Journal of persianate studies 10 (2017) 218–239

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The Accidentality of Existence in Avicenna and

its Critique by Averroes

† Yegane Shayegan

edited by Bahman Zakipour

Open University of Japan
bahman_zakipour@yahoo.com

edited by Samaneh Gachpazian

Independent Scholar
samaneh833@yahoo.com

Abstract

The accidentality of existence in Avicenna (Ebn Sinā, d. 1037) is related to

his distinction between “existence (vojud)” and “quiddity (māhiyya).” Both
these theories have been greatly criticized by Averroes (Ebn Roshd, d. 1198).
The latter’s misunderstanding of Avicenna has been the cause of confusion
for the comprehension of Aristotle (d. 322 BCE) in Western Christian scho-
lasticism. This misunderstanding has also extended to Western contemporary
Aristotelian scholarship.
This paper will try to clarify how this phenomenon perpetuated a global
confusion and misunderstanding between the East and the West and also

* Professor Yegane Shayegan (Tehran, March 1937–Paris, June 2007), studied Islamic phi-
losophy in Geneva and at Harvard University, where she wrote her PhD dissertation en-
titled, “Avicenna on Time” (1986). She was a research scholar at the University College in
London and taught at the Sorbonne, Paris, and the Iranian Institute of Philosophy, Tehran
(2003–2005).
In 2002, she first presented this paper in English at an international symposium on the
Islamic schools of thought of Cordoba and Isfahan in Isfahan. Although she revised the text,
intending to publish it with Oxford University Press, it never appeared in print. A decade after
her death, we decided to publish this important article, using a version with her comments in
the margin. We express our gratitude to Prof. Saïd Amir Arjomand and Prof. Shayegan’s close
relatives, especially Prof. Dariush Shayegan, whose support made this possible.

© koninklijke brill nv, leiden, 2017 | doi 10.1163/18747167-12341315

The Accidentality of Existence in Avicenna 219

created a disastrous situation for the comprehension of the Peripatetic School.

This state of affairs has continued up to the present day among both medieval-
ists and scholars of Aristotelian philosophy. However, it is not my intention in
this paper to give a complete review of Western and Eastern scholarship on
this subject. Rather, I shall limit myself (with some exceptions) to the works
of Aristotle, Alexander of Aphrodisias (fl. c. 205) and other Greek commenta-
tors, Avicenna, and Averroes, which together constitute the primary sources
for the ongoing discussion around the nature of “essence” and “existence” in
Avicenna’s works.

Keywords

accidentality – existence – quiddity – Avicenna – Averroes

“Essence” versus “Existence” in Avicenna

Averroes’ basic error was his complete misunderstanding of the distinction

between the verb “to be (Grk. einai)” and the substantive “being (Grk. to on).”
“To be” for him was the “existent,” which is not distinguished from “essence” or
“quiddity.” It was the “existent” as the substantive to on, and not einai, the verb.
If Aristotle was as simple as Averroes implies, then we would not have had two-
and-a-half millennia of commentators analyzing his writings in a constant, un-
resolved struggle. As van den Bergh rightly explains:

For Averroes “existence” is “the existent,” to on, the individual tode ti, it is
the substance, hē ousia, it is the subject, to hypokeimenon, of a sentence;
for Avicenna “existence” is “to exist,” to einai; it is added to the subject as
a predicate in such sentences as “Socrates exists,” and as a predicate it is
an accident.
Ebn Roshd 1969, II, 131 nn. 224–5

Let me now begin with the distinction between “essence” and “existence.”
Avicenna says that “quiddity” does not contain in itself “existence” as a con-
stituent part (Ebn Sinā 1985–1986, 514–515). This does not mean that quiddities
are floating somewhere in no-man’s land and are independent in themselves.
It merely means that when we analyze things conceptually, here and now, we
can see that there is a multitude of things, such as tables, horses, men, and
women. When we say that these things “exist,” we are adding “existence” to

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220 Shayegan

them, by which they are qualified (ibid.). This verb “to exist” or “to be” which we
add does not change anything in the plurality of things as quiddities, it is just
the unifying element among them. This unifying element or “existence” is one
and the same predicate, attributed analogically to them all.1
Therefore, “existence” is a “common,” unifying factor versus the multiplicity
of things in the world. It is distinguished from “quiddity” since the quiddity of
a man is different from the quiddity of a horse. But their existence, that is, the
act of existing, by which we see them, is one and the same. Avicenna further
says that “quiddity” is something like “man,” “horse,” “intellect,” or “soul.” Then,
each of these is said to be qualified (mowsuf) by “one” and “existent.”
Our understanding of the quiddity of anything is different from our under-
standing of its unity. By understanding its unity one understands that it is one
thing. Unity is neither the essence of anything nor does it constitute the es-
sence, it is a necessary attribute of things (ibid.).2 Hence, things are shared by
oneness and existence (Ebn Sinā 2012/1433, IV, 103 ll. 7–9)3 and divided by es-
sences. Avicenna, however, distinguishes the sharing of existence from sharing
in genus. The latter belongs to the domain of quiddity. When we define a quid-
dity, we use the genus and the differentia, such as “Man is a rational animal.”
Existence is not a genus and thus it cannot be defined. It can therefore not be
predicated univocally either.
This is the case when the definition of two or more things is one and the
same. A definition (hadd) is only used in answer to the question “what it is
(māhiyya),” not for that it is (hoviyya).” Avicenna clearly admits that existence
is not a genus (Ebn Sinā 2012/1433, I, pt. 1, 62 l. 6)4 and the community named
by existence is not the community meant by genus.

