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Graph Theory-based Ship Power System Expansion
Strategy for Enhanced Resilience
Kexing Lai
The Ohio State University
Columbus, OH 43210
lai.323@osu.edu
Abstract -- The next generation ships are geared toward
electrification more than ever before. In an all-electric ship
(AES), the design and planning of ship power system (SPS) is
critical for survivability against any physical attacks on power
lines. Therefore, enhancement of resilience against malicious
physical attacks is a pressing issue for SPS. This paper proposes
a graph theory-based power line expansion strategy. The
proposed method simultaneously maximizes the algebraic
connectivity and weighted max-flow from generator nodes to
load nodes of the graph representative of the SPS. Further, in
terms of load shedding, the proposed strategy is compared
against the planning strategy aimed at reducing the operational
cost. Several tests are conducted to demonstrate the performance
of proposed strategy on a ship DC power system.
Keywords—graph theory, pareto optimality, power system
planning, resilience, shipbuilding industry.
I. INTRODUCTION
Since the last few years, the naval ship architecture has
been transitioning toward the all-electric ship (AES). In 2013,
the newly launched destroyer, USS Zumwalt DG-1000,
became the US Navy’s first AES. A fully integrated power
system (IPS) is the most distinctive feature, which includes
generating and distributing electrical energy for the entire
ship. Multiple missions can be carried out by the IPS such as
propulsion, battle, and support service [1]. The other two
Zumwalt class destroyers, USS Zumwalt DG-1001 and DG-
1002, with IPS are scheduled to be commissioned in 2018 and
2019 [2]. Besides, the Royal Navy commissioned six Type-45
destroyers with IPS between 2009 and 2013 [3]. Due to the
numerous advantages offered by a direct current (DC)
configuration over the AC configuration, such as higher
efficiency and better dynamic characteristics, the ship power
system (SPS) design is moving toward the DC power
distribution system [4].
Warships are frequently confronted with malicious attacks,
which normally come from torpedoes, mines, or anti-ship
cruise missiles [5]. However, since the SPS plays a critical
role in the AES, the malicious attackers might target them to
cause significant damage to the ship operation. In the recent
decade, the utility grid had faced major attacks that affected
economically and even led to life losses in some cases. For
instance, in 2013, the physical attack on a substation in
Coyote, California caused $15M loss [6]. The recent cyber-
attack on Ukraine power grid caused up to 73 MWh of electric
This work was supported by the Office of Naval Research under Award
N00014-16-1-2753
978-1-5386-1053-4/18/$31.00 © 2018 IEEE
2018-PSEC-0142
Mahesh S. Illindala
The Ohio State University
Columbus, OH 43210
millindala@ieee.org
power deficiency, which is the 95% of their daily electricity
consumption [7]. To mitigate the negative effects caused by
attacks, this paper proposes a graph theory-based method for
power line expansion strategy on SPS. The proposed strategy
aims at reducing load shedding under physical attacks on the
power lines.
The overall objective is to enhance the resilience of SPS by
reducing the load shedding due to physical attacks on power
lines. Prior publications that investigated resilience
enhancement of a SPS can be classified into two categories.
Those in the first category are focused on SPS design,
planning and operation, aimed at providing stronger support to
service restoration from contingencies. For instance, an
energy storage system (ESS) design and planning strategy was
proposed in [8] to hedge against islanding the electrical zones
under fault conditions. In [9], different operation strategies for
SPS considering load curtailments with failed generators were
covered. Reference [10] discussed the effects of the SPS
topology design on its resilience. Alternatively, a graph
theory-based method was developed in [11] for SPS topology
design to meet availability requirements. In the second
publication category on resilience enhancement, the intelligent
operation and reconfigurations are being studied for speeding
up the restoration from contingencies. For instance, in [12], a
multiagent system was adopted for system recovery from
faults on SPS by system reconfiguration. Reference [13]
presented a graph theory-based search algorithm for SPS to
restore from system casualties by saving most of the loads
with least cost. A genetic algorithm was used in [14] to
determine the actions of the switches for recovery considering
both load level and priority. Unlike aforementioned literatures,
this paper aims at enhancing the SPS resilience through the
power line expansion strategy using graph theory.
Graph theory is being widely applied nowadays in power
systems for system service restoration and vulnerability
analysis. The service restoration in a distribution system
comprising microgrids can be accelerated using spanning tree
search [15]. In [16], the shortest path between sources and
faulted point was identified by Dijkstra algorithm. Graph
theory and Choquet Integral were used to quantify the
resilience of distribution system in [17]. Reference [18]
developed a risk-graph for investigating power grid
vulnerability under cascading failures. In [19], a weighted
entropy analysis method was proposed to identify the
vulnerable lines in the power grid with wind power. In this
paper, graph theory is applied for the power system planning
 2018-PSEC-0142 Page 2 of 8

