Cayetano v. MonsodG.R. No.

100113, September 3, 1991

Facts:
Respondent Christian Monsod was nominated by President Corazon C. Aquino
to the position of Chairman of theCOMELEC in a letter received by the
Secretariat of the Commission on Appointments on April 25, 1991.
Petitioner opposed the nomination because allegedly Monsod does not possess the
required qualification of having been engagedin the practice of law for at least ten years.On
June 5, 1991, the Commission on Appointments confirmed the nomination of Monsod as
Chairman of the COMELEC.On June 18, 1991, he took his oath of office. On the
same day, he assumed office as Chairman of the COMELEC.Challenging the
validity of the confirmation by the Commission on Appointments of Monsod's nomination,
petitioner as acitizen and taxpayer, filed the instant petition for certiorari
and Prohibition praying that said confirmation
and thec o n s e q u e n t a p p o i n t m e n t o f M o n s o d a s C h a i r m a n o f t h e C o m m i s s
ion on Elections be declared null and void.

Issue:
Whether the appointment of Chairman Monsod of Comelec violates Section 1 (1), Article IX-
C of the 1987 Constitution?

Held:
The 1987 Constitution provides in Section 1 (1), Article IX-C, that there shall be a
Commission on Elections composed of a C h a i r m a n a n d s i x C o m m i s s i o n e r s w h o
shall be natural-born citizens of the Philippines and, at the time of
t h e i r appointment, at least thirty-five years of age, holders of a college degree,
and must not have been candidates for anyelective position in the immediately
preceding elections. However, a majority thereof, including the Chairman, shall bemembers
of the Philippine Bar who have been engaged in the practice of law for at least ten
years.Atty. Christian Monsod is a member of the Philippine Bar, having passed the bar
examinations of 1960 with a grade of 86-55%. He has been dues paying member
of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines since its inception in 1972-73.
He hasalso been paying his professional license fees as lawyer for more than ten years.At
this point, it might be helpful to define private practice. The term, as commonly understood,
means "an individual or organization engaged in the business of delivering legal services."
(Ibid.). Lawyers who practice alone are often called"sole practitioners." Groups of lawyers
are called "firms." The firm is usually a partnership and members of the firm are
thepartners. Some firms may be organized as professional corporations and the
members called shareholders. In either case, the members of the firm are the
experienced attorneys. In most firms, there are younger or more
inexperiencedsalaried attorneys called "associates."Hence, the Commission on the basis
of evidence submitted doling the public hearings on Monsod's confirmation,
implicitlyd e t e r m i n e d t h a t h e p o s s e s s e d t h e n e c e s s a r y q u a l i f i c a t i o n s a s r e
q u i r e d b y l a w . T h e j u d g m e n t r e n d e r e d b y t h e Commission in the exercise of
such an acknowledged power is beyond judicial interference except only upon a
clear showing of a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.
(Art. VIII, Sec. 1 Constitution). Thus,only where such grave abuse of discretion is clearly
shown shall the Court interfere with the Commission's judgment. Inthe instant case, there is
no occasion for the exercise of the Court's corrective power, since no abuse, much less a
graveabuse of discretion, that would amount to lack or excess of jurisdiction and
would warrant the issuance of the writsprayed, for has been clearly shown.Besides in
the leading case of Luego v. Civil Service Commission, he Court said that,
Appointment is an essentiallydiscretionary power and must be performed by the
officer in which it is vested according to his best lights, the onlycondition being
that the appointee should possess the qualifications required by law. If he
does, then the appointmentcannot be faulted on the ground that there are others better
qualified who should have been preferred. This is a politicalquestion involving considerations
of wisdom which only the appointing authority can decide

B.M. No. 1678 December 17, 2007

PETITION FOR LEAVE TO RESUME PRACTICE OF LAW,
BENJAMIN M. DACANAY, petitioner.

