Tijing vs CA

G.R. No. 125901, March 8, 2001 [Habeas Corpus]

FACTS:
Edgardo and Bienvenida Tijing filed a petition for habeas corpus in order to recover their
youngest child, Edgardo Jr., whom they did not see for 4 years. Trial court granted the
petition and ordered Angelita Diamante to immediately release the child, now named
John Thomas D. Lopez, and turn him over to his parents. CA reversed and set aside the
decision rendered by the lower court. It questioned the propriety of the habeas corpus in
this case.

ISSUE:Whether or not habeas corpus is the proper remedy to regain custody of the
minor.

RULING:
Yes. SC upheld the decision of the trial court.

The writ of habeas corpus extends to all cases of illegal confinement or detention by
which any person is deprived of his liberty, or by the rightful custody of any person
withheld from the persons entitled thereto. The writ of habeas corpus is the proper legal
remedy to enable parents to regain the custody of a minor child even if the latter be in
the custody of a third person of his own free will. It must be stressed out that in habeas
corpus proceeding, the question of identity is relevant and material, subject to the usual
presumption, including those as identity of the person.

The trial court was correct in its judgment based on the evidence established by the
parents and by the witness who is the brother of the late common-law husband of
Angelita. Furthermore, there are no clinical records, log book or discharge from the
clinic where John Thomas was allegedly born were presented. Strong evidence directly
proves that Thomas Lopez, Angela's "husband", was not capable of siring a child.
Moreover, his first marriage produced no offspring even after almost 15 years of living
together with his legal wife. His 14 year affair with Angelita also bore no offspring.

The birth certificate of John Thomas Lopez were attended by irregularities. It was filed
by Thomas Lopez, the alleged father. Under Sec. 4, Act No. 3753 (Civil Register Law),
the attending physician or midwife in attendance of the birth should cause the
registration of such birth. Only in default of the physician or midwife, can the parent
register the birth of his child. Certificate must be filed with the LCR within 30 days after
the birth. The status of Thomas and Angelita on the birth certificate were typed in as
legally married, which is false because Angelita herself had admitted that she is a
"common-law wife."

Trial court also observed several times that when the child and Bienvenida were both in
court, the two had strong similarities in their faces. Resemblance between a minor and
his alleged parent is competent and material evidence to establish parentage. Lastly,
the spouses presented clinical records and testimony of the midwife who attended
Bienvenida's childbirth.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. RONNIE RULLEPA y GUINTO

398 SCRA 567, 5 March 2003, EN BANC

Ronnie Rullepa y Guinto (Rullepa), a houseboy, was charged with Rape before the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Quezon City for allegedly having carnal knowledge with
“AAA”, three (3) years of age, a minor and against her will and without her consent.
“AAA” described her abuse under the hands of Rullepa in a plain and matter-of-
fact manner in her testimony. The victim and her mother testified that she was only three
years old at the time of the rape. However, the prosecution did not offer the victim‘s
certificate of live birth or similar authentic documents in evidence.

Finding for the prosecution, the RTC rendered judgment finding Rullepa guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of rape and accordingly sentenced him to death. The case was placed
for automatic review of the Supreme Court

ISSUE:

Whether or not the trial court erred in imposing the supreme penalty of death upon
Rullepa

HELD:

A person‘s appearance, where relevant, is admissible as object evidence, the same being
addressed to the senses of the court. As to the weight to accord such appearance,
especially in rape cases, the Court in People v. Pruna laid down the guideline.

Under the guideline, the testimony of a relative with respect to the age of the victim is
sufficient to constitute proof beyond reasonable doubt in cases (a) and (b) above. In such
cases, the disparity between the allegation and the proof of age is so great that the court
can easily determine from the appearance of the victim the veracity of the testimony. The
appearance corroborates the relative‘s testimony.

