FREIE UNIVERSITÄT BERLIN

HUMBOLDT UNIVERSITÄT ZU BERLIN

UNIVERSITÄT POTSDAM
MASTER OF ARTS INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

BRAZILIAN POLICY TOWARDS THE SOUTH ATLANTIC:

POLITICS AND STRATEGY

BRUNO GOMES GUIMARÃES

[Matriculation number: 769224]

First supervisor: Prof. Dr. Raimund Krämer

Second supervisor: Prof. Dr. Lucas Kerr de Oliveira

Berlin / Potsdam

November 2014
 BRUNO GOMES GUIMARÃES

BRAZILIAN POLICY TOWARDS THE SOUTH ATLANTIC: POLITICS AND

STRATEGY

Dissertation thesis submitted to the Joint

Masters Program in International
Relations of the Free University of
Berlin, Humboldt University of Berlin,
and University of Potsdam as partial
requisite for obtaining of the degree of
Master of Arts in International Relations.

First supervisor: Prof. Dr. Raimund

Krämer

Second supervisor: Prof. Dr. Lucas Kerr

de Oliveira

Berlin / Potsdam

2014
 BRUNO GOMES GUIMARÃES

BRAZILIAN POLICY TOWARDS THE SOUTH ATLANTIC: POLITICS AND

STRATEGY

Dissertation thesis submitted to the Joint

Masters Program in International
Relations of the Free University of
Berlin, Humboldt University of Berlin,
and University of Potsdam as partial
requisite for obtaining of the degree of
Master of Arts in International Relations.

Approved on: Berlin / Potsdam, ____________ 2014.

___________________________
Prof. Dr. Raimund Krämer — First Supervisor
Universität Potsdam

___________________________
Prof. Dr. Lucas Kerr de Oliveira — Second Supervisor
Universidade Federal da Integração Latino-Americana
For the Brazilian Nation
 ACKNOLEDGMENTS

First I thank my family, whose love has always been the most important factor
for me to pursue my dreams. It was very hard for me to be away from them during these
two years. My journey may have physically pushed me away, but my love and
admiration for them has not wavered. Pai, mãe, mana, tia, vô e vó, eu amo vocês.

While I was writing this work, I have met many obstacles, both personal and
academic. Lest I did not finish it, I counted on the support of many insightful and dear
friends to keep me focused and to overcome these difficulties. I sincerely thank all of
them: Sílvia Sebben, Marcelo Kanter, João Arthur Reis, Willian Roberto, Daniel
Deporte, Anna Paula Bennech, Pavol Šeregi, Csaba Pogonyi, Kinga Michalska, Zuzana
Kikova, Bruno Magno, Jessica Höring, Gabriela Verri, and Marcelo Scalabrin Müller. I
am especially thankful to Giovana Zuccato, Iara Binta Machado and Diogo Ives for
giving me a hand when I thought all was lost and to Pedro Brites and Athos Munhoz,
whose brotherhood has always been invaluable to me.

Even though having oceans and continents keeping us apart, the

encouragement from my former schoolmates has also been vital to me. Daphne Mahfuz,
Bianca Villavicencio, Ariel Oliveira, Bruna Salgado, Alexandre Guterres, Rodrigo
Waick, Gabriela Basso, Daniel Haase, and especially Henrique Bordini, you kept me
sane whenever I thought I had been too involved with International Relations, Brazilian
Foreign Policy, and related issues.

During my studies in Berlin, I have had the pleasure to meet many interesting
people from all around the world, renewing my resolve to study abroad. In particular
my fellow students Szymon Parzniewski, Inga Galat, Maksim Roskin, and Julian Fitz
have been very important to me for their companionship. They have made it easier for
me live far away from my motherland, Brazil. In that regard, I would also like to thank
all of my friends who came to visit me in Germany: They surely kept me less homesick.

I also express my gratitude to the South American Institute for Policy and
Strategy (ISAPE) and its staff: The discussions we have had at ISAPE have always been
very instructive. In particular I would like to thank ISAPE for providing me the space
and infrastructure to write this dissertation in Porto Alegre. On a special note, I must say
that my ISAPE colleague Camila Moreira Cesar became more than a coworker during
our stay abroad: The Paris-Berlin axis revealed a good and supportive friendship that
anchored me in reality.

By the same token, I am also grateful to the Global Public Policy Institute
(GPPi) and my former colleagues there. They revived my keenness to learn more about
my field of study. I am especially thankful to Sarah Brockmeier, Philipp Rotmann,
Gerrit Kurtz and Thorsten Benner; our debates on the most varied issues during my
internship were always challenging and they have definitely sharpened my thoughts.

I ought to acknowledge the importance of my undergraduate studies at UFRGS

in shaping my analytical skills, which have been fundamental for the drafting of this
work. Therefore, I am very thankful to my former professors Paulo Visentini, André
Reis, Marco Cepik, and José Miguel Martins. They have been the cornerstone of my
education in International Relations. Particularly, I would like to thank Prof. Dr.
Analúcia Danilevicz Pereira for indicating some bibliography to me and Prof. Dr. Lucas
Kerr de Oliveira for giving me the pleasure of accepting my invite to be the second
advisor of this dissertation.

Last but not least, I would like to thank the Potsdam University, the Free
University of Berlin, and the Humboldt University for granting to me the opportunity to
carry out my master studies in International Relations. The universities' staff and faculty
have been highly attentive, notably Mrs. Ulrike Kaczinski, in spite of the many
difficulties and bureaucracy involving this joint MA program. I would also like to thank
Prof. Dr. Raimund Krämer for being my supervisor.
To the Sea, to the Sea! The white gulls are crying,
The wind is blowing and the white foam is flying.
West, west away, the round sun is falling.
J. R. R. Tolkien

Olhai de que esperanças me mantenho!

Vede que perigosas seguranças!
Que não temo contrastes nem mudanças,
andando em bravo mar, perdido o lenho.
Luís de Camões
 ABSTRACT

This dissertation refers to the Brazilian policy towards the South Atlantic in a historical
perspective from 1930 until the XXI century. It uses the concept of international
insertion paradigms as an analytical framework to better apprehend and delineate the
object of study. Three paradigms are taken into account: developmentalist, neoliberal,
and logistical. The first spans from 1930 until 1989, the second from 1990 until 2000,
and the latter from 2000 until today. The question is, then, how have they been
articulated and oriented Brazilian policy towards the South Atlantic. In order to answer
this question, every chapter explains the paradigm, relays the history of the Brazilian
international insertion during each period, and describes the respective politics and
strategy of the country concerning the South Atlantic. The study finds that in the
developmentalist period Brazil oriented its international insertion towards achieving
development goals through an autonomous foreign policy and strong participation of the
State. It comprised two moments: One in which Brazil sought an associate model of
development and the other an independent one. This reflected on the country's South
Atlantic policy. First the country prioritized relations with the United States for
obtaining technology and capital for its naval industry and Navy, then it began to forge
ties with African countries regardless of regime type and started to make its Navy more
independent from the US Cold War strategy. Brazil fostered the creation of ZOPACAS
after the Malvinas/Falklands War when South Atlantic countries noticed that they could
not rely on the West to guarantee their security. In turn, the neoliberal international
insertion implied an alignment with the US and the adhesion to international regimes,
besides opening up the domestic market and deregulation of the economy. The research
shows that Brazil reduced its South Atlantic policy to very low levels in the period:
Relations with Africa sunk to a bare minimum, the Navy became obsolete, and the
naval industry all but disappeared. The logistical paradigm reversed this trend. It
implied a more realist foreign policy, according to which the Brazilian State pursues its
national interests in synergy with the private sector in order to attain advanced
technology and competitiveness. In the South Atlantic, this international insertion
materialized in greater ties with African countries and South America while
domestically the exploration of the Pré-Sal meant the revival of the naval industry and
the implementation of strategic programs for the Navy, such as SisGAAz and PROSUB.
The study concludes that both the developmental and logistical paradigms have carried
forth national development projects to a greater or lesser extent and have autonomously
pursued Brazil's interests in the South Atlantic. Conversely, the neoliberal paradigm
belittled them despite some positive results such as CPLP's creation. The former
represent a pragmatist international insertion oriented by the independent pursuit of the
nation's interests — similar to the strategies of mature powers — and the latter is more
dependent and ideological, inadequate to the weight of the country in the international
system.
KEYWORDS: Brazil. South Atlantic. International Insertion Paradigms. Brazilian Foreign
Policy. Development.
 ZUSAMMENFASSUNG

Diese Arbeit beschäftigt sich mit der brasilianischen Politik für den Südatlantik in einer
historischen Perspektive von 1930 bis dem 21. Jahrhundert. Das Konzept der
Paradigmen der internationalen Insertion wird als analytische Rahmen verwendet, um
besser zu verstehen und zu beschreiben das Objekt der Studie. Drei Paradigmen werden
betrachtet: desenvolvimentista, neoliberal und logistisch. Das Erste geht von 1930 bis
1989, das Zweite von 1990 bis 2000 und das Letzte von 2000 bis zur Gegenwart. Die
Frage ist, also, wie sie artikuliert werden eine Richtung für die brasilianische
Südatlantik-Politik geben. Um diese Frage zu beantworten, erklärt jedes Kapitel eines
der Paradigmen, führt die Geschichte der brasilianischen internationalen Insertion
während des betreffenden Zeitraums aus und beschreibt die jeweiligen Politik und
Strategie des Landes in Bezug auf den Südatlantik. Die Studie zeigt, dass in der Zeit des
Desenvolvimentismo, Brasilien hat seine internationale Insertion Richtung
Durchführung von Entwicklungszielen durch eine autonome Außenpolitik und starke
staatliche Beteiligung orientiert. In ihm gab es zwei Momente: ein, in dem Brasilien
hatte ein assoziiertes Entwicklungsmodell, und der Andere eher unabhängig. Dies hat
sich in der Politik des Landes für den Südatlantik reflektiert. Zunächst priorisiert er die
Beziehungen zu den Vereinigten Staaten fürs Erreichen von Technologie und Kapital
für seine Marine und Schiffbauindustrie und begann danach Beziehungen mit
afrikanischen Ländern ohne Berücksichtigung auf Regimetypen zu schaffen und die
Marine unabhängiger von der US-Strategie im Kontext des Kalten Krieges zu machen.
Brasilien hat die Schaffung von ZOPACAS nach dem Falkland-Krieg unterstützt,
nachdem die südatlantischen Staaten bemerkt haben, dass sie sich nicht auf den Westen
verlassen könnten, um ihre Sicherheit zu gewährleisten. Ihrerseits, die neoliberale
internationale Insertion führte zu einer Ausrichtung an den Vereinigten Staaten und zum
Beitritt zu internationalen Regimen außer der Öffnung der Binnenmarkt und der
wirtschaftlichen Deregulierung. Die Forschung zeigt, dass Brasilien seine Politik
gegenüber den Südatlantik auf ein sehr niedriges Niveau in der Zeit eingeschränkt hat:
Beziehungen zu Afrika sanken auf das absolute Minimum, die Marine wurde
verschrottet und die Schifffahrtsindustrie praktisch verschwand. Das logistische
Paradigma kehrte diesen Trend um. Es erfordert eine realistischere Außenpolitik, nach
denen der brasilianische Staat verfolgt seine nationalen Interessen in Synergie mit dem
privaten Sektor, um fortschrittliche Technologie und Wettbewerbsfähigkeit zu erhalten.
Im Südatlantik wurde diese internationale Präsenz in Form von tieferen Beziehungen
mit afrikanischen Ländern und Südamerika materialisiert, während im Inland die
Erforschung des Pré-Sal die Wiederbelebung der Schiffbauindustrie und die Umsetzung
der strategischen Programme für die Marine wie SisGAAz und PROSUB bedeutete. Die
Studie schließt, dass sowohl das logistische und das desenvolvimentista Paradigma
nationale Entwicklungsprojekte mehr oder weniger durchgeführt haben und autonom
die brasilianischen Interessen im Südatlantik verfolgt haben. Im Gegensatz dazu hat das
neoliberale Paradigma sie trotz einiger positiver Ergebnisse wie die Schaffung des
CPLP herabgesetzt. Die Ersten stellen eine pragmatische internationale Insertion mit der
unabhängigen Ausübung der Interessen der Nation vor — ähnlich wie Strategien von
reifen Mächten — während dies angewiesen und ideologischer ist, ungeeignet fürs
Gewicht des Landes im internationalen System.
SCHLÜSSELWÖRTER: Brasilien. Südatlantik. Paradigmen der internationalen Insertion.
Brasilianische Außenpolitik. Entwicklung.
 RESUMO

Este trabalho trata da política brasileira para o Atlântico Sul em uma perspectiva
histórica de 1930 ao século XXI. Ele usa o conceito de paradigmas de inserção
internacional como um quadro analítico para melhor apreender e delinear o objeto de
estudo. Três paradigmas são considerados: desenvolvimentista, neoliberal e logístico. O
primeiro vai de 1930 até 1989, o segundo de 1990 a 2000 e o último de 2000 até os dias
de hoje. A questão é, então, como eles têm sido articulados e orientam a política
brasileira para o Atlântico Sul. Para responder essa questão, cada um dos capítulos
explica um dos paradigmas, realiza um histórico da inserção internacional brasileira
durante o período em questão e descreve as respectivas política e estratégia do país com
relação ao Atlântico Sul. O estudo mostra que no período desenvolvimentista o Brasil
orientou sua inserção internacional para alcançar objetivos de desenvolvimento através
de uma política externa autônoma e forte participação do Estado. Nele houve dois
momentos: um no qual o Brasil estabeleceu um modelo de desenvolvimento associado e
outro independente. Isso se refletiu na política do país para o Atlântico Sul. Primeiro ele
priorizou as relações com os Estados Unidos para obter tecnologia e capital para sua
Marinha e indústria naval e depois começou a forjar laços com países africanos sem
considerar tipos de regime e a tornar a Marinha mais independente da estratégia
estadunidense no contexto da Guerra Fria. O Brasil impulsionou a criação da
ZOPACAS após a Guerra das Malvinas quando países do Atlântico Sul perceberam que
não poderiam se fiar no Ocidente para garantir sua segurança. A inserção internacional
neoliberal, por sua vez, implicou um alinhamento com os Estados Unidos e a adesão a
regimes internacionais, além de abertura do mercado doméstico e desregulamentação da
economia. A pesquisa mostra que o Brasil reduziu sua política para o Atlântico Sul a
níveis bastante baixos no período: relações com a África diminuíram para o mínimo
indispensável, a Marinha foi sucateada e a indústria naval praticamente desapareceu. O
paradigma logístico reverteu essa tendência. Ele implicou uma política externa mais
realista de acordo com a qual o Estado brasileiro persegue seus interesses nacionais em
sinergia com o setor privado para obter tecnologia avançada e competitividade. No
Atlântico Sul, essa inserção internacional materializou-se sob a forma de laços mais
profundos com países africanos e com a América do Sul enquanto que domesticamente
a exploração do Pré-Sal significou o renascimento da indústria naval e a implementação
de programas estratégicos para a Marinha, tais como o SisGAAz e o PROSUB. O
estudo conclui que ambos o paradigma logístico e desenvolvimentista levaram adiante
projetos de desenvolvimento nacional em maior ou menor grau e perseguiram
autonomamente os interesses brasileiros no Atlântico Sul. Em contraste, o paradigma
neoliberal menosprezou-os apesar de alguns resultados positivos como a criação da
CPLP. Aqueles representam uma inserção internacional pragmática orientada pela
perseguição independente dos interesses da nação — similar a estratégias de potências
maduras —, enquanto que este é mais dependente e ideológico, inadequado para o peso
do país no sistema internacional.
PALAVRAS-CHAVE: Brasil. Atlântico Sul. Paradigmas de inserção internacional. Política
externa brasileira. Desenvolvimento.
 LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS

ABC Brazilian Cooperation Agency

ALADI Latin American Integration Association

Amazul Blue Amazon Defense Technologies

AU African Union

BNDE National Bank for Economic Development

BNDES National Bank for Economic and Social Development

BRIC Brazil, Russia, India, and China

BRICS Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa

CASA South American Community of Nations

COSIPLAN South American Infrastructure and Planning Council

CPLP Community of Portuguese-Speaking Countries

CRA Contingency Reserve Arrangement

ECOWAS Economic Community of West African States

ESG Escola Superior de Guerra (Brazilian National War College)

EU European Union

FHC Fernando Henrique Cardoso

FOCEM Mercosul Fund for Structural Convergence

GDP Gross Domestic Product

IBSA India-Brazil-South Africa Forum

IDB Inter-American Development Bank

IIRSA Initiative for the Integration of South American Regional Infrastructure

IMF International Monetary Fund

IR International Relations

LAFTA Latin American Free Trade Association

Mercosul Southern Common Market

NAFTA North American Free Trade Agreement

NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organization

NDB New Development Bank

NPT Non-Proliferation Treaty

NSA United Sates National Security Agency

OAS Organization of American States

PAEMB Plan of Articulation and Equipment of the Brazilian Navy

PEI Independent Foreign Policy

Petrobras Petróleo Brasileiro S.A.

PROAREA Prospection and Exploration of Mineral Resources from the

International Area of the South Atlantic Program

PROSUB Submarine Development Program

PROSUPER Program for the Obtainment of Surface Assets

SACU Southern Africa Customs Union

SAFTA South American Free Trade Agreement

SATO South Atlantic Treaty Organization

SisGAAz Blue Amazon Management System

SWAPO South-West Africa People's Organisation

UN United Nations

UNASUL Union of South American Nations

UNCTAD United Nations Conference on Trade and Development

US United States of America

WTO World Trade Organization

ZOPACAS Zone of Peace and Cooperation of the South Atlantic

 CONTENT

1. INTRODUCTION ................................................................................................. 14

2. BRAZIL AND THE SOUTH ATLANTIC: THE DEVELOPMENTALIST

YEARS ...................................................................................................................... 21

2.1. The developmentalist paradigm ..................................................................... 21

2.2. Brazilian international insertion between 1930 and 1989 ............................. 23

2.3. Brazilian development and the South Atlantic .............................................. 33

3. BRAZIL WITHDRAWS FROM THE SOUTH ATLANTIC: NEOLIBERAL

YEARS ...................................................................................................................... 45

3.1. The neoliberal paradigm ................................................................................ 45

3.2. Brazilian international insertion between 1990 and 2000 ............................. 47

3.3. Withdrawal from the South Atlantic ............................................................. 53

4. RETURNING TO THE SOUTH ATLANTIC: THE LOGISTICAL

PARADIGM .............................................................................................................. 58

4.1. The logistical paradigm .................................................................................. 58

4.2. Brazilian international insertion in the XXI century .................................... 60

4.3. Returning to the South Atlantic ..................................................................... 68

5. CONCLUSION ..................................................................................................... 76

REFERENCES ......................................................................................................... 81
 14

1. INTRODUCTION

Multipolarity has become a reality of the international system with the rise of
emerging powers. We find ourselves in a phase of many uncertainties concerning the stability
of the world order. The world's only superpower, that is, the United States, has been
challenged on several occasions since the fall of the Berlin Wall, but most notably in the XXI
century. The world is at a place where the US has been steadily losing relative power vis-à-vis
emerging countries and along with it there has been a trend of regionalization of international
relations (Krämer 2013). An important issue of concern for the stability of the system is how
the emerging powers cope with their regions and with traditional powers. The posture of both
rising and established powers can determine the degree of peacefulness of the systemic
transformation currently taking place in the international scene.