RESOLUTION
CORONA, J.:
This bar matter concerns the petition of petitioner Benjamin M. Dacanay for leave to
resume the practice of law.
Petitioner was admitted to the Philippine bar in March 1960. He practiced law until he
migrated to Canada in December 1998 to seek medical attention for his ailments. He
subsequently applied for Canadian citizenship to avail of Canada’s free medical aid
program. His application was approved and he became a Canadian citizen in May 2004.
On July 14, 2006, pursuant to Republic Act (RA) 9225 (Citizenship Retention and Re-
Acquisition Act of 2003), petitioner reacquired his Philippine citizenship. 1 On that day, he
took his oath of allegiance as a Filipino citizen before the Philippine Consulate General in
Toronto, Canada. Thereafter, he returned to the Philippines and now intends to resume
his law practice. There is a question, however, whether petitioner Benjamin M. Dacanay
lost his membership in the Philippine bar when he gave up his Philippine citizenship in
May 2004. Thus, this petition.
In a report dated October 16, 2007, the Office of the Bar Confidant cites Section 2, Rule
138 (Attorneys and Admission to Bar) of the Rules of Court:
SECTION 2. Requirements for all applicants for admission to the bar. – Every applicant
for admission as a member of the bar must be a citizen of the Philippines, at least
twenty-one years of age, of good moral character, and a resident of the Philippines; and
must produce before the Supreme Court satisfactory evidence of good moral character,
and that no charges against him, involving moral turpitude, have been filed or are pending
in any court in the Philippines.
Applying the provision, the Office of the Bar Confidant opines that, by virtue of his
reacquisition of Philippine citizenship, in 2006, petitioner has again met all the
qualifications and has none of the disqualifications for membership in the bar. It
recommends that he be allowed to resume the practice of law in the Philippines,
conditioned on his retaking the lawyer’s oath to remind him of his duties and
responsibilities as a member of the Philippine bar.
We approve the recommendation of the Office of the Bar Confidant with certain
modifications.
The practice of law is a privilege burdened with conditions. 2 It is so delicately affected with
public interest that it is both a power and a duty of the State (through this Court) to control
and regulate it in order to protect and promote the public welfare. 3
Adherence to rigid standards of mental fitness, maintenance of the highest degree of
morality, faithful observance of the rules of the legal profession, compliance with the
mandatory continuing legal education requirement and payment of membership fees to
the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) are the conditions required for membership in
good standing in the bar and for enjoying the privilege to practice law. Any breach by a
lawyer of any of these conditions makes him unworthy of the trust and confidence which
the courts and clients repose in him for the continued exercise of his professional
privilege. 4
Section 1, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court provides:
SECTION 1. Who may practice law. – Any person heretofore duly admitted as a member
of the bar, or thereafter admitted as such in accordance with the provisions of this Rule,
and who is in good and regular standing, is entitled to practice law.
Pursuant thereto, any person admitted as a member of the Philippine bar in accordance
with the statutory requirements and who is in good and regular standing is entitled to
practice law.
Admission to the bar requires certain qualifications. The Rules of Court mandates that an
applicant for admission to the bar be a citizen of the Philippines, at least twenty-one years
of age, of good moral character and a resident of the Philippines. 5 He must also produce
before this Court satisfactory evidence of good moral character and that no charges
