POLITICAL LAW REVIEW

CASE DIGESTS

I. Constitutional Law

1. Manila Prince Hotel v. GSIS

MANILA PRINCE HOTEL, petitioner, vs. GOVERNMENT SERVICE INSURANCE SYSTEM,

MANILA HOTEL CORPORATION, COMMITTEE ON PRIVATIZATION and OFFICE OF THE
GOVERNMENT CORPORATE COUNSEL, respondents.
G.R. No. 122156. February 3, 1997

Ponente: J. Bellosillo
Topic: Self-Executing and Non-Self-Executing Provisions - Filipino First Policy
Synopsis:
When the GSIS decided to sell by public bidding up to 51% ownership of the Manila Hotel on September
1995, a Malaysian company appeared to be the winning bidder, giving rise to the issue of whether the
Filipino First policy can be applied to oppose the transfer of the hotel which has attained national
landmark status. The Supreme Court decided in the affirmative, stating that Sec. 10, second par., Art. XII
of the 1987 Constitution is a mandatory, positive command which is complete in itself and which needs
no further guidelines or implementing laws or rules for its enforcement.

Verily, Manila Hotel has become part of our national economy and patrimony. — For more than eight (8)
decades Manila Hotel has borne mute witness to the triumphs and failures, loves and frustrations of the
Filipinos. For sure, 51% of the equity of the MHC comes within the purview of the constitutional shelter
for it comprises the majority and controlling stock, so that anyone who acquires or owns the 51% will
have actual control and management of the hotel. In this instance, 51% of the MHC cannot be
disassociated from the hotel and the land on which the hotel edifice stands.

Digest:

FACTS
The Filipino First Policy enshrined in the 1987 Constitution, i.e., in the grant of rights, privileges, and
concessions covering the national economy and patrimony, the State shall give preference to qualified
Filipinos, is invoked by petitioner in its bid to acquire 51% of the shares of the Manila Hotel Corporation
(MHC) which owns the historic Manila Hotel. Opposing, respondents maintain that the provision is not
self-executing but requires an implementing legislation for its enforcement.

Respondents argued that Sec. 10, second par., Art. XII, of the 1987 Constitution is merely a statement of
principle and policy since it is not a self-executing provision and requires implementing legislation(s) x x x
x Thus, for the said provision to operate, there must be existing laws “to lay down conditions under
which business may be done.”

ISSUE(S)
WON Sec. 10, second par., Art. XII, of the 1987 Constitution is merely a statement of principle and policy
since it is not a self-executing provision and requires implementing legislation

RULING
The Provision is self-executing.
Admittedly, some constitutions are merely declarations of policies and principles. Their provisions
command the legislature to enact laws and carry out the purposes of the framers who merely establish
an outline of government providing for the different departments of the governmental machinery and
securing certain fundamental and inalienable rights of citizens. A provision which lays down a general
principle, such as those found in Art. II of the 1987 Constitution, is usually not self-executing. But a
provision which is complete in itself and becomes operative without the aid of supplementary or enabling
legislation, or that which supplies sufficient rule by means of which the right it grants may be enjoyed or
protected, is self-executing. Thus, a constitutional provision is self-executing if the nature and extent of
the right conferred and the liability imposed are fixed by the constitution itself, so that they can be
determined by an examination and construction of its terms, and there is no language indicating that the
subject is referred to the legislature for action.

Sec. 10, second par., Art. XII of the 1987 Constitution is a mandatory, positive command which is
complete in itself and which needs no further guidelines or implementing laws or rules for its
enforcement. From its very words the provision does not require any legislation to put it in operation. lt is
per se judicially enforceable. When our Constitution mandates that [i]n the grant of rights, privileges, and
concessions covering national economy and patrimony, the State shall give preference to qualified
Filipinos, it means just that—qualified Filipinos shall be preferred. And when our Constitution declares
that a right exists in certain specified circumstances an action may be maintained to enforce such right
notwithstanding the absence of any legislation on the subject; consequently, if there is no statute
especially enacted to enforce such constitutional right, such right enforces itself by its own inherent
potency and puissance, and from which all legislations must take their bearings. Where there is a right
there is a remedy. Ubi jus ibi remedium. ###

2. Macalintal v. COMELEC

ATTY. ROMULO B. MACALINTAL, petitioner vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, HON. ALBERTO

ROMULO, in his official capacity as Executive Secretary, and HON. EMILIA T. BONCODIN,
Secretary of the Department of Budget and Management, respondents.
G.R. No. 157013. July 10, 2003

Ponente: J. Austria-Martinez
Topic: Constitutional Construction
Synopsis:
Romulo Macalintal filed a petition for certiorari before the supreme court as a lawyer and a taxpayer,
questioning the constitutionality of the Overseas Absentee Voting Act of 2003 (R.A. 9189). The petitioner
raises as one of the questions the fact that the statute in question effectively grants COMELEC the power
to canvass the votes for president and vice-president, a power granted by the 1987 Constitution
exclusively upon Congress. The Supreme Court ruled that Congress could not have allowed the COMELEC
to usurp a power that constitutionally belongs to it or, as aptly stated by petitioner, to encroach on the
power of Congress to canvass the votes for president and vice-president and the power to proclaim the
winners for the said positions. The provisions of the Constitution as the fundamental law of the land
should be read as part of The Overseas Absentee Voting Act of 2003 and hence, the canvassing of the
votes and the proclamation of the winning candidates for president and vice-president for the entire
nation must remain in the hands of Congress.

Digest:

FACTS
Romulo Macalintal filed a petition for certiorari before the supreme court as a lawyer and a taxpayer,
questioning the constitutionality of the Overseas Absentee Voting Act of 2003 (R.A. 9189). The petitioner
raises the following questions:

1. Does Section 5(d) of Rep. Act No. 9189 allowing the registration of voters who are immigrants or
permanent residents in other countries by their mere act of executing an affidavit expressing
their intention to return to the Philippines, violate the residency requirement in Section 1 of
Article V of the Constitution.

2. Does Section 18.5 of the same law empowering the COMELEC to proclaim the winning candidates
for national offices and party list representatives including the President and the Vice-President
violate the constitutional mandate under Section 4, Article VII of the Constitution that the
winning candidates for President and the Vice-President shall be proclaimed as winners by
Congress.

3. May Congress, through the Joint Congressional Oversight Committee created in Section 25 of
Rep. Act No. 9189, exercise the power to review, revise, amend, and approve the Implementing
Rules and Regulations that the Commission on Elections shall promulgate without violating the
independence of the COMELEC under Section 1, Article IX-A of the Constitution?

ISSUE(S)
Whether or not RA 9189 should be declared unconstitutional

RULING
The petition is partly granted.

1. Section 1, Article V of the Constitution specifically provides that suffrage may be exercised by (1)
all citizens of the Philippines, (2) not otherwise disqualified by law, (3) at least eighteen years of
age, (4) who are residents in the Philippines for at least one year and in the place where they
propose to vote for at least six months immediately preceding the election. Under Section 5(d) of
R.A. No. 9189, one of those disqualified from voting is an immigrant or permanent resident who
is recognized as such in the host country unless he/she executes an affidavit declaring that
he/she shall resume actual physical permanent residence in the Philippines not later than three
years from approval of his/her registration under said Act.

2. Congress could not have allowed the COMELEC to usurp a power that constitutionally belongs to
it or, as aptly stated by petitioner, to encroach on the power of Congress to canvass the votes for
president and vice-president and the power to proclaim the winners for the said positions. The
provisions of the Constitution as the fundamental law of the land should be read as part of The
Overseas Absentee Voting Act of 2003 and hence, the canvassing of the votes and the
proclamation of the winning candidates for president and vice-president for the entire nation
must remain in the hands of Congress.

3. The Court has no general powers of supervision over COMELEC which is an independent body
except those specifically granted by the Constitution, that is, to review its decisions, orders and
rulings. In the same vein, it is not correct to hold that because of its recognized extensive
legislative power to enact election laws, Congress may intrude into the independence of the
COMELEC by exercising supervisory powers over its rule-making authority.
 By virtue of Section 19 of R.A. No. 9189, Congress has empowered the COMELEC to issue the
necessary rules and regulations to effectively implement the provisions of this Act within sixty
days from the effectivity of this Act. This provision of law follows the usual procedure in drafting
rules and regulations to implement a law the legislature grants an administrative agency the
authority to craft the rules and regulations implementing the law it has enacted, in recognition of
the administrative expertise of that agency in its particular field of operation.

By vesting itself with the powers to approve, review, amend, and revise the IRR for The Overseas
Absentee Voting Act of 2003, Congress went beyond the scope of its constitutional authority.
Congress trampled upon the constitutional mandate of independence of the COMELEC. Under
such a situation, the Court is left with no option but to withdraw from its usual reticence in
declaring a provision of law unconstitutional.

3. SWS v. DDB

SOCIAL JUSTICE SOCIETY (SJS), petitioner, vs. DANGEROUS DRUGS BOARD and PHILIPPINE
DRUG ENFORCEMENT AGENCY (PDEA), respondents.
G.R. No. 157870. November 3, 2008

Ponente: J. Velasco
Topic: Doctrine of Constitutional Supremacy – Mandatory drug testing for elective offices
Synopsis:
Does R.A. 9165, or the Comprehensive Drugs Act, indirectly prescribe a new qualification for the holding
of elective offices? The Supreme Court said that it is, because the mandatory drug test is obviously used
as a pre-condition to the validity of a certificate of candidacy for senator, or, with like effect, a condition
sine qua non to be voted upon. It is basic that if a law or an administrative rule violates any norm of the
Constitution, that issuance is null and void and has no effect. The Constitution is the basic law to which
all laws must conform; no act shall be valid if it conflicts with the Constitution. In the discharge of their
defined functions, the three departments of government have no choice but to yield obedience to the
commands of the Constitution. Whatever limits it imposes must be observed.

Digest:

FACTS
The petitioners in these consolidated cases assail the constitutionality of Section 36 of Republic Act No.
(RA) 9165, otherwise known as the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002, insofar as it requires
mandatory drug testing of candidates for public office, students of secondary and tertiary schools,
officers and employees of public and private offices, and persons charged before the prosecutor’s office
with certain offenses, among other personalities. Specifically, petitioner Aquilino Pimentel contends that
Sec. 36(g) of RA 9165 and COMELEC Resolution No. 6486 illegally impose an additional qualification on
candidates for senator.

According to Pimentel, the Constitution only prescribes a maximum of five (5) qualifications for one to be
a candidate for, elected to, and be a member of the Senate. He says that both the Congress and
COMELEC, by requiring, via RA 9165 and Resolution No. 6486, a senatorial aspirant, among other
candidates, to undergo a mandatory drug test, create an additional qualification that all candidates for
senator must first be certified as drug free. He adds that there is no provision in the Constitution
authorizing the Congress or COMELEC to expand the qualification requirements of candidates for senator.

ISSUE(S)
Are the assailed provisions unconstitutional for indirectly imposing another qualification for elective
candidates?

RULING
Yes. Pimentel’s contention is well-taken. Accordingly, Sec. 36(g) of RA 9165 should be, as it is hereby
declared as, unconstitutional. It is basic that if a law or an administrative rule violates any norm of the
Constitution, that issuance is null and void and has no effect. The Constitution is the basic law to which
all laws must conform; no act shall be valid if it conflicts with the Constitution. In the discharge of their
defined functions, the three departments of government have no choice but to yield obedience to the
commands of the Constitution. Whatever limits it imposes must be observed.

Sec. 36(g) of RA 9165, as sought to be implemented by the assailed COMELEC resolution, effectively
enlarges the qualification requirements enumerated in the Sec. 3, Art. VI of the Constitution. As couched,
said Sec. 36(g) unmistakably requires a candidate for senator to be certified illegal-drug clean, obviously
as a pre-condition to the validity of a certificate of candidacy for senator or, with like effect, a condition
sine qua non to be voted upon and, if proper, be proclaimed as senator-elect. The COMELEC resolution
completes the chain with the proviso that “[n]o person elected to any public office shall enter upon the
duties of his office until he has undergone mandatory drug test.” Viewed, therefore, in its proper context,
Sec. 36(g) of RA 9165 and the implementing COMELEC Resolution add another qualification layer to what
the 1987 Constitution, at the minimum, requires for membership in the Senate. Whether or not the drug-
free bar set up under the challenged provision is to be hurdled before or after election is really of no
moment, as getting elected would be of little value if one cannot assume office for non-compliance with
the drug-testing requirement.

4. Tawang Multi-Purpose Cooperative v. La Trinidad

TAWANG MULTI-PURPOSE COOPERATIVE, petitioner, vs. LA TRINIDAD WATER DISTRICT,

respondent.
G.R. No. 166471. March 22, 2011

Ponente: J. Carpio
Topic: Doctrine of Constitutional Supremacy – Indirect violations of the constitution
Synopsis:
What cannot be legally done directly cannot be done indirectly. It is this unwritten rule that served as the
final nail in the coffin for Section 47 of PD No. 198, which granted LTWD a legislative franchise over the
waterworks of Barangay Tawang. The 1935, 1973, and 1987 constitutions expressly and consistently
prohibit against grants of exclusive franchises by the Executive, Legislative, and Judiciary branches of
government. The assailed law however, provided that no other franchise shall be granted except upon
resolution by the board of directors of the district, subject to review by the Local Water District
Administration.

Digest:

FACTS
Tawang Multi-Purpose Cooperative (TMPC) filed with the National Water Resources Board (NWRB) an
application for a certificate of public convenience (CPC) to operate and maintain a waterworks system in
Barangay Tawang. La Trinidad Water District (LTWD) opposed TMPC’s application. LTWD claimed that,
under Section 47 of PD No. 198, as amended, its franchise is exclusive. Section 47 states that “no
franchise shall be granted to any other person or agency for domestic, industrial or commercial water
service within the district or any portion thereof unless and except to the extent that the board of
directors of said district consents thereto by resolution duly adopted, such resolution, however, shall be
subject to review by the Administration.”
The NWRB approved TMPC’s application for a CPC. In its 15 August 2002 Decision, the NWRB held that
LTWD’s franchise cannot be exclusive since exclusive franchises are unconstitutional. LTWD appealed to
the RTC and the latter set aside the NWRB’s Resolution and 15 August 2002 Decision and cancelled
TMPC’s CPC. The RTC held that Section 47 is valid.

ISSUE(S)
Whether or not Section 47 of PD No. 198, as amended, is valid

RULING
No, it is invalid (unconstitutional). The Supreme Court ruled that the President, Congress and the Court
cannot create directly franchises for the operation of a public utility that are exclusive in character. The
1935, 1973 and 1987 Constitutions expressly and clearly prohibit the creation of franchises that are
exclusive in character. Section 11, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution states that:

“No franchise, certificate, or any other form of authorization for the operation of a public utility shall be
granted except to citizens of the Philippines or to corporations or associations organized under the laws
of the Philippines, at least sixty per centum of whose capital is owned by such citizens, nor shall such
franchise, certificate or authorization be exclusive in character or for a longer period than fifty years.”

Section 47 of PD No. 198, as amended, allows the BOD and the LWUA to create directly franchises that
are exclusive in character which is unconstitutional. Jurisprudence dictates that in case of conflict
between the Constitution and a statute, the Constitution always prevails because the Constitution is the
basic law to which all other laws must conform to. The duty of the Court is to uphold the Constitution and
to declare void all laws that do not conform to it.

The dissenting opinion states two “reasonable and legitimate grounds” for the creation of exclusive
franchise: (1) protection of “the government’s investment,” and (2) avoidance of “a situation where
ruinous competition could compromise the supply of public utilities in poor and remote areas.” The
majority ruled that there is no “reasonable and legitimate” ground to violate the Constitution. The
Constitution should never be violated by anyone. Right or wrong, the President, Congress, the Court, the
BOD and the LWUA have no choice but to follow the Constitution. Any act, however noble its intentions,
is void if it violates the Constitution. This rule is basic.

