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Journal of Retailing 92 (3, 2016) 333–351

Cross-Channel Effects of Price Promotions: An Empirical Analysis of the


Multi-Channel Grocery Retail Sector
Els Breugelmans ∗,1 , Katia Campo 1,2
KU Leuven, Faculty of Economics and Business, Korte Nieuwstraat 33, 2000 Antwerp, Belgium
Available online 26 February 2016

Abstract
An important consideration for multi-channel grocery retailers is which promotion strategy to adopt across channels. The tendency of grocery
buyers to keep visiting the offline store after they start to buy at the chain’s online store implies that promotions in one channel can have substantial
negative effects on buying behavior in the other channel, especially if the promotions differ across channels. This article examines the cross-channel
effects of price promotions on category purchase decisions, taking into account both contemporaneous effects (during the promotion period) and
cross-period effects (after the promotion period). For cross-period promotion effects, a distinction is made between lagged promotion effects on
subsequent category purchases, and promotion frequency effects on future promotion effectiveness. The results show that (1) promotions in one
channel can have negative effects on category purchases in the other channel during the promotion period, (2) these cross-channel effects are
asymmetric, (3) high promotion frequency can have negative effects on future promotion effectiveness in the other channel, and (4) cross-channel
effects are more negative for more loyal customers of the chain.
© 2016 New York University. Published by Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.

Keywords: Multi-channel grocery shopping; Price promotions; Cross-channel promotion effects; Promotion effectiveness

“The future of grocery shopping is multi-channel.” non-grocery categories; Ansari, Mela, and Neslin 2008) there-
—Joanne Denney-Finch, chief executive (IGD 2009) fore challenges grocery retailers to construct operations models
Online grocery sales are expected to rise from 3.3 percent more strategically and implement marketing mix strategies care-
of total U.S. grocery spending to 11 percent by 2023 (Steiman fully (Retail Systems Research 2013). In this research, the focus
2014), and are expected to double its value in the U.K. by 2020 is on promotional strategies, and more particularly on the cross-
to £17.2 bn (IGD 2015). Most online grocery shoppers regularly channel promotion effects they entail. When implementing
visit both online and offline grocery stores, most often using the different promotional actions across channels, multi-channel
online and offline channel of the same (primary) chain (Melis retailers must wary about whether and how promotions in one
et al. 2015). These multi-channel shoppers constitute a rapidly channel influence buying behavior of their customers in the other
growing segment that dramatically changes the grocery mar- channel. Customers of a multi-channel grocery chain can take
ket (IGD 2011). As an interesting and consequential aspect of advantage of special offers available in the chain’s online and
this change in market conditions, multi-channel shoppers are offline channel. This may lead to subsidization of loyal chain
exposed to marketing actions of a chain’s online and offline customers rather than enhancing store traffic and overall sales.
channel. A survey conducted by IGD (2011) indeed confirms that a more
The trend of grocery shoppers using multiple channels rather extensive promotion offer is an important motivation for many
than migrating to an online channel (as is more likely in shoppers to visit multiple channels.
The decision whether and how to differentiate promotions
across channels is therefore an important managerial issue. Pre-
∗ Corresponding author. Tel.: +32 16326481. vious research, however, provided only partial insights into
E-mail addresses: els.breugelmans@kuleuven.be (E. Breugelmans), promotion effects in a multi-channel context. In this research,
katia.campo@kuleuven.be (K. Campo). we aim to provide a comprehensive analysis and examine the
1 Both the authors should be regarded as joint first authors.
2 Tel.: +32 16376260. effect of price promotions on household category purchase

http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jretai.2016.02.003
0022-4359/© 2016 New York University. Published by Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
334 E. Breugelmans, K. Campo / Journal of Retailing 92 (3, 2016) 333–351

decisions (i.e. category purchase incidence and quantity in a multi-channel grocery shopping context. Next, we describe
decisions) in a multi-channel grocery retail context, where con- our modeling approach and the data we used for the empiri-
sumers visit the offline and online channel of the same chain. cal analysis. After an overview and discussion of the estimation
We take into account both within and cross-channel promotion and simulation results, we discuss our main findings and the
effects (i.e. effects on the own and other channel), as well as con- resulting managerial implications. We end with limitations and
temporaneous and cross-period promotion effects (i.e. effects extensions for future research.
during and after the promotion period). For cross-period promo-
tion effects, we distinguish between short term lagged promotion Price Promotion Effects in a Multi-Channel Context
effects on subsequent category purchases, and longer term pro-
motion frequency effects on future promotion effectiveness. Price promotions, and the different effects they may have
Focusing on cross-channel and cross-period promotion effects on offline consumer buying behavior, have been examined in
is particularly relevant for repeatedly purchased categories like several previous studies (for a review, see van Heerde and
groceries, where multi-channel shoppers regularly visit (and are Neslin 2008). We seek to analyze these effects in a multi-
thus exposed to promotions in) online and offline channels. The channel shopping environment, from the retailer’s perspective.
estimation results shed light on several important research ques- For this reason, we focus on category-level (purchase incidence
tions: whether and how promotions in one channel reinforce and quantity) effects, rather than brand-level (choice/switching)
category sales in the own channel, cannibalize category sales in promotion effects (Ailawadi et al. 2007; Bell, Chiang, and
the other channel, lead to lower category sales in post-promotion Padmanabhan 1999; van Heerde and Neslin 2008).3 As indicated
periods, and/or reduce promotion effectiveness by making con- in Table 1, we provide a comprehensive analysis, by distin-
sumers less responsive to promotions. Based on the estimation guishing between own-and cross-channel promotion effects
results, we use simulations to detail different payoffs, in the form (i.e. effects in the same channel or in the other channel,
of sales revenue earned from different promotion strategies. respectively), and between contemporaneous and cross-period
Our unique data set for this study consists of a representative promotion effects (i.e. effects during or after the promotion
U.K. household panel from Kantar Worldpanel, obtained from period, respectively). For cross-period promotion effects, we fur-
AiMark. The data cover online and offline household grocery ther differentiate between lagged promotion effects (i.e. effects
purchases at Tesco, for a 78-week period. We estimate category on category purchase decisions in the post-promotion period,
purchase decision models (incidence and quantity) for two fre- resulting from consumers’ stockpiling behavior; Ailawadi et al.
quently purchased categories, milk and cereals, across Tesco’s 2007; van Heerde and Neslin 2008) and promotion frequency
online and offline stores. Tesco is the U.K. market leader in the effects (i.e. changes in promotion effectiveness due to [high]
grocery sector in the offline as well as the online channel. promotion frequency in the past; Foekens, Leeflang, and Wittink
From an academic point of view, this study provides impor- 1999; Kopalle, Mela, and Marsh 1999).
tant contributions to promotion and multi-channel retailing
literature. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first study
to examine explicitly the effects of promotions in one channel Own-Channel Promotion Effects
on buying behavior in the other channel of the same chain. We
also extend promotion literature by providing a comprehensive Own-channel promotion effects (contemporaneous, cross-
analysis of own- and cross-channel promotion effects, taking period lagged and cross-period promotion frequency effects)
both contemporaneous and cross-period promotion effects into have been examined in multiple past papers, and in most cases
account. That is, most previous literature focuses on cross- provided consistent results (Bucklin and Gupta 1992; Degeratu,
competitive promotion effects on brand or store choice within Rangaswamy, and Wu 2000; Foekens, Leeflang, and Wittink
an offline channel (Ailawadi and Neslin 1998; Bell, Chiang, 1999; Kopalle, Mela, and Marsh 1999; van Heerde and Neslin
and Padmanabhan 1999; Blattberg, Briesch, and Fox 1995; 2008; Zhang and Wedel 2009). Based on these results and the
Bucklin and Gupta 1992). Studies that examine promotion underlying mechanisms discussed in previous studies, we for-
effects in different channels mainly note differences in promo- mulate the following hypotheses. First, given the findings that
tion effectiveness between channels, without examining whether online and offline promotions can induce consumers to buy
promotions in one channel also affect purchase decisions in the a category earlier than planned or in larger quantities, at the
chain’s other channel (Chu, Chintagunta, and Cebollada 2008; expense of either competitive chains (category growth at the
Zhang and Wedel 2009). By using estimation results to sim- chain level; van Heerde and Neslin 2008) or future purchases
ulate the effect of different promotion scenarios, we provide (loyal acceleration in the own channel; Ailawadi et al. 2007), we
interesting insights into the sales revenue effects of different expect a strong, positive contemporaneous effect of price promo-
promotion strategies. Such an approach may help multi-channel tions on consumers’ category purchase decisions (H1). Second,
retailers improve their overall business strategy and optimize
cross-channel synergies through more effective promotion plan-
3 In the following discussions, we do not distinguish explicitly between
ning.
category purchase incidence and quantity, because previous research has demon-
In the next section, we present a brief overview of promo- strated that promotions have effects of similar direction on both decisions (Bell
tion effects examined in an offline context, and indicate how and Hilber 2006). We do, however, allow the magnitude of effects to differ (see
these findings can be translated to expected promotion effects the Model section).
E. Breugelmans, K. Campo / Journal of Retailing 92 (3, 2016) 333–351 335

Table 1
Overview promotion effects.
Own-channel Cross-channel

Contemporaneous price promotion effects H1 H4


H5: Asymmetry H8: Heterogeneity
Cross-period price promotion effects Lagged H2 H6
Promotion frequency H3 H7
H1. Offline (online) price promotions have a positive effect on category purchase decisions in the own offline (online) channel.
H2. Offline (online) price promotions have a negative effect on category purchase decisions in the own offline (online) channel in post-promotion periods.
H3. A high frequency of offline (online) price promotions has a negative effect on promotion effectiveness in the own offline (online) channel in subsequent
periods.
H4. Online (offline) price promotions have a negative effect on category purchase decisions in the other offline (online) channel.
H5. A similar price promotion in the online channel has a stronger negative effect on category purchase behavior in the offline channel than vice versa.
H6. Online (offline) price promotions have a negative effect on category purchase decisions in the other offline (online) channel in post-promotion periods.
H7.A high frequency of online (offline) price promotions has a negative effect on promotion effectiveness in the other offline (online) channel in subsequent
periods.
H8. Own- and cross-channel (contemporaneous and cross-period) promotion effects differ between loyal and non-loyal customers of the chain.

