De Leon v.

Esguerra
153 SCRA 602, August, 31, 1987

Facts: On May 17, 1982, petitioner Alfredo M. De Leon was elected Barangay Captain together with the other
petitioners as Barangay Councilmen of Barangay Dolores, Muncipality of Taytay, Province of Rizal in a Barangay
election held under Batas Pambansa Blg. 222, otherwise known as Barangay Election Act of 1982.

On February 9, 1987, petitioner De Leon received a Memorandum antedated December 1, 1986 but signed by respondent
OIC Governor Benjamin Esguerra on February 8, 1987 designating respondent Florentino G. Magno as Barangay
Captain of Barangay Dolores and the other respondents as members of Barangay Council of the same Barangay and
Municipality.

Petitioners prayed to the Supreme Court that the subject Memoranda of February 8, 1987 be declared null and void and
that respondents be prohibited by taking over their positions of Barangay Captain and Barangay Councilmen.

Petitioners maintain that pursuant to Section 3 of the Barangay Election Act of 1982 (BP Blg. 222), their terms of office
shall be six years which shall commence on June 7, 1988 and shall continue until their successors shall have elected and
shall have qualified. It was also their position that with the ratification of the 1987 Philippine Constitution, respondent
OIC Governor no longer has the authority to replace them and to designate their successors.

On the other hand, respondents contend that the terms of office of elective and appointive officials were abolished and
that petitioners continued in office by virtue of Sec. 2, Art. 3 of the Provisional Constitution and not because their term
of six years had not yet expired; and that the provision in the Barangay Election Act fixing the term of office of Barangay
officials to six years must be deemed to have been repealed for being inconsistent with Sec. 2, Art. 3 of the Provisional
Constitution.
Issue:
Whether or not the designation of respondents to replace petitioners was validly made during the one-year period which
ended on Feb 25, 1987.
Ruling:
Supreme Court declared that the Memoranda issued by respondent OIC Gov on Feb 8, 1987 designating respondents as
Barangay Captain and Barangay Councilmen of Barangay Dolores, Taytay, Rizal has no legal force and effect.
The 1987 Constitution was ratified in a plebiscite on Feb 2, 1987, therefore, the Provisional Constitution must be deemed
to have superseded. Having become inoperative, respondent OIC Gov could no longer rely on Sec 2, Art 3, thereof to
designate respondents to the elective positions occupied by petitioners. Relevantly, Sec 8, Art 1 of the 1987 Constitution
further provides in part:

"Sec. 8. The term of office of elective local officials, except barangay officials, which shall be determined by law, shall
be three years x x x."

Until the term of office of barangay officials has been determined by aw, therefore, the term of office of 6 years provided
for in the Barangay Election Act of 1982 should still govern.
 Lambino vs. Comelec
G.R. No. 174153, Oct. 25 2006
Facts:
Petitioners (Lambino group) commenced gathering signatures for an initiative petition to change the 1987 Constitution,
they filed a petition with the COMELEC to hold a plebiscite that will ratify their initiative petition under RA 6735.
Lambino group alleged that the petition had the support of 6M individuals fulfilling what was provided by art 17 of the
constitution. Their petition changes the 1987 constitution by modifying sections 1-7 of Art 6 and sections 1-4 of Art 7
and by adding Art 18. the proposed changes will shift the present bicameral- presidential form of government to
unicameral- parliamentary. COMELEC denied the petition due to lack of enabling law governing initiative petitions and
invoked the Santiago Vs. Comelec ruling that RA 6735 is inadequate to implement the initiative petitions.
Issue:
Whether or Not the Lambino Group’s initiative petition complies with Section 2, Article XVII of the Constitution on
amendments to the Constitution through a people’s initiative.
Whether or Not this Court should revisit its ruling in Santiago declaring RA 6735 “incomplete, inadequate or wanting
in essential terms and conditions” to implement the initiative clause on proposals to amend the Constitution.
Whether or Not the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion in denying due course to the Lambino Group’s
petition.
Decision: According to the SC the Lambino group failed to comply with the basic requirements for conducting a
people’s initiative. The Court held that the COMELEC did not grave abuse of discretion on dismissing the Lambino
petition.
The Initiative Petition Does Not Comply with Section 2, Article XVII of the Constitution on Direct Proposal by the
People
The petitioners failed to show the court that the initiative signer must be informed at the time of the signing of the nature
and effect, failure to do so is “deceptive and misleading” which renders the initiative void.
The Initiative Violates Section 2, Article XVII of the Constitution Disallowing Revision through Initiatives
The framers of the constitution intended a clear distinction between “amendment” and “revision, it is intended that the
third mode of stated in sec 2 art 17 of the constitution may propose only amendments to the constitution. Merging of
the legislative and the executive is a radical change, therefore constitutes a revision.
A Revisit of Santiago v. COMELEC is Not Necessary
Even assuming that RA 6735 is valid, it will not change the result because the present petition violated Sec 2 Art 17 to
be a valid initiative, must first comply with the constitution before complying with RA 6735
Petition is dismissed.
Ratio:
Section 2, Article XVII of the Constitution is the governing constitutional provision that allows a people’s initiative to
propose amendments to the Constitution. This section states:
Sec. 2. Amendments to this Constitution may likewise be directly proposed by the people through initiative upon a
petition of at least twelve per centum of the total number of registered voters of which every legislative district must be
represented by at least three per centum of the registered voters therein. x x x x (Emphasis supplied)
The deliberations of the Constitutional Commission vividly explain the meaning of an amendment “directly proposed
by the people through initiative upon a petition,”
 Bureau of Fisheries and Aquatic Resources Union BFAR vs COA
GR 169815,

Facts:
The BFAR Employees Union issued a resolution requesting the BFAR Central Office for a Food Basket Allowance. It
justified its request on the high cost of living which makes it hard to sustain even the four basic needs. On post-audit,
COA disallowed the grant of Food Basket Allowance. Petitioners moved for reconsideration and prayed for the lifting
of the disallowance for being unconstitutional as it contravenes the fundamental principle of the State enshrined under
Sections 9 and 10, Article II of the 1987 Constitution:

Section 9. The State shall promote a just and dynamic social order that will ensure the prosperity and independence of
the nation and free the people from poverty through policies that provide adequate social services, promote full
employment, a rising standard of living, and an improved quality of life for all.

Section 10. The State shall promote social justice in all phases of national development.

Issue:
Is the disallowance in question unconstitutional?

