Beruflich Dokumente
Kultur Dokumente
Justyna Zając
Poland’s Security Policy
Justyna Zaja ̨c
Poland’s Security
Policy
The West, Russia, and the Changing
International Order
Justyna Zaja ̨c
Institute of International Relations
Faculty of Political Science and International Studies
University of Warsaw
Warsaw, Poland
v
vi CONTENTS
6 Conclusions 185
Notes 193
Bibliography 195
Poland’s security policy, which forms the subject of this book, is a topic
that has interested me as a scholar for many years. During my research
leading to this book, being a member of the presidential team of experts
working on Poland’s National Security Strategic Review—which provided
the basis for the White Book on National Security of the Republic of Poland
published in 2013—has proven to be an invaluable experience. My stay as
a visiting scholar at the Elliott School of International Affairs of George
Washington University in the spring of 2015 has given me a perspective
that was highly useful in placing Poland’s post-Cold War security policy
in the context of the changing international order. In this regard, I would
like to thank Peter Rollberg—Director of the European, Russian and
Eurasian Studies at GWU, for creating a congenial working atmosphere.
I am also grateful to the Kościuszko Foundation, whose grant made my
stay at GWU possible.
In preparing a book like this one, the author is indebted to many per-
sons. I owe a special debt of gratitude to Ryszard Zięba for his invalu-
able comments. I would also like to extend my thanks to many colleagues
for their insightful opinions during the preparation of this book: Stephen
F. Cohen, James Goldgeier, Henry Hale, Stephen Hedlund, Erik Jones,
Marlene Laruelle, Henry Nau, Robert Orttung, Magnus Petersson,
Angela Stent, Constanze Stelzenmüller, with a very special thanks to
Sharon L. Wolchik. I am also most grateful to Jean Jacques Granas for his
invaluable editorial help as well as my ‘Poland’s Foreign Policy’ students
at the University of Warsaw whose fresh discernment sheds new light on
stubborn questions.
vii
viii ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
Last but not least, I am deeply grateful to my family and friends for
their patient and unfailing support and for cheering me on at all stages
leading to the publication of this book.
ABBREVIATIONS
ix
x ABBREVIATIONS
We are here, the leaders of five states: Poland, Ukraine, Estonia, Latvia and
Lithuania. We are here in order to take up a struggle. For the first time in a
long while, our neighbors from the north, in our case also from the north
and from the east, have shown a face we have known for centuries. Those
neighbors think that the nations around them should be subordinated to
them. We say no! That country is Russia. That country thinks that the old
times of an empire that collapsed 20 years ago are returning; that domina-
tion will once again be the chief trait of this region. It won’t! Those days are
over once and for ever. Not for twenty, thirty or fifty years. We all have, in
the same period or at different times, known this domination. It is a disaster
for […] all of Europe. It is the breaking of human characters, the imposi-
tion of a foreign regime and of a foreign language. […]We also know very
well that today it’s Georgia, tomorrow Ukraine, the day after tomorrow the
Baltic states, and after that it will perhaps be time for my country, Poland!
We were deeply convinced that membership in NATO and the European
Union would put an end to Russian appetites. It turned out not to be the
case, that it was a mistake. But we are able to stand up against it […].
xi
xii INTRODUCTION
on one thing: that the rules, whether they are formal or informal, are in
the main defined by the most powerful actors in the system.3 Thus, power
provides the structure for international order, as order is the structure for
power.4 In this work we assume that changes in the international system,
such as the redistribution of power (from a bipolar system to a unipolar
one, or from a unipolar to a multipolar one, for example), lead to a chang-
ing international order—the rules, norms and institutions that govern the
functioning of the society of states. The collapse of the USSR and of the
Eastern Bloc made it possible for the countries that were part of the West
during the Cold War to spread on a global scale the rules, norms and insti-
tutions on the basis of which they relate to one another. Those same rules,
norms and institutions were successfully implemented in many Central
and Eastern European states which had a vested interest in adopting them,
while countries in other regions of the world were, for various reasons, less
keen to do so. The weakening position of the West at the beginning of the
21st century and the redistribution of power in the international system
contributed to the dissemination by the emerging powers of rules, norms
and institutions that differed from those championed by the West.5
Three stages can be distinguished in this process by which a new inter-
national order has been taking shape since the end of the Cold War: the
transformation phase at the end the 1980s/early 1990s; the unipolar
order in the 1990s with the domination of the West and with the USA
as a hegemon; and the multipolar order that has been emerging since the
beginning of the 21st century. The last few years have brought particular
challenges for Poland’s security policy on account of the revisionist policy
of Russia, which is seeking to gain an equal position to that of western
countries (the USA and UE member states) and to play a key role in
international politics. These steps are seen in Poland as Russia’s return to
an imperial policy—one that endangers Poland’s security. The aim of this
book, therefore, is to examine the changes in Poland’s security policy in
connection with the redistribution of power in the international system
affecting the international order.
In this book, Poland is defined as a middle power.6 Despite the fact that
there is no general agreement in the literature about what constitutes a
middle power in international politics,7 the author has placed Poland in this
group on the basis of international hierarchy criteria,8 which refer to such
quantifiable attributes as area, population, strength of economy, military
capability and other comparable factors, as well as the state’s geographic loca-
tion. The latter criterion signifies that a ‘middle power’ is a state physically
xiv INTRODUCTION
located ‘in the middle’, between the system’s great powers.9 Middle powers
are able to influence the international order, but this influence is limited.
On the other hand, the international order has a great impact on their
policies. As Abramo Fimo Kenneth Organski points out about middle pow-
ers, ‘if they did desire to make changes upsetting others, they would lack
the power to do so. […] Many of these nations have accepted the exist-
ing international order […] and found a place in it which assures them
certain benefits’.10 Joshua Spero notes that ‘middle powers exist in a great
power imposed self-help world, where great powers all too frequently try to
ignore, manipulate, or dominate middle powers. Unlike great powers and
their ability to change the international system of power distribution, analy-
sis of middle powers centers largely on their attempts to influence and avoid
dominance regionally by great powers’.11 Hedley Bull argues that ‘middle
and small powers […] are able to provide for their security for long periods
while dispensing with allies. But their ability to do so is conditional upon
the maintenance of a general balance of power in the international system
by states other than themselves. By contrast, the ability of the great powers
to dispense with allies is not conditional in this way’.12
Poland qualifies as a middle power under either criteria—international
hierarchy and the state’s geographic location. Its total area amounts
about 312,000 km2, which gives it the 9th place in Europe and the 69th
place in the world; it has 38.5 million inhabitants, which makes it the
8th most populous country in Europe (taking the entire population of
Russia and Turkey into account) and the 6th in the European Union;
Poland has the world’s 20th largest economy. It is also located ‘in the
middle’ between Germany and Russia—both of which rank as regional
powers—a geopolitical location that brought it much hardship in his-
tory. Hedley Bull points out that Poland’s partition between Austria,
Prussia and Russia in the 18th century was an application of the concept
of balance of power; as a weak state, Poland was sacrificed in order to
keep the balance of power in Europe.13
Polish people and institutions also generally see Poland as a middle
power. This is an important factor because, if one were to paraphrase
Robert Rothstein, a middle power is ‘a state which recognizes that it can
not obtain security primarily by use of its own capabilities, and that it must
rely fundamentally on the aid of others’,14 or, as Robert Keohane puts it,
‘a middle power is a state whose leaders consider that it cannot act effec-
tively by itself, but may have a systemic impact in a small group or through
international institutions’.15
INTRODUCTION xv
On the premise that Poland is a middle power, this work seeks to answer
the following questions: To what degree does the changing international
order influence Poland’s security policy? Do the aims of Poland’s security
policy change along with the changing international order? What instru-
ments, methods and strategies does Poland resort to in its security policy
as the distribution of power and dominant pattern of behavior of states in
the world change?
These questions are all the more significant as it is difficult to distinguish a
distinct pattern of behavior in international politics that would be common
to all middle powers. Adam Chapnick notes that in the literature relating to
middle powers, three notions—multilateralism, conflict management and
moral power—combine to form a behavioral model.16 In other words, it is
often assumed in the literature that seeking to preserve the existing interna-
tional order, a tendency towards collaboration and multilateralism, favoring
peaceful methods of conflict resolution, acting not only in the name of the
national interest but rather on behalf of the international community, and
supporting international law are typical aspects of middle power behavior.
However, it is very difficult to prove that the behavior of middle powers is
characterized by a tendency to seek multilateral solutions to international
problems, to embrace compromise positions in international disputes, and
to base their diplomacy on “good international citizenship” notions.17 As
Dennis Stairs points out, ‘commentators on the roles played by “middle
powers” in world affairs […] assume, or they try artfully to demonstrate,
that patterns exist where in fact they do not, and that causes are simple
when they are actually complex’.18 In fact, middle powers do not always
take on responsibility for the creation and preservation of the international
order seriously, their behavior does not always strengthen international
institutions and processes in a way that favors the settlement of problems
and disputes through orderly political means within a rule-governed envi-
ronment, or contribute to the removal of the underlying causes of conflict,
whatever those causes may be.19
Thus, states with very similar attributes do not have similar foreign and
security policies. The behavioral trait that is common to all middle pow-
ers is their obvious inability to ‘do some of the things that great powers
can do. On the other hand, they can do things that a smaller power can-
not do’.20 The strategy of states derives from their individual choices, no
matter what group of states they belong to—great, middle or small pow-
ers. As Olav Knudsen says ‘certain patterns of conduct, as well as ways of
doing business, are common to all states’.21 Irrespective of size, each state
xvi INTRODUCTION
is an axiological project, which means that its foreign and security policies
are affected not only by objective factors, but also subjective ones, such as
history and identity.22 Olav Knudsen puts it in this way:
The strategies of middle powers also change under the influence of external
factors. As Andrew F. Cooper, Richard A. Higgott and Kim Richard Nossal
point out, ‘middle power behavior has been far from static in nature. As the
international system has changed, we have seen a dramatic modification in
the behavior of these states’.24 There is no behavioral pattern for middle
powers depending on international system type, however. Carsten Holbraad
states that in a unipolar and a multipolar system: ‘Middle powers’ conduct
and role would depend on the way [a] great power exercised its preponder-
ance as well as on their own individual inclinations. […] The inclinations
of the middle powers would depend on a number of objective and subjec-
tive factors, such as geographical position and political traditions, and might
lead them in different directions. In responding to the preponderant power,
some might support its policy, while others would see it as threat’.25
As a result, a state that qualifies as a ‘middle power’ on the basis of
quantifiable measures and geographical location does not always play the
role that is held in the literature as being typical of middle powers—that
of conflict manager, multilateral moral power, stabilizer, mediator, peace-
keeper, community builder, ‘helpful-fixer’ and facilitator.26 Instead of
multilateralism, conflict management and moral power—often presented
in the literature as typical behaviors of middle powers—they can concen-
trate on such activities as strengthening their own power, deterrence,
containment, entering into alliances, balancing, bandwagoning, hiding,
transcending, specializing,27 buck-passing,28 and/or bridging.29
The influence of the changing international order on Poland’s post-Cold
War security policy is clearly visible. Joshua Spero rightly draws attention
to the fact that, after the Cold War, Poland adopted a bridging strategy,
understood as an alignment with all neighbors to lessen regional security
INTRODUCTION xvii
dilemmas, rather then to try playing countries against one another, hide
behind neutrality or distance itself through non-alignment.30 This was
undoubtedly Warsaw’s strategy when Krzysztof Skubiszewski was Poland’s
foreign minister (1989–1993). During this period, Poland chose the path
of developing bilateral cooperation with all its neighbors, of sub-regional
cooperation (the Weimar Triangle, the Visegrad Triangle, the Council of
the Baltic Sea States, the Central European Initiative) and of promoting
the model of cooperative security in Europe through the CSCE.
This strategy changed over the years, however. From the fall of 1992,
Poland’s security policy became focused on joining NATO—a political
and military alliance which Poland saw as the institution best able to
provide it with security and which it wished to join as rapidly as possible.
Successive Polish governments saw the casus foederis clause in the North-
Atlantic Treaty’s Art. 5 as the expression of the Alliance’s most important
function and consistently took steps to support NATO while opposing
any actions that could weaken it. This entailed a reluctant stance on
Poland’s part with regard to the European Security and Defence Policy
(ESDP), adopted by the EU in 1999. While Poland revised its stance
and took steps to further the EU security and defense policy in later
years, it consistently held the view that this policy is of a complementary
nature in relation to NATO. Poland also adopted a bandwagoning strat-
egy, understood as joining a stronger entity in order to obtain coveted
benefits.31 And so, when the George W. Bush administration announced
the ‘war on terror’, Poland took part in the military invasion of Iraq in
2003. Warsaw’s bandwagoning strategy was supposed to contribute to
strengthen Poland’s security. In fact, Poland was not facing any imme-
diate threat at that time, but wished to demonstrate its loyalty to the
USA—NATO’s most powerful member—and in this way it sought assur-
ances of American assistance in case of need. By supporting the USA,
Poland also wished to gain economic advantages in the form of lucra-
tive contracts during the reconstruction of Iraq and it also sought to
strengthen its position vis-à-vis the Franco-German tandem in the EU.32
Poland’s strategy with regard to the USA and the Bush administration’s
‘war on terror’ can also be explained through the concept of asymmetri-
cal alliance, which takes place when there is a great difference in power
between two allies. The weaker ally is dependent on the stronger one
and, for this reason, finds itself under pressure to become involved in the
realization of the stronger ally’s interests in exchange for guarantees of
support in situations of danger, should any arise.33
xviii INTRODUCTION
Russia was a relatively weak state throughout the 1990s, however, and
Moscow’s criticism of the West’s behavior––especially that of the USA––in
international politics was not followed by effective action. This began to
change in the first decade of the 21st century. After Vladimir Putin came
to power in 2000, Russia managed to regain its internal stability, and the
multifaceted crisis that the West ran into a few years later inclined Russia
to embark on a policy aimed at altering the status quo and to bring it
a stronger position in the international system. This was made plain in
President Putin’s speech delivered at the Munich Security Conference in
February 2007. The events which followed—the Georgian–Russian War
in August 2008, the escalation of the Ukraine crisis beginning late 2013
and Russia’s annexation of Crimea in March 2014—reinforced in Poland
the sense that Europe was reverting to the former ‘Hobbesian’ paradigm
based on rivalry, conflict, the primacy of national interests, power, and
the division of the world into spheres of influence. This led to a greater
emphasis in Poland’s security policy on actions aimed at reinforcing the
country’s military capabilities, strengthening the NATO alliance, and con-
taining and deterring Russia.
Thinking along lines that are typical of neorealism, which stress a
state-centric approach as well as political and military rivalry, this plays
a dominant role in Poland and this was the primary factor which deter-
mined the division of this work’s contents. In this book the post-Cold
War order is divided into unipolar and multipolar periods in keeping
with Kenneth Walz’s approach to the concentration of power.35 The
period at the end of the 1980s/beginning of the 1990s, when the
bipolar world order was disintegrating, and Poland’s security policy
in the face of the Ukraine crisis, which began to escalate in the fall of
2013, have been treated separately.
The first chapter describes Poland as a middle power in the post-Cold
War context, which formed the background to its security policy. Attention
is drawn to what the author considers as being the most important deter-
minants of Poland’s security policy—the country’s geopolitical location;
its economic and social potential, which determines its power and inter-
national position; and its history and identity, which have an unusually
important influence on the choice of strategy in Poland’s security policy.
The last part of the first chapter is devoted to the analysis of the changes
in documents relating to the strategy of the Polish security since 1989 to
the present day, and takes differences between the concepts of Poland’s
political parties into account.
xx INTRODUCTION
The second chapter covers the changes in Poland’s security policy stemming
from the Autumn of Nations in 1989. At the turn of the 1980s to the 1990s,
Poland not only carried through a number of internal transformations,
but also fundamentally changed its security policy. The Polish authorities
embarked on a search for a new security model. Different concepts were con-
sidered, including Poland’s neutrality and the concept of the Intermarium.
In practice, the cooperative approach prevailed, and this manifested itself in
Poland’s active efforts to strengthen the CSCE. The cooperation between
the West and Russia made it easier for Poland to adopt its bridging strategy.
This strategy soon encountered obstacles, however.
The third chapter addresses Poland’s security policy within a unipolar
international order in which the West was dominant and the USA enjoyed
global hegemony. This chapter shows how Poland’s efforts to join NATO
led to the worsening of its relations with Russia and how those rela-
tions deteriorated as did the relationship between the West and Russia.
Growing tensions and differences in this relationship impelled the changes
that took place in Poland’s security policy strategy. In the mid-1990s,
Poland intensified its efforts to join NATO and to establish closer relations
with its strongest member—the USA. Seeking to preserve the strength
of the North Atlantic Treaty and America’s military presence in Europe,
Poland adopted a cautious stance with regard to the EU’s initiative to set
up a European Security and Defence Policy in 1999. Poland’s interest in a
cooperative security system as part of the OCSE visibly declined, and this
is also discussed in Chap. 3. At the same time, in the middle of the 1990s,
Poland intensified its efforts aimed to bring Ukraine into a closer relation-
ship of cooperation with the West, treating this as an element serving to
preclude the rebuilding of Russia’s strength.
The fourth chapter is devoted to Poland’s security policy in the face
of an emerging multilateral world order and describes the gradual ascen-
dance within that policy of elements that are typical of neorealism. After
president Putin’s 2007 speech in Munich, and the 2008 Georgian–Russian
War, Poland took steps to support NATO consolidation, the strengthening
of the guarantees under Art. 5, and closer relations with the USA. Given
that Washington had by then already decided to reduce its political and
military presence in Europe, Warsaw was inclined to play a more active
role in the development of the EU’s Common Security and Defence Policy
(CSDP). The EU, however, was struggling with an economic and political
crisis and grappling with the negative consequences of the Arab Spring,
and was too weak and too divided to take up effective steps to strengthen
INTRODUCTION xxi
NOTES
1. Excerpt from a speech delivered by Polish President Lech Kaczyński’s dur-
ing a rally in Georgia in August 2008, https://www.youtube.com/
watch?v=Ojcme45iykc, accessed on 6 February 2016.
2. Poles were among the victims of terrorist attacks abroad—for example,
three Polish citizens were killed in the terrorist attack on the Brada museum
in Tunis on 18 March 2015—but no attacks took place on Polish
territory.
3. T. L. Knutsen (1999), The Rise and Fall of World Orders (Manchester:
Manchester University Press), pp. 1–2.
4. I. W. Zartman (2009), ‘The Quest for Order in World Politics’, in I. W.
Zartman, ed., Imbalance of Power: US Hegemony and International Order
(Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers), p. 4. Zartman uses the term ‘world
order’.
5. As Henry Nau points out, ‘different worldviews exist in all countries. They
constitute a broad ideational variable affecting policy outcomes […]. If or
as American power accommodates more and more rising powers in that
sense relatively declines, the voices of today’s aspiring power become more
important. The voices will shape how future international structures may
change and evolve’. See H. R. Nau (2012), ‘Introduction: Domestic
Voices of Aspiring Powers’, in H. R. Nau, D.M. Ollapally, eds., Worldviews
INTRODUCTION xxiii
17. A. F. Cooper, R. A. Higgott, K. R. Nossal (1993), Relocating middle pow-
ers…, p. 19; B. Wood (1988), The Middle Powers and the General Interest
(Ottawa: North–South Institute), p. 21.
18. D. Stairs (1998), ‘Of medium powers and middling roles’, in K. Booth, ed.,
Statecraft and Security: The Cold War and Beyond (Cambridge: University
Press Cambridge), p. 270.
19. Ibid., p. 278.
20. Ibid., p. 275.
21. O.F. Knudsen (1996), ‘Analyzing Small-State Security: Role of External
Factors’, in W. Bauwens, A. Clesse, O.F. Knudsen, eds., Small States and
the Security Challenge in the New Europe (London, Washington: Brassey’s),
p. 3.
22. P. Grudziński (2008), Państwo inteligentne. Polska w poszukiwaniu
międzynarodowej roli, (Toruń: Wydawnictwo Adam Marszałek), pp. 36,
37–38, 52. For more on the background of states’ foreign policy, see
R. Zięba (2004), ‘Uwarunkowania polityki zagranicznej państwa’, in
R. Zięba, ed., Wstęp do teorii polityki zagranicznej państwa (Toruń:
Wydawnictwo Adam Marszałek), pp. 17–35.
23. O. F. Knudsen (1996), ‘Analysing Small-State Security… ’, pp. 12–13.
24. A. F. Cooper, R. A. Higgott, K. R. Nossal (1993), Relocating middle pow-
ers…, p. 19.
25. Holbraad uses the terms ‘unifocal system’ and ‘multiple system’. See
C. Holbraad (1984), Middle Powers in International Politics (New York:
St. Martin’s Press), pp. 185–186.
26. B. Wood (1988), The Middle Powers…, pp. 19–20; C. Holbraad (1971),
‘The Role of Middle Powers’, Cooperation and Conflict, Vol. 6, No. 2,
pp. 80; L. Pearson (1966). ‘Canada’s Role as a Middle Power’, in J. K.
Gordon, ed., Canada’s Role as a Middle Power (Toronto: Canadian
Institute for International Affairs), p. 204; P. V. Lyon, B. W. Tomlin
(1979), Canada as an International Actor (Toronto: Macmillan),
pp. 12–13; D. B. Dewitt, J. J. Kirton (1983), Canada as a Principal Power
(Toronto: John Wiley & Sons), p. 403; A. F. Cooper, R. A. Higgott, K. R.
Nossal (1993), Relocating middle powers…, pp. 24–25; R. Cox (1996),
Approaches to World Order (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press),
p. 243. See also E. Jordaan (2003), ‘The Concept of a middle power’…,
pp. 168–170.
27. P. Schroeder (1994), ‘Historical Realities vs. Neo-Realist Theory’,
International Security, Vol. 19, No. 1, pp. 116–117.
28. T. J. Christensen, J. Snyder (1990), ‘Chain Gangs and Passed Bucks:
Predicting Alliance Patterns in Multipolarity’, International Organization,
Vol. 44, No. 2, pp. 137–168. On buck-passing, see also J. Mearsheimer
(2001), The Tragedy of Great Powers Politics (New York: W. W. Norton &
Company).
INTRODUCTION xxv
Since the moment of the breakthrough in Poland, the government has been
guided by the imperative of reversing the former bad role and function of
our position between the powers of the East and the West – a position boil-
ing down mainly to domination from the East. As early as the second half
of the eighteenth century this position always had disastrous effects. For the
past three years we have been striving to ensure that this position is to our
advantage. [...] Poland has a geostrategic location that makes its position
militarily significant. That has a bearing on the whole region.5
Poland’s present territory is half the size it was in the past, however. Under
the Jagiellonian Dynasty—whose first representative, Władysław Jagiełło,
ascended the Polish throne in 1386—Poland grew in strength and became
a major European power whose golden age lasted through the 15th and
16th centuries. During this period, the Polish kings ruled over a realm
whose area ranged from about 700,000 to over 900,000 km².7 Growing
internal crises in conjunction with the rising power of Poland’s neighbors
ultimately led to the collapse of Polish statehood. Poland was carved up
between Russia, Austria and Prussia in three partitions and, in 1795, dis-
appeared from the political map of Europe for 123 years. Poland regained
its independence in 1918 and after its borders were finally delimitated in
1922, it occupied a territory of about 388,000 km². This was about half
of Poland’s territory before the partitions. The Second Polish Republic
(1918–1939) also had unfavorably shaped boundaries. Its Baltic Sea
coastline was only 140 km long. Its 1912 km border with Germany ran
through disputed territory and was devoid of any natural defensive attri-
butes like rivers and mountains, and its relations with Germany were tense.
Moreover, the German minority in Poland often sought protection for its
rights at the League of Nations on the basis of the so-called Little Treaty
of Versailles, and received support from the German state. Gdańsk, which
was a free city, was the object of many Polish–German disputes. The bor-
der with the USSR, Poland’s second-longest (1412 km), ran through ter-
ritories inhabited by Ukrainians and Byelorussians, whose attitude toward
Poles and the Polish state was hostile. This was particularly the case with
the Ukrainians, of which there were about 5 million—approximately 16%
of Poland’s population at the time.8 The Polish–Lithuanian border (507
km) was not a peaceful one because Poland and Lithuania were in dis-
pute over Vilnius and the Vilnius region. Although Poland’s border with
Czechoslovakia (the third longest, with 984 km), ran along the Carpathian
Mountain range and was largely an ethnic and natural one, Poland’s rela-
tions with its neighbor to the south were cool. Disputes over border areas
(Trans-Olza, Spis and Orava), which were settled in July 1920, left feel-
ings of injustice and mutual animosity on both sides of the border.9 Only
the border with Romania (349 km) and Latvia (109 km) were relatively
peaceful. These were the short borders, however.
After the Second World War, Polish territory was reduced by nearly 20%
(from 388,000 km² to 312,000 km²) and the number of countries with which it
shared a border fell to three: The USSR (a border of 1321 km), Czechoslovakia
(1292 km) and the German Democratic Republic (GDR) (467 km).
4 J. ZAJA ̨C
In contrast with the pre-war period, Poland now had largely natural bor-
ders, most of which followed rivers (the Oder, Western Neisse, and Bug) and
mountains (the Sudety and Carpathians). Poland’s population also became
homogenous, because Poland’s eastern boundary was based on ethnic fac-
tors (the Curzon line), and because the inhabitants of former German terri-
tories ceded to Poland were expelled by virtue of the Potsdam Agreement of
1945. Poland’s coastline also grew to 497 km, and this made it possible for
Poland to operate several seaports. Relations between the People’s Republic
of Poland and its neighbors were formally friendly, but in practice Poland’s
membership of the Eastern Bloc meant Warsaw’s freedom to shape its rela-
tions with other countries was limited.10
The Autumn of Nations, which began in 1989, did not affect Poland’s
borders, but transformed the countries which lay beyond them. Upon the
unification of the two German states (1990), the collapse of the Soviet
Union (1991) and the ‘velvet divorce’ in Czecholovakia (1993), the num-
ber of Poland’s neighbors grew from three to seven: Germany, the Czech
Republic, Slovakia, Ukraine, Belarus, Lithuania, and Russia. No territorial
claims were raised by Poland’s neighbors after these peaceful changes and
all of them recognized their border with Poland.11 Poland signed friendship
and cooperation agreements with each of its neighbors in the early 1990s.
Over the centuries, Poland’s changing international environment
determined the fate of the country in different ways. During the first
period of its history (10–14th centuries), the Polish state found itself
isolated from the great historical processes of Medieval Europe and this
was a time of consolidation and stabilization. In the 14th century, Poland
became the principal force driving integration processes in the region.
The Polish–Lithuanian dynastic union of 1385 brought a period of great-
ness and peaceful stability, which lasted until the death in 1572 of King
Zygmunt August—the last monarch of the Jagiellonian dynasty. Within a
few decades, however, the Polish Commonwealth began drifting toward
the periphery of European politics, a process that was hastened by the
country’s severance from the south-east due to the rise of Turkey and
by the rise of trans-Atlantic trade. These developments produced long-
lasting negative economic consequences as well as threats of a political
and military nature. The 17th and 18th centuries in Polish history were a
period of numerous wars and conflicts with Russia, Sweden and Turkey.12
By the second half of the 18th century, unfavorable external conditions
and ongoing internal crises had proved Poland unable to defend itself
against the encroachments of neighboring Austria, Prussia, and Russia.13
POST-COLD WAR DETERMINANTS OF POLAND’S SECURITY POLICY 5
Conflict became not only a lasting element but, indeed, the geopolitical
stigma of Polish–Russian history.42 As a result, history has stamped the
Polish national identity with an image of Russia as an imperial state seeking
to subjugate Poland and to anchor permanently its influence over Eastern
and Central Europe. The most obvious example of historical factors influ-
encing Polish–Russian relations today is the Katyn massacre—the murder
of about 22,000 soldiers, officers and other functionaries of the Polish
state carried out in the spring of 1940 by the Stalinist regime—which
remains a vivid scar in the Poles’ consciousness. While Russia acknowl-
edged responsibility for the murders, it chose not to disclose a portion of
the relevant documentation—a decision that caused much dissatisfaction
in Poland. Some Polish politicians feel it necessary to classify the crime
as a case of genocide, something that hasn’t happened so far. There are
also other non-resolved issues from the past in Polish–Russian relations.43
Despite the establishment of a Polish–Russian Group for Difficult Issues
in 2002, and a Center for Polish–Russian Dialogue and Understanding
in 2011 (in Poland and in Russia), history continues to affect relations
between the two countries.