Focal hypotheses in bold.

buying earlier or more in the category, in reaction to promotions, Based on a similar logic, we expect that multi-channel shoppers
can result in larger household stocks and a reduced need to buy may adjust their allocation decisions (indirect channel switch)
the category on subsequent shopping trips, unless consumers to take maximum advantage of promotion opportunities (H4).
also increase their consumption rate (Ailawadi et al. 2007; van
Heerde and Neslin 2008) or shift purchases from one store to Asymmetry of Cross-Channel Effects
the other (Guyt and Gijsbrechts 2014). In line with most previ-
ous research, we expect that promotions have a negative effect Research on the brand switching effects of promotions has
on category purchase decisions in post-promotion periods in the demonstrated that these effects tend to be asymmetric for brands
same channel (H2). Third, previous research has shown that fre- that belong to different price/quality tiers (Bronnenberg and
quent exposures to promotions can make future promotions less Wathieu 1996; Sivakumar 2004; Sivakumar and Raj 1997). The
effective (Foekens, Leeflang, and Wittink 1999; Kalyanaram and general finding is that consumers more easily “switch up” from
Winer 1995; Kopalle, Mela, and Marsh 1999; van Heerde and a low to a high tier brand in response to a promotion for the high
Neslin 2008). When promotions become endemic, consumers tier brand, than they “switch down” from a high to a low tier pro-
change their expectations about the value and frequency of future moted brand. One of the major reasons is that consumers rather
deals (Liu and Balachander 2014), such that they even start to give in on price than on quality (Sivakumar 2004). Cross-channel
regard promotional deals as normal (Blattberg, Briesch, and Fox contemporaneous promotion effects can for that reason also be
1995). Because shopping frequency is lower in online grocery asymmetric, in view of the channel differences in price and con-
stores, it is worthwhile to investigate whether a similar nega- venience (Gupta and Kim 2009). The online channel excels in
tive effect of a high promotion frequency on future promotion offering convenience advantages and allows consumers to save
sensitivity can be found in the online channel (H3). time and effort but often charges a higher price for this extra
service (e.g. Avery et al. 2012; Gupta and Kim 2009). Using
Cross-Channel Contemporaneous Effects reasoning similar to that applied to explain asymmetry in brand
switching effects (e.g. Sivakumar 2004), we expect that online
Our main contribution lies in the investigation of cross- price promotions can trigger consumers to take advantage of
channel promotion effects (focal hypotheses, highlighted in bold online shopping convenience (higher benefits) without having
in Table 1). To predict whether price promotions in one channel to suffer substantial increases in shopping costs (price discount).
cannibalize category purchases in the other channel, we focus on This may lead to asymmetry in cross-channel promotion effects
promotion-driven switching effects across channels. Promotion- to the advantage of the online channel, such that online price
driven switching effects have been observed for (offline) store promotions have a stronger negative effect on offline category
choice and purchase allocation decisions (Bucklin and Lattin purchase behavior than vice versa (H5).
1992; Guyt and Gijsbrechts 2014; Kumar and Leone 1988;
MacKenzie and Walters 1988). The underlying reason is that Cross-Channel Cross-Period Effects
promotions can increase the overall attractiveness of a store and
attract customers that would otherwise not have visited the store Similar to cross-period lagged promotion effects in the
(direct store switch). In addition, promotions can influence the own channel, consumer stockpiling triggered by promotions
category allocation patterns of consumers who regularly visit may negatively affect subsequent category purchase decisions
multiple stores, and stimulate shifts in purchases from one store in the other channel (Ailawadi et al. 2007; Dawes 2012).
to the other (indirect store switch; Bucklin and Lattin 1992). We explore these preemptive channel switching effects, by
336 E. Breugelmans, K. Campo / Journal of Retailing 92 (3, 2016) 333–351

examining whether price promotions in one channel lead to a purchase occasion,4 and channel (c = 1 for online and c = 2 for
reduction of category purchases in the other channel during post- offline channels), respectively. For parsimony, we exclude cat-
promotion periods (H6). What is more, multi-channel shoppers egory and segment indices. To distinguish between own- and
who interchangeably shop in online and offline channels of the cross-channel effects, we use the indicators c and c̄ to denote
same grocery chain are exposed to price promotions in both the own and other channel, respectively.
channels and may use this information to form their expecta- The first component of the hurdle model determines whether
tions about future promotion activities. We therefore expect that the key dependent variable (purchase quantity) is equal to zero
a high frequency of price promotions in one or both channels (no purchase in the category) or positive (purchase in the cate-
can lead to an expectation that price promotions will be widely gory) (McDowell 2003). This purchase incidence decision—that
available in the future (in offline and/or online channels), and is, whether household i makes a category purchase in channel c
consequently may reduce the effectiveness of price promotions on purchase occasion t (bit,c )—is described by a binomial Probit
in both channels (H7). model:
 ∗ >0
1, if bit,c
bit,c = , (1)
Heterogeneity in Promotion Reactions 0, otherwise
∗ is a latent variable capturing the attractiveness for
where bit,c
Finally, cross-channel effects can differ across households household i to make a purchase in the category in channel c on
(van Heerde and Neslin 2008; H8). Promotion effects maybe purchase occasion t, modeled by the following specification:
stronger for loyal chain customers, who can save more by tak-

ing advantage of (different) price reductions in the chain’s online bit,c = [α0 + α1 ∗ onvstit + α2 ∗ log(CRi ) + α3 ∗ INVRATIOit
and offline store. But less loyal, multiple-store shoppers have
more opportunities to shift category purchases across chains + α4 ∗ log(INVit ) + α5c ∗ loyalit,c ]
(rather than channels), which may trigger stronger positive con- + [μ1c ∗ promoit,c + μ2c ∗ promoit,c̄ ]
temporaneous promotion effects in a given channel (shift from
competitive to the focal chain). The lower visit frequency at the + [ϕ1c ∗ promoi,t−1,c + ϕ2c ∗ promoi,t−1,c̄ ]. (2)
focal chain, however, also may result in weaker cross-channel
and cross-period promotion effects. The operationalization of the variables is detailed in the Data
section and Table 3. The expression within the first set of square
brackets measures the household’s baseline category purchase
Empirical Analysis: Model tendency in the absence of promotions. The average tendency
to buy in the category (captured by the intercept α0 ) is adjusted
To analyze multi-channel promotion effects, we focus on con- for possible channel differences using an online channel dummy
sumers’ category purchase decisions for a single, multi-channel variable (onvstit ). The overall tendency to buy the category in
grocery chain for two reasons. First, examining customers’ the online channel is then equal to α0 + α1 . We expect a positive
buying behavior at the same chain provides insight into online correction parameter α1 , given the consumers’ tendency
promotion-driven purchase shifts across channels that can sup- to buy larger baskets online (Chintagunta, Chu, and Cebollada
port the development of profitable multi-channel promotion 2012; see also Table 2). To get an accurate estimate of household
strategies. Second, focusing on a single chain allows to isolate consumption needs and inventory effects, we use the procedure
“pure” channel allocation effects at the category level and elim- suggested by Bell and Boztuğ (2007). The consumption rate
inate possible confounding effects of chain differences (e.g. in parameter α2 should be positive: higher consumption needs lead
price or quality positioning, retail store image), while keeping to a stronger tendency to make a purchase in the category. In
the analysis tractable. contrast, the inventory ratio parameter α3 should be negative:
Channel choice (i.e. the decision to visit the online or offline higher than usual household stocks reduce the need to purchase
channel) and chain choice (i.e. the decision to visit the exam- the category. Bell and Boztuğ (2007) suggest that in addition
ined chain) are considered as exogenous decisions. In line with to a traditional inventory variable that controls for heterogene-
previous studies on category-level promotion effects, we dis- ity across different households, there can also be a potential
tinguish between the purchase incidence decision (given the positive effect caused by inventory estimation bias and inven-
channel and chain visit decision), and the purchase quantity tory effects on consumption. To control for this, we include a
decision (given purchase incidence), using a log-normal hurdle log inventory variable that we expect to be positive (captured
model (McDowell 2003; Wooldridge 2010). This model allows
the magnitude of the promotion effects and the set of relevant
4 In line with previous studies on category purchase decisions (e.g. van Heerde
variables to differ between purchase incidence and quantity deci-
and Neslin 2008), and because we treat the visit to the channel as given, we
sions. We use maximum likelihood procedures and Latent Gold®
model decisions during a purchase occasion (in our case, periods with a visit
software to estimate the model. In this way, we can define latent to the channel) rather than at absolute points in time (e.g. every week). Hence,
classes over both hurdle model components (see Vermunt and we consider only weeks in which households have the opportunity to buy the
Magidson 2005). The indices i, t and c refer to the household, category in a given channel.
E. Breugelmans, K. Campo / Journal of Retailing 92 (3, 2016) 333–351 337

by α4 ). In addition, we include channel-specific loyalty vari-

2,034 (25.96%)
48,711 (75.3%)

61,178 (25.0%)
33,400 (93.9%)
.425 (s.e.: .35)
.762 (s.e.: .64)
9,862 (15.2%)
Multi-channel

.29 (s.e.: .19)


.25 (s.e.: .26)
.41 (s.e.: .22)
.62 (s.e.: .29)
6,120 (9.5%)
ables (loyalit,c ) (Guadagni and Little 2008), which capture a
household’s tendency to repurchase a category in the same chan-
nel of a given chain (state dependence; van Heerde and Neslin
2008). The related parameters (α5c ) should be positive: A higher
category-specific loyalty to channel c of the focal chain in the
past leads to a higher tendency to repurchase the category in that

Single-channel

.796 (s.e.: .55)


.42 (s.e.: .22)

.68 (s.e.: .25)

2,178 (6.1%)
channel.