6 MW Gen1
G n
Ge 2 MW Pr
Propulsion
5 MW Gen3
G
Ge
N16
N3 load 1 N7

3.5 MW 3 MW 4 MW 3.5 MW 3.3 MW 3 MW 2 MW

N1 N5 N9 N11 N13
2 MW 3.7 MW
3.7 MW 3 MW 1.5 MW 2.5 MW
3.5 MW
4 MW N18 0.7 MW N19 N20 1 MW N21 0.7 MW N22 N15
0.3 MW
Control Hotel load 1 5 MW
Radar Hotel load 3 Hotel load 2
center
Weapon
4 MW 3.5 MW load
2.5 MW 3.5 MW
3 MW
N2 N6 N10 N12 N14 2 MW
2.1 MW 1.5 MW 2 MW 3.5 MW 3.5 MW 3 MW 4 MW

N17
4 MW G
Gen 4 N4 P
Propulsion N8 6 MW G
Gen 2
2.33 MW load 2

Fig. 1. Schematic of the ship DC zonal electrical distribution system adapted from [4]

to enhance the resilience of a DC SPS against physical attacks, generators, lines, and load demands are indicated in Fig. 1.
which is a critical issue that has been not been adequately Table I tabulates marginal costs of generators.
addressed in published literature. TABLE I. PARAMETERS OF GENERATORS
The major contributions of this paper are further explained Gen. Marginal cost ($/MWh) Gen. Marginal cost
as follows. A model is developed for SPS resilience ($/MWh)
1 40 3 50
enhancement using graph theory to determine power line 2 40 4 60
expansion. Specifically, the proposed model aims at
maximizing graph algebraic connectivity and weighted max- A. Ship Power System Description
flow from generator nodes to load nodes simultaneously. The Fig. 1 depicts the various components of SPS including
Pareto optimality set of such multi-objective optimization generators, loads, buses, and lines. Their characteristic
problem is obtained. Unlike [11], which assumes that lines features and mathematical models are described as following.
and loads are identical, the proposed method considers line The generators are all diesel generators. Their power
capacities and load priorities. Then, the proposed method and outputs are subject to power ratings as shown in (1), where the
the power line expansion method aimed at cost reduction notations, and , represent the power output and
(MCR) are evaluated for load shedding under physical attacks. capacity of the generator i, respectively.
Unlike [10], [20], which considered only the worst-case
scenario of a physical attack, this paper presents a 0≤ ≤ ,∀ (1)
comprehensive analysis on resilience against physical attacks
and illustrates the results as a weighted load shedding under Power flow on the line l is limited by its capacity as shown
various attack scenarios. Finally, the effects of various factors in (2). Besides, power flow on the line l depends on voltages
on the performance are studied. of the origin bus and the end bus as stated in (3) [10]. The
The reminder of the paper is organized as follows. Section notations, , , and stand for power flow, power
II describes the SPS based on a DC zonal electrical capacity, and conductance of the line l. Further, | ( ) and
distribution system topology. A method for cost reduction
| ( ) denote the voltages at the origin and end buses of the
model for power line expansion of SPS is also presented.
Section III presents the proposed method. Numerical studies line l. The line l in constraints (2) and (3) belongs to the set of
are presented in Section IV to demonstrate the advantages of existing power lines L.
proposed method toward resilience enhancement. Finally,
Section V presents the conclusion. − ≤ ≤ ,∀ ∈ (2)
= ∗ |( ) − | ( ) ,∀ ∈ (3)
II. SHIP POWER SYSTEM AND BASELINE POWER LINE
EXPANSION MODEL
The constraint (4) imposes limits on bus voltages, where
Fig. 1 displays the topology of a SPS, which is a DC zonal the notations of , and denote voltage, minimum
electrical distribution system, adapted from [4]. This is used voltage, and maximum voltage of the bus n.
as the test system in this paper. There are 22 buses and 29
lines. Four generators are installed on buses 3, 4, 16, and 17. (4)
Eight loads are installed on buses 7, 8, 15, 18, 19, 20, 21, and ≤ ≤ ,∀
22, which are prioritized from high to low as: weapons, radars,
control center, propulsion, and hotel loads. The capacities of In addition, for each bus the injected power flow is equal to
the exit power flow. The power balance constraint is shown in

