G.R. No.

L-31763 December 27, 1929

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
H. JANSSEN, defendant-appellant.

W. E. Greenbaum and Luis G. Hofileña for appellant.

Attorney-General Jaranilla for appellee.

VILLA-REAL, J.:

H. Janssen appeals to this court from the judgment of the Court of First Instance of Antique
convicting him of a violation of section 2 of Act No. 3412, and sentencing him to pay a fine of P200,
with subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency at the rate of one day for every 12 ½ pesetas,
and to pay the court costs.

In support of his appeal, the appellant assigns the following alleged errors as committed by the court
a quo in its decision, to wit:

The trial court erred:

1. In holding that it is the duty of the accused to inquire into and determine the residence of
the bride before solemnizing marriage.

2. In finding that the habitual residence of the bride, Juana S. del Rosario is the municipality
of Banga, Province of Capiz, and not the municipality of San Jose, Province of Antique.

3. In holding that the accused cannot solemnize marriage without publishing or proclaiming
such marriage 10 days prior to the celebration thereof.

4. In holding that the accused has violated section 2 of Act No. 3412.

5. In convicting the accused.

The following facts were proved at the trial beyond a reasonable doubt.

On December 26, 1928, Pedro N. Cerdeña and Juana S. del Rosario appeared before Reverend
Father H. Janssen, a Catholic parish priest of the municipality of San Jose, Antique, to have their
names inscribed in the marriage registry, Exhibit 3, which was done. On December 30, 1928, the
banns were published in his parish in San Jose, Antique.

As the classes opened on January 7, 1929, the contracting parties asked the defendant-appellant to
marry them before that date. Upon petition of the defendant-appellant, the Bishop of Jaro issued the
following dispensation on December 29, 1928:

In view of the exposition and petition contained in the foregoing document, and with the
understanding that no obstacle has been discovered in the investigation made or to be made
 of the status and liberty of the contracting parties, Pedro Cerdeña, single, of age, a resident
of San Jose, Antique, and Juana S. del Rosario, a native of Banga, Province of Capiz,
residing in San Jose, Antique, single, of age; dispensation is granted from one call of the
banns, as prayed for, subject to alms --------pesos, to be applied to charitable work and the
expenses of divine worship, enjoining the Reverend Parish Priest of San Jose, Province of
Antique, to whom a copy of this decree shall be transmitted, not to solemnize the marriage
under consideration, without being certain of the status and liberty of both contracting
parties, and that in the realization of said act, no complaint of any kind shall be made on any
legal ground; and that otherwise, it is our will that the dispensation be granted.

Causes: Urgent business of both parties, who being Government employees, cannot await
the last call without serious prejudice.

On the 1st of January, 1929, another proclamation was made to that effect.

On January 4, 1929, the municipal secretary of San Jose, Antique, issued the following authority to
solemnize marriage:

To all those authorized to celebrate marriage:

You are hereby authorized to solemnize the marriage of Pedro N. Cerdeña and Juana S. del
Rosario, in accordance with the rites and ceremonies of your Church, sect, or religion, and
with the laws of the Philippine Islands.lawphi 1.net

Given this day, January 4, 1929, in the municipality of San Jose, Antique, P. I.

Attached hereto is a copy of the petition filed by the contracting parties.

By virtue of the above-quoted dispensation, and in view of said authority of the municipal secretary
of San Jose, Antique, the defendant-appellant on January 6, 1929, solemnized the marriage of
Pedro N. Cerdeña to Juana S. del Rosario.

The only question to be decided in this appeal is whether or not the defendant-appellant violated
section 2 of Act No. 3412, the pertinent part of which reads as follows:

The municipal secretary or clerk of the municipal court of Manila, as the case may be, shall
post during ten days in a conspicuous place in the building where he has his office, a notice
setting forth the full names and domiciles of the applicants for marriage licenses, their
respective ages, and the names of their parents if living or of their guardians if otherwise. At
the expiration of this term, a license shall issue: Provided, however, That in case any such
applicant states in writing and under oath that the rules and practices of the church, sect, or
religion under which such applicant desires to contract marriage require banns or
publications prior to the solemnization of the marriage, it shall not be necessary for the
municipal secretary to make the publication required in this paragraph, and in this case the
license shall issue immediately after the filing of the application and shall state the church,
sect, or religion in which the marriage is to be solemnized.

While it is true that section 2 of Act No. 3412 quoted above, requires the municipal secretary to post
a notice for ten days upon a conspiciuous place of the building where he has his office, setting forth
the names, surnames, and residence of applicants for a license to contract marriage, their age, the
names of their parents, if alive, or of their guardians, as the case may be, before issuing the license
applied for, the same section contains a proviso to the effect that when the contracting parties desire
to marry in a church which requires previous proclamation before the celebration of the marriage,
there is no need of said publication. The only doubt is whether said proclamation must be made
during ten days, as in the publication in case the marriage is not celebrated in a church. The law
simply says that if the marriage takes place in a church whose rules and practices require
proclamation, the license applied for shall at once be issued, and it does not say that the
proclamation required by said church is to be made during ten days. As section 2 of Act No. 3412 is
penal in character, it should be strictly construed. And as said section does not require that the
proclamation be made during ten days, but that it is sufficient that the church in which the marriage
is to take place requires a proclamation, it is immaterial how many days said proclamation is made
in.

For the foregoing considerations, we are of opinion and so hold that the defendant-appellant did not
violate section 2 of Act No. 3412 in solemnizing the marriage of Pedro N. Cerdeña and Juana S. del
Rosario after two proclamations, before ten days were up, the third proclamation having been
dispensed with by a competent ecclesiastical authority. law phi1.net

The trial court was also of opinion that the defendant-appellant was bound to investigate whether the
license was issued by an official duly authorized by law, that is, by the municipal secretary of the
municipality where the woman habitually resides.

The law does not impose this duty upon priest or ministers of religion. It is sufficient to know that the
license has been issued by a competent official, and it may be presumed from the issuance of said
license that said official has complied with his duty of ascertaining whether the woman who desires
to get married resides habitually in his municipality. (Act N. 190, sec. 334, No. 14.)

Wherefore, we are of opinion and so hold, that when a marriage is solemnized by a church, sect, or
religion whose rules and practices require proclamation or publicity, it is not necessary that said
proclamation be made during ten days, unless said rules or practices so require.

By virtue whereof, the appealed judgment is reversed, and the defendant is absolved from the
information, with costs de oficio. So ordered.
A.M. No. MTJ-92-721 September 30, 1994

JUVY N. COSCA, EDMUNDO B. PERALTA, RAMON C. SAMBO, and APOLLO A.

VILLAMORA, complainants,
vs.
HON. LUCIO P. PALAYPAYON, JR., Presiding Judge, and NELIA B. ESMERALDA-BAROY,
Clerk of Court II, both of the Municipal Trial Court of Tinambac, Camarines Sur, respondents.

Esteban R. Abonal for complainants.

Haide B. Vista-Gumba for respondents.

PER CURIAM, J.:

Complainants Juvy N. Cosca, Edmundo B. Peralta, Ramon C. Sambo, and Apollo Villamora, are
Stenographer I, Interpreter I, Clerk II, and Process Server, respectively, of the Municipal Trial Court
of Tinambac, Camarines Sur. Respondents Judge Lucio P. Palaypayon, Jr. and Nelia B. Esmeralda-
Baroy are respectively the Presiding Judge and Clerk of Court II of the same court.

In an administrative complaint filed with the Office of the Court Administrator on October 5, 1992,
herein respondents were charged with the following offenses, to wit: (1) illegal solemnization of
marriage; (2) falsification of the monthly reports of cases; (3) bribery in consideration of an
appointment in the court; (4) non-issuance of receipt for cash bond received; (5) infidelity in the
custody of detained prisoners; and (6) requiring payment of filing fees from exempted entities. 1

Pursuant to a resolution issued by this Court respondents filed their respective Comments. 2 A Reply
to Answers of Respondents was filed by complainants. 3 The case was thereafter referred to
Executive Judge David C. Naval of the Regional Trial Court, Naga City, for investigation report and
recommendation. The case was however transferred to First Assistant Executive Judge Antonio N.
Gerona when Judge Naval inhibited himself for the reason that his wife is a cousin of respondent
Judge Palaypayon, Jr. 4

The contending versions of the parties regarding the factual antecedents of this administrative
matter, as culled from the records thereof, are set out under each particular charge against
respondents.

1. Illegal solemnization of marriage

Complainants allege that respondent judge solemnized marriages even without the requisite
marriage license. Thus, the following couples were able to get married by the simple expedient of
paying the marriage fees to respondent Baroy, despite the absence of a marriage license, viz.: Alano
P. Abellano and Nelly Edralin, Francisco Selpo and Julieta Carrido, Eddie Terrobias and Maria
Gacer, Renato Gamay and Maricris Belga, Arsenio Sabater and Margarita Nacario, and Sammy
Bocaya and Gina Bismonte. As a consequence, their marriage contracts (Exhibits B, C, D, F, G, and
A, respectively) did not reflect any marriage license number. In addition, respondent judge did not
sign their marriage contracts and did not indicate the date of solemnization, the reason being that he
allegedly had to wait for the marriage license to be submitted by the parties which was usually
several days after the ceremony. Indubitably, the marriage contracts were not filed with the local civil
registrar. Complainant Ramon Sambo, who prepares the marriage contracts, called the attention of
respondents to the lack of marriage licenses and its effect on the marriages involved, but the latter
opted to proceed with the celebration of said marriages.

Respondent Nelia Baroy claims that when she was appointed Clerk of Court II, the employees of the
court were already hostile to her, especially complainant Ramon Sambo who told her that he was
filing a protest against her appointment. She avers that it was only lately when she discovered that
the court had a marriage Register which is in the custody of Sambo; that it was Sambo who failed to
furnish the parties copies of the marriage contract and to register these with the local civil registrar;
and that apparently Sambo kept these marriage contracts in preparation for this administrative case.
Complainant Sambo, however, claims that all file copies of the marriage contracts were kept by
respondent Baroy, but the latter insists that she had instructed Sambo to follow up the submission by
the contracting parties of their marriage licenses as part of his duties but he failed to do so.

Respondent Judge Palaypayon, Jr. contends that the marriage between Alano P. Abellano and Nelly
Edralin falls under Article 34 of the Civil Code, hence it is exempt from the marriage license
requirement; that he gave strict instructions to complainant Sambo to furnish the couple a copy of
the marriage contract and to file the same with the civil registrar, but the latter failed to do so; that in
order to solve the problem, the spouses subsequently formalized their marriage by securing a
marriage license and executing their marriage contract, a copy of which was filed with the civil
registrar; that the other five marriages alluded to in the administrative complaint were not illegally
solemnized because the marriage contracts were not signed by him and they did not contain the
date and place of marriage; that copies of these marriage contracts are in the custody of
complainant Sambo; that the alleged marriage of Francisco Selpo and Julieta Carrido, Eddie
Terrobias and Maria Emma Gaor, Renato Gamay and Maricris Belga, and of Arsenio Sabater and
Margarita Nacario were not celebrated by him since he refused to solemnize them in the absence of
a marriage license; that the marriage of Samy Bocaya and Gina Bismonte was celebrated even
without the requisite license due to the insistence of the parties in order to avoid embarrassment to
their guests but that, at any rate, he did not sign their marriage contract which remains unsigned up
to the present.

2. Falsification of monthly report for July, 1991 regarding the number of marriages
solemnized and the number of documents notarized.

It is alleged that respondent judge made it appear that he solemnized seven (7) marriages in the
month of July, 1992, when in truth he did not do so or at most those marriages were null and void;
that respondents likewise made it appear that they have notarized only six (6) documents for July,
1992, but the Notarial Register will show that there were one hundred thirteen (113) documents
which were notarized during that month; and that respondents reported a notarial fee of only P18.50
for each document, although in fact they collected P20.00 therefor and failed to account for the
difference.

Respondent Baroy contends, however, that the marriage registry where all marriages celebrated by
respondent judge are entered is under the exclusive control and custody of complainant Ramon
Sambo, hence he is the only one who should be held responsible for the entries made therein; that
the reported marriages are merely based on the payments made as solemnization fees which are in
the custody of respondent Baroy. She further avers that it is Sambo who is likewise the custodian of
the Notarial Register; that she cannot be held accountable for whatever alleged difference there is in
the notarial fees because she is liable only for those payments tendered to her by Sambo himself;
that the notarial fees she collects are duly covered by receipts; that of the P20.00 charged, P18.50 is
remitted directly to the Supreme Court as part of the Judiciary Development Fund and P150 goes to
the general fund of the Supreme Court which is paid to the Municipal Treasurer of Tinambac,
Camarines Sur. Respondent theorizes that the discrepancies in the monthly report were manipulated
by complainant Sambo considering that he is the one in charge of the preparation of the monthly
report.

Respondent Judge Palaypayon avers that the erroneous number of marriages celebrated was
intentionally placed by complainant Sambo; that the number of marriages solemnized should not be
based on solemnization fees paid for that month since not all the marriages paid for are solemnized
in the same month. He claims that there were actually only six (6) documents notarized in the month
of July, 1992 which tallied with the official receipts issued by the clerk of court; that it is Sambo who
should be held accountable for any unreceipted payment for notarial fees because he is the one in
charge of the Notarial Register; and that this case filed by complainant Sambo is merely in retaliation
for his failure to be appointed as the clerk of court. Furthermore, respondent judge contends that he
is not the one supervising or preparing the monthly report, and that he merely has the ministerial
duty to sign the same.

3. Bribery in consideration of an appointment in the court

Complainants allege that because of the retirement of the clerk of court, respondent judge forwarded
to the Supreme Court the applications of Rodel Abogado, Ramon Sambo, and Jessell Abiog.
However, they were surprised when respondent Baroy reported for duty as clerk of court on October
21, 1991. They later found out that respondent Baroy was the one appointed because she gave a
brand-new air-conditioning unit to respondent judge.

