Liability and Termination (Case Digests)

Deang, Gameng, Ramos, Tejada, Torres, Usman
LIABILITY OF PUBLIC OFFICERS

1. AMADO C. ARIAS vs THE SANDIGANBAYAN
[G.R. No. 82512. December 19, 1989.]
FACTS: An information was filed charging the six accused including Petitioner Cresencio D. Data,
being then the district Engineer of the province of Rizal, Ministry of Public Works, and as such,
headed and supervised the acquisition of private lands for the right-of-way of the Mangahan
Floodway Project of the Government and Petitioner Amado C. Arias, then the Auditor of Rizal
Engineering District, Pasig, Metro Manila, who passed upon and approved in audit the acquisition
as well as the payment of lands needed for the Mangahan Floodway Project as co-conspirators in
causing undue injury and damage to the Government through the irregular disbursement and
expenditure of public funds. The records show that the six accused persons were convicted in
connection with the overpricing of land purchased by the Bureau of Public Works for the
Mangahan Floodway Project. The project was intended to ease the perennial floods in Marikina
and Pasig, Metro Manila. The accused were prosecuted because 19,004 square meters of "riceland"
in Rosario, Pasig which had been assessed at P5.00 a square meter in 1973 were sold as "residential
land" in 1978 for P80.00 a square meter. The land for the floodway was acquired through
negotiated purchase. The Sandigandayan rendered a decision finding the accused guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the violation of Section 3, paragraph (e) of Republic Act No. 3019, as amended,
otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act. Both Arias and Data appealed.
ISSUE: Whether the Sandiganbayan committed a reversible error in convicting the petitioners,
Amado C. Arias and Cresencio D. Data, of having violated Section 3, paragraph (e), of the Anti-
Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, in connection with the scandalous overpricing of land purchased
by the Government as right of way for its Mangahan Floodway Project in Pasig, Rizal.
RULING: YES. The Court agrees with the Solicitor-General that the assessor’s tax valuation of
P5.00/sgm of the subject land is completely unrealistic and arbitrary as the basis of conviction.
No undue injury was caused to the Government.
It bears stress that the Agleham property was acquired through negotiated purchase. It was,
therefor, nothing more than an ordinary contract of sale where the purchase price had to be arrived
at by agreement between the parties and could never be left to the discretion of one of the
contracting parties. Necessarily, the parties have to negotiate the reasonableness of the price,
taking into consideration such other factors as location, potentials, surroundings and capabilities.
A negotiated purchase may usually entail a higher buying price than one arrived at in the course of
expropriation proceedings.
On the alleged conspiracy
We would be setting a bad precedent if a head of office plagued by all too common problems —
dishonest or negligent subordinates, overwork, multiple assignments or positions, or plain
incompetence — is suddenly swept into a conspiracy conviction simply because he did not
personally examine every single detail, painstakingly trace every step from inception, and
investigate the motives of every person involved in a transaction before affixing his signature as the
final approving authority. It is doubtful if any auditor for a fairly sized office could p e r s o n ally do
all these things in all vouchers presented for his signature. The Court would be asking for the
impossible. All heads of offices have to rely to a reasonable extent on their subordinates and on the
good faith of those who prepare bids, purchase supplies, or enter into negotiations. There has to be
some added reason why he should examine each voucher in such detail. Any executive head of even
s m all government agencies or commissions can attest to the volume of papers that must be
signed. There are hundreds of documents, letters, memoranda, vouchers, and supporting papers
that routinely pass through his hands. The number in bigger offices or departments is even more
appalling. There should be other grounds than the mere signature or approval appearing on a
voucher to sustain a conspiracy charge and conviction.
There is no adequate evidence to establish the guilt of the petitioners, Amado C. Arias and
Cresencio D. Data, beyond reasonable doubt. The inadequate evidence on record is not sufficient to
sustain a conviction.
2. PEZA vs. COA

G.R. No. 210903. October 11, 2016
FACTS:
The PEZA Charter was amended by RA 8748 exempting PEZA from existing laws, rules and
regulations on compensation, position classification and qualification standards. Pursuant to the
amendment, the PEZA Board in Resolution No. M-99-266, adjusted PEZA's compensation plan
and included in the said compensation plan is the grant of Christmas bonus amounting to P75,
000.
State Auditor V Aurora Liveta-Funa, issued Notice of Disallowance stating that despite the
provisions of Section 16 of R.A. No. 7916, as amended, petitioner is still bound to observe the
guidelines and policies issued by the Office of the President citing this Court's ruling in Intia, Jr. v.
COA where it was ruled that the power of the board of directors to fix the compensation of the
employees is not absolute. The Corporate Government Sector B rendered a decision which was
adverse to petitioner. Upon appeal to respondent, the latter affirmed the Corporate Government
Sector’s decision.
The Supreme Court sustained COA ruling that the charters of those government entities exempt
from the Salary Standardization Law are not without any form of restriction. They are still required
to report to the Office of the President, through the DBM the details of their salary and
compensation system and to endeavor to make the system to conform as closely as possible to the
principles and modes provided in Republic Act No. 6758. Such restriction is the most apparent
indication that the legislature did not divest the President, as Chief Executive of his power of
control over the said government entities.
ISSUE:
W/N PEZA’s officials should be held financially accountable for the adoption of certain policies or
programs which are found to be not in accordance with the understanding by the Commission on
Audit several years after the fact.
RULING:
NO. Good faith has always been a valid defense of public officials that has been considered by this
Court in several cases. Good faith is a state of mind denoting "honesty of intention, and freedom
from knowledge of circumstances which ought to put the holder upon inquiry. There is no question
about the need to ferret out and convict public officers whose acts have made the bidding out and
construction of public works and highways synonymous with graft or criminal inefficiency in the
public eye.
However, the remedy is not to indict and jail every person who may have ordered the project, who
signed a document incident to its construction, or who had a hand somewhere in its
implementation. The careless use of the conspiracy theory may sweep into jail even innocent
persons who may have been made unwitting tools by the criminal minds who engineered the
defraudation.
It is unfair to penalize public officials based on overly stretched and strained interpretations of
rules which were not that readily capable of being understood at the time such functionaries acted
in good faith. If there is any ambiguity, which is actually clarified years later, then it should only be
applied prospectively. A contrary rule would be counterproductive. It could result in paralysis, or
lack of innovative ideas getting tried. In addition, it could dissuade others from joining the
government. When government service becomes unattractive, it could only have adverse
consequences for society.
3. LUIS TABUENA vs. SANDIGANBAYAN

G.R. Nos. 103501-03 February 17, 1997
FACTS:
Then President Marcos instructed Luis Tabuena over the phone to pay directly to the president’s
office and in cash what the Manila International Airport Authority (MIAA) owes the Philippine
National Construction Corporation (PNCC), pursuant to the 7 January 1985 memorandum of then
Minister Trade and Industry Roberto Ongpin. Tabuena agreed. About a week later, Tabuena
received from Mrs. Fe Roa-Gimenez, then private secretary of Marcos, a Presidential
Memorandum dated 8 January 1986 reiterating in black and white such verbal instruction. In
obedience to President Marcos’ verbal instruction and memorandum, Tabuena, with the help of
Gerardo G. Dabao and Adolfo Peralta, caused the release of P55 Million of MIAA funds by means of
three (3) withdrawals. Tabuena and Peralta were charged for malversation of funds, while Dabao
remained at large. One of the justices of the Sandiganbayan actively took part in the questioning of
a defense witness and of the accused themselves; the volume of the questions asked were more the
combined questions of the counsels. On 12 October 1990, they were found guilty beyond
reasonable doubt. Tabuena and Peralta filed separate petitions for review, appealing the
Sandiganbayan decision dated 12 October 19990 and the Resolution of 20 December 1991.
ISSUE:
Whether or not petitioners are guilty of the crime of malversation.
HELD:
No. Luis Tabuena and Adolfo Peralta are acquitted of the crime of malversation. Tabuena acted in
strict compliance with the MARCOS Memorandum. The order emanated from the Office of the
President and bears the signature of the President himself, the highest official of the land. It carries
with it the presumption that it was regularly issued. And on its face, the memorandum is patently
lawful for no law makes the payment of an obligation illegal. This fact, coupled with the urgent
tenor for its execution constrains one to act swiftly without question. There is no denying that the
disbursement, which Tabuena admitted as "out of the ordinary," did not comply with certain
auditing rules and regulations. But this deviation was inevitable under the circumstances Tabuena
was in. He did not have the luxury of time to observe all auditing procedures of disbursement
considering the fact that the MARCOS Memorandum enjoined his "immediate compliance" with
the directive that he forward to the President's Ofce the P55 Million in cash. Be that as it may,
Tabuena surely cannot escape responsibility for such omission. But since he was acting in good
faith, his liability should only be administrative or civil in nature, and not criminal.
4. EUFEMIO T. CORREA vs. COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE

G.R. No. L-46096. July 30, 1979.
FACTS: Respondent Court of First Instance rendered judgment ordering defendants Eufemio T.
Correa and Virgilio Sarmiento, municipal mayor and municipal treasurer of Norzagaray, Bulacan
personally to pay the salaries which the plaintiffs failed to receive by reason of their illegal removal
from office until they are actually reinstated. Petitioner filed a Motion to Quash the Writ of
Execution and to Direct Execution to the Municipality of Norzagaray, Bulacan, alleging that at the
time the writ was served on him, he was no longer mayor of Norzagaray, Bulacan. Petitioner
invoked the principle that when judgment is rendered against an officer of the municipal
corporation who is sued in his official capacity for the payment of back salaries of officers illegally
removed, the judgment is binding upon the corporation, whether or not the same is included as
party to the action. Respondent Court issued the Order denying the Motion to Quash Writ of
Execution. Petitioner thus came to this Court, maintaining that he could no longer be required to
pay the back salaries of the private respondents because payment on his part presupposes his
continuance in office, which is not the case. He contends that it is the Municipality of Norzagaray
that is liable for said payment, invoking Aguardor vs. Enerio and Sison vs. Pajo. Further, petitioner
alleges that the fact that he is no longer municipal mayor of Norzagaray, constitutes a substantial
change in the situation of the parties which makes the issuance of the writ of execution inequitable.
ISSUE: Whether or not respondent Court in denying the Motion to Quash the Writ of Execution
acted with grave abuse of discretion or with lack or excess of jurisdiction.
RULING: NO. In Nemenzo vs. Sabillano, the Court ruled that appellant Municipal Mayor Bernabe
Sabillano was "correctly adjudged liable" for the payment of the back salaries of appellee Police
Corporal Joaquin P. Nemenzo because his act of dismissing appellee "without previous
administrative investigation and without justifiable cause . . . is clearly an injury to appellee's
rights. Appellant cannot hide under the mantle of his official capacity and pass the liability to the
municipality of which he was mayor." In the discharge of governmental functions, "municipal
corporations are responsible for the acts of its officers, except if and when, and only to the extent
that, they have acted by authority of the law, and in conformity with the requirements thereof." A
public officer who commits a tort or other wrongful act, done in excess or beyond the scope of his
duty, is not protected by his office and is personally liable therefor like any private individual. This
principle of personal liability has been applied to cases where a public officer removes another
officer or discharges an employee wrongfully, the reported cases saying that by reason of non-
compliance with the requirements of law in respect to removal from office, the officials were acting
outside their official authority. Respondent Court, therefore, did not commit grave abuse of
discretion in denying petitioner's motion to quash writ of execution. The writ was strictly in
accordance with the terms of the judgment.
5. JESUS C. OCAMPO vs. OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN and MAXIMINO ECLIPSE

