G.R. No.

182498 December 3, 2009

GEN. AVELINO I. RAZON, JR., Chief, Philippine National Police (PNP); Police Chief
Superintendent RAUL CASTAÑEDA, Chief, Criminal Investigation and Detection Group (CIDG);
Police Senior Superintendent LEONARDO A. ESPINA, Chief, Police Anti-Crime and Emergency
Response (PACER); and GEN. JOEL R. GOLTIAO, Regional Director of ARMM, PNP, Petitioners,
vs.
MARY JEAN B. TAGITIS, herein represented by ATTY. FELIPE P. ARCILLA, JR., Attorney-in-
Fact, Respondent.

DECISION

BRION, J.:

We review in this petition for review on certiorari 1 the decision dated March 7, 2008 of the Court of Appeals
(CA) in C.A-G.R. AMPARO No. 00009.2 This CA decision confirmed the enforced disappearance of Engineer
Morced N. Tagitis (Tagitis) and granted the Writ of Amparo at the petition of his wife, Mary Jean B. Tagitis
(respondent). The dispositive portion of the CA decision reads:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, petition is hereby GRANTED. The Court hereby FINDS that this is an
"enforced disappearance" within the meaning of the United Nations instruments, as used in the Amparo
Rules. The privileges of the writ of amparo are hereby extended to Engr. Morced Tagitis.

Consequently: (1) respondent GEN. EDGARDO M. DOROMAL, Chief, Criminal Investigation and Detention
Group (CIDG) who should order COL. JOSE VOLPANE PANTE, CIDG-9 Chief, Zamboanga City, to aid him;
(2) respondent GEN. AVELINO I. RAZON, Chief, PNP, who should order his men, namely: (a) respondent
GEN. JOEL GOLTIAO, Regional Director of ARMM PNP, (b) COL. AHIRON AJIRIM, both head of TASK FORCE
TAGITIS, and (c) respondent SR. SUPERINTENDENT LEONARDO A. ESPINA, Chief, Police Anti-Crime and
Emergency Response, to aid him as their superior- are hereby DIRECTED to exert extraordinary diligence
and efforts, not only to protect the life, liberty and security of Engr. Morced Tagitis, but also to extend
the privileges of the writ of amparo to Engr. Morced Tagitis and his family, and to submit a monthly report
of their actions to this Court, as a way of PERIODIC REVIEW to enable this Court to monitor the action of
respondents.

This amparo case is hereby DISMISSED as to respondent LT. GEN. ALEXANDER YANO, Commanding General,
Philippine Army, and as to respondent GEN. RUBEN RAFAEL, Chief Anti-Terror Task Force Comet,
Zamboanga City, both being with the military, which is a separate and distinct organization from the police
and the CIDG, in terms of operations, chain of command and budget.

This Decision reflects the nature of the Writ of Amparo – a protective remedy against violations or threats
of violation against the rights to life, liberty and security.3 It embodies, as a remedy, the court’s directive
to police agencies to undertake specified courses of action to address the disappearance of an individual, in
this case, Engr. Morced N. Tagitis. It does not determine guilt nor pinpoint criminal culpability for the
disappearance; rather, it determines responsibility, or at least accountability, for the enforced disappearance
for purposes of imposing the appropriate remedies to address the disappearance. Responsibility refers to
the extent the actors have been established by substantial evidence to have participated in whatever way,
by action or omission, in an enforced disappearance, as a measure of the remedies this Court shall craft,
among them, the directive to file the appropriate criminal and civil cases against the responsible parties in
the proper courts. Accountability, on the other hand, refers to the measure of remedies that should be
addressed to those who exhibited involvement in the enforced disappearance without bringing the level of
their complicity to the level of responsibility defined above; or who are imputed with knowledge relating to
the enforced disappearance and who carry the burden of disclosure; or those who carry, but have failed to
discharge, the burden of extraordinary diligence in the investigation of the enforced disappearance. In all
these cases, the issuance of the Writ of Amparo is justified by our primary goal of addressing the
disappearance, so that the life of the victim is preserved and his liberty and security are restored.

We highlight this nature of a Writ of Amparo case at the outset to stress that the unique situations that call
for the issuance of the writ, as well as the considerations and measures necessary to address these
situations, may not at all be the same as the standard measures and procedures in ordinary court actions
and proceedings. In this sense, the Rule on the Writ of Amparo4 (Amparo Rule) issued by this Court is
unique. The Amparo Rule should be read, too, as a work in progress, as its directions and finer points remain
to evolve through time and jurisprudence and through the substantive laws that Congress may promulgate.

THE FACTUAL ANTECEDENTS

The background facts, based on the petition and the records of the case, are summarized below.

The established facts show that Tagitis, a consultant for the World Bank and the Senior Honorary Counselor
for the Islamic Development Bank (IDB) Scholarship Programme, was last seen in Jolo, Sulu. Together with
Arsimin Kunnong (Kunnong), an IDB scholar, Tagitis arrived in Jolo by boat in the early morning of October
31, 2007 from a seminar in Zamboanga City. They immediately checked-in at ASY Pension House. Tagitis
asked Kunnong to buy him a boat ticket for his return trip the following day to Zamboanga. When Kunnong
returned from this errand, Tagitis was no longer around.5 The receptionist related that Tagitis went out to
buy food at around 12:30 in the afternoon and even left his room key with the desk.6 Kunnong looked for
Tagitis and even sent a text message to the latter’s Manila-based secretary who did not know of Tagitis’
whereabouts and activities either; she advised Kunnong to simply wait.7

On November 4, 2007, Kunnong and Muhammad Abdulnazeir N. Matli, a UP professor of Muslim studies and
Tagitis’ fellow student counselor at the IDB, reported Tagitis’ disappearance to the Jolo Police Station. 8 On
November 7, 2007, Kunnong executed a sworn affidavit attesting to what he knew of the circumstances
surrounding Tagitis’ disappearance.9

More than a month later (on December 28, 2007), the respondent filed a Petition for the Writ of Amparo
(petition) with the CA through her Attorney-in-Fact, Atty. Felipe P. Arcilla.10 The petition was directed against
Lt. Gen. Alexander Yano, Commanding General, Philippine Army; Gen. Avelino I. Razon, Chief, Philippine
National Police (PNP); Gen. Edgardo M. Doromal, Chief, Criminal Investigation and Detention Group (CIDG);
Sr. Supt. Leonardo A. Espina, Chief, Police Anti-Crime and Emergency Response; Gen. Joel Goltiao, Regional
Director, ARMM-PNP; and Gen. Ruben Rafael, Chief, Anti-Terror Task Force Comet [collectively referred to
as petitioners]. After reciting Tagitis’ personal circumstances and the facts outlined above, the petition went
on to state:

xxxx

7. Soon after the student left the room, Engr. Tagitis went out of the pension house to take his early lunch
but while out on the street, a couple of burly men believed to be police intelligence operatives, forcibly took
him and boarded the latter on a motor vehicle then sped away without the knowledge of his student, Arsimin
Kunnong;

8. As instructed, in the late afternoon of the same day, Kunnong returned to the pension house, and was
surprised to find out that subject Engr. Tagitis cannot [sic] be contacted by phone and was not also around
and his room was closed and locked;

9. Kunnong requested for the key from the desk of the pension house who [sic] assisted him to open the
room of Engr. Tagitis, where they discovered that the personal belongings of Engr. Tagitis, including cell
phones, documents and other personal belongings were all intact inside the room;

10. When Kunnong could not locate Engr. Tagitis, the former sought the help of another IDB scholar and
reported the matter to the local police agency;

11. Arsimin Kunnong including his friends and companions in Jolo, exerted efforts in trying to locate the
whereabouts of Engr. Tagitis and when he reported the matter to the police authorities in Jolo, he was
immediately given a ready answer that Engr. Tagitis could have been abducted by the Abu Sayyaf group
and other groups known to be fighting against the government;

12. Being scared with [sic] these suggestions and insinuations of the police officers, Kunnong reported the
matter to the [respondent, wife of Engr. Tagitis] by phone and other responsible officers and coordinators
of the IDB Scholarship Programme in the Philippines, who alerted the office of the Governor of ARMM who
was then preparing to attend the OIC meeting in Jeddah, Saudi Arabia;

13. [Respondent], on the other hand, approached some of her co-employees with the Land Bank in Digos
branch, Digos City, Davao del Sur who likewise sought help from some of their friends in the military who
could help them find/locate the whereabouts of her husband;

14. All of these efforts of the [respondent] did not produce any positive results except the information from
persons in the military who do not want to be identified that Engr. Tagitis is in the hands of the uniformed
men;

15. According to reliable information received by the [respondent], subject Engr. Tagitis is in the custody of
police intelligence operatives, specifically with the CIDG, PNP Zamboanga City, being held against his will in
an earnest attempt of the police to involve and connect Engr. Tagitis with the different terrorist groups;

xxxx

17. [Respondent] filed her complaint with the PNP Police Station in the ARMM in Cotobato and in Jolo, as
suggested by her friends, seeking their help to find her husband, but [respondent’s] request and pleadings
failed to produce any positive results;

18. Instead of helping the [respondent], she [sic] was told of an intriguing tale by the police that her
husband, subject of the petition, was not missing but was with another woman having good time
somewhere, which is a clear indication of the [petitioners’] refusal to help and provide police assistance in
locating her missing husband;
19. The continued failure and refusal of the [petitioners] to release and/or turn-over subject Engr. Tagitis
to his family or even to provide truthful information to [the respondent] of the subject’s whereabouts, and/or
allow [the respondent] to visit her husband Engr. Morced Tagitis, caused so much sleepless nights and
serious anxieties;

20. Lately, [the respondent] was again advised by one of the [petitioners] to go to the ARMM Police
Headquarters again in Cotobato City and also to the different Police Headquarters including [those] in Davao
City, in Zamboanga City, in Jolo, and in Camp Crame, Quezon City, and all these places have been visited
by the [respondent] in search for her husband, which entailed expenses for her trips to these places thereby
resorting her to borrowings and beggings [sic] for financial help from friends and relatives only to try
complying [sic] to the different suggestions of these police officers, despite of which, her efforts produced
no positive results up to the present time;

21. In fact at times, some police officers, who [sympathized with] the sufferings undergone by the
[respondent], informed her that they are not the proper persons that she should approach, but assured her
not to worry because her husband is [sic] in good hands;

22. The unexplained uncooperative behavior of the [petitioners] to the [respondent’s] request for help and
failure and refusal of the [petitioners] to extend the needed help, support and assistance in locating the
whereabouts of Engr. Tagitis who had been declared missing since October 30, 2007 which is almost two
(2) months now, clearly indicates that the [petitioners] are actually in physical possession and custody of
[respondent’s] husband, Engr. Tagitis;

xxxx

25. [The respondent] has exhausted all administrative avenues and remedies but to no avail, and under the
circumstances, [the respondent] has no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy to protect and get the
release of subject Engr. Morced Tagitis from the illegal clutches of the [petitioners], their intelligence
operatives and the like which are in total violation of the subject’s human and constitutional rights, except
the issuance of a WRIT OF AMPARO. [Emphasis supplied]

On the same day the petition was filed, the CA immediately issued the Writ of Amparo, set the case for
hearing on January 7, 2008, and directed the petitioners to file their verified return within seventy-two (72)
hours from service of the writ.11

In their verified Return filed during the hearing of January 27, 2008, the petitioners denied any involvement
in or knowledge of Tagitis’ alleged abduction. They argued that the allegations of the petition were
incomplete and did not constitute a cause of action against them; were baseless, or at best speculative; and
were merely based on hearsay evidence. 12

The affidavit of PNP Chief Gen. Avelino I. Razon, attached to the Return, stated that: he did not have any
personal knowledge of, or any participation in, the alleged disappearance; that he had been designated by
President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo as the head of a special body called TASK FORCE USIG, to address
concerns about extralegal killings and enforced disappearances; the Task Force, inter alia, coordinated with
the investigators and local police, held case conferences, rendered legal advice in connection to these cases;
and gave the following summary:13

xxxx

4.

a) On November 5, 2007, the Regional Director, Police Regional Office ARMM submitted a report on
the alleged disappearance of one Engr. Morced Tagitis. According to the said report, the victim
checked-in at ASY Pension House on October 30, 2007 at about 6:00 in the morning and then roamed
around Jolo, Sulu with an unidentified companion. It was only after a few days when the said victim
did not return that the matter was reported to Jolo MPS. Afterwards, elements of Sulu PPO conducted
a thorough investigation to trace and locate the whereabouts of the said missing person, but to no
avail. The said PPO is still conducting investigation that will lead to the immediate findings of the
whereabouts of the person.

b) Likewise, the Regional Chief, 9RCIDU submitted a Progress Report to the Director, CIDG. The said
report stated among others that: subject person attended an Education Development Seminar set
on October 28, 2007 conducted at Ateneo de Zamboanga, Zamboanga City together with a Prof.
Matli. On October 30, 2007, at around 5:00 o’clock in the morning, Engr. Tagitis reportedly arrived
at Jolo Sulu wharf aboard M/V Bounty Cruise, he was then billeted at ASY Pension House. At about
6:15 o’clock in the morning of the same date, he instructed his student to purchase a fast craft ticket
bound for Zamboanga City and will depart from Jolo, Sulu on October 31, 2007. That on or about
10:00 o’clock in the morning, Engr. Tagitis left the premises of ASY Pension House as stated by the
cashier of the said pension house. Later in the afternoon, the student instructed to purchase the
ticket arrived at the pension house and waited for Engr. Tagitis, but the latter did not return. On its
 part, the elements of 9RCIDU is now conducting a continuous case build up and information gathering
to locate the whereabouts of Engr. Tagitis.

c) That the Director, CIDG directed the conduct of the search in all divisions of the CIDG to find Engr.
Tagitis who was allegedly abducted or illegally detained by covert CIDG-PNP Intelligence Operatives
since October 30, 2007, but after diligent and thorough search, records show that no such person is
being detained in CIDG or any of its department or divisions.

5. On this particular case, the Philippine National Police exhausted all possible efforts, steps and actions
available under the circumstances and continuously search and investigate [sic] the instant case. This
immense mandate, however, necessitates the indispensable role of the citizenry, as the PNP cannot stand
alone without the cooperation of the victims and witnesses to identify the perpetrators to bring them before
the bar of justice and secure their conviction in court.

The petitioner PNP-CIDG Chief, Gen. Edgardo M. Doromal, submitted as well his affidavit, also attached to
the Return of the Writ, attesting that upon receipt of the Writ of Amparo, he caused the following: 14

xxxx

That immediately upon receipt on December 29, 2007 of the Resolution of the Honorable Special Fourth
Division of the Court of Appeals, I immediately directed the Investigation Division of this Group [CIDG] to
conduct urgent investigation on the alleged enforced disappearance of Engineer Morced Tagitis.

That based on record, Engr. Morced N. Tagitis attended an Education Development Seminar on October 28,
2007 at Ateneo de Zamboanga at Zamboanga City together with Prof. Abdulnasser Matli. On October 30,
2007, at around six o’clock in the morning he arrived at Jolo, Sulu. He was assisted by his student identified
as Arsimin Kunnong of the Islamic Development Bank who was also one of the participants of the said
seminar. He checked in at ASY pension house located [sic] Kakuyagan, Patikul, Sulu on October 30, 2007
with [sic] unidentified companion. At around six o’clock in the morning of even date, Engr. Tagitis instructed
his student to purchase a fast craft ticket for Zamboanga City. In the afternoon of the same date, Kunnong
arrived at the pension house carrying the ticket he purchased for Engr. Tagitis, but the latter was nowhere
to be found anymore. Kunnong immediately informed Prof. Abdulnasser Matli who reported the incident to
the police. The CIDG is not involved in the disappearance of Engr. Morced Tagitis to make out a case of an
enforced disappearance which presupposes a direct or indirect involvement of the government.

That herein [petitioner] searched all divisions and departments for a person named Engr. Morced N. Tagitis,
who was allegedly abducted or illegally detained by covert CIDG-PNP Intelligence Operatives since October
30, 2007 and after a diligent and thorough research records show that no such person is being detained in
CIDG or any of its department or divisions.

That nevertheless, in order to determine the circumstances surrounding Engr. Morced Tagitis [sic] alleged
enforced disappearance, the undersigned had undertaken immediate investigation and will pursue
investigations up to its full completion in order to aid in the prosecution of the person or persons responsible
therefore.

Likewise attached to the Return of the Writ was PNP-PACER15 Chief PS Supt. Leonardo A. Espina’s affidavit
which alleged that:16

xxxx

That, I and our men and women in PACER vehemently deny any participation in the alleged abduction or
illegally [sic] detention of ENGR. MORCED N. TAGITS on October 30, 2007. As a matter of fact, nowhere in
the writ was mentioned that the alleged abduction was perpetrated by elements of PACER nor was there
any indication that the alleged abduction or illegal detention of ENGR. TAGITIS was undertaken jointly by
our men and by the alleged covert CIDG-PNP intelligence operatives alleged to have abducted or illegally
detained ENGR. TAGITIS.

That I was shocked when I learned that I was implicated in the alleged disappearance of ENGR. MORCED in
my capacity as the chief PACER [sic] considering that our office, the Police Anti-Crime and Emergency
Response (PACER), a special task force created for the purpose of neutralizing or eradicating kidnap-for-
ransom groups which until now continue to be one of the menace of our society is a respondent in kidnapping
or illegal detention case. Simply put, our task is to go after kidnappers and charge them in court and to
abduct or illegally detain or kidnap anyone is anathema to our mission.

That right after I learned of the receipt of the WRIT OF AMPARO, I directed the Chief of PACER Mindanao
Oriental (PACER-MOR) to conduct pro-active measures to investigate, locate/search the subject, identify
and apprehend the persons responsible, to recover and preserve evidence related to the disappearance of
ENGR. MORCED TAGITIS, which may aid in the prosecution of the person or persons responsible, to identify
witnesses and obtain statements from them concerning the disappearance and to determine the cause,
manner, location and time of disappearance as well as any pattern or practice that may have brought about
the disappearance.
That I further directed the chief of PACER-MOR, Police Superintendent JOSE ARNALDO BRIONES JR., to
submit a written report regarding the disappearance of ENGR. MORCED.

That in compliance with my directive, the chief of PACER-MOR sent through fax his written report.

That the investigation and measures being undertaken to locate/search the subject in coordination with
Police Regional Office, Autonomous Region of Muslim Mindanao (PRO-ARMM) and Jolo Police Provincial Office
(PPO) and other AFP and PNP units/agencies in the area are ongoing with the instruction not to leave any
stone unturned so to speak in the investigation until the perpetrators in the instant case are brought to the
bar of justice.

That I have exercised EXTRAORDINARY DILIGENCE in dealing with the WRIT OF AMPARO just issued.

Finally, the PNP PRO ARMM Regional Director PC Supt. Joel R. Goltiao (Gen. Goltiao), also submitted his
affidavit detailing the actions that he had taken upon receipt of the report on Tagitis’ disappearance, viz: 17

xxxx

3) For the record:

1. I am the Regional Director of Police Regional Office ARMM now and during the time of the incident;

xxxx

4. It is my duty to look into and take appropriate measures on any cases of reported enforced
disappearances and when they are being alluded to my office;

5. On November 5, 2007, the Provincial Director of Sulu Police Provincial Office reported to me through
Radio Message Cite No. SPNP3-1105-07-2007 that on November 4, 2007 at around 3:30 p.m., a certain
Abdulnasser Matli, an employee of Islamic Development Bank, appeared before the Office of the Chief of
Police, Jolo Police Station, and reported the disappearance of Engr. Morced Tagitis, scholarship coordinator
of Islamic Development Bank, Manila;

6. There was no report that Engr. Tagibis was last seen in the company of or taken by any member of the
Philippine National Police but rather he just disappeared from ASY Pension House situated at Kakuyagan
Village, Village, Patikul, Sulu, on October 30, 2007, without any trace of forcible abduction or arrest;

7. The last known instance of communication with him was when Arsimin Kunnong, a student scholar, was
requested by him to purchase a vessel ticket at the Office of Weezam Express, however, when the student
returned back to ASY Pension House, he no longer found Engr. Tagitis there and when he immediately
inquired at the information counter regarding his whereabouts [sic], the person in charge in the counter
informed him that Engr. Tagitis had left the premises on October 30, 2007 around 1 o’clock p.m. and never
returned back to his room;

8. Immediately after learning the incident, I called and directed the Provincial Director of Sulu Police
Provincial Office and other units through phone call and text messages to conduct investigation [sic] to
determine the whereabouts of the aggrieved party and the person or persons responsible for the threat, act
or omission, to recover and preserve evidence related to the disappearance of Engr. Tagitis, to identify
witnesses and obtain statements from them concerning his disappearance, to determine the cause and
manner of his disappearance, to identify and apprehend the person or persons involved in the disappearance
so that they shall be brought before a competent court;

9. Thereafter, through my Chief of the Regional Investigation and Detection Management Division, I have
caused the following directives:

a) Radio Message Cite No. RIDMD-1122-07-358 dated November 22, 2007 directing PD Sulu PPO to
conduct joint investigation with CIDG and CIDU ARMM on the matter;

b) Radio Message Cite No. RIDMD-1128-07-361 dated November 28, 2007 directing PD Sulu PPO to
expedite compliance to my previous directive;

c) Memorandum dated December 14, 2007 addressed to PD Sulu PPO reiterating our series of
directives for investigation and directing him to undertake exhaustive coordination efforts with the
owner of ASY Pension House and student scholars of IDB in order to secure corroborative statements
regarding the disappearance and whereabouts of said personality;

d) Memorandum dated December 24, 2007 addressed to PD Sulu PPO directing him to maximize
efforts to establish clues on the whereabouts of Engr. Tagitis by seeking the cooperation of Prof.
Abdulnasser Matli and Arsimin Kunnong and/or whenever necessary, for them to voluntarily submit
 for polygraph examination with the NBI so as to expunge all clouds of doubt that they may somehow
have knowledge or idea to his disappearance;

e) Memorandum dated December 27, 2007 addressed to the Regional Chief, Criminal Investigation
and Detection Group, Police Regional Office 9, Zamboanga City, requesting assistance to investigate
the cause and unknown disappearance of Engr. Tagitis considering that it is within their area of
operational jurisdiction;

f) Memorandum from Chief, Intelligence Division, PRO ARMM dated December 30, 2007 addressed
to PD Sulu PPO requiring them to submit complete investigation report regarding the case of Engr.
Tagitis;

10. In compliance to our directives, PD Sulu PPO has exerted his [sic] efforts to conduct investigation [sic]
on the matter to determine the whereabouts of Engr. Tagitis and the circumstances related to his
disappearance and submitted the following:

a) Progress Report dated November 6, 2007 through Radio Message Cite No. SPNP3-1106-10-2007;

b) Radio Message Cite No. SPIDMS-1205-47-07 informing this office that they are still monitoring
the whereabouts of Engr. Tagitis;

c) Investigation Report dated December 31, 2007 from the Chief of Police, Jolo Police Station, Sulu
PPO;

11. This incident was properly reported to the PNP Higher Headquarters as shown in the following:

a) Memorandum dated November 6, 2007 addressed to the Chief, PNP informing him of the facts of
the disappearance and the action being taken by our office;

b) Memorandum dated November 6, 2007 addressed to the Director, Directorate for Investigation
and Detection Management, NHQ PNP;

c) Memorandum dated December 30, 2007 addressed to the Director, DIDM;

4) In spite of our exhaustive efforts, the whereabouts of Engr. Tagitis cannot be determined but our office
is continuously intensifying the conduct of information gathering, monitoring and coordination for the
immediate solution of the case.

Since the disappearance of Tagistis was practically admitted and taking note of favorable actions so far
taken on the disappearance, the CA directed Gen. Goltiao – as the officer in command of the area of
disappearance – to form TASK FORCE TAGITIS.18

Task Force Tagitis

On January 11, 2008, Gen. Goltiao designated PS Supt. Ahiron Ajirim (PS Supt. Ajirim) to head TASK FORCE
TAGITIS.19 The CA subsequently set three hearings to monitor whether TASK FORCE TAGITIS was exerting
"extraordinary efforts" in handling the disappearance of Tagitis.20 As planned, (1) the first hearing would be
to mobilize the CIDG, Zamboanga City; (2) the second hearing would be to mobilize intelligence with Abu
Sayyaf and ARMM; and (3) the third hearing would be to mobilize the Chief of Police of Jolo, Sulu and the
Chief of Police of Zamboanga City and other police operatives. 21

In the hearing on January 17, 2008, TASK FORCE TAGITIS submitted to the CA an intelligence report from
PSL Usman S. Pingay, the Chief of Police of the Jolo Police Station, stating a possible motive for Tagitis’
disappearance.22 The intelligence report was apparently based on the sworn affidavit dated January 4, 2008
of Muhammad Abdulnazeir N. Matli (Prof. Matli), Professor of Islamic Studies at the University of the
Philippines and an Honorary Student Counselor of the IDB Scholarship Program in the Philippines, who told
the Provincial Governor of Sulu that:23

[Based] on reliable information from the Office of Muslim Affairs in Manila, Tagitis has reportedly taken and
carried away… more or less Five Million Pesos (P5,000,000.00) deposited and entrusted to his … [personal]
bank accounts by the Central Office of IDB, Jeddah, Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, which [was] intended for the
… IDB Scholarship Fund.

In the same hearing, PS Supt. Ajirim testified that since the CIDG was alleged to be responsible, he
personally went to the CIDG office in Zamboanga City to conduct an ocular inspection/investigation,
particularly of their detention cells.24 PS Supt. Ajirim stated that the CIDG, while helping TASK FORCE
TAGITIS investigate the disappearance of Tagitis, persistently denied any knowledge or complicity in any
abduction.25 He further testified that prior to the hearing, he had already mobilized and given specific
instructions to their supporting units to perform their respective tasks; that they even talked to, but failed
to get any lead from the respondent in Jolo.26 In his submitted investigation report dated January 16, 2008,
PS Supt. Ajirim concluded:27

9. Gleaned from the undersigned inspection and observation at the Headquarters 9 RCIDU and the
documents at hand, it is my own initial conclusion that the 9RCIDU and other PNP units in the area had no
participation neither [sic] something to do with [sic] mysterious disappearance of Engr. Morced Tagitis last
October 30, 2007. Since doubt has been raised regarding the emolument on the Islamic Development Bank
Scholar program of IDB that was reportedly deposited in the personal account of Engr. Tagitis by the IDB
central office in Jeddah, Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. Secondly, it could might [sic] be done by resentment or
sour grape among students who are applying for the scholar [sic] and were denied which was allegedly
conducted/screened by the subject being the coordinator of said program.

20. It is also premature to conclude but it does or it may and [sic] presumed that the motive behind the
disappearance of the subject might be due to the funds he maliciously spent for his personal interest and
wanted to elude responsibilities from the institution where he belong as well as to the Islamic student
scholars should the statement of Prof. Matli be true or there might be a professional jealousy among them.

xxxx

It is recommended that the Writ of Amparo filed against the respondents be dropped and dismissed
considering on [sic] the police and military actions in the area particularly the CIDG are exerting their efforts
and religiously doing their tasked [sic] in the conduct of its intelligence monitoring and investigation for the
early resolution of this instant case. But rest assured, our office, in coordination with other law-enforcement
agencies in the area, are continuously and religiously conducting our investigation for the resolution of this
case.

On February 4, 2008, the CA issued an ALARM WARNING that Task Force Tagitis did not appear to be
exerting extraordinary efforts in resolving Tagitis’ disappearance on the following grounds: 28

(1) This Court FOUND that it was only as late as January 28, 2008, after the hearing, that GEN. JOEL
GOLTIAO and COL. AHIRON AJIRIM had requested for clear photographs when it should have been
standard operating procedure in kidnappings or disappearances that the first agenda was for the
police to secure clear pictures of the missing person, Engr. Morced Tagitis, for dissemination to all
parts of the country and to neighboring countries. It had been three (3) months since GEN. JOEL
GOLTIAO admitted having been informed on November 5, 2007 of the alleged abduction of Engr.
Morced Tagitis by alleged bad elements of the CIDG. It had been more than one (1) month since the
Writ of Amparo had been issued on December 28, 2007. It had been three (3) weeks when battle
formation was ordered through Task Force Tagitis, on January 17, 2008. It was only on January 28,
2008 when the Task Force Tagitis requested for clear and recent photographs of the missing person,
Engr. Morced Tagitis, despite the Task Force Tagitis’ claim that they already had an "all points
bulletin", since November 5, 2007, on the missing person, Engr. Morced Tagitis. How could the police
look for someone who disappeared if no clear photograph had been disseminated?

(2) Furthermore, Task Force Tagitis’ COL. AHIROM AJIRIM informed this Court that P/Supt KASIM
was designated as Col. Ahirom Ajirim’s replacement in the latter’s official designated post. Yet, P/Supt
KASIM’s subpoena was returned to this Court unserved. Since this Court was made to understand
that it was P/Supt KASIM who was the petitioner’s unofficial source of the military intelligence
information that Engr. Morced Tagitis was abducted by bad elements of the CIDG (par. 15 of the
Petition), the close contact between P/Supt KASIM and Col. Ahirom Ajirim of TASK FORCE TAGITIS
should have ensured the appearance of Col. KASIM in response to this court’s subpoena and COL.
KASIM could have confirmed the military intelligence information that bad elements of the CIDG had
abducted Engr. Morced Tagitis.

Testimonies for the Respondent

On January 7, 2008, the respondent, Mary Jean B. Tagitis, testified on direct examination that she went to
Jolo and Zamboanga in her efforts to locate her husband. She said that a friend from Zamboanga holding a
high position in the military (whom she did not then identify) gave her information that allowed her to
"specify" her allegations, "particularly paragraph 15 of the petition." 29 This friend also told her that her
husband "[was] in good hands."30 The respondent also testified that she sought the assistance of her former
boss in Davao City, Land Bank Bajada Branch Manager Rudy Salvador, who told her that "PNP CIDG is
holding [her husband], Engineer Morced Tagitis."31 The respondent recounted that she went to Camp
Katitipan in Davao City where she met Col. Julasirim Ahadin Kasim (Col. Kasim/Sr. Supt Kasim) who read
to her and her friends (who were then with her) a "highly confidential report" that contained the "alleged
activities of Engineer Tagitis" and informed her that her husband was abducted because "he is under
custodial investigation" for being a liaison for "J.I. or Jema’ah Islamiah." 32

On January 17, 2008, the respondent on cross-examination testified that she is Tagitis’ second wife, and
they have been married for thirteen years; Tagitis was divorced from his first wife. 33 She last communicated
with her husband on October 29, 2007 at around 7:31 p.m. through text messaging; Tagitis was then on
his way to Jolo, Sulu, from Zamboanga City.34
The respondent narrated that she learned of her husband’s disappearance on October 30, 2007 when her
stepdaughter, Zaynah Tagitis (Zaynah), informed her that she had not heard from her father since the time
they arranged to meet in Manila on October 31, 2007. 35 The respondent explained that it took her a few
days (or on November 5, 2007) to personally ask Kunnong to report her husband’s disappearance to the
Jolo Police Station, since she had the impression that her husband could not communicate with her because
his cellular phone’s battery did not have enough power, and that he would call her when he had fully-
charged his cellular phone’s battery.36

The respondent also identified the high-ranking military friend, who gave her the information found in
paragraph 15 of her petition, as Lt. Col. Pedro L. Ancanan, Jr (Col. Ancanan). She met him in Camp Karingal,
Zamboanga through her boss.37 She also testified that she was with three other people, namely, Mrs.
Marydel Martin Talbin and her two friends from Mati City, Davao Oriental, when Col. Kasim read to them
the contents of the "highly confidential report" at Camp Katitipan, Davao City. The respondent further
narrated that the report indicated that her husband met with people belonging to a terrorist group and that
he was under custodial investigation. She then told Col. Kasim that her husband was a diabetic taking
maintenance medication, and asked that the Colonel relay to the persons holding him the need to give him
his medication.38

On February 11, 2008, TASK FORCE TAGITIS submitted two narrative reports,39 signed by the respondent,
detailing her efforts to locate her husband which led to her meetings with Col. Ancanan of the Philippine
Army and Col. Kasim of the PNP. In her narrative report concerning her meeting with Col. Ancanan, the
respondent recounted, viz:40

On November 11, 2007, we went to Zamboanga City with my friend Mrs. Marydel Talbin. Our flight from
Davao City is 9:00 o’clock in the morning; we arrived at Zamboanga Airport at around 10:00 o’clock. We
[were] fetched by the two staffs of Col. Ancanan. We immediately proceed [sic] to West Mindanao Command
(WESTMINCOM).

On that same day, we had private conversation with Col. Ancanan. He interviewed me and got information
about the personal background of Engr. Morced N. Tagitis. After he gathered all information, he revealed to
us the contents of text messages they got from the cellular phone of the subject Engr. Tagitis. One of the
very important text messages of Engr. Tagitis sent to his daughter Zaynah Tagitis was that she was not
allowed to answer any telephone calls in his condominium unit.

While we were there he did not tell us any information of the whereabouts of Engr. Tagitis. After the said
meeting with Col. Ancanan, he treated us as guests to the city. His two staffs accompanied us to the mall
to purchase our plane ticket going back to Davao City on November 12, 2007.

When we arrived in Davao City on November 12, 2007 at 9:00 in the morning, Col. Ancanan and I were
discussing some points through phone calls. He assured me that my husband is alive and he’s last looked
[sic] in Talipapao, Jolo, Sulu. Yet I did not believe his given statements of the whereabouts of my husband,
because I contacted some of my friends who have access to the groups of MILF, MNLF and ASG. I called up
Col. Ancanan several times begging to tell me the exact location of my husband and who held him but he
refused.

While I was in Jolo, Sulu on November 30, 2007, I called him up again because the PNP, Jolo did not give
me any information of the whereabouts of my husband. Col. Ancanan told me that "Sana ngayon alam mo
na kung saan ang kinalalagyan ng asawa mo." When I was in Zamboanga, I was thinking of dropping by
the office of Col. Ancanan, but I was hesitant to pay him a visit for the reason that the Chief of Police of Jolo
told me not to contact any AFP officials and he promised me that he can solve the case of my husband
(Engr. Tagitis) within nine days.

I appreciate the effort of Col. Ancanan on trying to solve the case of my husband Engr. Morced Tagitis, yet
failed to do so.

The respondent also narrated her encounter with Col. Kasim, as follows:41

On November 7, 2007, I went to Land Bank of the Philippines, Bajada Branch, Davao City to meet Mr. Rudy
Salvador. I told him that my husband, Engineer Morced Tagitis was presumed to be abducted in Jolo, Sulu
on October 30, 2007. I asked him a favor to contact his connections in the military in Jolo, Sulu where the
abduction of Engr. Tagitis took place. Mr. Salvador immediately called up Camp Katitipan located in Davao
City looking for high-ranking official who can help me gather reliable information behind the abduction of
subject Engineer Tagitis.

On that same day, Mr. Salvador and my friend, Anna Mendoza, Executive Secretary, accompanied me to
Camp Katitipan to meet Col. Kasim. Mr. Salvador introduced me to Col. Kasim and we had a short
conversation. And he assured me that he’ll do the best he can to help me find my husband.

After a few weeks, Mr. Salvador called me up informing me up informing me that I am to go to Camp
Katitipan to meet Col. Kasim for he has an urgent, confidential information to reveal.
On November 24, 2007, we went back to Camp Katitipan with my three friends. That was the time that Col.
Kasim read to us the confidential report that Engr. Tagitis was allegedly connected [with] different terrorist
[groups], one of which he mentioned in the report was OMAR PATIK and a certain SANTOS - a Balik Islam.

It is also said that Engr. Tagitis is carrying boxes of medicines for the injured terrorists as a supplier. These
are the two information that I can still remember. It was written in a long bond paper with PNP Letterhead.
It was not shown to us, yet Col. Kasim was the one who read it for us.

He asked a favor to me that "Please don’t quote my Name! Because this is a raw report." He assured me
that my husband is alive and he is in the custody of the military for custodial investigation. I told him to
please take care of my husband because he has aliments and he recently took insulin for he is a diabetic
patient.

In my petition for writ of amparo, I emphasized the information that I got from Kasim.

On February 11, 2008, the respondent presented Mrs. Marydel Martin Talbin (Mrs. Talbin) to corroborate
her testimony regarding her efforts to locate her husband, in relation particularly with the information she
received from Col. Kasim. Mrs. Talbin testified that she was with the respondent when she went to
Zamboanga to see Col. Ancanan, and to Davao City at Camp Katitipan to meet Col. Kasim. 42

In Zamboanga, Mrs. Talbin recounted that they met with Col. Ancanan, who told them that there was a
report and that he showed them a series of text messages from Tagitis’ cellular phone, which showed that
Tagitis and his daughter would meet in Manila on October 30, 2007.43

She further narrated that sometime on November 24, 2007, she went with the respondent together with
two other companions, namely, Salvacion Serrano and Mini Leong, to Camp Katitipan to talk to Col.
Kasim.44 The respondent asked Col. Kasim if he knew the exact location of Engr. Tagitis. Col. Kasim told
them that Tagitis was in good hands, although he was not certain whether he was with the PNP or with the
Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP). She further recounted that based on the report Col. Kasim read in
their presence, Tagitis was under custodial investigation because he was being charged with terrorism;
Tagitis in fact had been under surveillance since January 2007 up to the time he was abducted when he was
seen talking to Omar Patik and a certain Santos of Bulacan, a "Balik Islam" charged with terrorism. Col.
Kasim also told them that he could not give a copy of the report because it was a "raw report." 45 She also
related that the Col. Kasim did not tell them exactly where Tagitis was being kept, although he mentioned
Talipapao, Sulu.Prof., lalabas din yan."50 Prof. Matli also emphasized that despite what his January 4, 2008
affidavit indicated,51 he never told PS Supt. Pingay, or made any accusation, that Tagitis took away money
entrusted to him.52 Prof. Matli confirmed, however, that that he had received an e-mail report53 from Nuraya
Lackian of the Office of Muslim Affairs in Manila that the IDB was seeking assistance of the office in locating
the funds of IDB scholars deposited in Tagitis’ personal account.54

On cross-examination by the respondent’s counsel, Prof. Matli testified that his January 4, 2008 affidavit
was already prepared when PS Supt. Pingay asked him to sign it.55 Prof Matli clarified that although he read
the affidavit before signing it, he "was not so much aware of… [its] contents." 56

On February 11, 2008, the petitioners presented Col. Kasim to rebut material portions of the respondent’s
testimony, particularly the allegation that he had stated that Tagitis was in the custody of either the military
or the PNP.57 Col. Kasim categorically denied the statements made by the respondent in her narrative report,
specifically: (1) that Tagitis was seen carrying boxes of medicines as supplier for the injured terrorists; (2)
that Tagitis was under the custody of the military, since he merely said to the respondent that "your husband
is in good hands" and is "probably taken cared of by his armed abductors;" and (3) that Tagitis was under
custodial investigation by the military, the PNP or the CIDG Zamboanga City. 58 Col. Kasim emphasized that
the "informal letter" he received from his informant in Sulu did not indicate that Tagitis was in the custody
of the CIDG.59 He also stressed that the information he provided to the respondent was merely a "raw
report" sourced from "barangay intelligence" that still needed confirmation and "follow-up" as to its
veracity.60

On cross-examination, Col. Kasim testified that the information he gave the respondent was given to him
by his informant, who was a "civilian asset," through a letter which he considered as "unofficial." 61 Col.
Kasim stressed that the letter was only meant for his "consumption" and not for reading by others.62 He
testified further that he destroyed the letter right after he read it to the respondent and her companions
because "it was not important to him" and also because the information it contained had no importance in
relation with the abduction of Tagitis.63 He explained that he did not keep the letter because it did not
contain any information regarding the whereabouts of Tagitis and the person(s) responsible for his
abduction.64

In the same hearing on February 11, 2008, the petitioners also presented Police Senior Superintendent Jose
Volpane Pante (Col. Pante), Chief of the CIDG-9, to disprove the respondent’s allegation that Tagitis was in
the custody of CIDG-Zamboanga City.65 Col. Pante clarified that the CIDG was the "investigative arm" of
the PNP, and that the CIDG "investigates and prosecutes all cases involving violations in the Revised Penal
Code particularly those considered as heinous crimes." 66 Col. Pante further testified that the allegation that
9 RCIDU personnel were involved in the disappearance of Tagitis was baseless, since they did not conduct
any operation in Jolo, Sulu before or after Tagitis’ reported disappearance. 67 Col. Pante added that the four
(4) personnel assigned to the Sulu CIDT had no capability to conduct any "operation," since they were only
assigned to investigate matters and to monitor the terrorism situation. 68 He denied that his office conducted
any surveillance on Tagitis prior to the latter’s disappearance. 69 Col. Pante further testified that his
investigation of Tagitis’ disappearance was unsuccessful; the investigation was "still facing a blank wall" on
the whereabouts of Tagitis.70

THE CA RULING

On March 7, 2008, the CA issued its decision71 confirming that the disappearance of Tagitis was an "enforced
disappearance" under the United Nations (UN) Declaration on the Protection of All Persons from Enforced
Disappearances.72 The CA ruled that when military intelligence pinpointed the investigative arm of the PNP
(CIDG) to be involved in the abduction, the missing-person case qualified as an enforced disappearance.
The conclusion that the CIDG was involved was based on the respondent’s testimony, corroborated by her
companion, Mrs. Talbin. The CA noted that the information that the CIDG, as the police intelligence arm,
was involved in Tagitis’ abduction came from no less than the military – an independent agency of
government. The CA thus greatly relied on the "raw report" from Col. Kasim’s asset, pointing to the CIDG’s
involvement in Tagitis’ abduction. The CA held that "raw reports" from an "asset" carried "great weight" in
the intelligence world. It also labeled as "suspect" Col. Kasim’s subsequent and belated retraction of his
statement that the military, the police, or the CIDG was involved in the abduction of Tagitis.

The CA characterized as "too farfetched and unbelievable" and "a bedlam of speculation" police theories
painting the disappearance as "intentional" on the part of Tagitis. He had no previous brushes with the law
or any record of overstepping the bounds of any trust regarding money entrusted to him; no student of the
IDB scholarship program ever came forward to complain that he or she did not get his or her stipend. The
CA also found no basis for the police theory that Tagitis was "trying to escape from the clutches of his second
wife," on the basis of the respondent’s testimony that Tagitis was a Muslim who could have many wives
under the Muslim faith, and that there was "no issue" at all when the latter divorced his first wife in order
to marry the second. Finally, the CA also ruled out kidnapping for ransom by the Abu Sayyaf or by the ARMM
paramilitary as the cause for Tagitis’ disappearance, since the respondent, the police and the military noted
that there was no acknowledgement of Tagitis’ abduction or demand for payment of ransom – the usual
modus operandi of these terrorist groups.

Based on these considerations, the CA thus extended the privilege of the writ to Tagitis and his family, and
directed the CIDG Chief, Col. Jose Volpane Pante, PNP Chief Avelino I. Razon, Task Force Tagitis heads Gen.
Joel Goltiao and Col. Ahiron Ajirim, and PACER Chief Sr. Supt. Leonardo A. Espina to exert extraordinary
diligence and efforts to protect the life, liberty and security of Tagitis, with the obligation to provide monthly
reports of their actions to the CA. At the same time, the CA dismissed the petition against the then
respondents from the military, Lt. Gen Alexander Yano and Gen. Ruben Rafael, based on the finding that it
was PNP-CIDG, not the military, that was involved.

On March 31, 2008, the petitioners moved to reconsider the CA decision, but the CA denied the motion in
its Resolution of April 9, 2008.73

THE PETITION

In this Rule 45 appeal questioning the CA’s March 7, 2008 decision, the petitioners mainly dispute the
sufficiency in form and substance of the Amparo petition filed before the CA; the sufficiency of the legal
remedies the respondent took before petitioning for the writ; the finding that the rights to life, liberty and
security of Tagitis had been violated; the sufficiency of evidence supporting the conclusion that Tagitis was
abducted; the conclusion that the CIDG Zamboanga was responsible for the abduction; and, generally, the
ruling that the respondent discharged the burden of proving the allegations of the petition by substantial
evidence.74

THE COURT’S RULING

We do not find the petition meritorious.

Sufficiency in Form and Substance

In questioning the sufficiency in form and substance of the respondent’s Amparo petition, the petitioners
contend that the petition violated Section 5(c), (d), and (e) of the Amparo Rule. Specifically, the petitioners
allege that the respondent failed to:

1) allege any act or omission the petitioners committed in violation of Tagitis’ rights to life, liberty
and security;

2) allege in a complete manner how Tagitis was abducted, the persons responsible for his
disappearance, and the respondent’s source of information;

3) allege that the abduction was committed at the petitioners’ instructions or with their consent;
 4) implead the members of CIDG regional office in Zamboanga alleged to have custody over her
husband;

5) attach the affidavits of witnesses to support her accusations;

6) allege any action or inaction attributable to the petitioners in the performance of their duties in
the investigation of Tagitis’ disappearance; and

7) specify what legally available efforts she took to determine the fate or whereabouts of her
husband.

A petition for the Writ of Amparo shall be signed and verified and shall allege, among others (in terms of
the portions the petitioners cite):75

(c) The right to life, liberty and security of the aggrieved party violated or threatened with
violation by an unlawful act or omission of the respondent, and how such threat or violation is
committed with the attendant circumstances detailed in supporting affidavits;

(d) The investigation conducted, if any, specifying the names, personal circumstances, and
addresses of the investigating authority or individuals, as well as the manner and conduct of the
investigation, together with any report;

(e) The actions and recourses taken by the petitioner to determine the fate or whereabouts of the aggrieved
party and the identity of the person responsible for the threat, act or omission; and

The framers of the Amparo Rule never intended Section 5(c) to be complete in every detail in stating the
threatened or actual violation of a victim’s rights. As in any other initiatory pleading, the pleader must of
course state the ultimate facts constituting the cause of action, omitting the evidentiary details. 76 In an
Amparo petition, however, this requirement must be read in light of the nature and purpose of the
proceeding, which addresses a situation of uncertainty; the petitioner may not be able to describe with
certainty how the victim exactly disappeared, or who actually acted to kidnap, abduct or arrest him or her,
or where the victim is detained, because these information may purposely be hidden or covered up by those
who caused the disappearance. In this type of situation, to require the level of specificity, detail and precision
that the petitioners apparently want to read into the Amparo Rule is to make this Rule a token gesture of
judicial concern for violations of the constitutional rights to life, liberty and security.

To read the Rules of Court requirement on pleadings while addressing the unique Amparo situation, the test
in reading the petition should be to determine whether it contains the details available to the petitioner
under the circumstances, while presenting a cause of action showing a violation of the victim’s rights to life,
liberty and security through State or private party action. The petition should likewise be read in its totality,
rather than in terms of its isolated component parts, to determine if the required elements – namely, of the
disappearance, the State or private action, and the actual or threatened violations of the rights to life, liberty
or security – are present.

In the present case, the petition amply recites in its paragraphs 4 to 11 the circumstances under which
Tagitis suddenly dropped out of sight after engaging in normal activities, and thereafter was nowhere to be
found despite efforts to locate him. The petition alleged, too, under its paragraph 7, in relation to paragraphs
15 and 16, that according to reliable information, police operatives were the perpetrators of the abduction.
It also clearly alleged how Tagitis’ rights to life, liberty and security were violated when he was "forcibly
taken and boarded on a motor vehicle by a couple of burly men believed to be police intelligence operatives,"
and then taken "into custody by the respondents’ police intelligence operatives since October 30, 2007,
specifically by the CIDG, PNP Zamboanga City, x x x held against his will in an earnest attempt of the police
to involve and connect [him] with different terrorist groups."77

These allegations, in our view, properly pleaded ultimate facts within the pleader’s knowledge about Tagitis’
disappearance, the participation by agents of the State in this disappearance, the failure of the State to
release Tagitis or to provide sufficient information about his whereabouts, as well as the actual violation of
his right to liberty. Thus, the petition cannot be faulted for any failure in its statement of a cause of action.

If a defect can at all be attributed to the petition, this defect is its lack of supporting affidavit, as required
by Section 5(c) of the Amparo Rule. Owing to the summary nature of the proceedings for the writ and to
facilitate the resolution of the petition, the Amparo Rule incorporated the requirement for supporting
affidavits, with the annotation that these can be used as the affiant’s direct testimony. 78 This requirement,
however, should not be read as an absolute one that necessarily leads to the dismissal of the petition if not
strictly followed. Where, as in this case, the petitioner has substantially complied with the requirement by
submitting a verified petition sufficiently detailing the facts relied upon, the strict need for the sworn
statement that an affidavit represents is essentially fulfilled. We note that the failure to attach the required
affidavits was fully cured when the respondent and her witness (Mrs. Talbin) personally testified in the CA
hearings held on January 7 and 17 and February 18, 2008 to swear to and flesh out the allegations of the
petition. Thus, even on this point, the petition cannot be faulted.
Section 5(d) of the Amparo Rule requires that prior investigation of an alleged disappearance must have
been made, specifying the manner and results of the investigation. Effectively, this requirement seeks to
establish at the earliest opportunity the level of diligence the public authorities undertook in relation with
the reported disappearance.79

We reject the petitioners’ argument that the respondent’s petition did not comply with the Section 5(d)
requirements of the Amparo Rule, as the petition specifies in its paragraph 11 that Kunnong and his
companions immediately reported Tagitis’ disappearance to the police authorities in Jolo, Sulu as soon as
they were relatively certain that he indeed had disappeared. The police, however, gave them the "ready
answer" that Tagitis could have been abducted by the Abu Sayyaf group or other anti-government groups.
The respondent also alleged in paragraphs 17 and 18 of her petition that she filed a "complaint" with the
PNP Police Station in Cotobato and in Jolo, but she was told of "an intriguing tale" by the police that her
husband was having "a good time with another woman." The disappearance was alleged to have been
reported, too, to no less than the Governor of the ARMM, followed by the respondent’s personal inquiries
that yielded the factual bases for her petition.80

These allegations, to our mind, sufficiently specify that reports have been made to the police authorities,
and that investigations should have followed. That the petition did not state the manner and results of the
investigation that the Amparo Rule requires, but rather generally stated the inaction of the police, their
failure to perform their duty to investigate, or at the very least, their reported failed efforts, should not be
a reflection on the completeness of the petition. To require the respondent to elaborately specify the names,
personal circumstances, and addresses of the investigating authority, as well the manner and conduct of
the investigation is an overly strict interpretation of Section 5(d), given the respondent’s frustrations in
securing an investigation with meaningful results. Under these circumstances, we are more than satisfied
that the allegations of the petition on the investigations undertaken are sufficiently complete for purposes
of bringing the petition forward.

Section 5(e) is in the Amparo Rule to prevent the use of a petition – that otherwise is not supported by
sufficient allegations to constitute a proper cause of action – as a means to "fish" for evidence.81 The
petitioners contend that the respondent’s petition did not specify what "legally available efforts were taken
by the respondent," and that there was an "undue haste" in the filing of the petition when, instead of
cooperating with authorities, the respondent immediately invoked the Court’s intervention.

We do not see the respondent’s petition as the petitioners view it.

Section 5(e) merely requires that the Amparo petitioner (the respondent in the present case) allege "the
actions and recourses taken to determine the fate or whereabouts of the aggrieved party and the identity
of the person responsible for the threat, act or omission." The following allegations of the respondent’s
petition duly outlined the actions she had taken and the frustrations she encountered, thus compelling her
to file her petition.

xxxx

7. Soon after the student left the room, Engr. Tagitis went out of the pension house to take his early lunch
but while out on the street, a couple of burly men believed to be police intelligence operatives, forcibly took
him and boarded the latter on a motor vehicle then sped away without the knowledge of his student, Arsimin
Kunnong;

xxxx

10. When Kunnong could not locate Engr. Tagitis, the former sought the help of another IDB scholar and
reported the matter to the local police agency;

11. Arsimin Kunnong, including his friends and companions in Jolo, exerted efforts in trying to locate the
whereabouts of Engr. Tagitis and when he reported the matter to the police authorities in Jolo, he was
immediately given a ready answer that Engr. Tagitis could [have been] abducted by the Abu Sayyaf group
and other groups known to be fighting against the government;

12. Being scared with these suggestions and insinuations of the police officers, Kunnong reported the matter
to the [respondent](wife of Engr. Tagitis) by phone and other responsible officers and coordinators of the
IDB Scholarship Programme in the Philippines who alerted the office of the Governor of ARMM who was then
preparing to attend the OIC meeting in Jeddah, Saudi Arabia;

13. [The respondent], on the other hand, approached some of her co-employees with the Land Bank in
Digos branch, Digos City, Davao del Sur, who likewise sought help from some of their friends in the military
who could help them find/locate the whereabouts of her husband;

xxxx
15. According to reliable information received by the [respondent], subject Engr. Tagitis is in the custody of
police intelligence operatives, specifically with the CIDG, PNP Zamboanga City, being held against his will in
an earnest attempt of the police to involve and connect Engr. Tagitis with the different terrorist groups;

xxxx

17. [The respondent] filed her complaint with the PNP Police Station at the ARMM in Cotobato and in Jolo,
as suggested by her friends, seeking their help to find her husband, but [the respondent’s] request and
pleadings failed to produce any positive results

xxxx

20. Lately, [respondent] was again advised by one of the [petitioners] to go to the ARMM Police
Headquarters again in Cotobato City and also to the different Police Headquarters including the police
headquarters in Davao City, in Zamboanga City, in Jolo, and in Camp Crame, Quezon City, and all these
places have been visited by the [respondent] in search for her husband, which entailed expenses for her
trips to these places thereby resorting her to borrowings and beggings [sic] for financial help from friends
and relatives only to try complying to the different suggestions of these police officers, despite of which, her
efforts produced no positive results up to the present time;

xxxx

25. [The respondent] has exhausted all administrative avenues and remedies but to no avail, and under the
circumstances, [respondent] has no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy to protect and get the release
of subject Engr. Morced Tagitis from the illegal clutches of [the petitioners], their intelligence operatives and
the like which are in total violation of the subject’s human and constitutional rights, except the issuance of
a WRIT OF AMPARO.

Based on these considerations, we rule that the respondent’s petition for the Writ of Amparo is sufficient in
form and substance and that the Court of Appeals had every reason to proceed with its consideration of the
case.

The Desaparecidos

The present case is one of first impression in the use and application of the Rule on the Writ of Amparo in
an enforced disappearance situation. For a deeper appreciation of the application of this Rule to an enforced
disappearance situation, a brief look at the historical context of the writ and enforced disappearances would
be very helpful.

The phenomenon of enforced disappearance arising from State action first attracted notice in Adolf Hitler’s
Nact und Nebel Erlass or Night and Fog Decree of December 7, 1941. 82 The Third Reich’s Night and Fog
Program, a State policy, was directed at persons in occupied territories "endangering German security";
they were transported secretly to Germany where they disappeared without a trace. In order to maximize
the desired intimidating effect, the policy prohibited government officials from providing information about
the fate of these targeted persons.83

In the mid-1970s, the phenomenon of enforced disappearances resurfaced, shocking and outraging the
world when individuals, numbering anywhere from 6,000 to 24,000, were reported to have "disappeared"
during the military regime in Argentina. Enforced disappearances spread in Latin America, and the issue
became an international concern when the world noted its widespread and systematic use by State security
forces in that continent under Operation Condor 84 and during the Dirty War85 in the 1970s and 1980s. The
escalation of the practice saw political activists secretly arrested, tortured, and killed as part of governments’
counter-insurgency campaigns. As this form of political brutality became routine elsewhere in the continent,
the Latin American media standardized the term "disappearance" to describe the phenomenon. The victims
of enforced disappearances were called the "desaparecidos," 86 which literally means the "disappeared
ones."87 In general, there are three different kinds of "disappearance" cases:

1) those of people arrested without witnesses or without positive identification of the arresting agents
and are never found again;

2) those of prisoners who are usually arrested without an appropriate warrant and held in complete
isolation for weeks or months while their families are unable to discover their whereabouts and the
military authorities deny having them in custody until they eventually reappear in one detention
center or another; and

3) those of victims of "salvaging" who have disappeared until their lifeless bodies are later
discovered.88

In the Philippines, enforced disappearances generally fall within the first two categories, 89 and 855 cases
were recorded during the period of martial law from 1972 until 1986. Of this number, 595 remained missing,
132 surfaced alive and 127 were found dead. During former President Corazon C. Aquino’s term, 820 people
were reported to have disappeared and of these, 612 cases were documented. Of this number, 407 remain
missing, 108 surfaced alive and 97 were found dead. The number of enforced disappearances dropped
during former President Fidel V. Ramos’ term when only 87 cases were reported, while the three-year term
of former President Joseph E. Estrada yielded 58 reported cases. KARAPATAN, a local non-governmental
organization, reports that as of March 31, 2008, the records show that there were a total of 193 victims of
enforced disappearance under incumbent President Gloria M. Arroyo’s administration. The Commission on
Human Rights’ records show a total of 636 verified cases of enforced disappearances from 1985 to 1993.
Of this number, 406 remained missing, 92 surfaced alive, 62 were found dead, and 76 still have
undetermined status.90 Currently, the United Nations Working Group on Enforced or Involuntary
Disappearance91 reports 619 outstanding cases of enforced or involuntary disappearances covering the
period December 1, 2007 to November 30, 2008.92

Enforced Disappearances Under Philippine Law

The Amparo Rule expressly provides that the "writ shall cover extralegal killings and enforced
disappearances or threats thereof." 93 We note that although the writ specifically covers "enforced
disappearances," this concept is neither defined nor penalized in this jurisdiction. The records of the
Supreme Court Committee on the Revision of Rules (Committee) reveal that the drafters of the Amparo
Rule initially considered providing an elemental definition of the concept of enforced disappearance: 94

JUSTICE MARTINEZ: I believe that first and foremost we should come up or formulate a specific definition
[for] extrajudicial killings and enforced disappearances. From that definition, then we can proceed to
formulate the rules, definite rules concerning the same.

CHIEF JUSTICE PUNO: … As things stand, there is no law penalizing extrajudicial killings and enforced
disappearances… so initially also we have to [come up with] the nature of these extrajudicial killings and
enforced disappearances [to be covered by the Rule] because our concept of killings and disappearances
will define the jurisdiction of the courts. So we’ll have to agree among ourselves about the nature of killings
and disappearances for instance, in other jurisdictions, the rules only cover state actors. That is an element
incorporated in their concept of extrajudicial killings and enforced disappearances. In other jurisdictions, the
concept includes acts and omissions not only of state actors but also of non state actors. Well, more
specifically in the case of the Philippines for instance, should these rules include the killings, the
disappearances which may be authored by let us say, the NPAs or the leftist organizations and others. So,
again we need to define the nature of the extrajudicial killings and enforced disappearances that will be
covered by these rules. [Emphasis supplied] 95

In the end, the Committee took cognizance of several bills filed in the House of Representatives 96 and in the
Senate97 on extrajudicial killings and enforced disappearances, and resolved to do away with a clear textual
definition of these terms in the Rule. The Committee instead focused on the nature and scope of the concerns
within its power to address and provided the appropriate remedy therefor, mindful that an elemental
definition may intrude into the ongoing legislative efforts. 98

As the law now stands, extra-judicial killings and enforced disappearances in this jurisdiction are not crimes
penalized separately from the component criminal acts undertaken to carry out these killings and enforced
disappearances and are now penalized under the Revised Penal Code and special laws. 99 The simple reason
is that the Legislature has not spoken on the matter; the determination of what acts are criminal and what
the corresponding penalty these criminal acts should carry are matters of substantive law that only the
Legislature has the power to enact under the country’s constitutional scheme and power structure.

Even without the benefit of directly applicable substantive laws on extra-judicial killings and enforced
disappearances, however, the Supreme Court is not powerless to act under its own constitutional mandate
to promulgate "rules concerning the protection and enforcement of constitutional rights, pleading, practice
and procedure in all courts,"100 since extrajudicial killings and enforced disappearances, by their nature and
purpose, constitute State or private party violation of the constitutional rights of individuals to life, liberty
and security. Although the Court’s power is strictly procedural and as such does not diminish, increase or
modify substantive rights, the legal protection that the Court can provide can be very meaningful through
the procedures it sets in addressing extrajudicial killings and enforced disappearances. The Court, through
its procedural rules, can set the procedural standards and thereby directly compel the public authorities to
act on actual or threatened violations of constitutional rights. To state the obvious, judicial intervention can
make a difference – even if only procedurally – in a situation when the very same investigating public
authorities may have had a hand in the threatened or actual violations of constitutional rights.

Lest this Court intervention be misunderstood, we clarify once again that we do not rule on any issue of
criminal culpability for the extrajudicial killing or enforced disappearance. This is an issue that requires
criminal action before our criminal courts based on our existing penal laws. Our intervention is in determining
whether an enforced disappearance has taken place and who is responsible or accountable for this
disappearance, and to define and impose the appropriate remedies to address it. The burden for the public
authorities to discharge in these situations, under the Rule on the Writ of Amparo, is twofold. The first is to
ensure that all efforts at disclosure and investigation are undertaken under pain of indirect contempt from
this Court when governmental efforts are less than what the individual situations require. The second is to
address the disappearance, so that the life of the victim is preserved and his or her liberty and security
restored. In these senses, our orders and directives relative to the writ are continuing efforts that are not
truly terminated until the extrajudicial killing or enforced disappearance is fully addressed by the complete
determination of the fate and the whereabouts of the victim, by the production of the disappeared person
and the restoration of his or her liberty and security, and, in the proper case, by the commencement of
criminal action against the guilty parties.

Enforced Disappearance Under International Law

From the International Law perspective, involuntary or enforced disappearance is considered a flagrant
violation of human rights.101 It does not only violate the right to life, liberty and security of the desaparecido;
it affects their families as well through the denial of their right to information regarding the circumstances
of the disappeared family member. Thus, enforced disappearances have been said to be "a double form of
torture," with "doubly paralyzing impact for the victims," as they "are kept ignorant of their own fates, while
family members are deprived of knowing the whereabouts of their detained loved ones" and suffer as well
the serious economic hardship and poverty that in most cases follow the disappearance of the household
breadwinner.102

The UN General Assembly first considered the issue of "Disappeared Persons" in December 1978 under
Resolution 33/173. The Resolution expressed the General Assembly’s deep concern arising from "reports
from various parts of the world relating to enforced or involuntary disappearances," and requested the "UN
Commission on Human Rights to consider the issue of enforced disappearances with a view to making
appropriate recommendations."103

In 1992, in response to the reality that the insidious practice of enforced disappearance had become a global
phenomenon, the UN General Assembly adopted the Declaration on the Protection of All Persons from
Enforced Disappearance (Declaration).104 This Declaration, for the first time, provided in its third preambular
clause a working description of enforced disappearance, as follows:

Deeply concerned that in many countries, often in a persistent manner, enforced disappearances occur, in
the sense that persons are arrested, detained or abducted against their will or otherwise deprived of their
liberty by officials of different branches or levels of Government, or by organized groups or private
individuals acting on behalf of, or with the support, direct or indirect, consent or acquiescence of the
Government, followed by a refusal to disclose the fate or whereabouts of the persons concerned or a refusal
to acknowledge the deprivation of their liberty, which places such persons outside the protection of the law.
[Emphasis supplied]

Fourteen years after (or on December 20, 2006), the UN General Assembly adopted the International
Convention for the Protection of All Persons from Enforced Disappearance (Convention). 105 The Convention
was opened for signature in Paris, France on February 6, 2007. 106 Article 2 of the Convention defined
enforced disappearance as follows:

For the purposes of this Convention, "enforced disappearance" is considered to be the arrest, detention,
abduction or any other form of deprivation of liberty by agents of the State or by persons or groups of
persons acting with the authorization, support or acquiescence of the State, followed by a refusal to
acknowledge the deprivation of liberty or by concealment of the fate or whereabouts of the disappeared
person, which place such a person outside the protection of the law. [Emphasis supplied]

The Convention is the first universal human rights instrument to assert that there is a right not to be subject
to enforced disappearance107 and that this right is non-derogable.108 It provides that no one shall be
subjected to enforced disappearance under any circumstances, be it a state of war, internal political
instability, or any other public emergency. It obliges State Parties to codify enforced disappearance as an
offense punishable with appropriate penalties under their criminal law. 109 It also recognizes the right of
relatives of the disappeared persons and of the society as a whole to know the truth on the fate and
whereabouts of the disappeared and on the progress and results of the investigation. 110 Lastly, it classifies
enforced disappearance as a continuing offense, such that statutes of limitations shall not apply until the
fate and whereabouts of the victim are established.111

Binding Effect of UN Action on the Philippines

To date, the Philippines has neither signed nor ratified the Convention, so that the country is not yet
committed to enact any law penalizing enforced disappearance as a crime. The absence of a specific penal
law, however, is not a stumbling block for action from this Court, as heretofore mentioned; underlying every
enforced disappearance is a violation of the constitutional rights to life, liberty and security that the Supreme
Court is mandated by the Constitution to protect through its rule-making powers.

Separately from the Constitution (but still pursuant to its terms), the Court is guided, in acting on Amparo
cases, by the reality that the Philippines is a member of the UN, bound by its Charter and by the various
conventions we signed and ratified, particularly the conventions touching on humans rights. Under the UN
Charter, the Philippines pledged to "promote universal respect for, and observance of, human rights and
fundamental freedoms for all without distinctions as to race, sex, language or religion."112 Although no
universal agreement has been reached on the precise extent of the "human rights and fundamental
freedoms" guaranteed to all by the Charter,113 it was the UN itself that issued the Declaration on enforced
disappearance, and this Declaration states:114

Any act of enforced disappearance is an offence to dignity. It is condemned as a denial of the purposes of
the Charter of the United Nations and as a grave and flagrant violation of human rights and fundamental
freedoms proclaimed in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and reaffirmed and developed in
international instruments in this field. [Emphasis supplied]

As a matter of human right and fundamental freedom and as a policy matter made in a UN Declaration, the
ban on enforced disappearance cannot but have its effects on the country, given our own adherence to
"generally accepted principles of international law as part of the law of the land." 115

In the recent case of Pharmaceutical and Health Care Association of the Philippines v. Duque III, 116 we held
that:

Under the 1987 Constitution, international law can become part of the sphere of domestic law either
by transformation or incorporation. The transformation method requires that an international law be
transformed into a domestic law through a constitutional mechanism such as local legislation. The
incorporation method applies when, by mere constitutional declaration, international law is
deemed to have the force of domestic law. [Emphasis supplied]

We characterized "generally accepted principles of international law" as norms of general or customary

international law that are binding on all states. We held further: 117

[G]enerally accepted principles of international law, by virtue of the incorporation clause of the Constitution,
form part of the laws of the land even if they do not derive from treaty obligations. The classical formulation
in international law sees those customary rules accepted as binding result from the combination [of] two
elements: the established, widespread, and consistent practice on the part of States; and a psychological
element known as the opinion juris sive necessitates (opinion as to law or necessity). Implicit in the latter
element is a belief that the practice in question is rendered obligatory by the existence of a rule of law
requiring it. [Emphasis in the original]

The most widely accepted statement of sources of international law today is Article 38(1) of the Statute of
the International Court of Justice, which provides that the Court shall apply "international custom, as
evidence of a general practice accepted as law."118 The material sources of custom include State practice,
State legislation, international and national judicial decisions, recitals in treaties and other international
instruments, a pattern of treaties in the same form, the practice of international organs, and resolutions
relating to legal questions in the UN General Assembly. 119 Sometimes referred to as "evidence" of
international law,120 these sources identify the substance and content of the obligations of States and are
indicative of the "State practice" and "opinio juris" requirements of international law.121 We note the
following in these respects:

First, barely two years from the adoption of the Declaration, the Organization of American States (OAS)
General Assembly adopted the Inter-American Convention on Enforced Disappearance of Persons in June
1994.122 State parties undertook under this Convention "not to practice, permit, or tolerate the forced
disappearance of persons, even in states of emergency or suspension of individual guarantees." 123 One of
the key provisions includes the States’ obligation to enact the crime of forced disappearance in their
respective national criminal laws and to establish jurisdiction over such cases when the crime was committed
within their jurisdiction, when the victim is a national of that State, and "when the alleged criminal is within
its territory and it does not proceed to extradite him," which can be interpreted as establishing universal
jurisdiction among the parties to the Inter-American Convention.124 At present, Colombia, Guatemala,
Paraguay, Peru and Venezuela have enacted separate laws in accordance with the Inter-American
Convention and have defined activities involving enforced disappearance to be criminal.1251avvphi1

Second, in Europe, the European Convention on Human Rights has no explicit provision dealing with the
protection against enforced disappearance. The European Court of Human Rights (ECHR), however, has
applied the Convention in a way that provides ample protection for the underlying rights affected by enforced
disappearance through the Convention’s Article 2 on the right to life; Article 3 on the prohibition of torture;
Article 5 on the right to liberty and security; Article 6, paragraph 1 on the right to a fair trial; and Article 13
on the right to an effective remedy. A leading example demonstrating the protection afforded by the
European Convention is Kurt v. Turkey,126where the ECHR found a violation of the right to liberty and security
of the disappeared person when the applicant’s son disappeared after being taken into custody by Turkish
forces in the Kurdish village of Agilli in November 1993. It further found the applicant (the disappeared
person’s mother) to be a victim of a violation of Article 3, as a result of the silence of the authorities and
the inadequate character of the investigations undertaken. The ECHR also saw the lack of any meaningful
investigation by the State as a violation of Article 13. 127

Third, in the United States, the status of the prohibition on enforced disappearance as part of customary
international law is recognized in the most recent edition of Restatement of the Law: The Third, 128 which
provides that "[a] State violates international law if, as a matter of State policy, it practices, encourages, or
condones… (3) the murder or causing the disappearance of individuals."129 We significantly note that in a
related matter that finds close identification with enforced disappearance – the matter of torture – the United
States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit Court held in Filartiga v. Pena-Irala130 that the prohibition on
torture had attained the status of customary international law. The court further elaborated on the
significance of UN declarations, as follows:

These U.N. declarations are significant because they specify with great precision the obligations of member
nations under the Charter. Since their adoption, "(m)embers can no longer contend that they do not know
what human rights they promised in the Charter to promote." Moreover, a U.N. Declaration is, according to
one authoritative definition, "a formal and solemn instrument, suitable for rare occasions when principles of
great and lasting importance are being enunciated." Accordingly, it has been observed that the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights "no longer fits into the dichotomy of ‘binding treaty’ against ‘non-binding
pronouncement,' but is rather an authoritative statement of the international community." Thus, a
Declaration creates an expectation of adherence, and "insofar as the expectation is gradually justified by
State practice, a declaration may by custom become recognized as laying down rules binding upon the
States." Indeed, several commentators have concluded that the Universal Declaration has become, in toto,
a part of binding, customary international law. [Citations omitted]

Fourth, in interpreting Article 2 (right to an effective domestic remedy) of the International Convention on
Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), to which the Philippines is both a signatory and a State Party, the UN
Human Rights Committee, under the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, has stated that the
act of enforced disappearance violates Articles 6 (right to life), 7 (prohibition on torture, cruel, inhuman or
degrading treatment or punishment) and 9 (right to liberty and security of the person) of the ICCPR, and
the act may also amount to a crime against humanity.131

Fifth, Article 7, paragraph 1 of the 1998 Rome Statute establishing the International Criminal Court (ICC)
also covers enforced disappearances insofar as they are defined as crimes against humanity,132 i.e., crimes
"committed as part of a widespread or systematic attack against any civilian population, with knowledge of
the attack." While more than 100 countries have ratified the Rome Statute, 133 the Philippines is still merely
a signatory and has not yet ratified it. We note that Article 7(1) of the Rome Statute has been incorporated
in the statutes of other international and hybrid tribunals, including Sierra Leone Special Court, the Special
Panels for Serious Crimes in Timor-Leste, and the Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia.134 In
addition, the implementing legislation of State Parties to the Rome Statute of the ICC has given rise to a
number of national criminal provisions also covering enforced disappearance. 135

While the Philippines is not yet formally bound by the terms of the Convention on enforced disappearance
(or by the specific terms of the Rome Statute) and has not formally declared enforced disappearance as a
specific crime, the above recital shows that enforced disappearance as a State practice has been repudiated
by the international community, so that the ban on it is now a generally accepted principle of international
law, which we should consider a part of the law of the land, and which we should act upon to the extent
already allowed under our laws and the international conventions that bind us.

The following civil or political rights under the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the ICCPR and the
International Convention on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESR) may be infringed in the course of
a disappearance:136

1) the right to recognition as a person before the law;

2) the right to liberty and security of the person;

3) the right not to be subjected to torture and other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or
punishment;

4) the right to life, when the disappeared person is killed;

5) the right to an identity;

6) the right to a fair trial and to judicial guarantees;

7) the right to an effective remedy, including reparation and compensation;

8) the right to know the truth regarding the circumstances of a disappearance.

9) the right to protection and assistance to the family;

10) the right to an adequate standard of living;

11) the right to health; and

12) the right to education [Emphasis supplied]

Article 2 of the ICCPR, which binds the Philippines as a state party, provides:

Article 2

3. Each State Party to the present Covenant undertakes:

(a) To ensure that any person whose rights or freedoms as herein recognized are violated shall have
an effective remedy, notwithstanding that the violation has been committed by persons acting in an
official capacity;

(b) To ensure that any person claiming such a remedy shall have his right thereto determined by
competent judicial, administrative or legislative authorities, or by any other competent authority
provided for by the legal system of the State, and to develop the possibilities of judicial remedy;

(c) To ensure that the competent authorities shall enforce such remedies when granted. [Emphasis
supplied]

In General Comment No. 31, the UN Human Rights Committee opined that the right to an effective remedy
under Article 2 of the ICCPR includes the obligation of the State to investigate ICCPR violations promptly,
thoroughly, and effectively, viz:137

15. Article 2, paragraph 3, requires that in addition to effective protection of Covenant rights, States Parties
must ensure that individuals also have accessible and effective remedies to vindicate those rights… The
Committee attaches importance to States Parties' establishing appropriate judicial and administrative
mechanisms for addressing claims of rights violations under domestic law… Administrative mechanisms are
particularly required to give effect to the general obligation to investigate allegations of violations promptly,
thoroughly and effectivelythrough independent and impartial bodies. A failure by a State Party to investigate
allegations of violations could in and of itself give rise to a separate breach of the Covenant. Cessation of
an ongoing violation is an essential element of the right to an effective remedy. [Emphasis supplied]

The UN Human Rights Committee further stated in the same General Comment No. 31 that failure to
investigate as well as failure to bring to justice the perpetrators of ICCPR violations could in and of itself
give rise to a separate breach of the Covenant, thus:138

18. Where the investigations referred to in paragraph 15 reveal violations of certain Covenant rights, States
Parties must ensure that those responsible are brought to justice. As with failure to investigate, failure to
bring to justice perpetrators of such violations could in and of itself give rise to a separate breach of the
Covenant. These obligations arise notably in respect of those violations recognized as criminal under either
domestic or international law, such as torture and similar cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment (article
7), summary and arbitrary killing (article 6) and enforced disappearance (articles 7 and 9 and, frequently,
6). Indeed, the problem of impunity for these violations, a matter of sustained concern by the Committee,
may well be an important contributing element in the recurrence of the violations. When committed as part
of a widespread or systematic attack on a civilian population, these violations of the Covenant are crimes
against humanity (see Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, article 7). [Emphasis supplied]

In Secretary of National Defense v. Manalo,139 this Court, in ruling that the right to security of persons is a
guarantee of the protection of one’s right by the government, held that:

The right to security of person in this third sense is a corollary of the policy that the State "guarantees full
respect for human rights" under Article II, Section 11 of the 1987 Constitution. As the government is the
chief guarantor of order and security, the Constitutional guarantee of the rights to life, liberty and security
of person is rendered ineffective if government does not afford protection to these rights especially when
they are under threat. Protection includes conducting effective investigations, organization of the
government apparatus to extend protection to victims of extralegal killings or enforced
disappearances (or threats thereof) and/or their families, and bringing offenders to the bar of
justice. The Inter-American Court of Human Rights stressed the importance of investigation in the
Velasquez Rodriguez Case, viz:

(The duty to investigate) must be undertaken in a serious manner and not as a mere formality preordained
to be ineffective. An investigation must have an objective and be assumed by the State as its own legal
duty, not as a step taken by private interests that depends upon the initiative of the victim or his family or
upon their offer of proof, without an effective search for the truth by the government. [Emphasis supplied]

Manalo significantly cited Kurt v. Turkey, 140 where the ECHR interpreted the "right to security" not only as
a prohibition on the State against arbitrary deprivation of liberty, but also as the imposition of a positive
duty to afford protection to the right to liberty. The Court notably quoted the following ECHR ruling:

[A]ny deprivation of liberty must not only have been effected in conformity with the substantive and
procedural rules of national law but must equally be in keeping with the very purpose of Article 5, namely
to protect the individual from arbitrariness... Having assumed control over that individual, it is incumbent
on the authorities to account for his or her whereabouts. For this reason, Article 5 must be seen as requiring
the authorities to take effective measures to safeguard against the risk of disappearance and to conduct a
prompt effective investigation into an arguable claim that a person has been taken into custody and has not
been seen since. [Emphasis supplied]

These rulings effectively serve as the backdrop for the Rule on the Writ of Amparo, which the Court made
effective on October 24, 2007. Although the Amparo Rule still has gaps waiting to be filled through
substantive law, as evidenced primarily by the lack of a concrete definition of "enforced disappearance," the
materials cited above, among others, provide ample guidance and standards on how, through the medium
of the Amparo Rule, the Court can provide remedies and protect the constitutional rights to life, liberty and
security that underlie every enforced disappearance.

Evidentiary Difficulties Posed by the Unique Nature of an Enforced Disappearance

Before going into the issue of whether the respondent has discharged the burden of proving the allegations
of the petition for the Writ of Amparo by the degree of proof required by the Amparo Rule, we shall discuss
briefly the unique evidentiary difficulties presented by enforced disappearance cases; these difficulties form
part of the setting that the implementation of the Amparo Rule shall encounter.

These difficulties largely arise because the State itself – the party whose involvement is alleged –
investigates enforced disappearances. Past experiences in other jurisdictions show that the evidentiary
difficulties are generally threefold.

First, there may be a deliberate concealment of the identities of the direct perpetrators. 141 Experts note that
abductors are well organized, armed and usually members of the military or police forces, thus:

The victim is generally arrested by the security forces or by persons acting under some form of governmental
authority. In many countries the units that plan, implement and execute the program are generally
specialized, highly-secret bodies within the armed or security forces. They are generally directed through a
separate, clandestine chain of command, but they have the necessary credentials to avoid or prevent any
interference by the "legal" police forces. These authorities take their victims to secret detention centers
where they subject them to interrogation and torture without fear of judicial or other controls. 142

In addition, there are usually no witnesses to the crime; if there are, these witnesses are usually afraid to
speak out publicly or to testify on the disappearance out of fear for their own lives. 143 We have had occasion
to note this difficulty in Secretary of Defense v. Manalo 144 when we acknowledged that "where powerful
military officers are implicated, the hesitation of witnesses to surface and testify against them comes as no
surprise."

Second, deliberate concealment of pertinent evidence of the disappearance is a distinct possibility; the
central piece of evidence in an enforced disappearance – i.e., the corpus delicti or the victim’s body – is
usually concealed to effectively thwart the start of any investigation or the progress of one that may have
begun.145 The problem for the victim’s family is the State’s virtual monopoly of access to pertinent evidence.
The Inter-American Court of Human Rights (IACHR) observed in the landmark case of Velasquez
Rodriguez146 that inherent to the practice of enforced disappearance is the deliberate use of the State’s
power to destroy the pertinent evidence. The IACHR described the concealment as a clear attempt by the
State to commit the perfect crime.147

Third is the element of denial; in many cases, the State authorities deliberately deny that the enforced
disappearance ever occurred.148 "Deniability" is central to the policy of enforced disappearances, as the
absence of any proven disappearance makes it easier to escape the application of legal standards ensuring
the victim’s human rights.149 Experience shows that government officials typically respond to requests for
information about desaparecidos by saying that they are not aware of any disappearance, that the missing
people may have fled the country, or that their names have merely been invented. 150

These considerations are alive in our minds, as these are the difficulties we confront, in one form or another,
in our consideration of this case.

Evidence and Burden of Proof in Enforced Disappearances Cases

Sections 13, 17 and 18 of the Amparo Rule define the nature of an Amparo proceeding and the degree and
burden of proof the parties to the case carry, as follows:

Section 13. Summary Hearing. The hearing on the petition shall be summary. However, the court, justice
or judge may call for a preliminary conference to simplify the issues and determine the possibility of
obtaining stipulations and admissions from the parties.

xxxx

Section 17. Burden of Proof and Standard of Diligence Required. – The parties shall establish their claims
by substantial evidence.
The respondent who is a private individual must prove that ordinary diligence as required by applicable laws,
rules and regulations was observed in the performance of duty.

The respondent who is a public official or employee must prove that extraordinary diligence as required by
applicable laws, rules and regulations was observed in the performance of duty.

The respondent public official or employee cannot invoke the presumption that official duty has been
regularly performed or evade responsibility or liability.

Section 18. Judgment. – … If the allegations in the petition are proven by substantial evidence, the
court shall grant the privilege of the writ and such reliefs as may be proper and appropriate; otherwise,
the privilege shall be denied. [Emphasis supplied]

These characteristics – namely, of being summary and the use of substantial evidence as the required level
of proof (in contrast to the usual preponderance of evidence or proof beyond reasonable doubt in court
proceedings) – reveal the clear intent of the framers of the Amparo Rule to have the equivalent of an
administrative proceeding, albeit judicially conducted, in addressing Amparo situations. The standard of
diligence required – the duty of public officials and employees to observe extraordinary diligence – point,
too, to the extraordinary measures expected in the protection of constitutional rights and in the consequent
handling and investigation of extra-judicial killings and enforced disappearance cases.

Thus, in these proceedings, the Amparo petitioner needs only to properly comply with the substance and
form requirements of a Writ of Amparo petition, as discussed above, and prove the allegations by substantial
evidence. Once a rebuttable case has been proven, the respondents must then respond and prove their
defenses based on the standard of diligence required. The rebuttable case, of course, must show that an
enforced disappearance took place under circumstances showing a violation of the victim’s constitutional
rights to life, liberty or security, and the failure on the part of the investigating authorities to appropriately
respond.

The landmark case of Ang Tibay v. Court of Industrial Relations151 provided the Court its first opportunity to
define the substantial evidence required to arrive at a valid decision in administrative proceedings. To
directly quote Ang Tibay:

Substantial evidence is more than a mere scintilla. It means such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind
might accept as adequate to support a conclusion. [citations omitted] The statute provides that ‘the rules
of evidence prevailing in courts of law and equity shall not be controlling.’ The obvious purpose of this and
similar provisions is to free administrative boards from the compulsion of technical rules so that the mere
admission of matter which would be deemed incompetent in judicial proceedings would not invalidate the
administrative order. [citations omitted] But this assurance of a desirable flexibility in administrative
procedure does not go so far as to justify orders without a basis in evidence having rational probative force.
[Emphasis supplied]

In Secretary of Defense v. Manalo,152 which was the Court’s first petition for a Writ of Amparo, we recognized
that the full and exhaustive proceedings that the substantial evidence standard regularly requires do not
need to apply due to the summary nature of Amparo proceedings. We said:

The remedy [of the writ of amparo] provides rapid judicial relief as it partakes of a summary proceeding
that requires only substantial evidence to make the appropriate reliefs available to the petitioner; it is not
an action to determine criminal guilt requiring proof beyond reasonable doubt, or liability for damages
requiring preponderance of evidence, or administrative responsibility requiring substantial evidence that will
require full and exhaustive proceedings.[Emphasis supplied]

Not to be forgotten in considering the evidentiary aspects of Amparo petitions are the unique difficulties
presented by the nature of enforced disappearances, heretofore discussed, which difficulties this Court must
frontally meet if the Amparo Rule is to be given a chance to achieve its objectives. These evidentiary
difficulties compel the Court to adopt standards appropriate and responsive to the circumstances, without
transgressing the due process requirements that underlie every proceeding.

In the seminal case of Velasquez Rodriguez,153 the IACHR – faced with a lack of direct evidence that the
government of Honduras was involved in Velasquez Rodriguez’ disappearance – adopted a relaxed and
informal evidentiary standard, and established the rule that presumes governmental responsibility for a
disappearance if it can be proven that the government carries out a general practice of enforced
disappearances and the specific case can be linked to that practice. 154 The IACHR took note of the realistic
fact that enforced disappearances could be proven only through circumstantial or indirect evidence or by
logical inference; otherwise, it was impossible to prove that an individual had been made to disappear. It
held:

130. The practice of international and domestic courts shows that direct evidence, whether testimonial or
documentary, is not the only type of evidence that may be legitimately considered in reaching a decision.
Circumstantial evidence, indicia, and presumptions may be considered, so long as they lead to conclusions
consistent with the facts.
131. Circumstantial or presumptive evidence is especially important in allegations of disappearances,
because this type of repression is characterized by an attempt to suppress all information about the
kidnapping or the whereabouts and fate of the victim. [Emphasis supplied]

In concluding that the disappearance of Manfredo Velásquez (Manfredo) was carried out by agents who
acted under cover of public authority, the IACHR relied on circumstantial evidence including the hearsay
testimony of Zenaida Velásquez, the victim’s sister, who described Manfredo’s kidnapping on the basis of
conversations she had with witnesses who saw Manfredo kidnapped by men in civilian clothes in broad
daylight. She also told the Court that a former Honduran military official had announced that Manfredo was
kidnapped by a special military squadron acting under orders of the Chief of the Armed Forces. 155 The IACHR
likewise considered the hearsay testimony of a second witness who asserted that he had been told by a
Honduran military officer about the disappearance, and a third witness who testified that he had spoken in
prison to a man who identified himself as Manfredo. 156

Velasquez stresses the lesson that flexibility is necessary under the unique circumstances that enforced
disappearance cases pose to the courts; to have an effective remedy, the standard of evidence must be
responsive to the evidentiary difficulties faced. On the one hand, we cannot be arbitrary in the admission
and appreciation of evidence, as arbitrariness entails violation of rights and cannot be used as an effective
counter-measure; we only compound the problem if a wrong is addressed by the commission of another
wrong. On the other hand, we cannot be very strict in our evidentiary rules and cannot consider evidence
the way we do in the usual criminal and civil cases; precisely, the proceedings before us are administrative
in nature where, as a rule, technical rules of evidence are not strictly observed. Thus, while we must follow
the substantial evidence rule, we must observe flexibility in considering the evidence we shall take into
account.

The fair and proper rule, to our mind, is to consider all the pieces of evidence adduced in their totality, and
to consider any evidence otherwise inadmissible under our usual rules to be admissible if it is consistent
with the admissible evidence adduced. In other words, we reduce our rules to the most basic test of reason
– i.e., to the relevance of the evidence to the issue at hand and its consistency with all other pieces of
adduced evidence. Thus, even hearsay evidence can be admitted if it satisfies this basic minimum test.

We note in this regard that the use of flexibility in the consideration of evidence is not at all novel in the
Philippine legal system. In child abuse cases, Section 28 of the Rule on Examination of a Child Witness157 is
expressly recognized as an exception to the hearsay rule. This Rule allows the admission of the hearsay
testimony of a child describing any act or attempted act of sexual abuse in any criminal or non-criminal
proceeding, subject to certain prerequisites and the right of cross-examination by the adverse party. The
admission of the statement is determined by the court in light of specified subjective and objective
considerations that provide sufficient indicia of reliability of the child witness. 158 These requisites for
admission find their counterpart in the present case under the above-described conditions for the exercise
of flexibility in the consideration of evidence, including hearsay evidence, in extrajudicial killings and
enforced disappearance cases.

Assessment of the Evidence

The threshold question for our resolution is: was there an enforced disappearance within the meaning of
this term under the UN Declaration we have cited?

The Convention defines enforced disappearance as "the arrest, detention, abduction or any other form of
deprivation of liberty by agents of the State or by persons or groups of persons acting with the authorization,
support or acquiescence of the State, followed by a refusal to acknowledge the deprivation of liberty or by
concealment of the fate or whereabouts of the disappeared person, which place such a person outside the
protection of the law."159Under this definition, the elements that constitute enforced disappearance are
essentially fourfold:160

(a) arrest, detention, abduction or any form of deprivation of liberty;

(b) carried out by agents of the State or persons or groups of persons acting with the authorization,
support or acquiescence of the State;

(c) followed by a refusal to acknowledge the detention, or a concealment of the fate of the
disappeared person; and

(d) placement of the disappeared person outside the protection of the law. [Emphasis supplied]

We find no direct evidence indicating how the victim actually disappeared. The direct evidence at hand only
shows that Tagitis went out of the ASY Pension House after depositing his room key with the hotel desk and
was never seen nor heard of again. The undisputed conclusion, however, from all concerned – the petitioner,
Tagitis’ colleagues and even the police authorities – is that Tagistis disappeared under mysterious
circumstances and was never seen again. The respondent injected the causal element in her petition and
testimony, as we shall discuss below.
We likewise find no direct evidence showing that operatives of PNP CIDG Zamboanga abducted or arrested
Tagitis. If at all, only the respondent’s allegation that Tagistis was under CIDG Zamboanga custody stands
on record, but it is not supported by any other evidence, direct or circumstantial.

In her direct testimony, the respondent pointed to two sources of information as her bases for her allegation
that Tagistis had been placed under government custody (in contrast with CIDG Zamboanga custody). The
first was an unnamed friend in Zamboanga (later identified as Col. Ancanan), who occupied a high position
in the military and who allegedly mentioned that Tagitis was in good hands. Nothing came out of this claim,
as both the respondent herself and her witness, Mrs. Talbin, failed to establish that Col. Ancanan gave them
any information that Tagitis was in government custody. Col. Ancanan, for his part, admitted the meeting
with the respondent but denied giving her any information about the disappearance.

The more specific and productive source of information was Col. Kasim, whom the respondent, together
with her witness Mrs. Talbin, met in Camp Katitipan in Davao City. To quote the relevant portions of the
respondent’s testimony:

Q: Were you able to speak to other military officials regarding the whereabouts of your husband particularly
those in charge of any records or investigation?

A: I went to Camp Katitipan in Davao City. Then one military officer, Col. Casim, told me that my husband
is being abducted [sic] because he is under custodial investigation because he is allegedly "parang liason
ng J.I.", sir.

Q: What is J.I.?

A: Jema’ah Islamiah, sir.

Q: Was there any information that was read to you during one of those visits of yours in that Camp?

A: Col. Casim did not furnish me a copy of his report because he said those reports are highly confidential,
sir.

Q: Was it read to you then even though you were not furnished a copy?

A: Yes, sir. In front of us, my friends.

Q: And what was the content of that highly confidential report?

A: Those alleged activities of Engineer Tagitis, sir.161 [Emphasis supplied]

She confirmed this testimony in her cross-examination:

Q: You also mentioned that you went to Camp Katitipan in Davao City?

A: Yes, ma’am.

Q: And a certain Col. Kasim told you that your husband was abducted and under custodial investigation?

A: Yes, ma’am.

Q: And you mentioned that he showed you a report?

A: Yes, ma’am.

Q: Were you able to read the contents of that report?

A: He did not furnish me a copy of those [sic] report because those [sic] were highly confidential. That is a
military report, ma’am.

Q: But you were able to read the contents?

A: No. But he read it in front of us, my friends, ma’am.

Q: How many were you when you went to see Col. Kasim?

A: There were three of us, ma’am.

Q: Who were your companions?

A: Mrs. Talbin, tapos yung dalawang friends nya from Mati City, Davao Oriental, ma’am. 162

xxxx

Q: When you were told that your husband is in good hands, what was your reaction and what did you do?

A: May binasa kasi sya that my husband has a parang meeting with other people na parang mga terorista
na mga tao. Tapos at the end of the report is [sic] under custodial investigation. So I told him "Colonel, my
husband is sick. He is diabetic at nagmemaintain yun ng gamot. Pakisabi lang sa naghohold sa asawa ko na
bigyan siya ng gamot, ma’am."163

xxxx

Q: You mentioned that you received information that Engineer Tagitis is being held by the CIDG in
Zamboanga, did you go to CIDG Zamboanga to verify that information?

A: I did not go to CIDG Zamboanga. I went to Camp Karingal instead. Enough na yun na effort ko because
I know that they would deny it, ma’am.164

On February 11, 2008, the respondent presented Mrs. Talbin to corroborate her testimony that her husband
was abducted and held under custodial investigation by the PNP-CIDG Zamboanga City, viz:

Q: You said that you went to Camp Katitipan in Davao City sometime November 24, 2007, who was with
you when you went there?

A: Mary Jean Tagitis, sir.

Q: Only the two of you?

A: No. We have some other companions. We were four at that time, sir.

Q: Who were they?

A: Salvacion Serrano, Mini Leong, Mrs. Tagitis and me, sir.

Q: Were you able to talk, see some other officials at Camp Katitipan during that time?

A: Col. Kasim (PS Supt. Julasirim Ahadin Kasim) only, sir.

Q: Were you able to talk to him?

A: Yes, sir.

Q: The four of you?

A: Yes, sir.

Q: What information did you get from Col. Kasim during that time?

A: The first time we met with [him] I asked him if he knew of the exact location, if he can furnish us the
location of Engr. Tagitis. And he was reading this report. He told us that Engr. Tagitis is in good hands. He
is with the military, but he is not certain whether he is with the AFP or PNP. He has this serious case. He
was charged of terrorism because he was under surveillance from January 2007 up to the time that he was
abducted. He told us that he was under custodial investigation. As I’ve said earlier, he was seen under
surveillance from January. He was seen talking to Omar Patik, a certain Santos of Bulacan who is also a
Balik Islam and charged with terrorism. He was seen carrying boxes of medicines. Then we asked him how
long will he be in custodial investigation. He said until we can get some information. But he also told us that
he cannot give us that report because it was a raw report. It was not official, sir.

Q: You said that he was reading a report, was that report in document form, in a piece of paper or was it in
the computer or what?

A: As far as I can see it, sir, it is written in white bond paper. I don’t know if it was computerized but I’m
certain that it was typewritten. I’m not sure if it used computer, fax or what, sir.

Q: When he was reading it to you, was he reading it line by line or he was reading in a summary form?

A: Sometimes he was glancing to the report and talking to us, sir.165

xxxx

Q: Were you informed as to the place where he was being kept during that time?

A: He did not tell us where he [Tagitis] was being kept. But he mentioned this Talipapao, Sulu, sir.

Q: After that incident, what did you do if any?

A: We just left and as I’ve mentioned, we just waited because that raw information that he was reading to
us [sic] after the custodial investigation, Engineer Tagitis will be released. [Emphasis supplied] 166

Col. Kasim never denied that he met with the respondent and her friends, and that he provided them
information based on the input of an unnamed asset. He simply claimed in his testimony that the "informal
letter" he received from his informant in Sulu did not indicate that Tagitis was in the custody of the CIDG.
He also stressed that the information he provided the respondent was merely a "raw report" from "barangay
intelligence" that still needed confirmation and "follow up" as to its veracity. 167

To be sure, the respondent’s and Mrs. Talbin’s testimonies were far from perfect, as the petitioners pointed
out. The respondent mistakenly characterized Col. Kasim as a "military officer" who told her that "her
husband is being abducted because he is under custodial investigation because he is allegedly ‘parang liason
ng J.I.’" The petitioners also noted that "Mrs. Talbin’s testimony imputing certain statements to Sr. Supt.
Kasim that Engr. Tagitis is with the military, but he is not certain whether it is the PNP or AFP is not worthy
of belief, since Sr. Supt. Kasim is a high ranking police officer who would certainly know that the PNP is not
part of the military."

Upon deeper consideration of these inconsistencies, however, what appears clear to us is that the petitioners
never really steadfastly disputed or presented evidence to refute the credibility of the respondent and her
witness, Mrs. Talbin. The inconsistencies the petitioners point out relate, more than anything else, to details
that should not affect the credibility of the respondent and Mrs. Talbin; the inconsistencies are not on
material points.168 We note, for example, that these witnesses are lay people in so far as military and police
matters are concerned, and confusion between the police and the military is not unusual. As a rule, minor
inconsistencies such as these indicate truthfulness rather than prevarication 169and only tend to strengthen
their probative value, in contrast to testimonies from various witnesses dovetailing on every detail; the
latter cannot but generate suspicion that the material circumstances they testified to were integral parts of
a well thought of and prefabricated story.170

Based on these considerations and the unique evidentiary situation in enforced disappearance cases, we
hold it duly established that Col. Kasim informed the respondent and her friends, based on the informant’s
letter, that Tagitis, reputedly a liaison for the JI and who had been under surveillance since January 2007,
was "in good hands" and under custodial investigation for complicity with the JI after he was seen talking
to one Omar Patik and a certain "Santos" of Bulacan, a "Balik Islam" charged with terrorism. The
respondent’s and Mrs. Talbin’s testimonies cannot simply be defeated by Col. Kasim’s plain denial and his
claim that he had destroyed his informant’s letter, the critical piece of evidence that supports or negates
the parties’ conflicting claims. Col. Kasim’s admitted destruction of this letter – effectively, a suppression of
this evidence – raises the presumption that the letter, if produced, would be proof of what the respondent
claimed.171 For brevity, we shall call the evidence of what Col. Kasim reported to the respondent to be the
"Kasim evidence."

Given this evidence, our next step is to decide whether we can accept this evidence, in lieu of direct evidence,
as proof that the disappearance of Tagitis was due to action with government participation, knowledge or
consent and that he was held for custodial investigation. We note in this regard that Col. Kasim was never
quoted to have said that the custodial investigation was by the CIDG Zamboanga. The Kasim evidence only
implies government intervention through the use of the term "custodial investigation," and does not at all
point to CIDG Zamboanga as Tagitis’ custodian.

Strictly speaking, we are faced here with a classic case of hearsay evidence – i.e., evidence whose probative
value is not based on the personal knowledge of the witnesses (the respondent, Mrs. Talbin and Col. Kasim
himself) but on the knowledge of some other person not on the witness stand (the informant).172

To say that this piece of evidence is incompetent and inadmissible evidence of what it substantively states
is to acknowledge – as the petitioners effectively suggest – that in the absence of any direct evidence, we
should simply dismiss the petition. To our mind, an immediate dismissal for this reason is no different from
a statement that the Amparo Rule – despite its terms – is ineffective, as it cannot allow for the special
evidentiary difficulties that are unavoidably present in Amparo situations, particularly in extrajudicial killings
and enforced disappearances. The Amparo Rule was not promulgated with this intent or with the intent to
make it a token gesture of concern for constitutional rights. It was promulgated to provide effective and
timely remedies, using and profiting from local and international experiences in extrajudicial killings and
enforced disappearances, as the situation may require. Consequently, we have no choice but to meet the
evidentiary difficulties inherent in enforced disappearances with the flexibility that these difficulties
demand.1avvphi1
To give full meaning to our Constitution and the rights it protects, we hold that, as in Velasquez, we should
at least take a close look at the available evidence to determine the correct import of every piece of evidence
– even of those usually considered inadmissible under the general rules of evidence – taking into account
the surrounding circumstances and the test of reason that we can use as basic minimum admissibility
requirement. In the present case, we should at least determine whether the Kasim evidence before us is
relevant and meaningful to the disappearance of Tagistis and reasonably consistent with other evidence in
the case.

The evidence about Tagitis’ personal circumstances surrounded him with an air of mystery. He was reputedly
a consultant of the World Bank and a Senior Honorary Counselor for the IDB who attended a seminar in
Zamboanga and thereafter proceded to Jolo for an overnight stay, indicated by his request to Kunnong for
the purchase of a return ticket to Zamboanga the day after he arrived in Jolo. Nothing in the records indicates
the purpose of his overnight sojourn in Jolo. A colleague in the IDB, Prof. Matli, early on informed the Jolo
police that Tagitis may have taken funds given to him in trust for IDB scholars. Prof Matli later on stated
that he never accused Tagitis of taking away money held in trust, although he confirmed that the IDB was
seeking assistance in locating funds of IDB scholars deposited in Tagitis’ personal account. Other than these
pieces of evidence, no other information exists in the records relating to the personal circumstances of
Tagitis.

The actual disappearance of Tagitis is as murky as his personal circumstances. While the Amparo petition
recited that he was taken away by "burly men believed to be police intelligence operatives," no evidence
whatsoever was introduced to support this allegation. Thus, the available direct evidence is that Tagitis was
last seen at 12.30 p.m. of October 30, 2007 – the day he arrived in Jolo – and was never seen again.

The Kasim evidence assumes critical materiality given the dearth of direct evidence on the above aspects
of the case, as it supplies the gaps that were never looked into and clarified by police investigation. It is the
evidence, too, that colors a simple missing person report into an enforced disappearance case, as it injects
the element of participation by agents of the State and thus brings into question how the State reacted to
the disappearance.

Denials on the part of the police authorities, and frustration on the part of the respondent, characterize the
attempts to locate Tagitis. Initially in Jolo, the police informed Kunnong that Tagitis could have been taken
by the Abu Sayyaf or other groups fighting the government. No evidence was ever offered on whether there
was active Jolo police investigation and how and why the Jolo police arrived at this conclusion. The
respondent’s own inquiry in Jolo yielded the answer that he was not missing but was with another woman
somewhere. Again, no evidence exists that this explanation was arrived at based on an investigation. As
already related above, the inquiry with Col. Ancanan in Zamboanga yielded ambivalent results not useful
for evidentiary purposes. Thus, it was only the inquiry from Col. Kasim that yielded positive results. Col.
Kasim’s story, however, confirmed only the fact of his custodial investigation (and, impliedly, his arrest or
abduction), without identifying his abductor/s or the party holding him in custody. The more significant part
of Col. Kasim’s story is that the abduction came after Tagitis was seen talking with Omar Patik and a certain
Santos of Bulacan, a "Balik Islam" charged with terrorism. Mrs. Talbin mentioned, too, that Tagitis was being
held at Talipapao, Sulu. None of the police agencies participating in the investigation ever pursued these
leads. Notably, Task Force Tagitis to which this information was relayed did not appear to have lifted a finger
to pursue these aspects of the case.

More denials were manifested in the Returns on the writ to the CA made by the petitioners. Then PNP Chief
Gen. Avelino I. Razon merely reported the directives he sent to the ARMM Regional Director and the Regional
Chief of the CIDG on Tagitis, and these reports merely reiterated the open-ended initial report of the
disappearance. The CIDG directed a search in all of its divisions with negative results. These, to the PNP
Chief, constituted the exhaustion "of all possible efforts." PNP-CIDG Chief General Edgardo M. Doromal, for
his part, also reported negative results after searching "all divisions and departments [of the CIDG] for a
person named Engr. Morced N. Tagitis . . . and after a diligent and thorough research, records show that no
such person is being detained in the CIDG or any of its department or divisions." PNP-PACER Chief PS Supt.
Leonardo A. Espina and PNP PRO ARMM Regional Director PC Superintendent Joel R. Goltiao did no better
in their affidavits-returns, as they essentially reported the results of their directives to their units to search
for Tagitis.

The extent to which the police authorities acted was fully tested when the CA constituted Task Force Tagitis,
with specific directives on what to do. The negative results reflected in the Returns on the writ were again
replicated during the three hearings the CA scheduled. Aside from the previously mentioned "retraction"
that Prof. Matli made to correct his accusation that Tagitis took money held in trust for students, PS Supt.
Ajirim reiterated in his testimony that the CIDG consistently denied any knowledge or complicity in any
abduction and said that there was no basis to conclude that the CIDG or any police unit had anything to do
with the disappearance of Tagitis; he likewise considered it premature to conclude that Tagitis simply ran
away with the money in his custody. As already noted above, the Task Force notably did not pursue any
investigation about the personal circumstances of Tagitis, his background in relation to the IDB and the
background and activities of this Bank itself, and the reported sighting of Tagistis with terrorists and his
alleged custody in Talipapao, Sulu. No attempt appears to have ever been made to look into the alleged IDB
funds that Tagitis held in trust, or to tap any of the "assets" who are indispensable in investigations of this
nature. These omissions and negative results were aggravated by the CA findings that it was only as late as
January 28, 2008 or three months after the disappearance that the police authorities requested for clear
pictures of Tagitis. Col. Kasim could not attend the trial because his subpoena was not served, despite the
fact that he was designated as Ajirim’s replacement in the latter’s last post. Thus, Col. Kasim was not then
questioned. No investigation – even an internal one – appeared to have been made to inquire into the
identity of Col. Kasim’s "asset" and what he indeed wrote.

We glean from all these pieces of evidence and developments a consistency in the government’s denial of
any complicity in the disappearance of Tagitis, disrupted only by the report made by Col. Kasim to the
respondent at Camp Katitipan. Even Col. Kasim, however, eventually denied that he ever made the
disclosure that Tagitis was under custodial investigation for complicity in terrorism. Another distinctive trait
that runs through these developments is the government’s dismissive approach to the disappearance,
starting from the initial response by the Jolo police to Kunnong’s initial reports of the disappearance, to the
responses made to the respondent when she herself reported and inquired about her husband’s
disappearance, and even at Task Force Tagitis itself.

As the CA found through Task Force Tagitis, the investigation was at best haphazard since the authorities
were looking for a man whose picture they initially did not even secure. The returns and reports made to
the CA fared no better, as the CIDG efforts themselves were confined to searching for custodial records of
Tagitis in their various departments and divisions. To point out the obvious, if the abduction of Tagitis was
a "black" operation because it was unrecorded or officially unauthorized, no record of custody would ever
appear in the CIDG records; Tagitis, too, would not be detained in the usual police or CIDG detention places.
In sum, none of the reports on record contains any meaningful results or details on the depth and extent of
the investigation made. To be sure, reports of top police officials indicating the personnel and units they
directed to investigate can never constitute exhaustive and meaningful investigation, or equal detailed
investigative reports of the activities undertaken to search for Tagitis. Indisputably, the police authorities
from the very beginning failed to come up to the extraordinary diligence that the Amparo Rule requires.

CONCLUSIONS AND THE AMPARO REMEDY

Based on these considerations, we conclude that Col. Kasim’s disclosure, made in an unguarded moment,
unequivocally point to some government complicity in the disappearance. The consistent but unfounded
denials and the haphazard investigations cannot but point to this conclusion. For why would the government
and its officials engage in their chorus of concealment if the intent had not been to deny what they already
knew of the disappearance? Would not an in-depth and thorough investigation that at least credibly
determined the fate of Tagitis be a feather in the government’s cap under the circumstances of the
disappearance? From this perspective, the evidence and developments, particularly the Kasim evidence,
already establish a concrete case of enforced disappearance that the Amparo Rule covers. From the prism
of the UN Declaration, heretofore cited and quoted, 173the evidence at hand and the developments in this
case confirm the fact of the enforced disappearance and government complicity, under a background of
consistent and unfounded government denials and haphazard handling. The disappearance as well
effectively placed Tagitis outside the protection of the law – a situation that will subsist unless this Court
acts.

This kind of fact situation and the conclusion reached are not without precedent in international enforced
disappearance rulings. While the facts are not exactly the same, the facts of this case run very close to
those of Timurtas v. Turkey,174 a case decided by ECHR. The European tribunal in that case acted on the
basis of the photocopy of a "post-operation report" in finding that Abdulvahap Timurtas (Abdulvahap) was
abducted and later detained by agents (gendarmes) of the government of Turkey. The victim's father in this
case brought a claim against Turkey for numerous violations of the European Convention, including the right
to life (Article 2) and the rights to liberty and security of a person (Article 5). The applicant contended that
on August 14, 1993, gendarmes apprehended his son, Abdulvahap for being a leader of the Kurdish Workers’
Party (PKK) in the Silopi region. The petition was filed in southeast Turkey nearly six and one half years
after the apprehension. According to the father, gendarmes first detained Abdulvahap and then transferred
him to another detainment facility. Although there was no eyewitness evidence of the apprehension or
subsequent detainment, the applicant presented evidence corroborating his version of events, including a
photocopy of a post-operation report signed by the commander of gendarme operations in Silopi, Turkey.
The report included a description of Abdulvahap's arrest and the result of a subsequent interrogation during
detention where he was accused of being a leader of the PKK in the Silopi region. On this basis, Turkey was
held responsible for Abdulvahap’s enforced disappearance.

Following the lead of this Turkish experience - adjusted to the Philippine legal setting and the Amparo
remedy this Court has established, as applied to the unique facts and developments of this case – we believe
and so hold that the government in general, through the PNP and the PNP-CIDG, and in particular, the
Chiefs of these organizations together with Col. Kasim, should be held fully accountable for the enforced
disappearance of Tagitis.

The PNP and CIDG are accountable because Section 24 of Republic Act No. 6975, otherwise known as the
"PNP Law,"175 specifies the PNP as the governmental office with the mandate "to investigate and prevent
crimes, effect the arrest of criminal offenders, bring offenders to justice and assist in their prosecution." The
PNP-CIDG, as Col. Jose Volpane Pante (then Chief of CIDG Region 9) testified, is the "investigative arm" of
the PNP and is mandated to "investigate and prosecute all cases involving violations of the Revised Penal
Code, particularly those considered as heinous crimes." 176 Under the PNP organizational structure, the PNP-
CIDG is tasked to investigate all major crimes involving violations of the Revised Penal Code and operates
against organized crime groups, unless the President assigns the case exclusively to the National Bureau of
Investigation (NBI).177 No indication exists in this case showing that the President ever directly intervened
by assigning the investigation of Tagitis’ disappearance exclusively to the NBI.

Given their mandates, the PNP and PNP-CIDG officials and members were the ones who were remiss in their
duties when the government completely failed to exercise the extral'>To fully enforce the Amparo remedy,
we refer this case back to the CA for appropriate proceedings directed at the monitoring of the PNP and the
PNP-CIDG investigations and actions, and the validation of their results through hearings the CA may deem
appropriate to conduct. For purposes of these investigations, the PNP/PNP-CIDG shall initially present to the
CA a plan of action for further investigation, periodically reporting the detailed results of its investigation to
the CA for its consideration and action. On behalf of this Court, the CA shall pass upon: the need for the
PNP and the PNP-CIDG to make disclosures of matters known to them as indicated in this Decision and as
further CA hearings may indicate; the petitioners’ submissions; the sufficiency of their investigative efforts;
and submit to this Court a quarterly report containing its actions and recommendations, copy furnished the
petitioners and the respondent, with the first report due at the end of the first quarter counted from the
finality of this Decision. The PNP and the PNP-CIDG shall have one (1) full year to undertake their
investigation. The CA shall submit its full report for the consideration of this Court at the end of the 4th
quarter counted from the finality of this Decision.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, we DENY the petitioners’ petition for review on certiorari for lack of
merit, and AFFIRM the decision of the Court of Appeals dated March 7, 2008 under the following terms:

a. Recognition that the disappearance of Engineer Morced N. Tagitis is an enforced disappearance

covered by the Rule on the Writ of Amparo;

b. Without any specific pronouncement on exact authorship and responsibility, declaring the
government (through the PNP and the PNP-CIDG) and Colonel Julasirim Ahadin Kasim accountable
for the enforced disappearance of Engineer Morced N. Tagitis;

c. Confirmation of the validity of the Writ of Amparo the Court of Appeals issued;

d. Holding the PNP, through the PNP Chief, and the PNP-CIDG, through its Chief, directly responsible
for the disclosure of material facts known to the government and to their offices regarding the
disappearance of Engineer Morced N. Tagitis, and for the conduct of proper investigations using
extraordinary diligence, with the obligation to show investigation results acceptable to this Court;

e. Ordering Colonel Julasirim Ahadin Kasim impleaded in this case and holding him accountable with
the obligation to disclose information known to him and to his "assets" in relation with the enforced
disappearance of Engineer Morced N. Tagitis;

f. Referring this case back to the Court of Appeals for appropriate proceedings directed at the
monitoring of the PNP and PNP-CIDG investigations, actions and the validation of their results; the
PNP and the PNP-CIDG shall initially present to the Court of Appeals a plan of action for further
investigation, periodically reporting their results to the Court of Appeals for consideration and action;

g. Requiring the Court of Appeals to submit to this Court a quarterly report with its recommendations,
copy furnished the incumbent PNP and PNP-CIDG Chiefs as petitioners and the respondent, with the
first report due at the end of the first quarter counted from the finality of this Decision;

h. The PNP and the PNP-CIDG shall have one (1) full year to undertake their investigations; the Court
of Appeals shall submit its full report for the consideration of this Court at the end of the 4th quarter
counted from the finality of this Decision;

These directives and those of the Court of Appeals’ made pursuant to this Decision shall be given to, and
shall be directly enforceable against, whoever may be the incumbent Chiefs of the Philippine National Police
and its Criminal Investigation and Detection Group, under pain of contempt from this Court when the
initiatives and efforts at disclosure and investigation constitute less than the extraordinary diligence that
the Rule on the Writ of Amparo and the circumstances of this case demand. Given the unique nature of
Amparo cases and their varying attendant circumstances, these directives – particularly, the referral back
to and monitoring by the CA – are specific to this case and are not standard remedies that can be applied
to every Amparo situation.

The dismissal of the Amparo petition with respect to General Alexander Yano, Commanding General,
Philippine Army, and General Ruben Rafael, Chief, Anti-Terrorism Task Force Comet, Zamboanga City, is
hereby AFFIRMED. SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 150224 May 19, 2004

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, appellee,

vs.
JOEL YATAR alias "KAWIT", appellant.

DECISION

PER CURIAM:

On automatic review is a Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Bulanao, Tabuk, Kalinga, Branch 25,
sentencing appellant Joel Yatar alias "Kawit" to Death for the special complex crime of Rape with Homicide,
and ordering him to pay the heirs of the victim, Kathylyn D. Uba, civil indemnity in the amount of
P75,000.00, moral damages in the amount of P200,000.00, exemplary damages in the amount of
P50,000.00, actual damages in the amount of P186,410.00, or total damages amounting to P511,410.00,
and costs of litigation.1

Appellant was charged with Rape with Homicide under the following Information:

That on or about the afternoon of June 30, 1998 at Liwan West, Rizal, Kalinga, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the accused, in order to have carnal knowledge of a certain
KATHYLYN D. UBA, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully, and feloniously, and with use of a bladed
weapon stab the latter inflicting upon her fatal injuries resulting in the death of the victim, and on
the occasion or by reason thereof, accused, wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously, and by means of
force and violence had carnal knowledge of said Kathlyn D. Uba against her will.

CONTRARY TO LAW.2

The facts are:

On June 30, 1998, at 8:30 a.m., Judilyn Pas-a and her first cousin, seventeen year old Kathylyn Uba,
were on the ground floor of the house of their grandmother, Isabel Dawang, in Liwan West, Rizal,
Kalinga. They were talking about the letter sent by their aunt, Luz Yatar, to her husband, appellant
Joel Yatar, through Kathylyn’s friend, Cecil Casingan. Kathylyn handed the letter to appellant earlier
that morning.3

At 9:00 a.m. of the same day, Judilyn and her husband, together with Isabel Dawang, left for their farm in
Nagbitayan some two kilometers away. Before Judilyn and her husband departed, Kathylyn told Judilyn that
she intended to go to Tuguegarao, but in the event she would not be able to leave, she would just stay
home and wash her clothes or go to the house of their aunt, Anita Wania. Kathylyn was left alone in the
house.4

Later, at 10:00 a.m., Anita Wania and fifteen year old Beverly Deneng stopped by the house of Isabel. They
saw appellant at the back of the house. They went inside the house through the back door of the kitchen to
have a drink of water. Anita asked appellant what he was doing there, and he replied that he was getting
lumber to bring to the house of his mother.5

At 12:30 p.m., while Judilyn was on her way home from Nagbitayan, she saw appellant descend the ladder
from the second floor of the house of Isabel Dawang and run towards the back of the house. 6 She later
noticed appellant, who was wearing a white shirt with collar and black pants, pacing back and forth at the
back of the house. She did not find this unusual as appellant and his wife used to live in the house of Isabel
Dawang.7

At 1:30 p.m., Judilyn again saw appellant when he called her near her house. This time, he was wearing a
black shirt without collar and blue pants. Appellant told her that he would not be getting the lumber he had
stacked, and that Isabel could use it. She noticed that appellant’s eyes were "reddish and sharp." Appellant
asked her where her husband was as he had something important to tell him. Judilyn’s husband then arrived
and appellant immediately left and went towards the back of the house of Isabel.8

In the evening of the same day, Isabel Dawang arrived home and found that the lights in her house were
off. She called out for her granddaughter, Kathylyn Uba. The door to the ground floor was open. She noticed
that the water container she asked Kathylyn to fill up earlier that day was still empty. She went up the
ladder to the second floor of the house to see if Kathylyn was upstairs. She found that the door was tied
with a rope, so she went down to get a knife. While she groped in the dark, she felt a lifeless body that was
cold and rigid.9

Isabel moved her hand throughout the entire body. She found out that it was the naked body of her
granddaughter, Kathylyn. She called for help. Judilyn and her husband arrived. Isabel was given a flashlight
by Judilyn. She focused the beam and saw Kathylyn sprawled on the floor naked, with her intestines
protruding out of her stomach. Meanwhile, neighbors had arrived to offer assistance. A daughter of Isabel,
Cion, called the police.10
At 9:00 that evening, SP04 Melchor Faniswa received a report that a dead woman was found in Isabel
Dawang’s house. Together with fellow police officers, Faniswa went to the house and found the naked body
of Kathylyn Uba with multiple stab wounds.

The people in the vicinity informed the police officers that appellant was seen going down the ladder of the
house of Isabel Dawang at approximately 12:30 p.m.

The police discovered the victim’s panties, brassiere, denim pants, bag and sandals beside her naked
cadaver at the scene of the crime, and they found a dirty white shirt splattered with blood within 50 meters
from the house of Isabel.

When questioned by the police authorities, appellant denied any knowledge of Kathylyns’s death, 11 however,
he was placed under police custody.

On July 3, 1998, appellant asked the police officers if he could relieve himself. Police Officer Cesar Abagan
accompanied him to the toilet around seven to ten meters away from the police station. They suddenly
heard someone shout in the Ilocano dialect, "Nagtaray!" (He’s running away!). Police Officer Orlando Manuel
exited through the gate of the Police Station and saw appellant running away. Appellant was approximately
70 meters away from the station when Police Officer Abagan recaptured him. 12 He was charged with Rape
with Homicide. When he was arraigned on July 21, 1998, appellant pleaded "not guilty."

After trial, appellant was convicted of the crime of Rape with Homicide, defined and penalized under Article
266-A of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by R.A. 8353, otherwise known as the Anti-Rape Law of 1997,
and was accordingly, sentenced to Death.

Hence, this automatic review pursuant to Article 47 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended. In his Brief,
appellant assigns the following errors:

THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN GIVING MUCH WEIGHT TO THE EVIDENCE PRESENTED BY
THE PROSECUTION NOTWITHSTANDING THEIR DOUBTFULNESS.

II

THE TRIAL COURT SERIOUSLY ERRED IN NOT ACQUITTING THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT OF THE
SERIOUS CRIME CHARGED DUE TO REASONABLE DOUBT.

Appellant’s contentions are unmeritorious.

The issue regarding the credibility of the prosecution witnesses should be resolved against appellant. This
Court will not interfere with the judgment of the trial court in determining the credibility of witnesses unless
there appears in the record some fact or circumstance of weight and influence which has been overlooked
or the significance of which has been misinterpreted.13 Well-entrenched is the rule that the findings of the
trial court on credibility of witnesses are entitled to great weight on appeal unless cogent reasons are
presented necessitating a reexamination if not the disturbance of the same; the reason being that the former
is in a better and unique position of hearing first hand the witnesses and observing their deportment, conduct
and attitude.14 Absent any showing that the trial judge overlooked, misunderstood, or misapplied some facts
or circumstances of weight which would affect the result of the case, the trial judge’s assessment of
credibility deserves the appellate court’s highest respect. 15 Where there is nothing to show that the
witnesses for the prosecution were actuated by improper motive, their testimonies are entitled to full faith
and credit.16

The weight of the prosecution’s evidence must be appreciated in light of the well-settled rule which provides
that an accused can be convicted even if no eyewitness is available, as long as sufficient circumstantial
evidence is presented by the prosecution to prove beyond doubt that the accused committed the crime.17

Reference to the records will show that a total of eleven (11) wounds, six (6) stab and five (5) incised, were
found on the victim’s abdomen and back, causing a portion of her small intestines to spill out of her
body.18 Rigor mortis of the vicitm’s body was complete when Dr. Bartolo examined the victim at 9:00 a.m.
on July 1, 1998. According to him, the time of death may be approximated from between nine (9) to twelve
(12) hours prior to the completion of rigor mortis.19 In other words, the estimated time of death was
sometime between 9:00 a.m. to 12:00 p.m. on June 30, 1998. This was within the timeframe within which
the lone presence of appellant lurking in the house of Isabel Dawang was testified to by witnesses.

It should also be noted that, although the Postmortem Report by the attending physician, Dr. Pej Evan C.
Bartolo, indicates that no hymenal lacerations, contusions or hematoma were noted on the victim, 20 Dr.
Bartolo discovered the presence of semen in the vaginal canal of the victim. During his testimony, Dr.
Bartolo stated that the introduction of semen into the vaginal canal could only be done through sexual
intercourse with the victim.21 In addition, it is apparent from the pictures submitted by the prosecution that
the sexual violation of the victim was manifested by a bruise and some swelling in her right forearm
indicating resistance to the appellant’s assault on her virtue.22

Significantly, subsequent testing showed that the Deoxyribonucleic acid (DNA) of the sperm specimen from
the vagina of the victim was identical the semen to be that of appellant’s gene type.

DNA is a molecule that encodes the genetic information in all living organisms. 23 A person’s DNA is the same
in each cell and it does not change throughout a person’s lifetime; the DNA in a person’s blood is the same
as the DNA found in his saliva, sweat, bone, the root and shaft of hair, earwax, mucus, urine, skin tissue,
and vaginal and rectal cells.24 Most importantly, because of polymorphisms in human genetic structure, no
two individuals have the same DNA, with the notable exception of identical twins. 25

DNA print or identification technology has been advanced as a uniquely effective means to link a suspect to
a crime, or to exonerate a wrongly accused suspect, where biological evidence has been left. For purposes
of criminal investigation, DNA identification is a fertile source of both inculpatory and exculpatory evidence.
It can assist immensely in effecting a more accurate account of the crime committed, efficiently facilitating
the conviction of the guilty, securing the acquittal of the innocent, and ensuring the proper administration
of justice in every case.

DNA evidence collected from a crime scene can link a suspect to a crime or eliminate one from suspicion in
the same principle as fingerprints are used.26 Incidents involving sexual assault would leave biological
evidence such as hair, skin tissue, semen, blood, or saliva which can be left on the victim’s body or at the
crime scene. Hair and fiber from clothing, carpets, bedding, or furniture could also be transferred to the
victim’s body during the assault.27Forensic DNA evidence is helpful in proving that there was physical contact
between an assailant and a victim. If properly collected from the victim, crime scene or assailant, DNA can
be compared with known samples to place the suspect at the scene of the crime. 28

The U.P. National Science Research Institute (NSRI), which conducted the DNA tests in this case, used the
Polymerase chain reaction (PCR) amplification method by Short Tandem Repeat (STR) analysis. With PCR
testing, tiny amounts of a specific DNA sequence can be copied exponentially within hours. Thus, getting
sufficient DNA for analysis has become much easier since it became possible to reliably amplify small
samples using the PCR method.

In assessing the probative value of DNA evidence, courts should consider, inter alia, the following factors:
how the samples were collected, how they were handled, the possibility of contamination of the samples,
the procedure followed in analyzing the samples, whether the proper standards and procedures were
followed in conducting the tests, and the qualification of the analyst who conducted the tests. 29

In the case at bar, Dr. Maria Corazon Abogado de Ungria was duly qualified by the prosecution as an expert
witness on DNA print or identification techniques.30 Based on Dr. de Ungria’s testimony, it was determined
that the gene type and DNA profile of appellant are identical to that of the extracts subject of
examination.31 The blood sample taken from the appellant showed that he was of the following gene types:
vWA 15/19, TH01 7/8, DHFRP2 9/10 and CSF1PO 10/11, which are identical with semen taken from the
victim’s vaginal canal.32 Verily, a DNA match exists between the semen found in the victim and the blood
sample given by the appellant in open court during the course of the trial.

Admittedly, we are just beginning to integrate these advances in science and technology in the Philippine
criminal justice system, so we must be cautious as we traverse these relatively uncharted waters.
Fortunately, we can benefit from the wealth of persuasive jurisprudence that has developed in other
jurisdictions. Specifically, the prevailing doctrine in the U.S. has proven instructive.

In Daubert v. Merrell Dow,33 it was ruled that pertinent evidence based on scientifically valid principles could
be used as long as it was relevant and reliable. Judges, under Daubert, were allowed greater discretion over
which testimony they would allow at trial, including the introduction of new kinds of scientific techniques.
DNA typing is one such novel procedure.

Under Philippine law, evidence is relevant when it relates directly to a fact in issue as to induce belief in its
existence or non-existence.34 Applying the Daubert test to the case at bar, the DNA evidence obtained
through PCR testing and utilizing STR analysis, and which was appreciated by the court a quo is relevant
and reliable since it is reasonably based on scientifically valid principles of human genetics and molecular
biology.

Independently of the physical evidence of appellant’s semen found in the victim’s vaginal canal, the trial
court appreciated the following circumstantial evidence as being sufficient to sustain a conviction beyond
reasonable doubt: (1) Appellant and his wife were living in the house of Isabel Dawang together with the
victim, Kathylyn Uba; (2) In June 1998, appellant’s wife left the house because of their frequent quarrels;
(3) Appellant received from the victim, Kathylyn Uba, a letter from his estranged wife in the early morning
on June 30, 1998; (4) Appellant was seen by Apolonia Wania and Beverly Denneng at 1:00 p.m. of June
30, 1998 near the kitchen of the house of Isabel Dawang, acting strangely and wearing a dirty white shirt
with collar; (5) Judilyn Pas-a saw appellant going down the ladder of the house of Isabel at 12:30 p.m.,
wearing a dirty white shirt, and again at 1:30 p.m., this time wearing a black shirt; (6) Appellant hurriedly
left when the husband of Judilyn Pas-a was approaching; (7) Salmalina Tandagan saw appellant in a dirty
white shirt coming down the ladder of the house of Isabel on the day Kathylyn Uba was found dead; (8) The
door leading to the second floor of the house of Isabel Dawang was tied by a rope; (9) The victim, Kathylyn
Uba, lay naked in a pool of blood with her intestines protruding from her body on the second floor of the
house of Isabel Dawang, with her stained pants, bra, underwear and shoes scattered along the periphery;
(10) Laboratory examination revealed sperm in the victim’s vagina (Exhibit "H" and "J"); (11) The stained
or dirty white shirt found in the crime scene was found to be positive with blood; (12) DNA of slide, Exhibit
"J" and "H", compared with the DNA profile of the appellant are identical; and (13) Appellant escaped two
days after he was detained but was subsequently apprehended, such flight being indicative of guilt. 35

Circumstantial evidence, to be sufficient to warrant a conviction, must form an unbroken chain which leads
to a fair and reasonable conclusion that the accused, to the exclusion of others, is the perpetrator of the
crime. To determine whether there is sufficient circumstantial evidence, three requisites must concur: (1)
there is more than one circumstance; (2) facts on which the inferences are derived are proven; and (3) the
combination of all the circumstances is such as to produce a conviction beyond reasonable doubt. 36

In an attempt to exclude the DNA evidence, the appellant contends that the blood sample taken from him
as well as the DNA tests were conducted in violation of his right to remain silent as well as his right against
self-incrimination under Secs. 12 and 17 of Art. III of the Constitution.

This contention is untenable. The kernel of the right is not against all compulsion, but against testimonial
compulsion.37 The right against self- incrimination is simply against the legal process of extracting from the
lips of the accused an admission of guilt. It does not apply where the evidence sought to be excluded is not
an incrimination but as part of object evidence.

We ruled in People v. Rondero38 that although accused-appellant insisted that hair samples were forcibly
taken from him and submitted to the National Bureau of Investigation for forensic examination, the hair
samples may be admitted in evidence against him, for what is proscribed is the use of testimonial compulsion
or any evidence communicative in nature acquired from the accused under duress.

Hence, a person may be compelled to submit to fingerprinting, photographing, paraffin, blood and DNA, as
there is no testimonial compulsion involved. Under People v. Gallarde,39 where immediately after the
incident, the police authorities took pictures of the accused without the presence of counsel, we ruled that
there was no violation of the right against self-incrimination. The accused may be compelled to submit to a
physical examination to determine his involvement in an offense of which he is accused.

It must also be noted that appellant in this case submitted himself for blood sampling which was conducted
in open court on March 30, 2000, in the presence of counsel.

Appellant further argues that the DNA tests conducted by the prosecution against him are unconstitutional
on the ground that resort thereto is tantamount to the application of an ex-post facto law.

This argument is specious. No ex-post facto law is involved in the case at bar. The science of DNA typing
involves the admissibility, relevance and reliability of the evidence obtained under the Rules of Court.
Whereas an ex-post facto law refers primarily to a question of law, DNA profiling requires a factual
determination of the probative weight of the evidence presented.

Appellant’s twin defense of denial and alibi cannot be sustained. The forensic DNA evidence and bloodied
shirt, notwithstanding the eyewitness accounts of his presence at Isabel Dawang’s house during the time
when the crime was committed, undeniably link him to the June 30, 1998 incident. Appellant did not
demonstrate with clear and convincing evidence an impossibility to be in two places at the same time,
especially in this case where the two places are located in the same barangay. 40 He lives within a one
hundred (100) meter radius from the scene of the crime, and requires a mere five minute walk to reach one
house from the other. This fact severely weakens his alibi.

As to the second assignment of error, appellant asserts that the court a quo committed reversible error in
convicting him of the crime charged. He alleges that he should be acquitted on reasonable doubt.

Appellant’s assertion cannot be sustained.

Generally, courts should only consider and rely upon duly established evidence and never on mere
conjectures or suppositions. The legal relevancy of evidence denotes "something more than a minimum of
probative value," suggesting that such evidentiary relevance must contain a "plus value." 41 This may be
necessary to preclude the trial court from being satisfied by matters of slight value, capable of being
exaggerated by prejudice and hasty conclusions. Evidence without "plus value" may be logically relevant
but not legally sufficient to convict. It is incumbent upon the trial court to balance the probative value of
such evidence against the likely harm that would result from its admission.

The judgment in a criminal case can be upheld only when there is relevant evidence from which the court
can properly find or infer that the accused is guilty beyond reasonable doubt. Proof beyond reasonable doubt
requires moral certainty of guilt in order to sustain a conviction. Moral certainty is that degree of certainty
that convinces and directs the understanding and satisfies the reason and judgment of those who are bound
to act conscientiously upon it. It is certainty beyond reasonable doubt.42 This requires that the
circumstances, taken together, should be of a conclusive nature and tendency; leading, on the whole, to a
satisfactory conclusion that the accused, and no one else, committed the offense charged. 43 In view of the
totality of evidence appreciated thus far, we rule that the present case passes the test of moral certainty.

However, as a matter of procedure, and for the purpose of meeting the requirement of proof beyond
reasonable doubt, motive is essential for conviction when there is doubt as to the identity of the culprit.44

Pertinently, it must be noted that Judilyn Pas-a, first cousin of the victim, testified that she last saw the
victim alive in the morning of June 30, 1998 at the house of Isabel Dawang. 45 She witnessed the appellant
running down the stairs of Isabel’s house and proceeding to the back of the same house. 46 She also testified
that a few days before the victim was raped and killed, the latter revealed to her that "Joel Yatar attempted
to rape her after she came from the school."47 The victim told Judilyn about the incident or attempt of the
appellant to rape her five days before her naked and violated body was found dead in her grandmother’s
house on June 25, 1998.48 In addition, Judilyn also testified that when her auntie Luz Dawang Yatar, wife of
appellant, separated from her husband, "this Joel Yatar threatened to kill our family." 49 According to Judilyn,
who was personally present during an argument between her aunt and the appellant, the exact words
uttered by appellant to his wife in the Ilocano dialect was, "If you leave me, I will kill all your family and
your relatives x x x."50 These statements were not contradicted by appellant.

Thus, appellant’s motive to sexually assault and kill the victim was evident in the instant case. It is a rule
in criminal law that motive, being a state of mind, is established by the testimony of witnesses on the acts
or statements of the accused before or immediately after the commission of the offense, deeds or words
that may express it or from which his motive or reason for committing it may be inferred. 51

Accordingly, we are convinced that the appellant is guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the special complex
crime of rape with homicide. Appellant sexually assaulted Kathylyn Uba, and by reason or on the occasion
thereof, in order to conceal his lustful deed, permanently sealed the victim’s lips by stabbing her repeatedly,
thereby causing her untimely demise.

The following are the elements constitutive of rape with homicide: (1) the appellant had carnal knowledge
of a woman; (2) carnal knowledge of a woman was achieved by means of force, threat or intimidation; and
(3) by reason or on the occasion of such carnal knowledge by means of force, threat or intimidation,
appellant killed the woman.52However, in rape committed by close kin, such as the victim’s father, step-
father, uncle, or the common-law spouse of her mother, it is not necessary that actual force or intimidation
be employed.53 Moral influence or ascendancy takes the place of violence and intimidation.54 The fact that
the victim’s hymen is intact does not negate a finding that rape was committed as mere entry by the penis
into the lips of the female genital organ, even without rupture or laceration of the hymen, suffices for
conviction of rape.55 The strength and dilatability of the hymen are invariable; it may be so elastic as to
stretch without laceration during intercourse. Absence of hymenal lacerations does not disprove sexual
abuse especially when the victim is of tender age.56

In the case at bar, appellant is the husband of the victim’s aunt. He is seven years older than the victim
Kathylyn Uba. Before he and his wife separated, appellant lived in the house of his mother-in-law, together
with the victim and his wife. After the separation, appellant moved to the house of his parents, approximately
one hundred (100) meters from his mother-in-law’s house. Being a relative by affinity within the third civil
degree, he is deemed in legal contemplation to have moral ascendancy over the victim.

Under Article 266-B of the Revised Penal Code, the penalty of death is imposed when by reason or on the
occasion of the rape, homicide is committed. Although three (3) Justices of this Court maintain their position
that R.A. 7659 is unconstitutional insofar as it prescribes the death penalty, they nevertheless submit to the
ruling of the majority that the law is not unconstitutional, and that the death penalty can be lawfully imposed
in the case at bar.

As to damages, civil indemnity ex delicto of P100,000.00,57 actual damages incurred by the family of the
victim that have been proved at the trial amounting to P93,190.00, 58 and moral damages of
P75,000.0059 should be awarded in the light of prevailing law and jurisprudence. Exemplary damages cannot
be awarded as part of the civil liability since the crime was not committed with one or more aggravating
circumstances.60

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Decision of the RTC of Bulanao, Tabuk, Kalinga, Branch 25 in
Criminal Case No. 35-98, sentencing appellant Joel Yatar alias "Kawit" to Death for the special complex
crime of Rape with Homicide is AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION that he be ORDERED to pay the
family of the victim Kathylyn Uba civil indemnity ex delicto in the amount of P100,000.00, P93,190.00 in
actual damages and P75,000.00 in moral damages. The award of exemplary damages is DELETED.

Upon the finality of this Decision and in accordance with Art. 83 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by
Sec. 25 of Rep. Act No. 7659, let the records of this case be forthwith forwarded to the President of the
Philippines for the possible exercise of the pardoning power. Costs de oficio. SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 148220 June 15, 2005

ROSENDO HERRERA, petitioner,

vs.
ROSENDO ALBA, minor, represented by his mother ARMI A. ALBA, and HON. NIMFA CUESTA-
VILCHES, Presiding Judge, Branch 48, Regional Trial Court, Manila, respondents.

DECISION

CARPIO, J.:

The Case

This is a petition for review1 to set aside the Decision2 dated 29 November 2000 of the Court of Appeals
("appellate court") in CA-G.R. SP No. 59766. The appellate court affirmed two Orders3 issued by Branch 48
of the Regional Trial Court of Manila ("trial court") in SP No. 98-88759. The Order dated 3 February 2000
directed Rosendo Herrera ("petitioner") to submit to deoxyribonucleic acid ("DNA") paternity testing, while
the Order dated 8 June 2000 denied petitioner’s motion for reconsideration.

The Facts

On 14 May 1998, then thirteen-year-old Rosendo Alba ("respondent"), represented by his mother Armi Alba,
filed before the trial court a petition for compulsory recognition, support and damages against petitioner.
On 7 August 1998, petitioner filed his answer with counterclaim where he denied that he is the biological
father of respondent. Petitioner also denied physical contact with respondent’s mother.

Respondent filed a motion to direct the taking of DNA paternity testing to abbreviate the proceedings. To
support the motion, respondent presented the testimony of Saturnina C. Halos, Ph.D. When she testified,
Dr. Halos was an Associate Professor at De La Salle University where she taught Cell Biology. She was also
head of the University of the Philippines Natural Sciences Research Institute ("UP-NSRI"), a DNA analysis
laboratory. She was a former professor at the University of the Philippines in Diliman, Quezon City, where
she developed the Molecular Biology Program and taught Molecular Biology. In her testimony, Dr. Halos
described the process for DNA paternity testing and asserted that the test had an accuracy rate of 99.9999%
in establishing paternity.4

Petitioner opposed DNA paternity testing and contended that it has not gained acceptability. Petitioner
further argued that DNA paternity testing violates his right against self-incrimination.

The Ruling of the Trial Court

In an Order dated 3 February 2000, the trial court granted respondent’s motion to conduct DNA paternity
testing on petitioner, respondent and Armi Alba. Thus:

In view of the foregoing, the motion of the petitioner is GRANTED and the relevant individuals, namely:
the petitioner, the minor child, and respondent are directed to undergo DNA paternity testing in a
laboratory of their common choice within a period of thirty (30) days from receipt of the Order, and to
submit the results thereof within a period of ninety (90) days from completion. The parties are further
reminded of the hearing set on 24 February 2000 for the reception of other evidence in support of the
petition.

IT IS SO ORDERED.5 (Emphasis in the original)

Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration of the 3 February 2000 Order. He asserted that "under the
present circumstances, the DNA test [he] is compelled to take would be inconclusive, irrelevant and the
coercive process to obtain the requisite specimen…, unconstitutional."

In an Order dated 8 June 2000, the trial court denied petitioner’s motion for reconsideration. 6

On 18 July 2000, petitioner filed before the appellate court a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the 1997
Rules of Civil Procedure. He asserted that the trial court rendered the Orders dated 3 February 2000 and 8
June 2000 "in excess of, or without jurisdiction and/or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction." Petitioner further contended that there is "no appeal nor any [other] plain, adequate
and speedy remedy in the ordinary course of law." Petitioner maintained his previous objections to the
taking of DNA paternity testing. He submitted the following grounds to support his objection:

1. Public respondent misread and misapplied the ruling in Lim vs. Court of Appeals (270 SCRA 2).

2. Public respondent ruled to accept DNA test without considering the limitations on, and conditions
precedent for the admissibility of DNA testing and ignoring the serious constraints affecting the
reliability of the test as admitted by private respondent’s "expert" witness.
 3. Subject Orders lack legal and factual support, with public respondent relying on scientific findings
and conclusions unfit for judicial notice and unsupported by experts in the field and scientific
treatises.

4. Under the present circumstances the DNA testing petitioner [is] compelled to take will be
inconclusive, irrelevant and the coercive process to obtain the requisite specimen from the petitioner,
unconstitutional.7

The Ruling of the Court of Appeals

On 29 November 2000, the appellate court issued a decision denying the petition and affirming the
questioned Orders of the trial court. The appellate court stated that petitioner merely desires to correct the
trial court’s evaluation of evidence. Thus, appeal is an available remedy for an error of judgment that the
court may commit in the exercise of its jurisdiction. The appellate court also stated that the proposed DNA
paternity testing does not violate his right against self-incrimination because the right applies only to
testimonial compulsion. Finally, the appellate court pointed out that petitioner can still refute a possible
adverse result of the DNA paternity testing. The dispositive portion of the appellate court’s decision reads:

WHEREFORE, foregoing premises considered, the Petition is hereby DENIED DUE COURSE, and ordered
dismissed, and the challenged orders of the Trial Court AFFIRMED, with costs to Petitioner.

SO ORDERED.8

Petitioner moved for reconsideration, which the appellate court denied in its Resolution dated 23 May 2001. 9

Issues

Petitioner raises the issue of whether a DNA test is a valid probative tool in this jurisdiction to determine
filiation. Petitioner asks for the conditions under which DNA technology may be integrated into our judicial
system and the prerequisites for the admissibility of DNA test results in a paternity suit. 10

Petitioner further submits that the appellate court gravely abused its discretion when it authorized the trial
court "to embark in [sic] a new procedure xxx to determine filiation despite the absence of legislation to
ensure its reliability and integrity, want of official recognition as made clear in Lim vs. Court of Appeals and
the presence of technical and legal constraints in respect of [sic] its implementation." 11 Petitioner maintains
that the proposed DNA paternity testing violates his right against self-incrimination.12

The Ruling of the Court

The petition has no merit.

Before discussing the issues on DNA paternity testing, we deem it appropriate to give an overview of a
paternity suit and apply it to the facts of this case. We shall consider the requirements of the Family Code
and of the Rules of Evidence to establish paternity and filiation.

An Overview of the Paternity and Filiation Suit

Filiation proceedings are usually filed not just to adjudicate paternity but also to secure a legal right
associated with paternity, such as citizenship,13 support (as in the present case), or inheritance. The burden
of proving paternity is on the person who alleges that the putative father is the biological father of the child.
There are four significant procedural aspects of a traditional paternity action which parties have to face:
a prima facie case, affirmative defenses, presumption of legitimacy, and physical resemblance between the
putative father and child.14

A prima facie case exists if a woman declares that she had sexual relations with the putative father. In our
jurisdiction, corroborative proof is required to carry the burden forward and shift it to the putative father. 15

There are two affirmative defenses available to the putative father. The putative father may show
incapability of sexual relations with the mother, because of either physical absence or impotency. 16 The
putative father may also show that the mother had sexual relations with other men at the time of conception.

A child born to a husband and wife during a valid marriage is presumed legitimate. 17 The child’s legitimacy
may be impugned only under the strict standards provided by law. 18

Finally, physical resemblance between the putative father and child may be offered as part of evidence of
paternity. Resemblance is a trial technique unique to a paternity proceeding. However, although likeness is
a function of heredity, there is no mathematical formula that could quantify how much a child must or must
not look like his biological father.19 This kind of evidence appeals to the emotions of the trier of fact.
In the present case, the trial court encountered three of the four aspects. Armi Alba, respondent’s mother,
put forward a prima facie case when she asserted that petitioner is respondent’s biological father. Aware
that her assertion is not enough to convince the trial court, she offered corroborative proof in the form of
letters and pictures. Petitioner, on the other hand, denied Armi Alba’s assertion. He denied ever having
sexual relations with Armi Alba and stated that respondent is Armi Alba’s child with another man. Armi Alba
countered petitioner’s denial by submitting pictures of respondent and petitioner side by side, to show how
much they resemble each other.

Paternity and filiation disputes can easily become credibility contests. We now look to the law, rules, and
governing jurisprudence to help us determine what evidence of incriminating acts on paternity and filiation
are allowed in this jurisdiction.

Laws, Rules, and Jurisprudence Establishing Filiation

The relevant provisions of the Family Code provide as follows:

ART. 175. Illegitimate children may establish their illegitimate filiation in the same way and on the same
evidence as legitimate children.

xxx

ART. 172. The filiation of legitimate children is established by any of the following:

(1) The record of birth appearing in the civil register or a final judgment; or

(2) An admission of legitimate filiation in a public document or a private handwritten instrument and
signed by the parent concerned.