Held:
The court denied the petition. Social justice provisions of the Constitution are not self-executing principles ready for
enforcement through the courts. They are merely statements of principles and policies giving guidelines for legislation
and that they do not embody judicially enforceable constitutional rights.
 MANILA PRINCE HOTEL VS. GSIS
G.R. NO. 122156. February 3, 1997
MANILA PRINCE HOTEL petitioner,
vs.
GOVERNMENT SERVICE INSURANCE SYSTEM, MANILA HOTEL CORPORATION, COMMITTEE ON
PRIVATIZATION and OFFICE OF THE GOVERNMENT CORPORATE COUNSEL, respondents.
Facts:

The controversy arose when respondent Government Service Insurance System (GSIS), pursuant to the privatization
program of the Philippine Government, decided to sell through public bidding 30% to 51% of the issued and outstanding
shares of respondent Manila Hotel Corporation (MHC). The winning bidder, or the eventual “strategic partner,” will
provide management expertise or an international marketing/reservation system, and financial support to strengthen the
profitability and performance of the Manila Hotel.
In a close bidding held on 18 September 1995 only two (2) bidders participated: petitioner Manila Prince Hotel
Corporation, a Filipino corporation, which offered to buy 51% of the MHC or 15,300,000 shares at P41.58 per share,
and Renong Berhad, a Malaysian firm, with ITT-Sheraton as its hotel operator, which bid for the same number of shares
at P44.00 per share, or P2.42 more than the bid of petitioner. Prior to the declaration of Renong Berhard as the winning
bidder, petitioner Manila Prince Hotel matched the bid price and sent a manager’s check as bid security, which GSIS
refused to accept.
Apprehensive that GSIS has disregarded the tender of the matching bid and that the sale may be consummated with
Renong Berhad, petitioner filed a petition before the Court.

Issues:

Whether or not Sec. 10, second par., Art. XII, of the 1987 Constitution is a self-executing provision.
Whether or not the Manila Hotel forms part of the national patrimony.
Whether or not the submission of matching bid is premature
Whether or not there was grave abuse of discretion on the part of the respondents in refusing the matching bid of the
petitioner.

Rulings:
In the resolution of the case, the Court held that:
It is a self-executing provision.
Since the Constitution is the fundamental, paramount and supreme law of the nation, it is deemed written in every statute
and contract. A provision which lays down a general principle, such as those found in Art. II of the 1987 Constitution,
is usually not self-executing. But a provision which is complete in itself and becomes operative without the aid of
supplementary or enabling legislation, or that which supplies sufficient rule by means of which the right it grants may
be enjoyed or protected, is self-executing.
A constitutional provision is self-executing if the nature and extent of the right conferred and the liability imposed are
fixed by the constitution itself, so that they can be determined by an examination and construction of its terms, and there
is no language indicating that the subject is referred to the legislature for action. Unless it is expressly provided that a
legislative act is necessary to enforce a constitutional mandate, the presumption now is that all provisions of the
constitution are self-executing. If the constitutional provisions are treated as requiring legislation instead of self-
executing, the legislature would have the power to ignore and practically nullify the mandate of the fundamental law.
10, second par., Art. XII of the 1987 Constitution is a mandatory, positive command which is complete in itself and
which needs no further guidelines or implementing laws or rules for its enforcement. From its very words the provision
does not require any legislation to put it in operation. It is per se judicially enforceable. When our Constitution mandates
that in the grant of rights, privileges, and concessions covering national economy and patrimony, the State shall give
preference to qualified Filipinos, it means just that – qualified Filipinos shall be preferred. And when our Constitution
declares that a right exists in certain specified circumstances an action may be maintained to enforce such right
notwithstanding the absence of any legislation on the subject; consequently, if there is no statute especially enacted to
enforce such constitutional right, such right enforces itself by its own inherent potency and puissance, and from which
all legislations must take their bearings. Where there is a right there is a remedy. Ubi jus ibi remedium.
The Court agree.
In its plain and ordinary meaning, the term patrimony pertains to heritage. When the Constitution speaks of national
patrimony, it refers not only to the natural resources of the Philippines, as the Constitution could have very well used
the term natural resources, but also to the cultural heritage of the Filipinos.
It also refers to Filipino’s intelligence in arts, sciences and letters. In the present case, Manila Hotel has become a
landmark, a living testimonial of Philippine heritage. While it was restrictively an American hotel when it first opened
in 1912, a concourse for the elite, it has since then become the venue of various significant events which have shaped
Philippine history.
Verily, Manila Hotel has become part of our national economy and patrimony. For sure, 51% of the equity of the MHC
comes within the purview of the constitutional shelter for it comprises the majority and controlling stock, so that anyone
who acquires or owns the 51% will have actual control and management of the hotel. In this instance, 51% of the MHC
cannot be disassociated from the hotel and the land on which the hotel edifice stands.
It is not premature.
In the instant case, where a foreign firm submits the highest bid in a public bidding concerning the grant of rights,
privileges and concessions covering the national economy and patrimony, thereby exceeding the bid of a Filipino, there
is no question that the Filipino will have to be allowed to match the bid of the foreign entity. And if the Filipino matches
the bid of a foreign firm the award should go to the Filipino. It must be so if the Court is to give life and meaning to the
Filipino First Policy provision of the 1987 Constitution. For, while this may neither be expressly stated nor contemplated
in the bidding rules, the constitutional fiat is omnipresent to be simply disregarded. To ignore it would be to sanction a
perilous skirting of the basic law.
The Court does not discount the apprehension that this policy may discourage foreign investors. But the Constitution
and laws of the Philippines are understood to be always open to public scrutiny. These are given factors which investors
must consider when venturing into business in a foreign jurisdiction. Any person therefore desiring to do business in the
Philippines or with any of its agencies or instrumentalities is presumed to know his rights and obligations under the
Constitution and the laws of the forum.
There was grave abuse of discretion.
To insist on selling the Manila Hotel to foreigners when there is a Filipino group willing to match the bid of the foreign
group is to insist that government be treated as any other ordinary market player, and bound by its mistakes or gross
errors of judgement, regardless of the consequences to the Filipino people. The miscomprehension of the Constitution
is regrettable. Thus, the Court would rather remedy the indiscretion while there is still an opportunity to do so than let
the government develop the habit of forgetting that the Constitution lays down the basic conditions and parameters for
its actions.
Since petitioner has already matched the bid price tendered by Renong Berhad pursuant to the bidding rules, respondent
GSIS is left with no alternative but to award to petitioner the block of shares of MHC and to execute the necessary
agreements and documents to effect the sale in accordance not only with the bidding guidelines and procedures but with
the Constitution as well. The refusal of respondent GSIS to execute the corresponding documents with petitioner as
provided in the bidding rules after the latter has matched the bid of the Malaysian firm clearly constitutes grave abuse
of discretion.
Hence, respondents GOVERNMENT SERVICE INSURANCE SYSTEM, MANILA HOTEL CORPORATION,
COMMITTEE ON PRIVATIZATION and OFFICE OF THE GOVERNMENT CORPORATE COUNSEL are directed
to CEASE and DESIST from selling 51% of the shares of the Manila Hotel Corporation to RENONG BERHAD, and
to ACCEPT the matching bid of petitioner MANILA PRINCE HOTEL CORPORATION to purchase the subject 51%
of the shares of the Manila Hotel Corporation at P44.00 per share and thereafter to execute the necessary agreements
and documents to effect the sale, to issue the necessary clearances and to do such other acts and deeds as may be
necessary for the purpose.
 Civil Liberties Union vs Executive Secretary
194 SCRA 317 – Political Law – Ex Officio Officials – Members of the Cabinet – Singularity of Office – EO 284
Facts:
In July 1987, then President Corazon Aquino issued Executive Order No. 284 which allowed members of the Cabinet,
their undersecretaries and assistant secretaries to hold other government offices or positions in addition to their primary
positions subject to limitations set therein. The Civil Liberties Union (CLU) assailed this EO averring that such law is
unconstitutional. The constitutionality of EO 284 is being challenged by CLU on the principal submission that it adds
exceptions to Sec 13, Article 7 of the Constitution which provides:

“Sec. 13. The President, Vice-President, the Members of the Cabinet, and their deputies or assistants shall not, unless
otherwise provided in this Constitution, hold any other office or employment during their tenure. They shall not, during
said tenure, directly or indirectly practice any other profession, participate in any business, or be financially interested
in any contract with, or in any franchise, or special privilege granted by the Government or any subdivision, agency, or
instrumentality thereof, including government-owned or controlled corporations or their subsidiaries. They shall strictly
avoid conflict of interest in the conduct of their office.”

CLU avers that by virtue of the phrase “unless otherwise provided in this Constitution“, the only exceptions against
holding any other office or employment in Government are those provided in the Constitution, namely: (i) The Vice-
President may be appointed as a Member of the Cabinet under Sec 3, par. (2), Article 7; and (ii) the Secretary of Justice
is an ex-officio member of the Judicial and Bar Council by virtue of Sec 8 (1), Article 8.

ISSUE:
Whether or not EO 284 is constitutional.

HELD:
No, it is unconstitutional. It is clear that the 1987 Constitution seeks to prohibit the President, Vice-President, members
of the Cabinet, their deputies or assistants from holding during their tenure multiple offices or employment in the
government, except in those cases specified in the Constitution itself and as above clarified with respect to posts held
without additional compensation in an ex-officio capacity as provided by law and as required by the primary functions
of their office, the citation of Cabinet members (then called Ministers) as examples during the debate and deliberation
on the general rule laid down for all appointive officials should be considered as mere personal opinions which cannot
override the constitution’s manifest intent and the people’s understanding thereof.

In the light of the construction given to Sec 13, Art 7 in relation to Sec 7, par. (2), Art IX-B of the 1987 Constitution,
EO 284 is unconstitutional. Ostensibly restricting the number of positions that Cabinet members, undersecretaries or
assistant secretaries may hold in addition to their primary position to not more than 2 positions in the government and
government corporations, EO 284 actually allows them to hold multiple offices or employment in direct contravention
of the express mandate of Sec 13, Art 7 of the 1987 Constitution prohibiting them from doing so, unless otherwise
provided in the 1987 Constitution itself.
 Borja vs Comelec

Facts:

Jose T. Capco, Jr. was elected as Vice-Mayor of Pateros on January 18, 1988 for a term ending on June 30, 1992. On
September 2, 1989, he became Mayor, by operation of law, upon the death of the incumbent, Cesar Borja. Thereafter,
Capco was elected and served as Mayor for two more terms, from 1992 to 1998. On March 27, 1998, Capco filed a
Certificate of Candidacy for Mayor of Pateros in the May 11, 1998 elections. Petitioner Benjamin U. Borja, Jr., who
was also a candidate for mayor, sought Capco’s disqualification on the ground that Capco would have already served
as Mayor for 3 consecutive terms by June 30, 1998; hence, he would be ineligible to serve for another term. The Second
Division of the Comelec declared Capco disqualified but the Comelec en banc reversed the decision and declared Capco
eligible to run for mayor. Capco was subsequently voted and proclaimed as mayor.

Issue:

Whether or not a vice-mayor who succeeds to the office of mayor by operation of law and serves the remainder of the
term is considered to have served a term in that office for the purpose of the three-term limit.

Held:

No. The term limit for elective local officials must be taken to refer to the right to be elected as well as the right to serve
the same elective position. Consequently, it is not enough that an individual has served three consecutive terms in an
elective local office, he must also have been elected to the same position for the same number of times before the
disqualification can apply. Capco was qualified to run again as mayor in the next election because he was not elected to
the office of mayor in the first term but simply found himself thrust into it by operation of law. Neither had he served
the full term because he only continued the service, interrupted by the death, of the deceased mayor. The vice-mayor’s
assumption of the mayorship in the event of the vacancy is more a matter of chance than of design. Hence, his service
in that office should not be counted in the application of any term limit.

The policy embodied in the constitutional provision (Art. X, §8) is not only to prevent the establishment of political
dynasties but also to enhance the freedom of choice of the people. A consideration of the historical background of Art.
X, §8 of the Constitution reveals that the members of the Constitutional Commission were as much concerned with
preserving the freedom of choice of the people as they were with preventing the monopolization of political power. In
discussing term limits, the drafters of the Constitution did so on the assumption that the officials concerned were serving
by reason of election. To consider Capco to have served the first term in full and therefore ineligible to run a third time
for reelection would be not only to falsify reality but also to unduly restrict the right of the people to choose whom they
wish to govern them. (Borja vs Comelec, G.R. No. 133495, September 3, 1998)
 FRANCISCO VS. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
G.R. NO. 160261. November 10, 2003

ERNESTO B. FRANCISCO, JR., petitioner,

NAGMAMALASAKIT NA MGA MANANANGGOL NG MGA MANGGAGAWANG PILIPINO, INC., ITS
OFFICERS AND MEMBERS, petitioner-in-intervention,
WORLD WAR II VETERANS LEGIONARIES OF THE PHILIPPINES, INC., petitioner-in-intervention,
vs.
THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, REPRESENTED BY SPEAKER JOSE G. DE VENECIA, THE SENATE,
REPRESENTED BY SENATE PRESIDENT FRANKLIN M. DRILON, REPRESENTATIVE GILBERTO C.
TEODORO, JR. AND REPRESENTATIVE FELIX WILLIAM B. FUENTEBELLA, respondents.
JAIME N. SORIANO, respondent-in-Intervention,
SENATOR AQUILINO Q. PIMENTEL, respondent-in-intervention.
Facts:

On 28 November 2001, the 12th Congress of the House of Representatives adopted and approved the Rules of Procedure
in Impeachment Proceedings, superseding the previous House Impeachment Rules approved by the 11th Congress.
On 22 July 2002, the House of Representatives adopted a Resolution, which directed the Committee on Justice “to
conduct an investigation, in aid of legislation, on the manner of disbursements and expenditures by the Chief Justice of
the Supreme Court of the Judiciary Development Fund (JDF).
On 2 June 2003, former President Joseph E. Estrada filed an impeachment complaint (first impeachment complaint)
against Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide Jr. and seven Associate Justices of the Supreme Court for “culpable violation of
the Constitution, betrayal of the public trust and other high crimes.” The complaint was endorsed by House
Representatives, and was referred to the House Committee on Justice on 5 August 2003 in accordance with Section 3(2)
of Article XI of the Constitution. The House Committee on Justice ruled on 13 October 2003 that the first impeachment
complaint was “sufficient in form,” but voted to dismiss the same on 22 October 2003 for being insufficient in substance.
The following day or on 23 October 2003, the second impeachment complaint was filed with the Secretary General of
the House by House Representatives against Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr., founded on the alleged results of the
legislative inquiry initiated by above-mentioned House Resolution. The second impeachment complaint was
accompanied by a “Resolution of Endorsement/Impeachment” signed by at least 1/3 of all the Members of the House
of Representatives.
Various petitions for certiorari, prohibition, and mandamus were filed with the Supreme Court against the House of
Representatives, et. al., most of which petitions contend that the filing of the second impeachment complaint is
unconstitutional as it violates the provision of Section 5 of Article XI of the Constitution that “[n]o impeachment
proceedings shall be initiated against the same official more than once within a period of one year.”
Issues:

Whether or not the offenses alleged in the Second impeachment complaint constitute valid impeachable offenses under
the Constitution.
Whether or not Sections 15 and 16 of Rule V of the Rules on Impeachment adopted by the 12th Congress are
unconstitutional for violating the provisions of Section 3, Article XI of the Constitution.
Whether the second impeachment complaint is barred under Section 3(5) of Article XI of the Constitution.
Rulings:

This issue is a non-justiciable political question which is beyond the scope of the judicial power of the Supreme Court
under Section 1, Article VIII of the Constitution.
Any discussion of this issue would require the Court to make a determination of what constitutes an impeachable offense.
Such a determination is a purely political question which the Constitution has left to the sound discretion of the
legislation. Such an intent is clear from the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission.
Courts will not touch the issue of constitutionality unless it is truly unavoidable and is the very lis mota or crux of the
controversy.
The Rule of Impeachment adopted by the House of Congress is unconstitutional.
Section 3 of Article XI provides that “The Congress shall promulgate its rules on impeachment to effectively carry out
the purpose of this section.” Clearly, its power to promulgate its rules on impeachment is limited by the phrase “to
effectively carry out the purpose of this section.” Hence, these rules cannot contravene the very purpose of the
Constitution which said rules were intended to effectively carry out. Moreover, Section 3 of Article XI clearly provides
for other specific limitations on its power to make rules.
It is basic that all rules must not contravene the Constitution which is the fundamental law. If as alleged Congress had
absolute rule making power, then it would by necessary implication have the power to alter or amend the meaning of
the Constitution without need of referendum.
It falls within the one year bar provided in the Constitution.
Having concluded that the initiation takes place by the act of filing of the impeachment complaint and referral to the
House Committee on Justice, the initial action taken thereon, the meaning of Section 3 (5) of Article XI becomes clear.
Once an impeachment complaint has been initiated in the foregoing manner, another may not be filed against the same
official within a one year period following Article XI, Section 3(5) of the Constitution.
Considering that the first impeachment complaint, was filed by former President Estrada against Chief Justice Hilario
G. Davide, Jr., along with seven associate justices of this Court, on June 2, 2003 and referred to the House Committee
on Justice on August 5, 2003, the second impeachment complaint filed by Representatives Gilberto C. Teodoro, Jr. and
Felix William Fuentebella against the Chief Justice on October 23, 2003 violates the constitutional prohibition against
the initiation of impeachment proceedings against the same impeachable officer within a one-year period.

Hence, Sections 16 and 17 of Rule V of the Rules of Procedure in Impeachment Proceedings which were approved by
the House of Representatives on November 28, 2001 are unconstitutional. Consequently, the second impeachment
complaint against Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr. which was filed by Representatives Gilberto C. Teodoro, Jr. and
Felix William B. Fuentebella with the Office of the Secretary General of the House of Representatives on October 23,
2003 is barred under paragraph 5, section 3 of Article XI of the Constitution.
 Merlin Magallona vs Secretary Eduardo Ermita
655 SCRA 476 – Political Law – National Territory – RA 9522 is Constitutional

FACTS:
In March 2009, Republic Act 9522, an act defining the archipelagic baselines of the Philippines was enacted – the law
is also known as the Baselines Law. This law was meant to comply with the terms of the third United Nations Convention
on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS III), ratified by the Philippines in February 1984.
Professor Merlin Magallona et al questioned the validity of RA 9522 as they contend, among others, that the law
decreased the national territory of the Philippines hence the law is unconstitutional. Some of their particular arguments
are as follows:
a. the law abandoned the demarcation set by the Treaty of Paris and other ancillary treaties – this also resulted to the
exclusion of our claim over Sabah;
b. the law, as well as UNCLOS itself, describes the Philippine waters as “archipelagic” waters which, in international
law, opens our waters landward of the baselines to maritime passage by all vessels (innocent passage) and aircrafts
(overflight), undermining Philippine sovereignty and national security, contravening the country’s nuclear-free policy,
and damaging marine resources, in violation of relevant constitutional provisions;
c. the classification of the Kalayaan Island Group (KIG), as well as the Scarborough Shoal (bajo de masinloc), as a
“regime of islands” pursuant to UNCLOS results in the loss of a large maritime area but also prejudices the livelihood
of subsistence fishermen.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the contentions of Magallona et al are tenable.