[G.R. No. 114683. January 18, 2000.]
FACTS: Petitioner is the Training Coordinator of NIACONSULT, INC., a subsidiary of the
National Irrigation Administration. An administrative charge for serious misconduct and/or fraud
or willful breach of trust was filed against him before the Office of the Ombudsman by
NIACONSULT through its president, the private respondent, Maximino Eclipse. Petitioner was
required by respondent Ombudsman to file his counter-affidavit within ten (10) days from receipt
with a c a v e a t that failure to file the same would be deemed a waiver of his right to present
evidence. Despite notice, petitioner failed to comply with the order. A year later, the respondent
Ombudsman issued another order giving petitioner another chance to file his counter-affidavit.
Again, petitioner failed. Thereafter, the respondent Ombudsman issued a resolution
recommending the discharge of petitioner from the service. Petitioner moved for reconsideration,
claiming that he was denied due process in that the administrative case was resolved solely on the
basis of the complainant's evidences without affording him the opportunity to file his counter-
affidavit. The Ombudsman denied the motion. Aggrieved, petitioner filed the present petition.
While the case was pending, petitioner filed a manifestation stating that the criminal complaint
filed against him based on the same facts or incidents which gave rise to the administrative case
was dismissed by the Regional Trial Court. With the dismissal of the criminal case, petitioner
manifested that the administrative case can no longer stand on its own and should be dismissed.
ISSUE: Whether or not with the dismissal of the criminal case, the administrative case can no
longer stand on its own and should be dismissed
RULING: NO. The dismissal of the criminal case will not foreclose administrative action filed
against petitioner or give him a clean bill of health in all respects. The Regional Trial Court, in
dismissing the criminal complaint, was simply saying that the prosecution was unable to prove the
guilt of petitioner beyond reasonable doubt, a condition sin e q u a n o n for conviction. The lack or
absence of proof beyond reasonable doubt does not mean an absence of any evidence whatsoever
for there is another class of evidence which, though insufficient to establish guilt beyond
reasonable doubt, is adequate in civil cases; this is preponderance of evidence. Then too, there is
the "substantial evidence" rule in administrative proceedings which merely requires such relevant
evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion. Thus, considering
the difference in the quantum of evidence, as well as the procedure followed and the sanctions
imposed in criminal and administrative proceedings, the findings and conclusions in one should
not necessarily be binding on the other. The essence of due process is an opportunity to be heard.
One may be heard, not solely by verbal presentation but also, and perhaps even many times more
creditably and practicable than oral argument, through pleadings. In administrative proceedings,
moreover, technical rules of procedure and evidence are not strictly applied; administrative due
process cannot be fully equated to due process in its strict judicial sense.
6. OFFICE OF THE COURT ADMINISTRATOR vs. RAMON G. ENRIQUEZ

[A.M. No. P-89-290. January 29, 1993.]
FACTS: Respondent Ramon G. Enriquez, Deputy Sheriff of Branch XXXI of the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) of Manila was administratively charged with the crime of falsification of a public
document and with conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service. The Information alleged
that respondent, taking advantage of his official position and, committing the offense in relation to
his official duties, forge and falsify, or cause to be forged and falsified, Sheriff's (sic) Certificate of
Sale dated May 12, 1986, which is a public document, by stating therein that the payment for the
properties which he levied and sold at public auction was made on May 12, 1986, and that the
amount of P1,325,000.00, representing the bid price for the aforesaid levied properties, was paid
to him on May 12, 1986, when in truth and in fact, the payment thereof was actually made on May
23, 1986 to Genstar Container Corporation through its attorney-in-fact. Instead of filing the
answer/explanation as ordered, the respondent forwarded to the Court Administrator a letter
informing the latter that Criminal Case No. 12987 was still pending resolution before the
Sandiganbayan and that therefore, he (respondent) should not be held administratively liable. On
15 May 1989, the Sandiganbayan, acting on a demurrer to evidence, promulgated a Resolution

granting the same and dismissing the case against the respondent "for insufficiency of evidence.
Respondent then filed a Manifestation informing this Court of the promulgation of the above
resolution and praying that "by virtue of the dismissal of the Criminal Case filed against the
respondent before the Sandiganbayan, the Administrative Case . . . be likewise dismissed."
ISSUE: Whether or not by virtue of the dismissal of the Criminal Case filed against the respondent
before the Sandiganbayan, the Administrative Case should be likewise dismissed
RULING: NO. The Sandiganbayan, in dismissing the same, was simply saying that the
prosecution was unable to prove the guilt of the respondent beyond reasonable doubt, a condition
sin e q u a n o n for conviction because of the presumption of innocence which the Constitution
guarantees an accused. Lack or absence of proof beyond reasonable doubt does not mean an
absence of any evidence whatsoever for there is another class of evidence which, though
insufficient to establish guilt beyond reasonable doubt, is adequate in civil cases; this is p r e p o n d
e r a n c e of evidence. Then too, there is the "substantial evidence" rule in administrative
proceedings which merely requires in these cases such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind
might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.
7. FRANCISCO I. CHAVEZ v. THE HON. SANDIGANBAYAN

G.R. No. 91391, January 24, 1991
FACTS:
The Republic of the Philippines, through the Presidential Commission on Good Government
(PCGG) with the assistance of Solicitor General Francisco Chavez filed with the Sandiganbayan a
complaint against Eduardo Cojuangco, Jr. and Juan Ponce Enrile, among others, for reconveyance,
reversion and accounting, restitution and damages. After the denial of his motion to dismiss,
respondent Enrile filed his answer with compulsory counterclaim and cross-claim with damages.
The Republic filed its reply to the answer and motion to dismiss the counterclaim. The motion was
opposed by respondent Enrile. The respondent Sandiganbayan issued a resolution holding that
“The resolution of the Motion to Dismiss the Counterclaim against the Plaintiff government is
deferred until after trial, the grounds relied upon not appearing to be indubitable”
Respondent Enrile then requested leave from the Sandiganbayan to implead the petitioner and the
PCGG officials as party defendants for lodging this alleged "harassment suit" against him. The
motion was granted. In a later resolution, the respondent Sandiganbayan denied a motion to
reconsider the granting of such motion.
Thereafter, all the PCGG officials filed their answer to the counterclaims invoking their immunity
from suits as provided in Section 4 of Executive Order No. 1. Instead of filing an answer, the
petitioner comes to this Court assailing the resolutions as rendered with grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack of jurisdiction.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the impleading of the petitioner as additional party defendant in the counterclaim
filed by respondent Enrile is proper.
HELD:
It may be noted that the private respondent did not limit himself to general averments of malice,
recklessness, and bad faith but filed specific charges that then PCGG Chairman Jovito Salonga had
already cleared the respondent and yet, knowing the allegations to be false, the petitioner still filed
the complaint. On the other hand, the petitioner submits that no counter-claim can be filed against
him in his capacity as Solicitor General since he is only acting as counsel for the Republic.
Thus, the petitioner argues that since he is simply the lawyer in the case, exercising his duty under
the law to assist the Government in the filing and prosecution of all cases pursuant to Section 1,
Executive Order No. 14, he cannot be sued in a counterclaim in the same case.
Presiding Justice Francis Garchitorena correctly observed that there is no general immunity arising
solely from occupying a public office. The general rule is that public officials can be held personally
accountable for acts claimed to have been performed in connection with official duties where they
have acted ultra vires or where there is a showing of bad faith.
Moreover, the petitioner's argument that the immunity proviso under Section 4(a) of Executive
Order No. 1 also extends to him is not well-taken. A mere invocation of the immunity clause does
not ipso facto result in the charges being automatically dropped.
In the case of Presidential Commission on Good Government v. Peña (159 SCRA 556 [1988]) then
Chief Justice Claudio Teehankee, added a clarification of the immunity accorded PCGG officials
under Section 4(a) of Executive Order No. 1 as follows:
With respect to the qualifications expressed by Mr. Justice Feliciano in his separate opinion, I just
wish to point out two things: First, the main opinion does not claim absolute immunity for the
members of the Commission. The cited section of Executive Order No. 1 provides the Commission's
members immunity from suit thus: "No civil action shall lie against the Commission or any
member thereof for anything done or omitted in the discharge of the task contemplated by this
order." No absolute immunity like that sought by Mr. Marcos in his Constitution for himself and
his subordinates is herein involved. It is understood that the immunity granted the members of the
Commission by virtue of the unimaginable magnitude of its task to recover the plundered wealth
and the State's exercise of police power was immunity from liability for damages in the official
discharge of the task granted the members of the Commission much in the same manner that
judges are immune from suit in the official discharge of the functions of their office . . . " (at pp.
581-582)
Immunity from suit cannot institutionalize irresponsibility and non-accountability nor grant a
privileged status not claimed by any other official of the Republic.
Where the petitioner exceeds his authority as Solicitor General acts in bad faith, or, as contended
by the private respondent, "maliciously conspir(es) with the PCGG commissioners in persecuting
respondent Enrile by filing against him an evidently baseless suit in derogation of the latter's
constitutional rights and liberties" (Rollo, p. 417), there can be no question that a complaint for
damages may be filed against him. High position in government does not confer a license to
persecute or recklessly injure another. The actions governed by Articles 19, 20, 21, and 32 of the
Civil Code on Human Relations may be taken against public officers or private citizens alike. The
issue is not the right of respondent Enrile to file an action for damages. He has the right.
NOTE: Under the circumstances of this case, we rule that the charges pressed by respondent Enrile
for damages under Article 32 of the Civil Code arising from the filing of an alleged harassment suit
with malice and evident bad faith do not constitute a compulsory counterclaim. To vindicate his
rights, Senator Enrile has to file a separate and distinct civil action for damages against the
Solicitor General.
8.CESAR S. DUMDUMA v. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION

G.R. No. 182606, December 4, 2011
FACTS:
Dumduma entered public service in 1979 as a patrolman in the then Integrated National Police. He
was promoted in 1991 as SPO4 of the PNP. He was then designated as officer-in-charge of San
Miguel Police Station in San Miguel, Leyte. On December 15, 1998, he took the Career Service
Professional Examination in Quezon City. Dumduma filled out a Personal Data Sheet (PDS)
pursuant to his promotional appointment as Police Inspector. On Item No. 18 of the PDS,
Dumduma stated that he passed the Career Service Professional Examination Computer-Assisted
Test with a rating of 81%. His appointment was then forwarded to the PNP-CSC Field Office for
verification and approval. It was then discovered that Dumduma did not have the proper civil
service eligibility, contrary to what he disclosed in his PDS. His name was not included in the CSC-
National Capital Region (CSC-NCR) Regional Register of Eligibles for the Career Service
Professional Examination; instead, his name appeared in the Regional List of Passing/Failing
Examinees with a rating of 25.82%. Accordingly, the director of the CSC-NCR, Adoracion F. Arenas
disapproved Dumduma’s appointment. The CSC-NCR formally charged Dumduma with
Dishonesty.
Dumduma denied the charge. According to him, prior to the date of the examination, Dumduma
met a certain Dilodilo, who was allegedly a retired CSC director. Dilodilo promised Dumduma her
"total support” in exchange of convincing [his] close friend to sell a property [to her]. On December
15, 1998, Dumduma took the Career Service Professional Examination. A week later, he received
his Certificate of Eligibility from an unnamed person, who claimed to be Dilodilo’s emissary.
The CSC-NCR held that the Certificate of Eligibility relied upon by Dumduma in making his PDS
entry was spurious. CSC found Dumduma’s version of how he obtained his certificate of eligibility
implausible. The CA found substantial evidence supporting the conclusion that Dumduma’s
Certificate of Eligibility was spurious.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Dumduma is guilty of dishonesty.
HELD:
The Court agrees with the CSC and the CA that the undisputed facts, as revealed by the evidence,
make out a clear case of dishonesty against Dumduma. When Dumduma’s claim of eligibility was
contradicted by the CSC Register of Eligibles and the List of Passing/Failing Examinees, it became
incumbent upon Dumduma to explain why he made the incorrect entry in his PDS. Unlike his PDS
entry, the CSC records are presumed correct and made in the regular course of official business.
Dumduma asserts that, despite the questionable circumstances, he is in good faith and that the
blame is with the CSC personnel who gave him a Certificate of Eligibility. Their actions should not
be attributable to him, unless there is evidence that he colluded with them.
Dumduma’s contention is in stark contrast to his admissions and does not merit belief. The
concept of good faith in administrative cases such as this one is explained in a recent case in this
wise:
Good faith is ordinarily used to describe that state of mind denoting honesty of intention and
freedom from knowledge of circumstances which ought to put the holder upon inquiry; an honest
intention to abstain from taking any unconscientious advantage of another, even through
technicalities of law, together with absence of all information, notice, or benefit or belief of facts
which render [a] transaction unconscientious. In short, good faith is actually a question of
intention. Although this is something internal, we can ascertain a person’s intention not from his
own protestation of good faith, which is self-serving, but from evidence of his conduct and outward
acts.
In the instant case, the facts and circumstances surrounding Dumduma’s acquisition of the
Certificate of Eligibility cast serious doubts on his good faith. He made a deal with a retired CSC
official and accepted the Certificate of Eligibility from her representative. These circumstances
reveal Dumduma’s knowledge that Dilodilo could have pulled strings in order to obtain his
Certificate of Eligibility and have it delivered to his residence. How else would a retired employee
obtain the said certificate? Dumduma cannot feign innocence given his unquestioning cooperation
with Dilodilo.
Besides, whether some CSC personnel should be held administratively liable for falsifying
Dumduma’s Certificate of Eligibility is beside the point. The fact that someone else falsified the
certificate will not excuse Dumduma for knowingly using the same for his career advancement.
9. MARIA CAROLINA P. ARAULLO v. BENIGNO SIMEON AQUINO III

G.R. No. 209287, July 1, 2014
FACTS:
Sen. Jinggoy Ejercito Estrada delivered a privilege speech in the Senate of the Philippines to reveal
that some Senators, including himself, had been allotted an additional ₱50 Million each as
"incentive" for voting in favor of the impeachment of Chief Justice Renato C. Corona.
Responding to Sen. Estrada’s revelation, Secretary Florencio Abad of the DBM issued a public
statement entitled Abad: Releases to Senators Part of Spending Acceleration Program, explaining
that the funds released to the Senators had been part of the DAP, a program designed by the DBM
to ramp up spending to accelerate economic expansion. He clarified that the funds had been
released to the Senators based on their letters of request for funding; and that it was not the first
time that releases from the DAP had been made because the DAP had already been instituted in
2011 to ramp up spending after sluggish disbursements had caused the growth of the gross
domestic product (GDP) to slow down. He explained that the funds under the DAP were usually
taken from
unreleased appropriations under Personnel Services;
unprogrammed funds;
carry-over appropriations unreleased from the previous year; and
budgets for slow-moving items or projects that had been realigned to support faster-disbursing
projects.
The DBM listed the following as the legal bases for the DAP’s use of savings, namely:
Section 25(5), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution, which granted to the President the authority to
augment an item for his office in the general appropriations law;
Section 49 (Authority to Use Savings for Certain Purposes) and Section 38 (Suspension of
Expenditure Appropriations), Chapter 5, Book VI of Executive Order (EO) No. 292 (Administrative
Code of 1987); and
the General Appropriations Acts (GAAs) of 2011, 2012 and 2013, particularly their provisions on
the (a) use of savings; (b) meanings of savings and augmentation; and (c) priority in the use of
savings.
As for the use of unprogrammed funds under the DAP, the DBM cited as legal bases the special
provisions on unprogrammed fund contained in the GAAs of 2011, 2012 and 2013.
The revelation of Sen. Estrada and the reactions of Sec. Abad and the DBM brought the DAP to the
consciousness of the Nation for the first time, and made this present controversy inevitable. That
the issues against the DAP came at a time when the Nation was still seething in anger over
Congressional pork barrel – "an appropriation of government spending meant for localized
projects and secured solely or primarily to bring money to a representative’s district"– excited the
Nation as heatedly as the pork barrel controversy.
Nine petitions assailing the constitutionality of the DAP and the issuances relating to the DAP were
filed within days of each other.
ISSUE:
Whether or not DAP is constitutionally infirm. YES
HELD:
DAP was not an appropriation measure; hence, no appropriation law was required to adopt or to
implement it. We agree with the OSG’s position.
The DAP was a government policy or strategy designed to stimulate the economy through
accelerated spending. Congress could appropriate but would have nothing more to do during the
Budget Execution Stage. Indeed, appropriation was the act by which Congress "designates a
particular fund, or sets apart a specified portion of the public revenue or of the money in the public
treasury, to be applied to some general object of governmental expenditure, or to some individual
purchase or expense."
On the other hand, the President, in keeping with his duty to faithfully execute the laws, had
sufficient discretion during the execution of the budget to adapt the budget to changes in the
country’s economic situation. He could adopt a plan like the DAP for the purpose. He could pool
the savings and identify the PAPs to be funded under the DAP. The pooling of savings pursuant to
the DAP, and the identification of the PAPs to be funded under the DAP did not involve
appropriation in the strict sense because the money had been already set apart from the public
treasury by Congress through the GAAs. In such actions, the Executive did not usurp the power
vested in Congress under Section 29(1), Article VI of the Constitution.
Unreleased appropriations and withdrawn unobligated allotments under the DAP were not
savings, and the use of such appropriations contravened Section 25(5), Article VI of the 1987
Constitution.
Notwithstanding our appreciation of the DAP as a plan or strategy validly adopted by the Executive
to ramp up spending to accelerate economic growth, the challenges posed by the petitioners
constrain us to dissect the mechanics of the actual execution of the DAP. The management and
utilization of the public wealth inevitably demands a most careful scrutiny of whether the
Executive’s implementation of the DAP was consistent with the Constitution, the relevant GAAs
and other existing laws.
Although executive discretion and flexibility are necessary in the execution of the budget, any
transfer of appropriated funds should conform to Section 25(5), Article VI of the Constitution.
Congress has traditionally allowed much flexibility to the President in allocating funds pursuant to
the GAAs, particularly when the funds are grouped to form lump sum accounts. It is assumed that
the agencies of the Government enjoy more flexibility when the GAAs provide broader
appropriation items. This flexibility comes in the form of policies that the Executive may adopt
during the budget execution phase. The DAP – as a strategy to improve the country’s economic
position – was one policy that the President decided to carry out in order to fulfill his mandate
under the GAAs.
Section 25 (5), Article VI of the Constitution, by which the President, the President of the Senate,
the Speaker of the House of Representatives, the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, and the heads
of Constitutional Commissions are authorized to transfer appropriations to augmentany item in
the GAA for their respective offices from the savings in other items of their respective
appropriations. The plain language of the constitutional restriction leaves no room for the
petitioner’s posture, which we should now dispose of as untenable.
It bears emphasizing that the exception in favor of the high officials named in Section 25(5), Article
VI of the Constitution limiting the authority to transfer savings only to augment another item in the
GAA is strictly but reasonably construed as exclusive. Accordingly, we should interpret Section
25(5), supra, in the context of a limitation on the President’s discretion over the appropriations
during the Budget Execution Phase.
Requisites for the valid transfer of appropriated funds under Section 25(5), Article VI of the 1987
Constitution:
1. There is a law authorizing the President, the President of the Senate, the Speaker of the House of
Representatives, the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, and the heads of the Constitutional
Commissions to transfer funds within their respective offices;
2. The funds to be transferred are savings generated from the appropriations for their respective
offices; and
3. The purpose of the transfer is to augment an item in the general appropriations law for their
respective offices.
10.OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN vs. ULDARICO P. ANDUTAN, JR.

