G.R. No.

168943 October 27, 2006

IGLESIA NI CRISTO, petitioner,

vs.
HON. THELMA A. PONFERRADA, in her capacity as Presiding Judge, Regional
Trial Court, Br. 104, Quezon City, and HEIRS OF ENRIQUE G. SANTOS,
respondents.

CO-OWNERSHIP- Action Reinvindicatoria

FACTS Only one of co-owners filed a complaint for Quieting of Title and/or Accion
Publiciana before the RTC, Quezon City. A motion to dismiss was filed alleging that
there was no showing that he was authorized to do so by the other co-owners. He
alleged that after the death of their father in 1970, they inherited the property; their
father, Enrique Santos, during his lifetime, and plaintiffs, after the death of the former,
had been in actual, continuous and peaceful possession of the property until 1994 when
petitioner claimed ownership based on TCT No. 321744 issued on September 18, 1984
and barred them from fencing their property.

Petitioner’s claim that it had been in actual or material possession of the property since
1984 when TCT No. 321744 was issued in its favor is belied by the allegations in the
complaint that respondents had been in actual and material possession of the property
since 1961 up to the time they filed their complaint on October 24, 2001.

Admittedly, respondents interposed the alternative reinvindicatory action against

petitioner.
ISSUE Is accion reinvindicatoria the proper remedy?
RULING An accion reinvindicatoria does not necessarily presuppose that the actual and
material possession of the property is on defendant and that plaintiff seeks the recovery
of such possession from defendant. It bears stressing that an accion reinvindicatoria is
a remedy seeking the recovery of ownership and includes jus possidendi, jus utendi,
and jus fruendi as well. It is an action whereby a party claims ownership over a parcel of
land and seeks recovery of its full possession. (Capacete v. Baroro, 453 Phil. 392, 402
(2003). Thus, the owner of real property in actual and material possession thereof may
file an accion reinvindicatoria against another seeking ownership over a parcel of land
including jus vindicandi, or the right to exclude defendants from the possession thereof.
In this case, respondents filed an alternative reinvindicatory action claiming ownership
over the property and the cancellation of TCT No. 321744 under the name of petitioner.
In fine, they sought to enforce their jus utendi and jus vindicandi when petitioner claimed
ownership and prevented them from fencing the property.

Since respondents were in actual or physical possession of the property when they filed
their complaint against petitioner on October 24, 2001, the prescriptive period for the
reinvindicatory action had not even commenced to run, even if petitioner was able to
secure TCT No. 321744 over the property in 1984. The reason for this is that:

x x x one who is in actual possession of a piece of land claiming to be the owner thereof
may wait until his possession is disturbed or his title is attacked before taking steps to
vindicate his right, the reason for the rule being, that his undisturbed possession gives
him a continuing right to seek the aid of a court of equity to ascertain and determine the
nature of the adverse claim of a third party and its effect on his own title, which right can
be claimed only by one who is in possession. (Vda. de Cabrera v. CA, 335 Phil. 19
(1997).
Heirs of Enrique Toring v. Heirs of Teodosia Boquilaga
G.R. No. 163610, September 27, 2010, 631 SCRA 278