Respondent Baroy claims that when she was still in Naga City she purchased an air-conditioning
unit but when she was appointed clerk of court she had to transfer to Tinambac and, since she no
longer needed the air conditioner, she decided to sell the same to respondent judge. The installation
and use thereof by the latter in his office was with the consent of the Mayor of Tinambac.

Respondent judge contends that he endorsed all the applications for the position of clerk of court to
the Supreme Court which has the sole authority over such appointments and that he had no hand in
the appointment of respondent Baroy. He contends that the air-conditioning unit was bought from his
co-respondent on installment basis on May 29, 1992, eight (8) months after Baroy had been
appointed clerk of court. He claims that he would not be that naive to exhibit to the public as item
which could not be defended as a matter of honor and prestige.

4. Cash bond issued without a receipt

It is alleged that in Criminal Case No. 5438, entitled "People vs. Mendeza, et al., "bondswoman
Januaria Dacara was allowed by respondent judge to change her property bond to cash bond; that
she paid the amount of P1,000.00 but was never issued a receipt therefor nor was it made to appear
in the records that the bond has been paid; that despite the lapse of two years, the money was never
returned to the bondswoman; and that it has not been shown that the money was turned over to the
Municipal Treasurer of Tinambac.

Respondent Baroy counters that the cash bond was deposited with the former clerk of court, then
turned over to the acting clerk of court and, later, given to her under a corresponding receipt; that the
cash bond is deposited with the bank; and that should the bondswoman desire to withdraw the
same, she should follow the proper procedure therefor.

Respondent judge contends that Criminal Case No. 5438 was archieved for failure of the bondsman
to deliver the body of the accused in court despite notice; and that he has nothing to do with the
payment of the cash bond as this is the duty of the clerk of court.
 5. Infidelity in the custody of prisoners

Complainants contend that respondent judge usually got detention prisoners to work in his house,
one of whom was Alex Alano, who is accused in Criminal Case No. 5647 for violation of the
Dangerous Drugs Act; that while Alano was in the custody of respondent judge, the former escaped
and was never recaptured; that in order to conceal this fact, the case was archived pursuant to an
order issued by respondent judge dated April 6, 1992.

Respondent judge denied the accusation and claims that he never employed detention prisoners
and that he has adequate household help; and that he had to order the case archived because it had
been pending for more than six (6) months and the accused therein remained at large.

6. Unlawful collection of docket fees

Finally, respondents are charged with collecting docket fees from the Rural Bank of Tinambac,
Camarines Sur, Inc. although such entity is exempt by law from the payment of said fees, and that
while the corresponding receipt was issued, respondent Baroy failed to remit the amount to the
Supreme Court and, instead, she deposited the same in her personal account.

Respondents Baroy contends that it was Judge-Designate Felimon Montenegro (because

respondent judge was on sick leave) who instructed her to demand payment of docket fees from
said rural bank; that the bank issued a check for P800.00; that she was not allowed by the Philippine
National Bank to encash the check and, instead, was instructed to deposit the same in any bank
account for clearing; that respondent deposited the same in her account; and that after the check
was cleared, she remitted P400.00 to the Supreme Court and the other P400.00 was paid to the
Municipal Treasurer of Tinambac.

On the basis of the foregoing contentions, First Vice-Executive Judge Antonio N. Gerona prepared
and submitted to us his Report and Recommendations dated May 20, 1994, together with the
administrative matter. We have perspicaciously reviewed the same and we are favorably impressed
by the thorough and exhaustive presentation and analysis of the facts and evidence in said report.
We commend the investigating judge for his industry and perspicacity reflected by his findings in
said report which, being amply substantiated by the evidence and supported by logical illations, we
hereby approve and hereunder reproduce at length the material portions thereof.

xxx xxx xxx

The first charge against the respondents is illegal solemnization of marriage. Judge
Palaypayon is charged with having solemnized without a marriage license the
marriage of Sammy Bocaya and Gina Besmonte (Exh. A). Alano Abellano and Nelly
Edralin (Exh. B), Francisco Selpo and Julieta Carrido (Exh. C), Eddie Terrobias and
Maria Emma Gaor (Exh. D), Renato Gamay and Maricris Belga (Exh. F) and Arsenio
Sabater and Margarita Nacario (Exh. G).

In all these aforementioned marriages, the blank space in the marriage contracts to
show the number of the marriage was solemnized as required by Article 22 of the
Family Code were not filled up. While the contracting parties and their witnesses
signed their marriage contracts, Judge Palaypayon did not affix his signature in the
marriage contracts, except that of Abellano and Edralin when Judge Palaypayon
signed their marriage certificate as he claims that he solemnized this marriage under
Article 34 of the Family Code of the Philippines. In said marriages the contracting
parties were not furnished a copy of their marriage contract and the Local Civil
Registrar was not sent either a copy of the marriage certificate as required by Article
23 of the Family Code.

The marriage of Bocaya and Besmonte is shown to have been solemnized by Judge
Palaypayon without a marriage license. The testimonies of Bocay himself and
Pompeo Ariola, one of the witnesses of the marriage of Bocaya and Besmonte, and
the photographs taken when Judge Palaypayon solemnized their marriage (Exhs. K-
3 to K-9) sufficiently show that Judge Palaypayon really solemnized their marriage.
Bocaya declared that they were advised by Judge Palaypayon to return after ten (10)
days after their marriage was solemnized and bring with them their marriage license.
In the meantime, they already started living together as husband and wife believing
that the formal requisites of marriage were complied with.

Judge Palaypayon denied that he solemnized the marriage of Bocaya and Besmonte
because the parties allegedly did not have a marriage license. He declared that in
fact he did not sign the marriage certificate, there was no date stated on it and both
the parties and the Local Civil Registrar did not have a copy of the marriage
certificate.

With respect to the photographs which show that he solemnized the marriage of
Bocaya and Besmonte, Judge Palaypayon explains that they merely show as if he
was solemnizing the marriage. It was actually a simulated solemnization of marriage
and not a real one. This happened because of the pleading of the mother of one of
the contracting parties that he consent to be photographed to show that as if he was
solemnizing the marriage as he was told that the food for the wedding reception was
already prepared, visitors were already invited and the place of the parties where the
reception would be held was more than twenty (20) kilometers away from the
poblacion of Tinambac.

The denial made by Judge Palaypayon is difficult to believe. The fact alone that he
did not sign the marriage certificate or contract, the same did not bear a date and the
parties and the Local Civil Registrar were not furnished a copy of the marriage
certificate, do not by themselves show that he did not solemnize the marriage. His
uncorroborated testimony cannot prevail over the testimony of Bocaya and Ariola
who also declared, among others, that Bocaya and his bride were advised by Judge
Palaypayon to return after ten (10) days with their marriage license and whose
credibility had not been impeached.

The pictures taken also from the start of the wedding ceremony up to the signing of
the marriage certificate in front of Judge Palaypayon and on his table (Exhs. K-3, K-
3-a, K-3-b, K-3-c, K-4, K-4-a, K-4-b, K-4-c,
K-4-d, K-5, K-5-a, K-5-b, K-6, K-7, K-8, K-8-a and K-9), cannot possibly be just to
show a simulated solemnization of marriage. One or two pictures may convince a
person of the explanation of Judge Palaypayon, but not all those pictures.

Besides, as a judge it is very difficult to believe that Judge Palaypayon would allows
himself to be photographed as if he was solemnizing a marriage on a mere pleading
of a person whom he did not even know for the alleged reasons given. It would be
highly improper and unbecoming of him to allow himself to be used as an instrument
of deceit by making it appear that Bocaya and Besmonte were married by him when
in truth and in fact he did not solemnize their marriage.
With respect to the marriage of Abellano and Edralin (Exh. B), Judge Palaypayon
admitted that he solemnized their marriage, but he claims that it was under Article 34
of the Family Code, so a marriage license was not required. The contracting parties
here executed a joint affidavit that they have been living together as husband and
wife for almost six (6) years already (Exh. 12; Exh. AA).

In their marriage contract which did not bear any date either when it was solemnized,
it was stated that Abellano was only eighteen (18) years, two (2) months and seven
(7) days old. If he and Edralin had been living together as husband and wife for
almost six (6) years already before they got married as they stated in their joint
affidavit, Abellano must ha(ve) been less than thirteen (13) years old when he started
living with Edralin as his wife and this is hard to believe. Judge Palaypayon should
ha(ve) been aware of this when he solemnized their marriage as it was his duty to
ascertain the qualification of the contracting parties who might ha(ve) executed a
false joint affidavit in order to have an instant marriage by avoiding the marriage
license requirement.

On May 23, 1992, however, after this case was already filed, Judge Palaypayon
married again Abellano and Edralin, this time with a marriage license (Exh. BB). The
explanation given by Judge Palaypayon why he solemnized the marriage of the
same couple for the second time is that he did not consider the first marriage he
solemnized under Article 34 of the Family Code as (a) marriage at all because
complainant Ramon Sambo did not follow his instruction that the date should be
placed in the marriage certificate to show when he solemnized the marriage and that
the contracting parties were not furnished a copy of their marriage certificate.

This act of Judge Palaypayon of solemnizing the marriage of Abellano and Edralin
for the second time with a marriage license already only gave rise to the suspicion
that the first time he solemnized the marriage it was only made to appear that it was
solemnized under exceptional character as there was not marriage license and
Judge Palaypayon had already signed the marriage certificate. If it was true that he
solemnized the first marriage under exceptional character where a marriage license
was not required, why did he already require the parties to have a marriage license
when he solemnized their marriage for the second time?

The explanation of Judge Palaypayon that the first marriage of Abellano and Edralin
was not a marriage at all as the marriage certificate did not state the date when the
marriage was solemnized and that the contracting parties were not furnished a copy
of their marriage certificate, is not well taken as they are not any of those grounds
under Article(s) 35, 36, 37 and 38 of the Family Code which declare a marriage void
from the beginning. Even if no one, however, received a copy of the marriage
certificate, the marriage is still valid (Jones vs. H(o)rtiguela, 64 Phil. 179). Judge
Palaypayon cannot just absolve himself from responsibility by blaming his personnel.
They are not the guardian(s) of his official function and under Article 23 of the Family
Code it is his duty to furnish the contracting parties (a) copy of their marriage
contract.

With respect to the marriage of Francisco Selpo and Julieta Carrido (Exh. C), and
Arsenio Sabater and Margarita Nacario (Exh. G), Selpo and Carrido and Sabater and
Nacarcio executed joint affidavits that Judge Palaypayon did not solemnize their
marriage (Exh. 13-A and Exh. 1). Both Carrido and Nacario testified for the
respondents that actually Judge Palaypayon did not solemnize their marriage as they
did not have a marriage license. On cross-examination, however, both admitted that
they did not know who prepared their affidavits. They were just told, Carrido by a
certain Charito Palaypayon, and Nacario by a certain Kagawad Encinas, to just go to
the Municipal building and sign their joint affidavits there which were already
prepared before the Municipal Mayor of Tinambac, Camarines Sur.

With respect to the marriage of Renato Gamay and Maricris Belga (Exh. f), their
marriage contract was signed by them and by their two (2) witnesses, Atty. Elmer
Brioso and respondent Baroy (Exhs. F-1 and F-2). Like the other aforementioned
marriages, the solemnization fee was also paid as shown by a receipt dated June 7,
1992 and signed by respondent Baroy (Exh. F-4).

Judge Palaypayon also denied having solemnized the marriage of Gamay and Belga
allegedly because there was no marriage license. On her part, respondent Baroy at
first denied that the marriage was solemnized. When she was asked, however, why
did she sign the marriage contract as a witness she answered that she thought the
marriage was already solemnized (TSN, p. 14; 10-28-93).

Respondent Baroy was, and is, the clerk of court of Judge Palaypayon. She signed
the marriage contract of Gamay and Belga as one of the two principal sponsors. Yet,
she wanted to give the impression that she did not even know that the marriage was
solemnized by Judge Palaypayon. This is found very difficult to believe.

Judge Palaypayon made the same denial of having solemnized also the marriage of
Terrobias and Gaor (Exh. D). The contracting parties and their witnesses also signed
the marriage contract and paid the solemnization fee, but Judge Palaypayon
allegedly did not solemnize their marriage due to lack of marriage license. Judge
Palaypayon submitted the affidavit of William Medina, Vice-Mayor of Tinambac, to
corroborate his testimony (Exh. 14). Medina, however, did not testify in this case and
so his affidavit has no probative value.

Judge Palaypayon testified that his procedure and practice have been that before the
contracting parties and their witnesses enter his chamber in order to get married, he
already required complainant Ramon Sambo to whom he assigned the task of
preparing the marriage contract, to already let the parties and their witnesses sign
their marriage contracts, as what happened to Gamay and Belga, and Terrobias and
Gaor, among others. His purpose was to save his precious time as he has been
solemnizing marriages at the rate of three (3) to four (4) times everyday (TSN, p. 12;
2-1-94).

This alleged practice and procedure, if true, is highly improper and irregular, if not
illegal, because the contracting parties are supposed to be first asked by the
solemnizing officer and declare that they take each other as husband and wife before
the solemnizing officer in the presence of at least two (2) witnesses before they are
supposed to sign their marriage contracts (Art. 6, Family Code).

The uncorroborated testimony, however, of Judge Palaypayon as to his alleged

practice and procedure before solemnizing a marriage, is not true as shown by the
picture taken during the wedding of Bocaya and Besmonte (Exhs. K-3 to K-9) and by
the testimony of respondent Baroy herself who declared that the practice of Judge
Palaypayon ha(s) been to let the contracting parties and their witnesses sign the
marriage contract only after Judge Palaypayon has solemnized their marriage (TSN,
p. 53;
10-28-93).

Judge Palaypayon did not present any evidence to show also that he was really
solemnizing three (3) to four (4) marriages everyday. On the contrary his monthly
report of cases for July, 1992 shows that his court had only twenty-seven (27)
pending cases and he solemnized only seven (7) marriages for the whole month
(Exh. E). His monthly report of cases for September, 1992 shows also that he
solemnized only four (4) marriages during the whole month (Exh. 7).