G.R. No. 164679. July 27, 2011.
FACTS:
Andutan was formerly the Deputy Director of the One-Stop Shop Tax Credit and Duty Drawback
Center of the Department of Finance (DOF). On June 30, 1998, then Executive Secretary Ronaldo
Zamora issued a Memorandum directing all non-career officials or those occupying political
positions to vacate their positions effective July 1, 1998. Pursuant to the Memorandum, Andutan
resigned from his post. Subsequently, Andutan, et al. were criminally charged by the Fact Finding
and Intelligence Bureau (FFIB) of the Ombudsman with Estafa through Falsification of Public
Documents, and violations RA 3019. As government employees, Andutan et al. were likewise
administratively charged of Grave Misconduct, Dishonesty, Falsification of Official Documents and
Conduct Prejudicial to the Best Interest of the Service. The criminal and administrative charges
arose from anomalies in the illegal transfer of Tax Credit Certificates (TCCs) to Steel Asia, among
others. The Ombudsman found the respondents guilty of Gross Neglect of Duty. Having been
separated from the service, Andutan was imposed the penalty of forfeiture of all leaves, retirement
and other benefits and privileges, and perpetual disqualification from reinstatement and/or
reemployment in any branch or instrumentality of the government, including government owned
and controlled agencies or corporations. The CA annulled and set aside the decision of the
Ombudsman, ruling that the latter “should not have considered the administrative complaints”
because: first, Section 20 of R.A. 6770 provides that the Ombudsman “may not conduct the
necessary investigation of any administrative act or omission complained of if it believes that x x x
[t]he complaint was filed after one year from the occurrence of the act or omission complained of”;
and second, the administrative case was filed after Andutan’s forced resignation.
ISSUES:
1. Whether Section 20(5) of R.A. 6770 prohibit the Ombudsman from conducting an administrative
investigation a year after the act was committed.
2. Whether the Ombudsman has authority to institute an administrative complaint against a
government employee who had already resigned.
HELD:
1. No. Well-entrenched is the rule that administrative offenses do not prescribe. Administrative
offenses by their very nature pertain to the character of public officers and employees. In
disciplining public officers and employees, the object sought is not the punishment of the officer or
employee but the improvement of the public service and the preservation of the public’s faith and
confidence in our government. Clearly, Section 20 of R.A. 6770 is merely directory and does not
prohibit the Ombudsman from conducting an administrative investigation after the lapse of one
year, reckoned from the time the alleged act was committed. Without doubt, even if the
administrative case was filed beyond the one (1) year period stated in Section 20(5), the
Ombudsman was well within its discretion to conduct the administrative investigation.
2. No. The Ombudsman can no longer institute an administrative case against Andutan because the
latter was not a public servant at the time the case was filed. It is irrelevant, according to the
Ombudsman, that Andutan had already resigned prior to the filing of the administrative case since
the operative fact that determines its jurisdiction is the commission of an offense while in the
public service. The SC observed that indeed it has held in the past that a public official’s resignation
does not render moot an administrative case that was filed prior to the official’s resignation. In the
past cases, the Court found that the public officials – subject of the administrative cases – resigned,
either to prevent the continuation of a case already filed or to pre-empt the imminent filing of one.
Here, neither situation obtains. First, Andutan’s resignation was neither his choice nor of his own
doing; he was forced to resign. Second, Andutan resigned from his DOF post on July 1, 1998, while
the administrative case was filed on September 1, 1999, exactly one year and two months after his
resignation. What is clear from the records is that Andutan was forced to resign more than a year
before the Ombudsman filed the administrative case against him. If the SC agreed with the
interpretation of the Ombudsman, any official – even if he has been separated from the service for
a long time – may still be subject to the disciplinary authority of his superiors, ad infinitum.
Likewise, if the act committed by the public official is indeed inimical to the interests of the State,
other legal mechanisms are available to redress the same.
NOTE: The State is not without remedy against Andutan or any public official who committed
violations while in once, but had already resigned or retired therefrom. Under the "threefold
liability rule," the wrongful acts or omissions of a public officer may give rise to civil, criminal and
administrative liability. Even if the Ombudsman may no longer file an administrative case against a
public official who has already resigned or retired, the Ombudsman may still file criminal and civil
cases to vindicate Andutan's alleged transgressions. In fact, here, the Ombudsman — through the
FFIB — filed a criminal case for Estafa and violations of Section 3 (a), (e) and (j) of the Anti-Graft
and Corrupt Practices Act against Andutan. If found guilty, Andutan will not only be meted out the
penalty of imprisonment, but also the penalties of perpetual disqualification from office, and
confiscation or forfeiture of any prohibited interest.
11. FRANCIS SAEZ vs. GLORIA MACAPAGAL-ARROYO et. al.

G.R. No. 183533. September 25, 2012
FACTS:
On March 6, 2008, the petitioner led with the Court a petition to be granted the privilege of the
writs of amparo and habeas data with prayers for temporary protection order, inspection of place
and production of documents. In the petition, he expressed his fear of being abducted and killed;
hence, he sought that he be placed in a sanctuary appointed by the Court. He likewise prayed for
the military to cease from further conducting surveillance and monitoring of his activities and for
his name to be excluded from the order of battle and other government records connecting him to
the Communist Party of the Philippines (CPP). Without necessarily giving due course to the
petition, the Court issued the writ of amparo commanding the respondents to make a verified
return, and referred the case to the Court of Appeals (CA) for hearing and decision. The CA ruled
that the petitioner failed to adduce sufficient evidence to substantiate his petition for the writs. The
CA likewise dropped as respondent Pres. GMA on the ground of her immunity from suit.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the president should be immediately dropped as respondent pursuant to the
presidential immunity from suit principle.
HELD:
No. The President cannot be automatically dropped as a respondent pursuant to the doctrine of
command responsibility.
In Noriel Rodriguez v. GMA et. al the Court stated:
Command responsibility of the president.
Having established the applicability of the doctrine of command responsibility in amparo
proceedings, it must now be resolved whether the president, as commander-in-chief of the
military, can be held responsible or accountable for extrajudicial killings and enforced
disappearances. We rule in the affirmative. To hold someone liable under the doctrine of command
responsibility, the following elements must obtain:
a. the existence of a superior-subordinate relationship between the accused as superior and the
perpetrator of the crime as his subordinate; b. the superior knew or had reason to know that the
crime was about to be or had been committed; and c. the superior failed to take the necessary and
reasonable measures to prevent the criminal acts or punish the perpetrators thereof.
The president, being the commander-in-chief of all armed forces, necessarily possesses control
over the military that qualifies him as a superior within the purview of the command responsibility
doctrine. Under E.O. 226, a government official may be held liable for neglect of duty under the
doctrine of command responsibility if he has knowledge that a crime or offense shall be committed,
is being committed, or has been committed by his subordinates, or by others within his area of
responsibility and, despite such knowledge, he did not take preventive or corrective action either
before, during, or immediately after its commission. Knowledge of the commission of irregularities,
crimes or offenses is presumed when (a) the acts are widespread within the government official's
area of jurisdiction; (b) the acts have been repeatedly or regularly committed within his area of
responsibility; or (c) members of his immediate staff or office personnel are involved. Meanwhile,
as to the issue of failure to prevent or punish, it is important to note that as the commander-in-
chief of the armed forces, the president has the power to effectively command, control and
discipline the military.
Pursuant to the doctrine of command responsibility, the President, as the Commander-in Chief of
the AFP , can be held liable for affront against the petitioner's rights to life, liberty and security as
long as substantial evidence exist to show that he or she had exhibited involvement in or can be
imputed with knowledge of the violations, or had failed to exercise necessary and reasonable
diligence necessary and reasonable diligence in conducting the necessary investigations required
under the rules. The Court also stresses that rule that the presidential immunity from suit exists
only in concurrence with the president's incumbency. Conversely, this presidential privilege of
immunity cannot be invoked by a non-sitting president for acts committed during his or her
tenure. even for acts committed during his or her tenure. Courts look with disfavor upon the
presidential privilege of immunity, especially when it impedes the search for truth or impairs the
vindication of a right. The petitioner, however, is not exempted from the burden of proving by
substantial evidence his allegations against the President to make the latter liable for either acts or
omissions violative of rights against life, liberty and security. In the instant case, the petitioner
merely included the President's name as a party respondent without any attempt at all to show the
latter's actual involvement in, or knowledge of the alleged violations. Further, prior to the filing of
the petition, there was no request or demand for any investigation that was brought to the
President's attention. Thus, while the President cannot be completely dropped as a respondent in a
petition for the privilege of the writs of amparo and habeas data merely on the basis of the
presidential immunity from suit, the petitioner in this case failed to establish accountability of the
President, as commander-in-chief, under the doctrine of command responsibility.
12. PEOPLE vs. SANDIGANBAYAN et. al.

G.R. No. 164577. July 5, 2010
FACTS:
On November 23, 1999, private respondents Victorino A. Basco, et. al. all high-ranking public
officers were charged with having violated Section 3 (e) of Republic Act No. 3019, as amended,
(Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act) before the Sandiganbayan. On August 23, 2002, the
Sandiganbayan issued a Pre-trial Order identifying the issues as follows: (i) whether or not the
construction projects involved should have been subjected to a public bidding as mandated by P .D.
1594, as amended; (ii) whether or not there was overpricing in the construction costs of the
projects; (iii) whether or not the government suffered undue injury or damage as a consequence;
(iv) whether or not the accused acted with evident bad faith and/or manifest partiality; and (v)
whether or not the accused conspired with each other in committing the offense charged. Instead
of presenting their evidence, the respondents led their respective motions for leave to file their
demurrer to evidence based substantially on the following grounds: (ii) that the prosecution failed
to prove that the questioned contracts were indeed overpriced as Atty. Pagunuran merely relied on
the Department of Public Works and Highways (DPWH) table of "Typical Construction Costs,
1999" without more; and (iii) that the ruling of the Court of Appeals in an administrative case (C.A.
G.R. SP No. 62084), which upheld the validity of the direct negotiated contracts, even in the
absence of a public bidding, was already the law of the case. The Sandiganbayan denied the
demurrers opining that the prosecution's evidence substantiated the essential elements charged in
the Information. For said reason, it was incumbent on the respondents to present controverting
evidence. On the exoneration in the administrative case, Sandiganbayan was of the view that there
was disparity in the nature of the two proceedings and in the quantum of evidence required, and so
it did not necessarily bar a successful criminal prosecution involving the same or similar acts.
ISSUE:
Whether the or not the dismissal of an administrative case bars the filing of a criminal prosecution
for the same or similar acts subject of the administrative complaint.
HELD:
No. Neither does the disposition in one case inevitably govern the resolution of the other case/s
and vice versa. Administrative liability is one thing; criminal liability for the same act is another.
The distinct and independent nature of one proceeding from the other can be attributed to the
following: first, the difference in the quantum of evidence required and, correlatively, the
procedure observed and sanctions imposed; and second, the principle that a single act may offend
against two or more distinct and related provisions of law, or that the same act may give rise to
criminal as well as administrative liability. Although the dismissal of the criminal case cannot be
pleaded to abate the administrative proceedings primarily on the ground that the quantum of proof
required to sustain administrative charges is significantly lower than that necessary for criminal
actions, the same does not hold true if it were the other way around, that is, the dismissal of the
administrative case is being invoked to abate the criminal case. The reason is that the evidence
presented in the administrative case may not necessarily be the same evidence to be presented in
the criminal case. The prosecution is certainly not precluded from adducing additional evidence to
discharge the burden of proof required in the criminal cases. However, if the criminal case will be
prosecuted based on the same facts and evidence as that in the administrative case, and the court
trying the latter already squarely ruled on the absence of facts and/or circumstances sufficient to
negate the basis of the criminal indictment, then to still burden the accused to present
controverting evidence despite the failure of the prosecution to present sufficient and competent
evidence, will be a futile and useless exercise.
13.TESDA VS. THE COMMISSION ON AUDIT