Historical factors also affect Poland’s relations with Lithuania and
Ukraine. Frictions in Polish–Lithuanian relations over the issue of the
Polish minority in Lithuania appeared at the beginning of the 1990s. In
1989 the number of Poles living in Lithuania stood at 258,000 people,
about 7% of the country’s population.44 Over 90% of those Poles have
lived for centuries in south-eastern Lithuania—mainly in the capital city
of Vilnius and the regions of Šalčininkai, Švenčionys, Trakai and Vilnius.45
Those are areas which, before the Second World War, had been part of
Poland, to which they had been annexed following an armed operation by
the Polish army conducted in October 1920 (the so-called Żeligowski’s
Mutiny). Lithuania did not recognize this annexation and diplomatic rela-
tions were only established in 1938, following an ultimatum from Poland.
Thus, the establishment of formal diplomatic ties did not reflect any real
improvement in relations between the two countries.46 Mutual animosi-
ties, having lain dormant since the Second World War, resurfaced after
the end of the Cold War. At the beginning of the 1990s, during negotia-
tions leading to the signing of the Polish–Lithuanian Treaty on Friendly
Relations and Good Neighborly Cooperation, the Lithuanians proposed that
the preamble to the treaty include a condemnation of Żeligowski’s inva-
sion and Poland’s subsequent occupation of Vilnius and the Vilnius region
from 1920 to 1939, something the Poles refused to accept. During the
14 J. ZAJA ̨C
negotiations there were also differing views about the rights and privileges
of the Polish minority in Lithuania. In light of these difficulties negotia-
tions dragged on and while Poland signed similar treaties with its other
eastern neighbors in 1992, an understanding with Lithuania was only
reached two years later. The relevant treaty, signed in April 1994, made
it possible for the two countries to normalize relations, but the spirit of
the past continues to haunt Polish–Lithuanian relations. Questions having
to do with the rights of Lithuania’s Polish minority that live in compact
settlements on territory which used to be part of the Polish state before
the Second World War, continue to cause friction. One of the most impor-
tant problems is the legal inability for Poles in Lithuania to write their
surnames in the original form.47
Historical questions also loom over Polish–Ukrainian relations.
Nationalism and anti-Polish attitudes among Ukrainians had grown for
centuries and crystallized following the First World War. In November
1918, fighting broke out between Poles and Ukrainians over the city of
Lwów and rapidly transformed itself into a regular war for Eastern Galicia.
In April 1920, the Ukrainian People’s Republic headed by Semon Petlura
concluded an alliance with Poland directed against the Bolsheviks, but
this alliance was of a tactical nature and Ukrainian separatism in the
western part of Ukraine retained its distinctly anti-Polish character. In
October 1920, Poland and Soviet Russia, which had been at war since
1919, agreed on a ceasefire and, in March 1921, signed the Treaty of
Riga, which ended the collaboration between Poland and the Ukrainian
People’s Republic. The interwar period was a time of growing sense of
national identity among Ukrainians and of recurring violent action on the
part of Ukrainian nationalists directed against the Polish state. The Polish
authorities took no steps to defuse tensions. Quite the opposite—succes-
sive governments in Warsaw sought to Polonize and assimilate national
minorities, and their frequently brutal policy only compounded anti-Pol-
ish sentiment.48 This led to tragedy during the Second World War: In
1943 the Ukrainian Insurgent Army (UPA) carried out an extensive eth-
nic cleansing operation during which an estimated 100,000 Poles were
murdered,49 most of them (50–60 thousand) in Volhynia.50 This issue
resurfaced in Polish-Ukrainian relations after the Cold War. Since 2003,
commemorations of the anti-Polish UPA campaign in Volhynia have been
organized every year. Though important and momentous, they have
unfortunately not brought closure to the historical wounds affecting the
way Poles and Ukrainians perceive each other. For many years, Ukrainians
POST-COLD WAR DETERMINANTS OF POLAND’S SECURITY POLICY 15
security policy. It was not an easy transition, however, because it took time
to overcome entrenched patterns, habits and procedures. Furthermore,
for a long time there were no institutions dealing with strategic thought,
planning and management.52 Nevertheless, changes of strategies and con-
cepts pertaining to Poland’s security policy did take place and, since the
dissolution of the Warsaw Pact in 1991, several successive documents
defining Polish security strategy were adopted. These documents are from
1992, 2000, 2003, 2007, and 2014. In 2013, for the first time, a White
Book on National Security of the Republic of Poland was drawn up under
the auspices of President Bronisław Komorowski.
The 2014 strategy reflects a sense of threat from Russia that had been
growing for several years. The document further stated:
Russia’s relations with the West will remain an important factor influencing
the security of Poland, the region and Europe. The reassertion of Russia’s
position as a major power at the expense of its neighbourhood, as well as the
escalation of its confrontational policy, an example of which is the conflict
with Ukraine, including the annexation of Crimea, has a negative impact on
the security in the region.57
a hard alliance with the USA is more important than NATO alone, and
of decreasing interest in US political and military presence in Poland.69
There is also a difference between PO and PiS about the methods used
to shape Poland’s Eastern policy. Despite the fact that both parties rec-
ognize the existence of a potential threat from Russia, in the case of PiS
these fears are expressed more explicitly. President Lech Kaczyński was
deeply involved in state policy concerning the post-Soviet area and made
reference to the Jagiellonian idea in this regard. While he made use of this
term strictly as a slogan, the essence of his policy was to weaken Russia
and to strengthen Poland’s position by establishing ties of cooperation
with post-Soviet states which were geopolitically important for Poland.
Being convinced that Russia was seeking to rebuild its sphere of influ-
ence in Central and Eastern Europe, President Kaczyński stressed that it
was in Poland’s interest to seek a far-reaching weakening of Russia’s posi-
tion through a power distribution favorable to Poland. Thus he invariably
supported NATO membership for Georgia and Ukraine. As Kaczyński
argued, the disintegration of the post-Soviet geopolitical order was in
Poland’s interest.70 For this reason, during the NATO Bucharest Summit
in April 2008, Kaczyński personally lobbied on behalf of greater NATO
cooperation with Georgia and Ukraine. He thought the best strategy with
regard to the post-Soviet area would be a policy conducted independently
and/or in classic cooperation with chosen countries. This idea was based
on the premise that a stronger position for Poland in the East contributes
to a stronger position for Poland in the EU and this, in conjunction with
close relations with the USA, translated into a stronger position for Poland
with regard to Russia.71 In practice, this entailed efforts to establish ties
between Poland and the political elites of individual countries, for example
those of Azerbaijan or Georgia. Considering the prevalent patrimonialism
in most post-Soviet states,72 seeking an understanding on the level of the
elites had its justifications.
As declared, PO’s approach to Eastern policy was altogether different.
In the summer of 2009, Polish foreign minister Radosław Sikorski called
for the abandonment of the Jagiellonian idea in Polish foreign policy, argu-
ing that Poland’s collapse in 1939 represented a civilizational defeat of the
idea of ‘Jagiellonian statehood’, and Poland’s Jagiellonian power ambi-
tions did not provide it with any appropriate answers to the geostrategic
and identity dilemmas of the day.73 PO also places a much greater emphasis
on the necessity to conduct Poland’s foreign policy aims within the frame-
work of the European Union. One consequence of this approach was the
POST-COLD WAR DETERMINANTS OF POLAND’S SECURITY POLICY 23
NOTES
1. N. Davies (1984), Heart of Europe. A Short History of Poland (Oxford and
New York: Oxford University Press); K. Dziewanowski (1995), Polityka w
sercu Europy (Warsaw: Oficyna Wydawnicza Rytm).
2. See K. Łastawski (2015), ‘Pozycja geopolityczna Polski w Europie po roz-
padzie bloku radzieckiego’, in J. Zaja ̨c, A. Włodkowska-Bagan,
M. Kaczmarski, eds., Bezpieczeństwo międzynarodowe. Polska-Europa-
Świat. Księga Jubileuszowa dedykowana Profesorowi Ryszardowi Ziębie z
okazji czterdziestolecia pracy naukowej (Warsaw: WDiNP UW), p. 285.
3. J. Kloczkowski, ed. (2009), Przeklęte miejsce Europy? Dylematy polskiej geo-
polityki (Cracow: Ośrodek Myśli Politycznej).
4. (2013), White Book on National Security of the Republic of Poland (Warsaw:
The National Security Bureau), p. 9.
5. K. Skubiszewski (1993), ‘The Eastern Policies of Poland’. Address to five
Parliamentary Committees (Senate Committee for Emigration and Poles
Abroad, Senate Committee for Foreign Affairs, Diet Committee for
Communication with Poles Abroad, Diet Committee for Economic
Relations and Maritime Economy, Diet Committee for Foreign Affairs),
assembled at their joint session in Warsaw on 18 November 1992, Materials
and Documents, No. 1/1993 (Warsaw: Department of Information and
Promotion of Foreign Ministry of Poland), pp. 5–6.
6. (2014), Statistical Yearbook of the Republic of Poland (Warsaw: Central
Statistical Office), pp. 82–83.
7. J. Topolski (1982), Zarys dziejów Polski (Warsaw: Interpress), p. 90. See
also A. Zamoyski (2009), Poland: A History (London: Harper Press);
P. Jasienica (2007), Polska Jagiellonów (Warsaw: Prószyński i S-ka).
8. Estimates as to the number of Ukrainians in interwar Poland differ accord-
ing to source, and run from 4.4 to 5.4 million.
9. Most of the disputed territory of Spis and Orava was awarded to
Czechoslovakia.
10. J. Zaja ̨c, R. Zięba (2005), Polska w stosunkach międzynarodowych 1945–1989
(Toruń: Wydawnictwo Adam Marszałek).
11. Only Belarus raised territorial claims. In October 1990 Minsk demanded
that Warsaw recognize the region of Białystok as ethnically Byelorussian
and that an autonomous area be established there. Minsk withdrew those
demands quite rapidly, however.
12. For more, see L. Moczulski (1999), Geopolityka. Potęga w czasie i
przestrzeni (Warsaw: Dom Wydawniczy Bellona), pp. 568–569.
13. For more, see P. Jasienica (2007), Rzeczpospolita Obojga Narodów. Dzieje
agonii (Warsaw: Prószyński i S-ka); J. Sowa (2011), Fantomowe ciało króla.
Peryferyjne zmagania z nowoczesna ̨ forma ̨ (Cracow: Univeristas).
26 J. ZAJA ̨C
28. J. Zaja ̨c, (2014), ‘Polen: Zehn Jahre Mitgliedschaft in der EU’, Religion
und Gesellschaft in Ost und West, RGOW, No. 10 (Zürich: Institut G2W),
pp. 16–17.
29. (2014), Działalność badawcza i rozwojowa w Polsce w 2013 r. (Warsaw:
Central Statistical Office).
30. (2013) White Book on National Security of the Republic of Poland (Warsaw:
The National Security Bureau), p. 44. See also A. A. Michta (2003),
‘Modernizing the Polish Military’, in M. Zaborowski, D. H. Dunn, eds.,
Poland: A New Power in Transatlantic Security (London, Portland OR:
Frank Cass), pp. 40–49.
31. (2010), Wizja Sił Zbrojnych RP-2030 (Warsaw: Ministry of National
Defense).
32. R. L. Buell (1939), Poland. Key to Europe (New York, London: Alfred
A. Knopf).
33. J. Pawelec, P. Szeliga (2014), Nadgonić czas. Wywiad rzeka ze Zdzisławem
Najderem (Warsaw: Świat Ksia ̨żki), p. 415.
34. W. Bernacki (2009), ‘Wizje ładu międzynarodowego w polskiej myśli poli-
tycznej XV–XVIII wieku’, in J. Kloczkowski (ed.), Przeklęte miejsce Europy
…, pp. 59–60 (47–66). Compare with A. Walicki (2002), Rosja, katoli-
cyzm i sprawa polska (Warsaw: Prószyński i S-ka), pp. 366–367.
35. All sources indicate that Poland began to be referred to as the ‘Bulwark of
Christianity’ in the middle of the 15th century. It was Papal diplomats,
wishing to draw Poland into another coalition against the Sublime Porte,
who first coined this phrase in connection with the Polish state. See
J. Tazbir (1989), Poland as the Rampart of Christian Europe. Myths and
Historical Reality (Warsaw: Interpress), p. 17.
36. As Adam Bromke notes, from political idealism developed the program of
independence and insurrection, directed primarily toward shaking off the
yoke from the East. The method advocated was military action supported
by assistance from France. From political realism emerged the program of
seeking Russian support, which in the first place was directed toward
defense of the territorial integrity of the Commonwealth against the two
German courts and was expected to accomplish the most urgent reforms
under Russian protection. A. Bromke (1967), Poland's Politics: Idealism
vs. Realism (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press), pp. 3, 253.
37. G. Stanford (1999), Poland. The Conquest of History (Amsterdam:
Harwood Academic Publisher), p. 1.
38. Historical factors contributed to a serious deterioration in Polish–German
relations in 2005–2007, under the governments led by Law and Justice
(PiS). This party raised the issue of the Second World War and accused
Germany of not having sufficiently compensated for the material and
moral damage Poland sustained during the war. This took place against the
28 J. ZAJA ̨C
President Lech Kaczyński, who did not hide his surprise and irritation with
the result of the vote. Despite the fact that the European Court of Human
Rights looked into the matter of Lithuania’s treatment of its Polish minor-
ity and that the Polish government expressed its dissatisfaction to the
Lithuanian authorities with the lack of progress on repeated occasions, the
matter remains unresolved. More on Poland’s policy towards the Polish
Minority in Lithuania see: A. Bieńczyk-Missala (2006), Human Rights in
Polish Foreign Policy after 1989 (Warsaw: PISM), pp. 170–181. See also:
S. Bieleń S. (2012), ‘The possibility of reconciliation in Polish-Russian
relations’, Lithuanian Foreign Policy Review, Vol. 27, pp. 11–34.
48. K. Grünberg, B. Sprengler (2005), Trudne sa ̨siedztwo. Stosunki polsko-
ukraińskie w X–XX wieku (Warsaw: Ksia ̨żka i Wiedza), pp. 320, 383 et seq.
49. Polish operations cost the lives of 10,000 to 15,000 Ukrainians. See
G. Motyka (2011), Od rzezi wołyńskiej do akcji “Wisła”. Konflikt polsko-
ukraiński 1943–1947 (Cracow: Wydawnictwo Literackie), pp. 447–448.
50. These numbers are given in W. Siemaszko, E. Siemaszko (2008),
Ludobójstwo dokonane przez nacjonalistów na ludności polskiej Wołynia
1939–1945, vol. I (Warsaw: Wydawnictwo von Borowiecky), p. 39.
51. R. Zięba (2013), Polityka zagraniczna Polski w strefie euroatlantyckiej
(Warsaw: Wydawnictwa Uniwersytetu Warszawskiego), p. 240 et seq.
52. S. Koziej (2012), ‘Obronność Polski w warunkach samodzielności strate-
gicznej lat 90. XX wieku’, Bezpieczeństwo Narodowe, No. 2, p. 20.
53. (2000) Strategia Bezpieczeństwa Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej, (Warsaw),
Introduction, point. 2.1.
54. The CSCE was renamed the OSCE on 1 January 1995.
55. (2007), Strategia Bezpieczeństwa Narodowego Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej,
(Warsaw), point 48.
56. (2014), National Security Strategy of the Republic of Poland, (Warsaw),
point 36.
57. Ibid., point 41.
58. Ibid, point 65.
59. Ibid., point 68.
60. (2014), Program Prawa i Sprawiedliwości 2014, p. 153.
61. B. Koszel (2012), ‘A New Opening? Polish–German Relations during the
Rule of the PO-PSL Coalition (2007–2009)’, Przegla ̨d Zachodni, No. 4,
pp. 201–227.
62. R. Sikorski, ‘Polska a przyszłość Unii Europejskiej’, speech given in Berlin
on 28 November 2011 by the Polish foreign minister, http://www.msz.
gov.pl/resource/c2a33d88-7b8d-4fa5-8680-a67a4b2b38af:JCR ,
accessed on 28 January 2016.
63. (2012), ‘Orędzie po złożeniu przysięgi przed Zgromadzeniem Narodowym
i objęciu urzędu Prezydenta Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej, Warszawa, 6 sier-
pnia 2010 roku’, Prezydent Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej Bronisław Komorowski.
30 J. ZAJA ̨C
The West emerged victorious from the Cold War, but its global dominance
only became apparent a few months after the beginning of the Autumn of
Nations. The changes that began in 1989 in Central and Eastern Europe
were so swift that it was not possible to predict in what direction they
would evolve.1 In 1991 the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance
(COMECON) and the Warsaw Pact were dissolved, and the USSR dis-
integrated into 15 separate states that had to face a number of domes-
tic problems. Long-dormant conflicts broke out between some of them.
The situation in the Balkans also became complicated. The Slovenian and
Croatian declarations of independence in 1991 marked the disintegra-
tion of Yugoslavia and the breakout of bloody conflicts in the area. The
appropriateness of NATO’s future existence was discussed, the Western
European Union was revived, the integration process within the European
Communities progressed apace, and the CSCE became increasingly active.
A new international order was emerging—one in which member states of
formerly opposite blocs had to redefine their international roles.
In the new circumstances, Poland, a middle Central European power,
faced the necessity of transforming its internal as well as its foreign and
security policy. It wanted to leave the Warsaw Pact and COMECON as
soon as possible but, at the same time, it did not know in which direc-
tion the international politics would evolve. Even though events were
unpredictable, the international situation favored Poland like it hadn’t for
several centuries.
Poland undertook to transform its security policy in the late 1980s and
early 1990s in the context of a changing international order. It played an
important role in the dismantling of the Eastern Bloc, and it choose rap-
prochement with Western Europe and the USA as a security policy prior-
ity. Warsaw was also seeking to strengthen the CSCE and decided to seek
NATO membership and to pursue collaboration with the Western European
Union (WEU). At the same time, Poland’s policy was characterized by a
lack of cohesion in its Eastern policy—something that brought negative
consequences for Poland at a later period. Poland nevertheless adopted a
bridging strategy in its security policy at the turn of the 1980s to the 1990s.
and the multilateralists.5 As this debate unfolded, the USA, which had
no definite security policy vision, adopted a passive stance with regard to
international developments toward the end of 1991. Neither the conflicts
in the post-Soviet area nor the escalating violence in the Balkans inclined
the Bush administration to take decisive steps. This situation continued
in the early stages of Bill Clinton’s presidency. It took the new president’s
administration, which took office in January 1993, several months to for-
mulate a comprehensive strategy in world politics. It was a period during
which Clinton, whose campaign slogan was ‘the economy, stupid’, con-
centrated on domestic affairs.
While Americans debated the USA’s future role in world politics, in
Western Europe the process of integration was progressing rapidly. The
Maastricht Treaty signed in February 1992 established the European
Union, which rested on three pillars: (1) the European Community, (2)
the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) and (3) cooperation
in the fields of justice and home affairs (JHA). The European Union
was going through a period of prosperity; it was becoming a model of
successful integration for many former Eastern Bloc countries that were
aiming for membership of this elite group. A discussion about the Euro-
Atlantic security structure was also under way during this time.6 At issue
was the role of the North Atlantic Alliance in the new geopolitical reality,
the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE), and the
long-dormant WEU. Many experts representing the neoliberal approach
favored the establishment of a regional system of cooperative security in
Europe based on the CSCE, the WEU, or even on both those organiza-
tions. As the West did not articulate a clear concept for Europe’s security
architecture and as a number of institutions—NATO, the WEU and the
CSCE—were vying for primacy in this respect, Poland and other Central
and East European countries were cautious with security policy decisions.
In the end, however, the neorealist view about the necessity of retain-
ing NATO prevailed out of concern that a post-Cold War Europe could
see a return to past rivalries between the powers for spheres of influence.
Thus, after a short period of renewed vitality for the CSCE and the WEU,
it is NATO that came to the foreground, and accession to its structures
became the goal of many former Eastern Bloc states, which saw NATO
as a guarantor of their security. The ongoing disintegration of the Soviet
Union and of Eastern Bloc institutions, in conjunction with the relative
weakness of other non-European states, gradually but rapidly led the West
to assume a dominant global position.
34 J. ZAJA ̨C
The shift from the bipolar international order that characterized the
Cold War period to an emerging unipolar order dominated by the West
and characterized by the hegemonic role of the USA presented serious
challenges for Poland, which found itself at the heart of the international
changes taking place in the early 1990s. The Polish government had not
only to guide the process of the country’s internal transformations, but
also to manage the transformation of Poland’s security policy—terminate
former obligations issuing from the country’s membership in the Eastern
Bloc and consider new priorities. The authorities, which originated from
Solidarity (Solidarność), were in agreement about the need to dissolve the
structures of the Eastern Bloc as soon as possible. The choice of a future
course of action was already visible, albeit not clearly marked out.
The choice of the United States as the guarantor of Polish security thus
seemed natural. The USA was unquestionably the victor in the Cold War
and was viewed in Warsaw as the country thanks to which Poland and
other states in the region had recovered their liberty and sovereignty. The
history of Polish–American relations only served to amplify the apprecia-
tion and friendliness felt in Poland toward the USA. Only sporadically were
questions raised that could cast a shadow on the image of ideal Polish–
American relations.33 In the minds of people at large, the USA was asso-
ciated with success, prosperity and as a champion of values that are dear
to Poles, like liberty and democracy. Polish commanders in the American
War of Independence—Tadeusz Kościuszko and Kazimierz Pułaski—are
often recalled in Poland, as is President Woodrow Wilson’s 14-point plan
of 1918, the 13th of which called for the restoration of Polish indepen-
dence that had been lost in the 18th century.34 The United States contrib-
uted to Allied victory over the fascist Axis Powers in the Second World
42 J. ZAJA ̨C
War, and supported Polish dissidents during the Cold War period. When,
in 1980, Solidarity (Solidarność) was born, the United States was one
of its leading supporters. Washington also financed Radio Free Europe,
which broadcast uncensored information to Poland. These elements had
an impact on post-Cold War Polish–American relations, as many Solidarity
oppositionists came to occupy leading positions in the state administration
after Poland became independent from the USSR. Also of significance
was the large number of Polish–Americans (about 10 million). Moreover,
decision makers in Warsaw strongly believed in the convergence of Polish
and American interests.
The choice of the USA was made more obvious, as Polish decision mak-
ers placed great importance on integrating Poland with NATO’s system of
‘hard’ security, while the European Communities—membership of which
Poland also aspired to—were lacking a military component. Admittedly,
the EC sought to revive and strengthen the WEU, but this process was
slow and failed to bring tangible results. Poland was also cautious in its
politico-military cooperation with other European states and mindful that
France and the United Kingdom had failed to come to Poland’s aid in the
face of German aggression in 1939 despite the treaties of alliance those
powers had signed with Poland.
The United States thus came to occupy a key position in Poland’s secu-
rity policy, even if this position was not as obvious in the early 1990s as it
would become in later years. Polish–American military cooperation began
to grow relatively quickly, however. In June 1990, at Poland’s initiative a
group of American and Polish generals met in Warsaw; in December of the
same year US Deputy-Secretary of Defense Dick Cheney came on a visit to
Warsaw and the arrangements made then enabled Polish officers to study
at prestigious American institutions as part of the International Military
Education and Training (IMET) program. During President George
H. W. Bush’s visit to Poland in July 1992, discussions included Poland’s
possible purchase or lease of American F-16 or F-18 aircraft.35 The col-
laboration between the two countries’ intelligence services also proceeded
successfully, as could be seen during the first Persian Gulf War in 1991.
The extensive and effective Polish intelligence network in the Middle
East provided the Americans (and the British) with extensive informa-
tion about Iraq’s military potential and about the quantity and types of
weapons and other equipment (such as radars) used by the Iraqi military.
Significantly, Warsaw had provided military assistance in the form of two
Polish warships and a unit of engineers who were to go into action should
Saddam Hussein have used chemical weapons.36 The professionalism and
‘GO WEST’: POLAND’S SECURITY POLICY IN TRANSITION 43
the rise of the so-called ULB doctrine (for Ukraine, Lithuania, Belarus),
also referred to as the ‘Giedroyc doctrine’ or the ‘Giedroyc-Mieroszewski
doctrine’. The main premise of this doctrine was the belief that it was pos-
sible to overcome the fatalism that Poland’s geopolitical situation entailed.
Mieroszewski thought that the Poles are a nation entrapped in their past,
but he believed in the possibility of far-reaching geopolitical transforma-
tions and tried to promote them along with Giedroyc. Both men believed
that the best guarantee of Poland’s security is the emancipation of the
Ukrainian, Lithuanian and Byelorussian nations from Soviet domination
in cooperation with the Polish nation, wherein this emancipation should
take place in conjunction with international transformations and in coop-
eration with all European nations, because the struggle of captive nations
individually was not a realistic option. They thought that the maintenance
of the independence and self-determination of the three nations was of
the highest importance, in keeping with the premise that for as long as
Poland and Russia remain in dispute over ULB—Ukraine, Lithuania and
Byelorussia—there can be no security for Poland.53 In fact, Jerzy Giedroyc
and Juliusz Mieroszewski were the heirs of three pre-War Polish political
projects: Federalism, Intermarium (Międzymorze) and Prometheism. In
consideration of the fact that the ideas behind those projects continue
to exert an important influence on Poland’s foreign and security policy,
it is worthwhile to devote some attention to them, especially as they are
related to Józef Piłsudski, a figure of unusual importance in Polish his-
tory.54 Piłsudski thought that the greatest challenge facing Poland was its
location between Christian Europe and the ‘Asian’ East. In Piłsudski’s
mind, Poland belonged to Western civilization and its role was to defend
it. The foreign and security policy concept he championed was based on
the premise that a large and strong Poland would emerge; therefore, in the
first years after Poland regained its independence on 11 November 1918,
Piłsudski concentrated on acquiring as large a territory as possible. While
he thought that possibilities of territorial expansion to the west were lim-
ited by the decisions of the Entente, such possibilities existed to the east
and it is in this direction that he focused his attentions.55 Two compatible
concepts emerged in this context: that of Federation and Prometheism.
The federal concept entailed the weakening of Russia through the eman-
cipation of the nations that were a part of it and their voluntary association
with Poland. In essence, this was a return to the Jagiellonian concept based
on the idea of a federation of nations making up the Commonwealth.56 In
order to weaken Russian imperialism and to make the realization of the
50 J. ZAJA ̨C
[...] we can’t hold the position that every Great-Russian program is impe-
rialist […] but that the Polish eastern program is not imperialist but
is some lofty “Jagiellonian idea” […]. Only for us does the Jagiellonian
Idea have nothing in common with imperialism. But for the Lithuanians,
Ukrainians and Byelorussians it is Polish imperialism in its purest form. The
Commonwealth of Both Nations ended with the wholesale Polonization
of the entire Lithuanian gentry [...] We sought to have the upper hand
on the ULB territories – be it through military means, or by advancing
federation plans – because history teaches us that when Russia rules over
those territories it is an insurmountable rival. [...] It is impossible to discuss
Polish-Russian relations in isolation from the ULB territories, because
Polish-Russian relations were always a function of the situation that pre-
vailed on those territories in a given historical period.60
with Russia, a prospect that Poland viewed with some apprehension. Soon
after, relations worsened further due to the violation of Polish minority
rights in Belarus.