FACTS On October 10, 1996, the heirs of Enrique Toring (petitioners) filed before the
trial court a petition for production, delivery, surrender of documents, annulment of
document against the heirs of Teodosia Boquilaga (respondents). Petitioners thus
sought the issuance of an order directing the defendants to deliver, produce and
surrender the reconstituted Original Certificates of Title (OCTs) (RO-13240, RO-13238
and RO-13239) and TCT No. 97615. Should the defendants refuse to deliver the said
titles, it is prayed that the court (a) declare OCT Nos. RO-13240, RO-13238 and RO-
13239 and TCT No. 97615 null and void; (b) direct the Register of Deeds to cancel said
titles and in lieu thereof issue new TCTs in the name of Enrique Toring; and (c) declare
OCT No. 13237 null and void for being cancelled by TCT No. RT-3989.
In their Answer with Motion to Hear Affirmative Defenses, defendants denied
petitioners allegations and asserted that it was the heirs of Teodosia Boquilaga who
have been in possession of the land since time immemorial, enjoying the fruits thereof
and paying the taxes due thereon as evidenced by tax receipts issued for the years
1992 to 1995. They likewise denied for want of knowledge or information sufficient to
form a belief as to the truth x x x relative to the original certificate of title in the name of
Teodosia Boquilaga which was cancelled and the transfer certificate of title in the name
of Enrique Toring were destroyed in the advent of the second world war. Prior to the
reconstitution by defendants, it was verified from the Register of Deeds of the Province
of Cebu and the Land Registration Authority (LRA) that no such titles were issued
covering the subject lots; petitioners have yet to register their alleged deed of sale but
that is now not proper. Defendants averred that Lot Nos. 1834, 2248 and 2249 rightfully
belong to the heirs of Teodosia Boquilaga, while the lot covered by TCT No. 97615 (Lot
No. 1835) was acquired by Attys. Bernaldez, Estandarte and Cugtas in good faith and in
consideration of services rendered, hence acquired by innocent third persons in good
faith and for value. As special and affirmative defenses, defendants contended that the
RTC has no jurisdiction in this case since the assessed value of the properties involved
does not exceed P20,000.00, and that petitioners are guilty of laches for failing to act
and take corrective measures with the Register of Deeds for sixty-nine (69) years on the
alleged destruction of the documents.

The parties agreed to submit the case for decision on the basis of position papers,
memoranda/comment and other documentary evidence in support of their respective
claims.
ISSUE Who owns the subject lots which were originally registered in the name of
Teodosia Boquilaga, respondents predecessor-in-interest?
RULING After a careful review, we hold that petitioners have satisfactorily established
their claim of ownership over the subject lots by preponderance of evidence. The
existence and due execution of the Escritura de Venta Absoluta was never disputed by
the respondents. Petitioners documentary evidence showed that the registration fees for
the transfer of the lots mentioned in the said deed of absolute sale was duly paid,
resulting in the issuance of TCTs in the name of Enrique Toring. Thereafter, petitioners
took possession of the land, sharing in the fruits thereof and paying the realty taxes due
on the lands. While the original owners duplicate TCTs were in the possession of
petitioners, the original transfer certificates of title on file with the registry of deeds were
lost or destroyed during the last world war. Petitioners were also able to judicially
reconstitute TCT No. T-16805 (RT-3989) on November 11, 1994, as per the annotation
thereon.
On the other hand, respondents have not adduced competent evidence other than the
reconstituted OCTs in their possession. The tax receipts presented revealed that they
belatedly paid real estate taxes in 1995 (for the years 1992 to 1995), which weakens
their claim of possession since time immemorial. While tax declarations and receipts are
not conclusive evidence of ownership, yet, when coupled with proof of actual
possession, tax declarations and receipts are strong evidence of ownership. And even
assuming that respondents are indeed occupying the lands or portions thereof, it is not
clear whether they occupy or possess the same as owners or tenants.
ARNELITO ADLAWAN vs. EMETERIO ADLAWAN
479 SCRA 275, G. R. No. 161916, January 20, 2006

FACTS: Arnelito Adlawan was acknowledged illegitimate son of Dominador Adlawan

who died without an issue and survived by his wife Graciana. Claiming to be the sole
heir of Dominador, petitioner executed an affidavit adjudicating to himself Lot 7226 and
the house built thereon. Arnelito filed an unlawful detainer suit to eject respondents
from the property in his own name and as the sole owner of the property.

ISSUE: Whether petitioner can validly maintain the instant case for ejectment.

HELD: NO. The late Dominador Adlawan was survived not only by petitioner but also by
the legal wife of the decedent, Graciana, who died 10 years after the demise of
Dominador on May 28, 1987.