On the issue that the creation of franchises that are exclusive in character is a valid exercise of police
power, the SC ruled that police power does not include the power to violate the Constitution. Police
power is the plenary power vested in Congress to make laws not repugnant to the Constitution. This rule
is basic. In Metropolitan Manila Development Authority v. Viron Transportation Co., Inc., the Court held
that, “Police power is the plenary power vested in the legislature to make, ordain, and establish
wholesome and reasonable laws, statutes and ordinances, not repugnant to the Constitution.” In Carlos
Superdrug Corp. v. Department of Social Welfare and Development, the Court held that, police power “is
‘the power vested in the legislature by the constitution to make, ordain, and establish all manner of
wholesome and reasonable laws, statutes, and ordinances x x x not repugnant to the constitution.’” In
Metropolitan Manila Development Authority v. Garin, the Court held that, “police power, as an inherent
attribute of sovereignty, is the power vested by the Constitution in the legislature to make, ordain, and
establish all manner of wholesome and reasonable laws, statutes and ordinances x x x not repugnant to
the Constitution.

5. Oposa v. Factoran
JUAN ANTONIO, ANNA ROSARIO and JOSE ALFONSO, all surnamed OPOSA, minors, and
represented by their parents ANTONIO and RIZALINA OPOSA, et. al., petitioners, vs. THE
HONORABLE FULGENCIO S. FACTORAN, JR., in his capacity as the Secretary of the
Department of Environment and Natural Resources, and THE HONORABLE ERIBERTO U.
ROSARIO, Presiding Judge of the RTC, Makati, Branch 66, respondents.
G.R. No. 101083. July 30, 1993

Ponente: J. Davide, Jr.

Topic: Self-Executing Provisions – Right to a Balanced and Healthful Ecology
Synopsis:
The right to a balanced and healthful ecology carries with it the correlative duty to refrain from impairing
the environment. Thus, the right of the petitioners (and all those they represent) to a balanced and
healthful ecology is as clear as the DENR’s duty—under its mandate and by virtue of its powers and
functions under E.O. No. 192 and the Administrative Code of 1987—to protect and advance the said
right.

Digest:

FACTS
In this case, herein petitioners, through their representatives, prays that the DENR be compelled to
cancel all existing timber licenses in the country, as well as to enjoin the department from receiving,
accepting, processing, renewing or approving new timber license agreements. In its cause of action,
petitioner alleges that defendant’s refusal to cancel the aforementioned TLA’s is manifestly contrary to
the public policy enunciated in the Philippine Environmental Policy which, in effect, violates the
constitutional provision on the protection and advancement of the right of the people to a balanced and
healthful ecology in accord with the rhythm and harmony of nature.’ (Section 16, Article II. id.) Secretary
Factoran claims that the petitioners failed to allege with sufficient definiteness a specific legal right
involved or a specific legal wrong committed.

ISSUE(S)
Do the petitioners have a proper cause of action anchored on a legal right?

RULING
Yes. The complaint focuses on one specific fundamental legal right—the right to a balanced and healthful
ecology which, for the first time in our nation’s constitutional history, is solemnly incorporated in the
fundamental law. While the right to a balanced and healthful ecology is to be found under the Declaration
of Principles and State Policies and not under the Bill of Rights, it does not follow that it is less important
than any of the civil and political rights enumerated in the latter. Such a right belongs to a different
category of rights altogether for it concerns nothing less than self-preservation and self-perpetuation—
aptly and fittingly stressed by the petitioners—the advancement of which may even be said to predate all
governments and constitutions. As a matter of fact, these basic rights need not even be written in the
Constitution for they are assumed to exist from the inception of humankind. If they are now explicitly
mentioned in the fundamental charter, it is because of the well-founded fear of its framers that unless
the rights to a balanced and healthful ecology and to health are mandated as state policies by the
Constitution itself, thereby highlighting their continuing importance and imposing upon the state a solemn
obligation to preserve the first and protect and advance the second, the day would not be too far when
all else would be lost not only for the present generation, but also for those to come—generations which
stand to inherit nothing but parched earth incapable of sustaining life.

The right to a balanced and healthful ecology carries with it the correlative duty to refrain from impairing
the environment. Thus, the right of the petitioners (and all those they represent) to a balanced and
healthful ecology is as clear as the DENR’s duty—under its mandate and by virtue of its powers and
functions under E.O. No. 192 and the Administrative Code of 1987—to protect and advance the said
right.

Concurring opinion of J. Feliciano:

As a matter of logic, by finding petitioners’ cause of action as anchored on a legal right comprised in the
constitutional statements above noted, the Court is in effect saying that Section 15 (and Section 16) of
Article II of the Constitution are self-executing and judicially enforceable even in their present form.

6. Gamboa v. Secretary of Finance

WILSON P. GAMBOA, petitioner, vs. FINANCE SECRETARY MARGARITO B. TEVES, FINANCE

UNDERSECRETARY JOHN P. SEVILLA, AND COMMISSIONER RICARDO ABCEDE OF THE
PRESIDENTIAL COMMISSION ON GOOD GOVERNMENT (PCGG) IN THEIR CAPACITIES AS
CHAIR AND MEMBERS, RESPECTIVELY, OF THE PRIVATIZATION COUNCIL, CHAIRMAN
ANTHONI SALIM OF FIRST PACIFIC CO., LTD. IN HIS CAPACITY AS DIRECTOR OF METRO
PACIFIC ASSET HOLDINGS INC., CHAIRMAN MANUEL V. PANGILINAN OF PHILIPPINE LONG
DISTANCE TELEPHONE COMPANY (PLDT) IN HIS CAPACITY AS MANAGING DIRECTOR OF
FIRST PACIFIC CO., LTD., PRESIDENT NAPOLEON L. NAZARENO OF PHILIPPINE LONG
DISTANCE TELEPHONE COMPANY, CHAIR FE BARIN OF THE SECURITIES EXCHANGE
COMMISSION, and PRESIDENT FRANCIS LIM OF THE PHILIPPINE STOCK EXCHANGE,
respondents.
PABLITO V. SANIDAD and ARNO V. SANIDAD, petitioners-in-intervention.
G.R. No. 176579. June 28, 2011

Ponente: J. Carpio
Topic: Self-Executing Provisions – 60%/40% Rule
Synopsis:
The foreign ownership of about 81% of PLDT’s shareholdings is violative of the constitution. The
60%/40% rule is self-executing, as it aims to reserve to Filipinos specific areas of investment, such as the
development of natural resources and ownership of land, educational institutions and advertising
business. In case of doubt, the Constitution should be considered self-executing rather than non-self-
executing. Unless the contrary is clearly intended, the provisions of the Constitution should be considered
self-executing, as a contrary rule would give the legislature discretion to determine when, or whether,
they shall be effective. These provisions would be subordinated to the will of the lawmaking body, which
could make them entirely meaningless by simply refusing to pass the needed implementing statute.

Digest:

FACTS
The Philippine Legislature enacted Act No. 3436 which granted PLDT franchise and the right to engage in
telecommunications business. General Telephone and Electronics Corporation (GTE), an American
company, sold 26% of the outstanding common shares of PLDT to Philippine Telecommunications
Investment Corporation (PTIC). In 1977, Prime Holdings, Inc. (PHI) became the owner of 114,415 shares
of stock of PTIC.

In 1986, the said shares were sequestered by PCGG and were later declared by the Court to be owned by
the Republic of the Philippines.

In 1999, First Pacific a Bermuda-registered, Hong Kong based investment firm, acquired the remaining
54% of the outstanding capital stock of PTIC. On November 20, 2006, the Inter-Agency Privatization
Council (IPC) of the Philippine Government announced that it would sell the 114,415 PTIC shares through
public bidding. During the bidding, Parallax won the bid.

Thereafter, First Pacific announced that it would exercise its right of first refusal as a PTIC stockholder
and buy the 114,415 PTIC stockholder and buy said stocks by matching the bid price of Parallax. But First
Pacific failed to do so and instead, yielded its right to PTIC itself which was given by PTIC itself which
was then given by IPC until March 2, 2007 to buy the PTIC shares. First Pacific, through its subsidiary,
Metro Pacific Assets Holdings, Inc. (MPAH), entered into a Conditional sale and purchase agreement of
said shares with the Philippine Government and the sale was completed.

With the sale, First Pacific’s common shareholdings increased from 30.7% to 37 %, thereby increasing
the common shareholdings of foreigners in PLDT to about 81.47%. Which violates Sec.11, Art. XII of the
1987 Constitution which limits the foreign ownership of the capital of a public utility to not more than
40%.

ISSUE(S)
Whether Sec. 11, Article XII is self-executing

RULING
Section 11, Article XII of the Constitution, like other provisions of the Constitution expressly reserving to
Filipinos specific areas of investment, such as the development of natural resources and ownership of
land, educational institutions and advertising business, is self-executing. There is no need for legislation
to implement these self-executing provisions of the Constitution. The rationale why these constitutional
provisions are self-executing was explained in Manila Prince Hotel v. GSIS, thus:

“x x x Hence, unless it is expressly provided that a legislative act is necessary to enforce a constitutional
mandate, the presumption now is that all provisions of the constitution are self-executing. If the
constitutional provisions are treated as requiring legislation instead of self-executing, the legislature
would have the power to ignore and practically nullify the mandate of the fundamental law. This can be
cataclysmic. That is why the prevailing view is, as it has always been, that —

. . . in case of doubt, the Constitution should be considered self-executing rather than non-self-executing.
. . . Unless the contrary is clearly intended, the provisions of the Constitution should be considered self-
executing, as a contrary rule would give the legislature discretion to determine when, or whether, they
shall be effective. These provisions would be subordinated to the will of the lawmaking body, which could
make them entirely meaningless by simply refusing to pass the needed implementing statute.”

7. Gamboa v. Secretary of Finance

ROBERT V. TOBIAS, RAMON M. GUZMAN, TERRY T. LIM, GREGORIO D. GABRIEL, and

ROBERTO R. TOBIAS, JR. petitioners,
vs.
HON. CITY MAYOR BENJAMIN S. ABALOS, CITY TREASURER WILLIAM MARCELINO, and THE
SANGGUNIANG PANLUNGSOD, all of the City of Mandaluyong, Metro Manila, respondents.
G.R. No. L-114783 December 8, 1994

Ponente: J. Bidin
Topic: Constitutional Construction – One-Title-One-Subject Policy
Synopsis:
The creation of a separate congressional district for Mandaluyong is not a subject separate and distinct
from the subject of its conversion into a highly urbanized city but is a natural and logical consequence of
its conversion into a highly urbanized city. Verily, the title of R.A. No. 7675, "An Act Converting the
Municipality of Mandaluyong Into a Highly Urbanized City of Mandaluyong" necessarily includes and
contemplates the subject treated under Section 49 regarding the creation of a separate congressional
district for Mandaluyong. Moreover, a liberal construction of the "one title-one subject" rule has been
invariably adopted by this court so as not to cripple or impede legislation.

Digest:

FACTS
The case arose because of Rep. Ronaldo Zamora’s proposed law converting the municipality of
Mandaluyong into Highly Urbanized City. It became a law on February 9, 1994. A plebiscite was held on
April 10, 1994. The turnout at the plebiscite was only 14.41% of the voting population. Nevertheless,
18,621 voted "yes" whereas 7,911 voted "no." By virtue of these results,R.A. No. 7675 was deemed
ratified and in effect.

Petitioners come before the Supreme Court, contending RA 7675 as unconstitutional.

ISSUE(S)

1. Was there gerrymandering (a manipulation of electoral constituency to achieve one’s purposes)?

2. Did the law violate the one-title-one-subject policy?
3. Are the people of San Juan properly excluded from the plebiscite of RA 7675?

RULING

1. The Solicitor General respondent is correct, it should be noted that Rep. Ronaldo Zamora, the
author of the assailed law, is the incumbent representative of the former San Juan/ Mandaluyong
district, having consistently won in both localities. By dividing San Juan/Mandaluyong, Rep.
Zamora’s constituency has in fact been diminished, which development could hardly be
considered as favorable to him. Thus, there is no gerrymandering;
2. No, it did not violate the one title-one subject rule under the Constitution which provide that
"Sec. 26 (1). Every bill passed by the Congress shall embrace only one subject which shall be
expressed in the title thereof."The creation of a separate congressional district for Mandaluyong
is not a subject separate and distinct from the subject of its conversion into a highly urbanized
city but is a natural and logical consequence of such conversion. Further, a liberal construction of
the “one title-one subject” rule has been invariably adopted by the Supreme Court so as not to
cripple or impede legislation;
3. Petitioners contend that the people of San Juan should have been made to participate in the
plebiscite on R.A. No. 7675 as the same involved a change in their legislative district. The
contention is bereft of merit since the principal subject involved in the plebiscite was the
conversion of Mandaluyong into a highly urbanized city. The matter of separate district repre-
sentation was only ancillary thereto. Thus, the inhabitants of San Juan were properly excluded
from the said plebiscite as they had nothing to do with the change of status of neighboring
Mandaluyong.

8. Santiago v. COMELEC

MIRIAM DEFENSOR SANTIAGO, ALEXANDER PADILLA, and MARIA ISABEL ONGPIN,

petitioners, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, JESUS DELFIN, ALBERTO PEDROSA & CARMEN
PEDROSA, in their capacities as founding members of the People’s Initiative for Reforms,
Modernization and Action (PIRMA), respondents
G.R. No. 127325. March 19, 1997

Ponente: J. Davide, Jr.

Topic: Constitutional Construction – Initiative on amendments to the Constitution.
Synopsis:
Under Section 2 of R.A. No. 6735, the people are not accorded the power to “directly propose, enact,
approve or reject, in whole or in part, the Constitution” through the system of initiative—they can only do
so with respect to “laws, ordinances, or resolutions.”—Contrary to the assertion of public respondent
COMELEC, Section 2 of the Act does not suggest an initiative on amendments to the Constitution. The
inclusion of the word “Constitution” therein was a delayed afterthought. That word is neither germane
nor relevant to said section, which exclusively relates to initiative and referendum on national laws and
local laws, ordinances, and resolutions. That section is silent as to amendments on the Constitution. As
pointed out earlier, initiative on the Constitution is confined only to proposals to AMEND. The people are
not accorded the power to “directly propose, enact, approve, or reject, in whole or in part, the
Constitution” through the system of initiative. They can only do so with respect to “laws, ordinances, or
resolutions.”

Digest:

FACTS
On 6 December 1996, private respondent Atty. Jesus S. Delfin filed with public respondent Commission
on Elections a petition to amend the Constitution by people’s initiative, particularly with respect to the
proposed lifting of the term limits of all elective officials. On December 18 of the same year, herein
petitioners filed this case for special civil action for prohibition under Rule 65, contending that the
constitutional provision on people’s initiative to amend the Constitution can only be implemented by law
to be passed by Congress. No such law has been passed. Furthermore, while it is true that R.A. No. 6735
provides for three systems of initiative, namely, initiative on the Constitution, on statutes, and on local
legislation, it nevertheless failed to provide any subtitle on initiative on the Constitution, unlike in the
other modes of initiative, which are specifically provided for in Subtitle II and Subtitle III. This deliberate
omission indicates that the matter of people’s initiative to amend the Constitution was left to some future
law. Petitioners also cited the privilege speech of former Senator Arturo Tolentino, which he delivered on
the Senate floor in 1994, stating: “There is not a single word in that law which can be considered as
implementing [the provision on constitutional initiative]. Such implementing provisions have been
obviously left to a separate law.”

ISSUE(S)
Do the people have the right to propose the lifting of the term limits of elective officials, an amendment
of the provisions of the 1987 Constitution, by initiative?

RULING
No. Bluntly stated, the right of the people to directly propose amendments to the Constitution through
the system of initiative would remain entombed in the cold niche of the Constitution until Congress
provides for its implementation. Stated otherwise, while theConstitution has recognized or granted that
right, the people cannot exercise it if Congress, for whatever reason, does not provide for its
implementation. In short, the system of initiative on the Constitution under Section 2 of Article XVII of
the Constitution is not self-executory. Under Section 2 of R.A. No. 6735, the people are not accorded the
power to “directly propose, enact, approve or reject, in whole or in part, the Constitution” through the
system of initiative—they can only do so with respect to “laws, ordinances, or resolutions.”—Contrary to
the assertion of public respondent COMELEC, Section 2 of the Act does not suggest an initiative on
amendments to the Constitution. The said section reads: SECTION 2. Statement and Policy.—The power
of the people under a system of initiative and referendum to directly propose, enact, approve or reject, in
whole or in part, the Constitution, laws, ordinances, or resolutions passed by any legislative body upon
compliance with the requirements of this Act is hereby affirmed, recognized and guaranteed. The
inclusion of the word “Constitution” therein was a delayed afterthought. That word is neither germane
nor relevant to said section, which exclusively relates to initiative and referendum on national laws and
local laws, ordinances, and resolutions. That section is silent as to amendments on the Constitution. As
pointed out earlier, initiative on the Constitution is confined only to proposals to AMEND. The people are
not accorded the power to “directly propose, enact, approve, or reject, in whole or in part, the
Constitution” through the system of initiative. They can only do so with respect to “laws, ordinances, or
resolutions.”

