DLSU LAW

TRICIA CRUZ GO2 | 2015-2016

CIVIL LAW REVIEW II | ATTY. LEGARDA

LAND TITLES AND DEEDS

1. Torrens System

Legarda v. Saleeby, 31 Phil 590 (1915)

A title once registered cannot be defeated, even by an adverse, open, and notorious
possession. Registered title under the Torrens System cannot be defeated by prescription
(section 46, Act No. 496). The title, once registered, is notice to the world. All persons must take
notice. No one can plead ignorance of the registration.

Adopting the rule which we believe to be more in consonance with the purposes and the
real intent of the torrens system, we are of the opinion and so decree that in case land has been
registered under the Land Registration Act in the name of two different persons, the earlier in
date shall prevail. As was said above, the primary and fundamental purpose of the Torrens
System is to quiet title. If the holder of a certificate cannot rest secure in this registered title then
the purpose of the law is defeated.

Capitol v. Province of Negros Occidental, 7 SCRA 60 (1963)

The main purpose of the Torrens System is to avoid possible conflicts of title in and to
real estate, and to facilitate transactions relative thereto giving the public the right to rely upon
the face of Torrens certificate of title and to dispense with the of inquiring further, except when
the party concerned has actual knowledge of facts and circumstances that should impel a
reasonably cautious man to make such further inquiry. In the case at bar plaintiff had no such
actual knowledge, it being an established fact that he was not aware until 1949 that the land on
which the provincial hospital stood was Lot 378.

Valientes v Ramas, G.R. No. 157852, December 15, 2010

Under the Torrens System as enshrined in P.D. No. 1529, the decree of registration and
the certificate of title issued become incontrovertible upon the expiration of one year from the
date of entry of the decree of registration, without prejudice to an action for damages against the
applicant or any person responsible for the fraud. Notwithstanding the irrevocability of the
Torrens title already issued in the name of another person, he can still be compelled under the
law to reconvey the subject property to the rightful owner. The property registered is deemed to
be held in trust for the real owner by the person in whose name it is registered. After all, the
Torrens system was not designed to shield and protect one who had committed fraud or
misrepresentation and thus holds title in bad faith.

In an action for reconveyance, the decree of registration is respected as incontrovertible.

What is sought instead is the transfer of the property, in this case the title thereof, which has
been wrongfully or erroneously registered in another person's name, to its rightful and legal
owner, or to one with a better right. This is what reconveyance is all about.

Yet, the right to seek reconveyance based on an implied or constructive trust is not
absolute nor is it imprescriptible. An action for reconveyance based on an implied or
constructive trust must perforce prescribe in ten years from the issuance of the Torrens title over
the property.

Zulueta v Espina, February 25, 2012

It bears to note at this stage that the Court likewise agrees with the ruling of the CA that
respondents are presumed purchasers in good faith. In holding thus, the CA relied on the
settled principle that one who deals with property registered under the Torrens System need not
go beyond the same, but only has to rely on the title.

In the instant case, there is no dispute that the subject property was already covered by
a Torrens title when respondents bought the same. There was no allegation in the Amended
Complaint that respondents were not buyers in good faith. More particularly, there was nothing
in the said complaint to indicate that respondents were aware of or were participants in the
alleged fraud supposedly committed against petitioners' predecessor-in-interest, or that they
have notice of any defect in the title of the seller. As the CA correctly noted, from the time that
petitioners' predecessor-in-interest was supposedly deprived of ownership of the subject Jot
through an alleged fraudulent sale, the same had already been sold thrice.

Moreover, since the subject property was already covered by a Torrens title at the time
that respondents bought the same, the law does not require them to go beyond what appears
on the face of the title. The lot has, thus, passed to respondents, who are presumed innocent
purchasers for value, in the absence of any allegation to the contrary.

Landbank v Poblete, G.R. No. 196577, February 25, 2013

There is indeed a situation where, despite the fact that the mortgagor is not the owner of
the mortgaged property, his title being fraudulent, the mortgage contract and any foreclosure
sale arising therefrom are given effect by reason of public policy. This is the doctrine of "the
mortgagee in good faith" based on the rule that buyers or mortgagees dealing with property
covered by a Torrens Certificate of Title are not required to go beyond what appears on the face
of the title.

