G.R. No. 93833 September 28, 1995
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila FIRST DIVISION
SOCORRO D. RAMIREZ, petitioner,
 vs.
 HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS,
and ESTER S. GARCIA, respondents.
KAPUNAN, J.:
A civil case damages was filed by petitioner Socorro D. Ramirez in the
Regional Trial Court of Quezon City alleging that the private respondent, Ester
S. Garcia, in a confrontation in the latter's office, allegedly vexed, insulted and
humiliated her in a "hostile and furious mood" and in a manner offensive to
petitioner's dignity and personality," contrary to morals, good customs and
public policy."1
In support of her claim, petitioner produced a verbatim transcript of the
event and sought moral damages, attorney's fees and other expenses of
litigation in the amount of P610,000.00, in addition to costs, interests and
other reliefs awardable at the trial court's discretion. The transcript on which
the civil case was based was culled from a tape recording of the confrontation
made by petitioner.2 The transcript reads as follows:
Plaintiff Soccoro D. Ramirez (Chuchi) — Good Afternoon M'am.
Defendant Ester S. Garcia (ESG) — Ano ba ang nangyari sa 'yo, nakalimot ka
na kung paano ka napunta rito, porke member ka na, magsumbong ka kung
ano ang gagawin ko sa 'yo.
CHUCHI — Kasi, naka duty ako noon.
 ESG — Tapos iniwan no.
(Sic)
 CHUCHI — Hindi m'am, pero ilan beses na nila akong binalikan, sabing
ganoon —
ESG — Ito and (sic) masasabi ko sa 'yo, ayaw kung (sic) mag explain ka, kasi
hanggang 10:00 p.m., kinabukasan hindi ka na pumasok. Ngayon ako ang
babalik sa 'yo, nag-aaply ka sa States, nag-aaply ka sa review mo, kung
kakailanganin ang certification mo, kalimutan mo na kasi hindi ka sa akin
makakahingi.
CHUCHI — Hindi M'am. Kasi ang ano ko talaga noon i-cocontinue ko up to
10:00 p.m.
ESG — Bastos ka, nakalimutan mo na kung paano ka pumasok dito sa hotel.
Magsumbong ka sa Union kung gusto mo. Nakalimutan mo na kung paano ka
nakapasok dito "Do you think that on your own makakapasok ka kung hindi
ako. Panunumbyoyan na kita (Sinusumbatan na kita).
CHUCHI — Itutuloy ko na M'am sana ang duty ko.
ESG — Kaso ilang beses na akong binabalikan doon ng mga no (sic) ko.
ESG — Nakalimutan mo na ba kung paano ka pumasok sa hotel, kung on your
own merit alam ko naman kung gaano ka "ka bobo" mo. Marami ang
nag-aaply alam kong hindi ka papasa.
CHUCHI — Kumuha kami ng exam noon.
ESG — Oo, pero hindi ka papasa.
CHUCHI — Eh, bakit ako ang nakuha ni Dr. Tamayo
ESG — Kukunin ka kasi ako.
CHUCHI — Eh, di sana —
ESG — Huwag mong ipagmalaki na may utak ka kasi wala kang utak. Akala
mo ba makukuha ka dito kung hindi ako.
CHUCHI — Mag-eexplain ako.
ESG — Huwag na, hindi ako mag-papa-explain sa 'yo, makaalala ka kung
paano ka puma-rito. "Putang-ina" sasabi-sabihin mo kamag-anak ng nanay at
tatay mo ang mga magulang ko.
ESG — Wala na akong pakialam, dahil nandito ka sa loob, nasa labas ka
puwede ka ng hindi pumasok, okey yan nasaloob ka umalis ka doon.
CHUCHI — Kasi M'am, binbalikan ako ng mga taga Union.
ESG — Nandiyan na rin ako, pero huwag mong kalimutan na hindi ka
makakapasok kung hindi ako. Kung hindi mo kinikilala yan okey lang sa akin,
dahil tapos ka na.
CHUCHI — Ina-ano ko m'am na utang na loob.
ESG — Huwag na lang, hindi mo utang na loob, kasi kung baga sa no,
nilapastangan mo ako.
CHUCHI — Paano kita nilapastanganan?
 ESG — Mabuti pa lumabas ka na.
Hindi na ako makikipagusap sa 'yo. Lumabas ka na.
Magsumbong ka.3
As a result of petitioner's recording of the event and alleging that the said act
of secretly taping the confrontation was illegal, private respondent filed a
criminal case before the Regional Trial Court of Pasay City for violation of
Republic Act 4200, entitled "An Act to prohibit and penalize wire tapping and
other related violations of private communication, and other purposes." An
information charging petitioner of violation of the said Act, dated October 6,
1988 is quoted herewith:
INFORMATION
The Undersigned Assistant City Fiscal Accusses Socorro D. Ramirez of
Violation of Republic Act No. 4200, committed as follows:
That on or about the 22nd day of February, 1988, in Pasay City Metro Manila,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this honorable court, the
above-named accused, Socorro D. Ramirez not being authorized by Ester S.
Garcia to record the latter's conversation with said accused, did then and
there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, with the use of a tape recorder
secretly record the said conversation and thereafter communicate in writing
the contents of the said recording to other person.
Contrary to law.
 Pasay City, Metro Manila, September 16, 1988.
MARIANO M. CUNETA Asst. City Fiscal
Upon arraignment, in lieu of a plea, petitioner filed a Motion to Quash the
Information on the ground that the facts charged do not constitute an
offense, particularly a violation of R.A. 4200. In an order May 3, 1989, the trial
court granted the Motion to Quash, agreeing with petitioner that 1) the facts
charged do not constitute an offense under R.A. 4200; and that 2) the
violation punished by R.A. 4200 refers to a the taping of a communication by
a person other than a participant to the communication.4
From the trial court's Order, the private respondent filed a Petition for Review
on Certiorari with this Court, which forthwith referred the case to the Court
of Appeals in a Resolution (by the First Division) of June 19, 1989.
On February 9, 1990, respondent Court of Appeals promulgated its assailed
Decision declaring the trial court's order of May 3, 1989 null and void, and
holding that:
[T]he allegations sufficiently constitute an offense punishable under Section
1 of R.A. 4200. In thus quashing the information based on the ground that the
facts alleged do not constitute an offense, the respondent judge acted in
grave abuse of discretion correctible by certiorari.5
Consequently, on February 21, 1990, petitioner filed a Motion for
Reconsideration which respondent Court of Appeals denied in its Resolution6
dated June 19, 1990. Hence, the instant petition.
Petitioner vigorously argues, as her "main and principal issue"7 that the
applicable provision of Republic Act 4200 does not apply to the taping of a
private conversation by one of the parties to the conversation. She contends
that the provision merely refers to the unauthorized taping of a private
conversation by a party other than those involved in the communication.8 In
relation to this, petitioner avers that the substance or content of the
conversation must be alleged in the Information, otherwise the facts charged
would not constitute a violation of R.A. 4200.9 Finally, petitioner agues that
R.A. 4200 penalizes the taping of a "private communication," not a "private
conversation" and that consequently, her act of secretly taping her
conversation with private respondent was not illegal under the said act. 10
We disagree.
First, legislative intent is determined principally from the language of a
statute. Where the language of a statute is clear and unambiguous, the law
is applied according to its express terms, and interpretation would be
resorted to only where a literal interpretation would be either impossible 11
or absurb or would lead to an injustice. 12
Section 1 of R.A. 4200 entitled, " An Act to Prohibit and Penalized Wire
Tapping and Other Related Violations of Private Communication and Other
Purposes," provides:
Sec. 1. It shall be unlawfull for any person, not being authorized by all the
parties to any private communication or spoken word, to tap any wire or
cable, or by using any other device or arrangement, to secretly overhear,
intercept, or record such communication or spoken word by using a device
commonly known as a dictaphone or dictagraph or detectaphone or
walkie-talkie or tape recorder, or however otherwise described.
The aforestated provision clearly and unequivocally makes it illegal for any
person, not authorized by all the parties to any private communication to
secretly record such communication by means of a tape recorder. The law
makes no distinction as to whether the party sought to be penalized by the
statute ought to be a party other than or different from those involved in the
private communication. The statute's intent to penalize all persons
unauthorized to make such recording is underscored by the use of the
qualifier "any". Consequently, as respondent Court of Appeals correctly
concluded, "even a (person) privy to a communication who records his
private conversation with another without the knowledge of the latter (will)
qualify as a violator" 13 under this provision of R.A. 4200.
A perusal of the Senate Congressional Records, moreover, supports the
respondent court's conclusion that in enacting R.A. 4200 our lawmakers
indeed contemplated to make illegal, unauthorized tape recording of private
conversations or communications taken either by the parties themselves or
by third persons. Thus:
xxx xxx xxx Senator Tañada: That qualified only "overhear".
Senator Padilla: So that when it is intercepted or recorded, the element of
secrecy would not appear to be material. Now, suppose, Your Honor, the
recording is not made by all the parties but by some parties and involved not
criminal cases that would be mentioned under section 3 but would cover, for
example civil cases or special proceedings whereby a recording is made not
necessarily by all the parties but perhaps by some in an effort to show the
intent of the parties because the actuation of the parties prior, simultaneous
even subsequent to the contract or the act may be indicative of their
intention. Suppose there is such a recording, would you say, Your Honor, that
the intention is to cover it within the purview of this bill or outside?
Senator Tañada: That is covered by the purview of this bill, Your Honor.
Senator Padilla: Even if the record should be used not in the prosecution of
offense but as evidence to be used in Civil Cases or special proceedings?
Senator Tañada: That is right. This is a complete ban on tape recorded
conversations taken without the authorization of all the parties.
Senator Padilla: Now, would that be reasonable, your Honor?
Senator Tañada: I believe it is reasonable because it is not sporting to record
the observation of one without his knowing it and then using it against him.
It is not fair, it is not sportsmanlike. If the purpose; Your honor, is to record
the intention of the parties. I believe that all the parties should know that the
observations are being recorded.
Senator Padilla: This might reduce the utility of recorders.
Senator Tañada: Well no. For example, I was to say that in meetings of the
board of directors where a tape recording is taken, there is no objection to
this if all the parties know. It is but fair that the people whose remarks and
observations are being made should know that the observations are being
recorded.
Senator Padilla: Now, I can understand.
Senator Tañada: That is why when we take statements of persons, we say:
"Please be informed that whatever you say here may be used against you."
That is fairness and that is what we demand. Now, in spite of that warning,
he makes damaging statements against his own interest, well, he cannot
complain any more. But if you are going to take a recording of the
observations and remarks of a person without him knowing that it is being
taped or recorded, without him knowing that what is being recorded may be
used against him, I think it is unfair.
xxx xxx xxx (Congression Record, Vol. III, No. 31, p. 584, March 12, 1964)
Senator Diokno: Do you understand, Mr. Senator, that under Section 1 of the
bill as now worded, if a party secretly records a public speech, he would be
penalized under Section 1? Because the speech is public, but the recording is
done secretly.
Senator Tañada: Well, that particular aspect is not contemplated by the bill.
It is the communication between one person and another person — not
between a speaker and a public.
xxx xxx xxx (Congressional Record, Vol. III, No. 33, p. 626, March 12, 1964)
xxx xxx xxx
The unambiguity of the express words of the provision, taken together with
the above-quoted deliberations from the Congressional Record, therefore
plainly supports the view held by the respondent court that the provision
seeks to penalize even those privy to the private communications. Where the
law makes no distinctions, one does not distinguish.
Second, the nature of the conversations is immaterial to a violation of the
statute. The substance of the same need not be specifically alleged in the
information. What R.A. 4200 penalizes are the acts of secretly overhearing,
intercepting or recording private communications by means of the devices
enumerated therein. The mere allegation that an individual made a secret
recording of a private communication by means of a tape recorder would
suffice to constitute an offense under Section 1 of R.A. 4200. As the Solicitor
General pointed out in his COMMENT before the respondent court:
"Nowhere (in the said law) is it required that before one can be regarded as
a violator, the nature of the conversation, as well as its communication to a
third person should be professed." 14
Finally, petitioner's contention that the phrase "private communication" in
Section 1 of R.A. 4200 does not include "private conversations" narrows the
ordinary meaning of the word "communication" to a point of absurdity. The
word communicate comes from the latin word communicare, meaning "to
share or to impart." In its ordinary signification, communication connotes the
act of sharing or imparting signification, communication connotes the act of
sharing or imparting, as in a conversation, 15 or signifies the "process by
which meanings or thoughts are shared between individuals through a
common system of symbols (as language signs or gestures)" 16 These
definitions are broad enough to include verbal or non-verbal, written or
expressive communications of "meanings or thoughts" which are likely to
include the emotionally-charged exchange, on February 22, 1988, between
petitioner and private respondent, in the privacy of the latter's office. Any
doubts about the legislative body's meaning of the phrase "private
communication" are, furthermore, put to rest by the fact that the terms
"conversation" and "communication" were interchangeably used by Senator
Tañada in his Explanatory Note to the bill quoted below:
It has been said that innocent people have nothing to fear from their
conversations being overheard. But this statement ignores the usual nature
of conversations as well the undeniable fact that most, if not all, civilized
people have some aspects of their lives they do not wish to expose. Free
conversations are often characterized by exaggerations, obscenity, agreeable
falsehoods, and the expression of anti- social desires of views not intended THIRD DIVISION GERBERT R. CORPUZ - versus - DAISYLYN TIROL STO.
TOMAS and The SOLICITOR GENERAL, Republic of the Philippines Supreme
to be taken seriously. The right to the privacy of communication, among
Court Manila |G.R. No. 186571
others, has expressly been assured by our Constitution. Needless to state
Present:
here, the framers of our Constitution must have recognized the nature of
CARPIO MORALES, J., Chairperson, BRION,
 BERSAMIN,
conversations between individuals and the significance of man's spiritual
*
nature, of his feelings and of his intellect. They must have known that part of ABAD, and VILLARAMA, JR., JJ.
the pleasures and satisfactions of life are to be found in the unaudited, and Promulgated: August 11, 2010
free exchange of communication between individuals — free from every
DECISION
unjustifiable intrusion by whatever means.17
BRION, J.:
In Gaanan vs. Intermediate Appellate Court, 18 a case which dealt with the
issue of telephone wiretapping, we held that the use of a telephone extension
for the purpose of overhearing a private conversation without authorization Before the Court is a direct appeal from the decision[1] of the Regional
did not violate R.A. 4200 because a telephone extension devise was neither
Trial Court (RTC) of Laoag City, Branch 11, elevated via a petition for review
among those "device(s) or arrangement(s)" enumerated therein, 19 following
on certiorari[2] under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court (present petition).
the principle that "penal statutes must be construed strictly in favor of the
accused."20 The instant case turns on a different note, because the
applicable facts and circumstances pointing to a violation of R.A. 4200 suffer Petitioner Gerbert R. Corpuz was a former Filipino citizen who
from no ambiguity, and the statute itself explicitly mentions the unauthorized acquired Canadian citizenship through naturalization on November 29,
"recording" of private communications with the use of tape-recorders as 2000.[3] On January 18, 2005, Gerbert married respondent Daisylyn T. Sto.
among the acts punishable.
Tomas, a Filipina, in Pasig City.[4] Due to work and other professional
WHEREFORE, because the law, as applied to the case at bench is clear and commitments, Gerbert left for Canada soon after the wedding. He returned
unambiguous and leaves us with no discretion, the instant petition is hereby to the Philippines sometime in April 2005 to surprise Daisylyn, but was
DENIED. The decision appealed from is AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioner. shocked to discover that his wife was having an affair with another man. Hurt
and disappointed, Gerbert returned to Canada and filed a petition for
SO ORDERED.
divorce. The Superior Court of Justice, Windsor, Ontario, Canada granted
Padilla, Davide, Jr. and Bellosillo JJ., concur. Gerberts petition for divorce on December 8, 2005. The divorce decree took
effect a month later, on January 8, 2006.[5]
Hermosisima, Jr., J., is on leave.