42 (.53%)
The expression in the second set of brackets captures own-

(online)
and cross-channel contemporaneous promotion effects. The

870
own-channel promotion variables (promoit,c ) are household and
channel specific, measured as weighted percentage price dis-
counts (Grewal et al. 2011) offered in the category and channel

184,002 (75.0%)
5,760 (73.51%)
on a given purchase occasion. These variables are household

Single-channel

.413 (s.e.: .33)


.31 (s.e.: .20)

.41 (s.e.: .22)


specific, because we focus on visits to a channel during which

(offline)

166,991
the household has the opportunity to buy in the category, and
we use household preferences for specific items as weights. The
parameters (μ11 , μ12 ) should be positive, because promotions
often have an immediate, positive impact on consumers’ cate-
gory purchase incidence decisions in the own channel (H1). The

.416 (s.e.: .33)


.785 (s.e.: .60)
.30 (s.e.: .20)
.28 (s.e.: .21)
.41 (s.e.: .22)
.64 (s.e.: .26)
cross-channel promotion variables (promoit,c̄ ) are constructed

232,554

245,180
Cereals
similarly, but only taking into account those purchase occasions

10,732

35,578
7,836

6,120
Total
in which household i visited the other channel (c̄) during the
same week and was exposed to promotions in that channel.
The parameters (μ21 , μ22 ) should be negative, because promo-
tions in one channel are expected to have an immediate negative

3.14 (s.e.: 2.29)


3.11 (s.e.: 3.24)
2,175 (23.51%)
57,350 (74.3%)
13,028 (16.9%)

98,589 (25.0%)
36,985 (100%)
Multi-channel

.54 (s.e.: .27)


.36 (s.e.: .27)
.75 (s.e.: .21)
.85 (s.e.: .20)
6,750 (8.8%)
impact on consumers’ category purchase incidence in the other
channel (H4). The expression within the third set of brackets
captures own- and cross-channel, cross-period, lagged promo-
tion effects (promoi,t−1,c and promoi,t−1,c̄ respectively). The
parameters (ϕ1c , ϕ2c ) are expected to be negative, to reflect the
negative effects of consumer stockpiling on subsequent purchase

298,212 (75.0%)
2.84 (s.e.: 2.17)
7,076 (76.49%)

incidence decisions in the own and other channel (H2 and H6).
Single-channel

.62 (s.e.: .28)

.78 (s.e.: .23)


To incorporate past promotion frequency effects on promo-
(offline)

194,457

tion effectiveness, we use a model with varying parameters


(Foekens, Leeflang, and Wittink 1999; Kopalle, Mela, and Marsh
1999). The parameters of the own-channel promotion variables
(μ1c ) are a function of: (i) a constant capturing sensitivity to cur-

Expressed in standardized units: liters for milk, kilograms for cereals.


rent own-channel promotions, (ii) a past promotion frequency
2.92 (s.e.: 2.21)
3.11 (s.e.: 3.24)
.60 (s.e.: .28)
.36 (s.e.: .27)
.77 (s.e.: .22)
.85 (s.e.: .20)

variable in the own channel c (Lpromoit,c ) capturing the possi- Percentage of total in the category, across shopper segments.
ble decrease in promotion effectiveness due to a high promotion
251,807

396,801
13,028

36,985

Percentage of total in the shopper segment per category.


9,251

6,750

frequency in the own channel (μ11,c < 0; H3), and (iii) a past pro-
Total
Milk

motion frequency variable in the other channel c̄ (Lpromoit,c̄ )


Household purchase behavior, descriptive statistics.

capturing the possible decrease in promotion effectiveness due


to high promotion frequency in the other channel (μ12,c < 0; H7).
Off only
On only

Thus,
Both
Off

Off

Off

Off
On

On

On

On

μ1c = μ10,c + μ11,c ∗ Lpromoit,c + μ12,c ∗ Lpromoit,c̄ . (3)


(standardized units per trip)c

For the second component of the hurdle model, which cap-


Average purchase frequency

Average purchase incidence


(% of visits with purchase)
(nr of purchases per week)
Number of observationsb

tures category purchase quantity decisions, we use a log-normal


Shopping trip quantity
Number of shoppersa

specification that provided a much better model fit than the


linear truncated model (see the “Robustness Checks” section).
Sales (£/year)a

We operationalize the category purchase quantity variable as


the logarithm of the total quantity household i bought in chan-
Table 2

nel c on purchase occasion t. We incorporate all explanatory


a
b
c

variables—with the exception of channel loyalty, which is not


338 E. Breugelmans, K. Campo / Journal of Retailing 92 (3, 2016) 333–351

relevant for quantity decisions—in Eqs. (4) and (5) in the same equal to 1 if household i purchased PQ∗it,c units in channel c on
way as before. We have similar expectations for the direction of purchase occasion t, given purchase incidence, and 0 otherwise.
the effects, but allow the magnitude of the effects to be different.
Thus,
Empirical Analysis: Data
ln(PQ∗it,c ) = [β0 + β1 ∗ onvstit + β2 ∗ log(CRi )
+ β3 ∗ INVRATIOit + β4 ∗ log(INVit )] We have data from a representative U.K. household panel
from Kantar Worldpanel, obtained from AiMark for the period
+ [δ1c ∗ promoit,c + δ2c ∗ promoit,c̄ ] from July 2006 to December 2007. The U.K. online grocery
+ [γ1c ∗ promoi,t−1,c + γ2c ∗ promoi,t,1,c̄ ], and market is among the most developed of all major online grocery
markets (Kearney 2012), and in our analysis period, already
(4) reached much higher levels of multi-channel grocery shopping
than is observed in many other western countries nowadays. Our
data cover 78 weeks of online and offline household grocery pur-
δ1c = δ10,c + δ11,c ∗ Lpromoit,c + σ12,c ∗ Lpromoit,c̄ . (5) chases at Tesco, the market leader in the U.K. grocery sector for
both online and offline markets. In our estimation period, the
To account for household differences in promotion effects, chain only offered a home delivery service. Data for the first 26
we estimate the log-normal hurdle model using a latent-class weeks served to initialize the household-specific control vari-
analysis. Our dataset includes multi- and single-channel shop- ables; data for the next 52 weeks are used for model estimation.
pers (see “Data” section). Because we are especially interested We also have data about grocery purchases at other chains dur-
in promotion effects for multi-channel shoppers, we only include ing the same period, which we used to operationalize the control
heterogeneity in promotion reactions for these shoppers. For the variables (consumption rate, inventory level) and concomitant
single-channel shoppers, we estimate the ‘mean’ effects using category-specific chain loyalty variable.
the fixed-class member option in Latent Gold® . This approach We estimate category purchase decision models for two fre-
significantly simplifies our analyses and results, but does not quently purchased categories, milk and cereals. We include
bias the insights in cross-channel promotion effects for multi- all households that made at least one store visit to Tesco in
channel shoppers (see “Robustness Checks” section). For similar the estimation period (irrespective of the channel) and that are
reasons, we introduce heterogeneity in the effects for the promo- regular users of the category (i.e. consumption rate equal to
tion variables but not for the control variables, like consumption at least the 25 percent level of the consumption rate distribu-
rate and inventory level. To explain latent-class membership, tion across households). The sample includes 9,251 households
we include the household’s chain loyalty (i.e. share of category (2,175 multi-channel and 7,076 single-channel offline shop-
purchases at the focal chain, CatSharei ) as concomitant vari- pers) for milk and 7,836 households (2,034 multi-channel, 5,760
able. Similar to the formulation used by Gupta and Chintagunta single-channel offline, and 42 single-channel online shoppers)
(1994), we specify the segment membership probability pig as: for cereals.
exp(λ0g + λ1g ∗ CatSharei ) Table 2 provides descriptive statistics about household pur-
pig = G−1 . (6) chase behavior in each category. For multi-channel shoppers,
1 + m=1 exp(λ0m + λ1m ∗ CatSharei )
the average category purchase frequency is higher offline, but
The log-likelihood function for the entire sample is given by: the percentage of visits with a purchase and the quantity pur-
⎛ ⎞ chased per shopping trip (for cereals) are substantially higher
 I G 2 Tic
online. As previous research indicates, major shopping trips
LL = log ⎝ pig Lit,c|g ⎠ , (7) more likely occur in the online channel, whereas fill-in trips
i=1 g=1 c=1tc =1
happen in the offline channel (e.g. Chintagunta, Chu, and
where pig is household i’s probability of belonging to segment Cebollada 2012). Comparing offline purchases by multi- and
g (g = 1, . . ., G), Tic is the number of purchase occasions during single-channel shoppers, we find that the former visit offline
which household i made a visit to channel c of the chain, and store less frequently than the latter and tend to buy larger
I is the number of households in the data. Furthermore, Lit,c|g quantities in each shopping trip. This finding is in line with
is household i’s simultaneous likelihood of purchase incidence observations that time-constrained shoppers are more likely to
and quantity decisions on purchase occasion t in channel c (van take advantage of the online shopping convenience benefits
Heerde and Neslin 2008), which is conditional on i belonging (Degeratu, Rangaswamy, and Wu 2000; Perkins 2014).
to segment g: We highlight some key features of the variable operational-
ization here and provide more details in Table 3. We use the
Lit,c|g = (Pg (bit,c = 1))yit,c (1 − Pg (bit,c = 1))1−yit,c initialization period of 26 weeks and data from competitive
× (Pg (PQit,c = PQ∗it,c |bict = 1))Zit,c (8) chains to compute the consumption rate and provide a starting
value for the inventory level. To account for household differ-
with yit,c as the category purchase indicator, equal to 1 if house- ences in the levels of safety stock and make inventory effects
hold i purchased the category in channel c on purchase occasion comparable across households, we divide the inventory level
t, and 0 otherwise; and Zit,c as the purchase quantity indicator, by the household’s average inventory level (INVRATIOit ). The
E. Breugelmans, K. Campo / Journal of Retailing 92 (3, 2016) 333–351 339