- - - By intestate succession, Graciana and petitioner became co-owners of Lot 7226

under Article 998 of the New Civil Code.
- - - the death of Graciana on May 6, 1997, did not make petitioner the absolute owner
of Lot 7226 because the share of Graciana passed to her relatives by consanguinity and
not to petitioner with whom she had no blood relations.

- - - Article 487 provides that “any one of the co-owners may bring an action in
ejectment.”
- - - this article covers all kinds of actions for the recovery of possession: forcible entry
and unlawful detainer (accion interdictal), recovery of possession (accion publiciana)
and recovery of ownership (accion de reivindicacion).

A co-owner may bring such an action without the necessity of joining all the other co-
owners as co-plaintiffs because the suit if presumed to have been filed to benefit his co-
owners.

- - - Where the suit for the benefit of the plaintiff alone who claims to be the sole owner
and entitled to the possession of the litigated property, the action should be dismissed.
(Baloloy vs. Hular, 438 SCRA 80, G. R. No. 157767, September 9, 2004).

- - - It is not disputed that petitioner brought the suit for unlawful detainer in his name
alone and for his own benefit to the exclusion of the heirs of Graciana as he even
executed an affidavit of self-adjudication over the disputed property.

- - - It is clear therefore that petitioner cannot validly maintain the instant action
considering that he does not recognize the co-ownership that necessarily flows from his
theory of succession to the property of his late father Dominador.
G.R. No. 108547 February 3, 1997
FELICIDAD VDA. DE CABRERA, MARYJANE CABRERA and FELICIDAD
TEOKEMIAN, petitioners,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and VIRGILIA ORAIS DE FELICIO, represented by her
Attorney-in-Fact, ERNESTO M. ORAIS, respondents.
Facts:
Assailed in this Petition for Review on Certiorari is the Decision of the respondent Court
of Appeals. Felicidad Vda. de Cabrera and Marykane Cabrera was ordered to vacate
the portion of Lot 2238 occupied by them and surrender possession thereof to plaintiff,
as ordered by the CA adverse from what the RTC had decided which is reconveyance
of the said parcel of land to Felicidad.
These are their prayers:
xxx “WHEREFORE, this Honorable Court, after due notice and hearing on the merits of
this case; to issue order or orders;
1. Finding the defendants as the rightful, lawful, and legal owner of that portion which
was sold to them by Felicidad Teokemian and which was included in the title of plaintiff;
2. To find that the plaintiff did not own the said portion and that they have personal
knowledge of the same when the plaintiff filed and secured the title under the
Administrative Proceeding;
3. Finding that the plaintiff is only holding the title to that portion only in an implied trust
in favor of the real owner;
4. Finding the plaintiff legally obligated to cause the segregation of the portion at their
expense and deliver formally the said portion to the real owners, the defendants.
5. To order the plaintiff to execute, prepare and or make any instrument or document to
finally vest in the Defendants absolute, clear and flawless title or ownership over the
portion which the plaintiff holds title in trust in defendant’s favor. xxx
The respondent court held that such a petition has been barred by laches due to
inaction for more than thirty years. An act by Felicidad though as stated: “the
registration of the plaintiff’s title over the subject property was fraudulent insofar as it
involved the one-third interest of Felicidad Teokemian who did not sign the Deed of Sale
in favor of plaintiff’s predecessor-in-interest and, therefore, the latter held that portion as
a trustee of an implied trust for the benefit of Felicidad, pursuant to Art. 1456 of the Civil
Code.” Needless to state, these conclusions, being matters of fact, are entitled to our
full affirmation, since they are congruent with the findings of the trial court.”

Issue: WON Felicidad could not have recovered the land due to laches.