against him, involving moral turpitude, have been filed or are pending in any court in the
Philippines. 6
Moreover, admission to the bar involves various phases such as furnishing satisfactory
proof of educational, moral and other qualifications; 7 passing the bar
examinations; 8 taking the lawyer’s oath 9 and signing the roll of attorneys and receiving
from the clerk of court of this Court a certificate of the license to practice. 10
The second requisite for the practice of law ― membership in good standing ― is a
continuing requirement. This means continued membership and, concomitantly, payment
of annual membership dues in the IBP; 11 payment of the annual professional
tax; 12 compliance with the mandatory continuing legal education requirement; 13 faithful
observance of the rules and ethics of the legal profession and being continually subject to
judicial disciplinary control. 14
Given the foregoing, may a lawyer who has lost his Filipino citizenship still practice law in
the Philippines? No.
The Constitution provides that the practice of all professions in the Philippines shall be
limited to Filipino citizens save in cases prescribed by law. 15 Since Filipino citizenship is
a requirement for admission to the bar, loss thereof terminates membership in the
Philippine bar and, consequently, the privilege to engage in the practice of law. In other
words, the loss of Filipino citizenship ipso jure terminates the privilege to practice law in
the Philippines. The practice of law is a privilege denied to foreigners. 16
The exception is when Filipino citizenship is lost by reason of naturalization as a citizen of
another country but subsequently reacquired pursuant to RA 9225. This is because “all
Philippine citizens who become citizens of another country shall be deemed not to have
lost their Philippine citizenship under the conditions of [RA 9225].” 17 Therefore, a Filipino
lawyer who becomes a citizen of another country is deemed never to have lost his
Philippine citizenship if he reacquires it in accordance with RA 9225. Although he is
also deemed never to have terminated his membership in the Philippine bar, no automatic
right to resume law practice accrues.
Under RA 9225, if a person intends to practice the legal profession in the Philippines and
he reacquires his Filipino citizenship pursuant to its provisions “(he) shall apply with the
proper authority for a license or permit to engage in such practice.” 18 Stated otherwise,
before a lawyer who reacquires Filipino citizenship pursuant to RA 9225 can resume his
law practice, he must first secure from this Court the authority to do so, conditioned on:
(a) the updating and payment in full of the annual membership dues in the IBP;
(b) the payment of professional tax;
(c) the completion of at least 36 credit hours of mandatory continuing legal education; this
is specially significant to refresh the applicant/petitioner’s knowledge of Philippine laws
and update him of legal developments and
(d) the retaking of the lawyer’s oath which will not only remind him of his duties and
responsibilities as a lawyer and as an officer of the Court, but also renew his pledge to
maintain allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines.
Compliance with these conditions will restore his good standing as a member of the
Philippine bar.
WHEREFORE, the petition of Attorney Benjamin M. Dacanay is hereby GRANTED,
subject to compliance with the conditions stated above and submission of proof of such
compliance to the Bar Confidant, after which he may retake his oath as a member of the
Philippine bar.
SO ORDERED.
Puno, C.J., Ynares-Santiago, Sandoval-Gutierrez, Carpio, Austria-Martinez, Carpio-
Morales, Azcuna, Tinga, Chico-Nazario, Velasco, Jr., Nachura, Reyes, Leonardo-de
Castro, JJ., concur.
Quisumbing, J., on leave.
B.M. No. 810 January 27, 1998
IN RE: PETITION TO TAKE THE LAWYER’S OATH BY ARTHUR M. CUEVAS, JR.

