Beruflich Dokumente
Kultur Dokumente
164273 March 28, 2007 the signature of one Victrina Elnado Nubi (Nubi)11 which shows that his card in
question was "DECL OVERLIMIT" or declared over the limit.12
EMMANUEL B. AZNAR, Petitioner,
vs. Citibank denied the allegation that it blacklisted Aznar’s card. It also contended that
CITIBANK, N.A., (Philippines), Respondent. under the terms and conditions governing the issuance and use of its credit cards,
Citibank is exempt from any liability for the dishonor of its cards by any merchant
DECISION affiliate, and that its liability for any action or incident which may be brought against
it in relation to the issuance and use of its credit cards is limited to ₱1,000.00 or the
actual damage proven whichever is lesser.13
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.:
To prove that they did not blacklist Aznar’s card, Citibank’s Credit Card Department
Before this Court is a Petition for Review assailing the Decision 1 of the Court of Head, Dennis Flores, presented Warning Cancellation Bulletins which contained
Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 62554 dated January 30, 2004 which set aside the list of its canceled cards covering the period of Aznar’s trip. 14
the November 25, 1998 Order of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) Branch 10, Cebu
City and reinstated the Decision of RTC Branch 20 of Cebu City dated May 29,
1998 in Civil Case No. CEB-16474; and the CA Resolution dated May 26, 2004 On May 29, 1998, RTC Branch 20, Cebu City, through Judge Ferdinand J. Marcos,
denying petitioner’s motion for reconsideration. rendered its decision dismissing Aznar’s complaint for lack of merit.15 The trial court
held that as between the computer print-out16 presented by Aznar and the Warning
Cancellation Bulletins17 presented by Citibank, the latter had more weight as their
The facts are as follows: due execution and authenticity were duly established by Citibank. 18 The trial court
also held that even if it was shown that Aznar’s credit card was dishonored by a
Emmanuel B. Aznar (Aznar), a known businessman2 in Cebu, is a holder of a merchant establishment, Citibank was not shown to have acted with malice or bad
Preferred Master Credit Card (Mastercard) bearing number 5423-3920-0786-7012 faith when the same was dishonored.19
issued by Citibank with a credit limit of ₱150,000.00. As he and his wife, Zoraida,
planned to take their two grandchildren, Melissa and Richard Beane, on an Asian Aznar filed a motion for reconsideration with motion to re-raffle the case saying that
tour, Aznar made a total advance deposit of ₱485,000.00 with Citibank with the Judge Marcos could not be impartial as he himself is a holder of a Citibank credit
intention of increasing his credit limit to ₱635,000.00.3 card.20 The case was re-raffled21 and on November 25, 1998, the RTC, this time
through Judge Jesus S. De la Peña of Branch 10 of Cebu City, issued an Order
With the use of his Mastercard, Aznar purchased plane tickets to Kuala Lumpur for granting Aznar’s motion for reconsideration, as follows:
his group worth ₱237,000.00. On July 17, 1994, Aznar, his wife and grandchildren
left Cebu for the said destination.4 WHEREFORE, the Motion for Reconsideration is hereby GRANTED. The
DECISION dated May 29, 1998 is hereby reconsidered, and consequently, the
Aznar claims that when he presented his Mastercard in some establishments in defendant is hereby condemned liable to pay the following sums of money:
Malaysia, Singapore and Indonesia, the same was not honored.5 And when he tried
to use the same in Ingtan Tour and Travel Agency (Ingtan Agency) in Indonesia to a) ₱10,000,000.00 as moral damages;
purchase plane tickets to Bali, it was again dishonored for the reason that his card
was blacklisted by Citibank. Such dishonor forced him to buy the tickets in
cash.6 He further claims that his humiliation caused by the denial of his card was b) ₱5,000,000.00 as exemplary damages;
aggravated when Ingtan Agency spoke of swindlers trying to use blacklisted
cards.7 Aznar and his group returned to the Philippines on August 10, 1994.8 c) ₱1,000,000.00 as attorney’s fees; and
On August 26, 1994, Aznar filed a complaint for damages against Citibank, d) ₱200,000.00 as litigation expenses.22
docketed as Civil Case No. CEB-16474 and raffled to RTC Branch 20, Cebu City,
claiming that Citibank fraudulently or with gross negligence blacklisted his Judge De la Peña ruled that: it is improbable that a man of Aznar’s stature would
Mastercard which forced him, his wife and grandchildren to abort important tour fabricate Exh. "G" or the computer print-out which shows that Aznar’s Mastercard
destinations and prevented them from buying certain items in their tour.9 He further was dishonored for the reason that it was declared over the limit; Exh. "G" was
claimed that he suffered mental anguish, serious anxiety, wounded feelings, printed out by Nubi in the ordinary or regular course of business in the modern
besmirched reputation and social humiliation due to the wrongful blacklisting of his credit card industry and Nubi was not able to testify as she was in a foreign country
card.10 To prove that Citibank blacklisted his Mastercard, Aznar presented a and cannot be reached by subpoena; taking judicial notice of the practice of
computer print-out, denominated as ON-LINE AUTHORIZATIONS FOREIGN automated teller machines (ATMs) and credit card facilities which readily print out
ACCOUNT ACTIVITY REPORT, issued to him by Ingtan Agency (Exh. "G") with
bank account status, Exh. "G" can be received as prima facie evidence of the submitted by Aznar to support his Motion for Reconsideration, when no copy of
dishonor of Aznar’s Mastercard; no rebutting evidence was presented by Citibank such manifestation was served on the adverse party and it was filed beyond office
to prove that Aznar’s Mastercard was not dishonored, as all it proved was that said hours. The Court also noted that Judge De la Peña made an egregiously large
credit card was not included in the blacklisted cards; when Citibank accepted the award of damages in favor of Aznar which opened himself to suspicion. 31
additional deposit of ₱485,000.00 from Aznar, there was an implied novation and
Citibank was obligated to increase Aznar’s credit limit and ensure that Aznar will Aznar now comes before this Court on a petition for review alleging that: the CA
not encounter any embarrassing situation with the use of his Mastercard; Citibank’s erroneously made its own factual finding that his Mastercard was not blacklisted
failure to comply with its obligation constitutes gross negligence as it caused Aznar when the matter of blacklisting was already a non-issue in the November 25, 1998
inconvenience, mental anguish and social humiliation; the fine prints in the flyer of Order of the RTC; the RTC found that Aznar’s Mastercard was dishonored for the
the credit card limiting the liability of the bank to ₱1,000.00 or the actual damage reason that it was declared over the credit limit; this factual finding is supported by
proven, whichever is lower, is a contract of adhesion which must be interpreted Exh. "G" and by his (Aznar’s) testimony; the issue of dishonor on the ground of
against Citibank.23 ‘DECL OVERLIMIT’, although not alleged in the complaint, was tried with the
implied consent of the parties and should be treated as if raised in the pleadings
Citibank filed an appeal with the CA and its counsel filed an administrative case pursuant to Section 5, Rule 10 of the Rules of Civil Procedure; 32 Exh. "G" cannot be
against Judge De la Peña for grave misconduct, gross ignorance of the law and excluded as it qualifies as an electronic evidence following the Rules on Electronic
incompetence, claiming among others that said judge rendered his decision without Evidence which provides that print-outs are also originals for purposes of the Best
having read the transcripts. The administrative case was held in abeyance pending Evidence Rule; Exh. "G" has remained complete and unaltered, apart from the
the outcome of the appeal filed by Citibank with the CA.24lawphi1.net signature of Nubi, thus the same is reliable for the purpose for which it was
generated; the RTC judge correctly credited the testimony of Aznar on the issuance
On January 30, 2004, the CA rendered its Decision granting Citibank’s appeal thus: of the computer print-out as Aznar saw that it was signed by Nubi; said testimony
constitutes the "other evidence showing the integrity and reliability of the print-out to
the satisfaction of the judge" which is required under the Rules on Electronic
WHEREFORE, the instant appeal is GRANTED. The assailed order of the Regional Evidence; the trial court was also correct in finding that Citibank was grossly
Trial Court, 7th Judicial Region, Branch 10, Cebu City, in Civil Case No. CEB- negligent in failing to credit the additional deposit and make the necessary entries
16474, is hereby SET ASIDE and the decision, dated 29 May 1998 of the Regional in its systems to prevent Aznar from encountering any embarrassing situation with
Trial Court, 7th Judicial Region, Branch 20, Cebu City in this case is REINSTATED. the use of his Mastercard.33
SO ORDERED.25 Citibank, in its Comment, contends that: Aznar never had personal knowledge that
his credit card was blacklisted as he only presumed such fact; the issue of dishonor
The CA ruled that: Aznar had no personal knowledge of the blacklisting of his card on the ground that the card was declared over the limit was also never tried with
and only presumed the same when it was dishonored in certain establishments; the implied consent of both parties; Aznar’s self-serving testimony is not sufficient
such dishonor is not sufficient to prove that his card was blacklisted by Citibank; to prove the integrity and reliability of Exh. "G"; Aznar did not declare that it was
Exh. "G" is an electronic document which must be authenticated pursuant to Nubi who printed the document and that said document was printed in his presence
Section 2, Rule 5 of the Rules on Electronic Evidence 26 or under Section 20 of Rule as he merely said that the print-out was provided him; there is also no annotation
132 of the Rules of Court27 by anyone who saw the document executed or written; on Exh. "G" to establish that it was Nubi who printed the same; assuming further
Aznar, however, failed to prove the authenticity of Exh. "G", thus it must be that Exh. "G" is admissible and Aznar’s credit card was dishonored, Citibank still
excluded; the unrefuted testimony of Aznar that his credit card was dishonored by cannot be held liable for damages as it only shows that Aznar’s credit card was
Ingtan Agency and certain establishments abroad is not sufficient to justify the dishonored for having been declared over the limit; Aznar’s cause of action against
award of damages in his favor, absent any showing that Citibank had anything to Citibank hinged on the alleged blacklisting of his card which purportedly caused its
do with the said dishonor; Citibank had no absolute control over the actions of its dishonor; dishonor alone, however, is not sufficient to award Aznar damages as he
merchant affiliates, thus it should not be held liable for the dishonor of Aznar’s must prove that the dishonor was caused by a grossly negligent act of Citibank; the
credit card by said establishments.28 award of damages in favor of Aznar was based on Article 1170 34 of the Civil
Code, i.e., there was fraud, negligence or delay in the performance of its obligation;
Aznar filed a motion for reconsideration which the CA dismissed in its Resolution there was no proof, however that Citibank committed fraud or delay or that it
dated May 26, 2004.29 contravened its obligations towards Aznar; the terms and conditions of the credit
card cannot be considered as a contract of adhesion since Aznar was entirely free
to reject the card if he did not want the conditions stipulated therein; a person
Parenthetically, the administrative case against Judge De la Peña was activated whose stature is such that he is expected to be more prudent with respect to his
and on April 29, 2005, the Court’s Third Division30 found respondent judge guilty of transactions cannot later on be heard to complain for being ignorant or having been
knowingly rendering an unjust judgment and ordered his suspension for six months. forced into merely consenting to the contract.35
The Court held that Judge De la Peña erred in basing his Order on a manifestation
In his Reply, Aznar contended that to a layman, the term "blacklisting" is humiliated when its staff insinuated that he could be a swindler trying to use a
synonymous with the words "hot list" or "declared overlimit"; and whether his card blacklisted card.
was blacklisted or declared over the limit, the same was dishonored due to the fault
or gross negligence of Citibank.36 As correctly found by the RTC in its May 29, 1998 Decision, Aznar failed to prove
with a preponderance of evidence that Citibank blacklisted his Mastercard or
Aznar also filed a Memorandum raising as issues the following: placed the same on the "hot list."41
I. Whether or not the augmentation deposit in the amount of ₱485,000.00 Aznar in his testimony admitted that he had no personal knowledge that his
of the Petitioner constitutes relative extinctive novation; Mastercard was blacklisted by Citibank and only presumed such fact from the
dishonor of his card.
II. Whether or not the purchases made by Petitioner were beyond his
credit limit; Q Now, paragraph 12 also states and I quote: "its entry in the "hot" list was
confirmed to be authentic".
III. Whether or not the issues of dishonor by reason of overlimit was tried
with the consent of the parties; Now, who confirmed that the blacklisting of your Preferred Citibank Mastercard was
authentic?
IV. Whether or not the "On Line Authorization Report" is an electronic
document." A. Okey. When I presented this Mastercard, my card rather, at the Merchant’s
store, I do not know, they called up somebody for verification then later they told
V. Whether or not the "On Line Authorization Report" constitutes me that "your card is being denied". So, I am not in a position to answer that. I do
electronic evidence; not know whom they called up; where they verified. So, when it is denied that’s
presumed to be blacklisted.
VII. Whether or not the Respondent is negligent in not crediting the A. Denied.
deposits of the Respondent.37
Q. And after you were told that your card was denied you presumed that it
Aznar further averred in his Memorandum that Citibank assured him that with the was blacklisted?
use of his Mastercard, he would never be turned down by any merchant store, and
that under Section 43, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court, Exh. "G" is admissible in A. Definitely.
evidence.38
Q. So your statement that your card was allegedly blacklisted is only your
Citibank also filed a Memorandum reiterating its earlier arguments. 39 presumption drawn from the fact, from your allegations, that it was denied at
the merchandise store?
Stripped to its essentials, the only question that needs to be answered is: whether
Aznar has established his claim against Citibank. A. Yes, sir.42 (Emphasis supplied)
The answer is no. The dishonor of Aznar’s Mastercard is not sufficient to support a conclusion that
said credit card was blacklisted by Citibank, especially in view of Aznar’s own
It is basic that in civil cases, the burden of proof rests on the plaintiff to establish his admission that in other merchant establishments in Kuala Lumpur and Singapore,
case based on a preponderance of evidence. The party that alleges a fact also has his Mastercard was accepted and honored.43
the burden of proving it.40
Aznar puts much weight on the ON-LINE AUTHORIZATION FOREIGN ACCOUNT
In the complaint Aznar filed before the RTC, he claimed that Citibank blacklisted his ACTIVITY REPORT, a computer print-out handed to Aznar by Ingtan Agency,
Mastercard which caused its dishonor in several establishments in Malaysia, marked as Exh. "G", to prove that his Mastercard was dishonored for being
Singapore, and Indonesia, particularly in Ingtan Agency in Indonesia where he was
blacklisted. On said print-out appears the words "DECL OVERLIMIT" opposite requested her to sign to show proof that my Preferred Master Card has been
Account No. 5423-3920-0786-7012. rejected.44 (Emphasis supplied).
As correctly pointed out by the RTC and the CA, however, such exhibit cannot be Even if examined under the Rules on Electronic Evidence, which took effect on
considered admissible as its authenticity and due execution were not sufficiently August 1, 2001, and which is being invoked by Aznar in this case, the
established by petitioner. authentication of Exh. "G" would still be found wanting.
The prevailing rule at the time of the promulgation of the RTC Decision is Section Pertinent sections of Rule 5 read:
20 of Rule 132 of the Rules of Court. It provides that whenever any private
document offered as authentic is received in evidence, its due execution and Section 1. Burden of proving authenticity. – The person seeking to introduce an
authenticity must be proved either by (a) anyone who saw the document executed electronic document in any legal proceeding has the burden of proving its
or written; or (b) by evidence of the genuineness of the signature or handwriting of authenticity in the manner provided in this Rule.
the maker.
Section 2. Manner of authentication. – Before any private electronic document
Aznar, who testified on the authenticity of Exh. "G," did not actually see the offered as authentic is received in evidence, its authenticity must be proved by any
document executed or written, neither was he able to provide evidence on the of the following means:
genuineness of the signature or handwriting of Nubi, who handed to him said
computer print-out. Indeed, all he was able to allege in his testimony are the
following: (a) by evidence that it had been digitally signed by the person purported to
have signed the same;
Q I show to you a Computer Print Out captioned as On Line Authorization Activity
Report where it is shown that the Preferred Master Card Number (b) by evidence that other appropriate security procedures or devices as
5423392007867012 was denied as per notation on the margin of this Computer may be authorized by the Supreme Court or by law for authentication of
Print Out, is this the document evidencing the dishonor of your Preferred Master electronic documents were applied to the document; or
Card?
(c) by other evidence showing its integrity and reliability to the satisfaction
xxxx of the judge.
A Yes sir, after that Ingtan incident, I went straight to the Service Agency there and Aznar claims that his testimony complies with par. (c), i.e., it constitutes the "other
on the left hand side you will be able to see the name of the person in-charged [sic] evidence showing integrity and reliability of Exh. "G" to the satisfaction of the
there certifying that really my card is being blacklisted and there is the signature judge." The Court is not convinced. Aznar’s testimony that the person from Ingtan
there of the agency. Agency merely handed him the computer print-out and that he thereafter asked
said person to sign the same cannot be considered as sufficient to show said print-
out’s integrity and reliability. As correctly pointed out by Judge Marcos in his May
ATTY. NAVARRO: 29, 1998 Decision, Exh. "G" does not show on its face that it was issued by Ingtan
Agency as Aznar merely mentioned in passing how he was able to secure the print-
The witness, your honor, is pointing to the signature over the handwritten name of out from the agency; Aznar also failed to show the specific business address of the
Victrina Elnado Nubi which I pray, your honor, that the Computer Print Out be source of the computer print-out because while the name of Ingtan Agency was
marked as our Exhibit "G" and the remarks at the left hand bottom portion of mentioned by Aznar, its business address was not reflected in the print-out.45
Victorina Elnado Nubi with her signature thereon be encircled and be marked as
our Exhibit "G-1". Indeed, Aznar failed to demonstrate how the information reflected on the print-out
was generated and how the said information could be relied upon as true. In fact,
xxxx Aznar to repeat, testified as follows:
Q Mr. Aznar, where did you secure this Computer Print Out marked as Exhibit ATTY. NERI
"G"?
