RIGHT TO BE HEARD BY HIMSELF AND COUNSEL positively proved that the trial court failed to inform the accused

e trial court failed to inform the accused of his right

to counsel, it will be presumed that the accused was informed by the court
PEOPLE VS. HOLGADO [85 PHIL 752; G.R.L-2809; 22 MAR 1950] of such right.

Facts: Appellant Frisco Holgado was charged in the court of First Instance
of Romblon with slight illegal detention because according to the
information, being a private person, he did "feloniously and without
justifiable motive, kidnap and detain one Artemia Fabreag in the house of
Antero Holgado for about eight hours thereby depriving said Artemia
Fabreag of her personal liberty. He pleaded guilty (without a counsel) and
said that he was just instructed by Mr. Ocampo, which no evidence was
presented to indict the latter.
Issue: Whether or Not there was any irregularity in the proceedings in the
trial court.
Held: Yes. Rule 112, section 3 of ROC that : “If the defendant appears
without attorney, he must be informed by the court that it is his right to
have attorney being arraigned., and must be asked if he desires the aid of
attorney, the Court must assign attorney de oficio to defend him. A
reasonable time must be allowed for procuring attorney.” This was
violated. Moreso the guarantees of our Constitution that "no person shall
be held to answer for a criminal offense without due process of law", and
that all accused "shall enjoy the right to be heard by himself and counsel."
In criminal cases there can be no fair hearing unless the accused be given
the opportunity to be heard by counsel.
The trial court failed to inquire as to the true import of the qualified plea of
accused. The record does not show whether the supposed instructions of
Mr. Ocampo was real and whether it had reference to the commission of
the offense or to the making of the plea guilty. No investigation was
opened by the court on this matter in the presence of the accused and
there is now no way of determining whether the supposed instruction is a
good defense or may vitiate the voluntariness of the confession.
Apparently the court became satisfied with the fiscal's information that he
had investigated Mr. Ocampo and found that the same had nothing to do
with this case. Such attitude of the court was wrong for the simple reason
that a mere statement of the fiscal was not sufficient to overcome a
qualified plea of the accused. But above all, the court should have seen to
it that the accused be assisted by counsel especially because of the
qualified plea given by him and the seriousness of the offense found to be
capital by the court.
WHEREFORE, appellant is guilty.
Amion v Chiongson 301 SCRA 614 (January 22, 1999)
Facts: This is an administrative matter filed before the court charging the
respondent judge for ignorance of the law and oppression for vehemently
insisting of appointing the accused-appellant counsel de officio despite the
appellant’s opposition because he has his own counsel of choice in the
person of Atty. Depasucat. However, many instances that Atty. Depasucat
did not appear in court which prompted respondent judge to assign Atty.
Lao Ong from the PAO to represent the accused stating on record that his
representation is without prejudice to the appearance of the accused own
counsel. This was done in order to avoid delay of the trial since the
complainant already expressed frustration on the so many postponement
of the hearing.
Issue: Whether or not there is merit of invoking the right to counsel of his
own choice as asserted by the accused in the case at bar.
Held: The court finds the administrative complaint against respondent
judge devoid of merit. An examination of related provisions in the
Constitution concerning the right to counsel, will show that the "preference
in the choice of counsel" pertains more aptly and specifically to a person
under investigation rather than one who is the accused in a criminal
prosecution. Accused-complainant was not, in any way, deprived of his
substantive and constitutional right to due process as he was duly
accorded all the opportunities to be heard and to present evidence to
substantiate his defense but he forfeited this right, for not appearing in
court together with his counsel at the scheduled hearings. It was the
strategic machination of delaying the proceeding by the accused that gave
rise to the need of appointing him counsel de officio by the court as
delaying further the hearing is prejudicial to speedy disposition of a case
and causes delay in the administration of justice.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. EDUARDO AGBAYANI

PER CURIAM:

Facts: Sometime in September of 1993 in Malolos, Bulacan, the accused

was charged by his two daughters, FEDELINA and DODIMA the crime of
rape. The case was, however, provisionally dismissed by said Judge after
the complainants desisted from pursuing the same. Eduardo Agbayani
was thus consequently released from jail. Three (3) days thereafter he
molested again Eden, one of his siblings.

The next day, they go to Bulacan to report the incident to Fiscal Caraeg of
Bulacan, who had, the year before, handled the rape case filed by
Fedelina and Dodima. Fiscal Caraeg of Bulacan reported the complaint to
Judge Danilo Manalastas who reopened the previous provisionally
dismissed case and issued a warrant of arrest against the herein accused.

The trial court convicted the accused. The defense contended that he was
denied of the right to counsel.

Issue: Did the lower court failed to apprise him of his right to have counsel
of his own choice?

Held: No. It is settled that the failure of the record to disclose affirmatively
that the trial judge advised the accused of his right to counsel is not
sufficient ground to reverse conviction. The reason being that the trial
court must be presumed to have complied with the procedure prescribed
by law for the hearing and trial of cases, and that such a presumption can
only be overcome by an affirmative showing to the contrary. Thus it has
been held that unless the contrary appears in the record, or that it is
RIGHT TO BE INFORMED OF THE NATURE AND CAUSE OF
ACCUSATION
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. RONNIE QUITLONG
VITUG, J.:
Facts: Jonathan Capito (19 yr. old student of Med.Tech in Baguio) and
others while on their way home buy fish balls.When Calpito counted the
change for his 100-peso bill, he saw that he had only been handed back
thirty five pesos. Confronted by Calpito, the fishball vendor did not admit
that he had short-changed. Commotions between group of Capito and
group of Fish ball vendors happened. Capito was stabbed and died.
Police officers caught the accused on the act of stabbing Capito. Emelio
Senoto, Salvador Quitlong, and Ronnie Quitlong was charge for murder.
But in the original charge it was not alledge that there was conspiracy.
Issue: Whether or not conspiracy can be considered even if it is not allege
in the original complaint.
Held: Overwhelming, such as it may have been thought of by the trial
court, evidence of conspiracy is not enough for an accused to bear and to
respond to all its grave legal consequences; it is equally essential that
such accused has been apprised when the charge is made conformably
with prevailing substantive and procedural requirements.
No. An information, in order to ensure that the constitutional right of the
accused to be informed of the nature and cause of his accusation is not
violated, must state the name of the accused; the designation given to the
offense by the statute; a statement of the acts or omissions so complained
of as constituting the offense; the name of the offended party; the
approximate time and date of the commission of the offense; and the
place where the offense has been committed.
In embodying the essential elements of the crime charged, the information
must set forth the facts and circumstances that have a bearing on the
culpability and liability of the accused so that the accused can properly
prepare for and undertake his defense. One such fact or circumstance in
a complaint against two or more accused persons is that of conspiracy.
Quite unlike the omission of an ordinary recital of fact which, if not
excepted from or objected to during trial, may be corrected or supplied by
competent proof, an allegation, however, of conspiracy, or one that would
impute criminal liability to an accused for the act of another or others, is
indispensable in order to hold such person, regardless of the nature and
extent of his own participation, equally guilty with the other or others in the
commission of the crime. Where conspiracy exists and can rightly be
appreciated, the individual acts done to perpetrate the felony becomes of
secondary importance, the act of one being imputable to all the others.
[21] Verily, an accused must know from the information whether he faces
a criminal responsibility not only for his acts but also for the acts of his co-
accused as well.
Appellant Ronnie Quitlong was a principal by his own act of stabbing
Calpito that caused the latter's death. Appellants Salvador Quitlong and
Emilio Senoto, Jr., were holding the hands of Calpito at the precise time
that Ronnie Quitlong was in the act of executing his criminal intent.
Simultaneity, however, would not itself demonstrate the concurrence of will
or the unity of action and purpose that could be a basis for collective
responsibility of two or more individuals; indeed, from all indications, the
incident would appear to have occurred at the spur of moment. Appellants
Salvador Quitlong and Emilio Senoto, Jr., shall therefore be held to be
mere accomplices conformably with Article 18 of the Revised Penal Code.
WHEREFORE, appellant Ronnie Quitlong is found guilty of the crime of
murder.
PECHO V PEOPLE 262 SCRA 518 (1996)
Facts: The decision of the Supreme Court for convicting the accused for
the complex crime of attempted estafa thru falsification of official and
commercial document was assailed with the contention of the defense that
the accused may not be convicted of the crime for double jeopardy. The
charge against the accused was on violation of RA 3019 of which he was
acquitted because it only penalizes consummated crime. In the absence of
evidence that shows that the crime was consummated the accused was
acquitted but the court held judgment of prosecuting his conviction for
attempted estafa thru falsification of official and commercial document
which is necessarily included in the crime charged. Accused invokes the
defense of double jeopardy since his acquittal from the charge involving
RA 3019 is a bar for prosecution on the crime of attempted estafa thru
falsification of official and commercial document and that the accused was
not informed of this charge against him in the filing of the information.
Issue: Whether or not the accused was informed of the nature and cause
of the crime to which he is convicted
Held: The court presented the objectives of the right of the accused to be
informed of the nature and cause of the crime he is charged with as
follows:
To furnish the accused with such a description of the charge against him
as will enable him to make his defense;
To avail himself of his conviction or acquittal for protection against a
further prosecution for the same cause;
To inform the court of the facts alleged, so that it may decide whether they
are sufficient in law to support a conviction, if one should be had.
In order that this requirement may be satisfied facts must be stated: not
conclusions of law. The complaint must contain a specific allegation of
every fact and circumstance necessary to constitute the crime. What
determines the real nature and cause of accusation against an accused is
the actual recital of facts stated in the information or complaint and not the
caption or preamble of the information or complaint nor the specification of
the provision of law alleged to have been violated, they being conclusions
of law. It follows then that an accused may be convicted of a crime which
although not the one charged, is necessarily included in the latter. It has
been shown that the information filed in court is considered as charging for
two offenses which the counsel of the accused failed to object therefore he
can be convicted for both or either of the charges.
However by reviewing the case at bar the SC finds lack of sufficient
evidence that would establish the guilt of the accused as conspirator to the
crime of estafa beyond reasonable doubt, the prior decision of the SC was
deemed to be based merely on circumstantial evidence, thus the accused
was acquitted.
SORIANO VS. SANDIGANBAYAN [131 SCRA 184; G.R. NO.L-65952;
31 JUL 1984]
Facts: Tan was accused of qualified theft. The petitioner, who was an
Asst. Fiscal, was assigned to investigate. In the course of the
investigation, petitioner demanded Php.4000 from Tan as price for
dismissing the case. Tan reported it to the NBI which set up an
entrapment. Tan was given a Php.2000, marked bill, and he had supplied
the other half. The entrapment succeeded and an information was filed
with the Sandiganbayan. After trial, the Sandiganbayan rendered a
decision finding the petitioner guilty as a principal in violating the Anti Graft
and Corrupt Practices Act (R.A.3019). A motion for reconsideration was
denied by the Sandiganbayan, hence this instant petition.
Issue: Whether or Not the investigation conducted by the petitioner can be
regarded as contract or transaction within the purview of .RA.3019.
Held: R.A. 3019 Sec.3. Corrupt practices of public officers - In addition to
acts or omissions of public officers already penalized by existing laws, the
following shall constitute corrupt practices of any public officer and are
hereby declared to be unlawful: xxx b. Directly or indirectly requesting or
receiving any gift, present, share percentage or benefit, for himself or for
other person, in connection with any contract or transaction between the
Govt. and any other party wherein the public officer in his official capacity
has to intervene under the law.
The petitioner stated that the facts make out a case of direct bribery under
Art.210 of the RPC and not a violation of R.A. 3019 sec.3 (b). The offense
of direct bribery is not the offense charged and is not included in the
offense charged which is violation of R.A.3019 sec.3 (b).
The respondent claimed that, transaction as used hereof, is not limited to
commercial or business transaction, but includes all kinds of transaction
whether commercial, civil, or administrative in nature.
The court agrees with the petitioner. It is obvious that the investigation
conducted by the petitioner was neither a contract nor transaction. A
transaction like a contract is one which involves some consideration as in
credit transactions. And this element is absent in the investigation
conducted by the petitioner.
Judgment modified. Petitioner is guilty of direct bribery under Art.210 of
the RPC.
BORJA VS. MENDOZA [77 SCRA 422; G.R. NO.L-45667; 20 JUN 1977]
Facts: Borja was accused of slight physical injuries in the City of Cebu.
However, he was not arraigned. That not withstanding, respondent Judge
Senining proceeded with the trial in absentia and rendered a decision
finding petitioner guilty of the crime charged. The case was appealed to
the Court o First Instance in Cebu presided by respondent Judge
Mendoza. It was alleged that the failure to arraign him is a violation of his
constitutional rights. It was also alleged that without any notice to
petitioner and without requiring him to submit his memorandum, a decision
on the appealed case was rendered The Solicitor General commented that
the decision should be annulled because there was no arraignment.
Issue: Whether or Not petitioner’s constitutional right was violated when he
was not arraigned.
Held: Yes. Procedural due process requires that the accused be arraigned
so that he may be informed as to why he was indicted and what penal
offense he has to face, to be convicted only on a showing that his guilt is
shown beyond reasonable doubt with full opportunity to disprove the
evidence against him. It is also not just due process that requires an
arraignment. It is required in the Rules that an accused, for the first time, is
granted the opportunity to know the precise charge that confronts him. It is
imperative that he is thus made fully aware of possible loss of freedom,
even of his life, depending on the nature of the crime imputed to him. At
the very least then, he must be fully informed of why the prosecuting arm
of the state is mobilized against him. Being arraigned is thus a vital aspect
of the constitutional rights guaranteed him. Also, respondent Judge
Senining convicted petitioner notwithstanding the absence of an
arraignment. With the violation of the constitutional right to be heard by
himself and counsel being thus manifest, it is correct that the Solicitor
General agreed with petitioner that the sentence imposed on him should
be set aside for being null. The absence of an arraignment can be invoked
at anytime in view of the requirements of due process to ensure a fair and
impartial trial.
Wherefore, the petition for certiorari is granted. The decision of respondent
Judge Romulo R. Senining dated December 28, 1973, finding the accused
guilty of the crime of slight physical injuries, is nullified and set aside.
Likewise, the decision of respondent Judge Rafael T. Mendoza dated
November 16, 1976, affirming the aforesaid decision of Judge Senining, is
nullified and set aside. The case is remanded to the City Court of Cebu for
the prosecution of the offense of slight physical injuries, with due respect
and observance of the provisions of the Rules of Court, starting with the
arraignment of petitioner.
JUAN PONCE ENRILE V. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, G.R. NO.
213455, 11 AUGUST 2015.
[BRION, J.] The Office of the Ombudsman filed an Information for plunder
against Enrile, Jessica Lucila Reyes, Janet Lim Napoles, Ronald John
Lim, and John Raymund de Asis before the Sandiganbayan.
The Information reads:
xxxx
In 2004 to 2010 or thereabout, in the Philippines, and within this
Honorable Court’s jurisdiction, above-named accused JUAN PONCE
ENRILE, then a Philippine Senator, JESSICA LUCILA G. REYES, then
Chief of Staff of Senator Enrile’s Office, both public officers, committing
the offense in relation to their respective offices, conspiring with one
another and with JANET LIM NAPOLES, RONALD JOHN LIM, and JOHN
RAYMUND DE ASIS, did then and there willfully, unlawfully, and criminally
amass, accumulate, and/or acquire ill-gotten wealth amounting to at least
ONE HUNDRED SEVENTY TWO MILLION EIGHT HUNDRED THIRTY
FOUR THOUSAND FIVE HUNDRED PESOS (Php172,834,500.00)
through a combination or series of overt criminal acts, as follows:
1. by repeatedly receiving from NAPOLES and/or her
representatives LIM, DE ASIS, and others, kickbacks or
commissions under the following circumstances: before, during
and/or after the project identification, NAPOLES gave, and
ENRILE and/or REYES received, a percentage of the cost of a
project to be funded from ENRILE’S Priority Development
Assistance Fund (PDAF), in consideration of ENRILE’S
endorsement, directly or through REYES, to the appropriate
government agencies, of NAPOLES’ non-government
organizations which became the recipients and/or target
implementors of ENRILE’S PDAF projects, which duly-funded
projects turned out to be ghosts or fictitious, thus enabling
NAPOLES to misappropriate the PDAF proceeds for her
personal gain;
2. by taking undue advantage, on several occasions, of their
official positions, authority, relationships, connections, and
influence to unjustly enrich themselves at the expense and to
the damage and prejudice, of the Filipino people and the
Republic of the Philippines.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
Enrile filed a motion for bill of particulars before the Sandiganbayan. On
the same date, he filed a motion for deferment of arraignment since he
was to undergo medical examination at the Philippine General Hospital
(PGH).
The Court denied Enrile’s motion for bill of particulars.
ISSUE: Is a Motion to Quash the proper remedy if the information is vague
or indefinite resulting in the serious violation of Enrile’s constitutional right
to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him?
HELD: NO. When allegations in an Information are vague or indefinite, the
remedy of the accused is not a motion to quash, but a motion for a bill of
particulars.
The purpose of a bill of particulars is to supply vague facts or allegations in
the complaint or information to enable the accused to properly plead and
prepare for trial. It presupposes a valid Information, one that presents all
the elements of the crime charged, albeit under vague terms. Notably, the
specifications that a bill of particulars may supply are only formal
amendments to the complaint or Information. Thus, if the Information is
lacking, a court should take a liberal attitude towards its granting and order
the government to file a bill of particulars elaborating on the charges.
Doubts should be resolved in favor of granting the bill to give full meaning
to the accused’s Constitutionally guaranteed rights.
Notably, the government cannot put the accused in the position of
disclosing certain overt acts through the Information and withholding
others subsequently discovered, all of which it intends to prove at the trial.
This is the type of surprise a bill of particulars is designed to avoid. The
accused is entitled to the observance of all the rules designated to bring
about a fair verdict. This becomes more relevant in the present case
where the crime charged carries with it the severe penalty of capital
punishment and entails the commission of several predicate criminal acts
involving a great number of transactions spread over a considerable
period of time. Notably, conviction for plunder carries with it the penalty of
capital punishment; for this reason, more process is due, not less. When a
person’s life interest – protected by the life, liberty, and property language
recognized in the due process clause – is at stake in the proceeding, all
measures must be taken to ensure the protection of those fundamental
rights.
While both the motion to dismiss the Information and the motion for bill of
particulars involved the right of an accused to due process, the
enumeration of the details desired in Enrile’s supplemental opposition to
issuance of a warrant of arrest and for dismissal of information and in his
motion for bill of particulars are different viewed particularly from the prism
of their respective objectives. In the former, Enrile took the position that
the Information did not state a crime for which he can be convicted; thus,
the Information is void; he alleged a defect of substance. In the latter, he
already impliedly admits that the Information sufficiently alleged a crime
but is unclear and lacking in details that would allow him to properly plead
and prepare his defense; he essentially alleged here a defect of form.
Note that in the former, the purpose is to dismiss the Information for its
failure to state the nature and cause of the accusation against Enrile; while
the details desired in the latter (the motion for bill of particulars) are
required to be specified in sufficient detail because the allegations in the
Information are vague, indefinite, or in the form of conclusions and will not
allow Enrile to adequately prepare his defense unless specifications are
made.That every element constituting the offense had been alleged in the
Information does not preclude the accused from requesting for more
specific details of the various acts or omissions he is alleged to have
committed. The request for details is precisely the function of a bill of
particulars. Hence, while the information may be sufficient for purposes of
stating the cause and the crime an accused is charged, the allegations
may still be inadequate for purposes of enabling him to properly plead and
prepare for trial.
We DIRECT the People of the Philippines to SUBMIT, within a non-
extendible period of fifteen (15) days from finality of this Decision, with
copy furnished to Enrile, a bill of particulars containing the facts sought
that we herein rule to be material and necessary. The bill of particulars
shall specifically contain the following:
1. The particular overt act/s alleged to constitute the “combination
or series of overt criminal acts” charged in the Information.
2. A breakdown of the amounts of the “kickbacks or commissions”
allegedly received, stating how the amount of P172,834,500.00
was arrived at.
3. A brief description of the ‘identified’ projects where kickbacks or
commissions were received.
4. The approximate dates of receipt, “in 2004 to 2010 or
thereabout,” of the alleged kickbacks and commissions from
the identified projects. At the very least, the prosecution should
state the year when the kickbacks and transactions from the
identified projects were received.
5. The name of Napoles’ non-government organizations (NGOs)
which were the alleged “recipients and/or target implementors
of Enrile’s PDAF projects.”
6. The government agencies to whom Enrile allegedly endorsed
Napoles’ NGOs. The particular person/s in each government
agency who facilitated the transactions need not be named as
a particular.
All particulars prayed for that are not included in the above are hereby
denied.
MACAPAGAL-ARROYO V. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES [G.R. NO. 220598,
JULY 19, 2016]
QUICK LINKS:
Full text of the Decision (Bersamin, J.)
Dissenting opinions:
Sereno, C.J.
Leonen, J.
Concurring and dissenting: Perlas-Bernabe, J.
FACTS: Petitioners in this case are former President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo and
former Philippine Charity Sweepstakes Office (PCSO) Budget and Accounts Officer
Benigno Aguas.
The Ombudsman charged in the Sandiganbayan with plunder as defined by, and
penalized under Section 2 of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 7080, as amended by R.A. No.
7659 the following: (1) GMA, (2) Aguas, (3) former PCSO General Manager and Vice
Chairman Rosario C. Uriarte, (4) former PCSO Chairman of the Board of Directors
Sergio O. Valencia, (5) former members of the PCSO Board of Directors, and (6) two
former officials of the Commission on Audit (COA).
The information read:
…[the] accused…all public officers committing the offense in relation to their
respective offices and taking undue advantage of their respective official positions,
authority, relationships, connections or influence, conniving, conspiring and
confederating with one another, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and criminally
amass, accumulate and/or acquire. Directly or indirectly, ill-gotten wealth in the
aggregate amount or total value of THREE HUNDRED SIXTY FIVE MILLION NINE
HUNDRED NINETY SEVEN THOUSAND NINE HUNDRED FIFTEEN PESOS
(PHP365,997,915.00), more or less, through any or a combination or a series of
overt or criminal acts, or similar schemes or means, described as follows:
(a) diverting in several instances, funds from the operating budget of PCSO to its
Confidential/Intelligence Fund that could be accessed and withdrawn at any time with
minimal restrictions, · and converting, misusing, and/or illegally conveying or
transferring the proceeds drawn from said fund in the aforementioned sum, also in
several instances, to themselves, in the guise of fictitious expenditures, for their
personal gain and benefit;
(b) raiding the public treasury by withdrawing and receiving, in several instances, the
above-mentioned amount from the Confidential/Intelligence Fund from PCSO’s
accounts, and or unlawfully transferring or conveying the same into their possession
and control through irregularly issued disbursement vouchers and fictitious
expenditures; and
(c) taking advantage of their respective official positions, authority, relationships,
connections or influence, in several instances, to unjustly enrich themselves in the
aforementioned sum, at the expense of, and the damage and prejudice of the Filipino
people and the Republic of the Philippines.
CONTRARY TO LAW
The Sandiganbayan eventually acquired jurisidiction over most of the accused,
including petitioners. All filed petitions for bail, which the Sandiganbayan granted
except those of the petitioners. Their motions for reconsideration were denied. GMA
assailed the denial of her petition for bail before the Supreme Court. However, this
remains unresolved.
After the Prosecution rested its case, the accused separately filed their demurrers to
evidence asserting that the Prosecution did not establish a case for plunder against
them.
The Sandiganbayan granted the demurrers and dismissed the case against the
accused within its jurisdiction, except for petitioners and Valencia. It held that there
was sufficient evidence showing that they had conspired to commit plunder.
Petitioners filed this case before the Supreme Court on certiorari before the Supreme
Court to assail the denial of their demurrers to evidence, on the ground of grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.
ISSUES:
1.) Procedural Issue: WON the special civil action for certiorari is proper to
assail the denial of the demurrers to evidence – YES.
PROSECUTION: The petition for certiorari of GMA was improper to challenge the
denial of her demurrer to evidence.
HELD: Certiorari is proper since the Sandiganbayan gravely abused its
discretion in denying GMA’s demurrer to evidence.
General rule: The special civil action for certiorari is generally not proper to assail
such an interlocutory order issued by the trial court because of the availability of
another remedy in the ordinary course of law. Moreover, Section 23, Rule 119 of the
Rules of Court expressly provides, “the order denying the motion for leave of court to
file demurrer to evidence or the demurrer itself shall not be reviewable by appeal or
by certiorari before judgment.”
Exception: “In the exercise of our superintending control over other courts, we are to
be guided by all the circumstances of each particular case ‘as the ends of justice may
require.’ So it is that the writ will be granted where necessary to prevent a substantial
wrong or to do substantial” (citing Ong v. People [G.R. No. 140904, October 9,
2000]).
2.) Substantive Issue: WoN the Prosecution sufficiently established the
existence of conspiracy among GMA, Aguas, and Uriarte – NO.
A. As regards petitioner GMA
HELD: The Supreme Court rejected the Sandiganbayan’s declaration in
denying GMA’s demurrer that GMA, Aguas, and Uriate had conspired and
committed plunder. The Prosecution did not sufficiently allege the existence of
a conspiracy among GMA, Aguas and Uriarte.
A perusal of the information (quoted above) suggests that what the Prosecution
sought to show was an implied conspiracy to commit plunder among all of the
accused on the basis of their collective actions prior to, during and after the implied
agreement. It is notable that the Prosecution did not allege that the conspiracy among
all of the accused was by express agreement, or was a wheel conspiracy or a chain
conspiracy. This was another fatal flaw of the Prosecution.
Section 2 of Republic Act No. 7080 (Plunder Law) requires in the criminal
charge for plunder against several individuals that there must be a main
plunderer and her co-conspirators, who may be members of her family, relatives
by affinity or consanguinity, business associates, subordinates or other persons. In
other words, the allegation of the wheel conspiracy or express conspiracy in the
information was appropriate because the main plunderer would then be identified in
either manner. Citing Estrada v. Sandiganbayan, “The gravamen of the conspiracy
charge…is that each of them, by their individual acts, agreed to participate, directly
or indirectly, in the amassing, accumulation and acquisition of ill-gotten wealth of
and/or for former President Estrada.”
Such identification of the main plunderer was not only necessary because the law
required such identification, but also because it was essential in safeguarding the
rights of all of the accused to be properly informed of the charges they were being
made answerable for.
In fine, the Prosecution’s failure to properly allege the main plunderer should
be fatal to the cause against the petitioners for violating the rights of each
accused to be informed of the charges against each of them.
PROSECUTION: GMA, Uriarte and Aguas committed acts showing the existence of
an implied conspiracy among themselves, thereby making all of them the main
plunderers. The sole overt act of GMA to become a part of the conspiracy was her
approval via the marginal note of “OK” of all the requests made by Uriarte for the use
of additional intelligence fund. By approving Uriaiie’s requests in that manner, GMA
violated the following:
a. Letter of Instruction 1282, which required requests for additional confidential and
intelligence funds (CIFs) to be accompanied with detailed, specific project proposals
and specifications; and
b. COA Circular No. 92-385, which allowed the President to approve the release of
additional CIFs only if there was an existing budget to cover the request.
HELD: GMA’s approval of Uriarte’s requests for additional CIFs did not make
her part of any design to raid the public treasury as the means to amass,
accumulate and acquire illgotten wealth. Absent the specific allegation in the
information to that effect, and competent proof thereon, GMA’s approval of
Uriarte’s requests, even if unqualified, could not make her part of any criminal
conspiracy to commit plunder or any other crime considering that her approval
was not by any means irregular or illegal.
a. An examination of Uriarte’s several requests indicates their compliance with LOI
No. 1282. The requests, similarly worded, furnished:
(1) the full details of the specific purposes for which the funds would be spent;
(2) the explanations of the circumstances giving rise to the necessity of the
expenditure; and
(3) the particular aims to be accomplished.
The additional CIFs requested were to be used to protect PCSO’s image and the
integrity of its operations. According to its terms, LOI No. 1282 did not detail any
qualification as to how specific the requests should be made.
b. The funds of the PCSO were comingled into one account as early as 2007.
Consequently, although only 15% of PCSO’s revenues was appropriated to an
operation fund from which the CIF could be sourced, the remaining 85% of PCSO’s
revenues, already co-mingled with the operating fund, could still sustain the additional
requests. In short, there was available budget from which to draw the additional
requests for CIFs.
PROSECUTION: GMA had known that Uriarte would raid the public treasury, and
would misuse the amounts disbursed. This knowledge was imputed to GMA by virtue
of her power of control over PCSO.
HELD: The Prosecution seems to be relying on the doctrine of command
responsibility to impute the actions of subordinate officers to GMA as the
superior officer. The reliance is misplaced, for incriminating GMA under those
terms was legally unacceptable and incomprehensible.
The application of the doctrine of command responsibility is limited, and cannot be
true for all litigations. This case involves neither a probe of GMA’s actions as the
Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, nor of a human rights
issue (compare to Rodriguez v. Macapagal-Arroyo [G.R. No. 191805, November 15,
2011]).
B. As regards Aguas
HELD: Aguas’ certifications and signatures on the disbursement vouchers
were insufficient bases to conclude that he was into any conspiracy to commit
plunder or any other crime. Without GMA’s participation, he could not release any
money because there was then no budget available for the additional CIFs. Whatever
irregularities he might have committed did not amount to plunder, or to any implied
conspiracy to commit plunder.
3.) Substantive Issue: WoN the Prosecution sufficiently established all
the elements of the crime of plunder – NO.
A. WoN there was evidence of amassing, accumulating or acquiring ill-gotten
wealth in the total amount of not less than P50 million – NO.
HELD: The Prosecution adduced no evidence showing that either GMA or
Aguas or even Uriarte, for that matter, had amassed, accumulated or acquired
illgotten wealth of any amount. There was also no evidence, testimonial or
otherwise, presented by the Prosecution showing even the remotest possibility that
the CIFs of the PCSO had been diverted to either GMA or Aguas, or Uriarte.
B. WoN the predicate act of raiding the public treasury alleged in the
information was proved by the Prosecution – NO.
SANDIGANBAYAN: In order to prove the predicate act of raids of the public treasury,
the Prosecution need not establish that the public officer had benefited from such act;
and that what was necessary was proving that the public officer had raided the public
coffers.
HELD: The common thread that binds all the four terms in Section 1(d) of Republic
Act No. 7080 together (misappropriation, conversion, misuse or malversation of
public funds) is that the public officer used the property taken. Pursuant to the
maxim of noscitur a sociis, raids on the public treasury requires the raider to
use the property taken impliedly for his personal benefit.