1  Analogy in the Aristotelian sense means proportional analogy. However, it acquired a less
mathematical sense during the Middle Ages, whence it came to be known as “attributive
analogy.” Aubenque’s (1962) rejection of the attributive interpretation of the term “analogy”
in favor of the proportional understanding of this term drew sharp criticism from his col-
league de Muralt (1963), who thinks we should not discard the commentary tradition. Even
though the accounts of both have aided me in my understanding of Aristotle’s doctrine of
being, decisive treatment of their controversy falls outside of the scope of this article.
2  Avicenna leaves unspecified whether “things (ashyāʾ)” refers to substance alone or also to
individuals in any of the categories other than substance.
3  Avicenna writes that “one” and “being” are existent in all the categories.
4  Avicenna (2012/1433, IV, 106 ll. 12–14) says that “one” is not said of substance as a genus nor as
a differentia, but as an accident. He further adds that “one” and “being” are not part of sub-
stance but said of it and of the other categories (ibid., 107 ll.3–4). Cf. Aristotle, 1977, I, 147–59;
Alexander of Aphrodisias 1891, 246–50.

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The Accidentality of Existence in Avicenna 221

Averroes’ objection to Avicenna is as follows: Ghazāli (d. 1111) states that,

according to the philosophers, the term “existence” only indicates a necessary
attribute of the essence of things. Averroes declares that this is a false (bātel)
statement and that none of the philosophers other than Avicenna had claimed
this view (idem 1999, 369 l. 14–370 l. 1). And he continues:

Having denied that existence is a genus, predicated either univocally or

equivocally, Avicenna claimed that it was a term which signified a com-
mon, necessary attribute of things (zaʿama anna-ho esmon yadullu ʿala
lāzemin ʿāmmin le-ʾl-ashyāʾ).5
ibid., 370 ll. 1–3; idem 1969, I, 223

Averroes’ argument is that, if “existence” were a necessary attribute, this neces-

sary attribute could not be given as an answer to the question “what a thing is”
(idem 1999, 370 l. 4). I have just mentioned that the question of “what it is” is
not asked about existence but about “quiddity” or “essence.” Averroes has an
utter confusion with respect to terms referring to existence and those signify-
ing quiddities. Averroes adds:

And further, if “existence” really signifies a necessary attribute in things,

does it signify this necessary attribute univocally (be-ʾl-tavātuʾ) or equivo-
cally (be-eshterāk al-esm) or in some other mode of attribution?
idem 1999, 370 ll. 4–6; idem 1969, I, 223

And in his dialectical irony he ridicules Avicenna by saying, “And if it has a uni-
vocal meaning, how can there be an accident univocally predicated of things
essentially different?” Adding further, “I believe that Avicenna regarded this as
possible” (idem 1999, 370 ll. 6–7; idem 1969, I, 223).
Here, he is confusing the essential versus the accidental. He then proceeds
by explaining his own theory:

Since that [Avicenna’s statement] is impossible, the term “existence” in-

dicates essences which have different degrees of meaning (motaqārebat
al-maʿnā), essences some of which are more perfect than others.6
idem 1999, 370 ll. 12–3; idem 1969, I, 223

5  I would rather translate lāzem ʿāmm as “inseparable, common accident.”

6  Van den Bergh has translated the phrase “motaqārebat al-maʿnā” as “analogical in meaning.”
On the analogical character of existence as a predicate in Avicenna, see n. 13.

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222 Shayegan

Averroes’ thought, and not that of Aristotle, as Gilson has it (92–3), can be
called “un chosisme intégral” or “all-encompassing reification.”7 In Aristotle,
Gilson added (93): “La substance est conçue comme un bloc ontologique, sans
fissure, où l’essence, l’existence et l’unité ne font qu’un.” Izutsu agrees (88–90)
with Gilson about Aristotle, yet recognizes that Aristotle made a distinction
between “essence” and “existence” in his Posterior Analytics. I’ll address the
Posterior Analytics further below.
Returning to Averroes’ interpretation of Aristotle and Avicenna, in order to
refute the latter’s ideas, he refers to Fārābi’s (d. 950) Ketāb al-Horuf, but com-
pletely misrepresents him. In this book, Fārābi is trying to establish a com-
parative linguistic vocabulary of different languages in order to make people
understand the terms mowjud (“existent”) and vojud (“existence”). In his com-
parative linguistic varieties for stating the verb “to be” he uses Greek, Persian,
and Soghdian terms and clearly acknowledges that the verb “to be” does not
exist in Arabic and is replaced by the verb “to find” (vajada) in its passive form
vojeda, i.e. “to be found.” He then translates vajada into Persian by yāft and
the passive participle mowjud (“found”) by yāfta.8 Fārābi explains that the al-
ternative Persian verb hast (“is”) and the substantive hasti (“being”) are the
exact equivalents of the Greek estin and to on (Fārābi, 110–3/§80–3). Averroes
completely misses the point that Fārābi is trying to emphasize, i.e. the distinc-
tion between “existence” and “existent” by referring to other languages. What’s
more, he confuses the copulative and the predicative uses of mowjud in Fārābi,
in the same way in which he fails to distinguish between existence in concreto
and existence as analyzed in the mind (in abstracto).
Izutsu rightly argues that, according to Avicenna, the “essence”/“existence”
dichotomy is “an event occurring primarily in the sphere of concepts, on the
level of conceptual analysis. The distinction thus established is a result of a con-
ceptual analysis of the ontological reality, i.e. of concrete, existent things.” He
further adds that “this point is most important for the correct understanding
of the Avicennian position, because it has often been claimed that Avicenna’s
metaphysics is fundamentally essentialistic” (idem, 97).9
Avicenna’s existential philosophy lies at the basis of Sadr al-Din Shirāzi’s
(d. 1640) primacy of existence (asālat al-vojud) over quiddity. But, outside of

7  Gilson believes that Averroes is the real Aristotelian commentator and not Avicenna; see also
n. 19.
8  In this connection, see also Sadr al-Din Shirāzi 1964, 67.
9  Izutsu (97, n. 79) refers to Gilson as opposing “… Avicenna’s ‘essentialism’ to the ‘existential’
philosophy of Thomas Aquinas.”