Held:
The right of the defendants for reconveyance of the subject property arising from an
implied trust under Article 1456 of the Civil Code is material to the instant case, such
remedy has not yet lapsed, as erroneously submitted by the plaintiffs, and, is thus, a bar
to the plaintiff’s action. In the case of Heirs of Jose Olviga vs. Court of Appeals, we
observed that an action for reconveyance of a parcel of land based on implied or
constructive trust prescribes in ten years, the point of reference being the date of
registration of the deed or the date of the issuance of the certificate of title over the
property, but this rule applies onlywhen the plaintiff or the person enforcing the trust is
not in possession of the property, since if a person claiming to be the owner thereof is in
actual possession of the property, as the defendant is in the instant case, the right to
seek reconveyance, which in effect seeks to quiet title to the property, does not
prescribe. The reason for this is that one who is in actual possession of a piece of land
claiming to be the owner thereof may wait until his possession is disturbed or his title is
attacked before taking steps to vindicate his right, the reason for the rule being, that his
undisturbed possession gives him a continuing right to seek the aid of a court of equity
to ascertain and determine the nature of the adverse claim of a third party and its effect
on his own title, which right can be claimed only by one who is in possession.
As it is, before the period of prescription may start, it must be shown that (a) the trustee
has performed unequivocal acts of repudiation amounting to an ouster of the cestui que
trust; (b) such positive acts of repudiation have been made known to the cestui que
trust; and, (c) the evidence thereon is clear and positive.
In the case at bar, the defendant Felicidad Teokemian, and thereafter, the Cabreras,
were in actual possession of the property since it was left to Felicidad Teokemian by her
father in 1941, which possession had not been interrupted, despite the sale of the two-
third portion thereof to the plaintiff in 1950, and the latter’s procurement of a Certificate
of Title over the subject property in 1957. Until the institution of the present action in
1988, plaintiffs, likewise, have not displayed any unequivocal act of repudiation, which
could be considered as an assertion of adverse interest from the defendants, which
satisfies the above-quoted requisites. Thus, it cannot be argued that the right of
reconveyance on the part of the defendants, and its use as defense in the present suit,
has been lost by prescription.
Undisputed is the fact that since the sale of the two-third portion of the subject property
to the plaintiff, the latter had allowed Felicidad Teokemian to occupy that one-third
portion allotted to her. There has, therefore, been a partial partition, where the
transferees of an undivided portion of the land allowed a co-owner of the property to
occupy a definite portion thereof and has not disturbed the same, for a period too long
to be ignored--the possessor is in a better condition or right (Potior est conditio
possidentis).

Clearly, the plaintiff in this instance is barred from asserting her alleged right over the
portion subject matter in the instant case on the ground that their right has been lost by
laches.
G.R. No. 162175 June 28, 2010
MIGUEL J. OSSORIO PENSION FOUNDATION, INCORPORATED, Petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE,
Respondents.
G.R. No. 176858 September 15, 2010
HEIRS OF JUANITA PADILLA, represented by CLAUDIO PADILLA, Petitioners,
vs.
DOMINADOR MAGDUA, Respondent.
FACTS:
(1) Petitioners alleged that Ricardo, through misrepresentation, had the land transferred
in his name without the consent and knowledge of his co-heirs. Juanita, the mother of
the heirs had allegedly executed a notarized Affidavit of Transfer of Real Property
(Affidavit) in favor of Ricardo on 4 June 1966 making him the sole owner of the land.
(2) The land was subsequently sold by Ricardo's daughters, Josephine Bahia and
Virginia Bahia-Abas, to respondent Dominador Magdua (Dominador).

RTC: The case was filed only in 2001 or more than 30 years since the Affidavit was
executed in 1966. The RTC explained that while the right of an heir to his inheritance is
imprescriptible, yet when one of the co-heirs appropriates the property as his own to the
exclusion of all other heirs, then prescription can set in. The RTC added that since
prescription had set in to question the transfer of the land under the Affidavit, it would
seem logical that no action could also be taken against the deed of sale executed by
Ricardo's daughters in favor of Dominador.