In this first charge of having illegally solemnized marriages, respondent Judge

Palaypayon has presented and marked in evidence several marriage contracts of
other persons, affidavits of persons and certification issued by the Local Civil
Registrar (Exhs. 12-B to 12-H). These persons who executed affidavits, however, did
not testify in this case. Besides, the marriage contracts and certification mentioned
are immaterial as Judge Palaypayon is not charged of having solemnized these
marriages illegally also. He is not charged that the marriages he solemnized were all
illegal.

The second charge against herein respondents, that of having falsified the monthly
report of cases submitted to the Supreme Court and not stating in the monthly report
the actual number of documents notarized and issuing the corresponding receipts of
the notarial fees, have been sufficiently proven by the complainants insofar as the
monthly report of cases for July and September, 1992 are concerned.

The monthly report of cases of the MTC of Tinambac, Camarines Sur for July, 1992
both signed by the respondents, show that for said month there were six (6)
documents notarized by Judge Palaypayon in his capacity as Ex-Officio Notary
Public (Exhs. H to H-1-b). The notarial register of the MTC of Tinambac, Camarines
Sur, however, shows that there were actually one hundred thirteen (113) documents
notarized by Judge Palaypayon for the said month (Exhs. Q to Q-45).

Judge Palaypayon claims that there was no falsification of the monthly report of
cases for July, 1992 because there were only six (6) notarized documents that were
paid (for) as shown by official receipts. He did not, however, present evidence of the
alleged official receipts showing that the notarial fee for the six (6) documetns were
paid. Besides, the monthly report of cases with respect to the number of documents
notarized should not be based on how many notarized documents were paid of the
notarial fees, but the number of documents placed or recorded in the notarial
register.

Judge Palaypayon admitted that he was not personally verifying and checking
anymore the correctness of the monthly reports because he relies on his co-
respondent who is the Clerk of Court and whom he has assumed to have checked
and verified the records. He merely signs the monthly report when it is already
signed by respondent Baroy.

The explanation of Judge Palaypayon is not well taken because he is required to

have close supervision in the preparation of the monthly report of cases of which he
certifies as to their correctness. As a judge he is personally responsible for the
proper discharge of his functions (The Phil. Trial Lawyer's Asso. Inc. vs. Agana, Sr.,
102 SCRA 517). In Nidera vs. Lazaro, 174 SCRA 581, it was held that "A judge
cannot take refuge behind the inefficiency or mismanagement of his court
personnel."

On the part of respondent Baroy, she puts the blame of the falsification of the
monthly report of cases on complainant Sambo whom she allegedly assigned to
prepare not only the monthly report of cases, but the preparation and custody of
marriage contracts, notarized documents and the notarial register. By her own
admission she has assigned to complainant Sambo duties she was supposed to
perform, yet according to her she never bother(ed) to check the notarial register of
the court to find out the number of documents notarized in a month (TSN, p. 30; 11-
23-93).

Assuming that respondent Baroy assigned the preparation of the monthly report of
cases to Sambo, which was denied by the latter as he claims that he only typed the
monthly report based on the data given to him by her, still it is her duty to verify and
check whether the report is correct.

The explanation of respondent Baroy that Sambo was the one in custody of marriage
contracts, notarized documents and notarial register, among other things, is not
acceptable not only because as clerk of court she was supposed to be in custody,
control and supervision of all court records including documents and other properties
of the court (p. 32, Manual for Clerks of Court), but she herself admitted that from
January, 1992 she was already in full control of all the records of the court including
receipts (TSN, p. 11; 11-23-93).

The evidence adduced in this cases in connection with the charge of falsification,
however, also shows that respondent Baroy did not account for what happened to
the notarial fees received for those documents notarized during the month of July
and September, 1992. The evidence adduced in this case also sufficiently show that
she received cash bond deposits and she did not deposit them to a bank or to the
Municipal Treasurer; and that she only issued temporary receipts for said cash bond
deposits.

For July, 1992 there were only six (6) documents reported to have been notarized by
Judge Palaypayon although the documents notarized for said month were actually
one hundred thirteen (113) as recorded in the notarial register. For September, 1992,
there were only five (5) documents reported as notarized for that month, though the
notarial register show(s) that there were fifty-six (56) documents actually notarized.
The fee for each document notarized as appearing in the notarial register was
P18.50. Respondent Baroy and Sambo declared that what was actually being
charged was P20.00. Respondent Baroy declared that P18.50 went to the Supreme
Court and P1.50 was being turned over to the Municipal Treasurer.

Baroy, however, did not present any evidence to show that she really sent to the
Supreme Court the notarial fees of P18.50 for each document notarized and to the
Municipal Treasurer the additional notarial fee of P1.50. This should be fully
accounted for considering that Baroy herself declared that some notarial fees were
allowed by her at her own discretion to be paid later. Similarly, the solemnization fees
have not been accounted for by Baroy considering that she admitted that even (i)n
those instances where the marriages were not solemnized due to lack of marriage
license the solemnization fees were not returned anymore, unless the contracting
parties made a demand for their return. Judge Palaypayon declared that he did not
know of any instance when solemnization fee was returned when the marriage was
not solemnized due to lack of marriage license.

Respondent Baroy also claims that Ramon Sambo did not turn over to her some of
the notarial fees. This is difficult to believe. It was not only because Sambo
vehemently denied it, but the minutes of the conference of the personnel of the MTC
of Tinambac dated January 20, 1992 shows that on that date Baroy informed the
personnel of the court that she was taking over the functions she assigned to Sambo,
particularly the collection of legal fees (Exh. 7). The notarial fees she claims that
Sambo did not turn over to her were for those documents notarized (i)n July and
September, 1992 already. Besides there never was any demand she made for
Sambo to turn over some notarial fees supposedly in his possession. Neither was
there any memorandum she issued on this matter, in spite of the fact that she has
been holding meetings and issuing memoranda to the personnel of the court (Exhs.
V, W, FF, FF-1, FF-2, FF-3; Exhs. 4-A (supplement(s), 5-8, 6-S, 7-S and 8-S).

It is admitted by respondent Baroy that on October 29, 1991 a cash bond deposit of a
certain Dacara in the amount of One Thousand (P1,000.00) Pesos was turned over
to her after she assumed office and for this cash bond she issued only a temporary
receipt (Exh. Y). She did not deposit this cash bond in any bank or to the Municipal
Treasurer. She just kept it in her own cash box on the alleged ground that the parties
in that case where the cash bond was deposited informed her that they would settle
the case amicably.

Respondent Baroy declared that she finally deposited the aforementioned cash bond
of One Thousand (P1,000.00) Pesos with the Land Bank of the Philippines (LBP) in
February, 1993, after this administrative case was already filed (TSN, pp. 27-28; 12-
22-93). The Pass Book, however, shows that actually Baroy opened an account with
the LBP, Naga Branch, only on March 26, 1993 when she deposited an amount of
Two Thousand (P2,000.00) Pesos (Exhs. 8 to 8-1-a). She claims that One Thousand
(P1,000.000) Pesos of the initial deposit was the cash bond of Dacara. If it were true,
it was only after keeping to herself the cash bond of One Thousand (P1,000.00)
Pesos for around one year and five months when she finally deposited it because of
the filing of this case.

On April 29, 1993, or only one month and two days after she finally deposited the
One Thousand (P1,000.00) Pesos cash bond of Dacara, she withdrew it from the
bank without any authority or order from the court. It was only on July 23, 1993, or
after almost three (3) months after she withdrew it, when she redeposited said cash
bond (TSN, p. 6; 1-4-94).

The evidence presented in this case also show that on February 28, 1993
respondent Baroy received also a cash bond of Three Thousand (P3,000.00) Pesos
from a certain Alfredo Seprones in Crim. Case No. 5180. For this cash bond deposit,
respondent Baroy issued only an annumbered temporary receipt (Exh. X and X-1).
Again Baroy just kept this Three Thousand (P3,000.00) Pesos cash bond to herself.
She did not deposit it either (in) a bank or (with) the Municipal Treasurer. Her
explanation was that the parties in Crim. Case No. 5180 informed her that they would
settle the case amicably. It was on April 26, 1993, or almost two months later when
Judge Palaypayon issued an order for the release of said cash bond (Exh. 7).
Respondent Baroy also admitted that since she assumed office on October 21, 1991
she used to issue temporary receipt only for cash bond deposits and other payments
and collections she received. She further admitted that some of these temporary
receipts she issued she failed to place the number of the receipts such as that
receipt marked Exhibit X (TSN, p. 35; 11-23-93). Baroy claims that she did not know
that she had to use the official receipts of the Supreme Court. It was only from
February, 1993, after this case was already filed, when she only started issuing
official receipts.

The next charge against the respondents is that in order to be appointed Clerk of
Court, Baroy gave Judge Palaypayon an air conditioner as a gift. The evidence
adduced with respect to this charge, show that on August 24, 1991 Baroy bought an
air conditioner for the sum of Seventeen Thousand Six Hundred (P17,600.00) Pesos
(Exhs. I and I-1). The same was paid partly in cash and in check (Exhs. I-2 and I-3).
When the air conditioner was brought to court in order to be installed in the chamber
of Judge Palaypayon, it was still placed in the same box when it was bought and was
not used yet.

The respondents claim that Baroy sold it to Judge Palaypayon for Twenty Thousand
(P20,00.00) Pesos on installment basis with a down payment of Five Thousand
(P5,000.00) Pesos and as proof thereof the respondents presented a typewritten
receipt dated May 29, 1993 (Exh. 22). The receipt was signed by both respondents
and by the Municipal Mayor of Tinambac, Camarines Sur and another person as
witness.

The alleged sale between respondents is not beyond suspicion. It was bought by
Baroy at a time when she was applying for the vacant position of Clerk of Court (to)
which she was eventually appointed in October, 1991. From the time she bought the
air conditioner on August 24, 1991 until it was installed in the office of Judge
Palaypayon it was not used yet. The sale to Judge Palaypayon was only evidenced
by a mere typewritten receipt dated May 29, 1992 when this case was already filed.
The receipt could have been easily prepared. The Municipal Mayor of Tinambac who
signed in the receipt as a witness did not testify in this case. The sale is between the
Clerk of Court and the Judge of the same court. All these circumstances give rise to
suspicion of at least impropriety. Judges should avoid such action as would subject
(them) to suspicion and (their) conduct should be free from the appearance of
impropriety (Jaagueta vs. Boncasos, 60 SCRA 27).

With respect to the charge that Judge Palaypayon received a cash bond deposit of
One Thousand (P1,000.00) Pesos from Januaria Dacara without issuing a receipt,
Dacara executed an affidavit regarding this charge that Judge Palaypayon did not
give her a receipt for the P1,000.00 cash bond she deposited (Exh. N). Her affidavit,
however, has no probative value as she did not show that this cash bond of
P1,000.00 found its way into the hands of respondent Baroy who issued only a
temporary receipt for it and this has been discussed earlier.

Another charge against Judge Palaypayon is the getting of detention prisoners to

work in his house and one of them escaped while in his custody and was never
found again. To hide this fact, the case against said accused was ordered archived
by Judge Palaypayon. The evidence adduced with respect to this particular charge,
show that in Crim. Case No. 5647 entitled People vs. Stephen Kalaw, Alex Alano and
Allan Adupe, accused Alex Alano and Allan Adupe were arrested on April 12, 1991
and placed in the municipal jail of Tinambac, Camarines Sur (Exhs. 0, 0-1, 0-2 and 0-
3; Exh. 25). The evidence presented that Alex Alano was taken by Judge
Palaypayon from the municipal jail where said accused was confined and that he
escaped while in custody of Judge Palaypayon is solely testimonial, particularly that
of David Ortiz, a former utility worker of the MTC of Tinambac.

Herein investigator finds said evidence not sufficient. The complainants should have
presented records from the police of Tinambac to show that Judge Palaypayon took
out from the municipal jail Alex Alano where he was under detention and said
accused escaped while in the custody of Judge Palaypayon.

The order, however, of Judge Palaypayon dated April 6, 1992 in Crim. Case No.
5047 archiving said case appears to be without basis. The order states: "this case
was filed on April 12, 1991 and the records show that the warrant of arrest (was)
issued against the accused, but up to this moment there is no return of service for
the warrant of arrest issued against said accused" (Exh. 0-4). The records of said
case, however, show that in fact there was a return of the service of the warrant of
arrest dated April 12, 1991 showing that Alano and Adupe were arrested (Exh. 0-3).

Judge Palaypayon explained that his order dated April 6, 1992 archiving Crim. Case
No. 5047 referred only to one of the accused who remained at large. The explanation
cannot be accepted because the two other accused, Alano and Adupe, were
arrested. Judge Palaypayon should have issued an order for the arrest of Adupe who
allegedly jumped bail, but Alano was supposed to be confined in the municipal jail if
his claim is true that he did not take custody of Alano.

The explanation also of Judge Palaypayon why he ordered the case archived was
because he heard from the police that Alano escaped. This explanation is not
acceptable either. He should ha(ve) set the case and if the police failed to bring to
court Alano, the former should have been required to explain in writing why Alano
was not brought to court. If the explanation was that Alano escaped from jail, he
should have issued an order for his arrest. It is only later on when he could not be
arrested when the case should have been ordered archived. The order archiving this
case for the reason that he only heard that Alano escaped is another circumstance
which gave rise to a suspicion that Alano might have really escaped while in his
custody only that the complainants could not present records or other documentary
evidence to prove the same.

The last charge against the respondents is that they collected filing fees on collection
cases filed by the Rural Bank of Tinambac, Camarines Sur which was supposed to
be exempted in paying filing fees under existing laws and that the filing fees received
was deposited by respondent Baroy in her personal account in the bank. The
evidence presented show that on February 4, 1992 the Rural Bank of Tinambac filed
ten (10) civil cases for collection against farmers and it paid the total amount of Four
Hundred (P400.00) Pesos representing filing fees. The complainants cited Section
14 of Republic Act 720, as amended, which exempts Rural Banks (from) the
payment of filing fees on collection of sums of money cases filed against farmers on
loans they obtained.

