[G.R. No. 123713. April 1, 1998.
] owner and possessor of the land until they donated the same in 1988 to their
HEIRS OF LEOPOLDO VENCILAO, SR., represented by their Administrator
ELPIDIO VENCILAO, petitioners, vs. COURT OF APPEALS, SPOUSES SABAS
and RUPERTA GEPALAGO, and DOMICIANO GEPALAGO, respondents.
Lord M. Marapao for petitioner.
Public Attorney's Office for private respondents.
SYNOPSIS
A parcel of registered land located at Canduyao, Calapo, San Isidro, Bohol
mortgaged by Pedro Luspo to the PNB was foreclosed and a portion of which
was later sold to the Gepalago Spouses. It was donated by the spouses to
their son in 1988. On February 12, 1990, petitioners filed a complaint for
recovery thereof claiming ownership by virtue of acquisitive prescription in
favor of their deceased father who had declared the property for taxation
purposes. The trial court rendered judgment in favor of petitioners holding
that they had been in possession thereof for more than thirty (30) years and
that the Gepalagos knew that the land had long been possessed and enjoyed
in the concept of owners by petitioners. The Court of Appeals, on appeal,
reversed the trial court and held that the vendee for value has the right to
rely on what appears on the certificate of title and that a certificate of title is
the best evidence of ownership of registered land. aEACcS
The Supreme Court held that a title, once registered, cannot be defeated
even by adverse, open and notorious possession. Tax declarations and
receipts do not by themselves conclusively prove title to the land.
In order that an action to recover ownership of real property may prosper,
the person who claims that he has a better right to it must prove not only his
ownership of the same but also satisfactorily prove the identity thereof.
As a general rule, where the certificate of title is in the name of the vendor
when the land is sold, the vendee for value has the right to rely on what
appears on the face of the title. He is under no obligation to look beyond the
certificate and investigate the title of the vendor appearing on the face of the
certificate. By way of exception, the vendee is required to make the
necessary inquiries if there is anything in the certificate of title which
indicates any cloud or vice in the ownership of the real property. In the
instant case, there is nothing from the records showing that the title of PNB,
the vendor, was flawed.
Petitioners who failed to contest three (3) transactions involving the property
are now estopped from denying the title of the present owners. cSaATC
DECISION
BELLOSILLO, J p:
Between two (2) sets of claimants of real property — those claiming
ownership by acquisitive prescription, and those asserting ownership on the
basis of a deed of sale recorded in the certificate of title of the vendor as
mortgagee and highest bidder in a foreclosure sale — who has a better
right? cdtai
On 12 February 1990 the heirs of Leopoldo Vencilao Sr., represented by their
Administrator Elpidio Vencilao, filed with the Regional Trial Court of Bohol a
complaint for quieting of title, recovery of possession and/or ownership,
accounting and damages with prayer for the issuance of writs of preliminary
prohibitory and mandatory injunction against the spouses Sabas and Ruperta
Gepalago. 1 The complaint was subsequently amended to include an action
for reconveyance and cancellation of title and to implead defendant
Domiciano Gepalago. 2
The heirs of Leopoldo Vencilao Sr. alleged that they were the absolute
owners of a parcel of land situated in Cambansag, San Isidro, Bohol, with an
area of 3,625 square meters having inherited the same from their father,
Leopoldo Vencilao Sr., who during his lifetime was in peaceful, open,
notorious and uninterrupted possession and enjoyment of the property in
the concept of owner, declared the property for taxation purposes under Tax
Declaration No. 37C6-344 and religiously paid the real estate taxes. He
likewise had the property consistently declared as his own in other
documents, e.g., those relevant to the 1987 Comprehensive Agrarian Reform
Program (CARP). After his death, his heirs continued to possess and enjoy the
property.
The Gepalago spouses, on the other hand, denied all the material allegations
in the complaint and claimed that they were the registered owners of a
5,970-square meter property located in Candungao Calapo, San Isidro, Bohol,
and covered by TCT No. 16042, previously a portion of a 1,401,570 square-
meter land originally owned by a certain Pedro Luspo. The entire parcel of
land was mortgaged by Pedro Luspo to the Philippine National Bank (PNB) as
security for a loan. Since Luspo failed to pay the obligation upon maturity the
mortgage was foreclosed. Thereafter PNB, the highest bidder in the
foreclosure sale, conveyed the whole property to fifty-six (56) vendees
among whom were the spouses Sabas and Ruperta Gepalago who acquired
the 5,970 square-meter portion thereof. Since then, they had been the
son Domiciano Gepalago.
The trial court appointed a commissioner to survey the litigated property and
determine the areas claimed by both parties. The commissioner reported
that the area claimed by the Vencilaos was included in the titled property of
the Gepalagos. On the basis of the commissioner's report and the other
pieces of evidence presented by the parties, the trial court found the
following: (a) The property claimed by the Gepalagos consisted of 5,970
square meters, while that of the Vencilaos covered an area of 22,401.58
square meters as indicated in the survey plan submitted by Engr. Jesus H.
Sarmiento, the court appointed commissioner; (b) Insofar as the survey plan
and report submitted by Engr. Sarmiento were concerned, these indubitably
established the fact that the Vencilaos owned the excess area of 16,431.58
square meters which was clearly outside the area claimed by the Gepalagos;
(c) The lot in question had been titled to defendant Sabas Gepalago and
subsequently titled to his son, defendant Domiciano Gepalago, under
Transfer Certificate of Title No. 18621 by virtue of a deed of donation
executed on 25 October 1988 by Sabas Gepalago in favor of Domiciano
Gepalago; and, (d) As stated in the commissioner's report, "If the titled lot of
Domiciano Gepalago is plotted in accordance with the technical description
appearing in the title, it will be relocated to more than 219 kilometers
eastward away from its supposed actual location. This amounts to its non-
existence." 3
The trial court then ruled in favor of the Vencilaos holding that they had been
in possession, cultivation and enjoyment of the litigated property for more
than thirty (30) years and that the improvements therein were introduced by
them long before any title was ever issued to the Gepalagos. The lower court
added that there was ample evidence showing that the Gepalagos knew
when they bought the property from PNB that the land had long been
possessed and enjoyed in the concept of owners by the Vencilaos. Thus,
while under ordinary circumstances a certificate of title is indefeasible, it is
not so when a person with prior knowledge of the ownership and possession
of the land by another obtains title to it.
The Gepalagos appealed the decision of the trial court. After due
consideration, the Court of Appeals reversed the trial court and declared the
Gepalagos owners of the disputed property —
Evidently, defendant-appellants spouses Gepalago were purchasers in good
faith and for value. They acquired their share in the property from the
Philippine National Bank (PNB) which was the registered owner. Even
assuming they had knowledge of the plaintiff-appellees' possession of the
said property at the time of the purchase, it was PNB which was the
registered owner of the property. The title was transferred to the bank after
the foreclosure sale of the property mortgaged by the previous registered
owner, Pedro Luspo. Thus where the certificate of title is in the name of the
vendor when the land is sold, the vendee for value has the right to rely on
what appears on the certificate of title. The rule that all persons dealing with
property covered by Torrens Certificate of Title are not required to go beyond
what appears on the face of the title is well-settled.
Granting that plaintiff-appellees were possessors of the property for a long
time, they never raised objections to the transactions affecting the land.
There was no action made or any protest recorded with the Register of
Deeds.
Defendant-appellants' claim of ownership was evidenced by certificates of
title issued in their names. A Torrens Certificate of Title is the best evidence
of ownership of a registered land. As against the allegations of plaintiff-
appellees, defendant-appellants are the ones entitled to the property.
Defendant-appellants' ownership of the property was evidenced by a
certificate of title while plaintiff-appellees relied merely on tax declaration.
Torrens title is generally a conclusive evidence of the ownership of the land
referred to therein. Defendant-appellants acquired the land in a foreclosure
sale and there was no evidence to show that plaintiff-appellees were
defrauded when the property was mortgaged and then sold . . . 4
The motion for reconsideration by the Vencilaos having been denied 5 they
filed the instant petition for review.
In awarding the disputed land to petitioners, the trial court erroneously
found that petitioners had been in possession and enjoyment of the property
for more than thirty (30) years. It should be noted that the land in dispute is
a registered land placed under the operation of the Torrens system way back
in 1959, or more than thirty (30) years before petitioners instituted the
present action in the court a quo, and for which Original Certificate of Title
No. 400 was issued. 6 The rule is well-settled that prescription does not run
against registered land. Thus, under Sec. 47 of PD 1529, otherwise known as
the Property Registration Decree, it is specifically provided that "no title to
registered land in derogation of that of the registered owner shall be
acquired by prescription or adverse possession." A title, once registered,
cannot be defeated even by adverse, open and notorious possession. The
certificate of title issued is an absolute and indefeasible evidence of
ownership of the property in favor of the person whose name appears
therein. It is binding and conclusive upon the whole world. 7 All persons must
take notice and no one can plead ignorance of the registration. 8
Page | 1
Neither can the tax declarations and tax receipts presented by petitioners as
evidence of ownership prevail over respondents' certificate of title which, to
reiterate, is an incontrovertible proof of ownership. It should be stressed that
tax declarations and receipts do not by themselves conclusively prove title to
the land. 9 They only constitute positive and strong indication that the
taxpayer concerned has made a claim either to the title or to the possession
of the property for which taxes have been paid. 10 Stated differently, tax
declarations and tax receipts are only prima facie evidence of ownership or
possession. Cdtai But assuming ex gratia argumenti that petitioners had
indeed acquired the land they were claiming by prescription, there likewise
exists a serious doubt on the precise identity of the disputed property. What
petitioners claimed in their complaint was a parcel of land located in
Cambansag, San Isidro, Bohol, with an area of 3,625 square meters. 11 This
clearly differs from the piece of land registered in the name of the Gepalagos,
which is Lot No. A-73 of the Subdivision Plan (LRC) Psd-60558, LRC Rec. No.
H-4251, and located in Candungao Calapo, San Isidro, Bohol, with an area of
5,970 square meters. 12 Even the commissioner's report failed to clarify the
difference in the area and location of the property claimed. In order that an
action to recover ownership of real property may prosper, the person who
claims that he has a better right to it must prove not only his ownership of
the same but also satisfactorily prove the identity thereof. 13
As a general rule, where the certificate of title is in the name of the vendor
when the land is sold, the vendee for value has the right to rely on what
appears on the face of the title. 14 He is under no obligation to look beyond
the certificate and investigate the title of the vendor appearing on the face
of the certificate. By way of exception, the vendee is required to make the
necessary inquiries if there is anything in the certificate of title which
indicates any cloud or vice in the ownership of the property. 15Otherwise,
his mere refusal to believe that such defect exists, or his willful closing of his
eyes to the possibility of the existence of a defect in his vendor's title, will not
make him an innocent purchaser for value if it afterwards develops that the
title was in fact defective, and it appears that he had such notice of the defect
as would have led to its discovery had he acted with that measure of
precaution which may reasonably be required of a prudent man in a like
situation. 16
Petitioners maintain that it is the exception, not the general rule, which
should be applied in this case. They argue that respondents had knowledge
of prior possession and enjoyment by petitioners when they purchased the
property. Thus, they were not innocent purchasers for value and could not
invoke the indefeasibility of their title.
We do not agree. The exception contemplates a situation wherein there
exists a flaw in the title of the vendor and the vendee has knowledge or at
least ought to have known of such flaw at the time he acquired the property,
in which case, he is not considered as an innocent purchaser for value. In the
instant case, we discern nothing from the records showing that the title of
PNB, the vendor, was flawed. Petitioners not only failed to substantiate their
claim of acquisitive prescription as basis of ownership but they also failed to
allege, and much less adduce, any evidence that there was a defect in the
title of PNB. In the absence of such evidence, the presumption leans towards
the validity of the vendor's title.
Therefore, inasmuch as there was no flaw in the title of PNB, private
respondents rightly believed that they could and did acquire likewise a
flawless title. Indeed, as a result of the deed of conveyance between PNB and
private respondents, there was transmission of ownership and the latter
stepped into the shoes of the former hence entitled to all the defenses
available to PNB, including those arising from the acquisition of the property
in good faith and for value.
Finally, another consideration that militates heavily against the present
petition is the unusual silence of petitioners while the ownership of the
disputed land transferred from one person to another. There were at least
three (3) transactions on record involving the property: first, the contract of
mortgage between Luspo and PNB whereby the property was used as
security for the loan contracted by Luspo; second, the foreclosure of
mortgage upon the failure of Luspo to pay the loan and the subsequent sale
of the property at public auction; and third, the sale of the property to fifty-
six (56) vendees, among whom were the Gepalago spouses. Each of these
transactions was registered and a corresponding transfer certificate issued in
favor of the new owner. Yet in all these, petitioners never instituted any
action contesting the same nor registered any objection thereto; instead,
they remained silent. Thus, they are now estopped from denying the title of
the present owner. Having failed to assert their rights, if any, over the
property warrants the presumption that they have either abandoned them
or declined to assert them. Or, it could likewise be inferred therefrom that
petitioners themselves were not convinced in the validity of their claim.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals of
31 July 1995 as well as its Resolution of 14 December 1995 denying
reconsideration is AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioners.
SO ORDERED. cdtai
||| (Heirs of Vencilao, Sr. v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 123713, [April 1, 1998],
351 PHIL 815-826)
[G.R. No. 138939. December 6, 2006.]
MR. and MRS. ALEJANDRO PANG-ODEN, petitioners, vs. ISABEL LEONEN,
CATALINA G. LEONEN, CAYETANO LEONEN, MANUEL LEONEN, ANGEL
LEONEN, MARIA LEONEN, HERMINIA LEONEN, TERESITA L. ACOSTA, and
FRANCISCO LEONEN, respondents.
DECISION
GARCIA, J p:
In this petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, petitioner-
spouses Alejandro Pang-oden and Saturnina Pang-oden assail and seek to set
aside the decision 1 dated June 8, 1998 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-
G.R. CV No. 54494, as reiterated in its Resolution 2 of January 7, 1999,
denying the petitioners' motion for reconsideration.
The assailed decision affirmed an earlier decision 3 of the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) of Balaoan, La Union, Branch 34, in Civil Case No 440, an action
for Recovery of Possession Based on Ownership, thereat commenced by the
herein respondents against the petitioners.
Basically, the case involves a boundary dispute between petitioners and
respondents. Both claim ownership of a strip of land consisting of 1,336.5
square meters.
The facts:
Petitioners and respondents are the owners of two (2) adjoining parcels of
land located at Sudipen, La Union. Petitioners' land is at the eastern portion
while that of the respondents is at the western side. The two properties have
a common boundary: a creek which ran from south to north, such that
petitioners' property was bounded by said creek on the west, while that of
respondents was bounded by the same creek on the east.
Due to constant heavy rains and flood, water from the creek overflowed and
destroyed the irrigation canal located at the north of the property in dispute.
In order to minimize the damage to the irrigation canal, the National
Irrigation Administration (NIA) diverted the course of the creek so rain water
will not go directly to the irrigation canal. As a result, the course of the creek
which originally ran from south to north and which used to separate the
respective properties of the parties was instead diverted to run from south
to northwest, passing through the middle portion of the respondents'
property and resulting to the formation of a new creek. Consequently, the
NIA asked the permission of Manuel Leonen, one of the herein respondents,
to allow it to use the new creek as an irrigation canal. Manuel Leonen
consented. The portion segregated by the new creek, consisting of 1,336.5
square meters, is the strip of land subject of this controversy. caIACE
According to the respondents, the property in question forms part of a bigger
parcel of land with an area of 5,370 square meters declared in the name of
their father and predecessor-in-interest, Dionisio Leonen, under Tax
Declaration No. 6473. For more than 50 years, they have been in quiet,
peaceful, adverse and uninterrupted possession of the disputed property.
Sometime in 1976, however, Manuel Leonen saw the carabao of petitioner
Alejandro Pang-oden devouring the Leonens' sugar cane crops planted on
the property in question. It was then that Manuel Leonen discovered that
petitioners had encroached on the 1,336.5-square meter portion of their
property and had in fact occupied the same. Respondents brought the matter
before the local barangay authorities but Alejandro Pang-oden refused to
surrender possession of said portion claiming that he is the lawful owner
thereof.
On September 25, 1992, after repeated demands to vacate the subject strip
of land remained unheeded, the respondents filed a complaint for Recovery
of Possession Based on Ownership against the spouses Alejandro and
Saturnina Pang-oden before the RTC of Balaoan, La Union, thereat docketed
as Civil Case No. 440.
In their Answer with Counterclaim, the spouses Alejandro and Saturnina
Pang-oden claimed that the 1,336.5-square meter strip of land in question
was part of a bigger property with an area of 12,674-square meters originally
owned by Alejandro's mother, Sotera Apusen, under Tax Declaration No.
4506. They also averred that it was around the year 1950 when Manuel
Leonen started cultivating the subject strip of land and planted crops
thereon, but only upon the mere tolerance of Alejandro's mother.
On November 23, 1995, the RTC rendered judgment for the respondents as
plaintiffs thereat, adjudging the latter to be the lawful and exclusive owners
of the property in question, and ordering the spouses Pang-oden to vacate
the same and pay the respondents the amount of P1,000.00 representing the
yearly harvest of the land; P10,000.00 as attorney's fees; P10,000.00 as moral
damages; and P5,000.00 as litigation expenses.
From the adverse decision of the trial court, the spouses went on appeal to
the CA in CA G.R. CV No. 54494. On June 8, 1998, the CA came out with its
herein challenged decision affirming that of the trial court, minus the award
of P1,000.00 for the yearly harvest of the land, thus:
Page | 2
WHEREFORE, the appealed Decision is AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION
that the order to pay . . . the amount of P1,000.00 representing the yearly
harvest of the land from 1989 up to the time ownership and possession is
finally restored is SET ASIDE.
Costs against defendants-appellants.
SO ORDERED.
Partly says the CA in its decision:
Based on the evidence submitted by plaintiffs-appellees [herein
respondents], it was established that there was indeed an old creek that used
to separate the properties of plaintiffs-appellees and the defendants-
appellants [herein petitioners] which originally ran from south to north. It has
likewise been established by overwhelming evidence that a new creek was
later created that now runs from south to northwest and thus cuts through
plaintiffs-appellees' property.
xxx xxx xxx
These witnesses are, as aptly noted by the trial court, "disinterested
witnesses testifying to a fact of public knowledge that there was an original
creek in the eastern boundary of the property of Dionisio Leonen." Their
testimonies were properly found to be credible as they were consistent with
the cadastral survey and the survey plan submitted by plaintiffs-
appellees. ICDcEA
xxx xxx xxx
. . . . And by the creation of the new creek that cuts through the property of
plaintiffs-appellees, defendants-appellants cannot claim ownership of the
segregated portion (subject of this case) because as far as their property is
concerned, the parcel of land left by Sotera Apusen remains bounded on the
west by the old creek and cannot extend to the portion segregated by the
new creek. (Words in brackets added). 4
Their motion for reconsideration having been denied by the appellate court
in its Resolution of January 7, 1999, the spouses Pang-oden are now with this
Court via the instant recourse, contending that the CA gravely erred:
I proven in a conclusive manner as its location corresponds with those given
. . . IN AWARDING THE OWNERSHIP OF THE PROPERTY IN SUIT (1,336.5 SQ.
M. IN AREA) LOCATED WITHIN SITIO PANGASAAN, NAMALTUGAN,
SUDIPEN, LA UNION, TO RESPONDENTS WHEN THEIR PROPERTY IS LOCATED
AT SITIO BIMMODET, NAMALTUGAN, SUDIPEN LA UNION.
II
. . . IN AFFIRMING THE AWARDS OF P10,000.00 AS ATTORNEY'S FEES,
P10,000.00 AS MORAL DAMAGES AND P5,000.00 AS LITIGATION EXPENSES
TO RESPONDENTS.
III
. . . IN NOT REVERSING THE DECISION OF THE TRIAL COURT SINCE
RESPONDENTS' COMPLAINT LACKS THE REQUIRED QUANTUM OF PROOF
AND THE TESTIMONY OF THEIR WITNESSES ARE NOT IN HARMONY WITH
THE STATE OF AFFAIRS IN THE LOCALITY. 5
We DENY.
In the main, the only issue to be resolved is: who, as between the petitioners
and the respondents, own the strip of land subject of the suit.
Petitioners contend that no new creek was created and that the present
creek is the same creek which bounds their property on the west, thus
making them the owners of the property in question. Likewise, the
petitioners argue that both the trial and appellate courts should have relied
on the boundaries and exact location of the subject property. Finally, they
fault the CA for giving credence to the conflicting testimonies of the
respondents' witnesses.
In assailing the appellate court's decision, petitioners impute errors which
basically involve questions of fact and the appreciation of evidence by the
two courts below. This case furnishes another occasion for us to reiterate the
settled principle that this Court's jurisdiction in a petition for review under
Rule 45 is limited to reviewing and correcting only errors of law, not of fact,
the only power of the Court being to determine if the legal conclusions drawn
from the findings of fact are correct. 6 Absent any showing that the findings
complained of are totally devoid of support from the evidence on record, or
that the judgment itself is based on misapprehension of facts, such findings
must stand. The Court is not expected or required to examine or refute the
oral and documentary evidence submitted by the parties. 7 The Court finds
no reason to depart from this settled rule, it appearing that the findings of
fact by the courts a quo are fully substantiated by the evidence extant on
record. Likewise, the Court has consistently ruled that the findings of fact by
the CA, especially if such findings, as here, are affirmatory of those of the trial
court, will not be disturbed on appeal. 8
The CA and the trial court relied on the testimonies of two (2) disinterested
witnesses: Gregorio Libao, a retired employee of the NIA, and Anacleto Dicta-
an, a resident of Sudipen, La Union. Both testified as to the existence of an
old creek which served as the common boundary of the respective properties
of the parties, and of the subsequent diversion of the creek to its present
position which now cuts through the middle portion of the respondents'
property. Petitioners insist, however, that their testimonies are replete with
inconsistencies and contradictions which render said testimonies unworthy
of belief. The Court disagrees. The two courts below both found their
testimonies credible. Matters of credibility of witnesses are best addressed
to the sound judgment of the trial court, and this Court generally defers to
the trial court's assessment because it has the singular opportunity to
observe the demeanor of witnesses and their manner of testifying. 9 Besides,
as correctly pointed out by the CA, the inconsistencies cited by the
petitioners refer to minor and collateral matters which do not affect the
credibility of said witnesses. CIHAED
For sure, the witnesses' testimonies were amply supported by the report and
sketch plan prepared by the court-appointed commissioner, which revealed
the existence of an old creek running from south to north, and the creation
of a new creek from south to northwest. The same sketch plan showed that
the location of the house of Sotera Apusen, mother of petitioner Alejandro
Pang-oden, was bounded on the west by the old creek, which creek bounds
the lot of Dionisio Leonen on the east. This bolsters the fact that there was
indeed an old creek which used to separate the respective properties of the
herein parties.
Worth mentioning is the provision of Article 434 of the Civil Code which
ordains that "in an action to recover, the property must be identified, and
the plaintiff must rely on the strength of his title and not on the weakness of
the defendant's claim." Hence, in order that an action for the recovery of
property may prosper, it is indispensable that the party who prosecutes it
must fully prove, not only his ownership of the thing claimed, but also the
identity of the same. 10 As we see it, the evidence presented in this case
showed that the property subject of the dispute rightfully belongs to the
respondents, as it was established that the same is part of the parcel of land
declared under the name of respondents' predecessor-in-interest, Dionisio
Leonen. Indeed, the verification survey of the contested property conducted
by Juvenal Quitoriano, a geodetic engineer, revealed that it was in the name
of Dionisio Leonen. Too, the identity of the disputed strip of land has been
by the witnesses and the record of the ocular inspection. The cadastral
survey of the property clearly identifies and delineates the extent of the
subject land. As the petitioners failed to substantiate their claim that the
present creek is still the same creek which bounds their property on the west,
the respondents have the right to recover possession of the disputed strip of
land.
In sum, the evidence on record clearly establish that there used to be an old
creek originally running from south to north and separating the property of
the petitioners from that of the respondents. Then, due to expediency and
necessity of protecting the irrigation canal in the area, the course of that
creek was subsequently diverted to run from south to northwest, cutting
through the property of the respondents. Hence, the portion segregated (the
subject property) from respondents' land as a result of such diversion
continues to be their property and they shall retain ownership of the same.
We are, however, with the petitioners in their challenge as regards the trial
court's award of moral damages, attorney's fees and expenses of litigation,
as affirmed by the CA. As it is, the trial court erred in this respect, as it did not
disclose in the body of its decision the factual basis for such awards.
Whenever such awards are made, the court must explicitly state in the body
of its decision, and not merely in its dispositive portion, the legal reason for
the award. 11 Here, the trial court made the award only in the dispositive
portion of its decision without stating the basis therefor in the body thereof.
The power of courts to grant damages and attorney's fees demands factual,
legal and equitable justification; its basis cannot be left to speculation or
conjecture. 12
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DENIED and the assailed CA decision
dated June 8, 1998 is AFFIRMED, with the MODIFICATION that the award of
moral damages, attorney's fees and litigation expenses is DELETED.
Costs against the petitioners. aDcETC
SO ORDERED.
||| (Pang-oden v. Leonen, G.R. No. 138939, [December 6, 2006], 539 PHIL
148-158)
[G.R. No. 142546. August 9, 2001.]
HEIRS OF ANASTACIO FABELA, namely; Teodula Fabela Paguidopon,
Ricardo Fabela, Irenita Fabela Zea(d), Carolina Fabela Arazo Donglas, and
Ampiloquio Fabela, petitioners, vs. HON. COURT OF APPEALS, HEIRS OF
ROQUE NERI, namely: Roque Neri, Jr. Filomeno, Sherlina, Emeterio,
Antonio, Nelcar and Claudia, all surnamed Neri, respondents.
Llego & Llego Law Office for petitioners.
Dysangco Neri-Dysangco & Fernandez Law Offices for private respondents.
SYNOPSIS
Carmelino Neri, as vendee-a-retro, was entrusted with the possession of a
parcel of land for a period of fourteen (14) years from the date of the
Page | 3
instrument. Upon the expiration of said period, possession of the property
was to be restored to Simeona Balhon and her children (heirs of Anastacio
Fabela) without need of "redemption." In 1977 or 1978, Barrio Abacan road
was constructed across the subject land, which divided it into two separate
lots known as Lot 868 and 870. Roque Neri, Sr. declared these two parcels of
land in his name with the Bureau of Lands and the Assessor's office.
Sometime in 1980, the Philippine Veterans Industrial Development
Corporation (PHIVIDEC), negotiated with Roque Neri, Sr. for the purchase of
Lot 870, however, the heirs of Anastacio Fabela, protested. As a
consequence, Roque Neri, Sr. executed a waiver of rights stating that the
8,000 sq. meter portion of Lot 870 was erroneously included in his name,
thus plaintiff heirs of Anastacio Fabela eventually received the proceeds of
the sale. Thereafter, the late Roque Neri, Sr. continued to ignore plaintiffs'
demand for the return of Lot 868. The heirs of Anastacio Fabela filed a
complaint for reconveyance and damages against the heirs of Roque Neri,
Sr., involving said lot. The case was submitted for decision on the basis of
plaintiffs' evidence since all the defendants were declared in default. After
trial and hearing ex-parte, the trial court rendered judgment in favor of
plaintiffs. In finding that the property belonged to the heirs of Anastacio
Fabela, the trial court concluded that in the "Escritura de Transaccion,"
Carmelino Neri was obliged to restore the subject property in or about 1938
to the heirs of Anastacio Fabela. Defendants heirs of Roque Neri, Sr. filed a
motion to set aside orders of default and judgment which the trial court
denied. The Heirs of Roque Neri, Sr. appealed to the respondent Court of
Appeals which rendered its assailed decision reversing the trial court's
judgment by default and dismissed the complaint. It sustained the trial
court's declaration of default against appellants Heirs of Roque Neri, Sr. but
found that the judgment of default was contrary to the evidence or the law.
It concluded that petitioners had not successfully adduced the required
preponderance of evidence on their claim of absolute ownership over Lot
868. Appellees' motion for reconsideration was denied. Hence, this petition
filed by the heirs of Anastacio Fabela.
According to the Supreme Court, the judgment of default against defendants
who have not appeared or filed their answers does not imply a waiver of all
their rights, except their right to be heard and to present evidence to support
their allegations. Since the trial court rendered a judgment of default against
private respondents, the latter took the appropriate remedy, which is an
ordinary appeal. Thus, notwithstanding the respondent court's complete
agreement with the trial court's findings that all the respondents were
properly declared in default, it found that the judgment by default was
contrary to the evidence or the law and thus reversed the trial court's
decision. In civil cases, the burden of proof is on the plaintiff to establish his
case by preponderance of evidence. If he claims a right granted or created by
law, he must prove his claim by competent evidence and need not rely upon
the weakness of the evidence of his opponent. When the record did not show
that the land, which was the subject matter of the action for recovery of
ownership, had been exactly determined, such action could not prosper.
Hence, petitioners' ownership rights in the land claimed were not
satisfactorily and conclusively proven during the trial. The petition was
denied and the decision of the respondent Court of Appeals was affirmed.
DECISION
GONZAGA-REYES, J p:
Petitioners, heirs of Anastacio Fabela, seek to annul the (1) decision of the
respondent Court of Appeals dated June 17, 1999 1 which reversed and set
aside the appealed judgment by default of the Regional Trial Court of
Misamis Oriental, Branch 18, Cagayan De Oro City 2 in Civil Case No. 10459
declaring petitioners as the rightful owners of subject lot 868 of the Pls. 293
of Balacanas, Nabacaan, Villanueva, Misamis Oriental, and (2) its resolution
dated February 18, 3 2000 denying petitioners' motion for reconsideration.