If Congress intended R.A. No. 6735 to fully provide for the implementation of the initiative on
amendments to the Constitution, it could have provided for a subtitle therefor, considering that in the
order of things, the primacy of interest, or hierarchy of values, the right of the people to directly propose
amendments to the Constitution is far more important than the initiative on national and local laws. While
the Act provides subtitles for National Initiative and Referendum (Subtitle II) and for Local Initiative and
Referendum (Subtitle III), no subtitle is provided for initiative on the Constitution. This conspicuous
silence as to the latter simply means that the main thrust of the Act is initiative and referendum on
national and local laws.

9. Lambino v. COMELEC

RAUL L. LAMBINO and ERICO B. AUMENTADO, TOGETHER WITH 6,327,952 REGISTERED

VOTERS, petitioners, vs. THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, respondent.
G.R. No. 174153. October 25, 2006

Ponente: J. Carpio
Topic: Amendments to the Constitution – Two-Part Test
Synopsis:
In our Constitution, courts have developed a two-part test in determining whether the proposed changes
amends or revises the constitution: the (1) quantitative test and the qualitative test. The quantitative test
asks whether the proposed change is "so extensive in its provisions as to change directly the 'substantial
entirety' of the constitution by the deletion or alteration of numerous existing provisions."36 The court
examines only the number of provisions affected and does not consider the degree of the change. The
(2) qualitative test inquiries into the qualitative effects of the proposed change in the constitution. The
main inquiry is whether the change will "accomplish such far reaching changes in the nature of our basic
governmental plan as to amount to a revision.

Digest:

FACTS
On 15 February 2006, Raul L. Lambino and Erico B. Aumentado ("Lambino Group"), with other groups
and individuals, commenced gathering signatures for an initiative petition to change the 1987
Constitution. On 25 August 2006, the Lambino Group filed a petition with the COMELEC to hold a
plebiscite that will ratify their initiative petition under Section 5(b) and (c) and Section 7 of Republic Act
No. 6735 or the Initiative and Referendum Act ("RA 6735"). The Lambino Group alleged that their
petition had the support of 6,327,952 individuals constituting at least twelve per centum (12%) of all
registered voters, with each legislative district represented by at least three per centum (3%) of its
registered voters. The Lambino Group also claimed that COMELEC election registrars had verified the
signatures of the 6.3 million individuals.The Lambino Group's initiative petition changes the 1987
Constitution by modifying Sections 1-7 of Article VI (Legislative Department) and Sections 1-4 of Article
VII (Executive Department) and by adding Article XVIII entitled "Transitory Provisions." These proposed
changes will shift the present Bicameral-Presidential system to a Unicameral-Parliamentary form of
government.

COMELEC denied the petition due to lack of enabling law governing initiative petitions and invoked the
Santiago Vs. Comelec ruling that RA 6735 is inadequate to implement the initiative petitions.

ISSUE(S)
1. Whether the initiative petition an amendment or revision.

2. Whether the Lambino’s Group initiative petition complies with Section 2, Article XVII of the
Constitution on amendments to the Constitution through a people’s initiative.

3. Whether the initiative petition of the Lambino Group violated the Constitution.
4. Whether the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion in denying due course to the
Lambino Group’s petition.

RULING
1. It was a Revision of the Constitution. Revision broadly implies a change that alters a basic principle in
the constitution, like altering the principle of separation of powers or the system of checks-and-balances.
There is also revision if the change alters the substantial entirety of the constitution, as when the change
affects substantial provisions of the constitution. On the other hand, amendment broadly refers to a
change that adds, reduces, or deletes without altering the basic principle involved. Revision generally
affects several provisions of the constitution, while amendment generally affects only the specific
provision being amended.

In California where the initiative clause allows amendments but not revisions to the constitution just like
in our Constitution, courts have developed a two-part test: the (1) quantitative test and the qualitative
test. The quantitative test asks whether the proposed change is "so extensive in its provisions as to
change directly the 'substantial entirety' of the constitution by the deletion or alteration of numerous
existing provisions."36 The court examines only the number of provisions affected and does not consider
the degree of the change.The (2) qualitative test inquires into the qualitative effects of the proposed
change in the constitution. The main inquiry is whether the change will "accomplish such far reaching
changes in the nature of our basic governmental plan as to amount to a revision."

2. No. According to the SC the Lambino group failed to comply with the basic requirements for
conducting a people’s initiative.
The Initiative Petition Does Not Comply with Section 2, Article XVII of the Constitution on Direct Proposal
by the People
During the oral arguments, Atty. Lambino expressly admitted that they printed only 100,000 copies of the
draft petition they filed more than six months later with the COMELEC. With only 100,000 printed copies
of the petition, it would be physically impossible for all or a great majority of the 6.3 million signatories to
have seen the petition before they signed the signature sheets. The inescapable conclusion is that the
Lambino Group failed to show to the 6.3 million signatories the full text of the proposed changes. If ever,
not more than one million signatories saw the petition before they signed the signature sheets.
The petitioners failed to show the court that the initiative signer must be informed at the time of the
signing of the nature and effect, failure to do so is “deceptive and misleading” which renders the initiative
void.

3. Yes, The Initiative Violates Section 2, Article XVII of the Constitution Disallowing Revision through
Initiatives
A people's initiative to change the Constitution applies only to an amendment of the Constitution and not
to its revision. In contrast, Congress or a constitutional convention can propose both amendments and
revisions to the Constitution. Article XVII of the Constitution provides:
ARTICLE XVII
AMENDMENTS OR REVISIONS
Sec. 1. Any amendment to, or revision of, this Constitution may be proposed by:
(1) The Congress, upon a vote of three-fourths of all its Members, or
(2) A constitutional convention.
Sec. 2. Amendments to this Constitution may likewise be directly proposed by the people through
initiative x x x. (Emphasis supplied)

4.No, The Court held that the COMELEC did not grave abuse of discretion on dismissing the Lambino
petition. In dismissing the Lambino Group's initiative petition, the COMELEC en banc merely followed this
Court's ruling in Santiago and People's Initiative for Reform, Modernization and Action (PIRMA) v.
COMELEC.52 For following this Court's ruling, no grave abuse of discretion is attributable to the
COMELEC.

10. Province of North Cotabato v. GRP

THE PROVINCE OF NORTH COTABATO, duly represented by GOVERNOR JESUS SACDALAN

and/or VICE-GOVERNOR EMMANUEL PIÑOL, for and in his own behalf, petitioners, vs. THE
GOVERNMENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES PEACE PANEL ON ANCESTRAL
DOMAIN (GRP), represented by SEC. RODOLFO GARCIA, ATTY. LEAH ARMAMENTO, ATTY.
SEDFREY CANDELARIA, MARK RYAN SULLIVAN and/or GEN. HERMOGENES ESPERON, JR.,
the latter in his capacity as the present and duly-appointed Presidential Adviser on the Peace
Process (OPAPP) or the so-called Office of the Presidential Adviser on the Peace Process,
respondents
G.R. No. 183591. October 14, 2008

Ponente: J. Carpio
Topic: Elements of a State – The international law concept of “association”
Synopsis:
The failed MOA-AD which was supposed to be signed between the Government of the Republic of the
Philippines (GRP) and the MILF, through the Chairpersons of their respective peace negotiating panels,
was questioned by several petitioners. The MOA-AD contains many provisions which are consistent with
the international legal concept of association. These provisions of the MOA indicate, among other things,
that the Parties aimed to vest in the BJE the status of an associated state or, at any rate, a status closely
approximating it. The concept of association is not recognized under the present Constitution.

Digest:

FACTS
The Government of the Republic of the Philippines (GRP) and the MILF, through the Chairpersons of their
respective peace negotiating panels, were scheduled to sign a Memorandum of Agreement on the
Ancestral Domain (MOA-AD) Aspect of the GRP-MILF Tripoli Agreement on Peace of 2001 in Kuala
Lumpur, Malaysia.

The signing of the MOA-AD between the GRP and the MILF was not to materialize, however, for upon
motion of petitioners, specifically those who filed their cases before the scheduled signing of the MOA-
AD, SC issued a Temporary Restraining Order enjoining the GRP from signing the same.
The Province of North Cotabato and Vice-Governor Emmanuel Piñol filed a petition for Mandamus and
Prohibition with Prayer for the Issuance of Writ of Preliminary Injunction and Temporary Restraining
Order. Invoking the right to information on matters of public concern, petitioners seek to compel
respondents to disclose and furnish them the complete and official copies of the MOA-AD including its
attachments, and to prohibit the slated signing of the MOA-AD, pending the disclosure of the contents of
the MOA-AD and the holding of a public consultation thereon. Supplementarily, petitioners pray that the
MOA-AD be declared unconstitutional.

ISSUE(S)
WON contents of the MOA-AD violate the Constitution and the laws

RULING
YES.

In general, the objections against the MOA-AD center on the extent of the powers conceded therein to
the BJE. Petitioners assert that the powers granted to the BJE exceed those granted to any local
government under present laws, and even go beyond those of the present ARMM. Before assessing some
of the specific powers that would have been vested in the BJE, however, it would be useful to turn first to
a general idea that serves as a unifying link to the different provisions of the MOA-AD, namely, the
international law concept of association. Significantly, the MOA-AD explicitly alludes to this concept,
indicating that the Parties actually framed its provisions with it in mind.

Association is referred to in paragraph 3 on TERRITORY, paragraph 11 on RESOURCES, and paragraph 4

on GOVERNANCE. It is in the last-mentioned provision, however, that the MOA-AD most clearly uses it to
describe the envisioned relationship between the BJE and the Central Government.
“4. The relationship between the Central Government and the Bangsamoro juridical entity shall be
associative characterized by shared authority and responsibility with a structure of governance based on
executive, legislative, judicial and administrative institutions with defined powers and functions in the
comprehensive compact. A period of transition shall be established in a comprehensive peace compact
specifying the relationship between the Central Government and the BJE.” (Emphasis and underscoring
supplied)

The nature of the “associative” relationship may have been intended to be defined more precisely in the
still to be forged Comprehensive Compact. Nonetheless, given that there is a concept of “association” in
international law, and the MOA-AD—by its inclusion of international law instruments in its TOR—placed
itself in an international legal context, that concept of association may be brought to bear in
understanding the use of the term “associative” in the MOA-AD.

MOA-AD contains many provisions which are consistent with the international legal concept of
association, specifically the following: the BJE’s capacity to enter into economic and trade relations with
foreign countries, the commitment of the Central Government to ensure the BJE’s participation in
meetings and events in the ASEAN and the specialized UN agencies, and the continuing responsibility of
the Central Government over external defense. Moreover, the BJE’s right to participate in Philippine
official missions bearing on negotiation of border agreements, environmental protection, and sharing of
revenues pertaining to the bodies of water adjacent to or between the islands forming part of the
ancestral domain, resembles the right of the governments of FSM and the Marshall Islands to be
consulted by the U.S. government on any foreign affairs matter affecting them.

These provisions of the MOA indicate, among other things, that the Parties aimed to vest in the BJE the
status of an associated state or, at any rate, a status closely approximating it.
The concept of association is not recognized under the present Constitution.

11. Magallona v. Ermita

PROF. MERLIN MAGALLONA, et al., petitioners, vs. HON. EDUARDO ERMITA, IN HIS
CAPACITY AS EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, et al., respondents
G.R. No. 187167. August 16, 2011

Ponente: J. Carpio
Topic: Territory – UNCLOS III, as incorporated by R.A. 9522
Synopsis:
The Supreme Court found RA 9522 constitutional, even with respect to what appeared to petitioners as
reduction of Philippine maritime territory. On the contrary, the law only seeks to demarcate the territorial
waters pursuant to the UNCLOS III. Additionally, The Court finds that the conversion of internal waters
into archipelagic waters will not risk the Philippines as affirmed in the Article 49 of the UNCLOS III, an
archipelagic State has sovereign power that extends to the waters enclosed by the archipelagic baselines,
regardless of their depth or distance from the coast. It is further stated that the regime of archipelagic
sea lanes passage will not affect the status of its archipelagic waters or the exercise of sovereignty over
waters and air space, bed and subsoil and the resources therein.

Digest:

FACTS
R.A. 9522 was enacted by the Congress to comply with the terms of the United Nations Convention on
the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS III), which the Philippines ratified on February 27, 1984.
Merlin Magallona questioned the constitutionality of of RA 9522 as they contend, among others, that the
law decreased the national territory of the Philippines as follows:

1. It reduces Philippine maritime territory, and logically, the reach of the Philippine state’s sovereign
power, in violation of Article 1 of the 1987 Constitution, embodying the terms of the Treaty of
Paris and ancillary treaties.
2. It opens the country’s waters landward of the baselines to maritime passage by all vessels and
aircrafts, undermining Philippine sovereignty and national security, contravening the country’s
nuclear-free policy, and damaging marine resources, in violation of relevant constitutional
provisions.
3. Its treatment of Kalayaan Island Group as “regime of islands” not only results in the loss of a
large maritime area but also prejudices the livelihood of subsistence fishermen.

ISSUE(S)
Whether or not RA 9522, the amendatory Philippine Baseline Law should be declared unconstitutional

RULING
No. The Court finds R.A. 9522 constitutional. It is a Statutory Tool to Demarcate the Country’s Maritime
Zones and Continental Shelf Under UNCLOS III, not to Delineate Philippine Territory. It is a vital step in
safeguarding the country’s maritime zones. It also allows an internationally-recognized delimitation of the
breadth of the Philippine’s maritime zones and continental shelf.

Additionally, The Court finds that the conversion of internal waters into archipelagic waters will not risk
the Philippines as affirmed in the Article 49 of the UNCLOS III, an archipelagic State has sovereign power
that extends to the waters enclosed by the archipelagic baselines, regardless of their depth or distance
from the coast. It is further stated that the regime of archipelagic sea lanes passage will not affect the
status of its archipelagic waters or the exercise of sovereignty over waters and air space, bed and subsoil
and the resources therein.

The Court further stressed that the baseline laws are mere mechanisms for the UNCLOS III to precisely
describe the delimitations. It serves as a notice to the international family of states and it is in no way
affecting or producing any effect like enlargement or diminution of territories.
 12. Lansang v. CA

AMADO J. LANSANG, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS, GENERAL ASSEMBLY OF THE BLIND,
INC., and JOSE IGLESIAS, respondents
G.R. No. 102667. February 23, 2000

Ponente: J. Quisumbing
Topic: Doctrine of State Immunity from Suit – Acts performed in bad faith
Synopsis:
A claim for damages based on the alleged reneging of a public officer on a verbal contract of lease, an
act done in apparent bad faith, is not a suit against the state. The doctrine of state immunity from suit
applies to complaints filed against public officials for acts done in the performance of their duties. The
rule is that the suit must be regarded as one against the state where satisfaction of the judgment against
the public official concerned will require the state itself to perform a positive act, such as appropriation of
the amount necessary to pay the damages awarded to the plaintiff. The rule does not apply where the
public official is charged in his official capacity for acts that are unlawful and injurious to the rights of
others.

Digest:

FACTS
Private respondent General Assembly of the Blind (GABI) were allegedly awarded a verbal contract of
lease in Rizal Park by the National Parks Development Committee (NPDC). However, this verbal contract
accommodation was unclear because there was no document or instrument involved. With the change of
government, the new Chairman of NPDC, petitioner Amado J. Lansang, sought to clean up Rizal Park and
terminated the said verbal agreement with GABI and demanded that they vacate the area.

The notice was signed by the president of GABI, private respondent Jose Iglesias, allegedly to indicate his
conformity to its contents but later on claimed that he was deceived into signing the notice. On the day
of the supposed eviction, GABI filed an action for damages and injunction in the RTC against the
petitioner but it was dismissed, ruling that the complaint was actually directed against the state which
could not be sued without its consent.

On appeal, the Court of Appeals reversed the decision of the trial court and ruled that a government
official being sued in his official capacity is not enough to protest such official from liability for acts done
without or in excess of his authority.