Q Now, paragraph 12 also states and I quote: "its entry in the "hot" list was
A This is provided by that Agency, your honor. They were the ones who confirmed to be authentic"
provided me with this. So what the lady did, she gave me the Statement and I
Now, who confirmed that the blacklisting of your Preferred Citibank Mastercard was no allegation in the Complaint or evidence to show that there was gross negligence
authentic? on the part of Citibank in declaring that the credit card has been used over the limit.
A Okey. When I presented this Mastercard, my card rather, at the Merchant’s store, The Court is also perplexed that stated on Exh. "G" is the amount of "6,289,195.10"
I do not know, they called up somebody for verification then later they told me that opposite petitioner's account number, which data, petitioner did not clarify. 48 As
"your card is being denied". So, I am not in a position to answer that. I do not plaintiff in this case, it was incumbent on him to prove that he did not actually incur
know whom they called up; where they verified. So, when it is denied that’s the said amount which is above his credit limit. As it is, the Court cannot see how
presumed to be blacklisted.46 (Emphasis supplied) Exh. "G" could help petitioner's claim for damages.
Aznar next invokes Section 43 of Rule 130 of the Rules of Court, which pertains to The claim of petitioner that Citibank blacklisted his card through fraud or gross
entries in the course of business, to support Exh. "G". Said provision reads: negligence is likewise effectively negated by the evidence of Citibank which was
correctly upheld by the RTC and the CA, to wit:
Sec. 43. Entries in the course of business. – Entries made at, or near the time of
the transactions to which they refer, by a person deceased or unable to testify, who xxx Mr. Dennis Flores, the Head of the Credit Card Department of defendant Bank,
was in a position to know the facts therein stated, may be received as prima presented documents known as Warning Cancellation Bulletin for July 10, 17, 24,
facie evidence, if such person made the entries in his professional capacity or in and 31, 1994 (Exhibits ‘3’, ‘3-1’ to ‘3-38’, ‘4’, ‘4-1’ to ‘4-38’ ‘5’, ‘5-1’ to ‘5-39’ and ‘6’,
the performance of duty and in the ordinary or regular course of business or duty. ‘6-1’ to ‘6-39’), for August 7, 1994 (Exhibit[s] ‘7’, ‘7-1’ to ‘7-37’), for August 8, 1994
(Exhibit[s] ‘8’, ‘8-1’ to ‘8-20’) which show that plaintiff’s Citibank preferred
Under this rule, however, the following conditions are required: mastercard was not placed in a hot list or was not blacklisted.
1. the person who made the entry must be dead, or unable to testify; The Warning Cancellation Bulletins (WCB) (Exhibits ‘3’, ‘4’, ‘5’, ‘6’, ‘7’, ‘8’ and their
submarkings) which covered the period of four (4) days in July 1994 (from July 10,
17, 24 and 31, 1994), and two (2) days in August 1994, (August 7 and 8, 1994),
2. the entries were made at or near the time of the transactions to which when plaintiff traveled in the aforementioned Asian countries showed that said
they refer; Citibank preferred mastercard had never been placed in a ‘hot list’ or the same was
blacklisted, let alone the fact that all the credit cards which had been cancelled by
3. the entrant was in a position to know the facts stated in the entries; the defendant bank were all contained, reported and listed in said Warning
Cancellation Bulletin which were issued and released on a regular basis.
4. the entries were made in his professional capacity or in the
performance of a duty, whether legal, contractual, moral or religious; and These three hundred (300) Warning Cancellation Bulletins pieces of documentary
proofs, all in all, adduced by defendant pointed to the fact that said plaintiff’s credit
5. the entries were made in the ordinary or regular course of business or car (sic) was not among those found in said bulletins as having been cancelled for
duty.47 the period for which the said bulletins had been issued.
As correctly pointed out by the RTC in its May 29, 1998 Decision, there appears on Between said computer print out (Exhibit ‘G’) and the Warning Cancellation
the computer print-out the name of a certain "Victrina Elnado Nubi" and a signature Bulletins (Exhibits ‘3’ to ‘8’ and their submarkings) the latter documents adduced by
purportedly belonging to her, and at the left dorsal side were handwritten the words defendant are entitled to greater weight than that said computer print out presented
"Sorry for the delay since the records had to be retrieved. Regards. Darryl Mario." It by plaintiff that bears on the issue of whether the plaintiff’s preferred master card
is not clear therefore if it was Nubi who encoded the information stated in the print- was actually placed in the ‘hot list’ or blacklisted for the following reasons:
out and was the one who printed the same. The handwritten annotation signed by a
certain Darryl Mario even suggests that it was Mario who printed the same and only The first reason is that the due execution and authentication of these Warning
handed the print-out to Nubi. The identity of the entrant, required by the provision Cancellation Bulletins (or WCB) have been duly established and identified by
above mentioned, was therefore not established. Neither did petitioner establish in defendant’s own witness, Dennis Flores, one of the bank’s officers, who is the head
what professional capacity did Mario or Nubi make the entries, or whether the of its credit card department, and, therefore, competent to testify on the said
entries were made in the performance of their duty in the ordinary or regular course bulletins as having been issued by the defendant bank showing that plaintiff’s
of business or duty. preferred master credit card was never blacklisted or placed in the Bank’s ‘hot list’.
But on the other hand, plaintiff’s computer print out (Exhibit ‘G’) was never
And even if Exh. "G" is admitted as evidence, it only shows that the use of the authenticated or its due execution had never been duly established. Thus, between
credit card of petitioner was denied because it was already over the limit. There is a set of duly authenticated commercial documents, the Warning Cancellation
Bulletins (Exhibits ‘3’ to ‘8’ and their submarkings), presented by defendants (sic) COURT: (to witness)
and an unauthenticated private document, plaintiff’s computer print out (Exhibit ‘G’),
the former deserves greater evidentiary weight supporting the findings of this Court Q So, I think Atty. Navarro is only after whether a credit line could be extended?
that plaintiff’s preferred master card (Exhibit ‘1’) had never been blacklisted at all or
placed in a so-called ‘hot list’ by defendant.49
A Yes, your honor.
Petitioner next argues that with the additional deposit he made in his account which
was accepted by Citibank, there was an implied novation and Citibank was under Q Even if there is no augmenting?
the obligation to increase his credit limit and make the necessary entries in its
computerized systems in order that petitioner may not encounter any embarrassing A No, sir, it is not possible. So, the only way the ₱237,000.00 transaction could
situation with the use of his credit card. Again, the Court finds that petitioner's be approved was by way of advance payment which actually happened in this
argument on this point has no leg to stand on. case because there is no way that the ₱237,000.00 can be approved with the
₱150,000.00 credit limit.52 (Emphasis supplied)
Citibank never denied that it received petitioner’s additional deposit. 50 It even
claimed that petitioner was able to purchase plane tickets from Cebu to Kuala The allegations of blacklisting not having been proved, is Citibank liable for
Lumpur in the amount of ₱237,170.00, which amount was beyond his ₱150,000.00 damages for the dishonor of Aznar’s Mastercard?
limit, because it was able to credit petitioner’s additional deposit to his account.
Flores of Citibank testified: Again, the answer is no.
COURT: Citibank, in its attempt to evade liability, invokes paragraphs 7 and 15 of the terms
and conditions governing the issuance of its Mastercard which read:
Q When was this ticket purchased, after the account was augmented
7. MERCHANT AFFILIATES. [Citibank is] not responsible if the Card is not honored
or before? by any merchant affiliate for any reason. Furthermore, [the cardholder] will not hold
[Citibank] responsible for any defective product or service purchased through the
A After the account was augmented, Your Honor, because there is no way we can Card.
approve a P250,000.00 purchase with a P150,000.00 credit limit. 51
xxxx
xxx
15. LIMITATION OF LIABILITY. In any action arising from this agreement or any
ATTY. NERI: incident thereto which [the cardholder] or any other party may file against [Citibank],
[Citibank’s] liability shall not exceed One Thousand Pesos [₱1,000.00] or the actual
damages proven, whichever is lesser.53
For the record, your honor, the deposit of P450,000.00 was made as per
exhibit of the plaintiff on June 28. The purchase of the tickets amount to
P237,000.00 was approved and debited on the account of Mr. Aznar on July On this point, the Court agrees with Aznar that the terms and conditions of
20, your honor. The deposit was made about a month before the purchase of Citibank’s Mastercard constitute a contract of adhesion. It is settled that contracts
the tickets as per documentary exhibits, your honor. between cardholders and the credit card companies are contracts of adhesion, so-
called, because their terms are prepared by only one party while the other merely
affixes his signature signifying his adhesion thereto. 54
COURT:
In this case, paragraph 7 of the terms and conditions states that "[Citibank is] not
So, Atty. Navarro, what do you say to that explanation? responsible if the Card is not honored by any merchant affiliate for any reason x x
x". While it is true that Citibank may have no control of all the actions of its
ATTY. NAVARRO [counsel of petitioner]: merchant affiliates, and should not be held liable therefor, it is incorrect, however,
to give it blanket freedom from liability if its card is dishonored by any merchant
That is correct, your honor, that is borne out by the records, your affiliate for any reason. Such phrase renders the statement vague and as the said
honor. (Emphasis supplied) terms and conditions constitute a contract of adhesion, any ambiguity in its
provisions must be construed against the party who prepared the contract, 55 in this damages are the recompense or compensation awarded for the damage suffered.
case Citibank. Thus, there can be damage without injury to those instances in which the loss or
harm was not the result of a violation of a legal duty. In such cases, the
Citibank also invokes paragraph 15 of its terms and conditions which limits its consequences must be borne by the injured person alone, the law affords no
liability to ₱1,000.00 or the actual damage proven, whichever is lesser. remedy for damages resulting from an act which does not amount to a legal injury
or wrong. These situations are often called damnum absque injuria.63
Again, such stipulation cannot be considered as valid for being unconscionable as
it precludes payment of a larger amount even though damage may be clearly WHEREFORE, the petition is denied for lack of merit.
proven. This Court is not precluded from ruling out blind adherence to the terms of
a contract if the attendant facts and circumstances show that they should be SO ORDERED.
ignored for being obviously too one-sided.56
It is settled that in order that a plaintiff may maintain an action for the injuries of
which he complains, he must establish that such injuries resulted from a breach of
duty which the defendant owed to the plaintiff – a concurrence of injury to the
plaintiff and legal responsibility by the person causing it. The underlying basis for
the award of tort damages is the premise that an individual was injured in
contemplation of law; thus there must first be a breach before damages may be
awarded and the breach of such duty should be the proximate cause of the injury. 57
It is not enough that one merely suffered sleepless nights, mental anguish or
serious anxiety as a result of the actuations of the other party. It is also required
that a culpable act or omission was factually established, that proof that the
wrongful act or omission of the defendant is shown as the proximate cause of the
damage sustained by the claimant and that the case is predicated on any of the
instances expressed or envisioned by Arts. 221958 and 222059 of the Civil Code.60
While the Court commiserates with Aznar for whatever undue embarrassment he
suffered when his credit card was dishonored by Ingtan Agency, especially when
the agency’s personnel insinuated that he could be a swindler trying to use
blacklisted cards, the Court cannot grant his present petition as he failed to show
by preponderance of evidence that Citibank breached any obligation that would
make it answerable for said suffering.
We do not dispute the findings of the lower court that private respondent suffered
damages as a result of the cancellation of his credit card. However, there is a
material distinction between damages and injury. Injury is the illegal invasion of a
legal right; damage is the loss, hurt, or harm which results from the injury; and
SECOND DIVISION
In connection with the employment contract, Jose, Jr. signed a declaration [10] dated
BERNARDO B. JOSE, JR., G.R. No. 169606 10 June 2002 stating that:
Petitioner,
Present: In order to implement the Drug and Alcohol Policy on board the
managed vessels the following with [sic] apply:
CARPIO, J., Chairperson,
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO,* All alcoholic beverages, banned substances and unprescribed
- versus - BRION, drugs including but not limited to the following: Marijuana Cocaine
DEL CASTILLO, and Phencyclidine Amphetamines Heroin Opiates are banned from
ABAD, JJ. Stelmar Tankers (Management) Ltd. managed vessels.
Disciplinary action up to and including dismissal will be taken against any employee
MICHAELMAR PHILS., INC. found to be in possession of or impaired by the use of any of the above mentioned
and MICHAELMAR SHIPPING Promulgated: substances.
SERVICES, INC.,
Respondents. November 27, 2009 A system of random testing for any of the above banned substances will be used to
x- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - x enforce this policy. Any refusal to submit to such tests shall be deemed as a
serious breach of the employment contract and shall result to the seamans
dismissal due to his own offense.
DECISION
Therefore any seaman will be instantly dismissed if:
CARPIO, J.: xxx
They are found to have positive trace of alcohol or any of the banned substances in
The Case any random testing sample.
xxxx
The Courts Ruling In a petition for review under Rule 45, Rules of Court, invoking
the usual reason, i.e., that the Court of Appeals has decided a
In its 11 May 2005 Decision, the Court of Appeals held that there was just cause for question of substance not in accord with law or with
Jose, Jr.s dismissal. The Court of Appeals gave credence to the drug test result applicable decisions of the Supreme Court, a mere statement
showing that Jose, Jr. was positive for marijuana. The Court of Appeals considered of the ceremonial phrase is not sufficient to confer merit on
the drug test result as part of entries in the course of business. The Court of Appeals the petition. The petition must specify the law or prevailing
held that: jurisprudence on the matter and the particular ruling of the
appellate court violative of such law or previous doctrine laid
Under legal rules of evidence, not all unsigned documents or down by the Supreme Court. (Emphasis supplied)
papers fail the test of admissibility. There are kinds of evidence
known as exceptions to the hearsay rule which need not be
invariably signed by the author if it is clear that it issues from him In the present case, Jose, Jr. did not show that the Court of Appeals ruling is violative
because of necessity and under circumstances that safeguard the of any law or jurisprudence. Section 43, Rule 130, of the Rules of Court states:
trustworthiness of the paper. A number of evidence of this sort are
called entries in the course of business, which are transactions SEC. 43. Entries in the course of business. Entries made at, or
made by persons in the regular course of their duty or near the time of the transactions to which they refer, by a person
business. We agree with the labor arbiter that the drug test result deceased, or unable to testify, who was in a position to know the
constitutes entries made in the ordinary or regular course of facts therein stated, may be received as prima facie evidence, if
duty of a responsible officer of the vessel. The tests such person made the entries in his professional capacity or in the
administered to the crew were routine measures of the vessel performance of duty and in the ordinary or regular course of
conducted to enforce its stated policy, and it was a matter of business or duty.
course for medical reports to be issued and released by the
medical officer. The ships physician at Curacao under whom
the tests were conducted was admittedly Dr. Heath. It was In Canque v. Court of Appeals,[25] the Court laid down the requisites for admission in
under his name and with his handwritten comments that the evidence of entries in the course of business: (1) the person who made the entry is
report on the respondent came out, and there is no basis to dead, outside the country, or unable to testify; (2) the entries were made at or near
suspect that these results were issued other than in the the time of the transactions to which they refer; (3) the person who made the entry
ordinary course of his duty. As the labor arbiter points out, was in a position to know the facts stated in the entries; (4) the entries were made in
the drug test report is evidence in itself and does not require a professional capacity or in the performance of a duty; and (5) the entries were made
additional supporting evidence except if it appears that the in the ordinary or regular course of business or duty.
drug test was conducted not in accordance with drug testing
procedures. Nothing of the sort, he says, has even been Here, all the requisites are present: (1) Dr. Heath is outside the country; (2) the
suggested in this particular case.[23] (Emphasis supplied) entries were made near the time the random drug test was conducted; (3) Dr.
Heath was in a position to know the facts made in the entries; (4) Dr. Heath made
the entries in his professional capacity and in the performance of his duty; and (5)
Jose, Jr. claims that the Court of Appeals erred when it ruled that there was just the entries were made in the ordinary or regular course of business or duty.
cause for his dismissal. The Court is not impressed. In a petition for review on
certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, a mere statement that the Court of The fact that the drug test result is unsigned does not necessarily lead to the
Appeals erred is insufficient. The petition must state the law or jurisprudence and the conclusion that Jose, Jr. was not found positive for marijuana. In KAR ASIA, Inc. v.
particular ruling of the appellate court violative of such law or Corona,[26] the Court admitted in evidence unsigned payrolls. In that case, the Court
jurisprudence. In Encarnacion v. Court of Appeals,[24] the Court held that: held that:
Petitioner asserts that there is a question of law involved in this Entries in the payroll, being entries in the course of business, enjoy
appeal. We do not think so. The appeal involves an appreciation the presumption of regularity under Rule 130, Section 43 of the
of facts, i.e., whether the questioned decision is supported by the Rules of Court. It is therefore incumbent upon the respondents to
evidence and the records of the case. In other words, did the Court adduce clear and convincing evidence in support of their
of Appeals commit a reversible error in considering the trouble claim. Unfortunately, respondents naked assertions without proof
record of the subject telephone? Or is this within the province of in corroboration will not suffice to overcome the disputable
presumption.