RIGHT TO SPEEDY IMPARTIAL AND PUBLIC TRIAL
PEOPLE V TEE GR NO. 140546-47 (JANUARY 20, 2003)
"rights of the accused to speedy trial"
Facts: The case involves an automatic review of judgment made against
Tee who was convicted for illegal possession of marijuana and sentenced
to death. The defense assailed the decision of the court for taking
admissible as evidence the marijuana seized from the accused by virtue of
allegedly general search warrant. They further contend that the accused
was deprived of his right to speedy trial by failure of the prosecution to
produce their witness who failed to appear during the 20 hearing dates
thereby slowing down the trial procedure.
Issue: Whether or not the substantive right of the accused for a speedy
trial prejudiced during the hearing of the case.
Held: The court ruled that the substantive right of the accused for a fair
and speedy trial was not violated. It held that the Speedy Trial Act of 1998
provides that the trial period for the criminal cases should be in general
180 days. However, in determining the right of an accused to speedy trial,
courts should do more than a mathematical computation of the number of
postponements of the scheduled hearings of the case.The right to a
speedy trial is deemed violated only when: (1) the proceedings are
attended by vexatious, capricious, and oppressive delays; or (2) when
unjustified postponements are asked for and secured; or (3) when without
cause or justifiable motive a long period of time is allowed to elapse
without the party having his case tried.
It was shown by the records that the prosecution exerted efforts in
obtaining a warrant to compel the witness to testify. The concept of
speedy trial is necessarily relative where several factors are weighed such
as the length of time of delay, the reason of such delay, and conduct of
prosecution and the accused and the prejudice and damaged caused to
the accused of such delay. The court did not find the 20 days of delayed
hearing unreasonable length of time as to constitute deprivation of the
constitutional rights of the accused for a speedy trial in addition to the fact
that court trial may be always subjected to postponement for reasonable
cause of delay. In the absence of showing that the reason for delay was
capricious or oppressive, the State must not be deprived of reasonable
opportunity in prosecuting the accused.
Held: The court referred to previous jurisprudence upholding the
constitutional rights of the accused to a speedy trial. It re-affirmed with
emphasis that such right is more significant than the procedural defects
pointed out by the People of the Philippines that the CA should have been
made party-respondent to the petition. Technicalities should always give
way to the reality of the situation and that in the absence of a valid
decision the stage trial was not completed and the accused should be
accorded with the right to contend that they had not been accorded their
right to be tried as promptly as circumstances permit. Thus the SC finds
merit to dismiss the case against the petitioners.
CONDE VS. RIVERA [45 PHIL 650; G.R. NO. 21741; 25 JAN 1924]
Facts: Aurelia Conde, formerly a municipal midwife in Lucena, Tayabas,
has been forced to respond to no less the five information for various
crimes and misdemeanors, has appeared with her witnesses and counsel
at hearings no less than on eight different occasions only to see the cause
postponed, has twice been required to come to the Supreme Court for
protection, and now, after the passage of more than one year from the
time when the first information was filed, seems as far away from a definite
resolution of her troubles as she was when originally charged.
Issue: Whether or Not petitioner has been denied her right to a speedy
and impartial trial.
Held: Philippine organic and statutory law expressly guarantee that in all
criminal prosecutions the accused shall enjoy the right to have a speedy
trial. Aurelia Conde, like all other accused persons, has a right to a speedy
trial in order that if innocent she may go free, and she has been deprived
of that right in defiance of law. We lay down the legal proposition that,
where a prosecuting officer, without good cause, secures postponements
of the trial of a defendant against his protest beyond a reasonable period
of time, as in this instance for more than a year, the accused is entitled to
relief by a proceeding in mandamus to compel a dismissal of the
information, or if he be restrained of his liberty, by habeas corpus to obtain
his freedom.

FLORES V PEOPLE 61 SCRA 331 (DECEMBER 10, 1974)

"rights of the accused to a speedy trial"

Facts: Petitioners plea for their constitutional rights to a speedy trial by

certiorari where the proceeding of the case for robbery against petitioners
dragged on for over a decade without any final judgment rendered by the
court. Petitioners sought for the dismissal of the case due to inordinate
delay in its disposition. The People in its affirmative defense raised the
facts that the case was not properly captioned, as the People of the Phils.
against whom it is filed was not a tribunal exercising judicial functions and
without the Court of Appeals being made a part to the petition there are
insufficient facts to constitute a cause of action. Moreover it defends that
the CA took all necessary steps to complete the transcript of stenographic
notes of the original trial.