ISSUE(S)
Whether or not private respondents' complaint against petitioner Lansang, as Chairman of NPDC, is in
effect a suit against the state which cannot be sued without its consent

RULING
NO. The doctrine of state immunity from suit applies to complaints filed against public officials for acts
done in the performance of their duties. The rule is that the suit must be regarded as one against the
state where satisfaction of the judgment against the public official concerned will require the state itself
to perform a positive act, such as appropriation of the amount necessary to pay the damages awarded to
the plaintiff. The rule does not apply where the public official is charged in his official capacity for acts
that are unlawful and injurious to the rights of others. Public officials are not exempt, in their personal
capacity, from liability arising from acts committed in bad faith. Neither does it apply where the public
official is clearly being sued not in his official capacity but in his personal capacity, although the acts
complained of may have been committed while he occupied a public position.

13. Heirs of Mendoza v. DPWH

HEIRS OF DIOSDADO M. MENDOZA, namely: LICINIA V. MENDOZA, PETER VAL V. MENDOZA,

CONSTANCIA V. MENDOZA YOUNG, CRISTINA V. MENDOZA FIGUEROA, DIOSDADO V.
MENDOZA, JR., JOSEPHINE V. MENDOZA JASA, and RIZALINA V. MENDOZA PUSO,
petitioners, vs. DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC WORKS AND HIGHWAYS, and the DPWH
SECRETARY, respondents
G.R. No. 203834. July 9, 2014

Ponente: J. Carpio
Topic: Doctrine of State Immunity from Suit – Acts jure imperii vs. Acts jure gestionis
Synopsis:
The general rule is that a state may not be sued, but it may be the subject of a suit if it consents to be
sued, either expressly or impliedly. In order to determine implied waiver when the State or its agency
entered into a contract, there is a need to distinguish whether the contract was entered into in its
governmental capacity. The contracts that the DPWH entered into with Mendoza for the construction of
Packages VI and IX of the HADP were done in the exercise of its governmental functions. Hence,
petitioners cannot claim that there was an implied waiver by the DPWH simply by entering into a
contract.

Digest:

FACTS
Diosdado M. Mendoza, the owner of a business named D’ Superior Builders, was the winning bidder for
the construction of the 15-kilometer Madaymen Masala Amsuling Road in Benguet and the engineers’
quarters and laboratory, designated as Package VI, of the Highland Agriculture Development Project
(HADP) of the DPWH. He also won the bidding for Package IX of the project. Subsequently however,
Mendoza filed a case for specific performance and damages against the DPWH, contending that the
named defendants conspired to make it appear that Superior Builders incurred negative slippage of 29%
and recommended the forfeiture of Package VI, and that the DPWH did not execute any contract for
Package IX despite the Superior Builders’ compliance with all the post-evaluation requirements. The
DPWH also recommended the rebidding of Package IX. Package IX was, in effect, canceled together with
the forfeiture of the contract for Package VI. In ruling for the plaintiff (Mendoza), the trial court ruled that
in entering into a contract, the DPWH divested itself of immunity from suit and assumed the character of
an ordinary litigant.

ISSUE(S)
Did the acts of the DPWH, in entering the contracts with Mendoza, serve as implied waiver of the State’s
immunity from suit?

RULING
No. The general rule is that a state may not be sued, but it may be the subject of a suit if it consents to
be sued, either expressly or impliedly. There is express consent when a law so provides, while there is
implied consent when the State enters into a contract or it itself commences litigation. The Supreme
Court explained that to determine implied waiver when the State or its agency entered into a contract,
there is a need to distinguish whether the contract was entered into in its governmental or proprietary
capacity. The Court described the DPWH as an unincorporated government agency without any separate
juridical personality of its own, and thus it enjoys immunity from suit.
The contracts that the DPWH entered into with Mendoza for the construction of Packages VI and IX of
the HADP were done in the exercise of its governmental functions. Hence, petitioners cannot claim that
there was an implied waiver by the DPWH simply by entering into a contract. Thus, the Court of Appeals
correctly ruled that the DPWH enjoys immunity from suit and may not be sued without its consent.

14. Secretary of Health v. Phil. Pharmawealth, Inc.

DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH, THE SECRETARY OF HEALTH, and MA. MARGARITA M. GALON,

petitioners, vs. PHIL PHARMAWEALTH, INC., respondent
G.R. No. 182358. February 20, 2013.

Ponente: J. Del Castillo

Topic: Doctrine of State Immunity from Suit – Unincorporated agencies performing jure imperii
Synopsis:
DOH is an unincorporated agency which performs sovereign or governmental functions. An
unincorporated government agency without any separate juridical personality of its own enjoys immunity
from suit because it is invested with an inherent power of sovereignty. Accordingly, a claim for damages
against the agency cannot prosper; otherwise, the doctrine of sovereign immunity is violated. However,
the need to distinguish between an unincorporated government agency performing governmental
function and one performing proprietary functions has arisen. The immunity has been upheld in favor of
the former because its function is governmental or incidental to such function; it has not been upheld in
favor of the latter whose function was not in pursuit of a necessary function of government but was
essentially a business.

Digest:

FACTS
Administrative Order (AO) No. 27 series of 1998 was issued by then Department of Health (DOH)
Secretary Romualdez, which set the guidelines and procedure for accreditation of government suppliers
of pharmaceutical products for sale or distribution to the public, such accreditation to be valid for 3 years
but subject to annual review.

On January 25, 2000, Sec. Romualdez issued AO 10 series of 2000 which amended AO 27. Under Sec.
VII, the accreditation period for government suppliers of pharmaceutical products was reduced to two
years. Moreover, such accreditation may be recalled, suspended or revoked after due deliberation and
proper notice by the DOH Accreditation Committee, through its Chairman.

Sec. VII of AO 10, was later amended by AO 66 series of 2000, which provided that the 2 year
accreditation period may be recalled, suspended or revoked only after due deliberation, hearing and
notice by the DOH Accreditation Committee, through its Chairman.

On August 28, 2000, the DOH issued Memorandum No. 171-C which provided for a list and category of
sanctions to be imposed on accredited government suppliers of pharmaceutical products in case of
adverse findings regarding their products or violations committed by them during accreditation. In line
with this, former Undersecratary Galon, issued Memorandum No. 209 series of 2000, inviting
representatives of 24 accredited drug companies, including Phil Pharmawealth, Inc. (PPI) to a meeting.
During which the undersecretary handed them copies of a document entitled “Report on Violative
Products” issued by BFAD. Specifically, the BFAD found that PPI’s products which were being sold to the
public were unfit for human consumption. PPI including the 24 drug companies present were directed to
submit within 10 days, their respective explanations on their adverse findings contained in the report.
But instead of submitting its explanation, PPI belatedly sent a letter addressed to the Undersecretary.
However, PPI did not indicate when its reply would be submitted; nor did it seek an extension of the 10
day period, which had expired, much less offer any explanation for its failure to timely submit its reply.

In a letter-reply, Undersecretary Galon found “untenable” PPI’s and therein informed PPI that, effective
immediately, its accreditation has been suspended for two years pursuant to AO 10 and Memorandum
No. 171-C. However, in another letter, PPI questioned the suspension.

PPI filed before the RTC of Pasig City a Complaint seeking to declare null and void certain DOH
Administrative issuances, with prayer for damages and injunction against the DOH, the former Secretary
and Undersecretary. But the trial court dismissed the case, declaring the case to be one instituted against
the state, in which case the principle of state immunity from suit is applicable.

PPI appealed to the CA and the CA reversed the trial court ruling and ordered the remand of the case for
the conduct of further proceedings.

ISSUE(S)
Whether the DOH can validly invoke state immunity

RULING
Yes. As a general rule, a state may not be sued. However, if it consents, either expressly or impliedly,
then it may be the subject of a suit. There is express consent when a law, either special or general, so
provides. On the other hand, there is implied consent when the state “enters into a contract or it itself
commences litigation.” However, it must be clarified that when a state enters into a contract, it does not
automatically mean that it has waived its non-suability. The State “will be deemed to have impliedly
waived its non-suability [only] if it has entered into a contract in its proprietary or private capacity.
[However,] when the contract involves its sovereign or governmental capacity[,] x x x no such waiver
may be implied.” “Statutory provisions waiving [s]tate immunity are construed in strictissimi juris. For,
waiver of immunity is in derogation of sovereignty.”

The DOH can validly invoke state immunity.

a) DOH is an unincorporated agency which performs sovereign or governmental functions.

The ruling in Air Transportation Office v. Ramos is relevant, viz.:

An unincorporated government agency without any separate juridical personality of its own enjoys
immunity from suit because it is invested with an inherent power of sovereignty. Accordingly, a claim for
damages against the agency cannot prosper; otherwise, the doctrine of sovereign immunity is violated.
However, the need to distinguish between an unincorporated government agency performing
governmental function and one performing proprietary functions has arisen. The immunity has been
upheld in favor of the former because its function is governmental or incidental to such function; it has
not been upheld in favor of the latter whose function was not in pursuit of a necessary function of
government but was essentially a business.

b) The Complaint seeks to hold the DOH solidarily and jointly liable with the other defendants for
damages which constitutes a charge or financial liability against the state.

Moreover, it is settled that if a Complaint seeks to “impose a charge or financial liability against the
state,” the defense of non-suability may be properly invoked. In this case, PPI specifically prayed, in its
Complaint and Amended and Supplemental Complaint, for the DOH, together with Secretaries Romualdez
and Dayrit as well as Undersecretary Galon, to be held jointly and severally liable for moral damages,
exemplary damages, attorney’s fees and costs of suit. Undoubtedly, in the event that PPI succeeds in its
suit, the government or the state through the DOH would become vulnerable to an imposition or financial
charge in the form of damages. This would require an appropriation from the national treasury which is
precisely the situation which the doctrine of state immunity aims to protect the state from.

The mantle of non-suability extends to complaints filed against public officials for acts done in the
performance of their official functions.

“The suability of a government official depends on whether the official concerned was acting within his
official or jurisdictional capacity, and whether the acts done in the performance of official functions will
result in a charge or financial liability against the government.” Otherwise stated, “public officials can be
held personally accountable for acts claimed to have been performed in connection with official duties
where they have acted ultra vires or where there is showing of bad faith.” Moreover, “[t]he rule is that if
the judgment against such officials will require the state itself to perform an affirmative act to satisfy the
same, such as the appropriation of the amount needed to pay the damages awarded against them, the
suit must be regarded as against the state x x x. In such a situation, the state may move to dismiss the
[C]omplaint on the ground that it has been filed without its consent.”

15. UP v. Dizon

UNIVERSITY OF THE PHILIPPINES, JOSE V. ABUEVA, RAUL P. DE GUZMAN, RUBEN P.

ASPIRAS, EMMANUEL P. BELLO, WILFREDO P. DAVID, CASIANO S. ABRIGO, and JOSEFINA R.
LICUANAN, petitioners, vs. HON. AGUSTIN S. DIZON, in his capacity as Presiding Judge of
the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 80, STERN BUILDERS, INC., and
SERVILLANO DELA CRUZ, respondents
G.R. No. 171182. August 23, 2012

Ponente: J. Bersamin
Topic: Doctrine of State Immunity from Suit – Garnishment pursuant to a judgment award
Synopsis:
The RTC cannot direct the garnishment of public funds to satisfy a judgment debt, because the
constitution prohibits payment out of the national treasury unless it is by an appropriation made by
Congress. Further, Trial judges should not immediately issue writs of execution or garnishment against
the Government or any of its subdivisions, agencies and instrumentalities to enforce money judgments.
They should bear in mind that the primary jurisdiction to examine, audit and settle all claims of any sort
due from the Government or any of its subdivisions, agencies and instrumentalities pertains to the
Commission on Audit (COA)

Digest:

FACTS
On August 30, 1990, the UP entered into a contract with respondent Stern Builders Corporation for the
construction of the extension building and the renovation of the College of Arts and Sciences Building in
the campus of the University of the Philippines in Los Baños (UPLB).

The contractor billed three (3) progress billings but the UP only paid two (2) billings. The 3rd billing
amounting to P273,729.47 was not paid due to disallowance by COA. However, despite the lifting of COA
of the disallowance, the obligation was not paid. Thus, they sought the aid of the court.

RTC directed the garnishment of public funds mounting to PhP16,370,191.74 belonging to the UP to
satisfy the writ of execution issued to enforce already the final and executor judgment against the UP.
CA affirmed the RTC.

Hence, the appeal.

ISSUE(S)
Whether the funds of the UP were the proper subject of garnishment in order to satisfy the judgment
award

RULING
No, an appropriation by Congress was required before the judgment that rendered the UP liable for moral
and actual damages (including attorney’s fees) would be satisfied considering that such monetary
liabilities were not covered by the “appropriations earmarked for the said project.” The Constitution
strictly mandated that “(n)o money shall be paid out of the Treasury except in pursuance of an
appropriation made by law.”

Further, Trial judges should not immediately issue writs of execution or garnishment against the
Government or any of its subdivisions, agencies and instrumentalities to enforce money judgments.
1They should bear in mind that the primary jurisdiction to examine, audit and settle all claims of any sort
due from the Government or any of its subdivisions, agencies and instrumentalities pertains to the
Commission on Audit (COA) pursuant to Presidential Decree No. 1445(Government Auditing Code of the
Philippines).

16. ATO v. Spouses Ramos

UNIVERSITY OF THE PHILIPPINES, JOSE V. ABUEVA, RAUL P. DE GUZMAN, RUBEN P.

ASPIRAS, EMMANUEL P. BELLO, WILFREDO P. DAVID, CASIANO S. ABRIGO, and JOSEFINA R.
LICUANAN, petitioners, vs. HON. AGUSTIN S. DIZON, in his capacity as Presiding Judge of
the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 80, STERN BUILDERS, INC., and
SERVILLANO DELA CRUZ, respondents
G.R. No. 171182. August 23, 2012

Ponente: J. Bersamin
Topic: Doctrine of State Immunity from Suit – Acts jure imperii vs. Acts jure gestionis
Synopsis:
The State’s immunity from suit does not extend to the petitioner because it is an agency of the State
engaged in an enterprise that is far from being the State’s exclusive prerogative.

The CA correctly appreciated the juridical character of the ATO as an agency of the Government not
performing a purely governmental or sovereign function, but was instead involved in the management
and maintenance of the Loakan Airport, an activity that was not the exclusive prerogative of the State in
its sovereign capacity. Hence, the ATO had no claim to the State’s immunity from suit.
Digest:

FACTS
Spouses Ramos discovered that a portion of their land was being used as part of the runway and running
shoulder of the Loakan Airport being operated by petitioner Air Transportation Office (ATO). On August
11, 1995, the respondents agreed after negotiations to convey the affected portion by deed of sale to the
ATO for ₱778,150.00. However, ATO failed to pay despite repeated verbal and written demands. Thus,
respondents filed an action for collection against the ATO and some of its officials in the RTC.
In their answer, the ATO and its co-defendants invoked as an affirmative defense the issuance of
Proclamation No. 1358, whereby President Marcos had reserved certain parcels of land that included the
respondents’ affected portion for use of the Loakan Airport. They asserted that the RTC had no
jurisdiction to entertain the action without the State’s consent considering that the deed of sale had been
entered into in the performance of governmental functions.

The RTC denied the ATO’s motion for a preliminary hearing of the affirmative defense and likewise
denied the ATO’s motion for reconsideration. The CA dismissed the petition for certiorari.

The RTC rendered its decision on the merits in favor of the respondents. ATO appealed to the CA, which
affirmed the RTC’s decision. Hence, this appeal by petition for review on certiorari.

ISSUE(S)
WON the ATO could be sued without the State’s consent

RULING

The petition for review has no merit.

The immunity of the State from suit, known also as the doctrine of sovereign immunity or non-suability of
the State, is expressly provided in Article XVI of the 1987 Constitution, Section 3. The State may not be
sued without its consent. The immunity from suit is based on the political truism that the State, as a
sovereign, can do no wrong.