Most difficult to understand, however, was Poland’s policy toward
Lithuania—the third country concerned by the Giedroyc-Mieroszewski
doctrine. Lithuania was the first Soviet republic to proclaim its indepen-
dence (11 March 1990) and sought backing for this process in Warsaw.
Yet the Polish authorities limited themselves to mere gestures of support.68
When the Soviet authorities attempted to pacify Lithuania, Latvia and
Estonia by force in January 1991, Poland merely stated that the authori-
ties of those three states were legal and called for a peaceful resolution
to the crisis. When Poland officially recognized Lithuanian independence
several months later (26 August 1991), it was the 23rd country to do so.
Warsaw’s dilatory stance and, especially, the stance of Lithuania’s con-
siderable Polish minority, which, fearing Lithuanian nationalism, favored,
keeping Lithuania within the Soviet Union, had a detrimental impact on
Polish–Lithuanian relations. These factors could not remain without influ-
ence on the negotiations leading to the friendship and cooperation treaty,
which was signed by the two countries only in April 1994.
Poland also failed to achieve lasting stabilization in its relations with
Russia—the largest of Poland’s neighbors to the east. From the outset,
security concerns were a key issue in relations between the two countries.
Despite the disintegration of the USSR and the transformations taking
place there, Poland invariably feared Russia’s potential as a great power.69
Though entirely justified by historical experience, such fears introduced
an additional element of distrust in the two countries’ mutual relations,
which were already burdened by negative experiences and unresolved
issues from the past. The most pressing problem in mutual relations was
the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Poland. In February 1990 the Soviet
government declared that it was ready to hold talks concerning Soviet
troops stationed in Poland. Only in September 1990, however, did the
Polish government respond. This period of delay was caused by Warsaw’s
uncertainty about the final resolution of the Oder and Lusatian Neisse
border issue with Germany. When talks about the withdrawal of Soviet
forces from Poland began in November 1990, the Soviet negotiators put
forward the concept of a so-called anti-coalition clause based the ‘Falin-
Kvitsinsky doctrine’. This was unacceptable for Poland, as it entailed that
the USSR and Poland could not take part in any military and political
alliance targeted against the other and could not conclude agreements
54 J. ZAJA ̨C
contrary to the purposes of the Treaty; that the parties would undertake
not to allow any foreign armed forces to make use of any bases, deploy-
ment installations and other infrastructure, including objects transferred
to Poland in connection with the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Polish
territory. Moscow abandoned this idea following the collapse of the
Yanaev putsch in August 1991. A packet of agreements concerning the
withdrawal of Russian troops from Polish territory and the transit through
Polish territory of Russian troops withdrawn from Germany was signed on
22 May 1992.70 On the same day Poland and Russia also signed a Treaty
on Friendly and Good-Neighbourly Cooperation, but this treaty failed
to address issues of importance for Poland, like damages for victims of
Stalinist crimes, a common assessment of the Katyn massacre, and regulat-
ing navigation in the Vistula Lagoon and through the Strait of Baltiysk.71
It nevertheless created the bases for extensive bilateral collaboration and
was shortly followed by other agreements—on border crossings; on the
avoidance of double taxation, on transborder cooperation, on cooperation
between Polish regions and the district of Sankt-Petersburg; a consular
convention on the promotion and mutual protection of investments; a
declaration on cultural, scientific and educational collaboration (1992); a
treaty on trade and economic cooperation; an understanding on the con-
struction of a system of gas pipelines for the transit or Russian gas through
Polish territory and for supplies of Russian gas to Poland (1993); and an
understanding on basic principles for regulating mutual debt related to
trade between Poland and the former USSR (1996).72
Relatively quickly, Polish–Russian relations became dominated by the
question of NATO enlargement eastward. Poland wished to become a
member of this organization, while Russia consistently opposed NATO
enlargement. Polish and Russian security interests turned out to be
contradictory. In addition, relations between Poland and the USSR/
Russian Federation were fraught with many difficult problems which were
due to a complicated history and which arose from Poland’s inclusion in
a common bloc with the USSR, among other reasons. During the ini-
tial stages of its transformations, Poland concentrated on settling difficult
issues, demanded that the Kremlin admit its responsibility for the Katyn
massacre, and when the USSR did so (in April 1990), it demanded further
acts of expiation from Moscow. This hampered the formation of a climate
favoring political cooperation with first the USSR, and later with Russia.73
Polish post-Cold War decision makers who wanted to rest Poland’s
Eastern policy on the ‘Giedroyc-Mieroszewski doctrine’ were not entirely
‘GO WEST’: POLAND’S SECURITY POLICY IN TRANSITION 55
NOTES
1. On the Autumn of Nations see more P. Kenney (2002), A Carnival of
Revolution: Central Europe 1989 (Princeton, Oxford: Princeton University
Press).
2. G. Bush (September 17, 1991), Toward a New World Order, Address before
a Joint Session of Congress, Washington D.C., September 11, 1990
(Washington: US Department of State), Vol. 1, No. 3.
3. (1991), National Security of the United States, August 1991 (Washington
DC: The White House), http://nssarchive.us/NSSR/1991.pdf.
4. B. R. Posen, A. L. Ross (Winter 1996/97), ‘Competing Visions of US
Grand Strategy’, International Security, Vol. 21, No. 3, pp. 5–53.
5. See more M. Cox (1995), US Foreign Policy after the Cold War: Superpower
without a Mission? (London: Royal Institute of International Affairs).
6. On the subject of changes to the security system in Europe, see G. Flynn,
D. J. Scheffer (1990), ‘Limited Collective Security’, Foreign Policy, No.
80, pp. 77–101; R. H. Ullman (1991), Securing Europe (Princeton:
Princeton University Press), pp. 63–79; Ch. A. Kupchan, (1991),
‘Concerts, Collective Security, and the Future of Europe’, International
Security, Vol. 16, No. 1, pp. 114–161; J. Joffe (1992), ‘Collective Security
and the Future of Europe: Failed Dreams and Dead Ends’, Survival, Vol.
34, No. 1, pp. 36–50; A. Hyde-Price (1991), European Security beyond the
Cold War: Four Scenarios for the 2010 (London: SAGE Publications for
RIIA); A. M. Rusi (1991), After the Cold War: Europe’s New Political
Architecture (New York: St. Martin’s Press); A. Clesse, L. Rühl, eds.
(1990), Beyond East-West Confrontation: Searching for a new Security in
Europe (Baden-Baden: Nomos Verlagsesellschaft).
56 J. ZAJA ̨C
19. For example, Andrzej Walicki suggests that defining Poland solely in cate-
gories of ‘Latin civilization’ seems attractive to those who would wish to
free Poland of communism and who identify communism with Russian
domination. Since the 15th century, Poland did indeed consider itself as
the Antemurale, but at the same time, it was willing to accept the oriental-
ization of its culture while, in political terms, fearing nothing more than
Western-type absolutum dominium. See A. Walicki (2002), Rosja, katoli-
cyzm i sprawa polska (Warsaw: Prószyński i S-ka), pp. 366–367.
20. K. Łastawski (2009), Polska racja stanu po wsta ̨pieniu do Unii Europejskiej
(Warsaw: Wydawnictwa Akademickie i Profesjonalne), p. 156 et seq.
21. The idea of eternal neutrality, championed primarily by defense minister
Piotr Kołodziejczyk, was consistent with the debate under way, especially
on the pages of the periodical Foreign Affairs about the idea of neutraliz-
ing the countries of Central and Eastern Europe, so that they would form
a buffer of sorts, or a ‘gray zone’ separating NATO from USSR (which still
existed in the spring of 1991). This idea was quickly abandoned in Poland,
however.
22. K. Skubiszewski (1999), ‘Polska i Sojusz Północnoatlantycki w latach
1989–1991, Sprawy Międzynarodowe, No. 1, (Warsaw: PISM), p. 17.
23. (1990), ‘Treaty between the Polish People’s Republic and the German
Democratic on the Demarcation of the Territorial Waters in the Bay of
Pomerania, Berlin, May 22, 1989’ Zbiór Dokumentów-Recueil de
Documents avril- juin 1989 (Warsaw: PISM), No. 2 (520), pp. 13–21.
24. For more, see A. Czubiński, ed. (1988), PRL–RFN. Blaski i cienie procesu
normalizacji wzajemnych stosunków 1972–1987 (Poznań: Instytut
Zachodni); D. Bingen (1997), Polityka Republiki Bońskiej wobec Polski. Od
Adenauera do Kohla 1949–1991 (Cracow: Wydawnictwo Kwadrat).
25. M. Stolarczyk (2010), Zbieżność i rozbieżność interesów w stosunkach polsko-
niemieckich w latach 1989–2009 (Katowice: Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu
Śla ̨skiego), p. 94 et seq.
26. See the memoirs of Prime Minister Tadeusz Mazowiecki and the min-
utes of his telephone conversation with German Chancellor Helmut
Kohl on 23 February 1990, T. Mazowiecki (2012), Rok 1989 i lata
następne. Teksty wybrane i nowe (Warsaw: Prószyński i S-ka), pp. 96–125.
The signed joint German–Polish declaration following the meeting
between Kohl and Mazowiecki in Krzyżowa in Lower Silesia on 9–14
November 1989 fails to define unequivocally the question of Poland’s
western border. In this situation, the Polish government took steps to
have united Germany and Poland sign a treaty settling in a final manner
the question of the German–Polish border. Further see A. Hajnicz
(1996), Ze soba ̨ czy przeciw sobie. Polska–Niemcy 1989–1992 (Warsaw:
Presspublica).
58 J. ZAJA ̨C
Conference, see J. Karski, The Great Powers and Poland: From Versailles to
Yalta, (Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield), pp. 357–384, 449–484.
34. In one of his 13 points, Wilson called for the establishment of an indepen-
dent Polish state on territories inhabited by a Polish population, with free
access to the sea, with political and economic independence, and with the
territorial integrity of such a state to be guaranteed under an international
convention. For more, see M. Fałkowski (2005), ‘Postawy Polaków wobec
Stanów Zjednoczonych, Amerykanów i stosunków transatlantyckich’, in
L. Kolarska-Bobińska, J. Kucharczyk, P. M. Kaczyński, eds., Mosty przez
Atlantyk? Postawy Polaków, Czechów, Słowaków wobec Stanów Zjednoczonych
(Warsaw: Instytut Spraw Publicznych), pp. 35–56. For more, see
P. Wandycz (1980), The United States and Poland (Cambridge MA and
London: Harvard University Press).
35. B. Winid (2001), ‘Zagadnienia bezpieczeństwa w stosunkach polsko-
amerykańskich w latach 1989–2000’, in R. Kuźniar, ed., Polska polityka
bezpieczeństwa 1989–2000 (Warsaw: Wydawnictwo Naukowe Scholar),
pp. 209, 214.
36. J. Onyszkiewicz (2014), ‘Na drodze do NATO-okruchy wspomnień’,
Bezpieczeństwo Narodowe, No. 29, pp. 24–25.
37. R. Kuźniar (2009), Poland’s Foreign Policy after 1989 (Warsaw:
Wydawnictwo Naukowe Scholar), p. 105.
38. After the failure of the UN operation in Haiti (UNMIH), the Security
Council established the Multinational Forces—MNF, which were placed
under the command of the United States.
39. The greater part of the Polish contingent returned home in mid-December
1994. See D. S. Kozerawski (2012), Kontyngenty Wojska Polskiego w
międzynarodowych operacjach pokojowych w latach 1973–1999: konflikty-
interwencje-bezpieczeństwo (Toruń: Wydawnictwo Adam Marszałek),
pp. 266–276.
40. Support East European Democracy (SEED) Act of 1989, Public Law 101-
179-Nov. 28, 1989. See also M. Albright (1991), ‘The Role of the United
States in Central Europe’, Proceedings of the Academy of Political Science,
Vol. 38, No. 1, (New York: Academy of Political Science) pp. 71–84.
41. See (3 June 1993) ‘Afera karabinowa. Czego boi się prokurator Hill’,
Rzeczypospolita; (13 October 1993) ‘Afera karabinowa. Oskarżeni złożyli
zeznania’, Rzeczypospolita.
42. J. Zaja ̨c (2015), ‘Asymetria w stosunkach polsko-amerykańskich w
zmieniaja ̨cym się ładzie międzynarodowym’, in B. Szklarski, ed.,
Niekonfrontacyjna asymetria w relacjach polsko-amerykańskich (Warsaw:
Ministry of Foreign Affairs), pp. 45–60.
43. J. Zaja ̨c, R. Zięba (2005), Polska w stosunkach międzynarodowych…,
pp. 224–239.
60 J. ZAJA ̨C
54. Piłsudski was Head of State in 1918–1922. Even though he held no offi-
cial position after this period, he retained the leading role in shaping Polish
policy, including foreign and security policy, until his death in 1935.
55. For more on the thinking of Józef Piłsudski, see A. Nowak (2009),
‘Geopolityczne koncepcje Józefa Piłsudskiego’, in J. Kloczkowski, ed.,
Przeklęte miejsce Europy? Dylematy polskiej geopolityki (Cracow: Ośrodek
Myśli Politycznej, Wyższa Szkoła Europejska im. ks. J. Tischnera).
56. About the Jagiellonian Idea, see O. Halecki (1937), Idea jagiellońska
(Lwów: Zakład Narodowy im. Ossolińskich); and P. Jasienica (2007),
Polska Jagiellonów (Warsaw: Prószyński i S-ka).
57. S. Mikulicz (1971), Prometeizm z polityce II Rzeczypospolitej (Warsaw:
Ksia ̨żka i Wiedza).
58. In 1918–1920, both ideas—that of the Federation and that of
Intermarium—overlapped to some extent. In essence, they called for
Russia’s disintegration along its ‘ethnic seams’, assuming that the newly
emerging states would be fearful of Russia and would naturally seek to ally
themselves with Poland. This thinking gave way to the idea of building a
security system of sorts that would be strongly influenced by Poland. For
more on the concept of Intemrarium during the Interwar period, see
P. Okulewicz (2001), Koncepcja ‘międzymorza’ w myśli i praktyce polityc-
znej Józefa Piłsudskiego w latach 1918–1926 (Poznań; Wydawnictwa
Poznańskie).
59. A. Friszke (2007), Przystosowanie i opór. Studia z dziejów PRL (Warsaw:
Biblioteka Więzi), pp. 346–358.
60. J. Mieroszewski (1974), ‘Rosyjski “kompleks polski” i obszar ULB’,
Kultura, No. 9 (324), pp. 6–8.
61. No such document was signed at the time with Belarus, because the
authorities in Minsk did not want to confirm the existing boundary with
Poland, arguing that Belarus was not a party to the border treaty signed on
16 August 1945 by Poland and the USSR. Minsk even demanded that
Poland recognize the Białystok region as ethnically Byelorussian. Minsk
also voiced reservations about the treatment of the Byelorussian minority
in Poland and demanded the establishment of a Byelorussian ethnic district
in Poland. Foreign Minister Skubiszewski refused to discuss the question
about the border, holding that they were inviolable and immutable. In
effect, the political declaration on good-neighborliness was signed in
Warsaw on 10 October 1991. See K. Fedorowicz (2009), ‘Polityka Polski
wobec Białorusi’, in A. Gil, T. Kapuśniak, eds., Polityka wschodnia Polski.
Uwarunkowania. Koncepcje. Realizacja (Lublin: Instytut Europy
Środkowo-Wschodniej), p. 234.
62 J. ZAJA ̨C
The first half of the 1990s saw the emergence of a unipolar world order
marked by the dominance of the West and the hegemonic position of the
United States. The unipolar world order affected Poland’s security policy.
During the period of transformations that began in 1989, Poland’s high-
est priorities were to develop close relations with its neighbors, create new
forms of sub-regional cooperation (like the Visegrad Triangle, Council of
the Baltic Sea States, Central European Initiative, and Weimar Triangle),
strengthen the CSCE-based cooperative security system in Europe, join
west-European structures like NATO and the EU, and to establish closer
relations with the USA and Western European countries. As the unilat-
eral world order consolidated, the relative importance of those elements
changed. The bridging strategy, adopted by Poland during the transition
period, was beginning to give way to the aim of joining the NATO alliance
and establishing tight relations with its most powerful member. Thus the
importance of NATO and close relations with the USA, which became a
strategic partner for Poland, grew. The USA’s involvement in European
security was seen as crucial in Poland. Seeking to maintain a strong NATO
and American presence in Europe, Poland approached the European
Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) with caution and even disinclination.
The role of the CSCE/OCSE—an important component of Poland’s
security policy in the early 1990s—began to diminish relatively quickly.
As the priorities in Polish policy evolved and as differences between the
West, especially the USA, and Russia grew toward the end of the 1990s,
tensions between Poland and Russia became more pronounced. Poland’s
relations with its other Eastern neighbors in the 1990s were also not very
satisfactory. While a notable improvement in Polish–Lithuanian rela-
tions could be observed in the second half of the 1990s, the status of the
Polish minority in Lithuania remained a problem that cast a shadow over
the two countries’ relations. Cooperation with Belarus was reduced and
diplomatic tensions between Warsaw and Minsk were frequent. Polish–
Ukrainian relations were revitalized in 1996 but they were not without
problems and were changeable in nature.
the world’s new dangers and to capitalize on its opportunities. [...] The
need for American leadership abroad remains as strong as ever’.4 The same
approach was adopted two years later.5 Both documents were based on
ideas originating in the early years of the Clinton presidency. Their under-
lying premise was the recognition of the need to ‘enhance US security,
bolster America's economic prosperity, and promote democracy abroad’.6
In pursuit of those goals, Washington intended to work with states and
international organizations and to encourage them to work with each
other. While pursuing cooperation with other actors as a priority, the USA
was willing to act unilaterally when it thought that its vital interests were at
stake, and this was made clear as early as September 1993 in a statement by
Anthony Lake, the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs.7
In practice, the friction between unilateralism and multilateralism
in US security policy became increasingly visible. While President
Bill Clinton’s first term (1992–1996) was marked by a multilateral
approach, during the second term one could observe the evolution of
American security policy toward unilateralism.8 As the UN’s weakness
was made plain in the first half of the 1990s in Somalia, in Haiti and in
Bosnia and Herzegovina, Washington found it necessary to bolster its
own leadership, and the steps it took symbolized an ever-clearer shift
towards unilateralism.9 This trend manifested itself in US raids on ter-
rorist bases in Sudan and Afghanistan in 1998 following the terrorist
attacks on US embassies in Kenya and Tanzania; the failure to send
the Kyoto Protocol, signed by president Clinton in 1998, for ratifica-
tion in the US Senate; and NATO’s armed intervention in Kosovo
in March 1999 without a mandate from the UN Security Council.
The trend toward unilateralism in US policy reached its apogee dur-
ing the presidency of George W. Bush (2001–2009). Very early dur-
ing his first term, President Bush decidedly rejected the idea of the
Kyoto Protocol, the statute of the International Criminal Court, the
Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty of 1996, and the Convention
on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer
of Anti-Personnel Mines and on their Destruction of 1997. He also
announced the USA would withdraw from the Anti-Ballistic Missile
Treaty of 1972, and it did so in June 2002. Unilateralist trends grew
more pronounced following the terrorist attacks of 11 September
2001. The White House’s adoption of the ‘war on terror’ as a top
priority led the USA to act in disregard of international organiza-
tions, and with the help of states forming a ‘coalition of the willing’.
66 J. ZAJA ̨C
The preemptive strike doctrine, whose essence was laid out in the
September 2002 US National Security Strategy, elicited serious reser-
vations from the international community.10 The document states:
The United States has long maintained the option of preemptive actions to
counter a sufficient threat to our national security. The greater the threat, the
greater is the risk of inaction – and the more compelling the case for taking
anticipatory action to defend ourselves, even if uncertainty remains as to the
time and place of the enemy’s attack. To forestall or prevent such hostile acts
by our adversaries, the United States will, if necessary, act preemptively.11
This provision gave many countries good grounds to fear the possibility
that the USA might act in violation of international law in pursuit of its
own national interests.12 The anxiety of many such countries was com-
pounded by the Bush administration’s plans to build a strategic missile
defense system.
America’s military intervention in Afghanistan in October 2001 made
the Bush administration’s methods of operation plain. Despite the rec-
ognition by the Alliance that the 9/11 terrorist attacks on US territory
constituted grounds to apply Art. 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty, the
Americans rejected the aid extended by its allies in the form of NATO
involvement, requested individual assistance from chosen countries, and
mounted a ‘coalition of the willing’. In effect, only in August 2003 did
NATO take over command of the International Security Assistance Force
(ISAF). In the years that followed, President Bush’s administration pro-
ceeded with no regard for international organizations and in breach or
international law and sought to reinforce US military potential and ensure
US supremacy in the world.
Washington’s unilateralism gave rise to much criticism and opposition
in many states, including some US allies in Western Europe. While transat-
lantic relations were relatively good during the Clinton presidency, the pol-
icies of the Bush administration placed them under considerable strain.13
This was most visible in the context of US’s Iraq policy, which divided
European countries sharply. On 30 January 2003, the so-called ‘letter of
the eight’ was signed by the prime ministers of the United Kingdom,
Spain, Italy, Portugal, Denmark, Poland, Hungary, and by the president
of the Czech Republic. The letter caused consternation in Brussels and
in those EU countries which were against the war. In effect, the letter
helped to deepen the rift among NATO allies, some of whom would not
accept American leadership based on unilateralism and militarism.14 Some
POLAND’S SECURITY POLICY IN THE UNIPOLAR WORLD ORDER 67
was struggling with many internal problems and its ability to influence events
on the world stage was limited.
Thus Poland—which had joined NATO in 1999, the EU in 2004, and
which had traditionally seen Russia as a potential threat—had to contend
with a climate of growing opposition to America’s leadership style from
many members of the international community, including some European
Union members and Russia. Poland adopted a firmly pro-American stance
in the face of the criticism directed at the USA by many countries; it rec-
ognized the United States as its strategic partner; it adopted a cautious
and reluctant stance with regard to the EU’s efforts to establish a military
component in the shape of the ESDP; and Warsaw’s pro-American stance
contributed to a rise of tensions in Polish–Russian relations.
In the first few months of his administration, president Clinton had not
given much thought to the issue of NATO’s future. Then, in late April
1993, at the opening of the Holocaust Museum in Washington, he met one-
on-one with a series of Central and Eastern European leaders, including the
highly regarded leaders of Poland and the Czech Republic, Lech Wałęsa and
Vaclav Havel. These two, having struggled so long to throw off the Soviet
yoke, carried a moral authority matched by few others around the world.
Each leader delivered the same message to Clinton: their top priority was
NATO membership. After the meetings, Clinton told Lake how impressed
he had been with the vehemence with which these leaders spoke, and Lake
was inclined to think positively toward expansion from that moment.24
1) It specified neither a date for the admission of new members nor the
criteria which they will have to meet, [and]
2) It made the admission of a new member contingent not only on the
degree of its preparation for membership but also on an assessment
of the overall situation of European security. This could arouse sus-
picions about the importance of the objection of one of the coun-
tries, although the statements make it clear that no third country
would have the right to veto NATO decisions on this issue.29
70 J. ZAJA ̨C
operations in the Iraqi provinces. The tasks of those rotations were also
civilian–military cooperation and assistance in the economic rebuild-
ing of the province. In November 2007, Polish Prime Minister Donald
Tusk announced that Polish troops would be withdrawn from Iraq. As a
result, in October 2008, Poland’s mission ended.
During America’s ‘war on terror’, Poland went further than most
countries in its support for the US policy. The high point was reached in
2002–2005, when Poland allowed the USA to establish a secret prison
on its territory, where persons suspected of terrorist activity were tor-
tured by CIA operatives. As early as November 2005, Human Rights
Watch revealed ‘that the United States has used secret detention facili-
ties in Eastern Europe, namely in Poland and Romania, to illegally hold
terrorist suspects without rights or access to counsel’.61 This informa-
tion was confirmed by the Council of Europe in its June 2006 and June
2007 reports, which stated that Poland hosted a secret CIA prison on
its territory (in Stare Kiejkuty), assisted with the transfer of secretly
detained individuals in and out of Poland, including to other secret
detention sites, and permitted the use of its airspace and airports for
such transfers. According to the Council of Europe ‘some individual
high office-holders knew about and authorized Poland’s role in the
CIA’s operation of secret detention facilities for High-Value Detainees
on Polish territory, from 2002 to 2005. The following persons could
therefore be held accountable for these activities: the President of
Poland, Aleksander Kwasniewski; the chief of the National Security
Bureau, Marek Siwiec; the minister of national defense (Ministerial
Oversight of Military Intelligence), Jerzy Szmajdziński; and the head of
military intelligence, Marek Dukaczewski’.62
The matter ultimately found its dénouement at the European Court of
Human Rights. In December 2013, at the request of the Palestinian Abu
Zubaydah and the Saudi Abd al-Rahim al-Nashiri, the European Court
of Human Rights conducted an oral hearing in Strasbourg in the cases of
al-Nashiri v. Poland and Abu Zubaydah v. Poland. In what proved to be
a landmark judgment, in July 2014 the court found Poland complicit in
‘CIA rendition, secret detention and interrogation operations on its ter-
ritory’,63 and that it had exposed the plaintiffs to serious risk of torture
by enabling the CIA to detain them. In conclusion, the court found that
Poland had violated Articles 2, 3, 5, 6§1, 8 and 13 of the Convention for
the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms of 1950,
and Article 1 of Protocol No. 6 to the Convention of 1983. The tribu-
78 J. ZAJA ̨C
nal found that the plaintiffs had been subjected to torture during their
detention by the CIA on Polish territory. The Polish authorities were
bound, pursuant to Article 1 of the Convention, to take steps in order
to ensure that persons finding themselves within their jurisdiction would
not be tortured or subjected to inhumane treatment or punishment. The
tribunal also examined the complaints in terms of possible violations of
the right to a fair trial and in this respect also found that Poland had
been in breach of the European Convention on Human Rights. It fur-
ther found that Poland had violated the plaintiffs’ right to freedom and
personal safety, their right to respect for their private and family life, and
also their right to an effective remedy allowing them to seek redress for
the violations. It also found that the inquiry conducted in this matter in
Poland had fallen short of the standards of effectiveness required when
dealing with cases of suspected violation of the prohibition of torture.
For these reasons the European Court of Human Rights, in a unanimous
ruling, ordered Poland to pay 130,000 euros (100,000 euros in respect
of non-pecuniary damage, 30,000 euros in respect of costs and expenses)
to Husayn (Abu Zubayda) and 100,000 euros to Al Nashiri (in respect of
non-pecuniary damage).64 After an appeal by the Polish government was
turned down on February 2015, the rulings became final.