Two years after the divorce, Gerbert has moved on and has found
another Filipina to love. Desirous of marrying his new Filipina fiance in
the Philippines, Gerbert went to the Pasig City Civil Registry Office and
registered the Canadian divorce decree on his and Daisylyns marriage
certificate.Despite the registration of the divorce decree, an official of the
National Statistics Office (NSO) informed Gerbert that the marriage between
him and Daisylyn still subsists under Philippine law; to be enforceable, the
foreign divorce decree must first be judicially recognized by a competent
Philippine court, pursuant to NSO Circular No. 4, series of 1982.[6]
Accordingly, Gerbert filed a petition for judicial recognition of
foreign divorce and/or declaration of marriage as dissolved (petition) with
the RTC. Although summoned, Daisylyn did not file any responsive pleading
but submitted instead a notarized letter/manifestation to the trial court. She
offered no opposition to Gerberts petition and, in fact, alleged her desire to
file a similar case herself but was prevented by financial and personal
circumstances. She, thus, requested that she be considered as a party-in-
interest with a similar prayer to Gerberts.
In its October 30, 2008 decision,[7] the RTC denied Gerberts
petition. The RTC concluded that Gerbert was not the proper party to
institute the action for judicial recognition of the foreign divorce decree as he
is a naturalized Canadian citizen. It ruled that only the Filipino spouse can
avail of the remedy, under the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family
Code,[8] in order for him or her to be able to remarry under Philippine
law.[9] Article 26 of the Family Code reads:
Art. 26. All marriages solemnized outside
the Philippines, in accordance with the laws in force in the
country where they were solemnized, and valid there as
such, shall also be valid in this country, except those
prohibited under Articles 35(1), (4), (5) and (6), 36, 37 and 38.
Where a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a
foreigner is validly celebrated and a divorce is thereafter
validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating
him or her to remarry, the Filipino spouse shall likewise
have capacity to remarry under Philippine law.
This conclusion, the RTC stated, is consistent with the legislative intent behind
the enactment of the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code, as
determined by the Court in Republic v. Orbecido III;[10] the provision was
enacted to avoid the absurd situation where the Filipino spouse remains
married to the alien spouse who, after obtaining a divorce, is no longer
married to the Filipino spouse.[11]
THE PETITION
From the RTCs ruling,[12] Gerbert filed the present petition.[13]
Gerbert asserts that his petition before the RTC is essentially for
declaratory relief, similar to that filed in Orbecido; he, thus, similarly asks for
a determination of his rights under the second paragraph of Article 26 of the
Family Code. Taking into account the rationale behind the second paragraph
of Article 26 of the Family Code, he contends that the provision applies as
well to the benefit of the alien spouse. He claims that the RTC ruling unduly
stretched the doctrine in Orbecido by limiting the standing to file the petition
only to the Filipino spouse an interpretation he claims to be contrary to the
essence of the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code. He
considers himself as a proper party, vested with sufficient legal interest, to
institute the case, as there is a possibility that he might be prosecuted for
bigamy if he marries his Filipina fiance in the Philippines since two marriage
certificates, involving him, would be on file with the Civil Registry Office. The
Office of the Solicitor General and Daisylyn, in their respective
Comments,[14] both support Gerberts position.
Essentially, the petition raises the issue of whether the second paragraph of
Article 26 of the Family Code extends to aliens the right to petition a court
of this jurisdiction for the recognition of a foreign divorce decree.
THE COURTS RULING
The alien spouse can claim
no right under the second
paragraph of Article 26 of
the Family Code as the
substantive right it
establishes is in favor of the
Filipino spouse
The resolution of the issue requires a review of the legislative history and
intent behind the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code.
The Family Code recognizes only two types of defective marriages void[15] and
voidable[16] marriages. In both cases, the basis for the judicial declaration of
absolute nullity or annulment of the marriage exists before or at the time
of the marriage. Divorce, on the other hand, contemplates the dissolution of
the lawful union for cause arising after the marriage.[17] Our family laws do
not recognize absolute divorce between Filipino citizens.[18]
Recognizing the reality that divorce is a possibility in marriages
between a Filipino and an alien, President Corazon C. Aquino, in the exercise
of her legislative powers under the Freedom Constitution,[19] enacted
Executive Order No. (EO) 227, amending Article 26 of the Family Code to its
present wording, as follows:
Art. 26. All marriages solemnized outside
the Philippines, in accordance with the laws in force in the
country where they were solemnized, and valid there as
such, shall also be valid in this country, except those
prohibited under Articles 35(1), (4), (5) and (6), 36, 37 and 38.
Where a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a
foreigner is validly celebrated and a divorce is thereafter
validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating
him or her to remarry, the Filipino spouse shall likewise
have capacity to remarry under Philippine law.
Through the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code, EO 227
effectively incorporated into the law this Courts holding in Van Dorn v.
Romillo, Jr.[20] and Pilapil v. Ibay-Somera.[21] In both cases, the Court refused
to acknowledge the alien spouses assertion of marital rights after a foreign
courts divorce decree between the alien and the Filipino. The Court, thus,
recognized that the foreign divorce had already severed the marital bond
between the spouses. The Court reasoned in Van Dorn v. Romillo that:
To maintain x x x that, under our laws, [the Filipino spouse]
has to be considered still married to [the alien spouse] and
still subject to a wife's obligations x x x cannot be just. [The
Filipino spouse] should not be obliged to live together with,
observe respect and fidelity, and render support to [the alien
spouse]. The latter should not continue to be one of her heirs
with possible rights to conjugal property. She should not be
discriminated against in her own country if the ends of
justice are to be served.[22]
As the RTC correctly stated, the provision was included in the law to
avoid the absurd situation where the Filipino spouse remains married to the
alien spouse who, after obtaining a divorce, is no longer married to the
Filipino spouse.[23] The legislative intent is for the benefit of the Filipino
spouse, by clarifying his or her marital status, settling the doubts created by
the divorce decree. Essentially, the second paragraph of Article 26 of the
Family Code provided the Filipino spouse a substantive right to have his or
her marriage to the alien spouse considered as dissolved, capacitating him
or her to remarry.[24] Without the second paragraph of Article 26 of the
Family Code, the judicial recognition of the foreign decree of divorce,
whether in a proceeding instituted precisely for that purpose or as a related
issue in another proceeding, would be of no significance to the Filipino spouse
since our laws do not recognize divorce as a mode of severing the marital
bond;[25] Article 17 of the Civil Code provides that the policy against absolute
divorces cannot be subverted by judgments promulgated in a foreign
country. The inclusion of the second paragraph in Article 26 of the Family
Code provides the direct exception to this rule and serves as basis for
recognizing the dissolution of the marriage between the Filipino spouse and
his or her alien spouse.
Additionally, an action based on the second paragraph of Article 26 of the
Family Code is not limited to the recognition of the foreign divorce decree. If
the court finds that the decree capacitated the alien spouse to remarry, the
courts can declare that the Filipino spouse is likewise capacitated to contract
another marriage. No court in this jurisdiction, however, can make a similar
declaration for the alien spouse (other than that already established by the
decree), whose status and legal capacity are generally governed by his
national law.[26]
Given the rationale and intent behind the enactment, and the
purpose of the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code, the RTC
was correct in limiting the applicability of the provision for the benefit of the
Filipino spouse. In other words, only the Filipino spouse can invoke the
second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code; the alien spouse can claim
no right under this provision.
The foreign divorce decree
is presumptive evidence of
a right that clothes the
party with legal interest to
petition for its recognition
in this jurisdiction
We qualify our above conclusion i.e., that the second paragraph of
Article 26 of the Family Code bestows no rights in favor of aliens with the
complementary statement that this conclusion is not sufficient basis to
dismiss Gerberts petition before the RTC. In other words, the unavailability of
the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code to aliens does not
necessarily strip Gerbert of legal interest to petition the RTC for the
recognition of his foreign divorce decree. The foreign divorce decree itself,
after its authenticity and conformity with the aliens national law have been
duly proven according to our rules of evidence, serves as a presumptive
evidence of right in favor of Gerbert, pursuant to Section 48, Rule 39 of the
Rules of Court which provides for the effect of foreign judgments. This Section
states:
SEC. 48. Effect of foreign judgments or final
orders.The effect of a judgment or final order of a tribunal
of a foreign country, having jurisdiction to render the
judgment or final order is as follows:
(a) In case of a judgment or final order upon
a specific thing, the judgment or final order
is conclusive upon the title of the thing; and
(b) In case of a judgment or final order
against a person, the judgment or final
order is presumptive evidence of a right as
between the parties and their successors in
interest by a subsequent title.
 In either case, the judgment or final order may be stationed in the foreign country in which the record is kept and (b)
repelled by evidence of a want of jurisdiction, want of notice
to the party, collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of law or fact. authenticated by the seal of his office.

