throughout the Philippines, prevent or suppress all forms of lawless violence as well any
DAVID VS MACAPAGAL - ARROYO
G.R. No. 171396, May 3 2006
[Legislative Department - Power to Declare War and Delegate Emergency
Power]
FACTS:
On February 24, 2006, President Arroyo issued PP No. 1017 declaring a state of
emergency, thus:
NOW, THEREFORE, I, Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, President of the Republic of the Philippines
and Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, [calling-out power] by
virtue of the powers vested upon me by Section 18, Article 7 of the Philippine Constitution
which states that: “The President. . . whenever it becomes necessary, . . . may call out
(the) armed forces to prevent or suppress. . .rebellion. . .,” and in my capacity as their
Commander-in-Chief, do hereby command the Armed Forces of the Philippines, to maintain
law and order throughout the Philippines, prevent or suppress all forms of lawless violence
as well as any act of insurrection or rebellion ["take care" power] and to enforce obedience
to all the laws and to all decrees, orders and regulations promulgated by me personally or
upon my direction; and [power to take over] as provided in Section 17, Article 12 of the
Constitution do hereby declare a State of National Emergency.
On the same day, PGMA issued G.O. No. 5 implementing PP1017, directing the members of
the AFP and PNP "to immediately carry out the necessary and appropriate actions and
measures to suppress and prevent acts of terrorism and lawless violence."
David, et al. assailed PP 1017 on the grounds that (1) it encroaches on the emergency
powers of Congress; (2) it is a subterfuge to avoid the constitutional requirements for the
imposition of martial law; and (3) it violates the constitutional guarantees of freedom of
the press, of speech and of assembly. They alleged “direct injury” resulting from “illegal
arrest” and “unlawful search” committed by police operatives pursuant to PP 1017.
During the hearing, the Solicitor General argued that the issuance of PP 1017 and GO 5
have factual basis, and contended that the intent of the Constitution is to give full
discretionary powers to the President in determining the necessity of calling out the armed
forces. The petitioners did not contend the facts stated b the Solicitor General.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the PP 1017 and G.O. No. 5 is constitutional.
RULING:
The operative portion of PP 1017 may be divided into three important provisions, thus:
First provision: “by virtue of the power vested upon me by Section 18, Artilce VII … do
hereby command the Armed Forces of the Philippines, to maintain law and order
Constitutional Law 1 Case digest Compiled by: Justice “merzy”
act of insurrection or rebellion”
Second provision: “and to enforce obedience to all the laws and to all decrees, orders
and regulations promulgated by me personally or upon my direction;”
Third provision: “as provided in Section 17, Article XII of the Constitution do hereby
declare a State of National Emergency.”
PP 1017 is partially constitutional insofar as provided by the first provision of the decree.
First Provision: Calling Out Power.
The only criterion for the exercise of the calling-out power is that “whenever it becomes
necessary,” the President may call the armed forces “to prevent or suppress lawless
violence, invasion or rebellion.” (Integrated Bar of the Philippines v. Zamora)
President Arroyo’s declaration of a “state of rebellion” was merely an act declaring a status
or condition of public moment or interest, a declaration allowed under Section 4, Chap 2,
Bk II of the Revised Administration Code. Such declaration, in the words of Sanlakas, is
harmless, without legal significance, and deemed not written. In these cases, PP 1017 is
more than that. In declaring a state of national emergency, President Arroyo did not only
rely on Section 18, Article VII of the Constitution, a provision calling on the AFP to prevent
or suppress lawless violence, invasion or rebellion. She also relied on Section 17, Article
XII, a provision on the State’s extraordinary power to take over privately-owned public
utility and business affected with public interest. Indeed, PP 1017 calls for the exercise of
an awesome power. Obviously, such Proclamation cannot be deemed harmless.
To clarify, PP 1017 is not a declaration of Martial Law. It is merely an exercise of President
Arroyo’s calling-out power for the armed forces to assist her in preventing or suppressing
lawless violence.
Second Provision: The "Take Care" Power.
The second provision pertains to the power of the President to ensure that the laws be
faithfully executed. This is based on Section 17, Article VII which reads:
SEC. 17. The President shall have control of all the executive departments, bureaus, and
offices. He shall ensure that the laws be faithfully executed.
This Court rules that the assailed PP 1017 is unconstitutional insofar as it grants President
Arroyo the authority to promulgate “decrees.” Legislative power is peculiarly within the
province of the Legislature. Section 1, Article VI categorically states that “[t]he legislative
power shall be vested in the Congress of the Philippines which shall consist of a Senate
and a House of Representatives.” To be sure, neither Martial Law nor a state of rebellion
nor a state of emergency can justify President Arroyo’s exercise of legislative power by
issuing decrees.
Third Provision: The Power to Take Over
Distinction must be drawn between the President’s authority to declare“a state of national
emergency” and to exercise emergency powers. To the first, Section 18, Article VII grants
the President such power, hence, no legitimate constitutional objection can be raised. But
to the second, manifold constitutional issues arise.
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Generally, Congress is the repository of emergency powers. This is evident in the tenor of
Section 23 (2), Article VI authorizing it to delegate such powers to the President.
Certainly, a body cannot delegate a power not reposed upon it. However, knowing that
during grave emergencies, it may not be possible or practicable for Congress to meet and
exercise its powers, the Framers of our Constitution deemed it wise to allow Congress to
grant emergency powers to the President, subject to certain conditions, thus:
(1) There must be a war or other emergency.
(2) The delegation must be for a limited period only.
(3) The delegation must be subject to such restrictions as the Congress may prescribe.
(4) The emergency powers must be exercised to carry out a national policy declared by
Congress.
Section 17, Article XII must be understood as an aspect of the emergency powers
clause. The taking over of private business affected with public interest is just another
facet of the emergency powers generally reposed upon Congress. Thus, when Section 17
states that the “the State may, during the emergency and under reasonable terms
prescribed by it, temporarily take over or direct the operation of any privately owned public
utility or business affected with public interest,” it refers to Congress, not the President.
Now, whether or not the President may exercise such power is dependent on whether
Congress may delegate it to him pursuant to a law prescribing the reasonable terms
thereof.
Following our interpretation of Section 17, Article XII, invoked by President Arroyo in
issuing PP 1017, this Court rules that such Proclamation does not authorize her during the
emergency to temporarily take over or direct the operation of any privately owned public
utility or business affected with public interest without authority from Congress.
