OSPREY'VANGUARD 45

AMTRACS:
US AMPHIBIOUS
ASSAULT VEHICLES
~

Steven Zaloga
Colour plates by Terry Hadler
 VANGUARD SER I ES

EDIT OR: MAR TlN W I NDROW

AMTRACS:
US AMPHIBIOUS
ASSAULT VEHICLES
T exf by STEVEN ZALOGA

Colour piafes by TERR Y HADLER

OS PRE Y PUB Ll S H I NG LO:\DO:-J

Publishecl in [987 by
O sprey Publishin g Ltcl
J\lcm bel" co mpa n) of tll(' C eorge Phi lip C roup
[ ~ q Lo ng .\ cre. Lo nd o n \\' C2 E g LP
(' COP) rigll! 1987 O :-,prt'y Pu blishing Lid

This book is co pyrighl cd und er dw Ber ne COIwe nlion .

,\11 rig hts r('s('¡Tecl. Apa n fro m a n y fai r clca ling lor Ihe
purposc of pri va te slU dy. resca reh, crit icism 0 1" rc\'icw,
as pcrmill cd under I he Copy rig ht Ael, 1956, no pan
oC Ih is p ubli ca lion may be reprodu ced . sto rcd in a
rClricva l sysH: m. 01' Ira nsmilled in a ny form 01" by a ny
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0 plica!. pho tocopying. rf'cord in g 01' Olherwise , wilho ul
Ihe prio r per missio n 01' Ihe copyrig ht own cr. Enquiries
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Brili,s /¡ Libm~)' Calalogllillg in Publicatiol/ Data

Za loga , StC\'CIl J.
,\ml rae!'i : US a mphibi o us assa uh \'c hicl cs.
Va ngua rcl ; 45 1.
l . • \rmorcd \'c hi cles. ~ I ilil a r y- C ni lcd

Statcs H isto r) '2. l\ IOl or \"Ch icles.

Amphibi ous U nilccI Sta l('s-H istor y
1. Ti Lle 11. Seri es
62 3.74'75 UG4-16·S

Filmscl in C rca t llritain

Prill! cd thro ugh Boo kbui1ckrs LId , H ong Kong

Author' s Note
Th(' a Ulh o r would like lo ac kn ow ledgc lh e assisla nc('
oC s('\'(,1"31 {j'jcnd s whose a id made Ihis book possible ,
T ha nk s go lo Ji m Loop fo r ma tcrial o n US Arm )'
a mt racs, 10 J\ li ke Cree n fo r hi s hclp in loca tin g
photos in the ¡:J\ IC archi\·c. 10 :\or man Friec!m <l n for
his h(' lp ",ith es Na\')' prod ucl io n fig ures. a nd 10
Si mo n OUlIslan . .J oe Bermud ez, Bill Auerbac h a no
C('o rg-e Ba lin for Iwl p in loca ling pholos.

Amphibian Vehicles
Fe\\' milita r)' o perations are as cliffi cull anc! risky as
an am phibio lls la ndin g aga inst a contestecl bcach-
head, as \Vas a lJ lOO cv id c I11 in Brita in 's ill-fa lcd
Gallipo li la nd ings in "'o del W a r 1. In th e I 920S a nel
1930s, US M a rin e pl a nn ers contc mplated new
solutio ns to this age-o ld tac ti eal pro blcm . No t
surprising lYl lhe m a in foc us o f ncw equipm c nt
progra mmcs was 0 11 lhe clcve lo pmelll of mod ern
landing boa ts. This qui ckl )' ex ha usteel th e meagrc
funclin g a\'a ila blc a ne! p rcve rll cd mu ch expcrimelll-
ati on Wilh tracked la ndin g erart.
Thc im agina ti vc and irasc ible Ameri can in-
ven to r, J. Walter Christi e, proposed a mphibi o us
trac kecl ve hicles 10 bo th th e US Arm )' and th e US
~I a rine Corps in th e cad )' 1920S. H e ofrered his
~1. I 923 a mphibio us ta nk 10 the r-Iarine Corps fo r
tri a ls , a nc! it \Vas usce! cx pcrim cnta ll y during lhe
1924 a m p hibio us exe rcise a l C ulebra, Puerto Ri co.
The M . 1923 a mphibian could beller be d ese rib ed
as a sc1f-pro pelled g UIl , as its 75111m gun \Vas 11 0 1
turrCl-mo ullted , hut fitt ed in th e hui\. Thc Ñl a rin c
Roebling's original Alligator, comple ted in 193:;' bore liule
resemblaoce to the later amtracs. lt proved to be too slow aod
too heavy, as weU as uomanageable in water. (FMC Corp. )
Corps, w hile findin g l he conee p t inleresling, feh
Iha t th e C hrisli c a mphibian \Vas unsea\Vorth y a nd
unsatisfae lo ry in o lher respecls, a nd d ccidcd againsl
ad o pting it. I nstead , th e Marine Corps a d o pled lhe
Six-Ton Specia l Trac to r (th e US-buill ve rsion o f
th e Freneh R ena ult FT light ta nk ), whieh w as small
cnou g h to be la nd ed from li g htcrs 0 1' ba rges fo r
a mphibi ous o pcra lio ns. Thc ~Il a rin cs \Ve re con-
\'ineed of the va lue of a rmo ured ve hi cles in
supporting beae h la ndings, bUl in t he I 930S lacked
sumcient fundin g for mu ch ex perim enla tion with
a rmoured 0 1' a mphibious ve hi ck s.
In 1937, an a rticle a ppcared in Lije m agaz ine of a
trac kcd a mphibi o us ve hicle, the Alliga tor, w hi eh
had bee n d e"cJo ped fo r reseue o pera ti ons in lhe
s",a l11ps oC Flo rid a. This atlrae led M a rin e C orps
a llentio n ; a nd a ft er inspcclio n of lhe vc hicle, lhe
Na"y \Vas as ked 10 scc ure pilot modcls fo r trials, and
possible acqui silio n .
Th e AlligalO r \V as the resull oC pri vale efrorts b y
mcmbcrs of o n(' of Ameri ca"s m OSl illustrious
3
 ,
1M P

Tbe second lDodel ofthe Alligator, completed in 1937, attracted

cspeciall y because of i!s clumsy performance al sea
US Marine Corps attcntion and led to the LVT-I. (FMC Corp. )
comparee! to conve ntional boats, so the Marine
request was rejected on the grounds of econom )'.
engineering famili es, the Roeblings. john and The Marines persislcd ; and in O Clober 1939 Gen.
Donald Roebling, lhe son and grandson ofColonel Moses, the presidenl of the ~/larines Equipment
Washinglon Roebling (builder of lhe Brookl yn Board) convinced Rocbling to design a vchicle
Bridge) had buill the ve hicle, using their own funds, speciflcally lor military usc. The new 1940 model)
aner witnessing lhe disastrous resulls of several so metimes ealled lhe Crocodile, \Vas lighlcr in
hurricanes in the swa mpy Okeec hobec regio n ol' weigh t and performed better than carlier models.
Florida. Donald Roebling allempled to d evclop a Although it was not as manoellvrable as a boat 01'
ve hi cle whieh would bridge ¡he gap belween 'w here comparable size, its pontoon design made it more
a boal grounded and a car f100ded out'. The sea\vorthy in rough surf cone!itions.
Alligator was intcnded to serve as a rese ue vchiele in Thc oUlbreak of wa r in Europe led to lhe
swampy areas lhal were inaccessible lo either boats expansion oflhc US military budgel. Thc US Navy
or vchicles; he usce! aluminium conslruction to savc Bureau of Ships finall y succumbed lO Marine
on weight, and an un usual track suspcnsion lhat pressllre and con tracted Roebling to bllild a second
provided propulsion both in the waler and on land. prololype wilh a more powerful 12 0 hp Lincoln-
The tirst AlligalOr was complcted in 1935 bUl its Zephyr engine. lt was eo mpleled and dcli ve red to
performance was disa ppointing, mainl y beca use ilS Quantico in November 1940, and was used in Flcet
waler speed was a pallry 2.3 mph. A se ri es of Exerci ses in january- Fcbruary 1941, the ,results
redesigns culminatcd in a virtu ally nc\\' vc hicle by greatl y impressing both Navy and lVlarine ob-
1937. This modcl was shorter ancl wider lhan lhe scrvers. The Navy felt , however, that the alum-
original 1935 lorm but , more imponantl y, used a ini um construction was llot rugged enough fm
sturdier track and suspension systcm. lt wcighcd military servicc , preferring steel , and lh at the track
3,1 oolb. less (8, 700Ib.) and had a waler speed ofS.6 design would nol endu re lhe abrasive cffects ofsand
mph; and il was lhis 1937 modellhat so impresscd ancl sa lt water; Rocbling was contraetcd lo produce-
thc Marine officers. a revi sed vcrsion incorporating thesc changes. As
The Navy, hO\vevcr) was no! so cnthused, Roebling did nOl have access to actual procluction

4
facilities, he turned to the Food i\,Jaehincry
Corporation (FM C) who had fabricated pa rts for
the earlier Alligators. This "'aS the first traeked
military ve hicle projcet for Fi\IC . which today
produces mo re a rmo urcd vc hi cles than a ny other
compan y in the Unitcd States.
The ne\\' "ehicle \Vas orlieiall y dubbed L VT
I Landing Vehide Trae kcd ), in kccping with the
Na\'y nomcnclaturc systclll for landing e ran . FM C
\\' as awardcd an ¡nidal contrae l for 200 LVTs
bcsidcs lh e t \\'0 prOlOl )'pes, a ncl lhe flrSl wa s
eompleted in Jul y 1941. The contract was later
increased, for a tota l of 1,225 LVT-I , po pularl ~
kn own as Alligalors.
Thc first fvlarin c amphibi an tractor (va riousl)
ca lled am/rae, amlrak alld amlJhtrac) unit, lhe
Amphibian Tractor Dctachmcllt , was formed in
~Ia y 1941 at Dunedi n, Florid a. This unit formcd
the nucleus for the la ter 1St ¡\mphibian Tracto r
Baltalion of' lhe 1St Marine Di vision , which
complctcd o rga nisation in Fcb ru ary 1942 shonl )
after lhe o utbreak of lhe \Var in lhe Pac ifle. 'Thc
earl y conccp lion of amtrac o pcrations cnvisioned
lIsing the Alligators so ld )' as amp hibiolls sllppk
\'c hicles. 'T he LVT - I was made of mild 5t('cl w ith no
armour \'a lu c; il was llsed lO bring supplics f!'om
ships off-shorc, onto and be yo nd the bcac hes. 1'11("
lrack s)'Slem, C\'e n w hen impro"ed. \Vas slill \'cr~
susceptible lo damage \V hc n used o n hard gro und .
so th erc \Vcre no pl ans LO use th e amlracs {o r
prolongcd period s on land . 1nd eed, the earl \'
a mlracs o nl y had a life expcclancy oCabo ul 200
hours' rllnning time due to the strcsses on lIw
l'lIginc. suspcnsion a ncJ (rack.
The plan s ea llcd for the d eployment of a single
a mphibian tractor battal io n Wi lh eac h ~'[ a rin e
division, initiall y numberin g 75 "c hi cles per
battalio n, The firsl use of a mtracs in a combal
th eatre took place in August 19+2, when lhe 1St and
2nd Amphibian Tractor Ba tta lions \Vc re lI sed LO
provide logistical Sllpport at Guadalcanal in the
Solomon Isla nd s. In Nove mber 1942, AlligalOrs
\Vilh lhe Fleel ~Iarine Forcc ",ere uscd lO bring
~ uppli cs as hore during lhe la ncJings in French
:\I oroceo as part 01" Operation 'Toreh'. Alliga tors
\\'c re uscd in a simila r ro le a l ¡\tlll in lhe Aleutian
The LVT-I Alligator first entered service in the Solomon
lslands in 1942 at Guadalcanal, and later at Bougainville and
Rendova in 1943. As seen here during the &ugainville
caDlpaign, it was used solely in the supply role. (USMC)