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The Accidentality of Existence in Avicenna 223

the School of Isfahan, too, the same position can be found in the works of
Sabzavāri (late nineteenth century).
The legacy of Avicenna extends itself over one thousand years of philosophy
in Iran. In this period, different schools flourished, but two main positions were
advocated. On one side were those who held the view of the principality of ex-
istence (asālat al-vojud), while, on the other, were those who believed in the
principality of quiddity (asālat māhiyya). Shahāb al-Din Sohravardi (d. c. 1191)
and Mir Dāmād (d. 1631), the teacher of Sadr al-Din Shirāzi were among this
latter school (Izutsu, 100; Ashtiāni, 217–218).

The Accidentality of Existence in Avicenna

Avicenna maintains that existence is something superadded to quiddity as

an accident (Gilson, 92).10 This however is not meant in the sense of an ordi-
nary accident such as “whiteness,” inhering in a subject. He even clarifies the
above fact by adding that the accident or attribute is a “lāzem,” which I under-
stand in this case as representing an inseparable accident.11
Existence according to Avicenna is not predicated univocally (Ebn Sinā
2012/1433, I, pt. 1, 62 l. 5); rather, together with the “one,”12 it is said to be predi-
cated analogically (be-ʾl-tashkik) (Ebn Sinā 2012/1433, I, pt. 2, 11 ll. 5–8; idem
2012/1433, IV, 97 l. 4; idem 1973, 64 l. 27).13 When we shall go to the sources we
shall see that all this originates with Aristotle and is perfectly interpreted by
Alexander of Aphrodisias. The accidentality of existence is certainly not “an
erroneous assertion (sein intümliche Behauptung),” as held by Manser (Izutsu,
119, n. 121). The struggle goes on for centuries in the West between those ar-
guing for “existence” as something constituted by the intrinsic principles of

10  Gilson agrees with Averroes’ criticism of Avicenna on the question of “being” and “one”
being added to quiddity as an accident; see n. 7 above and n. 19 below.
11  “One” and “being” are said of substance, but are not part of it, as may be inferred, for ex-
ample, from Ebn Sinā 2012/1433, IV, 107 l. 3, 109 l. 10; idem 1973, 65 l. 1.
12  The correlation of “being” and “one” is stated, for example, in idem 2012/1433, IV, 103 ll.
7–8; idem 1973, 65 l. 5.
13  In his introduction, Lameer (Sadr al-Din Shirāzi 2006, 28 n. 3), says that tashkik was
used to render the Greek amphibolos (“ambiguous”) in the ancient Arabic translation of
Aristotle’s Rhetoric. It is therefore not surprising to find the Latin translation of Avicenna’s
Metaphysics render the expression “be-ʾl-tashkik” as “ambigue;” Ebn Sinā 2012/1433, IV, 97,
ll. 4–6. Even though one might rightly argue that Avicenna’s “be-ʾl-tashkik” should there-
fore be rendered as “ambiguously,” in my understanding, “analogically” imposes itself as
the only meaningful interpretation.

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224 Shayegan

quiddity and those perceiving it as something outside the quiddity (praeter

essentiam).14 We have to keep in mind that, for Avicenna, this accident that
is lāzem, i.e. that “follows upon” quiddity, is not an ens in alio like “whiteness.”
Averroes interprets the Avicennian accident as an ordinary accident, re-
marking: “[Avicenna] imagines that ‘one’ and ‘being’ signify attributes which
are superadded to the essence of a thing” (Ebn Roshd 1938–1952, I, 313 ll. 6–7).
He even accuses “this guy (hazā al-rajol)” of following in the footsteps of the
theologians (ibid., ll. 8–12). His claim does not limit itself to the Metaphysics, it
also extends throughout his other works such as the Tahāfot altahāfot. In this
latter work he says: “Avicenna considers existence as a mere accident (ʿaraz)
inhering in (lāheq le) quiddity” (idem 1999, 303 ll. 3–4).
I recapitulate: in his criticism of Avicenna, Averroes has committed some
grave errors. Not only did he identify “existence” with “genus” (ibid., 371 ll. 7–9),
but he also confused the “existential” with the “essential” by making “one” and
“being” into something constitutive of the intrinsic principles of quiddity,
whereas, for Avicenna, they are to be regarded as an ʿaraz lāzem, viz. as acci-
dents that “follow upon” and are extrinsic to quiddity, rather than as accidents
in the ordinary sense of an ens in alio. As such, Averroes has misled, on the
one hand, the student of Avicenna, and on the other, eight hundred years of
Western Aristotelian scholarship. Averroes’ interpretation of Aristotle is flawed
because he could not come to terms with the Aristotelian aporetic method,
the complexity of which is compounded by the fact that the latter broaches
many important questions in seemingly contradictory ways in various places
throughout his surviving corpus.15 The one person to comprehend the underly-
ing argument in these cases is Alexander of Aphrodisias.