In that context, the topic of how emerging powers handle their surrounding seas is
crucial for assessing the stability of the system. As Spykman (1969), Mearsheimer (2001),
and Kaplan (2014) explained it, one important factor for the rise of the United States as a
regional hegemon (and, therefore, world power) was its dominance over the Greater
Caribbean. The US has fought many wars in the region since its independence for that goal,
for instance the Spanish-American War (1898), the Banana Wars (1898-1934), World War I
and the invasion of Grenada (1983), to name but a few (Randall and Mount 1998; O’Brien
2007). The lesson on the importance of reaching out to the sea and trying to have control over
it in order to become a world power seems to have been learned by all emerging powers.
China has been trying to assert its rights and power on the South China Sea, India in the Indic
Ocean, and Brazil in the South Atlantic.

The South Atlantic Ocean, as can be seen on Map 1, currently undergoes a moment
of rising international importance. There have been many discoveries of mineral and oil
resources on its basin that brought maritime territorial disputes back to the international
agenda. Some authors predict that the South Atlantic will become as important as the Middle
East as an oil exporting region, putting together the oil reserves of South America and the
Gulf of Guinea (e.g. Oliveira 2012; Leite 2011). Moreover, with the increasingly limited
capacity of the Panama and Suez Canals, which do not support super-tankers, the relevance of
the South Atlantic trade routes as whole has augmented (De los Reyes 2009).
 15

Map 1 — The South Atlantic

Source: adapted from Nations Online (2014).

The geopolitical scientist Therezinha de Castro (2002) states that there are many
varied ways of delimitating the South Atlantic, especially concerning its northern part. For her
 16

the most practical way would be to consider the northern extremity of the South Atlantic to be
the Atlantic “choke point” between Natal, a city on the Brazilian northeastern salience, and
Dakar, Senegal — the northernmost Sub-Saharan country in West Africa. However, even
though it is already in the Northern Hemisphere, the South Atlantic's northern limit is
considered to be the whole Brazilian coast up to Cape Verde due to historical reasons linked
with Portuguese colonization. The limits to the South, East and West are somewhat easier to
define: the Antarctic, the Cape of Good Hope and the Beagle/Magallanes/Drake Straits,
respectively (Castro 2002).

The ocean currents of the South Atlantic, albeit not as a powerful binding force as
the ones in the North Atlantic, are natural connecting circuits between Africa and South
America. Their importance for commercial maritime routes has been vital since the times of
Portuguese colonization, because they bring together major coastal cities from both sides of
the ocean such as Rio de Janeiro, Luanda, and Salvador (Alencastro 2000; Marques 2013).
Moreover, islands in the South Atlantic are “security trampolines”, which have served as
bases and support for the oceanic routes (Castro, 2002).

Following that, Castro (2002) identifies three “insular trampolines”, as seen in Map
2, which have historically been vital for the command 1 of the South Atlantic since the Age of
Discovery: from Portugal in the late XV century to the United Kingdom and the United States
at present. The first of these is the triangle formed by the Ascension, Saint Helena, and Tristan
da Cunha Islands, vital for the route to the Indic Ocean and for power projection into Sub-
Saharan Africa. The second is the one composed by Fernando de Noronha, Trindade, and
Malvinas/Falkland Islands, which have served to control the route to the Pacific and the
Magallanes/Beagle Strait as well as to support incursions towards South America.2 The third
trampoline is closer to the Antarctic, but interpenetrates the other two, effectively challenging
the preponderance of the African and South American continents over the other routes. The
Shetland, South Sandwich, Gough, and South Georgia Islands form it.

1
Command of the sea is understood as explained by Corbett (1911), i.e. it is the control of maritime
communications for commercial or military purposes without any serious interference by enemy forces.
Command of the sea is rather circumstantial, rooted on the ability of using it, not on the complete dominion
over it (Proença Jr., Diniz, and Raza 1999).
2
Fernando de Noronha is also strategically significant to project power from the American continent towards
West Africa (Castro, 2002).
 17

Bearing that in mind, Brazil is a crucial actor in this scenario for it has the longest
coastline in the South Atlantic. Therezinha de Castro (2002) even stated that the country was
pivotal for controlling it. Brazil has almost 7500 km of Atlantic coastline and 80% of the
Brazilian population lives near the coast (Wiesebron 2013). 95% of the country's international
trade is carried out through South Atlantic oceanic routes (Wiesebron 2013). Several natural
resources were discovered in the Brazilian Exclusive Economic Zone (ZEE, in Portuguese),
but most importantly oil and gas in the Pré-Sal, the layer under the salt in deep waters of the
South Atlantic. In full operation, the oil reserves would make Brazil become one of the
world's top ten oil producers (Wiesebron 2013). This could prompt Brazil to become a sea
power in order to protect its resources.

Map 2 — The insular trampolines

Source: Therezinha de Castro (2002).

 18

According to the sea strategist Alfred T. Mahan (1890), there are six conditions that
affect the sea power. The first three related to geophysical conditions of the state, namely the
geographical position, the physical conformation, and the extent of the territory. The position
of a country may promote concentration or dispersion of forces, either towards the land or the
sea. It also can provide central positions for military operations. The ease of access to the sea
is also important, through rivers and natural ports. The physical conditions may also push the
country to orient itself towards the sea, favoring marine enterprise, whenever the resources in
the territory are insufficient for its development. As for the extent of the territory, it does not
matter as much as the extent of the coastline, which, if long, can have a positive or negative
effect depending on the size of the population. In view of that, the latter three conditions
identified by the author are the number of inhabitants, the character of the people, and the
character of the government (Mahan 1890). The total number of inhabitants itself is not
indicative of sea power, but rather the number of inhabitants somehow connected to the
seaside: Their readiness for marine activities count more than the population living on the
countryside without any links to the sea. As for the other two conditions, they relate to
predispositions to act upon tmaritime issues. The people must act towards its development
associated with the sea and the government must adopt policies acknowledging the
importance of the sea to the country.

Having these in mind, Brazil has a clear maritime vocation. Its position is
unquestionably favorable to maritime activities. Although there is a tendency to the dispersion
of forces due to the length of the coastline, most of the Brazilian population and industry is
located in regions next to the coast. In fact, Stratfor (2012) notes that there is even a
geographical difficulty for integrating the Brazilian countryside to the coastline, which is the
most economically dynamic part. This emphasizes the link between the Brazilian population
and the sea. As for the character of the government, it is the purpose of the present research to
analyze Brazil's policies related to its surrounding sea, i.e. the South Atlantic. Furthermore,
Brazil gradually enhances its role in the international system, and as a emerging power it is
important to analyze its rise to watch whether it is going to be peaceful or not, and that is why
observing the Brazilian international insertion and its policy towards the sea is vital to
understand the evolution of the international system as a whole.

On his seminal work on the Brazilian international insertion, Amado Cervo (2008a)
makes important inroads for the creation of a Brazilian theory of international relations with
 19

the development of concepts for better understanding Brazilian policies as a whole.3 Based on
a historical approach, he notices that there have been several constant tenets of Brazilian
international insertion since the country's independence in 1822, namely the stance in favor of
self-determination (in the context of decolonization processes), non-intervention, peaceful
resolution of disputes, legalism, normative multilateralism, non-confrontationist and
cooperative foreign action, strategic partnerships, realism and pragmatism, cordiality towards
neighboring countries, development as the main goal, and independence. The latter affects all
other ones, for Brazil, while implementing them, tries to carve its own model of international
insertion (Cervo 2008a). Brazilian policies are, thus, autonomously formulated based on the
country's particular worldview.

Albeit always present, the emphasis given to each of the tenets has varied over time.
From a historical observation of this variation, Cervo (2008) comes up with the concept of
“international insertion paradigms”. Roughly speaking, these paradigms are the combination
of the image that the people and/or their leaders have of themselves as a nation and of the
world around them, as well as the relation between both elements, and the perception of their
own national interests (Cervo 2008a). They also involve policy making and how information
is interpreted so as to guide strategic calculations (Cervo 2008a). Cervo (2008) stresses that
paradigmatic concepts presuppose long periods of time, i.e. the short term is informed by
paradigms, but they do not reflect them accurately due to other immediate concerns. They are
overarching principles that transcend specific governments or political parties.

In view of that, Amado Cervo (2003; 2008a) identifies four paradigms in the history
of Brazilian foreign relations: liberal-conservative, desenvolvimentista (usually translated as
“developmentalist”), neoliberal or normal4, and logistical. All through the XIX century and
until 1930 the liberal-conservative paradigm was in place. In 1930 the developmentalist

3
Cervo's enterprise has been one of creating a Brazilian theory of International Relations (IR) and through
historical studies he develops concepts which can be used for organizing the field of study and coming up
with indicators to evaluate the performance of leaders from the government, civil society, and academia
(Cervo 2008a; Cervo 2003; Cervo 2008b). He tries to go beyond the “epistemological imperialism” of
international relations theories, acknowledging that all theories have the interests of the regions whence they
come imbued in them and that traditional theories do not perfectly fit South American realities and interests
(Cervo 2008b). Accordingly, the concept of “international insertion” itself, widely used by Brazilian (and
other South American) International Relations scholars, is quite telling. The term is similar to “grand
strategy”, which is everywhere in Anglo-Saxon IR literature, but it does not denote the exact same meaning
for it implies that the country being analyzed is outside of the world order; in other words, it is a concept
crafted specifically for developing and emerging countries.
4
Cervo (2008a; 2003) names it neoliberal and/or normal, but it shall be henceforth referred to just as
neoliberal paradigm in this thesis.
 20

paradigm took over and lasted until 1989, when it was substituted by the neoliberal one.
Finally, from the onset of the XXI century the logistical paradigm has been predominant
within Brazil, although coexisting with both previous paradigms (Roxo 2009; Cervo 2010;
Cervo and Bueno 2011).

The purpose of this thesis is, thus, to assess how the developmentalist, neoliberal,
and logistical paradigms have been articulated and oriented the Brazilian policy towards the
South Atlantic from 1930 until today. 5 It will try to shine a light on to what extent Brazil has
changed or maintained its policy towards its surrounding sea over time. The analysis will be
structured according to the time-periods of each paradigm: 1930 to 1989, 1990 until 2000, and
the XXI century. The first chapter will delve into the details of the developmentalist paradigm
— origins (internal and external), factors that led to its permanence or demise, mental blocs
(ideology and politics), perception of national interests, economic relations, and impact on
national development —, general aspects of the Brazilian international insertion during the
considered period, and finally a section on the Brazilian policies towards the South Atlantic
themselves. The following chapters will have the same structure, considering their respective
paradigms. As a final point, there will be a brief discussion about the findings with
perspectives for the future.

5
The liberal-conservative paradigm, which mostly deals with the international insertion of the Brazilian
Empire and the Old Republic, will not be part of this analysis, because our main focus is the formation of
Brazil's modern approaches towards the South Atlantic. For a very instructive argument about the period, do
check Relações Brasil-África e a Geopolítica do Atlântico Sul by Eli Alves Penha (2011).
 21

2. BRAZIL AND THE SOUTH ATLANTIC: THE DEVELOPMENTALIST YEARS

2.1. The developmentalist paradigm

The developmentalist paradigm originated from both external and internal pressures
coming right after the economic crisis of 1929 (Cervo 2008a). Paulo Visentini writes that:

The country [Brazil], both because of the exhaustion of the internal model of
monoculture and its respective foreign ties and because of the grave
alterations caused by the crisis on international relations, would be
stimulated to propel its economic development through new pathways and
redefine the role of its foreign policy within these new circumstances
(Visentini 2013, 2, my translation).
Externally, the world had plunged into a deep recession. It severely affected the
Brazilian economy, which was heavily dependent on commodities exports, notably coffee.
Furthermore, antagonizing political and economic blocs started to resurface all around the
world while the United States under Franklin D. Roosevelt scrapped its old policies towards
Latin America and began putting forward considerable investments in the region — the Good
Neighborhood Policy (Smith 2005).

Internally, new socio-political forces, resulting from the intense urbanization in the
beginning of the XX century, demanded the modernization of the country especially after the
economic crisis. Urban masses started to fight for more jobs and wealth, while the bourgeoisie
called for new business opportunities (Fonseca 1987). They wanted to put an end to a system
which favored the “coffee oligarchs”. At the same time, the Brazilian Military, whose
equipments were alarmingly obsolete by the end of the 1920s, wanted to acquire the means to
guarantee the country's safety and to pursue hegemony in the South American subcontinent
(Cervo 2008a; Visentini 2013). In addition to that, the intellectual elite and a new class of
politicians embraced a revolutionary mentality and capitalized on the former impulses
towards change.

Altogether both pressure sources led to a paradigm which since the beginning was
marked by three characteristics: the consciousness of the undergoing transition, development
as the main goal, and a realist behavior (Cervo 2008a). In the past, the elite, composed mainly
of coffee farmers, restricted the Brazilian foreign policy to ensuring markets for their
products; they did not have a project for the nation (Visentini 2013). Thus, the paradigm put
forward an innovative international stance in which Brazil would pursue the numerous
 22

interests of a complex society and not only those of the commodity sector. National interest
would be the sum of many varied interests which sometimes collide, but development —
understood as expansion of the industry and economic growth — would be at its basis (Cervo
2008a).

The ideology behind the paradigm — desenvolvimentismo (henceforth,

developmentalism) — is critical of capitalism, because it recognizes that there are many
asymmetries between countries caused by the economic system. However, Amado Cervo
(2008a, 75, my translation) notes that “the liberal ideology was subjacent, yet it did not
contaminate the developmentalist policy like a fundamentalism”. Developmentalism tries to
overcome capitalist asymmetries through the promotion of development and decision-making
autonomy, but it does not oppose liberalism at all times, only when it is contrary to the
country's national interests (i.e. development). However, within the ideology there are two
interpretations of what development model should be followed: associated (to the US for
instance) or autonomous (Cervo 2008a). The former consists of deepening geopolitical,
political and economic ties with the center of the global economy for achieving
industrialization. The latter argues for strengthening national forces, especially the economic
core, and creating complete political autonomy. This duality marked some inflexions within
the paradigm between 1930 and 1989, but this internal debate would later become paradigms
themselves, that is, the neoliberal and logistical.

The Brazilian foreign policy's main goal under the developmentalist paradigm is
development, synonymous with industrialization (Visentini 2013). It would be made more
efficient through decision-making autonomy, an increase in external cooperation,
flexibilization of trade policy — no longer to a specific country or bloc of countries —,
simultaneous negotiations with great powers and neighboring countries, and, significantly, the
security policy would be subordinated to development goals and economic gains (Cervo
2008a). Foreign policy would complement development goals through the obtainment of
capital, foreign markets, and science and technology.

In this sense, access to the Brazilian market would depend on the impact of an open
market on the overall development goals. It is in this context that the Brazilian policies of
import and export substitution, characteristic of the period, can be better understood. The
rationale of the developmentalist paradigm is that an underdeveloped country cannot wish to
 23

become an advanced country by exporting primary goods and importing manufactured

products, it must become competitive in foreign markets for industrial goods (Cervo 2008a).
Dependency tied to the center-periphery dichotomy could only be overcome through rapid
industrialization and all other policy fields should be oriented towards that goal (Cervo
2008a).

2.2. Brazilian international insertion between 1930 and 1989

During the developmentalist paradigm, there were two distinct phases, reflecting the
internal debate on how Brazil should carry out its development. From 1930 until 1970, the
associated model prevailed to the detriment of the autonomous one, which would take over
from 1970 onwards. The first moment is one in which Brazil went through three regimes,
characterized by democratic populism and varying degrees of authoritarianism. The latter is
the military dictatorship and the years of a slow drift towards democratization. Throughout
both periods, governmental economic policies were marked by international trade and
currency exchange rates for state capitalization and accumulation of reserves as well as public
investments to curb financial and infrastructural choke points in the Brazilian industrialization
through import and export substitution process6 (Tavares 1972). High inflation rates, external
imbalances, and the increase of regional disparities were the main side-effects of these
policies (Tavares 19 2; onseca, Cunha, and Bichara 2013; Cervo 2008a; H pker 1983).

In the first 15 years of the paradigm Brazilian President Getúlio Vargas, one of the
main political leaders representing developmentalism, tried to set off a capitalist revolution in
the country. He recognized in the economic crisis of 1929 an opportunity to start Brazilian
industrialization. Vargas challenged the interests of the coffee farmers and let the Brazilian
currency devaluate, which on its own was a stark incentive for the country's industry (Bresser-
Pereira 2012). According to Bresser-Pereira (2012), several sectors of the Brazilian society
supported him and his endeavor to initiate a state-led development program: leftist and
nationalist intellectuals, industrial bourgeoisie, modern State bureaucracy, urban working
class, cattle farmers, and import substituting sectors (which produced solely for the Brazilian
market).

6
Import substitution does not mean diminishing the overall quantity of goods being imported (i.e. it does not
aim at autarky), but rather a change in the type of imported goods; the import of capital goods, for instance
rose pointedly in the first phases of the process (Tavares 1972). Export substitution works in the same logic.
 24

Nevertheless, Vargas could not rely only on domestic policies in order to achieve the
goal of industrialization. He had to resort to external powers to get the capital and technology
needed to develop the heavy industry in Brazil. The United States and Germany were, then,
the most promising choices. Vargas played both, exploiting the intense competition between
them to get the best trade conditions. Brazil sustained a position of “pragmatic equidistance”
between both powers (Moura 1980). Vargas tried to take advantage of the United States,
while Franklin D. Roosevelt was pursuing the so-called Good Neighborhood Policy to boost
US-Latin America commercial ties. Within that scope, Brazil and the US signed a reciprocal
trade agreement in 1935 for lower import and export taxes. However, at the same time
German interests in Brazil had been steadily rising too and, for instance, in 1938 Brazil
provided 25% of all German imports and Germany provided Brazil with modern weaponry
(Smith 2005; Hoffmann 2005).

Especially when World War II broke out and the US got itself involved in it, Brazil
bargained for huge concessions aiming at military modernization and the establishment of the
first big scale steel industry in the country. Given that the US was not giving in to the
Brazilian demands, Vargas made American leaders believe that it could be possible that
Brazil would enter the war on the German side after a speech commending totalitarian
regimes and predicting the end of democracies in 1940. 7 This bluff proved to be very
successful. The United States acquiesced to provide the means for the first Brazilian steel
plant and for the modernization of the country's Armed Forces. In addition to that, Vargas
negotiated the Brazilian participation in the conflict so as to ensure this military
modernization in return for the US use of Brazilian military bases in South Atlantic coastal
cities (Belém, Recife, and Natal). This was also of great avail to Brazil, which was the only
Latin American country to wage war against Axis powers, leading up to the country's
operations in the South Atlantic and in the Western European front.