In the absence of the foregoing evidence, the legitimate filiation shall be proved by:

(1) The open and continuous possession of the status of a legitimate child; or

(2) Any other means allowed by the Rules of Court and special laws.

The Rules on Evidence include provisions on pedigree. The relevant sections of Rule 130 provide:

SEC. 39. Act or declaration about pedigree.—The act or declaration of a person deceased, or unable to
testify, in respect to the pedigree of another person related to him by birth or marriage, may be received in
evidence where it occurred before the controversy, and the relationship between the two persons is shown
by evidence other than such act or declaration. The word "pedigree" includes relationship, family genealogy,
birth, marriage, death, the dates when and the places where these facts occurred, and the names of the
relatives. It embraces also facts of family history intimately connected with pedigree.

SEC. 40. Family reputation or tradition regarding pedigree.—The reputation or tradition existing in a family
previous to the controversy, in respect to the pedigree of any one of its members, may be received in
evidence if the witness testifying thereon be also a member of the family, either by consanguinity or affinity.
Entries in family bibles or other family books or charts, engraving on rings, family portraits and the like,
may be received as evidence of pedigree.

This Court’s rulings further specify what incriminating acts are acceptable as evidence to establish filiation.
In Pe Lim v. CA,20 a case petitioner often cites, we stated that the issue of paternity still has to be resolved
by such conventional evidence as the relevant incriminating verbal and written acts by the putative father.
Under Article 278 of the New Civil Code, voluntary recognition by a parent shall be made in the record of
birth, a will, a statement before a court of record, or in any authentic writing. To be effective, the claim of
filiation must be made by the putative father himself and the writing must be the writing of the putative
father.21 A notarial agreement to support a child whose filiation is admitted by the putative father was
considered acceptable evidence.22 Letters to the mother vowing to be a good father to the child and pictures
of the putative father cuddling the child on various occasions, together with the certificate of live birth,
proved filiation.23 However, a student permanent record, a written consent to a father’s operation, or a
marriage contract where the putative father gave consent, cannot be taken as authentic writing.24 Standing
alone, neither a certificate of baptism25 nor family pictures26 are sufficient to establish filiation.

So far, the laws, rules, and jurisprudence seemingly limit evidence of paternity and filiation to incriminating
acts alone. However, advances in science show that sources of evidence of paternity and filiation need not
be limited to incriminating acts. There is now almost universal scientific agreement that blood grouping tests
are conclusive on non-paternity, although inconclusive on paternity.27

In Co Tao v. Court of Appeals,28 the result of the blood grouping test showed that the putative father was
a "possible father" of the child. Paternity was imputed to the putative father after the possibility of paternity
was proven on presentation during trial of facts and circumstances other than the results of the blood
grouping test.

In Jao v. Court of Appeals,29 the child, the mother, and the putative father agreed to submit themselves
to a blood grouping test. The National Bureau of Investigation ("NBI") conducted the test, which indicated
that the child could not have been the possible offspring of the mother and the putative father. We held that
the result of the blood grouping test was conclusive on the non-paternity of the putative father.

The present case asks us to go one step further. We are now asked whether DNA analysis may be admitted
as evidence to prove paternity.

DNA Analysis as Evidence

DNA is the fundamental building block of a person’s entire genetic make-up. DNA is found in all human cells
and is the same in every cell of the same person. Genetic identity is unique. Hence, a person’s DNA profile
can determine his identity.30

DNA analysis is a procedure in which DNA extracted from a biological sample obtained from an individual is
examined. The DNA is processed to generate a pattern, or a DNA profile, for the individual from whom the
sample is taken. This DNA profile is unique for each person, except for identical twins. 31 We quote relevant
portions of the trial court’s 3 February 2000 Order with approval:

Everyone is born with a distinct genetic blueprint called DNA (deoxyribonucleic acid). It is exclusive to
an individual (except in the rare occurrence of identical twins that share a single, fertilized egg), and DNA
is unchanging throughout life. Being a component of every cell in the human body, the DNA of an individual’s
blood is the very DNA in his or her skin cells, hair follicles, muscles, semen, samples from buccal swabs,
saliva, or other body parts.

The chemical structure of DNA has four bases. They are known as A (adenine), G (guanine), C (cystosine)
and T(thymine). The order in which the four bases appear in an individual’s DNA determines his or her
physical makeup. And since DNA is a double-stranded molecule, it is composed of two specific paired
bases, A-T or T-A and G-C or C-G. These are called "genes."

Every gene has a certain number of the above base pairs distributed in a particular sequence. This gives a
person his or her genetic code. Somewhere in the DNA framework, nonetheless, are sections that differ.
They are known as "polymorphic loci," which are the areas analyzed in DNA typing (profiling, tests,
fingerprinting, or analysis/DNA fingerprinting/genetic tests or fingerprinting). In other words, DNA typing
simply means determining the "polymorphic loci."

How is DNA typing performed? From a DNA sample obtained or extracted, a molecular biologist may proceed
to analyze it in several ways. There are five (5) techniques to conduct DNA typing. They are: the RFLP
(restriction fragment length polymorphism); "reverse dot blot" or HLA DQ a/Pm loci which was used in 287
cases that were admitted as evidence by 37 courts in the U.S. as of November 1994; mtDNA process; VNTR
(variable number tandem repeats); and the most recent which is known as the PCR-([polymerase] chain
reaction) based STR (short tandem repeats) method which, as of 1996, was availed of by most forensic
laboratories in the world. PCR is the process of replicating or copying DNA in an evidence sample a million
times through repeated cycling of a reaction involving the so-called DNA polymerize enzyme. STR, on the
other hand, takes measurements in 13 separate places and can match two (2) samples with a reported
theoretical error rate of less than one (1) in a trillion.

Just like in fingerprint analysis, in DNA typing, "matches" are determined. To illustrate, when DNA or
fingerprint tests are done to identify a suspect in a criminal case, the evidence collected from the crime
scene is compared with the "known" print. If a substantial amount of the identifying features are the same,
the DNA or fingerprint is deemed to be a match. But then, even if only one feature of the DNA or fingerprint
is different, it is deemed not to have come from the suspect.

As earlier stated, certain regions of human DNA show variations between people. In each of these regions,
a person possesses two genetic types called "allele", one inherited from each parent. In [a] paternity test,
the forensic scientist looks at a number of these variable regions in an individual to produce a DNA profile.
Comparing next the DNA profiles of the mother and child, it is possible to determine which half of the child’s
DNA was inherited from the mother. The other half must have been inherited from the biological father. The
alleged father’s profile is then examined to ascertain whether he has the DNA types in his profile, which
match the paternal types in the child. If the man’s DNA types do not match that of the child, the man
is excluded as the father. If the DNA types match, then he is not excluded as the father.32 (Emphasis in
the original)

Although the term "DNA testing" was mentioned in the 1995 case of People v. Teehankee, Jr.,33 it was
only in the 2001 case of Tijing v. Court of Appeals34 that more than a passing mention was given to DNA
analysis. In Tijing,we issued a writ of habeas corpus against respondent who abducted petitioners’
youngest son. Testimonial and documentary evidence and physical resemblance were used to establish
parentage. However, we observed that:
Parentage will still be resolved using conventional methods unless we adopt the modern and scientific ways
available. Fortunately, we have now the facility and expertise in using DNA test for identification and
parentage testing. The University of the Philippines Natural Science Research Institute (UP-NSRI) DNA
Analysis Laboratory has now the capability to conduct DNA typing using short tandem repeat (STR) analysis.
xxx For it was said, that courts should apply the results of science when completely obtained in aid of
situations presented, since to reject said result is to deny progress. Though it is not necessary in this case
to resort to DNA testing, in [the] future it would be useful to all concerned in the prompt resolution of
parentage and identity issues.

Admissibility of DNA Analysis as Evidence

The 2002 case of People v. Vallejo35 discussed DNA analysis as evidence. This may be considered a 180
degree turn from the Court’s wary attitude towards DNA testing in the 1997 Pe Lim case,36 where we stated
that "DNA, being a relatively new science, xxx has not yet been accorded official recognition by our courts."
In Vallejo, the DNA profile from the vaginal swabs taken from the rape victim matched the accused’s DNA
profile. We affirmed the accused’s conviction of rape with homicide and sentenced him to death. We
declared:

In assessing the probative value of DNA evidence, therefore, courts should consider, among other things,
the following data: how the samples were collected, how they were handled, the possibility of contamination
of the samples, the procedure followed in analyzing the samples, whether the proper standards and
procedures were followed in conducting the tests, and the qualification of the analyst who conducted the
tests.37

Vallejo discussed the probative value, not admissibility, of DNA evidence. By 2002, there was no longer
any question on the validity of the use of DNA analysis as evidence. The Court moved from the issue of
according "official recognition" to DNA analysis as evidence to the issue of observance of procedures in
conducting DNA analysis.

In 2004, there were two other cases that had a significant impact on jurisprudence on DNA testing: People
v. Yatar38 and In re: The Writ of Habeas Corpus for Reynaldo de Villa.39 In Yatar, a match existed
between the DNA profile of the semen found in the victim and the DNA profile of the blood sample given by
appellant in open court. The Court, following Vallejo’s footsteps, affirmed the conviction of appellant
because the physical evidence, corroborated by circumstantial evidence, showed appellant guilty of rape
with homicide. In De Villa, the convict-petitioner presented DNA test results to prove that he is not the
father of the child conceived at the time of commission of the rape. The Court ruled that a difference between
the DNA profile of the convict-petitioner and the DNA profile of the victim’s child does not preclude the
convict-petitioner’s commission of rape.

In the present case, the various pleadings filed by petitioner and respondent refer to two United States
cases to support their respective positions on the admissibility of DNA analysis as evidence: Frye v.
U.S.40 and Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals.41 In Frye v. U.S., the trial court convicted Frye of
murder. Frye appealed his conviction to the Supreme Court of the District of Columbia. During trial, Frye’s
counsel offered an expert witness to testify on the result of a systolic blood pressure deception test 42 made
on defendant. The state Supreme Court affirmed Frye’s conviction and ruled that "the systolic blood pressure
deception test has not yet gained such standing and scientific recognition among physiological and
psychological authorities as would justify the courts in admitting expert testimony deduced from the
discovery, development, and experiments thus far made." The Fryestandard of general acceptance states
as follows:

Just when a scientific principle or discovery crosses the line between the experimental and demonstrable
stages is difficult to define. Somewhere in this twilight zone the evidential force of the principle must be
recognized, and while courts will go a long way in admitting expert testimony deduced from a well recognized
scientific principle or discovery, the thing from which the deduction is made must be sufficiently established
to have gained general acceptance in the particular field in which it belongs.

In 1989, State v. Schwartz43 modified the Frye standard. Schwartz was charged with stabbing and
murder. Bloodstained articles and blood samples of the accused and the victim were submitted for DNA
testing to a government facility and a private facility. The prosecution introduced the private testing facility’s
results over Schwartz’s objection. One of the issues brought before the state Supreme Court included the
admissibility of DNA test results in a criminal proceeding. The state Supreme Court concluded that:

While we agree with the trial court that forensic DNA typing has gained general acceptance in the scientific
community, we hold that admissibility of specific test results in a particular case hinges on the laboratory’s
compliance with appropriate standards and controls, and the availability of their testing data and results. 44

In 1993, Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc.45 further modified the Frye-
Schwartz standard. Daubertwas a product liability case where both the trial and appellate courts denied
the admissibility of an expert’s testimony because it failed to meet the Frye standard of "general
acceptance." The United States Supreme Court ruled that in federal trials, the Federal Rules of Evidence
have superseded the Frye standard. Rule 401 defines relevant evidence, while Rule 402 provides the
foundation for admissibility of evidence. Thus:

Rule 401. "Relevant evidence" is defined as that which has any "tendency to make the existence of any fact
that is of consequence to the determination of the action more probable or less probable than it would be
without the evidence.

Rule 402. All relevant evidence is admissible, except as otherwise provided by the Constitution of the United
States, by Act of Congress, by these rules, or by other rules prescribed by the Supreme Court pursuant to
statutory authority. Evidence which is not relevant is not admissible.

Rule 702 of the Federal Rules of Evidence governing expert testimony provides:

If scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence
or to determine a fact in issue, a witness qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or
education, may testify thereto in the form of an opinion or otherwise.

Daubert cautions that departure from the Frye standard of general acceptance does not mean that the
Federal Rules do not place limits on the admissibility of scientific evidence. Rather, the judge must ensure
that the testimony’s reasoning or method is scientifically valid and is relevant to the issue. Admissibility
would depend on factors such as (1) whether the theory or technique can be or has been tested; (2) whether
the theory or technique has been subjected to peer review and publication; (3) the known or potential rate
of error; (4) the existence and maintenance of standards controlling the technique’s operation; and (5)
whether the theory or technique is generally accepted in the scientific community.

Another product liability case, Kumho Tires Co. v. Carmichael,46 further modified the Daubert standard.
This led to the amendment of Rule 702 in 2000 and which now reads as follows:

If scientific, technical or other specialized knowledge will assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence
or to determine a fact in issue, a witness qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or
education, may testify thereto in the form of an opinion or otherwise, if (1) the testimony is based upon
sufficient facts or data, (2) the testimony is the product of reliable principles and methods, and (3) the
witness has applied the principles and methods reliably to the facts of the case.

We now determine the applicability in this jurisdiction of these American cases. Obviously, neither the Frye-
Schwartz standard nor the Daubert-Kumho standard is controlling in the Philippines.47 At best, American
jurisprudence merely has a persuasive effect on our decisions. Here, evidence is admissible when it is
relevant to the fact in issue and is not otherwise excluded by statute or the Rules of Court. 48 Evidence is
relevant when it has such a relation to the fact in issue as to induce belief in its existence or non-
existence.49 Section 49 of Rule 130, which governs the admissibility of expert testimony, provides as follows:

The opinion of a witness on a matter requiring special knowledge, skill, experience or training which he is
shown to possess may be received in evidence.

This Rule does not pose any legal obstacle to the admissibility of DNA analysis as evidence. Indeed, even
evidence on collateral matters is allowed "when it tends in any reasonable degree to establish the probability
or improbability of the fact in issue."50

Indeed, it would have been convenient to merely refer petitioner to our decisions in Tijing,
Vallejo and Yatar to illustrate that DNA analysis is admissible as evidence. In our jurisdiction, the
restrictive tests for admissibility established by Frye-Schwartz and Daubert-Kumho go into the weight
of the evidence.

Probative Value of DNA Analysis as Evidence

Despite our relatively liberal rules on admissibility, trial courts should be cautious in giving credence to DNA
analysis as evidence. We reiterate our statement in Vallejo:

In assessing the probative value of DNA evidence, therefore, courts should consider, among other things,
the following data: how the samples were collected, how they were handled, the possibility of contamination
of the samples, the procedure followed in analyzing the samples, whether the proper standards and
procedures were followed in conducting the tests, and the qualification of the analyst who conducted the
tests.51]

We also repeat the trial court’s explanation of DNA analysis used in paternity cases:

In [a] paternity test, the forensic scientist looks at a number of these variable regions in an individual to
produce a DNA profile. Comparing next the DNA profiles of the mother and child, it is possible to determine
which half of the child’s DNA was inherited from the mother. The other half must have been inherited from
the biological father. The alleged father’s profile is then examined to ascertain whether he has the DNA
types in his profile, which match the paternal types in the child. If the man’s DNA types do not match that
of the child, the man is excluded as the father. If the DNA types match, then he is not excluded as the
father.52

It is not enough to state that the child’s DNA profile matches that of the putative father. A complete match
between the DNA profile of the child and the DNA profile of the putative father does not necessarily establish
paternity. For this reason, following the highest standard adopted in an American jurisdiction, 53 trial courts
should require at least 99.9% as a minimum value of the Probability of Paternity ("W") prior to a paternity
inclusion. W is a numerical estimate for the likelihood of paternity of a putative father compared to the
probability of a random match of two unrelated individuals. An appropriate reference population database,
such as the Philippine population database, is required to compute for W. Due to the probabilistic nature of
paternity inclusions, W will never equal to 100%. However, the accuracy of W estimates is higher when the
putative father, mother and child are subjected to DNA analysis compared to those conducted between the
putative father and child alone.54

DNA analysis that excludes the putative father from paternity should be conclusive proof of non-paternity.
If the value of W is less than 99.9%, the results of the DNA analysis should be considered as corroborative
evidence. If the value of W is 99.9% or higher, then there is refutable presumption of paternity.55 This
refutable presumption of paternity should be subjected to the Vallejo standards.

Right Against Self-Incrimination

Section 17, Article 3 of the 1987 Constitution provides that "no person shall be compelled to be a witness
against himself." Petitioner asserts that obtaining samples from him for DNA testing violates his right against
self-incrimination. Petitioner ignores our earlier pronouncements that the privilege is applicable only to
testimonial evidence. Again, we quote relevant portions of the trial court’s 3 February 2000 Order with
approval:

Obtaining DNA samples from an accused in a criminal case or from the respondent in a paternity case,
contrary to the belief of respondent in this action, will not violate the right against self-incrimination. This
privilege applies only to evidence that is "communicative" in essence taken under duress (People vs. Olvis,
154 SCRA 513, 1987). The Supreme Court has ruled that the right against self-incrimination is just a
prohibition on the use of physical or moral compulsion to extort communication (testimonial evidence) from
a defendant, not an exclusion of evidence taken from his body when it may be material. As such, a defendant
can be required to submit to a test to extract virus from his body (as cited in People vs. Olvis, Supra); the
substance emitting from the body of the accused was received as evidence for acts of lasciviousness (US
vs. Tan Teng, 23 Phil. 145); morphine forced out of the mouth was received as proof (US vs. Ong Siu Hong,
36 Phil. 735); an order by the judge for the witness to put on pair of pants for size was allowed (People vs.
Otadora, 86 Phil. 244); and the court can compel a woman accused of adultery to submit for pregnancy test
(Villaflor vs. Summers, 41 Phil. 62), since the gist of the privilege is the restriction on "testimonial
compulsion."56

The policy of the Family Code to liberalize the rule on the investigation of the paternity and filiation of
children, especially of illegitimate children, is without prejudice to the right of the putative parent to claim
his or her own defenses.57 Where the evidence to aid this investigation is obtainable through the facilities of
modern science and technology, such evidence should be considered subject to the limits established by the
law, rules, and jurisprudence.

WHEREFORE, we DISMISS the petition. We AFFIRM the Decision of the Court of Appeals dated 29
November 2000 in CA-G.R. SP No. 59766. We also AFFIRM the Orders dated 3 February 2000 and 8 June
2000 issued by Branch 48 of the Regional Trial Court of Manila in Civil Case No. SP-98-88759. SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 176527 October 9, 2009

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee,

vs.
SAMSON VILLASAN y BANATI, Accused-Appellant.

DECISION

BRION, J.:

We review in this appeal the May 25, 2006 decision of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR H.C. No.
00250.1The appellate court affirmed the May 29, 2001 decision of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch
18, Cebu City,2that in turn found appellant Samson Villasan (appellant) guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
the crime of murder and imposed on him the penalty of reclusion perpetua.

ANTECEDENT FACTS

The prosecution charged the appellant before the RTC with the crime of murder under the following
Information:3

That on or about the 1st day of June, 2000, at about 6:30 in the evening, in the City of Cebu, Philippines,
and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said accused, armed with a .357 caliber Magnum
revolver S&W (Homemade), with treachery and evident premeditation, with deliberate intent, with intent to
kill, did then and there attack, assault and shot one Jacinto T. Bayron, hitting him on his [sic] vital parts of
his body, thereby inflicting upon him physical injuries, as a consequence of which said Jacinto T. Bayron
died instantaneously.

CONTRARY TO LAW.

The appellant pleaded not guilty to the charge upon arraignment.4 The prosecution presented the following
witnesses in the trial on the merits that followed: Jose Secula (Jose); Gaudioso Quilaton (Gaudioso); Sergio
Bayron (Sergio); and Dr. Rene Enriquez Cam (Dr. Cam). The appellant, Carlito Moalong (Carlito), and Police
Senior Inspector Mutchit Salinas (P/Sr. Insp. Salinas) took the witness stand for the defense.

Jose, a security guard of PROBE Security Agency, testified that he was outside his employer’s branch office
at the Ayala Business Center, Siquijor Road, Cebu City at around 6:15 p.m. of June 1, 2000, when he heard
three successive gunshots.5 He mounted his motorcycle to go and investigate but before he could start it,
he saw the appellant "walking fast" and carrying a gun. He ordered the appellant to stop and to drop his
weapon. The latter obeyed and dropped his gun. He then approached the appellant, conducted a body search
on him,6 and turned him over to his (Jose’s) supervisor who, in turn, contacted the police. The police
forthwith brought the suspect to the police station. Jose recalled that he executed an affidavit on the
shooting incident before the police.7

On cross examination, Jose clarified that he did not see the actual shooting; he only saw the victim’s lifeless
body after the appellant had been arrested.8 On re-direct, Jose stated that before the appellant was brought
to the police station, the latter told him that he had shot a fellow driver. 9

Gaudioso, a store assistant at Healthy Options, narrated that he boarded a jeep at the waiting shed at the
Ayala Business Center at around 6:30 p.m. of June 1, 2000.10 He occupied the jeep’s front seat, beside the
driver Jacinto Bayron (Bayron). While so seated, he heard the appellant briefly converse with Bayron,
requesting the latter to be allowed to ride the jeep because his own jeep conked out. 11 Soon after the
appellant got into Bayron’s jeep, Gaudioso heard a gunshot. He looked back and saw the appellant shoot
Bayron twice in the head.12 Gaudioso immediately jumped off but later returned to assist in bringing Bayron
to the hospital.13 It was then that he learned of Bayron’s name. Thereafter, the police invited him to the
police station for his statement regarding the shooting.14

On cross examination, Gaudioso recalled that there were three other passengers at that time inside the
jeep. He immediately turned his head towards the passenger’s side when he heard the first shot; two more
shots followed. He got scared and jumped off the jeep together with the other passengers. He later returned
and found that the driver was already dead.15

On re-direct, he reiterated that he was the only passenger at the jeep’s front seat, and that the appellant
was seated at the jeep’s rear seats. He maintained that the appellant shot Bayron. 16

Sergio, the victim’s brother, testified that Bayron was a jeep driver earning more or less ₱500.00 daily. He
further stated that the funeral and burial expenses for his brother amounted to ₱100,000.00. He also added
that Bayron had a common-law wife and had a 1 ½ year-old son with her.17

Dr. Cam, the Medico-Legal Officer of the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI), Cebu City, testified that he
conducted a post-mortem examination on the victim’s body on June 2, 2000, 18 and made the following
findings:
NECROPSY REPORT

GUNSHOT WOUNDS:

1) ENTRANCE: 1.0 x 1.3 cms., ovaloid edges, with an area of tattooing around the wound, 8.0 x 10.0
cms., contusion collar widest supero-laterally, located at the right side of the face, below the right
eye, 3.5 cms. x x x

2) ENTRANCE: 0.9 x 1.0 cm., ovaloid, edges inverted, contusion collar widest infero-posteriorly,
located at the right side of the head, just in front of the right ear x x x

3) ENTRANCE: 0.6 x 0.8 cm. ovaloid, edges inverted, contusion collar widest, supero-medially,
located at the right side of the head, occipital area, 4.0 cms., above 13.0 cms., behind the right
external auditory meatus, x x x

POSTMORTEM FINDINGS

Hematoma, scalp, frontal area and right parietal.

Hemorrhage, intracranial, intracerebral, subdural, subarachnoidal, massive, generalized

Internal Organs, congested

Stomach, empty

CAUSE OF DEATH: GUNSHOT WOUNDS OF THE HEAD

Remarks: Two (2) bullets were recovered and submitted to Firearm Investigation Section for Ballistic
Examination.19

On cross-examination, Dr. Cam stated that the distance between the muzzle of the gun and the entrance
wounds was two feet, more or less.20

The defense presented a different version of events.

Carlito testified that he was with the appellant at the parking lot of the Ayala Business Park at past 5:00
p.m. of June 1, 2000, when Bayron and another person approached the appellant. Bayron pointed to the
appellant and said: "Pre, pagtarong sa imong pagkatawo, basig magkaaway ta" (Behave like a good man,
otherwise we will become enemies). The appellant replied, "pre tell me who was the person who told you
about that"?21 Bayron’s companion then accused the appellant of being a traitor. 22

The jeepney dispatcher soon after called Bayron as it was his jeep’s turn to load passengers. 23 Bayron and
his companion boarded the jeep; Bayron sat at the driver’s seat while his companion proceeded to the
passengers’ seats at the rear. The appellant followed them into the jeep and sat behind Bayron. There were
5-7 passengers on board the jeep, one of them at the front seat beside Bayron. Bayron then drove away,
leaving the parking area.24According to Carlito, he learned of Bayron’s death at 6:30 p.m. of that day. 25

On cross examination, Carlito testified that he went to Ayala on June 1, 2000 to meet the appellant to ask
for help on his application as a driver.26 He saw the appellant and Bayron talking to each other when he
arrived, and overheard Bayron warning the appellant to be careful. Bayron thereafter got into his jeep,
followed by the appellant who sat behind him (Bayron). While inside the jeep, Bayron pointed his finger at
the appellant and continued to argue with the appellant as he drove away.27 He heard gunshots 15 minutes
after the jeep left the parking area. Carlito later saw the appellant being apprehended by security guards.28

The appellant stated that he was a driver plying the Ayala-Colon route. At around 5:00-6:00 p.m. of June
1, 2000, he talked to "Lito" at the parking area of the Ayala Business Center. Lito was a friend of his son
who had been asking for his assistance in applying as a driver. 29 He read a newspaper after talking to Lito.
Not long after, Bayron and a certain Roel came and pointed their fingers at him. Roel uttered, "Even if you
are double your body [sic], I am not afraid."30 The appellant suspected that Roel was mad at him for an
incident in 1999 when he reprimanded Roel for indiscriminately firing a gun. 31

The appellant further narrated that Bayron went to the jeep’s driver’s seat after the dispatcher called him.
Roel followed Bayron but sat on the rear passenger seat. The appellant also got into the jeep and sat across
Roel because he was bothered by what was happening between Bayron and Roel.32 He asked Roel to get off
the jeep so they could settle their differences, but Roel instead drew a gun from his waist. 33 The appellant
and Roel wrestled for the gun which discharged while they were grappling for its possession. Thereafter,
Roel immediately alighted from the jeep. The appellant followed but was unable to catch up with Roel.34

On cross examination, the appellant recalled that he read a newspaper at the parking lot after conversing
with Lito. At that point, Bayron and Roel came; Roel pointed a finger at him and blamed him for his (Roel’s)
arrest for illegal possession of firearms.35 Bayron went to board his jeep when the dispatcher called him;
Roel followed him inside the jeep. The appellant then also boarded the jeep, sitting across Roel to "clear the
matter" with him.36 When the jeep was already on its way, Roel suddenly drew a gun from his waist. The
appellant held Roel’s hand, but the gun went off while they were grappling for its possession. He did not
notice if anyone had been hit. The passengers, including Roel, ran out of the jeep. 37 The appellant saw the
gun on the ground and picked it up. The appellant tried to follow Roel, but the latter was able to board
another jeep. Thereafter, the security guards arrested appellant and then turned him over to the police. 38

P/Sr. Insp. Salinas testified that he conducted a paraffin test on the appellant at the PNP Regional Crime
Laboratory on June 2, 2000 to determine the presence of gunpowder nitrates. The appellant tested negative
for the presence of gunpowder nitrates.39

On cross examination, P/Sr. Insp. Salinas explained that the absence of gunpowder nitrates was not
conclusive proof that person did not fire a gun. According to him, a person could remove traces gunpowder
nitrates by washing his hands.40

The RTC convicted the appellant of the crime of murder in its decision of May 29, 2001, as follows:

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing facts and circumstances, accused Samsom B. Villasan is found guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Murder and is hereby imposed the penalty of RECLUSION
PERPETUA, with the accessory penalties of the law; to indemnify the heirs of the deceased Jacinto Bayron
in the sum of ₱50,000.00 and to pay the costs.

The accused is, however, credited in full during the whole period of his detention provided that he will signify
in writing that he will abide by all the rules and regulations of the penitentiary.

SO ORDERED.41

The appellant directly appealed to this Court in view of the penalty of reclusion perpetua that the RTC
imposed. We referred the case to the Court of Appeals for intermediate review pursuant to our ruling in
People v. Mateo.42

The CA affirmed the RTC Decision in toto in its May 25, 2006 Decision.43

In his brief,44 the appellant argued that the prosecution failed to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt.

THE COURT’S RULING

We deny the appeal but modify the awarded indemnities.

Sufficiency of Prosecution Evidence

An established rule in appellate review is that the trial court’s factual findings, including its assessment of
the credibility of the witnesses and the probative weight of their testimonies, as well as the conclusions
drawn from the factual findings, are accorded respect, if not conclusive effect. These factual findings and
conclusions assume greater weight if they are affirmed by the CA. Despite the RTC and the CA’s unanimity
in the findings of fact, we nevertheless carefully scrutinized the records of this case, as the penalty of
reclusion perpetua demands no less than this kind of scrutiny.45

Gaudioso, in his July 25, 2000 testimony, positively identified the appellant as the person who shot Bayron
inside the latter’s own jeepney on June 1, 2000; he never wavered in pointing to the appellant as the
assailant. To directly quote from the records:

FISCAL VICTOR LABORTE:

Q: At about 6:30 in the evening of June 1, 2000, can you recall where you were?

GAUDIOSO QUILATON:

A: Yes, I can remember.

Q: Please tell the Court where you were at that particular date and time.

A: When I went out of my work place, I boarded a jeep.

Q: In what place did you board the jeep?

A: At the waiting shed at the Ayala, where the jeepney stop is located.
Q: Where is this Ayala situated, in what city?

A: Cebu City.

Q: Were you the only one who boarded that jeepney?

A: We were four (4), sir.

Q: I see. In what particular seat of the jeepney were you seated?

A: Front seat, sir.

Q: While you were on board that jeepney, what happened?

A: First, the driver had conversation.

Q: With whom did that driver have conversation?

A: The one who shot. [sic]

Q: So, what happened afterwards, while that man and the jeepney driver were talking with each
other?

A: First, I heard there was a request that he would be boarding a jeepney because his jeep conked
up. [sic]

Q: Who made that request?

A: That one person who shot. [sic]

Q: And what happened afterwards, after that request was made by the person to the driver?

A: He was able to board.

Q: And then what happened next?

A: Then I heard one (1) gunshot.

Q: And what did you do when you heard that gunshot?

A: I turned towards my back.

Q: And what did you see, if any, when you turned your head?

A: When I turned back, there were two (2) gunshots I heard, two (2) gunshots. [sic]

Q: You only heard two (2) gunshots?

A: Three (3), sir: the first one, and then followed by two (2) gunshots.

Q: Who caused that gunshot?

A: That person who shot the driver.

Q: Did you actually see that person shot the driver?

A: Yes.

Q: How far were you to that person who shot the driver?

A: Very near.

Q: How near?

A: Two (2) "dangaw" only, which may be loosely translated as thumb and forefinger extended, is
less than, from the thumb to the forefinger, because he was sitting at my back. [sic]

Q: Was the driver hit?

 A: Yes, he was hit.

Q: In what portion of his body was the driver hit?

A: On his head.

Q: Now, if that person, whom you said you saw shot the driver, is in the courtroom now, can you
point to him?

A: Yes, I can.

Q: Please point to that person.

A: That man, third (3rd) from the left.

(Witness pointed to the person who stood up and identified himself as Samson Villasan)

xxxx

Q: Now you told the Court Mr. Witness that you were the only one seated at the front of the jeepney,
Right?

A: Yes.

Q: And three other passengers were at the back of the jeepney?

A: Yes.

Q: And one of the three passengers at the back shot the driver?

A: That’s right, sir.

Q: Is that person whom you saw shot the driver inside the courtroom now?

A: He is around.

Q: Can you point to him again?

A: Yes.

Q: Please do.

A: That person.

(Witness pointing to the person who stood up and identified himself as Samson Villasan).

x x x x46 [Emphasis supplied]

Time and again, we have ruled that the credibility of witnesses is a matter best left to the determination of
the trial court as this tribunal had the actual opportunity to observe the witnesses firsthand and to note
their demeanor, conduct, and attitude. The trial court’s assessment of the credibility of witnesses is binding
on this Court, except when that tribunal overlooked facts and circumstances of weight and influence that
can alter the result.47

We carefully scrutinized the records of this case and found no reason to disbelieve Gaudioso’s
straightforward narration of the events surrounding Bayron’s death. Nor did we see anything on record
indicating any improper motive that could have led Gaudioso to falsely testify against the appellant. In fact,
the appellant never imputed any ill motive on Gaudioso. To reiterate, Gaudioso and the appellant were in
the same jeep during the shooting incident; there was light inside the jeep. More importantly, Gaudioso saw
the actual shooting because he was "very near" the appellant when the latter shot Bayron. To Gaudioso,
what he witnessed must have been a shocking and startling event he would not forget in a long, long time.
Under these circumstances, we entertain no doubt on the positive identification of the appellant as the
assailant.

The Appellant’s Defenses

The appellant sought to exculpate himself by claiming that the shooting of Bayron was accidental; and that
he (appellant) was not sure who pulled the trigger because the gun went off when he and Roel were
grappling for its possession.
We do not find the appellant’s claim of accidental shooting believable as it contradicts the available physical
evidence provided by Dr. Cam that the victim suffered three gunshot wounds on the face and head. Dr.
Cam’s Necropsy Report corroborated by the Autopsy Report of the Cosmopolitan Funeral Homes showing
that the victim suffered a total of three gunshot wounds, supported the testimony of Gaudioso that the
appellant shot the victim thrice. Jose notably also testified that he heard three successive gunshots. These
pieces of evidence are clearly inconsistent with the appellant’s claim that the victim’s shooting was accidental
and that only one shot was fired.

The nature, number and location of the victim’s gunshot wounds also belie the appellant’s claim of accidental
shooting. The three wounds, all sustained in the head and the face from shots coming from the rear, are
clearly indicative of a determined effort to end the victim’s life.

The appellant nonetheless claims that his identity as the assailant was not proven with certainty as no trace
of gunpowder nitrates was found in his hand.

We do not find the appellant’s claim persuasive.

While the appellant tested negative for gunpowder nitrates, Forensic Chemist Salinas testified that a paraffin
test is not conclusive proof that one has not fired a gun. This view is fully in accord with past findings and
observations of this Court that paraffin tests, in general, are inconclusive; the negative findings in paraffin
tests do not conclusively show that a person did not discharge a firearm. 48 Our ruling in People v. Teehankee,
Jr.49 on this point is particularly instructive:

Scientific experts concur in the view that the paraffin test has "… proved extremely unreliable in use. The
only thing that it can definitely establish is the presence or absence of nitrates or nitrites on the hand. It
cannot be established from this test alone that the source of the nitrates or nitrites was the discharge of a
firearm. The person may have handled one or more of a number of substances which give the same positive
reaction for nitrates or nitrites, such as explosives, fireworks, fertilizers, pharmaceuticals, and leguminous
plants such as peas, beans, and alfalfa. A person who uses tobacco may also have nitrate or nitrite deposits
on his hands since these substances are present in the products of combustion of tobacco." In numerous
rulings, we have also recognized several factors which may bring about the absence of gunpowder nitrates
on the hands of a gunman, viz: when the assailant washes his hands after firing the gun, wears gloves at
the time of the shooting, or if the direction of a strong wind is against the gunman at the time of firing. x x
x x [Emphasis ours]

In sum, the positive, clear and categorical testimonies of the prosecution witnesses deserve full merit in
both probative weight and credibility over the negative results of the paraffin test conducted on the
appellant.

The Crime Committed

Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code defines the crime of murder as follows:

Any person who, not falling within the provisions of Article 246 shall kill another, shall be guilty of murder
and shall be punished by reclusion perpetua to death if committed with any of the following attendant
circumstances:

1. With treachery, x x x

In convicting the appellant of murder, the courts a quo appreciated treachery. This circumstance exists
when the offender commits any of the crimes against persons, employing means, method or forms which
tend directly and especially to ensure its execution, without risk to the offender, arising from the defense
that the offended party might make. This definition sets out what must be shown by evidence to conclude
that treachery existed, namely: (1) the employment of means of execution that gives the person attacked
no opportunity for self-defense or retaliation; and (2) the deliberate and conscious adoption of this means
of execution.50 The essence of this qualifying circumstance is in the elements of suddenness and surprise,
and the lack of expectation that the attack would take place, thus depriving the victim of any real opportunity
for self-defense while ensuring the commission of the crime without risk to the offender. 51

The evidence in this case showed that the appellant briefly talked with Bayron as the latter sat on the jeep’s
driver’s seat preparatory to driving off. Thereafter, the appellant entered the jeep through its rear entrance,
and sat behind Bayron. Not long after Bayron started his jeep, the appellant shot him three times, hitting
him in the head and at the side of the face. This manner and mode of attack by the appellant, to our mind,
indicate treachery. The appellant’s attack came without warning, and was swift and sudden. The appellant
attacked Bayron from behind; the unsuspecting victim had no expectation of the coming attack and was
totally defenseless against it. From these facts, the appellant clearly and purposely DENIED the victim of
any real chance to defend himself and secured the commission of the crime without risk to himself.52
In People v. Vallespin,53 we explained:

The essence of treachery is the sudden and unexpected attack by the aggressor on the unsuspecting victim,
depriving the latter of any real chance to defend himself, thereby ensuring its commission without risk to
the aggressor and without the slightest provocation on the part of the victim. It can exist even if the attack
is frontal, if it is sudden and unexpected, giving the victim no opportunity to defend himself against such
attack. In essence, it means that the offended party was not given an opportunity to make a defense.

No Evident Premeditation

The Information alleged that the crime was committed with evident premeditation. We do not find any
evidentiary support for this allegation.

Evident premeditation, like other qualifying circumstances, must be established by clear and positive
evidence showing that planning and preparation took place prior to the killing. For evident premeditation to
be appreciated, the prosecution must show the following: (1) the time the accused determined to commit
the crime; (2) an act manifestly indicating that the accused clung to this determination; and (3) a sufficient
lapse of time between the resolve to kill and its execution that would have allowed the killer to reflect on
the consequences of his act. 54Significantly, the prosecution did not even attempt to prove the presence of
these elements. In People v. Sison,55we held that evident premeditation should not be appreciated where
there is neither evidence of planning or preparation to kill nor of the time when the plot was conceived.

The Proper Penalty

The crime of murder qualified by treachery is penalized under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code (as
amended by Republic Act No. 7659) with reclusion perpetua to death.

While evident premeditation was alleged in the Information, this circumstance was not adequately proven.
Hence, in the absence of mitigating and aggravating circumstances in the commission of the felony, the
courts a quo correctly sentenced the appellant to reclusion perpetua, conformably with Article 63(2) of the
Revised Penal Code.

Civil Liability

The grant of civil indemnity as a consequence of the crime of murder requires no proof other than the fact
of death as a result of the crime and proof of the appellant’s responsibility therefor. While the RTC and the
CA commonly awarded ₱50,000.00 as death indemnity to the murder victim’s heirs, prevailing jurisprudence
dictates an award of ₱75,000.00.56 Hence, we modify the award of civil indemnity to this extent, to be paid
by the appellant to the victim’s heirs.

Moral damages are likewise mandatory in cases of murder and homicide. We award ₱50,000.00 as moral
damages to the victim’s heirs in accordance with prevailing rules.57

The heirs of the victim are likewise entitled to exemplary damages since the qualifying circumstance of
treachery was firmly established. When a crime is committed with an aggravating circumstance, either
qualifying or generic, an award of ₱25,000.00 as exemplary damages is justified under Article 2230 of the
New Civil Code.58

The lower courts were correct in not awarding actual damages to the victim’s heirs because they failed to
present any supporting evidence for their claim. To be entitled to actual damages, it is necessary to prove
the actual amount of loss with reasonable certainty, based on competent proof and the best evidence
obtainable by the injured party. In the absence of proof, jurisprudence dictates an award of ₱25,000.00 as
temperate damages for the victim’s heirs on the reasonable assumption that when death occurs, the family
of the victim incurred expenses for the wake and the funeral.59

We cannot award indemnity for loss of earning capacity to the victim’s heirs because no documentary
evidence was presented to substantiate this claim. As a rule, documentary evidence should be presented to
substantiate a claim for this type of damages. While there are exceptions to the rule, these exceptions do
not apply; although self-employed, Bayron did not earn less than the current minimum wage under current
labor laws.60

WHEREFORE, in light of all the foregoing, we hereby AFFIRM the May 25, 2006 Decision of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. CR H.C. No. 00250 with the following MODIFICATIONS: (1) the awarded civil indemnity
is INCREASED to ₱75,000.00; (2) the appellant is ORDERED to PAY the heirs of the victim ₱50,000.00 as
moral damages; (3) the appellant is ORDERED to PAY the heirs of the victim ₱25,000.00 as exemplary
damages; and (4) the appellant is ORDERED to PAY the heirs of the victim ₱25,000.00 as temperate
damages. SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 116196 June 23, 1999

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
PABLO ADOVISO, defendant-appellant.

KAPUNAN, J.:

Pablo Adoviso appeals from the Joint Judgment1 of the Regional Trial Court of Camarines Sur2 declaring him
guilty beyond reasonable doubt for two counts of Murder.

Appellant, allegedly a member of the Citizens Armed Forces Geographical Unit (CAFGU), was originally
charged with four unidentified persons who have, however, remained at large. The information 3 charging
appellant with the Murder of Rufino Agunos under Criminal Case No. P-2079 alleges:

That on or about the 18th day of February 1990 at about 8:00 o'clock [sic] in the evening at
Sitio Tan-agan, Barangay Casugad, Municipality of Bula, Province of Camarines Sur,
Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused,
while armed with assorted long firearms, conspiring, confederating and mutually helping one
another, with intent to kill and with treachery and evident premeditation, did then and there
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously shoot one Rufino Agunos several times with said firearms
hitting the latter on the different parts of his body which were the direct and immediate cause
of his death, to the damage and prejudice of the heirs of said Rufino Agunos.

That the crime complained of against the accused is not service connected.

ACTS CONTRARY TO LAW.

Except for the name of the victim, the information in Criminal Case No. P-2080 with respect to the killing of
Emeterio Vasquez, contains the same allegations.4

Appellant pleaded not guilty to both charges. At the joint trial of Criminal Case Nos. P-2079 and P-2080, the
prosecution presented their version of the events that transpired on the evening of February 18, 1990, as
follows:

The spouses Emeterio and Anastacia Vasquez had two adjacent houses in Sitio Tan-agan, Barangay
Casugad, Bula, Camarines Sur. One of the houses was actually a camalig where they stored harvested rice.
The spouses preferred to live there because it was cooler. The living area of the camalig had walls of bamboo
called salsag. This area was elevated from the ground. Three steps led down to an awning (suyab) walled
with bamboo slats. These slats were placed horizontally approximately four to six inches apart. A portion of
the awning was used as a kitchen but another portion had a papag where the Vasquez' grandson, Rufino
Agunos, son of their daughter Virginia, would sleep whenever he tended the irrigation pump. The spouses
son Bonifacio occupied the other house eight (8) meters from the camalig with his own son Elmer.

At around 8:00 in the evening of February 18, 1990, Emeterio Vazquez was preparing coffee as his wife was
about to retire for the night. Their grandson Rufino had already gone to sleep in the papag. Anastacia had
just finished spreading the sleeping mat when she heard three or four gunshots. Emeterio then uttered that
he had been shot. Seeing Emeterio, Anastacia exclaimed, "Why should you not be hit when infact there are
guns in front of you." Anastacia saw the "protruding edge of the gun" on the wall near the stairs where
Emeterio went down. A lamp near the stairs where Emeterio drank coffee illuminated the camalig but
Anastacia failed to recognize the persons who fired their guns at her husband.

The Vasquez' son Bonifacio was in the bigger house when he heard the gunshots. Earlier that evening,
Bonifacio was talking to Rufino regarding the engine of the irrigation pump. Bonifacio was still talking when
he noticed that Rufino had fallen asleep, the latter's back against the bamboo wall. Bonifacio left Rufino
snoring in the papag and went to the other house. Only a minute had passed after he had gone up when
Bonifacio heard the gunshots. He and his 16-year-old son Elmer immediately went down the front yard to
investigate.

Bonifacio hid himself in the dark portion of the yard, behind a coconut tree. From a distance of eight (8)
meters, Bonifacio saw Rufino, who was inside the camalig, being shot by several persons from the outside.
Looking through the bamboo slats of the camalig wall. Bonifacio recognized one of the assailants, with a
large built and long hair, as appellant Pablo Adoviso because of the gas lamp that was lighted inside
the camalig. Of Rufino's assailants, only appellant was not wearing a mask. Appellant was holding a long
firearm wrapped inside a sack with its muzzle protruding and directed where Rufino was sleeping. Appellant
then fired hitting Rufino. At that moment, Bonifacio heard his father Emeterio shout "Pino," (referring to his
grandson Rufino) and saw his father go down the stairs carrying a gas lamp. Appellant fired again, hitting
Emeterio at the stomach.

For his part, Elmer, who rushed towards the camalig with his father Bonifacio, saw five (5) persons aiming
their firearms at the camalig. Except for appellant, each of these persons had a cover over their faces. Three
(3) of them were positioned in a ditch near the camalig while two (2) others were near its door. Elmer saw
these five (5) persons shoot his cousin Rufino who was lying down on the papag. Although his back was hit,
Rufino was able to crawl under the papag. Elmer's grandfather was also hit on the stomach but he managed
to up the camalig. When appellant and his companion by the camalig door saw Elmer, they fired at him
then, with the three others at the ditch, escaped to the banana plantation Elmer, on the other hand, fled
towards the coconut plantation.

Upon returning to the camalig, Elmer saw his father carrying his grandfather Emeterio. He also found Rufino
at the foot of a coconut tree near the river, lying on his side with his body curled. Rufino told Elmer that he
had been hit and, when Elmer failed to locate his wound, Rufino took Elmer's hand and put it on his back.
Elmer then moved Rufino "sidewise." Upon returning to the camalig, Elmer carried his grandfather and
bandaged his stomach with diapers.

In the meantime, Bonifacio went to the municipal building of Bula to fetch the police. Inspector Antonio
Lopez and Senior Police Officer 1 Claro Ballevar returned to the scene of the crime with him. The police
brought Emeterio and Rufino to the municipal hall of Bula and then to the Bicol Regional Hospital. Both
Emeterio and Rufino died early the next morning.

The certification5 dated March 7, 1990 and signed by Dr. Janice Nanette Estrada, resident physician of the
Bicol Regional Hospital in Naga City, states that 35-year-old Rufino Agunos died of four (4) gunshot wounds:
at the inguinal area, the sacral area, the thigh and the abdomen. The wounds at the inguinal area and the
thigh bore contusion collars. The same physician certified that Emeterio Vasquez, 88 years of age, sustained
seven (7) gunshot wounds at the paraumbilical area, lumbar area, hypogastrium, anterior aspect of the
right forearm, anteromedial aspect of the right forearm, anteromedial aspect left arm and anterolateral
aspect of the left arm. Four (4) of these gunshot wounds had contusion collars — at the paraumbilical area,
the hypogastrium, the right forearm and the left arm. 6

Appellant Adoviso interposed alibi and denial as his defense.

Appellant claimed that he was a member of the CAFGU whose headquarters was located in Barangay
Palsong, Bula, Camarines Sur. At around 7:00 in the evening of February 18, 1990, he was in Sitio Durabod,
Palsong, about a kilometer away from the CAFGU headquarters. He, together with Francisco Bislombre,
Benjamin Alina, Jr. and PFC Antero Esteron, had some drinks in the store of Honoria Tragante until around
11:00 p.m.

Honoria Tragante and Francisco Bislombre corroborated appellant's alibi. Antero Esteron likewise testified
that from 7:00 until past 11:00 that night of February 18, 1990, he and appellant had a drinking spree at
the Tragante store. He distinctly remembered that date because it was the fiesta of Balatan.

To support his denial appellant presented Lt. Antonio Lopez, the deputy chief of police and SPO2 Claro
Ballebar of the PNP Bula Police Station. Lopez identified a police certification 7 prepared by Pfc. Ramon N.
Canabe to the effect that the shooting incident was perpetrated "by unidentified armed men." Lopez said
that he (Lopez) was one of those who brought the victims to the hospital who were then still conscious. The
victims told him that they did not know who shot them or why they were shot.

SPO2 Claro Ballebar, however testified that in the follow-up investigation he conducted several days after
the incident, Bonifacio Vasquez revealed to him that he (Bonifacio) "vividly saw the incident and recognized"
appellant as one of the perpetrators of the crime and that the killings had some something to do with land
dispute between Bonifacio's parents and the Galicia family.

The defense also offered in evidence the testimony of Ernesto A. Lucena, Polygraph Examiner II of the
National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) in Manila, who conducted a polygraph test on appellant. In Polygraph
Report No. 900175, 8 Lucena opined that appellants ''polygrams revealed that there were no specific
reactions indicative of deception to pertinent questions relevant" to the investigation of the crimes.

In rebuttal, Bonifacio Vasquez revealed that when he reported the incident to the police, he did not identify
appellant as one of the culprits because he was afraid of appellant who was a member of the CAFGU.
Nevertheless, Bonifacio did mention to the police that he recognized appellant as one of the perpetrators of
the crime although he told them that he did not recognize appellant's four (4) companions. He did not
mention to Lopez and Canabe appellant's identity because he was "confused" about what had happened in
their house.

On March 25, 1994, the trial court rendered a Joint Judgment finding appellant guilty beyond reasonable
doubt for two (2) counts of murder and disposing of Criminal Case Nos. P-2079 and P-2080 as follows:

WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, joint judgment is hereby rendered:

In Criminal Case No. P-2079, finding the accused PABLO ADOVISO guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of the crime of MURDER and imposing upon him the penalty of RECLUSION
PERPETUA and to pay the legal heirs of Rufino Agunos, consisting of the widow, Evelyn T.
 Agunos and their four (4) children the sum of FIFTY THOUSAND PESOS (P50,000.00)
Philippine Currency;

In Criminal Case No. P-2080, likewise finding said accused PABLO ADOVISO guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of MURDER and imposing upon him another penalty
of RECLUSION PERPETUA and to pay the legal heirs of the late EMETERIO VASQUEZ,
consisting of Anastacia Vasquez and Bonifacio Vasquez, another sum of FIFTY THOUSAND
PESOS (P50,000.00) Philippine Currency with all the accessory penalties provided therefore
in both cases and to pay the costs in both instances.

SO ORDERED.9

Appellant hinges his bid for exoneration on whether he was properly identified by the two (2) eyewitnesses
as one of the killers of the victims. He contends that eyewitnesses Bonifacio and Elmer Vasquez presented
an "incredible" story because it is "highly improbable" that they could have "distinctly and positively
recognized accused-appellant as one of the perpetrators of the crimes." 10 According to appellant, Bonifacio,
who was in the dark portion of the yard hiding behind a coconut tree, could not have identified appellant by
the light emanating from gas lamp inside the camalig where Emeterio Vasquez and Rufino Agunos were
staying at the time of the incident. Neither could Elmer Vasquez, who declared that he saw his grandfather
shot by appellant, could have identified appellant because of the poor lighting coming from the gas lamp
being carried by his grandfather. Appellant claims that the gas lamp carried by Elmer's grandfather was "a
small can about two (2) inches tall and the wick is smaller than a cigarette" and the lamp inside
the camalig "was placed inside a bigger can so that the direction of the light emanating therefrom was
upwards and not sidewise." 11

Visibility is indeed a vital factor in the determination of whether or not an eyewitness could have identified
the perpetrator of a crime. However, it is settled that when conditions of visibility are favorable, and the
witnesses do not appear to be biased, their assertion as to the identity of the malefactor should normally
be accepted. 12 Illumination produced by kerosene lamp or a flashlight is sufficient to allow identification of
persons. 13 Wicklamps, flashlights, even moonlight or starlight may, in proper situations be considered
sufficient illumination, making the attack on the credibility of witnesses solely on that ground
unmeritorious. 14

In this case, not one (1) but two (2) gas lamps illuminated the place — the one placed inside the camalig and
that held by Emeterio as he descended from the stairs after the first volley of gunfire. Appellant's contention
therefore that one particular gas lamp could not have lighted the place because it was placed inside a can
is puerile. Besides, Elmer was not describing either of the gas lamps during the incident. The defense counsel
at the trial and appellant's counsel misunderstood the testimonies of Elmer and his grandmother on that
matter. Thus, Elmer testified:

ATTY. CORTES:

Q Is it not that the lamp you said placed along the door, which is already
marked as lamp, is that not this lamp was placed inside a kerosene can as
testified to by your grandmother so that the cat could not cause it to fall?

A It was placed just on the floor not inside the can. 15

(Emphasis supplied.)

For her part, Anastacia testified as follows.

ATTY. CORTES:

xxx xxx xxx

Q Because you were already about to retire, the doors and windows were
already closed, is that correct?

A Yes, sir.

Q That you also shut down or closed the light, is that correct?

A No, sir, we even placed the kerosene lamp inside a can.

Q You said, you placed the lamp inside a can so that the light is going up, is
that correct?

A Yes, sir.

Q So, the light was not illuminating sidewise because it was inside a can?
 A When we left, I got the kerosene lamp and brought it with me.

ATTY. CORTES:

I think, the witness did not get the question right, Your Honor.

COURT:

Repeat the question.

ATTY. CORTES:

Q My question Madam Witness is, when you were about to retire?

A The lamp was placed on the floor where my husband was drinking coffee.

COURT :

Q Who are the persons you are referring to as having left when you placed the
light inside the can?

A My son, Bonifacio, and the policemen, Your Honor, when the(y) brought
Emeterio and Rufino to the hospital. 16 (emphasis supplied).

Clearly then, the lamp inside the camalig was placed on the floor and a can was placed over it only after the
incident when Anastacia left with her son and the police to bring the victims to the hospital.

The bamboo slats of the camalig could not have effectively obstructed the eyewitnesses' view of appellant,
considering that the slats were built four (4) meters apart. Besides, it is the natural reaction of relatives of
victims to strive to observe the faces and appearance of the assailants, if not ascertain their identities, and
the manner in which the crime is committed. 17 A relative will naturally be interested in identifying the
malefactor to secure his conviction to obtain justice for the death of his relative(s). 18 It must remembered
that appellant was not a complete stranger to the eyewitnesses. Bonifacio had known him for ten (10)
years 19 while Elmer had been acquainted with him for four (4) years. Elmer recalled that appellant used to
join the rabuz at the barracks. 20 Familiarity with appellant's face and appearance minimized if not erased
the possibility that they could have been mistaken as to his identity.

Appellant's allegation that it was "improbable" for him to have committed the crimes without a mask, unlike
the other participants, deserves scant consideration. It is not contrary to human experience for a person to
commit a crime before the very eyes of people who are familiar to them. Indeed, some may even take pride
in their identification as the perpetrator of a criminal act.

Appellant also considers as a "positive sign," Bonifacio's failure to immediately identify him as the
perpetrator of the crime to the police. 21 The delay in reporting his participation to the police was however
sufficiently explained by Bonifacio. Bonifacio was afraid of appellant since the latter was a member of the
CAFGU and, as such, was provided with a gun. He was also hesitant in identifying appellant immediately
lest he got wind of his impending arrest and posthaste escaped the clutches of the law. The failure of a
witness to reveal at once the identity of the accused as one of the perpetrators of the crime does not affect,
much less, impair his credibility as a witness. 22 The general or common rule is that witnesses react to a
crime in different ways. 23 There is no standard form of human behavioral response to a strange, startling
and frightful event, and there is no standard rule by which witnesses to a crime must react. 24

There is no merit in appellant's contention that Bonifacio had a motive in implicating him. According to
appellant, Bonifacio suspected that he was hired by the Galicia family to kill Bonifacio's father who had
earlier won in a land dispute with the Galicias. It is irrelevant here to talk of motive on the part of Bonifacio
inasmuch as to credible witnesses had positively identified appellant as one of the participants in the killing
of Emeterio Vasquez and Rufino Agunos.

Appellant's alibi thus crumbles in the face of his positive identification as one of the perpetrators of the
crimes. 25 For an alibi to prosper, moreover, there must be proof that the defendant was not only somewhere
else when the crime was committed but that he could not be physically present at the place of the crime or
its immediate vicinity at the time of its commission. 26 Appellant did not prove the physical impossibility of
his being in Sitio Tan-agan which is not exactly remote from Sitio Palsong where he claimed to be when the
incident happened. Both places are within the Municipality of Bula. Appellant admitted that the distance
between the two sitios could be negotiated in three hours even without any means of transportation. 27 On
the other hand, his alleged companion in Sitio Palsong, Antero Esteron, testified that the distance could be
traveled in thirty-five (35) minutes by "trimobile" or private vehicle. 28
Apart from the fact that appellant's alibi was inherently weak, he was not even sure where he was and who
were his companions at the time the crimes were committed. We quote the observation of the trial court on
this point:

On the premise that the trial court rendered the judgment of conviction on the basis of "mere conjectures
and speculations," 29 appellant argues that the negative result of the polygraph test should be given weight
to tilt the scales of justice in his favor.

A polygraph is an electromechanical instrument that simultaneously measures and records certain

physiological changes in the human body that are believed to be involuntarily caused by an examinee's
conscious attempt to deceive the questioner. 30 The theory behind a polygraph or lie detector test is that a
person who lie deliberately will have rising blood pressure and a subconscious block in breathing, which will
be recorded on the graph. 31 However, American courts almost uniformly reject the results of polygraphs
tests when offered in evidence for the purposes of establishing the guilt or innocence of one accused of a
crime, whether the accused or the prosecution seeks its introduction, for the reason that polygraph has not
as yet attained scientific acceptance as a reliable and ascertaining truth or deception. 32 The rule is no
different in this jurisdiction. Thus, in People v. Daniel, 33 stating that much faith and credit should not be
vested upon a lie detector test as it is not conclusive. Appellant, in this case, has not advanced any reason
why this rule should not apply to him.

Appellant was therefore correctly adjudged guilty of two counts of Murder. Treachery qualified the killing to
murder. There is treachery when the offender commits any of the crimes against the person, employing
means, methods or forms in the execution thereof which tend directly and specially to insure its execution,
without risk to himself arising from the defense which offended party might make. 34 In other words, there
is treachery when the attack on an unarmed victim who has not given the slightest provocation is sudden,
unexpected and without warning. 35 The victims in this case were totally unaware of an impending assault
— Rufino was sleeping and Emetario was going down the stairs when they were shot.

WHEREFORE, the Joint Judgment of the trial court is hereby AFFIRMED.1âwphi1.nêt SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 109144 August 19, 1994

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
MORENO L. TUMIMPAD, accused-appellant.

The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.

Miguel M. Lingating for accused-appellant.

KAPUNAN, J.:

Accused-appellant Constable Moreno L. Tumimpad and co-accused Constable Ruel C. Prieto were charged
with the crime of rape committed against a 15-year old Mongoloid child in a complaint dated on May 24,
1991, signed by her mother, Mrs. Pastora L. Salcedo, which reads:

That during the period between the last week of March 1989 and the first week of April 1989,
in Barangay Lower Lamac, Oroquieta City, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the said accused did then and there, wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously,
have (sic) carnal knowledge with Sandra Salcedo, complainant's daughter, a woman who is a
mongoloid and so weak of mind and in intellect as to be capable of giving rational and legal
consent. 1

Upon arraignment, accused-appellant pleaded not guilty to the crime charged and due trial ensued.

The facts as established by evidence are as follows:

Sandra Salcedo at the time of the incident was a 15-year old Mongoloid and daughter of Lt. Col. Teofisto
Salcedo and Pastora Salcedo. She had a mind of a five-year old child, who still needed to be fed and dressed
up. Her vocabulary was limited and most of the time she expressed herself by motions.

Col. Teofisto Salcedo was then Provincial Commander of Misamis Occidental. Four security men were
assigned to him, two of whom were accused Constable Ruel Prieto and accused-appellant Moreno Tumimpad.

The Salcedo family, composed of Col. Salcedo, his wife Pastora, his son Alexander and wife and daughter
Sandra, lived in a two-storey officers' quarters inside Camp Lucas Naranjo, Provincial Headquarters, in
Oroquieta City. The upper storey of the house was occupied by Col. Salcedo, his wife and Sandra while the
lower storey had two (2) rooms, one of which was occupied by the four security men and the other by
Alexander Salcedo and his wife.

It was on August 7, 1989, when Sandra complained of constipation. Mrs. Salcedo then brought her to a
doctor in Oroquieta City for a checkup. Medication was given to Sandra but her condition did not improve.
Sandra became irritable and moody. She felt sick and unhappy.

The following day, August 8, 1989, Sandra saw Moreno Tumimpad coming out from the kitchen and told her
mother, "Mama, patayin mo 'yan, bastos." 2

Mrs. Pastora Salcedo, worried of her daughter's condition, brought her to Regina Hospital. Sandra was able
to relieve herself the following day but still remained moody and irritable. She refused to take a bath in
spite of scoldings from her mother. She did not want to eat and whenever she did, she would vomit.

Sandra was brought to a doctor in Oroquieta City for a second checkup. Dr. Conol, the examining physician,
ordered a urinalysis. Jose C. Lim, a Medical Technologist, conducted the urinalysis. The result revealed that
Sandra was pregnant. 3 Mrs. Pastora Salcedo could not believe that her daughter was pregnant and so she
brought Sandra to Madonna and Child Hospital in Cagayan de Oro City. Dr. Kho, and OB-GYNE Specialist,
examined Sandra and subjected her to a pelvic ultra-sound examination. The results were positive. The
fetus' gestational age was equivalent to 17.1 weeks. 4 Another ultra-sound examination at the United
Doctors Medical Center (UDMC) at Quezon City on September 11, 1989 confirmed that she was indeed
pregnant. 5

On January 11, 1990, Sandra gave birth to a baby boy who was named Jacob Salcedo. Hence, the filing of
the complaint 6 by Mrs. Pastora Salcedo.

During the investigation conducted by the CIS, about thirty (30) pictures of different persons were laid on
the table and Sandra was asked to pick up the pictures of her assailants. Sandra singled out the pictures of
Moreno Tumimpad and Ruel Prieto. 7 Later, Sandra was brought out of the investigation room to a police
line-up of ten people, including Moreno Tumimpad and Ruel Prieto. She was again asked to point to her
assailants. Without hesitation, Sandra fingered Moreno Tumimpad and Ruel Prieto. 8
Mrs. Pastora Salcedo testified that she requested her two daughters-in-law, Joy Salcedo and Celsa Salcedo,
to ask Sandra the identity of the persons who sexually molested her. 9

Joy confirmed in her testimony that she asked Sandra who sexually molested her. Sandra revealed that
Moreno Tumimpad and Ruel Prieto were the ones who raped her. Sandra demonstrated how she was raped.
First, her thighs were touched, then she was hugged and her panty was taken off. A push and pull movement
followed. 10Celsa testified that she was present when the victim demonstrated how she was sexually abused
by the two accused, including the way her nipples were touched saying "dito hawak," and holding her breasts
to emphasize. She likewise went through the motion of removing her panty, uttering at the same time
"hubad panty."

Sandra identified in open court accused Moreno Tumimpad and Ruel Prieto as the persons who raped her
and said she wished them dead, as they did something bad to her. 11 She once again demonstrated how
she was sexually abused. She held her two thighs with her two hands next to her sexual organ saying,
"panty" and then placed her hand on her breast and gestured as if she were sucking. She also touched her
private organ and made a push and pull movement. 12

During the trial, the accused moved that a blood test, both "Major Blood Grouping Test" and "Pheno Blood
Typing" be conducted on the offended party, her child Jacob and the two accused. The result of the test
conducted by the Makati Medical Center showed that Jacob Salcedo has a type "O" blood, Sandra Salcedo
type "B", accused Ruel Prieto type "A" and accused-appellant type "O".

Both accused anchored their defense on mere denial contending that it was impossible for them to have
committed the crime of rape.

After trial on the merits, the trial court convicted Moreno Tumimpad of the crime charged but acquitted the
other accused, Ruel Prieto, on reasonable doubt, stating that he "has a different type of blood with (sic) the
child Jacob Salcedo as his type of blood is "A", while that of child Jacob Salcedo is
type "O".

The dispositive portion of the decision reads:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Court finds the accused, PO1 Moreno Tumimpad,
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Rape, as charged in the information, and
pursuant to the provisions of Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, there being
no aggravating nor mitigating circumstance attendant in the commission of the crime, said
accused Moreno Tumimpad is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of RECLUSION
PERPETUA; to indemnify the offended girl, Sandra Salcedo, in the amount of P20,000.00; and
to suffer the other accessory penalties provided for by laws; and to pay the costs of the
proceedings.

On reasonable doubt, accused Ruel Prieto is hereby declared ACQUITTED from the charge.

SO ORDERED. 13

Accused-appellant assigns the following as errors of the lower court:

1. The lower court erred in not appreciating the impossibility of committing the offense
charged without detection.

2. The lower court erred in convicting the accused-appellant base on major blood grouping
test known as ABO and RHS test, not a paternal test known as chromosomes or HLA test.

The appeal is devoid of merit.

Accused-appellant argues that it was impossible for him to have committed the crime of rape because most
of the time he and his co-accused Ruel Prieto were together with Col. Salcedo on inspection tours while the
victim was always in the company of her mother. He further contends that it was likewise impossible for
Sandra, if she had really been molested, not to have shouted out of pain, she being a virgin. As if adding
insult to injury, accused-appellant suggests that it was Sandra's brother, Cristopher Salcedo, allegedly a
drug user, who could have raped her.

We are not convinced.

It is true that the accused usually went with Col. Salcedo during inspection tours but sometimes they were
left behind and would play pingpong or card games with Sandra at the ground floor of the house. While
Sandra was always with her mother, there were times when she was left alone in the house with the
accused. 14

Mrs. Pastora Salcedo testified:

 Q How many security men remain if you can recall when your husband reported
for work?

A Two (2).

Q Who were these security men who remained?

A Moreno Tumimpad and Ruel Prieto.

Q How about the 2 other security men Tanggan and Colaljo?

A My husband sent (sic) them for an errand and sometime they used to go with
my husband to the office.

Q Every time when your husband is out what they do while they were (sic) at
the headquarter?

A I saw them sleeping and sometime they were playing at the porch with my
daughter Sandra playing pingpong and sometime they were listening music.

Q Where did they play usually take place?

A Living room. 15

xxx xxx xxx

Q By the say, (sic) Mrs. Salcedo, you said a while ago when you were at the
headquarters you were able to do your choirs, (sic) doing laundry jobs in the
second storey of your house. Do you know where is your daughter Sandra at
that time?

A Yes, she spent her time at the second floor.

Q What part of the ground floor she used (sic) to stay?

A Because she is found (sic) of music she stay in the living room.

Q Did she has (sic) any playmates?

A Moreno and Prieto.

Q Have you seen actually the 2 accused playing with your daughter?

A Yes, playing pingpong and playing cards. 16

The victim more than once positively identified accused-appellant Moreno Tumimpad as one of the
perpetrators of the crime. First, during the investigation conducted by the CIS, Sandra singled out accused-
appellant and his co-accused from among the thirty (30) pictures of different persons shown to her. Second,
at the police lineup of several persons, likewise conducted by the CIS, Sandra once again unerringly pointed
accused-appellant and his co-accused as the ones who raped her. Third, in open court, Sandra without
hesitation, pointed to accused- appellant as the perpetrator of the crime.

The following is the victim's own testimony:

PROS. RAMOS:

Will you please demonstrate before this Honorable Court what Moreno and Ruel
did to you?

RECORD:

The witness when she stood up held both her thighs (sic) with her two hand
(sic) down to her sexual organ saying a word "panty" and she placed her hand
on her breast and did something as if sucking and held her private part (sic)
and did a push and pull movement and she cried.

Q When you said that there was a push and pull movement of the body and
when this was being done did you feel pain?
A Yes pain.

Q What part of your body is painful?

RECORD:

The witness touching her private parts.

Q Did you also see blood on your sexual organ?

A Yes.

Q Where did you see these blood?

RECORD:

The witness touching her private parts.

Q When this push and pull movement was being made, did you see a man's
organ?

A Yes sir.

Q Where did you see this male organ?

A Witness touching her private part.

Q Who did this to you, who removed your panty?

A Moreno and Ruel.

Q Did you see Moreno taking off his pants?

A Yes.

Q Did you see his sex organ?

A The witness touching her private parts.

Q How about this Ruel, did you see if he taken (sic) off his pants?

A Yes.

Q Did you see his sex organ?

A Yes, witness again touching her private part.

Q Both of them?

A Yes.

Q Where did Moreno and Ruel removed (sic) your panty?

A Moreno.

Q In your house?

A Yes.

Q What part of your house did Moreno and Ruel remove your panty?

A Downstairs Moreno and Ruel remove panty.

Q What part of the ground floor, was it outside or inside the room?

A In the room.
 Q When (sic) Moreno and Ruel are inside the courtroom now, can you point to
them?

A Yes.

Q Will you please point to them?

PROS. RAMOS:

May we request the accused to stand up your honor?

RECORD:

Both accused stood up from where they were sitting inside the courtroom.

PROS. RAMOS:

Who is that person (prosecutor Ramos point to accused Moreno Tumimpad)?

A Moreno.

RECORD:

The witness pointing to a certain person who is standing and when asked what
is his name, he readily answered that he is Moreno Tumimpad.

PROS. RAMOS:

Who is that person standing besides Moreno?

A Joel.

PROS. RAMOS:

If your honor please, she could not pronounced (sic) well the word Ruel but the
way she called this name is Joel which refers to the same person who is one of
the accused in this case. 17

Melinda Joy Salcedo, the victim's sister-in-law, testified that Sandra demonstrated to her how she was
ravished by the two accused, thus:

Q Now, will you please tell us what did Sandra Salcedo told (sic) you as to how
she was abused?

A By what she had stated there were also actions that she made.

Q Will you please demonstrate to this Honorable Court how did Sandra Salcedo
was abused as narrated or demonstrated to you by Sandra Salcedo?

A According to her she was held in her thigh and then she was hugged and then
the panty was taken off and making a push and pull movement (witness
demonstration by holding her thigh)?

Q Now, after Sandra Salcedo told you and demonstrated to you how she was
abused. What else did Sandra Salcedo tell you if she had told you any more
matter?

A She did not say anything more.

Q Now, when Sandra Salcedo refused to talk or say anything else. What
happened next?

A Then it was Celsa who asked her.

Q Where were you when Celsa asked Sandra Salcedo?

A I was just beside her.

 Q You said that after Sandra Salcedo refused to talk, Celsa did the questioning,
did you hear the question being asked by Celsa to Sandra Salcedo?

A Yes.

Q And what was the question being asked by Celsa to Sandra Salcedo?

A Celsa asked Sandra Salcedo as to what other things that these two had done
to her?

Q And what if any did Sandra Salcedo tell you as to what was done to her?

A By way of talking and action.

Q And what was the answer of Sandra Salcedo?

A He (sic) answered it by action and talking.

Q And what was the answer of Sandra Salcedo as related by her to Celsa
through words and action?

RECORD:

The witness demonstrated by holding his (sic) nipple going down to her thigh.

Q What else had transpired next?

A No more.

Q Now, whenever Sandra Salcedo mentioned the names of accused Moreno

Tumimpad and Ruel Prieto, have you observed whose names was usually
mentioned first by Sandra Salcedo?

A She mentioned first the name of Moreno Tumimpad and Ruel.

Q And what happened after that?

A I informed my mother-in-law of what Sandra Salcedo had told us.

Q When did you tell your mother-in- law about what Sandra Salcedo told you
and Celsa?

A That very evening sir. 18

Accused-appellant simplistically and quite erroneously argues that his conviction was based on the medical
finding that he and the victim have the same blood type "O".

Accused-appellants' culpability was established mainly by testimonial evidence given by the victim herself
and her relatives. The blood test was adduced as evidence only to show that the alleged father or any one
of many others of the same blood type may have been the father of the child. As held by this Court in Janice
Marie Jao vs. Court of Appeals 19:

Paternity — Science has demonstrated that by the analysis of blood samples of the mother,
the child, and the alleged father, it can be established conclusively that the man is not the
father of a particular child. But group blood testing cannot show only a possibility that he is.
Statutes in many states, and courts in others, have recognized the value and the limitations
of such tests. Some of the decisions have recognized the conclusive presumption of non-
paternity where the results of the test, made in the prescribed manner, show the impossibility
of the alleged paternity. This is one of the few cases in which the judgment of the Court may
scientifically be completely accurate, and intolerable results avoided, such as have occurred
where the finding is allowed to turn on oral testimony conflicting with the results of the test.
The findings of such blood tests are not admissible to prove the fact of paternity as they show
only a possibility that the alleged father or any one of many others with the same blood type
may have been the father of the child.

WHEREFORE, accused-appellant's guilt of the crime of rape having been proven beyond reasonable doubt,
the decision appealed from is hereby AFFIRMED. SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 178830 July 14, 2008

ROLEX SUPLICO, Petitioner,

vs.
NATIONAL ECONOMIC AND DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY, represented by NEDA SECRETARY
ROMULO L. NERI, and the NEDA-INVESTMENT COORDINATION COMMITTEE, DEPARTMENT OF
TRANSPORTATION AND COMMUNICATIONS (DOTC), represented by DOTC SECRETARY
LEANDRO MENDOZA, including the COMMISSION ON INFORMATION AND COMMUNICATIONS
TECHNOLOGY, headed by its Chairman, RAMON P. SALES, THE TELECOMMUNICATIONS OFFICE,
BIDS AND AWARDS FOR INFORMATION AND COMMUNICATIONS TECHNOLOGY (ICT), headed
by DOTC ASSISTANT SECRETARY ELMER A. SONEJA as Chairman, and the TECHNICAL WORKING
GROUP FOR ICT, AND DOTC ASSISTANT SECRETARY LORENZO FORMOSO, AND ALL OTHER
OPERATING UNITS OF THE DOTC FOR INFORMATION AND COMMUNICATIONS TECHNOLOGY,
and ZTE CORPORATION, AMSTERDAM HOLDINGS, INC., AND ALL PERSONS ACTING IN THEIR
BEHALF, Respondents.

x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x

G.R. No. 179317

AMSTERDAM HOLDINGS, INC., and NATHANIEL SAUZ, Petitioners,

vs.
DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION AND COMMUNICATIONS, SECRETARY LEANDRO MENDOZA,
COMMISSION ON INFORMATION AND COMMUNICATIONS TECHNOLOGY, and ASSISTANT
SECRETARY LORENZO FORMOSO III, Respondents.

x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x

G.R. No. 179613

GALELEO P. ANGELES, VICENTE C. ANGELES, JOB FLORANTE L. CASTILLO, TRINI ANNE G.

NIEVA, ROY ALLAN T. ARELLANO, CARLO MAGNO M. REONAL, ETHEL B. REGADIO, RAENAN B.
MALIG, AND VINALYN M. POTOT, TOGETHER WITH LAWYERS AND ADVOCATES FOR
ACCOUNTABILITY, TRANSPARENCY, INTEGRITY AND GOOD GOVERNANCE (LATIGO), Petitioners,
vs.
DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION AND COMMUNICATIONS (DOTC), represented by DOTC
SECRETARY LEANDRO MENDOZA, and ZHONG XING EQUIPMENT (ZTE) COMPANY, LTD., AND
ANY AND ALL PERSONS ACTING ON THEIR BEHALF, Respondents.

RESOLUTION

REYES, R.T., J.:

Under consideration is the Manifestation and Motion1 dated October 26, 2007 of the Office of the Solicitor
General (OSG) which states:

The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) respectfully avers that in an Indorsement dated October 24, 2007,
the Legal Service of the Department of Transportation and Communications (DOTC) has informed it of the
Philippine Government’s decision not to continue with the ZTE National Broadband Network Project (see
attachment2). That said, there is no more justiciable controversy for this Honorable Court to resolve.
WHEREFORE, public respondents respectfully pray that the present petitions be DISMISSED.

On November 13, 2007, the Court noted the OSG’s manifestation and motion and required petitioners in
G.R. Nos. 178830, 179317, and 179613 to comment.

On December 6, 2007, Rolex Suplico, petitioner in G.R. No. 178830, filed his Consolidated Reply and
Opposition,3opposing the aforequoted OSG Manifestation and Motion, arguing that:

66. Aside from the fact that the Notes of the Meeting Between President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo
and Chinese President Hu Jintao held 2 October 2007 were not attached to the 26 October 2007
Manifestation and Motion – thus depriving petitioners of the opportunity to comment thereon – a
mere verbally requested 1st Indorsement is not sufficient basis for the conclusion that the ZTE-DOTC
NBN deal has been permanently scrapped.

67. Suffice to state, said 1st Indorsement is glaringly self-serving, especially without the Notes of
the Meeting Between President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo and Chinese President Hu Jintao to support
its allegations or other proof of the supposed decision to cancel the ZTE-DOTC NBN deal. Public
respondents can certainly do better than that.4
 Petitioner Suplico further argues that:

79. Assuming arguendo that some aspects of the present Petition have been rendered moot (which
is vehemently denied), this Honorable Court, consistent with well-entrenched jurisprudence, may
still take cognizance thereof.5

Petitioner Suplico cites this Court’s rulings in Gonzales v. Chavez, 6 Rufino v. Endriga,7 and Alunan III v.
Mirasol8that despite their mootness, the Court nevertheless took cognizance of these cases and ruled on the
merits due to the Court’s symbolic function of educating the bench and the bar by formulating guiding and
controlling principles, precepts, doctrines, and rules.

On January 31, 2008, Amsterdam Holdings, Inc. (AHI) and Nathaniel Sauz, petitioners in G.R. No. 179317,
also filed their comment expressing their sentiments, thus:

3. First of all, the present administration has never been known for candor. The present
administration has a very nasty habit of not keeping its word. It says one thing, but does another.

4. This being the case, herein petitioners are unable to bring themselves to feel even a bit reassured
that the government, in the event that the above-captioned cases are dismissed, will not backtrack,
re-transact, or even resurrect the now infamous NBN-ZTE transaction. This is especially relevant
since what was attached to the OSG’s Manifestation and Motion was a mere one (1) page written
communication sent by the Department of Transportation and Communications (DOTC) to the OSG,
allegedly relaying that the Philippine Government has decided not to continue with the NBN project
"x x x due to several reasons and constraints."

Petitioners AHI and Sauz further contend that because of the transcendental importance of the issues raised
in the petition, which among others, included the President’s use of the power to borrow, i.e., to enter into
foreign loan agreements, this Court should take cognizance of this case despite its apparent mootness.

On January 15, 2008, the Court required the OSG to file respondents’ reply to petitioners’ comments on its
manifestation and motion.

On April 18, 2008, the OSG filed respondents’ reply, reiterating their position that for a court to exercise its
power of adjudication, there must be an actual case or controversy – one which involves a conflict of legal
rights, an assertion of opposite legal claims susceptible of judicial resolution; the case must not be moot or
academic or based on extra-legal or other similar considerations not cognizable by a court of justice. 9

Respondents also insist that there is no perfected contract in this case that would prejudice the government
or public interest. Explaining the nature of the NBN Project as an executive agreement, respondents stress
that it remained in the negotiation stage. The conditions precedent10 for the agreement to become effective
have not yet been complied with.

Respondents further oppose petitioners’ claim of the right to information, which they contend is not an
absolute right. They contend that the matters raised concern executive policy, a political question which the
judicial branch of government would generally hesitate to pass upon.

On July 2, 2008, the OSG filed a Supplemental Manifestation and Motion. Appended to it is the Highlights
from the Notes of Meeting between President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo and Chinese President Hu Jintao,
held in XI Jiao Guesthouse, Shanghai, China, on October 2, 2007. In the Notes of Meeting, the Philippine
Government conveyed its decision not to continue with the ZTE National Broadband Network Project due to
several constraints. The same Notes likewise contained President Hu Jintao’s expression of understanding
of the Philippine Government decision.

We resolve to grant the motion.

Firstly, the Court notes the triple petitions to be for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus, with application
for the issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order (TRO) and/or Preliminary Injunction. The individual
prayers in each of the three (3) consolidated petitions are:

G.R. No. 178830

WHEREFORE, it is respectfully prayed of this Honorable Court:

1. Upon the filing of this Petition, pursuant to the second paragraph of Rule 58, Section 5 of the Rules
of Court, issue forthwith an ex parte temporary restraining order enjoining respondents, their
subordinates, agents, representatives and any and all persons acting on their behalf from pursuing,
entering into indebtedness, disbursing funds, and implementing the ZTE-DOTC Broadband Deal;
 2. Compel respondents, upon Writ of Mandamus, to forthwith produce and furnish petitioner or his
undersigned counsel a certified true copy of the contract or agreement covering the NBN project as
agreed upon with ZTE Corporation;

3. Schedule Oral Arguments in the present case pursuant to Rule 49 in relation to Section 2, Rule 56
of the revised Rules of Court; and,

4. Annul and set aside the award of the ZTE-DOTC Broadband Deal, and compel public respondents
to forthwith comply with pertinent provisions of law regarding procurement of government ICT
contracts and public bidding for the NBN contract.11 (Emphasis supplied)

G.R. No. 179317

WHEREFORE, petitioners Amsterdam Holdings, Inc., and Nathaniel Sauz respectfully pray as follows:

A. upon the filing of this Petition for Mandamus and conditioned upon the posting of a bond in such
amount as the Honorable Court may fix, a temporary restraining order and/or writ of preliminary
injunction be issued directing the Department of Transportation and Communication, the Commission
on Information and Communications Technology, all other government agencies and
instrumentalities, their officers, employees, and/or other persons acting for and on their behalf to
desist during the pendency of the instant Petition for Mandamus from entering into any other
agreements and from commencing with any kind, sort, or specie of activity in connection with the
National Broadband Network Project;

B. the instant Petition for Mandamus be given due course; and,

C. after due consideration of all relevant issues, judgment be rendered directing respondents to allow
herein petitioners access to all agreements entered into with the Government of China, the ZTE
Corporation, and/or other entities, government instrumentalities, and/or individuals with regard to
the National Broadband Network Project.12 (Emphasis supplied)

G.R. No. 179613

WHEREFORE, it is respectfully prayed of this Honorable Court to:

1. Compel respondents, upon Writ of Mandamus, to forthwith produce and furnish petitioner or his
undersigned counsel a certified true copy of the contract or agreement covering the NBN project as
agreed upon with ZTE Corporation;

2. Schedule Oral Arguments in the present case pursuant to Rule 49 in relation to Section 2, Rule 56
of the Revised Rules of Court;

3. Annul and set aside the award of the contract for the national broadband network to respondent
ZTE Corporation, upon the ground that said contract, as well as the procedures resorted to
preparatory to the execution thereof, is contrary to the Constitution, to law and to public policy;

4. Compel public respondent to forthwith comply with pertinent provisions of law regarding
procurement of government infrastructure projects, including public bidding for said contract to
undertake the construction of the national broadband network. 13 (Emphasis supplied)

On September 11, 2007, the Court issued a TRO 14 in G.R. No. 178830, enjoining the parties from "pursuing,
entering into indebtedness, disbursing funds, and implementing the ZTE-DOTC Broadband Deal and Project"
as prayed for. Pertinent parts of the said Order read:

WHEREAS, the Supreme Court, on 11 September 2007, adopted a resolution in the above-entitled case, to
wit:

"G.R. No. 178830 (Rolex Suplico vs. National Economic and Development Authority, represented by NEDA
Secretary Romulo L. Neri, and the NEDA Investment Coordination Committee, Department of Transportation
and Communications (DOTC), represented by DOTC Secretary Leandro Mendoza, including the Commission
on Information and Communications Technology, headed by its Chairman, Ramon P. Sales, The
Telecommunications Office, Bids and Awards for Information and Communications Technology Committee
(ICT), headed by DOTC Assistant Secretary Elmer A. Soneja as Chairman, and The Technical Working Group
for ICT, and DOTC Assistant Secretary Lorenzo Formoso, and All Other Operating Units of the DOTC for
Information and Communications Technology, and ZTE Corporation, Amsterdam Holdings, Inc., and
ARESCOM, Inc.—Acting on the instant petition with prayer for temporary restraining order and/or writ of
preliminary injunction, the Court Resolved, without giving due course to the petition, to

xxxx
(d) Issue a TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER, effective immediately and continuing until further orders
from this Court, enjoining the (i) National Economic and Development Authority, (ii) NEDA-Investment
Coordination Committee, (iii) Department of Transportation and Communications, Commission on
Information and Communications Technology, (iv) Telecommunications Office, Bids and Awards for
Information and Communications Technology Committee (ICT), (v) Technical Working Group for ICT, and
all other Operating Units of the DOTC for Information and Communications Technology, (vi) ZTE
Corporation; (vii) Amsterdam Holdings, Inc., and (viii) ARESCOM, Inc., and any and all persons acting on
their behalf from ‘pursuing, entering into indebtedness, disbursing funds, and implementing the ZTE-DOTC
Broadband Deal and Project’ as prayed for."

NOW THEREFORE, effective immediately and continuing until further orders from this Court, You,
Respondents (i) National Economic and Development Authority, (ii) NEDA-Investment Coordination
Committee, (iii) Department of Transportation and Communications, Commission on Information and
Communications Technology, (iv) Telecommunications Office, Bids and Awards for Information and
Communications Technology Committee (ICT), (v) Technical Working Group for ICT, and all other Operating
Units of the DOTC for Information and Communications Technology, (vi) ZTE Corporation; (vii) Amsterdam
Holdings, Inc., and (viii) ARESCOM, Inc., and any and all persons acting on their behalf are hereby ENJOINED
from "pursuing, entering into indebtedness, disbursing funds, and implementing the ZTE-DOTC Broadband
Deal and Project" as prayed for.15 (Emphasis supplied.)

Petitioners in G.R. Nos. 178830 and 179613 pray that they be furnished certified true copies of the "contract
or agreement covering the NBN project as agreed upon with ZTE Corporation." It appears that during one
of the Senate hearings on the NBN project, copies of the supply contract 16 were readily made available to
petitioners.17Evidently, the said prayer has been complied with and is, thus, mooted.

When President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, acting in her official capacity during the meeting held on October
2, 2007 in China, informed China’s President Hu Jintao that the Philippine Government had decided not to
continue with the ZTE-National Broadband Network (ZTE-NBN) Project due to several reasons and
constraints, there is no doubt that all the other principal prayers in the three petitions (to annul, set aside,
and enjoin the implementation of the ZTE-NBN Project) had also become moot.

Contrary to petitioners’ contentions that these declarations made by officials belonging to the executive
branch on the Philippine Government’s decision not to continue with the ZTE-NBN Project are self-serving,
hence, inadmissible, the Court has no alternative but to take judicial notice of this official act of the President
of the Philippines.

Section 1, Rule 129 of the Rules of Court provides:

SECTION 1. Judicial Notice, when mandatory. – A court shall take judicial notice, without introduction of
evidence, of the existence and territorial extent of states, their political history, forms of government and
symbols of nationality, the law of nations, the admiralty and maritime courts of the world and their seals,
the political constitution and history of the Philippines, the official acts of the legislative, executive and
judicial departments of the Philippines, the laws of nature, the measure of time, and the geographical
divisions. (Emphasis supplied)

Under the rules, it is mandatory and the Court has no alternative but to take judicial notice of the official
acts of the President of the Philippines, who heads the executive branch of our government. It is further
provided in the above-quoted rule that the court shall take judicial notice of the foregoing facts without
introduction of evidence. Since we consider the act of cancellation by President Macapagal-Arroyo of the
proposed ZTE-NBN Project during the meeting of October 2, 2007 with the Chinese President in China as an
official act of the executive department, the Court must take judicial notice of such official act without need
of evidence.

In David v. Macapagal-Arroyo,18 We took judicial notice of the announcement by the Office of the President
banning all rallies and canceling all permits for public assemblies following the issuance of Presidential
Proclamation No. 1017 and General Order No. 5.

In Estrada v. Desierto,19 the Court also resorted to judicial notice in resolving the factual ingredient of the
petition.

Moreover, under Section 2, paragraph (m) of Rule 131 of the Rules of Court, the official duty of the executive
officials20 of informing this Court of the government’s decision not to continue with the ZTE-NBN Project is
also presumed to have been regularly performed, absent proof to the contrary. Other than petitioner AHI’s
unsavory insinuation in its comment, the Court finds no factual or legal basis to disregard this disputable
presumption in the present instance.

Concomitant to its fundamental task as the ultimate citadel of justice and legitimacy is the judiciary’s role
of strengthening political stability indispensable to progress and national development. Pontificating on
issues which no longer legitimately constitute an actual case or controversy will do more harm than good to
the nation as a whole. Wise exercise of judicial discretion militates against resolving the academic issues,
as petitioners want this Court to do. This is especially true where, as will be further discussed, the legal
issues raised cannot be resolved without previously establishing the factual basis or antecedents.

Judicial power presupposes actual controversies, the very antithesis of mootness. In the absence of actual
justiciable controversies or disputes, the Court generally opts to refrain from deciding moot issues. Where
there is no more live subject of controversy, the Court ceases to have a reason to render any ruling or make
any pronouncement.

Kapag wala nang buhay na kaso, wala nang dahilan para magdesisyon ang Husgado.

In Republic Telecommunications Holdings, Inc. v. Santiago,21 the lone issue tackled by the Court of Appeals
(CA) was whether the Securities Investigation and Clearing Department (SICD) and Securities and Exchange
Commission (SEC) en banc committed reversible error in issuing and upholding, respectively, the writ of
preliminary injunction. The writ enjoined the execution of the questioned agreements between Qualcomm,
Inc. and Republic Telecommunications Holdings, Inc. (RETELCOM). The implementation of the agreements
was restrained through the assailed orders of the SICD and the SEC en banc which, however, were nullified
by the CA decision. Thus, RETELCOM elevated the matter to this Court praying for the reinstatement of the
writ of preliminary injunction of the SICD and the SEC en banc. However, before the matter was finally
resolved, Qualcomm, Inc. withdrew from the negotiating table. Its withdrawal had thwarted the execution
and enforcement of the contracts. Thus, the resolution of whether the implementation of said agreements
should be enjoined became no longer necessary.

Equally applicable to the present case is the Court ruling in the above-cited Republic Telecommunications.
There We held, thus:

Indeed, the instant petition, insofar as it assails the Court of Appeals’ Decision nullifying the orders of the
SEC en banc and the SICD, has been rendered moot and academic. To rule, one way or the other, on the
correctness of the questioned orders of the SEC en banc and the SICD will be indulging in a theoretical
exercise that has no practical worth in view of the supervening event.

The rule is well-settled that for a court to exercise its power of adjudication, there must be an actual case
or controversy – one which involves a conflict of legal rights, an assertion of opposite legal claims susceptible
of judicial resolution; the case must not be moot or academic or based on extra-legal or other similar
considerations not cognizable by a court of justice. Where the issue has become moot and academic, there
is no justiciable controversy, and an adjudication thereon would be of no practical use or value as courts do
not sit to adjudicate mere academic questions to satisfy scholarly interest, however intellectually
challenging.

In the ultimate analysis, petitioners are seeking the reinstatement of the writ of injunction to prevent the
concerned parties from pushing through with transactions with Qualcomm, Inc. Given that Qualcomm, Inc.
is no longer interested in pursuing the contracts, there is no actual substantial relief to which petitioners
would be entitled and which would be negated by the dismissal of the petition.

The Court likewise finds it unnecessary to rule whether the assailed Court of Appeals’ Decision had the effect
of overruling the Court’s Resolution dated 29 January 1999, which set aside the TRO issued by the appellate
court.

A ruling on the matter practically partakes of a mere advisory opinion, which falls beyond the realm of
judicial review. The exercise of the power of judicial review is limited to actual cases and controversies.
Courts have no authority to pass upon issues through advisory opinions or to resolve hypothetical or feigned
problems.

While there were occasions when the Court passed upon issues although supervening events had rendered
those petitions moot and academic, the instant case does not fall under the exceptional cases. In those
cases, the Court was persuaded to resolve moot and academic issues to formulate guiding and controlling
constitutional principles, precepts, doctrines or rules for future guidance of both bench and bar.

In the case at bar, the resolution of whether a writ of preliminary injunction may be issued to prevent the
implementation of the assailed contracts calls for an appraisal of factual considerations which are peculiar
only to the transactions and parties involved in this controversy. Except for the determination of whether
petitioners are entitled to a writ of preliminary injunction which is now moot, the issues raised in this petition
do not call for a clarification of any constitutional principle or the interpretation of any statutory provision. 22

Secondly, even assuming that the Court will choose to disregard the foregoing considerations and brush
aside mootness, the Court cannot completely rule on the merits of the case because the resolution of the
three petitions involves settling factual issues which definitely requires reception of evidence. There is not
an iota of doubt that this may not be done by this Court in the first instance because, as has been stated
often enough, this Court is not a trier of facts.

Ang pagpapasiya sa tatlong petisyon ay nangangailangan ng paglilitis na hindi gawain ng Hukumang ito.
Respondent ZTE, in its Comment in G.R. No. 178830,23 correctly pointed out that since petitioner Suplico
filed his petition directly with this Court, without prior factual findings made by any lower court, a
determination of pertinent and relevant facts is needed. ZTE enumerated some of these factual issues, to
wit:

(1) Whether an executive agreement has been reached between the Philippine and Chinese
governments over the NBN Project;

(2) Whether the ZTE Supply Contract was entered into by the Republic of the Philippines, through
the DOTC, and ZTE International pursuant to, and as an integral part of, the executive agreement;

(3) Whether a loan agreement for the NBN Project has actually been executed;

(4) Whether the Philippine government required that the NBN Project be completed under a Build-
Operate-and-Transfer Scheme;

(5) Whether the AHI proposal complied with the requirements for an unsolicited proposal under the
BOT Law;

(6) Whether the Philippine government has actually earmarked public finds for disbursement under
the ZTE Supply Contract; and

(7) Whether the coverage of the NBN Project to be supplied under the ZTE Supply Contract is more
extensive than that under the AHI proposal or such other proposal submitted therefor.24

Definitely, some very specific reliefs prayed for in both G.R. Nos. 178830 and 179613 require prior
determination of facts before pertinent legal issues could be resolved and specific reliefs granted.

In G.R. No. 178830, petitioner seeks to annul and set aside the award of the ZTE-DOTC Broadband Deal
and compel public respondents to forthwith comply with pertinent provisions of law regarding procurement
of government ICT contracts and public bidding for the NBN contract.

In G.R. No. 179613, petitioners also pray that the Court annul and set aside the award of the contract for
the national broadband network to respondent ZTE Corporation, upon the ground that said contract, as well
as the procedures resorted to preparatory to the execution thereof, is contrary to the Constitution, to law
and to public policy. They also ask the Court to compel public respondent to forthwith comply with pertinent
provisions of law regarding procurement of government infrastructure projects, including public bidding for
said contract to undertake the construction of the national broadband network.

It is simply impossible for this Court "to annul and set aside the award of the ZTE-DOTC Broadband Deal"
without any evidence to support a prior factual finding pointing to any violation of law that could lead to
such annulment order. For sure, the Supreme Court is not the proper venue for this factual matter to be
threshed out.

Thirdly, petitioner Suplico in G.R. No. 178830 prayed that this Court order "public respondents to forthwith
comply with pertinent provisions of law regarding procurement of government ICT contracts and public
bidding for the NBN contract."25 It would be too presumptuous on the part of the Court to summarily compel
public respondents to comply with pertinent provisions of law regarding procurement of government
infrastructure projects without any factual basis or prior determination of very particular violations
committed by specific government officials of the executive branch. For the Court to do so would amount to
a breach of the norms of comity among co-equal branches of government. A perceived error cannot be
corrected by committing another error. Without proper evidence, the Court cannot just presume that the
executive did not comply with procurement laws. Should the Court allow itself to fall into this trap, it would
plainly commit grave error itself.

Magiging kapangahasan sa Hukumang ito na pilitin ang mga pinipetisyon na tumalima sa batas sa
pangongontrata ng pamahalaan kung wala pang pagtitiyak o angkop na ebidensiya ng nagawang paglabag
dito.

Let it be clarified that the Senate investigation in aid of legislation cannot be the basis of Our decision which
requires a judicial finding of facts.

Justice Antonio T. Carpio takes the view that the National Broadband Network Project should be declared
null and void. The foregoing threefold reasons would suffice to address the concern of Our esteemed
colleague.

The Court is, therefore, constrained to dismiss the petitions and deny them due course because of mootness
and because their resolution requires reception of evidence which cannot be done in an original petition
brought before the Supreme Court. WHEREFORE, the petitions are DISMISSED. The Temporary Restraining
Order issued on September 11, 2007 is DISSOLVED. SO ORDERED.
A.M. No. RTJ-92-876 September 19, 1994

STATE PROSECUTORS, complainants,

vs.
JUDGE MANUEL T. MURO, Regional Trial Court, Branch 54, Manila, respondent.

PER CURIAM:

In assaying the requisite norms for qualifications and eminence of a magistrate, legal authorities place a
premium on how he has complied with his continuing duty to know the law. A quality thus considered
essential to the judicial character is that of "a man of learning who spends tirelessly the weary hours after
midnight acquainting himself with the great body of traditions and the learning of the law; is profoundly
learned in all the learning of the law; and knows how to use that learning." 1

Obviously, it is the primary duty of a judge, which he owes to the public and to the legal profession, to know
the very law he is supposed to apply to a given controversy. He is called upon to exhibit more than just a
cursory acquaintance with the statutes and procedural rules. Party litigants will have great faith in the
administration of justice if judges cannot justly be accused of apparent deficiency in their grasp of the legal
principles. For, service in the judiciary means a continuous study and research on the law from beginning
to end. 2

In a letter-complaint 3 dated August 19, 1992, respondent Judge Manuel T. Muro of the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) of Manila, Branch 54, was charged by State Prosecutors Nilo C. Mariano, George C. Dee and Paterno
V. Tac-an with ignorance of the law, grave misconduct and violations of Rules 2.01, 3.01 and 3.02 of the
Code of Judicial Conduct, committed as follows:

1. That on August 13, 1992, respondent judge issued an Order dismissing eleven (11) cases
(docketed as Crim. Cases Nos. 92-101959 to 92- 101969, inclusive) filed by the undersigned
complainant prosecutors (members of the DOJ Panel of Prosecutors) against the accused Mrs.
Imelda Romualdez Marcos, for Violation of Central Bank Foreign Exchange Restrictions, as
consolidated in CB Circular No. 960, in relation to the penal provisions of Sec. 34 of R.A. 265,
as amended, . . .;

2. That respondent Judge issued his Order solely on the basis of newspaper reports (August
11, 1992 issues of the Philippine Daily Inquirer and the Daily Globe) concerning the
announcement on August 10, 1992 by the President of the Philippines of the lifting by the
government of all foreign exchange restrictions and the arrival at such decision by the
Monetary Board as per statement of Central Bank Governor Jose Cuisia;

3. That claiming that the reported announcement of the Executive Department on the lifting
of foreign exchange restrictions by two newspapers which are reputable and of national
circulation had the effect of repealing Central Bank Circular No. 960, as allegedly supported
by Supreme Court decisions . . ., the Court contended that it was deprived of jurisdiction,
and, therefore, motu, prop(r)io had to dismiss all the eleven cases aforementioned "for not
to do so opens this Court to charges of trying cases over which it has no more jurisdiction;"

4. That in dismissing aforecited cases on August 13, 1992 on the basis of a Central Bank
Circular or Monetary Board Resolution which as of date hereof, has not even been officially
issued, and basing his Order/decision on a mere newspaper account of the advance
announcement made by the President of the said fact of lifting or liberalizing foreign exchange
controls, respondent judge acted prematurely and in indecent haste, as he had no way of
determining the full intent of the new CB Circular or Monetary Board resolution, and whether
the same provided for exception, as in the case of persons who had pending criminal cases
before the courts for violations of Central Bank Circulars and/or regulations previously issued
on the matter;

5. That respondent Judge's arrogant and cavalier posture in taking judicial notice purportedly
as a matter of public knowledge a mere newspaper account that the President had announced
the lifting of foreign exchange restrictions as basis for his assailed order of dismissal is highly
irregular, erroneous and misplaced. For the respondent judge to take judicial notice thereof
even before it is officially released by the Central Bank and its full text published as required
by law to be effective shows his precipitate action in utter disregard of the fundamental
precept of due process which the People is also entitled to and exposes his gross ignorance
of the law, thereby tarnishing public confidence in the integrity of the judiciary. How can the
Honorable Judge take judicial notice of something which has not yet come into force and the
contents, shape and tenor of which have not yet been published and ascertained to be the
basis of judicial action? The Honorable Judge had miserably failed to "endeavor diligently to
ascertain the facts" in the case at bar contrary to Rule 3.02 of the Code of Judicial Conduct
constituting Grave Misconduct;
 6. That respondent Judge did not even ha(ve) the prudence of requiring first the comment of
the prosecution on the effect of aforesaid Central Bank Circular/Monetary Board resolution on
the pending cases before dismissing the same, thereby denying the Government of its right
to due process;

7. That the lightning speed with which respondent Judge acted to dismiss the cases may be
gleaned from the fact that such precipitate action was undertaken despite already scheduled
continuation of trial dates set in the order of the court (the prosecution having started
presenting its evidence . . .) dated August 11, 1992 to wit: August 31, September 3, 10, 21,
& 23 and October 1, 1992, all at 9:30 o'clock in the morning, in brazen disregard of all notions
of fair play, thereby depriving the Government of its right to be heard, and clearly exposing
his bias and partiality; and

8. That, in fact, the motive of respondent Judge in dismissing the case without even waiting
for a motion to quash filed by the counsel for accused has even placed his dismissal Order
suspect.

Pursuant to a resolution of this Court dated September 8, 1992, respondent judge filed his
comment, 4 contending, inter alia, that there was no need to await publication of the Central Bank (CB)
circular repealing the existing law on foreign exchange controls for the simple reason that the public
announcement made by the President in several newspapers of general circulation lifting foreign exchange
controls was total, absolute, without qualification, and was immediately effective; that having acted only on
the basis of such announcement, he cannot be blamed for relying on the erroneous statement of the
President that the new foreign exchange rules rendered moot and academic the cases filed against Mrs.
Marcos, and which was corrected only on August 17, 1992 but published in the newspapers on August 18,
1992, and only after respondent judge had issued his order of dismissal dated August 13, 1992; that the
President was ill-advised by his advisers and, instead of rescuing the Chief Executive from embarrassment
by assuming responsibility for errors in the latter's announcement, they chose to toss the blame for the
consequence of their failures to respondent judge who merely acted on the basis of the announcements of
the President which had become of public knowledge; that the "saving clause" under CB Circular No. 1353
specifically refers only to pending actions or investigations involving violations of CB Circular No. 1318,
whereas the eleven cases dismissed involved charges for violations of CB Circular No. 960, hence the
accused cannot be tried and convicted under a law different from that under which she was charged; that
assuming that respondent judge erred in issuing the order of dismissal, the proper remedy should have
been an appeal therefrom but definitely not an administrative complaint for his dismissal; that a mistake
committed by a judge should not necessarily be imputed as ignorance of the law; and that a "court can
reverse or modify a doctrine but it does not show ignorance of the justices or judges whose decisions were
reversed or modified" because "even doctrines initiated by the Supreme Court are later reversed, so how
much more for the lower courts?"

He further argued that no hearing was necessary since the prosecution had nothing to explain because, as
he theorized, "What explanation could have been given? That the President was talking 'through his hat' (to
use a colloquialism) and should not be believed? That I should wait for the publication (as now alleged by
complainants), of a still then non-existent CB circular? . . . As it turned out, CB Circular No. 3153 (sic) does
not affect my dismissal order because the said circular's so-called saving clause does not refer to CB Circular
960 under which the charges in the dismissed cases were based;" that it was discretionary on him to take
judicial notice of the facts which are of public knowledge, pursuant to Section 2 of Rule 129; that the
contention of complainants that he acted prematurely and in indecent haste for basing his order of dismissal
on a mere newspaper account is contrary to the wordings of the newspaper report wherein the President
announced the lifting of controls as an accomplished fact, not as an intention to be effected in the future,
because of the use of the present perfect tense or past tense "has lifted," not that he "intends to lift," foreign
exchange controls.

Finally, respondent judge asseverates that complainants who are officers of the Department of Justice,
violated Section 6, Rule 140 of the Rules of Court which provides that "proceedings against judges of first
instance shall be private and confidential" when they caused to be published in the newspapers the filing of
the present administrative case against him; and he emphasizes the fact that he had to immediately resolve
a simple and pure legal matter in consonance with the admonition of the Supreme Court for speedy
disposition of cases.

In their reply 5 and supplemental reply, 6 complainants aver that although the saving clause under Section
16 of CB Circular No. 1353 made specific reference to CB Circular No. 1318, it will be noted that Section
111 of Circular No. 1318, which contains a saving clause substantially similar to that of the new circular, in
turn refers to and includes Circular No. 960. Hence, whether under Circular No. 1318 or Circular No. 1353,
pending cases involving violations of Circular No. 960 are excepted from the coverage thereof. Further, it is
alleged that the precipitate dismissal of the eleven cases, without according the prosecution the opportunity
to file a motion to quash or a comment, or even to show cause why the cases against accused Imelda R.
Marcos should not be dismissed, is clearly reflective of respondent's partiality and bad faith. In effect,
respondent judge acted as if he were the advocate of the accused.

On December 9, 1993, this Court issued a resolution referring the complaint to the Office of the Court
Administrator for evaluation, report and recommendation, pursuant to Section 7, Rule 140 of the Rules of
Court, as revised, there being no factual issues involved. The corresponding report and
recommendation, 7 dated February 14, 1994, was submitted by Deputy Court Administrator Juanito A.
Bernad, with the approval of Court Administrator Ernani Cruz-Paño.

The questioned order 8

of respondent judge reads as follows:

These eleven (11) cases are for Violation of Central Bank Foreign Exchange Restrictions as
consolidated in CB Circular No. 960 in relation to the penal provision of Sec. 34 of R.A. 265,
as amended.

The accused Mrs. Imelda R. Marcos pleaded not guilty to all these cases; apparently the other
accused in some of these cases, Roberto S. Benedicto, was not arrested and therefore the
Court did not acquire jurisdiction over his person; trial was commenced as against Mrs.
Marcos.

His Excellency, the President of the Philippines, announced on August 10, 1992 that the
government has lifted all foreign exchange restrictions and it is also reported that Central
Bank Governor Jose Cuisia said that the Monetary Board arrived at such decision (issue of the
Philippine Daily Inquirer, August 11, 1992 and issue of the Daily Globe of the same date). The
Court has to give full confidence and credit to the reported announcement of the Executive
Department, specially from the highest official of that department; the Courts are charged
with judicial notice of matters which are of public knowledge, without introduction of proof,
the announcement published in at least the two newspapers cited above which are reputable
and of national circulation.

Per several cases decided by the Supreme Court (People vs. Alcaras, 56 Phil. 520, People vs.
Francisco, 56 Phil. 572, People vs. Pastor, 77 Phil. 1000, People vs. Crisanto Tamayo, 61 Phil.
225), among others, it was held that the repeal of a penal law without re-enactment
extinguishes the right to prosecute or punish the offense committed under the old law and if
the law repealing the prior penal law fails to penalize the acts which constituted the offense
defined and penalized in the repealed law, the repealed law carries with it the deprivation of
the courts of jurisdiction to try, convict and sentence persons charged with violations of the
old law prior to its repeal. Under the aforecited decisions this doctrine applies to special laws
and not only to the crimes punishable in the Revised Penal Code, such as the Import Control
Law. The Central Bank Circular No. 960 under which the accused Mrs. Marcos is charged is
considered as a penal law because violation thereof is penalized with specific reference to the
provision of Section 34 of Republic Act 265, which penalizes violations of Central Bank Circular
No. 960, produces the effect cited in the Supreme Court decisions and since according to the
decisions that repeal deprives the Court of jurisdiction, this Court motu proprio dismisses all
the eleven (11) cases as a forestated in the caption, for not to do so opens this Court to
charges of trying cases over which it has no more jurisdiction.

This order was subsequently assailed in a petition for certiorari filed with the Court of Appeals, entitled
"People of the Philippines vs. Hon. Manuel T. Muro, Judge, RTC of Manila, Br. 54 and Imelda R. Marcos,"
docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 29349. When required to file her comment, private respondent Marcos failed
to file any. Likewise, after the appellate court gave due course to the petition, private respondent was
ordered, but again failed despite notice, to file an answer to the petition and to show cause why no writ of
preliminary injunction should issue. Eventually, on April 29, 1993, the Court of Appeals rendered a
decision 9 setting aside the order of August 13, 1992, and reinstating Criminal Cases Nos. 92-101959 to 92-
101969.

In finding that respondent judge acted in excess of jurisdiction and with grave abuse of discretion in issuing
the order of dismissal, the appellate court held that:

The order was issued motu proprio, i.e., without any motion to dismiss filed by counsel for
the accused, without giving an opportunity for the prosecution to be heard, and solely on the
basis of newspaper reports announcing that the President has lifted all foreign exchange
restrictions.

The newspaper report is not the publication required by law in order that the enactment can
become effective and binding. Laws take effect after fifteen days following the completion of
their publication in the Official Gazette or in a newspaper of general circulation unless it is
otherwise provided (Section 1, Executive Order No. 200). The full text of CB Circular 1353,
series of 1992, entitled "Further Liberalizing Foreign Exchange Regulation" was published in
the August 27, 1992 issue of the Manila Chronicle, the Philippine Star and the Manila Bulletin.
Per certification of the CB Corporate Affairs Office, CB Circular No. 1353 took effect on
September 2 . . . .

Considering that respondent judge admittedly had not seen the official text of CB Circular No.
1353, he was in no position to rule judiciously on whether CB Circular No. 960, under which
the accused Mrs. Marcos is charged, was already repealed by CB Circular No. 1353. . . .
 xxx xxx xxx

A cursory reading of the . . . provision would have readily shown that the repeal of the
regulations on non-trade foreign exchange transactions is not absolute, as there is a provision
that with respect to violations of former regulations that are the subject of pending actions or
investigations, they shall be governed by the regulations existing at the time the cause of
action (arose). Thus his conclusion that he has lost jurisdiction over the criminal cases is
precipitate and hasty. Had he awaited the filing of a motion to dismiss by the accused, and
given opportunity for the prosecution to comment/oppose the same, his resolution would have
been the result of deliberation, not speculation.

I. The doctrine of judicial notice rests on the wisdom and discretion of the courts. The power to take judicial
notice is to be exercised by courts with caution; care must be taken that the requisite notoriety exists; and
every reasonable doubt on the subject should be promptly resolved in the negative. 10

Generally speaking, matters of judicial notice have three material requisites: (1) the matter must be one of
common and general knowledge; (2) it must be well and authoritatively settled and not doubtful or
uncertain; and (3) it must be known to be within the limits of the jurisdiction of the court. 11 The provincial
guide in determining what facts may be assumed to be judicially known is that of notoriety. 12 Hence, it can
be said that judicial notice is limited to facts evidenced by public records and facts of general notoriety. 13

To say that a court will take judicial notice of a fact is merely another way of saying that the usual form of
evidence will be dispensed with if knowledge of the fact can be otherwise acquired. 14 This is because the
court assumes that the matter is so notorious that it will not be disputed. 15 But judicial notice is not judicial
knowledge. The mere personal knowledge of the judge is not the judicial knowledge of the court, and he is
not authorized to make his individual knowledge of a fact, not generally or professionally known, the basis
of his action. Judicial cognizance is taken only of those matters which are "commonly" known. 16

Things of "common knowledge," of which courts take judicial notice, may be matters coming to the
knowledge of men generally in the course of the ordinary experiences of life, or they may be matters which
are generally accepted by mankind as true and are capable of ready and unquestioned
demonstration. 17 Thus, facts which are universally known, and which may be found in encyclopedias,
dictionaries or other publications, are judicially noticed, provided they are of such universal notoriety and
so generally understood that they may be regarded as forming part of the common knowledge of every
person. 18

Respondent judge, in the guise of exercising discretion and on the basis of a mere newspaper account which
is sometimes even referred to as hearsay evidence twice removed, took judicial notice of the supposed
lifting of foreign exchange controls, a matter which was not and cannot be considered of common knowledge
or of general notoriety. Worse, he took cognizance of an administrative regulation which was not yet in force
when the order of dismissal was issued. Jurisprudence dictates that judicial notice cannot be taken of a
statute before it becomes effective. 19 The reason is simple. A law which is not yet in force and hence, still
inexistent, cannot be of common knowledge capable of ready and unquestionable demonstration, which is
one of the requirements before a court can take judicial notice of a fact.

Evidently, it was impossible for respondent judge, and it was definitely not proper for him, to have taken
cognizance of CB Circular No. 1353, when the same was not yet in force at the time the improvident order
of dismissal was issued.

II. Central Bank Circular No. 1353, which took effect on September 1, 1992, further liberalized the foreign
exchange regulations on receipts and disbursements of residents arising from non-trade and trade
transactions. Section 16 thereof provides for a saving clause, thus:

Sec. 16. Final Provisions of CB Circular No. 1318. - All the provisions in Chapter X of CB
Circular No. 1318 insofar as they are not inconsistent with, or contrary to the provisions of
this Circular, shall remain in full force and effect: Provided, however, that any regulation on
non-trade foreign exchange transactions which has been repealed, amended or modified by
this Circular, violations of which are the subject of pending actions or investigations, shall not
be considered repealed insofar as such pending actions or investigations are concerned, it
being understood that as to such pending actions or investigations, the regulations existing
at the time the cause of action accrued shall govern.

Respondent judge contends that the saving clause refers only to the provisions of Circular No. 1318, whereas
the eleven criminal cases he dismissed involve a violation of CB Circular No. 960. Hence, he insists, Circular
No. 960 is deemed repealed by the new circular and since the former is not covered by the saving clause in
the latter, there is no more basis for the charges involved in the criminal cases which therefore warrant a
dismissal of the same. The contention is patently unmeritorious.

Firstly, the second part of the saving clause in Circular No. 1353 explicitly provides that "any regulation on
non-trade foreign transactions which has been repealed, amended or modified by this Circular, violations of
which are the subject of pending actions or investigations, shall not be considered repealed insofar as such
pending actions or investigations are concerned, it being understood that as to such pending actions or
investigations, the regulations existing at the time the cause of action accrued shall govern." The terms of
the circular are clear and unambiguous and leave no room for interpretation. In the case at bar, the accused
in the eleven cases had already been arraigned, had pleaded not guilty to the charges of violations of Circular
No. 960, and said cases had already been set for trial when Circular No. 1353 took effect. Consequently,
the trial court was and is supposed to proceed with the hearing of the cases in spite of the existence of
Circular No. 1353.

Secondly, had respondent judge only bothered to read a little more carefully the texts of the circulars
involved, he would have readily perceived and known that Circular No. 1318 also contains a substantially
similar saving clause as that found in Circular No. 1353, since Section 111 of the former provides:

Sec. 111. Repealing clause. - All existing provisions of Circulars 365, 960 and 1028, including
amendments thereto, with the exception of the second paragraph of Section 68 of Circular
1028, as well as all other existing Central Bank rules and regulations or parts thereof, which
are inconsistent with or contrary to the provisions of this Circular, are hereby repealed or
modified accordingly: Provided, however, that regulations, violations of which are the subject
of pending actions or investigations, shall be considered repealed insofar as such pending
actions or investigations are concerned, it being understood that as to such pending actions
or investigations, the regulations existing at the time the cause of action accrued shall govern.

It unequivocally appears from the section above quoted that although Circular No. 1318 repealed Circular
No. 960, the former specifically excepted from its purview all cases covered by the old regulations which
were then pending at the time of the passage of the new regulations. Thus, any reference made to Circular
No. 1318 necessarily involves and affects Circular No. 960.

III. It has been said that next in importance to the duty of rendering a righteous judgment is that of doing
it in such a manner as will beget no suspicion of the fairness and integrity of the judge. 20 This means that
a judge should not only render a just, correct and impartial decision but should do so in such a manner as
to be free from any suspicion as to its fairness and impartiality and as to his integrity. While a judge should
possess proficiency in law in order that he can competently construe and enforce the law, it is more
important that he should act and behave in such a manner that the parties before him should have
confidence in his impartiality. Thus, it is not enough that he decides cases without bias and favoritism. Nor
is it sufficient that he in fact rids himself of prepossessions. His actuations should moreover inspire that
belief. Like Caesar's wife, a judge must not only be pure but beyond suspicion. 21

Moreover, it has always heretofore been the rule that in disposing of controverted cases, judges should
show their full understanding of the case, avoid the suspicion of arbitrary conclusion, promote confidence in
their intellectual integrity and contribute useful precedents to the growth of the law. 22 A judge should be
mindful that his duty is the application of general law to particular instances, that ours is a government of
laws and not of men, and that he violates his duty as a minister of justice under such a system if he seeks
to do what he may personally consider substantial justice in a particular case and disregards the general
law as he knows it to be binding on him. Such action may have detrimental consequences beyond the
immediate controversy. He should administer his office with due regard to the integrity of the system of the
law itself, remembering that he is not a depository of arbitrary power, but a judge under the sanction of the
law. 23 These are immutable principles that go into the very essence of the task of dispensing justice and
we see no reason why they should not be duly considered in the present case.

The assertion of respondent judge that there was no need to await publication of Circular No. 1353 for the
reason that the public announcement made by the President in several newspapers of general circulation
lifting foreign exchange controls is total, absolute, without qualification, and immediately effective, is beyond
comprehension. As a judge of the Regional Trial Court of Manila, respondent is supposed to be well-versed
in the elementary legal mandates on the publication of laws before they take effect. It is inconceivable that
respondent should insist on an altogether different and illogical interpretation of an established and well-
entrenched rule if only to suit his own personal opinion and, as it were, to defend his indefensible action. It
was not for him to indulge or even to give the appearance of catering to the at-times human failing of
yielding to first impressions. 24 He having done so, in the face of the foregoing premises, this Court is hard
put to believe that he indeed acted in good faith.

IV. This is not a simple case of a misapplication or erroneous interpretation of the law. The very act of
respondent judge in altogether dismissing sua sponte the eleven criminal cases without even a motion to
quash having been filed by the accused, and without at least giving the prosecution the basic opportunity
to be heard on the matter by way of a written comment or on oral argument, is not only a blatant denial of
elementary due process to the Government but is palpably indicative of bad faith and partiality.

The avowed desire of respondent judge to speedily dispose of the cases as early as possible is no license
for abuse of judicial power and discretion, 25 nor does such professed objective, even if true, justify a
deprivation of the prosecution's right to be heard and a violation of its right to due process of
law. 26

The lightning speed, to borrow the words of complainants, with which respondent judge resolved to dismiss
the cases without the benefit of a hearing and without reasonable notice to the prosecution inevitably opened
him to suspicion of having acted out of partiality for the accused. Regardless of how carefully he may have
evaluated changes in the factual situation and legal standing of the cases, as a result of the newspaper
report, the fact remains that he gave the prosecution no chance whatsoever to show or prove that it had
strong evidence of the guilt of the accused. To repeat, he thereby effectively deprived the prosecution of its
right to due process. 27 More importantly, notwithstanding the fact that respondent was not sure of the
effects and implications of the President's announcement, as by his own admission he was in doubt whether
or not he should dismiss the cases, 28 he nonetheless deliberately refrained from requiring the prosecution
to comment thereon. In a puerile defense of his action, respondent judge can but rhetorically ask: "What
explanation could have been given? That the President was talking 'through his hat' and should not be
believed? That I should wait for the publication of a still then non- existent CB Circular?" The pretended
cogency of this ratiocination cannot stand even the minutest legal scrutiny.

In order that bias may not be imputed to a judge, he should have the patience and circumspection to give
the opposing party a chance to present his evidence even if he thinks that the oppositor's proofs might not
be adequate to overthrow the case for the other party. A display of petulance and impatience in the conduct
of the trial is a norm of conduct which is inconsistent with the "cold neutrality of an impartial judge." 29 At
the very least, respondent judge acted injudiciously and with unjustified haste in the outright dismissal of
the eleven cases, and thereby rendered his actuation highly dubious.

V. It bears stressing that the questioned order of respondent judge could have seriously and substantially
affected the rights of the prosecution had the accused invoked the defense of double jeopardy, considering
that the dismissal was ordered after arraignment and without the consent of said accused. This could have
spawned legal complications and inevitable delay in the criminal proceedings, were it not for the holding of
the Court of Appeals that respondent judge acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of
jurisdiction. This saved the day for the People since in the absence of jurisdiction, double jeopardy will not
set in. To stress this point, and as a caveat to trial courts against falling into the same judicial error, we
reiterate what we have heretofore declared:

It is settled doctrine that double jeopardy cannot be invoked against this Court's setting aside
of the trial court's judgment of dismissal or acquittal where the prosecution which represents
the sovereign people in criminal cases is denied due process. . . . .

Where the prosecution is deprived of a fair opportunity to prosecute and prove its case, its
right to due process is thereby violated.

The cardinal precept is that where there is a violation of basic constitutional rights, courts are
ousted of their jurisdiction. Thus, the violation of the State's right to due process raises a
serious jurisdictional issue . . . which cannot be glossed over or disregarded at will. Where
the denial of the fundamental right of due process is apparent, a decision rendered in
disregard of that right is void for lack of jurisdiction . . . . 30

It is also significant that accused Marcos, despite due notice, never submitted either her comment on or an
answer to the petition for certiorari as required by the Court of Appeals, nor was double jeopardy invoked
in her defense. This serves to further underscore the fact that the order of dismissal was clearly unjustified
and erroneous. Furthermore, considering that the accused is a prominent public figure with a record of
influence and power, it is not easy to allay public skepticism and suspicions on how said dismissal order
came to be, to the consequent although undeserved discredit of the entire judiciary.

VI. To hold a judge liable for rendering a manifestly unjust order through inexcusable negligence or
ignorance, it must be clearly shown that although he has acted without malice, he failed to observe in the
performance of his duty that diligence, prudence and care which the law is entitled to exact in the rendering
of any public service. Negligence and ignorance are inexcusable if they imply a manifest injustice which
cannot be explained by a reasonable interpretation, and even though there is a misunderstanding or error
of the law applied, it nevertheless results logically and reasonably, and in a very clear and indisputable
manner, in the notorious violation of the legal precept. 31

In the present case, a cursory perusal of the comment filed by respondent judge reveals that no substantial
argument has been advanced in plausible justification of his act. He utterly failed to show any legal, factual,
or even equitable justification for the dismissal of the eleven criminal cases. The explanation given is no
explanation at all. The strained and fallacious submissions therein do not speak well of respondent and
cannot but further depreciate his probity as a judge. On this point, it is best that pertinent unedited excerpts
from his comment 32 be quoted by way of graphic illustration and emphasis:

On the alleged ignorance of the law imputed to me, it is said that I issued the Order dismissing
the eleven (11) cases against Mrs. Imelda R. Marcos on the basis of newspaper reports
referred to in paragraph 2 of the letter complaint without awaiting the official publication of
the Central Bank Circular. Ordinarily a Central Bank Circular/Resolution must be published in
the Official Gazette or in a newspaper of general circulation, but the lifting of "all foreign
exchange controls" was announced by the President of the Philippines WITHOUT
QUALIFICATIONS; as published in the Daily Globe, August 11, 1992" the government has
lifted ALL foreign exchange controls," and in the words of the Philippine Daily Inquirer report
of the same date "The government yesterday LIFTED the LAST remaining restrictions on
 foreign exchange transactions, . . ." (emphasis in both quotations supplied) not only the
President made the announcement but also the Central Bank Governor Jose Cuisia joined in
the announcement by saying that "the Monetary Board arrived at the decision after noting
how the "partial liberalization" initiated early this year worked."

Therefore, because of the ABSOLUTE lifting of ALL restrictions on foreign exchange

transactions, there was no need to await the publication of the repealing circular of the Central
Bank. The purpose of requiring publication of laws and administrative rules affecting the public
is to inform the latter as to how they will conduct their affairs and how they will conform to
the laws or the rules. In this particular case, with the total lifting of the controls, there is no
need to await publication. It would have been different if the circular that in effect repealed
Central Bank Circular No. 960, under which the accused was charged in the cases dismissed
by me, had provided for penalties and/or modified the provisions of said Circular No. 960.

The Complainants state that the lifting of controls was not yet in force when I dismissed the
cases but it should be noted that in the report of the two (2) newspapers aforequoted, the
President's announcement of the lifting of controls was stated in the present perfect tense
(Globe) or past tense (Inquirer). In other words, it has already been lifted; the announcement
did not say that the government INTENDS to lift all foreign exchange restrictions but instead
says that the government "has LIFTED all foreign exchange controls," and in the other
newspaper cited above, that "The government yesterday lifted the last remaining restrictions
on foreign exchange transactions". The lifting of the last remaining exchange regulations
effectively cancelled or repealed Circular No. 960.

The President, who is the Chief Executive, publicly announced the lifting of all foreign
exchange regulations. The President has within his control directly or indirectly the Central
Bank of the Philippines, the Secretary of Finance being the Chairman of the Monetary Board
which decides the policies of the Central Bank.

No official bothered to correct or qualify the President's announcement of August 10,

published the following day, nor made an announcement that the lifting of the controls do not
apply to cases already pending, not until August 17 (the fourth day after my Order, and the
third day after report of said order was published) and after the President said on August 17,
reported in the INQUIRER's issue of August 18, 1992, that the "new foreign exchange rules
have nullified government cases against Imelda R. Marcos, telling reporters that the charges
against the widow of former President Marcos "have become moot and academic" because of
new ruling(s) which allow free flow of currency in and out of the country" (Note,
parenthetically, the reference to "new rules" not to "rules still to be drafted"). The INQUIRER
report continues: "A few hours later, presidential spokeswoman Annabelle Abaya said, RAMOS
(sic) had "corrected himself'." "He had been belatedly advised by the Central Bank Governor
Jose Cuisia and Justice Secretary Franklin Drilon that the Monetary Board Regulation excluded
from its coverage all criminal cases pending in court and such a position shall stand legal
scrutiny', Mrs. Abaya, said."

I will elaborate on two points:

1. If the President was wrong in making the August 10 announcement (published in August
11, 1992, newspapers) and in the August 17 announcement, SUPRA, and thus I should have
relied on the Presidential announcements, and there is basis to conclude that the President
was at the very least ILL-SERVED by his financial and legal advisers, because no one bothered
to advise the President to correct his announcements, not until August 17, 1992, a few hours
after the President had made another announcement as to the charges against Imelda Marcos
having been rendered moot and academic. The President has a lot of work to do, and is not,
to my knowledge, a financier, economist, banker or lawyer. It therefore behooved his
subalterns to give him timely (not "belated") advice, and brief him on matters of immediate
and far-reaching concerns (such as the lifting of foreign exchange controls, designed, among
others to encourage the entry of foreign investments). Instead of rescuing the Chief Executive
from embarrassment by assuming responsibility for errors in the latter's announcement, these
advisers have chosen to toss the blame for the consequence of their failing to me, who only
acted on the basis of announcements of their Chief, which had become of public knowledge.

xxx xxx xxx

The Court strongly feels that it has every right to assume and expect that respondent judge is possessed
with more than ordinary credentials and qualifications to merit his appointment as a presiding judge in the
Regional Trial Court of the National Capital Judicial Region, stationed in the City of Manila itself. It is,
accordingly, disheartening and regrettable to note the nature of the arguments and the kind of logic that
respondent judge would want to impose on this Court notwithstanding the manifest lack of cogency thereof.
This calls to mind similar scenarios and how this Court reacted thereto.

In one case, an RTC Judge was administratively charged for acquitting the accused of a violation of CB
Circular No. 960 despite the fact that the accused was apprehended with US$355,349.00 while boarding a
plane for Hongkong, erroneously ruling that the State must first prove criminal intent to violate the law and
benefit from the illegal act, and further ordering the return of US$3,000.00 out of the total amount seized,
on the mistaken interpretation that the CB circular exempts such amount from seizure. Respondent judge
therein was ordered dismissed from the government service for gross incompetence and ignorance of the
law. 33

Subsequently, the Court dismissed another RTC judge, with forfeiture of retirement benefits, for gross
ignorance of the law and for knowingly rendering an unjust order or judgment when he granted bail to an
accused charged with raping an 11-year old girl, despite the contrary recommendation of the investigating
judge, and thereafter granted the motion to dismiss the case allegedly executed by the complainant. 34

Similarly, an RTC judge who was described by this Court as one "who is ignorant of fairly elementary and
quite familiar legal principles and administrative regulations, has a marked penchant for applying
unorthodox, even strange theories and concepts in the adjudication of controversies, exhibits indifference
to and even disdain for due process and the rule of law, applies the law whimsically, capriciously and
oppressively, and displays bias and impartiality," was dismissed from the service with forfeiture of all
retirement benefits and with prejudice to reinstatement in any branch of the government or any of its
agencies or instrumentalities. 35

Still in another administrative case, an RTJ judge was also dismissed by this Court for gross ignorance of
the law after she ordered, in a probate proceeding, the cancellation of the certificates of title issued in the
name of the complainant, without affording due process to the latter and other interested parties. 36

Only recently, an RTC judge who had been reinstated in the service was dismissed after he acquitted all the
accused in four criminal cases for illegal possession of firearms, on the ground that there was no proof of
malice or deliberate intent on the part of the accused to violate the law. The Court found him guilty of gross
ignorance of the law, his error of judgment being almost deliberate and tantamount to knowingly rendering
an incorrect and unjust judgment. 37

ACCORDINGLY, on the foregoing premises and considerations, the Court finds respondent Judge Manuel T.
Muro guilty of gross ignorance of the law. He is hereby DISMISSED from the service, such dismissal to carry
with it cancellation of eligibility, forfeiture of leave credits and retirement benefits, and disqualification from
reemployment in the government service. 38

Respondent is hereby ordered to CEASE and DESIST immediately from rendering any judgment or order, or
continuing any judicial action or proceeding whatsoever, effective upon receipt of this decision. SO
ORDERED.
G.R. No. 114776 February 2, 2000

MENANDRO B. LAUREANO, petitioner,

vs.
COURT OF APPEALS AND SINGAPORE AIRLINES LIMITED, respondents.

QUISUMBING, J.:

This petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court seeks to reverse the Decision of
the Court of Appeals, dated October 29, 1993, in C.A. G.R. No. CV 34476, as well as its Resolution dated
February 28, 1994, which denied the motion for reconsideration.

The facts of the case as summarized by the respondent appellate court are as follows:

Sometime in 1978, plaintiff [Menandro B. Laureano, herein petitioner], then Director of Flight
Operations and Chief Pilot of Air Manila, applied for employment with defendant company [herein
private respondent] through its Area Manager in Manila.

On September 30, 1978, after the usual personal interview, defendant wrote to plaintiff, offering a
contract of employment as an expatriate B-707 captain for an original period of two (2) years
commencing on January 21, 1978. Plaintiff accepted the offer and commenced working on January
20, 1979. After passing the six-month probation period, plaintiffs appointment was confirmed
effective July 21, 1979. (Annex "B", p. 30, Rollo).

On July 21, 1979, defendant offered plaintiff an extension of his two-year contract to five (5) years
effective January 21, 1979 to January 20, 1984 subject to the terms and conditions set forth in the
contract of employment, which the latter accepted (Annex "C" p. 31, Rec.).

During his service as B-707 captain, plaintiff on August 24, 1980, while in command of a flight,
committed a noise violation offense at the Zurich Airport, for which plaintiff apologized.(Exh. "3", p.
307, Rec.).

Sometime in 1980, plaintiff featured in a tail scraping incident wherein the tail of the aircraft scraped
or touched the runway during landing. He was suspended for a few days until he was investigated
by board headed by Capt. Choy. He was reprimanded.

On September 25, 1981, plaintiff was invited to take a course of A-300 conversion training at
Aeroformacion, Toulouse, France at dependant's expense. Having successfully completed and passed
the training course, plaintiff was cleared on April 7, 1981, for solo duty as captain of the Airbus A-
300 and subsequently appointed as captain of the A-300 fleet commanding an Airbus A-300 in flights
over Southeast Asia. (Annexes "D", "E" and "F", pp. 34-38, Rec.).

Sometime in 1982, defendant, hit by a recession, initiated cost-cutting measures. Seventeen (17)
expatriate captains in the Airbus fleet were found in excess of the defendant's requirement (t.s.n.,
July 6, 1988. p. 11). Consequently, defendant informed its expatriate pilots including plaintiff of the
situation and advised them to take advance leaves. (Exh. "15", p. 466, Rec.)

Realizing that the recession would not be for a short time, defendant decided to terminate its excess
personnel (t.s.n., July 6, 1988, p. 17). It did not, however, immediately terminate it's A-300 pilots.
It reviewed their qualifications for possible promotion to the B-747 fleet. Among the 17 excess Airbus
pilots reviewed, twelve were found qualified. Unfortunately, plaintiff was not one of the twelve.

On October 5, 1982, defendant informed plaintiff of his termination effective November 1, 1982 and
that he will be paid three (3) months salary in lieu of three months notice (Annex "I", pp. 41-42,
Rec.). Because he could not uproot his family on such short notice, plaintiff requested a three-month
notice to afford him time to exhaust all possible avenues for reconsideration and retention. Defendant
gave only two (2) months notice and one (1) month salary. (t.s.n., Nov. 12, 1987. p. 25).

Aggrieved, plaintiff on June 29, 1983, instituted a case for illegal dismissal before the Labor Arbiter.
Defendant moved to dismiss on jurisdiction grounds. Before said motion was resolved, the complaint
was withdrawn. Thereafter, plaintiff filed the instant case for damages due to illegal termination of
contract of services before the court a quo (Complaint, pp. 1-10, Rec.).

Again, defendant on February 11, 1987 filed a motion to dismiss alleging inter alia: (1) that the court
has no jurisdiction over the subject matter of the case, and (2) that Philippine courts have no
jurisdiction over the instant case. Defendant contends that the complaint is for illegal dismissal
together with a money claim arising out of and in the course of plaintiffs employment "thus it is the
Labor Arbiter and the NLRC who have the jurisdiction pursuant to Article 217 of the Labor Code" and
that, since plaintiff was employed in Singapore, all other aspects of his employment contract and/or
documents executed in Singapore. Thus, defendant postulates that Singapore laws should apply and
courts thereat shall have jurisdiction. (pp. 50-69, Rec.).
 In traversing defendant's arguments, plaintiff claimed that: (1) where the items demanded in a
complaint are the natural consequences flowing from a breach of an obligation and not labor benefits,
the case is intrinsically a civil dispute; (2) the case involves a question that is beyond the field of
specialization of labor arbiters; and (3) if the complaint is grounded not on the employee's
dismissal per se but on the manner of said dismissal and the consequence thereof, the case falls
under the jurisdiction of the civil courts. (pp. 70-73, Rec.)

On March 23, 1987, the court a quo denied defendant's motion to dismiss (pp. 82-84, Ibid). The
motion for reconsideration was likewise denied. (p. 95 ibid.)

On September 16, 1987, defendant filed its answer reiterating the grounds relied upon in its motion
to dismiss and further arguing that plaintiff is barred by laches, waiver, and estoppel from instituting
the complaint and that he has no cause of action . (pp. 102-115)1

On April 10, 1991, the trial court handed down its decision in favor of plaintiff. The dispositive portion of
which reads:

WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of plaintiff Menandro Laureano and against
defendant Singapore Airlines Limited, ordering defendant to pay plaintiff the amounts of —

SIN$396,104.00, or its equivalent in Philippine currency at the current rate of exchange at the time
of payment, as and for unearned compensation with legal interest from the filing of the complaint
until fully paid;

SIN$154,742.00, or its equivalent in Philippine currency at the current rate of exchange at the time
of payment; and the further amounts of P67,500.00 as consequential damages with legal interest
from the filing of the complaint until fully paid;

P1,000,000.00 as and for moral damages; P1,000,000.00 as and for exemplary damages; and
P100,000.00 as and for attorney's fees.

Costs against defendant.

SO ORDERED.2

Singapore Airlines timely appealed before the respondent court and raised the issues of jurisdiction, validity
of termination, estoppel, and damages.

On October 29, 1993, the appellate court set aside the decision of the trial court, thus,

. . . In the instant case, the action for damages due to illegal termination was filed by plaintiff-
appellee only on January 8, 1987 or more than four (4) years after the effectivity date of his dismissal
on November 1, 1982. Clearly, plaintiff-appellee's action has already prescribed.

WHEREFORE, the appealed decision is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The complaint is hereby
dismissed.

SO ORDERED.3

Petitioner's and Singapore Airlines' respective motions for reconsideration were denied.

Now, before the Court, petitioner poses the following queries:

1. IS THE PRESENT ACTION ONE BASED ON CONTRACT WHICH PRESCRIBES IN TEN YEARS UNDER ARTICLE
1144 OF THE NEW CIVIL CODE OR ONE FOR DAMAGES ARISING FROM AN INJURY TO THE RIGHTS OF THE
PLAINTIFF WHICH PRESCRIBES IN FOUR YEARS UNDER ARTICLE 1146 OF THE NEW CIVIL CODE?

2. CAN AN EMPLOYEE WITH A FIXED PERIOD OF EMPLOYMENT BE RETRENCHED BY HIS EMPLOYER?

3. CAN THERE BE VALID RETRENCHMENT IF AN EMPLOYER MERELY FAILS TO REALIZE THE EXPECTED
PROFITS EVEN IF IT WERE NOT, IN FACT, INCURRING LOSSES?

At the outset, we find it necessary to state our concurrence on the assumption of jurisdiction by the Regional
Trial Court of Manila, Branch 9. The trial court rightly ruled on the application of Philippine law, thus:

Neither can the Court determine whether the termination of the plaintiff is legal under the Singapore
Laws because of the defendant's failure to show which specific laws of Singapore Laws apply to this
case. As substantially discussed in the preceding paragraphs, the Philippine Courts do not take
judicial notice of the laws of Singapore. The defendant that claims the applicability of the Singapore
 Laws to this case has the burden of proof. The defendant has failed to do so. Therefore, the Philippine
law should be applied.4

Respondent Court of Appeals acquired jurisdiction when defendant filed its appeal before said court. 5 On
this matter, respondent court was correct when it barred defendant-appellant below from raising further the
issue of jurisdiction.6

Petitioner now raises the issue of whether his action is one based on Article 1144 or on Article 1146 of the
Civil Code. According to him, his termination of employment effective November 1, 1982, was based on an
employment contract which is under Article 1144, so his action should prescribe in 10 years as provided for
in said article. Thus he claims the ruling of the appellate court based on Article 1146 where prescription is
only four (4) years, is an error. The appellate court concluded that the action for illegal dismissal originally
filed before the Labor Arbiter on June 29, 1983, but which was withdrawn, then filed again in 1987 before
the Regional Trial Court, had already prescribed.

In our view, neither Article 11447 nor Article 11468 of the Civil Code is here pertinent. What is applicable is
Article 291 of the Labor Code, viz:

Art. 291. Money claims. — All money claims arising from employee-employer relations accruing
during the effectivity of this Code shall be filed within three (3) years from the time the cause of
action accrued; otherwise they shall be forever barred.

xxx xxx xxx

What rules on prescription should apply in cases like this one has long been decided by this Court. In illegal
dismissal, it is settled, that the ten-year prescriptive period fixed in Article 1144 of the Civil Code may not be
invoked by petitioners, for the Civil Code is a law of general application, while the prescriptive period fixed
in Article 292 of the Labor Code [now Article 291] is a SPECIAL LAW applicable to claims arising from
employee-employer relations.9

More recently in De Guzman vs. Court of Appeals,10 where the money claim was based on a written contract,
the Collective Bargaining Agreement, the Court held:

. . . The language of Art. 291 of the Labor Code does not limit its application only to "money claims
specifically recoverable under said Code" but covers all money claims arising from an employee-
employer relations" (Citing Cadalin v. POEA Administrator, 238 SCRA 721, 764 [1994]; and Uy v.
National Labor Relations Commission, 261 SCRA 505, 515 [1996]). . . .

It should be noted further that Article 291 of the Labor Code is a special law applicable to money
claims arising from employer-employee relations; thus, it necessarily prevails over Article 1144 of
the Civil Code, a general law. Basic is the rule in statutory construction that "where two statutes are
of equal theoretical application to a particular case, the one designed therefore should prevail."
(Citing Leveriza v. Intermediate Appellate Court, 157 SCRA 282, 294.) Generalia specialibus non
derogant.11

In the light of Article 291, aforecited, we agree with the appellate court's conclusion that petitioner's action
for damages due to illegal termination filed again on January 8, 1987 or more than four (4) years after the
effective date of his dismissal on November 1, 1982 has already prescribed.

In the instant case, the action for damages due to illegal termination was filed by plaintiff-appelle
only on January 8, 1987 or more than four (4) years after the effectivity date of his dismissal on
November 1, 1982. Clearly, plaintiff-appellee's action has already prescribed.

We base our conclusion not on Article 1144 of the Civil Code but on which sets the prescription period at
three (3) years and which governs under this jurisdiction.

Petitioner claims that the running of the prescriptive period was tolled when he filed his complaint for illegal
dismissal before the Labor Arbiter of the National Labor Relations Commission. However, this claim deserves
scant consideration; it has no legal leg to stand on. In Olympia International, Inc., vs., Court of Appeals,
we held that "although the commencement of a civil action stops the running of the statute of prescription
or limitations, its dismissal or voluntary abandonment by the plaintiff leaves in exactly the same position as
though no action had been commenced at all."12

Now, as to whether petitioner's separation from the company due to retrenchment was valid, the appellate
court found that the employment contract of petitioner allowed for pre-termination of employment. We
agree with the Court of Appeals when it said,

It is a settled rule that contracts have the force of law between the parties. From the moment the
same is perfected, the parties are bound not only to the fulfillment of what has been expressly
stipulated but also to all consequences which, according to their nature, may be in keeping with good
faith, usage and law. Thus, when plaintiff-appellee accepted the offer of employment, he was bound
 by the terms and conditions set forth in the contract, among others, the right of mutual termination
by giving three months written notice or by payment of three months salary. Such provision is clear
and readily understandable, hence, there is no room for interpretation.

xxx xxx xxx

Further, plaintiff-appellee's contention that he is not bound by the provisions of the Agreement, as
he is not a signatory thereto, deserves no merit. It must be noted that when plaintiff-appellee's
employment was confirmed, he applied for membership with the Singapore Airlines Limited (Pilots)
Association, the signatory to the aforementioned Agreement. As such, plaintiff-appellee is estopped
from questioning the legality of the said agreement or any proviso contained therein.13

Moreover, the records of the present case clearly show that respondent court's decision is amply supported
by evidence and it did not err in its findings, including the reason for the retrenchment:

When defendant-appellant was faced with the world-wide recession of the airline industry resulting
in a slow down in the company's growth particularly in the regional operation (Asian Area) where the
Airbus 300 operates. It had no choice but to adopt cost cutting measures, such as cutting down
services, number of frequencies of flights, and reduction of the number of flying points for the A-300
fleet (t.s.n., July 6, 1988, pp. 17-18). As a result, defendant-appellant had to lay off A-300 pilots,
including plaintiff-appellee, which it found to be in excess of what is reasonably needed.14

All these considered, we find sufficient factual and legal basis to conclude that petitioner's termination from
employment was for an authorized cause, for which he was given ample notice and opportunity to be heard,
by respondent company. No error nor grave abuse of discretion, therefore, could be attributed to respondent
appellate court.1âwphi1.nêt

ACCORDINGLY, the instant petition is DISMISSED. The decision of the Court of Appeals in C.A. CV No. 34476
is AFFIRMED. SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 160236 October 16, 2009

"G" HOLDINGS, INC., Petitioner,

vs.
NATIONAL MINES AND ALLIED WORKERS UNION Local 103 (NAMAWU); SHERIFFS RICHARD H.
APROSTA and ALBERTO MUNOZ, all acting Sheriffs; DEPARTMENT OF LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT,
Region VI, Bacolod District Office, Bacolod City, Respondents.