14  “Præter essentiam” is used by Thomas Aquinas; cf. Izutsu, 119, n. 119.
15  For the question of the aporetic method in Aristotle, see Aubenque 1962, 158–9: “C’est de
cette réflexion sur les apories que naîtra l’ontologie aristotélicienne; bien plus, s’il est vrai
que ‘la solution des apories’ est par elle­même ‘découverte,’ on pourra dire que la science
aristotélicienne de l’être en tant qu’être n’est autre que le systéme général de la solution
des apories.” In this respect, Aubenque refers to Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics VII (ch. 2,
1146 b 7), where we read: “Hē gar lusis tēs aporias heuresis estin,” i.e. “La solution de l’aporie
est découverte” (idem 1926, 385); cf. Trico’s translation: “car résoudre l’aporie c’est décou-
vrir le vrai” (idem 1994, 326) and Rackham’s translation: “for to solve a difficulty is to find
the answer to a problem” (idem 1926, 385). Aubenque adds (1962, 221): “Or, résoudre une
aporie, ce n’est pas l’éluder, c’est la développer (diaporēsai), non pas passer à côté, mais
s’enfoncer en elle et la parcourir de part en part (dia). Aporein, diaporein, euporein.…” See
also Aristotle, 1976, 33–35; Booth, 27.

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The Accidentality of Existence in Avicenna 225

“Essence” and “Existence” in Aristotle and some Greek

Commentators

As a corollary to the above discussion, I shall now retrace the distinction be-
tween “essence” and “existence” in Aristotle’s Physics, his Posterior Analytics,
and in some of the Greek commentators:

Aristotle, Physics II
I shall refer to two matters that are important to Aristotle in his Physics: “nature”
and “time.” In both of these, Aristotle draws a distinction between “existence”
and “essence” and recognizes the priority and self-evidence of existence. In
Physics II, ch. 1, 193 a 3–6, Aristotle declares that to try and prove that nature ex-
ists is laughable. Wicksteed and Cornford’s English translation reads as follows:

Any attempt to prove that nature, in this sense, is a reality would be child-
ish; for it is patent that many things corresponding to our definitions do
actually exist; and to set about proving the obvious from the unobvious
betrays confusion of mind as to what is self-evident and what is not.
(Aristotle 1929–1934, I, 111)

In this translation, “reality” renders the Greek estin, i.e. “exists.” “Reality” has
many meanings, so the modern reader can easily be led astray and remain un-
aware of the fact that Aristotle is distinguishing “essence” from “existence” and
affirming the self-evidence of the latter. I do not think that anybody can real-
istically deny the Aristotelian doctrine with respect to the distinction between
“essence” and “existence;” otherwise the Aristotelian corpus would remain
incomprehensible. After all, the ingredients of existence such as “one (hen),”
“being (on),” akolouthein or “to follow” would in that case remain indistinguish-
able from the ingredients of “essence,” such as “genus” and “differentia.”

Philoponus (on Physics) and Simplicius

Commenting upon Physics II, ch. 1, 193 a 3, Philoponus (d. 530) states:

He (Aristotle) himself in the [books on] Demonstration said that there

are four goals needing to be pursued regarding each subject-matter:
whether it is, what it is, of what sort it is, and on account of what it is,
and of all of them the main one is whether it is. So since he showed what
nature is without first showing if it is at all, he defends this very point
in this way, [saying] that to try to show that nature exists is ridiculous,

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226 Shayegan

the reality16 itself being so self-evident, and [that] in the case of things
whose existence is obvious one ought not to try to show that they exist,
but should devote one’s discussions (logos) to what they are and the rest
[of the questions].
Philoponus 1993, 19–20/205.25–206.3

This means that Philoponus takes Aristotle to consider “existence” as being

prior to and distinguished from, “essence” and also, self-evident, a conclusion
that applies to the following passage from Simplicius (d. 533) as well:

Since we should ask whether the object of our enquiry exists at all be-
fore we ask the question what it is, as Aristotle explains in Book 2 of his
Posterior Analytics (since it would be a waste of time to ask what the pro-
posed object of enquiry is if it does not exist at all, because there could
be no definition of what does not exist); since, then, this is the case, and
since he himself gave the definition of nature without showing that it ex-
ists, he explains that it was with good reason that he omitted to discuss
whether it exists. For those things that have evident substantial existence
need no proof of their existence, as Aristotle went on to show in Book 2 of
the Posterior Analytics, if I remember correctly. Because it is obvious from
plain fact, he says, that things which have a principle of change within
themselves, i.e. nature, exist, it is ridiculous to try to show that nature
exists.
Simplicius 1997, 25/271.25–272.1

This means that Simplicius understands Aristotle to consider “existence” as

being prior to and distinguished from “essence”—as well as self-evident.

Aristotle, Physics IV
It may be helpful to also refer, more briefly, to Physics IV, ch. 10, 217 b 29ff.,
where the question of time’s existence is raised by Aristotle as a great aporia
and where it is well distinguished from its essence and definition. Simplicius
follows him in this and in addition, he calls the existence of time self-evident

16  I do not think that Lacey’s translation of hupostasis as “reality” is a proper rendering in
this context. In order to stay as close as possible to the original discussion, “actual ex-
istence” would be more appropriate, since the reader would then understand that the
discussion is about “essence,” “existence,” and the self-evidence of the latter.

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The Accidentality of Existence in Avicenna 227

to all (Simplicius 1882, 695 l. 16; idem 1992, 102). Philoponus, too, gives prior-
ity to the question of time existence, distinguishing it clearly from its essence
(Philoponus 1887, 702 ll. 14–5).

