Reclassification And Conversion Of Public Land

Public land is classified into four categories: (a) agricultural (b) forest or timber (c) mineral or (d) national
parks.

Under Section 2, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution, only agricultural lands of the public domain may be
alienated. Consequently, lands classified as forest or timber, mineral, or national parks are not
susceptible of alienation or disposition unless they are reclassified as agricultural.

A positive act of the Government is necessary to enable such reclassification, and the exclusive
prerogative to classify public lands under existing laws is vested in the Executive Department, not in the
courts.

Conversion refers to the transformation of the character/status of the land from being a public land to
private land. When public land is no longer intended for public service or for the development of the
national wealth, thereby effectively removing the land from the ambit of public dominion, a declaration
of such conversion must be made in the form of a law duly enacted by Congress or by a Presidential
proclamation in cases where the President is duly authorized by law to that effect.

1. [ GR No. 9069, Mar 31, 1915 ]

MUNICIPALITY OF CAVITE v. HILARIA ROJAS +
30 Phil. 602

TORRES, J.:

Appeal filed through bill of exceptions by the Attorney-General, representing the plaintiff municipality of
Cavite, from the judgment of March 27, 1913, whereby the Honorable Herbert D. Gale, judge, dismissed
the complaint with costs against the plaintiff party, declaring that the said municipality had no right to
require that the defendants vacate the land in question.

By an instrument dated December 5, 1911, afterwards amended on March 14, 1912, the provincial fiscal
of Cavite, representing the municipality of that name, filed a complaint in the Court of First Instance of
said province alleging that the plaintiff municipal corporation, duly organized and constituted in
accordance with Act No. 82, and as the successor to the rights said entity had under the late Spanish
government, and by virtue of Act No. 1039, had exclusive right, control and administration over the
streets, lanes, plazas, and public places of the municipality of Cavite; that the defendants, by virtue of a
lease secured from the plaintiff municipality, occupy a parcel of land 93 square meters in area that
forms part of the public plaza known under the name of Soledad, belonging to the municipality of
Cavite, the defendants having constructed thereon a house, through payment to the plaintiff for
occupation thereof of a rental of P5.58 a quarter in advance, said defendants being furthermore
obligated to vacate the leased land within sixty days subsequent to plaintiff's demand to that effect; that
the defendants have been required by the municipality to vacate and deliver possession of the said land,
but more than the sixty days within which they ought to have vacated it have elapsed without their
having done so to date; that the lease secured from the municipality of Cavite, by virtue whereof the
defendants occupy the land that is the subject matter of the complaint, is ultra vires and therefore ipso
facto null and void and of no force or effect, for the said land is an integral portion of a public plaza of
public domain and use, and the municipal council of Cavite has never at any time had any power of
authority to withdraw it from public use and to lease it to a private party for his own use, and so the
defendants have never had any right to occupy or to retain the said land under leasehold, or in any
other way, their occupation of the parcel being furthermore illegal; and therefore prayed that judgment
be rendered declaring that possession of the said land lies with the plaintiff and ordering the defendants
to vacate the land and deliver possession thereof to said plaintiff, with the costs against the defendants.

The demurrer filed to the foregoing complaint having been overruled, with exception on the part of the
defendants, in their answer of April 10, 1912, they admitted some of the allegations contained in the
complaint but denied that the parcel of land which they occupy and to which the complaint refers forms
an integral part of Plaza Soledad, or that the lease secured by them from the municipality of Cavite was
null and void and ultra vires, stating if they refused to vacate said land it was because they had acquired
the right of possession thereof. As a special defense they alleged that, according to the lease, they could
only be ordered to vacate the land leased when the plaintiff municipality might need it for decoration or
other public use, which does not apply in the present case; and in a cross-complaint they alleged that on
the land which is the subject matter of the complaint the defendants have erected a house of strong
materials, assessed at P3,000, which was constructed under a license secured from the plaintiff
municipality; that if they should be ordered to vacate the said land they would suffer damages to the
extent of P3,000, wherefore they prayed that they be absolved from the complaint, or in the contrary
case that the plaintiff be sentenced to indemnify them in the sum of P3,000 as damages, and to pay the
costs.

After a hearing of the case, wherein both parties submitted parol and documentary evidence, the court
rendered the judgment that has been mentioned, whereto counsel for the municipality excepted and in
writing asked for a reopening of the case and the holding of a new trial. This motion was denied, with
exception on the part of the appellant, and the corresponding bill of exceptions was filed, approved and
forwarded to the clerk of this court.

It is duly proven in the record that, upon presentation of an application by Hilaria Rojas, the municipal
council of Cavite by resolution No. 10, dated July 3, 1907, Exhibit C, leased to the said Rojas some 70 or
80 square meters of Plaza Soledad, on condition that she pay rent quarterly in advance according to the
schedule fixed in Ordinance No. 43, series of 1903, and that she obligate herself to vacate said land
within sixty days subsequent to notification to that effect. The record shows (receipts, Exhibit 1) that she
has paid the land tax on the house erected on the lot.

The boundary line between the properties of the municipality of Cavite and the naval reservation, as
fixed in Act No. 1039 of the Philippine Commission, appears in the plan prepared by a naval engineer
and submitted as evidence by the plaintiff, Exhibit C of civil case No. 724 of the Cavite court and
registered in this court as No. 9071. According to said plan, defendant's house is erected on a plat of
ground that forms part of the promenade called Plaza Soledad, and this was also so proven by the
testimony of the plaintiff's witnesses.

By section 3 of the said Act No. i039, passed January 12, 1904, the Philippine Commission granted to the
municipality of Cavite all the land included in the tract called. Plaza Soledad. In the case of Nicolas vs.
Jose (6 Phil. Rep., 589), wherein the municipality of Cavite, represented by its president Catalino Nicolas,
sought inscription in its name of the land comprised in the said Plaza Soledad, with objection on the part
of Maria Jose et al. who occupied some parts thereof with their houses and who also sought that
inscription be decreed in their name of the parcels of land in this plaza occupied by them, this court
decided that neither the municipality nor the objectors were entitled to inscription, for with respect to
the objectors said plaza belonged to the municipality of Cavite and with respect to the latter the said
Plaza Soledad was not transferable property of that municipality to be inscribed in its name, because the
intention of Act No. 1039 was that the said plaza and other places therein enumerated should be kept
open for public transit; wherefore there can be no doubt that the defendant has no right to continue to
occupy the land of the municipality leased by her, for it is an integral portion of Plaza Soledad," which is
for public use and is reserved for the common benefit.

According to article 344 of the Civil Code: "Property for public use in provinces and in towns comprises
the provincial and town roads, the squares, streets, fountains, and public waters, the promenades, and
public works of general service supported by said towns or provinces."

The said Plaza Soledad being a promenade for public use, the municipal council of Cavite could not in
1907 withdraw or exclude from public use a portion thereof in order to lease it for the sole benefit of
the defendant Hilaria Rojas. In leasing a portion of said plaza or public place to the defendant for private
use the plaintiff municipality exceeded its authority in the exercise of its powers by executing a contract
over a thing of which it could not dispose, nor is it empowered so to do.

The Civil Code, article 1271, prescribes that everything which is not outside the commerce of man may
be the object of a contract, and plazas and streets are outside of this commerce, as was decided by the
supreme court of Spain in its decision of February 12, 1895, which says: "Communal things that cannot
be sold because they are by their very nature outside of commerce are those for public use, such as the
plazas, streets, common lands, rivers, fountains, etc."

Therefore, it must be concluded that the contract, Exhibit C, whereby the municipality of Cavite leased
to Hilaria Rojas a portion of the Plaza Soledad is null and void and of no force or effect, because it is
contrary to the law and the thing leased cannot be the object of a contract. On the hypothesis that the
said lease is null and void in accordance with the provisions of article 1303 of the Civil Code, the
defendant must restore and deliver possession of the land described in the complaint to the
municipality of Cavite, which in its turn must restore to the said defendant all the sums it may have
received from her in the nature of rentals just as soon as she restores the land improperly leased. For
the same reasons as have been set forth, and as said contract is null and void in its origin, it can produce
no effect and consequently the defendant is not entitled to claim that the plaintiff municipality
indemnify her for the damages she may suffer by the removal of her house from the said land.

For all the foregoing reasons we must reverse the judgment appealed from and declare, as we do
declare, that the land occupied by Hilaria Rojas forms part of the public plaza called Soledad, and as the
lease of said parcel of land is null and void, we order the defendant to vacate it and release the land in
question within thirty days, leaving it cleared as it was before her occupation. There is no ground for the
indemnity sought in the nature of damages, but the municipality must in its turn restore to the
defendant the rentals collected; without special finding as to the costs.

So ordered.

Arellano, C. J., Johnson and Araullo, JJ., concur.

Moreland, J., concurs in the result.

Facts:

In 1907, the municipal council of Cavite leased to Rojas a part of Plaza Soledad, on the condition that she
will pay rent quarterly in advance and that she will vacate the leased land within sixty days subsequent
to plaintiff’s demand. The plaintiff ordered the defendants to vacate and deliver the possession of the
land. However, the defendants refused to do so, claiming that they had acquired the right of possession
thereof. They further claimed that according to the lease, they could only be ordered to vacate the land
leased when the plaintiff municipality might need it for decoration or other public use.

Issue:

Whether or not the contract of lease entered into by the parties is valid.

Ruling:

No. The contract of lease is null and void. The Civil Code provides that everything which is not outside
the commerce of man may be the object of a contract. The plazas and streets are outside of this
commerce of man, since they are properties intended for public use. Thus, in leasing a portion of said
plaza or public place to the defendants for private use the plaintiff municipality exceeded its authority in
the exercise of its powers by executing a contract over a thing of which it could not dispose, nor is it
empowered so to do. Further, the defendants must restore and deliver possession of the land. On the
other hand the plaintiff must reimburse to the defendants the rentals they have paid as soon as they
restore the land improperly leased
2. Valiao et al

CASE DIGEST: PACIFICO M. VALIAO, for himself and in behalf of his co-heirs LODOVICO,
RICARDO, BIENVENIDO, all Surnamed VALIAO and NEMESIO M. GRANDEA, Petitioners, v.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, MACARIO ZAFRA, and MANUEL YUSAY, Respondents.