In disputing the probative value of the payrolls for December 1994, the appellate The charge of drug use inside the companys premises and
court observed that the same contain only the signatures of Ermina Daray and during working hours against petitioner constitutes serious
Celestino Barreto, the paymaster and the president, respectively. It further opined misconduct, which is one of the just causes for
that the payrolls presented were only copies of the approved payment, and not termination. Misconduct is improper or wrong conduct. It is the
copies disclosing actual payment. transgression of some established and definite rule of action, a
forbidden act, a dereliction of duty, willful in character, and implies
The December 1994 payrolls contain a computation of the amounts payable to the wrongful intent and not merely an error in judgment. The
employees for the given period, including a breakdown of the allowances and misconduct to be serious within the meaning of the Act must be of
deductions on the amount due, but the signatures of the respondents are such a grave and aggravated character and not merely trivial or
conspicuously missing. Ideally, the signatures of the respondents should unimportant. Such misconduct, however serious, must
appear in the payroll as evidence of actual payment. However, the absence of nevertheless, in connection with the work of the employee,
such signatures does not necessarily lead to the conclusion that the constitute just cause for his separation. This Court took judicial
December 1994 COLA was not received. (Emphasis supplied) notice of scientific findings that drug abuse can damage the
mental faculties of the user. It is beyond question therefore
that any employee under the influence of drugs cannot
In the present case, the following facts are established (1) random drug tests are possibly continue doing his duties without posing a serious
regularly conducted on all officers and crew members of M/T Limar; (2) a random threat to the lives and property of his co-workers and even
drug test was conducted at the port of Curacao on 8 October 2002; (3) Dr. Heath his employer. (Emphasis supplied)
was the authorized physician of M/T Limar; (4) the drug test result of Jose, Jr. showed
that he was positive for marijuana; (5) the drug test result was issued under Dr.
Heaths name and contained his handwritten comments. The Court of Appeals found Jose, Jr. claims that he was not afforded due process. The Court agrees. There are
that: two requisites for a valid dismissal: (1) there must be just cause, and (2) the
employee must be afforded due process. [31] To meet the requirements of due
The tests administered to the crew were routine measures of the process, the employer must furnish the employee with two written notices a notice
vessel conducted to enforce its stated policy, and it was a matter apprising the employee of the particular act or omission for which the dismissal is
of course for medical reports to be issued and released by the sought and another notice informing the employee of the employers decision to
medical officer. The ships physician at Curacao under whom the dismiss. In Talidano v. Falcon Maritime & Allied Services, Inc.,[32] the Court held that:
tests were conducted was admittedly Dr. Heath. It was under his
name and with his handwritten comments that the report on the [R]espondent failed to comply with the procedural due process
respondent came out, and there is no basis to suspect that these required for terminating the employment of the employee. Such
results were issued other than in the ordinary course of his requirement is not a mere formality that may be dispensed with at
duty. As the labor arbiter points out, the drug test report is will. Its disregard is a matter of serious concern since it constitutes
evidence in itself and does not require additional supporting a safeguard of the highest order in response to mans innate sense
evidence except if it appears that the drug test was conducted not of justice. The Labor Code does not, of course, require a formal or
in accordance with drug testing procedures. Nothing of the sort, trial type proceeding before an erring employee may be
he says, has even been suggested in this particular case. [27] dismissed. This is especially true in the case of a vessel on the
ocean or in a foreign port. The minimum requirement of due
process termination proceedings, which must be complied
Factual findings of the Court of Appeals are binding on the Court. Absent grave with even with respect to seamen on board a vessel, consists
abuse of discretion, the Court will not disturb the Court of Appeals factual of notice to the employees intended to be dismissed and the
findings.[28] In Encarnacion,[29] the Court held that, unless there is a clearly grave or grant to them of an opportunity to present their own side of
whimsical abuse on its part, findings of fact of the appellate court will not be the alleged offense or misconduct, which led to the
disturbed. The Supreme Court will only exercise its power of review in known managements decision to terminate. To meet the
exceptions such as gross misappreciation of evidence or a total void of requirements of due process, the employer must furnish the
evidence. Jose, Jr. failed to show that the Court of Appeals gravely abused its worker sought to be dismissed with two written notices
discretion. before termination of employment can be legally effected, i.e.,
(1) a notice which apprises the employee of the particular acts
Article 282(a) of the Labor Code states that the employer may terminate an or omissions for which his dismissal is sought; and (2) the
employment for serious misconduct. Drug use in the premises of the employer subsequent notice after due hearing which informs the
constitutes serious misconduct. In Bughaw, Jr. v. Treasure Island Industrial employee of the employers decision to dismiss
Corporation,[30] the Court held that: him. (Emphasis supplied)
In the present case, Jose, Jr. was not given any written notice about his
dismissal. However, the propriety of Jose, Jr.s dismissal is not affected by the lack
of written notices.When the dismissal is for just cause, the lack of due process does
not render the dismissal ineffectual but merely gives rise to the payment of P30,000
in nominal damages.[33]
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The 11 May 2005 Decision and 5 August
2005 Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 83272
are AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION that OSG Ship Management Manila, Inc.
is ordered to pay Bernardo B. Jose, Jr. P30,000 in nominal damages.
[G.R. No. 107735. February 1, 1996] Ochobillo, and for discrediting his; (b) in finding that the killing was attended with
evident premeditation; (c) in ruling that he committed treachery and, (d) in convicting
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. RICARDO SAN him of murder.[4]
GABRIEL y ORTIZ, defendant-appellant.
DECISION We sustain the conviction of the accused for murder. It is settled that findings
BELLOSILLO, J.: of fact of the trial court are accorded greatest respect by the appellate court absent
any abuse of discretion,[5] and none is perceivable in the case at bench; hence we
RICARDO O. SAN GABRIEL was charged with murder in an Information affirm the factual findings of the trial court.
alleging that on 26 November 1989, armed with a bladed weapon, in conspiracy with The accused contends that the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses are
Ramon Doe, with treachery, evident premeditation and intent to kill, he assaulted and incredible and conflicting. We however find otherwise. Gonzales and Ochobillo, as
stabbed to death Jaime A. Tonog.[1] The trial court convicted the accused as charged observed by the trial court, testified in a direct and candid manner. No evil motive is
and sentenced him to life imprisonment and to pay the heirs of Jaime Tonog the sum attributed to them as to testify falsely against the accused. That Gonzales harbored
of P30,000, plus costs.[2] a grudge against the accused because he owed her some money, and even enticed
The accused is now before us on appeal. her customers into patronizing another carinderia, can hardly be believed. We are
not convinced that Brenda Gonzales would testify against accused-appellant for a
The evidence shows that at around seven oclock in the evening of 26 crime so grave simply because he owed her a measly sum of P300.00. That he
November 1989, within the vicinity of Pier 14 at North Harbor along Marcos enticed the customers of Gonzales into patronizing another carinderia is belied by
Road, Manila, a fistfight ensued between Jaime Tonog on one hand and the accused the fact that on the night of the incident he was, as he claimed, eating at
Ricardo San Gabriel together with Ramon Doe on the other. The fight was eventually the carinderia of Gonzales. If there be any testimony that should be considered
broken up when onlookers pacified the protagonists. Ricardo and Ramon then incredible and illogical it must be that of the accused. His assertion that Mando
hastened towards Marcos Road but in no time were back with bladed weapons. They stabbed the victim should not receive any evidentiary value when weighed against
approached Tonog surreptitiously, surrounded him and simultaneously stabbed him the positive assertion of the prosecution witnesses that the accused was the
in the stomach and at the back, after which the assailants ran towards the highway assailant of Jaime Tonog.
leaving Tonog behind on the ground. He was then brought
to Mary JohnstonHospital where he was pronounced dead on arrival. Quite interestingly, the accused did not offer any information regarding the
person and circumstances of Mando. Up to this date Mando remains a myth. Not a
Dr. Marcial G. Cenido, Medico-Legal Officer of the Western Police District, single witness was presented by the defense to prove who Mando was, nor even a
autopsied the cadaver of the victim and reported that it sustained two (2) penetrating hint of his personal circumstances. During the entire proceedings in the court below
stab wounds each caused by a single-bladed instrument. He opined that both Mando was never mentioned by the prosecution witnesses. Nobody ever implicated
wounds were fatal.[3] him except the accused. In fact, there should have been no difficulty procuring
witnesses to testify on the part of the accused as the incident was viewed openly by
The accused has a different version. He testified that he saw Tonog drunk; a multitude of bystanders. His failure to present any witness pointing to Mando as
Tonog even attempted to box him but he parried his blow; Tonog continued walking the perpetrator of the crime convinces us that Mando in fact existed only as a figment
but when he chanced upon Ramon he suddenly and without provocation boxed and of the mind.
kicked Ramon; Ramon fought back but was subdued by his bigger assailant so the
former ran towards the highway; when Tonog met a certain Mando he boxed the The accused also asserts that Gonzales arrived at the crime scene only after
latter who however fought back despite his (accused) warning not to; at this moment the victim was brought to the hospital and that she even inquired from him about
he saw Ramon return with a bolo on hand; he warned Ramon not to fight but his what happened. Again we are not persuaded. The statement contradicts the earlier
advice went unheeded; instead, with bolo on hand Ramon struck Tonog on the belly; version of the accused that Gonzales was prejudiced against him as he owed her
when Mando saw what happened he (Mando) pulled out his knife and also stabbed some money. For, granting that Gonzales had a grudge against him it was not likely
Tonog at the back; Ramon and Mando then fled towards the highway. that she would inquire from him about the incident as there were other persons then
present who could shed light on the startling occurrence. Equally dubious is the
The accused further claimed that he even stayed with the victim and called out avowal of the accused that Gonzales arrived at the crime scene only after the victim
the latters companions to bring him to the hospital; that prosecution witness Brenda was rushed to the hospital considering that the incident took place just in front of her
Gonzales only arrived at the crime scene after Tonog was already taken to the store. Besides, this claim was easily demolished by Gonzales detailed account of the
hospital; that Brenda even inquired from him what happened and then prodded him fight.
to testify; that his refusal coupled with the fact that he owed Gonzales some money
earned him the ire of the latter and that was why he was charged for the death of The fact that the witnesses did not immediately report the incident to the police
Tonog. does not necessarily discredit them. After all, reports were made albeit by different
persons. The accused banks on the apparent inconsistency as to why Gonzales
Accused-appellant claims in this appeal that the trial court erred: (a) in giving failed to give immediately her account of the killing to the authorities. But the
credence to the testimonies of prosecution witnesses Brenda Gonzales and Pio
discrepancy is so minor that it cannot undermine her credibility nor detract from the As previously stated, the discrepancies do not militate against the fact firmly
truth that she personally witnessed the incident and positively identified the accused. established by the prosecution that Tonog was stabbed at the back by the accused
and by Ramon Doe in the abdomen. Any discordance noted is so minor and
The accused leans heavily on the Advance Information Sheet[6] prepared by insignificant that no further consideration is essential. The most honest witnesses
Pat. Steve Casimiro which did not mention him at all and named only Ramon Doe as make mistakes sometimes, but such innocent lapses do not necessarily impair their
the principal suspect.Unfortunately this cannot defeat the positive and candid credibility. The testimony of a witness must be considered and calibrated in its
testimonies of the prosecution witnesses. Entries in official records, as in the case of entirety and not by truncated portions thereof or isolated passages therein.[12] The
a police blotter, are only prima facie evidence of the facts therein stated. They are presence of the accused in the vicinity even after the commission of the crime does
not conclusive. The entry in the police blotter is not necessarily entitled to full credit not in any way extricate him from his dilemma. Certainly, it is no proof of his
for it could be incomplete and inaccurate, sometimes from either partial suggestions innocence.
or for want of suggestions or inquiries, without the aid of which the witness may be
unable to recall the connected collateral circumstances necessary for the correction The court a quo properly considered the aggravating circumstance of treachery
of the first suggestion of his memory and for his accurate recollection of all that in convicting the accused of murder. Treachery is present when the offender commits
pertain to the subject. It is understandable that the testimony during the trial would any of the crimes against person, employing means, methods or forms in the
be more lengthy and detailed than the matters stated in the police execution thereof which tend directly and specially to insure its execution, without
blotter.[7] Significantly, the Advance Information Sheet was never formally offered by risk to himself arising from the defense which the offended party might
the defense during the proceedings in the court below.Hence any reliance by the make.[13] Alevosia or treachery presumes an attack that is deliberate and
accused on the document must fail since the court cannot consider any evidence unexpected. There is no treachery when the victim is placed on guard, as when a
which has not been formally offered.[8] heated argument preceded the attack, especially when the victim was standing face
to face with his assailants, and the initial assault could not have been unforeseen. [14]
Parenthetically, the Advance Information Sheet was prepared by the police
officer only after interviewing Camba, an alleged eyewitness. The accused then It is true that in the case at bench the attack was preceded by a fistfight. It was
could have compelled the attendance of Camba as a witness. The failure to exert the however established that they were already pacified by onlookers when the accused
slightest effort to present Camba on the part of the accused should militate against and Ramon returned. Lulled into complacency the victim simply stayed where he was
his cause. Entries in official records made in the performance of his duty by a public before the fistfight when after a brief moment the accused together with Ramon
officer or by a person in the performance of a duty specially enjoined by law are prima returned with bladed weapons.Both approached the victim and circled him
facie evidence of the facts therein stated.[9] But to be admissible in evidence three surreptitiously. The attack was sudden and simultaneous that the victim was never
(3) requisites must concur: (a) The entry was made by a police officer or by another given a chance to defend himself. As we have held in People v. Balisteros,[15] where
person specially enjoined by law to do so; (b) It was made by the public officer in the a victim was totally unprepared for the unexpected attack from behind and had no
performance of his duties or by such other person in the performance of a duty weapon to resist it, the stabbing could not but be considered as treacherous. The
specially enjoined by law; and, (c) The public officer or other person had sufficient evidence proved that the victim was caught unaware by the sudden assault. No
knowledge of the facts by him stated, which must have been acquired by him weapon was found, nor even intimated to be, in his possession.
personally or through official information.[10]
Conversely the court a quo should have disregarded evident
The Advance Information Sheet does not constitute an exception to the premeditation. Evident premeditation requires a showing that the execution of the
hearsay rule, hence, inadmissible. The public officer who prepared the document had criminal act was preceded by cool thought and reflection upon the resolution to carry
no sufficient and personal knowledge of the stabbing incident. Any information out the criminal intent during a space of time sufficient to arrive at a calm
possessed by him was acquired from Camba which therefore could not be judgment.[16] Evidence for the prosecution showed that after the fight was broken up
categorized as official information because in order to be classified as such the the accused and Ramon Doe proceeded towards the highway. They returned only
persons who made the statements not only must have personal knowledge of the after a lapse of approximately five (5) minutes. From the foregoing we cannot
facts stated but must have the duty to give such statements for the record. [11] In the conclude that the accused had sufficient time within which to meditate on the
case of Camba, he was not legally so obliged to give such statements. consequences of his acts. Meditation necessitates that it be evident and proven. Be
that as it may, treachery as a qualifying circumstance having attended the killing, the
The accused enumerates discrepancies in the testimonies of the prosecution conviction of the accused for murder still holds.
witnesses. Thus, according to him, it was testified that the victim was stabbed by the
accused at the back but failed to point out its precise location. The stabbing WHEREFORE,. the decision of the court a quo in Crim. Case No. 90-81744
admittedly occurred at around seven oclock in the evening but the Advance dated 25 July 1991 convicting accused-appellant RICARDO SAN GABRIEL Y
Information Sheet reported 6:30 p.m. One witness testified that the fistfight was only ORTIZ of murder is AFFIRMED. The penalty of life imprisonment however is
between the victim and Ramon Doe, while another reported that it involved the victim, MODIFIED to reclusion perpetua,[17] while the award of P30,000.00 as indemnity is
Ramon Doe and the accused. Further, it was not accurately determined whether INCREASED to P50,000.00 conformably with existing jurisprudence. Costs against
Ramon and the accused returned to the scene of the crime within five (5) minutes or accused-appellant.
after the lapse thereof.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 103292 January 27, 1993 their investigation, the police interrogated Evelyn de Vera. Evelyn executed a sworn
statement where she identified two (2) of the suspects as Modesto Cabuang and
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, Nardo Matabang. She stated that she could readily identify them because the latter
vs. were her barangay mates and hence knew them well. Moreover, when Modesto
MODESTO CABUANG y FLORES, NARDO MATABANG y SALVADOR, JOHN Cabuang suddenly emerged from the rice paddies, he was only about two (2)
DOE and RICHARD DOE, defendants-appellants. meters away from her. Nardo Matabang was clearly seen by Evelyn from behind
the plants in the yard where she crouched in concealment, there being lights
illuminating the road in front of the yard.1 Later, Evelyn was again able positively to
FELICIANO, J.: identify and point out Cabuang and Matabang from a police line-up. However, the
two (2) other suspects, i.e., the tricycle driver and the person who rode at the rear
Accused Modesto Cabuang and Nardo Matabang appeal from the judgment of the of the tricycle remained unknown and at large.