Aristotle, Posterior Analytics II

In his Posterior Analytics II, ch. 7, 92 b 4–15, Aristotle also makes a clear dis-
tinction between “essence” and “existence,” in addition to his reference to the
primacy of “existence” over “essence” and the fact that “existence” is not a
genus:

How can one prove the essence? Anyone who knows what “man” or any
other thing is must also know that it is; because no one knows what a
non-existent thing is. (He may know the meaning of a phrase, or of
a name if, e.g., I speak of a unicorn; but it is impossible to know what a
unicorn is). But (a) if it is proposed to prove what a thing is, and that it
is, how can they be proved by the same argument? Both definition and
demonstration give us one piece of information; but what man is and that
man is are two different things. (b) Again, we hold that it is by demon-
stration that everything must be proved to exist, except essence; and ex-
istence is not the essence of anything, because being is not a genus. So
there will be demonstration that a thing is two different things.
idem, 1976, 197

And at 93 b 34–5, Aristotle further remarks that:

We do not really know except in an accidental sense [katasumbebēkos]

whether the thing exists or not.
ibid., 207

Philoponus (on Posterior Analytics)

In the commentary on book B of the Posterior Analytics attributed to Philoponus,
the author explains that if we do not know by assumption (kath’ hupothesin)
that man exists, we cannot give the definition of man as a “two-legged animal”
(Philoponus 1909, 359 ll. 18–9/92 a 35–92 b 15).17 Clarifying Philoponus’ use of
the adverbial phrase “by assumption (kath’ hupothesin),” it may be helpful to
quote from Aristotle’s Posterior Analytics I, ch. 2, 72 a 18ff., where the definition

17  
Cf. Aristotle’s Posterior Analytics II, ch. 7, 92 b 4ff.; idem 1976, 197.

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228 Shayegan

(horismos) is clearly distinguished from the hypothesis, the former defining the
essence, the latter asserting the existence or non-existence of a thing:

A thesis which assumes one or the other part of a proposition, i.e., that
something does, or does not exist, is a hypothesis; a thesis which does
not do this is a definition … it is not a hypothesis, because to define the
nature of a unit is not the same as to assert its existence.
idem 1976, 33–5

From the above it may be inferred that Philoponus concurs with Aristotle in
that “essence” and “existence” are two intrinsically different things. In this re-
spect, I would add that Philoponus, like Aristotle, but unlike Averroes, denies
that “being (to on)” is a “genus (genos)” (Philoponus 1909, 361 l. 3), and thus,
“being” cannot be part of any definition and consequently of any essence,
whatsoever.

Themistius and Eustratius

In his paraphrase of the Posterior Analytics, Themistius (d. c. 388) also makes
the distinction between “essence” and “existence” (idem, 48 ll. 9–10) and re-
marks that we know accidentally that something is (apo sumbebēkoton
ginōskomen hoti estin) (ibid., 49 l. 28). The distinction between horismos and
hupothesis is also evoked, in this case with a reference to Theophrastus (ibid.,
7). Finally, Eustratius (d. c. 1120), in his paraphrase of Posterior Analytics II, ch. 7
(idem, 94 l. 33–95 l. 18), puts the distinction between “essence” and “existence”
in terms similar to those of Philoponus and Themistius.
This summary of some key passages from the Greek sources, commenc-
ing with Aristotle himself (fourth century BCE) and ending with Eustratius
(twelfth century CE) demonstrates that Avicenna’s distinction between “es-
sence” and “existence” is Peripatetic.

The Accidentality of Existence in Aristotle and Alexander of

Aphrodisias

In his Metaphysics III (ch. 4, 1001 a 35ff.), Aristotle, discussing the eleventh apo-
ria, remarks that if “being” and “one” were substances, we would fall into the
problem of Parmenides, who said that “being” is “one” and denied any multi-
plicity (idem 1977, I, 135). Therefore, “being” and “one” are not substances (ibid.,
II, 13 [1053 b 23–4]; I 135 [1001 a 24]). But if they are not substances, then what

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The Accidentality of Existence in Avicenna 229

are they? Aristotle says that they are the most universal of things (katholou
malista pantōn) (ibid., I, 135 [1001 a 19–22]).
Alexander of Aphrodisias, in his commentary on the Metaphysics III, ch. 4,
1001 a 22–3, interprets Aristotle’s “if there is no absolute Unity or absolute
Being” as follows:

He states “But if there is not some One Itself and Being Itself” in place of
“For if it is not possible to assume One and Being as genera of beings and
as predicated of them in that way”—that is, not as equivocal terms.18
Alexander of Aphrodisias 1891, 224 ll. 24–6; idem 1989–1994, II, 177

According to Alexander, if “being” and “one” are not substances, then they are
accidents and thus predicated as such of something else, as may be inferred
from what he says a few lines later:

[T]herefore, if One is not a substance, then neither are the units; but if
the units are not substances, then neither is number; hence number will
be an accident, not a substance-given that One is not some substance but
rather an accident of something else [emphasis added].
ibid., 224 ll. 54–6; idem 1989–1994, II, 177

Alexander clearly believes that Aristotle took this side of the aporia, i.e. that
“one” and “being” are not substances and are, therefore, accidents. What re-
mains is to establish precisely what kind of accident is meant in this case.
According to Aristotle, there are two kinds of accidents: first, there is what
one might call the “ordinary accident (sumbebēkos),” which he described in his
Metaphysics as follows:

“Accident (sumbebēkos)” means that which applies to something and is

truly stated, but neither necessarily nor usually; as if, for example … a
cultured man might be white; but since this does not happen necessarily
or usually, we call it an accident.
Aristotle 1977, I, 289

18  See also idem 1891, 224 ll. 19–20. Alexander also says that “one” and “being” are predicated
“universally (kath’ holou).” This must mean “commonly,” since according to Aubenque
(1962, 210 n. 3), “Alors que kath’ holou désigne généralement l’universalité du genre, est dit
koinon ce qui est commun à plusieurs genres.” See also Pines, 28–30.