Sometime in December 1985, the heirs of Anastacio Fabela filed a complaint
for reconveyance and damages against the heirs of Roque Neri, Sr., involving
the subject lot 868, alleging among others, that plaintiffs' late grandfather,
Anastacio Fabela, left two parcels of land in Nabacaan, Misamis Oriental
which were later identified as lot 868 with an area of 48,121 sq. meters and
lot 870 consisting of 15,658 sq. meters which originally formed part of their
grandfather's big tract of land; that earlier in 1924, the parcel of land became
the subject of litigation (Civil Case No. 2891) in the then Court of First
Instance of Misamis Oriental between Carmelino Neri as plaintiff and
Simeona Balhon and children heirs of Anastacio Fabela as defendants and in
connection therewith, the parties entered into an agreement embodied in
an "Escritura de transaccion", a notarized document in a Visayan dialect,
which provided that Carmelino Neri, as vendee-a-retro had been entrusted
with the possession of a parcel of land for a period of fourteen (14) years
from the date of the instrument which was May 10, 1924 and upon the
expiration of said period, Carmelino Neri was to restore the possession of the
property to Simeona Balhon and her children-heirs of Anastacio Fabela,
without need of "redemption"; that sometime in 1977 or 1978, the Bureau
of Lands conducted a cadastral survey on this land when a road (Barrio
Abacan road) was constructed across the land dividing it into two separate
lots which are now known as lot 868 and 870; that Roque Neri Sr. declared
these two parcels of land in his name with the Bureau of Lands and the
Assessor's Office; that sometime in 1980, the Philippine Veterans Industrial
Development Corporation (PHIVIDEC), a government entity buying
substantially all real properties at Nabacaan, Villanueva, Misamis Oriental,
negotiated with Roque Neri Sr. for the purchase of lot 870, however, the heirs
of Anastacio Fabela, protested and consequently, Roque Neri Sr. executed a
waiver of rights over a portion of lot 870 stating that the 8,000 sq. meter
portion of lot 870 was erroneously included in his name, thus plaintiff heirs
of Anastacio Fabela eventually received the proceeds of the sale; that with
respect to lot 868, which was the lot in controversy, the late Roque Neri Sr.
continued to ignore plaintiffs' demand for the return of the said lot. Plaintiffs
prayed for judgment declaring (1) the plan of lot 868, Pls-293 and the tax
declarations issued subsequent to and by virtue of aforesaid plan as null and
void, (2) the heirs of Anastacio Fabela as the lawful owners of lot 868, and (3)
the estate of Roque Neri Sr. liable for payment of damages. HEDCAS
Upon motion of plaintiffs heirs of Anastacio Fabela, defendants Sherlinda
Neri Jamisolamin, Emeterio Neri and Antonio Neri, were declared in default
on April 14, 1986, Filomena Neri on September 26, 1986 while Nelchar and
Claudia Neri on February 9, 1989, for their failure to file answer despite
receipt of summons and copy of the complaint. On the other hand,
defendant Roque B. Neri, Jr. had filed his answer with Counterclaim, but was
likewise declared in default for failure to appear at pre-trial on August 12,
1988.
The case was submitted for decision on the basis of plaintiffs' evidence since
all the defendants were declared in default. After trial and hearing ex-parte,
the trial court rendered judgment in favor of plaintiffs, the dispositive portion
reads: 4
"WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, judgment is rendered in favor of the
heirs of the late Anastacio Fabela including those named in the Complaint as
plaintiffs, as co-owners of lot 868, Pls-293 subject of the complaint and as
indicated in the plan (Exhibit D), as such entitled to the full enjoyment and
possession thereof. All other prayers or claims in the complaint are denied
for lack of merit."
In finding that the property belonged to the heirs of Anastacio Fabela, the
trial court concluded that in the "Escritura de Transaccion," Carmelino Neri
was obliged to restore the subject property in or about 1938 to the heirs of
Anastacio Fabela; thus the fulfillment of that prestation of Carmelino Neri
was presumed under Section 5, par (ii), Rule 131, Rules of Court which
enumerates among the disputable presumptions "that a trustee or other
person whose duty it was to convey real property to a particular person has
actually conveyed it to him when such presumption is necessary to perfect
the title of such person or his successor-in interest." It thus found that the
Fabela heirs have been in possession of lot 868 since 1938 up to the present
and as such were entitled to the full enjoyment and possession as owners
thereof.
On July 24, 1989, defendants heirs of Roque Neri Sr. filed a motion to set
aside orders of default and judgment which the trial court denied in an Order
dated August 22, 1989, on the grounds that the motion had been filed out of
time (after judgment) and that even if such motion would be treated as a
motion to set aside judgment/new trial under Section 1, Rule 37, Rules of
Court, defendants' negligence was not excusable, much less a mistake. 5
Heirs of Roque Neri Sr. appealed to the respondent Court of Appeals.
Considering, however, that the original records of the case from the trial
court had been lost or misplaced, the respondent court, pursuant to Rule 7
of the Revised Internal Rules of the Court of Appeals (RIRCA), set the case for
preliminary conference on December 17, 1998, which was reset to January
26, 1999, and the parties were informed of the loss of the original records of
the case. Counsel for defendants-appellants heirs of Roque Neri Sr.
manifested her clients' willingness to submit the case for decision, even
without the original records and asked for thirty days to file memorandum,
to which manifestation counsel for plaintiffs-appellees heirs of Fabela
interposed no objection. The respondent court granted appellants' prayer
and gave plaintiffs-appellees twenty days to file their counter memorandum
and appellants ten (10) days to file reply memorandum, after which the case
was submitted for decision. 6
On June 17, 1999, the respondent Court of Appeals rendered its assailed
decision reversing the trial court's judgment by default and dismissed the
complaint. It sustained the trial court's declaration of default against
appellants heirs of Roque Neri, Sr. but found that the judgment of default
was contrary to the evidence or the law. It concluded that petitioners had
not successfully adduced the required preponderance of evidence on their
claim of absolute ownership over lot 868, the court stated: 7
"Art. 434 of the Civil Code states that "In an action to recover, the property
must be identified, and the plaintiff must rely on the strength of his title and
not on the weakness of the defendant's claims. The possessor of the property
has the presumption of title in his favor. Hence, any person who claims that
he has a better right to the property, as owner thereof, must prove (1) that
he has a better title than the defendant to the property, and (2) the identity
of the property. The identity of the land sought to be recovered may be
established through the survey plan of the property. Ownership may be
Page | 4
proved by any evidence admissible in law, such as titles and certificates, long
possession and tax declarations or receipts.
Appellees claimed that Lots 868 and 870 are owned by their grandfather
Anastacio Fabela. The records of the Bureau of Lands, as well as the survey
plan presented in court, however, indicate Roque Neri, Sr. as the registered
claimant of both lots. The original of the 'Escritura de Transaccion' on which
appellees relied heavily, was not presented in court. Its probative value,
however, remains doubtful since said document does not really prove
appellees' absolute ownership of the subject property, nor was Lot 868
explicitly referred to as the property being entrusted to the vendee-a-retro
(Carmelino Neri). aTIEcA
On the other hand, the waiver of rights executed in 1980 by Roque Neri, Sr.
appears to refer only to a portion of Lot 870 (the parcel of land sold to
PHIVIDEC), and not to Lot 868. The old tax declaration presented by appellees
and which supposedly covered the two (2) lots did not specify the lot
number, nor was there any evidence presented that the original parcel of
land actually consisted of eighteen (18) hectares. Their allegation that both
lots have already been partitioned among the heirs of Anastacio Fabela was
not substantiated by any document or writing evidencing such extra-judicial
partition. The fourteen (14) years of the agreed temporary possession of the
land by the defendants-appellants had lapsed a long time ago, and this was
prior to the 1971 public survey conducted by the Bureau of Lands. It appears
appellees did not exert diligent efforts to regain possession or resume paying
taxes on the land thereafter, prior to the purchase of Lot 870 by PHIVIDEC.
The fact that appellees were the ones paid by PHIVIDEC for the portion of Lot
870 does not automatically lead to the conclusion that they also absolutely
own Lot 868. Most significant yet, is appellees' failure to adequately explain
why they had not at all registered their claim over the property with the
Bureau of Lands during and after the public survey in the municipality.
Roque Neri, Sr., appellants' predecessor-in-interest, meanwhile registered
his claim or interest on the land and declared it for taxation purposes.
Appellees' claim of possession was through the land's caretaker and
administrator, Delfin Sia, but at the same time admitting that appellants
similarly benefit from the fruits of the land. Regarding tax declarations, it has
been held that while tax declarations and receipts are not conclusive
evidence of ownership, yet, when coupled with proof of actual possession,
they are strong evidence of ownership. Thus, where it was shown that
plaintiff has never paid the land tax, while the defendant has faithfully done
so for many years, there being no explanation offered, it was held that such
payment of taxes should be taken into consideration in favor of defendant.
Being the exclusive possessors of the subject property who have declared the
same for tax purposes through the years, defendants-appellants are entitled
to such favorable presumption of ownership which so far had not been
overturned by plaintiffs-appellees.
The foregoing considered, it is clear that plaintiffs had not successfully
proved by the required preponderance of evidence their claim of absolute
ownership of Lot 868. It is an invariable rule laid down in numerous decisions,
that a person who claims the ownership of property is in duty bound to
clearly identify the land claimed, in accordance with the titles on which he
founds (sic) his right to ownership, and he shall not be permitted to rely upon
the defects in defendant's title. Failure to prove his right of ownership will
bar an action to recover the property; his right to recover must be founded
on positive title or right, and not merely on negative ones, such as the lack or
insufficiency of title on the part of the defendant. The possessor has a
presumption of title, and unless the plaintiff proves he has a better right, he
cannot recover the property from the defendant."
Appellees' motion for reconsideration was denied in a resolution dated
February 18, 2000.
Hence this petition for review on certiorari filed by the heirs of Anastacio
Fabela alleging that the respondent court (1) departed from the stringent
jurisprudence on default and appeals filed out of time and (2) erred in the
appreciation of the findings of fact of the lower court.
Anent the first assigned error, petitioners fault the respondent court for
reversing the decision of the trial court despite its complete agreement with
the findings of the trial court that respondents were properly declared in
default. They contend that the reasons cited by private respondents for their
failure to file answer and to appear at the pre-trial were not meritorious and
that private respondents' affidavit attached to the motion for
reconsideration did not declare how Roque Neri Sr. acquired lot 868. ScaEIT
We are not persuaded.
Section 1, Rule 18 8 of the old Rules of Court which is the law applicable in
the instant case provides:
"Judgment by default — If the defendant fails to answer within the time
specified in these rules, the court shall, upon motion of the plaintiff and proof
of such failure, declare the defendant in default. Thereupon, the court shall
proceed to receive the plaintiff's evidence and render judgment granting him
such relief as the complaint and the facts proven may warrant. This provision
applies where no answer is made to a counterclaim, cross-claim, or third-
party complaint within the period provided in this rule."
Favorable relief can be granted only after the court has ascertained that the
evidence offered and the facts proven by the presenting party, petitioners in
this case, warrant the grant of the same. 9 In this sense, the law gives the
defaulting parties some measure of protection because plaintiffs, despite the
default of defendants, are still required to substantiate their allegations in
the complaint. The judgment of default against defendants who have not
appeared or filed their answers does not imply a waiver of all their rights,
except their right to be heard and to present evidence to support their
allegations. 10 Otherwise, it would be meaningless to require presentation
of evidence if every time the other party is declared in default, a decision
would automatically be rendered in favor of the non-defaulting party and
exactly according to the tenor of his prayer. 11 Since the trial court rendered
a judgment of default against private respondents, the latter took the
appropriate remedy which is an ordinary appeal under Section 2 Rule 41, par
(3) 12 , of the Rules of Court providing in part as follow:
"A party who has been declared in default may likewise appeal from the
judgment rendered against him as contrary to the evidence or to the law,
even if no petition for relief to set aside the order of default had been
presented by him in accordance with Rule 38."
Thus, notwithstanding the respondent court's complete agreement with the
trial court's findings that all the respondents were properly declared in
default, it found that the judgment by default was contrary to the evidence
or the law and thus reversed the trial court decision.
Anent the second error, petitioners claim that the respondent court erred in
concluding that petitioners' predecessor Roque Neri, Sr. appeared as the
registered claimant of lot 868 and 870 which was contrary to the findings of
the trial court that the "plan showing lot 868 (Exh. D-2) and lot 870 (Exh. D-
1) although appearing to have been approved by Jose F. Gatus, OIC, Regional
Director, on July 17, 1986 does not on its face indicate for whom it had been
approved"; that Neri Sr. failed to produce evidence of ownership on how he
acquired the subject Lot No. 868. They further claim that the execution in
their favor by Roque Neri Sr. of a waiver of right over lot 870 where the
former acknowledged the erroneous inclusion of the lot in his name was a
strong admission against interest on Neri's part. They also contend that the
respondent court erred in doubting the probative value of the "Escritura de
Transaccion" only for the reason that the original was not presented in court.
These arguments essentially raise factual issues which normally are not
reviewable by this Court in a petition under Rule 45 which is generally limited
only to question of law. 13 While certain exceptions to this rule are
recognized such as when the factual findings of the respondent Court of
Appeals are at variance with those of the Regional Trial Court, the Court does
not, in all cases of disagreement of facts between these two courts,
automatically delve into the record to determine the facts for
itself. 14 Admittedly, there have been instances when this Court made
independent findings of fact on the points that the trial court and the
appellate court disagreed but we did not do so as a matter of course. When
the dispute between the two courts are merely on probative value, we limit
our review of the evidence ascertaining if the findings of the Court of Appeals
are supported by the record. And, so long as the findings of the said court are
consistent with, or not palpably contrary to, the evidence on record, we
decline to make a review on the probative value of the evidence. 15 In the
instant case, We find no cogent reason to disturb the factual findings of the
respondent court and its conclusion that petitioners failed to establish their
case by preponderance of evidence. STADIH
The invariable applicable rule is to the effect that in order to maintain an
action for recovery of ownership, the person who claims that he has a better
right to the property must prove not only his ownership of the property
claimed but also the identity thereof. 16 The party who desires to recover
must fix the identity of the land claimed by describing the location, area and
boundaries thereof. 17
In the instant case, petitioners based their claim of ownership on the
"1924 Escritura de Transaccion", the original copy of which was not
presented in the trial court, while the photocopy was also lost when the
original records were elevated to the respondent court. This was the only
piece of evidence that would establish petitioners' ownership and the
identity of subject lot 868. In ruling for petitioners heirs of Anastacio Fabela
as the absolute owners of lot 868, the trial court found that in the Escritura,
"it appears that the portion which is now identified as lot 868 had been
entrusted to the possession of Carmelino Neri, as vendee-a retro, for a period
of 14 years from the date of the instrument which was May 10, 1924 and
upon the expiration of which said Carmelino Neri was to restore the
possession of the property to Simeona Balhon and her children heirs of
Anastacio Fabela, namely Petra Buenaventura, Julio and Pedro, all surnamed
Fabela, without need of 'redemption'," and "that fulfillment of Neri's
obligation was presumed to have taken place." We note, however, that
nowhere in the trial court's narration of facts were the boundaries of the
parcel of land indicated with particularity, nor the parcel of land referring to
as lot 868. What really defines a piece of land is not the area mentioned in
its description, but the boundaries therein laid down, as enclosing the land
and indicating its limits. 18
Page | 5
Moreover, the testimony of petitioner heir Teodula Fabela Paguidopon
which was quoted in part in petitioners' own memorandum 19 did not also
clearly establish the relation of the said "Escritura de Transaccion" to lot 868,
to wit:
"Q: Now, that bigger lot has the cadastral lot number before?
A: No because that was not yet surveyed.
Q: Do you know who owns this lot?
A; Our grandfather Anastacio Fabela.
Q: Now while it was still in the hands of Anastacio Fabela while he was still
alive, do you know what was the total area of the mother lot?
A: Yes, it was estimated by our father and we estimated it to be 18 hectares.
Q: Do you have evidence to prove that it was indeed 18 hectares?
A: Yes, ma'am.
Q: I am showing to you an old document but only a xerox copy thereof
entitled escritura de transaccion notarized by Uldarico Akut in the year 1924,
kindly take a look and see where is the 18 hectares which you have just
mentioned?
A: This one.
xxx xxx xxx
ATTY. LLEGO:
". . . We will have this marked as our Exhibits A, A-1 to A-3."
xxx xxx xxx
(TSN of 2/9/89 pages 16 to 18 (topmost)
COURT:
Plaintiff is ordered to prepare the English translation of that document.
xxx xxx xxx
(TSN of 2/9/89 page 18)
"ATTY. LLEGO: (continuing)
Q: You have pointed this portion as your basis for saying that the area is 18
hectares. Now kindly read this paragraph on the description of the land for
purposes of record. (witness is ready (sic)
Which, we pray that that portion being read into the record by witness be
marked as our Exhibit A-4. CcAITa
COURT:
Mark it. (page 18 bottom to page 19 middle portion of the page)."
Unfortunately, the description of the eighteen (18) hectare land which
should had been read and incorporated into the transcript for purposes of
record, was omitted in the quoted portion, to establish the exact location,
area and boundary of the 18 hectare lot in relation to lot 868. The omission
has created serious doubts as to the specific identity of the lot which
petitioners sought to recover. Moreover, even in the petitioners' complaint
filed before the trial court, there was no allegation of the metes and bounds
of the subject lot, the complaint reads:
"3) a. That the grandfather of plaintiffs-the late Anastacio Fabela, had left
among others, the following property, to wit:
a) Lot 870
Area: 15,658 sq. m.
Location: Nabacaan, Misamis Oriental
b) Lot 868
Area: 48,121 sq. m.
Location: Nabacaan, Misamis Oriental
b. That the above described parcels of land are adjacent to each other as
shown by a photocopy of the sketch plan from the Bureau of Lands hereto
enclosed and marked as Annex "B";
c. That these two parcels since time immemorial used to be one big parcel of
land, until in 1977 or 1978, when a government cadastral survey in
Villanueva, Misamis Oriental, was undertaken by the Bureau of Lands,
wherein a road was provided and made to appear across the big parcel of
land, causing it to be divided physically and for which the government
surveyors assigned two lots numbers for what used to be one big parcel of
land, thus the appearance of Lot 870 and Lot 868; This once one big chunk of
land never had a cadastral number in the past;"
Notably, the total area of lots 868 and 870 would only be about 63,679 sq.
meters or about six (6) hectares which fails to correspond to the eighteen
(18) hectare parcel of land allegedly owned by the late Anastacio Fabela
which was the subject of the "Escritura de Transaccion" and testified to by
Teodula Fabela Paguidopon. Petitioners failed to identify the land with that
degree of certainty required to support their affirmative allegation of
ownership.
Moreover, the respondent court found, and we agree, that the waiver of
rights executed in 1980 by Roque Neri Sr., in favor of petitioners referred only
to a portion of lot 870 and not to lot 868. Thus such waiver which petitioners
capitalized on as an admission against Neri's interest did not in any way
support petitioners' claim of ownership of lot 868. Said waiver reads: 20
"ACKNOWLEDGMENT OF ADJUDICATION AND QUITCLAIM
KNOW ALL MEN BY THESE PRESENTS:
That I, Roque Neri, Sr., of legal age, widower, Filipino, with residence and
postal address at Villanueva, Misamis Oriental, Philippines, do hereby
ACKNOWLEDGE AND CONFIRM that the certain portion of a parcel of land
located at Balacanas, Villanueva, Misamis Oriental under Lot No. 870 of Pls.
923 of Villanueva Public Land Subdivision containing a total area of SIXTEEN
THOUSAND SQUARE METERS (16,000 sq. m.) which portion is more
particularly described as follows:
North — Roque Neri, Sr.
East — Nabacaan Road
West — Tayum Creek
South — Lot 869
containing an area of EIGHT THOUSAND SQUARE METERS (8,000 sq. m.) is
hereby adjudicated in favor of the Heirs of Anastacio Fabela.
That the above described portion of a parcel of land actually belongs and
owned by said Heirs of Anastacio Fabela. aSTcCE
That the above described portion of land was erroneously included in the land
survey conducted by the Bureau of Lands in my name.
That I hereby quitclaim and renounce whatever interest, rights and
participation I have over the described portion of real property of which the
Heirs of Anastacio Fabela were the lawful owners.
In witness whereof, I have hereunto set my hand this 18th day of August 1980
in Villanueva, Misamis Oriental, Philippines.
SGD. ILLEGIBLE
T/ROQUE NERI, SR."
A simple reading of the instrument would readily show that only 8,000 sq.
meters of the entire 16,000 sq. meters included in lot 870 was adjudicated in
favor of the heirs of Anastacio Fabela as belonging to them. In fact,
petitioners in their memorandum admitted that only 8,000 sq. meters was
given to them and yet they did not take any positive action to assert their
ownership of the entire lot 870. Petitioners have accordingly no sound basis
to claim lot 868 by virtue of such instrument. As the appellate court succinctly
stated, "the fact that appellees were the ones paid by PHIVIDEC for the
portion of lot 870 does not automatically lead to the conclusion that they
also absolutely own lot 868. Most significantly, is appellees failure to
adequately explain why they had not at all registered their claim over the
property with the Bureau of Lands during and after the public survey in the
municipality." Finally, petitioners also failed to allege much less establish that
they are in possession of the subject lot.
On the other hand, the respondent court found, and this finding was not
refuted, that petitioners' own witness, Norberto Dumat-ol, a representative
of the Bureau of Lands, testified that when a cadastral survey was conducted
in 1971, the registered claimant of lot 868 based on their official record was
Roque Neri Sr. Petitioners' allegation that Neri Sr., committed fraud in the
registration in his name of these two (2) parcels of lot was not substantiated.
The survey plan for lot 868 was approved for Roque Neri Sr. and he had also
declared lot 868 for taxation purposes which was admitted by petitioners as
their complaint prayed for the annulment of the plan and tax declaration.
Although a tax declaration is not considered as conclusive proof of ownership
the same is admissible in evidence to show the nature of the possession of
the claimant of the property for which taxes have been paid. We accordingly
find well-taken the respondent court's conclusion as follows:
"Thus, where it was shown that plaintiff has never paid the land tax, while
the defendant has faithfully done so for many years, there being no
explanation offered, it was held that such payment of taxes should be taken
into consideration in favor of defendant. Being the exclusive possessors of
the subject property who have declared the same for tax purposes through
the years, defendants-appellants are entitled to such favorable presumption
of ownership which so far had not been overturned by plaintiffs-appellees."
In civil cases, the burden of proof is on the plaintiff to establish his case by
preponderance of evidence. 21 If he claims a right granted or created by law,
he must prove his claim by competent evidence. He must rely on the strength
of his own evidence and not upon the weakness of that of his
opponent. 22 When the record does not show that the land which is the
subject matter of the action for recovery of ownership has been exactly
determined, such action cannot prosper, inasmuch as the petitioners'
ownership rights in the land claimed do not appear satisfactorily and
conclusively proven at the trial. 23
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED and the decision of the respondent
Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED. ITScHa
SO ORDERED.
||| (Heirs of Fabela v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 142546, [August 9, 2001],
414 PHIL 838-857)
Page | 6
[G.R. No. 143491. December 6, 2006.]
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs. EFREN M.
CARRASCO, respondent.
DECISION
GARCIA, J p:
Petitioner Republic of the Philippines, thru this petition for review on
certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, seeks to annul and set aside
the Decision 1 dated June 14, 2000 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV
No. 59566, affirming in toto an earlier decision 2 of the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) of Morong, Rizal, Branch 80, which ordered the registration in the
name of herein respondent Efren C. Carrasco of a parcel of land situated at
Tandang Kutyo, Sampaloc, Tanay, Rizal.
The factual antecedents:
On October 1, 1996, in the RTC of Morong, Rizal, respondent Efren M.
Carrasco filed an application for registration of title over a 17,637-square
meter land situated at Sitio Ulang Tubig, Tandang Kutyo, Sampaloc, Tanay,
Province of Rizal.
In his application, docketed as Land Registration Case (LRC) No. 215-T and
raffled to Branch 80 of the court, respondent alleged that he is the owner in
fee simple of the land sought to be registered; that said land is alienable and
disposable and not within any military or whatever kind of reservation; that
to the best of his knowledge, the land has never been mortgaged or
encumbered or that any person has any interest thereon, legal or equitable;
and that the subject land is declared for taxation purposes in his name.
Among the documents attached to the application were the individual plan
and technical description of the land; Diazo polyester film (SEPIA) of the
original survey subdivision plan SGS-No. 04-000518-D of which the subject
land is a part; respondent's Affidavit of Ownership dated August 22, 1996,
therein stating that he took possession of the land in 1990 from his
predecessor, Norberto Mingao, who has occupied the land for the last 25
years; the latter's Deed of Waiver dated December 16, 1991, thereunder
waiving his claim over the land in favor of the respondent; a Certification
from the Land Registration Authority as to the status of the land; Tax
Declaration No. 017-4224 for the year 1996 in respondent's name; and an
official receipt dated September 13, 1996 of realty tax payment. ADSIaT
Petitioner Republic, through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), filed
an opposition to the application. There being no private oppositor, the trial
court issued an order of general default on November 10, 1997 and
proceeded on the same day with the markings of the respondent's
documents and the reception ex parte of his evidence.
Thereafter, or on November 26, 1997, the respondent testified in support of
his application. He likewise adduced the testimony of one Teosito Avesado.
Hereunder is the trial court's summation of respondent's testimonial
evidence:
Petitioner Efren Carrasco testified on November 26, 1997 that he is single, 24
years of age, a farmer and residing at Tanay, Rizal, a Filipino; that he owned
a parcel of land located at Sitio Ulang Tubig, Barangay Tandang Kutyo, Tanay,
Rizal with an area of 17,637 sq. meters; that the said land has not been the
subject of Original Registration of Title as amended by PD 1529; that he
acquired the said land from Norberto Mingao as his compensation for having
worked with him and his acquisition as evidenced by a Waiver executed by
Norberto Mingao in favor of petitioner on December 16, 1991 which he
caused to be marked Exhibit "E;" that he also produced and showed to the
Court as proof of his ownership to the land an original survey subdivision plan
No. SGS-04-000518-0, which he caused to be marked Exhibit "F" and the
particular Lot No. 16 on the map as Exhibit "F-1;" that he caused the survey
of the property by a duly licensed Geodetic Engineer in the person of
Engineer Modesto Allado who prepared the technical descriptions of the
property now marked Exhibit "G" and issued a surveyors certificate which
was marked Exhibit "H;" that the land sought to be registered was declared
for taxation purposes as shown in Tax Declaration No. 017-4224 in the name
of Efren Carrasco which was marked Exhibit "I;" that the taxes for the said
property was paid under Official Receipt No. 215109 dated September 13,
1996 marked Exhibit "J;" that the boundary owners of his property sought to
be registered are: on the East, Miguel Taclas, on the North, Maximo
Mondragon, on the South, Allan Alcantara and on the West, Jesus Consulta;
that he has been in continuously, openly, adversely in possession of the said
property in the concept of an owner, while his predecessors-in-interest has
likewise been in possession of the same in the concept of an owner
continuously, openly, and adversely for more than 25 years; that there are
no other persons claiming possession over the property; that the same
property has not been mortgaged or encumbered to any other persons or
entities; that the property subject matter of the case is not within a military
or naval reservation.
On cross-examination, he testified and clarified that he was employed in the
land of Norberto Mingao, clearing and planting on the vast property he owns;
that his father also had worked for Norberto Mingao for a very long time and
for the services that he and his father rendered, he was given by Mingao
about 17,637 square meters of the more or less 600,000 square meters of
land he owns; that in 1950 his father took over the possession of the land,
cultivated the same and planted fruit trees and growing crops; the said land
was given by Mr. Mingao to his father because of the services he rendered
to Mingao by clearing, planting and cultivating his vast track of lands; that it
was in 1990 that he occupied the possession of his father by virtue of the
Deed of Waiver executed by Mingao in his favor. AcISTE
The second witness of petitioner is Teosito Avesado, 69 years old, a
businessman and a resident of B.F. Homes Phase 3, Parañaque, Metro
Manila; that he personally knows the applicant in this case as he is one of the
workers of Norberto Mingao, that he knew the land sought to be registered
because he used to visit Mingao in that area as they happened to be the
President and Vice President of the Magellan Agricultural Corporation
respectively; that he is interested in the petition so that people working with
Mingao should be given the rightful ownership and title to the land they hold;
that Mr. Mingao had started to occupy a vast tract of land during the early
1940s and because of his appreciation to the services of his workers who
worked for him in the land for a very long time, he gave a portion of his land
to applicant. 3
In a decision 4 dated February 4, 1998, the trial court, upon a finding that the
respondent has sufficiently established his ownership of the land in question,
ordered the registration thereof in his name, thus:
Wherefore, it is hereby decreed that the property described as Lot 16, SGS-
000518-D located at Tandang Kutyo, Sampaloc, Tanay, Rizal with an area of
17,637 square meters may now be registered and confirmed in the name of
Efren N. Carrasco pursuant to the provisions of the Land Registration Act, and
the corresponding title to the property be issued in his name after payment
of the required fees.
Let copies of this Decision be furnished the Solicitor General, the Land
Registration Authority, the Department of Environment and Natural
Resources, the Provincial Government of Rizal, the Office of the District
Engineer of Rizal, the Municipality of Tanay, Rizal and the parties concerned.
SO ORDERED.
Insisting that (1) the land being applied for registration is not alienable public
agricultural land; and (2) respondent is not qualified to register the same
under Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1529, 5 the Republic, through the OSG,
appealed to the CA whereat its appellate recourse was docketed as CA-G.R.
CV No. 59566.
During the pendency of the appeal, the respondent filed a motion with the
appellate court praying for the admission of additional evidence, which
additional evidence included an Affidavit of Ownership dated June 1, 1998 of
Norberto Mingao. In its resolution of February 9, 1999, however, the CA
merely noted the motion. TcDaSI
Eventually, in the herein assailed decision dated June 14, 2000, the CA
dismissed the Republic's appeal and affirmed in toto the appealed decision
of the trial court, to wit:
WHEREFORE, the judgment appealed from is hereby AFFIRMED in toto.
SO ORDERED.
In its decision, the CA held that the subject land is alienable in view of the
certification from the Department of Environment and Natural Resources
(DENR) that the land was verified to be within the alienable and disposable
land of the public domain and outside of any civil or military reservation. On
the issue of whether the respondent was qualified to have the land
registered in his name, the CA ruled in the affirmative having found the
evidence sufficient to establish respondent's and Mingao's ownership and
possession of the land in accordance with the rule laid down in Republic v.
Court of Appeals 6 that occupation and cultivation for more than 30 years by
an applicant and his predecessor-in-interest vest title on such applicant so as
to segregate the land from the mass of the public domain.
Unable to accept the judgment, the Republic is now with this Court via the
present petition on the following grounds:
I
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN AFFIRMING THE LOWER
COURT'S RULING THAT RESPONDENT IS QUALIFIED TO APPLY FOR THE
REGISTRATION OF TITLE OVER THE SUBJECT PARCEL OF LAND UNDER P.D.
NO. 1529.
II
ASSUMING ARGUENDO THAT RESPONDENT IS QUALIFIED TO APPLY FOR
REGISTRATION OF THE QUESTIONED LOT, STILL THE HONORABLE COURT OF
APPEALS ERRED IN RULING THAT BASED ON JURISPRUDENCE, REPUBLIC V.
