Cruz vs Secretary of DENR
implementing agency tasked to undertake reclamation
Natural Resources and Environmental Law; Constitutional Law;
IPRA; Regalian Doctrine
GR. No. 135385, Dec. 6, 2000
FACTS:
Petitioners Isagani Cruz and Cesar Europa filed a suit for prohibition
and mandamus as citizens and taxpayers, assailing the
constitutionality of certain provisions of Republic Act No. 8371,
otherwise known as the Indigenous People’s Rights Act of 1997
(IPRA) and its implementing rules and regulations (IRR). The
petitioners assail certain provisions of the IPRA and its IRR on the
ground that these amount to an unlawful deprivation of the State’s
ownership over lands of the public domain as well as minerals and
other natural resources therein, in violation of the regalian doctrine
embodied in section 2, Article XII of the Constitution.
ISSUE:
Do the provisions of IPRA contravene the Constitution?
HELD:
No, the provisions of IPRA do not contravene the Constitution.
Examining the IPRA, there is nothing in the law that grants to the
ICCs/IPs ownership over the natural resources within their ancestral
domain. Ownership over the natural resources in the ancestral
domains remains with the State and the rights granted by the IPRA to
the ICCs/IPs over the natural resources in their ancestral domains
merely gives them, as owners and occupants of the land on which the
resources are found, the right to the small scale utilization of these
resources, and at the same time, a priority in their large scale
development and exploitation.
Additionally, ancestral lands and ancestral domains are not part of the
lands of the public domain. They are private lands and belong to the
ICCs/IPs by native title, which is a concept of private land title that
existed irrespective of any royal grant from the State. However, the
right of ownership and possession by the ICCs/IPs of their ancestral
domains is a limited form of ownership and does not include the right
to alienate the same.
Francisco Chavez vs Public Estates Authority (July 2002)
384 SCRA 152 – Civil Law – Land Titles and Deeds – Lands of the
Public Domain
The Public Estates Authority (PEA) is the central
projects nationwide. It took over the leasing and selling
functions of the DENR (Department of Environmental and
Natural Resources) insofar as reclaimed or about to be
reclaimed foreshore lands are concerned.
PEA sought the transfer to the Amari Coastal Bay and
Development Corporation, a private corporation, of the
ownership of 77.34 hectares of the Freedom Islands. PEA
also sought to have 290.156 hectares of submerged areas
of Manila Bay to Amari.
ISSUE: Whether or not the transfer is valid.
HELD: No. To allow vast areas of reclaimed lands of the
public domain to be transferred to Amari as private lands will
sanction a gross violation of the constitutional ban on private
corporations from acquiring any kind of alienable land of the
public domain.
The Supreme Court affirmed that the 157.84 hectares of
reclaimed lands comprising the Freedom Islands, now
covered by certificates of title in the name of PEA, are
alienable lands of the public domain. The 592.15 hectares of
submerged areas of Manila Bay remain inalienable natural
resources of the public domain. The transfer (as embodied
in a joint venture agreement) to AMARI, a private
corporation, ownership of 77.34 hectares of the Freedom
Islands, is void for being contrary to Section 3, Article XII of
the 1987 Constitution which prohibits private corporations
from acquiring any kind of alienable land of the public
domain. Furthermore, since the Amended JVA also seeks to
transfer to Amari ownership of 290.156 hectares of still
submerged areas of Manila Bay, such transfer is void for
being contrary to Section 2, Article XII of the 1987
Constitution which prohibits the alienation of natural
resources other than agricultural lands of the public domain.
Chavez v. NHA (2007)
Doctrines:
 Secs. 2 and 3, Art. XII of the Constitution declare
that all natural resources are owned by the State
and they cannot be alienated except for alienable
agricultural lands of the public domain.
Facts:
On March 19, 1993, the National Housing Authority
(NHA) and R-II Builders, Inc. (RBI) entered into a Joint
Venture Agreement (JVA) for the development of the
Smokey Mountain dumpsite and reclamation area to be
converted into a low cost medium rise housing complex and
industrial/commercial site. The Project will involve 79
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hectares of reclaimed land (it was initially 40 hectares but the JVA
was amended). The JVA also provides that as part of the
consideration for the Project, NHA will convey a portion of the
reclaimed lands to RBI.
The reclamation of the area was made; and subsequently,
Special Patents were issued conveying the reclaimed land to NHA.
On August 5, 2004, former Solicitor General Francisco I. Chavez
filed this Petition for Prohibition and Mandamus seeking to declare
NULL and VOID the Joint Venture Agreement (JVA) and the Smokey
Mountain Development and Reclamation Project, and all other
agreements in relation thereto, for being Unconstitutional and Invalid.
Issues:
1. W/N NHA and RBI have been granted the power and
authority to reclaim lands of the public domain (Chavez
claims that the power to reclaim lands of public domain is
vested exclusively with PEA).
2. W/N NHA and RBI were given the power and authority by
DENR to reclaim foreshore and submerged lands, as
required (Chavez claims that they were not).