After World War II, the United States rose as the world's main power and Brazil had
to learn how to handle this new reality. The US cultural and political influence was heavily
present in the country in the post-war context and President Dutra (1946-1951) started a new
phase of “special relations” between both countries. 8 Dutra aligned the Brazilian foreign

7
The Brazilian regime was, then, authoritarian itself since 1937 with the Estado Novo dictatorship proclaimed
by Vargas.
8
Dutra was the first brazilian president to officially visit the United States.
 25

policy to US positions even further in the belief that the Washington would give more support
for Brazilian development. For instance, Brazil severed diplomatic ties with the Soviet Union
and voted in favor of Chiang Kai-Shek's China to enter the United Nations. Other important
projects acknowledging US primacy in the western hemisphere were the Inter-American
Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance, a defensive military alliance also known as the Rio Pact,
signed in Rio de Janeiro in 1947, and the creation of the Organization of American States
(OAS) in 1948. In the same year, the Escola Superior de Guerra (ESG, Portuguese acronym),
the Brazilian national war college, was created.

However, this support to the United States did not pay off. Washington argued that
Brazil should seek help for its development at the World Bank instead of direct bilateral
negotiations and that it should create a favorable climate for private investments. Therefore,
when Vargas came back to power in Brazil (1951-1954), he shifted the foreign policy back
towards a more nationalistic leaning. This drift is called the “nationalist bargain” in which
Brazil would trade its support on several strategic issues for the US in exchange of economic
assistance for industrial development, very similar to what Vargas had done in his previous
government (Vizentini 1995; Visentini 2013). The central objective was to attain US capital
for national development.

Yet, Vargas did not have the same conditions for implementing this bargain (Fonseca
2003). In spite of minor victories, on other fronts there were many setbacks. On the one hand,
Brazil did convince the US to acknowledge that poverty in Latin America was conducive to
popular revolt and, therefore, communist movements, i.e. tackling the issue of
underdevelopment is a way to fend off communism (Cervo and Bueno 2002). On the other,
many unequal bilateral treaties were signed, for instance the Agreement for Mutual Defense
Assistance in 1952. The latter was deemed unreasonable and entreguista9 (subservient) by
many sectors of the Brazilian society, because it increased the dependency on US armaments
and military training. Brazil also signed two agreements on rare-earth elements (monazite and
thorium), one in 1952 and the other in 1954, trading ores used for nuclear technology in return
for wheat from the US. In 1953 Brazil signed an agreement with Germany for the acquisition

9
During the congressional debate about this agreement with the United States, there was a great polarization
on Brazilian foreign policy between nationalists and those who supported automatic alignment with the US.
The latter were called entreguistas by the nationalist opposition (the term comes from the Portuguese word
for “handing over”, “yielding”, or “giving up”). The polarization lasted longer than this initial debate and on
top of that it spread to domestic politics, culminating in Vargas' suicide in 1954 (Hirst 2006).
 26

of three uranium centrifuges, but the United States blocked it even though Brazil had already
paid for them (Kuramoto and Appoloni 2002; Cervo and Bueno 2002). As a response to those
obstacles, Vargas started to lean closer to nationalistic and leftist political groups and created
the sate company Petróleo Brasileiro S.A. (Petrobras) and the National Bank for Economic
Development (BNDE, acronym in Portuguese), besides limiting profit remittances.

In the short presidency of Café Filho (1954-1955) after Vargas' suicide, the Brazilian
foreign policy shifted back to the automatic alignment with the United States. Café Filho
opened the Brazilian market to foreign businesses and signed more agreements with the US,
notably on the civilian use of nuclear energy and for uranium mining in Brazil. 10 Café Filho's
government was also labeled as entreguista by the opposition, since its stance was closer to
Dutra's submissiveness than to Vargas' project of national development (Cervo and Bueno
2002).

During Kubitschek's government (1956-1961), Brazil adopted a low profile foreign

policy, neither nationalistic nor aligned, almost exclusively limited to technical-scientific
needs for economic development (Cervo and Bueno 2002). Kubitschek tried to attract foreign
capital and worked closely with US President Eisenhower for that, leading up to the creation
of the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB). On the other hand, he denounced the treaty
for uranium mining signed by Café Filho and increased state control over its exploration. Pan-
Americanism also resurfaced in Brazilian speeches (and in Latin America as a whole) and it
led to the creation of the Latin American Free Trade Association (LAFTA) in 1960. In the
context of the Cuban Revolution in 1959, Brazil did not confront the US when it pushed for
the isolation of the island, but it insisted on avoiding interference in the internal affairs of all
countries (Vizentini 1995).

This “soft” stand on Cuba was followed by trade talks with several socialist
countries, including the diplomatic recognition of the Soviet Union. The normalization of
Brazilian relations with them was part of the initiative called Independent Foreign Policy
(PEI, Portuguese acronym). PEI belonged to both presidencies of Jânio Quadros (1961) and
João Goulart (1961-1964). It had five main points: the prospection of new foreign markets 11
for Brazilian primary and manufactured goods, autonomous formulation of national economic

10
US President Eisenhower had just launched the program Atoms for Peace.
11
It is important to note that in the 1950s the European Economic Community was created, making it more
difficult the access of Brazilian goods into European markets.
 27

planning, peaceful coexistence and disarmament, non-intervention in internal affairs and self-
determination, and decolonization. Consequently, Brazil moved closer to the Third World,
including newly independent countries in Africa and Asia. Thereby PEI increased the
geographical area of Brazilian interests, escaping limits imposed by the United States to its
foreign action, although it preached neutral stances with no compromises between blocs. This
represented an attempt to take advantage of the international system's bipolarity to achieve
greater bargaining leverage with the United States.

However, this new Brazilian posture was against the strategic interests of the United
States, especially after the Cuban Missile Crisis in 1962. Washington started to exploit the
heightened political polarization and economic instability in Brazil to reach out to right-wing
opposition forces and the Military. The US funded and armed paramilitary forces in the
country for the event of a civil war (Bandeira 1989). In 1963 the Brazilian government found
out that Gen. Castelo Branco had developed a military plan to resist the authority of the
central government with the support of US forces. Questioned, the US declared that it was
only a theoretical military training, nothing else. Washington also started to engage in direct
talks with federative and municipal units of Brazil, undermining the Brazilian constitution for
only the federal government could engage in foreign affairs (Cervo and Bueno 2002). Castelo
Branco also pushed for the renewal of the Agreement for Mutual Defense Assistance, but
Goulart opposed it.12 In the end, it was renewed even without the president's knowledge in
1964 (Bandeira 1989). In the same year, the US Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-
American Affairs Thomas C. Mann developed the so-called Mann Doctrine that advocated the
defense of US interests in Latin America through regime change for the establishment of US-
friendly military dictatorships. Accordingly, in March 1964 the US established the Operation
Brother Sam for assisting the Brazilian Armed Forces in the event of armed resistance after
the military coup (Silva 2005). The coup took place on April 1, but there was no resistance
and the operation was cancelled on the following day. In the end, the armed movement for the
deposition of President Goulart was exclusively domestic, despite counting on the US
appreciation and possibly assistance (Bandeira 1989; Cervo and Bueno 2002).

In the first years of the military regime the Brazilian foreign policy went through a
“course correction” in relation to the democratic populism of the previous presidents. It
started off as being automatically aligned with the United States. However, the idea of a
12
Supposedly, under this agreement the US could legally intervene in Brazil to restore order.
 28

national development project survived within the dictatorship and consequently the notion of
international autonomy (Visentini 2013). For representatives of the Armed Forces, heavily
influenced by (military) geopolitical scientists such as Golbery do Couto e Silva and Mario
Travassos, development and security were inseparable, i.e. they are two faces of the same
coin, although they did not consider the social aspect of it (Bohou 2007). Visentini (2013)
explains that the military regime wanted to develop the country so that it could become a
medium power in the international system, but that this idea actually persisted because of
Itamaraty, the Brazilian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, which remained independent from the
military government or at least barely affected by it.

Castelo Branco, the first military dictator (1964-1967), pursued an international

insertion strategy strongly aligned with the US called “Interdependent Foreign Policy” in
opposition to the PEI. He justified it by saying that:

In the present conjuncture of bipolar power confrontation, with [a] radical

political-ideological split between the respective power centers, the
preservation of independence presupposes the acceptance of a certain degree
of interdependence, either on the military or on the political arena. [We]
consider it our duty to opt for an intimate collaboration with the Western
system, in whose preservation lies the very survival of our living standards
and human dignity (Castelo Branco apud Schilling 1981, 23, my translation).
During his mandate, Brazil focused mainly on the bilateral relations with the United
States, abandoning the Third World, multilateralism, and any other kind of international
dimensions besides the hemisphere (Visentini 2013). It was also under Castelo Branco that
the notion of Brazilian sub-imperialism appeared for the first time to describe the country's
actions. For instance, Brazil joined the US in the military intervention in the Dominican
Republic in 1965 with OAS authorization, severely damaging its reputation in Latin America
(Visentini 2013). Castelo Branco also supported the failed US proposition of creating an
Inter-American Defense Force within the framework of OAS for interventions in the
hemisphere against internal or external subversion.

On the other hand, even in these first years the dictatorship maintained the idea of
promoting Brazilian development. Castelo Branco implemented some medium and long term
reforms of the economic system, such as the Program of Governmental Economic Action, the
creation of the Central Bank, and inflation-indexed bonds, among others. This trend was
deepened by the next dictators, Costa e Silva (1967-1969) and Médici (1969-1974), who
played up endogenous development over security, which was considered its byproduct. Costa
 29

e Silva noted that the North-South divide was more important for the persistence of
underdevelopment in Brazil than the East-West one. Therefore, he decided not to sign the
Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), which was considered too elitist, freezing up a technological
barrier among States (Silva 2005).13 Médici, on his turn, reaped the fruits of the accelerated
growth of the country's gross domestic product (GDP), the “Brazilian miracle”, due to the first
National Development Program (I PND, Portuguese acronym) from 1972 to 1974. The I PND
consisted of expansionist fiscal, monetary and credit policies, focusing on durable consumer
goods and the modernization of agriculture. The high rates of economic growth during the
period, as can be seen in Graphic 1, allowed Médici to pursue Brazilian national interests
bilaterally in all continents, seeking markets, technology, and raw materials (Gonçalves and
Miyamoto 1993).

Graphic 1 — Real GDP variation rate (%) per year during the Brazilian military dictatorship

15

13

11
Real GDP variation rate (%)

-1 1964 1967 1970 1973 1976 1979 1982 1985

-3

-5

Source: own elaboration with economic data from Ipeadata (2014).

13
In compensation, Brazil signed the Treaty of Tlatelolco in 1967, prohibiting nuclear weapons in Latin
America and the Caribbean.
 30

However, external imbalances arising from the oil crisis in 1973 and the subsequent
increase of international interest rates deeply affected Brazil's model of international insertion.
Inflation and import prices spiked with the oil crisis, so the import substitution process
suffered a heavy blow, since capital goods could no longer be imported as cheap as before.
This problem could be overcome through external loans, but the higher interest rates made it
prohibitive. Hence, the “economic miracle” came to an end. The government of Ernesto
Geisel (1974-1979) opted, then, for tackling the root causes of the crisis and launched the II
PND. It intended to finish the process of industrialization in the country through the financing
and guaranteeing demand for three sectors: capital goods, raw materials (e.g. petrochemicals,
non-ferrous metals, ores), and infrastructure (e.g. nuclear and hydroelectric energy, ethanol,
oil extraction, railways). The II PND, at the inception, was conceived as a medium to long
term development plan, since the payback of the investments would need a longer timeframe
to come (Mantega 1997). Indeed, by 1978 Brazil had achieved a complete industrial structure:
The industrialization was finished. Still, the interest rates of the foreign loans were rising and
the external debt more than tripled from 1974 to 1978 (A. B. de Castro and Souza 1985).

Gonçalves and Miyamoto (1993) tell that Geisel gave Itamaraty the liberty to go
even further with some ideas sketched in the previous governments after he suddenly realized,
during and after the crises, that the country did not have access to decision-making roles in the
financial system. Brazil then launched a policy of “responsible pragmatism”, consisting of the
dissociation between national interests and the ideological boundaries imposed by the Cold
War. The Brazilian Minister of Foreign Affairs, Azeredo da Silveira, expressed this new
orientation at opening of the United Nations General Assembly in 1974:

We want our presence in a wider-ranging international scene to be

accompanied by the preservation of the primordial ethical values that have
been and that continue to be the bases of our foreign policy.
We want our words in the international field to be direct and simple, without
ambiguity or subterfuge. We want the Brazilian Government to be able to
accomplish the œcumenical vocation of its people, who are open to
uninhibited and frank communication. We want to explore the paths of
understanding, for we believe, fundamentally, that cooperation is more
effective than antagonism and that mutual respect is more creative than
ambitions of preponderance.
Our conduct for attaining those objectives is pragmatic and responsible:
pragmatic to the extent to which we desire effectiveness and to which we are
disposed to seek, wherever Brazilian national interests may move us, areas
of convergence and zones of coincidence with the national interests of other
peoples; and responsible because we will always act within the framework of
 31

ethics and exclusively as a function of objectives clearly identified and

accepted by the Brazilian people (UN 1974, 2, para. 10–12).
In practice, “responsible pragmatism” meant that Brazil would not turn its back to
the developing countries anymore, at least economically (Sato 1998). For instance, Itamaraty
created offices for the Middle East and Africa within its structure for the first time. In those
countries Brazil tried to negotiate oil supplies in exchange for manufactured goods (Vizentini
1998; Santana 2006; Mittelstadt 2010). The country also recognized the independence of
many African countries, but most importantly Angola, Mozambique and Guinea-Bissau,
becoming an important actor in the continent.14 It also re-established diplomatic relations with
the People's Republic of China. Furthermore, Brazil celebrated a nuclear cooperation treaty
with West Germany, which faced strong opposition of the US. This opposition accentuated
after Carter came to power and started to strongly criticize the Brazilian dictatorship's record
on human rights. In return, Brazil denounced several military agreements with Washington in
1977. Since Brazil-US relations had cooled down, the ties with Western Europe, Japan, and
the Second World deepened. Notwithstanding that, there were no immediate positive results
in Latin America due to higher tensions with Argentina, even if the signature of the Amazon
Multilateral Treaty in 1978 — which was the first concrete initiative towards the integration
of the subcontinent — is taken into account (Gonçalves and Miyamoto 1993; Souto Maior
2006; Piedra-Calderón 2007).

The last military dictator, João Figueiredo (1979-1985), carried this responsible
pragmatism further under the guise of “universalism”. The North-South divide became more
evident for Brazilian policy-makers after Ronald Reagan took up the presidency in the United
States. Gonçalves and Miyamoto (1993) assert that Brazil was impelled to look elsewhere for
the support of its national development project, because Reagan politically dismissed the
voices of the Third World through a renewed emphasis on Cold War polarization. The
Malvinas/Falklands War, during which the US supported the United Kingdom, was a strong
evidence in support for this perception. Consequently, Brazil concentrated its efforts in Latin
American integration and in intensifying ties with Africa, Asia, and the Middle East.15 For
instance, Brazil supported the creation of the Latin American Integration Association

14
Until then Brazil had been very reticent in condemning Portuguese colonialism. Moreover, the regimes in
those countries were communist, so Brazil acted against the United States' strategic interests when it
recognized them.
15
In the context of the Second Cold War, the United States strongly disapproved this orientation of Brazilian
foreign policy (Silva 2005).
 32

(ALADI, Portuguese acronym) and energy cooperation projects. The country also became
more involved in Southern African issues where Brazil politically supported Angola against
South African aggressions and the South-West Africa People's Organisation (SWAPO) as the
legitimate representative of the Namibian people (Visentini 2013; Gonçalves and Miyamoto
1993).16 Cooperation with China also increased, as well as with Middle Eastern countries,
particularly Iraq.

The first civilian government since 1964, headed by José Sarney (1986-1990), had to
primarily cope with the political transition towards democracy in a context of severe
economic crisis, notably concerning external debt and hyperinflation. The National
Constituent Assembly took place between 1987 and 1988, the year in which the new
democratic constitution was approved. Notwithstanding the triumph of democracy, the
government pursued many unsuccessful economic plans to tackle hyperinflation, such as the
Plano Cruzado. The debt crisis made Brazil turn to the United States for assistance. However,
Washington insisted that Brazil should consult with the IMF and give up on its policies
regarding intellectual property rights, environment and the Amazon forest, informatics, and
nuclear energy. In the end, Brasília refused most of these demands and only accepted to resort
to IMF loans, leading to more turbulent relations with the US.

Despite this diminished room for maneuver, the Brazilian diplomacy started many
initiatives in other regions of the world, including with the Soviet Union, African, Middle
Eastern, and Asian countries. Yet, the most important initiative was in South America.
Visentini (2013, 91, my translation) sharply analyses that “The fewer possibilities of action by
Brazil at the global level, the more South America was valued as a strategic alternative, with
its axis centered on cooperation and integration with Argentina, which was going through
problems very similar to Brazil's”. The Brazilian-Argentinean cooperation and integration
was stepped up through the Protocol for Integration and Economic Cooperation in 1986 and
the Brazil-Argentina Integration, Cooperation and Development Treaty in 1988. The latter
provided for a common market between both countries within 10 years and it laid the ground
for the creation of the Southern Common Market (Mercosul) in 1991.

16
A good indicator of the intensification of Brazil-African relations is the fact that Figueiredo became the first
South American head of state to ever visit the African continent in an official travel to Nigeria, Cape Verde,
Guinea-Bissau, Algeria, and Senegal in 1980 (Gonçalves and Miyamoto 1993).
 33

2.3. Brazilian development and the South Atlantic

When Getúlio Vargas came to power in 1930, Brazil had no policy nor an overall
strategy for the South Atlantic space. This continued for the first decade of his government
until the outbreak of World War II. There were no significant relations with African countries.
Argentina was a concern of the Brazilian regime, since both countries had been rivals since
they were Portuguese and Spanish colonies. The Brazilian Armed Forces were obsolete and
the Navy was no exception. Demands for modernization were not uncommon, since Brazilian
warships had all been built between 1906 and 1917. In 1936, Vargas launched the Programa
de Renovação (“Renovation Program”) to substitute and modernize the fleet with foreign and
Brazilian-built warships. Brazil bought three submarines from Italy in 1937. However, the
Navy was unprepared and with dismal firepower for both strategic and tactical purposes,
because this program did not take into consideration major concerns such as the defense of the
coast and maritime routes (Cabral 2013).

After World War II broke out, Brazil and other Latin American countries started to
supply resources to both Allied and Axis powers. Therefore, sea lanes became even more vital
for the country than in the previous years. Since the UK and others were conducting a
blockade on Germany and Italy, the majority of Brazilian commerce was in fact with the US.
Berlin quickly noticed this and used the French military bases it had conquered in the South
Atlantic — particularly in Senegal and the French Guyana — to conduct military operations
against merchant vessels. Ten submarines were deployed to attack ships close to the Brazilian
coast. Although some Brazilian ships had already been sunk in the Mediterranean and the
North Atlantic, it was only after these German submarines sunk down five merchant ships and
a small boat in the South Atlantic that Brazil entered the war against the Axis powers in 1942
(Cabral 2013).