COURT OF APPEALS, 235 SCRA 567 (1994), RESPONDENT HAD BEEN IN
POSSESSION THEREOF WITHIN THE PERIOD PRESCRIBED BY LAW FOR THE
SAME TO BE ACQUIRED THROUGH JUDICIAL CONFIRMATION OF IMPERFECT
TITLE. 7
In his Comment, 8 respondent maintains that he is entitled to apply for
registration of title over the subject property because his open, adverse and
continuous possession thereof for more than 30 years has ripened into
ownership. In any event, respondent argues that the CA has found his
evidence sufficient to establish his and his predecessor-in-interest's
Page | 7
ownership and possession of the land, which factual finding is conclusive on
this Court. cTECHI
The petition is impressed with merit.
While the rule is well-settled that findings of fact of appellate courts are
conclusive upon this Court, there are, however, recognized exceptions
thereto, among which is where the findings of fact are not supported by the
record or are so glaringly erroneous as to constitute a serious abuse of
discretion. 9 Such exceptions obtain in this case.
Basically, the pivotal issue is whether the respondent was able to sufficiently
prove his possession, in the concept of an owner, of the land sought to be
registered for the period required by law so as to entitle him to the
registration thereof in his name.
We resolve the issue in the negative.
Before one can register his title over a parcel of land, he must show that: (1)
he, by himself or through his predecessors-in-interest, has been in open,
continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation thereof
under a bona fide claim of ownership since June 12, 1945 or earlier; and (2)
the land subject of the application is alienable and disposable land of the
public domain. 10
For sure, Section 14, paragraph (1), of the Property Registration Decree (P.D.
No. 1529) explicitly states:
SEC. 14. Who may apply. — The following persons may file in the proper
Court of First Instance [now the Regional Trial Court] an application for
registration of title to land, whether personally or through their duly
authorized representatives:
(1) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest have
been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and
occupation of alienable and disposable lands of the public domain under
a bona fide claim of ownership since June 12, 1945, or earlier. aEDCAH
We have no disagreement with the finding of the CA that the subject
property is part of the alienable and disposable agricultural lands of the
public domain, having been classified as such by the DENR, an appropriate
government agency for the purpose. We part ways, however, with the CA in
its conclusion that the respondent has established his ownership of the land
in question for the period of possession required by law.
Respondent anchors his claim of ownership on his allegation of continuous,
open and adverse possession in the concept of an owner by himself and
through his predecessor-in-interest, Norberto Mingao, for more than 30
years. 11 Bearing in mind the rule that a person who seeks registration of
title to a piece of land must prove his claim by clear and convincing
evidence, 12 we find respondent's evidence in this respect insufficient.
To begin with, the respondent failed to prove that Norberto Mingao from
whom he allegedly derived his title, was the owner of the subject land and
hence can transmit rights over the same in his favor.
In his Deed of Waiver dated December 16, 1991, Mingao merely claimed
ownership of the land and that he is waiving his right and interest thereon in
favor of the respondent. Significantly, the same Waiver did not even
specifically state when his (Mingao's) possession started. While, as rightly
found by the CA, Mingao has been in possession of the land since 1950 based
on Mingao's Affidavit of Ownership dated June 1, 1998 which was presented
while the case was pending appeal with the CA, nonetheless, without more,
said affidavit is not adequate to prove the fact of possession beginning that
date. Indeed, it may not be amiss to point out that Mingao did not even
testify in this case.
The Court cannot give full credence to respondent's Affidavit of
Ownership dated August 22, 1996 for he simply alleged therein that Mingao
had occupied the land for the last 25 years. Likewise, respondent's testimony
regarding Mingao's possession and ownership, aside from being self-serving,
consists merely of general statements with no specifics even as to when his
predecessor began occupying the land. Indeed, such is hardly the well-nigh
incontrovertible evidence required in cases of this nature. Respondent must
present proof of specific acts of ownership to substantiate his claim and
cannot just offer general statements which are mere conclusions of law than
factual evidence of possession. AaEcHC
In the same vein, Teosito Avesado's testimony cannot be relied upon to
corroborate respondent's claim as to Mingao's possession as owner of the
land, more so, when we are not sufficiently convinced as to said witness'
personal acquaintance with Mingao or knowledge regarding the latter's
intention to give the subject land to the respondent.
Furthermore, there is no proof that Mingao declared the land in his name for
taxation purposes or paid taxes due thereon. True, a tax declaration by itself
is not sufficient to prove ownership. Nonetheless, it may serve as sufficient
basis for inferring possession. 13 As we held in Republic v. Alconaba: 14
While tax receipts and declarations are not incontrovertible evidence of
ownership, they constitute, at the least, proof that the holder has a claim of
title over the property. The voluntary declaration of a piece of property for
taxation purposes not only manifests one's sincere and honest desire to
obtain title to the property, but also announces an adverse claim against the
State and all other interested parties with an intention to contribute needed
revenues to the government. Such an act strengthens one's bona fide claim
of acquisition of ownership.
Hence, since Mingao's possession and ownership of the subject land were
not sufficiently proven, Mingao himself cannot validly transmit his rights over
the land in respondent's favor. At any rate, the mode by which respondent
alleged to have taken possession and ownership of the land is not one of
those provided for under Article 712 of the Civil Code. 15
To show how he acquired possession of the subject land from Mingao,
respondent presented his Affidavit of Ownership dated August 22, 1996 and
Mingao's Deed of Waiver dated December 16, 1991. But said documents
cannot show that there was a valid transmission of rights. As it were,
respondent's Affidavit of Ownership merely stated that he has taken
possession of the subject land in 1990 from Mingao. On the other hand,
Mingao's Deed of Waiver is not, as aforestated, a mode of acquiring
ownership.
The waiver cannot even be considered a donation because it does not comply
with the formalities required in order for a donation of an immovable to be
valid pursuant to Article 749 of the Civil Code 16because respondent's
acceptance thereof is lacking. HDCTAc
Also, prescription cannot be availed of to acquire ownership not only because
the respondent's possession was not in the concept of an owner, but also
because he failed to comply with the required period. Respondent cannot
tack his possession to that of Mingao's since there is no privity between
them, the transmission of rights not having been proven. Thus, respondent's
possession must be reckoned only from the time of his actual possession
which, as admitted by him, commenced in 1990.
But even assuming, in gratia argumenti, that respondent may validly derive
his right of possession from Mingao, still, he may not rightfully apply for
confirmation of title to the land in question. For, as the CA correctly found,
and which the respondent does not dispute, Mingao's possession started
only in 1950 which is 5 years later than the reckoning point of June 12, 1945
under the Property Registration Decree (P.D. No. 1529). It is thus clear that
respondent failed to comply with the period of possession and occupation
not only as required by Section 14(1), supra, of the Property Registration
Decree but also by the Public Land Act or Commonwealth Act (C.A.) No. 141,
the pertinent provision of which is Section 48(b):
Section 48. The following described citizens of the Philippines, occupying
lands of the public domain or claiming to own any such lands or an interest
therein, but whose titles have not been perfected or completed, may apply
to the Court of first Instance of the province where the land is located for
confirmation of their claims and the issuance of a certificate of title
therefore, under the Land Registration Act, to wit:
xxx xxx xxx
(b) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest have
been in open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and
occupation of agricultural lands of the public domain, under a bona fide claim
of acquisition of ownership, since June 12, 1945, or earlier, immediately
preceding the filing of the application for confirmation of title except when
prevented by war or force majeure. These shall be conclusively presumed to
have performed all the conditions essential to a Government grant and shall
be entitled to a certificate of title under the provisions of this
chapter. cCSHET
Clearly then, the reliance placed by the appellate court in Republic v. Court
of Appeals 17 where we ruled that occupation and cultivation for more than
30 years by an applicant and his predecessor-in-interest vest title on such
applicant so as to segregate the land from the mass of public land, is
erroneous. Said ruling has been effectively superseded by subsequent
legislations which amended Section 48(b) the Public Land Act. The case
of Republic v. Doldol, 18 cited in Igtiben v. Republic, 19 provides a summary
of these amendments, to wit:
The original Section 48(b) of C.A. No. 141 provided for possession and
occupation of lands of the public domain since July 26, 1894. This was
superseded by R.A. No. 1942 which provided for a simple thirty-year
prescriptive period of occupation by an applicant for judicial confirmation of
imperfect title. The same, however, has already been amended
by Presidential Decree No. 1073, approved on January 25, 1977. As amended
Section 48(b) now reads:
Section 48. The following described citizens of the Philippines, occupying
lands of the public domain or claiming to own any such lands or an interest
therein, but whose titles have not been perfected or completed, may apply
to the Court of first Instance of the province where the land is located for
confirmation of their claims and the issuance of a certificate of title
therefore, under the Land Registration Act, to wit:
xxx xxx xxx
(b) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest have
been in open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and
occupation of agricultural lands of the public domain, under a bona fide claim
Page | 8
of acquisition of ownership, since June 12, 1945, or earlier, immediately
preceding the filing of the application for confirmation of title except when
prevented by war or force majeure. These shall be conclusively presumed to
have performed all the conditions essential to a Government grant and shall
be entitled to a certificate of title under the provisions of this chapter.
(Emphasis supplied.) EcTDCI
As presently phrased, the law requires that possession of lands of the public
domain must be from June 12, 1945 or earlier for the land to be acquired
through judicial confirmation of imperfect or incomplete title.
In sum, the respondent could not have acquired an imperfect title to the land
in question because he has not proved possession openly, continuously and
adversely in the concept of an owner since June 12, 1945, the period of
possession required by law. At best, he can only prove possession since 1990,
the date which he admitted to have taken possession of the subject parcel of
land from Mingao.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. Accordingly, the assailed decision
dated June 14, 2000 of the CA in CA-G.R. CV No. 59566 is REVERSED and SET
ASIDE and LRC No. 215-T of the RTC of Morong, Rizal, Branch 80, is ordered
DISMISSED.
No costs.
[G.R. No. 168464. January 23, 2006.]
ZENAIDA RAMOS-BALALIO, petitioner, vs. ROLANDO RAMOS, EUSEBIO I.
RAMOS and EVANGELISTO GARCIA, respondents.
D.L. Wagas Law Office for petitioner.
Julian B. Dela Rosa for respondents.
DECISION
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J p:
This petition assails the Decision 1 of the Court of Appeals dated February 16,
2005 in CA-G.R. CV No. 58644 reversing the Decision 2 of the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) of Roxas, Isabela, Branch 23, dated July 17, 1996, in Civil Case No.
Br. 23-357 which ruled that herein petitioner Zenaida Ramos-Balalio had a
superior right to possess Lot No. 204, Pls-15, situated at Muñoz, Roxas,
Isabela, as well as its Resolution 3 dated June 14, 2005 denying the motion
for reconsideration.
As culled from the records, petitioner Zenaida and her brother Alexander
(now deceased) are the children of spouses Susana Bueno and Abundio
Ramos. The spouses started occupying Lot No. 204 in 1938. Abundio died in
1944. Susana met her second husband, respondent Eusebio Ramos in 1946,
with whom she had five children, one of whom is respondent Rolando.
In the interim, prior to 1958, Susana discovered that Felimon Domingo
applied for a sales patent over the subject parcel of land which she opposed.
The Bureau of Lands resolved the dispute, thus:
In the light of the foregoing facts, it is clear that Felimon B. Domingo has not
entered, possessed or cultivated the land in question and therefore he has
not acquired any preference right thereto. Upon the other hand contestant
Susana Bueno Vda. de Ramos and her children have sufficiently established
their right of preference over the land except the one hectare Cemetery site,
on the basis of their continuous occupation and cultivation and their valuable
improvements introduced thereon.
Wherefore, it is ordered that the Sales Application No. 21992 of Felimon B.
Domingo be as hereby it is rejected, forfeiting in favor of the Government
whatever amount have been paid on account thereof. The land in question
shall be subdivided so as to exclude therefrom the one hectare portion in the
northwestern part of the land, which shall be reserved as barrio cemetery
site, while the remaining area is hereby allocated to SUSANA BUENO VDA DE
RAMOS who shall file an appropriate application therefore within sixty (60)
days after the survey thereof at her own expense, it not appearing that this
Office has received the homestead (new) application allegedly filed by her
for the same land.
SO ORDERED. 4
It was alleged that as Susana accompanied her husband Eusebio, a soldier,
wherever he was assigned, Susana's father, George Bueno, and daughter,
petitioner Zenaida continued the cultivation and possession of the subject
land. Sometime later, Susana sold the land to petitioner who, in turn,
partitioned it among herself, her brother, Alexander, and respondent
Rolando and his siblings. The partition was not registered but Deeds of Sale
were executed in favor of Rolando and Alexander. aDCIHE
Petitioner thereafter mortgaged her share; however, it came to her
knowledge that respondents Rolando and Eusebio had usurped her share
and deprived the mortgagees of possession over the land. After settling the
mortgage, petitioner filed a case for recovery of inheritance, possession and
damages with a petition for preliminary mandatory injunction.
The trial court had the land surveyed. Subdividing the land into Lots 204-A to
204-H 5 based on the actual possessor or occupant, the survey plan revealed
the following:
1. Plaintiff Zenaida Ramos Balalio has no possession, occupation, and
cultivation whatsoever of lot 204, Pls-15;
2. Rolando Ramos is in possession and cultivation of lot 204-F, lot 204-G and
lot 204-C, with a total area of 43,957 sq. m., more or less;
3. Eusebio Ramos is occupying and cultivating lot 204-A with an area of 4,994
sq. m., more or less;
4. Lot 204-B consisting of 17,685 sq. m., more or less, is possessed and
cultivated by Evangelisto Garcia, another intervenor. His occupation is very
much less than the two (2) hectares sold to him by Alexander Ramos. It is
short by 2,311 sq. m., more or less;
5. The total area of the land in question, after deducting one (1) hectare
occupied by the cemetery is 73,150 sq. m., more or less. 6
On July 17, 1996, the trial court rendered its decision holding that petitioner
was deprived of her right to cultivation and possession of her share of Lot
No. 204 and thus ruled:
AS A CONSEQUENCE OF ALL THE FOREGOING, judgment is hereby rendered
in favor of plaintiff, Zenaida Ramos and against Rolando Ramos, defendant,
and Eusebio Ramos, intervenor.
1. Ordering Eusebio Ramos to vacate lot 204-A and surrender it to
Evangelisto Garcia because he is not entitled to any portion of the lot in
question, it being the conjugal property of the first marriage of Susana Bueno
to Abundio Ramos;
2. Evangelisto Garcia is adjudicated the first two (2) hectares from the North
and East of the cemetery, as he validly bought the area from Alexander
Ramos. He is presently occupying only 17,689 sq. m., more or less. His
possession now is increased to two (2) hectares which includes the area
being possessed by Eusebio Ramos;
3. The remaining portion of the share of Alexander Ramos is 4,410 sq. m.,
more or less. This is adjudicated in favor of his heirs. This portion now
corresponds to the area immediately South of the area of Evangelisto Garcia,
the partition being from East to West;
4. The middle portion consisting of 24,410 sq. m., more or less, and
immediately South of the cemetery, and also South of the portion
adjudicated to the heirs of Alexander is now given to Zenaida Ramos Balalio
as her valid share of lot 204, the partition being also East to West;
5. South of the share of Zenaida consisting also of 24,410 sq. m., more or less,
is the valid share of Rolando Ramos and his full blooded brother and sisters
namely Robin, Corazon, Myrna and Mila, all surnamed Ramos;
6. Rolando Ramos and Eusebio Ramos are ordered jointly and severally to
pay Zenaida Ramos:
a. Ten Thousand (P10,000.00) Pesos as attorney's fees;
b. One thousand Five Hundred (P1,500.00) Pesos as appearance fees of her
lawyer;
c. Ten Thousand (P10,000.00) Pesos as incidental expenses relative to the
case;
d. One Hundred Thousand Eight Hundred (P100,800.00) Pesos as the
reasonable owner's share of the produce of the land of Zenaida Ramos from
1975 to the present, with an interest of 6% per annum until fully paid;
7. The Clerk of Court and the Sheriff are ordered to repair to the land in
question and partition said land in accordance with the tenor of this decision;
8. And to pay the cost.
SO ORDERED. 7
On appeal, the Court of Appeals found that neither Zenaida nor Alexander
complied with the homestead application requirements in order to acquire
superior vested right. As a consequence, it reversed the decision of the trial
court, to wit:
As a consequence of the foregoing, the Court rules in favor of appellants as
to the fourth error and finds that the contract supposedly dividing that
property among Zenaida, Rolando Ramos and Alexander Ramos cannot be
enforced because neither of the parties therein can claim any vested right
over the subject parcel land which is still part of the public domain.
Also, prescinding from the above ruling, the intervention of Eusebio Ramos
and Evangelisto Garcia should likewise be dismissed. As to Eusebio, since
Susana never filed an application for homestead, her right never ripened to
ownership which she could have transmitted to her heirs. As to Evangelisto
Garcia who supposedly purchased that share of Alexander (an heir of
Susana), since the vendor never inherited anything from Susana there was
nothing which he (Evangelisto) could have bought. In fine, neither of the
intervenors could claim any right which they can enforce in court.
WHEREFORE, the Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Roxas, Isabela,
Branch 23, in Civil Case No. Br. 23-357 is REVERSED and the "Complaint" filed
by plaintiff-appellee as well as the respective "Answer in Intervention" of
Eusebio Ramos and Evangelisto Garcia are all hereby ordered DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED. 8
Hence, this petition on the following assigned errors:
Page | 9
7.1. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS SERIOUSLY ERRED IN REVERSING
THE TRIAL COURT'S DECISION AND DISMISSING THE PETITIONER'S
COMPLAINT.
7.2. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN HOLDING THAT
PETITIONER IS NOT IN PRIOR POSSESSION OF THE SAID LAND, AND
DECLARING THAT SHE HAS NO RIGHT WHATSOEVER TO THE DISPUTED LAND.
7.3. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN IGNORING THE ISSUE OF
ACCION PUBLICIANA IN THE CASE AT BAR AND CONFINED ITSELF TO THE
CLAIM OF RECOVERY OF INHERITANCE. 9
The petition is partly meritorious.
Under the Regalian doctrine, all lands of the public domain belong to the
State and those lands not appearing to be clearly within private ownership
are presumed to belong to the State. 10 Lands of the public domain are
classified into agricultural, forest or timber, mineral lands, and national
parks. Alienable lands of the public domain shall be limited to agricultural
lands. 11
Commonwealth Act No. 141 (1936), or the Public Land Act, as amended
by Presidential Decree No. 1073 (1977), remains to be the general law
governing the classification and disposition of alienable lands of the public
domain. It enumerates the different modes of acquisition of these lands and
prescribes the terms and conditions to enable private persons to perfect
their title to them. It is, therefore, the applicable law to the case before us.
A homestead patent, such as the subject of the instant case, is one of the
modes to acquire title to public lands suitable for agricultural purposes.
Under the Public Land Act, a homestead patent is one issued to any citizen of
this country, over the age of 18 years or the head of a family, and who is not
the owner of more than 24 12hectares of land in the country. 13 To be
qualified, the applicant must show that he has resided continuously for at
least one year in the municipality where the land is situated and must have
cultivated at least one-fifth of the land applied for. 14
In the case at bar, petitioner Zenaida asserts her right to a parcel of
agricultural land that her parents Susana and Abundio had possessed since
1938. She claims that, for some time, the cultivation of this land was left to
her and her grandfather and that, following the death of her father Abundio,
the land was allegedly sold to her by her mother Susana.
Zenaida's argument is flawed because it assumes that her parents had
perfected their title over the land and that they could validly convey the same
to third persons, whether by sale or by inheritance. However, a careful
examination of the records shows that petitioner has not satisfactorily
established that a valid application for homestead patent was filed by her
parents. The decision of the Bureau of Lands in 1958 only addressed
Zenaida's family's right of preference over the land, in view of their
possession and cultivation of the land. Nonetheless, the Bureau of Lands
ordered the filing of an appropriate application for its registration which
indicates that as of that time, there was as yet no valid application filed. 15
The purported sale, therefore, between petitioner and her mother cannot be
given effect, nor can it be a source of right for Zenaida, because Susana did
not have the authority to sell what did not belong to her. The invalidation of
the sale consequently nullifies the partition of the property among Zenaida,
Alexander, and Rolando and his siblings because Zenaida could not have
disposed of the land which she did not own. SIAEHC
For the same reason, neither Eusebio nor Rolando can claim any right
whatsoever as heirs of Susana. Their claim evidently relies on the provision
of the Public Land Actwhich states:
Section 105. If at any time the applicant or grantee shall die before the
issuance of the patent or the final grant of the land, or during the life of the
lease, or while the applicant or grantee still has obligations pending towards
the Government, in accordance with this Act, he shall be succeeded in his
rights and obligations with respect to the land applied for or granted or
leased under this Act by his heirs in law, who shall be entitled to have issued
to them the patent or final concession if they show that they have complied
with the requirements therefor, and who shall be subrogated in all his
rights and obligations for the purposes of this Act. (Emphasis added)
The reliance is misplaced because the cited provision speaks of an applicant,
grantee, or lessee. Susana was not one of these. In her lifetime, despite her
possession and cultivation of the land, she failed to apply for a homestead
patent and to acquire any vested right that Eusebio or Rolando can inherit.
As such, the land remains part of the public domain. Furthermore, Eusebio
and Rolando cannot invoke their prior possession and occupation of the land
because the same cannot be considered as adverse, open, public, peaceful
and to the exclusion of all.
Hence, the subject land remains to be part of the public domain and rightfully
belongs to the State. As held by the Court of Appeals, none of the parties
obtained a defensible title to the property which can be upheld by the Court.
Nonetheless, the possession of the land is different from the issue of
its ownership. Petitioner argues that her petition may be treated as an accion
publiciana and not merely an action for recovery of inheritance.
An accion publicianais an action for the recovery of the right to possess and
is a plenary action in an ordinary civil proceeding to determine the better
right of possession of realty independently of title. 16 In this case, the issue
is whether Zenaida, as an applicant for public land, may be considered as
having any right to the land occupied, which may entitle her to sue in courts
for the return of the possession thereof.
We find that Zenaida has proven prior possession of the portion of land she
claims as her share, which possession antedates the filing of the homestead
application. She produced evidence showing that she has filed a verified
application for the registration of the land with the Bureau of Lands on
August 10, 1971, 17 which is still pending. The documents remain
uncontested and the application has not been assailed by any of the parties
to the case. She alleged that during the lifetime of her mother, she and her
maternal grandfather cultivated and occupied the land.
Moreover, Zenaida presented tax declarations both in her name and that of
her predecessor-in-interest (mother Susana Bueno) covering the property.
Time and again, we have held that although tax declarations or realty tax
payments of property are not conclusive evidence of ownership,
nevertheless, they are good indicia of possession in the concept of owner for
no one in his right mind would be paying taxes for a property that is not in
his actual or at least constructive possession. 18 They constitute at least
proof that the holder has a claim of title over the property. The voluntary
declaration of a piece of property for taxation purposes manifests not only
one's sincere and honest desire to obtain title to the property and announces
his adverse claim against the State and all other interested parties, but also
the intention to contribute needed revenues to the Government. 19
All told, petitioner Zenaida's uncontested and verified application for a
homestead patent coupled with her open and notorious occupation of the
land convinces us of her preferential right to possess the land claimed, which
entitles her to be protected by the law in such possession.
WHEREFORE, the petition is PARTIALLY GRANTED. The Decision of the Court
of Appeals dated February 16, 2005 is MODIFIED, insofar as to grant
petitioner Zenaida Ramos-Balalio preferential possession of the portion of
Lot 204, Pls-15, situated in Muñoz, Roxas, Isabela, as delineated in the
Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Roxas, Isabela, Branch 23, dated July
17, 1996. STIcEA
SO ORDERED.
||| (Ramos-Balalio v. Ramos, G.R. No. 168464, [January 23, 2006], 515 PHIL
506-518)
[G.R. No. 160990. September 11, 2006.]
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs. SPOUSES RICARDO B.
ENRIQUEZ and ELIZA M. ENRIQUEZ, respondents.
DECISION
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J p:
For resolution by the Court is a petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules
of Court, filed by the Republic of the Philippines questioning the
Decision 1 dated November 28, 2003 rendered by the Court of Appeals (CA)
in CA-G.R. CV No. 68973. The assailed Decision affirmed the Decision of the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Daet, Camarines Norte, Branch 39, granting the
application for registration of title of land filed by respondents.
Respondents filed their verified petition for confirmation and registration of
title to two parcels of land located in Gahonon, Daet, Camarines Norte on
January 16, 1997.2 One parcel, Lot 1711, Pls-488-D, consists of 455 square
meters. The other parcel (hereafter referred to as "Parcel 2"), described
in Psu-05-006497-D, contains 297 square meters.
Petitioner, through the Director of Lands, filed an Opposition on the grounds
that respondents or their predecessors-in-interest have not been in
continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession of the property since June
12, 1945 or prior thereto; that respondents' evidence is not competent or
sufficient to establish their claim; and that the parcel of land applied for is a
portion of the public domain. 3
On September 28, 1998, the RTC rendered its Decision with the following
dispositive portion:
WHEREFORE, title of the applicants to the 455-square meter parcel of land
described on Plan-051603-0022344 (Exh. "M") and the 297-square meter
parcel of land described on plan Psu-05-006497-D (Exh. "M-1") is hereby
confirmed and the same is ordered registered in the name of spouses Ricardo
B. Enriquez and Eliza M. Enriquez, both of legal age, Filipino citizens and
residents of Batobalani, Paracale, Camarines Norte.
Once this decision shall have become final, let an order for the issuance of
decree be issued. CIaASH
SO ORDERED. 4
Petitioner filed an appeal with the CA on grounds of lack of jurisdiction due
to respondents' failure to present the original tracing cloth plan of the subject
lots, and respondents' failure to prove open, continuous, exclusive, and
adverse possession for more than 30 years. Finding no error, the CA denied
Page | 10
the appeal and affirmed the RTC Decision in the assailed Decision dated
November 28, 2003. 5
Hence, herein petition based on the following grounds:
I
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN AFFIRMING THE DECISION OF THE TRIAL
COURT WHICH GRANTED THE APPLICATION FOR LAND REGISTRATION,
DESPITE THE FACT THAT THE TRIAL COURT HAS NOT ACQUIRED
JURISDICTION TO PROCEED WITH THE CASE FOR FAILURE OF RESPONDENTS
TO PRESENT THE ORIGINAL TRACING CLOTH PLAN OR THE DIAZO
POLYESTER FILM.
II
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN AFFIRMING THE DECISION OF THE TRIAL
COURT GRANTING THE APPLICATION FOR LAND REGISTRATION DESPITE
THE FAILURE OF RESPONDENTS TO PROVE THAT THEY AND THEIR
PREDECESSORS-IN-INTEREST HAD BEEN IN OPEN, CONTINUOUS, EXCLUSIVE
AND NOTORIOUS POSSESSION OF THE SUBJECT LOTS IN THE CONCEPT OF
OWNERS FOR AT LEAST THIRTY YEARS. 6
These issues, notably, are questions of fact that petitioner had already
previously raised in its appeal before the CA. The general rule is that
questions of fact are beyond the province of Rule 45 of the Rules of
Court. 7 Said rule, however, admits of certain exceptions, to wit:
(1) when the factual findings of the Court of Appeals and the trial court are
contradictory;
(2) when the findings are grounded entirely on speculations, surmises, or
conjectures;
(3) when the inference made by the Court of Appeals from its findings of fact
is manifestly mistaken, absurd, or impossible;
(4) when there is grave abuse of discretion in the appreciation of facts;
(5) when the appellate court, in making its findings, goes beyond the issues
of the case, and such findings are contrary to the admissions of both
appellant and appellee;
(6) when the judgment of the Court of Appeals is premised on a
misapprehension of facts;
(7) when the Court of Appeals fails to notice certain relevant facts which, if
properly considered, will justify a different conclusion;
(8) when the findings of fact are themselves conflicting;
(9) when the findings of fact are conclusions without citation of the specific
evidence on which they are based; and
(10) when the findings of fact of the Court of Appeals are premised on the
absence of evidence but such findings are contradicted by the evidence on
record. 8(Emphasis supplied) HAISEa
After going over the evidence extant in the record of this case, the Court finds
that the CA failed to notice a relevant fact which, if properly considered, will
justify a different conclusion, thus necessitating a review of the case.
Particularly, the Court is referring to the fact that there exists a material
discrepancy in the technical description of Parcel 2 applied for as will be
discussed forthwith.
Before one can register his title over a parcel of land, the applicant must show
that (a) he, by himself or through his predecessors-in-interest, has been in
open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of the
subject land under a bona fide claim of ownership since June 12, 1945 or
earlier; and (b) the land subject of the application is alienable and disposable
land of the public domain. 9
One of the mandatory requirements in applications of original registration of
land is the submission in evidence of the original tracing cloth plan or the
"sepia copy" (Diazo Polyester Film), duly approved by the Bureau of Lands.
This is to establish the true identity of the land to ensure that it does not
overlap a parcel of land or a portion thereof already covered by a previous
land registration, and to forestall the possibility that it will be overlapped by
a subsequent registration of any adjoining land. Failure to comply with this
requirement is fatal to petitioner's application for registration. 10
Nevertheless, in several cases, the Court allowed substantial compliance with
this rule. In Recto v. Republic of the Philippines, 11 this Court held that
blueprint copies of the original tracing cloth plan from the Bureau of Lands
and other evidence could also provide sufficient identification to identify a
piece of land for registration purposes, as the property was sufficiently
identified by: 1) the blueprint copy of the plan and technical description
which were both approved by the Land Management Services of the
Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR); and 2) the report
of the Land Management Sector stating that the subject property is not a
portion of, nor identical to any previously approved isolated survey. The
applicants in the Recto case also submitted a certified true copy of the
original tracing cloth plan to the CA as well as a certification from the Land
Registration Authority attesting that the original plan in diazo polyester film
was on file.
In Republic of the Philippines v. Hubilla, 12 the Court also deemed as
substantial compliance the submission of the following in lieu of the original
tracing cloth plan, to wit: 1) a blueprint copy of the subdivision plan approved
by the Director of Lands; 2) a technical description approved by the Land
Management Bureau of the DENR; 3) a certification from the DENR
Community Environment and Natural Resources Office (CENRO) which states
that the Property has not been forfeited for non-payment of real estate
taxes, is entirely within the alienable and disposable zone as of December 31,
1925, has not been previously titled and is not covered by any previous public
land application; and 4) a report of the Land Management Bureau stating that
the Property is not recorded in their lot and plan index cards as being subject
of a previous public land application. The applicants also filed a motion to
admit original tracing cloth plan with the Court of Appeals during the
pendency of the appeal and attached thereto the original plan, which the
Court noted as the same as the blueprint subdivision plan offered as evidence
before the trial court. IDCcEa
In the present case, there is no question that respondents did not submit the
original of the tracing cloth plan of Lots 1711, Pls-488-D and Psu-05-006497-
D. Applying the exception, the CA ruled that the same may be dispensed with
as there are on record the blueprint copies of the properties and "other
evidences," which sufficiently establish the nature, identity, location and
extent of the subject properties. The CA also ruled that the case of Director
of Lands v. Tesalona, 13 cited by petitioner, does not apply in this case since
there is no discrepancy in the area of the land as stated in the application and
in the blue print.