The Polish–American rapprochement at the beginning of 21st century
was also reflected in military cooperation. In April 2003 Poland signed a
contract for the purchase of American airplanes—36 single-seat F-16Cs and
12 two-seat F-16Ds. Three manufacturers vied for the contract: Lockheed
Martin—the American maker of the F-16; Dassault Aviation—the French
manufacturer of the Mirage 2000-5; and Saab-BAE Systems—the British–
Swedish consortium, maker of the JAS-39 Gripen. Polish decision makers
argued that the choice of the F-16s was due to the fact that Lockheed
Martin’s offer was the most advantageous—both in terms of price and of
the offset package. Many critical voices, however, alleged that the Polish
authorities’ decision was dictated by political considerations. As early as
November 2000, during a meeting of the SLD parliamentary caucus, it
was disclosed that in July 2000, Prime Minister Jerzy Buzek had informed
that party’s spokesperson, Danuta Waniek, of the fact that the government
had made attempts to purchase F-16 airplanes in the USA while bypass-
ing the tender procedure. In addition, prior to his visit to the USA in
December 2001 foreign minister Włodzimierz Cimoszewicz stated pub-
licly that the decision to purchase the airplanes is subject to additional
considerations besides technical or military ones.65
POLAND’S SECURITY POLICY IN THE UNIPOLAR WORLD ORDER 79
does not have any real foreign policy vision other than historical distrust of
Germany and Russia, but he instinctively identifies with the U.S., providing
an opportunity to influence his strategic vision and cement Poland's foreign
policy even more closely to U.S. interests. [...] Jarek is an extremely intel-
ligent and confident politician, but he has no experience in governance [...]
Well-informed arguments appealing to both his patriotism and his intellect
stand the best chance of success in helping keep Polish foreign policy vision
in line with U.S. interests.76
system being built between the EU/WEU and NATO was seen as the
second pillar of Polish security. It also treated the ESDI as part of NATO
and stated that the development of the European defense policy didn’t
weaken lasting and strong Euro-Atlantic ties in the security sphere.86
It is worthwhile to note, that even after the Cologne European Council
decided to establish the ESDP, Polish officials tended to use the term
‘European Security and Defence Identity’ instead of ‘European Security
and Defence Policy’. This seemingly minor linguistic difference was sig-
nificant, however. It symbolized Poland’s approach, in keeping with which
Warsaw saw the new area of cooperation between EU states as an institu-
tion that should be subordinated to NATO, and not as an undertaking
aimed at reinforcing the capabilities of the European Union in the sphere
of security and defense. The National Security Strategy of the Republic of
Poland of 2003 assessed the EU’s security and defense cooperation in sim-
ilar terms. Poland adopted a concordant position with regard to the provi-
sions of the project of the Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe
(TCE). On 9 September 2003 the Polish government presented the opin-
ion that all EU member states should take part in the decision-making
process leading to the establishment of CFSP cooperation mechanisms (in
matters concerning ESDP). Poland also insisted on including in the proj-
ect provisions about NATO’s role in the Euro-Atlantic security system.87
The Polish position did not meet with the understanding of the countries
which favored greater EU autonomy from the USA in the field of security
and defense. Those countries, like France and Germany, accused Warsaw
of having an excessively pro-American stance.
Poland’s efforts to gain EU membership gradually led its position
about the European Security and Defence Policy to change from disincli-
nation to cautious engagement, in keeping with the premise that, since the
process of EU cooperation in this area is under way, Poland must ensure
for itself an appropriate place in it. In November 2000, during the first
Capabilities Commitment Conference, Poland declared that it would take
part in the rapid reaction forces being organized by the European Union,
but only if this doesn’t entail any additional costs in addition to the obli-
gations Poland had already assumed within NATO. During the third
planning conference, in May 2003, Poland declared it would make a total
of 1500 soldiers available for the EU to use in various Petersberg Task
(operations). Several months earlier, in February 2003, Poland had also
expressed interest in the planned project groups provided in the European
Capabilities Action Plan (ECAP). As a result, in 2003–2007, Poland took
POLAND’S SECURITY POLICY IN THE UNIPOLAR WORLD ORDER 83
part in various degrees in the work of eight ECAP project groups in the
following capabilities: air refueling; strategic air and maritime transport;
defense against weapons of mass destruction; special forces; search and
rescue on the battlefield; medical backup; and operational command.88
In April 2004, Poland also declared it would take part in the creation of
EU Battlegroups, an initiative thought up two months earlier by France,
Germany and the United Kingdom. In November 2004, Poland and
Germany, along with Slovakia, Lithuania and Latvia, signed a declaration
of intent in the matter of the formation of a common battle group that was
formalized in a memorandum of understanding two years later (November
2006). This unit was made available to the EU at the beginning of 2010,
and in the first half of the year, Poland played the role of a framework
country. Polish units are also part of a battle group that includes forces
from Germany and France. The so-called Weimar Battlegroup was formed
by the decision of the three countries in July 2006 and its tour of duty
began at the beginning of 2013. Discussions between the general staffs of
Poland, the Czech Republic, Slovakia and Hungary have been under way
since January 2006 about the possibility of forming a so-called Visegrad
Battlegroup by 2016. Poland has also become active in the work of the
European Defence Agency (EDA), particularly in the sphere of reinforcing
Europe’s armaments market, the development of R&D programs, plan-
ning the development of European crisis reaction capabilities important
for the realization of Headline Goal 2010 and beyond that time frame.89
Since 2003, Poland has also been taking part in the Petersberg opera-
tions conducted under the auspices of the ESDP. Polish soldiers took part
in the following operations: EUFOR ‘Concordia’ in Macedonia (March–
December 2003—17 persons); EUFOR RD Congo (June–December
2006—130 persons); and EUFOR TCHAD/RCA (spring 2008–spring
2009—330–400 persons). It is also taking part in the EUTM Mali
operation (from 2013—20 soldiers withdrawn in May 2014) and in the
EUFOR ‘Althea’ operation in Bosnia and Herzegovina, the largest ever
conducted by the European Union (from December 2004—initially 275
Polish soldiers, 50 soldiers since December 2010). Poland’s involvement
in the EU’s civilian missions is relatively modest: EUPOL ‘Proxima’ in
Macedonia (December 2003–December 2005—6 police officers, later 3);
EUPOL Bosnia and Herzegovina (January 2003–June 2012—12 police
officers, later 7); EUJUST LEX Iraq (July 2005–December 2013—as part
of this mission, Poland conducted two training courses in 2006–2007,
two vocational internships in 2008, and one vocational internship in 2009
84 J. ZAJA ̨C
for the Iraqi prison service, and provided training to 48 persons in all);
EUPOL AFGHANISTAN (from June 2007—5 persons in 2016), EUAM
Ukraine (from July 2014—1 person), EUNAVFOR Med Sophia (from
July 2015—1 person), and EUPOL COPPS in the Palestinian Territories
(from January 2006—1 person from September 2016). More Poles took
part in EU civilian missions in Kosovo and in Georgia. The Special Polish
Police Unit (over 115 persons) and several experts from the Police, the
Customs Service and the Border Police are taking part in the EU mis-
sion deployed in Kosovo in December 2008 (EULEX Kosovo). About
20 Polish citizens are also on contract for the needs of the mission (as
of January 2015). In the aftermath of the 2008 Russian–Georgian war,
approximately 20 persons from Poland are taking part in the EU observa-
tion mission in Georgia (EUMM Georgia) launched in October 2008.
Poland is also taking part in the technical and advisory mission for the
monitoring of the Ukrainian–Moldovan border (EUBAM Moldova/
Ukraine), launched in November 2005. The Polish contingent is one
of the most numerous of all sent by EU member states (18 persons in
2016).90
Despite Poland’s involvement in the development of the ESDP, it
invariably gave priority to maintaining a strong NATO and US presence
in Europe. An important reason for Poland’s cautious stance with regard
to European autonomy in the field of security and defense was its distrust
in the EU’s ability to act effectively on their own. The military capabilities
of Western European countries are much smaller than that of the USA; the
WEU was not able to act without support from NATO resources and logis-
tics, and this is also a problem of the EU as a whole. Warsaw’s skepticism
about the military self-reliance of the European Union and its member
states is made the greater by Poland’s historical experiences. Both France
and the United Kingdom failed to came to Poland’s aid during Germany’s
invasion in September 1939, even though they were bound to do so under
the treaties of alliance they had signed with Poland (in 1921 and 1939,
respectively). Also, since the very inception of the ESDP, many in Warsaw
held the view that Western European states would not be inclined to
incur significant expenses in order to build a defense force independent of
NATO and that, in effect, the entire concept of a European Security and
Defence Policy would remain a dead letter in the military sense, and in
the political sense would only serve to limit American influence. Warsaw,
however, strove to avert a transatlantic rift on the issue, acting on the
assumption that, should Poland have to face armed aggression (although
POLAND’S SECURITY POLICY IN THE UNIPOLAR WORLD ORDER 85
After few years of the Autumn of Nations, Poland gradually lost interest
in the further development and strengthening of the CSCE/OSCE. This
institution was not equipped in hard security guarantee instruments which
were very important for Poland and it became clear relatively quickly that
86 J. ZAJA ̨C
it did not have the means to respond effectively to conflict situations that
arose in the Balkans and in the post-Soviet area after the end of the Cold
War.95 Russia’s involvement in strengthening the CSCE was also a signifi-
cant factor leading to Poland’s diminishing interest in this institution. In
the summer of 1994, Russian foreign minister Andrei Kozyrev issued a
document suggesting that the Budapest Summit planned for December
1994 ‘is called upon to give a strong impetus to strengthening its lead-
ing role in the construction of the new Europe’, and that ‘the CSCE
should aim at coordinating the activities of NATO, the European Union,
the Council of Europe, the WEU and the CIS in the sphere of enhanc-
ing stability and security, promoting peacekeeping and protecting human
and national minority rights’. Even though, in the same document, he
stressed that his proposal did not entail turning the CSCE into ‘a hier-
archical leader or commander’,96 his words gave rise to fears in Poland
that Moscow was trying to subordinate NATO and other EU institutions
to the CSCE. Such suspicions had been raised earlier, when, during the
NACC ministerial meeting in January 1994, Kozyrev had suggested that
this structure should become the CSCE’s military arm. The Russian pro-
posals met with the favor of a number of politicians in France, Switzerland,
Germany and the Netherlands. This led to a dispute among CSCE mem-
bers, some of which, led by Russia, called for the further institutionaliza-
tion of the CSCE and a considerable strengthening of its position in the
Euro-Atlantic security system, while others, among whom the strongest
voice was that of the United States, were opposed to this idea and opted
for the maintenance of the CSCE’s loose character. Many in Washington
viewed the OSCE as a clear competitor to NATO for primacy in provid-
ing for Euro-Atlantic security and many pointed to the OSCE’s alleged
history of ‘failures’ to prevent or to resolve conflicts as evidence of its
unreliability.97 Poland shared this point of view. After the December 1994
CSCE Summit in Budapest, Bronisław Geremek, Chairman of the Sejm’s
Foreign Affairs Committee stated that the inability to determine the prin-
ciples for the CSCE’s future functioning only serves to reinforce the view
that the only effective European security structure is NATO.98 Poland
declared that, in its view, the OSCE could promote democratic values and
make use of so-called ‘soft security’ instruments, but that such initiatives
should not rest upon obligations of a legal nature. And so, in March 1996,
Poland, Slovakia and Hungary submitted a proposal to work out prin-
ciples of cooperation among security organizations—the OSCE, NATO,
EU, and WEU.99 It is while holding this position that Poland entered the
POLAND’S SECURITY POLICY IN THE UNIPOLAR WORLD ORDER 87
Poland wished to join NATO and saw this institution as being the most
important in Europe’s security architecture, while Moscow saw it as a relic
of the Cold War and an organization serving as the instrument of America’s
expansionist policy. This fundamental difference in Russian and Polish
interests in security matters affected mutual relations, which abounded
with negative events and in which mere incidents took on the form of
diplomatic irritants. In October 1994, a number of Russian citizens were
assaulted in Warsaw (at Warszawa-Wschodnia rail station) and the incident
led to the cancellation of Russian Prime Minister Viktor Chernomyrdin’s
planned visit to Poland. President Boris Yeltsin did not accept the invita-
tion to attend the 50th anniversary commemoration of the liberation of
the Auschwitz concentration camp in January 1995, and President Lech
Wałęsa did not attend the 50th anniversary commemoration of the end of
the Second World War in Moscow in May of that year. Several months later,
in February 1996 the Russians requested that a corridor from Belarus to the
Kaliningrad District be built. In Poland such an idea carried negative con-
notations with demands Germany had made on Poland on the eve of the
Second World War. These tensions were compounded in December 1995
by the so-called Oleksy affair, in which the then Minister of Internal Affairs
Andrzej Milczanowski accused Prime Minister Józef Oleksy of contacts with
a Russian intelligence agent. The accusation led to Oleksy’s resignation in
January 1996. Divergent interests in security matters also affected Polish–
Russian economic relations. While an agreement was signed between the
two countries in 1995 allowing Polish ships to fish in Russian economic
waters on the Sea of Okhotsk, and two important agreements were signed in
1996 concerning the cancellation of mutual debts, and long-term supplies
of Russian gas to Poland, Moscow was not interested in the ‘Partnership
for Transformation’ program proposed in 1994 by the Polish foreign affairs
minister Andrzej Olechowski, calling for the growth of economic, social,
scientific and cultural cooperation. In effect, Polish–Russian trade grew, but
at a lesser rate than made possible by the two countries’ potential. Other
unresolved issues also affected mutual relations negatively. These included
the question of free navigation for Polish ships through the Strait of Baltiysk,
the unresolved issue of the Katyn massacres (the murder of about 22,000
Polish officers by Soviet secret police agency, the NKVD in 1940), and the
unsettled matter of Polish goods of culture stolen and carted off to the
USSR during the Second World War. Polish–Russian antagonism was also
fuelled by Poland’s favorable attitude toward the Chechen insurgents, seen
in Warsaw as freedom fighters and in Moscow as terrorists.
90 J. ZAJA ̨C
NOTES
1. See more K. E. Jørgensen, ed., (1997), European Approches to Crisis
Management (The Hague-London-Boston: Kluwer Law International);
F. Attinà, D. Irrera, eds. (2010), Multilateral Security and ESDP
Operations (Farnham: Ashgate).
2. W. C. Wohlforth (Summer 1998), ‘The Stability of a Unipolar World’,
International Security, 24/1, p. 9. See also: C. Krauthammer
(1990/1992), ‘The Unipolar Moment, Foreign Affairs, Vol. 70, No.
23, pp. 23–33; J. Nye (1990), Bound to Lead: the Changing Nature of
American Power (New York: Basic Books); E. B. Kapstein,
M. Mastanduno, eds. (1999), Unipolar Politics. Realism and State
Strategies after the Cold War (New York: Columbia University Press).
3. Z. Brzeziński (2004), The Choice, Global Domination or Global
Leadership (New York: Basic Books); J. Ikenberry (2011), Liberal
Leviathan: The Origins, Crisis, and Transformation of the American
World Order (Princeton and Oxford: Princeton University Press);
C. Norrlof (2010), America’s Global Advantage. US Hegemony and
International Cooperation (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press);
I. W. Zartman, ed. (2009), Imbalance of Power: US Hegemony and
International Order (Boulder, London: Lynne Rienner Publishers);
E. B. Kapstein, M. Mastanduno (2010), ‘Realism and state strategies’, in
E. B. Kapstein , M. Mastanduno, eds., Unipolar Politics. Realism…,
pp. 1–27; L. R. Lee (2010), US Hegemony and International Legitimacy.
Norms, power and followership in the wars on Iraq (London, New York:
Routledge).
4. (July 1994), A National Security Strategy of Engagement and
Enlargement (Washington DC: The White House), pp. i, iv, http://
nssarchive.us/NSSR/1996.pdf, accessed on 28 January 2015.
5. (Oct. 1998), A National Security Strategy for a New Century (Washington
DC: The White House).
6. (30 Apr. 1999), ‘Presidential Decision Directive PDD 68 on International
Public Information (IPI)’. See M. Halliwell, C. Morley, eds (2008),
American Thought and Culture in the 21st Century (Edinburgh:
Edinburgh University Press), p. 104.
7. (21 Sept. 1993), Remarks of Anthony Lake, Assistant to the President
for National Security Affairs, ‘From Containment to Enlargement’,
(Washington D.C.: John Hopkins University, School of Advanced
International Studies).
8. For more, see S. Patrick, S. Forman, eds. (2002), Multilateralism &
U.S. Foreign Policy. Ambivalent Engagement (Boulder, London: Lynne
Rienner Publisher).
POLAND’S SECURITY POLICY IN THE UNIPOLAR WORLD ORDER 93
9. See the critical opinions about the unilateral nature of US policy in S. P.
Huntington (Mar.-Apr. 1999), ‘The Lonely Superpower’, Foreign
Affairs, Vol. 78, No. 2, pp. 35–49. In this article, Huntington argues
that ‘international politics in the nineties is a strange hybrid, a uni-mul-
tipolar system with one superpower and several major powers’ (p. 36).
See also G. Wills (Mar.-Apr. 1999), ‘Bully of the Free World’, Ibid.,
pp. 50–59.
10. D. Malone, Y. F. Khong, eds. (2003), Unilateralism and U.S. Foreign
Policy: International Perspectives (Boulder, London: Lynne Rienner
Publisher).
11. (2002), National Security Strategy (Washington D.C.: The White
House), p. 15.
12. For more see I. H. Daalder, J. M. Lindsay (2003), America Unbound.
The Bush Revolution in Foreign Policy (Washington, DC: Brookings
Institution Press); M. Buckley, R. Singh, eds. (2006), The Bush Doctrine
and the War on Terrorism. Global Response, Global Consequences (London,
New York: Routledge); R. Suskind (2006), The One Percent Doctrine:
Deep Inside America’s Pursuit of Its Enemies Since 9/11 (New York:
Simon & Schuster).
13. G. Lindstrom, ed. (2003), Shift or Rift. Assessing US–EU Relations after
Iraq (Paris: Institute for Security Studies); D. P. Houghton (2009),
‘Bush and Europe’ in A. Wroe, J. Herbert, Assessing the George W. Bush
Presidency. A Tale of Two Terms (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University
Press), pp. 115–128; E. Jones (July 2004), ‘Debating the Transatlantic
Relationship: Rhetoric and Reality’, International Affairs, Vol. 80, No.
4, pp. 595–612; B. Huldt (2005), ‘The Iraq War and the transatlantic
relationship’, in J. Hallenberg, H. Karlsson, eds., The Iraq War: European
perspectives on politics, strategy and operations (London, New York:
Routledge), pp. 38–60.
14. See more H. Nau (2008), “Iraq and Previous Transatlantic Crisis:
Divided by Threat, Not Institutions or Values” in J. Anderson, G. J.
Ikenberry, T. Risse, eds. The End of the West?: Crisis and Change in the
Atlantic Order (Ithaca: Cornell University Press) pp. 82–110.
15. A. E. Stent (2014), The Limits of Partnership. U.S.-Russian relations in
the Twenty-First Century (Princeton and Oxford: Princeton University
Press), pp. 22–24; A. Bryc (2008), Rosja w XXI wieku. Gracz światowy
czy koniec gry? (Warsaw: Wydawnictwa Akademickie i Profesjonalne),
pp. 134–162.
16. J. F. Matlock (2010), Superpower Illusions: How Myths and False
Ideologies Led America Astray—and How To Return To Reality (New
Heaven, London: Yale University Press), p. 171. See also S.F. Cohen
94 J. ZAJA ̨C
38. ‘See Special Message to the Senate Transmitting the North Atlantic
Treaty, 12 April, 1949’ Public Papers of President Harry S. Truman,
1943–1953, http://trumanlibrary.org/publicpapers/index.
php?pid=1092&st=&st1=, accessed on 28 January 2016.
39. J. Zaja ̨c (2007), ‘Udział Polski w misjach pokojowych i stabilizacyjnych
na pocza ̨tku XXI wieku’, Krakowskie Studia Międzynarodowe, No. 4,
pp. 191–207.
40. See https://www.msz.gov.pl/pl/polityka_zagraniczna/polityka_bez-
pieczenstwa/operacje_nato_i_ue/operacje_nato/#oae, accessed on 28
January 2016.
41. ‘41. posiedzenie Sejmu w dniu 11 maja 2007 r. Informacja Ministra
Spraw Zagranicznych o zadaniach polskiej polityki zagranicznej w 2007
r.’, p. 397, http://orka.sejm.gov.pl/StenoInter5.nsf/0/F46789E275E
31E43C12572D8006E1D11/$file/41_d_ksiazka.pdf, accessed on 28
January 2016.
42. http://www.isaf.nato.int/troop-numbers-and-contributions/index.
php, accessed on 28 January 2016.
43. http://www.wojsko-polskie.pl/pl/misje-zagraniczne/polskie-
kontyngenty- wojskowe/misja-pokojowa-w-afganistanie/pkw-
afganistan- 2007-2014/28672,pkw-afganistan-2007-2014.html ,
accessed on 28 January 2016.
44. h t t p : / / w w w. n a t o . i n t / n a t o _ s t a t i c _ f l 2 0 1 4 / a s s e t s / p d f /
pdf_2015_10/20151007_2015-10-rsm-placemat.pdf, accessed on 28
January 2016.
45. O. Osica (2003), ‘In Search of a New Role: Poland in Euro-Atlantic
Relations’, in M. Zaborowski, D. H. Dunn, eds., Poland: A New Power
in Transatlantic Security (London, Portland, OR: Frank Cass),
pp. 31–32.
46. In the end, the Alliance only invited Albania and Croatia, rejecting the
candidacy of Macedonia over Greek objections.
47. ‘Bucharest Summit Declaration Issued by the Heads of State and
Government participating in the meeting of the North Atlantic Council
in Bucharest on 3 April 2008’, (http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natol-
ive/official_texts_8443.htm), accessed on 25 January 2016.
48. J. Nowak-Jeziorański (29 Apr. 2000), ‘Pułapka z wyboru’, Polityka, No.
18, pp. 36–37.
49. D. M. Andrews (2005), ‘The United States and its Atlantic Partners’, in
D. M. Andrews, ed., The Atlantic Alliance Under Stress: US-European
Relations after Iraq (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press), p. 61.
50. R. Kuźniar (2012), Polityka zagraniczna III Rzeczypospolitej (Warsaw:
Wydawnictwo Naukowe Scholar), p. 134; D. H. Dunn (2003), ‘Poland:
POLAND’S SECURITY POLICY IN THE UNIPOLAR WORLD ORDER 97
In the first years after the Cold War, the world order rested on the global
hegemony of the USA. Toward the end of the 1990s, things began to
change, however. As early as 1999, Samuel Huntington noted that the
‘unipolar moment’, which arrived with the end of the Cold War and the
collapse of the Soviet Union, had passed.1 At the beginning of the 21st
century, the emerging powers were beginning to play increasingly impor-
tant international roles and were challenging America’s hegemony.2 The
influence of the BRIC countries (Brazil, Russia, India, China) is grow-
ing rapidly. At the beginning of 21st century, the world thus entered the
period of a multipolar international order, i.e., one ‘made up of three or
more significant powers’.3
This trend entails the decline of the existing world powers’ relative
position. While the USA continues to hold that title, the influence of the
European Union and of its member states is declining visibly, due not only
to the growing importance of other world centers, but also of the EU’s
own internal problems. From Poland’s standpoint, Russia’s return to the
global game is a very important factor. Although many observers claim
that Russia is not a power on the rise but one in decline, Moscow’s policy
over the past decade has given rise to considerable unease in many Central
and Eastern European countries. Ever since President Putin’s speech given
at the Munich security conference in February 2007 and the Georgian–
Russian war in August 2008,4 fears in Warsaw that Russia might revert to
an imperial policy have been rising steadily and have had a clear and direct
impact on Poland’s security policy. As a consequence of the emerging mul-
tipolar international order, Poland is concentrating on NATO consolidation
and on reinforcing the Alliance’s defensive capabilities; on closer political
and military relations with the USA. It has been advocating a stronger EU
defense policy and is also reinforcing its own military capabilities. In order
to contain Russian influence in Eastern Europe and to prevent its restora-
tion in Central Europe, Poland is also taking steps to strengthen pro-West-
ern currents in some post-Soviet states, above all in Ukraine and Georgia.
This wording implied the United States had accepted the development
of the European Security and Defence Policy and confirmed America’s
changing stance with regard to the this policy. At the same time, the
attitude of France, a country that had traditionally been opposed to US
domination in Europe, was also changing. While President Jacques Chirac
(1995–2007) had made no secret of the fact that the ESDP was to lead
to the formation of a structure independent of NATO, his successor
Nicolas Sarkozy (2007–2012) adopted a more conciliatory stance with
respect to NATO–UE collaboration. As a result, at the NATO Summit
in Strasbourg/Kehl France announced its return to the Alliance’s military
structures, which it had left in 1966.13
As the United States has been increasingly involved in Asia, it has
also been reducing its military presence in Europe. In 1953, the USA
had approximately 450,000 troops in Europe operating across 1200
sites. During the early 1990s US troop numbers in Europe were
slashed. Between 1990 and 1993, the number of US soldiers in Europe
decreased from 213,000 to 122,000. In 2013 only 64,000 US troops
remained permanently based in Europe, and the number of sites had
been reduced by 85% from Cold War times.14 In 2009, NATO went
through a serious internal crisis as, for the first time in its history, it
faced a budget deficit.15 This generated a public discussion concerning
the Alliance’s maintenance costs and about the financial contribution
of NATO members to the organization’s budget. As Robert Gates, US
Secretary of Defense, stated during a speech given in June 2011, the
USA’s share of NATO’s military budget had grown to 75% since the end
106 J. ZAJA ̨C
Eastern Europe.32 In the Polish public debate there soon was outright
talk of Russia’s aggressive policy, of its imperialist concept of forcing
spheres of influence upon small and medium-size countries, and of
treating the interests of major powers in a privileged manner. As the
dispatches disclosed by WikiLeaks make clear, Radosław Sikorski, the
Polish foreign minister, ‘used to think Russia would be a danger in
10–15 years, but after the Georgia crisis, it could be as little as 10–15
months’.33 In November 2008, during a visit in Washington, Sikorski
presented an idea, known as the ‘Sikorski Doctrine’, in keeping with
which ‘any further attempt to redraw borders in Europe by force or by
subversion should be regarded by Europe as a threat to its security and
should entail a proportional response by the whole Atlantic commu-
nity’.34 Poland’s view was not shared by all European Union member
states, and this was due to their different attitudes toward Russia. As
Marc Leonard and Nicu Popescu pointed out in 2007, there were five
distinct policy approaches to Russia among old and new members of
the European Union:
“Trojan Horses” (Cyprus and Greece) who often defend Russian interests
in the EU system, and are willing to veto common EU positions; “Strategic
Partners” (France, Germany, Italy and Spain) who enjoy a “special rela-
tionship” with Russia which occasionally undermines common EU poli-
cies; “Friendly Pragmatists” (Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Finland, Hungary,
Luxembourg, Malta, Portugal, Slovakia and Slovenia) who maintain a close
relationship with Russia and tend to put their business interests above politi-
cal goals; “Frosty Pragmatists” (Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Ireland,
Latvia, the Netherlands, Romania, Sweden and the United Kingdom) who
also focus on business interests but are less afraid than others to speak out
against Russian behavior on human rights or other issues; and “New Cold
Warriors” (Lithuania and Poland) who have an overtly hostile relationship
with Moscow and are willing to use the veto to block EU negotiations with
Russia.35
Medvedev say that NATO had no longer the capacity to provide security
of the European continent. [The] Russian leadership does not hide from
the fact of its preference to push America out of Europe. We in Poland
would not be in favor.37
clear that the highest priority was given to the first. During the Lisbon
summit, Poland’s efforts to strengthen the Alliance’s collective defense
function were also accompanied by demands for the modernization, and
even the deployment, of NATO’s defense infrastructure, and for guaran-
tees that contingency planning would be updated in case a threat or crisis
should emerge in Poland’s vicinity (Warsaw obtained the first such plan in
2001). Poland also proposed that the principle of automaticity be intro-
duced to the Alliance’s response process in case of aggression, but this was
not adopted, however. The questions of financial burden sharing and that
of the future presence of American troops in Europe remained unresolved.
