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CONTENTION 1: INHERENCY

TURKEY IS CURRENTLY HOUSING U.S. B-61 TACTICAL NUCLEAR WEAPONS OR

TNW’S, BUT THEY LACK STRATEGIC VALUE – NATO NO LONGER RELIES ON TNW’S
FOR DEFENSE
Bell 09 (Alexandra, 23 November, The status of U.S. nuclear weapons in Turkey,
http://www.thebulletin.org/-web-edition/features/the-status-of-us-nuclear-weapons-turkey)
For more than 40 years, Turkey has been a quiet custodian of U.S. tactical nuclear weapons . During
the Cold War, Washington positioned intermediate-range nuclear missiles and bombers there to serve as a bulwark against the Soviet Union (i.e., to
defend the region against Soviet attack and to influence Soviet strategic calculations). In the event of a Soviet assault on Europe, the weapons were to
be fired as one of the first retaliatory shots. Bu t
as the Cold War waned, so , too, did the weapons' strategic value.
Thus, over the last few decades ,the United States has removed all of its intermediate-range missiles from Turkey and reduced its
other nuclear weapons there through gradual redeployments and arms control agreements. Today, Turkey
hosts an estimated 90 B61 gravity bombs at Incirlik Air Base. Fifty of these bombs are reportedly PDF assigned for delivery by
U.S. pilots, and forty are assigned for delivery by the Turkish Air Force. However, no permanent nuclear-capable U.S.
fighter wing is based at Incirlik, and the Turkish Air Force is reportedly PDF not certified for NATO nuclear missions, meaning nuclear-
capable F-16s from other U.S. bases would need to be brought in if Turkey's bombs were ever needed. Such a relaxed posture makes
clear just how little NATO relies on tactical nuclear weapons for its defense anymore. So in effect,
U.S. tactical nuclear weapons in Turkey are without military value or purpose.

WE WILL INEVITABLY REMOVE TNWS IN THE FUTURE—IT’S A QUESTION OF

DOING IT COHERENTLY OR MUDDLING THROUGH
Ingram 9 (Paul Ingram, Executive Director, British American Security Information Council, April 2009,
“Eliminating battlefield nuclear weapons from Europe and moving towards the adoption of a non-nuclear
weapon security doctrine for the Alliance,” in “The Shadow NATO Summit: Options for NATO - pressing
the reset button on the strategic concept,” British American Security Information Council,
http://www.basicint.org/pubs/natoshadow.pdf)
I conclude by observing that in my opinion, it is only a matter of time before the decision
becomes clear and obvious. The choice is therefore not whether to scrap TNWs,
but how we arrive at that choice. We can do so positively and strategically, with a
clarity of purpose that feeds into a stronger Alliance in the future… or we can
take longer over it, sweep the issue under the carpet, muddle through, and then
be forced to abandon because of prohibitive cost. This second option would be
criminal irresponsibility, and could well weaken the Alliance in exactly the way that those
who continue to see TNWs as playing a cohesive force in the Alliance warn of.

WITHDRAWAL WILL BE LONG AND SLOW

Allyn Gaestel, May 6th, 2010, “Countdown to Zero attempts to re-energize the nuclear
disarmament and non-proliferation process” European Newswire,
http://www.europanewsblog.com/2010/05/countdown-to-zero-attempts-to-reenergize-
the-nuclear-disarmament-and-nonproliferation-process-.html
The movement toward nuclear non-proliferation is a slow process, as evidenced by the
incremental steps at the conference this week.  On Monday the United States revealed for the first time that it contains
5,113 weapons in its arsenal. UN Secretary-General Ban ki-Moon lauded the United States’ leadership in promoting transparency. The START treaty
signed earlier this year between Russia and the United States will bring both countries’ stockpiles to their lowest point since the 1950s. And Obama
has made the pursuit of a world free of nuclear weapons one of his foreign policy priorities.  Yet the United States and Russia still hold 90 percent of
the world’s nuclear weapons. Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad continues to avoid probes into the country’s nuclear research and missile
program. Earlier this week at the conference Ahmadinejad lashed out at the United States for undermining the pursuit of nuclear energy programs.
Attempts at the conference to implement a nuclear free zone in the Middle East are complicated by Iran’s stance and Israel’s refusal to acknowledge
their nuclear stockpile. In
the face of the slow moving process towards nuclear disarmament and
non-proliferation, “Countdown to Zero” aims to mobilize the public behind the broader,
long-term goal of a world free of nuclear weapons. 
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Plan:

President Obama should issue an Executive Order to substantially reduce the

United States’ military presence by eliminating all U.S. B-61 Tactical Nuclear
Weapons in the Republic of Turkey.
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NORMAL MEANS THE EXECUTIVE DOES THE PLAN

GREENPEACE 06, “Why US NATO nuclear weapons must go”
http://www.greenpeace.org/raw/content/international/press/reports/securing-our-safety.pdf
US nuclear policy, plans and scenarios include roles for the weapons deployed in Europe. It is the
President of the United States that would make these scenarios and plans a reality, and he can do
so without the permission of the country hosting the weapons. This year, an article in the New
Yorker exposed the frightening reality of current NATO nuclear sharing arrangements.3
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CONTENTION 2: PROLIF

THREE INTERNAL LINKS TO STOPPING IT:

1. EARLY TNW WITHDRAWAL PREVENTS OTHER COUNTRIES FROM

PROLIFERATING
Miles A. Pomper, William Poter, and Nikolai Sokov, Unit for Policy Planning and Research, Finnish
Ministry for Foreign Affaris, December 2009, http://cns.miis.edu/opapers/pdfs/tnw_europe.pdf)
The longer the stalemate over TNW continues, the greater the chance that negative features
associated with U.S. and Russian TNW will spread to other countries. The arsenals of short-range
missiles and other delivery vehicles in China, India, and Pakistan continue to grow along with the
potential risk that they will be fitted with nuclear weapons. The bulk of the (still very small) arsenals of the latter two
consists of short- and intermediate range weapons, which are apparently not permanently equipped with nuclear warheads. Consequently, they
present the same challenges of unauthorized access as described above with regard to American and Russian arsenals. Reliance of sub-strategic
nuclear weapons in these countries and potentially in China is also fraught with the danger of crisis instability along the lines outlined above . Early
practical steps by the United States and Russia to reduce and eventually eliminate their TNW
stockpiles could contribute in a tangible way to averting the same threats and challenges in other
nuclear weapon states.

2. REMOVAL OF TNWS IN TURKEY CAUSES A MOVEMENT TOWARDS

DEESCALATION
Bell 09 (Alexandria, Alexandra Bell is a Project Manager at the Ploughshares Fund and a Truman
National Security Fellow, “Turkey’s Nuclear Crossroads”, http://www.good.is/post/turkeys-nuclear-
crossroads/)
On April 5, 2009, President Barrack Obama made a speech in Prague outlining his intention to make nuclear disarmament, with the eventual goal of
elimination, the organizing principle of U.S. nuclear policy. Now the task is to figure out the how to actually get to zero
nuclear weapons. There are approximately 23,335 nuclear weapons held between nine nations: the United States, Russia, China, France,
Britain, India, Pakistan, North Korea, and Israel. Less widely known are the five other states that hold nuclear weapons . During the Cold
War, NATO deployed nonstrategic or “tactical” nuclear weapons  in Turkey. Today
Belgium, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, and

these aging weapons are more of a liability than an asset—their size and portability makes them
attractive to terrorists. The removal of these tactical nukes is an early step on the long road to
zero.