Let it be emphasized that while the President alone can declare a state of national
emergency, however, without legislation, he has no power to take over privately-owned
public utility or business affected with public interest. Nor can he determine when such
exceptional circumstances have ceased. Likewise, without legislation, the President has no
power to point out the types of businesses affected with public interest that should be
taken over. In short, the President has no absolute authority to exercise all the powers of
the State under Section 17, Article VII in the absence of an emergency powers act passed
by Congress.
As of G.O. No. 5, it is constitutional since it provides a standard by which the AFP and the
PNP should implement PP 1017, i.e. whatever is “necessary and appropriate actions and
measures to suppress and prevent acts of lawless violence.” Considering that “acts of
terrorism” have not yet been defined and made punishable by the Legislature, such portion
of G.O. No. 5 is declared unconstitutional.
SANLAKAS Vs. Executive Secretary
421 SCRA 656 G.R. No. 159085
February 3, 2004
Facts: During the wee hours of July 27, 2003, some three-hundred junior officers and
enlisted men of the AFP, acting upon instigation, command and direction of known and
Constitutional Law 1 Case digest Compiled by: Justice “merzy”
unknown leaders have seized the Oakwood Building in Makati. Publicly, they complained of
the corruption in the AFP and declared their withdrawal of support for the government,
demanding the resignation of the President, Secretary of Defense and the PNP Chief.
These acts constitute a violation of Article 134 of the Revised Penal Code, and by virtue of
Proclamation No. 427 and General Order No. 4, the Philippines was declared under the
State of Rebellion. Negotiations took place and the officers went back to their barracks in
the evening of the same day. On August 1, 2003, both the Proclamation and General
Orders were lifted, and Proclamation No. 435, declaring the Cessation of the State of
Rebellion was issued.
In the interim, however, the following petitions were filed: (1) SANLAKAS AND PARTIDO
NG MANGGAGAWA VS. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, petitioners contending that Sec. 18 Article
VII of the Constitution does not require the declaration of a state of rebellion to call out
the AFP, and that there is no factual basis for such proclamation. (2)SJS Officers/Members
v. Hon. Executive Secretary, et al, petitioners contending that the proclamation is a
circumvention of the report requirement under the same Section 18, Article VII,
commanding the President to submit a report to Congress within 48 hours from the
proclamation of martial law. Finally, they contend that the presidential issuances cannot be
construed as an exercise of emergency powers as Congress has not delegated any such
power to the President. (3) Rep. Suplico et al. v. President Macapagal-Arroyo and
Executive Secretary Romulo, petitioners contending that there was usurpation of the power
of Congress granted by Section 23 (2), Article VI of the Constitution. (4) Pimentel v.
Romulo, et al, petitioner fears that the declaration of a state of rebellion "opens the door
to the unconstitutional implementation of warrantless arrests" for the crime of rebellion.
Issue:
Whether or Not Proclamation No. 427 and General Order No. 4 are constitutional?
Whether or Not the petitioners have a legal standing or locus standi to bring suit?
Held: The Court rendered that the both the Proclamation No. 427 and General Order No. 4
are constitutional. Section 18, Article VII does not expressly prohibit declaring state or
rebellion. The President in addition to its Commander-in-Chief Powers is conferred by the
Constitution executive powers. It is not disputed that the President has full discretionary
power to call out the armed forces and to determine the necessity for the exercise of such
power. While the Court may examine whether the power was exercised within
constitutional limits or in a manner constituting grave abuse of discretion, none of the
petitioners here have, by way of proof, supported their assertion that the President acted
without factual basis. The issue of the circumvention of the report is of no merit as there
was no indication that military tribunals have replaced civil courts or that military
authorities have taken over the functions of Civil Courts. The issue of usurpation of the
legislative power of the Congress is of no moment since the President, in declaring a state
of rebellion and in calling out the armed forces, was merely exercising a wedding of her
Chief Executive and Commander-in-Chief powers. These are purely executive powers,
vested on the President by Sections 1 and 18, Article VII, as opposed to the delegated
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legislative powers contemplated by Section 23 (2), Article VI. The fear on warrantless
arrest is unreasonable, since any person may be subject to this whether there is rebellion
or not as this is a crime punishable under the Revised Penal Code, and as long as a valid
warrantless arrest is present.
Legal standing or locus standi has been defined as a personal and substantial interest in
the case such that the party has sustained or will sustain direct injury as a result of the
governmental act that is being challenged. The gist of the question of standing is whether
a party alleges "such personal stake in the outcome of the controversy as to assure that
concrete adverseness which sharpens the presentation of Issue upon which the court
depends for illumination of difficult constitutional questions. Based on the foregoing,
petitioners Sanlakas and PM, and SJS Officers/Members have no legal standing to sue.
Only petitioners Rep. Suplico et al. and Sen. Pimentel, as Members of Congress, have
standing to challenge the subject issuances. It sustained its decision in Philippine
Constitution Association v. Enriquez, that the extent the powers of Congress are impaired,
so is the power of each member thereof, since his office confers a right to participate in
the exercise of the powers of that institution.
SALONGA vs PAÑO
G.R. No. L-59524 February 18, 1985
Facts: The petitioner invokes the constitutionally protected right to life and liberty
guaranteed by the due process clause, alleging that no prima facie case has been
established to warrant the filing of an information for subversion against him. Petitioner
asks the Court to prohibit and prevent the respondents from using the iron arm of the law
to harass, oppress, and persecute him, a member of the democratic opposition in the
Philippines.
The case roots backs to the rash of bombings which occurred in the Metro Manila area in
the months of August, September and October of 1980. Victor Burns Lovely, Jr, one of the
victims of the bombing, implicated petitioner Salonga as one of those responsible.
On December 10, 1980, the Judge Advocate General sent the petitioner a “Notice of
Preliminary Investigation” in People v. Benigno Aquino, Jr., et al. (which included petitioner
as a co-accused), stating that “the preliminary investigation of the above-entitled case has
been set at 2:30 o’clock p.m. on December 12, 1980” and that petitioner was given ten
(10) days from receipt of the charge sheet and the supporting evidence within which to file
his counter-evidence. The petitioner states that up to the time martial law was lifted on
January 17, 1981, and despite assurance to the contrary, he has not received any copies of
the charges against him nor any copies of the so-called supporting evidence.
The counsel for Salonga was furnished a copy of an amended complaint signed by Gen.
