DEFINITION OF FOREIGN ELEMENTS
SAUDI ARABIAN AIRLINES, petitioner, vs.COURT OF APPEALS,
MILAGROS P. MORADA and HON. RODOLFO A. ORTIZ, in his
capacity as Presiding Judge of Branch 89, Regional Trial Court
of Quezon City, respondents.
Conflict of Laws; Actions; Where the factual antecedents
satisfactorily establish the existence of a foreign element, the
problem could present a “conflicts” case.—Where the factual
antecedents satisfactorily establish the existence of a foreign
element, we agree with petitioner that the problem herein could
present a “conflicts” case. A factual situation that cuts across
territorial lines and is affected by the diverse laws of two or more
states is said to contain a “foreign element.” The presence of a
foreign element is inevitable since social and economic affairs of
individuals and associations are rarely confined to the geographic
limits of their birth or conception.
Same; Same; The forms in which a foreign element may appear
are many, such as the fact that one party is a resident Philippine
national, and that the other is a resident foreign corporation.—The
forms in which this foreign element may appear are many. The
foreign element may simply consist in the fact that one of the
parties to a contract is an alien or has a foreign domicile, or that a
contract between nationals of one State involves properties
situated in another State. In other cases, the foreign element may
assume a complex form. In the instant case, the foreign element
consisted in the fact that private respondent Morada is a resident
Philippine national, and that petitioner SAUDIA is a resident
foreign corporation. Also, by virtue of the employment of Morada
with the petitioner SAUDIA as a flight stewardess, events did
transpire during her many occasions of travel across national
borders, particularly from Manila, Philippines to Jeddah, Saudi
Arabia, and vice versa, that caused a “conflicts” situation to arise.
FACTS:
Plaintiff Morada is a flight attendant for defendant SAUDIA’s
airlines based in Jeddah. On April 27, 1990, while on a lay-over in
Jakarta, Indonesia, Morada became a victim of attempted rape by
fellow crewmembers, Thamer and Allah, who are both Saudi
nationals. The two were eventually arrested and deported back to
Saudi Arabia while Morada was transferred to Manila. On various
dates after the incident, Morada was summoned to Jeddah by her
employer in order to sign documents, purporting to be statements
dropping the case against Thamer and Allah. However, it turned
out that a case was in fact filed against her before the Saudi court,
which later found her guilty of (1) adultery; (2) going to a disco,
dancing and listening to the music in violation of Islamic laws; and
(3) socializing with the male crew, in contravention of Islamic
tradition.
Hence, Morada filed this complaint for damages based on Article
21 of the New Civil Code against SAUDIA and its country manager.
ISSUES:
Whether or not the case involves a ‘conficts problem’
Whether or not the trial court has jurisdiction over the case
Whether the proper law applicable is Philippine law or the law of
the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia
RULING:
Is there a ‘conflicts’ case?
The Supreme Court held in the affirmative.
A factual situation that cuts across territorial lines and is affected
by the diverse laws of two or more states is said to contain a
“foreign element.” The presence of a foreign element is inevitable
since social and economic affairs of individuals and associations
are rarely confined to the geographic limits of their birth or
conception.
The forms in which this foreign element may appear are many.
The foreign element may simply consist in the fact that one of the
parties to a contract is an alien or has a foreign domicile, or that a
contract between nationals of one State involves properties
situated in another State. In other cases, the foreign element may
assume a complex form.
In the instant case, the foreign element consisted in the fact that
private respondent Morada is a resident Philippine national, and
that petitioner SAUDIA is a resident foreign corporation. Also, by
virtue of the employment of Morada with the petitioner SAUDIA as
a flight stewardess, events did transpire during her many
occasions of travel across national borders, particularly from
Manila, Philippines to Jeddah, Saudi Arabia, and vice versa, that
caused a “conflicts” situation to arise.
Applicability of Art. 19 and 21, NCC and Jurisdiction of Quezon City
RTC
The Supreme Court held that private respondent aptly predicated
her cause of action on Articles 19 and 21 of the New Civil Code.
Although Article 19 merely declares a principle of law, Article 21
gives flesh to its provisions. Thus, violations of Articles 19 and 21
are actionable, with judicially enforceable remedies in the
municipal forum.
Based on the allegations in the Amended Complaint, read in the
light of the Rules of Court on jurisdiction, the Supreme Court found
that the RTC of Quezon City possesses jurisdiction over the subject
matter of the suit. Its authority to try and hear the case is provided
under Section 1 of RA 7691. Venue was also held to be proper.
Furthermore, jurisdiction over the person of the plaintiff and
defendant were properly acquired.
Choice-of-law Problem
Choice-of-law problems seek to answer two important questions:
(1) What legal system should control a given situation where some
of the significant facts occurred in two or more states; and (2) to
what extent should the chosen legal system regulate the situation.
Before a choice can be made, it is necessary for us to determine
under what category a certain set of facts or rules fall. This process
is known as “characterization,” or the “doctrine of qualification.” It
is the “process of deciding whether or not the facts relate to the
kind of question specified in a conflicts rule.” The purpose of
“characterization” is to enable the forum to select the proper law.
Our starting point of analysis here is not a legal relation, but a
factual situation, event or operative fact. An essential element of
conflict rules is the indication of a “test” or “connecting factor” or
“point of contact.” Choice-of-law rules invariably consist of factual
relationship (such as property right, contract claim) and a
connecting factor or point of contract, such as the situs of the res,
the place of celebration, the place of performance, or the place of
wrongdoing.
Note that one or more circumstances may be present to serve as
the possible test for the determination of the applicable law. These
“test factors” or “points of contact” or “connecting factors” could
be any of the following:
1. The nationality of a person, his domicile, his residence, his place of
sojourn, or his origin;
2. The seat of a legal or juridical person, such as a corporation;
3. The situs of a thing, that is, the place where a thing is, or is deemed
to be situated. In particular, the lex situs is decisive when real
rights are involved;
4. The place where an act has been done, the locus actus, such as the
place where a contract has been made, a marriage celebrated, a
will signed or a tort committed. The lex loci actus is particularly
important in contracts and torts;
5. The place where an act is intended to come into effect, e.g. the
place of performance of contractual duties, or the place where a
power of attorney is to be exercised;
6. The intention of the contracting parties as to the law that should
govern their agreement, the lex loci intentionis;
7. The place where judicial or administrative proceedings are
instituted or done. The lexfori – the law of the forum – is
particularly important because, as we have seen earlier, matters of
‘procedure’ not going to the substance of the claim involved are
governed by it; and because the lexfori applies whenever the
content of the otherwise applicable foreign law is excluded from
application in a given case for the reason that it falls under one of
the exceptions to the applications of foreign law; and
8. The flag of the ship, which in many cases is decisive of practically
all legal relationships of the ship and of its master or owner as
such. It also covers contractual relationships particularly contracts
of affreightment.”
Considering that the complaint in the court a quo is one involving
torts, the “connecting factor” or “point of contact” could be the
place or places where the tortious conduct or lex loci actus
occurred. And applying the torts principle in a conflicts case, we
find that the Philippines could be said as a situs of the tort (the
place where the alleged tortious conduct took place). This is
because it is in the Philippines where petitioner allegedly deceived
private respondent, a Filipina residing and working here.
According to her, she had honestly believed that petitioner would,
in the exercise of its rights and in the performance of its duties,
“act with justice, give her her due and observe honesty and good
faith.” Instead, petitioner failed to protect her, she claimed. That
certain acts or parts of the injury allegedly occurred in another
country is of no moment. For in our view what is important here is
the place where the over-all harm or the fatality of the alleged
injury to the person, reputation, social standing and human rights
of the complainant, had lodged, according to the plaintiff below
(herein private respondent). All told, it is not without basis to
identify the Philippines as the situs of the alleged tort.
Moreover, with the widespread criticism of the traditional rule of
lex loci delicti commissi, modern theories and rules on tort liability
have been advanced to offer fresh judicial approaches to arrive at
just results. In keeping abreast with the modern theories on tort
liability, we find here an occasion to apply the “State of the most
significant relationship” rule, which in our view should be
appropriate to apply now, given the factual context of this case.
In applying said principle to determine the State which has the
most significant relationship, the following contacts are to be
taken into account and evaluated according to their relative
importance with respect to the particular issue: (a) the place
where the injury occurred; (b) the place where the conduct
causing the injury occurred; (c) the domicile, residence,
nationality, place of incorporation and place of business of the
parties; and (d) the place where the relationship, if any, between
the parties is centered.
Over-all injury occurred in the Philippines
As already discussed, there is basis for the claim that over-all
injury occurred and lodged in the Philippines. There is likewise no
question that private respondent is a resident Filipina national,
working with petitioner, a resident foreign corporation engaged
here in the business of international air carriage. Thus, the
“relationship” between the parties was centered here, although it
should be stressed that this suit is not based on mere labor law
violations. From the record, the claim that the Philippines has the
most significant contact with the matter in this dispute, raised by
private respondent as plaintiff below against defendant (herein
petitioner), in our view, has been properly established.
PHASES IN CONFLICT RESOLUTION
Hasegawa vs. Kitamura GR No. 149177
FACTS:
In March 1999, Nippon Engineering Consultants Co., Ltd, a
Japanese firm, was contracted by the Department of Public Works
and Highways (DPWH) to supervise the construction of the
Southern Tagalog Access Road. In April 1999, Nippon entered into
an independent contractor agreement (ICA) with Minoru Kitamura
for the latter to head the said project. The ICA was entered into in
Japan and is effective for a period of 1 year (so until April 2000). In
January 2000, DPWH awarded the Bongabon-Baler Road project to
Nippon. Nippon subsequently assigned Kitamura to head the road
project. But in February 2000, Kazuhiro Hasegawa, the general
manager of Nippon informed Kitamura that they are pre-
terminating his contract. Kitamura sought Nippon to reconsider
but Nippon refused to negotiate. Kitamura then filed a complaint
for specific performance and damages against Nippon in the RTC
of Lipa.
Hasegawa filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that the
contract was entered in Japan hence, applying the principle of lex
loci celebracionis, cases arising from the contract should be
cognizable only by Japanese courts. The trial court denied the
motion. Eventually, Nippon filed a petition for certiorari with the
Supreme Court.
Hasegawa, on appeal significantly changed its theory, this
time invoking forum non conveniens; that the RTC is an
inconvenient forum because the parties are Japanese nationals
who entered into a contract in Japan. Kitamura on the other hand
invokes the trial court’s ruling which states that matters
connected with the performance of contracts are regulated by the
law prevailing at the place of performance, so since the obligations
in the ICA are executed in the Philippines, courts here have
jurisdiction.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the complaint against Nippon should be dismissed.
RULINGS:
No. The trial court did the proper thing in taking cognizance of it.
In the first place, the case filed by Kitamura is a complaint
for specific performance and damages. Such case is incapable of
pecuniary estimation; such cases are within the jurisdiction of the
regional trial court.
Hasegawa filed his motion to dismiss on the ground of
forum non conveniens. However, such ground is not one of those
provided for by the Rules as a ground for dismissing a civil case.
The Supreme Court also emphasized that the contention that
Japanese laws should apply is premature. In conflicts cases, there
are three phases and each next phase commences when one is
settled, to wit:
1. Jurisdiction – Where should litigation be initiated? Court must
have jurisdiction over the subject matter, the parties, the issues,
the property, the res. Also considers, whether it is fair to cause a
defendant to travel to this state; choice of law asks the further
question whether the application of a substantive law which will
determine the merits of the case is fair to both parties.
2. Choice of Law – Which law will the court apply? Once a local court
takes cognizance, it does not mean that the local laws must
automatically apply. The court must determine which substantive
law when applied to the merits will be fair to both parties.
3. Recognition and Enforcement of Judgment – Where can the
resulting judgment be enforced?
This case is not yet in the second phase because upon the
RTC’s taking cognizance of the case, Hasegawa immediately filed a
motion to dismiss, which was denied. He filed a motion for
reconsideration, which was also denied. Then he bypassed the
proper procedure by immediately filing a petition for certiorari.
The question of which law should be applied should have been
settled in the trial court had Hasegawa not improperly appealed
the interlocutory order denying his MFR.
RAYTHEON V. ROUZIE [ G.R. No. 162894, February 26, 2008 ]
Principle: the Court outlined three consecutive phases involved
in judicial resolution of conflicts-of-laws problems, namely:
jurisdiction, choice of law, and recognition and enforcement of
judgments. Thus, in the instanceswhere the Court held that the
local judicial machinery was adequate to resolve controversies
with a foreign element, the following requisites had to be
proved: (1) that the Philippine Court is one to which the parties
may conveniently resort; (2) that the Philippine Court is in a
position to make an intelligent decision as to the law and the
facts; and (3) that the Philippine Court has or is likely to have
the power to enforce its decision.
FACTS:
Sometime in 1990, Brand Marine Services, Inc., a
corporation duly organized and existing under the laws of the
State of Connecticut, United States of America, and respondent
Stockton W. Rouzie, Jr., an American citizen, entered into a
contract whereby BMSI hired respondent as its representative to
negotiate the sale of services in several government projects in the
Philippines for an agreed remuneration of 10% of the gross
receipts. On 1992, respondent secured a service contract with the
Republic of the Philippines on behalf of BMSI for the dredging of
rivers affected by the Mt. Pinatubo eruption and mudflows.
On 1994, respondent filed before the NLRC, a suit against
BMSI and Rust International, Inc., Rodney C. Gilbert and Walter G.
Browning for alleged nonpayment of commissions, illegal
termination and breach of employment contract.The LA ordered
BMSI & Rust to pay Rouzie’s money claims. Upon appeal, the NLRC
reversed & dismissed Rouzie’s complaint on the ground of lack of
jurisdiction.
On 1999, respondent, then a resident of La Union, instituted
an action for damages before the RTC of La Union. The Complaint
named as defendants herein petitioner Raytheon International,
Inc. as well as BMSI and RUST, the two corporations impleaded in
the earlier labor case.
Petitioner also referred to the NLRC decision which disclosed
that per the written agreement between respondent and BMSI and
RUST, denominated as “Special Sales Representative Agreement,”
the rights and obligations of the parties shall be governed by the
laws of the State of Connecticut. Petitioner sought the dismissal of
the complaint on grounds of failure to state a cause of action and
forum non conveniens and prayed for damages by way of
compulsory counterclaim.
Petitioner asserts that the written contract between
respondent and BMSI included a valid choice of law clause, that is,
that the contract shall be governed by the laws of the State of
Connecticut. It also mentions the presence of foreign elements in
the dispute – namely, the parties and witnesses involved are
American corporations and citizens and the evidence to be
presented is located outside the Philippines – that renders our
local courts inconvenient forums.
ISSUE(S):
1. W/N the RTC had jurisdiction.
2. W/N the complaint should be dismissed on the ground of
forum non conveniens.
RULING:
1. YES.
On the matter of jurisdiction over a conflicts-of-laws problem
where the case is filed in a Philippine court and where the court
has jurisdiction over the subject matter, the parties and the res, it
may or can proceed to try the case even if the rules of conflict-of-
laws or the convenience of the parties point to a foreign forum.
This is an exercise of sovereign prerogative of the country where
the case is filed.
Jurisdiction over the nature and subject matter of an action is
conferred by the Constitution and the law & by the material
allegations in the complaint, irrespective of w/n the plaintiff is
entitled to recover all or some of the claims or reliefs sought
therein. The case file was an action for damages arising from an
alleged breach of contract. Undoubtedly, the nature of the action
and the amount of damages prayed are w/in the jurisdiction of the
RTC.
As regards jurisdiction over the parties, the RTC acquired
jurisdiction over Rouzi upon the filing of the complaint. On the
other hand, jurisdiction over the person of Raytheon was acquired
by its voluntary appearance in court.
AVAILABLE FORUM AND THE PARTIES ARE NOT PRECLUDED
FROM SEEKING REMEDIES ELSEWHERE.
Raytheon’s averments of the foreign elements are not sufficient to
oust the RTC of its jurisdiction over the case and the parties
involved.
Moreover, the propriety of dismissing a case based on the
principle of forum non conveniens requires a factual
determination; hence, it is more properly considered as a matter
of defense. While it is w/c the discretion of the trial court to
abstain from assuming jurisdiction on this ground, it should do so
only after vital facts are established, to determine whether special
circumstances require the court’s desistance.