To our mind, direct involvement or being the subject of the foreign judgment The records show that Gerbert attached to his petition a copy of the

is sufficient to clothe a party with the requisite interest to institute an action divorce decree, as well as the required certificates proving its

before our courts for the recognition of the foreign judgment. In a divorce authenticity,[30] but failed to include a copy of the Canadian law on

situation, we have declared, no less, that the divorce obtained by an alien divorce.[31] Under this situation, we can, at this point, simply dismiss the

abroad may be recognized in the Philippines, provided the divorce is valid petition for insufficiency of supporting evidence, unless we deem it more

according to his or her national law.[27] appropriate to remand the case to the RTC to determine whether the divorce
decree is consistent with the Canadian divorce law.

The starting point in any recognition of a foreign divorce judgment is

the acknowledgment that our courts do not take judicial notice of foreign We deem it more appropriate to take this latter course of action,

judgments and laws. Justice Herrera explained that, as a rule, no sovereign is given the Article 26 interests that will be served and the Filipina wifes

bound to give effect within its dominion to a judgment rendered by a tribunal (Daisylyns) obvious conformity with the petition. A remand, at the same time,

of another country.[28] This means that the foreign judgment and its will allow other interested parties to oppose the foreign judgment and

authenticity must be proven as facts under our rules on evidence, together overcome a petitioners presumptive evidence of a right by proving want of

with the aliens applicable national law to show the effect of the judgment on jurisdiction, want of notice to a party, collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of law

the alien himself or herself.[29] The recognition may be made in an action or fact. Needless to state, every precaution must be taken to ensure

instituted specifically for the purpose or in another action where a party conformity with our laws before a recognition is made, as the foreign

invokes the foreign decree as an integral aspect of his claim or defense. judgment, once recognized, shall have the effect of res judicata[32] between
the parties, as provided in Section 48, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court.[33]

In Gerberts case, since both the foreign divorce decree and the
national law of the alien, recognizing his or her capacity to obtain a divorce, In fact, more than the principle of comity that is served by the

purport to be official acts of a sovereign authority, Section 24, Rule 132 of the practice of reciprocal recognition of foreign judgments between nations,

Rules of Court comes into play. This Section requires proof, either by (1) the res judicataeffect of the foreign judgments of divorce serves as the

official publications or (2) copies attested by the officer having legal custody deeper basis for extending judicial recognition and for considering the alien

of the documents. If the copies of official records are not kept in spouse bound by its terms.This same effect, as discussed above, will not

the Philippines, these must be (a) accompanied by a certificate issued by the obtain for the Filipino spouse were it not for the substantive rule that the

proper diplomatic or consular officer in the Philippine foreign service second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code provides.
Considerations beyond the (g) adoptions;
recognition of the foreign (h) acknowledgment of natural children;
divorce decree (i) naturalization; and
As a matter of housekeeping concern, we note that (j) changes of name.

the Pasig City Civil Registry Office has already recorded the divorce decree
on Gerbert and Daisylyns marriage certificate based on the mere
presentation of the decree.[34] We consider the recording to be legally
improper; hence, the need to draw attention of the bench and the bar to
what had been done.
xxxx
Sec. 4. Civil Register Books. The local registrars shall keep
and preserve in their offices the following books, in which
they shall, respectively make the proper entries concerning
the civil status of persons:

(1) Birth and death register;

Article 407 of the Civil Code states that [a]cts, events and judicial decrees
concerning the civil status of persons shall be recorded in the civil
register. The law requires the entry in the civil registry of judicial decrees that
produce legal consequences touching upon a persons legal capacity and
status, i.e., those affecting all his personal qualities and relations, more or less
permanent in nature, not ordinarily terminable at his own will, such as his
being legitimate or illegitimate, or his being married or not.[35]
A judgment of divorce is a judicial decree, although a foreign one,
affecting a persons legal capacity and status that must be recorded. In fact,
Act No. 3753 or the Law on Registry of Civil Status specifically requires the
registration of divorce decrees in the civil registry:
Sec. 1. Civil Register. A civil register is established for
recording the civil status of persons, in which shall be
entered:
(2) Marriage register, in which shall be entered not
only the marriages solemnized but also divorces
and dissolved marriages.
(3) Legitimation, acknowledgment, adoption,
change of name and naturalization register.
But while the law requires the entry of the divorce decree in the civil registry,
the law and the submission of the decree by themselves do not ipso
facto authorize the decrees registration. The law should be read in relation
with the requirement of a judicial recognition of the foreign judgment before
it can be given res judicata effect. In the context of the present case, no
judicial order as yet exists recognizing the foreign divorce decree. Thus, the
Pasig City Civil Registry Office acted totally out of turn and without authority
of law when it annotated the Canadian divorce decree on Gerbert and