3. W/N the reclaimed lands are classified as alienable and
disposable lands of the public domain (Chavez claims that
there was no proclamation officially classifying the reclaimed
lands as alienable and disposable).
4. W/N the transfer of reclaimed lands to RBI is void since it did
not undergo public bidding but by negotiated contract.
5. W/N RBI, being a private corporation, is barred by the
Constitution to acquire lands of public domain.
Held/Ratio:
1. YES. Although PEA was designated under EO 525 as the
agency primarily responsible for integrating, directing, and
coordinating all reclamation projects, its charter does not
mention that it has the exclusive and sole power and
authority to reclaim lands of public domain. In fact, EO 525
provides that reclamation projects may also be undertaken
by a national government agency or entity authorized by its
charter to reclaim land.
There are 3 requisites to a legal and valid reclamation
project:
a. approval by the President;
b. favorable recommendation of PEA; and
c. undertaken by any of the ff:
i. PEA
ii. any person or entity pursuant to a contract
it executed with PEA
iii. the National government agency or
entity authorized under its charter to
reclaim lands subject to consultation
with PEA.
Applying the above requirements, the SC concluded that the
Project has met all 3 requirements:
a. There was ample approval by the President of the
Philippines. Presidents Aquino and Ramos issued
Proclamations approving and implementing the
reclamation of lands.
b. There was an implied grant of a favorable
endorsement of the reclamation phase from
PEA. This is shown in the fact that PEA was a
member of the EXECOM which was in charge
of overseeing the implementation of the Project.
c. The reclamation was undertaken by the NHA, a
national government agency authorized to
reclaim lands under its charter and other laws.
While the charter of NHA does not explicitly
mention “reclamation” in any of its listed powers,
such power is implied since it is vital or
incidental to achieving the objective of an urban
land reform and housing program.
2. YES. The DENR exercises exclusive jurisdiction on
the management and disposition of all lands of the
public domain. As such, it decides whether areas,
like foreshore or submerged lands, should be
reclaimed or not and whether they should be
classified as alienable and disposable.
In this case, when the President approved and
ordered the development of a housing project with
the corresponding reclamation work, making DENR
a member of the EXECOM (committee tasked to
implement the project), the required authorization
from the DENR to reclaim land can be deemed
satisfied. Also, the issuance of the Environmental
Compliance Certificates by the DENR shows its
ratification of the reclamation project.
3. YES. When Proclamations Nos. 39 (placed the
lands under the administration and disposition of
the NHA) and 465 (increased the reclamation area
from 40 hectares to 79 hectares) were issued, the
inalienable lands covered by said proclamations
were converted to alienable and disposable
lands of public domain. Furthermore, when the
titles to such reclaimed lands were transferred to
the NHA, said alienable and disposable lands of
public domain were automatically classified as
lands of the private domain or patrimonial
properties of the State. The reason is obvious: if
the reclaimed land is not converted to patrimonial
land once transferred to NHA, then it would be
useless to transfer it to the NHA since it will not be
able to transfer such lands to qualified entities and
thus, it will not achieve its purpose.
4. VALID. Since the lands reclaimed became
patrimonial properties of the State upon transfer of
their titles to the NHA, the latter can therefore
legally transfer them to RBI or to any other
interested qualified buyer without any bidding.
Unlike the PEA, the NHA is a government agency
not tasked to sell lands of the public domain.
5. NO. RA 6957, as amended (BOT Law), states that
a contractor can be paid “a portion as percentage
of the reclaimed land” subject to the constitutional
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 requirement that only Filipino citizens or corporations with at
least 60% Filipino equity can acquire the same. In this case,
RBI is a private corporation wherein Filipino citizens own at
least 60% of its shares.
Republic vs Naguiat
Natural Resources and Environmental Laws
G.R. No. 134209; January 24, 2006
FACTS:
Celestina Naguiat filed an application for registration of title to four
parcels of land located in Panan, Botolan, Zambales. The applicant
alleges that she is the owner of the said parcels of land having
acquired them by purchase from its previous owners and their
predecessors-in-interest who have been in possession thereof for
more than thirty (30) years; and that to the best of her knowledge,
said lots suffer no mortgage or encumbrance of whatever kind nor is
there any person having any interest, legal or equitable, or in
possession thereof.
Petitioner Republic opposed on the ground that neither the applicant
nor her predecessors-in interest have been in open, continuous,
exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of the lands in
question since 12 June 1945 or prior thereto, considering the fact that
she has not established that the lands in question have been
declassified from forest or timber zone to alienable and disposable
property.
ISSUE:
Did the areas in question cease to have the status of forest or other