G.R. No. 204869 March 11 2014
FACTS: Upon post audit, the TESDA audit team leader discovered that for the calendar years
2004-2007, TESDA paid EME twice each year to its officials from two sources: (1) the General
Fund for locally-funded projects, and (2) the Technical Education and Skills Development Project
(TESDP) Fund for the foreign-assisted projects.
On 15 May 2008, the audit team issued Notice of Disallowance disallowing the payment of EME
amounting to P5,498,706.60 for being in excess of the amount allowed in the 2004-2007 GAAs. In
addition, the EME were disbursed to TESDA officials whose positions were not of equivalent ranks
as authorized by the Department of Budget and Management (DBM), contrary to the provisions of
the 2004-2007 GAAs. Said notice indicated the persons liable for the excessive payment of EME:
the approving officers, payees and the accountants.
The COA adopted the findings of both the TESDA audit team and the COA Cluster Director that the
grant of EME exceeded the allowable limit in the 2004-2007 GAAs. The COA emphasized that the
provision in the 2004-2007 GAAs that granted EME clearly provided a ceiling for its grant.
Accordingly, the COA ruled that the failure of the TESDA officials to adhere to the 2004-2007
GAAs negated their claim of good faith. Thus, the COA ordered them to refund the excess EME
they received.
ISSUE: Whether or not the respondent erred in holding the officers of TESDA individually liable
for the disallowance even if they may be rightfully considered in good faith who are entitled for
actualy services rendered.
RULING: NO. The Court does not find any grave abuse of discretion when COA disallowed the
disbursement of EME to TESDA officials for being excessive and unauthorized by law, specifically
the 2004-2007 GAAs.
The COA faithfully implemented the GAA provisions. COA Circular No. 2012-00117 states that the
amount fixed under the GAA for the National Government offices and officials shall be the ceiling
in the disbursement of EME. COA Circular No. 89-300,18 prescribing the guidelines in the
disbursement of EME, likewise states that the amount fixed by the GAA shall be the basis for the
control in the disbursement of these funds.
The COA merely complied with its mandate when it disallowed the EME that were reimbursed to
officers who were not entitled to the EME, or who received EME in excess of the allowable amount.
When the law is clear, plain and free from ambiguity, there should be no room for interpretation
but only its application.
With regard to the refund, the Court applied the Casal ruling in Velasco v. COA, to wit:
x x x the blatant failure of the petitioners-approving officers to abide with the provisions of AO 103
and AO 161 overcame the presumption of good faith. The deliberate disregard of these issuances is
equivalent to gross negligence amounting to bad faith. Therefore, the petitioners-approving officers
are accountable for the refund of the subject incentives which they received.
However, with regard to the employees who had no participation in the approval of the subject
incentives, they were neither in bad faith nor were they grossly negligent for having received the
benefits under the circumstances. The approving officers’ allowance of the said awards certainly
tended to give it a color of legality from the perspective of these employees. Being in good faith,
they are therefore under no obligation to refund the subject benefits which they received.
Applying by analogy the Blaquera, Casal and Velasco rulings, as well as Section 16 of the 2009
Rules and Regulations on Settlement of Accounts, we hold the approving officers of TESDA liable
for the excess EME received by them.
Accordingly, the Director-General's blatant violation of the clear provisions of the Constitution, the
2004-2007 GAAs and the COA circulars is equivalent to gross negligence amounting to bad faith.
He is required to refund the EME he received from the TESDP Fund for himself. As for the TESDA
officials who had no participation in the approval of the excessive EME, they acted in good faith
since they had no hand in the approval of the unauthorized EME. They also honestly believed that
the additional EME were reimbursement for their designation as project officers by the Director-
General. Being in good faith, they need not refund the excess EME they received.
14. RODOLFO AGUINALDO vs. HON. LUIS SANTOS

G.R. No. 94115 August 21 1992
FACTS: Petitioner was duly elected Governor of the Province of Cagayan, having been elected to
said position during the local elections held on January 17 1988, to serve a term of 4 years
therefrom. When a coup d’etat was crushed, he received a telegram from the DILG Secretary
ordering him to show cause why he should not be suspended or removed for his alleged disloyalty.
Apparently, mayors of Cagayan filed a complaint for disloyalty to the Republic and culpable
violation of the Constitution against him, arguing that he had a hand in the failed coup. He said
that he was not privy to the rebel plans, although he was a sympathizer. On the basis of the
complaint and answers, Respondent Secretary suspended petitioner from office for 60 days from
notice and later found him guilty as charged and orderd his removal from offce. While this case was
pending, petitioner filed a certificate of candidacy and subsequently won by a landslide margin in
the 1992 elections.
ISSUE: Whether or not the petitioner is liable for the administrative liability incurred prior his
reelection in 1992.
RULING: NO. Aguinaldo’s re-election to the position of Governor of Cagayan has rendered the
administrative case at bar moot and academic. After the canvassing of votes, Aguinaldo garnered
the most number of votes among the candidates. As ruled by the court in Aguinaldo v Comelec, the
re-election to office operates as a condonation of the officer’s previous misconduct to the extent of
cutting off the right to remove him therefor. The Court should never remove a public officer for acts
done prior to his present term of office. To do otherwise would be to deprive the people of their
right to elect their officers. When the people have elected a man to office, it must be assumed that
they did this with knowledge of his life and character, and that they disregarded or forgave his fault
or misconduct, if he had been guilty of any. It is not for the court, by reason of such fault or
misconduct, to practically overrule the will of the people. The foregoing rule, however, finds no
application to criminal cases pending against Aguinaldo for acts he may have committed during the
failed coup.
15.SALUMBIDES, JR. vs. OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN

G.R. No. 180917 April 23 2010
FACTS: Salumbides and Glenda were appointed as Municipal Legal Officer and Administrator
and Municipal Budget Officer, respectively, of Tagkawayan, Quezon. Herein respondents Ricardo
Agon, Ramon Villasanta, Elmer Dizon, Salvador Adul, and Agnes Fabian, all members of the
Sanggunian, filed with the Office of the Ombudsman a complaint against Salumbides and Glenda,
including the mayor, Coleta, Jason and Aquino for holding government projects without prior
approval from the Sanggunian. The administrative case alleged a violation of the COA rules and the
Local Government Code. They asked that Salumbides et al be placed in preventive suspension. The
Ombudsman dropped the mayor and also Coleta, since they were elective officials who were re-
elected, pursuant to the doctrine of condonation. Jason and Aquino were absolved, but Salumbides
and Glenda were found guilty of Simple Neglect of Duty. Petitioner argues that they were unfairly
treated and the doctrine of condonation violates the equal protection clause.
ISSUE: Whether or not the petitioners can invoke the doctrine of condonation to absolve them
from administrative liability.
RULING: NO. The reelection to office operates as a condonation of the officer’s previous
misconduct to the extent of cutting off the right to remove him therefor. The Court should never
remove a public officer for acts done prior to his present term of office. To do otherwise would be to
deprive the people of their right to elect their officers. When the people elected a man to office, it
must be assumed that they did this with knowledge of his life and character, and that they
disregarded or forgave his faults or misconduct, if he had been guilty of any. It is not for the court,
by reason of such faults or misconduct, to practically overrule the will of the people. Contrary to
petitioner’s asseveration, the non-application of the condonation doctrine to appointive officials
does not violate the right to equal protection of the law. The electorates condonation of the
previous administrative infractions of the reelected official cannot be extended to that of the
reappointed coterminous employees, the underlying basis of the rule being to uphold the will of the
people expressed through the ballot. In other words, there is neither subversion of the sovereign
will nor disenfranchisement of the electorate to speak of, in the case of reappointed coterminous
employees. It is the will of the populace, not the whim of one person who happens to be the
appointing authority, that could extinguish an administrative liability. Since petitioners hold
appointive positions, they cannot claim the mandate of the electorate. The people cannot be
charged with the presumption of full knowledge of the life and character of each and every
probable appointee of the elective official ahead of the latter’s actual reelection.
Moreover, as correctly observed by respondents, the lack of conspiracy cannot be appreciated in

favor of petitioners who were found guilty of simple neglect of duty, for if they conspired to act
negligently, their infraction becomes intentional. There can hardly be conspiracy to commit
negligence. Petitioners fell short of the reasonable diligence required of them, for failing to exercise
due care and prudence in ascertaining the legal requirements and fiscal soundness of the projects
before stamping their imprimatur and giving their advice to their superior. The appellate court
correctly ruled that as municipal legal officer, petitioner Salumbides failed to uphold the law and
provide a sound legal assistance and support to the mayor in carrying out the delivery of basic
services and provisions of adequate facilities when he advised the mayor to proceed with the
construction of the subject projects without prior competitive bidding. As pointed out by the Office
of the Solicitor General, to absolve Salumbides is tantamount to allowing with impunity the giving
of erroneous or illegal advice, when by law he is precisely tasked to advise the mayor on matters
related to upholding the rule of law. Indeed, a legal officer who renders a legal opinion on a course
of action without any legal basis becomes no different from a lay person who may approve the same
because it appears justified.
As regards petitioner Glenda, the appellate court held that the improper use of government funds
upon the direction of the mayor and prior advice by the municipal legal officer did not relieve her
of liability for willingly cooperating rather than registering her written objection as municipal
budget officer. Aside from the lack of competitive bidding, the appellate court, pointing to the
improper itemization of the expense, held that the funding for the projects should have been taken
from the capital outlays that refer to the appropriations for the purchase of goods and services, the
benefits of which extend beyond the fiscal year and which add to the assets of the local government
unit.It added that current operating expenditures like MOOE/RMF refer to appropriations for the
purchase of goods and services for the conduct of normal local government operations within the
fiscal year.
16. OMBUDSMAN CARPIO-MORALES vs. COURT OF APPEALS and BINAY, JR.