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Page 3 of 8 2018-PSEC-0142

(5). The set, denotes the set of generators connected to the N3 N7 N16
N16 N1
N1 l2 l7 N5 l8 l9 l16 l20 l22 N
N13
bus n. The indices o(l) and e(l) represent the origin and end
buses of line l. Load demand level on bus n is denoted by . N9 N11
l26
l3 l12 l14 l18 l24
N18
N 18 N19
N N20 N21 N22 N15
∑ +∑| () −∑| () = ,∀ (5)

B. Power Line Expansion Baseline Method for Cost l1 l15 l19 l25
l4 l13
Reduction (MCR) l27
N6 N10 l17 N12
N N14
The power line expansion method aimed at minimizing the l10 l11
l5 l6
operational cost after adding lines (MCR) is used as baseline N2 l21 l23
for comparison purpose [21]. The corresponding model is N4 N8 N17
N
described as follows: Fig. 2. Graph representation of the ship power system shown in Fig. 1

∑ ∗ (6) B. Overviews of Graph Theory Concepts

, , ,
s.t. = ∗ ∗ −
|( ) | ( )
∑∉
≤
(1) ~ (5)
The objective function, shown in (6), aims at minimizing
the summation of generator fuel costs, which are determined
from the products of marginal costs and power outputs of
generators. The binary variable decides whether the non-
existing line l should be added or not. When is equal to 1,
the corresponding line is added, otherwise, it is not built. The
set L denotes the set of existing lines in the original system.
Equations (7) calculate power flow on the line l, which does
not exist in the original system ( ∉ ). If the non-existing
power line l is not added ( = 0), the power flow through it
will be zero, as imposed by (7). Otherwise, the power flow
calculation method of the newly added line l ( = 1) is the
same as existing lines in the original system. The constraint (8)
presents the budget for power line expansion. Specifically, the
number of added lines is lower than or equal to . The
remaining constraints (1)  (5) were earlier explained in
Section IIA. It should be noted that products of binary
variables and continuous variables in the model make the
problem difficult to solve. Reference [22] presents a
linearization method that is employed to equate the model to a
mixed-integer linear programming (MILP) problem. This is to
accelerate the solving process significantly and obtain the
guaranteed global optimal solution. For brevity, the
linearization method is not explained here.
III. GRAPH THEORY-BASED POWER LINE EXPANSION STRATEGY
In this section, the proposed power line expansion strategy
is developed to enhance the system resiliency against physical
attacks.
A. Graph Visualization of the SPS
The SPS topology shown in Fig. 1 can be visualized as a
graph. A graph G = {V, E} consists of a vertex set V and an
edge set E. The buses in the SPS are represented as vertices
and lines become edges. Fig. 2 shows the graph visualization
of the SPS.
,∀ ∉ (7) Two concepts of graph theory, algebraic connectivity, and
(8) max-flow are applied here for the power line expansion in
SPS.
The algebraic connectivity of the graph G is indicated by
the second-smallest eigenvalue of the Laplacian matrix L;
this is also called as Fiedler eigenvalue in some references, for
example [23].
Laplacian matrix L of graph G is obtained by (9) where the
matrix A and D represent the adjacent matrix and degree
matrix of graph G, respectively. Adjacent matrix A is a binary
matrix, indicating whether there is an edge between two
vertices. When the vertices i and j are connected, the
corresponding elements Ai,j=1, otherwise Ai,j=0, as shown in
(10). Degree matrix D is a diagonal matrix, which shows the
number of edges attached to each vertex. The number of
attached edges to the vertex v is called the degree of the vertex
v. Mathematical definition of degree matrix is given in (11).
= − (9)
1; (10)
=
,
0;
( ); = (11)
, =
0; ℎ
The magnitude of indicates how well the graph is
connected. The higher value of this number, the better
connected of the graph. Therefore, is one of the elements in
the resilience matrix defined in [24].
The max-flow problem is popular in graph theory and
optimization theory. It finds the maximum flow (MFs,t) from
the source vertex s to the sink vertex t. The flow is a mapping
from the source vertex s to the sink vertex t. It is subjected to
two constraints [25]:
(i) The flow of an edge cannot exceed its capacity.
(ii) The sum of flows entering a vertex must equal the
flows exiting the vertex, except for the source and sink
vertices.
C. Proposed Method for Power Line Expansion
The power line expansion strategy is decided by filtering
the potential strategies. By comparing characteristics of the
resultant graphs after applying all potential strategies, the