l sland s off Alaska in Ma y ' 943, a l Shcmya l sland in
the Aleutia ns in August '943, and a t R endo va in
the Salo ma n Islands in Septembcr ' 943. The ne\\"
3rd Amphibi a n Traelor Ba ttalion was e mployed a l
Bougai nvillc in lh e Nonhcrn Solomons in No\'cm-
ber ' 943.
Tarawa: New Tactics
By 1943, lhe a mlracs had proved lo be very useful
vc hicles in uncontcstcd amphibious landings; bUI
for trDap la nclings against contestcd bcac hcs, more
convenlional crafl like LCVPs were used. Thc
utilit y o f a mlracs as assa ult vc hicles lo carry lroops
was firSl dcmo nstrated at 'r arawa, in Novembcr
' 9+3·
In '943 lhe swilc h in lhe foeus ofUS effons, from
lhe largc tropica l islands of lhe south-weSlcrn
Paci fi c LO lhe roeky littlc a lo lls ofthe centra l Paci lic,
ca ll ed fo r a shifl in amphibi o lls lact¡es. The !in)'
alolls die! 1101 OUiT 1111' op li on of 1I1lco1llcslcd
6
•
The first use ofarntracs in a n assault role took place al Tarawa
in Novetnber 1943. H ere, one oflhe surviving L VT -1 Alligators
i s lodged against the coconut log sea-wall 00 Bedo at Red Beach
Three. The improvised arrnour plate added to the cab is
clearly evident. (USMC)
la ndings as had pre,-iously been the caSto M osl of
,he islands la rge enough ' o be ofmilit a r y va lllc had
been fOrlificd by ¡he J apanesc. Land ings wou ld
ha,·c 10 take p lace di rect ly agai nsl fOrl ilied J apa nes.
posilions ifl he isla ncl s were la be seizecl. In aclcli ti on,
man y of lh e islancls in lh e ato lls wcrc ringcd by coral
relfs which were loo shallow for Hi ggins boa ls like
th e LCVPs a nd L C M s in cerl a in lidal condilio ns.
Thc firsl of these island fo rtresses to be a lt ac kcd
"vas Be lio in lh e Tarawa atoll. Elc rn e nts oi' lh e 2nd
tvl ar in c Divisio n \Vcrc to scizc Belio , while Arm~
unils scizecl lh e less heavil y defend ed island of
~ I a kin . Belio \Vas surroundecl by a coral reef 01'
und c lcrrninecl dcpth \\,hich grea tl y conccrlwcI
~ l arinc planners. The Nav y \Vas convin ced lh a l lh e
recf \Vas sufficicn tl y subrnerged to pcrrnit a loadecl
H igg in s boal to safely pass o\'er it; lh e ~larines we re
no!. :\I aj. f)a,·id :\1. Shollp. the 2nd ~ I a rin c
Di\'ision operalions offieer (and later one of lhe
heroes ofTarawa), had ser ved wiLh lhe division on
Guadalcanal and remembcrcd lhe yeaman service
provided by lhe amtraes of lhe 1St anel 2nd
.\mphibian Tracto r Ballalions. Shoup eoncludeel
Ihal lhe amlracs wou ld be ideal for lhe Belio
landing, si nee Ihey eo uld rcadil y surmount lhe
li·inging reef if il was ineleeel loo sha llow. The
divisional commander, Gen. Juljan Smi th , prc-
scnted his plans lO lhe Marine corn mandcr of the
grou nd elemenls oflhe amphibious force, Maj.Gcn.
Holl a nd M. ('Howlin ' Mad ' ) Smilh. Juli an Smilh
convinced H . M. Sm ilh orlhe need for lhe amlraes,
as \Ve ll as menlioning lhal lhe Navy had little
ellthusiasm ror lhe notion. H . M. Smith "isilCd his
i\a\'y coulllcrparl for Operalion 'Ga lva nic', R eal'
,\dmiral Richmond Kell y Turner, 10 requesl more
amlracs than lhe 100 \Vorn-oul L VT - 1s of Lhe 2nd
Amphibian Tractor Battalion al Wcllington ,
,\us" ·alia. The cantankerous Turner echoed lhe
Xavy's opposition LO lhe use ofamtracs, saying lhal
-
-
lhe Higgins boals could clear lhe li·inging reef and
that the amLracs were unseaworth y. The major-
ge neral vie\Ved lhe Navy's a ui tude as ca ll olls
ind iffcrcncc lo lhe l\1arines rat hcr lhan any scriolls
objection lO the novel use of arntracs. \ Howlin'
ivlacl ' Smith \Vas as slubborn as Turner, ancl, afler él
biner argument, concluded 'No arntracs, no
opcration!'. Turner rele ntccl and promised a funhcr
100 new amtracs from the na val base at Sornoa.
By lhe a u lumll of 1943 lhe 100 LVT- I amlracs of
lhe 2nd Amphibiall Traelor Battalion had long
since passcd their theoreticallife expcctancy c1ue lO
lheir use 011 Guadalcana!. MOSI had a iread)"
chalked up over 400 hours of running lime
compa red to thcir 200- hollr average Jife cxpcc-
laney, and only 75 cou ld be salvaged. The eorrosive
rffcc ts of sea water on thcir suspcnsion ancl
The LVT-2 Water 8uITalo saw its eombat debut at Tarawa.
This L VT -2 was hit and burned alODg the beaeh edge at Betio. It
has improvised armour on the cab front. In the background
are a s unken M4A2 Sherman tank, and a DlUllber of disabled
amtraes. (USMC)
7
propulsion , a nd lh eir genera ll y worn- OU l cond ition ,
were so sevcre lhal lhe unit was wary oC a n )
rchearsa ls ror the landing wh ich would rUrlhe r \Vear
lhem clown. On ly 50 of lhe new LVT-2S \Vel"!"
delivered before lhe operalion.
The LVT-2 Water Buffalo
The L VT-2 had been devcloped lO overcOllle
shon comings in lhe inilia l LVT-I d esign oOe\'(lop-
Illem began in 194.1 by lhe Bureau of Ships ancl
FtvIC. The LVT-2 used a new lorsilaslic s prun~
suspension w hi ch ofTcrcd a bctler rid e o n la nd as
we ll as grea tc r durabilit y. The powc nrain wa ...
taken directl y from lhe M 3A 1 li ghl tan k, anel
provieled grea ler powe r a nd reli a bilily. The LVT- "
(a lso ealled LVT Mk . 11 or Waler Burralo) was firsl
ordereel inlO produelion in June 1942, bUl did nOl
reaeh eomba l unils umil 1943. It had a life
expeelaney tluee times as high as lhe LVT-I (600
' ·S. 200 running ho urs); bUl lhe lraeks had lO be
replaeed every 150 hours or so, espeeiall )' if run O"er
hard terrain .
The cornma nder ur lhe 'l nd Alllphibian Tractor
The Borg-Wamer Model A was a paralle l atternpl lo develop
an improved amlrac alongside s imilar e fTorls by FMC. It was
equipped with a lurre1 from an M3A1 lighl lank, seen here
pointoo. over the rear of the vehicle. The Mode l A and Model B
laler loo. to the LVT-3 BushmaSler. (US Navy)
8
Balla lion , l\laj. Henr)' Orewes, was lold by Cen.
J uli a n Smilh lhal his amlraes could eXpeCl lO
cncounter ver)' hea \'y fire in spile o f Na\')' prornises
lO 'oblil erale' lhe J apa nese defences on Beli o, a nd
suggesled lha l Drewes add ar mour plaling lO lhe
a mlracs. Drc\Ves sea rched \ Velling lon ror armour.
a nd finall y fo und some rusled 91ll1ll pla le oUlside
th e ci, y, w hich \Vas cul a nd prepared by the
Ceneral l\l olOrs planl in \\'ellinglon and allached
lO lhe LVT-I s. The few officcrs w ho sur vived lhe
assa lllt relt tha l lhe armo ur saved man)' li \'es; man)
o rth e crcws argued o th crwise, bu! nea rl y a ll agreed
tha! it was an impo rtant mOl'ale booster. In
addit io n, Illachin e g un mounlS \Vc rc addcd to lh e
amtraes: uSll all y a .50-ea l. in rrOnl, and l\\'O .30-ca l.
machin e g llns o n lhc sid e o r rear.
The shorlagc of amlracs for Operalion 'Cal-
\'a nie' in t.'\' ilab ly mea nl that on ly .a proponion of
Lhe troops were landed using Lhe m: lhe firsL ,hree
wa\'es wou ld be ca rried in 011 lhe amlracs, fo llo\\ed
b) rcinforcemenls in LeV ps Higgins boa ls). The
first wa\'c lI scd "2 or lhe a\'a ilable 125 am Lracs. T'he
a ll ac k on Belio Island on 20 No\'embcr 194 3 was
preceded by a rea rsomc na\'a l and ai r bombard-
me nl, lO ta ll ing so me 3,000 lons oC munitions o nto
a n isla nd on ly 29 1 acres in a rea. Ncvcrthclcss, lhe
J apancse rorees had ample time to fortiry l he island ,
and Lhe cO lllma nd cr had boasted lhat it would take
 a million mcn , a hundrecl yca rs' to capwre the a ft er t"h eir fu cl ta nks were hit ; a ncl two were blowlI
islanel from his crack Specia l Na va l La neling Forees up by mines. OCthe 500 a mlrac crewm en , 323 were
Ijapanese m a rin es). killed or wüundcd , including lhe ba tta lion com-
The e1urability of th e J a pan cse bunkers beca me ma nder n/hU. Drewcs, killed by g unfire while
all too clea r as lhe a lll lracs of th e first wavc co mma ncling lhe firsl wave.
approacheel th e beach al a lurtlc craw l. They In spite ofthe losscs, the a mtracs hacl m a nageel lo
surmounted th e frin ging reef without dilllcult y, but c1 cli ve r a sig nificant number of troo ps to lhe
carne uncler a n inlense barrage from heavy m ac hinc beachhead successfull y. The sa me was Ilot lrue oC
guns, mor ta rs a ncl a niller )' fro m th e surviving lhe Higgins boats in the fo urth , fiflh a nd sixth
bunkers. Eig ht of lhe a mlracs we re sunk 011 lhe wa ves. As lhe Nfa rin e pla nners ha d fcareel , they
approac h, a llcl m a ny mo re suffcreel so much Ca iled lo clear lhe frin ging recfs, a nd the marines
e1a mage fro m bullels a nel shrapne l th a t they la tcr inside we re ob liged to elisembark and wad e as ho re
sank whcn a tte mpting to rctuflllO sea for rc1oadin g. fi'om dista nces of 300 to 800 ya rcls uncl er in tense
The aclcl ed a rm o ur ofTerccl modest pro tecti oll J a p a ncse m ac hinc g un fire. 11 was a slau g htcr, with
against sma ll a rms fire, but was inael equ a te aga insl sing le Japa nese m ac hinc g un s killin g 01' wo undin g
heav)' m achine g un fire. The m ac hine g Ullllers 0 11 entire boa t-loacls of marines.
board were pa rti c ula rl y ha rd hit , sin ce thcir T o suppo rt th e beachhead , a d ozen M4A2
IVea pons we re la rge ly unp ro tecteel anel they ha cl lo Sherm a n ta nks of the 1St M a rin e Amphibious
cxposc the mselves lO fire the m. By th e encl of th e Corps T a nk Ba tta li o n \Ve re bro ug hl up o n LC M
operatioll olll y 35 a mlracs we re still opera ti o na l. A landin g c raft . As with the lroops, th e tank la nding
IOtal of 52 L VT-I s a llCl 30 L VT- 2S hael been lost to
cnern y aC lion , and eig ht to m echani cal fa ilures. OC
LVT(A )-IS orthe Army 708th Amphibian Tank Battalion come
these, 35 hacl been sunk directl y by g unfire; 26 \Ve re ashore at Saipan on D-Day, IsJune 1944. Neither the Army nor
disa blcd b y g unfire a nel shra pne l a fl n hav ing the Marines were completely happy with the LVT(A)-I due lo
the small gun carried, but it continued in ser vice through the
surmounlecl lhe reef; nine had burnecl o n t:he beac h end of the war. Note the r ear machine gun tubs. (USMC )

9
eraft ",ere slOpped b ), lhe Ii-inging reel: Onl)' llm'('
lanks evenl ua ff y made lheir way safel)' lo the bcach ,
11105l bcing 10Sl in lhc waler due lo engine Oood ing.
or sinking in lO l he gaping sheff eralers causcd b)
naval gu nfirc . \\'hile lhe tanks \Vcrc laler lo pron'
in valuablc in lhe capture of the island, lhcir ca rl )
diffieullies rea ehing lhe beaeh hi g hlighled lhe need
for illllllcdiatc firc support during the initial assault
phase, preferabl )' in lhe lo rm of so me so n 0('
amphibious lank,
After 76 hours of blood)' fightin g, Belio \Vas
taken. The COS1S \\'ere slaggering: :;,4°0 ~Iarilll'
casua ltics, a third of th ese kilkcl ; and virtua ll y lhe
cntire garrison of '2,600 J apancse S~LF marinc~.
'rhe nightmarish imagc oC lhe slaug htcr of the
marines wad ing ashore fraln lhe beached Higgim,
boals Icd lo USMC insislenee onlhe use ofamlracs
la carry out an) amphihioll' landings againsl
A pair oC LVT(A}-Is of tbe Marine 1St Armored Ampbibian
Baualion in action in the Marshalls in the sum.rner of 1944-
There was sorne cootroversy over the use of amtaoks, and
whether they shou1d conduct their fire s upport missioos while
in the water otT-shore, as seco here, or 00 lhe beach itse1f.
(USMC)
lO
eOlltcstccl beaches in lhe l'1l1urc. The i\larinc Corp'
hacl concludecl tha1 amtracs had macle the critical
d iflcn:ncr bet\\('en \'ictor)' and clcfeal al Tarawa. Ir
all l he landings hacl bern concluelrcl using lhe
L C \ ' Ps a nd LCM s, lhe landing \\'ou ld probab"
ha\'e been a \'ery blood )' ra ilurc, The hea\')' eOSl 01'
lhe ballle eaused a scanclal bafk in lhe Unilcd
Sla les, The ~Iarines had no c1iIEcull)' o\'el' lheir
rcqllest for cxpandcd prodllclion ol' am 1racs, ami
lhe Na\') 's n: llIClance 10 use amlracs in a mphibious
landings e\'aporalecl, The US Arm y, responsiblc rol'
amphibious operalions in lhe Soulh- \\'esl Pacir,c.
paiel carl'fll l atlc ntion lO lhe Icssons ofTarawa. ami
bcgan l'xpanding its own amtrac lInils.
Amtanks and Fire Support
1n '94' , dUl'ing lhe de\'elopmem of lhe L \ "1'-2, lhe
dcsign tcams "vere askcd lo in vcsliga lc lhe
possibilil)' of de\'eloping an armed and armoured
\Tl'sion of the ncw amlrac. Thi s took place before
the Tara wa la ndings. a nd the requirement a ppears
to llave been bascd 011 conccrns tha t amphibio us
landings might faee J a pa nese ta nk units. Steel
armour ofbcl ween 6mm and 12 mm was employcd
in place 01' lhe sheet slce l lIscd on lhe normal
LVT-2. The M6 37m m ta nk gun was the la rgest
anti-tank IVea pon tha t eould be adopted eluc lO
wcight and rtco il reslricli ons. The turret \Vas
adap teel from the ~1 5A 1 Stua n light ta nk turret,
and \Vas ielc ntical cxccpt for lhe delctio n orthe rea l'
turret rad io bustle. T wo .30-ca l. machine g uns wcrc
adeled on scarf rings behinel th e turret to provid e ,
~ .
additional rlre support. The a rmour a nd turre t .. .
aeleled a bout three tons 10 the wcig ht ofthe ve hicle,
but this did not seriously degrade ve hicle buoya nc)'
• •• - t
"

since no lroops 01' suppli cs werc to be carrice! . Thc At Tinian, a coral c1jfTwould have prevented!he amtracs from
advancing beyond lhe beach, leading lo lhe development ofthe
new ve hicle, the L VT (A )-I , was t ype classi ~ed a nel Doodlebug, seen here. This LVT-2 had a special tiIDber raIDp
lo surIDount the obslacle, and six ofthese were used during!he
cntered proeluction in Deee mber 1943, a month Tinian landing. (USM C)
afler the T a rawa landing. Thcsc vchi cles wcrc
usuall y calleel amlanks (or am/lhtanks) to distinguish elevclopme nt. Likewise, the applica bility of LVTs
them f1'om the arntracs. During lhe de\'elopme nl of for th e Norma nd y in vasion \Vas brushcd asid e as
the LVT (A )-I . the US Arm y placed a require me nt being unn ceessa ry. The U S infa ntr y a t Oma ha
for an armo ured a mlrac. This w as dC\'clopcd Beaeh would be forced to rclearn T arawa's blood y
concurrentl )' with the L V r (A)-I , as t he T 33. I t ,,"as Icsson of lhe vulncra bili ty of unpro tcc tcd infantry
a cross betwec n the LVT- 2 a nd the LVT (A )-I . wading asho re fro m la nding cra f't.
having the a rmoured hull a nd ca b orthe L VT (A)- 1
and the genera l storage con ~g ura tion orthe L VT-2. Am.trac Organisation
It entered produc tion in 1943 for the US Arm y as U nd er the E-Seri es T a ble of O rga nisation a nd
the LVT (A)-2. Ec¡ uipment (TOE ) of Ap ril 1943, eae h M a rine
The T a rawa ex perie nee a lso pro mpted the US Di \'ision had an o rga nic Amphibia n Tracto r
i\rm y to accc lcrate deve lo pmc nt of a rnphib io lls Batt a lion . ",ilh 100 a mtrars o rga nised illlO three
\Trs io ns o r no rma l tanks. Thi s lOo k two dircc tio ns: rompani cs. Th e U S~I C e\'e nlll all y ra iscd 11
the devclopment orimproved wading gear for ta nks amphibi an tractor ba ualiolls plus a nllmber of
elropped into shallow wa ter, and the d evelopme nt sma ller d etac hments. In the spring 01' 1944, betwec n
01' detac ha ble pontoons a nel propulsion syste ms to lhe K waj alc ill and Saipan o peral io lls, the a m-
enablc ta nks 10 swirn asho re fro m sorne dista nce. phibi a n trac to r ba u a lions were re moved fro m
\ 'ario lls ty pcs of wading gcar were w idely used in di visiona l contro l, and rcta ined a l corps ¡evel for
amphibi ous la ndings by both M4 Sherm a n a nd betler co-o rd ina tio n during la nding o pera tions. In
~1 5A 1 Stu a n ta nks. The pon lOon systems, such as O c tober 194.3, the US M C a mi the US Arm y began
the M 19 (Ritc hie T-6) Swimming Deviee htt ed lO rai sing their IIrsl a mtank batta li o ns, 1he US Arm y
~14 mcdillm tanks, were n01 read y in sig nificanl ehristening them Amp/¡ibian T allk !3auaüons, while
Ilumbcrs lInlillhe last maj o r o pcra lio n orthe wa r o n th e M a rines ca lled th eir units Armored Amphibian
Okinawa, w hcrc 20 ~,l arinc Shcrrna ns were la nd cd Battaliolls. The ~,I a rin e a mtank ba lla lio lls had fo ur
b,' mea ns of these syste ms. The DO ta nks (Duplcx companies 0 (' 18 L VT (A )- 1s, tota lling 72, plus three
Dri vc ), dcw" lo ped in Bri tai n for lhe Normand) L"T-2S in ba u a lio ll Hcadqu art crs; w hile lhe Arm y
in vas ion, were used by US la nk ba u a lio ns in ba tt a lions initia ll y had fo ur compa nies of 17
Euro pe, but lhey never madc an a ppearan ce in t1w L \'T (A )-IS, plus fo ur LVT (A)-2 a mtracs in
Pacifico There was ve ry little inte rpla y betwce n th e batta lion HQ The Arm y batta li on TOE was la ter
twO th ca lres in terms of specia lised cquipment enl argcd to 18 a mtanks and lwO a mlracs per
11
compan y, with ba tlalio n st rcng th n Slllg to 75
LVT (A) a mtanks a nd 12 LVT a mtracs.
The first US Arm y a mphibi a n tracto r baIl a li o ns
wcrc ra ised conc urrclltl y Wilh the !le\\' a m ta nk
ba lta lions. The Arm y's burcau cracy had bee n
sce ptica l of the a mtracs a fí er earl y tests in 1942,
finding lhcm ver y clumsy LO o per a te. Howc"cr , US
Arm y unils in th e Pac ine rccog ni scd th c ir ulility in
lhe swam p y conditio ns of lhe South-\Ves t Pac ific,
even if o nl y for logistica l suppo rt , a nd had bee n
rcqu csling amtracs for so rn e time. Prio rit y of
a nllrac del ivcries \Ve nt lO the wfarin es, howcvcr ,
a nd lhe fi rs1 US Arrn y a rnlracs did nOl a ppear in
th e Pac i~ e until carl y 1944- Thc ~rs t two a mtank
The ArDly's 2nd Engineer Special Brigade Support Battery
lIlodified son1e L VT(A}-2S into lire support vehicles, like this
oue seen h e re firing ioto Japanese dug-outs 00 Schouten Island
in the Nethe rlands Indies in 1944. Barrage rocket projectors
w e re Inounted in the cargo bay, and a 3701.01. aircraft gun (fro01.
the P-39 fighter ) was m.ounted on the rearo (US Ar01.y)
-
• :-
.. - -~~
12
a nd t\Vo a mtrac ba n a lions \Ve re ra iscd a l lhe
Ann y's Amphibi o us Training C enter a l FLOrd ,
Ca lifornia, o n 27 O cto ber 1943 o n th e basis 01'
exisling a rmo ured infa ntry a nd la nk u ni ls. The US
Arm y amphibian tractor battalions wt rc orga nisccl
slig htl y dirrcrentl y fro m lheir M a rin e co unt erparts:
there \Vc re t\Vo compa nies, eac h wilh 5 1 aml racs,
a ncl a to ta l 01' I 19 a mlraes per ba tta li o n . Altho ugh
lhe a ml rac is mo re closel y associa tecl \v ith lhe US
M a rin e Corps, it is worth no tin g th a t lhe US Arm y
ae tu a ll y fo rm cd m ore a mphibi a n ba ttali o ns du ring
lhe wa r th a n lhe M a rin es: sevcn Arm y a nd three
~ll ar in e a mta nk ba tta li ons; a ncl 23 A rm y a nd 1 1
~I a rin e a rnlrac ba tta lio ns. Likewise, 55 per cent of
a ll a mtracs went lo lhe Arm y, a nd o nl y 40 per cenl
lO lhe Ma rin es.
Debut oC the Allltank
The ~larin c 1st A m p hi bia n 'fr acto r Ba lla lio n \Vas
• 4
."
-~
. . . -" . . - •
.~
used Lo provide logistical support during the
operati ons aL Arawe and Cape G louccster on New
Britain in Deccmbcr 1943. The next major assault
landing sinee Tarawa was schcduled ror the
Marshalls in February 1944, with both Arm y a nd
~1arin e amph ibi an batLalio ns partlClpating.
Kwajalcin is the longest atoll in the wo rld ,
stretching sorne 60 miles with a 20-mile-wid e
lagoon, and idcall y suitcd to amtrac operations. US
planners fea red another Tarawa , and so prepared
lO make extensive use oftanks and am lanks. Army
troops wcrc assign ed lO K wajalein a nd a numbcr of
smallcr isla nd s in the atoll, using the Provisional
Amphibian Tractor Battalion su pported b y the
Marines' ll ew 1St Armored Amphibian Battalion.
The Provisional Amphibian Tractor Battalion had
been fo rmed around the Arm y's premier amtank
battalion , the 708th Amphibian Tank Battalion.
Howe ver, the battalion had not rcceived sumcient
LVT (A)-I s, and so was reorganised III an
improvised rashion with LVT (A )- IS, LVT (A )-2S
and LVT- 25. This opcration marked the combat
debut or the LVT (A )- I in both Army and Marine
scrvice. The Marin e 4th Amphibian Tractor
Battalio n was split tú form two additional
An LVT(A }-4 ofthe Marine 3rd Armored Amphibian Battalion
on the beach at Peleliu on 15 September 1944_ Due to the
amtanks' very light armour, the Marines preferred to land
M.tA2 medium tanks as soon as possible to provide direct fire
support for the advance inland frOID the beach. (USMC)
battalions, the 10th and 11th Amphibian Tractor
Battalions, causing sig nificant problems in the
conduct orthe la ndings in the M a rshalls as the units
had so lillle time ror training.
Usual Marine tactics lor amtank d cp loyment
were to positio n a n amtank compan y in line in fro n!
ofeach wave ofamlracs. Usually, nava l g un{-lre was
restricted from {-iring too close to the la nding bcach,
so the gunfire orthc amtanks covcrcd this gap. The
170r 18 LVT (A)-I s procccded in the lcad to the
beach and, w hen in range, began to open fire wilh
their 37111m guns and three .30-cal. machinc g uns.
The intenlion was to force theJapancsc defcnde rs to
keep Lheir heads do wn with su pprcssivc firc, rathcr
Ihan to pick off p a rticu lar rargets. There was some
controversy during the ¡nirial operations regarding
the final approach to the bcach. Thc initi a l doctrine
devclopcd by the a ml ank battalio ns was tha t the
amtanks wou ld reach sha llow water, then echclon
ofTto the fl a nk to a llow the a mtracs to procecd to the

