Beruflich Dokumente
Kultur Dokumente
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968b0e50e4c9&pddocfullpath=%2Fshared%2Fdocument%2Fcases%2Furn%3AcontentItem%3A3YTR-
R370-00KR-D54X-00000-00&pddocid=urn%3AcontentItem%3A3YTR-R370-00KR-D54X-00000-
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67ec85304fc5
Doc ID: urn:contentItem:3YTR-R370-00KR-D54X-00000-00
44
Conclusion: The court took the case on its own motion for appellate review, and affirmed. The court held
that the interest was properly calculated from the date when the action was initiated because the statute
was literal in its award of interest to compensate for the delay in plaintiffs' obtaining their money. The
fact that defendant electric company was added later did not affect plaintiffs' entitlement to interest from
the date of commencement of the action.
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8fe4524db05e&pdsearchterms=Bernier+v.+Bos.+Edison+Co.%2C+380+Mass.+372%2C+403+N.E.2d+39
1+(1980)&pdstartin=hlct%3A1%3A1&pdtypeofsearch=searchboxclick&pdsearchtype=SearchBox&pdqt
type=and&pdquerytemplateid=&ecomp=532bk&prid=598b9f6f-52ae-458d-bbe1-dc89f07c3a43
URL: https://advance.lexis.com/search/?pdmfid=1000516&crid=c7426756-294c-4a4e-a300-
3d661790db2f&pdsearchterms=AbDouch+v.+Lopez%2C+829+N.W.2d+662+(2013)&pdstartin=hlct%3A
1%3A1&pdtypeofsearch=searchboxclick&pdsearchtype=SearchBox&pdqttype=or&pdquerytemplateid
=&ecomp=532bk&prid=03266210-439d-4b33-84a0-7db087ca3d13
Doc ID: urn:contentItem:5878-THR1-F04H-P005-00000-00
53
Conclusion: The United States Supreme Court agreed that there were privileges and immunities belonging
to United States citizens that a state was forbidden to abridge. However, the Court held that the right of
admission to practice in the courts of a state was not one of these privileges and immunities and that this
right in no sense depended on citizenship of the United States. The Court reasoned that the right to control
and regulate the granting of license to practice law in the courts of a state was one of those powers that
was not transferred for its protection to the federal government. The Court found that its exercise was in
no manner governed or controlled by citizenship of the United States in the party seeking such license.
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d225acff6a5f&pdsearchterms=Bradwell+v.+Ill.%2C+83+US+130+(1873)&pdstartin=hlct%3A1%3A1&pd
typeofsearch=searchboxclick&pdsearchtype=SearchBox&pdqttype=and&pdquerytemplateid=&ecomp
=532bk&prid=21d16c37-cf8f-417a-bfbe-3ac9339ee47d
Doc ID: urn:contentItem:3S4X-JM90-003B-H12Y-00000-00
55
Issue: Is a defendant, with reasonably foreseeable emotional harm, liable for harm caused to the plaintiff
due to negligent actions?
Answer: Yes.
Conclusion: The trial court dismissed plaintiff's action because she was not within the "zone of danger,"
but the court refused to dismiss a complaint filed on behalf of another of plaintiff's infant daughters,
whom the court determined to be within the zone of physical impact. The court reversed the judgment,
holding that the "zone of danger" doctrine was improperly restricted to those exposed to physical injury.
The court extended the doctrine to encompass those exposed to emotional injury, expressly
overruling Amaya v. Home Ice Fuel & Supply Co., 379 P.2d 513 (Cal. 1963), to the extent it was inconsistent
with its ruling.
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a5d931a7e6b8&pdsearchterms=Dillon+v.+Legg%2C+441+P.2d+912+(Cal.+1968)&pdstartin=hlct%3A1%
3A1&pdtypeofsearch=searchboxclick&pdsearchtype=SearchBox&pdqttype=and&pdquerytemplateid=
&ecomp=532bk&prid=28192106-00f8-42c6-bce2-d225acff6a5f
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531dac9506b1&pdsearchterms=Dairy+Queen%2c+Inc.+v.+Wood%2c+369+U.S.+469%2c+82+S.+Ct.+89
4+(1962)&pdstartin=hlct%3a1%3a1&pdtypeofsearch=searchboxclick&pdsearchtype=SearchBox&pdqt
type=and&pdquerytemplateid=&ecomp=532bk&prid=5f526014-2d5f-47bc-94e7-
a5d931a7e6b8&aci=la&cbc=0&lnsi=92d2f43a-f2ec-49c8-b384-
749e146438c9&rmflag=0&sit=1533173533794.588
Doc ID: urn:contentItem:3S4X-H9D0-003B-S0H7-00000-00
57
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e44817fbed68&pddocfullpath=%2Fshared%2Fdocument%2Fcases%2Furn%3AcontentItem%3A4M9X-
Y9N0-0039-42KS-00000-00&pddocid=urn%3AcontentItem%3A4M9X-Y9N0-0039-42KS-00000-
00&pdcontentcomponentid=323879&pdshepid=urn%3AcontentItem%3A7XXH-15H1-2NSD-M3K8-
00000-00&pdteaserkey=sr0&pditab=allpods&ecomp=5ypck&earg=sr0&prid=06afa097-6f88-400a-
9d27-38ffca009873
Doc ID: urn:contentItem:4M9X-Y9N0-0039-42KS-00000-00
60
URL: https://advance.lexis.com/search/?pdmfid=1000516&crid=283b9d6d-919d-4153-89a4-
ed7aa9d53807&pdsearchterms=Ariz.+Christian+Sch.+Tuition+Org.+v.+Winn%2C+563+U.S.+125%2C+1
31+S.+Ct.+1436+(2011)&pdstartin=hlct%3A1%3A1&pdtypeofsearch=searchboxclick&pdsearchtype=Se
archBox&pdqttype=and&pdquerytemplateid=&ecomp=532bk&prid=29fd92c2-45dc-4e98-9e64-
ad5924e8cab7
Doc ID: urn:contentItem:52J6-MYX1-F04K-F25H-00000-00
63
Facts: Under the CTEA, Congress enlarged the duration of copyrights by 20 years in order to, inter alia,
harmonize the baseline United States copyright term with the term adopted by the European Union.