Petitioner, however, insists that there exists a material discrepancy in the
area of Parcel 2.
The Court went over the records of this case and indeed, as borne by
respondents' own evidence, there exists a significant discrepancy in the area
of Lot Psu-05-006497-D creating a doubt as to the actual area, such that the
exception to the rule on the presentation of the original tracing cloth plan
cannot be applied.
In the Deed of Absolute Sale dated December 2, 1994 between Rosalinda
Oloya and respondents, Parcel 2 was described as follows:
Parcel 2 A parcel of land situated at Gahonon, Daet, Camarines Norte,
Philippines. Bounded on the north by irrigation canal; on the South lot owned
by Mrs. of Tomas Cootauco; on the West lot No. 1710 -____ and on the East
lo [sic] No. 1710 ____. Declared under Tax Decl. No. 018-0991 containing an
area of 250 Sq. m more or less. 14
This is confirmed in the Provincial Assessor's Property Field Appraisal &
Assessment Sheet for the years 1993 15 and 1994, 16 and the Declaration of
Real Property in the names of Rosalinda Oloya and Tomas Cootauco,
although the boundaries set therein were as follows:
Northeast: Lot 1711
Northwest: Road lot
Southeast: Road lot
Southwest: National road
Meanwhile, in the 1996 blue print copy of the survey plan 17 and the
technical description issued by the Lands Management Services, 18 Parcel 2
already contained an area of 297 square meters, and bounded as follows:
Southwest: National Road
Northwest: property of Samuel Magana
Northeast: Lot 1711, Pls 488-D
Southeast property of Emeteria Abodago
Moreover, the Court notes that in a Certification dated October 15, 1992,
issued by the Office of the CENRO, Daet, Camarines Norte, there already
exists a previous survey plan over the same property but which measures 250
square meters. It was stated therein: "THIS IS TO CERTIFY that per records
filed in this Office, shows that the parcel of land with an area of 250 square
meters as surveyed by Engr. Virgilio F. Jimenez for Tomas Cootauco, located
at Gahonon, Daet, Camarines Norte . . . ." 19
Respondents failed to satisfactorily explain the reason for the difference in
the area. What respondent Ricardo Enriquez merely said on this score was:
"When the relocation survey was conducted and the exact boundaries were
determined, it was found out that the area is actually 297 and not
250." 20 Such bare testimony does not suffice to clarify the difference in the
area, as shown in the pertinent documents on record. Respondent Enriquez
did not conduct the survey, and it does not appear that he has technical
know-how in this regard. It could have been different had the original tracing
cloth plan been submitted in evidence, since it is the best evidence to identify
a piece of land for registration purposes, 21 or at the very least, the geodetic
engineer who surveyed the property should have testified with regard to the
increase in the area. SITCEA
It should be stressed that a person who seeks registration of title to a piece
of land must prove the claim by clear and convincing evidence, and is duty
bound to identify sufficiently and satisfactorily the property. Otherwise
stated, all facts must indicate that no other person, including the
Page | 11
government, will be prejudiced by the adjudication of the land to the
applicant. 22
Given respondents' failure to identify with certainty the area of Parcel 2 as
described in Lot Psu-05-006497-D, the RTC should have therefore denied the
application for registration of title over said property.
The foregoing conclusion, however, does not hold true with regard to Lot
1711, Pls-488-D. All the evidence on record sufficiently identified the
property as the one applied for by respondents, and containing the
corresponding metes and bounds as well as area. Consequently, the original
tracing cloth plan need not be presented in evidence, applying the exception
set forth in the Hubilla 23 and Recto 24 cases.
On the issue of open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession of the
subject lots, the Court will settle the issue only vis-à-vis Lot 1711, Pls-488-D,
since as earlier stated, the application for the registration of title over Parcel
2 should be denied.
In Republic v. Jacob, 25 the Court explained the concept of possession and
occupation referred to in cases of registration of title, viz.:
Indeed, the law speaks of "possession and occupation." Possession is broader
than occupation because it includes constructive possession. Unless,
therefore, the law adds the word "occupation," it seeks to delimit the all-
encompassing effect of constructive possession. Taken together with the
words "continuous," "exclusive" and "notorious," the word "occupation"
seems to highlight the facts that for an applicant to qualify, her possession of
the property must not be a mere fiction.
Actual possession of a land consists in the manifestation of acts of dominion
of such a nature as a party would naturally exercise over her own property.
A mere casual cultivation of portions of land by the claimant does not
constitute sufficient basis for a claim of ownership. Such possession is not
exclusive and notorious as it gives rise to a presumptive grant from the State.
The applicant is burdened to offer proof of specific acts of ownership to
substantiate the claim over the land. The good faith of the person consists in
the reasonable belief that the person from whom she received the property
was the owner thereof and could transfer ownership.
Records bear out that Lot 1711, Pls-488-D was originally part of a 707-square
meter property owned by Concepcion Pabico. In an Escritura de Compra
Venta dated April 23, 1941, the property was sold to Tomas
Cootauco. 26 After the death of Cootauco, his heirs sold the property, which
was already partitioned into to two portions, Parcel 1 consisting of 455
square meters and Parcel 2 consisting of 250 square meters, to Rosalinda
Buñag Oloya by virtue of a "Deed of Absolute Sale" dated October 22,
1992. 27 The sale was confirmed in an "Extra-Judicial Settlement of Estate
with Confirmation of Sale" executed on October 22, 1992. 28 Oloya, in turn,
sold these two parcels of land to respondents in a "Deed of Absolute Sale"
dated December 2, 1994. 29
Records also show that as early as 1963, Cootauco has already declared Lot
1711, Pls-488-D for taxation purposes, 30 and realty taxes have been paid
thereon since 1964. 31 It has been ruled that while tax declarations and
realty tax payment of property are not conclusive evidence of ownership,
nevertheless, they are good indicia of the possession in the concept of owner
for no one in his right mind would be paying taxes for a property that is not
in his actual or at least constructive possession. They constitute at least proof
that the holder has a claim of title over the property. The voluntary
declaration of a piece of property for taxation purposes manifests not only
one's sincere and honest desire to obtain title to the property and announces
his adverse claim against the State and all other interested parties, but also
the intention to contribute needed revenues to the Government. Such an act
strengthens one's bona fide claim of acquisition of ownership. 32
Given the sufficiency of proof of respondents' compliance with the legal
requirements, in that Lot 1711, Pls-488-D has been identified with certainty,
and that respondents and their predecessor-in-interest have been in open,
continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of the same
since 1963, or for 34 years, the application for the registration of title of Lot
1711, Pls-488-D was therefore correctly granted by the RTC and affirmed by
the CA.
WHEREFORE, the petition is PARTIALLY GRANTED. The Decision dated
November 28, 2003 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 68973 affirming
the Decision of the Regional Trial Court is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION to
the effect that the Decision of the Regional Trial Court dated September 28,
1998 is MODIFIED whereby the application for original registration of the
297-square meter parcel of land described in plan Psu-05-006497-D is
DENIED.
SO ORDERED.
||| (Republic v. Spouses Enriquez, G.R. No. 160990, [September 11, 2006],
533 PHIL 87-100)
[G.R. No. 157593. March 22, 2007.]
SPS. ALBERTO and JOCELYN AZANA, petitioners, vs. CRISTOPHER LUMBO
and ELIZABETH LUMBO-JIMENEZ, respondents.
DECISION
CORONA, J p:
In this appeal by certiorari, spouses Alberto and Jocelyn Azana assail the
decision 1 dated September 17, 2002 and resolution 2 dated March 12, 2003
of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 60973. After a re-evaluation
of the evidence on record, the appellate court held that the trial court's
factual findings were contrary to the evidence presented and, on that basis,
reversed the latter's ruling.
Originally, respondents filed an action for quieting of title 3 in the Regional
Trial Court (RTC) of Kalibo, Aklan. The subject matter of the action was a piece
of real property located in the island of Boracay, a prime tourist destination.
It was designated as Lot 64 during the national reservation survey of Boracay
on April 14, 1976.
Respondents alleged that they were the owners of Lot 64. They claimed that,
in a deed of absolute sale dated December 1, 1996, the spouses Emilio and
Estela Gregorio sold Lot 64 to petitioners. This cast a cloud over their title.
To support their claim of ownership, respondents stated that Lot 64 was
originally part of the 8.0488-hectare land bought in a public auction by their
parents, which they inherited entirely; that such sale in the public auction
was evidenced by a final bill of sale dated September 18, 1939; that Lot 64
was separately designated during the national reservation survey only
because it was also being claimed by the spouses Gregorio; and that, if Lots
63 and 64 were combined, the boundaries of the resulting lot coincided with
the boundaries of the lot purchased under the final bill of sale.
For their part, petitioners claim that they purchased Lot 64 from the spouses
Gregorio in good faith; that the spouses Gregorio became the lawful owners
of Lot 64 by virtue of a deed of absolute sale dated March 25, 1976 executed
by Ignacio Bandiola in favor of Estela Gregorio whereby Bandiola transferred
to Gregorio a parcel of land with an area of 3.4768 hectares; and that Lot 64
was part of this 3.4768-hectare land.
According to the RTC of Kalibo, Aklan, respondents failed to establish the
identity of the lot sold under the final bill of sale. Consequently, their claim
of title over Lot 64 also had to fail. In the words of the court a quo:
Assaying the evidence presented by the parties in relation to their respective
submissions, the Court noted that the land acquired by [respondents']
parents at the public auction is not solely bounded on the North and East by
[the] Visayan Sea, but also by Anunciacion Gelito and Guillermo Sualog,
respectively. Indeed, [respondents] own survey plan discloses that Lots 63
and 64 [are] bounded by Lot 62 and seashore.
Hence, it is not clear that the land acquired by [respondents'] parents at an
auction sale includes Lot 64. The Court could probably sustain [respondents']
theory if the said land is solely bounded on the North and East by [the]
Visayan Sea or seashore. There would be no space for any intervening
lot. 4 (citations omitted)
Finding equiponderance of evidence, 5 the trial court ruled in favor of
petitioners and upheld the validity of the sale of Lot 64 to them.
On review, the CA arrived at a different conclusion. It declared respondents
as owners of Lot 64 and nullified the sale by the spouses Gregorio to
petitioners. The appellate court agreed with respondents that Lot 64 was
part of the 8.0488-hectare property described in the final bill of sale. As
opposed to the findings of the trial court, the appellate court was satisfied
that the boundaries of the lot resulting from the merger of Lots 63 and 64
coincided with the boundaries of the 8.0488 hectare property. Moreover, the
CA noted that the areas of Lots 63 and 64 were 7.0300 hectares and 1.2012
hectares respectively, meaning that the area resulting from the combination
of the two lots was equivalent to "8.0000 hectares, more or less, which [was]
the total area being claimed by the [respondents]". 6
Aggrieved, the spouses Gregorio and the spouses Azana filed in this Court
separate petitions for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of
Court. The petitions were separately docketed as G.R. No. 157617 7 and G.R.
No. 157593, respectively. The Court instantly denied both petitions for
essentially raising questions of fact which are generally beyond our review.
Thereafter, both the Gregorios and petitioners filed their respective motions
for reconsideration. The Court denied the MR 8 of the spouses Gregorio, in
effect denying G.R. No. 157617 with finality.
Meanwhile, the MR of the spouses Azana was granted. As a general rule, it is
not the Supreme Court's function to review, examine and evaluate or weigh
the probative value of the evidence presented. 9 The factual findings of the
trial and appellate courts are binding on this Court and are given great weight
and respect. 10 However, the rule is not absolute. In instances where there
is divergence in the findings and conclusions of the trial court, on one hand,
and the appellate court, on the other, the Court may give the petition due
course and re-examine the evidence on record. 11 Satisfied that the
foregoing exception applies to this case, the Court ordered the reinstatement
of G.R. No. 157593 (this petition).
Page | 12
Respondents oppose the petition on the ground that it is already barred by
prior judgment. They argue that the dismissal of the Gregorios' petition (G.R.
No. 157617) was a final judgment constituting a bar to the institution of a
similar petition.
Respondents' position is incorrect. Res judicata calls for the concurrence of
the following requisites: (1) there is final judgment or order; (2) the court
rendering it has jurisdiction over the subject matter and the parties; (3) the
judgment or order is on the merits and (4) there is, between the two cases,
identity of parties, subject matter and causes of action. 12 Here, the first
requisite is absent. The Court's resolution denying the spouses Gregorio's
petition is not the final judgment contemplated by the first requisite. Rather,
"final judgment" entails a decision which perpetually settles the controversy
and lays to rest all questions raised. At that point, there was no final
judgment because the spouses Azana's appeal of the CA decision was still
pending before us. Stated differently, there was yet no final judgment which
could be entered and executed.
We now proceed to consider the documents relied upon by the parties.
To prove their claim, petitioners submitted a deed of absolute sale of real
property 13 dated March 25, 1976 to show that Ignacio Bandiola sold to
Estela Gregorio 3.4768 hectares of land located in Manoc-Manoc, Malay,
Aklan. The property was particularly described as follows:
THE PORTION SOLD CONSISTS of 3.4768 hectares, more or less, located at
the southern side of the whole parcel and with the following pertinent
boundaries: on the North by Visayan Sea and Ernesto Bandiola; on the East
by Visayan Sea; on the South by Felicitas Lumbo, D. Pelayo, and D. Magapi;
and on the West by Teodorica Bandiola. 14
They also presented the corresponding tax declaration 15 which reiterated
the same property boundaries.
Petitioners point out that a portion of this property was separately declared
for realty tax purposes under ARP/TD No. 93-011-1020/1021 as Lot 64 with
an area of 1.48 hectares. 16 The tax declaration indicated that the
boundaries of Lot 64 were:
North: Visayan Sea South: Lot 63
West: lot 99-pt East: Visayan Sea
In the hope of strengthening their case, petitioners narrated the supposed
origin of the disputed property. They claimed that the 3.4768-hectare
property was taken from the consolidated lots owned by Ignacio
Bandiola, i.e., three contiguous parcels of land with individual areas of 8.7766
hectares, 6550 square-meters and 4994 square-meters. 17 From this land
mass, Ignacio Bandiola carved out 3.4768 hectares and sold the same to
Estela Gregorio. Allegedly, this portion included Lot 64 which Estela Gregorio,
in turn, sold to petitioners. cEDaTS
Granting for the sake of argument that petitioners' preceding allegations are
true, it follows that Ignacio Bandiola's lots, if taken as one, must have
extended to the Visayan Sea in the east to have roped in Lot 64. It also follows
that at least one of the lots should have the Visayan Sea as its eastern
boundary. However, this conclusion is belied by the tax declarations
petitioners themselves presented. Not one of the tax declarations stated that
any of Bandiola's lots was bound in the east by the Visayan Sea. On the
contrary, all the tax declarations stated that each of the lots was bound in
the east by a particular land mass:
Tax Declaration No. 3066
Land Area: 8.7766 hectares
Boundaries: North — Visayan Sea
East — Lorenzo Lumbo,
Vanancio Maming
West — Conchita Tirol, Visayan Sea
South — Moises Pelayo, Paula Gelito 18
Tax Declaration No. 3087
Land Area: 0.6550 hectare
Boundaries: North — Visayan Sea
East — Felicitas Alag de Lumbo
West — Felicitas Alag de Lumbo
South — Quirica Lumbo 19
Tax Declaration No. 3068
Land Area: 0.4994 hectare
Boundaries: North — Ignacio Bandiola
East — Anunciacion Gelito and
F.A. Lumbo
West — Ignacio Bandiola
South — Gertrudes Casimero &
Salvador Magapi 20
Petitioners strained to explain the discrepancy by pointing out that "Lot 64
was but a mere portion of the three parcels of land covered by the [three]
tax declarations. . . . . It [was] therefore, quite unlikely that Lot 64 would have
the exact same boundaries as any or all of these [three] parcels." 21
We find their explanation wanting. If, indeed, Lot 64 was part of Ignacio
Bandiola's mass of properties it would have been in its south-east corner,
occupying part of its southern and eastern perimeter. 22 Therefore, the
parcels of land covered by the three tax declarations must reflect southern
and/or eastern boundaries similar to those of Lot 64. But, as explained
earlier, none of the lots was enclosed or partly enclosed in the east by the
sea. It is highly unlikely that the corner portion of the mother property would
not have similar boundaries as those of the latter on at least two
sides. CDAcIT
The Court is not inclined to pronounce which of the documents presented by
petitioners is true and correct. It is enough to say that the evidence they
presented cast doubt on the validity of their claim. Petitioners failed to
establish, by preponderance of evidence, the exact perimeters of the land
which they claim as their own.
On the other hand, respondents anchor their claim over Lot 64 on a final bill
of sale 23 dated September 18, 1939. Apparently, the document was
executed in favor of Lorenzo and Felicitas Lumbo who bought an 8.0488-
hectare property in a public auction. It stated:
That on September 30, 1937, the real property under Tax Declaration No.
6523 was forfeited to the Government in the manner and form prescribed by
Act 3995 known as the Assessment Law, for non-payment of land taxes
corresponding to the years 1931 to 1937, inclusive, the description of which
follows:
A parcel of cocal land situated in the barrio of Manocmanoc, municipality of
Buruanga, province of Capiz, Philippines, having an area of 80, 488 square
meters more or less. Bounded on the North by Visayan Sea; on the East by
the property of Guillermo Sualog and Visayan Sea; on the South by the
property of Moises Pelayo; and on the West by the properties of Venancio
Maming and Lucino Gelito, and assessed at P1040.00. . . . . 24
The trial court discredited the final bill of sale by highlighting the fact that the
property bought at the public auction was not solely bound on the north and
east by the Visayan Sea but also by the properties of Anuncion Gelito and
Guillermo Sualog, respectively. With this, the trial court deduced that there
was an intervening space which should not have been there if the lot referred
to in the document included Lot 64. Thus, the final bill of sale must pertain
to a different parcel of land.
We find the trial court's conclusion inaccurate. The Gelito and Sualog
properties were not located between the Visayan Sea and the disputed
property. Otherwise, the tax declarations and final bill of sale would have
indicated that the Lumbo property was solely bound in the north by the
Gelito property and in the east by the Sualog property. A cursory look at the
survey map 25 reveals that the perimeter of the Lumbo property ran along
the Visayan Sea and Gelito's property in the north, and the Visayan Sea and
Sualog's property in the east. Naturally, the tax declarations and final bill of
sale included the two properties mentioned as part of the boundaries of the
Lumbo property. AEIcSa
Petitioners underscore the seeming irregularities in the description of the
property under the final bill of sale, a deed of sale dated May 20, 1939 and
the tax declarations for the years 1991 and 1993 in the names of
respondents. They posit that these irregularities negate respondents' claim
of legal or equitable title and ultimately justify the resolution of the case in
their favor.
A deed of absolute sale 26 was executed on May 20, 1939 between
Pantaleon Maming and the respondents' parents, stipulating the sale to the
Lumbos of "an approximate area of [five hectares], being a part of the land
under Tax No. 6523 in the name of Pantaleon Maming. . . ". 27 Petitioners
emphasize the fact that the property sold under the final bill of sale was the
same lot under Tax Declaration No. 6523. This discrepancy supposedly
blurred the identification of the property claimed by respondents.
We disagree.
The CA sufficiently reconciled the difference in the land areas in the two
deeds:
. . . . It may be asked why there were two deeds of sale covering the same
property. We find credence in [respondents'] explanation. The public auction
was held on 13 September 1938 and therefore Pantaleon Maming had up to
13 September 1939 to redeem the property. Before the expiration of the
period of redemption, Lorenzo Lumbo bought [five] hectares of the [eight]-
hectare property in an attempt, as [respondents] put it, to persuade Maming
not to redeem the property. This can be inferred from the price of P500.00
he paid for the [five] hectares while in the auction sale held, he bought the
entire 8.0488 hectares for only P56.78. . . . 28
Next, petitioners highlight the tax declarations filed by respondents for the
years 1991 29 and 1993 30 covering Lot 63 only. In the absence of contrary
evidence, tax declarations, being official documents, enjoy a presumption of
truth as to their contents. Petitioners contend that, unlike them, respondents
Page | 13
never actually declared Lot 64 as theirs and cannot therefore claim
ownership of the property.
Jurisprudence is consistent that tax declarations are not conclusive evidence
of ownership of the properties stated therein. 31 A disclaimer is even printed
on their face that they are "issued only in connection with real property
taxation [and] should not be considered as title to the property." At best, tax
declarations are an indicia of possession in the concept of an
owner. 32 However, non-declaration of a property for tax purposes does not
necessarily negate ownership. 33
From the foregoing, the fact that both tax declarations in the names of
respondents covered Lot 63 only did not necessarily mean they did not own
Lot 64 as they were in fact able to present a document evidencing ownership
of both properties — he final bill of sale. TDAHCS
Clearly, respondents have been able to establish by preponderance of
evidence that they are the rightful owners of Lot 64.
When an owner of real property is disturbed in any way in his rights over the
property by the unfounded claim of others, he may bring an action for
quieting of title. The purpose of the action is to remove the cloud on his title
created by any instrument, record, encumbrance or proceeding which is
apparently valid or effective but is in truth and in fact invalid and prejudicial
to his title. 34
Here, the deeds of sale executed in favor of petitioners and the spouses
Gregorio were prima facie valid and enforceable. However, further scrutiny
and investigation established that petitioners' predecessor-in-interest,
Ignacio Bandiola, could not have owned the disputed lot. Consequently, the
subsequent conveyances of Lot 64 to the spouses Gregorio and thereafter,
to petitioners, were null and void. Therefore, respondents, as the adjudged
owners of Lot 64, are entitled to have the aforementioned deeds of sale
nullified to remove any doubt regarding their ownership of the lot.
While the appellate court adequately explained its decision, it failed to
categorically declare the deeds of sale as null and void in its dispositive
portion. Since it is the dispositive portion of the decision which shall be
carried out, it is important that the status of the deeds of sale be clearly
stated therein.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DENIED. The decision dated September
17, 2002 and resolution dated March 12, 2003 of the Court of Appeals are
AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION that the deed of absolute sale dated
March 25, 1976, in so far as it covers Lot 64, and the deed of absolute sale
dated December 1, 1996 are hereby declared null and void.
Costs against petitioners. ETDHaC
SO ORDERED.
||| (Spouses Azana v. Lumbo, G.R. No. 157593, [March 22, 2007], 547 PHIL
598-610)
[G.R. No. 168222. April 18, 2006.]
SPS. TEODULO RUMARATE, (deceased) and ROSITA RUMARATE; deceased
TEODULO RUMARATE is represented herein by his Heirs/Substitutes,
namely, ANASTACIA RUMARATE, CELSO RUMARATE, MARINA RUMARATE,
ROMEO RUMARATE, GUILLERMO RUMARATE, FIDEL RUMARATE,
MERLINDA RUMARATE, MARISSA RUMARATE, CLEMENCIA RUMARATE,
SANCHO RUMARATE and NENITA RUMARATE, petitioners, vs. HILARIO
HERNANDEZ, JOAQUIN HERNANDEZ, SALVADOR HERNANDEZ, BENJAMIN
HERNANDEZ, LEONORA HERNANDEZ-LAZA, VICTORIA HERNANDEZ-
MERCURIO, RODRIGO HERNANDEZ, BERNARDO HERNANDEZ, LOURDES
HERNANDEZ-CABIDA, MARIO SALVATIERRA, ADELAIDA FONTILA-
CIPRIANO, and THE REGISTER OF DEEDS OF QUEZON
PROVINCE, respondents.
DECISION
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J p:
Assailed in this petition for review is the May 26, 2005 Decision 1 of the Court
of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 57053, which reversed and set aside the March
31, 1997 Decision 2 of the Regional Trial Court of Calauag, Quezon, Branch
63, in Civil Case No. C-964, declaring petitioners as owners of Lot No. 379
with an area of 187,765 square meters and located in Barrio
Catimo, 3 Municipality of Guinayangan, Province of Quezon.
The facts show that on September 1, 1992, petitioner spouses Teodulo
Rumarate (Teodulo) and Rosita Rumarate filed an action for reconveyance of
real property and/or quieting of title with damages against respondent heirs
of the late spouses Cipriano Hernandez and Julia Zoleta. 4 Teodulo averred
that Lot No. 379 was previously possessed and cultivated by his godfather,
Santiago Guerrero (Santiago), a bachelor, who used to live with the Rumarate
family in San Pablo City. Between 1923 and 1924, Santiago and the Rumarate
family transferred residence to avail of the land distribution in Catimo,
Guinayangan, Quezon. From 1925 to 1928, Santiago occupied Lot No. 379
cultivating five hectares thereof. Before moving to Kagakag, Lopez, Quezon
in 1929, Santiago orally bequeathed his rights over Lot No. 379 to Teodulo
and entrusted to him a copy of a Decision of the Court of First Instance (CFI)
of Tayabas dated April 21, 1925 recognizing his (Santiago) rights over Lot No.
379. 5Since Teodulo was only 14 years old then, his father helped him
cultivate the land. 6 Their family thereafter cleared the land, built a
house 7 and planted coconut trees, corn, palay and vegetables thereon. 8 In
1960, Santiago executed an "Affidavit (quit-claim)" 9 ratifying the transfer of
his rights over Lot No. 379 to Teodulo. Between 1960 and 1970, three
conflagrations razed the land reducing the number of coconut trees growing
therein to only 400, but by the time Teodulo testified in 1992, the remaining
portions of the land was almost entirely cultivated and planted with
coconuts, coffee, jackfruits, mangoes and vegetables. 10 From 1929, Teodulo
and later, his wife and 11 children possessed the land as owners and declared
the same for taxation, the earliest being in 1961. 11
In 1970, Teodulo discovered that spouses Cipriano Hernandez and Julia
Zoleta, respondents' predecessors-in-interest, were able to obtain a title
over Lot No. 379. He did not immediately file a case against respondents
because he was advised to just remain on the land and pay the corresponding
taxes thereon. 12
Respondents, on the other hand, claimed that on November 11, 1964,
Santiago sold the questioned lot to their parents, the spouses Cipriano
Hernandez and Julia Zoleta, for P9,000.00. 13 Respondents alleged that on
April 21, 1925, the CFI of Tayabas rendered a Decision written in Spanish,
declaring Lot No. 379 as a public land and recognizing Santiago as claimant
thereof in Cadastral Proceeding No. 12. However, no title was issued to
Santiago because he failed to file an Answer. Spouses Cipriano Hernandez
and Julia Zoleta filed a motion to re-open Cadastral Proceeding No. 12,
alleging that though no title was issued in the name of Santiago, the same
decision is, nevertheless, proof that Santiago was in possession of Lot No.
379 since 1925 or for more than 30 years. Having succeeded in the rights of
Santiago, the spouses prayed that Cadastral Proceeding No. 12 be re-opened
and that the corresponding title over Lot No. 379 be issued in their name. On
September 13, 1965, the CFI of Tayabas rendered a decision adjudicating Lot
No. 379 in favor of the spouses, in whose name Original Certificate of Title
(OCT) No. O-11844 14 was issued on the same date. 15 Cipriano Hernandez
planted coconut trees on the land through the help of a certain Fredo 16 who
was instituted as caretaker. In 1970, Fredo informed Cipriano Hernandez that
he will no longer stay on the land because there are people instructing him
to discontinue tilling the same. 17
After the death of the spouses, 18 respondents executed a deed of partition
over the subject lot and were issued TCT No. T-237330 on June 28, 1988 in
lieu of OCT No. O-11844. 19
Respondent Joaquin Hernandez (Joaquin) testified that in 1964, he
accompanied his father in inspecting the lot which was then planted with
coconut trees. 20 Thereafter, he visited the land twice, once in 1966 and the
other in 1970. From 1966 up to the time he testified, his family declared the
lot for taxation and paid the taxes due thereon. 21 Joaquin explained that
after the death of his father in 1971, he no longer visited the land and it was
only when the complaint was filed against them when he learned that
petitioners are in actual possession of the property. 22 He added that his
siblings had planned to convert Lot No. 379 into a grazing land for cattle but
decided to put it off for fear of the rampant operations then of the New
People's Army between the years 1965-1970. 23
On March 31, 1997, the trial court rendered a decision in favor of petitioners.
It held that since the latter possessed the land in the concept of an owner
since 1929, they became the owners thereof by acquisitive prescription after
the lapse of 10 years, pursuant to the Code of Civil Procedure. Thus, when
Santiago sold the lot to respondents' parents in 1964, the former no longer
had the right over the property and therefore transmitted no title to said
respondents. The dispositive portion of the trial court's decision, reads:
WHEREFORE, in the light of all the foregoing considerations judgment is
hereby rendered in favor of the plaintiffs and against the defendants, to wit:
1. Declaring that the parcel of land (Lot No. 379 of the Cadastral Survey of
Guinayangan, Cadastral Case No. 12, LRC Cadastral Record No. 557), situated
in Brgy. Katimo, Tagkawayan, Quezon had been fraudulently, deceitfully and
mistakenly registered in the names of the spouses Cipriano Hernandez and
Julia Zoleta;
2. Declaring that herein defendants [heirs] of spouses Cipriano Hernandez
and Julia Zoleta have no better rights than their parents/predecessors-in-
interest, they having stepped only on (sic) their shoes;
3. Declaring that the plaintiff Rosita Victor Rumarate and substitute
plaintiffs-[heirs] of the deceased Teodulo Rumarate are the true, real and
legal owners/or the owners in fee simple absolute of the above described
parcel of land;
4. Ordering the defendants to convey the above-described parcel of land to
plaintiff Rosita Victor Rumarate and to the substitute plaintiffs (heirs) of the
deceased Teodulo Rumarate;
5. Ordering the Register of Deeds for Quezon Province in Lucena City to
cancel Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-237330 and to issue in lieu thereof a
new certificate of title in favor of plaintiff Rosita Victor Rumarate and the
substitute plaintiffs (heirs) of the deceased plaintiff Teodulo Rumarate, in
accordance with law and settled jurisprudence; and HCEcAa
Page | 14
6. Ordering the defendants to pay the costs of the suit.
SO ORDERED. 24
Respondents appealed to the Court of Appeals which on May 26, 2005,
reversed and set aside the decision of the trial court. It ruled that Teodulo
did not acquire title over Lot No. 379, either by donation or acquisitive
prescription; that Teodulo's bare allegation that Santiago orally bequeathed
to him the litigated lot is insufficient to prove such transfer of ownership; and
that even assuming that the property was truly donated by Santiago to
Teodulo in 1929, or in the 1960 Affidavit, said conveyance is void for not
complying with the formalities of a valid donation which require the donation
and the acceptance thereof by the donee to be embodied in a public
instrument. Both requirements, however, are absent in this case because in
1929, the alleged donation was not reduced to writing while the purported
1960 donation was never accepted in a public document by Teodulo. The
appellate court thus surmised that since it was not established that Santiago
donated Lot No. 379 to Teodulo, it follows that the latter also failed to prove
that he possessed the land adversely, exclusively and in the concept of an
owner, a vital requisite before one may acquire title by acquisitive
prescription. In conclusion, the Court of Appeals ruled that even assuming
further that Teodulo had a right over the property, his cause of action is now
barred by laches because he filed an action only in 1992 notwithstanding
knowledge as early as 1970 of the issuance of title in the name of spouses
Cipriano Hernandez and Julia Zoleta. The decretal portion of the decision
states:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant appeal is GRANTED. The
assailed March 31, 1997 decision of the Regional Trial Court of Calauag,
Quezon, Branch 63, inCivil Case No. C-964 is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
No costs.