Three of the new LVT-4S were converted mto flalllcthrowers
for the Peleliu landings, and were used to attack bunkers. The
flalllegun was mountcd behind a large arrnour shield, as seco
in this rear view of one of the vehicles.
bcac h . l 'hcy wo uld m a intain thcir position o ff l!w
coaSl, in huI! defiladc in lhe water, providin g
covcring fire ulllil ta nks co uld be la nd cd in
subscqucnt wa"es. Thc ai m was LO kce p lhe
a rnl a nks in lhe water w hefe lhey waLlld be Icss
\'uln cra blc LO cnem y 3 1lli-tank g un s: 011 la ne! lh e
LVT (A )-I \Vas like a beac hed \Vhale. ami ilS lhin
ar mo ur o ITcrcd no prolcCl ion againsl hca\'y
m ac hin c g un firc 01' a nti-tank g Ull s . 011 the oth n
ha nd , lhe M a rin e infa lllry cornmandcrs w3nlcd lhe
am lanks up 0 11 lhe bcachcs so thal lhe)' could co-
orclinate th cir fire suppa rt Wi lh localllnils lIntillhe
ta nks a rri ved. The M a rin e amtank cre ws o bj cc led
to m a n y of lhe infa nlr y requ ests, fccling lhal the
infa n,,')' om cers needless l)' exposed lheir I¡'agilc
veh icles to hoslilc firc in róles better suiled to
no rm a lla nks. f\lan y ofthe infa ntr)' officcrs s impl ~
didn ' l understand ha\\' lhinl y armollred th e
a mla nks "'ere, a nd te nd ed to use lhem in lhe sa me
",ay that lhey wou ld use a n .\Lt-A 2 Sherman la nk .
-
The co ntrovc rsy over lhe isslIe of w hethe r a mla nks
sho llld be lIscd to Sllpport ?\1a rin e o r Army
adva nces beyo nd th e immedi ate beach a rca
linge red lo ng after lhe M arsha lls fighling.
1'he fig hlin g in lhe l\h rs ha lls was nOl a repeal of
lhe blood )' T a ra wa ex peri ence. The J apa nose
d efc nde rs we re mu ch mo re sca ttered lha n on
T a rawa, a nd the J\larines a nd Army had dra",n
a ppro priale lessons from thc earl ier déback. The
~I a rin es wcre suppon ed b y ta nks fI'om lhe 4 1h
J\larin c 'T a nk Balla lio n , and lhe Arm y unit ~ al
K waj a lein we re supporl ed b y lhe 767 lh T a llk
Batta lion. 'r 'he use of th c amlanks in a Ilrc support
rólc had rcvcalcd so me shoncomings, howcve r. Thc
37 mm M 6 g un was perfec Li y ad equale lo deal w ilh
lhe rarcly-cnco untcred Japanese lanks, bU I il was
nOl suit a ble for attacking lhe bunkers 0 1' ot her
f()rtillcd posilions w hi ch were a more common
largc l, a nd so 1here was a d esirc for a larger \Vcapo ll .
-¡-"O da )'s aner lhe K wajalein landing, lhe '}lh
J\l a rin e Di vision auacked lhe ! \Vo adj acc nt is la nd "i
oC Ro i a nd Na mur, using lhe 4 lh a nd 10lh
Amphibian Tractor Baua lions, sllpponcd b y lhe
ISl Armored Amphibian Ba lla lio n .
The LVT(A)-4 AIntank flam c amlracs by mOllnting a rdinar)' infa lllry man-
Dc\"e lopmcllt ora more hcavil y armcd amt ank. lhe pack J\11 namcthro"'ers in a small opening in lhe
I.YT (A )-4, "'as in fae l a lreacl )' nea rin g eo mple lion .
bo\\' of some LVT (A)-2S a nd L VT (A ) IS. These
JUSI a s lhe LVT (A)-I ha cl been a nn r cl Wilh lh e were uscd dllring lhe K waj alcin o peratíon , but
IUI"!"e l fi'om lhe I\I 5A I lig hl la nk, so lhe ne'" werc not \'cry uscful sincc thcir rangc \Vas
LVT (A)-4 ",as a rmed Wilh lhe IUI"!"el fro m lhe 1\1 8 in aelequa le. The Arm y's 2nd Engineer Spee ia l
7:i mm H owil ze r MOlor Carri age (basecl on lhe Brigael e Support Ba lle ry moclinccl a numbc r of
~1 5 A I li ghl la nk e hassis). As in lhe case of lhe LVT (A )-2S in lO ft re sUppOrl \'e hicles. Eac h a mlrac
1\1 5A 1/ 1\1 8 HI\I C, lhe LVT (A)-4 requirecl a la rge r recei\'ed fou r I\Ik VII + 5 inc h ba rrage rockel
turre! ring, whi c h mea nt ex tc ncling lh e supc rstru c- prqjcClors, thrce 1112 ,50-ca l. heav)' machinc g llns,
lure baek 011 lhe LVT (A )-4, co\"ering O\Tr lhe 1\\'0 a ncl a ped esla l-mounl ed ~Ik IV 37 mm a UlO ma lie
scarf rings of lhe machinc g un lubs; a l ¡he time il ca n non (like lhal useel on lhe P-39 ft ghler ). The
was no! cv idellt lO ¡he designcrs th a t lh e dclc tion o í' wl arines dcvc lopcd simi lar rocket-firing amtracs in
¡hese mac hine g un positio ns wa uld be a ne of lhe lhe Centra l Pacine ftghling, bUI ge nera ll)', la ncl ing
mosl sen o us tac tical sho rtcomings o f Ihe !l ew craft wcrc used in thi s role rather than amtracs.
LVT (A l-4. Wilh lhe exceplion of a sma ll number of A rm y
As ""e ll as wo rk 011 up-g unncd \'c rsio ns of lhe LVT (A)-2S, a ll a ml racs were buil l unarmoured
amtanks, work had also bcgun 011 other forms offirc dcspite the implications drawn from T arawa. Thc
support amlracs a nd a mta nks. ProtOl ypes oC Nav)' \vas rcluctant lO armour a ll amtracs, sincc
LVT (A)- Is \V ilh E7 a nel E1 4- 7R 2 Aa me-Ihrawers
wefe devclopecl , bUl wcrc never accc¡Jled for A wave ofMarine LVT(A }-4S advance towards the beaches at
Iwo JiDla. The least popular feature of the LVT(A)-4 was its
el eploymen l 10 lhe Pacifte. Iranicall )', lhe lack of vulnerability to close-in inCantry attack due to its lack oC roof
Oa methro\\'er a mlraes had lecl lhe Arm y's 708lh arrnour, and ins ufficient Dlachine guns. By the tiIne ofibe Iwo
Jitna landing !bis had heen aDleliorated by adding Dlore
Amphibi an Tank Battalion to buitd (l ve impro viscd machine guns and gun shields, as seen here. (USMC)

15
many \,ould eOlllinue to be used in a logi!'olical
SUppOrl role where more armour mealll lh a l le!'os
cargo could bc carried . I nSlcad , ' Iand ard i,ed
armour kils wcre de\'e1oped 10 be " 'eld ed lO amlraC'~
usrd in assault land ings. The kilS contained CUI
sheels of ha lf- ancl quarter-ineh slee l. 1'he halr: inch
slecl was welded 10 lhe bo\, and fronl ea b, wh ile lhe
quancr-inch pancls werc ac!c!ed to lhe pon100ns.
Some unils in Ihe ficld added addil ional plales of
Iheir o\\n. Beginning in r-Iareh 19+1. all L\'T- 2S
had cab armour addec! al the factor ).. The armour
uscd on L \'Ts durin g lhe war \Vas onl), sufficienl 10
prOlccl againsl small arms {ire. Shrapncl and hea\'y
ll1achinc gun fire cou ld pencu'ale lhe ponlOons, and
erews had 10 ca refu ll y check Ihe side ponlOons
befare elllcring lhe walcr again lO prcq>1ll Ihe
\'c hicle from filling wilh water and si nking. (Crews
\\(TC issued a bag of \Vooden plugs 10 hamll1er into
any holes Ihey found. )
Battle for the Marianas
The maill campaign in lhe Central Pac iflc~ for Ihe-
key ~1arianas islands ofSaipan , Cuall1 alld Tillian .
\Vas se heduled for June Jul y, 194+ 1'he,e opcra-
li ons were 10 be lhe largesl amphibious landings
using am lraes 10 dale . 1'h" firsl L \'T (I\ )-4 am lanb
ane! LVT-4- amlraes \\ere tl\'ailable rol' these
operalions. The Army's ¡oSlh I\m phibian Tank
Ballalion had 16 L \ 'T A )-+" issuing eaeh lank
compa n) four L\TI A -.¡.s ancl 13 L\'T (A l -I ';
\, hile lhe ~larill es' 1lC'''' 2nd Armorte! . \ll1phibi an
Battalion was almosl e-nlirely equ ippccl wilh Ihe
llC'wer amlélllk. Opcratioll ' Fo ragcr', Ihe attaek on
Saipan, bega n on I .')J une 19. ~ l. Abolll 700 amI raes
"'ere used , including amlanks fi'om lhe Arm y's
7081h Amphibian T a nk Ba llalion and Ihe Marines
2nd Arlllorcd Amphibian Ba tt a lion, a ne! six allltrac
ballalions including Ihe Arm y\ 5341h, 7151h anel
773rd anel Ihe r-Iarines' 2nd, 41h a nd 10th
¡\Illphibian Traclor Battalions.
By Ihe lime of Ihe Saipan operalion, Japa n",,.
laedes ",cre changing: they had deeidee! to a\'oid
plaeing 1ll0!:ll of their defell!:lin' positions on the
beae hcs, rea li!:li ng lha l man ) would be 1051 10 lhe
hea\'y US lIaval bombardment. 1nS1C'ad , on larg(T
islands, defcllces "'ere planned 10 lake advantagt of
terraill featllres inland. The landings at Saipan
",ere n01 COlllCS1Cd in lhe sa me fa shion as al
Tarawa , bU1 lhe Japanese forces launehed a
number of cou ntcr-altacks againsl lhe beach-hcad ,
inrluding lank allacks. The 7081h Amphibian
Tank Ballalion particularl y dislinguished ilsrlf
The lale produclÍon models of lhe LVT-2 built afler March
1944 had an armoured cab and protcctcd rear air intakes. This
version is very difficult to dislinguish from lhe Army LVT(A )-
2, which also had integral hull and bow annour. 11ús is a
Marine LVT-2 on Iwo J1ma, with added gun s hields. (USM C)
during the fighting , earning the Presid e nti a l Unil
Citati on. Saipan was c1ccJarcd scc ure 0 11 9 July
/944; a nd on 27 Jul y G ua m a nd Tinia n \Ye re
attacked. As a l Saipa n, lhe initi al lalldin gs \vere
condUClcd using a rn tracs. The atlac k 0 11 G ua m 011
2 /Jul y /944 in volved 358 am lracs anel a mla nks
rrom lhe M arin es' / sl a nd 2nd Armorcd Am-
phibia n Balla lions anel lhe 3rd a nd 4t h Amp hibian
Tractor Ba tta li o ns. The a ltack 0 11 Tinian includcd
al1 initial assau lt by 465 Army and i\ll arinc a mtracs
ane! 68 arn la nks. Tinian '5 bcachcs provcd more of a
problcm due LO lhe p rese nce or cora l c1irrs al lhe
cclge ofthc beach area, so a spcc ia l Scc bec version oC
lhe LVT-2, lhe Doodlcbug, was filted Wilh a tim ber
ramp over th e lOp ofth c vch icle lo permit fo llowin g
amtracs l O surmount l he barrier. T en D oodlc bugs
"ere buill by t he r.r a rine 2nd Amphibian TracLO r
Baltal ion, proving lO be quite successrul during
thcir bricf e mploymcll t a l Tini an.
Thc ~rariana s campaign reOecled a gradua l
malUring of assa ult amphibian doctrin e. ÑIany of
lhe am lrac ballalion omcers presenleel el elailcel
suggeslions for improvcmcllls o n lhe vc hicles in
lhcir aftcr-aclio l1 ('cports. 'The sin g le most common
criLicism conccrncd lhe lack of armour 0 11 lhe
am tracs, a nd lhe laek of armo ur kilS lO protecl
machine g un posilions o n the ve hicles. As an
inlerim so lution armourshields were improvised , or
Navy sma ll eraft or la nding erafl shie lds we re
oblaincd. Therr \vas a lso SO Il1C dissatisfac tion w ilh
lhe genera l conf i ~ llral i o n of lhe ex isling LVT- 2
am lrac: to di"{'lJlhark, l he lroops hacl to Ieap over
th e sid es a dangcrO lls procecl ure in a conlesled
beach-head. Sol ulions 10 some or lhese problems
w('re a lreacl y underwa y back in lhe U niled S tates.
The M aria nas f1g hling hig hlig hled problcms
",ilh lhe amlanks. The L VT (A)- / \Vas genera ll y
\'icwed as bcin g llllsuilable; lhe 37 m m g lln was no t
vcry llseful aga insl bunkcrs, a nd J apa nese lan ks
were so rarc1y eneolln lered on lhe beach lhal ilS
anli-a rmollr a bility was seldo ll1 nceded. Thc o ne
goocl reaturc orl he LVT (A )- / was lhe provision or
lhe lWO scarf ring mounls (or .30-ca l. machine g uns
on lhe rear hull. Thc J a pan ese inranlry lackcd an y
aclvanced anti-armollr weapo ns like bazookas, a nd
so were obl igcd lo attaek ta nks lIsing sllicidallaC lics
w ilh mag nelic min es. C lose- in defence of lhe
am la nks agai nsl suc h a lt acks was vital.
Thc LVT (A)-4 was welcomed ror ilS large r gun;
th e sho rl 75m m howitzer was a much more lI sefu l
\\'eapon than lhe 37mm a nli-ta nk g un on lhe
LVT (A)- /. However, lhe LVT (A)-4 hael been
elevclopeel wilh lilt le ap prcc ia lion or lhe lype or
fighling la king place in lhe Paeific; ill acked lhe lwO
Anny troops of the 7th Infantry DivisioD in an LVT-4 move
towards the beach at Okinawa OD D-Day, 1 April 1945- The
LVT-4 had a large rear ramp, as seen here, which permiued
easier loading and unloading ofthe cargo hay than the earlier
LVT-I and LVT-2 amtracs. (US Army)
/7
rear machine gun tubs of the L VT (A)-I , and had
no co-axia l .30-cal. machinc gu n fiued bcsid e the
75mm howitzcr. 1ts onl y self-defence wea pon was a
·50-cal. ~1 2 HB hea\'y machinc gu n fittcd lO a ring
mount 011 lOp of lhe turret. From this positioll , lhe
machinc g unncr \Vas compktcly exposed 10 cncl11)'
small arms fire. The L \'T (A)-4 was thus much
more diflicult to defend than the LVT (A)-I ; and in
faet man y amtank CfCWS felt that machinc gUl1s
wcre actually the l11os1 val uable elemenl of lhe
am lanks in man y circumslanccs. Anothcr UIl-
popular featurc on the LVT (A)-4 was the lack of
ovcr hcad a rmour 011 lhe turrct- a partic ular
shoncoming in arcas of hcavy foliage whcrc
cOllccalcd J apancsc lroops ancl snipers cou ld firc or
throw grcnadcs ¡!llO lhe tU1TCt.
Apan fra m lisling lhe cquipmcllt shoncomings,
the officers ofthe 708t h Amphibian Tank Battalion
suggested that the róle of amtanks be changed lO
lhal of mobile art illery, and lhal further lraining
should be providcd for al11 lank crcws la prepare
thcm for lhe use of their \'c hicles in an indirect fire
rólc. Thcy a lso noted that once the beach was
secured a nd tanks landed , tanks would bc bettcr
suited LO dircc t-fire aClions and close infantr)'
suppon tha n the thinly armoured amtanks. Thc
afkr-ac tion repons fi'om lh e amtank units rccom-
The new LVT-3 Bushnlasters were first used in combat 00
Okinawa where they were used to land troops of the 6th
Marine Oivision. These Bushmasters have the optiooal
armour kit fitted 00 the bow. (USMC)
mendcd that the LVT (A )-I be withdrawn ¡ro In
ser\'ice, and that an improw·d version of lhe
L VT (A)-4 take its place.
The e riticisms of the LVT (A)-4 \Vere taken lO
hca rt , alt hough nOl all lhe recommcndaLio ns were
a pproved for production vehicles. An imprO\TCI
"ersion of the LVT (A)-4 was de\'e loped , a ncl
although iL was not g ivcn an official desig na ti o n, il
was popularl y ca llcd the LVT (A)-4 ' ~Iarianas
Model ', arter the eampaign which had prompted its
dcvclopmcnt. Thc real' of the turrel w as modificd
by removing the small partial roof and the ring
mounL along with the .50-ca l. heavy machinc g un :
in its place, LwO pintlc-mounted .30-cal. 1ll3c hine
gun s \Vere added, complete wit h gun shields. A ball-
1ll0 ul1led .30-cal. machine gun was addcd in lhe
superstructure front (a lthough this feature had been
devcIoped before the Marianas ca mpaign , and had
been added on late-produClion L VT (A)- 1s as well ).
Fe", of the LVT (A)-4 ~larianas ~Iodel s were
avai lable in Lhe Pacifie unlil '945; and as a resu h
there was a good dcal of improvi sa tion on LVT (A)-
4s lO providc protection for lhe turreL machinc
gunncr, a nd Lo add add itional maehinc guns.
Furthcr improvcmellts, including a powcr traverse
syslclll for Lhe turret and a gyro-stabi liscr for the
howitzer, led in 1945 to the LVT (A)-5. Develop-
menL of an amlank with even bctter armamcnt, lhe
T86 Amphibian Cun Carriage, was begun by the
Arm y in '943. This was basica lly an attempt lO
d evelop an amp hibian ve rsion of the ~118 tank
destroyer. A corrcsponding howil zcr vcrsion Wilh a The rolling counlryside of Okinawa permiued large-scale
rnechanised operations. Atntracs and arntanks, like these
,05mm howilzer, lhe T 87, a lso reaehed prol ol)'pe Marine LVT(A }-4s, were used to transport and support these
form o Howeve r, by lhe lime lhat these vehiclcs werc Marine drives. (USMC)