Petitioners argued that the CTEA violated the "limited times" prescription of the Copyright Clause. As to
the First Amendment, petitioners contended that the CTEA was a content-neutral regulation of speech
that failed inspection under the heightened judicial scrutiny appropriate for such regulations.
Issue: Are existing copyright terms that are extended for those requirements under the Copyright Clause
valid?
Answer: No.
Conclusion: The CTEA's extension of existing copyrights did not exceed Congress' power under the
Copyright Clause. The Court rejected petitioners' arguments that (1) the extension was a congressional
attempt to evade or override the "limited times" constraint, (2) Congress could not extend an existing
copyright absent new consideration from the author, and (3) the extensions should have been subject to
heightened judicial review. The Court also rejected petitioners' argument that the CTEA violated the First
Amendment.
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d5e4a2bf566e&pdsearchterms=Eldred+v.+Ashcroft%2C+537+U.S.+186+(2003)&pdstartin=hlct%3A1%3
A1&pdtypeofsearch=searchboxclick&pdsearchtype=SearchBox&pdqttype=and&pdquerytemplateid=
&ecomp=532bk&prid=67f2f19e-6d41-48a7-a6ab-348d4e8eb97f
Doc ID: urn:contentItem:47P7-BT40-004B-Y018-00000-00
66
Facts: The professor was hired for his first teaching job as an assistant professor at a state-run university.
He was hired for a fixed term of one year and was not re-hired the following year. The professor brought
suit against the university alleging that he was denied his Fourteenth Amendment right to due process
because the university never gave him a reason for their decision not to re-hire him and further he had
no opportunity to challenge their decision at a hearing.
Issue: Does the due process clause under the Fourteenth Amendment protect interests of individuals with
regard to liberty and property rights after they have been denied of reemployment?
Answer: No.
Conclusion: The lower court granted summary judgment on the procedural issue and ordered the
university to provide the professor with reasons and a hearing. The appellate court affirmed and the board
of regents sought review. On review, the Court held that the professor had no protected interest in
continued employment, as he had completed his contracted for term, therefore, there could be
no Fourteenth Amendmentprotection. The decision of the lower court and the appellate court was
reversed and the case was remanded.
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b3f26976c841&pdsearchterms=Bd.+of+Regents+v.+Roth%2C+408+U.S.+564%2C+92+S.+Ct.+2701+(197
2)&pdstartin=hlct%3A1%3A1&pdtypeofsearch=searchboxclick&pdsearchtype=SearchBox&pdqttype=a
nd&pdquerytemplateid=&ecomp=532bk&prid=d4036dfd-46b1-4672-99a4-2518f24ccc32
Doc ID: urn:contentItem:3S4X-D560-003B-S27N-00000-00
68
Facts: An abductor viciously assaulted and raped the victim and the evidence suggested that the sexual
assault had been planned with the owner's property in mind. The assailant was never identified or caught.
Issue: May a landowner, of an overgrown vegetation where, a third party’s rape occurred, be held liable?
Answer: No.
Conclusion: The court held that the trial court properly set aside the verdict. No evidence demonstrated
that the owner had any past experience that might have reasonably led him to foresee that violent
criminal activity could have been caused by his negligent maintenance of the land.
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ada1-
5417c1b60b3d&pdsearchterms=Doe+v.+Manhaimer%2C+563+A.2d+699+(1989)&pdstartin=hlct%3A1
%3A1&pdtypeofsearch=searchboxclick&pdsearchtype=SearchBox&pdqttype=and&pdquerytemplatei
d=&ecomp=532bk&prid=a956ca7a-a085-4c2d-a3a9-b3f26976c841
Doc ID: urn:contentItem:3RX4-0J20-003D-84VN-00000-00
69
URL: https://advance.lexis.com/search/?pdmfid=1000516&crid=ef55ec57-a98a-4b07-8de9-
76838cf41b37&pdsearchterms=Empro+Manufacturing+Co.+Inc.+v.+Ball-
co+Manufacturing%2C+Inc.%2C+870+F.2d+423+(7th+Cir.+1989)&pdstartin=hlct%3A1%3A1&pdtypeofs
earch=searchboxclick&pdsearchtype=SearchBox&pdqttype=and&pdquerytemplateid=&ecomp=532bk
&prid=7dce4c16-b48e-42a0-ada1-5417c1b60b3d
Case Name: Allied Steel & Conveyors, Inc. v. Ford Motor Co.
Citation: 277 F.2d 907 (6th Cir. 1960)
Rule: In the absence of fraud or wilful deceit, one who signs a contract which he has had an opportunity
to read and understand, is bound by its provisions.
Facts: Appellee automobile manufacturer brought an action against appellant machinery and equipment
manufacturer, seeking indemnification under a contract clause that purported to hold appellant
responsible for an injury sustained by appellant's employee, even though caused by appellee's
negligence.
Issue: Is it valid to accomplish an acceptance through a commencing performance when there is a
preferred method of acceptance?
Answer: No.