Table 3
Variable operationalizations.
Notation Name Description Specification

bit,c Category purchase incidence for Indicator variable, equal to 1 if


household i in channel c on t household i makes a category purchase
in channel c on purchase occasion t (i.e.
week with a shopping trip), 0 otherwise.
ln(PQit,c ) Logarithm of category quantity for Logarithm of total quantity bought in a
household i in channel c on t category (in standardized units:
milliliters, milk; grams, cereals) for
household i in channel c on purchase
occasion t.
onvstit Visit to the online channel for Indicator variable, equal to 1 if
household i on purchase occasion t household i visits the online channel on
purchase occasion t, 0 otherwise.
both vstit Visit to both channels for household i Indicator variable, equal to 1 if
on purchase occasion t household i visits both channels on
purchase occasion t, 0 otherwise.
26
CRi Weekly consumption rate for Overall total quantity of the category CRi = s=1
PQis /26
household i bought by household i in all channels
and chains in the initialization period
(PQis ; s = 1, . . ., 26; s = week indicator),
divided by the number of weeks in
initialization period (26).
INVit Inventory rate for household i on Inventory in the previous week INVit = max[0, (INVi,s−1 + POi,s−1 − CRi )]
purchase occasion t (INVi,s−1 ), plus the amount bought in the
previous week across all chains (PQi,s−1 )
minus the weekly consumption rate
(CRi ). If this inventory level is less than
0, we use 0. The inventory level at the
starting point of the initialization period
(INVi0 ) is set equal to 0.
INVit
INVRATIOit Mean-centered inventory rate for Mean-centered version of the inventory INVRATIOit = AVG INVi
household i on purchase occasion t rate, using the average inventory for
household i (AVG INVi ).
loyalit,c Loyalty variable for household i in Weighted average of past loyalty for the loyalit,c = θ * loyali,t−1,c + (1 − θ) * bi,t−1,c
channel c on purchase occasion t category in channel c at the focal chain
(loyali,t−1,c ) and channel choice at the
focal chain on the last purchase occasion
(bi,t−1,c ) for household i, with weight
θ = .7 to capture fading effects.

N

WPctDisctis,c Average percentage price reduction The average percentage of price discount WPctDisctis,c = win ∗ PctDisctns,c
in category for household i in (PctDisctnsc ) of a category across all n=1
channel c in week s SKUs (n = 1, . . ., N) in channel c in week
s, weighted by spending shares for SKU
n in each household i’s long-term
shopping basket in the focal chain (win ).
Promotions are determined on the basis
of price deviations from the average
price level (equal to 1 if unit price of
SKU n in week s < [average price of
SKU n − 1 standard deviation]). The
price discount percentage is calculated as
the difference between unit price of SKU
n minus average price of SKU n in week
s, divided by average price of SKU n.
Promoit,c Current sales promotions for Weighted percentage price reduction for Promoit,c = WPctDisctit,c * Vstit,c
household i in channel c on purchase household i in channel c, given that
occasion t household i visits the channel in
purchase occasion t (Vstit,c ).
340 E. Breugelmans, K. Campo / Journal of Retailing 92 (3, 2016) 333–351

Table 3 (Continued)
Notation Name Description Specification

Promoit,c̄ Current sales promotions for Weighted percentage price reduction for Promoit,c̄ = WPctDisctit,c ∗ Vstit,c ∗ both vstit
household i in channel c̄ on purchase household i in channel c̄, given that
occasion t household i visits both channels in
purchase occasion t.
Promoi,t−1,c Lagged promotion for household i in Weighted percentage price reduction for
channel c on purchase occasion t household i in channel c of the previous
purchase occasion t − 1.

26
 N
LPromoit,c Past promotion frequency for Weighted sum of previous promoted Lpromoit,c = λs ∗ n=1
Disctn,t−s,c ∗ Vstit,c
household i in channel c on purchase items of the category (number of s=1
occasion t promoted items, Nrpromoi,t-s,c ) on
purchase occasion t, given the visits of
household i in channel c in past 26 weeks
(s = 1, . . ., 26), with weight λ = .75 to
capture fading effects.
PQi Tesco
CatSharei Share of category purchases at the Overall total quantity of the category CatSharei = PQi All
focal chain for household i bought by household i in the estimation
period in all channels at the focal chain
Tesco (PQi Tesco ) relative to overall total
quantity of the category bought by
household i in all channels at all chains
(PQi All )

channel loyalty variable (loyalit,c ) is a weighted average of past discount as the ratio of (1) the difference between the SKU’s
channel loyalty (loyali,t−1,c ) and the households’ previous chan- regular unit price and its actual price and (2) the SKU’s regular
nel choice for the category at Tesco (bi,t−1,c , equal to 1 if channel unit price. To make these promotion variables household spe-
c was selected on the previous purchase occasion t − 1 and 0 cific, we focus on visits to a channel when the household has an
otherwise). It captures state dependency effects, including the opportunity to buy in the category, and we use SKU spending
tendency of consumers to repurchase the category in the same shares in each household’s long-term shopping basket (i.e. over
channel. The concomitant variable, category-specific chain loy- the entire time period and all chains) as weights. These weights
alty, is operationalized as the share of category purchases at reflect household-specific SKU preferences (Raju 1992; Zhang
Tesco relative to other chains.5 and Breugelmans 2012). The category promotion variable thus
To construct the promotion variables, we first determine the is larger when more SKUs of the category are promoted, pro-
percentage price discount for each stockkeeping unit (SKU) in motions are offered for more strongly preferred SKUs, and/or
the category—because “consumers process their price savings the price discounts provided are greater. This operationalization
in a relative fashion” (Grewal et al. 2011, p. S48)—and each allows us to capture that more and deeper price discounts, espe-
time period when SKU n was on promotion. In line with previ- cially when offered for the household’s favorite items, generate
ous price promotion studies, we identify promotion periods as stronger positive effects (Nijs et al. 2001; Shankar and Bolton
weeks in which the SKU’s unit price is at least one standard devi- 2004). Lagged promotion variables are constructed in a similar
ation below its regular (average) price level (Geyskens, Gielens, way, using a one-period lag.7
and Gijsbrechts 2010; Nijs et al. 2001).6 For the selected SKUs Past promotion frequency variables (Lpromoit,c , Lpromoit,c̄ )
and promotion weeks, we then calculate the percentage price are operationalized as a weighted sum of category promotions
in a specific channel during the past 26 weeks (s = 1, . . ., 26),
given that household i visited the channel and was exposed
5 This time-invariant variable captures category-specificchain loyalty and indi- to these promotions (Vstit,c = 1). Because we want to capture
cates whether household i spends a larger share of category purchases at the the overall effect of past promotion exposure in the category
focal chain Tesco. It is not to be confused with the time-specific channel loyalty (e.g. Foekens, Leeflang, and Wittink 1999; Kopalle, Mela, and
variable (loyalit,c ) which reflects a household’s loyalty to the online or offline
Marsh 1999), we take all SKU promotions in the category into
channel of the focal chain, at a specific point in time.
6 We used the entire estimation period to determine the regular (average) price account
N (i.e. no weighting with household-specific preferences;
and its standard deviation. For milk, there was a significant (category-wide) price n=1 PctDisct n,t−s,c ). In line with previous research, we use
increase in week 62 (week 36 of the estimation period) in the online and offline the decay factor λ to control for recency and frequency effects.
channels. Therefore, we calculated an average price for the period before and an The resulting past promotion frequency variable is greater when
average price for the period after the price increase. To verify our classification
of (no) promotion SKUs/weeks, we conducted robustness checks using different
operationalizations of the average price level (e.g. based on a moving window)
and different cut-offs (e.g. two standard deviations). Our classification remained 7 Note that the one-period lag, t − 1, refers to the previous shopping trip rather

robust. than the previous time period (week).


E. Breugelmans, K. Campo / Journal of Retailing 92 (3, 2016) 333–351 341

Table 4
Marketing mix, descriptive statistics.
Milk Cereals

Offline Online Offline Online

Number of SKUs in the assortment 79 23 187 42


Average paid price (in £)a .75 (s.e.: .26) .61 (s.e.: .13) 3.38 (s.e.: 1.61) 3.25 (s.e.: 1.56)
Average number of SKUs on promotion/weekb 10.17 (s.e.: 12.03) 2.56 (s.e.: 3.28) 25.12 (s.e.: 15.60) 5.15 (s.e.: 4.25)
Average percentage price discountb 13.84% (s.e.: .0476) 17.50% (s.e.: .0774) 22.38% (s.e.: .0514) 27.64% (s.e.: .0825)
Percentage promotion overlapc 11.59% 46.21% 10.85% 52.81%
a Expressed in standardized units: liters for milk, kilograms for cereals. Note that these are paid prices and therefore include the effect of promotional price

reductions.
b These variables are not weighted with household-specific preference shares.
c The percentage of SKUs that are simultaneously promoted in both channels, relative to the total number of promotions in the channel.

a household has more frequently and recently been exposed to Estimation Results
category promotions.