Judge Palaypayon, however, had nothing to do with the payment of the filing fees of
the Rural Bank of Tinambac as it was respondent Baroy who received them and
besides, on February 4, 1992, he was on sick leave. On her part Baroy claims that
the bank paid voluntarily the filing fees. The records, however, shows that
respondent Baroy sent a letter to the manager of the bank dated January 28, 1992 to
the effect that if the bank would not pay she would submit all Rural Bank cases for
dismissal (Annex 6, comment by respondent Baroy).

Respondent Baroy should have checked whether the Rural Bank of Tinambac was
really exempt from the payment of filing fees pursuant to Republic Act 720, as
amended, instead of threatening the bank to have its cases be submitted to the court
in order to have them dismissed. Here the payment of the filing fees was made on
February 4, 1992, but the Four Hundred (P400.00) Pesos was only turned over to the
Municipal Treasurer on March 12, 1992. Here, there is an undue delay again in
complying with her obligation as accountable officer.

In view of the foregoing findings that the evidence presented by the complainants
sufficiently show that respondent Judge Lucio P. Palaypayon, Jr. had solemnized
marriages, particularly that of Sammy Bocaya and Gina Besmonte, without a
marriage license, and that it having been shown that he did not comply with his duty
in closely supervising his clerk of court in the preparation of the monthly report of
cases being submitted to the Supreme Court, particularly for the months of July and
September, 1992 where it has been proven that the reports for said two (2) months
were falsified with respect to the number of documents notarized, it is respectfully
recommended that he be imposed a fine of TEN THOUSAND (P10,000.00) PESOS
with a warning that the same or similar offenses will be more severely dealt with.

The fact that Judge Palaypayon did not sign the marriage contracts or certificates of
those marriages he solemnized without a marriage license, there were no dates
placed in the marriage contracts to show when they were solemnized, the contracting
parties were not furnished their marriage contracts and the Local Civil Registrar was
not being sent any copy of the marriage contract, will not absolve him from liability.
By solemnizing alone a marriage without a marriage license he as the solemnizing
officer is the one responsible for the irregularity in not complying (with) the formal
requ(i)sites of marriage and under Article 4(3) of the Family Code of the Philippines,
he shall be civilly, criminally and administratively liable.

Judge Palaypayon is likewise liable for his negligence or failure to comply with his
duty of closely supervising his clerk of court in the performance of the latter's duties
and functions, particularly the preparation of the monthly report of cases (Bendesula
vs. Laya, 58 SCRA 16). His explanation that he only signed the monthly report of
cases only when his clerk of court already signed the same, cannot be accepted. It is
his duty to closely supervise her, to check and verify the records if the monthly
reports prepared by his clerk of court do not contain false statements. It was held that
"A judge cannot take refuge behind the inefficiency or incompetence of court
personnel (Nidua vs. Lazaro, 174 SCRA 158).

In view also of the foregoing finding that respondent Nelia Esmeralda-Baroy, the
clerk of court of the Municipal Trial Court of Tinambac, Camarines Sur, has been
found to have falsified the monthly report of cases for the months of July and
September, 1992 with respect to the number of documents notarized, for having
failed to account (for) the notarial fees she received for said two (2) months period;
for having failed to account (for) the solemnization fees of those marriages allegedly
not solemnized, but the solemnization fees were not returned; for unauthorized
issuance of temporary receipts, some of which were issued unnumbered; for
 receiving the cash bond of Dacara on October 29, 1991 in the amount of One
Thousand (P1,000.00) Pesos for which she issued only a temporary receipt (Exh. Y)
and for depositing it with the Land Bank of the Philippines only on March 26, 1993, or
after one year and five months in her possession and after this case was already
filed; for withdrawing said cash bond of One Thousand (P1,000.00) Pesos on April
29, 1993 without any court order or authority and redepositing it only on July 23,
1993; for receiving a cash bond of Three Thousand (P3,000.00) Pesos from Alfredo
Seprones in Crim. Case No. 5180, MTC, Tinambac, Camarines Sur, for which she
issued only an unnumbered temporary receipt (Exhs. X and X-1) and for not
depositing it with a bank or with the Municipal Treasurer until it was ordered
released; and for requiring the Rural Bank of Tinambac, Camarines Sur to pay filing
fees on February 4, 1992 for collection cases filed against farmers in the amount of
Four Hundred (P400.00) Pesos, but turning over said amount to the Municipal
Treasurer only on March 12, 1992, it is respectfully recommended that said
respondent clerk of court Nelia Esmeralda-Baroy be dismissed from the service.

It is provided that "Withdrawal of court deposits shall be by the clerk of court who
shall issue official receipt to the provincial, city or municipal treasurer for the amount
withdrawn. Court deposits cannot be withdrawn except by order of the court, . . . ."
(Revised Manual of Instructions for Treasurers, Sec. 183, 184 and 626; p. 127,
Manual for Clerks of Court). A circular also provides that the Clerks of Court shall
immediately issue an official receipt upon receipt of deposits from party litigants and
thereafter deposit intact the collection with the municipal, city or provincial treasurer
and their deposits, can only be withdrawn upon proper receipt and order of the Court
(DOJ Circular No. 52, 26 April 1968; p. 136, Manual for Clerks of Court). Supreme
Court Memorandum Circular No. 5, 25 November 1982, also provides that "all
collections of funds of fiduciary character including rental deposits, shall be deposited
immediately by the clerk of court concerned upon receipt thereof with City, Municipal
or Provincial Treasurer where his court is located" and that "no withdrawal of any of
such deposits shall be made except upon lawful order of the court exercising
jurisdiction over the subject matter.

Respondent Baroy had either failed to comply with the foregoing circulars, or
deliberately disregarded, or even intentionally violated them. By her conduct, she
demonstrated her callous unconcern for the obligations and responsibility of her
duties and functions as a clerk of court and accountable officer. The gross neglect of
her duties shown by her constitute(s) a serious misconduct which warrant(s) her
removal from office. In the case of Belen P. Ferriola vs. Norma Hiam, Clerk of Court,
MTCC, Branch I, Batangas City; A.M. No. P-90-414; August 9, 1993, it was held that
"The clerk of court is not authorized to keep funds in his/her custody; monies
received by him/her shall be deposited immediately upon receipt thereof with the
City, Municipal or Provincial Treasurer. Supreme Court Circular Nos. 5 dated
November 25, 1982 and 5-A dated December 3, 1982. Respondent Hiam's failure to
remit the cash bail bonds and fine she collected constitutes serious misconduct and
her misappropriation of said funds constitutes dishonesty. "Respondent Norma Hiam
was found guilty of dishonesty and serious misconduct prejudicial to the best interest
of the service and (the Court) ordered her immediate dismissal (from) the service.

xxx xxx xxx

We here emphasize once again our adjuration that the conduct and behavior of everyone connected
with an office charged with the dispensation of justice, from the presiding judge to the lowliest clerk,
should be circumscribed with the heavy burden of responsibility. His conduct, at all times, must not
only be characterized by propriety and decorum but, above all else, must be beyond suspicion.
Every employee should be an example of integrity, uprightness and honesty. 5 Integrity in a judicial
office is more than a virtue, it is a necessity. 6 It applies, without qualification as to rank or position,
from the judge to the least of its personnel, they being standard-bearers of the exacting norms of
ethics and morality imposed upon a Court of justice.

On the charge regarding illegal marriages the Family Code pertinently provides that the formal
requisites of marriage are, inter alia, a valid marriage license except in the cases provided for
therein. 7 Complementarily, it declares that the absence of any of the essential or formal requisites
shall generally render the marriage void ab initio and that, while an irregularity in the formal
requisites shall not affect the validity of the marriage, the party or parties responsible for the
irregularity shall be civilly, criminally and administratively liable. 8

The civil aspect is addressed to the contracting parties and those affected by the illegal marriages,
and what we are providing for herein pertains to the administrative liability of respondents, all without
prejudice to their criminal responsibility. The Revised Penal Code provides that "(p)riests or ministers
of any religious denomination or sect, or civil authorities who shall perform or authorize any illegal
marriage ceremony shall be punished in accordance with the provisions of the Marriage Law."9 This
is of course, within the province of the prosecutorial agencies of the Government.

The recommendation with respect to the administrative sanction to be imposed on respondent judge
should, therefore, be modified. For one, with respect to the charge of illegal solemnization of
marriages, it does appear that he had not taken to heart, but actually trifled with, the law's concern
for the institution of marriage and the legal effects flowing from civil status. This, and his undeniable
participation in the other offenses charged as hereinbefore narrated in detail, approximate such
serious degree of misconduct and of gross negligence in the performance of judicial duties as to
ineludibly require a higher penalty.

WHEREFORE, the Court hereby imposes a FINE of P20,000.00 on respondent Judge Lucio P.
Palaypayon. Jr., with a stern warning that any repetition of the same or similar offenses in the future
will definitely be severely dealt with. Respondent Nelia Esmeralda-Baroy is hereby DISMISSED from
the service, with forfeiture of all retirement benefits and with prejudice to employment in any branch,
agency or instrumentality of the Government, including government-owned or controlled
corporations.

Let copies of this decision be spread on their records and furnished to the Office of the Ombudsman
for appropriate action.

SO ORDERED.
 A.M. No. MTJ-00-1329. March 8, 2001

HERMINIA BORJA-MANZANO, Petitioner, vs. JUDGE ROQUE R.

SANCHEZ, MTC, Infanta, Pangasinan, respondent.

RESOLUTION

DAVIDE, JR., C.J.:

The solemnization of a marriage between two contracting parties

who were both bound by a prior existing marriage is the bone of
contention of the instant complaint against respondent Judge Roque
R. Sanchez, Municipal Trial Court, Infanta, Pangasinan. For this act,
complainant Herminia Borja-Manzano charges respondent Judge
with gross ignorance of the law in a sworn Complaint-Affidavit filed
with the Office of the Court Administrator on 12 May 1999.

Complainant avers that she was the lawful wife of the late David
Manzano, having been married to him on 21 May 1966 in San
Gabriel Archangel Parish, Araneta Avenue, Caloocan City. 1 Four
children were born out of that marriage. 2 On 22 March 1993,
however, her husband contracted another marriage with one
Luzviminda Payao before respondent Judge. 3 When respondent
Judge solemnized said marriage, he knew or ought to know that the
same was void and bigamous, as the marriage contract clearly
stated that both contracting parties were separated.

Respondent Judge, on the other hand, claims in his Comment that

when he officiated the marriage between Manzano and Payao he did
not know that Manzano was legally married. What he knew was that
the two had been living together as husband and wife for seven
years already without the benefit of marriage, as manifested in their
joint affidavit. 4 According to him, had he known that the late
Manzano was married, he would have advised the latter not to
marry again; otherwise, he (Manzano) could be charged with
bigamy. He then prayed that the complaint be dismissed for lack of
merit and for being designed merely to harass him.

After an evaluation of the Complaint and the Comment, the Court

Administrator recommended that respondent Judge be found guilty
of gross ignorance of the law and be ordered to pay a fine of
P2,000, with a warning that a repetition of the same or similar act
would be dealt with more severely.

On 25 October 2000, this Court required the parties to manifest

whether they were willing to submit the case for resolution on the
basis of the pleadings thus filed. Complainant answered in the
affirmative.

For his part, respondent Judge filed a Manifestation reiterating his

plea for the dismissal of the complaint and setting aside his earlier
Comment. He therein invites the attention of the Court to two
separate affidavits 5 of the late Manzano and of Payao, which were
allegedly unearthed by a member of his staff upon his instruction.
In those affidavits, both David Manzano and Luzviminda Payao
expressly stated that they were married to Herminia Borja and
Domingo Relos, respectively; and that since their respective
marriages had been marked by constant quarrels, they had both left
their families and had never cohabited or communicated with their
spouses anymore. Respondent Judge alleges that on the basis of
those affidavits, he agreed to solemnize the marriage in question in
accordance with Article 34 of the Family Code.

We find merit in the complaint.

Article 34 of the Family Code provides:

No license shall be necessary for the marriage of a man and a

woman who have lived together as husband and wife for at least
five years and without any legal impediment to marry each other.
The contracting parties shall state the foregoing facts in an affidavit
before any person authorized by law to administer oaths. The
solemnizing officer shall also state under oath that he ascertained
the qualifications of the contracting parties and found no legal
impediment to the marriage.

For this provision on legal ratification of marital cohabitation to

apply, the following requisites must concur:
1. The man and woman must have been living together as husband
and wife for at least five years before the marriage;

2. The parties must have no legal impediment to marry each other;

3. The fact of absence of legal impediment between the parties

must be present at the time of marriage;

4. The parties must execute an affidavit stating that they have lived
together for at least five years [and are without legal impediment to
marry each other]; and

5. The solemnizing officer must execute a sworn statement that he

had ascertained the qualifications of the parties and that he had
found no legal impediment to their marriage.6 cräläwvirt ualib räry

Not all of these requirements are present in the case at bar. It is

significant to note that in their separate affidavits executed on 22
March 1993 and sworn to before respondent Judge himself, David
Manzano and Luzviminda Payao expressly stated the fact of their
prior existing marriage. Also, in their marriage contract, it was
indicated that both were separated.

Respondent Judge knew or ought to know that a subsisting previous

marriage is a diriment impediment, which would make the
subsequent marriage null and void.7 In fact, in his Comment, he
stated that had he known that the late Manzano was married he
would have discouraged him from contracting another marriage.
And respondent Judge cannot deny knowledge of Manzanos and
Payaos subsisting previous marriage, as the same was clearly stated
in their separate affidavits which were subscribed and sworn to
before him.

The fact that Manzano and Payao had been living apart from their
respective spouses for a long time already is immaterial. Article
63(1) of the Family Code allows spouses who have obtained a
decree of legal separation to live separately from each other, but in
such a case the marriage bonds are not severed. Elsewise
stated,legal separation does not dissolve the marriage tie, much
less authorize the parties to remarry. This holds true all the more
when the separation is merely de facto, as in the case at bar.