DECISION

NACHURA, J.:

Before this Court is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court assailing the
October 14, 2003 Decision1 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 75322.

The Facts

The petitioner, "G" Holdings, Inc. (GHI), is a domestic corporation primarily engaged in the business of
owning and holding shares of stock of different companies. 2 It was registered with the Securities and
Exchange Commission on August 3, 1992. Private respondent, National Mines and Allied Workers Union
Local 103 (NAMAWU), was the exclusive bargaining agent of the rank and file employees of Maricalum
Mining Corporation (MMC),3 an entity operating a copper mine and mill complex at Sipalay, Negros
Occidental.4

MMC was incorporated by the Development Bank of the Philippines (DBP) and the Philippine National Bank
(PNB) on October 19, 1984, on account of their foreclosure of Marinduque Mining and Industrial
Corporation’s assets. MMC started its commercial operations in August 1985. Later, DBP and PNB transferred
it to the National Government for disposition or privatization because it had become a non-performing asset.5

On October 2, 1992, pursuant to a Purchase and Sale Agreement6 executed between GHI and Asset
Privatization Trust (APT), the former bought ninety percent (90%) of MMC’s shares and financial
claims.7 These financial claims were converted into three Promissory Notes 8 issued by MMC in favor of GHI
totaling ₱500M and secured by mortgages over MMC’s properties. The notes, which were similarly worded
except for their amounts, read as follows:

PROMISSORY NOTE

AMOUNT - Php114,715,360.00 [Php186,550,560.00 in the second

note, and Php248,734,080.00 in the
third note.]

MAKATI, METRO MANILA, PHILIPPINES, October 2, 1992

For Value Received, MARICALUM MINING CORPORATION (MMC) with postal address at 4th Floor, Manila
Memorial Park Bldg., 2283 Pasong Tamo Extension, Makati, Metro Manila, Philippines, hereby promises to
pay "G" HOLDINGS, INC., at its office at Phimco Compound, F. Manalo Street, Punta, Sta. Ana, Manila, the
amount of PESOS ONE HUNDRED FOURTEEN MILLION, SEVEN HUNDRED FIFTEEN THOUSAND AND THREE
HUNDRED SIXTY (Php114,715,360.00) ["PESOS ONE HUNDRED EIGHTY SIX MILLION FIVE HUNDRED FIFTY
THOUSAND FIFE HUNDRED AND SIXTY (Php186,550,560.00)" in the second note, and "PESOS TWO
HUNDRED FORTY EIGHT MILLION, SEVEN HUNDRED THIRTY FOUR THOUSAND AND EIGHTY
(Php248,734,080.00)" in the third note], PHILIPPINE CURRENCY, on or before October 2, 2002. Interest
shall accrue on the amount of this Note at a rate per annum equal to the interest of 90-day Treasury Bills
prevailing on the Friday preceding the maturity date of every calendar quarter.

As collateral security, MMC hereby establishes and constitutes in favor of "G" HOLDINGS, INC., its successors
and/or assigns:

1. A mortgage over certain parcels of land, more particularly listed and described in the Sheriff’s
Certificate of Sale dated September 7, 1984 issued by the Ex-Officio Provincial Sheriff of Negros
Occidental, Rolando V. Ramirez, with office at Bacolod City following the auction sale conducted
pursuant to the provisions of Act 3135, a copy of which certificate of sale is hereto attached as Annex
"A" and made an integral part hereof;

2. A chattel mortgage over assets and personal properties more particularly listed and described in
the Sheriff’s Certificate of Sale dated September 7, 1984 issued by the Ex-Officio Provincial Sheriff
of Negros Occidental, Rolando V. Ramirez, with office at Bacolod City following the auction conducted
pursuant to the provisions of Act 1508, a copy of which Certificate of Sale is hereto attached as
Annex "B" and made an integral part hereof.
 3. Mortgages over assets listed in APT Specific Catalogue GC-031 for MMC, a copy of which Catalogue
is hereby made an integral part hereof by way of reference, as well as assets presently in use by
MMC but which are not listed or included in paragraphs 1 and 2 above and shall include all assets
that may hereinafter be acquired by MMC.

MARICALUM MINING CORPORATION

(Maker)

x x x x9

Upon the signing of the Purchase and Sale Agreement and upon the full satisfaction of the stipulated down
payment, GHI immediately took physical possession of the mine site and its facilities, and took full control
of the management and operation of MMC.10

Almost four years thereafter, or on August 23, 1996, a labor dispute (refusal to bargain collectively and
unfair labor practice) arose between MMC and NAMAWU, with the latter eventually filing with the National
Conciliation and Mediation Board of Bacolod City a notice of strike. 11 Then Labor Secretary, now Associate
Justice of this Court, Leonardo A. Quisumbing, later assumed jurisdiction over the dispute and ruled in favor
of NAMAWU. In his July 30, 1997 Order in OS-AJ-10-96-014 (Quisumbing Order), Secretary Quisumbing
declared that the lay-off (of workers) implemented on May 7, 1996 and October 7, 1996 was illegal and that
MMC committed unfair labor practice. He then ordered the reinstatement of the laid-off workers, with
payment of full backwages and benefits, and directed the execution of a new collective bargaining agreement
(CBA) incorporating the terms and conditions of the previous CBA providing for an annual increase in the
workers’ daily wage.12 In two separate cases─G.R. Nos. 133519 and 138996─filed with this Court, we
sustained the validity of the Quisumbing Order, which became final and executory on January 26, 2000. 13

On May 11, 2001, then Acting Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE) Secretary, now also an
Associate Justice of this Court, Arturo D. Brion, on motion of NAMAWU, directed the issuance of a partial
writ of execution (Brion Writ), and ordered the DOLE sheriffs to proceed to the MMC premises for the
execution of the same.14 Much later, in 2006, this Court, in G.R. Nos. 157696-97, entitled Maricalum Mining
Corporation v. Brion and NAMAWU,15affirmed the propriety of the issuance of the Brion Writ.

The Brion Writ was not fully satisfied because MMC’s resident manager resisted its enforcement. 16 On motion
of NAMAWU, then DOLE Secretary Patricia A. Sto. Tomas ordered the issuance of the July 18, 2002 Alias
Writ of Execution and Break-Open Order (Sto. Tomas Writ).17 On October 11, 2002, the respondent acting
sheriffs, the members of the union, and several armed men implemented the Sto. Tomas Writ, and levied
on the properties of MMC located at its compound in Sipalay, Negros Occidental. 18

On October 14, 2002, GHI filed with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Kabankalan City, Negros Occidental,
Special Civil Action (SCA) No. 1127 for Contempt with Prayer for the Issuance of a Temporary Restraining
Order (TRO) and Writ of Preliminary Injunction and to Nullify the Sheriff’s Levy on Properties. 19 GHI
contended that the levied properties were the subject of a Deed of Real Estate and Chattel Mortgage, dated
September 5, 199620 executed by MMC in favor of GHI to secure the aforesaid ₱550M promissory notes;
that this deed was registered on February 24, 2000; 21 and that the mortgaged properties were already
extrajudicially foreclosed in July 2001 and sold to GHI as the highest bidder on December 3, 2001, as
evidenced by the Certificate of Sale dated December 4, 2001. 22

The trial court issued ex parte a TRO effective for 72 hours, and set the hearing on the application for a writ
of injunction.23 On October 17, 2002, the trial court ordered the issuance of a Writ of Injunction (issued on
October 18, 2002)24 enjoining the DOLE sheriffs from further enforcing the Sto. Tomas Writ and from
conducting any public sale of the levied-on properties, subject to GHI’s posting of a ₱5M bond. 25

Resolving, among others, NAMAWU’s separate motions for the reconsideration of the injunction order and
for the dismissal of the case, the RTC issued its December 4, 2002 Omnibus Order, 26 the dispositive portion
of which reads:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, respondent NAMAWU Local 103’s Motion for Reconsideration dated
October 23, 2002 for the reconsideration of the Order of this Court directing the issuance of Writ of Injunction
prayed for by petitioner and the Order dated October 18, 2002 approving petitioner’s Injunction Bond in the
amount of ₱5,000,000.00 is hereby DENIED.

Respondent’s Motion to Dismiss as embodied in its Opposition to Extension of Temporary Restraining Order
and Issuance of Writ of Preliminary Injunction with Motion to Dismiss and Suspend Period to File Answer
dated October 15, 2002 is likewise DENIED.

Petitioner’s Urgent Motion for the return of the levied firearms is GRANTED. Pursuant thereto, respondent
sheriffs are ordered to return the levied firearms and handguns to the petitioner provided the latter puts
[up] a bond in the amount of ₱332,200.00.

Respondent’s lawyer, Atty. Jose Lapak, is strictly warned not to resort again to disrespectful and
contemptuous language in his pleadings, otherwise, the same shall be dealt with accordingly.
SO ORDERED.27

Aggrieved, NAMAWU filed with the CA a petition for certiorari under Rule 65, assailing the October 17, 18
and December 4, 2002 orders of the RTC.28

After due proceedings, on October 14, 2003, the appellate court rendered a Decision setting aside the RTC
issuances and directing the immediate execution of the Sto. Tomas Writ. The CA ruled, among others, that
the circumstances surrounding the execution of the September 5, 1996 Deed of Real Estate and Chattel
Mortgage yielded the conclusion that the deed was sham, fictitious and fraudulent; that it was executed two
weeks after the labor dispute arose in 1996, but surprisingly, it was registered only on February 24, 2000,
immediately after the Court affirmed with finality the Quisumbing Order. The CA also found that the
certificates of title to MMC’s real properties did not contain any annotation of a mortgage lien, and,
suspiciously, GHI did not intervene in the long drawn-out labor proceedings to protect its right as a
mortgagee of virtually all the properties of MMC.29

The CA further ruled that the subsequent foreclosure of the mortgage was irregular, effected precisely to
prevent the satisfaction of the judgment against MMC. It noted that the foreclosure proceedings were
initiated in July 2001, shortly after the issuance of the Brion Writ; and, more importantly, the basis for the
extrajudicial foreclosure was not the failure of MMC to pay the mortgage debt, but its failure "to satisfy any
money judgment against it rendered by a court or tribunal of competent jurisdiction, in favor of any person,
firm or entity, without any legal ground or reason."30 Further, the CA pierced the veil of corporate fiction of
the two corporations.31 The dispositive portion of the appellate court’s decision reads:

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing considerations, the petition is GRANTED. The October 17, 2002 and
the December 4, 2002 Order of the RTC, Branch 61 of Kabankalan City, Negros Occidental are hereby
ANNULLED and SET ASIDE for having been issued in excess or without authority. The Writ of Preliminary
Injunction issued by the said court is lifted, and the DOLE Sheriff is directed to immediately enforce the Writ
of Execution issued by the Department of Labor and Employment in the case "In re: Labor Dispute in
Maricalum Mining Corporation" docketed as OS-AJ-10-96-01 (NCMB-RB6-08-96).32

The Issues

Dissatisfied, GHI elevated the case to this Court via the instant petition for review on certiorari, raising the
following issues:

WHETHER OR NOT GHI IS A PARTY TO THE LABOR DISPUTE BETWEEN NAMAWU AND MMC.

II

WHETHER OR NOT, ASSUMING ARGUENDO THAT THE PERTINENT DECISION OR ORDER IN THE SAID LABOR
DISPUTE BETWEEN MMC AND NAMAWU MAY BE ENFORCED AGAINST GHI, THERE IS ALREADY A FINAL
DEETERMINATION BY THE SUPREME COURT OF THE RIGHTS OF THE PARTIES IN SAID LABOR DISPUTE
CONSIDERING THE PENDENCY OF G.R. NOS. 157696-97.

III

WHETHER OR NOT GHI IS THE ABSOLUTE OWNER OF THE PROPERTIES UNLAWFULLY GARNISHED BY
RESPONDENTS SHERIFFS.

IV

WHETHER OR NOT THE HONORABLE HENRY D. ARLES CORRECTLY ISSUED A WRIT OF INJUNCTION
AGAINST THE UNLAWFUL EXECUTIOIN ON GHI’S PROPERTIES.

WHETHER OR NOT THE VALIDITY OF THE DEED OF REAL AND CHATTEL MORTGAGE OVER THE SUBJECT
PROPERTIES BETWEEN MMC AND GHI MAY BE COLLATERALLY ATTACKED.

VI

WHETHER OR NOT, ASSUMING ARGUENDO THAT THE VALIDITY OF THE SAID REAL AND CHATTEL
MORTGAGE MAY BE COLLATERALLY ATTACKED, THE SAID MORTGAGE IS SHAM, FICTITIOUS AND
FRAUDULENT.

VII

WHETHER OR NOT GHI IS A DISTINCT AND SEPARATE CORPORATE ENTITY FROM MMC.
 VIII

WHETHER OR NOT GHI CAN BE PREVENTED THROUGH THE ISSUANCE OF A RESTRAINING ORDER OR
INJUNCTION FROM TAKING POSSESSION OR BE DISPOSSESSED OF ASSETS PURCHASED BY IT FROM
APT.33

Stripped of non-essentials, the core issue is whether, given the factual circumstances obtaining, the RTC
properly issued the writ of injunction to prevent the enforcement of the Sto. Tomas Writ. The resolution of
this principal issue, however, will necessitate a ruling on the following key and interrelated questions:

1. Whether the mortgage of the MMC’s properties to GHI was a sham;

2. Whether there was an effective levy by the DOLE upon the MMC’s real and personal properties;
and

3. Whether it was proper for the CA to pierce the veil of corporate fiction between MMC and GHI.

Our Ruling

Before we delve into an extended discussion of the foregoing issues, it is essential to take judicial cognizance
of cases intimately linked to the present controversy which had earlier been elevated to and decided by this
Court.

Judicial Notice.

Judicial notice must be taken by this Court of its Decision in Maricalum Mining Corporation v. Hon. Arturo
D. Brion and NAMAWU,34 in which we upheld the right of herein private respondent, NAMAWU, to its labor
claims. Upon the same principle of judicial notice, we acknowledge our Decision in Republic of the Philippines,
through its trustee, the Asset Privatization Trust v. "G" Holdings, Inc.,35 in which GHI was recognized as the
rightful purchaser of the shares of stocks of MMC, and thus, entitled to the delivery of the company notes
accompanying the said purchase. These company notes, consisting of three (3) Promissory Notes, were part
of the documents executed in 1992 in the privatization sale of MMC by the Asset Privatization Trust (APT)
to GHI. Each of these notes uniformly contains stipulations "establishing and constituting in favor of GHI"
mortgages over MMC’s real and personal properties. The stipulations were subsequently formalized in a
separate document denominated Deed of Real Estate and Chattel Mortgage on September 5, 1996.
Thereafter, the Deed was registered on February 4, 2000. 36

We find both decisions critically relevant to the instant dispute. In fact, they should have guided the courts
below in the disposition of the controversy at their respective levels. To repeat, these decisions respectively
confirm the right of NAMAWU to its labor claims37 and affirm the right of GHI to its financial and mortgage
claims over the real and personal properties of MMC, as will be explained below. The assailed CA decision
apparently failed to consider the impact of these two decisions on the case at bar. Thus, we find it timely to
reiterate that: "courts have also taken judicial notice of previous cases to determine whether or not the case
pending is a moot one or whether or not a previous ruling is applicable to the case under consideration."38

However, the CA correctly assessed that the authority of the lower court to issue the challenged writ of
injunction depends on the validity of the third party’s (GHI’s) claim of ownership over the property subject
of the writ of execution issued by the labor department. Accordingly, the main inquiry addressed by the CA
decision was whether GHI could be treated as a third party or a stranger to the labor dispute, whose
properties were beyond the reach of the Writ of Execution dated December 18, 2001. 39

In this light, all the more does it become imperative to take judicial notice of the two cases aforesaid, as
they provide the necessary perspective to determine whether GHI is such a party with a valid ownership
claim over the properties subject of the writ of execution. In Juaban v. Espina,40 we held that "in some
instances, courts have also taken judicial notice of proceedings in other cases that are closely connected to
the matter in controversy. These cases may be so closely interwoven, or so clearly interdependent, as to
invoke a rule of judicial notice." The two cases that we have taken judicial notice of are of such character,
and our review of the instant case cannot stray from the findings and conclusions therein.

Having recognized these crucial Court rulings, situating the facts in proper perspective, we now proceed to
resolve the questions identified above.

The mortgage was not a sham.

Republic etc., v. "G" Holdings, Inc. acknowledged the existence of the Purchase and Sale Agreement
between the APT and the GHI, and recounts the facts attendant to that transaction, as follows:

The series of negotiations between the petitioner Republic of the Philippines, through the APT as its trustee,
and "G" Holdings culminated in the execution of a purchase and sale agreement on October 2, 1992. Under
the agreement, the Republic undertook to sell and deliver 90% of the entire issued and
outstanding shares of MMC, as well as its company notes, to "G" Holdings in consideration of the purchase
price of ₱673,161,280. It also provided for a down payment of ₱98,704,000 with the balance divided into
four tranches payable in installment over a period of ten years." 41

The "company notes" mentioned therein were actually the very same three (3) Promissory Notes amounting
to ₱550M, issued by MMC in favor of GHI. As already adverted to above, these notes uniformly contained
stipulations "establishing and constituting" mortgages over MMC’s real and personal properties.

It may be remembered that APT acquired the MMC from the PNB and the DBP. Then, in compliance with its
mandate to privatize government assets, APT sold the aforesaid MMC shares and notes to GHI. To repeat,
this Court has recognized this Purchase and Sale Agreement in Republic, etc., v. "G" Holdings, Inc.

The participation of the Government, through APT, in this transaction is significant. Because the Government
had actively negotiated and, eventually, executed the agreement, then the transaction is imbued with an
aura of official authority, giving rise to the presumption of regularity in its execution. This presumption
would cover all related transactional acts and documents needed to consummate the privatization sale,
inclusive of the Promissory Notes. It is obvious, then, that the Government, through APT, consented to the
"establishment and constitution" of the mortgages on the assets of MMC in favor of GHI, as provided in the
notes. Accordingly, the notes (and the stipulations therein) enjoy the benefit of the same presumption of
regularity accorded to government actions. Given the Government consent thereto, and clothed with the
presumption of regularity, the mortgages cannot be characterized as sham, fictitious or fraudulent.

Indeed, as mentioned above, the three (3) Promissory Notes, executed on October 2, 1992, "established
and constituted" in favor of GHI the following mortgages:

1. A mortgage over certain parcels of land, more particularly listed and described in the Sheriff’s
Certificate of Sale dated September 7, 1984 issued by the Ex-Officio Provincial Sheriff of Negros
Occidental, Rolando V. Ramirez, with office at Bacolod City following the auction sale conducted
pursuant to the provisions of Act 3135, a copy of which certificate of sale is hereto attached as Annex
"A" and made an integral part hereof;

2. A chattel mortgage over assets and personal properties more particularly listed and described in
the Sheriff’s Certificate of Sale dated September 7, 1984 issued by the Ex-Officio Provincial Sheriff
of Negros Occidental, Rolando V. Ramirez, with office at Bacolod City following the auction conducted
pursuant to the provision of Act 1508, a copy of which Certificate of Sale is hereto attached as Annex
"B" and made an integral part hereof.

3. Mortgages over assets listed in APT Specific catalogue GC-031 for MMC, a copy of which Catalogue
is hereby made an integral part hereof by way of reference, as well as assets presently in use by
MMC but which are not listed or included in paragraphs 1 and 2 above and shall include all assets
that may hereinafter be acquired by MMC.42

It is difficult to conceive that these mortgages, already existing in 1992, almost four (4) years before
NAMAWU filed its notice of strike, were a "fictitious" arrangement intended to defraud NAMAWU. After all,
they were agreed upon long before the seeds of the labor dispute germinated.

While it is true that the Deed of Real Estate and Chattel Mortgage was executed only on September 5, 1996,
it is beyond cavil that this formal document of mortgage was merely a derivative of the original mortgage
stipulations contained in the Promissory Notes of October 2, 1992. The execution of this Deed in 1996 does
not detract from, but instead reinforces, the manifest intention of the parties to "establish and constitute"
the mortgages on MMC’s real and personal properties.

Apparently, the move to execute a formal document denominated as the Deed of Real Estate and Chattel
Mortgage came about after the decision of the RTC of Manila in Civil Case No. 95-76132 became final in
mid-1996. This conclusion surfaces when we consider the genesis of Civil Case No. 95-76132 and
subsequent incidents thereto, as narrated in Republic, etc. v. "G" Holdings, Inc., viz:

Subsequently, a disagreement on the matter of when installment payments should commence arose
between the parties. The Republic claimed that it should be on the seventh month from the signing of the
agreement while "G" Holdings insisted that it should begin seven months after the fulfillment of the closing
conditions.

Unable to settle the issue, "G" Holdings filed a complaint for specific performance and damages with the
Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 49, against the Republic to compel it to close the sale in accordance
with the purchase and sale agreement. The complaint was docketed as Civil Case No. 95-76132.

During the pre-trial, the respective counsels of the parties manifested that the issue involved in the case
was one of law and submitted the case for decision. On June 11, 1996, the trial court rendered its decision.
It ruled in favor of "G" Holdings and held:

"In line with the foregoing, this Court having been convinced that the Purchase and Sale Agreement is
indeed subject to the final closing conditions prescribed by Stipulation No. 5.02 and conformably to Rule 39,
Section 10 of the Rules of Court, accordingly orders that the Asset Privatization Trust execute the
corresponding Document of Transfer of the subject shares and financial notes and cause the
actual delivery of subject shares and notes to "G" Holdings, Inc., within a period of thirty (30)
days from receipt of this Decision, and after "G" Holdings Inc., shall have paid in full the entire balance,
at its present value of ₱241,702,122.86, computed pursuant to the prepayment provisions of the
Agreement. Plaintiff shall pay the balance simultaneously with the delivery of the Deed of Transfer and
actual delivery of the shares and notes.

SO ORDERED."

The Solicitor General filed a notice of appeal on behalf of the Republic on June 28, 1996. Contrary to the
rules of procedure, however, the notice of appeal was filed with the Court of Appeals (CA), not with the trial
court which rendered the judgment appealed from.

No other judicial remedy was resorted to until July 2, 1999 when the Republic, through the APT, filed a
petition for annulment of judgment with the CA. It claimed that the decision should be annulled on the
ground of abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction on the part of the trial court. x x x

Finding that the grounds necessary for the annulment of judgment were inexistent, the appellate court
dismissed the petition. x x x x43

With the RTC decision having become final owing to the failure of the Republic to perfect an appeal, it may
have become necessary to execute the Deed of Real Estate and Chattel Mortgage on September 5, 1996,
in order to enforce the trial court’s decision of June 11, 1996. This appears to be the most plausible
explanation for the execution of the Deed of Real Estate and Chattel Mortgage only in September 1996.
Even as the parties had already validly constituted the mortgages in 1992, as explicitly provided in the
Promissory Notes, a specific deed of mortgage in a separate document may have been deemed necessary
for registration purposes. Obviously, this explanation is more logical and more sensible than the strained
conjecture that the mortgage was executed on September 5, 1996 only for the purpose of defrauding
NAMAWU.

It is undeniable that the Deed of Real Estate and Chattel Mortgage was formally documented two weeks
after NAMAWU filed its notice of strike against MMC on August 23, 1996. However, this fact alone cannot
give rise to an adverse inference for two reasons. First, as discussed above, the mortgages had already
been "established and constituted" as early as October 2, 1992 in the Promissory Notes, showing the clear
intent of the parties to impose a lien upon MMC’s properties. Second, the mere filing of a notice of strike by
NAMAWU did not, as yet, vest in NAMAWU any definitive right that could be prejudiced by the execution of
the mortgage deed.

The fact that MMC’s obligation to GHI is not reflected in the former’s financial statements─a circumstance
made capital of by NAMAWU in order to cast doubt on the validity of the mortgage deed─is of no moment.
By itself, it does not provide a sufficient basis to invalidate this public document. To say otherwise, and to
invalidate the mortgage deed on this pretext, would furnish MMC a convenient excuse to absolve itself of its
mortgage obligations by adopting the simple strategy of not including the obligations in its financial
statements. It would ignore our ruling in Republic, etc. v. "G" Holdings, Inc., which obliged APT to deliver
the MMC shares and financial notes to GHI. Besides, the failure of the mortgagor to record in its financial
statements its loan obligations is surely not an essential element for the validity of mortgage agreements,
nor will it independently affect the right of the mortgagee to foreclose.

Contrary to the CA decision, Tanongon v. Samson44 is not "on all fours" with the instant case. There are
material differences between the two cases. At issue in Tanongon was a third-party claim arising from a
Deed of Absolute Sale executed between Olizon and Tanongon on July 29, 1997, after the NLRC decision
became final and executory on April 29, 1997. In the case at bar, what is involved is a loan with mortgage
agreement executed on October 2, 1992, well ahead of the union’s notice of strike on August 23, 1996. No
presumption of regularity inheres in the deed of sale in Tanongon, while the participation of APT in this case
clothes the transaction in 1992 with such a presumption that has not been successfully rebutted.
In Tanongon, the conduct of a full-blown trial led to the finding─duly supported by evidence─that the
voluntary sale of the assets of the judgment debtor was made in bad faith. Here, no trial was held, owing
to the motion to dismiss filed by NAMAWU, and the CA failed to consider the factual findings made by this
Court in Republic, etc. v. "G" Holdings, Inc. Furthermore, in Tanongon, the claimant did not exercise his
option to file a separate action in court, thus allowing the NLRC Sheriff to levy on execution and to determine
the rights of third-party claimants.45 In this case, a separate action was filed in the regular courts by GHI,
the third-party claimant. Finally, the questioned transaction in Tanongon was a plain, voluntary transfer in
the form of a sale executed by the judgment debtor in favor of a dubious third-party, resulting in the inability
of the judgment creditor to satisfy the judgment. On the other hand, this case involves an involuntary
transfer (foreclosure of mortgage) arising from a loan obligation that well-existed long before the
commencement of the labor claims of the private respondent.

Three other circumstances have been put forward by the CA to support its conclusion that the mortgage
contract is a sham. First, the CA considered it highly suspect that the Deed of Real Estate and Chattel
Mortgage was registered only on February 4, 2000, "three years after its execution, and almost one month
after the Supreme Court rendered its decision in the labor dispute." 46 Equally suspicious, as far as the CA is
concerned, is the fact that the mortgages were foreclosed on July 31, 2001, after the DOLE had already
issued a Partial Writ of Execution on May 9, 2001.47 To the appellate court, the timing of the registration of
the mortgage deed was too coincidental, while the date of the foreclosure signified that it was "effected
precisely to prevent the satisfaction of the judgment awards."48Furthermore, the CA found that the mortgage
deed itself was executed without any consideration, because at the time of its execution, all the assets of
MMC had already been transferred to GHI.49

These circumstances provided the CA with sufficient justification to apply Article 1387 of the Civil Code on
presumed fraudulent transactions, and to declare that the mortgage deed was void for being simulated and
fictitious.50

We do not agree. We find this Court’s ruling in MR Holdings, Ltd. v. Sheriff Bajar51 pertinent and instructive:

Article 1387 of the Civil Code of the Philippines provides:

"Art. 1387. All contracts by virtue of which the debtor alienates property by gratuitous title are presumed
to have been entered into in fraud of creditors, when the donor did not reserve sufficient property to pay all
debts contracted before the donation.

Alienations by onerous title are also presumed fraudulent when made by persons against whom some
judgment has been rendered in any instance or some writ of attachment has been issued. The decision or
attachment need not refer to the property alienated, and need not have been obtained by the party seeking
rescission.

In addition to these presumptions, the design to defraud creditors may be proved in any other manner
recognized by law and of evidence."

This article presumes the existence of fraud made by a debtor. Thus, in the absence of satisfactory evidence
to the contrary, an alienation of a property will be held fraudulent if it is made after a judgment has been
rendered against the debtor making the alienation. This presumption of fraud is not conclusive and may be
rebutted by satisfactory and convincing evidence. All that is necessary is to establish affirmatively that the
conveyance is made in good faith and for a sufficient and valuable consideration.

The "Assignment Agreement" and the "Deed of Assignment" were executed for valuable considerations.
Patent from the "Assignment Agreement" is the fact that petitioner assumed the payment of
US$18,453,450.12 to ADB in satisfaction of Marcopper’s remaining debt as of March 20, 1997. Solidbank
cannot deny this fact considering that a substantial portion of the said payment, in the sum of
US$13,886,791.06, was remitted in favor of the Bank of Nova Scotia, its major stockholder.

The facts of the case so far show that the assignment contracts were executed in good faith. The execution
of the "Assignment Agreement" on March 20, 1997 and the "Deed of Assignment" on December 8,1997 is
not the alpha of this case. While the execution of these assignment contracts almost coincided with the
rendition on May 7, 1997 of the Partial Judgment in Civil Case No. 96-80083 by the Manila RTC, however,
there was no intention on the part of petitioner to defeat Solidbank’s claim. It bears reiterating that as early
as November 4, 1992, Placer Dome had already bound itself under a "Support and Standby Credit
Agreement" to provide Marcopper with cash flow support for the payment to ADB of its obligations. When
Marcopper ceased operations on account of disastrous mine tailings spill into the Boac River and ADB pressed
for payment of the loan, Placer Dome agreed to have its subsidiary, herein petitioner, pay ADB the amount
of US$18,453,450.12.

Thereupon, ADB and Marcopper executed, respectively, in favor of petitioner an "Assignment Agreement"
and a "Deed of Assignment." Obviously, the assignment contracts were connected with transactions
that happened long before the rendition in 1997 of the Partial Judgment in Civil Case No. 96-
80083 by the Manila RTC.Those contracts cannot be viewed in isolation. If we may add, it is highly
inconceivable that ADB, a reputable international financial organization, will connive with Marcopper to feign
or simulate a contract in 1992 just to defraud Solidbank for its claim four years thereafter. And it is equally
incredible for petitioner to be paying the huge sum of US$18,453,450.12 to ADB only for the purpose of
defrauding Solidbank of the sum of ₱52,970,756.89.

It is said that the test as to whether or not a conveyance is fraudulent is ― does it prejudice the rights of
creditors? We cannot see how Solidbank’s right was prejudiced by the assignment contracts considering that
substantially all of Marcopper’s properties were already covered by the registered "Deed of Real Estate and
Chattel Mortgage" executed by Marcopper in favor of ADB as early as November 11, 1992. As such,
Solidbank cannot assert a better right than ADB, the latter being a preferred creditor. It is basic that
mortgaged properties answer primarily for the mortgaged credit, not for the judgment credit of
the mortgagor’s unsecured creditor. Considering that petitioner assumed Marcopper’s debt to ADB, it
follows that Solidbank’s right as judgment creditor over the subject properties must give way to that of the
former.52

From this ruling in MR Holdings, we can draw parallel conclusions. The execution of the subsequent Deed of
Real Estate and Chattel Mortgage on September 5, 1996 was simply the formal documentation of what had
already been agreed in the seminal transaction (the Purchase and Sale Agreement) between APT and GHI.
It should not be viewed in isolation, apart from the original agreement of October 2, 1992. And it cannot be
denied that this original agreement was supported by an adequate consideration. The APT was even ordered
by the court to deliver the shares and financial notes of MMC in exchange for the payments that GHI had
made.

It was also about this time, in 1996, that NAMAWU filed a notice of strike to protest non-payment of its
rightful labor claims.53 But, as already mentioned, the outcome of that labor dispute was yet unascertainable
at that time, and NAMAWU could only have hoped for, or speculated about, a favorable ruling. To paraphrase
MR Holdings, we cannot see how NAMAWU’s right was prejudiced by the Deed of Real Estate and Chattel
Mortgage, or by its delayed registration, when substantially all of the properties of MMC were already
mortgaged to GHI as early as October 2, 1992. Given this reality, the Court of Appeals had no basis to
conclude that this Deed of Real Estate and Chattel Mortgage, by reason of its late registration, was a
simulated or fictitious contract.

The importance of registration and its binding effect is stated in Section 51 of the Property Registration
Decree or Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1529, 54 which reads:

SECTION 51. Conveyance and other dealings by registered owner.—An owner of registered land may
convey, mortgage, lease, charge or otherwise deal with the same in accordance with existing laws. He may
use such forms, deeds, mortgages, leases or other voluntary instrument as are sufficient in law. But no
deed, mortgage, lease or other voluntary instrument, except a will purporting to convey or effect registered
land, shall take effect as a conveyance or bind the land, but shall operate only as a contract between the
parties and as evidence of authority to the Registry of Deeds to make registration.

The act of registration shall be the operative act to convey or affect the land insofar as third persons are
concerned, and in all cases under this Decree, the registration shall be made in the Office of the Register of
Deeds for the province or the city where the land lies.55

Under the Torrens system, registration is the operative act which gives validity to the transfer or creates a
lien upon the land. Further, entrenched in our jurisdiction is the doctrine that registration in a public registry
creates constructive notice to the whole world.56 Thus, Section 51 of Act No. 496, as amended by Section
52 of P.D. No. 1529, provides:

SECTION 52. Constructive notice upon registration.—Every conveyance, mortgage, lease, lien, attachment,
order, judgment, instrument or entry affecting registered land shall, if registered, filed or entered in the
Office of the Register of Deeds for the province or city where the land to which it relates lies, be constructive
notice to all persons from the time of such registering, filing or entering.

But, there is nothing in Act No. 496, as amended by P.D. No. 1529, that imposes a period within which to
register annotations of "conveyance, mortgage, lease, lien, attachment, order, judgment, instrument or
entry affecting registered land." If liens were not so registered, then it "shall operate only as a contract
between the parties and as evidence of authority to the Registry of Deeds to make registration." If
registered, it "shall be the operative act to convey or affect the land insofar as third persons are concerned."
The mere lapse of time from the execution of the mortgage document to the moment of its registration does
not affect the rights of a mortgagee.

Neither will the circumstance of GHI’s foreclosure of MMC’s properties on July 31, 2001, or after the DOLE
had already issued a Partial Writ of Execution on May 9, 2001 against MMC, support the conclusion of the
CA that GHI’s act of foreclosing on MMC’s properties was "effected to prevent satisfaction of the judgment
award." GHI’s mortgage rights, constituted in 1992, antedated the Partial Writ of Execution by nearly ten
(10) years. GHI’s resort to foreclosure was a legitimate enforcement of a right to liquidate a bona fide debt.
It was a reasonable option open to a mortgagee which, not being a party to the labor dispute between
NAMAWU and MMC, stood to suffer a loss if it did not avail itself of the remedy of foreclosure.

The well-settled rule is that a mortgage lien is inseparable from the property mortgaged. 57 While it is true
that GHI’s foreclosure of MMC’s mortgaged properties may have had the "effect to prevent satisfaction of
the judgment award against the specific mortgaged property that first answers for a mortgage obligation
ahead of any subsequent creditors," that same foreclosure does not necessarily translate to having been
"effected to prevent satisfaction of the judgment award" against MMC.

Likewise, we note the narration of subsequent facts contained in the Comment of the Office of the Solicitor
General. Therein, it is alleged that after the Partial Writ of Execution was issued on May 9, 2001, a motion
for reconsideration was filed by MMC; that the denial of the motion was appealed to the CA; that when the
appeal was dismissed by the CA on January 24, 2002, it eventually became the subject of a review petition
before this Court, docketed as G.R. No. 157696; and that G.R. No. 157696 was decided by this Court only
on February 9, 2006.

This chronology of subsequent events shows that February 9, 2006 would have been the earliest date for
the unimpeded enforcement of the Partial Writ of Execution, as it was only then that this Court resolved the
issue. This happened four and a half years after July 31, 2001, the date when GHI foreclosed on the
mortgaged properties. Thus, it is not accurate to say that the foreclosure made on July 31, 2001 was
"effected [only] to prevent satisfaction of the judgment award."

We also observe the error in the CA’s finding that the 1996 Deed of Real Estate and Chattel Mortgage was
not supported by any consideration since at the time the deed was executed, "all the real and personal
property of MMC had already been transferred in the hands of G Holdings." 58 It should be remembered that
the Purchase and Sale Agreement between GHI and APT involved large amounts (₱550M) and even spawned
a subsequent court action (Civil Case No. 95-76132, RTC of Manila). Yet, nowhere in the Agreement or in
the RTC decision is there any mention of real and personal properties of MMC being included in the sale to
GHI in 1992. These properties simply served as mortgaged collateral for the 1992 Promissory Notes.59 The
Purchase and Sale Agreement and the Promissory Notes themselves are the best evidence that there was
ample consideration for the mortgage.

Thus, we must reject the conclusion of the CA that the Deed of Real Estate and Chattel Mortgage executed
in 1996 was a simulated transaction.

On the issue of whether there had been an effective levy upon the properties of GHI.

The well-settled principle is that the rights of a mortgage creditor over the mortgaged properties are superior
to those of a subsequent attaching creditor. In Cabral v. Evangelista,60 this Court declared that:

Defendants-appellants purchase of the mortgaged chattels at the public sheriff's sale and the delivery of the
chattels to them with a certificate of sale did not give them a superior right to the chattels as against
plaintiffs-mortgagees. Rule 39, Section 22 of the old Rules of Court (now Rule 39, Section 25 of the Revised
Rules), cited by appellants precisely provides that "the sale conveys to the purchaser all the right which the
debtor had in such property on the day the execution or attachment was levied." It has long been settled
by this Court that "The right of those who so acquire said properties should not and can not be superior to
that of the creditor who has in his favor an instrument of mortgage executed with the formalities of the law,
in good faith, and without the least indication of fraud. This is all the more true in the present case, because,
when the plaintiff purchased the automobile in question on August 22, 1933, he knew, or at least, it is
presumed that he knew, by the mere fact that the instrument of mortgage, Exhibit 2, was registered in the
office of the register of deeds of Manila, that said automobile was subject to a mortgage lien. In purchasing
it, with full knowledge that such circumstances existed, it should be presumed that he did so, very much
willing to respect the lien existing thereon, since he should not have expected that with the purchase, he
would acquire a better right than that which the vendor then had." In another case between two mortgagees,
we held that "As between the first and second mortgagees, therefore, the second mortgagee has at most
only the right to redeem, and even when the second mortgagee goes through the formality of an
extrajudicial foreclosure, the purchaser acquires no more than the right of redemption from the first
mortgagee." The superiority of the mortgagee's lien over that of a subsequent judgment creditor is now
expressly provided in Rule 39, Section 16 of the Revised Rules of Court, which states with regard to the
effect of levy on execution as to third persons that "The levy on execution shall create a lien in favor of the
judgment creditor over the right, title and interest of the judgment debtor in such property at the time of
the levy, subject to liens or encumbrances then existing."

Even in the matter of possession, mortgagees over chattel have superior, preferential and paramount rights
thereto, and the mortgagor has mere rights of redemption. 61

Similar rules apply to cases of mortgaged real properties that are registered. Since the properties were
already mortgaged to GHI, the only interest remaining in the mortgagor was its right to redeem said
properties from the mortgage. The right of redemption was the only leviable or attachable property right of
the mortgagor in the mortgaged real properties. We have held that —

The main issue in this case is the nature of the lien of a judgment creditor, like the petitioner, who has
levied an attachment on the judgment debtor's (CMI) real properties which had been mortgaged to a
consortium of banks and were subsequently sold to a third party, Top Rate.

xxxx

The sheriff's levy on CMI's properties, under the writ of attachment obtained by the petitioner, was actually
a levy on the interest only of the judgment debtor CMI on those properties. Since the properties were
already mortgaged to the consortium of banks, the only interest remaining in the mortgagor CMI was its
right to redeem said properties from the mortgage. The right of redemption was the only leviable or
attachable property right of CMI in the mortgaged real properties. The sheriff could not have attached the
properties themselves, for they had already been conveyed to the consortium of banks by mortgage (defined
as a "conditional sale"), so his levy must be understood to have attached only the mortgagor's remaining
interest in the mortgaged property — the right to redeem it from the mortgage.62

xxxx

There appears in the record a factual contradiction relating to whether the foreclosure by GHI on July 13,
200163over some of the contested properties came ahead of the levy thereon, or the reverse. NAMAWU
claims that the levy on two trucks was effected on June 22, 2001, 64 which GHI disputes as a misstatement
because the levy was attempted on July 18, 2002, and not 2001 65 What is undisputed though is that the
mortgage of GHI was registered on February 4, 2000,66 well ahead of any levy by NAMAWU. Prior registration
of a lien creates a preference, as the act of registration is the operative act that conveys and affects the
land,67 even against subsequent judgment creditors, such as respondent herein. Its registration of the
mortgage was not intended to defraud NAMAWU of its judgment claims, since even the courts were already
judicially aware of its existence since 1992. Thus, at that moment in time, with the registration of the
mortgage, either NAMAWU had no properties of MMC to attach because the same had been previously
foreclosed by GHI as mortgagee thereof; or by virtue of the DOLE’s levy to enforce NAMAWU’s claims, the
latter’s rights are subject to the notice of the foreclosure on the subject properties by a prior mortgagee’s
right. GHI’s mortgage right had already been registered by then, and "it is basic that mortgaged properties
answer primarily for the mortgaged credit, not for the judgment credit of the mortgagor’s unsecured
creditor."68

On the issue of piercing the veil of corporate fiction.

The CA found that:

"Ordinarily, the interlocking of directors and officers in two different corporations is not a conclusive
indication that the corporations are one and the same for purposes of applying the doctrine of piercing the
veil of corporate fiction. However, when the legal fiction of the separate corporate personality is abused,
such as when the same is used for fraudulent or wrongful ends, the courts have not hesitated to pierce the
corporate veil (Francisco vs. Mejia, 362 SCRA 738). In the case at bar, the Deed of Real Estate and Chattel
Mortgage was entered into between MMC and G Holdings for the purpose of evading the satisfaction of the
legitimate claims of the petitioner against MMC. The notion of separate personality is clearly being utilized
by the two corporations to perpetuate the violation of a positive legal duty arising from a final judgment to
the prejudice of the petitioner’s right."69

Settled jurisprudence70 has it that –

"(A) corporation, upon coming into existence, is invested by law with a personality separate and distinct
from those persons composing it as well as from any other legal entity to which it may be related. By this
attribute, a stockholder may not, generally, be made to answer for acts or liabilities of the said corporation,
and vice versa. This separate and distinct personality is, however, merely a fiction created by law for
convenience and to promote the ends of justice. For this reason, it may not be used or invoked for ends
subversive to the policy and purpose behind its creation or which could not have been intended by law to
which it owes its being. This is particularly true when the fiction is used to defeat public convenience, justify
wrong, protect fraud, defend crime, confuse legitimate legal or judicial issues, perpetrate deception or
otherwise circumvent the law. This is likewise true where the corporate entity is being used as an alter ego,
adjunct, or business conduit for the sole benefit of the stockholders or of another corporate entity. In all
these cases, the notion of corporate entity will be pierced or disregarded with reference to the particular
transaction involved.

Given this jurisprudential principle and the factual circumstances obtaining in this case, we now ask: Was
the CA correct in piercing the veil of corporate identity of GHI and MMC?

In our disquisition above, we have shown that the CA’s finding that there was a "simulated mortgage"
between GHI and MMC to justify a wrong or protect a fraud has struggled vainly to find a foothold when
confronted with the ruling of this Court in Republic v. "G" Holdings, Inc.

The negotiations between the GHI and the Government--through APT, dating back to 1992--culminating in
the Purchase and Sale Agreement, cannot be depicted as a contrived transaction. In fact, in the
said Republic, etc., v. "G" Holdings, Inc., this Court adjudged that GHI was entitled to its rightful claims─
not just to the shares of MMC itself, or just to the financial notes that already contained the mortgage
clauses over MMCs disputed assets, but also to the delivery of those instruments. Certainly, we cannot
impute to this Court’s findings on the case any badge of fraud. Thus, we reject the CA’s conclusion that it
was right to pierce the veil of corporate fiction, because the foregoing circumstances belie such an inference.
Furthermore, we cannot ascribe to the Government, or the APT in particular, any undue motive to participate
in a transaction designed to perpetrate fraud. Accordingly, we consider the CA interpretation unwarranted.

We also cannot agree that the presumption of fraud in Article 1387 of the Civil Code relative to property
conveyances, when there was already a judgment rendered or a writ of attachment issued, authorizes
piercing the veil of corporate identity in this case. We find that Article 1387 finds less application to an
involuntary alienation such as the foreclosure of mortgage made before any final judgment of a court. We
thus hold that when the alienation is involuntary, and the foreclosure is not fraudulent because the mortgage
deed has been previously executed in accordance with formalities of law, and the foreclosure is resorted to
in order to liquidate a bona fide debt, it is not the alienation by onerous title contemplated in Article 1387
of the Civil Code wherein fraud is presumed.

Since the factual antecedents of this case do not warrant a finding that the mortgage and loan agreements
between MMC and GHI were simulated, then their separate personalities must be recognized. To pierce the
veil of corporate fiction would require that their personalities as creditor and debtor be conjoined, resulting
in a merger of the personalities of the creditor (GHI) and the debtor (MMC) in one person, such that the
debt of one to the other is thereby extinguished. But the debt embodied in the 1992 Financial Notes has
been established, and even made subject of court litigation (Civil Case No. 95-76132, RTC Manila). This can
only mean that GHI and MMC have separate corporate personalities.

Neither was MMC used merely as an alter ego, adjunct, or business conduit for the sole benefit of GHI, to
justify piercing the former’s veil of corporate fiction so that the latter could be held liable to claims of third-
party judgment creditors, like NAMAWU. In this regard, we find American jurisprudence persuasive. In a
decision by the Supreme Court of New York 71 bearing upon similar facts, the Court denied piercing the veil
of corporate fiction to favor a judgment creditor who sued the parent corporation of the debtor, alleging
fraudulent corporate asset-shifting effected after a prior final judgment. Under a factual background largely
resembling this case at bar, viz:

In this action, plaintiffs seek to recover the balance due under judgments they obtained against Lake George
Ventures Inc. (hereinafter LGV), a subsidiary of defendant that was formed to develop the Top O’ the World
resort community overlooking Lake George, by piercing the corporate veil or upon the theory that LGV's
transfer of certain assets constituted fraudulent transfers under the Debtor and Creditor Law. We previously
upheld Supreme Court's denial of defendant's motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint (252
A.D.2d 609, 675 N.Y.S.2d 234)and the matter proceeded to a nonjury trial. Supreme Court thereafter
rendered judgment in favor of defendant upon its findings that, although defendant dominated LGV, it did
not use that domination to commit a fraud or wrong on plaintiffs. Plaintiffs appealed.

The trial evidence showed that LGV was incorporated in November 1985. Defendant's principal, Francesco
Galesi, initially held 90% of the stock and all of the stock was ultimately transferred to defendant. Initial
project funding was provided through a $2.5 million loan from Chemical Bank, secured by defendant's
guarantee of repayment of the loan and completion of the project. The loan proceeds were utilized to
purchase the real property upon which the project was to be established. Chemical Bank thereafter loaned
an additional $3.5 million to LGV, again guaranteed by defendant, and the two loans were consolidated into
a first mortgage loan of $6 million. In 1989, the loan was modified by splitting the loan into a $1.9 term
note on which defendant was primary obligor and a $4.1 million project note on which LGV was the obligor
and defendant was a guarantor.

Due to LGV's lack of success in marketing the project's townhouses and in order to protect itself from
the exercise of Chemical Bank's enforcement remedies, defendant was forced to make monthly
installments of principal and interest on LGV's behalf. Ultimately, defendant purchased the project note from
Chemical Bank for $3.1 million, paid the $1.5 million balance on the term note and took an assignment of
the first mortgage on the project's realty. After LGV failed to make payments on the indebtedness over the
course of the succeeding two years, defendant brought an action to foreclose its mortgage. Ultimately,
defendant obtained a judgment of foreclosure and sale in the amount of $6,070,246.50. Defendant bid in
the property at the foreclosure sale and thereafter obtained a deficiency judgment in the amount of
$3,070,246.50.

Following the foreclosure sale, LGV transferred to defendant all of the shares of Top of the World Water
Company, a separate entity that had been organized to construct and operate the water supply and delivery
system for the project, in exchange for a $950,000 reduction in the deficiency judgment.

the U.S. Supreme Court of New York held—

Based on the foregoing, and accepting that defendant exercised complete domination and control over LGV,
we are at a loss as to how plaintiffs perceive themselves to have been inequitably affected by defendant's
foreclosure action against LGV, by LGV's divestiture of the water company stock or the sports complex
property, or by defendant's transfer to LGV of a third party's uncollectible note, accomplished solely for tax
purposes. It is undisputed that LGV was, and for some period of time had been, unable to meet its obligations
and, at the time of the foreclosure sale, liens against its property exceeded the value of its assets by several
million dollars, even including the water company and sports complex at the values plaintiffs would assign
to them. In fact, even if plaintiffs' analysis were utilized to eliminate the entire $3 million deficiency
judgment, the fact remains that subordinate mortgages totaling nearly an additional $2 million have priority
over plaintiffs' judgments.

As properly concluded by Supreme Court, absent a finding of any inequitable consequence to plaintiffs, both
causes of action pleaded in the amended complaint must fail. Fundamentally, a party seeking to pierce the
corporate veil must show complete domination and control of the subsidiary by the parent and also that
such domination was used to commit a fraud or wrong against the plaintiff that resulted in the plaintiff's
injury ( 252 A.D.2d 609, 610, 675 N.Y.S.2d 234, supra; see, Matter of Morris v. New York State Dept. of
Taxation & Fin., 82 N.Y.2d 135, 141, 603 N.Y.S.2d 807, 623 N.E.2d 1157). Notably, "[e]vidence of
domination alone does not suffice without an additional showing that it led to inequity, fraud or
malfeasance" (TNS Holdings v. MKI Sec. Corp., 92 N.Y.2d 335, 339, 680 N.Y.S.2d 891, 703 N.E.2d 749).

xxxx
In reaching that conclusion, we specifically reject a number of plaintiffs' assertions, including the entirely
erroneous claims that our determination on the prior appeal (252 A.D.2d 609, 675 N.Y.S.2d 234, supra) set
forth a "roadmap" for the proof required at trial and mandated a verdict in favor of plaintiffs upon their
production of evidence that supported the decision's "listed facts". To the contrary, our decision was
predicated upon the existence of such evidence, absent which we would have granted summary judgment
in favor of defendant. We are equally unpersuaded by plaintiffs' continued reliance upon defendant's
December 1991 unilateral conversion of its intercompany loans with LGV from debt to equity, which
constituted nothing more than a "bookkeeping transaction" and had no apparent effect on LGV's obligations
to defendant or defendant's right to foreclose on its mortgage. 72

This doctrine is good law under Philippine jurisdiction.

In Concept Builders, Inc. v. National Labor Relations Commission,73 we laid down the test in determining
the applicability of the doctrine of piercing the veil of corporate fiction, to wit:

1. Control, not mere majority or complete control, but complete domination, not only of finances but
of policy and business practice in respect to the transaction attacked so that the corporate entity as
to this transaction had at the time no separate mind, will or existence of its own.

2. Such control must have been used by the defendant to commit fraud or wrong, to perpetuate the
violation of a statutory or other positive legal duty, or dishonest and, unjust act in contravention of
plaintiffs legal rights; and,

3. The aforesaid control and breach of duty must proximately cause the injury or unjust loss
complained of.

xxxx

Time and again, we have reiterated that mere ownership by a single stockholder or by another corporation
of all or nearly all of the capital stock of a corporation is not, by itself, a sufficient ground for disregarding a
separate corporate personality.74 It is basic that a corporation has a personality separate and distinct from
that composing it as well as from that of any other legal entity to which it may be related. Clear and
convincing evidence is needed to pierce the veil of corporate fiction. 75

In this case, the mere interlocking of directors and officers does not warrant piercing the separate corporate
personalities of MMC and GHI. Not only must there be a showing that there was majority or complete control,
but complete domination, not only of finances but of policy and business practice in respect to the transaction
attacked, so that the corporate entity as to this transaction had at the time no separate mind, will or
existence of its own. The mortgage deed transaction attacked as a basis for piercing the corporate veil was
a transaction that was an offshoot, a derivative, of the mortgages earlier constituted in the Promissory Notes
dated October 2, 1992. But these Promissory Notes with mortgage were executed by GHI with APT in the
name of MMC, in a full privatization process. It appears that if there was any control or domination exercised
over MMC, it was APT, not GHI, that wielded it. Neither can we conclude that the constitution of the loan
nearly four (4) years prior to NAMAWU’s notice of strike could have been the proximate cause of the injury
of NAMAWU for having been deprived of MMC’s corporate assets.

On the propriety of injunction to prevent execution by the NLRC on the properties of third-party
claimants

It is settled that a Regional Trial Court can validly issue a Temporary Restraining Order (TRO) and, later, a
writ of preliminary injunction to prevent enforcement of a writ of execution issued by a labor tribunal on the
basis of a third-party’s claim of ownership over the properties levied upon.76 While, as a rule, no temporary
or permanent injunction or restraining order in any case involving or growing out of a labor dispute shall be
issued by any court--where the writ of execution issued by a labor tribunal is sought to be enforced upon
the property of a stranger to the labor dispute, even upon a mere prima facie showing of ownership of such
claimant--a separate action for injunctive relief against such levy may be maintained in court, since said
action neither involves nor grows out of a labor dispute insofar as the third party is
concerned.77 Instructively, National Mines and Allied Workers’ Union v. Vera78

Petitioners' reliance on the provision of Art. 254 of the New Labor Code (herein earlier quoted) which
prohibits injunctions or restraining orders in any case involving or growing out of a 'labor dispute' is not
well-taken. This has no application to the case at bar. Civil Case No. 2749 is one which neither "involves"
nor "grows out" of a labor dispute. What 'involves' or 'grows out' of a labor dispute is the NLRC case between
petitioners and the judgment debtor, Philippine Iron Mines. The private respondents are not parties to the
said NLRC case. Civil Case No. 2749 does not put in issue either the fact or validity of the proceeding in
theNLRC case nor the decision therein rendered, much less the writ of execution issued thereunder. It does
not seek to enjoin the execution of the decision against the properties of the judgment debtor. What is
sought to be tried in Civil Case No. 2749 is whether the NLRC's decision and writ of execution, above
mentioned, shall be permitted to be satisfied against properties of private respondents, and not of the
judgment debtor named in the NLRC decision and writ of execution. Such a recourse is allowed under the
provisions of Section 17, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court.
To sustain petitioners' theory will inevitably lead to disastrous consequences and lend judicial imprimatur to
deprivation of property without due process of law. Simply because a writ of execution was issued by the
NLRC does not authorize the sheriff implementing the same to levy on anybody's property. To deny the
victim of the wrongful levy, the recourse such as that availed of by the herein private respondents, under
the pretext that no court of general jurisdiction can interfere with the writ of execution issued in a labor
dispute, will be sanctioning a greater evil than that sought to be avoided by the Labor Code provision in
question. Certainly, that could not have been the intendment of the law creating the NLRC. For well-settled
is the rule that the power of a court to execute its judgment extends only over properties unquestionably
belonging to the judgment debtor."

Likewise, since the third-party claimant is not one of the parties to the action, he cannot, strictly speaking,
appeal from the order denying his claim, but he should file a separate reivindicatory action against the
execution creditor or the purchaser of the property after the sale at public auction, or a complaint for
damages against the bond filed by the judgment creditor in favor of the sheriff. 79

A separate civil action for recovery of ownership of the property would not constitute interference with the
powers or processes of the labor tribunal which rendered the judgment to execute upon the levied
properties. The property levied upon being that of a stranger is not subject to levy. Thus, a separate action
for recovery, upon a claim and prima facie showing of ownership by the petitioner, cannot be considered as
interference.80

Upon the findings and conclusions we have reached above, petitioner is situated squarely as such third-
party claimant. The questioned restraining order of the lower court, as well as the order granting preliminary
injunction, does not constitute interference with the powers or processes of the labor department. The
registration of the mortgage document operated as notice to all on the matter of the mortgagee’s prior
claims. Official proceedings relative to the foreclosure of the subject properties constituted a prima facie
showing of ownership of such claimant to support the issuance of injunctive reliefs.

As correctly held by the lower court:

The subject incidents for TRO and/or Writ of Injunction were summarily heard and in resolving the same,
the Court believes, that the petitioner has a clear and unmistakable right over the levied properties. The
existence of the subject Deed of Real Estate and Chattel Mortgage, the fact that petitioner initiated a
foreclosure of said properties before the Clerk of Court and Ex-Officio Sheriff, RTC Branch 61, Kabankalan
City on July 13, 2001, the fact that said Ex-Officio Sheriff and the Clerk of Court issue a Notice of Foreclosure,
Possession and Control over said mortgaged properties on July 19, 2001 and the fact that a Sheriff’s
Certificate of Sale was issued on December 3, 2001 are the basis of its conclusion. Unless said mortgage
contract is annulled or declared null and void, the presumption of regularity of transaction must be
considered and said document must be looked [upon] as valid.

Notably, the Office of the Solicitor General also aptly observed that when the respondent maintained that
the Deed of Real Estate and Chattel mortgage was entered into in fraud of creditors, it thereby admitted
that the mortgage was not void, but merely rescissible under Article 1381(3) of the Civil Code; and,
therefore, an independent action is needed to rescind the contract of mortgage. 81 We, however, hold that
such an independent action cannot now be maintained, because the mortgage has been previously
recognized to exist, with a valid consideration, in Republic, etc., v. "G" Holdings, Inc.

A final word

The Court notes that the case filed with the lower court involves a principal action for injunction to prohibit
execution over properties belonging to a third party not impleaded in the legal dispute between NAMAWU
and MMC. We have observed, however, that the lower court and the CA failed to take judicial notice of, or
to consider, our Decisions in Republic, etc., v. "G" Holdings, Inc., and Maricalum Mining Corporation v. Brion
and NAMAWU, in which we respectively recognized the entitlement of GHI to the shares and the company
notes of MMC (under the Purchase and Sale Agreement), and the rights of NAMAWU to its labor claims. At
this stage, therefore, neither the lower court nor the CA, nor even this Court, can depart from our findings
in those two cases because of the doctrine of stare decisis.

From our discussion above, we now rule that the trial court, in issuing the questioned orders, did not commit
grave abuse of discretion, because its issuance was amply supported by factual and legal bases.

We are not unmindful, however, of the fact that the labor claims of NAMAWU, acknowledged by this Court
in Maricalum, still awaits final execution. As success fades from NAMAWU’s efforts to execute on the
properties of MMC, which were validly foreclosed by GHI, we see that NAMAWU always had, and may still
have, ample supplemental remedies found in Rule 39 of the Rules of Court in order to protect its rights
against MMC. These include the examination of the judgment obligor when judgment is unsatisfied,82 the
examination of the obligors of judgment obligors,83 or even the resort to receivership.84

While, theoretically, this case is not ended by this decision, since the lower court is still to try the case filed
with it and decide it on the merits, the matter of whether the mortgage and foreclosure of the assets that
are the subject of said foreclosure is ended herein, for the third and final time. So also is the consequential
issue of the separate and distinct personalities of GHI and MMC. Having resolved these principal issues with
certainty, we find no more need to remand the case to the lower court, only for the purpose of resolving
again the matter of whether GHI owns the properties that were the subject of the latter’s foreclosure.

WHEREFORE, the Petition is GRANTED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals dated October 14, 2003 is SET
ASIDE. The Omnibus Order dated December 4, 2002 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 61 of Kabankalan
City, Negros Occidental is AFFIRMED. No costs. SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 187917 January 19, 2011

METROPOLITAN BANK & TRUST COMPANY, Petitioner,

vs.
SPOUSES EDMUNDO MIRANDA and JULIE MIRANDA, Respondents.

DECISION

NACHURA, J.:

On appeal is the June 30, 2008 Decision 1 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 87775, affirming
the June 16, 2006 Decision2 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Santiago City, Branch 35, as well as its
subsequent Resolution dated May 7, 2009,3 denying petitioner’s motion for reconsideration.

Respondents, spouses Edmundo Miranda and Julie Miranda, applied for and obtained a credit
accommodation from petitioner Metropolitan Bank & Trust Company (Metrobank). On August 27, 1996,
respondents obtained a ₱4,000,000.00 loan from Metrobank and executed a real estate mortgage 4 over a
parcel of land in Poblacion, Santiago, Isabela, covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 202288.
Upon respondents’ request, Metrobank increased the loan from ₱4,000,000.00 to ₱5,000,000.00. The real
estate mortgage executed on August 27, 1996 was thus amended 5 to increase the principal amount of loan
secured by the mortgage to ₱5,000,000.00.

Subsequently, respondents obtained additional loans from Metrobank - ₱1,000,000.00 on December 3,

1996, and ₱1,000,000.00 on May 8, 1997. The additional loans were secured by mortgage 6 over lands
situated in Dubinan and Mabini, Santiago, Isabela, covered by TCT Nos. T-202288, T-180503, T-260279,
and T-272664.

Respondents encountered difficulties in paying their loans. They requested for a longer period to settle their
account and further requested for the restructuring of their loans, which requests Metrobank granted.
Respondents then signed Promissory Note (PN) No. 599773 7 for ₱6,400,000.00, and PN No. 5997728 for
₱950,000.00, both payable on February 24, 2002, with interest at 17.250% per annum. They also amended
the deeds of real estate mortgage they executed in favor of Metrobank to increase the amount of loans
secured by mortgage to ₱6,350,000.00. The amendment was inscribed on TCT Nos. T-202288,9 T-
260279,10 and T-180503.11

On August 25, 2000, Metrobank sent respondents a demand letter12 to settle their overdue account of
₱8,512,380.15, inclusive of interest and penalties; otherwise, the bank would initiate "the necessary legal
proceedings x x x, without further notice." Respondents, however, failed to settle their account.
Consequently, Metrobank caused the extrajudicial foreclosure and auction sale of the mortgaged properties
on November 16, 2000. The Clerk of Court and Ex-Officio Sheriff of Santiago City sold the mortgaged
properties at public auction for the sum of ₱9,284,452.00 to Metrobank, as the highest bidder. A Certificate
of Sale13 was issued in favor of Metrobank on November 27, 2000, which was registered with the Registry
of Deeds on November 29, 2000.

Claiming that the extrajudicial foreclosure was void, respondents filed a complaint for Nullification of the
Foreclosure Proceedings and Damages with Prayer for Temporary Restraining Order/Injunction 14 with the
RTC of Santiago City. They alleged non-compliance with the provisions of Presidential Decree No. 107915 and
Act No. 3135,16 particularly the publication requirement. Respondents further asserted that Metrobank
required them to sign blank promissory notes and real estate mortgage, and that they were not furnished
with copies of these documents. Later, they discovered that the terms and conditions of the promissory
notes and of the mortgage were entirely different from what was represented to them by the bank. The
right to fix the interest rates, they added, was

exclusively given to the bank. Respondents, thus, prayed for the annulment of the extrajudicial foreclosure
proceedings.

Metrobank answered the complaint, denying its material allegations and asserting the validity of the
foreclosure proceedings. Specifically, it averred compliance with the posting and publication requirements.
Thus, it prayed for the dismissal of the complaint.17

Meanwhile, on December 20, 2001, Metrobank caused the cancellation of the TCTs in the name of
respondents and the issuance of new ones in its name. On December 21, 2001, the Ex-Officio Sheriff
executed a Final Deed of Sale.18

On June 16, 2006, the RTC rendered a decision 19 annulling the extrajudicial foreclosure proceedings. The
RTC reviewed the records of the foreclosure proceedings and found no proof of publication of the sheriff’s
notice of sale; there was no affidavit of publication attached to the records. This fatal defect, it held,
invalidated the auction sale and the entire foreclosure proceedings. The RTC further held that, when
Metrobank foreclosed the mortgaged properties, respondents’ loan account was still outstanding for there
was an overpayment of interests amounting to ₱1,529,922.00. Thus, the foreclosure proceedings were
without factual and legal basis. The RTC further noted that Metrobank consolidated its title even before the
issuance of the sheriff’s Final Deed of Sale. The trial court considered it an irregularity sufficient to invalidate
the consolidation.

The dispositive portion of the RTC decision reads:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of [respondents] and against
[petitioner] Metrobank as follows:

1) DECLARING as null and void the Sheriff’s Certificate of Sale, dated November 27, 2000, Exhibit
"11";

2) DECLARING as null and void the Sheriff’s Final Deed of Sale, dated December 21, 2000, Exhibit
"12";

3) CANCELLING [Metrobank’s] TCT Nos. T-319236 (Exhibit "13"); T-319235 over Lot 6-B-18 (Exhibit
"14"); T-T-319235 over Lot 4-F (Exhibit "15"); and T-319237 (Exhibit "16");

4) RESTORING [respondents’] TCT Nos. T-260279 (Exhibit "E"); T-202288 (Exhibit "F"); T-180503
(Exhibit "G"; and T- 272664 (Annex "E"); and

5) ORDERING x x x Metrobank to pay PHP50,000.00 as attorney’s fees, and the cost of suit.

SO ORDERED. 20

Metrobank filed a motion for reconsideration, but the RTC denied it on July 31, 2006.

Metrobank then appealed to the CA, faulting the RTC for annulling the foreclosure proceedings. It insisted
that the bank complied with the publication requirement. Metrobank also disagreed with the trial court’s
finding of overpayment of interests amounting to ₱1,529,922.00, claiming that the applicable interest rates
on respondents’ loans were 17% and not 12% as computed by the trial court. It further asserted that a final
deed of sale is not necessary for purposes of consolidating its ownership over the subject properties. Finally,
Metrobank assailed the award of attorney’s fees for lack of basis.

On June 30, 2008, the CA resolved Metrobank’s appeal in this wise:

WHEREFORE, the appeal is DISMISSED. The assailed decision dated June 16, 2006 of the RTC of Santiago
City, Branch 35, in Civil Case No. 35-3022 is AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.21

Metrobank’s motion for reconsideration also suffered the same fate, as the CA denied it on May 7, 2009. 22

Before us, Metrobank insists on the validity of the foreclosure proceedings. Essentially, it argues that
foreclosure proceedings enjoy the presumption of regularity, and the party alleging irregularity has the
burden of proving his claim. Metrobank asserts that, in this case, the presumption of regularity was not
disputed because respondents failed to prove that the notice of sale was not published as required by law.

At the outset, it must be stated that only questions of law may be raised before this Court in a Petition for
Review under Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of Civil Procedure. This Court is not a trier of facts, and it is not
the function of this Court to reexamine the evidence submitted by the parties. 23

It has been our consistent ruling that the question of compliance or non-compliance with notice and
publication requirements of an extrajudicial foreclosure sale is a factual issue, and the resolution thereof by
the trial court is generally binding on this Court. The matter of sufficiency of posting and publication of a
notice of foreclosure sale need not be resolved

by this Court, especially when the findings of the RTC were sustained by the CA. Well-established is the rule
that factual findings of the CA are conclusive on the parties and carry even more weight when the said court
affirms the factual findings of the trial court.24

The unanimity of the CA and the trial court in their factual ascertainment that there was non-compliance
with the publication requirement bars us from supplanting their findings and substituting them with our
own. Metrobank has not shown that they are entitled to an exception to this rule. It has not sufficiently
demonstrated any special circumstances to justify a factual review.

Metrobank makes much ado of respondents’ failure to present proof of non-compliance with the publication
requirement. It insists that respondents failed to discharge the requisite burden of proof.

Apparently, Metrobank lost sight of our ruling in Spouses Pulido v. CA, 25 Sempio v. CA,26 and, recently, in
Philippine Savings Bank v. Spouses Dionisio Geronimo and Caridad Geronimo, 27 viz.:
While it may be true that the party alleging non-compliance with the requisite publication has the burden of
proof, still negative allegations need not be proved even if essential to one’s cause of action or defense if
they constitute a denial of the existence of a document the custody of which belongs to the other party.

It would have been a simple matter for Metrobank to rebut the allegation of non-compliance by producing
the required proof of publication. Yet, Metrobank opted not to rebut the allegation; it simply relied on the
presumption of regularity in the performance of official duty.

Unfortunately, Metrobank’s reliance on the presumption of regularity must fail because it did not present
any proof of publication of the notice of sale. As held by this Court in Spouses Pulido v. Court of Appeals: 28

[P]etitioners' reliance on the presumption of regularity in the performance of official duties falls in the face
of a serious imputation on non-compliance. The presumption of compliance with official duty is rebutted by
failure to present proof of posting.

Further, in Philippine Savings Bank v. Spouses Dionisio Geronimo and Caridad Geronimo,29 this Court
rejected a similar contention, viz.:

Petitioner's invocation of the presumption of regularity in the performance of official duty on the part of
Sheriff Castillo is misplaced. While posting the notice of sale is part of a sheriff's official functions, the actual
publication of the notice of sale cannot be considered as such, since this concerns the publisher's business.
Simply put, the sheriff is incompetent to prove that the notice of sale was actually published in a newspaper
of general circulation.

As correctly found by the RTC and the CA, the records 30 of the foreclosure proceedings lacked any proof of
publication. This explains why Metrobank could not present any proof of publication.

We take this occasion to reiterate that the object of a notice of sale is to inform the public of the nature and
condition of the property to be sold, and of the time, place, and terms of the sale. Notices are given for the
purpose of securing bidders and preventing a sacrifice sale of the property.

The goal of the notice requirement is to achieve a "reasonably wide publicity" of the auction sale. This is
why publication in a newspaper of general circulation is required. The Court has previously taken judicial
notice of the "far-reaching effects" of publishing the notice of sale in a newspaper of general circulation.
Thus, the publication of the notice of sale was held essential to the validity of foreclosure proceedings. 31 In
this case, Metrobank failed to establish compliance with the publication requirement. The RTC and the CA
cannot, therefore, be faulted for nullifying the foreclosure proceedings.

Metrobank next questions the authority of the RTC and the CA to take cognizance of the records of the
foreclosure proceedings as basis for annulling the auction sale. It claims that the trial court may not take
judicial notice of the records of proceedings in another case, unless the parties themselves agreed to it.
Metrobank asserts that it did not give its consent to the trial court’s examination of the records of the
extrajudicial foreclosure proceedings. Further, the RTC did not even set a hearing for the purpose of
declaring its intention to take judicial notice of the records of the extrajudicial proceedings, as required by
Section 332 of Rule 129. Metrobank, thus, contends that the RTC exceeded its authority in taking cognizance
of the records of the extrajudicial proceedings.

We disagree.

As a rule, courts do not take judicial notice of the evidence presented in other proceedings, even if these
have been tried or are pending in the same court or before the same judge. This rule, however, is not
absolute.

In Juaban v. Espina33 and "G" Holdings, Inc. v. National Mines and Allied Workers Union Local 103
(NAMAWU),34we held that, in some instances, courts have also taken judicial notice of proceedings in other
cases that are closely connected to the matter in controversy. These cases may be so closely interwoven,
or so clearly interdependent, as to invoke a rule of judicial notice.

The RTC, therefore, acted well within its authority in taking cognizance of the records of the extrajudicial
foreclosure proceedings, and the CA cannot be faulted for sustaining the RTC.

Metrobank further questions the trial court’s finding of overpayment of interests. But like the issue on
compliance with the publication requirement, the issue on overpayment of interests involves the
ascertainment of facts not subject of review by this Court. We reiterate that our jurisdiction is limited to
reviewing and revising errors of law imputed to the lower court, the latter’s findings of fact being conclusive
and not reviewable by this Court.35

Besides, we find nothing erroneous in this factual finding of the RTC. As explained by the RTC in its decision:

[T]he Court notes that the original promissory notes evidencing the various loans of the plaintiffs were not
presented in court by either party; they are needed to determine the stipulated interest rate. The Court is
thus left to determine the same based on the testimony of the plaintiffs that the agreed interest rate is 12%
per annum; amazingly, this was not denied or refuted by the [petitioner] bank, in which case, 12% interest
rate is applied at least for the period beginning 1997 until 1999, when the loan was renewed under the two
(2) new promissory notes which indicated a higher rate of interest of 17.250% per annum. As mentioned
above, the interest payments made by the [respondents] were already admitted by [Metrobank] in its
answer to the complaint as well as in its comment to [respondents’] formal offer of evidence, and such
interest payments are duly reflected and contained in the passbook account of the [respondents], Exhibit
"H," "H-1" to "H-10." But, in order to determine whether [respondents’] account has become past due or
not, as the [petitioner] bank represents, the Court deems it necessary to undertake some mathematical
computation the result of which would decisively guide the Court to arrive at a rightful conclusion, thus:

1) Total interest payments by [respondents]

from May 7, 1997 to June 30, 1999 - ₱3,332,422.00

2) Interest due
from May 7, 1997 to June 30, 1999 - ₱1,802,500.00

computed as follows:

a) 1st year (₱7 M x 12%), from May 7, 1997 to May 28, 1998 - ₱ 840,000.00

b) 2nd year
i) from June 3, 1998 to Feb. 24, 1999 (8 mos.) - ₱ 560,000.00

ii) from March, 1999 to June 30, 1999 (4 mos.) - ₱ 402,500.00

3) Total Interest paid - ₱ 3,332,422.00

Less Interest due - ₱ 1,802,500.00

Overpaid interest - ₱ 1,529,922.00

From the foregoing, it is evident that [respondents] overpaid interests for the period of two (2) years, from
May 1997 to June 1999, in the total amount of Php. 1,529,922.00. Thus, the Court is convinced that it is
just and equitable that such an overpayment be construed as advance interest payments which should be
applied for the succeeding period or year of their contract. Otherwise, [Metrobank] would unjustly enrich
itself at the expense of [respondents]. In such a case, it was premature then for [Metrobank] to declare
[respondents’] account as past due, because at that juncture[, respondents’] loan obligation was
outstanding and in declaring otherwise, [Metrobank’s] action was without basis as there was no violation of
their loan contract. Consequently, it follows that the foreclosure proceedings subsequently held on
November 26, 2000 was without factual and legal basis, too. For, indeed, when the foreclosure proceedings
in question was conducted, [respondents’] loan account with [Metrobank], as it is said, was still outstanding,
because [respondents] were able to pay the interest due. Therefore, the Court is again convinced that the
nullification prayed for is in order.36

We need not say more.

In fine, the right of a bank to foreclose a mortgage upon the mortgagor's failure to pay his obligation must
be exercised according to its clear mandate, and every requirement of the law must be complied with, or
the valid exercise of the right would end. The exercise of a right ends when the right disappears, and it
disappears when it is abused especially to the prejudice of others. 37

As further declared by this Court in Philippine Savings Bank v. Spouses Dionisio Geronimo and Caridad
Geronimo:38

While the law recognizes the right of a bank to foreclose a mortgage upon the mortgagor's failure to pay his
obligation, it is imperative that such right be exercised according to its clear mandate. Each and every
requirement of the law must be complied with, lest, the valid exercise of the right would end. It must be
remembered that the exercise of a right ends when the right disappears, and it disappears when it is abused
especially to the prejudice of others.

We, therefore, affirm the CA and sustain the RTC in nullifying the extrajudicial foreclosure of real estate
mortgage and sale, including Metrobank’s title.

With this disquisition, we find no necessity to discuss the issue of the validity of the consolidation of title by
Metrobank.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The challenged Decision and Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-
G.R. CV No. 87775 are AFFIRMED. SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 159507 April 19, 2006

ANICETO G. SALUDO, JR., Petitioner,

vs.
AMERICAN EXPRESS INTERNATIONAL, INC., and/or IAN T. FISH and DOMINIC
MASCRINAS, Respondents.

DECISION

CALLEJO, SR., J.:

Before the Court is the Petition for Review on Certiorari filed by Aniceto G. Saludo, Jr. seeking to reverse
and set aside the Decision1 dated May 22, 2003 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 69553. The
assailed decision directed the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Maasin City, Southern Leyte, Branch 25 thereof,
to vacate and set aside its Orders dated September 10, 2001 and January 2, 2002 in Civil Case No. R-3172,
and enjoined the presiding judge2 thereof from conducting further proceedings in said case, except to
dismiss the complaint filed therewith on ground of improper venue. The petition also seeks to reverse and
set aside the appellate court's Resolution dated August 14, 2003 denying the motion for reconsideration of
the assailed decision.

The factual and procedural antecedents are as follows:

Aniceto G. Saludo, Jr. filed a complaint for damages against the American Express International, Inc. (AMEX)
and/or its officers Ian T. Fish, Vice-President and Country Manager, and Dominic Mascrinas, Head of
Operations, with the RTC of Maasin City, Southern Leyte. The case was raffled to Branch 25 of the said
court.

The complaint alleged, inter alia, that plaintiff (herein petitioner Saludo) "is a Filipino citizen, of legal age,
and a member of the House of Representatives and a resident of Ichon, Macrohon, Southern Leyte,
Philippines." On the other hand, defendant (herein respondent AMEX, Inc.) "is a corporation doing business
in the Philippines and engaged in providing credit and other credit facilities and allied services with office
address at 4th floor, ACE Building, Rada Street, Legaspi Village, Makati City." The other defendants (herein
respondents Fish and Mascrinas) are officers of respondent AMEX, and may be served with summons and
other court processes at their office address.

The complaint's cause of action stemmed from the alleged wrongful dishonor of petitioner Saludo's AMEX
credit card and the supplementary card issued to his daughter. The first dishonor happened when petitioner
Saludo's daughter used her supplementary credit card to pay her purchases in the United States some time
in April 2000. The second dishonor occurred when petitioner Saludo used his principal credit card to pay his
account at the Hotel Okawa in Tokyo, Japan while he was there with other delegates from the Philippines to
attend the Congressional Recognition in honor of Mr. Hiroshi Tanaka.

The dishonor of these AMEX credit cards were allegedly unjustified as they resulted from respondents'
unilateral act of suspending petitioner Saludo's account for his failure to pay its balance covering the period
of March 2000. Petitioner Saludo denied having received the corresponding statement of account. Further,
he was allegedly wrongfully charged for late payment in June 2000. Subsequently, his credit card and its
supplementary cards were canceled by respondents on July 20, 2000.

Petitioner Saludo claimed that he suffered great inconvenience, wounded feelings, mental anguish,
embarrassment, humiliation and besmirched political and professional standing as a result of respondents'
acts which were committed in gross and evident bad faith, and in wanton, reckless and oppressive manner.
He thus prayed that respondents be adjudged to pay him, jointly and severally, actual, moral and exemplary
damages, and attorney's fees.

In their answer, respondents specifically denied the allegations in the complaint. Further, they raised the
affirmative defenses of lack of cause of action and improper venue. On the latter, respondents averred that
the complaint should be dismissed on the ground that venue was improperly laid because none of the parties
was a resident of Leyte. They alleged that respondents were not residents of Southern Leyte. Moreover,
notwithstanding the claim in his complaint, petitioner Saludo was not allegedly a resident thereof as
evidenced by the fact that his community tax certificate, which was presented when he executed the
complaint's verification and certification of non-forum shopping, was issued at Pasay City. To buttress their
contention, respondents pointed out that petitioner Saludo's complaint was prepared in Pasay City and
signed by a lawyer of the said city. Respondents prayed for the dismissal of the complaint a quo.

Thereafter, respondents filed an Opposition to Ex-Parte Motion (to Set Case for Pre-Trial) and Motion for
Preliminary Hearing (on Affirmative Defense of Improper Venue) to which petitioner Saludo filed his
Comments and/or Objections to the Affirmative Defense of Improper Venue. He asserted that any allegation
refuting his residency in Southern Leyte was baseless and unfounded considering that he was the
congressman of the lone district thereof at the time of the filing of his complaint. He urged the court a quo
to take judicial notice of this particular fact. As a member of Congress, he possessed all the qualifications
prescribed by the Constitution including that of being a resident of his district. He was also a member of the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines-Southern Leyte Chapter, and has been such ever since his admission to
the Bar. His community tax certificate was issued at Pasay City only because he has an office thereat and
the office messenger obtained the same in the said city. In any event, the community tax certificate is not
determinative of one's residence.

In the Order dated September 10, 2001, the court a quo denied the affirmative defenses interposed by
respondents. It found the allegations of the complaint sufficient to constitute a cause of action against
respondents. The court a quo likewise denied respondents' affirmative defense that venue was improperly
laid. It reasoned, thus:

x x x [T]he fact alone that the plaintiff at the time he filed the complaint was and still is, the incumbent
Congressman of the Lone District of Southern Leyte with residence at Ichon, Macrohon, Southern Leyte, is
enough to dispell any and all doubts about his actual residence. As a high-ranking government official of
the province, his residence there can be taken judicial notice of. As such his personal, actual and physical
habitation or his actual residence or place of abode can never be in some other place but in Ichon, Macrohon,
Southern Leyte. It is correctly stated by the plaintiff, citing the case of Core v. Core, 100 Phil. 321 that,
"residence, for purposes of fixing venue of an action, is synonymous with domicile. This is defined as the
permanent home, the place to which, whenever absent for business or pleasure, one intends to return, and
depends on the facts and circumstances, in the sense that they disclose intent. A person can have but one
domicile at a time. A man can have but one domicile for one and the same purpose at any time, but he may
have numerous places of residence. Venue could be at place of his residence. (Masa v. Mison, 200 SCRA
715 [1991])3

Respondents sought the reconsideration thereof but the court a quo denied the same in the Order dated
January 2, 2002. They then filed with the appellate court a petition for certiorari and prohibition alleging
grave abuse of discretion on the part of the presiding judge of the court a quo in issuing the September 10,
2001 and January 2, 2002 Orders. Upon respondents' posting of a bond, the appellate court issued on March
14, 2002 a temporary restraining order which enjoined the presiding judge of the court a quo from
conducting further proceedings in Civil Case No. R-3172.

On May 22, 2003, the appellate court rendered the assailed decision granting respondents' petition for
certiorari as it found that venue was improperly laid. It directed the court a quo to vacate and set aside its
Orders dated September 10, 2001 and January 2, 2002, and enjoined the presiding judge thereof from
further proceeding in the case, except to dismiss the complaint.

The appellate court explained that the action filed by petitioner Saludo against respondents is governed by
Section 2, Rule 4 of the Rules of Court. The said rule on venue of personal actions basically provides that
personal actions may be commenced and tried where plaintiff or any of the principal plaintiffs resides, or
where defendant or any of the principal defendants resides, at the election of plaintiff.

Venue was improperly laid in the court a quo, according to the appellate court, because not one of the
parties was a resident of Southern Leyte. Specifically, it declared that petitioner Saludo was not a resident
thereof. The appellate court pronounced that, for purposes of venue, the residence of a person is his
personal, actual or physical habitation, or his actual residence or place of abode, which may not necessarily
be his legal residence or domicile provided he resides therein with continuity and consistency. 4

The appellate court quoted the following discussion in Koh v. Court of Appeals 5 where the Court distinguished
the terms "residence" and "domicile" in this wise:

x x x [T]he term domicile is not exactly synonymous in legal contemplation with the term residence, for it
is [an] established principle in Conflict of Laws that domicile refers to the relatively more permanent abode
of a person while residence applies to a temporary stay of a person in a given place. In fact, this distinction
is very well emphasized in those cases where the Domiciliary Theory must necessarily supplant the
Nationality Theory in cases involving stateless persons.

xxxx

"There is a difference between domicile and residence. Residence is used to indicate a place of abode,
whether permanent or temporary; domicile denotes a fixed permanent residence to which when absent, one
has the intention of returning. A man may have a residence in one place and a domicile in another. Residence
is not domicile, but domicile is residence coupled with intention to remain for an unlimited time. A man can
have but one domicile for one and the same purpose at any time, but he may have numerous places of
residence. His place of residence generally is his place of domicile, but is not by any means, necessarily so
since no length of residence without intention of remaining will constitute domicile."6 (Italicized for
emphasis)

In holding that petitioner Saludo is not a resident of Maasin City, Southern Leyte, the appellate court referred
to his community tax certificate, as indicated in his complaint's verification and certification of non-forum
shopping, which was issued at Pasay City. Similarly, it referred to the same community tax certificate, as
indicated in his complaint for deportation filed against respondents Fish and Mascrinas. Under Republic Act
No. 7160,7 the community tax certificate shall be paid in the place of residence of the individual, or in the
place where the principal office of the juridical entity is located. 8 It also pointed out that petitioner Saludo's
law office, which was also representing him in the present case, is in Pasay City. The foregoing circumstances
were considered by the appellate court as judicial admissions of petitioner Saludo which are conclusive upon
him and no longer required proof.

The appellate court chided the court a quo for stating that as incumbent congressman of the lone district of
Southern Leyte, judicial notice could be taken of the fact of petitioner Saludo's residence thereat. No
evidence had yet been adduced that petitioner Saludo was then the congressman of Southern Leyte and
actual resident of Ichon, Macrohon of the said province.

The appellate court held that, based on his complaint, petitioner Saludo was actually residing in Pasay City.
It faulted him for filing his complaint with the court a quo when the said venue is inconvenient to the parties
to the case. It opined that under the rules, the possible choices of venue are Pasay City or Makati City, or
any place in the National Capital Judicial Region, at the option of petitioner Saludo.

It stressed that while the choice of venue is given to plaintiff, said choice is not left to his caprice and cannot
deprive a defendant of the rights conferred upon him by the Rules of Court. 9 Further, fundamental in the
law governing venue of actions that the situs for bringing real and personal civil actions is fixed by the rules
to attain the greatest possible convenience to the party litigants by taking into consideration the maximum
accessibility to them - i.e., to both plaintiff and defendant, not only to one or the other - of the courts of
justice.10

The appellate court concluded that the court a quo should have given due course to respondents' affirmative
defense of improper venue in order to avoid any suspicion that petitioner Saludo's motive in filing his
complaint with the court a quo was only to vex and unduly inconvenience respondents or even to wield
influence in the outcome of the case, petitioner Saludo being a powerful and influential figure in the said
province. The latter circumstance could be regarded as a "specie of forum shopping" akin to that in Investors
Finance Corp. v. Ebarle11 where the Court mentioned that the filing of the civil action before the court in
Pagadian City "was a specie of forum shopping" considering that plaintiff therein was an influential person
in the locality.

The decretal portion of the assailed Decision dated May 22, 2003 of the appellate court reads:

UPON THE VIEW WE TAKE OF THIS CASE, THUS, the challenged orders must be, as they hereby are,
VACATED and SET ASIDE and the respondent judge, or any one acting in his place or stead, is instructed
and enjoined to desist from further proceeding in the case, except to dismiss it. The temporary restraining
order earlier issued is hereby converted into a writ of preliminary injunction, upon the posting this time by
petitioners [herein respondents], within five (5) days from receipt of this decision, of a bond in the amount
of Five Million Pesos (P5,000,000.00), to answer for all damages that private respondent [herein petitioner]
may sustain by reason of the issuance of such injunction should the Court finally decide that petitioners are
not entitled thereto. Private respondent, if he so minded, may refile his case for damages before the Regional
Trial Court of Makati City or Pasay City, or any of the Regional Trial Courts of the National Capital Judicial
Region. Without costs.

SO ORDERED.12

Petitioner Saludo sought the reconsideration of the said decision but the appellate court, in the Resolution
dated August 14, 2003, denied his motion for reconsideration. Hence, he filed the instant petition for review
with the Court alleging that:

The Court of Appeals, (Special Fourth Division), in promulgating the afore-mentioned Decision and
Resolution, has decided a question of substance in a way probably not in accord with law or with applicable
decisions of this Honorable Court.

(a) the Court of Appeals erred in not taking judicial notice of the undisputed fact that herein petitioner
is the incumbent congressman of the lone district of Southern Leyte and as such, he is a residence
(sic) of said district;

(b) the Court of Appeals erred in dismissing the complaint on the basis of improper venue due to the
alleged judicial admission of herein petitioner;

(c) the Court of Appeals in dismissing the complaint ignored applicable decisions of this Honorable
Court; and1avvphil.net

(d) the Court of Appeals erred in deciding that herein petitioner violated the rules on venue, and
even speculated that herein petitioner's motive in filing the complaint in Maasin City was only to vex
the respondents.13

In gist, the sole substantive issue for the Court's resolution is whether the appellate court committed
reversible error in holding that venue was improperly laid in the court a quo in Civil Case No. R-3172 because
not one of the parties, including petitioner Saludo, as plaintiff therein, was a resident of Southern Leyte at
the time of filing of the complaint.

The petition is meritorious.

Petitioner Saludo's complaint for damages against respondents before the court a quo is a personal action.
As such, it is governed by Section 2, Rule 4 of the Rules of Courts which reads:

SEC. 2. Venue of personal actions. - All other actions may be commenced and tried where the plaintiff or
any of the principal plaintiffs resides, or where the defendant or any of the principal defendants resides, or
in the case of a non-resident defendant where he may be found, at the election of the plaintiff.

The choice of venue for personal actions cognizable by the RTC is given to plaintiff but not to plaintiff's
caprice because the matter is regulated by the Rules of Court. 14 The rule on venue, like other procedural
rules, is designed to insure a just and orderly administration of justice, or the impartial and evenhanded
determination of every action and proceeding.15 The option of plaintiff in personal actions cognizable by the
RTC is either the place where defendant resides or may be found, or the place where plaintiff resides. If
plaintiff opts for the latter, he is limited to that place.16

Following this rule, petitioner Saludo, as plaintiff, had opted to file his complaint with the court a quo which
is in Maasin City, Southern Leyte. He alleged in his complaint that he was a member of the House of
Representatives and a resident of Ichon, Macrohon, Southern Leyte to comply with the residency
requirement of the rule.

However, the appellate court, adopting respondents' theory, made the finding that petitioner Saludo was
not a resident of Southern Leyte at the time of the filing of his complaint. It hinged the said finding mainly
on the fact that petitioner Saludo's community tax certificate, indicated in his complaint's verification and
certification of non-forum shopping, was issued at Pasay City. That his law office is in Pasay City was also
taken by the appellate court as negating petitioner Saludo's claim of residence in Southern Leyte.

The appellate court committed reversible error in finding that petitioner Saludo was not a resident of
Southern Leyte at the time of the filing of his complaint, and consequently holding that venue was improperly
laid in the court a quo. In Dangwa Transportation Co., Inc. v. Sarmiento, 17 the Court had the occasion to
explain at length the meaning of the term "resides" for purposes of venue, thus:

In Koh v. Court of Appeals, we explained that the term "resides" as employed in the rule on venue on
personal actions filed with the courts of first instance means the place of abode, whether permanent or
temporary, of the plaintiff or the defendant, as distinguished from "domicile" which denotes a fixed
permanent residence to which, when absent, one has the intention of returning.

"It is fundamental in the law governing venue of actions (Rule 4 of the Rules of Court) that the situs for
bringing real and personal civil actions are fixed by the rules to attain the greatest convenience possible to
the parties-litigants by taking into consideration the maximum accessibility to them of the courts of justice.
It is, likewise, undeniable that the term domicile is not exactly synonymous in legal contemplation with the
term residence, for it is an established principle in Conflict of Laws that domicile refers to the relatively more
permanent abode of a person while residence applies to a temporary stay of a person in a given place. In
fact, this distinction is very well emphasized in those cases where the Domiciliary Theory must necessarily
supplant the Nationality Theory in cases involving stateless persons.

"This Court held in the case of Uytengsu v. Republic, 50 O.G. 4781, October, 1954, reversing its previous
stand in Larena v. Ferrer, 61 Phil. 36, and Nuval v. Guray, 52 Phil. 645, that -

'There is a difference between domicile and residence. Residence is used to indicate a place of abode,
whether permanent or temporary; domicile denotes a fixed permanent residence to which when absent, one
has the intention of returning. A man may have a residence in one place and a domicile in another. Residence
is not domicile, but domicile is residence coupled with the intention to remain for an unlimited time. A man
can have but one domicile for one and the same purpose at any time, but he may have numerous places of
residence. His place of residence generally is his place of domicile, but is not by any means, necessarily so
since no length of residence without intention of remaining will constitute domicile.' (Italicized for emphasis)

"We note that the law on venue in Courts of First Instance (Section 2, of Rule 4, Rules of Court) in referring
to the parties utilizes the words 'resides or may be found,' and not 'is domiciled,' thus:

'Sec. 2(b) Personal actions - All other actions may be commenced and tried where the defendant or any of
the defendants resides or may be found, or where the plaintiff or any of the plaintiffs resides, at the election
of the plaintiff.' (Italicized for emphasis)

"Applying the foregoing observation to the present case, We are fully convinced that private respondent
Coloma's protestations of domicile in San Nicolas, Ilocos Norte, based on his manifested intention to return
there after the retirement of his wife from government service to justify his bringing of an action for damages
against petitioner in the C.F.I. of Ilocos Norte, is entirely of no moment since what is of paramount
importance is where he actually resided or where he may be found at the time he brought the action, to
comply substantially with the requirements of Sec. 2(b) of Rule 4, Rules of Court, on venue of personal
actions." (Koh v. Court of Appeals, supra, pp. 304-305.)

The same construction of the word "resides" as used in Section 1, Rule 73, of the Revised Rules of Court,
was enunciated in Fule v. Court of Appeals, et al. (G.R. No. L-40502) and Fule v. Hon. Ernani C. Paño, et
al. (G.R. No. L-42670), decided on November 29, 1976. Thus, this Court, in the aforecited cases, stated:

"2. But, the far-ranging question is this: What does the term 'resides' mean? Does it refer to the actual
residence or domicile of the decedent at the time of his death? We lay down the doctrinal rule that the term
'resides' connotes ex vi termini 'actual residence' as distinguished from 'legal residence or domicile.' This
term 'resides,' like the terms 'residing' and 'residence' is elastic and should be interpreted in the light of the
object or purposes of the statute or rule in which it is employed. In the application of venue statutes and
rules - Section 1, Rule 73 of the Revised Rules of Court is of such nature - residence rather than domicile is
the significant factor. Even where the statute uses the word 'domicile' still it is construed as meaning
residence and not domicile in the technical sense. Some cases make a distinction between the terms
'residence' and 'domicile' but as generally used in statutes fixing venue, the terms are synonymous, and
convey the same meaning as the term 'inhabitant.' In other words, 'resides' should be viewed or understood
in its popular sense, meaning, the personal, actual or physical habitation of a person, actual residence or
place of abode. It signifies physical presence in a place and actual stay thereat. In this popular sense, the
term means merely residence, that is, personal residence, not legal residence or domicile. Residence simply
requires bodily presence as an inhabitant in a given place, while domicile requires bodily presence in that
place and also an intention to make it one's domicile. No particular length of time of residence is required
though; however, the residence must be more than temporary."18

There is no dispute that petitioner Saludo was the congressman or the representative of the lone district of
Southern Leyte at the time of filing of his complaint with the court a quo. Even the appellate court admits
this fact as it states that "it may be conceded that private respondent ever so often travels to Maasin City,
Southern Leyte, because he is its representative in the lower house."19

As a member of the House of Representatives, petitioner Saludo was correctly deemed by the court a quo
as possessing the requirements for the said position,20 including that he was then a resident of the district
which he was representing, i.e., Southern Leyte. Significantly, for purposes of election law, the term
"residence" is synonymous with "domicile," thus:

x x x [T]he Court held that "domicile" and "residence" are synonymous. The term "residence," as used in
the election law, imports not only an intention to reside in a fixed place but also personal presence in that
place, coupled with conduct indicative of such intention. "Domicile" denotes a fixed permanent residence to
which when absent for business or pleasure, or for like reasons, one intends to return. x x x 21

It can be readily gleaned that the definition of "residence" for purposes of election law is more stringent in
that it is equated with the term "domicile." Hence, for the said purpose, the term "residence" imports "not
only an intention to reside in a fixed place but also personal presence in that place, coupled with conduct
indicative of such intention."22When parsed, therefore, the term "residence" requires two elements: (1)
intention to reside in the particular place; and (2) personal or physical presence in that place, coupled with
conduct indicative of such intention. As the Court elucidated, "the place where a party actually or
constructively has a permanent home, where he, no matter where he may be found at any given time,
eventually intends to return and remain, i.e., his domicile, is that to which the Constitution refers when it
speaks of residence for the purposes of election law."23

On the other hand, for purposes of venue, the less technical definition of "residence" is adopted. Thus, it is
understood to mean as "the personal, actual or physical habitation of a person, actual residence or place of
abode. It signifies physical presence in a place and actual stay thereat. In this popular sense, the term
means merely residence, that is, personal residence, not legal residence or domicile. Residence simply
requires bodily presence as an inhabitant in a given place, while domicile requires bodily presence in that
place and also an intention to make it one's domicile."24

Since petitioner Saludo, as congressman or the lone representative of the district of Southern Leyte, had
his residence (or domicile) therein as the term is construed in relation to election laws, necessarily, he is
also deemed to have had his residence therein for purposes of venue for filing personal actions. Put in
another manner, Southern Leyte, as the domicile of petitioner Saludo, was also his residence, as the term
is understood in its popular sense. This is because "residence is not domicile, but domicile is residence
coupled with the intention to remain for an unlimited time."

Reliance by the appellate court on Koh v. Court of Appeals25 is misplaced. Contrary to its holding,26 the facts
of the present case are not similar to the facts therein. In Koh, the complaint was filed with the Court of
First Instance in San Nicolas, Ilocos Norte by plaintiff who admitted that he was a resident of Kamias,
Quezon City. Save for the fact that he grew up in San Nicolas, Ilocos Norte and that he manifested the intent
to return there after retirement, plaintiff therein had not established that he was actually a resident therein
at the time of the filing of his complaint. Neither did he establish that he had his domicile therein because
although he manifested the intent to go back there after retirement, the element of personal presence in
that place was lacking. To reiterate, domicile or residence, as the terms are taken as synonyms, imports
"not only an intention to reside in a fixed place but also personal presence in that place, coupled with conduct
indicative of such intention."27

In contrast, petitioner Saludo was the congressman or representative of Southern Leyte at the time of filing
of his complaint with the court a quo. Absent any evidence to the contrary, he is deemed to possess the
qualifications for the said position, including that he was a resident therein. And following the definition of
the term "residence" for purposes of election law, petitioner Saludo not only had the intention to reside in
Southern Leyte, but he also had personal presence therein, coupled with conduct indicative of such intention.
The latter element, or his bodily presence as an inhabitant in Southern Leyte, was sufficient for petitioner
Saludo to be considered a resident therein for purposes of venue.

The following ratiocination of the court a quo is apt:

Residence in civil law is a material fact, referring to the physical presence of a person in a place. A person
can have two or more residences, such as a country residence and a city residence. (Quetulio v. Ruiz, S.C.
Off. Gaz. 156, Commentaries and Jurisprudence in Civil Law, Vol. 1, page 211, Tolentino). Residence is
acquired by living in a place; on the other hand, domicile can exist without actually living in the place. The
important thing for domicile is that, once residence has been established in one place, there be an intention
to stay there permanently, even if residence is also established in some other place.

Thus, if a person lives with his family habitually in Quezon City, he would have his domicile in Quezon City.
If he also has a house for vacation purposes in the City of Baguio, and another house in connection with his
business in the City of Manila, he would have residence in all three places (Tolentino, Commentaries and
Jurisprudence on Civil Law, Vol. 1, Page 212, 1990 Edition) so that one[']s legal residence or domicile can
also be his actual, personal or physical residence or habitation or place of abode if he stays there with
intention to stay there permanently.

In the instant case, since plaintiff has a house in Makati City for the purpose of exercising his profession or
doing business and also a house in Ichon, Macrohon, Southern Leyte, for doing business and/or for election
or political purposes where he also lives or stays physically, personally and actually then he can have
residences in these two places. Because it would then be preposterous to acknowledge and recognize plaintiff
Aniceto G. Saludo, Jr. as congressman of Southern Leyte without also recognizing him as actually, personally
and physically residing thereat, when such residence is required by law.28

The fact then that petitioner Saludo's community tax certificate was issued at Pasay City is of no moment
because granting arguendo that he could be considered a resident therein, the same does not preclude his
having a residence in Southern Leyte for purposes of venue. A man can have but one domicile for one and
the same purpose at any time, but he may have numerous places of residence. 29

That petitioner Saludo was the congressman or representative of the lone district of Southern Leyte at the
time of the filing of his complaint was admitted as a fact by the court a quo. In this connection, it
consequently held that, as such, petitioner Saludo's residence in Southern Leyte, the district he was the
representing, could be taken judicial notice of. The court a quo cannot be faulted for doing so because courts
are allowed "to take judicial notice of matters which are of public knowledge, or are capable of
unquestionable demonstration, or ought to be known to judges because of their judicial functions." 30 Courts
are likewise bound to take judicial notice, without the introduction of evidence, of the law in force in the
Philippines, 31 including its Constitution.

The concept of "facts of common knowledge" in the context of judicial notice has been explained as those
facts that are "so commonly known in the community as to make it unprofitable to require proof, and so
certainly known to as to make it indisputable among reasonable men." 32 Moreover, "though usually facts
of 'common knowledge' will be generally known throughout the country, it is sufficient as a basis for judicial
notice that they be known in the local community where the trial court sits." 33 Certainly, the fact of
petitioner Saludo being the duly elected representative of Southern Leyte at the time could be properly
taken judicial notice of by the court a quo, the same being a matter of common knowledge in the community
where it sits.

Further, petitioner Saludo's residence in Southern Leyte could likewise be properly taken judicial notice of
by the court a quo. It is bound to know that, under the Constitution, one of the qualifications of a
congressman or representative to the House of Representatives is having a residence in the district in which
he shall be elected.

In fine, petitioner Saludo's act of filing his complaint with the court a quo cannot be characterized as a
"specie of forum-shopping" or capricious on his part because, under the rules, as plaintiff, he is precisely
given this option.

Finally, respondents' claim that the instant petition for review was not properly verified by petitioner Saludo
deserves scant consideration.

Section 4, Rule 7 of the Rules of Court reads:

Sec. 4. Verification. - Except when otherwise specifically required by law or rule, pleadings need not be
under oath, verified or accompanied by affidavit.

A pleading is verified by an affidavit that the affiant has read the pleading and that the allegations therein
are true and correct of his personal knowledge or based on authentic records.

A pleading required to be verified which contains a verification based on "information and belief," or upon
"knowledge, information and belief," or lacks proper verification, shall be treated as an unsigned pleading.

Petitioner Saludo's verification and certification of non-forum shopping states that he has "read the contents
thereof [referring to the petition] and the same are true and correct of my own personal knowledge and
belief and on the basis of the records at hand." The same clearly constitutes substantial compliance with
the above requirements of the Rules of Court.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision dated May 22, 2003 and
Resolution dated August 14, 2003 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 69553 are REVERSED and SET
ASIDE. The Orders dated September 10, 2001 and January 2, 2002 of the Regional Trial Court of Maasin
City, Southern Leyte, Branch 25 thereof, in Civil Case No. R-3172 are REINSTATED. SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 185708 September 29, 2010

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Appellee,

vs.
JUANITO CABIGQUEZ y ALASTRA, Appellant.

DECISION

VILLARAMA, JR., J.:

On appeal is the Decision1 dated July 9, 2008 of the Court of Appeals (CA), Mindanao Station, which affirmed
the Decision2 dated October 29, 2003 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Cagayan de Oro City, Branch 18
finding appellant Juanito Cabigquez y Alastra (Cabigquez) and Romulo Grondiano y Soco (Grondiano) guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of robbery (Criminal Case No. 2001-816), and also convicting appellant Cabigquez
of rape (Criminal Case No. 2001-815), both crimes committed against private complainant AAA, 3 a 43-year
old widow and mother of ten (10) children. Grondiano decided to withdraw his appeal before the appellate
court.4 Hence, this review shall consider only Cabigquez’s appeal.

Below are the facts, as culled from the records of both the trial and appellate courts.

In the evening of March 26, 2001, AAA and her three minor children – BBB, CCC, and DDD5 – slept inside
AAA’s small sari-sari store which was annexed through the exterior balcony of her house at Purok 1-A,
Tablon in Cagayan de Oro City. AAA’s head was close to the door, while a cabinet stood at her right side.
She left the 50-watt incandescent bulb on as they slept through the night.6

At around 3:30 a.m., March 27, 2001, AAA was awakened when clothes fell on her face. When she looked
up, she saw a man whose face was covered with a handkerchief and wearing a camouflage jacket and
cycling shorts. He immediately poked a gun at her. AAA shouted "Ayyy!," rousing her three children from
sleep.7 Despite the cover on the burglar’s face, BBB was able to identify him as Romulo Grondiano, one of
their neighbors, based on the hanging mole located below his left eye. 8 Armed with a stainless
handgun,9 Grondiano ordered AAA and her children to lie face down.10 Though stricken with fear, BBB
noticed that Grondiano had a companion who stayed at the balcony keeping watch. 11 Grondiano then
ransacked the store, taking with him ₱3,000.00 cash from the cabinet and ₱7,000.00 worth of grocery items.
Before he left, Grondiano pointed the gun at AAA’s back and warned them not to make any noise.12

As soon as Grondiano left the store, the other man entered. BBB identified the man as appellant Juanito
Cabigquez as the latter did not conceal his face. Armed with Grondiano’s gun, Cabigquez stripped AAA of
her short pants and underwear, placed a pillow on her lower abdomen and mounted her from behind. He
lifted and twisted one of her legs and pinned the other. AAA shouted "Ayaw!" (No!), but offered no further
resistance. Cabigquez inserted his penis into AAA’s vagina, and proceeded to ravish her in full view of her
children, and even as the latter cried for mercy. Before he left, Cabigquez threatened to kill AAA and her
children if they would tell anyone about the incident.13

Afraid for their lives, AAA and her children remained prostrate on the floor even after the two malefactors
had left. Shortly thereafter, they decided to proceed to the house of AAA’s older son, EEE, and asked for
help. AAA failed to disclose to her son the identities of the two men. Meanwhile, BBB, fearing retaliation
from the two men, decided not to divulge the identities of Cabigquez and Grondiano to her mother and
brother.14

That same morning, March 27, 2001, AAA reported the incident to the Puerto Police Station. No criminal
complaint, however, was filed since AAA was still uncertain of the identities of the two men. AAA was
physically examined by Dr. Cristilda O. Villapañe and Dr. Riman Ricardo, resident physicians at the Northern
Mindanao Medical Center.15Dr. Villapañe’s examination revealed that the smear recovered from AAA’s vagina
was positive for spermatozoa,16while Dr. Ricardo found a two-centimeter contusion on AAA’s left hand
dorsum.17

On May 24, 2001, Cabigquez was arrested for possession of illegal drugs.18 Grondiano was likewise arrested
on May 26, 2001 also for possession of illegal drugs.19 With the two men incarcerated, and now certain of
their safety, BBB finally mustered the courage to reveal the identities of Cabigquez and Grondiano to her
mother.20

On July 18, 2001, two Informations were filed against Cabigquez and Grondiano, viz:

Criminal Case No. 2001-816 (For: Robbery)

The undersigned Assistant City Prosecutor accuses JUANITO CABIGQUEZ y ALASTRA, alias "DODOY", and
ROMULO GRONDIANO y SOCO, alias "Molok", of the crime they committed, as follows:

That on March 27, 2001, at more or less 3:30 o’clock in the early morning in a store located at Purok 1-A,
Barangay Tablon, Cagayan de Oro City, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the
above-named accused, conspiring, confederating and helping with one another, with intent to gain and
violence or intimidation of persons, did then and there wil[l]fully, unlawfully and feloniously take, rob and
carry away cash – Php3,000.00 and assorted [grocery] stocks valued Php7,000.00 all in all amounting to
Php10,000.00, owned by and belonging to one [AAA], in the following manner: that accused Romulo
Grondiano intimidated the offended party with a gun pointed to her and her three children and ordered them
to lay on the floor with face down and then took, robbed and carried away the aforementioned valuable
personal things while Juanito Cabigquez y Alastra acting/serving as lookout at the door of the store, to the
damage and prejudice of the offended party, in the total sum of Php10,000.00, Philippine Currency.

Contrary to and in violation to Article 294, par. 5, of the Revised Penal Code, as amended. 21

Criminal Case No. 2001-815 (For: Rape)

The undersigned Assistant City Prosecutor accuses, JUANITO CABIGQUEZ Y ALASTRA ALIAS "DODOY", of
the crime of RAPE that he committed as follows:

That on March 27, 2001, at more or less 3:30 o’clock or thereabout, in the early morning, at Purok 1A,
Tablon, Cagayan de Oro City, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-
named accused, armed with a gun, and with the use thereof, by means of force, and intimidation, did then
and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have carnal knowledged (sic) of the offended party [AAA],
against her will [and] in the presence and full view of her children.

Contrary to and in violation to (sic) Article 266-A (Formerly under Art. 335) of the Revised Penal Code, as
amended by R.A. 8353.22

Both accused pleaded not guilty to the charges. 23 During the trial, Cabigquez admitted that on the night of
March 26, 2001, he slept in the house of Leonila Omilao, a neighbor of Cabigquez and AAA. 24 He admitted
that he did not have any quarrel with AAA and found no possible reason why AAA would file the complaints
and testify against him.25 Omilao herself testified that Cabigquez was in her house on the night of the
incident and even saw the latter sleeping in the kitchen. During Omilao’s cross-examination, however, the
trial court noted Silvina Cabigquez, appellant’s daughter, coaching Omilao in her answers. 26

On October 21, 2002, the trial court, on motion by the defense, ordered the National Bureau of Investigation
(NBI) in Manila to conduct a deoxyribonucleic acid (DNA) analysis on the sperm taken from AAA’s vagina.
On May 21, 2003, NBI Forensic Chemist III Aida Viloria Magsipoc testified that the sample collected from
AAA did not match Cabigquez’s DNA profile since the specimen submitted to them were mere vaginal
discharges from AAA.27

On October 29, 2003, the trial court rendered judgment convicting Cabigquez and Grondiano of the crimes
charged. The dispositive portion of said decision reads:

IN THE LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the Court finds accused JUANITO CABIGQUEZ GUILTY beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of Rape under Article 266-A of the Revised Penal Code, punishable under
Article 266-B of the same Code, and there being one aggravating circumstance [the used (sic) of a deadly
weapon (firearm)] without a[ny] mitigating circumstance, accused JUANITO CABIGQUEZ is hereby
sentenced and is SO ORDERED to suffer the supreme penalty of Death by lethal injection, including its
accessory penalties. He is further directed and is SO ORDERED to pay the victim the sum of FIFTY
THOUSAND PESOS (P50,000.00) as indemnity, plus another TWENTY FIVE THOUSAND PESOS (P25,000.00),
as moral damages. Pursuant to Section 22 of R.A. 7659 and Section 10 of Rule 122 of the Rules of Court,
let the entire record of this case be forwarded to the Supreme Court for automatic review.

FURTHERMORE, the Court likewise finds accused JUANITO CABIGQUEZ and ROMULO GRONDIANO GUILTY
beyond reasonable doubt of the Crime of Robbery punishable under paragraph 5 of Article 294 of the Revised
Penal Code, and [there] being no aggravating nor mitigating circumstance, and after applying the
Indeterminate Sentence Law, accused JUANITO CABIGQUEZ and ROMULO GRONDIANO are hereby
sentenced and are SO ORDERED to serve the [penalty of] imprisonment of TWO (2) YEARS, TEN (10)
MONTHS AND TWENTY (20) DAYS OF PRISION CORRECCIONAL, as the MINIMUM, to SIX (6) YEARS, ONE
(1) MONTH AND ELEVEN (11) DAYS OF PRISION MAYOR, as the MAXIMUM, including its accessory penalties,
plus further SO ORDERED to pay the stolen items and cash in the sum of TEN THOUSAND PESOS
(P10,000.00).

SO ORDERED. Cagayan de Oro City, October 29, 2003.28

The records of the case were elevated to this Court on automatic review. Pursuant to our ruling in People v.
Mateo,29 the case was referred to the CA.

In his appeal, appellant maintained his defense of alibi and denial. He questioned the accuracy and credibility
of BBB’s testimony given her failure to immediately divulge the identity of the perpetrators after the incident.
Appellant also noted that AAA’s lone interjection, while she was allegedly being raped by him, can hardly be
considered as a manifest resistance.30 The defense also argued that the prosecution failed to establish
conspiracy since BBB did not actually see that Cabigquez was on the balcony while the robbery was being
committed.31
By Decision dated July 9, 2008, the CA upheld the RTC in convicting appellant of both crimes of robbery and
rape. The CA found BBB’s testimony candid and not prompted by ill-motive. As to BBB’s failure to promptly
implicate Grondiano and Cabigquez for the crimes, the appellate court ruled that this cannot be taken against
her in the light of serious threats made by said accused on their family. The alleged contradictions in the
testimonies of AAA and BBB were likewise not fatal to the case of the prosecution as they bear no materiality
to the commission of the crime. The CA also noted that the accused were able to consummate their criminal
acts without any physical resistance from the victims who could not even cry loudly because they were
ordered at gunpoint not to make any noise. It rejected the defense of alibi put up by Cabigquez in view of
his admission that he stayed at a house within the vicinity of AAA’s store.32

The CA thus decreed:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the appealed October 29, 2003 Decision of the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) of Misamis Oriental, 10th Judicial Region, Branch 18, Cagayan de Oro City, convicting Juanito A.
Cabigquez, the lone appellant before Us, for the crimes of Robbery and Rape, is hereby AFFIRMED with
MODIFICATION in that Juanito A. Cabigquez is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua
for the crime of Rape.

SO ORDERED.33

Before this Court, appellant Cabigquez reiterates the following arguments:

I.

THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN CONVICTING THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT OF THE CRIME
CHARGED DESPITE THE FAILURE OF THE PROSECUTION TO PROVE THEIR GUILT BEYOND
REASONABLE DOUBT.

II.

THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN GIVING WEIGHT AND CREDENCE TO THE INCREDIBLE AND
INCONSISTENT TESTIMONY OF THE PROSECUTION WITNESSES.

III.

ASSUMING ARGUENDO THAT THE ACCUSED-APPELLANTS COMMITTED ROBBERY, THE COURT A QUO
GRAVELY ERRED IN ORDERING THEM TO PAY THE COMPLAINANT P10,000.00 AS ACTUAL DAMAGES.

IV.

THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN FINDING THAT THERE WAS CONSPIRACY IN THE CASE AT
BAR.34

We sustain the ruling of the CA.

The factual findings of the RTC, as affirmed by the appellate court, indubitably prove that appellant raped
AAA even if the specimen obtained from the vaginal swabs and submitted to the NBI failed to match
appellant’s DNA profile. Rape is committed by a man who shall have carnal knowledge of a woman through
force, threat or intimidation.35The commission of rape was clearly shown by testimonial and documentary
evidence; the defense submits that it is the identity of the perpetrator which is not duly established.

For purposes of criminal investigation, DNA identification is indeed a fertile source of both inculpatory and
exculpatory evidence.36 In this case, however, the result of the DNA test is rendered inconclusive to
exculpate or inculpate the appellant since the sample tested by the NBI merely contained vaginal discharges.
In the laboratory test earlier conducted by Dr. Villapañe on the vaginal swab obtained from AAA’s genitalia,
the presence of spermatozoa was confirmed. This notwithstanding, the totality of evidence satisfactorily
established that it was indeed appellant who raped AAA.

AAA’s daughter, BBB, who witnessed the entire incident which happened inside their store on the night in
question, positively identified appellant as the one who raped her mother against the latter’s will by
threatening her and her children with a handgun he was then carrying. BBB’s unflinching and consistent
testimony, when taken together with Dr. Villapañe’s findings and AAA’s own declarations in court, provides
sufficient basis for the conviction of appellant for rape.

Quoted herein are the relevant portions of BBB’s testimony on direct examination as to her identification of
appellant as her mother’s rapist, viz:

Q Now, [BBB], you said that you are 13 years old and you said a while ago you sworn that you will
tell the truth, can you remember that?
A Yes, sir.

Q Okay now, are you going to tell the truth and nothing but the truth before this Honorable Court?

A Yes, sir I will tell the truth.

Q Do you know what will happen to you if you tell a lie in court?

A Yes, sir I will be imprisoned.

Q Do you want to be imprisoned?

A No, sir.

Q So, you will tell the truth nothing but the truth?

A Yes, sir.

Q Do you know accused Romulo Grondiano?

A Yes, sir because he is our neighbor.

xxxx

Q Do you also know accused Juanito Cabigquez who is accused for rape and co-accused in robbery?

A Yes, sir he is also our neighbor.

Q For how long have you known Juanito Cabigquez before March 27, 2001?

A Since I came that age of reason I already knew Juanito Cabigquez.

Q Is Juanito Cabigquez also a resident of Purok 1-A at Tablon?

A Yes, sir.

Q Do you also know the nickname of Juanito Cabigquez?

A Its Dodoy.

Q If Juanito Cabigquez is inside this courtroom, can you point to him?

A Note: Witness pointed to a person who when asked of his name identified himself as Juanito
Cabigquez.

Q Okay, on March 27, 2001 at about 3:30 early in the morning, do you remember where were you?

A I was inside our store sleeping together with our mother.

Q Aside from you and your mother, who were other persons who were with you?

A Together with my two (2) siblings.

xxxx

Q Now, while you were sleeping together with your mother and your two (2) younger siblings at that
time, what happened?

xxxx

A The three (3) of us were awakened because of the shout of our mother.

Q Who is that us?

A I together with my two (2) siblings.

Q Your mother also woke up?

A Yes, sir.

Q Now, after you were awakened by the shout of your mother, what did you observe, if there was
any?

A I saw my mother knelt down and I came nearer and then I embraced her because I thought she
was dreaming but I saw Romulo Grondiano with a gun.

xxxx

Q Alright, what happened while you saw accused Romulo Grondiano already at the door of your store
of your mother holding a gun and your mother was kneeling?

A He ordered us to lay face down.

Q After Romulo Grondiano ordered you to lay face down, what did you, your mother and your two
(2) siblings do?

A I let my mother lay face down.

Q How about you?

A I also lay face down.

Q How about your two (2) younger siblings?

A They also lay face down.

Q Alright, while the four (4) of you were lying face down, what did you observe?

A I noticed that he had a companion who is at our balcony.

Q How were you able to notice that he has a companion?

A Because we had a chair made of bamboo and then if somebody or a person hit it, it will sound.

xxxx

Q Now, after Romulo Grondiano took all those things that you have enumerated a while ago, where
did Romulo Grondiano go?

A He pointed a gun at my mother’s back and then ordered us not to move.

xxxx

Q Alright, after Romulo Grondiano told you, your mother and your two (2) younger siblings not to
move, where did Romulo Grondiano go?

A He went to the balcony and then Juanito Cabigquez replaced him (Romulo) in going up, he (Juanito)
went inside our store.

xxxx

Q Alright, you testified a while ago that after Romulo Grondiano went inside your store he passed by
the balcony of your house, then co-accused Juanito Cabigquez came in, where did Juanito Cabigquez
come in?

A He entered in our store.

Q The same store where you, your mother and two (2) younger siblings were staying at that time?

A Yes, sir.

Q How were you able to recognize that it was Juanito Cabigquez who came in?

A Because I saw him.

Q When you saw Juanito Cabigquez, were you still lying face down or were you already sitting?
A I was already lying face down.

Q How were you able to see him?

A Because I looked back at the door because I thought that Romulo Grondiano already left but then
I saw Juanito Cabigquez came in and replaced Romulo Grondiano.

Q This Juanito Cabigquez who came in after Romulo Grondiano went out, is he the same Juanito
Cabigquez the co-accused for robbery and accused in rape case?

A Yes, sir.

Q If he is inside this courtroom, can you point him again?

A Note: Witness pointed again to a person who when asked of his name identified himself as Juanito
Cabigquez.

Q After Juanito Cabigquez came in inside the store, what did you observe?

A He removed the shortpants of my mother and then he got the pillow of my mother and placed it
under her abdomen.

xxxx

Q Now, what was the position of your mother when Juanito Cabigquez took off the shortpants of your
mother?

A She was still lying face down.

Q What was the position of your mother when Juanito Cabigquez put the pillow under her abdomen?

A She was still lying face down.

Q By the way, when Juanito Cabigquez entered the store, was the light still on?

A Yes, sir.

Q Now, you said that your mother shouted when Juanito Cabigquez came in. My question is, when
did your mother actually shout?

A When Juanito Cabigquez was removing the shortpants of my mother.

COURT: (to the witness)

Q Can you tell the Court what kind of shout your mother did?

A My mother shouted "ay!"

PROS. M. NOLASCO: (cont’g.)

Q Now, was Juanito able to take off the shortpants of your mother?

A Yes, sir because it was a gartered shortpants.

Q Now, how about the panty of your mother?

A It was removed together with the shortpants.

Q Now, after the shortpants and panty of your mother were taken off and the pillow was placed
under her abdomen, what next did you observe?

A Juanito Cabigquez mounted on my mother.

Q And then, what did Juanito do when he mounted to your mother?

A He did a push and pull motion.

Q How about your two (2) younger siblings, were they still awake at that time?
 A Yes, sir, they were crying.

Q How about you?

A I also cried.

Q When you noticed that he (Juanito Cabigquez) entered your store, was he carrying a gun?

xxxx

A He was bringing a gun.

xxxx

Q Can you demonstrate the length of the gun that you saw?

A The gun which Juanito Cabigquez was bringing was the same gun Romulo brought.

Q How about your mother while Juanito Cabigquez was already mounted on her and make a push
and pull motion, what did your mother do?

A My mother was crying.

xxxx

Q You said that you, your mother and your two (2) younger siblings were crying while Juanito
Cabigquez mounted on your mother and made a push and pull motion, what happened after that?

A He pointed his gun at the back of my mother and then told us not to tell to anybody because they
will return and kill us.

Q Now, after Juanito Cabigquez warned you not to tell anybody otherwise they will return and kill
you, what did Juanito Cabigquez do?

A He went up to the balcony.

xxxx

Q How about Juanito Cabigquez, when he entered your store of your mother and raped your mother,
what was he wearing?

A He was wearing a white t-shirt and maong pants.

COURT: (to the witness)

Q Was it long or short?

A Long pants.

xxxx 37
(Emphasis supplied.)

Appellant asserts that it is significant that AAA herself did not recognize him and his co-accused despite her
familiarity with them as they were her customers in her store. It was pointed out that the identification of
the perpetrators was supplied solely by her daughter BBB, who should not have been given any credence in
view of her inconsistent declarations such as when she testified that when she woke up, her mother was
kneeling contrary to the latter’s testimony that when clothes fell on her face, she was awakened and that
her mother shouted but a gun was pointed to her. Moreover, BBB saw the accused several times after the
alleged crimes transpired and yet she did not manifest any alarm even when they reported the matter to
the police; it was only after the accused were detained that their identities were revealed. In the light of
serious discrepancies in the testimonies of prosecution witnesses, appellant maintains that BBB’s
identification of the perpetrators of robbery and rape was unreliable and doubtful. 38

We are not persuaded.

While it is true that the most natural reaction for victims of crimes is to strive to remember the faces of
their assailants and the manner in which the craven acts are committed,39 in this case, AAA cannot be
faulted for failing to recognize appellant as her rapist though the latter was their neighbor. It must be
recalled, as narrated by AAA and BBB, they were all still lying face down when appellant suddenly entered
the store right after his co-accused Grondiano exited through the balcony taking the loot with him. BBB
recounted that her mother was still lying face down when appellant removed her mother’s short pants and
panty, placed a pillow below her abdomen and then proceeded to rape her. It was BBB who had the
opportunity to look at this second person who entered their house because she looked back at the door
thinking that Grondiano (the one who first entered the store) already left, but then appellant immediately
came in after Grondiano. Although AAA was able to shout at that time, she could not move because she was
afraid that her three children, who were already crying, will be harmed.40

As to the alleged inconsistency in the position of her mother when accused Grondiano entered their store,
the same is inexistent considering that AAA was relating the exact moment when she woke up and realized
the presence of an intruder because clothes fell on her face, while BBB who was awakened by the shout of
her mother, simply described her mother then already in a kneeling position as she woke up first. BBB had
thought her mother was just dreaming but then she saw Grondiano already inside the house with a gun.

Neither would BBB’s delay in revealing the identities of the perpetrators to the police taint her identification
of appellant as the one who raped her mother and conspirator of Grondiano in robbing their store. Failure
to immediately reveal the identity of a perpetrator of a felony does not affect, much less impair, the
credibility of witnesses, more so if such delay is adequately explained.41 BBB sufficiently explained her action
in not immediately divulging to her mother and brother nor reporting to the police whom she saw inside
their house that early morning of March 27, 2001. She was afraid that the assailants would make good their
threat that they will return and kill their family if they reported the incident to anybody. But when a couple
of months later appellant and his co-accused Grondiano were arrested on drug charges, BBB finally felt it
was safe to come out in the open and inform the police of the identities of the two men who robbed their
house, one of whom subsequently raped her mother (appellant).

Appellant cannot seek acquittal on the basis of the negative result of the DNA test on the specimen
conducted by the NBI.

A positive DNA match is unnecessary when the totality of the evidence presented before the court points to
no other possible conclusion, i.e., appellant raped the private offended party. A positive DNA match may
strengthen the evidence for the prosecution, but an inconclusive DNA test result may not be sufficient to
exculpate the accused, particularly when there is sufficient evidence proving his guilt. Notably, neither a
positive DNA match of the semen nor the presence of spermatozoa is essential in finding that rape was
committed. The important consideration in rape cases is not the emission of semen but the penetration of
the female genitalia by the male organ.42

Moreover, it is evident that the rape of AAA was committed in the presence and in full view of her three
minor children. Thirteen (13)-year old BBB, as well as her two minor siblings who were present at the time
when the rape was committed, was already old enough to sense the bestiality being committed against their
own mother.43 Such circumstance, as recited in the last portion of the Information for Criminal Case No.
2001-815 is, by itself, sufficient to qualify the rape under Article 266-B of the Revised Penal Code,44 as
amended. Consequently, the CA was correct in affirming the conviction of appellant for qualified rape.

With respect to the charge of robbery, we find no merit in appellant’s argument that the prosecution failed
to establish that he conspired with co-accused Grondiano in stealing goods from private complainant’s store.
He asserts that there was no proof that he was outside the store when the crime of robbery was being
committed; private complainant and her daughter merely surmised that another person was outside the
store because of a creaking sound created by a bamboo chair, but they actually did not see that person or
if there was indeed that person.45

On this issue, we hold that the CA correctly ruled that conspiracy was sufficiently proven by circumstantial
evidence on record, thus:

We also find that the trial court correctly appreciated conspiracy against Cabigquez with respect [to] the
crime of robbery. There is conspiracy when two or more persons come to an agreement concerning the
commission of a felony and decide to commit it. Direct proof of previous agreement to commit a crime is
not necessary. Conspiracy may be shown through circumstantial evidence, deduced from the mode and
manner in which the offense was perpetrated, or inferred upon the acts of the accused themselves when
such lead to a joint purpose and design, concerted action, and community of interest.

Neither [AAA] nor [BBB] saw Cabigquez acting as a lookout outside the store. However, the creaking sound
coming from the balcony and the fact that [BBB] saw Cabigquez go inside the store, as soon as Grondiano
left, reasonably verify a discernment that someone stood by outside and close to the store’s entrance during
the looting, and that such person was Cabigquez. The fact that only Grondiano concealed his face reasonably
indicates a prior agreement between the two (2) malefactors for Cabigquez to act as a lookout in the
commission of robbery. After raping [AAA], Cabigquez also warned of killing [AAA and her children] if they
told anyone about the incident, which threat contributed to the common sentiment of concealing both crimes
of robbery and rape. These circumstances sufficiently establish a joint purpose and design, and a community
of interest, between Cabigquez and Grondiano, in committing the crime of robbery. 46

On the matter of actual damages awarded by the trial court, appellant questions the amount thereof,
insisting there was no basis for the actual cost of the items taken from the store.
We find no reversible error committed by the CA in sustaining such award. In People v. Martinez,47 this
Court ruled that the trial court has the power to take judicial notice of the value of stolen goods because
these are matters of public knowledge or capable of unquestionable demonstration. Judicial cognizance,
which is based on considerations of expediency and convenience, displace evidence since, being equivalent
to proof, it fulfills the object which the evidence is intended to achieve. Surely, matters like the value of the
appliances, canned goods and perfume are undeniably within public knowledge and easily capable of
unquestionable demonstration.48 Here, what is involved are common goods for everyday use and ordinary
stocks found in small sari-sari stores like private complainant’s store, i.e., milk, soap, coffee, sugar, liquor
and cigarettes. The RTC was thus correct in granting the reasonable amount of ₱10,000.00 as computed by
the private complainant representing the value of stolen merchandise from her store.

Further, the Court deems it proper to adjust the sums awarded as civil indemnity, moral and exemplary
damages. Applying prevailing jurisprudence, the private complainant is entitled to ₱75,000.00 as civil
indemnity, ₱75,000.00 as moral damages and ₱25,000.00 as exemplary damages. 49

Lastly, the death penalty imposed on appellant was correctly modified to reclusion perpetua, in view of the
passage of Republic Act No. 9346, entitled "An Act Prohibiting the Imposition of Death Penalty in the
Philippines."50Notwithstanding the reduction of the penalty imposed on appellant, he is not eligible for parole
following Section 3 of the said law, which provides:

SEC. 3. Persons convicted of offenses punished with reclusion perpetua, or whose sentences will be reduced
to reclusion perpetua, by reason of this Act, shall not be eligible for parole under Act No. 4103, otherwise
known as the Indeterminate Sentence Law, as amended.

WHEREFORE, the appeal is DISMISSED and the Decision dated July 9, 2008 of the Court of Appeals,
Mindanao Station in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 00409 is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATIONS in that the penalty of
reclusion perpetua imposed on appellant in Criminal Case No. 2001-815 for qualified rape is herein clarified
as without eligibility for parole, and the appellant is ordered to pay the private complainant ₱75,000.00 as
civil indemnity, ₱75,000.00 as moral damages and ₱25,000.00 as exemplary damages. With costs against
the appellant. SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 150949 June 21, 2007

JUDGE DOLORES L. ESPAÑOL,* Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court, Branch 90, Dasmariñas,
Cavite,petitioner,
vs.
ATTY. BENJAMIN S. FORMOSO and SPOUSES BENITO SEE and MARLY SEE, respondents.

DECISION

SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J.:

Before us is a Petition for Review on Certiorari assailing the Decision1 dated September 12, 2001 and
Resolution dated November 15, 2001 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 65652.

The facts are:

On April 15, 1994, Sharcons Builders Philippines, Inc. (Sharcons) bought from Evanswinda Morales a piece
of land consisting of 33,130 square meters in Paliparan, Dasmariñas, Cavite. The property is covered by
Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. T-278479 issued in her name by the Register of Deeds of Trece
Martires City.

Thus, TCT No. T-278479 in Evanswinda’s name was cancelled and in lieu thereof, TCT No. T-511462 was
issued in the name of Sharcons. However, when the latter’s workers tried to fence and take possession of
the lot, they were prevented by the caretaker of spouses Joseph and Enriqueta Mapua. The caretaker
claimed that spouses Mapua are the owners of the land. Sharcons verified the status of the title and found
that TCT No. T-107163 was indeed registered in the names of spouses Mapua as early as July 13, 1979.

On January 25, 2000, Sharcons filed with the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 90, Dasmariñas, Cavite a
complaint for quieting of title, docketed as Civil Case No. 2035-00. Impleaded as defendants were spouses
Mapua, Evanswinda Morales, and the Register of Deeds of Trece Martires City.

In their answer, spouses Mapua alleged, among others, that all the documents relied upon by Sharcons are
spurious and falsified.

In the course of the proceedings, or on July 9, 2001, Judge Dolores L. Español, petitioner, issued an Order
stating that Benito See and Marly See, president and treasurer, respectively, of Sharcons, and its counsel,
Atty. Benjamin Formoso, respondents, have used a spurious certificate of title and tax declaration when it
(Sharcons) filed with the RTC its complaint for quieting of title. Consequently, petitioner declared
respondents guilty of direct contempt of court and ordered their confinement for ten (10) days in the
municipal jail of Dasmariñas, Cavite.

Petitioner’s Order is partly reproduced as follows:

From the foregoing circumstances, this Court is of the view and so holds that the instant case is a
callous and blatant imposition of lies, falsehoods, deceptions, and fraudulent manipulations, through
the extensive use of falsified documents by the plaintiff corporation and its former counsel, Atty.
Benjamin S. Formoso, defendant Evanswinda C. Morales and even the Geodetic Engineer who
connived with this private group on one hand, and some officials and employees of the government
agencies responsible for the processing and issuance of spurious or falsified titles, on the other.
Unless these fraudulent operations are put to a complete and drastic halt, the Courts are at the
mercy of these unscrupulous people for their own personal gain.

Using the presumption that whoever is in possession and user of falsified document is the forger
thereof (Gamido v. Court of Appeals, 25 SCRA 101 [1995]), let the appropriate falsification charges
be filed against Benito See and Marly See together with Evanswinda C. Morales. Thus, let a copy of
this Order be forwarded to the National Bureau of Investigation and the Department of Justice for
their appropriate action. As regards Atty. Benjamin S. Formoso, let a copy of this Order be forwarded
to the Bar Confidant’s Office, Supreme Court. Manila.

Further, Benito See and Marly See, President and Treasurer of Sharcons Builders Phils. Inc.,
respectively, and Atty. Benjamin S. Formoso, counsel for Sharcons until March 13, 2001, are declared
and held in contempt for foisting falsehoods and using falsified and spurious documents in the pursuit
of their nefarious activities pursuant to the instant case filed before this Court. Let the corresponding
Warrants of Arrest be issued against the aforesaid respondents who should serve ten (10) days of
detention at the Dasmariñas Municipal Jail, Cavite.

Likewise, the title issued to Sharcons Builders Philippines, Inc., under TCT No. T-511462 allegedly
issued on November 11, 1994, being spurious, is hereby cancelled, it having been derived from
another spurious title with TCT No. T-278479 allegedly issued to Evanswinda C. Morales on December
29, 1989. The Declaration of Real Property No. 4736 is likewise hereby cancelled for being spurious.
Let a copy of this Order be forwarded to the Registry of Deeds for its implementation with respect to
 the two (2) titles for cancellation and to the Assessor’s Office of the Municipality of Dasmariñas,
Cavite, to stave off the proliferation of these spurious instruments.

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the instant case is DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE, whereas,
the private defendant’s counterclaims, which need further substantiation, are likewise dismissed.
However, the said private defendants are not precluded from pursuing their rightful course(s) of
action in the interest of justice.

SO ORDERED.

Petitioner stated that in determining the merits of Sharcons' complaint for quieting of title, she "stumbled"
upon Civil Case No. 623-92 for cancellation of title and damages filed with the RTC, Branch 20, Imus, Cavite,
presided by then Judge Lucenito N. Tagle.2 Petitioner then took judicial notice of the judge’s Decision
declaring that Sharcons' TCT and other supporting documents are falsified and that respondents are
responsible therefor.

On July 12, 2001, petitioner issued warrants of arrest against respondents. They were confined in the
municipal jail of Dasmariñas, Cavite. That same day, respondents filed a motion for bail and a motion to lift
the order of arrest. But they were denied outright by petitioner.

Respondents then filed with the Court of Appeals a petition for a writ of habeas corpus, docketed as CA-
G.R. SP No. 65652. On July 19, 2001, the Court of Appeals granted the petition.

On September 12, 2001, the Court of Appeals promulgated its Decision, the dispositive portion of which
reads:

IN THE LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, finding the instant petition to be meritorious, the same is
hereby GRANTED. Respondent judge’s July 9, 2001 Order, insofar as it declared herein petitioners in
direct contempt and ordered their incarceration for ten (10) days, as well as the Warrant of Arrest,
dated July 12, 2001, and the Order of Commitment, dated July 13, 2001, which the respondent judge
issued against the persons of the herein petitioners, are hereby NULLIFIED and SET ASIDE.

SO ORDERED.

The Court of Appeals ruled that Judge Español erred in taking cognizance of the Decision rendered by then
Judge Tagle in Civil Case No. 623-92 since it was not offered in evidence in Civil Case No. 2035-00 for
quieting of title. Moreover, as the direct contempt of court is criminal in nature, petitioner should have
conducted a hearing. Thus, she could have determined whether respondents are guilty as charged.

Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration but the Court of Appeals denied the same in its Resolution of
November 15, 2001.

Hence, this petition.

The basic question before us is whether petitioner erred in ruling that respondents are guilty of direct
contempt of court for using falsified documents when Sharcons filed its complaint for quieting of title.

The early case of In re Jones3 defined contempt of court as "some act or conduct which tends to interfere
with the business of the court, by a refusal to obey some lawful order of the court, or some act of disrespect
to the dignity of the court which in some way tends to interfere with or hamper the orderly proceedings of
the court and thus lessens the general efficiency of the same." It has also been described as "a defiance of
the authority, justice or dignity of the court; such conduct as tends to bring the authority and administration
of the law into disrespect or to interfere with or prejudice parties litigants or their witnesses during
litigation."4 Simply put, it is despising of the authority, justice, or dignity of the court.5

The offense of contempt traces its origin to that time in England when all courts in the realm were but
divisions of the Curia Regia, the supreme court of the monarch, and to scandalize a court was an affront to
the sovereign.6 This concept was adopted by the Americans and brought to our shores with modifications. In
this jurisdiction, it is now recognized that courts have the inherent power to punish for contempt
on the ground that respect for the courts guarantees the very stability of the judicial
institution.7 Such stability is essential to the preservation of order in judicial proceedings, to the
enforcement of judgments, orders, and mandates of the courts, and, consequently, to the very
administration of justice.8

Rule 71 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended, provides:

SEC. 1. Direct contempt punished summarily. – A person guilty of misbehavior in the presence of or
so near a court as to obstruct or interrupt the proceedings before the same, including disrespect
toward the court, offensive personalities toward others, or refusal to be sworn or to answer as a
witness, or to subscribe an affidavit or deposition when lawfully required to do so, may be summarily
adjudged in contempt by such court and punished by a fine not exceeding two thousand pesos or
 imprisonment not exceeding ten (10) days, or both, if it be a Regional Trial Court or a court of
equivalent or higher rank, or by a fine not exceeding two hundred pesos or imprisonment, not
exceeding one (1) day, or both, if it be a lower court.

In Narcida v. Bowen,9 this Court characterized direct contempt as one done "in the presence of or so near
the court or judge as to obstruct the administration of justice." It is a contumacious act done facie curiae and
may be punished summarily without hearing.10 In other words, one may be summarily adjudged in direct
contempt at the very moment or at the very instance of the commission of the act of contumely.

Section 3, Rule 71 of the same Rules states:

SEC. 3. Indirect contempt to be punished after charge and hearing. – After a charge in writing has
been filed and an opportunity given to the respondent to comment thereon within such period as
may be fixed by the court and to be heard by himself or by counsel, a person guilty of any of the
following acts may be punished for indirect contempt:

(a) Misbehavior of an officer of court in the performance of his official duties or in his official
transactions;

(b) Disobedience of or resistance to a lawful writ, process, order, or judgment of a court, including
the act of a person who, after being dispossessed or ejected from any real property by the judgment
or process of any court of competent jurisdiction, enters or attempts or induces another to enter into
or upon such real property, for the purpose of executing acts of ownership or possession, or in any
manner disturbs the possession given to the person adjudged to be entitled thereto;

(c) Any abuse of or any unlawful interference with the processes or proceedings of a court not
constituting direct contempt under Section 1 of this Rule;

(d) Any improper conduct tending, directly or indirectly, to impede, obstruct, or degrade the
administration of justice;

(e) Assuming to be an attorney or an officer of a court and acting as such without authority;

(f) Failure to obey a subpoena duly served;

(g) The rescue, or attempted rescue, of a person or property in the custody of an officer by virtue of
an order or process of a court held by him.

But nothing in this section shall be so construed as to prevent the court from issuing process to bring
the respondent into court, or from holding him in custody pending such proceedings.

Indirect or constructive contempt, in turn, is one perpetrated outside of the sitting of the court and may
include misbehavior of an officer of a court in the performance of his official duties or in his official
transactions, disobedience of or resistance to a lawful writ, process, order, judgment, or command of a
court, or injunction granted by a court or a judge, any abuse or any unlawful interference with the process
or proceedings of a court not constituting direct contempt, or any improper conduct tending directly or
indirectly to impede, obstruct or degrade the administration of justice.11

We agree with petitioner that the use of falsified and forged documents is a contumacious act. However, it
constitutes indirect contempt not direct contempt. Pursuant to the above provision, such act is an improper
conduct which degrades the administration of justice. In Santos v. Court of First Instance of Cebu, Branch
VI,12 we ruled that the imputed use of a falsified document, more so where the falsity of the document is
not apparent on its face, merely constitutes indirect contempt, and as such is subject to such defenses
as the accused may raise in the proper proceedings. Thus, following Section 3, Rule 71, a contemner may
be punished only after a charge in writing has been filed, and an opportunity has been given to the accused
to be heard by himself and counsel.13 Moreover, settled is the rule that a contempt proceeding is not a civil
action, but a separate proceeding of a criminal nature in which the court exercises limited
jurisdiction.14 Thus, the modes of procedure and the rules of evidence in contempt proceedings are
assimilated as far as practicable to those adapted to criminal prosecutions.15 Perforce, petitioner judge erred
in declaring summarily that respondents are guilty of direct contempt and ordering their incarceration. She
should have conducted a hearing with notice to respondents.

Petitioner, in convicting respondents for direct contempt of court, took judicial notice of the Decision in Civil
Case No. 623-92, assigned to another RTC branch, presided by then Judge Tagle. Section 1, Rule 129 of
the Revised Rules of Court provides:

SEC. 1. Judicial notice, when mandatory. – A court shall take judicial notice, without the introduction
of evidence, of the existence and territorial extent of states, their political history, forms of
government, and symbols of nationality, the law of nations, the admiralty and maritime courts of the
world and their seals, the political constitution and history of the Philippines, the official acts of
 the legislative, executive and judicial departments of the Philippines, the laws of nature, the
measure of time, and the geographical divisions.

In Gener v. De Leon,16 we held that courts are not authorized to take judicial notice of the contents of
records of other cases even when such cases have been tried or pending in the same court. Hence, we
reiterate that petitioner took judicial notice of the Decision rendered by another RTC branch and on the basis
thereof, concluded that respondents used falsified documents (such as land title and tax declaration)
when Sharcons filed its complaint for quieting. Verily, the Court of Appeals did not err in ruling that
respondents are not guilty of direct contempt of court.

Meanwhile, the instant petition challenging the Decision of the Court of Appeals granting the writ of habeas
corpusin favor of respondents has become moot. We recall that respondents were released after posting the
required bail as ordered by the Court of Appeals. A writ of habeas corpus will not lie on behalf of a person
who is not actually restrained of his liberty. And a person discharged on bail is not restrained of his liberty
as to be entitled to a writ of habeas corpus.17

WHEREFORE, we DENY the petition. The challenged Decision and Resolution of the Court of Appeals in
CA-G.R. SP No. 65652 are AFFIRMED. No costs. SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 177809 October 16, 2009

SPOUSES OMAR and MOSHIERA LATIP, Petitioners,

vs.
ROSALIE PALAÑA CHUA, Respondent.

DECISION

NACHURA, J.:

Challenged in this petition for review on certiorari is the Court of Appeals (CA) Decision in CA-G.R. SP No.
89300:1(1) reversing the decision of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 274, Parañaque City in Civil
Case No. 04-0052;2 and (2) reinstating and affirming in toto the decision of the Metropolitan Trial Court
(MeTC), Branch 78, of the same city in Civil Case No. 2001-315.3

First, we sift through the varying facts found by the different lower courts.

The facts parleyed by the MeTC show that respondent Rosalie Chua (Rosalie) is the owner of Roferxane
Building, a commercial building, located at No. 158 Quirino Avenue corner Redemptorist Road, Barangay
Baclaran, Parañaque City.