During the war, the main strategic concerns were the dependency on maritime trade
routes for transportation and the well-functioning of the industry (Cabral 2013). Coastal
navigation was essential for supplies and communication between Brazil's main cities. The
war effort included the creation of the Northeastern Naval Force. The warships for this new
fleet came from the US, with whom an agreement was signed. It also included the
modernization of all the Brazilian Navy, mostly for anti-submarine warfare, and in exchange
for that the US Military could use Brazilian naval and air bases. The responsibilities over the
 34

defense of the South Atlantic were shared between both countries. The main concerns were
the submarine attacks on trade fleets and a possible German invasion of South America from
French African colonies through the Brazilian Northeast. Brazil guaranteed the control over
the southern coastal routes, especially between Florianópolis and Rio de Janeiro, and the
Army was deployed to the Northeast to prevent an invasion. The US assisted Brazil in the
naval defense from Rio to Recife, where the headquarters of the IV Fleet — a US naval force
created during the war for the protection of trade routes in the South Atlantic — were
located.17 From Recife to the Caribbean, the Northeastern Naval Force would only help
merchant convoys next to the Brazilian coast. Besides that, Brazil militarily occupied the
archipelagos of Fernando de Noronha and Trindade and considered independently invading
Senegal and the French Guyana to neutralize German threats (Cabral 2013).

In the Atlantic Campaign, 34 Brazilian warships and 20 merchant vessels were sunk
in contrast to one Italian and 11 German submarines (Cabral 2013). Almost 3.000 ships and
600 convoys were escorted by the Brazilian Navy, with or without US assistance (Cabral
2013). Even though the US often did not fulfill its part of the agreement — late ship
deliveries, insufficient information-sharing, and unsatisfactory military training to Brazilian
personnel —, the outcome of the war was very positive for the Brazilian Armed Forces,
especially the Navy. Its firepower increased manifold with newer warships and technological
upgrades. On top of that, it qualitatively improved its strategic and tactical planning (Cabral
2013). Bearing that in mind, the associated model of development had given good results for
the country.

The experience from World War II served as a basis for a Cold War framework for
hemispheric defense. In 1947 the Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance, more
commonly known as the Rio Pact, was signed after long Pan-American negotiations which
had started by the end of the 1930s. The OAS was created in 1948. Several countries of the
Americas took part in it. Both were mainly fostered by the United States fearing the rising
influence of Nazi Germany and later of the Soviet Union in Latin America. The pact's most
distinctive characteristics were the self-defense against interventions in the American
continent from external powers and changes in sovereignty, for instance a return of

17
According to Cabral (2013), Washington gave great importance for the sea lanes in the South Atlantic,
because they led to the theater of operations in India besides providing raw materials for North Atlantic
countries.
 35

colonialism. Therefore, more than the OAS, the Rio Pact was regarded as an embodiment of
the Monroe Doctrine (“America for Americans”). It was based on continental solidarity and
reciprocal assistance against external and internal aggression. Yet, it established a defensive
military alliance without means to assure its implementation, since it did not include
provisions for regular armed forces nor any form of institutionalization (Castro 2002).

Following the Rio Pact and the OAS, several bilateral military agreements were
signed between the US and Latin American countries. They all took into consideration the
United States' global strategy: containment of the Soviet Union in the context of the Cold War
and the security of maritime routes through naval bases and facilities. Therefore, in the eyes
of the US, Latin American countries should play a complementary role for that goal and the
bilateral military agreements followed that logic. In 1952 Brazil signed the Agreement for
Mutual Defense Assistance, which increased the dependency on US armaments and military
training. According to the US strategy, the Brazilian Navy should specialize in anti-submarine
warfare just as it had done during World War II for the defense of the South Atlantic. This
created a situation of structural dependency for the Navy in which the US had a say on the
modernization of the whole Brazilian fleet (Penha 2011).

The ESG was created around the same time. A school of thought regarding the
Brazilian approach towards the South Atlantic emerged in it and challenged the idea of
strategic autonomy. It was highly conditioned by the Cold War mentality and, therefore,
favored closer ties with the United States. Conversely, those who challenged this view argued
for a greater economic and military relations with Sub-Saharan African countries so as to
increase Brazilian influence in the region. Both sides, however, agreed on several points, for
instance, the need for technological development of the Brazilian military industry, the
modernization of the Navy, control of nuclear technology for military purposes, defense of the
territorial sea, benefiting from maritime resources, projection towards the Antarctic, and the
objection to a formal military alliance in the South Atlantic (Penha 2011).

By the end of the 1950s, it was clear that the US did not confer much strategic value
to the South Atlantic. Despite the establishment of the South Atlantic Maritime Coordination
in 1959 for naval military drills, notably the simulation of anti-submarine warfare,
Washington was very reluctant to adequately provide equipment, training, and vessels to the
Brazilian Navy (Penha 2011). There was a perception that the US deliberately wanted to keep
 36

it undersized and the 1952 agreement was once again put into question. As a result, Brazil
decided to acquire armaments from European countries and not just from the US. In addition
to that, although the Brazilian government presented its interests about the exploration of the
Antarctic to the US in 1958, the country was left out of the negotiations about the Antarctic
Treaty's draft.18 This also raised fears that Brazil was deliberately being severely undermined
in the South Atlantic. That is why the country did not adhere to the Treaty until 1975 and
reserved its rights to conduct activities in the continent, strategic to the South Atlantic (Penha
2009).19

The issue of maritime resources exploration rights and the fragility of the Brazilian
Navy came back to the spotlight in first years of the 1960s. On the occasion of the Lobster
War (1962-1963), Brazil found out that France was using for commercial purposes its
permissions to conduct scientific research on lobsters in Brazilian jurisdictional waters and it
started to apprehend French boats' cargoes. Both countries were negotiating a peaceful
solution to end the dispute in 1963, when France announced that warships would escort
fishing boats into Brazilian waters (Lessa 1999). It sparked large demonstrations in Brazil and
the government decided to deploy warships and the Air Force to the region. The swift
escalation led the United States to send a message to the Brazilian government reminding that
the Brazilian Navy's warships were bought from them and, under contract, could not be used
against US allies (Braga 2009; Raffaelli 2003). Brazil refused to comply with the request, but
France budged a few days later without any military confrontation. After this incident,
Brasília realized the need to defend its rights in international forums as well as to increase its
Navy's autonomy in relation to the US.

The relative unimportance of the South Atlantic to the US global strategy began to
wane with the intensification of the decolonization process in Africa. The Soviet Union saw in
the decolonization an opportunity to increase its influence sphere in the ocean, especially in
Southern Africa, and the US realized it (Penha 2011). Brazil also wanted to gain more
18
The geopolitical scientists Therezinha de Castro and Delgado de Carvalho had elaborated the “defrontation”
theory according to which Brazil has territorial rights over the Antarctic (e.g. Carvalho and Castro 1956;
Castro 1997). Both lobbied in the Legislative in favor of a greater Brazilian presence in the continent (Penha
2011). However, the theory has never been officially accepted by the Brazilian government, even though the
Military has been discussing it.
19
The Brazilian Legislative approved a bill in 1973 authorizing logistical support to the exploration of the
Antarctic after strong lobby by the Navy (Penha 2009). In 1976 a national policy for the development of
activities in the continent was established, one year after Brazil had finally signed the international treaty.
The country received observer status in 1983 after which an official scientific program was created, the
PROANTAR.
 37

influence in the region when it launched the PEI, but had to cope with the rising Cold War
tensions in the South Atlantic space. Diplomatic relations were established with several
African countries and the first direct maritime trade routes between Brazil and the continent
were inaugurated in 1963 (Penha 2011). Besides that the government called for the complete
decolonization of the continent. This change in Brazilian foreign policy prompted harsh
reprimands by Lisbon, which still had a powerful lobby within Itamaraty, and other colonial
powers. The Brazilian society, especially conservatives, also questioned it, mostly due to the
lack of knowledge about the African continent and some prejudice from the media which was
heavily influenced by European colonialist values (Penha 2011).

The PEI was overturned with the military coup in 1964. Castelo Branco's main
priority was fighting communism with the West and decolonization was a second rank issue
on the agenda. Therefore, although the military regime still called for the end of Apartheid
and colonialism in Africa, it favored working together with Portugal and South Africa,
because both belonged to the West in the Cold War context. In fact, he defended closer ties
with Pretoria and Lisbon so as to create a South Atlantic defense community in which Brazil
would have a prominent role. His strategy was one of engaging in this ideological war in
Africa and the South Atlantic in order to guarantee a more significant support from the US to
acquire technology, armaments, and capital (Penha 2011), a typical approach of the associated
developmentalism model.

This Cold War notion of “ideological borders” was left aside when Costa e Silva
came to power. His government represented a turning point in Brazilian African policy due to
the pursuit of market diversification (Saraiva 1996). Penha (2011) argues that Costa e Silva
kicked off the “golden years” of Brazil-Africa relations, not only because Brasília wanted to
explore new markets, but also because it sought to shift the balance towards a more
autonomous South Atlantic foreign policy which favored peaceful resolutions to conflicts,
without interference from foreign powers and without the establishment of formal collective
defense arrangements.

Accordingly, two governmental programs, one civilian and the other military, were
created for the development and empowerment of the Brazilian naval industry vis-à-vis the
US. On the civilian side, some measures and a five-years plan were taken to increase the
participation of Brazilian vessels in the overall freight services in the country, leading up to
 38

the growth of Brazilian shipbuilding facilities and size of the country's merchant fleet.20 On
the military side, in 1967 the Programa Decenal de Renovação dos Meios Flutuantes
(“Decennial Program for the Renovation of Floating Means”) is launched for the acquisition
of more than 70 warships, including submarines. This 10-year program was the first step
significantly away from the dependency on US technology: European countries, mainly
France and West Germany, would provide submarines and frigates to the Brazilian Navy.
Thus, the US not only lost its status of exclusive supplier, but also the means of pressuring
Brazil, i.e. dominion over the military technology (Couteau-Begarie 1985). It meant a slow
drift towards the autonomous development model of the developmentalist paradigm.
Nonetheless, this program was still heavily focused on the means for conducting anti-
submarine warfare and Rio Pact's perspective of hemispheric defense (Penha 2011).

Under Médici and Geisel the model of associated developmentalism in the South
Atlantic was completely halted. Brazil adopted a firmly independent posture in which the
Navy participated in the formulation of policies towards the South Atlantic space. In 1970, a
law was passed demarcating the Brazilian territorial waters — 200 miles from the coast —
overturning previous laws which had favored foreign fishing vessels.21 The United States,
Belgium, Finland, France, Greece, Japan, Norway, the UK, West Germany, Sweden, and the
Soviet Union filed formal complaints against the measure (Carvalho 1999). Washington even
retaliated with a ban on certain Brazilian imports. Militarily, Brazil opted to achieve strategic
autonomy in the South Atlantic in spite of US protests. For instance, the Brazilian government
revoked the permission for the US to have a naval mission in the country in 1977.

After the end of the Programa Decenal de Renovação dos Meios Flutuantes, Geisel
decided to denounce the military agreement with the US also in 1977 in order to be able to
build an independent and complete navy, i.e. not only directed towards anti-submarine
warfare. The Brazilian Navy's Políticas Básicas e Diretrizes (“Basic Policies and Guidelines”)
and Plano Estratégico (“Strategic Plan”) represented a complete detachment from the US
naval strategy. Renewed procurement programs would focus on the modernization of the
Brazilian shipyards and overall naval industry by generating strong demand that would allow

20
One should note that the United Nations Conference for Trade and Development (UNCTAD) supported the
creation of national merchant fleets by developing countries in order to eliminate deficits and foster
development (Penha 2011).
21
In 1966 Argentina had adopted the same measure and foreign fishing boats relocated to Brazil. After that,
Brazilian fisheries were almost depleted due to predatory fishing techniques, such as trawling.
 39

for scale production. The government also commissioned a study for the development of
nuclear-powered submarines. As a result of this greater awareness about the South Atlantic,
there was a strong convergence between military programs and industrial policies for the
civilian naval sector. A second five-year plan was launched for freight vessels and by the end
of the 1970s approximately 50% of all ships operating in Brazilian ports had the country's flag
(Penha 2011). Penha (2011) informs that Brazil became the world's 7th largest shipbuilder and
it had one of the 20th largest merchant fleets. The industrialization and modernization process
in the naval industry had also created 30,000 job posts in shipyards (Penha 2011).

This South Atlantic insertion strategy reflected on the other side of the ocean. Médici
sought a greater number of bilateral partners in Africa. Many African heads of state visited
Brazil, which in turn opened several embassies in the continent besides carrying out many
business fairs. Brasília also called for the complete decolonization of the continent. 22 Penha
(2011) argues that the objective of the government was to have Africa as an economic as well
as political partner to become a great power in the international system. This goal became
clearer when Geisel came to power in 1974. Brazil favored the South Atlantic after it was
compelled to find new export markets for manufactured goods and alternative oil supplies.
The symbolic cases are the independence of Portuguese colonies in Africa, especially Angola.
Brazil pushed for the international recognition of the independence movements, ignoring
Lisbon's reproaches. It became the first country to recognize the independences of Angola,
Guinea-Bissau, Mozambique, and São Tomé and Príncipe between 1974 and 1975, even
before their governments had formally declared their autonomy.

Considering the geopolitical context in Africa and the South Atlantic these measures
become quite noteworthy. Brazil recognized the Marxist governments in Angola and
Mozambique. In the former case, it was the complete opposite of what the US had wanted.
The decolonization struggles had brought the Soviet Union to Africa and Washington feared
that Moscow could interfere with vital sea lanes, if the Soviets were present in Angola,
Mozambique and elsewhere. Therefore, the Brazilian attitude buries any notion of Cold War
ideological disputes in its policies. The country would have an autonomous international

22
However, one should note that Brazil voted against two UN resolutions condemning Portuguese colonialism
in 1972 and 1973 and this contradiction was an obstacle for the improvement of Brazil-Africa ties (Penha
2011).
 40

insertion and the partnerships with African countries would go beyond mere commerce and
oil:

One could interpret the growing ties with the countries from Black Africa,
especially with those of Portuguese colonization, as a response to the
necessity of expansion into foreign markets, but that would limit the reasons
and consequences of the Brazilian foreign policy's new African inflexion.
The premature recognition of Angola's independence and the little
importance given to the fact that the newest independent countries from
southern Africa have very distinct political and social regimes compared to
Brazil reveals another component as well: the search for a new political
partnership that strengthens Brazilian positions in the Third World context
and its claims towards the developed world (Lima and Moura 1982, 358–
359, my translation).
This Third World aspect aimed at further progressing the Brazilian autonomous
developmentalist project. It sought to fill the gap between underdevelopment and
development with the completion of the industrialization process, i.e. starting to export capital
goods instead of durable consumer goods. Therefore, South Atlantic security — in the context
of the Cold War — became subordinated to development in the Brazilian agenda (Saraiva
1996).

This posture worsened Brazil's relations with South Africa. Pretoria was a key player
in the defense of the South Atlantic in the Cold War. It had proposed in the 1960s the
establishment of a military alliance similar to NATO in the region: SATO, the South Atlantic
Treaty Organization. SATO's main goal would be to counter Soviet influence (Hurrell
1983).23 Brazil had joined the debates concerning this alliance, considering it an improvement
over the Rio Pact for the defense of the ocean. However, after Brazil increased its ties with the
communist regimes of Mozambique and Angola, the prospect of creating SATO became very
dim. Lest it be considered hypocrite like the countries of the Global North that economically
and politically supported South Africa despite criticizing the Apartheid regime, Brasília
restrained all initiatives towards Pretoria — falling short of severing diplomatic ties — until
Nelson Mandela's presidency in 1994 (Pereira 2010).

Nevertheless, commercial and political ties with Sub-Saharan African countries

boomed. They became a privileged space for Brazil's trade strategy and they were interested
in Brazilian services, technology, and manufactured goods. The latter composed the largest
part of the trade flows towards Africa. The commerce went from US$ 130 million in 1970 to

23
Note that this idea is very similar to the one defended by Castelo Branco.
 41

US$ 3.3 billion in 1985 (Cervo and Bueno 2002). African countries exported mainly oil to
Brazil. Petrobras started to invest and work in joint ventures in them. Brazilian private
companies also started investing in large infrastructure projects in transportation,
telecommunication, sanitation, farming, and agriculture. The state-led Banco do Brasil (“Bank
of Brazil”) opened several subsidiaries in Nigeria, Côte d'Ivoire, Gabon, Senegal, and Angola
to provide financial services for these projects. Brazil also became a large arms supplier to the
continent, exporting mainly to Nigeria, which became the country's main partner in Africa
(Machado 2013). Nigeria was the first African country with which Brazil established
countertrade contracts exchanging oil for manufactured and capital goods and services — a
common measure in the 1980s to circumvent the need to use foreign currencies (Santana
2003).

The economic crisis stemming from external debt and the Malvinas/Falklands War
were the main issues that affected the geopolitical landscape of the South Atlantic in the
1980s. The former had harsh consequences for the Brazilian industry. Both drove a wedge
between the Global North and South Atlantic countries, notably in South America.

From the get-go of the Malvinas/Falklands War in 1982, Brazil stood by Argentina,
although it had officially declared neutrality, considering that the United Kingdom was still an
important financial partner.24 Itamaraty diplomatically represented Argentina in London from
the onset of the conflict until 1989. Brasília did not condemn the Argentinean invasion; it
called for a peaceful resolution of the dispute in accordance with the respective UN Security
Council resolutions. The military conflict was closely watched by Brazil and its importance to
the country was such that Figueiredo went to the UN General Assembly to support
Argentinean claims, thus becoming the first Brazilian president to make a speech at the
organization. Bandeira (1995) affirms that Brazil supplied armaments to Argentina, namely
surveillance airplanes, ballistic rockets, and Xavante fighters — all of which had already been
in use by the Brazilian Armed Forces. The goal was to provide for the Argentinean Armada
the means to spy on the British Task Force (Bandeira 1995). In addition to that, Brazil also
turned a blind eye to the arms exports coming from Cuba, Libya, Israel, and the Soviet Union
towards Argentina through the Brazilian airspace during the war (Casado and Oliveira 2012).

24
Brazil has condemned the British occupation of the islands since the invasion in 1833.
 42

This position can be explained by Brasília's deteriorating relations with Washington

and the emerging cooperation with Buenos Aires and other countries of the Third World in
the 1970s (Vidigal 2007). Brazil and Argentina had seen their bilateral ties grow strong in the
1970s, according to Spektor (2002), regardless of major obstacles such as the dispute
involving the construction of the Itaipu hydroelectric dam. In fact, Brazil was Argentina's
main Latin American trade partner before and during the war (Hirst and Lengyel 1986;
Vidigal 2007). In 1983 almost 15% of Argentinean imports came from Brazil — the majority
of which composed by manufactured goods (Hirst 1988). Nevertheless, the further
intensification of Brazil-Argentina relations was a direct result of the war. Brazilian
unequivocal support to the Argentinean claims strengthened the confidence between Buenos
Aires and Brasília. So much so that both countries started to engage in military cooperation
after the war. For instance, after the violation of the Tlatelolco Treaty with the British
deployment of two atomic submarines to the South Atlantic — an act of nuclear intimidation
—, they decided to unite their efforts to cooperate in this sensitive field. 25

The war highlighted the strategic vulnerability of South America. Argentina had
invoked the Rio Pact to gather hemispheric support, especially from the United States, but it was
in vain. The Pact's first resolution recognized the Argentinean sovereign rights over the islands,
while requesting the cessation of hostilities. Nevertheless, Washington abandoned Pan-American
solidarity when it decided to support London, cutting off military and economic ties with
Argentina (Höring, Weber, and Closs 2014). This struck a huge blow on Buenos Aires, which also
suffered economic sanctions from Western Europe besides a maritime blockade imposed by the
UK. The US worried that the Argentinean invasion would spark an anti-colonialist reaction in
Latin America, making room for a Soviet Union's engagement (Candeas 2005). Still, it buried
the Rio Pact and severely undermined the OAS whose impotence became clear with the adoption
of very bland resolutions.26 Consequently, South American countries started to boycott joint
military drills with the US. Finally, the Argentinean defeat increased the subcontinent's awareness
on the need to cooperate to overcome their military and economic vulnerabilities in relation to
western powers (Lhaver apud Penha 2011).