As the alleged age approaches the age sought to be proved, the person‘s appearance,
as object evidence of her age, loses probative value. Doubt as to her true age becomes
greater and, following United States v. Agadas, such doubt must be resolved in favor of
the accused.
Because of the vast disparity between the alleged age (three years old) and the age
sought to be proved (below twelve years), the trial court would have had no difficulty
ascertaining the victim‘s age from her appearance. No reasonable doubt,
therefore, exists that the second element of statutory rape is present.

Whether the victim was below seven years old, however, is another matter. Here,
reasonable doubt exists. A mature three and a half-year old can easily be mistaken for
an underdeveloped seven-year old. The appearance of the victim, as object evidence,
cannot be accorded much weight and the testimony of the mother is, by itself, insufficient.

As it has not been established with moral certainty that “AAA” was below seven years old
at the time of the commission of the offense, Rullepa cannot be sentenced to suffer the
death penalty. Only the penalty of reclusion perpetua can be imposed upon him.

GR. No. 121979 March 2, 1998

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
SAMUEL ULZORON, accused-appellant.

FACTS: Samuel Ulzoron was charged with rape with the use of a deadly weapon.
On the strength of the testimony of the complaining witness Emily Gabo, the trial court
convicted the accused. It found the latter’s testimony straightforward and credible. It
rationalized that she would not have filed her complaint for rape if her accusations were
not true, for to do so would only expose herself to public shame or ridicule. No improper
motive on her part to file the case had been shown. The findings of the examining
physician also lent credence to her claim. On the other hand, the trial court found the
defense of the accused too weak, anemic.

Appellant concedes, even as he assails his conviction, that his defense is inherently
weak. Nevertheless, he faults the trial court for convicting him on the basis of his
defense. He argues that the undisputed facts and circumstances made it more likely
that Emily was involved in an adulterous relationship with him. He also invites attention
to the circumstance that the judge who wrote the decision did not personally try the
case hence appellant claims that the former lacked the opportunity to observe the
demeanor of the parties and their witnesses.

ISSUE1: W/N accused-appellant’s guilt was sufficiently established

HELD1: Contrary to accused-appellant’s claim that he was convicted because of his
weak defense, his conviction was actually founded on the overwhelming evidence of the
prosecution.
The circumstances of force and intimidation attending the instant case were manifested
clearly not only in the victim’s testimony but also in the physical evidence presented
during the trial consisting of her torn dress and underwear as well as the medico-legal
report. Such pieces of evidence indeed are more eloquent than a hundred witnesses.
The fact of carnal knowledge is not disputed. It was positively established through the
offended party’s own testimony and corroborated by that of her examining physician.

Moreover, the conduct of the complaining witness immediately following the assault
clearly established the truth of her charge that she was raped by accused-appellant.

ISSUE2: W/N the circumstance that the judge who wrote the decision did not personally
try the case tainted his decision
HELD2: NO. The circumstance that the judge who wrote the decision had not heard the
testimonies of the prosecution witnesses does not taint or disturb his decision. After all,
he had the records of the case before him including the transcript of stenographic notes.
The validity of a decision is not necessarily impaired by the fact that its writer only took
over from a colleague who had earlier presided at the trial unless there is a clear
showing of grave abuse of discretion in the appreciation of the facts, and none exists in
the present case. The records amply support the factual findings of the trial court and its
assessment of the credibility of the witnesses.
July 22, 2012
People vs. Abalos, 258 SCRA 523
By LLBe:LawLifeBuzzEtcetera

Facts: In the evening of March 20, 1983, while accused Tiburcio Abalos and his father,
Police Major Cecilio Abalos, were having a heated argument, a woman shouted “Police
officer, help us! Somebody’s making trouble here.” The victim, P/Pfc. Labine, then
appeared at the scene and asked Major Abalos, “What is it, sir?” The victim saluted
Abalos when the latter turned around to face him. As Major Abalos leveled his carbine
at Labine, accused hurriedly left and procured a piece of wood, about two inches thick,
three inches wide and three feet long, from a nearby Ford Fiera vehicle. He then swiftly
returned and unceremoniously swung with that wooden piece at Labine from behind,
hitting the policeman at the back of the right side of his head. Labine collapsed
unconscious in a heap, and he later expired from the severe skull fracture he sustained
from that blow. The trial court found the accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the
complex crime of direct assault with murder.

