Coquilla was born on 1938 of Filipino parents in Oras, Eastern Samar.

He grew up and resided there until

1965, when he was subsequently naturalized as a U.S. citizen after joining the US Navy. In 1998, he came
to the Philippines and took out a residence certificate, although he continued making several trips to the
United States.

Coquilla eventually applied for repatriation under R.A. No. 8171 which was approved. On November 10,
2000, he took his oath as a citizen of the Philippines.

On November 21, 2000, he applied for registration as a voter of Butunga, Oras, Eastern Samar which was
approved in 2001. On February 27, 2001, he filed his certificate of candidacy stating that he had been a
resident of Oras, Eastern Samar for 2 years.

Incumbent mayor Alvarez, who was running for re-election sought to cancel Coquilla’s certificate of
candidacy on the ground that his statement as to the two year residency in Oras was a material
misrepresentation as he only resided therein for 6 months after his oath as a citizen.

Before the COMELEC could render a decision, elections commenced and Coquilla was proclaimed the
winner. On July 19, 2001, COMELEC granted Alvarez’ petition and ordered the cancellation of petitioner’s
certificate of candidacy.

ISSUE:
Whether or not Coquilla had been a resident of Oras, Eastern Samar at least on year before the elections
held on May 14, 2001 as what he represented in his COC.

RULING:
No. The statement in petitioner’s certificate of candidacy that he had been a resident of Oras, Eastern
Samar for “two years” at the time he filed such certificate is not true. The question is whether the
COMELEC was justified in ordering the cancellation of his certificate of candidacy for this reason.
Petitioner made a false representation of a material fact in his certificate of candidacy, thus rendering
such certificate liable to cancellation. In the case at bar, what is involved is a false statement concerning
a candidate’s qualification for an office for which he filed the certificate of candidacy. This is a
misrepresentation of a material fact justifying the cancellation of petitioner’s certificate of candidacy. The
cancellation of petitioner’s certificate of candidacy in this case is thus fully justified.

PEOPLE V JALOSJOS
Feb. 3, 2000

Facts: The accused-appellant, Romeo Jalosjos, is a full-fledged member of Congress who is confined at the
national penitentiary while his conviction for statutory rape and acts of lasciviousness is pending appeal.
The accused-appellant filed a motion asking that he be allowed to fully discharge the duties of a
Congressman, including attendance at legislative sessions and committee meetings despite his having
been convicted in the first instance of a non-bailable offense on the basis of popular sovereignty and the
need for his constituents to be represented

Issue: Whether or not accused-appellant should be allowed to discharge mandate as member of House of
Representatives

Held: Election is the expression of the sovereign power of the people. However, inspite of its importance,
the privileges and rights arising from having been elected may be enlarged or restricted by law.

The immunity from arrest or detention of Senators and members of the House of Representatives arises
from a provision of the Constitution. The privilege has always been granted in a restrictive sense. The
provision granting an exemption as a special privilege cannot be extended beyond the ordinary meaning
of its terms. It may not be extended by intendment, implication or equitable considerations.

The accused-appellant has not given any reason why he should be exempted from the operation of Sec.
11, Art. VI of the Constitution. The members of Congress cannot compel absent members to attend
sessions if the reason for the absence is a legitimate one. The confinement of a Congressman charged
with a crime punishable by imprisonment of more than six years is not merely authorized by law, it has
constitutional foundations. To allow accused-appellant to attend congressional sessions and committee
meetings for 5 days or more in a week will virtually make him a free man with all the privileges
appurtenant to his position. Such an aberrant situation not only elevates accused-appellant’s status to
that of a special class, it also would be a mockery of the purposes of the correction system.

TRILLANES vs PIMENTEL Case Digest

ANTONIO F. TRILLANES IV v. HON. OSCAR PIMENTEL, SR., IN HIS CAPACITY AS PRESIDING JUDGE, REGIONAL
TRIAL COURT- BRANCH 148, MAKATI CITY, et al.
556 SCRA 471 (2008), EN BANC (Carpio Morales, J.)

All persons, except those charged with offenses punishable by reclusion perpetua when evidence of guilt is
strong, shall, before conviction, be bailable by sufficient sureties, or be released on recognizance as may be
provided by law.