Journal of persianate studies 10 (2017) 218–239

230 Shayegan

But there is another kind of accident, which he describes in a passage immedi-

ately following the above:

“Accident” has also another sense, namely whatever belongs to each thing
in virtue of itself (kath’ hauto), but not in its essence (mē en tēi ousiai); e.g.
as having the sum of its two angles equal to two right angles belongs to
the triangle.
ibid., I, 291

Now, in Metaphysics IV, ch. 2, Aristotle, speaking about “being” and “one” as
terms “added” to substance declares:

Since “one man” and “man” and “existent man” and “man” are the same
thing, i.e. the duplication in the statement “one man” and “one existent
man” gives no fresh meaning (clearly the concepts of humanity and ex-
istence are not dissociated in respect of their coming to be or ceasing to
be), and similarly in the case of the term “one,” so that obviously the ad-
ditional term (prosthesis) in these phrases has the same significance, and
unity is nothing distinct from being.19
ibid., I, 151

19  I have slightly modified Tredennick’s translation. What Aristotle means is that when
“being” and “one” are added to “man,” they do not interfere in the concept of humanity,
the quiddity of “man.” The concepts of existence and humanity are not dissociated in
existing things but dissociated in thought. This is in fact a distinction between, on the one
hand, “essence,” and on the other, “existence.” In other words, “one” and “being” do not
enter into the quiddity of things, but are said of them. Gilson has a completely different
interpretation of the same Aristotelian quotation: “L’intention d’Aristote en ce passage est
donc claire: la métaphysique traitera de l’un, comme elle traite de l’être, parce que ce ne
sont là que deux autres noms de cette même réalité fondamentale, l’ousia, qui est et est
une de plein droit. S’il y a quelque part une doctrine d’identité de l’être et de la substance,
c’est bien celle-là, et l’on conçoit sans peine qu’Averroés ait eu conscience de rétablir
l’aristotélisme authentique en critiquant la position d’Avicenne sur ce point” (idem 1972,
92; emphasis added). Gilson refers to Aristotle’s Metaphysics as a “bloc ontologique” (ibid.,
93). Couloubaritsis (1983, 67) and Brandner (191ff.) have implicitly challenged Gilson’s
position, since Aristotle’s metaphysics is not only “ousiology,” but also “henology” and
“ontology.” Important though they are, these distinctions cannot be further elaborated
upon within the present context. St. Thomas Aquinas (d. 1274) does separate the quiddity
from its existence, for otherwise they would be completely synonymous: “Now the terms
one and being signify one nature according to different concepts, and therefore they are
like the terms principle and cause, and not like the terms tunic and garment, which are
wholly synonymous.” (idem 1961, I, 222, left column, §549). If we reconsider the argument

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The Accidentality of Existence in Avicenna 231

In what sense does the above passage inform us about the way in which “being”
and “one” are to be understood in their relation to substance? Since we have es-
tablished that Aristotle must have regarded them as “accidents,” he must have
meant to say that they are not mere accidents, i.e. not accidents in the ordinary
sense, such as “whiteness.” Now it has been explained above that, for Aristotle,
there is yet another kind of accident, namely “whatever belongs to each thing
in virtue of itself (kath’ hauto), but not in its essence (mē en tēi ousiai)” (cf. ibid.,
I, 289). And in my view, this is the kind of accidentality that applies to “one”
and “being” in the passage quoted above.
This interpretation is supported by the following two quotations from
Alexander of Aphrodisias:

After this discussion of the accidental, Aristotle says that “accident” also
has another meaning. For any [attributes] that belong to a subject in vir-
tue of the subject itself, but are not in its substance or definition, are also
accidents … Or perhaps the words, “whatever attributes belong to each
thing in virtue of themselves and are not in its substance” are equivalent
to, “whatever attributes belong to each thing in virtue of some definite
cause, not however in such a way that they are in its substance.”
idem 1891, 438 ll. 26–8, 439 ll. 10–3; idem 1988–1993, II, 126–127

And:

By essential accidents Aristotle means things that are inseparable

[akhōrista]20 and proper [idia] and almost of the essence of the thing, in
terms of which descriptive accounts [hoi di’ hupographēs logoi] are com-
monly framed about certain things. For example, it would be an essential
accident of a triangle to have three angles equal to two right angles, and
to have two sides greater than the third, any way they are taken; but it is
not from these features that the triangle gets its definition. It would be an
essential accident of number that it is odd or even, and of each being that

from the standpoint of substance in concreto, the latter is the same as one and being, in
other words: extra-mentally, there is no difference between substance, one, and being,
since substance is just identical with “being and one (hoper on and hoper hen),” in which
connection, see Alexander of Aphrodisias 1891, 249 ll. 7–8.
20  I have inserted the Greek terms added by me. I wish to emphasize that the two expres-
sionsterms:, “inseparable (akhōristos)” and “descriptive account (di’ hupographēs logos),”
are pre­Porphyrian.