However, it has been consistently held that this rule does not apply to banks, which are
required to observe a higher standard of diligence. A bank whose business is impressed with
public interest is expected to exercise more care and prudence in its dealings than a private
individual, even in cases involving registered lands. A bank cannot assume that, simply because
the title offered as security is on its face free of any encumbrances or lien, it is relieved of the
responsibility of taking further steps to verify the title and inspect the properties to be
mortgaged.

Applying the same principles, we do not find Land Bank to be a mortgagee in good faith.
Cagatao v. Almonte, October 9, 2013
Although the CA correctly ruled that the transfer from Gatchalian to Manzulin was invalid, the
existence of a valid Torrens title in the name of Carlos which has remained unchallenged before the
proper courts has made irrelevant the issue of whether Gatchalian and his successors-in-interest should
have retained ownership over the property. This is pursuant to the principle that a Torrens title is
irrevocable and its validity can only be challenged in a direct proceeding. The purpose of adopting a
Torrens System in our jurisdiction is to guarantee the integrity of land titles and to protect their
indefeasibility once the claim of ownership is established and recognized. This is to avoid any possible
conflicts of title that may arise by giving the public the right to rely upon the face of the Torrens title and
dispense with the need of inquiring further as to the ownership of the property. Hence, a Torrens
certificate of title is indefeasible and binding upon the whole world unless it is nullified by a court of
competent jurisdiction in a direct proceeding for cancellation of title.

Paraguya v. Sps. Crucillo, G.R. No. 200265, December 2, 2013

It is an established rule that a Torrens certificate of title is not conclusive proof of ownership.
Verily, a party may seek its annulment on the basis of fraud or misrepresentation. However, such action
must be seasonably filed, else the same would be barred. In this relation, Section 32 of PD 1529 provides
that the period to contest a decree of registration shall be one (1) year from the date of its entry and that,
after the lapse of the said period, the Torrens certificate of title issued thereon becomes incontrovertible
and indefeasible. In view of the foregoing, the Court is impelled to sustain the CA’s dismissal of
Paraguya’s complaint for annulment of OCT No. P–17729 since it was filed only on December 19, 1990,
or more than eleven (11) years from the title’s date of entry on August 24, 1979. Based on Section 32 of
PD 1529, said title had become incontrovertible and indefeasible after the lapse of one (1) year from the
date of its entry, thus barring Paraguya’s action for annulment of title.

Heirs of Sarili, et al v Lagrosa, G.R. No. 193517, January 15, 2014

It is well settled that even if the procurement of a certificate of title was tainted with fraud
and misrepresentation, such defective title may be the source of a completely legal and valid
title in the hands of an innocent purchaser for value. Where innocent third persons, relying on
the correctness of the certificate of title thus issued, acquire rights over the property, the court
cannot disregard such rights and order the total cancellation of the certificate. The effect of such
an outright cancellation would be to impair public confidence in the certificate of title, for
everyone dealing with property registered under the Torrens system would have to inquire in
every instance whether the title has been regularly or irregularly issued. This is contrary to the
evident purpose of the law.

The general rule is that every person dealing with registered land may safely rely on the
correctness of the certificate of title issued therefor and the law will in no way oblige him to go
beyond the certificate to determine the condition of the property. Where there is nothing in the
certificate of title to indicate any cloud or vice in the ownership of the property, or any
encumbrance thereon, the purchaser is not required to explore further than what the Torrens
Title upon its face indicates in quest for any hidden defects or inchoate right that may
subsequently defeat his right thereto.

However, a higher degree of prudence is required from one who buys from a person
who is not the registered owner, although the land object of the transaction is registered. In such
a case, the buyer is expected to examine not only the certificate of title but also all factual
circumstances necessary for him to determine if there are any flaws in the title of the
transferor. The buyer also has the duty to ascertain the identity of the person with whom he is
dealing with and the latter’s legal authority to convey the property.

The strength of the buyer’s inquiry on the seller’s capacity or legal authority to sell depends on
the proof of capacity of the seller. If the proof of capacity consists of a special power of attorney
duly notarized, mere inspection of the face of such public document already constitutes
sufficient inquiry. If no such special power of attorney is provided or there is one but there
appears to be flaws in its notarial acknowledgment, mere inspection of the document will not do;
the buyer must show that his investigation went beyond the document and into the
circumstances of its execution.

