaining
provisions of RA 9335 is UPHELD. Pursuant to Section 13 of RA 9335, the rest of the provisions remain
in force and effect.
SO ORDERED.

SECOND DIVISION

TONY N. FIGUEROA and ROGELIO J. FLAVIANO, G.R. No. 159813

Petitioners,
Present:

PUNO, J., Chairperson,

SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ,
- versus - CORONA,
AZCUNA, and
GARCIA, JJ.

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Promulgated:

Respondent.
August 9, 2006
x-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x

DECISION
GARCIA, J.:

Assailed and sought to be set aside in this petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court is the
Decision[1] dated October 11, 2002 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR No. 17235, affirming in
toto an earlier decision of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Davao City, Branch 17, which found herein
petitioners guilty of the crime of libel.

The antecedent facts:

On March 24, 1992, in the RTC of Davao City, the city prosecutor of Davao, at the instance of
one Aproniano Rivera, filed an Information[2] for libel under Article 355 in relation to Article 360 of the
Revised Penal Code against the herein petitioners, Tony N. Figueroa and Rogelio J. Flaviano. Docketed
in the same court as Criminal Case No. 25,957-92 and raffled to Branch 17 thereof, the Information
alleges as follows:

That on or about April 9, 1991, in the City of Davao, Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-mentioned accused, Tony VN. Figueroa,
writer under the column entitled Footprints of the People's Daily Forum, conspiring,
confederating and helping one another with his co-accused Rogelio J. Flaviano,
Publisher-Editor of the same magazine, with malicious intent of impeaching the honesty,
integrity, character as well as the reputation and the social standing of one Aproniano
Rivera and with intent to cast dishonor, discredit and contempt upon said Aproniano
Rivera, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously published in the People's Daily Forum, a news
publication as follows:

Bangkerohan public market these days is no different from the US Times

Square. Bullies, thugs, hooligans and gyppers roam with impunity, some
using organizational clout as a ploy to keep themselves from obvious
exposure. Some leeches, like a certain Aproniano Rey Rivera, our
sources say, are lording it over like the city's sprawling vegetable and
meat complex has become an apportioned bailiwick.

Rivera, apparently a non-Visayan pseudobully flaunting with his tag as

president of a vendor's federation, has intimated a good number of lowly
hawkers. This is a confirmed fact, our sources believe. And our
independent eveasdroppers [sic] have come with a similar perception of
a man who continues to lead a federation when, in the first place, he has
no business being in Davao or in Bankerohan.

Often, Mr. Re (King?) Rivera strolls the stretches which criss-cross the
Bankerohan confines with the arrogance of a tribal chieftain; the only
differences, however, are that: he uses no G-strings, speaks in some
strange Luzon lingo and twang, and has no solid leadership. Our reports
have finely outlined the mechanics of Rivera's tactics despite assertions
the man is nothing but a paper tiger conveniently propped up by
federation members loyal to his sometime indecent role as a sachem.
 This man, the sources add, is backed by powerful city government
hooligans who, it was reported, have direct hand in the planned
manipulation in the distribution of stalls to privileged applicants. Even if
he has reportedly sold his interest in the public market, which should be
reason enough for him to resign from his position, Rivera still carries the
false aura of intimidating poor vendors and imposing his insensible
remarks about what must be done about the governance of
Bangkerohan.
Sometimes its hard to compel a man with Rivera's mind about the
nuances of honorable resignation. May iba d'yan na pakapalan na lang
ng mukha!

xxx xxx xxx

Rivera, however, must be consoled in knowing he's not alone with his
dirty antics. Romy Miclat, a president of a meat vendors group in
Bankerohan, and his board member, Erning Garcia, have tacitly followed
the way of the thugs, floating little fibs to gullible victims. Our moles have
gathered the due are seeling [sic] the new public market stalls for
P9,000 with the assurances that the buyer gets a display area ordinarily
occupied by two applicants. A lot more have fallen prey to the scheme,
and more the blindly swallowing all the books the two are peddling.

This dilemma has been there for so long, but the city hall, RCDP, and the
city council have continuously evaded the vicious cabal of men out to
derail the raffling of the stalls to applicants. Some believe strongly this is
odd, but they can only whimper at their helplessness against power-
brokers who have taken over the dominance of Bangkerohan. One of the
likely victims in this filthy machination are the sinapo vendors who have
become explosively furious over the snafu they are facing because of the
manipulation of stalls inside Bangkerohan.

Insiders continuo[u]sly tell of woeful tales about how they have been
given runarounds by many so-called public servants, but they have
maintained their composures quite curiously. They are talking, however,
of anger which, our sources [s]ay, may end up with a bloody retaliation.
This probability is looming more lucid every day the officials handling the
Bangkerohan stall mess are condoning their plight. Even politicos are
oddly silent about the whole controversy for some unknown reasons. It
looks like the alleged schemes perpetrated by Rivera, Miclat and Garcia
will remain unperturbed, no thanks to power-brokers.

which newspaper was read by the people throughout Davao City, to the dishonor,
discredit and contempt upon said Aproniano Rivera.

Contrary to law.

On arraignment, petitioners as accused, assisted by counsel, entered a common plea

of Not Guilty. Thereafter, trial on the merits ensued.

On June 8, 1993, the RTC rendered its decision [3] finding both petitioners guilty as charged and
accordingly sentenced them, thus:
 WHEREFORE, finding the evidence of the prosecution sufficient to prove the guilt of both
accused, Tony Figueroa and Rogelio Flaviano, columnist and publisher-editor,
respectively of the People's Daily Forum, of the offense charged, beyond reasonable
doubt; their evidence adduced is not sufficient to afford their exoneration, pursuant to
Art. 355 in relation to Art. 360 of the Revised Penal Code, without any mitigating ot [sic]
aggravating circumstances, proved in the commission of the offense charged, imposing
the indeterminate sentence law, both accused are hereby sentenced to suffer an
indeterminate penalty of imprisonment of five months and one day of arresto mayor
maximum as minimum penalty, to two years four months and 31 days of prision
correccional minimum as maximum penalty with accessory penalty as provided for by
law.

Moreover, pursuant to Art. 100 in relation to Art. 104 of the Revised Penal Code,
governing civil indemnity, both accused are ordered to pay jointly and solidarily the
amount of P50,000.00 as moral damages to complainant, Aproniano Rivera and the
amount of P10,000.00 by way of attorney's fees with costs.

Without any aggravating circumstances proved by the prosecution, in the commission of

the offense charged exemplary damages against both accused, cannot be awarded. x x x

SO ORDERED.

From the trial courts judgment of conviction, petitioners went to the CA whereat their appellate recourse
was docketed as CA-G.R. CR No. 17235.

As stated at the threshold hereof, the CA, in the herein assailed Decision[4] dated October 11, 2002,
affirmed that of the trial court, to wit:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the decision of the Regional Trial Court is

hereby AFFIRMED in all respects.

SO ORDERED.

Undaunted, petitioners are now with this Court via this petition for review on their submissions that the CA
erred -

1. IN HOLDING THAT THE COLUMN ENTITLED FOOTPRINTS OF THE

PEOPLES DAILY FORUM IS LIBELOUS OR DEFAMATORY TO PRIVATE
COMPLAINANT APRONIANO RIVERA;
2. IN HOLDING THAT PRIVATE COMPLAINANT IS NOT A PUBLIC
OFFICER, HENCE THE PUBLISHED ARTICLE CANNOT BE CONSIDERED TO
BE WITHIN THE PURVIEW OF PRIVILEGED COMMUNICATION;

3. IN UPHOLDING THE AWARD OF MORAL DAMAGES AND ATTORNEY'S FEES.

The petition lacks merit.

In praying for their acquittal, petitioners attempt to pass off the subject published article as one that
portrays the condition of the Bankerohan Public Market in general. Citing Jimenez v. Reyes,
[5]
they challenge the finding of the two courts below on the libelous or defamatory nature of
the same article which, to them, must be read and construed in its entirety. It is their posture that the
article was not directed at the private character of complainant Aproniano Rivera but on the sorry state of
affairs at the Bankerohan Public Market.

Petitioners posture cannot save the day for them.

Our own reading of the entire text of the published article convinces us of its libelous or defamatory
character. While it is true that a publication's libelous nature depends on its scope, spirit and motive taken
in their entirety, the article in question as a whole explicitly makes mention of private complainant Rivera
all throughout. It cannot be said that the article was a mere general commentary on the alleged
existing state of affairs at the aforementioned public market because Rivera was not only specifically
pointed out several times therein but was even tagged with derogatory names. Indubitably, this name-
calling was, as correctly found by the two courts below, directed at the very person of Rivera himself.

If, as argued, the published article was indeed merely intended to innocently present the current condition
of the Bankerohan Public Market, there would then be no place in the article for the needless name-
calling which it is wrought full of. It is beyond comprehension how calling Rivera a leech, a paper
tiger, a non-Visayan pseudobully with the arrogance of a tribal chieftain save for his speaking
in some strange Luzon lingo and twang and who has no business being in Davao
or Bankerohancan ever be regarded or viewed as comments free of malice. As it is, the tag and
description thus given Rivera have no place in a general account of the situation in the public market, and
cannot, by any stretch of the imagination, be construed to be anything other than what
they really are: defamatory and libelous in nature, and definitely directed at the private character of
complainant Rivera. For indeed, no logical connection can possibly be made between
Rivera's Luzon origin and the conditions of the Bankerohan Public Market. Doubtless, the words used in
the article reek of venom towards the very person of Rivera.