Regional Trial Court, Branch 57 of San Carlos City, Pangasinan finding them guilty
of robbery with rape and homicide, and imposing upon each of them a prison term On 17 October 1988, the third day after the tragic night, the police found a book
of reclusion perpetua. They were also ordered to pay, jointly and severally, to the ("Laboratory Manual in Organic Chemistry") and some articles of feminine
mother of the victim an indemnity of P50,000.00; the sum of P400.00 as the underwear and other personal belongings of a woman scattered some 50 to 100
amount of money taken by the accused from the victim; the amount of P10,000.00 meters away from where they had first found Maria Victoria's body. Evelyn viewed
as moral damages; the sum of P46,495.00 as funeral expenses; and the costs of these belongings and identified them as owned by her cousin Maria Victoria who
the suit. was a student at the Philippine Women's University (PWU). Examination of the
personal belongings so found also showed that cash in the amount of P400.00, in
The facts as found by the trial court may be summarized as follows. Maria Victoria's possession the night before, was missing.
On 14 October 1988, at around 11 o'clock at night, Evelyn De Vera and her cousin Dr. Nario Ferrer, a physician resident in Bayambang, Pangasinan, conducted an
Maria Victoria Parana, both 19 years of age, having come from a house of a autopsy on the body of the victim. He rendered an autopsy report which show the
common friend, one Mia Colisao, were walking home along an uninhabited place in following findings:
Barangay Buenlag I of Bayambang, Pangasinan. Suddenly, from out of the rice
paddies along the road, Modesto Cabuang emerged with a flashlight and asked Incised wound, 4.0 cm superficial, antero-lateral aspect neck (R);
them where they were going. Evelyn became very anxious and started walking
faster. Upon the other hand, Maria Victoria started talking to Modesto. When
Evelyn was about ten (10) feet ahead of the two, she looked back and saw Contusion hematoma, 1 x 1 cm. mid clavicular area (L);
Modesto turn and shift his flashlight to the rear, illuminating the figure of Nardo
Matabang, who had also suddenly appeared behind them from the rice fields Stab wound, 1.5 cm. 5th ICS, parasternal line (L), penetrating,
alongside the road. Modesto then put off and pocketed his flashlight, grabbed Maria perforating the heart at the ventricular level, lacerating the
Victoria and covered her mouth. Nardo Matabang in turn pursued Evelyn, who had lingular part of the (L) lung;
started to run away. She ran and ran until she entered the yard of a house along
the road and hid in the shadows of the plants and shrubs inside the yard where she Hematoma, mediastinum;
could not seen by Nardo, but from where she could see him. After some time,
having lost sight of Evelyn, Nardo went back and rejoined Modesto.
Hemopericardium, 300 cc;
Sometime later, Evelyn from her hiding place saw a tricycle pass by with her cousin
Maria Victoria, and Modesto Cabuang, Nardo Matabang, the tricycle driver and Hemothorax (L) — 2 liters;
another person who was seated at the back of the tricycle. Evelyn heard her cousin
crying and pleading for help. After the tricycle had passed by, Evelyn emerged from Stab wound, 1.5 cm. 7th ICS, para-vertebral line (R), penetrating
her hiding place and proceeded to the house of her sister. There she was scolded and lacerating the posterior basal part of (R) lung;
by her sister for coming home late. Evelyn, confused by the scolding and frightened
by what she had just seen and experienced, was not able to tell her sister what had Hemothorax (R) 1 liter;
just occurred. She stayed in the sala and there tried to go to sleep, without
success.
Incised wound, 3.0 cm. 2 points, parallel to each other, mons
pubis;
The following morning, Maria Victoria was found dead along the road, naked, with
stab wounds in different parts of her body including the pubic area. In the course of
Incised wound, 3.0 cm. posterior fourchet of the vagina, In People v. Savellano, 7 appellant Savellano argued that since the complaining
transecting the perineum down to the anal canal; witness had reported to the police authorities the matter of her husband's death and
identified the Savellanos' as her husband's killers only after the lapse of two (2)
Vagina with blood clots with fecaloid material; days, rather than immediately when she had the very first opportunity to do so while
the police was conducting an "on the spot" investigation, the credibility of her
testimony was greatly weakened. This Court rejected this argument stating that:
Hymen — carunculated.
It is quite understandable when the witnesses do not immediately
The report also noted the stab wounds in the pubic region including the area report the identity of the offender after a startling occurrence
between the vagina and the anal canal, as well as the presence of lacerations and more especially when they are related to the victim as they just
spermatozoa in the victim's vagina, indicating that Maria Victoria had been raped had a traumatic experience. . . . [A] delay of about a few hours
and mutilated. Dr. Ferrer identified four (4) of the wounds as mortal in character, before the identification of the offender by the prosecution
which wounds were produced by a sharp edge and a pointed object. The cause of witnesses does not thereby affect their credibility. 8
the death was listed as "hypovolemic shock" resulting from severe decrease in the
volume of blood supply, producing death about six (6) hours before the autopsy. 2
In People v. de Guzman,9 the accused-appellant sought to capitalize upon the fact
that the prosecution witness did not volunteer the information covered by her
On the basis of the foregoing evidence, and primarily on Evelyn de Vera's sworn testimony to the policeman who had investigated the crime immediately after the
statement which she later repeated in substantially identical terms before the trial murder was committed. Disposing of this contention, this Court ruled that:
court, Modesto Cabuang and Nardo Matabang were convicted of the crime of
robbery with rape and homicide.
The initial reluctance of witnesses to volunteer information about
a criminal case and unwillingness to be involved in criminal
In the present appeal, appellants principally urge that the trial court had erred in investigations due to fear of reprisal [are] common occurrence(s)
finding that prosecution witness Evelyn de Vera had positively identified Modesto and [have] been judicially declared as not affecting their
Cabuang and Nardo Matabang as the assailants of Maria Victoria. Appellants point credibility, . . . .
to the entry in the Bayambang police blotter found on page 483, Entry No. 4436,
Volume IV, Series of 86 (Exhibit "I") which stated that the assailants were "still
unidentified" although the entry was made after prosecution witness Evelyn de Vera xxx xxx xxx
was questioned by the police. Accused accordingly argue that Evelyn de Vera had
never identified the appellants as the assailants of Maria Victoria, who in fact had The testimony of Gloria should be given full weight and credit.
later to identify them from a police line-up. Her failure to give a sworn statement to the police should not be
taken against her. There is no law which requires that the
We consider this contention bereft of merit. Upon receiving the report that a dead testimony of a prospective witness should first be reduced into
body was found in Barangay Buenlag I, members of the Bayambang Police Station writing in order that her declaration in Court at a later date may
immediately proceeded to the reported crime scene on the morning of 15 October be believed by the Judge.10
1988. The police investigator, Pfc. Elegio Lopez, who initially questioned witness
De Vera that morning, noticed that she was in a state of shock. 3 He accordingly The above rulings apply squarely to the case at bar. Evelyn de Vera was clearly
chose to defer further questioning until the afternoon of the same day when Evelyn traumatized, in a state of shock, upon finding out that her cousin who had been with
had calmed down sufficiently to be able to give a sworn statement to the police. her just the night before, was brutally raped and killed. She could not then and
Thus, there was the initial report prepared and recorded in the police blotter 4 at there clearly and calmly recount the events she had experienced and witnessed
around 11 o'clock in the morning, stating that the assailants were still unidentified; that dreadful night in a logical sequence. The few hours delay which lapsed from
there was, upon the other hand, Evelyn de Vera's sworn statement 5 made and the time the entry in the police blotter was made, up to the time Evelyn gave her
completed in the afternoon of the same day, where she revealed the identifies of sworn statement on the afternoon of the same day, did not have the effect of
the men she had seen the night before and who she believed were responsible for eroding the intrinsic credibility and strength of that statement. It may be noted that
the rape and death of her cousin Maria Victoria. significantly longer delays in informing investigating officers of what witnesses had
seen, have been held understandable by this Court and as not, in themselves,
The failure of Evelyn to specify the accused-appellants as the doers of the horrific destructive of the otherwise credible character of such testimony, especially where
rape, killing and robbery of Maria Victoria the first time she was questioned by the the witnesses' fear of possible retaliation from the accused could not be dismissed
police, does not adversely affect her credibility. It is firmly settled case law that the as merely fanciful. 11
delay of a witness in revealing to the police authority what he or she may know
about a crime does not, by itself, render the witness' testimony unworthy of belief. 6
It remains only to note that entries in a police blotter, though regularly done in the incompatible with every rational hypothesis except that of guilt on the part of the
course of performance of official duty are not conclusive proof of the truth of such accused.16 In brief, the circumstances must produce conviction of guilt beyond
entries. In People v. Santito, Jr.,12 this Court held that entries in official records like reasonable doubt.17
a police blotter are only prima facie evidence of the facts therein set out, since the
entries in the police blotter could well be incomplete or inaccurate. Testimony given In the case at bar, the circumstances forming an unbroken chain and leading to the
in open court during the trial is commonly much more lengthy and detailed than the conviction beyond reasonable doubt that Cabuang and Matabang, among others,
brief entries made in the police blotter and the trial court cannot base its findings on were guilty of robbery with rape and homicide, were the following:
a police report merely, but must necessarily consider all other evidence gathered in
the course of the police investigation and presented in court. 13 In the case at bar,
we conclude that prosecution witness Evelyn de Vera did positively and clearly 1. While Evelyn de Vera and Maria Victoria Parana were walking
identify Modesto Cabuang and Nardo Matabang as among those who had raped home through an uninhabited place at about 11 o'clock at night
and killed and robbed the hapless Maria Victoria Parana. on 14 October 1988, accused Cabuang and Matabang suddenly
appeared from the surrounding rice fields. Cabuang grabbed
Maria Victoria and covered her mouth. Evelyn ran away because
Appellants also set up the defenses of denial and alibi. Cabuang denied having had she became terribly frightened and Matabang followed in pursuit.
anything to do with the rape and killing of Mari Victoria. He said that he was at the Matabang lost sight of Evelyn along the road.
wake of the daughter of one Ben Juinio of Barangay Buenlag I, the whole night of
14 October 1988 and until 6:30 in the morning of the following day. Cabuang was,
however, unable to offer any details in elaboration or corroboration of his claim of 2. From her hiding place in the front yard of a house along the
alibi. Matabang, for his part, testified that on 14 October 1988, he was in his house road, Evelyn saw Maria Victoria pass by in a tricycle with the
in Karanglaan, Dagupan City, with his wife, his sister-in-law, and his child and had accused Cabuang, Matabang and two (2) other men and heard
never left his house. He testified further that he left his home for Bayambang only Maria Victoria crying and pleading for help. Evelyn clearly
on the next day 15 October 1988. His testimony was, however, found by the trial recognized Cabuang and Matabang, but not the other two (2).
court to be flawed by discrepancies and inconsistencies and by lack of sufficient
corroboration. 3. Early the next morning, on 15 October 1988, the body of Mario
Victoria was found in the barangay traversed by the road on
The firmly settled doctrine is that the defense of alibi cannot prosper, unless the which Maria Victoria were walking the night before.
accused is able to prove that he was at some other place during the commission of
the crime and that it was impossible for him to have been at the scene of the crime 4. The claims of alibi by Cabuang and Matabang were not
at the time of its commission.14 Clearly, neither of the appellants was able to do so successfully established. Cabuang acknowledged that he was in
in the case at bar. Modesto Cabuang was supposedly attending the wake held in the same barangay where Maria Victoria had been assaulted and
the same barangay where Maria Victoria was ravished and killed and robbed. killed, while Matabang asserted that he was in his house in
Nardo Matabang, upon the other hand, was allegedly at home in a town no more Dagupan City which was no more than an hour or so by bus from
than an hour or so by bus from Bayambang. the scene of the crime. Neither Cabuang nor Matabang offered
and presented independent and reliable corroboration of their
It is equally settled doctrine that positive identification must prevail over simple presence far away from the scene of the crime at the time of
denials and unacceptable alibis. Appellants have not even tried to suggest that occurrence of the crime.
Evelyn de Vera might have had some ill motive to testify falsely against them. To
the contrary, she had all the reasons to speak the truth with respect to her cousin's The trial court found the circumstances, considered together, as adequate to prove
ravishers and killers. When there is no evidence to indicate that the principal appellants' guilt beyond reasonable doubt. This Court agrees, having been unable
witness for the prosecution was moved by improper motives, the presumption is to find any reason for overturning this conclusion of the trial court.
that such witness was not so moved, and that her testimony is entitled to full faith
and credit. 15 WHEREFORE, the decision of the trial court finding the accused-appellants
Modesto Cabuang and Nardo Matabang guilty beyond reasonable doubt of robbery
It is, of course, true that Evelyn de Vera did not witness the actual sexual assault with rape and homicide and sentencing the accused to reclusion perpetua is hereby
and slaying of Maria Victoria nor the talking of the P400.00 missing from Maria AFFIRMED in toto except that the indemnity is hereby INCREASED from
Victoria's belongings. The evidence presented by the prosecution witness was P50,000.00 to P100,000.00 considering that Maria Victoria Parana was not only
circumstantial in nature. But circumstantial evidence can be and often is entirely raped but also brutally mutilated and killed by the accused. Costs against
sufficient to support a conviction, where the multiple circumstances are proven and appellants.
are consistent with the hypothesis that the accused is guilty and at the same time
inconsistent with the hypothesis that the accused is innocent, as well as SO ORDERED.
SECOND DIVISION Petitioner and her counsel failed to appear during the pre-trial scheduled
on June 5, 1998 despite due notice thereof, albeit her counsel filed on even date an
MA. LIZA FRANCO-CRUZ, G.R. No. 172238 urgent motion to postpone. The motion was denied, however, and petitioner was
Petitioner, declared as in default [sic]. Respondents at once started presenting evidence ex-
Present: parte.[7]
In her Answer,[5] petitioner, after denying the material allegations of the WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby
Complaint, alleged as among her Affirmative Defenses that she is not the real party- rendered against MARIA LIZA FRANCO-CRUZ, operator of
in-interestand, therefore, the complaint stated no cause of action against her, hence, FRANCO TRANSIT, ordering her:
must be dismissed; that the owner and the management of the bus involved in the
case have always exercised the due diligence of a good father of a family in the 1) To pay P50,000.00 each by way of actual
selection and supervision of their employees; and that the proximate cause of the damages and lost income to plaintiffs Marites M.
collision was the negligence and recklessness of a third party, the driver of a Philippine Ganelo, Catherine C. Santos and Ma. Theresa Q.
Rabbit bus.[6] Fabian;
2) To pay moral damages to the above-named Petitioner argues, however, that:
plaintiffs in the amount of P100,000.00;
The ruling of the respondent Court of Appeals contained
3) To pay actual damages in the amount of in its questioned Decision dated March 30, 1999 that the Petitioner
P515,631.00 to plaintiff Victory Liner, Inc., and lost had lost her right to appeal is a patent nullity. What the respondent
income in the amount of P50,000.00; Court of Appeals missed is the fact that before the period to appeal
or file a Motion for Reconsideration expire[d], respondent Ma.
4) To pay attorneys fees of P50,000.00 and the Theresa Q. Fabian filed a Partial Motion for Reconsideration of the
costs of the suit. Decision of the lower court dated March 30, 1999, which motion
asserted that the lower court erred in not awarding indemnity for
SO ORDERED.[17] the death of each victims [sic] to the plaintiffs and that it failed to
clarify the award of attorneys fees of P50,000.00 as to its
awardees and its division. With the filing of such Partial Motion for
Respondent Ma. Theresa filed a Motion for Partial Reconsideration and Reconsideration by respondent Ma. Theresa Q. Fabian which
Clarification.[18] Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration[19] of the trial courts prayed for the modification and clarification of the Decision
decisionreiterating her plea that she is not the real party-in-interest against whom the dated March 30, 1999, then, the said decision did not become
action should be brought, she again submitting the Certification of Registration of the final.[34] (Underscoring supplied)
bus in the name of Felicisima R. Franco, together with an Official Receipt of payment
as Annex A to the motion.