On July 6, 2001, Rosalie filed a complaint for unlawful detainer plus damages against petitioners, Spouses
Omar and Moshiera Latip (Spouses Latip). Rosalie attached to the complaint a contract of lease over two
cubicles in Roferxane Bldg., signed by Rosalie, as lessor, and by Spouses Latip, as lessees thereof.1 a vv p
h!1

The contract of lease reads:

CONTRACT OF LEASE

KNOW ALL MEN BY THESE PRESENTS:

This Contract of Lease is entered into by and between:

ROSALIE PALAÑA CHUA, Filipino, of legal age, married with office at 2/F JOFERXAN Building, F.B. Harrison
St., Brgy. Baclaran, Parañaque City, and hereinafter referred to as the LESSOR,

- and -

OMAR LATIEF marriage to MOSHIERA LATIEF, also both Filipino, of legal age with address at 24 Anahan
St. RGV Homes Parañaque City, and hereinafter referred to as the LESSEES.

WITNESSETH

1. That the LESSOR is the owner of the commercial building erected at the lot of the Toribio G. Reyes Realty,
Inc. situated at 158 Quirino Ave. corner Redemptorist Road, Barangay Baclaran in Parañaque Ctiy;

2. That LESSOR hereby leases two (2) cubicles located at the 1st & 2nd Floor, of said building with an area
of 56 square meters under the following terms and conditions, to wit:

a. That the monthly rental of the two (2) cubicles in PESOS, SIXTY THOUSAND (₱60,000.00),
Philippine Currency. However, due to unstable power of the peso LESSEES agrees to a yearly
increase of ten (10%) percent of the monthly rental;

b. That any rental in-arrears shall be paid before the expiration of the contract to the LESSOR;

c. That LESSEES agree to pay their own water and electric consumptions in the said premises;

d. That the LESSEES shall not sub-let or make any alteration in the cubicles without a written
permission from the LESSOR. Provided, however, that at the termination of the Contract, the
lessee shall return the two cubicles in its original conditions at their expenses;

e. That the LESSEES agree to keep the cubicles in a safe and sanitary conditions, and shall
not keep any kinds of flammable or combustible materials.

f. That in case the LESSEES fail to pay the monthly rental every time it falls due or violate
any of the above conditions shall be enough ground to terminate this Contract of Lease.
Provided, further, that, if the LESSEES pre-terminate this Contract they shall pay the rentals
for the unused month or period by way of liquidated damages in favor of the LESSOR.
3. That this Contract of Lease is for six (6) yrs. only starting from December _____, 1999 or up to December
______, 2005.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the parties have hereunto affixed their hands this ___th day of December, 1999 at
City of Manila, Philippines.

(sgd.) (sgd.)
ROSALIE PALAÑA-CHUA MOSHIERA LATIEF
LESSOR LESSEE

(sgd.)
OMAR LATIEF
LESSEE

SIGNED IN THE PRESENCE OF:

(sgd.) (sgd.)
1. Daisy C. Ramos 2. Ferdinand C. Chua

Republic of the Philippines)

City of Manila)s.s.

ACKNOWLEDGMENT

BEFORE ME, a Notary Public for and in the City of Manila personally appeared the following persons:

Rosalie P. Chua with CTC No. 05769706 at Parañaque City on 2/1/99; Moshiera Latief with CTC No.
12885654 at Parañaque City on 11/11/99; Omar Latief with CTC No. 12885653 Parañaque City on Nov. 11,
1999.

known to me and to me known to be the same persons who executed this instrument consisting of two (2)
pages duly signed by them and the two (2) instrumental witnesses and acknowledged to me that the same
is their free and voluntarily acts and deeds.

IN FAITH AND TESTIMONY WHEREOF, I have hereunto affixed my hand and Notarial Seal this ____th day
of December, 1999 at the City of Manila, Philippines.

Doc. No. _____ ATTY. CALIXTRO B. RAMOS

Page No. _____ NOTARY PUBLIC
Book No. LXV Until December 31, 2000
Series of 1999 PTR # 374145-1/11/99/-Mla.
IBP # 00262-Life Member4

A year after the commencement of the lease and with Spouses Latip already occupying the leased cubicles,
Rosalie, through counsel, sent the spouses a letter demanding payment of back rentals and should they fail
to do so, to vacate the leased cubicles. When Spouses Latip did not heed Rosalie’s demand, she instituted
the aforesaid complaint.

In their Answer, Spouses Latip refuted Rosalie’s claims. They averred that the lease of the two (2) cubicles
had already been paid in full as evidenced by receipts showing payment to Rosalie of the total amount of
₱2,570,000.00. The three (3) receipts, in Rosalie’s handwriting, read:

1. I received the amount of ₱2,000,000.00 (two million pesos) from [O]mar Latip & Moshi[e]ra
Latip for the payment of 2 cubicles located at 158 Quirino Ave. corner Redemptorist Rd.[,]
Baclaran P[arañ]aque City. ROFERLAND5 Bldg. with the terms 6 yrs. Contract.

₱2,000,000.00 (sgd.)
CHECK # 3767924 ____________________
FAR EAST BANK Rosalie Chua

(sgd.)
____________________
Ferdinand Chua

2. Received cash
₱500,000.00
From Moshiera Latip
 (sgd.)
Rosalie Chua
12/10/99
____________________
Received by

3. Received cash
₱70,000.00 from
Moshiera Latip

(sgd.)
12-11-99 ____________________
Received by:6

Spouses Latip asseverated that sometime in October 1999, Rosalie offered for sale lease rights over two (2)
cubicles in Roferxane Bldg. Having in mind the brisk sale of goods during the Christmas season, they readily
accepted Rosalie’s offer to purchase lease rights in Roferxane Bldg., which was still under construction at
the time. According to Spouses Latip, the immediate payment of ₱2,570,000.00 would be used to finish
construction of the building giving them first priority in the occupation of the finished cubicles.

Thereafter, in December 1999, as soon as two (2) cubicles were finished, Spouses Latip occupied them
without waiting for the completion of five (5) other stalls. Spouses Latip averred that the contract of lease
they signed had been novated by their purchase of lease rights of the subject cubicles. Thus, they were
surprised to receive a demand letter from Rosalie’s counsel and the subsequent filing of a complaint against
them.

The MeTC ruled in favor of Rosalie, viz.:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the [Spouses Latip] and all persons claiming rights under them are
hereby ordered to VACATE the property subject of this case located at the 1st and 2nd floors of a Roferxane
Building situated at No. 158 Quirino Avenue corner Redemptorist Road, Barangay Baclaran, Parañaque City.
The [Spouses Latip] are also ordered to PAY [Rosalie] the amount of SEVEN HUNDRED TWENTY THOUSAND
PESOS (₱720,000.00) as rent arrearages for the period of December 1999 to December 2000 and thereafter
to PAY [Rosalie] the amount of SEVENTY TWO THOUSAND PESOS (₱72,000.00) per month from January
2001 to December 2002, plus ten percent (10%) increase for each and every succeeding years thereafter
as stipulated in paragraph 2(a) of the Contract of Lease x x x, until the [Spouses Latip] have completely
vacated the leased premises subject of this lease. Finally[,] the [Spouses Latip] are hereby ordered to PAY
[Rosalie] the amount of TWENTY THOUSAND PESOS (₱20,000.00) as attorney’s fees and TWO THOUSAND
PESOS (₱2,000.00) per [Rosalie’s] appearance in Court as appearance fee and to PAY the cost of this suit.

[Spouses Latip’s] counterclaim is hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit.

SO ORDERED.7

In stark contrast, the RTC reversed the MeTC and ruled in favor of Spouses Latip. The RTC did not give
credence to the contract of lease, ruling that it was not notarized and, in all other substantial aspects,
incomplete. Further on this point, the RTC noted that the contract of lease lacked: (1) the signature of
Ferdinand Chua, Rosalie’s husband; (2) the signatures of Spouses Latip on the first page thereof; (3) the
specific dates for the term of the contract which only stated that the lease is for "six (6) y[ea]rs only starting
from December 1999 or up to December 2005"; (4) the exact date of execution of the document, albeit the
month of December and year 1999 are indicated therein; and (5) the provision for payment of deposit or
advance rental which is supposedly uncommon in big commercial lease contracts.

The RTC believed the claim of Spouses Latip that the contract of lease was modified and supplemented; and
the entire lease rentals for the two (2) cubicles for six (6) years had already been paid by Spouses Latip in
the amount of ₱2,570,000.00. As to Rosalie’s claim that her receipt of ₱2,570,000.00 was simply goodwill
payment by prospective lessees to their lessor, and not payment for the purchase of lease rights, the RTC
shot this down and pointed out that, apart from her bare allegations, Rosalie did not adduce evidence to
substantiate this claim. On the whole, the RTC declared an existent lease between the parties for a period
of six (6) years, and already fully paid for by Spouses Latip. Thus, Spouses Latip could not be ejected from
the leased premises until expiration of the lease period.

The RTC disposed of the appeal, viz.:

WHEREFORE, all the foregoing considered, the appealed decision of the [MeTC] dated January 13, 2004 is
reversed as judgment is hereby rendered for the [Spouses Latip] and against [Rosalie], ordering the latter
to pay the former –

(1) the sum of PhP1,000,000.00 as moral damages;

(2) the sum of PhP500,000.00 as exemplary damages;

 (3) the sum of PhP250,000.00 plus PhP3,000.00 per court appearance as and for attorney’s fees;
and

(4) costs of suit.

SO ORDERED.8

In yet another turn of events, the CA, as previously mentioned, reversed the RTC and reinstated the decision
of the MeTC. The CA ruled that the contract of lease, albeit lacking the signature of Ferdinand and not
notarized, remained a complete and valid contract. As the MeTC had, the CA likewise found that the alleged
defects in the contract of lease did not render the contract ineffective. On the issue of whether the amount
of ₱2,570,000.00 merely constituted payment of goodwill money, the CA took judicial notice of this common
practice in the area of Baclaran, especially around the Redemptorist Church. According to the appellate
court, this judicial notice was bolstered by the Joint Sworn Declaration of the stallholders at Roferxane Bldg.
that they all had paid goodwill money to Rosalie prior to occupying the stalls thereat. Thus, ruling on
Rosalie’s appeal, the CA disposed of the case:

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Petition for Review is hereby GRANTED. The assailed decision of
RTC Parañaque City Branch 274 dated September 24, 2004 is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE, and the
January 13, 2004 decision of the MeTC is REINSTATED and AFFIRMED en toto.

SO ORDERED.9

Not surprisingly, Spouses Latip filed the present appeal.

The singular issue for our resolution is whether Spouses Latip should be ejected from the leased cubicles.

As previously adverted to, the CA, in ruling for Rosalie and upholding the ejectment of Spouses Latip, took
judicial notice of the alleged practice of prospective lessees in the Baclaran area to pay goodwill money to
the lessor.

We disagree.

Sections 1 and 2 of Rule 129 of the Rules of Court declare when the taking of judicial notice is mandatory
or discretionary on the courts, thus:

SECTION 1. Judicial notice, when mandatory. – A court shall take judicial notice, without the introduction of
evidence, of the existence and territorial extent of states, their political history, forms of government and
symbols of nationality, the law of nations, the admiralty and maritime courts of the world and their seals,
the political constitution and history of the Philippines, the official acts of the legislative, executive and
judicial departments of the Philippines, the laws of nature, the measure of time, and the geographical
divisions.

SEC. 2. Judicial notice, when discretionary. – A court may take judicial notice of matters which are of public
knowledge, or are capable of unquestionable demonstration or ought to be known to judges because of their
judicial functions.

On this point, State Prosecutors v. Muro10 is instructive:

I. The doctrine of judicial notice rests on the wisdom and discretion of the courts. The power to take judicial
notice is to be exercised by courts with caution; care must be taken that the requisite notoriety exists; and
every reasonable doubt on the subject should be promptly resolved in the negative.

Generally speaking, matters of judicial notice have three material requisites: (1) the matter must be one of
common and general knowledge; (2) it must be well and authoritatively settled and not doubtful or
uncertain; and (3) it must be known to be within the limits of the jurisdiction of the court. The principal
guide in determining what facts may be assumed to be judicially known is that of notoriety. Hence, it can
be said that judicial notice is limited to facts evidenced by public records and facts of general notoriety.

To say that a court will take judicial notice of a fact is merely another way of saying that the usual form of
evidence will be dispensed with if knowledge of the fact can be otherwise acquired. This is because the court
assumes that the matter is so notorious that it will not be disputed. But judicial notice is not judicial
knowledge. The mere personal knowledge of the judge is not the judicial knowledge of the court, and he is
not authorized to make his individual knowledge of a fact, not generally or professionally known, the basis
of his action. Judicial cognizance is taken only of those matters which are "commonly" known.

Things of "common knowledge," of which courts take judicial notice, may be matters coming to the
knowledge of men generally in the course of the ordinary experiences of life, or they may be matters which
are generally accepted by mankind as true and are capable of ready and unquestioned demonstration. Thus,
facts which are universally known, and which may be found in encyclopedias, dictionaries or other
publications, are judicially noticed, provided they are of such universal notoriety and so generally understood
that they may be regarded as forming part of the common knowledge of every person. 11

We reiterated the requisite of notoriety for the taking of judicial notice in the recent case of Expertravel &
Tours, Inc. v. Court of Appeals,12 which cited State Prosecutors:

Generally speaking, matters of judicial notice have three material requisites: (1) the matter must be one of
common and general knowledge; (2) it must be well and authoritatively settled and not doubtful or
uncertain; and (3) it must be known to be within the limits of the jurisdiction of the court. The principal
guide in determining what facts may be assumed to be judicially known is that of notoriety. Hence, it can
be said that judicial notice is limited to facts evidenced by public records and facts of general notoriety.
Moreover, a judicially noticed fact must be one not subject to a reasonable dispute in that it is either: (1)
generally known within the territorial jurisdiction of the trial court; or (2) capable of accurate and ready
determination by resorting to sources whose accuracy cannot reasonably be questionable.

Things of "common knowledge," of which courts take judicial notice, may be matters coming to the
knowledge of men generally in the course of the ordinary experiences of life, or they may be matters which
are generally accepted by mankind as true and are capable of ready and unquestioned demonstration. Thus,
facts which are universally known, and which may be found in encyclopedias, dictionaries or other
publications, are judicially noticed, provided, they are such of universal notoriety and so generally
understood that they may be regarded as forming part of the common knowledge of every person. As the
common knowledge of man ranges far and wide, a wide variety of particular facts have been judicially
noticed as being matters of common knowledge. But a court cannot take judicial notice of any fact which,
in part, is dependent on the existence or non-existence of a fact of which the court has no constructive
knowledge.

From the foregoing provisions of law and our holdings thereon, it is apparent that the matter which the
appellate court took judicial notice of does not meet the requisite of notoriety. To begin with, only the CA
took judicial notice of this supposed practice to pay goodwill money to the lessor in the Baclaran area.
Neither the MeTC nor the RTC, with the former even ruling in favor of Rosalie, found that the practice was
of "common knowledge" or notoriously known.

We note that the RTC specifically ruled that Rosalie, apart from her bare allegation, adduced no evidence to
prove her claim that the amount of ₱2,570,000.00 simply constituted the payment of goodwill money.
Subsequently, Rosalie attached an annex to her petition for review before the CA, containing a joint
declaration under oath by other stallholders in Roferxane Bldg. that they had paid goodwill money to Rosalie
as their lessor. On this score, we emphasize that the reason why our rules on evidence provide for matters
that need not be proved under Rule 129, specifically on judicial notice, is to dispense with the taking of the
usual form of evidence on a certain matter so notoriously known, it will not be disputed by the parties.

However, in this case, the requisite of notoriety is belied by the necessity of attaching documentary
evidence, i.e., the Joint Affidavit of the stallholders, to Rosalie’s appeal before the CA. In short, the alleged
practice still had to be proven by Rosalie; contravening the title itself of Rule 129 of the Rules of Court –
What need not be proved.

Apparently, only that particular division of the CA had knowledge of the practice to pay goodwill money in
the Baclaran area. As was held in State Prosecutors, justices and judges alike ought to be reminded that
the power to take judicial notice must be exercised with caution and every reasonable doubt on the subject
should be ample reason for the claim of judicial notice to be promptly resolved in the negative.

Ultimately, on the issue of whether Spouses Latip ought to be ejected from the leased cubicles, what remains
in evidence is the documentary evidence signed by both parties – the contract of lease and the receipts
evidencing payment of ₱2,570,000.00.

We need not be unduly detained by the issue of which documents were executed first or if there was a
novation of the contract of lease. As had been found by the RTC, the lease contract and the receipts for the
amount of ₱2,570,000.00 can be reconciled or harmonized. The RTC declared:

Definitely, the parties entered into a lease agreement over two (2) cubicles of the 1st and 2nd floors of
Roferxane (Roferland) Building, a commercial building located at 158 Quirino Avenue, corner Redemptorist
Road, Baclaran, Parañaque City and belonging to [Rosalie]. The lease agreement is for a term of six (6)
years commencing in December 1999 up to December 2005. This agreement was embodied in a Contract
of Lease x x x. The terms of this lease contract, however, are modified or supplemented by another
agreement between the parties executed and or entered into in or about the time of execution of the lease
contract, which exact date of execution of the latter is unclear. 13

We agree with the RTC’s holding only up to that point. There exists a lease agreement between the parties
as set forth in the contract of lease which is a complete document. It need not be signed by Ferdinand Chua
as he likewise did not sign the other two receipts for ₱500,000.00 and ₱70,000.00, respectively, which
contained only the signature of Rosalie. Besides, it is undisputed that Rosalie owns and leases the stalls in
Roferxane Bldg.; thus, doing away with the need for her husband’s consent. The findings of the three lower
courts concur on this fact.

The contract of lease has a period of six (6) years commencing in December 1999. This fact is again
buttressed by Spouses Latip’s admission that they occupied the property forthwith in December 1999,
bearing in mind the brisk sales during the holiday season.

On the conflicting interpretations by the lower courts of the receipts amounting to ₱2,570,000.00, we hold
that the practice of payment of goodwill money in the Baclaran area is an inadequate subject of judicial
notice. Neither was Rosalie able to provide sufficient evidence that, apart from the belatedly submitted Joint
Affidavit of the stallholders of Roferxane Bldg., the said amount was simply for the payment of goodwill
money, and not payment for advance rentals by Spouses Latip.

In interpreting the evidence before us, we are guided by the Civil Code provisions on interpretation of
contracts, to wit:

Art. 1371. In order to judge the intention of the contracting parties, their contemporaneous and subsequent
acts shall be principally considered.

Art. 1372. However general the terms of a contract may be, they shall not be understood to comprehend
things that are distinct and cases that are different from those which the parties intended to agree.

Art. 1373. If some stipulation of any contract should admit of several meanings, it shall be understood as
bearing that import which is most adequate to render it effectual.

The RTC was already on the right track when it declared that the receipts for ₱2,570,000.00 modified or
supplemented the contract of lease. However, it made a quantum leap when it ruled that the amount was
payment for rentals of the two (2) cubicles for the entire six-year period. We cannot subscribe to this finding.
To obviate confusion and for clarity, the contents of the receipts, already set forth above, are again
reproduced:

1. I received the amount of ₱2,000,000.00 (two million pesos) from [O]mar Latip & Moshi[e]ra Latip
for the payment of 2 cubicles located at 158 Quirino Ave. corner Redemptorist Rd.[,] Baclaran
P[arañ]que City. ROFERLAND Bldg. with the terms 6 yrs. Contract.

₱2,000,000.00 (sgd.)
CHECK # 3767924 ____________________
FAR EAST BANK Rosalie Chua

(sgd.)
____________________
Ferdinand Chua

2. Received cash
₱500,000.00
From Moshiera Latip

(sgd.)
Rosalie Chua
12/10/99
____________________
Received by

3. Received cash
₱70,000.00 from
Moshiera Latip

(sgd.)
12-11-99 ____________________
Received by:14

There is nothing on the receipts and on record that the payment and receipt of ₱2,570,000.00 referred to
full payment of rentals for the whole period of the lease. All three receipts state Rosalie’s receipt of cash in
varying amounts. The first receipt for ₱2,000,000.00 did state payment for two (2) cubicles, but this cannot
mean full payment of rentals for the entire lease period when there are no words to that effect. Further, two
receipts were subsequently executed pointing to the obvious fact that the ₱2,000,000.00 is not for full
payment of rentals. Thus, since the contract of lease remained operative, we find that Rosalie’s receipt of
the monies should be considered as advanced rentals on the leased cubicles. This conclusion is bolstered by
the fact that Rosalie demanded payment of the lease rentals only in 2000, a full year after the
commencement of the lease.
Finally, we note that the lease ended in 2005. Consequently, Spouses Latip can be ejected from the leased
premises. They are liable to Rosalie for unpaid rentals on the lease of the two (2) cubicles in accordance
with the stipulations on rentals in the Contract of Lease. However, the amount of ₱2,570,000.00, covering
advance rentals, must be deducted from this liability of Spouses Latip to Rosalie.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is hereby GRANTED. The decision of the Court of Appeals in
CA-G.R. SP No. 89300 is REVERSED. The petitioners, spouses Omar and Moshiera Latip, are liable to
respondent Rosalie Chua for unpaid rentals minus the amount of ₱2,570,000.00 already received by her as
advance rentals. No costs. SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 156052 February 13, 2008

SOCIAL JUSTICE SOCIETY (SJS), VLADIMIR ALARIQUE T. CABIGAO and BONIFACIO S.

TUMBOKON, petitioners,
vs.
HON. JOSE L. ATIENZA, JR., in his capacity as Mayor of the City of Manila, respondent.

x----------------------x

CHEVRON PHILIPPINES INC., PETRON CORPORATION and PILIPINAS SHELL PETROLEUM

CORPORATION, movants-intervenors.

x----------------------x

DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY, movant-intervenor.

RESOLUTION

CORONA, J.:

After we promulgated our decision in this case on March 7, 2007, Chevron Philippines Inc. (Chevron), Petron
Corporation (Petron) and Pilipinas Shell Petroleum Corporation (Shell) (collectively, the oil companies) and
the Republic of the Philippines, represented by the Department of Energy (DOE), filed their respective
motions for leave to intervene and for reconsideration of the decision.

Chevron1 is engaged in the business of importing, distributing and marketing of petroleum products in the
Philippines while Shell and Petron are engaged in the business of manufacturing, refining and likewise
importing, distributing and marketing of petroleum products in the Philippines.2 The DOE is a governmental
agency created under Republic Act (RA) No. 7638 3 and tasked to prepare, integrate, coordinate, supervise
and control all plans, programs, projects and activities of the government relative to energy exploration,
development, utilization, distribution and conservation. 4

The facts are restated briefly as follows:

Petitioners Social Justice Society, Vladimir Alarique T. Cabigao and Bonifacio S. Tumbokon, in an original
petition for mandamus under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, sought to compel respondent Hon. Jose L.
Atienza, Jr., then mayor of the City of Manila, to enforce Ordinance No. 8027. This ordinance was enacted
by the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Manila on November 20, 2001,5 approved by respondent Mayor on
November 28, 2001,6 and became effective on December 28, 2001 after publication.7 Sections 1 and 3
thereof state:

SECTION 1. For the purpose of promoting sound urban planning and ensuring health, public safety,
and general welfare of the residents of Pandacan and Sta. Ana as well as its adjoining areas, the land
use of [those] portions of land bounded by the Pasig River in the north, PNR Railroad Track in the
east, Beata St. in the south, Palumpong St. in the southwest, and Estero de Pandacan in the west[,]
PNR Railroad in the northwest area, Estero de Pandacan in the [n]ortheast, Pasig River in the
southeast and Dr. M.L. Carreon in the southwest. The area of Punta, Sta. Ana bounded by the Pasig
River, Marcelino Obrero St., Mayo 28 St., and F. Manalo Street, are hereby reclassified from Industrial
II to Commercial I.

xxx xxx xxx

SEC. 3. Owners or operators of industries and other businesses, the operation of which are no longer
permitted under Section 1 hereof, are hereby given a period of six (6) months from the date of
effectivity of this Ordinance within which to cease and desist from the operation of businesses which
are hereby in consequence, disallowed.

Ordinance No. 8027 reclassified the area described therein from industrial to commercial and directed the
owners and operators of businesses disallowed under the reclassification to cease and desist from operating
their businesses within six months from the date of effectivity of the ordinance. Among the businesses
situated in the area are the so-called "Pandacan Terminals" of the oil companies.

On June 26, 2002, the City of Manila and the Department of Energy (DOE) entered into a memorandum of
understanding (MOU)8 with the oil companies. They agreed that "the scaling down of the Pandacan Terminals
[was] the most viable and practicable option." The Sangguniang Panlungsod ratified the MOU in Resolution
No. 97.9 In the same resolution, the Sanggunian declared that the MOU was effective only for a period of
six months starting July 25, 2002.10 Thereafter, on January 30, 2003, the Sanggunian adopted Resolution
No. 1311 extending the validity of Resolution No. 97 to April 30, 2003 and authorizing the mayor of Manila
to issue special business permits to the oil companies.12
This was the factual backdrop presented to the Court which became the basis of our March 7, 2007 decision.
We ruled that respondent had the ministerial duty under the Local Government Code (LGC) to "enforce all
laws and ordinances relative to the governance of the city,"13 including Ordinance No. 8027. We also held
that we need not resolve the issue of whether the MOU entered into by respondent with the oil companies
and the subsequent resolutions passed by the Sanggunian could amend or repeal Ordinance No. 8027 since
the resolutions which ratified the MOU and made it binding on the City of Manila expressly gave it full force
and effect only until April 30, 2003. We concluded that there was nothing that legally hindered respondent
from enforcing Ordinance No. 8027.

After we rendered our decision on March 7, 2007, the oil companies and DOE sought to intervene and filed
motions for reconsideration in intervention on March 12, 2007 and March 21, 2007 respectively. On April
11, 2007, we conducted the oral arguments in Baguio City to hear petitioners, respondent and movants-
intervenors oil companies and DOE.

The oil companies called our attention to the fact that on April 25, 2003, Chevron had filed a complaint
against respondent and the City of Manila in the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila, Branch 39, for the
annulment of Ordinance No. 8027 with application for writs of preliminary prohibitory injunction and
preliminary mandatory injunction.14 The case was docketed as civil case no. 03-106377. On the same day,
Shell filed a petition for prohibition and mandamus likewise assailing the validity of Ordinance No. 8027 and
with application for writs of preliminary prohibitory injunction and preliminary mandatory injunction. 15 This
was docketed as civil case no. 03-106380. Later on, these two cases were consolidated and the RTC of
Manila, Branch 39 issued an order dated May 19, 2003 granting the applications for writs of preliminary
prohibitory injunction and preliminary mandatory injunction:

WHEREFORE, upon the filing of a total bond of TWO MILLION (Php 2,000,000.00) PESOS, let a Writ
of Preliminary Prohibitory Injunction be issued ordering [respondent] and the City of Manila, their
officers, agents, representatives, successors, and any other persons assisting or acting in their
behalf, during the pendency of the case, to REFRAIN from taking steps to enforce Ordinance No.
8027, and let a Writ of Preliminary Mandatory Injunction be issued ordering [respondent] to issue
[Chevron and Shell] the necessary Business Permits to operate at the Pandacan Terminal. 16

Petron likewise filed its own petition in the RTC of Manila, Branch 42, also attacking the validity of Ordinance
No. 8027 with prayer for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction and/or temporary restraining order
(TRO). This was docketed as civil case no. 03-106379. In an order dated August 4, 2004, the RTC enjoined
the parties to maintain the status quo.17

Thereafter, in 2006, the city council of Manila enacted Ordinance No. 8119, also known as the Manila
Comprehensive Land Use Plan and Zoning Ordinance of 2006.18 This was approved by respondent on June
16, 2006.19

Aggrieved anew, Chevron and Shell filed a complaint in the RTC of Manila, Branch 20, asking for the
nullification of Ordinance No. 8119.20 This was docketed as civil case no. 06-115334. Petron filed its own
complaint on the same causes of action in the RTC of Manila, Branch 41. 21 This was docketed as civil case
no. 07-116700.22 The court issued a TRO in favor of Petron, enjoining the City of Manila and respondent
from enforcing Ordinance No. 8119.23

Meanwhile, in civil case no. 03-106379, the parties filed a joint motion to withdraw complaint and
counterclaim on February 20, 2007. 24 In an order dated April 23, 2007, the joint motion was granted and
all the claims and counterclaims of the parties were withdrawn. 25

Given these additional pieces of information, the following were submitted as issues for our resolution:

1. whether movants-intervenors should be allowed to intervene in this case;26

2. whether the following are impediments to the execution of our March 7, 2007 decision:

(a) Ordinance No. 8119, the enactment and existence of which were not previously brought
by the parties to the attention of the Court and

(b) writs of preliminary prohibitory injunction and preliminary mandatory injunction and
status quo order issued by the RTC of Manila, Branches 39 and 42 and

3. whether the implementation of Ordinance No. 8027 will unduly encroach upon the DOE’s powers
and functions involving energy resources.

During the oral arguments, the parties submitted to this Court’s power to rule on the constitutionality and
validity of Ordinance No. 8027 despite the pendency of consolidated cases involving this issue in the
RTC.27 The importance of settling this controversy as fully and as expeditiously as possible was emphasized,
considering its impact on public interest. Thus, we will also dispose of this issue here. The parties were after
all given ample opportunity to present and argue their respective positions. By so doing, we will do away
with the delays concomitant with litigation and completely adjudicate an issue which will most likely reach
us anyway as the final arbiter of all legal disputes.

Before we resolve these issues, a brief review of the history of the Pandacan Terminals is called for to put
our discussion in the proper context.

History Of The Pandacan Oil Terminals

Pandacan (one of the districts of the City of Manila) is situated along the banks of the Pasig river. At the
turn of the twentieth century, Pandacan was unofficially designated as the industrial center of Manila. The
area, then largely uninhabited, was ideal for various emerging industries as the nearby river facilitated the
transportation of goods and products. In the 1920s, it was classified as an industrial zone. 28 Among its early
industrial settlers were the oil companies. Shell established its installation there on January 30,
1914.29 Caltex (now Chevron) followed suit in 1917 when the company began marketing its products in the
country.30 In 1922, it built a warehouse depot which was later converted into a key distribution
terminal.31 The corporate presence in the Philippines of Esso (Petron’s predecessor) became more keenly
felt when it won a concession to build and operate a refinery in Bataan in 1957.32 It then went on to operate
a state-of-the-art lube oil blending plant in the Pandacan Terminals where it manufactures lubes and
greases.33

On December 8, 1941, the Second World War reached the shores of the Philippine Islands. Although Manila
was declared an open city, the Americans had no interest in welcoming the Japanese. In fact, in their zealous
attempt to fend off the Japanese Imperial Army, the United States Army took control of the Pandacan
Terminals and hastily made plans to destroy the storage facilities to deprive the advancing Japanese Army
of a valuable logistics weapon.34 The U.S. Army burned unused petroleum, causing a frightening
conflagration. Historian Nick Joaquin recounted the events as follows:

After the USAFFE evacuated the City late in December 1941, all army fuel storage dumps were set
on fire. The flames spread, enveloping the City in smoke, setting even the rivers ablaze, endangering
bridges and all riverside buildings. … For one week longer, the "open city" blazed—a cloud of smoke
by day, a pillar of fire by night.35

The fire consequently destroyed the Pandacan Terminals and rendered its network of depots and service
stations inoperative.36

After the war, the oil depots were reconstructed. Pandacan changed as Manila rebuilt itself. The three major
oil companies resumed the operation of their depots.37 But the district was no longer a sparsely populated
industrial zone; it had evolved into a bustling, hodgepodge community. Today, Pandacan has become a
densely populated area inhabited by about 84,000 people, majority of whom are urban poor who call it
home.38 Aside from numerous industrial installations, there are also small businesses, churches,
restaurants, schools, daycare centers and residences situated there. 39 Malacañang Palace, the official
residence of the President of the Philippines and the seat of governmental power, is just two kilometers
away.40 There is a private school near the Petron depot. Along the walls of the Shell facility are shanties of
informal settlers.41 More than 15,000 students are enrolled in elementary and high schools situated near
these facilities.42 A university with a student population of about 25,000 is located directly across the depot
on the banks of the Pasig river.43

The 36-hectare Pandacan Terminals house the oil companies’ distribution terminals and depot
facilities.44 The refineries of Chevron and Shell in Tabangao and Bauan, both in Batangas, respectively, are
connected to the Pandacan Terminals through a 114-kilometer45 underground pipeline system.46 Petron’s
refinery in Limay, Bataan, on the other hand, also services the depot.47 The terminals store fuel and other
petroleum products and supply 95% of the fuel requirements of Metro Manila, 48 50% of Luzon’s consumption
and 35% nationwide.49 Fuel can also be transported through barges along the Pasig river or tank trucks via
the South Luzon Expressway.

We now discuss the first issue: whether movants-intervenors should be allowed to intervene in this case.

Intervention Of The Oil Companies And The DOE Should Be Allowed In The Interest of Justice

Intervention is a remedy by which a third party, not originally impleaded in the proceedings, becomes a
litigant therein to enable him, her or it to protect or preserve a right or interest which may be affected by
such proceedings.50 The pertinent rules are Sections 1 and 2, Rule 19 of the Rules of Court:

SEC. 1. Who may intervene. — A person who has a legal interest in the matter in litigation, or in the
success of either of the parties, or an interest against both, or is so situated as to be adversely
affected by a distribution or other disposition of property in the custody of the court or of an officer
thereof may, with leave of court, be allowed to intervene in the action. The court shall consider
whether or not the intervention will unduly delay or prejudice the adjudication of the rights of the
original parties, and whether or not the intervenor’s rights may be fully protected in a separate
proceeding.
 SEC. 2. Time to intervene. — The motion to intervene may be filed at any time before rendition of
judgment by the trial court. A copy of the pleading-in-intervention shall be attached to the motion
and served on the original parties.

Thus, the following are the requisites for intervention of a non-party:

(1) Legal interest

(a) in the matter in controversy; or

(b) in the success of either of the parties; or

I against both parties; or

(d) person is so situated as to be adversely affected by a distribution or other disposition of

property in the custody of the court or of an officer thereof;

(2) Intervention will not unduly delay or prejudice the adjudication of rights of original parties;

(3) Intervenor’s rights may not be fully protected in a separate proceeding51 and

(g)The motion to intervene may be filed at any time before rendition of judgment by the trial court.

For both the oil companies and DOE, the last requirement is definitely absent. As a rule, intervention is
allowed "before rendition of judgment" as Section 2, Rule 19 expressly provides. Both filed their separate
motions after our decision was promulgated. In Republic of the Philippines v. Gingoyon,52 a recently decided
case which was also an original action filed in this Court, we declared that the appropriate time to file the
motions-in-intervention was before and not after resolution of the case. 53

The Court, however, has recognized exceptions to Section 2, Rule 19 in the interest of substantial justice:

The rule on intervention, like all other rules of procedure, is intended to make the powers of the
Court fully and completely available for justice. It is aimed to facilitate a comprehensive adjudication
of rival claims overriding technicalities on the timeliness of the filing thereof. 54

The oil companies assert that they have a legal interest in this case because the implementation of Ordinance
No. 8027 will directly affect their business and property rights.55

[T]he interest which entitles a person to intervene in a suit between other parties must be in the
matter in litigation and of such direct and immediate character that the intervenor will either gain or
lose by direct legal operation and effect of the judgment. Otherwise, if persons not parties to the
action were allowed to intervene, proceedings would become unnecessarily complicated, expensive
and interminable. And this would be against the policy of the law. The words "an interest in the
subject" means a direct interest in the cause of action as pleaded, one that would put the intervenor
in a legal position to litigate a fact alleged in the complaint without the establishment of which plaintiff
could not recover.56

We agree that the oil companies have a direct and immediate interest in the implementation of Ordinance
No. 8027. Their claim is that they will need to spend billions of pesos if they are compelled to relocate their
oil depots out of Manila. Considering that they admitted knowing about this case from the time of its filing
on December 4, 2002, they should have intervened long before our March 7, 2007 decision to protect their
interests. But they did not.57 Neither did they offer any worthy explanation to justify their late intervention.

Be that as it may, although their motion for intervention was not filed on time, we will allow it because they
raised and presented novel issues and arguments that were not considered by the Court in its March 7,
2007 decision. After all, the allowance or disallowance of a motion to intervene is addressed to the sound
discretion of the court before which the case is pending. 58 Considering the compelling reasons favoring
intervention, we do not think that this will unduly delay or prejudice the adjudication of rights of the original
parties. In fact, it will be expedited since their intervention will enable us to rule on the constitutionality of
Ordinance No. 8027 instead of waiting for the RTC’s decision.

The DOE, on the other hand, alleges that its interest in this case is also direct and immediate as Ordinance
No. 8027 encroaches upon its exclusive and national authority over matters affecting the oil industry. It
seeks to intervene in order to represent the interests of the members of the public who stand to suffer if
the Pandacan Terminals’ operations are discontinued. We will tackle the issue of the alleged encroachment
into DOE’s domain later on. Suffice it to say at this point that, for the purpose of hearing all sides and
considering the transcendental importance of this case, we will also allow DOE’s intervention.

The Injunctive Writs Are Not Impediments To The Enforcement Of Ordinance No. 8027
Under Rule 65, Section 359 of the Rules of Court, a petition for mandamus may be filed when any tribunal,
corporation, board, officer or person unlawfully neglects the performance of an act which the law specifically
enjoins as a duty resulting from an office, trust or station. According to the oil companies, respondent did
not unlawfully fail or neglect to enforce Ordinance No. 8027 because he was lawfully prevented from doing
so by virtue of the injunctive writs and status quo order issued by the RTC of Manila, Branches 39 and 42.

First, we note that while Chevron and Shell still have in their favor the writs of preliminary injunction and
preliminary mandatory injunction, the status quo order in favor of Petron is no longer in effect since the
court granted the joint motion of the parties to withdraw the complaint and counterclaim.60

Second, the original parties failed to inform the Court about these injunctive writs. Respondent (who was
also impleaded as a party in the RTC cases) defends himself by saying that he informed the court of the
pendency of the civil cases and that a TRO was issued by the RTC in the consolidated cases filed by Chevron
and Shell. It is true that had the oil companies only intervened much earlier, the Court would not have been
left in the dark about these facts. Nevertheless, respondent should have updated the Court, by way of
manifestation, on such a relevant matter.

In his memorandum, respondent mentioned the issuance of a TRO. Under Section 5 of Rule 58 of the Rules
of Court, a TRO issued by the RTC is effective only for a period of 20 days. This is why, in our March 7, 2007
decision, we presumed with certainty that this had already lapsed. 61 Respondent also mentioned the grant
of injunctive writs in his rejoinder which the Court, however, expunged for being a prohibited pleading. The
parties and their counsels were clearly remiss in their duties to this Court.

In resolving controversies, courts can only consider facts and issues pleaded by the parties. 62 Courts, as
well as magistrates presiding over them are not omniscient. They can only act on the facts and issues
presented before them in appropriate pleadings. They may not even substitute their own personal knowledge
for evidence. Nor may they take notice of matters except those expressly provided as subjects of mandatory
judicial notice.

We now proceed to the issue of whether the injunctive writs are legal impediments to the enforcement of
Ordinance No. 8027.

Section 3, Rule 58 of the Rules of Court enumerates the grounds for the issuance of a writ of preliminary
injunction:

SEC. 3. Grounds for issuance of preliminary injunction. ― A preliminary injunction may be granted
when it is established:

(a) That the applicant is entitled to the relief demanded, and the whole or part of such relief consists
in restraining the commission or continuance of the act or acts complained of, or in requiring the
performance of an act or acts, either for a limited period or perpetually;

(b) That the commission, continuance or nonperformance of the act or acts complained of during the
litigation would probably work injustice to the applicant; or

(g) IThat a party, court, agency or a person is doing, threatening, or is attempting to do, or is
procuring or suffering to be done, some act or acts probably in violation of the rights of the applicant
respecting the subject of the action or proceeding, and tending to render the judgment ineffectual.

There are two requisites for the issuance of a preliminary injunction: (1) the right to be protected
exists prima facieand (2) the acts sought to be enjoined are violative of that right. It must be proven that
the violation sought to be prevented will cause an irreparable injustice.

The act sought to be restrained here was the enforcement of Ordinance No. 8027. It is a settled rule that
an ordinance enjoys the presumption of validity and, as such, cannot be restrained by
injunction.63 Nevertheless, when the validity of the ordinance is assailed, the courts are not precluded from
issuing an injunctive writ against its enforcement. However, we have declared that the issuance of said writ
is proper only when:

... the petitioner assailing the ordinance has made out a case of unconstitutionality strong
enough to overcome, in the mind of the judge, the presumption of validity, in addition to a
showing of a clear legal right to the remedy sought....64 (Emphasis supplied)

Judge Reynaldo G. Ros, in his order dated May 19, 2003, stated his basis for issuing the injunctive writs:

The Court, in resolving whether or not a Writ of Preliminary Injunction or Preliminary Mandatory
Injunction should be issued, is guided by the following requirements: (1) a clear legal right of the
complainant; (2) a violation of that right; and (3) a permanent and urgent necessity for the Writ to
prevent serious damage. The Court believes that these requisites are present in these cases.
 There is no doubt that the plaintiff/petitioners have been legitimately operating their business in the
Pandacan Terminal for many years and they have made substantial capital investment therein. Every
year they were issued Business Permits by the City of Manila. Its operations have not been declared
illegal or contrary to law or morals. In fact, because of its vital importance to the national economy,
it was included in the Investment Priorities Plan as mandated under the "Downstream Oil Industry
Deregulation Act of 1988 (R.A. 8479). As a lawful business, the plaintiff/petitioners have a right,
therefore, to continue their operation in the Pandacan Terminal and the right to protect their
investments. This is a clear and unmistakable right of the plaintiff/petitioners.

The enactment, therefore, of City Ordinance No. 8027 passed by the City Council of Manila
reclassifying the area where the Pandacan Terminal is located from Industrial II to Commercial I and
requiring the plaintiff/petitioners to cease and desist from the operation of their business has
certainly violated the rights of the plaintiff/petitioners to continue their legitimate business in the
Pandacan Terminal and deprived them of their huge investments they put up therein. Thus, before
the Court, therefore, determines whether the Ordinance in question is valid or not, a Writ of
Preliminary Injunction and a Writ of Mandatory Injunction be issued to prevent serious and
irreparable damage to plaintiff/petitioners.65

Nowhere in the judge’s discussion can we see that, in addition to a showing of a clear legal right
of Chevron and Shell to the remedy sought, he was convinced that they had made out a case of
unconstitutionality or invalidity strong enough to overcome the presumption of validity of the
ordinance. Statutes and ordinances are presumed valid unless and until the courts declare the contrary in
clear and unequivocal terms.66 The mere fact that the ordinance is alleged to be unconstitutional or invalid
will not entitle a party to have its enforcement enjoined. 67 The presumption is all in favor of validity. The
reason for this is obvious:

The action of the elected representatives of the people cannot be lightly set aside. The councilors
must, in the very nature of things, be familiar with the necessities of their particular municipality and
with all the facts and circumstances which surround the subject and necessitate action. The local
legislative body, by enacting the ordinance, has in effect given notice that the regulations are
essential to the well being of the people . . . The Judiciary should not lightly set aside legislative
action when there is not a clear invasion of personal or property rights under the guise of police
regulation.68

X—x—x

...[Courts] accord the presumption of constitutionality to legislative enactments, not only because
the legislature is presumed to abide by the Constitution but also because the judiciary[,] in the
determination of actual cases and controversies[,] must reflect the wisdom and justice of the people
as expressed through their representatives in the executive and legislative departments of the
government.69

The oil companies argue that this presumption must be set aside when the invalidity or unreasonableness
appears on the face of the ordinance itself.70 We see no reason to set aside the presumption. The ordinance,
on its face, does not at all appear to be unconstitutional. It reclassified the subject area from industrial to
commercial. Prima facie, this power is within the power of municipal corporations:

The power of municipal corporations to divide their territory into industrial, commercial and
residential zones is recognized in almost all jurisdictions inasmuch as it is derived from the police
power itself and is exercised for the protection and benefit of their inhabitants. 71

X—x—x

There can be no doubt that the City of Manila has the power to divide its territory into residential and
industrial zones, and to prescribe that offensive and unwholesome trades and occupations are to be
established exclusively in the latter zone.

xxx xxx xxx

Likewise, it cannot be denied that the City of Manila has the authority, derived from the police power,
of forbidding the appellant to continue the manufacture of toyo in the zone where it is now situated,
which has been declared residential....72

Courts will not invalidate an ordinance unless it clearly appears that it is unconstitutional. There is no such
showing here. Therefore, the injunctive writs issued in the Manila RTC’s May 19, 2003 order had no leg to
stand on.

We are aware that the issuance of these injunctive writs is not being assailed as tainted with grave abuse
of discretion. However, we are confronted with the question of whether these writs issued by a lower court
are impediments to the enforcement of Ordinance No. 8027 (which is the subject of the mandamus petition).
As already discussed, we rule in the negative.
Ordinance No. 8027 Was Not Superseded By Ordinance No. 8119

The March 7, 2007 decision did not take into consideration the passage of Ordinance No. 8119 entitled "An
Ordinance Adopting the Manila Comprehensive Land Use Plan and Zoning Regulations of 2006 and Providing
for the Administration, Enforcement and Amendment thereto" which was approved by respondent on June
16, 2006. The simple reason was that the Court was never informed about this ordinance.

While courts are required to take judicial notice of the laws enacted by Congress, the rule with respect to
local ordinances is different. Ordinances are not included in the enumeration of matters covered by
mandatory judicial notice under Section 1, Rule 129 of the Rules of Court. 73

Although, Section 50 of RA 40974 provides that:

SEC. 50 Judicial notice of ordinances. - All courts sitting in the city shall take judicial notice of the
ordinances passed by the [Sangguniang Panglungsod].

This cannot be taken to mean that this Court, since it has its seat in the City of Manila, should have taken
steps to procure a copy of the ordinance on its own, relieving the party of any duty to inform the Court
about it.

Even where there is a statute that requires a court to take judicial notice of municipal ordinances, a court is
not required to take judicial notice of ordinances that are not before it and to which it does not have access.
The party asking the court to take judicial notice is obligated to supply the court with the full text of the
rules the party desires it to have notice of.75 Counsel should take the initiative in requesting that a trial court
take judicial notice of an ordinance even where a statute requires courts to take judicial notice of local
ordinances.76

The intent of a statute requiring a court to take judicial notice of a local ordinance is to remove any discretion
a court might have in determining whether or not to take notice of an ordinance. Such a statute does not
direct the court to act on its own in obtaining evidence for the record and a party must make the ordinance
available to the court for it to take notice.77

In its defense, respondent claimed that he did not inform the Court about the enactment of Ordinance No.
8119 because he believed that it was different from Ordinance No. 8027 and that the two were not
inconsistent with each other.78

In the same way that we deem the intervenors’ late intervention in this case unjustified, we find the failure
of respondent, who was an original party here, inexcusable.

The Rule On Judicial Admissions Is Not Applicable Against Respondent

The oil companies assert that respondent judicially admitted that Ordinance No. 8027 was repealed by
Ordinance No. 8119 in civil case no. 03-106379 (where Petron assailed the constitutionality of Ordinance
No. 8027) when the parties in their joint motion to withdraw complaint and counterclaim stated that "the
issue ...has been rendered moot and academic by virtue of the passage of [Ordinance No. 8119]." 79 They
contend that such admission worked as an estoppel against the respondent.

Respondent countered that this stipulation simply meant that Petron was recognizing the validity and legality
of Ordinance No. 8027 and that it had conceded the issue of said ordinance’s constitutionality, opting instead
to question the validity of Ordinance No. 8119.80 The oil companies deny this and further argue that
respondent, in his answer in civil case no. 06-115334 (where Chevron and Shell are asking for the
nullification of Ordinance No. 8119), expressly stated that Ordinance No. 8119 replaced Ordinance No.
8027:81

... Under Ordinance No. 8027, businesses whose uses are not in accord with the reclassification were
given six months to cease [their] operation. Ordinance No. 8119, which in effect, replaced
Ordinance [No.] 8027, merely took note of the time frame provided for in Ordinance No. 8119....
Ordinance No. 8119 thus provided for an even longer term, that is[,] seven years; 82 (Emphasis
supplied)

Rule 129, Section 4 of the Rules of Court provides:

Section 4. Judicial admissions. ― An admission, verbal or written, made by a party in the course of
the proceedings in the same case, does not require proof. The admission may be contradicted only
by showing that it was made through palpable mistake or that no such admission was made.
(Emphasis supplied)

While it is true that a party making a judicial admission cannot subsequently take a position contrary to or
inconsistent with what was pleaded,83 the aforestated rule is not applicable here. Respondent made the
statements regarding the ordinances in civil case nos. 03-106379 and 06-115334 which are not "the same"
as this case before us.84 To constitute a judicial admission, the admission must be made in the same case
in which it is offered.

Hence, respondent is not estopped from claiming that Ordinance No. 8119 did not supersede Ordinance No.
8027. On the contrary, it is the oil companies which should be considered estopped. They rely on the
argument that Ordinance No. 8119 superseded Ordinance No. 8027 but, at the same time, also impugn its
(8119’s) validity. We frown on the adoption of inconsistent positions and distrust any attempt at clever
positioning under one or the other on the basis of what appears advantageous at the moment. Parties cannot
take vacillating or contrary positions regarding the validity of a statute85 or ordinance. Nonetheless, we will
look into the merits of the argument of implied repeal.

Ordinance No. 8119 Did Not Impliedly Repeal Ordinance No. 8027

Both the oil companies and DOE argue that Ordinance No. 8119 repealed Ordinance No. 8027. They assert
that although there was no express repeal 86 of Ordinance No. 8027, Ordinance No. 8119 impliedly repealed
it.

According to the oil companies, Ordinance No. 8119 reclassified the area covering the Pandacan Terminals
to "High Density Residential/Mixed Use Zone (R-3/MXD)"87 whereas Ordinance No. 8027 reclassified the
same area from Industrial II to Commercial I:

SECTION 1. For the purpose of promoting sound urban planning and ensuring health, public safety, and
general welfare of the residents of Pandacan and Sta. Ana as well as its adjoining areas, the land use of
[those] portions of land bounded by the Pasig River in the north, PNR Railroad Track in the east, Beata St.
in the south, Palumpong St. in the southwest, and Estero de Pancacan in the west[,] PNR Railroad in the
northwest area, Estero de Pandacan in the [n]ortheast, Pasig River in the southeast and Dr. M.L. Carreon
in the southwest. The area of Punta, Sta. Ana bounded by the Pasig River, Marcelino Obrero St., Mayo 28
St., and F. Manalo Street, are hereby reclassified from Industrial II to Commercial I. (Emphasis
supplied)

Moreover, Ordinance No. 8119 provides for a phase-out of seven years:

SEC. 72. Existing Non-Conforming Uses and Buildings. - The lawful use of any building, structure or
land at the time of the adoption of this Ordinance may be continued, although such use does not
conform with the provision of the Ordinance, provided:

xxx xxx xxx

(g) In case the non-conforming use is an industrial use:

xxx xxx xxx

d. The land use classified as non-conforming shall program the phase-out and
relocation of the non-conforming use within seven (7) years from the date of
effectivity of this Ordinance. (Emphasis supplied)

This is opposed to Ordinance No. 8027 which compels affected entities to vacate the area within six months
from the effectivity of the ordinance:

SEC. 3. Owners or operators of industries and other businesses, the operation of which are no longer
permitted under Section 1 hereof, are hereby given a period of six (6) months from the date of
effectivity of this Ordinance within which to cease and desist from the operation of businesses which
are hereby in consequence, disallowed.

Ordinance No. 8119 also designated the Pandacan oil depot area as a "Planned Unit Development/Overlay
Zone (O-PUD)":

SEC. 23. Use Regulations in Planned Unit Development/Overlay Zone (O-PUD). – O-PUD Zones are
identified specific sites in the City of Manila wherein the project site is comprehensively planned as
an entity via unitary site plan which permits flexibility in planning/ design, building siting,
complementarily of building types and land uses, usable open spaces and the preservation of
significant natural land features, pursuant to regulations specified for each particular PUD.
Enumerated below are identified PUD:

xxx xxx xxx

6. Pandacan Oil Depot Area

xxx xxx xxx

 Enumerated below are the allowable uses:

1. all uses allowed in all zones where it is located

2. the [Land Use Intensity Control (LUIC)] under which zones are located shall, in all instances be
complied with

3. the validity of the prescribed LUIC shall only be [superseded] by the development controls and
regulations specified for each PUD as provided for each PUD as provided for by the masterplan of
respective PUDs.88(Emphasis supplied)

Respondent claims that in passing Ordinance No. 8119, the Sanggunian did not intend to repeal Ordinance
No. 8027 but meant instead to carry over 8027’s provisions to 8119 for the purpose of making Ordinance
No. 8027 applicable to the oil companies even after the passage of Ordinance No. 8119. 89 He quotes an
excerpt from the minutes of the July 27, 2004 session of the Sanggunian during the first reading of
Ordinance No. 8119:

Member GARCIA: Your Honor, iyong patungkol po roon sa oil depot doon sa amin sa Sixth District
sa Pandacan, wala pong nakalagay eith sa ordinansa rito na taliwas o kakaiba roon sa ordinansang
ipinasa noong nakaraang Konseho, iyong Ordinance No. 8027. So kung ano po ang nandirito sa
ordinansa na ipinasa ninyo last time, iyon lang po ang ni-lift eithe at inilagay eith. At eith eith
ordinansang …iyong naipasa ng huling Konseho, niri-classify [ninyo] from Industrial II to Commercial
C-1 ang area ng Pandacan kung nasaan ang oil depot. So ini-lift lang po [eithe] iyong definition,
density, at saka po yon pong … ng… noong ordinansa ninyo na siya eith naming inilagay eith, iniba
lang po naming iyong title. So wala po kaming binago na taliwas o nailagay na taliwas doon
sa ordinansang ipinasa ninyo, ni-lift lang po [eithe] from Ordinance No. 8027."90 (Emphasis
supplied)

We agree with respondent.

Repeal by implication proceeds on the premise that where a statute of later date clearly reveals the intention
of the legislature to abrogate a prior act on the subject, that intention must be given effect. 91

There are two kinds of implied repeal. The first is: where the provisions in the two acts on the same subject
matter are irreconcilably contradictory, the latter act, to the extent of the conflict, constitutes an implied
repeal of the earlier one.92 The second is: if the later act covers the whole subject of the earlier one and is
clearly intended as a substitute, it will operate to repeal the earlier law. 93 The oil companies argue that the
situation here falls under the first category.

Implied repeals are not favored and will not be so declared unless the intent of the legislators is
manifest.94 As statutes and ordinances are presumed to be passed only after careful deliberation and with
knowledge of all existing ones on the subject, it follows that, in passing a law, the legislature did not intend
to interfere with or abrogate a former law relating to the same subject matter. 95 If the intent to repeal is
not clear, the later act should be construed as a continuation of, and not a substitute for, the earlier act. 96

These standards are deeply enshrined in our jurisprudence. We disagree that, in enacting Ordinance No.
8119, there was any indication of the legislative purpose to repeal Ordinance No. 8027. 97 The excerpt quoted
above is proof that there was never such an intent. While it is true that both ordinances relate to the same
subject matter, i.e.classification of the land use of the area where Pandacan oil depot is located, if there is
no intent to repeal the earlier enactment, every effort at reasonable construction must be made to reconcile
the ordinances so that both can be given effect:

The fact that a later enactment may relate to the same subject matter as that of an earlier statute
is not of itself sufficient to cause an implied repeal of the prior act, since the new statute may merely
be cumulative or a continuation of the old one. What is necessary is a manifest indication of legislative
purpose to repeal.98

For the first kind of implied repeal, there must be an irreconcilable conflict between the two ordinances.
There is no conflict between the two ordinances. Ordinance No. 8027 reclassified the Pandacan area from
Industrial II to Commercial I. Ordinance No. 8119, in Section 23, designated it as a "Planned Unit
Development/Overlay Zone (O-PUD)." In its Annex C which defined the zone boundaries, 99 the Pandacan
area was shown to be within the "High Density Residential/Mixed Use Zone (R-3/MXD)." These zone
classifications in Ordinance No. 8119 are not inconsistent with the reclassification of the Pandacan area from
Industrial to Commercial in Ordinance No. 8027. The "O-PUD" classification merely made Pandacan a
"project site ... comprehensively planned as an entity via unitary site plan which permits flexibility in
planning/design, building siting, complementarity of building types and land uses, usable open spaces and
the preservation of significant natural land features...." 100 Its classification as "R-3/MXD" means that it
should "be used primarily for high-rise housing/dwelling purposes and limited
complementary/supplementary trade, services and business activities." 101 There is no conflict since both
ordinances actually have a common objective, i.e., to shift the zoning classification from industrial to
commercial (Ordinance No. 8027) or mixed residential/commercial (Ordinance No. 8119).
Moreover, it is a well-settled rule in statutory construction that a subsequent general law does not repeal a
prior special law on the same subject unless it clearly appears that the legislature has intended by the latter
general act to modify or repeal the earlier special law. Generalia specialibus non derogant (a general law
does not nullify a specific or special law).102 This is so even if the provisions of the general law are sufficiently
comprehensive to include what was set forth in the special act.103 The special act and the general law must
stand together, one as the law of the particular subject and the other as the law of general application.104 The
special law must be taken as intended to constitute an exception to, or a qualification of, the general act or
provision.105

The reason for this is that the legislature, in passing a law of special character, considers and makes
special provisions for the particular circumstances dealt with by the special law. This being so, the
legislature, by adopting a general law containing provisions repugnant to those of the special law
and without making any mention of its intention to amend or modify such special law, cannot be
deemed to have intended an amendment, repeal or modification of the latter. 106

Ordinance No. 8027 is a special law107 since it deals specifically with a certain area described therein (the
Pandacan oil depot area) whereas Ordinance No. 8119 can be considered a general law 108 as it covers the
entire city of Manila.

The oil companies assert that even if Ordinance No. 8027 is a special law, the existence of an all-
encompassing repealing clause in Ordinance No. 8119 evinces an intent on the part of the Sanggunian to
repeal the earlier ordinance:

Sec. 84. Repealing Clause. – All ordinances, rules, regulations in conflict with the provisions of this
Ordinance are hereby repealed; PROVIDED, That the rights that are vested upon the effectivity of
this Ordinance shall not be impaired.

They cited Hospicio de San Jose de Barili, Cebu City v. Department of Agrarian Reform:109

The presence of such general repealing clause in a later statute clearly indicates the legislative intent
to repeal all prior inconsistent laws on the subject matter, whether the prior law is a general law or
a special law... Without such a clause, a later general law will ordinarily not repeal a prior special law
on the same subject. But with such clause contained in the subsequent general law, the prior special
law will be deemed repealed, as the clause is a clear legislative intent to bring about that result. 110

This ruling in not applicable here. The repealing clause of Ordinance No. 8119 cannot be taken to indicate
the legislative intent to repeal all prior inconsistent laws on the subject matter, including Ordinance No.
8027, a special enactment, since the aforequoted minutes (an official record of the discussions in
the Sanggunian) actually indicated the clear intent to preserve the provisions of Ordinance No. 8027.

To summarize, the conflict between the two ordinances is more apparent than real. The two ordinances can
be reconciled. Ordinance No. 8027 is applicable to the area particularly described therein whereas Ordinance
No. 8119 is applicable to the entire City of Manila.

Mandamus Lies To Compel Respondent Mayor To Enforce Ordinance No. 8027

The oil companies insist that mandamus does not lie against respondent in consideration of the separation
of powers of the executive and judiciary.111 This argument is misplaced. Indeed,

[the] Courts will not interfere by mandamus proceedings with the legislative [or executive
departments] of the government in the legitimate exercise of its powers, except to enforce mere
ministerial acts required by law to be performed by some officer thereof. 112 (Emphasis
Supplied)

since this is the function of a writ of mandamus, which is the power to compel "the performance of an act
which the law specifically enjoins as a duty resulting from office, trust or station." 113

They also argue that petitioners had a plain, speedy and adequate remedy to compel respondent to enforce
Ordinance No. 8027 which was to seek relief from the President of the Philippines through the Secretary of
the Department of Interior and Local Government (DILG) by virtue of the President’s power of supervision
over local government units. Again, we disagree. A party need not go first to the DILG in order to compel
the enforcement of an ordinance. This suggested process would be unreasonably long, tedious and
consequently injurious to the interests of the local government unit (LGU) and its constituents whose welfare
is sought to be protected. Besides, petitioners’ resort to an original action for mandamus before this Court
is undeniably allowed by the Constitution.114

Ordinance No. 8027 Is Constitutional And Valid

Having ruled that there is no impediment to the enforcement of Ordinance No. 8027, we now proceed to
make a definitive ruling on its constitutionality and validity.
The tests of a valid ordinance are well established. For an ordinance to be valid, it must not only be within
the corporate powers of the LGU to enact and be passed according to the procedure prescribed by law, it
must also conform to the following substantive requirements: (1) must not contravene the Constitution or
any statute; (2) must not be unfair or oppressive; (3) must not be partial or discriminatory; (4) must not
prohibit but may regulate trade; (5) must be general and consistent with public policy and (6) must not be
unreasonable.115

The City of Manila Has The Power To Enact Ordinance No. 8027

Ordinance No. 8027 was passed by the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Manila in the exercise of its police power.
Police power is the plenary power vested in the legislature to make statutes and ordinances to promote the
health, morals, peace, education, good order or safety and general welfare of the people. 116 This power
flows from the recognition that salus populi est suprema lex (the welfare of the people is the supreme
law).117 While police power rests primarily with the national legislature, such power may be
delegated.118 Section 16 of the LGC, known as the general welfare clause, encapsulates the delegated police
power to local governments:119

Section 16. General Welfare. ― Every local government unit shall exercise the powers expressly
granted, those necessarily implied therefrom, as well as powers necessary, appropriate, or incidental
for its efficient and effective governance, and those which are essential to the promotion of the
general welfare. Within their respective territorial jurisdictions, local government units shall ensure
and support, among other things, the preservation and enrichment of culture, promote health and
safety, enhance the right of the people to a balanced ecology, encourage and support the
development of appropriate and self-reliant scientific and technological capabilities, improve public
morals, enhance economic prosperity and social justice, promote full employment among their
residents, maintain peace and order, and preserve the comfort and convenience of their inhabitants.

LGUs like the City of Manila exercise police power through their respective legislative bodies, in this case,
the Sangguniang Panlungsod or the city council. Specifically, the Sanggunian can enact ordinances for the
general welfare of the city:

Section. 458. – Powers, Duties, Functions and Compensation. – (a) The sangguniang panglungsod,
as the legislative branch of the city, shall enact ordinances, approve resolutions and appropriate
funds for the general welfare of the city and its inhabitants pursuant to Section 16 of this Code xxxx

This police power was also provided for in RA 409 or the Revised Charter of the City of Manila:

Section 18. Legislative powers. — The [City Council] shall have the following legislative powers:

xxx xxx xxx

(g) To enact all ordinances it may deem necessary and proper for the sanitation and safety, the
furtherance of the prosperity, and the promotion of the morality, peace, good order, comfort,
convenience, and general welfare of the city and its inhabitants, and such others as may be necessary
to carry into effect and discharge the powers and duties conferred by this chapter xxxx120

Specifically, the Sanggunian has the power to "reclassify land within the jurisdiction of the city." 121

The Enactment Of Ordinance No. 8027 Is A Legitimate Exercise Of Police Power

As with the State, local governments may be considered as having properly exercised their police power
only if the following requisites are met: (1) the interests of the public generally, as distinguished from those
of a particular class, require its exercise and (2) the means employed are reasonably necessary for the
accomplishment of the purpose and not unduly oppressive upon individuals. In short, there must be a
concurrence of a lawful subject and a lawful method.122

Ordinance No. 8027 was enacted "for the purpose of promoting sound urban planning, ensuring health,
public safety and general welfare"123 of the residents of Manila. The Sanggunian was impelled to take
measures to protect the residents of Manila from catastrophic devastation in case of a terrorist attack on
the Pandacan Terminals. Towards this objective, the Sanggunian reclassified the area defined in the
ordinance from industrial to commercial.

The following facts were found by the Committee on Housing, Resettlement and Urban Development of the
City of Manila which recommended the approval of the ordinance:

(1) the depot facilities contained 313.5 million liters of highly flammable and highly volatile products which
include petroleum gas, liquefied petroleum gas, aviation fuel, diesel, gasoline, kerosene and fuel oil among
others;

(2) the depot is open to attack through land, water or air;

(3) it is situated in a densely populated place and near Malacañang Palace and

(4) in case of an explosion or conflagration in the depot, the fire could spread to the neighboring
communities.124

The ordinance was intended to safeguard the rights to life, security and safety of all the inhabitants of Manila
and not just of a particular class.125 The depot is perceived, rightly or wrongly, as a representation of western
interests which means that it is a terrorist target. As long as it there is such a target in their midst, the
residents of Manila are not safe. It therefore became necessary to remove these terminals to dissipate the
threat. According to respondent:

Such a public need became apparent after the 9/11 incident which showed that what was perceived
to be impossible to happen, to the most powerful country in the world at that, is actually possible.
The destruction of property and the loss of thousands of lives on that fateful day became the impetus
for a public need. In the aftermath of the 9/11 tragedy, the threats of terrorism continued [such]
that it became imperative for governments to take measures to combat their effects.126

Wide discretion is vested on the legislative authority to determine not only what the interests of the public
require but also what measures are necessary for the protection of such interests. 127 Clearly,
the Sanggunian was in the best position to determine the needs of its constituents.

In the exercise of police power, property rights of individuals may be subjected to restraints and burdens in
order to fulfill the objectives of the government. 128 Otherwise stated, the government may enact legislation
that may interfere with personal liberty, property, lawful businesses and occupations to promote the general
welfare.129 However, the interference must be reasonable and not arbitrary. And to forestall arbitrariness,
the methods or means used to protect public health, morals, safety or welfare must have a reasonable
relation to the end in view.130

The means adopted by the Sanggunian was the enactment of a zoning ordinance which reclassified the area
where the depot is situated from industrial to commercial. A zoning ordinance is defined as a local city or
municipal legislation which logically arranges, prescribes, defines and apportions a given political subdivision
into specific land uses as present and future projection of needs. 131 As a result of the zoning, the continued
operation of the businesses of the oil companies in their present location will no longer be permitted. The
power to establish zones for industrial, commercial and residential uses is derived from the police power
itself and is exercised for the protection and benefit of the residents of a locality. 132 Consequently, the
enactment of Ordinance No. 8027 is within the power of the Sangguniang Panlungsod of the City of Manila
and any resulting burden on those affected cannot be said to be unjust:

There can be no doubt that the City of Manila has the power to divide its territory into residential and
industrial zones, and to prescribe that offensive and unwholesome trades and occupations are to be
established exclusively in the latter zone.

"The benefits to be derived by cities adopting such regulations (zoning) may be summarized as
follows: They attract a desirable and assure a permanent citizenship; they foster pride in and
attachment to the city; they promote happiness and contentment; they stabilize the use and value
of property and promote the peace, [tranquility], and good order of the city. We do not hesitate to
say that the attainment of these objects affords a legitimate field for the exercise of the police power.
He who owns property in such a district is not deprived of its use by such regulations. He may use it
for the purposes to which the section in which it is located is dedicated. That he shall not be permitted
to use it to the desecration of the community constitutes no unreasonable or permanent hardship
and results in no unjust burden."

xxx xxx xxx

"The 14th Amendment protects the citizen in his right to engage in any lawful business, but it does
not prevent legislation intended to regulate useful occupations which, because of their nature or
location, may prove injurious or offensive to the public."133

We entertain no doubt that Ordinance No. 8027 is a valid police power measure because there is a
concurrence of lawful subject and lawful method.

Ordinance No. 8027 Is Not Unfair, Oppressive Or Confiscatory Which Amounts To Taking Without
Compensation

According to the oil companies, Ordinance No. 8027 is unfair and oppressive as it does not only regulate
but also absolutely prohibits them from conducting operations in the City of Manila. Respondent counters
that this is not accurate since the ordinance merely prohibits the oil companies from operating their
businesses in the Pandacan area.

Indeed, the ordinance expressly delineated in its title and in Section 1 what it pertained to. Therefore, the
oil companies’ contention is not supported by the text of the ordinance. Respondent succinctly stated that:
 The oil companies are not forbidden to do business in the City of Manila. They may still very well do
so, except that their oil storage facilities are no longer allowed in the Pandacan area. Certainly, there
are other places in the City of Manila where they can conduct this specific kind of business. Ordinance
No. 8027 did not render the oil companies illegal. The assailed ordinance affects the oil companies
business only in so far as the Pandacan area is concerned.134

The oil companies are not prohibited from doing business in other appropriate zones in Manila. The City of
Manila merely exercised its power to regulate the businesses and industries in the zones it established:

As to the contention that the power to regulate does not include the power to prohibit, it will be seen
that the ordinance copied above does not prohibit the installation of motor engines within the
municipality of Cabanatuan but only within the zone therein fixed. If the municipal council of
Cabanatuan is authorized to establish said zone, it is also authorized to provide what kind of engines
may be installed therein. In banning the installation in said zone of all engines not excepted in the
ordinance, the municipal council of Cabanatuan did no more than regulate their installation by means
of zonification.135

The oil companies aver that the ordinance is unfair and oppressive because they have invested billions of
pesos in the depot.136 Its forced closure will result in huge losses in income and tremendous costs in
constructing new facilities.

Their contention has no merit. In the exercise of police power, there is a limitation on or restriction of
property interests to promote public welfare which involves no compensable taking. Compensation is
necessary only when the state’s power of eminent domain is exercised. In eminent domain, property is
appropriated and applied to some public purpose. Property condemned under the exercise of police power,
on the other hand, is noxious or intended for a noxious or forbidden purpose and, consequently, is not
compensable.137 The restriction imposed to protect lives, public health and safety from danger is not a
taking. It is merely the prohibition or abatement of a noxious use which interferes with paramount rights of
the public.

Property has not only an individual function, insofar as it has to provide for the needs of the owner, but also
a social function insofar as it has to provide for the needs of the other members of society. 138 The principle
is this:

Police power proceeds from the principle that every holder of property, however absolute and
unqualified may be his title, holds it under the implied liability that his use of it shall not be injurious
to the equal enjoyment of others having an equal right to the enjoyment of their property, nor
injurious to the right of the community. Rights of property, like all other social and conventional
rights, are subject to reasonable limitations in their enjoyment as shall prevent them from being
injurious, and to such reasonable restraints and regulations established by law as the legislature,
under the governing and controlling power vested in them by the constitution, may think necessary
and expedient.139

In the regulation of the use of the property, nobody else acquires the use or interest therein, hence there
is no compensable taking.140 In this case, the properties of the oil companies and other businesses situated
in the affected area remain theirs. Only their use is restricted although they can be applied to other profitable
uses permitted in the commercial zone.

Ordinance No. 8027 Is Not Partial And Discriminatory

The oil companies take the position that the ordinance has discriminated against and singled out the
Pandacan Terminals despite the fact that the Pandacan area is congested with buildings and residences that
do not comply with the National Building Code, Fire Code and Health and Sanitation Code. 141

This issue should not detain us for long. An ordinance based on reasonable classification does not violate
the constitutional guaranty of the equal protection of the law. 142 The requirements for a valid and reasonable
classification are: (1) it must rest on substantial distinctions; (2) it must be germane to the purpose of the
law; (3) it must not be limited to existing conditions only and (4) it must apply equally to all members of
the same class.143

The law may treat and regulate one class differently from another class provided there are real and
substantial differences to distinguish one class from another. 144 Here, there is a reasonable classification.
We reiterate that what the ordinance seeks to prevent is a catastrophic devastation that will result from a
terrorist attack. Unlike the depot, the surrounding community is not a high-value terrorist target. Any
damage caused by fire or explosion occurring in those areas would be nothing compared to the damage
caused by a fire or explosion in the depot itself. Accordingly, there is a substantial distinction. The enactment
of the ordinance which provides for the cessation of the operations of these terminals removes the threat
they pose. Therefore it is germane to the purpose of the ordinance. The classification is not limited to the
conditions existing when the ordinance was enacted but to future conditions as well. Finally, the ordinance
is applicable to all businesses and industries in the area it delineated.
Ordinance No. 8027 is Not Inconsistent With RA 7638 And RA 8479

The oil companies and the DOE assert that Ordinance No. 8027 is unconstitutional because it contravenes
RA 7638 (DOE Act of 1992)145 and RA 8479 (Downstream Oil Industry Deregulation Law of 1998). 146 They
argue that through RA 7638, the national legislature declared it a policy of the state "to ensure a continuous,
adequate, and economic supply of energy"147 and created the DOE to implement this policy. Thus, under
Section 5 I, DOE is empowered to "establish and administer programs for the exploration, transportation,
marketing, distribution, utilization, conservation, stockpiling, and storage of energy resources." Considering
that the petroleum products contained in the Pandacan Terminals are major and critical energy resources,
they conclude that their administration, storage, distribution and transport are of national interest and fall
under DOE’s primary and exclusive jurisdiction.148

They further assert that the terminals are necessary for the delivery of immediate and adequate supply of
oil to its recipients in the most economical way.149 Local legislation such as Ordinance No. 8027 (which
effectively calls for the removal of these terminals) allegedly frustrates the state policy of ensuring a
continuous, adequate, and economic supply of energy expressed in RA 7638, a national law. 150 Likewise,
the ordinance thwarts the determination of the DOE that the terminals’ operations should be merely scaled
down and not discontinued.151They insist that this should not be allowed considering that it has a nationwide
economic impact and affects public interest transcending the territorial jurisdiction of the City of Manila. 152

According to them, the DOE’s supervision over the oil industry under RA 7638 was subsequently underscored
by RA 8479, particularly in Section 7 thereof:

SECTION 7. Promotion of Fair Trade Practices. ― The Department of Trade and Industry (DTI) and
DOE shall take all measures to promote fair trade and prevent cartelization, monopolies,
combinations in restraint of trade, and any unfair competition in the Industry as defined in Article
186 of the Revised Penal Code, and Articles 168 and 169 of Republic Act No. 8293, otherwise known
as the "Intellectual Property Rights Law". The DOE shall continue to encourage certain practices
in the Industry which serve the public interest and are intended to achieve efficiency and
cost reduction, ensure continuous supply of petroleum products, and enhance environmental
protection. These practices may include borrow-and-loan agreements, rationalized depot and
manufacturing operations, hospitality agreements, joint tanker and pipeline utilization, and joint
actions on oil spill control and fire prevention. (Emphasis supplied)

Respondent counters that DOE’s regulatory power does not preclude LGUs from exercising their police
power.153

Indeed, ordinances should not contravene existing statutes enacted by Congress. The rationale for this was
clearly explained in Magtajas vs. Pryce Properties Corp., Inc.:154

The rationale of the requirement that the ordinances should not contravene a statute is obvious.
Municipal governments are only agents of the national government. Local councils exercise only
delegated legislative powers conferred on them by Congress as the national lawmaking body. The
delegate cannot be superior to the principal or exercise powers higher than those of the latter. It is
a heresy to suggest that the local government units can undo the acts of Congress, from which they
have derived their power in the first place, and negate by mere ordinance the mandate of the statute.

"Municipal corporations owe their origin to, and derive their powers and rights wholly from the
legislature. It breathes into them the breath of life, without which they cannot exist. As it creates,
so it may destroy. As it may destroy, it may abridge and control. Unless there is some constitutional
limitation on the right, the legislature might, by a single act, and if we can suppose it capable of so
great a folly and so great a wrong, sweep from existence all of the municipal corporations in the
State, and the corporation could not prevent it. We know of no limitation on the right so far as to the
corporation themselves are concerned. They are, so to phrase it, the mere tenants at will of the
legislature."

This basic relationship between the national legislature and the local government units has not been
enfeebled by the new provisions in the Constitution strengthening the policy of local autonomy.
Without meaning to detract from that policy, we here confirm that Congress retains control of the
local government units although in significantly reduced degree now than under our previous
Constitutions. The power to create still includes the power to destroy. The power to grant still includes
the power to withhold or recall. True, there are certain notable innovations in the Constitution, like
the direct conferment on the local government units of the power to tax, which cannot now be
withdrawn by mere statute. By and large, however, the national legislature is still the principal of the
local government units, which cannot defy its will or modify or violate it.155

The question now is whether Ordinance No. 8027 contravenes RA 7638 and RA 8479. It does not.

Under Section 5 I of RA 7638, DOE was given the power to "establish and administer programs for the
exploration, transportation, marketing, distribution, utilization, conservation, stockpiling, and storage of
energy resources." On the other hand, under Section 7 of RA 8749, the DOE "shall continue to encourage
certain practices in the Industry which serve the public interest and are intended to achieve efficiency and
cost reduction, ensure continuous supply of petroleum products." Nothing in these statutes prohibits the
City of Manila from enacting ordinances in the exercise of its police power.

The principle of local autonomy is enshrined in and zealously protected under the Constitution. In Article II,
Section 25 thereof, the people expressly adopted the following policy:

Section 25. The State shall ensure the autonomy of local governments.

An entire article (Article X) of the Constitution has been devoted to guaranteeing and promoting the
autonomy of LGUs. The LGC was specially promulgated by Congress to ensure the autonomy of local
governments as mandated by the Constitution:

Sec. 2. Declaration of Policy. ― (a) It is hereby declared the policy of the State that the
territorial and political subdivisions of the State shall enjoy genuine and meaningful local
autonomy to enable them to attain their fullest development as self-reliant communities
and make them more effective partners in the attainment of national goals. Toward this end,
the State shall provide for a more responsive and accountable local government structure instituted
through a system of decentralization whereby local government units shall be given more powers,
authority, responsibilities, and resources. The process of decentralization shall proceed from the
National Government to the local government units. (Emphasis supplied)

We do not see how the laws relied upon by the oil companies and DOE stripped the City of Manila of its
power to enact ordinances in the exercise of its police power and to reclassify the land uses within its
jurisdiction. To guide us, we shall make a brief survey of our decisions where the police power measure of
the LGU clashed with national laws.

In Tan v. Pereña,156 the Court ruled that Ordinance No. 7 enacted by the municipality of Daanbantayan,
Cebu allowing the operation of three cockpits was invalid for violating PD 449 (or the Cockfighting Law of
1974) which permitted only one cockpit per municipality.

In Batangas CATV, Inc. v. Court of Appeals,157 the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Batangas City enacted
Resolution No. 210 granting Batangas CATV, Inc. a permit to operate a cable television (CATV) system in
Batangas City. The Court held that the LGU did not have the authority to grant franchises to operate a CATV
system because it was the National Telecommunications Commission (NTC) that had the power under EO
Nos. 205 and 436 to regulate CATV operations. EO 205 mandated the NTC to grant certificates of authority
to CATV operators while EO 436 vested on the NTC the power to regulate and supervise the CATV industry.

In Lina, Jr. v. Paño,158 we held that Kapasiyahan Bilang 508, Taon 1995 of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of
Laguna could not be used as justification to prohibit lotto in the municipality of San Pedro, Laguna because
lotto was duly authorized by RA 1169, as amended by BP 42. This law granted a franchise to the Philippine
Charity Sweepstakes Office and allowed it to operate lotteries.

In Magtajas v. Pryce Properties Corp., Inc.,159 the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Cagayan de Oro City passed
Ordinance Nos. 3353 and 3375-93 prohibiting the operation of casinos in the city. We ruled that these
ordinances were void for contravening PD 1869 or the charter of the Philippine Amusements and Gaming
Corporation which had the power to operate casinos.

The common dominator of all of these cases is that the national laws were clearly and expressly in conflict
with the ordinances/resolutions of the LGUs. The inconsistencies were so patent that there was no room for
doubt. This is not the case here.

The laws cited merely gave DOE general powers to "establish and administer programs for the exploration,
transportation, marketing, distribution, utilization, conservation, stockpiling, and storage of energy
resources" and "to encourage certain practices in the [oil] industry which serve the public interest and are
intended to achieve efficiency and cost reduction, ensure continuous supply of petroleum products." These
powers can be exercised without emasculating the LGUs of the powers granted them. When these ambiguous
powers are pitted against the unequivocal power of the LGU to enact police power and zoning ordinances
for the general welfare of its constituents, it is not difficult to rule in favor of the latter. Considering that the
powers of the DOE regarding the Pandacan Terminals are not categorical, the doubt must be resolved in
favor of the City of Manila:

SECTION 5. Rules of Interpretation. ― In the interpretation of the provisions of this Code, the
following rules shall apply:

(a) Any provision on a power of a local government unit shall be liberally interpreted in its favor, and
in case of doubt, any question thereon shall be resolved in favor of devolution of powers and of the
lower local government unit. Any fair and reasonable doubt as to the existence of the power shall be
interpreted in favor of the local government unit concerned;

xxx xxx xxx

 (g) IThe general welfare provisions in this Code shall be liberally interpreted to give more powers to
local government units in accelerating economic development and upgrading the quality of life for
the people in the community xxxx

The least we can do to ensure genuine and meaningful local autonomy is not to force an interpretation
that negates powers explicitly granted to local governments. To rule against the power of LGUs to
reclassify areas within their jurisdiction will subvert the principle of local autonomy guaranteed by
the Constitution.160 As we have noted in earlier decisions, our national officials should not only comply
with the constitutional provisions on local autonomy but should also appreciate the spirit and liberty
upon which these provisions are based.161

The DOE Cannot Exercise The Power Of Control Over LGUs

Another reason that militates against the DOE’s assertions is that Section 4 of Article X of the Constitution
confines the President’s power over LGUs to one of general supervision:

SECTION 4. The President of the Philippines shall exercise general supervision over local governments. Xxxx

Consequently, the Chief Executive or his or her alter egos, cannot exercise the power of control over
them.162Control and supervision are distinguished as follows:

[Supervision] means overseeing or the power or authority of an officer to see that subordinate
officers perform their duties. If the latter fail or neglect to fulfill them, the former may take such
action or step as prescribed by law to make them perform their duties. Control, on the other hand,
means the power of an officer to alter or modify or nullify or set aside what a subordinate officer
ha[s] done in the performance of his duties and to substitute the judgment of the former for that of
the latter.163

Supervisory power, when contrasted with control, is the power of mere oversight over an inferior body; it
does not include any restraining authority over such body. 164 It does not allow the supervisor to annul the
acts of the subordinate.165 Here, what the DOE seeks to do is to set aside an ordinance enacted by local
officials, a power that not even its principal, the President, has. This is because:

Under our present system of government, executive power is vested in the President. The members
of the Cabinet and other executive officials are merely alter egos. As such, they are subject to the
power of control of the President, at whose will and behest they can be removed from office; or their
actions and decisions changed, suspended or reversed. In contrast, the heads of political subdivisions
are elected by the people. Their sovereign powers emanate from the electorate, to whom they are
directly accountable. By constitutional fiat, they are subject to the President’s supervision only, not
control, so long as their acts are exercised within the sphere of their legitimate powers. By the same
token, the President may not withhold or alter any authority or power given them by the Constitution
and the law.166

Thus, the President and his or her alter egos, the department heads, cannot interfere with the activities of
local governments, so long as they act within the scope of their authority. Accordingly, the DOE cannot
substitute its own discretion for the discretion exercised by the sanggunian of the City of Manila. In local
affairs, the wisdom of local officials must prevail as long as they are acting within the parameters of the
Constitution and the law.167

Ordinance No. 8027 Is Not Invalid For Failure To Comply With RA 7924 And EO 72

The oil companies argue that zoning ordinances of LGUs are required to be submitted to the Metropolitan
Manila Development Authority (MMDA) for review and if found to be in compliance with its metropolitan
physical framework plan and regulations, it shall endorse the same to the Housing and Land Use Regulatory
Board (HLURB). Their basis is Section 3 (e) of RA 7924:168

SECTION 3. Scope of MMDA Services. ― Metro-wide services under the jurisdiction of the
MMDA are those services which have metro-wide impact and transcend local political boundaries or
entail huge expenditures such that it would not be viable for said services to be provided by the
individual [LGUs] comprising Metropolitan Manila. These services shall include:

xxx xxx xxx

(g) Urban renewal, zoning, and land use planning, and shelter services which include the
formulation, adoption and implementation of policies, standards, rules and regulations, programs
and projects to rationalize and optimize urban land use and provide direction to urban growth and
expansion, the rehabilitation and development of slum and blighted areas, the development of shelter
and housing facilities and the provision of necessary social services thereof. (Emphasis supplied)

Reference was also made to Section 15 of its implementing rules:

 Section 15. Linkages with HUDCC, HLURB, NHA, LGUs and Other National Government Agencies
Concerned on Urban Renewal, Zoning and Land Use Planning and Shelter Services. Within the context
of the National Housing and Urban Development Framework, and pursuant to the national standards,
guidelines and regulations formulated by the Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board [HLURB] on
land use planning and zoning, the [MMDA] shall prepare a metropolitan physical framework plan and
regulations which shall complement and translate the socio-economic development plan for Metro
Manila into physical or spatial terms, and provide the basis for the preparation, review, integration
and implementation of local land use plans and zoning, ordinance of cities and municipalities in the
area.

Said framework plan and regulations shall contain, among others, planning and zoning policies and
procedures that shall be observed by local government units in the preparation of their own plans
and ordinances pursuant to Section 447 and 458 of RA 7160, as well as the identification of sites and
projects that are considered to be of national or metropolitan significance.

Cities and municipalities shall prepare their respective land use plans and zoning
ordinances and submit the same for review and integration by the [MMDA] and
indorsement to HLURB in accordance with Executive Order No. 72 and other pertinent
laws.

In the preparation of a Metropolitan Manila physical framework plan and regulations, the [MMDA]
shall coordinate with the Housing and Urban Development Coordinating Council, HLURB, the National
Housing Authority, Intramuros Administration, and all other agencies of the national government
which are concerned with land use and zoning, urban renewal and shelter services. (Emphasis
supplied)

They also claim that EO 72169 provides that zoning ordinances of cities and municipalities of Metro Manila
are subject to review by the HLURB to ensure compliance with national standards and guidelines. They cite
Section 1, paragraphs I, (e), (f) and (g):

SECTION 1. Plan formulation or updating. ―

xxx xxx xxx

(g) Cities and municipalities of Metropolitan Manila shall continue to formulate or update their
respective comprehensive land use plans, in accordance with the land use planning and
zoning standards and guidelines prescribed by the HLURB pursuant to EO 392, S. of 1990,
and other pertinent national policies.

xxx xxx xxx

(e) Pursuant to LOI 729, S. of 1978, EO 648, S. of 1981, and RA 7279, the comprehensive land
use plansof provinces, highly urbanized cities and independent component cities shall be reviewed
and ratified by the HLURB to ensure compliance with national standards and guidelines.

(f) Pursuant to EO 392, S. of 1999, the comprehensive land use plans of cities and municipalities
of Metropolitan Manila shall be reviewed by the HLURB to ensure compliance with national standards
and guidelines.

(g) Said review shall be completed within three (3) months upon receipt thereof otherwise, the same
shall be deemed consistent with law, and, therefore, valid. (Emphasis supplied)

They argue that because Ordinance No. 8027 did not go through this review process, it is invalid.

The argument is flawed.

RA 7942 does not give MMDA the authority to review land use plans and zoning ordinances of cities and
municipalities. This was only found in its implementing rules which made a reference to EO 72. EO 72
expressly refers to comprehensive land use plans (CLUPs) only. Ordinance No. 8027 is admittedly not a
CLUP nor intended to be one. Instead, it is a very specific ordinance which reclassified the land use of a
defined area in order to prevent the massive effects of a possible terrorist attack. It is Ordinance No. 8119
which was explicitly formulated as the "Manila [CLUP] and Zoning Ordinance of 2006." CLUPs are the
ordinances which should be submitted to the MMDA for integration in its metropolitan physical framework
plan and approved by the HLURB to ensure that they conform with national guidelines and policies.

Moreover, even assuming that the MMDA review and HLURB ratification are necessary, the oil companies
did not present any evidence to show that these were not complied with. In accordance with the presumption
of validity in favor of an ordinance, its constitutionality or legality should be upheld in the absence of proof
showing that the procedure prescribed by law was not observed. The burden of proof is on the oil companies
which already had notice that this Court was inclined to dispose of all the issues in this case. Yet aside from
their bare assertion, they did not present any certification from the MMDA or the HLURB nor did they append
these to their pleadings. Clearly, they failed to rebut the presumption of validity of Ordinance No. 8027. 170

Conclusion

Essentially, the oil companies are fighting for their right to property. They allege that they stand to lose
billions of pesos if forced to relocate. However, based on the hierarchy of constitutionally protected rights,
the right to life enjoys precedence over the right to property. 171 The reason is obvious: life is irreplaceable,
property is not. When the state or LGU’s exercise of police power clashes with a few individuals’ right to
property, the former should prevail.172

Both law and jurisprudence support the constitutionality and validity of Ordinance No. 8027. Without a
doubt, there are no impediments to its enforcement and implementation. Any delay is unfair to the
inhabitants of the City of Manila and its leaders who have categorically expressed their desire for the
relocation of the terminals. Their power to chart and control their own destiny and preserve their lives and
safety should not be curtailed by the intervenors’ warnings of doomsday scenarios and threats of economic
disorder if the ordinance is enforced.

Secondary to the legal reasons supporting the immediate implementation of Ordinance No. 8027 are the
policy considerations which drove Manila’s government to come up with such a measure:

... [The] oil companies still were not able to allay the apprehensions of the city regarding the security
threat in the area in general. No specific action plan or security measures were presented that would
prevent a possible large-scale terrorist or malicious attack especially an attack aimed at Malacañang.
The measures that were installed were more directed towards their internal security and did not
include the prevention of an external attack even on a bilateral level of cooperation between these
companies and the police and military.

xxx xxx xxx

It is not enough for the city government to be told by these oil companies that they have the most
sophisticated fire-fighting equipments and have invested millions of pesos for these equipments. The
city government wants to be assured that its residents are safe at any time from these installations,
and in the three public hearings and in their position papers, not one statement has been said that
indeed the absolute safety of the residents from the hazards posed by these installations is
assured.173

We are also putting an end to the oil companies’ determination to prolong their stay in Pandacan despite
the objections of Manila’s residents. As early as October 2001, the oil companies signed a MOA with the
DOE obliging themselves to:

... undertake a comprehensive and comparative study ... [which] shall include the preparation of a
Master Plan, whose aim is to determine the scope and timing of the feasible location of the Pandacan
oil terminals and all associated facilities and infrastructure including government support essential
for the relocation such as the necessary transportation infrastructure, land and right of way
acquisition, resettlement of displaced residents and environmental and social acceptability which
shall be based on mutual benefit of the Parties and the public.174

Now that they are being compelled to discontinue their operations in the Pandacan Terminals, they cannot
feign unreadiness considering that they had years to prepare for this eventuality.

Just the same, this Court is not about to provoke a crisis by ordering the immediate relocation of the
Pandacan Terminals out of its present site. The enforcement of a decision of this Court, specially one with
far-reaching consequences, should always be within the bounds of reason, in accordance with a
comprehensive and well-coordinated plan, and within a time-frame that complies with the letter and spirit
of our resolution. To this end, the oil companies have no choice but to obey the law.

A Warning To Petitioners’ Counsel

We draw the attention of the parties to a matter of grave concern to the legal profession.

Petitioners and their counsel, Atty. Samson Alcantara, submitted a four-page memorandum that clearly
contained either substance nor research. It is absolutely insulting to this Court.

We have always tended towards judicial leniency, temperance and compassion to those who suffer from a
wrong perception of what the majesty of the law means. But for a member of the bar, an officer of the
court, to file in this Court a memorandum of such unacceptable quality is an entirely different matter.

It is indicative less of a personal shortcoming or contempt of this Court and more of a lawyer’s sorry descent
from a high sense of duty and responsibility. As a member of the bar and as an officer of the court, a lawyer
ought to be keenly aware that the chief safeguard of the body politic is respect for the law and its
magistrates.

There is nothing more effective than the written word by which counsel can persuade this Court of the
righteousness of his cause. For if truth were self-evident, a memorandum would be completely unnecessary
and superfluous.

The inability of counsel to prepare a memorandum worthy of this Court’s consideration is an ejemplo malo to
the legal profession as it betrays no genuine interest in the cause he claims to espouse. Or did counsel think
he can earn his moment of glory without the hard work and dedication called for by his petition?

A Final Word

On Wednesday, January 23, 2008, a defective tanker containing 2,000 liters of gasoline and 14,000 liters
of diesel exploded in the middle of the street a short distance from the exit gate of the Pandacan Terminals,
causing death, extensive damage and a frightening conflagration in the vicinity of the incident. Need we say
anthing about what will happen if it is the estimated 162 to 211 million liters175 of petroleum products in the
terminal complex which blow up?

WHEREFORE, the motions for leave to intervene of Chevron Philippines Inc., Petron Corporation and
Pilipinas Shell Petroleum Corporation, and the Republic of the Philippines, represented by the Department
of Energy, are hereby GRANTED. Their respective motions for reconsideration are hereby DENIED. The
Regional Trial Court, Manila, Branch 39 is ORDERED to DISMISS the consolidated cases of Civil Case No.
03-106377 and Civil Case No. 03-106380.

We reiterate our order to respondent Mayor of the City of Manila to enforce Ordinance No. 8027. In
coordination with the appropriate agencies and other parties involved, respondent Mayor is hereby ordered
to oversee the relocation and transfer of the Pandacan Terminals out of its present site.

To ensure the orderly transfer, movement and relocation of assets and personnel, the intervenors Chevron
Philippines Inc., Petron Corporation and Pilipinas Shell Petroleum Corporation shall, within a non-extendible
period of ninety (90) days, submit to the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 39, the comprehensive plan
and relocation schedule which have allegedly been prepared. The presiding judge of Manila RTC, Branch 39
will monitor the strict enforcement of this resolution.

Atty. Samson Alcantara is hereby ordered to explain within five (5) days from notice why he should not be
disciplined for his refusal, or inability, to file a memorandum worthy of the consideration of this Court. Treble
costs against petitioners’ counsel, Atty. Samson Alcantara. SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 165153 August 25, 2010

CARLOS DE CASTRO, Petitioner,

vs.
LIBERTY BROADCASTING NETWORK, INC. and EDGARDO QUIOGUE, Respondents.

RESOLUTION

BRION, J.:

The respondent, Liberty Broadcasting Network, Inc. (LBNI), filed the present Motion for Reconsideration
with Motion to Suspend Proceedings, asking us, first, to set aside our Decision1 and, second, to suspend the
court proceedings in view of the Stay Order issued on August 19, 2005 by the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Makati, Branch 138, in relation to the corporate rehabilitation proceedings that LBNI initiated.

The dispositive part of our Decision reads:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, we hereby GRANT the petition. Accordingly, we REVERSE and SET ASIDE
the Decision and Resolution of the CA promulgated on May 25, 2004 and August 30, 2004, respectively,
and REINSTATE in all respects the Resolution of the National Labor Relations Commission dated September
20, 2002. Costs against the respondents.

SO ORDERED.2

The facts, as recited in our Decision, are summarized below:

The petitioner, Carlos C. de Castro, worked as a chief building administrator at LBNI. On May 31, 1996,
LBNI dismissed de Castro on the grounds of serious misconduct, fraud, and willful breach of the trust reposed
in him as a managerial employee. Allegedly, de Castro committed the following acts:

1. Soliciting and/or receiving money for his own benefit from suppliers/dealers/traders [Cristino
Samarita and Jose Aying], representing "commissions" for job contracts involving the repair,
reconditioning and replacement of parts of the airconditioning units at the company’s Antipolo
Station, as well as the installation of fire exits at the [LBNI’s] Technology Centre;

2. Diversion of company funds by soliciting and receiving on different occasions a total of ₱14,000.00
in "commissions" from Aying for a job contract in the company’s Antipolo Station;

3. Theft of company property involving the unauthorized removal of one gallon of Delo oil from the
company storage room;

4. Disrespect/discourtesy towards a co-employee, for using offensive language against [Vicente

Niguidula, the company’s supply manager];

5. Disorderly behavior, for challenging Niguidula to a fight during working hours within the company
premises, thereby creating a disturbance that interrupted the normal flow of activities in the
company;

6. Threat and coercion, for threatening to inflict bodily harm on the person of Niguidula and for
coercing [Gil Balais], a subordinate, into soliciting money in [de Castro’s] behalf from
suppliers/contractors;

7. Abuse of authority, for instructing Balais to collect commissions from Aying and Samarita, and for
requiring Raul Pacaldo (Pacaldo) to exact 2% - 5% of the price of the contracts awarded to suppliers;
and

8. Slander, for uttering libelous statements against Niguidula.3

Aggrieved, de Castro filed a complaint for illegal dismissal against LBNI with the National Labor Relations
Commission (NLRC) Arbitration Branch, National Capital Region, praying for reinstatement, payment of
backwages, damages, and attorney’s fees. 4 He maintained that he could not have solicited commissions
from suppliers considering that he was new in the company.5 Moreover, the accusations were belatedly filed
as the imputed acts happened in 1995. He explained that the one gallon of Delo oil he allegedly took was
actually found in Gil Balais’ room.6 He denied threatening Vicente Niguidula, whom he claimed verbally
assaulted him and challenged him to a fight, an incident which he reported to respondent Edgardo Quiogue,
LBNI’s executive vice president, and to the Makati police.7 De Castro alleged that prior to executing affidavits
against him, Niguidula and Balais had serious clashes with him.8

On April 30, 1999, the Labor Arbiter rendered a decision 9 in de Castro’s favor, holding LBNI liable for illegal
dismissal.10 The Labor Arbiter found the affidavits of LBNI’s witnesses to be devoid of merit, noting that (1)
witnesses Niguidula and Balais had altercations with de Castro prior to the execution of their respective
affidavits; (2) the affidavit of Cristino Samarita, one of the suppliers from whom de Castro allegedly asked
for commissions, stated that it was not de Castro, but Balais, who personally asked for money; and (3) Jose
Aying, another supplier, recanted his earlier affidavit.11

LBNI appealed the Labor Arbiter’s ruling to the NLRC. Initially, the NLRC reversed the Labor Arbiter’s decision
but on de Castro’s motion for reconsideration, the NLRC reinstated the Labor Arbiter’s decision. 12 It ruled
that the charges against de Castro "were never really substantiated other than by ‘bare allegations’ in the
witnesses’ affidavits who were the company’s employees and who had altercations with De Castro prior to
the execution of their affidavits."13

LBNI again appealed the NLRC’s adverse decision to the Court of Appeals (CA). On May 25, 2004, the CA
reversed the NLRC’s decision and held that de Castro’s dismissal was based on valid grounds. It ruled too
that the NLRC gravely abused its discretion when it disregarded the affidavits of all of LBNI’s witnesses. 14

In our September 23, 2008 Decision, we found that de Castro’s dismissal was based on unsubstantiated
charges. Aying, a contractor, earlier executed an affidavit stating that de Castro asked him for commission,
but in his second affidavit, he recanted his statement and exonerated de Castro. 15 The other witnesses,
Niguidula and Balais, were LBNI employees who resented de Castro. 16 We noted that de Castro had not
stayed long in the company and had not even passed his probationary period when the acts charged
allegedly took place. We found this situation contrary to common experience, since new employees have a
natural motivation to make a positive first impression on the employer, if only to ensure that they are
regularized.17

Thus, we ruled that the grounds that LBNI invoked for de Castro’s dismissal were, at best, doubtful, based
on the evidence presented. These doubts should be interpreted in de Castro’s favor, pursuant to Article 4 of
the Labor Code.18 Between a laborer and his employer, doubts reasonably arising from the evidence or
interpretation of agreements and writing should be resolved in the former’s favor.19

The Motion for Reconsideration

LBNI now moves for a reconsideration of our September 23, 2008 Decision based on the following
arguments: (1) LBNI had valid legal grounds to terminate de Castro’s employment for loss of trust and
confidence;20 (2) the affidavits of LBNI’s witnesses should not have been totally disregarded;21 and (3) LBNI
is currently under rehabilitation, hence, the proceedings in this case must be suspended. 22 LBNI points out
that it filed, with the RTC of Makati, a petition for Corporate Rehabilitation with Prayer for Suspension of
Payments (docketed as S.P. Proc. Case No. M-6126), and on August 19, 2005, the RTC issued a Stay Order
directing, among others, that the –

enforcement of all claims against Liberty Telecoms, Liberty Broadcasting and Skyphone, whether for money
or otherwise and whether such enforcement is by Court action or otherwise x x x be forthwith stayed.23

Comment on the Motion for Reconsideration

In his comment, de Castro contends that LBNI’s motion for reconsideration contains a rehash of LBNI’s
earlier arguments. He avers that despite the RTC’s Stay Order, it is premature for this Court to suspend the
proceedings. If a suspension of the proceedings is necessary, the proper venue to file the motion is with the
Office of the Labor Arbiter. 24 De Castro further posits that LBNI should have informed this Court of the
status of its Petition for Corporate Rehabilitation.25

THE COURT’S RULING

Except for the prayer to suspend the execution of our September 23, 2008 Decision, we do not find LBNI’s
Motion for Reconsideration meritorious. Although we reject, for lack of merit, LBNI’s arguments regarding
the legality of de Castro’s dismissal, we suspend the execution of our Decision in deference to the Stay
Order issued by the rehabilitation court.

The issue of illegal dismissal has already been resolved in the Court’s September 23, 2008
Decision

LBNI’s motion for reconsideration merely reiterates its earlier arguments, which we have already addressed
in our September 23, 2008 Decision. LBNI has failed to offer any substantive argument that would convince
us to reverse our earlier ruling.

LBNI argues that there is no logic for it to illegally dismiss de Castro because being on probationary
employment – a fact which this Court had stated in its decision – all that the company had to do was not to
re-hire him.26 By this claim, LBNI has misread the import of our ruling. The September 23, 2008 Decision
declared that de Castro "had not stayed long in the company and had not even passed his probationary
period when the acts charged allegedly took place."27 Properly read, we found that the acts charged against
de Castro took place when he was still under probationary employment – a finding completely different from
LBNI’s claim that de Castro was dismissed during his probationary employment. On the contrary, de Castro
was dismissed on the ninth month of his employment with LBNI, and by then, he was already a regular
employee by operation of law. Article 281 of the Labor Code provides that "[p]robationary employment shall
not exceed six (6) months from the date the employee started working, x x x [a]n employee who is allowed
to work after a probationary period shall be considered a regular employee." As a regular employee, de
Castro was entitled to security of tenure and his illegal dismissal from LBNI justified the awards of separation
pay, backwages, and damages.

The pendency of the rehabilitation proceedings does not affect the Court’s jurisdiction to resolve the case,
but merely suspends the execution of the September 23, 2008 Decision

On October 18, 2005, while de Castro’s petition was still pending before the Court, LBNI filed a motion to
suspend the proceedings, citing the Stay Order, dated August 19, 2005, issued by the RTC of Makati, Branch
138 in S.P. Case No. M-6126.28 The Stay Order read:

FOR THE REASONS GIVEN and applying Section 6 of the Interim Rules of Procedure on Corporate
Rehabilitation, x x x it is ordered that enforcement of all claims against [LBNI] whether for money or
otherwise and whether such enforcement is by Court action or otherwise, its guarantors and sureties not
solidarily liable with the petitioner, be forthwith stayed.

xxxx

SO ORDERED.29

LBNI’s motion was denied in our Resolution of December 12, 2005 for being premature, as de Castro then
had yet to file his reply to LBNI’s comment on the petition. 30 Thereafter, nothing was heard from LBNI
regarding the Stay Order or the rehabilitation proceedings it instituted before the RTC of Makati, Branch
138. Even the memorandum, dated May 4, 2006, that LBNI filed with the Court contained no reference to
the rehabilitation proceedings.31

The filing of a memorandum before the Court is not an empty requirement, devoid of legal significance. In
A.M. No. 99-2-04-SC, the Court declared that issues raised in previous pleadings but not included in the
memorandum shall be deemed waived or abandoned. Being a summation of the parties’ previous pleadings,
the memoranda alone may be considered by the Court in deciding or resolving the petition. Thus, on account
of LBNI’s omission, only the issues raised in the parties’ memoranda – principally, the validity of de Castro’s
dismissal from LBNI – were considered by the Court in resolving the case.

"The Court does not take judicial notice of proceedings in the various courts of justice in the Philippines." 32 At
the time we decided the present case, we were thus not bound to take note of and consider the pendency
of the rehabilitation proceedings, as the matter had not been properly brought to our attention. In Social
Justice Society v. Atienza,33 we said that:

In resolving controversies, courts can only consider facts and issues pleaded by the parties.1âwphi1 Courts,
as well as magistrates presiding over them are not omniscient. They can only act on the facts and issues
presented before them in appropriate pleadings. They may not even substitute their own personal knowledge
for evidence. Nor may they take notice of matters except those expressly provided as subjects of mandatory
judicial notice.

xxxx

The party asking the court to take judicial notice is obligated to supply the court with the full text of the
rules the party desires it to have notice of.

Notably, LBNI’s memorandum was filed on May 4, 2006, more than 180 days from the date of the initial
hearing on October 5, 2005 (as set in the Stay Order of August 19, 2005). Under Section 11, Rule 4 of the
Interim Rules of Procedure on Corporate Rehabilitation (Interim Rules), a petition for rehabilitation shall be
dismissed if no rehabilitation plan is approved by the court upon the lapse of 180 days from the date of
initial hearing. While the Interim Rules grant extension beyond the 180-day period, no such extension was
alleged in this case; in fact, as we earlier pointed out, no mention at all was made in LBNI’s memorandum
of the rehabilitation proceedings. With the failure of LBNI to raise rehabilitation proceedings in its
memorandum, the Court had sufficient grounds to suppose that the rehabilitation petition had been
dismissed by the time the case was submitted for decision.

Given these circumstances, the existence of the Stay Order – which would generally authorize the
suspension of judicial proceedings, even those pending before the Court – could not have affected the
Court’s action on the present case. At any rate, a stay order simply suspends all actions for claims against
a corporation undergoing rehabilitation; it does not work to oust a court of its jurisdiction over a case
properly filed before it.34 Our ruling on the principal issue of the case – that de Castro had been illegally
dismissed from his employment with LBNI – thus stands.

Nevertheless, with LBNI’s manifestation that it is still undergoing rehabilitation, the Court resolves to
suspend the execution of our September 23, 2008 Decision. The suspension shall last up to the termination
of the rehabilitation proceedings, as provided in Section 11, in relation to Section 27, Rule 4 of the Interim
Rules –

Sec. 11. Period of the Stay Order. - The stay order shall be effective from the date of its issuance until the
dismissal of the petition or the termination of the rehabilitation proceedings.

The petition shall be dismissed if no rehabilitation plan is approved by the court upon the lapse of one
hundred eighty (180) days from the date of the initial hearing. The court may grant an extension beyond
this period only if it appears by convincing and compelling evidence that the debtor may successfully be
rehabilitated. In no instance, however, shall the period for approving or disapproving a rehabilitation plan
exceed eighteen (18) months from the date of filing of the petition.

xxxx

Sec. 27. Termination of Proceedings. – In case of the failure of the debtor to submit the rehabilitation plan,
or the disapproval thereof by the court, or the failure of the rehabilitation of the debtor because of failure
to achieve the desired targets or goals as set forth therein, or the failure of the said debtor to perform its
obligations under the said plan, or a determination that the rehabilitation plan may no longer be
implemented in accordance with its terms, conditions, restrictions, or assumptions, the court shall upon
motion, motu proprio, or upon the recommendation of the Rehabilitation Receiver, terminate the
proceedings. The proceedings shall also terminate upon the successful implementation of the rehabilitation
plan.

WHEREFORE, we DENY the Motion for Reconsideration; accordingly, our Decision dated September 23,
2008 is hereby AFFIRMED. The National Labor Relations Commission is, however, directed to suspend the
execution of our September 23, 2008 Decision until the Stay Order is lifted or the corporate rehabilitation
proceedings are terminated. Respondent Liberty Broadcasting Network, Inc. is hereby directed to submit
quarterly reports to the National Labor Relations Commission on the status of its rehabilitation, subject to
the penalty of contempt in case of noncompliance. SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. L-31408 April 22, 1991

THE DIRECTOR OF LANDS, petitioner,

vs.
THE COURT OF APPEALS and BORROMEO BROS. ESTATE, INC., respondents.

Feliberto Leonardo and Benjamin S. Rallon for private respondent.

NARVASA, J.:

Whether the land in dispute was formed by the action of the sea or by deposits of soil and sedimentary
matter carried by river currents is the main issue in this case, which was elevated to the Court by petition
for review of a decision of the Court of Appeals.1

In October 1956 the corporation R. Borromeo Bros. Estate, Inc. instituted in the Court of First Instance of
Leyte original proceedings2 for confirmation and registration of title in its favor of a parcel of land fronting
the sea in the coastal town of San Isidro, Leyte with an area of 130,537 square meters. The
application3 alleged that the land was bounded on the North, East and South by property of the applicant
and on the West by San Isidro Bay; that it had been formed by accretion of sediments carried from the
highlands by the natural action of the Si-ong and Sinubdan Rivers when these overflowed their banks during
the rainy season;4 that it had been publicly, openly, continuously and adversely possessed by the applicant
for 20 years prior to the filing of the application; and that to the applicant's knowledge there existed no
mortgage, lien or other adverse claim on the land.5

Two oppositions to the application were filed. One, filed by the Director of Lands, asserted that the land
applied for was part of the public domain, and that the applicant or its predecessors-in-interest had no
sufficient title to the land, by way of either composition of possessory information, or by virtue of open,
public, adverse and continuous possession under claim of ownership since July 26, 1894. 6

The other opposition, filed by the Municipality of San Isidro, echoed the contention of the Director of Lands
that the land formed part of the public domain, alleging that it was classified as Timber Block-J, Leyte Project
No. 40; denied the applicant's claim of open, adverse, continuous and exclusive possession and averred
that the land was occupied by other parties who had waived their claims in favor of said oppositor; and
alleged, further, that it (oppositor) needed the land for municipal expansion, having in fact adopted
resolutions requesting the Government to reserve the land for that purpose, and that the applicant had
applied for, but had been denied, a lease of the land after it had been released for private occupation by the
Bureau of Forestry.7

The case was then heard. It would appear that after the applicant had presented its evidence, it sought and
was allowed to amend its application, which originally alleged that the land applied for had been formed of
alluvium deposited by the action of the sea,8 in order to allege, as said appellant's evidence had tended to
establish, that said land had been formed instead from accretions of soil and sediment carried from higher
places by the currents of the Si-ong and Sinubdan Creeks.

Thereafter, evidence for the oppositors also having been presented, the Trial Court rendered judgment
denying the application and declaring the land applied for public land formed by the action of the sea and
not of any river.9 The applicant then appealed to the Court of Appeals, which reversed the decision of the
Trial Court, sustained the applicant's contention as to the origin of the land, on that basis declared the land
to be private land of said applicant and decreed its registration in the applicant's name.10

The Appellate Court's judgment was in turn appealed to this Court by the Director of Lands who, in the
main, argues that the Appellate Court erred in concluding that the evidence showed the land to have been
formed by the action of rivers and in not holding the applicant bound by the averment in its original
application that the land was formed by the natural action of the sea. 11

The first assignment of error may be disposed of by the simple expedient of pointing out that the assailed
"conclusion" of the Court of Appeals is one of fact, not of law, and is, therefore, beyond the province of this
Court to review,12 save in certain exceptional circumstances.13

To dispel any doubts, however, and not to rely solely on what might appear to some to be a fine distinction,
particularly considering that the finding of the Court of Appeals on the crucial factual question of how the
land in dispute came into existence conflicts with that of the Trial Court, this Court has reviewed the available
record14 and finds no sound basis for ascribing any error to the Appellate Court in its appreciation of the
evidence.

The petitioner's case is anchored on evidence tending to establish that the Sinubdan and Si-ong Rivers
whose currents, according to the private respondent, formed the land in question from the sediments they
carried were not natural streams, but mere canals dug as part of an irrigation system; that they had no
intrinsic water sources and in fact dried up during the summer season; that a survey commissioned by the
petitioner itself in 1949 did not indicate their existence on the plan; and that part of the land is swampy
with mangrove trees growing thereon.15
More persuasive, however, is the countervailing evidence of the private respondent which consists,
principally, of the testimony of Felix Sablado, a bridge foreman of the Bureau of Public Highways, and Teofilo
Pacana, overseer of the petitioner's lands. According to the petitioner's uncontradicted summary of
Sablado's testimony, said witness had undertaken studies of the Sinubdan and Si-ong Rivers, measuring
their depth and width, the volume of water that they carried, and the size of the bridges spanning them. He
had declared the Si-ong was more than seven meters deep, while the Sinubdan had a depth of more than
three meters, that the Filemon Bridge crossing the Si-ong was seven meters long and four meters wide and
the Sinubdan Bridge had the same dimensions. And under cross-examination, he had maintained that there
is a source of water under the Filemon Bridge.16 Pacana, for his part, testified that there is a continuous flow
of water in both rivers throughout the year, and not merely during the rainy season, as claimed by one of
the oppositors' witnesses, and that while a few mangrove trees grow in the salvage zone which is far from
the land, none are found within the boundaries of the land itself.17 This is at least partly confirmed by
photographs received in evidence18 showing rice, coconut trees and bamboo groves growing on the land,
and which apparently persuaded the Trial Court that at least a part of the land had been . . . transformed
(through cultivation by the private respondent) into a veritable first class rice land. 19

The petitioner's argument that accretion, by definition imperceptible, could hardly account for such an area
of land (more than thirteen hectares) being built up within a period of six years, hinges upon an
unwarrantedly literal advertence to the testimony of one of the private respondent's witnesses who declared
that the process took place from 1930 to 1936. 20 Assuming that the witness attested to what he sincerely
believed to be the truth, the possibility of his being mistaken cannot be discounted because, the age of the
rivers in question never having been established, the process of accretion through the action of their currents
could have started much earlier than 1930. It is also entirely possible –– and reasonably presumable, lacking
any proof to the contrary –– even granting that accretion started only in 1930, for the land to have grown
to thirteen hectares in the twenty years that followed until 1956 when the application for registration was
filed.

The Court therefore finds no error in the ruling of the Court of Appeals that the land was formed by accretion
through the action of river currents and belonged to the private respondent as riparian owner pursuant to
Art. 457 of the Civil Code.1âwphi1

The Court of Appeals also correctly overruled the petitioner's contention that the averment in the original
application for registration attributing the origin of the land to the action of the sea, which averment, with
leave of court, was later superseded by an amendment to the effect that the land was formed by the action
of rivers, was binding on the private respondent as a judicial admission. Pleadings that have been amended
disappear from the record, lose their status as pleadings and cease to be judicial admissions. While they
may nonetheless be utilized against the pleader as extra-judicial admissions, they must, in order to have
such effect, be formally offered in evidence.21 It does not appear that the original application for registration
containing the averment in question, or that particular averment itself, was offered or received in evidence
for the petitioner in the Trial Court.

WHEREFORE, the Decision of the Court of Appeals subject of the petition for review is AFFIRMED, without
pronouncement as to costs. SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 157847 August 25, 2005

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, represented by the AIR TRANSPORTATION OFFICE

(ATO), Petitioners,
vs.
LEODIGARIO SARABIA, HERMENIGILDO DE LA CRUZ, DELIA REBUTAR, MILDRED ROSE, ANITA
DE LA CRUZ, ERLINDA LUCERIO, GEORGIE DE LA CRUZ, FELMA DE LA CRUZ, FELINO DE LA
CRUZ, TERESITA SAMSON, EVANGELINE COLOMER, Respondents.

DECISION

GARCIA, J.:

Before the Court is this petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, assailing the
decision1dated November 18, 2002 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 66124, which affirmed the
November 26, 1999 decision of the Regional Trial Court at Aklan, Branch 5, in an expropriation case thereat
filed by the petitioner. The affirmed decision of the trial court dispositively reads:

WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered:

1. Fixing the amount of P800.00 per square meter as just compensation to be paid by plaintiff to defendants
for the taking of the subject property indicated as Lot 6068-A in the Sketch Plan (Annex B, complaint)
containing an area of 4,901 square meters which is a portion of the bigger parcel of land covered by Original
Certificate of Title No. P-15596. The aggregate amount shall earn legal interest of 6% per annum
commencing from November 11, 1999 until the finality of this Decision, thereafter, 12% interest per annum
from the finality of the Decision on the remaining unpaid amount until full payment.

2. Ordering the defendants to withdraw the amount of P50,000.00 deposited provisionally with the Land
Bank Kalibo Branch, Kalibo, Aklan, by the Air Transportation Office under Savings Account No. 0452-1084-
45 to be deducted therefrom the costs of P10,600.00 and balance shall be deducted from the aggregate
amount of the just compensation; and

3. Declaring the plaintiff’s lawful right to retain possession of the subject property and to appropriate it for
the public purpose it was intended for, i.e., the operations of the airport control tower, Kalibo crash fire
rescue station, airport terminal and headquarters of the PNP Aviation Security, upon full payment of the just
compensation thereat as fixed in paragraph 1 hereof.

Plaintiff is directed to pay the costs of P9,600.00 representing the Commissioners’ fees equivalent to P800.00
per session for each commissioner, and P1,000.00 to Mr. Remegio M. Bautista as the designated secretary
of the commissioners.

SO ORDERED.2

Sometime in 1956, the Air Transportation Office (ATO) took possession and control of some 4,901 square-
meter portion of Lot 6068, a 10,468 square-meter lot located at Pook Kalibo, Aklan. Lot 6068 is covered by
Original Certificate of Title No. P-15596 of the Register of Deeds of Aklan in the names of the private
respondents who are heirs of the late Segundo De la Cruz.

Initially, the ATO utilized the subject occupied portion of Lot 6068 as an airport parking area. In time, several
structures were erected thereon, including the control tower, the Kalibo crash fire rescue station, the Kalibo
airport terminal and the headquarters of the PNP Aviation Security Group.

In 1995, stores and restaurants made of light materials were constructed on the area outside the 4,901
square-meter portion occupied by ATO. In 1997, private respondents filed a complaint for Recovery of
Possession with Damages before the Municipal Trial Court of Kalibo. The case, docketed as Civil Case No.
1644, is now pending in said court. ATO intervened in that case and alleged that the occupants of the stores
and restaurants are its lessees.

Petitioner assured private respondents that they would be paid the fair market value of the subject land.
However, the parties did not agree on the amount of compensation therefor.

On June 25, 1998, petitioner Republic of the Philippines, represented by the Air Transportation Office, filed
with the Regional Trial Court at Aklan an action for the expropriation of the entire Lot 6068, thereat docketed
as Civil Case No. 5543.

On August 6, 1999, the trial court appointed three (3) commissioners to ascertain the just compensation
for the subject property.
Upon conduct of ocular inspection and hearing, the commissioners submitted a report to the trial court with
the following recommendation:

NOW THEREFORE, after a brief discussion and in consideration of the premises herein above presented, the
Commissioners hereby recommends (sic) and fix the value of 4,901 sq. m. at P800.00 pesos per square
meter and the remaining area of 5,567 square meters at P500.00 per square meter as offered by the
defendants.

On pre-trial, petitioner submitted a sketch plan of Lot 6068, showing the relative location of the 4,901
square-meter portion it actually occupied.

During the hearing of September 3, 1999, the trial court directed petitioner to present evidence to prove
that the remaining portion not actually and physically occupied by the government is still needed for public
purpose. However, petitioner countered that there is no need to present evidence thereon considering that
almost one-half (1/2) of the entire property subject of the case has already been in fact occupied and
devoted to public purpose.

The trial court ignored petitioner’s posturing and issued an order3 disposing, as follows:

WHEREFORE, the Court finds and so holds that the additional area consisting of 5,567 square meters or Lot
6068-B (unshaded portion in Annex "B"- Complaint) is not needed by the plaintiff for public use or purpose,
but only the shaded portion, Lot 6068-A, containing an area of 4,901 square meters.

SO ORDERED.

Eventually, in a decision dated November 26, 1999,4 the trial court adopted the aforestated commissioner’s
report which fixed the just compensation for the 4,901 square-meter portion of Lot 6068 at ₱800.00 per
square meter, the current market value of the property in 1999.

In so adjudging, the trial court relied on Republic vs. Honorable Lucerito Tagle, et al.,5 and thus fixed the
just compensation for the 4,901 square-meter portion based on the current market value not at the time of
the taking which was in 1956, but at the time of the issuance of the writ of possession on November 11,
1999. To the trial court, the date of the issuance of the writ has to be considered in fixing the just
compensation because the same signified petitioner’s proper acquisition and taking of the property which
involves not only physical possession but also the legal right to possess and own the same.

Unable to accept the trial court’s decision for allegedly being contrary to law and established jurisprudence,
petitioner Republic filed a notice of appeal and record on appeal, which the trial court approved on January
18, 2000. Hence, the entire records of the case were transmitted to the Court of Appeals, whereat the
Republic’s appeal was docketed as CA-G.R. CV No. 66124.

In the herein assailed decision6 dated November 18, 2002, the Court of Appeals AFFIRMED the appealed
decision of the trial court, thus:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the assailed decision dated November 26, 1999 of the Regional Trial
Court, Branch 5, Kalibo, Aklan in Civil Case No. 5543 is hereby AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.

In its decision, the appellate court placed emphasis on the alleged failure of petitioner prove that the "taking"
of the occupied 4,901 square-meter portion of Lot 6068 occurred in 1956. More specifically, it ruled:

Granting that indeed plaintiff-appellant’s possession took place in 1956, said possession pertained to a
"portion" of said lot. The admission of plaintiff-appellant that the encroachment covered a wider and wider
area as time passed, puts into issue the character of said possession. Was it "taking" in the sense of
expropriation?

The expropriation of real property does not include mere physical entry or occupation of land. The physical
entry and occupation of the property in 1956 should include all the rights that may be exercised by an owner
of the subject property. Plaintiff-appellant failed to show that it intended to acquire physical possession but
also the legal right to possess and ultimately to own the subject property.

Disconsolately, the assailed decision reveals inaction of plaintiff-appellant in proving its present claim which
should have been done the earliest possible opportunity. It was stated that:

The plaintiff, despite receipt of copy of aforesaid report and the expiration of the prescribed period to file
any comment thereto, opted not to file any pleading relative thereto. Upon the other hand, the defendants
interposed no objection to said report.
Hence, there appears no error in the lower court’s ruling that the "taking" for the purposes of fixing just
compensation be considered on November 11, 1999, the date of the issuance of the writ of possession, as
well as the lower court’s adherence to the recommendation of the commissioners.

Petitioner moved for a reconsideration of the appellate court’s decision but its motion was denied by said
court in its resolution of April 1, 2003.

Hence, petitioner’s present recourse.

As we see it, the sole question presented herein involves the precise time at which just compensation should
be fixed: whether as of the time of actual taking of possession by the expropriating entity, as insisted by
petitioner Republic, or at the issuance of the writ of possession pursuant to the expropriation proceedings,
as maintained by the respondents and sustained by both the trial court and the Court of Appeals.

Before going any further, however, we take exception to the appellate court’s finding that evidence is
wanting on the fact of petitioner’s taking possession of the disputed 4,901 square-meter portion in 1956.

Petitioner contends that contrary to what the appellate court found, the taking of the property in 1956 or at
least a wide portion thereof, was adequately established.

We agree with petitioner Republic that sufficient evidence exists to prove that the taking occurred sometime
in 1956.

As borne by the records, private respondents’ Answer and Pre-Trial Brief contain irrefutable admissions.
Thus, in their Answer,7 respondents declared, among others, as follows:

1. That they admit each and every allegation in paragraphs 1,2,3,4,5 and 6 of the complaint. They admit
that the portion of the land sought to be expropriated which is indicated by the white shaded of the sketch
plan which is attached as ANNEX "B" of the complaint with an area of 4,901 square meters, more or less,
has been in the possession of the plaintiff since 1956 up to the present.

Significantly, paragraph 6 of the complaint8 which is among those admitted by the respondents, reads:

6. The subject property has been in possession and control of ATO since 1956 and was initially devoted to
parking area. At present, several structures, are erected on the area, to wit: the control tower, Kalibo crash
fire rescue station, the Kalibo airport terminal and the headquarters of the Philippine National Police (PNP)
Aviation Security Group. Also, a part of the lot is leased to concessionaires selling local products and souvenir
items. The remaining portion is intended for the expansion and other improvement of the airport.

Besides, respondents no less averred in their Pre-Trial Brief:9

I. BRIEF STATEMENT OF THE RESPONDENTS’ CLAIM

1. That the defendants are the owners of that certain parcel of land located at Pook, Kalibo, Aklan,
Philippines, which is covered by Original Certificate Title No. T-1559-6. A portion of the land has been
occupied by the plaintiff for many years now which portion of land is indicated on the sketch plan
which is marked Annex "B" of the complaint.

xxx xxx xxx

I1. ADMISSION

xxx xxx xxx

2. That this land has been in the possession of the plaintiff for many years now without paying any rental
to the defendants. (Emphasis supplied)

xxx xxx xxx

Surely, private respondents’ admissions in their Answer and Pre-Trial Brief are judicial admissions which
render the taking of the lot in 1956 conclusive or even immutable. And well-settled is the rule that an
admission, verbal or written, made by a party in the course of the proceedings in the same case, does not
require proof.10 A judicial admission is an admission made by a party in the course of the proceedings in the
same case, for purposes of the truth of some alleged fact, which said party cannot thereafter
disprove.11 Indeed, an admission made in the pleading cannot be controverted by the party making such
admission and are conclusive as to him, and that all proofs submitted by him contrary thereto or inconsistent
therewith should be ignored whether objection is interposed by a party or not.12

This Court is thus convinced that the taking of the occupied 4,901 square-meter portion of Lot 6068 occurred
in 1956.
In the context of the State’s inherent power of eminent domain, there is a "taking" when the owner is
actually deprived or dispossessed of his property; where there is a practical destruction or a material
impairment of the value of his property; or when he is deprived of the ordinary use thereof.13 There is a
"taking" in this sense when the expropriator enters private property not only for a momentary period but
for a more permanent duration, for the purpose of devoting the property to a public use in such a manner
as to oust the owner and deprive him of all beneficial enjoyment thereof. 14 After all, ownership "is nothing
without the inherent rights of possession, control and enjoyment". Where, as here, the owner is deprived
of the ordinary and beneficial use of his property or of its value by its being diverted to public use, there is
taking within the constitutional sense.15

This brings us to the issue of when the just compensation for the property taken should be reckoned.

Petitioner argues, and rightly so, that the just compensation fixed by the trial court based on the market
value of the property after the commencement of the expropriation proceedings contradicts established
jurisprudence that the value of the property as it was when the government took possession of the land
represents its true value.

In a long line of cases, we have consistently ruled that compensation for property expropriated must be
determined as of the time the expropriating authority takes possession thereof and not as of the institution
of the proceedings.16

So it is that in Republic vs. Lara, et al,17 this Court, quoting from its earlier decision in Provincial Government
vs. Caro,18 ruled:

The value of the property should be fixed as of the date when it was taken and not the date of the filing of
the proceedings. For where property is taken ahead of the filing of the condemnation proceedings, the value
thereof may be enhanced by the public purpose for which it is taken; the entry by the plaintiff upon the
property may have depreciated its value thereby; or, there may have been a natural increase in the value
of the property from the time it is taken to the time the complaint is filed, due to general economic
conditions. The owner of private property should be compensated only for what he actually loses; it is not
intended that his compensation shall extend beyond his loss or injury. And what he loses is only the actual
value of his property at the time it is taken. This is the only way the compensation to be paid can be truly
just; i.e., "just" not only to the individual whose property is taken, "but to the public, which is to pay for it"
xxx.

The instant case is akin to that of Jose Ma. Ansaldo vs. Francisco S. Tantuico, Jr. and Baltazar
Aquino,19 decided 1990, where two (2) lots of private ownership were taken by the government and used
for the widening of a road more than 40 years without the benefit of any action of eminent domain or
agreement with its owners, albeit without protest by the latter. In a decision in that case, penned by then
Chief Justice Andres Narvasa, this Court, citing the earlier case of Republic vs. PNB,20 wrote:

Normally, of course, where the institution of an expropriation action precedes the taking of the property
subject thereof, the just compensation is fixed as of the time of the filing of the complaint. This is so provided
by the Rules of Court, the assumption of possession by the expropriator ordinarily being conditioned on its
deposits with the National or Provincial Treasurer of the value of the property as provisionally ascertained
by the court having jurisdiction of the proceedings.

There are instances, however, where the expropriating agency takes over the property prior to the
expropriation suit, as in this case – although, to repeat, the case at bar is quite extraordinary in that
possession was taken by the expropriator more than 40 years prior to suit. In these instances, this Court
has ruled that the just compensation shall be determined as of the time of taking, not as of the time of filing
of the action of eminent domain.

xxx xxx xxx

"… (W)hen plaintiff takes possession before the institution of the condemnation proceedings, the value
should be fixed as of the time of the taking of said possession, not of filing of the complaint and the latter
should be the basis for the determination of the value, when the taking of the property involved coincides
with or is subsequent to, the commencement of the proceedings. Indeed, otherwise, the provision of Rule
69, Section 3, directing that compensation ‘be determined as of the date of the filing of the complaint’ would
never be operative.

We are not, however, in accord with petitioner’s assertion that the just compensation for the entire Lot
6068 should be fixed in the amount based on its assessed value in 1956. There is nothing on record that
petitioner occupied the remaining 5,567 square-meter portion of Lot 6068, neither did it ever present proof
that said unoccupied portion is necessary for public use, except for its self-serving allegation that said
portion is needed for the expansion and other improvement of the airport.

WHEREFORE, the petition is PARTIALLY GRANTED. The November 18, 2002 decision of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R CV No. 66124 is MODIFIED in the sense that the computation of just compensation for
the 4,901 square-meter portion of Lot 6860 should be based on its fair market value in 1956. SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 154430 June 16, 2006

Spouses JOSE N. BINARAO and PRECIOSA BINARAO, Petitioners,

vs.
PLUS BUILDERS, INC., Respondent.

DECISION

SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J.:

For our resolution is the instant petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure, as amended, assailing the Decision 1 dated July 19, 2002, of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV
No. 68921, entitled "Sps. Jose N. Binarao and Preciosisima Binarao v. Plus Builders, Inc."

The facts are:

Bahayang Pag-asa, Inc., and its sister corporation, Delfin Hermanos, Inc., are the owners and developers
of Bahayang Pag-asa Subdivision in Cavite City. Plus Builders, Inc., herein respondent, is in charge of the
construction and sale of the houses therein.

On April 19, 1990, spouses Jose and Preciosisima N. Binarao, petitioners, purchased a house and lot in
Bahayang Pag-asa Subdivision for a total price of P327,491.95.

Petitioner Jose Binarao executed an Affidavit of Undertaking on Equity whereby he agreed to pay
respondent P96,791.95 in the following manner: P5,000.00 upon signing of the contract, and the
remaining P91,791.95 within 15 days thereafter.

However, petitioners failed to comply with their undertaking, prompting respondent’s counsel to send them
a demand letter.

On July 6, 1998, petitioners paid respondent P20,000.00, leaving a balance of P65,571.22 payable in three
installments.

On March 10, 1999, respondent’s counsel sent petitioners another demand letter, but they refused to pay.

Consequently, respondent filed with the Metropolitan Trial Court (MTC), Branch 25, Manila a complaint for
a sum of money against petitioners, docketed as Civil Case No. 163822-CV.

On June 11, 2001, the MTC rendered a Decision2 in favor of respondent, thus:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the plaintiff Plus Builders, Inc.
and against defendants Spouses Jose and Preciosisima Binarao ordering the latter jointly and severally to
pay the former the sum of P65,571.75, plus interest thereon at the stipulated rate of 16% per annum
computed from March 22, 1990, and a sum equivalent to 25% of the amount due as liquidated damages
until the same is fully paid, and the sum equivalent to 25% of the unpaid balance as and by way of attorney’s
fees and the costs of suit.

SO ORDERED.

On appeal, the Regional Trial Court, Branch 7, Manila, rendered a Decision 3 dated November 23, 2001,
affirming in toto the MTC Decision, holding that petitioners, in their answer, did not deny respondent’s
allegation in its complaint that they have still an outstanding balance of P65,571.22.

Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration but was denied by the RTC in an Order4 dated January 15,
2002.

Petitioners then filed with the Court of Appeals a petition for review.

On July 19, 2002, the Appellate Court rendered a Decision affirming in toto the RTC Decision.

The Court of Appeals held:

x x x Section 11, Rule 8 of the 1997 Rules of Court states:

Sec. 11. Allegations not specifically denied deemed admitted. – Material averment in the complaint, other
than those as to the amount of unliquidated damages, shall be deemed admitted when not specifically
denied. Allegations of usury in a complaint to recover usurious interest are deemed admitted if not denied
under oath.
And, Section 10, Rule 8 of the 1997 Rules of Court, as to the manner of making denials, provides:

Sec. 10. Specific denial. – A defendant must specify each material allegation of fact the truth of which he
does not admit and, whenever practicable, shall set forth the substance of the matters upon which he relies
to support his denial. Where a defendant desires to deny only a part of an averment, he shall specify so
much of it as is true and material and shall deny only the remainder. Where a defendant is without
knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of a material averment made in the
complaint, he shall so state, and this shall have the effect of a denial.

In the instant case, petitioners did not deny the allegations as stipulated in paragraph 4 of the complaint of
herein respondent corporation. In fact, petitioners even admitted the allegations thereon. xxx

Petitioners, in their answer, specifically paragraph 1 thereof, stated:

1. Defendants admit paragraphs 1 and 4 of the complaint.

While it is true that paragraph 7 of petitioners’ answer to the complaint qualified the fact that they didn’t
sign any payment plan, this qualification however neither denies nor negates the other facts, as admitted,
that were stated in paragraph 4 of the complaint which actually states three facts: (1) that petitioner paid
the amount of P20,000.00 to respondent; (2) that petitioner still has a balance of P65,571.22; and (3) that
such unpaid balance is to be paid in three (3) agreed payment plan. What is denied by petitioners in
paragraph 7 of their answer, if at all, is the fact that there is no agreed payment plan. But, as to the fact,
to repeat, that petitioners still owe P65,571.22, as balance after payment of P20,000.00, is admitted by
petitioners as this fact is never denied by them.

Such admission, being made in the pleading, is considered as judicial admission. Being so, the allegations,
statements, or admissions contained in the pleading are conclusive as against the pleader, in this case,
petitioners. By admitting therefore that petitioners still owe P65,571.22 to respondent corporation, such is
conclusive to petitioners. Petitioners, on the other hand, may be relieved, as provided for in Section 2, Rule
129 of the Rules of Court, of the effects of such admission in their pleading if they can show that the
admission had been made through palpable mistake. However, petitioners failed to show any palpable
mistake on their part.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant petition is hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit. The assailed
Order dated January 15, 2002 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 7, Manila, and its Decision dated November
23, 2001 in Civil Case No. 01-101401, are hereby AFFIRMED in toto.

SO ORDERED.

Hence, this petition for review raising this basic issue:

WHETHER OR NOT PETITIONERS ADMITTED ABSOLUTELY IN THEIR ANSWER THEIR LIABILITY

UNDER THE PROPOSED PAYMENT PLAN DATED 06 JULY 1998.

Petitioners contend that they did not agree to pay respondent P96,791.95 and that they did not admit in
their answer they are liable to respondent.

Respondent maintains that petitioners’ admission of liability in their answer binds them.

The petition lacks merit.

Sec. 4, Rule 129 of the Revised Rules of Court provides:

"Sec. 4. Judicial admissions. – An admission, verbal or written, made by a party in the course of the
proceedings in the same case, does not require proof. The admission may be contradicted only by showing
that it was made through palpable mistake or that no such admission was made."

A party may make judicial admissions in (a) the pleadings, (b) during the trial, either by verbal or written
manifestations or stipulations, or (c) in other stages of the judicial proceeding. 5

Here, petitioners admitted in their answer the allegation in paragraph 4 of respondent’s complaint. As
correctly ruled by the Court of Appeals, petitioners admitted that: (a) they paid the amount of P20,000.00;
(b) they still have a balance of P65,571.72; and (c) the unpaid balance is to be paid in three installments.
It is well-settled that judicial admissions cannot be contradicted by the admitter who is the party
himself6 and binds the person who makes the same, and absent any showing that this was made thru
palpable mistake (as in this case) , no amount of rationalization can offset it. 7

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The assailed Decision dated July 19, 2002 of the Court of Appeals in
CA-G.R. CV No. 68921 is AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioners. SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 158144 July 31, 2008

ST. MARY'S FARM, INC., Petitioner,

vs.
PRIMA REAL PROPERTIES, INC., RODOLFO A. AGANA, JR., and THE REGISTER OF DEEDS OF LAS
PIÑAS, METRO MANILA, Respondents.

DECISION

NACHURA, J.:

This is a petition for review of the decision 1 of the Court of Appeals (CA) affirming in toto the decision 2 of
the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 254, Las Piñas City, which dismissed for lack of merit the complaint
for annulment of sale.

The factual antecedents of the case, as narrated by the RTC, are as follows:

[I]t appears that herein plaintiff was the registered owner of an originally twenty-five thousand five hundred
ninety-eight (25,598) square meters of land situated at Bo. Pugad Lawin, Las Piñas City under Transfer
Certificate of Title No. S-1648 (11521-A) of the Registry of Deeds of Las Piñas City.

In compliance with a final court decision in Civil Case No. 87-42915 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch XL
of Manila, plaintiff passed and approved on 27 June 1988 a board resolution authorizing defendant Rodolfo
A. Agana to cede to T.S. Cruz Subdivision four thousand (4,000) square meters of the land covered by the
aforecited Transfer Certificate of Title No. S-1648 (11521-A). Allegedly, after the consummation of this
transaction, defendant Rodolfo A. Agana did not return to plaintiff the borrowed aforementioned title and[,]
instead, allegedly forged a board resolution of the plaintiff corporation supposedly to the effect that plaintiff
had authorized him to sell the remaining twenty-one thousand five hundred ninety-eight (21,598) square
meters of the subject property. A series of transactions thereafter took place between defendant Rodolfo A.
Agana and defendant Prima Real Properties, Inc. (Prima) which transactions culminated to the signing on 5
September 1988 of an absolute deed of sale transferring the ownership of the subject land from herein
plaintiff to herein defendant Prima. After the consummation of the sale, defendant Prima effected the
cancellation of Transfer Certificate of Title No. S-1648 (11521-A) in the name of plaintiff and in lieu thereof
another Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-6175 in the name of defendant Prima was issued by defendant
Alejandro R. Villanueva in his capacity as Register of Deeds of Las Piñas City.

Subsequent developments had it that on 6 October 1988, defendant Prima duly purchased from T.S. Cruz
Subdivision the aforementioned four thousand (4,000) square meters portion of the subject property which
development thereafter led to the cancellation of the aforementioned Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-6175
and the issuance by the Registry of Deeds of Las Piñas City of two separate titles both in the name of
defendant Prima, Transfer Certificate of Title No. 7863 covering the aforementioned four thousand square
meters and Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-7864 covering the herein twenty-one thousand five hundred
ninety-eighty (21,598) square meter subject property.

In its complaint which was amended twice, the second amendment even needed the intervention of the
Court of Appeals in a petition for certiorari and mandamus after the same was denied admission by Hon.
N.C. Perello, Presiding Judge of the then Assisting Court of Makati, [Muntinlupa], Metro Manila, herein
plaintiff alleged inter alia that the authorization certified to by Antonio V. Agcaoili, Corporate Secretary of
the plaintiff and used by defendant Rodolfo A. Agana in selling the subject property to defendant Prima was
a forgery as the board of directors of the plaintiff never enacted a resolution authorizing herein defendant
Rodolfo A. Agana to sell herein subject property to defendant Prima or to anyone else for that matter.
Plaintiff further claimed that defendant Prima in collusion with defendant Rodolfo A. Agana acted maliciously
and in bad faith in relying on the forged authority without taking any step to verify the same with the plaintiff
as owner of the subject property. According to plaintiff, the deed of absolute sale entered into between
defendants Prima and Rodolfo A. Agana being the result of fraudulent transaction was void thereby, among
others, causing damage to the plaintiff. For canceling Transfer Certificate of Title No. S-1648 (11521-A)
knowing fully well that the authorization to sell [to] defendant Rodolfo A. Agana was a forgery, defendant
Alejandro R. Villanueva was likewise made liable for damages.

On the other hand, defendant Prima separately with defendant Rodolfo A. Agana in their respective answers,
sought and insisted constantly on the dismissal of the complaint based solidly on the ground that Venice B.
Agana and Ma. Natividad A. Villacorta who filed in behalf of the plaintiff the original complaint and the
amended and the second amended complaints as well, respectively, lacked legal capacity to sue because
they were not authorized therefor by the board of directors of the plaintiff. Furthermore, defendant Prima
argued that it acted in good faith when it relied solely on the face of the purported authorization of defendant
Rodolfo A. Agana and entered into the deed of absolute sale and paid in full the purchase price of
PhP2,567,760.00 of the subject property. This fact, according to defendant Prima, made it a buyer in good
faith and for value. To cap its argument, defendant Prima in adopting the defense of defendant Rodolfo A.
Agana asserted that even assuming that the authorization of defendant Rodolfo A. Agana was forged when
plaintiff, through its President, Marcelino A. Agana, Jr. (brother of Rodolfo) accepted/received part of the
aforestated purchase price knowing fully well the same to be the proceeds of the sale of the subject property,
plaintiff has been precluded as it is now estopped from asking for rescission of the deed of absolute sale and
reconveyance of the subject property.3

After due hearing, the trial court rendered judgment on April 7, 2000, dismissing the complaint for
annulment of sale with damages filed by the petitioner.4

The trial court found that the respondent was a buyer in good faith and for value, relying on the authority
of Rodolfo A. Agana to sell the property in behalf of the petitioner company, as evidenced by a notarized
board resolution. As such, the trial court ruled that the petitioner was bound by the acts of its agent and
must necessarily bear whatever damage may have been caused by this alleged breach of trust.

On appeal, the CA affirmed in toto.

Thus, petitioner filed the instant petition raising the following errors:

The Court of Appeals gravely erred in ruling that Respondent Agana was duly authorized by Petitioner under
the Certification dated June 30, 1988 (Exhibits "D" and "3") to enter into the sale of the subject property
with Respondent Prima Real.

(A) There is no proof of the Certification’s authenticity and due execution;

(B) There is clear and convincing evidence that the Certification was forged.

(C) Even assuming that the Certification was authentic and duly executed, it was not sufficient in
form and by its terms to authorize Respondent Agana to sell the subject property or receive payment
on behalf of Petitioner.

II

The Court of Appeals gravely erred in not holding that Respondent Prima Real was the author of its own
damage by not making reasonable and prudent inquiries into the fact, nature and extent of Respondent
Agana’s authority, and by causing the issuance of checks in the name of Respondent Agana.

The petition must fail.

A cursory reading of the issues reveals that these are factual matters which are not within the province of
the Court to look into, save only in exceptional circumstances which are not present in the case at bar. Well
settled is the rule that in petitions for review on certiorari under Rule 45, only questions of law must be
raised.5 As a matter of procedure, the Court defers and accords finality to the factual findings of trial courts,
especially when, as in the case at bar, such findings are affirmed by the appellate court. This factual
determination, as a matter of long and sound appellate practice, deserves great weight and shall not be
disturbed on appeal. It is not the function of the Court to analyze and weigh all over again the evidence or
premises supportive of the factual holding of the lower courts.6

Petitioner insists that "the sale of the realty entered into between respondent Agana, purportedly on behalf
of the petitioner, and respondent Prima is null and void for lack of authority on the part of respondent Agana
to sell the property."7 The board resolution allegedly granting Rodolfo Agana the authority to sell in behalf
of the company, as certified by Corporate Secretary Atty. Antonio V. Agcaoili, is alleged to be a forgery. Ma.
Natividad A. Villacorta, who served as assistant to Marcelino A. Agana, Jr., the President of St. Mary’s Farm,
Inc., in 1988 testified that the board of directors did not hold any meeting on June 27, 1988; that, in fact,
the signature of Atty. Antonio Agcaoili was not genuine; and that said document was merely presented to
the notary public for notarization without Atty. Agcaoili appearing before him.