ISSUE: The main issue is whether the present action is already barred by prescription.

HELD: No, it has not prescribed.

Since possession of co-owners is like that of a trustee, in order that a co-owner's

possession may be deemed adverse to the cestui que trust or other co-owners, the
following requisites must concur: (1) that he has performed unequivocal acts of
repudiation amounting to an ouster of the cestui que trust or other co-owners, (2) that
such positive acts of repudiation have been made known to the cestui que trust or other
co-owners, and (3) that the evidence thereon must be clear and convincing. In the
present case, all three requisites have been met.

After Juanita's death in 1989, petitioners sought for the partition of their mother's land.
The heirs, including Ricardo, were notified about the plan. Ricardo, through a letter
dated 5 June 1998, notified petitioners, as his co-heirs, that he adjudicated the land
solely for himself. Accordingly, Ricardo's interest in the land had now become adverse
to the claim of his co-heirs after repudiating their claim of entitlement to the land. In
Generosa v. Prangan-Valera, we held that in order that title may prescribe in favor of
one of the co-owners, it must be clearly shown that he had repudiated the claims of the
others, and that they were apprised of his claim of adverse and exclusive ownership,
before the prescriptive period begins to run.

However, in the present case, the prescriptive period began to run only from 5 June
1998, the date petitioners received notice of Ricardo's repudiation of their claims to the
land. Since petitioners filed an action for recovery of ownership and possession,
partition and damages with the RTC on 26 October 2001, only a mere three years had
lapsed. This three-year period falls short of the 10-year or 30-year acquisitive
prescription period required by law in order to be entitled to claim legal ownership over
the land. Thus, Dominador cannot invoke acquisitive prescription.

In sum, we find that the Affidavit, as the principal evidence relied upon by the RTC to
dismiss the case on the ground of prescription, insufficiently established Dominador's
rightful claim of ownership to the land. Thus, we direct the RTC to try the case on the
merits to determine who among the parties are legally entitled to the land.
MANUEL T. GUIA VS. CA AND JOSE B. ABEJO GR NO. 120864 October 8, 2003
Facts: Two parcels of land covering a fishpond equally owned by PrimitivaLejano and
LorenzaAraniego. The one half undivided portion owned by Araniego was later
purchased by plaintiff from his father TeofiloAbejo, the only heir of the original owner
(husband of Araniego). Prior to this sale, the whole fishpond was leased by the heirs of
Primitiva Lejano with the knowledge and consent of Teofilo A. Abejo in favor of De Guia.
De Guia continues to possess the entire fishpond and derived income therein despite
the expiration of the lease contract and several demands to vacate by TeofiloAbejo and
by his successor-in-interest, Jose Abejo.Abejo filed a complaint for recovery of
possession with damages against De Guia. However, Abejo failed to present evidence
of the judicial or extrajudicial partition of the fishpond.
Issue: Whether a co-owner can file ejectment case against a co-owner?Whether Abejo
was entitled to rent?
Held: Under Article 484, “there is co-ownership whenever the ownership of an
undivided thing or right belongs to different persons. A co-owner of an undivided parcel
of land is an owner of the whole, and over the whole he exercises the right of dominion,
but he is at the same time the owner of a portion which is truly abstract. Article 487 also
provides that ‘anyone of the co-owners may bring an action for ejectment”. This article
covers all kinds of actions for the recovery of possession. Any co-owner may file an
action under Article 487 not only against a third person, but also against another co-
owner who takes exclusive possession and asserts exclusive ownership of the property.
However, the only purpose of the action is to obtain recognition of the co-ownership.
The plaintiff cannot seek exclusion of the defendant from the property because as a co-
owner he has a right of possession.
If one co-owner alone occupies the property without opposition from the other co-
owners, and there is no lease agreement, the other co-owners cannot demand the
payment of rent. Conversely, if there is an agreement to lease the house, the co-
owners can demand rent from the co-owner who dwells in the house.
The Lejano Heirs and TeofiloAbejo agreed to lease the entire FISHPOND to DE GUIA.
After DE GUIA’s lease expired in 1979, he could no longer use the entire FISHPOND
without paying rent.
G.R. No. 108228 February 1, 2001
SPOUSES MANUEL and SALVACION DEL CAMPO, petitioners,
vs.
HON. COURT OF APPEALS and HEIRS OF JOSE REGALADO, SR., respondents.