A sovereign is exempt from suit, not because of any formal conception or obsolete theory, but on the
logical and practical ground that there can be no legal right as against the authority that makes the law
on which the right depends. "Car on peut bien recevoir loy d'autruy, mais il est impossible par nature de
se donner loy." Bodin, Republique, 1, chap. 8, ed. 1629, p. 132; Sir John Eliot, De Jure Maiestatis, chap.
3. Nemo suo statuto ligatur necessitative. Baldus, De Leg. et Const. Digna Vox, 2. ed. 1496, fol. 51b, ed.
1539, fol. 61. - Justice Holmes in Kawananakoa v. Polyblank:

Practical considerations dictate the establishment of an immunity from suit in favor of the State.
Otherwise, and the State is suable at the instance of every other individual, government service may be
severely obstructed and public safety endangered because of the number of suits that the State has to
defend against.
[A] continued adherence to the doctrine of non-suability is not to be deplored for as against the
inconvenience that may be caused private parties, the loss of governmental efficiency and the obstacle to
the performance of its multifarious functions are far greater if such a fundamental principle were
abandoned and the availability of judicial remedy were not thus restricted. With the well-known
propensity on the part of our people to go to court, at the least provocation, the loss of time and energy
required to defend against law suits, in the absence of such a basic principle that constitutes such an
effective obstacle, could very well be imagined.

An unincorporated government agency without any separate juridical personality of its own enjoys
immunity from suit because it is invested with an inherent power of sovereignty. Accordingly, a claim for
damages against the agency cannot prosper; otherwise, the doctrine of sovereign immunity is violated.
However, the need to distinguish between an unincorporated government agency performing
governmental function and one performing proprietary functions has arisen. The immunity has been
upheld in favor of the former because its function is governmental or incidental to such function;
it has not been upheld in favor of the latter whose function was not in pursuit of a necessary function of
government but was essentially a business. – Fr. Bernas

Not all government entities, whether corporate or non-corporate, are immune from suits. Immunity from
suits is determined by the character of the objects for which the entity was organized. The rule is thus
stated in Corpus Juris:
Suits against State agencies with relation to matters in which they have assumed to act in private or non-
governmental capacity, and various suits against certain corporations created by the state for public
purposes, but to engage in matters partaking more of the nature of ordinary business rather than
functions of a governmental or political character, are not regarded as suits against the state. The latter
is true, although the state may own stock or property of such a corporation for by engaging in business
operations through a corporation, the state divests itself so far of its sovereign character, and by
implication consents to suits against the corporation. - National Airports Corporation v. Teodoro, supra,
pp. 206-207

The CA correctly appreciated the juridical character of the ATO as an agency of the Government not
performing a purely governmental or sovereign function, but was instead involved in the management
and maintenance of the Loakan Airport, an activity that was not the exclusive prerogative of the State in
its sovereign capacity. Hence, the ATO had no claim to the State’s immunity from suit.

The doctrine of sovereign immunity cannot be successfully invoked to defeat a valid claim for
compensation arising from the taking without just compensation and without the proper expropriation
proceedings being first resorted to of the plaintiffs’ property.

The doctrine of sovereign immunity was not an instrument for perpetrating any injustice on a citizen. In
exercising the right of eminent domain, the Court explained, the State exercised its jus imperii, as
distinguished from its proprietary rights, or jus gestionis; yet, even in that area, where private property
had been taken in expropriation without just compensation being paid, the defense of immunity from suit
could not be set up by the State against an action for payment by the owners. - De los Santos v.
Intermediate Appellate Court,

Whether or not the ATO could be sued without the State’s consent has been rendered moot by the
passage of RA 9497, otherwise known as the Civil Aviation Authority Act of 2008. which abolished the
ATO, to wit:

Section 4. Creation of the Authority. - There is hereby created an independent regulatory body with
quasi-judicial and quasi-legislative powers and possessing corporate attributes to be known as the Civil
Aviation Authority of the Philippines (CAAP), herein after referred to as the "Authority" attached to the
Department of Transportation and Communications (DOTC) for the purpose of policy coordination. For
this purpose, the existing Air transportation Office created under the provisions of Republic Act No. 776,
as amended is hereby abolished.
xxx
Under its Transitory Provisions, R.A. No. 9497 established in place of the ATO the Civil Aviation Authority
of the Philippines (CAAP), which thereby assumed all of the ATO’s powers, duties and rights, assets, real
and personal properties, funds, and revenues,

With the CAAP having legally succeeded the ATO pursuant to R.A. No. 9497, the obligations that the ATO
had incurred by virtue of the deed of sale with the Ramos spouses might now be enforced against the
CAAP.

WHEREFORE, the Court denies the petition for review on certiorari, and affirms the decision promulgated
by the Court of Appeals.

- RIVERA

17. Hermano Oil vs. Toll Regulatory Board

HERMANO OIL MANUFACTURING & SUGAR CORPORATION, petitioner, vs. TOLL
REGULATORY BOARD, ENGR. JAIME S. DUMLAO, JR., PHILIPPINE NATIONAL
CONSTRUCTION CORPORATION (PNCC) and DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC WORKS AND
HIGHWAYS (DPWH), respondents
G.R. No. 167290. November 26, 2014

Ponente: J. Bersamin
Topic: Doctrine of State Immunity from Suit – Acts jure imperii vs. Acts jure gestionis
Synopsis:
The issue to be determined concerns the demand of the petitioner to have access to the North Luzon
Expressway (NLEX) by way of an easement of right of way. The demand was rebuffed by the
respondents and upheld by both the trial and appellate courts. The Supreme Court ruled that, as the TRB
and the DPWH were exercising governmental functions, they were invested with the inherent power of
sovereignty. Being unincorporated agencies or entities of the National Government, they could not be
sued as such.

Digest:

FACTS
Hermano Oil Manufacturing & Sugar Corporation owned a parcel of land at NLEX. The petitioner
requested that respondent Toll Regulatory Board (TRB) grant an easement of right of way, for it had
been deprived of its enjoyment and possession by the fence that barred its entry. TRB denied based on
the Limited Access Highway Act.

Hence, petitioner sued TRB and Engr. Dumlao demanding specific performance, the grant of the
easement of right of way and damages being deprived of its property without due process, just
compensation and equal protection of the law.

In its order dated March 6, 2002,10 the RTC granted the motion to dismiss, observing as follows:The
present action against the defendants Toll Regulatory Board and its Executive Director, Engr. Jaime S.
Dumlao, Jr., could be considered as a suit against the state without its consent as among the reliefs
prayed for in the complaint is to require the said defendants to pay, jointly and severally, a just and
reasonable compensation of the plaintiff's property which, if awarded in the judgment against said
defendants, would ultimately involve an appropriation by the state of the amount needed to pay the
compensation and damages so awarded. Moreover, as pointed out by the defendants-movants,
defendant Jaime S. Dumlao, Jr. is sued in his official capacity so that the instant complaint against him is
tantamount to a claim against the state which cannot be sued without its consent.

On October 27, 2004, the CA promulgated its assailed judgment, affirming the RTC's dismissal of the
complaint

ISSUE(S)
Whether the respondents can validly invoke the state immunity from suit

RULING
In our view, the TRB, Dumlao and the DPWH correctly invoked the doctrine of sovereign immunity in
their favor. The TRB and the DPWH performed purely or essentially government or public functions. As
such, they were invested with the inherent power of sovereignty. Being unincorporated agencies or
entities of the National Government, they could not be sued as such. On his part, Dumlao was acting as
the agent of the TRB in respect of the matter concerned.
 18. Republic of Indonesia v. Vinzon

THE REPUBLIC OF INDONESIA, HIS EXCELLENCY AMBASSADOR SOERATMIN, and MINISTER

COUNSELLOR AZHARI KASIM, petitioners, vs. JAMES VINZON, doing business under the
name and style of VINZON TRADE AND SERVICES, respondent
G.R. No. 154705. June 26, 2003

Ponente: J. Azcuna
Topic: Doctrine of State Immunity from Suit – Restrictive Theory
Synopsis:
The rules of International Law, however, are neither unyielding nor impervious to change. The increasing
need of sovereign States to enter into purely commercial activities remotely connected with the discharge
of their governmental functions brought about a new concept of sovereign immunity. This concept, the
restrictive theory, holds that the immunity of the sovereign is recognized only with regard to public acts
or acts jure imperii, but not with regard to private acts or acts jure gestionis. Submission by a foreign
state to local jurisdiction must be clear and unequivocal. It must be given explicitly or by necessary
implication.

Digest:

FACTS
Petitioner, Republic of Indonesia, represented by its Counsellor, Siti Partinah, entered into a Maintenance
Agreement in August 1995 with respondent James Vinzon, sole proprietor of Vinzon Trade and Services.
The Maintenance Agreement stated that respondent shall, for a consideration, maintain specified
equipment at the Embassy Main Building, Embassy Annex Building and the Wisma Duta, the official
residence of petitioner Ambassador Soeratmin.

Petitioners claim that sometime prior to the date of expiration of the said agreement, they informed
respondent that the renewal of the agreement shall be at the discretion of the incoming Chief of
Administration, Minister Counsellor Azhari Kasim. When Minister Counsellor Kasim assumed the position
of Chief of Administration he allegedly found respondent’s work and services unsatisfactory and not in
compliance with the standards set in the Maintenance Agreement. Hence, the Indonesian Embassy
terminated the agreement. Petitioners claim, moreover, that they had earlier verbally informed
respondent of their decision to terminate the agreement.

Respondent claims that the aforesaid termination was arbitrary and unlawful. Hence, respondent filed a
complaint against petitioners in RTC. Petitioners filed a Motion to Dismiss, alleging that the Republic of
Indonesia, as a foreign sovereign State, has sovereign immunity from suit and cannot be sued as a party-
defendant in the Philippines.

ISSUE(S)
WON Petitioner has sovereign immunity from suit

RULING
Yes. International law is founded largely upon the principles of reciprocity, comity, independence, and
equality of States which were adopted as part of the law of our land under Article II, Section 2 of the
1987 Constitution. The rule that a State may not be sued without its consent is a necessary consequence
of the principles of independence and equality of States. As enunciated in Sanders v. Veridiano II, the
practical justification for the doctrine of sovereign immunity is that there can be no legal right against the
authority that makes the law on which the right depends. In the case of foreign States, the rule is derived
from the principle of the sovereign equality of States, as expressed in the maxim par in parem non habet
imperium. All states are sovereign equals and cannot assert jurisdiction over one another. A contrary
attitude would “unduly vex the peace of nations.”
The rules of International Law, however, are neither unyielding nor impervious to change. The increasing
need of sovereign States to enter into purely commercial activities remotely connected with the discharge
of their governmental functions brought about a new concept of sovereign immunity. This concept, the
restrictive theory, holds that the immunity of the sovereign is recognized only with regard to public acts
or acts jure imperii, but not with regard to private acts or acts jure gestionis.
Submission by a foreign state to local jurisdiction must be clear and unequivocal. It must be given
explicitly or by necessary implication. We find no such waiver in this case. ###

19. China National Machinery and Equipment Corp. v. Santamaria

CHINA NATIONAL MACHINERY & EQUIPMENT CORP. (GROUP), petitioner, vs. HON. CESAR
D. SANTAMARIA, in his official capacity as Presiding Judge of Branch 145, Regional Trial
Court of Makati City, HERMINIO HARRY L. ROQUE, JR., JOEL R. BUTUYAN, ROGER R. RAYEL,
ROMEL R. BAGARES, CHRISTOPHER FRANCISCO C. BOLASTIG, LEAGUE OF URBAN POOR FOR
ACTION (LUPA), KILUSAN NG MARALITA SA MEYCAUAYAN (KMM-LUPA CHAPTER), DANILO
M. CALDERON, VICENTE C. ALBAN, MERLYN M. VAAL, LOLITA S. QUINONES, RICARDO D.
LANOZO, JR., CONCHITA G. GOZO, MA. TERESA D. ZEPEDA, JOSEFINA A. LANOZO, and
SERGIO C. LEGASPI, JR., KALIPUNAN NG DAMAYANG MAHIHIRAP (KADAMAY), EDY
CLERIGO, RAMMIL DINGAL, NELSON B. TERRADO, CARMEN DEUNIDA, and EDUARDO
LEGSON, respondents.
G.R. No. 185572. February 7, 2012.

Ponente: J. Sereno
Topic: Doctrine of State Immunity from Suit – Restrictive Theory
Synopsis:
Admittedly, the Loan Agreement was entered into between EXIM Bank and the Philippine government,
while the Contract Agreement was between Northrail and CNMEG. Although the Contract Agreement is
silent on the classification of the legal nature of the transaction, it nonetheless reveals the intention of
the parties to the Northrail Project to classify the whole venture as commercial or proprietary in
character. Adhering to the restrictive theory, the petitioner is therefore not entitled to immunity from suit.

Digest:

FACTS
On 14 September 2002, petitioner China National Machinery & Equipment Corp. (CNMEG), represented
by its chairperson, Ren Hongbin, entered into a Memorandum of Understanding with the North Luzon
Railways Corporation for the conduct of a feasibility study on a possible railway line from Manila to San
Fernando, La Union.

On 30 August 2003, the Export Import Bank of China (EXIM Bank) and the Department of Finance of the
Philippines (DOF) entered into a Memorandum of Understanding, wherein China agreed to extend
Preferential Buyer’s Credit to the Philippine government to finance the Northrail Project. The Chinese
government designated EXIM Bank as the lender, while the Philippine government named the DOF as the
borrower. Under the Aug 30 MOU, EXIM Bank agreed to extend an amount not exceeding USD
400,000,000 in favor of the DOF, payable in 20 years, with a 5-year grace period, and at the rate of 3%
per annum.

On 1 October 2003, the Chinese Ambassador to the Philippines, Wang Chungui, wrote a letter to DOF
Secretary Jose Isidro Camacho informing him of CNMEG’s designation as the Prime Contractor for the
Northrail Project. On 30 December 2003, Northrail and CNMEG executed a Contract Agreement for the
construction of Section I, Phase I of the North Luzon Railway System from Caloocan to Malolos on a
turnkey basis (the Contract Agreement). The contract price for the Northrail Project was pegged at USD
421,050,000.

On 26 February 2004, the Philippine government and EXIM Bank entered into a counterpart financial
agreement, the Buyer Credit Loan Agreement. In the Loan Agreement, EXIM Bank agreed to extend
Preferential Buyer’s Credit in the amount of USD 400,000,000 in favor of the Philippine government in
order to finance the construction of Phase I of the Northrail Project.

ISSUE(S)
Whether or not the Northrail contracts are products of an executive agreement between two sovereign
states

RULING
No. Petitioner China National Machinery & Equipment Corp. (Group) is not entitled to immunity from suit,
and the Contract Agreement is not an executive agreement. CNMEG’s prayer for the issuance of a TRO
and/or Writ of Preliminary Injunction is DENIED for being moot and academic.
The Court explained the doctrine of sovereign immunity in Holy See v. Rosario, to wit:
There are two conflicting concepts of sovereign immunity, each widely held and firmly established.
According to the classical or absolute theory, a sovereign cannot, without its consent, be made a
respondent in the courts of another sovereign. According to the newer or restrictive theory, the immunity
of the sovereign is recognized only with regard to public acts or acts jure imperii of a state, but not with
regard to private acts or acts jure gestionis. (Emphasis supplied; citations omitted.)

As it stands now, the application of the doctrine of immunity from suit has been restricted to sovereign or
governmental activities (jure imperii). The mantle of state immunity cannot be extended to commercial,
private and proprietary acts (jure gestionis).

Since the Philippines adheres to the restrictive theory, it is crucial to ascertain the legal nature of the act
involved – whether the entity claiming immunity performs governmental, as opposed to proprietary,
functions. As held in United States of America v. Ruiz.

Admittedly, the Loan Agreement was entered into between EXIM Bank and the Philippine government,
while the Contract Agreement was between Northrail and CNMEG. Although the Contract Agreement is
silent on the classification of the legal nature of the transaction, the foregoing provisions of the Loan
Agreement, which is an inextricable part of the entire undertaking, nonetheless reveal the intention of the
parties to the Northrail Project to classify the whole venture as commercial or proprietary in character.
Thus, piecing together the content and tenor of the Contract Agreement, the Memorandum of
Understanding dated 14 September 2002, Amb. Wang’s letter dated 1 October 2003, and the Loan
Agreement would reveal the desire of CNMEG to construct the Luzon Railways in pursuit of a purely
commercial activity performed in the ordinary course of its business.

20. Arigo v. Swift

MOST REV. PEDRO D. ARIGO, D.D., Vicar Apostolic of Puerto Princesa, et al., petitioners,
versus SCOTT H. SWIFT, in his capacity as Commander of the U.S. 7th Fleet, et al.,
respondents
G.R. No. 206510. September 16, 2014

Ponente: J. Villarama, Jr.