Despite this insistence, we find no cogent reason to deviate from the findings and conclusions of the
respondent court affirming those of the trial court on this matter. Anent the forged signature of Atty.
Agcaoili, the CA did not err in not giving evidentiary weight to the findings of the Document Examiner of the
National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) on the ground that the findings were not really conclusive. In the
first place, the procedure for the investigation of questionable handwriting was not properly followed. There
is nothing on record that will conclusively show that the alleged standard sample signatures of Atty. Antonio
Agcaoili, which were submitted to the NBI and made the basis of comparison, were the genuine signatures
of the same Atty. Antonio Agcaoili. Moreover, the examiner testified that it was possible to have variations
in the standard signatures of Atty. Agcaoili, caused by certain factors such as passage of time, pressure and
physical condition of the writer which may have decisive influences on his handwriting’s
characteristics.8 Thus, in the instant case, it cannot readily be concluded that a particular signature
appearing in those documents is not genuine for lack of proper identification and a more accurate
comparison of signatures. Mere allegation of forgery is not evidence and the burden of proof lies in the party
making the allegation.9 Unfortunately, in the case at bar, the petitioner failed to discharge this burden.
Further challenging the due execution of the board resolution bearing the Secretary’s Certification, petitioner
wants us to consider the same as inadmissible on the ground that Atty. Agcaoili did not appear before a
notary public for notarization. We do not agree, because in the past, we have already held that the non-
appearance of the party before the notary public who notarized the deed does not necessarily nullify or
render the parties’ transaction void ab initio.10 However, the non-appearance of the party exposes the notary
public to administrative liability which warrants sanction by the Court. This fact notwithstanding, we agree
with the respondent court that it is not enough to overcome the presumption of the truthfulness of the
statements contained in the board resolution. To overcome the presumption, there must be sufficient, clear
and convincing evidence as to exclude all reasonable controversy as to the falsity of the certificate. 11 In the
absence of such proof, the document must be upheld. Notarization converts a private document into a public
document, making it admissible in court without further proof of its authenticity. 12

On the basis of this notarized board resolution, respondent had every reason to rely on Rodolfo Agana’s
authority to sell the subject property. Undeniably then, the respondent is an innocent purchaser for value
in good faith. Our pronouncement in Bautista v. Silva13 is instructive:

A buyer for value in good faith is one who buys property of another, without notice that some other person
has a right to, or interest in such property and pays full and fair price for the same, at the time of such
purchase, or before he has notice of the claim or interest of some other persons in the property. He buys
the property with the well-founded belief that the person from whom he receives the thing had title to the
property and capacity to convey it.

To prove good faith, a buyer of registered and titled land need only show that he relied on the face of the
title to the property. He need not prove that he made further inquiry for he is not obliged to explore beyond
the four corners of the title. Such degree of proof of good faith, however, is sufficient only when the following
conditions concur: first, the seller is the registered owner of the land; second, the latter is in possession
thereof; and third, at the time of the sale, the buyer was not aware of any claim or interest of some other
person in the property, or of any defect or restriction in the title of the seller or in his capacity to convey
title to the property.14

All the conditions enumerated in the aforementioned case are present in the case at bar, enough for us to
consider Prima as a buyer in good faith. Prima Real Properties, Inc. is a company engaged in the buying and
selling of real properties. As borne out by the records, respondent exerted efforts to verify the true
background of the subject property. Rodolfo Agana presented to respondent the (1) notarized board
resolution which stated that at a special meeting held on June 27, 1988, the board of directors authorized
Mr. Rodolfo A. Agana, Treasurer, to sell the subject property covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT)
No. S-1648;15 (2) a separate Certification by the petitioner’s president, Marcelino A. Agana, Jr., authorizing
its Treasurer, Rodolfo Agana, to sell said property;16 and, (3) TCT No. T-1648 of the subject property.
Convinced that Rodolfo Agana had the authority to sell on behalf of the company after being presented all
these documents, the sale between the parties was thereby consummated. A deed of sale was executed on
September 5, 198817 and the full consideration of ₱2,567,760.00 for the subject property was paid.18

It is of no moment that the checks were made payable to Rodolfo Agana and not to the company which,
according to the petitioner, should have alerted the respondent to inquire further into the extent of Agana’s
authority to transfer the subject property. This was no longer necessary considering that respondent had
every reason to rely on Rodolfo Agana’s authority to sell, evidenced by the notarized Certification. As
explained in the Bautista case:

When the document under scrutiny is a special power of attorney that is duly notarized, we know it to be a
public document where the notarial acknowledgment is prima facie evidence of the fact of its due execution.
A buyer presented with such a document would have no choice between knowing and finding out whether
a forger lurks beneath the signature on it. The notarial acknowledgment has removed that choice from him
and replaced it with a presumption sanctioned by law that the affiant appeared before the notary public and
acknowledged that he executed the document, understood its import and signed it. In reality, he is deprived
of such choice not because he is incapable of knowing and finding out but because, under our notarial
system, he has been given the luxury of merely relying on the presumption of regularity of a duly notarized
SPA. And he cannot be faulted for that because it is precisely that fiction of regularity which holds together
commercial transactions across borders and time.

In sum, all things being equal, a person dealing with a seller who has [in his] possession title to the property
but whose capacity to sell is restricted, qualifies as a buyer in good faith if he proves that he inquired into
the title of the seller as well as into the latter’s capacity to sell; and that in his inquiry, he relied on the
notarial acknowledgment found in the seller’s duly notarized special power of attorney. He need not prove
anything more for it is already the function of the notarial acknowledgment to establish the appearance of
the parties to the document, its due execution and authenticity. 19

Aside from the pertinent documents presented, respondent also relied on the confirmation and certification
of the Register of Deeds of Las Piñas City and Mr. Timoteo S. Cruz, owner of the land likewise sold by Rodolfo
Agana for the petitioner, with similar authorization by the petitioner and signed by the corporate secretary
Atty. Agcaoili. Agana acted as petitioner’s authorized agent and had full authority to bind the company in
that transaction with Cruz.
Contrary to the allegations of the petitioner that respondent Agana’s authority was only limited to negotiate
and not to sell the subject property, suffice it to state that the board resolution further averred that he was
"authorized and empowered to sign any and all documents, instruments, papers or writings which may be
required and necessary for this purpose to bind the Corporation in this undertaking." 20 The certification of
the President, Marcelino Agana, Jr. also attests to this fact. With this notarized board resolution, respondent
Agana, undeniably, had the authority to cede the subject property, carrying with it all the concomitant
powers necessary to implement said transaction. On the strength of the deed of absolute sale executed
pursuant to such authority, title over the land in petitioner’s name was cancelled and a new certificate of
title – TCT No. T-617521 – was already issued in the name of Prima Real Properties, Inc.

Thus, it is too late in the day to have the sale voided, notwithstanding the retraction made by Rodolfo Agana
in his Comment22 on the Petition filed with this Court. Therein, he admits that he acted solely and without
proper authority of the corporation. Agana states that he wishes to end once and for all the rift that had
occurred in the corporation; and in order to buy peace for all the parties and for himself, he is willing to
return the money paid by Prima so that ownership of the property can be returned to the petitioner. In light
of this admission that Agana had no authority, petitioner posits that there is justifiable reason for the Court
to re-visit or evaluate the facts of the case anew.

Unfortunately, the Court cannot give weight to this magnanimous gesture of Agana; neither will the Court
lend credence to Agana’s assertion that he acted solely and without proper authority from the corporation,
inasmuch as it was raised for the very first time in this Court and only after 8 years from the inception of
the case. In all the pleadings filed by respondent Agana in court, he was steadfast in his position that he
had authority to sell the subject property. A judicial admission conclusively binds the party making it. He
cannot thereafter take a position contradictory to, or inconsistent with his pleadings. Acts or facts admitted
do not require proof and cannot be contradicted unless it is shown that the admission was made through
palpable mistake or that no such admission was made. 23 In the instant case, there is no proof of these
exceptional circumstances. Clearly, the retraction was merely an afterthought on the part of respondent
Agana with the intention to end the rift in the family corporation.

Considering all the foregoing, it cannot be gainsaid that respondent Prima is an innocent purchaser in good
faith and for value. WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The decision of the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 151952 March 25, 2009

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee,

vs.
HERACLEO ABELLO Y FORTADA, Accused-Appellant.

DECISION

BRION, J.:

We review in this appeal the decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 23746,1 which affirmed with
modification the joint decision of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 170, Malabon City, in Criminal Case
Nos. 19623-MN, 19624-MN and 19625-MN.2

Appellant Heracleo Abello y Fortada (Abello) stands convicted of one (1) count of violation of paragraph 2,
Article 266-A of the Revised Penal Code (RPC), as amended;3 and two (2) counts of violation of sexual abuse
under Republic Act (R.A.) No. 7610 (Child Abuse Law). For these crimes, he was sentenced to suffer
imprisonment of twelve (12) years of prision mayor, as minimum, to twenty (20) years of reclusion
temporal, and two reclusion perpetuas, respectively.

The following Informations (all dated July 8, 1998) were filed against the appellant:

Criminal Case No. 19623-MN

That on or about the 8th day of July 1998, in Navotas, Metro Manila, and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-named accused, being a step-father (sic) of victim AAA,4 with lewd design and
by means of force and intimidation, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously putting his penis
inside the mouth of said AAA, against her will and without her consent.

CONTRARY TO LAW.5

Criminal Case No. 19624-MN

That on or about the 30th day of June 1998, in Navotas, Metro Manila, and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-named accused, being a step-father (sic) of victim AAA, a (sic) years old, and
Polio Striken (sic), with lewd design by means of violence and intimidation, did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously mashing her breast, against her will and without her consent. 6

CONTRARY TO LAW.

Criminal Case No. 19625-MN

That on or about the 2nd day of July 1998, in Navotas, Metro Manila, and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-named accused, being a step-father (sic) of victim AAA, a (sic) 21 years old,
and Polio Striken (sic), with lewd design by means of violence and intimidation, did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously mashing her breast, against her will and without her consent. 7

CONTRARY TO LAW.

Abello, with the assistance of counsel, pleaded not guilty to these charges. The cases were jointly tried since
they arose from similar incidents involving the same parties. 8 The prosecution relied on testimony of the
victim, AAA, who identified Abello as the perpetrator of the rape and sexual abuses against her. Abello’s
defense was confined to his denial of the accusations.

The Background Facts

The RTC summarized the facts as follows:

The victim in these cases is twenty-one (21) year old AAA. She contracted polio when she was seven (7)
months old. She was not able to study on account of her difficulty in walking. Hence, she could only read
and write her name including that of her friends.

On June 30, 1998 at around 4:00 o’clock (sic) in the early morning, AAA was sleeping in their house in
Kalyeng Impiyerno, Navotas, Metro Manila along with her sister-in-law and nephew. She was suddenly
awakened when Abello … mashed her breast. Come July 2, 1999 at around 3:00 a.m. Abello again mashed
the breast of AAA practically under the same previous situation while the latter was sleeping. In these two
occasions AAA was able to recognize Abello because of the light coming from outside which illuminated the
house. Then on July 8, 1998, at around 2:00 a.m., Abello this time placed his soft penis inside the mouth
of AAA. The latter got awaken when Abello accidentally kneeled on her right hand. AAA exclaimed "Aray"
forcing the accused to hurriedly enter his room. He was nevertheless seen by AAA. The victim on the same
date reported the incident to her sister-in-law and mother.

Amidst the accusation of raping and twice sexually abusing AAA, Abello interposed the defense of denial. In
all of the instances, Abello claimed that he merely stepped on the victim at the sala on his way to his room
after retiring home.

The RTC found Abello guilty under the three Informations. The dispositive portion of the decision states:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered as follows:

1. In Criminal Case No. 19623-MN, the Court finds accused Heracleo Abello y Fortada guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of Violation of Paragraph 2, Article 226-A, Republic Act [No.] 8353 and hereby
sentences him to suffer an indeterminate penalty of Seven (7) Years of prision mayor, as minimum, to
Thirteen (13) Years of reclusion temporal, as maximum; 9

2. In Criminal Case Nos. 19624-MN and 19625-MN, the Court finds accused Heracleo Abello y Fortada guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of two (2) counts of Violation of Section 5, Article III of Republic Act [No.] 7610
and hereby sentences him in each of the two cases to suffer an indeterminate penalty of Four (4) Years of
prision correctional (sic), as minimum, to Twelve (12) Years and One (1) Day of prision mayor, as
maximum.10 [Emphasis theirs]

The CA affirmed Abello’s conviction on appeal but modified the penalties imposed. The dispositive portion
of its decision reads:

WHEREFORE, the appealed judgement (sic) is hereby AFFIRMED subject to the following MODIFICATIONS:

1.In Criminal Case No. 19623-MN, appellant is hereby sentenced to suffer an indeterminate penalty of twelve
(12) years of prision mayor, as minimum, to twenty (20) years of reclusion temporal, as maximum;
Appellant is further ordered to pay complainant, AAA, moral damages in the amount of ₱50,000.00

2. In Criminal Case Nos. 19624-MN and 19625-MN, appellant is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of
reclusion perpetua in each of the two cases.11

The Issues

Abello contends in his Brief that:12

1. The court a quo erred in not absolving the accused-appellant of the crime of violation of paragraph 2,
Article 266-A of the Revised Penal Code, as amended;

2. The court a quo has committed an error in not exculpating the accused-appellant of the crime of violation
of Section 5, Article III of R.A. No. 7610.13

He emphasizes that it was impossible for him to have committed these crimes considering that: (a) he is
AAA’s stepfather who has a healthy sexual relationship with her mother; (b) AAA was not alone during these
alleged incidents; and (c) AAA admitted that she was asleep when these incidents happened making it likely
that she could have just dreamed of them.

The Office of the Solicitor General maintains the correctness of Abello’s conviction on the basis of AAA’s
positive and candid narration covering the elements constituting the crimes of rape by sexual assault and
sexual abuse.

Our Ruling

We affirm Abello’s conviction on all three charges.

Determining the guilt or innocence of an accused, based solely on the victim’s testimony, is not an easy
task in reviewing convictions for rape and sexual abuse cases. For one, these crimes are usually committed
in private so that only the two direct parties can attest to what happened; thus, the testimonies are largely
uncorroborated as to the exact details of the rape, and are usually in conflict with one another. With this in
mind, we exercise utmost care in scrutinizing the parties’ testimonies to determine who of them is believable.
Oftentimes, we rely on the surrounding circumstances as shown by the evidence, and on common human
experience.

We carefully reviewed AAA’s testimony in light of the issues Abello raised in his appeal, and in light of
matters he did not raise but which materially affect his innocence or culpability. After due consideration, we
find no reason to doubt the veracity of AAA’s testimony and her version of the events that led to the filing
of the present charges.
In her testimony, AAA positively and unequivocally narrated the details of her rape and sexual abuse she
suffered in Abello’s hands, as follows:

Q: Do you remember any unusual incident that happened on June 30, 1999, inside your mother’s house at
around 4:00 o’clock (sic)?

A: I remembered on that date that he hold (sic) my breast, sir.

Q: Who hold (sic) your breast?

A: He is the one, sir. (Witness pointed to the accused.)

Q: What else did he do to you at that time?

A: That was again repeated on July 2 more or less 3:00 o’clock (sic), sir.

Q: What did he do to you on July 2 at 3:00 o’clock (sic)?

A: The same he mashed my breast, sir.

Q: Was that repeated?

A: On July 8 at around 2:00 o’clock in the morning, sir.

Q: What happened then?

A: He placed his penis on (sic) my mouth, sir.

Q: While his penis was inside your mouth, what else was he doing to you?

A: He suddenly entered the room of my mother because I saw him and I was sure that it was him who was
doing that to me, sir.

Q: When was that when the accused placed his penis inside your mouth?

A: I was sleeping at that time, sir.

Q: Were you awaken (sic)?

A: Yes, sir.

Q: When you were awakened, what did you see?

A: His organ was in my mouth while I was sleeping, I got awaken (sic) because I felt pain after he
accidentally kneeled on my right hand and because of that I cried "aray," x x x

xxx

Q: So, it cannot take one minute or thirty seconds that the penis of the accused was inserted on (sic) your
mouth open?

A: I notice that my mouth was open, Your Honor.

Q: So, you were not sure whether it lasted for one second or one minute?

A: It lasted for one second, Your Honor.

Q: And you were awakened?

A: Yes, Your Honor.

Q: How do you know that it was the penis of the accused?

A: I saw it, Your Honor.

Q: Whom did you see?

A: Him, you honor.

Q: While the penis was inside your mouth, were you sleeping or awaken already?

A: I got awaken because of the placement of his penis on (sic) my mouth, sir.

Q: Was his penis soft or hard?

A: I got hold of it, Your honor.

xxx

Q: How were you able to hold the penis?

A: I hold (sic) the penis to push it out on (sic) my mouth, Your honor.14

We note that both the RTC and CA found AAA’s testimony to be positive, direct, and categorical, while the
RTC found the defense’s version too strained to be believed for being contrary to human experience; the
RTC refused to accept the claim that Abello was prosecuted for rape and sexual abuse simply because he
stepped with his knees on her stepdaughter’s hand.15 A material point we noted is that Abello could not say
why AAA would falsely accuse him.16 The substance and tenor of the testimony and the element of
motivation are critical points for us since a straightforward, categorical and candid narration by the victim
deserves credence if no ill motive can be shown driving her to falsely testify against the accused.17

Our consideration of Abello’s defense of denial and his other arguments lead us to reject them for the
following reasons:

First, the issue of his credibility is reduced to a choice between the offended party’s positive testimony and
the denial of the accused. In this case, AAA categorically and unmistakably identified Abello as her rapist
and sexual abuser;18 the identification was positive because the scene was illuminated by a light coming
from outside the parties’ house at the time of the incidents. 19 She also testified that during the rape, she
saw Abello suddenly enter the room of her mother after she yelped in pain when he stepped with his knee
on her hand.20 Settled jurisprudence tells us that the mere denial of one’s involvement in a crime cannot
take precedence over the positive testimony of the offended party. 21

Abello likewise admitted that in the wee hours of the mornings of June 30, July 2, and July 8, 1998, he
passed by the sala of their house where AAA and her companions were sleeping. 22 This admission shows
that he had the opportunity and the means to commit these crimes in terms of his location and close
proximity to AAA who, together with her companions, were then sleeping.

Second, we flatly reject Abello’s argument that his relationship with AAA insulates him from the crimes
charged. Our judicial experience tells us that in handling these types of cases, the relationship between the
offender and the offended party has never been an obstacle to the commission of the crime against chastity.
Although alarming to admit, this kind and degree of relationship is now quite common in these types of
crimes. Studies show a rising incidence of family and domestic violence where 98.8% of the victims are
women; an estimated 26.7% of these cases involve sexual abuse, while 33% involve incest committed
against children.23 In these cases, the male spouse, the father of the victim, or close male relatives, have
been identified as frequent abusers. 24

Third, we find the claim that AAA could have just dreamed of the incidents complained of, to be preposterous.
It is highly unlikely that a woman in her right mind would expose and declare herself a victim of rape and
sexual abuse, when she would thereby open herself to the humiliating experience of a public trial and to the
possible social stigma of being a victim of rape and sexual abuse. In the normal course, a woman will not
expose herself to these risks unless she is certain of what happened and she seeks to obtain justice against
the perpetrator. We note in this regard AAA’s categorical testimony that she filed the criminal charges
because she did not know what to do; she thus reported the incidents to her mother and sister-in-law who
thereafter sought police assistance.25

The record also shows that AAA lived a sheltered life cared for by her relatives because of her polio. 26 Unless
the contrary is shown, it is highly unusual for her to have the worldly sophistication to invent or fabricate
the charges she made, particularly one made against her stepfather. A charge against one’s stepfather, too,
is unusual in our socio-cultural context because of the respect we give our elders, and is only understandable
if there is a deeply felt cause for complaint. We particularly note that no imputation has been made at any
time in the case that AAA is not normal, save for her physical disability, or has a strained relationship with
her stepfather prior to the acts charged.

Based on these considerations and in the absence of clear indications of errors in giving credence to AAA’s
testimony, we find no reason to disturb the factual findings of the RTC and the CA.

Rape by sexual assault

R.A. No. 8353 which took effect on October 22, 1997 introduced into the Philippine legal system the concept
of rape by sexual assault. This amendment not only reclassified rape as a crime against persons, but also
expanded the definition of rape from the traditional concept of a sexual intercourse committed by a man
against an unwilling woman.

The second paragraph of Article 266-A of the RPC, as amended defines rape by sexual assault as committed
by any person who, under any of the circumstance mentioned in paragraph 1 … shall commit an act of
sexual assault by inserting his penis into another person’s mouth or anal orifice, or any instrument or object,
into the genital or anal orifice of another person.

The elements of rape by sexual assault are:

(1)That the offender commits an act of sexual assault;

(2)That the act of sexual assault is committed by any of the following means:

(a) By inserting his penis into another person’s mouth or anal orifice; or

xxx

(3) That the act of sexual assault is accomplished under any of the following circumstances:

(a) By using force or intimidation;

(b) When a woman is deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious;

x x x27

AAA’s testimony covers the commission of the sexual assault through the insertion of Abello’s male organ
into her mouth; AAA also consistently identified Abello as the perpetrator of the sexual assault. These
statements satisfy the first and second elements of the rape.

Her testimony that she was roused from sleep with Abello’s male organ inserted in her mouth, goes into the
third element of the crime.28 In this respect, we observe that both the RTC and the CA failed to notice the
variance between the allegations in the Information for rape and that proven at the trial on the mode of
committing the offense. The Information alleges "force and intimidation" as the mode of commission, while
AAA testified during the trial that she was asleep at the time it happened and only awoke to find Abello’s
male organ inside her mouth.

This variance is not fatal to Abello’s conviction for rape by sexual assault. In People v. Corpuz, 29 we ruled
that a variance in the mode of commission of the offense is binding upon the accused if he fails to object to
evidence showing that the crime was committed in a different manner than what was alleged. In the present
case, Abello did not object to the presentation of evidence showing that the crime charged was committed
in a different manner than what was stated in the Information. Thus, the variance is not a bar to Abello’s
conviction of the crime charged in the Information.

Acts of lasciviousness

Abello was convicted of two (2) counts of sexual abuse under Section 5 (b), Article III of R.A. No. 7610,
which defines and penalizes acts of lasciviousness committed against a child:

Section 5. Child Prostitution and Other Sexual Abuse. - Children, whether male or female, who for money,
profit, or any other consideration or due to the coercion or influence of any adult, syndicate or group, indulge
in sexual intercourse or lascivious conduct, are deemed to be children exploited in prostitution and other
sexual abuse.

xxx

(b) Those who commit the act of sexual intercourse or lascivious conduct with a child exploited in prostitution
or subject to other sexual abuse; Provided, That when the victims is under twelve (12) years of age, the
perpetrators shall be prosecuted under Article 335, paragraph 3, for rape and Article 336 of Act No. 3815,
as amended, the Revised Penal Code, for rape or lascivious conduct, as the case may be: Provided, That
the penalty for lascivious conduct when the victim is under twelve (12) years of age shall be reclusion
temporal in its medium period; and

The essential elements of this provision are:

1. The accused commits the act of sexual intercourse or lascivious conduct.

2. The said act is performed with a child exploited in prostitution or subjected to other sexual abuse.

3. The child whether male or female, is below 18 years of age. 30

Paragraph (h), Section 2 of the Implementing Rules and Regulations of R.A. 7610 31 (implementing rules)
defines lascivious conduct as a crime committed through the intentional touching, either directly or through
the clothing of the genitalia, anus, groin, breast, inner thigh or buttocks with the intent to abuse, humiliate,
harass, degrade, or arouse or gratify the sexual desire of any person, among others. Records show that
AAA duly established this element when she positively testified that Abello fondled her breasts on two
separate occasions while she slept.

The second element requires that the lascivious conduct be committed on a child who is either exploited in
prostitution or subjected to other sexual abuse. This second element requires evidence proving that: (a)
AAA was either exploited in prostitution or subjected to sexual abuse and (b) she is a child as defined under
R.A. No. 7610.

In Olivarez v. Court of Appeals,32 we explained that the phrase, "other sexual abuse" in the above provision
covers not only a child who is abused for profit, but also one who engages in lascivious conduct through the
coercion or intimidation by an adult. In the latter case, there must be some form of compulsion equivalent
to intimidation which subdues the free exercise of the offended party’s will. 33

In the present case, the prosecution failed to present any evidence showing that force or coercion attended
Abello’s sexual abuse on AAA; the evidence reveals that she was asleep at the time these crimes happened
and only awoke when she felt her breasts being fondled. Hence, she could have not resisted Abello’s
advances as she was unconscious at the time it happened. In the same manner, there was also no evidence
showing that Abello compelled her, or cowed her into silence to bear his sexual assault, after being roused
from sleep. Neither is there evidence that she had the time to manifest conscious lack of consent or
resistance to Abello’s assault.

More importantly, AAA cannot be considered a child under Section 3(a) of R.A. No. 7610 which reads:

(a) "Children" refers to person below eighteen (18) years of age or those over but are unable to fully take
care of themselves or protect themselves from abuse, neglect, cruelty, exploitation or discrimination
because of a physical or mental disability or condition; [Emphasis supplied]

The implementing rules elaborated on this definition when it defined a "child" as one who is below 18 years
of age or over said age who, upon evaluation of a qualified physician, psychologist or psychiatrist, is found
to be incapable of taking care of herself fully because of a physical or mental disability or condition or of
protecting herself from abuse.

While the records show that the RTC, the CA and the investigating prosecutor who filed the corresponding
Informations, considered AAA’s polio as a physical disability that rendered her incapable of normal function,
no evidence was in fact presented showing the prosecution’s compliance with the implementing rules.
Specifically, the prosecution did not present any evidence, testimonial or documentary, of any medical
evaluation or medical finding from a qualified physician, psychologist or psychiatrist attesting that AAA’s
physical condition rendered her incapable of fully taking care of herself or of protecting herself against sexual
abuse. Under the circumstances, we cannot consider AAA a child under Section 3(a) of R.A. No. 7610.

In arriving at this conclusion, we consider that since R.A. No. 7610 is a special law referring to a particular
class in society, the prosecution must show that the victim truly belongs to this particular class to warrant
the application of the statute’s provisions. Any doubt in this regard we must resolve in favor of the accused.

From another perspective, we also note that no evidence has been adduced showing that AAA’s physical
disability prevented her from resisting Abello’s attacks; the evidence only reveals that Abello took advantage
of the opportunity presented to him (i.e., that AAA and her companions who were then asleep) to commit
the sexual abuses; this inference is supported by the fact that he stopped his sexual assault when AAA
started to awaken. It can also be reasonably deduced from these circumstances that Abello sought to commit
the sexual abuses with impunity -- without AAA’s knowledge and without any interference on her part.

In light of these conclusions, we cannot hold Abello liable under R.A. No. 7610. However, we still find him
liable for acts of lasciviousness under Article 336 of the RPC, as amended.

In Olivarez, we emphasized that the character of the crime is not determined by the caption or preamble of
the information or from the specification of the provision of law alleged to have been violated; the crime
committed is determined by the recital of the ultimate facts and circumstances in the complaint or
information.34 In the present case, although the two Informations wrongly designated R.A. No. 7610 as the
law violated; the allegations therein sufficiently constitute acts punishable under Article 336 of the RPC
whose elements are:

1. That the offender commits any act of lasciviousness;

2. That the offended party is another person of either sex; and

3. That it is done under any of the following circumstances:

 a. By using force or intimidation; or

b. When the offended party is deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious; or

c. When the offended party is under 12 years of age or is demented. 35

The presence of the first and second elements of the offense has been earlier discussed, albeit in the
consideration of a charge under R.A. No. 7610. The prosecution established these elements through AAA’s
testimony that her breasts were fondled while she was asleep. While she did not actually see Abello fondling
her (as the fondling was done while she was asleep and stopped when she awakened), she related that she
identified Abello because she saw him enter her mother’s room immediately after she felt her breasts fondled
and after he stepped with his knees on her hand.36 AAA also testified that Abello was illuminated by a light
coming from outside their house.37 Further, the perpetrator could only be Abello as the only other occupants
of the house at the time were her mother, her sister-in-law and her young nephew who were all asleep.38 The
third element was proven by her testimony that, on two occasions, Abello mashed her breasts while she
was sleeping.39

As we discussed above, the Informations alleged the element of violence and intimidation as the mode of
committing the sexual abuses, contrary to what the prosecution established during the trial that AAA was
asleep on the two occasions when the offenses were committed. Pursuant to our above discussions citing
Corpuz,40 the deficiencies in the allegations will not relieve Abello of liability under the circumstances of this
case.

The Penalty

The three Informations all alleged the stepfather-stepdaughter relationship between AAA and Abello.
Relationship as an alternative circumstance under Article 15 of the RPC, as amended, and is an aggravating
circumstance in crimes against chastity and in rape.41 This modifying circumstance, however, was not duly
proven in the present case due to the prosecution’s failure to present the marriage contract between Abello
and AAA’s mother. If the fact of marriage came out in the evidence at all, it was via an admission by Abello
of his marriage to AAA’s mother. This admission, however, is inconclusive evidence to prove the marriage
to AAA’s mother,42 as the marriage contract still remains the best evidence to prove the fact of
marriage.43 This stricter requirement is only proper as relationship is an aggravating circumstance that
increases the imposable penalty, and hence must be proven by competent evidence.

Rape by sexual assault is penalized by prision mayor which has a range of six (6) years and one (1) day to
twelve (12) years. Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the minimum of the indeterminate penalty
shall be within the full range of the penalty that is one degree lower than prision mayor, in this case, prision
correccional which has a range of penalty from six (6) months and one (1) day to six (6) years. In the
absence of any mitigating or aggravating circumstance, the maximum of the indeterminate penalty shall be
taken within the medium period of prision mayor, or eight (8) years and one (1) day to ten (10)
years.44 Hence, Abello may be sentenced to suffer an indeterminate penalty ranging from six (6) months
and one (1) day to six (6) years of prision correccional, as minimum, to eight (8) years and one (1) day to
ten (10) years, as maximum, for the crime of rape.

The imposable penalty for acts of lasciviousness under Article 336 of the RPC, as amended, is prision
correccional. Under Scale No. 1 of Article 71 of this law, one degree lower from prision correccional is arresto
mayor which has a range of penalty from one (1) month and one (1) day to six (6) months. Applying the
Indeterminate Sentence Law, the minimum of the indeterminate penalty shall be taken from the full range
of arresto mayor. Absent any mitigating or aggravating circumstance in the case, the maximum of the
indeterminate penalty shall be taken from the medium period of prision correccional or two (2) years, four
(4) months and one (1) day to four (4) years and two (2) months. Accordingly, Abello may be meted an
indeterminate penalty ranging from one (1) month and one (1) day to six (6) months of arresto mayor, as
minimum, to two (2) years, four (4) months and one (1) day to four (4) years and two (2) months of prision
correccional, as maximum, for each count of acts of lasciviousness.

The Civil Liability

A victim of rape by sexual assault is entitled to an award of ₱30,000 as civil indemnity and ₱30,000 as moral
damages.45 Civil indemnity is separate and distinct from the award of moral damages which is automatically
granted in rape cases.46 Moral damages are additionally awarded without need of further pleading or proof;
it is presumed that the victim necessarily suffered injury due to the odiousness of the crime. 47

For acts of lasciviousness, AAA is awarded ₱20,000 as civil indemnity and ₱30,000 as moral damages for
each count in line with existing jurisprudence. 48

The Court further awards exemplary damages in the amount of ₱25,000 for the rape through sexual assault
committed upon AAA and ₱2,000 for each count of acts of lasciviousness. 49 Article 2230 of the Civil Code
allows an award of exemplary damages when the crime is committed with one or more aggravating
circumstances.
Although not alleged in the Informations (as now required by Sections 8 and 9, Rule 110 of the 2000 Revised
Rules of Criminal Procedure),50 the aggravating circumstance of dwelling was nonetheless proven during the
trial when AAA testified that she was sexually abused by Abello while she was asleep in their house.51

Additionally, Article 266-B of the RPC, as amended, recognizes knowledge by the offender of the mental
disability, emotional disorder and/or physical handicap of the offended party at the time of the commission
of the crime, as a qualifying circumstance. Again, this knowledge by Abello of AAA’s polio was duly proven
during the trial; this matter was not alleged in the Information. 52

These aggravating and qualifying circumstances of dwelling and Abello’s knowledge of AAA’s physical
disability may be appreciated in awarding the victim exemplary damages in line with our ruling in People v.
Catubig53 where we held that the presence of an aggravating circumstance, whether ordinary or qualifying,
entitles the offended party to an award of exemplary damages.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the decision dated January 3, 2002 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R.
CR No. 23746 is AFFIRMED with the following MODIFICATIONS in that:

(1) In Criminal Case No. 19623, we find appellant Heracleo Abello y Fortada GUILTY of rape by
sexual assault defined and penalized under Articles 266-A and 266-B of the Revised Penal Code, as
amended. We sentence him to suffer an indeterminate prison term of six (6) years of prision
correccional, as minimum, to ten (10) years of prision mayor, as maximum. He is ORDERED to pay
AAA ₱30,000.00 as civil liability; ₱30,000.00 as moral damages and ₱25,000.00 as exemplary
damages;

(2) In Criminal Case Nos. 19624-MN and 19625-MN, we find appellant Heracleo Abello y Fortada
GUILTY of acts of lasciviousness, defined and penalized under Article 336 of the Revised Penal Code,
as amended. For each count, he is sentenced to an indeterminate prison term of six (6) months of
arresto mayor, as minimum, to four (4) years and two (2) months of prision correccional, as
maximum. He is further ORDERED to pay AAA the amounts of ₱20,000.00 as civil indemnity;
₱30,000.00 as moral damages and ₱2,000.00 as exemplary damages, in each case. SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 177361 February 1, 2010

ARMANDO VIDAR @ "Ricky", NORBERTO BUTALON,(†) SONNY MARBELLA @ "Spike" and JOHN
DOES and PETER DOES, Petitioners,
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.

DECISION

DEL CASTILLO, J.:

A person is killed, either by reason or on occasion of the robbery. To sustain a conviction for robbery with
homicide, the prosecution must prove the following elements: (1) taking of personal property belonging to
another; (2) with intent to gain; (3) with the use of violence or intimidation against a person; and (4) on
the occasion or by reason of the robbery, the crime of homicide, as used in its generic sense, was committed.
A conviction requires certitude that the robbery is the malefactor’s main purpose and objective, and the
killing is merely incidental to the robbery. The intent to rob must precede the taking of human life, but the
killing may occur before, during, or after the robbery.1

In the instant case, the prosecution satisfactorily proved that the crime committed by the petitioners was
robbery with homicide.

Factual Antecedents

It was early evening of April 30, 2001, when army officer, Sgt. Julio D. Dioneda (Dioneda), was brutally
murdered and valuables taken from his house located at Sitio Burabod, Barangay Poblacion, Bacon District,
Sorsogon City.

Consequently, a criminal charge for Robbery with Homicide against herein petitioners Armando Vidar @
Ricky (Vidar), Norberto Butalon (Butalon), Sonny Marbella @ Spike (Marbella), and several Does was filed
under an Information2 which reads:

The undersigned accuses ARMANDO VIDAR @ "Ricky" of Sto. Domingo, Pto. Diaz, Sorsogon, NORBERTO
BUTALON, of Maslog, Legaspi City, and SONNY MARBELLA @ "Spike" of Lungib, Pilar, Sorsogon and several
other JOHN DOES and PETER DOES, of the crime of ROBBERY WITH HOMICIDE, defined and penalized under
Article 294 par. 1 of the Revised Penal Code, committed as follows:

That on or about the 30th day of April 2001, at about 7:00 o’clock in the evening at Sitio Burabod, Barangay
Poblacion, Bacon District, Sorsogon City, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the
above named accused, conspiring and confederating together and helping one another, armed with firearms,
did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously and with intent to gain, enter the dwelling of one Sgt.
Julio D. Dioneda and once inside, took therefrom at gunpoint a Cal. 45 pistol, a wallet containing ₱1,000.00
cash, a crash helmet and a motorcycle all belonging to the said Sgt. Julio D. Dioneda; that on the occasion
of the said robbery and for the purpose of enabling them to take, steal and carry away the items above
mentioned with ease, herein accused, in pursuance of their conspiracy, did then and there, willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously, with treachery and taking advantage of their superior number and strength and
with intent to kill, attack, assault and repeatedly shot the said Sgt. Julio D. Dioneda, inflicting upon him
multiple gunshot wounds that caused his instantaneous death, to the damage and prejudice of his legal
heirs.

CONTRARY TO LAW.

Sorsogon City, Sorsogon, July 8, 2002.

Petitioners, assisted by their counsel de parte, pleaded not guilty to the crime of Robbery with Homicide as
charged in the Information. After pre-trial was terminated, trial on the merits followed.

The antecedent facts of this case as recounted by the prosecution witnesses Florecita Dioneda (Florecita)
and Niña Dioneda Elemanco (Niña) that led to the conviction of the petitioners are as follows:

At about 7:00 o’clock in the evening of April 30, 2001, Florecita, wife of the victim, and her sister-in-law
Niña, were inside the former’s house at Burabod, Poblacion, Bacon District, Sorsogon City. They were
watching television when three armed men suddenly barged inside. One of them, later identified as Marbella,
poked a gun at Florecita while the other two ransacked the house taking a wallet, crash helmet and a .45
caliber firearm with its magazine. These items belong to Dioneda who was then taking a bath outside the
house. Florecita and Niña followed the three men when the latter went out. At the yard, they saw the three
men together with more or less 10 other persons surrounding Dioneda who was lying facing the ground.
Despite Florecita’s pleas not to kill her husband, Marbella and Vidar still fired a volley of shots causing
Dioneda’s instantaneous death. The three then boarded Dioneda’s motorcylcle and fled the area.
Niña corroborated the material details of the robbery and the killing and testified further that she could not
forget the faces of the three malefactors as she was very sure that they were the ones who barged inside
the house and later killed her brother.

Petitioners vehemently denied the accusations against them. Marbella averred that he does not know
Dioneda and that he was in his house in Lungib, Pilar, Sorsogon on April 30, 2001 while Vidar asserted that
he has no knowledge of the killing of Dioneda. Butalon, on the other hand, professed his innocence, claiming
that he also does not know Dioneda and that he was in his house at Omoroy, Legaspi City on April 30, 2001.
Collectively, they alleged that the possible motive behind the charge against them is that they were known
members of the New People’s Army (NPA).

Ruling of the Regional Trial Court

The Regional Trial Court of Sorsogon, Branch 52, relying on the credible and positive testimonies of the
prosecution witnesses, rejected the defense interposed by the petitioners and accordingly rendered a
Decision3 on September 2, 2004 finding all of them guilty of the crime of robbery with homicide. The
dispositive portion of said Decision reads:

WHEREFORE-, premises considered, the Court finds accused Armando Vidar @ "Ricky", Norberto Butalon,
and Sonny Marbella @ "Spike" guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Robbery with Homicide,
defined and penalized under Article 294 of the Revised Penal Code with the aggravating circumstance of
treachery, and applying the provision of Art. 63, par. 1 of the Revised Penal Code, in relation to Article 294
par. 1 of the Revised Penal Code, the Court hereby sentences each one of them to suffer the maximum
penalty of DEATH and to pay jointly and severally, the heirs of the victim the amount of ₱50,000.00 as civil
indemnity and the further sum of ₱5,500.00 as actual damages, the sum of ₱50,000.00 as moral damages,
the amount of ₱3,336,768.00 as unearned income and the amount of ₱50,000.00 as exemplary damages
without subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency and to pay the costs.

The Clerk of Court is hereby ordered to transmit the records of this case to the Honorable Supreme Court
for automatic review, and to prepare the Mittimus immediately.

The Warden of the Bureau of Jail Management and Penology (BJMP) Sorsogon City and/or Legaspi City is
hereby ordered to deliver the accused to the National Penitentiary, Muntinlupa City, with proper escort and
security immediately. SO ORDERED.

Ruling of the Court of Appeals

On appeal, petitioners raised the following errors:

The Honorable Court a quo erred in finding the accused-appellants guilty of the crime of robbery with
homicide despite the insufficiency of evidence for the prosecution to support the same.

II

The Honorable Court a quo erred in not finding that robbery and homicide were committed in furtherance
of rebellion as admitted both by the prosecution and the defense witnesses that the victim was killed by
reason of his being a member of the Philippine Army and in the performance of his duty and the assailants
are members of the New People’s Army (NPA) of which the accused- appellants are also members even up
to the time of their arrest.

On December 18, 2006, the Court of Appeals (CA) rendered its Decision 4 finding the appeal to be
unmeritorious. The appellate court gave credence to the eyewitnesses’ account of the victim’s death and
the identity of herein petitioners.

Accordingly, the CA affirmed the findings of the trial court but modified the penalty imposed from Death
to reclusion perpetua. The decretal portion of the decision reads:

WHEREFORE, the judgment of the Regional Trial Court of Sorsogon City, Branch 52, dated September 2,
2004 convicting the accused-appellants ARMANDO VIDAR alias "RICKY", NORBERTO BUTALON, SONNY
MARBELLA alias "SPIKE" of the crime of Robbery with Homicide is affirmed. Considering, however, the repeal
of R.A 7659 with the passage of Republic Act No. 9346 on June 24, 2006 prohibiting the imposition of the
death penalty, in lieu of the trial court’s imposition of the death penalty, each of the accused-appellants is
hereby sentenced to suffer reclusion perpetua. They are further directed to indemnify the heirs of the victim
the amount of ₱50, 000.00 as civil indemnity, ₱50,000.00 as moral damages, ₱50,000.00 as exemplary
damages, ₱5,500.00 as actual damages and ₱2,224,512.00 for the victim’s loss of earning capacity.

SO ORDERED.5
Hence, this petition.

On August 8, 2007, we issued a Resolution 6 treating the instant petition as petitioners’ Supplemental Brief
and notified the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) that it may file a supplemental brief within 30 days
from notice thereof, if it so desires. The OSG filed a Manifestation 7 (in lieu of Supplemental Brief) that it had
already exhaustively argued all the issues relevant to the case in its Appellee’s Brief 8 dated October 17,
2005.

Petitioners’ Arguments

Petitioners contend that the appellate court erred in affirming the decision of the trial court despite the
absence of proof adduced before the court below establishing beyond reasonable doubt that they committed
the crime of robbery with homicide. They maintain that the delay of almost a year in filing formal charges
against them cast serious doubt on the intention and motive of the complainant. They aver that while the
incident took place on April 30, 2001, formal charges against them were filed only in February 2002.

Respondent’s Arguments

In refuting petitioners’ contention, the OSG representing the respondent, reiterated the ruling of the court a
quo and sought the affirmation of the assailed decision.

Our Ruling

Petitioners’ arguments are bereft of merit. The delay did not greatly weaken the credibility of the testimonies
of the prosecution witnesses. In the light of the circumstances obtaining in the case at bar, we believe that
the delay in reporting to the police authorities the attendant facts of the crime for which the petitioners have
been charged is consistent with normal human behavior considering that after a tragic incident, the last
thing that the bereaved would want is to provoke further reprisals from the perpetrators of the felonious
act. Although there is a natural tendency to seek the ends of justice for the treacherous killing of a dearly
departed, personal safety takes priority as dictated by our culture. Moreover, considering private
complainant’s honest belief that petitioners are known to be members of the NPA, the fear of reprisal from
them was ever present which caused her momentary silence. After all, delay in reporting the occurrence of
a crime or other unusual event in rural areas is well known.9 Others reveal the perpetrator of the crime only
after the lapse of one year or so to make sure that the possibility of a threat to his life or to his loved ones
is already diminished if not totally avoided. In People v. Gornes10 we held that:

It is true that the charge against the appellant was initiated only three and a half years after the commission
of the crime. However, the fact of delay alone does not work against the witness.

Thus, the fact of delay attributed to the prosecution witnesses cannot be taken against them.11 What is
important is that their testimonies regarding the incident bear the earmarks of truth and dependability.

One thing which bolsters the prosecution witnesses’ credibility is the fact that they had no motive to
prevaricate against the petitioners. They were not actuated by improper motive to fabricate the facts and
to foist a very serious offense against them. Where there is no evidence, as in this case, to indicate that the
prosecution witnesses were actuated by improper motive, the presumption is that they were not so actuated
and that their testimonies are entitled to full faith and credit. 12 For personal motive on the part of a witness
to testify against the accused to be appreciated as showing bias, its presence should be supported by
satisfactory proof.13 Aside from their bare allegation, petitioners miserably failed in this regard. On the
contrary, we are not prepared to disbelieve the prosecution witnesses’ testimonies on their vital points
substantiating the circumstances of time and place of the offense charged against petitioners.

Petitioners likewise contend that their identification by the prosecution witnesses was attended with
irregularity considering that they were identified merely from among the four photographs presented at
Camp Escudero. They posit that this manner of identification provides an incredible suggestive procedure.

We beg to disagree.

In ascertaining whether an out-of-court identification is positive or derivative, the Court has adopted the
totality of circumstances test wherein the following factors are taken into consideration: 1) the witness’s
opportunity to view the criminal at the time of the crime; 2) the witness’s degree of attention at that time;
3) the accuracy of any prior description given by the witness; 4) the level of certainty demonstrated by the
witness at the identification; 5) the length of time between the crime and the identification; and 6) the
suggestiveness of the identification procedure. 14

We have scrutinized with great caution the witnesses’ manner of identifying petitioners vis-a-vis the
foregoing factors and we discern nothing irregular that would result in an erroneous identification.

At the outset, it must be stressed that the prosecution witnesses had an unobstructed view of the petitioners’
appearance who were not donning masks to hide their faces when the latter barged inside the house. There
is no indication that darkness prevailed inside the house so as to have an obscure view at the time. They
even testified that one of the petitioners even poked a gun at them while the others were ransacking the
house. Thus even for a while, there was a frontal confrontation between petitioners and the witnesses,
giving the latter an opportunity to take a good look at petitioners. Nothing in the records allows the presence
of any distraction that would have disrupted the witnesses’ attention during the occurrence of the incident.
Niña even described to the policemen the physical appearance of petitioners though no cartographic sketch
was presented.15 Experience dictates, precisely because of the unusual acts of violence committed right
before witnesses’ eyes, that they remember with a high degree of reliability the identity of
criminals.16 Though a considerable length of time had elapsed, the witnesses never wavered in their
identification of petitioners. They cannot forget their faces.

It is worth mentioning also that the identification of petitioners was effectively admitted when petitioners
failed to dispute the same before the lower courts. The in-court identification of the petitioners later on
dispels any doubt as to the correctness of their identities. As we held in People v. Rivera:17

Even assuming arguendo that the appellant Alfonso Rivera’s out-of-court identification was tainted with
irregularity, his subsequent identification in court cured any flaw that may have attended it. Without
hesitation, the two prosecution witnesses, Renato Losaria and Juanito Baylon identified the appellant as one
of the assailants. In People v. Timon, the accused were identified through a show-up. The accused assailed
the process of identification because no other suspect was presented in a police line-up. We ruled that a
police line-up is not essential in identification and upheld the identification of the accused through a show-
up. We also held that even assuming arguendo that the out-of-court identification was defective, the defect
was cured by the subsequent positive identification in court for the ‘inadmissibility of a police line-up
identification x x x should not necessarily foreclose the admissibility of an independent in-court identification.

Moreover, the burden is on petitioners to prove that their mug shot identification was unduly suggestive.
There is no evidence that the authorities had supplied or even suggested to the witnesses that petitioners
were the suspected gunmen. We, therefore, fail to see any flaw that would invalidate the eyewitnesses’
identification. As aptly observed by the CA:

Both Florecita Dioneda and Niña Elemanco gave a credible eyewitness’ account of the victim’s x x x death
[by gunshots] in the hands of accused-appellant. Their testimony [sic] giving details of a startling and
shocking incident that cannot easily be fabricated deserves credence and full probative weight for it indicates
sincerity and truthfulness in the narration of events. Both of these witnesses had a good look at the victim’s
assailants, who did not at any time during the incident attempt to conceal their faces. Accused-appellant
MARBELLA even stood less [than] a meter from Florecita Dioneda as he pointed a gun at her while another
accused-appellant even [etched] upon her a distinct impression of his baldness as repeatedly mentioned by
her during her testimony. As there is nothing to indicate that these two principal witnesses were moved by
improper motives, their positive declarations on the witness stand deserve full faith and credit.18

The fact that the prosecution witnesses are related to the victim will not necessarily taint their testimonies.
The weight of testimony of witnesses is neither impaired nor in any way affected by their relationship to the
victim when there is no showing of improper motive on their part. 19 Relationship per se of a witness with
the victim of the crime does not necessarily mean that the witness is biased. 20 These prosecution witnesses
are the most aggrieved parties, being the victim’s widow and sister. Thus, their motive of putting the killers
behind bars cannot be considered improper.21 It would be unnatural for a relative who is interested in
avenging the crime to implicate persons other than the real culprit lest the guilty go unpunished. 22

Deeply entrenched in our jurisprudence is the rule that the assessment of the credibility of witnesses is a
domain best left to the trial court judge because of his unique opportunity to observe their deportment and
demeanor on the witness stand; a vantage point denied appellate courts – and when his findings have been
affirmed by the Court of Appeals, these are generally binding and conclusive upon this Court. 23

Significantly, in the pleadings filed before the trial court and in the appellate court, petitioners were steadfast
in their position that the crime was committed in furtherance of rebellion, obviously to escape criminal
liability for the present charge. This is judicial admission that they indeed committed the crime. A judicial
admission conclusively binds the party making it. He cannot thereafter take a position contradictory to or
inconsistent with his pleading. Acts or facts admitted do not require proof and cannot be contradicted unless
it is shown that the admission was made through palpable mistake or that no such admission was
made.24 Moreover, when a party adopts a certain theory in the court below, he is not allowed to change his
theory on appeal, for to allow him to do so would not only be unfair to the other party but would also be
offensive to the basic rules of fair play, justice and due process.25

Treachery was also duly proven. The deadly and successive actions of the petitioners did not allow the victim
any opportunity to defend himself. The victim was innocently taking a bath totally unaware of the planned
attack against him. Or while he may have realized a possible danger to his person, the attack was executed
in such a manner as to make defense, not to say counter attack, impossible. The suddenness of the assault,
without the slightest provocation from him who was unarmed and with nary an opportunity to repel the
aggression or defend himself, ineluctably qualified the crime with alevosia.26

The twin defenses of denial and alibi raised by petitioners must necessarily fail in view of the positive
identification made by the prosecution witnesses. Alibi and denial are inherently weak defenses and must
be brushed aside when the prosecution has sufficiently and positively ascertained the identity of the
accused.27 And it is only axiomatic that positive testimony prevails over negative testimony.28

The testimonies of the prosecution witnesses thus established beyond reasonable doubt the elements of
robbery with homicide, namely: 1) the taking of personal property was committed with violence or
intimidation against persons; 2) the property taken belongs to another; 3) the taking was done with animo
lucrandi; and 4) by reason of the robbery or on the occasion thereof, the crime of homicide which is therein
used in a generic sense, was committed.29

As to damages, we find the amounts awarded by the trial court as modified by the CA with respect to the
amount of the loss of earning capacity to have been duly substantiated and warranted. We see no cogent
reason to reverse the same.

Finally, we take note that petitioner Butalon died before final judgment. According to the written report of
the Penal Superintendent,30 Butalon died at the New Bilibid Prison Hospital on October 21, 2004. Thus,
consistent with our ruling in People v. Bayotas31 that the death of an accused pending appeal of his
conviction extinguishes his criminal liability as well as the civil liability based solely thereon, we declare the
dismissal of the petition of the late Norberto Butalon.

WHEREFORE, the petition for review is DENIED. The challenged Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-
G.R. CR H.C. No. 00554 dated December 18, 2006 is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION that the petition
of Norberto Butalon is dismissed, his criminal and civil liability having been extinguished by reason of his
death. SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 181829 September 1, 2010

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Appellee,

vs.
SATURNINO VILLANUEVA, Appellant.

DECISION

DEL CASTILLO, J.:

On appeal is the November 5, 2007 Decision 1 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 02210
which affirmed with modification the November 28, 2003 Decision 2 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Tayug, Pangasinan, Branch 51. The CA found appellant Saturnino Villanueva guilty beyond reasonable doubt
of three counts of qualified rape and sentenced him to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua and to pay
his victim the amounts of ₱75,000.00 as civil indemnity, ₱75,000.00 as moral damages, and ₱25,000.00 as
exemplary damages, for each count.

Factual Antecedents:

On November 6, 2002, three Informations were filed against appellant for the crime of rape. The accusatory
portions of the Informations read:

Crim. Case No. T-3157:

That on or about the 9th day of June, 2002, at dawn, x x x, province of Pangasinan, Philippines, and within
the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused who is the father of complainant, armed
with a bladed weapon, by means of force, threat and intimidation, did then and there willfully, unlawfully
and feloniously have sexual intercourse with one "AAA," 3 a minor 12 years of age, against her will and
consent, to the damage and prejudice of said "AAA."

CONTRARY to Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Republic Act 8353. 4

Crim. Case No. T-3158:

That on or about the 27th day of September, 1999, in the evening, at x x x, province of Pangasinan,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused who is the father
of complainant, armed with a bladed weapon, by means of force, threat and intimidation, did then and there
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have sexual intercourse with one "AAA," a minor 9 years of age, against
her will and consent, to the damage and prejudicie of said "AAA."

CONTRARY to Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Republic Act 8353.5

Crim. Case No. T-3159:

That on or about the 28th day of September, 1999, at dawn, at x x x, province of Pangasinan, Philippines,
and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused who is the father of
complainant, armed with a bladed weapon, by means of force, threat and intimidation, did then and there
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have sexual intercourse with one "AAA," a minor 9 years of age, against
her will and consent, to the damage and prejudice of said "AAA."

CONTRARY to Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Republic Act 8353. 6

When arraigned on November 14, 2002, appellant pleaded not guilty to all charges. 7

During pre-trial, the parties stipulated that the appellant is the father of "AAA." It was likewise agreed that
"AAA" was below 12 years of age when the rape incidents happened.8 "AAA’s" birth and medical certificates
were likewise marked as Exhibits "A" and "C," respectively.9

Thereafter, the cases were tried jointly.10

Version of the Prosecution

The prosecution presented "AAA" as its witness. "AAA" narrated that when she was about 4 years old, her
mother left her in the care of her father, herein appellant. Since then, she had been living with her father.

"AAA" claimed that appellant sexually abused her on September 27 and 28, 1999 and on June 9, 2002.
During her testimony, "AAA" narrated that:

PROS. ULANDAY:
Q Will you please state your name, age and other personal circumstances?

WITNESS:

A I am "AAA," 13 years old, out-of-school youth, presently residing at x x x 11

xxxx

PROS. ULANDAY:

Q Madam Witness, do you still remember September 27, 1999?

A Yes, sir.

Q Why do you remember that particular date?

A That was the birthday of my father and the date when he touched me, sir.

xxxx

Q Who rape[d] you?

A My papa, sir. Witness pointed to the accused.

xxxx

PROS. ULANDAY:

Q You claimed that your father touched and used you. How did he begin in touching you?

A He tied me, sir.

xxxx

Q What part of your body was x x x tied by your father?

A My mouth, sir.

Q What other parts of your body, if there [are] any?

A My hands and my feet, sir.

PROS. ULANDAY:

My witness is crying, your Honor.12

xxxx

Q Now, after your father tied you on September 27, 1999, what did he do, if there’s any?

A He raped me, sir.

COURT:

Q What do you mean by x x x saying he raped you?

xxxx

A He undressed me, sir.

xxxx

COURT:

And we make of record that [witness is now] in tears.13

xxxx
PROS. ULANDAY:

Q Madam Witness, during the last hearing you uttered the word "incua na." What do you mean by
that?

A He inserted his penis into my vagina, sir.

Q How long a time did your father [insert] his penis into your vagina?

A About two minutes, sir.

Q At early dawn of September 28, 1999, what happened if any, between you and your father?

A The same, sir.

Q What do you mean by the same?

A That he inserted his penis into my vagina, sir.

Q Before your father inserted his penis into your vagina, what did he do, if there was any?

A He first undressed me, sir.

Q While he was undressing you what were you doing, if any?

A I failed to do any, sir.

Q Why did you fail to do any?

A Because I was afraid, sir.

Q Why were you afraid at the time?

A Because he threatened me, sir.

Q How did he [threaten] you?

A That if I would report the matter to anyone he would kill the person to whom I will report, sir.

Q Do you remember June 9, 2002 at 3:00 o’clock dawn?

A Yes, sir.

Q Why do you remember that particular date?

A Because he again raped me, sir.

Q Who raped you?

A My father, sir.

Q In what particular place [were] you raped?

A In our house, sir.

xxxx

Q You claimed that you were raped by your father, how did he rape you?

A He undressed me, sir.

Q What else did he do aside from undressing you?

A He poked a knife at me, sir.

Q And after poking a knife at you, what happened next, if any?

A Then he touched (kinuti) me, sir.

 Q What part of your body was touched by your father?

A My vagina, sir.

Q How did he touch your vagina?

A He inserted his penis into my vagina, sir.

Q What happened when he inserted his penis into your vagina?

A I cried, sir.14

After the presentation of "AAA’s" testimony, the prosecution rested its case.

Version of the Defense

The defense presented appellant as its first witness. In his testimony, appellant admitted that "AAA" is his
daughter.15 He also admitted that on September 27 and 28, 1999 and June 9, 2002, he was living in the
same house as "AAA."16 However, when asked regarding the rape charges filed against him by his daughter,
appellant denied the same. Thus:

Q And this daughter of your[s] now charge you [with] rape in Crim. Case Nos. T-3157/3158/3159
for allegedly having sexual intercourse with her against her will and consent. What can you say
against these charges by your daughter?

A [Those are] not true, sir.17

The defense next presented Marcelino Villanueva (Marcelino) who testified that he is the father of the
appellant.18He claimed that "AAA" filed the rape cases against appellant because the latter forbade her to
entertain suitors.19Marcelino also alleged that after appellant was incarcerated, "AAA" eloped with her 20-
year old boyfriend and that "AAA" only separated from her boyfriend when she was brought under the care
of the Department of Social Welfare and Development.20 When asked how old "AAA" was when she allegedly
eloped with her boyfriend, Marcelino answered that "AAA" was only 13 years old. 21

Ruling of the Regional Trial Court

The trial court lent credence to the testimony of "AAA." However, it noted that although it was agreed upon
during the pre-trial that "AAA" was a minor below 12 years of age, the fact remains that "AAA" was 12
years, six months and 19 days when she was ravished by the appellant on June 9, 2002. 22 The court below
also observed that "AAA has always been a pathetic child of oppression, abuse and neglect" and that "[h]er
innocence, tender age, dependence [on appellant] for survival, and her virtual orphanhood sufficed to qualify
every sexual molestation perpetrated by her father as rape x x x."23

The dispositive portion of the Decision reads:

WHEREFORE, finding the accused SATURNINO VILLANUEVA guilty beyond reasonable doubt of three counts
of rape, defined and penalized by Article 266-A of the Revised Penal Code, perpetrated against [his] daughter
on September 27, 1999, September 28, 1999 and June 9, 2002, x x x and as mandated by Article 266-B,
same Code, the Court hereby sentences him to suffer the penalty of DEATH for each offense, to indemnify
the complainant "AAA" for damages in the amount of ₱50,000.00 per [count], and to pay the costs.

SO ORDERED.24

Ruling of the Court of Appeals

In his brief filed before the appellate court, appellant claimed that the prosecution failed to present evidence
that would overcome the presumption of his innocence. Appellant also alleged that the trial court erred in
lending credence to the unrealistic and unnatural testimony of "AAA." 25 He claimed that it was unusual for
"AAA" not to offer any resistance to the advances allegedly made by him considering that he was unarmed.
According to the appellant, "AAA" should have struggled or at least offered some resistance because she
was not completely helpless.26Appellant also suggested that "AAA" must have been coached because
initially, she did not know the acts which constitute rape. However, during the succeeding hearings, "AAA"
allegedly testified in detail the bestial acts committed against her.27

Moreover, appellant argued that the prosecution failed to formally offer in evidence the medical certificate
and to present the doctor who conducted the medical examination to testify on his findings.28 Likewise,
"AAA’s" birth certificate was not formally offered. Neither did the Municipal Civil Registrar who allegedly
prepared the same take the witness stand. Thus appellant claimed that assuming he was indeed guilty of
the crimes charged, he should only be held liable for simple rape and not qualified rape because the minority
of the victim was not duly established.29Further, with the passage of Republic Act No. 9346, appellant should
not be sentenced to death.30

On the other hand, appellee maintained that "AAA’s" credibility was beyond doubt 31 and that it was
unnecessary to offer proof of resistance where the assailant exercised moral ascendancy against his victim,
as in this case.32Appellee insisted that the crimes committed were three counts of qualified, and not simple,
rape considering that "AAA" was a minor and the offender was her father,33 and that the parties had already
stipulated during pre-trial as regards the age of the victim.34

On November 5, 2007, the appellate court rendered its Decision disposing thus:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Decision dated 28 November 2003 of the Regional Trial Court of
Tayug, Pangasinan, Branch 51 in Crim. Case Nos. T-3157, T-3158 and T-3159 finding accused-appellant
Saturnino Villanueva guilty beyond reasonable doubt of three (3) counts of qualified rape under Articles
266-A and 266-B is AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION that pursuant to Republic Act No. 9346, the penalty
of death imposed on appellant is reduced to reclusion perpetua for each count of qualified rape, without
eligibility for parole under Act No. 4103, as amended. Further, accused-appellant is ordered to pay the
private complainant/victim ["AAA"], for each count of qualified rape, the amounts of Php 75,000.00 as civil
indemnity, Php 75,000.00 as moral damages and Php 25,000.00 as exemplary damages.

SO ORDERED.35

The appellate court found no reason to reverse the findings of the trial court on the credibility of
"AAA."36 Although there were occasions when "AAA" would not immediately answer the questions
propounded to her, the CA opined that it was because she was either distressed in recounting her horrible
experiences or in tears.37 The appellate court likewise considered the fact that "AAA" was only 13 years old
when she testified on her harrowing experiences.38

The appellate court likewise brushed aside appellant’s contention that "AAA" did not offer any resistance.
According to the CA, appellant’s moral ascendancy over "AAA" substitutes for violence or intimidation.39

The CA also concluded that even without the medical certificate, appellant could still be held liable for three
counts of rape. His conviction could rest exclusively on the credible testimony of "AAA" and the medical
certificate would only be corroborative evidence.40 Anent the birth certificate, the CA recalled that during
pre-trial, the minority of the victim and her relationship with the appellant had already been stipulated upon.
Hence, the said elements have been sufficiently alleged in the Informations and proven during trial.41

Finally, the CA held that appellant’s denial is intrinsically weak and self-serving especially considering
"AAA’s" credible and straightforward testimony.42

Our Ruling

Both the appellant and the appellee opted not to file their supplemental briefs. 43

The appeal is partly meritorious.

At the outset, we must state that we entertain no doubt that appellant thrice raped his daughter, "AAA." We
examined the records and we find "AAA’s" testimony convincing and straightforward. We therefore have no
reason to reverse or modify the findings of the trial court on the credibility of the victim’s testimony, more
so in this case where the said findings were affirmed by the CA.

We also agree with the ruling of the appellate court that appellant could be convicted of rape even without
the medical certificate. "In rape cases, the accused may be convicted solely on the testimony of the victim,
provided the testimony is credible, natural, convincing, and consistent with human nature and the normal
course of things."44 As stated above, "AAA’s" testimony was credible and convincing. As such, appellant’s
conviction could rest solely on it. The medical certificate would only serve as corroborative evidence.

We, however, agree with the appellant that both the medical certificate and "AAA’s" birth certificate,
although marked as exhibits during the pre-trial, should not have been considered by the trial court and the
CA because they were not formally offered in evidence. Section 34, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court explicitly
provides: "The court shall consider no evidence which has not been formally offered. The purpose for which
the evidence is offered must be specified."

In this case, we note that after the marking of the exhibits during pre-trial, the prosecution did not formally
offer the said medical certificate or birth certificate in evidence. In fact, the prosecution rested its case after
presenting the testimony of "AAA" without formally offering any documentary exhibit at all.

Our ruling in Heirs of Pedro Pasag v. Parocha45 is instructive, thus:

The rule on formal offer of evidence is not a trivial matter. Failure to make a formal offer within a
considerable period of time shall be deemed a waiver to submit it. Consequently, as in this case, any
evidence that has not been offered shall be excluded and rejected.

xxxx

The Rules of Court [provide] that ‘the court shall consider no evidence which has not been formally offered.’
A formal offer is necessary because judges are mandated to rest their findings of facts and their judgment
only and strictly upon the evidence offered by the parties at the trial. Its function is to enable the trial judge
to know the purpose or purposes for which the proponent is presenting the evidence. On the other hand,
this allows opposing parties to examine the evidence and object to its admissibility. Moreover, it facilitates
review as the appellate court will not be required to review documents not previously scrutinized by the trial
court.

xxxx

Thus, the trial court is bound to consider only the testimonial evidence presented and exclude the documents
not offered. Documents which may have been identified and marked as exhibits during pre-trial or trial but
which were not formally offered in evidence cannot in any manner be treated as evidence. Neither can such
unrecognized proof be assigned any evidentiary weight and value. It must be stressed that there is a
significant distinction between identification of documentary evidence and its formal offer. The former is
done in the course of the pre-trial, and trial is accompanied by the marking of the evidence as an exhibit;
while the latter is done only when the party rests its case. The mere fact that a particular document is
identified and marked as an exhibit does not mean that it has already been offered as part of the evidence.
It must be emphasized that any evidence which a party desires to submit for the consideration of the court
must formally be offered by the party; otherwise, it is excluded and rejected. 46ten.lihpwal

We reiterated the above ruling in Dizon v. Court of Tax Appeals 47 where one of the issues presented was
whether the Court of Tax Appeals and the CA gravely abused their discretion "in allowing the admission of
the pieces of evidence which were not formally offered" by the Bureau of Internal Revenue. 48 In finding the
case impressed with merit, the Court held that:

Under Section 8 of RA 1125, the CTA is categorically described as a court of record. As cases filed before it
are litigated de novo, party-litigants shall prove every minute aspect of their cases. Indubitably, no
evidentiary value can be given the pieces of evidence submitted by the BIR, as the rules on documentary
evidence require that these documents must be formally offered before the CTA. x x x

xxxx

x x x [T]he presentation of the BIR’s evidence is not a mere procedural technicality which may be
disregarded considering that it is the only means by which the CTA may ascertain and verify the truth of
BIR’s claims against the Estate. The BIR’s failure to formally offer these pieces of evidence, despite CTA’s
directives, is fatal to its cause. Such failure is aggravated by the fact that not even a single reason was
advanced by the BIR to justify such fatal omission. This, we take against the BIR.49

We are not unaware that there is an exception to the above-stated rule. In People v. Mate,50 Silvestre Mate
(Mate) was charged with the crime of "Kidnapping for Ransom with Murder and Frustrated Murder." 51 During
arraignment, he entered a plea of "guilty." The court then propounded clarificatory questions to determine
whether the accused understood the consequences of his plea. Immediately thereafter, the trial court
promulgated its decision finding the accused guilty as charged and sentenced him to death. 52 It was only
after the rendition of the judgment that the trial court conducted hearings for the reception of the
prosecution’s evidence.53

From the prosecution’s evidence, it would appear that during the investigation, Mate voluntarily made extra-
judicial statements as contained in Exhibits "A," "B," and "J." Also, after his conviction, he appeared as
witness for the prosecution against his co-accused where he affirmed his extra-judicial statements in Exhibits
"A," "B," and "J." However, the state prosecutor failed to formally offer said exhibits.

In debunking the defense’s contentions that the trial court erred in rendering a judgment of conviction on
Mate even before the prosecution could present its evidence, and in considering the exhibits which were not
formally offered, the Court held thus:

The defense contends that the trial court committed a serious error in rendering judgment of conviction
immediately after Mate had pleaded guilty to the crime charged on the basis of his plea of guilty and before
receiving any evidence. While the trial court committed an error in rendering judgment immediately after
the accused had pleaded guilty, and, thereafter, conducted hearings for the reception of the evidence for
the prosecution, such an irregularity, is insufficient to justify the setting aside of the judgment of conviction,
considering that it is supported by the judicial and extra-judicial confessions of the accused and by other
evidence. x x x

xxxx
The defense questions also the failure of the state prosecutor Cornelio Melendres to make a formal offer of
his exhibits, although they have been marked and identified. Such an oversight appears trivial because the
entire evidence for the prosecution is recorded. Even without the exhibits which have been incorporated into
the records of the case, the prosecution can still establish the case because the witnesses properly identified
those exhibits and their testimonies are recorded.

Exhibits "A", "B", and "J" are all admissible against Mate because it appears with clarity that he voluntarily
and spontaneously gave those narrations without compulsion from anybody. In fact, . . . when he testified
against Ben Bohol he affirmed those narrations again.54

In Mato v. Court of Appeals,55 we concretized the above ruling by holding that evidence, although not
formally offered in evidence, may be "admitted and considered by the trial court provided the following
requirements are present, viz: first, the same must have been duly identified by testimony duly recorded
and, second, the same must have been incorporated in the records of the case." 56 In Ramos v. Dizon,57 we
deemed the exhibits to have been incorporated into the records because they had been "presented and
marked during the pre-trial of the case."58Likewise, the first requisite was deemed satisfied because one of
the parties therein explained the contents of the exhibits when interrogated by the respondents’ counsel. 59

In the instant case, we find the rulings espoused in People v. Mate, 60 Mato v. Court of Appeals,61 and Ramos
v. Dizon62 not applicable. Thus, we find that both the trial court and the CA erred in allowing the admission
of "AAA’s" medical certificate and birth certificate. The records would show that the lone witness for the
prosecution did not identify the said exhibits or explain their contents. When "AAA" was placed on the
witness stand, she merely stated that she was 13 years old. No reference was ever made to her birth
certificate. The same is true with the medical certificate. After the marking during the pre-trial, the
prosecution did not refer to it in any stage of the proceedings. Neither did it present the doctor who prepared
the same.

Moreover, appellant’s admission during the pre-trial that "AAA" was a minor below 12 years of age 63 would
not help the prosecution’s case. First, the trial court found this admission inaccurate as in fact, "AAA" was
already above 12 years of age when the rape incident transpired on June 9, 2002. Second and more
important, appellant’s admission during pre-trial is not admissible as it violates Section 2, Rule 118 of the
Rules of Court which explicitly provides that: "All agreements or admissions made or entered during the
pre-trial conference shall be reduced in writing and signed by the accused and his counsel, otherwise they
cannot be used against the accused. x x x." In People v. Chua Uy,64 we held that:

Even granting for the sake of argument that RAMON admitted during the pre-trial that Exhibits "D" to "D-
4", inclusive, and Exhibit "E" contained methamphetamine hydrochloride, the admission cannot be used in
evidence against him because the Joint Order was not signed by RAMON and his counsel. Section 4 of Rule
118 of the Rules of Court expressly provides:

SEC. 4. Pre-trial agreements must be signed. No agreement or admission made or entered during the pre-
trial conference shall be used in evidence against the accused unless reduced to writing and signed by his
counsel.

Put in another way, to bind the accused the pre-trial order must be signed not only by him but his counsel
as well. The purpose of this requirement is to further safeguard the rights of the accused against improvident
or unauthorized agreements or admissions which his counsel may have entered into without his knowledge,
as he may have waived his presence at the pre-trial conference; eliminate any doubt on the conformity of
the accused of the facts agreed upon.

In this case, records would show that the Pre-trial Order was not signed by both appellant and his counsel.

In view of the foregoing, we find that the prosecution did not present any satisfactory evidence to prove
"AAA’s" minority. "In the prosecution of criminal cases, x x x, nothing but proof beyond reasonable doubt
of every fact necessary to constitute the crime with which an accused is charged must be established.
Qualifying circumstances or special qualifying circumstances must be proved with equal certainty and
clearness as the crime itself; otherwise, there can be no conviction of the crime in its qualified form. As a
qualifying circumstance of the crime of rape, the concurrence of the victim’s minority and her relationship
to the accused-appellant must be both alleged and proven beyond reasonable doubt."65

In view of the foregoing, we find appellant guilty only of three counts of simple rape 66 the penalty for which
is reclusion perpetua for each count. Accordingly, the awards of civil indemnity must be reduced to
₱50,000.00 and moral damages to ₱50,000.00. Finally, the award of exemplary damages is proper.
"Exemplary damages may be awarded in criminal cases as part of civil liability if the crime was committed
with one or more aggravating circumstances. Relationship as an alternative circumstance under Article 15
of the Revised Penal Code is considered aggravating in the crime of rape." 67 In this case, the aggravating
circumstance of relationship was duly established. Appellant himself admitted when he testified in open
court that he is "AAA’s" father. However, the award of ₱25,000.00 as exemplary damages must be increased
to ₱30,000.00 in line with prevailing jurisprudence. 68
WHEREFORE, we find appellant Saturnino Villanueva GUILTY of three counts of simple rape and accordingly
sentence him to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua and to indemnify his victim "AAA" the amounts of
₱50,000.00 as civil indemnity, ₱50,000.00 as moral damages, and ₱30,000.00 as exemplary damages, for
each count. SO ORDERED.
 CIRSE FRANCISCO CHOY G. R. No. 153699
TORRALBA,
P e t i t i o n e r,
Promulgated:

- versus August 22, 2005

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,

R e s p o n d e n t.
x--------------------------------------------------x

DECISION

CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:

This is a petition for review on certiorari of the Decision[1] promulgated on 22 May 2002 of the Court of

Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 24818 which affirmed, with modification, the trial courts [2] decision finding

petitioner Cirse Francisco Choy Torralba guilty of the crime of libel in Criminal Case No. 9107.

Culled from the records are the following facts:

Petitioner Torralba was the host of a radio program called Tug-Ani ang Lungsod which was aired over the

radio station DYFX in Cebu City. On 12 September 1994, an information for libel was filed before the Regional

Trial Court (RTC) of Tagbilaran City against petitioner Torralba. The information states:

The undersigned, City Prosecutor II, City of Tagbilaran, Philippines, hereby accuses CIRSE
FRANCISCO CHOY TORRALBA for the crime of Libel, committed as follows:

That, on or about the 11th day of April, 1994, in the City of Tagbilaran, Philippines, and within
the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, did then and there
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, with deliberate and malicious intent of maligning,
impeaching and discrediting the honesty, integrity, reputation, prestige and honor of late CFI
Judge Agapito Y. Hontanosas, who was during his [lifetime] a CFI Judge of Cebu and a man
of good reputation and social standing in the community and for the purpose of exposing him
to public hatred, contempt, disrespect and ridicule, in his radio program TUG-ANI AND
LUNGSOD (TELL THE PEOPLE) over radio station DYFX, openly, publicly and repeatedly
announce[d] the following: KINING MGA HONTANOSAS, AGAPITO HONTANOSAS UG CASTOR
HONTANOSAS, MGA COLLABORATOR SA PANAHON SA GUERRA. SA ATO PA, TRAYDOR SA
YUTANG NATAWHAN. X X X. DUNAY DUGO NGA PAGKATRAYDOR ANG AMAHAN NI MANOLING
HONTANOSAS, which in English means: THESE HONTANOSAS, AGAPITO HONTANOSAS AND
CASTOR HONTANOSAS, ARE COLLABORATORS DURING THE WAR. IN OTHER WORDS, THEY
ARE TRAITORS TO THE LAND OF THEIR BIRTH. X X X. THE FATHER OF MANOLING
HONTANOSAS HAD TREACHEROUS BLOOD, and other words of similar import, thereby
maliciously exposing the family of the late Judge Agapito Hontanosas including Atty. Manuel
L. Hontanosas,[3] one of the legitimate children of [the] late CFI Judge Agapito Y. Hontanosas
to public hatred, dishonor, discredit, contempt and ridicule causing the latter to suffer social
humiliation, embarrassment, wounded feelings and mental anguish, to the damage and
prejudice of said Atty. Manuel L. Hontanosas in the amount to be proved during the trial of
the case.

Acts committed contrary to the provisions of Article 353 of the Revised Penal Code in relation
to Article 355 of the same Code.

City of Tagbilaran, Philippines, September 8, 1994.

(SGD.) ADRIANO P. MONTES

City Prosecutor II

APPROVED:
 (SGD) MARIANO CAPAYAS
City Prosecutor[4]

Upon arraignment on 12 March 1996, petitioner Torralba pleaded not guilty to the crime he was charged

with.[5]

On 14 May 1998, petitioner Torralba filed before the RTC, Branch 1, Tagbilaran City, where Crim. Case No.

9107 was raffled off, a motion for consolidation [6] alleging therein that private complainant Atty. Manuel

Hontanosas (Atty. Hontanosas) filed a total of four (4) criminal cases for libel against petitioner Torralba,

three of which Crim. Cases No. 8956, No. 8957, and No. 8958 were then pending with the RTC, Branch III,

Tagbilaran City. As the evidence for the prosecution as well as the defense were substantially the same,

petitioner Torralba moved that Crim. Case No. 9107 be consolidated with the three other cases so as to

save time, effort, and to facilitate the early disposition of these cases.

In its order dated 25 May 1998,[7] the motion for consolidation filed by petitioner Torralba was granted by

the RTC, Branch 1, Tagbilaran City.

During the trial on the merits of the consolidated cases, the prosecution presented as witnesses Segundo

Lim, private complainant Atty. Hontanosas, and Gabriel Sarmiento.

Lim testified that he was one of the incorporators of the Tagbilaran Maritime Services, Inc. (TMSI) and was

at that time the assigned manager of the port in Tagbilaran City. According to him, sometime during the

Marcos administration, petitioner Torralba sought TMSIs sponsorship of his radio program. This request was

approved by private complainant Atty. Hontanosas who was then the president of TMSI. During the existence

of said sponsorship agreement, the management of TMSI noticed that petitioner Torralba was persistently

attacking former Bureau of Internal Revenue Deputy Director Tomas Toledo and his brother Boy Toledo who

was a customs collector. Fearing that the Toledos would think that TMSI was behind the incessant criticisms

hurled at them, the management of TMSI decided to cease sponsoring petitioner Torralbas radio show. In

effect, the TMSI sponsored Tug-Ani ang Lungsod for only a month at the cost of P500.00.

Soon thereafter, petitioner Torralba took on the management of TMSI. Lim testified that petitioner

Torralba accused TMSI of not observing the minimum wage law and that said corporation was charging

higher handling rates than what it was supposed to collect.

On 17 December 1993, private complainant Atty. Hontanosas went on-air in petitioner Torralbas

radio program to explain the side of TMSI. The day after said incident, however, petitioner Torralba resumed

his assault on TMSI and its management. It was petitioner Torralbas relentless badgering of TMSI which
allegedly prompted Lim to tape record petitioner Torralbas radio broadcasts. Three of the tape recordings

were introduced in evidence by the prosecution, to wit:

Exhibit B - tape recording of 19 January 1994[8]

Exhibit C - tape recording of 25 January 1994[9]
Exhibit D - tape recording of 11 April 1994[10]

During his testimony, Lim admitted that he did not know how to operate a tape recorder and that he

asked either his adopted daughter, Shirly Lim, or his housemaid to record petitioner Torralbas radio

program. He maintained, however, that he was near the radio whenever the recording took place and had

actually heard petitioner Torralbas radio program while it was being taped. This prompted petitioner Torralba

to pose a continuing objection to the admission of the said tape recordings for lack of proper authentication

by the person who actually made the recordings. In the case of the subject tape recordings, Lim admitted

that they were recorded by Shirly Lim. The trial court provisionally admitted the tape recordings subject to

the presentation by the prosecution of Shirly Lim for the proper authentication of said pieces of evidence.

Despite petitioner Torralbas objection to the formal offer of these pieces of evidence, the court a

quo eventually admitted the three tape recordings into evidence.[11]

It was revealed during Lims cross-examination[12] that petitioner Torralba previously instituted a

criminal action for libel[13] against the former arising from an article published in the Sunday Post, a

newspaper of general circulation in the provinces of Cebu and Bohol. In said case, Lim was found guilty as

charged by the trial court[14] and this decision was subsequently affirmed, with modification, by the Court

of Appeals in its decision promulgated on 29 July 1996 in CA-G.R. CR No. 16413 entitled, People of the

Philippines v. Segundo Lim and Boy Guingguing.[15] In our resolution of 04 December 1996, we denied Lims

petition for review on certiorari.[16]

For his part, private complainant Atty. Hontanosas testified that he was at that time the chairman

and manager of TMSI; that on 20 January 1994, Lim presented to him a tape recording of petitioner

Torralbas radio program aired on 18 January 1994 during which petitioner Torralba allegedly criticized him

and stated that he was a person who could not be trusted; that in his radio show on 25 January 1994,

petitioner Torralba mentioned that he was now [wary] to interview any one because he had a sad experience

with someone who betrayed him and this someone was like his father who was a collaborator; that on 12

April 1994, Lim brought to his office a tape recording of petitioner Torralbas radio program of 11 April 1994
during which petitioner Torralba averred that the Hontanosas were traitors to the land of their birth; that

Judge Agapito Hontanosas and Castor Hontanosas were collaborators during the Japanese occupation; and

that after he informed his siblings regarding this, they asked him to institute a case against petitioner

Torralba.[17]

When he was cross-examined by petitioner Torralbas counsel, private complainant Atty. Hontanosas

disclosed that he did not actually hear petitioner Torralbas radio broadcasts and he merely relied on the

tape recordings presented to him by Lim as he believed them to be genuine. [18]

Sarmiento testified that he was the former court stenographer and interpreter of RTC, Branch 3,

Tagbilaran City, and that he translated the contents of the tape recordings in 1994 upon the request of

private complainant Atty. Hontanosas.

The defense presented, as its sole witness, petitioner Torralba himself. Petitioner Torralba maintained

that he was a member of the Kapisanan ng mga Brodkaster ng Pilipinas and other civic organizations in

Cebu. In the course of his profession as a radio broadcaster, he allegedly received complaints regarding the

services of TMSI particularly with respect to the laborers low pay and exhorbitant rates being charged for

the arrastre services. As he was in favor of balanced programming, petitioner Torralba requested TMSI to

send a representative to his radio show in order to give the corporation an opportunity to address the issues

leveled against it; thus, the radio interview of private complainant Atty. Hontanosas on

17 December 1993.

When petitioner Torralba was cross-examined by private complainant Atty. Hontanosas,[19] he denied

having called former CFI Judge Hontanosas a traitor during his 11 April 1994 radio broadcast. Petitioner

Torralba admitted, though, that during the 17 December 1993 appearance of private complainant Atty.

Hontanosas in his radio program, he did ask the latter if he was in any way related to the late CFI Judge

Hontanosas. Petitioner Torralba averred that he posed said question as mere backgrounder on his

interviewee.
 On 24 August 2000, the trial court rendered an omnibus decision [20] acquitting petitioner Torralba in

Crim. Cases No. 8956, No. 8957, and No. 8958 but holding him guilty of the crime of libel in Crim. Case No.

9107. The dispositive portion of the trial courts decision reads:

WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, the Court hereby ACQUITS from criminal liability
herein accused Cirse Francisco Choy Torralba of the charges alluded in Criminal Cases Nos.
8956, 8957, and 8958 being an exercise of legitimate self-defense, as afore-discussed.
Consequently, the corresponding cash bonds of the accused in said cases as shown by OR No.
5301156, No. 5301157, and No. 5301158, all dated February 23, 2000, issued by the Clerk
of Court of Multiple Salas in the amount of P4,200.00 each representing cash deposits
therefore are hereby cancelled and released.

However, the Court finds the same accused GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt in Crim. Case
No. 9107 for his unwarranted blackening of the memory of the late Hon. CFI Judge Agapito
Y. Hontanosas through the air lanes in his radio program resulting to the dishonor and
wounded feelings of his children, grandchildren, relatives, friends, and close associates. For
this, the Court hereby sentences the accused to imprisonment for an indeterminate period of
FOUR MONTHS of Arresto Mayor to THREE YEARS of Prision Correccional medium period
pursuant to Art. 353 in relation to Art. 354 and Art. 355 of the Revised Penal Code under
which the instant case falls. Furthermore, he is ordered to indemnify the heirs of the late
Judge Agapito Y. Hontanosas for moral damages suffered in the amount of ONE MILLION
PESOS (P1,000,000.00), as prayed for, considering their good reputation and high social
standing in the community and the gravity of the dishonor and public humiliation caused. [21]

Petitioner Torralba seasonably filed an appeal before the Court of Appeals which, in the challenged decision

before us, affirmed, with modification, the findings of the court a quo, thus:

WHEREFORE, the appealed Decision of the court a quo is AFFIRMED with the modification
that accused-appellant is hereby sentenced to suffer imprisonment of four (4) months of
arresto mayor to two (2) years, eleven (11) months and ten (10) days of prision correccional
and to pay moral damages in the amount of P100,000.00.[22]

Hence, the present recourse where petitioner Torralba raises the following issues:

THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS SPEAKING THROUGH ITS SPECIAL FIFTEENTH

DIVISION GRAVELY ERRED IN AFFIRMING THE DECISION OF THE LOWER COURT A
QUO (WITH MODIFICATION), CONVICTING PETITIONER-APPELLANT [TORRALBA] FOR THE
CRIME OF LIBEL AS DEFINED AND PENALIZED UNDER ARTICLES 353 AND 355 OF THE
REVISED PENAL CODE BASED SOLELY ON THE ALLEGED TESTIMONY OF SEGUNDO LIM . . .
AS BORNE OUT BY THE STENOGRAPHIC NOTES WOULD NOT SUPPORT THE FINDING THAT
HE TESTIFIED ON THE MALICIOUS IMPUTATIONS PURPORTEDLY MADE BY PETITIONER-
APPELLANT [TORRALBA] IN CRIMINAL CASE NO. 9107.

II

THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS SERIOUSLY COMMITTED AN ERROR IN ADMITTING IN

EVIDENCE AN UNAUTHENTICATED AND SPURIOUS TAPE RECORD OF A RADIO BROADCAST
(EXHIBIT D) ALLEGEDLY BY HEREIN PETITIONER-APPELLANT [TORRALBA] ON THE BASIS OF
WHICH THE LATTER WAS CONVICTED FOR THE CRIME OF LIBEL.

III

ASSUMING WITHOUT ADMITTING THAT PETITIONER-APPELLANT [TORRALBA] MADE

UTTERANCES CONTAINED IN THE TAPE RECORD MARKED AS EXHIBIT D, THE HONORABLE
COURT SERIOUSLY ERRED IN NOT CONSIDERING THE PRIVILEGE[D] NATURE OF HIS
ALLEGED STATEMENTS IN FEALTY ADHERRENCE TO THE LANDMARK DECISION OF THE
HONORABLE SUPREME COURT IN BORJAL VS. CA, 301 SCRA 01 (JAN. 14, 1999).
 IV

THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED AN ERROR IN AWARDING DAMAGES

AGAINST THE PETITIONER ABSENT ANY SHOWING OF EVIDENT BAD FAITH ON THE PART OF
THE PETITIONER-APPELLANT [TORRALBA] WHO ACTED WITH UBERIMA
FIDES (OVERWHELMING GOOD FAITH) IN EXERCISING THE CONSTITUTIONALLY ENSHRINED
FREEDOM OF THE PRESS (ARTICLE 2220, NEW CIVIL CODE).[23]

This Court deems it proper to first resolve the issue of the propriety of the lower courts admission in evidence

of the 11 April 1994 tape recording. Oddly, this matter was not addressed head-on by the Office of the

Solicitor General in its comment.

Petitioner Torralba vigorously argues that the court a quo should not have given considerable weight on the

tape recording in question as it was not duly authenticated by Lims adopted daughter, Shirly Lim. Without

said authentication, petitioner Torralba continues, the tape recording is incompetent and inadmissible

evidence. We agree.

It is generally held that sound recording is not inadmissible because of its form[24] where a proper foundation

has been laid to guarantee the genuineness of the recording. [25] In our jurisdiction, it is a rudimentary rule

of evidence that before a tape recording is admissible in evidence and given probative value, the following

requisites must first be established, to wit:

(1) a showing that the recording device was capable of taking testimony;
(2) a showing that the operator of the device was competent;
(3) establishment of the authenticity and correctness of the recording;
(4) a showing that changes, additions, or deletions have not been made;
(5) a showing of the manner of the preservation of the recording;
(6) identification of the speakers; and
(7) a showing that the testimony elicited was voluntarily made without any kind of
inducement.[26]

In one case, it was held that the testimony of the operator of the recording device as regards its operation,

his method of operating it, the accuracy of the recordings, and the identities of the persons speaking laid a

sufficient foundation for the admission of the recordings. [27] Likewise, a witness declaration that the sound

recording represents a true portrayal of the voices contained therein satisfies the requirement of

authentication.[28] The party seeking the introduction in evidence of a tape recording bears the burden of

going forth with sufficient evidence to show that the recording is an accurate reproduction of the

conversation recorded.[29]

These requisites were laid down precisely to address the criticism of susceptibility to tampering of

tape recordings. Thus, it was held that the establishment of a proper foundation for the admission of a

recording provided adequate assurance that proper safeguards were observed for the preservation of the

recording and for its protection against tampering.[30]

 In the case at bar, one can easily discern that the proper foundation for the admissibility of the tape

recording was not adhered to. It bears stressing that Lim categorically admitted in the witness stand that

he was not familiar at all with the process of tape recording [31] and that he had to instruct his adopted

daughter to record petitioner Torralbas radio broadcasts, thus:

ATTY. HONTANOSAS:

q Was this radio program of the accused recorded on April 11, 1994?

a Yes, sir.

q Who recorded the same radio program of April 11, 1994?

a It was my adopted daughter whom I ordered to tape recorded the radio program of Choy
Torralba.[32]

Clearly, Shirly Lim, the person who actually recorded petitioner Torralbas radio show on 11 April 1994,

should have been presented by the prosecution in order to lay the proper foundation for the admission of

the purported tape recording for said date. Without the requisite authentication, there was no basis for the

trial court to admit the tape recording Exhibit D in evidence.

In view of our disallowance of the 11 April 1994 tape recording, we are constrained to examine the records

of this case in order to determine the sufficiency of evidence stacked against petitioner Torralba, bearing in

mind that in criminal cases, the guilt of the accused can only be sustained upon proof beyond reasonable

doubt.

In his comprehensive book on evidence, our former colleague, Justice Ricardo Francisco, wrote that

[e]vidence of a message or a speech by means of radio broadcast is admissible as evidence when the

identity of the speaker is established either by the testimony of a witness who saw him broadcast his

message or speech, or by the witness recognition of the voice of the speaker. [33]

The records of this case are bereft of any proof that a witness saw petitioner Torralba broadcast the alleged

libelous remarks on 11 April 1994. Lim, however, stated that while petitioner Torralbas radio program on

that date was being tape recorded by his adopted daughter, he was so near the radio that he could even

touch the same.[34] In effect, Lim was implying that he was listening to Tug-Ani ang Lungsod at that time.

In our view, such bare assertion on the part of Lim, uncorroborated as it was by any other evidence, fails

to meet the standard that a witness must be able to recognize the voice of the speaker. Being near the radio

is one thing; actually listening to the radio broadcast and recognizing the voice of the speaker is another.

Indeed, a person may be in close proximity to said device without necessarily listening to the contents of a

radio broadcast or to what a radio commentator is saying over the airwaves.

What further undermines the credibility of Lims testimony is the fact that he had an ax to grind against

petitioner Torralba as he was previously accused by the latter with the crime of libel and for which he was

found guilty as charged by the court. Surely then, Lim could not present himself as an uninterested witness

whose testimony merits significance from this Court.

Nor is this Court inclined to confer probative value on the testimony of private complainant Atty. Hontanosas

particularly in the light of his declaration that he did not listen to petitioner Torralbas radio show subject of

this petition. He simply relied on the tape recording handed over to him by Lim.

Time and again, this Court has faithfully observed and given effect to the constitutional presumption of

innocence which can only be overcome by contrary proof beyond reasonable doubt -- one which requires

moral certainty, a certainty that convinces and satisfies the reason and conscience of those who are to act

upon it.[35] As we have so stated in the past

Accusation is not, according to the fundamental law, synonymous with guilt, the prosecution
must overthrow the presumption of innocence with proof of guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
To meet this standard, there is need for the most careful scrutiny of the testimony of the
State, both oral and documentary, independently of whatever defense is offered by the
accused. Only if the judge below and the appellate tribunal could arrive at a conclusion that
the crime had been committed precisely by the person on trial under such an exacting test
should the sentence be one of conviction. It is thus required that every circumstance favoring
innocence be duly taken into account. The proof against him must survive the test of reason;
the strongest suspicion must not be permitted to sway judgment.[36]

Confronted with what the State was able to present as evidence against petitioner Torralba, this

Court is compelled to overturn the decision of the Court of Appeals due to insufficiency of evidence meriting

a finding of guilt beyond reasonable doubt.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision promulgated on 22 May 2002 of the Court of

Appeals, affirming the omnibus decision dated 24 August 2000 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 3,

Tagbilaran City, is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Instead, a new one is

entered ACQUITTING petitioner Cirse Francisco Choy Torralba of the crime of libel. The cash bond posted

by said petitioner is ordered released to him subject to the usual auditing and accounting procedures. No

costs. SO ORDERED.
SR. INSP. JERRY C. VALEROSO, G.R. No. 164815
Petitioner,

- versus –

THE PEOPLE OF THE Promulgated:

PHILIPPINES,
Respondent. February 22, 2008
x--------------------------------------------------x

DECISION

REYES, R.T., J.:

THE law looks forward, never backward. Lex prospicit, non respicit. A new law has a prospective, not
retroactive, effect.[1] However, penal laws that favor a guilty person, who is not a habitual criminal, shall be
given retroactive effect.1-a These are the rule, the exception and exception to the exception on effectivity of
laws.

Ang batas ay tumitingin sa hinaharap, hindi sa nakaraan. Gayunpaman, ang parusa ng bagong
batas ay iiral kung ito ay pabor sa taong nagkasala na hindi pusakal na kriminal.

We apply the exception rather than the rule in this petition for review on certiorari of the decision of
the Court of Appeals (CA), affirming with modification that of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) in Quezon City,
finding petitioner liable for illegal possession of a firearm.

The Facts

On July 10, 1996, at around 9:30 a.m., SPO2 Antonio M. Disuanco of the Criminal Investigation
Division, Central Police District Command, received a dispatch order [2] from the desk officer.[3] The order
directed him and three (3) other policemen to serve a warrant of arrest[4] issued by Judge Ignacio Salvador
against petitioner Sr. Insp. Jerry C. Valeroso in a case for kidnapping with ransom. [5]

After a briefing, the team conducted the necessary surveillance on petitioner, checking his hideouts
in Cavite, Caloocan, and Bulacan.[6] Eventually, the team proceeded to the Integrated National Police (INP)
Central Station at Culiat, Quezon City, where they saw petitioner as he was about to board a tricycle. [7] SPO2
Disuanco and his team approached petitioner.[8] They put him under arrest, informed him of his
constitutional rights, and bodily searched him.[9] Found tucked in his waist[10] was a Charter Arms, bearing
Serial Number 52315[11] with five (5) live ammunition.[12]

Petitioner was then brought to the police station for questioning. [13]

A verification of the subject firearm at the Firearms and Explosives Division at Camp Crame revealed that it
was not issued to petitioner but to a certain Raul Palencia Salvatierra of Sampaloc, Manila.[14]Epifanio
Deriquito, the records verifier, presented a certification [15] to that effect signed by Edwin C. Roque, chief
records officer of the Firearms and Explosive Division.[16]
 Petitioner was then charged with illegal possession of firearm and ammunition under Presidential
Decree (P.D.) No. 1866,[17] as amended. The Information read:

That on or about the 10th day of July, 1996, in Quezon City, Philippines, the said
accused without any authority of law, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and knowingly
have in his/her possession and under his/her custody and control

One (1) cal. 38 Charter Arms revolver bearing Serial No. 52315 with five (5)
live ammo.

without first having secured the necessary license/permit issued by the proper authorities.

CONTRARY TO LAW.

Quezon City, Philippines, July 15, 1996.

(Sgd.)

GLORIA VICTORIA C. YAP

Assistant City Prosecutor[18]

With the assistance of his counsel de parte, Atty. Oscar Pagulayan, petitioner pleaded not guilty when
arraigned on October 9, 1996.[19] Trial on the merits ensued.

SPO2 Disuanco and Deriquito testified for the prosecution in the manner stated above.

Upon the other hand, the defense version was supplied by the combined testimonies of petitioner Sr.
Insp. Jerry C. Valeroso, SPO3 Agustin R. Timbol, Jr. and Adrian Yuson.

Petitioner recounted that on July 10, 1996, he was fast asleep in the boarding house of his children located
at Sagana Homes, Barangay New Era, Quezon City.[20] He was roused from his slumber when four (4)
heavily armed men in civilian clothes bolted the room. [21] They trained their guns at him[22] and pulled him
out of the room. They then tied his hands and placed him near the faucet.[23] The raiding team went back
inside and searched and ransacked the room.[24] SPO2 Disuanco stood guard outside with him.[25] Moments
later, an operative came out of the room and exclaimed, Hoy, may nakuha akong baril sa loob![26]

Petitioner was told by SPO2 Disuanco that we are authorized to shoot you because theres a shoot to kill
order against you, so if you are planning do so something, do it right now.[27] He was also told that there
was a standing warrant for his arrest.[28] However, he was not shown any proof when he asked for
it.[29] Neither was the raiding group armed with a valid search warrant.[30]

According to petitioner, the search done in the boarding house was illegal. The gun seized from him
was duly licensed and covered by necessary permits. He was, however, unable to present the documentation
relative to the firearm because it was confiscated by the police. Petitioner further lamented that when he
was incarcerated, he was not allowed to engage the services of a counsel. Neither was he allowed to see or
talk to his family.[31]
Petitioner contended that the police had an axe to grind against him. While still with the Narcotics Command,
he turned down a request of Col. Romulo Sales to white-wash a drug-related investigation involving friends
of the said police officer. Col. Sales was likewise subject of a complaint filed with the Ombudsman by his
wife. Col. Sales was later on appointed as the head of the unit that conducted the search in his boarding
house.[32]

SPO3 Timbol, Jr. of the Narcotics Command testified that he issued to petitioner a Memorandum Receipt
dated July 1, 1993[33] covering the subject firearm and its ammunition. This was upon the verbal instruction
of Col. Angelito Moreno. SPO3 Timbol identified his signature[34] on the said receipt.[35]

Adrian Yuson, an occupant of the room adjacent to where petitioner was arrested, testified that
on July 10, 1996, two (2) policemen suddenly entered his room as he was preparing for school. [36] They
grabbed his shoulder and led him out.[37] During all those times, a gun was poked at him.[38] He was asked
where petitioner was staying. Fearing for his life, he pointed to petitioners room.[39]

Four (4) policemen then entered the room.[40] He witnessed how they pointed a gun at petitioner,
who was clad only in his underwear.[41] He also witnessed how they forcibly brought petitioner out of his
room.[42] While a policeman remained near the faucet to guard petitioner, three (3) others went back inside
the room.[43] They began searching the whole place. They forcibly opened his locker,[44] which yielded the
subject firearm.[45]

RTC and CA Dispositions

On May 6, 1998, the trial court found petitioner guilty as charged, disposing as follows:

WHEREFORE, the Court hereby finds the accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
Violation of Section 1 of Presidential Decree No. 1866 as amended by Republic Act No. 8294
and hereby sentences him to suffer the penalty of prision correccional in its maximum period
or from 4 years, 2 months and 1 day as minimum to 6 years as maximum and to pay the fine
in the amount of Fifteen Thousand Pesos (P15,000.00).

The gun subject of this case is hereby ordered confiscated in favor of the
government. Let the same be put in trust in the hands of the Chief of the PNP. SO
ORDERED.[46]

Petitioner moved to reconsider[47] but his motion was denied on August 27, 1998.[48] He appealed to
the CA.

On May 4, 2004, the appellate court affirmed with modification the RTC disposition. The fallo of the
CA decision reads:

Verily, the penalty imposed by the trial court upon the accused-appellant is modified
to 4 years and 2 months as minimum up to 6 years as maximum.

WHEREFORE, with the foregoing MODIFICATION as to the penalty, the decision appealed
from is hereby AFFIRMED in all other respects. SO ORDERED.[49]
 His motion for reconsideration[50] having been denied through a Resolution dated August 3,
2004,[51] petitioner resorted to the present petition under Rule 45.

Issues

Petitioner raises the following issues for Our consideration:

I. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED SERIOUS ERRORS OF LAW IN

AFFIRMING THE CONVICTION OF PETITIONER DESPITE THE ABSENCE OF PROOF
BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT.

II. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED SERIOUS ERRORS OF FACT AND LAW
IN SUSTAINING THE LEGALITY OF THE SEARCH AND THE VALIDITY AND ADMISSIBILITY
OF THE EVIDENCE OBTAINED THEREFROM DESPITE THE OVERWHELMING PROOF THAT
THE SAME IS THE FRUIT OF THE POISONOUS TREE.

III. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED SERIOUS ERRORS OF LAW IN NOT
UPHOLDING THE REGULARITY AND VALIDITY SURROUNDING THE ISSUANCE OF THE
MEMORANDUM RECEIPTS (SIC) IN FAVOR OF PETITIONER WHICH PROVES HIS
INNOCENCE OF THE CRIME CHARGE (SIC).[52] (Underscoring supplied)

Our Ruling

In illegal possession of firearm and ammunition, the prosecution has the burden of proving the twin
elements of (1) the existence of the subject firearm and ammunition, and (2) the fact that the accused who
possessed or owned the same does not have the corresponding license for it. [53]

The prosecution was able to discharge its burden.

The existence of the subject firearm and its ammunition was established through the testimony
of SPO2 Disuanco.[54] Defense witness Yuson also identified the firearm.[55] Its existence was likewise
admitted by no less than petitioner himself.[56]

As for petitioners lack of authority to possess the firearm, Deriquito testified that a verification of
the Charter Arms Caliber .38 bearing Serial No. 52315 with the Firearms and Explosives Division at Camp
Crame revealed that the seized pistol was not issued to petitioner. It was registered in the name of a certain
Raul Palencia Salvatierra of Sampaloc, Manila.[57] As proof, Deriquito presented a certification signed by
Roque, the chief records officer of the same office.[58]

The Court on several occasions ruled that either the testimony of a representative of, or a certification
from, the Philippine National Police (PNP) Firearms and Explosive Office attesting that a person is not a
licensee of any firearm would suffice to prove beyond reasonable doubt the second element of possession of
illegal firearms.[59] The prosecution more than complied when it presented both.

The certification is outside the scope of the hearsay rule.

 The general rule is that a witness can testify only to those facts which he knows of his personal
knowledge; that is, which are derived from his own perception.[60] Otherwise, the testimony is objectionable
for being hearsay.[61]

On this score, the certification from the Firearms and Explosives Division is an exception to the
hearsay rule by virtue of Rule 130, Section 44 of the Rules of Court which provides:

Sec. 44. Entries in official records. Entries in official records made in the performance
of his official duty by a public officer of the Philippines, or by a person in the performance of
a duty specifically enjoined by law, are prima facie evidence of the facts therein stated.

It may be true that the contents of said certification are only prima facie evidence of the facts stated
there. However, the failure of petitioner to present controverting evidence makes the presumption
unrebutted. Thus, the presumption stands.

Petitioner, however, raises several points which he says entitles him to no less than an acquittal.

The assessment of credibility of witnesses lies with the trial court.

First, petitioner says that the seizure of the subject firearm was invalid. The search was conducted
after his arrest and after he was taken out of the room he was occupying.[62]

This contention deserves scant consideration.

Petitioners version of the manner and place of his arrest goes into the factual findings made by the trial court
and its calibration of the credibility of witnesses. However, as aptly put by Justice Ynares-Santiago in People
v. Rivera:[63]

x x x the manner of assigning values to declarations of witnesses on the witness stand

is best and most competently performed by the trial judge who had the unmatched
opportunity to observe the witnesses and assess their credibility by the
various indicia available but not reflected on record. The demeanor of the person on the stand
can draw the line between fact and fancy or evince if the witness is telling the truth or lying
through his teeth. We have consistently ruled that when the question arises as to which of
the conflicting versions of the prosecution and the defense is worthy of belief, the assessment
of the trial courts are generally viewed as correct and entitled to great weight. Furthermore,
in an appeal, where the culpability or innocence of the accused depends on the issue of
credibility of witnesses and the veracity of their testimonies, findings of the trial court are
given the highest degree of respect if not finality.[64] (Underscoring supplied)

The trial court found the prosecution version worthy of credence and belief. We find no compelling
reason not to accept its observation on this score.

Worth noting is the fact that petitioner is a ranking police officer who not only claims to be highly
decorated,[65] but have effected a number of successful arrests[66] as well. Common sense would dictate that
he must necessarily be authorized to carry a gun. We thus agree with the Office of the Solicitor General that
framing up petitioner would have been a very risky proposition. Had the arresting officers really intended to
cause the damnation of petitioner by framing him up, they could have easily planted a more incriminating
evidence rather than a gun. That would have made their nefarious scheme easier, assuming that there
indeed was one.

The pieces of evidence show that petitioner is not legally authorized to possess the subject
firearm and its five (5) ammunition.

Second, petitioner insists that he is legally authorized to possess the subject firearm and its
ammunition on the basis of the Memorandum Receipt issued to him by the PNP Narcotics Command.[67]

Although petitioner is correct in his submission that public officers like policemen are accorded
presumption of regularity in the performance of their official duties, [68] it is only a presumption; it may be
overthrown by evidence to the contrary. The prosecution was able to rebut the presumption when it proved
that the issuance to petitioner of the Memorandum Receipt was anything but regular.

SPO3 Timbol, Jr. testified that he issued the Memorandum Receipt to petitioner based on the verbal
instruction of his immediate superior, Col. Moreno.[69] However, a reading of Timbols testimony on cross-
examination[70] would reveal that there was an unusual facility by which said receipt was issued to
petitioner. Its issuance utterly lacked the usual necessary bureaucratic constraints. Clearly, it was issued to
petitioner under questionable circumstances.

Failure to offer an unlicensed firearm as evidence is not fatal provided there is competent
testimony as to its existence.

Third, petitioner claims that the subject firearm and ammunition should have been excluded as
evidence because they were not formally offered by the prosecution [71] in violation of Section 34, Rule 132
of the Rules of Court.[72]

We note that petitioner contradicted himself when he argued for the validity of the Memorandum
Receipt and, at the same time, for the exclusion in evidence of the subject firearm and its
ammunition.Petitioners act may result to an absurd situation where the Memorandum Receipt is declared
valid, while the subject firearm and its ammunition which are supposedly covered by the Memorandum
Receipt are excluded as evidence. That would have made the Memorandum Receipt useless.

In any case, petitioners contention has no leg to stand on.

Contrary to petitioners claim, the subject firearm[73] and its five (5) live ammunition[74] were offered
in evidence by the prosecution.[75] Even assuming arguendo that they were not offered, petitioners stance
must still fail. The existence of an unlicensed firearm may be established by testimony, even without its
presentation at trial. In People v. Orehuela,[76] the non-presentation of the pistol did not prevent the
conviction of the accused.
 The doctrine was affirmed in the recent case of People v. Malinao.[77]

As previously stated, the existence of the subject firearm and its five (5) live ammunition were
established through the testimony of SPO2 Disuanco.[78] Yuson also identified said firearm.[79] Petitioner
even admitted its existence.[80]

We hasten to add that there may also be conviction where an unlicensed firearm is presented during
trial but through inadvertence, negligence, or fortuitous event (for example, if it is lost), it is not offered in
evidence, as long as there is competent testimony as to its existence.

Penal and civil liabilities

Petitioner was charged with the crime of illegal possession of firearms and ammunition under the
first paragraph of Section 1 of P.D. No. 1866, as amended. It provides that [t]he penalty of reclusion
temporal in its maximum period to reclusion perpetua shall be imposed upon any person who shall
unlawfully manufacture, deal in, acquire, dispose, or possess any firearm, part of firearm, ammunition or
machinery, tool or instrument used or intended to be used in the manufacture of any firearm or ammunition.

P.D. No. 1866, as amended, was the governing law at the time petitioner committed the offense
on July 10, 1996. However, R.A. No. 8294 amended P.D. No. 1866 on July 6, 1997,[81] during the pendency
of the case with the trial court. The present law now states:

SECTION 1. Unlawful Manufacture, Sale, Acquisition, Disposition or Possession of

Firearms or Ammunition or Instruments Used or Intended to be Used in the Manufacture of
Firearms or Ammunition. The penalty of prision correccional in its maximum period and a fine
of not less than Fifteen Thousand Pesos (P15,000) shall be imposed upon any person who
shall unlawfully manufacture, deal in, acquire, dispose, or possess any low-powered firearm,
such as rimfire handgun, .380 or .32 and other firearm of similar firepower, part of firearm,
ammunition, or machinery, tool or instrument used or intended to be used in the manufacture
of any firearm or ammunition: Provided, That no other crime was committed. (Underscoring
supplied)

As a general rule, penal laws should not have retroactive application, lest they acquire the character
of an ex post facto law.[82] An exception to this rule, however, is when the law is advantageous to the
accused. According to Mr. Chief Justice Araullo, this is not as a right of the offender, but founded on the
very principles on which the right of the State to punish and the commination of the penalty are based, and
regards it not as an exception based on political considerations, but as a rule founded on principles of strict
justice.[83]

Although an additional fine of P15,000.00 is imposed by R.A. No. 8294, the same is still advantageous
to the accused, considering that the imprisonment is lowered to prision correccional in its maximum
period[84] from reclusion temporal in its maximum period to reclusion perpetua[85] under P.D. No. 1866.
 Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, prision correccional maximum which ranges from four (4)
years, two (2) months and one (1) day to six (6) years, is the prescribed penalty and will form the maximum
term of the indeterminate sentence. The minimum term shall be one degree lower, which is prision
correccional in its medium period (two [2] years, four [4] months and one [1] day to four [4] years and two
[2] months).[86] Hence, the penalty imposed by the CA is correct. The penalty of four (4) years and two (2)
months of prision correccional medium, as minimum term, to six (6) years of prision correccional maximum,
as maximum term, is in consonance with the Courts ruling in Gonzales v. Court of Appeals[87] and Barredo
v. Vinarao.[88]

As to the subject firearm and its five (5) live ammunition, their proper disposition should be made
under Article 45 of the Revised Penal Code[89] which provides, among others, that the proceeds and
instruments or tools of the crime shall be confiscated and forfeited in favor of the government.

WHEREFORE, the Decision of the Court of Appeals dated May 4, 2004 is AFFIRMED in full. SO
ORDERED.
 JULIUS CACAO y PRIETO, G.R. No. 180870
Petitioner,

- versus -

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Promulgated:

Respondent. January 22, 2010
x-------------------------------------------------------------------x

DECISION

DEL CASTILLO, J.:

In order to safeguard its citizenry from the harmful effects of dangerous drugs on their physical and mental well-
being, the State pursued an intensive and unrelenting campaign against the trafficking and use of dangerous drugs
and other similar substances.[1] However, in our desire to totally eradicate this social ill, we must adhere to the
constitutional pronouncement that in all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall be presumed innocent until the
contrary is proved.[2] This case illustrates once more our faithful adherence to said constitutional requirement.

Factual Antecedents

For review is the Decision[3] of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR

No. 29985 dated July 27, 2007 affirming in toto the Decision[4] of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Laoag City, Branch
13 in Criminal Case No. 11489-13 dated November 25, 2005 finding herein petitioner Julius Cacao y Prieto (Cacao)
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violating Section 11, Article II of Republic Act (RA) No. 9165 (The Comprehensive
Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002) and sentencing him to suffer the penalty of imprisonment ranging from 12 years and
one day to 15 years and ordering him to pay a fine of P400,000.00. Also assailed is the Resolution[5] of the CA
dated December 11, 2007 denying the motion for reconsideration.

On October 15, 2004, two separate informations were filed against Joseph Canlas y Naguit[6] and Cacao[7] indicting
them for violation of Section 11, Article II of RA 9165 before the RTC of Laoag City. Insofar as pertinent to this
petition, we shall quote the information only against Cacao in Criminal Case No. 11489-13 which reads:
That on or about the 14th day of October, 2004, at Laoag City, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction
of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously [sic] have in his possession, control and custody 1 plastic sachet of methamphetamine
hydrochloride or shabu containing a total of 1.6 grams including plastic sachets [sic] without any
license or authority, in violation of the aforesaid law.
CONTRARY TO LAW.[8]

When arraigned on November 30, 2004, Cacao pleaded not guilty.[9] Thereafter trial on the merits followed.

The inculpatory facts, as unveiled by the prosecution in its evidence given during the trial, were briefly synthesized
by the Office of the Solicitor General, viz:
On October 14, 2004, at around 7:45 in the evening, Police Officer 3 (PO3) Celso Pang-ag of the
Intelligence and Operation Section of the Laoag City Police Station received a telephone call from an
informant about a drug session being held inside Room 5 of the Starlight Hotel located at Barangay
5, Ablan Avenue, Laoag City.

Acting on the information, PO3 Pang-ag, together with PO2 Jonel Mangapit, went immediately to the
Starlight Hotel to determine the veracity of the report. Upon arrival at the target area, PO3 Pang-ag
and PO2 Mangapit approached the lady clerk manning the information counter of Starlight Hotel and
inquired about the alleged drug session at Room 5 of the hotel.
 The lady clerk informed PO3 Pang-ag and PO2 Mangapit that the roomboy of the hotel was about to
deliver a softdrink to Room 5 and they could follow him if they [so wish]. Thus, PO3 Pang-ag and PO2
Mangapit followed the roomboy to Room 5. Upon arrival, the roomboy knocked at the door and a
woman, later identified as Mylene, opened the door wide enough to enable the police officers to look
inside.

PO3 Pang-ag and PO2 Mangapit saw petitioner seated on top of the bed sniffing shabu while Joseph
Canlas was on the floor assisting petitioner sniffing shabu. At this juncture, PO3 Pang-ag and PO2
Mangapit arrested petitioner and Joseph and confiscated from them the drug paraphernalia, glass
tooter, scissors, lighters and plastic sachets.

PO2 Mangapit frisked petitioner and recovered from him one plastic sachet containing shabu.

After informing petitioner and Joseph of their constitutional rights, PO3 Pang-ag and PO2 Mangapit
brought them to the Laoag City Police Station and turned them over to the police officer on duty while
the confiscated items were turned over to SPO3 Loreto Ancheta.

The Philippine National Police (PNP) laboratory conducted an examination on the specimen recovered
from appellant and his companion which tested positive for shabu.[10]

Cacao professed his innocence and presented his defense in this wise:

In the afternoon of 14 October 2004, petitioner was waiting for a ride going home along the National
Road at the rotunda of San Nicolas, Ilocos Norte. Joseph Canlas [who was on his way
to] Laoag City aboard his motorcycle x x x pulled over and asked the petitioner if the latter could
spare a moment to estimate a work he wanted to be done in his house. Admittedly, the petitioner is
a contractor. Petitioner agreed and they both boarded Canlas motorcycle for Laoag City.

While in Laoag City, petitioner and Canlas stopped at the public market for the latter to collect [loan
payment] as he is also a money lender. Petitioner stayed [by] Canlas motorcycle. When Canlas
returned, it was then that they decided to have chicks (or womanize). They then proceeded to
Starlight Hotel located along Ablan Ave., Laoag City on board Canlas motorcycle.

x x x at the Starlight Hotel, petitioner asked for a room and [was given] Room 5 x x x. Thereafter,
Canlas stayed inside Room 5 while petitioner went out to the hotels counter to wait for the woman
they [had] contacted. Present at the counter at the time was the lady cashier [named] Cherry Corpuz.

In about thirty (30) minutes, a tricycle-for-hire arrived with a man and a woman on board as
passengers. The tricycle went inside the hotel and stopped right in front of the counter where the
petitioner and the lady cashier were. After alighting from the tricycle, the woman companion inquired
where Room 5 is [and was directed] by the lady cashier. The woman [who] alighted from the tricycle
in the company of another male person was later on identified to be Mylene Daquioag. Thereafter,
Mylene Daquioag proceeded to Room 5 while the male companion stayed behind with the petitioner
at the hotels counter. When petitioner could not wait [any] longer because there was only one woman
who arrived, he x x x asked the male companion of Mylene Daquioag if another woman is coming. The
male companion answered in the negative. A couple of minutes [later], petitioner followed to Room
5 so he could [sic] go home instead because it was then getting late.

Upon entering the room, petitioner saw Mylene Daquioag and Canlas seated at the table inside the
room. He also saw Mylene Daquioag offer something contained in plastic x x x to Canlas. The latter
refused as he said it is a woman that he was asking [for].

Barely a moment after entering Room 5, the two then heard a knock on the door from the
outside. Mylene Daquiaog immediately stood up and told the petitioner and Canlas that they are (her)
companions.

As soon as the door was unlocked by Mylene Daquioag, several policemen barged inside the room
with their guns drawn out. Petitioner was shoved to the bed by one of the police. He was later bodily
searched but nothing was found from [sic] him except his wallet containing cash of
about P 7,000.00. The wallet was later turned over to the petitioners wife at the Police Station of
Laoag, City. The P7,000.00 was never seen again.

As petitioner was made to sit at [sic] the bed, one of the police officers pointed to a plastic sachet on
the floor. It was about two (2) meters away from him and about a meter from the police pointing [to]
it. The same police then explained that the plastic sachet belongs to the petitioner. Immediately,
petitioner cried foul on the assertion.

Due to the suddenness of events, the petitioner was not as much as able to notice what the other
police did to Canlas.

Without much ado, the petitioner and Canlas were apprehended, handcuffed and brought to the
Laoag City Police Station. Charges were later on filed against them.[11]
Ruling of the Regional Trial Court

On November 25, 2005, the trial court rendered its judgment finding Cacao guilty of the offense charged and
sentenced him accordingly, viz:

WHEREFORE x x x

The accused Julius Cacao is likewise found GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt as charged of illegal
possession of methamphetamine hydrochloride weighing 1.3987 grams in Criminal Case No. 11489
and is therefore sentenced to suffer the indeterminate penalty of imprisonment from TWELVE (12)
YEARS and ONE (1) DAY to FIFTEEN (15) YEARS and to pay the fine of Four hundred thousand
(P400,000.00) pesos, Philippine Currency.

The sachets of shabu confiscated from the accused are all confiscated in favor of the Government,
the same to be disposed as the law prescribes. Cost de oficio.

SO ORDERED.[12]

Ruling of the Court of Appeals

Aggrieved by the Decision of the trial court, Cacao interposed an appeal to the CA. On July 27, 2007, the appellate
court rendered judgment affirming Cacaos conviction. It held that the circumstances obtaining in this case validly
cloaked the arresting officers with the authority to search and seize any contraband or prohibited material which may
be used as proof of the offense of which Cacao is charged. It also ruled that there is no proof that the police officers
compelled Cacao to admit a crime. As to the alleged contradictory statements, the appellate court ruled that they
refer only to minor details which are not sufficient to overthrow the probative value accorded them by the trial court.

Petitioner moved for reconsideration[13] but the motion was denied by the appellate court in its Resolution[14] dated
on December 11, 2007.

Issues

In this petition, Cacao ascribes to the trial court the following errors:

I. The lower court gravely erred in ruling that the guilt of the accused was
proven beyond reasonable doubt considering the myriad material inconsistencies,
discrepancies, and incredible statements in the prosecution evidence.[15]

II. The lower court gravely erred in failing to lend credence to the critical
testimony of Benedict Villanueva.[16]

III. The lower court erred in not finding that the crucial first link in the chain of
custody of the specimen subjected for examination was not proven.[17]

IV. The lower court gravely erred in declaring that the defense of frame-up cannot
be given weight.[18]

V. The lower court gravely erred in relying on the weakness of the defense.[19]

VI. The lower court gravely erred in failing to find that the presumption of
innocence of the petitioner stands unrebutted, hence, his conviction is erroneous.[20]

Our Ruling

We find merit in the petition.

As a general rule, factual findings and conclusions of the trial court and the CA are entitled to great weight and respect
and will not be disturbed on appeal. However, if there is any indication that the trial court overlooked certain facts or
circumstances which would substantially affect the disposition of the case,[21] we will not hesitate to review the
same. In this case, we find it imperative to review the factual findings of the trial court because of certain
inconsistencies in the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses on material points.
Jurisprudence holds that in prosecution of cases involving illegal possession of prohibited drugs, the prosecution must
establish with moral certainty the elemental act of possession of a prohibited substance coupled with the fact that
such possession is not authorized by law. Essential, however, in a drug-related case is that the identity of the
dangerous drug be established beyond reasonable doubt.[22] Since the dangerous drug constitutes the corpus
delicti of the offense and the fact of its existence is vital to a judgment of conviction,[23] it behooves upon the
prosecution to establish and prove with certainty that the dangerous drug presented in court as evidence against the
accused is the same item recovered from his possession.

We have scrutinized in detail the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses and found not only glaring inconsistencies
on material points but more importantly a failure to identify indubitably the prohibited drug allegedly confiscated from
Cacao.

The testimonies of the prosecutions principal witnesses are inconsistent as to who delivered the
prohibited drug to the evidence custodian.

PO3 Celso Pang-ag (Pang-ag) and PO2 Jonel Mangapit (Mangapit) both testified that it was the latter who brought
the item confiscated from petitioner to the evidence custodian, SPO3 Loreto Ancheta (Ancheta). Thus:

Q: What about the two plastic sachets you confiscated from the possession of the accused Joseph
and the one plastic sachet which Jonel Mangapit confiscated from the possession of Julius
Cacao as well as the drug paraphernalia you mentioned, what did you do with them?
A: We turned over the confiscated drug paraphernalia and the one I confiscated to the evidence
custodian, SP03 Loreto Ancheta and the one confiscated by P02 Mangapit was also turned
over by him to the evidence custodian, sir.
Q: Who was the evidence custodian whom you and Jonel Mangapit turned over the items you said?
A: SPO3 Loreto Ancheta, Sir.[24]

Mangapit corroborated Pang-ags testimony that it was he who delivered to Ancheta the item he seized from Cacao.
Thus:

Q: How about the one big plastic sachet you were able to seize from the right front pocket of accused
Cacao, what did you do?
A: I turned it over to the evidence custodian, Sir.

Q: Who was that evidence custodian to whom you turned over that plastic sachet?
A: SP02 Loreto Ancheta, Sir.[25]

The foregoing assertions are totally at odds with the testimony of Ancheta, the evidence custodian. The latter denied
that it was Mangapit who delivered the item allegedly recovered from Cacao. Instead, he repeatedly and categorically
declared that it was SP03 Balolong (Balolong) from whom he received the plastic sachet of shabu.

Q: Who delivered to you the specimen allegedly confiscated from the possession of Cacao?
A: SP03 Balolong, Sir.[26]

During his cross-examination, Ancheta confirmed his declaration that it was Balolong and definitely not
Mangapit who handed to him the plastic sachet of shabu. Ancheta testified thus:

Q: You said that it was officer Balolong who handed to you the plastic sachet of shabu which was
allegedly taken from the possession of accused Julius Cacao, did I hear you right?
A: Julius Cacao, yes sir.

Q: It was not officer Mangapit who handed to you the plastic sachet of shabu?
A: Balolong, sir.
 Q: It was not Mangapit?
A: No sir.[27]
When confronted with the afore-quoted testimony of Ancheta, Mangapit cannot explain the variance. He just gave a
sweeping answer I do not know.[28]

We cannot understand why the courts below did not doubt or suspect the patently inconsistent and contradictory
testimonies of the principal witnesses of the prosecution. Contrary to the findings of the appellate court, we are of
the considered view that this contradiction is not so inconsequential or minor but a discrepancy touching on
substantial and significant matter which could well affect the credibility of the witnesses.

The prosecution failed to satisfactorily establish that the item presented in court was the same item
confiscated from Cacao.

The patent inconsistency between the testimonies of Mangapit and Pang-ag, on one hand, and the testimony of
Ancheta on the other hand, necessarily leads us to doubt that the plastic sachet of shabu identified in court is the
same item that was allegedly seized and confiscated from petitioner. If the version of Mangapit is to be believed,
then the most lamentable aspect pertains to his failure to identify the seized item with certainty. For sure Mangapit,
who is the most competent person to make the proper identification being the officer who confiscated the item from
Cacao, never actually identified the same:

Q: If shown to you again that one big plastic sachet where you put markings would you be able to
recognize and identify the same?
A: Yes, sir.

Q: Giving to you an already opened brown envelope with several contents, will you please sort out
[the] contents and bring out that big plastic sachet you claimed you confiscated from the
custody of accused Cacao?
A: (Witness sorting out the contents of the plastic bag containing several items). (Witness examining
the plastic sachet mounted on the bond paper marked as Exhibit B-1).

Q: Are the markings you claimed which were placed in the plastic sachet still visible and readable?
A: Yes, sir.

Q: Will you please read for record purposes the markings?

A: Initial JPC and my signature, sir.
(Witness pointing to the initials and signature written on a darker masking tape on the plastic
sachet).[29]

Verily, there was no actual and effective identification of the subject specimen. After sorting out the contents of the
plastic bag, witness Mangapit merely pointed to the initial and signature written on a masking tape attached to the
plastic sachet. At no instance did he make a categorical and accurate declaration that the sachet contained
the shabu allegedly confiscated from Cacao.

The only other person who could have identified the subject drug is Pang-ag. However, we cannot lend credence to
his supposed identification, the same not being also positive, certain and unequivocal. Besides, there is no showing
that this witness actually saw the shabu at the time it was allegedly seized from petitioner. In fact, Pang-ag is even
incompetent to make the identification since from all indications, he has never been in possession of it.

Be that as it may, any identification made by these witnesses on the item allegedly seized from petitioner is rendered
meaningless and bereft of probative value in view of the categorical denial of the evidence custodian that he received
the same from Mangapit. It is now clearly evident from the records that the sachet of shabu which the evidence
custodian received, marked and submitted for examination and later presented in court is not the same sachet
of shabu which Mangapit claimed to have confiscated from petitioner and subsequently transmitted to the evidence
custodian.
Moreover, considering the testimony of Ancheta, it was Balolong who forwarded the seized item. It is quite strange
that Ancheta would point to Balolong as the sender of the seized items if he had no basis in saying so.However, our
own scrutiny of the records failed to show the role of Balolong in the operation since admittedly, the only lawmen
who participated therein were Mangapit and Pang-ag. In fact, as testified to by Mangapit, Balolong proceeded to the
hotel after the operation.[30] How then was Balolong able to get hold of the confiscated substance when he was neither
a party to nor present during the operation? Who entrusted the substance to him assuming that somebody requested
him to submit it for safekeeping? These are only some of the lingering questions which must be answered
convincingly and satisfactorily so as to ensure that there had been no substitution, contamination or tampering with
the sachet of shabu allegedly taken from petitioner. It must be noted that Balolong was never presented to testify in
this case. Thus, there is no evidence to prove that what was turned over to the evidence custodian by Balolong and
later presented in court was the same substance recovered from petitioner. The failure to establish the chain of
custody is fatal to the prosecutions case. There can be no crime of illegal possession of a prohibited drug when
nagging doubts persist on whether the item confiscated was the same specimen examined and established to be the
prohibited drug.[31] In People v. Casimiro,[32] citing People v. Mapa,[33] we acquitted the accused for failure of the
prosecution to establish the identity of the prohibited drug which constitutes the corpus delicti. Equally true in Zarraga
v. People,[34] we also acquitted the accused in view of the prosecutions failure to indubitably show the identity of
the shabu.

At this juncture, it must be stressed that the corpus delicti in dangerous drugs cases constitutes the drug itself. This
means that proof beyond reasonable doubt of the identity of the prohibited drug is essential.[35]

Likewise, our ruling in People v. Gutierrez[36] on chain of custody rule is instructive. Thus:

As a mode of authenticating evidence, the chain of custody rule requires the presentation of the seized
prohibited drugs as an exhibit be preceded by evidence sufficient to support a finding that the matter
in question is what the proponent claims it to be. This would ideally cover the testimony about every
link in the chain, from seizure of the prohibited drug up to the time it is offered in evidence, in such a
way that everyone who touched the exhibit would describe how and from whom it was received, to
include, as much as possible, a description of the condition in which it was delivered to the next in the
chain.

Finally, petitioners defenses of denial and frame-up are concededly inherently weak and commonly used in drug-
related cases. However, it must be stressed that conviction of the accused must rest not on the weakness of the
defense but on the strength of the evidence of the prosecution.

Based on the foregoing, we are of the considered view that the quantum of evidence needed to convict, that is proof
beyond reasonable doubt, has not been adequately established by the prosecution. While as a rule we desist from
disturbing the findings and conclusions of the trial court especially with respect to the credibility of witnesses, we
must bow to the superior and immutable rule that the guilt of the accused must be proved beyond reasonable doubt
because the law presumes that the accused is innocent unless and until proven otherwise. Presumption of regularity
in the performance of official duty cannot by itself override the constitutional right of the accused to be presumed
innocent unless overcome by strong, clear and compelling evidence.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 29985
dated July 27, 2007 affirming in toto the Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Laoag City, Branch 13, in Criminal
Case No. 11489-13, and its Resolution dated December 11, 2007 denying the motion for reconsideration,
are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Petitioner Julius Cacao y Prieto is ACQUITTED on ground of reasonable doubt.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 178757 March 13, 2009

RONALD CARINO and ROSANA ANDES, Petitioners,

vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.

DECISION

TINGA, J.:

In this petition for review on certiorari,1 petitioners Ronald Carino and Rosana Andes assail the Decision 2 of
the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 29867 dated 13 March 2007, which affirmed the joint decision 3 of
the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 103,4 finding petitioners Ronald Carino and Rosana Andes
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of illegal possession of methamphetamine hydrochloride, a dangerous drug
locally known as shabu.

Petitioners Carino and Andes were apprehended on two separate but related incidents on 20 June 2003 at
the corner of G. Araneta and E. Rodriguez Avenues in Quezon City. The apprehending officers were allegedly
members of the Central Police District (CPD)-Galas Police Station 11 and were part of the eight-man
team5 that was dispatched by the police district authorities to conduct the "Oplan Sita"—an operation which
had for its object the suppression of rampant robbery in the vicinity. It was in the course of this operation
that both petitioners were arrested without a warrant for allegedly having in their possession plastic sachets
containing shabu.

After the arrest and investigation, petitioners were charged in two separate informations 6 with violation of
Section 11, Article II of Republic Act No. 9165 (R.A. No. 9165). 7 Both of them entered a negative plea on
arraignment.8 The cases were thereafter jointly tried.

The prosecution offered the testimony of PO1 Joseph Tayaban (Tayaban) and PO1 Arnold Eugenio (Eugenio)
to prove the charges against petitioners. Tayaban and Eugenio professed that they were the ones who
arrested both petitioners.

Tayaban testified that the members of "Oplan Sita," on 20 June 2003, had started patrolling the area of
coverage as early as 9:00 o’clock in the morning of that day. At around 2:00 o’clock in the afternoon, his
colleague, Eugenio, spotted Carino, about a meter away from their location and holding a plastic sachet in
his hand. Right there and then, they placed Carino under arrest and Eugenio immediately seized the plastic
sachet.9 They asked Carino who the source of the plastic sachet was and the latter immediately identified
petitioner Andes. They approached Andes, and she allegedly became hysterical when the policemen
introduced themselves to her. It was then that Tayaban noticed the woman inserting something inside the
pocket of her 5-year old male child. Tayaban was suspicious so he inspected the right pocket of the child
and found a plastic sachet inside it containing shabu.10 Petitioners were immediately brought to the Galas
Police Station. The plastic sachets were allegedly submitted to the desk officer and then to the station
investigator who in the presence of Tayaban marked each of the specimens with the initials "JT-RA" and
"AE-RC."11 The markings purportedly represented the initials of Eugenio and Tayaban and the initials of
petitioners from whom they were seized.1avvphi1

Eugenio corroborated the testimony of Tayaban in its material respects. He admitted that he was the one
who grabbed Carino when he noticed that the latter was holding a plastic sachet in his hand. He suspected
the sachet to be containing shabu and he immediately told Carino of his offense. At that point Carino
allegedly dropped the plastic sachet, so he (Eugenio) picked it up and after examining the same concluded
that it indeed contained shabu.12 He and his companions brought Carino to their team leader just across the
street. The latter asked Carino who the source of the shabu was, and he was told that it was a certain
woman.13 Some members of the team, including Tayaban, left Araneta Avenue and went to Banawe Avenue
to the place where the woman allegedly could be found, but Eugenio was not able to catch up with them
because he received a phone message moments later that the woman had already been arrested. He instead
proceeded to the police station for the investigation.14

The prosecution also submitted the results of the qualitative examination administered on the contents of
the two plastic sachets seized from petitioners. The chemistry report signed by Engineer Leonard M. Jabonillo
(Jabonillo), chemist and forensic analyst at the CPD Crime Laboratory Office, revealed that the specimens
submitted for analysis yielded positive of methamphetamine hydrochloride content.15

Both petitioners denied the charges. It was revealed during their testimony, however, that they had
previously known each other as Carino was employed as a "latero" at the automobile repair shop owned by
Andes’s "kumpare."16

Carino testified that he was on his way to work when he was arrested along E. Rodriguez Avenue. He was
allegedly grabbed by the hand by one of the policemen and asked him to come with them to the police
station. He denied having been frisked at any time between his arrest and conveyance to the police
station.17 Quite boldly, he asserted that Tayaban was the source of the plastic sachet allegedly recovered
from him as he in fact saw the said officer pull the sachet out of his own pocket at the time the arrest was
taking place. At that point, Carino was asked who the source of the drug was, but when he replied that it
was not his, one of the officers retorted, "Nagmamaang-maangan ka pa." At the police station, he was
allegedly mauled by Tayaban because he again denied ownership of the plastic sachet. 18 When he was
brought to the prosecutor’s office for inquest proceedings, Carino continued, the fiscal allegedly told the
police, "Bakit hindi na lang natin i-further investigation ito? Wala namang ebidensiya sa kanya," suggesting
that the police escort including Tayaban and Eugenio did not bring the supposed sachet of shabu seized
from petitioners.19

Petitioner Andes, for her part, narrated that she and her 5-year old son were on their way home from the
bakeshop when suddenly, Tayaban and a certain police officer Prado approached them and asked her
whether she could identify the man inside the police car; 20 that she obliged, so she proceeded to the where
the car was parked and seeing petitioner Carino inside with his hands cuffed told the officers that the man
was familiar to her because he was an employee at his "kumpare’s" shop but she could not place his
name;21 that she was then invited to come to the police station and once there, she saw Carino being frisked
and the officers found nothing on him; and that she was also frisked by Tayaban but found nothing on her
either.22 She also claimed that Tayaban and his companions demanded from her and Carino ₱10,000.00 for
their release but they were detained because they could not and did not pay.23

On 9 December 2005, the trial court rendered its joint decision 24 in these cases finding both petitioners
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of illegal possession of dangerous drugs. It sentenced
petitioners to suffer the prison term of twelve years and one day as minimum to thirteen years as maximum
as well as to pay the fine of ₱300,000.00.25

Petitioners interposed an appeal with the Court of Appeals,26 but in its 13 March 2007 Decision the appellate
court affirmed the findings and conclusions of the trial court. 27 Petitioners moved for reconsideration28 but
the same was denied.29

In this Petition for Review on Certiorari,30 petitioners once again bid to establish that their guilt has not been
proven beyond reasonable doubt. They capitalize on the alleged inconsistencies in the testimony of police
officers Tayaban and Eugenio,31 as well as on the inadmissibility, for failure to establish the chain of custody,
of the drug specimens supposedly seized from them on account of the failure of the forensic chemist who
signed the chemistry report to testify in court.32

The OSG, for its part, advances that the evidence was sufficient to prove the petitioners’ guilt in this case
especially considering that the alleged inconsistencies in the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses in this
case can no longer be challenged because they had already been accorded credibility by the trial
court.33 Besides, the OSG points out, petitioners advance no better defense than their self-serving claim of
frame-up which must be dismissed in light of the presumption that the police officers involved in their
apprehension have regularly performed their duty.34 As to the claim that the evidence should not be
admitted for failure of the forensic chemist to testify, the OSG points out that the parties had already agreed
at the pre-trial to dispense with such testimony inasmuch as they had already stipulated that the drug
specimens were actually submitted to the laboratory for analysis and that the results thereof were then
reduced in written report.35

The Court grants the petition.

To begin with, prosecutions for illegal possession of prohibited drugs necessitates that the elemental act of
possession of a prohibited substance be established with moral certainty, together with the fact that the
same is not authorized by law. The dangerous drug itself constitutes the very corpus delicti of the offense
and the fact of its existence is vital to a judgment of conviction. 36 In these cases, it is therefore essential
that the identity of the prohibited drug be established beyond doubt.37

The mere fact of unauthorized possession will not suffice to create in a reasonable mind the moral certainty
required to sustain a finding of guilt. More than just the fact of possession, the fact that the substance
illegally possessed in the first place is the same substance offered in court as exhibit must also be established
with the same unwavering exactitude as that requisite to make a finding of guilt. The chain of custody
requirement performs this function in that it ensures that unnecessary doubts concerning the identity of the
evidence are removed.38

Chain of custody is defined as the duly recorded authorized movements and custody of seized drugs or
controlled chemicals or plant sources of dangerous drugs or laboratory equipment of each stage, from the
time of seizure/confiscation to receipt in the forensic laboratory to safekeeping to presentation in court for
destruction.39 As a method of authenticating evidence, it requires that the admission of an exhibit be
preceded by evidence sufficient to support a finding that the matter in question is what the proponent claims
it to be.40 It would include testimony about every link in the chain, from the moment the item was picked
up to the time it is offered into evidence, in such a way that every person who touched the exhibit would
describe how and from whom it was received, where it was and what happened to it while in the witness’
possession, the condition in which it was received and the condition in which it was delivered to the next
link in the chain. These witnesses would then describe the precautions taken to ensure that there had been
no change in the condition of the item and no opportunity for someone not in the chain to have possession
of the same.41 It is from the testimony of every witness who handled the evidence from which a reliable
assurance can be derived that the evidence presented in court is one and the same as that seized from the
accused.

In the case at bar, however, the prosecution evidence is insufficient to provide that assurance, for all the
people who made contact with the sachets of shabu allegedly seized from petitioners, only Tayaban and
Eugenio were able to testify in court as to the identity of the evidence. The desk officer at the police station
to whom the specimens were purportedly surrendered by Tayaban and Eugenio was not even presented in
court to observe the identity and uniqueness of the evidence. Even more to the point is the fact that the
testimony of the investigator, who had taken custody of the plastic sachets after the same were reported to
the desk officer, was likewise not offered in court to directly observe the evidence and admit the specific
markings thereon as his own. The same is true with respect to Jabonillo, the forensic chemist at the crime
laboratory who administered the chemical examination on the specimens and who could have testified on
the circumstances under which he received the specimen at the laboratory for analysis and testing, as well
as on the conduct of the examination which was administered on the specimen and what he did with it at
the time it was in his possession and custody.

Aside from that, the prosecution has not in fact reasonably explained why these same witnesses were not
able to testify in court. While indeed the OSG claims that the testimony of Jabonillo has already been
dispensed with by the parties at the pre-trial stage, there however seems to be not a single hint in the pre-
trial order which implies that the parties indeed dispensed with said testimony. 42

In view of these loopholes in the evidence adduced against appellant, it can be reasonably concluded that
the prosecution was unable to establish the identity of the dangerous drug and in effect failed to obliterate
the hypothesis of petitioners’ guiltlessness.

Be that as it may, while a testimony about a perfect chain is not always the standard because it is almost
always impossible to obtain, an unbroken chain of custody becomes indispensable and essential when the
item of real evidence is not distinctive and is not readily identifiable, or when its condition at the time of
testing or trial is critical, or when a witness has failed to observe its uniqueness. 43 The same standard
likewise obtains in case the evidence is susceptible to alteration, tampering, contamination 44 and even
substitution and exchange.45 In other words, the exhibit’s level of susceptibility to fungibility, alteration or
tampering—without regard to whether the same is advertent or otherwise not—dictates the level of
strictness in the application of the chain of custody rule.

A unique characteristic of narcotic substances is that they are not readily identifiable as in fact they are
subject to scientific analysis to determine their composition and nature. Hence, the risk of tampering, loss
or mistake with respect to an exhibit of this nature is greatest when the exhibit is small and is one that has
physical characteristics fungible in nature and similar in form to substances familiar to people in their daily
lives.46 The danger, according to Graham v. State,47 is real. In that case, a substance later analyzed as
heroin was excluded from the prosecution evidence because it was previously handled by two police officers
prior to examination who, however, did not testify in court on the condition and whereabouts of the exhibit
at the time it was in their possession. The court pointed out that the white powder seized could have been
indeed heroin or it could have been sugar or baking powder. It ruled that unless the state can show by
records or testimony the continuous whereabouts of the exhibit at least between the time it came into the
possession of police officers until it was tested in the laboratory to determine its composition, testimony of
the state as to the laboratory’s findings is inadmissible. 481awphi1.zw+

Indeed, the Court cannot reluctantly close its eyes to the likelihood, or at least the possibility, that at any
of the links in the chain of custody over a narcotic specimen there could have been tampering, alteration or
substitution of substances from other cases—by accident or otherwise—in which similar evidence was seized
or in which similar evidence was submitted for laboratory testing. Hence, in authenticating the same, a
standard more stringent than that applied to cases involving objects which are readily identifiable must be
applied, a more exacting standard that entails a chain of custody of the item with sufficient completeness if
only to render it improbable that the original item has either been exchanged with another or been
contaminated or tampered with.

Our drugs laws in fact establish reasonable safeguards for the protection of the identity and integrity of
narcotic substances and dangerous drugs seized and/or recovered from drug offenders. Section 2149 of R.A.
No. 9165 materially requires the apprehending team having initial custody and control of the drugs to,
immediately after seizure and confiscation, physically inventory and photograph the same in the presence
of the accused or the person/s from whom such items were confiscated and/or seized, or his/her
representative or counsel, a representative from the media and the Department of Justice, and any elected
public official who shall be required to sign the copies of the inventory and be given a copy thereof. The
same requirements are also found in Section 2150of its implementing rules51 as well as in Section 252 of the
Dangerous Drugs Board Regulation No. 1 series of 2002.53

The members of the arresting team in this case, however, do not seem to have complied with these
guidelines. The prosecution has not even shown that they had extended reasonable efforts to comply with
the statutory requirements in handling the evidence. From the testimonies of Tayaban and Eugenio, it is
clear that after the arrest of petitioners they immediately seized the plastic sachets, took custody thereof
and brought the same to the police station together with petitioners. It was at the police station—and not
at the place where the item was seized from appellant—where, according to Tayaban and Eugenio, the
unnamed police investigator had placed the markings on the specimens. What is more telling is the
admission made by Tayaban to the effect that the markings were placed on the plastic sachet in his presence
and not in the presence of petitioners as required by law.

These flaws in the conduct of the post-seizure custody of the dangerous drug allegedly recovered from
petitioners, taken together with the failure of the key persons who handled the same to testify on the
whereabouts of the exhibits before they were offered in evidence in court, militate against the prosecution’s
cause because they not only cast doubt on the identity of the corpus delicti but also tend to negate, if not
totally discredit, the claim of regularity in the conduct of official police operation advanced by the OSG.
Indeed, we cannot give much weight to the contention that the arresting officers in this case were not
trained to apprehend and arrest drug offenders, because as agents of the government in law enforcement
they are reasonably presumed to know the laws and the rules they are tasked to enforce.