Issue: Whether or not the constitutional rights of the accused to a speedy

trial was violated.
Republic Act No. 8493 February 12, 1998
AN ACT TO ENSURE A SPEEDY TRIAL OF ALL CRIMINAL CASES
BEFORE THE SANDIGANBAYAN, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT,
METROPOLITAN TRIAL COURT, MUNICIPAL TRIAL COURT, AND
MUNICIPAL CIRCUIT TRIAL COURT, APPROPRIATING FUNDS
THEREFOR, AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the Philippines in
Congress assembled::
Section 1. Title. - This Act shall be known as the "Speedy Trial Act of 1998."
Section 2. Mandatory Pre-Trial in Criminal Cases. - In all cases cognizable
by the Municipal Trial Court, Municipal Circuit Trial Court, Metropolitan Trial
Court, Regional Trial Court, and the Sandiganbayan, the justice or judge shall,
after arraignment, order a pre-trial conference to consider the following:
(a) Plea bargaining;
(b) Stipulation of Facts;
(c) Marking for identification of evidence of parties;
(d) Waiver of objections to admissibility of evidence; and
(e) Such other matters as will promote a fair and expeditious trial.
Section 3. Pre-Trial Agreement. - All agreements or admissions made or
entered into during the pre-trial conference shall be reduced to writing and
signed by the accused and counsel, otherwise the same shall not be used in
evidence against the accused. The agreements in relation to matters referred
to in Section 2 hereof is subject to the approval of the court: Provided, That the
agreement on the plea of the accused to a lesser offense may only be revised,
modified, or annulled by the court when the same is contrary to law, public
morals, or public policy.
Section 4. Nonappearance at Pre-Trial Conference. - Where counsel for the
accused or the prosecutor does not appear at the pre-trial conference and
does not offer an acceptable excuse for his/her lack of cooperation, the pre-
trial justice or judge may impose proper sanctions or penalties.
Section 5. Pre-Trial Order. - After the pre-trial conference, the court shall
issue an order reciting the actions taken, the facts stipulated, and evidence
marked. Such order shall bind the parties, limit the trial to matters not disposed
of and control the course of action during the trial, unless modified by the court
to prevent manifest injustice.
Section 6. Time Limit for Trial. - In criminal cases involving persons charged
of a crime, except those subject to the Rules on Summary Procedure, or where
the penalty prescribed by law does not exceed six (6) months imprisonment, or
a fine of One thousand pesos (P1,000.00) or both, irrespective of other
imposable penalties, the justice or judge shall, after consultation with the public
prosecutor and the counsel for the accused, set the case for continuous trial on
a weekly or other short-term trial calendar at the earliest possible time so as to
ensure speedy trial. In no case shall the entire trial period exceed one hundred
eighty (180) days from the first day of trial, except as otherwise authorized by
the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court pursuant to Section 3, Rule 22 of the
Rules of Court.
Section 7. Time Limit Between Filing of Information and Arraignment and
Between Arraignment and Trial. - The arraignment of an accused shall be
held within thirty (30) days from the filing of the information, or from the date
the accused has appeared before the justice, judge or court in which the
charge is pending, whichever date last occurs. Thereafter, where a plea of not
guilty is entered, the accused shall have at least fifteen (15) days to prepare for
trial. Trial shall commence within thirty (30) days from arraignment as fixed by
the court.
If the accused pleads not guilty to the crime charged, he/she shall state
whether he/she interposes a negative or affirmative defense. A negative
defense shall require the prosecution to prove the guilt of the accused beyond
reasonable doubt, while an affirmative defense may modify the order of trial
and require the accused to prove such defense by clear and convincing
evidence.
Section 8. Time Limit Following an Order for New Trial. - If the accused is
to be tried again following an order of a court for a new trial, the trial shall
commence within thirty (30) days from the date the order for a new trial
becomes final, except that the court retrying the case may extend such period
but in any case shall not exceed one hundred eighty (180) days from the date
the order for a new trial becomes final if unavailability of witnesses or other
factors resulting from passage of time shall make trial within thirty (30) days
impractical.
Section 9. Extended Time Limit. - Notwithstanding the provisions of Section
7 of this Act, for the first twelve-calendar-month period following its effectivity,
the time limit with respect to the period from arraignment to trial imposed by
Section 7 of this Act shall be one hundred eighty (180) days. For the second
twelve-month period the time limit shall be one hundred twenty (120) days, and
for the third twelve-month period the time limit with respect to the period from
arraignment to trial shall be eighty (80) days.
Section 10. Exclusions. - The following periods of delay shall be excluded in
computing the time within which trial must commence:
(a) Any period of delay resulting from other proceedings
concerning the accused, including but not limited to the following:
(1) delay resulting from an examination of the accused,
and hearing on his/her mental competency, or physical
incapacity;
(2) delay resulting from trials with respect to charges
against the accused;
(3) delay resulting from interlocutory appeals;
(4) delay resulting from hearings on pre-trial motions:
Provided, That the delay does not exceed thirty (30)
days,
(5) delay resulting from orders of inhibition, or
proceedings relating to change of venue of cases or
transfer from other courts;
(6) delay resulting from a finding of the existence of a
valid prejudicial question; and
(7) delay reasonably attributable to any period, not to
exceed thirty (30) days, during which any proceeding
concerning the accused is actually under advisement.
(b) Any period of delay resulting from the absence or unavailability
of the accused or an essential witness.
For purposes of this subparagraph, an accused or an essential
witness shall be considered absent when his/her whereabouts are
unknown and, in addition, he/she is attempting to avoid
apprehension or prosecution or his/her whereabouts cannot be
determined by due diligence. An accused or an essential witness
shall be considered unavailable whenever his/her whereabouts are
known but his/her presence for trial cannot be obtained by due
diligence or he/she resists appearing at or being returned for trial.
(c) Any period of delay resulting from the fact that the accused is
mentally incompetent or physically unable to stand trial.
(d) If the information is dismissed upon motion of the prosecution
and thereafter a charge is filed against the accused for the same
offense, or any offense required to be joined with that offense, any
period of delay from the date the charge was dismissed to the date
the time limitation would commence to run as to the subsequent
charge had there been no previous charge.
(e) A reasonable period of delay when the accused is joined for
trial with a co-accused over whom the court has not acquired
jurisdiction, or as to whom the time for trial has not run and no
motion for severance has been granted.
(f) Any period of delay resulting from a continuance granted by any
justice or judge motu propio or on motion of the accused or his/her
counsel or at the request of the public prosecutor, if the justice or
judge granted such continuance on the basis of his/her findings
that the ends of justice served by taking such action outweigh the
best interest of the public and the defendant in a speedy trial. No
 such period of delay resulting from a continuance granted by the
court in accordance with this subparagraph shall be excludable
under this section unless the court sets forth, in the record of the
case, either orally or in writing, its reasons for finding that the ends
of justice served by the granting of such continuance outweigh the
best interests of the public and the accused in a speedy trial.
Section 11. Factors for Granting Continuance. - The factors, among others,
which a justice or judge shall consider in determining whether to grant a
continuance under subparagraph (f) of Section 10 of this Act are as follows:
(a) Whether the failure to grant such a continuance in the
proceeding would be likely to make a continuation of such
proceeding impossible, or result in a miscarriage of justice.
(b) Whether the case taken as a whole is so novel, so unusual and
so complex, due to the number of accused or the nature of the
prosecution or otherwise, that it is unreasonable to expect
adequate preparation within the periods of time established by this
Act.
No continuance under subparagraph (f) of Section 10 shall be granted
because of general congestion of the court's calendar, or lack of diligent
preparation or failure to obtain available witnesses on the part of the public
prosecutor.
Section 12. Public Attorney's Duties Where Accused is Imprisoned. - If
the public attorney knows that a person charged of a crime is preventively
detained, either because he/she is charged of a bailable crime and has no
means to post bail, or is charged of a non-bailable crime, or is serving a term
of imprisonment in any penal institution, the public attorney shall promptly:
(a) Undertake to obtain the presence of the prisoner for trial, or
cause a notice to be served on the person having custody of the
prisoner mandating such person to so advise the prisoner of
his/her right to demand trial.
(b) Upon receipt of a notice, the person having custody of the
prisoner shall promptly advise the prisoner of the charge and of
his/her right to demand trial. If at any time thereafter the prisoner
informs the person having custody that he/she demands trial, such
person shall cause notice to that effect to be sent promptly to the
public attorney.
(c) Upon receipt of such notice, the public attorney shall promptly
seek to obtain the presence of the prisoner for trial.
(d) When the person having custody of the prisoner receives from
the public attorney a properly supported request for temporary
custody of the prisoner for trial, the prisoner shall be made
available to that public attorney.
Section 13. Remedy Where Accused is Not Brought to Trial Within the
Time Limit. - If an accused is not brought to trial within the time limit required
by Section 7 of this Act as extended by Section 9, the information shall be
dismissed on motion of the accused. The accused shall have the burden of
proof of supporting such motion but the prosecution shall have the burden of
going forward with the evidence in connection with the exclusion of time under
Section 10 of this Act.
In determining whether to dismiss the case with or without prejudice, the court
shall consider, among other factors, the seriousness of the offense, the facts
and circumstances of the case which led to the dismissal, and the impact of a
reprosecution on the implementation of this Act and on the administration of
justice. Failure of the accused to move for dismissal prior to trial or entry of a
plea of guilty shall constitute a waiver of the right to dismissal under this
section.
Section 14. Sanctions. - In any case in which counsel for the accused, the
public prosecution or public attorney:
(a) knowingly allows the case to be set for trial without disclosing
the fact that a necessary witness would be unavailable for trial;
(b) files a motion solely for the purpose of delay which he/she
knows is totally frivolous and without merit;
(c) makes a statement for the purpose of obtaining continuance
which he/she knows to be false and which is material to the
granting of a continuance; or
(d) otherwise willfully fails to proceed to trial without justification
consistent with the provisions of this Act, the court may, without
prejudice to any appropriate criminal and/or administrative charges
to be instituted by the proper party against the erring counsel if and
when warranted, punish any such counsel or attorney, as follows:
(1) in the case of a counsel privately retained in
connection with the defense of an accused, by
imposing a fine not exceeding; fifty percent (50%) of
the compensation to which he/she is entitled in
connection with his/her defense of the accused;
(2) by imposing on any appointed counsel de officio or
public prosecutor a fine not exceeding Ten thousand
pesos (10,000.00); and
(3) by denying any defense counsel or public
prosecutor the right to practice before the court
considering the case for a period not exceeding thirty
(30) days.
The authority to punish provided for by this section shall be in
addition to any other authority or power available to the court. The
court shall follow the procedures established in the Rules of Court
in punishing any counsel or public prosecutor pursuant to this
section.
Section 15. Rules and Regulations. - The Supreme Court shall promulgate
rules, regulations, administrative orders and circulars which shall seek to
accelerate the disposition of criminal cases. The rules, regulations,
administrative orders and circulars formulated shall provide sanctions against
justices and judges who willfully fail to proceed to trial without justification
consistent with the provisions of this Act.
Section 16. Funding. - For the effective implementation of the rules,
regulations, administrative orders and circulars promulgated under this Act, the
amount of Twenty million pesos (P20,000,000.00) annually shall be
appropriated from the allocation of the Supreme Court under the General
Appropriations Act. Thereafter, such additional amounts as may be necessary
for its continued implementation shall be included in the annual General
Appropriations Act.
Section 17. Act Not a Bar to Speedy Trial Claim Under the Constitution. -
No provision of this Act shall be interpreted as a bar to any claim of denial of
speedy trial as required by Article III, Section 14(2) of the 1987 Constitution.
Section 18. Repealing Clause. - All laws, presidential decrees, executive
orders, rules and regulations or parts thereof inconsistent with the provisions of
this Act are hereby repealed or modified accordingly.
Section 19. Separability Clause. - In case any provision of this Act is
declared unconstitutional, the other provisions shall remain in effect.
Section 20. Effectivity. - This Act shall take effect after fifteen (15) days
following its publication in the Official Gazette or in any newspaper of general
circulation: Provided, That Section 7 of this Act shall become effective after the
expiration of the aforementioned third-calendar-month period provided in
Section 9 of this Act.
Approved: February 12, 1998
MANUEL MATEO v. ONOFRE VILLALUZ, GR Nos. L-34756-59, 1973-03-31
Facts: Petitioners are... among those being tried by respondent Judge for the
offense of robbery in band with homicide.
motion for his disqualification
Rolando Reyes... when called upon to testify as an additional witness for the
prosecution impugned his written declaration stating that it was executed as a
result of a threat by a government agent.
Respondent Judge turned down this plea for disqualification. Hence this
petition, based on the asserted violation of a constitutional right not to be
convicted of an offense without due process of... law.
The facts,... the American Express Bank... was robbed and an American
service-man was killed... four (4) criminal actions were... filed against
petitioners
It appears that the said Rolando Reyes had executed an extra-judicial
statement... h... e Honorable Respondent Judge;... and, in that statement had
implicated petitioners; evidently, the Honorable
Respondent Judge was aware of this... and it was for this reason that he had
deferred ruling on petitioner Ruben Martinez' motions and supplemental
motion to dismiss 'until after the prosecution has presented and rested its
evidence as against Rolando Reyes
Rolando Reyes,... however, was tried separately from and in the absence of
petitioners; so that the proceedings against him did not constitute evidence
against petitioner.
while petitioner Martinez' Motion and Supplemental Motion to Dismiss
remained unresolved, the... prosecution filed a 'Motion to Present Additional
Evidence... respondent
Judge granted the prosecution's 'Motion to Present Additional Evidence' ruling
that 'it is well settled jurisprudence in this jurisdiction and elsewhere that it is
within the sound discretion of the court whether or not to allow the presentation
of additional evidence after the... parties have rested their case... the
prosecution called Rolando Reyes as an additional witness... and in the course
of his testimony, marked an extrajudicial statement purportedly executed by
him on
Rolando Reyes... repudiated it, stated that he had executed it because he had
been threatened by a government agent
As soon as the foregoing facts were made of record in... the case, defendants
[petitioners herein] verbally moved to suspend the proceedings to enable them
to file a motion to disqualify the Honorable Respond-ent Judge... he motion for
suspension was granted:
Issues:
whether the circumstance of a party having subscribed before respondent
Judge... an extra-judicial statement purporting to describe the manner in which
an offense was committed, later on repudiated by him as the product of
intimidation in the course of his having been asked to testify against
petitioners, would suffice to negate that degree of objectivity... the Constitution
requires?
Ruling:
To our mind, respondent judge should inhibit himself since it has become
apparent that his further continuance in Case 4871 would not be in the best
interest... of justice, which he is bound to serve."
The answer must be in the affirmative.
Petitioners are thus entitled to the relief sought. Respondent Judge could not
be totally immune to what apparently was asserted before him in such
extrajudicial statement. Moreover, it is unlikely that he was not... in the slightest
bit offended by the affiant's turnabout with his later declaration that there was
intimidation by a government agent exerted on him. That was hardly flattering
to re-spondent Judge. It is not only that. His sense of fairness under the
circumstances could easily... be blunted. The absence of the requisite due
process element is thus noticeable. There is this circumstance even more
telling. It was he who attested to its due execution on October 1, 1971 wherein
Rolando Reyes admitted his participation in the crime and in addition
implicated... petitioners. At that time, their motion for dismissal of the charges
against them was pending; its resolution was deferred by respondent Judge
until after the prosecution had presented and rested its evidence against
affiant, who was himself indicted and tried for the same... offense, but in a
separate proceeding. It cannot be doubted then that respondent Judge in
effect ruled that such extra-judicial statement was executed freely. With its
repudiation on the ground that it was not so at all, coercion having come into
the picture, there is apparent... the situation of a judge having to pass on a
question that by implication had already been answered by him. Such a fact
became rather obvious. For respondent Judge was called upon to review a
matter on which he had previously given his opinion. It is this inroad in one's...
objectivity that is sought to be avoided by the law on disqualification. The
misgivings then as to the requirement of due process for "the cold neutrality of
an impartial judge" not being met are more than justified. Hence the conclusion
reached by us.
HON. GREGORIO. N. GARCIA, JUDGE OF THE CITY COURT OF MANILA
VS. HON. FELIX DOMINGO, JUDGE OF THE COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE
OF MANILA
FERNANDO, J.:
Facts: In Branch I the City Court of Manila presided over by petitioner Judge,
there were commenced, by appropriate informations eight (8) criminal actions
against respondent Edgardo Calo, and Simeon Carbonnel and Petitioner
Francisco Lorenzana.
The accused wanted for the speedy trial so they requested to held the trial
even on Saturday on the chamber of Judge Gamboa. The petitioner granted
the request.(as police officers under suspension because of the cases,
desired the same to be terminated as soon as possible and as there were
many cases scheduled for trial on the usual criminal trial days (Monday,
Wednesday and Friday).
On appeal the prosecution said that there was no trial, therefore the petioner
judge order should be reversed.
Issue: Whether or not the judge denied the accused of public trial.
Held:Yes. Public trial possesses that character when anyone interested in
observing the manner a judge conducts the proceedings in his courtroom may
do so. There is to be no ban on such attendance. His being a stranger to the
litigants is of no moment. No relationship to the parties need be shown.
There is the well-recognized exception though that warrants the exclusion of
the public where the evidence may be characterized as "offensive to decency
or public morals." 21
WHEREFORE, the writ of certiorari prayed for is granted .
PEOPLE VS. MAPALAO
Facts: Eleven (11) people rode in a Ford Fiera going to Baguio. Namely
they are: Felizardo Galvez, Jimmy Jetwani, Simeon Calama, Rene
Salonga, Eduardo Lopez, Adolfo Quiambao, Aliman Bara-akal, Anwar
HadjiEdris, GumanakOmpa and defendant-appelants in this case, Omar
Magpalao and Rex Magumnang.
After an hour of driving, the car stopped so that one of the passengers
could urinate. While the car was stopped the Bara-akal, Edris, Ompa,
Magpalao and Magumnang pointed guns and knives at the other
passengers and divested them of their properties.
On of the robbers then ordered Galvez to drive the car towards the
precipice (bangin). When the car was near the precipice, Galvez then
stepped to the brakes. The other passengers jumped out of the car and
went to different directions to escape. Galvez however, was left in side the
car and was stabbed by one of the robbers. The robbers then escaped.
Quiambao, who owned the car helped Galvez to get to a hospital. Galvez
died in the hospital. The robbers were then apprehended with the
exception of Edris who remain at large. Mangumnang however escaped
while being in detention and Bara-akal died inside the jail. Since
Mangumnang was not arrested, the trial in absentia continued as to him.
Ompa, Magpalao, and Magumnang were all held guilty as principal by
direct participation of the crime of Robbery with Homicide.
Issue: Whether or Not the lower court erred in failing to applythe
Constitutionalmandate on the presumption of innocence and proof beyond
reasonable doubt when it allowed the trial in absentia to push through on
the part of defendant-appellant Magumnang.
Held: The Court affirmed the decision of the lower court. The reason is
that the lower court has jurisdiction over Magumnang the moment the
latter was in custody. Jurisdiction once acquired is not lost upon the
instance of parties but until the case is terminated. Since all the requisites
of trial in absentia are complete, the court has jurisdiction over
Magumnang.
In addition, Magumnang was presumed innocent during his trial in
absentia. The prosecution had strong evidence against him as proof
beyond reasonable doubt that he is a principal by direct participation in the
crime of Robbery with Homicide. Thus, the Constitutional mandate was
not violated.
PEOPLE VS. VALERIANO AMESTUZO, FEDERICO AMPATIN, ALBINO
BAGAS (ACCUSED- APPELLANT) AND DIASCORO VINAS – GR
104383, JULY 12, 2001
FACTS
This is an appeal from the decision of the Caloocan RTC Branch 131
convicting the accused of the complex crime of robbery with a bad and
double rape.
On February 1991, a group of 8 men entered the house of Perlita
Lacsamana and stole valuables amounting to Php728K. In the course of the
robbery, 2 gang members raped Lacsamana's niece and employee.
Four days after the incident, the police, together with Federico Ampatin,
went to a handicrafts factory in NIA Road, Pasay City to look for a certain
“Mario”. The police ordered the factory workers to lie down and, after some
threats and hitting him on the neck with the butt of a pistol, told Ampatin to
point at anyone (“magturo ka ng kahit sino”). Ampatin, out of fear, pointed
at the first person that he saw, who was the accused-appellant. The police
thereafter brought the accused to the police station to be presented to the
complainants.
At the station, Lacsamana asked the accused-appellant if he knew Vinas
and Amestuzo, but he answered in the negative. Then the police told the
complainants that the accused-appellant was a suspect in the robbery so
the complainants started hitting and kicking the accused-appellant. They
only stopped when the police intervened.
ISSUES
(1) Whether the accused was deprived of the right to counsel from
the time he was arrested to the time he was presented to the
witnesses for identification.
(2) Whether the manner of out-of-court identification was irregular
and, therefore, inadmissible in court.
HELD
(1) NO. The guarantees of sec. 12 (1) of the Bill of Rights or the so-
called Miranda rights of the accused may only be invoked while
he is under custodial investigation. Custodial investigation
begins from the time when the police no longer ask general
questions about the crime, but start focusing on the suspect and
attempt to elicit incriminating questions in the course of the
investigation. The object of the Miranda rights is to ensure that
the accused is protected from possible intimidation or coercion
from law enforcement officers who may force him to admit to a
crime that he did not commit.
The police line-up is not yet included in the custodial
investigation as it is the witnesses who are asked questions during
the line-up. In this regard, the inquiry has not yet shifted from investigatory
to accusatory. Moreover, during the line-up, there was no evidence
that the accused was interrogated by the police, nor were there any
incriminating statements elicited from him.
(2) YES. There is no law prescribing a specific manner of
identification in criminal cases. A police line-up is, therefore, an
acceptable way for the complainants to identify the suspect in a
crime. However, the court also applies the circumstances test
enunciated in the case of People vs. Teehankee, which had the
following factors:
1. the witness's opportunity to view criminal at the time of
the crime
2. the witness's degree of attention at that time
3. the accuracy of any prior description given by the
witness
4. the level of certaintydemonstrated by the witness at the
time of the identification
5. the length of time between the crime and the identification
6. the suggestiveness of the identification process
The Court found that the out-of-court identification in this case
failed the last criterion because of the police's announcement to the
complainants that the accused-appellant was a suspect in the crime. This
was considered improperly suggestive because it was not the
complainants themselves who pointed to or identified the accused-
appellant. There was, therefore, no spontaneity nor objectivity in the
identification.
RE: REQUEST RADIO-TV COVERAGE OF THE TRIAL IN THE
SANDIGANBAYAN OF THE PLUNDER CASES AGAINST THE FORMER
PRESIDENT JOSEPH E. ESTRADA, SECRETARY OF JUSTICE
HERNANDO PEREZ, KAPISANAN NG MGA BRODKASTER NG
PILIPINAS, CESAR SARINO, RENATO CAYETANO and ATTY.
RICARDO ROMULO,petitioners,
vs. JOSEPH E. ESTRADA and INTEGRATED BAR OF THE
PHILIPPINES, oppositors.
Facts: On 13 March 2001, the Kapisanan ng mga Brodkaster ng Pilipinas
(KBP) sent a letter requesting this Court to allow live media coverage of the
anticipated trial of the plunder and other criminal cases filed against former
President Joseph E. Estrada before the Sandiganbayan.The petitioners
invoked other than the freedom of the press, the constitutional right of the
people to be informed of matters of public concern which could only be
recognized, served and satisfied by allowing live radio and television
coverage of the court proceedings. Moreover, the live radio and television
coverage of the proceedings will also serve the dual purpose of ensuring
the desired transparency in the administration of justice.
However, in the Resolution of the Court on October 1991, in a case for libel
filed by then President Corazon C. Aquino read that the Court resolved to
prohibit live radio and television coverage of court proceedings in view of
protecting the parties’ right to due process, to prevent distraction of the
participants in the proceedings and to avoid miscarriage of justice.
Issue: Whether the constitutional guarantees of freedom of the press and
right to information of public concern be given more weight than the
fundamental rights of the accused.
Ruling: The petition is denied.
The courts recognize the constitutionally embodied freedom of the press
and the right to public information. It also approves of media's exalted
power to provide the most accurate and comprehensive means of
conveying the proceedings to the public and in acquainting the public with
the judicial process in action; nevertheless, within the courthouse, the
overriding consideration is still the paramount right of the accused to due
process which must never be allowed to suffer diminution in its
constitutional proportions.
Due process guarantees the accused a presumption of innocence until the
contrary is proved in a trial that is not lifted above its individual settings nor
made an object of public's attention and where the conclusions reached are
induced not by any outside force or influencebut only by evidence and
argument given in open court, where fitting dignity and calm ambiance is
demanded."Television can work profound changes in the behavior of the
people it focuses on."The conscious or unconscious effect that such
coverage may have on the testimony of witnesses and the decision of
judges cannot be evaluated but, it can likewise be said, it is not at all unlikely
for a vote of guilt or innocence to yield to it.
Although an accused has a right to a public trial but it is a right that belongs
to him, more than anyone else, where his life or liberty can be held critically
in balance. A public trial aims to ensure that he is fairly dealt with and would
not be unjustly condemned and that his rights are not compromised. A
public trial is not synonymous with publicized trial; it only implies that the
court doors must be open to those who wish to come, sit in the available
seats, conduct themselves with decorum and observe the trial process. In
the constitutional sense, a courtroom should have enough facilities for a
reasonable number of the public to observe the proceedings, not too small
as to render the openness negligible and not too large as to distract the trial
participants from their proper functions, who shall then be totally free to
report what they have observed during the proceedings.
[A.M. No. 10-11-5-SC, June 14 : 2011] RE: PETITION FOR RADIO AND
TELEVISION COVERAGE OF THE MULTIPLE MURDER CASES
AGAINST MAGUINDANAO GOVERNOR ZALDY AMPATUAN, ET AL.,
[A.M. No. 10-11-6-SC ]
Facts: On November 23, 2009, 57 people including 32 journalists and
media practitioners were killed while on their way to Shariff Aguak in
Maguindanao. Touted as the worst election-related violence and the most
brutal killing of journalists in recent history, the tragic incident which came
to be known as the "Maguindanao Massacre" spawned charges for 57
counts of murder and an additional charge of rebellion against 197
accused.
The record shows that NUJP Vice-Chairperson Jose Jaime Espina, by
January 12, 2010 letter[14] to Judge Solis-Reyes, requested a dialogue to
discuss concerns over media coverage of the proceedings of the
Maguindanao Massacre cases. Judge Solis-Reyes replied, however, that
"matters concerning media coverage should be brought to the Court's
attention through appropriate motion."[15] Hence, the present petitions
which assert the exercise of the freedom of the press, right to information,
right to a fair and public trial, right to assembly and to petition the
government for redress of grievances, right of free access to courts, and
freedom of association, subject to regulations to be issued by the Court.
apart from the earlier cases is the impossibility of accommodating even
the parties to the cases - the private complainants/families of the victims
and other witnesses - inside the courtroom. On public trial, Estrada
basically discusses:
An accused has a right to a public trial but it is a right that belongs to him,
more than anyone else, where his life or liberty can be held critically in
balance. A public trial aims to ensure that he is fairly dealt with and would
not be unjustly condemned and that his rights are not compromised in
secrete conclaves of long ago. A public trial is not synonymous with
publicized trial; it only implies that the court doors must be open to those
who wish to come, sit in the available seats, conduct themselves with
decorum and observe the trial process. In the constitutional sense, a
courtroom should have enough facilities for a reasonable number of the
public to observe the proceedings, not too small as to render the
openness negligible and not too large as to distract the trial participants
from their proper functions, who shall then be totally free to report what
they have observed during the proceedings.[26]
Even before considering what is a "reasonable number of the public" who
may observe the proceedings, the peculiarity of the subject criminal cases
is that the proceedings already necessarily entail the presence of
hundreds of families. It cannot be gainsaid that the families of the 57
victims and of the 197 accused have as much interest, beyond mere
curiosity, to attend or monitor the proceedings as those of the impleaded
parties or trial participants. It bears noting at this juncture that the
prosecution and the defense have listed more than 200 witnesses each.
The impossibility of holding such judicial proceedings in a courtroom that
will accommodate all the interested parties, whether private complainants
or accused, is unfortunate enough. What more if the right itself commands
that a reasonable number of the general public be allowed to witness the
proceeding as it takes place inside the courtroom. Technology tends to
provide the only solution to break the inherent limitations of the courtroom,
to satisfy the imperative of a transparent, open and public trial.
Indeed, the Court cannot gloss over what advances technology has to
offer in distilling the abstract discussion of key constitutional precepts into
the workable context. Technology per se has always been neutral. It is
the use and regulation thereof that need fine-tuning. Law and technology
can work to the advantage and furtherance of the various rights herein
involved, within the contours of defined guidelines.