Topic: Doctrine of State Immunity from Suit – Restrictive Theory
Synopsis:
In this case, the US respondents were sued in their official capacity as commanding officers of the US
Navy who had control and supervision over the USS Guardian and its crew. The alleged act or omission
resulting in the unfortunate grounding of the USS Guardian on the TRNP was committed while they were
performing official military duties. Considering that the satisfaction of a judgment against said officials will
require remedial actions and appropriation of funds by the US government, the suit is deemed to be one
against the US itself. The principle of State immunity therefore bars the exercise of jurisdiction by this
Court over the persons of respondents Swift, Rice and Roblin.

Digest:

FACTS
The USS Guardian is an Avenger-class mine countermeasures ship of the US Navy. In December 2012,
the US Embassy in the Philippines requested diplomatic clearance for the said vessel “to enter and exit
the territorial waters of the Philippines and to arrive at the port of Subic Bay for the purpose of routine
ship replenishment, maintenance, and crew liberty.” On January 6, 2013, the ship left Sasebo, Japan for
Subic Bay, arriving on January 13, 2013 after a brief stop for fuel in Okinawa, Japan.

On January 15, 2013, the USS Guardian departed Subic Bay for its next port of call in Makassar,
Indonesia. On January 17, 2013 at 2:20 a.m. while transiting the Sulu Sea, the ship ran aground on the
northwest side of South Shoal of the Tubbataha Reefs, about 80 miles east-southeast of Palawan. No one
was injured in the incident, and there have been no reports of leaking fuel or oil. On April 17, 2013, the
above-named petitioners on their behalf and in representation of their respective sector/organization and
others, including minors or generations yet unborn, filed the present petition against Scott H. Swift in his
capacity as Commander of the U.S. 7th Fleet, et. al. as respondents. Petitioners claim that the grounding,
salvaging and post-salvaging operations of the USS Guardian cause and continue to cause environmental
damage of such magnitude as to affect the provinces of Palawan, Antique, Aklan, Guimaras, Iloilo,
Negros Occidental, Negros Oriental, Zamboanga del Norte, Basilan, Sulu, and Tawi-Tawi, which events
violate their constitutional rights to a balanced and healthful ecology. They also seek a directive from this
Court for the institution of civil, administrative and criminal suits for acts committed in violation of
environmental laws and regulations in connection with the grounding incident.

ISSUE(S)
Whether this Court has jurisdiction over the US respondents who did not submit any pleading or
manifestation in this case

RULING
NO. The immunity of the State from suit, known also as the doctrine of sovereign immunity or non-
suability of the State, is expressly provided in Section 3, Article XVI of the 1987 Constitution which states
that “the State may not be sued without its consent.” The rule that a state may not be sued without its
consent, as expressed in Section 3, Article XVI of the 1987 Constitution, is one of the generally accepted
principles of international law that we have adopted as part of the law of our land under Section 2, Article
II.

In the case of Minucher v. Court of Appeals, we further expounded on the immunity of foreign states
from the jurisdiction of local courts, as follows: “The precept that a State cannot be sued in the courts of
a foreign state is a long-standing rule of customary international law then closely identified with the
personal immunity of a foreign sovereign from suit and, with the emergence of democratic states, made
to attach not just to the person of the head of state, or his representative, but also distinctly to the state
itself in its sovereign capacity. If the acts giving rise to a suit are those of a foreign government done by
its foreign agent, although not necessarily a diplomatic personage, but acting in his official capacity, the
complaint could be barred by the immunity of the foreign sovereign from suit without its consent. Suing a
representative of a state is believed to be, in effect, suing the state itself. The proscription is not
accorded for the benefit of an individual but for the State, in whose service he is, under the maxim — par
in parem, non habet imperium — that all states are sovereign equals and cannot assert jurisdiction over
one another. The implication, in broad terms, is that if the judgment against an official would require the
state itself to perform an affirmative act to satisfy the award, such as the appropriation of the amount
needed to pay the damages decreed against him, the suit must be regarded as being against the state
itself, although it has not been formally impleaded.”

In this case, the US respondents were sued in their official capacity as commanding officers of the US
Navy who had control and supervision over the USS Guardian and its crew. The alleged act or omission
resulting in the unfortunate grounding of the USS Guardian on the TRNP was committed while they were
performing official military duties. Considering that the satisfaction of a judgment against said officials will
require remedial actions and appropriation of funds by the US government, the suit is deemed to be one
against the US itself. The principle of State immunity therefore bars the exercise of jurisdiction by this
Court over the persons of respondents Swift, Rice and Roblin.

21. Basco v. PAGCOR

ATTORNEYS HUMBERTO BASCO, EDILBERTO BALCE, SOCRATES MARANAN AND LORENZO

SANCHEZ, petitioners, vs. PHILIPPINE AMUSEMENTS AND GAMING CORPORATION
(PAGCOR), respondent
G.R. No. 91649. May 14, 1991

Ponente: J. Paras
Topic: Local Autonomy
Synopsis:
The principle of local autonomy does not make local governments sovereign within the state, it simply
means decentralization. Local Government has been described as a political subdivision of a nation or
state which is constituted by law and has substantial control of local affairs. In a unitary system of
government, such as the government under the Philippine Constitution, local governments can only be an
intra sovereign subdivision of one sovereign nation, it cannot be an imperium in imperio.

Digest:

FACTS
Petitioners here seek the annulment the Philippine Amusement and Gaming Corporation (PAGCOR)
Charter—PD 1869, because it is allegedly contrary to morals, public policy and order, and because it
constitutes a waiver of a right prejudicial to a third person with a right recognized by law. It waived the
Manila City government’s right to impose taxes and license fees, which is recognized by law. Moreover,
the law has intruded into the local government’s right to impose local taxes and license fees. This, in
contravention of the constitutionally enshrined principle of local autonomy. The petitioners are
particularly assailing Section 13 par. (2) of P.D. 1869 which exempts PAGCOR, as the franchise holder
from paying any “tax of any kind or form, income or otherwise, as well as fees, charges or levies of
whatever nature, whether National or Local.”

ISSUE(S)
Does the PAGCOR Charter violate the principle of fiscal autonomy?

RULING
No. The City of Manila, being a mere Municipal corporation has no inherent right to impose taxes. The
Charter or statute must plainly show an intent to confer that power or the municipality cannot assume it.
Its “power to tax” therefore must always yield to a legislative act which is superior having been passed
upon by the state itself which has the “inherent power to tax”.
The Charter of the City of Manila is subject to control by Congress. It should be stressed that municipal
corporations are mere creatures of Congress which has the power to “create and abolish municipal
corporations” due to its “general legislative powers”. Congress, therefore, has the power of control over
Local governments. And if Congress can grant the City of Manila the power to tax certain matters, it can
also provide for exemptions or even take back the power.

22 Kilosbayan v. Morato

KILOSBAYAN, INCORPORATED, JOVITO R. SALONGA, CIRILO A. RIGOS, ERME CAMBA,

EMILIO C. CAPULONG, JR., JOSE T. APOLO, EPHRAIM TENDERO, FERNANDO SANTIAGO,
JOSE ABCEDE, CHRISTINE TAN, RAFAEL G. FERNANDO, RAOUL V. VICTORINO, JOSE
CUNANAN, QUINTIN S. DOROMAL, SEN. FREDDIE WEBB, SEN. WIGBERTO TAÑADA, REP.
JOKER P. ARROYO, petitioners, vs. MANUEL L. MORATO, in his capacity as Chairman of the
Philippine Charity Sweepstakes Office, and the PHILIPPINE GAMING MANAGEMENT
CORPORATION, respondents
G.R. No. 118910. November 16, 1995

Ponente: J. Mendoza
Topic: Non-Self-Executing Provisions
Synopsis:
By authorizing the holding of lottery for charity, Congress has in effect determined that consistently with
these policies and principles of the Constitution, the PCSO may be given this authority. That is why we
said with respect to the opening by the PAGCOR of a casino in Cagayan de Oro, “the morality of gambling
is not a justiciable issue. Gambling is not illegal per se. ...It is left to Congress to deal with the activity as
it sees fit.

Digest:

FACTS
Petitioners seek reconsideration for the Courts decision in this case. They insists that the decision in the
first case has already settled (Please see Kilosbayan vs. Guingona) 1.) Whether Kilosbayan, Inc. has a
standing to sue and 2.) Whether under its charter the PCSO can enter into any form of association or
collaboration with any party in operating an online lottery. Consequently, petitioners contend, these
questions can no longer be reopened.

Furthermore the petitioners contented that (1) that the constitutional policies and principles
invoked by petitioners, while not supplying the basis for affirmative relief from the courts, may
nonetheless be resorted to for striking down laws or official actions which are inconsistent with them and
(2) that the Constitution, by guaranteeing to independent people’s organizations “effective and
reasonable participation at all levels of social, political and economic decision-making” (Art. XIII, §16),
grants them standing to sue on constitutional grounds.

The policies and principles of the Constitution invoked by petitioner read:

ART. II, §5. The maintenance of peace and order, the protection of life, liberty, and property, and the
promotion of the general welfare are essential for the enjoyment by all the people of the blessings of
democracy.
Id., §12. The natural and primary right and duty of parents in the rearing of the youth for civic efficiency
and the development of moral character shall receive the support of the Government.
Id., §13. The State recognizes the vital role of the youth in nation-building and shall promote and protect
their physical, moral, spiritual, intellectual, and social well-being. It shall inculcate in the youth patriotism
and nationalism, and encourage their involvement in public and civic affairs.
Id., §17. The State shall give priority to education, science and technology, arts, culture, and sports to
foster patriotism and nationalism, accelerate social progress, and promote total human liberation and
development.

ISSUE(S)
Whether the constitutional policies and principles invoked by petitioners is self-executing

RULING
No. the provisions are not self-executing. They do not confer rights which can be enforced in the courts
but only provide guidelines for legislative or executive action. By authorizing the holding of lottery for
charity, Congress has in effect determined that consistently with these policies and principles of the
Constitution, the PCSO may be given this authority. That is why we said with respect to the opening by
the PAGCOR of a casino in Cagayan de Oro, “the morality of gambling is not a justiciable issue. Gambling
is not illegal per se. ...It is left to Congress to deal with the activity as it sees fit.” (Magtajas v. Pryce
Properties Corp., Inc., 234 SCRA 255, 268 (1994))

23 Tanada v. Angara

WIGBERTO E. TAÑADA and ANNA DOMINIQUE COSETENG, as members of the Philippine

Senate and as taxpayers; GREGORIO ANDOLANA and JOKER ARROYO as members of the
House of Representatives and as taxpayers; NICANOR P. PERLAS and HORACIO R.
MORALES, both as taxpayers; CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION, NATIONAL ECONOMIC
PROTECTIONISM ASSOCIATION, CENTER FOR ALTERNATIVE DEVELOPMENT INITIATIVES,
LIKAS-KAYANG KAUNLARAN FOUNDATION, INC., PHILIPPINE RURAL RECONSTRUCTION
MOVEMENT, DEMOKRATIKONG KILUSAN NG MAGBUBUKID NG PILIPINAS, INC., and
PHILIPPINE PEASANT INSTITUTE, in representation of various taxpayers and as non-
governmental organizations, petitioners, vs. EDGARDO ANGARA, ALBERTO ROMULO,
LETICIA RAMOS-SHAHANI, HEHERSON ALVAREZ, AGAPITO AQUINO, RODOLFO BIAZON,
NEPTALI GONZALES, ERNESTO HERRERA, JOSE LINA, GLORIA MACAPAGAL-ARROYO,
ORLANDO MERCADO, BLAS OPLE, JOHN OSMEÑA, SANTANINA RASUL, RAMON REVILLA,
RAUL ROCO, FRANCISCO TATAD and FREDDIE WEBB, in their respective capacities as
members of the Philippine Senate who concurred in the ratification by the President of the
Philippines of the Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization; SALVADOR
ENRIQUEZ, in his capacity as Secretary of Budget and Management; CARIDAD VALDEHUESA,
in her capacity as National Treasurer; RIZALINO NAVARRO, in his capacity as Secretary of
Trade and Industry; ROBERTO SEBASTIAN, in his capacity as Secretary of Agriculture;
ROBERTO DE OCAMPO, in his capacity as Secretary of Finance; ROBERTO ROMULO, in his
capacity as Secretary of Foreign Affairs; and TEOFISTO T. GUINGONA, in his capacity as
Executive Secretary, respondents
G.R. No. 118295. May 2, 1997

Ponente: J. Panganiban
Topic: Constitutional Construction – Filipino First Policy
Synopsis:
While the Constitution indeed mandates a bias in favor of Filipino goods, services, labor and enterprises,
at the same time, it recognizes the need for business exchange with the rest of the world on the bases of
equality and reciprocity and limits protection of Filipino enterprises only against foreign competition and
trade practices that are unfair—the Constitution did not intend to pursue an isolationist policy.

Digest:

FACTS
In order to hasten the recovery after the World War I, member countries ratified World Trade
Organization with the signing of the “Final Act” in Marrakesh, Morocco. The Philippines joined to WTO
thru Respondent Rizalino Navarro, then Secretary of DTI representing the Republic of the Philippines
signed in Marrakesh, Morocco, the Final Act Embodying the Results of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral
Negotiation.

On August 12, 1994, the members of the Philippine Senate received a letter dated August 11, 1994 from
the President of the Philippines, stating among others that “the Uruguay Round Final Act is hereby
submitted to the Senate for its concurrence pursuant to Section 21, Article VII of the Constitution.”

The Senate adopted Resolution No. 97 which ratified the agreement establishing the WTO.

ISSUE(S)
Whether letter the “spirit and intent” of the Constitution is violated by the WTO Agreement which states
“develop a self-reliant and independent national economy effectively controlled by Filipinos x x x (to) give
preference to qualified Filipinos (and to) promote the preferential use of Filipino labor, domestic materials
and locally produced goods”

RULING
No, decision of the Senate to ratify the WTO Agreement is not defiant of the Constitution. What the
Senate did was a valid exercise of its authority. As to whether such exercise was wise, beneficial or viable
is outside the realm of judicial inquiry and review. That is a matter between the elected policy makers
and the people. As to whether the nation should join the worldwide march toward trade liberalization and
economic globalization is a matter that our people should determine in electing their policy makers. After
all, the WTO Agreement allows withdrawal of membership, should this be the political desire of a
member.

Further, while the Constitution indeed mandates a bias in favor of Filipino goods, services, labor and
enterprises, at the same time, it recognizes the need for business exchange with the rest of the world on
the bases of equality and reciprocity and limits protection of Filipino enterprises only against foreign
competition and trade practices that are unfair—the Constitution did not intend to pursue an isolationist
policy.-

24 Estrada v. Escritor

ALEJANDRO ESTRADA, complainant, vs. SOLEDAD S. ESCRITOR, respondent

A.M. No. P-02-1651. June 22, 2006.
(Formerly OCA I.P.I. No. 00-1021-P)

Ponente: J. Puno
Topic: Separation of Church and State
Synopsis:
While the Constitution indeed mandates a bias in favor of Filipino goods, services, labor and enterprises,
at the same time, it recognizes the need for business exchange with the rest of the world on the bases of
equality and reciprocity and limits protection of Filipino enterprises only against foreign competition and
trade practices that are unfair—the Constitution did not intend to pursue an isolationist policy.

Digest:

FACTS
Soledad Escritor was a member of Jehova’s Witnesses. In 2000, complainant Alejandro Estrada requested
Judge Jose F. Caoibes, Jr. of the Las Piñas RTC to investigate Escritor, for the purpose of initiating an
administrative complaint. Estrada believes that, by living with a man not her husband and having borne a
child out of this living arrangement, she is committing an immoral act that tarnishes the image of the
court, thus she should not be allowed to remain employed therein as it might appear that the court
condones her act. Respondent was consequently charged with disgraceful and immoral conduct under
the Revised Administrative Code. In her defense, Escritor claims that as a member of the religious sect
known as the Jehovah’s Witnesses and the Watch Tower and Bible Tract Society, their conjugal
arrangement is in conformity with their religious beliefs and has the approval of her congregation. In fact,
after ten years of living together, she executed on July 28, 1991, a “Declaration of Pledging Faithfulness.”

ISSUE(S)
Given that Escritor’s defense hinges on religious concerns, is the court, in interpreting the Revised
Administrative Code in her favor, in effect violating the constitutional mandate against enacting laws
respecting an establishment of religion?