We take this occasion to reiterate, albeit not needlessly, that the presumption of regularity in the
performance of official duty must be seen in the context of an existing rule of law or statute authorizing the
performance of an act or duty or prescribing a procedure in the performance thereof. The presumption, in
other words, obtains only where nothing in the records is suggestive of the fact that the law enforcers
involved deviated from the standard conduct of official duty as provided for in the law. 54 But where the
official act in question is irregular on its face, an adverse presumption arises as a matter of course.55

All told, in view of the deviation of the apprehending officers from the mandated conduct of taking post-
seizure custody of the dangerous drug in this case, there is no way to presume that the members thereof
had performed their duties regularly. And even assuming that we can confidently rely on the credibility of
the prosecution witnesses in this case, the evidence would still fall short of satisfying the quantum of
evidence required to arrive at a finding of guilt beyond reasonable doubt because the evidence chain failed
to conclusively connect petitioners with the seized drugs in a way that would establish that the specimens
are one and the same as that seized in the first place and offered in court as evidence.

In Mallillin v. People,56 People v. Obmiranis57 and People v. Garcia,58 we declared that the failure of the
prosecution to offer the testimony of key witnesses to establish a sufficiently complete chain of custody of
a specimen of shabu, and the irregularity which characterized the handling of the evidence before the same
was finally offered in court, fatally conflict with every proposition relative to the culpability of the accused.
It is this same reason that now moves us to reverse the judgment of conviction in the present case.

WHEREFORE, the Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 29867 dated 13 March 2007, affirming
the joint decision of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 103 in Criminal Case Nos. Q-03-118301
and Q-03-118302 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Petitioners Ronald Carino y Asunzion and Rosana Andes y
Nobelo are ACQUITTED on reasonable doubt and are accordingly ordered immediately released from custody
unless they are lawfully held for another offense.

The Director of the Bureau of Corrections is directed to implement this Decision and to report to this Court
the action taken hereon within five (5) days from receipt. SO ORDERED.
 THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, G.R. No. 174198
Plaintiff-Appellee,

- versus -

Promulgated:

ZAIDA KAMAD y AMBING, January 19, 2010

Accused-Appellant.

x----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
--------- x
DECISION

BRION, J.:

We review the decision[1] of the Court of Appeals[2] (CA) in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 00505 which

affirmed in toto the decision[3] of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 259, Paraaque City[4] in Criminal

Case Nos. 02-1236-7 finding Zaida[5] Kamad y Ambing (accused-appellant) guilty beyond reasonable doubt

of illegal sale of shabu under Section 5, Article II of Republic Act No. 9165 (RA 9165) or the Comprehensive

Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002.

Along with her boyfriend Leo Ramirez y Acosta (Leo) who was charged for illegal possession

of shabu, the accused-appellant was charged under an Information[6] that reads:

The above-named accused, not being lawfully authorized to possess or otherwise use any
dangerous drug and without the corresponding license or prescription, did then and there
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously give away, distribute and sell to a customer for P300.00
pesos one (1) small heat sealed transparent plastic sachet containing crystalline substance
(shabu) weighing 0.20 gram, which when examined were found positive for
Methamphetamine Hydrochloride (shabu), a dangerous drug, in violation of the above-cited
law.

CONTRARY TO LAW.

The accused-appellant pleaded not guilty on arraignment. Trial on the merits thereafter ensued.

The prosecutions version of events is summarized below.

On October 16, 2002, the Philippine National Police (PNP) Drug Enforcement Unit of the Southern

Police District, Fort Bonifacio, Taguig (Taguig police) received information from an asset that a certain Zaida

was engaged in the illegal sale of shabu at Purok IV, Silverio Compound in Paraaque City. The Taguig police

formed a buy-bust team composed of P/Insp. Antonio Parillas,[7] PO3 Christopher Maulit[8] (PO3 Maulit), PO1

Manfoste,[9] SPO2 Arthur Velasco, and SPO2 Ernesto Sanchez[10] (SPO2 Sanchez), as members. SPO2

Sanchez acted as poseur-buyer and received three (3) one hundred peso bills for use as marked money.
 After surveillance of the area, the buy-bust team and their asset proceeded at around 10:00

p.m. of October 16, 2002 to the target area where they immediately saw the accused-appellant and Leo.

The asset and SPO2 Sanchez approached the two while the rest of the buy-bust team watched from a

distance. The asset introduced SPO2 Sanchez as a buyer of shabu and the accused-appellant asked him

how much he would buy. SPO2 Sanchez asked for P300.00 worth of shabu and gave the marked money;

the accused-appellant thereafter handed him a plastic sachet containing a substance suspected to

be shabu. SPO2 Sanchez lighted a cigarette to give the pre-arranged signal for the buy-bust team to

approach. SPO2 Sanchez arrested the accused-appellant and recovered from her the P300.00 marked

money. The buy-bust team arrested Leo who was found in possession of one (1) plastic sachet also

suspected to contain shabu.

The buy-bust team took the accused-appellant and Leo and the recovered plastic sachets to their

office for investigation. The recovered plastic sachets, marked as ES-1-161009 and ES-2-161002, were then

brought to the PNP Crime Laboratory for qualitative examination; the tests yielded positive results

for methamphetamine hydrochloride.[11]

The defense expectedly presented a different version of events.

The accused-appellant[12] denied the charge and claimed that she and Leo were framed-up. At

around 2:30 p.m. of October 16, 2002, the accused-appellant and Leo went to Leos cousins house. Since

Leos cousin was not yet at home, she and Leo waited. After waiting for an hour, four (4) men wearing

civilian clothes and carrying firearms entered the house and introduced themselves as police officers. The

accused-appellant and Leo were frisked, but nothing was found in their possession. The police officers asked

the accused-appellant where she kept the shabu; she replied that she was not selling shabu. Afterwards,

she and Leo were taken to the police headquarters where they were again frisked and asked the same

question to which they gave the same response. The police detained Leo and the accused-appellant for

about a day and later brought them to the Prosecutors Office for inquest without showing them any shabu.

THE RTC RULING

After consideration of the evidence, the RTC decreed:

WHEREFORE, PREMISES CONSIDERED, finding both accused GUILTY beyond

reasonable doubt, this Court hereby sentences Zaida Kamad to life imprisonment and to pay
a fine of P500,000.00 for Violation of Section 5, Art. II, RA 9165 SO ORDERED.[13]

The accused-appellant appealed the RTC decision to the CA, attacking the RTCs reliance on the

presumption of regularity that the RTC found to have attended the conduct of the buy-bust operation by the

police. She argued that no presumption of regularity could arise considering that the police violated
NAPOLCOM rules by using an asset; the rules prohibit the deputation of private persons as PNP civilian

agents.[14] The accused-appellant also pointed out the material inconsistencies in the testimony of the

prosecution witnesses that cast doubt on their credibility, namely: (a) the uncertainty of SPO2 Sanchez

regarding the time the buy-bust team was dispatched to the target area; (b) the confusion of PO3 Maulit on

the identity of the team leader of the buy-bust team; (c) the admitted mistake of PO3 Maulit that only the

recovered plastic sachet was marked ES (standing for the initials of SPO2 Sanchez), while the marked money

was marked MF (standing for the initials of P/Insp. Mariano F. Fegarido as commanding officer); and (d) the

contradictory statements of PO3 Maulit who testified that it was Leo who sold the shabu and that of SPO2

Sanchez who testified that it was the accused-appellant who sold him the shabu.

THE CA RULING

The CA rejected the defense arguments and affirmed in toto the RTC findings. The CA ruled that the

prosecution satisfactorily established the accused-appellants guilt based on the positive testimony of SPO2

Sanchez on the conduct of the buy-bust operation; his testimony bore badges of truth. Accordingly, the CA

found the accused-appellants uncorroborated denial undeserving of any weight. The CA brushed aside as a

minor inconsistency the uncertainty in the testimony of SPO2 Sanchez on the time the buy-bust operation

took place. The CA also brushed aside the violation of the NAPOLCOM rules on the ground that the accused-

appellant was arrested in flagrante delicto for illegal sale of shabu committed in the presence of the

prosecution witnesses who were police officers. Moreover, the CA held that the use of assets to aid police

officers in buy-bust operations has been judicially recognized. The CA found that while the asset brokered

the shabu transaction, he had no role in the apprehension of the accused-appellant and in the search and

seizure of the shabu from the accused-appellant.

THE ISSUE

The only issue in this case is whether the accused-appellant is guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violation

of Section 5, Article II of RA 9165 for the illegal sale of 0.20 gram of shabu.

THE COURTS RULING

We draw attention at the outset to the unique nature of an appeal in a criminal case; the appeal throws the

whole case open for review and it is the duty of the appellate court to correct, cite and appreciate errors in

the appealed judgment whether they are assigned or unassigned.[15] We find the present appeal meritorious

on the basis of such review.

 As a general rule, the trial court's findings of fact, especially when affirmed by the CA, are entitled

to great weight and will not be disturbed on appeal. This rule, however, admits of exceptions and does not

apply where facts of weight and substance with direct and material bearing on the final outcome of the case

have been overlooked, misapprehended or misapplied.[16] After due consideration of the records of this case,

the evidence adduced, and the applicable law and jurisprudence, we hold that a deviation from the general

rule is warranted.

In a prosecution for illegal sale of dangerous drugs, the following elements must be duly established:

(1) proof that the transaction or sale took place; and (2) the presentation in court of the corpus delictior

the illicit drug as evidence.[17] Proof of the corpus delicti in a buy-bust situation requires evidence, not only

that the transacted drugs actually exist, but evidence as well that the drugs seized and examined are the

same drugs presented in court. This is a condition sine qua non for conviction as the drugs are the main

subject of the illegal sale constituting the crime and their existence and identification must be proven for

the crime to exist. As we discuss below, the special characteristics of prohibited drugs necessitate their strict

identification by the prosecution.[18]

Our examination of the records shows that while the prosecution established through the testimony

of SPO2 Sanchez that the sale of the prohibited drug by the accused-appellant took place, we find that both

the RTC and the CA failed to consider the following infirmities in the prosecutions case: (1) the serious

lapses in the RA 9165 procedure committed by the buy-bust team in handling the seized shabu; and (2) the

failure of the police to comply with the chain of custody rule in handling the seized shabu, resulting in the

prosecutions failure to properly identify the shabu offered in court as the same shabu seized from the

accused-appellant on October 16, 2002.

Non-compliance with the prescribed procedure under Section 21, Article II of RA 9165

In People v. Garcia,[19] we emphasized the prosecutions duty to adduce evidence proving compliance

by the buy-bust team with the prescribed procedure laid down under paragraph 1, Section 21, Article II

of RA 9165. This provision reads:

1) The apprehending team having initial custody and control of the drugs shall,
immediately after seizure and confiscation, physically inventory and photograph the
same in the presence of the accused or the person/s from whom such items were
confiscated and/or seized, or his/her representative or counsel, a representative
from the media and the Department of Justice (DOJ), and any elected public
official who shall be required to sign the copies of the inventory and be given a
copy thereof. [emphasis supplied]

The Implementing Rules and Regulations of RA 9165 under its Section 21(a) provides further details on how

RA 9165 is to be applied, and provides too for a saving mechanism in case no strict compliance with the

requirements took place. Section 21(a) states:

(a) The apprehending office/team having initial custody and control of the drugs shall,
immediately after seizure and confiscation, physically inventory and photograph the same in
the presence of the accused or the person/s from whom such items were confiscated and/or
seized, or his/her representative or counsel, a representative from the media and the
 Department of Justice (DOJ), and any elected public official who shall be required to sign the
copies of the inventory and be given a copy thereof: Provided, further that non-
compliance with these requirements under justifiable grounds, as long as the
integrity and the evidentiary value of the seized items are properly preserved by the
apprehending officer/team, shall not render void and invalid such seizures of and
custody over said items.[Emphasis supplied.]

Strict compliance with the prescribed procedure is required because of the illegal drugs unique

characteristic rendering it indistinct, not readily identifiable, and easily open to tampering, alteration or

substitution either by accident or otherwise.[20] Hence, the rules on the measures to be observed during and

after the seizure, during the custody and transfer of the drugs for examination, and at all times up to their

presentation in court.

In this case, SPO2 Sanchez testified on the seizure and the handling of the seized shabu. The records

show that his testimony and the identification he made in court constitute the totality of the prosecutions

evidence on how the police handled and preserved the integrity of the seized shabu. Significantly, SPO2

Sanchez merely stated in his testimony that:

Q: What else transpired when Zaida gave something to you and you, being the poseur buyer,
gave the money to Zaida?

A: We brought them to our office.

xxxx

Q: What did you do with those plastic sachets containing white crystalline substance?

A: We brought them to the SPD Crime Lab for examination.[21]

Thus, he failed to provide specific details on how the seized shabu was marked although the evidence

shows that the shabu was marked as ES-1-161009 before it was sent to a forensic laboratory. His testimony

also failed to state whether the marking of the shabu was done immediately after its seizure (as Section 21

of RA 9165 requires) or during the investigation. His testimony likewise failed to disclose if a physical

inventory and photography of the seized items had taken place, or if they had, whether these were

undertaken in the presence of the accused or his counsel, or a representative from the media and the

Department of Justice, and of an elective official.

In sum, his testimony failed to show how the integrity and evidentiary value of the item

seized had been preserved; no explanation was ever given by SPO2 Sanchez to justify the non-

compliance by the buy-bust team with the prescribed procedures. In fact, the records clearly

reveal that the prosecution did not even acknowledge the procedural lapses committed by the

buy-bust team in the handling of the seized shabu.

 The consequences of the above omissions must necessarily be grave for the prosecution under the

rule that penal laws, such as RA 9165, are strictly construed against the government and liberally in favor

of the accused.[22] One consequence is to produce doubts on the origins of the illegal drug presented in

court,[23] thus leading to the prosecutions failure to establish the corpus delicti.[24] Unless excused by the

saving mechanism, the acquittal of the accused must follow.

The non-compliance with the chain of custody rule

Separately from Section 21 violations, we also find the prosecution fatally remiss in establishing an

unbroken link in the chain of custody of the seized shabu; its evidence is simply incomplete in establishing

the necessary links in the handling of the seized prohibited drug from the time of its seizure until its

presentation in court.

In Mallillin v. People,[25] we explained the chain of custody rule and what constitutes sufficient

compliance with this rule:

As a method of authenticating evidence, the chain of custody rule requires that the
admission of an exhibit be preceded by evidence sufficient to support a finding that the matter
in question is what the proponent claims it to be. It would include testimony about every
link in the chain, from the moment the item was picked up to the time it is offered
into evidence, in such a way that every person who touched the exhibit would
describe how and from whom it was received, where it was and what happened to
it while in the witnesses' possession, the condition in which it was received and the
condition in which it was delivered to the next link in the chain. These witnesses
would then describe the precautions taken to ensure that there had been no change
in the condition of the item and no opportunity for someone not in the chain to have
possession of the same. [emphasis supplied][26]

We applied this ruling in People v. Garcia,[27] People v. Gum-Oyen,[28] People v.

Denoman[29] and People v. Coreche[30] where we recognized the following links that must be established in

the chain of custody in a buy-bust situation: first, the seizure and marking, if practicable, of the illegal drug

recovered from the accused by the apprehending officer; second, the turnover of the illegal drug seized by

the apprehending officer to the investigating officer; third, the turnover by the investigating officer of the

illegal drug to the forensic chemist for laboratory examination; and fourth, the turnover and submission of

the marked illegal drug seized from the forensic chemist to the court.

(a) The first link in the chain of custody

We observe that SPO2 Sanchez testimony lacks specifics on how the seized shabu was handled

immediately after the accused-appellants arrest. Although the records show that SPO2 Sanchez testified

that he actually seized the shabu when he arrested the accused-appellant, he never disclosed the identity

of the person/s who had custody and possession of the shabu after its seizure, nor that he retained

possession of the shabu from the place of the arrest until they reached the police station.
 SPO2 Sanchez also failed to state the time and place as well as the identity of the person/s who

made the markings on the two (2) plastic sachets containing the recovered shabu seized from the accused-

appellant and Leo on October 16, 2002.

(b) The second link in the chain of custody

We also observe that SPO2 Sanchez testimony regarding the post-arrest police investigation failed

to provide particulars on whether the shabu was turned over to the investigator. The records only identify

the name of the investigator as one SPO1 Nuestro before whom SPO2 Sanchez and PO3 Maulit executed

a Joint Affidavit of Arrest dated October 17, 2002.[31] Thus, a big gap exists on who had custody and

possession of the shabu prior to, during and immediately after the police investigation, and how

the shabu was stored, preserved, labeled and recorded from the time of its seizure up to its receipt by

the forensic laboratory.

(c) The third link in the chain of custody

The third link in the chain is represented by two (2) pieces of documentary evidence adduced by the

prosecution consisting of the letter-request dated October 17, 2002[32] of Police Superintendent Mariano F.

Fegarido as Chief of the Southern Police District Drug Enforcement Group and the Physical Science Report

No. D-1502-02 prepared by Engr. Richard Allan B. Mangalip as the forensic chemist.[33]

These documents reveal that the recovered plastic sachets of shabu bearing the markings ES-1-

161002 and ES-2-161002 were sent to the forensic laboratory sealed in one (1) small brown envelope

bearing unidentified signatures. On the same day, the PNP Crime Laboratory received this letter-request

along with the submitted specimens. The specimens were then subjected to qualitative examination which

yielded positive for methylamphetamine hydrochloride.

These pieces of evidence notably fail to identify the person who personally brought the

seized shabu to the PNP Crime Laboratory. They also fail to clearly identify the person who received

the shabu at the forensic laboratory pursuant to the letter-request dated October 17, 2002, and who

exercised custody and possession of the shabu after it was examined and before it was presented in court.

Neither was there any evidence adduced showing how the seized shabu was handled, stored and

safeguarded pending its presentation in court.

(d) The fourth link in the chain of custody

The fourth link presents a very strange and unusual twist in the prosecutions evidence in this case.

Although the forensic chemist was presented in court, we find that his offered testimony related to a shabu

specimen other than that seized in the buy-bust operation of October 16, 2002. Specifically, his testimony

pertained to shabu seized by the police on October 12, 2002. This is borne by the following exchanges:
FISCAL UY: The testimony of the witness is being offered to prove . . . that he is the
one who cause [sic] the examination of the physical evidence subject of this case
containing with white crystalline substance placed inside the plastic sachet
weighing 0.20 grams and 0.30 grams with markings of EBC and EBC-1 that I reduced
findings after the examination conducted.

xxxx

Q And with the cause of the performance of your duties, were you able to receive a letter
request relevant to this case specifically a drug test request, dated October
12, 2002 from PS/Insp. Wilfredo Calderon. Do you have the letter request with you?

A Yes, sir.

Q The witness presented to this representation the letter request dated October 12, 2002 for
purposes of identification, respectfully request that it be marked in evidence as Exhibit
A. In this Exhibit A Mr. Officer, were you able to receive the evidence submitted
specifically a small brown stapled wire envelope with signature containing with
white crystalline substance inside and with markings EBC- 12/10/02 and EBC-
1 12/10/02. After you received this specimen what action did you take or do?

A Upon receiving, I read and understand the content of the letter request after which, I
stamped and marked the letter request and then record it on the logbook and after
recording it on the logbook, I performed the test for determination of the presence of
dangerous drug on the specimen.

Q Now, after those tests conducted what was the result of the examination?

A It gives positive result for Methamphetamine Hydrochloride or otherwise known as shabu,

a dangerous drug.

Q At this juncture your Honor, the witness handed with this representation a brown envelope
with markings D-1487-02, and the signature and the date 12 October 02, now Mr.
Witness tell us who placed these markings on this brown envelope?

A I am the one who personally made the markings, sir.

Q And in the face of this brown envelope there is a printed name PO1 Edwin Plopinio and the
signature and the date 12 October 2002. Do you know who placed who placed those
markings?

A I have no idea.

Q At this juncture your Honor, this representation proceeded to open the brown envelope.
May I respectfully request that this brown envelope be marked in evidence as Exhibit
B. And inside this brown envelope are three pieces of plastic sachets inside which are
white crystalline substance with markings EPC 12 October 02 and EPC-1 12 October
02. May I respectfully request that these plastic sachets with white substance inside be
marked in evidence as Exhibit B-1 and B-2. And in these plastic sachets with white
crystalline inside is a masking tape with the signature and letters are RAM, do you know
who placed those letters?

A I am the one who placed that markings sir.

 Q And what RAM stands for?

A That stands for my name Richard Allan Mangalip sir.

Q You mentioned that you reduced your findings in writing, do you have the official finding
with you?

A Yes, sir.

Q At this juncture the witness handed to this representation the physical science report
no. D-1487-2 for purposes of identification respectfully request that this specimen be
marked in evidence as Exhibit C. And in this Exhibit C, there is a signature above the
typewritten name Engineer Richard Allan B. Mangalip, do you whose signature is this
Mr. Witness? [34] [Emphasis supplied]

A That is my signature sir.

Q Respectfully request that the signature appearing in Exhibit C be marked in evidence as

Exhibit C-1. You stated earlier that you cause the weight of the white crystalline
substance in this plastic sachet, what the weights of this white crystalline substance?

A For the specimen A, it is .20 grams and the specimen B, it is .30 gram.

Q May I respectfully request that this weight indicated in this physical science report now
mark in evidence as Exhibit C-2. I have no further questions to the witness your Honor.

xxxx

Aside from the different dates of seizure, we note that the shabu identified and presented in court

as evidence through the testimony of the forensic chemist, showed characteristics distinct from

the shabu from the buy-bust sale of October 16, 2002:

First, there were different markings made on the plastic sachets of the shabu recovered on October

12, 2002. As testified to, one plastic sachet of shabu was marked, EBC 12 October 02, while the other plastic

sachet of shabu was marked, EBC-1 12 October 02;[35]

Second, there was a different sealed brown envelope used where a printed name and signature of

one PO1 Edwin Plopino and the date 12 October 2002 were written; [36]

Third, the examination of the shabu by the PNP Crime Laboratory was made pursuant to a different

letter-request for examination dated October 12, 2002 written by one P/Insp. Wilfredo Calderon;[37]and
 Fourth, the results of the shabu testified to by the forensic chemist in court was contained in a

different forensic laboratory report known as Physical Science Report No. D-1487-2.[38]

We highlight these characteristics because they are different from the documentary evidence the

prosecution formally offered[39] consisting of the letter-request dated October 17, 2002[40] and the Physical

Science Report No. D-1502-02.[41] The testimonies of SPO2 Sanchez and PO3 Maulit as well as the submitted

documentary evidence referred to the plastic sachets of shabu through their markings of ES-1-161002 and

ES-2-161002.[42]

From all these, we find it obvious that some mistake must have been made in the presentation of

the prosecutions evidence. The prosecution, however, left the discrepancies fully unexplained. To reiterate,

the forensic chemist testified to a specimen dated October 12, 2002, or one secured way before the buy-

bust of October 16, 2002, but marked as evidence documents relating to the specimen of October 16,

2002. Strangely, even the defense disregarded the discrepancies. In his comment on the offer of evidence,

the defense simply stated, among others, by way of stipulation, that the forensic chemical officer only

conducted a qualitative examination of the specimen he examined and not the quantitative

examination.[43] Coming immediately after the offer of evidence that mentioned the plastic sachets

containing white crystalline substances with markings ES-1 16/10/02 and ES-2 16/10/02, and the Physical

Science Report No. D-1502-02,[44] the defense was clearly sleeping on its feet when it reacted to the

prosecutions offer of evidence.

But the defense was not alone in glossing over the discrepancies between the testimony for the

prosecution and the offered evidence, as both the RTC and CA also failed to notice the glaring flaws in the

prosecutions evidence. Apparently, because the parties did not point out these discrepancies while the

appellate court did not closely review the records of the proceedings, the discrepancies were not taken into

account in the decision now under review.

These observations bring us full circle to our opening statement under the Courts ruling on the kind

and extent of review that an appellate court undertakes in a criminal case; the appeal opens the whole

case for review, with the appellate court charged with the duty to cite and appreciate the errors it may find

in the appealed judgment, whether these errors are assigned or unassigned. This is one such instance where

we are duty bound to rectify errors that, although unnoticed below and unassigned by the parties, are clearly

reflected in the records of the case.

The Conclusion

Given the flagrant procedural lapses the police committed in handling the seized shabu and the

obvious evidentiary gaps in the chain of its custody, a presumption of regularity in the performance of duties

cannot be made in this case. A presumption of regularity in the performance of official duty is made in the

context of an existing rule of law or statute authorizing the performance of an act or duty or prescribing a

procedure in the performance thereof. The presumption applies when nothing in the record suggests that

the law enforcers deviated from the standard conduct of official duty required by law; where the official act

is irregular on its face, the presumption cannot arise. [45] In light of the flagrant lapses we noted, the lower

courts were obviously wrong when they relied on the presumption of regularity in the performance of official

duty.

We rule, too, that the discrepancy in the prosecution evidence on the identity of the seized and

examined shabu and that formally offered in court cannot but lead to serious doubts regarding the origins

of the shabu presented in court. This discrepancy and the gap in the chain of custody immediately affect

proof of the corpus delicti without which the accused must be acquitted.

From the constitutional law point of view, the prosecutions failure to establish with moral certainty all

the elements of the crime and to identify the accused as the perpetrator signify that it failed to overturn the

constitutional presumption of innocence that every accused enjoys in a criminal prosecution. When this

happens, as in this case, the courts need not even consider the case for the defense in deciding the case; a

ruling for acquittal must forthwith issue.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, we hereby REVERSE and SET ASIDE the March 28, 2006
decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 00505 affirming the decision of conviction dated
October 27, 2004 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 259, Paraaque City in Criminal Case Nos. 02-1236-7
for illegal sale of shabu under Section 5, Article II of Republic Act No. 9165. Accused-appellant ZAIDA
KAMAD y AMBING is hereby declared ACQUITTED and ordered immediately RELEASED from detention,
unless she is confined for any other lawful cause.

The Director of the Bureau of Corrections is DIRECTED to IMPLEMENT this Decision and to report to this
Court the action taken hereon within five (5) days from receipt. SO ORDERED.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, G.R. No. 186497
Plaintiff-Appellee,

Promulgated:
- versus - September 17, 2009

HASANADDIN GUIARA y BANSIL,

Accused-Appellant.

.
x-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x

DECISION

VELASCO, JR., J.:

The Case

This is an appeal from the September 19, 2008 Decision [1] of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R.
CR-H.C. No. 02958 entitled People of the Philippines v. Hasanaddin Guiara y Bansil which affirmed the July
18, 2007 Joint Decision[2] of Branch 267 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Pasig City in Criminal Case Nos.
14272-D-TG and 14273-D-TG, finding accused-appellant Hasanaddin Guiara y Bansil guilty of violations of
Sections 5 and 11, Article II of Republic Act No. (RA) 9165 or the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of
2002.

The Facts

The charge against the accused-appellant stemmed from the following Information:

Criminal Case No. 14272-D-TG

(Violation of Section 5 [Sale], Article II of R.A. 9165)

That on or about the 24 th day of August, 2005, in the City of Taguig, Philippines and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, did, then and there
willfully, unlawfully and knowingly sell, deliver and give away to PO2 Rolly B. Concepcion,
who acted as poseur-buyer, a total of 0.17 gram of white crystalline substance, which
substance was found positive to the test for Methamphetamine Hydrochloride, also known as
Shabu, a dangerous drug.

Contrary to law.[3]

Criminal Case No. 14273-D-TG

(Violation of Section 11 [Possession], Article II of R.A. 9165)

That on or about the 24th day of August, 2005, in the City of Taguig, Philippines and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, without being
authorized by law to possess any dangerous drug, did, then and there willfully, unlawfully and
knowingly possesses and under his custody and control .23 gram of white crystalline
substance contained in one (1) heat sealed transparent plastic sachet, which substance was
found positive to the test for Methamphetamine Hydrochloride, also known as Shabu, a
dangerous drug, in violation of the above-cited law.

Contrary to law.[4]

On November 29, 2005, accused-appellant was arraigned and entered a plea of not guilty to the
charges against him.
 At the pre-trial conference, the prosecution and the defense stipulated on: (1) the identity of
accused-appellant; (2) the jurisdiction of the trial court over the person of accused-appellant and the subject
matter of the cases; (3) the date, place, and fact of the arrest; (4) the authority of the police officers as
members of the Station Anti-Illegal Drugs-Special Operations Task Force (SAID-SOTF) of the Taguig City
Police Station; (5) the existence of the subject specimens; (6) the fact that a request has been made by
the arresting officers for the examination of the confiscated items; (7) the fact that the Forensic Chemist,
Police Senior Inspector Maridel Rodis, examined the specimens and issued a laboratory report thereon; (8)
the fact that the examining forensic chemist had no knowledge from whom the alleged specimens were
taken; and (9) the fact that the subject specimens tested positive for methylamphetamine hydrochloride.
Hence, after the stipulations were made, the testimony of the Forensic Chemist was dispensed with.

Thereafter, trial on the merits ensued.

During the trial, the prosecution presented as their witnesses PO2 Rolly B. Concepcion and PO2
Ronnie L. Fabroa. On the other hand, the defense presented as its witnesses accused-appellant, Normina
Piang, and Abdul Pattah.

Version of the Prosecution

The facts, according to the prosecution, are as follows:

On August 24, 2005, at about 3 oclock in the afternoon, a confidential informant arrived at the Taguig
City Police Station and reported the illegal drug peddling activities of one alias Mads on Zamboanga
Street, Maharlika Village, Taguig City. Accordingly, the information was relayed to their Chief P/Insp.
Ronaldo Pamor who then conducted a briefing.

During the briefing, PO2 Rolly B. Concepcion was designated as the poseur-buyer. He was given a
five hundred peso (PhP 500) bill, which he marked with his initials, RBC, and photocopied for record
purposes, to be used as the buy-bust money during the entrapment.

After making the necessary coordination with the Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency, the police
team, which was composed of P/Insp. Pamor, PO2 Concepcion, PO3 Arnulfo Vicua, PO3 Danilo Arago, PO3
Santiago Cordova, PO3 Felipe Metrillo, PO2 Ronnie L. Fabroa, PO2 Remegio Aguinaldo, PO3 Antonio Reyes,
and SPO1 Angelito Galang, with the informant, proceeded to their target area. Upon arriving at the target
area, the team members positioned themselves strategically to observe the transaction, while PO2
Concepcion and the informant proceeded to the location of the shabu peddler where the informant
introduced PO2 Concepcion to alias Mads. He told Mads that his friend wanted to buy PhP 500 worth
of shabu. Mads then replied, Limang-daang piso lang ba? Meron pa ako dito. He then pulled out two (2)
plastic sachets containing white crystalline substance and gave the smaller packet to PO2 Concepcion. In
turn, PO2 Concepcion gave the marked money to Mads. Thereafter, Mads handed a plastic sachet
containing shabu to PO2 Concepcion, who upon receiving the same, executed the pre-arranged signal, by
removing his ballcap, signifying that the transaction was already consummated. This prompted his team to
rush to their position to assist in the arrest.
 After the apprehension of Mads, who was later identified as accused-appellant, the buy-bust money
was recovered from the possession of accused-appellant, as well as another plastic sachet containing shabu.
PO2 Concepcion then marked the confiscated pieces of evidence for future identification purposes. After
marking, accused-appellant was brought to the police station.

Upon arrival at the police station, PO2 Concepcion turned over the confiscated items to the police
investigator for the preparation of the necessary request for examination at the crime laboratory.
Subsequently, the specimens subject of the buy-bust operation were forwarded to the Philippine National
Police (PNP) Crime Laboratory in Camp Crame, Quezon City. Police Senior Inspector Maridel C. Rodis,
Forensic Chemical Officer conducted a qualitative examination on the said specimens. The specimens gave
positive result to the tests for Methamphetamine Hydrochloride, a dangerous drug. He issued Chemistry
Report No. D-959-05 dated August 25, 2005, which showed the following results:

SPECIMEN SUBMITTED:
Two (2) heat-sealed transparent plastic sachets each containing white crystalline substance
having the following markings and net weights:
A (HBG-1 8-24-05) 0.17 gram
B (HBG-2 8-24-05) 0.23 gram
xxxx
PURPOSE OF LABORATORY EXAMINATION:
To determine the presence of any dangerous drugs. x x x
FINDINGS:
Qualitative examination conducted on specimen A and B gave POSITIVE result to the tests for
Methylamphetamine Hydrochloride, a dangerous drug.
xxxx
CONCLUSION:
Specimen A and B contain Methylamphetamine Hydrochloride, a dangerous drug.[5] x x x

Version of the Defense

On the other hand, accused-appellant interposed the defenses of denial and frame-up.

He recounted that on August 24, 2005, at around 2:30 in the afternoon, while he was on his way to
a billiard hall, a white motor vehicle suddenly stopped in front of him on Zamboanga
Street, MaharlikaVillage, Taguig City. Immediately, three armed men with guns went out of the vehicle and
approached him. After they introduced themselves as policemen, they held him and forced him to get inside
their vehicle. He was then taken to the SAID-SOTF office at the Taguig police station.

While at the police station, accused-appellant inquired as to the reason why he was being detained.
The police officers did not respond, instead they told him to call his parents or relatives and to tell them that
he was caught by the police. PO2 Concepcion extorted him and told him to produce PhP 20,000 or else they
would file a case against him for violation of the dangerous drugs law.

After having failed to produce the amount that the police were asking, accused-appellant was taken
to the PNP Crime Laboratory in Camp Crame for drug testing. He was then taken back to Taguig Cityand
presented for inquest.
 The testimony of accused-appellant was corroborated by the testimonies of Normina Piang and Abdul
Pattah to the extent of the manner in which the arrest of the accused-appellant was made by the police.

Ruling of the Trial Court

After trial, the RTC convicted accused-appellant. The dispositive portion of the Joint Decision reads:

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing considerations, the Court finds accused

HASANADDIN GUIARA y Bansil in Criminal Case No. 14272-D-TG for Violation of Section 5,
1st paragraph, Article II of Republic Act No. 9165, otherwise known as The Comprehensive
Drugs Act of 2002, GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt. Hence, accused Hasanaddin Guiara y
Bansil is hereby sentenced to suffer LIFE IMPRISONMENT and ordered to pay a fine of FIVE
HUNDRED THOUSAND PESOS (PhP500,000.00).
Moreover, accused HASANADDIN GUIARA y Bansil is also found GUILTY beyond
reasonable doubt in Criminal Case No. 14273-D-TG for Violation of Section 11, 2nd paragraph,
No. 3 Article II of Republic Act No. 9165, otherwise known as The Comprehensive Drugs Act
of 2002. And since the quantity of methylamphetamine hydrochloride (shabu) found in the
possession of the accused is only .23 gram, accused Hasanaddin Guiara y Bansil is hereby
sentenced to suffer imprisonment ranging from TWELVE (12) YEARS and ONE (1) DAY as
minimum -to- FOURTEEN (14) YEARS and TWENTY ONE (21) DAYS as maximum. Accused
Hasanaddin Guiara y Bansil is further penalized to pay a fine in the amount of THREE
HUNDRED THOUSAND PESOS (PhP300,000.00).
Accordingly, the Jail Warden of Taguig city Jail where accused Hasanaddin Guiara y
Bansil is presently detained is hereby ordered to forthwith commit the person of convicted
Hasanaddin Guiara y Bansil to the New Bilibid Prisons (NBP), Bureau of Corrections
in Muntinlupa City, Metro Manila.
Upon the other hand, the shabu contained in two (2) heat-sealed transparent plastic
sachets with a total weight of 0.40 gram which are the subject matter of the above-captioned
cases, are hereby ordered transmitted and/or submitted to the custody of the Philippine Drug
Enforcement Agency (PDEA) subject and/or pursuant to existing Rules and Regulations
promulgated thereto for its proper disposition.
Costs de oficio.
SO ORDERED.[6]

On appeal to the CA, accused-appellant disputed the lower courts decision finding him guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime charged. He raised the issue that the police officers failed to conduct a
legitimate and valid buy-bust operation. He also questioned whether the chain of custody of
the shabu allegedly recovered from him was properly established arguing that the police officers failed to
follow the established rules governing custodial procedures in drug cases without any justification for doing
so.

Ruling of the Appellate Court

On September 19, 2008, the CA affirmed the judgment of the lower court. It ruled that all the
elements of the crimes charged were aptly established by the prosecution, including the chain of custody,
to wit:

The foregoing testimony indubitably shows that a transaction involving shabu between
appellant and the poseur-buyer actually took place. This is important because in prosecutions
involving illegal sale of dangerous drugs, what is material is the proof that the transaction or
sale actually took place, coupled with the presentation in court of the corpus delicti as
evidence. The corpus delicti in this case was sufficiently established with the presentation of
the specimen HBG-1 in court and the Chemistry Report No. D-959-05 which clearly states
that the contents thereof were shabu.
xxxx
 In the case at bar, appellant was caught in actual possession of prohibited drugs
without any showing that he was duly authorized by law to possess the same. Having been
caught in flagrante delicto, there is, therefore a prima facie evidence of animus possidendi on
appellants part.
xxxx
On this aspect, [w]e find that the chain of custody of the seized substance was not
broken and that the prosecution was able to properly identify the same. The confiscated items
were marked by PO2 Concepcion immediately after he arrested appellant. Moreover, said
marked items were the same items which were submitted to the PNP Crime Laboratory for
analysis and examination, and which was later on found to be positive for shabu.[7]

The CA also dismissed the allegation of frame-up saying that the defense failed to establish any
ulterior motive on the part of the arresting officers in deviation from the legitimate performance of their
duties.

The dispositive portion of the CA Decision reads:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Joint Decision of

the Regional Trial Court of Pasig City, Branch 267, in Criminal Case Nos. 14272-D-TG &
14273-D-TG, promulgated on July 18, 2007, finding accused-appellant guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of violating Secs. 5 and 11, Art. II of Republic Act No. 9165 (Comprehensive
Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002), as amended, is hereby AFFIRMED and UPHELD.
With costs against the accused-appellant.
SO ORDERED.[8]

Accused-appellant filed a timely notice of appeal of the CA Decision.

The Issue

WHETHER OR NOT THE EVIDENCE ADDUCED BY THE PROSECUTION IS SUFFICIENT TO

ESTABLISH THE GUILT OF THE ACCUSED BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT

Our Ruling

We sustain accused-appellants conviction.

Buy-Bust Operation was Legitimate and Valid

Accused-appellant attacks the credibility of the police officers who conducted the buy-bust operation.
He argues that the contradictory testimonies of the police show that no buy-bust operation was actually
carried out and that it was merely fabricated or concocted by the police officers to maliciously charge
accused-appellant.

We disagree.
 In our jurisprudence, a buy-bust operation is a recognized means of entrapment using such ways
and means devised by peace officers for the purpose of trapping or capturing a lawbreaker. [9] It is legal and
has been proved to be an effective method of apprehending drug peddlers, provided due regard to
constitutional and legal safeguards is undertaken.[10]

In the prosecution of illegal sale of shabu, the essential elements have to be established, to wit: (1)
the identity of the buyer and the seller, the object of the sale and the consideration; and (2) the delivery of
the thing sold and the payment therefor.[11] What is material is the proof that the transaction or sale actually
took place, coupled with the presentation in court of the corpus delicti as evidence. The delivery of the illicit
drug to the poseur-buyer and the receipt by the seller of the marked money successfully consummate the
buy-bust transaction.

In the instant case, the prosecution was able to establish these elements beyond moral
certainty. Accused-appellant sold and delivered the shabu for PhP 500 to PO2 Concepcion posing as buyer;
the said drug was seized and identified as a prohibited drug and subsequently presented in evidence; there
was actual exchange of the marked money and contraband; and finally, accused-appellant was fully aware
that he was selling and delivering a prohibited drug. In fact, PO2 Concepcion testified thus:

PROSEC. SANTOS: What time did your team arrive at Maharlika?

A: 5:45 p.m., sir.
PROSEC. SANTOS: In what particular place in Maharlika did your team go?
A: At Zamboanga Street, Maharlika Village, Taguig City.
PROSEC. SANTOS: Upon arrival thereat, tell us what[,] if any[,] did you observe or see?
A: Upon arrival, sir, we walk towards the basketball court together with the confidential
informant and readily saw alias mads, sir.
PROSEC. SANTOS: So, your confidential informant readily saw alias mads?
A: Yes, sir.
PROSEC. SANTOS: After that, when you[r] CI saw this mads, what did you do?
A: He talked to alias mads and he introduced me as [a] buyer of shabu.
PROSEC. SANTOS: Will you please repeat to us if possible[,] in verbatim[,] what your
informant told alias mads about you?
A: They talked, sir, and he told him that Im his friend and Im going to buy shabu worth five
hundred pesos and alias mads uttered limang-daang piso lang ba?
Meron pa ko dito.
PROSEC. SANTOS: Now, after that exchange [of] words, limang-daan piso lang ba? Meron pa
ko dito, what happened, Officer?
A: He asked for the five hundred pesos and he brought out two (2) plastic sachets, he chooses
[one] and [gives] me the plastic sachet with a lesser contents.
PROSEC. SANTOS: And how many sachets did this alias mads give you during that time?
A: Only one (1) plastic sachet, sir.
PROSEC. SANTOS: So, after that exchange of that money and commodity has already taken
place, what if any did you do then?
A: I gave the pre-arrange and I saw the immediate approach of PO2 Ronnie Fabroa, sir.
PROSEC. SANTOS: And what happened?
A: We arrested alias mads and I ask for his personal circumstances and I told him to bring
out the contents of his pockets.
PROSEC. SANTOS: Did this alias mads obey your instructions to bring out the contents of his
pockets?
A: Yes, sir, and I recovered the buy-bust money and another plastic sachet containing
suspected shabu.[12]
 The foregoing testimony indubitably shows that a transaction involving shabu actually took place
between accused-appellant and the poseur-buyer. What is more, the corpus delicti in this case was
sufficiently established with the presentation of the specimen HBG-1 in court and Chemistry Report No. D-
959-05 which clearly states that the contents were shabu.

Likewise, the foregoing testimony also establishes that accused-appellant was indeed found in
possession of illegal drugs aside from what he sold to the poseur-buyer, without showing that accused-
appellant had any authority to possess them.

On the other hand, in the prosecution for illegal possession of dangerous drugs, the following
elements must be proved with moral certainty: (1) that the accused is in possession of the object identified
as a prohibited or regulatory drug; (2) that such possession is not authorized by law; and (3) that the
accused freely and consciously possessed the said drug.[13]

It bears stressing that this crime is mala prohibita, and as such, criminal intent is not an essential
element. Further, possession, under the law, includes not only actual possession, but also constructive
possession. Actual possession exists when the drug is in the immediate physical possession or control of the
accused. Constructive possession, on the other hand, exists when the drug is under the dominion and control
of the accused or when he has the right to exercise dominion and control over the place where it is found. [14]

Also, the prosecution must prove that the accused had animus possidendi or the intent to possess
the drugs. In U.S. v. Bandoc,[15] the Court ruled that the finding of a dangerous drug in the house or within
the premises of the house of the accused is prima facie evidence of knowledge or animus possidendi and is
enough to convict in the absence of a satisfactory explanation.[16]

In the case at bar, accused-appellant was caught in actual possession of prohibited drugs without
any showing that he was duly authorized by law to possess the same. Having been caught in flagrante
delicto, there is, therefore, a prima facie evidence of animus possidendi on accused-appellants part.

As a matter of fact, the trial court, in disposing the case, said:

The substance of the prosecutions evidence is to the effect that accused Hasanaddin
Guiara y Bansil was arrested by the police because of the existence of the shabu he sold to
PO2 Rolly B. Concepcion as well as the recovery of the buy-bust money from his possession,
and the presence of another plastic sachet containing shabu that was also recovered from his
person.

To emphasize, the prosecution witnesses in the person of PO2 Rolly B. Concepcion and
PO2 Ronnie L. Fabroa positively identified accused Hasanaddin Guiara y Bansil as the person
they apprehended on August 24, 2005 at Zamboanga Street, Maharlika Village, Taguig City.
[They] arrested accused Hasanaddin B. Guiara because their team was able to
procure shabu from him during the buy-bust operation they purposely conducted against the
aforementioned accused.

The buy-bust money recovered by the arresting officers from the possession of the
accused Hasanaddin Guiara y Bansil as well as the shabu they were able to purchase from
the accused sufficiently constitute as the very corpus delicti of the crime of Violation of Section
5, 1st paragraph, Article II of Republic Act No. 9165, and the other plastic sachet
containing shabu that was recovered from the accused Guiara similarly constitute as
the corpus delicti of the crime of Violation of Section 11, 2 nd paragraph, No. 3, Article II of
Republic Act No. 9165.[17] x x x
 Clearly, the trial court found that the testimonies of both PO2 Concepcion and PO2 Ronnie L. Fabroa
established the existence of a valid and legitimate buy-bust operation and all the essential elements of the
crimes charged against accused-appellant.

Furthermore, contrary to accused-appellants contentions, the minor inconsistencies in the testimonies of

the police officers are too insufficient or insubstantial to overturn the judgment of conviction against him,
since those testimonies are consistent on material points. Time and time again, this Court has ruled that
the witnesses testimonies need only to corroborate one another on material details surrounding the actual
commission of the crime.[18] Questions as to the exact street where the illegal sale was consummated do
not in any way impair the credibility of the witnesses. To secure a reversal of the appealed judgment, such
inconsistencies should pertain to that crucial moment when the accused was caught selling shabu, not to
peripheral matters.[19]

It should be noted that in passing upon the credibility of witnesses, the appellate court generally
yields to the judgment of the trial courts since they are in a better position to decide the question, having
heard the witnesses themselves and observed their deportment and manner of testifying during the
trial.[20] Thus, this Court finds no cogent reason to disturb the trial courts assessment of the credibility of
the prosecution witnesses.

Chain of Custody Was Properly Established

In every prosecution for the illegal sale of prohibited drugs, the presentation of the drug, i.e.,
the corpus delicti, as evidence in court is material.[21] In fact, the existence of the dangerous drug is crucial
to a judgment of conviction. It is, therefore, indispensable that the identity of the prohibited drug be
established beyond doubt. Even more than this, what must also be established is the fact that the substance
bought during the buy-bust operation is the same substance offered in court as exhibit. The chain of custody
requirement performs this function in that it ensures that unnecessary doubts concerning the identity of the
evidence are removed.[22]

To ensure that the chain of custody is established, the Implementing Rules and Regulations of RA
9165 provide:

SECTION 21. Custody and Disposition of Confiscated, Seized and/or

Surrendered Dangerous Drugs, Plant Sources of Dangerous Drugs, Controlled
Precursors and Essential Chemicals, Instruments/Paraphernalia and/or Laboratory
Equipment. The PDEA shall take charge and have custody of all dangerous drugs, plant
sources of dangerous drugs, controlled precursors and essential chemicals, as well as
instruments/paraphernalia and/or laboratory equipment so confiscated, seized and/or
surrendered, for proper disposition in the following manner:

(a) The apprehending officer/team having initial custody and control of the drugs shall,
immediately after seizure and confiscation, physically inventory and photograph the same in
the presence of the accused or the person/s from whom such items were confiscated and/or
seized, or his/her representative or counsel, a representative from the media and the
Department of Justice (DOJ), and any elected public official who shall be required to sign the
copies of the inventory and be given a copy thereof; Provided, that the physical inventory
and photograph shall be conducted at the place where the search warrant is served;
or at the nearest police station or at the nearest office of the apprehending
officer/team, whichever is practicable, in case of warrantless seizures; Provided,
further, that non-compliance with these requirements under justifiable grounds, as
long as the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized items are properly
preserved by the apprehending officer/team, shall not render void and invalid such
seizures of and custody over said items.[23] x x x (Emphasis and underscoring supplied.)
 A close reading of the law reveals that it allows certain exceptions. Thus, contrary to the assertions
of accused-appellant, Section 21 need not be followed with pedantic rigor. Non-compliance with Sec. 21
does not render an accuseds arrest illegal or the items seized/confiscated from him inadmissible. [24] What
is essential is the preservation of the integrity and the evidentiary value of the seized items, as the same
would be utilized in the determination of the guilt or innocence of the accused. [25]

In the instant case, there was substantial compliance with the law and the integrity of the drugs
seized from accused-appellant was preserved. The chain of custody of the drugs subject matter of the case
was shown not to have been broken. The factual milieu of the case reveals that the confiscated items were
marked by PO2 Concepcion immediately after he arrested accused-appellant. Then, the said marked items
were submitted to the PNP Crime Laboratory for analysis and examination, and which was later on found to
be positive for shabu. PO2 Concepcion testified thus:

PROSEC. SANTOS: Now, you were telling us that your immediate back up, you saw him
rushing to your place, what[,] if any[,] did your immediate backup
do when he was already near you?
A: We arrested him and I [asked] for his personal circumstances and marked the evidence I
confiscated from him and the shabu I bought, sir.
PROSEC. SANTOS: You said you marked the shabu that you bought from him and the shabu
that was confiscated from his possession, tell us, what kind of
marking did you put on the plastic sachet containing the shabu that
you bought from him during that time?
A: HBG-1, the subject of the sale and HBG-2 the evidence confiscated from his possession.
PROSEC. SANTOS: Now, after you have marked the shabu or these plastic sachets containing
the shabu that you bought and confiscated from him, what
happened?
A: My companions [approached] us and we brought alias mads to the police station.
xxxx
PROSEC. SANTOS: Now after you have brought him to your station, what happened to the
shabu that you bought and confiscated from him during that time?
A: We [turned] it over to the investigator and after that he prepared a request for laboratory
examination.
PROSEC. SANTOS: So there was already a request for laboratory examination?
A: Yes, sir.
PROSEC. SANTOS: Now, you said you [turned] it over to the investigator, who among you
transported these specimen to the crime laboratory for examination?
A: I and the investigator, sir.
PROSEC. SANTOS: So, you said that together with the investigator, you brought the
specimens to the crime lab?
A: Yes, sir.
PROSEC. SANTOS: What happened at the crime lab?
A: They received the request for laboratory examination.
PROSEC. SANTOS: The request, how about the specimens?
A: Together with the specimens, sir.
PROSEC. SANTOS: Do you have any proof to show that the crime lab received the request
and the specimens?
A: There was, sir.
PROSEC. SANTOS: What is that?
A: The stamp received, sir.
PROSEC. SANTOS: If you will see that document again, will you be able to identify it?
A: Yes, sir.
 PROSEC. SANTOS: Im showing to you Exhibit B, this is a request for laboratory examination,
will you please examine the same and tell us the proof of the receipt
of the request and the specimens?
A: It was recorded by PO1 Calimag, sir.
PROSEC. SANTOS: For the record, your Honor, the witness is referring to Exhibit B-2, your
Honor. Now, Officer, if you will see again the shabu that you bought
and confiscated from the accused, will you be able to identify it?
A: Yes, sir.
PROSEC. SANTOS: Why do you say that you could identify the same?
A: Because there are my initials, sir.
PROSEC. SANTOS: I have here with me two (2) plastic sachets containing shabu, will you
please carefully examine the same and point us the plastic sachet
containing the shabu that you bought and the plastic sachet
containing the shabu that you confiscated from the possession of the
accused during that time? For the record, your Honor, the two (2)
plastic sachets are contained in [a] small plastic bag. Im showing to
you these two (2) plastic sachets, Officer, and please [examine] it
and tell us, which one of them is the subject of the sale and the
confiscated shabu?
A: This one is the subject of the sale, HBG-1.
INTERPRETER: Witness is referring to Exhibit D-1.
A: And HBG-2, this is the plastic sachet confiscated from the accused.
INTERPRETER: Witness is referring to Exhibit D-2.[26]

Moreover, this Court held in Malillin v. People[27] that the testimonies of all persons who handled the
specimen are important to establish the chain of custody. Thus, the prosecution offered the testimony of
PO2 Concepcion, the police officer who first handled the dangerous drug. The testimony of Police Senior
Inspector Maridel C. Rodis, who handled the dangerous drug after PO2 Concepcion, was, however, dispensed
with after the stipulations made by both the prosecution and the defense.

Undoubtedly, therefore, there was an unbroken chain in the custody of the illicit drug purchased from
accused-appellant.

Defenses of Denial and Frame-Up Are Weak

Denial, as a defense, is an inherently weak one[28] and has been viewed by this Court with disdain, for it can
easily be concocted and is a very common line of defense in prosecutions arising from violations of RA
9165.[29] Similarly, the defense of frame-up is also easily fabricated and commonly used in buy-bust
cases.[30]

In order for the Court to appreciate such defenses, there must be clear and convincing evidence to
prove such defense because in the absence of any intent on the part of the police authorities to falsely
impute such crime against accused-appellant, the presumption of regularity in the performance of duty
stands.

In the case at bar, the defense failed to show any evidence of ill motive on the part of the police
officers. Even accused-appellant himself declared that he did not know any of the police officers who arrested
him. During his direct examination, he testified, thus:

Q : While walking along Zamboanga Street going to the billiard hall, what happened?
A : A white Adventure blocked my way, sir.
Q : And after this vehicle blocked your way, what happened, Mr. Witness?
A : Three men in civilian clothes alighted from the vehicle and approached me. They held me
and forced me to board their vehicle.
 Q : Do you know any of the three individuals who got out and tried to force you inside the
vehicle?
A : None, sir.

ATTY. GARLITOS : Did they tell you the reason why you are being forcibly taken inside the
vehicle?
A : No sir.
Q : Did they introduce themselves to you?
A : They introduced themselves as policemen, sir.[31]

Likewise, the trial court held:

The testimony of PO2 Rolly B. Concepcion that was corroborated by PO2 Ronnie L.
Fabroa, who have not shown and displayed any ill motive to arrest the accused is sufficient
enough to convict the accused of the crimes charged against him. x x x As law enforcers, their
narration of the incident is worthy of belief and as such they are presumed to have performed
their duties in a regular manner, in the absence of any evidence to the contrary. To stress x
x x testimony of arresting officers, with no motive or reason to falsely impute a serious charge
against the accused is credible.[32]

Thus, the categorical statements of the prosecution witnesses must prevail over the bare denials of
the accused.[33] Denial, if unsubstantiated by clear and convincing evidence, is a negative and self-serving
evidence which deserves no weight in law and cannot be given greater evidentiary value over the testimony
of the credible witnesses who testify on affirmative matters.[34]

Therefore, this Court upholds the presumption of regularity in the performance of official duties
and finds that the prosecution has discharged its burden of proving the guilt of accused-appellant beyond
reasonable doubt.

WHEREFORE, the appeal is DISMISSED. The CA Decision in CA-G.R. CR HC No. 02958 finding
accused-appellant Hasanaddin Guiara guilty of the crimes charged is AFFIRMED. SO ORDERED.
 [G.R. No. 131516. March 5, 2003]

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. RONNIE RULLEPA y GUINTO, accused-

appellant.

DECISION
CARPIO-MORALES, J.:

On complaint of Cyra May Francisco Buenafe, accused-appellant Ronnie Rullepa y Guinto was charged
with Rape before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Quezon City allegedly committed as follows:

That on or about the 17 th day of November, 1995, in Quezon City, Philippines, the said accused, by means
of force and intimidation, to wit: by then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously removing her panty,
kissing her lips and vagina and thereafter rubbing his penis and inserting the same to the inner portion of
the vagina of the undersigned complainant, 3 years of age, a minor, against her will and without her
consent.[1]

Arraigned on January 15, 1996, accused-appellant pleaded not guilty.[2]

From the testimonies of its witnesses, namely Cyra May,[3] her mother Gloria Francisco Buenafe, Dr.
Cristina V. Preyra, and SPO4 Catherine Borda, the prosecution established the following facts:
On November 20, 1995, as Gloria was about to set the table for dinner at her house in Quezon City,
Cyra May, then only three and a half years old, told her, Mama, si kuya Ronnie lagay niya titi niya at sinaksak
sa puwit at sa bibig ko.
Kuya Ronnie is accused-appellant Ronnie Rullepa, the Buenafes house boy, who was sometimes left
with Cyra May at home.
Gloria asked Cyra May how many times accused-appellant did those things to her, to which she
answered many times. Pursuing, Gloria asked Cyra May what else he did to her, and Cyra May indicated the
room where accused-appellant slept and pointed at his pillow.
As on the night of November 20, 1995 accused-appellant was out with Glorias husband Col.
Buenafe,[4] she waited until their arrival at past 11:00 p.m. Gloria then sent accused-appellant out on an
errand and informed her husband about their daughters plaint. Buenafe thereupon talked to Cyra May who
repeated what she had earlier told her mother Gloria.
When accused-appellant returned, Buenafe and Gloria verified from him whether what Cyra May had
told them was true. Ronnie readily admitted doing those things but only once, at 4:00 p.m. of November
17, 1995 or three days earlier. Unable to contain her anger, Gloria slapped accused-appellant several times.
Since it was already midnight, the spouses waited until the following morning to bring accused-appellant
to Camp Karingal where he admitted the imputations against him, on account of which he was
detained. Glorias sworn statement[5] was then taken.[6]
Recalling what accused-appellant did to her, Cyra May declared at the witness stand: Sinaksak nya ang
titi sa pepe ko, sa puwit ko, at sa bunganga, thus causing her pain and drawing her to cry. She added that
accused-appellant did these to her twice in his bedroom.
Dr. Ma. Cristina V. Preyra, the Medico-Legal Officer and Chief of the Biological Science Branch of the
Philippine National Police Crime Laboratory who examined Crya May, came up with her report dated
November 21, 1995,[7] containing the following findings and conclusions:

FINDINGS:

GENERAL AND EXTRA GENITAL:

Fairly developed, fairly nourished and coherent female child subject. Breasts are undeveloped. Abdomen is
flat and soft.

GENITAL:

There is absence of pubic hair. Labia majora are full, convex and coaptated with congested and abraded
labia minora presenting in between. On separating the same is disclosed an abraded posterior
fourchette and an elastic, fleshy type intact hymen. External vaginal orifice does not admit the tip of the
examining index finger.

xxx

CONCLUSION:
Subject is in virgin state physically.

There are no external signs of recent application of any form of trauma at the time of examination.
(Emphasis supplied.)
By Dr. Preyras explanation, the abrasions on the labia minora could have been caused by friction with
an object, perhaps an erect penis. She doubted if riding on a bicycle had caused the injuries.[8]
The defenses sole witness was accused-appellant, who was 28 and single at the time he took the witness
stand on June 9, 1997. He denied having anything to do with the abrasions found in Cyra Mays genitalia,
and claimed that prior to the alleged incident, he used to be ordered to buy medicine for Cyra May who had
difficulty urinating. He further alleged that after he refused to answer Glorias queries if her husband Buenafe,
whom he usually accompanied whenever he went out of the house, was womanizing, Gloria would always
find fault in him. He suggested that Gloria was behind the filing of the complaint. Thus:
q- According to them you caused the abrasions found in her genital?
a- That is not true, sir.
q- If that is not true, what is the truth?
a- As I have mentioned earlier that before I started working with the family I was sent to Crame to
buy medicine for the daughter because she had difficulty in urinating.
q- Did you know why the child has difficulty in urinating?
a- No, I do not know, sir.
q- And how about the present complaint filed against you, the complaint filed by the mother of the
victim?
a- I did not do it, sir.
q- What is the truth, what can you say about this present complaint filed against you?
a- As I said Mrs. Buenafe got mad at me because after I explained to her that I was going with her
gusband (sic) to the children of the husband with a former marriage.[9]
Finding for the prosecution, Branch 96 of the Quezon City RTC rendered judgment, the dispositive
portion of which reads:

WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered finding accused RONNIE RULLEPA y GUINTO guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of rape, and he is accordingly sentenced to death.

The accused is ordered to pay CYRA MAE BUENAFE the amount of P40,000.00 as civil indemnity.

Costs to be paid by the accused.[10] (Italics in the original.)

Hence, this automatic review, accused-appellant assigning the following errors to the trial court:
I

THE COURT A QUO ERRED IN CONSIDERING AS ADMISSIBLE IN EVIDENCE THE ACCUSED-APPELLANTS

ADMISSION.

II

THE COURT A QUO ERRED ON (sic) RULING THAT THE ACCUSED-APPELLANTS SILENCE DURING TRIAL
AMOUNTED TO AN IMPLIED ADMISSION OF GUILT.

III

THE COURT A QUO ERRED IN FINDING THAT THE GUILT OF THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT FOR THE CRIME
CHARGED HAS BEEN PROVEN BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT.

IV

THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN IMPOSING THE SUPREME PENALTY OF DEATH UPON THE
ACCUSED-APPELLANT.[11] (Emphasis supplied.)

Accused-appellant assails the crediting by the trial court, as the following portion of its decision shows,
of his admission to Gloria of having sexually assaulted Cyra May:

In addition, the mother asserted that Rullepa had admitted Cyra Ma[y]s complaint during the confrontation
in the house. Indeed, according to the mother, the admission was even expressly qualified by Rullepas
insistence that he had committed the sexual assault only once, specifying the time thereof as 4:00 pm of
November 17, 1995. That qualification proved that the admission was voluntary and true. An uncoerced and
truthful admission like this should be absolutely admissible and competent.

xxx

Remarkably, the admission was not denied by the accused during trial despite his freedom to deny it if
untrue. Hence, the admission became conclusive upon him.[12] (Emphasis supplied.)

To accused-appellant, the statements attributed to him are inadmissible since they were made out of
fear, having been elicited only after Cyra Mays parents bullied and questioned him. He thus submits that it
was error for the trial court to take his failure to deny the statements during the trial as an admission of
guilt.
Accused-appellants submission does not persuade. The trial court considered his admission merely as
an additional ground to convince itself of his culpability. Even if such admission, as well as the implication
of his failure to deny the same, were disregarded, the evidence suffices to establish his guilt beyond
reasonable doubt.
The plain, matter-of-fact manner by which Cyra May described her abuse in the hands of
her Kuya Ronnie is an eloquent testament to the truth of her accusations. Thus she testified on direct
examination:
q- Do you recall if Ronnie Rullepa did anything to you?
a- Yes, sir.
q- What did he do to you?
a- Sinaksak nya ang titi sa pepe ko, sa puwit ko, at sa bunganga
q- How many times did he do that to you?
a- Twice, sir.
xxx
q- Do you remember when he did these things to you?
a- Opo.
q- When was that?
a- When my mother was asleep, he put he removed my panty and inserted his penis inside my
vagina, my anus and my mouth, sir.
xxx
q- After your Kuya Ronnie did those things to you what did you feel?
a- Sabi nya ganito (Witness putting her finger in her lips) Nasaktan po ako at umiyak po ako.
q- Did you cry because of hurt?
a- Yes.
q- What part of your body hurt?
a- Pepe ko po. When I went to the bathroom to urinate, I felt pain in my organ, sir. [13]
Cyra May reiterated her testimony during cross-examination, providing more revolting details of her
ordeal:
q- So, you said that Kuya Ronnie did something to you what did he do to you on November 17,
1995?
a- Sinaksak nga yong titi nya. He inserted his penis to my organ and to my mouth, sir.
xxx
q- When you said that your kuya Ronnie inserted his penis into your organ, into your mouth, and
into your anus, would you describe what his penis?
a- It is a round object, sir.
C o u r t:
Is this titi of your kuya Ronnie a part of his body?
a- Opo.
q- Was that in the head of kuya Ronnie?
a- No, sir.
q- Which part of his body that titi located?
 (Witness pointing to her groin area)
C o u r t:
Continue
xxx
q- Why were you in that room?
a- Gusto nya po matulog ako sa kuwarto niya.
q- When you were in that room, what did Kuya Ronnie do to you?
a- Hinubo po niya ang panty ko.
q- And after he remove your panty, what did Kuya Ronnie do, what did he do to you?
a- He inserted his penis to my organ, sir.
q- Why did kuya Ronnie, was kuya Ronnie already naked or he was already wearing any clothing?
a- Still had his clothing on, sir.
q- So, where did his penis, saan lumabas ang penis ni Kuya Ronnie?
a- Dito po, (Witness referring or pointing to her groin area)
xxx
q- So, thats the and at the time, you did not cry and you did not shout for help?
a- Sabi nya po, not to make any noise because my mother might be roused from sleep.
q- How long was kuya Ronnie did that to you?
a- Matagal po.
q- After kuya Ronnie scrub his penis to your vagina, what other things did he do?
a- After that he inserted his penis to my mouth, and to my anus, sir.
q- You did not complain and you did not shout?
a- I cried, sir.[14]
Accused-appellant draws attention to the statement of Cyra May that he was not in the house on
November 17 (1995), as reflected in the following transcript of her testimony:
q- Is it not a fact that you said a while ago that when your father leaves the house, he [was] usually
accompanied by your kuya Ronnie?
a- Opo.
q- Why is it that Kuya Ronnie was in the house when you father left the house at that time, on
November 17?
a- He was with Kuya Ronnie, sir.
q- So, it is not correct that kuya Ronnie did something to you because your kuya Ronnie [was]
always with your Papa?
a- Yes, sir.[15]
The above-quoted testimony of Cyra May does not indicate the time when her father Col. Buenafe left
their house on November 17, 1995 with accused-appellant and, thus, does not preclude accused-appellants
commission of rape on the same date. In any event, a young child is vulnerable to suggestion, hence, her
affirmative response to the defense counsels above-quoted leading questions.
As for the variance in the claim regarding when Gloria was informed of the rape, Gloria having testified
that she learned of it on November 20, 1995[16] while Cyra May said that immediately after the incident, she
awakened her mother who was in the adjacent room and reported it: [17] This is a minor matter that does
not detract from Cyra Mays categorical, material testimony that accused-appellant inserted his penis into
her vagina.
Accused-appellant goes on to contend that Cyra May was coached, citing the following portion of her
testimony:
q- Yong sinabi mong sinira nya ang buhay mo, where did you get that phrase?
a- It was the word of my Mama, sir.[18]
On the contrary, the foregoing testimony indicates that Cyra May was really narrating the truth, that of
hearing her mother utter sinira niya ang buhay mo.
Accused-appellants suggestion that Cyra May merely imagined the things of which he is accused,
perhaps getting the idea from television programs, is preposterous. It is true that the ordinary child is a
great weaver of romances, and her imagination may induce (her) to relate something she has heard or read
in a story as personal experience.[19] But Cyra Mays account is hardly the stuff of romance or fairy
tales. Neither is it normal TV fare, if at all.
This Court cannot believe that a victim of Cyra Mays age could concoct a tale of defloration, allow the
examination of her private parts, and undergo the expense, trouble, inconvenience, not to mention the
trauma of public trial.[20]
Besides, her testimony is corroborated by the findings of Dr. Preyra that there were abrasions in
her labia minora, which she opined, could have been caused by friction with an erect penis.
This Court thus accords great weight to the following assessment of the trial court regarding the
competency and credibility of Cyra May as a witness:

Her very tender age notwithstanding, Cyra Ma(y) nonetheless appeared to possess the necessary
intelligence and perceptiveness sufficient to invest her with the competence to testify about her
experience. She might have been an impressionable child as all others of her age are but her narration
of Kuya Ronnies placing his titi in her pepe was certainly one which could not be considered as a common
childs tale. Her responses during the examination of counsel and of the Court established her consciousness
of the distinction between good and bad, which rendered inconceivable for her to describe a bad act of the
accused unless it really happened to her. Needless to state, she described the act of the accused as bad. Her
demeanor as a witness manifested during trial by her unhesitant, spontaneous, and plain responses to
questions further enhanced her claim to credit and trustworthiness.[21] (Italics in the original.)

In a futile attempt at exculpation, accused-appellant claims that even before the alleged incident Cyra
May was already suffering from pain in urinating. He surmises that she could have scratched herself which
caused the abrasions. Dr. Preyra, however, was quick to rule out this possibility. She stated categorically
that that part of the female organ is very sensitive and rubbing or scratching it is painful. [22] The abrasions
could not, therefore, have been self-inflicted.
That the Medical-Legal Officer found no external signs of recent application of any form of trauma at
the time of the examination does not preclude accused-appellants conviction since the infliction of force is
immaterial in statutory rape.[23]
More. That Cyra May suffered pain in her vagina but not in her anus despite her testimony that accused-
appellant inserted his penis in both orifices does not diminish her credibility. It is possible that accused-
appellants penis failed to penetrate her anus as deeply as it did her vagina, the former being more resistant
to extreme forces than the latter.
Accused-appellants imputation of ill motive on the part of Gloria is puerile. No mother in her right mind
would subject her child to the humiliation, disgrace and trauma attendant to a prosecution for rape if she
were not motivated solely by the desire to incarcerate the person responsible for the childs
defilement.[24] Courts are seldom, if at all, convinced that a mother would stoop so low as to subject her
daughter to physical hardship and shame concomitant to a rape prosecution just to assuage her own hurt
feelings.[25]
Alternatively, accused-appellant prays that he be held liable for acts of lasciviousness instead of rape,
apparently on the basis of the following testimony of Cyra May, quoted verbatim, that he merely scrubbed
his penis against her vagina:
q- Is it not a fact that kuya Ronnie just made some scrubbed his penis into your vagina?
a- Yes, sir.
q- And when he did not actually penetrated your vagina?
a- Yes, sir.[26]
Dr. Preya, however, found abrasions in the labia minora, which is directly beneath the labia
majora,[27] proving that there was indeed penetration of the vagina, not just a mere rubbing or scrubbing
of the penis against its surface.
In fine, the crime committed by accused-appellant is not merely acts of lasciviousness but statutory
rape.
The two elements of statutory rape are (1) that the accused had carnal knowledge of a woman, and (2)
that the woman is below twelve years of age. [28] As shown in the previous discussion, the first
element, carnal knowledge, had been established beyond reasonable doubt. The same is true with respect
to the second element.
The victims age is relevant in rape cases since it may constitute an element of the offense. Article 335
of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Republic Act No. 7659,[29] provides:

Art. 335. When and how rape is committed. Rape is committed by having carnal knowledge of a woman
under any of the following circumstances:

x x x.

3. When the woman is under twelve years of age x x x.

x x x.

The crime of rape shall be punished by reclusion perpetua.

x x x.

Furthermore, the victims age may constitute a qualifying circumstance, warranting the imposition of the
death sentence. The same Article states:

The death penalty shall also be imposed if the crime of rape is committed with any of the following attendant
circumstances:

1. when the victim is under eighteen (18) years of age and the offender is a parent, ascendant, step-
parent, guardian, relative by consanguinity or affinity with the third civil degree, or the common-law spouse
of the parent of the victim.

4. when the victim is x x x a child below seven (7) years old.

Because of the seemingly conflicting decisions regarding the sufficiency of evidence of the victims age
in rape cases, this Court, in the recently decided case of People v. Pruna,[30] established a set of guidelines
in appreciating age as an element of the crime or as a qualifying circumstance, to wit:

1. The best evidence to prove the age of the offended party is an original or certified true copy of the
certificate of live birth of such party.

2. In the absence of a certificate of live birth, similar authentic documents such as baptismal certificate and
school records which show the date of birth of the victim would suffice to prove age.

3. If the certificate of live birth or authentic document is shown to have been lost or destroyed or otherwise
unavailable, the testimony, if clear and credible, of the victims mother or a member of the family either by
affinity or consanguinity who is qualified to testify on matters respecting pedigree such as the exact age or
date of birth of the offended party pursuant to Section 40, Rule 130 of the Rules on Evidence shall be
sufficient under the following circumstances:

a. If the victim is alleged to be below 3 years of age and what is sought to be proved is that she is less than
7 years old;

b. If the victim is alleged to be below 7 years of age and what is sought to be proved is that she is less than
12 years old;

c. If the victim is alleged to be below 12 years of age and what is sought to be proved is that she is less
than 18 years old.

4. In the absence of a certificate of live birth, authentic document, or the testimony of the victims mother
or relatives concerning the victims age, the complainants testimony will suffice provided that it is expressly
and clearly admitted by the accused.

5. It is the prosecution that has the burden of proving the age of the offended party. The failure of the
accused to object to the testimonial evidence regarding age shall not be taken against him.

6. The trial court should always make a categorical finding as to the age of the victim.

Applying the foregoing guidelines, this Court in the Pruna case held that the therein accused-appellant
could only be sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua since:

x x x no birth certificate or any similar authentic document, such as a baptismal certificate of LIZETTE, was
presented to prove her age. x x x.

x x x.

However, the Medico-Legal Report relied upon by the trial court does not in any way prove the age of
LIZETTE, for there is nothing therein which even mentions her age. Only testimonial evidence was presented
to establish LIZETTEs age.Her mother, Jacqueline, testified (that the victim was three years old at the time
of the commission of the crime).

xxx

Likewise, LIZETTE testified on 20 November 1996, or almost two years after the incident, that she was 5
years old. However, when the defense counsel asked her how old she was on 3 January 1995, or at the time
of the rape, she replied that she was 5 years old. Upon further question as to the date she was born, she
could not answer.

For PRUNA to be convicted of rape in its qualified form and meted the supreme penalty of death, it must be
established with certainty that LIZETTE was below 7 years old at the time of the commission of the crime. It
must be stressed that the severity of the death penalty, especially its irreversible and final nature once
carried out, makes the decision-making process in capital offenses aptly subject to the most exacting rules
of procedure and evidence.

In view of the uncertainty of LIZETTEs exact age, corroborative evidence such as her birth certificate,
baptismal certificate or any other authentic document should be introduced in evidence in order that the
qualifying circumstance of below seven (7) years old is appreciated against the appellant. The lack of
objection on the part of the defense as to her age did not excuse the prosecution from discharging its
burden. That the defense invoked LIZETTEs tender age for purposes of questioning her competency to testify
is not necessarily an admission that she was below 7 years of age when PRUNA raped her on 3 January
1995. Such being the case, PRUNA cannot be convicted of qualified rape, and hence the death penalty
cannot be imposed on him.

However, conformably with no. 3 (b) of the foregoing guidelines, the testimony of LIZETTEs mother that
she was 3 years old at the time of the commission of the crime is sufficient for purposes of holding PRUNA
liable for statutory rape, or rape of a girl below 12 years of age. Under the second paragraph of Article 335,
as amended by R.A. No. 7659, in relation to no. 3 of the first paragraph thereof, having carnal knowledge
of a woman under 12 years of age is punishable by reclusion perpetua. Thus, the penalty to be imposed on
PRUNA should be reclusion perpetua, and not death penalty. (Italics in the original.)

Several cases[31] suggest that courts may take judicial notice of the appearance of the victim in
determining her age. For example, the Court, in People v. Tipay,[32] qualified the ruling in People v.
Javier,[33] which required the presentation of the birth certificate to prove the rape victims age, with the
following pronouncement:

This does not mean, however, that the presentation of the certificate of birth is at all times necessary to
prove minority. The minority of a victim of tender age who may be below the age of ten is quite manifest
and the court can take judicial notice thereof. The crucial years pertain to the ages of fifteen to seventeen
where minority may seem to be dubitable due to ones physical appearance. In this situation, the prosecution
has the burden of proving with certainty the fact that the victim was under 18 years of age when the rape
was committed in order to justify the imposition of the death penalty under the above-cited provision.
(Emphasis supplied.)

On the other hand, a handful of cases[34] holds that courts, without the requisite hearing prescribed by
Section 3, Rule 129 of the Rules of Court,[35] cannot take judicial notice of the victims age.
Judicial notice signifies that there are certain facta probanda, or propositions in a partys case, as to
which he will not be required to offer evidence; these will be taken for true by the tribunal without the need
of evidence.[36] Judicial notice, however, is a phrase sometimes used in a loose way to cover some other
judicial action. Certain rules of Evidence, usually known under other names, are frequently referred to in
terms of judicial notice.[37]
The process by which the trier of facts judges a persons age from his or her appearance cannot be
categorized as judicial notice. Judicial notice is based upon convenience and expediency for it would certainly
be superfluous, inconvenient, and expensive both to parties and the court to require proof, in the ordinary
way, of facts which are already known to courts.[38] As Tundag puts it, it is the cognizance of certain facts
which judges may properly take and act on without proof because they already know them. Rule 129 of
the Rules of Court, where the provisions governing judicial notice are found, is entitled What Need Not Be
Proved. When the trier of facts observes the appearance of a person to ascertain his or her age, he is not
taking judicial notice of such fact; rather, he is conducting an examination of the evidence, the evidence
being the appearance of the person. Such a process militates against the very concept of judicial notice, the
object of which is to do away with the presentation of evidence.
This is not to say that the process is not sanctioned by the Rules of Court; on the contrary, it does. A
persons appearance, where relevant, is admissible as object evidence, the same being addressed to the
senses of the court. Section 1, Rule 130 provides:

SECTION 1. Object as evidence. Objects as evidence are those addressed to the senses of the court. When
an object is relevant to the fact in issue, it may be exhibited to, examined or viewed by the court.

To be sure, one author writes, this practice of inspection by the court of objects, things
or persons relevant to the fact in dispute, has its roots in ancient judicial procedure. [39] The author proceeds
to quote from another authority:

Nothing is older or commoner in the administration of law in all countries than the submission to the senses
of the tribunal itself, whether judge or jury, of objects which furnish evidence. The view of the land by the
jury, in real actions, of a wound by the judge where mayhem was alleged, and of the person of one
alleged to be an infant, in order to fix his age, the inspection and comparison of seals, the examination
of writings, to determine whether they are ()blemished,() the implements with which a crime was committed
or of a person alleged, in a bastardy proceeding, to be the child of another, are few illustrations of what
may be found abundantly in our own legal records and textbooks for seven centuries past. [40](Emphasis
supplied.)

A persons appearance, as evidence of age (for example, of infancy, or of being under the age of
consent to intercourse), is usually regarded as relevant; and, if so, the tribunal may properly observe the
person brought before it.[41] Experience teaches that corporal appearances are approximately an index of
the age of their bearer, particularly for the marked extremes of old age and youth. In every case such
evidence should be accepted and weighed for what it may be in each case worth. In particular, the outward
physical appearance of an alleged minor may be considered in judging his age; a contrary rule would for
such an inference be pedantically over-cautious.[42] Consequently, the jury or the court trying an issue of
fact may be allowed to judge the age of persons in court by observation of such persons. [43] The formal offer
of the person as evidence is not necessary. The examination and cross-examination of a party before the
jury are equivalent to exhibiting him before the jury and an offer of such person as an exhibit is properly
refused. [44]
This Court itself has sanctioned the determination of an aliens age from his appearance. In Braca v.
Collector of Customs,[45] this Court ruled that:

The customs authorities may also determine from the personal appearance of the immigrant what his age
is. The person of a Chinese alien seeking admission into the Philippine Islands is evidence in an investigation
by the board of special inquiry to determine his right to enter; and such body may take into consideration
his appearance to determine or assist in determining his age and a finding that the applicant is not a minor
based upon such appearance is not without evidence to support it.

This Court has also implicitly recognized the same process in a criminal case. Thus, in United States v.
Agadas,[46] this Court held:

Rosario Sabacahan testified that he was 17 years of age; that he had never purchased a cedula; and that
he was going to purchase a cedula the following january. Thereupon the court asked this defendant these
questions: You are a pretty big boy for seventeen. Answer: I cannot tell exactly because I do not remember
when I was born, but 17 years is my guess. Court: If you are going to take advantage of that excuse, you
had better get some positive evidence to that effect. Answer: I do not remember, as I already stated on
what date and in what year I was born. The court, in determining the question of the age of the defendant,
Rosario Sabacahan, said:

The defendant, Rosario Sabacahan, testified that he thought that he was about 17 years of age, but judging
by his appearance he is a youth 18 or 19 years old. He has shown that he has no positive information on
the subject and no effort was made by the defense to prove the fact that he is entitled to the mitigating
circumstance of article 9, paragraph 2, of the Penal code, which fact it is held to be incumbent upon the
defense to establish by satisfactory evidence in order to enable the court to give an accused person the
benefit of the mitigating circumstance.

In United States vs. Estavillo and Perez (10 Off. Gaz., 1984) Estavillo testified, when the case was tried in
the court below, that he then was only 16 years of age. There was no other testimony in the record with
reference to his age. But the trial judge said: The accused Estavillo, notwithstanding his testimony giving
his age as 16 years, is, as a matter of fact, not less than 20. This court, in passing upon the age of Estavillo,
held:

We presume that the trial court reached this conclusion with reference to the age of Estavillo from the latters
personal appearance. There is no proof in the record, as we have said, which even tends to establish the
assertion that this appellant understated his age. * * * It is true that the trial court had an opportunity to
note the personal appearance of Estavillo for the purpose of determining his age, and by so doing reached
the conclusion that he was at least 20, just two years over 18.This appellant testified that he was only 16,
and this testimony stands uncontradicted. Taking into consideration the marked difference in the penalties
to be imposed upon that age, we must, therefore, conclude (resolving all doubts in favor of the appellants)
that the appellants ages were 16 and 14 respectively.

While it is true that in the instant case Rosario testified that he was 17 years of age, yet the trial court
reached the conclusion, judging from the personal appearance of Rosario, that he is a youth 18 or 19 years
old. Applying the rule enunciated in the case just cited, we must conclude that there exists a reasonable
doubt, at least, with reference to the question whether Rosario was, in fact 18 years of age at the time the
robbery was committed. This doubt must be resolved in favor of the defendant, and he is, therefore,
sentenced to six months of arresto mayor in lieu of six years ten months and one day of presidio mayor. x
x x.

There can be no question, therefore, as to the admissibility of a persons appearance in determining

his or her age. As to the weight to accord such appearance, especially in rape cases, Pruna laid down
guideline no. 3, which is again reproduced hereunder:
3. If the certificate of live birth or authentic document is shown to have been lost or destroyed or otherwise
unavailable, the testimony, if clear and credible, of the victims mother or a member of the family either by
affinity or consanguinity who is qualified to testify on matters respecting pedigree such as the exact age or
date of birth of the offended party pursuant to Section 40, Rule 130 of the Rules on Evidence shall be
sufficient under the following circumstances:

a. If the victim is alleged to be below 3 years of age and what is sought to be proved is that she is less than
7 years old;

b. If the victim is alleged to be below 7 years of age and what is sought to be proved is that she is less than
12 years old;

c. If the victim is alleged to be below 12 years of age and what is sought to be proved is that she is less
than 18 years old.

Under the above guideline, the testimony of a relative with respect to the age of the victim is sufficient
to constitute proof beyond reasonable doubt in cases (a), (b) and (c) above. In such cases, the disparity
between the allegation and the proof of age is so great that the court can easily determine from the
appearance of the victim the veracity of the testimony. The appearance corroborates the relatives
testimony.
As the alleged age approaches the age sought to be proved, the persons appearance, as object evidence
of her age, loses probative value. Doubt as to her true age becomes greater and, following Agadas, supra,
such doubt must be resolved in favor of the accused.

This is because in the era of modernism and rapid growth, the victims mere physical appearance is not
enough to gauge her exact age. For the extreme penalty of death to be upheld, nothing but proof beyond
reasonable doubt of every fact necessary to constitute the crime must be substantiated. Verily, the minority
of the victim should be not only alleged but likewise proved with equal certainty and clearness as the crime
itself. Be it remembered that the proof of the victims age in the present case spells the difference between
life and death.[47]

In the present case, the prosecution did not offer the victims certificate of live birth or similar authentic
documents in evidence. The victim and her mother, however, testified that she was only three years old at
the time of the rape. Cyra Mays testimony goes:
q- Your name is Cyra Mae is that correct?
a- Yes, sir.
q- And you are 3 years old?
a- Yes, sir.[48]
That of her mother goes:
Q How old was your daughter when there things happened?
A 3 and years old.
Q When was she born?
A In Manila, May 10, 1992.[49]
Because of the vast disparity between the alleged age (three years old) and the age sought to be proved
(below twelve years), the trial court would have had no difficulty ascertaining the victims age from her
appearance. No reasonable doubt, therefore, exists that the second element of statutory rape, i.e., that the
victim was below twelve years of age at the time of the commission of the offense, is present.
Whether the victim was below seven years old, however, is another matter. Here, reasonable doubt
exists. A mature three and a half-year old can easily be mistaken for an underdeveloped seven-year old. The
appearance of the victim, as object evidence, cannot be accorded much weight and, following Pruna, the
testimony of the mother is, by itself, insufficient.
As it has not been established with moral certainty that Cyra May was below seven years old at the
time of the commission of the offense, accused-appellant cannot be sentenced to suffer the death
penalty. Only the penalty of reclusion perpetua can be imposed upon him.
In line with settled jurisprudence, the civil indemnity awarded by the trial court is increased
to P50,000.00. In addition, Cyra May is entitled to an award of moral damages in the amount
of P50,000.00.[50]
WHEREFORE, the Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 96,
is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION. Accused-appellant Ronnie Rullepa y Guinto is found GUILTY of
Statutory Rape, defined and punished by Article 335 (3) of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, and is
sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua. He is ordered to pay private complainant, Cyra May
Buenafe y Francisco, the amount of P50,000.00 as civil indemnity and P50,000.00 as moral damages. SO
ORDERED.
 [G.R. No. 80505 : December 4, 1990.]

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, vs. MARIO TANDOY y LIM, Defendant-
Appellant.

DECISION

CRUZ, J.:

The decision of the Regional Trial Court of Makati, Branch 133 dated October 13, 1987, convicting Mario
Tandoy of the crime of violation of Art. II, Sec. 4 of Rep. Act No. 6425 known as the Dangerous Drugs Act
of 1972, is before us on appeal.

The information against the accused-appellant read as follows:

That on or about the 27th day of May 1986, in the Municipality of Makati, Metro Manila, Philippines, and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused without being authorized by law,
did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously sell eight (8) pieces of dried marijuana flowering tops,
two (2) pieces of dried marijuana flowering tops and crushed dried marijuana flowering tops, which are
prohibited drug, for and in consideration of P20.00.

Upon arraignment, Tandoy entered a plea of not guilty. After trial, Judge Buenaventura J. Guerrero rendered
a decision the dispositive portion of which declared:

WHEREFORE, the Court finds Mario Tandoy y Lim guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violation of Sec. 4, Art.
II, Rep. Act No. 6425, as amended, and is hereby sentenced to life imprisonment and to pay a fine of
P20,000.00 and cost.: nad

The marijuana confiscated in this case is declared confiscated and forfeited and ordered turned over to the
Dangerous Drugs Board for proper disposal. SO ORDERED.

The accused-appellant raises the following assignment of errors in this appeal:

1. The Court a quo erred in finding accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime charged despite
lack of evidence to prove that he sold marijuana to the poseur-buyer.

2. The Court a quo erred in admitting in evidence against the accused Exh. "E-2-A" which is merely a xerox
copy of the P10.00 bill allegedly used as buy-bust money.

The evidence of the prosecution may be summarized as follows:

On May 27, 1986, at about 3:30 p.m. Lt. Salido, Jr. of the Makati Police Station dispatched Pfc. Herino de
la Cruz, and Detectives Pablo R. Singayan, Nicanor Candolesas, Luisito de la Cruz, Estanislao Dalumpines,
Antonio Manalastas and Virgilio Padua to conduct a buy-bust operation at Solchuaga St., Barangay
Singkamas, Makati.

The target area was a store along the said street, and Singayan was to pose as the buyer. He stood alone
near the store waiting for any pusher to approach. The other members of the team strategically positioned
themselves. Soon, three men approached Singayan. One of them was the accused-appellant, who said
without preamble: "Pare, gusto mo bang umiskor?" Singayan said yes. The exchange was made then and
there — two rolls/pieces of marijuana for one P10.00 and two P5.00 bills marked ANU (meaning Anti-
Narcotics Unit).

The team then moved in and arrested Tandoy. Manalastas and Candolesas made a body search of the
accused-appellant and took from him the marked money, as well as eight more rolls/foils of marijuana and
crushed leaves.: nad

The arresting officers brought Tandoy to the Office of the Anti-Narcotics Unit, Makati Police Station, for
investigation by Detective Marvin Pajilan. The accused-appellant chose to remain silent after having been
informed of his constitutional rights.

These events were narrated under oath by De la Cruz, Singayan and Pajilan. 1 Microscopic, chemical and
chromotographic examination was performed on the confiscated marijuana by Raquel P. Angeles, forensic
chemist of the National Bureau of Investigation, who later testified that the findings were positive. The
marijuana was offered as an exhibit. 2

As might be expected, the accused-appellant had a different story. His testimony was that from 1:30 to
4:00 p.m. of the day in question, he was playing "cara y cruz" with 15 other persons along Solchuaga St.
when somebody suddenly said that policemen were making arrests. The players grabbed the bet money
and scampered. However, he and a certain Danny (another "cara y cruz" player) were caught and taken to
the Narcotics Command headquarters in Makati. There they were mauled and warned that if they did not
point to their fellow pushers, they would rot in jail. The accused-appellant denied he had sold marijuana to
Singayan and insisted the bills taken from him were the bet money he had grabbed at the "cara y cruz"
game. 3

The trial court, which had the opportunity to observe the demeanor of the witnesses and to listen to their
respective testimonies, gave more credence to the statements of the arresting officers. Applying the
presumption that they had performed their duties in a regular manner, it rejected Tandoy's uncorroborated
allegation that he had been manhandled and framed. Tandoy had not submitted sufficient evidence of his
charges, let alone his admission that he had no quarrel with the peace officers whom he had met only on
the day of his arrest.

In People v. Patog, 4 this Court held:

When there is no evidence and nothing to indicate the principal witness for the prosecution was actuated by
improper motives, the presumption is that he was not so actuated and his testimony is entitled to full faith
and credit.

Tandoy submits that "one will not sell this prohibited drug to another who is a total stranger until the seller
is certain of the identity of the buyer."

The conjecture must be rejected.: nad

In People v. Paco, 5 this Court observed:

Drug-pushing when done on a small level as in this case belongs to that class of crimes that may be
committed at anytime and at any place. After the offer to buy is accepted and the exchange is made, the
illegal transaction is completed in a few minutes. The fact that the parties are in a public place and in the
presence of other people may not always discourage them from pursuing their illegal trade as these factors
may even serve to camouflage the same. Hence, the Court has sustained the conviction of drug pushers
caught selling illegal drugs in a billiard hall (People v. Rubio, G.R. No. 66875, June 19, 1986, 142 SCRA 329;
People v. Sarmiento, G.R. No. 72141, January 12, 1987, 147 SCRA 252), in front of a store (People vs.
Khan, supra) along a street at 1:45 p.m. (People v. Toledo, G.R. No. 67609, November 22, 1985, 140 SCRA
259), and in front of a house (People v. Policarpio, G.R. No. 69844, February 23, 1988).
As the Court has also held, "What matters is not an existing familiarity between the buyer and the seller but
their agreement and the acts constituting the sale and delivery of the marijuana leaves." 6

Under the second assigned error, the accused-appellant invokes the best evidence rule and questions the
admission by the trial court of the xerox copy only of the marked P10.00 bill.

The Solicitor General, in his Comment, correctly refuted that contention thus:

This assigned error centers on the trial court's admission of the P10.00 bill marked money (Exh. E-2-A)
which, according to the appellant, is excluded under the best evidence rule for being a mere xerox copy.
Apparently, appellant erroneously thinks that said marked money is an ordinary document falling under Sec.
2, Rule 130 of the Revised Rules of Court which excludes the introduction of secondary evidence except in
the five (5) instances mentioned therein.:-cralaw

The best evidence rule applies only when the contents of the document are the subject of inquiry. Where
the issue is only as to whether or not such document was actually executed, or exists, or in the circumstances
relevant to or surrounding its execution, the best evidence rule does not apply and testimonial evidence is
admissible. (Cf. Moran, op. cit., pp. 76-77; 4 Martin, op. cit., p. 78.)

Since the aforesaid marked money was presented by the prosecution solely for the purpose of establishing
its existence and not its contents, other substitutionary evidence, like a xerox copy thereof, is therefore
admissible without the need of accounting for the original.

Moreover, the presentation at the trial of the "buy-bust money" was not indispensable to the conviction of
the accused-appellant because the sale of the marijuana had been adequately proved by the testimony of
the police officers. So long as the marijuana actually sold by the accused-appellant had been submitted as
an exhibit, the failure to produce the marked money itself would not constitute a fatal omission.

We are convinced from the evidence on record that the prosecution has overcome the constitutional
presumption of innocence in favor of the accused-appellant with proof beyond reasonable doubt of his guilt.
He must therefore suffer the penalty prescribed by law for those who would visit the scourge of drug
addiction upon our people.

WHEREFORE, the appeal is DISMISSED and the challenged decision AFFIRMED in toto, with costs against
the accused-appellant. SO ORDERED
G.R. No. 55691 May 21, 1992

ESPERANZA BORILLO, in her behalf and in behalf of her children, petitioner,

vs.
HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and CATALINA BORILLO, respondents.

Crisostomo F. Pariñas for petitioner.

DAVIDE, JR., J.:

In this petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court filed on 24 November 1980,
petitioner urges this Court to review and reverse the decision 1 of the Court of Appeals (Third Division) in
C.A.-G.R. No. 64536-R, promulgated on 3 September 1980, which reversed and set aside the 3 June 1978
decision of Branch II of the then Court of First Instance (now Regional Trial Court) of Abra in Civil Case No.
1043.

On 10 February 1977, petitioner, for herself and on behalf of her children, filed before the abovementioned
trial court a complaint against private respondent and Marcos Borillo for the recovery of several parcels of
land located at Bugbuguis, Quillat, Langiden, Abra particularly described in said complaint, under the first
cause of action, as follows:

(a) A parcel of land (Riceland unirr. and pastureland) . . . with an area of 1231 sq. m.; with
assessed value in the sum of P40.00; under Tax Declaration No. 6319 in the name of
Esperanza Borillo, et al.;

(b) A parcel of land (Riceland unirr.) . . . with an area of 980 sq. m.; with an assessed value
in the sum of P40.00; under Tax Declaration No. 6320 in the name of Esperanza Borillo, et
al.;

(c) A parcel of land (Riceland unirr.) . . . with an area of 698 sq. m.; with assessed value in
the sum of P20.00; under Tax Declaration No. 6321 in the name of Esperanza Borillo, et al.;

(d) A parcel of land (Cornland) . . . with an area of 570 sq. m.; with an assessed value of
P20.00; under Tax Declaration No. 6322 in the name of Esperanza Borillo, et al. 2

and one-fifth (1/5) undivided portion of two (2) parcels of land, also located in the same place as the
above four (4) parcels, particularly described under the second cause of action, thus:

(e) A parcel of land (Riceland unirr.) . . . with an area of 1440 sq. m.; with an assessed value
of P60.00; under Tax Declaration No. 1745 in the name of Venancio Borillo;

(f) A parcel of land (Cornland) . . . with an area of 684 sq. m.; with an assessed value of
P20.00; under Tax Declaration No. 0746 in the name of Venancio Borillo.3

The complaint was docketed as Civil Case No. 1043.

In the complaint, petitioner alleges that the abovementioned parcels (a), (b), (c) and (d) were originally
owned by her late husband, Elpidio Borillo, with whom she had four (4) children, namely: Patricia, Melecio,
Bonifacia and Quirino. Although said parcels of land were unregistered, they were declared in 1948 in the
name of Elpidio under Tax Declaration Nos. 0731, 0732, 0733 and 0734, respectively. 4 Elpidio had been in
peaceful, public, continuous and uninterrupted possession thereof in concept of owner even before his
marriage to petitioner and until his death in 1970. After his death, petitioner continued to possess and
cultivate said parcels of land and enjoy the fruits thereof until sometime in 1971-1972 when private
respondent and Marcos Borillo, Elpidio's siblings, forcibly and unlawfully dispossessed her of the property.
Despite repeated demands, Marcos and the private respondent refused to return the property to the
petitioner and her children. In 1974, new Tax Declarations, namely Nos. 6319, 6320, 6321 and 6322 5 for
parcels (a), (b), (c) and (d), respectively, were issued in her name. Upon the other hand, parcels (e) and
(f), also unregistered, were inherited by Elpidio, his brother Marcos and sisters Catalina, Aurelia and Rosita,
from their father, Venancio Borillo. Elpidio's 1/5 pro-indiviso share therein was unlawfully taken by private
respondent sometime in 1971; the latter refused to return it to petitioner and her children, who are Elpidio's
heirs, despite repeated demands.

Petitioner then prays that judgment be rendered declaring her and her children owners of parcels (a), (b),
(c) and (d), as well as the 1/5 pro-indiviso portion of parcels (e) and (f), and ordering the private respondent
and Marcos Borillo to pay actual and moral damages plus costs.

In their Answer filed on 14 March 1977, private respondent claims that parcels (a), (c) and (d) were sold to
her by her late brother Elpidio in 1935, while Marcos Borillo claims that parcel (b) was sold to him by Elpidio
sometime in 1937, long before Elpidio's marriage to petitioner. Although they did not declare these parcels
for taxation purposes in their respective names, they immediately took possession and occupied the same
as owners thereof. Private respondent had been paying the realty taxes on parcels (a), (c) and (d) since
1948 6 and explains her failure to secure in her name tax declarations for said parcels during Elpidio's
lifetime by alleging that she trusted him because he was her brother and he had assured her that she could
transfer in her favor the title thereto anytime. After the Second World War, Elpidio and Rosita, another
sibling, sold to her their respective undivided shares in parcels (e) and (f).

On 15 March 1977, private respondent alone filed an Amended Answer. On the other hand, on 5 April 1977,
Patricia and Melencio Borillo filed a motion to withdraw as co-plaintiffs on the ground that they did not
authorize their inclusion as such and that the private respondent is the true and lawful owner of the land in
question. 7

At the trial, private respondent relied heavily on Exhibit "3", a private document purportedly showing that
Elpidio sold to her all his property for P40.00, and Exhibit "4", which she claims to be a deed of sale of
parcels (a), (c) and (d) allegedly executed by Elpidio Borillo in 1935. Upon the other hand, Marcos Borillo
claimed that the deed of sale evidencing the sale to him of parcel (b) was lost during the Second World War.
Both parties claim actual possession of the property. Private respondent and Marcos Borillo even claimed
possession for more than thirty (30) years.

After trial on the merits, the lower court rendered on 3 June 1978 a decision in favor of herein petitioner,
the dispositive portion of which reads:

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, judgment is hereby rendered declaring the plaintiffs
as the true owners of parcels A, B, C and D described in par. 4 of the complaint and as co-
owners of parcels E and F described in par. 6 of the complaint with Rosita Borillo, Aurelia
Borillo and the defendants Catalina Borillo and Marcos Borillo. With costs against the
defendants. 8

The trial court arrived at this decision on the basis of the following findings of fact:

The claim of ownership by the plaintiffs with respect to the four parcels of land described in
par. 4 of the complaint is preponderantly established by Tax Declaration Nos. 731, 732, 733
and 734, Exhibits, "A, A-1, A-2 and A-3" for the plaintiffs. These tax declarations covering the
four parcels of land in question are tax declarations issued in 1948 and is (sic) in the name of
Elpidio Borillo, husband of plaintiff Esperanza Borillo. Defendants never declared it (sic) in
their name (sic) and no action or attempt whatsoever was made by the defendants to declare
it (sic) in their name (sic) during the lifetime of Elpidio Borillo. It was only after the death of
Elpidio Borillo and the institution of this action by the plaintiffs that defendants took action
and strangely declared it (sic) in their names.

Obviously, the bulk of evidence for the plaintiffs are (sic) the tax declarations in the name of
Elpidio Borillo which do not absolutely prove their ownership. But the circumstances obtaining
in this case renders (sic) the tax declarations — Exhibits "A, A-1, A-2 and A-3", reliable and
predominantly point that plaintiffs are owners of the four parcels of land described in par. 4
of the complaint as against the plaintiffs (sic). First, it will be noted that Exhibits A, A-1, A-2
and A-3 were prepared and issued long before the death of Elpidio Borillo. He was then a
bachelor having married the plaintiff Esperanza Borillo in 1950. Defendant Catalina Borillo
married long before the 2nd World War. Defendant Marcos Borillo likewise married before
World War II. Defendants have properties declared in their names. Marcos Borillo
accompanied the Assessors who measured the four parcels of land according to him (sic).
Despite the status of the parties and the Assessors having been accompanied by defendant
Marcos Borillo, still the four parcels of land were declared in the name of Elpidio Borillo. It is
unconceivable (sic) why it was (sic) declared in the name of Elpidio Borillo, if it does (sic) not
belong to him. True, that tax declarations are not conclusive proof of ownership, but it cannot
be gainsaid especially in rural areas like Langiden, Abra where lands are not surveyed and
titled, that tax declarations are strong evidence of possession and ownership.

Secondly, the four parcels of land described in par. 4 of the complaint were declared in the
name of Elpidio Borillo for 29 years and no action whatsoever was taken by the defendants
to have the tax declarations (Exhibits A, A-1, A-2 and A-3) be (sic) cancelled and declared
the lands (sic) in their names during the lifetime of the declared owner Elpidio Borillo and
immediately after his death. It was only in 1977 after the filing of the complaint and after the
plaintiffs caused the cancellation of Exhibits A, A-1, A-2 and A-3 and declared the lands in
their names when defendants attempted to declare it (sic) also in their names. The
unfathomable tolerance of the defendants of having the four (4) parcels of land be (sic)
declared in the name of their deceased brother, Elpidio Borillo in 1948 and remained (sic) in
his name after his marriage with (sic) the plaintiff Esperanza Borillo in 1950 even (sic) after
his death in 1971, is fatal and strongly negate their (sic) defendants' claim of ownership. No
person like the defendants will ever allow his/her property be (sic) declared in the name of
another for twenty-nine (29) years. The fact that the lands were declared in the name of
Elpidio Borillo for twenty-nine (29) years coupled by (sic) his actual possession during his
lifetime until his death in 1971 as testified to by Esperanza Borillo and Clemente Llaneza who
is an uninterested witness strongly outweighed the evidence for the defendants and
convincingly indicate that the four parcels of land described in par. 4 of the complaint really
 belong to Elpidio Borillo. The claim of defendants that they are (sic) in actual possession
before World War II up to the present is persuasively belied by Exhibits A, A-1, A-2 and A-3
and the testimony of Clemente Llaneza.

The claim of defendant Catalina Borillo that she purchased parcels A, C and D described in
par. 4 of the complaint from her deceased brother Elpidio Borillo before World War II as
evidence (sic) by Exhibits "3" and "4" appears unreliable and incredible. Exhibit "3" which is
an acknowledgment receipt dated May 12, 1946 made no mention of what property has been
sold. There is no evidence of any transfer of ownership. In fact, there is nothing clear from
the evidence as to what land of Elpidio Borillo is referred to in Exhibit "3". From the terms of
Exhibit "3" and the alleged consideration thereof, it thus becomes obvious that it is only a
receipt evidencing a loan of P40.00.

Exhibit "4" (receipt) which is the main basis of the claim of ownership by defendant Catalina
Borillo with respect to parcels A, C and D in par. 4 of the complaint, appears unreliable and
cannot prevail against the evidence for the plaintiffs. This Exhibit "4" for defendant Catalina
Borillo is undated and unsigned. Defendant Catalina Borillo testified that she does not know
the contends of Exhibit "4". Elpidio Borillo as shown by Exhibit "3" for defendant Catalina
Borillo and Exhibits E and F for the plaintiffs knows how to write his name. Yet, Exhibit "4"
was not signed by him. Aside from the patent defects of Exhibit "4" on its face which renders
it unreliable, it will be noted that during the pre-trial proceedings, defendant Catalina Borillo
presented Exhibit "4" to support her claim as alleged in her answer of having purchased
parcels A, C and D from Elpidio Borillo in 1935. Clearly embodied, however, in Exhibit "4" are
tax declarations Nos. 0732, 0731 and 0734 which are indeed tax declarations in 1948 in the
name of Elpidio Borillo. Considering that Exhibit "4" is a document executed in 1935 according
to the defendant Catalina Borillo, why are Tax Declarations Nos. 731, 732 and 734 which were
issued only in 1948 incorporated? The inclusion of non-existent document (sic) in Exhibit "4"
at the time of its alleged execution absolutely renders Exhibit "4" wholly unworthy and
undeserving of any credence. 9

Private respondent appealed from the adverse decision to the respondent Court. Her co-defendant, Marcos
Borillo, did not.

The appeal was docketed as C.A.-G.R. No. 64536-R. In her Appellant's Brief, private respondent assigns the
following errors:

THAT THE FACTS RELIED UPON IS (sic) NOT SUPPORTED BY EVIDENCE.

II

THAT THE DECISION IS NOT IN ACCORDANCE WITH LAW.

On 3 September 1980, the respondent Court promulgated its decision 10 reversing the decision of the trial
court, thus:

WHEREFORE, the judgment appealed from is hereby set aside and another judgment is hereby
rendered declaring defendant Catalina Borillo as the owner of parcels (a), (c) and (d) and of
the one-fifth portion of Elpidio Borillo in parcels (e) and (f); that defendant Marcos Borillo is
the owner of parcel (b); with costs against the plaintiffs.

SO ORDERED.

The respondent Court made the following disquisitions to support its decision:

We are convinced that the preponderance of the evidence tilt (sic) heavily in favor of
defendant. Defendant established she has been in possession in the concept of owner of said
three parcels of land (a), (c) and (d) since her purchase of the same long before the war and
she cultivated the same in the concept of owner, paying the real estate taxes and thereafter
declaring it in her name while Marcos Borillo acquired parcel (b) from Elpidio since 1938 of
which he took possession in the concept of owner, and declared the same in his name paying
the real estate taxes. No less than Melecio Borillo, son of plaintiff Esperanza, not only withdrew
as party plaintiff with his sister Patricia but he even testified that he knew from the very
mouth of his father Elpidio while he was still alive that he sold the property in question to
defendant Catalina Borillo. It has also been shown that Elpidio Borillo sold his 1/5 portion of
parcels (e) and (f) also before the war to defendant and she had been in continuous
possession since then in the concept of owner.
 Under Article 1137 of the Civil Code, such uninterrupted, adverse, open possession for thirty
(30) years by defendants regardless of their title or good faith upholds said defendants' right
over the property. (Parcotillo vs. Parcotillo, 12 SCRA 435, 440).

In finding for the plaintiffs the trial court relied on the tax declarations in the name of Elpidio
as proof that plaintiffs are the owners of the questioned property since the property is untitled;
that for 29 years no action was taken by defendants to declare the property in their name
(sic) and it was only in 1977 after the filing of the complaint that defendants so declared the
properties in their name (sic); that Exhibit 4 is unreliable being unsigned by Elpidio when
there is evidence that he could sign his name; that Exhibit 3 did not mention the property
sold; that Exhibit 4 was made in 1935 as alleged in the answer but surprisingly it embodied
Tax Declarations 731, 732 and 734 which were issued only in 1948; and that the alleged sale
of the right of Elpidio over parcels (e) and (f) are without receipts.

We disagree. Declaration of ownership for taxation purposes, or assessment declaration and

tax receipts do not constitute evidence of ownership. They are only prima facie evidence of
possession. (Evangelista vs. Tabayuyong, 7 Phil. 607; Casimiro vs. Fernandez, 9 Phil. 562)
However, if the holder of a (sic) land presents a deed of conveyance in his favor from the
former owner thereof to support his claim of ownership, the declaration of ownership and tax
receipts relative to the property may be used to prove good faith on his part in occupying and
possessing the same. (Elumbaring vs. Elumbaring, 12 Phi. 384) And while it is true that tax
receipts do not prove titled (sic) to a land, nevertheless when considered with the actual
possession of the property by the applicant, they constitute evidence of great weight in
support of the claim of title of ownership by prescription. (Viernes vs. Agpaoa, 41 Phil. 286;
Land Registration and Mortgages by Ventura, pp. 125-126)

Plaintiffs admitted that defendants are in possession of the lands in question and the records
show that even during the lifetime of Elpidio, the defendant had been paying the real property
taxes of the property (Exhs. 1 to 1-I). The sale of parcels (a), (c) and (d) to defendant is
evidenced by Exhibits 3 and 4. Although Exhibit 3 does not indicate the property subject of
the sale, such deficiency can be attributed to the fact that this was a document executed
between brother and sister without the assistance of a lawyer but testimonial evidence has
been adduced that cured this defect. True it is that Exhibit 4 appears not to have been signed
by Elpidio and he merely imprinted a cross over his name when it appears that he knew how
to sign. However, defendants Catalina and Marcos Borillo categorically testified that Elpidio
signed his name only by copying a sample. Hence, it is understandable if Elpidio did not sign
Exhibit 4 for he must not have been furnished a (sic) guide to be copied. No evidence was
adduced that Exhibit 4 was actually executed in 1935. What was established is that Elpidio
sold said three parcels to defendant Catalina before the war. In confirmation of said sale,
Exhibit 4 must have been executed on or before 1948 that is why it reflects the Tax
Declarations of said property to be effective in the same year.

On the other hand, outside of the fact that the property remained to be declared in the name
of Elpidio plaintiffs have not adduced any other evidence to buttress their claim of ownership.
Plaintiff Esperanza paid for the real property taxes of the property only on June 22, 1977 after
the complaint was filed in court. (Exhibit C) It is not improbable that the reason why the
properties remained in the name of Elpidio inspite of the fact that it has long been sold to
defendants is because this is a sale between brother and sister where mutual trust and
confidence is to be expected. Indeed, during the lifetime of Elpidio he never questioned the
acts of ownership exercised by the defendants over the property and even after his death in
1970, plaintiff Esperanza only remembered to assert their alleged right in 1976 when she
attempted to talk to defendant who told her it was already sold to them and yet it was only
in 1977 that the complaint was filed.

Petitioner took this present recourse asking Us to review the respondent Court's findings of facts and reverse
its decision on the ground that the same is based solely on "speculation, surmise and conjecture," and that
it committed a "misapprehension of facts."

After private respondent filed her Comment and the petitioner submitted a Reply, this Court gave due course
to the petition 11 and required the petitioner to submit her Brief within thirty (30) days from
notice, 12 which she complied with. 13 Private respondent subsequently filed her Brief. 14

The petition is meritorious.

To begin with, the respondent Court committed a grave error in reversing the trial court's judgment insofar
as it concerns defendant Marcos Borillo. As earlier stated, the latter did not appeal from the trial court's
decision. As against him, and more particularly with respect to parcel (b), the decision has long become
final and the respondent Court is without jurisdiction to review the same. 15 Otherwise stated, beyond the
period to appeal, a judgment is no longer within the scope of the power of review of any court. 16 The
appeal interposed by private respondent did not benefit Marcos Borillo because the former does not have
anything to do with parcel (b) and the defense in respect thereto is exclusive to the latter.
The respondent Court likewise erred in reversing the trial court and ruling that private respondent is the
owner of parcels (a), (c) and (d) and Elpidio Borillo's 1/5 pro-indiviso share in parcels (e) and (f).

It is of course settled that the appellate court's findings of fact are binding and must be respected by this
Court. 17 There are, however, recognized exceptions thereto, 18 among which are when the factual findings
of the trial court and the appellate court are conflicting, 19 when they are totally devoid of support in the
record or are so glaringly erroneous as to constitute serious abuse of discretion. 20

These exceptions obtain in the present case.

The fact that parcels (a), (c) and (d) were originally owned by Elpidio Borillo is not disputed by private
respondent. In fact, she claims to have derived her title over the same from the former through a sale in
1935. Thus, the question to be resolved is whether or not Elpidio Borillo did in fact sell the said parcels of
land to the private respondent.

To substantiate her claim, private respondent presented two (2) documents, Exhibits "3" and "4". The trial
court in its judgment described Exhibit "3", dated 12 May 1946, as a mere acknowledgment receipt of a
loan of P40.00 and not a sale for it does not mention any property sold and is not acknowledged before a
notary public. It then concluded that said instrument is a mere receipt evidencing a loan. On the other hand,
Exhibit ''4'' is an undated and unsigned document written in lead pencil on simple grade paper. The
instrument has no witnesses, is not acknowledged before a notary public and has a mere cross over the
written name of Elpidio Borillo. It was duly proven that Elpidio knew how to write and sign his name.
Although Exhibit "4" was purportedly executed in 1935, the same mentions Tax Declaration Nos. 0731,
0732, 0733 and 0734 issued in 1948 in the name of Elpidio Borillo. Private respondent herself testified that
she had no knowledge of the contents of said instrument. The trial court ruled Exhibit "4" as "wholly
unworthy and undeserving of any credence."

In reversing the foregoing findings, the respondent Court tried to justify the deficiencies and discrepancies
in Exhibit "3" by saying that the absence of specifications as to what property was sold is understandable
because the transaction was between brother and sister. It added that this defect was cured by testimonial
evidence. It made no attempt, however, to explain the variance in the date of the alleged sale (1935) and
the date of the instrument (1946).

As to Exhibit "4", the respondent Court accepted private respondent's explanation for the absence of the
signature of Elpidio Borillo on the purported deed of sale saying that contrary to petitioner's assertion, Elpidio
did not really know how to write his name. Private respondent and Marcos Borillo testified that Elpidio's
signature appeared on his voter's registration record and voter's ID card 21 only because he was given a
sample to copy. They declared that unlike those occasions, at the time of the sale, Elpidio was not given
any sample to copy; this explains why he just printed a cross over his name. As to why it mentions tax
declarations issued in 1948, although it is claimed to have been executed in 1935, the respondent Court
theorizes and speculates that:

. . . In confirmation of said sale, Exhibit 4 must have been executed on or before 1948 that
is why it reflects the Tax Declarations of said property to be effective in the same year. 22

It is thus clear that what was originally submitted by private respondent as the original deed of sale was
later accepted by the respondent Court as a deed of confirmation of sale.

Both Exhibits "3" and "4" are private documents. Hence, before they may be received in evidence, their due
execution and authenticity must first be proven by the party presenting them. 23 At the hearing of this case
before the trial court, the controlling rule on this point was Section 21, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court which
provided:

Sec. 21. Private writing, its execution and authenticity, how proved. — Before any private
writing may be received in evidence, its due execution and authenticity must be proved either:

(a) By anyone who saw the writing executed;

(b) By evidence of the genuineness of the handwriting of the maker; or

(c) By a subscribing witness. 24

Private respondent did not present anyone who actually saw the execution of Exhibits "3" and "4", witnessed
Elpidio affix his signature on Exhibit "3" or make the cross over his written name in Exhibit "4". There are
no subscribing witnesses. The due execution then of Exhibits "3" and "4", as the alleged deeds of sale
transferring title over said parcels of land to private respondent, was not satisfactorily proven; thus, the
same can not be received in evidence.

Even if We are to assume that Exhibits "3" and "4" are admissible in evidence, they still do not satisfactorily
prove the transfers of titles over the subject parcels to the private respondent. As earlier pointed out, Exhibit
"3" makes no mention of any property sold. Hence, it hardly qualifies as a deed of sale. It suffers from a
patent and not just an intrinsic ambiguity. The respondent Court then committed an error by giving credence
to the testimonies offered to cure such ambiguity. It disregarded the parol evidence rule then applicable,
namely, Section 7, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court, which provided as follows:

Sec. 7. Evidence of written agreement. — When the terms of an agreement have been
reduced to writing, it is to be considered as containing all such terms, and, therefore, there
can be, between the parties and their successors in interest, no evidence of the terms of the
agreement other than the contents of the writing, except in the following cases:

(a) Where a mistake or imperfection of the writing, or its failure to express the
true intent and agreement of the parties, or the validity of the agreement is
put in issue by the pleadings;

(b) When there is an intrinsic ambiguity in the writing.

The term "agreement" includes wills. 25

Before parol evidence may be admitted in order to identify, explain or define the subject matter of a writing,
it must first be shown that the writing itself already contains a description sufficient to serve as a foundation
for the admission of such parol evidence; the evidence should also be consistent with the writing. Otherwise
stated, in order to admit parol evidence to aid in the description of the subject matter of a deed or other
writing, there must be a description that will serve as a foundation for such evidence; the writing must at
least give some data from which the description may be found and made certain. Parol evidence is not
admissible to identify the property where the description thereof is so vague as to amount to no description
at all. In other words, parol evidence is not permitted to supply a description, but only to apply it. 26

In his Commentary on the Rules of Court, 27 former Chief Justice Manuel V. Moran explains the rule in the
evident of patent ambiguity, as is the case in Exhibit "3":

. . . The rule is that "if the words of a document are so defective or ambiguous as to be
unmeaning, no evidence can be given to show what the author of the document intended to
say." (Steph, Evidence, Art. 91) The reason for the rule, in the language of Mr. Justice Story,
is that "if the language be too doubtful for any settled construction, by the admission of parol
evidence you create and do not merely construe the contract. You attempt to do that for the
party which he has not chosen to do for himself; and the law very property denies such an
authority to courts of Justice." (Peisch v. Dickson, Fed. Cas. No. 10, 911, 1 Mason, 9.) As Lord
Bacon said, "Ambiguitas patens cannot be holpen by averment." (Bacon, Max., 23) A case of
patent ambiguity is that of a deed wherein "a parcel of land" without description is donated.
The donation is void. The uncertainty cannot be explained by parol evidence. (Wigmore on
Evidence, 2d. ed., p. 414.) The following appears to be the most accurate and most
comprehensive statement of the rule regarding patent ambiguity: "In other words and more
generally, if the court, placing itself in the situation in which the testator or contracting party
stood at the time of executing the instrument, and with a full understanding of the force and
import of the words, cannot ascertain his meaning and intention from the language of the
instrument, then it is a case of incurable, hopeless uncertainty and the instrument is,
therefore, so far inoperative and void." (Palmer v. Albee, 50 Ia., 429, 432, quoting 1 Greenleaf
on Evidence, par. 300.)

As to Exhibit "4", We agree with the trial court that it could not have been prepared in 1935, as contended
by private respondent, because it makes reference to Tax Declarations issued in 1948, thirteen (13) years
later. Common sense and logic reject such contention. Unfortunately, the respondent Court belabored the
explanation that Exhibit "4" must have been executed on or before 1948 to confirm the prior sale. This is
unacceptable as it is purely conjectural. Absent any evidence that it was signed by Elpidio Borillo, it is not
difficult to conclude that this document does not proceed from any legitimate source. It is one which could
easily be fabricated. The trial court did not then err when it considered Exhibit "4" as "wholly unworthy and
undeserving of any credence."

It is not also true, as was held by the respondent Court, that the conclusion of the trial court that Elpidio
Borillo was in possession of the property in concept of owner until his death, is based solely on the tax
declarations in his name. As shown earlier, the court considered the testimonies of the petitioner and one
Clemente Llaneza whom the trial court described as "an uninterested witness." Thus:

. . . The fact that the lands were declared in the name of Elpidio Borillo for twenty-nine (29)
years coupled by his actual possession during his lifetime until his death in 1971 as testified
to by Esperanza Borillo and Clemente Llaneza who is an uninterested witness strongly
outweighed the evidence for the defendants and convincingly indicate that the four parcels of
land described in paragraph 4 of the complaint really belong to Elpidio Borillo. . . .

It is thus clear that the authorities cited by the respondent Court on the probative value of the tax
declarations favor the herein petitioner and not the private respondent. For indeed, while tax declarations
and tax receipts do not constitute evidence of ownership, they are prima facie evidence of possession.
Accordingly, since Elpidio Borillo, during his lifetime, and then the petitioner, after his death, secured and
were issued tax declarations for the parcels of land in question, and were in fact in possession thereof, the
excuse offered by private respondent as to her failure to obtain the tax declarations deserves no
consideration at all. The flimsiness or implausibility of the excuse becomes more apparent when We consider
the findings of the trial court that private respondent has other properties declared in her name for taxation
purposes and that neither she nor Marcos objected to the measurement by the assessors of the four (4)
parcels for Elpidio Borillo.

The conclusion then is inevitable that the late Elpidio Borillo did not sell and alienate parcels (a), (c) and (d)
to private respondent.

As to parcels (e) (f), private respondent presented no deed of sale in her favor.

Private respondent can not likewise seek refuge under a claim of ownership by virtue of acquisitive
prescription.

Acquisitive prescription of dominion requires that there be public, peaceful and uninterrupted possession in
the concept of owner 28 for a period of ten (10) years, in case of ordinary prescription, 29 and thirty (30)
years, in case of extraordinary prescription. 30

After reviewing the evidence presented before it, the trial court concluded that Elpidio Borillo had actual,
peaceful and continuous possession of the subject parcels of land during his lifetime and until his death in
1970. The respondent Court reversed this finding and ruled that it was private respondent who had the
possession since her purchase thereof in 1935.

It is a matter of judicial policy to accord the trial court's findings of facts with the highest respect and not
to disturb the same on appeal unless there are strong and impelling reasons to do so. 31 The reason for
this is that trial courts have more opportunity and facilities to examine factual matters than appellate
courts. 32 They are in a better position to assess the credibility of witnesses, not only by the nature of their
testimonies, but also by their demeanor on the stand. 33

In Shauf vs. Court of Appeals, 34 We ruled:

Elementary is the rule that the conclusions and findings of fact of the trial court are entitled
to great weight on appeal and should not be disturbed unless for strong and cogent reasons.
(Vda. de Alberto, et al. vs. CA, et al., 173 SCRA 436 [1989]) Absent any substantial proof,
therefore, that the trial court's decision was grounded entirely on speculations, surmises or
conjectures, the same must be accorded full consideration and respect. This should be so
because the trial court is, after all, in a much better position to observe and correctly
appreciate the respective parties' evidence as they were presented. (Matabuena vs. CA, et
al., 173 SCRA 170 [1989])

We find no impelling, compelling or cogent reason to overturn the findings of fact of the trial court.

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is GRANTED. The challenged decision of the Court of Appeals is hereby
REVERSED and SET ASIDE and the judgment of the Regional Trial Court of Abra dated 3 June 1978 in Civil
Case No. 1043 is hereby AFFIRMED and REINSTATED.
 ADELA G. RAYMUNDO, EDGARDO R. G.R. No. 171036
RAYMUNDO, LOURDES R. RAYMUNDO,
TERESITA N. RAYMUNDO, EVELYN R. SANTOS,
ZENAIDA N. RAYMUNDO, LUIS N. RAYMUNDO,
JR. and LUCITA R. DELOS REYES,

Petitioners,

- versus -

ERNESTO LUNARIA, ROSALINDA RAMOS and Promulgated:

HELEN MENDOZA,

Respondents.
October 17, 2008

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DECISION

QUISUMBING, J.:

Assailed in this petition for review are the Court of Appeals Decision [1] dated October 10, 2005 and the
Resolution[2] dated January 10, 2006 in CA-G.R. CV No. 75593.

The facts in this case are as follows:

Sometime in May 1996, petitioners approached respondent Lunaria to help them find a buyer for their property
situated at Marilao, Bulacan with an area of 12,126 square meters for the amount of P60,630,000. Respondent
Lunaria was promised a 5% agents commission in the event that he finds a buyer. After respondents found a
buyer, Cecilio Hipolito, an Exclusive Authority to Sell[3] was executed embodying the agreement made by the
parties. After the corresponding Deed of Absolute Sale of Real Property[4] was registered in the Registry of
Deeds, a copy thereof was given to the Far East Bank and Trust Co., which was then holding in escrow the
amount of P50,000,000 to be disbursed or paid against the total consideration or price of the property.

On February 14, 1997, Ceferino G. Raymundo, one of the co-owners, advised respondents to go to the bank
to receive the amount of P1,196,000 as partial payment of their total commission. Also, respondents were
instructed to return after seven days to get the balance of the commission due them.

On February 21, 1997, respondents returned to the bank. However, the check covering the balance
of their commission was already given by the bank manager to Lourdes R. Raymundo, the representative
of the petitioners. Respondents tried to get the check from the petitioners, however, they were told that
there is nothing more due them by way of commission as they have already divided and distributed the
balance of the commissions among their nephews and nieces.

For their part, petitioners counter that there was a subsequent verbal agreement entered into by the
parties after the execution of the written agreement. Said verbal agreement provides that the 5% agents
commission shall be divided as follows: 2/5 for the agents, 2/5 for Lourdes Raymundo, and 1/5 for the buyer,
Hipolito. The share given to Lourdes Raymundo shall be in consideration for the help she would extend in the
processing of documents of sale of the property, the payment of the capital gains tax to the Bureau of Internal
Revenue and in securing an order from the court. The 1/5 commission given to Hipolito, on the other hand, will
be used by him for the payment of realty taxes.
Hence, for failure of the respondents to receive the balance of their agents commission, they filed an action
for the collection of a sum of money before the Regional Trial Court of Valenzuela City, Branch 172.
On January 22, 2002, the trial court rendered a Decision [5] in favor of the respondents. The dispositive
portion of said decision reads:

WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered as follows:

1) Ordering the defendants, jointly and severally, to pay the plaintiffs the amount
of P1,834,900.00, representing the unpaid commission, plus interest thereon at the legal rate
from the filing of this case until fully paid;

2) Ordering the defendants to, jointly and severally, pay the plaintiffs the amount
of P200,000.00 as moral damages and the amount of P100,000.00 as exemplary damages;
and

3) Ordering the defendants [to], jointly and severally, pay the plaintiffs the amount
of P150,000.00 as attorneys fees, plus the costs of suit.

SO ORDERED.[6]

Aggrieved, petitioners appealed. In a Decision dated October 10, 2005, the Court of Appeals affirmed the
decision of the trial court with the modification that the amount of moral and exemplary damages awarded
to respondents shall be reduced. The dispositive portion reads:

WHEREFORE, the appealed Decision dated January 22, 2002 is affirmed, subject to
the modification that the award of moral damages is reduced to P50,000.00 and exemplary
damages to P25,000.00.

SO ORDERED.[7]

On October 28, 2005, petitioners filed a Motion for Reconsideration. [8] However, it was denied in a
Resolution dated January 10, 2006. Hence, the instant petition raising the following issues:

I.

THE HONORABLE COURT SERIOUSLY ERRED IN APPLYING THE PAROLE EVIDENCE RULE IN
THIS CASE (DECISION, PAGE 7, PARAGRAPH 1). THIS PRINCIPLE HAS NO APPLICATION TO
THE FACTS OF THE INSTANT CASE.

II.

FURTHER, IT ERRED IN REQUIRING, ALBEIT IMPLICITLY, THE PETITIONERS TO ESTABLISH

THE VERBAL AGREEMENT MODIFYING THE EARLIER WRITTEN AGREEMENT (THE EXCLUSIVE
AUTHORITY TO SELL) BY MORE THAN A PREPONDERANCE OF EVIDENCE (DECISION, PAGE
8). THIS IS PLAINLY CONTRARY TO LAW THAT MERELY REQUIRES PREPONDERANCE OF
EVIDENCE IN CIVIL CASES.

III.

FINALLY, EVEN CONCEDING FOR THE SAKE OF ARGUMENT THAT PETITIONERS STILL OWE
THE RESPONDENTS THE BALANCE OF THEIR COMMISSION, THE HONORABLE COURT ERRED
IN RULING THE PETITIONERS ARE EACH JOINTLY AND SEVERALLY [LIABLE] FOR THE
PAYMENT OF THE ENTIRE BROKERS FEES. THIS RULING HAS NO LEGAL BASIS AND IS
CONTRARY TO ART. 1207 OF THE NEW CIVIL CODE.[9]
 Plainly stated, the issues for resolution are: Did the Court of Appeals err (1) in applying the parol
evidence rule; (2) in requiring petitioners to establish their case by more than a preponderance of evidence;
and (3) in holding petitioners jointly and severally liable for the payment of the entire brokers fees?

Anent the first issue, petitioners contend that the Court of Appeals erred in applying the parol
evidence rule to the facts of the case because the verbal agreement was entered into subsequent to the
written agreement. Further, they aver that there is no rule that requires an agreement modifying an earlier
agreement to be in the same form as the earlier agreement in order for such modification or amendment to
be valid.

Conversely, respondents argue that the Court of Appeals did not apply the parol evidence rule in this
case. Although the appellate court stated and emphasized the general legal principle and rule on parol
evidence, it did not apply the parol evidence rule with regard to the evidence adduced by the petitioners.

We rule for the respondents. To begin with, we agree with petitioners claim that the parol evidence
rule does not apply to the facts of this case. First, the parol evidence rule forbids any addition to or
contradiction of the terms of a written instrument by testimony or other evidence purporting to show that, at
or before the execution of the parties written agreement, other or different terms were agreed upon by the
parties, varying the purport of the written contract. [10] Notably, the claimed verbal agreement was agreed
upon not prior to but subsequent to the written agreement. Second, the validity of the written agreement
is not the matter which is being put in issue here. What is questioned is the validity of the claim that a
subsequent verbal agreement was agreed upon by the parties after the execution of the written agreement
which substantially modified their earlier written agreement.

Nonetheless, even if we apply the parol evidence rule in this case, the evidence presented by the
petitioners fell short in proving that a subsequent verbal agreement was in fact entered into by the parties.
We subscribe to the findings of both the trial court and the appellate court that the evidence presented by
petitioners did not establish the existence of the alleged subsequent verbal agreement. As pointed out by
the trial court:

Note that no written evidence was presented by the defendants to show that the
plaintiffs [herein respondents] agreed to the above-sharing of the commission. The fact is
that the plaintiffs are denying having ever entered into such sharing agreement. For if the
plaintiffs as sales agents indeed agreed to share the commission they are entitled to receive
by virtue of the Exclusive Authority to Sell with Lourdes G. Raymundo and Hipolito, it passes
understanding why no written agreement to that effect was ever made. The absence of such
written agreement is mute but telling testimony that no such sharing arrangement was ever
made.[11]

As to the second issue, petitioners contend that the appellate court erred in requiring them to prove
the existence of the subsequent verbal agreement by more than a mere preponderance of evidence since
no rule of evidence requires them to do so. In support of this allegation, petitioners presented petitioner
Lourdes Raymundo who testified that she was given 2/5 share of the commission pursuant to the verbal
sharing scheme because she took care of the payment of the capital gains tax, the preparation of the
documents of sale and of securing an authority from the court to sell the property.

For their part, respondents counter that the appellate court did not require petitioners to prove the
existence of the subsequent oral agreement by more than a mere preponderance of evidence. What the
appellate court said is that the petitioners failed to prove and establish the alleged subsequent verbal
agreement even by mere preponderance of evidence.
 Petitioners abovecited allegation has no merit. By preponderance of evidence is meant that the
evidence as a whole adduced by one side is superior to that of the other. [12] It refers to the weight, credit
and value of the aggregate evidence on either side and is usually considered to be synonymous with the
term greater weight of evidence or greater weight of the credible evidence. It is evidence which is more
convincing to the court as worthy of belief than that which is offered in opposition thereto. [13]

Both the appellate court and trial court ruled that the evidence presented by the petitioners is not
sufficient to support their allegation that a subsequent verbal agreement was entered into by the parties.
In fact, both courts correctly observed that if Lourdes Raymundo was in reality offered the 2/5 share of the
agents commission for the purpose of assisting respondent Lunaria in the documentation requirement, then
why did the petitioners not present any written court order on her authority, tax receipt or sales document
to support her self-serving testimony? Moreover, even the worksheet allegedly reflecting the commission
sharing was unilaterally prepared by petitioner Lourdes Raymundo without any showing that respondents
participated in the preparation thereof or gave their assent thereto. Even the alleged payment of 1/5 of the
commission to the buyer to be used in the payment of the realty taxes cannot be given credence since the
payment of realty taxes is the obligation of the owners, and not the buyer. Lastly, if the said sharing
agreement was entered into pursuant to the wishes of the buyer, then he should have been presented as
witness to corroborate the claim of the petitioners. However, he was not.

As to the third issue, petitioners contend that the appellate court erred in holding that the petitioners
were each jointly and severally liable for the payment of the brokers fees. They contend that the Civil Code
provides that unless the parties have expressly agreed to be jointly and severally liable for the entire brokers
fees, each of the petitioners should only be held liable to the extent of their pro-indiviso share in the property
sold.

For their part, respondents argue that the appellate court did not err in affirming the joint and
several liability of the petitioners. They aver that if there was error on the part of the trial court, it was not
raised or assigned as error by petitioners in their appeal. It was also not included in the Statement of Issues
in their brief which they submitted for resolution by the Court of Appeals. In fact, the same was never
mentioned, much less questioned, by petitioners in their brief.

On this score, we agree with respondents. The general rule is that once an issue has been adjudicated in a
valid final judgment of a competent court, it can no longer be controverted anew and should be finally laid to
rest.[14] In this case, petitioners failed to address the issue on their solidary liability when they appealed to
the Court of Appeals. They are now estopped to question that ruling. As to them, the issue on their liability is
already valid and binding.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED for lack of merit. The Decision dated October 10, 2005 and
the Resolution dated January 10, 2006 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 75593
are AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioners. SO ORDERED.
SPOUSES WILFREDO G.R. No. 171707

and ANGELA AMONCIO,

Petitioners,

-versus-

AARON GO BENEDICTO,

Respondent. Promulgated:

July 28, 2008

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DECISION

CORONA, J.:

At bar is an appeal by certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court assailing the decision of the

Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 79341[1] which, in turn, affirmed the decision of the Regional Trial

Court (RTC), Branch 82 of Quezon City.

The facts follow.

On July 15, 1997, petitioners Wilfredo and Angela Amoncio entered into a contract of lease with a

certain Ernesto Garcia over a 120 sq. m. portion of their 600 sq. m. property in Quezon City.

On August 20, 1997, petitioners entered into another contract of lease, this time with respondent

Aaron Go Benedicto over a 240 sq. m. portion of the same property. The contract read:

WHEREAS, the Lessor is the absolute owner of a parcel of land with an area of (600)
[sq. m.] situated in Neopolitan, Quezon City covered by T.C. T. No. 50473 of the Register of
Deeds of Quezon City, 240 [sq. m.] of which is being leased to the lessee;

That for and in consideration of the amount of NINETEEN THOUSAND TWO HUNDRED
PESOS (P19,200.00), Philippines Currency, monthly rental[,] the Lessor herein lease a portion
of said parcel of land with an area of 240 sq. m. to the lessee, subject to the following terms
and conditions:

1. That the term of the lease is for [f]ive (5) years renewable
annually for a maximum of five (5) years from the execution of this contract;

2. The Lessee shall pay in advance the monthly rental for the land
in the amount of ONE HUNDRED FIFTEEN THOUSAND TWO HUNDRED PESOS
(P115,200.00) Philippines Currency equivalent to three (3) months deposit
and three (3) months advance rental; commencing November, 1997;
 3. The [Lessee] shall issue postdated checks for the succeeding
rentals to the Lessor;

4. That in the event of failure to complete the term of the lease, the
lessee is still liable to answer for the rentals of the remaining period;

5. That all the improvement on the land leased shall automatically

become the property of the Lessor after the expiration of the term of the
lease;

6. That the leased parcel of land shall be devoted exclusively for the
construction supply business of the [Lessee];[2]

xxx xxx xxx

10. Design specification needs final approval by the Lessor[,] while structural
improvements would have to conform to local government specification,
taxes on structural improvement will be for the account of the Lessee. [3]

In December 1997, Garcia and respondent took possession of their respective leased portions.

In July 1999, Garcia pre-terminated his contract with petitioners. Respondent, on the other hand,

stayed on until June 8, 2000. According to petitioners, respondent stopped paying his monthly rentals in

December 1999. Shortly thereafter, petitioners claimed they discovered respondent putting up

improvements on another 120 sq. m. portion of their property which was never leased to him nor to Garcia.

They added he had also occupied Garcias portion immediately after the latter left.[4]

Petitioners asked respondent to pay his arrears and desist from continuing with his construction but

he took no heed. Because of respondents failure to meet petitioners demands, they asked him to vacate the

property. On January 27, 2000, they rescinded the lease contract.

On June 23, 2000, petitioners filed in the RTC of Quezon City a case [5] for recovery of possession of
real property against respondent. In the complaint, petitioners asked respondent to pay the following: (1)

rent from January 27, 2000 or from the time his lease contract was rescinded until he vacated the property;

(2) rent for Garcias portion from August 1999 until he vacated it and (3) rent for the remaining 120 sq. m.
which was not covered by his or Garcias contract. Petitioners likewise insisted that respondent was liable to

pay his arrears from December 1999 until the expiration of his lease contract in August 2002. According to

them, the lease contract provided:

in the event of [respondents] failure to complete the term of the lease, [he would]
still be liable to answer for the rentals of the remaining period.[6]

In his answer with counterclaim, respondent denied petitioners accusations and alleged that it was them

who owed him money. According to him, he and petitioner Wilfredo Amoncio agreed to construct five

commercial buildings on petitioners property. One of the buildings was to go to Garcia, two to petitioners

and the last two to him. They also agreed that he was to finance the construction and petitioners were to

pay him for the two buildings assigned to them.

 Respondent added he was to pay the rentals for five years and surrender the buildings (on his leased

portion) to petitioners after the lapse of said period. However, in June 2000, he vacated the premises after

he and petitioners could no longer settle things amicably.

Respondent asked to be paid: (1) P600,000 for the construction cost of the two buildings that went

to petitioners[7]; (2) P300,000 as adjusted cost of the portion leased to him and (3) P10,000 as attorneys

fees.

After trial, the RTC gave credence to respondents version and dismissed petitioners case for lack of factual

and legal basis. It also granted respondents counterclaim:

WHEREFORE, premises considered. Judgment is hereby rendered in favor of

[respondent] and against [petitioners] DISMISSING the latters complaint for lack of factual
and legal basis.

On the counterclaim, [petitioners] are hereby ordered to pay [respondent] as follows:

a. The sum of SIX HUNDRED THOUSAND (P600,000) PESOS

representing the cost of the two improvements constructed on the remaining portion
of the [petitioners] lot.

b. The sum of THREE HUNDRED THOUSAND PESOS (P300,000)

PESOS representing the adjusted cost of the two improvements likewise constructed
by [respondent][,] possession of which was terminated two and a half years before
the stipulated term of five (5) years.

c. The sum of TEN THOUSAND (P10,000) PESOS as and by way of

attorneys fees.

SO ORDERED.[8]

Petitioners elevated the case to the CA. There, petitioners argued that the RTC erred in (1) denying

their claim for payment of rentals both for the unexpired period of the lease and for the portions of the

property used by respondent which was not covered by his lease contract and (2) granting respondents

counterclaim although they did not allow the construction of the buildings. Petitioners likewise contended

the trial court disregarded the parol evidence rule[9] which disallowed the court from looking into any other

evidence relating to the agreement of the parties outside the written contract between them.

In its assailed decision, the CA affirmed the RTCs decision and dismissed petitioners appeal. It held that:

(1) petitioners did not adduce evidence to prove that respondent had actually occupied portions of

their property not covered by his contract;

 (2) petitioners could not insist that respondent pay the remaining period under the contract since

they were the ones who demanded that respondent vacate the premises and

(3) the rule on parol evidence could no longer apply after they failed to object to respondents

testimony (in the lower court) about their agreement regarding the construction of the

buildings.[10]

Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration but it was denied.[11] Hence, this petition.[12]

In support of this petition, petitioners essentially argue that the CA erred in ruling that: (1) they consented

to the construction of the buildings by respondent; (2) they waived their right to respondents assertion of

facts that were not embodied in the lease contract and (3) respondent was not a builder in bad faith. [13]

PETITIONERS ALLOWED THE CONSTRUCTION OF THE BUILDINGS

Petitioners first argument necessitates a review of the facts of the case which, as a general rule, is not the

task of this Court. Under Rule 45 of the Rules, this Court shall not pass upon the findings of fact by lower

courts unless they ignored salient points that would otherwise affect the outcome of the case.[14] There is

no reason for us to overturn the factual conclusions of the lower courts.

Moreover, the lower courts findings of fact were supported by the records of the case which indubitably

showed petitioners acquiescence to the construction of the buildings on their property. Petitioners denial

cannot negate the overwhelming proof that it was petitioner Wilfredo Amoncio himself who secured the

building permit for the project. He also required that all design specifications were to be approved by him. [15]

APPLICATION OF THE PAROL EVIDENCE RULE

Rule 130, Section 9 of the Rules of Court provides:

Section 9. Evidence of written agreements. When the terms of the agreement have
been reduced in writing, it is considered as containing all the terms agreed upon and there
can be, between the parties and their successors, no evidence of such terms other than the
contents of the written agreement.

The so-called parol evidence forbids any addition to or contradiction of the terms of a written

instrument by testimony purporting to show that, at or before the signing of the document, other terms

were orally agreed on by the parties.[16] Under the aforecited rule, the terms of the written contract are

conclusive upon the parties and evidence aliunde is inadmissible to vary an enforceable agreement

embodied in the document. However, the rule is not absolute and admits of exceptions:

xxx xxx xxx

 However, a party may present evidence to modify, explain or add to the terms of the
written agreement if he puts in issue in his pleading:

(a) An intrinsic ambiguity, mistake or imperfection in the written

agreement;

(b) The failure of the written agreement to express the true intent and
agreement of the parties thereto;

(c) The validity of the written agreement; or

(d) The existence of other terms agreed to by the parties or their successors
in interest after the execution of the written agreement.

The term agreement shall include wills.

The first exception applies when the ambiguity or uncertainty is readily apparent from reading the

contract. The wordings are so defective that what the author of the document intended to say cannot be

deciphered.[17] It also covers cases where the parties commit a mutual mistake of fact, [18] or where the

document is manifestly incomplete as the parties do not intend to exhibit the whole agreement but only to

define some of its terms.[19]

The second exception includes instances where the contract is so obscure that the contractual

intention of the parties cannot be understood by mere inspection of the instrument. [20] Thus, extrinsic proof

of its subject matter, of the relation of the parties and of the circumstances surrounding them when they

entered into the contract may be received as evidence.[21]

Under the third exception, the parol evidence rule does not apply where the purpose of introducing

the evidence is to show the invalidity of the contract. [22] This includes cases where a party alleges that no

written contract ever existed, or the parties fail to agree on the terms of the contract, or there is no

consideration for such agreement.[23]

The fourth exception involves a situation where the due execution of the contract or document is in

issue.[24]

The present case does not appear to fall under any of the given exceptions. However, a party to a

contract may prove the existence of any separate oral agreement as to any matter which is not inconsistent

with its terms.[25] This may be done if, from the circumstances of the case, the court believes that the

document does not convey entirely the whole of the parties transaction.[26]
 In this case, there are tell-tale signs that petitioners and respondent had other agreements aside

from those established by the lease contract. And we find it difficult to ignore them. We agree with the trial

court:

[T]hat [respondent], indeed, undertook the construction subject hereof, is not disputed by
[petitioners]. [Respondent] testified that two units thereof were intended for [petitioners],
another two units for him and one for Garcia at the cost of P300,000.00 per unit or for a total
budget of P1.5 million.

Evidence further disclosed that the [b]uilding [p]ermit issued therefor by the Building
Official bore the signature of [petitioner] Wilfredo Amoncio

the Court cannot be unmindful of [petitioner Wilfredo Amoncios denial by any

knowledge of the whole construction undertaken by herein [respondent.] But it is evident that
[petitioners] have chosen to adopt inconsistent positions which, by applicable jurisprudence,
[are] barred. Said the Court in this regard:

The doctrine of estoppel prohibits a party from assuming inconsistent

position based on the principle of election, and precludes him from repudiating
an obligation voluntarily assumed after having accepted benefits therefrom. To
countenance such repudiation would be contrary to equity and would put a
premium on fraud and misrepresentation[27]

Moreover, petitioners also failed to make a timely objection against respondents assertion of their

prior agreement on the construction of the buildings. Where a party entitled to the benefit of the parol

evidence rule allows such evidence to be received without objection, he cannot, after the trial has closed

and the case has been decided against him, invoke the rule in order to secure a reversal of the

judgment.[28] Hence, by failing to object to respondents testimony in the trial court, petitioners waived the

protection of the parol evidence rule.[29]

PAYMENT OF RENTAL

Petitioners demand the payment of the following: (1) rent from December 19, 1999 to June 8, 2000; [30] (2)

rent for the unexpired period of the lease or until August 2002 [31] and (3) rent corresponding to the portions

of the property used by respondent which, according to petitioners, were not covered by his lease

contract.[32]

Pursuant to the lease agreement, respondent paid three months advance and three months deposit

(at the inception of the lease contract), in effect already settling his rentals for six months from December

1999 to June 8, 2000. The CA correctly ruled:

While [respondent] stopped paying rentals in December 1999 and left before June 8, 2000, a period
covering six (6) months, [respondent], nonetheless, had already paid [petitioners] the
amount equivalent to six (6) months rentals [advance payment equivalent to three (3)
monthly rentals plus deposit equivalent to [another] three (3) monthly rentals][33] (emphasis
supplied)
 Regarding petitioners second claim (rent for the unexpired period of lease), we agree with the lower

courts that they (petitioners) are not entitled to it.