FACTS: On July 27, 2003, more than 300 heavily armed soldiers led by junior officers of the Armed Forces
of the Philippines (AFP) stormed into the Oakwood Premier Apartments in Makati City and publicly
demanded the resignation of the President and key national officials. After a series of negotiations, military
soldiers surrendered that evening.

In the aftermath of such event dubbed as the Oakwood Incident, petitioner Antonio F. Trillanes IV was
charged with coup d’état before the Regional Trial Court of Makati. Four years later, Trillanes remained in
detention and won a seat in the Senate. Before starting his term, Trillanes filed with RTC an Omnibus
Motion for Leave of Court to be Allowed to Attend Senate Sessions and Related Requests.

Trillanes requested to be allowed to attend senate sessions and fulfill his functions as senator. The RTC
however denied his motion. Thus, he filed Petition for Certiorari with the Supreme Court to set aside orders
of the RTC.

Issue:

 Whether or not Trillanes‘ election as senator provides legal justification to allow him to work and
serve his mandate as senator
Ruling

Trillanes’ election as Senator not a legislative justification to allow him to serve his mandate

The case against Trillanes is not administrative in nature. And there is no "prior term" to speak of. In a
plethora of cases, the Court categorically held that the doctrine of condonation does not apply to criminal
cases. Election, or more precisely, re-election to office, does not obliterate a criminal charge. Petitioner's
electoral victory only signifies pertinently that when the voters elected him to the Senate, "they did so with
full awareness of the limitations on his freedom of action [and] x x x with the knowledge that he could
achieve only such legislative results which he could accomplish within the confines of prison.

It is opportune to wipe out the lingering misimpression that the call of duty conferred by the voice of the
people is louder than the litany of lawful restraints articulated in the Constitution and echoed by
jurisprudence. The apparent discord may be harmonized by the overarching tenet that the mandate of the
people yields to the Constitution which the people themselves ordained to govern all under the rule of law.
The performance of legitimate and even essential duties by public officers has never been an excuse to free
a person validly in prison. The duties imposed by the "mandate of the people" are multifarious. The
accused-appellant asserts that the duty to legislate ranks highest in the hierarchy of government. The
accused-appellant is only one of 250 members of the House of Representatives, not to mention the 24
membersof the Senate, charged with the duties of legislation. Congress continues to function well in the
physical absence of one or a few of its members. x x x Never has the call of a particular duty lifted a prisoner
into a different classification from those others who are validly restrained by law.

Soliven v Makasiar Nov 14, 1988 G.R. No. 82585

Per Curiam

Facts:

Soliven broadcasted the statement that President Aquino hid under her bed during a coup d' etat. The
President sued for libel. Soliven claimed that he can't be sued because the President was immune from
suit.

Issue: WON Beltran's rights were violated when the RTC issued a warrant of arrest without personally
examining the complainant and the witnesses to determine probable cause.

Held: No

Ratio:

In satisfying himself of the existence of probable cause to issue a warrant of arrest, the judge isn't
required to examine the complainant and the witnesses.

He shall only personally evaluate the report and supporting documents submitted by the fiscal regarding
the existence of probable cause and issue a warrant of arrest on the basis thereof.

Also, if he finds no probable cause, he may disregard the fiscal's report and required the submission of
supporting affidavitsof witnesses to aid him in arriving at a conclusion as to the existence of probable
cause.

Otherwise, judges would be burdened with preliminary investigation instead of hearing cases.