RULING
No. In this case, the Supreme Court through Justice Puno elucidated that the Philippines adheres to the
benevolent neutrality approach in interpreting the separation clause in the constitution. Under these
circumstances, respondent Escritor’s conjugal arrangement cannot be penalized as she has made out a
case for exemption from the law based on her fundamental right to freedom of religion. The Court
recognizes that state interests must be upheld in order that freedoms—including religious freedom—may
be enjoyed. In the area of religious exercise as a preferred freedom, however, man stands accountable to
an authority higher than the state, and so the state interest sought to be upheld must be so compelling
that its violation will erode the very fabric of the state that will also protect the freedom. In the absence
of a showing that such state interest exists, man must be allowed to subscribe to the Infinite.

Justice Puno’s discussion on the three theories in church and state separation:

Strict Separation; Words and Phrases; The Strict Separationist believes that the Establishment Clause was
meant to protect the state from the church, and the state’s hostility towards religion allows no interaction
between the two.—The Strict Separationist believes that the Establishment Clause was meant to protect
the state from the church, and the state’s hostility towards religion allows no interaction between the
two. According to this Jeffersonian view, an absolute barrier to formal interdependence of religion and
state needs to be erected. Religious institutions could not receive aid, whether direct or indirect, from the
state. Nor could the state adjust its secular programs to alleviate burdens the programs placed on
believers. Only the complete separation of religion from politics would eliminate the formal influence of
religious institutions and provide for a free choice among political views, thus a strict “wall of separation”
is necessary.

Unlike the strict separationists, the strict neutrality view, which is a tamer version of the strict
separationist view, believes that the “wall of separation” does not require the state to be their
adversary—rather, the state must be neutral in its relations with groups of religious believers and non-
believers. “State power is no more to be used so as to handicap religions than it is to favor them.”—The
tamer version of the strict separationist view, the strict neutrality or separationist view, (or, the
governmental neutrality theory) finds basis in Everson v. Board of Education, 330 U.S. 1 (1946), where
the Court declared that Jefferson’s “wall of separation” encapsulated the meaning of the First
Amendment. However, unlike the strict separationists, the strict neutrality view believes that the “wall of
separation” does not require the state to be their adversary. Rather, the state must be neutral in its
relations with groups of religious believers and non-believers. “State power is no more to be used so as
to handicap religions than it is to favor them.” The strict neutrality approach is not hostile to religion, but
it is strict in holding that religion may not be used as a basis for classification for purposes of
governmental action, whether the action confers rights or privileges or imposes duties or obligations.
Only secular criteria may be the basis of government action. It does not permit, much less require,
accommodation of secular programs to religious belief.
Benevolent Neutrality or Accommodation; Words and Phrases; The theory of benevolent neutrality or
accommodation is premised on a different view of the “wall of separation,” in that, unlike the Jeffersonian
wall that is meant to protect the state from the church, the wall is meant to protect the church from the
state.—The theory of benevolent neutrality or accommodation is premised on a different view of the “wall
of separation,” associated with Williams, founder of the Rhode Island colony. Unlike the Jeffersonian wall
that is meant to protect the state from the church, the wall is meant to protect the church from the state.
Benevolent neutrality recognizes that religion plays an important role in the public life of the United
States as shown by many traditional government practices which, to strict neutrality, pose Establishment
Clause questions. Among these are the inscription of “In God We Trust” on American currency; the
recognition of America as “one nation under God” in the official pledge of allegiance to the flag; the
Supreme Court’s time-honored practice of opening oral argument with the invocation “God save the
United States and this Honorable Court”; and the practice of Congress and every state legislature of
paying a chaplain, usually of a particular Protestant denomination, to lead representatives in prayer.
These practices clearly show the preference for one theological viewpoint—the existence of and potential
for intervention by a god—over the contrary theological viewpoint of atheism. Church and government
agencies also cooperate in the building of low-cost housing and in other forms of poor relief, in the
treatment of alcoholism and drug addiction, in foreign aid and other government activities with strong
moral dimension.

25 Republic v. Galang

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs. NESTOR GALANG, respondent

G.R. No. 168335. June 6, 2011

Ponente: J. Brion
Topic: State Policies – The Family
Synopsis:
The Constitution sets out a policy of protecting and strengthening the family as the basic social
institution, and marriage is the foundation of the family. Marriage, as an inviolable institution protected
by the State, cannot be dissolved at the whim of the parties. In petitions for the declaration of nullity of
marriage, the burden of proof to show the nullity of marriage lies with the plaintiff. Unless the evidence
presented clearly reveals a situation where the parties, or one of them, could not have validly entered
into a marriage by reason of a grave and serious psychological illness existing at the time it was
celebrated, we are compelled to uphold the indissolubility of the marital tie.

Digest:

FACTS
While they got married on March 9, 1994 in Pampanga, on August 4, 1999, the respondent filed with the
RTC a petition for the declaration of nullity of his marriage with Juvy alleging that Juvy was
psychologically incapacitated to exercise the essential obligations of marriage as she was a kleptomaniac
and a swindler; that she stole his ATM card and his parents’ money, and often asked money from their
friends and relatives on the pretext that Christopher (son) was confined in a hospital; that she suffers
from "mental deficiency, innate immaturity, distorted discernment and total lack of care, love and
affection [towards him and their] child.". He posited that Juvy’s incapacity was "extremely serious" and
"appears to be incurable."

In his testimony, the respondent alleged that he was the one who prepared their breakfast because Juvy
did not want to wake up early; Juvy often left their child to their neighbors’ care; and Christopher almost
got lost in the market when Juvy brought him there
Aside from his testimony, the respondent also presented Anna Liza S. Guiang, a psychologist, who
testified that she conducted a psychological test on the respondent. Psychological findings tend to
confirm that the defendant suffers from personality and behavioral disorders. These disorders are
manifested through her grave dependency on gambling and stealing money. She doesn’t manifest any
sense of responsibility and loyalty and these disorders appear to be incorrigible.

After a careful perusal of the evidence in the instant case and there being no controverting evidence, the
RTC nullified the marriage in its decision of January 22, 2001 finding that the psychological incapacity of
respondent to comply with the essential marital obligations of his marriage with petitioner, which Dr.
Gerardo Veloso said can be characterized by (a) gravity because the subject cannot carry out the normal
and ordinary duties of marriage and family shouldered by any average couple existing under ordinary
circumstances of life and work; (b) antecedence, because the root cause of the trouble can be traced to
the history of the subject before marriage although its overt manifestations appear over after the
wedding; and (c) incurability, if treatments required exceed the ordinary means or subject, or involve
time and expense beyond the reach of the subject - are all obtaining in this case.

On appeal, the CA affirmed the RTC decision in toto, while also subsequently denying the motion for
reconsideration.

ISSUE(S)
WON the totality of the evidence presented by the respondent was insufficient to establish Juvy’s
psychological incapacity to perform her essential marital obligations

RULING
Yes, it was insufficient. Therefore, the Petition for Review on Certiorari filed by the Republic of the
Philippines (petitioner), challenging the decision of the CA was granted.

The respondent’s testimony merely showed the acts of Juvy which do not per se rise to the level of
psychological incapacity that the law requires since psychological incapacity must be more than just a
"difficulty," "refusal" or "neglect" in the performance of some marital obligations. It is essential that he or
she must be shown to be incapable of doing so because of some psychological, not physical, illness.
In other words, proof of a natal or supervening disabling factor in the person - an adverse integral
element in the personality structure that effectively incapacitates the person from really accepting and
thereby complying with the obligations essential to marriage - had to be shown. A cause has to be
shown and linked with the manifestations of the psychological incapacity.

The respondent’s testimony failed to show that Juvy’s condition is a manifestation of a disordered
personality rooted in some incapacitating or debilitating psychological condition that rendered her unable
to discharge her essential marital obligation. In this light, the acts attributed to Juvy only showed
indications of immaturity and lack of sense of responsibility, resulting in nothing more than the difficulty,
refusal or neglect in the performance of marital obligations.

The submitted psychological report hardly helps the respondent’s cause, as it glaringly failed to establish
that Juvy was psychologically incapacitated to perform her essential marital duties at the material time
required by Article 36 of the Family Code. The psychologist admitted in her report that she derived her
conclusions exclusively from the information given her by the respondent. Expectedly, the respondent’s
description of Juvy would contain a considerable degree of bias; thus, a psychological evaluation based
on this one-sided description alone can hardly be considered as credible or sufficient.

The psychologist’s report simply stressed Juvy’s negative traits which she considered manifestations of
Juvy’s psychological incapacity
In the end, the psychologist opined - without stating the psychological basis for her conclusion - that
"there is sufficient reason to believe that the defendant wife is psychologically incapacitated to perform
her marital duties as a wife and mother to their only son.

Finally, the allegations, even if true, all occurred during the marriage. The testimony was totally devoid of
any information or insight into Juvy’s early life and associations, how she acted before and at the time of
the marriage, and how the symptoms of a disordered personality developed. Simply put, the psychologist
failed to trace the history of Juvy’s psychological condition and to relate it to an existing incapacity at the
time of the celebration of the marriage. She, likewise, failed to successfully prove the elements of gravity
and incurability.

26 Garcia v. Executive Secretary

MAJOR GENERAL CARLOS F. GARCIA, AFP (RET.), petitioner, vs. THE EXECUTIVE
SECRETARY, representing the OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT; THE SECRETARY OF NATIONAL
DEFENSE VOLTAIRE T. GAZMIN; THE CHIEF OF STAFF, ARMED FORCES OF THE PHILIPPINES,
GEN. EDUARDO SL. OBAN, JR., and LT. GEN. GAUDENCIO S. PANGILINAN, AFP (RET.),
DIRECTOR, BUREAU OF CORRECTIONS, respondents
G.R. No. 198554. July 30, 2012

Ponente: J. Peralta
Topic: Parens Patriae – Equal protection
Synopsis:
The application of Article 29 of the Revised Penal Code in the Articles of War is in accordance with the
Equal Protection Clause of the 1987 Constitution; The purpose of the equal protection clause is to secure
every person within a state’s jurisdiction against intentional and arbitrary discrimination, whether
occasioned by the express terms of a statute or by its improper execution through the state’s duly-
constituted authorities.

Digest:

FACTS
Garcia, tried by the Special General Court Martial NR 2, was charged with and convicted of violation of
the 96th Article of War (Conduct Unbecoming an Officer and Gentleman) and violation of the 97th Article
of War (Conduct Prejudicial to Good Order and Military Discipline) for failing to disclose all his assets in
his Sworn Statement of Assets and Liabilities and Net worth for the year 2003 as required by RA 3019, as
amended in relation to RA 6713.

Garcia, among others, argued that the confirmation issued by the Office of the President directing his
two-year detention in a penitentiary had already been fully served following his preventive confinement
subject to Article 29 of the RPC (Revised Penal Code). He was released on December 16, 2010 after a
preventive confinement for six years and two months. He was initially confined at his quarters at Camp
General Emilio Aguinaldo before he was transferred to the Intelligence Service of the Armed Forces of the
Philippines (ISAFP) Detention Center, and latter to the Camp Crame Custodial Detention Center.

Hence, on September 16, 2011, or a week after the OP confirmed the sentence of the court martial
against him, Garcia was arrested and detained and continues to be detained, for 2 years, at the
maximum security compound of the National Penitentiary in Muntinlupa. The OP stated that Art 29 of the
RPC is not applicable in Military Courts for it is separate and distinct from ordinary courts.
Hence, this petition.

ISSUE(S)
(1) Whether or not Article 29 of the RPC is applicable in Military Courts
(2) Whether or not the application of Article 29 of the RPC in the Articles of War is in accordance with
the Equal Protection Clause of the 1987 Constitution

RULING
(1) The Court ruled that applying the provisions of Article 29 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC) (Period of
preventive imprisonment deducted from time of imprisonment), the time within which the petitioner was
under preventive confinement should be credited to the sentence confirmed by the Office of the
President, subject to the conditions set forth by the same law.

The Court held that “the General Court Martial is a court within the strictest sense of the word and acts
as a criminal court.” As such, certain provisions of the RPC, insofar as those that are not provided in the
Articles of War and the Manual for Courts-Martial, can be supplementary. “[A]bsent any provision as to
the application of a criminal concept in the implementation and execution of the General Court Martial’s
decision, the provisions of the Revised Penal Code, specifically Article 29 should be applied. In fact, the
deduction of petitioner’s (Garcia) period of confinement to his sentence has been recommended in the
Staff Judge Advocate Review.”

(2) The Court further held that the application of Article 29 of the RPC in the Articles of War is in
accordance with the Equal Protection Clause of the 1987 Constitution. “The concept of equal justice
under the law requires the state to govern impartially, and it may not draw distinctions between
individuals solely on differences that are irrelevant to a legitimate governmental objective.

It, however, does not require the universal application of the laws to all persons or things without
distinction. What it simply requires is equality among equals as determined according to a valid
classification. Indeed, the equal protection clause permits classification,” held the Court.

27 ABAKADA Guro Party List v. Purisima

ABAKADA GURO PARTY LIST (formerly AASJS) OFFICERS/MEMBERS SAMSON S.

ALCANTARA, ED VINCENT S. ALBANO, ROMEO R. ROBISO, RENE B. GOROSPE and EDWIN R.
SANDOVAL, petitioners, vs. HON. CESAR V. PURISIMA, in his capacity as Secretary of
Finance, HON. GUILLERMO L. PARAYNO, JR., in his capacity as Commissioner of the Bureau
of Internal Revenue, and HON. ALBERTO D. LINA, in his capacity as Commissioner of Bureau
of Customs, respondents
G.R. No. 166715. August 14, 2008

Ponente: J. Corona
Topic: Separation of Powers
Synopsis:
Legislative veto is a statutory provision requiring the President or an administrative agency to present the
proposed implementing rules and regulations of a law to Congress which, by itself or through a
committee formed by it, retains a “right” or “power” to approve or disapprove such regulations before
they take effect. As such, a legislative veto in the form of a congressional oversight committee is in the
form of an inward-turning delegation designed to attach a congressional leash (other than through
scrutiny and investigation) to an agency to which Congress has by law initially delegated broad powers. It
radically changes the design or structure of the Constitution’s diagram of power as it entrusts to Congress
a direct role in enforcing, applying or implementing its own laws.

Digest:

FACTS
This petition for prohibition seeks to prevent respondents from implementing and enforcing Republic Act
(RA) 9335 (Attrition Act of 2005). They assailed among others that the creation of a congressional
oversight committee on the ground that it violates the doctrine of separation of powers. While the
legislative function is deemed accomplished and completed upon the enactment and approval of the law,
the creation of the congressional oversight committee permits legislative participation in the
implementation and enforcement of the law.

Respondents said that the creation of the congressional oversight committee under the law enhances,
rather than violates, separation of powers. It ensures the fulfillment of the legislative policy and serves as
a check to any over-accumulation of power on the part of the executive and the implementing agencies.

ISSUE(S)
WON the provision of RA 9335 creating congressional oversight violated the principle of separation of
powers

RULING
The Joint Congressional Oversight Committee in RA 9335 was created for the purpose of approving the
implementing rules and regulations (IRR) formulated by the DOF, DBM, NEDA, BIR, BOC and CSC.

Legislative veto is a statutory provision requiring the President or an administrative agency to present the
proposed implementing rules and regulations of a law to Congress which, by itself or through a
committee formed by it, retains a “right” or “power” to approve or disapprove such regulations before
they take effect. As such, a legislative veto in the form of a congressional oversight committee is in the
form of an inward-turning delegation designed to attach a congressional leash (other than through
scrutiny and investigation) to an agency to which Congress has by law initially delegated broad powers. It
radically changes the design or structure of the Constitution’s diagram of power as it entrusts to Congress
a direct role in enforcing, applying or implementing its own laws.

From the moment the law becomes effective, any provision of law that empowers Congress or any of its
members to play any role in the implementation or enforcement of the law violates the principle of
separation of powers and is thus unconstitutional. Under this principle, a provision that requires Congress
or its members to approve the implementing rules of a law after it has already taken effect shall be
unconstitutional, as is a provision that allows Congress or its members to overturn any directive or ruling
made by the members of the executive branch charged with the implementation of the law.