RESOLUTION
FRANCISCO, J.:
Petitioner Arthur M. Cuevas, Jr., recently passed the 1996 Bar Examinations 1. His oath-
taking was held in abeyance in view of the Court’s resolution dated August 27, 1996 which
permitted him to take the Bar Examinations “subject to the condition that should (he) pass
the same, (he) shall not be allowed to take the lawyer’s oath pending approval of the Court
. . .” due to his previous conviction for Reckless Imprudence Resulting In Homicide. The
conviction stemmed from petitioner’s participation in the initiation rites of the LEX
TALIONIS FRATERNITAS, a fraternity in the SAN BEDA COLLEGE OF LAW, sometime
in September 1991, where Raul I. Camaligan, a neophyte, died as a result of the personal
violence inflicted upon him. Thereafter, petitioner applied for and was granted probation.
On May 10, 1995, he was discharged from probation and his case considered closed and
terminated.
In this petition, received by the Court on May 5, 1997, petitioner prays that “he be allowed
to take his lawyer’s oath at the Court’s most convenient time” 2 attaching thereto the Order
dated May 16, 1995 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 10 of Antique discharging him
from his probation, and certifications attesting to his righteous, peaceful and law abiding
character issued by: (a) the Mayor of the Municipality of Hamtic, Antique; (b) the Officer-
in-Charge of Hamtic Police Station; (c) the Sangguniang Kabataan of Pob. III, Hamtic,
through its chairman and officers; (d) a member of the IBP Iloilo Chapter; (e) the Parish
Priest and Vicar General of St. Joseph Cathedral, San Jose, Antique; and (f) the President
of the Parish Pastoral Council, Parish of Sta. Monica, Hamtic, Antique. On July 15, 1997,
the Court, before acting on petitioner’s application, resolved to require Atty. Gilbert D.
Camaligan, father of the deceased hazing victim Raul I. Camaligan, to comment thereon.
In compliance with the Court’s directive, Atty. Gilbert D. Camaligan filed his comment
which states as follows:
1 — He fully appreciates the benign concern given by this Hon. Court in allowing him to
comment to the pending petition of Arthur M. Cuevas to take the lawyer’s oath, and hereby
expresses his genuine gratitude to such gesture.
2 — He conforms completely to the observation of the Hon. Court in its resolution dated
March 19, 1997 in Bar Matter No. 712 that the infliction of severe physical injuries which
approximately led to the death of the unfortunate Raul Camaligan was deliberate (rather
than merely accidental or inadvertent) thus, indicating serious character flaws on the part
of those who inflicted such injuries. This is consistent with his stand at the outset of the
proceedings of the criminal case against the petitioner and his co-defendants that they
are liable not only for the crime of homicide but murder, since they took advantage of the
neophytes’ helpless and defenseless condition when they were “beaten and kicked to
death like a useless stray dog”, suggesting the presence of abuse of confidence, taking
advantage of superior strength and treachery (People vs. Gagoco, 58 Phil. 524).
3 — He, however, has consented to the accused-students’ plea of guilty to the lesser
offense of reckless imprudence resulting to the homicide, including the petitioner, out of
pity to their mothers and a pregnant wife of the accused who went together at his house
in Lucena City, literally kneeling, crying and begging for forgiveness for their sons, on a
Christmas day in 1991 and on Maundy Thursday in 1992, during which they reported that
the father of one of the accused died of heart attack upon learning of his son’s involvement
in the case.
4 — As a Christian, he has forgiven the petitioner and his co-defendants in the criminal
case for the death of his son. But as a loving father, who lost a son in whom he has high
hope to become a good lawyer — to succeed him, he still feels the pain of his untimely
demise, and the stigma of the gruesome manner of taking his life. This he cannot forget.
5 — He is not, right now, in a position to say whether petitioner, since then has become
morally fit for admission to the noble profession of the law. He politely submits this matter
to the sound and judicious discretion of the Hon. Court. 3
At the outset, the Court shares the sentiment of Atty. Gilbert D. Camaligan and
commiserates with the untimely death of his son. Nonetheless, Atty. Gilbert D. Camaligan
admits that “[h]e is not, right now, in a position to say whether petitioner since then has
become morally fit . . .” and submits petitioner’s plea to be admitted to the noble profession
of law to the sound and judicious discretion of the Court.
The petition before the Court requires the balancing of the reasons for disallowing or
allowing petitioner’s admission to the noble profession of law. His deliberate participation
in the senseless beatings over a helpless neophyte which resulted to the latter’s untimely
demise indicates absence of that moral fitness required for admission to the bar. And as
the practice of law is a privilege extended only to the few who possess the high standards
of intellectual and moral qualifications the Court is duty bound to prevent the entry of
undeserving aspirants, as well as to exclude those who have been admitted but have
become a disgrace to the profession. The Court, nonetheless, is willing to give petitioner
a chance in the same manner that it recently allowed Al Caparros Argosino, petitioner’s
co-accused below, to take the lawyer’s oath. 4
Petitioner Arthur M. Cuevas, Jr.’s discharge from probation without any infraction of the
attendant conditions therefor and the various certifications attesting to his righteous,
peaceful and civic-oriented character prove that he has taken decisive steps to purge
himself of his deficiency in moral character and atone for the unfortunate death of Raul I.
Camaligan. The Court is prepared to give him the benefit of the doubt, taking judicial notice
of the general tendency of the youth to be rash, temerarious and uncalculating. 5 Let it be
stressed to herein petitioner that the lawyer’s oath is not a mere formality recited for a few
minutes in the glare of flashing cameras and before the presence of select witnesses.
Petitioner is exhorted to conduct himself beyond reproach at all times and to live strictly
according to his oath and the Code of Professional Responsibility. And, to paraphrase Mr.
Justice Padilla’s comment in the sister case of Re: Petition of Al Agrosino To Take
Lawyer’s Oath, Bar Matter No. 712, March 19, 1997, “[t]he Court sincerely hopes that” Mr.
Cuevas, Jr., “will continue with the assistance he has been giving to his community. As a
lawyer he will now be in a better position to render legal and other services to the more
unfortunate members of society” 6.
ACCORDINGLY, the Court hereby resolved to allow petitioner Arthur M.. Cuevas, Jr., to
take the lawyer’s oath and to sign the Roll of Attorneys on a date to be set by the Court,
subject to the payment of appropriate fees. Let this resolution be attached to petitioner’s
personal records in the Office of the Bar Confidant.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, C.J., Regalado, Davide, Jr., Romero, Bellosillo, Melo, Puno, Vitug, Kapunan,
Mendoza, Panganiban and Martinez, JJ., concur.