Article 353 of the Revised Penal Code defines libel as follows:

Art. 353. Definition of libel. - A libel is a public and malicious imputation of a crime, or a
vice or defect, real or imaginary, or any act, omission, condition, status, or
circumstance tending to cause the dishonor, discredit, or contempt of a natural or
juridical person, or to blacken the memory of one who is dead.
Defamation, which includes libel and slander, means injuring a person's character, fame or reputation
through false and malicious statements. It is that which tends to injure reputation or to diminish the
esteem, respect, goodwill or confidence in the complainant or to excite derogatory feelings or opinions
about him. It is the publication of anything which is injurious to the good name or reputation of another or
tends to bring him into disrepute.[6]

In the light of the numerable defamatory imputations made against complainant Rivera as a person, the
article in dispute, even taken, as urged, in its totality, undeniably caused serious damage to his character
and person and clearly injurious to his reputation.

At any rate, in libel cases, the question is not what the writer of the libelous material means, but what the
words used by him mean.[7] Here, the defamatory character of the words used by the petitioners is shown
by the very recitals thereof in the questioned article.

It is next contended by the petitioners that Rivera is a public officer. On this

premise, they invoke in their favor the application of one of the exceptions to the legal
presumption of the malicious nature of every defamatory
imputation, as provided for under paragraph (2), Article 354 of the Revised Penal Code, to wit:

Art. 354. Requirement for publicity. - Every defamatory imputation is presumed to

be malicious, even if it be true, if no good intention and justifiable motive for
making it is shown, except in the following cases:

xxx xxx xxx

2. A fair and true report, made in good faith, without any comments or
remarks, of any judicial, legislative, or other official proceedings which are not of
confidential nature, or of any statement, report, or speech delivered in said proceedings,
or of any other act performed by public officers in the exercise of their functions.
Again, as correctly found by both the trial court and the CA, Rivera is not a public officer or
employee but a private citizen. Hence, the published article cannot be considered as falling within
the ambit of privileged communication within the context of the above-quoted provision of the
Penal Code.

A public office is the right, authority and duty, created and conferred by law, by which an
individual is invested with some portion of the sovereign functions of the government, to be
exercised by him for the benefit of the public. The individual so invested is a public officer. The
most important characteristic which distinguishes an office from an employment or contract is
that the creation and conferring of an office involve a delegation to the individual of some of the
sovereign functions of government, to be exercised by him for the benefit of the public; that some
portion of the sovereignty of the country, either legislative, executive or judicial, attaches, to be
exercised for the public benefit. Unless the powers conferred are of this nature, the individual is
not a public officer.[8]

Clearly, Rivera cannot be considered a public officer. Being a member of the market committee did not
vest upon him any sovereign function of the government, be it legislative, executive or judicial.
As reasoned out by the CA, the operation of a public market is not a governmental function but
merely an activity undertaken by the city in its private proprietary capacity. Furthermore, Rivera's
membership in the market committee was in representation of the association of market
vendors, a non-governmental organization belonging to the private sector.

Indeed, even if we were to pretend that Rivera was a public officer, which he clearly is not, the subject
article still would not pass muster as Article 354(2), supra, of the Revised Penal Code expressly requires
that it be a fair and true report, made in good faith, without any comments or remarks. Even a mere
cursory glance at the article reveals that it is far from being that.

Finally, petitioners assail the award by the two courts below of moral damages and attorney's fees in favor
of Rivera.

The assault must fail. Article 2219(7) of the Civil Code is express in stating that moral damages may be
recovered in case of libel, slander or any other form of defamation. From the very publication
and circulation of the subject defamatory and libelous material itself, there can be no doubt as to the
resulting wounded feelings and besmirched reputation sustained by complainant Rivera. The branding
of defamatory names against him most certainly exposed him to public contempt and ridicule. As found by
the trial court in its judgment of conviction:

Complainant, when he read the subject publication, was embarrass on what was written
against him, made more unpleasant on the occasion of the reunion of his son-in-law, who
just arrived from the United States for the first time, was confronted of the above-
defamatory publication. He was worried and depressed, about the comments against
him, affecting his credibility and personality, as representative of many market
organizations in Davao City.

Having been exposed to embarrassment and ridicule occasioned by the publication of the subject article,
Rivera is entitled to moral damages and attorney's fees.
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the instant petition is DENIED and the assailed CA Decision dated October 11,
2002 is AFFIRMED.

Costs against petitioners.

SO ORDERED.

EN BANC

LOUIS BAROK C. BIRAOGO, G.R. No. 192935

Petitioner,

- versus -

THE PHILIPPINE TRUTH COMMISSION OF

2010,
Respondent.
x-----------------------x
REP. EDCEL C. LAGMAN, G.R. No. 193036
REP. RODOLFO B. ALBANO, JR., REP.
SIMEON A. DATUMANONG, and REP. Present:
ORLANDO B. FUA, SR.,
Petitioners, CORONA, C.J.,
CARPIO,
CARPIO MORALES,
VELASCO, JR.,
- versus - NACHURA,
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO,
BRION,
PERALTA,
BERSAMIN,
DEL CASTILLO,
ABAD,
VILLARAMA, JR.,
PEREZ,
EXECUTIVE SECRETARY PAQUITO N. MENDOZA, and
OCHOA, JR. and DEPARTMENT OF BUDGET SERENO, JJ.
AND MANAGEMENT SECRETARY
FLORENCIO B. ABAD, Promulgated:
Respondents.
December 7, 2010

x -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- x

DECISION

MENDOZA, J.:
 When the judiciary mediates to allocate constitutional boundaries, it does not
assert any superiority over the other departments; it does not in reality nullify or invalidate
an act of the legislature, but only asserts the solemn and sacred obligation assigned to it
by the Constitution to determine conflicting claims of authority under the Constitution and
to establish for the parties in an actual controversy the rights which that instrument
secures and guarantees to them.

--- Justice Jose P. Laurel[1]

The role of the Constitution cannot be overlooked. It is through the Constitution that the fundamental
powers of government are established, limited and defined, and by which these powers are distributed
among the several departments.[2] The Constitution is the basic and paramount law to which all other laws
must conform and to which all persons, including the highest officials of the land, must defer.
[3]
Constitutional doctrines must remain steadfast no matter what may be the tides of time. It cannot be
simply made to sway and accommodate the call of situations and much more tailor itself to the whims and
caprices of government and the people who run it.[4]

For consideration before the Court are two consolidated cases [5] both of which essentially assail the
validity and constitutionality of Executive Order No. 1, dated July 30, 2010, entitled Creating the
Philippine Truth Commission of 2010.

The first case is G.R. No. 192935, a special civil action for prohibition instituted by petitioner Louis
Biraogo (Biraogo) in his capacity as a citizen and taxpayer. Biraogo assails Executive Order No. 1 for
being violative of the legislative power of Congress under Section 1, Article VI of the Constitution [6] as it
usurps the constitutional authority of the legislature to create a public office and to appropriate funds
therefor.[7]

The second case, G.R. No. 193036, is a special civil action for certiorari and prohibition filed by
petitioners Edcel C. Lagman, Rodolfo B. Albano Jr., Simeon A. Datumanong, and Orlando B. Fua,
Sr. (petitioners-legislators) as incumbent members of the House of Representatives.

The genesis of the foregoing cases can be traced to the events prior to the historic May 2010 elections,
when then Senator Benigno Simeon Aquino III declared his staunch condemnation of graft and corruption
with his slogan, Kung walang corrupt, walang mahirap. The Filipino people, convinced of his sincerity and
of his ability to carry out this noble objective, catapulted the good senator to the presidency.

To transform his campaign slogan into reality, President Aquino found a need for a special body to
investigate reported cases of graft and corruption allegedly committed during the previous administration.
 Thus, at the dawn of his administration, the President on July 30, 2010, signed Executive Order
No. 1 establishing the Philippine Truth Commission of 2010 (Truth Commission). Pertinent provisions of
said executive order read:
EXECUTIVE ORDER NO. 1

CREATING THE PHILIPPINE TRUTH COMMISSION OF 2010

WHEREAS, Article XI, Section 1 of the 1987 Constitution of the Philippines solemnly
enshrines the principle that a public office is a public trust and mandates that public
officers and employees, who are servants of the people, must at all times be accountable
to the latter, serve them with utmost responsibility, integrity, loyalty and efficiency, act with
patriotism and justice, and lead modest lives;

WHEREAS, corruption is among the most despicable acts of defiance of this principle
and notorious violation of this mandate;

WHEREAS, corruption is an evil and scourge which seriously affects the political,
economic, and social life of a nation; in a very special way it inflicts untold misfortune and
misery on the poor, the marginalized and underprivileged sector of society;

WHEREAS, corruption in the Philippines has reached very alarming levels, and
undermined the peoples trust and confidence in the Government and its institutions;

WHEREAS, there is an urgent call for the determination of the truth regarding certain
reports of large scale graft and corruption in the government and to put a closure to them
by the filing of the appropriate cases against those involved, if warranted, and to deter
others from committing the evil, restore the peoples faith and confidence in the
Government and in their public servants;

WHEREAS, the Presidents battlecry during his campaign for the Presidency in the last
elections kung walang corrupt, walang mahirap expresses a solemn pledge that if
elected, he would end corruption and the evil it breeds;

WHEREAS, there is a need for a separate body dedicated solely to investigating and
finding out the truth concerning the reported cases of graft and corruption during the
previous administration, and which will recommend the prosecution of the offenders and
secure justice for all;
WHEREAS, Book III, Chapter 10, Section 31 of Executive Order No. 292, otherwise
known as the Revised Administrative Code of the Philippines, gives the President the
continuing authority to reorganize the Office of the President.