G.R. No. 217126-27 November 10 2015
FACTS: Atty. Renato Bondal and Nicolas Enciso filed before the Office of the Ombudsman a case
against Junjun Binay, and other officials of the City Government of Makati, accusing them of
plunder and violation of RA 3019, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft. This was in connection with
the construction of the Makati City Hall Parking Building. The Ombudsman created a Special Panel
of Investigators to conduct the fact-finding, and the investigators charged Binay et al with 6
adminsitrative cases of grave misconduct, dishonesty, etc, and 6 criminal cases for violation of RA
3019. Binay was suspended for 6 months without pay pending investigation. Binay filed a case
before the CA arguing that the suspension order was not in place considering that the acts were
allegedly committed in his past terms and by virtue of the condonation doctrine he cannot anymore
be suspended on his present term. The CA granted his petition.
ISSUE: Whether or not the respondent can invoke the doctrine of condonation to dismiss the
administrative case filed against him.
RULING: NO. After the turbulent decades of Martial Law rule, the Filipino People have framed
and adopted the 1987 Constitution, which sets forth in the Declaration of Principles and State
Policies in Article II that "[t]he State shall maintain honesty and integrity in the public service and
take positive and effective measures against graft and corruption." More significantly, the 1987
Constitution strengthened and solidified what has been first proclaimed in the 1973 Constitution
by commanding public officers to be accountable to the people at all times:
Section 1. Public office is a public trust. Public officers and employees must at all times be
accountable to the people, serve them with utmost responsibility, integrity, loyalty, and efficiency
and act with patriotism and justice, and lead modest lives.
Reading the 1987 Constitution together with the above-cited legal provisions now leads this Court
to the conclusion that THE DOCTRINE OF CONDONATION IS ACTUALLY BEREFT OF LEGAL
BASES. To begin with, the concept of public office is a public trust and the corollary requirement of
accountability to the people at all times, as mandated under the 1987 Constitution, is plainly
inconsistent with the idea that an elective local official's administrative liability for a misconduct
committed during a prior term can be wiped off by the fact that he was elected to a second term of
office, or even another elective post. Election is not a mode of condoning an administrative offense,
and there is simply no constitutional or statutory basis in our jurisdiction to support the notion
that an official elected for a different term is fully absolved of any administrative liability arising
from an offense done during a prior term. In this jurisdiction, liability arising from administrative
offenses may be condoned by the President.
In this jurisdiction, there is, again, no legal basis to conclude that election automatically implies
condonation. If condonation of an elective official's administrative liability would perhaps, be
allowed in this jurisdiction, then the same should have been provided by law under our governing
legal mechanisms. Therefore, inferring from this manifest absence, it cannot be said that the
electorate's will has been abdicated. Equally infirm is Pascual's proposition that the electorate,
when re-electing a local official, are assumed to have done so with knowledge of his life and
character, and that they disregarded or forgave his faults or misconduct, if he had been guilty of
any. Suffice it to state that no such presumption exists in any statute or procedural rule.302
Besides, it is contrary to human experience that the electorate would have full knowledge of a
public official's misdeeds. Misconduct committed by an elective official is easily covered up, and is
almost always unknown to the electorate when they cast their votes.
That being said, THIS COURT SIMPLY FINDS NO LEGAL AUTHORITY TO SUSTAIN THE
CONDONATION DOCTRINE IN THIS JURISDICTION. As can be seen from this discourse, it was
a doctrine adopted from one class of US rulings way back in 1959 and thus, out of touch from - and
now rendered obsolete by - the current legal regime.
It should, however, be clarified that this Court's abandonment of the condonation doctrine should
be prospective in application for the reason that judicial decisions applying or interpreting the laws
or the Constitution, until reversed, shall form part of the legal system of the Philippines. As earlier
established, records disclose that the CA's resolutions directing the issuance of the assailed
injunctive writs were all hinged on cases enunciating the condonation doctrine. Thus, by merely
following settled precedents on the condonation doctrine, which at that time unwittingly remained
"good law," it cannot be concluded that the CA committed a grave abuse of discretion based on its
legal attribution above. Accordingly, the Writ of Prohibition and Injunction against the
Ombudsman's preventive suspension order was correctly issued. However, we hereby reverse the
CA’s decision.
TERMINATION OF OFFICIAL RELATIONS

17. Lecaroz vs. Sandiganbayan
G.R. No. 130872. March 25, 1999
FACTS:
Petitioner Francisco M. Lecaroz was the Municipal Mayor of Santa Cruz, Marinduque, while his
son and co-petitioner Lenlie Lecaroz, was the outgoing chairman of the Kabataang Barangay (KB)
of Barangay Bagong Silang, Santa Cruz, and currently a member of its Sangguniang Bayan. In the
1985 election of the Kabataang Barangay Jowil Red won as the KB Chairman of Barangay
Matalaba, Santa Cruz. Red was appointed by then President Marcos as member of the Sangguniang
Bayan of Santa Cruz representing the KBs of the municipality.
However, Mayor Lecaroz informed Red that he could not yet sit as member of the municipal
council until the Governor of Marinduque had cleared his appointment. Meanwhile with the
approval of the Mayor, Lenlie continued to receive his salary for more than a year. Finally Red was
able to secure appointment papers from the Aquino administration after three years and nine
months from the date he received his appointment paper from President Marcos.
Subsequently, Red filed with the Office of the Ombudsman several criminal complaints against the
Mayor and Lenlie arising from the refusal of the two officials to let him assume the position of KB
sectoral representative.
Petitioners contend that Red failed to qualify as KB sectoral representative to the SB since he did
not present an authenticated copy of his appointment papers; neither did he take a valid oath of
office. Resultantly, this enabled petitioner Lenlie Lecaroz to continue as member of the SB
although in a holdover capacity since his term had already expired. The Sandiganbayan however
rejected this postulate declaring that the holdover provision under Sec. 1 quoted above pertains
only to positions in the KB, clearly implying that since no similar provision is found in Sec. 7 of B.P.
Blg. 51, there can be no holdover with respect to positions in the SB.
ISSUE:
W/N the principle of hold-over is applicable in the Sanggunian Bayan.
RULING:
YES. The concept of holdover when applied to a public officer implies that the office has a fixed
term and the incumbent is holding onto the succeeding term. It is usually provided by law that
officers elected or appointed for a fixed term shall remain in office not only for that term but until
their successors have been elected and qualified. Where this provision is found, the office does not
become vacant upon the expiration of the term if there is no successor elected and qualified to
assume it, but the present incumbent will carry over until his successor is elected and qualified,
even though it be beyond the term fixed by law.
In the instant case, although BP Blg. 51 does not say that a Sanggunian member can continue to
occupy his post after the expiration of his term in case his successor fails to qualify, it does not also
say that he is proscribed from holding over. Absent an express or implied constitutional or
statutory provision to the contrary, an officer is entitled to stay in office until his successor is
appointed or chosen and has qualified. The legislative intent of not allowing holdover must be
clearly expressed or at least implied in the legislative enactment, otherwise it is reasonable to
assume that the law-making body favors the same.
This is founded on obvious considerations of public policy, for the principle of holdover is
specifically intended to prevent public convenience from suffering because of a vacancy and to
avoid a hiatus in the performance of government functions.
18. Estrada vs. Arroyo

G.R. Nos. 146710-15. March 2, 2001
FACTS:
In October 2000, Ilocos Sur governor Luis “Chavit” Singson, a close friend of the President, alleged
that he had personally given Estrada money as payoff from jueteng hidden in a bank account
known as “Jose Velarde”. Singson’s allegation also caused controversy across the nation, which
culminated in the House of Representatives’ filing of an impeachment case against Estrada on
November 13, 2000.
The exposé immediately ignited reactions of rage. On January 18, a crowd continued to grow at
EDSA, bolstered by students from private schools and left-wing organizations. Activists from the
group Bayan and Akbayan as well as lawyers of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and other bar
associations joined in the thousands of protesters.
On January 19, The Philippine National Police and the Armed Forces of the Philippines also
withdrew their support for Estrada and joined the crowd at EDSA Shrine.
At 2:00pm, Estrada appeared on television for the first time since the beginning of the protests and
maintains that he will not resign. He said that he wanted the impeachment trial to continue,
stressing that only a guilty verdict will remove him from office.
At 6:15pm, Estrada again appeared on television, calling for a snap presidential election to be held
concurrently with congressional and local elections on May 14, 2001. He added that he will not run
in this election.
On January 20, the Supreme Court declared that the seat of presidency was vacant, saying that
Estrada “constructively resigned his post”. Noon of the same day, Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo took
her oath of office in the presence of the crowd at EDSA, becoming the 14th president of the
Philippines.
At 2:00 pm, Estrada released a letter saying he had “strong and serious doubts about the legality
and constitutionality of her proclamation as president”, but saying he would give up his office to
avoid being an obstacle to healing the nation. Estrada and his family later left Malacañang Palace.
ISSUE:
W/N Estrada resigned.
RULING:
YES. The resignation of the petitioner cannot be doubted. It was confirmed by his leaving
Malacañang.
In the press release containing his final statement, (1) he acknowledged the oath-taking of the
respondent as President of the Republic albeit with reservation about its legality; (2) he
emphasized he was leaving the Palace, the seat of the presidency, for the sake of peace and in order
to begin the healing process of our nation. He did not say he was leaving the Palace due to any kind
of inability and that he was going to re-assume the presidency as soon as the disability disappears;
(3) he expressed his gratitude to the people for the opportunity to serve them. Without doubt, he
was referring to the past opportunity given him to serve the people as President; (4) he assured
that he will not shirk from any future challenge that may come ahead in the same service of our
country. Petitioner's reference is to a future challenge after occupying the office of the president
which he has given up, and (5) he called on his supporters to join him in the promotion of a
constructive national spirit of reconciliation and solidarity. Certainly, the national spirit of
reconciliation and solidarity could not be attained if he did not give up the presidency.
The press release was petitioner's valedictory, his final act of farewell. His presidency is now in the
past tense.
19. Collantes vs. CA