Neither can respondent Judge take refuge on the Joint Affidavit of

David Manzano and Luzviminda Payao stating that they had been
cohabiting as husband and wife for seven years. Just like
separation, free and voluntary cohabitation with another person for
at least five years does not severe the tie of a subsisting previous
marriage. Marital cohabitation for a long period of time between two
individuals who are legally capacitated to marry each other is
merely a ground for exemption from marriage license. It could not
serve as a justification for respondent Judge to solemnize a
subsequent marriage vitiated by the impediment of a prior existing
marriage.

Clearly, respondent Judge demonstrated gross ignorance of the law

when he solemnized a void and bigamous marriage. The maxim
ignorance of the law excuses no one has special application to
judges, 8 who, under Rule 1.01 of the Code of Judicial Conduct,
should be the embodiment of competence, integrity, and
independence. It is highly imperative that judges be conversant
with the law and basic legal principles. 9 And when the law
transgressed is simple and elementary, the failure to know it
constitutes gross ignorance of the law. 10
cräläwvirtuali brä ry

ACCORDINGLY , the recommendation of the Court Administrator is

hereby ADOPTED,with theMODIFICATIONthat the amount of fine to
be imposed upon respondent Judge Roque Sanchez is increased to
P20,000.

SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 83598 March 7, 1997

LEONCIA BALOGBOG and GAUDIOSO BALOGBOG, petitioners,

vs.
HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, RAMONITO BALOGBOG and GENEROSO
BALOGBOG, respondents.

MENDOZA, J.:

This is a petition for review of the decision 1 of the Court of Appeals, affirming the decision of the
Court of First Instance of Cebu City (Branch IX), declaring private respondents heirs of the deceased
Basilio and Genoveva Balogbog entitled to inherit from them.

The facts are as follows. Petitioners Leoncia and Gaudioso Balogbog are the children of Basilio
Balogbog and Genoveva Arzibal who died intestate in 1951 and 1961, respectively. They had an
older brother, Gavino, but he died in 1935, predeceasing their parents.

In 1968, private respondents Ramonito and Generoso Balogbog brought an action for partition and
accounting against petitioners, claiming that they were the legitimate children of Gavino by Catalina
Ubas and that, as such, they were entitled to the one-third share of Gavino in the estate of their
grandparents.

In their answer, petitioners denied knowing private respondents. They alleged that their brother
Gavino died single and without issue in their parents' residence at Tag-amakan, Asturias, Cebu. In
the beginning they claimed that the properties of the estate had been sold to them by their mother
when she was still alive, but they later withdrew this allegation.

Private respondents presented Priscilo Y. Trazo, 2 then 81 years old, mayor of the municipality of
Asturias from 1928 to 1934, who testified that he knew Gavino and Catalina to be husband and wife
and Ramonito to be their first child. On crossexamination, Trazo explained that he knew Gavino and
Catalina because they performed at his campaign rallies, Catalina as "balitaw" dancer and Gavino
Balogbog as her guitarist. Trazo said he attended the wedding of Gavino and Catalina sometime in
1929, in which Rev. Father Emiliano Jomao-as officiated and Egmidio Manuel, then a municipal
councilor, acted as one of the witnesses.

The second witness presented was Matias Pogoy, 3 a family friend of private respondents, who
testified that private respondents are the children of Gavino and Catalina. According to him, the
wedding of Gavino and Catalina was solemnized in the Catholic Church of Asturias, Cebu and that
he knew this because he attended their wedding and was in fact asked by Gavino to accompany
Catalina and carry her wedding dress from her residence in Camanaol to the poblacion of Asturias
before the wedding day. He testified that Gavino died in 1935 in his residence at Obogon,
Balamban, Cebu, in the presence of his wife. (This contradicts petitioners' claim made in their
answer that Gavino died in the ancestral house at Tag-amakan, Asturias.) Pogoy said he was a
carpenter and he was the one who had made the coffin of Gavino. He also made the coffin of the
couple's son, Petronilo, who died when he was six.

Catalina Ubas testified concerning her marriage to Gavino. 4 She testified that after the wedding, she
was handed a "receipt," presumably the marriage certificate, by Fr. Jomao-as, but it was burned
during the war. She said that she and Gavino lived together in Obogon and begot three children,
namely, Ramonito, Petronilo, and Generoso. Petronilo died after an illness at the age of six. On
crossexamination, she stated that after the death of Gavino, she lived in common law relation with a
man for a year and then they separated.

Private respondents produced a certificate from the Office of the Local Civil Registrar (Exh. P) that
the Register of Marriages did not have a record of the marriage of Gavino and Catalina, another
certificate from the Office of the Treasurer (Exh. L) that there was no record of the birth of Ramonito
in that office and, for this reason, the record must be presumed to have been lost or destroyed
during the war, and a certificate by the Parish Priest of Asturias that there was likewise no record of
birth of Ramonito in the church, the records of which were either lost or destroyed during the war.
(Exh. M)

On the other hand, as defendant below, petitioner Leoncia Balogbog testified 5 that Gavino died
single at the family residence in Asturias. She denied that her brother had any legitimate children
and stated that she did not know private respondents before this case was filed. She obtained a
certificate (Exh. 10) from the Local Civil Registrar of Asturias to the effect that that office did not have
a record of the names of Gavino and Catalina. The certificate was prepared by Assistant Municipal
Treasurer Juan Maranga, who testified that there was no record of the marriage of Gavino and
Catalina in the Book of Marriages between 1925 to 1935. 6

Witness Jose Narvasa testified 7 that Gavino died single in 1935 and that Catalina lived with a certain
Eleuterio Keriado after the war, although he did not know whether they were legally married. He
added, however, that Catalina had children by a man she had married before the war, although he
did not know the names of the children. On crossexamination, Narvasa stated that Leoncia
Balogbog, who requested him to testify, was also his bondsman in a criminal case filed by a certain
Mr. Cuyos.

Ramonito Balogbog was presented 8 to rebut Leoncia Balogbog's testimony.

On June 15, 1973, the Court of First Instance of Cebu City rendered judgment for private
respondents (plaintiffs below), ordering petitioners to render an accounting from 1960 until the
finality of its judgment, to partition the estate and deliver to private respondents one-third of the
estate of Basilio and Genoveva, and to pay attorney's fees and costs.

Petitioners filed a motion for new trial and/or reconsideration, contending that the trial court erred in
not giving weight to the certification of the Office of the Municipal Treasurer of Asturias (Exh. 10) to
the effect that no marriage of Gavino and Catalina was recorded in the Book of Marriages for the
years 1925-1935. Their motion was denied by the trial court, as was their second motion for new trial
and/or reconsideration based on the church records of the parish of Asturias which did not contain
the record of the alleged marriage in that church.

On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed. It held that private respondents failed to overcome the
legal presumption that a man and a woman deporting themselves as husband and wife are in fact
married, that a child is presumed to be legitimate, and that things happen according to the ordinary
course of nature and the ordinary habits of life. 9Hence, this petition.

We find no reversible error committed by the Court of Appeals.

First. Petitioners contend that the marriage of Gavino and Catalina should have been proven in
accordance with Arts. 53 and 54 of the Civil Code of 1889 because this was the law in force at the
time the alleged marriage was celebrated. Art. 53 provides that marriages celebrated under the Civil
Code of 1889 should be proven only by a certified copy of the memorandum in the Civil Registry,
unless the books thereof have not been kept or have been lost, or unless they are questioned in the
courts, in which case any other proof, such as that of the continuous possession by parents of the
status of husband and wife, may be considered, provided that the registration of the birth of their
children as their legitimate children is also submitted in evidence.

This Court noted long ago, however, that Arts. 42 to 107 of the Civil Code of 1889 of Spain did not
take effect, having been suspended by the Governor General of the Philippines shortly after the
extension of that code to this
country. 10 Consequently, Arts. 53 and 54 never came into force. Since this case was brought in the
lower court in 1968, the existence of the marriage must be determined in accordance with the
present Civil Code, which repealed the provisions of the former Civil Code, except as they related to
vested rights, 11 and the rules on evidence. Under the Rules of Court, the presumption is that a man
and a woman conducting themselves as husband and wife are legally married. 12 This presumption
may be rebutted only by cogent proof to the contrary. 13 In this case, petitioners' claim that the
certification presented by private respondents (to the effect that the record of the marriage had been
lost or destroyed during the war) was belied by the production of the Book of Marriages by the
assistant municipal treasurer of Asturias. Petitioners argue that this book does not contain any entry
pertaining to the alleged marriage of private respondents' parents.

This contention has no merit. In Pugeda v. Trias, 14 the defendants, who questioned the marriage of
the plaintiffs, produced a photostatic copy of the record of marriages of the Municipality of Rosario,
Cavite for the month of January, 1916, to show that there was no record of the alleged marriage.
Nonetheless, evidence consisting of the testimonies of witnesses was held competent to prove the
marriage. Indeed, although a marriage contract is considered primary evidence of marriage, 15 the
failure to present it is not proof that no marriage took place. Other evidence may be presented to
prove
marriage. 16 Here, private respondents proved, through testimonial evidence, that Gavino and
Catalina were married in 1929; that they had three children, one of whom died in infancy; that their
marriage subsisted until 1935 when Gavino died; and that their children, private respondents herein,
were recognized by Gavino's family and by the public as the legitimate children of Gavino.

Neither is there merit in the argument that the existence of the marriage cannot be presumed
because there was no evidence showing in particular that Gavino and Catalina, in the presence of
two witnesses, declared that they were taking each other as husband and wife. 17 An exchange of
vows can be presumed to have been made from the testimonies of the witnesses who state that a
wedding took place, since the very purpose for having a wedding is to exchange vows of marital
commitment. It would indeed be unusual to have a wedding without an exchange of vows and quite
unnatural for people not to notice its absence.

The law favors the validity of marriage, because the State is interested in the preservation of the
family and the sanctity of the family is a matter of constitutional concern. As stated in Adong
v. Cheong Seng Gee: 18

The basis of human society throughout the civilized world is that of marriage.
Marriage in this jurisdiction is not only a civil contract, but it is a new relation, an
institution in the maintenance of which the public is deeply interested. Consequently,
every intendment of the law leans toward legalizing matrimony. Persons dwelling
together in apparent matrimony are presumed, in the absence of any counter-
presumption or evidence special to the case, to be in fact married. The reason is that
such is the common order of society, and if the parties were not what they thus hold
themselves out as being, they would be living in the constant violation of decency
and of law. A presumption established by our Code of Civil Procedure is "that a man
and a woman deporting themselves as husband and wife have entered into a lawful
 contract of marriage." (Sec. 334, No. 28) Semper praesumitur pro matrimonio —
Always presume marriage. (U.S. vs. Villafuerte and Rabano [1905], 4 Phil., 476; Son
Cui vs. Guepangco, supra; U.S. vs. Memoracion and Uri [1916], 34 Phil., 633; Teter
vs. Teter [1884], 101 Ind., 129.)

Second. Petitioners contend that private respondents' reliance solely on testimonial evidence to
support their claim that private respondents had been in the continuous possession of the status of
legitimate children is contrary to Art. 265 of the Civil Code which provides that such status shall be
proven by the record of birth in the Civil Register, by an authentic document or by final judgment. But
in accordance with Arts. 266 and 267, in the absence of titles indicated in Art. 265, the filiation of
children may be proven by continuous possession of the status of a legitimate child and by any other
means allowed by the Rules of Court or special laws. Thus the Civil Code provides:

Art. 266. In the absence of the titles indicated in the preceding article, the filiation
shall be proved by the continuous possession of status of a legitimate child.

Art. 267. In the absence of a record of birth, authentic document, final judgment or
possession of status, legitimate filiation may be proved by any other means allowed
by the Rules of Court and special laws.

Petitioners contend that there is no justification for presenting testimonies as to the possession by
private respondents of the status of legitimate children because the Book of Marriages for the years
1928-1929 is available.

What is in issue, however, is not the marriage of Gavino and Catalina but the filiation of private
respondents as their children. The marriage of Gavino and Catalina has already been shown in the
preceding discussion. The treasurer of Asturias, Cebu certified that the records of birth of that
municipality for the year 1930 could not be found, presumably because they were lost or destroyed
during the war (Exh. L). But Matias Pogoy testified that Gavino and Catalina begot three children,
one of whom, Petronilo, died at the age of six. Catalina testified that private respondents Ramonito
and Generoso are her children by Gavino Balogbog. That private respondents are the children of
Gavino and Catalina Balogbog cannot therefore be doubted.

Moreover, the evidence in the record shows that petitioner Gaudioso Balogbog admitted to the
police of Balamban, Cebu that Ramonito is his nephew. As the Court of Appeals found:

Ironically, it is appellant Gaudioso himself who supplies the clincher that tips the
balance in favor of the appellees. In an investigation before the Police Investigating
Committee of Balamban, Cebu, held on March 8, 1968, conducted for the purpose of
inquiring into a complaint filed by Ramonito against a patrolman of the Balamban
police force, Gaudioso testified that the complainant in that administrative case is his
nephew. Excerpts from the transcript of the proceedings conducted on that date
(Exhs. "N", "N-1", "N-2", "N-3" and "N-4") read:

Atty. Kiamco — May it please this investigative body.

Q. Do you know the complainant in this Administrative Case No. 1?

A. Yes I know.

Q. Why do you know him?

 A. I know because he is my nephew.

Q. Are you in good terms with your nephew, the complainant?

A. Yes.

Q. Do you mean to say that you are close to him?

A. Yes. We are close.

Q. Why do you say you are close?

A. We are close because aside from the fact that he is my nephew

we were also leaving (sic) in the same house in Butuan City, and I
even barrow (sic) from him money in the amount of P300.00, when I
return to Balamban, Cebu.

xxx xxx xxx

Q. Why is Ramonito Balogbog your nephew?

A. Because he is the son of my elder brother.

This admission of relationship is admissible against Gaudioso although made in

another case. It is considered as a reliable declaration against interest (Rule 130,
Section 22). Significantly, Gaudioso did not try to offer any explanation to blunt the
effects of that declaration. He did not even testify during the trial. Such silence can
only mean that Ramonito is indeed the nephew of Gaudioso, the former being the
son of Gavino.

WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 111547 January 27, 1997

SPS. TRINIDAD S. ESTONINA and PAULINO ESTONINA, petitioners,

vs.
COURT OF APPEALS SPS. CELSO ATAYAN and NILDA HICBAN and CONSUELO VDA. DE
GARCIA, REMEDIOS, ELVIRA, OFELIA, VIRGILIO, MARILOU, and LOLITA all surnamed
GARCIA, and HEIRS OF CASTOR GARCIA and of SANTIAGO GARCIA, JR., respondents.

RESOLUTION

FRANCISCO, J.:

The instant controversy involves Lot C of the amended plan Psu-22983 Amd., situated in Barrio
Santisima Cruz, Sta. Cruz, Laguna with an area of 273 square meters. The said parcel of land was
covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-19175 issued in the name of Santiago Garcia who died
on October 2, 1967. Some six years after Santiago Garcia's death, or on March 10, 1973, the then
Court of First Instance of Manila issued an order granting Trinidad Estonina's application for a writ of
preliminary attachment in Civil Case No. 88430 entitled "Trinidad Estonina et al., plaintiffs -versus-
Consuelo Garcia et al., defendants". Consequently, a notice of attachment was inscribed as a
memorandum of encumbrance at the back of TCT No. T-19175 in favor of Trinidad Estonina
covering all the rights, title, interest, and participation that Consuelo Garcia, the widow of Santiago
Garcia, may have in and to the parcel of land covered by the said title.

As a result of a prior sale made by Santiago Garcia to Anselmo Balasoto of a sixty square meter
portion of the said parcel of land, TCT. No. T-19175 was cancelled and in lieu thereof, TCT No.
77215 was issued on July 25, 1975 in the name of Santiago Garcia covering the remaining 213
square meters. TCT No. 77215 was in turn cancelled on June 27, 1977 because of another sale
purportedly made during his lifetime by Santiago Garcia to his wife's niece, Ofelia Garcia, and TCT
No. 82229 was issued in the name of the latter.

On August 14, 1977, the children of Santiago Garcia with his first wife, Adela Isoreta, namely Ofelia,
Remedios, Elvira and Castor, all surnamed Garcia, executed a deed selling, transferring and
conveying unto the spouses Celso Atayan and Nilda Hicban (hereinafter referred to as the spouses
Atayan for brevity) their "title, rights, interest and participation which is four tenths (4/10) pro indiviso
share" in the said parcel of land covered by TCT No. T-82229. About a year after, Santiago Garcia's
second wife and widow, Consuelo Garcia and their children, Virgilio, Marilou and Lolita, all surnamed
Garcia, followed suit and also sold to the spouses Atayan, their four-tenths (4/10) pro indidviso share
in the same parcel of land. On February 22, 1980, Estrella R. Garcia, the widow of Santiago Garcia,
Jr. (Santiago Garcia's son from his first marriage), and their children, Roderick, Elizabeth, Dorothy
and Erlinda, likewise sold to the spouses Atayan, their one-tenth (1/10) pro indiviso share in the
parcel of land covered by TCT No. T-82229.1

Subsequent to a favorable decision obtained by Trinidad Estonina in Civil Case No. 88430 against
Consuelo Garcia, execution pending appeal was made on the parcel of land formerly covered by
TCT No. T-19175 (now covered by TCT No. T-82229) on July 20, 1979. The said parcel of land was
sold at a public auction where Trinidad Estonina was the highest bidder. Consuelo Garcia appealed
the decision in Civil Case No. 88430 before the then Intermediate Appellate Court which, however,
ruled in favor of Trinidad Estonina. Thus, on February 29, 1984, the Intermediate Appellate Court
rendered a decision declaring "owner's copy of Certificate of Title No. T-82229 a NULLITY and/or
CANCELLED". Upon the finality of the said decision, TCT No. T-82229 was cancelled by the
Register of Deeds of Laguna and in lieu thereof, TCT No. T-99961 was issued in favor of "Trinidad
Estonina married to Paulino Estonina".2

On July 25, 1985, the spouses Atayan filed a complaint for annulment of sheriff's sale and transfer
certificate of title with damages before Branch 28 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Santa Cruz,
Laguna, impleading as defendants therein the spouses Trinidad and Paulino Estonina (hereinafter
referred to as the spouses Estonina for brevity), Nicanor E. Silvano, Reynaldo G. Javier, Edmund R.
Solidum, the Register of Deeds of Laguna, and the heirs of Santiago Garcia who sold to the spouses
Atayan their pro indiviso shares in the parcel of land covered by TCT No. T-82229. The complaint
prayed:

that the sale at public auction of the parcel of land covered by TCT No. 77215 . . .
and the Sheriff's final deed . . . be declared null and void; that the Register of Deeds
be ordered to cancel TCT No. T-99961 in the name of Trinidad S. Estonina married
to Paulino Estonina . . . ; that the plaintiffs be declared owners of nine-tenths
(9/10) pro indiviso interests, shares and participation in the parcel of land covered by
TCT No.
T-77215, . . . , and the Register of Deeds ordered to issue a new certificate of title
corresponding thereto; and that the defendants Nicanor E. Silvano, Reynaldo G.
Javier and Edmund R. Solidum be ordered to pay, jointly and severally, the plaintiffs
spouses and (sic) amount of P30,000 for attorney's fees, P15,000 for litigation
expenses incurred, P20,000 for moral damages and P15,000 for exemplary
damages . . .3

In their amended answer to the plaintiff's complaint, the spouses Estonina claimed that:

the plaintiffs (spouses Atayan) had acted in bad faith in allegedly purchasing the
parcel of land, they being aware that it was the subject of a lawful and valid
attachment; that there was no valid extrajudicial settlement of agreement executed
by the heirs of Santiago Garcia by which their rights could have been adjusted and
settled before doing anything with his property; that the deeds of sale executed by
his heirs were anomalous, fictitious and simulated intended to defeat the adverse
judgment rendered by the Court against them and the writ of attachment issued
pursuant thereto as they were derived from a falsified deed of sale purportedly
executed by Santiago Garcia on June 23, 1967; that the property in question is
presumed to be conjugal answerable for obligations and liabilities of the conjugal
partnership incurred during the existence of the partnership; and that the plaintiffs
were guilty of laches (pp. 90-99, rec.).4

After trial, the RTC rendered a decision dismissing the complaint for lack of merit. It found, among
others, that the property covered by TCT No. T-19175 and now covered by TCT No. T-82229, was
acquired during the marriage of Santiago Garcia and Consuelo Gaza, and is presumed to be
conjugal in nature. Upon the death of Santiago Garcia on October 2, 1967, his conjugal share of
one-half (l/2) of the said parcel of land was transmitted to his heirs by intestate succession. By the
law on intestate succession, his nine children, five by his first wife and four out of the subsequent
marriage, and Consuelo Garcia, his second wife and widow, inherited the same at one-tenth (1/10)
eachpro indiviso. The remaining one-half (1/2) pertained to the conjugal share of Consuelo Garcia.
Thus, inasmuch as Consuelo Garcia inherited one-tenth (1/10) of her husband's conjugal share in
the said property and is the owner of one-half (1/2) thereof as her conjugal share, she owns a total of
55% (or 1/10 plus 1/2) of the said parcel of land.5Finding as such, the RTC held that what could be
attached by the spouses Estonina and later levied on execution and sold at public auction was only
Consuelo Garcia's rights and interests which is fifty five per cent (55%) of the property. Thus, the
RTC ordered the Register of Deeds of the Province of Laguna, to cancel Transfer Certificate of Title
No. T-99961 in the name of TRINIDAD S. ESTONINA, married to Paulino Estonina, and issue
another one, also in her name, married to the same person, stating therein that said person is the
owner of the property therein covered to the extent of 55% pro indiviso, and the remaining 45%
belongs to the heirs of Santiago Garcia pro indiviso.6

Both the spouses Atayan and the heirs of Santiago Garcia appealed to the herein public respondent
Court of Appeals. After a thorough review of the evidence on record, the Court of Appeals concluded
that contrary to the finding of the RTC, the parcel of land in question was not the conjugal property of
Santiago and Consuelo Garcia, but was the former's exclusive property. It was therefore the entire
property that formed part of Santiago Garcia's estate upon his death. When Santiago Garcia died,
his nine children and Consuelo Garcia inherited the said property each to the extent of one-tenth
(1/10) pro indiviso share. Hence, it was only Consuelo Garcia's one-tenth(l/l0) pro indiviso share in
the parcel of land in question which could be validly attached, levied and sold in execution to satisfy
the judgment against her and in favor of Trinidad Estonina in Civil Case No. 88430. On August 12,
1993, the Court of Appeals rendered a decision, the dispositive portion of which reads as follows:

WHEREFORE, the judgment appealed from is REVERSED and SET ASIDE.

Accordingly, Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-99961, covering Lot 2-C (LRC) Psd
223486, situated in Sta. Cruz, Laguna issued in the name of Trinidad S. Estonina,
married to Paulino Estonina . . . , is hereby ordered cancelled and nullified and the
Register of Deeds of Laguna ordered to issue another in lieu thereof covering the
same parcel of land in the name of Trinidad S. Estonina, widow, one-tenth (1/10) pro
indiviso share, and spouses Celso Atayan and Nilda Hicban, nine-tenths (9/10) pro
indiviso share.7

Aggrieved, the spouses Estonina filed this petition and raised the following issues:

I.

The Court of Appeals, in declaring the property in question as exclusive property of

Santiago Garcia, DISREGARDED the long established doctrine that the trial court's
findings especially as to the credibility of the witnesses should be respected.

II.

The Court of Appeals, in issuing the questioned decision, solely centered on the
nature of the property in question, and conveniently brushed aside the following legal
issues raised on appeal (thereby leading to an erroneous judgment), to wit:

(a) That the plaintiffs-appellant (Sps. Atayan and now private respondents) have no
cause of action and/or lack cause of action against Estoninas (now petitioners).
Assuming, arguendo that they have, the same is now barred by laches. The same is
true with the appellants Garcias (now also private respondents). Hence, the title of
Estonina should have been declared valid.

(b) That the plaintiffs-appellants (Sps. Atayan and now private respondents) are not
parties to Civil Case No. 88430 where the writ of attachment was issued and which
resulted in the execution pending appeal. Hence, they cannot attack the validity of
the execution in this proceedings especially so when judgment therein had already
attained finality.
 III.

Consequently, by virtue of the foregoing errors, the Court of Appeals erred in not
granting herein petitioners' prayer that the trial court's findings be modified by
upholding Estonina's title to the property under TCT No. T-99961, and affirming in all
other respect the order of the trial court. 8

The settled rule is that the factual findings of the appellate court are deemed conclusive. 9 Thus, the
jurisdiction of this Court in cases brought to it from the Court of Appeals is generally limited to the
review and revision of errors of law allegedly committed by the appellate court. As such, this Court is
generally not duty-bound to analyze and weigh all over again the evidence already considered in the
proceedings below. 10 This is, however, subject to several exceptions, one of which is when there is a
conflict between the factual findings of the Court of Appeals and the trial court, as in this case,
warranting a review by this Court of such factual findings. 11

In concluding that the parcel of land in question was the conjugal property of Santiago and Consuelo
Garcia, the trial court relied solely on the fact that when TCT No. T-19175 covering the said land was
issued, Santiago Garcia was already married to Consuelo Garcia, thus giving rise to the presumption
that the same was indeed conjugal. It found the testimony of Consuelo Garcia that the said property
was inherited by Santiago Garcia from his deceased mother to be self-serving and completely
disregarded the said testimony. And as regards the inscription at the back of the TCT No. T-19175
that:

[t]he property described in this title is subject to the claims of the heirs of the
deceased Eugenia Clemente, within two (2) years from January 27, 1961, in
accordance with the provision of Section 4, Rule 74 of the Rules of Court, 12

the trial court held that "there is no showing at all from said inscription that said property
came from the parents of Santiago Garcia." 13

On the other hand, the Court of Appeals in taking the stance that the said land was the exclusive
property of Santiago Garcia, gave credence to the unrebutted testimony of Consuelo Garcia that the
said parcel of land was inherited by Santiago Garcia from his deceased mother Eugenia Clemente
and that it used to be part of a big tract of land which was divided among Santiago and his sisters.

The evidence on record as well as established jurisprudence on the matter, lead us to concur with
the finding of the Court of Appeals that the property involved in this dispute is indeed the exclusive
property of the deceased Santiago Garcia. It has been repeatedly held by this Court that the
presumption under Article 160 of the Civil Code that all property of the marriage belong to the
conjugal partnership applies only when there is proof that the property was acquired during the
marriage. Otherwise stated, proof of acquisition during the marriage is a condition sine qua nonfor
the operation of the presumption in favor of the conjugal partnership. 14 In the case at bench, the
petitioners have been unable to present any proof that the property in question was acquired during
the marriage of Santiago and Consuelo. They anchor their claim solely on the fact that when the title
over the land in question was issued, Santiago was already married to Consuelo as evidenced by
the registration in the name of "Santiago Garcia married to Consuelo Gaza". This, according to the
spouses Estonina, suffices to establish the conjugal nature of the property. The foregoing contention
has no merit. In the case of Jocson v. Court of Appeals 15 we held that:

The certificates of title, however, upon which petitioner rests his claim in insufficient.
The fact that the properties were registered in the name of "Emilio Jocson, married to
Alejandra Poblete" is no proof that the properties were acquired during the spouses'
 coverture. Acquisition of title and registration thereof are two different acts. It is well
settled that registration does not confer title but merely confirms one already erdsting
. . . . It may be that the properties under dispute were acquired by Emilio Jocson
when he was still a bachelor but were registered only after his marriage to Alejandra
Poblete, which explains why he was described in the certificates of title as married to
the latter.