Prospero Olivas, dated 12 March 1981, charging Salonga, along with 39 other accused with
the violation of RA 1700, as amended by PD 885, BP 31 and PD 1736. On 15 October
1981, the counsel for Salonga filed a motion to dismiss the charges against Salonga for
failure of the prosecution to establish a prima facie case against him. On 2 December
1981, Judge Ernani Cruz Pano (Presiding Judge of the Court of First Instance of Rizal,
Branch XVIII, Quezon City) denied the motion. On 4 January 1982, he (Pano) issued a
Constitutional Law 1 Case digest Compiled by: Justice “merzy”
resolution ordering the filing of an information for violation of the Revised Anti-Subversion
Act, as amended, against 40 people, including Salonga. The resolutions of the said judge
dated 2 December 1981 and 4 January 1982 are the subject of the present petition for
certiorari. It is the contention of Salonga that no prima facie case has been established by
the prosecution to justify the filing of an information against him. He states that to
sanction his further prosecution despite the lack of evidence against him would be to admit
that no rule of law exists in the Philippines today.
Issues: 1. Whether the above case still falls under an actual case
2. Whether the above case dropped by the lower court still deserves a decision from the
Supreme Court
Held: 1. No. The Court had already deliberated on this case, a consensus on the Court’s
judgment had been arrived at, and a draft ponencia was circulating for concurrences and
separate opinions, if any, when on January 18, 1985, respondent Judge Rodolfo Ortiz
granted the motion of respondent City Fiscal Sergio Apostol to drop the subversion case
against the petitioner. Pursuant to instructions of the Minister of Justice, the prosecution
restudied its evidence and decided to seek the exclusion of petitioner Jovito Salonga as
one of the accused in the information filed under the questioned resolution.
The court is constrained by this action of the prosecution and the respondent Judge to
withdraw the draft ponencia from circulating for concurrences and signatures and to place
it once again in the Court’s crowded agenda for further deliberations.
Insofar as the absence of a prima facie case to warrant the filing of subversion charges is
concerned, this decision has been rendered moot and academic by the action of the
prosecution.
2. Yes. Despite the SC’s dismissal of the petition due to the case’s moot and academic
nature, it has on several occasions rendered elaborate decisions in similar cases where
mootness was clearly apparent.
The Court also has the duty to formulate guiding and controlling constitutional principles,
precepts, doctrines, or rules. It has the symbolic function of educating bench and bar on
the extent of protection given by constitutional guarantees.
In dela Camara vs Enage (41 SCRA 1), the court ruled that:
“The fact that the case is moot and academic should not preclude this Tribunal from
setting forth in language clear and unmistakable, the obligation of fidelity on the part of
lower court judges to the unequivocal command of the Constitution that excessive bail
shall not be required.”
In Gonzales v. Marcos (65 SCRA 624) whether or not the Cultural Center of the Philippines
could validly be created through an executive order was mooted by Presidential Decree No.
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15, the Center’s new charter pursuant to the President’s legislative powers under martial
law. Nevertheless, the Court discussed the constitutional mandate on the preservation and
development of Filipino culture for national Identity. (Article XV, Section 9, Paragraph 2 of
the Constitution).
In the habeas corpus case of Aquino, Jr., v. Enrile, 59 SCRA 183), the fact that the petition
was moot and academic did not prevent this Court in the exercise of its symbolic function
from promulgating one of the most voluminous decisions ever printed in the Reports.
TANADA v. ANGARA
272 SCRA 18, May 2, 1997
Facts: This is a petition seeking to nullify the Philippine ratification of the World Trade
Organization (WTO) Agreement. Petitioners question the concurrence of herein
respondents acting in their capacities as Senators via signing the said agreement.
The WTO opens access to foreign markets, especially its major trading partners, through
the reduction of tariffs on its exports, particularly agricultural and industrial products. Thus,
provides new opportunities for the service sector cost and uncertainty associated with
exporting and more investment in the country. These are the predicted benefits as
reflected in the agreement and as viewed by the signatory Senators, a “free market”
espoused by WTO.
Petitioners on the other hand viewed the WTO agreement as one that limits, restricts and
impair Philippine economic sovereignty and legislative power. That the Filipino First policy
of the Constitution was taken for granted as it gives foreign trading intervention.
Issue : Whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction on the part of the Senate in giving its concurrence of the said WTO
agreement.
Held: In its Declaration of Principles and state policies, the Constitution “adopts the
generally accepted principles of international law as part of the law of the land, and
adheres to the policy of peace, equality, justice, freedom, cooperation and amity , with all
nations. By the doctrine of incorporation, the country is bound by generally accepted
principles of international law, which are considered automatically part of our own laws.
Pacta sunt servanda – international agreements must be performed in good faith. A treaty
is not a mere moral obligation but creates a legally binding obligation on the parties.
Through WTO the sovereignty of the state cannot in fact and reality be considered as
absolute because it is a regulation of commercial relations among nations. Such as when
Philippines joined the United Nations (UN) it consented to restrict its sovereignty right
under the “concept of sovereignty as autolimitation.” What Senate did was a valid exercise
of authority. As to determine whether such exercise is wise, beneficial or viable is outside
the realm of judicial inquiry and review. The act of signing the said agreement is not a
Constitutional Law 1 Case digest Compiled by: Justice “merzy”
legislative restriction as WTO allows withdrawal of membership should this be the political
desire of a member. Also, it should not be viewed as a limitation of economic sovereignty.
WTO remains as the only viable structure for multilateral trading and the veritable forum
for the development of international trade law. Its alternative is isolation, stagnation if not
economic self-destruction. Thus, the people be allowed, through their duly elected officers,
make their free choice.
Petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit.
PEOPLE v. VERA
65 Phil 56, November 16, 1937
UNDUE DELEGATION OF POWER; EQUAL PROTECTION OF THE LAW
Facts: Mariano Cu Unjieng was convicted by the trial court in Manila. He filed for
reconsideration and four motions for new trial but all were denied. He then elevated to the
Supreme Court and the Supreme Court remanded the appeal to the lower court for a new
trial. While awaiting new trial, he appealed for probation alleging that the he is innocent of
the crime he was convicted of. The Judge of the Manila CFI directed the appeal to the
Insular Probation Office. The IPO denied the application. However, Judge Vera upon
another request by petitioner allowed the petition to be set for hearing. The City
Prosecutor countered alleging that Vera has no power to place Cu Unjieng under probation
because it is in violation of Sec. 11 Act No. 4221 which provides that the act of Legislature
granting provincial boards the power to provide a system of probation to convicted person.