Without doubt, petitioners already benefited immensely from the construction of the five buildings

on their property. The amount of their claim is a pittance compared to the increase in value of their property

over the years. It would unjustly enrich them if we were to rule in their favor considering that they did not

spend a single centavo for the construction of the buildings. It was respondent who financed the entire

project which, however, was taken over completely by petitioners.

As a rule, the contract is the law between the parties that must be enforced in sensu strictione.

However, it cannot be done under the circumstances of this case. To do so would result in a patently unjust

juridical situation. We, as a court not only of justice but of equity as well, may exercise our equitas

jurisdictio to refine the rough edges of the rule and avoid injustice.[34]

Lastly, petitioners claim for rental payment for the portions (not covered by respondents lease

contract) must be dismissed. This claim was never substantiated.

PETITIONERS LIABILITY TO RESPONDENT

What remains to be resolved is petitioners liability to respondent, as held by both the RTC and the CA. Were

petitioners indeed liable to respondent for the cost of the buildings constructed on their property?Yes.

Since the trial court allowed respondents testimony as evidence of the parties prior agreement (regarding

the construction of the buildings and the cost thereof), petitioners should pay respondent. Petitioners never

disputed the construction of the two buildings given to them. If one of the contracting parties derived some

benefit but did not give anything for it to the other, it is only fair that he should return the amount by which

he was unjustly enriched.[35] Equity dictates that petitioners be held liable for the expenses incurred by

respondent in constructing the buildings that went to them. No man ought to be enriched by anothers

injury.[36] Nemo ex alterius incommonde debet lecupletari.

Finally, following our ruling that petitioners knew of the construction of the buildings, any discussion on the

issue of whether respondent was a builder in bad faith is no longer necessary.

WHEREFORE, the assailed decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 79341 is hereby AFFIRMED.
Treble costs against petitioners.

SO ORDERED.

ESTATE OF ORLANDO LLENADO G.R. No. 145736

and WENIFREDA T. LLENADO, in her capacity as (a) Administratrix of the Estate of Orlando A.
Llenado and (b) Judicial Guardian of the Minor children of Orlando A. Llenado, and (c) in

her Own behalf as the Surviving Spouse and Legal Heir of Orlando A. Llenado,

Petitioners,

- versus –

EDUARDO LLENADO, JORGE LLENADO, FELIZA GALLARDO VDA. DE LLENADO and REGISTER

OF DEEDS of Valenzuela City, Promulgated:

Metro Manila,

Respondents. March 4, 2009

x ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- x

DECISION
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:

This petition for review on certiorari assails the May 30, 2000 Decision[1] of the Court of Appeals in
CA-G.R. CV No. 58911 which reversed the May 5, 1997 Decision [2] of the Regional Trial Court of Valenzuela
City, Branch 75 in Civil Case No. 4248-V-93, and the October 6, 2000 Resolution[3] which denied the motion
for reconsideration. The appellate court dismissed for lack of merit the complaint for annulment of deed of
conveyance, title and damages filed by petitioner against herein respondents.

The subject of this controversy is a parcel of land denominated as Lot 249-D-1 (subject lot) consisting
of 1,554 square meters located in Barrio Malinta, Valenzuela, Metro Manila and registered in the names of
Eduardo Llenado (Eduardo) and Jorge Llenado (Jorge) under Transfer of Certificate of Title (TCT) No. V-
1689.[4] The subject lot once formed part of Lot 249-D owned by and registered in the name of their father,
Cornelio Llenado (Cornelio), under TCT No. T-16810.

On December 2, 1975, Cornelio leased Lot 249-D-1 to his nephew, Romeo Llenado (Romeo), for a
period of five years, renewable for another five years at the option of Cornelio. On March 31, 1978, Cornelio,
Romeo and the latters cousin Orlando Llenado (Orlando) executed an Agreement [5] whereby Romeo
assigned all his rights to Orlando over the unexpired portion of the aforesaid lease contract. The parties
further agreed that Orlando shall have the option to renew the lease contract for another three years
commencing from December 3, 1980, up to December 2, 1983, renewable for another four years or up to
December 2, 1987, and that during the period that [this agreement] is enforced, the x x x property cannot
be sold, transferred, alienated or conveyed in whatever manner to any third party.

Shortly thereafter or on June 24, 1978, Cornelio and Orlando entered into a Supplementary
Agreement[6] amending the March 31, 1978 Agreement. Under the Supplementary Agreement, Orlando was
given an additional option to renew the lease contract for an aggregate period of 10 years at five-year
intervals, that is, from December 3, 1987 to December 2, 1992 and from December 3, 1992 to December
2, 1997. The said provision was inserted in order to comply with the requirements of Mobil Philippines, Inc.
for the operation of a gasoline station which was subsequently built on the subject lot.

Upon the death of Orlando on November 7, 1983, his wife, Wenifreda Llenado (Wenifreda), took over
the operation of the gasoline station. Meanwhile, on January 29, 1987, Cornelio sold Lot 249-D to his
children, namely, Eduardo, Jorge, Virginia and Cornelio, Jr., through a deed of sale, denominated as
Kasulatan sa Ganap Na Bilihan,[7] for the sum of P160,000.00. As stated earlier, the subject lot, which forms
part of Lot 249-D, was sold to Eduardo and Jorge, and titled in their names under TCT No. V-1689. Several
months thereafter or on September 7, 1987, Cornelio passed away.

Sometime in 1993, Eduardo informed Wenifreda of his desire to take over the subject lot. However,
the latter refused to vacate the premises despite repeated demands. Thus, on September 24, 1993, Eduardo
filed a complaint for unlawful detainer before the Metropolitan Trial Court of Valenzuela, Metro Manila against
Wenifreda, which was docketed as Civil Civil Case No. 6074.

On July 22, 1996, the Metropolitan Trial Court rendered its Decision in favor of Eduardo and ordered
Wenifreda to: (1) vacate the leased premises; (2) pay Eduardo reasonable compensation for the use and
occupation of the premises plus attorneys fees, and (3) pay the costs of the suit.

Wenifreda appealed to the Regional Trial Court of Valenzuela, Metro Manila, which reversed the
decision of the court a quo. Thus, Eduardo appealed to the Court of Appeals which rendered a
Decision[8] on March 31, 1998 reversing the decision of the Regional Trial Court and reinstating the decision
of the Metropolitan Trial Court. It also increased the amount of reasonable compensation awarded to
Eduardo for the use of the leased premises. Wenifredas appeal to this Court, docketed as G.R. No. 135001,
was dismissed in a Resolution[9] dated December 2, 1998. Accordingly, an Entry of Judgment[10]was made
in due course on July 8, 1999.

Previously, after Eduardo instituted the aforesaid unlawful detainer case on September 24, 1993,
herein petitioner Wenifreda, in her capacity as administratrix of the estate of Orlando Llenado, judicial
guardian of their minor children, and surviving spouse and legal heir of Orlando, commenced the subject
Complaint,[11] later amended, on November 10, 1993 for annulment of deed of conveyance, title and
damages against herein respondents Eduardo, Jorge, Feliza Llenado (mother of the Llenado brothers), and
the Register of Deeds of Valenzuela, Metro Manila. The case was docketed as Civil Case No. 4248-V-93 and
raffled to Branch 75 of the Regional Trial Court of Valenzuela, Metro Manila.

Petitioner alleged that the transfer and conveyance of the subject lot by Cornelio in favor of
respondents Eduardo and Jorge, was fraudulent and in bad faith considering that the March 31, 1978
Agreement provided that while the lease is in force, the subject lot cannot be sold, transferred or conveyed
to any third party; that the period of the lease was until December 3, 1987 with the option to renew granted
to Orlando; that the subject lot was transferred and conveyed to respondents Eduardo and Jorge on January
29, 1987 when the lease was in full force and effect making the sale null and void; that Cornelio verbally
promised Orlando that in case he (Cornelio) decides to sell the subject lot, Orlando or his heirs shall have
first priority or option to buy the subject lot so as not to prejudice Orlandos business and because Orlando
is the owner of the property adjacent to the subject lot; and that this promise was wantonly disregarded
when Cornelio sold the said lot to respondents Jorge and Eduardo.

In their Answer,[12] respondents Eduardo and Jorge claimed that they bought the subject lot from
their father, Cornelio, for value and in good faith; that the lease agreement and its supplement were not
annotated at the back of the mother title of the subject lot and do not bind them; that said agreements are
personal only to Cornelio and Orlando; that the lease expired upon the death of Orlando on November 7,
1983; that they were not aware of any verbal promise to sell the subject lot granted by Cornelio to Orlando
and, even if there was, said option to buy is unenforceable under the statute of frauds.

After the parties presented their respective evidence, the Regional Trial Court rendered judgment
on May 5, 1997 in favor of petitioner, viz:

WHEREFORE, PREMISES CONSIDERED, this Court finds the [petitioners] civil action
duly established by preponderance of evidence, renders judgment (adjudicates) in favor of
the [petitioner], Estate of Orlando Llenado represented by Wenifreda Llenado, and against
[respondents] e.g. Jorge, Eduardo, Felisa Gallardo, all surnamed Llenado, and the Register of
Deeds of Valenzuela, Metro Manila, as follows:

1) It hereby judicially declare as non-existence (sic) and null and void, the following:

a) The Kasulatan Sa Ganap na Kasunduan or Deed of Sale;

b) TCT- Transfer Certificate of Title No. V-9440, in the name of [respondent]

Eduardo Llenado, TCT- Transfer Certificate of Title No. V-1689, in the name of Jorge
Llenado, and Eduardo Llenado, and all deeds, documents or proceedings leading to the
issuance of said title, and all subsequent title issued therefrom and likewise whatever
deeds, documents or proceedings leading to the issuance of said subsequent titles;

2) It hereby orders the reconveyance of the said properties embraced in the said TCTs-
Transfer Certificate of Title Nos. V-9440 and V-1689 to the [petitioner] for the same
consideration, or purchase price, paid by [respondents] Eduardo Llenado and Jorge Llenado
for the same properties;

3) It hereby orders [respondent], Register of Deeds of Valenzuela, Metro Manila, to

cause the issuance of new transfer certificates of title over the said property in the name of
the [petitioner];

4) And, because this Court is not only a court of law, but of equity, it hereby rendered
the following damages to be paid by the [respondents], as the [respondents] litigated under
bonafide assertions that they have meritorious defense, viz:

a) P400,000.00 as moral damages;

b) 10,000.00 as nominal damages;

c) 10,000.00 as temperate damages;

d) 10,000.00 as exemplary damages;

e) 10,000.00 attorneys fees on the basis of quantum merit; and

f) costs of suit. SO ORDERED.[13]

The Regional Trial Court found that upon the death of Orlando on November 7, 1983, his rights under the
lease contract were transmitted to his heirs; that since the lease was in full force and effect at the time the
subject lot was sold by Cornelio to his sons, the sale violated the prohibitory clause in the said lease
contract. Further, Cornelios promise to sell the subject lot to Orlando may be established by parole evidence
since an option to buy is not covered by the statute of frauds. Hence, the same is binding on Cornelio and
his heirs.

Respondents appealed before the Court of Appeals which rendered the assailed May 30,
2000 Decision reversing the judgment of the Regional Trial Court and dismissing the Complaint. The
appellate court held that the death of Orlando did not extinguish the lease agreement and had the effect of
transmitting his lease rights to his heirs. However, the breach of the non-alienation clause of the said
agreement did not nullify the sale between Cornelio and his sons because the heirs of Orlando are mere
lessees on the subject lot and can never claim a superior right of ownership over said lot as against the
registered owners thereof. It further ruled that petitioner failed to establish by a preponderance of evidence
that Cornelio made a verbal promise to Orlando granting the latter the right of first refusal if and when the
subject lot was sold.

Upon the denial of its motion for reconsideration, petitioner is now before this Court on the following
assignment of errors:

[T]he Court of Appeals erred:

1.- In finding and concluding that there is no legal basis to annul the deed of conveyance
involved in the case and in not applying R.A. No. 3516, further amending R.A. No. 1162; and

2.- In not finding and holding as null and void the subject deed of conveyance, the same
having been executed in direct violation of an expressed covenant in said deed and in total
disregard of the pre-emptive, or preferential rights of the herein petitioners to buy the
property subject of their lease contract under said R.A. No. 3516, further amending R.A. No.
1162.[14]

The petition lacks merit.

Petitioner contends that the heirs of Orlando are entitled to the rights of a tenant under Republic Act
(R.A.) No. 1162,[15] as amended by R.A. No. 3516.[16] The right of first refusal or preferential right to buy
the leased premises is invoked pursuant to Section 5[17] of said law and this Courts ruling in Mataas Na Lupa
Tenants Association, Inc. v. Dimayuga.[18]

This issue is being raised for the first time on appeal. True, in Mataas Na Lupa Tenants Association,
Inc., the Court explained that Section 1 of R.A. No. 1162, as amended by R.A. No. 3516, authorizes the
expropriation of any piece of land in the City of Manila, Quezon City and suburbs which have been and are
actually being leased to tenants for at least 10 years, provided said lands have at least 40 families of tenants
thereon.[19] Prior to and pending the expropriation, the tenant shall have a right of first refusal or preferential
right to buy the leased premises should the landowner sell the same. However, compliance with the
conditions for the application of the aforesaid law as well as the qualifications of the heirs of Orlando to be
beneficiaries thereunder were never raised before the trial court, or even the Court of Appeals, because
petitioner solely anchored its claim of ownership over the subject lot on the alleged violation of the
prohibitory clause in the lease contract between Cornelio and Orlando, and the alleged non-performance of
the right of first refusal given by Cornelio to Orlando. The rule is settled, impelled by basic requirements of
due process, that points of law, theories, issues and arguments not adequately brought to the attention of
the lower court will not be ordinarily considered by a reviewing court as they cannot be raised for the first
time on appeal.[20] As the issue of the applicability of R.A. No. 1162, as amended, was neither averred in
the pleadings nor raised during the trial below, the same cannot be raised for the first time on appeal.

At any rate, the allegations in the Complaint and the evidence presented during the trial below do
not establish that Orlando or his heirs are covered by R.A. No. 1162, as amended. It was not alleged nor
shown that the subject lot is part of the landed estate or haciendas in the City of Manila which were
authorized to be expropriated under said law; that the Solicitor General has instituted the requisite
expropriation proceedings pursuant to Section 2[21] thereof; that the subject lot has been actually leased for
a period of at least ten (10) years; and that the subject lot has at least forty (40) families of tenants
thereon. Instead, what was merely established during the trial is that the subject lot was leased by Cornelio
to Orlando for the operation of a gasoline station, thus, negating petitioners claim that the subject lot is
covered by the aforesaid law. In Mataas Na Lupa Tenants Association, Inc., the Court further explained that
R.A. No. 1162, as amended, has been superseded by Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1517[22] entitled
Proclaiming Urban Land Reform in the Philippines and Providing for the Implementing Machinery
Thereof.[23] However, as held in Tagbilaran Integrated Settlers Association Incorporated v. Court of
Appeals,[24] P.D. No. 1517 is applicable only in specific areas declared, through presidential
proclamation,[25] to be located within the so-called urban zones.[26] Further, only legitimate tenants who
have resided on the land for ten years or more who have built their homes on the land and residents who
have legally occupied the lands by contract, continuously for the last ten years, are given the right of first
refusal to purchase the land within a reasonable time. [27] Consequently, those lease contracts entered into
for commercial use are not covered by said law.[28] Thus, considering that petitioner failed to prove that a
proclamation has been issued by the President declaring the subject lot as within the urban land reform
zone and considering further that the subject lot was leased for the commercial purpose of operating a
gasoline station, P.D. No. 1517 cannot be applied to this case.

In fine, the only issue for our determination is whether the sale of the subject lot by Cornelio to his
sons, respondents Eduardo and Jorge, is invalid for (1) violating the prohibitory clause in the lease
agreement between Cornelio, as lessor-owner, and Orlando, as lessee; and (2) contravening the right of
first refusal of Orlando over the subject lot.

It is not disputed that the lease agreement contained an option to renew and a prohibition on the
sale of the subject lot in favor of third persons while the lease is in force. Petitioner claims that when Cornelio
sold the subject lot to respondents Eduardo and Jorge the lease was in full force and effect, thus, the sale
violated the prohibitory clause rendering it invalid. In resolving this issue, it is necessary to determine
whether the lease agreement was in force at the time of the subject sale and, if it was in force, whether the
violation of the prohibitory clause invalidated the sale.

Under Article 1311 of the Civil Code, the heirs are bound by the contracts entered into by their
predecessors-in-interest except when the rights and obligations therein are not transmissible by their
nature, by stipulation or by provision of law. A contract of lease is, therefore, generally transmissible to the
heirs of the lessor or lessee. It involves a property right and, as such, the death of a party does not excuse
non-performance of the contract.[29] The rights and obligations pass to the heirs of the deceased and the
heir of the deceased lessor is bound to respect the period of the lease.[30] The same principle applies to the
option to renew the lease. As a general rule, covenants to renew a lease are not personal but will run with
the land.[31] Consequently, the successors-in-interest of the lessee are entitled to the benefits, while that of
the lessor are burdened with the duties and obligations, which said covenants conferred and imposed on
the original parties.

The foregoing principles apply with greater force in this case because the parties expressly stipulated
in the March 31, 1978 Agreement that Romeo, as lessee, shall transfer all his rights and interests under the
lease contract with option to renew in favor of the party of the Third Part (Orlando), the latters heirs,
successors and assigns[32] indicating the clear intent to allow the transmissibility of all the rights and
interests of Orlando under the lease contract unto his heirs, successors or assigns. Accordingly, the rights
and obligations under the lease contract with option to renew were transmitted from Orlando to his heirs
upon his death on November 7, 1983.

It does not follow, however, that the lease subsisted at the time of the sale of the subject lot
on January 29, 1987. When Orlando died on November 7, 1983, the lease contract was set to expire 26
days later or on December 3, 1983, unless renewed by Orlandos heirs for another four years. While the
option to renew is an enforceable right, it must necessarily be first exercised to be given effect. [33] As the
Court explained in Dioquino v. Intermediate Appellate Court:[34]

A clause found in an agreement relative to the renewal of the lease agreement at

the option of the lessee gives the latter an enforceable right to renew the contract in which
the clause is found for such time as provided for.The agreement is understood as being in
favor of the lessee, and the latter is authorized to renew the contract and to continue to
occupy the leased property after notifying the lessor to that effect. A lessors covenant or
agreement to renew gives a privilege to the tenant, but is nevertheless an executory
contract, and until the tenant has exercised the privilege by way of some affirmative act,
he cannot be held for the additional term. In the absence of a stipulation in the lease
requiring notice of the exercise of an option or an election to renew to be given within a
certain time before the expiration of the lease, which of course, the lessee must comply
with, the general rule is that a lessee must exercise an option or election to renew his lease
and notify the lessor thereof before, or at least at the time of the expiration of his original
term, unless there is a waiver or special circumstances warranting equitable relief.

There is no dispute that in the instant case, the lessees (private respondents) were
granted the option to renew the lease for another five (5) years after the termination of the
original period of fifteen years. Yet, there was never any positive act on the part of private
respondents before or after the termination of the original period to show their exercise of
such option. The silence of the lessees after the termination of the original period cannot
be taken to mean that they opted to renew the contract by virtue of the promise by the
lessor, as stated in the original contract of lease, to allow them to renew. Neither can the
exercise of the option to renew be inferred from their persistence to remain in the premises
despite petitioners demand for them to vacate. x x x.[35]

Similarly, the election of the option to renew the lease in this case cannot be inferred from petitioner
Wenifredas continued possession of the subject lot and operation of the gasoline station even after the death
of Orlando on November 7, 1983 and the expiration of the lease contract on December 3, 1983. In the
unlawful detainer case against petitioner Wenifreda and in the subject complaint for annulment of
conveyance, respondents consistently maintained that after the death of Orlando, the lease was terminated
and that they permitted petitioner Wenifreda and her children to remain in possession of the subject property
out of tolerance and respect for the close blood relationship between Cornelio and Orlando. It was
incumbent, therefore, upon petitioner as the plaintiff with the burden of proof during the trial below to
establish by some positive act that Orlando or his heirs exercised the option to renew the lease. After going
over the records of this case, we find no evidence, testimonial or documentary, of such nature was presented
before the trial court to prove that Orlando or his heirs exercised the option to renew prior to or at the time
of the expiration of the lease on December 3, 1983. In particular, the testimony of petitioner Wenifreda is
wanting in detail as to the events surrounding the implementation of the subject lease agreement after the
death of Orlando and any overt acts to establish the renewal of said lease.

Given the foregoing, it becomes unnecessary to resolve the issue on whether the violation of the
prohibitory clause invalidated the sale and conferred ownership over the subject lot to Orlandos heirs, who
are mere lessees, considering that at the time of said sale on January 29, 1987 the lease agreement had
long been terminated for failure of Orlando or his heirs to validly renew the same. As a result, there was no
obstacle to the sale of the subject lot by Cornelio to respondents Eduardo and Jorge as the prohibitory clause
under the lease contract was no longer in force.

Petitioner also anchors its claim over the subject lot on the alleged verbal promise of Cornelio
to Orlando that should he (Cornelio) sell the same, Orlando would be given the first opportunity to purchase
said property. According to petitioner, this amounted to a right of first refusal in favor of Orlando which may
be proved by parole evidence because it is not one of the contracts covered by the statute of
frauds. Considering that Cornelio sold the subject lot to respondents Eduardo and Jorge without first offering
the same to Orlandos heirs, petitioner argues that the sale is in violation of the latters right of first refusal
and is, thus, rescissible.

The question as to whether a right of first refusal may be proved by parole evidence has been
answered in the affirmative by this Court in Rosencor Development Corporation v. Inquing:[36]

We have previously held that not all agreements affecting land must be put into writing
to attain enforceability. Thus, we have held that the setting up of boundaries, the oral partition
of real property, and an agreement creating a right of way are not covered by the provisions
of the statute of frauds. The reason simply is that these agreements are not among those
enumerated in Article 1403 of the New Civil Code.

A right of first refusal is not among those listed as unenforceable under the statute of
frauds. Furthermore, the application of Article 1403, par. 2(e) of the New Civil Code
presupposes the existence of a perfected, albeit unwritten, contract of sale. A right of first
refusal, such as the one involved in the instant case, is not by any means a perfected contract
of sale of real property. At best, it is a contractual grant, not of the sale of the real property
involved, but of the right of first refusal over the property sought to be sold.

It is thus evident that the statute of frauds does not contemplate cases involving a
right of first refusal. As such, a right of first refusal need not be written to be enforceable and
may be proven by oral evidence.[37]

In the instant case, the Regional Trial Court ruled that the right of first refusal was proved by oral evidence
while the Court of Appeals disagreed by ruling that petitioner merely relied on the allegations in its Complaint
to establish said right. We have reviewed the records and find that no testimonial evidence was presented
to prove the existence of said right. The testimony of petitioner Wenifreda made no mention of the alleged
verbal promise given by Cornelio to Orlando. The two remaining witnesses for the plaintiff, Michael Goco
and Renato Malindog, were representatives from the Register of Deeds of Caloocan City who naturally were
not privy to this alleged promise. Neither was it established that respondents Eduardo and Jorge were aware
of said promise prior to or at the time of the sale of the subject lot. On the contrary, in their answer to the
Complaint, respondents denied the existence of said promise for lack of knowledge thereof. [38] Within these
parameters, petitioners allegations in its Complaint cannot substitute for competent proof on such a crucial
factual issue. Necessarily, petitioners claims based on this alleged right of first refusal cannot be sustained
for its existence has not been duly established.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The May 30, 2000 Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-
G.R. CV No. 58911 dismissing the complaint for annulment of deed of conveyance, title and damages, and
the October 6, 2000 Resolution denying the motion for reconsideration, are AFFIRMED. Costs against
petitioner. SO ORDERED.
 SALUN-AT MARQUEZ and NESTOR DELA G.R. No. 168387
CRUZ,
Petitioners,

- versus -

ELOISA ESPEJO, ELENITA ESPEJO,

EMERITA ESPEJO, OPHIRRO ESPEJO, Promulgated:
OTHNIEL ESPEJO, ORLANDO ESPEJO,
OSMUNDO ESPEJO, ODELEJO ESPEJO
and NEMI FERNANDEZ,
Respondents. August 25, 2010
x--------------------------------------------------------x

DECISION

DEL CASTILLO, J.

When the parties admit the contents of written documents but put in issue whether these documents adequately and
correctly express the true intention of the parties, the deciding body is authorized to look beyond these instruments
and into the contemporaneous and subsequent actions of the parties in order to determine such intent.

Well-settled is the rule that in case of doubt, it is the intention of the contracting parties that prevails, for the intention
is the soul of a contract, not its wording which is prone to mistakes, inadequacies, or ambiguities. To hold otherwise
would give life, validity, and precedence to mere typographical errors and defeat the very purpose of agreements.
This Petition for Review on Certiorari[1] assails the October 7, 2003 Decision,[2] as well as the May 11, 2005
Resolution[3] of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA G.R. SP No. 69981. The dispositive portion of the appellate courts
Decision reads:

WHEREFORE, finding reversible error committed by the Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication
Board, the instant petition for review is GRANTED. The assailed Decision, dated 17 January 2001,
rendered by the Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board is hereby ANNULLED and SET
ASIDE. The Decision of the Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board of Bayombong[,]
Nueva Vizcaya, dated 17 March 1998, is REINSTATED. Costs against respondents.

SO ORDERED.[4]

The reinstated Decision of the Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board (DARAB) of Bayombong, Nueva
Vizcaya, in turn, contained the following dispositive portion:

Accordingly, judgment is rendered:

1. Finding [respondents] to be the owner by re-purchase from RBBI [of] the Murong
property covered by TCT No. [T-]62096 (formerly TCT No. 43258);

2. Ordering the cancellation of TCT with CLOA Nos. 395 and 396 in the name[s] of Salun-
at Marquez and Nestor de la Cruz respectively, as they are disqualified to become tenants of the
Lantap property;

3. Directing RBBI to sell through VOS the Lantap property to its rightful beneficiary, herein
tenant-farmer Nemi Fernandez under reasonable terms and conditions;

4. Ordering RBBI to return the amount paid to it by Nestor and Salun-at; and ordering the
latter to pay 20 cavans of palay per hectare at 46 kilos per cavan unto [respondents] plus such
accrued and unpaid rentals for the past years as may be duly accounted for with the assistance
of the Municipal Agrarian Reform Officer of Bagabag, Nueva Vizcaya who is also hereby instructed
to assist the parties execute their leasehold contracts and;

5. The order to supervise harvest dated March 11, 1998 shall be observed until otherwise
modified or dissolved by the appellate body.
SO ORDERED.[5]
Factual Antecedents

Respondents Espejos were the original registered owners of two parcels of agricultural land, with an area of two
hectares each. One is located at Barangay Lantap, Bagabag, Nueva Vizcaya (the Lantap property) while the other is
located in Barangay Murong, Bagabag, Nueva Vizcaya (the Murong property). There is no dispute among the parties
that the Lantap property is tenanted by respondent Nemi Fernandez (Nemi)[6] (who is the husband[7] of respondent
Elenita Espejo (Elenita), while the Murong property is tenanted by petitioners Salun-at Marquez (Marquez) and Nestor
Dela Cruz (Dela Cruz).[8]

The respondents mortgaged both parcels of land to Rural Bank of Bayombong, Inc. (RBBI) to secure certain
loans. Upon their failure to pay the loans, the mortgaged properties were foreclosed and sold to RBBI. RBBI
eventually consolidated title to the properties and transfer certificates of title (TCTs) were issued in the name of
RBBI. TCT No. T-62096 dated January 14, 1985 was issued for the Murong property. It contained the following
description:

Beginning at a point marked I on plan H-176292, S. 44034 W. 1656.31 m. more or less from B.L.L.M.
No 1, Bagabag Townsite, K-27,
thence N. 28 deg. 20 E., 200.00 m. to point 2;
thence S. 61 deg. 40 E., 100.00 m. to point 3;
thence S. 28 deg. 20 W., 200.00 m. to point 4;
thence N. 61 deg. 40 W., 100.00 m. to point 1; point of beginning;
Containing an area of 2.000 hectares. Bounded on the northeast, by Road; on the southeast, and
southwest by public land; and on the northwest by Public Land, properties claimed by Hilario Gaudia
and Santos Navarrete. Bearings true. Declination 0131 E. Points referred to are marked on plan H-
176292. Surveyed under authority of sections 12-22 Act No. 2874 and in accordance with existing
regulations of the Bureau of Lands by H.O. Bauman Public Land Surveyor, [in] December 1912-March
1913. Note: All corners are Conc. Mons. 15x15x60 cm. This is Lot No. 79-A=Lot No. 159 of Bagabag
Townsite, K-27.[9]

Subsequently, TCT No. T-62836 dated June 4, 1985 was issued for the Lantap property and contained the following
description:

Beginning at a point marked 1 on plan H-105520, N. 80 deg. 32 W., 1150.21 m. from BLLM No. 122,
Irrigation project,
thence N. 61 deg. 40E., 200.00 m. to point 2;
thence N. 28 deg. 20E, 100.00 m. to point 3;
thence S. 61 deg. 40E, 200.00 m. to point 4;
thence S. 28 deg. 20W, 100.00 m. to point 1; point of beginning; containing an area of 2.0000
hectares. Bounded on the northeast, southeast, and southwest by Public land; and on the northwest
by Road and public land. Bearings true. Declination 0 deg. 31E., points referred to are marked on
plan H-105520. Surveyed under authority of Section 12-22, Act No. 2874 and in accordance with
existing regulations of the Bureau of Lands, by H.O. Bauman Public Land Surveyor, [in] Dec. 1912-
Mar. 1913 and approved on January 6, 1932. Note: This is Lot No. 119-A Lot No. 225 of Bagabag
Townsite K-27. All corners are B.I. Conc. Mons. 15x60 cm.[10]

Both TCTs describe their respective subjects as located in Bagabag Townsite, K-27, without any reference to
either Barangay Lantap or Barangay Murong.

On February 26, 1985, respondents Espejos bought back one of their lots from RBBI. The Deed of Sale[11] described
the property sold as follows:

x x x do hereby SELL, TRANSFER, and CONVEY, absolutely and unconditionally x x x that certain
parcel of land, situated in the Municipality of Bagabag, Province of Nueva Vizcaya, and more
particularly bounded and described as follows, to wit:

Beginning at a point marked 1 on plan x x x x Containing an area of 2.000

hectares. Bounded on the NE., by Road; on the SE., and SW by Public Land; and on
the NW., by Public Land, properties claimed by Hilario Gaudia and Santos
 Navarrete. Bearing true. Declination 013 B. Points referred to are marked on plan H-
176292.

of which the Rural Bank of Bayombong (NV) Inc., is the registered owner in fee simple in accordance
with the Land Registration Act, its title thereto being evidenced by Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-
62096 issued by the Registry of Deeds of Nueva Vizcaya.

As may be seen from the foregoing, the Deed of Sale did not mention the barangay where the property was located
but mentioned the title of the property (TCT No. T-62096), which title corresponds to the Murong property.There is
no evidence, however, that respondents took possession of the Murong property, or demanded lease rentals from
the petitioners (who continued to be the tenants of the Murong property), or otherwise exercised acts of ownership
over the Murong property. On the other hand, respondent Nemi (husband of respondent Elenita and brother-in-law
of the other respondents), continued working on the other property -- the Lantap property -- without any evidence
that he ever paid rentals to RBBI or to any landowner. The Deed of Sale was annotated on TCT No. T-62096 almost
a decade later, on July 1, 1994.[12]

Meanwhile, on June 20, 1990, RBBI, pursuant to Sections 20[13] and 21[14] of Republic Act (RA) No. 6657,[15] executed
separate Deeds of Voluntary Land Transfer (VLTs) in favor of petitioners Marquez and Dela Cruz, the tenants of the
Murong property. Both VLTs described the subject thereof as an agricultural land located
in Barangay Murong and covered by TCT No. T-62836 (which, however, is the title corresponding to the Lantap
property).[16]

After the petitioners completed the payment of the purchase price of P90,000.00 to RBBI, the DAR issued the
corresponding Certificates of Land Ownership Award (CLOAs) to petitioners Marquez[17] and Dela Cruz[18] on
September 5, 1991. Both CLOAs stated that their subjects were parcels of agricultural land situated
in Barangay Murong.[19] The CLOAs were registered in the Registry of Deeds of Nueva Vizcaya on September 5, 1991.

On February 10, 1997 (more than 10 years after the Deed of Sale in favor of the respondents and almost seven
years after the execution of VLTs in favor of the petitioners), respondents filed a Complaint[20] before the Regional
Agrarian Reform Adjudicator (RARAD) of Bayombong, Nueva Vizcaya for the cancellation of petitioners CLOAs, the
deposit of leasehold rentals by petitioners in favor of respondents, and the execution of a deed of voluntary land
transfer by RBBI in favor of respondent Nemi. The complaint was based on respondents theory that the Murong
property, occupied by the petitioners, was owned by the respondents by virtue of the 1985 buy-back, as documented
in the Deed of Sale. They based their claim on the fact that their Deed of Sale refers to TCT No. 62096, which pertains
to the Murong property.

Petitioners filed their Answer[21] and insisted that they bought the Murong property as farmer-beneficiaries
thereof. They maintained that they have always displayed good faith, paid lease rentals to RBBI when it became the
owner of the Murong property, bought the same from RBBI upon the honest belief that they were buying the Murong
property, and occupied and exercised acts of ownership over the Murong property. Petitioners also argued that what
respondents Espejos repurchased from RBBI in 1985 was actually the Lantap property, as evidenced by their
continued occupation and possession of the Lantap property through respondent Nemi.

RBBI answered[22] that it was the Lantap property which was the subject of the buy-back transaction with respondents
Espejos. It denied committing a grave mistake in the transaction and maintained its good faith in the disposition of
its acquired assets in conformity with the rural banking rules and regulations.

OIC-RARAD Decision[23]

The OIC-RARAD gave precedence to the TCT numbers appearing on the Deed of Sale and the VLTs. Since TCT No.
T-62096 appeared on respondents Deed of Sale and the said title refers to the Murong property, the OIC-RARAD
concluded that the subject of sale was indeed the Murong property. On the other hand, since the petitioners VLTs
referred to TCT No. T-62836, which corresponds to the Lantap property, the OIC-RARAD ruled that petitioners CLOAs
necessarily refer to the Lantap property. As for the particular description contained in the VLTs that the subject thereof
is the Murong property, the OIC-RARAD ruled that it was a mere typographical error.
Further, since the VLTs covered the Lantap property and petitioners are not the actual tillers thereof, the OIC-RARAD
declared that they were disqualified to become tenants of the Lantap property and ordered the cancellation of their
CLOAs. It then ordered RBBI to execute a leasehold contract with the real tenant of the Lantap property, Nemi.

The OIC-RARAD recognized that petitioners only right as the actual tillers of the Murong property is to remain as the
tenants thereof after the execution of leasehold contracts with and payment of rentals in arrears to respondents.

DARAB Decision[24]

Upon appeal filed by petitioners, the DARAB reversed the OIC-RARAD Decision. It ruled that in assailing the validity
of the CLOAs issued to petitioners as bona fide tenant-farmers, the burden of proof rests on the respondents. There
being no evidence that the DAR field personnel were remiss in the performance of their official duties when they
issued the corresponding CLOAs in favor of petitioners, the presumption of regular performance of duty prevails. This
conclusion is made more imperative by the respondents admission that petitioners are the actual tillers of the Murong
property, hence qualified beneficiaries thereof.

As for respondents allegation that they bought back the Murong property from RBBI, the DARAB ruled that they
failed to support their allegation with substantial evidence. It gave more credence to RBBIs claim that respondents
repurchased the Lantap property, not the Murong property. Respondents, as owners of the Lantap property, were
ordered to enter into an agricultural leasehold contract with their brother-in-law Nemi, who is the actual tenant of
the Lantap property.

The DARAB ended its January 17, 2001 Decision in this wise:

We find no basis or justification to question the authenticity and validity of the CLOAs issued to
appellants as they are by operation of law qualified beneficiaries over the landholdings; there is
nothing to quiet as these titles were awarded in conformity with the CARP program implementation;
and finally, the Board declares that all controverted claims to or against the subject landholding must
be completely and finally laid to rest.

WHEREFORE, premises considered and finding reversible errors[,] the assailed decision is ANNULLED
and a new judgment is hereby rendered, declaring:

1. Appellants Salun-at Marquez and Nestor Dela Cruz as the bona fide tenant-tillers
over the Murong property and therefore they are the qualified beneficiaries thereof;

2. Declaring Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) Nos. 395 and 396 issued in the name
of [farmer-beneficiaries] Salun-at Marquez and Nestor Dela Cruz respectively, covered formerly by
TCT No. 62096 (TCT No. 43258) of the Murong property as valid and legal;

3. Ordering the co-[respondents] to firm-up an agricultural leasehold contract with

bona fide tenant-tiller Nemi Fernandez over the Lantap property, [the latter] being the subject matter
of the buy back arrangement entered into between [respondents] and Rural Bank of Bayombong,
Incorporated, and other incidental matters are deemed resolved.

SO ORDERED.[25]

Ruling of the Court of Appeals

In appealing to the CA, the respondents insisted that the DARAB erred in ruling that they repurchased the Lantap
property, while the petitioners were awarded the Murong property. They were adamant that the title numbers
indicated in their respective deeds of conveyance should control in determining the subjects thereof. Since
respondents Deed of Sale expressed that its subject is the property with TCT No. T-62096, then what was sold to
them was the Murong property. On the other hand, petitioners VLTs and CLOAs say that they cover the property
with TCT No. T-62836; thus it should be understood that they were awarded the Lantap property. Respondents
added that since petitioners are not the actual tillers of the Lantap property, their CLOAs should be cancelled due to
their lack of qualification.

The CA agreed with the respondents. Using the Best Evidence Rule embodied in Rule 130, Section 3, the CA held
that the Deed of Sale is the best evidence as to its contents, particularly the description of the land which was the
object of the sale. Since the Deed of Sale expressed that its subject is the land covered by TCT No. T-62096 the
Murong property then that is the property that the respondents repurchased.
The CA further ruled that as for petitioners VLTs, the same refer to the property with TCT No. T-62836; thus, the
subject of their CLOAs is the Lantap property. The additional description in the VLTs that the subject thereof is located
in Barangay Murong was considered to be a mere typographical error. The CA ruled that the technical description
contained in the TCT is more accurate in identifying the subject property since the same particularly describes the
properties metes and bounds.

Both the RBBI[26] and petitioners[27] filed their respective motions for reconsideration, which were separately
denied.[28]

On June 22, 2004, RBBI filed a separate Petition for Review on Certiorari, docketed as G.R. No. 163320, with this
Court.[29] RBBI raised the issue that the CA failed to appreciate that respondents did not come to court with clean
hands because they misled RBBI to believe at the time of the sale that the two lots were not tenanted. RBBI also
asked that they be declared free from any liability to the parties as it did not enrich itself at anyones expense. RBBIs
petition was dismissed on July 26, 2004 for lack of merit. The said Resolution reads:

Considering the allegations, issues[,] and arguments adduced in the petition for review on certiorari,
the Court Resolves to DENY the petition for lack of sufficient showing that the Court of Appeals had
committed any reversible error in the questioned judgment to warrant the exercise by this Court of
its discretionary appellate jurisdiction in this case.[30]

Their Motion for Reconsideration was likewise denied with finality.[31] Entry of judgment was made in that case on
December 15, 2004.[32]

On July 27, 2005,[33] petitioners filed the instant petition.

Issues

Rephrased and consolidated, the parties present the following issues for the Courts determination:

I
What is the effect of the final judgment dismissing RBBIs Petition for Review on Certiorari, which assailed the same
CA Decision

II
Whether the CA erred in utilizing the Best Evidence Rule to determine the subject of the contracts

III
What are the subject properties of the parties respective contracts with RBBI
 Our Ruling

Propriety of the Petition

Respondents maintain that the instant petition for review raises factual issues which are beyond the province of Rule
45.[34]

The issues involved herein are not entirely factual. Petitioners assail the appellate courts rejection of their evidence
(as to the contractual intent) as inadmissible under the Best Evidence Rule. The question involving the admissibility
of evidence is a legal question that is within the Courts authority to review.[35]

Besides, even if it were a factual question, the Court is not precluded to review the same. The rule that a petition for
review should raise only questions of law admits of exceptions, among which are (1) when the findings are grounded
entirely on speculations, surmises, or conjectures; (2) when the inference made is manifestly mistaken, absurd or
impossible; (3) when there is grave abuse of discretion; (4) when the judgment is based on a misappreciation of
facts; (5) when the findings of fact are conflicting; (6) when, in making its findings, the same are contrary to the
admissions of both appellant and appellee; (7) when the findings are contrary to those of the trial court; (8) when
the findings are conclusions without citation of specific evidence on which they are based; (9) when the facts set forth
in the petition as well as in the petitioner's main and reply briefs are not disputed by the respondent; and (10) when
the findings of fact are premised on the supposed absence of evidence and contradicted by the evidence on record.[36]

In the instant case, we find sufficient basis to apply the exceptions to the general rule because the appellate court
misappreciated the facts of the case through its erroneous application of the Best Evidence Rule, as will be discussed
below. Moreover, the disparate rulings of the three reviewing bodies below are sufficient for the Court to exercise its
jurisdiction under Rule 45.

First Issue
Dismissal of RBBIs appeal

Respondents maintain that the Courts earlier dismissal of RBBIs petition

for review of the same CA Decision is eloquent proof that there is no reversible error in the appellate courts decision
in favor of the respondents.[37]

We are not persuaded. This Court dismissed RBBIs earlier petition in G.R. No. 163320 because it failed to convincingly
demonstrate the alleged errors in the CA Decision. The bank did not point out the inadequacies and errors in the
appellate courts decision but simply placed the responsibility for the confusion on the respondents for allegedly
misleading the bank as to the identity of the properties and for misrepresenting that the two lots were not
tenanted. Thus, RBBI argued that respondents did not come to court with clean hands.

These arguments were ineffectual in convincing the Court to review the appellate courts Decision. It is the appellants
responsibility to point out the perceived errors in the appealed decision. When a party merely raises equitable
considerations such as the clean hands doctrine without a clear-cut legal basis and cogent arguments to support his
claim, there should be no surprise if the Court is not swayed to exercise its appellate jurisdiction and the appeal is
dismissed outright. The dismissal of an appeal does not always and necessarily mean that the appealed decision is
correct, for it could simply be the result of the appellants inadequate discussion, ineffectual arguments, or even
procedural lapses.

RBBIs failure to convince the Court of the merits of its appeal should not prejudice petitioners who were not parties
to RBBIs appeal, especially because petitioners duly filed a separate appeal and were able to articulately and
effectively present their arguments. A party cannot be deprived of his right to appeal an adverse decision just because
another party had already appealed ahead of him,[38] or just because the other partys separate appeal had already
been dismissed.[39]

There is another reason not to bind the petitioners to the final judgment against RBBI. RBBI executed the transfer
(VLTs) in favor of petitioners prior to the commencement of the action. Thus, when the action for cancellation of
CLOA was filed, RBBI had already divested itself of its title to the two properties involved. Under the rule on res
judicata, a judgment (in personam) is conclusive only between the parties and their successors-in-interest by
title subsequent to the commencement of the action.[40] Thus, when the vendor (in this case RBBI) has already
transferred his title to third persons (petitioners), the said transferees are not bound by any judgment which may be
rendered against the vendor.[41]

Second Issue
Is it correct to apply the Best Evidence Rule?

Citing the Best Evidence Rule in Rule 130, Section 3, the CA held that the Deed of Sale between respondents and
RBBI is the best evidence as to the property that was sold by RBBI to the respondents. Since the Deed of Sale stated
that its subject is the land covered by TCT No. T-62096 the title for the Murong property then the property
repurchased by the respondents was the Murong property. Likewise, the CA held that since the VLTs between
petitioners and RBBI refer to TCT No. T-62836 the title for the Lantap property then the property transferred to
petitioners was the Lantap property.

Petitioners argue that the appellate court erred in using the best evidence rule to determine the subject of the Deed
of Sale and the Deeds of Voluntary Land Transfer. They maintain that the issue in the case is not the contents of the
contracts but the intention of the parties that was not adequately expressed in their contracts. Petitioners then argue
that it is the Parol Evidence Rule that should be applied in order to adequately resolve the dispute.

Indeed, the appellate court erred in its application of the Best Evidence Rule. The Best Evidence Rule states that
when the subject of inquiry is the contents of a document, the best evidence is the original document itself and no
other evidence (such as a reproduction, photocopy or oral evidence) is admissible as a general rule. The original is
preferred because it reduces the chance of undetected tampering with the document.[42]

In the instant case, there is no room for the application of the Best Evidence Rule because there is no dispute
regarding the contents of the documents. It is admitted by the parties that the respondents Deed of Sale referred to
TCT No. T-62096 as its subject; while the petitioners Deeds of Voluntary Land Transfer referred to TCT No. T-62836
as its subject, which is further described as located in Barangay Murong.

The real issue is whether the admitted contents of these documents adequately and correctly express the true
intention of the parties. As to the Deed of Sale, petitioners (and RBBI) maintain that while it refers to TCT No. T-
62096, the parties actually intended the sale of the Lantap property (covered by TCT No. T-62836).

As to the VLTs, respondents contend that the reference to TCT No. T-62836 (corresponding to the Lantap property)
reflects the true intention of RBBI and the petitioners, and the reference to Barangay Murong was a typographical
error. On the other hand, petitioners claim that the reference to Barangay Murong reflects their true intention, while
the reference to TCT No. T-62836 was a mere error. This dispute reflects an intrinsic ambiguity in the contracts,
arising from an apparent failure of the instruments to adequately express the true intention of the parties. To resolve
the ambiguity, resort must be had to evidence outside of the instruments.
The CA, however, refused to look beyond the literal wording of the documents and rejected any other evidence that
could shed light on the actual intention of the contracting parties. Though the CA cited the Best Evidence Rule, it
appears that what it actually applied was the Parol Evidence Rule instead, which provides:

When the terms of an agreement have been reduced to writing, it is considered as containing all the
terms agreed upon and there can be, between the parties and their successors in interest, no evidence
of such terms other than the contents of the written agreement.[43]

The Parol Evidence Rule excludes parol or extrinsic evidence by which a party seeks to contradict, vary, add to or
subtract from the terms of a valid agreement or instrument. Thus, it appears that what the CA actually applied in its
assailed Decision when it refused to look beyond the words of the contracts was the Parol Evidence Rule, not the Best
Evidence Rule. The appellate court gave primacy to the literal terms of the two contracts and refused to admit any
other evidence that would contradict such terms.

However, even the application of the Parol Evidence Rule is improper in the case at bar. In the first place, respondents
are not parties to the VLTs executed between RBBI and petitioners; they are strangers to the written contracts. Rule
130, Section 9 specifically provides that parol evidence rule is exclusive only as between the parties and their
successors-in-interest. The parol evidence rule may not be invoked where at least one of the parties to the suit is not
a party or a privy of a party to the written document in question, and does not base his claim on the instrument or
assert a right originating in the instrument.[44]

Moreover, the instant case falls under the exceptions to the Parol Evidence Rule, as provided in the second paragraph
of Rule 130, Section 9:

However, a party may present evidence to modify, explain or add to the terms of the written
agreement if he puts in issue in his pleading:

(1) An intrinsic ambiguity, mistake or imperfection in the written agreement;

(2) The failure of the written agreement to express the true intent and
agreement of the parties thereto;

x x x x (Emphasis supplied)

Here, the petitioners VLTs suffer from intrinsic ambiguity. The VLTs described the subject property as covered by TCT
No. T-62836 (Lantap property), but they also describe the subject property as being located in Barangay
Murong. Even the respondents Deed of Sale falls under the exception to the Parol Evidence Rule. It refers to TCT No.
T-62096 (Murong property), but RBBI contended that the true intent was to sell the Lantap property. In short, it was
squarely put in issue that the written agreement failed to express the true intent of the parties.

Based on the foregoing, the resolution of the instant case necessitates an examination of the parties respective parol
evidence, in order to determine the true intent of the parties. Well-settled is the rule that in case of doubt, it is the
intention of the contracting parties that prevails, for the intention is the soul of a contract,[45] not its wording which is
prone to mistakes, inadequacies, or ambiguities. To hold otherwise would give life, validity, and precedence to mere
typographical errors and defeat the very purpose of agreements.

In this regard, guidance is provided by the following articles of the Civil Code involving the interpretation of contracts:

Article 1370. If the terms of a contract are clear and leave no doubt upon the intention of the
contracting parties, the literal meaning of its stipulations shall control.

If the words appear to be contrary to the evident intention of the parties, the latter shall prevail over
the former.

Article 1371. In order to judge the intention of the contracting parties, their contemporaneous and
subsequent acts shall be principally considered.
Rule 130, Section 13 which provides for the rules on the interpretation of documents is likewise enlightening:

Section 13. Interpretation according to circumstances. For the proper construction of an instrument,
the circumstances under which it was made, including the situation of the subject thereof and of the
parties to it, may be shown, so that the judge may be placed in the position of those whose language
he is to interpret.

Applying the foregoing guiding rules, it is clear that the Deed of Sale was intended to transfer the Lantap property to
the respondents, while the VLTs were intended to convey the Murong property to the petitioners. This may be seen
from the contemporaneous and subsequent acts of the parties.

Third issue
Determining the intention of the parties regarding the subjects of their contracts

We are convinced that the subject of the Deed of Sale between RBBI and the respondents was the Lantap property,
and not the Murong property. After the execution in 1985 of the Deed of Sale, the respondents did not exercise acts
of ownership that could show that they indeed knew and believed that they repurchased the Murong property. They
did not take possession of the Murong property. As admitted by the parties, the Murong property was in the
possession of the petitioners, who occupied and tilled the same without any objection from the
respondents. Moreover, petitioners paid leasehold rentals for using the Murong property to RBBI, not to the
respondents.

Aside from respondents neglect of their alleged ownership rights over the Murong property, there is one other
circumstance that convinces us that what respondents really repurchased was the Lantap property. Respondent Nemi
(husband of respondent Elenita) is the farmer actually tilling the Lantap property, without turning over the supposed
landowners share to RBBI. This strongly indicates that the respondents considered themselves (and not RBBI) as the
owners of the Lantap property. For if respondents (particularly spouses Elenita and Nemi) truly believed that RBBI
retained ownership of the Lantap property, how come they never complied with their obligations as supposed tenants
of RBBIs land? The factual circumstances of the case simply do not support the theory propounded by the
respondents.
We are likewise convinced that the subject of the Deeds of Voluntary Land Transfer (VLTs) in favor of petitioners was
the Murong property, and not the Lantap property. When the VLTs were executed in 1990, petitioners were already
the tenant-farmers of the Murong property, and had been paying rentals to RBBI accordingly. It is therefore natural
that the Murong property and no other was the one that they had intended to acquire from RBBI with the execution
of the VLTs. Moreover, after the execution of the VLTs, petitioners remained in possession of the Murong property,
enjoying and tilling it without any opposition from anybody. Subsequently, after the petitioners completed their
payment of the total purchase price of P90,000.00 to RBBI, the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) officials
conducted their investigation of the Murong property which, with the presumption of regularity in the performance
of official duty, did not reveal any anomaly. Petitioners were found to be in actual possession of the Murong property
and were the qualified beneficiaries thereof. Thus, the DAR officials issued CLOAs in petitioners favor; and these
CLOAs explicitly refer to the land in Barangay Murong. All this time, petitioners were in possession of the Murong
property, undisturbed by anyone for several long years, until respondents started the controversy in 1997.

All of these contemporaneous and subsequent actions of RBBI and petitioners support their position that the subject
of their contract (VLTs) is the Murong property, not the Lantap property. Conversely, there has been no contrary
evidence of the parties actuations to indicate that they intended the sale of the Lantap property. Thus, it appears that
the reference in their VLT to TCT No. T-62836 (Lantap property) was due to their honest but mistaken belief that the
said title covers the Murong property. Such a mistake is not farfetched considering that TCT No. T-62836 only refers
to the Municipality of Bayombong, Nueva Vizcaya, and does not indicate the particular barangay where the property
is located. Moreover, both properties are bounded by a road and public land. Hence, were it not for the detailed
technical description, the titles for the two properties are very similar.
The respondents attempt to discredit petitioners argument that their VLTs were intrinsically ambiguous and failed to
express their true intention by asking why petitioners never filed an action for the reformation of their contract.[46] A
cause of action for the reformation of a contract only arises when one of the contracting parties manifests an intention,
by overt acts, not to abide by the true agreement of the parties.[47] It seems fairly obvious that petitioners had no
cause to reform their VLTs because the parties thereto (RBBI and petitioners) never had any dispute as to the
interpretation and application thereof. They both understood the VLTs to cover the Murong property (and not the
Lantap property). It was only much later, when strangers to the contracts argued for a different interpretation, that
the issue became relevant for the first time.

All told, we rule that the Deed of Sale dated February 26, 1985 between respondents and RBBI covers the Lantap
property under TCT No. T-62836, while the Deeds of Voluntary Land Transfer and TCT Nos. CLOA-395 and CLOA-
396 of the petitioners cover the Murong property under TCT No. T-62096. In consequence, the CAs ruling against
RBBI should not be executed as such execution would be inconsistent with our ruling herein.Although the CAs decision
had already become final and executory as against RBBI with the dismissal of RBBIs petition in G.R. No. 163320, our
ruling herein in favor of petitioners is a supervening cause which renders the execution of the CA decision against
RBBI unjust and inequitable.

WHEREFORE, the Petition for Review on Certiorari is GRANTED. The assailed October 7, 2003 Decision, as well as
the May 11, 2005 Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 69981 are REVERSEDand SET ASIDE. The
January 17, 2001 Decision of the DARAB Central Office is REINSTATED. The Deed of Sale dated February 26, 1985
between respondents and Rural Bank of Bayombong, Inc. covers the Lantap property under TCT No. T-62836, while
the Deeds of Voluntary Land Transfer and TCT Nos. CLOA-395 and CLOA-396 of the petitioners cover the Murong
property under TCT No. T-62096. The Register of Deeds of Nueva Vizcaya is directed to make the necessary
corrections to the titles of the said properties in accordance with this Decision. Costs against respondents. SO
ORDERED.
 ROMULO L. NERI, G.R. No. 180643
Petitioner,

- versus - Promulgated:

March 25, 2008

SENATE COMMITTEE ON
ACCOUNTABILITY OF PUBLIC
OFFICERS AND
INVESTIGATIONS, SENATE
COMMITTEE ON TRADE AND
COMMERCE, AND SENATE
COMMITTEE ON NATIONAL
DEFENSE AND SECURITY,
Respondents.

x--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x

DECISION

LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.:

At bar is a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court assailing the show
cause Letter[1] dated November 22, 2007 and contempt Order[2] dated January 30, 2008 concurrently
issued by respondent
Senate Committees on Accountability of Public Officers and Investigations, [3] Trade
and Commerce,[4] and National Defense and Security[5] against petitioner Romulo L.
Neri, former Director General of the National Economic and Development Authority (NEDA).

The facts, as culled from the pleadings, are as follows:

On April 21, 2007, the Department of Transportation and Communication (DOTC) entered into a contract
with Zhong Xing Telecommunications Equipment (ZTE) for the supply of equipment and services for the
National Broadband Network (NBN) Project in the amount of U.S. $ 329,481,290 (approximately P16 Billion
Pesos). The Project was to be financed by the Peoples Republic of China.

In connection with this NBN Project, various Resolutions were introduced in the Senate, as follows:
(1) P.S. Res. No. 127, introduced by Senator Aquilino Q. Pimentel, Jr., entitled RESOLUTION
DIRECTING THE BLUE RIBBON COMMITTEE AND THE COMMITTEE ON TRADE AND INDUSTRY
TO INVESTIGATE, IN AID OF LEGISLATION, THE CIRCUMSTANCES LEADING TO THE
APPROVAL OF THE BROADBAND CONTRACT WITH ZTE AND THE ROLE PLAYED BY THE
OFFICIALS CONCERNED IN GETTING IT CONSUMMATED AND TO MAKE RECOMMENDATIONS
TO HALE TO THE COURTS OF LAW THE PERSONS RESPONSIBLE FOR ANY ANOMALY IN
CONNECTION THEREWITH AND TO PLUG THE LOOPHOLES, IF ANY IN THE BOT LAW AND
OTHER PERTINENT LEGISLATIONS.

(2) P.S. Res. No. 144, introduced by Senator Mar Roxas, entitled RESOLUTION URGING
PRESIDENT GLORIA MACAPAGAL ARROYO TO DIRECT THE CANCELLATION OF THE ZTE
CONTRACT

(3) P.S. Res. No. 129, introduced by Senator Panfilo M. Lacson, entitled RESOLUTION
DIRECTING THE COMMITTEE ON NATIONAL DEFENSE AND SECURITY TO CONDUCT AN
INQUIRY IN AID OF LEGISLATION INTO THE NATIONAL SECURITY IMPLICATIONS OF
AWARDING THE NATIONAL BROADBAND NETWORK CONTRACT TO THE CHINESE FIRM
ZHONG XING TELECOMMUNICATIONS EQUIPMENT COMPANY LIMITED (ZTE CORPORATION)
WITH THE END IN VIEW OF PROVIDING REMEDIAL LEGISLATION THAT WILL PROTECT OUR
NATIONAL SOVEREIGNTY, SECURITY AND TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY.
 (4) P.S. Res. No. 136, introduced by Senator Miriam Defensor Santiago, entitled
RESOLUTION DIRECTING THE PROPER SENATE COMMITTEE TO CONDUCT AN INQUIRY, IN
AID OF LEGISLATION, ON THE LEGAL AND ECONOMIC JUSTIFICATION OF THE NATIONAL
BROADBAND NETWORK (NBN) PROJECT OF THE NATIONAL GOVERNMENT.

At the same time, the investigation was claimed to be relevant to the consideration of three (3) pending
bills in the Senate, to wit:

1. Senate Bill No. 1793, introduced by Senator Mar Roxas, entitled AN ACT SUBJECTING
TREATIES, INTERNATIONAL OR EXECUTIVE AGREEMENTS INVOLVING FUNDING IN THE
PROCUREMENT OF INFRASTRUCTURE PROJECTS, GOODS, AND CONSULTING SERVICES
TO BE INCLUDED IN THE SCOPE AND APPLICATION OF PHILIPPINE PROCUREMENT
LAWS, AMENDING FOR THE PURPOSE REPUBLIC ACT NO. 9184, OTHERWISE KNOWN AS
THE GOVERNMENT PROCUREMENT REFORM ACT, AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES;

2. Senate Bill No. 1794, introduced by Senator Mar Roxas, entitled AN ACT IMPOSING
SAFEGUARDS IN CONTRACTING LOANS CLASSIFIED AS OFFICIAL DEVELOPMENT
ASSISTANCE, AMENDING FOR THE PURPOSE REPUBLIC ACT NO. 8182, AS AMENDED BY
REPUBLIC ACT NO. 8555, OTHERWISE KNOWN AS THE OFFICIAL DEVELOPMENT
ASSISTANCE ACT OF 1996, AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES; and

3. Senate Bill No. 1317, introduced by Senator Miriam Defensor Santiago, entitled AN
ACT MANDATING CONCURRENCE TO INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS AND EXECUTIVE
AGREEMENTS.

Respondent Committees initiated the investigation by sending invitations to certain personalities and cabinet
officials involved in the NBN Project. Petitioner was among those invited. He was summoned to appear and
testify on September 18, 20, and 26 and October 25, 2007. However, he attended only the September 26
hearing, claiming he was out of town during the other dates.

In the September 18, 2007 hearing, businessman Jose de Venecia III testified that several high executive
officials and power brokers were using their influence to push the approval of the NBN Project by the
NEDA. It appeared that the Project was initially approved as a Build-Operate-Transfer (BOT) project but,
on March 29, 2007, the NEDA acquiesced to convert it into a government-to-government project, to be
financed through a loan from the Chinese Government.

On September 26, 2007, petitioner testified before respondent Committees for eleven (11) hours. He
disclosed that then Commission on Elections (COMELEC) Chairman Benjamin Abalos offered him P200 Million
in exchange for his approval of the NBN Project. He further narrated that he informed President Arroyo
about the bribery attempt and that she instructed him not to accept the bribe. However, when probed further
on what they discussed about the NBN Project, petitioner refused to answer, invoking executive privilege.
In particular, he refused to answer the questions on (a) whether or not President Arroyo followed up the
NBN Project,[6] (b) whether or not she directed him to prioritize it,[7] and (c) whether or not she directed
him to approve.[8]

Unrelenting, respondent Committees issued a Subpoena Ad Testificandum to petitioner, requiring him to

appear and testify on November 20, 2007.

However, in the Letter dated November 15, 2007, Executive Secretary Eduardo R. Ermita requested
respondent Committees to dispense with petitioners testimony on the ground of executive privilege. The
pertinent portion of the letter reads:

With reference to the subpoena ad testificandum issued to Secretary Romulo Neri to appear
and testify again on 20 November 2007 before the Joint Committees you chair, it will be
recalled that Sec. Neri had already testified and exhaustively discussed the ZTE / NBN project,
including his conversation with the President thereon last 26 September 2007.
 Asked to elaborate further on his conversation with the President, Sec. Neri asked for time to
consult with his superiors in line with the ruling of the Supreme Court in Senate v. Ermita,
488 SCRA 1 (2006).

Specifically, Sec. Neri sought guidance on the possible invocation of executive privilege on
the following questions, to wit:

a) Whether the President followed up the (NBN) project?

b) Were you dictated to prioritize the ZTE?
c) Whether the President said to go ahead and approve the project after
being told about the alleged bribe?

Following the ruling in Senate v. Ermita, the foregoing questions fall under conversations and
correspondence between the President and public officials which are considered executive
privilege (Almonte v. Vasquez, G.R. 95637, 23 May 1995; Chavez v. PEA, G.R. 133250, July
9, 2002). Maintaining the confidentiality of conversations of the President is necessary in the
exercise of her executive and policy decision making process. The expectation of a President
to the confidentiality of her conversations and correspondences, like the value which we
accord deference for the privacy of all citizens, is the necessity for protection of the public
interest in candid, objective, and even blunt or harsh opinions in Presidential decision-making.
Disclosure of conversations of the President will have a chilling effect on the President, and
will hamper her in the effective discharge of her duties and responsibilities, if she is not
protected by the confidentiality of her conversations.

The context in which executive privilege is being invoked is that the information sought to be
disclosed might impair our diplomatic as well as economic relations with the Peoples Republic
of China. Given the confidential nature in which these information were conveyed to the
President, he cannot provide the Committee any further details of these conversations,
without disclosing the very thing the privilege is designed to protect.

In light of the above considerations, this Office is constrained to invoke the settled doctrine
of executive privilege as refined in Senate v. Ermita, and has advised Secretary Neri
accordingly.

Considering that Sec. Neri has been lengthily interrogated on the subject in an unprecedented
11-hour hearing, wherein he has answered all questions propounded to him except the
foregoing questions involving executive privilege, we therefore request that his testimony on
20 November 2007 on the ZTE / NBN project be dispensed with.

On November 20, 2007, petitioner did not appear before respondent Committees. Thus, on November 22,
2007, the latter issued the show cause Letter requiring him to explain why he should not be cited in
contempt. The Letter reads:

Since you have failed to appear in the said hearing, the Committees on Accountability of Public
Officers and Investigations (Blue Ribbon), Trade and Commerce and National Defense and
Security require you to show cause why you should not be cited in contempt under Section
6, Article 6 of the Rules of the Committee on Accountability of Public Officers and
Investigations (Blue Ribbon).

The Senate expects your explanation on or before 2 December 2007.

On November 29, 2007, petitioner replied to respondent Committees, manifesting that it was not his
intention to ignore the Senate hearing and that he thought the only remaining questions were those he
claimed to be covered by executive privilege, thus:

It was not my intention to snub the last Senate hearing. In fact, I have cooperated
with the task of the Senate in its inquiry in aid of legislation as shown by my almost 11 hours
stay during the hearing on 26 September 2007.During said hearing, I answered all the
questions that were asked of me, save for those which I thought was covered by executive
privilege, and which was confirmed by the Executive Secretary in his Letter 15 November
2007. In good faith, after that exhaustive testimony, I thought that what remained were only
the three questions, where the Executive Secretary claimed executive privilege. Hence, his
request that my presence be dispensed with.

Be that as it may, should there be new matters that were not yet taken up during
the 26 September 2007 hearing, may I be furnished in advance as to what else I need to
clarify, so that as a resource person, I may adequately prepare myself.
 In addition, petitioner submitted a letter prepared by his counsel, Atty. Antonio R. Bautista, stating,
among others that: (1) his (petitioner) non-appearance was upon the order of the President; and (2) his
conversation with President Arroyo dealt with delicate and sensitive national security and diplomatic matters
relating to the impact of the bribery scandal involving high government officials and the possible loss of
confidence of foreign investors and lenders in the Philippines. The letter ended with a reiteration of
petitioners request that he be furnished in advance as to what else he needs to clarify so that he may
adequately prepare for the hearing.
In the interim, on December 7, 2007, petitioner filed with this Court the present petition
for certiorari assailing the show cause Letter dated November 22, 2007.

Respondent Committees found petitioners explanations unsatisfactory. Without responding to his

request for advance notice of the matters that he should still clarify, they issued the Order dated January
30, 2008, citing him in contempt of respondent Committees and ordering his arrest and detention at the
Office of the Senate Sergeant-At-Arms until such time that he would appear and give his testimony. The
said Order states:

ORDER

For failure to appear and testify in the Committees hearing on Tuesday, September
18, 2007; Thursday, September 20, 2007; Thursday, October 25, 2007; and Tuesday,
November 20, 2007, despite personal notice and Subpoenas Ad Testificandum sent to and
received by him, which thereby delays, impedes and obstructs, as it has in fact delayed,
impeded and obstructed the inquiry into the subject reported irregularities, AND for failure to
explain satisfactorily why he should not be cited for contempt (Neri letter of 29 November
2007), herein attached) ROMULO L. NERI is hereby cited in contempt of this (sic)
Committees and ordered arrested and detained in the Office of the Senate Sergeant-
At-Arms until such time that he will appear and give his testimony.

The Sergeant-At-Arms is hereby directed to carry out and implement this Order and
make a return hereof within twenty four (24) hours from its enforcement.

SO ORDERED.

On the same date, petitioner moved for the reconsideration of the above Order. [9] He insisted that
he has not shown any contemptible conduct worthy of contempt and arrest. He emphasized his willingness
to testify on new matters, however, respondent Committees did not respond to his request for advance
notice of questions. He also mentioned the petition for certiorari he filed on December 7, 2007. According
to him, this should restrain respondent Committees from enforcing the show cause Letter through the
issuance of declaration of contempt and arrest.

In view of respondent Committees issuance of the contempt Order, petitioner filed on February 1,
2008 a Supplemental Petition for Certiorari (With Urgent Application for TRO/Preliminary
Injunction),seeking to restrain the implementation of the said contempt Order.

On February 5, 2008, the Court issued a Status Quo Ante Order (a) enjoining respondent Committees from
implementing their contempt Order, (b) requiring the parties to observe the status quo prevailing priorto
the issuance of the assailed order, and (c) requiring respondent Committees to file their comment.

Petitioner contends that respondent Committees show cause Letter and

contempt Order were issued with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. He
stresses that his conversations with President Arroyo are candid discussions meant to explore options
in making policy decisions. According to him, these discussions dwelt on the impact of the bribery
scandal involving high government officials on the countrys diplomatic relations and economic
and military affairs and the possible loss of confidence of foreign investors and lenders in
the Philippines. He also emphasizes that his claim of executive privilege is upon the order of the President
and within the parameters laid down in Senate v. Ermita[10] and United States v. Reynolds.[11] Lastly, he
argues that he is precluded from disclosing communications made
to him in official confidence under Section 7[12] of Republic Act No. 6713,
otherwise known as Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and Employees, and Section
24[13] (e) of Rule 130 of the Rules of Court.

Respondent Committees assert the contrary. They argue that (1) petitioners testimony is material
and pertinent in the investigation conducted in aid of legislation; (2) there is no valid justification for
petitioner to claim executive privilege; (3) there is no abuse of their authority to order petitioners arrest;
and (4) petitioner has not come to court with clean hands.

In the oral argument held last March 4, 2008, the following issues were ventilated:
 1. What communications between the President and petitioner Neri are covered by the
principle of executive privilege?

1.a Did Executive Secretary Ermita correctly invoke the principle of executive privilege,
by order of the President, to cover (i) conversations of the President in the exercise
of her executive and policy decision-making and (ii) information, which might impair
our diplomatic as well as economic relations with the Peoples Republic of China?

1.b. Did petitioner Neri correctly invoke executive privilege to avoid testifying on his
conversations with the President on the NBN contract on his assertions that the said
conversations dealt with delicate and sensitive national security and
diplomatic matters relating to the impact of bribery scandal involving high
government officials and the possible loss of confidence of foreign investors
and lenders in the Philippines x x x within the principles laid down in Senate v.
Ermita (488 SCRA 1 [2006])?

1.c Will the claim of executive privilege in this case violate the following provisions of the
Constitution:

Sec. 28, Art. II (Full public disclosure of all transactions involving public interest)

Sec. 7, Art. III (The right of the people to information on matters of public concern)

Sec. 1, Art. XI (Public office is a public trust)

Sec. 17, Art. VII (The President shall ensure that the laws be faithfully executed)

and the due process clause and the principle of separation of powers?

2. What is the proper procedure to be followed in invoking executive privilege?

3. Did the Senate Committees gravely abuse their discretion in ordering the arrest of
petitioner for non-compliance with the subpoena?

After the oral argument, the parties were directed to manifest to the Court within twenty-four (24)
hours if they are amenable to the Courts proposal of allowing petitioner to immediately resume his testimony
before the Senate Committees to answer the other questions of the Senators without prejudice to the
decision on the merits of this pending petition. It was understood that petitioner may invoke executive
privilege in the course of the Senate Committees proceedings, and if the respondent Committees disagree
thereto, the unanswered questions will be the subject of a supplemental pleading to be resolved along with
the three (3) questions subject of the present petition.[14] At the same time, respondent Committees were
directed to submit several pertinent documents.[15]

The Senate did not agree with the proposal for the reasons stated in the Manifestation dated March
5, 2008. As to the required documents, the Senate and respondent Committees manifested that they would
not be able to submit the latters Minutes of all meetings and the Minute Book because it has never been the
historical and traditional legislative practice to keep them. [16] They instead submitted the Transcript of
Stenographic Notes of respondent Committees joint public hearings.

On March 17, 2008, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) filed a Motion for Leave to Intervene and to
Admit Attached Memorandum, founded on the following arguments:

(1) The communications between petitioner and the President are covered by the principle
of executive privilege.

(2) Petitioner was not summoned by respondent Senate Committees in accordance with the
law-making bodys power to conduct inquiries in aid of legislation as laid down in Section
21, Article VI of the Constitution and Senate v. Ermita.

(3) Respondent Senate Committees gravely abused its discretion for alleged non-
compliance with the Subpoena dated November 13, 2007.

The Court granted the OSGs motion the next day, March 18, 2008.

As the foregoing facts unfold, related events transpired.

On March 6, 2008, President Arroyo issued Memorandum Circular No. 151, revoking Executive Order
No. 464 and Memorandum Circular No. 108. She advised executive officials and employees to follow and
abide by the Constitution, existing laws and jurisprudence, including, among others, the case of Senate v.
Ermita[17] when they are invited to legislative inquiries in aid of legislation.

At the core of this controversy are the two (2) crucial queries, to wit:

First, are the communications elicited by the subject three (3) questions covered by executive
privilege?

And second, did respondent Committees commit grave abuse of discretion in issuing the contempt Order?

We grant the petition.

At the outset, a glimpse at the landmark case of Senate v. Ermita[18] becomes

imperative. Senate draws in bold strokes the distinction between the legislative and oversight powers of

the Congress, as embodied under Sections 21 and 22, respectively, of Article VI of the Constitution, to wit:

SECTION 21. The Senate or the House of Representatives or any of

its respective committees may conduct inquiries in aid of legislation in accordance with its

duly published rules of procedure. The rights of persons appearing in or affected by such

inquiries shall be respected.

 SECTION 22. The heads of department may upon their own initiative, with the consent of

the President, or upon the request of either House, or as the rules of each House shall provide,

appear before and be heard by such House on any matter pertaining to their departments.

Written questions shall be submitted to the President of the Senate or the Speaker of the

House of Representatives at least three days before their scheduled

appearance. Interpellations shall not be limited to written questions, but may cover matters

related thereto. When the security of the state or the public interest so requires and the

President so states in writing, the appearance shall be conducted in executive session.

Senate cautions that while the above provisions are closely related and complementary to each other,

they should not be considered as pertaining to the same power of Congress. Section 21 relates to the power

to conduct inquiries in aid of legislation. Its aim is to elicit information that may be used for legislation. On

the other hand, Section 22 pertains to the power to conduct a question hour, the objective of which is to

obtain information in pursuit of Congress oversight function. [19] Simply stated, while both powers allow

Congress or any of its committees to conduct inquiry, their objectives are different.

This distinction gives birth to another distinction with regard to the use of compulsory process. Unlike

in Section 21, Congress cannot compel the appearance of executive officials under Section 22. The Courts

pronouncement in Senate v. Ermita[20] is clear:

When Congress merely seeks to be informed on how department heads are

implementing the statutes which it has issued, its right to such information is not as

imperative as that of the President to whom, as Chief Executive, such department heads must

give a report of their performance as a matter of duty. In such instances, Section 22, in

keeping with the separation of powers, states that Congress may only request their

appearance. Nonetheless, when the inquiry in which Congress requires their appearance is in

aid of legislation under Section 21, the appearance is mandatory for the same reasons stated

in Arnault.

In fine, the oversight function of Congress may be facilitated by compulsory

process only to the extent that it is performed in pursuit of legislation. This is

consistent with the intent discerned from the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission

Ultimately, the power of Congress to compel the appearance of executive officials under

section 21 and the lack of it under Section 22 find their basis in the principle of separation of

powers. While the executive branch is a co-equal branch of the legislature, it cannot frustrate

the power of Congress to legislate by refusing to comply with its demands for information.

(Emphasis supplied.)
 The availability of the power of judicial review to resolve the issues raised in this case has also been

settled in Senate v. Ermita, when it held:

As evidenced by the American experience during the so-called McCarthy era, however,

the right of Congress to conduct inquiries in aid of legislation is, in theory, no less susceptible

to abuse than executive or judicial power. It may thus be subjected to judicial review pursuant

to the Courts certiorari powers under Section 1, Article VIII of the Constitution.

Hence, this decision.

The Communications Elicited by the Three (3) Questions are Covered

by Executive Privilege

We start with the basic premises where the parties have conceded.

The power of Congress to conduct inquiries in aid of legislation is broad. This is based on the

proposition that a legislative body cannot legislate wisely or effectively in the absence of information

respecting the conditions which the legislation is intended to affect or change. [21] Inevitably, adjunct thereto

is the compulsory process to enforce it. But, the power, broad as it is, has limitations. To be valid, it is

imperative that it is done in accordance with the Senate or House duly published rules of procedure and

that the rights of the persons appearing in or affected by such inquiries be respected.

The power extends even to executive officials and the only way for them to be exempted is through

a valid claim of executive privilege.[22] This directs us to the consideration of the question -- is there a

recognized claim of executive privilege despite the revocation of E.O. 464?

A- There is a Recognized Claim of Executive Privilege Despite the Revocation of E.O. 464

At this juncture, it must be stressed that the revocation of E.O. 464 does not in any way diminish our

concept of executive privilege. This is because this concept has Constitutional underpinnings. Unlike

the United States which has further accorded the concept with statutory status by enacting the Freedom

of Information Act[23] and the Federal Advisory Committee Act,[24] the Philippines has retained its

constitutional origination, occasionally interpreted only by this Court in various cases. The most recent of

these is the case of Senate v. Ermita where this Court declared unconstitutional substantial portions of E.O.

464. In this regard, it is worthy to note that Executive Ermitas Letter dated November 15, 2007 limits its

bases for the claim of executive privilege to Senate v. Ermita, Almonte v. Vasquez,[25] and Chavez v.

PEA.[26] There was never a mention of E.O. 464.

While these cases, especially Senate v. Ermita,[27] have comprehensively discussed the concept of

executive privilege, we deem it imperative to explore it once more in view of the clamor for this Court to

clearly define the communications covered by executive privilege.

The Nixon and post-Watergate cases established the broad contours of the presidential

communications privilege.[28] In United States v. Nixon,[29] the U.S. Court recognized a great public

interest in preserving the confidentiality of conversations that take place in the Presidents

performance of his official duties. It thus considered presidential communications as presumptively

privileged. Apparently, the presumption is founded on the Presidents generalized interest in

confidentiality. The privilege is said to be necessary to guarantee the candor of presidential advisors and

to provide the President and those who assist him with freedom to explore alternatives in the

process of shaping policies and making decisions and to do so in a way many would be unwilling

to express except privately.

In In Re: Sealed Case,[30] the U.S. Court of Appeals delved deeper. It ruled that there are two (2)

kinds of executive privilege; one is the presidential communications privilege and, the other is

the deliberative process privilege. The former pertains to communications, documents or other

materials that reflect presidential decision-making and deliberations and that the President

believes should remain confidential. The latter includes advisory opinions, recommendations and

deliberations comprising part of a process by which governmental decisions and policies are

formulated.

Accordingly, they are characterized by marked distinctions. Presidential communications

privilege applies to decision-making of the President while, the deliberative process privilege,

to decision-making of executive officials. The first is rooted in the constitutional principle of

separation of power and the Presidents unique constitutional

role; the second on common law privilege. Unlike the deliberative process

privilege, the presidential communications privilege applies to documents in their entirety, and

covers final and post-decisional materials as well as pre-deliberative ones[31] As a consequence,

congressional or judicial negation of the presidential communications privilege is always subject to

greater scrutiny than denial of the deliberative process privilege.

Turning on who are the officials covered by the presidential communications privilege, In Re: Sealed

Case confines the privilege only to White House Staff that has operational proximity to direct presidential

decision-making. Thus, the privilege is meant to encompass only those functions that form the core of

presidential authority, involving what the court characterized as quintessential and non-delegable

Presidential power, such as commander-in-chief power, appointment and removal power, the power to

grant pardons and reprieves, the sole-authority to receive ambassadors and other public officers, the power

to negotiate treaties, etc.[32]

The situation in Judicial Watch, Inc. v. Department of Justice[33] tested the In Re: Sealed Case principles.

There, while the presidential decision involved is the exercise of the Presidents pardon power, a non-

delegable, core-presidential function, the Deputy Attorney General and the Pardon Attorney were deemed
to be too remote from the President and his

senior White House advisors to be protected. The Court conceded that

functionally those officials were performing a task directly related to the Presidents pardon power, but

concluded that an organizational test was more appropriate for confining the potentially broad sweep that

would result from the In Re: Sealed Cases functional test. The majority concluded that, the lesser

protections of the deliberative process privilege would suffice. That privilege was, however, found insufficient

to justify the confidentiality of the 4,341 withheld documents.

But more specific classifications of communications covered by executive privilege are made in older

cases. Courts ruled early that the Executive has a right to withhold documents that might reveal military

or state secrets,[34] identity of government informers in some circumstances, ,[35] and information

related to pending investigations.[36] An area where the privilege is highly revered is in foreign

relations. In United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp.[37] the U.S. Court, citing President George

Washington, pronounced:

The nature of foreign negotiations requires caution, and their success must often

depend on secrecy, and even when brought to a conclusion, a full disclosure of all the

measures, demands, or eventual concessions which may have been proposed or contemplated

would be extremely impolitic, for this might have a pernicious influence on future negotiations

or produce immediate inconveniences, perhaps danger and mischief, in relation to other

powers. The necessity of such caution and secrecy was one cogent reason for vesting the

power of making treaties in the President, with the advice and consent of the Senate, the

principle on which the body was formed confining it to a small number of members. To admit,

then, a right in the House of Representatives to demand and to have as a matter of course

all the papers respecting a negotiation with a foreign power would be to establish a dangerous

precedent.

Majority of the above jurisprudence have found their way in our jurisdiction. In Chavez v.

PCGG[38], this Court held that there is a governmental privilege against public disclosure with respect to

state secrets regarding military, diplomatic and other security matters. In Chavez v. PEA,[39] there is also a

recognition of the confidentiality of Presidential conversations, correspondences, and discussions in closed-

door Cabinet meetings. In Senate v. Ermita, the concept of presidential communications privilege is

fully discussed.

As may be gleaned from the above discussion, the claim of executive privilege is highly recognized

in cases where the subject of inquiry relates to a power textually committed by the Constitution to the

President, such as the area of military and foreign relations. Under our Constitution, the President is the
repository of the commander-in-chief,[40] appointing,[41] pardoning,[42] and diplomatic[43] powers. Consistent

with the doctrine of separation of powers, the information relating to these powers may enjoy greater

confidentiality than others.

The above cases, especially, Nixon, In Re Sealed Case and Judicial Watch, somehow provide the

elements of presidential communications privilege, to wit:

1) The protected communication must relate to a quintessential and non-delegable presidential

power.

2) The communication must be authored or solicited and received by a close advisor of the

President or the President himself. The judicial test is that an advisor must be in

operational proximity with the President.

3) The presidential communications privilege remains a qualified privilege that may be

overcome by a showing of adequate need, such that the information sought likely

contains important evidence and by the unavailability of the information elsewhere by

an appropriate investigating authority.[44]

In the case at bar, Executive Secretary Ermita premised his claim of executive privilege on the ground that
the communications elicited by the three (3) questions fall under conversation and correspondence between
the President and public officials necessary in her executive and policy decision-making process and, that
the information sought to be disclosed might impair our diplomatic as well as economic relations with the
Peoples Republic of China. Simply put, the bases are presidential communications privilege and
executive privilege on matters relating to diplomacy or foreign relations.

Using the above elements, we are convinced that, indeed, the communications elicited by the three (3)
questions are covered by the presidential communications privilege. First, the communications relate
to a quintessential and non-delegable power of the President, i.e. the power to enter into an executive
agreement with other countries. This authority of the President to enter into executive agreements without
the concurrence of the Legislature has traditionally been recognized in Philippine
jurisprudence.[45] Second, the communications are received by a close advisor of the President. Under the
operational proximity test, petitioner can be considered a close advisor, being a member of President Arroyos
cabinet. And third, there is no adequate showing of a compelling need that would justify the limitation of
the privilege and of the unavailability of the information elsewhere by an appropriate investigating
authority.
The third element deserves a lengthy discussion.

United States v. Nixon held that a claim of executive privilege is subject to balancing against other

interest. In other words, confidentiality in executive privilege is not absolutely protected by the

Constitution. The U.S. Court held:

 [N]either the doctrine of separation of powers, nor the need for confidentiality of high-level

communications, without more, can sustain an absolute, unqualified Presidential privilege of

immunity from judicial process under all circumstances.

The foregoing is consistent with the earlier case of Nixon v. Sirica,[46] where it was held that presidential

communications are presumptively privileged and that the presumption can be overcome only by mere

showing of public need by the branch seeking access to conversations. The courts are enjoined to resolve

the competing interests of the political branches of the government in the manner that preserves the

essential functions of each Branch.[47] Here, the record is bereft of any categorical explanation from

respondent Committees to show a compelling or citical need for the answers to the three (3) questions in

the enactment of a law. Instead, the questions veer more towards the exercise of the legislative oversight

function under Section 22 of Article VI rather than Section 21 of the same Article. Senate v.

Ermita ruled that the the oversight function of Congress may be facilitated by compulsory

process only to the extent that it is performed in pursuit of legislation. It is conceded that it is

difficult to draw the line between an inquiry in aid of legislation and an inquiry in the exercise of oversight

function of Congress. In this regard, much will depend on the content of the questions and the manner the

inquiry is conducted.

Respondent Committees argue that a claim of executive privilege does not guard against a possible

disclosure of a crime or wrongdoing. We see no dispute on this. It is settled in United States v.

Nixon[48] that demonstrated, specific need for evidence in pending criminal trial outweighs the Presidents

generalized interest in confidentiality. However, the present cases distinction with the Nixon case is very

evident. In Nixon, there is a pending criminal proceeding where the information is requested and it is the

demands of due process of law and the fair administration of criminal justice that the information be

disclosed. This is the reason why the U.S. Court was quick to limit the scope of its decision. It stressed

that it is not concerned here with the balance between the Presidents generalized interest in

confidentiality x x x and congressional demands for information. Unlike in Nixon, the information

here is elicited, not in a criminal proceeding, but in a legislative inquiry. In this regard, Senate v.

Ermita stressed that the validity of the claim of executive privilege depends not only on the ground invoked

but, also, on the procedural setting or the context in which the claim is made. Furthermore, in Nixon, the

President did not interpose any claim of need to protect military, diplomatic or sensitive national security

secrets. In the present case, Executive Secretary Ermita categorically claims executive privilege on the

grounds of presidential communications privilege in relation to her executive and policy decision-

making process and diplomatic secrets.

The respondent Committees should cautiously tread into the investigation of matters which may

present a conflict of interest that may provide a ground to inhibit the Senators participating in the inquiry if

later on an impeachment proceeding is initiated on the same subject matter of the present Senate

inquiry. Pertinently, in Senate Select Committee on Presidential Campaign Activities v. Nixon,[49] it was held

that since an impeachment proceeding had been initiated by a House Committee, the Senate Select

Committees immediate oversight need for five presidential tapes should give way to the House Judiciary
Committee which has the constitutional authority to inquire into presidential impeachment. The Court

expounded on this issue in this wise:

It is true, of course, that the Executive cannot, any more than the other branches of
government, invoke a general confidentiality privilege to shield its officials and employees
from investigations by the proper governmental institutions into possible criminal
wrongdoing. The Congress learned this as to its own privileges in Gravel v. United States, as
did the judicial branch, in a sense, in Clark v. United States, and the executive branch itself
in Nixon v. Sirica. But under Nixon v. Sirica, the showing required to overcome the
presumption favoring confidentiality turned, not on the nature of the presidential
conduct that the subpoenaed material might reveal,but, instead, on the nature and
appropriateness of the function in the performance of which the material was
sought, and the degree to which the material was necessary to its fulfillment. Here
also our task requires and our decision implies no judgment whatever concerning
possible presidential involvement in culpable activity. On the contrary, we think the
sufficiency of the Committee's showing must depend solely on whether the
subpoenaed evidence is demonstrably critical to the responsible fulfillment of the
Committee's functions.

In its initial briefs here, the Committee argued that it has shown exactly this. It
contended that resolution, on the basis of the subpoenaed tapes, of the conflicts in the
testimony before it would aid in a determination whether legislative involvement in political
campaigns is necessary and could help engender the public support needed for basic reforms
in our electoral system. Moreover, Congress has, according to the Committee, power to
oversee the operations of the executive branch, to investigate instances of possible corruption
and malfeasance in office, and to expose the results of its investigations to public view. The
Committee says that with respect to Watergate-related matters, this power has been
delegated to it by the Senate, and that to exercise its power responsibly, it must have access
to the subpoenaed tapes.

We turn first to the latter contention. In the circumstances of this case, we need neither
deny that the Congress may have, quite apart from its legislative responsibilities, a general
oversight power, nor explore what the lawful reach of that power might be under the
Committee's constituent resolution. Since passage of that resolution, the House Committee
on the Judiciary has begun an inquiry into presidential impeachment. The investigative
authority of the Judiciary Committee with respect to presidential conduct has an express
constitutional source. x x x We have been shown no evidence indicating that Congress
itself attaches any particular value to this interest. In these circumstances, we think
the need for the tapes premised solely on an asserted power to investigate and
inform cannot justify enforcement of the Committee's subpoena.

The sufficiency of the Committee's showing of need has come to depend, therefore,

entirely on whether the subpoenaed materials are critical to the performance of its legislative

functions. There is a clear difference between Congress' legislative tasks and the responsibility

of a grand jury, or any institution engaged in like functions. While fact-finding by a

legislative committee is undeniably a part of its task, legislative judgments normally

depend more on the predicted consequences of proposed legislative actions and

their political acceptability, than on precise reconstruction of past events; Congress

frequently legislates on the basis of conflicting information provided in its hearings. In

contrast, the responsibility of the grand jury turns entirely on its ability to determine whether

there is probable cause to believe that certain named individuals did or did not commit specific

crimes. If, for example, as in Nixon v. Sirica, one of those crimes is perjury concerning the

content of certain conversations, the grand jury's need for the most precise evidence, the

exact text of oral statements recorded in their original form, is undeniable. We see no

comparable need in the legislative process, at least not in the circumstances of this
 case. Indeed, whatever force there might once have been in the Committee's argument that

the subpoenaed materials are necessary to its legislative judgments has been substantially

undermined by subsequent events. (Emphasis supplied)

Respondent Committees further contend that the grant of petitioners claim of executive privilege
violates the constitutional provisions on the right of the people to information on matters of public
concern.[50] We might have agreed with such contention if petitioner did not appear before them at all. But
petitioner made himself available to them during the September 26 hearing, where he was questioned for
eleven (11) hours. Not only that, he expressly manifested his willingness to answer more questions from
the Senators, with the exception only of those covered by his claim of executive privilege.

The right to public information, like any other right, is subject to limitation. Section 7 of Article III
provides:

The right of the people to information on matters of public concern shall be

recognized. Access to official records, and to documents, and papers pertaining to official acts,
transactions, or decisions, as well as to government research data used as basis for policy
development, shall be afforded the citizen, subject to such limitations as may be
provided by law.

The provision itself expressly provides the limitation, i.e. as may be provided by law. Some of
these laws are Section 7 of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 6713,[51] Article 229[52] of
the Revised Penal Code,Section 3 (k)[53] of R.A. No. 3019, and Section 24(e)[54] of Rule 130 of the Rules of
Court. These are in addition to what our body of jurisprudence classifies as confidential [55] and what our
Constitution considers as belonging to the larger concept of executive privilege. Clearly, there is a recognized
public interest in the confidentiality of certain information. We find the information subject of this case
belonging to such kind.

More than anything else, though, the right of Congress or any of its Committees to obtain information in aid
of legislation cannot be equated with the peoples right to public information. The former cannot claim that
every legislative inquiry is an exercise of the peoples right to information. The distinction between such
rights is laid down in Senate v. Ermita:

There are, it bears noting, clear distinctions between the right of Congress to information
which underlies the power of inquiry and the right of people to information on matters of
public concern. For one, the demand of a citizen for the production of documents pursuant to
his right to information does not have the same obligatory force as a subpoena duces
tecum issued by Congress. Neither does the right to information grant a citizen the power to
exact testimony from government officials. These powers belong only to Congress, not to an
individual citizen.

Thus, while Congress is composed of representatives elected by the people, it does

not follow, except in a highly qualified sense, that in every exercise of its power of
inquiry, the people are exercising their right to information.

The members of respondent Committees should not invoke as justification in their exercise of power a right
properly belonging to the people in general. This is because when they discharge their power, they do so as
public officials and members of Congress. Be that as it may, the right to information must be balanced with
and should give way, in appropriate cases, to constitutional precepts particularly those pertaining to delicate
interplay of executive-legislative powers and privileges which is the subject of careful review by numerous
decided cases.
B- The Claim of Executive Privilege is Properly Invoked

We now proceed to the issue -- whether the claim is properly invoked by the
President. Jurisprudence teaches that for the claim to be properly invoked, there must be a formal claim
of privilege, lodged by the head of the department which has control over the matter. [56] A formal and proper
claim of executive privilege requires a precise and certain reason for preserving their confidentiality. [57]

The Letter dated November 17, 2007 of Executive Secretary Ermita satisfies the requirement. It serves as
the formal claim of privilege. There, he expressly states that this Office is constrained to invoke the
settled doctrine of executive privilege as refined in Senate v. Ermita, and has advised Secretary
Neri accordingly. Obviously, he is referring to the Office of the President. That is more than enough
compliance. In Senate v. Ermita, a less categorical letter was even adjudged to be sufficient.

With regard to the existence of precise and certain reason, we find the grounds relied upon by Executive
Secretary Ermita specific enough so as not to leave respondent Committees in the dark on how the
requested information could be classified as privileged. The case of Senate v. Ermita only requires that an
allegation be made whether the information demanded involves military or diplomatic secrets, closed-door
Cabinet meetings, etc. The particular ground must only be specified. The enumeration is not even intended
to be comprehensive.[58] The following statement of grounds satisfies the requirement:

The context in which executive privilege is being invoked is that the information sought to be
disclosed might impair our diplomatic as well as economic relations with the Peoples Republic
of China. Given the confidential nature in which these information were conveyed to the
President, he cannot provide the Committee any further details of these conversations,
without disclosing the very thing the privilege is designed to protect.

At any rate, as held further in Senate v. Ermita, [59] the Congress must not require the executive to state
the reasons for the claim with such particularity as to compel disclosure of the information which the privilege
is meant to protect. This is a matter of respect to a coordinate and co-equal department.

II
Respondent Committees Committed Grave Abuse of Discretion in

Issuing the Contempt Order

Grave abuse of discretion means such capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment as is equivalent

to lack of jurisdiction, or, in other words where the power is exercised in an arbitrary or despotic manner

by reason of passion or personal hostility and it must be so patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of

positive duty or to a virtual refusal to perform the duty enjoined or to act at all in contemplation of law. [60]

It must be reiterated that when respondent Committees issued the show cause Letter dated
November 22, 2007, petitioner replied immediately, manifesting that it was not his intention to ignore the
Senate hearing and that he thought the only remaining questions were the three (3) questions he claimed
to be covered by executive privilege. In addition thereto, he submitted Atty. Bautistas letter, stating that
his non-appearance was upon the order of the President and specifying the reasons why his conversations
with President Arroyo are covered by executive privilege. Both correspondences include an expression
of his willingness to testify again, provided he be furnished in advance copies of the
questions. Without responding to his request for advance list of questions, respondent Committees issued
the Order dated January 30, 2008, citing him in contempt of respondent Committees and ordering his arrest
and detention at the Office of the Senate Sergeant-At-Arms until such time that he would appear and give
his testimony. Thereupon, petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration, informing respondent Committees
that he had filed the present petition for certiorari.
Respondent Committees committed grave abuse of discretion in issuing the contempt Order in view of five

(5) reasons.

First, there being a legitimate claim of executive privilege, the issuance of the contempt Order suffers from

constitutional infirmity.

Second, respondent Committees did not comply with the requirement laid down in Senate v. Ermita that

the invitations should contain the possible needed statute which prompted the need for the inquiry, along

with the usual indication of the subject of inquiry and the questions relative to and in furtherance

thereof. Compliance with this requirement is imperative, both under Sections 21 and 22 of Article VI of the

Constitution. This must be so to ensure that the rights of both persons appearing in or affected by such

inquiry are respected as mandated by said Section 21 and by virtue of the express language of Section

22. Unfortunately, despite petitioners repeated demands, respondent Committees did not send him an

advance list of questions.

Third, a reading of the transcript of respondent Committees January 30, 2008 proceeding reveals that only

a minority of the members of the Senate Blue Ribbon Committee was present during the

deliberation.[61] Section 18 of the Rules of Procedure Governing Inquiries in Aid of Legislation provides that:

The Committee, by a vote of majority of all its members, may punish for contempt

any witness before it who disobeys any order of the Committee or refuses to be sworn or to

testify or to answer proper questions by the Committee or any of its members.

Clearly, the needed vote is a majority of all the members of the Committee. Apparently, members who did

not actually participate in the deliberation were made to sign the contempt Order. Thus, there is a cloud of

doubt as to the validity of the contempt Order dated January 30, 2008. We quote the pertinent portion of

the transcript, thus:

THE CHAIRMAN (SEN. CAYETANO, A). For clarification. x x x The Chair will call
either a caucus or will ask the Committee on Rules if there is a problem. Meaning, if
we do not have the sufficient numbers. But if we have a sufficient number, we will
just hold a caucus to be able to implement that right away becauseAgain, our Rules
provide that any one held in contempt and ordered arrested, need the concurrence
of a majority of all members of the said committee and we have three committees
conducting this.

So thank you very much to the members

SEN. PIMENTEL. Mr. Chairman.

THE CHAIRMAN (SEN. CAYETANO,A). May I recognize the Minority Leader and
give him the floor, Senator Pimentel.

SEN. PIMENTEL. Mr. Chairman, there is no problem, I think, with consulting

the other committees. But I am of the opinion that the Blue Ribbon Committee is
the lead committee, and therefore, it should have preference in enforcing its own
decisions. Meaning to say, it is not something that is subject to consultation with
 other committees. I am not sure that is the right interpretation. I think that once
we decide here, we enforce what we decide, because otherwise, before we know it,
our determination is watered down by delay and, you know, the so-called
consultation that inevitably will have to take place if we follow the premise that has
been explained.

So my suggestion, Mr. Chairman, is the Blue Ribbon Committee should not forget its
the lead committee here, and therefore, the will of the lead committee prevails over all the
other, you, know reservations that other committees might have who are only secondary or
even tertiary committees, Mr. Chairman.

THE CHAIRMAN (SEN. CAYETANO, A.) Thank you very much to the Minority
Leader. And I agree with the wisdom of his statements. I was merely mentioning that under
Section 6 of the Rules of the Committee and under Section 6, The Committee by a vote of a
majority of all its members may punish for contempt any witness before it who disobeys any
order of the Committee.

So the Blue Ribbon Committee is more than willing to take that responsibility. But we only
have six members here today, I am the seventh as chair and so we have not met
that number. So I am merely stating that, sir, that when we will prepare the documentation,
if a majority of all members sign and I am following the Sabio v. Gordon rule wherein I do
believe, if I am not mistaken, Chairman Gordon prepared the documentation and then either
in caucus or in session asked the other members to sign. And once the signatures are
obtained, solely for the purpose that Secretary Neri or Mr. Lozada will not be able to legally
question our subpoena as being insufficient in accordance with law.

SEN. PIMENTEL. Mr. Chairman, the caution that the chair is suggesting is very well-
taken. But Id like to advert to the fact that the quorum of the committee is only two as far as
I remember. Any two-member senators attending a Senate committee hearing provide that
quorum, and therefore there is more than a quorum demanded by our Rules as far as we are
concerned now, and acting as Blue Ribbon Committee, as Senator Enrile pointed out. In any
event, the signatures that will follow by the additional members will only tend to strengthen
the determination of this Committee to put its foot forward put down on what is happening in
this country, Mr. Chairman, because it really looks terrible if the primary Committee of the
Senate, which is the Blue Ribbon Committee, cannot even sanction people who openly defy,
you know, the summons of this Committee. I know that the Chair is going through an
agonizing moment here. I know that. But nonetheless, I think we have to uphold, you know,
the institution that we are representing because the alternative will be a disaster for all of us,
Mr. Chairman. So having said that, Id like to reiterate my point.

THE CHAIRMAN (SEN. CAYETANO, A.) First of all, I agree 100 percent with the intentions
of the Minority Leader. But let me very respectfully disagree with the legal
requirements. Because, yes, we can have a hearing if we are only two but both
under Section 18 of the Rules of the Senate and under Section 6 of the Rules of the
Blue Ribbon Committee, there is a need for a majority of all members if it is a case
of contempt and arrest. So, I am simply trying to avoid the court rebuking the Committee,
which will instead of strengthening will weaken us. But I do agree, Mr. Minority Leader, that
we should push for this and show the executive branch that the well-decided the issue has
been decided upon the Sabio versus Gordon case. And its very clear that we are all allowed
to call witnesses. And if they refure or they disobey not only can we cite them in contempt
and have them arrested. x x x [62]

Fourth, we find merit in the argument of the OSG that respondent Committees likewise violated Section 21

of Article VI of the Constitution, requiring that the inquiry be in accordance with the duly published rules

of procedure. We quote the OSGs explanation:

 The phrase duly published rules of procedure requires the Senate of every Congress to publish

its rules of procedure governing inquiries in aid of legislation because every Senate is distinct

from the one before it or after it. Since Senatorial elections are held every three (3) years for

one-half of the Senates membership, the composition of the Senate also changes by the end

of each term. Each Senate may thus enact a different set of rules as it may deem fit. Not

having published its Rules of Procedure, the subject hearings in aid of legislation

conducted by the 14th Senate, are therefore, procedurally infirm.

And fifth, respondent Committees issuance of the contempt Order is arbitrary and

precipitate. It must be pointed out that respondent Committees did not first pass upon the claim of

executive privilege and inform petitioner of their ruling. Instead, they curtly dismissed his explanation as

unsatisfactory and simultaneously issued the Order citing him in contempt and ordering his immediate arrest

and detention.

A fact worth highlighting is that petitioner is not an unwilling witness. He manifested several times his

readiness to testify before respondent Committees. He refused to answer the three (3) questions because

he was ordered by the President to claim executive privilege. It behooves respondent Committees to first

rule on the claim of executive privilege and inform petitioner of their finding thereon, instead of peremptorily

dismissing his explanation as unsatisfactory. Undoubtedly, respondent Committees actions constitute grave

abuse of discretion for being arbitrary and for denying petitioner due process of law. The same quality

afflicted their conduct when they (a) disregarded petitioners motion for reconsideration alleging that he had

filed the present petition before this Court and (b) ignored petitioners repeated request for an advance list

of questions, if there be any aside from the three (3) questions as to which he claimed to be covered by

executive privilege.

Even the courts are repeatedly advised to exercise the power of contempt judiciously and sparingly

with utmost self-restraint with the end in view of utilizing the same for correction and preservation of the

dignity of the court, not for retaliation or vindication.[63] Respondent Committees should have exercised the

same restraint, after all petitioner is not even an ordinary witness. He holds a high position in a co-equal

branch of government.

In this regard, it is important to mention that many incidents of judicial review could have been

avoided if powers are discharged with circumspection and deference. Concomitant with the doctrine of

separation of powers is the mandate to observe respect to a co-equal branch of the government.

One last word.

The Court was accused of attempting to abandon its constitutional duty when it required the parties to

consider a proposal that would lead to a possible compromise. The accusation is far from the truth. The
Court did so, only to test a tool that other jurisdictions find to be effective in settling similar cases, to avoid

a piecemeal consideration of the questions for review and to avert a constitutional crisis between the

executive and legislative branches of government.

In United States v. American Tel. & Tel Co., [64] the court refrained from deciding the case because

of its desire to avoid a resolution that might disturb the balance of power between the two branches and

inaccurately reflect their true needs. Instead, it remanded the record to the District Court for

further proceedings during which the parties are required to negotiate a settlement. In the subsequent case

of United States v. American Tel. &Tel Co.,[65] it was held that much of this spirit of compromise is reflected

in the generality of language found in the Constitution. It proceeded to state:

Under this view, the coordinate branches do not exist in an exclusively adversary relationship

to one another when a conflict in authority arises. Rather each branch should take cognizance

of an implicit constitutional mandate to seek optimal accommodation through a realistic

evaluation of the needs of the conflicting branches in the particular fact situation.

It thereafter concluded that: The Separation of Powers often impairs efficiency, in terms of

dispatch and the immediate functioning of government. It is the long-term staying power

of government that is enhanced by the mutual accommodation required by the separation of

powers.

In rendering this decision, the Court emphasizes once more that the basic principles of constitutional
law cannot be subordinated to the needs of a particular situation. As magistrates, our mandate is to rule
objectively and dispassionately, always mindful of Mr. Justice Holmes warning on the dangers inherent in
cases of this nature, thus:

some accident of immediate and overwhelming interestappeals to the feelings and

distorts the judgment. These immediate interests exercise a kind of hydraulic pressure which
makes what previously was clear seem doubtful, and before which even well settled principles
of law will bend.[66]

In this present crusade to search for truth, we should turn to the fundamental constitutional principles
which underlie our tripartite system of government, where the Legislature enacts the law, the Judiciary
interprets it and the Executive implements it. They are considered separate, co-
equal, coordinate and supreme within their respective spheres but, imbued with a system of checks and
balances to prevent unwarranted exercise of power. The Courts mandate is to preserve these constitutional
principles at all times to keep the political branches of government within constitutional bounds in the
exercise of their respective powers and prerogatives, even if it be in the search for truth. This is the only
way we can preserve the stability of our democratic institutions and uphold the Rule of Law.

WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED. The subject Order dated January 30, 2008, citing
petitioner Romulo L. Neri in contempt of the Senate Committees and directing his arrest and detention, is
hereby nullified. SO ORDERED.
 [G.R. No. 112443. January 25, 2002]

TERESITA P. BORDALBA, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS, HEIRS OF NICANOR JAYME, namely,
CANDIDA FLORES, EMANNUEL JAYME, DINA JAYME DEJORAS, EVELIA JAYME, and GESILA
JAYME; AND HEIRS OF ASUNCION JAYME-BACLAY, namely, ANGELO JAYME-BACLAY,
CARMEN JAYME-DACLAN and ELNORA JAYME BACLAY, respondents.

DECISION
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:

This is a petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court seeking to set aside the October 20,
1992 Decision of the Court of Appeals[1] in CA-G.R. CV No. 27419, which affirmed with modification the
Decision[2] of the Regional Trial Court of Mandaue, Branch 28, in Civil Case No. MAN-386.
The instant controversy stemmed from Lot No. 1242 (Lot No. 799-C) with an area of 1,853 square
meters and located at Barrio Looc, Mandaue City. The subject lot is part of a parcel of land situated on the
corner of Mabini and Plaridel Streets in Mandaue City, and originally owned by the late spouses Carmeno
Jayme and Margarita Espina de Jayme. In 1947, an extra-judicial partition,[3] written in the Spanish
language was executed, describing said parcel of land as

2. otra parcela de terreno urbano en el barrio de Look, Mandawe, Cebu, que linda al N. con la Calle Mabini
y propiodades de F. Jayme; al E. linda con propiodades de Fernando Antigua; al S. linda con propiodades
de Lucas y Victoriano Jayme, y al O. linda con la Calle Plaridel. La propiodad descrita esta avaluada, con
todas sus mejoras, en la cantidad de MIL Y CINCUENTA PESOS ------------------------------------------------
P1,050.00.[4]

and disposing, inter alia, the same parcel of land as follows:

1) 1/3 in favor of - (a) their grandchild Nicanor Jayme, the deceased spouse of private respondent Candida
Flores and the father of private respondents Emmanuel, Dina, Evelia and Gesila, all surnamed Jayme; and
(b) their grandchild Asuncion Jayme-Baclay, whose heirs are private respondents Angelo Baclay, Elnora
Baclay and Carmen Jayme-Daclan;

2) 1/3 to their daughter Elena Jayme Vda. de Perez, mother of petitioner Teresita P. Bordalba; and

3) 1/3 to an unidentified party.

Built on the land adjudicated to the heirs of the spouses is Nicanor Jaymes house, which his family
occupied since 1945.
Sometime in July 1964, Elena Jayme Vda. de Perez, petitioners mother, filed with the Regional Trial
Court of Cebu, Branch IV, an amended application for the registration [5] of the lot described with the
following boundaries:

N - Fruelana Jayme & Road

S - Felicitas de Latonio

E - Agustin de Jayme

W - Porfirio Jayme, Lot No. 1 and Vivencio Abellana

Elena Jayme Vda. de Perez alleged that the lot sought to be registered was originally a part of a land
owned by her late parents, the spouses Carmeno Jayme and Margarita Espina de Jayme; and that 1/3 of
said land was adjudicated to her in an extra-judicial partition. She further stated that a portion of the lot for
which title is applied for is occupied by Nicanor Jayme with her permission.
Consequently, Nicanor Jayme and Asuncion Jayme-Baclay filed their opposition[6] contending that said
application included the 1/3 portion inherited by them in the 1947 extra-judicial partition. The case was,
however, dismissed for lack of interest of the parties.
Subsequently, petitioner filed with the Bureau of Lands of Cebu City an application [7] dated January 10,
1979, seeking the issuance of a Free Patent over the same lot subject of the aborted application of her
mother, Elena Jayme, now known as Lot No. 1242 (799-C), described as follows:

North: Froilan Jayme and Road

East: Agustin Jayme
South: Alfredo Alivio and Spouses Hilario Gandecila
West: Hilario Gandecila Porferio Jayme and Heirs of Vevencio Abellanosa [8]
 On April 16, 1980, petitioner was successfully granted Free Patent No. (VII-I) 11421 and Original
Certificate of Title No. 0-571 (FP) over said lot.[9] Thereafter, petitioner caused the subdivision and titling of
Lot No. 1242 (799-C), into 6 lots,[10] as well as the disposition of two parcels thereof, thus:

1) Lot No. 1242-A with an area of 581 square meters covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 22771 (FP)
in the name of spouses Genaro U. Cabahug and Rita Capala, to whom petitioner sold said lot;

2) Lot No. 1242-B with an area of 420 square meters covered by TCT No. 22772 in the name of Teresita P.
Bordalba, and which the latter mortgaged with the Rural Bank of Mandaue;

3) Lot No. 1242-C with an area of 210 square meters covered by TCT 22773 in the name of Teresita P.
Bordalba;

4) Lot No. 1242-D with an area of 210 square meters covered by TCT 22774 in the name of Teresita
Bordalba;

5) Lot No. 1242-E with an area of 216 square meters covered by TCT 22775 in the name of Teresita P.
Bordalba;

6) Lot No. 1242-F with an area of 216 square meters and covered by TCT No. 22776 in the name of Teresita
P. Bordalba.

Upon learning of the issuance in favor of petitioner of the aforesaid Free Patent and Original Certificate
of Title over Lot No. 1242, as well as the conveyances made by petitioner involving the lot subject of the
controversy, private respondents filed with the Regional Trial Court of Mandaue City, Branch 28, the instant
complaint against petitioner Teresita Bordalba, spouses Genaro U. Cabahug, and Rita Capala, Rural Bank of
Mandaue and the Director of the Bureau of Lands.
In the said complaint, private respondents prayed that Free Patent No. (VII-I) 11421 and OCT No. 0-
571 (FP), as well as TCT Nos. 22771-22776 be declared void and ordered cancelled. Private respondents
also prayed that they be adjudged owners of Lot No. 1242 (799-C), and that spouses Genaro V. Cabahug
and Rita Capala as well as the Rural Bank of Mandaue be declared buyers and mortgagee in bad faith,
respectively. In addition, they asked the court to award them actual, compensatory, and moral damages
plus attorneys fees in the amount of P20,000.00.
Petitioner, on the other hand, averred that Lot No. 1242 (799-C) was acquired by her through purchase
from her mother,[11] who was in possession of the lot in the concept of an owner since 1947. In her answer,
petitioner traced her mothers ownership of the lot partly from the 1947 deed of extra-judicial partition
presented by private respondents,[12] and claimed that Nicanor Jayme, and Candida Flores occupied a
portion of Lot No. 1242 (799-C) by mere tolerance of her mother. On cross-examination, petitioner admitted
that the properties of the late Carmeno Jayme and Margarita Espina de Jayme were partitioned by their
heirs in 1947, but claimed that she was not aware of the existence of said Deed of Extra-judicial
Partition. She, however, identified one of the signatures in the said Deed to be the signature of her
mother.[13]
On May 28, 1990, the trial court, finding that fraud was employed by petitioner in obtaining Free Patent
No. (VII-I) 11421 and OCT No. 0-571 (FP), declared said patent and title void and ordered its cancellation.
However, it declared that spouses Genaro U. Cabahug and Rita Capala as well as the Rural Bank of Mandaue
are purchasers and mortgagee in good faith, respectively; and consequently upheld as valid the sale of Lot
No. 1242-A covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 22771 (FP) to spouses Genaro U. Cabahug and Rita
Capala, and the mortgage of Lot No. 1242-B covered by TCT No. 22772 in favor of the Rural Bank of
Mandaue.The dispositive portion of the decision reads:

WHEREFORE, foregoing premises considered, Decision is hereby rendered in favor of the plaintiffs by:

1) declaring Free Patent No. (VII-I) 11421 as well as the Original Certificate of Title No. 0-57 (FP) and all
subsequent certificates of title as a result of the subdivision of Lot No. 1242 except TCT NO. 22771 (FP) as
null and void and ordering the Register of Deeds of Mandaue City to cancel them;

2) declaring spouses defendants Genaro U. Cabahug and Rita Capala as buyers in good faith and are the
legal and rightful owners of Lot No. 1242-A as described in TCT No. 22771 (FP);

3) declaring the Rural Bank of Mandaue, Inc. as mortgagee in good faith and the mortgage lien in its favor
be carried over to and be annotated in the new certificate of title to be issued under the names of the
plaintiffs;

4) declaring the plaintiffs as the legal and rightful owners of Lot 1242 and ordering the issuance of the
certificate of title in their names;

5) dismissing the claims of the defendant spouses Cabahug and Capala and the defendant Rural Bank of
Mandaue, Inc. for lack of merit;
6) ordering the defendant Teresita Bordalba to pay plaintiffs the following amounts:

(a) P5,000.00 as actual and litigation expenses;

(b) P20,000.00 as attorneys fees, and,

7) ordering defendant Bordalba to pay the costs.

SO ORDERED.[14]

Both petitioner Teresita Bordalba and private respondents appealed to the Court of Appeals, which
affirmed with modification the decision of the trial court. It ruled that since private respondents are entitled
only to 1/3 portion of Lot No. 1242 (799-C), petitioner should be ordered to reconvey 1/3 of Lot No. 1242
(799-C) to private respondents. The decretal portion of the respondent court's decision states:

WHEREFORE, the challenged decision is MODIFIED to order the reconveyance of one-third of the subject
land in favor of the plaintiff-appellees in lieu of the cancellation of the Certificates of Title issued and their
declaration as the owners of Lot No. 1242 in its entirety. The rest is AFFIRMED in toto.

SO ORDERED.[15]

Thus, petitioner filed the instant petition, assailing the decision of the Court of Appeals. Petitioner
contends that the testimonies given by the witnesses for private respondents which touched on matters
occurring prior to the death of her mother should not have been admitted by the trial court, as the same
violated the dead mans statute. Likewise, petitioner questions the right of private respondents to inherit
from the late Nicanor Jayme and Asuncion Jayme-Baclay, as well as the identity between the disputed lot
and the parcel of land adjudicated in the Deed of Extra-judicial Partition.
The contentions are without merit. It is doctrinal that findings of facts of the Court of Appeals upholding
those of the trial court are binding upon this Court. While there are exceptions to this rule, petitioner has
not convinced us that this case falls under one of them.[16]
The Court sees no reason to deviate from the findings of the trial court that petitioner resorted to fraud
and misrepresentation in obtaining a free patent and title over the lot under scrutiny. The Court of Appeals
correctly pointed out that misrepresentation tainted petitioners application, insofar as her declaration that
the land applied for was not occupied or claimed by any other person. Her declaration is belied by the extra-
judicial partition which she acknowledged, her mothers aborted attempt to have the lot registered, private
respondents predecessors-in-interests opposition thereto, and by the occupancy of a portion of the said lot
by Nicanor Jayme and his family since 1945.
It is a settled rule that the Land Registration Act protects only holders of title in good faith, and does
not permit its provision to be used as a shield for the commission of fraud, or as a means to enrich oneself
at the expense of others.[17]
As to the alleged violation of the dead mans statute,[18] suffice it to state that said rule finds no
application in the present case. The dead mans statute does not operate to close the mouth of a witness as
to any matter of fact coming to his knowledge in any other way than through personal dealings with the
deceased person, or communication made by the deceased to the witness. [19]
Since the claim of private respondents and the testimony of their witnesses in the present case is
based, inter alia, on the 1947 Deed of Extra-judicial Partition and other documents, and not on dealings and
communications with the deceased, the questioned testimonies were properly admitted by the trial court.
Likewise untenable is the claim of petitioner that private respondents are not legal heirs of Nicanor
Jayme and Asuncion Jayme-Baclay. Other than their bare allegations to dispute their heirship, no hard
evidence was presented by them to substantiate their allegations. Besides, in order that an heir may assert
his right to the property of a deceased, no previous judicial declaration of heirship is necessary.[20]
Anent the issue of identity, the disparity in the boundaries of Lot No. 1242 (799-C) vis--vis the
boundaries of the lot referred to in the 1947 Deed of Extra-judicial Partition can be explained by the fact
that Lot No. 1242 (799-C) is only a portion of the entire parcel of land described in the Deed, a 1/3 pro-
indiviso portion of which was adjudicated each to, first, petitioners mother, second, to the predecessors-in-
interest of private respondents, and third, to an unidentified party. Logically therefore, their boundaries will
not be similar. At any rate, the records show that the parcel of land adjudicated to the predecessors-in-
interest of the parties herein was the lot found on the corner of Plaridel and Mabini Streets in Looc, Mandaue
City. As admitted further by both parties, Lot No. 1242 (799-C) was part of the land allotted to their
predecessors-in-interest in the 1947 Deed of Extra-judicial Partition. Moreover, petitioners mother
acknowledged in her application for registration of Lot No. 1242 that the Deed of Extra-judicial Partition was
the source of her claim over the lot sought to be registered. She further admitted that the lot now known
as Lot No. 1242 (799-C) was part of the parcel of land inherited by her and her co-heirs, to the extent of
1/3 share each. Under Section 31, Rule 130, of the Revised Rules on Evidence, where one derives title to
property from another, the act, declaration, or omission of the latter, while holding the title, in relation to
the property, is evidence against the former.
Considering that Lot No.1242 (799-C) is part of the parcel of land over which private respondents
predecessors-in-interest is entitled to 1/3 pro-indiviso share, which was disregarded by petitioner when she
secured a Free Patent and Original Certificate of Title in her name, to the exclusion of private respondents
predecessors-in-interest, the trial court and the Court of Appeals, therefore, did not err in upholding the
right of private respondents as co-owners, and ordering the petitioner to reconvey 1/3 of the lot in question
to them.
Notwithstanding the foregoing, however, the Court is unable to determine what part of Lot No. 1242
(799-C) is within the boundaries of the parcel of land inherited in the 1947 Deed of Extra-judicial Partition
by the predecessors-in-interest of the parties herein. This is so because private respondents did not show
the extent of the said land mentioned in the 1947 Deed of Extra-judicial Partition in relation to Lot No. 1242
(799-C). While they presented the boundaries of the parcel of land adjudicated in the Deed, to wit:

North: Calle Mabini y propiodades de F. Jayme

East: Propiodades de Fernando Antigua
South: Propiodades de Lucas y Victoriano Jayme
West: Calle Plaridel

they did not, however, show where these boundaries are found in relation to the boundaries of Lot No. 1242
(799-C). Absent a fixed boundary of the parcel of land adjudicated in the Deed, which they claim Lot No.
1242 (799-C) is a part of, the Court cannot determine the extent to which the lot now known as Lot No.
1242 (799-C) is included. Admittedly, the north boundary of Lot No. 1242 (799-C) (Property of Froilan Jaime
and Mabini Street) is similar to the north boundary of the land mentioned in the Deed. With only one
reference point, however, the south, east and west boundaries of Lot No. 1242 (799-C) cannot be
established with certainty to be within the parcel of land described in the Deed of Extra-judicial Partition.
In Beo v. Court of Appeals,[21] the Court held that in order that an action for recovery of possession may
prosper, it is indispensable that he who brings the action must fully prove not only his ownership but also
the identity of the property claimed by describing the location, area and boundaries thereof. So that when
the record does not show that the land subject matter of the action has been exactly determined, the action
cannot prosper, inasmuch as the plaintiff's ownership rights in the land claimed do not appear satisfactorily
and conclusively proven at the trial.
In the present case, while it is true that private respondents were not able to show the extent of their
1/3 pro indiviso right over Lot No. 1242 (799-C), they have nevertheless established their claim over the
said lot.Hence, in line with our ruling in the case of Laluan v. Malpaya,[22] the prudent recourse would be to
remand the case to the lower court for a new trial.
WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, the October 20, 1992 Decision of the Court of Appeals in
CA-G.R. CV No. 27419, and the May 28, 1990 Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Mandaue City, Branch
28, in Civil Case No. MAN-386, insofar as it relates to the recognition of the 1/3 share of private respondents
over Lot No. 1242 (799-C) is AFFIRMED. The case is remanded to the trial court in order to determine what
part of Lot No. 1242 (799-C) is included in the parcel of land adjudicated in the 1947 Deed of Extrajudicial
Partition to the predecessors-in-interest of the parties herein. SO ORDERED.
 [G.R. No. 117740. October 30, 1998]

CAROLINA ABAD GONZALES, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS, HONORIA

EMPAYNADO, CECILIA H. ABAD, MARIAN H. ABAD and ROSEMARIE S. ABAD, respondents.

DECISION
ROMERO, J.:

Before us is a petition for certiorari to annul the decision of the Court of Appeals dated October 19,
1994, finding private respondents as the heirs of Ricardo de Mesa Abad as well as annulling petitioners
extra-judicial partition of the decedents estate.
The facts are as follows:
On April 18, 1972, petitioners Carolina Abad Gonzales, Dolores de Mesa Abad and Cesar de Mesa Tioseco
sought the settlement of the intestate estate of their brother, Ricardo de Mesa Abad, before the then Court
of First Instance of Manila. In their petition, docketed as Special Proceedings No. 86792, petitioners claimed
that they were the only heirs of Ricardo de Mesa Abad, as the latter allegedly died a bachelor, leaving no
descendants or ascendants, whether legitimate or illegitimate. On May 9, 1972, petitioners amended their
petition by alleging that the real properties covered by TCT Nos. 13530, 53671, and 64021, listed therein
as belonging to the decedent, were actually only administered by the latter, the true owner being their late
mother, Lucila de Mesa. On June 16, 1972, the trial court appointed Cesar de Mesa Tioseco as administrator
of the intestate estate of Ricardo de Mesa Abad.
Meanwhile, on May 2, 1972, petitioners executed an extrajudicial settlement of the estate of their late
mother Lucila de Mesa, copying therein the technical descriptions of the lots covered by TCT Nos. 13530,
53671, and 64021. By virtue thereof, the Register of Deeds cancelled the above-mentioned TCTs in the
name of Ricardo Abad and issued, in lieu thereof, TCT No. 108482 in the name of Dolores de Mesa Abad,
TCT No. 108483 in the name of Cesar de Mesa Tioseco and TCT No. 108484 in the name of Carolina Abad
Gonzales. The three promptly executed real estate mortgages over the real properties in favor of Mrs.
Josefina Viola, the wife of their counsel, Escolastico Viola.
On July 7, 1972, private respondents Honoria Empaynado, Cecilia Abad Empaynado, and Marian Abad
Empaynado filed a motion to set aside proceedings and for leave to file opposition in Special Proceedings
No. 86792. In their motion, they alleged that Honoria Empaynado had been the common-law wife of Ricardo
Abad for twenty-seven years before his death, or from 1943 to 1971, and that during these period, their
union had produced two children, Cecilia Abad Empaynado and Marian Abad Empaynado. Private
respondents also disclosed the existence of Rosemarie Abad, a child allegedly fathered by Ricardo Abad with
another woman, Dolores Saracho. As the law awards the entire estate to the surviving children to the
exclusion of collateral relatives, private respondents charged petitioners with deliberately concealing the
existence of said three children in order to deprive the latter of their rights to the estate of Ricardo Abad.
On July 24, 1972, private respondents filed a motion to withdraw their first motion and, in lieu thereof,
filed a motion for reconsideration praying that Cecilia Abad be appointed administrator instead of Cesar
Tioseco. The trial court denied private respondents motion to remove Cesar Tioseco as administrator, but
allowed them to appear in the proceedings to establish their right as alleged heirs of Ricardo Abad.
Private respondents later discovered that petitioners had managed to cancel TCT Nos. 13530, 53671,
and 64021 through the stratagem of extra-judicially partitioning their mothers estate. Accordingly, on
October 4, 1973, private respondents filed a motion to annul the extra-judicial partition executed by
petitioners, as well as TCT Nos. 108482, 108483, and 108484, the Torrens titles issued in substitution of
TCT Nos. 13530, 53671, and 64021 and the real estate mortgages constituted by the latter on said
properties.
After due trial, the lower court, on November 2, 1973, rendered the following judgment:

WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered as follows:

(1) Declaring Cecilia E. Abad, Marian E. Abad and Rosemarie S. Abad acknowledged natural children
of the deceased Ricardo M. Abad;
(2) Declaring said acknowledged natural children, namely: Cecilia E. Abad, Marian E. Abad, and
Rosemarie S. Abad the only surviving legal heirs of the deceased Ricardo M. Abad and as
such entitled to succeed to the entire estate of said deceased, subject to the rights of
Honoria Empaynado, if any, as co-owner of any of the property of said estate that may
have been acquired thru her joint efforts with the deceased during the period they lived
together as husband and wife;
(3) Denying the petition of decedents collateral relatives, namely: Dolores M. Abad, Cesar M.
Tioseco and Carolina M. Abad to be declared as heirs and excluding them from
participating in the administration and settlement of the estate of Ricardo Abad;
(4) Appointing Honoria Empaynado as the administratrix in this intestacy with a bond of THIRTY
THOUSAND (P30,000.00) PESOS; and
 (5) Ordering Cesar Tioseco to surrender to the new administratrix all property or properties, monies
and such papers that came into his possession by virtue of his appointment as
administrator, which appointment is hereby revoked.[1]
The trial court, likewise, found in favor of private respondents with respect to the latters motion for
annulment of certain documents. On November 19, 1974, it rendered the following judgment:

WHEREFORE, this Court finds oppositors Motion for Annulment, dated October 4, 1973 to be meritorious
and accordingly

1. Declares that the six (6) parcels of land described in TCT Nos. 13530, 53671 and 64021, all
registered in the name of Ricardo Abad, as replaced by TCT No. 108482 in the name of Dolores
de Mesa Abad, TCT No. 108483 in the name of Cesar de Mesa Tioseco and TCT No. 108484 in
the name of Carolina de Mesa Abad-Gonzales, and the residential house situated at 2432 Opalo
Street, San Andres Subdivision, Manila, to be the properties of the late Ricardo Abad;
2. Declares the deed of Extra Judicial Settlement of the Estate of the Deceased Lucila de Mesa,
executed on May 2, 1972 (Doc. No. 445, Page No. 86, Book No. VII, Series of 1972 of the notarial
book of Faustino S. Cruz) by petitioners and Carolina de Mesa Abad-Gonzales, to be inexistent
and void from the beginning;
3. Declares as null and void the cancellation of TCT Nos. 13530, 53671 and 64021 and issuance in
lieu thereof, of TCT Nos. 108482, 108483 and 108484;
4. Orders the Register of Deeds of Manila to cancel TCT No. 108482 of Dolores de Mesa Abad; TCT
No. 108483 of Cesar de Mesa Tioseco; and TCT No. 108484 of Carolina de Mesa Abad-Gonzales
and in lieu thereof, restore and/or issue the corresponding certificate of title in the name of
Ricardo Abad;
5. Declares as inexistent and void from the beginning the three (3) real estate mortgages executed
on July 7, 1972 executed by (a) petitioner Dolores de Mesa Abad, identified as Doc. No. 145,
Page No. 30, Book No. XX, Series of 1972; (b) petitioner Cesar de Mesa Tioseco, identified as
Doc. No. 146, Page 31, Book No. XX, Series of 1972; and (c) Carolina de Mesa Abad-Gonzales,
identified as Doc. No. 144, Page No. 30, Book No. XX, Series of 1972, all of the notarial book of
Ricardo P. Yap of Manila, in favor of Mrs. Josefina C. Viola, and orders the Register of Deeds of
Manila to cancel the registration or annotation thereof from the back of the torrens title of Ricardo
Abad; and
6. Orders Atty. Escolastico R. Viola and his law associate and wife, Josefina C. Viola, to surrender
to the new administratrix, Honoria Empaynado, TCT Nos. 108482, 108483, and 108484 within
five (5) days from receipt hereof.

SO ORDERED.[2]

Petitioners motion for reconsideration of the November 2, 1973 decision was denied by the trial
court. Their notice of appeal was likewise denied on the ground that the same had been filed out of
time. Because of this ruling, petitioners instituted certiorari and mandamus proceedings with the Court of
Appeals, docketed there as C.A.-G.R. No. SP-03268-R. On November 2, 1974, the appellate court granted
petitioners petition and ordered the lower court to give due course to the latters appeal. The trial court,
however, again dismissed petitioners appeal on the ground that their record on appeal was filed out of time.
Likewise, on January 4, 1975, petitioners filed their notice of appeal of the November 19, 1974 ruling
of the trial court. On March 21, 1975, this appeal was similarly denied on the ground that it had been filed
out of time.
Due to the dismissal of their two appeals, petitioners again instituted certiorari and mandamus
proceedings with the Court of Appeals, docketed therein as C.A.-G.R. No. SP-04352. The appellate court
affirmed the dismissal of the two appeals, prompting petitioners to appeal to the Supreme Court. On July 9,
1985, this Court directed the trial court to give due course to petitioners appeal from the order of November
2, 1973 declaring private respondents heirs of the deceased Ricardo Abad, and the order dated November
19, 1974, annulling certain documents pertaining to the intestate estate of deceased.
The two appeals were accordingly elevated by the trial court to the appellate court. On October 19,
1994, the Court of Appeals rendered judgment as follows:

WHEREFORE, all the foregoing considered, the instant appeal is DENIED for lack of merit. The orders of
the court a quo in SP No. 86792, to wit:

1. Order dated November 2, 1973, declaring in substance that Cecilia, Marian and Rosemarie, all
surnamed Abad as the acknowledged natural children and the only surviving heirs of the
deceased Ricardo Abad;
2. Order dated November 19, 1974, declaring in substance that the six (6) parcels of land described
in TCT Nos. 13530, 53671 and 64021 are the properties of Ricardo Abad; that the extra-judicial
partition of the estate of the deceased Lucila de Mesa executed on May 2, 1972 is inexistent and
void from the beginning; the cancellation of the aforementioned TCTs is null and void; the
 Register of Deeds be ordered to restore and/or issue the corresponding Certificates of Title in
the name of Ricardo Abad; and
3. Order dated March 21, 1975 denying the appeal of Dolores de Mesa Abad and Cesar de Mesa
Tioseco from the latter Order, for being filed out of time, are all AFFIRMED in toto. With costs
against petitioner-appellants.

SO ORDERED.[3]

Petitioners now seek to annul the foregoing judgment on the following grounds:
I. THE COURT OF APPEALS AND THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN HOLDING THAT
RESPONDENTS CECILIA E. ABAD, MARIAN E. ABAD AND ROSEMARIE S. ABAD ARE THE
ACKNOWLEDGED NATURAL CHILDREN OF THE DECEASED RICARDO DE MESA ABAD.
II. PETITIONERS ARE ENTITLED TO THE SUBJECT ESTATE WHETHER THE SAME IS OWNED BY THE
DECEASED RICARDO DE MESA ABAD OR BY LUCILA DE MESA, THE MOTHER OF PETITIONERS
AND RICARDO DE MESA ABAD.
We are not persuaded.
Petitioners, in contesting Cecilia, Marian and Rosemarie Abads filiation, submits the startling theory that
the husband of Honoria Empaynado, Jose Libunao, was still alive when Cecilia and Marian Abad were born
in 1948 and 1954, respectively.
It is undisputed that prior to her relationship with Ricardo Abad, Honoria Empaynado was married to
Jose Libunao, their union having produced three children, Angelita, Cesar, and Maria Nina, prior to the birth
of Cecilia and Marian. But while private respondents claim that Jose Libunao died in 1943, petitioners claim
that the latter died sometime in 1971.
The date of Jose Libunaos death is important, for if he was still alive in 1971, and given that he was
legally married to Honoria Empaynado, the presumption would be that Cecilia and Marian are not Ricardo
Abads children with the latter, but of Jose Libunao and Honoria Empaynado. Article 256, the applicable
provision of the Civil Code, provides:

Art. 256. The child shall be presumed legitimate, although the mother may have declared against its
legitimacy or may have been sentenced as an adulteress.[4]

To bolster their theory, petitioners presented in evidence the application for enrolment at Mapua
Institute of Technology of Angelita Libunao, accomplished in 1956, which states:

Fathers Name: Jose Libunao

Occupation: engineer (mining)

Mothers Name: Honoria Empaynado[5]

as well as Cesar Libunaos 1958 application for enrolment at the Mapua Institute of Technology, which states:

Fathers Name: Jose Libunao

Occupation: none

Mothers Name: Honoria Empaynado[6]

Petitioners claim that had Jose Libunao been dead during the time when said applications were
accomplished, the enrolment forms of his children would have stated so. These not being the case, they
conclude that Jose Libunao must have still been alive in 1956 and 1958.
Additionally, petitioners presented the joint affidavit of Juan Quiambao and Alejandro Ramos [7] stating
that to their knowledge Jose Libunao had died in 1971, leaving as his widow, Honoria Empaynado, and that
the former had been interred at the Loyola Memorial Park.
Lastly, petitioners presented the affidavit of Dr. Pedro Arenas,[8] Ricardo Abads physician, declaring that
in 1935, he had examined Ricardo Abad and found him to be infected with gonorrhea, and that the latter
had become sterile as a consequence thereof.
With these pieces of evidence, petitioners claim that Cecilia and Marian Abad are not the illegitimate
children of Ricardo Abad, but rather the legitimate children of the spouses Jose Libunao and Honoria
Empaynado.
At the outset, it must be noted that petitioners are disputing the veracity of the trial courts finding of
facts. It is a fundamental and settled rule that factual findings of the trial court, adopted and confirmed by
the Court of Appeals, are final and conclusive and may not be reviewed on appeal. [9] Petitioners, however,
argue that factual findings of the Court of Appeals are not binding on this Court when there appears in the
record of the case some fact or circumstance of weight and influence which has been overlooked, or the
significance of which has been misinterpreted, that if considered, would affect the result of the case. [10]
This Court finds no justifiable reason to apply this exception to the case at bar.
First, the evidence presented by petitioners to prove that Jose Libunao died in 1971 are, to say the
least, far from conclusive. Failure to indicate on an enrolment form that ones parent is deceased is not
necessarily proof that said parent was still living during the time said form was being accomplished.
Furthermore, the joint affidavit of Juan Quiambao and Alejandro Ramos as to the supposed death of Jose
Libunao in 1971 is not competent evidence to prove the latters death at that time, being merely secondary
evidence thereof. Jose Libunaos death certificate would have been the best evidence as to when the latter
died. Petitioners have, however, inexplicably failed to present the same, although there is no showing that
said death certificate has been lost or destroyed as to be unavailable as proof of Jose Libunaos death. More
telling, while the records of Loyola Memorial Park show that a certain Jose Bautista Libunao was indeed
buried there in 1971, this person appears to be different from Honoria Empaynados first husband, the latters
name being Jose Santos Libunao. Even the name of the wife is different. Jose Bautista Libunaos wife is listed
as Josefa Reyes while the wife of Jose Santos Libunao was Honoria Empaynado.
As to Dr. Arenas affidavit, the same was objected to by private respondents as being privileged
communication under Section 24 (c), Rule 130 of the Rules of Court. [11] The rule on confidential
communications between physician and patient requires that: a) the action in which the advice or treatment
given or any information is to be used is a civil case; b) the relation of physician and patient existed between
the person claiming the privilege or his legal representative and the physician; c) the advice or treatment
given by him or any information was acquired by the physician while professionally attending the patient;
d) the information was necessary for the performance of his professional duty; and e) the disclosure of the
information would tend to blacken the reputation of the patient.[12]
Petitioners do not dispute that the affidavit meets the first four requisites. They assert, however, that
the finding as to Ricardo Abads sterility does not blacken the character of the deceased. Petitioners
conveniently forget that Ricardo Abads sterility arose when the latter contracted gonorrhea, a fact which
most assuredly blackens his reputation. In fact, given that society holds virility at a premium, sterility alone,
without the attendant embarrassment of contracting a sexually-transmitted disease, would be sufficient to
blacken the reputation of any patient. We thus hold the affidavit inadmissible in evidence. And the same
remains inadmissible in evidence, notwithstanding the death of Ricardo Abad. As stated by the trial court:

In the case of Westover vs. Aetna Life Insurance Company, 99 N.Y. 59, it was pointed out that: The privilege
of secrecy is not abolished or terminated because of death as stated in established precedents. It is an
established rule that the purpose of the law would be thwarted and the policy intended to be promoted
thereby would be defeated, if death removed the seal of secrecy, from the communications and disclosures
which a patient should make to his physician. After one has gone to his grave, the living are not permitted
to impair his name and disgrace his memory by dragging to light communications and disclosures made
under the seal of the statute.

Given the above disquisition, it is clearly apparent that petitioners have failed to establish their claim
by the quantum of evidence required by law. On the other hand, the evidence presented by private
respondents overwhelmingly prove that they are the acknowledged natural children of Ricardo Abad. We
quote with approval the trial courts decision, thus:

In his individual statements of income and assets for the calendar years 1958 and 1970, and in all his
individual income tax returns for the years 1964, 1965, 1967, 1968, 1969 and 1970, he has declared therein
as his legitimate wife, Honoria Empaynado; and as his legitimate dependent children, Cecilia, Marian (except
in Exh. 12) and Rosemarie Abad (Exhs. 12 to 19; TSN, February 26, 1973, pp. 33-44).

xxxxxxxxx

In December 1959, Ricardo Abad insured his daughters Cecilia, then eleven (11) years old, and Marian,
then (5) years old, on [a] twenty (20) year-endowment plan with the Insular Life Assurance Co., Ltd. and
paid for their premiums (Exh. 34 and 34-A; 34-B to C; 35, 35-A to D; TSN, February 27, 1973, pp. 7-20).

In 1966, he and his daughter Cecilia Abad opened a trust fund acount of P100,000.00 with the Peoples Bank
and Trust Company which was renewed until (sic) 1971, payable to either of them in the event of death
(Exhs. 36-A; 36-E). On January 5, 1971, Ricardo Abad opened a trust fund of P100,000.00 with the same
bank, payable to his daughter Marian (Exh. 37-A). On January 4, 1971, Ricardo Abad and his sister Dolores
Abad had (sic) agreed to stipulate in their PBTC Trust Agreement that the 9% income of their P100,000.00
trust fund shall (sic) be paid monthly to the account reserved for Cecilia, under PBTC Savings Account No.
49053 in the name of Ricardo Abad and/or Cecilia Abad (Exh. 38) where the income of the trust fund
intended for Cecilia was also deposited monthly (TSN, February 27, 1973, pp. 21-36). Ricardo Abad had
also deposited (money) with the Monte de Piedad and Savings Bank in the name of his daughter Marian,
represented by him, as father, under Savings Account 17348 which has (sic) a balance of P34,812.28 as of
June 30, 1972. (Exh. 60-B)

With the finding that private respondents are the illegitimate children of Ricardo Abad, petitioners are
precluded from inheriting the estate of their brother. The applicable provisions are:
Art. 988. In the absence of legitimate descendants or ascendants, the illegitimate children shall succeed to
the entire estate of the deceased.

Art. 1003. If there are noillegitimate children, or a surviving spouse, the collateral relatives shall succeed
to the entire estate of the deceased in accordance with the following articles. (Italics supplied)

As to petitioners claim that the properties in the name of Ricardo Abad actually belong to their mother
Lucila de Mesa, both the trial court and the appellate court ruled that the evidence presented by private
respondents proved that said properties in truth belong to Ricardo Abad. As stated earlier, the findings of
fact by the trial court are entitled to great weight and should not be disturbed on appeal, it being in a better
position to examine the real evidence, as well as to observe the demeanor of the witnesses while testifying
in the case.[13] In fact, petitioners seem to accept this conclusion, their contention being that they are
entitled to the subject estate whether the same is owned by Ricardo Abad or by Lucila de Mesa.
Digressing from the main issue, in its decision dated October 19, 1994, the Court of Appeals affirmed
the trial courts order dated March 21, 1975 denying the appeal of Dolores de Mesa Abad and Cesar de Mesa
Tioseco on the ground that the same was filed out of time. This affirmance is erroneous, for on July 9, 1985,
this Court had already ruled that the same was not filed out of time. Well-settled is the dictum that the
rulings of the Supreme Court are binding upon and may not be reversed by a lower court.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant petition is hereby DENIED. The decision of the Court
of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 30184 dated October 19, 1994 is AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION that the
affirmance of the Order dated March 21, 1975 denying the appeal of Dolores de Mesa Abad and Cesar de
Mesa Tioseco for being filed out of time is SET ASIDE. Costs against petitioners. SO ORDERED.
 MAXIMO ALVAREZ, G.R. No. 143439

Petitioner,

- versus -

SUSAN RAMIREZ, Promulgated:

Respondent.

October 14, 2005

x---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x

D E C I S I O N

SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J.:

Before us is a petition for review on certiorari[1] assailing the Decision[2] of the Court of Appeals dated May

31, 2000 in CA-G.R. SP No. 56154, entitled SUSAN RAMIREZ, petitioner, versus, HON. BENJAMIN M.

AQUINO, JR., as JUDGE RTC, MALABON, MM, BR. 72, and MAXIMO ALVAREZ, respondents.

Susan Ramirez, herein respondent, is the complaining witness in Criminal Case No. 19933-MN for

arson[3] pending before the Regional Trial Court, Branch 72, Malabon City. The accused is Maximo Alvarez,

herein petitioner. He is the husband of Esperanza G. Alvarez, sister of respondent.

On June 21, 1999, the private prosecutor called Esperanza Alvarez to the witness stand as the first witness

against petitioner, her husband. Petitioner and his counsel raised no objection.

Esperanza testified as follows:

ATTY. ALCANTARA:

We are calling Mrs. Esperanza Alvarez, the wife of the accused, Your Honor.

COURT:

Swear in the witness.

xxx

ATTY. MESIAH: (sic)

Your Honor, we are offering the testimony of this witness for the purpose of proving
that the accused Maximo Alvarez committed all the elements of the crime being charged
particularly that accused Maximo Alvarez pour on May 29, 1998 gasoline in the house located
at Blk. 5, Lot 9, Phase 1-C, Dagat-dagatan, Navotas, Metro Manila, the house owned by his
sister-in-law Susan Ramirez; that accused Maximo Alvarez after pouring the gasoline on the
door of the house of Susan Ramirez ignited and set it on fire; that the accused at the time he
successfully set the house on fire (sic) of Susan Ramirez knew that it was occupied by Susan
Ramirez, the members of the family as well as Esperanza Alvarez, the estranged wife of
the accused; that as a consequence of the accused in successfully setting the fire to the
house of Susan Ramirez, the door of said house was burned and together with several articles
of the house, including shoes, chairs and others.
 COURT:

You may proceed.

DIRECT EXAMINATION

ATTY. ALCANTARA:

xxx

Q: When you were able to find the source, incidentally what was the source of that scent?

A: When I stand by the window, sir, I saw a man pouring the gasoline in the house of my
sister (and witness pointing to the person of the accused inside the court room).

Q: For the record, Mrs. Witness, can you state the name of that person, if you know?

A: He is my husband, sir, Maximo Alvarez.

Q: If that Maximo Alvarez you were able to see, can you identify him?

A: Yes, sir.

Q: If you can see him inside the Court room, can you please point him?

A: Witness pointing to a person and when asked to stand and asked his name, he gave his
name as Maximo Alvarez.[4]

In the course of Esperanzas direct testimony against petitioner, the latter showed uncontrolled

emotions, prompting the trial judge to suspend the proceedings.