Conclusion: The prescribed method of acceptance must be observed. The district court found that a
binding contract was formed at the time appellant began performance by delivery and installation of
machinery upon appellee's premises. The court applied the rule that, in the absence of fraud or wilful
deceit, a party signing a contract after having an opportunity to read and understand it was bound by its
provisions. Amendments to the parties' agreement, with all of their provisions and conditions, constituted
a binding bilateral contract at the time appellant, with appellee's knowledge and consent, began
performance by delivery and installation of the machinery upon appellee's premises.
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e5ccd68ee079&pdsearchterms=Allied+Steel+%26+Conveyors%2C+Inc.+v.+Ford+Motor+Co.%2C+277+F
.2d+907+(6th+Cir.+1960)&pdstartin=hlct%3A1%3A1&pdtypeofsearch=searchboxclick&pdsearchtype=
SearchBox&pdqttype=and&pdquerytemplateid=&ecomp=532bk&prid=ef55ec57-a98a-4b07-8de9-
76838cf41b37
Doc ID: urn:contentItem:3S4X-5J50-0039-Y341-00000-00
71
Facts: Petitioner applied to respondent city for a permit to redevelop her business. Respondent granted
the permit conditioned on petitioner dedicating some of her property to respondent in furtherance of its
land use plan. Petitioner brought suit on the grounds that respondent's dedication requirements were not
related to the proposed development, and therefore, constituted a taking without just compensation
under the U.S. Const. amend. V.
Issue: Is it valid to require a landowner to find a proportional connection to provide portions of her
property for the use of pedestrian/bicycle and the government’s use to prevent flood and reduce traffic?
Answer: No.
Conclusion: The government is not allowed to impose a land use restriction on a property unless it is
found that there is a proportionality on the conditions imposed of the land use. The Supreme Court of
Oregon found that the conditions were reasonably related to the proposed development. On appeal, the
Court held that there must be an essential nexus existing between the legitimate state interest and the
permit condition by the respondent. The Court held that if a nexus existed, then exactions imposed by
respondent must be roughly proportionate to the projected impact of the proposed development.
Respondent's conditions were not reasonably related to the impact of the proposed development, and
therefore, the judgment was overturned.
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677842d759b9&pdsearchterms=Dolan+v.+City+of+Tigard%2C+512+U.S.+374%2C+114+S.+Ct.+2309+(1
994)&pdstartin=hlct%3A1%3A1&pdtypeofsearch=searchboxclick&pdsearchtype=SearchBox&pdqttype
=and&pdquerytemplateid=&ecomp=532bk&prid=aa07f0c9-5435-4cbf-9bd6-e5ccd68ee079
Doc ID: urn:contentItem:3S65-JV00-003B-R52D-00000-00
72
Facts: Five civil rights cases were consolidated before the court in order to decide if the Civil Rights Act of
1875, 18 Stat. 335, §§ 1, 2 (1875), were constitutional. These cases were all founded on the first and
second sections of the Act of Congress, known as the Civil Rights Act, passed March 1st, 1875, entitled
"An Act to protect all citizens in their civil and legal rights."
Conclusion: The Court held that history showed no deference to M'Naghten that could elevate its formula
to the level of fundamental principle, so as to limit the traditional recognition of a State's capacity to
define crimes and defenses. Because allowing mental-disease evidence on mens rea could easily mislead,
it was not unreasonable to confine consideration of that kind of evidence to the insanity defense. The
Court of Appeals affirmed the decision.
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c7ec39005c48&pdsearchterms=Clark+v.+Arizona%2C+548+U.S.+735%2C+126+S.+Ct.+2709+(2006)&pd
startin=hlct%3A1%3A1&pdtypeofsearch=searchboxclick&pdsearchtype=SearchBox&pdqttype=and&p
dquerytemplateid=&ecomp=532bk&prid=3cf80ef0-64c4-4ca0-a1f8-d3be66240d26
Doc ID: urn:contentItem:4K94-P3R0-004B-Y03Y-00000-00
74
Facts: The cotenant, tenant-lessor, and lessee had an oral agreement regarding the lease of the tenants
in common property. Subsequently, the lessee entered a written lease with the tenant-lessor without the
agreement of the cotenant.
Issue: Is it a requirement of a tenant-lessor to secure a consent from a cotenant before having his
undivided interest in land be leased?
Answer: No.
Conclusion: The court affirmed the summary judgment granted to the lessee on the cotenant's ejectment
claim because the tenant-lessor could lease his undivided interest in land without the consent of the
cotenant, and the lessee stepped into the tenant-lessor's shoes as a tenant in common for the duration
of the lease. Further, the non-joining cotenant's sole remedy was partition of the land. The court also
affirmed the striking of the cotenant's affidavit in support of his motion for summary judgment because
his lay person testimony that the tenant-lessor was mentally incompetent was merely unsupported
conclusional statements that could not be considered in a motion for summary judgment. The trial court's
clarification of the relationship between the cotenant and lessee was remanded because the cotenant
had the option of choosing, until partition, whether he was bound by the oral lease arrangement or the
written lease arrangement.
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62bc5f95ad28&pdsearchterms=Carr+v.+Deking%2C+765+P.2d+40+(Wash.+Ct.+App.+1988)&pdstartin
=hlct%3A1%3A1&pdtypeofsearch=searchboxclick&pdsearchtype=SearchBox&pdqttype=and&pdquery
templateid=&ecomp=532bk&prid=8f348840-86e0-4d3d-a989-c7ec39005c48
Issue: Is the same standard of care applied to minors when they participate in dangerous adult activities?
Answer: Yes.
Conclusion: The requirements under Mich. Comp. Laws § 257.811(6) (Mich. Stat. Ann. § 9.2511(6)) that a
minor pass a driver's education course in order to obtain a license, did not mean that the minor was not
engaged in an adult activity and should not have been held to an adult standard of conduct. The minor
was engaged in the adult activity of driving an automobile, and the court did not consider the reasons
behind his undertaking the activity to justify departure from the general rule that all drivers be held to an
adult standard of care.