read )' for produeli on in la le ' 944, lhere was little

Arm y or Marine Corps intercst in arntanks. evenlua ll )' beco me lhe LVT-4. This new ve hicle
had lhe engine moved forwa rd 10 permil lhe cargo
New Allltracs hold lO be localed afl , aecessible by a large ra mp
The l.VT Conlinuing Board had a lread y rec- door. This conflguralion permitted lhe LVT-4 10
ognised lhe shon comings in amtrac config ura tion load a nd un load cargo rapidly, and il could easil y
in ' 942. The need 10 use a cra ne lO load a nd un load carr)' wheeled equipment such as j eeps or small
cargo fro m lhe cenlre hold of lhe LVT-2 limi led ilS artiller y pi eces. The firsl large order for lhe LVT-4
utili ty, bUl due to wanime priorilies LVT- 2 was placed in November '943; lhe Rrsl series-
prod uClion continued , while lhe L VT Continuing prOduclion LVT-4S \Ve re compleled in Dece mber
Board a ncl lhe Na,,)' proceeded ",ilh improved ' 943, a nd lhey (irsl enlered service a l lhe lime of lhe
van ants. Saipan la nding in June ' 944. The LVT-4 was
In lhe spring oC" ' 942, lhe LVT Conlinuing Board produced in larger numbers lha n any olher lype of
was sponsoring t\Vo devcJopment programmes LO amtrac during the \Va r, represcnting a lmost ha lf of
improve the auto moti ve performance of lhe a l! amlrac production. Ho wevcr, it arri ved on the
LVT-1. The proj ec l by FMC, whieh led lo lhe scc nc rcla li vcl y late, and so onl y saw wicl cspread use
LVT-2 design, envisioned keeping lhe cenlra l cargo in ' 94-5. The Marines and Arm y discussed
hold configura lion, bUl grea lly improving lhe lrac k manu fac tllring a version conslrucled of armour
a nd suspension. The L VT-2 was read y for Sleel, compara ble lo lhe LVT (A )-2 a mlrac. This
production a l lhe end of 1942, and went in to seri es \Vas designa led lhe LVT (A)-3, bUl il \Vas ne\"Cr
produclion in J a nu ar)' ' 943. Wilh lhe LVT- 2 a pprovecl for production, and opliona l armOur kits
design compleled in lhe spring of ' 942, FMC wcrc issucd in its pl ace lO armo ur lh e regul ar
tu rncd lO lhe developmenl of a furth er dcri va ti ve LVT-4·
Wilh a reconfigll red cargo ho Jd , w hich \vo uld The second progra mmc being sponsored by lhe

'9
L VTContinuing Board was to emerge as lhe L VT-3.
In 1942 lhe Navy's Bureau ofShips a pproac hed the
~lorse C hain Compa ny, a di vision ofBorg-Wa rner
Corpo rati o n, lo dcvclo p a ne vv track and suspcnsio n
system l O fe place the primüi \'c t ype uscd 0 11 the
LVT- I I\lIigator . Borg-Wa rner suggesled lhal a
more prude nt eourse would be to red esign the
vehicle e nlirely, 10 whieh lhe Navy agreed. This
rcsul led in lhe Borg-Wa rner Amphibi a n, M od el 1\,
whi eh \Vas d eli ve red to lhe L VT Co ntinuing Board
in Flo rid a in August 1942 for lIials. The Borg-
Wa rner Amphibia n, Modcl A was developed as a
conve nible a mtracj amtank . A weapons module ,
mounting lhe tUITel li·om a n M 3A I Sluart light
ta nk, eould be bolt ed or unbolled to lhe ehassis 10
convcrt il lo a nd fra m a cargo carrier or a n
a mphibi ous ta nk . The ~l odel A pro,·cd suceessful in
Although .he amtank battalions had suggested that the
LVT(A)-I be witbdrawn from service due to its shortcomings ,
it was used right through tbe Okinawa caDlpaign, as in the
case ofthese late-mode l LVT(A}- IS near Chalan OD D-Day, 1
April 194$. The late-model LVT(A}- Is bad protec ted engine
grills, a bow Dlachine gun, and additional arnlour around (h e
rear Dlachine gun tubs. (US Arrny)
20
tes ts, but it was not a pproved fo r prodUClion since it
o ffered no sig nificant improve menl over lhe exjsling
LVT- 2 "Va ler Bufla lo, o r its a m ta nk deriva li ve, th e
LVT (A)- J.
Ne\'erthelcss, lhe r-Iodcl A had displa yed a
numbcr o finnova l ions in lrac k and suspensio n, a nd
the Navy aUlhorised Borg-Wa rner to proeeed with
an improved lype, lhe M odel B. The M odc1 B •
programme started a l the sa me lime lhal the LVT
Continuing Board had been sponsoring the L VT-4,
w ilh its emphasis on casicr access lO lhe cargo ho ld .
Likewise, lhe Model B was d esigned wilh a rear
ra mp fo r access to lhe rear-mounted cargo ho ld .
One or the ma in innovalions in lhe M od el B d esign
\Vas the shifting oflhe two 11 0 hp Cadillae engines
(fro lll the MS/ MSAI lank) inlO the hull sponsons,
lcaving more space in lhe inte rna l cargo ho ld . 'T'ri a ls
of the M od el B took place al Ca mp Pendleton,
Ca lirornia, ayea r la ter in A ugust 1943. The initi al
pro tOlype was constru cted wilh armo ur pla le, bUl
aft er tria ls lhe Navy requesled th a t il be
ma nurac tured with sheet stecJ, w il h a n op lio na l
ar mou r kit. The modified M od ol B was aeee p ted for
 prod ucti o n in ~Il a rc h 1944, a nd a n in ilia l a rd er \Vas
placed fo r 1,800 \'e hieles. It was l ype-e1 ass i fi ed as
lhe LVT- 3. The M a rin es fel l lha t produ clio n of a
who ll y new lype was juslified du e lO lhe suspension
and powertrain improverncnts o rfcred by the L VT-3
Bushmaste r over lhe o lde r L VT- 2/ LVT-4 W ate r
Burra lo fa mil y. The L VT-3 did no l see comba l until
• 1945 al Okin awa.
Late-War Land i ngs
The Palaus
The nexl large l in lhe island-ho pping ca mpa ig n in
lhe Centra l Pac inc was lhe Pa la u group in lhe
Caro line ¡slan d s. The m a inJ a pa nese base a l Peleliu
was assig neello lhe M a rin es, w hile lhe Arm y helpeel
lac kl e neig h bouring A ng uar Isla nd . Peleliu lhreal-
ened to be a nOlhcr T arawa, wilh heavy J apanese
e1efences a ncl fortifica lions. By lhe lime of Peleliu ,
J a pa nese d efensive laclics had conlinu ed lheir shin
away fra m lhe reli a nce o n hcavy beach d efe nces
a ncl wastefu l ban¿oi cha rgcs agai nst the bcach-head .
Inslcad , the Pc lcliu garrison fa ur times lhe sizc of
lhe T arawa garrison- bu rrowed imo lhe rack)'
rid ges fUrlher inl a nd .
By lhi s lim e M ari ne laclics, too, had g reatl y
impro"cd . Thc mai n prob lcm was tha t lhere \\'c rc
nOl enoug h amt racs lO go around . The 1St M arine
---
Di visio n ho pcd lO have o ll e a m trac ba lLal io n per
rcgime nt aga insl lhe three bcachcs, plus a n a mla nk
ba tta lio n lO lead lhe wave. I l had lhe 1SI a nd 8th
A m phibi a n Trac lor Ba tta li o ns, and l he 3rd
A rm o red A mphibi a n Ba lla lio n with LVT (A)- I S
ancl L V T (A )-4s. Al the lasl mo m ent, a shi pm ent of
a bo ul 50 of lhe new LVT-4S a rri ved ; lhese \Yere
uscd lO form a provisio na l ba lta lio n , ca using a
ccn a in a m o un t of d isru ptio n , sincc o ne of lhe
ba tt a lio ns was rc lat ively new a nd inexpe ri enced ,
a nd m a ny o r thc ercws in lhe p rovisio na l uni1 were
com p lete ly unlra ined.
O n 15 Seple mber 19H lhe lhree a mlrac
ba lla li o ns we re preced ed 10 l he beach b y l he
am la nk ba tta lio n a nd b y rocke l-Ia un chin g la nd ing
e ra ft. lO softcn up J a pa nesc positions. The in itia l
a pproach was la r Icss cos1l y th a n al T arawa; bu t
o nce lhe su rro undi ng reef was reached cas ua ltics
mo unled , e\'cntu a ll y 10 la lling 26 a m p hi bians. The
terra in or the beaeh a rca was badl y torn u p by l hc
nava l bo mba rdm cnt, a nd \vas thus unsuitab lc fo r
lhe use of a mta nks. As a rcs ull of thc carli cr ca uti o us
use of a rnt an ks o n Saipa n , lhe 1st M a rin e Di visio n
insislcd this li me o n ha\·ing la nks la nd as soon as
possiblc, ra ther lh a n d epc nd e nt irel y o n lhe
a m la nks for ini lia l {lre suppo r t. A bo ut 30 S hcrm a ns
The LVTP-X3. des igned by FMC in 1947. was one of a nuttlber
ofexperiDlental amtracs developed UnDlediately after the war
in an aUeDlpt to exaDline new approaches and configurations.
None oftbese ente red production until the Korean Wa r forced
the Navy to replace tbe LVT-3C. (FMC Corp. )
__.,J _
"
21
The LVT-]C BushOlaster had the rear cargo bay covered over,
and a turret added in the front. This rear view shows the detail
changes on the LVT-]C. (Author)
oflhe ISl Tank Battalion \\'en.' landC'd, and proH'd
instrumental in sec uring lhe bC'ac h.
Prior to lhe landings, duee or lhe ne\\ L \'T-.¡s
had been modi fled as Oalllelhrower \'C hicles,
mounling r\'a\")' ~Ik. 1 ( Ronson Oame guns. 'rhe)
stood unu sed ror lhe flrsl I \VO da ys of' flghling; bul
o n lhe lhird d a)' lhe)' began to be broughl rorward
lO rou l OUl J a panese fonificalion s, a nd lhey \\'ere
used la ler in lhcca mpaig n when a sma ll amlrac a nd
amlank las k force was sent off lo neighbouring
Ngesbus island lO altack lhe J apanese garrison
lherc , The landings al Anguar Island on 17
Seplember werc conduclcd b), lhe .\ rm) 's 7261h
Alllphibian Traclor Ballali on, supported by lhe
7761h Alllphibian Tank Ba lla lion .
tvlarine casuallics on Pclcliu were double those
on Tarawa, and il proved l O be a ver)' conlro\-ersia l
opera tion. Howcvcr, dC'fcndC'rs in four times lhe
slrenglh or lhe Beli o garrison had been O\'CI'Come,
a nd lhe Iandings had been Condu cled wilhoUl
serious blunders. In rnan )' respecls, Pelelill marked
lhe clllminalion in lhe dcvrlopmelll of maril1e
amphibian assaull operalions in \\'orld \\'ar 11. 13,
lhis slage, lhe cenlra l rólc of lhe am lracs in lhe
inilia l landing had been we)) eSlablished by lhe
sllccesses al Guam , Saipan and Pelcliu , and the ro le
ofarnlanks in pro"iding initial (ire suppon was also
accepled. The imporlance of arnlanks in am-
phibious Jandings was viewed wilh sorne a rnbi\'-
al(,I1(,(', however , bOlh in lhe amlank baua lions and
22
111 the ~larin e di\'¡siolls lhernscl\'cs. \\"ilh Ihe
improvemem in lank wad ing eqllipmen l, COI1-
ve ntional lanks cou ld be landed on lhe beaches
"ilhin half an hour of lhe inilial landings. No on('.
espccially the arnlank erews, queslioned the fan
thal lhe ~I4A 2 Sherrnans wer(" rnu eh beuer suiled
lo pro\'iding close- in direct fire support for lhe
~Iarines once ashore. Th(' importance of amlanks
in amphibious operaliolls lhercfore conlinlled 10
decline as the role of conn'l1lional lanks increased.
Once ashore, Ihey were used mainl y in lhe indiren
a nille r) fire SlIppOrt role ",hile con\'enlional tanks
w('re lIsed f(>r direcl fire sllpporl.
The Philippines
The largesl single use of amlracs and a rnla nks in lhe
['acifle war, lhe Lr yle la ndings on 20 OClober 1944,
a re perhaps lhe Jcasl ramous. The S Arm )' used
nine am trac and (wo am lank baualions fOI" lhe
landing, bUl there was nOConleSl for lhe beac hes. As
a rcsul l, the Arm y am lracs \\'ere l"educC'd lO their
initial ro le of logislieal su pport , and liule a nenlion
was paid to lhe la nclings. The Army retain ed a large
nurnbe r ofamlracs for use in la ndings on the rnan )
islands in lhe Philippines, lIsing t"'o a mlrac
ballalions in lhe landing al Ormoc !sland on 7
Dccembcr 1944 and rour al Lingayell Gu lf' on
Luzon on 9 J a nuary 1945·
Iwo Jima
If therc ",ere qucslions aboul lhe need lO takc
Peleliu , lhere wcre no sut h doublS about l\\'o Jima.
T'his small volcanic islancl \\'as viewed as essenlial lo