G.R. No. 146738 Estrada vs. Arroyo

G.R. No 146710-15 Estrada vs. Desierto
March 2, 2001
FACTS:
Estrada was inaugurated as president of the Republic of the Philippines on June 30, 1998 with Gloria
Macapagal-Arroyo as his Vice President.
In October 2000, Ilocos Sur governor Luis “Chavit” Singson, a close friend of the President, alleged that he
had personally given Estrada money as payoff from jueteng hidden in a bank account known as “Jose
Velarde” – a grassroots-based numbers game. Singson’s allegation also caused controversy across the
nation, which culminated in the House of Representatives’ filing of an impeachment case against Estrada
on November 13, 2000. House Speaker Manny Villar fast-tracked the impeachment complaint. The
impeachment suit was brought to the Senate and an impeachment court was formed, with Chief
Justice Hilario Davide, Jr. as presiding officer. Estrada, pleaded “not guilty”.
The exposé immediately ignited reactions of rage. On January 18, a crowd continued to grow at EDSA,
bolstered by students from private schools and left-wing organizations. Activists from the group Bayan and
Akbayan as well as lawyers of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and other bar associations joined in the
thousands of protesters.
On January 19, The Philippine National Police and the Armed Forces of the Philippines also withdrew their
support for Estrada and joined the crowd at EDSA Shrine.
At 2:00pm, Estrada appeared on television for the first time since the beginning of the protests and
maintains that he will not resign. He said that he wanted the impeachment trial to continue, stressing that
only a guilty verdict will remove him from office.
At 6:15pm, Estrada again appeared on television, calling for a snap presidential election to be held
concurrently with congressional and local elections on May 14, 2001. He added that he will not run in this
election.
OnJanuary 20, the Supreme Court declared that the seat of presidency was vacant, saying that Estrada
“constructively resigned his post”. Noon of the same day, Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo took her oath of office
in the presence of the crowd at EDSA, becoming the 14th president of the Philippines.
At 2:00 pm, Estrada released a letter saying he had “strong and serious doubts about the legality and
constitutionality of her proclamation as president”, but saying he would give up his office to avoid being an
obstacle to healing the nation. Estrada and his family later left Malacañang Palace.
A heap of cases then succeeded Estrada’s leaving the palace, which he countered by filing a peition for
prohibition with a prayer for a writ of preliminary injunction. It sought to enjoin the respondent
Ombudsman from “conducting any further proceedings in cases filed against him not until his term as
president ends. He also prayed for judgment “confirming petitioner to be the lawful and incumbent
President of the Republic of the Philippines temporarily unable to discharge the duties of his office, and
declaring respondent to have taken her oath as and to be holding the Office of the President, only in an
acting capacity pursuant to the provisions of the Constitution.”
ISSUE:
1.) Whether or not the case at bar a political or justiciable issue. If justiciable, whether or not petitioner
Estrada was a president-on-leave or did he truly resign.
2.) Whether or not petitioner may invokeimmunity from suits.
HELD:
The Court defines a political issue as “those questions which, under the Constitution, are to be decided by
the people in their sovereign capacity, or in regard to which full discretionary authority has been delegated
to the legislative or executive branch of the government. It is concerned with issues dependent upon
the wisdom, not legality of a particular measure.”
The Court made a distinction between the Aquino presidency and the Arroyo presidency. The Court said that
while the Aquino government was a government spawned by the direct demand of the people in defiance to
the 1973 Constitution, overthrowing the old government entirely, the Arroyo government on the other hand
was a government exercising under the 1987 constitution, wherein only the office of the president was
affected. In the former, it The question of whether the previous president (president Estrada) truly resigned
subjects it to judicial review. The Court held that the issue is legal and not political.
For the president to be deemed as having resigned, there must be an intent to resign and the intent must
be coupled by acts of relinquishment. It is important to follow the succession of events that struck
petitioner prior his leaving the palace. Furthermore, the quoted statements extracted from the Angara
diaries, detailed Estrada’s implied resignation On top of all these, the press release he issued regarding is
acknowledgement of the oath-taking of Arroyo as president despite his questioning of its legality and his
emphasis on leaving the presidential seat for the sake of peace. The Court held that petitioner Estrada had
resigned by the use of the totality test: prior, contemporaneous and posterior facts and circumstantial
evidence bearing a material relevance on the issue.
As to the issue of the peitioner’s contention that he is immuned from suits, the Court held that petitioner
is no longer entitled to absolute immunity from suit. The Court added that, given the intent of the 1987
Constitution to breathe life to the policy that a public office is a public trust, the petitioner, as a non-sitting
President, cannot claim executive immunity for his alleged criminal acts committed while a sitting
President. From the deliberations, the intent of the framers is clear that the immunity of the president from
suit is concurrent only with his tenure(the term during which the incumbent actually holds office) and not
his term (time during which the officer may claim to hold the office as of right, and fixes the interval after
which the several incumbents shall succeed one another).