HELD:
No. The Supreme Court emphasized that RA 9522, or UNCLOS, itself is not a means to acquire, or lose, territory. The
treaty and the baseline law has nothing to do with the acquisition, enlargement, or diminution of the Philippine territory.
What controls when it comes to acquisition or loss of territory is the international law principle on occupation, accretion,
cession and prescription and NOT the execution of multilateral treaties on the regulations of sea-use rights or enacting
statutes to comply with the treaty’s terms to delimit maritime zones and continental shelves.
The law did not decrease the demarcation of our territory. In fact it increased it. Under the old law amended by RA 9522
(RA 3046), we adhered with the rectangular lines enclosing the Philippines. The area that it covered was 440,994 square
nautical miles (sq. na. mi.). But under 9522, and with the inclusion of the exclusive economic zone, the extent of our
maritime was increased to 586,210 sq. na. mi. (See image below for comparison)
If any, the baselines law is a notice to the international community of the scope of the maritime space and submarine
areas within which States parties exercise treaty-based rights.
The Philippine Baselines
Anent their particular contentions:
a. The law did not abandon the Sabah claim. This is evident on the provision of Section 2 of RA 9522:
Section 2. The definition of the baselines of the territorial sea of the Philippine Archipelago as provided in this Act is
without prejudice to the delineation of the baselines of the territorial sea around the territory of Sabah, situated in North
Borneo, over which the Republic of the Philippines has acquired dominion and sovereignty.
b. UNCLOS may term our waters as “archipelagic waters” and that we may term it as our “internal waters”, but the
bottom line is that our country exercises sovereignty over these waters and UNCLOS itself recognizes that. However,
due to our observance of international law, we allow the exercise of others of their right of innocent passage. No modern
State can validly invoke its sovereignty to absolutely forbid innocent passage that is exercised in accordance with
customary international law without risking retaliatory measures from the international community.
c. The classification of the KIG (or the Spratly’s), as well as the Scarborough Shoal, as a regime of islands did not
diminish our maritime area. Under UNCLOS and under the baselines law, since they are regimes of islands, they
generate their own maritime zones – in short, they are not to be enclosed within the baselines of the main archipelago
(which is the Philippine Island group). This is because if we do that, then we will be enclosing a larger area which would
already depart from the provisions of UNCLOS – that the demarcation should follow the natural contour of the
archipelago.
Nevertheless, we still continue to lay claim over the KIG and the Scarborough Shoal through effective occupation.
NOTES:
Under UNCLOS and the baselines law, we have three levels of maritime zones where we exercise treaty-based rights:
a. territorial waters – 12 nautical miles from the baselines; where we exercise sovereignty
b. contiguous zone – 24 nautical miles from the baselines; jurisdiction where we can enforce customs, fiscal,
immigration, and sanitation laws (CFIS).
c. exclusive economic zone – 200 nautical miles from the baselines; where we have the right to exploit the living and
non-living resources in the exclusive economic zone
Note: a fourth zone may be added which is the continental shelf – this is covered by Article 77 of the UNCLOS.
 Professional Video Inc. vs. TESDA
G.R. No. 155504, June 26, 2009,
Sovereignty, State Immunity from Suit, International Law
FACTS:
In 1999, TESDA, an instrumentality of the government established under R.A. No. 7796 (the TESDA Act of 1994) and
attached to the DOLE to develop and establish a national system of skills standardization, testing, and certification in
the country.
To fulfill this mandate, it sought to issue security-printed certification and/or identification polyvinyl (PVC) cards to
trainees who have passed the certification process.
Professional Video Inc. (PROVI) signed and executed the “Contract Agreement Project PVC ID Card issuance” for the
provision of goods and services in the printing and encoding of the PVC cards. PROVI was to provide TESDA with the
system and equipment compliant with the specifications defined in the proposal. In return, TESDA would pay PROVI
a specified sum of money after TESDA’s acceptance of the contracted goods and services. PPOVI alleged that TESDA
has still an outstanding balance and still remains unpaid.
TESDA claims that it entered the Contract Agreement and Addendum in the performance of its governmental function
to develop and establish a national system of skills standardization, testing, and certification; in the performance of this
governmental function, TESDA is immune from suit.
ISSUE:
Can TESDA be sued without its consent?
RULING:
TESDA, as an agency of the State, cannot be sued without its consent. The rule that a state may not be sued without its
consent is embodied in Section 3, Article XVI of the 1987 Constitution and has been an established principle that
antedates this Constitution. It is as well a universally recognized principle of international law that exempts a state and
its organs from the jurisdiction of another state.
The principle is based on the very essence of sovereignty, and on the practical ground that there can be no legal right as
against the authority that makes the law on which the right depends. It also rests on reasons of public policy. That public
service would be hindered, and the public endangered, if the sovereign authority could be subjected to law suits at the
instance of every citizen and, consequently, controlled in the uses and dispositions of the means required for the proper
administration of the government.
The proscribed suit that the state immunity principle covers takes on various forms, namely: a suit against the Republic
by name; a suit against an unincorporated government agency; a suit against a government agency covered by a charter
with respect to the agency’s performance of governmental functions; and a suit that on its face is against a government
officer, but where the ultimate liability will fall on the government. In the present case, the writ of attachment was issued
against a government agency covered by its own charter.
As discussed above, TESDA performs governmental functions, and the issuance of certifications is a task within its
function of developing and establishing a system of skills standardization, testing, and certification in the country. From
the perspective of this function, the core reason for the existence of state immunity applies i.e., the public policy reason
that the performance of governmental function cannot be hindered or delayed by suits, nor can these suits control the
use and disposition of the means for the performance of governmental functions.
 Lockheed vs. UP G.R. No. 18591 AprIL 18, 2012 Immunity from Suit
FACTS:
Petitioner Lockheed Detective and Watchman Agency, Inc. (Lockheed) entered into a contract for security services with
respondent UP. In 1998, several security guards assigned to UP filed separate complaints against Lockheed and UP for
payment of underpaid wages, 25% overtime pay, premium pay for rest days and special holidays, holiday pay, service
incentive leave pay, night shift differentials, 13th month pay, refund of cash bond, refund of deductions for the Mutual
Benefits Aids System (MBAS), unpaid wages from December 16-31, 1998, and attorney’s fees.

ISSUE:
Having a charter with which it can sue and be sued, can UP funds be garnished?

RULING:
We agree with UP that there was no point for Lockheed in discussing the doctrine of state immunity from suit as this
was never an issue in this case. Clearly, UP consented to be sued when it participated in the proceedings below. What
UP questions is the hasty garnishment of its funds in its PNB account. This Court finds that the CA correctly applied
the NEA case. Like NEA, UP is a juridical personality separate and distinct from the government and has the capacity
to sue and be sued. Thus, also like NEA, it cannot evade execution, and its funds may be subject to garnishment or levy.
However, before execution may be had, a claim for payment of the judgment award must first be filed with the COA.
 AIR TRANSPORTATION OFFICE v. SPOUSES DAVID & ELISEA RAMOS

FACTS:
Respondent Spouses discovered that a portion of their registered land in Baguio City was being used as part of the
runway and running shoulder of the Loakan Airport being operated by petitioner Air Transportation Office (ATO). The
respondents agreed after negotiations to convey the affected portion by deed of sale to the ATO in consideration of the
amount of P778,150.00. However, the ATO failed to pay despite repeated verbal and written demands.