Vilbar v Opinion, G.R. No. 176043, January 15, 2014.

The Court recognizes "[t]he settled rule that levy on attachment, duly registered,
takes preference over a prior unregistered sale. This result is a necessary consequence of
the fact that the [properties] involved [were] duly covered by the Torrens system which works
under the fundamental principle that registration is the operative act which gives validity to the
transfer or creates a lien upon the land."

Contrary to the [Spouses Vilbar’s] claim, [Opinion] was never remiss in his duty of
ensuring that the Gorospes had clean title over the property. [Opinion] had even conducted an
investigation. He had, in this regard, no reason not to believe in the assurance of the Gorospes,
more so that the claimed right of [Spouses Vilbar] was never annotated on the certificate of title
covering lot 20, because it is settled that a party dealing with a registered land does not have to
inquire beyond the Certificate of Title in determining the true owner thereof, and in guarding or
protecting his interest, for all that he has to look into and rely on are the entries in the Certificate
of Title.

Inarguably, Opinion acted in good faith in dealing with the registered owners of the
properties. He relied on the titles presented to him, which were confirmed by the Registry of
Deeds to be authentic, issued in accordance with the law, and without any liens or
encumbrances.

Besides, assuming arguendo that the Gorospes’ titles to the subject properties
happened to be fraudulent, public policy considers Opinion to still have acquired legal title as a
mortgagee in good faith. There is, however, a situation where, despite the fact that the
mortgagor is not the owner of the mortgaged property, his title being fraudulent, the mortgage
contract and any foreclosure sale arising therefrom are given effect by reason of public policy.
This is the doctrine of ‘the mortgagee in good faith’ based on the rule that all persons
dealing with property covered by a Torrens Certificate of Title, as buyers or mortgagees, are not
required to go beyond what appears on the face of the title. The public interest in upholding the
indefeasibility of a certificate of title, as evidence of the lawful ownership of the land or of any
encumbrance thereon, protects a buyer or mortgagee who, in good faith, relied upon what
appears on the face of the certificate of title.
Leong vs. See, G.R. No. 194077, December 3, 2014
The Torrens System was adopted to “obviate possible conflicts of title by giving the
public the right to rely upon the face of the Torrens certificate and to dispense, as a rule, with
the necessity of inquiring further.” One need not inquire beyond the four corners of the
certificate of title when dealing with registered property. An innocent purchaser for value refers
to someone who “buys the property of another without notice that some other person has a right
to or interest in it, and who pays a full and fair price at the time of the purchase or before
receiving any notice of another person’s claim.” One claiming to be an innocent purchaser for
value has the burden of proving such status.

The protection of innocent purchasers in good faith for value grounds on the social interest
embedded in the legal concept granting indefeasibility of titles. Between the third party and the
owner, the latter would be more familiar with the history and status of the titled
property. Consequently, an owner would incur less cost to discover alleged invalidities relating
to the property compared to a third party. Such costs are, thus, better borne by the owner to
mitigate costs for the economy, lessen delays in transactions, and achieve a less optimal
welfare level for the entire society.

Hortizuela vs. Togufa, G.R. No. 205867, February 23, 2015

In filing the complaint for reconveyance and recovery of possession, Hortizuela was not
seeking a reconsideration of the granting of the patent or the decree issued in the registration
proceedings. What she was seeking was the reconveyance of the subject property on account
of the fraud committed by respondent Gregoria. An action for reconveyance is a legal and
equitable remedy granted to the rightful landowner, whose land was wrongfully or erroneously
registered in the name of another, to compel the registered owner to transfer or reconvey the
land to him. Thus, the RTC did not err in upholding the right of Hortizuela to ask for the
reconveyance of the subject property. To hold otherwise would be to make the Torrens
system a shield for the commission of fraud.