That THE SUBJECT CONTRACT INCLUDED A STIPULATION THAT

THE SAME SHALL BE GOVERNED BYTHE LAWS OF THE STATE OF
CONNECTICUT DOES NOT SUGGEST THAT THE PHILIPPINE
COURTS, OR ANY OTHER FOREIGN TRIBUNAL FOR THAT
MATTER, ARE PRECLUDED FROM HEARING THE CIVIL ACTION.

JURISDICTION & CHOICE OF LAW ARE 2 DISTINCT CONCEPTS.

Jurisdiction considers whether it is fair to cause a defendant to
travel to this state; choice of law asks the further question whether
the application of a substantive law which will determine the
merits of the case is fair to both parties. The choice of law
stipulation will become relevant only when the substantive issues
of the instant case develop, that is, after hearing on the merits
proceeds before the trial court.

(b) NO.

UNDER THE DOCTRINE OF FORUM NON CONVENIENS, A COURT,

IN CONFLICTS-OF-LAWS CASES, MAY
REFUSE IMPOSITIONS ON ITS JURISDICTION WHERE IT IS NOT
THE MOST “CONVENIENT” OR
HSBC VS. SHERMAN, 176 SCRA 331 did not stipulate that only the courts of Singapore, to the exclusion
of all the rest, has jurisdiction. Neither did the clause in question
FACTS:
operate to divest Philippine courts of jurisdiction.
A complaint was filed by petitioner HSBC against private
CHARACTERIZATION AND POINTS OF CONTRACTS
respondents Sherman and Reloj. It appears that Eastern Book
Supply Service (Company), a company incorporated in Singapore -see Saudi Arabian Airlines vs CA
applied with, and was granted by the Singapore Branch of
petitioner Bank an overdraft facility, payable monthly. As security,
both private respondents, all of whom are directors of the
Company, executed a Joint and Several Guarantee in favor of
petitioner Bank whereby private respondents agreed to pay,
jointly and severally, on demand all sums owed by the Company to
petitioner Bank. Likewise included in the said Joint and Several
Guarantee a statement that the Courts of Singapore shall have
jurisdiction over all disputes arising this guarantee. The Company
failed to pay its obligation. Petitioner Bank demanded payment
but private respondents still failed to pay.
Private respondents contended that the court has no jurisdiction
over the subject matter of the complaint and that the court has no
jurisdiction over the persons of the private respondents.
ISSUE:
Is Philippine Courts have jurisdiction over the suit?
RULING:
Yes.
One basic principle underlies all rules of jurisdiction in
International Law: A state does not have jurisdiction in the
absence of some reasonable basis for exercising it whether the
proceedings are in rem, quasi in rem or in personam. The defense
of private respondents that the complaint should have been filed
in Singapore is based merely on technicality. They did not even
claim, much less prove, at the filing of the action here will cause
them any unnecessary trouble, damage or expense. The parties
CHOICE OF APPLICABLE LAW
AZNAR vs. GARCIA
G.R. No. L-16749, January 31, 1963
FACTS:
EDWARD Christensen died testate. The estate was distributed by
Executioner Aznar according to the will, which provides that: Php
3,600 be given to HELEN Christensen as her legacy, and the rest of
his estate to his daughter LUCY Christensen, as pronounced by CFI
Davao.
Opposition to the approval of the project of partition was filed by
Helen, insofar as it deprives her of her legitime as an
acknowledged natural child, she having been declared by Us an
acknowledged natural child of the deceased Edward in an earlier
case.
As to his citizenship, we find that the citizenship that he acquired
in California when he resided in Sacramento from 1904 to 1913,
was never lost by his stay in the Philippines, and the deceased
appears to have considered himself as a citizen of California by the
fact that when he executed his will he declared that he was a
citizen of that State; so that he appears never to have intended to
abandon his California citizenship by acquiring another. But at the
time of his death, he was domiciled in the Philippines.
ISSUE:
1. What law on succession should apply, the Philippine law or
the California law?
2. What is the law in California governing the disposition of
personal property?
HELD:
The partition be made as the Philippine law on succession
provides.
The law that governs the validity of his testamentary dispositions
is defined in Article 16 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, which is
as follows:
ART. 16. Real property as well as personal property is subject to
the law of the country where it is situated.
However, intestate and testamentary successions, both with
respect to the order of succession and to the amount of
successional rights and to the intrinsic validity of testamentary
provisions, shall be regulated by the national law of the person
whose succession is under consideration, whatever may be the
nature of the property and regardless of the country where said
property may be found.
The application of this article in the case at bar requires the
determination of the meaning of the term “national law” is used
therein.
2.
The decision of CFI Davao, sustains the contention of the executor-
appellee that under the California Probate Code, a testator may
dispose of his property by will in the form and manner he desires.
But HELEN invokes the provisions of Article 946 of the Civil Code
of California, which is as follows:
If there is no law to the contrary, in the place where personal
property is situated, it is deemed to follow the person of its owner
and is governed by the law of his domicile.
It is argued on executor’s behalf that as the deceased Christensen
was a citizen of the State of California, the internal law thereof,
which is that given in the Kaufman case, should govern the
determination of the validity of the testamentary provisions of
Christensen’s will, such law being in force in the State of California
of which Christensen was a citizen. Appellant, on the other hand, of laws in the California Civil Code, i.e., Article 946, which
insists that Article 946 should be applicable, and in accordance authorizes the reference or return of the question to the law of the
therewith and following the doctrine of the renvoi, the question of testator’s domicile. The conflict of laws rule in California, Article
the validity of the testamentary provision in question should be 946, Civil Code, precisely refers back the case, when a decedent is
referred back to the law of the decedent’s domicile, which is the not domiciled in California, to the law of his domicile, the
Philippines. Philippines in the case at bar. The court of the domicile cannot and
should not refer the case back to California; such action would
leave the issue incapable of determination because the case will
We note that Article 946 of the California Civil Code is its conflict
then be like a football, tossed back and forth between the two
of laws rule, while the rule applied in In re Kaufman, its internal
states, between the country of which the decedent was a citizen
law. If the law on succession and the conflict of laws rules of
and the country of his domicile. The Philippine court must apply
California are to be enforced jointly, each in its own intended and
its own law as directed in the conflict of laws rule of the state of
appropriate sphere, the principle cited In re Kaufman should apply
the decedent, if the question has to be decided, especially as the
to citizens living in the State, but Article 946 should apply to such
application of the internal law of California provides no legitime
of its citizens as are not domiciled in California but in other
for children while the Philippine law, Arts. 887(4) and 894, Civil
jurisdictions. The rule laid down of resorting to the law of the
Code of the Philippines, makes natural children legally
domicile in the determination of matters with foreign element
acknowledged forced heirs of the parent recognizing them.
involved is in accord with the general principle of American law
that the domiciliary law should govern in most matters or rights
which follow the person of the owner. We therefore find that as the domicile of the deceased Edward, a
citizen of California, is the Philippines, the validity of the
provisions of his will depriving his acknowledged natural child,
Appellees argue that what Article 16 of the Civil Code of the
the appellant HELEN, should be governed by the Philippine Law,
Philippines pointed out as the national law is the internal law of
the domicile, pursuant to Art. 946 of the Civil Code of California,
California. But as above explained the laws of California have
not by the internal law of California..
prescribed two sets of laws for its citizens, one for residents
therein and another for those domiciled in other jurisdictions.
NOTES: There is no single American law governing the validity of
testamentary provisions in the United States, each state of the
It is argued on appellees’ (Aznar and LUCY) behalf that the clause
Union having its own private law applicable to its citizens only and
“if there is no law to the contrary in the place where the property
in force only within the state. The “national law” indicated in
is situated” in Sec. 946 of the California Civil Code refers to Article
Article 16 of the Civil Code above quoted can not, therefore,
16 of the Civil Code of the Philippines and that the law to the
possibly mean or apply to any general American law. So it can
contrary in the Philippines is the provision in said Article 16 that
refer to no other than the private law of the State of California.
the national law of the deceased should govern. This contention
cannot be sustained.

As explained in the various authorities cited above, the national

law mentioned in Article 16 of our Civil Code is the law on conflict
BELLIS VS. BELLIS
20 SCRA 358
FACTS:
Amos G. Bellis was a citizen of the State of Texas and of the
United States. He had five legitimate children with his first wife
(whom he divorced), three legitimate children with his second
wife (who survived him) and, finally, three illegitimate children.
even assuming that Texas has a conflicts rule providing that the
domiciliary law should govern successional rights, the same would
not result in a reference back (renvoi) to Philippine law, but it
would still refer to Texas law. Nonetheless, if Texas has a conflicts
rule, adopting the rule of lex rei sitae, which calls for the
application of the law of the place where the properties are
situated, renvoi would arise, where the properties involved are
found in the Philippines.

6 years prior Amos Bellis’ death, he executed two(2) wills,
apportioning the remainder of his estate and properties to his
seven surviving children. The appellants filed their oppositions to
the project of partition claiming that they have been deprived of
their legitimes to which they were entitled according to the
Philippine law. Appellants argued that the deceased wanted his
Philippine estate to be governed by the Philippine law, thus the
creation of two separate wills.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the Philippine Laws will apply in the
determination of the rights of succession of the illegitimates.
The parties admit that the decedent, Amos G. Bellis, was a
citizen of the State of Texas, U.S.A., and that under the laws of
Texas, there are no forced heirs or legitimes. Accordingly, since
the intrinsic validity of the provision of the will and the amount of
successional rights are to be determined under Texas law, the
Philippine law on legitimes cannot be applied to the testacy of
Amos G. Bellis.
Hence, the court affirmed the ruling of the probate court.

RULING:
No. The Supreme Court ruled that the disposition of the
decedent in his will in which he stated that the Philippine laws will
apply and not his national law was considered illegal and void.
This was in the viewpoint of Article 16 of the New Civil Code
which said that national laws should govern.

The doctrine of renvoi is usually pertinent where the

decedent is a national of one country and is domiciled in another.
It does not apply to a case where the decedent was a citizen of
Texas and was domiciled therein at the time of his death. So that,
Cadalin, et. Al. vs. POEA administrator, et. Al.
G.R. No. L-104776, G.R. Nos. 104911-14, G.R. Nos. 105029-32,
December 5, 1994
FACTS:
Cadalin, et. Al. instituted a class suit with POEA for money
claims for the unexpired portion of their employment contract
with BRII, a foreign corporation, through AIBC, service contractor
of the former. The POEA Administrator rendered decision and in
which it awarded its decision in favor of 324 petitioners only.
Dissatisfied of the resolution, both the petitioners and the private
respondents move for the reconsideration of the resolution made
by the POEA administrator but all the motions were denied by
POEA administrator.
Due to the denials of their motions, both parties made their
respective appeals before the NLRC. In its Resolution, NLRC
provides that it agrees with POEA with regard to the use of the
Amiri Decree No. 23, labor law in State of Bahrain, as basis for the
renumeration being more favorable and beneficial to the workers.
NLRC, however, held that the Amiri Decree No. 23 applied only to
the claimants, who worked in Bahrain, and set aside awards of the
POEA Administrator in favor of the claimants, who worked
elsewhere. With regard to the issue of Prescription, as raised by
the private respondent, NLRC ruled that the prescriptive period
for the filing of the claims of the complainants was three years, as
provided in Article 291 of the Labor Code of the Philippines, and
not ten years as provided in Article 1144 of the Civil Code of the
Philippines nor one year as provided in the Amiri Decree No. 23 of
1976. Dissatisfied of the resolutions, the current petition for
review is filed.
ISSUES:
1.What law will govern in the computation of the money claims?
2.What law will govern with regard to the prescription of the
claims?
RULINGS:
1.The Amiri Decree No. 23.
The Court ruled that “The parties to a contract may select the law
by which it is to be governed. In such a case, the foreign law is
adopted as a "system" to regulate the relations of the parties,
including questions of their capacity to enter into the contract, the
formalities to be observed by them, matters of performance, and
so forth.
In the case at hand, the overseas-employment contracts, which
were prepared by AIBC and BRII themselves, provided that the
laws of the host country became applicable to said contracts if
they offer terms and conditions more favorable that those
stipulated therein. Since Bahrain, the host county, offers favorable
stipulation, the Amiri Decree therefore will apply.
Further, the court ruled that any ambiguity in the overseas-
employment contracts should be interpreted against AIBC and
BRII. It is because the law provides that,” the interpretation of
obscure words or stipulations in a contract shall not favor the
party who caused the obscurity.” Since, AIBC an BRII are the one
who prepares the employment contract, then contract should be
interpreted against them.
2.The Labor Code (3 years)
As correctly pointed out by the NLRC, Money claims-all money
claims arising from employer-employee relations accruing during
the effectivity of this Code shall be filed within three (3) years
from the time the cause of action accrued, otherwise they shall be
forever barred.
The contention of the POEA Administrator, that the three-year
prescriptive period under Article 291 of the Labor Code of the
Philippines applies only to money claims specifically recoverable
under said Code, does not find support in the plain language of the
provision. Neither is the contention of the claimants in G.R. Nos.
104911-14 that said Article refers only to claims "arising from the
employer's violation of the employee's right," as provided by the
Labor Code supported by the facial reading of the provision.
For Discussion:
The Amiri decree did not apply because, as a general rule, a foreign
procedural law will not be applied in the forum. Procedural
matters, such as service of process, joinder of actions, period and
requisites for appeal, and so forth, are governed by the laws of the
forum. This is true even if the action is based upon a foreign
substantive law.

A law on prescription of actions is sui generis in Conflict of Laws in

the sense that it may be viewed either as procedural or
substantive, depending on the characterization given such a law.