NOW, THEREFORE, I, BENIGNO SIMEON AQUINO III, President of the Republic of the
Philippines, by virtue of the powers vested in me by law, do hereby order:

SECTION 1. Creation of a Commission. There is hereby created the PHILIPPINE TRUTH

COMMISSION, hereinafter referred to as the COMMISSION, which shall primarily seek
and find the truth on, and toward this end, investigate reports of graft and corruption of
such scale and magnitude that shock and offend the moral and ethical sensibilities of the
people, committed by public officers and employees, their co-principals, accomplices and
accessories from the private sector, if any, during the previous administration; and
thereafter recommend the appropriate action or measure to be taken thereon to ensure
that the full measure of justice shall be served without fear or favor.
The Commission shall be composed of a Chairman and four (4) members who will act as
an independent collegial body.

SECTION 2. Powers and Functions. The Commission, which shall have all the powers of
an investigative body under Section 37, Chapter 9, Book I of the Administrative Code of
1987, is primarily tasked to conduct a thorough fact-finding investigation of reported
cases of graft and corruption referred to in Section 1, involving third level public officers
and higher, their co-principals, accomplices and accessories from the private sector, if
any, during the previous administration and thereafter submit its finding and
recommendations to the President, Congress and the Ombudsman.
In particular, it shall:

a) Identify and determine the reported cases of such graft and corruption which it will
investigate;

b) Collect, receive, review and evaluate evidence related to or regarding the cases of
large scale corruption which it has chosen to investigate, and to this end require any
agency, official or employee of the Executive Branch, including government-owned or
controlled corporations, to produce documents, books, records and other papers;

c) Upon proper request or representation, obtain information and documents from the
Senate and the House of Representatives records of investigations conducted by
committees thereof relating to matters or subjects being investigated by the Commission;

d) Upon proper request and representation, obtain information from the courts,
including the Sandiganbayan and the Office of the Court Administrator, information or
documents in respect to corruption cases filed with the Sandiganbayan or the regular
courts, as the case may be;

e) Invite or subpoena witnesses and take their testimonies and for that purpose,
administer oaths or affirmations as the case may be;

f) Recommend, in cases where there is a need to utilize any person as a state

witness to ensure that the ends of justice be fully served, that such person who qualifies
as a state witness under the Revised Rules of Court of the Philippines be admitted for
that purpose;

g) Turn over from time to time, for expeditious prosecution, to the appropriate
prosecutorial authorities, by means of a special or interim report and recommendation, all
evidence on corruption of public officers and employees and their private sector co-
principals, accomplices or accessories, if any, when in the course of its investigation the
Commission finds that there is reasonable ground to believe that they are liable for graft
and corruption under pertinent applicable laws;

h) Call upon any government investigative or prosecutorial agency such as the

Department of Justice or any of the agencies under it, and the Presidential Anti-Graft
Commission, for such assistance and cooperation as it may require in the discharge of its
functions and duties;

i) Engage or contract the services of resource persons, professionals and other

personnel determined by it as necessary to carry out its mandate;

j) Promulgate its rules and regulations or rules of procedure it deems necessary to

effectively and efficiently carry out the objectives of this Executive Order and to ensure
the orderly conduct of its investigations, proceedings and hearings, including the
presentation of evidence;
k) Exercise such other acts incident to or are appropriate and necessary in connection
with the objectives and purposes of this Order.
SECTION 3. Staffing Requirements. x x x.

SECTION 4. Detail of Employees. x x x.

SECTION 5. Engagement of Experts. x x x

SECTION 6. Conduct of Proceedings. x x x.

SECTION 7. Right to Counsel of Witnesses/Resource Persons. x x x.
SECTION 8. Protection of Witnesses/Resource Persons. x x x.
SECTION 9. Refusal to Obey Subpoena, Take Oath or Give Testimony. Any government
official or personnel who, without lawful excuse, fails to appear upon subpoena issued by
the Commission or who, appearing before the Commission refuses to take oath or
affirmation, give testimony or produce documents for inspection, when required, shall be
subject to administrative disciplinary action. Any private person who does the same may
be dealt with in accordance with law.
SECTION 10. Duty to Extend Assistance to the Commission. x x x.
SECTION 11. Budget for the Commission. The Office of the President shall provide the
necessary funds for the Commission to ensure that it can exercise its powers, execute its
functions, and perform its duties and responsibilities as effectively, efficiently, and
expeditiously as possible.
SECTION 12. Office. x x x.

SECTION 13. Furniture/Equipment. x x x.

SECTION 14. Term of the Commission. The Commission shall accomplish its mission on
or before December 31, 2012.

SECTION 15. Publication of Final Report. x x x.

SECTION 16. Transfer of Records and Facilities of the Commission. x x x.

SECTION 17. Special Provision Concerning Mandate. If and when in the judgment of the
President there is a need to expand the mandate of the Commission as defined in
Section 1 hereof to include the investigation of cases and instances of graft and
corruption during the prior administrations, such mandate may be so extended
accordingly by way of a supplemental Executive Order.

SECTION 18. Separability Clause. If any provision of this Order is declared

unconstitutional, the same shall not affect the validity and effectivity of the other
provisions hereof.

SECTION 19. Effectivity. This Executive Order shall take effect immediately.

DONE in the City of Manila, Philippines, this 30th day of July 2010.

(SGD.) BENIGNO S. AQUINO III

By the President:

(SGD.) PAQUITO N. OCHOA, JR.

Executive Secretary
 Nature of the Truth Commission

As can be gleaned from the above-quoted provisions, the Philippine Truth Commission (PTC) is a
mere ad hoc body formed under the Office of the President with the primary task to investigate reports of
graft and corruption committed by third-level public officers and employees, their co-principals,
accomplices and accessories during the previous administration, and thereafter to submit its finding and
recommendations to the President, Congress and the Ombudsman. Though it has been described as an
independent collegial body, it is essentially an entity within the Office of the President Proper and subject
to his control. Doubtless, it constitutes a public office, as an ad hoc body is one. [8]

To accomplish its task, the PTC shall have all the powers of an investigative body under Section
37, Chapter 9, Book I of the Administrative Code of 1987. It is not, however, a quasi-judicial body as it
cannot adjudicate, arbitrate, resolve, settle, or render awards in disputes between contending parties. All
it can do is gather, collect and assess evidence of graft and corruption and make recommendations. It
may have subpoena powers but it has no power to cite people in contempt, much less order their
arrest. Although it is a fact-finding body, it cannot determine from such facts if probable cause exists as to
warrant the filing of an information in our courts of law. Needless to state, it cannot impose criminal, civil
or administrative penalties or sanctions.
The PTC is different from the truth commissions in other countries which have been created as
official, transitory and non-judicial fact-finding bodies to establish the facts and context of serious
violations of human rights or of international humanitarian law in a countrys past. [9] They are usually
established by states emerging from periods of internal unrest, civil strife or authoritarianism to serve as
mechanisms for transitional justice.

Truth commissions have been described as bodies that share the following characteristics: (1)
they examine only past events; (2) they investigate patterns of abuse committed over a period of time, as
opposed to a particular event; (3) they are temporary bodies that finish their work with the submission of a
report containing conclusions and recommendations; and (4) they are officially sanctioned, authorized or
empowered by the State.[10] Commissions members are usually empowered to conduct research, support
victims, and propose policy recommendations to prevent recurrence of crimes. Through their
investigations, the commissions may aim to discover and learn more about past abuses, or formally
acknowledge them. They may aim to prepare the way for prosecutions and recommend institutional
reforms.[11]
 Thus, their main goals range from retribution to reconciliation. The Nuremburg and Tokyo war
crime tribunals are examples of a retributory or vindicatory body set up to try and punish those
responsible for crimes against humanity. A form of a reconciliatory tribunal is the Truth and Reconciliation
Commission of South Africa, the principal function of which was to heal the wounds of past violence and
to prevent future conflict by providing a cathartic experience for victims.

The PTC is a far cry from South Africas model. The latter placed more emphasis on reconciliation
than on judicial retribution, while the marching order of the PTC is the identification and punishment of
perpetrators. As one writer[12] puts it:

The order ruled out reconciliation. It translated the Draconian code spelled out by
Aquino in his inaugural speech: To those who talk about reconciliation, if they mean that
they would like us to simply forget about the wrongs that they have committed in the past,
we have this to say: There can be no reconciliation without justice. When we allow crimes
to go unpunished, we give consent to their occurring over and over again.

The Thrusts of the Petitions

Barely a month after the issuance of Executive Order No. 1, the petitioners asked the Court to
declare it unconstitutional and to enjoin the PTC from performing its functions. A perusal of the arguments
of the petitioners in both cases shows that they are essentially the same. The petitioners-legislators
summarized them in the following manner:

(a) E.O. No. 1 violates the separation of powers as it arrogates the power of the
Congress to create a public office and appropriate funds for its operation.

(b) The provision of Book III, Chapter 10, Section 31 of the Administrative Code
of 1987 cannot legitimize E.O. No. 1 because the delegated authority of the President to
structurally reorganize the Office of the President to achieve economy, simplicity and
efficiency does not include the power to create an entirely new public office which was
hitherto inexistent like the Truth Commission.

(c) E.O. No. 1 illegally amended the Constitution and pertinent statutes when it
vested the Truth Commission with quasi-judicial powers duplicating, if not superseding,
those of the Office of the Ombudsman created under the 1987 Constitution and the
Department of Justice created under the Administrative Code of 1987.

(d) E.O. No. 1 violates the equal protection clause as it selectively targets for
investigation and prosecution officials and personnel of the previous administration as if
corruption is their peculiar species even as it excludes those of the other administrations,
past and present, who may be indictable.