Nowhere in the law is stated that the law is applicable to a city like Manila because it is
only indicated therein that only provinces are covered. And even if Manila is covered by the
law it is unconstitutional because Sec 1 Art 3 of the Constitution provides equal protection
of laws. The said law provides absolute discretion to provincial boards and this also
constitutes undue delegation of power. Further, the said probation law may be an
encroachment of the power of the executive to provide pardon because providing
probation, in effect, is granting freedom, as in pardon.
Issues:
Whether or not Act No. 4221 constituted an undue delegation of legislative power
Whether or not the said act denies the equal protection of the laws
Discussions: An act of the legislature is incomplete and hence invalid if it does not lay
down any rule or definite standard by which the administrative officer or board may be
guided in the exercise of the discretionary powers delegated to it. The probation Act does
not, by the force of any of its provisions, fix and impose upon the provincial boards any
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standard or guide in the exercise of their discretionary power. What is granted, as
mentioned by Justice Cardozo in the recent case of Schecter, supra, is a “roving
commission” which enables the provincial boards to exercise arbitrary discretion. By section
11 if the Act, the legislature does not seemingly on its own authority extend the benefits of
the Probation Act to the provinces but in reality leaves the entire matter for the various
provincial boards to determine.
The equal protection of laws is a pledge of the protection of equal laws. The classification
of equal protection, to be reasonable, must be based on substantial distinctions which
make real differences; it must be germane to the purposes of the law; it must not be
limited to existing conditions only, and must apply equally to each member of the class.
Rulings: The Court concludes that section 11 of Act No. 4221 constitutes an improper and
unlawful delegation of legislative authority to the provincial boards and is, for this reason,
unconstitutional and void. There is no set standard provided by Congress on how provincial
boards must act in carrying out a system of probation. The provincial boards are given
absolute discretion which is violative of the constitution and the doctrine of the non
delegation of power. Further, it is a violation of equity so protected by the constitution.
The challenged section of Act No. 4221 in section 11 which reads as follows: This Act shall
apply only in those provinces in which the respective provincial boards have provided for
the salary of a probation officer at rates not lower than those now provided for provincial
fiscals. Said probation officer shall be appointed by the Secretary of Justice and shall be
subject to the direction of the Probation Office.
The provincial boards of the various provinces are to determine for themselves, whether
the Probation Law shall apply to their provinces or not at all. The applicability and
application of the Probation Act are entirely placed in the hands of the provincial boards. If
the provincial board does not wish to have the Act applied in its province, all that it has to
do is to decline to appropriate the needed amount for the salary of a probation officer.
It is also contended that the Probation Act violates the provisions of our Bill of Rights which
prohibits the denial to any person of the equal protection of the laws. The resultant
inequality may be said to flow from the unwarranted delegation of legislative power,
although perhaps this is not necessarily the result in every case. Adopting the example
given by one of the counsel for the petitioners in the course of his oral argument, one
province may appropriate the necessary fund to defray the salary of a probation officer,
while another province may refuse or fail to do so. In such a case, the Probation Act would
be in operation in the former province but not in the latter. This means that a person
otherwise coming within the purview of the law would be liable to enjoy the benefits of
probation in one province while another person similarly situated in another province would
be denied those same benefits. This is obnoxious discrimination. Contrariwise, it is also
Constitutional Law 1 Case digest Compiled by: Justice “merzy”
possible for all the provincial boards to appropriate the necessary funds for the salaries of
the probation officers in their respective provinces, in which case no inequality would result
for the obvious reason that probation would be in operation in each and every province by
the affirmative action of appropriation by all the provincial boards.
SENATE v. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
495 SCR A 170 – Constitutionality of E.O. 464
In 2005, scandals involving anomalous transactions about the North Rail Project as well as
the Garci tapes surfaced. This prompted the Senate to conduct a public hearing to
investigate the said anomalies particularly the alleged overpricing in the NRP. The
investigating Senate committee issued invitations to certain department heads and military
officials to speak before the committee as resource persons. Ermita submitted that he and
some of the department heads cannot attend the said hearing due to pressing matters that
need immediate attention. AFP Chief of Staff Senga likewise sent a similar letter. Drilon,
the senate president, excepted the said requests for they were sent belatedly and
arrangements were already made and scheduled. Subsequently, GMA issued EO 464 which
took effect immediately.
EO 464 basically prohibited Department heads, Senior officials of executive departments
who in the judgment of the department heads are covered by the executive privilege;
Generals and flag officers of the Armed Forces of the Philippines and such other officers
who in the judgment of the Chief of Staff are covered by the executive privilege; Philippine
National Police (PNP) officers with rank of chief superintendent or higher and such other
officers who in the judgment of the Chief of the PNP are covered by the executive
privilege; Senior national security officials who in the judgment of the National Security
Adviser are covered by the executive privilege; and Such other officers as may be
determined by the President, from appearing in such hearings conducted by Congress
without first securing the president’s approval.
The department heads and the military officers who were invited by the Senate committee
then invoked EO 464 to except themselves. Despite EO 464, the scheduled hearing
proceeded with only 2 military personnel attending. For defying President Arroyo’s order
barring military personnel from testifying before legislative inquiries without her approval,
Brig. Gen. Gudani and Col. Balutan were relieved from their military posts and were made
to face court martial proceedings. EO 464’s constitutionality was assailed for it is alleged
that it infringes on the rights and duties of Congress to conduct investigation in aid of
legislation and conduct oversight functions in the implementation of laws.
ISSUE: Whether or not EO 464 is constitutional.
HELD: The SC ruled that EO 464 is constitutional in part. To determine the validity of the
provisions of EO 464, the SC sought to distinguish Section 21 from Section 22 of Art 6 of
the 1987 Constitution. The Congress’ power of inquiry is expressly recognized in Section 21
of Article VI of the Constitution. Although there is no provision in the Constitution expressly
investing either House of Congress with power to make investigations and exact testimony
to the end that it may exercise its legislative functions advisedly and effectively, such
power is so far incidental to the legislative function as to be implied. In other words, the
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power of inquiry – with process to enforce it – is an essential and appropriate auxiliary to
the legislative function. A legislative body cannot legislate wisely or effectively in the
absence of information respecting the conditions which the legislation is intended to affect
or change; and where the legislative body does not itself possess the requisite information
– which is not infrequently true – recourse must be had to others who do possess it.