GLORIA V. COURT OF APPEALS

FACTS

Abad, Bandigas, Somebang and Margallo, private respondents, are public school teachers. Some time in
September and October 1990, during the teacher’s strikes, they did not report for work. For this reason
they were administratively charged with 1) grave misconduct; 2) gross violation of Civil Service Rules; 3)
gross neglectof duty; 4) refusal to perform official duty; 5) gross insubordination; 6) conduct prejudicial to
the best interest of service and; 7) AWOL. They were placed under preventive suspension.
Investigation ended before the lapse of the 90 day period. Margallo was dismissed from the service. The
three others were suspended for 6 months. On appeal to the CA, the court mitigated the punishment to
reprimand only. Hence their reinstatement. Now the reinstated teachers are asking for back wages during
the period of their suspension and pending appeal (before the CA exonerated them).

ISSUE

Whether the teachers are entitled to backwages for the period pending their appeal if they are
subsequently exonerated.

HELD

YES, they are entitled to full pay pending their appeal. To justify the award of back wages, the respondent
must be exonerated from the charges and his suspension be unjust. Preventive suspension pending appeal
is actually punitive, and it is actually considered illegal if the respondent is exonerated and the
administrative decision finding him guilty is reversed. Hence he should be reinstated with full pay for the
period of the suspension. Section 47 (4) of the Civil Service Decree states that the respondent “shall be
considered as under preventive suspension during the pendency of the appeal in the event he wins.” On
the other hand if his conviction is affirmed the period of his suspension becomes part of the final penalty of
suspension or dismissal. In the case at bar the respondents won in their appeal, therefore the period of
suspension pending their appeal would be considered as part of the preventive suspension, entitling them
to full pay because they were eventually exonerated and their suspension was unjustified.
They are still entitled to back salaries even if they were still reprimanded.
Senate vs Ermita