In this case, period of the Amiri Decree No. 23 of 1976 as regards

the claims in question would contravene the public policy on the
protection to labor, hence cannot be used as basis for prescription.
BANK OF AMERICA NT & ASIA VS. AMERICAN REALTY CORP.
PRINCIPLE: “In a conflict between a Philippine law and a
foreign law, Philippine law prevails.”
FACTS:
The Bank of America granted a loan to a corporation secured by a
real estate mortgage by the respondent. Upon the loan maturity,
the corporation debtor failed to pay and the petitioner bank filed
four (4) collection cases in the foreign courts (England and Hong
Kong) against the corporation debtors. At the same time it also
filed an extrajudicial foreclosure in the office of the Provincial
Sheriff of Bulacan, Philippines on the real estate mortgage and said
was sold in a public auction.
The respondent files action for damages against petitioner due to
the act of foreclosing the real estate mortgage extrajudicially
despite the pending civil suits before the foreign courts to collect
the principal loan. Petitioner contends that the respondent is not
made a party on the collection case before the foreign courts for
being a third party mortgagor and such actions were filed in
foreign courts and thus decisions rendered on such courts are not
enforceable in the Philippines unless a separate action is filed in
the Philippines to enforce such judgment and that under the
English law which is the law governing in the principal agreement,
the mortgagee does not lose its security interest by filing a civil
action for sum of money. The court rendered judgment in favor of
defendants declaring that the filing of civil suit on collection of a
sum of money in foreign courts constitutes a waiver on the
security of the mortgages.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the petitioner’s act of filing a collection suit against
the principal debtors before foreign courts constitutes a waiver of
the remedy of foreclosure.
RULING:
The court held that Section 4 Rule 2 of the 1997 Rules on
Civil Procedure provides that “if two or more suits are instituted
on the basis of the same cause of action, the filing of one or a
judgment upon the merits in any one is available as a ground for
the dismissal of the others.”
A mortgagor creditor may pursue two remedies either to
institute against the mortgage debtor a personal action for
collection of money or foreclosure of a mortgage but cannot avail
of both remedies. In Phil. jurisdiction these remedies are
alternative and not cumulative. Thus, choosing one remedy is a bar
to avail of the other remedy. Plaintiff cannot split up a single cause
of action by filing both remedies as expressly prohibited by the
rules on civil procedure.
On the contention of the petitioner that the English law
should apply to the principal agreements that states that the
mortgagee does not lose its security interest by simply filing civil
actions for sums of money, the court held that a foreign law must
be properly pleaded and proved as fact. If not pleaded, the court
will presume that the foreign law is the same as our local or
domestic or internal law. This is the DOCTRINE OF PROCESSUAL
PRESUMPTION.
Granting however that the English law is applicable in the
Philippine court, such law is contrary to sound and established
public policy of the forum which proscribes the splitting of a single
cause of action, thus still cannot be applied by the court in the
case.
It is proper that Philippine law should be upheld since it is
the country upon which the case is filed. Therefore the filing of a
collection case by the petitioner in foreign courts is a waiver for
the remedy of foreclosure of real estate mortgage.
HERALD BLACK DACASIN, Petitioner, vs. SHARON DEL MUNDO
DACASIN, Respondent. G.R. No. 168785 February 5, 2010
The Facts
Petitioner Herald Dacasin (petitioner), American, and
respondent Sharon Del Mundo Dacasin (respondent), Filipino,
were married in Manila in April 1994. They have one daughter,
Stephanie, born on 21 September 1995. In June 1999, respondent
sought and obtained from the Circuit Court, 19th Judicial Circuit,
Lake County, Illinois (Illinois court) a divorce decree against
petitioner.3 In its ruling, the Illinois court dissolved the marriage
of petitioner and respondent, awarded to respondent sole custody
of Stephanie and retained jurisdiction over the case for
enforcement purposes.
On 28 January 2002, petitioner and respondent executed in
Manila a contract (Agreement 4 ) for the joint custody of
Stephanie. The parties chose Philippine courts as exclusive forum
to adjudicate disputes arising from the Agreement. Respondent
undertook to obtain from the Illinois court an order
"relinquishing" jurisdiction to Philippine courts.
In 2004, petitioner sued respondent in the Regional Trial
Court of Makati City, Branch 60 (trial court) to enforce the
Agreement. Petitioner alleged that in violation of the Agreement,
respondent exercised sole custody over Stephanie.
Respondent sought the dismissal of the complaint for,
among others, lack of jurisdiction because of the Illinois court’s
retention of jurisdiction to enforce the divorce decree.
The Ruling of the Trial Court
In its Order dated 1 March 2005, the trial court sustained
respondent’s motion and dismissed the case for lack of
jurisdiction. The trial court held that: (1) it is precluded from
taking cognizance over the suit considering the Illinois court’s
retention of jurisdiction to enforce its divorce decree, including its
order awarding sole custody of Stephanie to respondent; (2) the
divorce decree is binding on petitioner following the "nationality
rule" prevailing in this jurisdiction;5 and (3) the Agreement is void
for contravening Article 2035, paragraph 5 of the Civil Code6
prohibiting compromise agreements on jurisdiction.7
Petitioner sought reconsideration, raising the new
argument that the divorce decree obtained by respondent is void.
Thus, the divorce decree is no bar to the trial court’s exercise of
jurisdiction over the case.
In its Order dated 23 June 2005, the trial court denied
reconsideration, holding that unlike in the case of respondent, the
divorce decree is binding on petitioner under the laws of his
nationality.
Hence, this petition.
Petitioner submits the following alternative theories for the
validity of the Agreement to justify its enforcement by the trial
court: (1) the Agreement novated the valid divorce decree,
modifying the terms of child custody from sole (maternal) to
joint;8 or (2) the Agreement is independent of the divorce decree
obtained by respondent.
The Issue
The question is whether the trial court has jurisdiction to
take cognizance of petitioner’s suit and enforce the Agreement on
the joint custody of the parties’ child.
The Ruling of the Court
The trial court has jurisdiction to entertain petitioner’s suit
but not to enforce the Agreement which is void. However, factual
and equity considerations militate against the dismissal of
petitioner’s suit and call for the remand of the case to settle the
question of Stephanie’s custody.
 Regional Trial Courts Vested With Jurisdiction to Enforce
Contracts
Subject matter jurisdiction is conferred by law. At the time
petitioner filed his suit in the trial court, statutory law vests on
Regional Trial Courts exclusive original jurisdiction over civil
actions incapable of pecuniary estimation.9 An action for specific
performance, such as petitioner’s suit to enforce the Agreement on
joint child custody, belongs to this species of actions.10 Thus,
jurisdiction-wise, petitioner went to the right court.
Indeed, the trial court’s refusal to entertain petitioner’s suit
was grounded not on its lack of power to do so but on its thinking
that the Illinois court’s divorce decree stripped it of jurisdiction.
This conclusion is unfounded. What the Illinois court retained was
"jurisdiction x xx for the purpose of enforcing all and sundry the
various provisions of [its] Judgment for Dissolution."11
Petitioner’s suit seeks the enforcement not of the "various
provisions" of the divorce decree but of the post-divorce
Agreement on joint child custody. Thus, the action lies beyond the
zone of the Illinois court’s so-called "retained jurisdiction."
Petitioner’s Suit Lacks Cause of Action
The foregoing notwithstanding, the trial court cannot
enforce the Agreement which is contrary to law.
In this jurisdiction, parties to a contract are free to stipulate
the terms of agreement subject to the minimum ban on
stipulations contrary to law, morals, good customs, public order,
or public policy.12 Otherwise, the contract is denied legal
existence, deemed "inexistent and void from the beginning."13 For
lack of relevant stipulation in the Agreement, these and other
ancillary Philippine substantive law serve as default parameters to
test the validity of the Agreement’s joint child custody
stipulations.14
At the time the parties executed the Agreement on 28
January 2002, two facts are undisputed: (1) Stephanie was under
seven years old (having been born on 21 September 1995); and
(2) petitioner and respondent were no longer married under the
laws of the United States because of the divorce decree. The
relevant Philippine law on child custody for spouses separated in
fact or in law15 (under the second paragraph of Article 213 of the
Family Code) is also undisputed: "no child under seven years of
age shall be separated from the mother x x x."16 (This statutory
awarding of sole parental custody17 to the mother is
mandatory,18 grounded on sound policy consideration,19 subject
only to a narrow exception not alleged to obtain here.20 ) Clearly
then, the Agreement’s object to establish a post-divorce joint
custody regime between respondent and petitioner over their
child under seven years old contravenes Philippine law.
The Agreement is not only void ab initio for being contrary
to law, it has also been repudiated by the mother when she
refused to allow joint custody by the father. The Agreement would
be valid if the spouses have not divorced or separated because the
law provides for joint parental authority when spouses live
together.21 However, upon separation of the spouses, the mother
takes sole custody under the law if the child is below seven years
old and any agreement to the contrary is void. Thus, the law
suspends the joint custody regime for (1) children under seven of
(2) separated or divorced spouses. Simply put, for a child within
this age bracket (and for commonsensical reasons), the law
decides for the separated or divorced parents how best to take
care of the child and that is to give custody to the separated
mother. Indeed, the separated parents cannot contract away the
provision in the Family Code on the maternal custody of children
below seven years anymore than they can privately agree that a
mother who is unemployed, immoral, habitually drunk, drug
addict, insane or afflicted with a communicable disease will have
sole custody of a child under seven as these are reasons deemed
compelling to preclude the application of the exclusive maternal
custody regime under the second paragraph of Article 213.22

It will not do to argue that the second paragraph of Article
213 of the Family Code applies only to judicial custodial
agreements based on its text that "No child under seven years of
age shall be separated from the mother, unless the court finds
compelling reasons to order otherwise." To limit this provision’s
enforceability to court sanctioned agreements while placing
private agreements beyond its reach is to sanction a double
standard in custody regulation of children under seven years old
of separated parents. This effectively empowers separated
parents, by the simple expedient of avoiding the courts, to subvert
a legislative policy vesting to the separated mother sole custody of
her children under seven years of age "to avoid a tragedy where a
mother has seen her baby torn away from her."This ignores the
legislative basis that "[n]o man can sound the deep sorrows of a
mother who is deprived of her child of tender age."
It could very well be that Article 213’s bias favoring one
separated parent (mother) over the other (father) encourages
paternal neglect, presumes incapacity for joint parental custody,
robs the parents of custodial options, or hijacks decision-making
between the separated parents. However, these are objections
which question the law’s wisdom not its validity or uniform
enforceability. The forum to air and remedy these grievances is the
legislature, not this Court. At any rate, the rule’s seeming
harshness or undesirability is tempered by ancillary agreements
the separated parents may wish to enter such as granting the
father visitation and other privileges. These arrangements are not
inconsistent with the regime of sole maternal custody under the
second paragraph of Article 213 which merely grants to the
mother final authority on the care and custody of the minor under
seven years of age, in case of disagreements.
Further, the imposed custodial regime under the second
paragraph of Article 213 is limited in duration, lasting only until
the child’s seventh year. From the eighth year until the child’s
emancipation, the law gives the separated parents freedom,
subject to the usual contractual limitations, to agree on custody
regimes they see fit to adopt. Lastly, even supposing that
petitioner and respondent are not barred from entering into the
Agreement for the joint custody of Stephanie, respondent
repudiated the Agreement by asserting sole custody over
Stephanie. Respondent’s act effectively brought the parties back to
ambit of the default custodial regime in the second paragraph of
Article 213 of the Family Code vesting on respondent sole custody
of Stephanie.
Nor can petitioner rely on the divorce decree’s alleged
invalidity - not because the Illinois court lacked jurisdiction or that
the divorce decree violated Illinois law, but because the divorce
was obtained by his Filipino spouse - to support the Agreement’s
enforceability. The argument that foreigners in this jurisdiction
are not bound by foreign divorce decrees is hardly novel. Van Dorn
v. Romillo settled the matter by holding that an alien spouse of a
Filipino is bound by a divorce decree obtained abroad. There, we
dismissed the alien divorcee’s Philippine suit for accounting of
alleged post-divorce conjugal property and rejected his
submission that the foreign divorce (obtained by the Filipino
spouse) is not valid in this jurisdiction in this wise:
There can be no question as to the validity of that Nevada
divorce in any of the States of the United States. The decree is
binding on private respondent as an American citizen. For
instance, private respondent cannot sue petitioner, as her
husband, in any State of the Union. What he is contending in this
case is that the divorce is not valid and binding in this jurisdiction,
the same being contrary to local law and public policy.
It is true that owing to the nationality principle embodied
in Article 15 of the Civil Code, only Philippine nationals are
covered by the policy against absolute divorces the same being
considered contrary to our concept of public policy and morality.
However, aliens may obtain divorces abroad, which may be
recognized in the Philippines, provided they are valid according to of justice to allow the parties to take advantage of the court’s
their national law. In this case, the divorce in Nevada released jurisdiction, submit evidence on the custodial arrangement best
private respondent from the marriage from the standards of serving Stephanie’s interest, and let the trial court render
American law, under which divorce dissolves the marriage. judgment. This disposition is consistent with the settled doctrine
that in child custody proceedings, equity may be invoked to serve
x xxx
the child’s best interest.
Thus, pursuant to his national law, private respondent is no
WHEREFORE, we REVERSE the Orders dated 1 March 2005
longer the husband of petitioner. He would have no standing to
and 23 June 2005 of the Regional Trial Court of Makati City,
sue in the case below as petitioner’s husband entitled to exercise
Branch 60. The case is REMANDED for further proceedings
control over conjugal assets. As he is bound by the Decision of his
consistent with this ruling.
own country’s Court, which validly exercised jurisdiction over him,
and whose decision he does not repudiate, he is estopped by his
own representation before said Court from asserting his right over
the alleged conjugal property. (Emphasis supplied)
We reiterated Van Dorn in Pilapil v. Ibay-Somera to dismiss
criminal complaints for adultery filed by the alien divorcee (who
obtained the foreign divorce decree) against his former Filipino
spouse because he no longer qualified as "offended spouse"
entitled to file the complaints under Philippine procedural rules.
Thus, it should be clear by now that a foreign divorce decree
carries as much validity against the alien divorcee in this
jurisdiction as it does in the jurisdiction of the alien’s nationality,
irrespective of who obtained the divorce.