In the case at bar, the records show that petitioners counsel indeed received
By Order[20] dated June 25, 1999, the trial court denied Ma. Theresas partial notice of the trial courts decision on April 29, 1999.[35] Following Rule 37, Section
motion for reconsideration but clarified that the attorneys fees should be divided 1 vis--vis Rule 41, Section 3 of the Rules of Court, petitioner had 15 days or until May
according to the following proportion: three-fourths (3/4) for Atty. Atilano Huaben B. 14, 1999 to file a motion for reconsideration or notice of appeal. She filed a motion
Lim who represented three of the plaintiffs and one-fourth (1/4) for Atty. Roberto A. for reconsideration on May 17, 1999, thus rendering the trial courts decision as to
Unciano who represented plaintiff Ma. Theresa Q. Fabian.[21] her final and executory. Testate Estate of Manuel v. Biascan[36] so teaches:
Respecting petitioners Motion for Reconsideration of the decision, the trial It is well-settled that judgments or orders become final
court denied the same for having been filed beyond the 15-day reglementary and executory by operation of law and not by judicial
period, it having been filed only on the 18th day (May 17, 1999) following the receipt declaration. Thus, finality of a judgment becomes a fact upon the
by petitioners counsel of a copy of the decision on April 29, 1999.[22] lapse of the reglementary period of appeal if no appeal is perfected
or [no] motion for reconsideration or new trial is filed. The trial court
On petitioners appeal,[23] the Court of Appeals, by Decision[24] of September need not even pronounce the finality of the order as the same
22, 2005, dismissed the same after noting that her motion for reconsideration of the becomes final by operation of law. In fact, the trial court could not
trial courts decision was filed only on the 18th day following receipt by her counsel of even validly entertain a motion for reconsideration after the lapse
a copy of the decision. The appellate court thus held that the trial courts decision had of the period for taking an appeal. x x x The subsequent filing of
become final and executory.[25] a motion for reconsideration cannot disturb the finality of the
judgment or order.[37] (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
Her Motion for Reconsideration[26] of the appellate courts Decision having
been denied,[27] petitioner filed the present Petition for Certiorari.[28]
The filing of a motion for reconsideration by respondent Ma. Theresa within
One of the requirements for certiorari to lie is that there is no appeal, or any the reglementary period prevented, with respect to her, the decision from becoming
plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. [29] Any judgment final, but not with respect to petitioner.
which finally disposes of a case, leaving nothing more for the court to do in respect
thereto such as the judgment of the Court of Appeals dismissing petitioners appeal In Bank of the Philippine Islands v. Far East Molasses Corporation,[38] this
as she had lost the right thereto is appealable. [30] Petitioners remedy is, therefore, Court, passing on Section 3, Rule 41 of the Rules of Court which provides that [t]he
appeal, not certiorari. appeal shall be taken within fifteen (15) days from notice of the judgment or final order
As a general rule, the requirements for perfecting an appeal within the appealed from (underscoring supplied), held:
reglementary period specified in law must be strictly followed, [31] appeal not being a
constitutional right but a mere statutory privilege.[32] The perfection of an appeal in x x x the commencement of the period to appeal x x x
the manner and within the period permitted by law is thus not only mandatory, but should x x x be reckoned x x x from the respective dates each of
also jurisdictional.[33] the parties received a copy of the decision. Therefore, each party
has a different period within which to appeal, unless, of course,
all of them received their copies on the same date and none filed There was no attempt, however, on the part of any of the witnesses for
a motion for reconsideration.[39] (Emphasis and underscoring respondents, to controvert petitioners affirmative defense that there is no cause of
supplied) action against her, she not being the registered owner of the Franco Transit bus,
even despite her submission of the bus Certificate of Registration in the name
Since each party has a different period within which to appeal, of Felicisima R. Franco which is conclusive proof of ownership.
the timely filing of a motion for reconsideration by one party does not interrupt the
other or another partys period of appeal. Respondents, in maintaining their cause of action against petitioner, relied
on the January 4, 1998 Traffic Accident Report[54] of Balajadia, who conducted a spot
In petitioners case, her Motion for Reconsideration of the trial courts decision investigation after the occurrence of the accident, [55] wherein he stated that the Franco
was filed three days after the expiration of the reglementary period for the purpose, Transit bus was [r]egistered under the name of Marializa Franco-Cruz of Batac,
hence, the Court of Appeals dismissal of her appeal was in order. Ilocos Norte. (Emphasis supplied) How Balajadia arrived at such statement, he did
not indicate in his Report. Neither did he pass on it when he took the witness stand
The faux pas or negligence of petitioners counsel, however, in failing to file on February 11, 1999.[56]
a timely motion for reconsideration should not be taken against her. Ordinarily, the
negligence of counsel binds the client.[40] However, this Court has recognized the Rule 130, Section 44 of the Rules of Court, provides:
following exceptions to this rule: (1) where reckless or gross negligence of counsel
deprives the client of due process of law; (2) when its application will result in outright SEC. 44. Entries in official records. Entries in official
deprivation of the clients liberty or property; or (3) where the interests of justice records made in the performance of his duty by a public officer of
require.[41] In the case at bar, the application of the rule would result in petitioner being the Philippines, or by a person in the performance of a duty
held liable for the damages suffered by respondents even without them having specially enjoined by law, are prima facie evidence of the facts
established the basis of her liability, thus depriving her of due process of law. therein stated. (Italics in the original)
The trial courts decision in favor of respondents must thus be set aside.
Given the attendant facts and circumstances, in the interest of justice, this
Court resolves to remand the case to the trial court to afford petitioner her right to
due process.
The exhibits were presented ostensibly in the course of Del Rosarios Under Section 45 of the aforesaid Rule, a document is a commercial list if: (1)
testimony. Private respondent did not present any other witnesses especially those it is a statement of matters of interest to persons engaged in an occupation; (2) such
whose signatures appear in the price quotations that became the bases of the award. statement is contained in a list, register, periodical or other published compilation; (3)
We hold, however, that the price quotations are ordinary private writings which under said compilation is published for the use of persons engaged in that occupation, and
the Revised Rules of Court should have been proffered along with the testimony of (4) it is generally used and relied upon by persons in the same occupation.
the authors thereof. Del Rosario could not have testified on the veracity of the Based on the above requisites, it is our considered view that Exhibits B, C, D,
contents of the writings even though he was the seasoned owner of a fishing fleet E, F and H[39] are not commercial lists for these do not belong to the category of other
because he was not the one who issued the price quotations. Section 36, Rule 130 published compilations under Section 45 aforequoted. Under the principle
of ejusdem generis, (w)here general words follow an enumeration of persons or
things, by words of a particular and specific meaning, such general words are not to WARRANTY : One (1) full year against factory defect.
be construed in their widest extent, but are to be held as applying only to persons or
things of the same kind or class as those specifically mentioned. [40] The exhibits Very truly yours,
mentioned are mere price quotations issued personally to Del Rosario who requested
for them from dealers of equipment similar to the ones lost at the collision of the two
vessels. These are not published in any list, register, periodical or other compilation POWER SYSTEMS, INC.
on the relevant subject matter. Neither are these market reports or quotations within
the purview of commercial lists as these are not standard handbooks or periodicals, (Sgd.)
containing data of everyday professional need and relied upon in the work of the E. D. Daclan
occupation.[41] These are simply letters responding to the queries of Del
Rosario. Thus, take for example Exhibit D which reads: To be sure, letters and telegrams are admissible in evidence but these are,
however, subject to the general principles of evidence and to various rules relating
to documentary evidence.[42] Hence, in one case, it was held that a letter from an
January 20, 1987 automobile dealer offering an allowance for an automobile upon purchase of a new
automobile after repairs had been completed, was not a price current or commercial
PROFORMA INVOICE NO. PSPI-05/87-NAV list within the statute which made such items presumptive evidence of the value of
the article specified therein. The letter was not admissible in evidence as a
MARIA EFIGINIA FISHING CORPORATION commercial list even though the clerk of the dealer testified that he had written the
letter in due course of business upon instructions of the dealer. [43]
Navotas, Metro Manila But even on the theory that the Court of Appeals correctly ruled on
the admissibility of those letters or communications when it held that unless plainly
Attention: MR. EDDIE DEL ROSARIO irrelevant, immaterial or incompetent, evidence should better be admitted rather than
rejected on doubtful or technical grounds,[44] the same pieces of evidence, however,
should not have been given probative weight. This is a distinction we wish to point
Gentlemen: out. Admissibility of evidence refers to the question of whether or not the
circumstance (or evidence) is to considered at all.[45] On the other hand, the probative
In accordance to your request, we are pleased to quote our Cummins Marine value of evidence refers to the question of whether or not it proves an issue. [46] Thus,
Engine, to wit. a letter may be offered in evidence and admitted as such but its evidentiary weight
depends upon the observance of the rules on evidence. Accordingly, the author of
Two (2) units CUMMINS Marine Engine model N855-M, 195 the letter should be presented as witness to provide the other party to the litigation
bhp. the opportunity to question him on the contents of the letter. Being mere hearsay
at 1800 rpm., 6-cylinder in-line, 4-stroke cycle, evidence, failure to present the author of the letter renders its contents suspect. As
natural aspirated, 5 in. x 6 in. bore and stroke, earlier stated, hearsay evidence, whether objected to or not, has no probative
855 cu. In. displacement, keel-cooled, electric value. Thus:
starting coupled with Twin-Disc Marine gearbox The courts differ as to the weight to be given to hearsay evidence
model MG-509, 4.5:1 reduction ratio, includes oil admitted without objection. Some hold that when hearsay has been
cooler, companion flange, manual and standard admitted without objection, the same may be considered as any other
accessories as per attached sheet. properly admitted testimony. Others maintain that it is entitled to no more
Price FOB Manila - - - - - - - - - - - - - - consideration than if it had been excluded.
- P 580,000.00/unit The rule prevailing in this jurisdiction is the latter one. Our Supreme
Total FOB Manila - - - - - - - - - - - - - - Court held that although the question of admissibility of evidence can not
- P 1,160,000.00 be raised for the first time on appeal, yet if the evidence is hearsay it has
vvvvvvvvv no probative value and should be disregarded whether objected to or
not. `If no objection is made quoting Jones on Evidence - `it (hearsay)
T E R M S : CASH becomes evidence by reason of the want of such objection even though
its admission does not confer upon it any new attribute in point of
DELIVERY : 60-90 days from date of order. weight. Its nature and quality remain the same, so far as its intrinsic
weakness and incompetency to satisfy the mind are concerned, and as
opposed to direct primary evidence, the latter always prevails.
VALIDITY : Subject to our final confirmation.
The failure of the defense counsel to object to the presentation of to P600,000.00, we agree with the Court of Appeals that the lower court acquired
incompetent evidence, like hearsay evidence or evidence that violates jurisdiction over the case when private respondent paid the docket fee corresponding
the rules of res inter alios acta, or his failure to ask for the striking out of to its claim in its original complaint. Its failure to pay the docket fee corresponding to
the same does not give such evidence any probative value. But its increased claim for damages under the amended complaint should not be
admissibility of evidence should not be equated with weight of considered as having curtailed the lower courts jurisdiction. Pursuant to the ruling
evidence. Hearsay evidence whether objected to or not has no probative in Sun Insurance Office, Ltd. (SIOL) v. Asuncion,[55] the unpaid docket fee should
value.[47] be considered as a lien on the judgment even though private respondent specified
the amount of P600,000.00 as its claim for damages in its amended complaint.
Accordingly, as stated at the outset, damages may not be awarded on the basis of
hearsay evidence.[48] Moreover, we note that petitioner did not question at all the jurisdiction of the
lower court on the ground of insufficient docket fees in its answers to both the
Nonetheless, the non-admissibility of said exhibits does not mean that it totally amended complaint and the second amended complaint. It did so only in its motion
deprives private respondent of any redress for the loss of its vessel. This is because for reconsideration of the decision of the lower court after it had received an adverse
in Lufthansa German Airlines v. Court of Appeals,[49] the Court said: decision. As this Court held in Pantranco North Express, Inc. v. Court of
In the absence of competent proof on the actual damage suffered, Appeals,[56] participation in all stages of the case before the trial court, that included
private respondent is `entitled to nominal damages which, as the law invoking its authority in asking for affirmative relief, effectively barred petitioner by
says, is adjudicated in order that a right of the plaintiff, which has been estoppel from challenging the courts jurisdiction. Notably, from the time it filed its
violated or invaded by defendant, may be vindicated and recognized, and answer to the second amended complaint on April 16, 1985, [57] petitioner did not
not for the purpose of indemnifying the plaintiff for any loss suffered. question the lower courts jurisdiction. It was only on December 29, 1989[58] when it
[Underscoring supplied]. filed its motion for reconsideration of the lower courts decision that petitioner raised
the question of the lower courts lack of jurisdiction. Petitioner thus foreclosed its right
Nominal damages are awarded in every obligation arising from law, contracts, to raise the issue of jurisdiction by its own inaction.
quasi-contracts, acts or omissions punished by law, and quasi-delicts, or in every
case where property right has been invaded.[50] Under Article 2223 of the Civil Code, WHEREFORE, the challenged decision of the Court of Appeals dated October
(t)he adjudication of nominal damages shall preclude further contest upon the right 14, 1992 in CA-G. R. CV No. 26680 affirming that of the Regional Trial Court of
involved and all accessory questions, as between the parties to the suit, or their Caloocan City, Branch 121, is hereby MODIFIED insofar as it awarded actual
respective heirs and assigns. damages to private respondent Maria Efigenia Fishing Corporation in the amount
of P6,438,048.00 for lack of evidentiary bases therefor. Considering the fact,
Actually, nominal damages are damages in name only and not in fact. Where however, that: (1) technically petitioner sustained injury but which, unfortunately, was
these are allowed, they are not treated as an equivalent of a wrong inflicted but simply not adequately and properly proved, and (2) this case has dragged on for almost two
in recognition of the existence of a technical injury. [51] However, the amount to be decades, we believe that an award of Two Million (P2,000,000.00)[59] in favor of
awarded as nominal damages shall be equal or at least commensurate to the injury private respondent as and for nominal damages is in order.
sustained by private respondent considering the concept and purpose of such
damages.[52] The amount of nominal damages to be awarded may also depend on No pronouncement as to costs.
certain special reasons extant in the case.[53]
Applying now such principles to the instant case, we have on record the fact
that petitioners vessel Petroparcel was at fault as well as private respondents
complaint claiming the amount of P692,680.00 representing the fishing nets, boat
equipment and cargoes that sunk with the M/V Maria Efigenia XV. In its amended
complaint, private respondent alleged that the vessel had an actual value
of P800,000.00 but it had been paid insurance in the amount of P200,000.00 and,
therefore, it claimed only the amount of P600,000.00. Ordinarily, the receipt of
insurance payments should diminish the total value of the vessel quoted by private
respondent in his complaint considering that such payment is causally related to the
loss for which it claimed compensation. This Court believes that such allegations in
the original and amended complaints can be the basis for determination of a fair
amount of nominal damages inasmuch as a complaint alleges the ultimate facts
constituting the plaintiff's cause of action.[54] Private respondent should be bound by
its allegations on the amount of its claims.
With respect to petitioners contention that the lower court did not acquire
jurisdiction over the amended complaint increasing the amount of damages claimed
On November 25, 1957 — one year and eight months after Civil Case 26909 was
dismissed — petitioners, this time thru their maternal grandfather Servillano Daldo
G.R. No. L-22793 May 16, 1967 as guardian ad litem, commenced the present action before the Juvenile &
Domestic Relations Court (Civil Case 00855) for acknowledgment and support,
involving the same parties, cause of action and subject matter.
CARMELITA TAN and RODOLFO TAN, petitioners,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and FRANCISCO TAN (alias Tan Uh Bak and Tan Seng On September 10, 1960, then Judge Juan P. Enriquez (Judge of the Court of First
Ka), respondents. Instance of Manila detailed to preside over the Juvenile & Domestic Relations Court
in the absence of the presiding Judge thereof who was on leave rendered judgment
declaring that "the present case is res judicata by reason of the dismissal with
Amando Asis for petitioners. prejudice of Civil Case 26909 of the Court of First Instance of Manila; and that,
Tañada, Teehankee and Carreon for respondents. even on the merits, plaintiffs [the present petitioners] have not made out their case
with sufficient evidence," and dismissed the complaint, without costs.
SANCHEZ, J.:
On October 8, 1960, petitioners herein, plaintiffs below, moved to reconsider.
The present is a suit aimed at establishing a children-to-father, illegitimate
relationship between petitioners and the principal respondent Francisco Tan, and to On January 31, 1961, then Judge Natividad Almeda Lopez reconsidered the
compel the latter to support petitioners. decision of Judge Enriquez of September 10, 1960, and rendered judgment, viz:
The background facts follow: In view of the foregoing considerations, this Court reconsider its decision
of September 10, 1960, and declares the minors Carmelita and Rodolfo
On July 22, 1955, petitioners, thru their mother Celestina Daldo as guardian ad Tan to be the illegitimate children of the defendant Francisco Tan alias
litem, sued respondent Tan in the Court of First Instance of Manila for Tan Uh Bak and Tang Seng Ka; and hereby orders the defendant to
acknowledgment and support (Civil Case 26909). 1äwphï1.ñët support said minors in the amount of P200.00 a month, said amount to be
paid within the first five (5) days of each month directly to Carmelita Tan,
for herself and for her younger brother Rodolfo; and to help them defray
On March 26, 1956, Celestina Daldo — after petitioners had already presented oral
their matriculation expenses, to pay semi-annually, on June and
and documentary evidence and were about to rest their case — moved to dismiss
November of such year, an additional sum of P300; to reimburse
the foregoing civil case upon the ground that the parties had come to an amicable
Servillano Daldo his expenses in supporting plaintiff minors during the
settlement, and prayed that the same be dismissed with prejudice and without
pendency of this case in the amount of P2,000, or at the rate of P50 a
recourse of appeal.
month from November 25, 1957; to pay plaintiff minors' attorney's fees of
P500; and to pay the costs of this proceedings.
On the same day, March 26, 1956, Celestina Daldo subscribed before the clerk of
the Court of First Instance of Manila to an affidavit categorically stating that
Respondent Francisco Tan appealed to the Court of Appeals.
respondent Francisco Tan, defendant in Civil Case 26909, "is not the father of my
said minor children named Carmelita and Rodolfo (herein petitioners) but another
person whose name I cannot divulge"; and that she prepared said affidavit On February 21, 1964, the Court of Appeals in turn reversed the last-named
precisely "to record what is true and to correct what misinterpretation may arise in judgment of Judge Natividad Almeda Lopez, and dismissed the complaint with
the future". costs against appellees in both instances.
On March 26, 1956, the Court of First Instance of Manila issued the following order: Petitioners now come to this Court in forma pauperis on appeal by way of certiorari.
As prayed for by plaintiffs in their motion filed today for the dismissal of 1. Threshold question is the admissibility of Exhibits H and I, testimony of
their complaint, on the ground that the parties have already come to an petitioners' witnesses in the former case. Petitioners balk at the ruling denying
amicable settlement, with the conformity of counsel for defendant, the admissibility.