495 SCRA 170 – Political Law – Constitutional Law – Legislative Branch – Question Hour – Constitutionality
of E.O. 464
In 2005, scandals involving anomalous transactions about the North Rail Project as well as the Garci tapes
surfaced. This prompted the Senate to conduct a public hearing to investigate the said anomalies
particularly the alleged overpricing in the NRP. The investigating Senate committee issued invitations to
certain department heads and military officials to speak before the committee as resource persons. Ermita
submitted that he and some of the department heads cannot attend the said hearing due to pressing
matters that need immediate attention. AFP Chief of Staff Senga likewise sent a similar letter. Drilon, the
senate president, excepted the said requests for they were sent belatedly and arrangements were already
made and scheduled. Subsequently, GMA issued EO 464 which took effect immediately.
EO 464 basically prohibited Department heads, Senior officials of executive departments who in the
judgment of the department heads are covered by the executive privilege; Generals and flag officers of the
Armed Forces of the Philippines and such other officers who in the judgment of the Chief of Staff are
covered by the executive privilege; Philippine National Police (PNP) officers with rank of chief
superintendent or higher and such other officers who in the judgment of the Chief of the PNP are covered
by the executive privilege; Senior national security officials who in the judgment of the National Security
Adviser are covered by the executive privilege; and Such other officers as may be determined by the
President, from appearing in such hearings conducted by Congress without first securing the president’s
approval.
The department heads and the military officers who were invited by the Senate committee then invoked
EO 464 to except themselves. Despite EO 464, the scheduled hearing proceeded with only 2 military
personnel attending. For defying President Arroyo’s order barring military personnel from testifying before
legislative inquiries without her approval, Brig. Gen. Gudani and Col. Balutan were relieved from their
military posts and were made to face court martial proceedings. EO 464’s constitutionality was assailed for
it is alleged that it infringes on the rights and duties of Congress to conduct investigation in aid of legislation
and conduct oversight functions in the implementation of laws.
ISSUE: Whether or not EO 464 is constitutional.
HELD: The SC ruled that EO 464 is constitutional in part. To determine the validity of the provisions of EO
464, the SC sought to distinguish Section 21 from Section 22 of Art 6 of the 1987 Constitution. The Congress’
power of inquiry is expressly recognized in Section 21 of Article VI of the Constitution. Although there is no
provision in the Constitution expressly investing either House of Congress with power to make
investigations and exact testimony to the end that it may exercise its legislative functions advisedly and
effectively, such power is so far incidental to the legislative function as to be implied. In other words, the
power of inquiry – with process to enforce it – is an essential and appropriate auxiliary to the legislative
function. A legislative body cannot legislate wisely or effectively in the absence of information respecting
the conditions which the legislation is intended to affect or change; and where the legislative body does
not itself possess the requisite information – which is not infrequently true – recourse must be had to
others who do possess it.
Section 22 on the other hand provides for the Question Hour. The Question Hour is closely related with the
legislative power, and it is precisely as a complement to or a supplement of the Legislative Inquiry. The
appearance of the members of Cabinet would be very, very essential not only in the application of check
and balance but also, in effect, in aid of legislation. Section 22 refers only to Question Hour, whereas,
Section 21 would refer specifically to inquiries in aid of legislation, under which anybody for that matter,
may be summoned and if he refuses, he can be held in contempt of the House. A distinction was thus made
between inquiries in aid of legislation and the question hour. While attendance was meant to be
discretionary in the question hour, it was compulsory in inquiries in aid of legislation. Sections 21 and 22,
therefore, while closely related and complementary to each other, should not be considered as pertaining
to the same power of Congress. One specifically relates to the power to conduct inquiries in aid of
legislation, the aim of which is to elicit information that may be used for legislation, while the other pertains
to the power to conduct a question hour, the objective of which is to obtain information in pursuit of
Congress’ oversight function. Ultimately, the power of Congress to compel the appearance of executive
officials under Section 21 and the lack of it under Section 22 find their basis in the principle of separation
of powers.
While the executive branch is a co-equal branch of the legislature, it cannot frustrate the power of Congress
to legislate by refusing to comply with its demands for information. When Congress exercises its power of
inquiry, the only way for department heads to exempt themselves therefrom is by a valid claim of
privilege. They are not exempt by the mere fact that they are department heads. Only one executive
official may be exempted from this power — the President on whom executive power is vested, hence,
beyond the reach of Congress except through the power of impeachment. It is based on her being the
highest official of the executive branch, and the due respect accorded to a co-equal branch of government
which is sanctioned by a long-standing custom. The requirement then to secure presidential consent
under Section 1, limited as it is only to appearances in the question hour, is valid on its face. For under
Section 22, Article VI of the Constitution, the appearance of department heads in the question hour is
discretionary on their part. Section 1 cannot, however, be applied to appearances of department heads in
inquiries in aid of legislation. Congress is not bound in such instances to respect the refusal of the
department head to appear in such inquiry, unless a valid claim of privilege is subsequently made, either
by the President herself or by the Executive Secretary.
When Congress merely seeks to be informed on how department heads are implementing the statutes
which it has issued, its right to such information is not as imperative as that of the President to whom, as
Chief Executive, such department heads must give a report of their performance as a matter of duty. In
such instances, Section 22, in keeping with the separation of powers, states that Congress may
only request their appearance. Nonetheless, when the inquiry in which Congress requires their appearance
is ‘in aid of legislation’ under Section 21, the appearance is mandatory for the same reasons stated
in Arnault.

Estrada v. Arroyo

Estrada V. Arroyo
G.R. No. 146738

FACTS: Petitioner sought to enjoin the respondent Ombudsman from conducting any further proceedings
in any criminal complaint that may be filed in his office, until after the term of petitioner as President is
over and only if legally warranted. Erap also filed a Quo Warranto case, praying for
judgment “confirming petitioner to be the lawful and incumbent President of the Republic of the
Philippines temporarily unable to discharge the duties of his office, and declaring respondent to have
taken her oath as and to be holding the Office of the President, only in an acting capacity pursuant to the
provisions of the Constitution.”

HELD:
FIRST: The cases at bar pose legal and not political questions.

The principal issues for resolution require the proper interpretation of certain provisions in the 1987
Constitution, notably section 1 of Article II, and section 8 of Article VII, and the allocation of governmental
powers under section II of Article VII. The issues likewise call for a ruling on the scope of presidential
immunity from suit. They also involve the correct calibration of the right of petitioner against prejudicial
publicity. As early as the 1803 case of Marbury v. Madison, the doctrine has been laid down that “it is
emphatically the province and duty of the judicial department to say what the law is . . .”

The Court also distinguished between EDSA People Power I and EDSA People Power II. EDSA I involves the
exercise of the people power of revolution which overthrew the whole government. EDSA II is an exercise
of people power of freedom of speech and freedom of assembly to petition the government for redress
of grievances which only affected the office of the President. EDSA I is extra constitutional and the
legitimacy of the new government that resulted from it cannot be the subject of judicial review, but EDSA
II is intra constitutional and the resignation of the sitting President that it caused and the succession of
the Vice President as President are subject to judicial review. EDSA I presented political question; EDSA II
involves legal questions.