The Facts of the Case and Nature of Proceeding Justify Remand

Instead of ordering the dismissal of petitioner’s suit, the

logical end to its lack of cause of action, we remand the case for the
trial court to settle the question of Stephanie’s custody. Stephanie
is now nearly 15 years old, thus removing the case outside of the
ambit of the mandatory maternal custody regime under Article
213 and bringing it within coverage of the default standard on
child custody proceedings – the best interest of the child. As the
question of custody is already before the trial court and the child’s
parents, by executing the Agreement, initially showed inclination
to share custody, it is in the interest of swift and efficient rendition
Zapanta versus Local Civil Registrar of Davao
237 SCRA 25
Facts:
The petition alleges that petitioner Gliceria S. Zapanta is the
widow of the late "Florencio B. Zapanta;" that said deceased was
born in Sta. Rita, Pampanga, on 24 October 1899, as evidenced by
his certificate of baptism. That on 5 August 1965, the late
Florencio B. Zapanta was admitted and confined at the San Pedro
Hospital, Davao City, and met his untimely demise on 11 August
1965 (p. 6, Record on Appeal); that after the traditional church
ceremonies at the Sta. Ana Church, Davao City, the remains of the
deceased was entombed at the municipal cemetery of Davao City
on 12 August 1965; that when petitioner requested the Local Civil
Registrar of Davao City for a certified true copy of the death
certificate of her late husband, she discovered, to her dismay and
surprise, that the name indicated in said death certificate was
"Flaviano Castro Zapanta," albeit the date of death and all other
circumstances and information reflected therein clearly and
conclusively revealed that the person referred to therein was no
other than her late husband, Florencio B. Zapanta
Hence, petitioner prays that, after due notice and hearing,
an order be issued directing the Local Civil Registrar of Davao City
to correct the death certificate of her deceased husband by
changing his name from "Flaviano Castro Zapanta" to "Florencio B.
Zapanta."
After due publication of the notice of hearing, the Assistant
City Fiscal of Davao City filed a motion to dismiss the petition,
advancing inter-alia that petitioner seeks to correct not only a
clerical error, but indeed a substantial one.
The Regional Trial Court dismissed the petition on the
ground that the correction of the name "Flaviano Castro Zapanta"
to "Florencio B. Zapanta," was not merely clerical but substantial
in nature and that it thereby did not have the power to grant the
relief prayed for.
Issue:
WON the RTC erred in dismissing the petition to correct the
death certificate of the deceased.
Ruling:
Yes, the RTC erred in dismissing the petition to correct the
death certificate of the deceased.
The general perception was that the judicial proceeding
under Art. 412 of the Civil Code, implemented by Rule 108 of the
Rules of Court, could only justify the correction of innocuous or
clerical errors apparent on the face of the record and capable of
being corrected by mere reference to it, such as misspellings and
obvious mistakes. However, in later cases, the Court has held that
it adheres to the principle that even substantial errors in a civil
registry may be corrected and the true facts established provided
the parties aggrieved by the error avail themselves of the
appropriate adversary proceeding.
Moreover, the Court defined the Adversary Proceeding
wherein one having opposing parties; contested, as distinguished
from an ex parte application, one of which the party seeking relief
has given legal warning to the other party, and afforded the latter
an opportunity to contest it. Hence, provided the trial court has
conducted proceedings where all relevant facts have been fully
and properly developed, where opposing counsel has been given
opportunity to demolish the opposite party’s case, and where the
evidence has been thoroughly weighed and considered, the suit or
proceeding is “appropriate.”
In the case at bar, the petition filed by the respondent in the
lower court by way of a special proceeding for cancellation and/or
correction of entries in the civil register with the requisite notice
and publication and the recorded proceedings that actually took
place thereafter could very well be regarded as that proper suit or
appropriate action.
Thus, the questioned Order of the then Court of First
Instance (now Regional Trial Court) of Davao is hereby SET ASIDE
and Special Proceeding is ordered reinstated.
NORMA A. DEL SOCORRO, for and in behalf of her minor child
RODERIGO NORJO VAN WILSEM,vs.ERNST JOHAN BRINKMAN
VAN WILSEM,
G.R. No. 193707. December 10, 2014.
Conflict of Laws; Evidence; Burden of Proof; Foreign Laws;
International Law; In international law, the party who wants to
have a foreign law applied to a dispute or case has the burden of
proving the foreign law.—In international law, the party who
wants to have a foreign law applied to a dispute or case has the
burden of proving the foreign law. In the present case, respondent
hastily concludes that being a national of the Netherlands, he is
governed by such laws on the matter of provision of and capacity
to support. While respondent pleaded the laws of the Netherlands
in advancing his position that he is not obliged to support his son,
he never proved the same. It is incumbent upon respondent to
plead and prove that the national law of the Netherlands does not
impose upon the parents the obligation to support their child
(either before, during or after the issuance of a divorce decree),
because Llorente v. Court of Appeals, 345 SCRA 592 (2000), has
already enunciated that: True, foreign laws do not prove
themselves in our jurisdiction and our courts are not authorized to
take judicial notice of them. Like any other fact, they must be
alleged and proved.
Same; Doctrine of Processual Presumption; Foreign Laws; If the
foreign law involved is not properly pleaded and proved, our
courts will presume that the foreign law is the same as our local or
domestic or internal law.—In view of respondent’s failure to prove
the national law of the Netherlands in his favor, the doctrine of
processual presumption shall govern. Under this doctrine, if the
foreign law involved is not properly pleaded and proved, our
courts will presume that the foreign law is the same as our local or
domestic or internal law. Thus, since the law of the Netherlands as
regards the obligation to support has not been properly pleaded
and proved in the instant case, it is presumed to be the same with
Philippine law, which enforces the obligation of parents to support
their children and penalizing the noncompliance therewith.
FACTS:
Norma A. Del Socorro and Ernst Van Wilsem contracted
marriage in Holland. They were blessed with a son named
Roderigo Norjo Van Wilsem. Unfortunately, their marriage bond
ended by virtue of a Divorce Decree issued by the appropriate
Court of Holland. Thereafter, Norma and her son came home to the
Philippines. According to Norma, Ernst made a promise to provide
monthly support to their son. However, since the arrival of
petitioner and her son in the Philippines, Ernst never gave support
to Roderigo. Norma filed a complaint against Ernst for violation of
R.A. No. 9262 for the latter’s unjust refusal to support his minor
child with petitioner.
The trial court dismissed the complaint since the facts
charged in the information do not constitute an offense with
respect to the accused, he being an alien.
ISSUE:
Does a foreign national have an obligation to support his minor
child under Philippine law?
RULING:
Yes, since Ernst is a citizen of Holland or the Netherlands,
we agree with the RTC that he is subject to the laws of his country,
not to Philippine law, as to whether he is obliged to give support to
his child, as well as the consequences of his failure to do so. This
does not, however, mean that Ernst is not obliged to support
Norma’s son altogether. In international law, the party who wants
to have a foreign law applied to a dispute or case has the burden of
proving the foreign law. In the present case, Ernst hastily
concludes that being a national of the Netherlands, he is governed
by such laws on the matter of provision of and capacity to support. B. AGREEMENT OF THEPARTIES
While Ernst pleaded the laws of the Netherlands in advancing his
See Cadalin vs. POEA 238 SCRA 721
position that he is not obliged to support his son, he never proved
the same. It is incumbent upon Ernst to plead and prove that the See HSBC vs. Sherman 176 SCRA 331
national law of the Netherlands does not impose upon the parents
C. SUBSTANCE VS. PROCEDURAL PRINCIPLE
the obligation to support their child. Foreign laws do not prove
themselves in our jurisdiction and our courts are not authorized to D. CENTER OF GRAVITY DOCTRINE
take judicial notice of them. Like any other fact, they must be
alleged and proved. E. RENVOI DOCTRINE