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53655ba81067&pdsearchterms=Stevens+v.+Veenstra%2C+226+Mich.+App.+441%2C+573+N.W.2d+34
1+(1997)&pdstartin=hlct%3A1%3A1&pdtypeofsearch=searchboxclick&pdsearchtype=SearchBox&pdqt
type=and&pdquerytemplateid=&ecomp=532bk&prid=e20c742b-5c36-4fac-82e3-66fa46682418
Doc ID: urn:contentItem:3SHJ-2MD0-0039-42GS-00000-00
77
Facts: While driving on a highway, defendant fired three shots at a pickup truck carrying three teenage
girls. One of the girls was killed. The trial court convicted defendant of second degree murder and two
counts of attempted second-degree murder.
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2641f9b9c7da&pdsearchterms=State+v.+Lyerla%2C+424+N.W.2d+908+(S.D.+1988)&pdstartin=hlct%3
A1%3A1&pdtypeofsearch=searchboxclick&pdsearchtype=SearchBox&pdqttype=and&pdquerytemplat
eid=&ecomp=532bk&prid=00cd1652-a9b1-47d7-843b-53655ba81067
Doc ID: urn:contentItem:3S71-2J70-003G-D1GF-00000-00
78
Facts: N.Y. Educ. Law §905(1) required school authorities in New York to examine students between eight
and sixteen years of age for scoliosis at least once in each school year. Plaintiffs alleged that, as a result of
defendant school district's failure to comply with this screening requirement, plaintiffs' daughter's ailment
was allowed to progress undetected. Plaintiffs' complaint was based on the alleged violation of N.Y. Educ.
Law §905(1), as well as a claim of common law negligence.
Issue: Is a tort liability be inferred from a statute violation as a private right of action?
Answer: Yes.
Conclusion: Defendant's motion for summary judgment was granted and affirmed on appeal, the court
having determined that N.Y. Educ. Law §905(1) did not create a private right of action, and that plaintiffs
had otherwise failed to state a claim for common law negligence. A private right of action was not
consistent with the statutory scheme.
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aee68c4eae6f&pdsearchterms=Uhr+v.+E.+Greenbush+Cent.+Sch.+Dis.%2C+720+N.E.2d+886+(1999)&
pdstartin=hlct%3A1%3A1&pdtypeofsearch=searchboxclick&pdsearchtype=SearchBox&pdqttype=and
&pdquerytemplateid=&ecomp=532bk&prid=d401fc3e-d718-4c7d-9bc7-2641f9b9c7da
Doc ID: urn:contentItem:3XP7-XG50-0039-40GY-00000-00
79
Rule:
Facts:
Issue:
Answer:
Conclusion:
URL:
Doc ID: https://advance.lexis.com/document/?pdmfid=1000516&crid=eaa65f09-5fe2-40dc-b797-
f45cdaece446&pddocfullpath=%2Fshared%2Fdocument%2Fcases%2Furn%3AcontentItem%3A5CWB-
WBV1-F04H-44NK-00000-00&pddocid=urn%3AcontentItem%3A5CWB-WBV1-F04H-44NK-00000-
00&pdcontentcomponentid=9249&pdteaserkey=sr3&pditab=allpods&ecomp=5ypck&earg=sr3&prid=
ce6c3610-b59a-4e57-8bde-45512207fd24
80
Facts: Defendant was convicted of assault with a deadly weapon and assault with intent to murder.
Defendant asserted that the trial court failed to properly instruct the jury with respect to lesser-included
offenses, and it also erred in instructing on the effect of intoxication.
Issue: Is voluntary intoxication considered as an evidence in a jury trial to determine guilt in a general
intent crime?
Answer: No.
Conclusion: It is to be considered depending on whether the crime was committed with a specific or
general intent. The court reversed, holding that the trial court's failure to instruct the jury on the lesser-
included offense was prejudicial error, because it deprived defendant of his constitutional right to have
the jury determine every material issue presented by the evidence. Furthermore, after the lower court
instructed the jury to consider intoxication in determining whether defendant had the specific intent to
commit murder, it followed with instructions which applied to general intent crimes and in no way made
clear to the jury that the latter instruction did not apply to the charge of assault with intent to commit
murder.
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4b691caed306&pdsearchterms=People+v.+Hood%2C+462+P.2d+370+(1969)&pdstartin=hlct%3A1%3A
1&pdtypeofsearch=searchboxclick&pdsearchtype=SearchBox&pdqttype=and&pdquerytemplateid=&e
comp=532bk&prid=eaa65f09-5fe2-40dc-b797-f45cdaece446
Doc ID: urn:contentItem:3RRK-JTR0-003C-H13R-00000-00
81
Facts: The condominium association adopted an amendment to the declaration of condominium limiting
all owners' ability to lease their units. The owners were notified two of their units did not comply with
these limitations. The owners purchased these units before the amendment. The leasing restriction
prevented a corporation which obtained federal financing to purchase units and lease them to
handicapped persons from obtaining such financing, and it sued the association.
Issue: Is it valid to impose on condominium owners to prohibit them from leasing their units through an
amendment to a declaration of condominiums?
Answer: No.
Conclusion: For as long as it is not a violation of public policy or constitutional rights of owners, the
imposition is valid. The restriction did not violate public policy or the owners' constitutional rights, as Fla.
Stat. ch. 718.110(1)(a) (2000) granted broad authority to amend the declaration. The distinction between
the owners and the corporation owning exempted units was not an arbitrary or discriminatory creation
of two classes of owners, but was related to providing handicapped persons an equal opportunity to enjoy
a unit in the complex.