To reiterate, the fact that petitioner was able to secure a title in her name did not operate
to vest ownership upon her of the subject land.1âwphi1 Registration of a piece of land under the
Torrens System does not create or vest title, because it is not a mode of acquiring ownership. A
certificate of title is merely an evidence of ownership or title over the particular property
described therein. It cannot be used to protect a usurper from the true owner; nor can it be used
as a shield for the commission of fraud; neither does it permit one to enrich himself at the
expense of others. Its issuance in favor of a particular person does not foreclose the possibility
that the real property may be co-owned with persons not named in the certificate, or that the
registered owner may hold it in trust for another person.
 2. Regalian Doctrine

Republic v Medida, G .R. No. 195097, August 3, 2012

As the rule now stands, an applicant must prove that the land subject of an application
for registration is alienable and disposable by establishing the existence of a positive act of the
government such as a presidential proclamation or an executive order; an administrative action;
investigation reports of Bureau of Lands investigators; and a legislative act or a statute. The
applicant may also secure a certification from the government that the land claimed to have
been possessed for the required number of years is alienable and disposable. In a line of cases,
we have ruled that mere notations appearing in survey plans are inadequate proof of the
covered properties’ alienable and disposable character.

Clearly, even the testimony of Engr. Belleza fails to satisfy the required proof. Before us,
Medida attempts to remedy the deficiency in his application by submitting the Certifications of
the CENRO of Argao, Cebu, attached to his Comment to further substantiate his claim that the
subject properties were already declared alienable and disposable. Unfortunately for the
respondent, the said CENRO Certifications remain inadequate to support his intended purpose.
The present rule on the matter then requires that an application for original registration
be accompanied by: (1) CENRO or PENRO Certification; and (2) a copy of the original
classification approved by the DENR Secretary and certified as a true copy by the legal
custodian of the official records. Medida failed in this respect. The records only include
CENRO Certifications on the subject properties’ alienability and disposability, but not a copy of
the original classification approved by the DENR Secretary and certified as true copy by its legal
custodian.
In view of the failure of the respondent to establish by sufficient proof that the subject
parcels of land had been classified as part of the alienable and disposable land of the public
domain, his application for registration of title should be denied.

Republic v Santos, G.R. No. 180027, July 18, 2012

We start our analysis by applying the principle of Jura Regalia or the Regalian Doctrine. Jura
Regalia simply mean that the State is the original proprietor of all lands and, as such, is the general
source of all private titles. Thus, pursuant to this principle, all claims of private title to land, save
those acquired from native title, must be traced from some grant, whether express or implied, from
the State. Absent a clear showing that land had been let into private ownership through the State’s
imprimatur, such land is presumed to belong to the State.

Being an unregistered land, Lot 3 is therefore presumed as land belonging to the State. It is
basic that those who seek the entry of such land into the Torrens system of registration must first
establish that it has acquired valid title thereto as against the State, in accordance with law.

In this case, the respondents were not able to satisfy the third requisite, i.e., that the
respondents failed to establish that they or their predecessors-in-interest, have been in possession
and occupation of Lot 3 "since June 12, 1945 or earlier." First, the testimonies of respondents’
predecessors-in-interest and/or their representatives were patently deficient on this point. Second,
the supporting tax declarations presented by the respondents also fall short of proving possession
since 12 June 1945 or earlier.

The respondents, however, make an alternative plea for registration, (ayaw sumuko) this
time, under Section 14(2) of Presidential Decree No. 1529. Notwithstanding their inability to comply
with Section 14(1) of Presidential Decree No. 1529, the respondents claim that they were at least
able to establish possession and occupation of Lot 3 for a sufficient number of years so as to acquire
title over the same via prescription.

In this case, the respondents were not able to present any "express declaration" from the
State, attesting to the patrimonial character of Lot 3. To put it bluntly, the respondents were not able
to prove that acquisitive prescription has begun to run against the State, much less that they have
acquired title to Lot 3 by virtue thereof. As jurisprudence tells us, a mere certification or report
classifying the subject land as alienable and disposable is not sufficient. We are, therefore, left with
the unfortunate but necessary verdict that the respondent is not entitled to the registration under
Section 14(2) of Presidential Decree No. 1529.

Republic v Lachica, G.R. No. 157485, March 26, 2014

In the case at bar, it is therefore the respondents which have the burden to identify
a positive act of the government, such as an official proclamation, declassifying inalienable
public land into disposable land for agricultural or other purposes. Since respondents failed to
do so, the alleged possession by them and by their predecessors–in–interest is inconsequential
and could never ripen into ownership. Accordingly, respondents cannot be considered to
have private rights within the purview of Proclamation No. 2074 as to prevent the application of
said proclamation to the subject property. We are thus constrained to reverse the rulings of the
courts a quo and grant the prayer of petitioner Republic to dismiss Civil Case No. 1181 (4390)
for lack of merit.