inalienable lands of the public domain?
HELD:
No, the said areas are still classified as forest land.The issue of
whether or not respondent and her predecessors-in-interest have
been in open, exclusive and continuous possession of the parcels of
land in question is of little moment. For, unclassified land cannot be
acquired by adverse occupation or possession; occupation thereof in
the concept of owner, however long, cannot ripen into private
ownership and be registered as title.
A forested area classified as forest land of the public domain does not
lose such classification simply because loggers or settlers have
stripped it of its forest cover. Parcels of land classified as forest land
may actually be covered with grass or planted to crops by kaingin
cultivators or other farmers. "Forest lands" do not have to be on
mountains or in out of the way places. The classification is merely
descriptive of its legal nature or status and does not have to be
descriptive of what the land actually looks like.
HEIRS OF MARIO MALABANAN vs. REPUBLIC OF THE
PHILIPPINES
GR No. 179987
April 29, 2009
en banc
FACTS:
On 20 February 1998, Mario Malabanan filed an application
for land registration before the RTC of Cavite-Tagaytay,
covering a parcel of land situated in Silang Cavite, consisting
of 71,324 square meters. Malabanan claimed that he had
purchased the property from Eduardo Velazco, and that he
and his predecessors-in-interest had been in open,
notorious, and continuous adverse and peaceful possession
of the land for more than thirty (30) years. Velazco testified
that the property was originally belonged to a twenty-two
hectare property owned by his great-grandfather, Lino
Velazco. Lino had four sons– Benedicto, Gregorio, Eduardo
and Esteban–the fourth being Aristedes’s grandfather. Upon
Lino’s death, his four sons inherited the property and divided
it among themselves. But by 1966, Esteban’s wife,
Magdalena, had become the administrator of all the
properties inherited by the Velazco sons from their father,
Lino. After the death of Esteban and Magdalena, their son
Virgilio succeeded them in administering the properties,
including Lot 9864-A, which originally belonged to his uncle,
Eduardo Velazco. It was this property that was sold by
Eduardo Velazco to Malabanan.
Among the evidence presented by Malabanan during trial
was a Certification dated 11 June 2001, issued by the
Community Environment & Natural Resources Office,
Department of Environment and Natural Resources
(CENRO-DENR), which stated that the subject property was
“verified to be within the Alienable or Disposable land per
Land Classification Map No. 3013 established under Project
No. 20-A and approved as such under FAO 4-1656 on
March 15, 1982.” On 3 December 2002, the RTC approved
the application for registration.
The Republic interposed an appeal to the Court of Appeals,
arguing that Malabanan had failed to prove that the property
belonged to the alienable and disposable land of the public
domain, and that the RTC had erred in finding that he had
been in possession of the property in the manner and for the
length of time required by law for confirmation of imperfect
title. On 23 February 2007, the Court of Appeals reversed
the RTC ruling and dismissed the appliocation of Malabanan.
ISSUES:
1. In order that an alienable and disposable land of the
public domain may be registered under Section 14(1) of
Presidential Decree No. 1529, otherwise known as the
Property Registration Decree, should the land be classified
as alienable and disposable as of June 12, 1945 or is it
sufficient that such classification occur at any time prior to
the filing of the applicant for registration provided that it is
established that the applicant has been in open, continuous,
exclusive and notorious possession of the land under a bona
fide claim of ownership since June 12, 1945 or earlier?
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2. For purposes of Section 14(2) of the Property Registration Decree
may a parcel of land classified as alienable and disposable be
deemed private land and therefore susceptible to acquisition by
prescription in accordance with the Civil Code?
3. May a parcel of land established as agricultural in character either
because of its use or because its slope is below that of forest lands be
registrable under Section 14(2) of the Property Registration Decree in
relation to the provisions of the Civil Code on acquisitive prescription?
4. Are petitioners entitled to the registration of the subject land in their
names under Section 14(1) or Section 14(2) of the Property
Registration Decree or both?
HELD:
good faith and with just title. Under extraordinary acquisitive
prescription, a person’s uninterrupted adverse possession of
patrimonial property for at least thirty (30) years, regardless
of good faith or just title, ripens into ownership.
It is clear that the evidence of petitioners is insufficient to
establish that Malabanan has acquired ownership over the
subject property under Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act.
There is no substantive evidence to establish that
Malabanan or petitioners as his predecessors-in-interest
have been in possession of the property since 12 June 1945
or earlier. The earliest that petitioners can date back their
possession, according to their own evidence—the Tax
Declarations they presented in particular—is to the year
1948. Thus, they cannot avail themselves of registration
under Section 14(1) of the Property Registration Decree.