FACTS: On August 11, 1987, petitioners filed with the RTC an application for registration of a parcel of land
situated in Barrio Galicia, Municipality of Ilog, Negros Occidental.

On June 20, 1988, private oppositors filed their Motion to Dismiss the application on the following grounds:
(1) the land applied for has not been declared alienable and disposable; (2) res judicata has set in to bar the
application for registration; and (3) the application has no factual or legal basis.

On August 24, 1988, the Republic of the Philippines (Republic), through the Office of the Solicitor General
(OSG), opposed the application for registration.

On July 3, 1989, the RTC denied private oppositors' Motion to Dismiss. Trial thereafter ensued.

In support of their application for registration, petitioners alleged that they acquired the subject property in
1947, upon the death of their uncle Basilio who purchased the land from a certain Fermin Payogao, pursuant to
a Deed of Sale dated May 19, 1916 entirely handwritten in Spanish language. Basilio possessed the land in
question from May 19, 1916 until his death in 1947. Basilio's possession was open, continuous, peaceful,
adverse, notorious, uninterrupted and in the concept of an owner. Upon Basilio's death, the applicants as co-
heirs possessed the said land until 1966, whenoppositor Zafra unlawfully and violently dispossessed them of
their property, which compelled them to file complaints of Grave Coercion and Qualified Theft against Zafra.
The RTC, in its Decision dated December 15, 1995, granted petitioners' application for registration of the
subject property.
Aggrieved by the Decision, the private oppositors and the Republic, through Assistant Prosecutor Josue A.
Gatin, filed an appeal with the CA, which reversed the trial court's findings in its Decision dated June 23,
2005.
Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration, which was denied by the CA. Hence, the present petition.

ISSUE:
Is the piece of land in question alienable and disposable land of the public domain.

HELD: Under Rule 45, the principle is well-established that this Court is not a trier of facts and that only
questions of law may be raised. This rule, however, is subject to certain exceptions. One of these is when the
findings of the appellate court are contrary to those of the trial court. Due to the divergence of the findings of
the CA and the RTC, the Court will now re-examine the facts and evidence adduced before the lower courts.

Under Section 14 (1) of Presidential Decree No. (PD) 1529, otherwise known as the Property Registration
Decree, petitioners need to prove that: (1) the land forms part of the alienable and disposable land of the public
domain; and (2) they, by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest, have been in open, continuous,
exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation of the subject land under a bona fide claim of ownership
from June 12, 1945 or earlier.

No such evidence was offered by the petitioners to show that the land in question has been classified as
alienable and disposable land of the public domain. In the absence of incontrovertible evidence to prove that
the subject property is already classified as alienable and disposable, we must consider the same as still
inalienable public domain. Verily, the rules on the confirmation of imperfect title do not apply unless and until
the land subject thereof is released in an official proclamation to that effect so that it may form part of the
disposable agricultural lands of the public domain.
3. Maneclang

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION

G.R. No. L-66575 September 30, 1986

ADRIANO MANECLANG, JULIETA, RAMONA, VICTOR, ANTONINA, LOURDES, TEODORO and

MYRNA, all surnamed MANECLANG, petitioners,
vs.
THE INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT and ALFREDO MAZA, CORLETO CASTRO, SALOME
RODRIGUEZ, EDUCARDO CUISON, FERNANDO ZARCILLA, MARIANO GABRIEL, NICOMEDES
CORDERO, CLETO PEDROZO, FELIX SALARY and JOSE PANLILIO, respondents.

Loreto Novisteros for petitioners.

Corleto R. Castro for respondents.

FERNAN, J.:

Petitioners Adriano Maneclang, et. al. filed before the then Court of First Instance of Pangasinan, Branch XI a
complaint for quieting of title over a certain fishpond located within the four [41 parcels of land belonging to
them situated in Barrio Salomague, Bugallon, Pangasinan, and the annulment of Resolutions Nos. 38 and 95 of
the Municipal Council of Bugallon Pangasinan. The trial court dismissed the complaint in a decision dated
August 15, 1975 upon a finding that the body of water traversing the titled properties of petitioners is a creek
constituting a tributary of the Agno River; therefore public in nature and not subject to private appropriation.
The lower court likewise held that Resolution No. 38, ordering an ocular inspection of the Cayangan Creek
situated between Barrios Salomague Sur and Salomague Norte, and Resolution No. 95 authorizing public
bidding for the lease of all municipal ferries and fisheries, including the fishpond under consideration, were
passed by respondents herein as members of the Municipal Council of Bugallon, Pangasinan in the exercise of
their legislative powers.

Petitioners appealed said decision to the Intermediate Appellate Court, which affirmed the same on April 29,
1983. Hence, this petition for review on certiorari.

Acting on the petition, the Court required the respondents to comment thereon. However, before respondents
could do so, petitioners manifested that for lack of interest on the part of respondent Alfredo Maza, the
awardee in the public bidding of the fishpond, the parties desire to amicably settle the case by submitting to the
Court a Compromise Agreement praying that judgment be rendered recognizing the ownership of petitioners
over the land the body of water found within their titled properties, stating therein, among other things, that "to
pursue the case, the same will not amount to any benefit of the parties, on the other hand it is to the advantage
and benefit of the municipality if the ownership of the land and the water found therein belonging to
petitioners be recognized in their favor as it is now clear that after the National Irrigation Administration [NIA]
had built the dike around the land, no water gets in or out of the land. 1

The stipulations contained in the Compromise Agreement partake of the nature of an adjudication of
ownership in favor of herein petitioners of the fishpond in dispute, which, as clearly found by the lower and
appellate courts, was originally a creek forming a tributary of the Agno River. Considering that as held in the
case of Mercado vs. Municipal President of Macabebe, 59 Phil. 592 [1934], a creek, defined as a recess or arm
extending from a river and participating in the ebb and flow of the sea, is a property belonging to the public
domain which is not susceptible to private appropriation and acquisitive prescription, and as a public water, it
cannot be registered under the Torrens System in the name of any individual [Diego v. Court of Appeals, 102
Phil. 494; Mangaldan v. Manaoag, 38 Phil. 4551; and considering further that neither the mere construction of
irrigation dikes by the National Irrigation Administration which prevented the water from flowing in and out of
the subject fishpond, nor its conversion into a fishpond, alter or change the nature of the creek as a property of
the public domain, the Court finds the Compromise Agreement null and void and of no legal effect, the same
being contrary to law and public policy.

The finding that the subject body of water is a creek belonging to the public domain is a factual determination
binding upon this Court. The Municipality of Bugallon, acting thru its duly-constituted municipal council is
clothed with authority to pass, as it did the two resolutions dealing with its municipal waters, and it cannot be
said that petitioners were deprived of their right to due process as mere publication of the notice of the public
bidding suffices as a constructive notice to the whole world.

IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the Court Resolved to set aside the Compromise Agreement and declare the
same null and void for being contrary to law and public policy. The Court further resolved to DISMISS the
instant petition for lack of merit.

SO ORDERED.

Feria (Chairman), Alampay, Gutierrez, Jr. and Paras, JJ., concur.

Salas V Jarencio (1972)

Ponente: Esguerra, J.
Legal Doctrine: Regardless of the source or classification of land in the possession of a municipality,
excepting those acquired with its own funds in its private or corporate capacity, such property is held in
trust for the State for the benefit of its inhabitants, whether it be for governmental or proprietary
purposes
Facts:
• February 24, 1919—the 4th Branch of the Court of First Instance of Manila, acting as a land
registration court, rendered judgment in Case No. 18, G.L.R.O. Record No. 111, declaring the City of
Manila the owner in fee simple of a parcel of land known as Lot No. 1, Block 557 of the Cadastral Survey
of the City of Mani1a, containing an area of 9,689.8 square meters, more or less.
• August 21, 1920 –Title No. 4329 issued on in favor of the City of Manila after the land in question was
registered in the City's favor. The Torrens Title expressly states that the City of Manila was the owner in
'fee simple' of the said land
• September 20, 1960—the Municipal Board, presided by then Vice-Mayor Antonio Villegas, requested
"His Excellency the President of the Philippines to consider the feasibility of declaring the city property
bounded by Florida, San Andres and Nebraska Streets, under Transfer Certificate of Title Nos. 25545 and
25547, containing an area of 7,450 square meters, as patrimonial property of the City of Manila for the
purpose of reselling these lots to the actual occupants thereof
• The said resolution of the Municipal Board of the City of Manila was officially transmitted to the
President of the Philippines the following day, to which a copy was furnished to the Senate and House of
Representatives of the Congress of the Philippines.
• June 20, 1964—RA 4118 was passed by the Senate and approved by the President pursuant to the
request. Such bill was enacted for social justice purposes, that they be sold to their currently landless
occupants.
• But due to reasons which do not appear in the record, the City of Manila made a complete turn-about,
for on December 20, 1966, Antonio J. Villegas, in his capacity as the City Mayor of Manila and the City of
Manila as a duly organized public corporation, brought an action for injunction and/or prohibition with
preliminary injunction to restrain, prohibit and enjoin the herein appellants, particularly the Governor of
the Land Authority and the Register of Deeds of Manila, from further implementing Republic Act No.
4118, and praying for the declaration of Republic Act No. 4118 as unconstitutional.
Issues and Decisions:
1. Is the property involved private or patrimonial property of the City of Manila? NO, it is the property
of the State.
2. Is Republic Act No. 4118 valid and not repugnant to the Constitution? YES, it is valid.

Ratio:
1. Is the property involved private or patrimonial property of the City of Manila? NO, it is the property of
the State. The rule is that when it comes to property of the municipality which it did not acquire in its
private or corporate capacity with its own funds, the legislature can transfer its administration and
disposition to an agency of the National Government to be disposed of according to its discretion. The
possession of a municipality, excepting those acquired with its own funds in its private or corporate
capacity, such property is held in trust for the State for the benefit of its inhabitants, whether it be for
governmental or proprietary purposes. The City of Manila, although declared by the Cadastral Court as
owner in fee simple, has not shown by any shred of evidence in what manner it acquired said land as its
private or patrimonial property. The presumption is that such land came from the State upon the
creation of the municipality.