Even though it concentrated on strengthening NATO’s traditional
collective defense function during the 2010 Lisbon Summit, Poland also
declared that it would continue to take part in all operations unrelated to
Art. 5 that serve the security of the Euro-Atlantic area and beyond. Polish
decision makers stressed, however, that such operations should be con-
ducted in a rational manner because they take up considerable funds from
the NATO budget and the defense budget of member states. In addition,
Poland supported the development of constructive relations with Russia
while, at the same time, emphasizing that this can’t take place at the cost
of the security of other states. Warsaw also took the position that other
countries lying east of Poland, including Ukraine and Georgia, should be
able to develop closer relations with NATO if they so wish, and even be
given the right to join the Alliance if they meet the criteria set forth in
the Washington Treaty.43 Poland also supported cooperation with other
security organizations and states from other regions of the world. These
points proved concordant with the position of NATO as a whole, and this
was reflected in the wording of the strategic concept adopted by NATO
on 19 November 2010.44 As it announced it would participate in ‘out of
area’ operations, Poland reduced its engagement in Afghanistan, in what
was part of a NATO-wide trend to withdraw forces from that country.
During the NATO Chicago Summit in May 2012, leaders of member
states decided that in the middle of 2013, ISAF would hand over respon-
sibility for all combat missions to the Afghan command, which would
thus gain the leading role in assuring security over the country’s entire
territory.
Given its growing sense of threat from Russia, in addition to its efforts
to strengthen NATO’s collective security function and to consolidate the
Alliance, Warsaw stepped up its efforts to bring about closer political and
military ties with the USA. One of the effects of the 2008 Georgian–Russian
114 J. ZAJA ̨C
I am very far from being fascinated by America. But the USA provided
us with a protective umbrella while, at the same time, being so far from
Poland that there can be no question of overly direct dependence. The
United States is strategically interested in Poland—also for its own secu-
POLAND’S SECURITY POLICY IN THE EMERGING MULTIPOLAR WORLD ORDER 115
rity—and this strengthens our position within NATO and the European
Union. This position could be additionally reinforced through a bilateral
treaty on missile defense concluded with Washington. I wish to stress the
term “bilateral”. This is why I was opposed to pressure to make this issue a
European agreement and to include it into the system of EU partners. The
effect would have been that decisions concerning our relations with the
United States would have been taken collectively. In general, there was pres-
sure on the part of the strongest EU member states to collectivize the mem-
bership of EU states in NATO. Of course, this is not in our interest. This
exactly is one of the problems of our raison d’état with NATO, and more
precisely with EU-NATO relations. [...] Above all, there is always Russia
in the background—Germany, France, and Russia behind them. Drawing
Russia into this system is not in our interest. The Russians are looking for
a sphere of influence in this region and this is beyond the slightest doubt.
Of course, this is taking place without excessive haste, by stages, and not in
the first instance, as there are others before us in this queue—yet it is taking
place. [...] One also shouldn’t forget that there is a great potential of anti-
Americanism in Europe. I can understand this anti-Americanism to some
degree, but to understand it does not mean to accept it, and even less to
see it as something advantageous for us. I am thinking in terms of my coun-
try’s interests, and Poland with close ties with the United States is stronger
within the EU, not weaker. Our position is made the stronger by convincing
others that we enjoy America’s support within NATO.48
conjunction with the other elements of the EPAA system located on the
Mediterranean Sea and in Romania, would be capable of protecting all
European NATO member states from incoming missiles from the Middle
East. In exchange, the USA undertook to station Patriot anti-aircraft bat-
teries intermittently in Poland in order to additionally protect Polish ter-
ritory from all possible external missile attacks.53 The EPAA project was
adopted by NATO countries at the Lisbon Summit in November 2010,
and later confirmed at the same forum in Chicago in May 2012.54
At the same time, on 13 June 2011 Poland and the USA signed a
Memorandum of Understanding concerning enhanced cooperation
between the two countries’ air forces. Pursuant to this agreement a USAF
Aviation Detachment (USAF AV-DET) was established. In 2012, USAF
AV-DET personnel were deployed on a continuous basis on Polish ter-
ritory and this was followed by deployments of US aircraft beginning in
2013 on a rotational basis. It was decided that the four-yearly rotational
deployments to Poland would consist of F-16 or C-130 aircraft.55 The
agreement provided for the first continuous presence of a US Armed
Forces unit on Polish territory and for greater interoperability of the
Polish Air Force with the US units. The USA is also extending financial
aid to Poland for military purposes. From FY1996 to FY2013, US for-
eign military (government-to-government) sales to Poland totaled over
4.7 billion USD, and were approximately 218 million USD in FY2013.
Poland has also received American support in a framework of Foreign
Military Financing (FMF) and International Military Education Training
(IMET). From FY2009 to FY2013 Poland received 152 million USD
in FMF,56 and 10.5 million USD in IMET.57 These sums are relatively
high in comparison with those received by other countries of Central and
Eastern Europe, but modest when compared to the aid received by coun-
tries outside the region and which are among the USA’s closest partners.
Taking into consideration the USA’s gradual reduction of its presence in
Europe, however, Poland is increasingly seeking to build up its own mili-
tary capabilities.
War, almost all of Poland’s operational forces were prepared for war tasks
as part of Warsaw Pact operations. In consequence, the Polish Army was
offensive by nature. The political transformations which began in 1989 led
to systemic and institutional problems, and this made it difficult to rebuild
and modernize the Polish Armed Forces, as well as to find the appropri-
ate place for them in the new state system. The infamous 1994 ‘Drawsko
dinner’—during which a vote of confidence in defense minister Piotr
Kołodziejczyk was held by the country’s most seniors officers—became
symbolic of the difficulties encountered during the process of transforma-
tion in the military sphere. Despite such problems, the gradual transfor-
mation of Poland’s Armed Forces did take place. The army was subjected
to a permanent process of modernization and adaptation to NATO norms
and requirements. In October 1998 the government adopted a program
of integration with NATO and of modernization of the Polish Armed
Forces for the years 1998–2012, and pointed to the need to equip the
Polish Army with modern weapons. Given the country’s financial prob-
lems, however, certain aspects of the program were ultimately abandoned,
and the program was replaced by the The Programme of Restructuring
and Technical Modernisation of the Armed Forces of the Republic of Poland
2001–2006. In May 2001, the Sejm passed a law mandating a level of
defense expenditure of 1.95% of the previous year’s GDP, which was a
high level in terms of the European average. For many years, however,
Poland did not increase the combat potential of its armed forces, and the
most serious problem in this sphere was waste of funds (large sums spent
on the maintenance of an excessively large officer corps, and on obsolete
weapons; and the inability to make full and proper use of funds set aside
for the purchase of new equipment).58
In the face of the emerging multipolar international order, Poland
stepped up the process of building up its military capabilities. The main
goal was to shift Poland’s priorities from external engagement to tasks con-
nected with the security (defense) of the country. Following the Obama
administration’s decision to withdraw from the anti-missile shield project
as envisioned by the Bush administration, Warsaw adopted plans to build
an missile defense system as a matter of high priority. In reference to the
Obama administration’s decision, President Komorowski admitted that
Poland had made the mistake of failing to appreciate the political implica-
tions of the changing US presidential administration and that this mistake
should not be repeated.59 A few months earlier, in November 2011, while
outlining the priorities of development of the Polish armed forces for the
POLAND’S SECURITY POLICY IN THE EMERGING MULTIPOLAR WORLD ORDER 119
5 POLAND AND THE CSDP
Poland’s cautious stance with regard to the Common Security and Defence
Policy began to evolve due to the changing international order. Voices
in Washington speaking in 2008 of the need for closer collaboration
between NATO and the EU in security matters; the 2009 North Atlantic
Alliance Summit in Strasbourg/Kehl, during which NATO recognized the
POLAND’S SECURITY POLICY IN THE EMERGING MULTIPOLAR WORLD ORDER 121
and as a so-called Initial Entry Force, that is, a rapid response force that
would be sent to crisis areas should such a need arise. As many EU mem-
ber states were opposed to those proposals, Warsaw gave up on them in
September 2011.70
The third priority of the Polish presidency of the EU Council con-
cerning the CSDP was the strengthening of the EU’s ability to plan and
conduct operations through the creation of a permanent civilian and
military planning and command structure that would eliminate the dual
approach to civilian and military missions. While EU civilian missions have
permanent planning and command structures, in the case of military mis-
sions commands are formed ad hoc on the basis of previously submitted
national commands. The idea of introducing a headquarters-like per-
manent structure for planning and conducting civilian and military mis-
sions proved controversial, however, and was very quickly blocked by the
United Kingdom.71
Another postulate of the Polish presidency was to establish closer rela-
tions with countries of Eastern Europe. Poland proposed that the European
Security and Defence College open its training offer to representatives of
Eastern Partnership states as a practical measure of such closer relations.
Training sessions for eastern partners were supposed to help familiarize
them with the CSDP political, institutional and operational framework—
something that would serve to make future cooperation more effective.
In the end, Poland only succeeded in having the Council include in its
Conclusion of 1 December 2011 a formulation about the need to enhance
cooperation with the EU’s eastern and southern neighbors in the sphere
of security and stability.72
All proposals concerning the strengthening of the CSDP were made part
of the context of developing the practical dimension of cooperation between
the EU and NATO—something that was clearly stressed in the program of
the Polish presidency. From Warsaw’s point of view, the most advantageous
of theses was the expansion of the scope of regular political consultations
between both organizations, including at the NATO Secretary General
and EU High Representative level. At the same time, Poland promoted all
initiatives aimed at the real expansion of the cooperation framework, i.e.,
closer cooperation between the European Defence Agency (EDA), acting
on behalf of improved defense capabilities for the EU, and the NATO Allied
Command for Transformation (ACT).73 Polish decision makers also began
to speak of the necessity to review the 2003 European Security Strategy, as
scholarly and expert milieus had been doing for several years.74
124 J. ZAJA ̨C
Warsaw was concerned that the proposed program for the consolida-
tion of Europe’s armaments industry would be detrimental to Polish
small and medium-size firms of this sector. The proposed program speci-
fied that only countries with a strong and well-established defense sector
could participate, and this would have excluded smaller countries such as
Poland and Bulgaria from the consolidation process. As Poland’s defense
minister Tomasz Siemoniak pointed out, such an arrangement would in
practice have meant that most orders for armaments would go to firms
that already enjoyed a strong market position.79 In effect, the decisions
adopted during the European Council in December 2013—(1) increas-
ing the effectiveness, visibility and impact of CSDP; (2) enhancing the
development of capabilities and (3) strengthening Europe's defense
industry—failed to be a turning point in improving the effectiveness of
the EU’s foreign and security policy.
Since the end of the Cold War, Poland has consistently supported pro-
Western currents in the foreign policy of post-Soviet states, and especially
in that of the Baltic States, Ukraine and Georgia. One of the ways in which
Poland did so was to draw those countries toward closer collaboration
with the European Union and NATO. During its EU accession negotia-
tions (1998–2002), Warsaw had already expressed its special interest in
the development of relations between the EU and Eastern Europe. This
interest was reflected in a document entitled Eastern Policy of the European
Union in the Context of its Enlargement by the Inclusion of East-Central
European Countries—the Polish View adopted by the Ministry of Foreign
Affairs in July 2001. Two years later the foreign ministry expanded this
concept in the form of a non-paper entitled Polish Proposals Concerning
the Future Shape of the Enlarged EU toward the New Eastern Neighbors.
In this document, Warsaw proposed developing further the EU’s rela-
tions with its Eastern neighbors: the inclusion of Russia in the European
Economic Space in the medium term and the signing of association agree-
ments with Ukraine, Moldova and Belarus, provided the latter countries
underwent democratization. That document also mentioned the pos-
sibility of Ukraine’s admission to the EU in the long term.80 After its
accession to the European Union in 2004, Poland stepped up its efforts
in this area, by collaborating with countries of the Visegrad Group and
126 J. ZAJA ̨C
The EaP funds, totaling 600 million euro made available to Eastern
Partnership countries over the period 2010-13 (85 million euro in 2010,
110 million euro in 2011, 175 million euro in 2012 and 230 million euro
in 2013), aimed to support three main areas: (1) comprehensive Institution
Building programs to assist reforms (about 175 million euro); (2) regional
development programs to address regional economic and social disparities
(about 7 million euro); (3) the implementation of the EaP, focusing on
democracy, governance and stability, economic integration and convergence
with EU policies, energy security, and contacts between people with the aim
of bringing the partners closer to the EU (about 350 million euro).82
The Eastern Partnership and other Polish policies in the region aim to coun-
ter a resurgent Russia. [...] By offering former Soviet republics the prospect
of free trade and visa-free travel to the EU, the Eastern Partnership can
spur the reforms needed for eventual EU membership and stem growing
Russian influence. [...] On the economic front, Polish officials believe a
larger Western business presence in countries like Belarus and Ukraine will
provide an alternative to Russian state-controlled companies, and EU good
governance programs can fight the corruption that facilitates Russian politi-
cal and economic influence.88
NOTES
1. S. P. Huntington (Mar.-Apr. 1999), ‘The Lonely Superpower’, Foreign
Affairs, Vol. 78, No. 2, p. 39. Other scholars also saw the unipolar order
as temporary. See C. Layne (1993), ‘Unipolar Illusion. Why New Great
Powers Will Rise’, International Security, vol. 17, No. 4, pp. 5–51;
C. Krauthammer (1990/1992), ‘The Unipolar Moment’, Foreign Affairs,
Vol. 70, No. 23, pp. 23–33; Ch. A. Kupchan (Fall 1998), ‘After Pax
Americana: Benign Power, Regional Integration, and the Sources of Stable
Multipolarity’, International Security, Vol. 23, No. 3, pp. 40–79;
M. Mastanduno (Spring 1997), ‘Preserving the Unipolar Moment: Realist
POLAND’S SECURITY POLICY IN THE EMERGING MULTIPOLAR WORLD ORDER 129
Theories and U.S. Grand Strategy after the Cold War’, International
Security, Vol. 21, No. 4, pp. 44–98.
2. A. Acharya (2014), The End of the American World Order (Cambridge,
Malden: Polity Press).
3. M. A. Smith (2012), ‘Power in the Changing Global Order. The US, Russia
and China’ (Cambridge, Malden: Polity Press), p. 53. Smith uses the term
‘international system’, not ‘international order’.
4. On Georgian-Russian War see more C. Welt (2010) , “The Thawing of a
Frozen Conflict: The Internal Security Dilemma and the 2004 Prelude to
the Russo-Georgian War”, Europe-Asia Studies, Vol. 62, No. 1, pp. 63–97;
E. Karagiannis (2013), “The 2008 Russian-Georgian war via the lens of
Offensive Realism”, European Security, Vol. 22, No. 1, pp. 74–93; H. B.
L. Larsen (2012), “The Russo-Georgian war and beyond: towards a
European great power concert”, European Security, Vol. 21, No. 1,
pp. 102–121.
5. The foreign ministers of those four countries met for the first time in 2006
and, in the years that followed, such meetings were headed by heads of
state. In 2011 this group was joined by the Republic of South Africa, and
the group became also known as BRICS.
6. J. O’Neill (30 Nov. 2001), ‘Building Better Global Economic BRICs’,
Global Economic Paper, No. 66, http://www.goldmansachs.com/our-
thinking/archive/archive-pdfs/build-better-brics.pdf.
7. For more on US foreign policy in the 21st century, see D. H. Allin,
E. Jones (2012), Weary Policeman: American Power in an Age of Austerity,
(New York: Routledge); G. J. Ikenberry, T. J. Knock, A.-M. Slaughter,
T. Smith (2009), The Crisis of American Foreign Policy. Wilsonianism in the
Twenty-first Century, (Princeton, Oxford: Princeton University Press).
8. H. Clinton (11 Oct. 2011), ‘America's Pacific Century’, Foreign Policy,
No. 189, pp. 56–63.
9. K. Archick (29 Jan. 2008), ‘NATO and the European Union’, CRS Report
for Congress, RL 32342.
10. On transatlantic cooperation in face of emerging the multipolar order see
more Ch. A. Kupchan, “The Atlantic Order in Transition: The Nature of
Change in US–European Relations” in J. Anderson, G. J. Ikenberry, and
T. Risse, eds. The End of the West?: Crisis and Change in the Atlantic Order
(Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2008) pp. 111–126; C. Monteleone
(2009), “The End of the Euro-Atlantic Pluralistic Security Community?
The New Agenda of Transatlantic Security relations in the Global Political
System”, in N. F. Sola, M. Smith, eds., Perceptions and Policy in
Transatlantic Relations. Prospective Visions form the US and Europe (New
York: Routledge), pp. 136–161.
130 J. ZAJA ̨C
does not have the capability to rule alone. Russia, while in a period of tran-
sitional difficulties, retains the inherent characteristics of a great power
(technology, resources, weaponry). And other rising centers of influence
strive for a greater role in world affairs. The nature of modern international
problems calls for solutions on a multilateral basis’. A. Kozyrev (May-June
1994), ‘The Lagging Partnership’, Foreign Affairs, Vol. 73, No. 3, pp. 63.
27. Z. Brzeziński (1997), The Grand Chessboard. American Primacy and Its
Geostrategic Imperatives (New York: Basic Books), pp. 101–102.
28. (2010), “U.S.-Russian Relations in an Age of American Triumphalism. An
Interview with Stephen F. Cohen”, Journal of International Affairs, Vol.
63, No. 2, p. 199.
29. D. M. Spechler (2010), “Russian Foreign Policy during the Putin’s
Presidency: the Impact of Competing Approaches”, Problems of Post-
Communism, Vol. 57, No. 5, pp. 35–50; M. Kaczmarski (Dec. 2009),
‘Russia’s Revisionist Policy towards the West’, OSW Studies, No. 33, p. 8.
30. (10 Feb. 2007) ‘Vystuplenie i diskussiya na Myunkhenskoi konferentsii po
voprosam politiki bezopasnosti’, see http://kremlin.ru/events/presi-
dent/transcripts/24034, accessed on 28 January 2016.
31. (5 June 2008) Vystupleniye na vstreche s predstavitelyami politicheskikh,
parlamentskikh i obshchestvennykh krugov Germaniy’, see http://krem-
lin.ru/events/president/transcripts/320, accessed on 28 January 2016;
and P. Grudziński, J. Pietrusiewicz (Mar. 2011), ‘Building a modern secu-
rity community in the area from Vancouver to Vladivostok’, Bezpieczeństwo
Narodowe, No. 19, pp. 51–62.
32. ‘Wspólna deklaracja w sprawie sytuacji w Gruzji uzgodniona z Prezydentami
Republiki Litewskiej, Republiki Łotewskiej i Republiki Estońskiej,
Warszawa, 9 sierpnia 2008 roku’, Prezydent Lech Kaczyński. Wysta ̨pienia,
listy, wywiady. Wybór 2008 (Warsaw: Kancelaria Prezydenta RP), pp. 80–81.
33. (12 Dec. 2008) Poland: a natural U.S. Ally on Eastern Policy, see https://
wikileaks.org/plusd/cables/08WARSAW1409_a.html, accessed on 28
January 2016.
34. See http://www.atlanticcouncil.org/en/news/transcripts/transcript-
polish-foreign-minister-radoslaw-sikorski-talks-to-council, accessed on 28
January 2016.
35. M. Leonard, N. Popescu (Nov. 2007), A Power Audit of EU-Russia
Relations (London: European Council on Foreign Relations), p. 2.
36. G. Kuczyński (Jan.-Feb. 2009), ‘Strategia Rosji wobec Zachodu’,
Bezpieczeństwo Narodowe 9/10, pp. 155–171.
37. (28 Dec. 2015), Transcript: Polish Foreign Minister Radosław Sikorski
Talks to the Council, November 19, 2008, http://www.atlanticcouncil.
org/en/news/transcripts/transcript-polish-foreign-minister-radoslaw-
sikorski-talks-to-council, accessed on 28 January 2016.
132 J. ZAJA ̨C
38. A. D. Rotfeld (2012), ‘Myśli o Rosji... i nie tylko. Eseje i wywiady’ (Warsaw:
Świat Ksia ̨żki), pp. 23–24. See also P. Kowal (2009), ‘Dwie strefy cienia.
Próby restauracji wpływów dawnego ZSRR w Europie a relacje Rosji z UE
i NATO’, in A. Orzelska, ed. (2009), Stosunki transatlantyckie z perspe-
ktywy polskiej polityki zagranicznej (Warsaw: Instytut Studiów Politycznych
PAN, Collegium Civitas), pp. 85–119.
39. The CSCE Summit in Astana, see http://www.msz.gov.pl/pl/polityka_
zagraniczna/polityka_bezpieczenstwa /szczyt_obwe_w_astanie_2010;jses
sionid=924AF65D1CECD0A934A36D4EBAE69D7D.cmsap2p ,
accessed on 28 January 2016.
40. (2010), OSCE, Astana Commemorative Declaration: Towards a Security
Community, p. 3, http://www.osce.org/node/74985, accessed on 28
January 2016.
41. (18 Dec. 2013), ‘Rosjanie rozmieszczaja ̨ iskandery w Kaliningradzie?
Koziej: “To broń propagandowa”’, Gazeta Wyborcza; and (20 Dec. 2013),
‘Tusk: rakiet Iskander nie ma w Kaliningradzie’, http://www.polskieradio.
p l / 5 / 3 / A r t y k u l / 1 0 0 8 2 7 0 , Tu s k - r a k i e t - I s k a n d e r- n i e - m a - w -
Kaliningradzie, accessed on 28 January 2016.
42. G. Kuczyński, ‘Strategia Rosji wobec…’, p. 171.
43. (18 Nov. 2010), ‘Sojusz z przyszłościa ̨’, a statement by President Bronisław
Komorowski, Gazeta Wyborcza.
44. (19 Nov. 2010), Active Engagement, Modern Defense: Strategic Concept for
the Defense and Security of the Members of the North Atlantic Treaty
Organization adopted by Heads of State and Government in Lisbon.
45. For more, see C. Ek (15 Feb. 2008), ‘Poland’s New Government:
Background and Issues for the United States’, CRS Report for Congress,
RS22811.
46. (20 Aug. 2008) ‘Agreement between the Government of the United
States of America and the Government of the Republic of Poland
Concerning the Deployment of Ground-Based Ballistic Missile Defense
Interceptors in the Territory of the Republic of Poland’, see http://www.
state.gov/documents/organization/180542.pdf, accessed 14 February
2016; (20 Aug. 2008), ‘Text of the declaration on Strategic Cooperation
between the United States of America and the Republic of Poland’,
http://2001- 2009.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2008/aug/108661.htm ,
accessed 14 February 2016.
47. A. Z. Kamiński, H. Szlajfer (2009), ‘Kierunek atlantycki w polskiej polityce
zagranicznej a projekt Wspólnej Europejskiej Polityki Bezpieczeństwa i
Obrony’, in A. Orzelska, ed., Stosunki transatlantyckie..., p. 45.
48. Ł. Warzecha (2010), Lech Kaczyński. Ostatni wywiad (Warsaw: Prószyński
i S-ka), pp. 241–242.
POLAND’S SECURITY POLICY IN THE EMERGING MULTIPOLAR WORLD ORDER 133
49. (30 Aug. 2008), Polska tanim sojusznikiem USA? An interview with Prof.
Ryszard Zięba conducted by Anna Jórasz, http://www.psz.pl.
50. R. Kuźniar (2006), ‘Bezpieczeństwo—po pierwsze nie szkodzić’, Polski
Przegla ̨d Dyplomatyczny, No. 5 (33), p. 12. See also B. Górka-Winter
(2006), “System obrony przeciwrakietowej Stanów Zjednoczonych—głos
w dyskusji” Polski Przegla ̨d Dyplomatyczny, No. 5 (33), pp. 53–69.
51. (15 July 2009), ‘An Open Letter to the Obama Administration from
Central and Eastern Europe’, Gazeta Wyborcza, see http://wyborcza.
pl/1,98817,6825987,An_Open_Letter_to_the_Obama_Administration_
from_ Central.html, accessed on 15 February 2016.
52. (3 July 2010), ‘Protocol Amending the Ballistic Missile Defense Agreement
Between the United States of America and the Republic of Poland’, see
http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2010/07/143945.htm, accessed
on 15 February 2016.
53. R. Zięba (2015), ‘Implikacje stosunków polsko-amerykańskich dla polityki
zagranicznej Polski’, Przegla ̨d Politologiczny, No. 2, pp. 7–20; K. Czornik,
M. Lakomy (2014), ‘Polityczny i wojskowy wymiar stosunków polsko-
amerykańskich w pierwszej i drugiej dekadzie XXI wieku’, in K. Czornik,
M. Lakomy, M. Stolarczyk, ed., Dylematy polityki zagranicznej na pocza ̨tku
XXI wieku (Katowice: Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu Śla ̨skiego),
pp. 435–436.
54. For more on Polish–American cooperation, see S. Domaradzki (2014),
‘Stosunki polsko-amerykańskie na pocza ̨tku XXI wieku - aspekty wojskowe
i polityczne’, in K. Czornik, M. Lakomy, eds., Dylematy polityki
bezpieczeństwa Polski na pocza ̨tku drugiej dekady XXI wieku (Katowice:
Regionalny Ośrodek Debaty Międzynarodowej), pp. 137–160; R. Grodzki
(2012), ‘Polsko-amerykańska współpraca wojskowa: stan i perspektywy’,
Biuletyn Instytutu Zachodniego, No. 114, pp. 1–5.
55. (13 June 2011) ‘Memorandum of Understanding between the Department of
Defense of the United States of America and the Minister of national Defense
of the Republic of Poland on Cooperation of the Air Forces of the United
States of America and the Republic of Poland, on the Territory of the Republic
of Poland’, http://archiwalny.mon.gov.pl/pliki/File/2011.06.13_-_MoU_
RP-USA_sily_powietrzne_EN.pdf, accessed on 28 January 2016.
56. http://www.state.gov/t/pm/ppa/sat/c14560.htm, accessed on 28
January 2016.
57. (17 Nov. 2015), http://www.state.gov/t/pm/ppa/sat/c14562.htm
accessed on 28 January 2016. See also D. E. Mix, ‘Poland and its Relations
with the United States: In Brief’, CRS Congressional Report, R44212.
58. See B. Balcerowicz (2001), ‘Siły zbrojne w polskiej polityce bezpieczeństwa’,
in R. Kuźniar, ed., Polska polityka bezpieczeństwa 1989–2000 (Warsaw:
Wydawnictwo Naukowe Scholar), pp. 493–495. J. Zaja ̨c, R. Zięba (2010),
134 J. ZAJA ̨C
84. For several years, there was talk in Poland about the concept of building
the Odessa-Brody-Gdańsk (Płock) oil pipeline to carry Caspian Sea oil to
Western Europe, but the idea did not come to fruition. Polish fears of
excessive dependence on Russia for energy grew in 2005 following the
signing by Germany and Russia of an agreement to build the Northern Gas
Pipeline. In 2007 President Kaczynski initiated energy summits with
Ukraine, Georgia, Lithuania and Azerbaijan. A year earlier, the Polish
energy corporation PKN Orlen purchased the Lithuanian oil refinery in
Mažeikiai, a move that was part of the concept of reducing Poland’s
dependence on Russian gas. The main premise of President Kaczyński was
to bring about a situation in which Azerbaijani oil would be carried by ship
to Ukraine, and from there through Ukrainian territory to Poland, and in
which access of Russian energy corporations to the European market
would be reduced. The energy summits did not bring any tangible results,
however, while the refinery in Mažeikiai is losing money and, as the com-
pany management announced in the fall of 2015, its closure is planned.
About President Lech Kaczyński’s Eastern policy concept, see P. Kowal,
‘Wielki powrót i wschodnia idea Lecha Kaczyńskiego’, in J. Kloczkowski,
ed. (2010), Polska w grze międzynarodowej. Geopolityka i sprawy wewnętrzne
(Cracow: Ośrodek Myśli Politycznej), pp. 39–68.