Court hereby orders this case dismissed with prejudice and without
pronouncement as to costs. The controlling statute is Section 37, Rule 123 of the 1940 Rules of Court, now
Section 41, Rule 130, viz:
SEC. 41. Testimony at a former trial. — The testimony of a witness one year in 1939. Carmelita was born on May 8, 1942 and Rodolfo, on September
deceased or out of the Philippines, or unable to testify, given in a former 11, 1944. The validity of the testimony of petitioners' witnesses in the present case
case between the same parties, relating to the same matter, the adverse was considerably downgraded by the affidavit of Celestina Daldo, heretofore
party having had an opportunity to cross-examine him, may be given in adverted to, attached to the record of the former Case 26909. In that affidavit,
evidence. Celestina deposed that petitioners were not fathered by Francisco Tan, but, in
Celestina's own words, by "another person whose name I cannot divulge." Striking
Concededly, the witnesses at the former trial were subpoenaed by the Juvenile & is the fact that this affidavit was executed after petitioners in the former case had
Domestic Relations Court a number of times. These witnesses did not appear to finished with their oral and documentary evidence and were about to submit their
testify. case. By then, their counsel had a grasp of the situation. Petitioners and their
guardian ad litem could have known whether they had reasonably made out a case
against respondent.
But are their testimonies in the former trial within the coverage of the rule of
admissibility set forth in Section 41, Rule 130? These witnesses are not dead. They
are not outside of the Philippines. Can they be categorized as witnesses of the Correctly then did the Court of Appeals rule out the probative value of petitioners'
class unable to testify? The Court of Appeals, construing this term, held that evidence and found for respondent. On this point the Court of Appeals said:
"subsequent failure or refusal to appear thereat [second trial] or hostility since
testifying at the first trial does not amount to inability to testify, but such inability ... we now come to the resolution of the second point; i.e., whether or not
proceeding from a grave cause, almost amounting to death, as when the witness is the plaintiffs have sufficiently proved their case. We have gone over and
old and has lost the power of speech. (Griffith vs. Sauls, 77 Tex 630, 14 S.W. 230, examined thoroughly the arguments and evidence of the parties, and we
231; section 37 of Rule 123, Rules of Court)." find that the evidence for the plaintiffs-appellees fall short of the
requirement of clear strong and convincing evidence. Such evidence is
Here, the witnesses in question were available. Only, they refused to testify. No necessary whether to prove legitimate or illigitimate paternity and filiation,
other person that prevented them from testifying, is cited. Certainly, they do not considering the seriousness of the relationship and its far-reaching
come within the legal purview of those unable to testify. consequences. As aptly expressed in the case of Serrano v. Aragon, (22
Phil. 10),
Besides in the situation here presented, petitioners are not at all bereft of remedy.
They could have urged the court to have said witnesses arrested, punished for "Public policy, indeed public necessity, demands that before an illegitimate
contempt.1 After all, these remedies are in the statute books to help litigants in the child be admitted into a legitimate family, every requisite of the law be
prosecution of their cases. Petitioners failed to avail of these remedies, went ahead completely and fully complied with. No one should ever be permitted upon
and submitted their case. doubtful evidence to take from legitimate children the property which they
and their parents have, by industry, fidelity, and frugality, acquired. ..."
We note petitioners' argument that to follow strictly the law of admissibility of
testimony in former trials, is to permit party litigants to buy witnesses to dissuade We agree with the findings of the trial court in its original correctly
them from testifying again. Nothing extant in the record will as much as intimate appreciating the evidence of the plaintiffs as unsatisfactory and
that respondent was responsible for the non-appearance of these witnesses. The insufficient, in view of the following considerations;
danger of tampering with witnesses is a problem that attends trials in many a time
and in number of imaginable situations. And, petitioners argument works both (1) That Exhibits H and I, former testimonies of witnesses in Civil Case
ways. Because, witnesses at the former trial can be bought not to testify at the No. 26909, are inadmissible. ...
second trial, in just the same way that they could have been bought to give their
original testimony. Solution of this problem lies elsewhere, not in the non- (2) That the baptismal certificates, Exhs. A and C are not admissible
enforcement of Section 41, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court. proofs of filiation (Malonda vs. Malonda, 45 O.G. 5468; Pareja vs. Pareja,
G.R. L-3824, prom. May 31, 1954; Capistrano vs. Gabino, 8 Phil. 135;
2. The procedural problem out of the way, we go direct to the merits. Adriano vs. De Jesus, 23 Phil. 350; Madridejo vs. Leon, 55 Phil. 1) The
birth certificate Exhibit B is likewise inadmissible against the defendant
Petitioners tried to prove that Celestina Daldo and respondent Francisco Tan lived because it failed to comply with Section 5 of Act 3753. The alleged
together as husband and wife for more than eight years commencing from 1936 to illegitimate father did not sign under oath the said birth certificate (Roces
1944. Petitioners Carmelita Tan and Rodolfo Tan are allegedly the fruits of such vs. Local Civil Registrar of Manila, G.R. L-10598, prom. February 14,
cohabitation. Respondent stoutly denies this claim, avers that he is very much a 1958; Crisolo vs. Macadaeg, G.R. L-7017 prom. April 29, 1954).
married man with children. Celestina Daldo, by her own admission, had been a
nursemaid (yaya) in respondent's residence but for l short period of not less than
It should be noted that said baptismal certificates are also useless to
prove the dates of birth of the appellees-minors, considering that the
period of cohabitation or any intimate relations at all between their mother
and the appellant has been denied and that same has not been
satisfactorily proved. Stated in another way, the date of birth as appearing
in the birth certificate would be material only if it coincides with the period
of cohabitation as admitted or sufficiently proved. To reason otherwise
would be to put the cart before the horse, so to speak.
(3) The oral evidence for the plaintiffs, consisting principally of the
testimonies of the grandfather and of the mother of the minors, are
unsatisfactory, being inconsistent and contradictory on material points,
and unbelievable. The loose character of the mother of the minors who
admittedly had lived and begotten children with several men of different
nationalities, cannot also be overlooked. Weighed against each other, the
evidence for the plaintiffs do not tip the scales in their favor as against the
defendant-appellant. We are not convinced, by preponderance of
evidence, that appellant is the father of the minor appellees. ...
Section 2, Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, formerly Section 2, Rule 46 of the 1940
Rules, employs the commanding language that "[o]nly questions of law may be
raised" in an appeal by certiorari from a judgment of the Court of Appeals. That
judgment, jurisprudence teaches, is conclusive as to the facts. We are not to alter
said facts — they bind us, or to review the questions of fact.2
Having reached the conclusion that, on the merits, petitioners made no case, it is
unnecessary for us to pass upon the other questions raised on appeal.
For the reasons given, we vote to affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeals under
review. No costs in all instances. So ordered.
Concepcion, C.J., Reyes, J.B.L., Dizon, Regala, Makalintal, Bengzon, J.P. Zaldivar
and Sanchez, JJ., concur.
Castro, J., took no part.
G.R. No. L-35357 February 2, 1932 A major question has to do with the action of the trial court in admitting evidence,
over the objection of the defendants, consisting of proof filed in a previous criminal
GUILLERMO B. GUEVARA, Plaintiff-Appellee, vs. ROSAURO ALMARIO, case. On this point we find in our Code of Civil Procedure, section 298, number 8,
MARCIANO ALMARIO, LA VANGUARDIA, INC., and MANUEL V. the provision that evidence may be received upon a trial of "The testimony of a
VILLAREAL, defendants. witness deceased or out of the jurisdiction, or unable to testify, given in a former
ROSAURO ALMARIO and MARCIANO ALMARIO, appellants. action between the same parties, relating to the same matter." We have also the
rule sanctioned by authoritative decisions that facts may be established by
evidence thereof given on a former trial, provided the court is satisfied: (1) That the
Juan T. Santos, Francisco Arellano, Celestino L. de Dios, and Marciano Almario for party against whom the evidence is offered, or his privy, was a party on the former
appellants. trial; (2) that the issue is substantially the same in the two cases; (3) that the
Guevara, Francisco & Recto for appellee. witness who proposes to testify to the former evidence is able to state it with
satisfactory correctness; and (4) that a sufficient reason is shown why the original
STREET,MALCOLM, J.: witness is not produced. In the same connection, it is well settled that a judgment of
conviction in a criminal proceeding cannot be admitted in evidence in a civil action.
The appeal taken in this case from a judgment of the Court of First Instance of the But a record in a criminal case may be admitted by way of inducement, or to show
City of Manila necessitates the scrutiny of the proceeding to determine their legality a collateral fact. (Ed. A. Keller & Co. vs. Ellerman & Bucknall Steamship Co. and
and a decision as to the amount of the damages which should be allowed the Collector of Customs [1918], 38 Phil., 514; Chantangco vs. Abaroa [1910], 218 U.
plaintiff. S., 476; City of Manilavs. Manila Electric Co. [1928], 52 Phil., 586.) Here, all other
consideration to one side, there has not been any sufficient reason, in truth no
reason at all, shown why the original witnesses in the criminal case could not be
On March 3, and March 16, 1927, La Vanguardia, a daily newspaper published in produced in the civil case. A showing of this character is necessary to justify the
the City of Manila, printed two articles which mentioned Guillermo B. Guevara, the court in receiving evidence given on a former trial. However, the general rule is
Fiscal of the City of Manila. The author of the articles was Rosauro Almario. They qualified, and properly so, by permitting the fact of defendant's conviction to be
were clearly and flagrantly libelous. In addition to casting aspersions on the plaintiff proved in the civil action. (Arambulo vs. Manila Electric Company [1930], 55 Phil.,
in a manner which need not be described, the articles assailed his official integrity. 75.) We fell also that there would be no nullification of the rule to permit further the
They passed beyond the bounds of legitimate criticism of a public official to attack record to disclose the express admission by the defendant in the criminal case of
the individual and to indulge in personalities. his authorship of the libel.
A criminal action was instituted, and after the evidence for the prosecution had The controlling facts to be deduced from all the foregoing are that an article which
been received, the accused Rosauro Almario was permitted to acknowledge grossly libeled Guillermo B. Guevara, Fiscal of the City of Manila, of which Rosauro
authorship of the defamatory articles and to change a plea of not guilty to a plea of Alamario was the author, was published in the press; that on the criminal charge
guilty, with certain qualifying explanations on his part. Thereupon, he was Alamario plead guilty and was sentenced accordingly, and that neither the truth nor
sentenced to pay a fine of P400. Subsequently, Guillermo B. Guevara instituted justifiable motives were established. But all other portions of the record in the
civil proceedings to recover a total of P100,000 by way of damages. Defendant criminal case, including the transcript of the testimony, are inadmissible in the civil
Almario pleaded the truth and justifiable motives. record. Discarding the personal equation, for the plaintiff and the defendant alike
are well known to the public, and considering the matter abstractly as we should,
When the case was called for trial, the plaintiff submitted his evidence consisting what should be the measure of damages?
exclusively of the record, exhibits, and judgment in the criminal case. The
defendants produced no evidence and contended themselves with filing a motion The Libel Law permits the person libeled to recover the actual pecuniary damages
for the dismissal of the case, which was denied. The trial judge thereafter rendered sustained by him, damages for injury to this to his feelings and reputation, and
judgment against Rosauro Almario for P5,000 as general damages and an equal punitive damages. Otherwise stated, special damages have not been proved.
sum of P5,000 as punitive damages. The defendants La Vanguardia Incorporated, Nominal damages are not generally recognized under the civil law. Punitive
Marciano Almario, and Manuel V. Villareal were absolved from the complaint. damages have been imposed in the criminal action. As to general or actual or
substantial damages, as variously described, these arise from legal inference and
Certain minor points can be disposed of quickly. For example, the action of the trial need not be proved. So likewise is the good reputation of the plaintiff presumed
court in refusing to grant Marciano Almario legal costs, and in ordering on its own until the contrary is established by proper evidence.
initiative the amendment of the complaint so that it contained allegations relating to
the judgment of conviction in the criminal case, are matters which addressed The authorities offer little aid in solving our problem, except as disclosing a tolerant
themselves to the discretion of the trial judge and should not be interfered with attitude on the part of the appellate court - more likely to reduce damages for libel
here. than to increase them. The case of Worcester vs. Ocampo [1912], 22 Phil., 42),
which was taken as a model by the trial judge is hardly such, considering the
marked differences in the two cases and the vast amount of evidence to be found
in the Worcester case, which is not to be found in the Guevara case. In other cases
offended parties have been allowed all the way from P50 to P5,000. (See
Phee vs. La Vanguardia [1923], 45 Phil., 221, P50; Causin vs. Jakosalem [1905], 5
Phil., 155, P100; Montinola vs. Montalvo [1916], 34 Phil., 662, P200; Choa Tek
Hee vs. Philippine Publishing Co. [1916], 34 Phil., 447, P300; Jimenez vs. Reyes
[1914], 27 Phil., 52, P500; Sotelo Matti vs. Bulletin Publishing Co. [1918], 37 Phil.,
562, P500; Oliver and Chamblise Oliver vs. La Vanguardia, Inc. [1925], 48 Phil.,
429, P1,000; Perfecto vs. Contreras [1914], 28 Phil., 538, P2,500;
Macleod vs. Philippine Publishing Co. [1909], 12 Phil., 427, P5,000.) But for
comparative purpose, the decisions are of little value for the specific amount of
damages in a libel must depend upon the facts of the particular case and the sound
discretion of the court.
When we come to give direct application to the proven facts and the governing
legal principles, we are not surprised to find about as great a variety of opinions as
there are members participating in the discussion. The suggestions regarding the
amount of the damages have ranged all the way from P200 proposed by the writer
to P6,000 proposed by another member of the court. Eventually, after an exchange
of impressions, a majority of the court have reached the conclusion that the plaintiff
should be awarded damages in the sum of P1,000.
The various errors assigned will be overruled except as to the first and sixth on the
appeal of Rosauro Almario, which will be partially sustained, with the result that the
judgment appealed from will be modified by condemning the defendant Rosauro
Almario to pay the plaintiff the sum of P1,000 and the costs of both instances.
Coronel versus Doroteo (Boy) Toledo y
Calipusan, Jr., respondent for Murder and
G.R. No. L-36603 September 30, 1978 taken and certified by the clerk-stenographer,
Jose P. de Guzman; the transcript of notes of
the hearing of the same case conducted on
DOROTEO TOLEDO, JR., petitioner, March 17, 1971 and appearing on pages 27 to
vs. 53 of the transcript of notes in the Fiscal's
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES and HON. RUPERTO KAPUNAN, Office and certified by the clerk-stenographer,
JR., respondents. Jose P. de Guzman, as Exhibit J-1, page 54,
which is a part of the proceedings held in the
BARREDO, J.: City Fiscal's Office on March 18, 1971 up to
that point where their respective adverse
counsel, Atty. Narvasa said: "After going over
Petition for certiorari against the ruling of respondent judge admitting as evidence
the testimony of the witness" — to be marked
for tile prosecution in the criminal case against petitioner the transcript of the
as Exhibit J-2. this page is a part of the
stenographic notes of the testimony of a witness given during the preliminary
proceedings of March 18, 1971, in the
investigation of the same murder charge against petitioner in the fiscal's office on
afternoon which in turn is certified to as correct
the ground that said witness could not despite several attempts be served with
by the clerk-stoneographer, Jose P. de
subpoena.
Guzman. We are offering that your Honor.
In Criminal Case No. 4825 of the Court of First Instance of Manila, a case of
COURT
murder, in which the petitioner is the accused, to close the evidence for the
prosecution, the fiscal offered as documentary evidence, Exhibits J, J-1 and J-2,
consisting of the transcript of the testimony, on both direct and cross-examination, Objections?
of one Mrs. Lydia Fernandez Cruz, allegedly a witness to the crime charged, given
during the preliminary investigation of the case in the office of the City Fiscal of ATTY. NARVASA
Manila. The offer was predicated on the contention tht said transcript is admissible
in lieu of the testimony of said witness in open court inasmuch as she had
repeatedly ignored several notices or subpoenas seeking her appearance. ...Exhibits J-1, J-2, may I make some
preliminary inquiry from the personnel of the
Court before I make my manifestation. There
The pertinent portion of th transcrip of the stenographic notes of the proceedings appears in the record, not yet paged, a
when the offer was made and ruled upon by the respondent court reads as follows: subpoena issued by this Hon- Court addressed
to Lydia Cruz Fernandez and at the back
ATTY. FAYLONA thereof there is a return from the Sheriff of
Manila that the subpoena was served on Lydia
Cruz, personally to H. R. Bautista who is
... As our last exhibit we offer in evidence the
working with subject Lydia Cruz . . . May we
testimony of the witness Lydia F. Cruz who
know if there is a manifestation or notice from
testified during the preliminary investigation of
this witness aside from this?
this case and who also was cross-examined,
as a matter of fact, the accused was
represented by the same counsel during the ATTY. FAYLONA
preliminary investigation in the Fiscal's Office
of Manila, and shw was duly cross-examined I think that in this offer of evidence whatever
by the respective counsels of the accused, the manifestation made out of this Court would be
same attorneys on record for the accused. For immaterial to the admission of the offer, As this
that purpose we are offering in evidence the Honorable Court has been a witness to the
whole transcript of notes which covers her several notices sent to this witness seeking her
testimony on March 16, 1971, consisting of 26 appearance But not, even once did she appear
pages and which wer request to be marked as in this Court. As a matter of fact it was even
Exhibit "J", her testimony in hte City Fiscal's made to appear that she was out of tile
Office in the case of Florencia Chincuanco y country. And so, for that matter, we are merely
offering in evidence plaintiff-, testimony of the J-3A for being hearsay and no basis for their
witness taken in the Fiscal's Office of Manila, admission under the rules.
the transcription (Exhibit J) for consideration of
this Court ATTY. FAYLONA
Even granting arguendo that respondent court erred in its The provision invoked by the private respondent reads:
judgment respecting the exertion required by law to locate and
bring a witness before the court this would not support Section 1. Rights of the defendant at the Trial.—In all criminal
petitioner's charge that 'the respondent Judge incurred in, and prosecutions the defendant shall be entitled:
acted with clear, grave and serious abuse of discretion
amounting to lack of jurisdiction'. If there was error at all, it was
simply an error of judgment in the appreciation of the facts and (f) To be confronted at the trial by, and to cross-examine the
tile law. The error being one of judgment, not of jurisdiction, witness against him, where the testimony of a witness for the
petitioner's remedy is appeal in due time, not certiorari (Fernando prosecution has previously been taken down by question and
vs. Vasquez, L-2641-1, January 30, 1970, 31 SCRA 288). answer in the presence of the defendant or his attorney, the
defense having had an opportunity to cross-examine the witness,
the testimony or deposition of the latter may be read, upon
satisfactory proof to the court that lie is dead or incapacitated to
testify, or can not with due diligence be found in the Philippines. rule of evidence with additional specific requisites to those prescribed by Section
(Subsec. (f), sec. 1, Rule 115, Rules of Court.) 47, more importantly, said provision is an implementing translation of the
constitutional right of an accused person "to meet the witnesses (against him) face
As can be seen, the second sentence of the foregoing provision is in pari to face. (Sec. 19, Bill of Rights, Article IV, Constitution of the Philippines of 1973)
materia with Section 41 of Rule 130 which has already been construed by the Actually, its first sentence accentuates the mandate that the accused shall be
Supreme Court in the case of Tan vs. Court of Appeals, 20 SCRA 54, where We entitled "to be confronted at the trial by, and to cross-examine the witness against
heard him." The second sentence only enumerates the instances when such
confrontation may be deemed substantially complied with, should it be impossible
to produce the witness at the trial, and applying the ruling in Tan, supra, none of
1. Threshold question in the admissibility of Exhibits H and 1, those instances has materialized in the case of petitioner herein. With reason,
testimony of petitioners' witnesses in the former case. Petitioners therefore, the Solicitor General states in his Comment aforequoted that "the
balk at the ruling denying admissibility. questioned exhibits should not have been admitted by respondent Judge."