SO ORDERED. 25
Hence, the instant appeal.
The issue to be resolved is to whom should Lot No. 379 be awarded? To
petitioners who possessed and cultivated the lot since 1929 up to the
present, but do not have a certificate of title over the property, or to
respondents who have a certificate of title but are not in possession of the
controverted lot?
In an action for quieting of title, the court is tasked to determine the
respective rights of the parties so that the complainant and those claiming
under him may be forever free from any danger of hostile claim. 26 Under
Article 476 27 of the Civil Code, the remedy may be availed of only when, by
reason of any instrument, record, claim, encumbrance or proceeding, which
appears valid but is, in fact, invalid, ineffective, voidable or unenforceable, a
cloud is thereby cast on the complainant's title to real property or any
interest therein. Article 477 of the same Code states that the plaintiff must
have legal or equitable title to, or interest in the real property which is the
subject matter of the suit. DIECTc
For an action to quiet title to prosper, two indispensable requisites must
concur, namely: (1) the plaintiff or complainant has a legal or an equitable
title to or interest in the real property subject of the action; and (2) the deed,
claim, encumbrance or proceeding claimed to be casting cloud on his title
must be shown to be in fact invalid or inoperative despite its prima
facie appearance of validity or legal efficacy. 28
In Evangelista v. Santiago, 29 it was held that title to real property refers to
that upon which ownership is based. It is the evidence of the right of the
owner or the extent of his interest, by which means he can maintain control
and, as a rule, assert a right to exclusive possession and enjoyment of the
property.
In the instant case, we find that Teodulo's open, continuous, exclusive,
notorious possession and occupation of Lot No. 379, in the concept of an
owner for more than 30 years vested him and his heirs title over the said lot.
The law applicable at the time Teodulo completed his 30-year possession
(from 1929 to 1959) of Lot No. 379, in the concept of an owner was Sec. 48(b)
of Commonwealth Act No. 141 or the Public Land Act, as amended by
Republic Act (RA) No. 1942, effective June 22, 1957 30 which provides:
Sec. 48. The following-described citizens of the Philippines, occupying lands
of the public domain or claiming to own any such lands or an interest therein,
but whose titles have not been perfected or completed, may apply to the
Court of First Instance (now Regional Trial Courts) of the province where the
land is located for confirmation of their claims and the issuance of a
certificate of title thereafter, under the Land Registration Act (now Property
Registration Decree), to wit:
xxx xxx xxx
(b) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest have
been, in continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation of
agricultural lands of the public domain, under a bona fide claim of acquisition
or ownership, for at least thirty years immediately preceding the filing of the
application for confirmation of title, except when prevented by war or force
majeure. Those shall be conclusively presumed to have performed all the
conditions essential to a government grant and shall be entitled to a
certificate of title under the provisions of this chapter.
When the conditions specified therein are complied with, the possessor is
deemed to have acquired, by operation of law, a right to a government grant,
without necessity of a certificate of title being issued, and the land ceases to
be part of the public domain. The confirmation proceedings would, in truth
be little more than a formality, at the most limited to ascertaining whether
the possession claimed is of the required character and length of time; and
registration thereunder would not confer title, but simply recognize a title
already vested. The proceedings would not originally convert the land from
public to private land, but only confirm such conversion already effected by
operation of law from the moment the required period of possession became
complete. 31
In the instant case, the trial court gave full faith and credence to the
testimony of Teodulo and his witnesses that his (Teodulo's) possession of the
land since 1929 was open, continuous, adverse, exclusive, and in the concept
of an owner. It is a settled rule in civil cases as well as in criminal cases that
in the matter of credibility of witnesses, the findings of the trial courts are
given great weight and highest degree of respect by the appellate court
considering that the latter is in a better position to decide the question,
having heard the witnesses themselves and observed their deportment and
manner of testifying during the trial. 32
A careful examination of the evidence on record shows that Teodulo
possessed and occupied Lot No. 379 in the concept of an owner. Since 1929,
Teodulo cultivated the controverted land, built his home, and raised his 11
children thereon. In 1957, he filed a homestead application over Lot No. 379
but failed to pursue the same. 33 After his demise, all his 11 children, the
youngest being 28 years old, 34 continued to till the land. From 1929 to 1960,
Santiago never challenged Teodulo's possession of Lot No. 379 nor
demanded or received the produce of said land. For 31 years Santiago never
exercised any act of ownership over Lot No. 379. And, in 1960, he confirmed
that he is no longer interested in asserting any right over the land by
executing in favor of Teodulo a quitclaim. EDcIAC
Indeed, all these prove that Teodulo possessed and cultivated the land as
owner thereof since 1929. While the oral donation in 1929 as well as the 1960
quitclaim ceding Lot No. 379 to Teodulo are void for non-compliance with
the formalities of donation, they nevertheless explain Teodulo and his
family's long years of occupation and cultivation of said lot and the nature of
their possession thereof.
In Bautista v. Poblete, 35 the Court sustained the registration of a parcel of
land in the name of the successors-in-interest of the donee notwithstanding
the invalidity of the donation inasmuch as said donee possessed the property
in the concept of an owner. Thus —
There is no question that the donation in question is invalid because it
involves an immovable property and the donation was not made in a public
document as required by Article 633 of the old Civil Code, in connection with
Article 1328 of the same Code (concerning gifts propter nuptias), but it does
not follow that said donation may not serve as basis of acquisitive
prescription when on the strength thereof the donee has taken possession
of the property adversely and in the concept of owner.
It follows therefore that Teodulo's open, continuous, exclusive, and
notorious possession and occupation of Lot No. 379 for 30 years, or from
1929 to 1959 in the concept of an owner, earned him title over the lot in
accordance with Sec. 48 (b) of the Public Land Act. Considering that Lot No.
379 became the private property of Teodulo in 1959, Santiago had no more
right to sell the same to spouses Cipriano Hernandez and Julia Zoleta in 1964.
Consequently, the latter and herein respondents did not acquire ownership
over Lot No. 379 and the titles issued in their name are void.
Interestingly, respondents adopted the theory that Santiago acquired title
over Lot No. 379 not from the April 21, 1925 Decision of the CFI of Tayabas
which merely recognized his rights over said lot, but from his more than 30
years of possession since 1925 up to 1964 when he sold same lot to their
(respondents) predecessors-in-interest, the spouses Cipriano Hernandez and
Julia Zoleta. On the basis of said claim, said spouses filed an action for, and
successfully obtained, confirmation of imperfect title over Lot No. 379,
pursuant to Sec. 48 (b) of the Public Land Act.
However, the records do not support the argument of respondents that
Santiago's alleged possession and cultivation of Lot No. 379 is in the nature
contemplated bythe Public Land Act which requires more than constructive
possession and casual cultivation. As explained by the Court in Director of
Lands v. Intermediate Appellate Court: 36
It must be underscored that the law speaks of "possession and occupation."
Since these words are separated by the conjunction and, the clear intention
of the law is not to make one synonymous with the other. Possession is
broader than occupation because it includes constructive possession. When,
therefore, the law adds the word occupation, it seeks to delimit the all-
encompassing effect of constructive possession. Taken together with the
words open, continuous, exclusive and notorious, the
word occupation serves to highlight the fact that for one to qualify under
paragraph (b) of the aforesaid section, his possession of the land must not be
Page | 15
mere fiction. As this Court stated, through then Mr. Justice Jose P. Laurel,
in Lasam vs. The Director of Lands:
". . . Counsel for the applicant invokes the doctrine laid down by us in Ramos
vs. Director of Lands (39 Phil. 175, 180). (See also Rosales vs. Director of
Lands, 51 Phil. 302, 304). But it should be observed that the application of
the doctrine of constructive possession in that case is subject to certain
qualifications, and this court was careful to observe that among these
qualifications is 'one particularly relating to the size of the tract in
controversy with reference to the portion actually in possession of the
claimant.' While, therefore, 'possession in the eyes of the law does not mean
that a man has to have his feet on every square meter of ground before it
can be said that he is in possession', possession under paragraph 6 of section
54 of Act No. 926, as amended by paragraph (b) of section 45 of Act No. 2874,
is not gained by mere nominal claim. The mere planting of a sign or symbol
of possession cannot justify a Magellan-like claim of dominion over an
immense tract of territory. Possession as a means of acquiring ownership,
while it may be constructive, is not a mere fiction . . . ." DHITcS
Earlier, in Ramirez vs. The Director of Lands, this Court noted:
". . . The mere fact of declaring uncultivated land for taxation purposes and
visiting it every once in a while, as was done by him, does not constitute acts
of possession."
In the instant case, Santiago's short-lived possession and cultivation of Lot
No. 379 could not vest him title. While he tilled the land in 1925, he ceased
to possess and cultivate the same since 1928. He abandoned the property
and allowed Teodulo to exercise all acts of ownership. His brief possession of
Lot No. 379 could not thus vest him title. Nemo potest plus juris ad alium
transferre quam ipse habet. No one can transfer a greater right to another
than he himself has. Hence, spouses Cipriano Hernandez and Julia Zoleta and
herein respondents did not acquire any right over the questioned lot and the
title issued in their names are void, because of the legal truism that the spring
cannot rise higher than the source. 37
Furthermore, spouses Cipriano Hernandez and Julia Zoleta cannot be
considered as purchasers in good faith because they had knowledge of facts
and circumstances that would impel a reasonably cautious man to make such
inquiry. 38 The Court notes that Santiago was not residing in Lot No. 379 at
the time of the sale. He was already 81 years old, too old to cultivate and
maintain an 18-hectare land. These circumstances should have prompted the
spouses to further inquire who was actually tilling the land. Had they done
so, they would have found that Teodulo and his family are the ones
possessing and cultivating the land as owners thereof.
In the same vein, respondents could not be considered as third persons or
purchasers in good faith and for value or those who buy the property and pay
a full and fair price for the same 39 because they merely inherited Lot No.
379 from spouses Cipriano Hernandez and Julia Zoleta.
Then too, even if Santiago acquired title over Lot No. 379 by virtue of the
April 21, 1925 Decision of the CFI of Tayabas, and not on account of his
alleged 30-year possession thereof, we will still arrive at the same conclusion.
This is so because the declaration of this Court that petitioners are the
rightful owners of the controverted lot is based on Teodulo's own possession
and occupation of said lot under a bona fide claim of acquisition of
ownership, regardless of the manner by which Santiago acquired ownership
over same lot.
On the issue of prescription, the settled rule is that an action for quieting of
title is imprescriptible, as in the instant case, where the person seeking relief
is in possession of the disputed property. A person in actual possession of a
piece of land under claim of ownership may wait until his possession is
disturbed or his title is attacked before taking steps to vindicate his right, and
that his undisturbed possession gives him the continuing right to seek the aid
of a court of equity to ascertain and determine the nature of the adverse
claim of a third party and its effect on his title. 40 Considering that petitioners
herein continuously possessed Lot No. 379 since 1929 up to the present, their
right to institute a suit to clear the cloud over their title cannot be barred by
the statute of limitations. DaTICE
Neither could petitioners' action be barred by laches because they
continuously enjoyed the possession of the land and harvested the fruits
thereof up to the present to the exclusion of and without any interference
from respondents. They cannot therefore be said to have slept on their rights
as they in fact exercised the same by continuously possessing Lot No. 379.
On the contrary, we find that it is respondents who are actually guilty of
laches. Though not specifically pleaded, the Court can properly address the
issue of laches based on petitioners' allegation in the complaint that
"[n]either spouses Cipriano Hernandez and Julia Zoleta . . . nor [herein
respondents] had taken steps to possess or lay adverse claim to said parcel
of land from the date of their registration of title in November, 1965 up to
the present." 41 Such averment is sufficient to impute abandonment of right
on the part of respondents. At any rate, laches need not be specifically
pleaded. On its own initiative, a court may consider it in determining the
rights of the parties. 42
The failure or neglect, for an unreasonable length of time to do that which
by exercising due diligence could or should have been done earlier
constitutes laches. It is negligence or omission to assert a right within a
reasonable time, warranting a presumption that the party entitled to assert
it has either abandoned it or declined to assert it. While it is by express
provision of law that no title to registered land in derogation of that of the
registered owner shall be acquired by prescription or adverse possession, it
is likewise an enshrined rule that even a registered owner may be barred
from recovering possession of property by virtue of laches. 43
In applying the doctrine of laches, we have ruled that where a party allows
the following number of years to lapse from the emergence of his cause of
action without enforcing his claim, laches sets in: 36 years; 12 years; 50 years;
34 years; 37 years; 32 years; 20 years; 47 years; 11 years; 25 years; 40 years;
19 years; 27 years; 7 years; 44 years; 4 years; and 67 years. 44
The elements of laches are: (1) conduct of a party on the basis of which the
other party seeks a remedy; (2) delay in asserting one's rights, despite having
had knowledge or notice of the other party's conduct and having been
afforded an opportunity to institute a suit; (3) lack of knowledge or notice on
the part of a party that the person against whom laches is imputed would
assert the right; and (4) injury or prejudice to the party asserting laches in the
event the suit is allowed to prosper. 45
All these elements are present in this case. Petitioners' continuous
possession and occupation of Lot No. 379 should have prompted the
respondents to file an action against petitioners, but they chose not to.
Respondents cannot deny knowledge of said possession by petitioners as
they even asserted in their Answer that in 1970, Teodulo ousted the tenant
they (respondents) instituted in the lot. From 1970 up to the filing of
petitioners' complaint in 1992, or after 22 years, respondents never bothered
to assert any right over Lot No. 379. Respondent Joaquin Hernandez testified
that he and his siblings had a plan to convert the land into a grazing land for
cattle but decided to put it off for fear of the rampant operations of the New
People's Army between the years 1965-1970. However, even after said years,
respondents took no step to implement their plan. Worse, among the siblings
of spouses Cipriano Hernandez and Julia Zoleta who are all living in the
Philippines, 46 only Joaquin Hernandez visited the land and only thrice, i.e.,
once in each years of 1964, 1966 and 1970. Thereafter, not one of them paid
visit to Lot No. 379, up to the time Joaquin Hernandez testified in
1996, 47 despite the fact that two of them are living only in Calauag, Quezon;
one in Agdangan, Quezon; 48 and two in Lucena City. 49 Neither did they
send a notice or correspondence to petitioners invoking their right over the
property. From all indications, the late spouses Cipriano Hernandez and Julia
Zoleta as well respondents, have neglected Lot No. 379. Were it not for this
action instituted by petitioners in 1992, their conflicting claims over the
property could not have been settled. It goes without saying that to lose a
property that has been in the family from 1929 up to the present, or for 77
years will certainly cause irreparable pecuniary and moral injury to
petitioners, especially so if the same ancestral land will be lost under most
unfair circumstances in favor of respondents who appear to have no real
interest in cultivating the same.
Finally, payment of taxes alone will not save the day for respondents. Only a
positive and categorical assertion of their supposed rights against petitioners
would rule out the application of laches. It means taking the offensive by
instituting legal means to wrest possession of the property which, however,
is absent in this case. Respondents' payment of taxes alone, without
possession could hardly be construed as an exercise of ownership. What
stands out is their overwhelming passivity by allowing petitioners to exercise
acts of ownership and to enjoy the fruits of the litigated lot for 22 years
without any interference.
In sum, the Court finds that Lot No. 379 should be adjudicated in favor of
petitioners.
One last point. Notwithstanding this Court's declaration that Lot No. 379
should be awarded in favor of petitioners, their title over the same is
imperfect and is still subject to the filing of the proper application for
confirmation of title under Section 48 (b) of the Public Land Act, where the
State and other oppositors may be given the chance to be heard. It was
therefore premature for the trial court to direct the Register of Deeds of
Lucena City to issue a certificate of title in the name of petitioners. HcaDIA
Nevertheless, the imperfect title of petitioners over Lot No. 379 is enough to
defeat the certificate of title issued to respondents. 50
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED and the May 26, 2005 Decision of the
Court of Appeals in C.A.-G.R. CV No. 57053, is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The
March 31, 1997 Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Calauag, Quezon,
Branch 63, in Civil Case No. C-964, awarding Lot No. 379 in favor petitioners
and ordering the cancellation of respondents' Transfer Certificate of Title No.
T-237330, is REINSTATED with the MODIFICATION deleting the trial court's
order directing the Register of Deed of Lucena City to issue a certificate of
title in the name of petitioners.
SO ORDERED.
||| (Spouses Rumarate v. Hernandez, G.R. No. 168222, [April 18, 2006], 521
PHIL 447-468)
Page | 16
[G.R No. L-17951 February 28, 1963.]
CONRADO C. FULE and LOURDES E. ARAGON, petitioners, vs. EMILIA E. DE
LEGARE and COURT OF APPEALS, respondents.
Teehankee, Tañada & Carreon for petitioners.
Ignacio M. Orendain for respondents.
DECISION
REGALA, J p:
This is a petition for certiorari to review the decision of the Court of Appeals,
promulgated on November 16, 1960, in Civil Case No. 15728-R, entitled
"Emilia E. Legare, plaintiff-appellant, versus, Conrado C. Fule and Lourdes F.
Aragon, defendants-appellants.
The facts of this case as found by the Court of Appeals in its decision are as
follows:
"This is an action for annulment of certain deeds of sale and conveyance
covering a parcel of land, together with the improvements existing thereon,
situated in the municipality of San Juan, province of Rizal, and for damages.
"It appears in evidence that the plaintiff, Emilia E. de Legare, was the owner
of a parcel of land, together with a residential house erected thereon,
situated at No. 146 Sta. Mesa Boulevard Extension, San Juan, Rizal, her
ownership being evidenced by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 21253, issued
by the Office of the Register of Deeds of the Province of Rizal. She was living
in that house together with defendant John W. Legare, her adopted son, and
a maid named Purita Tarrosa. On September 26, 1951, the plaintiff, thru a
public deed, constituted on the above mentioned house and lot a first class
mortgage in favor of defendant Tomas Q. Soriano to guarantee the payment
of a loan in the amount of P8,000.00. This deed of mortgage was on the same
date recorded in the Office of the Register of Deeds of the province of Rizal
and annotated in the memorandum of encumbrances of transfer certificate
of title No. 21253. On account of certain partial payments made by the
plaintiff and the contracting by the latter of additional loans in small amounts
from Tomas Q. Soriano the debt guaranteed by the above mentioned
mortgage was reduced to the sum of P7,000.00 as of February 23, 1953.
These transactions, however, were not annotated on the memorandum of
encumbrances of the above mentioned certificate of title.
"At about 9:00 o'clock in the evening of March 29, 1953, while the plaintiff,
John W. Legare, and Purita Tarrosa were seated in the drawing room of the
house above referred to, an unknown man intruded into the room,
approached the plaintiff, covered her mouth, and, pressing a knife on her
side, demanded that she give him P10,000.00 if she did not like to be killed.
The plaintiff replied that she did not have that amount. Thereupon, the
intruder told the plaintiff to raise the necessary amount as he would come
back the following morning, and once more threatened to kill her if she
would fail to do so. After having made that threat, the intruder left the house.
John W. Legare did not call for help nor made any attempt to defend his
mother, and when Purita Tarrosa stood up to go down the house to call for a
policeman, he held the latter by the hand and slapped her on the face when
she persisted in going down, telling her that the man had companions waiting
downstairs.
"After the intruder was gone John W. Legare approached the plaintiff, and
exhibiting to her a paper told her to sign it as with the same he could secure
from the U.S. Veterans Administration the amount which they needed to
deliver to that intruder. The plaintiff, who did not know how to read nor
write, altho she could sign her name, asked John W. Legare what that paper
was. The latter answered that it was an application for payment of
compensation. As plaintiff had confidence in John W. Legare and prior to that
occasion she had received from the U.S. Veterans Administration a letter
concerning some compensation she was to receive, she signed that paper.
After the paper was signed by the plaintiff, John W. Legare had Purita Tarrosa
sign it as a witness, without however, allowing the latter to read it.
"After that paper was thus signed, John W. Legare told the plaintiff and Purita
Tarrosa to pack up their things as they were leaving the house to hide in a
hotel, adding that the men who came earlier that evening were Huks. Early
the next morning John W. Legare took the plaintiff and Purita Tarrosa to the
Windsor Hotel in the City of Manila, and after conducting them to a room in
the hotel, told them not to leave the room nor peep out of the window as
they might be seen by the men who came to their house in the previous
evening. This advice given John W. Legare left the hotel. The plaintiff and
Purita Tarrosa stayed in that hotel for about a month and a half. John W.
Legare occasionally visited them there. In one of said occasional visits the
plaintiff told John that she wanted to go home. The latter told her that it was
not yet safe for her to go home. On May 7, 1953, however, John W. Legare
came to the hotel, gave the plaintiff a five peso bill, and told her that she
could use the amount for transportation expenses if she wanted to leave the
hotel. On the following morning the plaintiff and Purita Tarrosa left the hotel
and went direct to her house at Sta. Mesa Boulevard Extension. When they
arrived at the house, however, they found that it was occupied by strangers,
and that all her furniture and personal belongings had disappeared. Inquiring
from those strangers how they happened to occupy the house, the latter told
her that John W. Legare had sold the house to them and that it was no longer
hers. The plaintiff thereupon sought the help of her attorney. It was then
discovered that the paper which John W. Legare had the plaintiff and Purita
Tarrosa sign in the evening of March 29, 1953 was a deed of sale of the lot
and house in question in favor of John W. Legare for the sum of P12,000.00,
and that it was supposed to have been executed on the 7th day of April 1953,
and acknowledged before a notary public on that date. Exhibit X.
"It further appears that sometime prior to May 9, 1953, John W. Legare
approached Elias B. Fermin, the real estate broker who intervened in the
securing of the loan contracted by the plaintiff from Tomas Q. Soriano, and
sought said broker's help to sell the lot and house in question. Elias B. Fermin
accepted the commission and offered the property in sale to defendants
spouses Conrado C. Fule and Lourdes F. Aragon. Conrado C. Fule read the
title papers in the hand of John W. Legare and inspected the premises, and
satisfied with the result of his inspection, he agreed to purchase the property
for P12,000.00 on condition that the sum of P7,000, the unpaid balance of
plaintiff's indebtedness to Tomas Q. Soriano secured by a mortgage thereon,
would be deducted from the price, and that he would assume said mortgage.
The terms offered by Conrado C. Fule being acceptable to John W. Legare
and Tomas Soriano, the parties proceeded to formalize the contract.
Accordingly, on May 9, 1953, defendant Tomas Q. Soriano executed a deed
of absolute sale thereof, free of all liens and encumbrances, in favor of
defendant spouses Conrado C. Fule and Lourdes F. Aragon, Exhibit X-2, and
said spouses in turn executed in favor of Tomas Q. Soriano a deed of
mortgage covering the property for the sum of P7,000.00 Exhibit X-3. These
three deeds, together with transfer certificate of Title No. 21253, issued in
the name of the plaintiff, were on that same date presented for registration
in the Office of the Register of Deeds of the province of Rizal. The latter,
following the usual procedure, recorded, first, the deed of sale executed by
the plaintiff in favor of defendant John W. Legare (Exhibit 1) and issued in the
name of the latter transfer certificate of title No. 30126 which cancelled
transfer for certificate of title No. 21253 (Exhibit Y), then the deed of sale
executed by John W. Legare in favor of the spouses Conrado C. Fule and
Lourdes F. Aragon (Exhibit X-2) and issued in favor of the latter transfer
certificate of title No. 30127 (Exhibit Y-1), which cancelled transfer certificate
of title No. 30126, and then annotated on the memorandum of
encumbrances of transfer certificate of title No. 30127 the deed of mortgage
(Exhibit X-1) executed in favor of Tomas Q. Soriano by said spouses. Once
these were accomplished, Elias B. Fermin and John W. Legare went back to
the house of the spouses Conrado C. Fule and Lourdes F. Aragon and gave
the transfer certificate of title No. 30127. Thereupon said spouses delivered
to John W. Legare the balance of the purchase price of the property after
deducting therefrom the amount of the mortgage constituted thereon in
favor of Tomas Q. Soriano, the brokerage fees and the expenses incident to
the execution and registration of said deeds and issuance of new certificates
of title, which amounted to a little over P4,000.00.
"Upon the evidence, the trial court rendered judgment, the dispositive part
of which reads as follows:
"IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, this Court hereby orders:
"1)the cancellation of Certificate of Title Nos. 30127 and 30126, thereby
leaving valid TCT no. 21253 in the name of Emilia E. de Legare together with
the encumbrance thereon in favor of Tomas Q. Soriano;
"2)the delivery of the possession of the premises to the plaintiff and the
monthly rental of P150.00 a month from May 9, 1953, up to and including
the date on which the delivery is to be made, this obligation being
understood to be joint and several insofar as the defendants Fule and Aragon
are concerned;"
3)the award of P5,000.00 as moral damages in favor of the plaintiff and
enforceable against John W. Legare for the fraud perpetrated by the latter
on the former;
"4)the award of P1,000.00 as attorney's fees enforceable against the
defendants Fule and Aragon;
"And on the cross-claim the court orders —
"1)John W. Legare to refund to the spouses Fule and Aragon the amount paid
by the latter on account of the sale contained in Exhibit X-2 plus interest
thereon at the legal rate from the date of the cross-claim;
"2)the award of P5,000.00 as moral damages in favor of the spouses Fule and
Aragon and enforceable against John W. Legare for the misrepresentation
made by him;
"3)the reimbursement to the spouses Fule and Aragon by John W. Legare of
all amounts which may be paid by the former to the plaintiff by way of rentals
for the premises involved herein, as well as attorney's fees in the amount of
P1,000.00.
"SO ORDERED."
The Court of Appeals, in deciding the appeal, entered a judgment the
dispositive portion of which follows:
Page | 17
"WHEREFORE, modified as indicated above, i.e., the transfer certificate of
title No. 21253 issued in the name of Emilia E. de Legare is revived with the
mortgage in favor of appellee Tomas Q. Soriano annotated on its
memorandum of encumbrances but reduced to the amount of P7,000.00,
and that the award of attorney's fees in the amount of P1,000.00 to be paid
by the spouses Conrado C. Fule and Lourdes F. Aragon, in favor of the
plaintiff, is eliminated therefrom, the judgment appealed from is hereby
affirmed in all other respects, without special pronouncement as to costs in
this instance.
"IT IS SO ORDERED."
In elevating the judgment of the Court of Appeals to this Tribunal for review,
herein petitioners discussed 6 assignments of error. However, this Court, is
of the view that, in effect and substance, only one issue was raised. We have
always refrained from reviewing factual findings of the Court of Appeals and
the first two errors assigned were but attempts at disputing the same. The
other four were simply detailed aspects of the one, sole issue, to wit:
Were the herein petitioners purchasers in good faith and for value of the
properties here contested?
Guided by the facts found by the Court of Appeals, We hold the herein
petitioners innocent purchasers for value of the house and lot here disputed.
In consequence, they are here adjudged the lawful owners thereof.
A purchaser in good faith is one who buys property of another, without
notice that some other person has a right to, or interest in, such property and
pays a full and fair price for the same, at the time of such purchase, or before
he has notice of the claim or interest of some other persons in the property.
Good faith consists in an honest intention to abstain from taking any
unconscientious advantage of another (Cui and Joven vs. Henson, 51 Phil.,
606). We have measured the conduct of the petitioner spouses by this
yardstick.
These facts were uncontroverted. The negotiation and transaction which
eventually caused the certificate of title to be transferred from the herein
respondent to the petitioner spouses were conducted by a real estate broker
licensed since 1938. Nothing in John W. Legare's person or behaviour
suggested anything suspicious. He was the adopted son of the herein
respondent, and, to the time that he was contracting with the petitioner
spouses, he had not been known to commit crime or dishonesty. On the
contrary, John has had previous dealings with the real estate broker during
which he exhibited the expected degree of trustworthiness.
It should be noted that the deed of sale was regular upon its face, and no one
would have questioned its authenticity since it was duly acknowledged
before a notary public. Moreover, even if the petitioners had the opportunity
to compare the signature of the respondent on the deed of conveyance with
a specimen of her genuine signature, the effort, nonetheless, would have
been in vain since the respondent's signature on the document was
admittedly hers. Lastly, it should not be overlooked that the respondent,
during the whole period of the negotiation, was nowhere available to
confirm or deny the execution of the deed. She was then in hiding, or, hidden,
at the Windsor Hotel in Manila.
The diligence and precaution observed by the petitioners themselves could
hardly have been wanting. The records show that they did not rely solely and
fully upon the deed of sale in favor of John W. Legare and the fact that John
had then in his possession the corresponding certificate of title of the
registered owner. They demanded more. They insisted that the sale in favor
of John W. Legare be first registered and that the transfer in their favor be
thereafter likewise registered. It was only after all these were complied with
that they paid the purchaser price. In other words, the petitioner spouses
relied not really on the documents exhibited to them by John W. Legare, but,
on the registerability of those documents. This in our view, satisfies the
measure of good faith contemplated by law.
It is true that at the time the herein petitioners purchased the properties
from John W. Legare, he was not yet the registered owner of the same. This
fact alone, however, could not have caused the herein petitioners to lose
their status as innocent purchasers for value. It should be recalled that
although the title was in the name of the respondent Emilia E. de Legare, the
certificate of title was in the possession of her adopted son, John. Under
Section 5 of Act 496, as amended, John's possession of the certificate and his
subsequent production of it to the herein petitioners operated as a
"conclusive authority from the registered owner to the register of deeds to
enter a new certificate."
"SEC. 55. . .