SECOND: Using the totality test, the SC held that petitioner resigned as President.

1. The proposal for a snap election for president in May where he would not be a candidate
is an indicium that petitioner had intended to give up the presidency even at that time.
2. The Angara diary shows that the President wanted only five-day period promised by
Reyes, as well as to open the second envelop to clear his name.
"If the envelope is opened, on Monday, he says, he will leave by Monday.
"The President says. “Pagod na pagod na ako. Ayoko na masyado nang masakit. Pagod na ako sa red tape,
bureaucracy, intriga. (I am very tired. I don’t want any more of this – it’s too painful. I’m tired of the red
tape, the bureaucracy, the intrigue.)
"I just want to clear my name, then I will go.”
The SC held that this is high grade evidence that the petitioner has resigned. The intent to resign is clear
when he said “x x x Ayoko na masyado nang masakit.” “ Ayoko na” are words of resignation.
3. During the negotiations, the resignation of the petitioner was treated as a given fact. The
only unsettled points at that time were the measures to be undertaken by the parties during and
after transition period.
4. His resignation was also confirmed by his leaving Malacañang. In the press release
containing his final statement, (1) he acknowledged the oath-taking of the respondent as
President of the Republic albeit with the reservation about its legality; (2) he emphasized he was
leaving the Palace, the seat of the presidency, for the sake of peace and in order to begin the
healing process of our nation. He did not say he was leaving the Palace due to any kind of inability
and he was going to re-assume the presidency as soon as the disability disappears; (3) he
expressed his gratitude to the people for the opportunity to serve them. Without doubt, he was
referring to the past opportunity given him to serve the people as President; (4) he assured that
he will not shirk from any future challenge that may come ahead in the same service of our
country. Petitioner’s reference is to a future challenge after occupying the office of’ the president
which he has given up; and (5) he called on his supporters to join him in the promotion of a
constructive national spirit of reconciliation and solidarity. Certainly, the national spirit of
reconciliation and solidarity could not be attained if he did not give up the presidency. The press
release was petitioner’s valedictory, his final act of farewell. His presidency is now in the past
tense.

THIRD: The petitioner is permanently unable to act as President.

Section 11 of Article VII provides that “Congress has the ultimate authority under the Constitution to
determine whether the President is incapable of performing his functions.” Both houses of Congress have
recognized respondent Arroyo as the President.

The House of Representative passed on January 24, 2001 House Resolution No. l75 which states:
“RESOLUTION EXPRESSING THE SUPPORT OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES TO THE ASSUMPTION
INTO OFFICE BY VICE PRESIDENT GLORIA MACAPAGAL-ARROYO AS PRESIDENT OFTHE REPUBLIC OF THE
PHILIPPINES, EXTENDING ITS CONGRATULATIONS AND EXPRESSING ITS SUPPORT FOR HER
ADMINISTRATION AS A PARTNER IN THE ATTAINMENT OF THE NATION’S GOALS UNDER THE
CONSTITUTION.” The Senate also passed Senate Resolution No. 82 which states: “RESOLUTION
CONFIRMING PRESIDENT GLORIA MACAPAGAL-ARROYO’S NOMINATION OF SEN. TEOFISTO T.
GUINGONA, JR. AS VICE PRESIDENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES”

Implicitly clear in that recognition is the premise that the inability of petitioner Estrada is no longer
temporary. Congress has clearly rejected petitioner’s claim of inability. Even if petitioner can prove that
he did not resign, still, he cannot successfully claim that he is a President on leave on the ground that he
is merely unable to govern temporarily. That claim has been laid to rest by Congress and the decision that
respondent Arroyo is the de jure President made by a co-equal branch of government cannot be
reviewed by the Supreme Court.

FOURTH: The petitioner does not enjoy immunity from suit.