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strategies that lead to better graph algebraic connectivity and
larger weighted sum of max-flow from the generator nodes to
load nodes are selected. The algebraic connectivity of the
graph after adding new lines is obtained by calculating the
second-smallest eigenvalue of the Laplacian matrix L.
Define the set of gn and ln as nodes with generators and loads,
respectively. The weighted sum of max-flow (WSMF) from
generator nodes to load nodes is calculated by (12) where the
notation wln is the weighting factor for the load node ln.
Weighting factors of load nodes are determined by priorities
start
Sort all the potential power lines
expansion strategies (s1, s2, … sk)
Calculate WSMF and second-smallest eigenvalues of
Laplacian matrix (λ2) after applying ith expansion
strategy (si)
Compare resulting WSMF and λ2 by applying
strategy i (WSMFk and λ2k) with existing solutions in
Pareto optimality set
Is the strategy i (si)
dominated by an alternative
in existing Pareto optimality
set for both objectives?
Y
Y
i=k?
N Section II, has been implemented in General Algebraic
i=i+1
Put si in Pareto
optimality set
N Does the strategy i
dominate any
alternative in existing
Pareto optimality set for
both objectives?
Y Then, all the potential attack scenarios are processed in
Put si in Pareto optimality set, remove the
strategy dominated by si for both objectives
from Pareto optimality set
end
Fig. 3. Flowchart of proposed method
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2018-PSEC-0142 Page 4 of 8
of corresponding loads. The higher the priority of a load node,
the larger is its weighting factor. The notation MFgn,ln denotes
the maximum flow from the generator node (gn) to the load
node (ln).
=∑ ∗∑ , (12)
The maximization of WSMF and second-smallest
eigenvalue of Laplacian matrix are two objectives for the
system resilience enhancement. For multi-objective
optimization, the set of Pareto optimality is desired. Pareto
optimality is to determine if an allocation is optimal. If an
allocation is not optimal, an alternative allocation can improve
at least one objective of the condition while not reducing the
utilities of any other objectives. In other words, a solution is
called Pareto optimality when it is not dominated by another
solution for every objective. The definition of Pareto
optimality is:
The set of allocation X is Pareto optimal iff ∄ X’, such
that every utility function i (ui), ui(X) < ui(X’), ∀i. [26]
Specifically, two objectives are important in this study:
maximizing algebraic connectivity and WSMF. Therefore, the
goal of the proposed strategy is finding the Pareto optimality
set regarding these two objectives. Fig. 3 depicts the flowchart
of proposed algorithm. At first, the value of WSMF and
second-smallest eigenvalue of the Laplacian matrix L of
the resultant graph representatives are obtained after applying
N all potential strategies. Then, the Pareto optimality set is
determined by comparing performance of potential strategies.
The strategy dominated by an alternative for both objectives is
eliminated. The algorithm ends when no potential strategy is
left without comparing.
IV. NUMERICAL STUDIES
This section presents results of numerical studies tested on
the SPS shown in Fig. 1. The model of MCR, as described in
Modelling System (GAMS), which is a high-level modeling
system for mathematical optimization [27]. On the other hand,
the proposed algorithm is implemented in MATLAB. To
begin with, the outcomes of MCR and the proposed method
are obtained and analyzed. After that, both the methods are
compared in terms of load shedding with physical attacks.
Without loss of generality, it is reasonable to assume that
every power line can be attacked. To obtain the weighted load
shedding under various attack scenarios, MATLAB was used
to generate all possible attack scenarios. An attack scenario,
for instance, can be expressed as “l1 and l2 are attacked”.
GAMS to determine values of weighted load shedding for
corresponding attack scenarios. The values of weighted load
shedding are determined by solving an optimization problem
with the objective of minimizing weighted load shedding,
subject to the system constraints given in (1)(5). For brevity,
the model is not presented here; readers can check [10] for
detailed model.
Page 5 of 8 2018-PSEC-0142