hclp support bomber operations agai nstj apa n, a nd
the eventu a l ma inl and la ndings planned for 1946.
A tota l of 482 LVTs made the ini tia l landings.
including the 4t h and 5th Amp hibi an Tractor
Batta lions, and the L VT (A}-4S of the 2nd Armorcd
Amphibian Ba tta lion. As at Peleliu , the J apa nesc
had shirted to a more ca utio nary defence, prcfcrring
to wagc costly dcfcnsive aClions fro m fortificaLion s
and bunkers away frollllhe bcach ralher than racc a
hai lstorm ofr.re on the beach itse lr. As a result, the
amlracs \vcrc ablc LO makc Lhe beach w ilholl t
suffcring scri ous losscs. Once lh e)' \Vcrc 011 lh e
beach, howevcr, Ihc J a pancse aniller)' and monars
took their toll of \'c hicles a nd mcn; so ta nk suppon
was landed a lmosl irnmedia tcl y, and playcd a
centra l ro le in rou ling üutJapancse bunkc rs. ¡ \V()
Jima \Vas undou bted ly lhe toughest Mari ne battle
of lile \Va r, fought aga insl a garrison len limes lhe
sizc of Tarawa and even bcttcr fonified , hUI 1h("
assa ull landings did not matc h T arawa in bloody
fcrocit y. The role of amlanks COlltinued la climinish:
wi th a n adec¡u atc suppl y oftanks on ¡ wo jima they
wcrc relegated to an artil le r)' support ró lc , fol' which
they ",ere bctlcr suitcd .
-_..•
•
Development of a smaller amtrac, the FMC LVTP-6,
paralleled development orthe &rg-Warne r LVTP-5' Based on
the Army M59 APC, the LVTP-6 neve r entered quantity
production. (FMC Corp. )
Okinawa
Okinawa proved to be the climactic ball le of lhe
Paeir.c War, placing US forces on the doorstep of
theJ apa nese H ome lslands. The initia lla ndings on
1 Apri l 19+5 \Vere preceded by a number of
amp hibious assau lts againsl sma ller islands in lhe
R yu kyus by US Army troops who scized anc hor-
agrs ror the US Navy, a nd eleared out j apa nese
garnsons o n the O kin awa approaches. The
Okinawa la ndings which wcrc no t contcsted
were carri cd o ut by four di visio ns, t wO Army a nd
t\Vo Ma rinc, supported by nea rl y a dozcn a mtrac
and amlank baualions. Amtracs pla yed a n
unanticipated role in thc fighting , being used by the
-"larines for prolonged mechanised infantry oper-
ations , a kin to lhe Army's use in Europe of
armo urecl infantry ha lf-tracks. Okinawa's rolling
hills pcrmiued the usc of aml racs lO carr y troops
deep inland.
Okinawa \Vas no t lhe last use of a mtracs in the
23
Paeifie, though it was eertainl y thc last major
operaLion. They were usecl in lhe :rvfinclanao
landings in the Philippines on 17 April 1945; at
Lake San terne on New Guinca on 24 April 1945; at
the Bongae Channel on Sulu on 27 April; at Ce bu in
the Philippines on 26 Ma y 1945; and finall y, in a
large operation in vo lving two US Army arntrac
battalions at Balikpapan in Borneo on I Jul y 1945.
This last operation also marked one orthe only uses
oramtraes by other Allicd troops during the Paeifie
fighting. The Au stralians had rormed the 1St
Amphibious Armoured Squadron using newly
arrived L VT (A)-4S, and thc 1st Australian Traeked
Amphibious Vehicle Platoon AASC in Fcbruary
1945 The US supplied a total or30 LVT (A)-4s and
about 300 LVT-4S to Australia and Chin a in 1945.
Although neithcr unit was lO sec action, Au stralian
troops in volved in the Balikpapan landings did use
T.VTs in small numbers; as did British rorees in
llurma.
Amtracs in Europe
Although arntracs are much more dosel)' associatcd
with the fighting in the Paeific, they were used in a
number ol' operations in the European thea tre as
wd!. Howcvcr, priority was always g ivc n lO the
Pacifie units, and LVTs did not bceome available in
Europe in significant numbcrs until the late
summer or 1944. The US supplied 200 L VT - I S to
Britain in 1943, which wcrc usecl mainl )' for training
and cxperimentation. These were rollowed by
100 LVT-2S and 203 L VT-4S in 1944, and 50
LVT (A)-4s in 1945 under the Lend-Lease pro-
gramme. Thesc were ealled Bumdo II (LVT-2 ) ancl
Burralo IV (LVT-4) in British service (or Fantails,
in Ital y). Not surprisingl y, the unit most c10sely
associated \Vith amtrac cmploymcnt in lhe Euro-
pcan theatre was the British 79th Armourecl
Division , w hich was already renowned for its work
with spec iali scd armourecl vehicles. In OClOber
1944. the 79th Armoured Division was assigned the
messy task or disloclging German rorees in the
Seheldt estuary who were bloeking the approaches
to the vital port or Antwerp. L VTs orthe 1st Assault
Brigade, Roya l Engineers were uscd to land troops
on South Beve!and ¡sland on 23 /24 October,
24
rollowed by an atlaek on Walc heren. Wal eheren
\Vas protected by clikes, which the Allies rupturccl to
complicate the derenee or the Germans. The 11th
RTR ancl the 5th Assault R cgiment RE were fittccl
out with LVT-2 ancl LVT-4 Burraloes ror the
ope ration , to carry troop s and equipment in the
assault. Arter the I November 1944 landing, it took
a week or bloocl y fighting to secure the islancl. Thc
11th RTRl was again employed with Bufialoes at
the Rhinc erossing on 7 March 1945. Besides using
th e LVT -4s in th e convcntional róle, th e di vision
developcd some spec iali sed deri va ti ves, including a
mat-Ia ying LVT-4 which eou ld place a carpet or
wire-linked logs on the mucld y shore-banks to help
DD tanks and othcr amphibiou s vc hiclcs tran sit the
ri ver approaches w ithout bccoming bogged down;
a nd the Sea SerpeIlt, an L VT-4 fitted with two
small turrcts and Aam e gu ns. In view oC the
possibilit y or the British Army becoming more
in vo lved in amphibious operations in th e Pacific at
the conc lu sion oCthc European war , a require mcnt
for a British amtrac beca m e apparent, and develop-
ment bcgan in the spring or 1944. Designecl b y
l\ilorris Commcrcial Cars, it was hea vil y bascd on
the LVT-4, but was some what larger. It was
dubbed the Amphibian . {racked, 4 1011 CS, better
known as Ncptun c. A total oC 2,000 were ordered ,
along with a rccovery ve rsion (Sealion ) ancl
works hop version (Turtle); but with the end orthe
war the contrac ts werc cance llcd aftcr onl y a
handrul had been completecl.
The US Arm y usccl LVT- 2S ancl LVT-4S in small
numbers in 1944 and 1945 for ri ve r erossing
operations. One or the largest joint US- UK
opcrati ons using amtracs in Europc too k place
along the Po River in ltaly in Mareh- April 1945
undcr the control or the British 9th Armoured
Brigade. The US 755t h Tank Batta lion was
con ve rted to a Fantail unit with 119 LVTs ror the
operation. Likewise, an RASC unit and the 2/7th
Lancers were outfittecl with LVTs rrom US sources.
The L VTs were used to eross Aoodecl areas south or
Lake Comacehio as part orOperation ' Impaet' on
II April 1945, rollowcd by Opera tion ' Impaet
Ro ya l' two clays la ter; and on 24-26 April,
Company C ofthe 755th Tank Batta lion was used
in landin g operations across th e Po River.
IS('(' \ 'ang-uard 38, ¡\1ec/lilnised Infrmtr)'-
 1: LVT-l, FMF Atlantic; Op. 'Torch ',
Fedala, Morocco , 4 Dec. 1942
1 2; LVT·l, US Marine 2nd Amphib.
'Il-actor Bn.; Tarawa, 20 Nov. 1943

A
1: LVT·4, 11th Royal Tank Regl.;
Elbe River, Germany, 29 Apr. 1945
2: LVT(A)·1, 708t1t Amphib. Tank Bn.,
USArmYi Saipan, 15 June 1944
1

B
1: LVT(A)-4, US Marine 2nd Armd . Amphib. Bn.;
Tinian, August 1944
2: LVT-2 , US Marine 4th Amphib. Tractor Bn.;
]wo Jima, 1945

e
1: LVT-3, US Marine 1st Amphib. Tractor Bn.¡
Hungnam Harbour, Korea, Dec. 1950
2: LVT(A)-4, French Amphib. Asslt. Gp.¡
Port Fouad , Egypt, 6 Nov. 1956 1

o
1: LVT(A)-4, 1u Groupement Autonome, 1er REC¡
Annam, lndochina, 1952
2: LVTE-l, 3rd Amphib. Tractor Bn., US 1st
Marine Div.j Vietnam, 1967
1

E
 1: LVTH-6, Taiwanese Marine Div.; Taiwan, 1983
2: LVTP-7, ROK 1st Marine Div.; Re public oC Korea, 1984

F
•
 J: LVTP·7, Transport eo., Battaglione Marina
'San Marco'¡ Italy, 1984
2: LVTP-7, Argentine 1st Amphib. Vehicle Bn.;
1 FalkJands, April1982

G
1: LVTP-7, US Marine 2nd Arnphib. Asslt. eo.;
Grenada, 26 October 1983
2: LVTP-7, US Marine 6th Amphib. Bde.; ItaJy, 1985