Thus, the respondents filed an action for collection against the ATO and some of its officials in the RTC. In their answer,
the ATO and its co-defendants invoked as an affirmative defense the issuance of Proclamation No. 1358, whereby
President Marcos had reserved certain parcels of land that included the respondents affected portion for use of the
Loakan Airport. They asserted that the RTC had no jurisdiction to entertain the action without the States consent
considering that the deed of sale had been entered into in the performance of governmental functions.

The RTC held in favor of the Spouses, ordering the ATO to pay the plaintiffs Spouses the amount of P778,150.00 being
the value of the parcel of land appropriated by the defendant ATO as embodied in the Deed of Sale, plus an annual
interest of 12% from August 11, 1995, the date of the Deed of Sale until fully paid; (2) The amount of P150,000.00 by
way of moral damages and P150,000.00 as exemplary damages; (3) the amount of P50,000.00 by way of attorney’s fees
plus P15,000.00 representing the 10, more or less, court appearances of plaintiff’s counsel; (4) The costs of this suit.

On appeal, the CA affirmed the RTCs decision with modification deleting the awarded cost, and reducing the moral and
exemplary damage to P30,000.00 each, and attorney’s fees is lowered to P10,000.00.

ISSUE:
Could ATO be sued without the State's consent?

HELD:
An unincorporated government agency without any separate juridical personality of its own enjoys immunity from suit
because it is invested with an inherent power of sovereignty. Accordingly, a claim for damages against the agency
cannot prosper; otherwise, the doctrine of sovereign immunity is violated. However, the need to distinguish between an
unincorporated government agency performing governmental function and one performing proprietary functions has
arisen. The immunity has been upheld in favor of the former because its function is governmental or incidental to such
function; it has not been upheld in favor of the latter whose function was not in pursuit of a necessary function of
government but was essentially a business. National Airports Corporation v. Teodoro, Sr. and Phil. Airlines Inc., 91
Phil. 203 (1952)

Civil Aeronautics Administration vs. Court of Appeals (167 SCRA 28 [1988]),the Supreme Court, reiterating the
pronouncements laid down in Teodoro, declared that the CAA (predecessor of ATO) is an agency not immune from
suit, it being engaged in functions pertaining to a private entity.

The Civil Aeronautics Administration comes under the category of a private entity. Although not a body corporate it
was created, like the National Airports Corporation, not to maintain a necessary function of government, but to run what
is essentially a business, even if revenues be not its prime objective but rather the promotion of travel and the
convenience of the travelling public. It is engaged in an enterprise which, far from being the exclusive prerogative of
state, may, more than the construction of public roads, be undertaken by private concerns. National Airports Corp. v.
Teodoro, 91 Phil. 203 (1952)

The CA thereby correctly appreciated the juridical character of the ATO as an agency of the Government not performing
a purely governmental or sovereign function, but was instead involved in the management and maintenance of the
Loakan Airport, an activity that was not the exclusive prerogative of the State in its sovereign capacity. Hence, the ATO
had no claim to the States immunity from suit. We uphold the CAs aforequoted holding.

The doctrine of sovereign immunity cannot be successfully invoked to defeat a valid claim for compensation arising
from the taking without just compensation and without the proper expropriation proceedings being first resorted to of
the plaintiff’s property. Republic v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 90478, Nov. 2, 1991.

DENIED
 Vigilar vs. Aquino, G.R. No. 180388, Jan. 18, 2011 Immunity from Suit
FACTS:
Aquino was invited by DPWH to a bidding for the construction of a dike by bulldozing a part of the Porac River at
Barangay Ascomo-Pulungmasle, Guagua, Pampanga. Aquino was subsequently awarded the “Contract of Agreement”
by the said government agency.

By 9 July 1992, the project was duly completed by respondent, who was then issued a Certificate of Project Completion
dated 16 July 1992. However, claimed that PhP1,262,696.20 was still due him, but petitioners refused to pay the amount.
He thus filed a Complaint for the collection of sum of money with damages before the Regional Trial Court of Guagua,
Pampanga. Petitioners, for their part, set up the defense that the Complaint was a suit against the state; that respondent
failed to exhaust administrative remedies; and that the “Contract of Agreement” covering the project was void for
violating Presidential Decree No. 1445, absent the proper appropriation and the Certificate of Availability of Funds.

The trial court ruled in favor of the respondent. Petitioners (DPWH) then appealed the case before the CA which ruled
in their favor, declaring the contract null and void ab initio but ordered compensation to Aquino for worked delivered,
subject to Commission on Audit rules. Unsatisfied with the CA’s decision, Petitioners then raised the issue before the
Supreme Court seeking complete dismissal of the case without paying Aquino any money.

ISSUE:
Was the doctrine of sovereign immunity properly invoked?

RULING:
No. The Supreme Court said that the doctrine of governmental immunity from suit cannot serve as an instrument for
perpetrating an injustice to a citizen. Citing their decision in EPG Construction (G.R. No. 131544, March 16, 2001, 354
SCRA 566), the court said that it would be the apex of injustice and highly inequitable if the respondent is not duly
compensated for actual work performed and services rendered, where both the government and the public have received
benefits from the project and reaped the fruits of respondent’s honest toil and labor. The Court further said that the no
government agency or agent can conveniently hide under the State’s cloak of invincibility against suit, because this
principle has limitations especially when that the ends of justice would be subverted if we were to uphold, in this
particular instance, the State’s immunity from suit. The Court finally said that in this case, it can’t be an instrument of
injustice by upholding the immunity from suit principle and affirmed the decision of the Court of Appeals.
 Shell Philippines vs. Jalos G.R. No. 179918, Sept. 8, 2010 State Immunity
FACTS:
Petitioner Shell Philippines Exploration B.V. and the Republic of the Philippines entered into Service Contract 38 for
the exploration and extraction of petroleum in northwestern Palawan. Two years later, Shell discovered natural gas in
the Camago-Malampaya area and pursued its development of the well under the Malampaya Natural Gas Project. This
entailed the construction and installation of a pipeline, which spanned 504 kms. and crossed the Oriental Mindoro Sea,
from Shell’s production platform to its gas processing plant in Batangas. On May 19, 2003, respondents, 78 individuals,
claiming that they were all subsistence fishermen from the coastal barangay of Bansud, Oriental Mindoro, filed a
complaint for damages against Shell on the ground that their livelihood was adversely affected the construction and
operation of Shell’s natural gas pipeline. Shell moved for dismissal of the complaint alleging that the Pollution
Adjudication Board (PAB), not the trial court, has primary jurisdiction over pollution cases and actions for related
damages and that it could not be sued pursuant to the doctrine of state immunity without the State’s consent on the basis
that it merely serves as an agent of the Philippine government in the development of the Malampaya gas reserves through
Service Contract 38.