85. B. Wojna, M. Gniazdowski, eds., Eastern Partnership…, p. 44.
86. (2014), Record of the meeting of the Foreign Affairs Commission, 7 May.
http://www.sejm.gov.pl/Sejm7.nsf/biuletyn.xsp?documentId=4294F34
913E51DD7C1257CDD004B5B6F, accessed on 28 January 2016.
87. Ł. Warzecha, Lech Kaczyński…, p. 257. On NATO and Ukraine see more
T. Bukkvoll (2011), ‘Political and Military Utility of NATO for Ukraine’,
in H. Edström, J. Matlary, M. Petersson, eds., NATO: The Power of
Partnership (Basingstoke, New York: Palgrave Macmillan), pp. 83–111.
A. Legucka (2010), Perspektywy członkostwa Gruzji i Ukrainy w NATO
(Warsaw: Akademia Obrony Narodowej).
88. (12 Dec. 2008) ‘Poland: a natural U.S. Ally on Eastern Policy’, see
https://wikileaks.org/plusd/cables/08WARSAW1409_a.html, accessed
on 28 January 2016.
CHAPTER 5
The emerging of the multipolar world order in the early 21st century
has led to a clash between the West and Russia in Ukraine. At the end of
2013 the post-Cold War process by which the West’s influence extended
to Central and Eastern Europe—and Russia’s simultaneous opposition to
it—produced in Ukraine a crisis which escalated rapidly. Politically and
culturally, Ukraine is divided almost in half, with a pro-Western orien-
tation prevailing in the western part of the country, and a pro-Russian
outlook being predominant in its eastern part.1 In the post-Cold War
period, this cleavage made for a lack of clear priorities in Ukrainian foreign
policy. While Central European countries, including the Baltic States, set
a course for the West, thus depriving Russia of influence in this region,
the course of Kyiv’s foreign policy fluctuated depending on the party in
power. The changing priorities of Ukraine’s policy and a lack of internal
stability exposed this country to the influence of external actors. The crisis
in Ukraine has undoubtedly been caused by many factors,2 but from the
neorealist perspective, which forms the dominant approach in this book, it
is seen as a clash between the West and Russia.3
Ukraine’s fate is unusually important from Poland’s point of view.
One could say that Ukraine in the orbit of Western influences strength-
ens Poland’s security, while Ukraine under the influence of Russia weak-
ens that security considerably. This viewpoint determined Poland’s policy
towards Ukraine when the Ukraine crisis began. Warsaw adopted a clearly
pro-Ukrainian stance and demanded of its Western allies that decisive steps
be taken in response to Russia’s policy and its violations of international
law. This led to a considerable deterioration of the already ailing Polish–
Russian relations and to a growing sense of military threat in Poland. As
a consequence, Poland took steps to increase its defense capabilities, to
strengthen NATO’s eastern flank, and to reinforce political and military
ties with the USA.
Poland’s clear shift towards a traditional understanding of security is
not reflected in the policy of its Western allies, however. While Poland
and other Central European countries focus their efforts on military secu-
rity, western European countries—which are struggling with a growing
number of challenges related to the massive influx of immigrants—are
concentrating on non-military aspects of security. This gives rise to a clear
divergence of interests between Poland and many other EU member states
and to justified fears about the future of the EU and NATO.
The Ukraine crisis that broke out at the end of 2013 has multiple causes,
but in a neorealist perspective it has been brought about by the rivalry
between the West (the USA and EU) and Russia. Since Ukraine gained
its independence in 1991 it has been a geopolitical pivot in Central and
Eastern Europe. As Zbigniew Brzeziński pointed out in 1997, ‘Ukraine,
a new and important space on the Eurasian chessboard, is a geopolitical
pivot because its very existence as an independent country helps to trans-
form Russia. Without Ukraine, Russia ceases to be a Eurasian empire.
Russia without Ukraine can still strive for imperial status, but it would
then become a predominantly Asian imperial state [...]’.4 Russia thus
sought to maintain its influence in Ukraine using a wide range of instru-
ments—diplomatic, economic, military, cultural and social.5 At the same
time, Western influence progressively extended further east and succes-
sively came to encompass many Central European countries. This process
of NATO and EU extension eastward brought about rivalry between the
West and Russia in an area that Moscow used to know as its ‘near abroad’,
and which the EU refers to as ‘common neighborhood’. The resulting
situation has made Ukraine into a political battlefield between the West
and Russia, and has seriously destabilized Russian–European relations, as
THE UKRAINE CRISIS: IMPLICATIONS FOR POLAND’S SECURITY 139
Within just one week in May 1992, the President of Poland, Lech Wałęsa¸
paid a visit to the Vatican, received the President of Ukraine, Leonid
Kravchuk, in Warsaw, and then paid a visit to Moscow. Quite surprising
was, in particular, the date of President Kravchuk’s visit to Poland which
was rescheduled for an earlier date (17–18 May, 1992), to take place three
days before Mr. Wałęsa’s departure to Russia where he would go to sign the
treaty between the two states.15
POLUKRBAT was formed and was sent to take part in the Kosovo Force
(KFOR) peace mission in Kosovo in July 2000. In the sphere of economic
cooperation an important initiative was the establishment in October 1998
of the Poland–America-Ukraine Cooperation Initiative (PAUCI), for
the purpose of assisting small firms and local governments in supporting
macroeconomic reforms leading to a market economy.18 In 1992–1997,
Polish–Ukrainian trade grew sixfold and continued to grow despite the
temporary slump caused by the Eastern markets crisis of 1998. During the
first five years following Poland’s entry into the European Union, this trade
grew fivefold, and reached the record level of 8.79 billion USD in 2008.
In 2009 this figure fell markedly, to the level of 4.57 billion USD, only to
climb back gradually to the level of 7.47 billion USD in 2011.19
The proclaimed Polish–Ukrainian strategic partnership was not
reflected at the level of intersocial relations, however. Polish–Ukrainian
relations in this field continue to be disrupted by grievances rooted in his-
tory and the difficult coexistence of the two nations. Among the historic
events that cast a shadow on their relations are the mass crimes committed
during the Second World War on the Poles living in Volhynia and Eastern
Lesser Poland by the Ukrainian Insurgent Army (UPA), as a result of
which about 100,000 Poles perished, and the Polish authorities’ decision
in 1947 to forcefully resettle Ukrainians living in the south-eastern regions
of Poland to other parts of the country—the so-called Wisła (Vistula)
operation. Events from earlier historical periods also fuelled mutual ani-
mosities, dislike and distrust. As a result, in 2001, Dariusz Rosati—Polish
foreign minister in 1995–1997—commented on this situation by saying
that while talk of the Polish–Ukrainian strategic partnership has been pres-
ent for years, this partnership hadn’t led to any real ties of interdepen-
dence between the two countries or to anything giving grounds to claim
that the policies of Poland and Ukraine are based on some jointly formu-
lated vision.20 Despite some difficulties, successive governments in Warsaw
all viewed the establishment of pro-Western government in Ukraine favor-
ably. With this in mind Polish politicians and society were actively involved
in supporting the Orange Revolution 2004/2005. In face of these
events many Polish politicians—including presidents Lech Wałęsa and
Aleksander Kwaśniewski, future presidents Lech Kaczyński and Bronisław
Komorowski, and a delegation of Polish deputies headed by the Speaker
of the Sejm Józef Oleksy—traveled to Kyiv to express their support for the
demonstrators. Polish artists appeared during a special concert organized
144 J. ZAJA ̨C
In the initial stages of the crisis, the Polish government was one of the
mediators. Foreign minister Radosław Sikorski, along with his French and
German counterparts—Laurent Fabius and Frank-Walter Steinmeier—and
with the participation of a Russian representative, negotiated an agreement
on 21 February 2014 between Ukrainian President Victor Yanukovych
and opposition leaders—Arseniy Yatsenyuk, Vitali Klitschko and Oleh
Tyahnybok. The agreement, however, was rejected by the Right Sector,
a right-wing radical group which sought full victory. As protesters took
control of Kyiv, President Yanukovych left the country for Russia. On the
following day, 22 February 2014, the Ukrainian parliament (Verkhovna
Rada) voted to oust President Viktor Yanukovych and hold early presiden-
tial elections on 25 May. Five days later, the parliament established a new
government headed by one of the opposition leaders—Arseniy Yatsenyuk.
The new government turned to Western countries for help and announced
its readiness to conclude the association agreement with the EU rapidly.
The political part of the agreement between the European Union and the
new government in Kyiv was signed on 21 March 2014, while the trade
part, called the Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Area (DCFTA), was
signed on 27 June 2014. DCFTA went into effect on 1 January 2016.
From the outset, Poland supported the Yatsenyuk government. Warsaw
gave it political support, acted to speed up Ukraine’s signing of the asso-
ciation agreement with the EU, and declared it would provide financial
assistance to reform the Ukrainian state; in January 2015, Polish Prime
Minister Ewa Kopacz, declared during a visit in Kyiv that Poland would
grant Ukraine a 100 million EUR loan to help rebuild the Donbass region,
which was being devastated by civil war, and to support reforms.28 Poland
was also one of the countries favoring arming Ukraine. Polish foreign
minister Grzegorz Schetyna made an official announcement to that effect
during the Munich Security Conference in February 2015, although such
voices had been heard among Polish politicians earlier. Poland’s policy
in this regard was not consistent, however: When, in the spring of 2015,
the United Kingdom, the USA and Canada sent instructors to Ukraine
to train Ukrainian soldiers fighting against the separatists in the east of
the country, Poland decided to only train 50 Ukrainian instructors in the
Polish cities of Toruń, Zegrze and Poznań.29
From the very beginning of the crisis, however, Poland was consistent
in its sharp condemnations of Russian interference in Ukrainian affairs,
and Polish politicians played a leading role in pointing out the danger that
Russia’s military involvement in Ukraine might escalate.30 Certain Polish
THE UKRAINE CRISIS: IMPLICATIONS FOR POLAND’S SECURITY 147
politicians and experts argued that there was a threat of a direct Russian
attack on Poland and the Baltic States, and also that Putin treats Poland as
his greatest foe, because it was a leading supporter of Ukraine.31 Former
Polish deputy defense minister Romuald Szeremietiew even stated that
Russia might use a tactical nuclear weapon against Poland.32 Rare were
the voices which stated that one shouldn’t scare Polish society with visions
of a Russian attack on Poland and NATO, and few commentators drew
attention to the Poles’ Russophobia and to the fact that such an attitude is
detrimental to the country—not only in image terms.33
Being aware that its capability to affect events in Ukraine is limited, the
Polish government sought to get NATO and the EU involved in trying
to find a solution to the Ukraine crisis. As early as March 2014, President
Bronisław Komorowski called for a meeting of the North Atlantic Council
to hold urgent consultations pursuant to Art. 4 of the North Atlantic
Treaty in connection with the threat to members’ security, arguing that
Poland may feel threatened by Russia’s potential use of its armed forces
on the territory of neighboring Ukraine.34 The NATO council met and,
in a declaration issued on 2 March, ‘condemned the Russian Federation’s
military escalation in Crimea and expressed its grave concern regarding
the authorization by the Russian Parliament to use the armed forces of the
Russian Federation on the territory of Ukraine’. It stated that ‘Military
action against Ukraine by forces of the Russian Federation is a breach
of international law and contravenes the principles of the NATO-Russia
Council and the Partnership for Peace’, and called upon ‘the Russian
Federation to honor its international commitments, including those set
out in the Budapest Memorandum of 1994, the Treaty on Friendship and
Cooperation between Russia and Ukraine of 1997, and the legal frame-
work regulating the presence of the Russian Black Sea Fleet, to withdraw
its forces to its bases, and to refrain from any interference elsewhere in
Ukraine’.35
When it transpired during the same period that Russian special forces
soldiers without insignia (the so-called ‘little green men’) were supporting
Crimean separatists, Poland managed, during an extraordinary meeting of
EU foreign ministers, to force through a resolution calling the Russian
intervention in Crimea an act of aggression. It also called for a review of rela-
tions with Russia and for the introduction of visa and economic sanctions.36
Warsaw sought to achieve a consensus on the latter issues, something that
was initially a difficult task, but Polish diplomats were successful in the end.
148 J. ZAJA ̨C
Army soldiers in Poland began with a ‘firm protest’ issued by the Russian
foreign ministry in connection with the dismantling in September 2015 by
the authorities of the town of Pieniężno of a bust commemorating fallen
Soviet General Ivan Chernyakhovsky, seen as a persecutor of the Home
Army—the Polish underground resistance movement—during the Second
World War. In the wake of this event, other cases of dismantling monu-
ments commemorating the role of the USSR in liberating Poland from
the German occupation, and acts of vandalism took place. The chairman
of the Institute of National Remembrance (IPN) Łukasz Kamiński called
the removal of Chernyakhovsky’s bust worthy of emulation, and Russian
pressure on the Polish authorities inappropriate. On 18 December 2015,
the Russian State Duma issued a declaration stating that insulting and
the destruction of Soviet military memorials and burial sites in Poland
was unacceptable. The declaration also expressed ‘deep indignation’ in
connection with the profanation of those memorial sites, with ‘persistent
attempts to write history anew’, ‘belittling the contribution of the Soviet
nation’ in defeating the Third Reich, and in ‘distorting the role of the Red
Army in liberating Poland’. In response, the Polish foreign ministry called
on Russia to ‘refrain from engaging in hysteria about the monuments, as
this doesn’t favor building mutual dialogue and understanding but only
serves to sharpen rhetoric and escalate emotions having to do with his-
torical issues and the monuments in Polish–Russian relations’.57 All those
diplomatic incidents were reminiscent of the similar methods used by both
sides to antagonize the other in 2005–2007, when Poland was ruled by
PiS, but their destructive influence in Polish–Russian relations was greater.
Polish–Russian economic relations have also clearly worsened, and this
brought tangible losses to Poland. In August 2014 Russia responded to
the Western sanctions by counter-sanctions in the form of an import ban of
Polish foodstuffs and agricultural products. While Polish exports to Russia
had increased over threefold in 2004–2013 (to over 8.1 billion EUR),
in 2014 it decreased by 14% (to about 7 billion EUR). The decrease in
agricultural and food products was 30% (that is almost 0.4 billion EUR)
and in electrical machinery by about 15% (that is almost 0.5 billion EUR).
This led to Russia’s fall on the list of Poland’s most important purchas-
ers of agricultural and food products. While in 2013 Russia was 3rd on
this list, (after Germany and the United Kingdom) with a share of 6.2%,
in 2014 it had fallen to 7th place with a share of 4%. It was possible to
redirect some of the food products subject to Russia’s ban to other mar-
kets, but in some groups of products, especially fruit and vegetables, for
154 J. ZAJA ̨C
many of which Russia was the leading importer, the Russian embargo was
a painful blow to Polish producers and exporters. Of the products that
did not find alternate markets, the most important are apples. In 2014,
exports of Polish apples to Russia dropped by as much as 46%. Despite the
fact that some could be redirected, among other destinations, to Belarus,
Kazakhstan or Romania, exports of Polish apples fell by about 22% over-
all.58 Poland lost an important share of the Russian market, a return to
which will be more difficult than was the case when Russia introduced
an import on Polish animal and vegetable products in November 2005.
The drop in trade volume with Russia also entailed considerable losses for
Polish carriers and these will also be unusually difficult, if at all possible,
to undo.
The worsening of Polish–Russian relations also affected cultural coop-
eration. The Polish government withdrew from the planned organization
of the Year of Polish Culture in Russia and the Russian Year in Poland in
2015. The Ukraine crisis also deepened the negative perception of Polish–
Russian relations. A study of Polish public opinion conducted in May 2014
showed that ‘the events in Ukraine and Russian activity towards main-
taining its influence in this region strongly deteriorated the perception of
Polish–Russian relations. Almost two-thirds of Poles (65%) believed the
relations were bad, while only 3% considered them as good. Moreover,
Poles found it more difficult than in 2011 to imagine friendly relations
based on partnership between both states. Less than half of respondents
(46%) thought that they were possible.59
PiS, which has been in government since the fall of 2015, is a strong
proponent of strengthening Poland’s military security. Already during
its program convention in July 2015, this party announced that should
it come to power, it would increase defense spending to at least 2.3%
of GDP, and increase the size of Poland’s professional armed forces to
120,000 soldiers with the prospect of increasing this number by ‘several
tens of thousands’ more and to ‘rebuild’ the system of personnel reserves,
including the formation of a territorial defense system.63 The organiza-
tion of a national territorial defense system was named by new defense
minister Antoni Macierewicz as being among the defense ministry’s most
important tasks in the nearest future. He announced that in 2016, the
defense ministry intends to form and deploy along the country’s eastern
border of at least three brigades, and stressed that an important task is to
get the Warsaw NATO summit in July 2016 to decide on the stationing of
Allied units and bases on Polish territory.64 The strengthening of NATO’s
eastern flank became one of priorities of Poland’s security policy after the
escalation of the Ukraine crisis.
Out of concern for this type of threat, on 1 April 2014 foreign minister
Radosław Sikorski expressed Poland’s desire to host two heavy brigades
from NATO countries on its territory.66 Even though this request was not
forwarded directly to NATO, Polish decision makers made clear their inter-
est in the deployment on Polish territory of the largest possible number
of NATO units, commands or command centers, considering their mod-
est number at the present time.67 Poland’s idea of deploying significant
Alliance forces in countries of Central Europe was greeted with caution by
its NATO partners. Many of them held the view that the NATO–Russia
agreement of May 1997, on the basis of which the North Atlantic Council
undertook not to deploy significant NATO forces on the territory of the
Alliance’s new, post-Cold War, members, should be respected.
In effect, on 16 April 2014, NATO settled on a compromise solution:
The Alliance decided to temporarily increase its presence in ‘border coun-
tries’ and increased the rotational presence of NATO forces in Poland,
Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia and Romania in the summer of that year.
Further discussions on this topic were held during the NATO Summit in
Newport on 4–5 September 2014. There the Alliance
approved the NATO Readiness Action Plan (RAP) and decided to enhance
the responsiveness of NATO Response Force (NRF) by developing force
packages that are able to move rapidly and respond to potential challenges
and threats. As part of it, NATO member states decided to create a “spear-
head force” within NRF, known as the Very High Readiness Joint Task
Force (VJTF) a new Allied joint force of about 4,000 soldiers that will be
able to deploy within a few days to respond to challenges that arise, par-
ticularly at the periphery of NATO’s territory. They also agreed to estab-
lish an appropriate command and control presence and some in-place force
enablers on the territories of Eastern Allies at all times, with contributions
from Allies on a rotational basis, focusing on planning and exercising col-
lective defense scenarios. NATO members also decided to further enhance
NATO’s ability to quickly and effectively reinforce those Allies, including
through the preparation of infrastructure, pre-positioning of equipment
and supplies, and designation of specific bases. According to decisions, con-
tributing Allies will raise the readiness and capabilities of the Headquarters
158 J. ZAJA ̨C
Multinational Corps Northeast in Szczecin and will also enhance its role as
a hub for regional cooperation.68
In order to meet these goals, Polish decision makers began to build a con-
sensus among NATO members, beginning with Central European coun-
tries. Even before the NATO Summit in Newport, President Komorowski
hosted the presidents of Estonia, Lithuania, Latvia, the Czech Republic,
Slovakia, Hungary, Romania and Bulgaria in Warsaw on 22 July 2014.72
The aim of the meeting was to bring about a rapprochement between the
positions of those countries in matters of security, in the face of the Ukraine
crisis, they did not all share the idea of strengthening NATO’s eastern flank
to the same degree.73 While Poland, the Baltic States and Romania clearly
supported strengthening the Alliance’s infrastructure in Central Europe,
Hungary and Slovakia adopted a more restrained stance.74 The presidents of
Bulgaria, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania, Slovakia,
and the President of the Chamber of Deputies of the Czech Republic then
met on 3 November 2015 in Bucharest, on the joint invitation of the presi-
dents Klaus Iohannis of Romania and Andrzej Duda of Poland, in order to
work out a common position (so-called NATO mini-summit). Participants
in the meeting underlined their commitment to renewed emphasized on
NATO's collective defense and they agreed, among other things, that they
will act to strengthen the Eastern flank of NATO; the full implementation
of the RAP and the long term strategic adaptation of the Alliance will be
crucial in this respect in order to strengthen Central European defense and
deterrence. Participants of NATO mini-summit in Bucharest also pointed
out that Russia’s military activities in the neighborhood were undermining
European security architecture, and stood firm on Russia’s need to abide
by international law and meet its international obligations, responsibilities
160 J. ZAJA ̨C
those assurances during his visit to Warsaw on the occasion of the 25th
anniversary of Poland’s regained sovereignty. During his speech, delivered
at Warsaw’s Castle Square on 4 June 2014, the American president stated:
longest possible time before its NATO allies can come to Poland’s rescue in
case of military attack.92
In this context Poland is also buying helicopters of the latest gen-
eration. In April 2015, the Polish defense ministry announced that it
would acquire Airbus H225M Caracal Helicopters manufactured by the
European consortium EADS, for an estimated 3.5 billion USD. The PiS
opposition criticized this decision sharply as being prejudicial to Polish
defense contractors and their equipment, while favoring foreign firms.93
As a result, Antoni Macierewicz, the defense minister in the new govern-
ment formed after the 2015 parliamentary elections, announced that the
main defense contracts prepared by the previous government, especially
those for the multitask helicopter tender as well as for the medium-
range air defense system (the ‘Wisła’ program), would be subject to
review. As far as the tender for the helicopters is concerned, he said the
government’s decision would depend on the offset terms. In connec-
tion with the purchase of the American Patriot system, defense minister
Macierewicz stated that Poland is interested in sincere, equitable and
effective discussions with its American partners as, upon closer analysis,
it turned out that the price proposed in the contract is much higher
than initially stated, the delivery period was far longer, and the changing
conditions of realization unknown to the party charged with meeting
them.94 A few months later, Poland and the USA came to an under-
standing. At the beginning of July 2016, prior to the NATO summit
in Warsaw, the Polish Armaments Group (PGZ) and Raytheon signed
a letter of intent, by virtue of which the PGZ obtained a 50% share in
the execution of the Patriot system. It should be noted that close rela-
tions with the USA are extremely important for PiS. In April 2014, that
party’s leader Jarosław Kaczyński said that American, or at least mixed
Polish–American units should be stationed, as part of the North Atlantic
Alliance, on Polish territory and that under no circumstance should
Poland be a second class NATO member.95 In September 2015, Polish
diplomats successfully sought to arrange a bilateral meeting between
President Andrzej Duda and President Barack Obama on the occasion
of the 70th session of the UN General Assembly. During lunch, Duda
was seated next to Obama—something that Poland’s government circles
greeted with some satisfaction.96
Indeed, the great majority of Polish politicians, irrespective of politi-
cal affiliation, seek close cooperation with the USA, especially in politi-
cal and military matters, seeing in this the best way to ensure Poland’s
THE UKRAINE CRISIS: IMPLICATIONS FOR POLAND’S SECURITY 165
There is no security reason for the United States to risk war for Warsaw.
Poland never was strategically important for Washington. […] Americans
always felt sympathy for the plight of the Poles for centuries stuck among
avaricious empires. Although unfortunate, even tragic, Poland’s situation is
no cause for the United States to risk war (...) While it’s not certain what
America would do in the event of attempted Russian coercion of Warsaw,
most administrations would see that as a threat to core commitments that
could not be ignored. Being Germany’s neighbor also might galvanize
Berlin. At the very least, Moscow would recognize that threatening Poland
carries significant risks of confrontation with America. That’s far from
“worthless” for Poland.98
the OECD and the International Energy Agency.100 At the same time,
starting in the spring of 2014, the EU has stepped up its support for
Ukraine’s economic and political reforms.101
Poland, Germany and France, acting within the framework of the
Weimar Triangle, were the EU member states that initially played the
greatest role in trying to resolve the Ukraine crisis. On 21 February 2014,
those three countries’ foreign ministers were successful in bringing about
an agreement between President Yanukovych and representatives of the
Euromaidan protestors. Poland, whose stance was decidedly one-sidedly
pro-Ukrainian, was excluded from the mediation efforts in Ukraine rela-
tively quickly, however. Despite repeated pronouncements by Polish for-
eign minister Grzegorz Schetyna to the effect that the best way to address
Ukraine’s problems is as part of the Weimar Triangle, Poland was not
invited to join the negotiating table.102 Poland officially continued to sup-
port the ongoing efforts of France and Germany, which then acted, along
with Ukraine and Russia, as part of the Normandy format, and sought to
hold systematic consultations with them. It is with skepticism, however,
that it observed their reactions, as well as those of other EU members, to
developments in Ukraine.
Upon closer inspection, clear divergences can be observed in the stance
and approach of various EU members with regard to Ukraine crisis. The
politicians of no other country engaged themselves in so direct a manner,
on such a scale and intensity, and as uncritically in supporting the Ukrainian
revolution and the new authorities in Kyiv as did Polish politicians. Among
EU member states, Poland became a hawk of sorts and found itself part
of a small group, with the Baltic states, calling for decisive actions with
regard to Russia. In this context, it consistently presented an irreconcil-
able stance and saw each compromise in negotiations aimed at resolving
the Ukrainian crisis as a setback for the West. In May 2015, President
Komorowski went so far as to compare the diplomatic attempts to resolve
the conflict in Ukraine to the policy of appeasement pursued in the 1930s
by the Western powers with regard to the Third Reich.103 Other EU coun-
tries, including France and Germany, adopted a more moderate position.
Insofar as Warsaw consistently demanded that Russia return Crimea to
Ukraine, Berlin and Paris seem to accept the existing state of affairs. The
Minsk I (5 September 2014) and Minsk II (12 February 2015) agree-
ments, negotiated with the help of Angela Merkel and François Hollande,
did not make the peace arrangements dependent on the return of the
Crimean peninsula to Ukraine. The German and French leaders also show
168 J. ZAJA ̨C
feel more secure on the eastern flank.109 In fact, with the escalation of
the Ukraine crisis, Poland demanded from its allies stronger guarantees
for its security, something that not all NATO members have greeted
with enthusiasm. After the 2014 NATO Newport Summit, the German
defense minister Ursula von der Leyen stated that should NATO allies
be facing armed aggression, Germany would not be able to meet its obli-
gations as an ally, given the outdated armaments of the Bundeswehr.110
Similar opinions appeared in the pages of Der Spiegel. Referring to senior
American and European generals, the daily wrote that the German author-
ities admitted that the Alliance’s defense plans exceed the Bundeswehr’s
present technical capabilities, and that the generals are doubtful the cre-
ation of the NATO response force—the so-called spearhead—would be
successful.111 Also in contrast to Poland, other countries of the Visegrad
Group—Hungary, the Czech Republic and Slovakia—took a much less
unequivocally anti-Russian stance from Poland’s. In such circumstances
Poland has increasingly sought a rapprochement with Romania, the
Baltic states and with Sweden, Denmark, Norway and Finland—coun-
tries that are more directly affected by Russia’s policy.112 The United
Kingdom is also involved in strengthening NATO’s eastern flank.113
Reaching an understanding with its European partners in the mat-
ter of the Ukraine crisis is made the more difficult for Poland because
of its disinclination to accept immigrants arriving in massive numbers to
Europe. While the government of Ewa Kopacz (PO) agreed in September
2015 to host few thousand refugees as part of an EU agreement, the PiS
government remains averse to the idea. Like the other Visegrad coun-
tries, Poland refuses to accept a mechanism for the automatic allocation of
migrants entering the EU among its various member states.114 The stance
of Central European countries has been greeted critically by ‘Old Europe’
countries, which have to face an ever-growing illegal immigration prob-
lem. This situation widens the divergence between the interests of differ-
ent EU members and will make the maintenance of solidarity in the face
of the Ukraine crisis difficult.