Moreover, foreign law should not be applied when its -see Aznar vs. Garcia
application would work undeniable injustice to the citizens or F. LEX FORI
residents of the forum. To give justice is the most important
function of law; hence, a law, or judgment or contract that is G. APPLICABILITY OF PH LAWS AND ITS EXCEPTIONS
obviously unjust negates the fundamental principles of Conflict of
Laws. Applying the foregoing, even if the laws of the Netherlands
neither enforce a parent’s obligation to support his child nor
penalize the non-compliance therewith, such obligation is still duly
enforceable in the Philippines because it would be of great
injustice to the child to be denied of financial support when the
latter is entitled thereto.
H. PROOF AND AUTHENTICATION OF FOREIGN LAW
WILDVALLEY SHIPPING CO., LTD. V. COURT OF APPEALS AND
PHILIPPINE PRESIDENT LINES, INC.
G.R. NO. 119602 OCTOBER 6, 2000
FACTS:
The Philippine Roxas, a vessel owned by Philippine
President Lines, Inc., private respondent herein, arrived in Puerto
Ordaz, Venezuela, to load iron ore. Upon the completion of the
loading and when the vessel was ready to leave port, Mr. Vasquez,
an official pilot of Venezuela, was designated by the harbor
authorities in Puerto Ordaz to navigate the Philippine Roxas
through the Orinoco River. However, the Philippine Roxas ran
aground in the Orinoco River, this obstructing the ingress and
egress of vessels. As a result of the blockage, the Malandrinon, a
vessel owned by herein petitioner Wildvalley was unable to sail
out. Subsequently, Wildvalley filed a suit with the RTC of Manila
against President Lines Inc. and Pioneer Insurance Company for
damages in the form of unearned profits and interest thereon.
The petitioner averred that the Court of Appeals seriously
erred in disregarding Venezuelan law despite the fact that the
same has been substantially proved in the trial court without
objection from private respondent, and who objection was
interposed belatedly on appeal.
ISSUE:
Is the Venezuelan law applicable to the case at bar?
RULING:
It is well-settled that foreign laws do not prove themselves
in our jurisdiction and our courts are not authorized to take
judicial notice of them. Like any other fact, they must be alleged
and proved. A distinction is to be made as to the manner of
proving a written and an unwritten law. The former falls under
Section 24, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court, as amended, the entire
provision of which is quoted hereunder. Where the foreign law
sought to be proved is “unwritten”, the oral testimony of expert
witnesses is admissible, as are printed and published books of
reports of decisions of the courts of the country concerned if
proved to be commonly admitted in such courts.
Section 24 of Rule 132 of the Rules of Court as amended,
provides: The record of public document referred to in paragraph
(a) of Section 19, when admissible for any purpose, may be
evidenced by an official publication thereof or by a copy attested
by the officer having the legal custody of the record, or by his
deputy, and accompanied, if the record is not kept in the
Philippines, with a certificate that such officer has the custody. If
the office in which the record is kept is in a foreign country, the
certificate may be made by a secretary of the embassy or legation,
consul general, consul, vice consul, or consular agent or by any
officer in the foreign service of the Philippines stationed in the
foreign country in which the record is kept, and authenticated by
the seal of his office.”
We take note that these written laws were not proven in
the manner provided by Section 24 of Rule 132, of the Rules of
Court. For a foreign public document to be admissible, the
following requisites are mandatory: (1) it must be attested by the
officer having legal custody of the records or by his deputy; and
(2) it must be accompanied by a certificate by a secretary of the
embassy or legation, consul general, consul, vice consular or
consular agent or foreign service officer, and with the seal of his
office.
It is not enough that the GacetaOficial, or a book published
by the Ministerio de Comunicaciones of Venezuela, was presented
as evidence with Captain Monzon attesting it. It is also required by
Section 24, of Rule 132 of the Rules of Court that a certificate that
Captain Monzon, who attested the document, is the officer who
had legal custody of those records made by a secretary of the
embassy or legation, consul general, consul, vice consul or but on appeal, the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC)
consular agent or by any officer in the foreign service of the reversed the decision of the arbiter. The Court of Appeals likewise
Philippines stationed in Venezuela, and authenticated by the seal affirmed the NLRC.
of his office accompanying the copy o the public document. No
ISSUE:
such certificate could be found in the records of the case.
Whether or not the Saudi labor laws should be applied.
EDI-Staff builders International, Inc. vs. RULING:
National Labor Relations Commission,
No. The specific Saudi labor laws were not proven in court. EDI did
537 SCRA 409, October 26, 2007
not present proof as to the existence and the specific provisions of
such foreign law. Hence, processual presumption applies and
FACTS: Philippine labor laws shall be used. In international law, the party
who wants to have a foreign law applied to a dispute or case has
In 1993, EDI-Staffbuilders, Inc. (EDI), upon request of Omar
the burden of proving the foreign law. The foreign law is treated as
Ahmed Ali Bin Bechr Est. (OAB), a company in Saudi Arabia, sent
a question of fact to be properly pleaded and proved as the judge
to OAB resumes from which OAB can choose a computer specialist.
or labor arbiter cannot take judicial notice of a foreign law. He is
Eleazar Gran was selected. It was agreed that his monthly salary
presumed to know only domestic or forum law. Unfortunately for
shall be $850.00. But five months into his service in Saudi Arabia,
petitioner, it did not prove the pertinent Saudi laws on the matter;
Gran received a termination letter and right there and then was
thus, the International Law doctrine of presumed-identity
removed from his post. The termination letter states that he was
approach or processual presumption comes into play. Where a
incompetent because he does not know the ACAD system which is
foreign law is not pleaded or, even if pleaded, is not proved, the
required in his line of work; that he failed to enrich his knowledge
presumption is that foreign law is the same as ours. Thus, we
during his 5 month stay to prove his competence; that he is
apply Philippine labor laws in determining the issues presented
disobedient because he failed to submit the required daily reports
before us.
to OAB. Gran then signed a quitclaim whereby he declared that he
is releasing OAB from any liability in exchange of 2,948.00 Riyal.
When Gran returned, he filed a labor case for illegal
dismissal against EDI and OAB. EDI in its defense averred that the
dismissal is valid because when Gran and OAB signed the
employment contract, both parties agreed that Saudi labor laws
shall govern all matters relating to the termination of Gran’s
employment; that under Saudi labor laws, Gran’s termination due
to incompetence and insubordination is valid; that Gran’s
insubordination and incompetence is outlined in the termination
letter Gran received. The labor arbiter dismissed the labor case
NORSE MANAGEMENT CO. (PTE) and PACIFIC SEAMEN Supreme Court decisions in a long line of cases that a foreign law,
SERVICES, INC., vs. being a matter of evidence, must be alleged and proved, the law of
National Seamen Board,et. Al. Singapore ought not to be recognized in this case.
G.R. No. L-54204 September 30, 1982
But it is our considered opinion that the jurisprudence on this
matter was never meant to apply to cases before administrative or
Principle: Administrative and quasi-judicial bodies are not
quasi-judicial bodies such as the National Seamen Board. For well-
bound strictly by technical rules.
settled also is the rule that administrative and quasi-judicial
Topic: Proof and Authentication of Foreign Law bodies are not bound strictly by technical rules. It has always been
the policy of this Board, as enunciated in a long line of cases, that
FACTS:
in cases of valid claims for benefits on account of injury or death
Napoleon Abordo is an employee of Norse Management CO. while in the course of employment, the law of the country in which
(petitioner) as Second Engineer. He died from apoplectic stroke the vessel is registered shall be considered. We see no reason to
while in the course of employment. He embarks in a vessel of deviate from this well considered policy. Certainly not on technical
Singaporean Registry. Due to his death, Napolean’s wife claimed grounds as movants herein would like us to.
for compensation benefits before National Seamen’s Board
Since National Seamen Board is a quasi-judicial body, then it may
(respondent) alleging that the benefits that she will be receiving
not be bound strictly by the technical rules. Hence, its decision it
shall be based on the law where the vessel is registered. On the
using Singaporean Law is valid.
other hand, petitioners contend that the law of Singapore should
not be applied because the respondent don’t have a jurisdiction
over Singapore’s Insurance Law, that their responsibility is not
alleged in the complaint and that no proof of the existence of the
Workmen’s Insurance Law of Singapore. Respondent resolve the
case and used the Law of Singapore as basis of the benefits.
Petitioner appealed the resolution before the Ministry of Labor but
it did not receive any favorable consideration. Hence, the current
petition.
ISSUE:
What law shall govern? Philippine law or Singaporean Law?
RULING:
Singaporean Law.
The court ruled that it is true that the law of Singapore was not
alleged and proved in the course of the hearing. And following
TOPIC: CITIZENSHIP AND MODES OF ACQUISITION born citizen as required under Article VI, section 6 of the
Constitution.
CASE: BENGZON VS. HRET
HRET rendered its decision dismissing the petition for quo
FACTS:
warranto and declaring Cruz the duly elected Representative in
The citizenship of respondent Cruz is at issue in this case, in the said election.
view of the constitutional requirement that “no person shall be a
ISSUE:
Member of the House of Representatives unless he is a natural-
born citizen.” Whether or not Cruz, a natural-born Filipino who became an
American citizen, can still be considered a natural-born Filipino
Cruz was a natural-born citizen of the Philippines. He was
upon his reacquisition of Philippine citizenship.
born in Tarlac in 1960 of Filipino parents. In 1985, however, Cruz
enlisted in the US Marine Corps and without the consent of the RULING:
Republic of the Philippines, took an oath of allegiance to the USA.
YES.
As a consequence, he lost his Filipino citizenship for under CA No.
63 [(An Act Providing for the Ways in Which Philippine Filipino citizens who have lost their citizenship may
Citizenship May Be Lost or Reacquired (1936)] section 1(4), a however reacquire the same in the manner provided by law. C.A.
Filipino citizen may lose his citizenship by, among other, No. 63 enumerates the 3 modes by which Philippine citizenship
“rendering service to or accepting commission in the armed forces may be reacquired by a former citizen:
of a foreign country.” Whatever doubt that remained regarding his
loss of Philippine citizenship was erased by his naturalization as a
U.S. citizen in 1990, in connection with his service in the U.S. 1. by naturalization,
Marine Corps.
2. by repatriation, and
In 1994, Cruz reacquired his Philippine citizenship through
repatriation under RA 2630 [(An Act Providing for Reacquisition 3. by direct act of Congress.
of Philippine Citizenship by Persons Who Lost Such Citizenship by **
Rendering Service To, or Accepting Commission In, the Armed
Forces of the United States (1960)]. He ran for and was elected as
the Representative of the 2nd District of Pangasinan in the 1998
elections. He won over petitioner Bengzon who was then running
for reelection.
Subsequently, petitioner filed a case for Quo Warranto Ad
Cautelam with respondent HRET claiming that Cruz was not
qualified to become a member of the HOR since he is not a natural-
Repatriation may be had under various statutes by those who lost son of a Filipino father. It bears stressing that the act of
their citizenship due to: repatriation allows him to recover, or return to, his original status
before he lost his Philippine citizenship.
1. desertion of the armed forces;
2. services in the armed forces of the allied forces in World
War II;
3. service in the Armed Forces of the United States at any
other time,
4. marriage of a Filipino woman to an alien; and
5. political economic necessity.
Repatriation results in the recovery of the original
nationality. This means that a naturalized Filipino who lost his
citizenship will be restored to his prior status as a naturalized
Filipino citizen. On the other hand, if he was originally a natural-
born citizen before he lost his Philippine citizenship, he will be
restored to his former status as a natural-born Filipino.
R.A. No. 2630 provides:
Sec 1. Any person who had lost his Philippine citizenship by
rendering service to, or accepting commission in, the Armed
Forces of the United States, or after separation from the Armed
Forces of the United States, acquired United States citizenship,
may reacquire Philippine citizenship by taking an oath of
allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines and registering the
same with Local Civil Registry in the place where he resides or last
resided in the Philippines. The said oath of allegiance shall contain
a renunciation of any other citizenship.
Having thus taken the required oath of allegiance to the
Republic and having registered the same in the Civil Registry of
Magantarem, Pangasinan in accordance with the aforecited
provision, Cruz is deemed to have recovered his original status as
a natural-born citizen, a status which he acquired at birth as the
Mary Grace Poe-Llamanzares VS. Comelec
FACTS:
Mary Grace Natividad S. Poe-Llamanzares (petitioner) was
found abandoned as a newborn in the Parish Church of Jaro, Iloilo
by a certain Edgardo Militar on 3rd day of September year 1968.
Parental care and custody over petitioner was passed on by
Edgardo to his relatives, Emiliano Militar and Emiliano's wife. The
relatives then reported and registered the child as a founding with
the Civil Registrar of Iloilo. The child was then named Mary Grace
Natividad Contreras Militar. Grace was adopted by celebrity
spouses Ronald Allan Kelley Poe (a.k.a. Fenando Poe, Jr.) and
Jesusa Sonora Poe (a.k.a. Susan Roces).The petitioner was given
the name "Mary Grace Natividad Contreras Militar"in her
Foundling Certificate and Certificate of Live Birth. The trial court
granted their petition and ordered that petitioner's name be
changed from "Mary Grace Natividad Contreras Militar" to "Mary
Grace Natividad Sonora Poe" on 13th day of May year 1974.
Although there were annotations placed in the child’s
foundling certificate but it was only in 2005 that Susan Roces
found out that their lawyer failed to secure a new Certificate of
Live Birth with a Poe’s new name as well as the name of the
adoptive parents. Roces then submitted an affidavit and in 2006, a
Certificate of Live Birth in the name of Mary Grace Poe was
released by the Civil Registry of Iloilo.
At the age of 18, Poe was registered as a voter of San Juan.
Initially, the petitioner was enrolled and pursued a degree in
Development Studies at the University of the Philippines but she
chose to pursue her studies abroad and left for the United States of
America (U.S.) in 1988. Poe graduated in 1991 from Boston
College in Chestnuts Hill, Massachusetts where she earned her
Bachelor of Arts degree in Political Studies. In 1988, she was
issued a Philippine passport.
On 27 July 1991, Poe married Teodoro Llamanzares and flew to
the US right after the wedding. The petitioner gave birth to her
eldest child Brian Daniel (Brian) on 16th day of April year 1992 in
the US. In 2001, Poe became a naturalized American Citizen and
she obtained a US Passport that same year. In April 2004, Poe
came back to the Philippines in order to support her father’s
candidacy. It was at this time that she gave birth to her youngest
daughter. Her two daughters Hanna MacKenzie (Hanna) and
Jesusa Anika (Anika) were both born in the Philippines on 10 July
1998 and 5 June 2004, respectively. Poe returned to the US in July
2004 with her two daughters. Poe returned in December 2004
after knowing her father’s deteriorating condition. The latter died
and Poe stayed until February 2005 to take care of the funeral
arrangements. Poe wanted to be with her grieving mother that is
why she and her husband decided to move and reside
permanently in the Philippines sometime first quarter of 2005.
They prepared for resettlement including notification of their
children’s schools, coordination with property movers and inquiry
with Philippine authorities as to how they can bring their pet dog.
According to Poe, as early as 2004, she already quit her job
in the US. Poe came home on May 24, 2005 and immediately
secured a TIN while her husband stayed in the US. They stayed
with her mother until she and husband was able to purchase a
condominium in San Juan sometime February 2006. On February
14, 2006, Poe went back to the US to set up the other family
belongings. She commuted back in March 2006. In early 2006, Poe
and husband acquired a property in Corinthian Hills in Quezon
City where they built their family home.
On July 7, 2006, Poe took her Oath of Allegiance to the
Republic of the Philippines pursuant to R.A. 9225. On July 10,
2006, she filed a sworn petition to reacquire Philippine citizenship
together with petitions for derivative citizenship on behalf of her
three children. The Bureau of Immigration acted in favor of the
petition on July 18, 2006. She and her children were then
considered dual citizens. Poe then registered as voter in August ISSUES:
2006 and secured a Philippine passport thereafter.
Issue 1: Grace Poe-Llamanzares is a natural-born Filipino citizen.
On October 6, 2010, she was appointed as Chairperson of
Issue 2: Grace Poe satisfies the 10-year residency requirement.
the MTRCB. Before assuming her post, she executed an Affidavit of
Renunciation of Allegiance to the US before a notary public in Issue 3: Grace Poe’s candidacy should be denied or cancelled for
Pasig City on October 20, 2010. The following day, she submitted committing material misrepresentations in her COC.
the Affidavit to the Bureau of Immigration and took her oath as a
RULINGS:
chairperson of MTRCB. Poe from them on, she stopped using her
American passport. 1. Yes, Grace Poe might be and is considerably a natural-born
Filipino. For that, she satisfies one of the constitutional
On July 12, 2011, Poe executed an Oath/Affirmation of
requirements that only natural-born Filipinos may run for
Renunciation of Nationality of the US before the Vice Consul of the
presidency. First, there is a very high probability that Grace Poe’s
US Embassy in Manila.On December 9, 2011, the US Vice Consul
parents are Filipinos. Grace Poe's physical features are typical of
issued a Certificate of Loss of Nationality of the US effective
Filipinos. As a matter of fact that she was abandoned as an infant
October 21, 2010. On October 2, 2012, Poe filed with COMELEC
in a municipality where the population of the Philippines is
her Certificate of Candidacy for Senator saying that she was
overwhelmingly Filipinos such that there would be more than
resident of the Philippines for a period of 6 years and 6 months
99% chance that a child born in such province is a Filipino is also a
before May 13, 2013. She was then proclaimed a Senator on May
circumstantial mevidence of her parents’ nationality. That high
16, 2013. On October 15, 2015, Poe filed her COC for the
probability and the evidence on which it is based are admissible
Presidency for the May 2016 elections. She declared that she is a
under Rule 128, Section 4 of the Revised Rules on Evidence. To
natural born and her residence in the Philippine up to the day
assume otherwise is to accept the absurd, if not the virtually
before election would be 10 years and 11 months counted from
impossible, as the norm.
May 24, 2005.
Second, by votes of 7-5, the Supreme Court pronounced and
There were some petitions filed against Poe because there
said that foundlings are as a natural-born citizens. This is based on
are some issues about her that made her have this case in running
the finding that the deliberations of the 1934 Constitutional
for president. Petitions were filed against Poe alleging that (1) she
Convention manifests that the framers intended foundlings to be
committed material misrepresentation in her COC when she stated
covered by the enumeration. While the 1935 Constitution’s
that she is a resident of the Philippines for at least 10 years 11
enumeration is silent as to foundlings, there is no restrictive
months up to the day before May 9, 2016 Elections, (2) she is not
language which would definitely exclude foundlings either.
natural born considering that Poe is a foundling and (3) Grace
Because of silence and ambiguity in the enumeration with respect
Poe’s candidacy should be denied, rejected,or cancelled for
to foundlings, the Supreme Court felt the need to examine or test
committing material misrepresentations in her Certificate of
the intent of the framers.
Candidacy.
 Third, that foundlings are automatically conferred with
natural-born citizenship is supported by treaties and the general
principles of international law. Although the Philippines is not a
signatory to some of these treaties, it adheres to the customary
rule to presume foundlings as having born of the country in which
the foundling is found.
2. Yes. Grace Poe satisfied the requirements of animus manendi
coupled with animus revertendi in acquiring a new domicile. Grace
Poe’s domicile had been timely changed as of May 24, 2005, and
not on July 18, 2006 when her application under RA 9225 was
approved by the BI. COMELEC’s reliance on cases which decree
that an alien’s stay in the country cannot be counted unless she
acquires a permanent resident visa or reacquires her Filipino
citizenship is without merit. Such cases are different from the
circumstances in this case, in which Grace Poe presented an
overwhelming and somehow an accurate evidence of her actual
stay and intent to abandon permanently her domicile in the US.
Coupled with her eventual application to reacquire Philippine
citizenship and her family’s actual continuous stay in the
Philippines over the years, it is clear that when Grace Poe returned
on May 24, 2005, it was for good.
3. No. The COMELEC cannot cancel, deny or reject her Cerftificate
of Candidacy on the ground that she misrepresented facts as to her
citizenship and residency because such facts refer to grounds for
ineligibility in which the COMELEC has no jurisdiction to decide
upon. Only when there is a prior authority finding that a candidate
is suffering from a disqualification provided by law or the
Constitution that the COMELEC may deny due course or cancel her
candidacy on ground of false representations regarding her
qualifications. In this case, by authority of the Supreme Court
Grace Poe was pronounced qualified as a candidate for the
presidency. Hence, there cannot be any false representations in
her COC regarding her citizenship and residency.
DJUMANTAN VS. DOMINGO
G.R. No. 99358 January 30, 1995
Marriage of an alien woman to a Filipino husband does not ipso
facto make her a Filipino citizen and does not excuse her from
her failure to depart from the country upon the expiration of
her extended stay here as an alien.
Facts
Bernard Banez, the husband of Marina Cabael, went to Indonesia
as a contract worker. He embraced and was converted to Islam. On
May 17, 1974, he married petitioner in accordance with Islamic
rites. He returned to the Philippines in January 1979.
On January 13, 1979, petitioner and her two children with Banez,
(Marina and Nikulas) arrived in Manila as the “guests” of Banez.
The latter made it appear that he was just a friend of the family of
petitioner and was merely repaying the hospitality extended to
him during his stay in Indonesia. Banez executed an “Affidavit of
Guaranty and Support,” for his “guests.”
Petitioner and her children were admitted to the Philippines as
temporary visitors under Section 9(a) of the Immigration Act of
1940. In 1981, Marina Cabael discovered the true relationship of
her husband and petitioner. She filed a complaint for
“concubinage” with the Municipal Trial Court of Urdaneta,
Pangasinan against the two.
This case was, however, dismissed for lack of merit.
On March 25, 1982, the immigration status of petitioner was
changed from temporary visitor to that of permanent resident
under Section 13(a) of the same law.
On April 14, 1982, petitioner was issued an alien certificate of
registration.
Issue:
WON the petitioner’s admission into the country and the change of
her status from temporary visitor to permanent resident are legal
Ruling:
No, there was a blatant abuse of our immigration laws in effecting
petitioner’s entry into the country and the change of her
immigration status from temporary visitor to permanent resident.
All such privileges were obtained through misrepresentation.
Never was the marriage of petitioner to Banez disclosed to the
immigration authorities in her applications for temporary visitor’s
visa and for permanent residency.
The civil status of an alien applicant for admission as a temporary
visitor is a matter that could influence the exercise of discretion on
the part of the immigration authorities. The immigration
authorities would be less inclined to allow the entry of a woman
who claims to have entered into a marriage with a Filipino citizen,
who is married to another woman.
Generally, the right of the President to expel or deport aliens
whose presence is deemed inimical to the public interest is as
absolute and unqualified as the right to prohibit and prevent their
entry into the country. This right is based on the fact that since the
aliens are not part of the nation, their admission into the territory
is a matter of pure permission and simple tolerance which creates
no obligation on the part of the government to permit them to
stay.
The interest, which an alien has in being admitted into or allowed
to continue to reside in the country, is protected only so far as
Congress may choose to protect it. There is no law guaranteeing
aliens married to Filipino citizens the right to be admitted, much
less to be given permanent residency, in the Philippines.
The fact of marriage by an alien to a citizen does not withdraw her
from the operation of the immigration laws governing the
admission and exclusion of aliens. Marriage of an alien woman to a
Filipino husband does not ipso facto make her a Filipino citizen
and does not excuse her from her failure to depart from the
country upon the expiration of her extended stay here as an alien.
Therefore, the Decision of the Board of Commissioners dated
September 27, 1990 revoking the issuance of the permanent
resident visa to petitioner and the Resolution dated January 29,
1991 are REVERSED.
LOSS AND REACQUISITION OF FILIPINO CITIZENSHIP
G.R. No. 135083. May 26, 1999.*
ERNESTO S. MERCADO, petitioner, vs. EDUARDO BARRIOS
MANZANO and theCOMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, respondents.
Constitutional Law; Citizenship; Dual citizenship is different
from dual allegiance.—Dual citizenship is different from dual
allegiance. The former arises when, as a result of the concurrent
application of the different laws of two or more states, a person is
simultaneously considered a national by the said states.For
instance, such a situation may arise when a person whose parents
are citizens of a state which adheres to the principle of jus
sanguinis is born in a state which follows the doctrine of jus soli.
Such a person, ipso facto and without any voluntary act on his part,
is concurrently considered a citizen of both states.
Same; Same; Instances where it is possible for certain classes of
citizens of the Philippines to possess dual citizenship.—Considering
the citizenshipclause (Art. IV) of our Constitution, it is possible for
the following classes of citizens of the Philippines to possess dual
citizenship: (1) Those born of Filipino fathers and/or mothers in
foreign countries which follow the principle of jus soli; (2) Those
born in the Philippines of Filipino mothers and alien fathers if by
the laws of their fathers’ country such children are citizens of that
country; (3) Those who marry aliens if by the laws of the latter’s
country the former are considered citizens, unless by their act or
omission they are deemed to have renounced Philippine
citizenship. Dual allegiance, on the other hand, refers to the
situation in which a person simultaneously owes, by some positive
act, loyalty to two or more states. While dual citizenship is
involuntary, dual allegiance is the result of an individual’s volition.
Same; Same; The phrase “dual citizenship” in Republic Act No.
7160, §40(d) and in Republic Act No. 7854, §20 must be understood
as referring to “dual allegiance.”—In including §5 in Article IV on
citizenship, the concern of the Constitutional Commission was not
with dual citizens per se but with naturalized citizens who
maintain their allegiance to their countries of origin even after
their naturalization. Hence, the phrase “dual citizenship” in R.A.
No. 7160, §40(d) and in R.A. No. 7854, §20 must be understood as
referring to “dual allegiance.” Consequently, persons with mere
dual citizenship do not fall under this disqualification. Unlike those
with dual allegiance, who must, therefore, be subject to strict
process with respect to the termination of their status, for
candidates with dual citizenship, it should suffice if, upon the filing
of their certificates of candidacy, they elect Philippine citizenship
to terminate their status as persons
with dual citizenship considering that their condition is the
unavoidable consequence of conflicting laws of different states.
CASE DIGEST:
FACTS:
Manzano and Mercado are vice-mayoral candidates Makati City in
the May 11, 1998 elections. Manzano got the highest number votes
while Mercado bagged the second place. However, Manzano’s
proclamation was suspended in view of a pending petition for
disqualification on the ground that he is an American citizen.
In his answer, Manzano admitted that he is registered as a
foreigner with the Bureau of Immigration and alleged that he is a
Filipino citizen because he was born in 1955 of a Filipino father
and a Filipino mother. He was born in the United States (San
Francisco, CA) on Sept. 14, 1955 and is considered an American
citizen under US laws (jus soli). But notwithstanding his
registration as an American citizen, he did not lose his Filipino
citizenship.
The Second Division of the COMELEC granted the petition and
cancelled Manzano’s certificate of candidacy on the ground that he
is a dual citizen. Under the Local Government Code (sec. 40), dual
citizens are disqualified from running for any position.
The COMELEC en banc reversed the division’s ruling. In its
resolution, it said that Manzano was both a US citizen and a
Filipino citizen. It further ruled that although he was registered as
an alien with the Philippine Bureau of Immigration and was using
an American passport, this did not result in the loss of his
Philippine citizenship, as he did not renounce Philippine
citizenship and did not take an oath of allegiance to the US.
Moreover, the COMELEC found that when respondent attained the
age of majority, he registered himself as a Philippine voter and
voted as such, which effectively renounced his US citizenship
under American law. Under Philippine law, he no longer had US
citizenship.
Hence, this petition for certiorari.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not Manzano was no longer a US citizen
2. Whether or not Manzano is qualified to run for and hold
elective office
RULING:
DUAL CITIZENSHIP AS A GROUND FOR DISQUALIFICATION
Dual Citizenship vs. Dual Allegiance
To begin with, dual citizenship is different from dual allegiance.
The former arises when, as a result of the concurrent application
of the different laws of two or more states, a person is
simultaneously considered a national by the said states. For
instance, such a situation may arise when a person whose parents
are citizens of a state which adheres to the principle of jus
sanguinis is born in a state which follows the doctrine of jus soli.
Such a person, ipso facto and without any voluntary act on his
part, is concurrently considered a citizen of both states.
Considering the citizenship clause (Art. IV) of our Constitution, it is
possible for the following classes of citizens of the Philippines to
possess dual citizenship:
1. Those born of Filipino fathers and/or mothers in foreign countries
which follow the principle of jus soli;
2. Those born in the Philippines of Filipino mothers and alien fathers
if by the laws of their fathers’ country such children are citizens of
that country;
3. Those who marry aliens if by the laws of the latter’s country the
former are considered citizens, unless by their act or omission
they are deemed to have renounced Philippine citizenship.
There may be other situations in which a citizen of the Philippines
may, without performing any act, be also a citizen of another state;
but the above cases are clearly possible given the constitutional
provisions on citizenship.
Dual allegiance, on the other hand, refers to the situation in which
a person simultaneously owes, by some positive act, loyalty to two
or more states. While dual citizenship is involuntary, dual
allegiance is the result of an individual’s volition.
LGC prohibits “Dual Allegiance” not “Dual Citizenship”
The phrase “dual citizenship” in the LGC must be understood as
referring to “dual allegiance.” Consequently, persons with mere
dual citizenship do not fall under this disqualification. Unlike those
with dual allegiance, who must, therefore, be subject to strict
process with respect to the termination of their status, for
candidates with dual citizenship, it would suffice if, upon the filing
of their certificates of candidacy, they elect Philippine citizenship
to terminate their status as persons with dual citizenship
considering that their condition is the unavoidable consequence of
conflicting laws of different states.
 effectively repudiated his American citizenship and anything
By Electing Philippine Citizenship, the Candidate forswear which he may have said before as a dual citizen.
Allegiance to the Other Country