FACTS: A parcel of land was divided among 8 co-owners, namely: Salome 4/16,
Consorcia 4/16. Alfredo 2/16, Maria 2/16, Jose 1/16, Quirico 1/16, Rosalia 1/16 and
Julita 1/16.
1. Salome sold her 4/16 share for P200 to Soledad Daynolo. Thereafter, Solded
took possession of the land and built a house thereon. A few years later,
Soledad mortgaged the subject portion in favor of Jose Regalado as security fro
a debt
2. Meanwhile, Salome, Consorcia and Alfredo sold a portion of the land to
Regalado.
3. Some years later, Soledad’s heir paid the mortgage debt and redeemed the
mortgaged portion from Regalado, s evidenced by a deed of discharge of
mortgage. Soledad’s heirs, then, sold the redeemed portion to petitioners Del
Campo
4. Regalado caused the reconstitution of the OCT of the property. The reconstituted
OTC initially reflected the shares of the original co-owners but the title was later
transferred to Regalado who caused the subdivision of the entire property.
among these smaller lots was Lot no 162-C-6
5. Spouses Del Campo, then, filed a complaint for repartition, resurvey and
reconveyance of the land, claiming that they owned Lot no 162-C-6 which was
erroneously included in the TCT issued to Regalado. Petitioners alleged that they
occupied the area as residential dwelling since its purchase in 1951 and they
also paid the corresponding taxes
6. The trial court dismissed the complaint holding that while Salome could alienate
her pro-indiviso share in Lot 162, she could not validly sell an undivided part
thereof by metes and bounds to Soledad from whom the petitioners derived their
title. The trial court also reasoned that petitioners could not have a better right to
the property even if they were in physical possession of the same and declared
the property for taxation purposes, because mere possession cannot defeat the
right of the Regalados who had a Torrens title over the land.

ISSUES:
 1. Would a sale by a co-owner of a physical portion of an undivided property held in
common be valid
2. Is respondent Regalado estopped from denying Del Campo’s right and title over
the disputed area
3. Under the facts and circumstances duly established by evidence, are petitioner’s
entitled to repartition, resurvey and reconveyance of the property in question

HELD:
FIRST ISSUE: The mere fact that Salome purportedly transferred a definite portion of
the co-owned lot by metes and bounds to Soledad, however, does not per se render the
sale a nullity. In Lopez v. Vda de Cuaycong, SC held that: The fact that the agreement
in question purported to sell a concrete portion of the hacienda does not render
the sale void, for it is a well-established principle that the binding force of a
contract must be recognized as far as it is legally possible to do so. Applying this
principle to the instant case, the transaction entered into by Salome and Soledad
could be legally recognized in its entirety since the object of the sale did not even
exceed the ideal shares held by the former in the co-ownership. As a matter of fact,
the deed of sale executed between the parties expressly stipulated that the portion of
Lot 162 sold to Soledad would be taken from Salome’s 4/16 undivided interest in said
lot, which the latter could validly transfer in whole or in part even without the consent of
the other co-owners. Salome’s right to sell part of her undivided interest in the co-
owned property is absolute in accordance with the well-settled doctrine that a co-
owner has full ownership of his pro-indiviso share and has the right to alienate,
assign or mortgage it, and substitute another person in its. Since Salome’s clear
intention was to sell merely part of her aliquot share in Lot 162, no valid objection
can be made against it and the sale can be given effect to the full extent.