H
 Post-War LVT
Development
By lhe end ofthe war the Navy had ordered 22 ,683
amlraes and amlanks of lhe slandard produetion
models. However, in late 1945 lhe Navy eaneelled
man y ofthese contraets, and a lotal of 18,62 1 LVTs
\Vere deli vercd. Thc accompanying charts providc
more comprc hensivc dctails of thc wa rtimc
prod uetion of L VTs.
Following lhe war, lhe Army gradua ll y wilhdrew
from amphibious assau ll ve hicle devclopment, and
disbanded ilS a mphibi a n tank and tractor bal-
lalions. Man y oflhe amtanks and amlraes lhat had
been supplied lO lhe Army were lurned over lo
allies, nota bl y to China and Franee. Many M arine
and Army amlracs locatccl overseas \VeTe simpl y
broken up for serap.
The US Marine Corps, rea lising lhal buclgel
limits made the acquisition afnew amtracs unlikely,
deeicled lo hold on lO the newesl prod uetion
vehicles, nota bly the LVT-3 amtraes and LVT (A)-5
amta nks, most of whieh had not been shipped from
lhe US befo re lhe war end ed. In 1949 plan s were
begun lO modernise lhe LVT- 3 by add ing overhead
armour lO protcet thc troap bay; ancl this was
carried OUl in 1950 on 1,200 LVT-3s by
Conlinenlal Avia lion & Engineering (CA&E ),
rcsulling in lhe LVT- 3C. These form ed the
backbone of Marine am trac units in K orea. There
were plans lo de ve lop a heavil y mocl erni secl
L VT (A)-5, a ncl two very difTerent prolol ypes were
eom plctccl by CA& E and FMC in [949. In 1951 a
sma ll number of LVI' (A)-5s were modifled by
FMC with a new bow, turrel roor armour, and
other changcs; allcl sorne of th csc 5aw ser vice in
Korca.
Apart fram the moclernisation programmc 011
exisling L VI's in lhe inventory, lhe US Navy
Bureau oí' Ships was a lso engaged in a n active
programme of L VT leehnology c1evelopmenl. Tn
lhe late 19405 a seri es ofL VT prolol ypes were buil l
by va rio us manufac turers under Navy contract lO
exami ne ncw hull , suspension and propulsion
concepts. Man y prololype vehicles, including new
amta nks, amtracs a nd specia lised cargo vc hiclcs,
were built and tested, nonc of th em progrcssing
beyoncl lhe prolotype slagc , lhe intcnlion being
mercly lO exam ine new LVI' teehnologies. Funcling
for aelual produetion was simpl y nol availablc.
TIte LVTE-. 'Potato Digger' was used forengineer support and
mine~field breac hing. It is fitted with a combination bulldozer
bladefmine rake in the front. The large structure on the roofis
the launcher for the rocket~propelled demoütion line charge.
(FMC Corp. )
33
LVTs Return to COIllbat
LVTs wcrc back in combal shortl y arter lhe cnd of
lhe Second \\"o rld \\'ar. The Commu nisl a nd
National isl C hillcsc wagecl a brutal civil war, fin a l! )
culmina ling in lhe cxpu lsion of lhe Nationali sl
Chincse forces frol1l1 hc mainland 011 LO lhe ¡sland 0 1'
T aiwan. Thc N'a li ona lisl Chincsc forces \Ve J'('
pro\'idcd \Vil h a number of L\'Ts, mainly Ihe
LVT (A )-4 a nd LVT -4, from US i\rmy and IIlarinc
stockpilcs, w hic h WelT usccl cx tcnsi\'c ly in comba l.
man y la ler being ca plured (anel uscd ) b)
Co ml1lunisl Chinesc forces .
The o lllbrcak 0(' war in Korea caugh l lhe US
Marin e Corp~ and Army unprcparccl. NOl surpri s-
ing ly, lhe US ~ll ari n c fo rces in Korea rcqucsted thal
thcir am lrac baualions be brought back up to
strength , ane! lhe 1St Amphibian Tractor Baual ion
\Vas eq uippeel Wil h lhe ne\\'l)' modernised L V'T'- 3C,
On 15 Seple m ber lhis unil. supporl ed by
LVT (A)-5S of l he 561h Amphibian Tank ancl
Trac to r Ba ll ali o n. "e re ustd in lhe lallding a l
The LVTH·6AI gun carrier was fitted witb a I051D1D howitzer
to provide artillery support during alDtrac operations.lt could
carry 151 rounds ofalDlDurution in racks, plus 150 canistered
rounds in me cargo hold, during land operations; but for
alDphibious use a total of no lDore than 100 rounds was
considered safe. (FMC Corp. )
I nehon w hich dra malieall y alfeCled lhe CO llrse of
Ihe war. LV'T - 3Cs also Figu ree! pro minclltl y in
~ l a rin (' allacks O\T r Ihe Han Ri ver la ler in lhe
1110 nlh , a nd in Ihe c\"ac ua lio n of Huog nam
Ha rhou r füllowing Ihe Chincse entry in to lhe \Va r.
1950 a lso marked lhe enlr y of lhe LVTs inlO
a nOlher Asían \var. Frcnch forces in I nd ochina had
beell lIsing US M 29C \\'easels, kll ow n as crabes 10
lhe French, in the watery lerrain of lhe deltas.
Pcrhaps lhe besl known of th esc format ions \Vas lhe
ballalion raised b y lhe [" Régimenl Étrangere de
Cavalerie in 1948, Until 1950, lhe US ha d been
ullwilling 10 support lhe Frellch elforl in Ind oehin a
militarily, view ing it as an und esirable remn a nl of
a rc ha ic co lonia lism. Once th e Slalcs beca me
cnmcs hcd in the \Va l' in Korea, howcvcr, lhe
I ndochina fig hling \Vas sudd enl y viewed in a ne\V
lig hl : as anolher element in the containment of
Com munism , The US began suppl ying lhe Fre neh
",ilh equipmelll lhal had pre\'iously bee n denied,
illclllding LVT-4 a nd LVT (A )-4 a mphibi a ns, The
First of lhese arri ved in November 1950, and Wefe
used b y lhe Foreig n Legion eava lry lO form lhe ["
SOlls-grollpemenl amphibie, lhe firsl of a nllmber of
a mphibi o us assa ull groups, The LVTs provedl o be
id ca ll y SlIilcd lo the delta , providin g walerbor ne
transpon in dcep water, ane! acceptablc mobility on
the murky soil of rice-paelelies and riverbanks. In
195 1, whcn more ve hicles bccame avai lablc , the / '
REC formed two a mphibi ous groups, eom prised of
t\Vo Crab squadrons wit h 33 mae hine-gu n a rmeel
Crabs eaeh, three Alligator squadrons for troop
transport with 11 LVT-4S eaeh, a nd a suppon
plalOon , with six LVT (A)-4S. The Foreign Legion
cava lr y wcrc panicularly successful in thcir use or
these unique units, employing the m imaginat ive ly
in spitc of the poor lerrai n. To providc even morc
firepower, so me LVT-4S \Ve re modificel tO carry
40 111111 Bofors a nti-ai rcraft g uns for infa ntry
su pport. Most of the Freneh LVT-4S were a rmed
wit h shielded machin e guns, 01' recoilless rifles and
mortars. I
The end ofthe Ineloehina War did not signa l the
ene! of French amtrac opera lio ns. During the 195G
pla nning for the seizure of the Suez Ca na l, the
Anglo-Freneh plan ning com millee decided lO u'c
am tracs lO effect a la nding al Po n Faud. As Britain
no longer had any Lend -Lease amtraes avai lable.
the Fre neh Navy improvi seel a n a mphibious assa ult
The L VTE-7 was accepted for service, hut did not enler
production. The device on the rear of the vehicle is the rocket
launchcr assemhly which was used lo launch demolition line
charges for mincficld breaching. (FMC Corp. )
group from the former Amphibious Center a t
Ar.lew, thcn in lhc process ofbeing re-formed as lhe
Ylarine Brigaele. They were useel to la nd the ¡ " REP
ancl 3~' Marine Commando opposite the poliee anel
eoast-g uard stations at Pon Faud during the
la nelings. Both L VT-4 amtraes a nd LVT (A)-4
arn lanks wcrc employed.
The LVTP-5
\Vith lhe conclusio n of lhe war in KOI'ea, Marin e
amphibian tractor units wcre in poor condition
\Vilh a tota l of 539 LVTs of va rious models
returning from Korea in a partieu la rl y bad way.
They we re rebuilt ye t again at the M are l sla nel
Na"y Yard , but \Ve re fast app roaehing the end of
their usefullife. The LVTs that \Vere in betler sha pe
were dcl ivercd lO a llied marin e fOl'ces under lhe
MAP program me, nota bl y lO the Taiwanese ancl
Soulh KOI'can marines, lt was clca r that a !lC\\'
LVT wou ld be req uired.
35
 Al lhe oUlbrea k 01' lhe K orean ,,'ar, lhe Na,,)
Bureau ofS hips had dccided 10 prcss a head
new L \'T p rogramme based on lhe lec hno log)
dC\'c lopment effan s it had bren conduCling sinc('
19+6. In Dcce mhef 1950 it issucd a (OntraCL lO lhe
lnge rsoll Produ Cls Di vision 01' Borg-\\'ar ner Corp-
oration lO dC\Tlop a new fami l)' of amtracs. Th c
aim was 10 design a basic lroop carricr { L"TP- S .
a n arti ller)' firc suPPOrt ,'Chicle I L \ 'TH-6), a com-
manel ancl radio "e hicle ( LVTC R-I ), a n ai r
elerence "chicle L \'TAA-I I, a recowr) ,'Chicle
( LVTR-I ) a nel a combal enginecr/mineflelel
breaching "ehicle ( LVTE-I ), Whal was rema rk-
ablr about Ihe new amtrac \Vas il S sizc; il wc ig hcd
35 lons unloaeleel , anel ",as designed 10 carry 30- 3-1
comba l-a rmcd lroops ncarl y elouble lhe com-
plcrncnt of prc\'ious amtracs.
The firsl prolol ype, oran L\TH-6 gun carrier,
Tbe LVT-7A1 Dew prodUCtiOD vehicles are easily dislinguished
from the Lvr·7 series and the LVT-7At SLEP vehicles by the
square hous ings for the Cron1 headlights and tbe raised
cOIDDlander's cupola. This is an LVTC-7A1 , evident from lhe
extra radio antennae and the lack oC a machíne g UD
(FMC Corp. )
",as compleleel in AuguSl '951. Illleresl ingl)
Wilh a e nollg h, in 19) 1 F~ I C sllggesled lhe el e"e lopmenl 01'
a sma llrr am lrac fam il y, called lhc ~1edillm-wc i ghl
L"TP-X 2, The FMC enlry was esselllially a
na\'a lisrd \'crsion of lhc armourcd troop ca rricr il
\Vas drs ig ning for lhc ArmY I a nd w hic h wo úld
e"enlually emerge as lhe ~1 59 APC, The Arm)' was
insisling tha t a ll of ilS ncw lroop carricrs be
amp hibio us, a nel lhe ~r59 ",ascapable ofswimmi ng
across small ri vcrs or lakcs, Howcver, lhe Army
rcquirrmcnl for amphibiolls capa bilil y was far less
elcmaneling lha n lhe Kav y requiremcnl. The Nav)'
slanda rds for ami raes insisled lhal lhe)' be ab le 10
ncgo li ale hca"y sllrfand lo slI rvivc slIbmcrgc nce in
hea,')' sea conelilions: lhe) a lso ex peCled far highrr
water specds, a nd bcttcr manoclIvrabilily in \valer,
As a resu lt , lhe M 59 hael 10 be subsla ntia ll y rebllilt
to impro\'e ilS buoyancy a nd its wa ter propulsioll
c haracleristics.
Tri a ls oft hc Bo rg-\'\'arncr a mtracs wcrc SlI CCCSS-
fui , ami in ' 952 production began on lhe LVTP-5
troap carricr and lhe L VTH-6 g un carricr. 1n spiLc
01' lhe elecision 10 press a head Wilh production oflhe
turre!.
LVTP-5, lhe ~ I arines deciel ed 10 con linue de"clop-
ment orthe smaller (and cheapcr) F1vfC L VTP-X2 ,
feeling thal such a design might complement the
LVTP-5. As in the L VTP-5 family , a gun carrier
and air defence vcrsion wcrc dcvcloped , as well as a
troop carricr. 1n 1956 the FMC design was
accepted for Marine service as the L VTP-6, but b y
thi s time the production ofthe LVTP-5 \Vas almost
complele and so the L VTP-6 \Vas never placed inlo
production. A total 01' 1, 124 LVTP-5s and 210
LVTH-6s were built e1uring Ihe perioel up to 195 7.
Once procluclion \Vas complcted, howc ver, it was
dccided lO con ve n 58 01' the L VTP-5S into
commanel vehicles, e1esignated LVTP-5 (Cmel ).
Sma ll numbers al' lhe L VTE- 1 engineer vehicle and
65 LVTR-l rccovery ve hicles \Vere also buill; but
no LVTAA-l air defenee \Th icles \Vere buill apan
from lhe prolOl ype.
A number of suspcnsion ancl powcrtrain prob-
Iems plagueellhe early L VTP-51amily, anel dclayeel
their initial deploymelll ulllil 1956. Tho LVTP-5
series uscd lhe same transmission as lhe wI47 and
M48 tanks, ancl duc to lhe powenrain COI1-
r,guralion the final e1rives \Vere about 3ft bclow the
transmission output shafts, rcquiring a dropgcar
asscmbly lo couplc the final clri vcs ancl lran s-
missions. Thc clropgcars and carl y final drivcs werc
a frcq lIcnt source of Il1cchani cal failures. 1mprovc-
mcnts to lhe po\Vcrtrain ancl suspcnsioll , as well as
other modiflcations including th e additioll ora box
sllorke l and top dcck vC lltilators, so lvcd so mc of
thcsc problems, and the moclified vc hiclcs werc
designaleel L VTP-5A 1, L VTH-6A l , ele.
Marine amph ibi an trac tor ba ttalion s of Ihis
pe riod hael a tOlal 01' l20 LVTs each. The lwo
trac tor com panics had four plalOon s eac h w ith II
LVTP-SA LS. The ballalion HQ had lhree LVTP-
5A 1 (Cmel ) command ve hicles; one LVTR- 1A 1
recovcr)' "e hicle; a mine c1earance platoon with
eighl LVTE- J 'Patato Diggers'; a ma illlcnancc
plaloon with one LVTR- J Al; ancl an amphibian
platoon with lhree LVTP-5A l (Cmd ) anel 12
LVTP-5A1 lroop carriers. In lhe 19505 and '60S,
thesc battalions \Vc rc organic LO lhe Marine
di visions.
The LVTR-7AI is the reeovery version of the LVT-7 series. The
hydraulie erane has a 3-ton eapacity, and the vehicle is also
fitted with a reeovery wineh of Is-ton eapacity. (FMC Corp. )
37
Vietnant
During lhe Vielnam vVar, lhe 1Sl a nd 3rcl
Amphibian Tractor Baual ions \Vere deployed with
lhe rvlarines' 3rd a nd ISl Di"isions. The nalUre of
lhe fighting in Vietnam was ill-su itcd to lraditiona l
amtrac opera lions, and clue to ¡he lack uf contcsted
beach assa ulls lhe LVTP-5A1s were useel, as oflen
as nOl, as lig htl y ar mou rcd troop carriers. Howc\'cr,
the amlracs \Vcrc ve r y large and bulk y and we re
harell y as suilable for lhis role as lhe smaller Army
¡,r 113_ E,-e n lhough lhey were consielera bl y more
durable lhan arnlracs oflhe Second \VOl-Id W ar, liw
LVTP-5s werc nol intend eel for pro longed opcr-
ation on la nd ; lhe torsil astic sllspensions slIffered
from exccssi"c use for whic h lhey were not d csigned.
The powenrain , using a ta nk e ngine and lrans-
mission rather lha n a powenra in expressly designed
for amt racs, \Vas n01 id eal, a nd \Vas difliclllt 10
scrvlce; a \Vorn-OUl engine or lransmission took
nearl y a da y lO replace, The sing le grea tesl
wea kness in lhr LVTP-5 design was the con -
These L VTP-,s were used during the trials oC the new CadiUac
Gage turret which will be relrofiued 10 the AAV-,AIs
beginning in 1987. The new turret has both a '5"cal. J11achine
gun and a 40J11J11 Mk 19 autoDlatic grenade launcher. (Cadillac
Gag.)
figuralion oClhe fu el ce lls in lhe fl oor. In Vielnam
la nd mines \\"ere lhe primary d anger to a rmou red
\'e hicles, a nd a mine detonation und er a n LV'TP-5
often set ofr lhe pelrol tanks, causing a (ler)'
holocaust in Ihe crcw com pa rtmen l. After a re\\'
le lha l experi cnces with lhis da nger, ~larine units
q uick ly bccamc accuslo med lO riding on the oUlsid e
of the a mtracs, f(:el ing tha t cx posure to small a rms
fire \Vas a lesscr risk lh a n the danger poseel by mines.
As a resu lt of lhese prob lems lhe use of a mi raes
was )"estrietcd, a nd cflon s wc rc maele 10 tailor their
usc lO lhc lcrrain -sllch as p atroll ing a long
ri\'crba nks 01' coastline, or ",ilh Spccia l La nding
T earns rol' eoastal opera tions. They "'ere a lso used
in non-co mba tan t r6les, sllch as fc rr ying supplics
from rca r arcas, ",here lheir spaciolls holds pro\-ccl
usefu!. Besides lhe basic Lroop ca rrier, lhe othe !'
,·arianls or lhe L VTP-5 series a lso saw employmenl
in Vielnam. Thc LVTH-6A 1 \Vas il1lended fo r use
as an indircct arlillery tlrc support vchicle, bU l in
Vietn am over half of ilS missions werc in lhe la nk
role of direcl fire supporl for Marine unils.
The LVTP-7
The problems with lhe LVTP- 5 in Vielnam,
admilledl y eaused in large measure by ilS
employmenl in roles ror whieh il had nol been
designed , led la eonsidera tion or a replaeemen!.
1nitial design work ror an LVTP-5 replaec menl had
begun in 1964, sinee lhe origina l design speeifl-
eations ror the LVTP-5 had required a 15-year li re
expeclancy, and lhe ve hicles had alread y been in
sen ·iee sinee 1955- 56. Tnitia l design sludies \Vere
eompleled by C hrysler a nd F~I C, and in 1965
FMC won lhe deve lopmcnl contrac1. T he new
vehi cle, inili a ll y designaled L VTPX -1 2, reverted
bac k lO the earlier Seeond World War LVT design
in terms 01" size. Use or the LVTP-5A 1 in Vi etna m
made it clear lhal sueh a la rge vchicle was hardl y
idea l for land operalioll ; and lhe c rcw complemc lll
One ofthe tnore unusual derivatives oflhe LVT·7 series w as
lhe MTU (Mobile Tesl Uolt ), a us Ar tny tes t·bed lo consider
the feasibility of a tnediutn energy laser for air defence. The
circular turret contaros the laser beatn projector and optical
tracking equiptnenl, and the large container on the rear
contaros the ge neralor neooed to supply the prodigious energy
requireDJ.ents of the la s e r. (US DoD )
39
 The LVTEX-3 was one ofa number ofauempts lO explore fire
support versions of the LVT-,. The Marines had initially
planned to acquire the LVTH-,5 10,5mm gun carrier in 1972, bul
this neverprogressed beyond lhe drawing board, The L VTEX-
3 mated an experÍJnental Navy 10,5DlDl low-recoil gun in a
surplus Army M,5,51 Sheridan tank turret. It was not accepled
for service use. (US Navy )
was redllced from 30 lO 25 troops and a three-man
crew), or a fi\'c-ton payload capacity, on lhe ne\\'
\'ehicle. Grealer emphasis \las also placed on lancl
performance , in some measure owing to lhe lcsson of
Vietnam.
F~lC selcCled a con\'entional lorsion bar
suspension in lieu of the lorsilastic suspension lha1
had been cmploycd on amlracs since lhe LV'l '-2 of
194 J. The engine was a well-proven Delroil Diese l
lrllck diese! enginc, matcd to a nc'" transmission.
Propulsion in wa ter ",as pro\'iclecl by a combinalion
oflhe normal trac k propul!-.ion couplcd ",ilh a nc\\'
hydrojel s)'slem. This ofTerecl consiclerab l)' im-
provecl manoeuvrability compared lO the slllggish
beha\'iour of prcvious arnlracs. The ne\,' \'chicle
\\as l5 lOns lighler lhan lhe L \ 'T P-5. De"e1opmelll
100k 17 1110nths, and 1hc firsl \'c hicle was reacly in
Seplember 1967. A lOla l or 15 prolol ypes \Vere
conslruclecl, and lcsling continuecl throughout
1969. The LVTPX-12 nll"l or surpassed a ll or ilS
requirc1l1ents except for lhe turrel \\'capon sla lioll:
the initial l'cquiremenl cal!cd fol' a 20m m cannon
armamCllt, but problems w ith lhis wcapon Iecl LO a
reclesign oflhe turrel ",ilh a ,50-cal. hca\'y machine
gun in ilS place, The ne\\ \'ehieles \\'ere firsl funded
in lhe FY 70 Fisca l Year 19i'" derencc budgel. The
1"
•
l1e\\' series was designalccI LVT- 7, \vith lhe
slandard lroop carricr being designaled LVTP-7.
Thc 2nd Amphibious TraelOr Ballalion al Camp
L{~cune, Nonh Carol ina recci"ed two prolot ypcs
f()I' fami li arisa tion in 1971 , and initial deli"cries 01'
procluclion "chicles began in J anuar)' 1972.
As ",ilh lhe rad ier LVTP-5 series, there were
plans lO c1C\'e1op a ramily of relaled suppon l)'pes
based on lhe L \'TP-7. These includecl lhe L"TC-7
command \'chicle, LVTR- 7 recovery vehicle,
1.\'TE-7 minefieid breaching ve hicle, and
L \TH-5 gun carrier. The firsl lhree reached
prOlOl)'pe rorm , and lhe L \'TP- 7 and LVTC-7
enlerecl prOduclion in thcearly 1970s, The howilzer
"ch icle, LVTHX-5, \Vas ne\'er complc led. By lhe
1970S lhe ~larines had concludcd lhal ilS fire
suppon rólc cou ld be rulfillcd beller by ~16oA I
lanks in lhe direel fire róle, ancl ~1109 selr-propellcd
155mm ho\Vilzers in lhe aniller)' hrc suppon róle. A
lOlal of 942 LVTP- 7s, 55 LVTR- 7s and 84 LVTC-
7s ",ere built in the initial orclers for lhe ~I arinc
Corps belween 1970 and 1974. The eurrenl Assa uh
Amphibian Battalions are a good clcal largcr than
any previous organisa li o n, hav ing an HQ and
Sen'ice Compan)' ancl faur Assault Amphibian
Companies, lOlalling 18i LVTP-7S, 15 LVTC-7s
and fi"e L "TR-7S.
The L\'T- 7 [amil)' prO\'ed more durable and
cflcclive in service lhan lhe LVTP-5 series. The)'
\\'ere cheaper to opcrate, had much bcltcr land and
water performance, and could be dri\'en comfon-
ab l) and ror prolonged period s on land wilhoul lhe
advcrse conscqucnccs th a l had aITIi cled Ihe
LVTP-5's torsilaslic suspCllsion. In ract , lhe LVTP-
7's suspension formed the basis for lhe suspension on
lhe new l\-12 Bradley Inranlry Fighling Ve hicle'
which cnlcrcd scrvice Wilh lhe Army in lhe ea rl y
'980s. The LVT-7 series was used operaliona ll y b y
US Marine rorees during peacckeeping opcrations
in Lebanon , a nd in lhe in vasion ofGrenada in J 983.
Based on previous ex peri cnce wilh amlracs, lhe
Marine Corps l'xpeeted the L VT-7 series lO last
aboul len yca r:-. ulIlillhe mid-I g8os, and thcreforc
began devclopmen l or a successor in lhe miel- '970s.
Thc Marine Corps considered a number or oplions,
including unconvemional approaches such as lhe
L VA armoured air cushion assaull vc hi cle, and lhe
more eon ventional LVT (X ) lrae keel assa ult
"c hicle. Thc L VA programme cnvisioncd a n un-
onhodox sllspcnsion lhal wo uld use an air cushion
syslcm for notalion and propulsion on waler, and
a lrack systc ll1 on land. H owcvcr, lhe prog ra mmc
was dropped in '979, berore a prololype was
ISt·¡- O ~prt'y \ "al1gl1ard 13, Thl .\12 JJratl{I)'
The LV A was an advanced allltrac prograrnrne aillled at
developing an assault alllphibian which would use air cushion
propulsion at sea, and tracked propulsion on land. This
ilIustration shows the BeU Aerospace cODcepl of the LV A,
s howing the air cushion configuration in the background and
the retracted air c u s hion¡tracked land configuration in tbe
foreground. The progralllIlle proIllised to be costly and
technologically risky, and consequently was abandoncd in
1979 before prototypes were cOnlpleted. (Bell Aerospace)
construc led, in favOllr of pllrslling lhe less cosll y and
risky I. VT (X ). Three eompa nies-Gencral D y-
na mies, FMC anel BcJl Aerospaec reeei vcd con-
traelS to d evelop the improved L "T (X ).
Into the 199"5: the LVT(X) Deci5ion
The LVT (X ) programme cn visioned an amtrac
beller suited to land combat lhan the LVT-7. lt
wou ld be bellcr armoured , a nd beltcr armed , wiLh
an alllOmatic ca nnon in lhe 25- 35mm ra nge. In
man y respects the LVT (X ) was planned as a
Marine equi va lent orthe Arm y's new M 2 Braelley
Inrantry Fighling Vehicle (IFV ). Like the Bradley,
lhe troops in lhe L VT(X ) could fight rro m inside
the vehicle, or dismount. '1'0 permit the lroops 10
¡'ifallt~" Figll/m,l: rl hiell . fighl rrom with in lhe vehicle Icd to so me interesting