G.R. No. 169604. March 6, 2007
FACTS:
Petitioner Nelson Collantes was appointed as Undersecretary for Peace and Order of the
Department of Interior and Local Government (DILG) by the then President Fidel V. Ramos.
With the change of administration, Collantes allegedly received word from persons close to then
President Ejercito Estrada to give up his position so that the President could unreservedly appoint
his key officials. As such, Collantes relinquished his post at the DILG.
Thereafter, on 1 July 1998, President Estrada appointed Collantes to the controversial post —
Undersecretary for Civilian Relations of the Department of National Defense (DND). As it
happened, his stint in the DND was short lived. Collantes was supposedly ordered by then
Secretary Orlando Mercado to renounce his post in favor of another presidential appointee,
General Orlando Soriano. In deference to the President's prerogative, he resigned from office
believing that he will soon be given a new assignment.
Unfortunately, Collantes was not given any other post in the government, as in fact, he received a
letter from President Estrada terminating his services effective 8 February 1999.
Upon complaint before the CSC, the latter ruled that Collantes is deemed effectively resigned from
his position as Undersecretary of the DND. Upon petition before the CA, the latter upheld the
resolution of the CSC which allegedly effectively held "that petitioner may be removed from his
position as Undersecretary of the Department of National Defense without the concomitant

transfer to a position equivalent in rank or be removed then, be floated perpetually, which is
tantamount to a constructive dismissal, in violation of his right to security of tenure as a career
executive service eligible."
ISSUE:
W/N a courtesy resignation is valid.
RULING:
YES. There are no special legal effects when a resignation is one of a courtesy resignation. The mere
fact that the President, by himself or through another, requested for someone's resignation does
not give the President the obligation to appoint such person to another position. A courtesy
resignation is just as effectual as any other resignation. There can be no implied promises of
another position just because the resignation was made out of courtesy. Any express promise of
another position, on the other hand, would be void, because there can be no derogation of the
discretion of the appointing power, and because its object is outside the commerce of man.
Petitioner, as a ranking member of the bureaucracy, ought to have known that such promise offers
no assurance in law that the same would be complied with. The time honored rule is that public
office is a public trust, and as such, the same is governed by law, and cannot be made the subject of
personal promises or negotiations by private persons.
20. THE GENERAL MANAGER, PPA VS. MONSERATE

FACTS:
In the early part of 1988, when the PPA underwent a reorganization, respondent applied for the
permanent position of Manager II (SG-19) of the Resource Management Division, same office. The
Comparative Data Sheet accomplished by the PPA Reorganization Task Force shows the ranking of
the six (6) aspirants to the said position, thus:
CANDIDATES ELIGIBILITY xxx TOTAL
1. MONSERATE, JULIETA CS Prof. xxx 79.5
2. ANINO, RAMON 1st grade xxx 70
3. TEODOSIO, APRIL PD 907 (CPA) xxx 67
4. MORTOLA, DARIO CS Prof. xxx 67
5. ESPINOSA, AMALIK Bar xxx 63.5
6. PERFECTO, BASCOS RA 1080 xxx 59.5
On February 1, 1988, Maximo Dumlao, Jr., then General Manager of the PPA, appointed
respondent to the position of Manager II. On even date, respondent assumed office and discharged
the functions thereof. On July 8, 1988, the CSC, through Silva her appointment.
Meanwhile, on April 18, 1988, Anino, who ranked second to respondent per the Comparative Data
Sheet earlier quoted, filed an appeal/petition with the PPA Appeals Board, protesting against
respondents appointment. The PPA Appeals Board, in a Resolution dated August 11, 1988,
sustained the protest and rendered ineffective respondent’s appointment.
Aggrieved, respondent filed with the PPA General Manager an appeal/request for clarification
dated November 2, 1988. She questioned her replacement under PPA Special Order No. 479-88,
claiming that the proceedings before the PPA Appeals Board were irregular because (1) she was not
notified of the hearing before it; (2) she was not furnished a copy of the August 11, 1988 PPA
Appeals Board Resolution or a copy of the protest filed by petitioner Anino; (3) she was not
informed of the reasons behind her replacement; and (4) their Port Manager (in Iloilo City), who
was then an official member of the Board, was not included in the said proceedings.
Pending resolution of her appeal/request for clarification, respondent received a copy of PPA
Special Order No. 492-88 officially reassigning her to the position of Administrative Officer
(SG-15) which was petitioner Anino's former position and was lower than her previous position as
Finance Officer (SG 16) before she was appointed as Division Manager.
Respondent filed on November 25, 1988 a precautionary appeal with the CSC. She manifested that
as of said date (November 25), she has not yet been furnished a certified copy of the PPA Appeals
Board Resolution.
The CSC, in its Resolution dated March 21, 1995, dismissed respondents appeal.
The Court of Appeals nullify the Resolutions of the CSC. It ruled that the August 11, 1988
Resolution of the PPA Appeals Board was not supported by evidence and that the same was
irregularly issued due to lack of proper notice to respondent with respect to the Boards
proceedings. It concluded that her reassignment from the position of Manager II, Resource
Management Division (SG-19), to the position of Administrative Officer (SG-15) was a demotion
violative of her constitutional right to security of tenure and due process.
Petitioners vehemently aver that respondent was never demoted since demotion, being in the
nature of administrative penalty, presupposes a conviction in an administrative case. Here,
respondent was not charged of any administrative case. Rather, she was displaced from her
position as an aftermath of the PPA reorganization, authorized by law, the implementation of
which having been carried out with utmost good faith. Furthermore, the said displacement was just
the necessary effect of the August 11, 1988 Resolution of the PPA Appeals Board which sustained
petitioner Aninos timely protest against respondents appointment. Petitioners theorize that the
appointment of respondent as Resource Management Division Manager did not become final until
the protest filed against her was favorably decided in her favor by the CSC.
Petitioners also contend that the head of an agency, being the appointing authority, is the one most
knowledgeable to decide who can best perform the functions of the office. The appointing authority
has a wide latitude of choice subject only to the condition that the appointee should possess the
qualifications required by law.
ISSUE: Whether or not there was due process when respondent was replaced by petitioner Anino
from her position as Manager II, Resource Management Division, and demoted as Administrative
Officer.
RULING: NO. PPA reorganization in 1988 has nothing to do with respondent’s demotion from
the contested position of Manager II, Resource Management Office (SG-19), to the lower position
of Administrative Officer (SG-15). Antithetically, it was precisely because of the said reorganization
that respondent applied to the higher position of Division Manager II. In fact, the Comparative
Data Sheet accomplished by the PPA Reorganization Task Force itself shows that respondent
ranked No. 1, while petitioner Anino ranked No. 2, from among the six (6) contenders to the said
post. Respondent was eventually issued a permanent appointment as such Division Manager on
February 1, 1988 by then PPA General Maximo Dumlao, Jr., during which time she actually
assumed office and discharged its functions. This appointment was later approved on July 8, 1988
by the CSC, through Assistant Director Guillermo R. Silva of the Civil Service Field Office-PPA.
Clearly, it was only after the reorganization and upon the issuance of the August 11, 1988
Resolution of the PPA Appeals Board when respondent was demoted to the lower position of
Administrative Officer.
Therefore, contrary to petitioners claim, respondent was demoted, not by reason of the PPA
reorganization in 1988, but due to the PPA Appeals Board Resolution dated August 11, 1988
sustaining petitioner Aninos protest against respondents appointment.
We uphold the Court of Appeals finding that the August 11, 1998 PPA Appeals Board Resolution
was void for lack of evidence and proper notice to respondent.
21.SANGGUNIANG BAYAN OF SAN ANDRES VS COURT OF APPEALS

FACTS:
Private Respondent Augusto T. Antonio was elected president of the Association of Barangay
Councils (ABC) for the Municipality of San Andres, Catanduanes and was appointed by the
President as member of Sangguniang Bayan.
Meanwhile, then Secretary of the DILG declared the election for the president of the Federation of
the Association of Barangay Councils (FABC) of the same province, in which private respondent
was a voting member, void for want of a quorum. Hence, a reorganization of the provincial council
became necessary. Conformably, the DILG secretary designated private respondent as a temporary
member of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of the Province of Catanduanes, effective June 15, 1990.
In view of his designation, private respondent resigned as a member of the Sangguniang Bayan.
Nenito F. Aquino, then vice-president of the ABC, was subsequently appointed by the provincial
governor as member of the Sangguniang Bayan in place of private respondent. Aquino assumed
office on July 18, 1990 after taking his oath.
Subsequently, the ruling of DILG Secretary Santos annulling the election of the FABC president
was reversed by the Supreme Court in Taule vs. Santos. In the same case, the appointment of
Private Respondent Antonio as sectoral representative to the Sangguniang Panlalawigan was
declared void, because he did not possess the basic qualification that he should be president of the
federation of barangay councils.
The private respondent wrote to the members of the Sangguniang Bayan of San Andres advising
them of his re-assumption of his original position, duties and responsibilities as sectoral
representative therein. In response thereto, the Sanggunian issued a resolution declaring that
Antonio had no legal basis to resume office as a member of the Sangguniang Bayan.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not respondent’s resignation as ex-officio member of Petitioner Sangguniang Bayan
ng San Andres, Catanduanes is deemed complete so as to terminate his official relation thereto
2. Whether or not respondent had totally abandoned his ex-officio membership in Petitioner
Sangguniang Bayan
RULING:
1. NO. To constitute a complete and operative resignation from public office, there must be: (a) an
intention to relinquish a part of the term; (b) an act of relinquishment; and (c) an acceptance by
the proper authority.
The records are bereft of any evidence that private respondents resignation was accepted by the
proper authority. From the time that he was elected as punong barangay up to the time he resigned
as a member of Sangguniang Bayan, the governing law was B.P. 337 or the Local Government Code
of 1983. While said law was silent as to who specifically should accept the resignation of an
appointive member of the Sangguniang Bayan, Sec. 6 of Rule XIX of its implementing rules states
that the [r]esignation of sanggunian members shall be acted upon by the sanggunian concerned,
and a copy of the action taken shall be furnished the official responsible for appointing a
replacement and the Ministry of Local Government. The position shall be deemed vacated only
upon acceptance of the resignation.
It is not disputed that private respondents resignation letter was addressed only to the municipal
mayor of San Andres, Catanduanes. It is indicated thereon that copies were furnished the
provincial governor, the municipal treasurer and the DILG. Neither the mayor nor the officers who
had been furnished copies of said letter expressly acted on it. On hindsight, and assuming
arguendo that the aforecited Sec. 6 of Rule XIX is valid and applicable, the mayor should have
referred or endorsed the latter to the Sangguniang Bayan for proper action. In any event, there is
no evidence that the resignation was accepted by any government functionary or office.
2. YES. While we agree with Respondent Court that the resignation was not valid absent any
acceptance thereof by the proper authority, we nonetheless hold that Private Respondent Antonio
has effectively relinquished his membership in the Sangguniang Bayan due to his voluntary
abandonment of said post.
There are two essential elements of abandonment: first, an intention to abandon and, second, an
overt or external act by which the intention is carried into effect.
The following clearly manifest the intention of private respondent to abandon his position: (1) his
failure to perform his function as member of the Sangguniang Bayan, (2) his failure to collect the
corresponding remuneration for the position, (3) his failure to object to the appointment of Aquino
as his replacement in the Sangguniang Bayan, (4) his prolonged failure to initiate any act to
reassume his post in the Sangguniang Bayan after the Supreme Court had nullified his designation
to the Sangguniang Panlalawigan.
On the other hand, the following overt acts demonstrate that he had effected his intention: (1) his
letter of resignation from the Sangguniang Bayan; (2) his assumption of office as member of the
Sangguniang Panlalawigan, (3) his faithful discharge of his duties and functions as member of said
Sanggunian, and (4) his receipt of the remuneration for such post.
It must be stressed that when an officer is designated to another post, he is usually called upon to
discharge duties in addition to his regular responsibilities. Private respondent, however, did not
simultaneously discharge the duties and obligations of both positions. Neither did he, at that time,
express an intention to resume his office as member of the Sangguniang Bayan. His overt acts,
silence, inaction and acquiescence, when Aquino succeeded him to his original position, show that
Antonio had abandoned the contested office.
22. CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION VS EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