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31dde3af150c&pdsearchterms=Woodside+Vill.+Condo.+Ass%27n+v.+McClernan%2C+806+So.+2d+452
+(Fla.+2002)&pdstartin=hlct%3A1%3A1&pdtypeofsearch=searchboxclick&pdsearchtype=SearchBox&p
dqttype=and&pdquerytemplateid=&ecomp=532bk&prid=cacd6e5d-8b66-4906-b7c5-4b691caed306
Doc ID: urn:contentItem:44TW-GHC0-0039-452X-00000-00
82
Facts: Defendant invited a woman back to his apartment and made advances on her. Though the woman
repeatedly rejected his advances, defendant persisted. The woman testified that she believed defendant
was determined to have sex with her and that he would hurt her if she did not go along with it. She
reported the assault immediately. Defendant was convicted of sexual assault in the first degree in
violation of Conn. Gen. Stat. Ann. § 53a-70.
Issue: Is it a requirement to intend to perform sexual acts with another individual who does not consent
it to be guilty of sexual assault?
Answer: No.
Conclusion: The defendant claimed several errors including that the trial court should have granted his
motion for acquittal due to insufficiency of the evidence on the element of lack of consent. Defendant
argued that he did not realize that the woman was not consenting, and that such subjective intent on his
part was an element of the crime. The court disagreed. According to the court, the jury could properly
have found beyond a reasonable doubt that the woman's words and actions could not reasonably be
viewed to indicate her consent to intercourse. The court held that the inquiry on the issue of consent was
not the subjective state of mind of defendant or the victim, but rather the victim's manifestations of lack
of consent by words or conduct.
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7f0ab03e6105&pdsearchterms=State+v.+Smith%2C+554+A.2d+713+(1989)&pdstartin=hlct%3A1%3A1
&pdtypeofsearch=searchboxclick&pdsearchtype=SearchBox&pdqttype=and&pdquerytemplateid=&ec
omp=532bk&prid=5a33240d-433e-4bc1-b734-31dde3af150c
Doc ID: urn:contentItem:3RX4-0KP0-003D-8541-00000-00
83
Facts: Defendant was convicted of manslaughter as a result of the stabbing and killing of her husband
after a night of drinking and arguing.
Issue: If there is an instruction to the jury that subjective standard of reasonableness must apply in cases
involving self-defense, is it also equivalent to the relevance of battered woman syndrome?
Answer: No.
Conclusion: he court held that defendant's conduct was not to be judged by what a reasonably cautious
person would or would not do or consider necessary to do under the like circumstances, but what
defendant in good faith honestly believed and had reasonable ground to believe was necessary for her to
do to protect herself from apprehended death or great bodily injury. The trial court should have directed
the jury to assume the physical and psychological properties peculiar to defendant and then decide
whether or not the particular circumstances surrounding her at the time she used force were sufficient to
create in her mind a sincere and reasonable belief that the use of force was necessary to protect herself
from imminent and unlawful harm.
URL: https://advance.lexis.com/search/?pdmfid=1000516&crid=d84d3a6a-8b4f-4c87-b990-
e42d91e90286&pdsearchterms=State+v.+Leidholm%2C+334+N.W.2d+811+(N.D.+1983)&pdstartin=hlc
t%3A1%3A1&pdtypeofsearch=searchboxclick&pdsearchtype=SearchBox&pdqttype=and&pdquerytem
plateid=&ecomp=532bk&prid=3e0c319b-68f9-4883-92dd-7f0ab03e6105
Doc ID:
84
Facts: Appellant coal company challenged the appellate court decision which affirmed the trial court's
holding that appellant's use of a street was not hostile or adverse to the true owner, appellee
supermarket, as required to perfect its claim of adverse possession.
Facts: Petitioner grandparents petitioned a Washington Superior Court for the right to visit their
grandchildren. Respondent mother opposed the petition. The case ultimately reached the Washington
Supreme Court, which reversed the order of visitation entered by the superior court.
Issue: Is any person permitted to petition the high court for visitation rights and be granted such for the
best interest of the child, and is it a violation of the due process clause to deny such?
Answer: Yes.
Conclusion: The state superior court failed to accord the determination of respondent, a fit custodial
parent, any material weight; announced a presumption in favor of grandparent visitation; and failed to
accord significant weight to respondent's already having offered meaningful visitation to petitioners. The
court concluded that the Due Process Clause of the United States Constitution did not permit a state to
infringe on the fundamental right of parents to make child rearing decisions. Accordingly, the court held
that Wash. Rev. Code § 26.10.160(3), as applied in this case, was unconstitutional.
URL: https://advance.lexis.com/search/?pdmfid=1000516&crid=73d32ebb-c111-4ce5-b824-
122a511f8c93&pdsearchterms=Troxel+v.+Granville%2C+530+U.S.+57+(2000)&pdstartin=hlct%3A1%3
A1&pdtypeofsearch=searchboxclick&pdsearchtype=SearchBox&pdqttype=and&pdquerytemplateid=
&ecomp=532bk&prid=72276ee7-829f-4435-a6e6-66902eb42232
Doc ID: urn:contentItem:40DT-5CT0-004C-1010-00000-00
86
Facts: The parties sons had a disagreement on the school bus. Plaintiff's son, who was the larger of the
two boys, went to defendant's home. Defendant's son told the other boy to leave, retreated into his home
and called 911. The 911 tape recorded defendant's son ordering plaintiff's son to leave the home.
Plaintiff's son refused and was taped saying that if he was shot he would get back up and "beat"
defendant's son. Defendant's son shot plaintiff's son in the knee. Plaintiff sued defendant for damages
and defendant filed a reconventional demand.