(a) births; Daisylyns marriage certificate, on the strength alone of the foreign decree
(b) deaths; presented by Gerbert.
(c) marriages;
(d) annulments of marriages;
(e) divorces; Evidently, the Pasig City Civil Registry Office was aware of the
(f) legitimations; requirement of a court recognition, as it cited NSO Circular No. 4, series of
1982,[36]and Department of Justice Opinion No. 181, series of 1982[37] both of
which required a final order from a competent Philippine court before a
foreign judgment, dissolving a marriage, can be registered in the civil registry,
but it, nonetheless, allowed the registration of the decree. For being contrary
to law, the registration of the foreign divorce decree without the requisite
judicial recognition is patently void and cannot produce any legal effect.
Another point we wish to draw attention to is that the recognition
that the RTC may extend to the Canadian divorce decree does not, by itself,
authorize the cancellation of the entry in the civil registry. A petition for
recognition of a foreign judgment is not the proper proceeding,
contemplated under the Rules of Court, for the cancellation of entries in the
civil registry.
Article 412 of the Civil Code declares that no entry in a civil register
shall be changed or corrected, without judicial order. The Rules of Court
supplements Article 412 of the Civil Code by specifically providing for a special
remedial proceeding by which entries in the civil registry may be judicially
cancelled or corrected. Rule 108 of the Rules of Court sets in detail the
jurisdictional and procedural requirements that must be complied with
before a judgment, authorizing the cancellation or correction, may be
annotated in the civil registry. It also requires, among others, that the verified
petition must be filed with the RTC of the province where the corresponding
civil registry is located;[38] that the civil registrar and all persons who have or
claim any interest must be made parties to the proceedings;[39] and that the
time and place for hearing must be published in a newspaper of general
circulation.[40] As these basic jurisdictional requirements have not been met
in the present case, we cannot consider the petition Gerbert filed with the
RTC as one filed under Rule 108 of the Rules of Court.
We hasten to point out, however, that this ruling should not be construed as
requiring two separate proceedings for the registration of a foreign divorce
decree in the civil registry one for recognition of the foreign decree and
another specifically for cancellation of the entry under Rule 108 of the Rules
of Court. The recognition of the foreign divorce decree may be made in a Rule
108 proceeding itself, as the object of special proceedings (such as that in
Rule 108 of the Rules of Court) is precisely to establish the status or right of a
party or a particular fact. Moreover, Rule 108 of the Rules of Court can serve
as the appropriate adversarial proceeding[41] by which the applicability of the
foreign judgment can be measured and tested in terms of jurisdictional
infirmities, want of notice to the party, collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of
law or fact.
WHEREFORE, we GRANT the petition for review on certiorari,
and REVERSE the October 30, 2008 decision of
the Regional Trial Court of LaoagCity, Branch 11, as well as its February 17,
2009 order. We order the REMAND of the case to the trial court for further
proceedings in accordance with our ruling above. Let a copy of this Decision
be furnished the Civil Registrar General. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
[G.R. No. 102858. July 28, 1997]
THE DIRECTOR OF LANDS, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and
TEODORO ABISTADO, substituted by MARGARITA, MARISSA, MARIBEL,
ARNOLD and MARY ANN, all surnamed ABISTADO, respondents.
DECISION
PANGANIBAN, J.:
Is newspaper publication of the notice of initial hearing in an original
land registration case mandatory or directory?
Statement of the Case
The Court of Appeals ruled that it was merely procedural and that the
failure to cause such publication did not deprive the trial court of its authority
to grant the application. But the Solicitor General disagreed and thus filed this
petition to set aside the Decision[1] promulgated on July 3, 1991 and the
subsequent Resolution[2]promulgated on November 19, 1991 by Respondent
Court of Appeals[3] in CA-G.R. CV No. 23719. The dispositive portion of the
challenged Decision reads:[4]
"WHEREFORE, premises considered, the judgment of dismissal appealed
from is hereby set aside, and a new one entered confirming the registration
and title of applicant, Teodoro Abistado, Filipino, a resident of Barangay 7,
Poblacion Mamburao, Occidental Mindoro, now deceased and substituted
by Margarita, Marissa, Maribel, Arnold and Mary Ann, all surnamed
Abistado, represented by their aunt, Miss Josefa Abistado, Filipinos,
residents of Poblacion Mamburao, Occidental Mindoro, to the parcel of land
covered under MSI (IV-A-8) 315-D located in Poblacion Mamburao,
Occidental Mindoro.
The oppositions filed by the Republic of the Philippines and private
oppositor are hereby dismissed for want of evidence.
Upon the finality of this decision and payment of the corresponding taxes
due on this land, let an order for the issuance of a decree be issued."
The Facts
On December 8, 1986, Private Respondent Teodoro Abistado filed a
petition for original registration of his title over 648 square meters of land
under Presidential Decree (PD) No. 1529.[5] The application was docketed as
Land Registration Case (LRC) No. 86 and assigned to Branch 44 of the Regional
Trial Court of Mamburao, Occidental Mindoro.[6] However, during the
pendency of his petition, applicant died. Hence, his heirs -- Margarita,
Marissa, Maribel, Arnold and Mary Ann, all surnamed Abistado -- represented
by their aunt Josefa Abistado, who was appointed their guardian ad litem,
were substituted as applicants.
The land registration court in its decision dated June 13, 1989 dismissed
the petition for want of jurisdiction. However, it found that the applicants
through their predecessors-in-interest had been in open, continuous,
exclusive and peaceful possession of the subject land since 1938.
In dismissing the petition, the trial court reasoned:[7]
"x x x. However, the Court noted that applicants failed to comply with the
provisions of Section 23 (1) of PD 1529, requiring the Applicants to publish
the notice of Initial Hearing (Exh. `E') in a newspaper of general circulation in
the Philippines. Exhibit `E' was only published in the Official Gazette
(Exhibits `F' and `G'). Consequently, the Court is of the well considered view
that it has not legally acquired jurisdiction over the instant application for
want of compliance with the mandatory provision requiring publication of
the notice of initial hearing in a newspaper of general circulation."
The trial court also cited Ministry of Justice Opinion No. 48, Series of
1982, which in its pertinent portion provides:[8]
It bears emphasis that the publication requirement under Section 23 [of PD
1529] has a two-fold purpose; the first, which is mentioned in the provision
of the aforequoted provision refers to publication in the Official Gazette,
and is jurisdictional; while the second, which is mentioned in the opening
clause of the same paragraph, refers to publication not only in the Official
Gazette but also in a newspaper of general circulation, and is
procedural. Neither one nor the other is dispensable. As to the first,
publication in the Official Gazette is indispensably necessary because
without it, the court would be powerless to assume jurisdiction over a
particular land registration case. As to the second, publication of the notice
of initial hearing also in a newspaper of general circulation is indispensably
necessary as a requirement of procedural due process; otherwise, any
decision that the court may promulgate in the case would be legally infirm.
Unsatisfied, private respondents appealed to Respondent Court of
Appeals which, as earlier explained, set aside the decision of the trial court
and ordered the registration of the title in the name of Teodoro Abistado.
The subsequent motion for reconsideration was denied in the
challenged CA Resolution dated November 19, 1991.
The Director of Lands represented by the Solicitor General thus elevated
this recourse to us. This Court notes that the petitioners counsel anchored his
petition on Rule 65. This is an error. His remedy should be based on Rule 45
because he is appealing a final disposition of the Court of Appeals. Hence, we
shall treat his petition as one for review under Rule 45, and not for certiorari
under Rule 65.[9]
The Issue
Petitioner alleges that Respondent Court of Appeals committed grave
abuse of discretion[10] in holding
x x x that publication of the petition for registration of title in LRC Case No.
86 need not be published in a newspaper of general circulation, and in not
dismissing LRC Case No. 86 for want of such publication.
Petitioner points out that under Section 23 of PD 1529, the notice of
initial hearing shall be published both in the Official Gazette and in a
newspaper of general circulation. According to petitioner, publication in the
Official Gazette is necessary to confer jurisdiction upon the trial court, and
xxx in xxx a newspaper of general circulation to comply with the notice
requirement of due process.[11]
Private respondents, on the other hand, contend that failure to comply
with the requirement of publication in a newspaper of general circulation is
a mere procedural defect. They add that publication in the Official Gazette is
sufficient to confer jurisdiction.[12]
In reversing the decision of the trial court, Respondent Court of Appeals
ruled:[13]
x x x although the requirement of publication in the Official Gazette and in a
newspaper of general circulation is couched in mandatory terms, it cannot
be gainsaid that the law also mandates with equal force that publication in
the Official Gazette shall be sufficient to confer jurisdiction upon the court.
Further, Respondent Court found that the oppositors were afforded the
opportunity to explain matters fully and present their side. Thus, it justified
its disposition in this wise:[14]
x x x We do not see how the lack of compliance with the required procedure
prejudiced them in any way. Moreover, the other requirements of:
publication in the Official Gazette, personal notice by mailing, and posting at
the site and other conspicuous places, were complied with and these are
sufficient to notify any party who is minded to make any objection of the
application for registration.
The Courts Ruling
We find for petitioner.
Newspaper Publication Mandatory
The pertinent part of Section 23 of Presidential Decree No. 1529
requiring publication of the notice of initial hearing reads as follows:
Sec. 23. Notice of initial hearing, publication, etc. -- The court shall, within
five days from filing of the application, issue an order setting the date and
hour of the initial hearing which shall not be earlier than forty-five days nor
later than ninety days from the date of the order.
The public shall be given notice of initial hearing of the application for land
registration by means of (1) publication; (2) mailing; and (3) posting.
1. By publication. --
Upon receipt of the order of the court setting the time for initial hearing,
the Commissioner of Land Registration shall cause a notice of initial hearing
to be published once in the Official Gazette and once in a newspaper of
general circulation in the Philippines: Provided, however, that the
publication in the Official Gazette shall be sufficient to confer jurisdiction
upon the court. Said notice shall be addressed to all persons appearing to
have an interest in the land involved including the adjoining owners so far as
known, and `to all whom it may concern.' Said notice shall also require all
persons concerned to appear in court at a certain date and time to show
cause why the prayer of said application shall not be granted.
xxx xxx xxx
Admittedly, the above provision provides in clear and categorical terms
that publication in the Official Gazette suffices to confer jurisdiction upon the
land registration court. However, the question boils down to whether, absent
any publication in a newspaper of general circulation, the land registration
court can validly confirm and register the title of private respondents.
We answer this query in the negative. This answer is impelled by the
demands of statutory construction and the due process rationale behind the
publication requirement.
The law used the term shall in prescribing the work to be done by the
Commissioner of Land Registration upon the latters receipt of the court order
setting the time for initial hearing. The said word denotes an imperative and
thus indicates the mandatory character of a statute.[15] While concededly
such literal mandate is not an absolute rule in statutory construction, as its
import ultimately depends upon its context in the entire provision, we hold
that in the present case the term must be understood in its normal
mandatory meaning. In Republic vs. Marasigan,[16] the Court through Mr.
Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr. held that Section 23 of PD 1529 requires notice
of the initial hearing by means of (1) publication, (2) mailing and (3) posting,
all of which must be complied with. If the intention of the law were
otherwise, said section would not have stressed in detail the requirements of
mailing of notices to all persons named in the petition who, per Section 15 of
the Decree, include owners of adjoining properties, and occupants of the
land. Indeed, if mailing of notices is essential, then by parity of reasoning,
publication in a newspaper of general circulation is likewise imperative since
the law included such requirement in its detailed provision.
It should be noted further that land registration is a proceeding in
rem.[17] Being in rem, such proceeding requires constructive seizure of the
land as against allpersons, including the state, who have rights to or interests
in the property. An in rem proceeding is validated essentially through
publication. This being so, the process must strictly be complied
with. Otherwise, persons who may be interested or whose rights may be