Contrary to petitioner's position, the certificates of title show, on their face, that the
properties were exclusively Emilio Jocson's, the registered owner. This is so because
the words "married to" preceding "Alejandra Poblete" are merely descriptive of the
civil status of Emilio Jocson . . . . In other words, the import from the certificates of
title is that Emilio Jocson is the owner of the properties, the same having been
registered in his name alone, and that he is married to Alejandra
Poblete. 16

Being the exclusive property of Santiago Garcia, it was the entire parcel of land in question that
formed part of his estate and which passed to his ten heirs by compulsory succession upon his
death. And as correctly held by the Court of Appeals, what could therefore be attached and sold at
public auction in Civil Case No. 88430 was only the one-tenth (1/10) pro indiviso share of Consuelo
Garcia in the said parcel of land. The sale at public auction of the disputed property in its entirety by
the Sheriff in favor of Trinidad Estonina over and above the one-tenth (1/10) share of Consuelo
Garcia is null and void, belonging as it does to the other heirs of Santiago Garcia and later to the
spouses Atayan. Worth reiterating is the basic precept that the power of the court in the execution of
judgments extends only over properties uncluestionably belonging to the judgment debtor. The levy
by the sheriff of a property by virtue of a writ of attachment may be considered as made under the
authority of the court only when the property levied upon belongs to the defendant. 17 For, as the
saying goes, one man's goods shall not be sold for another man's debts. 18

The right of a third-party claimant to file an independent action to vindicate his claim of ownership
over the properties seized is reserved by Section 17, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court:

Sec. 17. Proceedings where property claimed by third person. — If property levied on
be claimed by any other person than the judgment debtor or his agent, and such
person make an affidavit of his title thereto or his right to the possession thereof,
stating the grounds of his right or title, and serve the same upon the officer making
the levy, and a copy thereof upon the judgment creditor, the officer shall not be
bound to keep the property, unless such judgment creditor or his agent, on demand
of the officer, indemnify the officer against such claim by a bond in a sum not greater
than the value of the property levied on. In case of disagreement as to such value,
the same shall be determined by the court issuing the writ of execution.

The officer is not liable for damages, for the taking or the keeping of the property, to
any third-party claimant unless a claim is made by the latter and unless an action for
damages is brought by him against the officer within one hundred twenty (120) days
from the date of the filing of the bond. But nothing herein contained shall prevent
such claimant or any third person from vindicating his claim to the property by any
other proper action.

xxx xxx xxx (Emphasis supplied.)

As stated in the case of Sy v. Discaya, 19 this "proper action" would have for its object the recovery of
ownership or possession of the property seized by the sheriff, as well as damages resulting from the
allegedly wrongful seizure and detention thereof despite the third party claim and it may be brought
against the sheriff and such other parties as may be alleged to have colluded with him in the
supposedly wrongful execution proceedings, such as the judgment creditor himself. Such "proper
action", as above pointed out, is and should be an entirely separate and distinct action from that in
which execution has issued, if instituted by a stranger to the latter suit. 20

In the case at bench, the filing by the spouses Atayan of an independent action with the court other
than the one which issued the writ of execution is proper as they were strangers to Civil Case No.
88430. Such an independent action cannot be considered as an encroachment upon the jurisdiction
of a co-equal and coordinate court. 21 While it is true that property in custody of the law may not be
interfered with, without the permission of the proper court, this rule is confined to cases where the
property belongs to the defendant or one in which the defendant has proprietary interests. But when
the Sheriff, acting beyond the bounds of his office seizes a stranger's property, the rule does not
apply and interference with his custody is not interference with another court's custody. 22

The foregoing puts to rest any and all questions raised regarding the propriety of the course of action
taken by the spouses Atayan in vindication of their claim over the land in question. Anent the
contention that the spouses Atayan are guilty of laches, suffice it to state that this residual argument
deserves scant consideration. Being strangers to Civil Case No. 88430 where the writ of execution
over the land in question was issued, they cannot be faulted for filing the "proper action" only in 1985
or six (6) years after the levy on execution. Besides, it was only in 1984 that the Court of Appeals
rendered a decision finally cancelling the title of their predecessors-in-interest and issuing another
one in favor of Trinidad Estonina. The action filed by the spouses Atayan seeking the annulment of
the sheriffs sale and the transfer certificate of title with damages immediately thereafter or on July
25, 1985 cannot be considered as undue delay nor does it imply a lack of interest to enforce their
claim over the disputed property.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED and the assailed decision of the Court of Appeals is
affirmed in toto.

SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 135216 August 19, 1999

TOMASA VDA. DE JACOB, as Special Administratrix of the Intestate Estate of Deceased

Alfredo E. Jacob,petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, PEDRO PILAPIL, THE REGISTER OF DEEDS for the Province of
Camarines Sur, and JUAN F. TRIVINO as publisher of "Balalong," respondents.

PANGANIBAN, J.:

The contents of a document may be proven by competent evidence other than the document itself,
provided that the offeror establishes its due execution and its subsequent loss or destruction.
Accordingly, the fact of marriage may be shown by extrinsic evidence other than the marriage
contract.

The Case

Before us is a Petition for Review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, assailing the Decision of the
Court of Appeals1 (CA) dated January 15, 1998, and its Resolution dated August 24, 1998, denying
petitioner’s Motion for Reconsideration.

The dispositive part of the CA Decision reads:

WHEREFORE, finding no reversible error in the decision appealed from it being more
consistent with the facts and the applicable law, the challenged Decision dated 05 April 1994
of the RTC, Br. 30, Tigaon, Camarines Sur is AFFIRMED in toto.2

The decretal portion of the trial court Decision3 is as follows:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, decision is hereby rendered in favor of [herein

Respondent] Pedro Pilapil, and against [herein Petitioner] Tomasa Guison as follows:

a) Declaring Exh. B, the so called "reconstructed marriage contract" excluded under

the best evidence rule, and therefore declaring said Exh. B spurious and non-
existent.

b) Declaring Exh. 3 Order dated July 18, 1961, and the signature of the issuing
Judge JOSE L. MOYA (Exh. 34) to be genuine.

c) Permanently setting aside and lifting the provisional writ of injunction earlier
issued; and

d) To pay attorney's fees of P50,000.

And costs against [herein petitioner.]

The Facts

The Court of Appeals narrates the facts thus:

Plaintiff-appellant [petitioner herein] claimed to be the surviving spouse of deceased Dr.
Alfredo E. Jacob and was appointed Special Administratix for the various estates of the
deceased by virtue of a reconstructed Marriage Contract between herself and the deceased.

Defendant-appellee on the other hand, claimed to be the legally-adopted son of Alfredo. In

support of his claim, he presented an Order dated 18 July 1961 issued by then Presiding
Judge Jose L. Moya, CFI, Camarines Sur, granting the petition for adoption filed by
deceased Alfredo in favor of Pedro Pilapil. 1âwphi 1.nêt

During the proceeding for the settlement of the estate of the deceased Alfredo in Case No.
T-46 (entitled "Tomasa vda. de Jacob v. Jose Centenera, et al) herein defendant-appellee
Pedro sought to intervene therein claiming his share of the deceased’s estate as Alfredo's
adopted son and as his sole surviving heir. Pedro questioned the validity of the marriage
between appellant Tomasa and his adoptive father Alfredo.

Appellant Tomasa opposed the Motion for Intervention and filed a complaint for injunction
with damages (Civil Case No. T-83) questioning appellee's claim as the legal heir of Alfredo.

The following issues were raised in the court a quo:

a) Whether the marriage between the plaintiff-appellant and deceased Alfredo Jacob
was valid;

b) Whether the defendant-appellee is the legally adopted son of deceased Jacob.

On the first issue, appellant claims that the marriage between her and Alfredo was
solemnized by one Msgr. Florencio C. Yllana, CBCP, Intramuros, Manila sometime in 1975.
She could not however present the original copy of the Marriage Contract stating that the
original document was lost when Msgr. Yllana allegedly gave it to Mr. Jose Centenera for
registration. In lieu of the original, Tomasa presented as secondary evidence a reconstructed
Marriage Contract issued in 1978.

During the trial, the court a quo observed the following irregularities in the execution of the
reconstructed Marriage Contract, to wit:

1. No copy of the Marriage Contract was sent to the local civil registrar by the
solemnizing officer thus giving the implication that there was no copy of the marriage
contract sent to, nor a record existing in the civil registry of Manila;

2. In signing the Marriage Contract, the late Alfredo Jacob merely placed his
"thumbmark" on said contract purportedly on 16 September 1975 (date of the
marriage). However, on a Sworn Affidavit executed between appellant Tomasa and
Alfredo a day before the alleged date of marriage or on 15 September 1975 attesting
that both of them lived together as husband and wife for five (5) years, Alfredo
[af]fixed his customary signature. Thus the trial court concluded that the "thumbmark"
was logically "not genuine". In other words, not of Alfredo Jacob’s;

3. Contrary to appellant’s claim, in his Affidavit stating the circumstances of the loss
of the Marriage Contract, the affiant Msgr. Yllana never mentioned that he allegedly
"gave the copies of the Marriage Contract to Mr. Jose Centenera for registration".
And as admitted by appellant at the trial, Jose Centenera (who allegedly acted as
 padrino) was not present at the date of the marriage since he was then in Australia.
In fact, on the face of the reconstructed Marriage Contract, it was one "Benjamin
Molina" who signed on top of the typewritten name of Jose Centenera. This belies
the claim that Msgr. Yllana allegedly gave the copies of the Marriage Contract to Mr.
Jose Centenera;

4. Appellant admitted that there was no record of the purported marriage entered in
the book of records in San Agustin Church where the marriage was allegedly
solemnized.

Anent the second issue, appellee presented the Order dated 18 July 1961 in Special
Proceedings No. 192 issued by then Presiding Judge Moya granting the petition for adoption
filed by deceased Alfredo which declared therein Pedro Pilapil as the legally adopted son of
Alfredo.

Appellant Tomasa however questioned the authenticity of the signature of Judge Moya.

In an effort to disprove the genuineness and authenticity of Judge Moya's signature in the
Order granting the petition for adoption, the deposition of Judge Moya was taken at his
residence on 01 October 1990.

In his deposition, Judge Moya attested that he could no longer remember the facts in judicial
proceedings taken about twenty-nine (29) years ago when he was then presiding judge since
he was already 79 years old and was suffering from "glaucoma".

The trial court then consulted two (2) handwriting experts to test the authenticity and
genuineness of Judge Moya's signature.

A handwriting examination was conducted by Binevenido C. Albacea, NBI Document

Examiner. Examiner Albacea used thirteen (13) specimen signatures of Judge Moya and
compared it with the questioned signature. He pointed out irregularities and "significant
fundamental differences in handwriting characteristics/habits existing between the
questioned and the "standard" signature" and concluded that the questioned and the
standard signatures "JOSE L. MOYA" were NOT written by one and the same person.

On the other hand, to prove the genuineness of Judge Moya's signature, appellee presented
the comparative findings of the handwriting examination made by a former NBI Chief
Document Examiner Atty. Desiderio A. Pagui who examined thirty-two (32) specimen
signatures of Judge Moya inclusive of the thirteen (13) signatures examined by Examiner
Albacea. In his report, Atty. Pagui noted the existence of significant similarities of
unconscious habitual pattern within allowable variation of writing characteristics between the
standard and the questioned signatures and concluded that the signature of Judge Moya
appearing in the Order dated 18 July 1961 granting the petition for adoption was indeed
genuine.

Confronted with two (2) conflicting reports, the trial court sustained the findings of Atty. Pagui
declaring the signature of Judge Moya in the challenged Order as genuine and authentic.

Based on the evidence presented, the trial court ruled for defendant-appellee sustaining his
claim as the legally adopted child and sole heir of deceased Alfredo and declaring the
reconstructed Marriage Contract as spurious and non-existent."4 (citations omitted, emphasis
in the original)
 Ruling of the Court of Appeals

In affirming the Decision of the trial court, the Court of Appeals ruled in this wise:

Dealing with the issue of validity of the reconstructed Marriage Contract, Article 6, par. 1 of
the Family Code provides that the declaration of the contracting parties that they take each
other as husband and wife "shall be set forth in an instrument signed by the parties as well
as by their witnesses and the person solemnizing the marriage." Accordingly, the primary
evidence of a marriage must be an authentic copy of the marriage contract.

And if the authentic copy could not be produced, Section 3 in relation to Section 5, Rule 130
of the Revised Rules of Court provides:

Sec. 3. Original document must be produced; exceptions. — When the subject of

inquiry is the contents of a document, no evidence shall be admissible other than the
original document itself, except in the following cases:

(a) When the original has been lost or destroyed, or cannot be produced in court
without bad faith on the part of the offeror;

xxx xxx xxx

Sec. 5. When the original document is unavailable. — When the original document
has been lost or destroyed, or cannot be produced in court, the offeror, upon proof of
its execution or existence and the cause of its unavailability without bad faith on his
part, may prove its contents by a copy. Or by a recital of its contents in some
authentic document, or by the testimony of witnesses in the order stated.

As required by the Rules, before the terms of a transaction in reality may be established by
secondary evidence, it is necessary that the due execution of the document and subsequent
loss of the original instrument evidencing the transaction be proved. For it is the due
execution of the document and subsequent loss that would constitute the foundation for the
introduction of secondary evidence to prove the contents of such document.

In the case at bench, proof of due execution besides the loss of the three (3) copies of the
marriage contract has not been shown for the introduction of secondary evidence of the
contents of the reconstructed contract. Also, appellant failed to sufficiently establish the
circumstances of the loss of the original document.

With regard to the trial court's finding that the signature of then Judge Moya in the
questioned Order granting the petition for adoption in favor of Pedro Pilapil was genuine,
suffice it to state that, in the absence of clear and convincing proof to the contrary, the
presumption applies that Judge Moya in issuing the order acted in the performance of his
regular duties.