25
Brazil and Argentina were not signatories of the NPT. In 1985 both countries issued the Joint Declaration on
Nuclear Energy, which stated the importance of the sector for their development. After that the respective
presidents began jointly visiting nuclear plants and allowing inspections by each other's nuclear agency
(Vargas 1997).
26
It is worth noting that these organizations had been deemed as the embodiment of the Monroe Doctrine,
which was first mentioned by the United States in 1823 — ten years before the British colonial occupation of
the Malvinas/Falklands.
 43

The South Atlantic was another geopolitical space whose vulnerability was
evidenced by the war. In response to that, Brazil launched together with Nigeria the proposal
for a Zone of Peace and Cooperation of the South Atlantic (ZOPACAS, Portuguese acronym)
in 1986. Both countries wanted to curb the influence of former colonialist powers in the South
Atlantic such as the UK and France. Besides that, they wanted to distance the region from the
East-West divide of the Cold War. Officially, ZOPACAS aims at avoiding the presence of
weapons of mass destruction in the region as well as the presence of extra-regional powers in
the ocean. In the minds of Brazilian policymakers and strategists, it would establish a “ring of
peace” around Brazil in the South Atlantic (Miyamoto 1987). The initiative was supported by
three South American countries and 21 African ones at the UN, where it was almost
unanimously approved by the General Assembly in 1986.27 The first meeting of the South
Atlantic heads of state occurred in Rio de Janeiro in 1988.

The second main issue in the Brazilian agenda in the 1980s, i.e. the economic crisis
due to external debt, also affected the country's position in the South Atlantic space. Brasília
had to sustain large foreign trade surpluses to cope with the debt. It gave greater priority to
exports to Africa, which throughout the 1980s ended up representing 10% of Brazil's overall
international trade (Penha 2011). Countertrade became a common practice to avoid using
foreign currencies. Cervo and Bueno (2002) tell that the country grew to be an important
alternative partner for African countries to detriment of former colonial powers. This
effectively projected Brazil as a regional power in the Southern Hemisphere.

At the same time that Brazil reasserted its influence in the South Atlantic space
through ZOPACAS and South American cooperation, the debt crisis hit the economy and the
developmentalist paradigm. The shipbuilding industry was one of the main industrial sectors
affected by it. In 1984, the government started to deregulate the naval industry and profitable
sea lanes were opened to national and foreign private companies. The crisis also halted the
modernization of the merchant fleet, which then consisted of many outdated vessels. 28 It
reduced their competitiveness in the market. Moreover, without demand more than half of all
Brazilian shipyards were idle by the end of the decade and into the 1990s, even if some of
them refocused on repairing old ships. Brazil had completed its industrialization and it
signalized the end of the developmentalist paradigm (Penha 2011).

27
The United States voted against it and a few developed countries abstained in the voting procedure.
28
Penha (2011) informs that the last delivery of new ships by the Brazilian naval industry took place in 1981.
 44

In sum, the articulation of the paradigm in view of the South Atlantic fulfilled the
expected role: It contributed to the Brazilian development. All presidents of the period
showed signs of having a national project and the South Atlantic policies would be part of it.
At first, the associated developmentalism provided the required means for Brazil to
industrialize and strengthen its navy. However, it soon became clear that it would not be
sustainable and that Brazil would need more partners to achieve its aspirations. The
international insertion associated with the United States was then put aside. The South
Atlantic became a strategic priority for the Brazilian economic growth and industrialization.
Ties with African countries were forged and deepened regardless of regime type. Civilian and
military naval projects were put in place. These boosted the Brazilian naval industry, which
became one of the largest in the world, and tackled external vulnerabilities created by the
developmentalist model itself. The Malvinas/Falklands War provided the opportunity for
Brazil to reassert its leadership in the South Atlantic space through ZOPACAS. The country
then reached the high ranks of international politics. However, by the end of the 1980s it
underwent a bitter economic crisis after it had achieved its industrialization and development
goals: a sign the end of the developmentalist international insertion paradigm.
 45

3. BRAZIL WITHDRAWS FROM THE SOUTH ATLANTIC: NEOLIBERAL YEARS

3.1. The neoliberal paradigm

The neoliberal paradigm was mostly an invention of the Latin American

intelligentsia, feeding off of the chronic challenges faced by developmentalism: economic
instability due to fiscal unbalance, inflation, and balance of payments (Cervo 2008a). On the
one hand, developmentalists thought that economic stability would come as a result to long
term measures such as an equilibrium between production and demand, public spending and
government revenues. On the other, monetarists leaned towards a “shock treatment” for the
Brazilian economy. At the onset of the 1990s, the latter found favorable conditions to
implement their ideas both in the external and the internal scenes, i.e. the unbridled drive for
foreign loans opened a door for the hegemonic structures of capitalism (Cervo 2008a).

Internally, Brazil (and much of Latin America) was undergoing a democratization

process after 20 years of military dictatorship. In 1988 a new constitution was approved and
in 1989 there were the first direct democratic elections. The neoliberal candidate, Fernando
Collor de Melo, won with the support of the elite and the media (Schr der and Castro 2009).
Collor, as he is known in Brazil, waged a war against a deliberate strategy of inducing
development through the State. For the advocates of neoliberalism, the State should only
provide economic stability, understood as monetary stability; everything else would be
provided by the free market, including national development.

Externally, by the end of the 1980s capitalism's hegemonic structures had established
new rules of political economy, known as the Washington Consensus. Moreover, with the
looming end of the Cold War and the purported ideological victory of the West (the alleged
“End of History”), adopting these rules was almost unquestionably seen as the way out of the
situation of permanent economic instability (Cervo 2008a). Cervo (2008a) tells that Argentina
was the example followed by Brazil, where neoliberal policies started to be implemented
already in 1989. The author, however, notices that in Brazil the adoption of the Washington
Consensus was never as committed as in Argentina. Nevertheless, the neoliberal doctrine
started being passively incorporated by much of the Brazilian elite, which took it as a sign of
a new trend of benign globalization, according to Cervo (2008a). However, this appraisal by
the elite was filled with miscalculations:
 46

The triumphant liberalism discourse of the hegemonic centers of capitalism

— that advanced liberalism only after they had built a solid internal
economic and social base for their nation-states through autarkic and
protectionist means — was a mirage for the unprepared elites of Latin
America (Saraiva 2005, 70, my translation).
In addition to that, the United States and the IMF strongly pushed this agenda all
around the globe, transforming the international economy:

The globalization engendered a new economic reality, characterized by the

increase of the volume and velocity of international financial flows, by
commercial leveling up in terms of supply and demand, by the convergence
of productive processes and, ultimately, by the convergence of State
regulations (Cervo and Bueno 2002, 455, my translation).
Indeed, in Brazil it meant measures to open the domestic markets, including
consumer, financial, service and production sectors; privatization of state companies and to
end state-entrepreneurship altogether; safeguard of foreign investments; and the adaptation of
public institutions and Brazilian legislation towards those goals. Among the actions taken to
revitalize the economy through shock treatments were currency change, savings confiscation,
freezing of bank accounts, prices and wages, monetary parity to the US dollar, and the
reduction of import taxes.

A key aspect of the neoliberal paradigm is that it sterilizes two focal points of the
developmentalist paradigm: the ideas of national interest and of national development project
(Cervo 2008a). Under the new paradigm, “the notion of national project, interest, or
sovereignty was put aside in the name of opening up to the new neoliberal and globalizing
order of the post-Cold War” (Visentini 2013, 95, my translation). For neoliberal leaders, only
great powers could dream of having a national project, therefore, Brazil should not be
voluntaristic and aspire to have one. The neoliberal paradigm considers that Brazilian national
interests are diluted within multilateral organizations and systemic capitalist forces, i.e. the
concept of a global governance in which a State's interests are the same as the international
community's. Therefore, there would be no need for an affirmative foreign policy.

In practice, the neoliberal paradigm went beyond what the Washington Consensus
recommended. Especially in the realm of privatizations, it favored foreign capital and
companies instead of national ones. Besides that, the opening of financial and banking
markets guaranteed the free flow of speculative capital, extremely harmful to a developing
country, because the wealth started to flow once again towards the center of the world
capitalist economy. The neoliberal elite did not try to come up with remedies for this situation
 47

beyond the “frantic search for international capital” (Cervo 2008a). Neoliberalism ended up
creating a situation of stark dependency on the center of the global economy. In addition to
that, instead of solving the deficit problem, the neoliberal policies only aggravated it. The
paradigm itself provided neither resources nor a strategy to cope with it, so economic
stagnation was the inexorable result. The implementation of these policies increased Brazil's
vulnerability as a whole: more debt, weaker businesses, closing of research and development
centers. Alarmingly, the Brazilian economy drifted back to the primary sector: the first signs
of deindustrialization, i.e. the “Dutch disease”. Cervo (2002, 8, my translation) states that:
“The subservience of the Normal [Neoliberal] State, built as an ideology of change,
engendered grave incoherencies by mistaking democracy with market imperialism,
competitiveness with economic openness and development with monetary stability”.

On the positive side, however, the overall productivity of the Brazilian economy rose
(Visentini 2013; Cervo 2002). According to Cervo (2008a), the opening of the economy woke
up Brazilian businessmen who were too accommodated with the protectionism of the previous
paradigm. They were compelled to modernize their factories and production methods in order
to adapt to this new reality. As a consequence, it contributed to elevating the systemic
productivity of the Brazilian economy (services, industry, and agriculture) (Cervo 2008a).
Cervo sums up the result of the neoliberal paradigm:

Monetary stability and increased productivity of the business system are the
gains attributed to the neoliberal governments of Latin America.
Deconstruction of the economy's central core, internal and external
indebtedness, alienation of the national assets and wealth transfer [abroad]
are their costs. Looking ahead, the neoliberal governments reintroduced one
century longer of structural dependency, the historical backwardness
overcoming which became further away (Cervo 2000, 21, my translation).

3.2. Brazilian international insertion between 1990 and 2000

In the first open elections since 1960, Fernando Collor de Melo (1990-1992) won
with a platform of change, economic stabilization (meaning monetary stability), and anti-
corruption, counting with enormous support of the traditional media (Schr der and Castro
2009). After his first efforts at containing hyperinflation had failed, he decided to unilaterally
— with no negotiations for getting counterparts from international trade partners — cut
external tariffs and promote the denationalization of the industry (Visentini 2013). Collor's
stance uncritically oscillated between the US and the European Union (EU) but without any
 48

hints of purposeful bargaining. In fact, Visentini (2013) says that Brazil started to
accommodate to the rules imposed by the US (and the EU), accepting the discussion of the
alleged “new themes” in international affairs, such as environment, human rights, intellectual
property rights, among others. It had abandoned the “Third World rhetoric of solidarity
between developing countries, focusing on questioning specific rules that it considers unjust
and harmful to the development of peripheral countries” (Vizentini 2008, 95, my translation).

Under his presidency, Itamaraty lost many of attributions and it did not have a
decisive participation in foreign policy-making, being responsible for bureaucratic tasks and
minor negotiations only (Visentini 2013). Collor bought into the thesis that the world had
become unipolar after the end of the Cold War. The long established Brazilian multilateral
diplomacy was left aside, shifting back to an alignment with the United States. He included
Paraguay and Uruguay into the Brazil-Argentina integration process as a means to further
reduce import and export taxes, since both countries already had significantly lower external
tariffs (Visentini 2013; Guimarães 2007). This led to the foundation of Mercosul with the
signature of the Treaty of Asunción in 1991. Additionally, Brazil's presence in Africa, Asia,
the Middle East, and the former Soviet space was also decreased. Some of this retraction
happened due to external factors, such as the war in Iraq and the internal convulsion in former
Soviet States. Yet, the government had also consciously decided not to take the opportunity to
engage with other countries, such as South Africa, India, China, and the Southeast Asian
nations. Instead of that, Brazil chose to focus its actions on the markets of the EU and the US.

Collor's policies had very negative economic and political results. For instance,
thousands of Brazilian companies went out of business (Cervo 2000; Visentini 2013). He
began to gradually lose his support from traditional political forces. As a desperate measure,
he named Celso Lafer, a well-known career diplomat, to increase his government's
respectability. It succeeded for a short while. Lafer conducted the United Nations Conference
on Environment and Development, also known as the Rio Summit or Earth Summit, which
successfully bound environmental and developmental issues together. In spite of this
achievement, his government was still severely criticized. The media turned its back on him
and started a campaign to oust him (Schr der and Castro 2009; Visentini 2013). Then,
 49

encouraged by television channels, students went out on the streets on a campaign called
caras pintadas (“painted faces”).29 Lest he face impeachment, Collor resigned.

Itamar Franco (1992-1994), Collor's low profile vice-president, was sworn in in

October 1992. The Military, which had been very displeased with the depreciation of national
assets and sovereignty, guaranteed his inauguration, since he had a more nationalistic
background (Visentini 2013). He immediately halted privatizations and highlighted the
necessity of a national development project. Besides that, President Itamar wanted to restore
the Brazilian presence in the international scene through multilateral forums and regional
integration.

Brazil recovered its active participation in multilateral organizations. At the United

Nations, for instance, Brazil was elected for the Security Council and decided to participate in
seven peacekeeping operations. Also at the UN, the country published the Agenda for
Development in addition to the Agenda for Peace, continuing the efforts to push the issue
back to international debates. It was a conscious strategy of participating in international
regimes and organizations so as to be able to make alliances and change the course of the
discussions and block or at least slow down potentially negative decisions (Visentini 2013).
That is why Brazil under Itamar Franco committed to the Western agenda of democracy,
social justice, human rights, individual freedoms and others. This way the country could add
its concerns to the debates, such as development, self-determination, non-intervention in
domestic affairs, and peaceful resolution of disputes. These are the roots of the strategy of
autonomy through participation/integration, i.e. maintenance of the room of maneuver in spite
of the increase in (economic) interdependence, which took a more definite shape in the
presidency of Fernando Henrique Cardoso (FHC) (Vigevani and Cepaluni 2007; Vigevani,
Oliveira, and Cintra 2003).

President Itamar also developed several partnerships with neighboring countries and
former Portuguese colonies, the latter leading up to the creation of the Community of
Portuguese Speaking Countries (CPLP, Portuguese acronym). Mercosul gained a strategic
dimension for the first time since its inception and became a priority of the government
(Visentini 2013; Vizentini 2008). Brazil pushed for the association of Chile and Bolivia to the

29
Schröder and Castro (2009) argue that this was the first case of the so-called “color revolutions” which
currently dominate international relations as a new kind of coup d'état through informational and
psychological war.
 50

bloc, for example. In 1994 there was the signing of the Protocol of Ouro Preto, which
strengthened the institutionalization of Mercosul, formalizing its intergovernmental structure
with a consensual decision-making process.

At the World Trade Organization, Brazil defended a multilateral system anchored in

regional integration as a way to fight protectionism by developed countries. Accordingly,
Brazil proposed the creation of a South American Free Trade Area (SAFTA) as a response to
the establishment of the North American Free Trade Area (NAFTA). It was the channel found
by Brazil to get in the way of Washington's interests in South America, according to Visentini
(2013). In the words of the then Minister of the Economy, Rubens Ricupero (1995, 27, my
translation), “[it] is logical that the countries of the South have to, first, consolidate their
economic integration before engaging, collectively, in trade arrangements with NAFTA or
other groupings.”

Brazil also reached several significant bilateral agreements. With the US, an accord
on space exploration and surveillance of the Amazon rainforest was concluded. With Russia,
India, and China — which were then called países baleia (“whale countries”) due to their
shared characteristics such as large economy, geographical dimension and population (e.g.
Albuquerque 1995; Sardenberg 1996) — Brazil engaged in several major initiatives as well.
For instance, an agreement for space and nuclear cooperation was signed with Russia. Beyond
growing economic ties, Brazil also entered an important treaty for scientific cooperation with
China, which included the joint development of satellites. Lastly, Brazil worked closely
together with India for reforming the UN Security Council.

Despite his short presidency, that lasted from the end of 1992 until December 1994,
Itamar's legacy is among the most important in current Brazilian history: the stabilization of
the economy, i.e. the end of hyperinflation. Fernando Henrique Cardoso (FHC), Minister of
the Economy, introduced the Plano Real. A new currency, the real, was put in place and it
successfully stabilized prices, increasing short-term consumption and economic growth.
However, the stability of the real was guaranteed by an artificial parity with the US dollar,
which increased manifold Brazil's external deficit (Fligenspan 1998).

Nonetheless, the immediate success of the Plano Real assured the election of FHC
(1995-2002). He reinstated the neoliberal agenda, although not as drastically as Collor. This
 51

secured Brazil's economic and political stability throughout the implementation of neoliberal
policies. As a whole:

The Cardoso government set up two generations of reforms suggested by the

Washington Consensus. In the first generation, Brazil implemented fiscal
austerity policies, retracted the welfare state and removed it from the
productive sphere. In the second generation policies, Brazil sought
transparency of public spending and guaranteed foreign investments (Silva
2008, 143, my translation).
In the medium to long-term, however, economic growth was not guaranteed by these
policies and by Plano Real; it would lead to social exclusion, putting into question their
continuation (Fligenspan 1998). In fact, the government ended up neglecting the country's
infrastructure and the State lost its strategic capacity on many key areas, especially through
the intensified privatization of large and efficient state companies in the sectors of
aeronautics, steel industry, informatics, and telecommunications among others (Visentini
2013). For FHC, the Brazilian industry should be a specialized segment of the world
economy, operating in global production chains; therefore, there would be no need for state-
led development or coordination. As a consequence, national businesses did not receive any
kind of preferential treatment from the government, leading to a record number of bankruptcy
requests being filed (e.g. Serasa 2014).

The Brazilian international insertion under FHC was based on economic-financial

globalization. It was similar, but not as hectic as under Collor. “What we saw in the HC
administration was the consolidation and sophistication of a policy initially formulated and
practiced in the Collor de Mello and Itamar ranco governments” (Vigevani and Cepaluni
2007, 288, my translation). Itamaraty once again lost its relative importance: Economic and
trade negotiations were transferred to the Ministry of Economy and the president himself led
the foreign policy, the advent of presidential diplomacy. FHC's blueprint for neoliberal
international insertion were the creation of a path towards deeper trade-oriented regional
integration, diversification of trade partners, multilateralism, and a quest to raise the country's
profile, especially as a global trader, to become a permanent member of the UN Security
Council (Visentini 2013).