The controlling statute is Section 37, Rule 123 of the 1940 Rules However, the Court cannot agree with respondents that certiorari is not available in
of Court, now Section 41, Rule 130, viz. the situation of petitioner in this case. Such posture overlooks the all important
fundamental consideration that the portion of the rule in question which ordains that
SEC. 41. Testimony at a former trial. — The in a criminal case, the defendant has the right "to be confronted at the trial by the
testimony of a witness deceased or out of the witness against him" is a constitutional mandate listed in the Bill of Rights which if
Philippines, or unable to testify, given in a violated results in total nullity of the adverse action of the court. Indeed, as already
former case between the same parties, relating indicated, the part of the provision invoked by the People is the exempting clause
to the same matter, the adverse party having intended to remove the stigma of hearsay in declarations out of court, and unless
had an opportunity to cross- examine him, may the same is strictly complied with, failure to present the witness at the trial cannot
be given in evidence. be excused. (Tan vs. Court of Appeals, supra.) It is only in case of actual
impossibility of producing the witness at the trial that in order not to defeat the ends
Concededly, the witnesses at the former trial were subpoenaed of substantial justice, the law permits the admission of testimony in another
by the Juvenile & Domestic Relations Court a number of times. proceeding. For obvious reasons, testimony in open court in actual trial cannot be
These witnesses did not appear to testify. equated with any out-of-court declaration, even when the witness has in fact been
confronted already by the defendant. The direct relevance of the trial to the ultimate
judgment as to the guilt or innocence of the accused is not present in any other
But are their testimonies in the former trial within the coverage of proceeding and is thus a factor that can influence materially the conduct and
the rule of admissibility set forth in Section 41, Rule 130? These demeanor of the witness as well as the respective efforts of the counsels of the
witnesses are not dead. They are not outside of the Philippines. parties. Any lawyer with adequate experience knows that substantial difference. We
Can they be categorized as witnesses of the class unable to hold, therefore, that the admission of evidence against the accused in a criminal
testify? The Court of Appeals, construing this term, held that case in violation of any explicit provision of the Bill of Rights in the Constitution
subsequent failure or refusal to appear thereat [second trial] or constitutes denial of due process and may be the ground for an immediate special
hostility since testifying at the first trial does not amount to remedy of certiorari, which, under consistent doctrines of this Court, is not available
inability to testify, but such inability proceeding from a grave in regard to rulings on admissibility of ordinary evidence that can properly and
cause, almost amounting to death, as when the witness is old adequately be raised only on appeal.
and has lost the power of speech. (Griffith vs. Sauls, 77 Tex 630,
14 S.W. 230, 231; section 37 of Rule 123, Rules of Court).
PREMISES CONSIDERED, the petition is granted and the ruling of respondent
judge admitting Exhibits J, J-1 and J-2 above referred to is hereby set aside, and
Here, the witnesses in question were available. Only, they the joint motion of the parties of August 18, 1978 Agreeing to the taking of the
refused to testify. No other person that prevented them from testimony of Mrs. Lydia Fernandez Cruz at the resumption of the trial is hereby
testifying, is cited. Certainly, they do not come within the legal granted. No costs.
purview of those unable to testify.
In other words, under Section 47 of Rule 130, the preconditions for the admission
of testimony given by a witness out of court must be strictly complied with. Indeed,
liberality in such respect is pregnant with undesirable possibilities affecting the
veracity of the evidence involved. And there is more reason to adopt such a strict
rule in case of the above-quoted Section 1 (f) of Rule 115, for apart from being a
G.R. No. 150157 January 25, 2007 1. The parties agreed on the capacity of the parties to sue and be sued as
well as the venue and the identities of the vehicles involved;
MAURICIO MANLICLIC and PHILIPPINE RABBIT BUS LINES, INC., Petitioners,
vs. 2. The identity of the drivers and the fact that they are duly licensed;
MODESTO CALAUNAN, Respondent.
3. The date and place of the vehicular collision;
DECISION
4. The extent of the injuries suffered by plaintiff Modesto Calaunan and
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.: the existence of the medical certificate;
Assailed before Us is the decision1 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 5. That both vehicles were going towards the south; the private jeep being
55909 which affirmed in toto the decision2 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of ahead of the bus;
Dagupan City, Branch 42, in Civil Case No. D-10086, finding petitioners Mauricio
Manliclic and Philippine Rabbit Bus Lines, Inc. (PRBLI) solidarily liable to pay 6. That the weather was fair and the road was well paved and straight,
damages and attorney’s fees to respondent Modesto Calaunan. although there was a ditch on the right side where the jeep fell into. 3
The factual antecedents are as follows: When the civil case was heard, counsel for respondent prayed that the transcripts
of stenographic notes (TSNs)4 of the testimonies of respondent Calaunan, Marcelo
The vehicles involved in this case are: (1) Philippine Rabbit Bus No. 353 with plate Mendoza and Fernando Ramos in the criminal case be received in evidence in the
number CVD-478, owned by petitioner PRBLI and driven by petitioner Mauricio civil case in as much as these witnesses are not available to testify in the civil case.
Manliclic; and (2) owner-type jeep with plate number PER-290, owned by
respondent Modesto Calaunan and driven by Marcelo Mendoza. Francisco Tuliao testified that his brother-in-law, respondent Calaunan, left for
abroad sometime in November, 1989 and has not returned since then. Rogelio
At around 6:00 to 7:00 o’clock in the morning of 12 July 1988, respondent Ramos took the stand and said that his brother, Fernando Ramos, left for Amman,
Calaunan, together with Marcelo Mendoza, was on his way to Manila from Jordan, to work. Rosalia Mendoza testified that her husband, Marcelo Mendoza,
Pangasinan on board his owner-type jeep. The Philippine Rabbit Bus was likewise left their residence to look for a job. She narrated that she thought her husband
bound for Manila from Concepcion, Tarlac. At approximately Kilometer 40 of the went to his hometown in Panique, Tarlac, when he did not return after one month.
North Luzon Expressway in Barangay Lalangan, Plaridel, Bulacan, the two vehicles She went to her husband’s hometown to look for him but she was informed that he
collided. The front right side of the Philippine Rabbit Bus hit the rear left side of the did not go there.1awphil.net
jeep causing the latter to move to the shoulder on the right and then fall on a ditch
with water resulting to further extensive damage. The bus veered to the left and The trial court subpoenaed the Clerk of Court of Branch 8, RTC, Malolos, Bulacan,
stopped 7 to 8 meters from point of collision. the court where Criminal Case No. 684-M-89 was tried, to bring the TSNs of the
testimonies of respondent Calaunan,5 Marcelo Mendoza6 and Fernando Ramos7 in
Respondent suffered minor injuries while his driver was unhurt. He was first said case, together with other documentary evidence marked therein. Instead of the
brought for treatment to the Manila Central University Hospital in Kalookan City by Branch Clerk of Court, it was Enrique Santos Guevara, Court Interpreter, who
Oscar Buan, the conductor of the Philippine Rabbit Bus, and was later transferred appeared before the court and identified the TSNs of the three afore-named
to the Veterans Memorial Medical Center. witnesses and other pertinent documents he had brought. 8 Counsel for respondent
wanted to mark other TSNs and documents from the said criminal case to be
By reason of such collision, a criminal case was filed before the RTC of Malolos, adopted in the instant case, but since the same were not brought to the trial court,
Bulacan, charging petitioner Manliclic with Reckless Imprudence Resulting in counsel for petitioners compromised that said TSNs and documents could be
Damage to Property with Physical Injuries, docketed as Crim. Case No. 684-M-89. offered by counsel for respondent as rebuttal evidence.
Subsequently on 2 December 1991, respondent filed a complaint for damages
against petitioners Manliclic and PRBLI before the RTC of Dagupan City, docketed For the defendants, petitioner Manliclic and bus conductor Oscar Buan testified.
as Civil Case No. D-10086. The criminal case was tried ahead of the civil case. The TSN9 of the testimony of Donato Ganiban, investigator of the PRBLI, in
Among those who testified in the criminal case were respondent Calaunan, Marcelo Criminal Case No. 684-M-89 was marked and allowed to be adopted in the civil
Mendoza and Fernando Ramos. case on the ground that he was already dead.
In the civil case (now before this Court), the parties admitted the following:
Respondent further marked, among other documents, as rebuttal evidence, the WHEREFORE, judgment is rendered in favor of the plaintiff and against the
TSNs10 of the testimonies of Donato Ganiban, Oscar Buan and petitioner Manliclic defendants ordering the said defendants to pay plaintiff jointly and solidarily the
in Criminal Case No. 684-M-89. amount of P40,838.00 as actual damages for the towing as well as the repair and
the materials used for the repair of the jeep in question; P100,000.00 as moral
The disagreement arises from the question: Who is to be held liable for the damages and another P100,000.00 as exemplary damages and P15,000.00 as
collision? attorney’s fees, including appearance fees of the lawyer. In addition, the
defendants are also to pay costs.12
Respondent insists it was petitioner Manliclic who should be liable while the latter is
resolute in saying it was the former who caused the smash up. Petitioners appealed the decision via Notice of Appeal to the Court of Appeals. 13
The versions of the parties are summarized by the trial court as follows: In a decision dated 28 September 2001, the Court of Appeals, finding no reversible
error in the decision of the trial court, affirmed it in all respects. 14
The parties differed only on the manner the collision between the two (2) vehicles
took place. According to the plaintiff and his driver, the jeep was cruising at the Petitioners are now before us by way of petition for review assailing the decision of
speed of 60 to 70 kilometers per hour on the slow lane of the expressway when the the Court of Appeals. They assign as errors the following:
Philippine Rabbit Bus overtook the jeep and in the process of overtaking the jeep,
the Philippine Rabbit Bus hit the rear of the jeep on the left side. At the time the I
Philippine Rabbit Bus hit the jeep, it was about to overtake the jeep. In other words,
the Philippine Rabbit Bus was still at the back of the jeep when the jeep was hit. THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED ON A QUESTION OF LAW IN AFFIRMING
Fernando Ramos corroborated the testimony of the plaintiff and Marcelo Mendoza. THE TRIAL COURT’S QUESTIONABLE ADMISSION IN EVIDENCE OF THE
He said that he was on another jeep following the Philippine Rabbit Bus and the TSN’s AND OTHER DOCUMENTS PRESENTED IN THE CRIMINAL CASE.
jeep of plaintiff when the incident took place. He said, the jeep of the plaintiff
overtook them and the said jeep of the plaintiff was followed by the Philippine
Rabbit Bus which was running very fast. The bus also overtook the jeep in which he II
was riding. After that, he heard a loud sound. He saw the jeep of the plaintiff
swerved to the right on a grassy portion of the road. The Philippine Rabbit Bus THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED ON A QUESTION OF LAW IN AFFIRMING
stopped and they overtook the Philippine Rabbit Bus so that it could not moved THE TRIAL COURT’S RELIANCE ON THE VERSION OF THE RESPONDENT ON
(sic), meaning they stopped in front of the Philippine Rabbit Bus. He testified that HOW THE ACCIDENT SUPPOSEDLY OCCURRED.
the jeep of plaintiff swerved to the right because it was bumped by the Philippine
Rabbit bus from behind. III
Both Mauricio Manliclic and his driver, Oscar Buan admitted that the Philippine THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED ON A QUESTION OF LAW IN AFFIRMING
Rabbit Bus bumped the jeep in question. However, they explained that when the THE TRIAL COURT’S UNFAIR DISREGARD OF HEREIN PETITIONER PRBL’s
Philippine Rabbit bus was about to go to the left lane to overtake the jeep, the latter DEFENSE OF EXERCISE OF DUE DILIGENCE IN THE SELECTION AND
jeep swerved to the left because it was to overtake another jeep in front of it. Such SUPERVISION OF ITS EMPLOYEES.
was their testimony before the RTC in Malolos in the criminal case and before this
Court in the instant case. [Thus, which of the two versions of the manner how the
collision took place was correct, would be determinative of who between the two IV
drivers was negligent in the operation of their respective vehicles.] 11
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED ON A QUESTION OF LAW IN AFFIRMING
Petitioner PRBLI maintained that it observed and exercised the diligence of a good THE TRIAL COURT’S QUESTIONABLE AWARD OF DAMAGES AND
father of a family in the selection and supervision of its employee, specifically ATTORNEY’S FEE.
petitioner Manliclic.
With the passing away of respondent Calaunan during the pendency of this appeal
On 22 July 1996, the trial court rendered its decision in favor of respondent with this Court, we granted the Motion for the Substitution of Respondent filed by
Calaunan and against petitioners Manliclic and PRBLI. The dispositive portion of its his wife, Mrs. Precila Zarate Vda. De Calaunan, and children, Virgilio Calaunan,
decision reads: Carmelita Honeycomb, Evelyn Calaunan, Marko Calaunan and Liwayway
Calaunan.15
In their Reply to respondent’s Comment, petitioners informed this Court of a should not be admitted in the instant case, why then did it offer the TSN of the
Decision16 of the Court of Appeals acquitting petitioner Manliclic of the charge 17 of testimony of Ganiban which was given in the criminal case? It appears that
Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Damage to Property with Physical Injuries petitioner PRBLI wants to have its cake and eat it too. It cannot argue that the
attaching thereto a photocopy thereof. TSNs of the testimonies of the witnesses of the adverse party in the criminal case
should not be admitted and at the same time insist that the TSN of the testimony of
On the first assigned error, petitioners argue that the TSNs containing the the witness for the accused be admitted in its favor. To disallow admission in
testimonies of respondent Calaunan,18Marcelo Mendoza19 and Fernando evidence of the TSNs of the testimonies of Calaunan, Marcelo Mendoza and
Ramos20 should not be admitted in evidence for failure of respondent to comply Fernando Ramos in the criminal case and to admit the TSN of the testimony of
with the requisites of Section 47, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court. Ganiban would be unfair.
For Section 47, Rule 13021 to apply, the following requisites must be satisfied: (a) We do not subscribe to petitioner PRBLI’s argument that it will be denied due
the witness is dead or unable to testify; (b) his testimony or deposition was given in process when the TSNs of the testimonies of Calaunan, Marcelo Mendoza and
a former case or proceeding, judicial or administrative, between the same parties or Fernando Ramos in the criminal case are to be admitted in the civil case. It is too
those representing the same interests; (c) the former case involved the same late for petitioner PRBLI to raise denial of due process in relation to Section 47,
subject as that in the present case, although on different causes of action; (d) the Rule 130 of the Rules of Court, as a ground for objecting to the admissibility of the
issue testified to by the witness in the former trial is the same issue involved in the TSNs. For failure to object at the proper time, it waived its right to object that the
present case; and (e) the adverse party had an opportunity to cross-examine the TSNs did not comply with Section 47.
witness in the former case.22
In Mangio v. Court of Appeals,27 this Court, through Associate Justice Reynato S.