3. TNWS IN TURKEY ENCOURAGE IRAN PROLIF

KIBAROGLU 05 (Mustafa Kibaroglu, Ph.D., Assistant Professor of International Relations at Bilkent
University, Isn’t it Time to Say Farewell to Nukes in Turkey?” European Security, Vol. 14, No. 4, 443/457,
December 2005)http://docserver.ingentaconnect.com/deliver/connect/routledg/09662839/v14n4/s3.pdf?
expires=1276604615&id=57266024&titleid=10739&accname=Paula+Zampietro&checksum=88B578E8A
CE6DCCE7C8C0556C939670F
However, the tide is turning, and since the early 1990s Turkey is getting more and more involved in Middle Eastern politics. Apart from Turkey’s
attempts to become a facilitator in the Israeli 􏱙/Palestinian dispute, Turkey finds itself at the core of the developments in Iraq. As such,
other
countries in the region are also reconsidering Turkey’s position vis-a` -vis Middle Eastern politics. Complaints
have been heard from regional analysts regarding Turkey’s alliance with the US and Israel. When
Turkish scholars and authorities comment on Iran’s nuclear program, their Iranian counterparts
point out that US nuclear weapons are still deployed in Turkey. Some even go so far as to qualify
Turkey as a ‘nuclear weapons state’, although such a status is not compatible with the definitions in the Non-Proliferation Treaty.32
This expression of how Turkey is seen by the Iranian authorities serves as another justification
for Iran’s ambitions to develop nuclear weapons. It is highly likely that ‘Iran has developed the
basic infrastructure to detonate a nuclear device.’33 Should the Iranian leadership decide to develop nuclear warheads in
the years to come, neither the Middle East nor the world will become a safer place to live. Most probably, some other countries in the region such as
Egypt and Saudi Arabia would follow suit. Countries in other parts of the world may do so as well.
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NOW, THERE ARE MULTIPLE IMPACTS TO THESE INTERNAL LINKS:

1. IRAN PROLIF MAKES GLOBAL PROLIF AND NUCLEAR WAR INEVITABLE

ACKERMAN 09 (Gary is part of the Presidential Task Force on Iranian Proliferation, Regional Security,
and U.S. Policy, Washington Institute for Near East Policy, “Preventing a Cascade of Instability: U.S.
Engagement to Check Iranian Nuclear Progress,” March, p. 2
http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/pubPDFs/PTF-Iran.pdf )
If Iran “gets away” at low cost with years of safeguards violations and defiance of UN Security
Council resolutions, nonproliferation norms likely will further erode across the globe. Other
countries may consider taking the same path , especially if Iran’s programs gain legitimacy . If the
Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) is seen as fraying, it may be difficult to make progress on
supplementary means to shore up the nonproliferation regime. The greater the number of
countries with nuclear weapons, the higher the risk that misperception and miscalculation could
lead to a nuclear confrontation, with horrible consequences. In the Middle East, those who see
themselves as regional powers may want nuclear capabilities matching those in Iran—including
enrichment or reprocessing facilities—for both strategic and prestige-related reasons. To be sure,
Middle East states would need many years to build an indigenous nuclear infrastructure, but the pursuit
of a broad range of nuclear capabilities could be destabilizing by creating the impression that the
military nuclearization of the region is inevitable.

2. GLOBAL PROLIF LEADS TO EXTINCTION

Utgoff, Deputy Director of Strategy, Forces, and Resources Division 02 of
Institute for Defense Analysis (Victor A., Summer 2002, Survival, p.87-90 Victor A
Utgoff, Deputy Director of Strategy, Forces, and Resources Division of Institute
for Defense Analysis, Summer 2002, Survival, p.87-90)
In sum, widespread proliferation is likely to lead to an occasional shoot-out with nuclear weapons,
and that such shoot outs will have a substantial probability of escalating to the maximum
destruction possible with the weapons at hand. Unless nuclear proliferation is stopped, we are
headed towards a world that will mirror the American Wild West of the late 1800s. With most, if not
all, nations wearing nuclear “six shooters” on their hips, the world may even be a more polite place
than it is today, but every once in a while we will all gather together on a hill to bury the bodies of
dead cities or even whole nations.
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3. NUCLEAR IRAN COLLAPSES US-CHINA RELATIONS, US ALLIANCE IN EAST

ASIA AND CAUSES AGGRESSION AGAINST TAIWAN
Zambelis ‘7 (Chris, Associate – Helios Global (International Political Risk Analysis), China Brief 7:23,
“The Iranian Nuclear Question in U.S.-China Relations”, 12-13,
http://www.jamestown.org/china_brief/article.php?articleid=2373858)
Any combination of these scenarios will dramatically alter the strategic landscape of the Middle
East. Barring a dramatic rapprochement in U.S.-Iranian relations, a nuclear Iran would
likely prompt the United States to devote more military and economic resources towards
shoring up its position and that of its allies in the Middle East. The U.S. military is already
stretched thin due to active force deployments and other commitments around the world.
As a consequence, continued Chinese diplomatic and economic support for Iran will
possibly lead to heightened tensions between Washington and Beijing. Despite agreeing to the
imposition of harsher sanctions against Iran, China sent an entirely different message a few days later when the Chinese National Petroleum and
Chemical Corporation (Sinopec) signed a $2 billion contract with Tehran to develop the Yadavaran oil field. The timing of this agreement could not
have come at a worse time for the United States, since it directly challenges Washington’s efforts to isolate Tehran at the UN. Iranian Oil Minister
Gholam Hossein-Nozari remarked that the contract “indicates Washington’s claims that international firms are not willing to invest in Iran are baseless”
(IRNA, December 10). In the case of China, he is absolutely right. beijing’s decision to conclude this latest investment deal with Tehran also
demonstrates China’s willingness to up the ante when it comes to major sticking points in U.S.-China bilateral relations without fear of serious
repercussions. This indicates an increasingly assertive and confident China that is not afraid to challenge the United States on issues the latter
Beijing may opt to use its multifaceted relationship
considers vital to its national security. It also suggests that
with Tehran as a lever to exert pressure on Washington down the line, making Iran more
than just a source of energy for the Chinese economy akin to other major energy
producers in the Middle East. Given China’s vast stake in Iran, the Iranian nuclear
question is sure to lead to increasing tensions in U.S.-China relations in future,
especially if Washington considers Chinese actions to be directly aiding and abetting
Iran’s nuclear ambitions.  The Iranian nuclear question in U.S.-China relations will make
its presence felt in East Asia. The potential rise of a nuclear-armed Iran is likely to detract
from the U.S.’s military footprint and security commitments in East Asia, to include its
alliances with Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, and the Philippines, as well as its efforts to
court Vietnam through closer military ties. This environment will surely encourage the
Chinese to take a more assertive line when it comes to the question of Taiwan and other
contentious issues, especially regional territorial and maritime disputes, as well as
economic and trade disagreements. The U.S. may attempt to compensate by encouraging its regional partners such as Japan
to take on more proactive roles on regional security issues. Nevertheless , these developments are a recipe for
heightened U.S.-China tensions, especially as Beijing seeks to exploit what it may
perceive as the steady unraveling of the U.S.-led cold war security alliance architecture
aimed at containing China in East Asia.
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FIRST IS EAST-ASIAN ALLIANCE:

US ALLIANCE STRUCTURE IN EAST ASIA PREVENTS REGIONAL INSTABILITY

AND WAR
Nye ’95 (Joseph, Prof. IR – Harvard, Foreign Affairs, “The case for deep engagement”, 74:4, July,
Proquest, http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/51210/joseph-s-nye-jr/east-asian-security-the-case-for-
deep-engagement?page=6 )
It is interesting to compare the post--Cold War strategic situation in East Asia with that in Europe. In both regions, the American alliance structure
survived the demise of the Soviet Union. In neither region is there a demand that the Americans go home. Quite the contrary. In the Pacific ,
the
Americans have alliances with five countries, and three of them (Australia, Japan, and South
Korea) provide access to significant facilities that enable us to fulfill our commitments in
the region and beyond. In both Europe and Asia, while there have been reductions in the numbers of American troops, roughly
100,000 troops remain in each case. Unlike Europe, however, there is no web of multilateral institutions tying
countries together in Asia. In Europe, the European Union has bridged the enmity between France and Germany that caused three
wars in a century. Similarly, NATO remains a strong multilateral alliance. Anyone who thinks that the end of the Cold War and the demise of the Soviet
Union have made NATO obsolete has not heard what political leaders in Paris, Bonn, Warsaw, or Prague have been saying publicly and often. By
comparison, multilateral institutions in East Asia are relatively weak. At this point, the United States is the only global political and economic power in
the region--a situation that will likely change over time. A second option would be for the United States to withdraw from
its alliances in the region on the grounds that the Cold War is over. This strategy would let normal balance-of-power politics take the
place of American leadership. The United States could try to play one state off against others. Some believe that this would be the lowest-cost option
would be both costly and destabilizing. The
for the United States. In practice, however, such an approach
structure of power in East Asia is not a stable balance where the United States could or
would want to mechanically adjust its relations between countries. East Asian reactions
to the balance-of-power approach would likely lead to a regional arms race. Ironically, this would
make U.S. participation in the region more costly and more dangerous as the United States had to balance the new and enhanced forces that would be
created. And the United States would absorb these costs without the benefit of burden-sharing from Asian allies, which now reduces our costs by over
$5 billion per year. Moreover, such a strategy would ignore and indeed waste the valuable investments we have made in existing relationships in the
region. The administration's East Asia strategy report is a strong, unswerving statement that
we will remain engaged in Asia. The identification of a stable level of troop strength is not
meant to perpetuate the Cold War. It represents the current reality in the region. The report's 1990 predecessor laid out a ten-
year plan for phased cuts in America's strategic posture and emphasized burden-shifting to allies, partly in an effort to placate a Congress that sought
to bring the troops home. Regrettably, the effort to persuade Congress came at the risk of alarming Asians. Two years later, a second strategy report
had to deal with a greatly changed strategic environment characterized by the collapse of the Soviet Union, the end of the Cold War, North Korea's
membership in the United Nations, conclusion of a joint denuclearization agreement with South Korea, Pyongyang's signing of an International Atomic
Energy Agency safeguards regime, and U.S. withdrawal from Philippine bases. In spite of the report's best efforts, it was impossible to reassure Asians
that the United States was a great power with a strong determination to stay in the region. The new East Asia strategy report has succeeded in
focusing the debate on the dimensions that matter: what is in the U.S. interest and how it should be achieved. Bilaterally, we must maintain and
strengthen the mutually beneficial security arrangements we have with our allies. These have withstood the test of wars and the trials of peace. We
have emerged from the Cold War with strong security arrangements that continue to have relevance, such as the early warning and intelligence
facilities the United States shares with Australi a.It is in America's interest to maintain the alliance structure
with countries like Japan and South Korea because these relationships are the basis for
regional stability. The 1995 East Asia strategy report echoes these conclusions from earlier Pentagon reports not out of nostalgia or a lack
of creativity but because of the importance of alliances in a strategy based on American leadership. The United States is
committed to lead in the Asia-Pacific region. Our national interests demand our deep
engagement. For most countries in the region, the United States is the critical variable in
the East Asia security equation. The United States is not the world's policeman, but our forward-deployed forces in Asia ensure
broad regional stability, help deter aggression against our allies, and contribute to the tremendous political and economic advances made by the
nations of the region. The concerns about American withdrawal heard today were voiced 20 years ago as well, after the Vietnam War. For the security
and prosperity of today to be maintained for the next 20 years, the United States must remain engaged in Asia, committed to peace in the region, and
dedicated to strengthening alliances and friendships. That is what we propose to do.
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ASIAN INSTABILITY SPARKS NUCLEAR CONFLICT, DESTROYS THE
NONPROLIFERATION REGIME, AND CRIPPLES THE US AND GLOBAL
ECONOMIES
Jonathan S. Landay, Writer for Knight Ridder/Tribune News Service, 3/10/2000 ("Top
Administration Officials Warn Stakes for US are high in Asian Conflicts" – Knight Ridder/Tribune
News Service) p. lexis
WASHINGTON _ The 3,700-mile arc that begins at the heavily fortified border between North and South
Korea and ends on the glacier where Indian and Pakistani troops skirmish almost every day has
earned the dubious title of most dangerous part of the world.
Few if any experts think China and Taiwan, North Korea and South Korea, or India and
Pakistan are spoiling to fight. But even a minor miscalculation by any of them could
destabilize Asia, jolt the global economy and even start a nuclear war . India, Pakistan and China all
have nuclear weapons, and North Korea may have a few, too . Asia lacks the kinds of organizations, negotiations and diplomatic
relationships that helped keep an uneasy peace for five decades in Cold War Europe. "Nowhere
else on Earth are the stakes as high and relationships so fragile ," said Bates Gill, director of northeast Asian
policy studies at the Brookings Institution, a Washington think tank . "We see the convergence of great power interest
overlaid with lingering confrontations with no institutionalized security mechanism in place.
There are elements for potential disaster ." In an effort to cool the region's tempers, President Clinton, Defense Secretary
William S. Cohen and National Security Adviser Samuel R. Berger all will hopscotch Asia's capitals this month . For America, the
stakes could hardly be higher. There are 100,000 U.S. troops in Asia committed to defending Taiwan, Japan and South Korea,
and the United States would instantly become embroiled if Beijing moved against Taiwan or North Korea
attacked South Korea. While Washington has no defense commitments to either India or Pakistan, a conflict between the two could end
the global taboo against using nuclear weapons and demolish the already shaky international
nonproliferation regime. In addition, globalization has made a stable Asia _ with its massive
markets, cheap labor, exports and resources _ indispensable to the U.S. economy. Numerous U.S.
firms and millions of American jobs depend on trade with Asia that totaled $600 billion last year, according to the Commerce Department.

ECONOMIC COLLAPSE CAUSES EXTINCTION

Bearden, Director of the Distinguished American Scientists (ADAS), 2000 (Thomas, Fellow
Emeritus, Alpha Foundation’s Institute for Advanced Study (AIAS) Pg.
http://www.cheniere.org/techpapers/)
History bears out that desperate nations take desperate actions. Prior to the final
economic collapse, the stress on nations will have increased the intensity and number
of their conflicts, to the point where the arsenals of weapons of mass destruction
(WMD) now possessed by some 25 nations, are almost certain to be released. As an
example, suppose a starving North Korea {i} launches nuclear weapons upon Japan and
South Korea, including U.S. forces there, in a spasmodic suicidal response. Or suppose a
desperate China — whose long range nuclear missiles can reach the United States —
attacks Taiwan. In addition to immediate responses, the mutual treaties involved in such
scenarios will quickly draw other nations into the conflict, escalating it significantly. As the
studies showed, rapid escalation to full WMD exchange occurs, with a great percent of
the WMD arsenals being unleashed. The resulting great Armageddon will destroy
civilization as we know it, and perhaps most of the biosphere, at least for many decades.
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AND, WE’LL PREEMPT PROLIF GOOD HERE:

1. ACCIDENTAL STRIKES MEANS ITS NOT CONTROLLABLE

Nathan Busch 2004 (No End in Sight: The Continuing Menace of Nuclear Proliferation, University Press
of Kentucky, 287-288)
As these accounts suggest, the risks of accidental and unauthorized use could be very high in emerging NWS s,
particularly during nuclear crises or periods of domestic instability. The prospects for proliferation are therefore especially disturbing because
emerging NWSs will tend to be more unstable than the established NWSs have been. For example, all three
of the emerging nuclear powers examined in this study- Iraq, Iran, and North Korea-have had significant risks of
domestic instability. Although Saddam Hussein proved able to crush any opposition, he did experience a number of coup attempts, as well as
repeated riots and uprisings during his time in power. And once an external invasion took place, all central authority evaporated quite rapidly. The risks
of regime-threatening upheavals are much greater, however, in North Korea and Iran than in Ba'athist Iraq. As we have seen, neither of these countries
has great prospects for political stability in the near- to mid-term .
In the event of severe upheavals or regime collapse, they
could experience a rapid deterioration of their central controls over their nuclear weapons and related
materials. Nor is it clear that simple command structures in emerging NWSs will significantly reduce the
risks of accidental or unauthorized use, as Seng and Karl contend. Indeed, as several analysts have argued , the rudimentary
command-and-control structures in India and Pakistan increase the likelihood of accidental or
unauthorized use, particularly during crises. The Indian military currently has little experience in handling nuclear weapons. If India's
nuclear weapons were given to the military during a crisis, they would be as inexperienced in preventing their use as they would be in using them.
Moreover, because Pakistan currently lacks an enunciated nuclear doctrine, reliable decision-making or
communications systems, or explicit targeting information, there is an increased likelihood that Pakistan's
own troops might undertake strikes on their own. These are risks that any emerging NWS would likely
experience as they worked to develop nuclear weapons, formulate use-doctrines, and establish command-and-control
systems. But since many of the countries most likely to develop nuclear weapons in the foreseeable future would
have to consider the chances of preventive strikes as quite high, they might choose to deploy (or be forced to
deploy) their nuclear weapons before they have all these issues sufficiently worked out . In these instances, the
simple command structures would not necessarily prevent accidental or unauthorized use, and in fact
could increase these risks.

THIS IS IMPACTED WITH NUCLEAR WAR

Yair Evron, Adjunct principal research associate at INSS, July 2008 (An Israel-Iran Balance of Nuclear
Deterrence: Seeds of Instability, in Israel and a Nuclear Iran: Implications for Arms Control, Deterrence,
and Defense, Institute for National Security Studies)
Command and control comprises two dimensions: the technical systems for early detection, warning, and control; and the decision making process
reliable C 4
responsible for the activation of nuclear weapons. It has become a common assessment in the context of the superpower model that
ISR systems are critical for the stability of nuclear deterrence. On the most elementary level, if early warning
systems do not operate correctly, there is the danger of an undetected nuclear surprise attack. Conversely, if
these systems mistakenly signal an incoming nuclear strike when in fact nothing occurred , decision
makers in the target country might try to respond with the nuclear capability under their comman d before being hit first. This might
lead to a nuclear war by mistake. Another possibility is that nuclear launching systems would be
activated but no actual attack would be executed. However, if these preparations are detected by the
other side, they might raise undue alarm there and lead it to dangerous nuclear moves.
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2. INTERNATIONAL PRESSURES WILL FORCE NEW PROLIFERATORS TO
NUCLEARIZE IN SECRET, THEIR EVIDENCE DOESN’T ASSUME THIS
Nathan Busch 2004 (No End in Sight: The Continuing Menace of Nuclear Proliferation, University Press
of Kentucky 225-226)
Because most newly proliferating states will be acting within a framework that may oppose proliferation
more directly than before, many of their actions will be shaped by these nonproliferation and counterproliferation regimes. In
particular, due to the serious consequences that could result from revelations about their nuclear weapons
programs, such as preemptive strikes, newly proliferating states will be likely to take greater steps to avoid
detection of their WMD programs by U.S. and other states' intelligence measures by employing various "denial and deception"
(D&D) techniques. Although the terms are interrelated, denial generally refers to "attempts to block information that could be used by an
opponent to learn some truth." It would include active measures , such as efforts to conceal WMD via camoflage, electronic
emission control, and various forms of physical, personnel, and communications security that help hide
the very existence of a clandestine activity. Deception, on the other hand, refers to a nation's efforts to cause an adversary to
believe something that is not true. Specifically, it involves the use of active or passive measures to convey a false or
inaccurate picture of a clandestine activity, such as disguising a biological weapons facility as a vaccine
plant. Proliferating states will be likely to use various D&D techniques to conceal their nuclear programs.
For example, Iraq, North Korea, and Iran all have concealed their nuclear weapons programs in
numerous facilities, often hidden underground. The steps that these countries have taken will be useful for examining the general denial and
deception approaches that other proliferating states might take

AND, OPAQUE PROLIFERATION GUARANTEES MULTIPLE SCENARIOS FOR

TERRORIST TRANSFER AND NUCLEAR WAR
Michael Wesley, Director of the Griffith Asia Pacific Research Institute, 2005 [“It’s Time to Scrap the
NPT,” Journal of International Affairs, 59:3]
By prohibiting proliferation, without the capacity or moral authority to enforce such a prohibition, the NPT makes opaque proliferation the only option for
aspiringnuclear weapons states.4 Opaque proliferation is destabilising to regional security. It breeds
miscalculation*/both overestimation of a state’s nuclear weapons development (as shown by the case of
Iraq), and underestimation (in the case of Libya)*/that can force neighbouring states into potentially
catastrophic moves. Even more dangerous, argues Lewis Dunn, is the likelihood that states with covert nuclear weapons
programs will develop weak failsafe mechanisms and nuclear doctrine that is destabilising: In camera decision
making may result in uncontrolled programs, less attention to safety and control problems and only limited assessment
of the risks of nuclear weapon deployments or use. The necessary exercises cannot be conducted, nor
can procedures for handling nuclear warheads be practised, nor alert procedures tested. As a result , the risk of
accidents or incidents may rise greatly in the event of deployment in a crisis or a conventional conflict.
Miscalculations by neighbours or outsiders also appear more likely, given their uncertainties about the
adversary’s capabilities, as well as their lack of information to judge whether crisis deployments mean that war is imminent (1991: 20, italics
in original). And because both the NPT and the current US counter-proliferation doctrine place such emphasis on preventing and reversing the spread
of nuclear weapons, states such as Pakistan, which desperately need assistance with both failsafe technology and stabilising nuclear doctrine, have
been suspicious of US offers of assistance (Pregenzer 2003). As the dramatic revelations of the nature and extent of the A. Q. Khan network showed ,
some states undertaking opaque proliferation have been prepared to rely on transnational smuggling
networks to gain vital components, materials and knowledge. Quite apart from the incapacity of the NPT regime to deal with this new
form of proliferation (Clary 2004), such non-state networks raise very real risks that for the right price, criminals or other
facilitators could pass nuclear materials to terrorist groups or extortionists (Albright and Hinderstein 2005). Both through its
inadequacies and its obsessive focus on stopping the spread of nuclear weapons, the NPT could be contributing to the ultimate nightmare: terrorists
armed with nuclear or radiological weapons.
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3. And, ANY CONFLICT CAUSES NUCLEAR WAR IN A WORLD OF PROLIF
Richard Russell March 2003 (The Nuclear Peace Fallacy: How Deterrence Can Fail, The Journal of
Strategic Studies, Vol. 26 No. 1, pp. 136-155)
Nuclear-armed adversaries might calculate that honor, fear and interest necessitate war and that its
conduct could be limited and not result in nuclear weapons exchanges. For instance, a nation state might
calculate that it could initiate conventional military operations for limited objectives-such as territory-that
would not threaten vital interests such as the regime survivability of the opponent, reducing the risk of
nuclear retaliation. The historical record shows that non-nuclear states are willing to attack or go to war
against nuclear powers. As Sagan points out, 'History suggests that states have nevertheless launched attacks in the face of such
uncertainty. Egypt and Syria attacked Israel in 1973 and Argentina invaded the United Kingdom's Falkland
Islands in 1982. Israel's reputed nuclear weapons capability did not deter the Iraqis from firing Scud missiles at Tel Aviv in the 1991 Gulf War. More
recently, many Indians see the 1999 Kargil crisis with Pakistan as evidence that the Pakistanis believed their
nuclear deterrent would allow them to take the contested territory in Kashmir without risking Indian
retaliation.. An aggressor nuclear state might calculate that it could achieve political objectives with
conventional military operations-the destruction of opposing conventional forces and the occupation of an adversary's capital, for
example-before an adversary could resort to nuclear weapons in its defense. While some might dismiss such a scenario as far-
fetched, one must recall that the German military, for all of its reputed prowess at military planning, had assumed in the pre-World War I Schlieffen Plan
that France could be defeated with dispatch before it turned its attention to defeating Russian forces in the east. It is a fair assumption that the
The
Germany of old will not be the last repository of military hubris and the possession of nuclear weapons today might even encourage such folly.
victim of a conventional attack-even if intended by the aggressor to achieve limited objectives-would be
under enormous psychological and emotional strain. Under such circumstances, the attacked state might
judge that the aggressor intends to bring about its total defeat, forcing the victim to unleash nuclear
retaliatory strikes to stave off conventional military defeat.