By electing Philippine citizenship, such candidates at the same
time forswear allegiance to the other country of which they are
also citizens and thereby terminate their status as dual citizens. It
may be that, from the point of view of the foreign state and of its
laws, such an individual has not effectively renounced his foreign
citizenship. That is of no moment.
PETITIONER’S ELECTION OF PHILIPPINE CITIZENSHIP
The COMELEC en banc’s ruling was that Manzano’s act of
registering himself as a voter was an effective renunciation of his
American citizenship. This ruling is in line with the US
Immigration and Nationality Act wherein it is provided that “a
person who is a national of the United States, whether by birth or
naturalization, shall lose his nationality by: (e) Voting in a political
election in a foreign state or participating in an election or
plebiscite to determine the sovereignty over foreign territory.” But
this provision was declared unconstitutional by the US Supreme
Court. Nevertheless, our SC held that by filing a certificate of
candidacy when he ran for his present post, private respondent
elected Philippine citizenship and in effect renounced his
American citizenship.
On the other hand, private respondent’s oath of allegiance to the
Philippines, when considered with the fact that he has spent his
youth and adulthood, received his education, practiced his
profession as an artist, and taken part in past elections in this
country, leaves no doubt of his election of Philippine citizenship.
His declarations will be taken upon the faith that he will fulfil his
undertaking made under oath. Should he betray that trust, there
are enough sanctions for declaring the loss of his Philippine
citizenship through expatriation in appropriate proceedings. In Yu
v. Defensor-Santiago, we sustained the denial of entry into the
country of petitioner on the ground that, after taking his oath as a
naturalized citizen, he applied for the renewal of his Portuguese
passport and declared in commercial documents executed abroad
that he was a Portuguese national. A similar sanction can be taken
against any one who, in electing Philippine citizenship, renounces
his foreign nationality, but subsequently does some act
constituting renunciation of his Philippine citizenship.

To recapitulate, by declaring in his certificate of candidacy that he

is a Filipino citizen; that he is not a permanent resident or
immigrant of another country; that he will defend and support the
Constitution of the Philippines and bear true faith and allegiance
thereto and that he does so without mental reservation, private
respondent has, as far as the laws of this country are concerned,
CASE: Valles vs. COMELEC 337 SCRA 543
PRINCIPLE: Principle of Jus Sanguinis
FACTS:
Philippine citizen. By virtue of the same laws, which were the laws
in force at the time of her birth, Telesforo’s daughter, herein
private respondent Rosalind Ybasco Lopez, is likewise a citizen of
the Philippines.

Rosalind Ybasco Lopez was born on May 16, 1934 in Australia to a The signing into law of the 1935 Philippine Constitution
Filipino father and an Australian mother. In 1949, at the age of has established the principle of jus sanguinis as basis for the
fifteen, she left Australia and came to settle in the Philippines, acquisition of Philippine citizenship, xxx
where she later married a Filipino and has since then participated So also, the principle of jus sanguinis, which confers
in the electoral process not only as a voter but as a candidate, as citizenship by virtue of blood relationship, was subsequently
well. In the May 1998 elections, she ran for governor but Valles retained under the 1973 and 1987 Constitutions. Thus, the herein
filed a petition for her disqualification as candidate on the ground private respondent, Rosalind Ybasco Lopez, is a Filipino citizen,
that she is an Australian. having been born to a Filipino father. The fact of her being born in
ISSUE: Australia is not tantamount to her losing her Philippine
Whether or not Rosalind is an Australian or a Filipino citizenship. If Australia follows the principle of jus soli, then at
most, private respondent can also claim Australian citizenship
RULING: resulting to her possession of dual citizenship.
The Philippine law on citizenship adheres to the principle
of jus sanguinis. Thereunder, a child follows the nationality or
citizenship of the parents regardless of the place of his/her birth,
as opposed to the doctrine of jus soli which determines nationality
or citizenship on the basis of place of birth.
Rosalind Ybasco Lopez was born a year before the 1935
Constitution took into effect and at that time, what served as the
Constitution of the Philippines were the principal organic acts by
which the United States governed the country. These were the
Philippine Bill of July 1, 1902 and the Philippine Autonomy Act of
Aug. 29, 1916, also known as the Jones Law.
Under both organic acts, all inhabitants of the Philippines
who were Spanish subjects on April 11, 1899 and resided therein
including their children are deemed to be Philippine citizens.
Private respondents father, Telesforo Ybasco, was born on Jan. 5,
1879 in Daet, Camarines Norte.... Thus, under the Philippine Bill of
1902 and the Jones Law, Telesforo Ybasco was deemed to be a
YU VS DEFENSOR-SANTIAGO ISSUE:
G.R. No. 83882. January 24, 1989
Whether or not petitioner Mr. Willie Yu’s acts constitute a
renunciation of his Philippine Citizenship?
RATIO: Express renunciation was held to mean a renunciation
that is made known distinctly and explicitly and not left to RULING:
inference or implication.
YES, express renunciation was held to mean a renunciation
FACTS: that is made known distinctly and explicitly and not left to
inference or implication. Petitioner, with full knowledge, and legal
Petitioner- a Portuguese National acquired a Philippine
capacity, after having renounced Portuguese citizenship upon
citizenship by naturalization on Feb. 10, 1978.
naturalization as a Philippine citizen resumed or reacquired his
Despite naturalization, on 21 July 1981, petitioner applied prior status as a Portuguese citizen, applied for a renewal of his
for and was issued a renewed Portuguese Passport No. 35/81 Portuguese passport and represented himself as such in official
serial N. 1517410 by the Consular Section of the Portuguese documents even after he had become a naturalized Philippine
Embassy in Tokyo. Said Consular Office certifies that his citizen. Such resumption or reacquisition of Portuguese
Portuguese passport expired on 20 July 1986. citizenship is grossly inconsistent with his maintenance of
Philippine citizenship.
Petitioner though a naturalized Filipino signed commercial
documents stating his citizenship as Portuguese without the
authentication of an appropriate Philippine Consul
Petitioner was detained by the CID for obtaining a Foreign
passport while (at the same time) holding a Filipino citizenship as
well
Respondents argue that the petitioner was in full
knowledge and legal capacity when he applied for A Philippine
citizenship through naturalization he consequently recognizes,
identifies and agrees to the oath taken which states to renounce
‘absolutely and forever all allegiance and fidelity to any foreign
prince, potentate, state or sovereignty” and pledged to “maintain
true faith and allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines,".
Hence, petitioner then knows the limitations or restrictions once
solemnizing said oath and it succeeding consequences should they
be violated.
BOARD OF IMMIGRATION COMMISSIONER V. GO 25 SCRA 890 Did the respondents lose their Philippine citizenship upon the
performance of certain acts or the happening of certain events in China?
FACTS:
RULING:
The Department of Foreign Affairs informed the Commissioner
of Immigration that, on the basis of the findings made by the NBI, the In deciding the question no foreign law can be applied. The
signature of the former Secretary of Foreign Affairs, on certain respondents are admittedly Filipino citizens at birth, and their status
documents, amongst them cable authorization authorizing the must be governed by Philippine law wherever they may be, in
documentation of Beato Go Callano and others, were not authentic. conformity with Article 15 (formerly Article 9) of the Civil Code which
Thereupon, the Department declared several documents among them provides as follows: “Laws relating to family rights and duties, or to the
the cable authorization to be null, void and no effect and the certificates status, conditions and legal capacity of persons are binding upon citizens
of registration and identity issued to Beato Go Callano and his brothers of the Philippines, even though living abroad.” Under Article IV, Section
were cancelled. 2, of the Philippine Constitution, “Philippine citizenship may be lost or
reacquired in the manner provided by law,” which implies that the
The Board of Immigration Commissioners ordered that they be
question of whether a Filipino has lost his Philippine citizenship shall be
returned to the to the port where they came or to the country of which
determined by no other than the Philippine Law.
they were nationals, upon the ground that they had been able to enter
this country and gain admission as Filipino citizens by the fraudulenty Section 1 of Commonwealth Act No. 63, as amended by Republic
secured authorization. Act No. 106, provides that a Filipino citizen may lose his citizenship by
naturalization in a foreign country; express renunciation of citizenship;
The respondents appealed to the Court of Appeals and found out
subscribing to an oath of allegiance to support the constitution or laws of
that respondents were the illegitimate children of Go Chiao Lin, a
a foreign country, rendering service to, or accepting a commission in in
Chinese citizen and Emilia Callano a Filipino citizen. Go Chiao Lin and
the armed forces of a foreign country; cancellation of the certificate of
Emilia together with the respondents went on vacation to Amoy, China,
naturalization; declaration by competent authority that he is a deserter
but Go died there. Emilia has to return to the Philippines as the maid of
of the Philippine armed forces in time of war; in the case of a woman by
Consul Eutiquio Sta. Romana because she was penniless, leaving her
marriage to a foreigner if, by virtue of laws in force in her husband’s
children behind. Subsequently the latter were able to go to Hongkong,
country, she acquired his nationality. Recognition of the petitioners by
where they sought and obtained employment. They applied with the
their alien father is not among the ground for losing Philippine
Philippine Consul General in Hongkong for entry into the Philippines as
citizenship under Philippine law, and it cannot be said that the
Filipino citizens and they were allowed to register in the Consulate as
petitioners lost their former status by reason of such recognition.
Filipino citizens and to travel directly to the Philippines.
However, the Board of Immigration Commissioners and the
Commissioner of Immigration maintain that they were Filipino citizens
when they left the Philippines in 1946, they lost that citizenship because
they were recognized by their common-law father, they became citizens
of the Republic of China in accordance with the Chinese Nationality Law.
ISSUE:
ELEGIBILITY OF ELECTIVE OFFICIALS (3)domicile by operation of law, which the law attributes to a
person independently of his residence or intention.
MAYOR JOSE UGDORACION, JR. v COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS
and EPHRAIM M.TUNGOL April 18, 2008 We are guided by three basic rules: (1) a man must have a
residence or domicile somewhere;(2) domicile, once established,
FACTS: remains until a new one is validly acquired; and (3) a man can
Jose Ugdoracion and Ephraim Tungol were rival mayoralty have but one residence or domicile at any given time. The general
candidates in Albuquerque, Bohol in the May 2007 elections. rule is that the domicile of origin is not easily lost; it is lost only
Tungol filed a petition to cancel Ugdoracion’s Certificate when there is an actual removal or change of domicile, a bona fide
of Candidacy contending that the latter’s declaration of eligibility intention of abandoning the former residence and establishing a
for Mayor constituted material misrepresentation; that he is new one, and acts which correspond with such purpose.
actually a “green card” holder or a permanent resident of the US.It
In the instant case, however, Ugdoracion’s acquisition of a
appears that Ugdoracion became a permanent US resident on
lawful permanent resident status in the US amounted to an
September 26, 2001 and was issued an Alien Number by the
abandonment and renunciation of his status as a resident of the
USINS. Ugdoracion, on the other hand, presented the following
Philippines; it constituted a change from his domicile of origin,
documents as proof of his substantial compliance with the
which was Albuquerque, Bohol, to a new domicile of choice, which
residency requirement: (1) a residence certificate; (2) an
is the USA.
application for a new voter’s registration; and (3) a photocopy
of Abandonment of Lawful Permanent Resident Status. COMELEC
cancelled Ugdoracion’s COC and removed his name from the
certified list of candidates for Mayor. His motion for recon was
denied. Hence, the petition imputing grave abuse of discretion to
the COMELEC.

ISSUE: Whether Ugdoracion lost his domicile of origin

RULING:

YES. Residence, in contemplation of election laws, is

synonymous to domicile. Domicile is the place where one actually
or constructively has his permanent home, where he, no matter
where he may be found at any given time, eventually intends to
return (animus revertendi) and remain (animus manendi).

Domicile is classified into (1) domicile of origin, which is

acquired by every person at birth; (2) domicile of choice, which is
acquired upon abandonment of the domicile of origin; and
CITIZENSHIP RETENTION AND REACQUISITION ACT RULINGS:

NESTOR A. JACOT, petitioner, vs. YES.

RO GEN T. DAL and COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, respondents.
G.R. No. 179848 November 27, 2008
TOPIC: Citizenship Retention and Reacquisition Act
FACTS:
Petitioner was a natural born citizen of the Philippines,
who became a naturalized citizen of the US on 13 December 1989.
He filed a request for the administration of his Oath of Allegiance
to the Republic of the Philippines with the Philippine Consulate
General (PCG) of Los Angeles, California. The Los Angeles PCG
issued on 19 June 2006 an Order of Approval of petitioner’s
request, and on the same day, petitioner took his Oath of
Allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines before Vice Consul
Edward C. Yulo. On 27 September 2006, the Bureau of
Immigration issued Identification Certificate No. 06-12019
recognizing petitioner as a citizen of the Philippines.
Petitioner filed his Certificate of Candidacy for the Position
of Vice-Mayor of the Municipality of Catarman, Camiguin. Private
respondent filed a petition for disqualification before COMELEC
alleging therein that petitioner failed to renounce his US
Citizenship. Petitioner answered that he already made an oath of
allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines and the oath
contained in the certificate of Candidacy is already a
renouncement of his Foreign Citizenship. COMELEC ruled to
disqualify the petitioner for its failure to make the required
renunciation of foreign citizenship. This rulings was affirmed by
COMELEC en Banc.
The court ruled that Section 5(2) of Republic Act No. 9225
compels natural-born Filipinos, who have been naturalized as
citizens of a foreign country, but who reacquired or retained their
Philippine citizenship (1) to take the oath of allegiance under
Section 3 of Republic Act No. 9225, and (2) for those seeking
elective public offices in the Philippines, to additionally execute
a personal and sworn renunciation of any and all foreign
citizenship before an authorized public officer prior or
simultaneous to the filing of their certificates of candidacy, to
qualify as candidates in Philippine elections.
In the case at bar, since the petitioner wants to run as a
candidate in Philippine elections, he should have executed a
personal and sworn renunciation of any and all foreign citizenship
in addition to the oath of allegiance that he executed before the
PCG. The filing of his certificate of candidacy (COC) is not similar to
personal and sworn renunciation as required by law although the
provisions in the COC is almost similar to the provisions of Sworn
of Renuciation.