Issue:Whether or not accused is denied of right to a speedy, impartial and

public trial

Held: The Court partially GRANTS pro hac vice petitioners' prayer for a
live broadcast of the trial court proceedings, subject to the guidelines.
Respecting the possible influence of media coverage on the impartiality of
trial court judges, petitioners correctly explain that prejudicial publicity
insofar as it undermines the right to a fair trial must pass the "totality of
circumstances" test, applied in People v. Teehankee, Jr.[24] and Estrada v.
Desierto,[25] that the right of an accused to a fair trial is not incompatible to
a free press, that pervasive publicity is not per se prejudicial to the right of
an accused to a fair trial, and that there must be allegation and proof of the
impaired capacity of a judge to render a bias-free decision. Mere fear of
possible undue influence is not tantamount to actual prejudice resulting in
the deprivation of the right to a fair trial.

Moreover, an aggrieved party has ample legal remedies. He may

challenge the validity of an adverse judgment arising from a proceeding
that transgressed a constitutional right. As pointed out by petitioners, an
aggrieved party may early on move for a change of venue, for continuance
until the prejudice from publicity is abated, for disqualification of the judge,
and for closure of portions of the trial when necessary. The trial court may
likewise exercise its power of contempt and issue gag orders.

One apparent circumstance that sets the Maguindanao Massacre cases

RIGHT OF CONFRONTATION
THE UNITED STATES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.LAZARO JAVIER, ET AL., defendants-appellants.
Modesto Castillo, Eusebio Lopez and G. N. Trinidad for appellants.
Acting Attorney-General Paredes for appellee.
MALCOLM, J.:
We find the proven facts as brought out in the trial of this case to be as follows:
Doroteo Natividad on the afternoon of October 22, 1915, fastened his carabao
valued at P150 in his corral situated in the barrio of Trapiche municipality of
Tanauan, Province of Batangas. On the following morning when he went to
look after the animal, he found the gate to the corral open and that the carabao
had disappeared. He reported the matter to the Constabulary, and a patrol of
the Constabulary under the leadership of sergeant Presa, now deceased, on
the 20th of November following, encountered the accused Lazaro Javier,
Apolinario Mendoza, and Placido de Chavez leading the carabao. When the
ladrones saw the Constabulary, that scattered in all directions. On the following
day, the Constabulary found this carabao tied in front of the house of one
Pedro Monterola in the barrio of Santa Clara, municipality of San Pablo. The
carabao was identified by Doroteo Natividad as the one which had been taken
from his corral on the night of October 22, 1915, and by the Constabulary as
the one seen in the possession of the accused.
As corroborative of such evidence, we have the well-known legal principle,
which as applied to cases of this character is that, although the persons who
unlawfully took a certain carabao are not recognized at the time, and their
identity remains entirely unknown, nevertheless, if the stolen animal is found in
the possession of the accused shortly after the commission of the crime and
they make no satisfactory explanation of such possession they may be
properly convicted of the crime. (See U. S. vs. Divino [1911], 18 Phil., 425.) In
the present instance, the attempt of the accused to insinuate that one of the
Constabulary soldiers testified against them falsely because of enmity is hardly
believable.
The foregoing statement of the facts and the law disposes of all but one
assignment of error, namely, that the lower court erred in admitting Exhibit B of
the prosecution as evidence. Exhibit B is the sworn statement of sergeant
Presa, now deceased, whose signature was identified, before the justice of the
peace of the municipality of Santo Tomas, Province of Batangas. Appellant's
argument is predicated on the provision of the Philippine Bill of Rights which
says, "That in all criminal prosecutions the accused shall enjoy the right . . . to
meet the witnesses face to face," and the provision of the Code of Criminal
Procedure, section 15 (5), which says that "In all criminal prosecutions the
defendant shall be entitled: . . . to be confronted at the trial by and to cross-
examine the witnesses against him." With reference to the clause of the Bill of
Rights, which we have quoted, Justice Day said in a case of the Philippine
origin (Dowdell vs. U. S. [1911], 221 U. S., 325) that it "intends to secure the
accused in the right to be tried, so far as facts provable by witnesses are
concerned, by only such witnesses as meet him face to face at the trial, who
give their testimony in his presence, and give to the accused an opportunity of
cross-examination. It was intended to prevent the conviction of the accused
upon deposition or ex parte affidavits, and particularly to preserve the right of
the accused to test the recollection of the witness in the exercise of the right of
cross-examination." In other words, confrontation is essential because cross-
examination is essential. A second reason for the prohibition is that a tribunal
may have before it the department and appearance of the witness while
testifying. ( U. S. vs. Anastacio [1906], 6 Phil., 413.) The Supreme Court of the
Philippine Islands has applied this constitutional provisions on behalf of
accused persons in a number of cases. (See for example U. S. vs. Tamjuanco
[1902], 1 Phil., 374; U. S. vs. Bello [1908], 11 Phil., 526; U. S. vs. De la Cruz
[1908], 12 Phil., 87.) It is for us now to determine whether the present facts
entitle the accused to the protection of the Bill of Rights or whether the facts
fall under some exception thereto.
The sworn statement of Presa was not made by question and answer under
circumstances which gave the defense an opportunity to cross-examine the
witness. The proviso of the Code of Criminal Procedure as to confrontation is
therefore inapplicable. Presa's statement again is not the testimony of a
witness deceased, given in a former action between the same parties relating
to the same matter. Consequently, the exception provided by section 298, No.
8, of the Code of Civil Procedure and relied upon by the prosecution in the
lower court is also inapplicable. Nor is the statement of Presa a dying
declaration or a deposition in a former trial or shown to be a part of the
preliminary examination. Under these circumstances, not to burden the opinion
with an extensive citation of authorities, we can rely on the old and historic
case of R. vs. Paine (1 Salk., 281 [King's Bench Div.]) occurring in the year
1696. It appears that a deposition of B., examined by the Mayor of Bristol
under oath, but not in P's presence, was offered. It was objected that B, being
dead, the defendant had lost all opportunity of cross-examining him. The
King's Bench consulted with the Common Pleas, and "it was the opinion of
both courts that these deposition should not be given in evidence, the
defendant not being present when they were taken before the Mayor and so
had lost the benefit of a cross-examination." Although we are faced with the
alternative of being unable to utilize the statements of the witness now
deceased, yet if there has been no opportunity for cross-examination and the
case is not one coming within one of the exceptions, the mere necessity alone
accepting the statement will not suffice. In fine, Exhibit B was improperly
received in evidence in the lower court.
With such a resolution of this question, we could, as has been done in other
cases, further find this to be reversible error and remand the case for a new
trial. We are convinced, however, that this would gain the accused nothing
except delay for the testimony of the owner of the carabao and of the two
Constabulary soldiers, rebutted by no reasonable evidence on behalf of the
accused, is deemed sufficient to prove guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.
The facts come under article 518, No. 3, in connection with article 520, as
amended, of the Penal Code. Accordingly the defendants and appellants are
each sentenced to four years, two months, and one day of presidio
correccional, with the accessory penalties provided by law, and to pay one-
third part of costs of both instances; the carabao shall be returned to Doroteo
Natividad, if this has not already been done. So ordered.
AGUSTIN V. TALINO, petitioner, vs.
THE SANDIGANBAYAN and THE PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, respondents.
CRUZ, J.: It is settled that if a separate trial is allowed to one of two or more
defendants, his testimony therein imputing guilt to any of the co-accused is not
admissible against the latter who was not able to cross-examine him. 1 The
issue in this case is whether or not such testimony was considered by the
respondent court against the petitioner, who claims that it was in fact the sole
basis of his conviction.
The petitioner, along with several others, were charged in four separate
informations with estafa through falsification of public documents for having
allegedly conspired to defraud the government in the total amount of
P26,523.00, representing the cost of repairs claimed to have been undertaken,
but actually not needed and never made, on four government vehicles, through
falsification of the supporting papers to authorize the illegal
payments.2 Docketed as CC Nos. 6681, 6682, 6683 and 6684, these cases
were tried jointly for all the accused until after the prosecution had rested,
when Genaro Basilio, Alejandro Macadangdang and petitioner Talino asked for
separate trials, which were allowed. 3 They then presented their evidence at
such trials, while the other accused continued defending themselves in the
original proceedings, at which one of them, Pio Ulat gave damaging testimony
against the petitioner, relating in detail his participation in the questioned
transactions. 4 In due time, the Sandiganbayan rendered its decision in all the
four cases finding Talino, Basilio, Macadangdang Ulat and Renato Valdez
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crimes charged while absolving the
other defendants for insufficient evidence. This decision is now challenged by
the petitioner on the ground that it violates his right of confrontation as
guaranteed by the Constitution.
In its decision, the respondent court * makes the following remarks about the
separate trial:
The peculiarity of the trial of these cases is the fact that We
allowed, upon their petition, separate trials for the accused Basilio
and Talino and Macadangdang. This being the case, We can only
consider, in deciding these cases as against them, the evidence for
the, prosecution as wen as their own evidence. Evidence offered
by the other accused can not be taken up.
It would really have been simpler had there been no separate trial
because the accused Pio B. Ulat said so many incriminatory things
against the other accused when he took the stand in his own
defense. But because Basilio, Talino and Macadangdang were
 granted separate trials and they did not cross examine Ulat
because, as a matter of fact, they were not even required to be
present when the other accused were presenting their defenses,
the latter's testimonies can not now be considered against said
three accused.
We cannot understand why, after it had heard the long and sordid
story related by Ulat on the stand, the prosecution did not endeavor
to call Ulat and put him on he stand as part •f its rebuttal evidence.
Had this been done, there would have been no impediment to the
consideration of Ulat's testimony against all the accused.5
The grant of a separate trial rests in the sound discretion of the court and is not
a matter of right to the accused, especially where, as in this case, it is sought
after the presentation of the evidence of the prosecution. 6 While it is true that
Rule 119, Section 8, of the Rules of Court does not specify when the motion
for such a trial should be filed, we have held in several cases that this should
be done before the prosecution commences presenting its evidence, although,
as an exception, the motion may be granted later, even after the prosecution
shall have rested, where there appears to be an antagonism in the respective
defenses of the accused. 7 In such an event, the evidence in chief of the
prosecution shall remain on record against an the accused, with right of
rebuttal on the part of the fiscal in the separate trial of the other accused. 8
The rule in every case is that the trial court should exercise the utmost
circumspection in granting a motion for separate trial, allowing the same only
after a thorough study of the claimed justification therefor, if only to avoid the
serious difficulties that may arise, such as the one encountered and regretted
by the respondent court, in according the accused the right of confrontation.
The right of confrontation is one of the fundamental rights guaranteed by the
Constitution 9 to the person facing criminal prosecution who should know, in
fairness, who his accusers are and must be given a chance to cross-examine
them on their charges. No accusation is permitted to be made against his back
or in his absence nor is any derogatory information accepted if it is made
anonymously, as in poison pen letters sent by persons who cannot stand by
their libels and must shroud their spite in secrecy. That is also the reason
why ex parte affidavits are not permitted unless the affiant is presented in
court 10 and hearsay is barred save only in the cases allowed by the Rules of
Court, like the dying declaration. 11
In United States v. Javier, 12 this Court emphasized:
... With reference to the clause of the Bill of Rights, which we have
quoted, Justice Day said in a case of Philippine origin (Dowdell v.
U.S. 119111, 221 U.S. 325) that it intends to secure the accused in
the right to be tried, so far as facts provable by witnesses are
concerned, by only such witnesses as meet him face to face at the
trial who give their testimony in his presence, and give to the
accused an opportunity of cross-examination. It was intended to
prevent the conviction of the accused upon depositions or ex parte
affidavits, and particularly to preserve the right of the accused to
test the recollection of the witness in the exercise of the right of
cross-examination.' In other words, confrontation is essential
because cross-examination is essential. A second reason for the
prohibition is that a tribunal may have before it the deportment and
appearance of the witness while testifying. (U.S. v. Anastacio
[1906], 6 Phil. 413.) The Supreme Court of the Philippine Islands
has applied this constitutional provision on behalf of accused
persons in a number of cases. (See for example U.S. v. Tanjuanco
[1902], 1 Phil., 374; U.S. v. Bello [1908], 11 Phil., 526; U.S. v. De la
Cruz [1908], 12 Phil. 87.) ...
We have carefully studied the decision under challenge and find that the
respondent court did not consider the testimony given by Ulat in convicting the
petitioner. The part of that decision finding Talino guilty made no mention of
Ulat at all but confined itself to the petitioner's own acts in approving the
questioned vouchers as proof of his complicity in the plot to swindle the
government. Thus:
If, as claimed, by Macadangdang, he had no knowledge nor
participation in the conspiracy to defraud, he would have
questioned this obvious irregularity. He would have asked whoever
was following up the vouchers why two biddings were conducted,
why the awards to "D" Alfenor' were cancelled, when the latter
were cancelled, and when the new bidding was made.
The very same case is true as regards the accused Agustin Talino.
While his duty to initial or sign the vouchers as regards the
adequacy of funds may have been ministerial, his failure to
observe the obvious irregularity is clear evidence of his complicity
in the conspiracy.
Talino declared that in the morning of May 23, 1980, four vouchers
(including three made out in favor of "D" Alfenor Repair Shop')
were brought to him for his certificate as regards the availability of
funds. He had signed all the four vouchers. In the afternoon of the
same day, three other vouchers were also presented to him for
certification as to funds these three were in substitution of Exhibits
"A", "B" and "C" which he had earlier signed but which, according
to Talino, were disallowed and cancelled, Talino claims that he had
examined the supporting documents of the last three vouchers the
RIV, the bids signed by the repair shops and the abstract of bids. If
what Talino says is true, at least the abstract of bids submitted in
the morning, where "D" Alfenor Motor Shop' appears to be the
lowest bidder, must have been different from the ones submitted
together with vouchers in the afternoon. This would have raised his
suspicions as to why these last three abstracts could be dated as
they were (May 18, May 15 and May 11, respectively) when it was
only that morning that the abstracts containing the name of "D";
Alfenor Motor Shop' were submitted. The fact that he readily
approved the substitute vouchers with the substitute winning
bidders is a clear indication that he knew he was facilitating an
irregular transaction.
It is our view that the evidence on record has established beyond
doubt the participation of both Agustin Talino and Alejandro
Macadangdang in all the four felonies charged in the
informations. 13
The petitioner makes much of the statement in the Comment that the
petitioner's guilt could be deduced "from the evidence for the prosecution and
from the testimony of Pio Ulat," 14 but that was not the respondent court
speaking. That was the Solicitor General's analysis. As far as the
Sandiganbayan was concerned, the said testimony was inadmissible against
the petitioner because he "did not cross examine Ulat and was not even
required to be present when the latter was testifying. In fact, the respondent
court even expressed the wish that Ulat had been presented as rebuttal
witness in the separate trial of the petitioner as there would then have been
"no impediment to the use of his testimony against the other accused. " As it
was not done, the trial court could not and did not consider Ulat's testimony in
determining the petitioner's part in the offenses.
The factual findings of the respondent court being supported by substantial
evidence other than Ulat's testimony, we see no reason to disturb them. It is
futile for the petitioner to invoke his constitutional presumption of innocence
because his guilt has in the view of the trial court been established beyond
reasonable doubt, and we agree.
WHEREFORE, the judgment appealed from is AFFIRMED, with costs against
the petitioner.
BANGAYAN V RCBC
Facts: Petitioner Ricardo Bangyan had 2 bank accounts with RCBC
(Respondent) , one savings account and one current account. Both accounts
had auto-transfer feature.
The petitioner also signed a Surety Agreement with RCBC in favor of 9
corporations. This Surety Agreement was to be used as a security guarantee
for any loan obligations, advances, credits and other obligations.
Petitioner contests the authenticity of the surety agreement and claims that it
has to be notarized.
Respondent had also issued Letters of Credit LC’s to 3 of the corporations
guaranteed by petitioner. The LCs were used for payment for imports.
Bureau of Customs sent a letter to RCBC demanding remittance of import
duties for 3 shipments for which RCBC had issued 3 LC’s.
RCBC had informed Petitioner that the BOC had sent a letter demanding
outstanding duties. Petitioner told RCBC that he will take care of matter.
RCBC froze funds in Petitioners accounts due to the BOC demand, since the
latter had given authority under the Surety Agreement. RCBC would only draw
from petitioners accounts upon order from the BOC.
Petitioner issued 2 checks, but were returned to with notation of Refer to
Drawer.
One of the Corporations included in the Surety Agreement had a LC that was
due and demandable, RCBC went ahead and debited petitioners account to
partially satisfy the loan. After the debit the petitioners passbook reflected a
balance of 45.46.
Thereafter the petitioner had issued 5 more checks, but were also dishonored.
The payees of the dishonored checks were demanding immediate payment.
Petitioner demanded that RCBC restore all the funds debited from his account
and indemnify him for damages.
ISSUES: WON RCBC was justified in dishonoring the checks and whether
petitioner is entitled to indemnity.
WON the Surety Agreement was valid.
WON RCBC violated the Bank Secrecy Law RA 1406, when the BOC made an
investigation of 3 of the companies included in the Surety Agreement and if
petitioner is can claim damages.
HELD/RATIO: RCBC was not in bad faith when it dishonored the checks. The
actions of RCBC were justified by the stipulations of the Surety Agreement.
Since the petitioner had guaranteed the corporations stipulated in
the Surety Agreement, RCBC had a fiduciary duty to debit the funds from the
petitioners account to settle the loans and duties of the said corporations.
The Surety Agreement was a valid contract between the Petitioner and RCBC.
The petitioner could not prove his allegations of forgery and lack of consent of
the agreement. The petitioner signed the Surety Agreement in behalf of the 9
Corporations. The petitioner also acknowledged the Surety Agreement when
he was informed by RCBC of the demand from the BOC and he assured the
bank that he was going to solve the problem.
RCBC and its representative did not divulge any information in the Affidavit
submitted to the BOC.
The petitioner failed to prove that there was wrong doing on the part of
respondent RCBC, since the dishonoring of the checks was the product of an
surety agreement for the 4 corporations’ LC’s which he voluntarily contracted.
FACTS: Petitioner Bangayan had a savings account and a current account
with one of the branches of respondent Rizal Commercial Banking Corporation
(RCBC). Bangayan purportedly signed a Comprehensive Surety Agreement
with respondent RCBC in favor of nine corporations. Under the Surety
Agreement, the funds in petitioner Bangayan’s accounts with RCBC would be
used as security to guarantee any existing and future loan obligations,
advances, credits/increases and other obligations, including any and all
expenses that these corporations may incur with respondent bank. Bangayan
contests the veracity and due authenticity of the Agreement on the ground that
his signature thereon was not genuine, and that the agreement was not
notarized. Respondent RCBC refutes this claim.
Then occurred different transactions between RCBC with other entities in
relation to the Surety Agreement. RCBC issued commercial letters of credit in
favor of different corporations. Mr. Lao, of RCBC, claimed that the bank would
not have extended the letters of credit in favor of the three corporations without
petitioner Bangayan acting as surety. After all the transactions in relation to the
letters of credit issued by RCBC in relation to the Surety Agreement,
Bangayan’s account was depleted.
Two of the seven checks that were drawn against petitioner Bangayan’s
Current Account were presented for payment to respondent RCBC were
returned by respondent RCBC with the notation "REFER TO DRAWER. Five
other checks of petitioner Bangayan were presented for payment to
respondent RCBC. These five checks were dishonored by respondent RCBC
on the ground that they had been drawn against insufficient funds ("DAIF") and
were likewise returned.
Thus, Bangayan, demanded that respondent bank restore all the funds to his
account and indemnify him for damages. Bangayan filed a complaint for
damages against respondent RCBC. In its defense, RCBC claims that
Bangayan signed a Surety Agreement in favor of several companies that
defaulted in their payment of customs duties that resulted in the imposition of a
lien over the accounts. Also, it funded a letter of credit of Lotec Marketing with
the account of petitioner Bangayan, who agreed to guarantee Lotec
Marketing’s obligations under the Surety Agreement; and, that the bank
applied Bangayan’s
deposits to satisfy part of Lotec Marketing’s obligation which resulted in the
depletion of the bank accounts.
ISSUE: Whether respondent RCBC was justified in dishonoring the checks,
and, consequently, whether petitioner Bangayan is entitled to damages arising
from the dishonor.
HELD: Yes. RCBC was justified in dishonoring the checks. Bangayan is not
entitled to damages.
Whatever damage to petitioner Bangayan’s interest or reputation from the
dishonor of the seven checks was a consequence of his agreement to act as
surety for the corporations and their failure to pay their loan obligations,
advances and other expenses.
First, there was no malice or bad faith on the part of respondent RCBC in the
dishonor of the checks, since its actions were justified by petitioner Bangayan’s
obligations under the Surety Agreement. Both the trial and the appellate courts
gave credence to the Surety Agreement, which categorically guaranteed the
four corporations’ obligations to respondent RCBC under the letters of credit.
As petitioner failed to discharge his burden of demonstrating that his signature
was forged, there being no positive and convincing evidence to prove such
fact, there is no reason to overturn the factual findings of the lower courts with
respect to the genuineness and due execution of the Surety Agreement.
Second, the mere absence of notarization does not necessarily render the
Surety Agreement invalid. Third, that the annex of the Surety Agreement does
not bear petitioner Bangayan’s signature is not a sufficient ground to invalidate
the main agreement altogether. Fourth, petitioner Bangayan never contested
the existence of the Surety Agreement prior to the filing of the Complaint. It
must be also be emphasized that petitioner Bangayan did not complain against
the four corporations which had benefitted from his bank account.
With respect to the first two dishonored checks, respondent RCBC had already
put on hold petitioner Bangayan’s account to answer for the customs duties
being demanded from the bank by the BOC. On the other hand, the five other
checks were subsequently dishonored because petitioner Bangayan’s account
was by that time already depleted due to the partial payment of Lotec
Marketing’s loan obligation.
Under Articles 2199 and 2200 of the Civil Code, actual or compensatory
damages are those awarded in satisfaction of or in recompense for loss or
injury sustained. They proceed from a sense of natural justice and are
designed to repair the wrong that has been done.
In all seven dishonored checks, respondent RCBC properly exercised its right
as a creditor under the Surety Agreement to apply the petitioner Bangayan’s
funds in his accounts as security for the obligations of the four corporations
under the letters of credit. Thus, petitioner Bangayan cannot attribute any
wrong or misconduct to respondent RCBC since there was no malice or bad
faith on the part of respondent in dishonoring the checks. Any damage to
petitioner arising from the dishonor of those checks was brought about, not by
the bank’s actions, but by the corporations that defaulted on their obligations
that petitioner had guaranteed to pay. The trial and the appellate courts,
therefore, committed no reversible error in disallowing the award of damages
to petitioner.
COMPULSORY PROCESSES
ROCO V CERVANTES
Facts: Five informations were filed by Cal's Corporation against Domingo
Roco for violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22. The cases were remanded
by the RTC to the MTCC for the reception of petitioner’s evidence.
During the pendency of the remanded cases, petitioner filed with the
MTCC a "Request for Issuance of Subpoena Ad Testificandum and
Subpoena Duces Tecum", requiring Cal’s Corporation or their duly
authorized representatives, to appear and testify in court oand to bring
with them certain documents, records and books of accounts for the years
1993-1999. However, the judge denied his request on the following
grounds: (a) the requested documents, book ledgers and other records
were immaterial in resolving the issues posed before the court; and (b) the
issuance of the subpoenas will only unduly delay the hearing of the
criminal cases.
Issue: WON the denial of the request for the issuance of the subpoenas is
violative of the constitutional right of the accused as enshrined in Art. III,
Sec. 14 (2) of the Constitution.
Held: Before a subpoena duces tecum may issue, the court must first be
satisfied that the following requisites are present: (1) the books,
documents or other things requested must appear prima facie relevant to
the issue subject of the controversy (test of relevancy); and (2) such books
must be reasonably described by the parties to be readily identified (test of
definiteness).
In determining whether the production of the documents described in a
subpoena duces tecum should be enforced by the court, it is proper to
consider, first, whether the subpoena calls for the production of specific
documents, or rather for specific proof, and secondly, whether that proof is
prima facie sufficiently relevant to justify enforcing its production. A
general inquisitorial examination of all the books, papers, and documents
of an adversary, conducted with a view to ascertain whether something of
value may not show up, will not be enforced.
In order to entitle a party to the issuance of a ‘subpoena duces tecum,’ it
must appear, by clear and unequivocal proof, that the book or document
sought to be produced contains evidence relevant and material to the
issue before the court, and that the precise book, paper or document
containing such evidence has been so designated or described that it may
be identified. In the case at bar, the books and documents that petitioner
requested to be subpoenaed are designated and described in his request
with definiteness and readily identifiable. The test of definiteness,
therefore, is satisfied in this case.
SEC 15 – SUSPENSION OF THE PRIVILEGE OF THE WRIT OF
HABEAS CORPUS
LANSANG V GARCIA
Abandonment of the Doctrine Held in the Barcelon Case & the
Montenegro Case
FACTS: Due to the throwing of two hand grenades in a Liberal Party
caucus in 1971 causing the death of 8 people, Marcos issued PP 889
which suspended the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus. Marcos urged
that there is a need to curtail the growth of Maoist groups. Subsequently,
Lansang et al were invited by the PC headed by Garcia for interrogation
and investigation. Lansang et al questioned the validity of the suspension
of the writ averring that the suspension does not meet the constitutional
requisites.
ISSUE: Whether or not the suspension is constitutional.
HELD: The doctrine established in Barcelon and Montenegro was
subsequently abandoned in this case where the SC declared that it had
the power to inquire into the factual basis of the suspension of the
privilege of the writ of habeas corpus by Marcos in Aug 1971 and to annul
the same if no legal ground could be established. Accordingly, hearings
were conducted to receive evidence on this matter, including two closed-
door sessions in which relevant classified information was divulged by the
government to the members of the SC and 3 selected lawyers of the
petitioners. In the end, after satisfying itself that there was actually a
massive and systematic Communist-oriented campaign to overthrow the
government by force, as claimed by Marcos, the SC unanimously decided
to uphold t5he suspension of the privilege of the Writ of Habeas Corpus.
Facts: On the evening of August 21, 1971, two grenades were thrown at
the miting the avance of the Liberal Party killing 8 persons and injuring
many. Thus, on August 23 then President Marcos issued proclamation
889, the suspension of the writ of habeas corpus. Herein petitioners were
apprehended by members of the Philippine Constabulary having invoked
the said proclamation. In effect the proclamation implies that the authority
to decide whether the exigency has arisen requiring suspension of the writ
belongs to the President and it expressly states that such declaration is
deemed “final and conclusive upon the courts and all other persons”
・ August 30: the president issued proclamation 889-A, amending
the previous proclamation.
・ September 18: proclamation 889-B issued; lifting the
suspension on selected provinces/cities.
・ September 25: proclamation 889-C issued; lifting the
suspension on selected provinces/cities.
・ October 4: proclamation 889-D issued; same as 889-C on
selected areas.
In view thereof, 18 provinces, 2 sub-provinces and 18 cities are still under
the suspension of writ of habeas corpus
Issue: Whether the court would adhere to its previous decision in Barcelon
vs. Baker and Montenegro vs. Castaneda?
Held: First, Proclamation 889-A superseded the original proclamation and
that flaws attributed thereto
are formal in nature. Which actually emphasize the actuality of the intent to
rise in arms. Second, The
court intervention: In Sterling vs. Constantin, Chief Justice Hughes
declared that “when there is a
substantial showing that the exertion of state power has overridden private
rights secured by the
Constitution, the subject is necessarily one for judicial review”. Thus, the
grant of power to suspend the
privilege of writ is neither absolute or unqualified
The declaration of a rebellion as argued by the petitioners need not to be a
wide-scale event, it may be
declared even if it only involves a small part of the country. The president
decision to suspend the writ
was by fact constitutional hence VALID, as he has three available courses
to suppress rebellion. First, to
call out the military, second to suspend the privilege of writ and lastly to
declare martial law.
Petitions DENIED; the CFI is directed to conduct preliminary investigations
Facts: In the evening of August 21, 1971, at about 9 p.m., while the Liberal
Party of the Philippines was holding a public meeting at Plaza Miranda,
Manila, for the presentation of its candidates in the general elections
scheduled for November 8, 1971, two hand grenades were thrown at the
platform where said candidates and other persons were. Eight persons
were killed and many more injured. Proclamation 889 was issued by the
President suspending privilege of writ of habeas corpus stating that there
is a conspiracy of rebellion and insurrection in order to forcibly seize
political power. Petitions for writ of habeas corpus were filed by persons
(13) who have been arrested without a warrant.
It was stated that one of the safeguards of the proclamation was that it is
to be applied to persons caught in flagrante delicto. Incidentally, Proc.
889-A was issued as an amendment, inserting the word “actually staging”.
Proc. 889-B was also issued lifting the suspension of privilege in 27
provinces, 3 sub-provinces and 26 cities. Proc. 889-C was issued
restoring the suspension in 13 provinces and cities(mostly in Mindanao).
Proc. 889-D further lifted the suspension in 7 provinces and 4 cities. Only
18 provinces and sub-provinces and 2 cities whose privilege was
suspended. Petitioners maintained that Proclamation No. 889 did not
declare the existence of actual "invasion insurrection or rebellion or
imminent danger thereof, however it became moot and academic since it
was amended. Petitioners further contend that public safety did not require
the issuance of proclamations stating: (a) that there is no rebellion; (b)
that, prior to and at the time of the suspension of the privilege, the
Government was functioning normally, as were the courts; (c) that no
untoward incident, confirmatory of an alleged July-August Plan, has
actually taken place after August 21, 1971; (d) that the President's alleged
apprehension, because of said plan, is non-existent and unjustified; and
(e) that the Communist forces in the Philippines are too small and weak to
jeopardize public safety to such extent as to require the suspension of the
privilege of the writ of habeas corpus.
A resolution was issued by majority of the Court having tentatively arrived
at a consensus that it may inquire in order to satisfy itself of the existence
of the factual bases for the proclamations. Now the Court resolves after
conclusive decision reached by majority.
Issues: (1) Whether or Not the authority to decide whether the exigency
has arisen requiring suspension (of the privilege of the writ of habeas
corpus) belongs to the President and his decision is final and conclusive
upon the courts and upon all other persons.
(2) Whether or Not public safety require the suspension of the privilege of
the writ of habeas corpus decreed in Proclamation No. 889-A.
Held: The President has authority however it is subject to judicial review.
Two conditions must concur for the valid exercise of the authority to
suspend the privilege to the writ (a) there must be "invasion, insurrection,
or rebellion" or "imminent danger thereof," and (b) "public safety" must
require the suspension of the privilege. President has three (3) courses of
action: (a) to call out the armed forces; (b) to suspend the privilege of the
writ of habeas corpus; and (c) to place the Philippines or any part thereof
under martial law. He had, already, called out the armed forces, proved
inadequate. Of the two other alternatives, the suspension of the privilege
is the least harsh.
Petitioners contention that CPP-NPA has no ability, is negatived by the
killing of 5 mayors, 20 barrio captains and 3 chiefs of police; that there
were fourteen (14) meaningful bombing incidents in the Greater Manila
Area in 1970. CPP has managed to infiltrate or establish and control nine
major labor organizations; has exploited the (11) major student or youth
organizations; about thirty (30) mass organizations actively advancing the
CPP.
JACKSON V MACALINO
Facts: Am information was filed against an American citizen, Raymond
Jackson for violation of Article 176 of the Revised Penal Code. Summary
deportation proceedings were initiated at the Commission of Immigration
and Deportation (CID) against the petitioner. However, he could not be
deported because he filed a petition to lift the summary order of
deportation with the CID which had not yet been resolved. The CID then
issued an order for his arrest for being an undesirable alien, based on the
hold departure order in one of the criminal cases.
Jackson filed a petition for habeas corpus against the Commissioner of the
CID. The court directed its issuance as well as a return of the writ by the
respondents. In their return , the respondents alleged inter alia that the
detention was on the basis of the summary deportation order issued and
the hold departure order of the Makati RTC.
Issue: WON the Commissioner of the CID can issue warrants of arrest and
if so, WON such warrants can only be issued to enforce a final order of
deportation.
Held: The ultimate purpose of the writ of habeas corpus is to relieve a
person from unlawful restraint. It is essentially a writ of inquiry and is
granted to test the right under which he is detained. The term “court”
includes quasi-judicial bodies like the Deportation Board of the Bureau of
Immigration.
As a general rule, the burden of proving illegal restraint by the
respondents rests on the petitioner who attaches such restraints. Whether
the return sets forth process where on its face shows good ground for the
detention of the petitioner, it is incumbent on him to allege and prove new
matter that tends to invalidate the apparent effects of such process. If it
appears that the detained person is in custody under a warrant of
commitment in pursuance of law, the return shall be considered prima
facie evidence of the cause of restraint. In this case, based on the return
of the writ by the respondents, Jackson was arrested and detained based
on the order of the BOC which had become final and executory. His
passports were also cancelled by the US consul on the ground that they
were tampered with. Based on previous jurisprudence, such constitute
sufficient grounds for the arrest and deportation of aliens from the
Philippines. Hence, the petition was dismissed.
In the Matter of the Petition for the Writ of Amparo and the Writ of
Habeas Data in Favor of Melissa C. Roxas Case Digest
In the Matter of the Petition for the Writ of Amparo and the Writ of
Habeas Data in Favor of Melissa C. Roxas
Melissa C. Roxas vs. Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, et al.
G. R. No. 189155, September 7, 2010,
FACTS: Roxas is an American citizen of Filipino descent. While in the
United States, she is enrolled in an exposure program to the Philippines
with the group Bagong Alyansang Makabayan- United States of America
(BAYAN-USA) of which she is a member. During the course of her
immersion, Roxas toured various provinces and towns in Central Luzon
and, in April of 2009, she volunteered to join members of BAYAN-Tarlac in
conducting an initial health survey in La Paz, Tarlac for a future medical
mission.
After doing survey work on 19 May 2009, Roxas and her companions,
Carabeo amd Jandoc, decided to rest in the house of Mr. Paolo in Sitio
Bagong Sikat, Barangay Kapanikian, La Paz, Tarlac. At around 1:30 in the
afternoon, however, Roxas, her companions and Mr. Paolo were startled by
the loud sounds of someone banging at the front door and a voice
demanding that they open-up. Suddenly 15 heavily armed men forcibly
opened the door, banged inside, tied and blindfolded Roxas and her
companions, Carabeo and Jandoc, then dragged them inside a van parked
outside the house. The armed men were all in civilian clothes and were
wearing bonnets to conceal their faces.
After about an hour of travelling, the van stopped. Roxas, Carabeo and
Jandoc were ordered to alight. After she was informed that she was
detained for being a member of the Communist Party of the Philippines –
New People’s Army (CPP-NPA), Roxas was separated from her
companions and was escorted to a room which she believed is a jail cell
from the sound of the metal doors. From there she could hear the sounds
of gunfire, the noise of planes taking off and landing and some construction
2.
bustle. Roxas inferred that she was taken to the military camp of Fort
Magsaysay in Laur, Nueva Ecija.
On May 25, 2009, Roxas was finally released and returned to her uncle’s
house in Quezon City. Before being release, the abductors gave her a
cellphone with a sim card, a slip of paper cantaining an email address with
password, a plastic bag containing biscuits and books, the handcuffs used
on her, a blouse and a pair of shoes. She was also sternly warned not to
report the incident to the group Karapatan or else something bad will
happen to her and her family. Sometime after her release, Roxas continued
to receive calls from one of her abductors via the cellular phone given to
her. Out of apprehension that she was being monitored and also fearing for
the safety of her family, Roxas threw away the cellphone.
Roxas fied a petition for writ of amparo and writ of habeas data.
The Court of Appeals granted her petition for writ of amparo and writ of
habeas data. However, the appellate court absolved the respondents from
the petition. Her prayer for the return of her personal belongings and for the
inspection order and production order were denied. Roxas invokes he
doctrine of command responsibility to implicate the high-ranking civilian and
military authorities.
ISSUES:
(1) Whether or not the principle of command responsibility shall apply in
writ of amparo?
(2) Whether or not the respondents are liable in her abduction and
torture?
(3) Whether or not her prayer for the return of her personal belongings be
granted?
(4) Whether or not her prayer for inspection order be granted?
(5) Whether or not the grant of writ of habeas data is proper?
RULING:
1. It must be stated at the outset that the use by the petitioner of the
doctrine of command responsibility as the justification in impleading
the public respondents in her amparo petition, is legally inaccurate, if
not incorrect. The doctrine of command responsibility is a rule of
substantive law that establishes liability and, by this account, cannot
be a proper legal basis to implead a party-respondent in an amparo
petition. According to Fr. Bernas, "command responsibility," in its
simplest terms, means the "responsibility of commanders for crimes
committed by subordinate members of the armed forces or other
persons subject to their control in international wars or domestic
conflict." In this sense, command responsibility is properly a form of
criminal complicity. Since the application of command responsibility
presupposes an imputation of individual liability, it is more aptly
invoked in a full-blown criminal or administrative case rather than in a
summary amparo proceeding. The obvious reason lies in the nature
of the writ itself: The writ of amparo is a protective remedy aimed at
providing judicial relief consisting of the appropriate remedial
measures and directives that may be crafted by the court, in order to
address specific violations or threats of violation of the constitutional
rights to life, liberty or security. While the principal objective of its
proceedings is the initial determination of whether an enforced
disappearance, extralegal killing or threats thereof had transpired—
the writ does not, by so doing, fix liability for such disappearance,
killing or threats, whether that may be criminal, civil or administrative
under the applicable substantive law. It must be clarified, however,
that the inapplicability of the doctrine of command responsibility in an
amparo proceeding does not, by any measure, preclude impleading
military or police commanders on the ground that the complained acts
in the petition were committed with their direct or indirect
acquiescence. In which case, commanders may be impleaded—not
actually on the basis of command responsibility—but rather on the
ground of their responsibility, or at least accountability.
The totality of the evidence presented by the petitioner does not
inspire reasonable conclusion that her abductors were military or
police personnel and that she was detained at Fort Magsaysay. First.
In amparo proceedings, the weight that may be accorded to parallel
circumstances as evidence of military involvement depends largely on
the availability or non-availability of other pieces of evidence that has
the potential of directly proving the identity and affiliation of the
perpetrators. Direct evidence of identity, when obtainable, must be
preferred over mere circumstantial evidence based on patterns and
similarity, because the former indubitably offers greater certainty as to
the true identity and affiliation of the perpetrators. An amparo court
cannot simply leave to remote and hazy inference what it could
otherwise clearly and directly ascertain. In the case at bench,
petitioner was, in fact, able to include in her Offer of Exhibits, the
cartographic sketches of several of her abductors whose faces she
managed to see. To the mind of the Court, these cartographic
sketches have the undeniable potential of giving the greatest certainty
as to the true identity and affiliation of petitioner’s abductors.
Unfortunately for the petitioner, this potential has not been realized in
view of the fact that the faces described in such sketches remain
unidentified, much less have been shown to be that of any military or
police personnel. Bluntly stated, the abductors were not proven to be
part of either the military or the police chain of command. Second. The
claim of the petitioner that she was taken to Fort Magsaysay was not
adequately established by her mere estimate of the time it took to
reach the place where she was detained and by the sounds that she
heard while thereat. Like the Court of Appeals, the Supreme Court are
not inclined to take the estimate and observations of the petitioner as
accurate on its face—not only because they were made mostly while
she was in blindfolds, but also in view of the fact that she was a mere
sojourner in the Philippines, whose familiarity with Fort Magsaysay
and the travel time required to reach it is in itself doubtful. With nothing
else but obscure observations to support it, petitioner’s claim that she
was taken to Fort Magsaysay remains a mere speculation.

3. In an order directing the public respondents to return the personal
belongings of the petitioner is already equivalent to a conclusive
pronouncement of liability. The order itself is a substantial relief that
can only be granted once the liability of the public respondents has
been fixed in a full and exhaustive proceeding. As already discussed
above, matters of liability are not determinable in a mere summary
amparo proceeding. But perhaps the more fundamental reason in
denying the prayer of the petitioner, lies with the fact that a person’s
right to be restituted of his property is already subsumed under the
general rubric of property rights—which are no longer protected by the
writ of amparo. Section 1 of the Amparo Rule, which defines the scope
and extent of the writ, clearly excludes the protection of property
rights.
4. The prayer of Roxas for the grant of the inspection order is equivalent
to sanctioning a "fishing expedition," which was never intended by the
Amparo Rule in providing for the interim relief of inspection order. An
inspection order is an interim relief designed to give support or
strengthen the claim of a petitioner in an amparo petition, in order to
aid the court before making a decision. A basic requirement before an
amparo court may grant an inspection order is that the place to be
inspected is reasonably determinable from the allegations of the party
seeking the order. While the Amparo Rule does not require that the
place to be inspected be identified with clarity and precision, it is,
nevertheless, a minimum for the issuance of an inspection order that
the supporting allegations of a party be sufficient in itself, so as to
make a prima facie case. This, as was shown above, petitioner failed
to do. Since the very estimates and observations of the petitioner are
not strong enough to make out a prima facie case that she was
detained in Fort Magsaysay, an inspection of the military camp cannot
be ordered. An inspection order cannot issue on the basis of
allegations that are, in themselves, unreliable and doubtful.
5. The writ of habeas data was conceptualized as a judicial remedy
enforcing the right to privacy, most especially the right to informational
privacy of individuals. The writ operates to protect a person’s right to
control information regarding himself, particularly in the instances
where such information is being collected through unlawful means in
order to achieve unlawful ends. Needless to state, an indispensable
requirement before the privilege of the writ may be extended is the
showing, at least by substantial evidence, of an actual or threatened
violation of the right to privacy in life, liberty or security of the victim.
This, in the case at bench, the petitioner failed to do. The main
problem behind the ruling of the Court of Appeals is that there is
actually no evidence on record that shows that any of the public
respondents had violated or threatened the right to privacy of the
petitioner. The act ascribed by the Court of Appeals to the public
respondents that would have violated or threatened the right to privacy
of the petitioner, i.e., keeping records of investigations and other
reports about the petitioner’s ties with the CPP-NPA, was not
adequately proven—considering that the origin of such records were
virtually unexplained and its existence, clearly, only inferred by the
appellate court from the video and photograph released by
Representatives Palparan and Alcover in their press conference. No
evidence on record even shows that any of the public respondents
had access to such video or photograph. In view of the above
considerations, the directive by the Court of Appeals enjoining the
public respondents from "distributing or causing the distribution to the
public any records in whatever form, reports, documents or similar
papers" relative to the petitioner’s "alleged ties with the CPP-NPA,"
appears to be devoid of any legal basis. The public respondents
cannot be ordered to refrain from distributing something that, in the
first place, it was not proven to have.
IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR THE ISSUANCE OF A WRIT
OF AMPARO IN FAVOR OF LILIBETH O. LADAGA v. MAJ. GEN.
REYNALDO MAPAGU G.R. No. 189689-91, November 13, 2012
Petitioners share the common circumstance of having their names included
in what is alleged to be a JCICC “AGILA” 3rd Quarter 2007 Order of Battle
Validation Result of the Philippine Army's 10th Infantry Division (10thID).
They perceive that by the inclusion of their names in the said Order of Battle
(OB List), they become easy targets of unexplained disappearances or
extralegal killings–a real threat to their life, liberty and security.
ATTY. LILIBETH O. LADAGA (Atty. Ladaga),first came to know of the
existence of the OB List from an undisclosed source on May 21, 2009. In
the OB List, it was reflected that the ULTIMATE GOAL is to TRY TO
OUSTPGMAON 30 NOV 2007.
On the other hand, Atty. Angela Librado-Trinidad (Atty. Librado-Trinidad),
delivered a privileged speech before the members of the Sangguniang
Panlungsod to demand the removal of her name from said OB List. The
Commission on Human Rights, for its part, announced the conduct of its
own investigation into the matter.
According to Atty. Librado-Trinidad, in the course of the performance of her
duties and functions, she has not committed any act against national
security that would justify the inclusion of her name in the said OB List. She
said that sometime in May 2008, two suspicious-looking men tailed her
vehicle. Also, on June 23, 2008 three men tried to barge into their house
Meanwhile, Atty. Carlos Isagani T. Zarate was informed that he was also
included on the OB List. In his petition, he alleged that the inclusion of his
name in the said OB List was due to his advocacies as a public interest or
human rights lawyer.
The Petitioners assert that the OB List is really a military hit-list as allegedly
shown by the fact that there have already been three victims of extrajudicial
killing whose violent deaths can be linked directly to the OB List.
On June 16, 2009 filed before the RTC a Petition for the Issuance of a Writ
of Amparo. The RTC subsequently issued separate Writs of Amparo,
directing the respondents to file a verified written return.
In the return of the respondents, they denied authorship of the OB List, and
alleged that petitioners failed to show that they were responsible for the
alleged threats.
After submission of the parties’ respective Position Papers, the RTC issued
Orders finding no substantial evidence to show that the perceived threat to
petitioners’ life, liberty and security was attributable to the unlawful act or
omission of the respondents. The privilege of the Writ was therefore denied.
ISSUES: Whether the totality of evidence satisfies the degree of proof
required under the Writ of Amparo.
RULING: No, the evidence does not satisfy degree of proof for the issuance
of the Writ of Amparo. The Writ of Amparo was promulgated by the Court
pursuant to its rule-making powers in response to the alarming rise in the
number of cases of enforced disappearances and extrajudicial killings. It is
an extraordinary remedy intended to address violations of, or threats to, the
rights to life, liberty or security and that, being a remedy of extraordinary
character, is not one to issue on amorphous or uncertain grounds but only
upon reasonable certainty. Justifying allegations must support the issuance
of the writ, on the following matters:
1. The personal circumstances of the petitioner;
2. The name and personal circumstances of the respondent responsible for
the threat, act or omission;
3. The right to life, liberty and security of the aggrieved party violated or
threatened with violation by an unlawful act or omission of the respondent
and how such threat or violation is committed with the attendant
circumstances detailed in supporting affidavits;
4. The investigation conducted specifying the names, personal
circumstances and addresses of the investigating authority or individuals;
5. Actions and recourses taken by the petitioner to determine the fate or
whereabouts of the aggrieved party and the identity of the person
responsible for the threat, act or omission;
6. The relief prayed for.

Under the Rule on the Writ of Amparo, the parties shall establish their claims
by substantial evidence, and if the allegations in the petition are proven by
substantial evidence, the court shall grant the privilege of the writ and such
reliefs as may be proper and appropriate

Substantial evidence is that amount of relevant evidence which a

reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.
Petitioners sought to prove that the inclusion of their names in the OB List
presented a real threat to their security by attributing the violent deaths of
the other known activists to the inclusion of their names or the names of
their militant organizations in the subject OB List. However, the existence of
the OB List could not be directly associated with the menacing behaviour of
suspicious men or the violent deaths of certain personalities.