While it is well-settled that a co-owner cannot rightfully dispose of a particular portion of

a co-owned property prior to partition among all the co-owners, this should not signify
that the vendee does not acquire anything at all in case a physically segregated area of
the co-owned lot is in fact sold to him. Since the co-owner/vendor’s undivided interest
could properly be the object of the contract of sale between the parties, what the
vendee obtains by virtue of such a sale are the same rights as the vendor had as
co-owner, in an ideal share equivalent to the consideration given under their
transaction. In other words, the vendee steps into the shoes of the vendor as co-owner
and acquires a proportionate abstract share in the property held in common. Even if a
co-owner sells the whole property as his, the sale will affect only his own share
but not those of the other co-owners who did not consent to the sale. Since a co-
owner is entitled to sell his undivided share, a sale of the entire property by one
co-owner will only transfer the rights of said co-owner to the buyer, thereby
making the buyer a co-owner of the property.

SECOND ISSUE: the intervening years between the date of petitioners’ purchase of the
property and 1987 when petitioners filed the instant complaint, comprise all of 36 years.
However, at no instance during this time did respondents or Regalado, for that matter,
question petitioners’ right over the land in dispute. In the case of Vda. De Cabrera vs.
Court of Appeals, it was held that where the transferees of an undivided portion of
the land allowed a co-owner of the property to occupy a definite portion thereof
and had not disturbed the same for a period too long to be ignored, the
possessor is in a better condition or right than said transferees. (Potior est
condition possidentis). Such undisturbed possession had the effect of a partial
partition of the co-owner property which entitles the possessor to the definite
portion which he occupies. Conformably, petitioners are entitled to the disputed
land, having enjoyed uninterrupted possession thereof for a total of 49 years up
to the present.

The lower court’s reliance on the doctrine that mere possession cannot defeat the right
of a holder of a registered Torrens title over property is misplaced, considering that
petitioners were deprived of their dominical rights over the said lot through fraud and
with evident bad faith on the part of Regalado. Regalado knew of the fact that he did not
have a title to the entire lot and could not, therefore, have validly registered the same in
his name alone because he was aware of petitioners’ possession of the subject portion
as well as the sale between Salome and Soledad.

Consequently, respondents are estopped from asserting that they own the subject
land in view of the Deed of Mortgage and Discharge of Mortgage executed
between Regalado and petitioners’ predecessor-in-interest. As petitioners correctly
contend, respondents are barred from making this assertion under the equitable
principle of estoppel by deed, whereby a party to a deed and his privies are
precluded from asserting as against the other and his privies any right or title in
derogation of the deed, or from denying the truth of any material fact asserted in
it.

THIRD ISSUE: The attendance of fraud in its issuance created an implied trust in favor
of petitioners and gave them the right to seek reconveyance of the parcel wrongfully
obtained by the former. An action for reconveyance based on an implied trust ordinarily
prescribes in ten years. But when the right of the true and real owner is recognized,
expressly or implicitly such as when he remains undisturbed in his possession,
the said action is imprescriptible, it being in the nature of a suit for quieting of
title. Having established by clear and convincing evidence that they are the legal
owners of the litigated portion included in TCT NO. 14566, it is only proper that
reconveyance of the property be ordered in favor of petitioners.
AURORA DEL BANCO, EVELYN DEL BANCO, FEDERICO TAINO, SOLEDAD
TAINO, JOVENCIO TAINO, SAMSON TAINO, NOE TAINO, SOCORRO TAINO and
CLEOFAS TAINO, petitioners,
vs.
INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT (Second Civil Cases Division), ALEJANDRA
PANSACOLA, LEONILA ENCALLADO, VEDASTO ENCALLADO, JOSE YEPES, et
al., respondents.
G.R. No. 72694 December 1, 1987
FACTS:
 In a document executed in the Municipality of San Rafael, Bulacan, on February
11, 1859, three brothers, Benedicto Pansacola, Jose Pansacola and Manuel
Pansacola (known as Fr. Manuel Pena) entered into an agreement which
provided, among others:

(1) That they will purchase from the Spanish Government the lands comprising
the Island of Cagbalite which is located in the Province of Tayabas (now
Quezon) and has an approximate area of 1,600 hectares;

(2) That the lands shall be considered after the purchase as their common
property;

(3) That the co-ownership includes Domingo Arce and Baldomera Angulo,
minors at that time represented by their father, Manuel Pansacola (Fr. Manuel
Pena) who will contribute for them in the proposed purchase of the Cagbalite
Island;

(4) That whatever benefits may be derived from the Island shall be shared
equally by the co-owners in the following proportion: Benedicto Pansacola-1/4
share; Jose Pansacola-1/4 share; and, Domingo Arce and Baldomera Angulo-
2/4 shares which shall be placed under the care of their father, Manuel
Pansacola (Fr. Manuel Pena).

 On April 11, 1868, they modified the terms and conditions of the agreement:

(a) The first one-fourth (1/4) portion shall belong to Don Benedicto Pansacola;

(b) The second one-fourth (1/4) portion shall belong to Don Jose Pansacola;

(c) The third one-fourth(1/4) portion shall henceforth belong to the children of their
deceased brother, Don Eustaquio Pansacola, namely: Don Mariano Pansacola,- Maria
Pansacola and Don Hipolito Pansacola;

(d) The fourth and last one-fourth (1/4) portion shall belong to their nephews and
nieces (1) Domingo Arce, (2) Baldomera Angulo, (3) Marcelina Flores, (4) Francisca
Flores, (5) Candelaria dela Cruz, and (6) Gervasio Pansacola who, being all minors,
are still under the care of their brother, Manuel Pansacola (Fr. Manuel Pena). The
latter is the real father of said minors.
 About one hundred years later, on November 18, 1968, private respondents
brought a special action for partition under the provisions of Rule 69 of the Rules
 of Court, including as parties the heirs and successors-in-interest of the co-
owners of the Cagbalite Island.
 The trial court rendered a decision dismissing the complaint. But the CA reversed
the decision.
ISSUES: Whether or not Cagbalite Island is still undivided property owned in common
by the heirs and successors-in-interest of the brothers, Benedicto, Jose and Manuel
Pansacola.
Does prescription run in favor of a co-owner against his co-owners or co-heirs so
long as he expressly or impliedly recognizes the co-ownership
HELD:
 YES. There is nothing in all four agreements that suggests that actual or
physical partition of the Island had really been made by either the original
owners or their heirs or successors-in-interest. Although, some of the private
respondents and some of the petitioners at the time the action for partition
was filed in the trial court have been in actual possession and enjoyment of
several portions of the property in question, this does not provide any proof
that the Island in question has already been actually partitioned and co-
ownership terminated. It is not enough that the co-owners agree to subdivide
the property. They must have a subdivision plan drawn in accordance with
which they take actual and exclusive possession of their respective portions
in the plan and titles issued to each of them accordingly. The mechanics of
actual partition should follow the procedure laid down in Rule 69 of the Rules
of Court.

 NO. No prescription shall run in favor of a co-owner against his co-owners or

co-heirs so long as he expressly or impliedly recognizes the co-
ownership.Co-owners cannot acquire by prescription the share of the other
co-owners, absent a clear repudiation of the co-ownership clearly
communicated to the other co-owners An action for partition does not
prescribe. Article 497 of the New Civil Code, provides that “the assignees of
the co-owners may take part in the partition of the common property, and
Article 494 provides that “each co-owner may demand at any time the
partition of the common property, a provision which implies that the action to
demand partition is imprescriptible or cannot be barred by laches” An action
for partition does not lie except when the co-ownership is properly repudiated
by the co- owner.