FACTS:
Petitioners maintain that this Executive Order which, in effect, allows members of the Cabinet,
their undersecretaries and assistant secretaries to hold other government offices or positions in
addition to their primary positions, albeit subject to the limitation therein imposed, runs counter to
Section 13, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution..
The constitutionality of Executive Order No. 284 is being challenged by petitioners on the principal
submission that it adds exceptions to Section 13, Article VII other than those provided in the
Constitution. According to petitioners, by virtue of the phrase "unless otherwise provided in this
Constitution," the only exceptions against holding any other office or employment in Government
are those provided in the Constitution, namely: (1) The Vice-President may be appointed as a
Member of the Cabinet under Section 3, par. (2), Article VII thereof; and (2) the Secretary of
Justice is an ex-officio member of the Judicial and Bar Council by virtue of Section 8 (1), Article
VIII.
Public respondents, on the other hand, maintain that the phrase "unless otherwise provided in the
Constitution" in Section 13, Article VII makes reference to Section 7, par. (2), Article I-XB insofar
as the appointive officials mentioned therein are concerned.
ISSUE: Whether or not the prohibition in Section 13, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution insofar
as Cabinet members, their deputies or assistants are concerned admit of the broad exceptions
made for appointive officials in general under Section 7, par. (2), Article I-XB which, for easy
reference is quoted anew, thus: "Unless otherwise allowed by law or by the primary functions of his
position, no appointive official shall hold any other office or employment in the Government or any
subdivision, agency or instrumentality thereof, including government-owned or controlled
corporation or their subsidiaries."
RULING:
NO. While all other appointive officials in the civil service are allowed to hold other office or
employment in the government during their tenure when such is allowed by law or by the primary
functions of their positions, members of the Cabinet, their deputies and assistants may do so only
when expressly authorized by the Constitution itself. In other words, Section 7, Article I-XB is
meant to lay down the general rule applicable to all elective and appointive public officials and
employees, while Section 13, Article VII is meant to be the exception applicable only to the
President, the Vice- President, Members of the Cabinet, their deputies and assistants.
Executive Order No. 284 is unconstitutional. Ostensibly restricting the number of positions that
Cabinet members, undersecretaries or assistant secretaries may hold in addition to their primary
position to not more than 2 positions in the government and government corporations, EO 284
actually allows them to hold multiple offices or employment in direct contravention of the express
mandate of Sec 13, Art 7 of the 1987 Constitution prohibiting them from doing so, unless otherwise
provided in the 1987 Constitution itself.
23. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION VS YU

FACTS:
In 1992, the national government implemented a devolution program pursuant to R.A. No. 7160,
(The Local Government Code of 1991), which affected the Department of Health (DOH) along with
other government agencies.
Prior to the devolution, Dr. Fortunata Castillo (Dr. Castillo) held the position of Provincial Health
Officer II (PHO II) of the DOH Regional Office No. IX in Zamboanga City. Respondent Dr. Agnes
Ouida P. Yu (Dr. Yu), on the other hand, held the position of Provincial Health Officer I (PHO I).
Upon the implementation of the devolution program, then Basilan Governor Gerry Salapuddin
(Governor Salapuddin) refused to accept Dr. Castillo as the incumbent of the PHO II position that
was to be devolved to the local government unit of Basilan, prompting the DOH to retain Dr.
Castillo at the Regional Office No. IX in Zamboanga City. She retired in 1996.
Meanwhile, in 1994, or two years after the implementation of the devolution program, Governor
Salapuddin appointed Dr. Yu to the PHO II position.
On February 23, 1998, Republic Act No. 8543, otherwise known as ―An Act Converting the Basilan
Provincial Hospital in the Municipality of Isabela, Province of Basilan, into a Tertiary Hospital
Under the Full Administrative and Technical Supervision of the Department of Health, Increasing
the Capacity to One Hundred Beds and Appropriating Funds Therefor, was passed into law
whereby the hospital positions previously devolved to the local government unit of Basilan were re-
nationalized and reverted to the DOH. The Basilan Provincial Health Hospital was later renamed
the Basilan General Hospital, and the position of PHO II was then re-classified to Chief of Hospital
II. While Dr. Yu was among the personnel reverted to the DOH with the re-nationalization of the
Basilan General Hospital, she was made to retain her original item of PHO II instead of being given
the re-classified position of Chief of Hospital II.
Aggrieved, filed a letter protest before the CSC claiming that she has a vested right to the position
of Chief of Hospital II. The CSC denied the protest. On appeal, the CA reversed the CSC.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in holding that PHO II position previously occupied
by respondent Yu is a devolved position.
2. Whether or not there was an abandonment of office when Dr. Castillo failed to assert her rights.
RULING:
1. NO. Devolution is the act by which the national government confers power and authority upon
the various local government units to perform specific functions and responsibilities. o ensure the
proper implementation of the devolution process, then President Corazon C. Aquino issued
Executive Order (E.O.) No. 503, otherwise known as the ―Rules and Regulations Implementing
the Transfer of Personnel and Assets, Liabilities and Records of National Government Agencies
Whose Functions Are To Be Devolved To The Local Government Units And For Other Related
Purposes, which laid down the following pertinent guidelines with respect to the transfer of
personnel: “The absorption of the NGA personnel by the LGU shall be mandatory, in which case,
the LGUs shall create the equivalent positions of the affected personnel except when it is not
administratively viable.”
On the basis of the foregoing, it was mandatory for Governor Salapuddin to absorb the position of
PHO II, as well as its incumbent, Dr. Fortunata Castillo. Highlighting the absence of discretion is
the use of the word “shall” both in Section 17 (i) of R.A. No. 7160 and in Section 2(a)(2) of E.O. No.
503, which connotes a mandatory order. The only instance that the LGU concerned may choose not
to absorb the NGA personnel is when absorption is not administratively viable, meaning, it would
result to duplication of functions, in which case, the NGA personnel shall be retained by the
national government.
Had Dr. Castillo felt aggrieved by her detail to the DOH Regional Office, she was not without
recourse. The law afforded her the right to appeal her case to the CSC, but she had not seen fit to
question the justification for her detail. Hence, the appointment of Dr. Yu to the position PHO II.
2. NO. Abandonment of office is the voluntary relinquishment of an office by the holder with the
intention of terminating his possession and control thereof. In order to constitute abandonment of
office, it must be total and under such circumstance as clearly to indicate absolute relinquishment
and there must be a complete abandonment of duties of such continuance that the law will infer a
relinquishment. Abandonment of duties is a voluntary act; it springs form and is accompanied by
deliberation and freedom of choice. The two essential elements of abandonment are: (1) an
intention to abandon; and (2) an overt or external act by which the intention is carried into effect.
In the case at bar, there is no voluntary abandonment because of the refusal of the governor to
accept the devolved NGA personnel. The fact that Dr. Castillo did not question the refusal which is
seemingly lackadaisical attitude towards protecting her rights is not tantamount to abandonment.
This is because, according to the Supreme Court, “the risk of incurring the ire of a powerful
politician effectively tied her hands and “it has become quite understandable that she could not
don her gloves and fight even if she wants to.”

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Deang, Gameng, Ramos, Tejada, Torres, Usman

LIABILITY OF PUBLIC OFFICERS

2. PEZA vs. COA

3. LUIS TABUENA vs. SANDIGANBAYAN

4. EUFEMIO T. CORREA vs. COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE

5. JESUS C. OCAMPO vs. OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN and MAXIMINO ECLIPSE

6. OFFICE OF THE COURT ADMINISTRATOR vs. RAMON G. ENRIQUEZ

15 May 1989, the Sandiganbayan, acting on a demurrer to evidence, promulgated a Resolution

7. FRANCISCO I. CHAVEZ v. THE HON. SANDIGANBAYAN

8.CESAR S. DUMDUMA v. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION

9. MARIA CAROLINA P. ARAULLO v. BENIGNO SIMEON AQUINO III

10.OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN vs. ULDARICO P. ANDUTAN, JR.

11. FRANCIS SAEZ vs. GLORIA MACAPAGAL-ARROYO et. al.

12. PEOPLE vs. SANDIGANBAYAN et. al.

13.TESDA VS. THE COMMISSION ON AUDIT

14. RODOLFO AGUINALDO vs. HON. LUIS SANTOS

15.SALUMBIDES, JR. vs. OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN

Moreover, as correctly observed by respondents, the lack of conspiracy cannot be appreciated in

16. OMBUDSMAN CARPIO-MORALES vs. COURT OF APPEALS and BINAY, JR.

TERMINATION OF OFFICIAL RELATIONS

18. Estrada vs. Arroyo

19. Collantes vs. CA

position as Undersecretary of the Department of National Defense without the concomitant

20. THE GENERAL MANAGER, PPA VS. MONSERATE

21.SANGGUNIANG BAYAN OF SAN ANDRES VS COURT OF APPEALS

22. CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION VS EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

23. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION VS YU

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