(e) The creation of the Philippine Truth Commission of 2010 violates the
consistent and general international practice of four decades wherein States constitute
truth commissions to exclusively investigate human rights violations, which customary
practice forms part of the generally accepted principles of international law which the
 Philippines is mandated to adhere to pursuant to the Declaration of Principles enshrined
in the Constitution.

(f) The creation of the Truth Commission is an exercise in futility, an adventure in

partisan hostility, a launching pad for trial/conviction by publicity and a mere populist
propaganda to mistakenly impress the people that widespread poverty will altogether
vanish if corruption is eliminated without even addressing the other major causes of
poverty.

(g) The mere fact that previous commissions were not constitutionally challenged
is of no moment because neither laches nor estoppel can bar an eventual question on the
constitutionality and validity of an executive issuance or even a statute. [13]

In their Consolidated Comment, [14] the respondents, through the Office of the Solicitor
General (OSG), essentially questioned the legal standing of petitioners and defended the assailed
executive order with the following arguments:

1] E.O. No. 1 does not arrogate the powers of Congress to create a public office
because the Presidents executive power and power of control necessarily include the
inherent power to conduct investigations to ensure that laws are faithfully executed and
that, in any event, the Constitution, Revised Administrative Code of 1987 (E.O. No.
292), [15] Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1416 [16] (as amended by P.D. No. 1772), R.A. No.
9970,[17] and settled jurisprudence that authorize the President to create or form such
bodies.

2] E.O. No. 1 does not usurp the power of Congress to appropriate funds because
there is no appropriation but a mere allocation of funds already appropriated by
Congress.

3] The Truth Commission does not duplicate or supersede the functions of the
Office of the Ombudsman (Ombudsman) and the Department of Justice (DOJ), because
it is a fact-finding body and not a quasi-judicial body and its functions do not duplicate,
supplant or erode the latters jurisdiction.

4] The Truth Commission does not violate the equal protection clause because it
was validly created for laudable purposes.

The OSG then points to the continued existence and validity of other executive orders and
presidential issuances creating similar bodies to justify the creation of the PTC such as Presidential
Complaint and Action Commission (PCAC) by President Ramon B. Magsaysay, Presidential Committee
on Administrative Performance Efficiency (PCAPE) by President Carlos P. Garcia and Presidential Agency
on Reform and Government Operations (PARGO) by President Ferdinand E. Marcos.[18]
From the petitions, pleadings, transcripts, and memoranda, the following are the principal issues
to be resolved:

1. Whether or not the petitioners have the legal standing to file

their respective petitions and question Executive Order No. 1;
 2. Whether or not Executive Order No. 1 violates the principle of
separation of powers by usurping the powers of Congress to create and to appropriate
funds for public offices, agencies and commissions;
3. Whether or not Executive Order No. 1 supplants the powers of the
Ombudsman and the DOJ;

4. Whether or not Executive Order No. 1 violates the equal protection clause; and

5. Whether or not petitioners are entitled to injunctive relief.

Essential requisites for judicial review

Before proceeding to resolve the issue of the constitutionality of Executive Order No. 1, the Court needs
to ascertain whether the requisites for a valid exercise of its power of judicial review are present.

Like almost all powers conferred by the Constitution, the power of judicial review is subject to limitations,
to wit: (1) there must be an actual case or controversy calling for the exercise of judicial power; (2) the
person challenging the act must have the standing to question the validity of the subject act or issuance;
otherwise stated, he must have a personal and substantial interest in the case such that he has
sustained, or will sustain, direct injury as a result of its enforcement; (3) the question of constitutionality
must be raised at the earliest opportunity; and (4) the issue of constitutionality must be the very lis mota of
the case.[19]

Among all these limitations, only the legal standing of the petitioners has been put at issue.

Legal Standing of the Petitioners

The OSG attacks the legal personality of the petitioners-legislators to file their petition for failure
to demonstrate their personal stake in the outcome of the case. It argues that the petitioners have not
shown that they have sustained or are in danger of sustaining any personal injury attributable to the
creation of the PTC. Not claiming to be the subject of the commissions investigations, petitioners will not
sustain injury in its creation or as a result of its proceedings. [20]

The Court disagrees with the OSG in questioning the legal standing of the petitioners-legislators
to assail Executive Order No. 1. Evidently, their petition primarily invokes usurpation of the power of the
Congress as a body to which they belong as members. This certainly justifies their resolve to take the
cudgels for Congress as an institution and present the complaints on the usurpation of their power and
rights as members of the legislature before the Court. As held in Philippine Constitution Association v.
Enriquez,[21]

To the extent the powers of Congress are impaired, so is the power of each
member thereof, since his office confers a right to participate in the exercise of the
powers of that institution.
An act of the Executive which injures the institution of Congress causes a
derivative but nonetheless substantial injury, which can be questioned by a member of
Congress. In such a case, any member of Congress can have a resort to the courts.

Indeed, legislators have a legal standing to see to it that the prerogative, powers and privileges
vested by the Constitution in their office remain inviolate. Thus, they are allowed to question the validity of
any official action which, to their mind, infringes on their prerogatives as legislators. [22]

With regard to Biraogo, the OSG argues that, as a taxpayer, he has no standing to question the
creation of the PTC and the budget for its operations. [23] It emphasizes that the funds to be used for the
creation and operation of the commission are to be taken from those funds already appropriated by
Congress. Thus, the allocation and disbursement of funds for the commission will not entail
congressional action but will simply be an exercise of the Presidents power over contingent funds.

As correctly pointed out by the OSG, Biraogo has not shown that he sustained, or is in danger of
sustaining, any personal and direct injury attributable to the implementation of Executive Order No. 1.
Nowhere in his petition is an assertion of a clear right that may justify his clamor for the Court to exercise
judicial power and to wield the axe over presidential issuances in defense of the Constitution. The case
of David v. Arroyo[24] explained the deep-seated rules on locus standi. Thus:

Locus standi is defined as a right of appearance in a court of justice on a given

question. In private suits, standing is governed by the real-parties-in interest rule as
contained in Section 2, Rule 3 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended. It
provides that every action must be prosecuted or defended in the name of the real
party in interest. Accordingly, the real-party-in interest is the party who stands to be
benefited or injured by the judgment in the suit or the party entitled to the avails of the
suit. Succinctly put, the plaintiffs standing is based on his own right to the relief sought.

The difficulty of determining locus standi arises in public suits. Here, the plaintiff
who asserts a public right in assailing an allegedly illegal official action, does so as a
representative of the general public. He may be a person who is affected no differently
from any other person. He could be suing as a stranger, or in the category of a citizen, or
taxpayer. In either case, he has to adequately show that he is entitled to seek judicial
protection. In other words, he has to make out a sufficient interest in the vindication of the
public order and the securing of relief as a citizen or taxpayer.
 Case law in most jurisdictions now allows both citizen and taxpayer standing in
public actions. The distinction was first laid down in Beauchamp v. Silk, where it was held
that the plaintiff in a taxpayers suit is in a different category from the plaintiff in a citizens
suit. In the former, the plaintiff is affected by the expenditure of public funds, while in the
latter, he is but the mere instrument of the public concern. As held by the New York
Supreme Court in People ex rel Case v. Collins: In matter of mere public right,
howeverthe people are the real partiesIt is at least the right, if not the duty, of every
citizen to interfere and see that a public offence be properly pursued and punished, and
that a public grievance be remedied. With respect to taxpayers suits, Terr v. Jordan held
that the right of a citizen and a taxpayer to maintain an action in courts to restrain the
unlawful use of public funds to his injury cannot be denied.

However, to prevent just about any person from seeking judicial interference in
any official policy or act with which he disagreed with, and thus hinders the activities of
governmental agencies engaged in public service, the United State Supreme Court laid
down the more stringent direct injury test in Ex Parte Levitt, later reaffirmed in Tileston
v. Ullman. The same Court ruled that for a private individual to invoke the judicial power to
determine the validity of an executive or legislative action, he must show that he has
sustained a direct injury as a result of that action, and it is not sufficient that he
has a general interest common to all members of the public.

This Court adopted the direct injury test in our jurisdiction. In People v. Vera, it
held that the person who impugns the validity of a statute must have a personal and
substantial interest in the case such that he has sustained, or will sustain direct
injury as a result. The Vera doctrine was upheld in a litany of cases, such as, Custodio
v. President of the Senate, Manila Race Horse Trainers Association v. De la
Fuente, Pascual v. Secretary of Public Works and Anti-Chinese League of the Philippines
v. Felix.[Emphases included. Citations omitted]

Notwithstanding, the Court leans on the doctrine that the rule on standing is a matter of
procedure, hence, can be relaxed for nontraditional plaintiffs like ordinary citizens, taxpayers, and
legislators when the public interest so requires, such as when the matter is of transcendental
importance, of overreaching significance to society, or of paramount public interest. [25]

Thus, in Coconut Oil Refiners Association, Inc. v. Torres,[26] the Court held that in cases of
paramount importance where serious constitutional questions are involved, the standing requirements
may be relaxed and a suit may be allowed to prosper even where there is no direct injury to the party
claiming the right of judicial review. In the first Emergency Powers Cases,[27] ordinary citizens and
taxpayers were allowed to question the constitutionality of several executive orders although they had
only an indirect and general interest shared in common with the public.

The OSG claims that the determinants of transcendental importance [28] laid down in CREBA v.
ERC and Meralco[29] are non-existent in this case. The Court, however, finds reason in Biraogos assertion
that the petition covers matters of transcendental importance to justify the exercise of jurisdiction by the
Court. There are constitutional issues in the petition which deserve the attention of this Court in view of
their seriousness, novelty and weight as precedents. Where the issues are of transcendental and
paramount importance not only to the public but also to the Bench and the Bar, they should be resolved
for the guidance of all.[30] Undoubtedly, the Filipino people are more than interested to know the status of
the Presidents first effort to bring about a promised change to the country. The Court takes cognizance of
the petition not due to overwhelming political undertones that clothe the issue in the eyes of the public,
but because the Court stands firm in its oath to perform its constitutional duty to settle legal controversies
with overreaching significance to society.