26 We first discuss the estimation results of the homogeneous
 N
 model. The results for milk and cereals are very similar, and we
Lpromoit,c = λs ∗ PctDisctn,t−s,c ∗ Vstit,c . (9) therefore discuss the results for both categories simultaneously,
s=1 n=1 citing category-specific outcomes only if we observe signifi-
Table 4 provides descriptive statistics of some marketing cant differences. We obtain significant and expected effects for
mix variables. As is often observed for online grocery stores, the control variables—consumption rate and inventory—on pur-
the online assortment is a subset of the offline assortment and chase incidence and quantity. The online correction parameter,
substantially smaller than the offline assortment for both milk as expected, exerts a significant positive effect on the incidence
and cereals (Cheng 2010). The offline channel outperforms the and quantity decisions of multi-channel shoppers (α1 = .640 and
online channel in terms of the average number of SKUs on pro- β1 = .239 for milk; α1 = .817 and β1 = .098 for cereals). This
motion, but promotional advantages tend to be greater in the finding confirms results from previous studies, in that multi-
online channel. For both categories, promotions overlap to some channel shoppers tend to order larger baskets online, with a
extent across channels: About 50 percent of SKUs promoted in higher purchase probability for regularly bought categories.
a particular week in the online channel are also on promotion in The channel-specific category loyalty variables also have the
the offline channel. Hence, for some products there is a common expected positive effect on purchase incidence (α5,1 = 1.015
base for the promotional calendar of both channels (possibly in and α5,2 = .962 for milk; α5,1 = .407 and α5,2 = .659 for
response to manufacturers’ trade promotions), yet the two chan- cereals).
nels also retain significant independence and responsibility for Focusing on multi-channel shoppers, we observe signifi-
day-to-day operations, such as promotion plans. cant, expected, positive own-channel contemporaneous effects
of online and offline promotions on purchase incidence and
quantity (μ10,1 /δ10,1 > 0 and μ10,2 /δ10,2 > 0), except for the con-
Empirical Analysis: Results temporaneous effect of offline promotions on offline purchase
incidence for milk (μ10,2 not significant). Most cross-channel
We estimate the previously described model for each category contemporaneous promotion effects point to channel canni-
separately, as well as for a varying number of latent classes for balization, in that the effects are significant and negative
the multi-channel shoppers. For both categories, the Bayesian (μ2,1 /δ2,1 < 0 and μ2,2 /δ2,2 < 0), with the exception of the cross-
Information Criterion (BIC) reaches a minimum only with a channel offline promotion effects on online purchase incidence
large number of multi-channel latent classes (11 for milk, 5 for decisions for milk (μ2,2 not significant) and on online purchase
cereals), and with negligible improvements in fit thereafter. In quantity decisions for cereals (δ2,2 not significant). Own- and
such cases, it is suggested to use an elbow plot to explore the cross-channel lagged promotion effects (ϕ1,1 , ϕ1,2 , ϕ2,1 , ϕ2,2
diminishing gains in model fit (Masyn 2013; Petras and Masyn and γ 1,1 , γ 1,2 , γ 2,1 , γ 2,2 ) are not significant in most cases.
2010). BIC plots reveal a clear elbow at three segments for both When significant (mostly for milk), they are positive, in con-
milk and cereals, with an improvement in the BIC of only .74 trast with our expectations, but in accordance with preference
percent for milk and .71 percent for cereals when moving from reinforcement effects observed in previous studies (see e.g.
three to four multi-channel latent classes. Tables 5 and 6 contain Guyt and Gijsbrechts 2014). We performed alternative tests
the estimation results for the homogeneous and heterogeneous of these lagged promotion effects and obtained largely the
models for milk and cereals, respectively. In addition to the same results (see the “Robustness Checks” section). Finally,
three multi-channel latent classes, there is one fixed class for we find significant, negative own-channel promotion frequency
single-channel offline shoppers in the milk category and two effects on both purchase incidence and quantity for cereals
fixed classes for single-channel shoppers (one for offline-only (μ11,1 /δ11,1 < 0 and μ11,2 /δ11,2 < 0) and on purchase quantity for
and one for online-only shoppers) in the cereals category. milk (δ11,1 and δ11,2 < 0; μ11,1 not significant; μ11,2 significant
342 E. Breugelmans, K. Campo / Journal of Retailing 92 (3, 2016) 333–351

Table 5
Estimation results, milk.a
Homogeneous Model Heterogeneous Model

Offline-only Multi-channel Offline-only Multi-channel Multi-channel Multi-channel


(S1) (S2) (S3)

Category purchase
incidence decision
Intercept Online (α1 ) NR .640** NR .561** .729** .234**
Intercept Online (␣1 ) NR .640** NR .561** .729** .234**
Log cons. rate (α2 ) .336** . 345**
Inventory, MC (α3 ) −.090** −.087**
Log inventory (α4 ) .026** .024**
Loyalty Online (α5,1 ) NR 1.015** NR .933** 1.031** 1.232**
Loyalty Offline (α5,2 ) NR .962** NR .757** .986** .799**
Own-channel Online → Online (μ10,1 ) NR 2.307* NR .857 .952 2.692
contemporaneous
Offline → Offline −.130 .384 −.138 −.649 2.285 −2.748*
(μ10,2 )
Lagged Online → Online (ϕ1,1 ) NR .549 NR .354 −.406 .545
Offline → Offline (ϕ1,2 ) 3.192** 1.277** 3.192** −.461 .301 1.414*
Frequency Online → Online (μ11,1 ) NR −.315 NR .010 .317 −.725
Offline → Offline .217** .095* −.218** .024 −.093 .268**
(μ11,2 )
Cross-channel Online → Offline (μ2,1 ) NR −7.829** NR −9.772** -8.066** −8.271**
contemporaneous Offline → Online (μ2,2 ) NR −2.436 NR −4.337* 9.120** −7.073*
Lagged Online → Offline (ϕ2,1 ) NR .769** NR .532 .994 −.553
Offline → Online (ϕ2,2 ) NR .024 NR −1.235 5.122* −2.696
Frequency Online → Offline NR .342 NR .499 .717 .165
(μ12,1 )
Offline → Online NR −.086 NR −.049 −.172 −.038
(μ12,2 )

Category quantity decision


Intercept Offline (β0 ) .588** .654** .572** 1.019** .292** .523**
Intercept Online (β1 ) NR .239** NR .215** .427** .111**
Log cons. rate (β2 ) .607** .617**
Inventory, MC (β3 ) −.055** −.048**
Log inventory (β4 ) .032** .028**
Own-channel Online → Online (δ10,1 ) NR 1.892** NR 1.521** 1.652 .642
contemporaneous Offline → Offline (δ10,2 ) 2.762** 2.715** 2.750** 1.077* 2.832** 1.364**
Lagged Online → Online (␥1,1 ) NR .012 NR −.312 1.013 −.028
Offline → Offline (␥1,2 ) 1.033** .556** 1.035** −.346 −.093 .521*
Frequency Online → Online (δ11,1 ) NR −.415** NR −.379** −.182 −.203
Offline → Offline (δ11,2 ) −.106** −.111** −.105** −.080** −.065 −.050
Cross-channel Online → Offline (δ2,1 ) NR −2.886** NR −5.151** 2.076 −2.087**
contemporaneous Offline → Online (δ2,2 ) NR −1.939** NR −1.805* −.710 −.970
Lagged Online → Offline (␥2,1 ) NR .352** NR −.006** 1.186** −.029
Offline → Online (␥2,2 ) NR .650* NR .192 .123 .655
Frequency Online → Offline (δ12,1 ) NR −.010 NR −.002 .007 .148
Offline → Online (δ12,2 ) NR −.147** NR −.137** −.122 .062
Variance .302** .284**

Segment membership Intercept .938** −.938** 2.523** −2.564** 1.493** −1.453**


Category-specific chain −.465** .465** −.843** 2.701** −3.422** 1.564**
loyalty
a NR = not relevant.
* Significant at 5% level.
** Significant at 1% level.

but positive). We also observe significant and negative promo- milk, offline promotion frequency negatively influences online
tion frequency effects across channels, but only for two purchase purchase quantity (δ12,2 < 0).
quantity effects. For cereals, online promotion frequency neg- Turning to single-channel shoppers, their promotion reac-
atively influences offline purchase quantity (δ12,1 < 0), and for tions are highly similar to the average (homogeneous) promotion
Table 6
Estimation results, cereals.a
Homogeneous model Heterogeneous model
Offline-only Online-only Multi-channel Offline-only Online-only Multi-channel (S1) Multi-channel (S2) Multi-channel (S3)
Category purchase incidence decision
Intercept Offline (α0 ) .466** NR −.105** .469** NR .251** .404** −.587**
Intercept Online (α1 ) NR 1.142** .817** NR 1.144** .642** .522** .827**
Log cons. rate (α2 ) .444** .449**
Inventory, MC (α3 ) −.196** −.197**
Log inventory (α4 ) .036** .032**
Loyalty Online (α5,1 ) NR NR .407** NR NR .536** .408** .518**
Loyalty Offline (α5,2 ) NR NR .659** NR NR .376** .539** .669**
Own-channel Online → Online (μ10,1 ) NR 1.217 2.393** NR 1.225 10.025** .962 −.240
Offline → Offline (μ10,2 ) .694** 1.438** .668** 2.042**

E. Breugelmans, K. Campo / Journal of Retailing 92 (3, 2016) 333–351


contemporaneous NR NR .508 1.067
Lagged Online → Online (ϕ1,1 ) NR .444 .532 NR .456 1.048 −.420 1.050
Offline → Offline (ϕ1,2 ) .475** NR .047 .472** NR .335 .170 −.582
Frequency Online → Online (μ11,1 ) NR −1.656 −4.652** NR −1.639 −20.302* −.809 −1.458
Offline → Offline (μ11,2 ) −.510 NR −3.340** −.453 NR −2.100 −4.910** −.923
Cross-channel Online → Offline (μ2,1 ) NR NR −6.484** NR NR −4.973** −9.155** −5.016**
contemporaneous Offline → Online (μ2,2 ) NR NR −1.189* NR NR −1.442 −2.284* 1.192
Lagged Online → Offline (ϕ2,1 ) NR NR .834** NR NR 1.286** −.139 1.030**
Offline → Online (ϕ2,2 ) NR NR .274 NR NR 1.413 .568 −.631
Frequency Online → Offline (μ12,1 ) NR NR 2.183 NR NR −.615 .809 .800
Offline → Online (μ12,2 ) NR NR −2.760 NR NR −20.655** −2.215 3.165
Category quantity decision
Intercept Offline (β0 ) .230** NR .251** .219** NR .527** .102** .120**
Intercept Online (β1 ) NR .328** .098** NR .318** .185** .003 .199**
Log cons. rate (β2 ) .302** .296**
Inventory, MC (β3 ) −.092** −.089**
Log inventory (β4 ) .021** .018**
Own-channel Online → Online (δ10,1 ) NR 2.527** 2.014** NR 2.502** 1.679* 1.118* .547
contemporaneous Offline → Offline (δ10,2 ) 1.805** NR 1.575** 1.769** NR 2.059** .818* .780
Lagged Online → Online (␥1,1 ) NR −.538 .078 NR −.538 .608 −.124 −.073
Offline → Offline (␥1,2 ) −.052 NR −.086 −0.055 NR −.186 −.242 −.478
Frequency Online → Online (δ11,1 ) NR −6.730** −6.424** NR −6.653** −8.351** −2.450* −4.000*
Offline → Offline (δ11,2 ) −4.126** NR −3.389** −4.043** NR −4.680** −1.750* −.268
Cross-channel Online → Offline (δ2,1 ) NR NR −2.092** NR NR −3.998** −1.239 −.681
contemporaneous Offline → Online (δ2,2 ) NR NR −.340 NR NR .891 −.240 −1.492*
Lagged Online → Offline (␥2,1 ) NR NR .178 NR NR .225 .146 −.455
Offline → Online (␥2,2 ) NR NR .122 NR NR −.414 −.152 .965*
Frequency Online → Offline (δ12,1 ) NR NR −3.473** NR NR −6.179** −1.180 −4.112
Offline → Online (δ12,2 ) NR NR −1.144 NR NR 1.300 −1.500 3.430
Variance .335** .323**

Segment Membership Intercept 4.647** −7.823** 3.176** 4.467** −8.197** .112 .056 3.561**
Category-specific chain loyalty −2.966** 5.386** −2.420** −2.444** 6.124** .147 .269 −4.097**
a NR = not relevant.
* Significant at 5% level.
** Significant at 1% level.