NUCLEAR WAR CAUSES HUMAN EXTINCTION

dr. martin hellman 08 (stanford professor of engineering, 2008, risk analysis of
nuclear deterrence, http://www.nuclearrisk.org/paper.pdf)
The danger associated with nuclear deterrence depends on both the cost of a failure and the failure rate.3 This section explores the cost of a failure of
nuclear deterrence, and the next section is concerned with the failure rate. While other definitions are possible, this article defines a failure of
deterrence to mean a full-scale exchange of all nuclear weapons available to the U.S. and Russia, an event that will be termed World War III.
Approximately 20 million people died as a result of the first World War. World War II’s fatalities
were double or triple that number—chaos prevented a more precise determination. In both cases
humanity recovered, and the world today bears few scars that attest to the horror of those two wars. Many people therefore implicitly believe that a third
World War would be horrible but survivable, an extrapolation of the effects of the first two global wars. In that view, World War III, while horrible, is
something that humanity may just have to face and from which it will then have to recover. In contrast, some of those most qualified to assess the
situation hold a very different view. In a 1961 speech to a joint session of the Philippine Congress, General Douglas MacArthur, stated ,
“Global
war has become a Frankenstein to destroy both sides. … If you lose, you are annihilated. If you
win, you stand only to lose. No longer does it possess even the chance of the winner of a duel. It
contains now only the germs of double suicide.” Former Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara expressed a similar view:
“If deterrence fails and conflict develops, the present U.S. and NATO strategy carries with it a high risk that Western civilization will be destroyed”
[McNamara 1986, page 6]. More recently, George Shultz, William Perry, Henry Kissinger, and Sam Nunn4 echoed those concerns when they quoted
nuclear weapons were “totally irrational, totally inhumane, good for nothing
President Reagan’s belief that
but killing, possibly destructive of life on earth and civilization .” [Shultz 2007] Official studies, while couched in less
emotional terms, still convey the horrendous toll that World War III would exact: “The resulting deaths would be far beyond any precedent. Executive
branch calculations show a range of U.S. deaths from 35 to 77 percent (i.e., 79-160 million dead) … a change in targeting could kill somewhere
between 20 million and 30 million additional people on each side .... These calculations reflect only deaths during the first 30 days. Additional millions
would be injured, and many would eventually die from lack of adequate medical care … millions of people might starve or freeze during the following
winter, but it is not possible to estimate how many. … further millions … might eventually die of latent radiation effects.” [OTA 1979, page 8] This OTA
report also noted the possibility of serious ecological damage [OTA 1979, page 9], a concern that assumed a new potentiality when the TTAPS report
the ash and dust from so many nearly simultaneous nuclear explosions and
[TTAPS 1983] proposed that
their resultant firestorms could usher in a nuclear winter that might erase homo sapiens from the
face of the earth, much as many scientists now believe the K-T Extinction that wiped out the dinosaurs resulted from an impact winter caused
by ash and dust from a large asteroid or comet striking Earth.
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CONTENTION 3: NUCLEAR TERRORISM

TACTICAL NUKES REMAIN THE MOST VIABLE WEAPONS FOR THEFT

Miles A. Pomper, William Poter, and Nikolai Sokov, Unit for Policy Planning and Research, Finnish
Ministry for Foreign Affaris, December 2009, http://cns.miis.edu/opapers/pdfs/tnw_europe.pdf)
TNW remains a category of nuclear weapons that is particularly vulnerable to illegal acquisition,
theft, or other forms of loss of control by proper authorities. Tactical nuclear weapons- as well as
warheads for air-launched strategic weapons (bombs and long range air-luanched cruise missiles, or ALCMs) – are inherently more
vulnerable because they are kept at storage facilities. In contrast, the bulk of warheads for ICBMs and SLBMs are
permanently mated to delivery vehicles and remain inside silos and submaries (which come with their own built-in defenses of personnel and security
systems). In addition, there exist procedures for release of TNW to troops on short notice, which presupposes shortcuts in security procedures.

THE RISK OF TERRORIST ACQUISITION OF US TACTICAL NUKES IN TURKEY

OUTWEIGHS ANY DETTERENT VALUE
Lale Sariibrahimoglu, May 04th, 2009, Expert from the Jamestown Foundation on the world of Terrorism,
“Turkey to face pressure over US nukes on its soil” http://www.todayszaman.com/tz-web/detaylar.do?
load=detay&link=174286&bolum=100 )
"However, since the Sept. 11 terrorist attacks, the international security environment has undergone
radical changes. The classical deterrent value of nuclear weapons no longer applies with these
emerging threats. At the same time, there is an increased probability of unauthorized use of crude
radiological devices or nuclear weapons by terrorist organizations. In addition to increased security at
storage sites, bolder steps must be taken by concerned countries to get rid of nuclear weapons.
Such steps should begin with reducing the number of US nuclear weapons deployed in allied countries,
including Turkey," he asserts.