Power of the President to Create the Truth Commission

In his memorandum in G.R. No. 192935, Biraogo asserts that the Truth Commission is a public
office and not merely an adjunct body of the Office of the President. [31] Thus, in order that the President
may create a public office he must be empowered by the Constitution, a statute or an authorization vested
in him by law. According to petitioner, such power cannot be presumed [32] since there is no provision in the
Constitution or any specific law that authorizes the President to create a truth commission. [33] He adds that
Section 31 of the Administrative Code of 1987, granting the President the continuing authority to
reorganize his office, cannot serve as basis for the creation of a truth commission considering the
aforesaid provision merely uses verbs such as reorganize, transfer, consolidate, merge, and abolish.
[34]
Insofar as it vests in the President the plenary power to reorganize the Office of the President to the
extent of creating a public office, Section 31 is inconsistent with the principle of separation of powers
enshrined in the Constitution and must be deemed repealed upon the effectivity thereof. [35]

Similarly, in G.R. No. 193036, petitioners-legislators argue that the creation of a public office lies
within the province of Congress and not with the executive branch of government. They maintain that the
delegated authority of the President to reorganize under Section 31 of the Revised Administrative Code:
1) does not permit the President to create a public office, much less a truth commission; 2) is limited to the
reorganization of the administrative structure of the Office of the President; 3) is limited to the restructuring
of the internal organs of the Office of the President Proper, transfer of functions and transfer of agencies;
and 4) only to achieve simplicity, economy and efficiency. [36] Such continuing authority of the President to
reorganize his office is limited, and by issuing Executive Order No. 1, the President overstepped the limits
of this delegated authority.

The OSG counters that there is nothing exclusively legislative about the creation by the President
of a fact-finding body such as a truth commission. Pointing to numerous offices created by past
presidents, it argues that the authority of the President to create public offices within the Office of the
President Proper has long been recognized.[37] According to the OSG, the Executive, just like the other
two branches of government, possesses the inherent authority to create fact-finding committees to assist
it in the performance of its constitutionally mandated functions and in the exercise of its administrative
functions.[38] This power, as the OSG explains it, is but an adjunct of the plenary powers wielded by the
President under Section 1 and his power of control under Section 17, both of Article VII of the
Constitution.[39]

It contends that the President is necessarily vested with the power to conduct fact-finding
investigations, pursuant to his duty to ensure that all laws are enforced by public officials and employees
of his department and in the exercise of his authority to assume directly the functions of the executive
department, bureau and office, or interfere with the discretion of his officials. [40] The power of the President
to investigate is not limited to the exercise of his power of control over his subordinates in the executive
branch, but extends further in the exercise of his other powers, such as his power to discipline
subordinates,[41] his power for rule making, adjudication and licensing purposes [42] and in order to be
informed on matters which he is entitled to know.[43]

The OSG also cites the recent case of Banda v. Ermita,[44] where it was held that the President
has the power to reorganize the offices and agencies in the executive department in line with his
constitutionally granted power of control and by virtue of a valid delegation of the legislative power to
reorganize executive offices under existing statutes.

Thus, the OSG concludes that the power of control necessarily includes the power to create
offices. For the OSG, the President may create the PTC in order to, among others, put a closure to the
reported large scale graft and corruption in the government. [45]

The question, therefore, before the Court is this: Does the creation of the PTC fall within the ambit
of the power to reorganize as expressed in Section 31 of the Revised Administrative Code? Section 31
contemplates reorganization as limited by the following functional and structural lines: (1) restructuring the
internal organization of the Office of the President Proper by abolishing, consolidating or merging units
thereof or transferring functions from one unit to another; (2) transferring any function under the Office of
the President to any other Department/Agency or vice versa; or (3) transferring any agency under the
Office of the President to any other Department/Agency or vice versa. Clearly, the provision refers to
reduction of personnel, consolidation of offices, or abolition thereof by reason of economy or redundancy
of functions. These point to situations where a body or an office is already existent but a modification or
alteration thereof has to be effected. The creation of an office is nowhere mentioned, much less
envisioned in said provision. Accordingly, the answer to the question is in the negative.
 To say that the PTC is borne out of a restructuring of the Office of the President under Section 31
is a misplaced supposition, even in the plainest meaning attributable to the term restructure an alteration
of an existing structure. Evidently, the PTC was not part of the structure of the Office of the President prior
to the enactment of Executive Order No. 1. As held in Buklod ng Kawaning EIIB v. Hon. Executive
Secretary,[46]

But of course, the list of legal basis authorizing the President to reorganize any
department or agency in the executive branch does not have to end here. We must not
lose sight of the very source of the power that which constitutes an express grant of
power. Under Section 31, Book III of Executive Order No. 292 (otherwise known as the
Administrative Code of 1987), "the President, subject to the policy in the Executive Office
and in order to achieve simplicity, economy and efficiency, shall have the continuing
authority to reorganize the administrative structure of the Office of the President." For this
purpose, he may transfer the functions of other Departments or Agencies to the Office of
the President. In Canonizado v. Aguirre [323 SCRA 312 (2000)], we ruled that
reorganization "involves the reduction of personnel, consolidation of offices, or abolition
thereof by reason of economy or redundancy of functions." It takes place when there is
an alteration of the existing structure of government offices or units therein,
including the lines of control, authority and responsibility between them. The EIIB
is a bureau attached to the Department of Finance. It falls under the Office of the
President. Hence, it is subject to the Presidents continuing authority to reorganize.
[Emphasis Supplied]

In the same vein, the creation of the PTC is not justified by the Presidents power of control.
Control is essentially the power to alter or modify or nullify or set aside what a subordinate officer had
done in the performance of his duties and to substitute the judgment of the former with that of the latter.
[47]
Clearly, the power of control is entirely different from the power to create public offices. The former is
inherent in the Executive, while the latter finds basis from either a valid delegation from Congress, or his
inherent duty to faithfully execute the laws.

The question is this, is there a valid delegation of power from Congress, empowering the
President to create a public office?

According to the OSG, the power to create a truth commission pursuant to the above provision
finds statutory basis under P.D. 1416, as amended by P.D. No. 1772. [48] The said law granted the
President the continuing authority to reorganize the national government, including the power to group,
consolidate bureaus and agencies, to abolish offices, to transfer functions, to create and classify
functions, services and activities, transfer appropriations, and to standardize salaries and materials. This
decree, in relation to Section 20, Title I, Book III of E.O. 292 has been invoked in several cases such
as Larin v. Executive Secretary.[49]
 The Court, however, declines to recognize P.D. No. 1416 as a justification for the President to
create a public office. Said decree is already stale, anachronistic and inoperable. P.D. No. 1416 was a
delegation to then President Marcos of the authority to reorganize the administrative structure of the
national government including the power to create offices and transfer appropriations pursuant to one of
the purposes of the decree, embodied in its last Whereas clause:

WHEREAS, the transition towards the parliamentary form of government will

necessitate flexibility in the organization of the national government.

Clearly, as it was only for the purpose of providing manageability and resiliency during the interim,
P.D. No. 1416, as amended by P.D. No. 1772, became functus oficio upon the convening of the First
Congress, as expressly provided in Section 6, Article XVIII of the 1987 Constitution. In fact, even the
Solicitor General agrees with this view. Thus:

ASSOCIATE JUSTICE CARPIO: Because P.D. 1416 was enacted was the last whereas
clause of P.D. 1416 says it was enacted to
prepare the transition from presidential to
parliamentary. Now, in a parliamentary form of
government, the legislative and executive
powers are fused, correct?

SOLICITOR GENERAL CADIZ: Yes, Your Honor.

ASSOCIATE JUSTICE CARPIO: That is why, that P.D. 1416 was issued. Now would you
agree with me that P.D. 1416 should not be
considered effective anymore upon the
promulgation, adoption, ratification of the 1987
Constitution.

SOLICITOR GENERAL CADIZ: Not the whole of P.D. [No.] 1416, Your Honor.

ASSOCIATE JUSTICE CARPIO: The power of the President to reorganize the entire
National Government is deemed repealed, at
least, upon the adoption of the 1987
Constitution, correct.

SOLICITOR GENERAL CADIZ: Yes, Your Honor.[50]

While the power to create a truth commission cannot pass muster on the basis of P.D. No. 1416 as
amended by P.D. No. 1772, the creation of the PTC finds justification under Section 17, Article VII of the
Constitution, imposing upon the President the duty to ensure that the laws are faithfully executed. Section
17 reads:

Section 17. The President shall have control of all the executive departments,
bureaus, and offices. He shall ensure that the laws be faithfully executed. (Emphasis
supplied).

As correctly pointed out by the respondents, the allocation of power in the three principal
branches of government is a grant of all powers inherent in them. The Presidents power to conduct
investigations to aid him in ensuring the faithful execution of laws in this case, fundamental laws on public
accountability and transparency is inherent in the Presidents powers as the Chief Executive. That the
authority of the President to conduct investigations and to create bodies to execute this power is not
explicitly mentioned in the Constitution or in statutes does not mean that he is bereft of such authority.
[51]
As explained in the landmark case of Marcos v. Manglapus:[52]

x x x. The 1987 Constitution, however, brought back the presidential system of

government and restored the separation of legislative, executive and judicial powers by
their actual distribution among three distinct branches of government with provision for
checks and balances.