There was a shift in Brazil's regional integration policy. South America substituted
Latin America as a priority, a geopolitical decision that acknowledged that the former is a
geographically and historically distinct than the latter (Lima and Hirst 2009; Bandeira 2009).
 52

Bandeira (2009) also tells that shared particularities and geographical contiguity created a
common agenda of challenges and opportunities. Hence, Mercosul became the cornerstone of
the Brazilian international insertion, benefiting from the strategic dimension conferred by
Itamar Franco. Besides the accelerated increase in intra-bloc trade flows, Brazil advanced the
political-strategic character of the organization. The Ushuaia Protocol on Democratic
Commitment in Mercosul, signed in 1998, stands out within this scope. Its first article, the
“democratic clause”, backed up the consolidation of the new democratic regimes and
institutions in the region. 30

FHC participated in negotiations about the Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA),
a US initiative, in tandem with Mercosul proceedings. Vizentini (2004) says that the
concretization of the FTAA would entail the end of Mercosul for there would no longer be
any tariff advantages, nor would the member-states' companies be able to compete with the
ones from the North. Yet, Brazil did not want to be left out of a possible albeit unlikely trade
agreement. So it decided to gain some time by participating in negotiations, while
highlighting the necessity of multilateral talks instead of bilateral consultations and never
frontally opposing positions held by Washington (Visentini 2013).

Brazil also markedly improved its overall relations with the United States and the
European Union. Besides the participation in FTAA talks, FHC accepted most if not all of the
Washington's demands on sensitive technology. For instance, Brazil acceded to the NPT, the
Nuclear Supplier Group, and the Missile Technology Control Regime, basically renouncing
its rights to use this kind of technology (Silva 2008). On the other hand, the EU was the
largest market for Brazilian goods and main source of foreign direct investments (Visentini
2013). Moreover, Mercosul-EU negotiations started for trade liberalization between both
blocs, since Brussels did not want to lose its economic leverage in the region — bearing in
mind the possibility of losing space with the concretization of the FTAA (Visentini 2013).

In addition to these developed trade partners, Brazil also went through a period of
growing trade ties with Southern African countries, notably Angola, South Africa, and
Mozambique, and Asia, namely China and the four “Asian Tigers” (Taiwan, Singapore, South
Korea, and Hong Kong). FHC also made sings in favor of maintaining the partnerships with
India, Russia, and China, towards a multipolar world order. However, they fell short of the

30
Even though it was still not ratified, it was successfully used by Brazil, Argentina, and Uruguay to put
pressure on Paraguay, when a political crisis with hints of coup occurred in 1999.
 53

aspired goal, because Brazil did not comply with many of the agreed items or plainly
abandoned them. For instance, Brasília denounced technological cooperation accords with
India after Delhi conducted atomic tests and closed bank agencies in Shanghai after some
small financial shocks, according to Visentini (2013).

These financial shocks, however, soon turned into an economic crisis of large
proportions with the Asian and the Russian crises in 1997 and 1998 respectively. Despite the
dire situation of the Brazilian economy, FHC was reelected in 1998 to stay in power until
2002. To quell the crisis, FHC called for IMF loans. The Fund made US$ 41.5 billion
available, but demanded stricter austerity measures from the government (Manfrini 2002). He
acquiesced to these stipulations for maintaining the Plano Real in spite of the social costs.
However, outflows of speculative capital in 1999 put economy further under stress. So the
government decided to devaluate the currency to control external imbalances. This measure
created a severe crisis within Mercosul, since Argentina still kept its currency pegged to the
US dollar and, therefore, started to have huge trade deficits with Brazil (Vizentini 2008).

The quick succession of crises and setbacks sparked the debate on the course of the
Brazilian foreign policy and the international insertion strategy. It represented a turning point
towards change within the country's ruling elite. They started to question the neoliberal
international insertion strategy and FHC adopted a stance of dealing with “asymmetric
globalization”, which slowly, but decidedly, started to put an end to the neoliberal paradigm's
era (Cervo 2008a; Silva 2008; Visentini 2013).

3.3. Withdrawal from the South Atlantic

The neoliberal paradigm had serious implications for the Brazilian policies for the
South Atlantic. The reorientation of international insertion model was followed by a retraction
of domestic and international initiatives. Thus, Brazil lost some of its influence in the South
Atlantic space under Collor, Itamar Franco, and FHC. Nevertheless, there were still some
projects that counter-intuitively entrenched Brazil in strategic regions and issue-areas.

One of the instances in which Brazil's influence was maintained was ZOPACAS.
After the end of the Cold War the grouping had lost its raison d'etre. However, in 1992
Itamaraty decided to adapt it to the new geopolitical landscape. Brazil advanced the
prioritization of economic cooperation instead of security (Penha 2011). This new orientation
 54

was adopted in a summit in Brasília in 1994. Three joint declarations were issued establishing
commercial cooperation and maritime environmental protection as well as reaffirming the
denuclearization of the South Atlantic. ZOPACAS was further strengthened in 1996 at a
meeting in Cape Town after the relations with South Africa had been normalized after the end
of Apartheid. More areas of cooperation were added to the agenda. The most important was
the emphasis on regional and sub-regional integration processes in the South Atlantic, such as
Mercosul, ECOWAS, and the Southern Africa Customs Union (SACU). However, in 1998 a
major setback befell ZOPACAS at a summit in Buenos Aires where no consensus was
reached on the implementation of further integration measures, because of the lack of
organizational structure and deeper institutionalization (Penha 2011).

Mercosul, the South American integration process led by Brazil and Argentina, was
also a big step forward. It put an end to the rivalry between both countries and led to greater
cooperation between them. Moreover, bilateral cooperation increased to new higher levels on
several civilian and military fields, including between the Brazilian Navy and the Argentinean
Armada. Joint naval military drills were established, bilateral and with the participation of
Uruguay. All agreed on a relative disarmament: The 1990s were a South American distension
period. Nevertheless, Buenos Aires still caused some trouble in the view of Brazilian
strategists, because it wanted to join NATO and become the South American bulwark of the
North's policies, especially in the earlier 1990s (Cervo and Bueno 2002). This intention was
deemed as an exaggeration of the neoliberal international insertion paradigm.

Brazilian relations with Africa were reduced to almost nothing during the 1990s.
Several Brazilian embassies were closed in the continent. A fact that by itself indicates the
retraction of the political interest to engage with Africa. The economic ties with the continent
sunk to the lowest level since the 1960s. Brazilian trade with Africa represented less than 3%
of the country's total, a drop of more that 66% in comparison to the previous decade (Penha
2011). Notwithstanding that, investments in infrastructure were still being carried out
throughout Africa — an inheritance from the 1970s and 1980s —, but mainly in South
Atlantic states such as Cameroon, Guinea-Bissau, Congo-Brazzaville, and Gabon.

Brazil diverted its attention to four specific countries in the continent: South Africa,
Nigeria, Namibia, and Angola. Since Mandela came to power in South Africa, Brazil engaged
with the country more intensely. In 1993, one year before, the first naval military drill
 55

ATLASUR was carried out by Argentina, Brazil, Uruguay and South Africa. It has taken
place biannually since then. Brazil became South Africa's main trade partner in South
America (Pereira 2013). On the other hand, Nigeria was Brazil's main economic partner in
Africa and oil was the main subject of their trade, with Brazil making significant investments
in the sector in the late 1990s (Machado 2013; Pimentel 2000). Namibia, in turn, became a
priority for security cooperation. Recently independent, the country possessed no navy and
Brazil stepped in to cooperate towards creating one. Several programs were then established
for the training of Namibian officers and sailors in Brazil. In fact, some authors even claim
that the Brazilian Navy is responsible for “giving birth” to the Namibian one (Aguilar 2013;
Forrest 2012; Gonzalez 2013). Finally, Brazil accepted to participate in a United Nations
peacekeeping mission in Angola from 1995 to 1997.31 1,200 troops were deployed, the largest
contingent dispatched by the country since World War II and the mission's main troop-
contributing state. Along with this mission, Brasília also bilaterally cooperated with Luanda in
the fields of education and development through quick-impact infrastructure projects.

A geopolitically important project advanced by Brazil in the 1990s was the creation
of the CPLP, bringing together Brazil, Angola, Guinea-Bissau, Mozambique, São Tomé and
Príncipe, Portugal, and Cape Verde. Penha (2011) affirms that Itamaraty envisioned it as a
means to intersect Mercosul, ECOWAS, and the Southern Africa Development Community.
The organization intends not only to promote the culture of Portuguese-speaking countries,
but also to engender political coordination and facilitate technical and scientific cooperation.
CPLP's political aspirations were put to the test when a crisis ensued in Guinea-Bissau in
1998. The organization negotiated the cessation of hostilities in coordination with ECOWAS,
halting separatist pressures in the country. The successful peaceful resolution of the conflict
was later praised by the United Nations (Pimentel 2000).

The neoliberal policies impacted negatively on the naval industry. Collor carried out
deregulating measures on freight and port administrations. They reduced the influence of
labor unions on workforce regulation, leading to massive unemployment in port cities.
International freighters received permissions to operate in international sea routes to and from
Brazil. The national fleet turned out to represent less than 30% of the whole commerce,

31
There were two other previous missions in Angola in which Brazil had participated by sending military
observers and health workers from 1989 to 1991 and 1991 to 1995. They are usually referred to as UN
Verification Mission I, II and III, respectively.
 56

according to Penha (2011), and only 8% of which was composed of Brazilian-made vessels.
This led to an even larger drop in the demand for new ships produced in Brazilian shipyards,
most of which filed bankruptcy and had to be shut down, generating more unemployment.
There were approximately 3,000 people working in the naval industry by the end of the
decade (Pires, Gomide, and Amaral 2014). FHC opened the freighter market to international
companies even further by removing restrictions on coastal routes navigation. The freighter
costs fell down significantly in the 1990s and that reduced inflationary pressures on the
economy. However, as a consequence, the industry suffered another major blow and by the
end of the 1990s the Brazilian merchant fleet was composed by old and obsolete ships. The
liberalization of ports did not guarantee neither private nor public investments to their
modernization. Most of the Brazilian ports became too old and shallow for modern ships to
dock. In the end, the naval sector grew to be an oligopoly of large transnational companies in
detriment of domestic small and medium scale ones. The end of the XX century thusly
witnessed the end of the naval industry and freighter services in Brazil, which once had been
one of the leading countries in the world in that area.

The neoliberal paradigm also harmfully impacted the Brazilian military naval
industry and, even worse, the overall defense policy of the State suffered from it as well.
Collor and FHC cut all subsidies to the military industry, causing some companies to shut
down. Moreover, both also sharply cut investments in the Armed Forces, notably the Navy.
Defense spending as a proportion of the GDP fell markedly. Warships and general equipment
became obsolete, since no attention was given to them by the State. On top of that, because
neoliberal leaders saw no immediate threats to Brazil in the neighborhood and believed that
the US would provide any military assistance if necessary, the country's national security
system was completely dismantled (Cervo and Bueno 2002).

In sum, the neoliberal paradigm cut back the Brazilian policies towards the South
Atlantic. It deprived Brazil of any notion of national project linked with the ocean. There was
a conviction that the Global North would steer the way towards socioeconomic development
and guarantee the country's defense — a belief that the country's needs were intrinsically
linked with those of the developed world. This lack of perception of any concrete national
interests led to the demise of the naval industry and the abandonment of the Navy. The
obsolescence of the military and merchant fleets was accompanied by mass unemployment.
Furthermore, the political and economic relations with South Atlantic Africa were reduced to
 57

a bare minimum number of countries, i.e. with Angola, Namibia, Nigeria, and South Africa,
besides the CPLP. The dependency on the Global North rose to whole new levels, increasing
the vulnerability of the Brazilian State. In the end, since the only positive impact of the
neoliberal policies were the productivity gains, the whole model began to be questioned by
the ruling elite itself — and this resulted in the rediscovery of the South Atlantic as a catalyst
of development.
 58

4. RETURNING TO THE SOUTH ATLANTIC: THE LOGISTICAL PARADIGM

4.1. The logistical paradigm

The origins of the logistical paradigm are threefold (Cervo 2008a).32 First, the failure
of the neoliberal policies on the social sphere, generating massive social exclusion.
Socioeconomic indicators worsened for the whole duration of the neoliberal paradigm,
especially poverty and unemployment. Second, the ruling class noticed that their colleagues
from the Global North did not follow the precepts they advocated. It was a typical case of “do
as I say, not as I do”: “The ruling class of the center preached openness and liberalism à
outrance as a recipe to overcome the crisis of Latin America, but they themselves declined the
implementation of these precepts, moved by the defense of their strategic long-term interests”
(Cervo 2008a, 84, my translation, original emphasis). So Latin American leaders realized that
they should better follow the North's behavior instead of their recommendations. Lastly, Latin
American critical thinking survived throughout the neoliberal era. Even though its
representatives were not in the spotlight, they persisted with their criticism of the model being
pursued without promoting a return to the developmentalist paradigm, but a mature
international insertion (Cervo 2008a).

Cervo (2008a) states that the ideology of the logistical paradigm is close to a
synthesis of both previous paradigms: liberalism to the outside and developmentalism for the
inside. It accepts that the nation is inserted in the capitalist world system and part of the
globalization. The internationalization of the economy is a tool for achieving development,
not an end in itself. As a result, it is an ideology which advocates for a balanced international
insertion, having development as a major goal (Machado 2009).

Politically, the logistical paradigm recovers the autonomy for foreign policy decision
making so as to overcome asymmetries found in the capitalist system (Cervo 2008a). In this
case, the State tries to carry out the interests of the society as a whole. It is no longer limited
to achieving macroeconomic stability. Yet it transfers the responsibilities of the
developmentalist entrepreneur State to the society itself (Cervo 2008a). So the State is neither
absolute (developmentalist) nor minimal (neoliberal), but mature. It challenges the

32
The terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001, in New York could be considered a complementary root for the
paradigm shift, although they happened at a slightly later date (Visentini 2013).
 59

assumption of developmentalism that the State has to provide everything, but also eliminates
the belief that the free market is able to do that. In the eyes of Cervo (2008a), this is the
conduct of advanced nations, which act according to their varied national interests. Therefore,
a logistical international insertion is assertive and based on the pursuit of complex and
diversified national interests.

The formation and perception of national interests is based on the supposition that
the developmentalist phase has been exhausted (Cervo 2008a). The Brazilian society is
advanced and its interests are thusly very plural and they need to be pursued internationally.
In view of that, the State projects the internationalization of the economy, trying to overcome
asymmetries of the capitalist system. Brazil is part of it, but the hegemonic structures can be
changed. The Sate, then, tries to lessen external vulnerabilities, mainly technological and
financial dependency, through the promotion of productive innovation and abandoning its
condition of international beggar (Cervo 2008a; Cervo and Bueno 2002).

According to Cervo (2008a), the main challenge identified by the logistical paradigm
is to strengthen the economic core of the nation to the level already achieved by advanced
countries. The focus relies on the State support to private and public enterprises in order for
them to improve their performance and attain global competitiveness (Cervo 2008a). Under
the logistical paradigm, the State is a strategist, not a conductor. Its logic is that development
comes from the coordination between government and civil society (Souza and Dias 2013).
There can be some state-entrepreneurship, but it is limited to key sectors. This being the case,
privatizations are halted or even reversed (Cervo and Bueno 2002). Accordingly, the State
tries to build the country's means of power and uses them to gain intangible comparative
advantages: science, technology, and entrepreneurial capability (Cervo 2008a).

Hence, globalization is an opportunity for doing business and advancing national

interests. Cervo (2008a) notices that this is the same perception of the countries from the
Global North, which end up protecting their companies, technologies, and capital, stimulating
their domestic consolidation and international expansion, while watching out for welfare,
decent wages, and employment. In the logistical paradigm, Brazil forges coalitions that
strengthen its role and challenge hegemonic structures, questioning the world order in the
sense that its rules should be written by all (Cervo 2008a). Globalization and interdependence
should be the starting point towards inclusion and multilateral governance, not exclusion and
 60

rule by the few. For Brazilian interests, real interdependence in a globalized world implies
making national enterprises join global productive chains and providing direct investments
abroad, especially in South America. Beyond economic expansion, the logistical paradigm,
thus, provides the means for regional integration (Sebben 2010). On top of that, South
American integration serves three purposes: Shielding the countries against external shocks,
creating a stable and peaceful environment that enables further development of the
subcontinent, and being a launch pad for their global power (Stuenkel 2013).

4.2. Brazilian international insertion in the XXI century

The quick succession of economic crises in the end of the 1990s strongly impacted
on the Plano Real and Mercosul. FHC and the ruling class realized that Brazil was very
vulnerable to external shocks and that there was an unequal distribution of power — the
“asymmetric globalization” —, especially in trade negotiations (Silva 2008). It led to a change
of course of the Brazilian international insertion towards a mitigation of these factors.
However, there were not many significant alterations in FHC's government: The critical
stance and the inflexion were only seeds that would germinate later (Visentini 2013; Cervo
2008a; Vigevani, Oliveira, and Cintra 2003).

The most important gear change under FHC was the renewed impulse towards South
American regional integration. When Mercosul seemed to fail, the Brazilian policy actually
perceived integration as a means to escape the economic crisis in the bloc: With it South
America would not be as dependent on foreign countries as before, i.e. they would diminish
their vulnerability to foreign markets through deeper regional integration (Vizentini 2005).
The landmark of this counter-intuitive choice is the convening of the Brasília Summit (also
known as the First South American Summit), which happened in 2000 (Sim es 2012). In the
meeting, Brazil not only tried to bind together Mercosul member-states, but introduced
initiatives to establish a subcontinental integration process. FHC devised the establishment of
SAFTA through a free trade agreement between Mercosul and the Andean Community, but,
on top of that, he proposed the construction of transportation, energy, and communication
infrastructure interconnecting all South American countries (Cervo and Bueno 2002). The
latter proposal was named Initiative for the Integration of South American Regional
Infrastructure (IIRSA, Portuguese acronym). It is the inversion of a historical tendency,
 61

because all South American countries had been facing the sea and external markets while
ignoring each other since the colonization period (Visentini 2013).33 As the then Minister of
Foreign Affairs Celso Lafer explains it:

The borders of our region are not and neither should be seen as divisive
borders, but as borders of cooperation. This is so as to build the economy of
our geography; to create synergies and axes of infrastructural integration; to
establish conditions of security and tranquility to face the common challenge
of development (MRE Brasil 2001 my translation).
These efforts for South American integration were continued and strengthened under
the presidency of Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva (2003-2010) from the Workers' Party.34 Lula's
Brazil consolidated its leadership status by pushing forward the South American integration
and Mercosul's re-foundation. In 2004 the Brasília Summit was institutionalized and
rebranded as the Community of South American Nations (CASA, Portuguese acronym). In
the scope of Mercosul, Brazil put forward the creation of the Fund for Structural Convergence
(FOCEM) and the Program of Competitive Import Substitution, whose objective is to tackle
imbalances between member-states and Brazil through the funding of their infrastructure and
exports to Brazil. For IIRSA, Brazil started to finance projects through the National Bank for
Economic and Social Development (BNDES). Lula also helped avert political crises in
Venezuela and supported Peru's association with Mercosul in an effort to bring all Andean
countries politically and economically closer to the bloc (Visentini 2013). In 2004, Brazil
accepted to take on the military leadership of the United Nations Stabilization Mission in
Haiti (MINUSTAH). Other South American countries deployed their troops to MINUSTAH
and the mission served to increase the interoperability among the Armed Forces of the
subcontinent — an important step towards military cooperation — (Reis and Guimarães
2011).