adversely affected would be barred from contesting an application which
they had no knowledge of. As has been ruled, a party as an owner seeking the
inscription of realty in the land registration court must prove by satisfactory
and conclusive evidence not only his ownership thereof but the identity of
the same, for he is in the same situation as one who institutes an action for
recovery of realty.[18]He must prove his title against the whole world. This
task, which rests upon the applicant, can best be achieved when all persons
concerned -- nay, the whole world -- who have rights to or interests in the
subject property are notified and effectively invited to come to court and
show cause why the application should not be granted.The elementary norms
of due process require that before the claimed property is taken from
concerned parties and registered in the name of the applicant, said parties
must be given notice and opportunity to oppose.
It may be asked why publication in a newspaper of general circulation
should be deemed mandatory when the law already requires notice by
publication in the Official Gazette as well as by mailing and posting, all of
which have already been complied with in the case at hand. The reason is due
process and the reality that the Official Gazette is not as widely read and
circulated as newspapers and is oftentimes delayed in its circulation, such
that the notices published therein may not reach the interested parties on
time, if at all. Additionally, such parties may not be owners of neighboring
properties, and may in fact not own any other real estate. In sum, the all-
encompassing in rem nature of land registration cases, the consequences of
default orders issued against the whole world and the objective of
disseminating the notice in as wide a manner as possible demand a
mandatory construction of the requirements for publication, mailing and
posting.
Admittedly, there was failure to comply with the explicit publication
requirement of the law. Private respondents did not proffer any excuse; even
if they had, it would not have mattered because the statute itself allows no
excuses. Ineludibly, this Court has no authority to dispense with such dismissed the petition and in effect affirmed the decision of the trial court
mandatory requirement. The law is unambiguous and its rationale and (b) the resolution dated July 14, 1988 denying petitioners' motion for
clear. Time and again, this Court has declared that where the law speaks in reconsideration.
clear and categorical language, there is no room for interpretation, vacillation
or equivocation; there is room only for application.[19] There is no alternative. The undisputed facts of the case are as follows:
Thus, the application for land registration filed by private respondents must
be dismissed without prejudice to reapplication in the future, after all the Petitioners Olivia and Hermes both surnamed Pascual are the acknowledged
legal requisites shall have been duly complied with. natural children of the late Eligio Pascual, the latter being the full blood
brother of the decedent Don Andres Pascual (Rollo, petition, p. 17).
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED and the assailed Decision and
Resolution are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The application of private
respondent for land registration is DISMISSED without prejudice. No costs. Don Andres Pascual died intestate on October 12, 1973 without any issue,
legitimate, acknowledged natural, adopted or spurious children and was
SO ORDERED. survived by the following:
Davide, Jr., Melo, and Francisco, JJ., concur.
(a) Adela Soldevilla de Pascual, surviving spouses;
Narvasa, C.J., (Chairman), on leave.
(b) Children of Wenceslao Pascual, Sr., a brother of the full
blood of the deceased, to wit:
G.R. No. 84240 March 25, 1992
Esperanza C. Pascual-
OLIVIA S. PASCUAL and HERMES S. PASCUAL, petitioners, Bautista
vs. Manuel C. Pascual
ESPERANZA C. PASCUAL-BAUTISTA, MANUEL C. PASCUAL, JOSE C. Jose C. Pascual
PASCUAL, SUSANA C. PASCUAL-BAUTISTA, ERLINDA C. PASCUAL, Susana C. Pascual-Bautista
WENCESLAO C. PASCUAL, JR., INTESTATE ESTATE OF ELEUTERIO T. Erlinda C. Pascual
PASCUAL, AVELINO PASCUAL, ISOCELES PASCUAL, LEIDA PASCUAL- Wenceslao C. Pascual, Jr.
MARTINES, VIRGINIA PASCUAL-NER, NONA PASCUAL-FERNANDO,
OCTAVIO PASCUAL, GERANAIA PASCUAL-DUBERT, and THE HONORABLE (c) Children of Pedro-Bautista, brother of the half blood of
PRESIDING JUDGE MANUEL S. PADOLINA of Br. 162, RTC, Pasig, Metro the deceased, to wit:
Manila, respondents.
Avelino Pascual
Isoceles Pascual
Loida Pascual-Martinez
PARAS, J.: Virginia Pascual-Ner
Nona Pascual-Fernando
This is a petition for review on certiorari which seeks to reverse and set Octavio Pascual
aside: (a) the decision of the Court of Appeals 1 dated April 29, 1988 in CA- Geranaia Pascual-Dubert;
G.R. SP. No. 14010 entitled "Olivia S. Pascual and Hermes S. Pascual v.
Esperanza C. Pascual-Bautista, Manuel C. Pascual, Jose Pascual, Susana C.
Pascual-Bautista, Erlinda C. Pascual, Wenceslao C. Pascual, Jr., et al." which
 (d) Acknowledged natural children of Eligio Pascual, brother
of the full blood of the deceased, to wit:
Olivia S. Pascual
Hermes S. Pascual
(e) Intestate of Eleuterio T. Pascual, a brother of the half
blood of the deceased and represented by the following:
Dominga M. Pascual
Mamerta P. Fugoso
Abraham S. Sarmiento, III
Regina Sarmiento-Macaibay
Eleuterio P. Sarmiento
Domiga P. San Diego
Nelia P. Marquez
Silvestre M. Pascual
Eleuterio M. Pascual
(Rollo, pp. 46-47)
Adela Soldevilla de Pascual, the surviving spouse of the late Don Andres
Pascual, filed with the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 162 (CFI of Rizal,
Br. XXIII), a Special Proceeding, Case No. 7554, for administration of the
intestate estate of her late husband (Rollo, p. 47).
On December 18, 1973, Adela soldevilla de Pascual filed a Supplemental
Petition to the Petition for letters of Administration, where she expressly
stated that Olivia Pascual and Hermes Pascual, are among the heirs of Don
Andres Pascual (Rollo, pp. 99-101).
On February 27, 1974, again Adela Soldevilla de Pascual executed an
affidavit, to the effect that of her own knowledge, Eligio Pascual is the
younger full blood brother of her late husband Don Andres Pascual, to belie
the statement made by the oppositors, that they were are not among the
known heirs of the deceased Don Andres Pascual (Rollo, p. 102).
On October 16, 1985, all the above-mentioned heirs entered into a
COMPROMISE AGREEMENT, over the vehement objections of the herein
petitioners Olivia S. Pascual and Hermes S. Pascual, although paragraph V of
such compromise agreement provides, to wit:
This Compromise Agreement shall be without prejudice to
the continuation of the above-entitled proceedings until the
final determination thereof by the court, or by another
compromise agreement, as regards the claims of Olivia
Pascual and Hermes Pascual as legal heirs of the deceased,
Don Andres Pascual. (Rollo, p. 108)
The said Compromise Agreement had been entered into despite the
Manifestation/Motion of the petitioners Olivia Pascual and Hermes Pascual,
manifesting their hereditary rights in the intestate estate of Don Andres
Pascual, their uncle (Rollo, pp. 111-112).
On September 30, 1987, petitioners filed their Motion to Reiterate
Hereditary Rights (Rollo, pp. 113-114) and the Memorandum in Support of
Motion to reiterate Hereditary Rights (Rollo, pp. 116-130).
On December 18, 1987, the Regional Trial Court, presided over by Judge
Manuel S. Padolina issued an order, the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, this Court resolves as it
is hereby resolved to Deny this motion reiterating the
hereditary rights of Olivia and Hermes Pascual (Rollo, p.
136).
On January 13, 1988, petitioners filed their motion for reconsideration
(Rollo, pp. 515-526). and such motion was denied.
Petitioner appealed their case to the Court of Appeals docketed as CA-G.R.
No. 14010 (Rollo, p. 15.).
On Aril 29, 1988, the respondent Court of Appeals rendered its decision the
decision the dispositive part of which reads:
WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED. Costs against the
petitioners.
 SO ORDERED. (Rollo, p. 38)
Petitioners filed their motion for reconsideration of said decision and on
July 14, 1988, the Court of Appeals issued its resolution denying the motion
for reconsideration (Rollo, p. 42).
Hence, this petition for review on certiorari.
After all the requirements had been filed, the case was given due course.
The main issue to be resolved in the case at bar is whether or not Article
992 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, can be interpreted to exclude
recognized natural children from the inheritance of the deceased.
Petitioners contend that they do not fall squarely within the purview of
Article 992 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, can be interpreted to exclude
recognized and of the doctrine laid down in Diaz v. IAC (150 SCRA 645
[1987]) because being acknowledged natural children, their illegitimacy is
not due to the subsistence of a prior marriage when such children were
under conception (Rollo, p. 418).
Otherwise stated they say the term "illegitimate" children as provided in
Article 992 must be strictly construed to refer only to spurious children
(Rollo, p. 419).
On the other hand, private respondents maintain that herein petitioners are
within the prohibition of Article 992 of the Civil Code and the doctrine laid
down in Diaz v. IAC is applicable to them.
The petition is devoid of merit.
Pertinent thereto, Article 992 of the civil Code, provides:
An illegitimate child has no right to inherit ab intestato from
the legitimate children and relatives of his father or mother;
nor shall such children or relatives inherit in the same
manner from the illegitimate child.
The issue in the case at bar, had already been laid to rest in Diaz v. IAC,
supra, where this Court ruled that:
Article 992 of the Civil Code provides a barrier or iron
curtain in that it prohibits absolutely a succession ab
intestato between the illegitimate child and the legitimate
children and relatives of the father or mother of said
legitimate child. They may have a natural tie of blood, but
this is not recognized by law for the purposes of Article 992.
Between the legitimate family and illegitimate family there
is presumed to be an intervening antagonism and
incompatibility. The illegitimate child is disgracefully looked
down upon by the legitimate family; the family is in turn
hated by the illegitimate child; the latter considers the
privileged condition of the former, and the resources of
which it is thereby deprived; the former, in turn, sees in the
illegitimate child nothing but the product of sin, palpable
evidence of a blemish broken in life; the law does no more
than recognize this truth, by avoiding further grounds of
resentment.
Eligio Pascual is a legitimate child but petitioners are his illegitimate
children.
Applying the above doctrine to the case at bar, respondent IAC did not err in
holding that petitioners herein cannot represent their father Eligio Pascual
in the succession of the latter to the intestate estate of the decedent Andres
Pascual, full blood brother of their father.
In their memorandum, petitioners insisted that Article 992 in the light of
Articles 902 and 989 of the Civil Code allows them (Olivia and Hermes) to
represent Eligio Pascual in the intestate estate of Don Andres Pascual.
On motion for reconsideration of the decision in Diaz v. IAC, this Court
further elucidated the successional rights of illegitimate children, which
squarely answers the questions raised by the petitioner on this point.
The Court held:
 Article 902, 989, and 990 clearly speaks of successional
rights of illegitimate children, which rights are transmitted
to their descendants upon their death. The descendants (of
these illegitimate children) who may inherit by virtue of the
right of representation may be legitimate or illegitimate. In
whatever manner, one should not overlook the fact that the
persons to be represented are themselves illegitimate. The
three named provisions are very clear on this matter. The
right of representation is not available to illegitimate
descendants of legitimate children in the inheritance of a
legitimate grandparent. It may be argued, as done by
petitioners, that the illegitimate descendant of a legitimate
child is entitled to represent by virtue of the provisions of
Article 982, which provides that "the grandchildren and
other descendants shall inherit by right of representation."
Such a conclusion is erroneous. It would allow intestate
succession by an illegitimate child to the legitimate parent
of his father or mother, a situation which would set at
naught the provisions of Article 992. Article 982 is
inapplicable to the instant case because Article 992
prohibits absolutely a succession ab intestato between the
illegitimate child and the legitimate children and relatives of
the father or mother. It may not be amiss to state Article
982 is the general rule and Article 992 the exception.
The rules laid down in Article 982 that "grandchildren and
other descendants shall inherit by right of representation"
and in Article 902 that the rights of illegitimate children . . .
are transmitted upon their death to their descendants,
whether legitimate or illegitimate are subject to the
limitation prescribed by Article 992 to the end that an
illegitimate child has no right to inherit ab intestato from
the legitimate children and relatives of his father or mother.
(Amicus Curiae's Opinion by former Justice Minister Ricardo
C. Puno, p. 12). Diaz v. Intermediate Appellate Court, 182
SCRA 427; pp. 431-432; [1990]).
Verily, the interpretation of the law desired by the petitioner may be more
humane but it is also an elementary rule in statutory construction that when
the words and phrases of the statute are clear and unequivocal, their
meaning must be determined from the language employed and the statute
must be taken to mean exactly what is says. (Baranda v. Gustilo, 165 SCRA
758-759 [1988]). The courts may not speculate as to the probable intent of
the legislature apart from the words (Aparri v. CA, 127 SCRA 233 [1984]).
When the law is clear, it is not susceptible of interpretation. It must be