That it has in its name a registered title is not questioned, but this title should be deemed to be held in
trust for the State as the land covered thereby was part of the territory of the City of Manila granted by
the sovereign upon its creation.

Therefore, the land in question pertains to the State and the City of Manila merely acted as trustee for
the benefit of the people therein for whom the State can legislate in the exercise of its legitimate
powers.

2. Is Republic Act No. 4118 valid and not repugnant to the Constitution? YES, it is valid. Consequently,
the City of Manila was not deprived of anything it owns, either under the due process clause or under
the eminent domain provisions of the Constitution. If it failed to get from the Congress the concession it
sought of having the land involved given to it as its patrimonial property, the Courts possess no power to
grant that relief. Republic Act No. 4118 does not, therefore, suffer from any constitutional infirmity.

G.R. No. L-26053 February 21, 1967

CITY OF MANILA, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
GERARDO GARCIA — CARMENCITA VILLANUEVA, MODESTA PARAYNO — NARCISO
PARAYNO, JUAN ASPERAS, MARIA TABIA — SIMEON DILIMAN, AQUILINO BARRIOS —
LEONORA RUIZ, LAUREANO DIZO, BERNABE AYUDA — LEOGARDA DE LOS SANTOS, ISABELO
OBAOB — ANDREA RIPARIP, JOSE BARRIENTOS, URBANO RAMOS, 1 ELENA RAMOS,
ESTEFANIA NEPACINA, MODESTA SANCHEZ, MARCIAL LAZARO, MARCIANA ALANO, HONORIO
BERIÑO — SEDORA ORAYLE, GLORIA VELASCO, WILARICO RICAMATA, BENEDICTO DIAZ, ANA
DEQUIZ — (MRS.) ALUNAN, LORENZO CARANDANG, JUAN PECAYO, FELICIDAD MIRANDA —
EMIGDIO EGIPTO, defendants-appellants.

Mauricio Z. Alunan for defendants-appellants.

City Fiscal's Office for plaintiff-appellee.

SANCHEZ, J.:
Plaintiff City of Manila is owner of parcels of land, forming one compact area, bordering Kansas, Vermont
and Singalong streets in Malate, Manila, and covered by Torrens Titles Nos. 49763, 37082 and 37558.
Shortly after liberation from 1945 to 1947, defendants entered upon these premises without plaintiff's
knowledge and consent. They built houses of second-class materials, again without plaintiff's knowledge
and consent, and without the necessary building permits from the city. There they lived thru the years to
the present.

In November, 1947, the presence of defendants having previously been discovered, defendants Felicidad
Miranda (Emigdio Egipto), Modesta C. Parayno, Benedicto Diaz, Laureano Dizo, Jose Barrientos, Elena
Ramos, Estefania Nepacina, Modesta Sanchez, Honorio Beriño, Gloria Velasco, Ana Dequis Alunan and
Benedicto Ofiaza (predecessor of defendant Carandang) were given by Mayor Valeriano E. Fugoso
written permits — each labeled "lease contract" — to occupy specific areas in the property upon
conditions therein set forth. Defendants Isabelo Obaob and Gerardo Garcia (in the name of Marta A.
Villanueva) received their permits from Mayor Manuel de la Fuente on January 29 and March 18,
respectively, both of 1948. The rest of the 23 defendants exhibited none.

For their occupancy, defendants were charged nominal rentals. 1äwphï1.ñët

Following are the rentals due as of February, 1962:

Amt. due from
Area Monthly
NAME date of delinquency
in sq.m. Rental
to Feb. 1962

1. Gerardo Garcia 66.00 P7.92 P1,628.97

2. Modesta C. Parayno 87.75 10.53 379.08

3. Juan Asperas 39.00 4.68 9.36

4. Maria Tabia 35.20 5.76 570.24

5. Aquilino Barrios
54.00 4.32 99.36
(Leonora Ruiz)

6. Laureano Dizo 35.00 2.80 22.40

7. Bernabe Ayuda 39.60 3.17 323.34

8. Isabelo Obaob 75.52 9.06 208.38

9. Jose Barrientos 39.53 4.74 744.18

10. Cecilia Manzano in Paid up to

lieu of Urbano Ramos (deceased) 46.65 5.60 Feb. 1962.

11. Elena Ramos 34.80 2.78 186.26

12. Estefania Nepacina 41.80 3.34 504.34

13. Modesta Sanchez 33.48 2.68 444.88

14. Marcial Lazaro 22.40 1.79 688.32

15. Marciana Alano 25.80 2.06 255.44

16. Honorio Beriño 24.00 1.92 188.16

17. Gloria Velasco 32.40 2.59 56.98

 18. Wilarico Ricamata 45.83 3.67 739.68

Paid up to
19. Benedicto Diaz 40.20 4.82
March 1962.

20. Ana Dequis Alunan 64.26 7.71 30.84

21. Lorenzo Carandang 45.03 5.40 437.40

22. Juan N. Pecayo 25.52 3.06 30.60

23. Felicidad Miranda 48.02 5.76 132.48

P7,580.69

Epifanio de los Santos Elementary School is close, though not contiguous, to the property. Came the
need for this school's expansion; it became pressing. On September 14, 1961, plaintiff's City Engineer,
pursuant to the Mayor's directive to clear squatters' houses on city property, gave each of defendants
thirty (30) days to vacate and remove his construction or improvement on the premises. This was followed
by the City Treasurer's demand on each defendant, made in February and March, 1962, for the payment
of the amount due by reason of the occupancy and to vacate in fifteen (15) days. Defendants refused.
Hence, this suit to recover possession.2

The judgment below directed defendants to vacate the premises; to pay the amounts heretofore indicated
opposite their respective names; and to pay their monthly rentals from March, 1962, until they vacate the
said premises, and the costs. Defendants appealed.

1. We are called upon to rule on the forefront question of whether the trial court properly found
that the city needs the premises for school purposes.

The city's evidence on this point is Exhibit E, the certification of the Chairman, Committee on
Appropriations of the Municipal Board. That document recites that the amount of P100,000.00
had been set aside in Ordinance 4566, the 1962-1963 Manila City Budget, for the construction of
an additional building of the Epifanio de los Santos Elementary School. It is indeed correct to say
that the court below, at the hearing, ruled out the admissibility of said document. But then, in the
decision under review, the trial judge obviously revised his views. He there declared that there
was need for defendants to vacate the premises for school expansion; he cited the very
document, Exhibit E, aforesaid.

It is beyond debate that a court of justice may alter its ruling while the case is within its power, to
make it conformable to law and justice.3 Such was done here. Defendants' remedy was to bring to
the attention of the court its contradictory stance. Not having done so, this Court will not reopen
the case solely for this purpose.4

Anyway, elimination of the certification, Exhibit E, as evidence, would not profit defendants. For,
in reversing his stand, the trial judge could well have taken — because the was duty bound to
take — judicial notice5 of Ordinance 4566. The reason being that the city charter of Manila
requires all courts sitting therein to take judicial notice of all ordinances passed by the municipal
board of Manila.6 And, Ordinance 4566 itself confirms the certification aforesaid that an
appropriation of P100,000.00 was set aside for the "construction of additional building" of the
Epifanio de los Santos Elementary School.

Furthermore, defendants' position is vulnerable to assault from a third direction. Defendants have
absolutely no right to remain in the premises. The excuse that they have permits from the mayor
is at best flimsy. The permits to occupy are recoverable on thirty days' notice. They have been
asked to leave; they refused to heed. It is in this factual background that we say that the city's
need for the premises is unimportant. The city's right to throw defendants out of the area cannot
be gainsaid. The city's dominical right to possession is paramount. If error there was in the finding
that the city needs the land, such error is harmless and will not justify reversal of the judgment
below.7

2. But defendants insist that they have acquired the legal status of tenants. They are wrong.

They entered the land, built houses of second-class materials thereon without the knowledge and
consent of the city. Their homes were erected without city permits.

These constructions are illegal. In a language familiar to all, defendants are squatters:

Since the last global war, squatting on another's property in this country has become a
widespread vice. It was and is a blight. Squatters' areas pose problems of health, sanitation. They
are breeding places for crime. They constitute proof that respect for the law and the rights of
others, even those of the government, are being flouted. Knowingly, squatters have embarked on
the pernicious act of occupying property whenever and wherever convenient to their interests —
without as much as leave, and even against the will, of the owner. They are emboldened
seemingly because of their belief that they could violate the law with impunity. The
pugnaciousness of some of them has tied up the hands of legitimate owners. The latter are thus
prevented from recovering possession by peaceful means. Government lands have not been
spared by them. They know, of course, that intrusion into property, government or private, is
wrong. But, then, the mills of justice grind slow, mainly because of lawyers who, by means, fair or
foul, are quite often successful in procuring delay of the day of reckoning. Rampancy of forcible
entry into government lands particularly, is abetted by the apathy of some public officials to
enforce the government's rights. Obstinacy of these squatters is difficult to explain unless it is
spawned by official tolerance, if not outright encouragement or protection. Said squatters have
become insensible to the difference between right and wrong. To them, violation of law means
nothing. With the result that squatting still exists, much to the detriment of public interest. It is high
time that, in this aspect, sanity and the rule of law be restored. It is in this environment that we
look into the validity of the permits granted defendants herein.

These permits, erroneously labeled "lease" contracts, were issued by the mayors in 1947 and
1948 when the effects of the war had simmered down and when these defendants could have
very well adjusted themselves. Two decades have now elapsed since the unlawful entry.
Defendants could have, if they wanted to, located permanent premises for their abode. And yet,
usurpers that they are, they preferred to remain on city property.

Defendants' entry as aforesaid was illegal. Their constructions are as illegal, without permits. 8 The
city charter enjoins the mayor to "safeguard all the lands" of the City of Manila. 9

Surely enough, the permits granted did not "safeguard" the city's land in question. It is our
considered view that the Mayor of the City of Manila cannot legalize forcible entry into public
property by the simple expedient of giving permits, or, for that matter, executing leases.