The Petitioners cannot assert that the inclusion of their names in the OB List
is as real a threat as that which brought ultimate harm to the other victims
without corroborative evidence from which it can be presumed that the
suspicious deaths of these three people were in fact, on account of their
militant affiliations. The Petitioners therefore were not able to prove by
substantial evidence that there was an actual threat to their rights to life,
liberty and security. The mere inclusion of their names in the OB List is not
sufficient enough evidence for the issuance of the Writ of Amparo.
RIGHT TO A SPEEDY DISPOSITION OF CASESDOMINGO PADUA,
DOMINGO PADUA, petitioner, vs.VICENTE ERICTA, etc., RUNDIO
ABJAETO, and ANTONIO G. RAMOS, respondents.
NARVASA, J.: Courts should not brook undue delays in the ventilation
and determination of causes. It should be their constant effort to assure
that litigations are prosecuted and resolved with dispatch. Postponements
of trials and hearings should not be allowed except on meritorious
grounds; and the grant or refusal thereof rests entirely in the sound
discretion of the Judge. It goes without saying, however, that that
discretion must be reasonably and wisely exercised, in the light of the
attendant circumstances. Some reasonable deferment of the proceedings
may be allowed or tolerated to the end that cases may be adjudged only
after full and free presentation of evidence by all the parties, specially
where the deferment would cause no substantial prejudice to any part.
The desideratum of a speedy disposition of cases should not, if at all
possible, result in the precipitate loss of a party's right to present evidence
and either in plaintiff's being non-suited or the defendant's being
pronounced liable under an ex parte judgment.
... (T)rial courts have ... the duty to dispose of controversies
after trial on the merits whenever possible. It is deemed an
abuse of discretion for them, on their own motion, to enter a
dismissal which is not warranted by the circumstances of the
case' (Municipality of Dingras v. Bonoan, 85 Phil. 458-59
[1950]). While it is true that the dismissal of an action on
grounds specified under Section 3, Rule 17 of the Revised
Rules of Court is addressed to their discretion (Flores v. Phil.
Alien Property Administrator, 107 Phil. 778 (1960]; Montelibano
v. Benares, 103 Phil. 110 [1958]; Adorable v. Bonifacio, 105
Phil. 1269 [1959]; Inter-Island Gas Service, Inc. v. De la Gerna,
L-17631, October 19, 1966, 18 SCRA 390), such discretion
must be exercised soundly with a view to the circumstances
surrounding each particular case (Vernus-Sanciangco v.
Sanciangco, L-12619, April 28, 1962, 4 SCRA 1209). If facts
obtain that serve as mitigating circumstances for the delay, the
same should be considered and dismissal denied or set aside (
Rudd v. Rogerson, 15 ALR 2d 672; Cervi v. Greenwood, 147
Coloma 190, 362 P. 2d 1050 [1961]), especially where the suit
appears to be meritorious and the plaintiff was not culpably
negligent and no injury results to defendant (27 C.J.S. 235-36;
15 ALR 3rd 680). (Abinales vs. Court of First Instance of
Zamboanga City, Br. I, 70 SCRA 590, 595).
It is true that the allowance or denial of petitions for
postponement and the setting aside of orders previously
issued, rest principally upon the sound discretion of the judge
to whom they are addressed, but always predicated on the
consideration that more than the mere convenience of the
courts or of the parties of the case, the ends of justice and
fairness would be served thereby (Camara Vda. de Zubiri v.
Zubiri, et al., L-16745, December 17, 1966). When no
substantial rights are affected and the intention to delay is not
manifest, the corresponding motion to transfer the hearing
having been filed accordingly, it is sound judicial discretion to
allow them (Rexwell Corp. v. Canlas, L-16746, December 30,
1961). (Panganiban vs. Vda. de Sta. Maria, 22 SCRA 708,
712).
In the civil action at bar, the Trial Court rejected the plaintiffs plea for
cancellation of one of three (3) hearing dates, the very first such plea
made by that party, upon a ground not entirely unmeritorious in the
premises, and under such circumstances as would not be productive of
any appreciable delay in the proceedings or any substantial prejudice to
the defendants, and summarily dismissed the complaint. Such a dismissal
was unwarranted and relief therefrom must be accorded.
The action that was thus summarily dismissed had been brought by
Domingo Padua (petitioner herein) in the Court of First Instance at Quezon
City. 1 In that action Padua sought to recover damages for the injures
suffered by his eight-year old daughter, Luzviminda, caused by her being
hit by a truck driven by Rundio Abjaeto and owned by Antonio G. Ramos
(private respondents herein). Padua was litigating in forma pauperis.
Trial of the case having been set in due course, Padua commenced
presentation of his evidence on December 6, 1973. He gave testimony on
direct exqmination in the course of which reference was made to
numerous documents, marked Exhibits B, B-1 to B-109. 2 At the close of
his examination, and on motion of defendants' counsel, the previously
scheduled hearing of December 12,1973 was cancelled, and Padua's
cross-examination was reset on December 17, 1973. 3 However, the
hearing of December 17,1973 was also cancelled, again at the instance of
defendants' counsel, who pleaded sickness as ground therefor; and trial
was once more slated to "take place on March 6, March 7 and 13, 1974,
all at 9:00 o'clock in the morning." 4
After defendants' attorney had twice sought and obtained cancellation of
trial settings, as above narrated, it was plaintiff Padua's counsel who next
moved for cancellation of a hearing date. In a motion dated and filed on
March 1, 1974, 5 copy of which was personally served on defendants'
lawyer 6 Padua's counsel alleged that he had "another hearing on March
6, 1974 in Tarlac Court of First Instance entitled: Salud Dupitas vs.
Mariano Abella, Civil Case No. 4904 which is of 1966 stint, and said court
in Tarlac is anxious to terminate said case once and for all," and that the
cancellation would "at any rate ... leave plaintiff and defendants two (2)
hearing dates on March 7 and 13, 1974;" and on these premises, he
asked "that the hearing on March 6, 1974 ... be ordered cancelled." No
opposition was filed by the defendants to the motion, whether on the
ground that the motion had not been properly set for hearing, the clerk
having merely been requested to "submit the ... motion upon receipt ... for
the consideration of the Court," 7or some other ground. Apart from filing
this motion on March 1, 1974, plaintiffs counsel took the additional step of
sending his client's wife to the Court on the day of the trial, March 6,1974,
to verbally reiterate his application for cancellation of the hearing on that
day. This, Mrs. Padua did. The respondent Judge however denied the
application and dismissed the case. His Honor's Order, dictated on that
day, March 6, 1974, reads as follows: 8
When this case was called for hearing today, neither plaintiff
nor counsel appeared. The plaintiffs wife, however, appeared in
Court and informed the Court that the plaintiffs counsel had to
attend to a very important case in the provinces.
The hearing for today was fixed by the plaintiff himself in open
court after consulting his calendar and hence the Court will not
grant the postponement on the ground that the plaintiffs
counsel had a very important case in the provinces. Neither did
the plaintiff himself appear.
In view hereof, let this case be dismissed.
Padua moved for reconsideration, 9 but this was denied.10 Hence, this
petition.
The Trial Court unaccountably ignored the fact that defendants' counsel
had twice applied for and been granted postponements of the trial; that
plaintiffs counsel had filed a written motion for postponement five (5) days
prior to the hearing sought to be transferred, and this was the very first
such motion filed by him; that although the motion for postponement could
have been objected to, no opposition was presented by defendants, which
was not surprising considering that their counsel had himself already
obtained two (2) postponements; that the ground for cancellation was not
entirely without merit: the counsel had a case in the Tarlac Court
scheduled on the same day, March 6, 1974, which had been pending
since 1964 and which the Tarlac Court understandably was anxious to
terminate; that the Padua motion for postponement sought cancellation of
only one (1) of three settings, leaving the case to proceed on the two (2)
subsequent hearing dates; and the motion had been verbally reiterated by
plaintiffs wife on the day of the hearing sought to be cancelled, Under the
circumstances, and in the light of the precedents set out in the opening
paragraphs of this opinion, the respondent Judge's action was
unreasonable, capricious and oppressive, and should be as it is hereby
annulled.
WHEREFORE, the writ of certiorari is granted and the Order of the Court a
quo dated March 6, 1974, dismissing the petitioner's complaint, and the
Order dated March 13, 1974 denying petitioner's motion for
reconsideration, are hereby ANNULLED AND SET ASIDE; Civil Case No.
Q-17563 is hereby REINSTATED and the Regional Trial Court which has
replaced Branch XVIII of the Court of First Instance in which the action
was pending at the time of dismissal, is DIRECTED to continue with the
trial of the petitioner's action and decide the same on the merits in due
course.
FLORES V PEOPLE
Facts: Petitioners plea for their constitutional rights to a speedy trial by
certiorari where the proceeding of the case for robbery against petitioners
dragged on for over a decade without any final judgment rendered by the
court. Petitioners sought for the dismissal of the case due to inordinate
delay in its disposition. The People in its affirmative defense raised the
facts that the case was not properly captioned, as the People of the Phils.
against whom it is filed was not a tribunal exercising judicial functions and
without the Court of Appeals being made a part to the petition there are
insufficient facts to constitute a cause of action. Moreover it defends that
the CA took all necessary steps to complete the transcript of stenographic
notes of the original trial.
the old one may be rendered. The case was returned to the lower court
but nothing was done for about a year because the offended party failed to
appear despite the 6/7 dates set for such hearing. Furthermore, when the
offended party took the witness stand, his testimony was characterized as
a mere fiasco as he could no longer remember the details of the alleged
crime and even failed to identify the 2 accused.
The trial court instead of rendering a decision sent back the records to the
appellate tribunal. 5 more years elapsed without anything being done,
petitioners sought dismissal of the case against them due to inordinate
delay in the disposition (from December 1955- May 1965). CA was
unresponsive notwithstanding the vigorous plea of the petitioners, its last
order being a denial of a second MR dated
January 1966. CA’s defense is that the case was not properly captioned
as “People of the Philippines” and without “Court of Appeals” being made
a party to the petition.
ISSUE: WON constitutional right to a speedy trial was violated.
HELD: YES. Petition for certiorari was granted. Orders denying Motion to
dismiss as Motion to Reconsideration are set aside and nullified. Criminal
Case against petitioners was dismissed.
Constitutional right to a speedy trial means one free from vexatious,
capricious and oppressive delays. An accused is entitled to a trial at the
earliest opportunity. He cannot be oppressed by delaying the
commencement of the trial for an unreasonable length of time. The
Constitution does not say that such right may be availed only where the
prosecution of a crime is commenced and undertaken by the fiscal. It does
not exclude from its operation cases commenced by private individuals.
“Where a person is prosecuted criminally, he is entitled to a speedy trial,
irrespective of the nature of the offense or the manner in which it is
authorized to be commenced”.
Technicalities should give way to the realities of the situation. There
should not be too much significance attached to the procedural defect
(refer to CA’s defense). CA failed to accord respect to this particular
constitutional right amounting at the very least to a grave abuse of
discretion.

Issue: Whether or not the constitutional rights of the accused to a speedy

trial was violated.

Held: The court referred to previous jurisprudence upholding the

constitutional rights of the accused to a speedy trial. It re-affirmed with
emphasis that such right is more significant than the procedural defects
pointed out by the People of the Philippines that the CA should have been
made party-respondent to the petition. Technicalities should always give
way to the reality of the situation and that in the absence of a valid
decision the stage trial was not completed and the accused should be
accorded with the right to contend that they had not been accorded their
right to be tried as promptly as circumstances permit. Thus the SC finds
merit to dismiss the case against the petitioners.