On June 30, 1999, petitioner, through counsel, filed a motion [5] to disqualify Esperanza from testifying

against him pursuant to Rule 130 of the Revised Rules of Court on marital disqualification.

Respondent filed an opposition[6] to the motion. Pending resolution of the motion, the trial court directed

the prosecution to proceed with the presentation of the other witnesses.

On September 2, 1999, the trial court issued the questioned Order disqualifying Esperanza Alvarez from

further testifying and deleting her testimony from the records. [7] The prosecution filed a motion for

reconsideration but was denied in the other assailed Order dated October 19, 1999.[8]

This prompted respondent Susan Ramirez, the complaining witness in Criminal Case No. 19933-MN,

to file with the Court of Appeals a petition for certiorari[9] with application for preliminary injunction and

temporary restraining order.[10]

On May 31, 2000, the Appellate Court rendered a Decision nullifying and setting aside the assailed Orders

issued by the trial court. Hence, this petition for review on certiorari.
 The issue for our resolution is whether Esperanza Alvarez can testify against her husband in Criminal

Case No. 19933-MN.

Section 22, Rule 130 of the Revised Rules of Court provides:

Sec. 22. Disqualification by reason of marriage. During their marriage, neither the
husband nor the wife may testify for or against the other without the consent of the affected
spouse, except in a civil case by one against the other, or in a criminal case for a crime
committed by one against the other or the latters direct descendants or ascendants.

The reasons given for the rule are:

1. There is identity of interests between husband and wife;

2. If one were to testify for or against the other, there is consequent danger of perjury;

3. The policy of the law is to guard the security and confidences of private life, even at the risk of

an occasional failure of justice, and to prevent domestic disunion and unhappiness; and

4. Where there is want of domestic tranquility there is danger of punishing one spouse through

the hostile testimony of the other.[11]

But like all other general rules, the marital disqualification rule has its own exceptions, both in civil

actions between the spouses and in criminal cases for offenses committed by one against the other. Like

the rule itself, the exceptions are backed by sound reasons which, in the excepted cases, outweigh those in

support of the general rule. For instance, where the marital and domestic relations are so strained that there

is no more harmony to be preserved nor peace and tranquility which may be disturbed, the reason based

upon such harmony and tranquility fails. In such a case, identity of interests disappears and the consequent

danger of perjury based on that identity is non-existent. Likewise, in such a situation, the security and

confidences of private life, which the law aims at protecting, will be nothing but ideals, which through their

absence, merely leave a void in the unhappy home.[12]

In Ordoo vs. Daquigan,[13] this Court held:

We think that the correct rule, which may be adopted in this jurisdiction, is that laid
down in Cargil vs. State, 35 ALR 133, 220 Pac. 64, 25 Okl. 314, wherein the court said:

The rule that the injury must amount to a physical wrong upon the
person is too narrow; and the rule that any offense remotely or indirectly
affecting domestic harmony comes within the exception is too broad. The better
rule is that, when an offense directly attacks, or directly and vitally impairs, the
conjugal relation, it comes within the exception to the statute that one shall not
be a witness against the other except in a criminal prosecution for a crime
committee (by) one against the other.
 Obviously, the offense of arson attributed to petitioner, directly impairs the conjugal relation between

him and his wife Esperanza. His act, as embodied in the Information for arson filed against him, eradicates

all the major aspects of marital life such as trust, confidence, respect and love by which virtues the conjugal

relationship survives and flourishes.

As correctly observed by the Court of Appeals:

The act of private respondent in setting fire to the house of his sister-in-law Susan
Ramirez, knowing fully well that his wife was there, and in fact with the alleged intent of
injuring the latter, is an act totally alien to the harmony and confidences of marital relation
which the disqualification primarily seeks to protect. The criminal act complained of had the
effect of directly and vitally impairing the conjugal relation. It underscored the fact that the
marital and domestic relations between her and the accused-husband have become so
strained that there is no more harmony, peace or tranquility to be preserved. The Supreme
Court has held that in such a case, identity is non-existent. In such a situation, the security
and confidences of private life which the law aims to protect are nothing but ideals which
through their absence, merely leave a void in the unhappy home. (People v. Castaeda, 271
SCRA 504). Thus, there is no longer any reason to apply the Marital Disqualification Rule.

It should be stressed that as shown by the records, prior to the commission of the offense, the

relationship between petitioner and his wife was already strained. In fact, they were separated de

facto almost six months before the incident. Indeed, the evidence and facts presented reveal that the

preservation of the marriage between petitioner and Esperanza is no longer an interest the State aims to

protect.

At this point, it bears emphasis that the State, being interested in laying the truth before the courts

so that the guilty may be punished and the innocent exonerated, must have the right to offer the direct

testimony of Esperanza, even against the objection of the accused, because (as stated by this Court

in Francisco[14]), it was the latter himself who gave rise to its necessity.

WHEREFORE, the Decision of the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED. The trial court, RTC, Branch 72, Malabon

City, is ordered to allow Esperanza Alvarez to testify against petitioner, her husband, in Criminal Case No.

19933-MN. Costs against petitioner. SO ORDERED.

 [G.R. No. 105938. September 20, 1996]

TEODORO R. REGALA, EDGARDO J. ANGARA, AVELINO V. CRUZ, JOSE C. CONCEPCION, ROGELIO

A. VINLUAN, VICTOR P. LAZATIN, and EDUARDO U. ESCUETA, petitioners,vs. THE
HONORABLE SANDIGANBAYAN, First Division, REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, ACTING
THROUGH THE PRESIDENTIAL COMMISSION ON GOOD GOVERNMENT, and RAUL S.
ROCO, respondents.

[G.R. No. 108113. September 20, 1996]

PARAJA G. HAYUDINI, petitioner, vs. THE SANDIGANBAYAN and THE REPUBLIC OF THE
PHILIPPINES, respondents.

DECISION
KAPUNAN, J.:

These cases touch the very cornerstone of every State's judicial system, upon which the workings of
the contentious and adversarial system in the Philippine legal process are based - the sanctity of fiduciary
duty in the client-lawyer relationship. The fiduciary duty of a counsel and advocate is also what makes the
law profession a unique position of trust and confidence, which distinguishes it from any other calling. In
this instance, we have no recourse but to uphold and strengthen the mantle of protection accorded to the
confidentiality that proceeds from the performance of the lawyer's duty to his client.
The facts of the case are undisputed.
The matters raised herein are an offshoot of the institution of the Complaint on July 31, 1987 before
the Sandiganbayan by the Republic of the Philippines, through the Presidential Commission on Good
Government against Eduardo M. Cojuangco, Jr., as one of the principal defendants, for the recovery of
alleged ill-gotten wealth, which includes shares of stocks in the named corporations in PCGG Case No. 33
(Civil Case No. 0033), entitled "Republic of the Philippines versus Eduardo Cojuangco, et al." [1]
Among the defendants named in the case are herein petitioners Teodoro Regala, Edgardo J. Angara,
Avelino V. Cruz, Jose C. Concepcion, Rogelio A. Vinluan, Victor P. Lazatin, Eduardo U. Escueta and Paraja
G. Hayudini, and herein private respondent Raul S. Roco, who all were then partners of the law firm Angara,
Abello, Concepcion, Regala and Cruz Law Offices (hereinafter referred to as the ACCRA Law Firm). ACCRA
Law Firm performed legal services for its clients, which included, among others, the organization and
acquisition of business associations and/or organizations, with the correlative and incidental services where
its members acted as incorporators, or simply, as stockholders. More specifically, in the performance of
these services, the members of the law firm delivered to its client documents which substantiate the client's
equity holdings, i.e., stock certificates endorsed in blank representing the shares registered in the client's
name, and a blank deed of trust or assignment covering said shares. In the course of their dealings with
their clients, the members of the law firm acquire information relative to the assets of clients as well as their
personal and business circumstances. As members of the ACCRA Law Firm, petitioners and private
respondent Raul Roco admit that they assisted in the organization and acquisition of the companies included
in Civil Case No. 0033, and in keeping with the office practice, ACCRA lawyers acted as nominees-
stockholders of the said corporations involved in sequestration proceedings. [2]
On August 20, 1991, respondent Presidential Commission on Good Government (hereinafter referred to
as respondent PCGG) filed a "Motion to Admit Third Amended Complaint" and "Third Amended Complaint"
which excluded private respondent Raul S. Roco from the complaint in PCGG Case No. 33 as party-
defendant.[3] Respondent PCGG based its exclusion of private respondent Roco as party-defendant on his
undertaking that he will reveal the identity of the principal/s for whom he acted as nominee/stockholder in
the companies involved in PCGG Case No. 33.[4]
Petitioners were included in the Third Amended Complaint on the strength of the following allegations:
14. Defendants Eduardo Cojuangco, Jr., Edgardo J. Angara, Jose C. Concepcion, Teodoro Regala,
Avelino V. Cruz, Rogelio A. Vinluan, Eduardo U. Escueta, Paraja G. Hayudini and Raul Roco of
the Angara Concepcion Cruz Regala and Abello law offices (ACCRA) plotted, devised,
schemed. conspired and confederated with each other in setting up, through the use of the
coconut levy funds, the financial and corporate framework and structures that led to the
establishment of UCPB, UNICOM, COCOLIFE, COCOMARK, CIC, and more than twenty other
coconut levy funded corporations, including the acquisition of San Miguel Corporation shares and
its institutionalization through presidential directives of the coconut monopoly. Through insidious
means and machinations, ACCRA, being the wholly-owned investment arm, ACCRA Investments
Corporation, became the holder of approximately fifteen million shares representing roughly
3.3% of the total outstanding capital stock of UCPB as of 31 March 1987. This ranks ACCRA
Investments Corporation number 44 among the top 100 biggest stockholders of UCPB which has
 approximately 1,400,000 shareholders. On the other hand, corporate books show the name
Edgardo J. Angara as holding approximately 3,744 shares as of February, 1984.[5]
In their answer to the Expanded Amended Complaint, petitioners ACCRA lawyers alleged that:

4.4. Defendants-ACCRA lawyers participation in the acts with which their co-defendants are charged, was
in furtherance of legitimate lawyering.

4.4.1. In the course of rendering professional and legal services to clients, defendants-ACCRA lawyers, Jose
C. Concepcion, Teodoro D. Regala, Rogelio A. Vinluan and Eduardo U. Escueta, became holders of shares of
stock in the corporations listed under their respective names in Annex A of the expanded Amended
Complaint as incorporating or acquiring stockholders only and, as such, they do not claim any proprietary
interest in the said shares of stock.

4.5. Defendant ACCRA-lawyer Avelino V. Cruz was one of the incorporators in 1976 of Mermaid Marketing
Corporation, which was organized for legitimate business purposes not related to the allegations of the
expanded Amended Complaint.However, he has long ago transferred any material interest therein and
therefore denies that the shares appearing in his name in Annex A of the expanded Amended Complaint are
his assets.[6]

Petitioner Paraja Hayudini, who had separated from ACCRA law firm, filed a separate answer denying
the allegations in the complaint implicating him in the alleged ill-gotten wealth.[7]
Petitioners ACCRA lawyers subsequently filed their "COMMENT AND/OR OPPOSITION" dated October 8,
1991 with Counter-Motion that respondent PCGG similarly grant the same treatment to them (exclusion as
parties-defendants) as accorded private respondent Roco.[8] The Counter-Motion for dropping petitioners
from the complaint was duly set for hearing on October 18, 1991 in accordance with the requirements of
Rule 15 of the Rules of Court.
In its "Comment," respondent PCGG set the following conditions precedent for the exclusion of
petitioners, namely: (a) the disclosure of the identity of its clients; (b) submission of documents
substantiating the lawyer-client relationship; and (c) the submission of the deeds of assignments petitioners
executed in favor of its clients covering their respective shareholdings. [9]
Consequently, respondent PCGG presented supposed proof to substantiate compliance by private
respondent Roco of the conditions precedent to warrant the latter's exclusion as party-defendant in PCGG
Case No. 33, to wit: (a) Letter to respondent PCGG of the counsel of respondent Roco dated May 24, 1989
reiterating a previous request for reinvestigation by the PCGG in PCGG Case No. 33; (b) Affidavit dated
March 8, 1989 executed by private respondent Roco as Attachment to the letter aforestated in (a); and (c)
Letter of the Roco, Bunag, and Kapunan Law Offices dated September 21, 1988 to the respondent PCGG in
behalf of private respondent Roco originally requesting the reinvestigation and/or re-examination of the
evidence of the PCGG against Roco in its Complaint in PCGG Case No. 33.[10]
It is noteworthy that during said proceedings, private respondent Roco did not refute petitioners'
contention that he did actually not reveal the identity of the client involved in PCGG Case No. 33, nor had
he undertaken to reveal the identity of the client for whom he acted as nominee-stockholder.[11]
On March 18, 1992, respondent Sandiganbayan promulgated the Resolution, herein questioned,
denying the exclusion of petitioners in PCGG Case No. 33, for their refusal to comply with the conditions
required by respondent PCGG. It held:
x x x.

ACCRA lawyers may take the heroic stance of not revealing the identity of the client for whom they have
acted, i.e. their principal, and that will be their choice. But until they do identify their clients, considerations
of whether or not the privilege claimed by the ACCRA lawyers exists cannot even begin to be debated. The
ACCRA lawyers cannot excuse themselves from the consequences of their acts until they have begun to
establish the basis for recognizing the privilege; the existence and identity of the client.

This is what appears to be the cause for which they have been impleaded by the PCGG as defendants herein.

5. The PCGG is satisfied that defendant Roco has demonstrated his agency and that Roco has apparently
identified his principal, which revelation could show the lack of cause against him. This in turn has allowed
the PCGG to exercise its power both under the rules of Agency and under Section 5 of E.O. No. 14-A in
relation to the Supreme Court's ruling in Republic v. Sandiganbayan (173 SCRA 72).

The PCGG has apparently offered to the ACCRA lawyers the same conditions availed of by Roco; full
disclosure in exchange for exclusion from these proceedings (par. 7, PCGG's COMMENT dated November 4,
1991). The ACCRA lawyers have preferred not to make the disclosures required by the PCGG.

The ACCRA lawyers cannot, therefore, begrudge the PCGG for keeping them as party defendants. In the
same vein, they cannot compel the PCGG to be accorded the same treatment accorded to Roco.

Neither can this Court.

WHEREFORE, the Counter Motion dated October 8, 1991 filed by the ACCRA lawyers and joined in by Atty.
Paraja G. Hayudini for the same treatment by the PCGG as accorded to Raul S. Roco is DENIED for lack of
merit.[12]

ACCRA lawyers moved for a reconsideration of the above resolution but the same was denied by the
respondent Sandiganbayan. Hence, the ACCRA lawyers filed the petition for certiorari, docketed as G.R. No.
105938, invoking the following grounds:
I

The Honorable Sandiganbayan gravely abused its discretion in subjecting petitioners ACCRA lawyers who
undisputably acted as lawyers in serving as nominee-stockholders, to the strict application of the law of
agency.

II

The Honorable Sandiganbayan committed grave abuse of discretion in not considering petitioners ACCRA
lawyers and Mr. Roco as similarly situated and, therefore, deserving of equal treatment.

1. There is absolutely no evidence that Mr. Roco had revealed, or had undertaken to reveal, the
identities of the client(s) for whom he acted as nominee-stockholder.
2. Even assuming that Mr. Roco had revealed, or had undertaken to reveal, the identities of the
client(s), the disclosure does not constitute a substantial distinction as would make the
classification reasonable under the equal protection clause.
3. Respondent Sandiganbayan sanctioned favoritism and undue preference in favor of Mr. Roco in
violation of the equal protection clause.
III

The Honorable Sandiganbayan committed grave abuse of discretion in not holding that, under the facts of
this case, the attorney-client privilege prohibits petitioners ACCRA lawyers from revealing the identity of
their client(s) and the other information requested by the PCGG.

1. Under the peculiar facts of this case, the attorney-client privilege includes the identity of the
client(s).
2. The factual disclosures required by the PCGG are not limited to the identity of petitioners ACCRA
lawyers' alleged client(s) but extend to other privileged matters.
IV

The Honorable Sandiganbayan committed grave abuse of discretion in not requiring that the dropping of
party-defendants by the PCGG must be based on reasonable and just grounds and with due consideration
to the constitutional right of petitioners ACCRA lawyers to the equal protection of the law.

Petitioner Paraja G. Hayudini, likewise, filed his own motion for reconsideration of the March 18, 1991
resolution which was denied by respondent Sandiganbayan. Thus, he filed a separate petition for certiorari,
docketed as G.R. No. 108113, assailing respondent Sandiganbayan's resolution on essentially the same
grounds averred by petitioners in G.R. No. 105938.
Petitioners contend that the exclusion of respondent Roco as party-defendant in PCGG Case No. 33
grants him a favorable treatment, on the pretext of his alleged undertaking to divulge the identity of his
client, giving him an advantage over them who are in the same footing as partners in the ACCRA law
firm. Petitioners further argue that even granting that such an undertaking has been assumed by private
respondent Roco, they are prohibited from revealing the identity of their principal under their sworn mandate
and fiduciary duty as lawyers to uphold at all times the confidentiality of information obtained during such
lawyer-client relationship.
Respondent PCGG, through its counsel, refutes petitioners' contention, alleging that the revelation of
the identity of the client is not within the ambit of the lawyer-client confidentiality privilege, nor are the
documents it required (deeds of assignment) protected, because they are evidence of nominee status. [13]
In his comment, respondent Roco asseverates that respondent PCGG acted correctly in excluding him
as party-defendant because he "(Roco) has not filed an Answer. PCGG had therefore the right to dismiss
Civil Case No. 0033 as to Roco `without an order of court by filing a notice of dismissal,'"[14] and he has
undertaken to identify his principal.[15]
Petitioners' contentions are impressed with merit.
I
It is quite apparent that petitioners were impleaded by the PCGG as co-defendants to force them to
disclose the identity of their clients. Clearly, respondent PCGG is not after petitioners but the bigger fish as
they say in street parlance. This ploy is quite clear from the PCGGs willingness to cut a deal with petitioners
-- the names of their clients in exchange for exclusion from the complaint. The statement of the
Sandiganbayan in its questioned resolution dated March 18, 1992 is explicit:

ACCRA lawyers may take the heroic stance of not revealing the identity of the client for whom they have
acted, i.e., their principal, and that will be their choice. But until they do identify their clients, considerations
of whether or not the privilege claimed by the ACCRA lawyers exists cannot even begin to be debated. The
ACCRA lawyers cannot excuse themselves from the consequences of their acts until they have begun to
establish the basis for recognizing the privilege; the existence and identity of the client.

This is what appears to be the cause for which they have been impleaded by the PCGG as defendants
herein. (Underscoring ours)

In a closely related case, Civil Case No. 0110 of the Sandiganbayan, Third Division, entitled Primavera
Farms, Inc., et al. vs. Presidential Commission on Good Government respondent PCGG, through counsel
Mario Ongkiko, manifested at the hearing on December 5, 1991 that the PCGG wanted to establish through
the ACCRA that their so called client is Mr. Eduardo Cojuangco; that it was Mr. Eduardo Cojuangco who
furnished all the monies to those subscription payments in corporations included in Annex A of the Third
Amended Complaint; that the ACCRA lawyers executed deeds of trust and deeds of assignment, some in
the name of particular persons, some in blank.
We quote Atty. Ongkiko:

ATTY. ONGKIKO:

With the permission of this Hon. Court. I propose to establish through these ACCRA lawyers that, one, their
so-called client is Mr. Eduardo Cojuangco. Second, it was Mr. Eduardo Cojuangco who furnished all the
monies to these subscription payments of these corporations who are now the petitioners in this case. Third,
that these lawyers executed deeds of trust, some in the name of a particular person, some in blank. Now,
these blank deeds are important to our claim that some of the shares are actually being held by the nominees
for the late President Marcos. Fourth, they also executed deeds of assignment and some of these
assignments have also blank assignees. Again, this is important to our claim that some of the shares are
for Mr. Cojuangco and some are for Mr. Marcos. Fifth, that most of these corporations are really just paper
corporations. Why do we say that? One: There are no really fixed sets of officers, no fixed sets of directors
at the time of incorporation and even up to 1986, which is the crucial year. And not only that, they have no
permits from the municipal authorities in Makati. Next, actually all their addresses now are care of Villareal
Law Office. They really have no address on records. These are some of the principal things that we would
ask of these nominees stockholders, as they called themselves.[16]

It would seem that petitioners are merely standing in for their clients as defendants in the
complaint. Petitioners are being prosecuted solely on the basis of activities and services performed in the
course of their duties as lawyers. Quite obviously, petitioners inclusion as co-defendants in the complaint is
merely being used as leverage to compel them to name their clients and consequently to enable the PCGG
to nail these clients. Such being the case, respondent PCGG has no valid cause of action as against
petitioners and should exclude them from the Third Amended Complaint.
II
The nature of lawyer-client relationship is premised on the Roman Law concepts of locatio conductio
operarum (contract of lease of services) where one person lets his services and another hires them without
reference to the object of which the services are to be performed, wherein lawyers' services may be
compensated by honorarium or for hire,[17] and mandato (contract of agency) wherein a friend on whom
reliance could be placed makes a contract in his name, but gives up all that he gained by the contract to
the person who requested him.[18] But the lawyer-client relationship is more than that of the principal-agent
and lessor-lessee.
In modern day perception of the lawyer-client relationship, an attorney is more than a mere agent or
servant, because he possesses special powers of trust and confidence reposed on him by his client. [19] A
lawyer is also as independent as the judge of the court, thus his powers are entirely different from and
superior to those of an ordinary agent.[20] Moreover, an attorney also occupies what may be considered as
a "quasi-judicial office" since he is in fact an officer of the Court [21] and exercises his judgment in the choice
of courses of action to be taken favorable to his client.
Thus, in the creation of lawyer-client relationship, there are rules, ethical conduct and duties that
breathe life into it, among those, the fiduciary duty to his client which is of a very delicate, exacting and
confidential character, requiring a very high degree of fidelity and good faith, [22] that is required by reason
of necessity and public interest[23] based on the hypothesis that abstinence from seeking legal advice in a
good cause is an evil which is fatal to the administration of justice.[24]
It is also the strict sense of fidelity of a lawyer to his client that distinguishes him from any other
professional in society. This conception is entrenched and embodies centuries of established and stable
tradition.[25] In Stockton v. Ford,[26] the U.S. Supreme Court held:

There are few of the business relations of life involving a higher trust and confidence than that of attorney
and client, or generally speaking, one more honorably and faithfully discharged; few more anxiously guarded
by the law, or governed by the sterner principles of morality and justice; and it is the duty of the court to
administer them in a corresponding spirit, and to be watchful and industrious, to see that confidence thus
reposed shall not be used to the detriment or prejudice of the rights of the party bestowing it. [27]

In our jurisdiction, this privilege takes off from the old Code of Civil Procedure enacted by the Philippine
Commission on August 7, 1901. Section 383 of the Code specifically forbids counsel, without authority of
his client to reveal any communication made by the client to him or his advice given thereon in the course
of professional employment.[28] Passed on into various provisions of the Rules of Court, the attorney-client
privilege, as currently worded provides:

Sec. 24. Disqualification by reason of privileged communication. - The following persons cannot testify as
to matters learned in confidence in the following cases:

xxx

An attorney cannot, without the consent of his client, be examined as to any communication made by the
client to him, or his advice given thereon in the course of, or with a view to, professional employment, can
an attorneys secretary, stenographer, or clerk be examined, without the consent of the client and his
employer, concerning any fact the knowledge of which has been acquired in such capacity. [29]

Further, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court states:

Sec. 20. It is the duty of an attorney:

(e) to maintain inviolate the confidence, and at every peril to himself, to preserve the secrets of his client,
and to accept no compensation in connection with his clients business except from him or with his knowledge
and approval.

This duty is explicitly mandated in Canon 17 of the Code of Professional Responsibility which provides
that:

Canon 17. A lawyer owes fidelity to the cause of his client and he shall be mindful of the trust and confidence
reposed in him.

Canon 15 of the Canons of Professional Ethics also demands a lawyer's fidelity to client:

The lawyer owes "entire devotion to the interest of the client, warm zeal in the maintenance and defense of
his rights and the exertion of his utmost learning and ability," to the end that nothing be taken or be withheld
from him, save by the rules of law, legally applied. No fear of judicial disfavor or public popularity should
restrain him from the full discharge of his duty. In the judicial forum the client is entitled to the benefit of
any and every remedy and defense that is authorized by the law of the land, and he may expect his lawyer
to assert every such remedy or defense. But it is steadfastly to be borne in mind that the great trust of the
lawyer is to be performed within and not without the bounds of the law. The office of attorney does not
permit, much less does it demand of him for any client, violation of law or any manner of fraud or
chicanery. He must obey his own conscience and not that of his client.

Considerations favoring confidentiality in lawyer-client relationships are many and serve several
constitutional and policy concerns. In the constitutional sphere, the privilege gives flesh to one of the most
sacrosanct rights available to the accused, the right to counsel. If a client were made to choose between
legal representation without effective communication and disclosure and legal representation with all his
secrets revealed then he might be compelled, in some instances, to either opt to stay away from the judicial
system or to lose the right to counsel. If the price of disclosure is too high, or if it amounts to self
incrimination, then the flow of information would be curtailed thereby rendering the right practically
nugatory. The threat this represents against another sacrosanct individual right, the right to be presumed
innocent is at once self-evident.
Encouraging full disclosure to a lawyer by one seeking legal services opens the door to a whole spectrum
of legal options which would otherwise be circumscribed by limited information engendered by a fear of
disclosure. An effective lawyer-client relationship is largely dependent upon the degree of confidence which
exists between lawyer and client which in turn requires a situation which encourages a dynamic and fruitful
exchange and flow of information. It necessarily follows that in order to attain effective representation, the
lawyer must invoke the privilege not as a matter of option but as a matter of duty and professional
responsibility.
The question now arises whether or not this duty may be asserted in refusing to disclose the name of
petitioners' client(s) in the case at bar. Under the facts and circumstances obtaining in the instant case, the
answer must be in the affirmative.
As a matter of public policy, a clients identity should not be shrouded in mystery. [30] Under this premise,
the general rule in our jurisdiction as well as in the United States is that a lawyer may not invoke the
privilege and refuse to divulge the name or identity of his client. [31]
The reasons advanced for the general rule are well established.
 First, the court has a right to know that the client whose privileged information is sought to be protected
is flesh and blood.
Second, the privilege begins to exist only after the attorney-client relationship has been established. The
attorney-client privilege does not attach until there is a client.
Third, the privilege generally pertains to the subject matter of the relationship.
Finally, due process considerations require that the opposing party should, as a general rule, know his
adversary. A party suing or sued is entitled to know who his opponent is. [32] He cannot be obliged to grope
in the dark against unknown forces.[33]
Notwithstanding these considerations, the general rule is however qualified by some important
exceptions.
1) Client identity is privileged where a strong probability exists that revealing the clients name
would implicate that client in the very activity for which he sought the lawyers advice.
In Ex-Parte Enzor,[34] a state supreme court reversed a lower court order requiring a lawyer to divulge
the name of her client on the ground that the subject matter of the relationship was so closely related to
the issue of the clients identity that the privilege actually attached to both. In Enzor, the unidentified client,
an election official, informed his attorney in confidence that he had been offered a bribe to violate election
laws or that he had accepted a bribe to that end. In her testimony, the attorney revealed that she had
advised her client to count the votes correctly, but averred that she could not remember whether her client
had been, in fact, bribed. The lawyer was cited for contempt for her refusal to reveal his clients identity
before a grand jury. Reversing the lower courts contempt orders, the state supreme court held that under
the circumstances of the case, and under the exceptions described above, even the name of the client was
privileged.
U.S. v. Hodge and Zweig,[35] involved the same exception, i.e. that client identity is privileged in those
instances where a strong probability exists that the disclosure of the client's identity would implicate the
client in the very criminal activity for which the lawyers legal advice was obtained.
The Hodge case involved federal grand jury proceedings inquiring into the activities of the Sandino
Gang, a gang involved in the illegal importation of drugs in the United States. The respondents, law partners,
represented key witnesses and suspects including the leader of the gang, Joe Sandino.
In connection with a tax investigation in November of 1973, the IRS issued summons to Hodge and
Zweig, requiring them to produce documents and information regarding payment received by Sandino on
behalf of any other person, and vice versa. The lawyers refused to divulge the names. The Ninth Circuit of
the United States Court of Appeals, upholding non-disclosure under the facts and circumstances of the
case, held:
A clients identity and the nature of that clients fee arrangements may be privileged where the person
invoking the privilege can show that a strong probability exists that disclosure of such information would
implicate that client in the very criminal activity for which legal advice was sought Baird v. Koerner, 279
F.2d at 680. While in Baird Owe enunciated this rule as a matter of California law, the rule also reflects
federal law. Appellants contend that the Baird exception applies to this case.
The Baird exception is entirely consonant with the principal policy behind the attorney-client
privilege. In order to promote freedom of consultation of legal advisors by clients, the apprehension of
compelled disclosure from the legal advisors must be removed; hence, the law must prohibit such disclosure
except on the clients consent. 8 J. Wigmore, supra sec. 2291, at 545. In furtherance of this policy, the
clients identity and the nature of his fee arrangements are, in exceptional cases, protected as confidential
communications.[36]
2) Where disclosure would open the client to civil liability, his identity is privileged. For instance,
the peculiar facts and circumstances of Neugass v. Terminal Cab Corporation,[37] prompted the
New York Supreme Court to allow alawyers claim to the effect that he could not reveal the name
of his client because this would expose the latter to civil litigation.
In the said case, Neugass, the plaintiff, suffered injury when the taxicab she was riding, owned by
respondent corporation, collided with a second taxicab, whose owner was unknown. Plaintiff brought action
both against defendant corporation and the owner of the second cab, identified in the information only as
John Doe. It turned out that when the attorney of defendant corporation appeared on preliminary
examination, the fact was somehow revealed that the lawyer came to know the name of the owner of the
second cab when a man, a client of the insurance company, prior to the institution of legal action, came to
him and reported that he was involved in a car accident. It was apparent under the circumstances that the
man was the owner of the second cab. The state supreme court held that the reports were clearly made to
the lawyer in his professional capacity.The court said:
That his employment came about through the fact that the insurance company had hired him to defend
its policyholders seems immaterial. The attorney in such cases is clearly the attorney for the policyholder
when the policyholder goes to him to report an occurrence contemplating that it would be used in an action
or claim against him.[38]
x x x xxx xxx.
 All communications made by a client to his counsel, for the purpose of professional advice or assistance,
are privileged, whether they relate to a suit pending or contemplated, or to any other matter proper for
such advice or aid; x x x And whenever the communication made, relates to a matter so connected with the
employment as attorney or counsel as to afford presumption that it was the ground of the address by the
client, then it is privileged from disclosure. xxx.
It appears... that the name and address of the owner of the second cab came to the attorney in this
case as a confidential communication. His client is not seeking to use the courts, and his address cannot be
disclosed on that theory, nor is the present action pending against him as service of the summons on him
has not been effected. The objections on which the court reserved decision are sustained. [39]
In the case of Matter of Shawmut Mining Company,[40] the lawyer involved was required by a lower
court to disclose whether he represented certain clients in a certain transaction. The purpose of the courts
request was to determine whether the unnamed persons as interested parties were connected with the
purchase of properties involved in the action. The lawyer refused and brought the question to the State
Supreme Court. Upholding the lawyers refusal to divulge the names of his clients the court held:
If it can compel the witness to state, as directed by the order appealed from, that he represented certain
persons in the purchase or sale of these mines, it has made progress in establishing by such evidence their
version of the litigation. As already suggested, such testimony by the witness would compel him to disclose
not only that he was attorney for certain people, but that, as the result of communications made to him in
the course of such employment as such attorney, he knew that they were interested in certain
transactions. We feel sure that under such conditions no case has ever gone to the length of compelling an
attorney, at the instance of a hostile litigant, to disclose not only his retainer, but the nature of the
transactions to which it related, when such information could be made the basis of a suit against his client. [41]
3) Where the governments lawyers have no case against an attorneys client unless, by revealing the
clients name, the said name would furnish the only link that would form the chain of testimony necessary
to convict an individual of a crime, the clients name is privileged.
In Baird vs Korner,[42] a lawyer was consulted by the accountants and the lawyer of certain undisclosed
taxpayers regarding steps to be taken to place the undisclosed taxpayers in a favorable position in case
criminal charges were brought against them by the U.S. Internal Revenue Service (IRS).
It appeared that the taxpayers returns of previous years were probably incorrect and the taxes
understated. The clients themselves were unsure about whether or not they violated tax laws and sought
advice from Baird on the hypothetical possibility that they had. No investigation was then being undertaken
by the IRS of the taxpayers. Subsequently, the attorney of the taxpayers delivered to Baird the sum of
$12,706.85, which had been previously assessed as the tax due, and another amount of money representing
his fee for the advice given. Baird then sent a check for $12,706.85 to the IRS in Baltimore, Maryland, with
a note explaining the payment, but without naming his clients. The IRS demanded that Baird identify the
lawyers, accountants, and other clients involved. Baird refused on the ground that he did not know their
names, and declined to name the attorney and accountants because this constituted privileged
communication. A petition was filed for the enforcement of the IRS summons. For Bairds repeated refusal
to name his clients he was found guilty of civil contempt. The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals held that, a
lawyer could not be forced to reveal the names of clients who employed him to pay sums of money to the
government voluntarily in settlement of undetermined income taxes, unsued on, and with no government
audit or investigation into that clients income tax liability pending. The court emphasized the exception that
a clients name is privileged when so much has been revealed concerning the legal services rendered that
the disclosure of the clients identity exposes him to possible investigation and sanction by government
agencies. The Court held:

The facts of the instant case bring it squarely within that exception to the general rule. Here money was
received by the government, paid by persons who thereby admitted they had not paid a sufficient amount
in income taxes some one or more years in the past. The names of the clients are useful to the government
for but one purpose - to ascertain which taxpayers think they were delinquent, so that it may check the
records for that one year or several years. The voluntary nature of the payment indicates a belief by the
taxpayers that more taxes or interest or penalties are due than the sum previously paid, if any. It indicates
a feeling of guilt for nonpayment of taxes, though whether it is criminal guilt is undisclosed. But it may well
be the link that could form the chain of testimony necessary to convict an individual of a federal
crime. Certainly the payment and the feeling of guilt are the reasons the attorney here involved was
employed - to advise his clients what, under the circumstances, should be done.[43]

Apart from these principal exceptions, there exist other situations which could qualify as exceptions to
the general rule.
For example, the content of any client communication to a lawyer lies within the privilege if it is relevant
to the subject matter of the legal problem on which the client seeks legal assistance. [44] Moreover, where
the nature of the attorney-client relationship has been previously disclosed and it is the identity which is
intended to be confidential, the identity of the client has been held to be privileged, since such revelation
would otherwise result in disclosure of the entire transaction.[45]
Summarizing these exceptions, information relating to the identity of a client may fall within the ambit
of the privilege when the clients name itself has an independent significance, such that disclosure would
then reveal client confidences.[46]
 The circumstances involving the engagement of lawyers in the case at bench, therefore, clearly reveal
that the instant case falls under at least two exceptions to the general rule. First, disclosure of the alleged
client's name would lead to establish said client's connection with the very fact in issue of the case, which
is privileged information, because the privilege, as stated earlier, protects the subject matter or the
substance (without which there would be no attorney-client relationship).
The link between the alleged criminal offense and the legal advice or legal service sought was duly
established in the case at bar, by no less than the PCGG itself. The key lies in the three specific conditions
laid down by the PCGG which constitutes petitioners ticket to non-prosecution should they accede thereto:

(a) the disclosure of the identity of its clients;

(b) submission of documents substantiating the lawyer-client relationship; and

(c) the submission of the deeds of assignment petitioners executed in favor of their clients covering their
respective shareholdings.

From these conditions, particularly the third, we can readily deduce that the clients indeed consulted
the petitioners, in their capacity as lawyers, regarding the financial and corporate structure, framework and
set-up of the corporations in question. In turn, petitioners gave their professional advice in the form of,
among others, the aforementioned deeds of assignment covering their clients shareholdings.
There is no question that the preparation of the aforestated documents was part and parcel of petitioners
legal service to their clients. More important, it constituted an integral part of their duties as
lawyers. Petitioners, therefore, have a legitimate fear that identifying their clients would implicate them in
the very activity for which legal advice had been sought, i.e., the alleged accumulation of ill-gotten wealth
in the aforementioned corporations.
Furthermore, under the third main exception, revelation of the client's name would obviously provide
the necessary link for the prosecution to build its case, where none otherwise exists. It is the link, in the
words of Baird, that would inevitably form the chain of testimony necessary to convict the (client) of a...
crime."[47]
An important distinction must be made between a case where a client takes on the services of an
attorney for illicit purposes, seeking advice about how to go around the law for the purpose of committing
illegal activities and a case where a client thinks he might have previously committed something illegal and
consults his attorney about it. The first case clearly does not fall within the privilege because the same
cannot be invoked for purposes illegal. The second case falls within the exception because whether or not
the act for which the advice turns out to be illegal, his name cannot be used or disclosed if the disclosure
leads to evidence, not yet in the hands of the prosecution, which might lead to possible action against him.
These cases may be readily distinguished, because the privilege cannot be invoked or used as a shield
for an illegal act, as in the first example; while the prosecution may not have a case against the client in
the second example and cannot use the attorney client relationship to build up a case against the latter. The
reason for the first rule is that it is not within the professional character of a lawyer to give advice on the
commission of a crime.[48] The reason for the second has been stated in the cases above discussed and are
founded on the same policy grounds for which the attorney-client privilege, in general, exists.
In Matter of Shawmut Mining Co., supra, the appellate court therein stated that "under such conditions
no case has ever yet gone to the length of compelling an attorney, at the instance of a hostile litigant, to
disclose not only his retainer, but the nature of the transactions to which it related, when such information
could be made the basis of a suit against his client.[49] "Communications made to an attorney in the course
of any personal employment, relating to the subject thereof, and which may be supposed to be drawn
out in consequence of the relation in which the parties stand to each other, are under the seal of confidence
and entitled to protection as privileged communications."[50] Where the communicated information, which
clearly falls within the privilege, would suggest possible criminal activity but there would be not much in the
information known to the prosecution which would sustain a charge except that revealing the name of the
client would open up other privileged information which would substantiate the prosecutions suspicions,
then the clients identity is so inextricably linked to the subject matter itself that it falls within the
protection. The Baird exception, applicable to the instant case, is consonant with the principal policy behind
the privilege, i.e., that for the purpose of promoting freedom of consultation of legal advisors by clients,
apprehension of compelled disclosure from attorneys must be eliminated. This exception has likewise been
sustained in In re Grand Jury Proceedings[51] and Tillotson v. Boughner.[52] What these cases unanimously
seek to avoid is the exploitation of the general rule in what may amount to a fishing expedition by the
prosecution.
There are, after all, alternative sources of information available to the prosecutor which do not depend
on utilizing a defendant's counsel as a convenient and readily available source of information in the building
of a case against the latter. Compelling disclosure of the client's name in circumstances such as the one
which exists in the case at bench amounts to sanctioning fishing expeditions by lazy prosecutors and litigants
which we cannot and will not countenance. When the nature of the transaction would be revealed by
disclosure of an attorney's retainer, such retainer is obviously protected by the privilege. [53] It follows that
petitioner attorneys in the instant case owe their client(s) a duty and an obligation not to disclose the latter's
identity which in turn requires them to invoke the privilege.
 In fine, the crux of petitioners' objections ultimately hinges on their expectation that if the prosecution
has a case against their clients, the latter's case should be built upon evidence painstakingly gathered by
them from their own sources and not from compelled testimony requiring them to reveal the name of their
clients, information which unavoidably reveals much about the nature of the transaction which may or may
not be illegal. The logical nexus between name and nature of transaction is so intimate in this case that it
would be difficult to simply dissociate one from the other. In this sense, the name is as much
"communication" as information revealed directly about the transaction in question itself, a communication
which is clearly and distinctly privileged. A lawyer cannot reveal such communication without exposing
himself to charges of violating a principle which forms the bulwark of the entire attorney-client relationship.
The uberrimei fidei relationship between a lawyer and his client therefore imposes a strict liability for
negligence on the former. The ethical duties owing to the client, including confidentiality, loyalty,
competence, diligence as well as the responsibility to keep clients informed and protect their rights to make
decisions have been zealously sustained. In Milbank, Tweed, Hadley and McCloy v. Boon,[54] the US Second
District Court rejected the plea of the petitioner law firm that it breached its fiduciary duty to its client by
helping the latter's former agent in closing a deal for the agent's benefit only after its client hesitated in
proceeding with the transaction, thus causing no harm to its client. The Court instead ruled that breaches
of a fiduciary relationship in any context comprise a special breed of cases that often loosen normally
stringent requirements of causation and damages, and found in favor of the client.
To the same effect is the ruling in Searcy, Denney, Scarola, Barnhart, and Shipley P.A. v.
Scheller[55] requiring strict obligation of lawyers vis-a-vis clients. In this case, a contingent fee lawyer was
fired shortly before the end of completion of his work, and sought payment quantum meruit of work
done. The court, however, found that the lawyer was fired for cause after he sought to pressure his client
into signing a new fee agreement while settlement negotiations were at a critical stage. While the client
found a new lawyer during the interregnum, events forced the client to settle for less than what was
originally offered. Reiterating the principle of fiduciary duty of lawyers to clients in Meinhard v.
Salmon[56] famously attributed to Justice Benjamin Cardozo that "Not honesty alone, but the punctilio of an
honor the most sensitive, is then the standard of behavior," the US Court found that the lawyer involved
was fired for cause, thus deserved no attorney's fees at all.
The utmost zeal given by Courts to the protection of the lawyer-client confidentiality privilege and
lawyer's loyalty to his client is evident in the duration of the protection, which exists not only during the
relationship, but extends even after the termination of the relationship. [57]
Such are the unrelenting duties required of lawyers vis-a-vis their clients because the law, which the
lawyers are sworn to uphold, in the words of Oliver Wendell Holmes, [58] "xxx is an exacting goddess,
demanding of her votaries in intellectual and moral discipline." The Court, no less, is not prepared to accept
respondents position without denigrating the noble profession that is lawyering, so extolled by Justice
Holmes in this wise:

Every calling is great when greatly pursued. But what other gives such scope to realize the spontaneous
energy of one's soul? In what other does one plunge so deep in the stream of life - so share its passions its
battles, its despair, its triumphs, both as witness and actor? x x x But that is not all. What a subject is this
in which we are united - this abstraction called the Law, wherein as in a magic mirror, we see reflected, not
only in our lives, but the lives of all men that have been. When I think on this majestic theme my eyes
dazzle. If we are to speak of the law as our mistress, we who are here know that she is a mistress only to
be won with sustained and lonely passion - only to be won by straining all the faculties by which man is
likened to God.

We have no choice but to uphold petitioners' right not to reveal the identity of their clients under pain
of the breach of fiduciary duty owing to their clients, because the facts of the instant case clearly fall within
recognized exceptions to the rule that the clients name is not privileged information.
If we were to sustain respondent PCGG that the lawyer-client confidential privilege under the
circumstances obtaining here does not cover the identity of the client, then it would expose the lawyers
themselves to possible litigation by their clients in view of the strict fiduciary responsibility imposed on them
in the exercise of their duties.
The complaint in Civil Case No. 0033 alleged that the defendants therein, including herein petitioners
and Eduardo Cojuangco, Jr. conspired with each other in setting up through the use of coconut levy funds
the financial and corporate framework and structures that led to the establishment of UCPB, UNICOM and
others and that through insidious means and machinations, ACCRA, using its wholly-owned investment arm,
ACCRA Investments Corporation, became the holder of approximately fifteen million shares representing
roughly 3.3% of the total capital stock of UCPB as of 31 March 1987. The PCGG wanted to establish through
the ACCRA lawyers that Mr. Cojuangco is their client and it was Cojuangco who furnished all the monies to
the subscription payment; hence, petitioners acted as dummies, nominees and/or agents by allowing
themselves, among others, to be used as instrument in accumulating ill-gotten wealth through government
concessions, etc., which acts constitute gross abuse of official position and authority, flagrant breach of
public trust, unjust enrichment, violation of the Constitution and laws of the Republic of the Philippines.
By compelling petitioners, not only to reveal the identity of their clients, but worse, to submit to the
PCGG documents substantiating the client-lawyer relationship, as well as deeds of assignment petitioners
executed in favor of its clients covering their respective shareholdings, the PCGG would exact from
petitioners a link that would inevitably form the chain of testimony necessary to convict the (client) of a
crime.
 III
In response to petitioners' last assignment of error, respondents allege that the private respondent was
dropped as party defendant not only because of his admission that he acted merely as a nominee but also
because of his undertaking to testify to such facts and circumstances "as the interest of truth may require,
which includes... the identity of the principal."[59]
First, as to the bare statement that private respondent merely acted as a lawyer and nominee, a
statement made in his out-of-court settlement with the PCGG, it is sufficient to state that petitioners have
likewise made the same claim not merely out-of- court but also in their Answer to plaintiff's Expanded
Amended Complaint, signed by counsel, claiming that their acts were made in furtherance of "legitimate
lawyering.[60] Being "similarly situated" in this regard, public respondents must show that there exist other
conditions and circumstances which would warrant their treating the private respondent differently from
petitioners in the case at bench in order to evade a violation of the equal protection clause of the
Constitution.
To this end, public respondents contend that the primary consideration behind their decision to sustain
the PCGG's dropping of private respondent as a defendant was his promise to disclose the identities of the
clients in question. However, respondents failed to show - and absolutely nothing exists in the records
of the case at bar - that private respondent actually revealed the identity of his client(s) to the PCGG. Since
the undertaking happens to be the leitmotif of the entire arrangement between Mr. Roco and the PCGG, an
undertaking which is so material as to have justified PCGG's special treatment exempting the private
respondent from prosecution, respondent Sandiganbayan should have required proof of the undertaking
more substantial than a "bare assertion" that private respondent did indeed comply with the
undertaking. Instead, as manifested by the PCGG, only three documents were submitted for the purpose,
two of which were mere requests for re-investigation and one simply disclosed certain clients which
petitioners (ACCRA lawyers) were themselves willing to reveal. These were clients to whom both petitioners
and private respondent rendered legal services while all of them were partners at ACCRA, and were not the
clients which the PCGG wanted disclosed for the alleged questioned transactions. [61]
To justify the dropping of the private respondent from the case or the filing of the suit in the respondent
court without him, therefore, the PCGG should conclusively show that Mr. Roco was treated as a species
apart from the rest of the ACCRA lawyers on the basis of a classification which made substantial distinctions
based on real differences. No such substantial distinctions exist from the records of the case at bench, in
violation of the equal protection clause.
The equal protection clause is a guarantee which provides a wall of protection against uneven application
of statutes and regulations. In the broader sense, the guarantee operates against uneven application of
legal norms so that all persons under similar circumstances would be accorded the same treatment. [62] Those
who fall within a particular class ought to be treated alike not only as to privileges granted but also as to
the liabilities imposed.

x x x. What is required under this constitutional guarantee is the uniform operation of legal norms so that
all persons under similar circumstances would be accorded the same treatment both in the privileges
conferred and the liabilities imposed.As was noted in a recent decision: Favoritism and undue preference
cannot be allowed. For the principle is that equal protection and security shall be given to every person
under circumstances, which if not identical are analogous. If law be looked upon in terms of burden or
charges, those that fall within a class should be treated in the same fashion, whatever restrictions cast on
some in the group equally binding the rest.[63]

We find that the condition precedent required by the respondent PCGG of the petitioners for their
exclusion as parties-defendants in PCGG Case No. 33 violates the lawyer-client confidentiality privilege. The
condition also constitutes a transgression by respondents Sandiganbayan and PCGG of the equal protection
clause of the Constitution.[64] It is grossly unfair to exempt one similarly situated litigant from prosecution
without allowing the same exemption to the others. Moreover, the PCGGs demand not only touches upon
the question of the identity of their clients but also on documents related to the suspected transactions, not
only in violation of the attorney-client privilege but also of the constitutional right against self-
incrimination. Whichever way one looks at it, this is a fishing expedition, a free ride at the expense of such
rights.
An argument is advanced that the invocation by petitioners of the privilege of attorney-client
confidentiality at this stage of the proceedings is premature and that they should wait until they are called
to testify and examine as witnesses as to matters learned in confidence before they can raise their
objections. But petitioners are not mere witnesses. They are co-principals in the case for recovery of alleged
ill-gotten wealth. They have made their position clear from the very beginning that they are not willing to
testify and they cannot be compelled to testify in view of their constitutional right against self-incrimination
and of their fundamental legal right to maintain inviolate the privilege of attorney-client confidentiality.
It is clear then that the case against petitioners should never be allowed to take its full course in the
Sandiganbayan. Petitioners should not be made to suffer the effects of further litigation when it is obvious
that their inclusion in the complaint arose from a privileged attorney-client relationship and as a means of
coercing them to disclose the identities of their clients. To allow the case to continue with respect to them
when this Court could nip the problem in the bud at this early opportunity would be to sanction an unjust
situation which we should not here countenance. The case hangs as a real and palpable threat, a proverbial
Sword of Damocles over petitioners' heads. It should not be allowed to continue a day longer.
 While we are aware of respondent PCGGs legal mandate to recover ill-gotten wealth, we will not sanction
acts which violate the equal protection guarantee and the right against self-incrimination and subvert the
lawyer-client confidentiality privilege.
WHEREFORE, IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the Resolutions of respondent Sandiganbayan (First
Division) promulgated on March 18, 1992 and May 21, 1992 are hereby ANNULLED and SET
ASIDE. Respondent Sandiganbayan is further ordered to exclude petitioners Teodoro D. Regala, Edgardo J.
Angara, Avelino V. Cruz, Jose C. Concepcion, *Rogelio A. Vinluan, Victor P. Lazatin, Eduardo U. Escueta and
Paraja G. Hayuduni as parties-defendants in SB Civil Case No. 0033 entitled "Republic of the Philippines v.
Eduardo Cojuangco, Jr., et al.". SO ORDERED.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, G.R. No. 149576

represented by the Land

Registration Authority,
Petitioner,

-versus–

KENRICK DEVELOPMENT

CORPORATION,

Respondent. Promulgated:

August 8, 2006

x------------------------------------------x

DECISION

CORONA, J.:

The Republic of the Philippines assails the May 31, 2001 decision [1] and August 20, 2001 resolution of the

Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 52948 in this petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.

This case stemmed from the construction by respondent Kenrick Development Corporation of a concrete

perimeter fence around some parcels of land located behind the Civil Aviation Training Center of the Air

Transportation Office (ATO) in 1996. As a result, the ATO was dispossessed of some 30,228 square meters

of prime land. Respondent justified its action with a claim of ownership over the property. It presented

Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) Nos. 135604, 135605 and 135606 issued in its name and which allegedly

originated from TCT No. 17508 registered in the name of one Alfonso Concepcion.

ATO verified the authenticity of respondents titles with the Land Registration Authority (LRA). On

May 17, 1996, Atty. Jose Loriega, head of the Land Title Verification Task Force of the LRA, submitted his

report. The Registrar of Deeds of Pasay City had no record of TCT No. 17508 and its ascendant title, TCT

No. 5450. The land allegedly covered by respondents titles was also found to be within Villamor Air Base

(headquarters of the Philippine Air Force) in Pasay City.

By virtue of the report, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), on September 3, 1996, filed a

complaint for revocation, annulment and cancellation of certificates of title in behalf of the Republic of the

Philippines (as represented by the LRA) against respondent and Alfonso Concepcion. It was raffled to Branch

114 of the Regional Trial Court of Pasay City where it was docketed as Civil Case No. 96-1144.
 On December 5, 1996, respondent filed its answer which was purportedly signed by Atty. Onofre

Garlitos, Jr. as counsel for respondent.

Since Alfonso Concepcion could not be located and served with summons, the trial court ordered the

issuance of an alias summons by publication against him on February 19, 1997.

The case was thereafter punctuated by various incidents relative to modes of discovery, pre-trial,

postponements or continuances, motions to dismiss, motions to declare defendants in default and other

procedural matters.

During the pendency of the case, the Senate Blue Ribbon Committee and Committee on Justice and

Human Rights conducted a hearing in aid of legislation on the matter of land registration and titling. In

particular, the legislative investigation looked into the issuance of fake titles and focused on how respondent

was able to acquire TCT Nos. 135604, 135605 and 135606.

During the congressional hearing held on November 26, 1998, one of those summoned was Atty.

Garlitos, respondents former counsel. He testified that he prepared respondents answer and transmitted an

unsigned draft to respondents president, Mr. Victor Ong. The signature appearing above his name was not

his. He authorized no one to sign in his behalf either. And he did not know who finally signed it.

With Atty. Garlitos revelation, the Republic promptly filed an urgent motion on December 3, 1998 to

declare respondent in default,[2] predicated on its failure to file a valid answer. The Republic argued that,

since the person who signed the answer was neither authorized by Atty. Garlitos nor even known to him,

the answer was effectively an unsigned pleading. Pursuant to Section 3, Rule 7 of the Rules of Court, [3] it

was a mere scrap of paper and produced no legal effect.

On February 19, 1999, the trial court issued a resolution granting the Republics motion. [4] It found

respondents answer to be sham and false and intended to defeat the purpose of the rules. The trial court

ordered the answer stricken from the records, declared respondent in default and allowed the Republic to

present its evidence ex parte.

The Republic presented its evidence ex parte, after which it rested its case and formally offered its

evidence.

Meanwhile, respondent sought reconsideration of the February 19, 1999 resolution but the trial court

denied it.
 Aggrieved, respondent elevated the matter to the Court of Appeals via a petition for

certiorari[5] seeking to set aside the February 19, 1999 resolution of the trial court. Respondent contended

that the trial court erred in declaring it in default for failure to file a valid and timely answer.

On May 31, 2001, the Court of Appeals rendered the assailed decision. It found Atty. Garlitos

statements in the legislative hearing to be unreliable since they were not subjected to cross-examination.

The appellate court also scrutinized Atty. Garlitos acts after the filing of the answer [6] and concluded that he

assented to the signing of the answer by somebody in his stead. This supposedly cured whatever defect the

answer may have had. Hence, the appellate court granted respondents petition for certiorari. It directed the

lifting of the order of default against respondent and ordered the trial court to proceed to trial with dispatch.

The Republic moved for reconsideration but it was denied. Thus, this petition.

Did the Court of Appeals err in reversing the trial courts order which declared respondent in default

for its failure to file a valid answer? Yes, it did.

A party may, by his words or conduct, voluntarily adopt or ratify anothers statement. [7] Where it appears

that a party clearly and unambiguously assented to or adopted the statements of another, evidence of those

statements is admissible against him.[8] This is the essence of the principle of adoptive admission.

An adoptive admission is a partys reaction to a statement or action by another person when it is reasonable

to treat the partys reaction as an admission of something stated or implied by the other person. [9] By

adoptive admission, a third persons statement becomes the admission of the party embracing or espousing

it. Adoptive admission may occur when a party:

(a) expressly agrees to or concurs in an oral statement made by another; [10]

(b) hears a statement and later on essentially repeats it;[11]

(c) utters an acceptance or builds upon the assertion of another; [12]

(d) replies by way of rebuttal to some specific points raised by another but ignores further points

which he or she has heard the other make[13] or

(e) reads and signs a written statement made by another.[14]

Here, respondent accepted the pronouncements of Atty. Garlitos and built its case on them. At no

instance did it ever deny or contradict its former counsels statements. It went to great lengths to explain

Atty. Garlitos testimony as well as its implications, as follows:

 1. While Atty. Garlitos denied signing the answer, the fact was that the answer was signed. Hence,

the pleading could not be considered invalid for being an unsigned pleading. The fact that the

person who signed it was neither known to Atty. Garlitos nor specifically authorized by him

was immaterial. The important thing was that the answer bore a signature.

2. While the Rules of Court requires that a pleading must be signed by the party or his counsel, it

does not prohibit a counsel from giving a general authority for any person to sign the answer

for him which was what Atty. Garlitos did. The person who actually signed the pleading was

of no moment as long as counsel knew that it would be signed by another. This was similar

to addressing an authorization letter to whom it may concern such that any person could act

on it even if he or she was not known beforehand.

3. Atty. Garlitos testified that he prepared the answer; he never disowned its contents and he

resumed acting as counsel for respondent subsequent to its filing. These circumstances show

that Atty. Garlitos conformed to or ratified the signing of the answer by another.

Respondent repeated these statements of Atty. Garlitos in its motion for reconsideration of the trial

courts February 19, 1999 resolution. And again in the petition it filed in the Court of Appeals as well as in

the comment[15] and memorandum it submitted to this Court.

Evidently, respondent completely adopted Atty. Garlitos statements as its own. Respondents

adoptive admission constituted a judicial admission which was conclusive on it.

Contrary to respondents position, a signed pleading is one that is signed either by the party himself

or his counsel. Section 3, Rule 7 is clear on this matter. It requires that a pleading must be signed by the

party or counsel representing him.

Therefore, only the signature of either the party himself or his counsel operates to validly convert a

pleading from one that is unsigned to one that is signed.

Counsels authority and duty to sign a pleading are personal to him. He may not delegate it to just

any person.

The signature of counsel constitutes an assurance by him that he has read the pleading; that, to the

best of his knowledge, information and belief, there is a good ground to support it; and that it is not
interposed for delay.[16] Under the Rules of Court, it is counsel alone, by affixing his signature, who can

certify to these matters.

The preparation and signing of a pleading constitute legal work involving practice of law which is

reserved exclusively for the members of the legal profession. Counsel may delegate the signing of a pleading

to another lawyer[17] but cannot do so

in favor of one who is not. The Code of Professional Responsibility provides:

Rule 9.01 ― A lawyer shall not delegate to any unqualified person the performance
of any task which by law may only be performed by a member of the Bar in good standing.

Moreover, a signature by agents of a lawyer amounts to signing by unqualified persons, [18] something the

law strongly proscribes.

Therefore, the blanket authority respondent claims Atty. Garlitos entrusted to just anyone was void.

Any act taken pursuant to that authority was likewise void. There was no way it could have been cured or

ratified by Atty. Garlitos subsequent acts.

Moreover, the transcript of the November 26, 1998 Senate hearing shows that Atty. Garlitos

consented to the signing of the answer by another as long as it conformed to his draft. We give no value

whatsoever to such self-serving statement.

No doubt, Atty. Garlitos could not have validly given blanket authority for just anyone to sign the

answer. The trial court correctly ruled that respondents answer was invalid and of no legal effect as it was

an unsigned pleading. Respondent was properly declared in default and the Republic was rightly allowed to

present evidence ex parte.

Respondent insists on the liberal application of the rules. It maintains that even if it were true that its answer

was supposedly an unsigned pleading, the defect was a mere technicality that could be set aside.

Procedural requirements which have often been disparagingly labeled as mere technicalities have

their own valid raison d etre in the orderly administration of justice. To summarily brush them aside may

result in arbitrariness and injustice.[19]

 The Courts pronouncement in Garbo v. Court of Appeals[20] is relevant:

Procedural rules are [tools] designed to facilitate the adjudication of cases. Courts
and litigants alike are thus [enjoined] to abide strictly by the rules. And while the Court, in
some instances, allows a relaxation in the application of the rules, this, we stress, was never
intended to forge a bastion for erring litigants to violate the rules with impunity. The liberality
in the interpretation and application of the rules applies only in proper cases and under
justifiable causes and circumstances. While it is true that litigation is not a game of
technicalities, it is equally true that every case must be prosecuted in accordance with the
prescribed procedure to insure an orderly and speedy administration of justice.

Like all rules, procedural rules should be followed except only when, for the most persuasive of reasons,

they may be relaxed to relieve a litigant of an injustice not commensurate with the degree of his

thoughtlessness in not complying with the prescribed procedure. [21] In this case, respondent failed to show

any persuasive reason why it should be exempted from strictly abiding by the rules.

As a final note, the Court cannot close its eyes to the acts committed by Atty. Garlitos in violation of the

ethics of the legal profession. Thus, he should be made to account for his possible misconduct.

WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED. The May 31, 2001 decision and August 20, 2001

resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 52948 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE and the

February 19, 1999 resolution of the Regional Trial Court of Pasay City, Branch 114 declaring respondent in

default is hereby REINSTATED.

Let a copy of this decision be furnished the Commission on Bar Discipline of the Integrated Bar of the

Philippines for the commencement of disbarment proceedings against Atty. Onofre Garlitos, Jr. for his

possible unprofessional conduct not befitting his position as an officer of the court. SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 157221 March 30, 2007

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Appellee,

vs.
CESAR GALVEZ, Appellant.

DECISION

AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.:

For review before this Court is the Decision 1 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR No. 18255 dated
March 30, 2001, which affirmed the Decision2 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) Isabela, Basilan finding the
accused-appellant Cesar Galvez (Galvez), guilty of Murder, but modifying the penalty of the RTC from a
sentence of "seventeen (17) years, four (4) months and one (1) day as minimum to twenty (20) years as
maximum" to reclusion perpetua.

The facts are as follows:

At around 11 o’clock in the evening of July 27, 1991, Danilo Perez, Rosalio Enojarda, Noel Cugal, Ricardo
Francisco and Wilfredo Rellios, took a break from making copra to eat leftover dinner inside the copra kiln
in the farm of Perez in Matarling, Lantawan, Basilan. When Enojarda stood up from the circle where they
were eating to drink water, shots rang out and Enojarda fell to the ground shouting "Dan ya tupa comigo"
(Dan, I am hit). The rest of the group took cover, crawling to different directions. After the attack, Rellios
reported the incident to the barangay captain and they brought Enojarda’s dead body to his family. 3

On May 28, 1992, an Information was filed against Cesar Galvez (Galvez), a member of the Philippine
National Police (PNP) for Murder, which reads:

That on or about the 27th day of July, 1991, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, viz. at
Matarling, Municipality of Lantawan, Province of Basilan, Philippines, the above named accused, armed with
an M16 armalite rifle, with treachery and evident premeditation, and with intent to kill, did then and there
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously assault, attack and shoot one Rosalio Enojarda with the said M16 armalite
rifle, thereby inflicting gunshot wound on the body of the latter which caused his death. 4

The prosecution presented evidence showing that: after Enojarda fell, the rest of the group took cover and
Rellios while in a crawling position, saw Galvez about 5 meters away holding an armalite rifle and firing at
their direction; Rellios also saw that Galvez had companions but did not recognize them as well as the
firearms they carried because they were approximately nine meters away; 5 Perez, also crawled and hid in
the bushes about 5 meters away; when the firing stopped, one of the attackers passed by about two meters
from where Perez was hiding and because the moon was bright, he recognized Galvez, his cousin, who was
wearing a fatigue uniform and armed with an armalite rifle; he also saw that Galvez had three armed
companions but did not recognize them nor the firearms they were carrying because they were about nine
meters from Galvez.6

Galvez put up denial and alibi as his defenses. He testified that he was staying at his father-in-law’s house
on July 27, 1991 and drank tuba at around 10:30 p.m. at a nearby store. He went home and slept with his
wife soon after.7To corroborate his testimony, he presented SPO2 Danilo Ramillano, a visitor at his father-
in-law’s house and Wilhelmina Espinosa, a sari-sari store owner. 8 He also presented Athena Elisa Anderson,
Document Examiner and Forensic Analyst of the PNP Crime Laboratory of Region 9, Zamboanga City, who
testified that the paraffin test conducted on both his hands showed that there was no nitrate present; 9 and
Police Inspector Lemuel Caser, Ballistic Examiner, who testified that the shells found at the scene of the
crime were not fired from the firearm issued to Galvez.10

After trial, the RTC rendered its Decision dated February 27, 1995 with the following findings:

From the foregoing facts as well as from the records of this case, this Court finds the following facts to be
undisputable, to wit:

1) That at the late night of July 27, 1991, Rosalio Enojarda, while making copra in the coconut land
of Danilo Perez at Matarling, Lantawan, Basilan, was shot to death by one of the four (4) men. How
many gunshot wounds he suffered and what part of his body was hit by the gunfire, the evidence is
found wanting.

2) That a day before the incident and on the date of the incident which was July 27, 1991, the
accused Cesar Galvez has not fired any firearms.

xxx

3) That the five (5) empty shells of armalite rifle…allegedly found by Barangay Captain Inocente
Manicap from the scene of the crime and later turned over to PFC Samuel Omoso, the Police
 Investigator of this case, did not come from the M16 armalite rifle with Serial No. 117460, the gun
issued to the accused Cesar Galvez. (citations omitted).11

Further, the trial court found that the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses, Rellios and Perez, were
credible and trustworthy as there was no motive to perjure themselves; that the testimony of defense
witness SPO2 Ramillano was full of loopholes; and that the testimony of the store owner was insufficient to
disprove the presence of the accused at the scene of the crime. 12

The RTC concluded:

xxx since this accused, Cesar Galvez, has not fired his M16 armalite rifle on that night of July 27, 1991, and
those five (5) empty shells were not fired from his armalite, then xxx the bullet that hit and instantly
killed Rosalio Enojarda on that night of July 27, 1991 at the copra kiln of Danilo Perez came from
the gun fired by any of the three (3) unidentified persons who were the companions of the
accused, Cesar Galvez at the night of the incident xxx.13 (emphasis supplied)

Despite the fact that the Information failed to allege conspiracy and the aggravating circumstances of
nocturnity and armed band, the RTC still convicted Galvez of murder based on conspiracy since Galvez was
seen by two witnesses at the scene of the crime carrying a firearm together with his unidentified armed
companions.14 The trial court also held that the offer of Galvez to have the case settled out of court is an
indication of his guilt.15

The RTC then disposed of the case as follows:

WHEREFORE, all factual and circumstantial matters surrounding the commission of the crime, being carefully
and meticulously examined and studied, this Court finds the accused SPO2 Cesar Galvez, a member of the
Philippine National Police GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt as principal in committing the crime of Murder
as alleged in the Information and which crime is defined and penalized under Art. 248 of the Revised Penal
Code, but considering his good military records after the commission of the crime, hereby sentences him to
suffer an imprisonment of SEVENTEEN (17) YEARS, FOUR (4) MONTHS and ONE (1) DAY as minimum, to
TWENTY (20) YEARS as maximum, which is the minimum period of Reclusion Temporal in its maximum
period to death. And to indemnify the heirs of the late Rosalio Enojarda, the amount of P50,000.00 as moral
damages and to pay the Court the amount of P500.00 as judicial costs and other accessory penalties
attached to the penalty of Reclusion Temporal.

And further this accused is hereby stripped of all the military ranks he now hold [sic] in the Armed Forces
of the Philippines.

And upon the promulgation of this decision, the accused shall immediately be committed to the Provincial
Jail where the Provincial Warden is directed to immediately transfer him to the National Penitentiary at San
Ramon Penal Colony at Zamboanga City for commitment thereat.

And the property bail bond he has posted for his provisional liberty is hereby ordered cancelled and its
pertinent papers returned, upon receipt to the bondsman.16

Galvez appealed the case to the CA, docketed as CA-G.R. CR No. 18255, which rendered its Decision on
March 30, 2001 affirming his guilt but modifying the penalty to be imposed, thus:

WHEREFORE, with the MODIFICATION that appellant CESAR GALVEZ is hereby sentenced to reclusion
perpetua, the decision appealed from is hereby AFFIRMED in all other respects.17

The CA held that the RTC erred in holding Galvez criminally liable based on conspiracy when such fact was
not alleged in the Information. However, it still found Galvez guilty of Murder. 18 The CA reasoned that: the
negative results of the paraffin and ballistic tests do not negate the possibility that Galvez used another gun
in shooting the victim; the eyewitnesses of the prosecution identified Galvez as the perpetrator if not one
of the perpetrators of the crime; alibi, which was offered by Galvez, is the weakest of all defenses and
cannot prevail over positive identification; the offer of Galvez to the wife of the victim to have the case
settled is also a strong indication of Galvez’s culpability; and treachery was adequately established as the
attack was sudden, unexpected and did not accord the victim an opportunity to defend himself. 19 The CA
further held that since there was no mitigating circumstance, the proper penalty should be reclusion
perpetua.20

Galvez filed a Motion for Reconsideration 21 which the CA denied in its Resolution dated August 21, 2001,
stating that it was a mere rehash of the arguments already addressed in the decision. 22

The entire records of the case were forwarded to this Court pursuant to Section 13, Rule 124 of the Rules
of Criminal Procedure. On April 8, 2003, the Court issued a Resolution 23 accepting the case; committing the
accused to the Davao Prison and Penal Farm; and informing the accused and the Solicitor General that they
may file additional briefs with this Court.24

In his Appellant’s Brief, Galvez argued that the trial court erred:
 I

… IN HOLDING THAT (HE) THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT IS LIABLE FOR MURDER FOR THE DEATH OF ROSALIO
ENOJARDA ON JULY 27, 1991 DESPITE ITS EXPRESS FINDINGS THAT THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT DID NOT
FIRE HIS RIFLE ON THAT FATAL NIGHT AND THAT THE BULLET THAT HIT AND KILLED ROSALIO ENOJARDA
COULD HAVE BEEN FIRED FROM ANY OF THE GUNS OR RIFLES BELONGING TO ANY OF THE THREE
UNIDENTIFIED PERSONS WHO WERE NOT CHARGED NOR INDICTED TOGETHER WITH THE ACCUSED IN
THE SAME CRIMINAL INFORMATION IN QUESTION.

II

… IN HOLDING THAT DANILO PEREZ AND WILFREDO RELLIOS, WHILE IN CRAWLING POSITION WHOSE
CHESTS WERE ALMOST TOUCHING THE GROUND AND UNDER CONDITIONS DESCRIBED BY THEM, HAD
SEEN THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT ARMED WITH M16 ARMALITE RIFLE IN THE NIGHTIME, OF 27 JULY 1991
DESPITE DANILO PEREZ’ [sic] POSITIVE ASSERTION THAT IT WAS IMPOSSIBLE OF HIS (SIC) TO IDENTIFY
THE ACCUSED WHEN ASKED TO DEMONSTRATE IN OPEN COURT IN THE MANNER AND CIRCUMSTANCE
NARRATED BY HIM.25

In his Supplemental Appellant’s Brief, Galvez further claims that it was seriously erroneous:

I.

…TO CONCLUDE THAT THERE WAS CONSPIRACY BETWEEN ACCUSED-APPELLANT AND THE OTHER
MALEFACTORS NOT INCLUDED IN THE PRESENT CASE.

II.

…TO BE SELECTIVE IN APPRECIATING MATTERS NOT INCLUDED IN THE INFORMATION, MORE SO THE
THEORY OF CONSPIRACY AGAINST ACCUSED-APPELLANT, THERE BEING NO OTHER PERSONS CHARGED
IN THE PRESENT CASE.

III.

…TO FIND THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT GUILTY OF MURDER UNDER CIRCUMSTANCES FAR DIFFERENT FROM
THE INFORMATION, IN EFFECT DENYING ACCUSED-APPELLANT [THE] RIGHT TO BE INFORMED OF THE
NATURE AND CAUSE OF ACCUSATION AGAINST HIM.

IV.

…TO GIVE CREDENCE TO THE TESTIMONIES OF THE TWO ALLEGED EYE WITNESSES WHOSE
DECLARATIONS WERE CLEARLY BELIED DURING THEIR CROSS EXAMINATION.

V.

…NOT TO CONSIDER THE DEFENSE OF ALIBI OF ACCUSED-APPELLANT.

VI.

…TO MAKE UNSUBSTANTIATED, BASELESS PRESUMPTIONS AND CONCLUSIONS IN A CRIMINAL CASE

WHERE THE INNOCENCE OF THE ACCUSED IS PRESUMED. 26

Galvez also filed an Addendum to Supplemental Appellant’s Brief adding that:

VII

THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS SERIOUSLY ERRED IN DISREGARDING THE RESULTS OF THE
PARAFFIN AND BALLISTIC TESTS AND IN ASSUMING THAT THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT SHOT THE DECEASED
USING AN M16 RIFLE OTHER THAN THE ONE ISSUED TO HIM.27

Galvez contends that: the degree of proof required in criminal cases is proof beyond reasonable doubt
because an accused is always presumed to be innocent unless proven otherwise; 28 when circumstances yield
two or more inferences, one of which is consistent with the presumption of innocence and the other
compatible with the finding of guilt, the court must side with that which will acquit the accused; in this case,
the RTC found undisputed the fact that he did not shoot the victim on the night of July 27, 1991 and the
firearm that was used in killing the victim was owned and possessed by another man, as shown by the
negative results of the paraffin and ballistic tests; the statement of Danilo Perez that he saw the accused
on the night of July 27, 1991 is not credible since Perez was in a crawling position with his chest almost
touching the ground at the time he allegedly saw the accused; Judge Memoracion, who penned the decision
could not have assessed the demeanor of the prosecution witnesses while testifying as it was another judge
who heard and received their testimonies;29 the two defense witnesses, who corroborated his (Galvez’s)
alibi are unbiased and unrelated to him; while alibi is the weakest defense, it is the only defense if it is the
truth and it assumes importance where the prosecution evidence is weak; the statement of the trial court
that the offer of the accused to have the case extra-judicially settled is a tacit admission of guilt is also
unsubstantiated as there is nothing in the records that shows that the accused made an offer to settle the
case out of court.30

For the plaintiff-appellee, the Solicitor General argued that: the paraffin test and the ballistic examination
are not conclusive proof that Galvez did not fire a gun during the incident; in this case, the paraffin test was
conducted on Galvez two days from the date of the incident; Galvez was also positively identified by the
prosecution witnesses as one of four armed men who attacked them during the incident; Perez clarified that
while he was in a crawling position, he was looking upward, thus, he was able to identify Galvez; between
Galvez’s alibi and the positive declarations of witnesses whose testimonies have not been assailed nor
discredited by improper motive, the latter deserves greater credence; the trial court correctly convicted
Galvez of murder as there was treachery since the victim was not in a position to defend himself from the
attack of the accused; the proper penalty should be reclusion perpetua under Art. 248 of the Revised Penal
Code as there was no mitigating circumstance; 31 Galvez is also liable for temperate damages of ₱25,000.00
since pecuniary loss has been suffered although its exact amount could not be determined, and exemplary
damages of ₱25,000.00 due to the presence of the qualifying circumstance of treachery; the amount of
₱50,000.00 as civil indemnity should also be awarded to the heirs of the victim together with the ₱50,000.00
awarded by the trial court for moral damages.32

After reviewing the entire records of the case, the Court resolves to acquit Galvez.

Conspiracy must be alleged in the information in order that an accused may be held liable for the acts of his
co-accused. In the absence of any averment of conspiracy in the information, an accused can only be made
liable for the acts committed by him alone and such criminal responsibility is individual and not collective. 33

As explained in People v. Tampis,34

The rule is that conspiracy must be alleged, not merely inferred, in the information. Absence of a particular
statement in the accusatory portion of the charge sheet concerning any definitive act constituting conspiracy
renders the indictment insufficient to hold one accused liable for the individual acts of his co-accused. Thus,
each of them would be held accountable only for their respective participation in the commission of the
offense.35

The rationale for this rule has long been settled. In People v. Quitlong, the Court explained:

Overwhelming, such as it may have been thought of by the trial court, evidence of conspiracy is not enough
for an accused to bear and respond to all its grave legal consequences; it is equally essential that such
accused has been apprised when the charge is made conformably with prevailing substantive and procedural
requirements. Article III, Section 14, of the 1987 Constitution, in particular, mandates that no person shall
be held answerable for a criminal offense without due process of law and that in all criminal prosecutions
the accused shall first be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him. The right to be
informed of any such indictment is likewise explicit in procedural rules. x x x

xxx

x x x Quite unlike the omission of an ordinary recital of fact which, if not excepted from or objected to during
trial, may be corrected or supplied by competent proof, an allegation, however, of conspiracy, or one that
would impute criminal liability to an accused for the act of another or others, is indispensable in order to
hold such person, regardless of the nature and extent of his own participation, equally guilty with the other
or others in the commission of the crime. Where conspiracy exists and can rightly be appreciated, the
individual acts done to perpetrate the felony becomes of secondary importance, the act of one being
imputable to all the others. Verily, an accused must know from the information whether he faces a criminal
responsibility not only for his acts but also for the acts of his co-accused as well.36

Since conspiracy was not alleged in the Information in this case, it is imperative that the prosecution prove
Galvez’s direct participation in the killing of the victim. This, the prosecution failed to do.

The CA, in holding Galvez guilty of Murder, gave weight to the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses
Rellios and Perez that they saw Galvez fire an armalite rifle in their direction on the night in question. The
positive identification of these witnesses, the CA ruled, has more weight than the negative results of the
paraffin and ballistic tests.37

We disagree.

The prosecution witnesses never actually saw Galvez shoot the victim. While this Court does not ordinarily
interfere with the findings of the lower courts on the trustworthiness of witnesses, when there appears on
the records, however, facts and circumstances of real weight which might have been overlooked or
misapprehended, this Court cannot shirk from its duty to render the law and apply justice. 38
During his direct examination, Perez testified as follows:

Q: While you were eating your merienda at about 11:00 o’clock in the evening on July 27, 1991 what
happened?

A: Suddenly we heard shots and we could not determine where it came from and one of our
companion was hit.

Q: Do you know who was that companion of yours who was hit?

A: Yes, Rosalio Enojarda.

xxx

Q: After you heard the gun fire which hit your companion Rosalio Enojarda, what did you do?

A: I dropped and crawled, sir.

xxx

Q: And then did the gunfire stop after you hid yourself among the grasses?

A: Yes sir.

Q: What happened after the firings stopped, when you were already hiding among the grasses?

A: I recognized the culprit sir because he passed by where I was hiding about two meters from me.

Q: You said you recognized the culprit when he passed by where you were hiding, who was that culprit?

A: Cesar Galvez, sir.

xxx

COURT:

After you heard the shots how long after you saw him passed by?

xxx

Q: Was it 30 minutes after?

xxx

A: In my own estimate about 20 to 25 minutes.

Q: In other words more or less you saw him (accused) passed by together with his companions around 20
to 25 minutes after you heard the shots, is that what you want to impress this Court?

A: Yes, Your Honor.

xxx

Q: Did you see him really shoot?

A: No, Your Honor. 39

(Emphasis supplied)

During his cross-examination, Perez further testified:

Q: So, when you said the explosions came from different directions, was not true?

A: We heard shots but we do not know where it came from, what we did was to drop and crawl.

COURT: (To the witness)

You did not see the one firing?

Yes, your Honor, because I crawled.

Q: And how many minutes after you heard firings you saw this accused and companions pass by?

A: I am not sure Your Honor about the exact time but I think it has about 20 to 25 minutes. 40

xxx

Q: Mr. Perez, you did not see the accused shot at Mr. Enojarda?

A: No sir.41 (Emphasis supplied).

Rellios also admitted during his cross-examination the following:

Q: You did not actually see Mr. Galvez shoot at Mr. Enojarda?

A: No sir.

COURT: (To the witness)

In other words you were only presuming that it was him.

A: No, Your Honor, I saw him.

ATTY. MARTIN: (Continuing)

Did you understand the question when you were asked by the Court. Since you did not actually
see Mr. Galvez shoot at the victim, and reportedly you saw him only five minutes thereafter, you
only presume Mr. Galvez to have shoot Mr. Enojarda?

A: Yes sir.42 (Emphasis supplied)

Based on the above testimonies, the following circumstances appear to have been established: (1) at around
11 p.m., Enojarda, Rellios, Perez, and their two companions were eating merienda near the copra kiln when
they were sprayed with gunfire; (2) Enojarda was fatally hit and fell on the ground; (3) Rellios, Perez and
their two companions ducked and crawled to seek cover; (4) about five minutes after the first burst of
gunfire, Galvez, armed with an M16 armalite rifle, was seen firing at Rellios, Perez and their two companions
as well as in the direction of the copra kiln; and (5) about 20 to 25 minutes after the first burst of gunfire,
Galvez was again seen clad in fatigue uniform and carrying an M16 armalite rifle along with three armed
companions, after which, their group left the scene of the crime.

However, these circumstances are not sufficient to establish the guilt of Galvez beyond reasonable doubt.

It is well to emphasize the four basic guidelines that must be observed in assaying the probative value of
circumstantial evidence:

x x x (a) It should be acted upon with caution; (b) All the essential facts must be consistent with the
hypothesis of guilt; (c) The facts must exclude every other theory but that of guilt of the accused; and, (d)
The facts must establish with certainty the guilt of the accused as to convince beyond reasonable doubt that
he was the perpetrator of the offense. The peculiarity of circumstantial evidence is that the series of events
pointing to the commission of a felony is appreciated not singly but collectively. The guilt of the accused
cannot be deduced from scrutinizing just one (1) particular piece of evidence. It is more like a puzzle which
when put together reveals a convincing picture pointing to the conclusion that the accused is the author of
the crime.43

as well as the doctrines enunciated by the Court that the prosecution must establish beyond reasonable
doubt every circumstance essential to the guilt of the accused; 44 and that every circumstance or doubt
favoring the innocence of the accused must be duly taken into account.45

The "incriminating circumstances" enumerated above are mainly based on the testimonies of prosecution
witnesses Perez and Rellios. A perusal of said testimonies reveals, however, other circumstances that should
be appreciated in favor of Galvez, to wit:

(a) Both Perez and Rellios testified that they saw Galvez with three other armed companions minutes
after Enojarda was shot but they did not testify that they saw him in the vicinity before the shooting
of Enojarda.46

(b) Perez testified that only one shot hit Enojarda.47

(c) Perez testified that he did not see Galvez shoot at Enojarda and that he merely assumed that
Galvez was the one who shot the victim when the latter passed by him. 48 Rellios testified that he
only presumed that Galvez shot at Enojarda.49
 (d) Perez testified that he had no misunderstanding with Galvez 50 and that he does not know any
motive why Enojarda was killed.51

In considering both favorable and "incriminating" circumstances for or against Galvez, the following must
always be borne in mind: that the Information charged Galvez as the sole perpetrator of the crime of Murder;
that the three other armed men were not included as John Does; and that there was no allegation of
conspiracy in the Information.

Consequently, it was incumbent upon the prosecution to prove that Galvez was the sole author of the shot
that killed Enojarda. The "incriminating circumstances" do not point to Galvez as the sole perpetrator of the
crime. The presence of the three armed men raises the probability that any one of those men inflicted the
fatal shot. It must be stressed that the prosecution witnesses merely presumed that it was Galvez who shot
Enojarda.

Moreover, the fact that Galvez was seen minutes after Enojarda was shot does not sufficiently establish that
Galvez was the one who shot Enojarda. There is no evidence that Galvez was seen or was together with the
three other armed men when Enojarda was hit. There is a missing link that precludes the Court from
concluding that it was Galvez who shot Enojarda.52 It cannot be said therefore that there was positive
identification of Galvez through circumstantial evidence.

In People v. Comendador,53 the Court held:

While no general rule can be laid down as to the quantity of circumstantial evidence which will suffice in a
given case, all the circumstances proved must be consistent with each other, consistent with the
hypothesis that the accused is guilty, and at the same time inconsistent with the hypothesis that
he is innocent, and with every other rational hypothesis except that of guilt. The circumstances
proved should constitute an unbroken chain which leads to one fair and reasonable conclusion which points
to the accused, to the exclusion of all others as the guilty person.54 (Emphasis supplied)

And in Dela Cruz v. People,55 the Court stressed, thus:

To emphasize, the foundation of the ruling of acquittal is reasonable doubt, which simply means that the
prosecution’s evidence was not sufficient to sustain the guilt of the accused-petitioner beyond the point of
moral certainty – certainty that convinces and satisfies the reason and the conscience of those who are to
act upon it. It is such proof to the satisfaction of the court, keeping in mind the presumption of innocence,
as precludes every reasonable hypothesis except that which it is given to support it. An acquittal based
on reasonable doubt will prosper even though the accused’s innocence may be doubted, for a
criminal conviction rests on the strength of the evidence of the prosecution and not on the
weakness of the defense. And, if the inculpatory facts and circumstances are capable of two or
more explanations, one of which is consistent with the innocence of the accused and the other
consistent with his guilt, then the evidence does not fulfill the test of moral certainty and is not
sufficient to support a conviction, and, thus, that which is favorable to the accused should be
considered.56 (Emphasis supplied).

And when the evidence on the commission of the crime is purely circumstantial or inconclusive, motive is
vital. As held in Crisostomo v. Sandiganbayan,57

Motive is generally held to be immaterial because it is not an element of the crime. However, motive
becomes important when the evidence on the commission of the crime is purely circumstantial or
inconclusive. Motive is thus vital in this case.58

In this case, prosecution witness Perez testified that he did not know of any motive on the part of Galvez to
kill Enojarda.59 This is a circumstance that should be taken in favor of Galvez.

In line with the ruling of the Court in Torralba v. People,60 to wit:

Time and again, this Court has faithfully observed and given effect to the constitutional presumption of
innocence which can only be overcome by contrary proof beyond reasonable doubt – one which requires
moral certainty, a certainty that convinces and satisfies the reason and conscience of those who are to act
upon it. As we have so stated in the past –

Accusation is not, according to the fundamental law, synonymous with guilt, the prosecution must overthrow
the presumption of innocence with proof of guilt beyond reasonable doubt. To meet this standard, there is
need for the most careful scrutiny of the testimony of the State, both oral and documentary, independently
of whatever defense is offered by the accused. Only if the judge below and the appellate tribunal
could arrive at a conclusion that the crime had been committed precisely by the person on trial
under such an exacting test should the sentence be one of conviction. It is thus required that
every circumstance favoring innocence be duly taken into account. The proof against him must
survive the test of reason; the strongest suspicion must not be permitted to sway
judgment.61 (Emphasis supplied)
There could not be any doubt that the facts, as established by the circumstantial evidence, failed to exclude
the possibility that another person shot Enojarda. There were three other armed men, any one of whom
could be the culprit.

When a crime is committed, it is the duty of the prosecution to prove the identity of the perpetrator of the
crime beyond reasonable doubt for there can be no conviction even if the commission of the crime is
established.62Indeed, the State, aside from showing the existence of a crime, has the burden of correctly
identifying the author of such crime.63 Both facts must be proved by the State beyond reasonable doubt on
the strength of its evidence and without solace from the weakness of the defense.64

Galvez correctly pointed out in his supplemental brief before this Court that it was erroneous for the CA to
have affirmed the RTC ruling that Galvez’s offer to the victim’s wife to settle the case is a tacit admission of
guilt.65

While the Court agrees that in criminal cases, an offer of compromise by the accused may be received in
evidence as an implied admission of guilt,66 such principle is not applicable in this case.

The only basis of the RTC in concluding that Galvez made on offer of compromise, 67 is the March 3, 1993
Order of the RTC which reads as follows:

Considering that the accused as well as his Counsel, Atty. Bienvenido G. Martin appeared in Court together
with Rosaflor Enojarda, the wife of the victim, and manifested that there is a possibility of understanding
and settlement between the parties, the above-entitled case is hereby reset for new assignment.68

Galvez’s supposed offer of compromise was not formally offered and admitted as evidence during the trial.
The victim’s widow or any prosecution witness did not testify on any offer of compromise made by Galvez.
We have held that when the evidence on the alleged offer of compromise is amorphous, the same shall not
benefit the prosecution in its case against the accused. 69

The Court also recognizes that there may be instances when an offer of compromise will not amount to an
admission of guilt. Thus, in People v. Godoy,70 the Court pronounced that:

…In criminal cases, an offer of compromise is generally admissible as evidence against the party making it.
It is a legal maxim, which assuredly constitutes one of the bases of the right to penalize, that in the matter
of public crimes which directly affect the public interest, no compromise whatever may be entered into as
regards the penal action. It has long been held, however, that in such cases the accused is
permitted to show that the offer was not made under a consciousness of guilt, but merely to
avoid the inconvenience of imprisonment or for some other reason which would justify a claim
by the accused that the offer to compromise was not in truth an admission of guilt or an attempt
to avoid the legal consequences which would ordinarily ensue therefrom.71(Emphasis supplied).

As the alleged offer of compromise was not presented in court, it was not shown that Galvez indeed made
such an offer under the consciousness of guilt. Galvez was not given the opportunity to explain that it was
given for some other reason that would justify a claim that it was not an admission of guilt or an attempt
to avoid its legal consequences.

In this case, the presumption of innocence of Galvez prevails over the alleged implied admission of guilt.
In Godoy, the Court, in acquitting the accused, explained that:

It frequently happens that in a particular case two or more presumptions are involved. Sometimes the
presumptions conflict, one tending to demonstrate the guilt of the accused and the other his innocence. In
such case, it is necessary to examine the basis for each presumption and determine what logical or social
basis exists for each presumption, and then determine which should be regarded as the more important and
entitled to prevail over the other. It must, however, be remembered that the existence of a presumption
indicating his guilt does not in itself destroy the presumption against innocence unless the inculpating
presumption, together with all the evidence, or the lack of any evidence or explanation, is sufficient to
overcome the presumption of innocence by proving the defendant’s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. Until
the defendant’s guilt is shown in this manner, the presumption of innocence continues. 72

xxx

The presumption of innocence, x x x is founded upon the first principles of justice, and is not a mere form
but a substantial part of the law. It is not overcome by mere suspicion or conjecture; a probability that the
defendant committed the crime; nor by the fact that he had the opportunity to do so. Its purpose is to
balance the scales in what would otherwise be an uneven contest between the lone individual pitted against
the People and all the resources at their command. Its inexorable mandate is that, for all the authority and
influence of the prosecution, the accused must be acquitted and set free if his guilt cannot be proved beyond
the whisper of a doubt. This is in consonance with the rule that conflicts in evidence must be resolved upon
the theory of innocence rather than upon a theory of guilt when it is possible to do so. 73
Thus, taking into account all the circumstances in favor of Galvez, there could not be a moral certainty as
to the guilt of Galvez. The prosecution has not proven the guilt of Galvez beyond reasonable doubt.

It may be pointed out that the following circumstances support the conviction of Galvez as charged:

(a) the negative findings of the paraffin and ballistic tests do not prove that Galvez did not fire a
gun;

(b) Galvez was a police officer who could have justified his presence at the scene of the crime with
a lawful purpose, yet he put up alibi which is inherently weak;

(c) Galvez did not present his wife and father-in-law as witnesses to corroborate his story that he
was at their house on the night in question; and

(d) Galvez refused three times to give a statement to the investigating police officer.

These circumstances do not help the prosecution in the discharge of its duty to prove the guilt of Galvez
beyond reasonable doubt.

It is true that a negative finding in a paraffin test is not a conclusive proof that one has not fired a gun, as
held by this Court in People v. Pagal74 and People v. Teehankee75 which were cited by the CA in its Decision,
since it is possible for a person to fire a gun and yet bear no traces of nitrate or gunpowder as when the
hands are bathed in perspiration or washed afterwards.76 Such principle, however, has no bearing in the
present case. In the Pagal and Teehankee cases, the Court concluded that a negative finding does not prove
that the accused therein had not fired a gun because the accused were positively identified by witnesses as
having shot their victims, unlike in the case at hand where Galvez is not positively identified by direct or
circumstantial evidence that he shot Enojarda. If the principle should be given any weight at all, it should
be in favor of Galvez, that is, considering that he is not positively identified, then, the negative results of
the paraffin test bolster his claim that he did not shoot Enojarda, and not the other way around.

The argument that the negative result of the ballistic examination does not prove that Galvez did not fire a
gun during the incident as it was possible that he used another gun, should also be struck down. It is the
prosecution which has the burden of showing that Galvez used a firearm other than the one issued to him
and that such firearm, which Galvez used, was the one that killed the victim. It is not for Galvez to prove
the opposite of the possibility adverted to by the prosecution as it is the prosecution which must prove his
guilt beyond reasonable doubt and not for him to prove his innocence.

Thus, while it is true that the negative results of the paraffin and ballistic tests do not conclusively prove
that Galvez did not shoot the victim, the same negative results cannot be used as circumstantial evidence
against Galvez to prove that he shot Enojarda. To do otherwise would violate the basic precepts of criminal
law which presumes the innocence of the accused. Every circumstance favoring an accused’s innocence
must be duly taken into account, the proof against him must survive the test of reason, and the strongest
suspicion must not be permitted to sway judgment.77

That Galvez was a police officer who could have justified his presence at the scene of the crime with a lawful
purpose, yet he put up an alibi which is inherently weak; and that Galvez did not present his wife and father-
in-law as witnesses to corroborate his story that he was at their house on the night in question, pertain to
the weakness of Galvez’s alibi which may cast doubt on his innocence. However, these circumstances do
not prove beyond reasonable doubt Galvez’s guilt. Although an accused must satisfactorily prove his alibi,
the burden in criminal cases still rests on the prosecution to prove the accused’s guilt. The prosecution
evidence must stand or fall on its own weight and cannot draw strength from the weakness of the defense.
Unless the prosecution overturns the constitutional presumption of innocence of an accused by competent
and credible evidence proving his guilt beyond reasonable doubt, the presumption remains. 78 Courts must
judge the guilt or innocence of the accused based on facts and not on mere conjectures, presumptions, or
suspicions.79

That Galvez refused three times to give a statement to the investigating police officer is a prerogative given
to the accused and should not be given evidentiary value to establish his guilt. In People v. Saavedra,80 the
Court held that an accused has the right to remain silent and his silence should not be construed as an
admission of guilt.

Even if the defense of the appellant may be weak, the same is inconsequential if, in the first place, the
prosecution failed to discharge the onus of his identity and culpability.81 Conviction must be based on the
strength of the prosecution and not on the weakness of the defense, i.e., the obligation is upon the shoulders
of the prosecution to prove the guilt of the accused and not the accused to prove his innocence. 82 The
prosecution’s job is to prove that the accused is guilty beyond reasonable doubt.83 Thus, when the evidence
for the prosecution is insufficient to sustain a conviction, it must be rejected and the accused absolved and
released at once.84

Time and again, the Court has pronounced that the great goal of our criminal law and procedure is not to
send people to jail but to render justice.85 Under our criminal justice system, the overriding consideration is
not whether the court doubts the innocence of the accused, but whether it entertains reasonable doubt as
to his guilt.86

It is indeed lamentable that because of the lapses of the Prosecution, justice could not be rendered in this
case for the untimely death of Enojarda. Justice, however, would also not be served with the conviction of
the herein accused. It is well to quote Justice Josue N. Bellosillo:

In fine, we are not unmindful of the gravity of the crime charged; but justice must be dispensed
with an even hand. Regardless of how much we want to punish the perpetrators of this ghastly
crime and give justice to the victim and her family, the protection provided by the Bill of Rights is
bestowed upon all individuals, without exception, regardless of race, color, creed, gender or
political persuasion – whether privileged or less privileged – to be invoked without fear or favor.
Hence, the accused deserves no less than an acquittal; ergo, he is not called upon to disprove
what the prosecution has not proved.87 (Emphasis supplied)

As the prosecution in this case failed to discharge its burden of proving Galvez’s guilt beyond reasonable
doubt, the Court has no choice but to acquit him.

WHEREFORE, the Decision of the Regional Trial Court, Isabela, Basilan, Branch 1 in Criminal Case No. 1816
dated February 2, 1995 and the Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 18255 dated March 30,
2001 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The accused-appellant Cesar Galvez is hereby ACQUITTED on the
ground that his guilt was not proven beyond reasonable doubt. The Director of the Bureau of Corrections is
ordered to cause the immediate release of Cesar Galvez unless he is being lawfully held for another crime
and to inform this Court accordingly within ten (10) days from notice. SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 168071 December 18, 2006

LUCIANO TAN, petitioner,

vs.
RODIL ENTERPRISES, respondent.

DECISION

CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:

The instant Petition for Review on Certiorari assails the Decision1 dated 21 October 2002 and the
Resolution2 dated 12 May 2005 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 67201, which set aside the 18
June 2001 Decision3 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila, Branch 26 in Civil Case No. 01-99797. The
RTC reversed the 6 October 2000 Decision 4 of the Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC) of Manila, Branch 13 in
Civil Case No. 166584, and dismissed the Complaint filed by respondent Rodil Enterprises against petitioner
Luciano Tan for utter lack of merit.

This case has its origin from the Complaint5 for Unlawful Detainer filed on 13 March 2000 by Rodil Enterprises
against Luciano Tan with the MeTC of Manila, Branch 13, docketed as Civil Case No. 166584.

The factual antecedents to the filing of the Complaint show that Rodil Enterprises is a lessee of the subject
premises, the Ides O’Racca Building since 1959. The Ides O’Racca Building, located at the corner of M. de
Santos and Folgueras Streets in Binondo, Manila, is owned by the Republic of the Philippines. On 18 May
1992, Rodil Enterprises and the Republic, through the Department of Environment and Natural Resources
(DENR), entered into a Renewal of a Contract of Lease over the Ides O’Racca Building. A subsequent
Supplementary Contract dated 25 May 1992 was similarly entered into, thus, extending the lease agreement
until 1 September 1997.

The validity of the 18 May 1992 and the 25 May 1992 contracts was placed in question in several actions
involving Rodil Enterprises, the Ides O’Racca Building Tenants Association, Inc., and other tenants. This
Court upheld the validity of the aforesaid contracts in a Decision rendered on 29 November 2001, in the
consolidated cases of Rodil Enterprises, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, Carmen Bondoc, Teresita Bondoc-Esto,
Divisoria Footwear and Chua Huay Soon (G.R. No. 129609) and Rodil Enterprises, Inc. v. Ides O’Racca
Building Tenants Association, Inc. (G.R. No. 135537).6

Prior thereto, the Office of the President in OP Case No. 4968 entitled, Spouses Saturnino B. Alvarez and
Epifania Binay Alvarez v. Rodil Enterprises Company, Inc. rendered a Decision7 dated 8 February 1994,
declaring the Renewal of Contract of Lease and the Supplementary Contract, dated 18 May 1992 and 25
May 1992, respectively, of no force and effect.

It appears that Rodil Enterprises appealed the 8 February 1994 Decision to the Court of Appeals, docketed
as CA-G.R. SP No. 34586 which was dismissed by the appellate court for non-compliance with procedural
requirements. The dismissal was appealed by Rodil Enterprises to the Supreme Court, docketed as G.R. No.
119711 which was also dismissed. Subsequently, the Office of the President issued an Order of Execution
of its 8 February 1994 Decision in OP Case No. 4968. Thereafter, Rodil Enterprises filed a Petition for Review
on Certiorari with the Court of Appeals on the Order of Execution, docketed as CA-G.R. SP No 79157. The
Court of Appeals rendered a Decision therein dated 28 March 2005 which annulled the Order of Execution,
and enjoined the Office of the President from enforcing its 8 February 1994 Decision in OP Case No. 4968.
Likewise, the Court of Appeals ordered the Office of the President to abide by the 29 November 2001 Decision
of the Supreme Court in the consolidated cases of G.R. No. 129609 and G.R. No. 135537, upholding the
validity of the Renewal of Contract of Lease and the Supplemental Contract, dated 18 May 1992 and the 25
May 1992, respectively. Finally, the Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 79157 was brought
on certiorari by the Ides O’Racca Building Tenants Association, Inc. to the Supreme Court, and docketed as
G.R. No. 169892. On 25 January 2006, the Court, in G.R. No. 169892, issued a Resolution denying the
Petition. On 20 March 2006, a Resolution was rendered in the same case denying with finality the amended
Motion for Reconsideration.

Meanwhile, during the pendency of the preceding cases, on 18 October 1999, a subsequent Contract of
Lease was drawn between Rodil Enterprises and the Republic, the same to be effective retroactively from 1
September 1997 to 21 August 2012 at a monthly rental of P65,206.67, subject to adjustment upon the
approval of a new appraisal covering the Ides O’Racca Building. Rodil Enterprises subleased various units of
the property to members of the Ides O’Racca Building Tenants Association, Inc. A space thereof, known as
Botica Divisoria was subleased to herein petitioner, Luciano Tan.

In Rodil Enterprises’ Complaint for Unlawful Detainer filed against Luciano Tan, the former alleged that
Luciano Tan bound himself to pay under a Contract of Sublease, the amount of P13,750.00 as monthly
rentals, representing the reasonable use and occupancy of the said premises. However, Luciano Tan
unjustifiably and unreasonably refused to pay the rentals from September 1997 up to the time of the filing
of the Complaint, and despite repeated oral and written demands, refused to vacate the premises and to
pay the rents due. Rodil Enterprises prayed that Luciano Tan and those claiming rights under him be ordered
to vacate the leased premises. A payment of rentals in arrears, amounting to P385,000.00 was similarly
sought, including attorney’s fees and litigation costs, as well as, subsequent monthly rentals in the amount
of P13,750.00 until Luciano Tan vacates Botica Divisoria.

In his Answer, Luciano Tan insists that he is a legitimate tenant of the government who owns the Ides
O’Racca Building and not of Rodil Enterprises. As such, he has the right to lease the said premises pending
the disposition and sale of the building. He based his claim on the fact that on 8 February 1994, the Office
of the President in OP Case No. 4968, had declared the Renewal of Contract of Lease dated 18 May 1992
and the Supplemental Contract dated 25 May 1992 between Rodil Enterprises and the Republic to be without
force and effect. Accordingly, the DENR was directed to award the lease contract in favor of the Ides O’Racca
Building Tenants Association, Inc. of which Luciano Tan is a member. He, thus, prayed for the dismissal of
the Complaint, and for the return of whatever amount Rodil Enterprises had collected from 1987 to 1997,
or during such time when he was still paying rentals to the latter.

On 27 June 2000, the MeTC issued an Order, recognizing an agreement entered into in open court by Luciano
Tan and Rodil Enterprises. The Order, inter alia, declared, thus:

On second call, the parties and counsel agreed in principle in open court to the following terms to
put an end to this civil case for ejectment between them:

1.) that [Luciano Tan] will pay P440,000.00 representing rentals from September, 1997 up to the
present, which is the outstanding obligation of [Luciano Tan] as of June, 2000, on or before June 30,
2000; and

2.) [Luciano Tan] will pay the monthly rentals computed at P13,750.00 on or before the 5th day of
each month after June 30, 2000.8

On 14 August 2000, Luciano Tan filed a Motion to Allow Defendant to Deposit Rentals, 9 averring therein that
he had agreed to pay all the rentals due on the subject premises and to pay the subsequent monthly rentals
as they fall due; that the rentals in arrears from September 1997 amounted to P467,500.00; and in line
with his good faith in dealing with Rodil Enterprises, he would like to deposit the aforesaid amount, and the
subsequent monthly rentals as they fall due. He prayed that he be allowed to deposit the Manager’s Check
for the amount of P467,500.00, made payable to the City Treasurer of Manila. However, on 15 August 2000,
the MeTC denied the Motion on the rationalization that Luciano Tan’s prayer to deposit the specified sum
with the City Treasurer of Manila contravenes Section 19,10 Rule 70 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.

Subsequently, the issues for the resolution of the MeTC were synthesized by the court in its Order, dated
25 July 2000, to wit:

[T]he issue insofar as [Rodil Enterprises], revolved on:

"Whether [Rodil Enterprises] is legally entitled to collect from [Luciano Tan] the amount of
rentals and interest thereon as prayed for in the complaint and to ask for the ejectment of
the defendant from the leased premises."

On the other hand, [Luciano Tan]’s counsel formulated the issues of the case in the following
manner[,] to wit:

1) Whether or not under the circumstances[,][Luciano Tan] could be ejected from the
premises in question;

2) Whether or not under the circumstances[,] [Rodil Enterprises] should be made to return
the amounts collected from [Luciano Tan] from 1987 to 1997 amounting to P988,650.00.11

On 6 October 2000, the MeTC rendered a Decision in favor of Rodil Enterprises. The court said that Luciano
Tan did not contest the sublease on a monthly basis, and in fact admitted in judicio, viz:

1.) That [Luciano Tan] will pay P440,000.00 representing rentals from September 1997 up to the
present, which is the outstanding obligation of the defendant as of June, 2000, on or before June 30,
2000; and

2) [[Luciano Tan] will pay the monthly rentals computed at P13,750.00, on or before the 5th day of
each month after June 30, 2000.

(Order dated June 27, 2000)12

According to the MeTC, notwithstanding the evidentiary norm in civil cases that an offer of compromise is
not an admission of any liability, and is not admissible in evidence against the offeror, the court cannot
overlook the frank representations by Luciano Tan’s counsel of the former’s liability in the form of rentals,
coupled with a proposal to liquidate.13 The foregoing gestures, as appreciated by the MeTC, were akin to an
admission of a fact, like the existence of a debt which can serve as proof of the loan, and was thus,
admissible.14 The court pronounced that Luciano Tan had explicitly acknowledged his liability for the periodic
consideration for the use of the subleased property. Estoppel, thus, precludes him from disavowing the fact
of lease implied from the tender of payment for the rentals in arrears. 15 The MeTC, explained further:

Prescinding from the foregoing discourse, it ineluctably follows that [Luciano Tan]’s indifference to
heed the two demand letters, the cognition of which were recognized (paragraphs VII and IX,
Complaint; paragraph 2, Answer), rendered him a deforciant (1 Regalado, Remedial Law
Compendium, 6th Revised Edition, 1997, page 770, citing Dikit vs. Ycasiano, 89 Phil. 44), and was
thus vulnerable to the special civil action under Section 1, Rule 70 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure, especially so when non-payment of rentals is an accepted prelude to, and a secondary
matrix for, a tenant’s eviction (Article 1673 (2), New Civil Code).

From a different plane, [Luciano Tan]’s quest at this juncture for recovery of the rentals he paid to
the plaintiff from 1987 to 1997 will not merit the desired result since, in a manner of speaking, it will
place the cart ahead of the horse, when juxtaposed with another pending controversy between the
parties before the Supreme Court (Annex "1," Position Paper for the Defendant; Annex "B," Answer
to Counterclaim).

The decretal portion of the Decision, states, viz:

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing premises, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of [Rodil
Enterprises], ordering:

1. Defendant Luciano Tan, and all persons claiming rights under him, to vacate the subject realty,
and to peacefully deliver possession to the plaintiff’s representative;

2. Defendant [Luciano Tan] to pay the sum of FOUR HUNDRED FORTY THOUSAND PESOS
(P440,000.00) as recognized unpaid rentals from September, 1997 up to June 30, 2000;

3. Defendant [Luciano Tan] to pay the sum of THIRTEEN THOUSAND SEVEN HUNDRED FIFTY PESOS
(P13,750.00) as agreed rental per month, starting July, 2000, and every month thereafter, until
possession is delivered to the plaintiff’s representative;

4. Defendant [Luciano Tan] to pay the sum of FIVE THOUSAND PESOS (P5,000.00) as reasonable
attorney’s fees; and

5. Defendant [Luciano Tan] to pay the cost of suit.

For want of merit, defendant’s counterclaim is hereby DISMISSED.

IT IS SO ORDERED.16

Aggrieved thereby, Luciano Tan appealed the Decision to the RTC. Meanwhile, Rodil Enterprises filed a
Motion for Issuance of Writ of Execution,17 which was subsequently denied by the MeTC in the Order 18 of 15
December 2000.

On 18 June 2001, the RTC rendered a Decision reversing the judgment appealed from and dismissing the
Complaint. It found that the MeTC erred in holding that the offer to compromise by Luciano Tan’s counsel
was akin to an admission of fact, the same being contrary to Section 27, 19 Rule 130 of the 1997 Rules of
Civil Procedure. As reasoned by the RTC:

During the pre-trial conference held in the lower court, proposals and counter-proposals emanated
from the parties’ counsels, which was normally inspired by the desire to "buy peace", nay, to put an
end to the troubles of litigation, and to promote settlement of disputes as a matter of public policy.
The act of defendant/appellant’s (sic) in the midst of pre-trial is not an admission of any liability and
therefore, should not be considered admissible evidence against him. 20

Proceeding to the issue of the right of Rodil Enterprises to collect rentals and eject Luciano Tan based on
the contracts, dated 18 May 1992 and 25 May 1992, the RTC ruled that the controversy is still pending
before the Supreme Court. It, thus, held that the prayer for recovery of rentals from 1987 to 1997 is
premature.

The RTC, disposed, as follows:

IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the judgment appealed from is hereby REVERSED, and a new
judgment is hereby entered DISMISSING the complaint in Civil Case No. 166584 for utter lack of
merit.21
Subsequently, Rodil Enterprises filed a Petition for Review with the appellate court, which, in a Decision
dated 21 October 2002 set aside the judgment of the RTC, and affirmed and reinstated the 6 October 2000
Decision of the MeTC.

According to the appellate court, there is, between Rodil Enterprises and the Republic of the Philippines, a
valid and subsisting Contract of Lease executed on 18 October 1999, the same for a period of fifteen (15)
years.22 The period of the lease, under the 18 October 1999 contract is from 1 September 1997 to 31 August
2012. The Court of Appeals gave credence to the fact that the existence of the aforesaid contract was not
denied nor controverted by Luciano Tan. What Luciano Tan, instead, impugned was the validity of the
contracts dated 18 and 25 May 1992, which was upheld by this Court in the consolidated cases of Rodil
Enterprises, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, Carmen Bondoc, Teresita Bondoc-Esto, Divisoria Footwear and Chua
Huay Soon (G.R. No. 129609) and Rodil Enterprises, Inc. v. Ides O’Racca Building Tenants Association,
Inc. (G.R. No. 135537).23

Ruling on the more important question of whether Luciano Tan made a judicial admission anent his liability
as a sublessee of Rodil Enterprises, the Court of Appeals held that the former made an implied admission of
the existence of a contract of sublease between him and Rodil Enterprises on the subject premises; and that
he had reneged in the payment of rentals since 1 September 1997. Moreover, it deemed Luciano Tan’s
Motion to Allow Defendant to Deposit Rentals as another admission in favor of Rodil Enterprises. The
appellate court elucidated, thus:

The evidence on record indubitably shows that respondent [Luciano Tan] is a sublessee of petitioner
[Rodil Enterprises] who failed to pay rentals from 01 September 1997 and even until the case was
filed before the [M]etropolitan [T]rial [C]ourt, when respondent [Luciano Tan] "agreed in principle in
open court" to the following terms:

1) that the defendant [Luciano Tan] will pay P440,000.00 representing rentals from
September, 1997 up to the present, which is the outstanding obligation of the defendant as
of June, 2000, on or before June 30, 2000; and

2) defendant [Luciano Tan] will pay the monthly rentals computed at P13,750.00 on or before
the 5thday of each month after June 30, 2000.

at the hearing on 27 June 2000 though no settlement was eventually reached between the parties,
respondent [Luciano Tan] in effect made an implied judicial admission that there was a subsisting
contract of sublease between him and petitioner, and that he was remiss in the payment of rentals
from 01 September 1997 up to that day (Rollo, Annex "9" of petition). Respondent [Luciano Tan]’s
admission was further bolstered by the fact that he filed a "Motion to Allow Defendant to Deposit
Rentals" (Rollo, p. 3 of Annex "15" of petition). By such acts, respondent [Luciano Tan] accepted the
truth of petitioner [Rodil Enterprises’] allegation of the existence of a contract of sublease between
them and of his non-payment of the rentals from 01 September 1997. A judicial admission is an
admission made in the course of the proceedings in the same case, verbal or written, by a party
accepting for the purposes of the suit the truth of some alleged fact, which said party cannot
thereafter disprove (Remedial Law by Herrera, Oscar M. citing Section 4, Rule 129 of the Revised
Rules on Evidence and Evidence by Salonga).24

The decretal portion of the 21 October 2002 Court of Appeals’ Decision, states, thus:

WHEREFORE, in the light of the foregoing, the petition for review is GIVEN DUE COURSE. The Decision
dated 18 June 2001 of the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 26 is hereby SET ASIDE. The
Decision dated 06 October 2000 of the Metropolitan Trial Court of Manila, Branch 13 is AFFIRMED
and REINSTATED.25

The appellate court denied Luciano Tan’s Motion for Reconsideration thereon, in a Resolution, 26 dated 12
May 2005.

Thus, petitioner comes before us, raising the following grounds, to wit:

THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED A GRAVE REVERSIBLE ERROR WHEN IT ISSUED
ITS RESOLUTION DENYING PETITIONER’S MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION OF ITS DECISION BY
RELYING SOLELY AND EXCLUSIVELY ON THE MARCH 28, 2005 DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS
AND DESPITE THE FACT THAT THE SAID DECISION HAS NOT YET BECOME FINAL AND EXECUTORY.

II

RESPONDENT RODIL ENTERPRISES IS GUILTY OF FORUM SHOPPING WHEN IT FILED THE PETITION
FOR CERTIORARI WITH THE COURT OF APPEALS DOCKETED AS CA-G.R. SP. NO. 79517 SEEKING
TO NULLIFY THE ORDER OF EXECUTION BY THE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT OF ITS 8 FEBRUARY
1994 DECISION IN OP CASE NO. 4968, DESPITE THE FACT THAT ITS PREVIOUS PETITION FOR
 REVIEW FILED WITH THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE SAME DECISION OF THE OFFICE OF THE
PRESIDENT DATED 8 FEBRUARY 1994 HAD BEEN DISMISSED BY THE COURT OF APPEALS IN ITS
RESOLUTION DATED NOVEMBER 17, 1994 DUE TO NON-COMPLIANCE WITH PROCEDURAL RULES.

III

THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED A SERIOUS REVERSIBLE ERROR AND A GRAVE
MISAPPREHENSION OF THE FACTS AND MISAPPRECIATION OF THE EVIDENCE WHEN IT RULED THAT
PETITIONER IS A SUBLESSEE OF RESPONDENT AND THAT PETITIONER WAS REMISS IN THE
PAYMENT OF HIS RENTALS OVER THE PREMISES.27

The Petition is without merit.

We shall address the first ground raised by petitioner with regard to the alleged reliance of the Court of
Appeals on the Decision of the Tenth Division of the same court, dated 28 March 2005 in CA-G.R. SP No.
79157, entitled, Rodil Enterprises, Inc. v. The Office of the President and Ides O’Racca Building Tenants
Association, Inc.28

Contrary to petitioner’s contention, we do not find that the Court of Appeals was in error when it took notice
of the ruling in CA-G.R. SP No. 79157 in resolving petitioner’s Motion for Reconsideration. As respondent
Rodil Enterprises asseverated, for the appellate court to ignore a decision rendered by a division thereof
would be to turn a blind eye on a valid judgment rendered by the same appellate body. Neither can we give
merit to petitioner’s submission that the reliance by the Court of Appeals on its Decision in CA-G.R. SP No.
79517 is premature and misplaced. More significantly, the contention of the petitioner that the Decision in
CA-G.R. SP No. 79517 has not attained finality has become mute when viewed within recent factual
developments. The ruling in CA-G.R. SP No. 79517 has long reached finality. This Court in a
Resolution29 dated 25 January 2006 denied the Petition for Review on Certiorari filed by the Ides O’Racca
Building Tenants Association, Inc. thereon. On 20 March 2006, this Court denied with finality the Motion for
Reconsideration of the 25 January 2006 Resolution for lack of compelling reason or substantial argument.30

Moreover, on 12 April 2004, the appellate court issued a Resolution, 31 granting petitioner a hearing on its
Motion for Reconsideration as the grounds cited therein needed further clarification. This belies petitioner’s
claim that the resolution on the Motion for Reconsideration was based solely on the ruling of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 79517.

We come to the second ground raised by the petitioner. Petitioner argues that Rodil Enterprises is guilty of
forum shopping when it filed the Petition for Certiorari with the Court of Appeals, docketed as CA-G.R. SP
No. 79157,32after it filed an Appeal with the appellate court in CA-G.R. SP No. 34586.33 Forum shopping is
the act of a party against whom an adverse judgment has been rendered in one forum, seeking another and
possibly favorable opinion in another forum other than by appeal or special civil action of certiorari.34

The question of forum shopping is not even material to the instant petition.

It must be emphasized that neither CA-G.R. SP No. 79157 nor CA-G.R. SP No. 34586 is before this Court
for consideration. These cases are separate and distinct from CA-G.R. SP No. 67201 now before us.

What are assailed in the instant Petition are the Decision of the Court of Appeals, dated 21 October 2002
and the Resolution, dated 12 May 2005 in CA G.R. SP No. 67201, which reversed the ruling of the RTC, and
affirmed the MeTC, ordering Luciano Tan to vacate the premises and peacefully deliver possession to Rodil
Enterprises. The matter in controversy is the refusal of Luciano Tan to pay the monthly rentals over Botica
Divisoria under the contract of sublease between the parties.

On the other hand, CA-G.R. SP No. 79157 was a Petition for Review on Certiorari seeking to nullify the Order
of Execution of the Office of the President of its 8 February 1994 Decision in OP Case No. 4968 finding the
Renewal of Contract of Lease, and the Supplemental Contract of no force and effect. CA-G.R. SP No. 34586
was an appeal on the Decision in O.P. Case No. 4968, which was the basis of the Order of Execution. If
there has indeed been forum shopping when CA-G.R. SP No. 79517 was instituted during the pendency of
CA-G.R. SP No. 34586, such question should have been raised by petitioner, at first instance, before the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 79517. It should be noted that the petition in CA-G.R. SP No. 79517
was already given due course by the Court of Appeals and its ruling therein has long attained finality when,
on appeal to this Court, docketed as G.R. No. 169892, we denied the said appeal with finality in our
Resolutions dated 25 January 2000 and dated 20 March 2006. Whatever matters concerning the said case
is now beyond the jurisdiction of this Court to resolve.

We proceed to the final ground raised by the petitioner for the allowance of the instant Petition. Petitioner
assails the factual findings of the Court of Appeals when it ruled that there was a judicial admission as to
petitioner’s liability under a contract of sublease between him and Rodil Enterprises.

To resolve this issue, a reading of the significant orders of the MeTC and the pleadings filed by petitioner is
warranted.
The MeTC issued an Order, dated 27 June 2000 of the following import, to wit:

On second call, the parties and counsel agreed in principle in open court to the following terms to
put an end to this civil case for ejectment between them:

1.) that the defendant [Luciano Tan] will pay P440,000.00 representing rentals from
September, 1997 up to the present, which is the outstanding obligation of the defendant as
of June, 2000 on or before June 30, 2000; and

2.) the defendant [Luciano Tan] will pay the monthly rentals computed at P13,750.00 on or
before the 5th day of each month after June 30, 2000.35

On 14 August 2000, petitioner filed a Motion to Allow Defendant to Deposit Rentals with the MeTC, praying
that he be allowed to deposit the rentals due as of August 2000, in the amount of P467,500.00, and the
subsequent monthly rentals as it falls due.

Petitioner posits that the aforesaid admission, made in open court, and then, reiterated in his Motion to
Allow Defendant to Deposit Rentals, cannot be taken as an admission of his liability, citing Section 27, Rule
130 of the Rules of Court,36 which states, inter alia, that an offer of compromise in a civil case is not a tacit
admission of liability.

The general rule is an offer of compromise in a civil case is not an admission of liability. It is not admissible
in evidence against the offeror.

The rule, however, is not iron-clad. This much was elucidated by this Court in Trans-Pacific Industrial
Supplies, Inc. v. Court of Appeals,37 to wit:

To determine the admissibility or non-admissibility of an offer to compromise, the circumstances of

the case and the intent of the party making the offer should be considered. Thus, if a party denies
the existence of a debt but offers to pay the same for the purpose of buying peace and avoiding
litigation, the offer of settlement is inadmissible. If in the course thereof, the party making the offer
admits the existence of an indebtedness combined with a proposal to settle the claim amicably, then,
the admission is admissible to prove such indebtedness (Moran, Comments on the Rules of Court,
Vol. 5, p. 233 [1980 ed.]); Francisco, Rules of Court, Vol. VII, p. 325 [1973 ed.] citing McNiel v.
Holbrook, 12 Pac. (US) 84, 9 L. ed., 1009). Indeed, an offer of settlement is an effective admission
of a borrower’s loan balance (L.M. Handicraft Manufacturing Corp. v. Court of Appeals, 186 SCRA
640 [1990]. x x x.38

Similarly, in the case of Varadero de Manila v. Insular Lumber Co.39 the Court applied the exception to the
general rule. In Varadero¸ there was neither an expressed nor implied denial of liability, but during the
course of the abortive negotiations therein, the defendant expressed a willingness to pay the plaintiff.
Finding that there was no denial of liability, and considering that the only question discussed was the amount
to be paid, the Court did not apply the rule of exclusion of compromise negotiations.

In the case at bar, the MeTC and the Court of Appeals properly appreciated petitioner’s admission as an
exception to the general rule of inadmissibility. The MeTC found that petitioner did not contest the existence
of the sublease, and his counsel made frank representations anent the former’s liability in the form of
rentals. This expressed admission was coupled with a proposal to liquidate. The Motion to Allow Defendant
to Deposit Rentals was deemed by the MeTC as an explicit acknowledgment of petitioner’s liability on the
subleased premises. The Court of Appeals agreed with the MeTC. Indeed, the existence of the Contract of
Lease, dated 18 October 1999 was not denied by petitioner. The contracts that were assailed by petitioner
are the contracts dated 18 and 25 May 1992, the validity of which has been upheld by this Court in the
consolidated cases of G.R. No. 129609 and G.R. No. 135537.

Finally, we find a categorical admission on the part of petitioner, not only as to his liability, but also, as to
the amount of indebtedness in the form of rentals due. The Order of the MeTC dated 27 June 2000 was clear
that the petitioner agreed in open court to pay the amount of P440,000.00, representing petitioner’s unpaid
rentals from September 1997 to June 2000; and that petitioner will pay the monthly rentals computed
at P13,750.00 on or before the 5th day of each month after 30 June 2000. The petitioner’s judicial admission
in open court, as found by the MeTC, and affirmed by the Court of Appeals finds particular significance when
viewed together with his Motion to Allow Defendant to Deposit Rentals, wherein petitioner stated that the
rentals due on the premises in question from September 1997 up to the present amounted to P467,500.00,
as of the date of filing the Motion. Petitioner cannot now be allowed to reject the same. An admission made
in the pleading cannot be controverted by the party making such admission and are conclusive as to him,
and that all proofs submitted by him contrary thereto or inconsistent therewith should be ignored whether
objection is interposed by a party or not. 40 A judicial admission is an admission made by a party in the
course of the proceedings in the same case, for purposes of the truth of some alleged fact, which said party
cannot thereafter disprove.41
WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED. The Decision dated 21 October 2002 and the Resolution dated 12
May 2005 in CA-G.R. SP No. 67201, affirming and reinstating the 6 October 2000 Decision of the MeTC in
Civil Case No. 166584 are AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioners. SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 146161 July 17, 2006

PEPITO CAPILA Y YRUMA, petitioner,

vs.
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent.

DECISION

SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J.:

For our resolution is the Petition for Review on Certiorari of the Decision 1 dated November 10, 2000 of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 18903, entitled "The People of the Philippines v. Pepito Capila y Yruma."

On August 24, 1993, an Information for robbery was filed with the Regional Trial Court, Branch 148, Makati
City, against Pepito Capila y Yruma, herein petitioner, his brother Bonifacio Capila y Yruma, Deogenio
Caparoso y Porfero, and Dimas dela Cruz y Lorena.

The Information, docketed as Criminal Case No. 93-7117, is quoted as follows:

That on or about the 9th day of August 1993, in the Municipality of Makati, Metro Manila, Philippines
and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, conspiring and
confederating together with alias Jose and alias Gil, whose true identities and present whereabouts
are still unknown and all of them mutually helping and aiding one another, with intent to gain and
by means of force, violence and intimidation, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously
take, steal and carry away cash money amounting to P1.3 million and three (3) caliber paltik firearms
in the total amount of P18,000.00, belonging to Pilipinas Bank represented by Juan Iglesia y Orgil
and Lanting Security Agency represented by Edgar Lucero y Iribayen, respectively, to the damage
and prejudice of the complainants in the aforementioned amount of P1.3 million and P18,000.00,
respectively.

Upon being arraigned, all the accused, assisted by counsel, pleaded not guilty. Trial commenced thereafter.

The evidence for the prosecution, as culled from the testimonies of Edgardo Irigayen, Ariel Arellano, SPO2
Dioscorro Asinas, Jr., and SPO4 Romualdo Maximo, is summarized as follows: 2

Petitioner Pepito Capila was a security guard of the Lanting Security and Watchman Agency assigned in the
Meralco Collection Office on J.P. Rizal Street, Makati City.

On May 9, 1992, Ariel Arellano and Lani Imperio, both employees of the Pilipinas Bank, Libertad Branch in
Pasay City, went to the Meralco Collection Office to receive and deposit cash collections from Meralco's 27
collectors. The total collection for that day amounted to P1,292,991.12. They then placed the money inside
a duffle bag table and had it padlocked. Then they waited for the Pilipinas Bank's armored car to arrive. The
security guard posted at the Meralco Collection Office at the time was Dimas dela Cruz, also from the Lanting
Security and Watchman Agency.

Before the armored car could arrive, two armed men suddenly entered the Meralco Collection Office. They
hit Dimas on the nape with a handgun. Then they ordered Ariel and Lani to lie on the floor face down and
immediately took the duffle bag containing Meralco's cash collections. They also seized three .38 caliber
revolvers, valued at P6,000.00 each, owned by the Lanting Security and Watchman Agency, including the
service handgun issued to Dimas.

After the malefactors fled, Dimas told Ariel that petitioner was one of those who robbed the office. Then
Dimas called the Makati Police Sub-Station 9, the Meralco Security Division, and the Lanting Security and
Watchman Agency to report the incident. The Makati Police dispatched SPO4 Romualdo Maximo to
investigate the robbery, while the Lanting Security and Watchman Agency instructed its intelligence officer,
Edgardo Irigayen, to talk to the guard on duty.

SPO4 Maximo, accompanied by a police photographer, a fingerprint technician, and another policeman,
arrived within ten minutes at the Meralco Collection Office. He questioned Ariel and Lani, but they could not
identify the robbers as they were lying face down on the floor. Upon inquiry by SPO4 Maximo, Dimas told
him that one of the robbers is petitioner, also a security guard of the Lanting Security and Watchman Agency
assigned in the Meralco Collection Office. Thereafter, SPO4 Maximo invited Dimas, Lani and Ariel to the
police station for the purpose of taking their sworn statements.

Irigayen, the intelligence officer of the Lanting Security and Watchman Agency, also questioned Dimas. The
latter reported that Pepito Capila is one of the robbers.

After the incident, petitioner fled to his hometown in Palapag, Northern Samar. The Lanting Security and
Watchman Agency then requested SPO4 Maximo and his team to go to Northern Samar to apprehend Capila.
In Northern Samar, the police operatives, with the assistance of the Citizens Armed Forces Geographical
Unit, arrested petitioner, his brother Bonifacio Capila, and Deogenio Caparoso. The police found P5,000.00
in possession of petitioner allegedly part of the loot. All the suspects were arrested without warrants.

SPO4 Maximo interrogated petitioner who admitted that he participated in the commission of the crime;
that his share of the loot is P45,000.00; and that Dimas is the mastermind.

After the prosecution had rested its case, all the accused, through counsel, filed a Demurrer to Evidence but
it was denied by the trial court.

When the case was called for the continuation of the hearing on November 15, 1994, the accused waived
their right to present their evidence, opting to submit their respective memoranda instead.

On January 3, 1995, the trial court rendered its Decision acquitting all the accused, except petitioner, thus:

WHEREFORE, premises considered:

1. And finding that the prosecution failed to prove the guilt of accused Bonifacio Capila, Deogenes
Caparoso, and Dimas dela Cruz beyond reasonable doubt, they are hereby acquitted.

2. And finding Pepito Capila guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Robbery defined under
Article 293 and penalized under Article 294 par. 5 of the Revised Penal Code, with the presence of
the aggravating circumstance of abuse of confidence, use of a firearm, and betrayal of trust, he is
hereby sentenced to an indeterminate prision term of from EIGHT (8) years as minimum to TEN (10)
years as maximum.

Pepito Capila is also ordered to pay:

1. Lanting Security Agency the sum of P18,000 for the value of the three firearms not
recovered and belonging to said agency;

2. The sum of P1,292,991.12 to Pilipinas Bank, the amount taken and not recovered.

With costs against accused Pepito Capila.

In his appeal to the Court of Appeals, petitioner alleged that the trial court erred in admitting in evidence
the statement of Dimas that he (petitioner) is one of the robbers. He was denied due process because he
was not able to cross-examine Dimas as the latter did not testify.

On November 10, 2000, the Court of Appeals promulgated its Decision affirming the assailed judgment of
the trial court, thus:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the appealed decision (dated January 3, 1995) of the Regional
Trial Court (Branch 148) in Makati, Metro Manila in Criminal Case No. 93-7217 is hereby AFFIRMED
with costs against the accused-appellant.

SO ORDERED.

Hence, the instant petition for Review on Certiorari.

The fundamental issue for our resolution is whether the prosecution was able to prove the guilt of herein
petitioner beyond reasonable doubt.

A careful scrutiny of the records shows that the prosecution relied heavily on the testimony of SPO4 Maximo
that immediately after the incident, Dimas reported to him that one of the robbers is petitioner. The Court
of Appeals, in affirming the court a quo's judgment convicting petitioner, ruled that Dimas' statement is part
of the res gestae.

In the appellee's brief, the Solicitor General reiterated the appellate court's ruling.

Res gestae is a Latin phrase which literally means "things done." As an exception to the hearsay rule, it
refers to those exclamations and statements by either the participants, victims, or spectators to a crime
immediately before, during or immediately after the commission of the crime, when the circumstances are
such that the statements were made as spontaneous reactions or utterances inspired by the excitement of
the occasion, and there was no opportunity for the declarant to deliberate and fabricate a false
statement.3 The reason for the rule is human experience. It has been shown that under certain external
circumstances of physical or mental shock, the state of nervous excitement which occurs in a spectator may
produce a spontaneous and sincere response to the actual sensations and perceptions produced by the
external shock. As the statements or utterances are made under the immediate and uncontrolled domination
of the senses, rather than reason and reflection, such statements or utterances may be taken as expressing
the real belief of the speaker as to the facts he just observed. The spontaneity of the declaration is such
that the declaration itself may be regarded as the event speaking through the declarant rather than the
declarant speaking for himself.4

The rule on res gestae is provided under Section 42, Rule 130 of the Revised Rules of Court, thus:

SEC. 42. Part of the res gestae. – Statements made by a person while a startling occurrence is taking
place or immediately prior or subsequent thereto with respect to the circumstances thereof, may be
given in evidence as part of the res gestae. So, also statements accompanying an equivocal act
material to the issue, and giving it a legal significance, may be received as part of the res gestae.

For the admission of the res gestae in evidence, the following requisites must be met: (1) that the principal
act or the res gestae be a startling occurrence; (2) the statement is spontaneous or was made before the
declarant had time to contrive or devise, and the statement is made during the occurrence or immediately
or subsequent thereto; and (3) the statement made must concern the occurrence in question and its
immediately attending circumstances.5

The Court of Appeals found that all the above requisites are present, thus:

First. The principal act is a startling occurrence which is the robbery in question.

Second. Dimas Dela Cruz informed the investigating officers that it was appellant who robbed the
Meralco office immediately after the incident occurred and before he had the time to contrive a story.

The robbery happened at around eight o'clock in the evening of August 9, 1993 (p. 4, TSN, February
24, 1994). Immediately after the incident, dela Cruz called up the police station (p. 17, TSN, January
31, 1994). In ten minutes, SPO4 Maximo and his companion were in the Meralco office where they
immediately conducted an investigation (pp. 3-9, TSN, February 24, 1994). During this investigation,
DELA Cruz pointed to appellant as one of the perpetrators of the crime.

Further, immediately after the robbers fled, dela Cruz informed Ariel Arellano (the bank
representative detailed at the Meralco office) that appellant was one of those who robbed the office
(pp. 15-17, TSN, January 31, 1994).

In other words, statement of dela Cruz was spontaneous as correctly observed by the trial court.

Third. The statement of dela Cruz refers to the robbery or incident subject matter of this case.

We are in accord with the Court of Appeals in its conclusion that all the requisites of the rule on Res
gestae are present. The principal act, which by any measure is undoubtedly a startling occurrence, is the
robbery of which petitioner is being charged. Immediately after the robbery, Dimas dela Cruz, the security
guard then on duty, informed Ariel that one of the perpetrators is herein petitioner. Dimas likewise reported
at once the incident to the police and to the security agency. When questioned by SPO4 Maximo, Dimas,
who was still shocked, named petitioner herein as one of the robbers. His statements to Ariel and SPO4
Maximo were made before he had the time and opportunity to concoct and contrive a false story. We note
that Dimas personally knows petitioner considering that both worked in the same security agency and
assigned in the same office.

Petitioner contends that since Dimas dela Cruz did not take the witness stand, he (petitioner) was deprived
of his right to cross-examine him. Thus, the Court of Appeals should not have considered Dimas' statement
as part of the Res gestae. Our ruling in Ilocos Norte Electric Company v. Court of Appeals6 is relevant.

In this case, it appears that in the evening of June 28 until the early morning of June 29, 1967, a strong
typhoon (Gening) occurred in Ilocos Norte, bringing heavy rains and consequent flooding. While one Isabel
Lao Juan was wading in waist-deep flood along Guerrero Street, Laoag City, suddenly she screamed, "Ay"
and quickly sank into the water. Her two companions, Aida Bulong and Linda Estavillo, shouted for help.
Ernesto dela Cruz arrived and tried to approach Isabel who was electrocuted. But at four meters away from
her, Ernesto turned back shouting, "the water is grounded." This Court ruled that the Court of Appeals
properly applied the principle of Res gestae. The testimonies of Aida and Linda that Ernesto dela Cruz tried
to approach the victim, but he turned back and shouted, "the water is grounded," are not hearsay although
he (Ernesto) was not presented as a witness. His declaration is part of the Res gestae.

Applying the above ruling on the instant case, we cannot consider the testimony of SPO4 Maximo as hearsay
since the statement of Dimas that petitioner is one of the robbers is part of the Res gestae.

Moreover, despite the damaging testimonies of the witnesses for the prosecution, petitioner did not testify
to rebut them. Such posture is admission in silence.

Section 32, Rule 130 of the New Rules on Evidence provides:

 Sec. 32. Admission by silence. – An act or declaration made in the presence and within the hearing
or observation of a party who does or says nothing when the act or declaration is such as naturally
to call for action or comment if not true, and when proper and possible for him to do so, may be
given in evidence against him.

Another factor that militates against petitioner's innocence is his flight to Samar after the commission of the
crime. Obviously, such flight is an indication of guilt.

Verily, we hold that the prosecution, by its evidence, has established the guilt of petitioner beyond
reasonable doubt.

WHEREFORE, we DENY the petition. The assailed Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 18903
finding petitioner PEPITO CAPILA y YRUMA guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of robbery
is AFFIRMED. With costs de oficio. SO ORDERED.
IN RE: PETITION FOR CANCELLATION G.R. No. 177861

AND CORRECTION OF ENTRIES IN THE RECORD OF BIRTH,

EMMA K. LEE,
Petitioner,

- versus –

COURT OF APPEALS, RITA K. LEE, LEONCIO K. LEE, LUCIA K. LEE-ONG,

JULIAN K. LEE, MARTIN K. LEE, ROSA LEE-VANDERLEK, MELODY

LEE-CHIN, HENRY K. LEE, NATIVIDAD LEE-MIGUEL, VICTORIANO K. LEE,

and THOMAS K. LEE, represented by Promulgated:

RITA K. LEE, as Attorney-in-Fact,

Respondents. July 13, 2010

x --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- x

DECISION

ABAD, J.:

This case is about the grounds for quashing a subpoena ad testificandum and a parents right not to
testify in a case against his children.

The Facts and the Case

Spouses Lee Tek Sheng (Lee) and Keh Shiok Cheng (Keh) entered the Philippines in the 1930s as immigrants
from China. They had 11 children, namely, Rita K. Lee, Leoncio K. Lee, Lucia K. Lee-Ong, Julian K. Lee, Martin
K. Lee, Rosa Lee-Vanderlek, Melody Lee-Chin, Henry K. Lee, Natividad Lee-Miguel, Victoriano K. Lee, and
Thomas K. Lee (collectively, the Lee-Keh children).

In 1948, Lee brought from China a young woman named Tiu Chuan (Tiu), supposedly to serve as
housemaid. The respondent Lee-Keh children believe that Tiu left the Lee-Keh household, moved into
another property of Lee nearby, and had a relation with him.

Shortly after Keh died in 1989, the Lee-Keh children learned that Tius children with Lee (collectively,
the Lees other children) claimed that they, too, were children of Lee and Keh. This prompted the Lee-Keh
children to request the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) to investigate the matter. After conducting
such an investigation, the NBI concluded in its report:

[I]t is very obvious that the mother of these 8 children is certainly not KEH SHIOK
CHENG, but a much younger woman, most probably TIU CHUAN. Upon further
evaluation and analysis by these Agents, LEE TEK SHENG is in a quandary in fixing
the age of KEH SHIOK CHENG possibly to conform with his grand design of making
his 8 children as their own legitimate children, consequently elevating the status of
his second family and secure their future. The doctor lamented that this complaint
would not have been necessary had not the father and his second family kept on
insisting that the 8 children are the legitimate children of KEH SHIOK CHENG. [1]
 The NBI found, for example, that in the hospital records, the eldest of the Lees other children, Marcelo
Lee (who was recorded as the 12th child of Lee and Keh), was born of a 17-year-old mother, when Keh was
already 38 years old at the time. Another of the Lees other children, Mariano Lee, was born of a 23-year-
old mother, when Keh was then already 40 years old, and so forth. In other words, by the hospital records
of the Lees other children, Kehs declared age did not coincide with her actual age when she supposedly
gave birth to such other children, numbering eight.

On the basis of this report, the respondent Lee-Keh children filed two separate petitions, one of them
before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Caloocan City[2] in Special Proceeding C-1674 for the deletion from
the certificate of live birth of the petitioner Emma Lee, one of Lees other children, the name Keh and replace
the same with the name Tiu to indicate her true mothers name.

In April 2005 the Lee-Keh children filed with the RTC an ex parte request for the issuance of a
subpoena ad testificandum to compel Tiu, Emma Lees presumed mother, to testify in the case. The RTC
granted the motion but Tiu moved to quash the subpoena, claiming that it was oppressive and violated
Section 25, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court, the rule on parental privilege, she being Emma Lees
stepmother.[3] On August 5, 2005 the RTC quashed the subpoena it issued for being unreasonable and
oppressive considering that Tiu was already very old and that the obvious object of the subpoena was to
badger her into admitting that she was Emma Lees mother.

Because the RTC denied the Lee-Keh childrens motion for reconsideration, they filed a special civil
action of certiorari before the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP 92555. On December 29, 2006 the CA
rendered a decision,[4] setting aside the RTCs August 5, 2005 Order. The CA ruled that only a
subpoena duces tecum, not a subpoena ad testificandum, may be quashed for being oppressive or
unreasonable under Section 4, Rule 21 of the Rules of Civil Procedure. The CA also held that Tius advanced
age alone does not render her incapable of testifying. The party seeking to quash the subpoena for that
reason must prove that she would be unable to withstand the rigors of trial, something that petitioner Emma
Lee failed to do.

Since the CA denied Emma Lees motion for reconsideration by resolution of May 8, 2007, [5] she filed
the present petition with this Court.

The Question Presented

The only question presented in this case is whether or not the CA erred in ruling that the trial court
may compel Tiu to testify in the correction of entry case that respondent Lee-Keh children filed for the
correction of the certificate of birth of petitioner Emma Lee to show that she is not Kehs daughter.

The Ruling of the Court

Petitioner Emma Lee claims that the RTC correctly quashed the subpoena ad testificandum it issued
against Tiu on the ground that it was unreasonable and oppressive, given the likelihood that the latter would
be badgered on oral examination concerning the Lee-Keh childrens theory that she had illicit relation with
Lee and gave birth to the other Lee children.
 But, as the CA correctly ruled, the grounds citedunreasonable and oppressiveare proper for
subpoena ad duces tecum or for the production of documents and things in the possession of the witness,
a command that has a tendency to infringe on the right against invasion of privacy. Section 4, Rule 21 of
the Rules of Civil Procedure, thus provides:

SECTION 4. Quashing a subpoena. The court may quash a subpoena duces

tecum upon motion promptly made and, in any event, at or before the time specified
therein if it is unreasonable and oppressive, or the relevancy of the books,
documents or things does not appear, or if the person in whose behalf the subpoena
is issued fails to advance the reasonable cost of the production thereof.

Notably, the Court previously decided in the related case of Lee v. Court of Appeals[6] that the Lee-
Keh children have the right to file the action for correction of entries in the certificates of birth of Lees other
children, Emma Lee included. The Court recognized that the ultimate object of the suit was to establish the
fact that Lees other children were not children of Keh. Thus:

It is precisely the province of a special proceeding such as the one outlined

under Rule 108 of the Revised Rules of Court to establish the status or right of a
party, or a particular fact. The petitions filed by private respondents for the
correction of entries in the petitioners' records of birth were intended to establish
that for physical and/or biological reasons it was impossible for Keh Shiok Cheng to
have conceived and given birth to the petitioners as shown in their birth records.
Contrary to petitioners' contention that the petitions before the lower courts were
actually actions to impugn legitimacy, the prayer therein is not to declare that
petitioners are illegitimate children of Keh Shiok Cheng, but to establish that the
former are not the latter's children. There is nothing to impugn as there is no blood
relation at all between Keh Shiok Cheng and petitioners.[7] (Underscoring supplied)

Taking in mind the ultimate purpose of the Lee-Keh childrens action, obviously, they would want Tiu
to testify or admit that she is the mother of Lees other children, including petitioner Emma Lee. Keh had
died and so could not give testimony that Lees other children were not hers. The Lee-Keh children have,
therefore, a legitimate reason for seeking Tius testimony and, normally, the RTC cannot deprive them of
their right to compel the attendance of such a material witness.

But petitioner Emma Lee raises two other objections to requiring Tiu to come to court and testify: a)
considering her advance age, testifying in court would subject her to harsh physical and emotional stresses;
and b) it would violate her parental right not to be compelled to testify against her stepdaughter.

1. Regarding the physical and emotional punishment that would be inflicted on Tiu if she were
compelled at her age and condition to come to court to testify, petitioner Emma Lee must establish this
claim to the satisfaction of the trial court. About five years have passed from the time the Lee-Keh children
sought the issuance of a subpoena for Tiu to appear before the trial court. The RTC would have to update
itself and determine if Tius current physical condition makes her fit to undergo the ordeal of coming to court
and being questioned. If she is fit, she must obey the subpoena issued to her.

Tiu has no need to worry that the oral examination might subject her to badgering by adverse
counsel. The trial courts duty is to protect every witness against oppressive behavior of an examiner and
this is especially true where the witness is of advanced age.[8]
 2. Tiu claimed before the trial court the right not to testify against her stepdaughter, petitioner Emma
Lee, invoking Section 25, Rule 130 of the Rules of Evidence, which reads:

SECTION 25. Parental and filial privilege.- No person may be compelled to

testify against his parents, other direct ascendants, children or other direct
descendants.

The above is an adaptation from a similar provision in Article 315 of the Civil Code that applies only
in criminal cases. But those who revised the Rules of Civil Procedure chose to extend the prohibition to all
kinds of actions, whether civil, criminal, or administrative, filed against parents and other direct ascendants
or descendants.

But here Tiu, who invokes the filial privilege, claims that she is the stepmother of petitioner Emma
Lee. The privilege cannot apply to them because the rule applies only to direct ascendants and descendants,
a family tie connected by a common ancestry. A stepdaughter has no common ancestry by her
stepmother. Article 965 thus provides:

Art. 965. The direct line is either descending or ascending. The former unites the
head of the family with those who descend from him. The latter binds a person with
those from whom he descends.

Consequently, Tiu can be compelled to testify against petitioner Emma Lee. WHEREFORE, the
Court DENIES the petition and AFFIRMS the decision and resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP
92555. SO ORDERED.