applied regardless of who may be affected, even if the law may be harsh or
onerous. (Nepomuceno, et al. v. FC, 110 Phil. 42). And even granting that
exceptions may be conceded, the same as a general rule, should be strictly
but reasonably construed; they extend only so far as their language fairly
warrants, and all doubts should be resolved in favor of the general
provisions rather than the exception. Thus, where a general rule is
established by statute, the court will not curtail the former nor add to the
latter by implication (Samson v. C.A., 145 SCRA 654 [1986]).
Clearly the term "illegitimate" refers to both natural and spurious.
Finally under Article 176 of the Family Code, all illegitimate children are
generally placed under one category, which undoubtedly settles the issue as
to whether or not acknowledged natural children should be treated
differently, in the negative.
It may be said that the law may be harsh but that is the law (DURA LEX SED
LEX).
PREMISES CONSIDERED, the petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit and the
assailed decision of the respondent Court of Appeals dated April 29, 1988 is
AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
Melencio-Herrera, Padilla, Regalado and Nocon, JJ., concur.
[G.R. No. 120721. February 23, 2005]
MANUEL G. ABELLO, JOSE C. CONCEPCION, TEODORO D. REGALA, AVELINO
V. CRUZ, petitioners, vs. COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE and
COURT OF APPEALS, respondents.
DECISION
AZCUNA, J.:
This is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of
Civil Procedure, assailing the decision of the Court of Appeals in CA G.R. SP
No. 27134, entitled Comissioner of Internal Revenue v. Manuel G. Abello, Jose
C. Concepcion, Teodoro D. Regala, Avelino V. Cruz and Court of Tax Appeals,
which reversed and set aside the decision of the Court of Tax Appeals (CTA),
ordering the Commissioner of Internal Revenue (Commissioner) to withdraw
his letters dated April 21, 1988 and August 4, 1988 assessing donors taxes and
to desist from collecting donors taxes from petitioners.
During the 1987 national elections, petitioners, who are partners in the
Angara, Abello, Concepcion, Regala and Cruz (ACCRA) law firm,
contributed P882,661.31 each to the campaign funds of Senator Edgardo
Angara, then running for the Senate. In letters dated April 21, 1988, the
Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR) assessed each of the
petitioners P263,032.66 for their contributions. On August 2, 1988,
petitioners questioned the assessment through a letter to the BIR. They
claimed that political or electoral contributions are not considered gifts under
the National Internal Revenue Code (NIRC), and that, therefore, they are not
liable for donors tax. The claim for exemption was denied by the
Commissioner.[1]
On September 12, 1988, petitioners filed a petition for review with the
CTA, which was decided on October 7, 1991 in favor of the petitioners. As
aforestated, the CTA ordered the Commissioner to desist from collecting
donors taxes from the petitioners.[2]
On appeal, the Court of Appeals reversed and set aside the CTA decision
on April 20, 1994.[3] The appellate Court ordered the petitioners to pay
donors tax amounting to P263,032.66 each, reasoning as follows:
The National Internal Revenue Code, as amended, provides:
Sec. 91. Imposition of Tax. (a) There shall be levied, assessed, collected, and
paid upon the transfer by any person, resident, or non-resident, of the
property by gift, a tax, computed as provided in Section 92. (b) The tax shall
apply whether the transfer is in trust or otherwise, whether the gift is direct
or indirect, and whether the property is real or personal, tangible or
intangible.
Pursuant to the above-quoted provisions of law, the transfer of property by
gift, whether the transfer is in trust or otherwise, whether the gift is direct
or indirect, and whether the property is real or personal, tangible or
intangible, is subject to donors or gift tax.
A gift is generally defined as a voluntary transfer of property by one to
another without any consideration or compensation therefor (28 C.J. 620;
Santos vs. Robledo, 28 Phil. 250).
In the instant case, the contributions are voluntary transfers of property in
the form of money from private respondents to Sen. Angara, without
considerations therefor. Hence, they squarely fall under the definition of
donation or gift.
As correctly pointed out by the Solicitor General:
The fact that the contributions were given to be used as campaign funds of
Sen. Angara does not affect the character of the fund transfers as donation
or gift. There was thereby no retention of control over the disposition of the
contributions. There was simply an indication of the purpose for which they
were to be used. For as long as the contributions were used for the purpose
for which they were intended, Sen. Angara had complete and absolute
power to dispose of the contributions. He was fully entitled to the economic
benefits of the contributions.
Section 91 of the Tax Code is very clear. A donors or gift tax is imposed on
the transfer of property by gift.
The Bureau of Internal Revenue issued Ruling No. 344 on July 20, 1988,
which reads:
Political Contributions. For internal revenue purposes, political contributions
in the Philippines are considered taxable gift rather than taxable income.
This is so, because a political contribution is indubitably not intended by the
giver or contributor as a return of value or made because of any intent to
repay another what is his due, but bestowed only because of motives of
philanthropy or charity. His purpose is to give and to bolster the morals, the
winning chance of the candidate and/or his party, and not to employ or buy.
On the other hand, the recipient-donee does not regard himself as
exchanging his services or his product for the money contributed. But more
importantly he receives financial advantages gratuitously.
When the U.S. gift tax law was adopted in the Philippines (before May 7,
1974), the taxability of political contributions was, admittedly, an unsettled
issue; hence, it cannot be presumed that the Philippine Congress then had
intended to consider or treat political contributions as non-taxable gifts
when it adopted the said gift tax law. Moreover, well-settled is the rule that
the Philippines need not necessarily adopt the present rule or construction
in the United States on the matter. Generally, statutes of different states
relating to the same class of persons or things or having the same purposes
are not considered to be in pari materia because it cannot be justifiably
presumed that the legislature had them in mind when enacting the
provision being construed. (5206, Sutherland, Statutory Construction, p.
546.) Accordingly, in the absence of an express exempting provision of law,
political contributions in the Philippines are subject to the donors gift
tax. (cited in National Internal Revenue Code Annotated by Hector S. de
Leon, 1991 ed., p. 290).
In the light of the above BIR Ruling, it is clear that the political contributions
of the private respondents to Sen. Edgardo Angara are taxable gifts. The
vagueness of the law as to what comprise the gift subject to tax was made
concrete by the above-quoted BIR ruling. Hence, there is no doubt that
political contributions are taxable gifts.[4]
Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration, which the Court of
Appeals denied in its resolution of June 16, 1995.[5]
Petitioners thereupon filed the instant petition on July 26, 1995. Raised
are the following issues:
1. DID THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERR WHEN IT FAILED
TO CONSIDER IN ITS DECISION THE PURPOSE BEHIND THE
ENACTMENT OF OUR GIFT TAX LAW?
2. DID THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERR IN NOT
CONSIDERING THE INTENTION OF THE GIVERS IN
DETERMINING WHETHER OR NOT THE PETITIONERS
POLITICAL CONTRIBUTIONS WERE GIFTS SUBJECT TO DONORS
TAX?
3. DID THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERR WHEN IT FAILED
TO CONSIDER THE DEFINITION OF AN ELECTORAL
CONTRIBUTION UNDER THE OMNIBUS ELECTION CODE IN
DETERMINING WHETHER OR NOT POLITICAL CONTRIBUTIONS
ARE TAXABLE?
4. DID THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERR IN NOT
CONSIDERING THE ADMINISTRATIVE PRACTICE OF CLOSE TO
HALF A CENTURY OF NOT SUBJECTING POLITICAL
CONTRIBUTIONS TO DONORS TAX?
5. DID THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERR IN NOT
CONSIDERING THE AMERICAN JURISPRUDENCE RELIED UPON
BY THE COURT OF TAX APPEALS AND BY THE PETITIONERS TO
THE EFFECT THAT POLITICAL CONTRIBUTIONS ARE NOT
TAXABLE GIFTS?
6. DID THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERR IN NOT APPLYING
AMERICAN JURISPRUDENCE ON THE GROUND THAT THIS WAS
NOT KNOWN AT THE TIME THE PHILIPPINES GIFT TAX LAW
WAS ADOPTED IN 1939?
7. DID THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERR IN RESOLVING THE
CASE MAINLY ON THE BASIS OF A RULING ISSUED BY THE
RESPONDENT ONLY AFTER THE ASSESSMENTS HAD ALREADY
BEEN MADE?
8. DID THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERR WHEN IT DID NOT
CONSTRUE THE GIFT TAX LAW LIBERALLY IN FAVOR OF THE
TAXPAYER AND STRICLTY AGAINST THE GOVERNMENT IN
ACCORDANCE WITH APPLICABLE PRINCIPLES OF STATUTORY
CONSTRUCTION?[6]
 First, Fifth and Sixth Issues
Section 91 of the National Internal Revenue Code (NIRC) reads:
(A) There shall be levied, assessed, collected and paid upon the
transfer by any person, resident or nonresident, of the
property by gift, a tax, computed as provided in Section 92
(B) The tax shall apply whether the transfer is in trust or
otherwise, whether the gift is direct or indirect, and
whether the property is real or personal, tangible or
intangible.
The NIRC does not define transfer of property by gift. However, Article
18 of the Civil Code, states:
In matters which are governed by the Code of Commerce and special laws,
their deficiency shall be supplied by the provisions of this Code.
Thus, reference may be made to the definition of a donation in the Civil Code.
Article 725 of said Code defines donation as:
. . . an act of liberality whereby a person disposes gratuitously of a thing or
right in favor of another, who accepts it.
Donation has the following elements: (a) the reduction of the patrimony of
the donor; (b) the increase in the patrimony of the donee; and, (c) the intent
to do an act of liberality or animus donandi.[7]
The present case falls squarely within the definition of a donation.
Petitioners, the late Manuel G. Abello[8], Jose C. Concepcion, Teodoro D.
Regala and Avelino V. Cruz, each gave P882,661.31 to the campaign funds of
Senator Edgardo Angara, without any material consideration. All three
elements of a donation are present. The patrimony of the four petitioners
were reduced by P882,661.31 each. Senator Edgardo Angaras patrimony
correspondingly increased by P3,530,645.24[9]. There was intent to do an act
of liberality or animus donandi was present since each of the petitioners gave
their contributions without any consideration.
Taken together with the Civil Code definition of donation, Section 91 of
the NIRC is clear and unambiguous, thereby leaving no room for construction.
In Rizal Commercial Banking Corporation v. Intermediate Appellate
Court[10] the Court enunciated:
It bears stressing that the first and fundamental duty of the Court is to apply
the law. When the law is clear and free from any doubt or ambiguity, there
is no room for construction or interpretation. As has been our consistent
ruling, where the law speaks in clear and categorical language, there is no
occasion for interpretation; there is only room for application (Cebu
Portland Cement Co. v. Municipality of Naga, 24 SCRA 708 [1968])
Where the law is clear and unambiguous, it must be taken to mean exactly
what it says and the court has no choice but to see to it that its mandate is
obeyed (Chartered Bank Employees Association v. Ople, 138 SCRA 273
[1985]; Luzon Surety Co., Inc. v. De Garcia, 30 SCRA 111 [1969]; Quijano v.
Development Bank of the Philippines, 35 SCRA 270 [1970]).
Only when the law is ambiguous or of doubtful meaning may the court
interpret or construe its true intent. Ambiguity is a condition of admitting
two or more meanings, of being understood in more than one way, or of
referring to two or more things at the same time. A statute is ambiguous if it
is admissible of two or more possible meanings, in which case, the Court is
called upon to exercise one of its judicial functions, which is to interpret the
law according to its true intent.
Second Issue
Since animus donandi or the intention to do an act of liberality is an
essential element of a donation, petitioners argue that it is important to look
into the intention of the giver to determine if a political contribution is a gift.
Petitioners argument is not tenable. First of all, donative intent is a creature
of the mind. It cannot be perceived except by the material and tangible acts
which manifest its presence. This being the case, donative intent is presumed
present when one gives a part of ones patrimony to another without
consideration. Second, donative intent is not negated when the person
donating has other intentions, motives or purposes which do not contradict
donative intent. This Court is not convinced that since the purpose of the
contribution was to help elect a candidate, there was no donative intent.
Petitioners contribution of money without any material consideration
evinces animus donandi. The fact that their purpose for donating was to aid
in the election of the donee does not negate the presence of donative intent.
Third Issue
Petitioners maintain that the definition of an electoral contribution
under the Omnibus Election Code is essential to appreciate how a political
contribution differs from a taxable gift.[11] Section 94(a) of the said Code
defines electoral contribution as follows:
The term "contribution" includes a gift, donation, subscription, loan,
advance or deposit of money or anything of value, or a contract, promise or
agreement to contribute, whether or not legally enforceable, made for the
purpose of influencing the results of the elections but shall not include
services rendered without compensation by individuals volunteering a
portion or all of their time in behalf of a candidate or political party. It shall