"The production of the owner's duplicate certificate whenever any voluntary
instrument is presented for registration shall be conclusive authority from
the registered owner to the register of deeds to enter a new certificate or to
make a memorandum or registration in accordance with such instrument,
and the new certificate or memorandum shall be binding upon the registered
owner and upon all persons claiming under him, in favor of every purchaser
for value and in good faith. . . ."
While it was true that the transfer in favor or John was still unregistered
when he sought to sell the property to the herein petitioners, it was not true
that the latter observed no precaution whatsoever from the complication of
such non-registration. As already discussed above, the petitioners required
that the registration of the previous sale (from the respondent to John W.
Legare) be first attended to and completed. After that was done and the
certificate of title was issued to John by the Register of Deeds, they still
withheld payment till the second sale (from John to the petitioners) was in
turn registered and the corresponding certificate of title therefor was issued
in their names. It was only after all these were followed that the entire
negotiation was terminated with the payment of the balance of the purchase
price. All these, we hold, were adequate safeguards against the objection
interposed. A contrary conclusion would operate to weaken the reliance of
the general public on the indefeasibility of titles registered under the Torrens
System.
We have so far demonstrated the good faith of the petitioner spouses. By the
very facts established by the Court of Appeals, however, there is still another
reason why the property here in question should be adjudged to the
petitioners.
Although the deed of sale in favor of John W. Legare was fraudulent, the fact
remains that he was able to secure a registered title to the house and lot. It
was this title which he subsequently conveyed to the herein petitioners. We
have indeed ruled that a forged or fraudulent deed is a nullity and conveys
no title (Director of Lands vs. Addison, 49 Phil., 19). However, we have also
laid down the doctrine that there are instances when such a fraudulent
document may become the root of a valid title. One such instance is where
the certificate of title was already transferred from the name of the true
owner to the forger, and while it remained that way, the land was
subsequently sold to an innocent purchaser. For then, the vendee had the
right to rely upon what appeared in the certificate (Inquimboy vs. Cruz, G.R.
No. L-13953, July 28, 1960).
We have been constrained to adopt the conclusion here set forth because
under the Torrens system, "registration is the operative act that gives validity
to the transfer or creates a lien upon the land (Secs. 50 and 51, Land
Registration Act). Consequently, where there was nothing in the certificate
of title to indicate any cloud or vice in the ownership of the property, or any
encumbrance thereon, the purchaser is not required to explore farther than
what the Torrens title upon its face indicates in quest for any hidden defect
or inchoate right that may subsequently defeat his right thereto. If the rule
were otherwise, the efficacy and conclusiveness of the certificate of title
which the Torrens system seeks to insure would entirely be futile and
nugatory. (Reynes vs. Barrera, 68 Phil., 656; De Lara and De Guzman vs.
Ayroso, 50 O.G. No 10, 4838). The public shall then be denied of its foremost
motivation for respecting and observing the Land Registration Act. In the
end, the business community stands to be inconvenienced and prejudiced
immeasurably.
Furthermore, when the Register of Deeds issued a certificate of title in the
name of John W. Legare, and thereafter registered the same, John W. Legare,
insofar as third parties were concerned, acquired valid title to the house and
lot here disputed. When, therefore, he transferred this title to the herein
petitioners, third persons, the entire transaction fell within the purview of
Article 1434 of the Civil Code. The registration in John W. Legare's name
effectively operated to convey the properties to him.
"Art. 1434.When a person who is not the owner of a thing sells or alienates
and delivers it, and later the seller or grantor acquires title thereto, such title
passes by operation of law to the buyer or grantee."
This Court sympathizes with the respondent. It is aware of the treacherous,
painful fraud committed on her by her adopted son. But positive provisions
of law and settled jurisprudence cannot be subordinated to that feeling.
Besides, the records of this case reveal that the herein respondent is herself
not entirely free from blame. We note that when John presented to her the
document which turned out to be a deed of conveyance in his favor, she
readily affixed her signature thereto upon the simple representation of John
that it was a document pertaining to her claim with the U.S. Veterans
Administrations. She could have asked her maid to read the contents of the
same for her and yet she did not. These, We believe, amount to a lack of
prudence and precaution on the part of Mrs. Emilia de Legare.
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the decision of the Court of Appeals is hereby
reversed and set aside. A new one is here entered dismissing the
respondent's complaint and declaring the petitioners herein the lawful
owners of the properties here involved. Without pronouncement as to costs.
||| (Fule v. De Legare, G.R No. L-17951, [February 28, 1963], 117 PHIL 367-
378)
[G.R. No. 106528. December 21, 1993.]
PHILIPPINE COLUMBIAN ASSOCIATION, petitioner, vs. THE HONORABLE
DOMINGO D. PANIS, as Judge, Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 41,
THE HONORABLE RICARDO DIAZ, as Judge, Regional Trial Court of Manila,
Branch 27, the CITY OF MANILA, ANTONIO GONZALES, JR., KARLO
BUTIONG, LEONARDO AQUINO, EDILBERTO LOPEZ, ANTILANO FERRER,
Page | 18
LOENCIA DAVILLO JAMERO, LUIS FERNANDEZ, PATRICIO DE GUZMAN,
RICARDO DE LEON, VIRGILIO TORNERO, FAUSTO FERNANDEZ, DOMINGO
MEREN, EDUARDA JACINTO, MAGDALENA VELEZ, LUSITO ALMADRONES,
MYRNA BARREDO EBREO, FULGENCIO CORSINO, PEDRO VELASQUEZ, JUAN
INOBAYA, NENITA ARCE, MAGNO ORTINEZ, ARMANDO PARAGAS,
HIPOLITO ESTABILLO, FELICIANO FAUSTINO, VIRGILIO EDIC, JOSE TINGZON,
JOSUE MARIANO, MARIA YERO, MA. DOLORES QUIZON, ISIDERO TAGUILIG,
CIRIACO MENDOZA, JUAN ROMERO, JOSE LAGATA, FRUCTUSO PUSING,
TEOFILO TERSOL, ANTONIO LACHICA, PIO RAJALES, REGINA VIERNES, JUAN
ROMERO, DOMINGO EDIC, EDUARDA GONZALES, PABLO QUIRANTE,
LEONORA SANTIA, MARIA RIVERA, ELENA ARCE, LAZARO GOMEZ, PEDRO
MENDOZA, DOMINADOR ADAO, JUAN PANTERA, FRISCA MANOOT,
SOCORRO SANTOS and GLORIA JEBUNAN, respondents.
Angara, Abello, Concepcion, Regala & Cruz for petitioner.
Dennis A. Padernal for private respondents.
City Legal Officer for respondent City of Manila.
DECISION
QUIASON, J p:
This is an appeal by certiorari to review: (1) the decision of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 23338, which dismissed the petition for certiorari
filed by herein petitioner, assailing the orders of (a) respondent Judge
Domingo D. Panis of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 41, Manila, in Civil Case
No. 90-53531, and (b) respondent Judge Ricardo D. Diaz, of the Regional Trial
Court, Branch 27, Manila, in Civil Case No. 90-53346; and (2) its Resolution
dated July 30, 1992, which denied the motion for reconsideration of the
decision. LLpr
Philippine Columbian Association, petitioner herein, is a non-stock, non-
profit domestic corporation and is engaged in the business of providing
sports and recreational facilities for its members. Petitioner's office and
facilities are located in the District of Paco, Manila, and adjacent thereto, is a
parcel of land consisting of 4,842.90 square meters owned by petitioner.
Private respondents are the actual occupants of the said parcel of land, while
respondents Antonio Gonzales, Jr. and Karlo Butiong were duly-elected
councilors of the City of Manila.
In 1982, petitioner instituted ejectment proceedings against herein private
respondents before the Metropolitan Trial Court of Manila. Judgment was
rendered against the said occupants, ordering them to vacate the lot and pay
reasonable compensation therefor. This judgment was affirmed by the
Regional Trial Court, the Court of Appeals and subsequently by the Supreme
Court in G.R. No. 85262.
As a result of the favorable decision, petitioner filed before the Metropolitan
Trial Court of Manila, a motion for execution of judgment, which was granted
on April 9, 1990. A writ of demolition was later prayed for and likewise issued
by the same court on May 30, 1990.
On June 8, 1990, private respondents filed with the Regional Trial Court,
Branch 27, Manila, a petition for injunction and prohibition with preliminary
injunction and restraining order against the Metropolitan Trial Court of
Manila and petitioner herein (Civil Case No. 90-53346) to enjoin their
ejectment from and the demolition of their houses on the premises in
question.
On June 28, 1990, the City of Manila filed a complaint docketed as Civil Case
No. 90-53531 against petitioner before the Regional Trial Court, Branch 41,
Manila, for the expropriation of the 4,842.90 square meter lot subject of the
ejectment proceedings in Civil Case No. 90-53346. Petitioner, in turn, filed a
motion to dismiss the complaint, alleging, inter alia, that the City of Manila
had no power to expropriate private land; that the expropriation is not for
public use and welfare; that the expropriation is politically motivated; and,
that the deposit of P2 million of the City of Manila representing the
provisional value of the land, was insufficient and was made under P.D. 1533,
a law declared unconstitutional by the Supreme Court. prcd
On September 14, 1990, the Regional Trial Court, Branch 41, Manila, denied
petitioner's motion to dismiss and entered an order of condemnation
declaring that the expropriation proceeding was properly instituted in
accordance with law. The court also ordered the parties to submit, within five
days, the names of their respective nominees as commissioners to ascertain
just compensation for the land in question.
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration of the order denying its motion
to dismiss, and later a motion to defer compliance with the order directing
the submission of the names of nominees to be appointed commissioners.
The City of Manila, however, filed an ex-parte motion for the issuance of a
writ of possession over the subject lot, mentioning the P2 million deposit
with the Philippine National Bank, representing the provisional value of the
land.
In separate orders dated October 5 and 8, 1990, the court issued the writ of
possession, and at the same time, denied petitioner's motion to defer
compliance and motion for reconsideration.
On September 21, 1990, as a result of the expropriation proceedings, the
Regional Trial Court, Branch 27, Manila, in Civil Case No. 90-53346 issued an
order, granting the writ of preliminary injunction prayed for by private
respondents. A motion for reconsideration filed by petitioner was
denied. llcd
Petitioner filed before the Court of Appeals a petition assailing the orders
dated September 14, 1990, and October 5 and 8, 1990 of Branch 41 of the
Regional Trial Court, and the Order dated September 21, 1990 of Branch 27
of the same court (CA-G.R. SP No. 23338). The Court of Appeals rendered a
Decision on November 31, 1992, denying the petition, and a Resolution on
July 31, 1992, denying reconsideration thereof.
Hence, this petition.
The land subject of this case is the 4,842.90 square meter lot, which was
formerly a part of the Fabie Estate. As early as November 11, 1966, the
Municipal Board of the City of Manila passed Ordinance No. 5971, seeking to
expropriate the Fabie Estate. Through negotiated sales, the City of Manila
acquired a total of 18,017.10 square meters of the estate, and thereafter
subdivided the land into home lots and distributed the portions to the actual
occupants thereof.
The remaining area of 4,842.90 square meters, more or less, was sold in 1977
by its owner, Dolores Fabie-Posadas, to petitioner. Since the time of the sale,
the lot has been occupied by private respondents.
On May 23, 1989, the City Council of Manila, with the approval of the Mayor,
passed Ordinance No. 7704 for the expropriation of the 4,842.90 square
meter lot.
Petitioner claims that expropriation of the lot cannot prosper because: (1)
the City of Manila has no specific power to expropriate private property
under the 1987 Constitution; and (2) assuming that it has such power, this
was exercised improperly and illegally in violation of the public use
requirement and petitioner's right to due process. Cdpr
Petitioner argues that under the 1987 Constitution, there must be a law
expressly authorizing local governments to undertake urban land reform
(Art. XIII, Sec. 9).
Petitioner forgot that the Revised Charter of the City of Manila, R.A. No. 409,
expressly authorizes the City of Manila to "condemn private property for
public use" (Sec. 3) and "to acquire private land . . . and subdivide the same
into home lots for sale on easy terms to city residents" (Sec. 100).
The Revised Charter of the City of Manila expressly grants the City of Manila
general powers over its territorial jurisdiction, including the power of
eminent domain, thus:
"General powers. — The city may have a common seal and alter the same at
pleasure, and may take, purchase, receive, hold, lease, convey, and dispose
of real and personal property for the general interest of the city, condemn
private property for public use, contract and be contracted with, sue and be
sued, and prosecute and defend to final judgment and execution, and
exercise all the powers hereinafter conferred" (R.A. 409, Sec. 3; Emphasis
supplied).
Section 100 of said Revised Charter authorizes the City of Manila to
undertake urban land reform, thus:
Sec. 100. The City of Manila is authorized to acquire private lands in the city
and to subdivide the same into home lots for sale on easy terms to city
residents, giving first priority to the bona fide tenants or occupants of said
lands, and second priority to laborers and low-salaried employees. For the
purpose of this section, the city may raise the necessary funds by
appropriations of general funds, by securing loans or by issuing bonds, and,
if necessary, may acquire the lands through expropriation proceedings in
accordance with law, with the approval of the President . . . " (Emphasis
supplied). LLpr
The City of Manila, acting through its legislative branch, has the express
power to acquire private lands in the city and subdivide these lands into
home lots for sale tobona-fide tenants or occupants thereof, and to laborers
and low-salaried employees of the city.
That only a few could actually benefit from the expropriation of the property
does not diminish its public use character. It is simply not possible to provide
all at once land and shelter for all who need them (Sumulong v. Guerrero, 154
SCRA 461 [1987]).
Corollary to the expanded notion of public use, expropriation is not anymore
confined to vast tracts of land and landed estates (Province of Camarines Sur
v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 103125, May 17, 1993; J.M. Tuason and Co. Inc.
v. Land Tenure Administration, 31 SCRA 413 [1970]). It is therefore of no
moment that the land sought to be expropriated in this case is less than half
a hectare only (Pulido v. Court of Appeals, 122 SCRA 63 [1983]).
Through the years, the public use requirement in eminent domain has
evolved into a flexible concept, influenced by changing conditions (Sumulong
v. Guerrero, supra; Manotok v. National Housing Authority, 150 SCRA 89
[1987]; Heirs of Juancho Ardona v. Reyes, 125 SCRA 220 [1983]). Public use
now includes the broader notion of indirect public benefit or advantage,
including in particular, urban land reform and housing.
Page | 19
This concept is specifically recognized in the 1987 Constitution which
provides that:
xxx xxx xxx
"The state shall, by law, and for the common good, undertake, in cooperation
with the private sector, a continuing program of urban land reform and
housing which will make available at affordable cost decent housing and
basic services to underprivileged and homeless citizens in urban centers and
resettlement areas. It shall also promote adequate employment
opportunities to such citizens. In the implementation of such program the
State shall respect the rights of small property owners" (Art. XIII, Sec. 9;
Emphasis supplied). LLpr
xxx xxx xxx
The due process requirement in the expropriation of subject lot has likewise
been complied with. Although the motion to dismiss filed by petitioner was
not set for hearing as the court is required to do (National Housing Authority
v. Valenzuela, 159 SCRA 396 [1988]), it never questioned the lack of hearing
before the trial and appellate courts. It is only now before us that petitioner
raises the issue of due process.
Indeed, due process was afforded petitioner when it filed its motion for
reconsideration of the trial court's order, denying its motion to dismiss.
The Court of Appeals, in determining whether grave abuse of discretion was
committed by respondent courts, passed upon the very same issues raised
by petitioner in its motion to dismiss, which findings we uphold. Petitioner
therefore cannot argue that it was denied its day in court.
The amount of P2 million representing the provisional value of the land is an
amount not only fixed by the court, but accepted by both parties. The fact
remains that petitioner, albeit reluctantly, agreed to said valuation and is
therefore estopped from assailing the same. It must be remembered that the
valuation is merely provisional. The parties still have the second stage in the
proceedings in the proper court below to determine specifically the amount
of just compensation to be paid the landowner (Revised Rules of Court, Rule
67, Sec. 5; National Power Corporation v. Jocson, 206 SCRA 520
[1992]). cdphil
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.
[G.R. No. L-47553. January 31, 1981.]
JANE L. GARCIA, MAYORICO P. SANDICO, BELEN R. GARCIA and DANILO
DIOKNO, petitioners, vs. COURT OF APPEALS (Special Tenth Division) and
NATIONAL POWER CORPORATION, respondents.
Ahmed C . Garcia for petitioners.
Solicitor General Estelito P. Mendoza, Assistant Solicitor General Nathaniel
P. De Pano, Jr., Solicitor Edgardo L. Kilayko and National Power Corporation
General Counsel Marcelino C . Ilaoand Assistant General Counsel Conrado
Q. Crucillo for respondents.
SYNOPSIS
In 1969, the National Power Corporation filed a complaint for eminent
domain for acquisition of right of way easement over defendants' two parcels
of land known as Blocks 10 and 19 which it needed for the construction of a
power line. Block 19 had already been occupied by plaintiff since 1957 with
the permission of defendants' predecessor although no agreement as to
compensation had ever been completed, while Block 10 was placed in its
possession in 1970 upon deposit of a provisional amount. The trial court
rendered judgment expropriating Blocks 10 and 19 and ordering plaintiff to
pay defendants P15.00 per square meter for the area expropriated, shown
to be the prevailing market value of the property at the time plaintiff took
possession. On appeal, the Court of Appeals held that the market value at
the time of the taking determined the just compensation, and inasmuch as
plaintiff had been occupying Block 19 since 1957 and defendants did not
present evidence as to the market value of said property as of 1957, the just
compensation should be that appearing in the 1957 tax declaration which in
this case is P.07 per square meter.
On certiorari, the Supreme Court held that since the plaintiff did not take
possession of Block 19 for the purpose of eminent domain in 1957, nor did it
subsequently file an action for expropriation in court over the said property
but only sought a right of way easement over the same, the market value
should not be fixed as of the time of the taking but as of the time the trial
court made its order of expropriation.
Judgment modified.
DECISION
FERNANDEZ, J p:
This is a petition for certiorari instituted by Jane L. Garcia, Mayorico P.
Sandico, Belen R. Garcia, and Danilo Diokno against the Court of Appeals
(Special Tenth Division), and the National Power Corporation seeking the
following relief: LLphil
"WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is most respectfully prayed of the
Court:
"1. That the Decision of the Court of Appeals respecting Block 19, wherein it
has adjudged private respondent entitled to acquire title and ownership over
the property by paying a compensation of P0.07 per square meter be
reversed and that the Decision of the Court of First Instance of Pampanga
adjudging the private respondent to compensate herein petitioners for Block
19 in the amount of P15.00 per square meter with interest at the legal rate
from June 30, 1954 be upheld;
"2. That, in the alternative to the petition next preceding, the private
respondent be adjudged to pay rentals for the use of Block 19 at the rate of
P2.00 per square meter per annum from June 30, 1954 until the same is
vacated by it;
"Petitioners further pray for such other reliefs as may be just and equitable
in the premises.
"Quezon City for Manila, Philippines January 31, 1978." 1
The record discloses that on August 8, 1969, the private respondent National
Power Corporation filed a complaint for eminent domain with the Court of
First Instance of Pampanga, Branch Five, docketed as Civil Case No.
3584 2 praying that it be allowed to acquire right of way easements over the
property of petitioners consisting of two adjoining parcels of land (Lots Nos.
633 and 634) with a total area of 15.98 hectares; that the said complaint
alleges that the proposed right-of-way is needed to construct the 69 KV
Mexico-Balibago power line which will encompass some 2,835 square meters
of petitioner's property 3 ; that on March 2, 1970, the defendants,
petitioners herein, filed an answer asking that the complaint for
expropriation be dismissed and on the first and second counter-claims
praying for the following:
"1. Under the first cause of action, sentencing the plaintiff to pay the
defendants rentals at the annual rate of P2.00 per square meter for the use
and occupancy of Block 19 with a total area of not less than 20,439 square
meters, starting from the year 1957 and for as long as plaintiff uses and
occupies the same; back rentals to bear interest at the rate of 12% per
annum, until paid.
"2. Under the second cause of action, sentencing plaintiff alternatively, i.e.,
in the event that expropriation be granted as prayed for in the complaint —
to pay defendants as compensation for the total encompassed in Block 10
(not less than 6,000 square meters) at the price of P20.00 per square meter,
with 12% interest computed from date of possession, until paid." 4
that on March 30, 1970, the plaintiff was placed in possession of the property
sought to be expropriated 5 upon a previous deposit on March 12, 1970 of a
provisional amount of P5,670; 6 that after the issues were joined evidence
was submitted by both parties to the Clerk of Court, Andres B. Paras, as lone
Commissioner, who submitted his Report 7 with the following
recommendation:
"CONCLUSION
"All told this Commissioner respectfully recommends that judgment be
rendered;
"(1) Expropriating the areas covered by Block 19 (20,439 sq. meters) and
Block 10 (6,190 sq. meters) of the subdivision plan (Exhibit 3) of the
defendant's properties in favor of the plaintiff;
"(2) Ordering plaintiff to pay the defendants Juana Garcia Sandico, Belen
Garcia Diokno and Bienvenido Garcia (a) by way of just compensation, the
amount of P15.00 per square meter for the Total area encomposed in Block
19 and Block 10, supra, with 6% interest computed from March 16, 1970,
until paid, (b) an amount to be fixed by the Court as and for attorney's fees.
"San Fernando, Pampanga, September 8, 1971.
"RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED:
"(Sgd) ANDRES B. PARAS
"Commissioner" 8
that mainly on the basis of the above report, the lower court rendered a
decision, the dispositive part of which reads:
"WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, judgment is hereby rendered:
"a) Expropriating the area covered by Block 10 (6,190 square meters) and
Block 19 (20,439 square meters) of the subdivision plan of defendants'
properties, with an aggregate area of 26,629 square meters, in favor of the
plaintiff;
"b) Ordering the plaintiff to pay the defendants Juana Garcia Sandico, Belen
Garcia Diokno and Bienvenido Garcia the amount of P15.00 per square meter
for the area herein expropriated which totals P399,435.00, with interest at
the legal rate computed as follows:
"A) For the area covered by Block 10, from June 30, 1954;
"B) For the area covered by Block 19, from March 30, 1970,
until fully paid and to pay Five (5%) percent of the amount involved as and
for attorney's fees and expenses of litigation, and to pay the costs of the suit.
Page | 20
"SO ORDERED.
"San Fernando, Pampanga, November 16, 1971.
(Sgd) HONORIO ROMERO
Judge" 9
that the plaintiff, private respondent National Power Corporation, appealed
to the Court of Appeals; 10 that on October 28, 1977, the Court of Appeals
rendered its decision modifying the trial court's decision as follows:
"Wherefore, judgment is hereby rendered:
"1. Expropriating in favor of the plaintiff the area covered by Block 10 (6,190
square meters) and Block 19 (20,439 square meters) of the subdivision plan
of the defendants' property;
"2. Ordering the plaintiff to pay the defendants Juana Garcia Sandico, Belen
Garcia Diokno and Bienvenido Garcia the purchase price of Block 10 (6,190
square meters) in the amount of P87,180.00 at P15.00 per square meter and
at the same time ordering the Provincial Treasurer of Pampanga to release
to the said defendants the amount of P5,670 deposited with him on February
26, 1970 as evidenced by Official Receipt No. 2497123 dated March 11, 1970
with interest at the legal rate on the amount of P87,180.00 from March 30,
1970;
"3. Ordering the plaintiff to pay to the same defendants the amount of
P14,511.69 as the market value for Block 19 (20,439 square meters) at P0.07
per square meter with legal interest from July 1, 1957.
"The judgment of the lower court awarding attorney's fees and costs are
hereby eliminated. cdasia
"SO ORDERED. 11
that on November 24, 1977, the petitioners filed a motion for
reconsideration of the decision of the Court of Appeals which was denied in
its resolution dated December 13, 1977; 12 and that the petitioners
appealed to this Court assigning as sole error allegedly committed by the
Court of Appeals the following:
"THE COURT OF APPEALS IN ITS DECISION OF OCTOBER 28, 1977 IN CA-G.R.
NO. 55720-R ERRED IN FIXING THE AMOUNT OF JUST COMPENSATION AT
P0.07 PER SQUARE METER, WHEN THE LOWER COURT FINDS THIS TO BE
P15.00 PER SQUARE METER." 13
The facts, as found by the Court of Appeals, are:
"The defendants own Lot 633 and Lot 634 located in Mexico, Pampanga. Lot
633 has an area of 85,212 square meters. Lot 634 has an area of 74,613
square meters. Total area is 159,825 square meters.
"According to the defendants' pleadings (p. 34, Record on Appeal), not
denied in the plaintiff's pleadings the National Power Corporation occupied
as early as 1957 portions of the two (2) lots for the construction of 'steel
towers and high power lines for 230 KV Ambuklao-Manila Line and 69 KV
Mexico-Tarlac Line.' The portions of the two (2) lots occupied has an area of
20,439 square meters. It is designated as Block 19 in the sketch plan (Exhibit
3). Up to now the plaintiff has not paid anything for the portion occupied,
either as rental or as purchase price.
"As early as March 10, 1960 these two (2) lots were surveyed for the purpose
of converting them into 'Conching Subdivision' (Exhibit 3) for residential
purposes. The two (2) lots were subdivided into 19 blocks (Block No. 1 to 19).
Except Block 19 which has been occupied by the NPC since 1957, the other
blocks were subdivided into residential lots, totalling 350 lots in all. Block 19
occupied by the NPC was not subdivided into lots because of the steel towers
and the power lines of the NPC, which make the said block dangerous for
residential purposes.
"The plan and the technical descriptions were duly approved by the court as
early as August 23, 1962 (Exhibit 2-A). The subdivision plan was in turn
approved by the Land Registration Commission on July 23, 1962 and by the
Municipal Council of Mexico, Pampanga on January 22, 1962 (Exhibit 4).
"After the subdivision plan was approved, steps were taken to improve the
property. Asphalted roads and gutters have been constructed. According to
the Commissioner's Report, 'there are men working in the construction of an
asphalt road and work is being done in full blast.' The same report states that
there are 'more or less 25 houses of strong materials constructed in the area.'
"According to the defendants' evidence, not rebutted by the plaintiff, there
are about 100 to 150 willing buyers of lots in the subdivision.
"On May 8, 1969 the NPC instituted the instant action for expropriation of a
'right-of-way easement' over a portion of the two (2) lots. In Lot 633 the
plaintiff wants to expropriate a portion consisting of 1470 square meters. In
Lot 634 the area to be expropriated is 2835 square meters. Total area to be
expropriated is 2835 square meters (Exhibit A). The entire area to be
expropriated is within Block 10 of Conching Subdivision (Exhibit 3) which is
adjacent to Block 19. (Vide, Exhibit 3). The plaintiff intends to use the area to
be expropriated for the construction and maintenance of its 69 KV Mexico-
Balibago Transmission Line.' The plaintiff offers to pay to the defendants an
easement fee in the nominal sum of P1.00 and 10.00 for its power to be
constructed." 14
Anent the error assigned by the petitioners, the pertinent portions of the
decision of the Court of Appeals are:
"The final question involves the determination of the just compensation. Just
compensation is the market value of the property. It should be determined
at the time of the taking. It is the price which it will command where it is
offered for sale by one who desires, but is not obliged to sell, and is bought
by one who is under no necessity of having it. (Manila Railway Co. vs.
Velasquez, 32, Phil., 286; Manila Railroad Co. vs. Caligsihan, 40 Phil., 326).
"The market value must be determined as of the time the plaintiff takes
possession. Thus when possession is ahead of the filing of the complaint, the
date of possession determines the market value. (Republic vs. PNB, L-14158,
41261).
"We first determine the market value of Block 10 consisting of 6,190 square
meters. The defendants' witnesses, namely, Garcia Sandico (tsn., January 9,
1971, p. 27), Gonzalo Magpayo (tsn., Feb. 6, 1971), Igino Sason (tsn., Feb. 6,
1971), Igino Sason (tsn., May 8, 1971), and Jose Angeles (tsn., May 15, 1975)
all testify that the prices of the residential lots in the subdivision as of 1971
was P15.00 to P20.00 per square meter. The contract to sell dated November
18, 1965 (Exhibit 5) shows that the price per square meter is P15.00. Another
contract to sell dated October 9, 1967 (Exhibit 5-A) shows a purchase price
of P15.00 per square meter. A request for reservation dated July 6, 1970
(Exhibit 6) shows a purchase price of P17.00 per square meter. Other
requests for reservation in 1969 and 1970 show a purchase price ranging
from P15.00 to P17.00 per square meter (Exhibits 6-A to 6-H, inclusive.)
On the other hand, the plaintiff presented only a tax declaration to prove the
market value. A tax declaration is only prima facie evidence of market value
which may be overcome by satisfactory evidence presented by the owners
of the property to be expropriated.
"We therefore agree with the finding of the lower court that the price of
Block 10 consisting of 6,190 square meters at P15.00 per square meter is
P92,850.00. It appears, however, that as of February 26, 1970 the plaintiff
deposited with the Provincial Treasurer of Pampanga the amount of P5,670
for the compensation of the property. Deducting P5,670 from P92,850.00 the
unpaid balance for Block 10 is P87,180.00.
"Block 19 presents a different problem. Said property was occupied,
according to the allegations of the defendants' counterclaim not denied in
the plaintiff's reply thereto, in 1957 by the plaintiff. In other words, the
possession of the property took place 13 years before the defendants filed
their counterclaim praying for the damages with respect to the occupation
of Block 19. The defendants did not present evidence as to the market value
of Block 19 as of 1957. The tax declaration therefore should constitute
the prima facie evidence of the market value for the purpose of determining
the just compensation. (Province of Ilocos Norte vs. Compania General de
Tabacos, L-7361, April 20, 1956, 53 O.G. 7687). As per tax declaration
(Exhibits B, B-1) the market value should be P.07 per square meter or a total
amount of P14,511.69 for Block 19 which consists of 20,439 square
meters." 15
The error raised refers solely to Block 19 of the petitioners' property.