Furthermore, since the signature appearing in the challenged Order was subjected to a rigid
examination of two (2) handwriting experts, this negates the possibility of forgery of Judge
Moya's signature. The value of the opinion of a handwriting expert depends not upon his
mere statement of whether a writing is genuine or false, but upon the assistance he may
afford in pointing out distinguishing marks, characteristics, and discrepancies in and between
genuine and false specimens of writing of which would ordinarily escape notice or dete[c]tion
 from an unpracticed observer. And in the final analysis, the assessment of the credibility of
such expert witnesses rests largely in the discretion of the trial court, and the test of
qualification is necessarily a relative one, depending upon the subject under investigation
and the fitness of the particular witness. Except in extraordinary cases, an appellate court will
not reverse on account of a mistake of judgment on the part of the trial court in determining
qualifications of this case.

Jurisprudence is settled that the trial court's findings of fact when ably supported by
substantial evidence on record are accorded with great weight and respect by the Court.
Thus, upon review, We find that no material facts were overlooked or ignored by the court
below which if considered might vary the outcome of this case nor there exist cogent reasons
that would warrant reversal of the findings below. Factual findings of the trial court are
entitled to great weight and respect on appeal especially when established by unrebutted
testimony and documentary evidence.5 (citations omitted, emphasis in the original)

Disagreeing with the above, petitioner lodged her Petition for Review before this Court.6

The Issues

In her Memorandum petitioner presents the following issues for the resolution of this Court:

a) Whether or not the marriage between the plaintiff Tomasa Vda. De Jacob and deceased
Alfredo E. Jacob was valid; and

b) Whether defendant Pedro Pilapil is the legally adopted son of Alfredo E. Jacob.7

The Court's Ruling

The Petition is meritorious. Petitioner's marriage is valid, but respondent’s adoption has not been
sufficiently established.

First Issue:

Validity of Marriage

Doctrinally, a void marriage may be subjected to collateral attack, while a voidable one may be
assailed only in a direct proceeding.8 Aware of this fundamental distinction, Respondent Pilapil
contends that the marriage between Dr. Alfredo Jacob and petitioner was void ab initio, because
there was neither a marriage license nor a marriage ceremony.9 We cannot sustain this contention.

To start with, Respondent Pedro Pilapil argues that the marriage was void because the parties had
no marriage license. This argument is misplaced, because it has been established that Dr. Jacob
and petitioner lived together as husband and wife for at least five years.10 An affidavit to this effect
was executed by Dr. Jacob and petitioner.11Clearly then, the marriage was exceptional in character
and did not require a marriage license under Article 76 of the Civil Code.12 The Civil Code governs
this case, because the questioned marriage and the assailed adoption took place prior the effectivity
of the Family Code.

When Is Secondary Evidence Allowed?

"It is settled that if the original writing has been lost or destroyed or cannot be produced in court,
upon proof of its execution and loss or destruction, or unavailability, its contents may be proved by a
copy or a recital of its contents in some authentic document, or by recollection of witnesses."13 Upon
a showing that the document was duly executed and subsequently lost, without any bad faith on the
part of the offeror, secondary evidence may be adduced to prove its contents.14

The trial court and the Court of Appeals committed reversible error when they (1) excluded the
testimonies of petitioner, Adela Pilapil and Msgr. Florencio Yllana and (2) disregarded the following:
(a) photographs of the wedding ceremony; (b) documentary evidence, such as the letter of
Monsignor Yllana stating that he had solemnized the marriage between Dr. Jacob and petitioner,
informed the Archbishop of Manila that the wedding had not been recorded in the Book of Marriages,
and at the same time requested the list of parties to the marriage; (c) the subsequent authorization
issued by the Archbishop — through his vicar general and chancellor, Msgr. Benjamin L. Marino —
ordaining that the union between Dr. Jacob and petitioner be reflected through a corresponding entry
in the Book of Marriages; and (d) the Affidavit of Monsignor Yllana stating the circumstances of the
loss of the marriage certificate.

It should be stressed that the due execution and the loss of the marriage contract, both constituting
the conditio sine qua non for the introduction of secondary evidence of its contents, were shown by
the very evidence they have disregarded. They have thus confused the evidence to show due
execution and loss as "secondary" evidence of the marriage. In Hernaez v. Mcgrath,15 the Court
clarified this misconception thus:

. . . [T]he court below was entirely mistaken in holding that parol evidence of the execution of
the instrument was barred. The court confounded the execution and the contents of the
document. It is the contents, . . . which may not be prove[n] by secondary evidence when the
instrument itself is accessible. Proofs of the execution are not dependent on the existence or
non-existence of the document, and, as a matter of fact, such proofs precede proofs of the
contents: due execution, besides the loss, has to be shown as foundation for the introduction
of secondary evidence of the contents.

xxx xxx xxx

Evidence of the execution of a document is, in the last analysis, necessarily collateral or
primary. It generally consists of parol testimony or extrinsic papers. Even when the document
is actually produced, its authenticity is not necessarily, if at all, determined from its face or
recital of its contents but by parol evidence. At the most, failure to produce the document,
when available, to establish its execution may affect the weight of the evidence presented
but not the admissibility of such evidence. (emphasis ours)

The Court of Appeals, as well as the trial court, tried to justify its stand on this issue by relying
on Lim Tanhu v. Ramolete.16 But even there, we said that "marriage may be prove[n] by other
competent evidence."17

Truly, the execution of a document may be proven by the parties themselves, by the swearing
officer, by witnesses who saw and recognized the signatures of the parties; or even by those to
whom the parties have previously narrated the execution thereof.18 The Court has also held that
"[t]he loss may be shown by any person who [knows] the fact of its loss, or by any one who ha[s]
made, in the judgment of the court, a sufficient examination in the place or places where the
document or papers of similar character are usually kept by the person in whose custody the
document lost was, and has been unable to find it; or who has made any other investigation which is
sufficient to satisfy the court that the instrument [has] indeed [been] lost."19
In the present case, due execution was established by the testimonies of Adela Pilapil, who was
present during the marriage ceremony, and of petitioner herself as a party to the event. The
subsequent loss was shown by the testimony and the affidavit of the officiating priest, Monsignor
Yllana, as well as by petitioner's own declaration in court. These are relevant, competent and
admissible evidence. Since the due execution and the loss of the marriage contract were clearly
shown by the evidence presented, secondary evidence — testimonial and documentary — may be
admitted to prove the fact of marriage.

The trial court pointed out that on the face of the reconstructed marriage contract were certain
irregularities suggesting that it had fraudulently been obtained.20 Even if we were to agree with the
trial court and to disregard the reconstructed marriage contract, we must emphasize that this
certificate is not the only proof of the union between Dr. Jacob and petitioner.

Proof of Marriage

As early as Pugeda v. Trias, 21 we have held that marriage may be proven by any competent and
relevant evidence. In that case, we said:

Testimony by one of the parties to the marriage, or by one of the witnesses to the marriage,
has been held to be admissible to prove the fact of marriage. The person who officiated at
the solemnization is also competent to testify as an eyewitness to the fact of
marriage.22 (emphasis supplied)

In Balogbog v. CA,23 we similarly held:

[A]lthough a marriage contract is considered primary evidence of marriage, the failure to

present it is not proof that no marriage took place. Other evidence may be presented to
prove marriage. (emphasis supplied, footnote ommitted)

In both cases, we allowed testimonial evidence to prove the fact of marriage. We reiterated this
principle in Trinidad v. CA,24 in which, because of the destruction of the marriage contract, we
accepted testimonial evidence in its place.25

Respondent Pedro Pilapil misplaces emphasis on the absence of an entry pertaining to 1975 in the
Books of Marriage of the Local Civil Registrar of Manila and in the National Census and Statistics
Office (NCSO).26 He finds it quite "bizarre" for petitioner to have waited three years before registering
their marriage.27 On both counts, he proceeds from the wrong premise. In the first place, failure to
send a copy of a marriage certificate for record purposes does not invalidate the marriage.28 In the
second place, it was not the petitioner’s duty to send a copy of the marriage certificate to the civil
registrar. Instead, this charge fell upon the solemnizing officer.29

Presumption in Favor of Marriage

Likewise, we have held:

The basis of human society throughout the civilized world is . . . of marriage. Marriage in this
jurisdiction is not only a civil contract, but it is a new relation, an institution in the
maintenance of which the public is deeply interested. Consequently, every intendment of the
law leans toward legalizing matrimony. Persons dwelling together in apparent matrimony are
presumed, in the absence of any counterpresumption or evidence special to the case, to be
in fact married. The reason is that such is the common order of society, and if the parties
 were not what they thus hold themselves out as being, they would be living in the constant
violation of decency and of law. A presumption established by our Code of Civil Procedure is
"that a man and woman deporting themselves as husband and wife have entered into a
lawful contract of marriage." Semper praesumitur pro matrimonio — Always presume
marriage.30 (emphasis supplied)

This jurisprudential attitude31 towards marriage is based on the prima facie presumption that a man
and a woman deporting themselves as husband and wife have entered into a lawful contract of
marriage.32 Given the undisputed, even accepted,33 fact that Dr. Jacob and petitioner lived together
as husband and wife,34 we find that the presumption of marriage was not rebutted in this case.

Second Issue:

Validity of Adoption Order

In ruling that Respondent Pedro Pilapil was adopted by Dr. Jacob and that the signature of Judge
Moya appearing on the Adoption Order was valid, the Court of Appeals relied on the presumption
that the judge had acted in the regular performance of his duties. The appellate court also gave
credence to the testimony of respondent’s handwriting expert, for "the assessment of the credibility
of such expert witness rests largely on the discretion of the trial court . . . "35

We disagree. As a rule, the factual findings of the trial court are accorded great weight and respect
by appellate courts, because it had the opportunity to observe the demeanor of witnesses and to
note telltale signs indicating the truth or the falsity of a testimony. The rule, however, is not
applicable to the present case, because it was Judge Augusto O. Cledera, not the ponente, who
heard the testimonies of the two expert witnesses. Thus, the Court examined the records and found
that the Court of Appeals and the trial court "failed to notice certain relevant facts which, if properly
considered, will justify a different conclusion."36 Hence, the present case is an exception to the
general rule that only questions of law may be reviewed in petitions under Rule 45.37

Central to the present question is the authenticity of Judge Moya's signature on the questioned
Order of Adoption. To enlighten the trial court on this matter, two expert witnesses were presented,
one for petitioner and one for Respondent Pilapil. The trial court relied mainly on respondent’s expert
and brushed aside the Deposition of Judge Moya himself.38 Respondent Pilapil justifies the trial
judge’s action by arguing that the Deposition was ambiguous. He contends that Judge Moya could
not remember whether the signature on the Order was his and cites the following portion as proof:39

Q. What was you[r] response, sir?

A: I said I do not remember.

Respondent Pilapil's argument is misleading, because it took the judge's testimony out of its context.
Considered with the rest of the Deposition, Judge Moya's statements contained no ambiguity. He
was clear when he answered the queries in the following manner:

Atty. Benito P. Fabie

Q. What else did she tell you[?]

A. And she ask[ed] me if I remembered having issued the order.

 Q. What was your response sir[?]

A. I said I do not remember.40

The answer "I do not remember" did not suggest that Judge Moya was unsure of what he was
declaring. In fact, he was emphatic and categorical in the subsequent exchanges during the
Deposition:

Atty. Benito P. Fabie

Q. I am showing to you this Order, Exh. "A" deposition[;] will you please recall whether you
issued this Order and whether the facsimile of the signature appearing thereon is your
signature.

A. As I said, I do not remember having issued such an order and the signature reading
Jose[;] I can’t make out clearly what comes after the name[;] Jose Moya is not my
signature.41

Clearly, Judge Moya could not recall having ever issued the Order of Adoption. More importantly,
when shown the signature over his name, he positively declared that it was not his.

The fact that he had glaucoma when his Deposition was taken does not discredit his statements. At
the time, he could with medication still read the newspapers; upon the request of the defense
counsel, he even read a document shown to him.42 Indeed, we find no reason – and the respondent
has not presented any – to disregard the Deposition of Judge Moya.

Judge Moya's declaration was supported by the expert testimony of NBI Document Examiner
Bienvenido Albacea, who declared:

Atty. Paraiso

Q And were you able to determine [w]hat purpose you had in your examination of this
document?

A Yes sir, [based on] my conclusion, [I] stated that the questioned and the standard
signature Jose L. Moya were not written by one and the same person. On the basis of my
findings that I would point out in detail, the difference in the writing characteristics [was] in
the structural pattern of letters which is very apparent as shown in the photograph as the
capital letter "J".43

It is noteworthy that Mr. Albacea is a disinterested party, his services having been sought without
any compensation. Moreover, his competence was recognized even by Respondent Pilapil’s expert
witness, Atty. Desiderio Pagui.44

Other considerations also cast doubt on the claim of respondent. The alleged Order was purportedly
made in open court. In his Deposition, however, Judge Moya declared that he did not dictate
decisions in adoption cases. The only decisions he made in open court were criminal cases, in which
the accused pleaded guilty.45 Moreover, Judge Moya insisted that the branch where he was
assigned was always indicated in his decisions and orders; yet the questioned Order did not contain
this information. Furthermore, Pilapil’s conduct gave no indication that he recognized his own
alleged adoption, as shown by the documents that he signed and other acts that he performed
thereafter.46 In the same vein, no proof was presented that Dr. Jacob had treated him as an adopted
child. Likewise, both the Bureau of Records Management47 in Manila and the Office of the Local Civil
Registrar of Tigaon, Camarines Sur,48 issued Certifications that there was no record that Pedro
Pilapil had been adopted by Dr. Jacob. Taken together, these circumstances inexorably negate the
alleged adoption of respondent.49

The burden of proof in establishing adoption is upon the person claiming such relationship.50 This
Respondent Pilapil failed to do. Moreover, the evidence presented by petitioner shows that the
alleged adoption is a sham.

WHEREFORE, the Petition is GRANTED and the assailed Decision of the Court of Appeals is
REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The marriage between Petitioner Tomasa Vda. de Jacob and the
deceased Alfredo E. Jacob is hereby recognized and declared VALID and the claimed adoption of
Respondent Pedro Pilapil is DECLARED NONEXISTENT. No pronouncement as to costs. 1âw phi 1.nêt

SO ORDERED.