The Pertition is denied.
(1) In connection with Section 14(1) of the Property Registration
Decree, Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act recognizes and confirms
that “those who by themselves or through their predecessors in
interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious
possession and occupation of alienable and disposable lands of the
public domain, under a bona fide claim of acquisition of ownership,
since June 12, 1945” have acquired ownership of, and registrable title
to, such lands based on the length and quality of their possession.
(a) Since Section 48(b) merely requires possession since 12 June
1945 and does not require that the lands should have been alienable
and disposable during the entire period of possession, the possessor
is entitled to secure judicial confirmation of his title thereto as soon as
it is declared alienable and disposable, subject to the timeframe
imposed by Section 47 of the Public Land Act.
Neither can petitioners properly invoke Section 14(2) as
basis for registration. While the subject property was
declared as alienable or disposable in 1982, there is no
competent evidence that is no longer intended for public use
service or for the development of the national evidence,
conformably with Article 422 of the Civil Code. The
classification of the subject property as alienable and
disposable land of the public domain does not change its
status as property of the public dominion under Article 420(2)
of the Civil Code. Thus, it is insusceptible to acquisition by
prescription.

(b) The right to register granted under Section 48(b) of the Public
Land Act is further confirmed by Section 14(1) of the Property
Registration Decree.

(2) In complying with Section 14(2) of the Property Registration

Decree, consider that under the Civil Code, prescription is recognized
as a mode of acquiring ownership of patrimonial property. However,
public domain lands become only patrimonial property not only with a
declaration that these are alienable or disposable. There must also be
an express government manifestation that the property is already
patrimonial or no longer retained for public service or the
development of national wealth, under Article 422 of the Civil Code.
And only when the property has become patrimonial can the
prescriptive period for the acquisition of property of the public
dominion begin to run.

(a) Patrimonial property is private property of the government. The

person acquires ownership of patrimonial property by prescription
under the Civil Code is entitled to secure registration thereof under
Section 14(2) of the Property Registration Decree.

(b) There are two kinds of prescription by which patrimonial property

may be acquired, one ordinary and other extraordinary. Under
ordinary acquisitive prescription, a person acquires ownership of a
patrimonial property through possession for at least ten (10) years, in

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