Admittedly, respondent failed to show the concurrence of all the requisites set forth Puno,28 admitted in evidence a TSN of the testimony of a witness in another case
by the Rules for a testimony given in a former case or proceeding to be admissible despite therein petitioner’s assertion that he would be denied due process. In
as an exception to the hearsay rule. Petitioner PRBLI, not being a party in Criminal admitting the TSN, the Court ruled that the raising of denial of due process in
Case No. 684-M-89, had no opportunity to cross-examine the three witnesses in relation to Section 47, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court, as a ground for objecting to
said case. The criminal case was filed exclusively against petitioner Manliclic, the admissibility of the TSN was belatedly done. In so doing, therein petitioner
petitioner PRBLI’s employee. The cases dealing with the subsidiary liability of waived his right to object based on said ground.
employers uniformly declare that, strictly speaking, they are not parties to the
criminal cases instituted against their employees.23 Petitioners contend that the documents in the criminal case should not have been
admitted in the instant civil case because Section 47 of Rule 130 refers only to
Notwithstanding the fact that petitioner PRBLI was not a party in said criminal case, "testimony or deposition." We find such contention to be untenable. Though said
the testimonies of the three witnesses are still admissible on the ground that section speaks only of testimony and deposition, it does not mean that documents
petitioner PRBLI failed to object on their admissibility. from a former case or proceeding cannot be admitted. Said documents can be
admitted they being part of the testimonies of witnesses that have been admitted.
Accordingly, they shall be given the same weight as that to which the testimony
It is elementary that an objection shall be made at the time when an alleged may be entitled.29
inadmissible document is offered in evidence; otherwise, the objection shall be
treated as waived, since the right to object is merely a privilege which the party may
waive. Thus, a failure to except to the evidence because it does not conform to the On the second assigned error, petitioners contend that the version of petitioner
statute is a waiver of the provisions of the law. Even assuming ex gratia argumenti Manliclic as to how the accident occurred is more credible than respondent’s
that these documents are inadmissible for being hearsay, but on account of failure version. They anchor their contention on the fact that petitioner Manliclic was
to object thereto, the same may be admitted and considered as sufficient to prove acquitted by the Court of Appeals of the charge of Reckless Imprudence Resulting
the facts therein asserted.24 Hearsay evidence alone may be insufficient to in Damage to Property with Physical Injuries.
establish a fact in a suit but, when no objection is made thereto, it is, like any other
evidence, to be considered and given the importance it deserves. 25 To be resolved by the Court is the effect of petitioner Manliclic’s acquittal in the civil
case.
In the case at bar, petitioner PRBLI did not object to the TSNs containing the
testimonies of respondent Calaunan, Marcelo Mendoza and Fernando Ramos in From the complaint, it can be gathered that the civil case for damages was one
the criminal case when the same were offered in evidence in the trial court. In fact, arising from, or based on, quasi-delict.30 Petitioner Manliclic was sued for his
the TSNs of the testimonies of Calaunan and Mendoza were admitted by both negligence or reckless imprudence in causing the collision, while petitioner PRBLI
petitioners.26 Moreover, petitioner PRBLI even offered in evidence the TSN was sued for its failure to exercise the diligence of a good father in the selection
containing the testimony of Donato Ganiban in the criminal case. If petitioner PRBLI and supervision of its employees, particularly petitioner Manliclic. The allegations
argues that the TSNs of the testimonies of plaintiff’s witnesses in the criminal case read:
"4. That sometime on July 12, 1988 at around 6:20 A.M. plaintiff was on The swerving of Calaunan’s jeep when it tried to overtake the vehicle in front of it
board the above-described motor vehicle travelling at a moderate speed was beyond the control of accused-appellant.
along the North Luzon Expressway heading South towards Manila
together with MARCELO MENDOZA, who was then driving the same; xxxx
"5. That approximately at kilometer 40 of the North Luzon Express Way, Absent evidence of negligence, therefore, accused-appellant cannot be held liable
the above-described motor vehicle was suddenly bumped from behind by for Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Damage to Property with Physical Injuries as
a Philippine Rabbit Bus with Body No. 353 and with plate No. CVD 478 defined in Article 365 of the Revised Penal Code.32
then being driven by one Mauricio Manliclic of San Jose, Concepcion,
Tarlac, who was then travelling recklessly at a very fast speed and had
apparently lost control of his vehicle; From the foregoing declaration of the Court of Appeals, it appears that petitioner
Manliclic was acquitted not on reasonable doubt, but on the ground that he is not
the author of the act complained of which is based on Section 2(b) of Rule 111 of
"6. That as a result of the impact of the collision the above-described the Rules of Criminal Procedure which reads:
motor vehicle was forced off the North Luzon Express Way towards the
rightside where it fell on its driver’s side on a ditch, and that as a
consequence, the above-described motor vehicle which maybe valued at (b) Extinction of the penal action does not carry with it extinction of the civil, unless
EIGHTY THOUSAND PESOS (P80,000) was rendered a total wreck as the extinction proceeds from a declaration in a final judgment that the fact from
shown by pictures to be presented during the pre-trial and trial of this which the civil might arise did not exist.
case;
In spite of said ruling, petitioner Manliclic can still be held liable for the mishap. The
"7. That also as a result of said incident, plaintiff sustained bodily injuries afore-quoted section applies only to a civil action arising from crime or ex delicto
which compounded plaintiff’s frail physical condition and required his and not to a civil action arising from quasi-delict or culpa aquiliana. The extinction
hospitalization from July 12, 1988 up to and until July 22, 1988, copy of of civil liability referred to in Par. (e) of Section 3, Rule 111 [now Section 2 (b) of
the medical certificate is hereto attached as Annex "A" and made an Rule 111], refers exclusively to civil liability founded on Article 100 of the Revised
integral part hereof; Penal Code, whereas the civil liability for the same act considered as a quasi-delict
only and not as a crime is not extinguished even by a declaration in the criminal
case that the criminal act charged has not happened or has not been committed by
"8. That the vehicular collision resulting in the total wreckage of the above- the accused.33
described motor vehicle as well as bodily (sic) sustained by plaintiff, was
solely due to the reckless imprudence of the defendant driver Mauricio
Manliclic who drove his Philippine Rabbit Bus No. 353 at a fast speed A quasi-delict or culpa aquiliana is a separate legal institution under the Civil Code
without due regard or observance of existing traffic rules and regulations; with a substantivity all its own, and individuality that is entirely apart and
independent from a delict or crime – a distinction exists between the civil liability
arising from a crime and the responsibility for quasi-delicts or culpa extra-
"9. That defendant Philippine Rabbit Bus Line Corporation failed to contractual. The same negligence causing damages may produce civil liability
exercise the diligence of a good father of (sic) family in the selection and arising from a crime under the Penal Code, or create an action for quasi-delicts or
supervision of its drivers; x x x"31 culpa extra-contractual under the Civil Code.34 It is now settled that acquittal of the
accused, even if based on a finding that he is not guilty, does not carry with it the
Can Manliclic still be held liable for the collision and be found negligent extinction of the civil liability based on quasi delict. 35
notwithstanding the declaration of the Court of Appeals that there was an absence
of negligence on his part? In other words, if an accused is acquitted based on reasonable doubt on his guilt,
his civil liability arising from the crime may be proved by preponderance of
In exonerating petitioner Manliclic in the criminal case, the Court of Appeals said: evidence only. However, if an accused is acquitted on the basis that he was not the
author of the act or omission complained of (or that there is declaration in a final
To the following findings of the court a quo, to wit: that accused-appellant was judgment that the fact from which the civil might arise did not exist), said acquittal
negligent "when the bus he was driving bumped the jeep from behind"; that "the closes the door to civil liability based on the crime or ex delicto. In this second
proximate cause of the accident was his having driven the bus at a great speed instance, there being no crime or delict to speak of, civil liability based thereon or
while closely following the jeep"; x x x ex delicto is not possible. In this case, a civil action, if any, may be instituted on
grounds other than the delict complained of.
We do not agree.
As regards civil liability arising from quasi-delict or culpa aquiliana, same will not be attempt to veer away from the truth was also apparent when it would be considered
extinguished by an acquittal, whether it be on ground of reasonable doubt or that that in his statement given to the Philippine Rabbit Investigator CV Cabading (Exh.
accused was not the author of the act or omission complained of (or that there is 15), he alleged that the Philippine Rabbit Bus bumped the jeep of Calaunan while
declaration in a final judgment that the fact from which the civil liability might arise the Philippine Rabbit Bus was behind the said jeep. In his testimony before the
did not exist). The responsibility arising from fault or negligence in a quasi-delict is Regional Trial Court in Malolos, Bulacan as well as in this Court, he alleged that the
entirely separate and distinct from the civil liability arising from negligence under Philippine Rabbit Bus was already on the left side of the jeep when the collision
the Penal Code.36 An acquittal or conviction in the criminal case is entirely took place. For this inconsistency between his statement and testimony, his
irrelevant in the civil case37 based on quasi-delict or culpa aquiliana. explanation regarding the manner of how the collision between the jeep and the
bus took place should be taken with caution. It might be true that in the statement
Petitioners ask us to give credence to their version of how the collision occurred of Oscar Buan given to the Philippine Rabbit Investigator CV Cabading, it was
and to disregard that of respondent’s. Petitioners insist that while the PRBLI bus mentioned by the former that the jeep of plaintiff was in the act of overtaking
was in the process of overtaking respondent’s jeep, the latter, without warning, another jeep when the collision between the latter jeep and the Philippine Rabbit
suddenly swerved to the left (fast) lane in order to overtake another jeep ahead of Bus took place. But the fact, however, that his statement was given on July 15,
it, thus causing the collision. 1988, one day after Mauricio Manliclic gave his statement should not escape
attention. The one-day difference between the giving of the two statements would
be significant enough to entertain the possibility of Oscar Buan having received
As a general rule, questions of fact may not be raised in a petition for review. The legal advise before giving his statement. Apart from that, as between his statement
factual findings of the trial court, especially when affirmed by the appellate court, and the statement of Manliclic himself, the statement of the latter should prevail.
are binding and conclusive on the Supreme Court.38 Not being a trier of facts, this Besides, in his Affidavit of March 10, 1989, (Exh. 14), the unreliability of the
Court will not allow a review thereof unless: statement of Oscar Buan (Exh. 13) given to CV Cabading rear its "ugly head" when
he did not mention in said affidavit that the jeep of Calaunan was trying to overtake
(1) the conclusion is a finding grounded entirely on speculation, surmise and another jeep when the collision between the jeep in question and the Philippine
conjecture; (2) the inference made is manifestly mistaken; (3) there is grave abuse Rabbit bus took place.
of discretion; (4) the judgment is based on a misapprehension of facts; (5) the
findings of fact are conflicting; (6) the Court of Appeals went beyond the issues of xxxx
the case and its findings are contrary to the admissions of both appellant and
appellees; (7) the findings of fact of the Court of Appeals are contrary to those of
the trial court; (8) said findings of fact are conclusions without citation of specific If one would believe the testimony of the defendant, Mauricio Manliclic, and his
evidence on which they are based; (9) the facts set forth in the petition as well as in conductor, Oscar Buan, that the Philippine Rabbit Bus was already somewhat
the petitioner's main and reply briefs are not disputed by the respondents; and (10) parallel to the jeep when the collision took place, the point of collision on the jeep
the findings of fact of the Court of Appeals are premised on the supposed absence should have been somewhat on the left side thereof rather than on its rear.
of evidence and contradicted by the evidence on record. 39 Furthermore, the jeep should have fallen on the road itself rather than having been
forced off the road. Useless, likewise to emphasize that the Philippine Rabbit was
running very fast as testified to by Ramos which was not controverted by the
After going over the evidence on record, we do not find any of the exceptions that defendants.40
would warrant our departure from the general rule. We fully agree in the finding of
the trial court, as affirmed by the Court of Appeals, that it was petitioner Manliclic
who was negligent in driving the PRBLI bus which was the cause of the collision. In Having ruled that it was petitioner Manliclic’s negligence that caused the smash up,
giving credence to the version of the respondent, the trial court has this say: there arises the juris tantum presumption that the employer is negligent, rebuttable
only by proof of observance of the diligence of a good father of a family. 41 Under
Article 218042 of the New Civil Code, when an injury is caused by the negligence of
x x x Thus, which of the two versions of the manner how the collision took place the employee, there instantly arises a presumption of law that there was negligence
was correct, would be determinative of who between the two drivers was negligent on the part of the master or employer either in the selection of the servant or
in the operation of their respective vehicle. employee, or in supervision over him after selection or both. The liability of the
employer under Article 2180 is direct and immediate; it is not conditioned upon prior
In this regard, it should be noted that in the statement of Mauricio Manliclic (Exh. recourse against the negligent employee and a prior showing of the insolvency of
15) given to the Philippine Rabbit Investigator CV Cabading no mention was made such employee. Therefore, it is incumbent upon the private respondents to prove
by him about the fact that the driver of the jeep was overtaking another jeep when that they exercised the diligence of a good father of a family in the selection and
the collision took place. The allegation that another jeep was being overtaken by supervision of their employee.43
the jeep of Calaunan was testified to by him only in Crim. Case No. 684-M-89
before the Regional Trial Court in Malolos, Bulacan and before this Court. In the case at bar, petitioner PRBLI maintains that it had shown that it exercised the
Evidently, it was a product of an afterthought on the part of Mauricio Manliclic so required diligence in the selection and supervision of its employees, particularly
that he could explain why he should not be held responsible for the incident. His
petitioner Manliclic. In the matter of selection, it showed the screening process that From the evidence of the defendants, it seems that the Philippine Rabbit Bus Lines
petitioner Manliclic underwent before he became a regular driver. As to the has a very good procedure of recruiting its driver as well as in the maintenance of
exercise of due diligence in the supervision of its employees, it argues that its vehicles. There is no evidence though that it is as good in the supervision of its
presence of ready investigators (Ganiban and Cabading) is sufficient proof that it personnel. There has been no iota of evidence introduced by it that there are rules
exercised the required due diligence in the supervision of its employees. promulgated by the bus company regarding the safe operation of its vehicle and in
the way its driver should manage and operate the vehicles assigned to them. There
In the selection of prospective employees, employers are required to examine them is no showing that somebody in the bus company has been employed to oversee
as to their qualifications, experience and service records. In the supervision of how its driver should behave while operating their vehicles without courting
employees, the employer must formulate standard operating procedures, monitor incidents similar to the herein case. In regard to supervision, it is not difficult to
their implementation and impose disciplinary measures for the breach thereof. To observe that the Philippine Rabbit Bus Lines, Inc. has been negligent as an
fend off vicarious liability, employers must submit concrete proof, including employer and it should be made responsible for the acts of its employees,
documentary evidence, that they complied with everything that was incumbent on particularly the driver involved in this case.
them.44
We agree. The presence of ready investigators after the occurrence of the accident
In Metro Manila Transit Corporation v. Court of Appeals,45 it was explained that: is not enough to exempt petitioner PRBLI from liability arising from the negligence
of petitioner Manliclic. Same does not comply with the guidelines set forth in the
cases above-mentioned. The presence of the investigators after the accident is not
Due diligence in the supervision of employees on the other hand, includes the enough supervision. Regular supervision of employees, that is, prior to any
formulation of suitable rules and regulations for the guidance of employees and the accident, should have been shown and established. This, petitioner failed to do.
issuance of proper instructions intended for the protection of the public and persons The lack of supervision can further be seen by the fact that there is only one set of
with whom the employer has relations through his or its employees and the manual containing the rules and regulations for all the drivers of PRBLI. 46 How
imposition of necessary disciplinary measures upon employees in case of breach then can all the drivers of petitioner PRBLI know and be continually informed of the
or as may be warranted to ensure the performance of acts indispensable to the rules and regulations when only one manual is being lent to all the drivers?
business of and beneficial to their employer. To this, we add that actual
implementation and monitoring of consistent compliance with said rules should be
the constant concern of the employer, acting through dependable supervisors who For failure to adduce proof that it exercised the diligence of a good father of a
should regularly report on their supervisory functions. family in the selection and supervision of its employees, petitioner PRBLI is held
solidarily responsible for the damages caused by petitioner Manliclic’s negligence.
In order that the defense of due diligence in the selection and supervision of
employees may be deemed sufficient and plausible, it is not enough to emptily We now go to the award of damages. The trial court correctly awarded the amount
invoke the existence of said company guidelines and policies on hiring and of P40,838.00 as actual damages representing the amount paid by respondent for
supervision. As the negligence of the employee gives rise to the presumption of the towing and repair of his jeep.47 As regards the awards for moral and exemplary
negligence on the part of the employer, the latter has the burden of proving that it damages, same, under the circumstances, must be modified. The P100,000.00
has been diligent not only in the selection of employees but also in the actual awarded by the trial court as moral damages must be reduced
supervision of their work. The mere allegation of the existence of hiring procedures to P50,000.00.48 Exemplary damages are imposed by way of example or correction
and supervisory policies, without anything more, is decidedly not sufficient to for the public good.49 The amount awarded by the trial court must, likewise, be
overcome such presumption. lowered to P50,000.00.50 The award of P15,000.00 for attorney’s fees and
expenses of litigation is in order and authorized by law.51
We emphatically reiterate our holding, as a warning to all employers, that "the
formulation of various company policies on safety without showing that they were WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant petition for review is DENIED. The
being complied with is not sufficient to exempt petitioner from liability arising from decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 55909 is AFFIRMED with the
negligence of its employees. It is incumbent upon petitioner to show that in MODIFICATION that (1) the award of moral damages shall be reduced
recruiting and employing the erring driver the recruitment procedures and company to P50,000.00; and (2) the award of exemplary damages shall be lowered
policies on efficiency and safety were followed." x x x. to P50,000.00. Costs against petitioners.
The trial court found that petitioner PRBLI exercised the diligence of a good father SO ORDERED.
of a family in the selection but not in the supervision of its employees. It expounded
as follows: