A.C. No.

2033 May 9, 1990

E. CONRAD and VIRGINIA BEWLEY GEESLIN, complainants,
vs.
ATTY. FELIPE C. NAVARRO, respondent.
A.C. No. 2148 May 9, 1990
ATTY. FRANCISCO ORTIGAS, JR. and ATTY. EULOGIO R. RODRIGUEZ, complainants,
vs.
ATTY. FELIPE C. NAVARRO, respondent.
Quasha, Asperilla, Ancheta, Valmonte, Peña & Marcos for complainants in AC No. 2033.
Felipe C. Navarro for and in his own behalf.

FACTS:

PER CURIAM:

We write this finale to the dispiriting charges filed by complainants Francisco Ortigas, Jr. and Eulogio R. Rodriguez in Administrative
Case No. 2148 and by spouses E. Conrad and Virginia Bewley Geeslin in Administrative Case No. 2033 2 seeking the disbarment of
respondent Atty. Felipe C. Navarro for malpractice and gross misconduct.

In our resolution dated May 5, 1980, issued consequent to the Report and Recommendation of the Office of the Solicitor General
submitted to this Court on April 21, 1980, we ordered the suspension of respondent Navarro from the practice of law during the
pendency of these cases.

The investigative phase was conducted by said office pursuant to our resolutions of February 14, 1975 and September 13, 1976 in
G.R. Nos.

L- 39386 and L-39620-29, entitled "Florentina Nuguid Vda. de Haberer vs. Court of Appeals, et al." With commendable thoroughness
and attention to detail, two reports were submitted which, in order to vividly portray the scope and magnitude of respondent's
operations and how he was able to perpetrate the anomalous transactions complained of, we quote extensively from said reports
which are sustained by the evidence of record.

ISSUE:

The two main issues raised by the Solicitor General in Administrative Case No. 2148 are:

1.Whether or not respondent Navarro sold properties titled in the names of other persons without the consent of the latter; and

2.If in the affirmative, whether or not such acts constitute sufficient grounds for suspension or disbarment.

RULING:

WHEREFORE, as prayed, the order dated June 21, 1971, is set aside. However, the decision dated May 26, 1971, insofar as it denies
the ejectment of the present occupants of the land as stated in the decision stands.

WHEREFORE, respondent Felipe C. Navarro is hereby DISBARRED and his name is ordered STRICKEN from the Roll of Attorneys. Let a
copy of this resolution be furnished to the Bar Confidant and the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and spread on the personal
records of respondent. This resolution is immediately executory.
 WILSON PO CHAM v. ATTY. EDILBERTO PIZARRO

A.C. No. 5499, 16 August 2005

The misconduct of a lawyer, whether in his professional or private capacity, which shows him to be wanting in moral
character, honesty, probity and good demeanor to thus render him unworthy of the privileges which his license and the
law confer upon him, may be sanctioned with disbarment or suspension.

Upon Atty. Edilberto Pizarro’s representations to complainant Wilson Po Cham (Po Cham) that a certain parcel of land being offered
for sale to him was alienable and disposable, Po Cham gave Atty. Pizarro two checks representing the purchase price of the said
property. Po Cham subsequently took possession of the property and installed a barbed wire fence at its front portion. Soon after,
however, a forest guard approached him and informed him that the property could not be fenced for the reason that it was part of
the Bataan National Park. Upon investigation, Po Cham discovered that the property is not an alienable or disposable land susceptible
of private ownership.

Po Cham demanded the return of the purchase price but Atty. Pizarro did not heed to the demand. Po Cham thereafter charged Atty.
Pizarro of violation of his oath as a member of the Bar.

The Supreme Court (SC) referred the case to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for investigation, report and recommendation
or decision. The IBP, in its Report and Recommendation, found Atty. Pizarro to have violated his oath as a member of the Bar. It
recommended his suspension from the practice of law for 3 months, subject to the approval of the members of the Board of
Governors. The case was forwarded to the SC for final action.

ISSUE: Whether or not Atty. Pizarro violated his solemn oath as a lawyer

HELD:

The misconduct of a lawyer, whether in his professional or private capacity, which shows him to be wanting in moral
character, honesty, probity and good demeanor to thus render him unworthy of the privileges which his license and the
law conferupon him, may be sanctioned with disbarment or suspension.

Atty. Pizarro has utterly failed to substantiate his documented claim of having irrevocable rights and interests over the property which
he could have conveyed to Po Cham. Atty. Pizarro must thus be faulted for fraudulently inducing Po Cham to purchase non-existent
―irrevocable rights, interest and participation‖ over an inalienable property.

IN RE: Suspension From The Practice Of Law In The Territory Of Guam Of Atty. Leon G. Maquera
B.M. No. 793
July 30, 2004

Facts:
In a Letter dated August 20, 1996, the District Court of Guam informed this Court of the suspension of Atty. Leon G.
Maquera (Maquera) from the practice of law in Guam. He was suspended from the practice of law in Guam for misconduct, as he
acquired his client's property as payment for his legal services, then sold it and as a consequence obtained an unreasonably high fee
for handling his client's case.
Under Section 27, Rule 138 of the Revised Rules of Court, the disbarment or suspension of a member of the Philippine Bar in a
foreign jurisdiction, where he has also been admitted as an attorney, is also a ground for his disbarment or suspension in this realm,
provided the foreign court's action is by reason of an act or omission constituting deceit, malpractice or other gross misconduct,
grossly immoral conduct, or a violation of the lawyer's oath.
The case was referred by the Court to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for investigation report and
recommendation. In its decision, the Superior Court of Guam stated that Maquera was the counsel of a certain Castro. Benavente
the creditor Castro, obtained a judgement against Castro, thus Castro;s property was to be sold at a public auction in satisfaction of
his obligation to Benavente. However, Castro retains the right of redemption.
In consideration of Maquera’s legal services, Castro entered into an oral agreement with Maquera and assigned his right of
redemption in favor of the latter. On January 8, 1988, Maquera exercised Castro's right of redemption by paying Benavente
US$525.00 in satisfaction of the judgment debt. Thereafter, Maquera had the title to the property transferred in his name.And after,
sold the property to C.S. Chang and C.C. Chang for Three Hundred Twenty Thousand U.S. Dollars (US$320,000.00).
The Guam Bar Ethics Committee filed a Petition in the Superior Court of Guam praying that Maquera be sanctioned for
violations of Rules 1.5 and 1.8(a) of the Model Rules of Professional Conduct (Model Rules) in force in Guam. In its Petition, the
Committee claimed that Maquera obtained an unreasonably high fee for his services. The Committee further alleged that Maquera
himself admitted his failure to comply with the requirement in Rule 1.8 (a) of the Model Rules that a lawyer shall not enter into a
business transaction with a client or knowingly acquire a pecuniary interest adverse to a client unless the transaction and the terms
governing the lawyer's acquisition of such interest are fair and reasonable to the client, and are fully disclosed to, and understood by
the client and reduced in writing.
On the basis of the Decision of the Superior Court of Guam, the IBP concluded that although the said court found Maquera
liable for misconduct, "there is no evidence to establish that Maquera committed a breach of ethics in the Philippines."However, the
IBP still resolved to suspend him indefinitely for his failure to pay his annual dues as a member of the IBP since 1977, which failure is,
in turn, a ground for removal of the name of the delinquent member from the Roll of Attorneys under Section 10, Rule 139-A of the
Revised Rules of Court.

Issue:
Whether or not Maquera, who was suspended from the practice of law in Guam, be suspended as member of the Philippine Bar on
the same ground of his suspension in Guam.
Ruling:
The power of the Court to disbar or suspend a lawyer for acts or omissions committed in a foreign jurisdiction is found in
Section 27, Rule 138 of the Revised Rules of Court, as amended by Supreme Court Resolution dated February 13, 1992, which states:
Section 27. Disbarment or suspension of attorneys by Supreme Court, grounds therefor.—A member of the bar may be disbarred or
suspended from his office as attorney by the Supreme Court for any deceit, malpractice, or other gross misconduct in such
office, grossly immoral conduct, or by reason of his conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude, or for any violation of
the oath which he is required to take before admission to practice, or for a willful disobedience appearing as attorney for a
party to a case without authority to do so. The practice of soliciting cases at law for the purpose of gain, either personally or
through paid agents or brokers, constitutes malpractice.
The disbarment or suspension of a member of the Philippine Bar by a competent court or other disciplinatory agency in a
foreign jurisdiction where he has also been admitted as an attorney is a ground for his disbarment or suspension if the basis
of such action includes any of the acts hereinabove enumerated.
The judgment, resolution or order of the foreign court or disciplinary agency shall be prima facie evidence of the ground for
disbarment or suspension
In the case at bar such transaction made by Maquera falls squarely under Article 1492 in relation to Article 1491, paragraph
5 of the Civil Code of the Philippines. Paragraph 5 of Article 1491 prohibits the lawyer's acquisition by assignment of the client's
property which is the subject of the litigation handled by the lawyer. Under Article 1492, the prohibition extends to sales in legal
redemption. This is founded on public policy because, by virtue of his office, an attorney may easily take advantage of the credulity
and ignorance of his client30 and unduly enrich himself at the expense of his client.
Such acts are violative of a lawyer's sworn duty to act with fidelity toward his clients. They are also violative of the Code of
Professional Responsibility, specifically, Canon 17 which states that "[a] lawyer owes fidelity to the cause of his client and shall be
mindful the trust and confidence reposed in him;" and Rule 1.01 which prohibits lawyers from engaging in unlawful, dishonest,
immoral or deceitful conduct. The requirement of good moral character is not only a condition precedent to admission to the
Philippine Bar but is also a continuing requirement to maintain one's good's standing in the legal profession.
The Court notes that Maquera has not yet been able to adduce evidence on his behalf regarding the charges of unethical
behavior in Guam against him, as it is not certain that he did receive the Notice of Hearing earlier sent by the IBP's Commission on
Bar Discipline. Thus, there is a need to ascertain Maquera's current and correct address in Guam in order that another notice, this
time specifically informing him of the charges against him and requiring him to explain why he should not be suspended or disbarred
on those grounds (through this Resolution), may be sent to him.
Nevertheless, the Court agrees with the IBP that Maquera should be suspended from the practice of law for non-payment of his IBP
membership dues from 1977 up to the present. Under Section 10, Rule 139-A of the Revised Rules of Court, non-payment of
membership dues for six (6) months shall warrant suspension of membership in the IBP, and default in such payment for one year
shall be ground for removal of the name of the delinquent member from the Roll of Attorneys.
A.C. No. 6697 July 25, 2006
ZOILO ANTONIO VELEZ, complainant,
vs. ATTY. LEONARD S. DE VERA, respondent.
Per Curiam:
Statement of the Case:
In a Complaint dated 11 April 2005, complainant Zoilo Antonio Velez moved for the suspension and/or disbarment of
respondent Atty. Leonard de Vera based on the following ground:
Complainant averred that the respondent, in appropriating for his own benefit funds due his client, was found to have
performed an act constituting moral turpitude by the Hearing Referee Bill Dozier, Hearing Department – San Francisco, State Bar of
California in Administrative Case No. 86-0-18429. Complainant alleged that the respondent was then forced to resign or surrender his
license to practice law in the said state in order to evade the recommended three (3) year suspension. Complainant asserted that the
respondent lacks the moral competence necessary to lead the country's most noble profession.
Facts:
An administrative case against Atty. de Vera was filed before the State Bar of California, docketed then as Adm. Case No. 86-
0-18429. It arose from an insurance case Atty. de Vera handled involving Julius Willis, III who figured in an automobile accident in
1986. Atty. de Vera was authorized by the elder Willis (father of Julius who was given authority by the son to control the case because
the latter was then studying in San Diego California) for the release of the funds in settlement of the case. Atty. de Vera received a
check in settlement of the case which he then deposited to his personal account.
Atty. de Vera vehemently insists that the foregoing facts do not prove that he misappropriated his client's funds as the latter's
father (the elder Willis) gave him authority to use the same and that, unfortunately, the hearing officer did not consider this
explanation notwithstanding the fact that the elder Willis testified under oath that he "expected de Vera might use the money for a
few days." By insisting that he was authorized by his client's father and attorney-in-fact to use the funds, Atty. de Vera has impliedly
admitted the use of the Willis funds for his own personal use.
In fact, Atty. de Vera did not deny complainant's allegation in the latter's memorandum that he (de Vera) received
US$12,000.00 intended for his client and that he deposited said amount in his personal account and not in a separate trust account
and that, finally, he spent the amount for personal purposes.
Issue: Whether or not when respondent deposited the funds of his client in his personal account and not in a separate account and
used it in his personal use violates Canon 16?
Ruling: Yes. The relation between attorney and client is highly fiduciary in nature. Being such, it requires utmost good faith, loyalty,
fidelity and disinterestedness on the part of the attorney. Its fiduciary nature is intended for the protection of the client. The Code
of Professional Responsibility mandates every lawyer to hold in trust all money and properties of his client that may come into his
possession. Accordingly, he shall account for all money or property collected or received for or from the client.
In herein case, as it is admitted by Atty. de Vera himself that he used his client's money for personal use, he has unwittingly
sealed his own fate since this admission constitutes more than substantial evidence of malpractice. Consequently, Atty. de Vera now
has the burden of rebutting the evidence which he himself supplied.
In his defense, Atty. de Vera claims that he was duly authorized by the elder Willis to use the funds intended for the latter's
son. Atty. de Vera also points out that he had restituted the full amount of US$12,000.00 even before the filing of the administrative
case against him in the State Bar of California.
Aside from these self-serving statements, however, we cannot find anywhere in the records of this case proof that indeed
Atty. de Vera was duly authorized to use the funds of his client.
Atty. de Vera cannot rely on the statement made by the hearing officer that the elder Willis had indeed testified that he
"expected de Vera might use the money for a few days." As Atty. de Vera had vigorously objected to the admissibility of the document
containing this statement, he is now estopped from relying thereon. Besides, that the elder Willis "expected de Vera might use the
money for a few days" was not so much an acknowledgment of consent to the use by Atty. de Vera of his client's funds as it was an
acceptance of the probability that Atty. de Vera might, indeed, use his client's funds, which by itself did not speak well of the character
of Atty. de Vera or the way such character was perceived. Respondent violated his oath to conduct himself with all good fidelity to his
client.
In the instant case, the act of Atty. de Vera in holding on to his client's money without the latter's acquiescence is conduct
indicative of lack of integrity and propriety. It is clear that Atty. de Vera, by depositing the check in his own account and using the
same for his own benefit is guilty of deceit, malpractice, gross misconduct and unethical behavior. He caused dishonor, not only to
himself but to the noble profession to which he belongs.
Nevertheless, we do not agree with complainant's plea to disbar respondent from the practice of law. Considering the
amount involved here – US$12,000.00, we believe that the penalty of suspension for two (2) years is appropriate.