Heirs of Gozo v Philippine Union Mission, G.R. No. 195990, Aug. 5,

2015

While the opposing parties center their arguments and counterarguments on the
timeliness of raising the question of the validity of' donation, a careful scrutiny of the records,
however, reveals a significant fact that at the time the Deed of Donation was executed by the
Spouses Gozo on 28 February 1937, the subject property was part of the inalienable public
domain. It was only almost after two decades later or on 5 October 1953 that the State ceded
its right over the land in favor of the Spouses Gozo by granting their patent application and
issuing an original certificate of title in their favor. Prior to such conferment of title, the Spouses
Gozo possessed no right to dispose of the land which, by all intents and purposes, belongs to
the State.

Under the Regalian doctrine, which is embodied in Article XII, Section 2 of our Constitution, all
lands of the public domain belong to the State, which is the source of any asserted right to any
ownership of land. All lands not appearing to be clearly within private ownership are presumed
to belong to the State. Accordingly, public lands not shown to have been reclassified or released
as alienable agricultural land or alienated to a private person by the State remain part of the
inalienable public domain.
The classification of public lands is an exclusive prerogative of the executive department of the
government and not the Courts. In the absence of such classification, the land remains as an
unclassified land until it is released therefrom and rendered open to disposition. This is in
consonance with the Regalian doctrine that all lands of the public domain belong to the State
and that the State is the source of any asserted right to ownership in land and charged with the
conservation of such patrimony.

3. Citizenship Requirement
SEE: cases under Family Law

4. Original Registration

Republic v Bantigue, G. R. No. 162322, March 14, 2012

The applicant for land registration has the burden of overcoming the presumption of
State ownership by establishing through incontrovertible evidence that the land sought to be
registered is alienable or disposable based on a positive act of the government. We held
in Republic v. T.A.N. Properties, Inc. that a CENRO certification is insufficient to prove the
alienable and disposable character of the land sought to be registered. The applicant must also
show sufficient proof that the DENR Secretary has approved the land classification and
released the land in question as alienable and disposable.

Thus, the present rule is that an application for original registration must be
accompanied by (1) a CENRO or PENRO Certification; and (2) a copy of the original
classification approved by the DENR Secretary and certified as a true copy by the legal
custodian of the official records.

Here, respondent Corporation only presented a CENRO certification in support of its

application. Clearly, this falls short of the requirements for original registration.

Paraguya v. Sps. Crucillo, G.R. No. 200265, December 2, 2013

The Court is impelled to sustain the CA’s dismissal of Paraguya’s complaint for
annulment of OCT No. P–17729 since it was filed only on December 19, 1990, or more than
eleven (11) years from the title’s date of entry on August 24, 1979. Based on Section 32 of PD
1529, said title had become incontrovertible and indefeasible after the lapse of one (1) year from
the date of its entry, thus barring Paraguya’s action for annulment of title.

Republic v Cortez, G.R. No. 186639, February 5, 2014

After a careful scrutiny of the records of this case, the Court finds that Cortez failed to
comply with the legal requirements for the registration of the subject property under Section
14(1) and (2) of P.D. No. 1529.
 Section 14(1) of P.D. No. 1529 refers to the judicial confirmation of imperfect or
incomplete titles to public land acquired under Section 48(b) of C.A. No. 141, as amended by
P.D. No. 1073. "Under Section 14(1) [of P.D. No. 1529], applicants for registration of title must
sufficiently establish first, that the subject land forms part of the disposable and alienable lands
of the public domain; second, that the applicant and his predecessors-in-interest have been in
open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation of the same; and third,
that it is under a bona fide claim of ownership since June 12, 1945, or earlier."

The first requirement was not satisfied in this case. To prove that the subject property
forms part of the alienable and disposable lands of the public domain, Cortez adduced in
evidence a survey plan Csd-00-000633 (conversion-subdivision plan of Lot 2697, MCadm 594-
D, Pateros Cadastral Mapping) prepared by Geodetic Engineer Oscar B. Fernandez and
certified by the Lands Management Bureau of the DENR. The said survey plan contained the
following annotation:

This survey is inside L.C. Map No. 2623, Project No. 29, classified as alienable &
disposable by the Bureau of Forest Development on Jan. 3, 1968.