It is apparent that the substantial reduction of what compensation has to be
paid for Block 19 came about as a result of the application of the doctrine
enunciated in the case of the Republic vs. Phil. National Bank, et
al., 16 clarifying the question as to what date the market value of condemned
property should be fixed, that "where the taking of the property precedes
the institution of the condemnation proceedings, the value should be fixed
as of the time of the taking." A careful reading of this case and the
cases 17 mentioned therein shows certain material facts which are not
identical to the case at bar, to wit: 1) the properties in question became the
subject of expropriation proceedings initiated by the plaintiff Government,
and 2) that the possession or "taking" of the Government of the properties
in question, whether it was made before or after the filing of the complaint
for expropriation was made for purposes of eminent domain or with the
intent to expropriate. 18 Hence, the Court of Appeals, in reducing the
amount from P15.00 per square meter to P0.07 per square meter, made the
value stated in the tax declaration of Block 19 in 1957 its basis on the
assumption that in the said year 1957 the private respondent had taken
possession of the land for the purpose of eminent domain and on the further
presumption that subsequent thereto an action for expropriation was
entered in court over this property. However, these facts assumed by the
Court of Appeals are not borne by the evidence on record. LibLex
Civil Case No. 3584 of the Court of First Instance of Pampanga, Branch V,
entitled "National Power Corporation vs. Jane L. Garcia, et al.," is an action
for expropriation but what was sought to be expropriated in the action was
a right of way for the use of private respondent in the construction of its 69
KV Mexico-Balibago transmission line. This purpose of private respondent is
stated in paragraph 5 of the Complaint 19 and indicated and shaded in red
on the sketch attached to the complaint as Annex "A". 20 Said paragraph
reads:
"The plaintiff needs right-of-way easements over portions of the parcels of
land hereinabove described for the consideration and maintenance of its KV
Page | 21
Mexico-Balibago transmission line, which portions are indicated and shaded
in red on the sketches attached hereto, marked as Annex "A".
The writ of possession directed the Sheriff "to place the plaintiff National
Power Corporation in immediate possession of what is needed of the
defendants' lands, for a right-of-way easement subject of this expropriation
proceedings." 21 The Ambuklao-Manila and Mexico-Tarlac transmission
lines established as early as 1953 and 1957 traversing properties covered by
Block 19 were not the subject matter of the said action. Moreover, in the
second paragraph of private respondents' answer to defendant's compulsory
counterclaim, 22 it is alleged that the construction of the Ambuklao-Manila
and Mexico-Tarlac transmission lines were with the permission of
petitioners' predecessor-in-interest, their father, Eutiquiano Garcia. As
shown by the transcript of the stenographic notes of the proceedings of June
26, 1971, 23 Mr. Eladio Espiritu, a witness of the private respondent,
attempted to establish that the entry of private respondent to petitioners'
property was with the consent of their predecessor. Likewise, as found by
the Commissioner in his Report, 24 all that the plaintiff, private respondent
herein, could show was an alleged authority to construct the Ambuklao-
Manila line only, allegedly signed by defendants' father (Exhibit "M"),
pending completion of the negotiation of the compensation to be paid.
Exhibit "M", in clear and unmistakable terms, states the nature of the
possession that the private respondent was granted at the time. The title of
this document is "PERMISSION TO OCCUPY LAND" which undoubtedly grants
to the National Power Corporation a privilege and the same is subject to the
terms and conditions embodied in the document. 25 As the private
respondent's entry was gained through permission, it did not have the
intention to acquire ownership either by voluntary purchase or by the
exercise of eminent domain. And the fact remains that the private
respondent never completed the negotiation as to compensation. Not only
this, private respondent went on to construct another line — the 69 KV
Mexico-Tarlac without defendants' permission nor a court
authorization. 26 All these prove the private respondent's intention not to
expropriate Block 19, as it did not seek so in the action it instituted on August
8, 1969. Neither did it have the intention to do so in 1953 as shown by the
terms in Exhibit "M". It is clear, therefore, that the private respondent not
only did not take possession with intent to expropriate Block 19, but that it
did not institute expropriation proceedings over the same. cdasia
Consequently, since the areas covered by Block 19 were never entered into
or possessed for purposes of eminent domain, nor did they become the
subject of an action for eminent domain, neither the date of entry nor the
filing of the action by private respondent for expropriation of a "right-of-way"
easement on December 8, 1969 could be reckoned with as the basis for the
determination of just compensation.
Hence, the conclusion of the Court of Appeals that the fair market value of
the property in question based on the tax assessment in 1957 is an error of
law, as it is a conclusion predicated on the wrong assumption that there was
a taking or possession of Block 19 in 1957 for purposes of expropriation and
that there was an action for expropriation of the same.
It is significant that the expropriation of Block 19 came about only when the
trial court declared that inasmuch as the private respondent cannot acquire
easement of right-of-way over Block 19, much less own it through
prescription, the only way for the private respondent to justify its continued
occupation of Block 19 is to expropriate the same. This declaration of the trial
court was affirmed by the Court of Appeals. The petitioners cannot legally
impugn now for the first time on appeal to this Court the trial court's directive
to expropriate Block 19 for public use. Well settled is the rule that questions
not raised in the lower court cannot now be raised for the first time on
appeal. 27 Hence, the expropriation of Block 19 is final.
By virtue of the special and peculiar circumstances of the case at bar, there
being no taking of the property in question for purposes of eminent domain
nor condemnation proceedings instituted over the same to speak of, the time
as of which the market value should be fixed is the time when the trial court
made its order of expropriation. It is the date of appropriation or the
investing date which as everyone knows required more than a day,
sometimes weeks to carry through as would an ordinary real estate purchase
and sale. Hence, in estimating the market value, all the capabilities of the
property and all the uses to which it may be applied or for which it is adapted
are to be considered and not merely the condition it is in the time and the
use to which it is then applied by the owner. All the facts as to the condition
of the property and its surroundings, its improvements and capabilities may
be shown and considered in estimating its value.
Anent the compensation to be paid for Block 19, the reasons relied upon by
the trial court which appear just, equitable, and in consonance with
established jurisprudence are:
"In the mind of the Court, the contentions so advanced by the plaintiff cannot
be maintained, and the authority just cited is not applicable in the instant
case. In the first place, it was clearly shown by the defendants that the
properties herein involved have been converted into a subdivision way back
in 1962. In support of this, the defendants presented the order of this Court
approving the subdivision plan, which was likewise approved by the Land
Registration Commission, and the resolution of the municipal council of
Mexico, Pampanga relative to the same subdivision. Moreover, as earlier
discussed the Court is guided by the Commissioner's Report and Findings of
the ocular inspection in determining the nature of the properties involved. In
effect, therefore, the Court is of the opinion that the evidence presented by
the defendants outweigh the evidence presented for the plaintiff by
preponderance.
"Furthermore, by the testimonies of the witnesses, it was established that
the properties, being converted into a subdivision sell at P15.00 to P20.00
per square meter and there are many willing buyers at this price range.
However, the plaintiff, in an effort to contradict this claim, presented the
appraisal made by the provincial appraisal committee for the province of
Pampanga which appraisal gave the valuation of P6.00 to P8.00 per square
meter for lots adjoining the lots of defendants. These prices or valuation,
however, in the opinion of the Court, cannot be and are not the
determinative factors in determining the value of the defendants' properties.
It has been established by the evidence on record and confirmed by the
report of the Commissioner, that the Conching Subdivision, where the
subject properties form parts, are located along the national highway; that it
is near the town proper of Mexico, Pampanga where the school and church
sites are situated. In giving valuation to properties, these factors, namely, the
relation or distance of the premises towards the national highway, to the
town proper, and to other commercial sites such as schools and churches,
must be given consideration. In this particular case, the properties, being
along the national highway, near the town proper of Mexico, Pampanga and
likewise near the school and church sites, must be given valuation
commensurate to its standing. This being the case, the Court believes that
the value of P15.00 per square meter is reasonable to be given to the
defendants' properties. The defendants therefore are entitled to the
payment of P15.00 per square meter for their properties object of this
expropriation proceedings which are Blocks 10 and 19 of the subdivision plan
with an aggregate area of 26,439 square meters."
The fair market value of Block 19 should be fixed at P15.00 per square meter.
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. No. 55720-R is
hereby modified as to Block 19 of the subdivision plan of petitioners'
property and the private respondent, National Power Corporation, is ordered
to pay to the petitioners the amount of P306,585.00 as the market value for
Block 19 (20,439 square meters) at P15.00 per square meter with legal
interest from March 30, 1970. No pronouncement as to costs. Cdpr
SO ORDERED.
||| (Garcia v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. L-47553, [January 31, 1981], 190
PHIL 518-533)
[G.R. No. 10278. November 23, 1915.]
THE MANILA RAILROAD COMPANY, plaintiff-appellant, vs. ROMANA
VELASQUEZ, MELECIO ALLAREY and DEOGRACIAS MALIGALIG,defendants-
appellants.
William A. Kincaid and Thomas L. Hartigan for plaintiff.
Ledesma, Lim & Irureta Goyena for defendants.
DECISION
TRENT, J p:
This action was instituted by the Manila Railroad Company for the purpose
of expropriating twelve small parcels of land for a railroad station site at
Lucena, Province of Tayabas.
The original defendants were Romana Velasquez, Melecio Allarey, and
Deogracias Maligalig. After the filing of the complaint Simeon Perez, Filemon
Perez, and Francisco Icasiano, having bought Romana Velasquez' interest,
were included as defendants. The commissioners fixed the value of the
twelve parcels at P81,412.75, and awarded P600 to Simeon Perez as damages
for the removal of an uncompleted camarin. Upon hearing, the
commissioners' report was approved and the plaintiff directed to pay to the
"Tayabas Land Company" the total amount awarded, with interest and costs.
The plaintiff company alleges that that amount is grossly excessive, pointing
out that the land has never been used except for rice culture.
Upon this appeal we are asked to review the evidence and reduce the
appraised value of the condemned land in accordance with our findings
rendering judgment accordingly. Has this court, under the law, authority to
take such action? And along with this question it must be decided whether
the Courts of First Instance have such power over the reports of
commissioners. Section 246 of the Code of Civil Procedure reads:
"Action of Court Upon Commissioners' Report. — Upon the filing of such
report in court, the court shall, upon hearing, accept the same and render
judgment in accordance therewith; or for cause shown, it may recommit the
report to the commissioners for further report of facts; or it may set aside
the report and appoint new commissioners; or it may accept the report in
part and reject it in part, and may make such final order and judgment as
shall secure to the plaintiff the property essential to the exercise of his rights
under the law, and to the defendant just compensation for the land so taken;
and the judgment shall require payment of the sum awarded as provided in
Page | 22
the next section, before the plaintiff can enter upon the ground and
appropriate it to the public use."
From this section it clearly appears that the report of the commissioners on
the value of the condemned land is not final. The judgment of the court is
necessary to give effect to their estimated valuation. (Crawford vs. Valley R.
R. Co., 25 Grat., 467.) Nor is the report of the commissioners conclusive,
under any circumstances, so that the judgment of the court is a mere detail
or formality requisite to the proceedings. The judgment of the court on the
question of the value of the land sought to be condemned is rendered after
a consideration of the evidence submitted to the commissioners, their
report, and the exceptions thereto submitted upon the hearing of the report.
By this judgment the court may accept the commissioners' report
unreservedly; it may return the report for additional facts; or it may set the
report aside and appoint new commissioners; or it may accept the report in
part or reject it in part, and "make such final order and judgment as shall
secure to the plaintiff the property essential to the exercise of his rights
under the law, and to the defendant just compensation for the land so
taken." Any one of these methods of disposing of the report is available to
and may be adopted by the court according as they are deemed suited to
secure to the plaintiff the necessary property and to the defendant just
compensation therefor. But can the latter method produce a different result
in reference to any part of the report from that recommended by the
commissioner?
Section 246 expressly authorizes the court to "accept the report in part and
reject it in part." If this phrase stood alone, it might be said that the court is
only empowered to accept as a whole certain parts of the report and reject
as a whole other parts. That is, if the commissioners fixed the value of the
land taken at P5,000, the improvements at P1,000, and the consequential
damages at P500, the court could accept the report in full as to any one item
and reject it as to any other item, but could not accept or reject a part of the
report in such a way as to change any one of the amounts. But the court is
also empowered "to make such final order and judgment as shall secure to
the plaintiff the property essential to the exercise of his rights under the law,
and to the defendant just compensation for the land so taken." The court is
thereby expressly authorized to issue such orders and render such judgment
as will produce these results. If individual items which make up the total
amount of the award in the commissioners' report could only be accepted or
rejected in their entirety, it would be necessary to return the case, so far as
the rejected portions of the report were concerned, for further consideration
before the same or new commissioners, and the court could not make a "final
order and judgment" in the cause until the rejected portions of the report
had been rereported to it. Thus, in order to give the quotation from 246 its
proper meaning, it is obvious that the court may, in its discretion correct the
commissioners' report in any manner deemed suitable to the occasion so
that final judgment may be rendered and thus end the litigation. The "final
order and judgment" are reviewable by this court by means of a bill of
exceptions in the same way as any other "action." Section 496 provides that
the Supreme Court may, in the exercise of its appellate jurisdiction, affirm,
reverse, or modify any final judgment, order, or decree of the Court of First
Instance, and section 497, as amended by Act No. 1596, provides that if the
excepting party filed a motion in the Court of First Instance for a new trial
upon the ground that the evidence was insufficient to justify the decision and
the judge overruled such motion and due exception was taken to his ruling,
the Supreme Court may review the evidence and make such findings upon
the facts by a preponderance of the evidence and render such final judgment
as justice and equity may require. So it is clear from these provisions that this
court, in those cases where the right of eminent domain has been exercised
and where the provisions of the above section have been complied with, may
examine the testimony and decide the case by a preponderance of the
evidence; or, in other words, retry the case upon the merits and render such
order or judgment as justice and equity may require. The result is that, in our
opinion, there is ample authority in the statute to authorize the courts to
change or modify the report of the commissioners by increasing or
decreasing the amount of the award, if the facts of the case will justify such
change or modification. As it has been suggested that this conclusion is in
conflict with some of the former holdings of this court upon the same
question, it might be well to briefly review the decisions to ascertain whether
or not, as a matter of fact, such conflict exists.
In City of Manila vs. Tuason (R. G. No. 3367, decided March 23, 1907,
unreported), the Court of First Instance modified the report of the
commissioners as to some of the items and confirmed it as to others. On
appeal, the Supreme Court remanded the cause, apparently for the reason
that the evidence taken by the commissioners and the lower court was not
before it, and perhaps also because the commissioners adopted a wrong
principle of assessing damages.
In Manila Railway Co. vs. Fabie (17 Phil. Rep., 206) the majority report of the
commissioners appraised the land at P56,337.18, while a dissenting
commissioner estimated it at P27,415.92. The Court of First Instance, after
taking additional evidence upon the consequential benefits to the remainder
of defendants' land by the construction of the railroad, and also as to the
rental value of various pieces of land in the locality, fixed the value of the
land at the sum estimated by the dissenting commissioner. The defendants
appealed to this court. This court remarked that the only evidence tending
to support the majority report of the commissioners consisted of deeds of
transfer of real estate between parties in that community showing the prices
paid by the vendees in such conveyances. It was held that without its being
shown that such transfers had been made in the ordinary course of business
and competition, and that the parties therein stated were not fictitious, such
deeds were incompetent as evidence of the value of the condemned land. As
to the action of the court in fixing the price of the land at P27,415.92, the
court said:
"Conceding, without deciding, that he also had the right to formulate an
opinion of his own as to the value of the land in question, nevertheless, if he
formulate such an opinion, he must base it upon competent evidence. The
difficulty with the case is that it affirmatively appears from the record on
appeal that there is an entire absence of competent evidence to support the
finding either of the commissioners or of the court, even if the court had a
right to make a finding of his own at all under the circumstances."
In Manila Railroad Co. vs. Attorney-General (22 Phil. Rep., 192) the only
question raised was the value of certain improvements on the condemned
portion of a hacienda, such improvements consisting mainly of plants and
trees and belonging to a lessee of the premises. The total damages claimed
were P24,126.50. The majority report of the commission allowed P19,478,
which amount was reduced by the Court of First Instance to P16,778. The
plaintiff company, upon appeal to this court, alleged that the damages
allowed were grossly excessive and that the amount allowed by the
commissioners should have been reduced by at least P17,000; while the
defendant urged that the damages as shown by the record were much
greater than those allowed, either by the commissioners or by the court. In
disposing of the case this court said:
"The only ground upon which the plaintiff company bases its contention that
the valuations are excessive is the minority report of one of the
commissioners. The values assigned to some of the improvements may be
excessive but we are not prepared to say that such is the case. Certainly there
is no evidence in the record which would justify us in holding these values to
be grossly excessive. The commissioners in their report go into rather minute
detail as to the reasons for the conclusions reached and the valuations fixed
for the various items included therein. There was sufficient evidence before
the commissioners to support the valuations fixed by them except only those
later modified by the court below. The trial court was of opinion that the
price of P2 each which was fixed for the orange trees (naranjitos) was
excessive, and this was reduced to P1.50 for each tree; this on the ground
that the evidence discloses that these trees were comparatively young at the
time of the expropriation, and that the value fixed by the majority report of
the commissioners was that of full-grown or nearly full-grown trees. We are
of opinion that this reduction was just and reasonable. Aside from the
evidence taken into consideration by the trial judge we find no evidence in
the record in support of the contention of the railroad plaintiff that the
valuations fixed in the majority report of the commissioners and by the trial
court are grossly excessive, and plaintiff company having wholly failed to
offer evidence in support of its allegations in this regard when the
opportunity so to do was provided in accordance with law, it has no standing
in this court to demand a new trial based on its unsupported allegations of
grossly excessive valuation of the property by the commissioners and the
court below."
This court affirmed the finding of damages made by the trial court with the
exception of an item for damages caused by fire to improvements on lands
adjoining those condemned, which was held not to be a proper matter to be
considered in condemnation proceedings. The court here approved of the
action of the Court of First Instance in reducing the amount of damages fixed
by the commissioners as to the value of the young orange trees on the
strength of the evidence of record.
In Manila Railroad Company vs. Caligsihan (R. G. No. 7932, decided March 25,
1913, unreported), it appears that the lower court approved in toto the
report of the commissioners. On appeal, this Supreme Court reversed the
lower court and remanded the case with orders to appoint new
commissioners, saying:
"Under the evidence in this case the award is excessive. Section 246 of the
Code of Civil Procedure giving to the court the power to 'make such final
order and judgment as shall secure to the party the property essential to the
exercise of his rights under the law, and to the defendant just compensation
for the land so taken,' we exercise that right in this case for the purpose of
preventing the defendants from obtaining that which would be more than
'just compensation' under all the evidence of the case.
"The judgment is reversed and the cause remanded, with instructions to the
lower court to appoint a new commission and to proceed from that point de
novo."
We will now examine the case (Philippine Railway Co. vs. Solon, 13 Phil. Rep.,
34) relied upon to support the proposition that the courts should not
Page | 23
interfere with the report of the commissioners to correct the amount of
damages except in cases of gross error, showing prejudice or corruption.
In that case the property belonging to the appellant which the company
sought to appropriate was his interest as tenant in a tract of land belonging
to the Government, together with a house standing thereon and other
property belonging to him. He asked that he be awarded for all the property
taken P19,398.42. The commissioners allowed him P10,745.25. At the
hearing had upon the report, the court reduced this amount and allowed the
appellant P9,637.75. The commissioners took a large amount of evidence
relative to the amount of damages. The testimony was conflicting as to the
value of the house, two witnesses fixing it at over P12,000; another at over
P14,000; one at P8,750; another at P6,250; and another at P7,050.95. The
commissioners fixed the value of the house alone at P9,500, and the court at
P8,792.50. This court said:
"Nor do we decide whether, in a case where the damages awarded by the
commissioners are grossly excessive or grossly insufficient, the court can,
upon the same evidence presented before the commissioners, itself change
the award. We restrict ourselves to deciding the precise question presented
by this case, in which it is apparent that, in the opinion of the court below,
the damages were not grossly excessive, for its own allowance was only
P1,000 less than the amount allowed by the commissioners, and the question
is whether in such a case the court can substitute its own opinion upon the
evidence presented before the commissioners for the opinion which the
commissioners themselves formed, not only from that evidence but also
from a view of the premises which by law they were required to make."
Referring to the manner in which the trial court arrived at its valuation of the
various items, including the house, this court said:
"Without considering the correctness of the rule adopted by the court for
determining the value of the property it is sufficient to say that the evidence
before the commissioners as to the value of the property taken was
contradictory and that their award was not palpably excessive or inadequate.
Under such circumstances, we are of the opinion that the court had no right
to interfere with it."
From the foregoing it is clear that (1) the testimony was conflicting; (2) that
the award as allowed by the commissioners was well within the amounts
fixed by the witnesses; and (3) that the award was not grossly excessive. That
it was not grossly excessive is shown by the difference between the amount
fixed by the commissioners and that fixed by the court, this difference being
P1,117.50, a reduction of a little over 10 per cent.
In City of Manila vs. Estrada (25 Phil. Rep., 208), the city sought to
expropriate an entire parcel of land with its improvements for use in
connection with a public market. The commissioners, after viewing the
premises and receiving evidence, being unable to agree, submitted two
reports to the court. In the majority report the value of the land was fixed at
P20 per square meter and in the minority report at P10. The Court of First
Instance fixed the value at P15 per square meter. Upon appeal this court,
after re- viewing the evidence, held that P10 per square meter was a just
compensation for the land taken and rendered judgment accordingly, saying:
"After a careful examination of the entire record in this case and the law
applicable to the questions raised therein, we are of the opinion that P10 per
square meter is a just compensation for the land taken."
From the above review of the cases it will be seen that this court has not only
not decided that the courts cannot interfere with the report of the
commissioners unless prejudice or fraud has been shown, but the decisions,
aside from the case of the City of Manila vs. Estrada, tend to show the
contrary; that is, an award which is grossly excessive or grossly insufficient in
the opinion of the court can be increased or decreased, although there be
nothing which tends to indicate prejudice or fraud on the part of the
commissioners. The case of the City of Manila vs. Estrada is direct authority
supporting the conclusions which we have reached in the case at bar. And
we are not without authority outside of this jurisdiction which supports the
view we have taken in the case under consideration. In Morgan's Louisiana
& Texas R. R. Co. vs. Barton (51 La. Ann., 1338), the court, in considering a
procedural law similar to our own, stated:
"On the question of the value of the land, 8.34 acres, the commissioners have
allowed $2,500, or $300 per acre. The defendant has put in the record the
testimony of witnesses claimed to support the allowance. Without
disregarding this testimony, it is sufficient to say that the opinions of the
witnesses do not seem to be based on any fact calculated to show the value
of the land. . . . On the other hand the plaintiff has placed before us the titles
of defendant of recent date showing the price paid by him (the defendant)
for the entire body of land of which the 8 acres are part; the acts of sale of
land in the same neighborhood, and of the same quality; the assessment of
defendant's property, and other testimony on this issue of value. . . . Giving
all possible weight, or rather restricting the testimony of the plaintiffs'
witnesses to its due influence, and giving, we think, necessary effect to the
acts by which defendant purchased, the acts of sale of other land, the
assessment of value, with due allowance for under assessment, and the
other testimony of record, we reach the conclusion that the award gives two-
thirds more than the value of the land. We fix the value of the land at
$833.33."
See also T. & P. R. R. Co. vs. Southern Develop. Co. (52 La. Ann., 535), where
the court held the appraisement too low and after discussing the evidence,
increased the amount of the award accordingly. A similar case is
Abney vs. Railroad Co. (105 La., 446). See also T. & P. R. R. Co. vs. Wilson (108
La., 1; 32 So., 173); and Louisiana Western R. Co. vs. Crossman's Heirs (111
La., 611; 35 So., 784), where the point is touched upon.
In Missouri the statute (1 Mo. Ann. Stat., sec. 1268) directs that "the court
shall make such order therein as right and justice may require, and may order
a new appraisement, upon good cause shown." Owing to a constitutional
restriction, this provision has been construed to apply only to damages and
benefits resulting to land owners in consequence of proposed
improvements, the cash value of property expropriated being an issue
triable, at the instance of either party by a jury subsequent to the findings of
the commissioners. Subject to this restriction, however, it has been held that
the above provision of law gives the court the right to increase or decrease
the amount awarded by the commissioners. In the late case of Tarkio
Drainage District vs. Richardson (237 Mo., 49), the court presents a lengthy
review of its decisions on this subject.
The question now arises, when may the courts, with propriety, overrule the
award of the commissioners in whole or in part, and substitute their own
valuation of the condemned property? We shall consider this question in two
ways: first, as one of procedure under section 246, above quoted; and
second, as to the evidence which must appear in the record in order to justify
such action.
From a mere reading of section 246 and the remarks just made, it should be
clear that the court is permitted to act upon the commissioners' report in one
of several ways, at its own discretion. The whole duty of the court in
considering the commissioners' report is to satisfy itself that just
compensation will be made to the defendant by its final judgment in the
matter, and in order to fulfill its duty in this respect the court will be obliged
to exercise its discretion in dealing with the report as the particular
circumstances of the case may require. But generally speaking, when the
commissioners' report cannot with justice be approved by the court, one of
three or four circumstances will usually present itself, each of which has for
its antidote one of the methods of dealing with the report placed at the
disposal of the court by section 246. Thus, if it be successfully established
that the commissioners refused to hear competent evidence material to the
case, then all the evidence in the case would not be before the court. The
court could not, with reason, attempt to either approve or change the report,
as it stood, for the reason that all the evidence of the case would not have
been considered by the commissioners nor have been presented to the
court; and the remedy would be to "recommit the report of the
commissioners for further report of facts." Again, if improper conduct, fraud,
or prejudice be charged against the commissioners and this charge be
sustained it would be safer to set aside the award thus vitiated and "appoint
new commissioners" who could render a report not tainted by these things.
But when the only error of the commissioners is that they have applied illegal
principles to the evidence submitted to them; or that they have disregarded
a clear preponderance of the evidence; or that they have used an improper
rule of assessment in arriving at the amount of the award, then, in such a
case, if the evidence be clear and convincing, the court should ordinarily be
able, by the use of those correct legal principles which govern the case, to
determine upon the amount which should be awarded without returning the
report to the commissioners. When the matter stands in this light, it becomes
the duty of the court to make "final order and judgment" in which the proper
award will be made and thus end the litigation between the parties.
Now, what evidence as to value must the record contain in order to justify
the court in disregarding the valuation fixed upon the condemned property
by the commissioners and substituting therefor its own finding of value? It is
almost a universal practice in the United States to submit the question of
value in expropriation cases to a jury or commission, usually of local property
owners, and one of the things they are specially instructed to do is to view or
inspect the condemned property. The purpose of this view and the additional
weight which should be given to the award of the appraisers because of the
view are questions often discussed. After a careful examination of a number
of adjudicated cases, we have concluded that the following cases, all
agreeing in principle, correctly state the purpose of the view.
In Denver Co. vs. Howe (49 Colo., 256; 112 P., 779), it was said: "The jury
viewed the premises and were better able to judge of the number of acres in
each, as well as other conditions affecting the land. The facts ascertained by
the view of the premises are not in the record, whether they were regarded
as so much additional evidence, or were used to better understand and apply
the evidence adduced at the trial. Keeping in view the evidence relating to
the special value of the building site, the value of improvements and of the
ground, it will be found that the verdict is within and supported by the values
as testified to, and these values, as fixed by the several witnesses,
represented to each the market value, as conceded by appellants. The verdict
is supported by the evidence of market value and on that ground would have
Page | 24
to be sustained if the matter complained of in the instruction had been
entirely omitted."
In Gorgas vs. Railroad Co. (114 Pa., 1; 22 Atl., 715), it was said: "A view may
sometimes be of the highest importance, where there is a conflict of
testimony. It may enable the jurors to see on which side the truth lies. And if
the witnesses on the one side or the other have testified to a state of facts
which exists only in their imagination, as to the location of the property, the
manner in which it is cut by the road, the character of the improvements, or
any other physical fact bearing upon the case, they surely cannot be expected
to ignore the evidence of their senses and give weight to testimony which
their view shows to be false. . . . The true rule in such cases is believed to be
that the jury in estimating the damages shall consider the testimony as given
by the witnesses, in connection with the facts as they appear upon the view;
and upon the whole case, as thus presented, ascertain the difference
between the market value of the property immediately before and
immediately after the land was taken. This difference is the proper measure
of damages."
In Close vs. Samm (27 Iowa, 503), subsequently approved in
Guinn vs. Railway Co. (131 Iowa, 680, 683; 109 N. W., 209), it was said: "The
question then arises as to the purposes and intent of this statute. It seems to
us that it was to enable the jury, by the view of the premises or place to better
understand and comprehend the testimony of the witnesses respecting the
same, and thereby the more intelligently to apply the testimony to the issues
on trial before them, and not to make them silent witnesses in the case,
burdened with testimony unknown to both parties, and in respect to which
no opportunity for cross-examination or correction of error, if any, could be
afforded either party. If they are thus permitted to include their personal
examination, how could a court ever properly set aside their verdict as being
against the evidence, or even refuse to set it aside without knowing the facts
ascertained by such personal examination by the jury? It is a general rule
certainly, if not universal, that the jury must base their verdict upon the
evidence delivered to them in open court, and they may not take into
consideration facts known to them personally, but outside of the evidence
produced before them in court. If a party would avail himself of the facts
known to a juror. he must have him sworn and examined as other witnesses."
In C. K. & W. R. Co. vs. Mouriquand (45 Kan., 170), the court approved of the
practice of instructing the jury that their view of the premises was to be used
in deter-mining the value of conflicting testimony, saying: "Had the jury
disregarded all the sworn evidence, and returned a verdict upon their own
view of the premises, then it might be said that the evidence which the jurors
acquired from making the view had been elevated to the character of
exclusive and predominating evidence. This is not allowable. The evidence of
the witnesses introduced in the court on the part of the landowner supports
fully the verdict. If the verdict was not supported by substantial testimony
given by witnesses sworn upon the trial, we would set it aside, but as the jury
only took into consideration the result of their view of the premises, in
connection with the sworn evidence produced before them, to determine
between conflicting evidence, the instruction was not so erroneous as to
require a new trial."
In Postal Telegraph-Cable Co. vs. Peyton (124 Ga., 746; 52 S. E., 803; 3 L. R.
A., N. S., 333), it was said: "A jury cannot be left to roam without any evidence
in the ascertainment and assessment of damages. The damages which the
law allows to be assessed in favor of a landowner whose property has been
taken or damaged under the right of eminent domain are purely
compensatory. The land actually appropriated by the telegraph company
amounted to only a fraction of an acre; and while it appeared that the
construction and maintenance of the telegraph line would cause
consequential damages to the plaintiff, no proof was offered from which any
fair and reasonable estimate of the amount of damages thereby sustained
could be made. The jury should have been supplied with the data necessary
in arriving at such an estimate. In the absence of this essential proof, a verdict
many times in excess of the highest proved value of the land actually taken
must necessarily be deemed excessive. Judgment reversed."
In New York, where the question has doubtless been raised more often than
anywhere else, the late cases illustrate the rule, perhaps the most clearly.