THE SCENARIO IS LINEAR- FOR EVERY REDUCTION IN NUCLEAR WEAPONS

COMES A DECREASED CHANCE OF NUCLEAR TERRORISM
Turner and Nunn 2007 [Ted and Sam, Co-Chairmen of the Nuclear Threat Initiative, NTI 2007 Annual
Report, http://www.nti.org/b_aboutnti/annual_report_2007.pdf]
The materials needed to build nuclear weapons can be found today in approximately 40 countries. More than
a dozen countries already have the ability to produce this material on their own. As demand for nuclear power grows with rising energy needs and
concerns over climate change, more countries are seeking to develop nuclear power. These countries may legitimately want fuel for their nuclear
reactors. But enriching uranium to run a nuclear reactor is the same process as enriching uranium to build a
nuclear weapon. In a world where there are many more nuclear players—some animated by regional conflicts, religious
hatred and stoked by extremist elements— the chances of making it through another generation without a nuclear
attack will be diminished. Deterrence—the strategy that helped us get through the Cold War without a nuclear attack— is far less
likely to prevent a nuclear explosion in a world where there are more nations with nuclear weapons, more
nations seeking nuclear weapons and more terrorists who have no return address and likely cannot be deterred. The
spread of nuclear weapons and nuclear know-how to more nations directly increases the threat of such
an attack by terrorists. It’s simple mathematics. The more nations and facilities that have nuclear
weapons or materials, the more likely it is that terrorists can penetrate a facility and acquire a nuclear
weapon or the materials they need to build one. It increasingly appears that nuclear weapons, which were created
to enhance our security in another age, increasingly imperil our security in this age
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NUCLEAR TERRORISM CAUSES EXTINCTION EVEN IF IT IS UNSUCCESSFUL

SID-AHMED 4 (mohamed sid-ahmed, political analyst, august 26 – september 1, 2004, al-ahram
weekly on-line, http://weekly.ahram.org.eg/2004/705/op5.htm)
. The phenomenon of terrorism is even more dangerous than is generally believed. We are in for
surprises no less serious than 9/11 and with far more devastating consequences . A nuclear attack
by terrorists will be much more critical than Hiroshima and Nagazaki, even if -- and this is far from certain -- the weapons used are less harmful
than those used then, Japan, at the time, with no knowledge of nuclear technology, had no choice but to capitulate. Today, the technology is a secret
for nobody. So far, except for the two bombs dropped on Japan, nuclear weapons have been used only to threaten Even
if it fails, it would
further exacerbate the negative features of the new and frightening world in which we are now
living. Societies would close in on themselves, police measures would be stepped up at the
expense of human rights, tensions between civilisations and religions would rise and ethnic
conflicts would proliferate. It would also speed up the arms race and develop the awareness that a
different type of world order is imperative if humankind is to survive . But the still more critical scenario is if the
attack succeeds. This could lead to a third world war, from which no one will emerge victorious. Unlike a conventional war which ends when one side
triumphs over another, this war will be without winners and losers . When nuclear pollution infects the whole planet, we
will all be losers.
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CONTENTION 4: DENUCLEARIZATION

TURKEY IS THE KEY PIECE OF THE PUZZLE – IT’S THE ONLY WAY WE CAN
REALIZE THE DREAM OF ZERO
Bell 09 (Alexandria, Alexandra Bell is a Project Manager at the Ploughshares Fund and a
Truman National Security Fellow, “Turkey’s Nuclear Crossroads”,
http://www.good.is/post/turkeys-nuclear-crossroads/,)
Getting the five NATO members who hold the tactical nukes to relinquish them quietly will take care, and Turkey may be the
toughest piece in this particular part of the disarmament puzzle. Most Turks I met would answer
disarmament questions in entirely different ways, depending on whether or not Iran was referenced . Removing tactical nuclear
weapons from Turkey will be difficult, but not impossible. In order to move towards a
world free of nuclear weapons, U.S. policy makers have to start thinking about how
things are connected. Countries like Turkey rely on nuclear weapons for political and security reasons. To feel comfortable without
nukes, these countries must be convinced that their neighbors will not acquire them. That means efforts to reduce
nuclear stockpiles—including tactical nukes—and efforts to stop the creation of new nuclear programs must
happen in concert.

NUCLEAR WEAPONS MAKE OMNICIDE INEVITABLE

David Krieger, October 29th, 2009, “Preventing Omnicide” Nuclear Age Peace Foundation”
http://www.wagingpeace.org/articles/2009/10/29_krieger_preventing_omnicide.php?krieger
Omnicide is a word coined by philosopher John Somerville.  It is an extension of the concepts of suicide and genocide.  It means the
death of all, the total negation and destruction of all life.  Omnicide is suicide for all.  It is the genocide of
humanity writ large.  It is what Rachel Carson began to imagine in her book, Silent Spring.  Can you imagine omnicide?  No people.  No
animals.  No trees.  No friendships.  No one to view the mountains, or the oceans, or the stars.   No
one to write a poem, or sing a song, or hug a baby, or laugh or cry.   With no present, there can be
no memory of the past, nor possibility of a future.  There is nothing.  Nuclear weapons make possible
the end of all, of omnicide. The starting point for ending the omnicidal threat of nuclear weapons
is the recognition that the threat is real and pervasive, and requires action.   Each of us is threatened.  All we
love and hold dear is threatened.  The future is threatened.  We are called upon to end our complacency and respond to this threat by demanding that
our leaders develop a clear pathway to the total elimination of nuclear weapons and to the
elimination of war as a means of resolving conflicts.

NUCLEAR WEAPONS UNDERMINE AND PROVIDE A FALSE SENSE OF SECURITY THROUGH

DETERRENCE
David Krieger and Angela McCraken, 2008, “Ten Myths About Nuclear Weapons” Nuclear Age Peace
Foundation, http://www.wagingpeace.org/menu/issues/nuclear-weapons/10-nw-myths.htm#5
5. Nuclear weapons make a country safer. It is a common belief that nuclear weapons protect a country by deterring potential aggressors from
attacking. By threatening massive retaliation, the argument goes, nuclear weapons prevent an attacker from starting a war. To the contrary ,
nuclear weapons are actually undermining the safety of the countries that possess them by
providing a false sense of security. While deterrence can provide some psychological sense of
security, there are no guarantees that the threat of retaliation will succeed in preventing an attack.
There are many ways in which deterrence could fail, including misunderstandings, faulty
communications, irrational leaders, miscalculations and accidents. In addition, the possession of
nuclear weapons enhances the risks of terrorism, proliferation and ultimately nuclear annihilation.

PLAN MAKES WARS LESS DESTRUCTIVE

Sagan 09 [Scott D. Sagan, a Fellow of the American Academy since 2008, is Professor of Political
Science and Codirector of the Center for International Security and Cooperation at Stanford University.
He is Codirector of the American Academy's Initiative on the Global Nuclear Future, Daedalus. Boston:
Fall 2009. Vol. 138, Iss. 4; pg. 157, 13 pgs]
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Some are pessimistic about the prospects for latent nuclear deterrence, believing that it is inherently less stable than the current form of active nuclear
the very fact of this reconstitution
deterrence. Sir Michael Quinlan, for example, argued that “it is sometimes suggested that
risk would serve as a deterrent to war–weaponless deterrence, it has been called, a sort of deterrence at
one remove. But that implies a worldwide and long-sighted wisdom on which it would surely be imprudent to count.”25 Quinlan was certainly correct to
remain skeptical about the degree we can ensure that “worldwide and long-sighted wisdom” will exist in the future world without nuclear weapons. But
surely the same argument holds true, and in spades, for a future world with many states holding nuclear arsenals .
We cannot design an
international system in which wisdom and prudence are guaranteed. A nuclear-free world
would, however, reduce the consequences of individual failures of wisdom and prudence.
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CONTENTION 5: TURKEY DIPLOMACY