The RTC dismissed the complaint ruling that it should be brought first to the PAB. CA reversed RTC’s order upon
respondent’s petition for certiorari. Shell moved for reconsideration of the CA’s decision but the same was denied.
Hence, Shell filed this petition for review under Rule 45.

ISSUE:
Can Shell invoke state immunity, as agent of the Republic of the Philippines?

RULING:
No. Shell cannot invoke state immunity because it is not an agent of the Republic of the Philippines. It is just a service
contractor for the exploration and development of one of the country’s natural gas reserves. While the Republic
appointed Shell as the exclusive party to conduct petroleum operations in the Camago-Malampayo area under the State’s
full control and supervision, it does not follow that Shell has become the State’s “agent” within the meaning of the law.

An agent is a person who binds himself to render some service or to do something in representation or on behalf of
another, with the consent or authority of the latter. The Essence of an agency is the agent’s ability to represent his
principal and bring about business relations between the latter and third persons.

Shell’s primary obligation under the Service Contract 38 is not to represent the Philippine government for the purpose
of transacting business with third persons, rather, its contractual commitment is to develop and manage petroleum
operations on behalf of the state. Hence, Shell is not an agent of the Philippine government but a provider of services,
technology and financing for the Malampaya Natural Gas Project; it is not immune from suit and it may be sued for
claims even without the State’s consent. And as evident in the stipulations agreed upon by the parties under Service
Contract 38, the Phil. Government recognized that Shell could be sued in relation to the project.
 Holy See vs. Rosario Jr.
G.R. No. 101949
238 SCRA 524
FACTS:
Petition arose from a controversy over a parcel of land. Lot 5-A, registered under the name Holy See, was contiguous
to Lot 5-B and 5-D under the name of Philippine Realty Corporation (PRC). The land was donated by the Archdiocese
of Manila to the Papal Nuncio, which represents the Holy See, who exercises sovereignty over the Vatican City, Rome,
Italy, for his residence.
Said lots were sold through an agent to Ramon Licup who assigned his rights to respondents Starbright Sales Enterprises,
Inc.
When the squatters refuse to vacate the lots, a dispute arose between the two parties because both were unsure whose
responsibility was it to evict the squatters from said lots. Respondent Starbright Sales Enterprises Inc. insists that Holy
See should clear the property while Holy See says that respondent corporation should do it or the earnest money will be
returned. With this, Msgr. Cirilios, the agent, subsequently returned the P100,000 earnest money.
The same lots were then sold to Tropicana Properties and Development Corporation.
Starbright Sales Enterprises, Inc. filed a suit for annulment of the sale, specific performance and damages against Msgr.
Cirilios, PRC as well as Tropicana Properties and Development Corporation. The Holy See and Msgr. Cirilos moved to
dismiss the petition for lack of jurisdiction based on sovereign immunity from suit. RTC denied the motion on ground
that petitioner already "shed off" its sovereign immunity by entering into a business contract. The subsequent Motion
for Reconsideration was also denied hence this special civil action for certiorari was forwarded to the Supreme Court.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Holy See can invoke sovereign immunity.
HELD:
The Court held that Holy See may properly invoke sovereign immunity for its non-suability. As expressed in Sec. 2 Art
II of the 1987 Constitution, generally accepted principles of International Law are adopted by our Courts and thus shall
form part of the laws of the land as a condition and consequence of our admission in the society of nations.
It was noted in Article 31(A) of the 1961 Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations that diplomatic envoy shall be
granted immunity from civil and administrative jurisdiction of the receiving state over any real action relating to private
immovable property. The Department of Foreign Affairs (DFA) certified that the Embassy of the Holy See is a duly
accredited diplomatic missionary to the Republic of the Philippines and is thus exempted from local jurisdiction and is
entitled to the immunity rights of a diplomatic mission or embassy in this Court.
Furthermore, it shall be understood that in the case at bar, the petitioner has bought and sold lands in the ordinary course
of real estate business, surely, the said transaction can be categorized as an act jure gestionis. However, petitioner has
denied that the acquisition and subsequent disposal of the lot were made for profit but claimed that it acquired said
property for the site of its mission or the Apostolic Nunciature in the Philippines.
The Holy See is immune from suit because the act of selling the lot of concern is non-propriety in nature. The lot was
acquired through a donation from the Archdiocese of Manila, not for a commercial purpose, but for the use of petitioner
to construct the official place of residence of the Papal Nuncio thereof. The transfer of the property and its subsequent
disposal are likewise clothed with a governmental (non-proprietal) character as petitioner sold the lot not for profit or
gain rather because it merely cannot evict the squatters living in said property.

In view of the foregoing, the petition is hereby GRANTED and the complaints were dismissed accordingly.
 ROMUALDEZ-YAP v. CSC
225 SCRA 285

FACTS:
Petitoner Conchita Romualdez-Yap started working with the Philippine National Bank (PNB) on September 20, 1972
and after several promotions, was appointed in 1983 as a Senior Vice President assigned to the Fund Transfer
Department. The case at bar is a special civil action for certiorari assailing Res. No. 92-201 of the respondent which
upheld the petitioner’s separation from PNB in light of EO 80 or the Revised Charter of PNB. Petitioner contends that
there is an existence of bad faith in its reorganization and that there is an erroneous application of the one year
prescriptive period for quo warranto proceedings in her case.

ISSUE:
Is the reorganization of PNB, a government-owned or controlled corporation performing ministrant functions, valid?