The General Dynamics LVT(X ) proposal is seen here in model
fonn. It was armed with a 35mm gun, and had two remote
control machine gun turrets at the rear hull corners. (Author )
clesign innOva lio ns; Bracl lcy-s lYJc firing ports
complicalCd lhe design of a waler-lighl hull , so
some of lhe cl esig ns rcli ed o n two re mote contro l
mac hine gun turrels a l lhe rear of lhe vehicle to
permit the squad lO engage enemy posi tions. The
Marine Corps consid cred lwO differenl LVT (X )
config uratio ns: a sma l! 13-trooP version, the
LVTX-1 3, and a vehicle more simila r in size lO the
LVTP- 7, called the LVT X-2 J.
The LVT (X ) promised lO be a fa irl y expensive
ve hicle lO develop and prod uce, and ma ny M arine
taClicians hacl g rave misgivings a bo ul lhe vehicle's
va lue. It is diflicull lo ba lance lhe eonflieting
engineering demands for good a mph ibi ous capa-
bilily on the one ha nd , Wilh good land performa nce
on the olher. T he LVT(X ) ",ould never be as good
an infanl ry fig hling ve hicle as an IFV designed
primaril y fo r lancl o pera ti on. Features necessary for
a mphibio us performa nce, such as the size requ ire-
men lS for buoyaney a nd lhe ",eig hl conslra ints for
fl o lalion , confli cled wi th feal ures for land combal
such as a smaJler size a nd heavier a rmo ur. Some
~'Iarin es queslio ned whet her an a mlrac was needed
any longer. 11 was no longer clear whelher lhe
Paeifie isla nd fíg hlingoflhe Seeond World Wa r was
al a ll relevanl lo lhe roles whieh lhe Ma rine Corps
wo uld faee in lhe 1990s. The L VTP- 7 was a
perfeelly adeq uate vehicle for sueh eonlested
la ndings, a nd lhere were o ther mca ns ava ila ble for
seizing a beaeh lha l \Vere nOl avai lab le in 1945.
Rather tha n direetl y assa ul l a heavil y defend ed
beaeh, lhe Ma rines 01" 1985 eould skin lhe defenees
by using heliborne assau ll. If beaches eould be
seizecl wilho Ul a d irect assa ult using such laclics.
olher types of erafl \Ve re fa r beller sui led for landing
lroops a nd supplies lha n lhe a mlraes. For exa mple,
the Ma rines were acq uiring LCAC air cllshion
la nding eraft which could rapidl y ferry men, tanks
and supplies as ha re.
The conlingency w hich most concernecl .M arine
pla nners in lhe earl y 1980s \Vas lhe possibi lily ofa
ca mpaig n in lhe Middle Eas t, such as a wa r in lran.
In this circ umslance, a mtracs were irrele va nt or ill-
suited; landing againsl a conlested beach was
unlikely, a nd lhe LVTP- 7 or LVT (X ) ",ere nOI
idea lly suiled lo eond ueling long meehanised
operations in a desert enviro nment. The M arine
Corps had fa llen behi nd lhe US Arm y in
mecha nising ilS fo rees for prolo nged la nd oper-
atio ns, since its tradi tio na l missio n facused on
beaeh-head assaull. The Army had gone lhrough
lhree genera li o ns o f anno urecl inra ntry carri ers
since 194 1, while lhe M arines hacl never been
eq uipped Wilh any. The lhought of fig hting a
Middle Easl eampaign as ' icg in fa mry' eoneerned
Ma rine pl anners; a better Soluli on presenlccI itselfin
lhe form o f mi xecl mecha nisa tion o f lhe Ñlar ine
d ivisions.
As lhe LVT- 7 had proven so d urable, il was in a
pasition LO be rebuilt in a Service Lifc EX lcnsion
Progra mme (SLEP) to fUrl her eXlcnd il S uscfulness
into lhe 1990s. This allo \ved lhe M arines lO rC lain a
capa bilil y lO assa ull a contcs led beach T arawa-
fashio n. Thc money savecl would be used lo
purchase armo ured in rantry tra nsporlcrs ro r pro-
lo nged la nd eampaigns. The Ma rines deeided lo
adopl a whee led in fa nlry fig hling ve hide, lhe LA V,
lO fulfil lhis la ller role. As a resull of lhis
re-ori enlation in lhe config ura lion or lhe ~ Iari n c
Corps, lhe LVT (X ) program me \Vas shcl ved in
Ma rch 1985 before a ny prolOlypes had been
eompleted .
The M arine Corps delermincd tha l lhe cxisting
invenlOry of LVT- 7s would be inadequa le lO lasl
¡nto the 1990S c1ue to a ttri tio n a nd reorga ni salion.
As a resull, an improved version of lhe LVT- 7
designaled lhe LVT- 7A 1 se ries \Vas developed,
incorporating a numbcr of clesig n improvc ments.
The SLEP progra mme rebui lt lhe old vehicles lo
lhe new LVT- 7A 1 sland ards. A tola l of 853
LVTP- 7s, 77 LVTC- 7s a nd 54 LVTR- 7s were
reb uilt; a nd 294 LVTP- 7A1S, 29 LVTC-7A ls and
len LVTR- 7A 1s were newly manufac lU red in lhe
years 1983- 85.
 Due lo the decision to relain the LVT-7A I This is a model of the FMC Future Arnphibian Vehicle
Concept. The FAVC project is airned at exarnining technol-
amtracs into the '99°5 a number oC improve ment ogies to irnprove the arnphibious qualities of arntracs,
prograrnmes we re a lso initi a tcd. The Marines were including such techniques as retracting strearnlined bow
panels, side skirts to channel and strearnline the tracked
ne ve r happy with lhe a rmament on lhe LVTP- 7, suspension, and lengthening the hull with retractable hydrojet
tubes. (Joseph Bennudez Jr. )
and in 1984 conducted a numbcr of tria ls of new
weapons lurrels. In Ig86 the Marines selected a be rcplaced some time in the 1990s. As a result, in
Cadi llac-Gage lurret a rmed wi th both a .50-eal. I g85 lhe Marine Corps bega n lhe FA VC (Fu lure
heavy machine gun a nd a Mk. I9 40m m gren adc Amphibious Vehicles Concepts) program me. The
taunchcr. The flrst 100 conversions will be fundcd in programme is being eonducled by lhe USMC and
Fiscal Year Ig8 7. An LVT-7 hull was ex perimen- FMC, and is a lwo-p ronged drort aimed a t
lally recon hgured as an L VTEX- 3 hre support examining both new am phibious ve hicle technol-
ve hicle by add ing a surplus Arm y M55 I Sheridan ogies w hich could be applied to a modernised AA V-
tan k turrct with a new low-rccoi l I 05mm gun ; 7A 1, as well as new vc hicle desig ns.
howe vc r, there a re no plans LO procccd with
conversion ar prod uction ofthis version. In spite of F oreign AJIltracs
lhe canccllalion of the LVTE-7 engineer ve hicle, BOlh the LVTP-5 ancl LVT- 7 se n es have been
there is still a need for a mine-clearing a mtrac to cxported in modcst numbers, as can be seen on the
supporl landing operations. This rcquirement is accom panyi ng chart. The Argcn tine Marine 1Sl
being partiall y salisfied by lhe use of the MCSK Amphibious Vehicle Battalion was used in lhe
(Mine Clearanee Syslem KilS) whic h can be hlled initi a l seiz ure oflhe Falklands in Apri l Ig82 , losing
lO LVTP- 7A Is. This system uses a small rockel to o ne LVTP-7 in lhe proeess lo a nti-ta nk rockets. 1
propel a line charge onto a minefield where il is The Philippines ha ve used their LVTH-6 and
ex ploded lo create a breach. A more elaborale a nd LVTP-5 in amphibious a nli-g uerrill a operations:
e!fecti ve sys lem , ca lled CATFAE, lo be filled to Th c lta li a n San Marco Marine Batta li on was used as
specia l mine-field breac hing ve hicles, is a lso under part oflTALCON forees during lhe I g83 Lebanon
development, using a fuel-air cxplosive rocket. peacekeeping e!forls, along with some of their
There a re a lso plans lO relro fil lhe LVT- 7A I with LVTP-7s.
P-goo appliqué armou r in lhe lale 1980s.
L VT Production 1941- 45

AAV-7A1 and FAVC Type 194 1 194 2 1943 '944 1945 Total

Due to lhe reconfiguration of the Marine Corps L\'T-I i' BS I 3°:.! 1,2:.!5
L\ ·T(A )-, 3 ,88 '19 5 10
with ilS new LA V a nd LVT units, lhe USMC ha ve [,\ 'T-:.! 1,422 2,962
1,54°
decided to change the na mc of lhe a mlracs lhe L\'T (A)-2 ' 00 25° 45°
I.\'T-3 733 2,23° 2,96 4
beller lO refleel lheir intended ro le. Beginning in I.VT-'I 11 4,g80 3,360 8,35 1
Ig85, the LVT-7A I famil y was renamed AA V-7A I LVT (A)-4 1,4 8 9 4°1 1,8go
I.. VT (I\)-5 ,69 ,69
(Amphibious Assault Vehicle ), ending a 45-year
T otals: i2 HS4 2,342 9,°93 6,260 18,621
lradition. As durable ancl long-li ved as lhe AA V-
7AIs have proved to be, the y wi ll probably ha ve to ISee \ 'anguard 38, M echunised b¡janll)'.

43
 r
An LVT(A 4 ofthe Marine 3rd Annored Anlpbibian Battalion knocked it out by ranuning it. This is the origina l ver s ion o f
encountered a hidden Japanese gun position on the b ea ch
during the landing at Peleliu on IS September 1944, a nd
r
the LVT(A 4 with the .so-cal. machine gun in a ring m ount.
(USMC)

L VT Production by service in World War :z LVTP-S and LVT-, Export

Type USMC US Army Lend-Lease Total Country LVT-S series LVTP-7 LVTC-7 LVTR-7
L VT -I 510 485 200 1,225 Argentina '9
L VT (A )- I ,82 328 ° 5'° I3razil ,6
LVT-2 1,355 1,5°7 '00 2,g62 ltaly 24
L\'T (A)-2 ° 45° o 45° Korea 53 5 3
1.\'T-3 2,962 2 ° 2,g64 J>hilippines ,7
L VT -4 1,7 6 5 6,083 5°3 8,35 1 Spai n ,6 2
LVT (Ah 533 1,30 7 5° 1,8go T aiwa n 7 17
LVT (A -5 ,,8 '4' ° 26g T haila nd 22
Venezuela 9
T ota ls: 7.4 6 5 10,3°3 853 18,621