Poland’s ability to act effectively in international politics is cur-
rently made difficult by the strong criticism that steps taken by the PiS
government have drawn from Poland’s EU partners. Germany has been
the source of particularly strong criticism aimed at the violation of core
democratic principles by the PiS government. Mutual Polish–German ani-
mosities are compounded by PiS’s traditional distrust of Germany and
its fear that Germany is seeking to dominate Europe.115 In April 2014,
THE UKRAINE CRISIS: IMPLICATIONS FOR POLAND’S SECURITY 171
NOTES
1. For more, see S. L. Wolchik, V. Zviglyanich, eds. (1999), Ukraine: The
Search for a National Identity (Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield).
2. For more on the causes of the Ukraine crisis, see R. Sakwa (2015), Frontline
Ukraine: Crisis in the Borderlands (London, New York: I. B. Tauris);
M. Rajan, E. Rumer (2015), Conflict in Ukraine: the Unwinding of the
post-Cold War Order (Cambridge and London: The MIT Press);
S. Yekelchyk (2015), The Conflict in Ukraine: What Everyone Needs to
Know (Oxford: Oxford University Press).
3. J. Mearsheimer (2014), ‘Why the Ukraine Crisis Is the West’s Fault: The
Liberal Delusions That Provoked Putin’, Foreign Affairs, Vol. 93 No. 5;
pp. 77–89; S. F. Cohen (2015), ‘The Ukrainian Crisis: It’s Not All Putin’s
Fault’, The Nation, December 14; R. Zięba (2015), ‘Ukraina jako przed-
miot rywalizacji między Zachodem a Rosja ̨’, Środkowoeuropejskie Studia
Polityczne, No. 3, pp. 5–26.
4. Z. Brzeziński (1997), The Grand Chessboard. American Primacy and Its
Geostrategic Imperatives (New York: Basic Books), p. 46.
5. A. Szeptycki (2013), Ukraina wobec Rosji: studium zależności (Warsaw:
Wydawnictwa Uniwersytetu Warszawskiego).
6. D. Trenin (2008), ‘Russia and the European Union: redefining Strategic
Partnership’, in G. Grevi, A. de Vasconcelos, eds., Partnership for Effective
Multilateralism: EU Relations with Brazil, China, India, Russia (Paris:
UE Institute for Security Studies), pp. 133–134, 139. About rivalry on the
172 J. ZAJA ̨C
16. S. Wolchik, R. Zięba (2000), ‘Ukraine’s Relations with the Visegrad
Countries’, in S. Wolchik, V. Zviglyanich, eds., Ukraine: The Search for a
National Identity (Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield), pp. 133–161.
17. Z. Brzeziński (1997), The Grand Chessboard…, pp. 113–114.
18. Its successor is the Polish–Ukrainian Cooperation Foundation (PAUCI),
which was established in April 2005, and whose mission is to develop
Ukraine’s ability to integrate closely with EU structures by taping into the
experience of Poland and other countries.
19. Yearbooks of Foreign Trade Statistics of Poland, Central Statistical Office,
Warsaw.
20. ‘Poland’s Eastern Policy’, Full record of the discussion organized by the
Stefan Batory Foundation and Tygodnik Powszechny on 1 March 2001,
p. 14.
21. ‘Reactions to the Events in Ukraine’, Public Opinion Poll, December
2004, p. 4.
22. (Dec. 2008), 8% of respondents held no opinion. ‘Stosunek Polaków do
innych narodów’, CBOS. Komunikat z badań, BS/193/2008, p. 2.
23. A. Balcer, K. Wóycicki (2014), Polska na globalnej szachownicy (Warsaw:
Wydawnictwo Poltext), p. 282.
24. See, for example B. Łagowski (2007). ‘Żartobliwa polityka zagraniczna’,
B. Łagowski, Duch i bezduszność III Rzeczypospolitej. Rozważania (Cracow:
Universitas), p. 269 (reprint from Przegla ̨d Tygodniowy, 6 March 2000).
25. B. Piętka (2016), ‘Szaleństwo czy zdrada?’, Myśl Polska, No. 3–4
(2069/70), 17–24 January, p. 8.
26. (2015), ‘Duda: chciałbym, by Ukraina była na szczycie NATO w
Warszawie’, 15 December http://www.tvn24.pl/wiadomosci-ze-
swiata,2/duda-chcialbym-by-ukraina-byla-na-szczycie-nato- w-
warszawie,603166.html, accessed on 28 January 2016.
27. P. Majewski (2014), ‘Polscy politycy doradzaja ̨ protestuja ̨cym na Majdanie’,
Rzeczpospolita, 27 January.
28. (2015), Prime Minister Kopacz declared that Poland would institute a
program of stipends for students and establish a spokesperson for reforms
in Ukraine. ‘Premier Kopacz oferuje Ukrainie 100 milionów euro pożyczki.
Na Donbas i reform”, PAP, 19 January.
29. (2015), “Zachód wysyła instruktorów na Ukrainę. Polska nie’, TVN24, 16
April.
30. (2014), ‘Donald Tusk: zagrożenie interwencja ̨ Rosji na Ukrainie jest obec-
nie większe niż kilkanaście dni temu’, PAP, 6 August.
31. See (2014), ‘Gen. Waldemar Skrzypczak: retoryka straszenia społeczeństwa
polskiego wojna ̨ jest nie na miejscu’, TVP Info, Dziennik Gazeta Prawna,
WP.PL, 6 August.
174 J. ZAJA ̨C
Duma-o-pomnikach-w-Polsce-MSZ-to-nic-nowego, accessed on 28
January 2016.
58. (2015), Polska 2015. Raport o stanie handlu zagranicznego (Warsaw:
Ministerstwo Gospodarki).
59. (2014), ‘Opinions about Polish-Russian Relations and Poland's Eastern
Policy’, CBOS Public Opinion Research Center, May 2014.
60. (2015), ‘Ustawa z dnia 10 lipca 2015 r. o zmianie ustawy o przebudowie i
modernizacji technicznej oraz finansowaniu Sił Zbrojnych Rzeczypospolitej
Polskiej oraz ustawy o finansach publicznych’, Dziennik Ustaw
Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej, 7 August.
61. (2015), ‘Prezydent określił główne kierunki rozwoju Sił Zbrojnych
RP’, 3 August, http://www.prezydent.pl/archiwum-bronislawa-
komorowskiego/aktualnosci/wydarzenia/art,3316,prezydent-okre-
slil-glowne-kierunki-rozwoju-sil-zbrojnych-rp.html, accessed on 28
January 2016.
62. (2015), Sprawy bezpieczeństwa narodowego w czasie prezydentury Bronisława
Komorowskiego 2010–2015, https://www.bbn.gov.pl/ftp/dok/01/
sprawy_bezpieczenstwa_narodowego_w_czasie_prezydentury_bronisl-
awa_komorowskiego.pdf, accessed on 10 January 2015.
63. (2016), ‘2,3% PKB na obronność i 120 000 żołnierzy w armii czynnej.
Konwencja PiS o Siłach Zbrojnych’, Defence24, 11 January, http://www.
defence24.pl/237834,23-pkb-na-obronnosc-i- 120-000-zolnierzy-w-
armii-czynnej-konwencja-pis-o-silach-zbrojnych, accessed on 28 January
2016.
64. (2015), ‘O najważniejszych zadaniach na posiedzeniu SKON’, 25
November, Ministry of National Defense, http://mon.gov.pl/aktual-
nosci/artykul/najnowsze/2015-11-25-o-najwazniejszych- zadaniach-
mon-na-posiedzeniu-skon, accessed on 11 January 2016.
65. (2013), White Book on National Security of the Republic of Poland (Warsaw),
p. 128.
66. (2014), ‘Sikorski: Dwie brygady NATO w Polsce i byłbym szczęśliwy’,
1 April, http://www.tvn24.pl/wiadomosci-z-kraju,3/sikorski-dwie-
brygady-nato-w-polsce-i-bylbym-szczesliwy,413876.html, accessed on
11 January 2016.
67. In early 2014, approximately 500 persons out of a total of 8000 NATO
command and liaison officers and soldiers: (2014), ‘Full record of the
meeting of the Foreign Affairs Committee (No. 126) from 2 April 2014 r.’
Sejm Chancellery, Sejm Commission Office, p. 8. On 1 January 2015,
Polish special forces took over annual command over NATO member spe-
cial forces on combat duty as part of NATO’s Response Forces. This was a
prestigious distinction, as the Poles were the first of the new NATO mem-
bers to be given the acquiescence of their allies to take over their elite units.
178 J. ZAJA ̨C
October, http://www.prezydent.pl/archiwum-lecha-kaczynskiego/aktu-
alnosci/rok-2009/art,12,695,wspolna-deklaracja-o-partnerstwie-strate-
gicznym.html, accessed on 10 January 2016.
78. P. Pacuła (2015), ‘Polsko-rumuńska współpraca obronna. Stan obecny i
perspektywy’, Bezpieczeństwo Narodowe, No. 3, p. 17.
79. (2013), ‘Agreement between the government of the Republic of Poland
and the government of Romania on bilateral defense cooperation’, 5 June,
http://archiwalny.mon.gov.pl/en/artykul/14394, accessed on 10
January 2016.
80. (2009), ‘Defence Ministers agree to strengthen NATO’s defences, estab-
lish Spearhead Force’, 5 February, http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/
news_117188.htm, accessed on 10 January 2016.
81. (2016), ‘Key missile defence site declared operational’, 12 May, http://www.
nato.int/cps/en/natohq/news_130721.htm, accessed on 5 July 2016.
82. (2016), ‘NATO musi reagować na zmieniając̨ą się sytuację i patrzeć w
przyszłośc’́ , 18 January, http://www.prezydent.pl/aktualnosci/wizytyza-
graniczne/art,45,nato-musi-reagowac-na-zmieniajaca-sie-sytuacje-i-patrzec-
w-przyszlosc.html, accessed on 19 January 2016.
83. (2016), ‘Szef NATO: Rosja gotowa zmieniać granice siła ̨’, 18 January,
http://www.rp.pl/Polityka/160119290-Szef-NATO-Rosja-gotowa-zmieniac-
granice-sila.html, accessed on 19 January 2016.
84. On USA involvement in NATO see M. Petersson (2015), The US-NATO
Debate: from Libya to Ukraine, (New York: Bloomsbury), pp. 115–151.
85. (2014), ‘Remarks by President Obama at the 25th Anniversary of Freedom
Day, Castle Square, Warsaw, Poland’, June 4, https://www.whitehouse.
gov/the-press-office/2014/06/04/remarks-president- obama-25th-
anniversary-freedom-day, accessed on 11 January 2016.
86. D. E. Mix (2015), ‘The United States and Europe: Current Issues’, CRS
Report, RS22163, Congressional Research Service, 3 February, p. 7.
87. (2014), ‘Siemoniak o współpracy wojskowej z USA’, 16 April, Polska Zbrojna,
http://polska-zbrojna.pl/home/articleshow/12295?t=Siemoniak-o-
wspolpracy-wojskowej-z-USA, accessed on 11 January 2016.
88. M. A. Piotrowski (2015), ‘Crossing at Vistula River: The Importance of
the Air and Missile Defence of Poland’, Bulletin (Warsaw: PISM), No. 44
(776), 28 April.
89. T. Bednarzak (2004), ‘Przepłacamy kilkakrotnie za amerykańskie pociski
JASSM? Cena odzwierciedla zawartość transakcji’, 6 December 2004,
http://wiadomosci.wp.pl/kat,139078,title,Przeplacamy-kilkakrotnie-za-
amerykanskie-pociski-JASSM-Cena-odzwierciedla-zawartosc-transakcji,wi
d,17081683,wiadomosc.html?ticaid=11691d&_ticrsn=3, accessed on 11
February 2016.
180 J. ZAJA ̨C
kaczynski-ucieka-przed-pytaniami-o-niemieckie-wojska-nie-pozwala-pytac-
dziennikarzom, accessed on 28 January 2016.
117. The USA sees the EU through the prism of its member states, not as a
unit. From the beginning of the Ukraine crisis, Washington didn’t believe
in the effectiveness of the European Union, as is reflected by the words
‘F..k the EU’ spoken by Assistant Secretary of State Victoria Nuland dur-
ing a telephone conversation with the US Ambassador to Ukraine,
Geoffrey Pyatt, in February 2014. See D. Chiacu, A. Mohammed (2014),
Leaked audio reveals embarrassing U.S. exchange on Ukraine, EU, 6
February, http://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-ukraine-tape-idUS-
BREA1601G20140207, accessed on 28 January 2016.
118. On PiS government see: J. Zaja ̨c (2016), ‘100 Tage PiS-Regierung in
Polen’, Religion & Gesellschaft in Ost und West, RGOW 3/2016,
pp. 9–10. The European Parliament adopted two resolutions on the situ-
ation in Poland on 13 April 2016 and 14 September 2016. The European
Parliament expressed its concern that actions taken by the Polish govern-
ment and the President of the Republic of Poland have led to the effec-
tive paralysis of the Constitutional Tribunal which poses a danger to
democracy, human rights and the rule of law. In the September resolu-
tion, besides the constitutional crisis, EP was also concerned about the
recent rapid legislative developments in other areas in relation, in particu-
lar, to independence and impartiality of public service media, right to
freedom of expression, right to privacy, procedural rights as well as the
fundamental right to a fair trial, political impartiality of the country’s
administration, and fundamental human rights, including women rights.
CHAPTER 6
Conclusions
Throughout the post-Cold War period, the main goal of Poland’s security
policy has been to provide protection against Russia. Despite the fact that
Poland’s successive National Security Strategies in the years 1989–2014
reflected a wide view of security and the absence of a military threat, the
fear that Russia might revert to an imperial policy was continually present.
The Polish Minister of National Defense Tomasz Siemoniak confirmed
this in September 2015 when he stated:
Since the end of the Cold War, our assessment of the security situation in
Europe was free of illusions about the absence of threats of a military nature.
The events in Ukraine only increased our perception of such threats. They
confirmed the unpredictability of Russian policy, aimed at regaining the sta-
tus of superpower and realization of arbitrarily defined political objectives,
also through the use of military means.1
events unfolding in the USSR were of the highest importance, while the
issue of NATO or WEU membership for Central European countries was
a premature one. Therefore, if Poland adopted a bridging strategy that
promoted a system of cooperative security in Europe in the first years of
transformations, it was largely due to the West’s reluctance to make deci-
sions about the future shape of European security. Minister Skubiszewski
assumed that after German reunification, the West sought to strengthen
the role of the CSCE, which was supposed to offer some compensation
to the Soviet Union for the loss of control over eastern Germany. He also
believed that the West thought the price to pay for German reunification
was the maintenance of Soviet influence in Central and Eastern Europe
and this meant that NATO would not expand beyond Germany’s eastern
border. Skubiszewski stated this clearly:
As long as the Soviet Union existed and was led by Mikhail Gorbachev,
the accession of former Soviet satellites to NATO was out of the question,
because such was the position of the Alliance and its members. [...] In the
times of the Tadeusz Mazowiecki and Jan Krzysztof Bielecki governments,
accession to the Alliance had to remain in the realm of possible (desirable)
scenarios or wishes; [...] The various guarantees granted to the USSR by the
West in connection with the resolution of the German problem, made the
admission of new members impossible [...] [Poland’s – JZ] actions had to be
gradual, without abrupt moves which would be seen as provocative by the
West and would not make Poland a desirable partner.7
Such were largely the circumstances in which Poland adopted its bridg-
ing strategy. The West’s thinking only changed in August 1991 with
Yanayev’s putsch (August Putsch), which foreshadowed the collapse of the
Soviet Union. As a result, after November 1991, institutional cooperation
between NATO and the Central and Eastern European countries—the
North Atlantic Cooperation Council (NACC)—was established. It was
then that Poland began to move away from focusing on the CSCE and
began to pursue a rapprochement with NATO and the WEU, although
the latter was never a priority in Polish security policy. As western coun-
tries called for more interaction between organizations building Europe’s
cooperative security, Poland took a similar position in support of the
“interlocking institutions” concept. Thus, despite having adopted NATO
accession as a security policy priority in 1992, Poland continued to pursue
its bridging strategy. Normalization, followed by close cooperation with
CONCLUSIONS 189
into spheres of influence. The security dilemma that Poland has been trying
to resolve for centuries remains extant. A consolidated European Union
and smooth transatlantic cooperation allow Poland to overcome traditional
anxieties related to its geopolitical location ‘between Germany and Russia’,
and assume a location ‘between the West and Russia’—one that makes it an
integral part of the West and affords it greater security.
NOTES
1. (2015), Główne kierunki rozwoju Sił Zbrojnych RP wobec nowych
uwarunkowań bezpieczeństwa międzynarodowego Wysta ̨pienie wicepre-
miera, ministra obrony narodowej Tomasza Siemoniaka z okazji 60-lecia
Zgromadzenia Parlamentarnego NATO, 22 September. http://mon.gov.
pl/z/pliki/rozne/2015/09/Warszawa_22.09.2015.pdf, accessed on 20
February 2016.
2. (June 2011), Polacy o relacjach między Polska ̨ a Niemcami. Komunikat z
badań, CBOS, BS/73/2011, p. 4.
3. (October 2008), Stosunki polsko-rosyjskie i sytuacja na Kaukazie. Komunikat
z badań, CBOS, BS/158/2008, pp. 8, 10.
4. (May 2014), Opinions about Polish-Russian Relations and Poland’s Eastern
Policy, CBOS, 77/2014.
5. Many Polish experts and politicians are of the opinion that the revisionist
Russian policy is determined by the authoritarian system. Many of them
consider President Vladimir Putin as the symbol of this policy.
6. J. Spero (2004), Bridging the European Divide: Middle Power Politics and
Regional Dilemmas (Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield), pp. 297–298, 300.
7. K. Skubiszewski (1999), ‘Polska i Sojusz Północnoatlantycki w latach
1989–1991’, Sprawy Międzynarodowe, No. 1, p. 11, 18.
8. Ibid., p. 47 et seq.
9. S. W. Garnett (1996), ‘Poland: Bulwark or Bridge’, Foreign Policy, No.
102, pp. 66–82.
10. For more, see Chap. 4.
11. A.Włodkowska-Bagan (2015), Środki i metody polityki zagranicznej państw
średniej rangi. Casus Polski po 1989 r., in J. Zaja ̨c, A. Włodkowska-Bagan,
M. Kaczmarski, eds. Bezpieczeństwo międzynarodowe. Polska-Europa-Świat.
Księga jubileuszowa na czterdziestolecie pracy naukowej prof. dr. hab.
Ryszarda Zięby (Warsaw: Wydawnictwo WDiNP UW), pp. 295–309.
12. A. Patience (2014), ‘Imagining middle powers’, Australian Journal of
International Affairs, Vol. 68, No. 2, p. 218.
BIBLIOGRAPHY
Acharya, A. 2014. The end of the American world order. Cambridge, Malden:
Polity Press.
Albright, M. 1991. The role of the United States in Central Europe. Proceedings
of the Academy of Political Science 38(1): 71–84.
Allin, D.H., and E. Jones. 2012. Weary policeman: American power in an age of
austerity. New York: Routledge.
Allison, R. 2013. Russia, the West, and military intervention. Oxford: Oxford
University Press.
Anderson, J., G.J. Ikenberry, and T. Risse (eds.). 2008. The end of the West? Crisis
and change in the Atlantic order. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.
Andrews, D.M. (ed.). 2005. The Atlantic alliance under stress: US-European rela-
tions after Iraq. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Archick, K. 2008. NATO and the European Union. CRS Report for Congress, RL
32342.
Asmus, R.D. 2004. Opening NATO’s door. How the alliance remade itself for a new
era. New York: Columbia University Press.
Asmus, R.D., R.L. Kugler, and F.S. Larrabee. 1993. Building a new NATO.
Foreign Affairs 72(4): 28–40.
Asmus, R.D., R.L. Kugler, and F.S. Larrabee. 1995. NATO expansion: The next
steps. Survival 37(1): 7–33.
Asmus, R.D., A.J. Blinken, and P.H. Gordon. 2005. Washington should embrace
the European Union. Foreign Affairs 84(1): 174–177.
Attinà, F., and D. Irrera (eds.). 2010. Multilateral security and ESDP operations.
Farnham: Ashgate.
Balcer, A., and K. Wóycicki. 2014. Polska na globalnej szachownicy. Warsaw:
Wydawnictwo Poltext.
© The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s) 2016 195
J. Zaja ̨c, Poland’s Security Policy,
DOI 10.1057/978-1-137-59500-3
196 BIBLIOGRAPHY
Bauwens, W., A. Clesse, and O.F. Knudsen (eds.). 1996. Small states and the
security challenge in the new Europe. London/Washington: Brassey’s.
Bereś, W., and K. Burnetko. 1999. Onyszkiewicz ze szczytów NATO. Warsaw: Dom
Wydawniczy Bellona.
Bieleń, S. (ed.). 2011a. Poland’s foreign policy in the 21st century. Warsaw: Difin.
Bieleń, S. (ed.). 2011b. Wizerunki międzynarodowe Rosji. Warsaw: Wydawnictwo
ASPRA.
Bieleń, S. 2012. The possibility of reconciliation in Polish-Russian relations.
Lithuanian Foreign Policy Review 27: 11–34.
Bieleń, S. 2014. Rozważania o polskim interesie narodowym. Stosunki
Międzynarodowe-International Relations 50(2): 57–73.
Bieleń, S., and A. Skrzypek (eds.). 2012. Geopolityka w stosunkach polsko-rosyjskich.
Warsaw: Wydawnictwo ASPRA.
Bieńczyk-Missala, A. 2006. Human rights in Polish foreign policy after 1989.
Warsaw: PISM.
Bingen, D. 1997. Polityka Republiki Bońskiej wobec Polski. Od Adenauera do Kohla
1949–1991. Cracow: Wydawnictwo Kwadrat.
Blank, S., A. Cohen, P.J. Dobriansky, M. Gage, R.O. Freedman, S. Sestanovich, and
A. Stent. 1998. The state of Russian foreign policy and U.S. policy toward Russia.
Heritage lectures, No. 607. Washington, DC: The Heritage Foundation.
Boesen, H., and L. Larsen. 2012. The Russo-Georgian war and beyond: Towards
a European great power concert. European Security 21(1): 102–121.
Booth, K. (ed.). 1998. Statecraft and security: The cold war and beyond. Cambridge:
University Press Cambridge.
Borawski, J., and T.D. Young. 2001. NATO after 2000: The future of the Euro-
Atlantic alliance. Westport: Praeger.
Borkowicz, J., J. Cichocki, and K. Pełczyńska-Nałęcz (eds.). 2007. Okręt
Koszykowa. Warsaw: Wydawnictwo Naukowe PWN.
Borodziej, W. (ed.). 2006. Polska wobec zjednoczenia Niemiec 1989–1991.
Dokumenty dyplomatyczne. Warsaw: Wydawnictwo Naukowe Scholar.
Bowker, M. 2007. Russia, America and the Islamic world. Aldershot: Ashgate.
Bromke, A. 1967. Poland’s politics: Idealism vs. realism. Cambridge, MA: Harvard
University Press.
Bryc, A. 2008. Rosja w XXI wieku. Gracz światowy czy koniec gry? Warsaw:
Wydawnictwa Akademickie i Profesjonalne.
Brzezinski, I.J. 1993. Polish-Ukrainian relations: Europe’s neglected strategic
axis. Survival 35(3): 26–37.
Brzeziński, Z. 1995. A plan for Europe. Foreign Affairs 74(1): 26–42.
Brzeziński, Z. 1997. The grand chessboard. American primacy and its geostrategic
imperatives. New York: Basic Books.
Brzeziński, Z. 2004. The choice, global domination or global leadership. New York:
Basic Books.
BIBLIOGRAPHY 197
Buckley, M., and R. Singh (eds.). 2006. The Bush doctrine and the war on terror-
ism. Global response, global consequences. London/New York: Routledge.
Buell, R.L. 1939. Poland. Key to Europe. New York/London: Alfred A. Knopf.
Bugajski, J. 2009. America’s new European allies. New York: Nova Science
Publishers.
Bull, H. 1977. The Anarchical Society. A study of order in world politics. London:
Macmillam Press.
Burant, S.R. 1993. International relations in a regional context: Poland and its
Eastern neighbors – Lithuania, Belarus, Ukraine. Europe-Asia Studies 45(3):
399–405.
Bush, G. 1991. Toward a new world order, address before a joint session of congress,
Washington D.C., September 11, 1990, vol. 1, no. 3. Washington: US Department
of State.
Chapnick, A. 1999. The middle power. Canadian Foreign Policy 7(2): 73–82.
Charap, S., and J. Shapiro. 2014. How to avoid a new cold war. Current History:
A Journal of Contemporary World Affairs 113: 265–271.
Christensen, T.J., and J. Snyder. 1990. Chain Gangs and passed bucks: Predicting
alliance patterns in multipolarity. International Organization 44(2): 137–168.
Clesse, A., and L. Rühl (eds.). 1990. Beyond east–west confrontation: Searching for
a new security in Europe. Baden-Baden: Nomos Verlagsesellschaft.
Clinton, H. 2011. America’s Pacific century. Foreign Policy 189: 56–63.
Cohen, J. 1999. Conflict prevention in the OSCE: An assessment of capacities. The
Hague: Netherlands Institute of International Relations ‘Clingendael’.
Cohen, S.F. 2001. Failed crusade: America and the tragedy of post-Communist
Russia. New York/London: W.W. Norton Company.
Cohen, S.F. 2015. The Ukrainian crisis: It’s not all Putin’s Fault. The Nation,
December 14.
Cooper, A.F., R.A. Higgott, and K.R. Nossal. 1993. Relocating middle powers.
Australia and Canada in a changing world order. Vancouver: UBC Press.
Cox, M. 1995. US foreign policy after the Cold War: Superpower without a mission?
London: Royal Institute of International Affairs.
Cox, R. 1996. Approaches to world order. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Czornik, K., and M. Lakomy (eds.). 2014. Dylematy polityki bezpieczeństwa Polski
na pocza ̨tku drugiej dekady XXI wieku. Katowice: Regionalny Ośrodek Debaty
Międzynarodowej.
Czornik, K., M. Lakomy, and M. Stolarczyk (eds.). 2014. Dylematy polityki
zagranicznej na pocza ̨tku XXI wieku. Katowice: Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu
Śla ̨skiego.
Czornik, K., M. Lakomy, and M. Stolarczyk (eds.). 2015. Implikacje konfliktu
ukraińskiego dla polityki zagranicznej i bezpieczeństwa polski. Aspekty polityczne,
wojskowe, gospodarcze i społeczne. Katowice: Regionalny Ośrodek Debaty
Międzynarodowej w Katowicach.
198 BIBLIOGRAPHY
Huntington, S.P. 1999. The lonely superpower. Foreign Affairs 78(2): 35–49.
Hyde-Price, A. 1991. European security beyond the Cold War: Four scenarios for the
2010. London: SAGE Publications for RIIA.
Hyde-Price, A. 1996. The international politics of East Central Europe. Manchester/
New York: Manchester University Press.
Ikenberry, G.J. 2011. Liberal leviathan: The origins, crisis, and transformation of
the American world order. Princeton/Oxford: Princeton University Press.
Ikenberry, G.J., et al. 2009. The crisis of American foreign policy. Wilsonianism in
the twenty-first century. Princeton/Oxford: Princeton University Press.
Jarosz, D., and M. Pasztor. 2015. Polish-French relations 1944–1989. Frankfurt-
am-Main: Peter Lang.
Jasienica, P. 2007a. Polska Jagiellonów. Warsaw: Prószyński i S-ka.
Jasienica, P. 2007b. Rzeczpospolita Obojga Narodów. Dzieje agonii. Warsaw:
Prószyński i S-ka.