also include the use of facilities voluntarily donated by other persons, the
money value of which can be assessed based on the rates prevailing in the
area.
Since the purpose of an electoral contribution is to influence the results
of the election, petitioners again claim that donative intent is not present.
Petitioners attempt to place the barrier of mutual exclusivity between
donative intent and the purpose of political contributions. This Court
reiterates that donative intent is not negated by the presence of other
intentions, motives or purposes which do not contradict donative intent.
Petitioners would distinguish a gift from a political donation by saying
that the consideration for a gift is the liberality of the donor, while the
consideration for a political contribution is the desire of the giver to influence
the result of an election by supporting candidates who, in the perception of
the giver, would influence the shaping of government policies that would
promote the general welfare and economic well-being of the electorate,
including the giver himself.
Petitioners attempt is strained. The fact that petitioners will somehow
in the future benefit from the election of the candidate to whom they
contribute, in no way amounts to a valuable material consideration so as to
remove political contributions from the purview of a donation. Senator
Angara was under no obligation to benefit the petitioners. The proper
performance of his duties as a legislator is his obligation as an elected public
servant of the Filipino people and not a consideration for the political
contributions he received. In fact, as a public servant, he may even be called
to enact laws that are contrary to the interests of his benefactors, for the
benefit of the greater good.
In fine, the purpose for which the sums of money were given, which was
to fund the campaign of Senator Angara in his bid for a senatorial seat, cannot
be considered as a material consideration so as to negate a donation.
Fourth Issue
Petitioners raise the fact that since 1939 when the first Tax Code was
enacted, up to 1988 the BIR never attempted to subject political
contributions to donors tax. They argue that:
. . . It is a familiar principle of law that prolonged practice by the
government agency charged with the execution of a statute, acquiesced in
and relied upon by all concerned over an appreciable period of time, is an
authoritative interpretation thereof, entitled to great weight and the
highest respect. . . .[12]
This Court holds that the BIR is not precluded from making a new
interpretation of the law, especially when the old interpretation was flawed.
It is a well-entrenched rule that
. . . erroneous application and enforcement of the law by public officers do
not block subsequent correct application of the statute (PLDT v. Collector of
Internal Revenue, 90 Phil. 676), and that the Government is never estopped
by mistake or error on the part of its agents (Pineda v. Court of First
Instance of Tayabas, 52 Phil. 803, 807; Benguet Consolidated Mining Co. v.
Pineda, 98 Phil. 711, 724).[13]
 Seventh Issue
Petitioners question the fact that the Court of Appeals decision is based
on a BIR ruling, namely BIR Ruling No. 88-344, which was issued after the
petitioners were assessed for donors tax. This Court does not need to delve
into this issue. It is immaterial whether or not the Court of Appeals based its
decision on the BIR ruling because it is not pivotal in deciding this case. As
discussed above, Section 91 (now Section 98) of the NIRC as supplemented
by the definition of a donation found in Article 725 of the Civil Code, is clear
and unambiguous, and needs no further elucidation.
Eighth Issue
Petitioners next contend that tax laws are construed liberally in favor of
the taxpayer and strictly against the government. This rule of construction,
however, does not benefit petitioners because, as stated, there is here no
room for construction since the law is clear and unambiguous.
Finally, this Court takes note of the fact that subsequent to the donations
involved in this case, Congress approved Republic Act No. 7166 on November
25, 1991, providing in Section 13 thereof that political/electoral
contributions, duly reported to the Commission on Elections, are not subject
to the payment of any gift tax. This all the more shows that the political
contributions herein made are subject to the payment of gift taxes, since the
same were made prior to the exempting legislation, and Republic Act No.
7166 provides no retroactive effect on this point.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED and the assailed Decision and
Resolution of the Court of Appeals are AFFIRMED.
No costs.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. L-22301 | August 30, 1967
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
MARIO MAPA Y MAPULONG, defendant-appellant.
Francisco P. Cabigao for defendant-appellant.
Office of the Solicitor General Arturo A. Alafriz, Assistant Solicitor General F.
R. Rosete and Solicitor O. C. Hernandez for plaintiff-appellee.
FERNANDO, J.:
The sole question in this appeal from a judgment of conviction by the lower
court is whether or not the appointment to and holding of the position of a
secret agent to the provincial governor would constitute a sufficient defense
to a prosecution for the crime of illegal possession of firearm and
ammunition. We hold that it does not.
The accused in this case was indicted for the above offense in an
information dated August 14, 1962 reading as follows: "The undersized
accuses MARIO MAPA Y MAPULONG of a violation of Section 878 in
connection with Section 2692 of the Revised Administrative Code, as
amended by Commonwealth Act No. 56 and as further amended by
Republic Act No. 4, committed as follows: That on or about the 13th day of
August, 1962, in the City of Manila, Philippines, the said accused did then
and there wilfully and unlawfully have in his possession and under his
custody and control one home-made revolver (Paltik), Cal. 22, without serial
number, with six (6) rounds of ammunition, without first having secured the
necessary license or permit therefor from the corresponding authorities.
Contrary to law."
When the case was called for hearing on September 3, 1963, the lower
court at the outset asked the counsel for the accused: "May counsel
stipulate that the accused was found in possession of the gun involved in
this case, that he has neither a permit or license to possess the same and
that we can submit the same on a question of law whether or not an agent
of the governor can hold a firearm without a permit issued by the Philippine
Constabulary." After counsel sought from the fiscal an assurance that he
would not question the authenticity of his exhibits, the understanding being
that only a question of law would be submitted for decision, he explicitly
specified such question to be "whether or not a secret agent is not required
to get a license for his firearm."
Upon the lower court stating that the fiscal should examine the document
so that he could pass on their authenticity, the fiscal asked the following
question: "Does the accused admit that this pistol cal. 22 revolver with six
rounds of ammunition mentioned in the information was found in his
possession on August 13, 1962, in the City of Manila without first having
secured the necessary license or permit thereof from the corresponding
authority?" The accused, now the appellant, answered categorically: "Yes,
Your Honor." Upon which, the lower court made a statement: "The accused
admits, Yes, and his counsel Atty. Cabigao also affirms that the accused
admits."
Forthwith, the fiscal announced that he was "willing to submit the same for
decision." Counsel for the accused on his part presented four (4) exhibits
consisting of his appointment "as secret agent of the Hon. Feliciano Leviste,"
then Governor of Batangas, dated June 2, 1962;1 another document likewise
issued by Gov. Leviste also addressed to the accused directing him to
proceed to Manila, Pasay and Quezon City on a confidential mission;2 the
oath of office of the accused as such secret agent,3 a certificate dated March
11, 1963, to the effect that the accused "is a secret agent" of Gov.
Leviste.4 Counsel for the accused then stated that with the presentation of
the above exhibits he was "willing to submit the case on the question of
whether or not a secret agent duly appointed and qualified as such of the
provincial governor is exempt from the requirement of having a license of
firearm." The exhibits were admitted and the parties were given time to file
their respective memoranda.1äwphï1.ñët
Thereafter on November 27, 1963, the lower court rendered a decision
convicting the accused "of the crime of illegal possession of firearms and
sentenced to an indeterminate penalty of from one year and one day to two
years and to pay the costs. The firearm and ammunition confiscated from
him are forfeited in favor of the Government."
The only question being one of law, the appeal was taken to this Court. The
decision must be affirmed.
The law is explicit that except as thereafter specifically allowed, "it shall be
unlawful for any person to . . . possess any firearm, detached parts of
firearms or ammunition therefor, or any instrument or implement used or
intended to be used in the manufacture of firearms, parts of firearms, or
ammunition."5 The next section provides that "firearms and ammunition
regularly and lawfully issued to officers, soldiers, sailors, or marines [of the
Armed Forces of the Philippines], the Philippine Constabulary, guards in the
employment of the Bureau of Prisons, municipal police, provincial
governors, lieutenant governors, provincial treasurers, municipal treasurers,
municipal mayors, and guards of provincial prisoners and jails," are not
covered "when such firearms are in possession of such officials and public
servants for use in the performance of their official duties."6
The law cannot be any clearer. No provision is made for a secret agent. As
such he is not exempt. Our task is equally clear. The first and fundamental
duty of courts is to apply the law. "Construction and interpretation come
only after it has been demonstrated that application is impossible or
inadequate without them."7 The conviction of the accused must stand. It
cannot be set aside.
Accused however would rely on People v. Macarandang,8 where a secret
agent was acquitted on appeal on the assumption that the appointment "of
the accused as a secret agent to assist in the maintenance of peace and
order campaigns and detection of crimes, sufficiently put him within the
category of a "peace officer" equivalent even to a member of the municipal
police expressly covered by section 879." Such reliance is misplaced. It is not
within the power of this Court to set aside the clear and explicit mandate of
a statutory provision. To the extent therefore that this decision conflicts
with what was held in People v. Macarandang, it no longer speaks with
authority.
Wherefore, the judgment appealed from is affirmed.
Concepcion, C.J., Reyes, J.B.L., Dizon, Makalintal, Bengzon, J.P., Zaldivar,
Sanchez, Castro and Angeles, JJ., concur.
[G.R. No. 116719. January 18, 1996]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. PATRICIO AMIGO alias
BEBOT, accused-appellant.
DECISION
MELO, J.:
Initially, Patricio Amigo was charged with frustrated murder in an
Information reading as follows:
The undersigned accuses the above-named accused of the crime of
FRUSTRATED MURDER, under Art. 248, in relation to Art. 5 of the Revised
Penal Code, committed as follows:
That on or about December 29, 1989, in the City of Davao, Philippines, and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-mentioned
accused, armed with a knife, with treachery and evident premeditation and
with intent to kill wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously attacked, assaulted and
stab with said weapon one Benito Ng Suy, thereby inflicting injuries upon
the latter, the following injuries, to wit:
MULTIPLE STAB WOUNDS-LEFT ARM, LEFT CHEST, ABDOMEN AND LEFT
THIGH WITH PENETRATION TO LEFT PLEURAL CAVITY, DIAPHRAGM
STOMACH, DUODENUM, PANCREAS AND MIDTRANVERSE COLON.
thus performing all the acts of execution which should have produced the
crime of murder as a consequence but nevertheless, did not produce it by
reason of causes independent of his will, that is, because of the timely and
able medical assistance immediately rendered to the said Benito Ng Suy.
(p.1, Rollo.)
to which he pleaded not guilty.
Subsequently, due to the death of the victim, an amended Information
was filed charging now the crime of murder, to wit:
That on or about December 29, 1989, in the City of Davao, Philippines, and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-mentioned
accused, armed with a knife, with treachery and evident premeditation and
with intent to kill wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously attacked, assaulted and
stabbed with said weapon one Benito Ng Say, thereby inflicting upon the
latter multiple wounds which caused his death and the consequent loss and
damage to the heirs of the victim.
(p. 3, Rollo.)
After trial on the merits, the court a quo rendered a decision, disposing:
WHEREFORE, finding the accused Patricio Amigo guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of the crime of MURDER punishable under Art. 248 of the Revised
Penal Code, with no modifying circumstance present, the accused is hereby
sentenced to the penalty of reclusion perpetua, which is the medium period
of the penalty of reclusion temporal in its maximum to death and to pay the
cost; to indemnify the offended party the amount of P93,214.70 as actual
damages and P50,000.00 as compensatory damages and P50,000.00 as
moral damages.
(p. 32, Rollo.)
Reversal thereof is now sought, with accused-appellant arguing that
error was committed by the trial court in imposing or meting out the penalty
of reclusion perpetua against him despite the fact that Sec. 19 (1), Article III
of the 1987 Constitution was already in effect when the offense was
committed.
The facts of the case, as briefly summarized in the brief submitted by the
Office of the Solicitor General and as borne out by the evidence, are as
follows:
On December 29, 1989, at around 1:00 P.M., after having spent half-day at