Section 22 on the other hand provides for the Question Hour. The Question Hour is closely
related with the legislative power, and it is precisely as a complement to or a supplement
of the Legislative Inquiry. The appearance of the members of Cabinet would be very, very
essential not only in the application of check and balance but also, in effect, in aid of
legislation. Section 22 refers only to Question Hour, whereas, Section 21 would refer
specifically to inquiries in aid of legislation, under which anybody for that matter, may be
summoned and if he refuses, he can be held in contempt of the House. A distinction was
thus made between inquiries in aid of legislation and the question hour. While attendance
was meant to be discretionary in the question hour, it was compulsory in inquiries in aid of
legislation. Sections 21 and 22, therefore, while closely related and complementary to each
other, should not be considered as pertaining to the same power of Congress. One
specifically relates to the power to conduct inquiries in aid of legislation, the aim of which
is to elicit information that may be used for legislation, while the other pertains to the
power to conduct a question hour, the objective of which is to obtain information in pursuit
of Congress’ oversight function. Ultimately, the power of Congress to compel the
appearance of executive officials under Section 21 and the lack of it under Section 22 find
their basis in the principle of separation of powers.
While the executive branch is a co-equal branch of the legislature, it cannot frustrate the
power of Congress to legislate by refusing to comply with its demands for information.
When Congress exercises its power of inquiry, the only way for department heads to
exempt themselves therefrom is by a valid claim of privilege. They are not exempt by the
mere fact that they are department heads. Only one executive official may be exempted
from this power — the President on whom executive power is vested, hence, beyond the
reach of Congress except through the power of impeachment. It is based on her being
the highest official of the executive branch, and the due respect accorded to a co-equal
branch of government which is sanctioned by a long-standing custom. The requirement
then to secure presidential consent under Section 1, limited as it is only to appearances in
the question hour, is valid on its face. For under Section 22, Article VI of the Constitution,
the appearance of department heads in the question hour is discretionary on their part.
Section 1 cannot, however, be applied to appearances of department heads in inquiries in
aid of legislation. Congress is not bound in such instances to respect the refusal of the
department head to appear in such inquiry, unless a valid claim of privilege is subsequently
made, either by the President herself or by the Executive Secretary.
When Congress merely seeks to be informed on how department heads are implementing
the statutes which it has issued, its right to such information is not as imperative as that of
the President to whom, as Chief Executive, such department heads must give a report of
their performance as a matter of duty. In such instances, Section 22, in keeping with the
separation of powers, states that Congress may only request their appearance.
Nonetheless, when the inquiry in which Congress requires their appearance is ‘in aid of
Constitutional Law 1 Case digest Compiled by: Justice “merzy”
legislation’ under Section 21, the appearance is mandatory for the same reasons stated
in Arnault.
NOTES: The SC ruled that Section 1 and Section 2a are valid. The rest invalid.
On March 6, 2008, President Arroyo issued Memorandum Circular No. 151, revoking
Executive Order No. 464 and Memorandum Circular No. 108. She advised executive
officials and employees to follow and abide by the Constitution, existing laws and
jurisprudence, including, among others, the case of Senate v. Ermita when they are invited
to legislative inquiries in aid of legislation.
AUTOMOTIVE INDUSTRY WORKERS ALLIANCE v. ROMULO
FACTS: Automotive Industry Workers Alliance (AIWA) and its affiliated unions call upon
the Supreme Court to exercise its power of judicial review to declare as unconstitutional an
executive order assailed to be in derogation of the constitutional doctrine of separation of
powers. In an original action for certiorari, they invoke their status as labor unions and as
taxpayers whose rights and interests are allegedly violated and prejudiced by Executive
Order 185 dated 10 March 2003 whereby administrative supervision over the National
Labor Relations Commission (NLRC), its regional branches and all its personnel including
the executive labor arbiters and labor arbiters was transferred from the NLRC Chairperson
to the Secretary of Labor and Employment. In support of their position, the Unions argue
that the NLRC -- created by Presidential Decree 442, otherwise known as the Labor Code,
during Martial Law – was an integral part of the Department (then Ministry) of Labor and
Employment (DOLE) under the administrative supervision of the Secretary of Justice.
During the time of President Corazon C. Aquino, and while she was endowed with
legislative functions after EDSA I, Executive Order 292 was issued whereby the NLRC
became an agency attached to the DOLE for policy and program coordination and for
administrative supervision. On 2 March 1989, Article 213 of the Labor Code was expressly
amended by Republic Act 6715 declaring that the NLRC was to be attached to the DOLE
for program and policy coordination only while the administrative supervision over the
NLRC, its regional branches and personnel, was turned over to the NLRC Chairman. The
subject EO 185, in authorizing the Secretary of Labor to exercise administrative supervision
over the NLRC, its regional branches and personnel, allegedly reverted to the pre-RA 6715
set-up, amending the latter law which only Congress can do. Alberto Romulo (in his
capacity as Executive Secretary) and Patricia Sto. Tomas (in her capacity as Secretary of
Labor and Employment), as represented by the Office of the Solicitor General, opposed the
petition on procedural and substantive grounds.
ISSUE: Whether the Unions -- which contend that they are suing for and in behalf of their
members (more or less 50,000 workers) –-- has the requisite standing.
HELD: NO. Legal standing or locus standi is defined as a “personal and substantial interest
Page 6
in the case such that the party has sustained or will sustain direct injury as a result of the
governmental act that is being challenged.” For a citizen to have standing, he must
establish that he has suffered some actual or threatened injury as a result of the allegedly
illegal conduct of the government; the injury is fairly traceable to the challenged action;
and the injury is likely to be redressed by a favorable action. Herein, the Unions have not
shown that they have sustained or are in danger of sustaining any personal injury
attributable to the enactment of EO 185.
As labor unions representing their members, it cannot be said that EO 185 will prejudice
their rights and interests considering that the scope of the authority conferred upon the
Secretary of Labor does not extend to the power to review, reverse, revise or modify the
decisions of the NLRC in the exercise of its quasi-judicial functions. Thus, only NLRC
personnel who may find themselves the subject of the Secretary of Labor’s disciplinary
authority, conferred by Section 1(d) of the subject executive order, may be said to have a
direct and specific interest in raising the substantive issue herein. Moreover, and if at all,
only Congress, and not the Unions herein, can claim any injury from the alleged executive
encroachment of the legislative function to amend, modify and/or repeal laws. Neither can
standing be conferred on the Unions as taxpayers since they have not established
disbursement of public funds in contravention of law or the Constitution. A taxpayer’s suit
is properly brought only when there is an exercise of the spending or taxing power of
Congress. EO 185 does not even require for its implementation additional appropriation. All
told, if the Court was to follow the strict rule on locus standi, the petition should be
forthwith dismissed on that score. The rule on standing, however, is a matter of procedure,
hence, can be relaxed for nontraditional plaintiffs like ordinary citizens, taxpayers and
legislators when the public interest so requires, such as when the matter is of
transcendental importance, of overarching significance to society, or of paramount public
interest. However, the issue posed in the present petition did not meet the exacting
standard required for the Court to take the liberal approach and recognize the standing of
the Unions.