Issue: Is the use of any dangerous weapon such as a shotgun to defend self from imminent threat
justified?
Answer: Yes.
Conclusion: The court noted plaintiff's son size, that his reputation for fighting, his refusal to leave
defendant's home when asked, and his threats. The court also noted defendant's son had already
retreated into the home and plaintiff's son continued to advance. The court stated that under such
circumstances, the trial court's conclusion that defendant's son used reasonable force to repel plaintiff's
son's attack was reasonable. Because the incident arose because of the fault of plaintiff's son, the trial
court did not abuse its discretion in assessing all costs to plaintiff.
URL: https://advance.lexis.com/search/?pdmfid=1000516&crid=d041db29-ab0a-4bed-aa70-
2e93179915ad&pdsearchterms=Slayton+v.+McDonald%2C+690+So.+2d+914+(La.+Ct.+App.+1997)&pd
startin=hlct%3A1%3A1&pdtypeofsearch=searchboxclick&pdsearchtype=SearchBox&pdqttype=and&p
dquerytemplateid=&ecomp=532bk&prid=73d32ebb-c111-4ce5-b824-122a511f8c93
Doc ID: urn:contentItem:3RJN-2KC0-0039-43VM-00000-00
87
Facts: Appellant was hired by a bank to monitor the progress of new home construction for appellees,
who had obtained a construction loan from the bank. The contractor defaulted after all of the original
construction loan proceeds and a portion of a second mortgage loan had been paid out by the bank.
Appellees recovered judgment against appellant on a third-party beneficiary theory based on its alleged
failure to properly monitor the progress of construction, which allowed funds to be improperly released
to the defaulting contractor.
Issue: Is it valid for a third-party beneficiary of a contract recover damages for certain circumstances in
the performance of a contract?
Answer: Yes.
Conclusion: While an intended third-party beneficiary of a contract may recover damages from a breach,
the other kind of a third-party beneficiary cannot, which is the incidental type. The court of appeals
reversed the judgment because erroneous progress reports were not the cause of any loss to appellees.
The court vacated the decision of the court of appeals and affirmed the judgment of the district court
because appellees qualified as third-party beneficiaries of the agreement between the bank and
appellant. The court found that although the initial construction loan might have been disbursed prior to
the faulty completion estimate, the erroneous reporting of the project's completion caused the bank to
disburse other funds of appellees that would have been retained had the report been accurate.
URL: https://advance.lexis.com/search/?pdmfid=1000516&crid=f8e2b5a5-7f27-45a0-a302-
e076223a1cff&pdsearchterms=Vogan+v.+Hayes+Appraisal+Assocs.+588+N.W.2d+420+(1999)&pdstart
in=hlct%3A1%3A1&pdtypeofsearch=searchboxclick&pdsearchtype=SearchBox&pdqttype=and&pdque
rytemplateid=&ecomp=532bk&prid=3e2f6f88-4dcb-4536-9ecd-d6063795bb16
Doc ID: urn:contentItem:3VM7-1TH0-0039-421J-00000-00
90
Conclusion: It is a guaranteed protection on freedom of speech, however, not absolute. The Supreme
Court affirmed the judgment upholding the conviction. The court held that it had jurisdiction to review
the state court's judgment where an order of the appeals court indicated that a federal question regarding
the Act's constitutionality had been presented and decided. The court held that the essence of the offense
was the combining with others in an association for the accomplishment of desired ends through the
advocacy and use of criminal and unlawful methods and that the Act was not an unreasonable or arbitrary
exercise of the police power of the state that unwarrantably infringed any right of free speech, assembly,
or association. The Act, as applied, did not violate either the Due Process or Equal Protection Clauses of
the Fourteenth Amendment.
URL: https://advance.lexis.com/search/?pdmfid=1000516&crid=f4c8dbb2-3dbe-4749-b5ca-
00c251cb9a61&pdsearchterms=Whitney+v.+California%2C+274+U.S.+357%2C+47+S.+Ct.+641+(1927)
&pdstartin=hlct%3A1%3A1&pdtypeofsearch=searchboxclick&pdsearchtype=SearchBox&pdqttype=an
d&pdquerytemplateid=&ecomp=532bk&prid=f8e2b5a5-7f27-45a0-a302-e076223a1cff
Doc ID: urn:contentItem:3S4X-G000-003B-743V-00000-00
91
Facts: Merchants, who imported sugars from San Domingo into the United States, alleged that they
should not have had to pay duties on their imported products because the sugars were similar to goods
imported from the Hawaiian Islands, which were exempt from duties.
Issue: Will a treaty inconsistent with the federal statute prevail over the other?
Answer: Yes.
Conclusion: A self-executing treaty and a federal statute in consideration of the same matter with
inconsistency will always fall at a condition that what will prevail is the one entered at a later date. The
court held that the treaty between the United States and the Dominican Republic did not provide for any
concessions of special privileges, which exempted the imported sugar from duties, and the Court affirmed
the circuit court's judgment in favor of the collector of the port. The court held that the treaty did not
cover concessions like those made to the Hawaiian Islands for a valuable consideration. The treaty
imposed an obligation upon both countries to avoid hostile legislation that would discriminate against
one country's goods in favor of goods of like character imported from any other country. However, the
treaties were not intended to interfere with special arrangements with other countries founded upon a
concession of special privileges.