The Supreme Court rejected petitioner’s argument that he cannot be prosecuted for the reason that he
must first be convicted in the impeachment proceedings. The impeachment trial of petitioner Estrada was
aborted by the walkout of the prosecutors and by the events that led to his loss of the presidency. On
February 7, 2001, the Senate passed Senate Resolution No. 83 “Recognizing that the Impeachment Court
is Functus Officio.” Since the Impeachment Court is now functus officio, it is untenable for petitioner to
demand that he should first be impeached and then convicted before he can be prosecuted. The plea, if
granted, would put a perpetual bar against his prosecution. The debates in the Constitutional Commission
make it clear that when impeachment proceedings have become moot due to the resignation of the
President, the proper criminal and civil cases may already be filed against him.

The SC also ruled in In re: Saturnino Bermudez that “incumbent Presidents are immune from suit or from
being brought to court during the period of their incumbency and tenure” but not beyond. Considering
the peculiar circumstance that the impeachment process against the petitioner has been aborted and
thereafter he lost the presidency, petitioner cannot demand as a condition sine qua non to his criminal
prosecution before the Ombudsman that he be convicted in the impeachment proceedings.

Also, petitioner cannot cite any decision of the SC licensing the President to commit criminal acts and
wrapping him with post-tenure immunity from liability. The rule is that unlawful acts of public officials are
not acts of the State and the officer who acts illegally is not acting as such but stands in the same footing
as any other trespasser.

FIFTH: Petitioner was not denied the right to impartial trial.

Pervasive publicity is not per se prejudicial to the right of an accused to fair trial. The mere fact that the
trial of appellant was given a day-to-day, gavel-to-gavel coverage does not by itself prove that the
publicity so permeated the mind of the trial judge and impaired his impartiality. In the case at bar, the
records do not show that the trial judge developed actual bias against appellant as a consequence of the
extensive media coverage of the pre-trial and trial of his case. The totality of circumstances of the case
does not prove that the trial judge acquired a fixed opinion as a result of prejudicial publicity which is
incapable if change even by evidence presented during the trial. Appellant has the burden to prove this
actual bias and he has not discharged the burden.

Domingo vs. Rayala (596 SCRA 90)

Domingo vs. Rayala
546 Scra 90

Facts:
Ma. Lourdes T. Domingo (Domingo), then Stenographic Reporter III at the NLRC, filed a Complaint for
sexual harassment against Rayala, the chairman of NLRC.
She alleged that Rayala called her in his office and touched her shoulder, part of her neck then tickled her
ears. Rayala argued that his acts does not constitute sexual harassment because for it to exist, there
must be a demand, request or requirement of sexual favor.

Issue:
Whether or not Rayala commit sexual harassment.

Rulings:
Yes.

The law penalizing sexual harassment in our jurisdiction is RA 7877. Section 3 thereof defines work-
related sexual harassment in this wise:
Sec. 3. Work, Education or Training-related Sexual Harassment Defined. – Work, education or training-
related sexual harassment is committed by an employer, manager, supervisor, agent of the employer,
teacher, instructor, professor, coach, trainor, or any other person who, having authority, influence or
moral ascendancy over another in a work or training or education environment, demands, requests or
otherwise requires any sexual favor from the other, regardless of whether the demand, request or
requirement for submission is accepted by the object of said Act.
(a) In a work-related or employment environment, sexual harassment is committed when:
(1) The sexual favor is made as a condition in the hiring or in the employment, re-employment or
continued employment of said individual, or in granting said individual favorable compensation, terms,
conditions, promotions, or privileges; or the refusal to grant the sexual favor results in limiting,
segregating or classifying the employee which in a way would discriminate, deprive or diminish
employment opportunities or otherwise adversely affect said employee;
. (2) The above acts would impair the employee’s rights or privileges under existing labor laws; or
. (3) The above acts would result in an intimidating, hostile, or offensive environment for the employee.

even if we were to test Rayala’s acts strictly by the standards set in Section 3, RA 7877, he would still be
administratively liable. It is true that this provision calls for a “demand, request or requirement of a sexual
favor.” But it is not necessary that the demand, request or requirement of a sexual favor be articulated in
a categorical oral or written statement. It may be discerned, with equal certitude, from the acts of the
offender. Holding and squeezing Domingo’s shoulders, running his fingers across her neck and tickling her
ear, having inappropriate conversations with her, giving her money allegedly for school expenses with a
promise of future privileges, and making statements with unmistakable sexual overtones – all these acts
of Rayala resound with deafening clarity the unspoken request for a sexual favor.