The subject matter of EO 185 is the grant of authority by the President to the Secretary of
Labor to exercise administrative supervision over the NLRC, its regional branches and all its
personnel, including the Executive Labor Arbiters and Labor Arbiters. Its impact, sans the
challenge to its constitutionality, is thereby limited to the departments to which it is
addressed. Considering that the governmental act being questioned has a limited reach, its
impact confined to corridors of the executive department, this is not one of those
exceptional occasions where the Court is justified in sweeping aside a critical procedural
requirement, rooted as it is in the constitutionally enshrined principle of separation of
powers
Constitutional Law 1 Case digest Compiled by: Justice “merzy”
KILOSBAYAN v. GUINGONA
Facts: This is a special civil action for prohibition and injunction, with a prayer for a
temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction which seeks to prohibit and restrain
the implementation of the Contract of Lease executed by the PCSO and the Philippine
Gaming Management Corporation in connection with the on-line lottery system, also know
as lotto.
Petitioners strongly opposed the setting up of the on-line lottery system on the basis of
serious moral and ethical considerations. It submitted that said contract of lease violated
Section 1 of R. A. No. 1169, as amended by B. P. Blg. 42.
Respondents contended, among others, that, the contract does not violate the Foreign
Investment Act of 1991; that the issues of wisdom, morality and propriety of acts of the
executive department are beyond the ambit of judicial reviews; and that the petitioners
have no standing to maintain the instant suit.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not petitioners have the legal standing to file the instant petition.
2. Whether or not the contract of lease is legal and valid.
RULING: As to the preliminary issue, the Court resolved to set aside the procedural
technicality in view of the importance of the issues raised. The Court adopted the liberal
policy on locus standi to allow the ordinary taxpayers, members of Congress, and even
association of planters, and non-profit civic organizations to initiate and prosecute actions
to question the validity or constitutionality of laws, acts, decisions, or rulings of various
government agencies or instrumentalities.
As to the substantive issue, the Court agrees with the petitioners whether the contract in
question is one of lease or whether the PGMC is merely an independent contractor should
not be decided on the basis of the title or designation of the contract but by the intent of
the parties, which may be gathered from the provisions of the contract itself. Animus
homini est anima scripti. The intention of the party is the soul of the instrument.
Therefore the instant petition is granted and the challenged Contract of Lease is hereby
declared contrary to law and invalid.
Page 7
 FRACISCO CHAVEZ v. PUBLIC ESTATES AUTHORITY and AMARI
384 SCR A 152
FACTS: The Public Estates Authority (PEA) is the central implementing agency tasked to
undertake reclamation projects nationwide. It took over the leasing and selling functions of
the DENR (Department of Environmental and Natural Resources) insofar as reclaimed or
about to be reclaimed foreshore lands are concerned.
PEA sought the transfer to the Amari Coastal Bay and Development Corporation, a private
corporation, of the ownership of 77.34 hectares of the Freedom Islands. PEA also sought
to have 290.156 hectares of submerged areas of Manila Bay to Amari.
ISSUE: Whether or not the transfer is valid.
HELD: No. To allow vast areas of reclaimed lands of the public domain to be transferred to
Amari as private lands will sanction a gross violation of the constitutional ban on private
corporations from acquiring any kind of alienable land of the public domain.
The Supreme Court affirmed that the 157.84 hectares of reclaimed lands comprising the
Freedom Islands, now covered by certificates of title in the name of PEA, are alienable
lands of the public domain. The 592.15 hectares of submerged areas of Manila Bay remain
inalienable natural resources of the public domain. The transfer (as embodied in a joint
venture agreement) to AMARI, a private corporation, ownership of 77.34 hectares of the
Freedom Islands, is void for being contrary to Section 3, Article XII of the 1987
Constitution which prohibits private corporations from acquiring any kind of alienable land
of the public domain. Furthermore, since the Amended JVA also seeks to transfer to
Amari ownership of 290.156 hectares of still submerged areas of Manila Bay, such transfer
is void for being contrary to Section 2, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution which prohibits
the alienation of natural resources other than agricultural lands of the public domain.
MATIBAG v BENIPAYO
FACTS: On February 2, 1999, the COMELEC en banc appointed petitioner as "Acting
Director IV" of the EID. On February 15, 2000, then Chairperson Harriet O. Demetriou
renewed the appointment of petitioner as Director IV of EID in a "Temporary" capacity. On
March 22, 2001, President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo appointed, ad interim, Benipayo as
COMELEC Chairman together with other commisioners in an ad interim appointment.
In his capacity as COMELEC Chairman, Benipayo issued a Memorandum dated April 11,
2001 addressed to petitioner as Director IV of the EID and to Cinco as Director III also of
the EID, designating Cinco Officer-in-Charge of the EID and reassigning petitioner to the
Law Department. COMELEC EID Commissioner-in-Charge Mehol K. Sadain objected to
petitioner’s reassignment in a Memorandum dated April 14, 2001 addressed to the
COMELEC en banc. Specifically, Commissioner Sadain questioned Benipayo’s failure to
consult the Commissioner-in-Charge of the EID in the reassignment of petitioner.
Constitutional Law 1 Case digest Compiled by: Justice “merzy”
Petitioner requested Benipayo to reconsider her relief as Director IV of the EID and her
reassignment to the Law Department.
Petitioner cited Civil Service Commission Memorandum Circular No. 7 dated April 10, 2001,
reminding heads of government offices that "transfer and detail of employees are
prohibited during the election period beginning January 2 until June 13, 2001." Benipayo
denied her request for reconsideration on April 18, 2001, citing COMELEC Resolution No.
3300 dated November 6, 2000, Exempting the Comelec from the coverage of the said
memo circular.