In a letter-complaint dated April 10, 2000, complainant Manuel L. Lee charged respondent Atty.
Regino B. Tambago with violation of the Notarial Law and the ethics of the legal profession for
notarizing a spurious last will and testament.

In his complaint, complainant averred that his father, the decedent Vicente Lee, Sr., never
executed the contested will. Furthermore, the spurious will contained the forged signatures of
Cayetano Noynay and Loreto Grajo, the purported witnesses to its execution.

In the said will, the decedent supposedly bequeathed his entire estate to his wife Lim Hock Lee,
save for a parcel of land which he devised to Vicente Lee, Jr. and Elena Lee, half-siblings of
complainant.

The will was purportedly executed and acknowledged before respondent on June 30,
1965.1 Complainant, however, pointed out that the residence certificate2 of the testator noted in
the acknowledgment of the will was dated January 5, 1962.3 Furthermore, the signature of the
testator was not the same as his signature as donor in a deed of donation4 (containing his
purported genuine signature). Complainant averred that the signatures of his deceased father in
the will and in the deed of donation were "in any way (sic) entirely and diametrically opposed
from (sic) one another in all angle[s]."5

Complainant also questioned the absence of notation of the residence certificates of the
purported witnesses Noynay and Grajo. He alleged that their signatures had likewise been
forged and merely copied from their respective voters’ affidavits.

Complainant further asserted that no copy of such purported will was on file in the archives
division of the Records Management and Archives Office of the National Commission for Culture
and the Arts (NCCA). In this connection, the certification of the chief of the archives division
dated September 19, 1999 stated:

Doc. 14, Page No. 4, Book No. 1, Series of 1965 refers to an AFFIDAVIT executed by
BARTOLOME RAMIREZ on June 30, 1965 and is available in this Office[’s] files.6
Respondent in his comment dated July 6, 2001 claimed that the complaint against him contained
false allegations: (1) that complainant was a son of the decedent Vicente Lee, Sr. and (2) that the
will in question was fake and spurious. He alleged that complainant was "not a legitimate son of
Vicente Lee, Sr. and the last will and testament was validly executed and actually notarized by
respondent per affidavit7 of Gloria Nebato, common-law wife of Vicente Lee, Sr. and
corroborated by the joint affidavit8 of the children of Vicente Lee, Sr., namely Elena N. Lee and
Vicente N. Lee, Jr. xxx."9

Respondent further stated that the complaint was filed simply to harass him because the criminal
case filed by complainant against him in the Office of the Ombudsman "did not prosper."

Respondent did not dispute complainant’s contention that no copy of the will was on file in the
archives division of the NCCA. He claimed that no copy of the contested will could be found there
because none was filed.

Lastly, respondent pointed out that complainant had no valid cause of action against him as he
(complainant) did not first file an action for the declaration of nullity of the will and demand his
share in the inheritance.

In a resolution dated October 17, 2001, the Court referred the case to the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines (IBP) for investigation, report and recommendation.10

In his report, the investigating commissioner found respondent guilty of violation of pertinent
provisions of the old Notarial Law as found in the Revised Administrative Code. The violation
constituted an infringement of legal ethics, particularly Canon 111 and Rule 1.0112 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility (CPR).13 Thus, the investigating commissioner of the IBP
Commission on Bar Discipline recommended the suspension of respondent for a period of three
months.

The IBP Board of Governors, in its Resolution No. XVII-2006-285 dated May 26, 2006, resolved:

[T]o ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby ADOPTED and APPROVED, with

modification, the Report and Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner of the
above-entitled case, herein made part of this Resolution as Annex "A"; and, finding the
recommendation fully supported by the evidence on record and the applicable laws and
rules, and considering Respondent’s failure to comply with the laws in the discharge of
his function as a notary public, Atty. Regino B. Tambago is hereby suspended from the
practice of law for one year and Respondent’s notarial commission is Revoked and
Disqualified from reappointment as Notary Public for two (2) years.14

We affirm with modification.

A will is an act whereby a person is permitted, with the formalities prescribed by law, to control to
a certain degree the disposition of his estate, to take effect after his death.15 A will may either be
notarial or holographic.

The law provides for certain formalities that must be followed in the execution of wills. The object
of solemnities surrounding the execution of wills is to close the door on bad faith and fraud, to
avoid substitution of wills and testaments and to guarantee their truth and authenticity.16

A notarial will, as the contested will in this case, is required by law to be subscribed at the end
thereof by the testator himself. In addition, it should be attested and subscribed by three or more
credible witnesses in the presence of the testator and of one another.17
The will in question was attested by only two witnesses, Noynay and Grajo. On this circumstance
alone, the will must be considered void.18 This is in consonance with the rule that acts executed
against the provisions of mandatory or prohibitory laws shall be void, except when the law itself
authorizes their validity.