These initiatives had very positive results and culminated in CASA's upgrade to the
Union of South American Nation (UNASUL) in 2007. According to Vizentini (2005), the
priority given to South American integration offered all neighboring countries a necessary
partnership to resume economic growth and effectively reversed the global trend of
marginalization of the region. The continental integration is seen as the only global strategy

33
Meanwhile, the United States pushed for the concretization of the FTAA. However, Brazil was focusing on
South America and perceived the hemispheric integration as detrimental to the project. Therefore, Brasília
was very cautious with Washington's attempt at accelerating the negotiations (Silva 2008; Visentini 2013).
34
Lula was the first center-left leaning president of Brazil.
 62

for all countries to assure development and governability in South America, while being a
necessary instrument for negotiations with other countries (Silva 2013; Vizentini 2005). In
fact, international trade talks, hemispheric or at the WTO, were also strongly affected by the
South American bloc, which together could demand more concessions from developed
countries (Hurrell 2009). Beyond commerce, UNASUL quickly became an organization for
high level dialogue between all countries to solve political disputes and divergences. For
instance, the South American Defense Council (CDSA, Portuguese acronym) was created in
2008 within the organization's scope to establish military confidence-building measures and
to come up with a common defense doctrine, inclusively for controlling the presence of
foreign bases in South American territory (Abdul-Hak 2013).35 However, CDSA's agenda
does not extend to extra-regional issues and it also does not seek to challenge outside powers
or blocs: Its goal is to consolidate peaceful relations among South American States (Stuenkel
2013). In 2009 IIRSA was absorbed by UNASUL with the creation of the South American
Infrastructure and Planning Council (COSIPLAN, Portuguese acronym). COSIPLAN has
given greater political support to physical integration activities, establishing strategic action
plans involving both private and public sectors.

Overarching the Brazilian international insertion under Lula, there was an active and
affirmative diplomacy. Itamaraty regained its prominent role, even though the presidential
diplomacy was kept as an important tool. In addition to that, the Ministry conducted its
policies with the support and collaboration of other state institutions, such as BNDES and the
Armed Forces. According to Visentini (2013), it included three diplomatic dimensions:
economic, political, and social. Economically, the country maintained its relations with
developed countries in order to obtain investments and technology at the same time as it
adopted a firmer stance in relation to international economic organisms such as the WTO and
the IMF. Politically, Brazil returned to the defense of its sovereignty and national interests.
Finally, on the social sphere, there was a clear sign towards the construction of an alternative
socioeconomic model which would tackle the distortions created by a globalization focused
solely on trade and free capital flows (Visentini 2013).

Having that in mind, along with the South American core of the Brazilian
international insertion strategy lies the idea of establishing closer relations with other

35
Bearing in mind that Venezuela and Ecuador had many times expressed their dissatisfaction with the US
military bases in Colombian territory under the pretext of the War on Drugs.
 63

developing countries and thereby to diversify global partnerships. As Lula's Minister of

Foreign Affairs, Celso Amorim, expressed it:

At the crossroads of all the main guidelines of Brazilian foreign policy is the
effort to establish closer relations with other developing countries. South-
South cooperation is a diplomatic strategy that originates from an authentic
desire to exercise solidarity toward poorer countries. At the same time, it
helps expand Brazil’s participation in world affairs. Cooperation among
equals in matters of trade, investment, science and technology and other
fields reinforces our stature and strengthens our position in trade, finance
and climate negotiations. Last but not least, building coalitions with
developing countries is also a way of engaging in the reform of global
governance in order to make international institutions fairer and more
democratic (Amorim 2010, 231).
Indeed, Brazil increased its ties with Africa, the Middle-East and Asia, besides Latin
America. The country forged strategic partnerships with other emerging countries for the
establishment of a multipolar and truly multilateral world order. The first step was the
creation of the India-Brazil-South Africa Forum (IBSA) to promote trilateral cooperation,
trade liberalization, and policy consultation and coordination in multilateral forums.
Preferential trade agreements between Mercosul and India and between Mercosul and SACU,
led by South Africa, were sealed in 2004 and 2009 respectively. There is a possibility that
both merge and include other South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation member-
states. Negotiations also started in 2007 for the same kind of agreement between Mercosul
and the Gulf Cooperation Council. Besides that, the grouping of Brazil, Russia, India, and
China (BRIC) started to hold informal meetings in 2006 for policy coordination. Brazil
reached science and high tech agreements with each of the BRIC countries individually.
Brazil also proposed the creation of the Summit of South American-Arab Countries and the
Africa-South America Summit, that took place in 2005 and 2006 respectively and have been
occurring ever since. Other groundbreaking South-South cooperation high-level meetings
involving Brazil were mainly in Africa, where Lula participated in an African Union (AU)
and an Economic Community Of West African States (ECOWAS) summit. In addition to that,
Brazil exercised its “solidarity diplomacy” in Africa sharing know-how and enhancing
technical cooperation, for instance, in agricultural and pharmaceutical sectors. Visentini
(2013) informs that the activities of the Brazilian Agency for Cooperation (ABC), Itamaraty's
division responsible for these initiatives, increased more than 250% since the beginning of
Lula's mandate.
 64

Brazil sought partners outside of the western hemisphere as a way to strengthen its
influence in the international scene through a more active and pragmatic posture (Vigevani
and Cepaluni 2007; Vizentini 2005). Vigevani and Cepaluni (2007) name this strategy of
“autonomy through diversification”. It does not only mean the search for alternative
international partners, but also the ability to pursue national interests in questions that
transcend the most immediate concerns, i.e. to intervene in matters concerning international
public goods (Vigevani and Cepaluni 2007). In this sense, Lula has used South-South
cooperation to balance Brazil's international insertion vis-à-vis developed countries and
international capital flows. It does not mean that the country has ignored its relations with the
developed world nor that it has abandoned established international regimes, but rather that
South-South relations have been used to balance the power wielded by developed countries in
world politics, especially in institutions such as the UN and the WTO (Machado 2013).

In fact, Brazilian relations with the European countries and the US thrived under
Lula regardless of some political disagreements. For instance, the amount of foreign direct
investment from Europe and the US into Brazil and vice versa rose sharply (Cervo and Bueno
2011). Brazil became a strategic partner of the EU in 2007 and regular Brazil-EU high-level
summits were established. Particularly with Washington, there was a notion of “limited
divergence” so as to avoid open confrontations between both countries (Lima and Hirst 2009).
In view of that, even though Brazil differed from the US on several occasions — such as the
invasion of Iraq and the War on Terror as a whole, the militarization of the Colombian
conflict, and WTO trade disputes —, two major accords were signed by the countries in the
fields of defense and energy technology. Similar bilateral agreements were sealed with France
and Germany. Brazil renewed the nuclear agreement with the latter in 2005, 2010, and again
in 2014.36 Brasília and Paris reached a comprehensive strategic agreement in 2008 which
included provisions for French military technology transfer.

Brazil maintained its strategy of autonomy through diversification even after the
financial crisis hit the world economy in 2008. The country was invited by the G7 (US,
France, UK, Canada, Germany, Italy, and Japan) to compose the financial G20 in order to
discuss the effects of the crisis and the economic stagnation in developed countries. There was

36
This is the same nuclear agreement that was signed in 1975. It has already been renewed five times. The
issue gained more importance in 2004, because the German Green Party wanted to denounce it, but after the
strong opposition of Dilma Rousseff, the then Brazilian Minister of Mining and Energy, the agreement was
maintained (Miranda 2014).
 65

the first high-level BRIC Summit in Yekaterinburg in 2009, which was held for further
coordinating their positions to be presented in G20 meetings. After 2009, it became a regular
activity of the four countries. Analysts deemed it a major success of Lula's foreign policy,
since the crisis did not have as negative an effect in Brazil as in the Global North, and a sign
of multipolarity in the international system (e.g. Pimentel 2013; Mello 2011; Visentini 2013).
As a result of the lower level of commerce between Brazil and the developed world, China
became the country's largest individual trade partner, a position which has been held ever
since.37

Around the same time, Brazil was invited by Middle-Eastern countries to perform the
role of mediator in disputes of the region. In 2009, amidst rising tensions between Iran and the
West, Lula went to Teheran trying to broker a deal with the help of Turkey. 38 The joint
trilateral declaration reached several confidence-building measures that provided a non-
confrontational solution to the deadlock. However, the United States and other western
countries rejected it. In addition to this initiative, Minister Celso Amorim coordinated efforts
to reach a peaceful resolution of the Israel-Palestine conflict during the Gaza War in 2009.
After a ceasefire was reached, Lula became the first Brazilian head of state to visit the
Palestine and Israel (Visentini 2013). His last deed in office in 2010 was the diplomatic
recognition of the Palestinian State according to the borders of 1967.

Dilma Rousseff (2011-2014), also from the Workers' Party, took over the presidency
in 2011. She maintained the same tenets of Brazilian international insertion but with a lower
profile than her predecessor (Stuenkel 2014a; Stuenkel 2014b). Under her, Brazil again
sought a diversification of partnerships without neglecting traditional ones. For instance, her
first year in office was marked by US President Barack Obama's visit to Brazil and by the
further institutionalization of the BRIC, which became BRICS after South Africa joined the
group as a result of a Brazilian initiative. Obama and Dilma were interested in improving
bilateral relations. In the occasion, several agreements were signed on many issue-areas: trade
and economic cooperation, air transportation, peaceful exploration of the outer space,
technical cooperation in third countries, education and academic exchange programs,

37
The EU taken as a bloc has had a greater share of the overall trade relations of Brazil since its inception.
38
Brazil has always defended the right to peaceful use of nuclear energy, nuclear disarmament, and safekeeping
fissile material to prevent nuclear terrorism.
 66

biodiversity, and biofuels. Obama also verbally supported the Brazilian claim for a permanent
seat at the UN Security Council.

Despite this initial intensification of US-Brazil ties, the bilateral relations suffered a
major setback in 2013. Dilma called off an official trip to Washington after leaked documents
had shown that the US National Security Agency (NSA) had spied millions of Brazilian
citizens' emails and phone calls (Greenwald, Kaz, and Casado 2013). The situation worsened
with the revelation that the NSA had also spied on Dilma's personal email address, on her
assistants, and on Petrobras (G1 2014; Kaz 2014). The espionage scandal prompted a harsh
Brazilian reprimand against the US at the UN General Assembly in September 2014 and
several other concrete measures to curb this vulnerability. Domestically, Brazil started to
develop its own encrypted email servers and physical databases. The Congress also passed a
bill regulating the internet and safeguarding privacy rights and net neutrality. Internationally,
Brazil worked together with Germany, also targeted by the NSA, to pass a resolution at the
UN recognizing privacy rights as human rights. Moreover, the EU and Brazil began working
on the installation of a direct submarine fiber-optic cable from the South Atlantic to Western
Europe to circumvent US servers and jurisdiction.

Even though Brazil strongly criticized the western intervention in Libya in 2011 —
leading up to the concept of “responsibility while protecting” for regulating humanitarian
military actions —, the relations with Europe prospered. Brazil became the 6 th largest investor
in the continent, amounting to 80 billion US dollars (Visentini 2013). There was also the
resumption of the trade talks between Mercosul and the EU with growing signs of an
agreement soon to be made. Brazilian ties with Sweden in particular intensified to whole new
level. In the beginning of 2013, both countries launched with Turkey a new informal trilateral
grouping for political consultations (COMEX 2014). By the end of the same year, Brazil
decided to acquire the Swedish fighter jets Gripen NG for its Air Force, putting an end to the
decades-old procurement program FX-2. The country will strengthen its defense industry and
increase its strategic autonomy with the joint production of these airplanes, since the
agreement includes technology transfer provisions and Brazil may export the jets to Argentina
and other South American countries (Oliveira, Zucatto, and Guimarães 2014; Oliveira et al.
2013).
 67

Dilma also demonstrated that for her South America was the core of the Brazilian
international insertion strategy. Brazil created more incentives within Mercosul for the
implementation of a financing fund for education and for the facilitation of academic
exchange programs for the students in the bloc. After a coup d'état in Paraguay got the
country suspended from Mercosul in 2012, Brazil pushed for the accession of Venezuela into
the organization. This measure circumvented Asunción (and the Paraguayan Senate), for it
was the only country that still had not approved the Venezuelan entrance. The coup in
Paraguay was also severely condemned by UNASUL countries. 39 Moreover, Dilma supported
the creation of the UNASUL Electoral Council and the UNASUL Council for Security,
Justice and Fight Against Transnational Organized Crime. The organization launched plans to
develop their own advanced trainer warplane, the Unasul-1. In 2014 UNASUL also approved
the creation of the South American Defense College.

Finally the highlight of 2014 was the BRICS Summit in Fortaleza, Brazil. The result
of the meeting was the creation of the BRICS Development Bank (officially New
Development Bank — NDB) and the BRICS Contingency Reserve Arrangement (CRA). Both
are the main financial organisms created since World War II and the Bretton Woods
Conference. 40 They emerged as a reaction to restrictions imposed by the US Legislative
bodies for the ratification of the new IMF quotas which would give the BRICS a greater role
in the institution (Desai and Vreeland 2014). Cheng (2014) and Stuenkel (2014c) argue that
they do not compete with the World Bank nor with the IMF, but rather complement them.
Nevertheless, Cheng (2014) argues that both institutions show the vitality and dynamism of
the BRICS in contrast to the slow pace of the economies of the developed world. While they
do not threaten the liberal economic order, these arrangements do pose a challenge to the rule
by the West and represent a new multipolar era (Heydarian 2014; Cheng 2014; Visentini apud
Costas and Fellet 2014).

39
There were some fears that the US could have been behind the coup, because Washington recognized the
new Paraguayan government only a few hours after the Paraguayan president's impeachment. Considering
that a few months afterwards Paraguay authorized the installation of a small US military base in its territory
for coping with “natural disasters”, the suspicion does not seem to be unfounded.
40
The NDB will have an initial an initial subscribed capital of US$ 50 billion and an initial authorized capital
of US$ 100 billion and it will finance infrastructure projects in the BRICS and other developing countries
(MRE Brasil 2014a). The CRA's initial total committed resources will be US$ 100 billion (MRE Brasil
2014b). China's initial contribution to the reserve will be of 41%; Brazil, India, and Russia will contribute
with 18% each and South Africa 5% (MRE Brasil 2014b). The CRA will work as a “financial safety net” for
the BRICS and other developing countries too.
 68

4.3. Returning to the South Atlantic

The logistical paradigm caused a revolution in the Brazilian policies for the South
Atlantic: strengthening of the regional integration, broadening relations with African states,
resumption of strategic projects, and revitalization of the naval industry. In the last years of
the FHC's second mandate, several impulses were given in the direction of increasing Brazil's
role in the South Atlantic. For instance, the Brazilian Navy acquired the aircraft-carrier São
Paulo from France in 2000. FHC also signed in 2001 the Naval Cooperation Agreement
(NCA) with Namibia. Under the auspices of this program, Brazil has helped to create and
train the Namibian Marine Corps, besides assisting the establishment of the Maritime Patrol
Service of Namibia. Under the NCA, Brazil has also mapped the continental shelf of the
country. Brazil has also donated several warships and patrol boats to the country since then,
most noticeably the Corvette Purus, which served in the Namibian navy between 2004 and
2012 up to its decommissioning. To date hundreds of Namibians officers and sailors have
graduated in the Brazilian Navy War School. Furthermore, Brazil opened a permanent Naval
Mission in Walvis Bay, one of the best natural ports of southwestern Africa (Gonzalez 2013;
Teixeira and Anselmo 2010).41

Lula deepened Brazil-Africa relations after his inauguration. His presidential

diplomacy witnessed numerous trips to African countries. He was always accompanied by
representatives of the private sector, demonstrating a new face of the Brazilian international
insertion (IPEA and World Bank 2011; Carmody 2013), characteristic of the logistical
paradigm. The measure was reciprocated by African heads of state, which paid several official
visits to Brazil. Lula pardoned their debts based on the idea overcoming social and economic
asymmetries through a partnership for development (IPEA and World Bank 2011).
Investments by Brazilian companies in African countries soared. Several new commercial
maritime routes were opened with the higher demand from the trade between Brazil and
Africa, which more than quadruplicated in Lula's two terms (MRE Brasil 2010). Besides that,
embassies that were closed by FHC have been reopened and other ones were built in countries
in which there had previously been none. The opening of the embassy in São Tomé and

41
It must be noted that this permanent naval mission is not the same as a military base. There are no warships
and only a few military attachés are deployed to this mission in order to regularly train Namibian marine
soldiers.
 69

Príncipe is very exemplar of the strategic logic of the Brazilian insertion, since the country is
central for the oil-rich Gulf of Guinea (Amorim 2013).

Map 3 — The Blue Amazon

Source: Pacheco (2009).

In 2004, the Brazilian Navy launched a concept called the “Blue Amazon”. It is
basically a plea at the United Nations for the legal extension of the country's continental shelf
 70

thereby increasing its Exclusive Economic Zone. If the plea is fully accepted by the
Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf, the Brazilian territory would become
50% larger, as it can be seen on Map 3 (Wiesebron 2013). While the ZEE only covers 200
nautical miles from the coast, the Blue Amazon would add 150 miles to that. In 2007 the
Commission deemed valid only 81% of the plea. Brazil has prepared other proposals for the
remaining 19% that are currently being analyzed by the Commission.

Concerns over maritime rights and the South Atlantic as a whole were heightened
after the discovery of large oil fields in its continental shelf. The Pré-Sal has enough potential
to boost oil production to make Brazil become of the 10 largest producers in the world
(Oliveira 2012).42 Lula coupled the exploration of these deepwater oil field to the
revitalization of the naval industry through Petrobras. The company has guaranteed demand
for platforms and boats produced in Brazil. In 2013 Brazilian lawmakers approved the
production sharing regime, which includes regulations requiring that several components of
the technologies used to extract oil from the Pré-Sal have to be produced in Brazi. It shows a
strategic planning of the government to support national industry and technology, besides
endogenously creating jobs and wealth (Brites and Jaeger 2013). In fact the industry was
heated up and it provided approximately 71,000 jobs by the end of the same year (Pires,
Gomide, and Amaral 2014). This is basically the essence of the logistical paradigm, i.e. the
State working to leverage the private sector towards the development of the country trying to
overcome capitalist asymmetries through Petrobras.