ISSUE:
Is the COMELEC correct in disqualifying the petitioner?
SOBEJANA-CONDON VS. COMELEC
FACTS:
The petitioner is a natural-born Filipino citizen having been
born of Filipino parents on August 8, 1944. On December 13, 1984,
she became a naturalized Australian citizen owing to her marriage
to a certain Kevin Thomas Condon.
On December 2, 2005, she filed an application to re-acquire
Philippine citizenship before the Philippine Embassy in Canberra,
Australia pursuant to Section 3 of R.A. No. 9225 otherwise known
as the "Citizenship Retention and Re-Acquisition Act of
2003."5 The application was approved and the petitioner took her
oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines on December
5, 2005.
On September 18, 2006, the petitioner filed an unsworn
Declaration of Renunciation of Australian Citizenship before the
Department of Immigration and Indigenous Affairs, Canberra,
Australia, which in turn issued the Order dated September 27,
2006 certifying that she has ceased to be an Australian citizen.
The petitioner ran for Mayor in her hometown of Caba, La
Union in the 2007 elections. She lost in her bid. She again sought
elective office during the May 10, 2010 elections this time for the
position of Vice-Mayor. She obtained the highest numbers of votes
and was proclaimed as the winning candidate. She took her oath of
office on May 13, 2010.
Soon thereafter, private respondents Robelito V. Picar,
Wilma P. Pagaduan7 and Luis M. Bautista,8 (private respondents)
all registered voters of Caba, La Union, filed separate petitions for
quo warranto questioning the petitioner’s eligibility before the
RTC. The petitions similarly sought the petitioner’s
disqualification from holding her elective post on the ground that
she is a dual citizen and that she failed to execute a "personal and
sworn renunciation of any and all foreign citizenship before any
public officer authorized to administer an oath" as imposed by
Section 5(2) of R.A. No. 9225.
The petitioner denied being a dual citizen and averred that since
September 27, 2006, she ceased to be an Australian citizen. She
claimed that the Declaration of Renunciation of Australian
Citizenship she executed in Australia sufficiently complied with
Section 5(2), R.A. No. 9225 and that her act of running for public
office is a clear abandonment of her Australian citizenship.
The trial decision ordered by the trial court declaring
Condon disqualified and ineligible to hold office of vice mayor of
Caba La union and nullified her proclamation as the winning
candidate.
After that the decision was appealed to the COMELEC but
the appeal was dismissed in the second division and affirmed the
decision of the trial court.
The petitioner contends that since she ceased to be an
Australian citizen on September 27, 2006, she no longer held dual
citizenship and was only a Filipino citizen when she filed her
certificate of candidacy as early as the 2007 elections. Hence, the
"personal and sworn renunciation of foreign citizenship" imposed
by Section 5(2) of R.A. No. 9225 to dual citizens seeking elective
office does not apply to her.
ISSUE:
Whether or not petitioner is disqualified from running for elective
office due to failure to renounce her Australian Citizenship in
accordance with Sec. 5 (2) of R.A 9225
HELD:
R.A. No. 9225 allows the retention and re-acquisition of
Filipino citizenship for natural-born citizens who have lost their
Philippine citizenship by taking an oath of allegiance to the
Republic.
 Natural-born citizens of the Philippines who, after the
effectivity of this Act, become citizens of a foreign country shall
retain their Philippine citizenship upon taking the aforesaid oath.

The oath is an abbreviated repatriation process that

restores one’s Filipino citizenship and all civil and political rights
and obligations concomitant therewith, subject to certain
conditions imposed in Section 5, paragraph 2 provides:

(2) Those seeking elective public office in the Philippines

shall meet the qualification for holding such public office as
required by the Constitution and existing laws and, at the time of
the filing of the certificate of candidacy, make a personal and
sworn renunciation of any and all foreign citizenship before any
public officer authorized to administer an oath.

On September 18, 2006, or a year before she initially

sought elective public office, she filed a renunciation of Australian
citizenship in Canberra, Australia.
Admittedly, however, the same was not under oath contrary to the
exact mandate of Section 5(2) that the renunciation of foreign
citizenship must be sworn before an officer authorized to
administer oath.

The Supreme Court said that, the renunciation of her

Australian citizenship was invalid due to it was not oath before
any public officer authorized to administer it rendering the act of
Condon void.

WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, the petition is

hereby DISMISSED.
Maquiling vs. COMELEC, April 16, 2013
Facts:
Respondent Arnado is a natural born Filipino citizen.3
However, as a consequence of his subsequent naturalization as a
citizen of the United States of America, he lost his Filipino
citizenship. Arnado applied for repatriation under Republic Act
(R.A.) No. 9225 before the Consulate General of the Philippines in
San Franciso, USA and took the Oath of Allegiance to the Republic
of the Philippines on 10 July 2008.4 On the same day an Order of
Approval of his Citizenship Retention and Re-acquisition was
issued in his favor.
On 3 April 2009 Arnado again took his Oath of Allegiance to
the Republic and executed an Affidavit of Renunciation of his
foreign citizenship, which states:
On 30 November 2009, Arnado filed his Certificate of
Candidacy for Mayor of Kauswagan, Lanao del Norte, On 28 April
2010, respondent Linog C. Balua (Balua), another mayoralty
candidate, filed a petition to disqualify Arnado and/or to cancel his
certificate of candidacy for municipal mayor of Kauswagan, Lanao
del Norte in connection with the 10 May 2010 local and national
elections.
Respondent Balua contended that Arnado is not a resident
of Kauswagan, Lanao del Norte and that he is a foreigner, attaching
thereto a certification issued by the Bureau of Immigration dated
23 April 2010 indicating the nationality of Arnado as "USA-
American."10To further bolster his claim of Arnado’s US
citizenship, Balua presented in his Memorandum a computer-
generated travel record11 dated 03 December 2009 indicating
that Arnado has been using his US Passport No. 057782700 in
entering and departing the Philippines.
On 30 April 2010, the COMELEC (First Division) issued an
Order13 requiring the respondent to personally file his answer
and memorandum within three (3) days from receipt thereof.
After Arnado failed to answer the petition, Balua moved to declare
him in default and to present evidence exparte.
Neither motion was acted upon, having been overtaken by the
2010 elections where Arnado garnered the highest number of
votes and was subsequently proclaimed as the winning candidate
for Mayor of Kauswagan, Lanao del Norte. It was only after his
proclamation that Arnado filed his verified answer,
THE RULING OF THE COMELEC FIRST DIVISION:
Instead of treating the Petition as an action for the
cancellation of a certificate of candidacy based on
misrepresentation, the COMELEC First Division considered it as
one for disqualification. The First Division disagreed with
Arnado’s claim that he is a Filipino citizen.18The Court ruled that
Arnado’s act of consistently using his US passport after renouncing
his US citizenship on 03 April 2009 effectively negated his
Affidavit of Renunciation.
Petitioner Casan Macode Maquiling (Maquiling), another
candidate for mayor of Kauswagan, and who garnered the second
highest number of votes in the 2010 elections, intervened in the
case and filed before the COMELEC En Banc a Motion for
Reconsideration together with an Opposition to Arnado’s
Amended Motion for Reconsideration. Maquiling argued that while
the First Division correctly disqualified Arnado, the order of
succession under Section 44 of the Local Government Code is not
applicable in this case. Consequently, he claimed that the
cancellation of Arnado’s candidacy and the nullification of his
proclamation, Maquiling, as the legitimate candidate who obtained
the highest number of lawful votes, should be proclaimed as the
winner.
RULING OF THE COMELEC EN BANC
Maquiling filed the instant petition questioning the
propriety of declaring Arnado qualified to run for public office
despite his continued use of a US passport, There are three
questions posed by the parties before this Court which will be
addressed seriatim as the subsequent questions hinge on the
result of the first.

Issues:
1. whether or not intervention is allowed in a disqualification case.
2. whether or not the use of a foreign passport after renouncing
foreign citizenship amounts to undoing a renunciation earlier
made.
3. whether or not the rule on succession in the Local Government
Code is applicable to this case.
RULINGS:
1. Intervention of a rival candidate in a disqualification case is
proper when there has not yet been any proclamation of the
winner.
2. The use of foreign passport after renouncing one’s foreign
citizenship is a positive and voluntary act of representation as to
one’s nationality and citizenship; it does not divest Filipino
citizenship regained by repatriation but it recants the Oath of
Renunciation required to qualify one to run for an elective
position.
Between 03 April 2009, the date he renounced his foreign
citizenship, and 30 November 2009, the date he filed his COC, he
used his US passport four times, actions that run counter to the
affidavit of renunciation he had earlier executed. By using his
foreign passport, Arnado positively and voluntarily represented
himself as an American,
Arnado’s category of dual citizenship is that by which
foreign citizenship is acquired through a positive act of applying
for naturalization. This is distinct from those considered dual
citizens by virtue of birth, who are not required by law to take the
oath of renunciation as the mere filing of the certificate of
candidacy already carries with it an implied renunciation of
foreign citizenship.39 Dual citizens by naturalization, on the other
hand, are required to take not only the Oath of Allegiance to the
Republic of the Philippines but also to personally renounce foreign
citizenship in order to qualify as a candidate for public office.
By the time he filed his certificate of candidacy on 30
November 2009, Arnado was a dual citizen enjoying the rights and
privileges of Filipino and American citizenship. He was qualified to
vote, but by the express disqualification under Section 40(d) of the
Local Government Code,40 he was not qualified to run for a
local elective.
3. The rule on Succession under LGC is not applicable. Maquiling is
not a second-placer as he obtained the highest number of votes
from among the qualified candidates.
Resolving the third issue necessitates revisiting Topacio v.
Paredes45 which is the jurisprudential spring of the principle that
a second-placer cannot be proclaimed as the winner in an election
contest. This doctrine must be re-examined and its soundness
once again put to the test to address the ever-recurring issue that
a secondplacer who loses to an ineligible candidate cannot be
proclaimed as the winner in the elections.
The often-quoted phrase in Topacio v. Paredes is that "the
wreath of victory cannot be transferred from an ineligible
candidate to any other candidate when the sole question is the
eligibility of the one receiving a plurality of the legally cast ballots.
This phrase is not even the ratio decidendi; it is a mere
obiter dictum. The Court was comparing "the effect of a decision
that a candidate is not entitled to the office
because of fraud or irregularities in the elections x x x with that
produced by declaring a person ineligible to hold such an office."
A proper reading of the case reveals that the ruling therein
is that since the Court of First Instance is without jurisdiction to
try a disqualification case based on the eligibility of the person
who obtained the highest number of votes in the election, its
jurisdiction being confined "to determine which of the contestants
has been duly elected" the judge exceeded his jurisdiction when he
"declared that no one had been legally elected president of the
municipality of Imus at the general election held in that town on 4
June 1912" where "the only question raised was whether or not
Topacio was eligible to be elected and to hold the office of
municipal president."
The Court did not rule that Topacio was disqualified and
that Abad as the second placer cannot be proclaimed in his stead.
An ineligible candidate who receives the highest number of votes
is a wrongful winner. By express legal mandate, he could not even
have been a candidate in the first place, but by virtue of the lack of
material time or any other intervening circumstances, his
ineligibility might not have been passed upon prior to election
date. Consequently, he may have had the opportunity to hold
himself out to the electorate as a legitimate and duly qualified
candidate. However, notwithstanding the outcome of the elections,
his ineligibility as a candidate remains unchanged. Ineligibility
does not only pertain to his qualifications as a candidate but
necessarily affects his right to hold public office. The number of
ballots cast in his favor cannot cure the defect of failure to qualify
with the substantive legal requirements of eligibility to run for
public office.
The will of the people as expressed through the ballot
cannot cure the vice of ineligibility, especially if they mistakenly
believed, as in this case, that the candidate was qualified.
Obviously, this rule requires strict application when the deficiency
is lack of citizenship. If a person seeks to serve in the Republic of
the Philippines, he must owe his total loyalty to this country only,
abjuring and renouncing all fealty and fidelity to any other state.
(Emphasis supplied)
It is imperative to safeguard the expression of the
sovereign voice through the ballot by ensuring that its exercise
respects the rule of law. To allow the sovereign voice spoken
through the ballot to trump constitutional and statutory
provisions on qualifications and disqualifications of candidates is
not democracy or republicanism. It is electoral anarchy. When set
rules are disregarded and only the electorate’s voice spoken
through the ballot is made to matter in the end, it precisely serves
as an open invitation for electoral anarchy to set in.
With Arnado’s disqualification, Maquiling then becomes the
winner in the election as he obtained the highest number of votes
from among the qualified candidates.
We have ruled in the recent cases of Aratea v. COMELEC54
and Jalosjos v. COMELEC55 that a void COC cannot produce any
legal effect.
Thus, the votes cast in favor of the ineligible candidate are
not considered at all in determining the winner of an election.
Even when the votes for the ineligible candidate are
disregarded, the will of the electorate is still respected, and even
more so. The votes cast in favor of an ineligible candidate do not
constitute the sole and total expression of the sovereign voice. The
votes cast in favor of eligible and legitimate candidates form part
of that voice and must also be respected.
There is no need to apply the rule cited in Labo v.
COMELEC56 that when the voters are well aware within the realm
of notoriety of a candidate’s disqualification and still cast their
votes in favor said candidate, then the eligible candidate obtaining
the next higher number of votes may be deemed elected. That rule
is also a mere obiter that further complicated the rules affecting
qualified candidates who placed second to ineligible ones.
The electorate’s awareness of the candidate’s
disqualification is not a prerequisite for the disqualification to
attach to the candidate. The very existence of a disqualifying
circumstance makes the candidate ineligible. Knowledge by the
electorate of a candidate’s disqualification is not necessary before
a qualified candidate who placed second to a disqualified one can
be proclaimed as the winner. The second-placer in the vote count
is actually the first-placer among the qualified candidates.

That the disqualified candidate has already been

proclaimed and has assumed office is of no moment. The
subsequent disqualification based on a substantive ground that
existed prior to the filing of the certificate of candidacy voids not
only the COC but also the proclamation.

The disqualifying circumstance surrounding Arnado’s

candidacy involves his citizenship. It does not involve the
commission of election offenses as provided for in the first
sentence of Section 68 of the Omnibus Election Code, the effect of
which is to disqualify the individual from continuing as a
candidate, or if he has already been elected, from holding the
office.

The disqualifying circumstance affecting Arnado is his

citizenship. With Arnado being barred from even becoming a
candidate, his certificate of candidacy is thus rendered void from
the beginning. It could not have produced any other legal effect
except that Arnado rendered it impossible to effect his
disqualification prior to the elections because he filed his answer
to the petition when the elections were conducted already and he
was already proclaimed the winner.

Arnado's disqualification, although made long after the

elections, reaches back to the filing of the certificate of candidacy.
Arnado is declared to be not a candidate at
all in the May 2010 elections.

Arnado being a non-candidate, the votes cast in his favor should

not have been counted. This leaves Maquiling as the qualified
candidate who obtained the highest number of votes. Therefore,
the rule on succession under the Local Government Code will not
apply.