The Civil Code likewise requires that a will must be acknowledged before a notary public by the
testator and the witnesses.19 The importance of this requirement is highlighted by the fact that it
was segregated from the other requirements under Article 805 and embodied in a distinct and
separate provision.20

An acknowledgment is the act of one who has executed a deed in going before some competent
officer or court and declaring it to be his act or deed. It involves an extra step undertaken
whereby the signatory actually declares to the notary public that the same is his or her own free
act and deed.21 The acknowledgment in a notarial will has a two-fold purpose: (1) to safeguard
the testator’s wishes long after his demise and (2) to assure that his estate is administered in the
manner that he intends it to be done.

A cursory examination of the acknowledgment of the will in question shows that this particular
requirement was neither strictly nor substantially complied with. For one, there was the
conspicuous absence of a notation of the residence certificates of the notarial witnesses Noynay
and Grajo in the acknowledgment. Similarly, the notation of the testator’s old residence certificate
in the same acknowledgment was a clear breach of the law. These omissions by respondent
invalidated the will.

As the acknowledging officer of the contested will, respondent was required to faithfully observe
the formalities of a will and those of notarization. As we held in Santiago v. Rafanan:22

The Notarial Law is explicit on the obligations and duties of notaries public. They are
required to certify that the party to every document acknowledged before him had
presented the proper residence certificate (or exemption from the residence tax); and to
enter its number, place of issue and date as part of such certification.

These formalities are mandatory and cannot be disregarded, considering the degree of
importance and evidentiary weight attached to notarized documents.23 A notary public, especially
a lawyer,24 is bound to strictly observe these elementary requirements.

The Notarial Law then in force required the exhibition of the residence certificate upon
notarization of a document or instrument:

Section 251. Requirement as to notation of payment of [cedula] residence tax. – Every

contract, deed, or other document acknowledged before a notary public shall have
certified thereon that the parties thereto have presented their proper [cedula] residence
certificate or are exempt from the [cedula] residence tax, and there shall be entered by
the notary public as a part of such certificate the number, place of issue, and date of
each [cedula] residence certificate as aforesaid.25

The importance of such act was further reiterated by Section 6 of the Residence Tax Act26 which
stated:

When a person liable to the taxes prescribed in this Act acknowledges any document
before a notary public xxx it shall be the duty of such person xxx with whom such
transaction is had or business done, to require the exhibition of the residence certificate
showing payment of the residence taxes by such person xxx.

In the issuance of a residence certificate, the law seeks to establish the true and correct identity
of the person to whom it is issued, as well as the payment of residence taxes for the current year.
By having allowed decedent to exhibit an expired residence certificate, respondent failed to
comply with the requirements of both the old Notarial Law and the Residence Tax Act. As much
could be said of his failure to demand the exhibition of the residence certificates of Noynay and
Grajo.

On the issue of whether respondent was under the legal obligation to furnish a copy of the
notarized will to the archives division, Article 806 provides:

Art. 806. Every will must be acknowledged before a notary public by the testator and the
witness. The notary public shall not be required to retain a copy of the will, or file
another with the office of the Clerk of Court. (emphasis supplied)

Respondent’s failure, inadvertent or not, to file in the archives division a copy of the notarized will
was therefore not a cause for disciplinary action.

Nevertheless, respondent should be faulted for having failed to make the necessary entries
pertaining to the will in his notarial register. The old Notarial Law required the entry of the
following matters in the notarial register, in chronological order:

1. nature of each instrument executed, sworn to, or acknowledged before him;

2. person executing, swearing to, or acknowledging the instrument;

3. witnesses, if any, to the signature;

4. date of execution, oath, or acknowledgment of the instrument;

5. fees collected by him for his services as notary;

6. give each entry a consecutive number; and

7. if the instrument is a contract, a brief description of the substance of the instrument.27

In an effort to prove that he had complied with the abovementioned rule, respondent contended
that he had crossed out a prior entry and entered instead the will of the decedent. As proof, he
presented a photocopy of his notarial register. To reinforce his claim, he presented a photocopy
of a certification28 stating that the archives division had no copy of the affidavit of Bartolome
Ramirez.