FACTS: Petitioners, Francisco Flores and Francisco Angel, were accused

for robbery. Information was filed in December 1951. They were found
guilty of the crime charged in November 1955. Notice of appeal was file in
December 1955. It was until February 1958 that action was taken by CA—
a resolution remanding the records of the case to the lower court for a
rehearing of the testimony of a certain witness deemed material for the
disposition of the case. Such resolution was amended dated August 1959
which granted the petitioners to set aside the decision so that evidence for
the defense on new facts may be received and a new decision in lieu of
SECTION 17 – RIGHT AGAINST SELF-INCRIMINATION
United States vs. Tan Teng [GR 7081, 7 Septmber 1912] First Division,
Johnson (J): 5 concur
Facts: Oliva Pacomio, a girl 7 years of age, was, on 15 September 1910,
staying in the house of her sister, located on Ilang-Ilang Street, in the city of
Manila. On said day, a number of Chinamen were gambling in or near the said
house. Some of said Chinamen had been in the habit of visiting the house of
Oliva's sister. Oliva Pacomio, on said day, after having taken a bath, returned
to her room. Tan Teng followed her into her room and asked her for some face
powder, which she gave him. After using some of the face powder upon his
private parts, he threw Oliva upon the floor, placing his private parts upon hers,
and remained in the position for some little time. Several days later, perhaps a
week or two, the sister of Oliva Pacomio discovered that the latter was
suffering from a venereal disease known as gonorrhea. It was at the time of
this discovery that Oliva related to her sister what had happened upon the
morning of September 15. The sister at once put on foot an investigation to
find the Chinaman. A number of Chinamen were collected together. Oliva was
called upon to identify the one who had abused her. The defendant was not
present at first. Later he arrived and Oliva identified him at once as the one
who had attempted to violate her. Upon this information, Tan Teng was
arrested and taken to the police station and stripped of his clothing and
examined. The policeman who examined Tan Teng swore that his body bore
every sign of the fact that he was suffering from the venereal disease known
as gonorrhea. The policeman took a portion of the substance emitting from the
body of Tan Teng and turned it over to the Bureau of Science for the purpose
of having a scientific analysis made of the same. The result of the examination
showed that Tan Teng was suffering from gonorrhea. Tan Teng was charged
with the crime of rape. During trial, Tan Teng contended, among others, that
the result of the scientific examination made by the Bureau of Science of the
substance taken from his body, at or about the time he was arrested, was not
admissible in evidence as proof of the fact that he was suffering from
gonorrhea; as that to admit such evidence was to compel the defendant to
testify against himself. After hearing the evidence, the Honorable Charles S.
Lobingier, judge, found Tan Teng guilty of the offense of abusos deshonestos,
as defined and punished under article 439 of the Penal Code, and sentenced
him to be imprisoned for a period of 4 years 6 months and 11 days of prison
correccional, and to pay the costs. Tan Teng appealed.
Issue: Whether the substance taken from Tan Teng, which indicates that he
has gonorrhea, cannot be used as evidence against Tan Teng on the ground
that it is violative of the constitutional injunction against self-incrimination.
Held: As held in Holt vs. US (218 US 245), the prohibition of compelling a man
in a criminal court to be a witness against himself, is a prohibition of the use of
physical or moral compulsion, to extort communications from him, not an
exclusion of his body as evidence, when it may be material. The objection, in
principle, would forbid a court to look at a person and compare his features
with a photograph in proof. Moreover the Court is not considering how far a
court would go in compelling a man to exhibit himself, for when he is exhibited,
whether voluntarily or by order, even if the order goes too far, the evidence if
material, is competent. Verily, the prohibition contained in section 5 of the
Philippine Bill that a person shall not be compelled to be a witness against
himself, is simply a prohibition against legal process to extract from the
defendant's own lips, against his will, an admission of his guilt. The main
purpose of the provision of the Philippine Bill is to prohibit compulsory oral
examination of prisoners before trial, or upon trial, for the purpose of extorting
unwilling confessions or declarations implicating them in the commission of a
crime. Herein, the substance was taken from the body of Tan Teng without his
objection, the examination was made by competent medical authority and the
result showed that Tan Teng was suffering from said disease. As was
suggested by Judge Lobingier, had Tan Teng been found with stolen property
upon his person, there certainly could have been no question had the stolen
property been taken for the purpose of using the same as evidence against
him. So also if the clothing which he wore, by reason of blood stains or
otherwise, had furnished evidence of the commission of a crime, there
certainly could have been no objection to taking such for the purpose of using
the same as proof. No one would think of even suggesting that stolen property
and the clothing in the case indicated, taken from Tan Teng, could not be used
against him as evidence, without violating the rule that a person shall not be
required to give testimony against himself.
Villaflor vs. Summer [GR 16444, 8 September 1920] En Banc, Malcolm (J):
5 concur
Facts: In a criminal case pending before the Court of First Instance of the city
of Manila, Emeteria Villaflor and Florentino Souingco were charged with the
crime of adultery. On trial before the Hon. Pedro Concepcion, Judge of First
Instance, upon the petition of the assistant fiscal for the city of Manila, the court
ordered Emeteria Villaflor to submit her body to the examination of one or two
competent doctors to determine if she was pregnant or not. Villaflor refused to
obey the order on the ground that such examination of her person was a
violation of the constitutional provision in contempt of court and was ordered to
be committed to Bilibid Prison until she should permit the medical examination
required by the court. Villaflor filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus.
Issue: Whether the compelling of a woman to permit her body to be examined
by physicians to determine if she is pregnant, violates that portion of our Code
of Criminal Procedure, providing that no person shall be compelled in any
criminal case to be a witness against himself.
Held: Obviously a stirring plea can be made showing that under the due
process of law clause of the Constitution every person has a natural and
inherent right to the possession and control of his own body. It is extremely
abhorrent to one's sense of decency and propriety to have to decide that such
inviolability of the person, particularly of a woman, can be invaded by exposure
to another's gaze. To compel any one, and especially a woman, to lay bare the
body, or to submit to the touch of a stranger, without lawful authority, is an
indignity, an assault, and a trespass. However, between a sacrifice of the
ascertainment of truth to personal considerations, between a disregard of the
public welfare for refined notions of delicacy, law and justice cannot hesitate.
Fully conscious that the Court is resolving a most extreme case in a sense,
which on first impression is a shock to one's sensibilities, it must nevertheless
enforce the constitutional provision in this jurisdiction in accord with the policy
and reason thereof, undeterred by merely sentimental influences. Once again
the Court lays down the rule that the constitutional guaranty, that no person
shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself, is
limited to a prohibition against compulsory testimonial selfincrimination. The
corollary to the proposition is that, on a proper showing and under an order of
the trial court, an ocular inspection of the body of the accused is permissible.
The proviso is that torture or force shall be avoided. Whether facts fall within or
without the rule with its corollary and proviso must, of course, be decided as
cases arise. It is a reasonable presumption that in an examination by reputable
and disinterested physicians due care will be taken not to use violence and not
to embarrass the patient any more than is absolutely necessary. Indeed, no
objection to the physical examination being made by the family doctor of the
accused or by doctor of the same sex can be seen.
Beltran vs. Samson [GR 32025, 23 September 1929] First Division,
Romualdez (J): 6 concur
Facts: Felix Samson, Judge of the Second Judicial District ordered Francisco
Beltran to appear before the Provincial Fiscal of Isabela, Francisco Jose, to
take dictations in his own handwriting from the latter. The purpose for such
was for the fiscal to compare Beltran's handwriting and to determine if it is he
who wrote certain documents supposed to be falsified. Beltran filed a petition
for a writ of prohibition.
Issue: Whether the writing from the fiscal's dictation by Beltran for the purpose
of comparing the latter's handwriting and determining whether he wrote certain
documents supposed to be falsified, constitutes evidence against himself
within the scope and meaning of the constitutional provision (i.e. "Nor shall he
be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself.").
Held: The fiscal under section 1687 of the Administrative Code, and the proper
judge, upon motion of the fiscal, may compel witnesses to be present at the
investigation of any crime of misdemeanor. But this power must be exercised
without prejudice to the constitutional rights of persons cited to appear. The
privilege is found in the Jones Law, which provides that "Nor shall he be
compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself." This text is not
limited to declaracion but says "to be a witness." As to its scope, this privilege
is not limited precisely to testimony, but extends to all giving or furnishing of
evidence. Writing is something more than moving the body, or the hand, or the
fingers. Writing is not a purely mechanical and attention. Herein, writing means
that Beltran is to furnish a means to determine or not he is the falsifier, as the
petition of the provincial fiscal clearly states. Except that it is more serious, the
present case is similar to that of producing documents of chattels in one's
possession. And as to such production of documents or chattels, which is not
so serious as present, the same eminent Professor Wigmore, in his work cited,
says (volume 4, page 864): "2264, Production or Inspection of Documents and
Chattels. — 1. It follows that the production of documents or chattels by a
person (whether ordinary witness or party-witness) in response to a subpoena,
or to a motion to order production, or to other form of process treating him as a
witness (i. e. as a person appearing before the tribunal to furnish testimony on
his moral responsibility for truth- telling), may be refused under the protection
of the privilege; and this is universally conceded." Thus, for the purposes of the
constitutional privilege, there is a similarity between one who is compelled to
produce a document, and one who is compelled to furnish a specimen of his
handwriting, for in both cases, the witness is required to furnish evidence
against himself. The present case is more serious than that of compelling the
production of documents or chattels, because here the witness is compelled to
write and create, by means of the act of writing, evidence which does not exist,
and which may identify him as the falsifier. It cannot be contended that if
permission to obtain a specimen of Beltran's handwriting is not granted, the
crime would go unpunished. Considering the circumstance that Beltran is a
municipal treasurer, it should not be a difficult matter for the fiscal to obtain
genuine specimens of his handwriting. But even supposing it is impossible to
obtain a specimen or specimens without resorting to the means complained of,
that is not reason for trampling upon a personal right guaranteed by the
constitution. It might be true that in some cases criminals may succeed in
evading the hand of justice, but such cases are accidental and do not
constitute the raison d'etre of the privilege. This constitutional privilege exists
for the protection of innocent persons. Hence, the Court ordered the judge and
the fiscal and those under their orders desist and abstain absolutely and
forever from compelling Beltran to take down dictation in his handwriting for the
purpose of submitting the latter for comparison.
Chavez vs. Court of Appeals [GR L-29169, 19 August 1968] En Banc,
Sanchez (J): 7 concur
Facts: A few days before 12 November 1962, Roger Chavez saw Johnson
Lee, a Chinese, driving a Thunderbird car. With Ricardo Sumilang (movie actor
Romeo Vasquez) in mind, whom he knew was in the market for such a car,
Chavez asked Lee whether his car was for sale. Lee answered affirmatively
and left his address with Chavez. Then, on November 12, Chavez met
Sumilang at a barbershop, informed him about the Thunderbird. But Sumilang
said that he had changed his mind about buying a new car. Instead, he told
Chavez that he wanted to mortgage his Buick car for P10,000.00 to cover an
indebtedness in Pasay City. Upon the suggestion of Chavez, they went to see
Luis Asistio, who he knew was lending money on car mortgages and who, on
one occasion, already lent Romeo Vasquez P3,000.00 on the same Buick car.
Asistio however told the two that he had a better idea on how to raise the
money. His plan was to capitalize on Romeo Vasquez' reputation as a wealthy
movie star, introduce him as a buyer to someone who was selling a car and,
after the deed of sale is signed, by trickery to run away with the car. Asistio
would then register it, sell it to a third person for a profit. Chavez, known to be
a car agent, was included in the plan. He furnished the name of Johnson Lee
who was selling his Thunderbird. In the morning of November 14, Chavez
telephoned Johnson Lee and arranged for an appointment. Sometime in the
afternoon, Chavez and Sumilang met Lee in his Thunderbird on Highway 54.
Sumilang was introduced as the interested buyer. Sumilang's driver inspected
the car, took the wheel for a while. After Sumilang and Lee agreed on the
purchase price (P21,000.00), they went to Binondo to Johnson Lee's cousin,
Dy Sun Hiok, in whose name the car was registered. Thereafter, they went to
see a lawyer-notary public in Quezon City, known to Chavez, for the drafting of
the deed of sale. After the deed of sale was drawn up, it was signed by
Sumilang as the vendee, Dy Sun Hiok the vendor, and Sumilang's driver and
Johnson Lee the witnesses thereto. As payment was to be made at Eugene's
restaurant in Quezon City, all of them then drove in the Thunderbird car to that
place. The deed of sale and other papers remained in the pockets of Johnson
Lee. At Eugene's, a man approached Sumilang with a note which stated that
the money was ready at the Dalisay Theater. Sumilang then wrote on the
same note that the money should be brought to the restaurant. At the same
time he requested Lee to exhibit the deed of sale of the car to the note bearer.
Then, the two Chinese were left alone in the restaurant. For Sumilang, who
had left the table to pose for pictures with some fans and came back, again left
never to return. So did Chavez, who disappeared after he left on the pretext of
buying cigarettes. The two Chinese could not locate Sumilang and Chavez.
They went out to the place where the Thunderbird was parked, found that it
was gone. They then immediately reported its loss to the police. Much later,
the NBI recovered the already repainted car and impounded it. Right after the
meeting at Eugene's, Chavez, Sumilang and Asistio converged that same day
at Barrio Fiesta, a restaurant at Highway 54 near the Balintawak monument in
Caloocan. There, Asistio handed to Sumilang P1,000.00 cash and a golf set
worth P800.00 as the latter's share in the transaction. On November 14, the
registration of the car was transferred in the name of Sumilang in Cavite City,
and three days later, in the name of Asistio in Caloocan. Roger Chavez,
Ricardo Sumilang alias "Romeo Vasquez", Edgardo P. Pascual alias "Ging"
Pascual, Pedro Rebullo alias "Pita", Luis Asistio alias "Baby" Asistio, Lorenzo
Meneses alias "Lory" Meneses, Peter Doe, Charlie Doe and Paul Doe were
charged with qualified theft of a motor vehicle, a Thunderbird car (Motor H9YH-
143003, Plate H-16648, Pasay City 1962) together with its accessories worth
P22,200.00, belonging to Dy Sun Hiok y Lim. Upon arraignment, all the
accused, except the three Does who have not been identified nor
apprehended, pleaded not guilty. On 23 July 1963, trial commenced before the
judge presiding Branch IX of the Court of First Instance of Rizal in Quezon
City. When trial opened, the prosecution called upon Roger Chavez to testify
as an ordinary witness (not a State witness). The trial proceeded, with "Fiscal
Grecia" conducting the "direct examination" of Roger Chavez. On 1 February
1965, the trial court rendered judgment which acquitted all other accused
except Roger Chavez, who was found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the
crime of qualified theft. He was accordingly sentenced to suffer an
indeterminate penalty of not less than 10 years, 1 day, as minimum and not
more than 14 years, 8 months and 1 day as maximum, to indemnify Dy Sun
Hiok and/or Johnson Lee in the sum of P21,000.00 without subsidiary
imprisonment in case of insolvency, to undergo the accessory penalties
prescribed by law, and to pay the costs. The Thunderbird car then in the
custody of the NBI was ordered to be turned over to Ricardo Sumilang, who
was directed to return to Asistio the sum of P1,000.00 unless the latter chose
to pay P21,500.00, representing the balance of the contract price for the car.
The sentence was promulgated on 8 March 1965. Roger Chavez appealed to
the Court of Appeals. On 14 May 1967, the Court of Appeals resolved to
dismiss the appeal. A move to reconsider was unavailing as, on 21 June 1968,
the Court of Appeals, through a per curiam resolution, disposed to maintain its
May 14 resolution dismissing the appeal, directed the City Warden of Manila
where Chavez is confined by virtue of the warrant of arrest issued by the Court
of Appeals, to the turn him over to Muntinglupa Bilibid Prisons pending
execution of the judgment below, and ordered remand of the case to the
Quezon City court for execution of judgment. Chavez filed a petition for a writ
of habeas corpus, and in the alternative, prayed for grant of the alternative
remedies of certiorari to strike down the two resolutions of the Court of Appeals
dismissing his appeal for failure to file brief, and of mandamus to direct the
said court to forward his appeal to the Supreme Court for the reason that he
was raising purely questions of law.
Issue: Whether a petition for a writ ofhabeas corpus is the proper remedy for
the court’s disregard of Chavez’ constitutional guarantee against self-
incrimination.
Held: The course which Chavez took is correct. Habeas corpus is a high
prerogative writ. It is traditionally considered as an exceptional remedy to
release a person whose liberty is illegally restrained such as when the
accused's constitutional rights are disregarded. Such defect results in the
absence or loss of jurisdiction and therefore invalidates the trial and the
consequent conviction of the accused whose fundamental right was violated.
That void judgment of conviction may be challenged by collateral attack, which
precisely is the function of habeas corpus. This writ may issue even if another
remedy which is less effective may be availed of by the defendant. Thus,
failure by the accused to perfect his appeal before the Court of Appeals does
not preclude a recourse to the writ. The writ may be granted upon a judgment
already final. For the writ of habeas corpus as an extraordinary remedy must
be liberally given effect so as to protect well a person whose liberty is at stake.
Under our own Rules of Court, to grant the remedy to Chavez whose case
presents a clear picture of disregard of a constitutional right is absolutely
proper. Section 1 of Rule 102 extends the writ, unless otherwise expressly
provided by law, "to all cases of illegal confinement or detention by which any
person is deprived of his liberty, or by which the rightful custody of any person
is withheld from the person entitled thereto." Further, a void judgment is in
legal effect no judgment. By it no rights are divested. From it no rights can be
obtained. Being worthless in itself, all proceedings founded upon it are equally
worthless. It neither binds nor bars any one. All acts performed under it and all
claims flowing out of it are void. The parties attempting to enforce it may be
responsible as trespassers. Still, since Chavez is still serving under a final and
valid judgment of conviction for another offense. he is entitled to liberty thru
habeas corpus only with respect to Criminal Case Q-5311 of the Court of First
Instance of Rizal, Quezon City Branch, under which he was prosecuted and
convicted.
People vs. Gallarde [GR 133025, 17 February 2000] First Division, Davide
Jr. (CJ): 4 concur
Facts: In the evening of 26 May 1997, at the house of spouses Eduardo and
Elena Talan in Brgy. Trenchera, Tayug, Pangasinan, their neighbors
converged. Among them were Radel Gallarde, Francisco, Renato, Edwin, all
surnamed Fernandez, Romel Hernandez, Jaime Cabinta, Rosy Clemente, Jon
Talen, Noel Arellaga and Ramil Bargon. Idling by was Editha, 10 year old
daughter of spouses Talan. After a while, Roger stood up and invited Jaime
and Gallarde to dine in the kitchen. As they partook of the meal, Gallarde
suddenly left. Jaime, too, stepped out of the kitchen to urinate. Outside the
house, he chanced upon Gallarde and Editha talking to each other. Jaime
whistled at Gallarde but instead of minding him, the latter sprinted towards the
road leading to his house. Thereafter, Editha entered the kitchen and took hold
of a kerosene lamp. Jaime followed her and asked where she was going.
Editha answered that she would look for Gallarde. Soon Editha left enroute to
where Gallarde fled. By 10:00 p.m., the drinking buddies had dispersed but
Jaime, Francisco, Edwin and Rose regrouped at Renato's place where they
talked and relaxed. Moments later, Roger arrived and informed them that
Editha was missing. Roger asked the group to help look for her. Elena Talan
informed his uncle, Barangay Ex-kagawad Mario Fernandez, about her
daughter's disappearance. The latter, together with his son Edwin, wife Virginia
and nephew Freddie Cortez wasted no time in joining their neighbors search
the houses, dikes and fields to look for the missing child. When Jaime
mentioned that Gallarde was the last person he saw talking to Editha, the
searchers went back to the house of Gallarde. The searchers found Gallarde
squatting with his short pants at the toilet about 6 meters away from Gallarde's
house; his hands and knees covered with soil. Asked where Editha was,
Gallarde replied: "I do not know, I did not do anything to her." To the question,
"where did you come from since a while ago you were not yet in this toilet?"
Gallarde answered "I was with Kiko, I was asleep in their house. One of the
searchers Mario Bado, got angry and countered that Gallarde's statement was
impossible because Kiko was with him drinking. After the confrontation at the
toilet, Exkagawad Fernandez brought Gallarde to Brgy. Captain Felicisimo
Mendoza, informing the latter that Gallarde was the last person seen talking
with the missing child. Fernandez then rejoined the searchers. Back in the
field, Virginia Fernandez tripped on a wet ground. The searchers, thereafter,
noticed disheveled grasses, and a wide hole among the disheveled grass.
When Ex-kagawad Fernandez forthwith scratched some earth aside and then
Editha's hand pitted out. Fernandez screamed in terror. Meantime, Barangay
Captain Mendoza heard shouts saying: "She is here, she is now here already
dead!" Mindful of Gallarde's safety, Brgy. Captain Mendoza decided to bring
Gallarde to the municipal building. On their way though, they met policemen on
board a vehicle. He flagged them down and turned over the person of
Gallarde, saying: "Here is the suspect in the disappearance of the little girl.
Since you are already here, I am giving him to you." The policemen together
with Gallarde proceeded to where the people found Editha. One of the
policemen shoved more soil aside. The lifeless Editha was completely naked
when she was recovered. A picture of Gallarde was taken without any counsel
present. On 24 June 1997, Gallarde was charged with the special complex
crime of rape with homicide. During the arraignment on 1 September 1997,
Gallarde, with the assistance of counsel, entered a plea of not guilty. Trial of
the case immediately ensued as the defense waived the holding of the pretrial
conference. On 12 February 1998, the Regional Trial Court of Tayug,
Pangasinan, Branch 51, rendered a decision convicting Gallarde of the crime
of murder only, not of the complex crime of rape with homicide because of the
lack of proof of carnal knowledge, and sentenced him to suffer the penalty of
reclusion perpetua and to indemnify the heirs of the late Editha Talan in the
negotiated sum of P70,000.00. His motion for reconsideration, having been
denied by the trial court in its Resolution of 28 February 1998, Gallarde
appealed to the Supreme Court.
Issue: Whether The taking of pictures of an accused violates of his
constitutional right against self-incrimination.
Held: The taking of pictures of an accused even without the assistance of
counsel, being a purely mechanical act, is not a violation of his constitutional
right against self-incrimination. The constitutional right of an accused against
self-incrimination proscribes the use of physical or moral compulsion to extort
communications from the accused and not the inclusion of his body in
evidence when it may be material. Purely mechanical acts are not included in
the prohibition as the accused does not thereby speak his guilt, hence the
assistance and guiding hand of counsel is not required. The essence of the
right against selfincrimination is testimonial compulsion, that is, the giving of
evidence against himself through a testimonial act. Hence, it has been held
that a woman charged with adultery may be compelled to submit to physical
examination to determine her pregnancy; and an accused may be compelled
to submit to physical examination and to have a substance taken from his body
for medical determination as to whether he was suffering from gonorrhea
which was contracted by his victim; to expel morphine from his mouth; to have
the outline of his foot traced to determine its identity with bloody footprints; and
to be photographed or measured, or his garments or shoes removed or
replaced, or to move his body to enable the foregoing things to be done.
Pascual vs. Board of Medical Examiners [GR L-25018, 26 May 1969] En
Banc, Fernando (J): 6 concur, 2 took no part, 2 on official leave
Facts: Salvador Gatbonton and Enriqueta Gatbonton filed an administrative
case against Arsenio Pascual Jr. for alleged immorality. At the initial hearing
thereof, Gatbonton’s counsel announced that he would present Pascual as his
first witness. Thereupon, Pascual, through counsel, made of record his
objection, relying on the constitutional right to be exempt from being a witness
against himself. The Board of Examiners, took note of such a plea, at the same
time stating that at the next scheduled hearing, on 12 February 1965, Pascual
would be called upon to testify as such witness, unless in the meantime he
could secure a restraining order from a competent authority. Arsenio Pascual,
Jr., filed on 1 February 1965 with the Court of First Instance of Manila
an action for prohibition with prayer for preliminary injunction against the
Board of Medical Examiners. On 9 February 1965, the lower court ordered that
a writ of preliminary injunction issue against the Board commanding it to refrain
from hearing or further proceeding with such an administrative case, to await
the judicial disposition of the matter upon Pascual posting a bond in the
amount of P500.00. There was a motion for intervention by Salvador
Gatbonton and Enriqueta Gatbonton, asking that they be allowed to file an
answer as intervenors. Such a motion was granted and an answer in
intervention was duly filed by them on 23 March 1965 sustaining the power of
Board, which for them is limited to compelling the witness to take the stand, to
be distinguished from the power to compel a witness to incriminate himself. A the PCGG since the petitioner was able to satisfy the requirements both of the
decision was rendered by the lower court on 2 August 1965, finding the claim law and the parties’ implementing agreements. Though the petitioners were
of Pascual to be well-founded and prohibiting the Board "from compelling the not able to testify against the Marcoses in RICO, it can be said that it not their
petitioner to act and testify as a witness for the complainant in said own fault.
investigation without his consent and against himself." Hence, the Board and
the Gatbontons appealed. Wherefore, the petitioner must be acquitted on the basis of the immunity
granted by the PCGG, which under the law has the power to grant immunity.
Issue: Whether a medical practitioner charged with malpractice in
administrative case can avail of the constitutional guarantee not to be a TWO KINDS OF IMMUNITY CAN BE GRANTED:
witness against himself.
1. Transactional Immunity - is broader aint he scope of its protection.
Held: The constitutional guarantee against self-incrimination is not limited to By its grant the witness can no longer be prosecuted for any
allowing a witness to object to questions the answers to which could lead to a offence whatsoever arising out of the act or transaction.
penal liability being subsequently incurred. It is true that one aspect of such a 2. Used-and-derivative-use - a witnessed is only assured that his or
right, to follow the language of another American decision, is the protection her particular testimony and evidence derived from it will not be
against "any disclosures which the witness may reasonably apprehend could used against him or her in a subsequent prosecution.
be used in a criminal prosecution or which could lead to other evidence that
might be so used." If that were all there is then it becomes diluted. The
constitutional guarantee protects as well the right to silence. As far back as
1905, the Court had occasion to declare: "The accused has a perfect right to
remain silent and his silence cannot be used as a presumption of his guilt."
Recently, in Chavez v. Court of Appeals, the Court reaffirmed the doctrine
anew that is the right of a defendant "to forego testimony, to remain silent,
unless he chooses to take the witness stand—with undiluted, unfettered
exercise of his own free genuine will." The constitutional guarantee, along with
other rights granted an accused, stands for a belief that while crime should not
go unpunished and that the truth must be revealed, such desirable objectives
should not be accomplished according to means or methods offensive to the
high sense of respect accorded the human personality. More and more in line
with the democratic creed, the deference accorded an individual even those
suspected of the most heinous crimes is given due weight. To quote from Chief
Justice Warren, "the constitutional foundation underlying the privilege is the
respect a government must accord to the dignity and integrity of its citizens."
Thus, in an administrative hearing against a medical practitioner for alleged
malpractice, the Board of Medical Examiners cannot, consistently with the self-
incrimination clause, compel the person proceeded against to take the witness
stand without his consent.

MAPA VS SANDIGANBAYAN: STATUTORY IMMUNITY

FACTS: Petitioner herein was charged with violation of Anti Graft and Corrupt
Practices.However he was granted an immunity from suit by the PCGG related
to the previous charges against him, provided that he will testify as witness
against the Marcoses in criminal proceedings in the United States Vs
Ferdinand Marcos, during the RICO, where Ferdinand Marcos and his wife,
Imelda Marcos were being tried for charges of corruption. All the expenses of
Mapa were shouldered by the PCCG when they flew to New York to testify
against the Marcoses. During the trial, Ferdinand Marcos died and La Bella,
the American prosecutor dispensed the testimony of Mapa and thereby
acquitted Imelda Marcos. Since Mapa, was not able to testify, it was contended
that the immunity from suit of Mapa took without force and effect. However, the
record shows that the petitioners provided information to the PCGG relating to
the prosecution of the RICO cases against the Marcoses in New York. Hence
this petition.

ISSUE: Whether or not the immunity given by the PCGG to Mapa is still in
effect and force.

HELD: Yes. Under Sec. 5, EO 14, the PCGG has the separate power to grant
immunity to any person from being prosecuted provided they will meet the
conditions provided by the PCGG.

In the case at bar, Mapa was granted immunity from the prosecution or
criminal case where he is being tried, and the PCGG even shouldered all the
expenses of Mapa when they flew to New York to testify implying that Mapa
was able to meet the conditions and the PCGG accepted the information given
by him (MAPA) to testify against the Marcoses during the RICO trial. Failure of
the petitioner to testify on the RICO can not nullify the immunity given to him by