their store, located at No. 166-A, Ramon Magsaysay Avenue, Davao City,
Benito Ng Suy was driving their gray Ford Fiera back home, situated at the
back of Car Asia, Bajada, Davao City. With him during that time were his
daughters, Jocelyn Ng Suy and a younger one together with his two year old
son, who were all seated at the front seat beside him while a five year old
boy was also seated at the back of the said vehicle. (TSN, April 29, 1991, pp.
3-5; TSN, March 31, 1992)
On their way home and while traversing the National Highway of Bajada,
Davao City, an orange Toyota Tamaraw driven by one Virgilio Abogada,
suddenly made a left turn in front of the Regional Hospital, Bajada, Davao
City, without noticing the Ford Fiera coming from the opposite direction. This
Tamaraw was heading for Sterlyn Kitchenette, which was situated at the
corner of the said hospital. (TSN, April 29, 1991, p. 4; TSN, March 31, 1992,
pp. 3 and 13)
With Virgilio was Patricio Amigo alias Bebot, a vulcanizer at Linglings
vulcanizing shop owned and operated by a certain Galadua. He was also
seated at the right front seat beside Virgilio.
Due to the unexpected veer made by Virgilio, an accidental head on
collision occurred between the Fiera and the Tamaraw, causing a slight
damage to the right bumper of the latter. (TSN, March 31, 1992, p. 4)
Right after the collision, Benito immediately alighted from the drivers
seat and confronted Virgilio Abogada who also went down from his vehicle.
(TSN, April 29, 1991, p. 5)
Benito, who was a big man with a loud voice told Virgilio, You were not
looking, to which Virgilio retorted, I did not see you. (TSN, April 29, 1991,
p.16)
While the two drivers where having this verbal confrontation, Patricio
who was merely a passenger of Virgilio also alighted from the front seat of
the Tamaraw and instantaneously approached Benito and advised the latter
to leave since it was merely a small and minor accident. (TSN, April 29, 1991,
pp. 16-18)
A bit irritated with the actuation exhibit by Patricio, Benito rebuked the
former and told him not to interfere, since he had nothing to do with the
accident. (Ibid., p. 7)
Irked by the comment made by Benito, Patricio sarcastically asked; You
are Chinese, is it you? With a ready answer Benito said; Yes, I am a Chinese
and why? Patricio in turn replied; So, you are a Chinese, wait for a while, then
left. (Ibid., pp. 7 and 19)
Immediately thereafter, Benito ordered Jocelyn to call a policeman, but
after a lapse of about one minute, Patricio returned and arrogantly
approached Benito, asking the latter once again, You are a Chinese, is it not?
To this Benito calmly responded in the affirmative.
(Ibid., pp. 7, 19-20)
Upon hearing the response, Patricio mumbled Ah, so you are a Chinese,
and suddenly took a five inch knife from his waist and simultaneously stabbed
Benito hitting him twice on the chest. (ibid., p. 20)
After being hit, Benito wounded and sensing that his life was in peril,
tried to evade his assailant by pushing Patricio away and run around the
Tamaraw but Patricio wielding the same knife and not content with the
injuries he had already inflicted, still chased Benito and upon overtaking the
latter embraced him and thrusted his knife on the victim several times, the
last of which hit Benito on the left side of his body. (Ibid., pp. 8, 10, 22)
It was at this juncture that Jocelyn who was still inside the Ford Fiera,
pleading for mercy to spare her father tried to get out of the vehicle but it
was very unfortunate that she could not open its door. (Ibid., p. 10)
Knowing that Patricio was really determined to kill her father by refusing
to heed her pleas, Joselyn shouted for help, since there were already several
people around witnessing that fatal incident, but to her consternation
nobody lifted a single finger to help them. (Ibid., pp. 6, 10, 18, 21-22) Only
after her father lay seated on the floor of their Ford Fiera after being hit on
the left side of his body that she was able to open the door of the said
vehicle. (Ibid., p. 12)
After this precise moment, her younger sister, upon seeing their father
bathing with his own blood, embraced him, causing Patricio to cease from his
ferocious assault and noticing the presence of several people, he
fled. (Ibid., p. 22)
Thereafter, an enraged Jocelyn chased him, but since the assailant ran
faster than her, she was not able to overtake him, thus, she instead decided
to go back to where her father was and carried him inside the Tamaraw who
bumped them and consequently brought him to San Pedro Hospital where
he was attended to at the Emergency Room. (Ibid., p. 13)
While at the Emergency Room, Benito who was on a very critical
condition, due to multiple (13) stabbed wounds, was operated by Dr. Rolando
Chiu. After the operation, he was subsequently brought to the ICU and stayed
there for three (3) weeks. (July 12, 1991, pp. 3 and 4)
In a last ditch effort to save his life, having only 10 to 20 percent survival,
Benito was airlifted to Manila and was directly confined at the Chinese
General Hospital. After three (3) weeks of confinement, Benito expired.
CAUSE OF DEATH - SEPSIS (an overwhelming infection). This means that the
infection has already circulated in the blood all over the body. (Ibid., pp.6-7)
(pp. 59-65, Rollo.)
Accused-appellant contends that under the 1987 Constitution and prior
to the promulgation of Republic Act No. 7659, the death penalty had been
abolished and hence, the penalty that should have been imposed for the
crime of murder committed by accused-appellant without the attendance of
any modifying circumstances, should be reclusion temporal in its medium
period or 17 years, 4 months and 1 day, to 20 years of reclusion temporal.
Reasons out accused-appellant:
. . . Since the death penalty (or capital punishment) is not imposable
when the stabbing and killing happened, the computation of the penalty
should be regarded from reclusion perpetua down and not from death
penalty. Indeed, the appropriate penalty is deducible from reclusion
perpetua down to reclusion temporal in its medium period. Hence, there
being no modifying circumstances present (p. 5 Decision, ibid.), the correct
penalty should be in the medium period (Art. 64, par. 1, Revised Penal Code)
which is 17 years, 4 months and 1 day to 20 years of reclusion temporal.
(p. 10, Appellants Brief, ff. p. 50, Rollo.)
The question raised by accused-appellant was settled by this Court
in People vs. Muoz (170 SCRA 107 [1989]) thusly:
In People vs. Gavarra, Justice Pedro L. Yap declared for the Court that in
view of the abolition of the death penalty under Section 19, Article III of the
1987 Constitution, the penalty that may be imposed for murder is reclusion
temporal in its maximum period to reclusion perpetua, thereby eliminating
death as the original maximum period. Later, without categorically saying so,
the Court, through Justice Ameurfina A. Melencio-Herrera in
People vs. Masangkay and through Justice Andres R. Narvasa in
People vs. Atencio, divided the modified penalty into three new periods, the
limits of which were specified by Justice Edgardo L. Paras in People vs. Intino,
as follows: the lower half of reclusion temporal maximum as the minimum;
the upper half of reclusion temporal maximum as the medium; and reclusion
perpetua as the maximum.
The Court has reconsidered the above cases and, after extended
discussion, come to the conclusion that the doctrine announced therein does
not reflect the intention of the framers as embodied in Article III, Section
19(1) of the Constitution. This conclusion is not unanimous, to be sure.
Indeed, there is much to be said of the opposite view, which was in fact
shared by many of those now voting for its reversal. The majority of the Court,
however, is of the belief that the original interpretation should be restored
as the more acceptable reading of the constitutional provision in question.
The advocates of the Masangkay ruling argue that the Constitution
abolished the death penalty and thereby limited the penalty for murder to
the remaining periods, to wit, the minimum and the medium. These should
now be divided into three new periods in keeping with the three-grade
scheme intended by the legislature. Those who disagree feel that Article III,
Section 19(1) merely prohibits the imposition of the death penalty and has
not, by reducing it to reclusion perpetua, also correspondingly reduced the
remaining penalties. These should be maintained intact.
A reading of Section 19(1) of Article III will readily show that there is
really nothing therein which expressly declares the abolition of the death
penalty. The provision merely says that the death penalty shall not be
imposed unless for compelling reasons involving heinous crimes the Congress
hereafter provides for it and, if already imposed, shall be reduced to reclusion
perpetua. The language, while rather awkward, is still plain enough. And it is
a settled rule of legal hermeneutics that if the language under consideration
is plain, it is neither necessary nor permissible to resort to extrinsic aids, like
the records of the constitutional convention, for its interpretation.
xxx xxx xxx
The question as we see it is not whether the framers intended to abolish
the death penalty or merely to prevent its imposition. Whatever the intention
was, what we should determine is whether or not they also meant to require
a corresponding modification in the other periods as a result of the
prohibition against the death penalty.
It is definite that such a requirement, if there really was one, is not at all
expressed in Article III, Section 19(1) of the Constitution or indicated therein
by at least clear and unmistakable implication. It would have been so easy,
assuming such intention, to state it categorically and plainly, leaving no
doubts as to its meaning. One searches in vain for such a statement, express
or even implied. The writer of this opinion makes the personal observation
that this might be still another instance where the framers meant one thing
and said another or - strangely, considering their loquacity elsewhere - did have no authority to modify them or revise their range as determined
not say enough. exclusively by the legislature. We should not encroach on this prerogative of
the lawmaking body.
The original ruling as applied in the Gavarra, Masangkay, Atencio and
Intino cases represented the unanimous thinking of the Court as it was then Coming back to the case at bar, we find that there being no generic
constituted. All but two members at that time still sit on the Court today. If aggravating or mitigating circumstance attending the commission of the
we have seen fit to take a second look at the doctrine on which we were all offenses, the applicable sentence is the medium period of the penalty
agreed before, it is not because of a change in the composition of this body. prescribed by Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code which, conformably to
It is virtually the same Court that is changing its mind after reflecting on the the new doctrine here adopted and announced, is still reclusion
question again in the light of new perspectives. And well it might, and tan, for perpetua. This is the penalty we imposed on all the accused-appellants for
the tenets it lays down are not immutable. The decisions of this Court are not each of the three murders they have committed in conspiracy with the
petrified rules grown rigid once pronounced but vital, growing things subject others. The award of civil indemnity for the heirs of each of the victims is
to change as all life is. While we are told that the trodden path is best, this affirmed but the amount thereof is hereby increased to P30,000.00 in line
should not prevent us from opening a fresh trial or exploring the other side with the present policy.
or testing a new idea in a spirit of continuing inquiry.
(at pp. 120-125.)
Accordingly, with the hope that as judges, (we) will be equal to (our)
The above ruling was reiterated in People vs. Parojinog (203 SCRA 673
tasks, whatever that means, we hereby reverse the current doctrine
[1991]) and in People vs. De la Cruz (216 SCRA 476 [1992]).
providing for three new periods for the penalty for murder as reduced by the
Constitution. Instead, we return to our original interpretation and hold that Finally, accused-appellant claims that the penalty of reclusion
Article III, Section 19(1) does not change the periods of the penalty prescribed perpetua is too cruel and harsh a penalty and pleads for sympathy. Courts are
by Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code except only insofar as it prohibits the not the forum to plead for sympathy. The duty of courts is to apply the law,
imposition of the death penalty and reduces it to reclusion perpetua. The disregarding their feeling of sympathy or pity for an accused. DURA LEX SED
range of the medium and minimum penalties remains unchanged. LEX. The remedy is elsewhere - clemency from the executive or an
amendment of the law by the legislative, but surely, at this point, this Court
The Court realizes that this interpretation may lead to certain inequities
can but apply the law.
that would not have arisen under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code
before its modification. Thus, a person originally subject to the death penalty WHEREFORE, the appealed decision is hereby AFFIRMED.
and another who committed the murder without the attendance of any
modifying circumstance will now be both punishable with the same medium SO ORDERED.
period although the former is concededly more guilty than the latter. True
enough. But that is the will not of this Court but of the Constitution. That is a
question of wisdom, not construction. Of some relevance perhaps is the
parable in the Bible of the workman who was paid the stipulated daily wage
of one penny although he had worked longer than others hired later in the
day also paid the same amount. When he complained because he felt unjustly
treated by the householder, the latter replied: Friend, I do you no wrong. Did
you not agree with me for a penny?
The problem in any event is addressed not to this Court but to the
Congress. Penalties are prescribed by statute and are essentially and
exclusively legislative. As judges, we can only interpret and apply them and