Squatting is unlawful and no amount of acquiescence on the part of the city officials will elevate it
into a lawful act. In principle, a compound of illegal entry and official permit to stay is obnoxious to
our concept of proper official norm of conduct. Because, such permit does not serve social
justice; it fosters moral decadence. It does not promote public welfare; it abets disrespect for the
law. It has its roots in vice; so it is an infected bargain. Official approval of squatting should not,
therefore, be permitted to obtain in this country where there is an orderly form of government.
 We, accordingly, rule that the Manila mayors did not have authority to give permits, written or
oral, to defendants, and that the permits herein granted are null and void.

3. Let us look into the houses and constructions planted by defendants on the premises. They
clearly hinder and impair the use of that property for school purposes. The courts may well take
judicial notice of the fact that housing school children in the elementary grades has been and still
is a perennial problem in the city. The selfish interests of defendants must have to yield to the
general good. The public purpose of constructing the school building annex is paramount. 10

In the situation thus obtaining, the houses and constructions aforesaid constitute public nuisance
per se. And this, for the reason that they hinder and impair the use of the property for a badly
needed school building, to the prejudice of the education of the youth of the land.11 They shackle
the hands of the government and thus obstruct performance of its constitutionally ordained
obligation to establish and maintain a complete and adequate system of public education, and
more, to "provide at least free public primary instruction".12

Reason dictates that no further delay should be countenanced. The public nuisance could well
have been summarily abated by the city authorities themselves, even without the aid of the
courts.13

4. Defendants challenge the jurisdiction of the Court of First Instance of Manila. They say that the
case should have been started in the municipal court. They prop up their position by the averment
that notice for them to vacate was only served in September, 1961, and suit was started in July,
1962. Their legal ground is Section 1, Rule 70 of the Rules of Court. We have reached the
conclusion that their forcible entry dates back to the period from 1945 to 1947. That entry was not
legalized by the permits. Their possession continued to remain illegal from incipiency. Suit was
filed long after the one-year limitation set forth in Section 1 of Rule 70. And the Manila Court of
First Instance has jurisdiction.14

Upon the premises, we vote to affirm the judgment under review. Costs against defendants-appellants.
So ordered.

CASE #13 SALVADOR LAUREL vs RAMON GARCIA (head of the Asset Privatization Trust), RAUL
MANGLAPUS (Secretary of Foreign Affairs), and CATALINO MACARAIG (Executive Secretary) DIONISIO
OJEDA JR. vs MACARAIG (Executive Secretary), GARCIA (head of the Asset Privatization Trust),
AMBASSADOR RAMON DEL ROSARIO ET AL. (members of the Principal and Bidding Committees on the
Utilization/Disposition Petition of Philippine Government Properties in Japan)

PROMULGATED: JULY 25, 1990

PONENTE: J. GUTIERREZ, JR.
These are two consolidated petitions for prohibition seeking to enjoin respondents, their
representatives and agents from proceeding with the bidding for the sale of the Roppongi Property in
Japan on February 20, 1990.

BACKGROUND: The Roppongi Property is one of the four properties in Japan acquired by the Philippine
Government under the Reparations Agreement which was entered into with Japan on May 9, 1956.
Other properties are: the (1) Nampeidai Property, which is the present site of the Philippine Embassy
Chancery; the (2) Kobe Commercial Property, which is now being used as a warehouse and parking lot
for the consulate staff; and the (3) Kobe Residential Property, which is now vacant. The Reparation
Agreement was entered into to indemnify the Filipino People for their losses in life and property and
their suffering during WWII.
The Roppongi Property was intended to be the site of the Philippine Embassy until it was later
transferred to Nampeidai when the Roppongi Building needed major repairs. The Philippine government
failed to provide the necessary funds thereby making the Roppongi Property undeveloped. A proposal
was presented to then President Cory by the Ambassador to Japan, Carlos Valdez. The proposal is to
make the property the subject of lease agreement with a Japanese firm – Kajima Corporation, which
shall construct buildings in Roppongi and Nampeidai. The consideration of the construction would be
the lease to the foreign corporation of one of the buildings to be constructed in Roppongi and two in
Nampeidai. The government did not act favorably on this proposal. Instead, then President Cory created
a committee to study the disposition/utilization of Philippine Government Properties in Tokyo and Kobe,
Japan. On July 25, 1987, the President issued E.O. 296 entitling non-filipino citizens or entities to avail of
separation’s capital goods and services in the event of sale, lease or disposition. The four reparation
properties, starting with the Roppongi Property, were to be sold.

Petitioner Laurel asserts that the Roppongi Property and the related lots were acquired as part of the
reparations from the Japanese government for diplomatic and consular use by the Philippine
government. He further states that it is classified as one of public dominion, and not of private
ownership under Article 420 of the Civil Code. He submits that it come under “property intended for
public service”. He states that being one of public dominion, no ownership by anyone can attach to it,
not even by the State. On the other hand, respondents argued that the properties are governed not by
the Civil Code but by the laws of Japan, relying upon the rule of lex situs - which is used in determining
the applicable law regarding the acquisition, transfer and devolution of the title to a property. And if the
Civil Code is indeed applicable, the Roppongi Property has ceased to become property of public
dominion for it has become patrimonial property because it has not been used for public service or for
diplomatic purposes for over thirteen years.

WHETHER THE ROPPONGI LOT IN JAPAN IS OF PUBLIC DOMINION AND CANNOT BE THEREFORE
ALIENATED?

Yes. There can be no doubt that the property is of public dominion. The respondents failed to show that
the property has become patrimonial. As property of public dominion, the Roppongi lot is outside the
commerce of man. It cannot be alienated. Its ownership is a special collective ownership for general use
and enjoyment, an application to the satisfaction of collective needs and resides in the social group. The
purpose is not to serve the State as a juridical person, but the citizens; it is intended for the common
and public welfare and cannot be the object of appropriation. Articles 419, 420 and 421 of the Civil Code
are applicable. The Roppongi Property is classified under paragraph 2 of Art. 420. The fact that the
Roppongi site has not been used for a long time for actual Embassy service does not automatically
convert it to patrimonial property. Any such conversion happens only if the property is withdrawn from
public use. A property continues to be part of the public domain, not available for private appropriation
or ownership until there is formal declaration on the part of the government to withdraw it from being
such. Abandonment of the intention to use the Roppongi property for public service and to make it
patrimonial property under Art 422 of the Code must be definite. Abandonment cannot be inferred
from the non-use alone specially if the non-use was attributable not to the government’s deliberate and
indubitable will but to lack of financial support to repair and improve the property. Abandonment must
be a certain and positive act based on correct legal premises.

The contention that Japanese Law, instead of the Civil Code, should apply is untenable. There is no
reason why a conflict of law rule should apply when no conflict of law situation exists, In the petition of
Ojeda, the constitutionality of E.O. 296 was not ruled upon for it is not the real issue in the case.
PETITIONS ARE GRANTED.
114 Phil. 266

LABRADOR, J.:

The above-entitled case involves the application and interpretation of Republic Act No. 2056, entitled
"An Act to prohibit, remove and/or demolish the construction of dams, dikes or any other works in
public navigable waters or waterways and in communal fishing grounds, to regulate works in such
waters or waterways and in communal fishing grounds, and to provide penalties for its violation, and for
other purposes." The pertinent provisions thereof in issue are Section 1 and the first part of Section 2,
which read as follows:
"SEC. 2. When it is found by the Secretary of Public Works and Communications, after due notice and
hearing, that any dam, dike or any other works now existing or may hereinafter be constrscted
encroaches into any public navigable river, stream, coastal waters and any other public navigable waters
or waterways, or that they are constructed in areas declared as communal fishing grounds, he shall have
the authority to order the removal of any such works and shall give the party concerned a period not to
exceed thirty days for the removal of the same: Provided, That fishpond constructions or works on
communal fishing grounds introduced in good faith before the areas were proclaimed as fishing grounds
shall be exempted from the provisions of this Act, provided such constructions or works do not obstruct
or impede the free passage of any navigable river, stream, or would not cause inundations of
agricultural areas: * * *."

The facts involved in the case may be briefly stated as follows: On August 15, 1958, Senator Rogelio de la
Rosa complained with the Secretary of Public Works and Communications against several fishpond
owners in Macabebe, Pampanga, amongwhom is petitioner herein Clemencia B. Vda. de Villongco. The
complaint charges that petitioner herein Vda. de Villongco has appropriated a portion of the coastal
waters of Pampanga, locally known as "Pantion", converting portions of the coastal areas into fishponds.
Investigations were conducted under the authority of the Secretary, who thereafter rendered the
following decision:

"Complainants allege that the conversion of this area into a fishpond by the respondents deprived them
of the uses of the area as a fishing ground and for navigation. On the other hand, the respondents
contend that this area is owned by them as shown toy the title above-adverted to.
"A relocation survey, based on the title, was made on the area in question to determine whether the
fishpond constructions and/ or works of the respondents are within the titled property. Said survey
shows that a portion of Manila Bay covering an area of approximately 24,860 square meters was
included as part of the fishpond by the respondents.

"The defense of respondents that the area in question being a private property, is not subject to the
provisions of Republic Act 2066 deserves consideration. The area being covered by a Torrens Certificate
of Title, the respondent's title thereon is indefeasible and imprescriptible. As sufficiently established, the
area in question is a foreshore land and is disposable under Section 59 of the Pablic Land Law. However,
of the enclosed portion, the area, of 24,860 square meters has been conclusively shown by the
relocation survey as not within the boundaries of the titled property. Be that as it may, tins, portion is
still of public ownership and the complainants should, therefore, not be deprived of its uses as a fishing
ground and passageway.

"Premises considered, it is hereby ordered that the respondents remove their fishpond works and/or
constructions insofar as it encroaches upon that portion of Manila Bay covering the area of
approximately 24,860 square meters and restore the original condition of said coastal water within
thirty (30) days from receipt of this decision; otherwise, this Office or its duly authorized representative
shall remove the same at the expense of the respondents within ten (10) days following the expiration
of the thirty-day period, without, prejudice to instituting judicial action against them under the
provisions of Section 3 of R. A. 2056." (Annex "C", pp. 20-21)

Clementia B. Vda. de Villongco filed a motion to reconsider the decision, but the same was denied by the
Undersecretary in a resolution dated August 5, 1959. Thereupon, on August 20, 1959, petitioner herein
filed the present suit in the Court of First Instance of Rizal, calling attention to the above proceedings,
especially the decision of the Secretary and the resolution of the Undersecretary denying the motion for
reconsideration, and arguing that Republic Act No. 2056, under which the Secretary issued the order
above-quoted, is null and void as conferring upon the Secretary power to decide as to whether or not
the dikes and other constructions encroach upon coastal waters, public streams, communal fishing
grounds, etc.; that the Undersecretary acted without or in the excess of jurisdiction in delegating
reception of evidence, in causing resurvey of the premises by a person who is not a duly licensed
surveyor, in violation of the agreement to that effect, in the absence of petitioner Villongco; that the
Secretary's order of demolition of the fishponds was beyond the jurisdiction of said Secretary and is
unconstitutional as an encroachment upon the private rights of the petitioners, etc. Upon the
presentation of the petition, the court below issued a writ of preliminary injunction against the
enforcement of the Secretary's disputed order. Trial of the case was had, with the submission of a
stipulation of facts, with exhibits, entered into between the parties, after which the court, through Hon.
Andres Reyes, rendered a decision declaring that the Secretary of Public Works and Communications
was in error in ordering the demolition of the dikes and other constructions of the petitioner Vda. de
Villongco, on the ground that said dikes and other constructions fall under the exception mentioned in
Section 2 of Republic Act No. 2056. We quote the order herein:
"Without the necessity of resolving the various incidental issues raised by the parties, the Court is of the
opinion that the case at bar hinges on only one vital issue that is whether the petitioners properly fall
within the benefits of the exemption expressly provided for under section 2 of Republic Act 2056, to wit:

'PROVIDED, That fishpond constructions on communal fishing grounds introduced in good faith before
the areas were proclaimed as fishing grounds shall be exempted from the provisions of this Act,
provided such constructions or works do not obstruct or impede the free passage of any navigable river,
stream, or would not cause inundations of agricultural areas.

'AND PROVIDED, FINALLY, that the removal of any such works shall not impair fishponds completed or
about to be completed which do not encroach or obstruct any public navigable river or stream and/or
which would not cause inundations of agricultural areas and which have been constructed in good faith
before the area was declared communal fishing grounds.'

"A perusal of the above provisions reveals that the petitioners herein would be entitled to the benefits
of said exemptions provided the following requisites are present: first, that the constructions or works in
question were constructed in good faith before the areas were declared communal fishing grounds;
second, that said constructions or works would not impede the free passage of any navigable river or
stream; and lastly, that the same would not cause inundations of agricultural areas.

"There is no question that the constructions of petitioners would not cause inundation of agricultural
areas. This was admitted in the answer of respondent Secretary and later included in the stipulation of
facts. There is also no dispute as to the fact that the same were constructed in good faith before June
13, 1958 when Republic Act No. 2056 took effect and therefore before any fishing ground could have
been declared communal." (pp. 2-3 of the decision).

The respondent Secretary has appealed from the above decision, alleging the following errors:

"THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN GIVING DUE COURSE TO THE INSTANT CASE FOR CERTIORARI AND
PROHIBITION AND IN DECIDING THE SAME WITHOUT CONSIDERING THE ISSUES INVOLVED THEREIN.

II

"THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN INTERPRETING THE PROVISIONS OF REPUBLIC ACT NO. 2056 WHICH,
OTHERWISE, IS CLEAR AND UNAMBIGUOUS, AND IN CONSTRUING THE EXEMPTING CLAUSE PROVIDED
IN SEC. 2 THEREOF TO INCLUDE FISHPOND CONSTRUCTIONS OR WORK OUTSIDE THE AREAS DECLARED
AS COMMUNAL FISHING GROUNDS.

III
"THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE APPELLEES FALL WITHIN SAID EXEMPTING
PROVISION OF SECTION 2 OF REPUBLIC ACT NO. 2056.

IV
"THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN ISSUING EX-PARTE THE WRIT OF PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION, AND LATER
MAKING IT PERMANENT.

V
"THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN GRANTING THE INSTANT PETITION FOR CERTIORARI AND PROHIBITION."

An examination of the facts adduced at the trial shows that petitioner Vda. de Villongco is the owner of
a fishpond situated in Macabebe, Pampanga, covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 7087 dated
January 28, 1952, containing an area of 90 hectares, 26 ares and 54 centares, bounded on the SW and W
by the Manila Bay and on the NW by the Manila Bay and the Supang Maruginas (Annex B-Stipulation). A
competent surveyor in the person of the Dredge Operation Supervisor of the Department of Public
Works conducted an investigation and submitted a report (Annex E of the Stipulation of Facts), with an
accompanying sketch of the fishpond showing the disputed portion, included within the dike of the
petitioner. The existing dike of the petitioner is a straight line from point A of Annex E-1 to point D, and
it includes a portion of public land indicated in red (portion B-c) in said Annex E-1, containing an area of
2 hectares, 48 ares and 60 centares (24,860 square meters). The surveyor found the following:

"It seems that the average depth along the sea side of the dike A-D as shown in the attached plan may
be about one (1) foot M.L.L.W.

"That section B-C of the dike is along the prolongation of section A-B towards point C and that no part of
dike B-C is protruding towards the sea.

"That navigation along dike A-D during low tide is limited to Vessels with a draft of about one foot.

"That section B-C of the dike will obstruct navigation towards a public domain (shaded red in the
attached plan) with an indicated area of about 24,880 square meters.

"In my opinion, section B-C of the dike will not obstruct navigation along or parallel to it." (Annex E-
Stipulation)

The court below held that said portion falls under the exception of Section 2 of Republic Act No. 2056,
because it does not interfere with navigation and does not produce inundation and the dikes were
constructed before the area was a fishing ground. (The parties have stipulated that there is yet na order
declaring the area as a fishing ground.)

A study of the provisions of Republic Act No. 2056, especially the sections we quote above disclose that
the authority granted the Secretary of Public Works and Communications is to declare that the
construction or building of dams, dikes or any other works encroaching on navigable rivers, streams, or
any other navigable public waters or waterways is prohibited and to order their removal or demolition.
The area included in the dikes of the petitioner, indicated in the red shaded portion in the Stipulation,
Exh. E-1, was not a part of the land titled in the name of the petitioner, as shown by the fact that the
titled land bounds on the W by a line from point 1 to point 19, point 19 ,to point 20 and point 20 to
point 21 of Lot No. 2 indicated in the plan of the land. Said red shaded portion, which contains an area
of 24,860 square meters, is clearly, therefore; a portion of the Manila Bay area or coastal area, which
the petitioner has evidently included within her dikes, perhaps to straighten the same. As the shaded
portion has a depth of 1 foot at low tide, it is evidently navigable at high tide for vessels of deeper draft
of 1 foot and at low tide navigable to those of 1 foot drafts. It is, therefore, a part of the waterways,
taking into account that the Manila Bay area, especially those bordering the fishponds in the provinces
of Pampanga, Bulacan and Rizal are waterways, especially used by fishermen and fishpond owners to
bring in their catch to market. The shaded area, therefore, is a public property, not susceptible to
appropriation by any private individual, not only because it belongs to the State but also because it is
used as a waterway.

"Article I. The following are part of the national domain open to public use:
The coasts or maritime frontiers of Spanish territory, with their coves, inlets, creeks, roadsteads, bays
and ports.

The coast sea, that is, the maritime zone encircling the coasts, to the full width recognized by
international law. * * *." (Art. 1, paragraphs 1 and 2, Spanish Law of Waters; See also Insular
Government vs. Aldecoa, 19 Phil., 505, 510).
The error of the court below lies in the fact that it considered the coast sea as falling under the
exception of Section 2. But an examination of Section 2 shows that coastal waters or public waterways
are not included in the exception. Only those works constructed on communal fishing grounds are
exempted; constructions on coastal waters or public waterways are not subject to the exception. Aside
from that fact, no inundation or free passage of any navigable river can take place on the coastal waters
or waterways, so coastal waters are not subject to the exception. The exception, apparently, applies
only to constructions on navigable rivers, when these constructions do not impede or obstruct the
passage of the river and when they do not cause inundation of agricultural areas. Coastal waters are not
within the contemplation of the exception because there is no navigable river or stream in coastal
waters and neither may there be an inundation therein.

We, therefore, find that the court below erred in its decision that the constructions of the petitioner,
subject matter of the case at bar, fall within the exception mentioned in Sec. 2 of the Act and its order in
issuing the prohibition is therefore, unwarranted.

The other error is the failure of the petitioner to avail of the administrative remedy, which consists in
appealing from the decision of the Secretary of Public Works and Communications to the President of
the Philippines. We find this assignment of error also to be well taken. We have, however, chosen to
consider the merits of the issue involved for the more prompt determination of the case and for a
proper understanding of the provisions of Republic Act No. 2056.

Wherefore, the decision and the injunction issued by the court below are hereby set aside, and the
petition against the Secretary of Public Works and Communications, dismissed, with costs against the
petitioner.

Bengzon, C. J., Padilla, Bautista Angelo, Concepcion, Reyes, J. B. L., Barrera, Paredes, Dizon, and De Leon,
JJ., concur.

G.R. No. L40474August 29, 1975

CEBU OXYGEN & ACETYLENE CO., INC., petitioner,

vs.
HON. PASCUAL A. BERCILLES Presiding Judge, Branch XV, 14th Judicial District, and JOSE L. ESPELETA,
Assistant Provincial Fiscal, Province of Cebu, representing the Solicitor General's Office and the Bureau
of Lands, respondents.
CONCEPCION, Jr., J.:

This is a petition for the review of the order of the Court of First Instance of Cebu dismissing petitioner's
application for registration of title over a parcel of land situated in the City of Cebu.

The parcel of land sought to be registered was only a portion of M. Borces Street, Mabolo, Cebu City. On
September 23, 1968, the City Council of Cebu, through Resolution No. 2193, approved on October 3,
1968, declared the terminal portion of M. Borces Street, Mabolo, Cebu City, as an abandoned road, the
same not being included in the City Development Plan.1 Subsequently, on December 19, 1968, the City
Council of Cebu passed Resolution No. 2755, authorizing the Acting City Mayor to sell the land through a
public bidding.2 Pursuant thereto, the lot was awarded to the herein petitioner being the highest bidder
and on March 3, 1969, the City of Cebu, through the Acting City Mayor, executed a deed of absolute sale
to the herein petitioner for a total consideration of P10,800.00.3 By virtue of the aforesaid deed of
absolute sale, the petitioner filed an application with the Court of First instance of Cebu to have its title
to the land registered.

On June 26, 1974, the Assistant Provincial Fiscal of Cebu filed a motion to dismiss the application on the
ground that the property sought to be registered being a public road intended for public use is
considered part of the public domain and therefore outside the commerce of man. Consequently, it
cannot be subject to registration by any private individual.

After hearing the parties, on October 11, 1974 the trial court issued an order dismissing the petitioner's
application for registration of title.6 Hence, the instant petition for review.
For the resolution of this case, the petitioner poses the following questions:
(1) Does the City Charter of Cebu City (Republic Act No. 3857) under Section 31, paragraph 34, give
the City of Cebu the valid right to declare a road as abandoned? and
(2) Does the declaration of the road, as abandoned, make it the patrimonial property of the City of
Cebu which may be the object of a common contract?

(1) The pertinent portions of the Revised Charter of Cebu City provides:
Section 31. Legislative Powers. Any provision of law and executive order to the contrary
notwithstanding, the City Council shall have the following legislative powers:
xxx xxx xxx
(34) ...; to close any city road, street or alley, boulevard, avenue, park or square. Property thus
withdrawn from public servitude may be used or conveyed for any purpose for which other real
property belonging to the City may be lawfully used or conveyed.

From the foregoing, it is undoubtedly clear that the City of Cebu is empowered to close a city road or
street. In the case of Favis vs. City of Baguio,7 where the power of the city Council of Baguio City to close
city streets and to vacate or withdraw the same from public use was similarly assailed, this court said:

5. So it is, that appellant may not challenge the city council's act of withdrawing a strip of Lapu-
Lapu Street at its dead end from public use and converting the remainder thereof into an alley. These
are acts well within the ambit of the power to close a city street. The city council, it would seem to us, is
the authority competent to determine whether or not a certain property is still necessary for public use.

Such power to vacate a street or alley is discretionary. And the discretion will not ordinarily be
controlled or interfered with by the courts, absent a plain case of abuse or fraud or collusion.
Faithfulness to the public trust will be presumed. So the fact that some private interests may be served
incidentally will not invalidate the vacation ordinance.

(2) Since that portion of the city street subject of petitioner's application for registration of title was
withdrawn from public use, it follows that such withdrawn portion becomes patrimonial property which
can be the object of an ordinary contract.

Article 422 of the Civil Code expressly provides that "Property of public dominion, when no longer
intended for public use or for public service, shall form part of the patrimonial property of the State."

Besides, the Revised Charter of the City of Cebu heretofore quoted, in very clear and unequivocal terms,
states that: "Property thus withdrawn from public servitude may be used or conveyed for any purpose
for which other real property belonging to the City may be lawfully used or conveyed."

Accordingly, the withdrawal of the property in question from public use and its subsequent sale to the
petitioner is valid. Hence, the petitioner has a registerable title over the lot in question.
WHEREFORE, the order dated October 11, 1974, rendered by the respondent court in Land Reg. Case
No. N-948, LRC Rec. No. N-44531 is hereby set aside, and the respondent court is hereby ordered to
proceed with the hearing of the petitioner's application for registration of title.

SO ORDERED.

Makalintal, C.J, Fernando, Barredo and Aquino, JJ., concur.

[G.R. No. 100709. November 14, 1997]

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, represented by the DIRECTOR OF LANDS, petitioner, vs. COURT OF
APPEALS, JOSEFINA L. MORATO, SPOUSES NENITA CO and ANTONIO QUILATAN AND THE REGISTER OF
DEEDS OF QUEZON PROVINCE, respondents.
DECISION

PANGANIBAN, J.:

Will the lease and/or mortgage of a portion of a realty acquired through free patent constitute sufficient
ground for the nullification of such land grant? Should such property revert to the State once it is
invaded by the sea and thus becomes foreshore land?

The Case
These are the two questions raised in the petition before us assailing the Court of Appeals[1] Decision in
CA-G.R. CV No. 02667 promulgated on June 13, 1991 which answered the said questions in the
negative.[2] Respondent Courts Decision dismissed[3] petitioners appeal and affirmed in toto the
decision of the Regional Trial Court[4] of Calauag, Quezon, dated December 28, 1983 in Civil Case No. C-
608. In turn, the Regional Trial Courts decision dismissed petitioners complaint for cancellation of the
Torrens Certificate of Title of Respondent Morato and for reversion of the parcel of land subject thereof
to the public domain.

The Facts
The petition of the solicitor general, representing the Republic of the Philippines, recites the following
facts:[5]

Sometime in December, 1972, respondent Morato filed a Free Patent Application No. III-3-8186-B on a
parcel of land with an area of 1,265 square meters situated at Pinagtalleran, Calauag, Quezon. On
January 16, 1974, the patent was approved and the Register of Deeds of Quezon at Lucena City issued
on February 4, 1974 Original Certificate of Title No. P-17789. Both the free patent and the title
specifically mandate that the land shall not be alienated nor encumbered within five (5) years from the
date of the issuance of the patent (Sections 118 and 124 of CA No. 141, as amended).
Subsequently, the District Land Officer in Lucena City, acting upon reports that respondent Morato had
encumbered the land in violation of the condition of the patent, conducted an investigation. Thereafter,
it was established that the subject land is a portion of the Calauag Bay, five (5) to six (6) feet deep under
water during high tide and two (2) feet deep at low tide, and not suitable to vegetation. Moreover, on
October 24, 1974, a portion of the land was mortgaged by respondent Morato to respondents Nenita Co
and Antonio Quilatan for P10,000.00 (pp. 2, 25, Folder of Exhibits). The spouses Quilatan constructed a
house on the land. Another portion of the land was leased to Perfecto Advincula on February 2, 1976 at
P100.00 a month, where a warehouse was constructed.

On November 5, 1978, petitioner filed an amended complaint against respondents Morato, spouses
Nenita Co and Antonio Quilatan, and the Register of Deeds of Quezon for the cancellation of title and
reversion of a parcel of land to the public domain, subject of a free patent in favor of respondent
Morato, on the grounds that the land is a foreshore land and was mortgaged and leased within the five-
year prohibitory period (p. 46, Records).

After trial, the lower court, on December 28, 1983, rendered a decision dismissing petitioners complaint.
In finding for private respondents, the lower court ruled that there was no violation of the 5-year period
ban against alienating or encumbering the land, because the land was merely leased and not alienated.
It also found that the mortgage to Nenita Co and Antonio Quilatan covered only the improvement and
not the land itself.

On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the trial court. Thereafter, the Republic of the
Philippines filed the present petition.[6]

The Issues
Petitioner alleges that the following errors were committed by Respondent Court:[7]
I
Respondent Court erred in holding that the patent granted and certificate of title issued to Respondent
Morato cannot be cancelled and annulled since the certificate of title becomes indefeasible after one
year from the issuance of the title.
II
Respondent Court erred in holding that the questioned land is part of a disposable public land and not a
foreshore land.
The Courts Ruling
The petition is meritorious.

First Issue: Indefeasibility of a Free Patent Title

In resolving the first issue against petitioner, Respondent Court held:[8]
x x x. As ruled in Heirs of Gregorio Tengco vs. Heirs of Jose Alivalas, 168 SCRA 198. x x. The rule is well-
settled that an original certificate of title issued on the strength of a homestead patent partakes of the
nature of a certificate of title issued in a judicial proceeding, as long as the land disposed of is really part
of the disposable land of the public domain, and becomes indefeasible and incontrovertible upon the
expiration of one year from the date of promulgation of the order of the Director of Lands for the
issuance of the patent. (Republic v. Heirs of Carle, 105 Phil. 1227 (1959); Ingaran v. Ramelo, 107 Phil. 498
(1960); Lopez v. Padilla, (G.R. No. L-27559, May 18, 1972, 45 SCRA 44). A homestead patent, one
registered under the Land Registration Act, becomes as indefeasible as a Torrens Title. (Pamintuan v.
San Agustin, 43 Phil. 558 (1982); El Hogar Filipino v. Olviga, 60 Phil. 17 (1934); Duran v. Oliva, 113 Phil.
144 (1961); Pajomayo v. Manipon, G.R. No. L-33676, June 30, 1971, 39 SCRA 676). (p. 203).

Again, in Lopez vs. Court of Appeals, 169 SCRA 271, citing Iglesia ni Cristo v. Hon. Judge, CFI of Nueva
Ecija, Branch I, (123 SCRA 516 (1983) and Pajomayo, et al. v. Manipon, et al. (39 SCRA 676 (1971) held
that once a homestead patent granted in accordance with the Public Land Act is registered pursuant to
Section 122 of Act 496, the certificate of title issued in virtue of said patent has the force and effect of a
Torrens Title issued under the Land Registration Act.

Indefeasibility of the title, however, may not bar the State, thru the Solicitor General, from filing an
action for reversion, as ruled in Heirs of Gregorio Tengo v. Heirs of Jose Aliwalas, (supra), as follows:

But, as correctly pointed out by the respondent Court of Appeals, Dr. Aliwalas title to the property
having become incontrovertible, such may no longer be collaterally attacked. If indeed there had been
any fraud or misrepresentation in obtaining the title, an action for reversion instituted by the Solicitor
General would be the proper remedy (Sec. 101, C.A. No. 141; Director of Lands v. Jugado, G.R. No. L-
14702, May 21, 1961, 2 SCRA 32; Lopez v. Padilla, supra). (p. 204).