44
•

The Plates
The camoufiage painling of US amp hibi ous
IracLOrs during Ihe Second \Vorld \Var remains
largely unknown. The a Ulhor has been un~bl r 10
find painting instructions for am lracs in lhe recarels
oflhe US r.larine Corps, lhe US i'lalional Archives,
or Ihe FM C Corp . archi ves. Fro m exisling colou r
photos and film , and wriucn accounts, il is evidcll t
lhat lhe arnlracs werc origina ll )' finishcd in a bluc-
grey colou r , w hich lhe a Ulhor bclicves \Vas
proba bl y US Navy Ocean G rey. The use of Ihis
colour slem med from Ihe facI lhal L VTs were
inilia ll y funeled from Ihe US Navy's cra fl budge!.
During 1944 , lh erc \Vas consid erable crilic ism fro m
Army unils tha t lhe g rey \Vas unsuilable for use once
Ihe L VT len
lhe wa ler. As a result, Ihe US Arm )'
began LO painl ilS LVTs in Olive Drab a rounel Ihe
autumn of 1944- It is not clcar whclhcr this was
done allhe faclory or b), Arm y depots. M arine unils
during lhis period see m LO have reson ed LO Iheir
Qwn rncasu res, aclopting locall y improviscd
camoufiage. Unfonunalcly, lhe ballalion recorels
do 11 0t rncnlion these activi tics. Following the wa r
Ihe M arine Corps followeel lhe Army's lead, and
painted ilS aml racs in uniform Fo resl Grecn ulllil
lhe mid-l g70s, whcn il ad op led lhe US Arm y's
four-colour ;\lERO C camou fi age pa in!.
Al: LVT-I , F¡\/FAlIallúc; OIJera/ion ' Torcll', Fedl"a,
Morocco, 4 December 1942
The vehicle is fini sheel in O\'erall Ocean Grey, ami is
prominently marked wilh a large US Aag. This
marking was carried o n most lracked vc hieles
panicipating in lhe landings, and was adoPled in
Ihe vai n hope Ihal lhe Fre nch wou ld nOI tire on
American lroops,
A2: LVT-I , US A,l arille 21ld Amphibiall Trac/or
Baltalioll; Tarawa, 20 November 1943
This LVT-I carri es a while laclica l numbc r
ma rking, as we ll as lhc unofTicial name ' M y De
Lo ris' o n th e supcrslruc lUre sid e.
B/: LJT-4, B,i/ü/¡ II//¡ Ro)'al Tallk Regimenl; E/be
River, Germally, 29 Apri/ '9J5
This L VT-4, rnanneel b), II R TR, \Vas present on
Ihe Elbe Ri"er in Ihe final days of Ihe war. It was
finishcd in o"erall BS l 987e Olive Drab, a g reener
co lo ur Ihan lhe simila rl y named US Arm y Olive
Drab, The ye llo \\/ cirele insigni a is indica ti vc o r 'c'
Squadron, and lhc remaining markings are in
w hile. Ol her cxamples or "chicle names in lhe lroop
are 'Soulhpon' and 'SlafTord '.
132: LJT( A)-I, 708//¡ Amphibiall Tallk Balla/ioll, US
Amry; Sai/Jall, '5 JUl1e J944
This Arrn)' LVT (A)-I \Vas knocked oul during Ihe
in ilia l beaeh figllling al Saipan. II is in overa ll
Oeean G rey. The l\VO yellow slripes on lhe hull siele
inclicale lh a l il \Vas used a l Beach Vellow Two. II is
frolll C Compa ny, as is evidenl bOlh from Ihe
"c hicle na me ('Crazy Legs' ) a nd Ihe bumpe r code
onlhe fronl ('C-20' ). Inlhe Pae ific, Illany US Army
baLlalions used a baualion insignia in ¡icu or lhe
bumper codeo The ballation insignia of Ihe 7081h
Amphibian 'T a nk BaLla lio n was a w hile or ye llo"...
lriang le Wilh a Slar in lhe centre. The 708lh
Alllphibian Tank Ballalion also ca rried a geomelric
insig nia on lhe turrel rea r, w hich ma y have been a
'wave' marking ralher Ihan an individual vehicle
marking. In lhis case, it was a ye llow '2' insid e a
ye ll ow square on lhe lUlTel real'. 1l a lso carríes
prominenl US na lio nal insignia, a w hüe slar, on lhe
lurrel siel e and hull side.
e,: I.I'T(A) -4, US Marine 2nd Arnzored Amphibiall
Baila/ion; Tinian, August '944
The Marines ap pear LO have solved Ihe camou fl age
problcm in lheir a mlrac unils by simply aelopting
local, expedicnt camouflage Wilh whalcvcr pailll
was ava ilable. This LVT (A)-4 on Tinian is fairl),
lypica l a nd is finished in whal appears LO be a sa nd-
coloureel paint Q\'er lhe base O cean Grey. The
vchicle markings a re in whilC, consisling or th e
vc hicle numbers ('A2' ), a nd lhe unil insign ia, a
wingcd w hite star.
C2: LVT-2, US M arine 4/h AmPhibian Traclol
Bal/aliOIl; /wo Jima, /9J5
The 41h Nlarine Di visio n ap pears la have uscd a
more c laborate and colo urru l ca mouAagc lha n in
man )' olher unil s. From colour film of lhe ba llle for
Iwo Jima il would seem lhal lhe 41h M arine
Di vision 's a rmo urcd ve hicles were finished in a
pallero of sand , reel-brown ami dark green. Thc
Ilumbcring is in yellow. Thc initial ' 11 ' is nOl a
number, bUl ralher two yc llo'" slripes, indicating
45
that this a mtrac was earmarked for Vellow Beach
Two during lhe allack. The ' B42' is probably a
eompan y and ve hicle number, a llhough lhis slyle 01"
Ilumbering was also occasionally used for 'wave'
ma rkings, indica ting which initial wave lhe amlrac
wo uld be placed in , a ncl whal its posi tion in the
wave would be. The number eould indicate 4lh
wave, 2nd ve hicle.
DI.· L VT-3, US M arine 1st Amphibious Tractor
Battation; Hungnam Ha rbour, Korea, December 1.950
Following the war, l\1arin c a mtracs wc re fini shccl in
overa ll Forest Green , a clark green colour oflen
ealled ' Marine Green '. The Second World War
praclice of beaeh landing markings is slill evid cnl
on t his ve hicle, in the form of two red st ripcs,
indicaling R ed Beach Two. The unil mark ings are
in Chrome Vellow ancl the nationa l insignia is in
white.
D2: L VT( A) -4, Freneh Amphibious Assault Group; Porl
Fuad, Egypt, 6 November 1956
These vc hicles \vere glvcn a hasty coat of sancl-
ye llow paint before d ebarking. Tnadequale supplies
Marines ofthe 5th RegÍlnent, riding LVT-3 allltracs ofthe 1st
AIIlphibian Tractor Battalion, pass through a North Korean
village after the crossing of the Han River on 20 Septelllber
1950. The UIlIIlodified LVT-3 Bushlllaster and the Ílnproved
LVT-3C allltrac were both used in Korea. (US ArIllY )
16
we re founcl , so man y oft he amlracs recei\'ed a more
blolehy camouAage coat than thi s vchicle. Thc
while ' H ' was a n identity marking ado pted for lhe
operation, basecl on the initial name of Operation
' H a milcar'. The blaek bancl a round the turrel was
a lso aclopted as an iclcntity marking for tanks a nd
other armourcc\ vc hieles to help distingui sh alliecl
Frcneh a nd British ar mou rccl ve hi cles from
EgYPlia n a rmoured ve hicles.
El.· LVT( A) -4. 1" Groupement Aulol/ome, 1" REC;
Annam, l ndochina, 1.952
French a rmour in lhc lndoehin a war was si mpl y
fini shec\ , in thi s case in overall olive drab with lhe
regimental crest pain tcd 011 the turret side, a ncl a
ve hiclc numbcr on lhc hull superslructurc fro nt.
E2: LVTE-I, 3rd Am/J/¡ihiolls Tractor BatlaliOIl, 1St US
Marine Division; " '11111011, ts/57
M ari ne armour in , 'il't llam was markcd in the
usua l pcacetimc fashion: ovcrall Forcsl Creen with
C hrome Vellow markings. In this case, some more
persona liscd insigni a have been added, including
lhe ca rd sym bo l and lhe cyes on lhe 'dozer blade.
FI: LVTH-6, Taiwanese ¡\1arine D ivisiofl)' Taiwan,
IgB3
'fhe mark ings on this Taiwanese amlrae show
r
American innucnces, bOl h in thcstyleof the ~1arjne
insignia, and in Lhe peacc lime US practicc of
painLing grease nipples in red lO ma ke lhem easier
LO find for servicing.
1'2: LVTP-7, ROK 1St Ma rine Division; RepubLic of
Koreo, Ufi4
The ROK ISl Marine Di vision has sorne of lhe mOSl
ga rishl y-decora led of a ll amIraes. The four-colour
ca mouOage pattern , adopled from lhe US syslem.
seems ralher poinLless in lhe faee of lhe o lher
markings. The di visional insignia 011 Lhe Il ose
consisls of a stylised mal' of K orea Wilh lhe
divisiona l numbcr supcrimposcd in red .
GI: L J' TP-7. Trons/Jorl COmpOle)" BOlloglione ,\Jarina
'San ,l/arco; Ita!)'. IgB4
BOlh the Army and Navy operate the LVT- 7 in
Ilal y. This ve hicle from lhe San Marco Marine
Baualio n ca rries lhe baualion insignia- a San
Marco li on on a red ba c kgroll nd~as we ll as Ihe
Navy's a nc hor symbo l, ancl lhe Tta li a n naliona l
colours on the hull front.
G2: LJ 'TP-7 , Argentine Isl Amphibious Vehiele
Bal/olion: Falklonds, April IgB2
The LVTP- 7s of lhis unil spearheaded the
Arge nlini a n a ltaek on lhe Fa lkla nd [sla nds in 1982.
The "chicles we re finished in o\'Crall Foresl Green
Tbe LVTP-!)AI was lhe standard troop carrying versioD ofthe
L VT-S series. The vulnerability orthe LVTP-sAt lO land nllnes
due lo the localion orilS petrol tanks led most Ma rine infantry
10 ride outside the vehicle during fi ghting in VietnaDl. This
LVTP-sA1 carries Marines oC the 4th Regiment during the
fighting around Cua Viet and Dong Ha on 30 May 1968. (USMC)
w ith the vc hiclc numbcr in yc llow, lhc M arine
a ncho r insig nia in w hite, a nd the natio nal fl ag
carried above ilo
! {¡ : LVTP-7, US Alarine 2nd Amp/¡ibious Assau!1
Campany; Crenada, 26 Oc/ober IgB3
~I a rine am lraes lIsed in the Gre nada fighting we re
plainl y ma rked. The camo llOage is a direel
ad op tioll oflh e US Army MERD C seheme, in this
case with Ficld Drab a nd Fo rest Green as lhe
primary colo urs, a nd Sand and Black as lhc
subsicliary colours. The onl y insignia a re lhe blac k
\'chicle markings.
1-12: LVTP-7, US Marine 6t/¡ Amphibiolls Brigade:
I/a /y, IgB5
This [ari ne a mlrae la king part in NATO exerciscs
in Ila ly is fini shed mueh the sa me as the ve hicle
a bove, bUl has had the brighler Eanh Yello,,"
sllbstiluted as a subsidiary eoJoll r instead of lhe
pa ler Sancl . The blaek ' Pac k Ra l' carloo n is
d efinilely ullof'ficia l, and this slyle of ma rking is very
uneommon in the M a rine Corps lod ay.
47
Notes sur les planches en couleur
I..A'~ eombinaisons de peinture régleml~lltain's pelldalll la 21l{le Cuerre r-.lolldiak
lIe sont paseonnucs, Les fi lms elles réeils suggcrent initialemenl que ron a ulilisé
le 1'S_\'my OUOIi r;r'Y (gris océan de la maríne nationaledes Etars-Cnis ); les uní tés
de rAnnée des EtatS'Lllis eommend:reJlt a pcindre leurs \'éhieules en Ohw Dmb
(grí,~ olivatre) en automne 19,}4, tandís (¡u(' les unílés de la f'S ,\lorilif (\Iorinf
liollQ/wlt deJ ElalJ-Unü) ímpro\'ís.ercJI! avee des modCles de eamouflage varih,
Aprcs la guerre, les \'éhí('ules de la .<I/arine OlH (.'lé pónls, ('omme ('('ux dI' r f ',~
Ar"!l', en Guro /'ortJl (verl foret ) ju,;qu'au milieu des années r970, 10rS<jue le
('amouflag(' ,\tERJ)C a quatre (Ou!curs de rusArmy a été adopté,
Al Peinture (Juan (;rty, av('e large drapeau amérieain transporté par la plupart
des véhicules a clKllilles dalls eelle opéralion, dans le vain espoir que les troupes
fram;;ai>r:-s 11(' lireraiclll pas sur eux. A2 Xuméro hlanc individue! rle ee véhielllc
d'unitl>, 1'1 110m ,~oml' par r¿'quipage: 'My Dt ÚJri/ B l La I:>t:inlure Oli!~ Drab de
I'"rm(-f' hritannique ':'l:lil plus v('f1e que la eoulcur équil'aknle df' l'armée
,m,áieaiflt', Le eerckjaulle ide!ltifie lT,scadron 'C', et le num du véhieulc est en
htanc B2 r-.lis hor.; de serviCl' pendant le dHJarqueml:nt inilial, ee L J'T( A)-I ,'SI
p,:iIl1en OU(lII Grt:J" Lcsraiesjaunes mOlltrenl qu'il a déharqué á ' Beaeh Vello" 2':
k ('()(Ic 'C- 'w ' et la leltre initialr: du nom '(;111':;) I,rgs', identifi('nt la compagni(' 'C'
du balailloTl, Cette unité utilisail UII tri<lngle blanc ou jaune avee une étoile au
centre comme insigne de hataillon. l.e "2·{lans·un-carré' jaune a l'arril-re (k L.
tourelle pourrait avoir indiqué la 'o,'uxiémt' lague dl~, forel"~ {k déharqllt'mellt',
el 'Camouflage upportlln' local, utilisallt une enu!cllr sable sur du gris, L,'
numéro du \'éhicule 'A-2' el l'insigne de bataillon a boile empcnn('e sont en
blane, e2 I-A-S véhieules de la 4cme Division de la r-.larine étaiellt peims awe un
eamouflage de sablr:, brun.rouge el I'ert. Lcs dcux raies jallnes indíqll,'nt "
nouveau 'lkaeh Vcllow 2'; ' B.p' est (ertainemelll un eode d,
eompagnie/véhicule, DI Des raics indiquanl un débarquemenl sur la plage 'Rnl
Ikach ,,' SOIl1 appliquécs sur la couleur d'ensembk ForeJ! Creen de méme que le,
insignes jaune de l'lInilé el blalle national. D2 U'lIe surehouehe de peinture
appliquée a la hate avec une coulcur sable donnait souven t un elkt plus laehell'
{lue el~ei, La leltre ' H ' en blanc é1ai! unt.' marque d'idcntifiealioll portée par IOU,
le> I'éhicules qlli avaienl participé a l'ir1l'asion de Suez, de mi'me (jlle la raie lloire
aulOur de la tourcl!e.
El Peintufe \'('f( uni, avee insigne régimentaire du UT NFC sur !es fl:lncs d(' la
tourdk el lluméro dt~ série du véhieu!e t'n hlanc sur une llande noire, eomprenant
un petil éeusson tricolore et k-s leltres 'le pour ' l ndochine', E2 Cou1cureouranl,'
I'n tempsde paix avee du ve1'1 'FortJl Crtnr' Cl des marquages Chromf ],lIou' (jmmf
c/rrome); le symwle de earte ajouer el !es ')eux' qui SOIl1 ajoulés sont personneh;l
I'rqllipage ou des marques d'unit(, non officidles, FI I:influcnce ami-ricaine <;('
\'oit dans l'insiglle de la ,\tarillret ,'¡la pcillture rüuge des poims de graissage puur
faciliter la visibilit(" F 2 La combinaison de qU:ltre colllcurs \'o)'antes lxur
diffiei!emcnt s'appclcr camoufl:lge (-¡ant donní' les aUIlTS marque, d{'plo)'"," ,i
vi~Tmenl. L'insigne de division a l'avant du vé hieulc eSl une carte slylisée de
Corée av({; le numéro d,' la division en rouge.
Gl L'armée el les forces nal':lles operent loules deux ce véhinde en Italie
L'imigne du bataillon d,·, fusiliers marins dI' Salr .\tarco un Lion de St .\ Iar( "n
jaune sur fond rouge- nt pOrlé p:lrt ee L \''1' 1'' 7, de méme que rallcre de 1"
marine national,' et les tmis rOlrlt-urs nalionales itali,'nnes. G 2 CeHe unité hai1 "
l'avall1-gard,~ de l'invasion initiak de l'Argell1inc, mais a í:lé relin;c alall1
I'arrivéc du Carps Expédiliunnaire hritannique; la pcinture lHil \' erl Forü a""
11 uméros jaunes I't ¡',mere dr. la \ Iarine nationalc était peinte en blanc au-dessou'
du drapcau nalional, HI Une adaptalion (lircete du programllle MERDC de(t ',~
.111111', iei d(' eoulcur Fidd Dlab (gris eampagne ) ('t FOItJI Grun (coulcurs primairrs
<, 1 ~'md (sable) el Bfack (noir ) (eoulcllrs sccondaires), Les marques cn noir clu
"h i'ule SOnt le seul insignr.. H 2 Ce véhieull~ pa1'1icipam a des ,'xerei("s de
1·( 11 ,\N en ltalie a une finition similaire ti eelle tic 1-11, mais avee Ul) t.orl/¡ Yelloll
l. " ,' ,k ~ienne ) plus vifau licu du plus p:ik Smrd (sable), Le dessin humoristiqut,
"'", /, H"t' I'n noir est totalemen1 Ilon oflieie1 et de, 1ll0illS eouralllS dl~ nosjour..'
Farbtafeln
Die vorscllrifi.smassigell Farhmu<.ter rlir de n Zweitell \\'cllkrieg ,ind nielll bekanl,
Aus Filmen und SehilderullW'll \,eiss mall, dass anf¡lI1g1ieh US Navy O eean Grey
wrwcnd"t wllrde; amerikanisch~ Arme,'- I::.inheiu'n bcgallllt'!I im Ilerb;;t t944,
Fahrl-euge Olive IJ rab I-U slreiehetl, ";lhrend US r-.larine-Einhtiten mit
wrsehieoenen Tarnfarben improvisier1ell, Nach dem Krieg \\Urdell .\Iarillt'-
Fahneugt so "ie die der Armee in ForeSl Green g('halten, bis r-.lil(e d('r 70er
Jahre d,'r vil'1'farhig" r-.IEROC-TarnaIl5trieh der Armt~e ve rwelldel \\urde,
Al Oeean Cre)'-Anslrieh, mil grosser US-Flagge, wurde bei diesn Opcration von
den rnósl('n Fahrleug('n \Trwendet in del' vergeblidwn HolflllJ11g, dass sie \'on
fi-anúisisehen Soldalell niehl Ucschossen wurden, A2 ,,'eissc Fahrl.eugnumlller
inncrhalh d,'f Einl)('it, mit VO!l der lksatzllng gegebenem Namell: 'r-.I} lJe Loris'.
Bl Das britische Oli\'e Drab \\.lf grüncr als das amerikanisch(' .A.(juilalent. 0 ('1'
gdb(' Kreis idenlifizil'rl das 'C'·Bataillon, mit Falm>;eugnamen in \"eiss, B 2 0 tT
bei dcr (Tstcn Küstenlandung aus>r:-r Ceftcht geSetzle L V' l', Al-I iSl Oc('an GrC)
g('slriehcn, Die gellwn Slreigen besagen, dass tT an der 'Ikaeh Ydlo\\ 2' gdandel
ist; del' Kode 'C-:20' und dcr AnJ;ulgsbuehstabc \O!l 'Craz) Lcgs' identifizieren
die C.Kompaniedes BataillollS, D iese Einheil bcnutzteein weis,esooer ein gdbes
IJreieek mit einelll Stern darin als Flalaillons- Markierung _ Oie gelbc '2 in Ólll'm
Redllcek an d('r T urmrückscile kiinntr 'zwóte ,,'die del' Land"trupPl'll '
l)I'dell{(~l hab,'n,
el l.okalc 'n\erkdienlirhe Tarnung' sandfarhig auf Grall, Die Falm:eug.
lIummer '.'\-2' und das l:blaillollskenn zeichen des geflugdlen Slerns sind weiss.
e2 Fahrf.('uge der 4, \ Iarillcdivision hatten die Tarnfalwn samlfarbig, rolbraun
und grün. Die zwei ge!ben Streifi:n bedeuten wiede r um 'l3caeh Vellow 2'; B42
ist wahn;cheinlirh del' Fahrf.cug¡ Kompanie-Kexle. BI Streif('n als Kennzeieh-
nung einer Landung an ' Red Beach '2' ",('rden aufdem Foresr Green-AIlMrieh
allfgctragen, dwnso wie {lie gdlwll Einheits· und die weisscn Nalion-
,tliliitsmarkierungen, 0 2 I-Iastiges Oberstreiehen mit Sandfaroc erlielte oH cinc
noch fleekigere Wirkung al> hier, '1-1' in \\'ciss war cinc ldentifizierungsmar-
kierung fuI' alle Fahrl.euge Ixi der Suez-l nva~ion, ehenso wie dn schwarf.l'
Streifen rund um den Turm,
E l Eintarbiger Grunanstrich, mil dem Rc gimenlszeirhen I('fR E(: an d('n Sciten
d('s Turms, und die FahrL"ugseriennummer in \\'ei,s auf eilll'm sehwarLell
Slreitell, mil einem kleinen dreirarbigen Z('ichen und mil ' l e' fiir Indnchina, E 2
Stand:lrdanSlrirh in Fon'st Green fiir Friedcnszeiten, mit r-. l arkierungen in
Chrome Vellow; das zusatzliehe Spielkarten.Zeieht'n uud die 't\ugell' sind
personliehe Sach(' der Iksat.zung oder inoffizil'lk \Iarkiefllng¡'n der Einh,'il. Fl
Aml'1'ikanischer EinHu,s iSl ersichl1ieh in den r-. l arim'·Allleichen und in dcr ROl-
\Iarkierung der Sehmierpunkte für Ucssere Siclllbarkeil. F2 lJe r auflidlige
\ 'i('rfarbenanSlrirh kann kaum als 'Tarnung' h('zeirhnct werden mil den so
,l;rell ,l;eha l teTlt~n SO!lstigT!I r-.larkierungell, Das Divisionsahleiehell \orne iSI cinc
stili~ierte Karte von Korea, mil dcr Divisionsnumm(,1' in Rol.
GI Armee wie l\l arine bcnulzen di,'St~s Fahrf.ellg in It,diell, Da, San r-.lareo·
r-.larine- Balaillonsahzeichen---der SI.r-.larkus-LOw(, in C elb auf rOlem Grund-
íSl an dieSl'm I. VTP-7 ersiehtlieh , ebcnso wil' der Anker der r-.l.lrinc und die
ilalienische Trikolore, G2 lJiesc Einl1eir filhne di(' erste argenlinisdw l nvasion
an, wllrdl' alxr abgezogen, che die britisehe EinsalztruPIJ(' eilllraf; hier gab es
cinen Anstrieh in Foresl Grc"1l mit gclbell Zahlen, IlTld eil1<'Tl .\I.lrineanker i"
\\'eiss unl('rhalb del' \'ationalflagg(', HI Eine dir('kll' Chl'fnahme de,
Farbschemas US Armv l\I ERDC, hiCl' in Field Drah lInd Fort<;t Grel~n
Il'rim:irfarbcn ), und i;, Sand und Blaek (Sckund:irfarbcnl, Die einzigen
t\hzeirhen si nd Scll\"lrZe Fahrz('ugmarkierungen. H 2 Oiest.'s an :"IATO-
\1,ltl Ü\erTI bcteiligte Fahrt.eug iSl weitgdlcnd wie 111 ausgefilhn, nur mit dem
11<'II<'('en Earth Vcllo~\ amraH dcm blas>r:-ren Sand, Die sehwarf.e Zeidl!lung
'l'ack Rat ' ist hiichst inofliziell und heU1ZUlal!;e aueh ¡ius>r:-rSl ulIgewohnlieh!
 OSPREY . V ANCUARD

A series of boo ks d esc ribin g kcy un its a nd wca pons sys lem s o f
20th cc n tur y \Varfare, p repa red b y lead ing m ili tar )' cx perts
fo r t he e nthu sias l a n d m oclc ll e r , a n d illu slrati n g a uth c llli c d Clai ls
of armo u r a ne! su p porting ve hi cles, cam ou fl agc, m a rkin gs,
uni for ms, insig ni a a nd wea po ns.

Avec annotations en francais sur les planches en couleur

'l Mit Aufzeichnungen auf deutsch uber die Farbtafeln

(3) US 1St lnfantry Division 1939- 45 (29) The M47 & M48 Patton Tanks
(6) The Lee /Grant Tanks in British Service (30 ) Polish Armour 1939 45
(8) US 1St Marine Division 1941 45 (31 ) US Half-Tracks of World War 11
(13) The Churchill Tank (32 ) The SdKfz 251 Half-Track
(15) The Sherman Tank in British Service (33) German Light Panzers 1932- 42
1942 45 (34) M JI 3 Series
(16 ) The Panzerkampfwagen m (35 ) Armour of the Pacific War
(17) The Stuart Light Tank Series (36) Long Range Desert Group
(18) The Panzerkampfwagen IV (37) Modern Soviet Combat Tanks
(19) Armour of the Middle East Wars 1948- 78 (38) Mechanised lnfantry
(20) The Tiger Tanks (39 ) US Armour Camouflage and Markings
(21) The PzKpfw V Panther 19 17- 45
(22) The Centurion Tank in Battle (40) US Light Tanks 1944-84; M24 Chaffee, M41
(23) British Tanks in N. Africa 194<>-42 Walker Bulldog and M551 Sheridan
(24) Soviet Heavy Tanks (41 ) The MI Abrams Battle Tank
(25) German Armoured Cars and R e cce Half. (42) Armour of the Vietnam Wars
T racks 1939 45 (43 ) The M2 Bradley lnfantry Fighting Vehicle
(26) The Sherman Tank in US and AlIied Service (44) Anti-Tank Helicopters
(27) Armour of the Korean War 1950 53 (45) Amtracs: US Amphibious Assault Vehicles
(28 ) The 6th Panzer Division 1937 45

STEVEN J. ZALOGA \Vas born in J9 52, reccivcd his
BA in histor y rrom Un io n College, a nd his M A from
Columbia U niversity. H e ha s publis hed ove r twel1ly
books a nd num erous a n ides dealing wit h modcrn
miJitar y tcchnoJogy , especially armo urcd vehicle dc-
vclo pme nt. His ma in arca ofil1lcrest is milita r y a ffairs in
lhe Sovict U nion and Eastern Europe in lhe Second
\'Vorl d "Var, and he has written as wc ll on A merican
armoured forces. Steven Zaloga li ves in Conn ecticut.

ISBN 0-85045-748-3
90000

9 7