REMOVING B61S IN TURKEY IS KEY TO TURKISH DIPLOMACY

Ingram et al. 2009 (Paul Ingram, Executive Director at the British American Security Council, Claudine
Lamond has recently graduated from the Australian National University holding a Bachelor of Arts in
International Relations, and a Bachelor of Asian Studies, Security and Strategic Studies, and Japanese. “
Politics around US tactical nuclear weapons in European host states,” BASIC Getting to Zero Papers, No.
11, 1-23, http://www.basicint.org/gtz/gtz11.pdf)
Turkey’s location has added an element of both risk and opportunity to NATO nuclear sharing. Turkey’s close proximity to states deemed potentially
hostile, such as Iran and Syria, make Turkey a preferred NATO base for TNWs. The risk, of course, is that stationing TNWs in Turkey might provoke a
Turkish parliamentarians have expressed to NATO the difficulty of
pre-emptive strike upon NATO bases.
explaining the continued presence of US TNWs on Turkish territory to Muslim and Arab
neighbors. There is a fear that they undermine Turkey’s clear diplomatic objectives to act as a
mediator within the region. Turkey has a unique opportunity to play a positive role in
promoting non-proliferation. Ending nuclear sharing and fully complying with the NPT would act as a
powerful example to neighboring states and strengthen Turkey’s legitimacy. Moreover, efforts by
the Turkish government to play a leading role in the elimination of nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction would receive overwhelming public
support.22

SUCCESSFUL TURKISH DIPLOMACY IS KEY TO MIDDLE EAST STABILITY

Çetinsaya 2008 (Gökhan Çetinsaya, Ph.D., Professor of History and International Relations at Istanbul
Technical University, Department of Humanities and Social Sciences, “The New Middle East, Turkey, and
the Search for Regional Stability,” Atlantic Council, http://www.acus.org/publication/us-turkey-relations-
require-new-focus/cetinsaya)
In this new Middle East, Turkey faces several challenges, risks and opportunities. Turkey is extremely anxious over the above-
mentioned developments in the region, and tries to pursue a careful and comprehensive diplomacy in the
region in order to forestall the dangers. Turkish political and military elites believe that disintegration of Iraq or/and new
destabilizations in the Middle East could be disastrous for the region as well as Turkey. What is Turkey’s policy toward the Middle East? Turkey’s
current policy toward the Middle East could only be understood in the context of general foreign policy and strategic vision of the new Turkish foreign
policy decision-makers or the Justice and Development Party (JDP) elites. In this vision ,
Turkey has become a pivotal
country and a regional power in Eurasia and the Middle East since the end of the Cold
War, and it has a great potential for constructive role in the Middle East, and also a
potential to become a global actor, in terms of its strategic, geographical and historical
depth. This vision denies a ‘bridge’ role for Turkey. This new vision identifies four main principles of Turkish foreign policy: The second
principle is called “zero-problem with the neighbors”. According to this line of argument, instead of a
psychology of neighboring enemies or a defensive attitude towards neighbors, Turkey
should establish good relations with all of its neighbors. Implementing this principle,
Turkey will gain extraordinary room for maneuver in the region. This is also the first
condition for Turkey to become a pivotal state or a key player in the Middle East.

CONFLICT IN THE MIDDLE EAST LEADS TO WORLD WAR

Reuters , 2007 (quoting Khalilzad -- "Middle East turmoil could cause world war: U.S. envoy." 8/27.
http://www.reuters.com/article/politicsNews/idUSL2719552620070827)
Upheaval in the Middle East and Islamic civilization could cause another world war, the U.S. ambassador to
the United Nations was quoted as saying in an Austrian newspaper interview published on Monday. Zalmay Khalilzad told the daily Die Presse the
Middle East was now so disordered that it had the potential to inflame the world as Europe did
during the first half of the 20th century. "The (Middle East) is going through a very difficult transformation
phase. That has strengthened extremism and creates a breeding ground for terrorism,"
he said in remarks translated by Reuters into English from the published German.
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CONTENTION 6: SOLVENCY

ELIMINATING TACTICAL NUKES IN TURKEY IS KEY TO START LARGER ARMS

REDUCTION TO ZERO
Lale Sariibrahimoglu, May 04th, 2009, Expert from the Jamestown Foundation on the world of Terrorism,
“Turkey to face pressure over US nukes on its soil” http://www.todayszaman.com/tz-web/detaylar.do?
load=detay&link=174286&bolum=100 )
"However, since the Sept. 11 terrorist attacks, the international security environment has undergone
radical changes. The classical deterrent value of nuclear weapons no longer applies with these
emerging threats. At the same time, there is an increased probability of unauthorized use of crude
radiological devices or nuclear weapons by terrorist organizations. In addition to increased security at
storage sites, bolder steps must be taken by concerned countries to get rid of nuclear weapons.
Such steps should begin with reducing the number of US nuclear weapons deployed in allied countries,
including Turkey," he asserts.

OBAMA’S UNIQUELY KEY

Cirincione 09 – Nuclear non-proliferation expert & President of the Ploughshares
Fund [Joseph “Interview with Global Zero signatory, Joe Cirincione on Daily
Kos,” Global Zero, Sunday, August 16, 2009, Pg.
http://www.globalzero.org/en/interview-global-zero-signatory-joe-cirincione-daily-
kos]
Absolutely. If the President doesn't exert his leadership here, the agenda he so eloquently described
in Prague on April 5 [of this year] will go down the tubes. He's got to get his White House staff, his senior people, focused, engaged in
this review, and prevent it from just drifting along. The way to make changes in the nuclear posture is to have
it driven by the vision of the President, and that's what Bush did. As a result, he changed US nuclear policy - or tried to. He
had a review that changed it by articulating new missions for nuclear weapons, declaring that there would be new warheads built, and new delivery
vehicles built. Now, the recommendations of that review were blocked by Congress, but the review itself came out the way the President wanted it to.
can't leave
So, the lesson is clear. If you want to have the President's vision, you've got to have the president running the posture review. You
it to the bureaucracy, even though you've appointed the people - let me get this straight, I want you to be
clear about this. I think the people that the president has appointed to the Department of Defense are first-rate. They're all brilliant, they're all
knowledgeable, they're all capable, but they do not run that bureaucracy. The bureaucracy runs them. It's just too big to think that a dozen people are
going to take control of it. They're not. They can't.