Petitioner appealed the denial of her request for reconsideration to the COMELEC en
banc in a Memorandum dated April 23, 2001. Petitioner also filed an administrative and
criminal complaint with the Law Department against Benipayo, alleging that her
reassignment violated Section 261 (h) of the Omnibus Election Code, COMELEC Resolution
No. 3258, Civil Service Memorandum Circular No. 07, s. 001, and other pertinent
administrative and civil service laws, rules and regulations.
During the pendency of her complaint before the Law Department, petitioner filed the
instant petition questioning the appointment and the right to remain in office of Benipayo,
Borra and Tuason, as Chairman and Commissioners of the COMELEC, respectively.
Petitioner claims that the ad interim appointments of Benipayo, Borra and Tuason violate
the constitutional provisions on the independence of the COMELEC.
ISSUES: Whether or not the assumption of office by Benipayo, Borra and Tuason on the
basis of the ad interim appointments issued by the President amounts to a temporary
appointment prohibited by Section 1 (2), Article IX-C of the Constitution.
RULING: We find petitioner’s argument without merit. An ad interim appointment is a
permanent appointment because it takes effect immediately and can no longer be
withdrawn by the President once the appointee has qualified into office. The fact that it is
subject to confirmation by the Commission on Appointments does not alter its permanent
character. The Constitution itself makes an ad interim appointment permanent in character
by making it effective until disapproved by the Commission on Appointments or until the
next adjournment of Congress.
ESTARIJA v. RANADA
FACTS: Respondent, On August 10, 1998, respondent Edward F. Ranada, a member of
the Davao Pilots Association, Inc. (DPAI) and Davao Tugboat and Allied Services, Inc.,
(DTASI) filed an administrative complaint for Gross Misconduct before the Office of the
Ombudsman-Mindanao, against petitioner Captain Edgardo V. Estarija, Harbor Master of
Page 8
the Philippine Ports Authority (PPA), Port of Davao, Sasa, Davao City. The complaint he would extort money in consideration of the issuance of berthing permits since the
alleged that Estarija, who as Harbor Master issues the necessary berthing permit for all signing of berthing permits is only ministerial on his part. He also maintains that Rep. Act
ships that dock in the DavaoPort, had been demanding money ranging from P200 to P2000 No. 6770 is unconstitutional because the Ombudsman has only the powers enumerated
for the approval and issuance of berthing permits, and P5000 as monthly contribution from under Section 13, Article XI of the Constitution, which powers do not include the power to
the DPAI. The complaint alleged that prior to August 6, 1998, in order to stop the mulcting directly remove, suspend,
and extortion activities of Estarija, the association reported Estarija’s activities to the
National Bureau of Investigation (NBI). On August 6, 1998, the NBI caught Estarija in demote, fine, or censure a government official. According to him, the Ombudsman’s power
possession of the P5,000 marked money used by the NBI to entrap Estarija. Consequently, is merely to recommend the action to the officer concerned. The Solicitor General
the Ombudsman ordered petitioner’s preventive suspension and directed him to answer maintains otherwise, arguing that the framers of the 1987 Constitution did not intend to
the complaint. The Ombudsman filed a criminal case against Estarija for violation of spell out, restrictively, each act which the Ombudsman may or may not do, since the
Republic Act No. 3019, The Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act ,before the Regional Trial purpose of the Constitution is to provide simplya framework within which to build the
Court of Davao City, Branch No. 8.In his counter-affidavit and supplemental counter- institution.
affidavit, petitioner denied demanding sums of money for the approval of berthing permits.
Issue No.1: Whether or not there is substantial evidence to hold Estarija liable for
He claimed that Adrian Cagata, an employee of the DPAI, called to inform him that the
dishonesty and grave misconduct
DPAI had payables to the PPA, and although he went to the association’s office, he was
hesitant to get the P5,000 from Cagata because the association had no pending
The petition is DENIED. Estarija is liable for dishonesty and grave misconduct. Estarija did
transaction with the PPA. Estarija claimed that Cagata made him believe that the money
not deny that he went to the DPAI office to collect, and that he actually received, the
was a partial remittance to the PPA of the pilotage fee for July 1998 representing 10% of
money which he demanded from the DPAI as monthly contribution. Since there was no
the monthly gross revenue of their association. Nonetheless, he received the money but
pending transaction between the PPA and the DPAI, he had no reason to go to the latter’s
assured Cagata that he would send an official receipt the following day. He claimed that
office to collect any money. Even if he was authorized to assist in the collection of money
the entrapment and the subsequent filing of the complaint were part of a conspiracy to
due the agency, he should have issued an official receipt for the transaction, but he did not
exact personal vengeance against him on account of Ranada’s business losses occasioned
do so. Patently, petitioner had been dishonest about accepting money from DPAI.
by the cancellation of the latter’s sub-agency agreement with Asia Pacific Chartering Phil.,
Misconduct is a transgression of some established and definite rule of action, more
Inc., which was eventually awarded to a shipping agency managed by Estarija’s son.
particularly, unlawful behavior or gross negligence by a public officer. And when the
elements of corruption, clear intent to violate the law or flagrant disregard of established
On August 31, 2000, the Ombudsman rendered a decision in the administrative case,
rule are manifest, the public officer shall be liable for grave misconduct.
finding Estarija guilty of dishonesty and grave misconduct. Estarija seasonably filed a
motion for reconsideration. Estarija claimed that dismissal was unconstitutional since the
Issue No.2: Whether or not the power of the Ombudsman to directly remove, suspend,
Ombudsman did not have direct and immediate power to remove government officials,
demote, fine, or censure erring officials is constitutional Rep. Act No. 6770 provides for the
whether elective or appointive, who are not removable by impeachment. He maintains that
functional and structural organization of the Office of the Ombudsman. In passing Rep. Act
under the 1987 Constitution, the Ombudsman’s administrative authority is merely
No.6770, Congress deliberately endowed the Ombudsman with the power to prosecute
recommendatory, and that Republic Act No. 6770, otherwise known as "The Ombudsman
offenses committed by public officers and employees to make him a more active and
Act of 1989", is unconstitutional because it gives the Office of the Ombudsman additional
effective agent of the people in ensuring accountability in public office. Moreover, the
powers that are not provided for in the Constitution. The Ombudsman denied the motion
legislature has vested the Ombudsman with broad powers to enable him to implement his
for reconsideration in an Order dated October 31, 2000. Thus, Estarija filed a Petition for
own actions.
Review with urgent prayer for the issuance of a temporary restraining order and writ of
preliminary prohibitory injunction before the Court of Appeals. The Court of Appeals, on Rep. Act No. 6770 is consistent with the intent of the framers of the 1987 Constitution.