Petitioner contends that the grant of Free Patent (IV-3) 275 and the subsequent issuance of Original
Certificate of Title No. P-17789 to Respondent Josefina L. Morato were subject to the conditions
provided for in Commonwealth Act (CA) No. 141. It alleges that on October 24, 1974, or nine (9) months
and eight (8) days after the grant of the patent, Respondent Morato, in violation of the terms of the
patent, mortgaged a portion of the land to Respondent Nenita Co, who thereafter constructed a house
thereon. Likewise, on February 2, 1976 and within the five-year prohibitory period, Respondent Morato
leased a portion of the land to Perfecto Advincula at a monthly rent of P100.00 who, shortly thereafter,
constructed a house of concrete materials on the subject land.[9] Further, petitioner argues that the
defense of indefeasibility of title is inaccurate. The original certificate of title issued to Respondent
Morato contains the seeds of its own cancellation: such certificate specifically states on its face that it is
subject to the provisions of Sections 118, 119, 121, 122, 124 of CA No. 141, as amended.[10]

Respondent Morato counters by stating that although a portion of the land was previously leased, it
resulted from the fact that Perfecto Advincula built a warehouse in the subject land without [her] prior
consent. The mortgage executed over the improvement cannot be considered a violation of the said
grant since it can never affect the ownership.[11] She states further:

x x x. the appeal of the petitioner was dismissed not because of the principle of indefeasibility of title
but mainly due to failure of the latter to support and prove the alleged violations of respondent Morato.
The records of this case will readily show that although petitioner was able to establish that Morato
committed some acts during the prohibitory period of 5 years, a perusal thereof will also show that
what petitioner was able to prove never constituted a violation of the grant.[12]

Respondent-Spouses Quilatan, on the other hand, state that the mortgage contract they entered into
with Respondent Morato can never be considered as [an] alienation inasmuch as the ownership over
the property remains with the owner.[13] Besides, it is the director of lands and not the Republic of the
Philippines who is the real party in interest in this case, contrary to the provision of the Public Land Act
which states that actions for reversion should be instituted by the solicitor general in the name of
Republic of the Philippines.[14]

We find for petitioner.

Quoted below are relevant sections of Commonwealth Act No. 141, otherwise known as the Public Land
Act:
Sec. 118. Except in favor of the Government or any of its branches, units or institutions, or legally
constituted banking corporations, lands acquired under free patent or homestead provisions shall not
be subject to encumbrance or alienation from the date of the approval of the application and for a term
of five years from and after the date of issuance of the patent or grant nor shall they become liable to
the satisfaction of any debt contracted prior to the expiration of said period; but the improvements or
crops on the land may be mortgaged or pledged to qualified persons, associations, or corporations.

No alienation, transfer, or conveyance of any homestead after five years and before twenty-five years
after issuance of title shall be valid without the approval of the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural
Resources, which approval shall not be denied except on constitutional and legal grounds. (As amended
by Com. Act No. 456, approved June 8, 1939.)
xxxxxxxxx
Sec. 121. Except with the consent of the grantee and the approval of the Secretary of Agriculture and
Natural Resources, and solely for educational, religious, or charitable purposes or for a right of way, no
corporation, association, or partnership may acquire or have any right, title, interest, or property right
whatsoever to any land granted under the free patent, homestead, or individual sale provisions of this
Act or to any permanent improvement on such land. (As amended by Com. Act No. 615, approved May
5, 1941)

Sec. 122. No land originally acquired in any manner under the provisions of this Act, nor any permanent
improvement on such land, shall be encumbered, alienated or transferred, except to persons,
corporations, association, or partnerships who may acquire lands of the public domain under this Act or
to corporations organized in the Philippines authorized therefore by their charters.

Except in cases of hereditary successions, no land or any portion thereof originally acquired under the
free patent, homestead, or individual sale provisions of this Act, or any permanent improvement on
such land, shall be transferred or assigned to any individual, nor shall such land or any permanent
improvement thereon be leased to such individual, when the area of said land, added to that of his own,
shall exceed one hundred and forty-four hectares. Any transfer, assignment, or lease made in violation
hereto shall be null and void. (As amended by Com. Act No. 615, Id.)
xxxxxxxxx
Sec. 124. Any acquisition, conveyance, alienation, transfer, or other contract made or executed in
violation of any of the provisions of sections one hundred and eighteen, one hundred and twenty, one
hundred and twenty-one, one hundred and twenty-two, and one hundred and twenty-three of this Act
shall be unlawful and null and void from its execution and shall produce the effect of annulling and
cancelling the grant, title, patent, or permit originally issued, recognized or confirmed, actually or
presumptively, and cause the reversion of the property and its improvements to the State.
(Underscoring supplied.)

The foregoing legal provisions clearly proscribe the encumbrance of a parcel of land acquired under a
free patent or homestead within five years from the grant of such patent. Furthermore, such
encumbrance results in the cancellation of the grant and the reversion of the land to the public domain.
Encumbrance has been defined as [a]nything that impairs the use or transfer of property; anything
which constitutes a burden on the title; a burden or charge upon property; a claim or lien upon
property. It may be a legal claim on an estate for the discharge of which the estate is liable; an
embarrassment of the estate or property so that it cannot be disposed of without being subject to it; an
estate, interest, or right in lands, diminishing their value to the general owner; a liability resting upon an
estate.[15] Do the contracts of lease and mortgage executed within five (5) years from the issuance of
the patent constitute an encumbrance and violate the terms and conditions of such patent? Respondent
Court answered in the negative:[16]

From the evidence adduced by both parties, it has been proved that the area of the portion of the land,
subject matter of the lease contract (Exh. B) executed by and between Perfecto Advincula and Josefina
L. Morato is only 10 x 12 square meters, whereas the total area of the land granted to Morato is 1,265
square meters. It is clear from this that the portion of the land leased by Advincula does not significantly
affect Moratos ownership and possession. Above all, the circumstances under which the lease was
executed do not reflect a voluntary and blatant intent to violate the conditions provided for in the
patent issued in her favor. On the contrary, Morato was compelled to enter into that contract of lease
out of sympathy and the goodness of her heart to accommodate a fellow man. x x x

It is indisputable, however, that Respondent Morato cannot fully use or enjoy the land during the
duration of the lease contract. This restriction on the enjoyment of her property sufficiently meets the
definition of an encumbrance under Section 118 of the Public Land Act, because such contract impairs
the use of the property by the grantee. In a contract of lease which is consensual, bilateral, onerous and
commutative, the owner temporarily grants the use of his or her property to another who undertakes to
pay rent therefor.[17] During the term of the lease, the grantee of the patent cannot enjoy the
beneficial use of the land leased. As already observed, the Public Land Act does not permit a grantee of
a free patent from encumbering any portion of such land. Such encumbrance is a ground for the
nullification of the award.
Moratos resort to equity, i.e. that the lease was executed allegedly out of the goodness of her heart
without any intention of violating the law, cannot help her. Equity, which has been aptly described as
justice outside legality, is applied only in the absence of, and never against, statutory law or judicial rules
of procedure. Positive rules prevail over all abstract arguments based on equity contra legem.[18]

Respondents failed to justify their position that the mortgage should not be considered an
encumbrance. Indeed, we do not find any support for such contention. The questioned mortgage falls
squarely within the term encumbrance proscribed by Section 118 of the Public Land Act.[19] Verily, a
mortgage constitutes a legal limitation on the estate, and the foreclosure of such mortgage would
necessarily result in the auction of the property.[20]

Even if only part of the property has been sold or alienated within the prohibited period of five years
from the issuance of the patent, such alienation is a sufficient cause for the reversion of the whole
estate to the State. As a condition for the grant of a free patent to an applicant, the law requires that
the land should not be encumbered, sold or alienated within five years from the issuance of the patent.
The sale or the alienation of part of the homestead violates that condition.[21]

The prohibition against the encumbrance -- lease and mortgage included -- of a homestead which, by
analogy applies to a free patent, is mandated by the rationale for the grant, viz.:[22]

It is well-known that the homestead laws were designed to distribute disposable agricultural lots of the
State to land-destitute citizens for their home and cultivation. Pursuant to such benevolent intention the
State prohibits the sale or encumbrance of the homestead (Section 116) within five years after the grant
of the patent. After that five-year period the law impliedly permits alienation of the homestead; but in
line with the primordial purpose to favor the homesteader and his family the statute provides that such
alienation or conveyance (Section 117) shall be subject to the right of repurchase by the homesteader,
his widow or heirs within five years. This section 117 is undoubtedly a complement of section 116. It
aims to preserve and keep in the family of the homesteader that portion of public land which the State
had gratuitously given to him. It would, therefore, be in keeping with this fundamental idea to hold, as
we hold, that the right to repurchase exists not only when the original homesteader makes the
conveyance, but also when it is made by his widow or heirs. This construction is clearly deducible from
the terms of the statute.

By express provision of Section 118 of Commonwealth Act 141 and in conformity with the policy of the
law, any transfer or alienation of a free patent or homestead within five years from the issuance of the
patent is proscribed. Such transfer nullifies said alienation and constitutes a cause for the reversion of
the property to the State.

The prohibition against any alienation or encumbrance of the land grant is a proviso attached to the
approval of every application.[23] Prior to the fulfillment of the requirements of law, Respondent
Morato had only an inchoate right to the property; such property remained part of the public domain
and, therefore, not susceptible to alienation or encumbrance. Conversely, when a homesteader has
complied with all the terms and conditions which entitled him to a patent for [a] particular tract of
public land, he acquires a vested interest therein and has to be regarded an equitable owner
thereof.[24] However, for Respondent Moratos title of ownership over the patented land to be
perfected, she should have complied with the requirements of the law, one of which was to keep the
property for herself and her family within the prescribed period of five (5) years. Prior to the fulfillment
of all requirements of the law, Respondent Moratos title over the property was incomplete. Accordingly,
if the requirements are not complied with, the State as the grantor could petition for the annulment of
the patent and the cancellation of the title.

Respondent Morato cannot use the doctrine of the indefeasibility of her Torrens title to bar the state
from questioning its transfer or encumbrance. The certificate of title issued to her clearly stipulated that
its award was subject to the conditions provided for in Sections 118, 119, 121, 122 and 124 of
Commonwealth Act (CA) No. 141. Because she violated Section 118, the reversion of the property to the
public domain necessarily follows, pursuant to Section 124.