It would not be accurate, however, to state that "executive power" is the power to
enforce the laws, for the President is head of state as well as head of government and
whatever powers inhere in such positions pertain to the office unless the Constitution
itself withholds it. Furthermore, the Constitution itself provides that the execution of the
laws is only one of the powers of the President. It also grants the President other powers
that do not involve the execution of any provision of law, e.g., his power over the
country's foreign relations.

On these premises, we hold the view that although the 1987 Constitution
imposes limitations on the exercise of specific powers of the President, it maintains
intact what is traditionally considered as within the scope of "executive power." Corollarily,
the powers of the President cannot be said to be limited only to the specific powers
enumerated in the Constitution. In other words, executive power is more than the sum of
specific powers so enumerated.

It has been advanced that whatever power inherent in the government that is
neither legislative nor judicial has to be executive. x x x.

Indeed, the Executive is given much leeway in ensuring that our laws are faithfully executed. As stated
above, the powers of the President are not limited to those specific powers under the Constitution. [53] One
of the recognized powers of the President granted pursuant to this constitutionally-mandated duty is the
power to create ad hoc committees. This flows from the obvious need to ascertain facts and determine if
laws have been faithfully executed. Thus, in Department of Health v. Camposano,[54] the authority of the
President to issue Administrative Order No. 298, creating an investigative committee to look into the
administrative charges filed against the employees of the Department of Health for the anomalous
purchase of medicines was upheld. In said case, it was ruled:

The Chief Executives power to create the Ad hoc Investigating Committee cannot
be doubted. Having been constitutionally granted full control of the Executive
Department, to which respondents belong, the President has the obligation to ensure that
all executive officials and employees faithfully comply with the law. With AO 298 as
mandate, the legality of the investigation is sustained. Such validity is not affected by the
fact that the investigating team and the PCAGC had the same composition, or that the
former used the offices and facilities of the latter in conducting the inquiry. [Emphasis
supplied]

It should be stressed that the purpose of allowing ad hoc investigating bodies to exist is to allow
an inquiry into matters which the President is entitled to know so that he can be properly advised and
guided in the performance of his duties relative to the execution and enforcement of the laws of the land.
And if history is to be revisited, this was also the objective of the investigative bodies created in the past
like the PCAC, PCAPE, PARGO, the Feliciano Commission, the Melo Commission and the Zenarosa
Commission. There being no changes in the government structure, the Court is not inclined to declare
such executive power as non-existent just because the direction of the political winds have changed.

On the charge that Executive Order No. 1 transgresses the power of Congress to appropriate
funds for the operation of a public office, suffice it to say that there will be no appropriation but only an
allotment or allocations of existing funds already appropriated. Accordingly, there is no usurpation on the
part of the Executive of the power of Congress to appropriate funds. Further, there is no need to specify
the amount to be earmarked for the operation of the commission because, in the words of the Solicitor
General, whatever funds the Congress has provided for the Office of the President will be the very source
of the funds for the commission. [55] Moreover, since the amount that would be allocated to the PTC shall
be subject to existing auditing rules and regulations, there is no impropriety in the funding.

Power of the Truth Commission to Investigate

The Presidents power to conduct investigations to ensure that laws are faithfully executed is well
recognized. It flows from the faithful-execution clause of the Constitution under Article VII, Section 17
thereof.[56] As the Chief Executive, the president represents the government as a whole and sees to it that
all laws are enforced by the officials and employees of his department. He has the authority to directly
assume the functions of the executive department. [57]

Invoking this authority, the President constituted the PTC to primarily investigate reports of graft and
corruption and to recommend the appropriate action. As previously stated, no quasi-judicial powers have
been vested in the said body as it cannot adjudicate rights of persons who come before it. It has been
said that Quasi-judicial powers involve the power to hear and determine questions of fact to which the
legislative policy is to apply and to decide in accordance with the standards laid down by law itself in
enforcing and administering the same law. [58] In simpler terms, judicial discretion is involved in the
exercise of these quasi-judicial power, such that it is exclusively vested in the judiciary and must be
clearly authorized by the legislature in the case of administrative agencies.

The distinction between the power to investigate and the power to adjudicate was delineated by
the Court in Cario v. Commission on Human Rights.[59] Thus:

"Investigate," commonly understood, means to examine, explore, inquire or delve

or probe into, research on, study. The dictionary definition of "investigate" is "to observe
or study closely: inquire into systematically: "to search or inquire into: x x to subject to an
official probe x x: to conduct an official inquiry." The purpose of investigation, of course, is
to discover, to find out, to learn, obtain information. Nowhere included or intimated is the
notion of settling, deciding or resolving a controversy involved in the facts inquired into by
application of the law to the facts established by the inquiry.

The legal meaning of "investigate" is essentially the same: "(t)o follow up step by
step by patient inquiry or observation. To trace or track; to search into; to examine and
inquire into with care and accuracy; to find out by careful inquisition; examination; the
taking of evidence; a legal inquiry;" "to inquire; to make an investigation," "investigation"
being in turn described as "(a)n administrative function, the exercise of which ordinarily
does not require a hearing. 2 Am J2d Adm L Sec. 257; x x an inquiry, judicial or otherwise,
for the discovery and collection of facts concerning a certain matter or matters."

"Adjudicate," commonly or popularly understood, means to adjudge, arbitrate,

judge, decide, determine, resolve, rule on, settle. The dictionary defines the term as "to
settle finally (the rights and duties of the parties to a court case) on the merits of issues
raised: x x to pass judgment on: settle judicially: x x act as judge." And "adjudge" means
"to decide or rule upon as a judge or with judicial or quasi-judicial powers: x x to award or
grant judicially in a case of controversy x x."
In the legal sense, "adjudicate" means: "To settle in the exercise of judicial
authority. To determine finally. Synonymous with adjudge in its strictest sense;" and
"adjudge" means: "To pass on judicially, to decide, settle or decree, or to sentence or
condemn. x x. Implies a judicial determination of a fact, and the entry of a
judgment." [Italics included. Citations Omitted]

Fact-finding is not adjudication and it cannot be likened to the judicial function of a court of justice,
or even a quasi-judicial agency or office. The function of receiving evidence and ascertaining therefrom
the facts of a controversy is not a judicial function. To be considered as such, the act of receiving
evidence and arriving at factual conclusions in a controversy must be accompanied by the authority
of applying the law to the factual conclusions to the end that the controversy may be decided or resolved
authoritatively, finally and definitively, subject to appeals or modes of review as may be provided by law.
[60]
Even respondents themselves admit that the commission is bereft of any quasi-judicial power. [61]
Contrary to petitioners apprehension, the PTC will not supplant the Ombudsman or the DOJ or erode their
respective powers. If at all, the investigative function of the commission will complement those of the two
offices. As pointed out by the Solicitor General, the recommendation to prosecute is but a consequence of
the overall task of the commission to conduct a fact-finding investigation. [62] The actual prosecution of
suspected offenders, much less adjudication on the merits of the charges against them, [63] is certainly not
a function given to the commission. The phrase, when in the course of its investigation, under Section
2(g), highlights this fact and gives credence to a contrary interpretation from that of the petitioners. The
function of determining probable cause for the filing of the appropriate complaints before the courts
remains to be with the DOJ and the Ombudsman.[64]

At any rate, the Ombudsmans power to investigate under R.A. No. 6770 is not exclusive but is shared
with other similarly authorized government agencies. Thus, in the case of Ombudsman v. Galicia,[65] it was
written:

This power of investigation granted to the Ombudsman by the 1987 Constitution and The
Ombudsman Act is not exclusive but is shared with other similarly authorized
government agencies such as the PCGG and judges of municipal trial courts and
municipal circuit trial courts. The power to conduct preliminary investigation on charges
against public employees and officials is likewise concurrently shared with the
Department of Justice. Despite the passage of the Local Government Code in 1991, the
Ombudsman retains concurrent jurisdiction with the Office of the President and the
local Sanggunians to investigate complaints against local elective officials. [Emphasis
supplied].

Also, Executive Order No. 1 cannot contravene the power of the Ombudsman to investigate criminal
cases under Section 15 (1) of R.A. No. 6770, which states:

(1) Investigate and prosecute on its own or on complaint by any person, any act
or omission of any public officer or employee, office or agency, when such act or
omission appears to be illegal, unjust, improper or inefficient. It has primary
jurisdiction over cases cognizable by the Sandiganbayan and, in the exercise of its
primary jurisdiction, it may take over, at any stage, from any investigatory agency of
government, the investigation of such cases. [Emphases supplied]

The act of investigation by the Ombudsman as enunciated above contemplates the conduct of a
preliminary investigation or the determination of the existence of probable cause. This is categorically out
of the PTCs sphere of functions. Its power to investigate is limited to obtaining facts so that it can advise
and guide the President in the performance of his duties relative to the execution and enforcement of the
laws of the land. In this regard, the PTC commits no act of usurpation of the Ombudsmans primordial
duties.
The same holds true with respect to the DOJ. Its authority under Section 3 (2), Chapter 1, Title III, Book IV
in the Revised Administrative Code is by no means exclusive and, thus, can be shared with a body
likewise tasked to investigate the commission of crimes.

Finally, nowhere in Executive Order No. 1 can it be inferred that the findings of the PTC are to be
accorded conclusiveness. Much like its predecessors, the Davide Commission, the Feliciano Commission
and the Zenarosa Commission, its findings would, at best, be recommendatory in nature. And being so,
the Ombudsman and the DOJ have a wider degree of latitude to decide whether or not to reject the
recommendation. These offices, therefore, are not deprived of their mandated duties but will instead be
aided by the reports of the PTC for possible indictments for violations of graft laws.