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232 Shayegan

it is one insofar as it is a “this something [tode ti]” and whatever accidents

belong in this manner [would be essential accidents] (emphasis added).21
idem 1891, 176 ll. 24–30; idem 1988–1993, II, 95

Therefore, my conclusion is that “being” and “one” have the status of a kath’
hautos sumbebēkos. But the question remains as to how to interpret this ex-
pression in this context. Usually, it is taken to refer to the proprium (idion).22
But, as observed by Porphyry, the proprium in the strict sense has as a charac-
teristic that it is predicated, always, but not in its essence, of a single species
alone, such as “capability of laughter” is predicated of “man” (Porphyry 1887,
38–9).
The difficulty with “being” is that, contrary to the proprium, it is predicated
of more than one species alone. I would therefore suggest to consider the pos-
sibility of understanding existence in terms of what Porphyry, in his Eisagōgē,
calls an “inseparable accident” (see n. 20). The inseparable accident seems to
meet all the characteristics of “being”: (1) it is predicated of more than one
species alone, but not in its essence; (2) when the inseparable accident is
destroyed, the subject is destroyed; (3) it is not convertible with the subject;
(4) though inseparable from the subject in being, it is very well separable from
it in thought; and, finally, as we shall see below, (5) being predicated analogi-
cally, existence as the inseparable accident admits of a “more or less.”23 Thus,
I suggest to understand “being” as a kath’ hautos sumbebēkos in terms of an
inseparable accident in the way in which the latter is distinguished from the
proprium in Porphyry’s Eisagōgē.
Now that we have established what kind of accidents “being” and “one” are,
it remains to clarify how they are predicated. According to Aristotle, the term
“being” has multiple meanings, but always in relation to one and the same na-
ture (pros hen kai mian tina phusin) (Aristotle 1977, I, 147).24

21  Note that Alexander used the terms “inseparable” and “proprium.”
22  See, for example, Aristotle 1975, I, 349; idem, 1977, I, 291.
23  See Porphyry 1887, 39, 44, 48, 50–51.
24  Much ink has been spilled over the theory of pros hen kai mian phusin legomenona, end-
ing with it being called “focal meaning” by Owen and Nussbaum (184–9, et passim). The
whole ontology of the Metaphysics is based on this theory, which has been greatly elabo-
rated by Alexander. This is the key to understanding Aristotle’s Metaphysics. According to
this theory, there is one and the same knowledge of “being” qua “being” and it is found in
the Metaphysics.

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The Accidentality of Existence in Avicenna 233

“Being” and “one” are the same nature in the sense that they follow
(akolouthein)25 each other as principle and cause, but are not identical in
formula (ibid., I, 149 [ch. 2, 1003 b 22–5]). Alexander, in his commentary on
Metaphysics IV, ch. 2, 1003 a 33f., explains the matter as follows:

He draws a distinction among things that are ranged under some com-
mon predicate: equivocals (homōnuma), univocals (sunōnuma), things
said by derivation from something (aph’ henos tinos)26 or by reference

25  “Akolouthein” is an important technical term in Aristotle. It is usually translated by “fol-

lowing upon.” It is the “following upon” of things that are different in their definition. In
Physics IV, ch. 11, 219 a 10–4, Aristotle uses “following” (akolouthein) to explain the relation
of time, motion, and spacial magnitude (idem 1929–1934, I, 389). They follow upon one
another with respect to their accidental attributes, e.g. continuity or divisibility, which
means unity. But the definition of these three terms—“spacial magnitude,” “motion,” and
“time”—are different. Each has its own definition, their “following” upon one another is
merely accidental, just as “one” and “being” are. Avicenna uses the proportional analogy
as Aristotle does in relation to time, motion, and spacial magnitude. Here, too, the defini-
tions of these three concepts are different (Shayegan, 124–5). For a similar argument with
respect to “one” and “being,” see Brandner (191 n. 12, 192), who explains “one” and “being”
by the use of the expression “following (susseguono),” while their concepts are not identi-
cal. See also Couloubaritsis (1983; 1992), who is the pioneer of the question of “henology”
in Aristotle. By raising this question, he opened a new chapter on Aristotelism. Henology
is now not merely reserved for neo-Platonism, but used for the foundation of Aristotelian
ontology, as well. Thus, “one (hen)” gives to “being (on)” its noetic unity. The result is a
coming-together of epistemology and ontology. Avicenna has an identical theory of “fol-
lowing” (tabiʿa, from which the verbal substantive tabiʿ derives) and he identifies “tavābiʿ”
with “lavāzem” in connection with what can be both a proprium or an inseparable acci-
dent; see, for example, Ebn Sinā 2012/1433, I, pt. 1, 30 ll. 7–9, 32 ll. 9–13, 34 ll. 3–13, 35 ll. 7–8.
26  See also Nicomachean Ethics I, ch. 2, 10096 b 26–8 (Aristotle 1926, 19–25). Ebn Sinā
(2012/1433, I, pt. 2, 11 ll. 5–8) also discusses the “esm moshakkak (analogical term).” In this
passage, the phrase “al-nesba elā mabda‌ʾ va-ghāya wāheda (the relation to a single prin-
ciple and end)” clearly refers to efficient and final causality. Cf. Zingano (355–6), who
writes: “Tout d’abord le pros hen est reconnu se trouver au coeur de l’unite de significa-
tion de l’être, quelle que soit sa valeur exacte. Ensuite, l’identité entre pros hen et aph’
henos sera affirrnée de plus en plus fortement: ils seront perçus comme des modes al-
tematifs pour exprimer un même rapport. Finalement, le aph’ henos est pris comme étant
le tenne principal de l’expression complexe aph’henos kai pros hen, et, par-là, une théorie
de l’émanation s’infiltre où il n’y avait auparavant qu’une doctrine de l’unité de significa-
tion de l’être: tout va vers l’un parce que tout provient de l’un. Cela veut dire que le rap-
port pros hen d’unité focale entre la substance et les autres catégories (disons, un rapport
horizontal) se voit désormais traversé d’un rapport (disons vertical) entre les divers types
de substances mises en rapport par la provenance à partir d’une seule.”