343
344 E. Breugelmans, K. Campo / Journal of Retailing 92 (3, 2016) 333–351

Table 7
Segment profile.a
Offline- Online-only Multi-channel Multi-channel Multi-channel Multi-channel
only (S1) (S2) (S3) (average)

Panel A: Milk
Segment size .739 .082 .057 .121
Concomitant variable
Average category-specific chain loyalty .77 .89 .53 .85 .80
Purchase behavior characteristics
Average purchase incidence probability .72 .78 .49 .85 .75
Average purchase quantity 2.85 4.89 1.71 3.20 3.46
Control variables
Average consumption rate 3.05 3.16 3.33 3.27 3.52
Average inventory ratio 1.16 1.28 1.11 1.17 1.15
Average online channel loyalty NR .23 .22 .18 .20
Average offline channel loyalty NR .78 .79 .85 .81
Promotion exposure variables
Average weighted percentage online price discount NR .011 .007 .010 .010
Average weighted percentage offline price discount .007 .009 .005 .008 .007
Average percentage of purchase occasions with visits NR .07 .12 .09 .09
to online and offline channel
Panel B: Cereals
Segment size .725 .004 .076 .094 .101
Concomitant variable
Average category-specific chain loyalty .79 .98 .88 .89 .66 .80
Purchase behavior characteristics
Average purchase incidence probability .40 .68 .50 .59 .27 .44
Average purchase quantity .41 .79 .76 .51 .27 .49
Control variables
Average consumption rate .41 .46 .48 .42 .43 .44
Average inventory ratio 1.14 1.15 1.31 1.22 1.04 1.18
Average online channel loyalty NR NR .22 .25 .26 .25
Average offline channel loyalty NR NR .78 .76 .74 .76
Promotion exposure variables
Average weighted percentage online price discount NR .017 .014 .015 .013 .014
Average weighted percentage offline price discount .021 NR .021 .023 .021 .022
Average percentage of purchase occasions with visits NR NR .07 .08 .11 .09
to online and offline channel
a NR = not relevant.

reactions of multi-channel shoppers. Among offline-only shop- percent for milk segment 2, 66 percent for cereals segment 3).
pers, we find significant and positive contemporaneous effects This share is lower than the 80 percent cut-off used to clas-
of promotions on purchase incidence (cereals) and quantity sify consumers as multiple store shoppers in previous research
(milk and cereals), as well as significant and negative promo- (Gijsbrechts, Campo, and Nisol 2008; Vroegrijk, Gijsbrechts,
tion frequency effects on quantity (milk and cereals). The lagged and Campo 2013). Shoppers in these segments thus represent
promotion effects again are not significant (purchase quantity, multiple-chain shoppers.8 They are further characterized by an
cereals) or else have an unexpected positive sign (purchase inci- above-average percentage of weeks in which they make both an
dence, milk and cereals; purchase quantity, milk). The small online and offline visit (12 percent for milk segment 2, 11 per-
online-only segment for cereals is sensitive to promotions for cent for cereals segment 3) and lower average purchase incidence
purchase quantity decisions, with a significant, positive contem- probability and quantity. In both categories, these segments are
poraneous effect of online promotions and a significant, negative the least sensitive to promotions. Except for offline promotions
online promotion frequency effect. on offline purchase quantity for milk, none of the own-channel
To explore differences in the own- and cross-channel pro- contemporaneous promotion effects is significant for these seg-
motion reactions across multi-channel shoppers, we focus ments. This lack of promotion sensitivity likely arises because
on the estimation results from the heterogeneous models in
Tables 5 and 6. For each category, the three segments exhibit
distinctive promotion reactions patterns. To understand these 8 Although we use category-specific Tescoshares, chain loyalty is largely con-

segment differences, we provide additional profile characteris- sistent across categories. The correlation between the category-specific shares
tics in Table 7. for milk and cereals equals .751. Using the 80 percent cut-off value to clas-
The segment profiles in Table 7 indicate that, for each cat- sify multiple-store shoppers, 87.1 percent of single-store shoppers for milk also
would be classified as single-store shoppers for cereals, and 76.9 percent would
egory, one segment exhibits a below-average Tesco share (53 be classified as multiple-chain shoppers in both categories.
E. Breugelmans, K. Campo / Journal of Retailing 92 (3, 2016) 333–351 345

multiple-chain shoppers visit different stores on a regular basis to (timing and depth) as test scenarios to simulate online and offline
buy each category in the most preferred store (i.e. the one offer- cross-channel promotion effects, because all online SKUs are
ing the best price/quality for that category; Gijsbrechts, Campo, also available offline. We compute the effect of the simulated
and Nisol 2008). Rather than using promotions to reduce their online/offline promotions on expected offline/online category
grocery spending, these shoppers realize savings by patronizing spending for household i (E(PQit,c )) as:
multiple (complementary) stores with different pricing formats
(e.g. traditional supermarkets and hard discounters; Vroegrijk, E(PQit,c ) = P(bit,c = 1) × E(PQit,c |bit,c = 1), (11)
Gijsbrechts, and Campo 2013).
where P(bit,c = 1) is the purchase incidence probability, and
The other two segments in each category show above-average
E(PQit,c |bit,c = 1) is the expected purchase quantity, conditional
Tesco shares (89 percent and 85 percent for milk segments 1
on incidence.
and 3; 88 percent and 89 percent for cereals segments 1 and
We then aggregate households’ expected category spending
2). They mainly differ in their purchase incidence and purchase
in a given channel to derive the expected change in category vol-
quantity patterns. Consumers in milk segment 3 and cereals seg-
ume sales. Because the change in promotion is the same for both
ment 2 buy the categories more frequently, while consumers
channels (denominator in Eq. (10)), we can derive conclusions
in milk segment 1 and cereals segment 1 buy in larger quanti-
about the asymmetry of cross-channel promotion effects from
ties. This is in line with their distinct promotion sensitivities.
the difference in sales change between channels. Table 8, Panel
The latter groups adjust their purchase quantity, rather than
A, contains an overview of the results, which confirm that cross-
timing decisions, in reaction to promotions, and they exhibit
channel contemporaneous promotion effects are asymmetric.
significant, positive own-channel and negative cross-channel
For both milk and cereals, we find that the negative impact of
contemporaneous promotion effects; significant, negative pro-
online promotions on expected offline sales is stronger than the
motion frequency effects, especially in the own channel and for
reverse.
purchase quantity decisions; and no significant lagged promo-
Next, to determine the relative size of own- and cross-channel
tion effects. The former groups are more sensitive to promotions
effects, we use a similar procedure, but focus on all households
in their purchase incidence decision, with substantial negative
(single- and multi-channel shoppers) and all purchase occasions.
cross-channel contemporaneous effects (but no significant cross-
In Table 8, Panel B, we report, for each category, the percentage
channel frequency effects). We therefore describe milk segment
change in category volume sales obtained with the current pro-
3 and cereals segment 2 shoppers as loyal frequent shoppers,
motion pattern, in the online channel (online sales), the offline
whereas milk segment 1 and cereals segment 1 are loyal large
channel (offline sales), and the chain as a whole (total sales). We
basket shoppers.
also provide results for scenarios with online promotions only
(offline promotions set to zero), and with offline promotions only
Simulation Results (online promotions set to zero), to gain insights into how online
and offline promotions drive the overall sales effect. To obtain
To gain better insights into the asymmetry of cross-channel the percentage change in sales, we compare the change in sales
contemporaneous promotion effects, as well as the overall chain- caused by promotions with the baseline sales in the absence of
level effect of alternative multi-channel promotion strategies, we promotions. For both categories, the overall effect of the current
conduct simulations, using the estimated parameters and actual promotion practice on total sales is positive (+2.09 percent for
data set. To investigate the magnitude and direction of asym- milk, +6.21 percent for cereals). An important conclusion there-
metry in cross-channel promotion effects, we compare shifts in fore is that own-channel contemporaneous promotion effects
channel sales caused by online and offline promotions, rather are tempered, but not completely canceled out by (negative)
than computing cross-elasticities (Sivakumar 2004): cross-channel effects. It is further clear that online promotions
|
online sales| |
offline sales| contribute relatively little to the changes in total sales, com-
Asymmetry advantage = − , (10) pared with offline promotions (+.06 percent and +28 percent vs.