URL: https://advance.lexis.com/search/?pdmfid=1000516&crid=b7533dca-399b-4c1f-a713-
1def8e1120f7&pdsearchterms=Whitney+v.+Robertson%2C+124+U.S.+190%2C+8+S.+Ct.+456+(1888)&
pdstartin=hlct%3A1%3A1&pdtypeofsearch=searchboxclick&pdsearchtype=SearchBox&pdqttype=and
&pdquerytemplateid=&ecomp=532bk&prid=f4c8dbb2-3dbe-4749-b5ca-00c251cb9a61
Doc ID: urn:contentItem:3S4X-H460-003B-H1HW-00000-00
92
Facts: The decedent brought this action to recover damages for personal injuries alleged to have resulted
from the negligence of two physicians in the employ of the University of California Los Angeles Medical
Center, a hospital operated and maintained by the Regents as a nonprofit charitable institution.
Issue: Is exculpatory clause applicable to bar a patient’s medical malpractice action considering that a
hospital provides services of public interest?
Answer: No.
Conclusion: If an exculpatory clause does not involve “public interest” then it is valid. However, a hospital
does involve the interest of the public. The court found that the agreement exhibited all of the
characteristics set forth by the courts of the type of transaction in which exculpatory provisions would be
held invalid, including the following: (1) the agreement involved an institution subject to public regulation;
(2) the hospital's services to those who needed the particular skill of its staff and facilities constituted a
practical and crucial necessity; and (3) the hospital held itself out as willing to perform its services for
those qualified members of the public.
URL: https://advance.lexis.com/search/?pdmfid=1000516&crid=b31f6716-3f74-4b70-9640-
c44be1d02a9f&pdsearchterms=Tunkl+v.+Regents+of+Univ.+of+Cal.%2C+60+Cal.+2d+92%2C+32+Cal.+
Rptr.+33%2C+383+P.2d+441+(1963)&pdstartin=hlct%3A1%3A1&pdtypeofsearch=searchboxclick&pdse
archtype=SearchBox&pdqttype=and&pdquerytemplateid=&ecomp=532bk&prid=b7533dca-399b-4c1f-
a713-1def8e1120f7
Doc ID: urn:contentItem:3RRK-MWF0-003C-H2DB-00000-00
93
Issue: Is the crime being committed needed to have been successful with the help of the accomplice
before the latter becomes liable?
Answer: No.
Conclusion: The intention of the accomplice and the contribution to the crime makes one guilty of such.
The court held that one could be guilty of murder by aiding and abetting if his actions prevented the
deceased from exercising one final chance at survival, even though it was likely that the result would have
been the same without his actions. He was constructively present, and thus guilty. The court specified
that their conclusion was not to influence criminal murder charges still pending.
URL: https://advance.lexis.com/search/?pdmfid=1000516&crid=9c8ea5d5-540b-445a-86fe-
167db447c430&pdsearchterms=State+ex+rel.+Attorney+Gen.+v.+Tally%2C+15+So.+722+(Ala.+1893)&
pdstartin=hlct%3A1%3A1&pdtypeofsearch=searchboxclick&pdsearchtype=SearchBox&pdqttype=and
&pdquerytemplateid=&ecomp=532bk&prid=b31f6716-3f74-4b70-9640-c44be1d02a9f
Doc ID: urn:contentItem:3Y8M-F540-0046-83CV-00000-00
94
Facts: Defendant was found guilty of driving an automobile while under the influence of intoxicating
liquor and of driving an automobile while under the influence of drugs and narcotics to a degree rendering
him incapable of safely driving the automobile. He appealed, arguing that the trial court erred when it
instructed the jury that the term "driving" had been defined and construed as requiring that a vehicle be
in motion in order for the offense to be committed.
Issue: Is an accidental movement of a car without the affirming action of a driver considered “driving” in
cases of driving under the influence?
Answer: No.
Conclusion: There must be an affirmative action from any person with the intent to move the vehicle.
Court found that the mere motion of the vehicle did not constitute "driving" of the vehicle. Therefore, the
trial court's instruction, which had the effect of telling the jury that any accidental movement of the
vehicle was sufficient to constitute a driving of the vehicle, constituted prejudicial error. The court also
found that the evidence in the case did not support a verdict of guilty on the charge relating to the driving
of a vehicle by defendant while under the influence of drugs.
URL: https://advance.lexis.com/search/?pdmfid=1000516&crid=9c8ea5d5-540b-445a-86fe-
167db447c430&pdsearchterms=State+ex+rel.+Attorney+Gen.+v.+Tally%2C+15+So.+722+(Ala.+1893)&
pdstartin=hlct%3A1%3A1&pdtypeofsearch=searchboxclick&pdsearchtype=SearchBox&pdqttype=and
&pdquerytemplateid=&ecomp=532bk&prid=b31f6716-3f74-4b70-9640-c44be1d02a9f
Doc ID: urn:contentItem:3XMH-7VW0-00KR-C22R-00000-00
95
URL: https://advance.lexis.com/search/?pdmfid=1000516&crid=59cd3eb8-b6dd-4229-ba38-
27ef5892d0a9&pdsearchterms=People+v.+Harvey%2C+27+Ill.+2d+282%2C+189+N.E.2d+320+(1963)&
pdstartin=hlct%3A1%3A1&pdtypeofsearch=searchboxclick&pdsearchtype=SearchBox&pdqttype=and
&pdquerytemplateid=&ecomp=532bk&prid=f48bea55-128e-4abe-91c4-2e6c29a4d453
Doc ID: urn:contentItem:3RRM-2S20-003C-43P6-00000-00
96
Facts: Sharing the waters in the Navy's Southern California operating area were at least 37 species of
marine mammals, including dolphins, whales, and sea lions. The parties strongly disputed the extent to
which the Navy's training activities, specifically its use of active sonar, would harm those animals or disrupt
their behavioral patterns.
Issue: Is there consideration given on the balance of competing claims of injury and the effect of relief
being requested by each party?
Answer: Yes.