However, Cortez’ reliance on the foregoing annotation in the survey plan is amiss; it
does not constitute incontrovertible evidence to overcome the presumption that the subject
property remains part of the inalienable public domain. In Republic of the Philippines v. Tri-Plus
Corporation, the Court clarified that, the applicant must at the very least submit a
certification from the proper government agency stating that the parcel of land subject of
the application for registration is indeed alienable and disposable.

It must be stressed that incontrovertible evidence must be presented to establish that the
land subject of the application is alienable or disposable.

In the present case, the only evidence to prove the character of the subject lands as
required by law is the notation appearing in the Advance Plan stating in effect that the
said properties are alienable and disposable. However, this is hardly the kind of proof
required by law. To prove that the land subject of an application for registration is alienable, an
applicant must establish the existence of a positive act of the government such as a
presidential proclamation or an executive order, an administrative action, investigation reports of
Bureau of Lands investigators, and a legislative act or statute. The applicant may also secure a
certification from the Government that the lands applied for are alienable and disposable.

In the case at bar, while the Advance Plan bearing the notation was certified by the
Lands Management Services of the DENR, the certification refers only to the technical
correctness of the survey plotted in the said plan and has nothing to do whatsoever with
the nature and character of the property surveyed. Respondents failed to submit a
certification from the proper government agency to prove that the lands subject for registration
are indeed alienable and disposable.

Fortuna v. Republic, G.R. No. 173423, March 5, 2014

Mere notations appearing in survey plans are inadequate proof of the covered
properties’ alienable and disposable character. These notations, at the very least, only establish
that the land subject of the application for registration falls within the approved alienable and
disposable area per verification through survey by the proper government office. The applicant,
however, must also present a copy of the original classification of the land into alienable and
disposable land, as declared by the DENR Secretary or as proclaimed by the President. In
Republic v. Heirs of Juan Fabio, the Court ruled that

[t]he applicant for land registration must prove that the DENR Secretary had approved the land
classification and released the land of the public domain as alienable and disposable, and that
the land subject of the application for registration falls within the approved area per verification
through survey by the PENRO or CENRO. In addition, the applicant must present a copy of
the original classification of the land into alienable and disposable, as declared by the DENR
Secretary, or as proclaimed by the President.

The survey plan and the DENR-CENRO certification are not proof that the President or
the DENR Secretary has reclassified and released the public land as alienable and disposable.
The offices that prepared these documents are not the official repositories or legal custodian of
the issuances of the President or the DENR Secretary declaring the public land as alienable and
disposable.

For failure to present incontrovertible evidence that Lot No. 4457 has been reclassified
as alienable and disposable land of the public domain though a positive act of the Executive
Department, the spouses Fortuna’s claim of title through a public land grant under the PLA
should be denied.

Republic vs. San Mateo, G.R. No. 203560, November 10, 2014
On the issue of whether the respondents were able to prove that the subject property is
alienable and disposable, We find that the respondents failed to prove that the property sought
to be registered is indeed alienable and thus subject toregistration. Respondents merely relied
on the certification of DENR-South CENRO to the effect that the subject property is alienable.
But as discussed below, this is insufficient, as respondents failed to present any proof that the
DENR Secretary approved such certification.

In the case here, however, the RTC Decision was only handed down on November 23,
2010, when the rule on strict compliance was already in effect. Thus, there was ample
opportunity for the respondents to comply with the new rule, and present before the RTC
evidence of the DENR Secretary's approval of the DENR-South CENRO Certification. This, they
failed to do.

Respondents' invocation of the pro hac vice rule in Vega is severely misplaced. They
would have this Court rule in their favor simply because the Republic failed to present
countervailing evidence other than mere denials. Such is not the import of the Vega ruling. In
Vega, aside from the certification from the CENRO, the registrants also presented other
evidence that the land sought to be registered is alienable. Here, it is the DENR-South
CENRO's certification that is the sole evidence presented by the respondents to prove the
land's alienability. That, by itself, is not sufficient. Respondents cannot now claim that there is
no sufficient evidence that the land is inalienable, when their own evidence on alienability is
wanting.
Canlas vs. Republic, G.R. No. 200894, November 10, 2014
It is settled that tax declarationsare not conclusive evidence of ownership. Other
evidence may be appreciated to determine actual possession and occupation. Documentary
evidence, such as tax declarations, when coupled with positive and clear testimonies of the
applicant and his or her witnesses, may be weighed in favor of the applicant.