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234 Shayegan

to one thing (pros hen). He will use this distinction to show that being is
neither a genus of the things of which it is predicated … nor an equivo-
cal … but something intermediate between equivocals and univocals, for
between these there are things said by derivation from one thing and by
reference to one thing, and among these is being.… But things said by
derivation from one thing and by reference to one thing do not maintain
towards one another the equality of claim to what is predicated of them
that is characteristic of univocals; nor, in tum, do they have the utter and
unmitigated diversity of equivocals; rather they have a certain common-
ality (koinōnia) insofar as they are what they are said to be because they
have a certain nature of that object (pragma), i.e. this nature is somehow
observed in all of them; it is because they are derived from that object, or
bear some relation (logos) to it, that they have come to share its name.27
Alexander of Aphrodisias 1891, 241 ll. 3–21; idem 1989–1994, IV, 15

So far Alexander’s commentary. What deserves to be noted here is that the fact
that he situates “being” and “one” as a predicate between homonyms and syn-
onyms is reminiscent of Aristotle’s Metaphysics VII, ch. 4, 1030 a 32–1030 b 3:28

Just as “is” applies to everything, although not in the same way, but
primarily to one thing and secondarily to others … similarly essence
also will belong primarily and simply to substance, and secondarily to
other things as well; just as the “what it is” is not essence simply, but the
essence of a quality or a quantity. For it must be either by equivocation29
that we say that these things are, or by adding and subtracting qualifica-
tions, as we say that the unknowable is known; since the truth is that
we use the terms neither equivocally nor in the same sense, but just as we
use the term “medical” in relation to one and the same thing; but not of
one and the same thing, nor yet equivocally.
Aristotle 1977, I, 325

27  See also Metaphysics VII, ch. 4, 1030 a 22ff. (Aristotle 1977, I, 323).
28  For Alexander’s reference to being as a predicate that is neither equivocal nor univo-
cal, but rather belonging to those predicates that are said aph’ henos and pros hen, see
Alexander of Aphrodisias 1891, 474 ll. 27–9.
29  Aristotle (Physics II, ch. 5, 196 b 22; idem 1929–1934, II, 149) distinguishes between two
kinds of homonyms: “by chance (apo tuchēs),” and “by thought (apo dianoias),” the latter
of which came later to called “intentional homonymy.” Cf. Aubenque 1962, 201. See also
Dexippus 1888, 22 ll. 6–9; idem 1990, 48.

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The Accidentality of Existence in Avicenna 235

On the other hand, Aristotle’s assertion that “being” applies in different degrees
to different things, and Alexander’s earlier affirmation that terms like “being”
and “one” “… do not maintain towards one another the equality of claim to
what is predicated of them that is characteristic of univocal” (Alexander of
Aphrodisias 1898–1994, V, 15) clearly indicates that existence as a predicate is
characterized by a “more” and a “less,” which is precisely one of the character-
istics of that kind of kath’ hautos sumbebēkos that later came to be called an
“inseparable accident” in the terminology of Alexander and Porphyry.

Conclusion

In conclusion, it can safely be stated that Avicenna’s views on the distinction

between “essence” and “existence” and his doctrine on the accidentality of
existence follow the thought of Aristotle and Alexander of Aphrodisias in its
general outlines. After all, all the elements that were found to be constitutive
of Avicenna’s aforementioned theories could be traced back to the works of
these two Greek thinkers:

•
“existence,” like “one,” is distinct from “essence;”
•
it is neither a substance nor a genus;
•
it is an accident that belongs to something in virtue of itself but not in its
essence;
•
as such it is to be understood as an inseparable accident in the way in which
it was defined against the proprium in Porphyry’s Eisagōgē; and
•
it is predicated analogically.

My conclusion is that Avicenna follows Aristotle and Alexander very closely

in his Shefāʾ (“Healing”). Even though Aristotle’s methodology is aporetic in
general, he uses different methods for different topics: the anological method
is used in his philosophy of being, and the scientific method of definition and
demonstration is used in the Posterior Analytics, where the main issue is logic
in its relation to understanding and the subject, which he emphasizes is “es-
sence,” while the Metaphysics deals with “existence.” The term “being” is said in
many senses, but in relation to one nature.
Averroes’ misunderstanding of Avicenna concerning the conceptual dis-
tinction between “essence” and “existence” and his consequent misunder-
standing of Aristotle and Alexander has turned the tide of the Peripatetic
School and this in two ways. Firstly, Avicenna has been unjustly qualified as

Journal of persianate studies 10 (2017) 218–239

236 Shayegan

a neo-Platonist incapable of understanding Aristotle.30 Secondly, Averroes’

erroneous criticism has guided Scholastic philosophy into an endless logical
strife from which Descartes wanted to liberate himself, heralding the begin-
ning of the individual society. Aristotle is very much alive in Iran in general
and in the school of Isfahan in particular. For this, we owe our debt of grati-
tude to Avicenna and to those who followed in his footsteps in later centuries.
But I must admit that after having replaced Aristotle by Avicenna, today we
are confronted with a completely new phenomenon. The present traditional
philosophers in Iran are all reacting to Avicenna and turning towards Averroes
merely because they have come to understand that Western Averroism has had
much more resonance in Western philosophy than Avicennism.31 Indeed, after
having remained inexistent during eight-hundred years in Iranian philosophy,
Averroes has suddenly emerged on the scene as a great rational Islamic thinker.
Contemporary traditional philosophy in Iran is in deep crisis, and it is to be
hoped that veracity will not be sacrificed on the altar of modernity. As for my
own opinion of “this guy (hazā al-rajol),” Averroes, j’accuse!

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