Violation of the Equal Protection Clause

Although the purpose of the Truth Commission falls within the investigative power of the
President, the Court finds difficulty in upholding the constitutionality of Executive Order No. 1 in view of its
apparent transgression of the equal protection clause enshrined in Section 1, Article III (Bill of Rights) of
the 1987 Constitution. Section 1 reads:

Section 1. No person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due

process of law, nor shall any person be denied the equal protection of the laws.

The petitioners assail Executive Order No. 1 because it is violative of this constitutional
safeguard. They contend that it does not apply equally to all members of the same class such that the
intent of singling out the previous administration as its sole object makes the PTC an adventure in
partisan hostility.[66] Thus, in order to be accorded with validity, the commission must also cover reports of
graft and corruption in virtually all administrations previous to that of former President Arroyo. [67]

The petitioners argue that the search for truth behind the reported cases of graft and corruption
must encompass acts committed not only during the administration of former President Arroyo but also
during prior administrations where the same magnitude of controversies and anomalies [68] were reported
to have been committed against the Filipino people. They assail the classification formulated by the
respondents as it does not fall under the recognized exceptions because first, there is no substantial
distinction between the group of officials targeted for investigation by Executive Order No. 1 and other
groups or persons who abused their public office for personal gain; and second, the selective
classification is not germane to the purpose of Executive Order No. 1 to end corruption. [69] In order to
attain constitutional permission, the petitioners advocate that the commission should deal with graft and
grafters prior and subsequent to the Arroyo administration with the strong arm of the law with equal force.
[70]

Position of respondents

According to respondents, while Executive Order No. 1 identifies the previous administration as
the initial subject of the investigation, following Section 17 thereof, the PTC will not confine itself to cases
of large scale graft and corruption solely during the said administration. [71] Assuming arguendo that the
commission would confine its proceedings to officials of the previous administration, the petitioners argue
that no offense is committed against the equal protection clause for the segregation of the transactions of
public officers during the previous administration as possible subjects of investigation is a valid
classification based on substantial distinctions and is germane to the evils which the Executive Order
seeks to correct.[72]To distinguish the Arroyo administration from past administrations, it recited the
following:

First. E.O. No. 1 was issued in view of widespread reports of large scale graft
and corruption in the previous administration which have eroded public confidence in
public institutions. There is, therefore, an urgent call for the determination of the truth
regarding certain reports of large scale graft and corruption in the government and to put
a closure to them by the filing of the appropriate cases against those involved, if
warranted, and to deter others from committing the evil, restore the peoples faith and
confidence in the Government and in their public servants.

Second. The segregation of the preceding administration as the object of fact-

finding is warranted by the reality that unlike with administrations long gone, the current
administration will most likely bear the immediate consequence of the policies of the
previous administration.

Third. The classification of the previous administration as a separate class for

investigation lies in the reality that the evidence of possible criminal activity, the evidence
that could lead to recovery of public monies illegally dissipated, the policy lessons to be
learned to ensure that anti-corruption laws are faithfully executed, are more easily
established in the regime that immediately precede the current administration.

Fourth. Many administrations subject the transactions of their predecessors to

investigations to provide closure to issues that are pivotal to national life or even as a
routine measure of due diligence and good housekeeping by a nascent administration
like the Presidential Commission on Good Government (PCGG), created by the late
President Corazon C. Aquino under Executive Order No. 1 to pursue the recovery of ill-
gotten wealth of her predecessor former President Ferdinand Marcos and his cronies,
and the Saguisag Commission created by former President Joseph Estrada under
Administrative Order No, 53, to form an ad-hoc and independent citizens committee to
investigate all the facts and circumstances surrounding Philippine Centennial projects of
his predecessor, former President Fidel V. Ramos.[73] [Emphases supplied]

Concept of the Equal Protection Clause

One of the basic principles on which this government was founded is that of the equality of right which
is embodied in Section 1, Article III of the 1987 Constitution. The equal protection of the laws is embraced
in the concept of due process, as every unfair discrimination offends the requirements of justice and fair
play. It has been embodied in a separate clause, however, to provide for a more specific guaranty against
any form of undue favoritism or hostility from the government. Arbitrariness in general may be challenged
on the basis of the due process clause. But if the particular act assailed partakes of an unwarranted
partiality or prejudice, the sharper weapon to cut it down is the equal protection clause.[74]

According to a long line of decisions, equal protection simply requires that all persons or things
similarly situated should be treated alike, both as to rights conferred and responsibilities imposed. [75] It
requires public bodies and institutions to treat similarly situated individuals in a similar manner. [76] The
purpose of the equal protection clause is to secure every person within a states jurisdiction against
intentional and arbitrary discrimination, whether occasioned by the express terms of a statue or by its
improper execution through the states duly constituted authorities. [77] In other words, the concept of equal
justice under the law requires the state to govern impartially, and it may not draw distinctions between
individuals solely on differences that are irrelevant to a legitimate governmental objective. [78]

The equal protection clause is aimed at all official state actions, not just those of the legislature.
[79]
Its inhibitions cover all the departments of the government including the political and executive
departments, and extend to all actions of a state denying equal protection of the laws, through whatever
agency or whatever guise is taken. [80]

It, however, does not require the universal application of the laws to all persons or things without
distinction. What it simply requires is equality among equals as determined according to a valid
classification. Indeed, the equal protection clause permits classification. Such classification, however, to
be valid must pass the test of reasonableness. The test has four requisites: (1) The classification rests
on substantial distinctions; (2) It is germane to the purpose of the law; (3) It is not limited to existing
conditions only; and
(4) It applies equally to all members of the same class. [81] Superficial differences do not make for a valid
classification.[82]

For a classification to meet the requirements of constitutionality, it must include or embrace all
persons who naturally belong to the class.[83] The classification will be regarded as invalid if all the
members of the class are not similarly treated, both as to rights conferred and obligations imposed. It is
not necessary that the classification be made with absolute symmetry, in the sense that the members of
the class should possess the same characteristics in equal degree. Substantial similarity will suffice; and
as long as this is achieved, all those covered by the classification are to be treated equally. The mere fact
that an individual belonging to a class differs from the other members, as long as that class is
substantially distinguishable from all others, does not justify the non-application of the law to him. [84]

The classification must not be based on existing circumstances only, or so constituted as to

preclude addition to the number included in the class. It must be of such a nature as to embrace all those
who may thereafter be in similar circumstances and conditions. It must not leave out or underinclude
those that should otherwise fall into a certain classification. As elucidated in Victoriano v. Elizalde Rope
Workers' Union[85] and reiterated in a long line of cases,[86]
The guaranty of equal protection of the laws is not a guaranty of equality in the
application of the laws upon all citizens of the state. It is not, therefore, a requirement, in
order to avoid the constitutional prohibition against inequality, that every man, woman and
child should be affected alike by a statute. Equality of operation of statutes does not
mean indiscriminate operation on persons merely as such, but on persons according to
the circumstances surrounding them. It guarantees equality, not identity of rights. The
Constitution does not require that things which are different in fact be treated in law as
though they were the same. The equal protection clause does not forbid discrimination as
to things that are different. It does not prohibit legislation which is limited either in the
object to which it is directed or by the territory within which it is to operate.

The equal protection of the laws clause of the Constitution allows classification.
Classification in law, as in the other departments of knowledge or practice, is the grouping
of things in speculation or practice because they agree with one another in certain
particulars. A law is not invalid because of simple inequality. The very idea of
classification is that of inequality, so that it goes without saying that the mere fact of
inequality in no manner determines the matter of constitutionality. All that is required of a
valid classification is that it be reasonable, which means that the classification should be
based on substantial distinctions which make for real differences, that it must be germane
to the purpose of the law; that it must not be limited to existing conditions only; and that it
must apply equally to each member of the class. This Court has held that the standard is
satisfied if the classification or distinction is based on a reasonable foundation or rational
basis and is not palpably arbitrary. [Citations omitted]

Applying these precepts to this case, Executive Order No. 1 should be struck down as violative of
the equal protection clause. The clear mandate of the envisioned truth commission is to investigate and
find out the truth concerning the reported cases of graft and corruption during the previous
administration[87] only. The intent to single out the previous administration is plain, patent and
manifest. Mention of it has been made in at least three portions of the questioned executive order.
Specifically, these are:

WHEREAS, there is a need for a separate body dedicated solely to investigating and
finding out the truth concerning the reported cases of graft and corruption during
the previous administration, and which will recommend the prosecution of the offenders
and secure justice for all;

SECTION 1. Creation of a Commission. There is hereby created the PHILIPPINE TRUTH

COMMISSION, hereinafter referred to as the COMMISSION, which shall primarily seek
 and find the truth on, and toward this end, investigate reports of graft and corruption of
such scale and magnitude that shock and offend the moral and ethical sensibilities of the
people, committed by public officers and employees, their co-principals, accomplices and
accessories from the private sector, if any, during the previous administration; and
thereafter recommend the appropriate action or measure to be taken thereon to ensure
that the full measure of justice shall be served without fear or favor.

SECTION 2. Powers and Functions. The Commission, which shall have all the powers of
an investigative body under Section 37, Chapter 9, Book I of the Administrative Code of
1987, is primarily tasked to conduct a thorough fact-finding investigation of reported
cases of graft and corruption referred to in Section 1, involving third level public officers
and higher, their co-principals, accomplices and accessories from the private sector, if
any, during the previous administration and thereafter submit its finding and
recommendations to the President, Congress and the Ombudsman. [Emphases supplied]

In this regard, it must be borne in mind that the Arroyo administration is but just a member of a
class, that is, a class of past administrations. It is not a class of its own. Not to include past
administrations similarly situated constitutes arbitrariness which the equal protection clause cannot
sanction. Such discriminating differentiation clearly reverberates to label the commission as a vehicle for
vindictiveness and selective retribution.