offline promo
online promo
+2.04 percent and +5.97 percent, for respectively milk and cere-
where a positive (negative) value suggests asymmetry in the als). This difference can be explained by the higher offline visit
advantage of the offline (online) channel. frequency and the large group of single-channel offline shoppers.
We compute baseline values for the expected online/offline Finally, to gain insights into the different payoffs in sales rev-
category volume sales for the case in which there are no enue from different multi-channel promotion strategies (cf. Wolk
promotions in the category in either channel (Promoit,c = and Ebling’s (2010) discussion of different multi-channel pri-
0 and Promoit,c̄ = 0).9 We use observed online promotions cing strategies), we investigate three scenarios: integration (same
frequency and average percentage price discount for online and
9 We focus on contemporaneous promotion effects and use the estimates of the
offline promotions), differentiation in the average percentage
significant parameters of the homogeneous models (see Tables 5 and 6), as well
price discount (higher for offline or online promotions), and
as the observed values of the control variables and own- and cross-channel cross-
period promotion variables, as given. Previous exposure to promotions therefore
is treated as a household characteristic at a given point in time. In line with the channels within that period. We therefore compute the change in sales caused by
operationalization (Table 3), cross-channel contemporaneous promotion effects cross-channel promotion effects for households that visit both online and offline
are only observed during the promotion period and for households that visit both channels during the promotion period.
346 E. Breugelmans, K. Campo / Journal of Retailing 92 (3, 2016) 333–351

Table 8
Simulation results.
Milk Cereals
Panel A: Asymmetric Cross-Channel Effects
Offline promotions Online promotions Difference Asymmetry advantage Offline promotion Online promotion Difference Asymmetry advantage
|Δonline sales| |Δoffline sales| |Δonline sales| |Δoffline sales|
153.66 477.75 −324.09 ONLINE 13.03 80.21 −67.18 ONLINE
Panel B: Percentage Change in Sales Compared with Baseline Sales (No Promotion) for Current Practice
Total Offline sales generated Total Total sales Online sales Total Offline sales generated Total Total sales
online by offline generated by online by offline
sales Single- Multi- sales Single- Multi- sales Single- Multi- sales
channel channel channel channel channel channel
shoppers shoppers shoppers shoppers shoppers shoppers
Online and offline 2.62% 2.14% 1.84% 2.07% 2.09% 5.33% 7.34% 7.19% 5.83% 7.24% 6.16% 6.21%
promotions
Online promotions 2.99% 0% −0.32% −.07% .06% 5.33% 7.84% 7.66% 0% −.57% −.13% .28%
only
Offline promotions −.33% 2.14% 2.19% 2.15% 2.04% 0% −.40% −.37% 5.83% 7.95% 6.21% 5.97%
only
Panel C: Percentage Change in Sales Compared with Baseline Sales (No Promotion) for Different Scenarios (values in brackets are percentage change in return)
Total Offline sales generated Total Total sales Online sales Total Offline sales generated Total Total sales
online by offline generated by online by offline
sales Single- Multi- sales Single- Multi- sales Single- Multi- sales
channel channel channel channel channel channel
shoppers shoppers shoppers shoppers shoppers shoppers
Integration 2.44% 3.04% 2.67% 2.95% 2.93% 5.33% 7.40% 7.25% 3.51% 4.04% 3.64% 3.83%
(1.11%) (1.70%) (1.36%) (1.61%) (1.59%) (2.74%) (4.63%) (4.50%) (1.84%) (2.21%) (1.93%) (2.06%)
Differentiation in the average percentage price discount
a. Higher for offline 2.41% 3.32% 2.94% 3.23% 3.20% 5.33% 7.37% 7.22% 3.82% 4.45% 3.97% 4.14%
promotion (1.08%) (1.82%) (1.49%) (1.75%) (1.72%) (2.74%) (4.60%) (4.47%) (1.98%) (2.42%) (2.08%) (2.21%)
b. Higher for online 2.69% 3.04% 2.65% 2.95% 2.94% 5.83% 8.14% 7.98% 3.51% 4.01% 3.63% 3.86%
promotions (1.21%) (1.70%) (1.34%) (1.61%) (1.59%) (2.95%) (5.02%) (4.88%) (1.84%) (2.18%) (1.92%) (2.08%)
Differentiation in the promotion frequency
a. More offline 2.21% 4.49% 4.04% 4.39% 4.30% 5.33% 7.32% 7.17% 5.02% 5.80% 5.20% 5.30%
promotions (0.88%) (2.58%) (2.19%) (2.49) (2.43%) (2.74%) (4.55%) (4.42%) (2.74%) (3.33%) (2.85%) (2.94%)
b. More online 3.78% 3.04% 3.09% 3.05% 3.08% 6.68% 9.36% 9.17% 3.51% 3.80% 3.58% 3.87%
promotions (1.88%) (1.70%) (1.73%) (1.70%) (1.71%) (3.53%) (5.97%) (5.80%) (1.84%) (1.96%) (1.87%) (2.08%)

differentiation in the promotion frequency (more offline or more positive effect when the differentiation pertains to offline rather
online promotions). In the first scenario, we use online promo- than online promotions. For both categories, a differentiation in
tions as a source to construct own- and cross-category promotion the promotion frequency dimension prompts a higher percentage
effects (cf. the asymmetry calculations). To determine a viable, increase in sales than a differentiation in the percentage dis-
higher average percentage price discount for the second sce- count depth. The large group of single-channel offline shoppers,
nario, we draw on prior findings (DelVecchio, Krishnan, and higher offline visit frequency, and stronger negative cross-
Smith 2007; Kalwani and Yim 1992) and use 7.5 percent as the channel online promotion effects together drive stronger positive
average discount increase. This results in an average high price effects for offline promotions. The positive percentage changes
discount of 25 percent for milk and 35.14 percent for cereals. in returns show that the increase in sales due to promotions more
For the third scenario, we randomly add promotions (i.e. aver- than compensates for the decrease in profit margin. Similar con-
age weighted price discount) in 10 percent of the cases. Table 8, clusions on the relative performance of alternative promotion
Panel C, offers an overview of the results, including percentage strategies hold for return increases as for sales increases.
changes in volume sales and returns (in brackets). For the lat-
ter, we correct the percentage change in quantity sales by the
expected price discount percentage.10 Robustness Checks
Both differentiation strategies result in higher positive overall
changes in total sales, compared with the integration strat- We conducted several robustness checks to verify the valid-
egy. In addition, the differentiation strategies exert a stronger ity and specification of our model variables and the consistency
of our findings. First, our model specification outperformed
alternative specifications for the baseline purchase tendency,
10 Expected change in returns for household i in channel c on purchase occasion using different indicators for category need (e.g. average spend-
t, due to promotion, can be approximated by the following equation: ing per trip instead of consumption per period) and inventory
E(POit,c |promoit,c ) ∗ [1 − E(WPctDisctit,c )]
effects (e.g. mean-centered lagged spending). Second, our model
− 1, that includes both cross-period promotion variables clearly out-
E(PQit,c |promoit,c )
performed models that included only one of the cross-period
where E(PQit,c |promoit,c ) is the expected purchase quantity (expected purchase effects. Model fit did also not improve for alternative oper-
quantity, conditional on incidence × purchase incidence probability), given ationalizations of the lagged promotion variable, including a
promotions in the category;E(PQit,c |promoit,c ) is the expected purchase quan-
tity without promotions in the category; and E(WPctDisctit,c ) is the expected
double lag specification (promotion in t − 1 and in t − 2) and a
(weighted) average percentage price reduction for household i in channel c at weighted lagged promotion variable defined over the 26 previous
purchase occasion t. periods.
E. Breugelmans, K. Campo / Journal of Retailing 92 (3, 2016) 333–351 347

Third, we tested alternative operationalizations of the promo- Kopalle, Mela, and Marsh 1999). Although online grocery stores
tion variable, including the number of promoted SKUs which typically are visited less frequently (Chu et al. 2010; see Table 2),
gave very similar results; and the absolute (rather than percent- we find evidence of a similar, own-channel online promotion fre-
age) price discount which provided clearly inferior results. We quency effect (support H3). In contrast with our expectations, a
also checked the sensitivity of the weight we used to capture fad- positive effect arises for some lagged promotion variables (no
ing effects for the promotion frequency variables (Eq. (9) and support H2). Past promotions, rather than reducing purchase
Table 3), but the results for decay factors in the .5–.9 range tendencies in the category, reinforce own-channel purchase
were similar. Unweighted promotion variables lead to simi- behavior within the chain. Similar effects have been reported
lar results for the within-channel promotion effects but cause for offline purchases (e.g. Guyt and Gijsbrechts 2014).
estimation problems for cross-channel promotion effects due
to multi-collinearity. Fourth, we estimated our model with a Cross-Channel Contemporaneous Effects
larger sample (i.e. no cut-off for consumption rates, such that the
sample includes very light category users) which provided sub- Our results show that promotions can have negative effects on
stantially inferior results, and a smaller sample (multi-channel purchase decisions in the other channel (support H4). By pre-
shoppers only) which gave very similar results. Consumers who empting category purchases in the other channel (i.e. reduced
shop in one channel are a substantial portion of the population purchase incidence probability and/or reduced quantity in the
in most grocery markets, and retailers care about overall sales other channel), channel differences in promotion attractiveness
and overall promotion lift, so we consider it justified to include can, within the same chain, lead to a shift in category sales from
single-channel shoppers in our estimation. We also tested a one channel to the other. These shifts depend on the extent to
model that allowed for heterogeneity among these shoppers and which promotions increase the relative attractiveness of a cat-
thereby confirmed that the restriction of single-channel latent egory, which is a function of the number of promoted items,
classes to one (or two for cereals) does not affect the reported the discount depth, and consumer preferences for promoted
results.11 Lastly, we found that a linear truncated model pro- SKUs. Our simulations further indicate that price promotions
vided robust results, but the log-normal model provided better are an effective instrument to stimulate category sales in a multi-
model fit. channel grocery shopping context, even though they create a risk
of cannibalization: for both categories, the overall effect of the
Discussion and Managerial Implications current promotion practice on total sales continues to be posi-
tive, both in terms of the percent increase in quantity sold and
The vast growth of multi-channel retailing in recent years the percent increase in return. So, a positive own-channel effect
(Neslin et al. 2006; Neslin and Shankar 2009; Shankar et al. does not get completely canceled out by a negative cross-channel
2011) emphasizes the increasing need for marketing managers effect.
to understand how to manage promotions in complex, multi- We further find that online promotions make relatively small
channel shopping environments. The major objectives of this contributions to the changes in sales (and revenue) compared
research were to examine the cross-channel effects of price with offline promotions. This is the result of the large, dom-
promotions on category purchase decisions in a multi-channel inant single-channel offline shopper segment, and the higher
context; analyze how they affect the chain’s overall results, offline visit frequency present in our sample. Hence, a differen-
taking contemporaneous and cross-period effects into account; tiation strategy that favors offline promotions appears to generate
and investigate the implications for the multi-channel retailer’s a greater chain-level effect. Yet, multi-channel grocery retailers
choice of promotion strategy. should monitor the size and promotion sensitivity of their differ-
ent shopper segments constantly, considering the fast-increasing
Own-Channel Promotion Effects number of multi-channel grocery shoppers.
It is also evident that grocery retailers and researchers
Our results replicate previous findings: price promotions can in this field must take both own- and cross-channel promo-
have positive effects on category purchase decisions, both offline tion effects, and both multi- and single-channel shoppers, into
and online, during the promotion period (support H1). Consis- consideration when assessing the impact of promotions. In a
tent with previous research, we find that a high frequency of multi-channel context, promotion effects will be overestimated
promotions in the offline channel reduces promotion effective- and conclusions will be inaccurate if cannibalization triggered
ness during subsequent visits to the same channel (Foekens, by cross-channel effects is ignored or a channel-by-channel anal-
Leeflang, and Wittink 1999; Kalyanaram and Winer 1995; ysis is used.