The appellate division, supreme court, in In re Titus Street in City of New York
(123 N. Y. S., 1018), where it appeared that the city's witnesses testified that
the property was worth $9,531 and the commissioners awarded $2,000 less,
said:
"We do not think that this is meeting the requirements of the law; we do not
believe that it is within the province of commissioners to arbitrarily set up
their own opinion against that of the witnesses called by the city, and to ward
damages largely below the figure to which the moving party is committed,
without something appearing in the record to justify such action. When a
party comes into court and makes an admission against his interest, no court
or judicial tribunal is justified in assuming that the admission is not true
without at least pointing out the reason for discrediting it; it carries with it
the presumption of truth, and this presumption is not to be overcome by the
mere fact that the commissioners might themselves have reached a different
conclusion upon the viewing of the premises. . . . This view of the
commissioners, it seems to us, is for the purpose of enabling the
commissioners to give proper weight and effect to the evidence before them,
and it might justify them in giving larger damages than some of the witnesses
thought proper, or even less than some of them declared to be sustained,
but where the evidence produced by the moving party in a proceeding for
taking property for public purposes fixes a sum, without any disagreement in
the testimony on that side, we are of the opinion that the cases do not justify
a holding that the commissioners are authorized to ignore such testimony
and to substitute their own opinion, in such a manner as to preclude the
supreme court from reviewing the determination. That is not in harmony
with that due process of law which is always demanded where rights of
property are involved, and would make it possible for a corrupt commission
to entirely disregard the rights of the individual to the undisturbed
enjoyment of his property, or its equivalent. "
From these authorities and keeping in mind the local law on the subject, we
think the correct rule to be that, if the testimony of value and damages is
conflicting, the commissioners may resort to their knowledge of the
elements which affect the assessment and which were obtained from a view
of the premises, in order to determine the relative weight of conflicting
testimony, but their award must be supported by the evidence adduced at
their hearings and made of record, or it cannot stand; or, in other words, the
view is intended solely for the purpose of better understanding the evidence
submitted. To allow the commissioners to make up their judgment on their
own individual knowledge of disputed facts material to the case, or upon
their private opinions, would be most dangerous and unjust. It would deprive
the losing party of the right of cross-examination and the benefit of all the
tests of credibility which the law affords. It would make each commissioner
the absolute judge of the accuracy and value of his own knowledge or
opinions and compel the court to affirm the report on the facts when all of
such facts were not before it. The evidence of such knowledge or of the
grounds of such opinions could not be preserved in a bill of exceptions or
questioned upon appeal. It is no hardship upon any of the parties to require
that the award must be based upon the evidence. It is the duty of each party
to submit what evidence of value he has and if he fails to do so he can not
complain if the appraisement is kept within the bounds of the evidence
presented to the commissioners.
In those cases where the testimony as to value and damages is conflicting the
commissioners should always set forth in full their reasons for accepting the
testimony of certain witnesses and rejecting that of others, especially in
those cases where a view of the premises has been made.
The commissioners are required by law to be disinterested landowners of the
province, selected by the court with a view to their ability to arrive at a
judicious decision in the assessment of damages. The judgment of men with
these qualifications upon the price of real property is entitled to some
considerable weight. Being local men, it may be assumed that they are
familiar with the local land values, the needs of the community in that line,
and the adaptability of particular sites to commercial purposes. Then, too,
their view of the premises enables commissioners to better understand the
evidence submitted to them, as we have said above. The declarations oœ
witnesses as to the value of the land; as to its condition, or the conditions of
improvements which may be located upon it, and comparisons made
between the condemned land and other land in the vicinity may all be better
understood by the commissioners if they have viewed the premises. It is,
therefore, no slight divergence from the seeming preponderance of the
evidence of record, as viewed by the court, which will justify the court in
brushing side the commissioners' report and appraising the property itself,
based only upon a perusal of the evidence which was submitted to them. It
is in those cases where the evidence submitted to the commissioners as to
value varies greatly that the real difficulty lies. In these cases it is clear that
some of the evidence must be untrustworthy. Hence, it is necessary to reject
that evidence which shows the price to be greatly higher or lower than
the just compensation to which the defendant owner is entitled. If, after
making due allowance for the superior facilities which the commissioners
had for arriving at the correct value of the property, the court is clearly of the
opinion that the evidence relied upon by them is untrustworthy, and that
other evidence rejected by the commission and which fixes the value of the
property at a figure greatly at variance with their valuation of the property
bears the earmarks of truth, then it becomes the duty of the court to
substitute for the commissions' award the amount indicated by such
evidence. That the estimated value made by the appraisers is to be given
"great weight ;" that such valuation is not to be "lightly set aside;" that it will
not be set aside "if there is substantial testimony to support it," unless error
is "plainly manifest;" "unless it is apparent that injustice has been done ;"
"unless the commissioners have clearly gone astray or adopted erroneous
principles;" "unless the commissioners acted upon wrong principles, or their
award is grossly inadequate;" unless the award is "palpably excessive or
inadequate;" unless it is "grossly inadequate or un-equal," is the burden of
all the cases.
Let us now examine the evidence, keeping these legal principles in mind. The
only discussion of the evidence of value made by the lower court was as
follows:
Page | 25
"To determine this question (the value of the land) the court abides by and
refers to the report of the commissioners dated July 10, 1913, because it
understands that it must accept this report in all its parts for the reason that
the prices fixed in the said report of P3.75 per square meter for parcel 21-B,
that of P3.50 per square meter for parcel 21-A, and that of P2 per square
meter for the rest of the parcels (naming them) are reasonable and just; the
compensation which is made in the said report for the damages occasioned
to the defendant Simeon Perez being also reasonable and just."
It will be seen that the lower court relied entirely upon the findings of the
commissioners. The commissioners justified their appraisement of the land
at a price so greatly in excess of its value as agricultural land upon the
following considerations. First, the construction of the provincial building and
the high school had increased the price of land in their vicinity. Second, the
neighborhood of these buildings had become a choice residential district.
Third, the population in the vicinity had increased since it became known that
the condemned property had been selected as a station site by the railroad
company. We propose to discuss the evidence of value precisely along these
lines, starting first, however, with its value as agricultural land, the only use
to which it has ever been put.
The condemned land is not located in the commercial district of the town of
Lucena, but is located near the provincial building and the high school. The
land has been used from time out of mind solely for the cultivation of rice
Deogracias Maligalig, one of the defendants, testified that rice land in the
municipality of Lucena was worth P500 per cavan (hectare). Melecio Allarey,
another defendant, testified that such land was worth from P300 to P400 per
hectare. Agustin testified that such land was worth between P400 and P500
per hectare if not under irrigation, and if under irrigation, more than P1,000.
Ambrosio Zaballero, owner of more than 30 parcels of land in the
municipality of Lucena, said that the site of the railroad station was nothing
but a rice field prior to the coming of the railroad, worth from P300 to P400
per hectare. Cayo Alzona, the only witness for the plaintiff, testified that, in
Candelaria, rice land was worth between P200 and P250 per hectare, he
having purchased an uncleared parcel of rice land for P150 per hectare. It
seems fair to accept the statement of the two defendants, Maligalig and
Allarey, and fix the price of the condemned land for agricultural purposes at
P500 per hectare.
Witnesses for the defendants, including three of the latter, fixed the value of
the condemned land at prices ranging from P5 to P8 per square meter. The
remaining defendant, Icasiano, did not testify before the commissioners. But
in his answer filed about seven months after purchasing the land for P0.81
per square meter, he alleged that his parcel was worth P5 per square meter.
So that we have all of the defendants and several other witnesses estimating
the value of the condemned land at about the same figure, or from P50,000
to P80,000 per hectare.
The defendant, Melecio Allarey, testified that he owned 30,000 square
meters of land in the vicinity of the railroad station site, 2,895 square meters
of which was wanted by the plaintiff company. Upon being asked what the
value of his land was, he promptly replied that it was worth P5.50 per square
meter. Asked if he were making his will whether he would list this property
at a total value of P150,000, he evaded a direct reply by saying that he would
divide it among his children. Asked if he considered himself the owner of land
valued at P150,000, he replied that for his purpose he figured on that price.
Asked if he would declare the land to be worth that sum in his sworn tax
declaration, he replied that he would accept the figures fixed upon by the tax
appraisers. His testimony shows clearly that he did not desire to commit
himself positively to the assertion that his three hectares of land was worth
P150,000. His ambiguous and evasive replies on cross-examination do not at
all harmonize with his unequivocal statement in his direct examination that
his land was worth P5.50 per square meter. Apparently, when confronted
with the price per hectare, which this estimate would put upon his land, he
was somewhat astounded. Indeed, we are inclined to believe that one of the
reasons for the high value placed upon the condemned land by all the
witnesses is that they were estimating the price per square meter instead of
per hectare, which is the customary method of fixing the price of agricultural
land. A perusal of the remainder of the testimony of defendant Allarey shows
that he is paying annual taxes on his 30,000 square meters of land amounting
to between P12 and P13. He also naively informs us that he has not been able
to till the land lately because he has no carabaos or other work animals.
Several of the witnesses for the defendants testified to having purchased
land in the vicinity of the station site for residential purposes. Thus, Edard
testified that he paid P1,400 for 220 square meters in 1910. Andres Dinlasan
sold 119 square meters for P10 per square meter on June 6, 1912. He could
give no reason why the purchaser had paid so much for the land, but in
response to a question said the purchaser had some more land joining it.
Agustin bought 1,900 square meters in 1910 for P2 per square meter.
Esteban Lagos paid P1,000 for a plot 16 by 18 meters in 1911. A most
remarkable thing about these purchases is that, as choice residential sites,
they are so extremely small. With the possible exception of the parcel
purchased by Agustin, the parcels in question are hardly generous enough to
permit of the construction of even a modest mansion. Cayo Alzona testified
that he purchased 2,200 square meters in 1906 for P350, and that he
purchased a little less than one hectare in 1912, all in the vicinity of the
station site, for which he paid P1,500. It will be noted that there is
considerable difference between these figures and the prices at which the
other witnesses testified they purchased land in that neighborhood. That the
evidence of sales of nearby land was competent, there can be no doubt.
In Aledo Terminal Ry. Co. vs. Butler (246 Ill., 406; 92 N. E., 909), the court said:
"Evidence of voluntary sales of other lands in the vicinity and similarly
situated is admissible in evidence to aid in estimating the value of the tract
sought to be condemned, but the value of such testimony depends upon the
similarity of the land to that in question and the time when such sales were
made and the distance such lands are from those the value of which is the
subject of inquiry."
In an earlier case, the supreme court of Illinois stated the rule as follows: "The
theory upon which evidence of sales of other similar property in the
neighborhood, at about the same time, is held to be admissible is that it tends
to show the fair market value of the property sought to be condemned. And
it can not be doubted that such sales, when made in a free and open market,
where a fair opportunity for competition has existed, become material and
often very important factors in determining the value of the particular
property in question." (Peoria Gas Light Co. vs. Peoria Term. Ry. Co., 146 Ill.,
372; 21 L. R. A., 373; 34 N. E. 550.)
The supreme court of Massachusetts, in Fourth National Bank vs. Com. (212
Mass., 66; 98 N. E., 86), affirms the rule as follows: "It long has been settled
that in the assessment of damages where lands are acquired by eminent
domain evidence is admissible of the price received from sales of land similar
in character, and situated in the vicinity, if the transactions are not so remote
in point of time that a fair comparison practically is impossible."
In Hewitt vs. Price (204 Mo., 31), it was said: "It is sufficient to say upon this
proposition that the law is well-settled in this State upon that subject, and
while the value or-selling price of similar property may be taken into
consideration in determining the value of the piece of property in litigation,
it is equally true that the location and character of such property should be
similar and the sale of such other property should at least be reasonably near
in point of time to the time at which the inquiry of the value of the property
in dispute is directed."
In Laing vs. United New Jersey R. R. & C. Co. (54 N. J. L., 576; 33 Am. St. Rep.,
682; 25 A., 409), it was said: "Generally in this and other states evidence of
sales of land in the neighborhood is competent on an inquiry as to the value
of land, and if the purchases or sales were made by the party against whom
the evidence was offered it might stand as an admission. But such testimony
is received only upon the idea that there is substantial similarity between the
properties. The practice does not extend, and the rule should not be applied,
to cases where the conditions are so dissimilar as not easily to admit of
reasonable comparison, and much must be left to the discretion of the trial
judge in the determination of the preliminary question whether the
conditions are fairly comparable."
Evidence of other sales made in good faith is competent if the character of
such parcels as sites for business purposes, dwellings, or for whatever other
use which enhances the pecuniary value of the condemned land is
sufficiently similar to the latter that it may be reasonably assumed that the
price of the condemned land would be approximately near the price brought
by the parcels sold. The value of such evidence, of course, diminishes as the
differences between the property sold and the condemned land increase.
The property must be in the immediate neighborhood, that is, in the zone of
commercial activity with which the condemned property is identified, and
the sales must be sufficiently near in point of time with the date of the
condemnation proceedings as to exclude general increases or decreases in
property values due to changed commercial conditions in the vicinity. No two
estates are ever exactly alike, and as the differences between parcels sold
and the land condemned must necessarily be taken into consideration in
comparing values, we think it much better that those differences should be
shown as part of the evidence of such sales, as is the practice in Iowa. (Town
of Cherokee vs. S. C. & I. F. Town Lot and Land Co., 52 Iowa, 279; 3 N. W., 42.)
And where these differences are so great that the sales in question can form
no reliable standard for comparison, such evidence should not be admitted.
(Presbrey vs. Old Colony & Newport R. Co., 103 Mass., 1.)
Aside from the bare fact that the real estate transactions referred to by the
witnesses were somewhere in the vicinity of the condemned land, there is
nothing to guide us as to the relative value of the condemned land. The
differences which must have existed between the various parcels of land in
the vicinity we are left to imagine. And while the commissioners' view of the
condemned land undoubtedly assisted them in forming their estimate of
value, still counsel should not have relied upon their astuteness to discover
differences in values, but should have brought them specifically to the
attention of the commissioners. It seems rather unusual, also, that the bare
statements of witnesses should be accepted as to the prices which nearby
parcels brought, in view of the insistence of counsel that the condemned land
is nothing more than agricultural land. These sales should have been
thoroughly investigated to determine whether they were made bona fide
Page | 26
and, if so, whether they were not attended by unusual circumstances which
materially in- creased the purchase price.
But while these transfers of nearby land are interesting as bearing upon the
value of the condemned land, the record also shows several transfers of the
latter itself after it became generally known that it had been selected by the
railroad company as the site for its Lucena station. We take it that these
transactions, in which the defendants were themselves parties, offer a far
more certain basis for estimating the value of the land than do their
testimony before the commissioners or the testimony of other witnesses as
to fancy prices paid for neighboring parcels. Romana Velasquez, who owned
the major portion of the condemned land, disposed of hers to her nephews
surnamed Perez. Her first sale was on July 21, 1912. This parcel contained
16,094 square meters and brought at this time P6,500, or a little more than
P0.40 per square meter. A month later Perez sold this parcel to one Icasiano
for P13,000, or a little less than P0.81 per square meter. Sra. Velasquez' next
sale was of three parcels, the first two of which contained approximately
23,000 square meters, while the area of the third was described as three
gantas of rice. The total price of the three parcels was P2,500 or a little over
P0.10 per meter. In one of these parcels was located approximately 8,700
square meters of the condemned land which the commissioners reported at
a price higher than any of the rest.
On May 26, 1913, Icasiano, the then owner of the parcel containing 16,094
square meters, sold it to the Tayabas Land Company for P18,000; and on July
1, 1913, some twenty days after the commissioners had rendered their
report, all of the remaining owners of the condemned land sold their
holdings, parcel by parcel, as it had been assessed by the commissioners, to
the same company for P1.05 per square meter, with the exception of Simeon
Perez who sold the two parcels owned by him at P2.27 and P2.11,
respectively. Here is the most convincing argument that all the witnesses
who placed values on the condemned property, ranging from P5 per square
meter to P8 per meter, were seriously in error. After all the speculation
concerning the land, after the commissioners had reported its value at prices
ranging from P2 to P3.75 per square meter, the owners sold the land, parcel
by parcel, as it had been assessed by the commissioners for a little more than
P1 per meter, with the exception of Simeon Perez who accepted P2.11 and
P2.27 for the two parcels which the commissioners had appraised at P3.50
and P3.75 per meter, respectively. It is unfortunate that the commissioners
did not have an opportunity to consider the deeds executed by the
defendants in favor of the Tayabas Land Company. With the commissioners'
valuation of the land before them, the Tayabas Land Company was actually
able to purchase from the defendant all of the condemned land at a greatly
inferior price. The defendants were not able to resist an offer of P1 and P2
per meter for their holdings, notwithstanding their fervid declarations before
the commissioners that their property was worth P5 per meter, and
notwithstanding the official report by a board composed of local men that it
was worth from P2 to P3.75 per meter. This, of course, does not include the
defendant Icasiano who sold out to the land company after the commission
had been appointed but before it had begun its labors. It is to be
remembered, however, that he both bought and sold the land after the
railroad company had made known its intention of expropriating it, and that
in his answer to the complaint he alleged his land to be worth P5 per meter.
Now, what was the object of the Tayabas Land Company in purchasing the
land? Evidently it was not with the intention of making any use of it, for the
railroad company had long since taken possession. They, as well as the
owners, were simply speculating on the probability that the award of the
commissioners would be approved by the court. It was little more than a
sporty guess on each side as to what would be allowed for the land by the
final judgment of the court. The company believed the award would exceed
P1.05 per meter, and the defendants thought the risk that the award would
be in a lesser amount was so great that they let the land go for the price the
company offered them. Nor is it at all certain that the prices inserted in these
deeds of sale were not fictitiously inflated. The circumstances under which
the sales were made would readily suggest the expediency of inserting
fictitious prices in the deeds.
The moment a parcel of land is wanted by a public service corporation the
price, for some occult reason, immediately soars far beyond what the owner
would think of asking or receiving in the open market. Owners ask fabulous
prices for it and neighbors look on with an indulgent smile or even persuade
themselves that the land is worth the price for which the owner holds out —
in view of the fact that it is wanted by a corporation, whose financial
resources are popularly supposed to be inexhaustible. The resultant good to
a community due to the investment of new capital, the increased
employment of labor, and the services the corporation will render are for the
moment forgotten; and persons called upon for opinions as to the price of
the desired property, unconsciously perhaps, relax from that sound business
acumen which guides them in their daily affairs, while they are considering,
not the price which they would care to pay if they wanted the land, but the
price which the corporation ought to pay in view of the fact that it is a
corporation.
The owner of condemned land is entitled to just compensation. That is all the
law allows him. "Compensation" means an equivalent for the value of the
land (property) taken. Anything beyond that is more and anything short of
that is less than compensation. To compensate is to render something which
is equal in value to that taken or received. The word "just" is used to intensify
the meaning of the word "compensation;" to convey the idea that the
equivalent to be rendered for the property taken shall be real, substantial,
full, ample. "Just compensation," therefore, as used in section 246 of the
Code of Civil Procedure, means a fair and full equivalent for the loss
sustained.
"The exercise of the power being necessary for the public good, and all
property being held subject to its exercise when, and as the public good
requires it, it would be unjust to the public that it should be required to pay
the owner more than a fair indemnity for such loss. To arrive at this fair
indemnity, the interests of the public and of the owner and all the
circumstances of the particular appropriation should be taken into
consideration." (Lewis on Eminent Domain, sec. 462.)
The compensation must be just to the public as well as to the owners.
(Searl vs. School District, 133 U. S., 533- 33 L. ed. 740.) Section 244 of our
code says that:
"The commissioners shall assess the value of the property taken and used,
and shall also assess the consequential damages to the property not taken
and deduct from such consequential damages the consequential benefits to
be derived by the owners from the public use of the land taken."
"To assess" is to perform a judicial act. The commissioners' power is limited
to assessing the value and to determining the amount of the damages. There
it stops; they can go no farther. The value and damages awarded must be a
just compensation and no more and no less. But in fixing these amounts, the
commissioners are not to act ad libitum. They are to discharge the trust
reposed in them according to well established rules and form their judgment
upon correct legal principles. To deny this is to place them where no one else
in this country is placed, above the law and beyond accountability.
There is no question but that the compensation to which a defendant owner
is entitled is the market value of the condemned property, to which, of
course, must be added his consequential damages if any, or from which must
be deducted his consequential benefits, if any. Such was our holding in
Manila Railway Co. vs.Fabie (17 Phil. Rep., 206). But, as stated in
Packard vs. Bergen Neck Ry. Co. (54 N. J. L., 553; 23 A., 506):
"The difficulty is not with the rule, but with its application. For the
determination of the market value of land, which is that sum of money which
a person, desirous but not compelled to buy and an owner willing but not
compelled to sell, would agree on as a price to be given and received
therefor, is beyond doubt difficult. The test is logically and legally correct, but
is cannot be applied to land with the accuracy with which it can be applied to
stocks, bonds and personal property generally. Still it is this test which
admittedly must be applied, even when the value of the land and the
damages are found in separate sums."
It is a very difficult matter to limit the scope of the inquiry as to what the
market value of condemned property is. The market value of a piece of land
is attained by a consideration of all those facts which make it commercially
valuable. Whether evidence considered by those whose duty it is to appraise
the land is of that nature is often a very difficult matter to decide. The
Supreme Court of the United States, in a carefully worded statement, marks
out the scope of the inquiry as follows:
"In determining the value of land appropriated for public purposes, the same
considerations are to be regarded as in a sale of property between private
parties. The inquiry in such cases must be: What is the property worth in the
market, viewed not merely with reference to the uses to which it is at the
time applied, but with reference to the uses to which it is plainly adapted;
that is to say, what is it worth from its availability for valuable uses? . . . As a
general thing, we should say that the compensation to the owner is to be
estimated by reference to the uses for which the property is suitable, having
regard to the existing business or wants of the community, or such as may
be reasonably expected in the immediate future." (Boom Co. vs. Patterson,
98 U. S., 403.)
This passage is quoted with approval in the late case of St. Louis I. M. & S. R.
Co. vs. Theodore Maxfield Co. (94 Ark., 135; 26 L. R. A., N. S;, 1111; 126 S. W.,
83), a very well considered case.
The supreme court of Missouri has also formulated an exceedingly clear
statement of the matter in the Stock Yards Case (120 Mo., 541):
"The market value of the property means its actual value independent of the
location of plaintiff's road thereon, that is, the fair value of the property as
between one who wants to purchase and one who wants to sell it; not what
could be obtained for it in peculiar circumstances when greater than its fair
price could be obtained; nor its speculative value; nor the value obtained
through the necessities of another. Nor, on the other hand, is it to be limited
to that price which the property would bring when forced off at auction
under the hammer. The question is, if the defendant wanted to sell its
Page | 27
property, what could be obtained for it upon the market from parties who
wanted to buy and would give its full value."
These views are practically in accord with Lewis on Eminent Domain (2d ed.),
section 478, where the rule is stated as follows:
"The market value of property is the price which it will bring when it is offered
for sale by one who desires, but is not obliged to sell it, and is bought by one
who is under no necessity of having it. In estimating its value all the
capabilities of the property, and all the uses to which it may be applied or for
which it is adapted are to be considered, and not merely the condition it is in
at the time and the use to which it is then applied by the owner. It is not a
question of the value of the property to the owner. Nor can the damages be
enhanced by his unwillingness to sell. On the other hand, the damages
cannot be measured by the value of the property to the party condemning
it, nor by its need of the particular property. All the facts as to the condition
of the property and its surroundings, its improvements and capabilities, may
be shown and considered in estimating its value." (Approved in Seaboard Air
Line vs. Chamblin, 108 Va., 42.)
Now, what was the utility of the land condemned? So far as the record shows,
its possible uses were, first, for the cultivation of rice; second, as a residential
site owing to its proximity to the provincial building and the high school; and
third, as a railroad station site.
Its location from a farmer's point of view would doubtless enhance its value,
since it was so close to the town of Lucena that the marketing of crops was a
decidedly simple matter. For this reason it was more valuable as agriculture
land than other farms farther away from town.
As a residential site it seems to have been-so far a complete failure. How long
the high school had stood there the record does not state. But although the
provincial building had stood near it for several years, not a single
homebuilder had selected any portion of the condemned land as a site for
his residence. We note that all those who testified at the hearing before the
commissioners to having purchased' land in the vicinity for home sites,
purchased other land than that condemned. Nor does the record contain any
intimation that any of the owners of the land had ever attempted to dispose
of any part of it as building lots.
As a residential site, therefore, its value was decidedly problematical.
Possibly, in the next dozen years a few houses might have been built upon
the land, but, judging by the past record, its development along this line
would have been extremely slow.
As a railroad station site, the record gives no indication that it is the sole
possible location for that purpose in Lucena. It is not shown that its location
for that purpose is at all superior to other possible locations. Indeed, it seems
that the railroad company at first selected another site for its station on the
other side of town. Hence, possessing no exclusive natural advantages for
this purpose, it is a foregone conclusion that the railroad company would not
willingly pay P81,000 for such a site when it could have purchased another
site for, say, P1,500.
Here it seems proper to say that the appearance of the railroad in the town
of Lucena was the occasion for an incipient real estate boom in the vicinity
of the provincial building and the high school. Several of the witnesses for
the defendants testified what they would offer, if they were in the market for
land in the vicinity of the station site, and the witness Alzona, the single
witness who testified for the plaintiff, testified that some owners of land near
the provincial building were askingbetween P500 and P700 for lots of 400
square meters. It is clear that these hypothetical purchases and sales do not
offer any reliable basis upon which to calculate the actual market value of
the land. The fond dreams of the owners of a sudden shift of the business
center of the town of Lucena to their vicinity, or of its becoming a choice
residential district, are not capital in hand.
"Proof must be limited to showing the present condition of the property and
the uses to which it is naturally adapted. It is not competent for the owner to
show to what use he intended to put the property, nor what plans he had for
its improvement, nor the probable future use of the property. Nothing can
be allowed for damages to an intended use." (Lewis on Eminent Domain, 2d
ed., sec. 709.)
From the evidence we have discussed above, it is apparent that a good price
for rice land in the vicinity of Lucena is P500 per hectare. With this as a basis,
at what would the prospective buyer estimate the possibility of the land
being used as a residential site sometime in the future and its possible
advantages as a railroad site? Certainly at nothing like the estimates
contained in the report of the commissioners. To secure an adequate return
on such a large investment as P80,000, every meter of the land would have
to be put to immediate use as residential sites, supposing that people could
be induced to buy it for that purpose at such figures or to pay the necessarily
large rent therefor based on such a valuation. And. to hold out for such a
figure in case a railroad company wanted the land as a depot site would mean
that the company would locate its depot at some other place. It seems to us
that, either as a residential site or as a railroad station site, its value should
be principally regulated by the value of other agricultural land on the
outskirts of the town. In other words, the chance that it would be wanted for
either of these purposes owing to its superior location was but slightly
greater than that of other agricultural land adjacent to the town. We are,
therefore, led to the conclusion that the price at which practically half of the
condemned land was sold by Romana Velasquez to the defendant, Filemon
Perez, is a most liberal estimate of its value. We refer to her sale of the parcel
of 16,094 square meters for P6,500. This parcel comprises practically one-
half of the entire station site and no outside land was included in the
transaction. The sale was made after it became known that the land sold was
to be part of the station site, and a statement to this effect was included in
the deed. Both parties being aware that the land was to be condemned by
the plaintiff- company, it cannot be said that they were not aware of all the
latent utility of the land. For these reasons, the price which this parcel
brought should serve as an excellent criterion of the value of the entire
station site. And while no explanation is given of why the sale occurred, since,
of course, no one would buy it with the expectation of using it himself when
he knew that it would shortly be occupied by the railroad company, still there
is not sufficient indication that it was sold for speculative purposes or that
the element of speculation entered into the transaction to enable us to say
that the price was inflated and exceeded the actual market value of the
condemned land as agricultural land to be worth P500 per hectare, and
leaves a little more than P3,500 for its potential value as a residential district
and as a railroad station site. This is, furthermore, approximately 400 per
cent higher than Sra. Velasquez' second sale (some four months later) to
Simeon Perez, when she sold about 23,000 square meters in the same
neighborhood for a little over P1,000 per hectare.
It is to be further noted that the average assessed valuation of the
condemned property is somewhat less than P0.08 per square meter, while
the highest assessed valuation of any of it is only P0.23 per square meter,
which is carried by some 5,973 square meters, or less than one-sixth of the
whole. It is also to be noted that these 5,973 square meters were appraised
by the commissioners as being worth exactly what the 16,094 square meters
were worth, the latter being assessed for taxation purposes at only P0.03 per
square meter.
At the price we have fixed, we are of the opinion that any consequential
damages which may have been occasioned to any of the defendants by the
condemnation proceedings is amply cared for.
The defendant, Simeon Perez, was awarded P600 damages by the
commissioners for being compelled to remove a building in course of
construction at the time the expropriation proceedings were started. This
building was designed to serve partly as a warehouse and partly for stores.
He commenced its construction about the middle of December, 1912, after
it became known that the plaintiff company wanted the land for a railroad
station. Construction work was ordered stopped by the court. From the
vague description of this order in the record, we presume it was the order of
the court of date of January 22, 1913, placing the plaintiff in possession ~f
the land under the provisions of Act No. 1258 as amended by Act No. 1592.
Until such action was taken by the railroad company, or until the
commissioners were appointed and had appraised the land, we know of no
legal provision which would prohibit the owner from doing with the land
what he pleased. The Act in question gives to the company "the right to enter
immediately upon the possession of the land involved." (Sec. 3.) This
amendment to Act No. 1258 was enacted especially for the benefit of railroad
companies, and affords full protection to them if they act with due diligence.
Until some such positive assertion of its desire to expropriate the land, no
reason is seen why the company might not ask for a dismissal of the
proceedings in accordance with section 127 of the Code of Civil Procedure.
The right of the owner to the enjoyment of his property ought not to be made
to depend so entirely upon the whims of a third party. No attempt was made
to meet the statement of Perez that he had expended a large sum of money
on the construction of the building. The commissioners probably saw the
structure or some of the materials which entered into it and are in a much
better position to judge of the amount expended upon the work than are we.
They have fixed that amount at P600. In the absence of positive evidence in
the record showing this finding to be grossly excessive, we must accept it as
correct.
For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the court below is modified by
reducing the award for the parcel containing 16,094 square meters to the
sum of P6,500. The damages for the remaining parcels will be fixed at the
same proportionate amount. As thus modified the judgment appealed from
is affirmed. No costs will be allowed on this appeal. The amount as herein
fixed, together with interest, will be deposited with the clerk of the Court of
First Instance of Tayabas, subject to the rights of the defendants and the
Tayabas Land Company. So ordered.
||| (Manila Railroad Co. v. Velasquez, G.R. No. 10278, [November 23, 1915],
32 PHIL 286-321)
Page | 28