A. Expansion Strategies using Different Methods into two lines with each having a capacity of 1 MW. This is
Table II tabulates the power line expansion strategy using because with more lines to be added, there exists a higher
MCR for different added line capacities ( ) and degree of flexibility. For instance, adding a single line with
maximum number of added lines ( ). From the results, it the capacity of 2 MW is equivalent to adding two lines with
can be seen that expansion strategy may change with values of capacities of 1 MW each, but restricted to the same location.
which shows the effects of line capacities on With such a restriction, the capacities of added lines are more
expansion strategy. likely to be not fully used due to the congestion in other parts
As mentioned earlier, in the proposed method two of the system. However, when more edges are added, it is
objectives are being maximized simultaneously, viz., the more likely to explore their capacities by placing them
algebraic connectivity and weighted sum of max-flow from properly. Therefore, it can be concluded that adding lines with
generator nodes to load nodes. Fig. 4, Fig. 5, and Fig. 6 show higher capacities will increase weighted maximum power
the Pareto fronts of both objectives under different capacities flow from generators to loads. Moreover, adding more lines
of added lines for Amax=1, Amax=2, and Amax=3, respectively. It can be even more beneficial since it increases both algebraic
is assumed that weights of loads on bus (N22 N21 N20 N19 connectivity of graph and weighted max-flow from generator
N7 N8 N18 N15) in Fig. 1 are (1 8 1 1 5 5 10 10), respectively. nodes to load nodes.
Results show that, with higher values of , the resultant B. Comparison between the Different Methods
values of WSMF increase, which indicates that maximum TABLE II. RESULTS OF BASELINE MCR METHOD
power flow between generator nodes and load nodes is higher. =1 =2 =3
Comparing Fig. 4, Fig. 5, and Fig. 6, it can be observed that =1 N3-N15 N3-N15/N13-N11 N3-N15/N2-N4/N2-
the second-smallest eigenvalue (λ2) of Laplacian matrix N4
=2 N3-N15 N3-N15/N22-N14 N3-N15/N13-
increases with the value of Amax, which indicates better N15/N13-N15
connectivity. This is because higher edge redundancy leads to =3 N3-N15 N3-N15/N14-N15 N3-N15/N13-
better connected network. In addition, with more lines added, N15/N13-N15
the value of WSMF rises. For instance, comparing Fig. 4 (b) =4 N3-N15 N3-N15/N1-N18 N3-N15/N1-
N18/N1-N18
and Fig. 5 (a), it can be observed that the value of WSMF
increases by splitting a single line with a capacity of 2 MW
λ2
λ2

λ2

λ2

WSMF ((M) WSMF (M)( WSMF (M)

( WSMF (M)
(
((a)) ((b)) (c) (d)
( )
Fig. 4. Pareto Fronts if one line is added (Amax=1) for different capacities of added lines (PFmaxl), (a) PFmaxl = 1MW, (b) PFmaxl = 2MW, (c) PF
max
l = 3MW, (d)
PFmaxl = 4MW
λ2

λ2
λ2

λ2

WSMF (M) WSMF

SMF (M)
(M WSMF (M) WSMF (M)
(
(a) (b) (c) (d)
Fig. 5. Pareto Fronts if two lines are added (Amax=2) for different capacities of added lines (PFmaxl), (a) PFmaxl = 1MW, (b) PFmaxl = 2MW, (c) PFmaxl = 3MW, (d)
PFmaxl = 4MW
λ2
λ2

λ2

λ2

WSMF (M) WSMF (M)

( WSMF (M)
(
(a) WSMF (M)
( )
(b) (c) (d)
Fig. 6. Pareto Fronts if three lines are added (Amax=3) for different capacities of added lines (PFmaxl), (a) PFmaxl = 1MW, (b) PFmaxl = 2MW, (c) PFmaxl = 3MW,
(d) PFmaxl = 4MW

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method, one solution from the Pareto optimality set is selected.

Third quartile Then, the selected solution and the solution shown in Table II
Maximum
are used to get the corresponding values of WLsh for all attack
Median
scenarios.
Outliers
ℎ=∑ ∗ ℎ (13)
Minimum