A photocopy is a mere secondary evidence. It is not admissible unless it is shown that the
original is unavailable. The proponent must first prove the existence and cause of the
unavailability of the original,29 otherwise, the evidence presented will not be admitted. Thus, the
photocopy of respondent’s notarial register was not admissible as evidence of the entry of the
execution of the will because it failed to comply with the requirements for the admissibility of
secondary evidence.

In the same vein, respondent’s attempt to controvert the certification dated September 21,
199930 must fail. Not only did he present a mere photocopy of the certification dated March 15,
2000;31 its contents did not squarely prove the fact of entry of the contested will in his notarial
register.

Notaries public must observe with utmost care32 and utmost fidelity the basic requirements in the
performance of their duties, otherwise, the confidence of the public in the integrity of notarized
deeds will be undermined.33
Defects in the observance of the solemnities prescribed by law render the entire will invalid. This
carelessness cannot be taken lightly in view of the importance and delicate nature of a will,
considering that the testator and the witnesses, as in this case, are no longer alive to identify the
instrument and to confirm its contents.34 Accordingly, respondent must be held accountable for
his acts. The validity of the will was seriously compromised as a consequence of his breach of
duty.35

In this connection, Section 249 of the old Notarial Law provided:

Grounds for revocation of commission. — The following derelictions of duty on the part of
a notary public shall, in the discretion of the proper judge of first instance, be sufficient
ground for the revocation of his commission:

xxx xxx xxx

(b) The failure of the notary to make the proper entry or entries in his notarial register
touching his notarial acts in the manner required by law.

xxx xxx xxx

(f) The failure of the notary to make the proper notation regarding cedula certificates.36

These gross violations of the law also made respondent liable for violation of his oath as a lawyer
and constituted transgressions of Section 20 (a), Rule 138 of the Rules of Court37 and Canon
138 and Rule 1.0139 of the CPR.

The first and foremost duty of a lawyer is to maintain allegiance to the Republic of the
Philippines, uphold the Constitution and obey the laws of the land.40 For a lawyer is the servant of
the law and belongs to a profession to which society has entrusted the administration of law and
the dispensation of justice.41

While the duty to uphold the Constitution and obey the law is an obligation imposed on every
citizen, a lawyer assumes responsibilities well beyond the basic requirements of good
citizenship. As a servant of the law, a lawyer should moreover make himself an example for
others to emulate.42 Being a lawyer, he is supposed to be a model in the community in so far as
respect for the law is concerned.43

The practice of law is a privilege burdened with conditions.44 A breach of these conditions
justifies disciplinary action against the erring lawyer. A disciplinary sanction is imposed on a
lawyer upon a finding or acknowledgment that he has engaged in professional
misconduct.45 These sanctions meted out to errant lawyers include disbarment, suspension and
reprimand.

Disbarment is the most severe form of disciplinary sanction.46 We have held in a number of
cases that the power to disbar must be exercised with great caution47 and should not be decreed
if any punishment less severe – such as reprimand, suspension, or fine – will accomplish the end
desired.48 The rule then is that disbarment is meted out only in clear cases of misconduct that
seriously affect the standing and character of the lawyer as an officer of the court.49

Respondent, as notary public, evidently failed in the performance of the elementary duties of his
office. Contrary to his claims that he "exercised his duties as Notary Public with due care and
with due regard to the provision of existing law and had complied with the elementary formalities
in the performance of his duties xxx," we find that he acted very irresponsibly in notarizing the will
in question. Such recklessness warrants the less severe punishment of suspension from the
practice of law. It is, as well, a sufficient basis for the revocation of his commission50 and his
perpetual disqualification to be commissioned as a notary public.51

WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Regino B. Tambago is hereby found guilty of professional

misconduct. He violated (1) the Lawyer’s Oath; (2) Rule 138 of the Rules of Court; (3) Canon 1
and Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility; (4) Art. 806 of the Civil Code and (5)
the provisions of the old Notarial Law.

Atty. Regino B. Tambago is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for one year and his
notarial commissionREVOKED. Because he has not lived up to the trustworthiness expected of
him as a notary public and as an officer of the court, he is PERPETUALLY DISQUALIFIED from
reappointment as a notary public.

Let copies of this Resolution be furnished to all the courts of the land, the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines and the Office of the Bar Confidant, as well as made part of the personal records of
respondent.

SO ORDERED.