Jasina, Ł., J. Kłoczowski, and A. Gil (eds.). 2007. Aktualność przesłania paryskiej
‘Kultury’ w dzisiejszej Europie. Zbiór studiów. Lublin: Instytut Europy
Środkowo-Wschodniej.
Jervis, R., and J. Snyder (eds.). 1991. Dominoes and Bandwagons: Strategic beliefs
and great power competition in the Euroasian Rimland. Oxford/New York:
Oxford University Press).
Joffe, J. 1992. Collective security and the future of Europe: Failed dreams and
dead ends. Survival 34(1): 36–50.
Jones, E. 2004. Debating the transatlantic relationship: Rhetoric and reality.
International Affairs 80(4): 595–612.
Jordaan, E. 2003. The concept of a middle power in international relations:
Distinguishing between emerging and traditional middle powers. Politikon
30(2): 165–181.
Jørgensen, K.E. (ed.). 1997. European approaches to crisis management. The
Hague/London/Boston: Kluwer Law International.
Kacprzyk, A. 2014. Deterring Russia after Ukraine: CEE divided on the future of
NATO policy. Policy Paper 13(96), July.
Kaczmarski, M. 2009, Russia’s Revisionist Policy towards the West. OSW Studies,
no. 33.
Kamińska, J. 2014. Poland and EU enlargement: Foreign policy in transformation.
New York/Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.
Kapstein, E.B., and M. Mastanduno (eds.). 1999. Unipolar politics. Realism and
state strategies after the Cold War. New York: Columbia University Press.
Kapstein, E.B., and M. Mastanduno (eds.). 2004. Unipolar politics. Realism and
state strategies after the Cold War. New York: Columbia University Press.
Karabeshkin, L., and D.R. Spechler. 2007. EU and NATO enlargement: Russia’s
expectations, responses and options for the future. European Security 16(3–4):
307–328.
BIBLIOGRAPHY 201
Karagiannis, E. 2013. The 2008 Russian-Georgian war via the lens of Offensive
Realism. European Security 22(1): 74–93.
Karski, J. 1997. Polska powinna stać się pomostem między narodami Europy
Zachodniej a jej wschodnimi sa ̨siadami. Łódź: Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu
Łódzkiego.
Karski, J. 2014. The Great Powers and Poland: From Versailles to Yalta. Lanham:
Rowman & Littlefield.
Kenney, P. 2002. A carnival of revolution: Central Europe 1989. Princeton/
Oxford: Princeton University Press.
Keohane, R. 1969. Lilliputians’ dilemmas: Small states in international politics.
International Organization 23(2): 291–310.
Klafkowski, A. 1957. Podstawy prawne granicy na Odra Nysa na tle umów
jałtańskiej i poczdamskiej. Poznań: Instytut Zachodni.
Klatt, M. 2011. Poland and its eastern neighbours: Foreign policy principles.
Journal of Contemporary European Research 7(1): 1–16.
Klich, B., and J.M. Nowak. 2000. Polska polityka bezpieczeństwa. Zapis dyskusji.
Polska w Europie 32: 35–71.
Kloczkowski, J. (ed.). 2009. Przeklęte miejsce Europy? Dylematy polskiej geopolityki.
Cracow: Ośrodek Myśli Politycznej.
Kloczkowski, J. (ed.). 2010. Polska w grze międzynarodowej. Geopolityka i sprawy
wewnętrzne. Cracow: Ośrodek Myśli Politycznej.
Knutsen, T.L. 1999. The rise and fall of world orders. Manchester: Manchester
University Press.
Kokot, J. 1959. The logic of the Oder-Neisse frontier. Warsaw: Wydawnictwo
Zachodnie.
Kolarska-Bobińska, L., J. Kucharczyk, and P.M. Kaczyński (eds.). 2005. Mosty
przez Atlantyk? Postawy Polaków, Czechów, Słowaków wobec Stanów Zjednoczonych.
Warsaw: Instytut Spraw Publicznych.
Kortunov, V. 2010. Mirovaya politika v usloviyakh krizisa. Moscow: Aspekt Press.
Koszel, B. 2008. Polska i Niemcy w Unii Europejskiej. Pola konfliktów i płaszczyzny
współpracy. Poznań: Instytut Zachodni.
Koszel, B. 2012. A new opening? Polish-German relations during the rule of the
PO-PSL coalition (2007–2009). Przegla ̨d Zachodni 4: 201–227.
Kowal, P. 2011. Krajobrazy z Mistralami w tle. Cracow: Ośrodek Myśli Politycznej.
Kowal, P., J. Ołdakowski, and M. Zuchniak (eds.). 2003. Nie jesteśmy ukrainofil-
ami. Polska myśl polityczna wobec Ukraińców i Ukrainy. Antologia tekstów.
Wrocław: Kolegium Europy Wschodniej.
Kozerawski, D.S. 2012. Kontyngenty Wojska Polskiego w międzynarodowych operac-
jach pokojowych w latach 1973–1999: konflikty-interwencje-bezpieczeństwo.
Toruń: Wydawnictwo Adam Marszałek.
Koziej, S. 2011. Potrzeba nowelizacji strategii bezpieczeństwa Unii Europejskiej.
Bezpieczeństwo Narodowe 20: 19–40.
202 BIBLIOGRAPHY
Łastawski, K. 2009. Polska racja stanu po wsta ̨pieniu do Unii Europejskiej. Warsaw:
Wydawnictwa Akademickie i Profesjonalne.
Layne, C. 1993. Unipolar illusion. Why new great powers will rise. International
Security 17(4): 5–51.
Lee, L.R. 2010. US hegemony and international legitimacy. Norms, power and fol-
lowership in the wars on Iraq. London/New York: Routledge.
Legucka, A. 2010. Perspektywy członkostwa Gruzji i Ukrainy w NATO. Warsaw:
Akademia Obrony Narodowej.
Leonard, M., and N. Popescu. 2007. A power audit of EU-Russia relations.
London: European Council on Foreign Relations.
Lewandowski, A., G. Radomski, and P. Tomaszewski (eds.). 2012. Bezpieczeństwo
zewnętrzne państwa w polskiej myśli politycznej po 1989 roku. Wybór źródeł.
Toruń: Wydawnictwo Naukowe Uniwersytetu Mikołaja Kopernika.
Lindstrom, G. (ed.). 2003. Shift or rift. Assessing US-EU relations after Iraq. Paris:
Institute for Security Studies.
Łomanowski, A., and B. Musiałowicz. 2006. Kierunki rosyjskiej polityki zagranic-
znej. Bezpieczeństwo Międzynarodowe, 17–40.
Łossowski, P. 1985. Po tej i tamtej stronie Niemna. Stosunki polsko-litewskie
1883–1939. Warsaw: Czytelnik.
Lyon, P.V., and B.W. Tomlin. 1979. Canada as an international actor. Toronto:
Macmillan.
Machejek, J., S. Pia ̨stka, and A. Machejek. 2000. Kwaśniewski: ‘pójdźmy dalej’.
Wywiad rzeka z prezydentem RP. Łodź: Hamal Books.
Ma ̨czak, A. (ed.). 1997. Historia Europy. Wrocław/Warsaw/Cracow: Zakład
Narodowy im. Ossolińskich.
Mälksoo, M. 2010. The politics of becoming European. A study of Polish and Baltics
post-Cold War security imaginaries. London/New York: Routledge.
Malone, D., and Y.F. Khong (eds.). 2003. Unilateralism and U.S. foreign policy:
International perspectives. Boulder/London: Lynne Rienner Publisher.
Mastanduno, M. 1997. Preserving the unipolar moment: Realist theories and U.S.
grand strategy after the Cold War. International Security 21(4): 44–98.
Matlock, J.F. 2010. Superpower illusions. How myths and false ideologies led America
astray – and how to return to reality. New Heaven/London: Yale University
Press.
Mearsheimer, J. 2001. The tragedy of great powers politics. New York: W. W. Norton
& Company.
Mearsheimer, J. 2014. Why the Ukraine crisis is the West’s fault: The liberal delu-
sions that provoked Putin. Foreign Affairs 93(5): 77–89.
Micgiel, J.S., and P. Wandycz (eds.). 2007. Reflections on Polish foreign policy.
New York: Columbia University, East Central European Center: Józef Piłsudski
Institute for Research in the Modern History of Poland.
Mieroszewski, J. 1962. Na ruinach przedmurza. Kultura 11(181): 99–108.
204 BIBLIOGRAPHY
Symonides, J. (ed.). 2010. Świat wobec nowych, zmieniaja ̨cych się wyzwań i
zagrożeń. Warsaw: Wydawnictwo Naukowe Scholar.
Szczepanik, K., A. Herman-Łukasik, and B. Janicka (eds.). 2007. Stosunki dyplo-
matyczne Polski. Informator, Tom I: Europa 1918–2006. Warsaw: Ministerstwo
Spraw Zagranicznych.
Szeptycki, A. 2013. Ukraina wobec Rosji: studium zależności. Warsaw: Wydawnictwa
Uniwersytetu Warszawskiego.
Szklarski, B. (ed.). 2015. Niekonfrontacyjna asymetria w relacjach polsko-
amerykańskich. Warsaw: Ministry of Foreign Affairs.
Tazbir, J. 1989. Poland as the Rampart of Christian Europe. Myths and historical
reality. Warsaw: Interpress.
Topolski, J. 1982. Zarys dziejów Polski. Warsaw: Interpress.
Ullman, R.H. 1991. Securing Europe. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
Walicki, A. 2002. Rosja, katolicyzm i sprawa polska. Warsaw: Prószyński i S-ka.
Walt, S.M. 1987. The origins of alliances. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.
Waltz, K. 1979. Theory of international politics. Reading: Addison-Wesley.
Wandycz, P. 1980. The United States and Poland. Cambridge, MA/London:
Harvard University Press.
Wandycz, P. 1992. The price of freedom. A history of East Central Europe from the
Middle Ages to the present. London: Routledge.
Warzecha, Ł. 2011. Lech Kaczyński. Ostatni wywiad. Warsaw: Prószyński i S-ka.
Węc, J. 2012. Pierwsza polska prezydencja w Unii Europejskiej. Uwarunkowania –
procesy decyzyjne – osia ̨gnięcia i niepowodzenia. Cracow: Księgarnia Akademicka.
Welt, C. 2010. The thawing of a Frozen conflict: The internal security dilemma
and the 2004 prelude to the Russo-Georgian War. Europe-Asia Studies 62(1):
63–97.
Włodkowska-Bagan, A. 2013. Rywalizacja mocarstw na obszarze poradzieckim.
Warsaw: Difin.
Wohlforth, W.C. 1998. The stability of a unipolar world. International Security
24(1): 9.
Wojciechowski, S., and A. Potyrała (eds.). 2014. Bezpieczeństwo Polski. Współczesne
wyzwania, 60–80. Warsaw: Difin.
Wojna, B., and M. Gniazdowski (eds.). 2009. Eastern partnership: The opening
report. Warsaw: PISM.
Wolchik, S.L., and J. Leftwich Curry (eds.). 2015. Central & East European poli-
tics: From communism to democracy. Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield.
Wolchik, S.L., and V. Zviglyanich (eds.). 1999. Ukraine: The search for a national
identity. Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield.
Wolfers, A. 1962. The balance of power in theory and practice. In Discord and
collaboration: Essays on international politics. Baltimore: John Hopkins
University Press.
208 BIBLIOGRAPHY
Wong, R., and C. Hill (eds.). 2011. National and European foreign policies –
Towards Europeanization. London/New York: Routledge.
Wood, B. 1988. The middle powers and the general interest. Ottawa: North–South
Institute.
Yekelchyk, S. 2015. The conflict in Ukraine: What everyone needs to know. Oxford:
Oxford University Press.
Zaborowski, M., and D.H. Dunn (eds.). 2003. Poland: A new power in transat-
lantic security. London/Portland: Frank Cass.
Zaja ̨c, J. 2005a. Polska w stosunkach międzynarodowych 1945–1989. Wybór doku-
mentów. Warsaw: Wydawnictwa Uniwersytetu Warszawskiego.
Zaja ̨c, J. (ed.). 2005b. Polityka zagraniczna USA po zimnej wojnie. Toruń:
Wydawnictwo Adam Marszałek.
Zaja ̨c, J. 2006. El desarrollo de las relaciones polaco-americanas después de la
guerra fria. Lamusa 5: 59–70.
Zaja ̨c, J. 2007. Udział Polski w misjach pokojowych i stabilizacyjnych na pocza ̨tku
XXI wieku. Krakowskie Studia Międzynarodowe 4: 191–207.
Zaja ̨c, J. 2009. Bandwagoning w polskiej polityce zagranicznej. Przegla ̨d Zachodni
3: 168–178.
Zaja ̨c, J. 2014a. The NATO summit in Newport: Polish perspective, Dossier stra-
tégique: La Pologne, un acteur de la défense européenne, La Lettre de L’IRSEM,
no. 8. Paris: Institut de recherche stratégique de l’École Militaire.
Zaja ̨c, J. 2014b. Poland’s position towards the transatlantic link, Dossier straté-
gique: La Pologne, un acteur de la défense européenne, La Lettre de L’IRSEM,
no. 3. Paris: Institut de recherche stratégique de l’École Militaire.
Zaja ̨c, J. 2014c. Polen: Zehn Jahre Mitgliedschaft in der EU. Religion und
Gesellschaft in Ost und West, RGOW, No. 10 (Zürich: Institut G2W), pp. 16–17.
Zaja ̨c, J. 2015. The EU in the Mediterranean: Between its international identity
and member states’ interests. European Foreign Affairs Review 20(1): 65–82.
Zaja ̨c, J., A. Włodkowska-Bagan, and M. Kaczmarski, eds. 2015. Bezpieczeństwo
międzynarodowe. Polska-Europa-Świat. Księga Jubileuszowa dedykowana
Profesorowi Ryszardowi Ziębie z okazji czterdziestolecia pracy naukowej. Warsaw:
Wydawnictwo WDiNP UW.
Zaja ̨c, J. 100 Tage PiS-Regierung in Polen, Religion & Gesellschaft in Ost und
West, RGOW 3/2016, pp. 9–10.
Zaja ̨c, J., and R. Zięba. 2005. Polska w stosunkach międzynarodowych 1945–1989.
Toruń: Wydawnictwo Adam Marszałek.
Zaja ̨c, J., and R. Zięba. 2010. Budowa zintegrowanego systemu bezpieczeństwa nar-
odowego Polski. Warsaw: Ministerstwo Rozwoju Regionalnego.
Zamoyski, A. 2009. Poland: A history. London: Harper Press.
Zartman, I.W. (ed.). 2009. Imbalance of power: US hegemony and international
order. Boulder/London: Lynne Rienner Publishers.
BIBLIOGRAPHY 209
WEBSITES
The Atlantic Council: http://www.atlanticcouncil.org/
Bild: http://www.bild.de/
Biuro Bezpieczeństwa Narodowego: http://www.bbn.gov.pl/
Cato Institute: http://www.cato.org/
Central Statistical Office of Poland: http://stat.gov.pl/
The Economist: http://www.economist.com/
The European Council: http://www.consilium.europa.eu/
The European Court of Human Rights: http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/
The European Defence Agency: https://www.eda.europa.eu/
European Union: http://europa.eu/
European Union External Action Service: http://eeas.europa.eu/
210 BIBLIOGRAPHY
Eurostat: http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/
EU Neighbourhood Info Centre: http://www.enpi-info.eu/
Gazeta Polska: http://www.gazetapolska.pl/
Gazeta Wyborcza: http://wyborcza.pl/
Goldman Sachs Group, Inc.: http://www.goldmansachs.com/
The Guardian: http://www.theguardian.com/
Harry S. Truman Library & Museum: http://trumanlibrary.org/
The Heritage Foundation: http://www.heritage.org/
Human Rights Watch: https://www.hrw.org/
International Security Assistance Force NATO: http://www.isaf.nato.int/
Kancelaria Prezesa Rady Ministrów: http://www.kprm.gov.pl
Le Monde: http://www.lemonde.fr/international/
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Republic of Poland: http://www.msz.gov.pl/
Ministry of National Defense Republic of Poland: http://mon.gov.pl/
National Security Strategy Archive: http://nssarchive.us/
Newsweek: http://newsweek.pl/
North Atlantic Treaty Organization: http://www.nato.int/
Ośrodek Myśli Politycznej, Cracow: http://www.omp.org.pl/
Ośrodek Studiów Wschodnich: http://www.osw.waw.pl/
Le Point: http://www.lepoint.fr/
Polish Armed Forces: http://www.wojsko-polskie.pl/
Polish Press Agency: http://www.pap.pl/
Polskie Radio: http://www.polskieradio.pl/
Polskie Stronnictwo Ludowe: http://psl.pl/
Prawo i Sprawiedliwość: http://www.pis .org.pl/
The President of the Republic of Lithuania: https://www.lrp.lt/
The President of the Republic of Poland: http://www.prezydent.pl/
The President of Russia: http://kremlin.ru/
Reuters: http://www.reuters.com/
RMF 24: http://www.rmf24.pl/
Rzeczpospolita: http://www.rp.pl/
Sejm Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej: http://www.sejm.gov.pl/
Sojusz Lewicy Demokratycznej: http://www.sld.org.pl/
Spiegel: http://www.spiegel.de/
Stowarzyszenie Wspólnota Polska: http://www.wspolnota-polska.org.pl/
Telewizja Polska: http://www.tvp.info/
Telewizja Republika: http://telewizjarepublika.pl/
TVN 24: http://www.tvn24.pl
United States Department of Defense: http://www.defense.gov/
United States Department of State: http://www.state.gov/
Urza ̨d ds. Cudzoziemców: http://udsc.gov.pl/
Visegrad Group: http://www.visegradgroup.eu/
BIBLIOGRAPHY 211
A B
Airborne Warning and Control System balance of power, xiv i, xviii, 41, 74,
(AWACS), 160, 162 115, 190
alliance, xvii, xix, xxi, 5, 10, 14, 17, balancing, xvi
22, 24, 35, 36, 37,42, 44, 45, 46, Baltic Sea States Council, 37
47, 53, 63, 66, 67, 68, 69, 70, bandwagoning, xvi, xvii,xxvn31,79,
71, 72–3, 74, 75, 84, 87, 88, 190, 192
104, 105, 110, 112, 113, 116, battlegroup, 83, 121, 122 124
119, 120, 124, 127, 128, 140, bipolar order, 5
142, 144, 157, 162 164, 165, BRIC, 103, 104, 106, 129n5
168, 170, 178n76, 188, 190 bridging/bridging strategy, xvi, xviii,
Alliance Ground Surveillance (AGS), xx, 32, 55, 63, 187–9
160 bulwark, 11, 12, 19, 48–55
American Missile Defense system, 67,
115, 160, 162
annexation of Crimea, xix, xxi, 18, C
140, 151, 166, 192 Caracal Helicopters, 164
Asia pivot, 18, 104, 191 casus foederis, xvii, 35, 36
Association Agreement, 125, 139, 145 Central and Eastern Europe, xii, xviii,
146, 168 xxi, xxii, 1, 2, 5, 20, 22, 23–4,
‘aterritorial’ threats/‘aterritorial’ 31, 32, 37, 38 41, 44, 46,
conflict, 120, 156 57n21,70, 74, 110, 116, 117,
Autumn of Nations, xx, xxii, 4, 31, 74, 137, 138, 161, 165, 171, 186,
85 187, 188, 190, 191
1
Note: Page numbers with “n” denote notes.
Central Europe, xviii, xxi–xxii, 12, 13, Euro-Maidan, 139, 145, 148, 167
37, 46,48, 51 70, 71, 79, 104, European Capabilities Action Plan
106, 107, 124, 141, 157, 161 (ECAP), 82–3
Central European Initiative (CEI), European Court of Human Rights,
xvii, 37, 63, 142 29n47, 77, 78, 191
Chobielin Initiative, 121 European Defence Agency (EDA), 83,
CIA prison, 77, 191 122, 123
COMECON, 1, 31, 37, 56n13, 187 European Neighborhood Policy
Committee for Polish-Russian (ENP), 126
Cooperation Strategy, 151, European Phased Adaptive Approach
176n51 (EPAA), 116, 160, 191
Common Security and Defence Policy European Reassurance Initiative
(CSDP), xx, 21, 24, 104, 120–3, (ERI), 162
124, 125, 134n69, 192 European Security and Defence Policy
Concert of Europe, 192 (ESDP), xvii, xx, 63, 64, 80, 81,
Conference for Security and 82, 84, 85, 105, 134n64, 191
Cooperation in Europe (CSCE), European Security Strategy, 120, 123,
xvii, xx, 16, 17, 29n54, 31, 32, 124
33, 39, 44–6, 63, 72, 85–6, 187,
188, 189
Confidence and Security Building F
Measures (CSBMs), 45 F-16, 42, 78, 117, 162, 163
Council of the Baltic Sea States
(CBSS), xvii, 63, 187
G
Georgian-Russian War, xi, xix, xx, 79,
D 103, 108, 109, 112, 113, 128,
defense capabilities, 18, 47, 104, 122, 140, 154, 186, 191
123, 138, 154–6, 166, 191–2 Giedroyc-Mieroszewski Doctrine, 49,
deterrence, xvi, 155, 159, 161, 192 50, 51, 53–4, 127, 141
‘dual-track’ concept, 51, 52 global hegemon/global hegemony, xx,
xviii, 64–68, 103, 189, 190
great powers, xiv, xv, xvi, 41, 53, 68,
E 74, 94n18, 110, 131n26, 144,
Eastern Bloc, xiii, xviii, 1, 4, 32, 33, 151, 190, 192
34–7, 38, 44, 56n11, 56n13, 70, GROM, 43, 72
165, 186
Eastern Partnership (EaP), xxi, 23,
123, 126–8, 139, 168 H
Eastern Partnership Summit, 139, 168 hegemonic position, xviii, 16, 34, 63,
Eastern Ukraine, 163, 166 64, 91
SUBJECT INDEX 215
I N
imperialism, 49, 50, 108, 109, 186 National Security Strategic Review,
imperial policy, xiii, 104, 108, 185, 154
192 NATO Bucharest Summit, 22, 73,
Intermarium, xx, 38, 49, 50, 61n58 127, 1159
international hierarchy, xiii, xiv, 1 NATO Chicago Summit, 113, 117
international order, xii–xvi, xviii, xx, NATO enlargement, 46, 47, 48, 54,
xxii, 1, 16, 17–18, 24, 31, 32, 34, 67, 69, 70–71, –73, 88, 90, 107,
36, 44, 55, 103–4, 108, 118, 127, 128
120, 129n3, 130n26, 186 NATO Lisbon Summit, 112, 113, 117
international system, xiii, xiv, xvi, xix, NATO Readiness Action Plan (RAP),
129n3, 186 157, 159
NATO Response Force (NRF), 157,
159, 170, 177n67
J NATO’s eastern flank, xxi, 138,
Jagiellonian concept/Jagiellonian 156–61, 162, 163, 170–1, 192
idea/Jagiellonian Poland, 22–3, NATO Strasbourg/Kehl Summit, 105,
49–50, 141 120
NATO Summit in Newport, 157, 158,
159, 160, 170
K NATO Warsaw Summit, 150, 156,
Kaliningrad District, 89, 90, 111, 115 158, 159, 161–2, 166, 168
Katyn massacre, 13, 23, 54, 89, 110 neo-imperial/neo-imperialist, 108,
‘Komorowski Doctrine’, 119–120, 155 141, 186, 192
neorealism, xii, xix, xx, 33, 137, 138,
192
L Normandy format, 148, 167
little green men, xxi, 147, 156 North Atlantic Cooperation Council
(NACC), 46, 69, 86, 188
M
Medvedev Plan, 108, 110, 111 O
middle power, xii, xiii, xiv, xv, xvi, xix, Oder and Lusatian Neisse rivers, 34–5,
1, 2, 68, 115, 186–7, 192 36, 38–39, 41, 43, 53
military capabilities, xix, xxi, 1, 84, 104, Orange Revolution, 91, 127, 143–4
111, 117, 118, 121, 122, 124 Organization for Security and
multipolar world order, xiii, 5, 18, 19, Cooperation in Europe (OSCE),
25, 91, 103–36, 137, 191 xvii, 1, 17, 19, 85–88, 111, 190
Munich Security Conference, xix, 103, ‘out of area’ operations, 71, 72, 75,
104, 108, 146, 191 112, 113
216 SUBJECT INDEX
P S
Partnership for Peace (PfP), 69, 71, Security Strategy of the Republic of
147, 190 Poland, 81, 82, 85, 90, 154,
Patriot missiles, 79, 114, 116, 117, 163 158, 192
PiS, 7, 9, 19–23, 24, 27n38, 30n68, ‘Sikorski Doctrine’, 109
72, 79, 91, 110, 126, 145, 148, SLD, 19–20, 24, 68, 74, 78, 91,
149, 150, 153, 156, 158, 161, 149, 158
164, 166, 170–2 Słupsk-Redzikowo, 114, 116, 161,
PO, 19, 20–4, 28n38, 79, 108, 110, 162, 191
127, 145, 149, 158, 170 Smolensk catastrophe, 20, 23, 110
Poland-America-Ukraine Cooperation spheres of influence, xix, 5, 11, 12,
Initiative (PAUCI), 143, 173n18 20, 33, 58n33, 93, 109, 110,
Poland’s eastern policy, 22, 32, 48–55, 117, 151, 193
140, 189, 190 state’s geographic location, xiii, xiv, 1
Polish Armed Forces, 9–10, 79, 114, Strategic Airlift Capability (SAC),
118, 119–21, 155–6, 163 160
Polish Military Contingent (PKW), Strategic Cooperation Consultative
72, 73, 76, 97n59 Group, 79, 114
Polish-Russian Group for Difficult Study on NATO Enlargement, 70,
Matters, 151 190
Polish-Ukrainian Presidential
Consulting Committee, 142, 150
POLUKRBAT, 72, 143 T
pooling & sharing, 121, 122, 124 Trojan horse, 81, 85, 109, 191
power, xi, xii, xiii, xiv, xv, xvi, xvii,
xviii, xix, 1, 2, 3, 5, 9, 11, 12, 13,
18, 19, 20, 21, 22, 31, 32, 33, U
34, 35, 3841, 53, 64, 68, 74, 87, Ukraine crisis, xix, xxi, 7, 15, 137–83,
103, 106, 107, 108, 109 110, 186, 192
115, 116 127, 137, 139, 140, ULB doctrine, 49–50
144, 145, 148, 149, 151, 156, unipolar world order, xix, xx, 19, 34,
167, 186, 187, 190, 191, 192 63–102
Principles of Poland’s Security Policy,
16, 47
Prometheism, 11, 49, 50, 141 V
Very High Readiness Joint Task Force
(VJTF), 157, 159
R Visegrad Triangle/Visegrad Group,
redistribution of power, xi, xiii, xviii, xvii, 7, 23, 37, 47, 51, 63,
18, 107 124, 125, 127, 142, 170,
revisionism/ revisionist, xi, xiii, 34, 187, 189
108, 116, 154, 191, 193n5 Volhynia, 14–15, 143
SUBJECT INDEX 217
1
Note: Page numbers with “n” denote notes.
V
Vasconcelos, Alvaro de, 171n6 Y
Verheugen, Günter, 169 Yanukovych, Victor, 139, 140, 144,
von der Leyen Ursula, 170 145, 146, 1668, 167
Yatsenyuk, Arseniy, 146
Yekelchyk, Serhy, 171n2
W Yeltsin, Boris, 67, 88, 89
Wagnsson, Charlotte, 94n22 Young, Thomas-Durell, 99n83
Wałęsa, Lech, 20, 68, 69, 89, 116, Yushchenko, Victor, 91, 127,
141, 143 144
226 NAME INDEX