When two lines are added (Amax=2), distributions of values

First quartile
Fig. 7. Illustration of box plot
To demonstrate the merits of proposed method over MCR
method in terms of enhanced resilience, this subsection
presents comparison of total weighted load shedding (WLsh)
under all attack scenarios, calculated by (13). The notations wn
and Lshn represent weighting factor of load on bus n and
corresponding load shedding. It is assumed that weights of
loads on bus (N22 N21 N20 N19 N7 N8 N18 N15) in Fig. 1
are (1 8 1 1 5 5 10 10), respectively. In this study, box plots
are used to present the distribution of values of WLsh under all
attack scenarios. The box plot, shown in Fig. 7, is a standard
way to illustrate the distribution of groups of data through
quartiles [28]. To compare the proposed method and the MCR
WLsh
of WLsh for various numbers of attacked lines, capacities of
added lines, and expansion methods are shown in Fig. 8
through Fig. 10. By using the proposed method, the values of
WLsh reduce for all casesin terms of median, quartiles,
maximum, and outliers. This demonstrates enhanced
resilience against physical attacks on lines. More attacked
lines would lead to higher values of WLsh, which can be
easily understood as more disabled lines lead to higher load
shedding. Besides, with higher capacity of added lines, the
load shedding under attack can be alleviated. This is because
congestion will be less likely to occur with higher line
capacities.

WLsh

WLsh

Method Method Method

(a) (b) (c)
Fig. 8. Box plots of weighted load shedding under all attack scenarios with 1 line to be attacked for MCR method and proposed method with 2 added lines
max
(A =2), (a) =1MW, (b) =2MW, (c) =3MW
WLsh

WLsh
WLsh

Method Method Method

(a) (b) (c)
Fig. 9. Box plots of weighted load shedding under all attack scenarios with 2 lines to be attacked for MCR method and proposed method with 2 added lines
(Amax=2), (a) =1MW, (b) =2MW, (c) =3MW
WLsh
WLsh

WLsh

Method Method Method

(a) (b) (c)
Fig. 10. Box plots of weighted load shedding under all attack scenarios with 3 lines to be attacked for MCR method and proposed method with 2 added lines
(Amax=2), (a) =1MW, (b) =2MW, (c) =3MW

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Figs. 11 – 13 present the box plots of WLsh for various Furthermore, the two methods are compared in terms of the
numbers of attacked lines, capacities of added lines, and number of attack scenarios that can lead to load shedding.
expansion methods when three lines are added (Amax=3). For Table III shows the results for different maximum numbers of
their effects on values of WLsh, the same conclusions can be attacked lines and expansion methods, assuming two lines are
drawn as the case with two added lines. A comparison added. It is observed that the number of attack scenarios
between two and three added lines highlights that load causing load shedding events in the SPS for the original
shedding is alleviated when more lines are added. Therefore, method is the highest. By contrast, the number of attack
by adding more lines, the resiliency can be enhanced against scenarios causing load shedding events is the lowest with the
physical attacks on lines. proposed method. These results have once again demonstrated
TABLE III. NUMBERS OF ATTACK SCENARIOS CAUSING LOAD the enhanced resilience offered by the proposed power line
SHEDDING expansion method.
1 attacked line (# of attack 2 attacked lines (# of attack
scenarios causing load scenarios causing load
shedding / total # of attack shedding / total # of attack
V. CONCLUSION
scenarios) scenarios) This paper presents a graph theory-based method for
Original 10/27 233/351 power line expansion on a ship power system (SPS) aimed at
system
MCR 6/29 167/406
enhancing resilience against physical attacks on the power
method lines. The proposed method simultaneously maximizes the
Proposed 5/29 138/406 graph algebraic connectivity and weighted max-flow from
method generator nodes to load nodes. This method considers line
capacities and load priorities of a SPS in making power line
expansion decisions.
WLsh

WLsh

WLsh

Method Method Method

(a) (b) (c)
Fig. 11. Box plots of weighted load shedding under all attack scenarios with 1 line to be attacked for MCR method and proposed method with 3 added lines
max
(A =3), (a) =1MW, (b) =2MW, (c) =3MW
WLsh

WLsh
WLsh

Method Method Method

(a) (b) (c)
Fig. 12. Box plots of weighted load shedding under all attack scenarios with 2 lines to be attacked for MCR method and proposed method with 3 added lines
(Amax=3), (a) =1MW, (b) =2MW, (c) =3MW
WLsh
WLsh

WLsh

Method Method Method

(a) (b) (c)
Fig. 13. Box plots of weighted load shedding under all attack scenarios with 3 lines to be attacked for MCR method and proposed method with 3 added lines
(Amax=3), (a) =1MW, (b) =2MW, (c) =3MW

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 2018-PSEC-0142 Page 8 of 8

A comprehensive evaluation was conducted on the SPS [19] R. Fang, R. Shang, Y. Wang, X. Guo, “Identification of Vulnerable
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[22] J. Arroyo, “Bilevel programming applied to power system vulnerability
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