HELD:
Ministrant functions are those undertaken by way of advancing the general interests of society and are merely optional.
Commercial or universal banking is, ideally, not a governmental but a private sector endeavour, an optional function of
the government. There are functions of the government which it may exercise to promote merely the welfare, progress,
and prosperity of the people. Thus, reorganization of such corporations like PNB are valid so long as they are done in
good faith as prescribed in the Dario v. Mison doctrine. Accordingly, the reorganization of PNB is found to be done in
good faith by the Court.
 GP VS MONTE DE PIEDAD
G.R. No. L-9959 December 13, 1916
Facts:
A devastating earthquake took place in the Philippines sometimes in 1863. Contributions amounting to $400,000 were
collected during the Spanish regime for the relief of the victims of an earthquake. Out of the aid, $80,000.00 was left
untouched. The Monte de Piedad, a charitable institution, in need for more working capital, petitioned the Governor-
General for the transfer of $80,000 as a loan.
In June 1893, the Department of Finance called upon the Monte de Piedad to return the $80,000. The respondent bank
declined to comply with this order upon the ground that only the Governor-General of the Philippine Islands and not
the Department of Finance had the right to order the reimbursement.
On account of various petitions of the persons, the Philippine Islands, through the Attorney-General, bring suit against
the Monte de Piedad for a recover of the $80,000, together with interest, for the benefit of those persons or their heirs.
After due trial, judgment was entered in favor of the plaintiff for the sum of $80,000 gold or its equivalent in
Philippine currency, together with legal interest from February 28, 1912, and the costs of the cause.
The defendant appealed. One of the assignment of errors made by the defendant was to question the competence of the
plaintiff (government) to bring the action, contending that the suit could be instituted only by the intended
beneficiaries themselves or by their heirs.

Issues:
Whether or not the Philippine government is competent to file a complaint against the respondent bank for the
reimbursement of the money of the intended beneficiaries?

Discussions:
In accordance with the doctrine of Parens Patriae. The government being the protector of the rights of the people has
the inherent supreme power to enforce such laws that will promote the public interest. No other party has been
entrusted with such right hence as “parents” of the people the government has the right to take back the money
intended for the people.
Rulings:
Yes. The Supreme Court upheld the right of the Government to file the case as parens patriae in representation of the
legitimate claimants. The legislature or government of the State, as parens patriae, has the right to enforce all charities
of public nature, by virtue of its general superintending authority over the public interests, where no other person is
entrusted with it.
This prerogative of parens patriae is inherent in the supreme power of every State, whether that power is lodged in a
royal person or in the legislature. It is a most beneficient functions, and often necessary to be exercised in the interest
of humanity, and for the prevention of injury to those who cannot protect themselves. The beneficiaries of charities,
who are often in capable of vindicating their rights, and justly look for protection to the sovereign authority, acting as
parens patriae. They show that this beneficient functions has not ceased to exist under the change of government from
a monarchy to a republic; but that it now resides in the legislative department, ready to be called into exercise
whenever required for the purposes of justice and right, and is a clearly capable of being exercised in cases of charities
as in any other cases whatever.
 Melchora Cabanas vs Francisco Pilapil
FACTS:
Florentino Pilapil insured himself and he indicated in his insurance plan that his child will be his beneficiary. He also
indicated that if upon his death the child is still a minor; the proceeds of his benefits shall be administered by his
brother, Francisco Pilapil. The child was only ten years of age when Florentino died and so Francisco then took charge
of Florentino’s insurance proceeds for the benefit of the child.
On the other hand, the mother of the child Melchora Cabanas filed a complaint seeking the delivery of the insurance
proceeds in favor and for her to be declared as the child’s trustee. Francisco asserted the terms of the insurance policy
and that as a private contract its terms and obligations must be binding only to the parties and intended beneficiaries.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the state may interfere by virtue of “parens patriae” to the terms of the insurance policy.

HELD:
Yes. The Constitution provides for the strengthening of the family as the basic social unit, and that whenever any
member thereof such as in the case at bar would be prejudiced and his interest be affected then the judiciary if a
litigation has been filed should resolve that case according to the best interest of that person. The uncle here should not
be the trustee, it should be the mother as she was the immediate relative of the minor child and it is assumed that the
mother shall show more care towards the child than the uncle will. The application of parens patriae here is in
consonance with this country’s tradition of favouring conflicts in favor of the family hence preference to the parent
(mother) is observed.
 Pharmaceutical and Health Care Association of the Philippines v Duque III
Facts:
Petition for certiorari seeking to nullify the Revised Implementing Rules and Regulations (RIRR) of E.O. 51 (Milk
Code). Petitioner claims that the RIRR is not valid as it contains provisions that are not constitutional and go beyond
what it is supposed to implement. Milk Code was issued by President Cory Aquino under the Freedom Constitution on
Oct.1986. One of the preambular clauses of the Milk Code states that the law seeks to give effect to Art 11 of the Int’l
Code of Marketing and Breastmilk Substitutes(ICBMS), a code adopted by the World Health Assembly(WHA). From
1982-2006, The WHA also adopted severe resolutions to the effect that breastfeeding should be supported, hence, it
should be ensured that nutrition and health claims are not permitted for breastmilk substitutes. In 2006, the DOH
issued the assailed RIRR.

Issue:
Sub-Issue: W/N the pertinent int’l agreements entered into by the Phil are part of the law of the land and may be
implemented by DOH through the RIRR. If yes, W/N the RIRR is in accord with int’l agreements
MAIN: W/N the DOH acted w/o or in excess of their jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack
of excess of jurisdiction and in violation of the Constitution by promulgating the RIRR.

Held:
Sub-issue:
Yes for ICBMS. Under 1987 Consti, int’l law can become domestic law by transformation (thru constitutional
mechanism such as local legislation) or incorporation (mere constitutional declaration i.e treaties) The ICBMS and
WHA resolutions were not treaties as they have not been concurred by 2/3 of all members of the Senate as required
under Sec, 21, Art 8. However, the ICBMS had been transformed into domestic law through a local legislation such as
the Milk Code. The Milk Code is almost a verbatim reproduction of ICBMS.

No for WHA Resolutions. The Court ruled that DOH failed to establish that the provisions pertinent WHA resolutions
are customary int’l law that may be deemed part of the law of the land. For an int’l rule to be considered as customary
law, it must be established that such rule is being followed by states because they consider it as obligatory to comply
with such rules (opinion juris). The WHO resolutions, although signed by most of the member states, were enforced or
practiced by at least a majority of member states. Unlike the ICBMS whereby legislature enacted most of the
provisions into the law via the Milk Code, the WHA Resolutions (specifically providing for exclusive breastfeeding
from 0-6 months, breastfeeding up to 24 Months and absolutely prohibiting ads for breastmilk substitutes) have not
been adopted as domestic law nor are they followed in our country as well. The Filipinos have the option of how to
take care of their babies as they see fit. WHA Resolutions may be classified as SOFT LAW – non-binding norms,
principles and practices that influence state behavior. Soft law is not part of int’l law.

Main issue:
Yes. Some parts of the RIRR were not in consonance with the Milk Code such as Sec. 4(f) ->advertising, promotions
of formula are prohibited,
Sec 11 -> prohibitions for advertising breastmilk substitutes intended for infants and young children uo to 24 months
And Sec 46 -> sanctions for advertising.
These provisions are declared null and void. The DOH and respondents are prohibited from implementing said
provisions.