Asymmetry of Cross-Channel Effects


11 The results of the model where we allowed for heterogeneity among single-
channel offline shoppers are available on request. Most single-channel offline Cross-channel, contemporaneous promotion effects appear to
shopper segments have significant, positive, contemporaneous promotion effects be asymmetric, that is online category price promotions have a
(especially for the quantity decision), and some also have significant, negative
promotion frequency effects. Similar to our findings for multi-channel shoppers,
stronger impact on offline category purchase decisions than vice
we find no evidence of lagged promotion effects among different single-channel versa (support H5). For the two grocery categories under con-
offline shopper segments. sideration (milk and cereals)—which are frequently purchased,
348 E. Breugelmans, K. Campo / Journal of Retailing 92 (3, 2016) 333–351

low risk categories—online shopping convenience thus consti- Limitations and Further Research
tutes an important advantage and triggers stronger reactions to
online promotions, at the expense of offline sales. Multi-channel Our research has several limitations that also provide inter-
retailers could capitalize on these asymmetric promotion effects esting indications for further research. First, we concentrate on
by adopting a differentiated promotion strategy. However, to price discount promotions and do not distinguish between pro-
assess the profitability of such an approach, channel differences motions initiated by the manufacturer versus the retailer, nor
in operational costs and profit margins also have to be taken into do we have data to differentiate among sales promotion forms
account, information we unfortunately did not have access to. (e.g. price vs. non-price promotions) and communications (e.g.
store flyer vs. in-store promotions). Additional research might
assess the importance of the initiator, the promotion form or its
Cross-Channel Cross-Period Effects communication vehicle. It also would be interesting to extend
our models with a price variable (which we partly capture in
In line with the own-channel lagged promotion effects, the price discount promotion variable) and information about
we find few significant—and a limited number of positive the chain’s delivery time and fee (data that we unfortunately did
impacts—of previous promotions on category purchases in the not have). We also lacked any data about unit cost information
other channel in the post-promotion period (no support H6). (margins) and therefore had to restrict our simulations to sales
We do find that high promotion frequency in one channel can revenue figures.
decrease future promotion sensitivity in the same but also in Second, we investigated cross-channel promotion effects for
the other channel (support H7). Therefore, exposure to a more just two categories. Analyzing a larger set of categories and
extensive online and offline price promotion offer in a multi- explicitly linking cross-channel effects to category character-
channel context might reduce future promotion effectiveness. istics, such as perceived online purchase risk and shopping
This reduction in promotion effectiveness is relatively limited convenience, could provide more specific guidelines for multi-
though, and our results indicate that own-channel promotion fre- channel promotion planning. What is more, we focus on an
quency effects clearly dominate the cross-channel effects. For online grocery shopping context. Replicating the study in other
the examined retail chain, high promotion frequency is thus not multi-channel retail settings would be interesting. Our research
an important disadvantage associated with a differentiated pro- focuses on cross-channel promotion effects at the category level,
motion strategy. Yet, with the growing number of multi-channel which are most relevant for a retailer. It also could be inter-
shoppers, multi-channel retailers should be aware that provid- esting to investigate cross-channel effects at the brand level,
ing more varied and extensive promotions in a differentiated with the notion that manufacturers could face a similar multi-
multi-channel strategy can entail a risk of reduced promotion channel promotion planning problem when selling their brands
effectiveness. through multi-channel retailers. Likewise, it would be inter-
esting to investigate the impact of cross-promotions on traffic
building and channel visits, as well as on cross-category pur-
Heterogeneity in Promotion Reactions chase behavior.
Third, our research focuses on analyzing cross-channel
The promotion effects depend on households’ loyalty to the promotion effectiveness in a multi-channel, single-chain
chain (support H8). We find that multiple-chain shoppers who context. We consider it a promising avenue for additional
buy a substantial amount of their groceries at competitive chains research to investigate cross-channel promotion effectiveness
are less inclined to buy sooner or more at the focal chain in reac- in a multi-channel, multi-chain context, such that researchers
tion to promotions (negligible own-channel contemporaneous explicitly model chain and channel choice decisions and take
promotion effects). Although they are more sensitive to pro- the activities of competitive chains into account.
motions in general, the two loyal segments reveal some clear
differences in their promotion reactions. The strongest (own- and Executive summary
cross-channel) contemporaneous and cross-period (frequency)
promotion effects emerge from the segment that buys less fre- More and more offline grocery chains are catching up with
quently but in larger quantities (without consuming substantially the trend towards multi-channel retailing, where they offer con-
more). These loyal customers appear to align their category pur- sumers the possibility to purchase via an online store. While
chases with actual and expected promotion actions, not only creating interesting opportunities to solidify customer loyalty
within but also across channels. For the retailer, the high pro- through improved service and to reach a larger group of con-
motion sensitivity of these loyal customers points to a risk of sumers, multi-channel retailing also adds to the complexity of
subsidization, in that price promotions lower the profit margins the marketing strategy. This is especially the case for grocery
earned from the customers who already are likely to make their retailers, where most grocery buyers keep visiting the offline
category purchases from the chain. Managers therefore need to store after they start to buy at the chain’s online store. These
be wary of negative cross-channel effects in these segments. multi-channel shoppers are exposed to, and can take advantage
Nevertheless, it is clear that a differentiated promotion strategy of, potentially different marketing offers. They can, for instance,
can pay off, especially if it includes more offline promotions and adjust their purchase decisions to take maximum advantage
the differentiation takes place along the frequency dimension. of different price reductions, leading to cannibalization of the
E. Breugelmans, K. Campo / Journal of Retailing 92 (3, 2016) 333–351 349

chain’s sales in each of the channels. Consequently, when imple- cancelled out by negative cross-channel effects. We further find
menting promotional strategies across channels, multi-channel that these cross-channel, contemporaneous promotion effects
retailers must wary about whether and how promotions in one appear to be asymmetric, that is online category price pro-
channel influence buying behavior of their customers in the other motions have a stronger impact on offline category purchase
channel. decisions than vice versa. While we find few significant—and a
In this paper, we perform a comprehensive analysis and exam- limited number of positive—instances of short term lagged pro-
ine the impact of price promotions on consumers’ category motion effects, we do find that high promotion frequency in one
purchase decisions in a multi-channel grocery retail context, channel can decrease future promotion sensitivity in the same
where consumers visit the offline and online channel of the but also in the other channel. This reduction in promotion effec-
same chain. From previous research, it is clear that price promo- tiveness is relatively limited though, and our results indicate that
tions not only have a direct effect on the consumers’ purchase own-channel promotion frequency effects clearly dominate the
decisions in the same store. Promotion effects can also extend cross-channel effects. Lastly, we find that cross-channel effects
to later periods, and impact purchase behavior in other stores. are more negative for more loyal customers of the chain.
We investigate similar effects in the new multi-channel context, Our results make clear that a differentiated promotion strat-
by takinginto account both within and cross-channel promotion egy can pay off, especially if it includes more offline promotions
effects (i.e. effects on the own and other channel), as well as con- and the differentiation takes place along the frequency dimen-
temporaneous and cross-period promotion effects (i.e. effects sion. It is also evident that grocery retailers and researchers
during and after the promotion period). For cross-period promo- in this field must take both own- and cross-channel promotion
tion effects, we distinguish between short term lagged promotion effects, and both multi- and single-channel shoppers, into con-
effects on subsequent category purchases (a larger stock at home sideration when assessing the impact of price promotions. In a
leading to a reduced tendency to buy the product on the next multi-channel context, promotion effects will be overestimated
shopping trip), and longer term promotion frequency effects on and conclusions will be inaccurate if cannibalization triggered
future promotion effectiveness (very frequent promotions lead- by cross-channel effects is ignored or a channel-by-channel anal-
ing to the expectation that there will be another price promotion ysis is used.
very soon, and that it is worthwhile to delay a category purchase
until the next shopping trip).
Acknowledgments
This study is the first to explicitly examine these multiple
cross-channel promotion effects. We thereby extend the pro-
The authors thank AiMark for providing the data and greatly
motion and multi-channel retailing literature by providing a
appreciate the valuable suggestions by the editor and the anony-
comprehensive analysis of different promotion effects: whether
mous JR reviewers. Special thanks go to Huiying He and Kim
and how promotions in one channel reinforce category sales in
Goeleven for their help. They also thank Koert van Ittersum,
the own channel, cannibalize category sales in the other chan-
Siegfried Dewitte, Vera Blazevic, and Lien Lamey for their
nel, lead to lower category sales in post-promotion periods,
helpful suggestions on previous versions of this article.
and/or reduce promotion effectiveness by making consumers
less responsive to promotions.
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