The fact that a parcel of land is not declared for tax purposes regularly, or that realty
taxes are not paid on a regular basis, does not automaticallycontradict the claim of possession.
Tax declarations serve as additional indicia of ownership. It is not conclusive as to the fact of
possession, occupation, or ownership.

Likewise, to solely rely on tax declarations and payment of realty taxes would mean that
petitioner’s possession of the land should be reckoned from 1949 or the year the earliest tax
declaration was made. Such interpretation is untenable and goes beyond the text of Section
14(1) of Presidential Decree No. 1529. Moreover, as shown in the records, petitioner, through
her predecessors-in-interest, has been in possession of the land since the early 1900s.

Republic vs. Alora, G.R. No. 210341, July 1, 2015

Applicants for registration must prove the following:(1) that the subject land forms part of
the disposable and alienable lands of the public domain; and (2) that they have been in open,
continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation of the land under a bona fide
claim of ownership since 12 June 1945 or earlier.

In order to prove that the parcel of land is part of the disposable and alienable lands of
the public domain, respondents rely on the certification issued by the CENRO. The issue is
whether this is sufficient evidence to show that the subject parcel of land falls within the
disposable and alienable lands of the public domain.

Petitioner claims that the CA and the RTC should have applied our ruling in Republic v.
T.A.N. Properties, Inc., which was promulgated on 26 June 2008.1âwphi1 In that case, we held
that applicants for land registration must present a copy of the original classification approved
by the DENR Secretary and certified as true copy by the legal custodian of the official records. If
this standard were to be applied in the instant case, the CA decision should be overturned
because respondents failed to present a certified classification from the DENR Secretary.
Petitioner argues that the standard in Republic v. T.A.N. Properties, Inc. has been applied in
more recent decisions of this Court.

In the case here, however, the RTC Decision was only handed down on November 23,
2010, when the rule on strict compliance was already in effect. Thus, there was ample
opportunity for the respondents to comply with the new rule, and present before the RTC
evidence of the DENR Secretary's approval of the DENR-South CENRO Certification. This, they
failed to do.

In the instant case, the RTC Resolution was issued on 3 July 2012, after the
promulgation of Republic v. T.A.N Properties, Inc. Thus, following our ruling in Republic v. San
Mateo, the rule requiring certification from the DENR Secretary should be applied. It is important
to emphasize that the more recent case of Republic v. Spouses Castuera, decided on 14
January 2015, applied the rule in Republic v. T.A.N Properties, Inc. without any qualification.

Republic vs, Dayaoen, G.R. No. 200773, July 8, 2015

The trial and appellate courts seriously erred in declaring that the annotation in the
tracing cloth of the approved survey plan (Exh. "H") and the certifications therein constitute
substantial compliance with the legal requirement on presentation of a certificate of land
classification status or any other proof that the subject land is alienable and disposable. We
cannot subscribe to such notion.

Thus, while respondents have complied with most of the requirements in connection with
their application for registration, they have not sufficiently shown that the property applied for is
alienable and disposable at the time their application for registration was filed. The Court is left with
no alternative but to deny their application for registration. To be sure, the nation's interests will be
best served by a strict adherence to the provisions of the land registration laws

CLT Realty v Hi-Grade Feeds Corporation, G .R. No. 160684, Sept. 2,

2015
A title can only have one date of registration, as there can only be one title covering the
same property. The date of registration is reckoned from the time of the title's transcription in the
record book of the Registry of Deeds. Therefore, the date appearing on the face of a title refers
to the date of issuance of the decree of registration, as provided in Sections 41 and 42 of the
Land Registration Act or Section 40 of the P.D. 1529.

Based on Decree No. 36455 in Land Registration Case No. 4429, the decree registering
OCT No. 994, the date of the issuance is 19 April 1917 while on the other hand, OCT No. 994
was received for transcription by the Register of Deeds on 3 May 1917. In this case, the date
which should be reckoned as the date of registration of the title is the date when the mother title
was received for transcription, 3 May 1917. As correctly found by the Court of Appeals:

For sure, the very copy of OCT No. 994, presented by Appellee CLT no less and marked
as its Exhibit "D", shows on its face that the date April 19, 1917 refers to the issuance of the
decree of registration by the Honorable Norberto Romualdez, while May 3, 1917 pertains to the
date when the same decree was Received for transcription in the Office of the Register of
Deeds.