February 12, 2003, dismissed the petition and affirmed the Ombudsman’s decision. In his They gave Congress the discretion to give the Ombudsman powers that are not merely
petition for review on certiorari, Estarija contends that he cannot be liable for grave persuasive in character. Thus, in addition to the power of the Ombudsman to prosecute
misconduct because he did not commit extortion as he was merely prodded by Adrian and conduct investigations, the lawmakers intended to provide the Ombudsman with the
Cagata, an employee of the DPAI, to receive the money and that it makes no sense why
Constitutional Law 1 Case digest Compiled by: Justice “merzy” Page 9
power to punish for contempt and preventively suspend any officer under his authority
pending an investigation when the case so warrants. He was likewise given disciplinary
authority over all elective and appointive officials of the government and its subdivisions,
instrumentalities and agencies except members of Congress and the Judiciary (Ledesma v.
Court of Appeals)
The Constitution does not restrict the powers of the Ombudsman in Section 13, Article XI
of the 1987Constitution, but allows the Legislature to enact a law that would spell out the
powers of the Ombudsman. Through the enactment of Rep. Act No. 6770,specifically
Section 15, par. 3, the lawmakers gave the Ombudsman such powers to sanction erring
officials and employees, except members of Congress, and the Judiciary. Sections 15, 21,
22 and 25 of Republic Act No. 6770 are constitutionally sound. The powers of the
Ombudsman are not merely recommendatory. His office was given teeth to render this
constitutional body not merely functional but also effective. Thus, we hold that under
Republic Act No. 6770 and the 1987 Constitution, the Ombudsman has the constitutional
power to directly remove from government service an erring public official other than a
member of Congress and the Judiciary.
PLANTERS PRODUCTS v. FERTIPHIL CORPORATION
Lessons Applicable: Bet. private and public suit, easier to file public suit, Apply real party
in interest test for private suit and direct injury test for public suit, Validity test varies
depending on which inherent power
FACTS:
President Ferdinand Marcos, exercising his legislative powers, issued LOI No. 1465 which
provided, among others, for the imposition of a capital recovery component (CRC) on the
domestic sale of all grades of fertilizers which resulted in having Fertiphil paying P 10/bag
sold to the Fertilizer and Perticide Authority (FPA).
FPA remits its collection to Far East Bank and Trust Company who applies to the payment
of corporate debts of Planters Products Inc. (PPI)
After the Edsa Revolution, FPA voluntarily stopped the imposition of the P10 levy. Upon
return of democracy, Fertiphil demanded a refund but PPI refused. Fertiphil filed a
complaint for collection and damages against FPA and PPI with the RTC on the ground that
LOI No. 1465 is unjust, unreaonable oppressive, invalid and unlawful resulting to denial of
due process of law.
Constitutional Law 1 Case digest Compiled by: Justice “merzy”
FPA answered that it is a valid exercise of the police power of the state in ensuring the
stability of the fertilizing industry in the country and that Fertiphil did NOT sustain damages
since the burden imposed fell on the ultimate consumers.
RTC and CA favored Fertiphil holding that it is an exercise of the power of taxation ad is as
such because it is NOT for public purpose as PPI is a private corporation.
ISSUE:
1.W/N Fertiphil has locus standi
2. W/N LOI No. 1465 is an invalid exercise of the power of taxation rather the police power
Held:
1. Yes. In private suits, locus standi requires a litigant to be a "real party in interest" or
party who stands to be benefited or injured by the judgment in the suit. In public suits,
there is the right of the ordinary citizen to petition the courts to be freed from unlawful
government intrusion and illegal official action subject to the direct injury test or where
there must be personal and substantial interest in the case such that he has sustained or
will sustain direct injury as a result. Being a mere procedural technicality, it has also been
held that locus standi may be waived in the public interest such as cases of transcendental
importance or with far-reaching implications whether private or public suit, Fertiphil has
locus standi.
2. As a seller, it bore the ultimate burden of paying the levy which made its products more
expensive and harm its business. It is also of paramount public importance since it
involves the constitutionality of a tax law and use of taxes for public purpose.
3. Yes. Police power and the power of taxation are inherent powers of the state but
distinct and have different tests for validity. Police power is the power of the state to
enact the legislation that may interfere with personal liberty on property in order to
promote general welfare. While, the power of taxation is the power to levy taxes as to be
used for public purpose. The main purpose of police power is the regulation of a behavior
or conduct, while taxation is revenue generation. The lawful subjects and lawful means
tests are used to determine the validity of a law enacted under the police power. The
power of taxation, on the other hand, is circumscribed by inherent and constitutional
limitations.
In this case, it is for purpose of revenue. But it is a robbery for the State to tax the citizen
and use the funds generation for a private purpose. Public purpose does NOT only pertain
to those purpose which are traditionally viewed as essentially governmental function such
as building roads and delivery of basic services, but also includes those purposes designed
to promote social justice. Thus, public money may now be used for the relocation of illegal
settlers, low-cost housing and urban or agrarian reform.
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 TARROSA v SINGSON
Appointing Power, Commission on Appointments, Confirmation Power

FACTS: Gabriel C. Singson was appointed Governor of the Bangko Sentral by President
Fidel V. Ramos in 1993. Jesus Armando Tarrosa, as a "taxpayer", filed a petition for
prohibition questioning the appointment of Singson for not having been confirmed by the
Commission on Appointments as required by the provisions of Section 6 of R.A. No. 7653,
which established the Bangko Sentral as the Central Monetary Authority of the Philippines.
The Secretary of Budget and Management was impleaded for disbursing public funds in
payment of the salaries and emoluments of respondent Singson. In their comment,
respondents claim that Congress exceeded its legislative powers in requiring the
confirmation by the CA of the appointment of the Governor of the Bangko Sentral. They
contend that an appointment to the said position is not among the appointments which
have to be confirmed by the CA, citing Section 16 of Article VI of the Constitution.

ISSUE: Whether or not the Governor of the BSP is subject to COA’s confirmation.

HELD: No. Congress exceeded its legislative powers in requiring the confirmation by the
COA of the appointment of the Governor of the BSP. An appointment to the said position is
not among the appointments which have to be confirmed by the COA under Section 16 of
Article 7 of the Constitution. Congress cannot by law expand the confirmation powers of
the Commission on Appointments and require confirmation of appointment of other
government officials not expressly mentioned in the first sentence of Section 16 of Article 7
of the Constitution.

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