Conclusion: The Court agreed with the Navy that the Ninth Circuit's "possibility" of irreparable injury
standard for preliminary relief was too lenient. The frequently reiterated standard required parties
seeking preliminary relief to demonstrate that irreparable injury was "likely" in the absence of an
injunction. The district court did not reconsider the likelihood of irreparable harm in light of four
restrictions not challenged by the Navy (the Navy was only challenging two out of six restrictions in the
injunction). Even if plaintiffs had shown irreparable injury from the Navy's training exercises, any such
injury was outweighed by the public interest and the Navy's interest in effective, realistic training of its
sailors. A proper consideration of such factors alone required denial of the requested injunctive relief.
URL: https://advance.lexis.com/search/?pdmfid=1000516&crid=689fa171-b811-4c09-8197-
b5ba655234e5&pdsearchterms=Winter+v.+Nat.+Resources+Def.+Council%2C+Inc.%2C+555+U.S.+7+(2
008)&pdstartin=hlct%3A1%3A1&pdtypeofsearch=searchboxclick&pdsearchtype=SearchBox&pdqttype
=and&pdquerytemplateid=&ecomp=532bk&prid=59cd3eb8-b6dd-4229-ba38-27ef5892d0a9
Doc ID: urn:contentItem:4TX2-8KV0-TXFX-13DV-00000-00
97
Facts: The police entered defendant's home after speaking with his wife and observing defendant on the
floor through the window. Upon entering the home, the police observed marijuana in plain view on the
couch.
Issue: Is it valid to claim medical necessity for case against possession to suppress evidence of marijuana
seen from the window?
Answer: Yes.
Conclusion: The court further held that the "knock and wait" rule under Wash. Rev. Code § 10.31.040 did
not apply because the police were presented with exigent circumstances. The court granted defendant's
request to remand his conviction for possession of a controlled substance for a determination of whether
defendant was entitled to a medical necessity defense in light of Controlled Substances Therapeutic Act,
which recognized marijuana as a medicinal drug. The court held that defendant would be required to
present medical testimony.
URL: https://advance.lexis.com/search/?pdmfid=1000516&crid=8ae40f5a-be80-4161-a2b5-
0554d3303e45&pdsearchterms=State+v.+Diana%2C+604+P.2d+1312+(Wash.+1979)&pdstartin=hlct%3
A1%3A1&pdtypeofsearch=searchboxclick&pdsearchtype=SearchBox&pdqttype=and&pdquerytemplat
eid=&ecomp=532bk&prid=689fa171-b811-4c09-8197-b5ba655234e5
Doc ID: urn:contentItem:3S3J-XWF0-003F-W544-00000-00
98
Issue: Was there enough evidence to prove that the defendant took advantage of the victim with authority
or physical force to inflict physical and psychological harm?
Answer: Yes.
Conclusion: The trial justice's finding that all of the ingredients were present in order for the defendant
to overbear the will of the victim, either by his authority or by a modicum of physical force and his
conclusion that all of the relevant hallmarks of force or coercion, both physical and psychological, were
part and parcel of defendant's misconduct, caused the court concern. In light of the erroneous finding of
force and coercion by implied threats, the court was uncertain about whether defendant was convicted
based on a finding of force and coercion by physical force beyond a reasonable doubt that was separate
and apart from the error.
URL: https://advance.lexis.com/search/?pdmfid=1000516&crid=bed9c838-387b-4bed-9c95-
2e8e54102c71&pdsearchterms=State+v.+DiPetrillo%2C+922+A.2d+124+(R.I.+2007)&pdstartin=hlct%3
A1%3A1&pdtypeofsearch=searchboxclick&pdsearchtype=SearchBox&pdqttype=and&pdquerytemplat
eid=&ecomp=532bk&prid=8ae40f5a-be80-4161-a2b5-0554d3303e45
Doc ID: urn:contentItem:4NS1-FFS0-0039-43GR-00000-00
99
URL: https://advance.lexis.com/search/?pdmfid=1000516&crid=2f148aed-747b-4063-8b12-
d652af47d05a&pdsearchterms=Wishnatsky+v.+Huey%2C+1997+ND+35+(1997)&pdstartin=hlct%3A1%
3A1&pdtypeofsearch=searchboxclick&pdsearchtype=SearchBox&pdqttype=and&pdquerytemplateid=
&ecomp=532bk&prid=bed9c838-387b-4bed-9c95-2e8e54102c71
Doc ID: urn:contentItem:3T3J-PTN0-0045-6058-00000-00
100
Facts: The Commonwealth, acting through the Attorney General, commenced a consumer protection
enforcement action against the mortgage company, claiming that it, in originating certain "subprime"
mortgage loans in Massachusetts, acted unfairly in violation of Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 93A, § 2.
URL: https://advance.lexis.com/search/?pdmfid=1000516&crid=9aca9881-6869-
449e-b23c-
f40729c8dd1a&pdsearchterms=Commonwealth+v.+Fremont+Inv.+%26+Loan%2C+452+Mass.+733%2C
+897+N.E.2d+548+(2008)&pdstartin=hlct%3A1%3A1&pdtypeofsearch=searchboxclick&pdsearchtype=
SearchBox&pdqttype=and&pdquerytemplateid=&ecomp=532bk&prid=2f148aed-747b-4063-8b12-
d652af47d05a
Doc ID: urn:contentItem:4V3V-95D0-TXFT-81R8-00000-00
101
Facts: Third party was involved in an altercation with tavern owner. While third party was being arrested,
defendant broke through the crowd and struck one police officer in the face. Defendant suffered a seizure
in jail and was taken to the hospital. Defendant was charged with aggravated battery and obstructing a
police officer. Defendant claimed he suffered from an epileptic seizure at the time of the alleged offenses.