Therefore, as the date of transcription in the record book of the Registry of Deeds is 3
May 1917, we rule that the genuine title is the title of Hi-Grade.

5. Subsequent Registration

Billote vs. Solis, G.R. No. 181057, June 17, 2015

After a cursory examination of the aforequoted findings, this Court observes that the
conclusion that the spouses Badar were, indeed, innocent purchasers for value, lacks sufficient
basis. As can be gleaned from the foregoing, the CA merely declared that the spouses appear
to be purchasers in good faith without specifying material evidence supporting such
declarations. The fact that the subject property was already covered by the title issued under the
names of respondents Imelda and Adelaida, by itself, does not automatically lead to the
conclusion that the spouses Badar had no knowledge of some other party’s interest over the
property. While the CA cited appropriate doctrines of law, it failed to substantiate them with
factual proofs confirming the same. This Court is, therefore, not prepared to categorically rule
that spouses Badar were, indeed, innocent purchasers for value and are consequently entitled
to the disputed property.

It must be recalled at this point that in a petition for the issuance of a new owner’s
duplicate copy of a certificate of title in lieu of one allegedly lost, the RTC, acting only as a land
registration court, has no jurisdiction to pass upon the question of actual ownership of the land
covered by the lost owner’s duplicate copy of the certificate of title. Possession of a lost
owner’s duplicate copy of a certificate of title is not necessarily equivalent to ownership
of the land covered by it. The certificate of title, by itself, does not vest ownership; it is merely
an evidence of title over a particular property.

CLT Realty vs. Hi-Grade Feeds, G.R. No. 160684, September 2, 2015
What matters most in this case is that CLT questioned the title of Hi-Grade for the
purpose of having CLT's own title upheld. Instead of establishing the genuineness of its own
title, CLT attacked Hi-Grade's titles. However, CLT failed to establish the chain of titles
linking its TCT No. T-177013 to the mother title, OCT No. 994. It failed to prove the
"circumstances under which its predecessor-in-interest acquired the whole of Lot 26 of the
Maysilo Estate. Ironically, it is even by CLT's presentation of OCT No. 994 and of the
succession of titles previous to those held by appellant Hi-Grade that the latter's titles [was]
established as genuine derivative titles of OCT No. 994."

To sum up, Hi-Grade was able to establish the chain of titles linking its titles, TCTs No.
237450 and T-14691, to the derivative title, TCT No. 4211, to the mother title, OCT No. 994. As
borne by the records, TCT No. 4211 was registered as a derivative title of OCT No. 994 on 9
September 1918. On the other hand, CLT's title, TCT No. R-17994, was registered also as a
derivative title of OCT No. 994 only on 12 September 1978. Thus, the reference of both parties
is OCT No. 994, but with different dates: CLT's OCT No. 994 is dated 19 April 1917, while Hi-
Grade's OCT No. 994 is dated 3 May 1917.

6. Non-Registrable Properties

7. Dealings with Unregistered Lands

Republic v. Roxas, G.R. No. 157988, December 11, 2013

It must be emphasized that a certificate of title issued under an administrative

proceeding pursuant to a homestead patent, as in the instant case, is as indefeasible as a
certificate of title issued under a judicial registration proceeding, provided the land covered by
said certificate is a disposable public land within the contemplation of the Public Land Law. A
certificate of title issued pursuant to a homestead patent becomes indefeasible after one year, is
subject to the proviso that "the land covered by said certificate is a disposable public land within
the contemplation of the Public Land Law." As we have ruled herein, the subject property is part
of the Matchwood Forest Reserve and is inalienable and not subject to disposition. Being
contrary to the Public Land Law, Homestead Patent No. 111598 and OCT No. P-5885 issued in
respondent Roxas’s name are void; and the right of petitioner Republic to seek cancellation of
such void patent/title and reversion of the subject property to the State is imprescriptible.

*Exclude: History of land laws, Remedies sufficiently covered under Remedial

Law, Registration of judgments, orders and partitions, Assurance fund, Registration of
patents, Administrative structure of the Register of Deeds, Consultas