Because of this greater awareness to guarantee Brazilian presence in the South

Atlantic, the country has adopted several policies to fully survey and protect the Blue Amazon
and the Pré-Sal. For the maritime resources two programs, namely the Prospection and
Exploration of Mineral Resources from the International Area of the South Atlantic Program
(PROAREA) and Biomar, have been developed. They deal with prospection and exploration
of South Atlantic mineral and living resources respectively (e.g. Leite 2011). PROAREA's
studies led to the 2014 authorization by the UN for Brazil to explore the Rio Grande Elevation
for cobalt and other minerals on the high seas of the ocean. On issues of scientific research,

42
The US is also present through the IV Fleet, which was reactivated in 2008 shortly after the discovery of
huge oil fields in the Brazilian offshore. The reasons presented by the US for the reactivation were the
combat against illicit trafficking and enhancing regional security (Bandeira 2009). It must be noted, however,
the IV Fleet does not have any permanently assigned warships. Currently it maintains only a command
structure and deployments occur only on a case by case basis.
 71

Brazil has taken on two programs, namely Protrindade and Proarquipélago. The former aims
at the development of the Trindade archipelago, which constitutes one of the insular
trampolines identified by Therezinha de Castro (see Map 2). The latter fosters research in all
Brazilian South Atlantic islands. Both are have been implemented by the Brazilian Navy,
whose main objective is to guarantee that all islands are permanently inhabited so that Brazil
may claim and guarantee its ZEE in the South Atlantic. Lastly, Brazil has also started to
develop the Blue Amazon Management System (SisGAAz). This system will be used for both
civilian and military purposes, since it includes an ambitious surveillance system
(Albuquerque 2010). The technologies used in SisGAAz are considered strategic and
therefore they have been designed by Brazilian companies for controlling them and
generating employment opportunities for highly skilled workers.

The situation on the military side has also gained much attention, although not as
coordinated as needed. Brazil's Defense White Paper and the National Defense Policy state
that the South Atlantic is a strategic for the security of the country. Denying the command of
the ocean to foreign powers is the objective. Most of the Brazilian Navy's warships and
equipments are still in need of replacement and modernization (Luis 2012; Brites, Martins,
and Silva 2013; Oliveira, Cepik, and Brites 2013). The strengthening of the Navy has been
Brazil's permanent goal since the year 2000. Investments have been carried out for the
development of nuclear submarines through the Submarine Development Program (PROSUB,
Portuguese acronym) and the Plan of Articulation and Equipment of the Brazilian Navy
(PAEMB, Portuguese acronym). According to the Brazilian National Defense Strategy issued
in 2005, the country is supposed to build 15 conventional submarines plus six nuclear ones (P.
da R. Brasil 2005). The document notes that submarines, especially the nuclear-powered ones,
are essential for sea-denial capabilities (P. da R. Brasil 2005; MD Brasil 2012). As such,
Brazil has sought a proactive posture for the defense of the Blue Amazon, especially oil
reserves and platforms. To sponsor research and business initiatives in areas related to
PROSUB, Brazil created the state defense company Amazul (Blue Amazon Defense
Technologies) in 2012. It was activated in August 2013 and it has been providing assistance
to build submarines and other warships for the Brazilian Navy. Lula and Dilma have also
shown intentions to renew Brazil's surface fleet. One of the main programs created for that is
the Program for the Obtainment of Surface Assets (PROSUPER, Portuguese acronym), which
plans the construction of five frigates, five patrol vessels, and one logistics support vessel in
 72

national shipyards. Several European and East Asian countries have already demonstrated
their intentions of developing partnerships for that purpose (Oliveira, Cepik, and Brites 2013).
Even so, budgetary constraints have affected most of the procurement programs aimed at
modernization and acquisition of capabilities, including PROSUPER, which was suspended in
early 2011. PROSUB is the only program which does not suffer significantly from such
problems. Consequently, the construction of conventional and nuclear-powered submarines
has been maintained despite economic shortcomings, while the construction and acquisition
of other kinds of warships has been interrupted (Albrecht 2011; IISS 2013). The Military
Balance 2013 states that together PROSUB, PROSUPER, and SisGAAz could grant Brazil
force-projection capabilities consistent with a global-power status, but that delays in these
procurement programs make its achievement uncertain (IISS 2013). In the end, the
modernization of the Navy has been hinging on:

[…] the health of the overall economy, and on how much Brazil sees state-
of-the-art military hardware necessary to sustain its international political
ambitions. The absence of a conventional strategic threat in the region and,
more recently, slow economic growth contribute to a reluctance to make
defence spending a priority (IISS 2013, 429).
This relative lack of focus for defense spending can be seen in the relations with the
United Kingdom and France. On the one hand, Brazil has commissioned British destroyers for
the Navy in the 2000s. These orders, however, have been made without much planning: They
were bought in “sell-out” situations, when other countries had cancelled their previous
contracts (Oliveira, Cepik, and Brites 2013). On the other hand, Brazil signed a strategic
military agreement with France to modernize the navy in 2008, showing signs of willingness
and a sense of purpose towards that goal. France agreed to jointly build with Brazil five
submarines, one powered by a Brazilian nuclear reactor and four conventional ones. France
has assisted in the design and construction of the non-nuclear parts, mainly the hull (IISS
2013). All submarines are to be manufactured in Brazil, i.e. the deal includes technology
transfers, creates jobs, and engenders development, and the first one is to be delivered in
2023.

On the multilateral level, Brazil renewed its efforts to push ZOPACAS forward after
the setback in 1998. In the 2007 Luanda Summit, four working groups were created. They
were divided into economic cooperation, combat to illicit activities and organized crime,
peacekeeping and peace operations, and scientific research on environmental and maritime
 73

issues. At the same meeting, ZOPACAS called on the United Kingdom to end its occupation
of the Malvinas/Falkland islands for the first time since its creation. In 2013 Brasília
promoted the inclusion of security issues more prominently in the agenda of the grouping.
Moreover, the Brazilian Defense Minister, Celso Amorim, offered to share know-how on the
mapping of continental shelves, capacity-building for rescue operations on the open sea,
peace operations, and maritime surveillance through long range identification and tracking
(MD Brasil 2013). Besides that, Brazil also suggested the creation of ZOPACAS seminars
regarding the defense of the South Atlantic, mostly concerned with the rising threat posed by
piracy in the Gulf of Guinea (Zucatto and Baptista 2014).

Under the scope of UNASUL, Brazil has supported the Argentinean claim over the
Malvinas/Falklands. The organization prohibited ships carrying the Falklands flag to dock in
all South American ports. After oil reserves were discovered in the region of the archipelago,
the United Kingdom started to stage military drills with a certain frequency and UNASUL has
condemned these measures several times. It has also defended the Argentinean claims at the
United Nations, calling for peaceful negotiations.

CPLP has also been an important forum for Brazilian policies in the South Atlantic.
In 2010 there was a high level meeting to discuss issues concerning the seas. Angola proposed
that all member-states should join efforts to map their continental shelves. Brazil promptly
agreed with it and the country has been assisting Angola, São Tomé and Príncipe,
Mozambique, Guinea-Bissau, and Cape Verde with this task since then. They also agreed to
host regular naval conferences. Since then, the navies of CPLP member-states have met
several times to discuss the geopolitical landscape and challenges to their international
insertion.

Bilaterally, Nigeria is still Brazil's main trade partner in Africa. Machado (2013) tells
that a de facto strategic partnership has actually been reached between both countries. For
instance, Petrobras has made its largest foreign direct investments in the country, summing up
to 2.3 billion US dollars (Penha 2011). Regarding the South Atlantic, Brazil started to assist
the Nigerian Navy in the combat against piracy in the Gulf of Guinea. The Brazilian
diplomatic mission in Lagos is one of the few that has had a permanent military envoy since
the 2000s. They signed a military agreement in 2010 according to which Brazil would train
 74

Nigerian naval officers and provide military vessels. The training program has been ongoing
since then.

Besides Nigeira, Brazil has also deepened its ties with Angola and South Africa.
Brasília and Luanda increased the exchanges between their navies in the past decade. Both
countries have also started to conduct joint research in the fields of shipbuilding, defense, and
public security (Fiori, Padula, and Vater 2012; Aguilar 2013). On the other hand, a military
cooperation agreement was signed between Brazil and South Africa in 2003. The navies of
both countries work in close cooperation to ensure the protection of the maritime borders as
well as the access to South Atlantic routes (Kornegay 2013). There have been joint military
exercises, namely ATLASUR (with Argentina and Uruguay) and IBSAMAR (with India).
Pretoria and Brasília have also worked together to develop the 5th generation A-Darter air-to-
air missiles, which will be adapted to fit the new Brazilian Gripen NG fighter jets. Both
countries are currently further negotiating the development of cargo aircraft, land-air missiles,
and unmanned aerial vehicles (Teixeira and Anselmo 2010; Vaz 2011; Kornegay 2013).

The energy company Petrobras has had a significant presence in offshore drilling in
Gabon and Congo Brazzaville. With Guinea-Bissau, Brazil has a military agreement which
helped constitute the country's first Security Forces through the Brazilian Mission of Techno-
Military Cooperation (Fiori, Padula, and Vater 2012). Brazil has also donated warships, patrol
boats and naval uniforms to the country. The same gesture was extended to São Tomé and
Príncipe. These measures have actually increased the demand for equipments produced by the
Brazilian military industry, i.e. they engender development and create jobs in the country in
line with the logistical international insertion paradigm. Finally, Brazil has also sold a corvette
to Equatorial Guinea in a deal which included the training of officers and sailors. Naval
instructors have also been sent to Benin by the Brazilian Navy. Brazil also has achieved a
military agreement with Senegal. In 2013 Brazil inaugurated a permanent naval mission in
Cape Verde to assist in the training of the coastguard. The logic of these actions is to avoid
the presence of extra-regional powers in the South Atlantic space, i.e. Brazil fosters local
states to strengthen their capabilities so that they do not have to ask for western assistance.

All in all, the emergence of the logistical paradigm meant the return of a national
project and the defense of national interests with an eye towards the South Atlantic, especially
after the discovery of the Pré-Sal. Brazil once again tried to reduce its vulnerabilities through
 75

greater ties with South America and Africa. The South Atlantic became a major locus for the
country's international insertion. Economic, military, and trade partnerships were forged and
deepened. Albeit demonstrating a willingness to make use of the ocean to boost social and
economic development, the governments of the period have not engaged in a comprehensive
concerted action, especially in areas related to defense. Nevertheless, significant steps have
been taken in that direction, such as PROSUB, SisGAAz, and the reorientation of Petrobras
towards the Pré-Sal. These are initiatives that pursue higher levels of technology for the
country, trying to modernize the Brazilian economy up to the most developed stages (e.g.
Martins 2013). The logistical international insertion in the South Atlantic, thus, has been
intense and has provided means for the reduction of asymmetries between the Global North
and Global South while playing the same game.
 76

5. CONCLUSION

The objective of this thesis was to assess how the developmentalist, neoliberal, and
logistical paradigms have oriented the Brazilian policy towards the South Atlantic from 1930
until today while exposing changes and continuity over time. Until 1990, Brazil had a clear
goal in mind, namely development, and this conditioned the country's policies towards the
Atlantic accordingly. The second paradigm ended this trend, leaving it up to the free market to
generate growth while forgetting any notion of national interest. The impact on the South
Atlantic was manifold: the end of the naval industry, the abandonment of the Navy, massive
unemployment, and a steep drop in political and economic relations with African countries. In
the XXI century Brazil learned the lessons from the neoliberal paradigm and implemented a
more autonomous international insertion strategy. The South Atlantic space thus became a
means for national development. Relations with Africa flourished, private companies resumed
investments in the continent, the Navy started to be modernized.

The logistical paradigm accepts the notion that capitalistic globalization is a reality
which must be dealt with to achieve development. The internationalization of the economy is
hence just a tool towards that goal. A logistical international insertion implies an autonomous
foreign policy making to overcome systemic asymmetries. The State acts together with the
private sector to strengthen the nation's economic center in order to reach higher levels of
technology and competitiveness. Since the beginning of the XXI century, Brazil has sought to
diversify its international partnerships, working on variable geometry coalitions to pursue its
national interests. Relations with the Global North have been maintained while newer blocs
have been created such as the BRICS and UNASUL.

Accordingly, the articulation of the logistical paradigm in the South Atlantic has
been aimed at Brazil's development. Political and economic partnerships with South Atlantic
countries have been fostered and deepened. Private sector investments in Africa soared. Brazil
has worked together with traditional powers, especially France, to modernize its Navy and
obtain strategic technological assets. Domestically, the exploration of the Pré-Sal revived the
country's naval industry through Petrobras' demand for ships and oil platforms, all the while
creating tens of thousands of employment opportunities. However, even though Lula, FHC
and Dilma have demonstrated a willingness to make use of the ocean to boost socioeconomic
development, their governments have not engaged in a comprehensive concerted action,
 77

especially on defense issue-areas. There was a return of the idea of a national development
project, yet it has not been implemented thoroughly. Nevertheless, significant steps have been
taken in that direction with PROSUB, SisGAAz, and Petrobras. These are initiatives that have
pursued higher levels of technology for the country, trying to modernize the Brazilian
economy up to the most developed stages. The logistical international insertion in the South
Atlantic, thus, has been intense and it has provided the means for the reduction of
asymmetries between the Global North and the Global South.

On the other hand, the Brazilian international insertion under the neoliberal paradigm
witnessed policies against a deliberate strategy of inducing development by the State. It would
be provided by the free market, while the State should only tackle the issue of economic
stability to create favorable conditions for private businesses to grow. Therefore, there is no
national project and no notion of national interest. The neoliberal model emerged as a way to
tackle the economic problems caused by developmentalism. Besides that, it is based on an
interpretation of the immediate post-Cold War in which the United States was the sole
superpower and that Brazil would guarantee its defense and development by participating in
international regimes and having good relations with the Global North. In practice, this
paradigm served as a base for selectivity in Brazilian foreign policy. Relations with developed
countries were favored in detriment to the Global South. Brazil unilaterally opened its
domestic market. There was no counterpart from any other country. The dependency on the
Global North rose to whole new levels, increasing the vulnerability of the Brazilian State.
Meanwhile, an open regionalism model was pursued in the formation of Mercosul. The
neoliberal international insertion accomplished monetary stability and the reduction of prices,
but it ended up creating many more social and economic problems.

The neoliberal paradigm undervalued the opportunities presented by the South

Atlantic. It deprived Brazil of any notion of national project linked with the ocean. The belief
that the country's needs were intrinsically linked with those of the developed world led to a
conviction that there should be no concerns over naval defense and the exploitation of
maritime resources towards development. This lack of perception of any concrete national
interests caused the abandonment of the Navy and the demise of the naval industry. Mass
unemployment followed the obsolescence of the military and merchant fleets. On the positive
side, productivity levels rose and freight costs sunk, reducing inflationary pressures on the
economy. Furthermore, the political and economic relations with South Atlantic African
 78

countries were reduced to a bare minimum, i.e. with Angola, Namibia, Nigeria, and South
Africa, besides the CPLP. In the end, since the only positive impact of the neoliberal policies
were the productivity gains and the reduction of prices, the whole model of international
insertion in the South Atlantic began to be questioned by the ruling elite itself.

Finally, the developmentalist paradigm comprised three main characteristics:

development and industrialization as the main goal, autonomous decision-making, and a
realist international insertion strategy. It considered that the Brazilian national interest is
composed of complex interests of the society. According to it, the State should lead the way
towards development. There was a strong notion of national development project. In practice,
Brazil at first pursued an associated model of development. The country favored relations
with the United States as long as the means to achieve modernization and growth were being
provided. Once Washington started to impose difficulties, Brazil tried to diversify its
relations. The first instance in which this happened was the PEI. The military regime reversed
this trend for a while, but it soon began to pursue an autonomous international insertion
strategy after renewed criticism from the US. This new phase of developmentalism witnessed
more ambitious plans. Brazil forged ties with the Third World in spite of criticism from
developed countries. In the end, the country reached the end of the industrialization process.
However, the depletion of the model presented future challenges, most importantly economic
instability.

The articulation of the developmentalist paradigm in relation to the South Atlantic

fulfilled the expected role: It contributed to Brazil's development. The national projects took
into account the maritime dimension for the pursuit of economic growth and industrialization.
At first, the associated developmentalism provided the required means for Brazil to
industrialize and strengthen its navy. However, it soon became clear that it was not
sustainable and that more partners would be needed to achieve the country's objectives. In the
autonomous developmentalist phase the South Atlantic became a strategic priority for the
national project. Brazil then forged ties with African countries regardless of regime type.
Naval plans were put in place to increase and modernize civilian and military fleets. They
boosted the Brazilian naval industry, which became one of the largest in the world, and
tackled vulnerabilities created by the developmentalist model itself. The Malvinas/Falklands
War deeply affected the Brazilian interpretation of the international scene. The country
realized that the Global South could not rely on the developed world for providing their
 79

security. Therefore, ZOPACAS was created and Brazil asserted its political leadership over
the South Atlantic space. However, by the end of the 1980s a bitter economic crisis hit the
country. It forced the country to seek out more partners in Africa and elsewhere. This policy
was successful. However, pressures emerged to end the developmental model when Brazil
had already achieved its industrialization and development goals and the South Atlantic
policy was halted.

All things considered, this study demonstrates that the effects of the international
insertion paradigms over the Brazilian policy towards the South Atlantic have been
considerably varied. It has shown that the logistical and developmentalist paradigms have
provided more beneficial results for Brazil's socioeconomic development than the neoliberal
one. The latter carried out important reforms, but the inattentiveness for the country's national
interests caused pernicious effects such as the selectivity in foreign relations, abandonment of
the Navy, and downfall of the naval industry. The neoliberal model belittled the idea of a
national development project, leading up to a situation in which Brazil increased its
dependency on the Global North without getting anything in return. Conversely, the logistical
and developmentalist paradigms have provided a realist foreign policy based on the national
interests of the country. Brazil maintained relations with all countries regardless of regime
type to achieve its objectives. In sum, both were equivalent to strategies from mature States.
The logistical international insertion recognizes the importance of the private sector and the
need for a nation-wide development project, especially linking defense, economic growth, and
social welfare. It is very similar to the way the United States, for instance, has conducted its
foreign and defense policy. In fact, the developmentalist and logistical paradigms represent a
pragmatist international insertion oriented by the independent pursuit of the nation's interests
— similar to the strategies of mature powers — while the neoliberal one is more ideological
and dependent, rather inadequate to the weight of the country in the international system.

Multipolarity brings many uncertainties to the international scene. The fairness of the
current world order has been questioned, since multipolarity does not mean multilateralism.
Those who write the rules want to keep their position, while ascending ones want to draft
them as well. Everyday new alliances and organizations are created to tackle the most
different issues, including security, environment, and trade. The South Atlantic is a
representative case, e.g. through UNASUL, ZOPACAS, IBSA. Brazil has upheld strong
positions making its national interests prevail for two periods of time since 1930, i.e. during
 80

the developmentalist and the logistical paradigms. These have provided the means for the
country to leverage and defend its position on the international scene. In the 1990s, however,
the country was grosso modo a mere pushover and barely could preserve some of its strategic
interests. In this sense, the logistical paradigm seems to have been the only one adequate for
the country to deal with the uncertainties of our time. By pursuing an international insertion
strategy that is autonomous, realist and oriented by the national interests of the country, it
seems that Brazil would not only guarantee its security and socioeconomic development, but
also forge the future of South America and the South Atlantic space.
 81

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