Issue: Whether or not the trial court erred in finding appellant guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of the complex crime of direct assault with murder.

Held: No. There are two modes of committing atentados contra la autoridad o sus
agentes under Article 148 of the RPC. The first is not a true atentado as it is tantamount
to rebellion or sedition, except that there is no public uprising. On the other hand, the
second mode is the more common way of committing assault and is aggravated when
there is a weapon employed in the attack, or the offender is a public officer, or the
offender lays hands upon a person in authority. Appellant committed the second form of
assault, the elements of which are that there must be an attack, use of force, or serious
intimidation or resistance upon a person in authority or his agent; the assault was made
when the said person was performing his duties or on the occasion of such
performance; and the accused knew that the victim is a person in authority or his agent,
that is, that the accused must have the intention to offend, injure or assault the offended
party as a person in authority or an agent of a person in authority. Here, Labine was a
duly appointed member of the then INP in Catbalogan, Samar and, thus, was an agent
of a person in authority pursuant to Article 152 of the RPC. There is also no dispute that
he was in the actual performance of his duties when assaulted by appellant, that is, he
was maintaining peace and order during the fiesta in Barangay Canlapwas. Appellant
himself testified that he personally knew Labine to be a policeman and, in fact, Labine
was then wearing his uniform. These facts should have sufficiently deterred appellant
from attacking him, and his defiant conduct clearly demonstrates that he really had the
criminal intent to assault and injure an agent of the law.
When the assault results in the killing of that agent or of a person in authority for that
matter, there arises the complex crime of direct assault with murder or homicide. The
killing in the instant case constituted the felony of murder qualified by alevosia through
treacherous means deliberately adopted Pfc. Labine was struck from behind while he
was being confronted at the same time by appellant’s father. The evidence shows that
appellant deliberately went behind the victim whom he then hit with a piece of wood
which he deliberately got for that purpose.

Caballes vs. CA
GR No. 136292 January. 15, 2002

FACTS:

On or about the 28th day of June, 1989, in the Municipality of Pangasinan, and/or
elsewhere in the Province of Laguna, and within the jurisdiction of this Honourable
Court, the above mentioned accused with intent to gain and without the knowledge and
consent of the owner thereof, the National Power Corporation, did then and there
wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously take, steal and carry away about 630 kg of Aluminium
cable conductors, valued at Php 27, 450.00, belonging to and to the damage and
prejudice of said owner National Power Corporation, in the aforesaid amount.
ISSUE:

WON the warrantless search without consent is valid?

HELD:

In case of consented searches or waiver of the constitutional guarantee against

obtrusive searches, it is fundamental that to constitute a waiver, it must first appear that
(1) the right exists; (2) that person involved had knowledge, either actual or
constructive, of the existence of such right, and (3) said person had an actual intention
to relinquish the right.

In the case at bar, the evidence is lacking that the petitioner intentionally surrendered
his right against unreasonable searches.

WHEREFORE, the impugned decision is reversed and set aside, and accused Rudy
Caballes is hereby ACQUITTED of the crime charged.

MUSTANG LUMBER VS CA

FACTS:
Acting on an information that a huge stockpile of narra flitches, shorts, and slabs were
seen inside petitioner’s lumberyard, a team of foresters and policeman was organized
and sent to conduct surveillance. In the course thereof, the team members saw coming
out from the lumberyard the petitioner’s truck loaded with lumber. The driver could not
produce the required invoices and transport documents, the team seized the truck
together with its cargo and impounded them.

ISSUE(S):
Whether or not the seizure of the truck and its cargo without warrant was unlawful.

RULING:
NO. Search of a moving vehicle is one of the five doctrinally accepted exceptions to the
constitutional mandate that no search or seizure shall be made except by virtue of a
warrant issued by a judge after personally determining the existence of probable cause.

Petition is DENIED.