Second Issue: Foreshore Land Reverts to the Public Domain

There is yet another reason for granting this petition.

Although Respondent Court found that the subject land was foreshore land, it nevertheless sustained
the award thereof to Respondent Morato:[25]

First of all, the issue here is whether the land in question, is really part of the foreshore lands. The
Supreme Court defines foreshore land in the case of Republic vs. Alagad, 169 SCRA 455, 464, as follows:

Otherwise, where the rise in water level is due to, the extraordinary action of nature, rainful, for
instance, the portions inundated thereby are not considered part of the bed or basin of the body of
water in question. It cannot therefore be said to be foreshore land but land outside of the public
dominion, and land capable of registration as private property.

A foreshore land, on the other hand has been defined as follows:

... that part of (the land) which is between high and low water and left dry by the flux and reflux of the
tides x x x x (Republic vs. C.A., Nos. L-43105, L-43190, August 31, 1984, 131 SCRA 532; Government vs.
Colegio de San Jose, 53 Phil 423)

The strip of land that lies between the high and low water marks and that is alternatively wet and dry
according to the flow of the tide. (Rep. vs. CA, supra, 539).

The factual findings of the lower court regarding the nature of the parcel of land in question reads:
Evidence disclose that the marginal area of the land radically changed sometime in 1937 up to 1955 due
to a strong earthquake followed by frequent storms eventually eroding the land. From 1955 to 1968,
however, gradual reclamation was undertaken by the lumber company owned by the Moratos. Having
thus restored the land thru mostly human hands employed by the lumber company, the area continued
to be utilized by the owner of the sawmill up to the time of his death in 1965. On or about March 17,
1973, there again was a strong earthquake unfortunately causing destruction to hundreds of residential
houses fronting the Calauag Bay including the Santiago Building, a cinema house constructed of
concrete materials. The catastrophe totally caused the sinking of a concrete bridge at Sumulong river
also in the municipality of Calauag, Quezon.

On November 13, 1977 a typhoon code named Unding wrought havoc as it lashed the main land of
Calauag, Quezon causing again great erosion this time than that which the area suffered in 1937. The
Court noted with the significance of the newspaper clipping entitled Baryo ng Mangingisda Kinain ng
Dagat (Exh. 11).

xxxxxxxxx

Evidently this was the condition of the land when on or about December 5, 1972 defendant Josefina L.
Morato filed with the Bureau of Lands her free patent application. The defendant Josefina Morato
having taken possession of the land after the demise of Don Tomas Morato, she introduced
improvement and continued developing the area, planted it to coconut trees. Having applied for a free
patent, defendant had the land area surveyed and an approved plan (Exh. 9) based on the cadastral
survey as early as 1927 (Exh. 10) was secured. The area was declared for taxation purposes in the name
of defendant Josefina Morato denominated as Tax Declaration No. 4115 (Exh. 8) and the corresponding
realty taxes religiously paid as shown by Exh. 8-A). (pp. 12-14, DECISION).

Being supported by substantial evidence and for failure of the appellant to show cause which would
warrant disturbance, the afore-cited findings of the lower court, must be respected.

Petitioner correctly contends, however, that Private Respondent Morato cannot own foreshore land:

Through the encroachment or erosion by the ebb and flow of the tide, a portion of the subject land was
invaded by the waves and sea advances. During high tide, at least half of the land (632.5 square meters)
is 6 feet deep under water and three (3) feet deep during low tide. The Calauag Bay shore has extended
up to a portion of the questioned land.

While at the time of the grant of free patent to respondent Morato, the land was not reached by the
water, however, due to gradual sinking of the land caused by natural calamities, the sea advances had
permanently invaded a portion of subject land. As disclosed at the trial, through the testimony of the
court-appointed commissioner, Engr. Abraham B. Pili, the land was under water during high tide in the
month of August 1978. The water margin covers half of the property, but during low tide, the water is
about a kilometer (TSN, July 19, 1979, p. 12). Also, in 1974, after the grant of the patent, the land was
covered with vegetation, but it disappeared in 1978 when the land was reached by the tides (Exhs. E-1;
E-14). In fact, in its decision dated December 28, 1983, the lower court observed that the erosion of the
land was caused by natural calamities that struck the place in 1977 (Cf. Decision, pp. 17-18).[26]

Respondent-Spouses Quilatan argue, however, that it is unfair and unjust if Josefina Morato will be
deprived of the whole property just because a portion thereof was immersed in water for reasons not
her own doing.[27]

As a general rule, findings of facts of the Court of Appeals are binding and conclusive upon this Court,
unless such factual findings are palpably unsupported by the evidence on record or unless the judgment
itself is based on a misapprehension of facts.[28] The application for a free patent was made in 1972.
From the undisputed factual findings of the Court of Appeals, however, the land has since become
foreshore. Accordingly, it can no longer be subject of a free patent under the Public Land Act.
Government of the Philippine Islands vs. Cabagis[29] explained the rationale for this proscription:

Article 339, subsection 1, of the Civil Code, reads:

Art. 339. Property of public ownership is

1. That devoted to public use, such as roads, canals, rivers, torrents, ports and bridges constructed by
the State, riverbanks, shores, roadsteads, and that of a similar character.

********

Article 1, case 3, of the Law of Waters of August 3, 1866, provides as follows:

ARTICLE 1. The following are part of the national domain open to public use:

********

3. The Shores. By the shore is understood that space covered and uncovered by the movement of the
tide. Its interior or terrestrial limit is the line reached by the highest equinoctal tides. Where the tides
are not appreciable, the shore begins on the land side at the line reached by the sea during ordinary
storms or tempests.

In the case of Aragon vs. Insular Government (19 Phil. 223), with reference to article 339 of the Civil
Code just quoted, this Court said:

We should not be understood, by this decision, to hold that in a case of gradual encroachment or
erosion by the ebb and flow of the tide, private property may not become property of public ownership.
as defined in article 339 of the code, where it appear that the owner has to all intents and purposes
abandoned it and permitted it to be totally destroyed, so as to become a part of the playa (shore of the
sea), rada (roadstead), or the like. * * *

In the Enciclopedia Jurdica Espaola, volume XII, page 558, we read the following:

With relative frequency the opposite phenomenon occurs; that is, the sea advances and private
properties are permanently invaded by the waves, and in this case they become part of the shore or
beach. They then pass to the public domain, but the owner thus dispossessed does not retain any right
to the natural products resulting from their new nature; it is a de facto case of eminent domain, and not
subject to indemnity.

In comparison, Article 420 of the Civil Code provides:

Art. 420. The following things are property of public dominion:

(1) Those intended for public use, such as roads, canals, rivers, torrents, ports and bridges constructed
by the State, banks, shores, roadsteads, and others of similar character;

(2) Those which belong to the State, without being for public use, and are intended for some public
service or for the development of the national wealth.

When the sea moved towards the estate and the tide invaded it, the invaded property became
foreshore land and passed to the realm of the public domain. In fact, the Court in Government vs.
Cabangis[30] annulled the registration of land subject of cadastral proceedings when the parcel
subsequently became foreshore land.[31] In another case, the Court voided the registration decree of a
trial court and held that said court had no jurisdiction to award foreshore land to any private person or
entity.[32] The subject land in this case, being foreshore land, should therefore be returned to the public
domain.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. This Court hereby REVERSES and SETS ASIDE the assailed
Decision of Respondent Court and ORDERS the CANCELLATION of Free Patent No. (IV-3) 275 issued to
Respondent Morato and the subsequent Original Certificate of Title No. P-17789. The subject land
therefore REVERTS to the State. No costs.

SO ORDERED.

Romero, Melo, and Francisco, JJ., concur.

Narvasa, C.J., (Chairman), on leave.

EVY D. MACASIANO VS. HONORABLE ROBERTO C. DIOKNO,MUNICIPALITY OF PARANAQUE,METRO
MANILA, PALANYAG KILUSANG BAYAN FOR SERVICE GR No. 97764 August 10, 1992

Facts: On June 13, 1990, the municipality of Paranaque passed an ordinance authorizing the closure of
some streets located at Baclaran, Paranaque, Metro Manila and the establishment of a flea market
thereon. By virtue of this Paranaque Mayor Ferrer was authorized to enter into a contract to any service
cooperative for the establishment, operation, maintenance and management of flea market and/or
vending areas. Because of this purpose, respondent Palanyag entered into an agreement with the
municipality of Paranaque with the obligation to remit dues to the treasury. Consequently, market stalls
were put up by respondent Palanyag on the said streets.

On September 30, 1990, Brig. Gen Macasiano, PNP Superintendent of Metropolitan Traffic
Command ordered the destruction and confiscation of the stalls. These stalls were later returned to
Palanyag. Petitioner then sent a letter to Palanyag giving the latter 10 days to discontinue the flea
market otherwise the market stalls shall be dismantled. Hence, respondents filed with the court a joint
petition for prohibition and mandamus with damages and prayer for preliminary injunction, to which
the petitioner filed his memorandum/opposition to the issuance of the writ of preliminary injunction.
The court issued a temporary restraining order to enjoin petitioner from enforcing his letter pending the
hearing on the motion for writ of preliminary injunction.

Issue: Whether an ordinance issued by the municipality of Paranaque authorizing the lease and use of
public streets or thoroughfares as sites for flea market is valid?

Held: Article 424 lays down the basic principle that properties of public domain devoted to public use
and made available to the public in general are outside the commerce of man and cannot be disposed or
leased by the local government unit to private persons. Aside from the requirement of due process, the
closure of the road should be for the sole purpose of withdrawing the road or other public property
from public use when circumstances show that such property is no longer intended or necessary for
public use or public service. When it is already withdrawn from public use, the property becomes
patrimonial property of the local government unit concerned. It is only then that respondent
municipality can use or convey them for any purpose for which other real property belonging to the
local unit concerned might lawfully used or conveyed.

Those roads and streets which are available to the public in general and ordinarily used for
vehicular traffic are still considered public property devoted to public use. In such case, the local
government has no power to use it for another purpose or to dispose of or lease it to private persons.
Hence the ordinance is null and void.