NOW IS KEY – GLOBAL MOMENTUM ENSURES SUCCESS

Klaus Naumann, 5/19/2010, “A Farewell to Nuclear Arms” Project Syndicate,
http://www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/naumann3/English
BERLIN – As the recent UN and Washington summits have demonstrated, nuclear arms
control and disarmament are among the top issues on the world’s political agenda. They
are likely to remain so for the foreseeable future. Indeed, 2010 will determine whether US
President Barack Obama’s vision of a nuclear-free world will remain a distant but
achievable hope, or must be abandoned . This year is crucially important. The agreement
signed in early April in Prague between Russia and the United States on the reduction of
strategic nuclear weapons and possibly on further cuts was accompanied by the
publication of the US Nuclear Posture Review, identifying the nuclear capabilities that
Obama’s administration wishes to preserve for the next four years. The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty
review conference will begin the work of adapting the NPT to our rapidly changing world. Many policymakers hope that 2010 will bring clarity on the
North Korean and Iranian nuclear programs. There are roughly 23,000 nuclear weapons today, which is 40,000 fewer than at the Cold War’s height.
These weapons’ total yield is greater than 150,000 Hiroshima-size nuclear explosions .
Nuclear disarmament is therefore still
urgently needed, and prominent politicians in the US and Germany have produced the
US-led Global Zero initiative and created the International Commission on Nuclear Non-
Proliferation and Disarmament (ICNND), sponsored by Australia and Japan and co-chaired by former Foreign Ministers Yoriko
Kawaguchi and Gareth Evans.
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TNWS ARE THE LARGEST COMPONENT TO COMPLETE GLOBAL NUCLEAR
DISARMAMENT
Kelleher 09 (Catherine, writer for the Arms Control Association, “Getting to Zero Starts Here:
Tactical Nuclear Weapons”, http://www.armscontrol.org/act/2009_10/Kelleher,)
The question of how to reduce or eliminate tactical nuclear weapons should be (and, Obama experts promise, will be) among the first in this ambitious
campaign, once an agreement extending the logic and verification protocols of START is reached. An agreement to extend key provisions of the treaty,
at least on an interim basis, will have to be reached by the time the current treaty expires December 5. A formal agreement is expected to follow early
next year. Tactical nuclear weapons are an important priority partly because of their seemingly easy solution, but
the weapons have
also because the challenges they present are emblematic of those in the larger arms control debate. Strategically,
little real value in the post-Cold War climate. They are vulnerable to a rogue or terrorist
attack, too small or risky for independent military use, and unpopular with military forces
and most political audiences. Lately, maintaining these weapons has provided many
more disadvantages than advantages for the countries that possess them in their arsenals—France, Russia, the United
Kingdom, and the United States—at least as measured in terms of the costs of safety and security, of the
operational burden of dedicating and preserving delivery aircraft, and of ensuring ongoing certification of forces. Even within NATO, for all but a few
countries, tactical weapons have come to represent a decreasingly meaningful symbolic commitment rather than a concrete deterrent or escalation
tripwire. From a U.S. standpoint, the relatively low numbers of such weapons that still exist, at approximately 1,000 in the U.S. arsenal with only 20-25
percent of that number located outside U.S. borders, would seem to make it easy to secure and verify their ultimate elimination.[ 2] Yet,these
weapons also represent one of the more complex components of reaching complete
nuclear disarmament and serve as an effective microcosm of the challenges in securing
U.S.-Russian agreement and eventually a global consensus on how and why to get to
zero. […] The Russians have also stated that they will not consider reducing their tactical nuclear stockpile until all U.S. weapons are removed
from European territory. As a principle, they have essentially declared that all tactical weapons should be based on national territories of nuclear-
weapon states.[4] As Obama tries to shift U.S. nuclear policy toward zero against substantial domestic and international odds, he will have to reconcile
the traditional Cold War/alliance commitment logic behind tactical nuclear deployments with his own long-term objectives and the present, complicated
political context.

ABSENT US LEADERSHIP, INTERNATIONAL MOBILIZATION OF NUKES WILL

FAIL
David Krieger, August 28th, 2006, “The Challenge of Abolishing Nuclear Weapons” Nuclear Age Peace
Foundation, http://www.wagingpeace.org/articles/2006/08/28_krieger_challenge.htm
The United States, as the world’s most powerful country and the only country to use nuclear
weapons in warfare, has a special responsibility to lead in fulfilling its obligations under
international law.  In fact, without US leadership, it is unlikely that progress will be possible toward
nuclear disarmament.  But rather than lead in this direction, the United States under the Bush administration has been the major obstacle
to nuclear disarmament.  It has failed to ratify the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, has withdrawn from the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty to pursue
dreams of “star wars,” has opposed a verifiable Fissile Material Cut-Off Treaty, and in general has acted as an obstacle to progress on all matters of
nuclear disarmament.  The US has also pursued a double standard with regard to nuclear weapons.  It has been silent on Israeli nuclear weapons, and
now seeks to change its own non-proliferation laws to enable it to provide nuclear technology and materials to India, a country that has not joined the
nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and has developed a nuclear arsenal.  At the same time, the US has developed contingency plans to use nuclear
weapons against seven countries, five of which are non-nuclear weapons states, despite giving assurances that it would not use nuclear weapons
against such states.
What is tragic is that the American people don’t seem to grasp the seriousness of their government’s failure.  They are lacking in education that would
lead to an understanding of the situation.  Their attention has been diverted to Iraq, Iran and North Korea, and they fail to see what is closest to home:
the failure of their own government to lead in a constructive and lawful manner to achieve the elimination of nuclear weapons.  “And thus,” in Einstein’s
words, “we drift toward unparalleled catastrophe.” To
bring about real change in nuclear policy, people must begin
with a vision of a world free of nuclear weapons, and then they must speak out as if their lives and
the lives of their children depended on their actions.  It is unlikely that governments will give up powerful weapons on their
own accord.  They must be pushed by their citizenry – citizens unwilling to continue to run the risk of nuclear holocaust. 
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US WEAPONS REDUCTION SENDS AN IMMEDIATE SIGNAL THAT HALTS
GLOBAL PROLIF
Joe Ciricione, November 6th, 2009, “The Impact of Nuclear Posture on Non-
Proliferation” Ploughshares Fund, http://www.ploughshares.org/news-
analysis/blog/impact-nuclear-posture-non-proliferation
The nuclear posture and strategic decisions of nuclear-armed nations have a significant,
often immediate impact on the nuclear acquisition decisions of other nations. A decision by a
state to acquire nuclear weapons can trigger a similar decision in a rival state. Conversely, the commitment not to acquire or maintain nuclear weapons
Re-establishing the commitment to the
by one state or group of states can foster similar commitments regionally or globally.
elimination of nuclear weapons by the United States and other nuclear-armed states coupled with practical
steps towards that goal would be a powerful barrier to the spread of nuclear weapons to other
states. The interim report of the Commission correctly notes: “If the U.S. by its actions indicates to other
nations that we are moving seriously to decrease the importance and role of nuclear
weapons, we increase our chance of getting the kind of cooperation we need to deal
effectively with the dangers of proliferation.” As the Commission finds:History has borne
out U.S. assessments of the essential connection between controlling existing arsenals
and preventing new ones. These previous national estimates can assist today’s officials in efforts to apply the same logic to current
threats. The Commission should find that the commitment by the United States and other nuclear-armed nations to eliminate
nuclear weapons and to take practical, immediate steps towards that goal will improve
U.S. security and substantially enhance prospects for preventing the acquisition of
nuclear weapons by new states and by terrorist groups.

NUCLEAR ZERO SOLVES PROLIF

Ramesh Takur, professor of Political Sciences, November 27th, 2007, “No Nukes, No Proliferation,”
Nuclear Age Peace Foundation,
http://www.wagingpeace.org/articles/2007/11/27_thakur_nukes_proliferation.php
U.S. presidential hopeful Sen. Barack Obama, D-Ill., declared, "America seeks a world in which there are no nuclear weapons." In January, three
former U.S. secretaries of defense and state--George Shultz, William Perry, Henry Kissinger--and Sen. Sam Nunn, D-Ga., former chairman of the
Senate Armed Services Committee, in an op-ed in the Wall Street Journal, called on Washington to take the lead in the abolition of nuclear weapons.
The national security benefits of nuclear weapons, they argued, are outweighed by the threats
posed to U.S. security by uncontrolled proliferation. Nuclear weapons could not proliferate if they
did not exist. Because they do, they will. The policy implication of this logic is that the best guarantee of nuclear
nonproliferation is nuclear disarmament through a nuclear weapons convention that bans the possession, acquisition, testing
and use of nuclear weapons, by everyone. This would solve the problem of nonproliferation as well as
disarmament. The focus on nonproliferation to the neglect of disarmament ensures that we get neither. If we want nonproliferation, therefore,
we must prepare for disarmament. Time is running out for the hypocrisy and accumulated anomalies of global nuclear apartheid. Either we will
achieve nuclear abolition or we will have to live with nuclear proliferation followed by nuclear war .
Better the soft glow of satisfaction from the noble goal realized of nuclear weapons banned, than
the harsh glare of the morning after of these weapons used.
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2010-2011 TURKEY AFF
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