RENATO M. DAVID, petitioner, vs. EDITHA A. AGBAY and
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.
G.R. No. 199113. March 18, 2015
Citizenship; Dual Citizenship; Citizenship Retention and
Reacquisition Act of 2003; Republic Act (RA) No. 9225, otherwise
known as the “Citizenship Retention and Reacquisition Act of 2003,”
was signed into law by President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo
(PGMA)on August 29, 2003.—R.A. 9225, otherwise known as the
“Citizenship Retention and Reacquisition Act of 2003,” was signed
into law by President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo on August 29,
2003. Sections 2 and 3 of said law read: SEC. 2. Declaration of
Policy.—It is hereby declared the policy of the State that all
Philippine citizens who become citizens of another country shall
be deemed not to have lost their Philippine citizenship under
the conditions of this Act. SEC. 3. Retention of Philippine
Citizenship.—Any provision of law to the contrary
notwithstanding, natural-born citizens of the Philippines who have
lost their Philippine citizenship by reason of their naturalization as
citizens of a foreign country are hereby deemed to have
reacquired Philippine citizenship upon taking the following
oath of allegiance to the Republic: “I ___________, solemnly swear
(or affirm) that I will support and defend the Constitution of the
Republic of the Philippines and obey the laws and legal orders
promulgated by the duly constituted authorities of the Philippines;
and I hereby declare that I recognize and accept the supreme
authority of the Philippines and will maintain true faith and
allegiance thereto; and that I impose this obligation upon myself
voluntarily without mental reservation or purpose of evasion.”
Natural-born citizens of the Philippines who, after the effectivity
of this Act, become citizens of a foreign country shall retain their
Philippine citizenship upon taking the aforesaid oath.
Same; Same; Same; In the case of those who became foreign
citizens after Republic Act (RA) No. 9225 took effect, they shall
retain Philippine citizenship despite having acquired foreign
citizenship provided they took the oath of allegiance under the new
law.—In fine, for those who were naturalized in a foreign country,
they shall be deemed to have reacquired their Philippine
citizenship which was lost pursuant to CA 63, under which
naturalization in a foreign country is one of the ways by which
Philippine citizenship may be lost. As its title declares, R.A. 9225
amends CA 63 by doing away with the provision in the old law
which takes away Philippine citizenship from natural-born
Filipinos who become naturalized citizens of other countries and
allowing dual citizenship, and also provides for the procedure for
reacquiring and retaining Philippine citizenship. In the case of
those who became foreign citizens after R.A. 9225 took effect, they
shall retain Philippine citizenship despite having acquired foreign
citizenship provided they took the oath of allegiance under the
new law.
CASE DIGEST:
FACTS:
In 1974, petitioner Renato M. David migrated to Canada
where he became a Canadian citizen by naturalization. Upon their
retirement, David and his wife returned to the Philippines and
purchased a lot where they constructed a residential house.
However, they came to know that the portion where they built
their house is a public land and part of the salvage zone. In April
2007, David filed a Miscellaneous Lease Application (MLA) over
the subject land wherein he indicated that he is a Filipino citizen.
Private respondent Editha A. Agbay opposed the application and
she also filed a criminal complaint for falsification of public
documents (Art. 172, RPC). Meanwhile, David re-acquired his
Filipino citizenship in October 2007.
The Office of the Provincial Prosecutor recommended the
filing of the information in court. David filed a petition for review
before the Department of Justice (DOJ) but the same was denied.
Meanwhile, CENRO rejected David’s MLA, ruling that the latter’s
subsequent re-acquisition of Philippine citizenship did not cure
the defect in his MLA. Thereafter, an information for Falsification
of Public Document was filed before the Municipal Trial Court and
a warrant of arrest was issued against the David. The latter then
filed an Urgent Motion for ReDetermination of Probable Cause,
which was denied. David’s petition for certiorari before the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) was likewise denied.
ISSUES:
May David be indicted for falsification for representing
himself as a Filipino in his Public Land Application despite his
subsequent re-acquition of Philippin citizenship under the
provisions of R.A. No. 9225?
RULING:
R.A. 9225, otherwise known as the “Citizenship Retention
and Reacquisition Act of 2003,” was signed into law by President
Gloria MacapagalArroyo on August 29, 2003. Sections 2 and 3 of
said law read:
SEC. 2. Declaration of Policy. – It is hereby declared the
policy of the State that all Philippine citizens who become citizens
of another country shall be deemed not to have lost their
Philippine citizenship under the conditions of this Act.
SEC. 3. Retention of Philippine Citizenship. – Any provision
of law to the contrary notwithstanding, natural-born citizens of
the Philippines who have lost their Philippine citizenship by
reason of their naturalization as citizens of a foreign country are
hereby deemed to have reacquired Philippine citizenship upon
taking the following oath of allegiance to the Republic: xxx
Natural-born citizens of the Philippines who, after the
effectivity of this Act, become citizens of a foreign country shall
retain their Philippine citizenship upon taking the aforesaid oath
(Emphasis supplied).
While Section 2 declares the general policy that Filipinos
who have become citizens of another country shall be deemed “not
to have lost their Philippine citizenship,” such is qualified by the
phrase “under the conditions of this Act.” Section 3 lays down such
conditions for two categories of natural-born Filipinos referred to
in the first and second paragraphs. Under the first paragraph are
those natural-born Filipinos who have lost their citizenship by
naturalization in a foreign country who shall re-acquire their
Philippine citizenship upon taking the oath of allegiance to the
Republic of the Philippines. The second paragraph covers those
natural-born Filipinos who became foreign citizens after R.A. 9225
took effect, who shall retain their Philippine citizenship upon
taking the same oath. The taking of oath ofallegiance is required
for both categories of natural-born Filipino citizens who became
citizens of a foreign country, but the terminology used is different,
“reacquired” for the first group, and “retain” for the second group.
The law thus makes a distinction between those natural-
born Filipinos who became foreign citizens before and after the
effectivity of R.A. 9225. Although the heading of Section 3 is
“Retention of Philippine Citizenship”, the authors of the law
intentionally employed the terms “re-acquire” and “retain” to
describe the legal effect of taking the oath of allegiance to
theRepublic of the Philippines. This is also evident from the title of
the lawusing both re-acquisition and retention.
Considering that David was naturalized as a Canadian
citizen prior to the effectivity of R.A. 9225, he belongs to the first
category of natural born Filipinos under the first paragraph of
Section 3 who lost Philippine citizenship by naturalization in a
foreign country. As the new law allows dual citizenship, he was
able to re-acquire his Philippine citizenship by taking the required
oath of allegiance.
 For the purpose of determining the citizenship of petitioner
at the time of filing his MLA, it is not necessary to discuss the
rulings in Frivaldo and Altarejos on the retroactivity of such
reacquisition because R.A. 9225 itself treats those of his category
as having already lost Philippine citizenship, in contradistinction
to those natural-born Filipinos who became foreign citizensafter
R.A. 9225 came into force. In other words, Section 2 declaring the
policy that considers Filipinos who became foreign citizens as not
to have lost their Philippine citizenship, should be read together
with Section 3, the second paragraph of which clarifies that such
policy governs all cases after the new law’s effectivity.
Falsification of documents under paragraph 1, Article 172
in relation to Article 171 of the RPC refers to falsification by a
private individual, or a public officer or employee who did not take
advantage of his official position, of public, private, or commercial
documents. The elements of falsification of documents under
paragraph 1, Article 172 of the RPC are: (1) that the offender is a
private individual or a public officer or employee who did not take
advantage of his official position; (2) that he committed any of the
acts of falsification enumerated in Article 171 of the RPC; and (3)
that the falsification was committed in a public, official or
commercial document.
David made the untruthful statement in the MLA, a public
document, that he is a Filipino citizen at the time of the filing of
said application, when in fact he was then still a Canadian citizen.
Under CA 63, the governing law at the time he was naturalized as
Canadian citizen, naturalization in a foreign country was among
those ways by which anatural-born citizen loses his Philippine
citizenship. While he reacquired Philippine citizenship under R.A.
9225 six months later, the falsification was already a
consummated act, the said law having no retroactive effect
insofaras his dual citizenship status is concerned. The MTC
therefore did not err in finding probable cause for falsification of
public document under Article172, paragraph 1.
Rommel Apolinario Jalosjos v. The Commission on Elections
G.R No. 191970, April 24, 2012
RATIO: The question of residence is a question of intention.
Jurisprudence has laid down the following guidelines: (a) every
person has a domicile or residence somewhere; (b) where once
established, that domicile remains until he acquires a new one; and
(c) a person can have but one domicile at a time.
Facts:
Petitioner Rommel Jalosjos was born in Quezon City on
October 26, 1973. He migrated to Australia in 1981 and there
acquired Australian citizenship. On November 22, 2008, at age 35,
he decided to return to the Philippines and lived with his brother,
Romeo in Brgy Veterans Village, Ipil, Zamboanga Sibugay. Four
days upon his return, he took an oath of allegiance to the Republic
of the Philippines. On September 1, 2009 he renounced his
Australian citizenship, executing a sworn renunciation of the
same.
From the time of his return, Jalosjos acquired a residential
property in the same village. He applied for registration as a voter
in the Municipality of Ipil but respondent Dan Erasmo, Sr., the
Barangay Captain of Veterans Village opposed the same. Acting on
the application, the Election registration Board approved it and
included Jalosjos’ name in the Commission on Elections voters list.
On November 28, 2009 Jalosjos filed his Certificate of
Candidacy for Governor of Zambonag Sibugay Province for the
May 10, 2010 elections. Erasmo promptly filed a petition to deny
due course of to cancel Jalosjos COC on the ground that the latter
made material misrepresentation in the same since he failed to
comply with (1) the requirements of R.A 9225 and (2) the one-
year residency requirement of the Local Government Code.
After hearing, the Second Division of the Comelec ruled
that, while Jalosjos had regained Philippine citizenship by
complying with the requirements of R.A 9225, he failed to prove
the residency requirement for gubernatorial candidate. He failed
to present ample proof of a Bona Fide intention to establish
domicile in Ipil, Zamboanga Sibugay. On motion for
reconsideration, the Comelec en banc affirmed the Second division
decision.
Acting on Jalosjos prayer for the issuance of temporary
restraining order, the Court resolved on May 7, 2010 to issue a
status quo ante order, enjoining the Comelec from enforcing its
February 11, 2010 decision pending further orders. Meanwhile,
Jalosjos won the election and was proclaimed winner of the 2010
gubernatorial race.
Issue:
WON the Comelec acted with grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in ruling that Jalosjos
failed to present ample proof of a bona fide intention to establish
his domicile in Ipil, Zamboanga Sibugay
Rulings:
The requirement of residence is synonymous with domicile,
meaning that a person must not only intend to reside in a
particular place but must also have personal in such place coupled
with conduct indicative of such intention.
Jurisprudence has laid down the following guidelines: (a)
every person has a domicile or residence somewhere; (b) where
once established, that domicile remains until he acquires a new
one; and (c) a person can have but one domicile at a time.
The COMELEC appears hasty in concluding that Jalosjos
failed to prove that he successfully changed his domicile to
Zambonga Sibugay. When he came to the Philippines in November
2008 to live with his brother in Zamboanga, it is evident that
Jalosjos did so with intent to change his domicile for good. He left
Australia, gave up his Australian citizenship and renounced his
allegiance to that country. In addition, he reacquired his old
citizenship by taking an oath of allegiance to the Republic of the
Philippines. It is sufficient that he should live there even if it be in a
rented house or in the house of a friend or relative. What matters
is that Jalosjos has proved two things: actual physical presence in
Ipil and an intention of making it his domicile. The evidence
Jalosjos presented is sufficient to establish Ipil, Zamboanga
Sibugay as his domicile. The COMELEC gravely abused its
discretion in holding otherwise.
RODOLFO V. JAO, petitioner, vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and PERICO V. JAO, respondents.
G.R. No. 128314 May 29, 2002
TOPIC: Venue of Estate Proceedings
FACTS:
Petitioner and Private Respondent are the only sons of late Ignacio
Tayag and Andrea Jao who died intestate. Herein, respondent filed
a petition for issuance of letter of administration before RTC of
Quezon City, place where the decedent resides at the time of death.
Petitioner moved for the dismissal of the petition on the ground of
improper venue. He argued that the deceased spouses did not
reside in Quezon City either during their lifetime or at the time of
their deaths. The decedent’s actual residence was in Angeles City,
Pampanga, where his late mother used to run and operate a
bakery.
in which he resides at the time of his death, and if he is an
inhabitant of a foreign country, the Court of First Instance of any
province in which he had estate. The court first taking cognizance
of the settlement of the estate of a decedent shall exercise
jurisdiction to the exclusion of all other courts. The jurisdiction
assumed by a court, so far as it depends on the place of residence
of the decedent, or of the location of his estate, shall not be
contested in a suit or proceeding, except in an appeal from that
court, in the original case, or when the want of jurisdiction
appears on the record. (underscoring ours)
In the case at hand, since the decedent resides at Quezon City at
the time of his death, then Quezon City is the proper venue to have
the estate proceedings.

The RTC dismissed the petition of the petitioner which was

affirmed by the Court of Appeals. Hence, the current petition.

ISSUE:

Which venue has the jurisdiction to the estate proceedings?

Quezon or Pampanga?

RULINGS:

Quezon.

The law provides that, if the decedent is an inhabitant of the

Philippines at the time of his death, whether a citizen or an alien,
his will shall be proved, or letters of administration granted, and
his estate settled, in the Court of First Instance in the province
San Luis vs. San Luis,
514 SCRA 294, February 06, 2007
FACTS:
During his lifetime, Felicisimo contracted three marriages. His first
marriage was with Virginia Sulit on March 17, 1942 out of which
were born six children, namely: Rodolfo, Mila, Edgar, Linda,
Emilita and Manuel. On August 11, 1963, Virginia predeceased
Felicisimo.
Five years later, on May 1, 1968, Felicisimo married Merry Lee
Corwin, with whom he had a son, Tobias. However, on October 15,
1971, Merry Lee, an American citizen, filed a Complaint for
Divorce before the Family Court of the First Circuit, State of
Hawaii, United States of America (U.S.A.), which issued a Decree
Granting Absolute Divorce and Awarding Child Custody on
December 14, 1973. On June 20, 1974, Felicisimo married
respondent Felicidad San Luis, then surnamed Sagalongos, before
Rev. Fr.
William Meyer, Minister of the United Presbyterian at Wilshire
Boulevard, Los Angeles, California, U.S.A. He had no children with
respondent but lived with her for 18 years from the time of their
marriage up to his death on December 18, 1992.
Thereafter, respondent sought the dissolution of their conjugal
partnership assets and the settlement of Felicisimo’s estate. On
December 17, 1993, she filed a petition for letters of
administration before the Regional Trial Court.
On February 4, 1994, petitioner Rodolfo San Luis, one of the
children of Felicisimo by his first marriage, filed a motion to
dismiss on the grounds of improper venue and failure to state a
cause of action. Rodolfo claimed that the petition for letters of
administration should have been filed in the Province of Laguna
because this was Felicisimo’s place of residence prior to his death.
He further claimed that respondent has no legal personality to file
the petition because she was only a mistress of Felicisimo since
the latter, at the time of his death, was still legally married to
Merry Lee.
The trial court dismissed the petition on the basis that venue was
improperly laid since at the time of his death, Felicisimo was the
duly elected governor and a resident of the Province of Laguna.
Hence, the petition should have been filed in Sta. Cruz, Laguna and
not in Makati City. The CA reversed the decision of the trial court.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the venue was properly laid.
RULING:
Yes, the venue was proper. Section 1, Rule 73 of the Rules of
Court, the petition for letters of administration of the estate of
Felicisimo should be filed in the Regional Trial Court of the
province "in which he resides at the time of his death."
For purposes of fixing venue under the Rules of Court, the
"residence" of a person is his personal, actual or physical
habitation, or actual residence or place of abode, which may not
necessarily be his legal residence or domicile provided he resides
therein with continuity and consistency. While petitioners
established that Felicisimo was domiciled in Sta. Cruz, Laguna,
respondent proved that he also maintained a residence in Alabang,
Muntinlupa from 1982 up to the time of his death. From the
foregoing, we find that Felicisimo was a resident of Alabang,
Muntinlupa for purposes of fixing the venue of the settlement of
his estate.