Though the OSG enumerates several differences between the Arroyo administration and other
past administrations, these distinctions are not substantial enough to merit the restriction of the
investigation to the previous administration only. The reports of widespread corruption in the Arroyo
administration cannot be taken as basis for distinguishing said administration from earlier administrations
which were also blemished by similar widespread reports of impropriety. They are not inherent in, and do
not inure solely to, the Arroyo administration. As Justice Isagani Cruz put it, Superficial differences do not
make for a valid classification.[88]

The public needs to be enlightened why Executive Order No. 1 chooses to limit the scope of the
intended investigation to the previous administration only. The OSG ventures to opine that to include
other past administrations, at this point, may unnecessarily overburden the commission and lead it to lose
its effectiveness.[89] The reason given is specious. It is without doubt irrelevant to the legitimate and noble
objective of the PTC to stamp out or end corruption and the evil it breeds. [90]

The probability that there would be difficulty in unearthing evidence or that the earlier reports
involving the earlier administrations were already inquired into is beside the point. Obviously, deceased
presidents and cases which have already prescribed can no longer be the subjects of inquiry by the PTC.
Neither is the PTC expected to conduct simultaneous investigations of previous administrations, given the
bodys limited time and resources. The law does not require the impossible (Lex non cogit ad
impossibilia).[91]
 Given the foregoing physical and legal impossibility, the Court logically recognizes the
unfeasibility of investigating almost a centurys worth of graft cases. However, the fact remains that
Executive Order No. 1 suffers from arbitrary classification. The PTC, to be true to its mandate of
searching for the truth, must not exclude the other past administrations. The PTC must, at least, have the
authority to investigate all past administrations. While reasonable prioritization is permitted, it should not
be arbitrary lest it be struck down for being unconstitutional. In the often quoted language of Yick Wo v.
Hopkins,[92]

Though the law itself be fair on its face and impartial in appearance, yet, if
applied and administered by public authority with an evil eye and an unequal hand, so as
practically to make unjust and illegal discriminations between persons in similar
circumstances, material to their rights, the denial of equal justice is still within the
prohibition of the constitution. [Emphasis supplied]

It could be argued that considering that the PTC is an ad hoc body, its scope is limited. The
Court, however, is of the considered view that although its focus is restricted, the constitutional guarantee
of equal protection under the laws should not in any way be circumvented. The Constitution is the
fundamental and paramount law of the nation to which all other laws must conform and in accordance
with which all private rights determined and all public authority administered. [93] Laws that do not conform
to the Constitution should be stricken down for being unconstitutional. [94] While the thrust of the PTC is
specific, that is, for investigation of acts of graft and corruption, Executive Order No. 1, to survive, must be
read together with the provisions of the Constitution. To exclude the earlier administrations in the guise of
substantial distinctions would only confirm the petitioners lament that the subject executive order is only
an adventure in partisan hostility. In the case of US v. Cyprian,[95] it was written: A rather limited number of
such classifications have routinely been held or assumed to be arbitrary; those include: race, national
origin, gender, political activity or membership in a political party, union activity or membership in a labor
union, or more generally the exercise of first amendment rights.

To reiterate, in order for a classification to meet the requirements of constitutionality, it must

include or embrace all persons who naturally belong to the class. [96] Such a classification must not be
based on existing circumstances only, or so constituted as to preclude additions to the number included
within a class, but must be of such a nature as to embrace all those who may thereafter be in similar
circumstances and conditions. Furthermore, all who are in situations and circumstances which are relative
to the discriminatory legislation and which are indistinguishable from those of the members of the class
must be brought under the influence of the law and treated by it in the same way as are the members of
the class.[97]

The Court is not unaware that mere underinclusiveness is not fatal to the validity of a law under
the equal protection clause.[98] Legislation is not unconstitutional merely because it is not all-embracing
and does not include all the evils within its reach. [99] It has been written that a regulation challenged under
the equal protection clause is not devoid of a rational predicate simply because it happens to be
incomplete.[100] In several instances, the underinclusiveness was not considered a valid reason to strike
down a law or regulation where the purpose can be attained in future legislations or regulations. These
cases refer to the step by step process. [101] With regard to equal protection claims, a legislature does not
run the risk of losing the entire remedial scheme simply because it fails, through inadvertence or
otherwise, to cover every evil that might conceivably have been attacked. [102]

In Executive Order No. 1, however, there is no inadvertence. That the previous administration
was picked out was deliberate and intentional as can be gleaned from the fact that it was underscored at
least three times in the assailed executive order.It must be noted that Executive Order No. 1 does not
even mention any particular act, event or report to be focused on unlike the investigative commissions
created in the past. The equal protection clause is violated by purposeful and intentional discrimination. [103]

To disprove petitioners contention that there is deliberate discrimination, the OSG clarifies that the
commission does not only confine itself to cases of large scale graft and corruption committed during the
previous administration.[104] The OSG points to Section 17 of Executive Order No. 1, which provides:

SECTION 17. Special Provision Concerning Mandate. If and when in the judgment of the
President there is a need to expand the mandate of the Commission as defined in
Section 1 hereof to include the investigation of cases and instances of graft and
corruption during the prior administrations, such mandate may be so extended
accordingly by way of a supplemental Executive Order.

The Court is not convinced. Although Section 17 allows the President the discretion to expand the
scope of investigations of the PTC so as to include the acts of graft and corruption committed in other
past administrations, it does not guarantee that they would be covered in the future. Such expanded
mandate of the commission will still depend on the whim and caprice of the President. If he would decide
not to include them, the section would then be meaningless. This will only fortify the fears of the
petitioners that the Executive Order No. 1 was crafted to tailor-fit the prosecution of officials and
personalities of the Arroyo administration.[105]
 The Court tried to seek guidance from the pronouncement in the case of Virata v.
Sandiganbayan,[106] that the PCGG Charter (composed of Executive Orders Nos. 1, 2 and 14) does not
violate the equal protection clause. The decision, however, was devoid of any discussion on how such
conclusory statement was arrived at, the principal issue in said case being only the sufficiency of a cause
of action.

A final word

The issue that seems to take center stage at present is - whether or not the Supreme Court, in
the exercise of its constitutionally mandated power of Judicial Review with respect to recent initiatives of
the legislature and the executive department, is exercising undue interference. Is the Highest Tribunal,
which is expected to be the protector of the Constitution, itself guilty of violating fundamental tenets like
the doctrine of separation of powers? Time and again, this issue has been addressed by the Court, but it
seems that the present political situation calls for it to once again explain the legal basis of its action lest it
continually be accused of being a hindrance to the nations thrust to progress.

The Philippine Supreme Court, according to Article VIII, Section 1 of the 1987 Constitution, is
vested with Judicial Power that includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies
involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has
been a grave of abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch
or instrumentality of the government.

Furthermore, in Section 4(2) thereof, it is vested with the power of judicial review which is the
power to declare a treaty, international or executive agreement, law, presidential decree, proclamation,
order, instruction, ordinance, or regulation unconstitutional. This power also includes the duty to rule on
the constitutionality of the application, or operation of presidential decrees, proclamations, orders,
instructions, ordinances, and other regulations. These provisions, however, have been fertile grounds of
conflict between the Supreme Court, on one hand, and the two co-equal bodies of government, on the
other. Many times the Court has been accused of asserting superiority over the other departments.

To answer this accusation, the words of Justice Laurel would be a good source of enlightenment,
to wit: And when the judiciary mediates to allocate constitutional boundaries, it does not assert any
superiority over the other departments; it does not in reality nullify or invalidate an act of the legislature,
but only asserts the solemn and sacred obligation assigned to it by the Constitution to determine
conflicting claims of authority under the Constitution and to establish for the parties in an actual
controversy the rights which that instrument secures and guarantees to them. [107]

Thus, the Court, in exercising its power of judicial review, is not imposing its own will upon a co-
equal body but rather simply making sure that any act of government is done in consonance with the
authorities and rights allocated to it by the Constitution. And, if after said review, the Court finds no
constitutional violations of any sort, then, it has no more authority of proscribing the actions under review.
Otherwise, the Court will not be deterred to pronounce said act as void and unconstitutional.

It cannot be denied that most government actions are inspired with noble intentions, all geared
towards the betterment of the nation and its people. But then again, it is important to remember this
ethical principle: The end does not justify the means. No matter how noble and worthy of admiration the
purpose of an act, but if the means to be employed in accomplishing it is simply irreconcilable with
constitutional parameters, then it cannot still be allowed. [108] The Court cannot just turn a blind eye and
simply let it pass. It will continue to uphold the Constitution and its enshrined principles.

The Constitution must ever remain supreme. All must bow to the mandate of this
law. Expediency must not be allowed to sap its strength nor greed for power debase its
rectitude.[109]

Lest it be misunderstood, this is not the death knell for a truth commission as nobly envisioned by
the present administration. Perhaps a revision of the executive issuance so as to include the earlier
past administrations would allow it to pass the test of reasonableness and not be an affront to the
Constitution. Of all the branches of the government, it is the judiciary which is the most interested in
knowing the truth and so it will not allow itself to be a hindrance or obstacle to its attainment. It must,
however, be emphasized that the search for the truth must be within constitutional bounds for ours is still
a government of laws and not of men.[110]

WHEREFORE, the petitions are GRANTED. Executive Order No. 1 is hereby

declared UNCONSTITUTIONAL insofar as it is violative of the equal protection clause of the Constitution.

As also prayed for, the respondents are hereby ordered to cease and desist from carrying out the
provisions of Executive Order No. 1.

SO ORDERED.