Following this rationale, Section 12 of RA 9335 should be struck down as unconstitutional. ###

28 Belgica v. Executive Secretary

GRECO ANTONIOUS BEDA B. BELGICA, JOSE M. VILLEGAS, JR., JOSE L. GONZALEZ, REUBEN
M. ABANTE, and QUINTIN PAREDES SAN DIEGO, petitioners, vs. HONORABLE EXECUTIVE
SECRETARY PAQUITO N. OCHOA, JR., SECRETARY OF BUDGET AND MANAGEMENT
FLORENCIO B. ABAD, NATIONAL TREASURER ROSALIA V. DE LEON, SENATE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, represented by FRANKLIN M. DRILON in his capacity as SENATE PRESIDENT,
and HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, represented by FELICIANO S. BELMONTE, JR. in his
capacity as SPEAKER OF THE HOUSE, respondents
G.R. No. 208566. November 19, 2013

Ponente: J. Perlas-Bernabe
Topic: Separation of Powers/Non-Delegation of Legislative Power
Synopsis:
The Congessional Pork Barrel is deemed unconstitutional, for violating certain constitutional principles,
particularly the separation of powers and the non-delegation of legislative powers. As a rule, the
budgeting power lies in Congress. It regulates the release of funds (power of the purse). The executive,
on the other hand, implements the laws – this includes the GAA to which the PDAF is a part of. Only the
executive may implement the law but under the pork barrel system, what’s happening was that, after the
GAA, itself a law, was enacted, the legislators themselves dictate as to which projects their PDAF funds
should be allocated to – a clear act of implementing the law they enacted.

Furthermore, the PDAF articles which allow the individual legislator to identify the projects to which his
PDAF money should go to is a violation of the rule on non-delegability of legislative power. The power to
appropriate funds is solely lodged in Congress (in the two houses comprising it) collectively and not
lodged in the individual members. Further, nowhere in the exceptions does it state that the Congress can
delegate the power to the individual member of Congress.

Digest:

FACTS
Pork Barrel is commonly known as the lump-sum, discretionary funds of the members of the Congress. It
underwent several legal designations from “Congressional Pork Barrel” to the latest “Priority Development
Assistance Fund” or PDAF. The allocation for the pork barrel is integrated in the annual General
Appropriations Act (GAA).

The PDAF articles in the GAA do provide for realignment of funds whereby certain cabinet members may
request for the realignment of funds into their department provided that the request for realignment is
approved or concurred by the legislator concerned.

The president does have his own source of fund albeit not included in the GAA. The so-called presidential
pork barrel comes from two sources: (a) the Malampaya Funds, from the Malampaya Gas Project – this
has been around since 1976, and (b) the Presidential Social Fund which is derived from the earnings of
PAGCOR – this has been around since about 1983.

Ever since, the pork barrel system has been besieged by allegations of corruption. In July 2013, six
whistle blowers, headed by Benhur Luy, exposed that for the last decade, the corruption in the pork
barrel system had been facilitated by Janet Lim Napoles. Napoles had been helping lawmakers in
funneling their pork barrel funds into about 20 bogus NGO’s (non-government organizations) which
would make it appear that government funds are being used in legit existing projects but are in fact
going to “ghost” projects. An audit was then conducted by the Commission on Audit and the results
thereof concurred with the exposes of Luy et al.

Greco Belgica and several others, filed various petitions before the Supreme Court questioning the
constitutionality of the pork barrel system.

ISSUE(S)
1. Whether or not the congressional pork barrel system is constitutional.
2. Whether or not presidential pork barrel system is constitutional.

RULING

1. NO. the congressional pork barrel system is unconstitutional for violating the following principles:

i. Separation of Powers

As a rule, the budgeting power lies in Congress. It regulates the release of funds (power of the purse).
The executive, on the other hand, implements the laws – this includes the GAA to which the PDAF is a
part of. Only the executive may implement the law but under the pork barrel system, what’s happening
was that, after the GAA, itself a law, was enacted, the legislators themselves dictate as to which projects
their PDAF funds should be allocated to – a clear act of implementing the law they enacted – a violation
of the principle of separation of powers. (Note in the older case of PHILCONSA vs Enriquez, it was ruled
that pork barrel, then called as CDF or the Countrywide Development Fund, was constitutional insofar as
the legislators only recommend where their pork barrel funds go).
This is also highlighted by the fact that in realigning the PDAF, the executive will still have to get the
concurrence of the legislator concerned.

ii. Non-delegability of Legislative Power

As a rule, the Constitution vests legislative power in Congress alone. (The Constitution does grant the
people legislative power but only insofar as the processes of referendum and initiative are concerned).
That being, legislative power cannot be delegated by Congress for it cannot delegate further that which
was delegated to it by the Constitution.
Exceptions to the rule are:
a. delegated legislative power to local government units but this shall involve purely local matters;
b. authority of the President to, by law, exercise powers necessary and proper to carry out a
declared national policy in times of war or other national emergency, or fix within specified limits,
and subject to such limitations and restrictions as Congress may impose, tariff rates, import and
export quotas, tonnage and wharfage dues, and other duties or imposts within the framework of
the national development program of the Government.

In this case, the PDAF articles which allow the individual legislator to identify the projects to which his
PDAF money should go to is a violation of the rule on non-delegability of legislative power. The power to
appropriate funds is solely lodged in Congress (in the two houses comprising it) collectively and not
lodged in the individual members. Further, nowhere in the exceptions does it state that the Congress can
delegate the power to the individual member of Congress.

iii. Principle of Checks and Balances

One feature in the principle of checks and balances is the power of the president to veto items in the GAA
which he may deem to be inappropriate. But this power is already being undermined because of the fact
that once the GAA is approved, the legislator can now identify the project to which he will appropriate his
PDAF. Under such system, how can the president veto the appropriation made by the legislator if the
appropriation is made after the approval of the GAA – again, “Congress cannot choose a mode of
budgeting which effectively renders the constitutionally-given power of the President useless.”

iv. Local Autonomy

As a rule, the local governments have the power to manage their local affairs. Through their Local
Development Councils (LDCs), the LGUs can develop their own programs and policies concerning their
localities. But with the PDAF, particularly on the part of the members of the house of representatives,
what’s happening is that a congressman can either bypass or duplicate a project by the LDC and later on
claim it as his own. This is an instance where the national government (note, a congressman is a national
officer) meddles with the affairs of the local government – and this is contrary to the State policy
embodied in the Constitution on local autonomy. It’s good if that’s all that is happening under the pork
barrel system but worse, the PDAF becomes more of a personal fund on the part of legislators.

II. YES. The presidential pork barrel is valid.

The main issue raised by Belgica et al against the presidential pork barrel is that it is unconstitutional
because it violates Section 29 (1), Article VI of the Constitution which provides that no money shall be
paid out of the Treasury except in pursuance of an appropriation made by law.
Belgica et al emphasized that the presidential pork comes from the earnings of the Malampaya and
PAGCOR and not from any appropriation from a particular legislation.
The Supreme Court disagrees as it ruled that PD 910, which created the Malampaya Fund, as well as PD
1869 (as amended by PD 1993), which amended PAGCOR’s charter, provided for the appropriation, to
wit:

i. PD 910: Section 8 thereof provides that all fees, among others, collected from certain
energy-related ventures shall form part of a special fund (the Malampaya Fund) which shall
be used to further finance energy resource development and for other purposes which the
President may direct;
ii. PD 1869, as amended: Section 12 thereof provides that a part of PAGCOR’s earnings shall be
allocated to a General Fund (the Presidential Social Fund) which shall be used in government
infrastructure projects.

These are sufficient laws which met the requirement of Section 29, Article VI of the Constitution. The
appropriation contemplated therein does not have to be a particular appropriation as it can be a general
appropriation as in the case of PD 910 and PD 1869.

29 Pimentel v. COMELEC

AQUILINO L. PIMENTEL III, petitioner, vs. THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS EN BANC

SITTING AS THE NATIONAL BOARD OF CANVASSERS, THE SPECIAL PROVINCIAL BOARD OF
CANVASSERS FOR MAGUINDANAO CHAIRED BY ATTY. EMILIO S. SANTOS, and JUAN MIGUEL
F. ZUBIRI, respondents.
G.R. No. 178413. March 13, 2008

Ponente: Chico-Nazario
Topic: Exclusivity of Qualifications to the Legislature (Senate)
Synopsis:
The Constitution is the basic law to which all laws must conform; no act shall be valid if it conflicts with
the Constitution. In the discharge of their defined functions, the three departments of government have
no choice but to yield obedience to the commands of the Constitution. Whatever limits it imposes must
be observed. In the same vein, the COMELEC cannot, in the guise of enforcing and administering election
laws or promulgating rules and regulations to implement Sec. 36(g), validly impose qualifications on
candidates for senator in addition to what the Constitution prescribes. If Congress cannot require a
candidate for senator to meet such additional qualification, the COMELEC, to be sure, is also without such
power. The right of a citizen in the democratic process of election should not be defeated by unwarranted
impositions of requirement not otherwise specified in the Constitution.

Digest:

FACTS
On December 23, 2003, the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) issued Resolution No. 6486, prescribing
the rules and regulations on the mandatory drug testing of candidates for public office in connection with
the May 10, 2004 synchronized national and local elections. The pertinent portions of the said resolution
read as follows:

WHEREAS, Section 36(g) of Republic Act No. 9165 provides that “all candidates for public office x x x
both in the national or local government shall undergo a mandatory drug test.”

Petitioner Aquilino Q. Pimentel, Jr., a senator of the Republic and a candidate for re-election in the May
10, 2004 elections, filed a Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition under Rule 65. In it, he seeks (1) to
nullify Sec. 36(g) of RA 9165 and COMELEC Resolution No. 6486 dated December 23, 2003 for being
unconstitutional in that they impose a qualification for candidates for senators in addition to those already
provided for in the 1987 Constitution; and (2) to enjoin the COMELEC from implementing Resolution No.
6486. In essence, Pimentel claims that Sec. 36(g) of RA 9165 and COMELEC Resolution No. 6486 illegally
impose an additional qualification on candidates for senator. He points out that, subject to the provisions
on nuisance candidates, a candidate for senator needs only to meet the qualifications laid down in Sec. 3,
Art. VI of the Constitution, to wit: (1) citizenship, (2) voter registration, (3) literacy, (4) age, and (5)
residency. Beyond these stated qualification requirements, candidates for senator need not possess any
other qualification to run for senator and be voted upon and elected as member of the Senate. The
Congress cannot validly amend or otherwise modify these qualification standards, as it cannot disregard,
evade, or weaken the force of a constitutional mandate, or alter or enlarge the Constitution.

ISSUE(S)
Whether or not Section 36(g) of Republic Act No. 9165 is unconstitutional

RULING
YES. The Court says that it is basic that if a law or an administrative rule violates any norm of the
Constitution, that issuance is null and void and has no effect. The Constitution is the basic law to which
all laws must conform; no act shall be valid if it conflicts with the Constitution. In the discharge of their
defined functions, the three departments of government have no choice but to yield obedience to the
commands of the Constitution. Whatever limits it imposes must be observed. In the same vein, the
COMELEC cannot, in the guise of enforcing and administering election laws or promulgating rules and
regulations to implement Sec. 36(g), validly impose qualifications on candidates for senator in addition to
what the Constitution prescribes. If Congress cannot require a candidate for senator to meet such
additional qualification, the COMELEC, to be sure, is also without such power. The right of a citizen in the
democratic process of election should not be defeated by unwarranted impositions of requirement not
otherwise specified in the Constitution. Section 36(g) of RA 9165, as sought to be implemented by the
assailed COMELEC resolution, effectively enlarges the qualification requirements enumerated in the Sec.
3, Art. VI of the Constitution which is declared to be unconstitutional.

30 Asistio v. Pe-Aguirre

LUIS A. ASISTIO, petitioner, versus Hon. Thelma Canlas Trinidad Pe-Aguirre, et al.,
respondents
G.R. No. 191124. April 27, 2010

Ponente: Nachura
Topic: Residency and Domicile
Synopsis:
"Residence," as used in political law is doctrinally settled to mean "domicile," importing not only an
intention to reside in a fixed place but also personal presence in that place, coupled with
conduct indicative of such intention inferable from a person’s acts, activities, and utterances
Domicile is not easily lost. To successfully effect a transfer thereof, one must demonstrate: (1) an
actual removal or change of domicile; (2) a bona fide intention of abandoning the former place of
residence and establishing a new one; and (3) acts which correspond with that purpose.

Digest:

FACTS
On January 26, 2010, private respondent Enrico R. Echiverri filed against petitioner Luis A.Asistio a
Petition for Exclusion before the MeTC, Branch 52, Caloocan City alleging that Asistio is not a resident of
Caloocan City, specifically not of 123 Interior P. Zamora St. Barangay 15, Caloocan City, the address
stated in his Certificate of Candidacy (COC) for Mayor in the 2010 Elections. Upon verification by private
respondent, petitioner was listed as a registered voter of Barangay 15 but his declared address , in truth,
falls under Barangay 17 where he is not listed in the CVL. Subsequently, the petition was granted by the
MeTC.

ISSUE(S)
Should Asistio be excluded from the permanent list of voters for failure to meet the residency
requirements?

RULING
No. Section 117 of The Omnibus Election Code (Batas Pambansa Bilang 881) echoed in Section 9
of The Voters Registration Act of 1996 (Republic Act No. 8189) states that for a voter to be registered,
he/she must have resided in the Philippines for at least one year, and six months in the place where they
seek to be registered. "Residence," as used in the law is doctrinally settled to mean "domicile," importing
not only an intention to reside in a fixed place but also personal presence in that place, coupled with
conduct indicative of such intention inferable from a person’s acts, activities, and utterances.

Domicile is not easily lost. To successfully effect a transfer thereof, one must demonstrate: (1) an
actual removal or change of domicile; (2) a bona fide intention of abandoning the former place of
residence and establishing a new one; and (3) acts which correspond with that purpose. Asistio has
always been a resident of Caloocan City since his birth or for more than 72 years and his family is known
to be among the prominent political families in Caloocan City. In fact, Asistio served in public office as
representative, having been elected as such in the 1992, 1995, 1998, and 2004 elections. In 2007, he
also sought election as City Mayor. In all of these occasions, Asistio cast his vote in the same city. Taking
these circumstances into consideration, it cannot be denied that Asistio has qualified, and continues to
qualify, as a voter of Caloocan City. There is no showing that he has established domicile elsewhere, or
that he had consciously and voluntarily abandoned his residence in Caloocan City.

31 Fernandez v. HRET

REPRESENTATIVE DANILO RAMON S. FERNANDEZ, petitioner, vs. HOUSE OF

REPRESENTATIVES ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL AND JESUS L. VICENTE, respondents
G.R. No. 187478. December 21, 2009

Ponente: J. Leonardo-De Castro

Topic: The House of Representatives - Qualifications
Synopsis:
The Constitution does not require a congressional candidate to be a property owner in the district where
he seeks to run but only that he resides in that district for at least a year prior to election day—to use
ownership of property in the district as the determinative indicium of permanence of domicile or
residence implies that only the landed can establish compliance with the residency requirement, and the
Supreme Court would be, in effect, imposing a property requirement to the right to hold public office,
which property requirement would be unconstitutional.

Digest:
FACTS
On July 5, 2007, private respondent Vicente filed a petition for quo warranto before the HRET, praying
that petitioner be declared ineligible to hold office as a Member of the House of Representatives
representing the First Legislative District of the Province of Laguna, and that petitioner’s election and
proclamation be annulled and declared null and void. Private respondent’s main ground for the quo
warranto petition was that petitioner lacked the required one-year residency requirement provided under
Article VI, Section 6 of the 1987 Constitution. The HRET ruled in favor of the private respondent, basing
its decision on documentary evidence where the petitioner stated that his birthplace is Pagsanjan,
Laguna, which is within the Fourth District of said province, as well as testimonies of barangay health
workers claiming that they never saw petitioner at his purported leased residence in Villa de Toledo,
Barangay Balibago, Sta. Rosa, Laguna.

ISSUE(S)
Is the evidence sufficient to justify the disqualification of Fernandez for non-compliance of the one-year
residency requirement?

RULING
No. The only thing these pieces of documentary evidence prove is that petitioner’s domicile of origin was
Pagsanjan, Laguna and it remained his domicile up to 2005, at the latest. On the other hand, what
petitioner asserted in his 2007 COC is that he had been a resident of Sta. Rosa, Laguna in the First
District of Laguna as of February 2006 and respondent’s evidence failed contradict that claim. The fact
that a few barangay health workers attested that they had failed to see petitioner whenever they
allegedly made the rounds in Villa de Toledo is of no moment.

Furthermore, the HRET puts undue emphasis on the fact that petitioner is only leasing a townhouse in
Sta. Rosa while he owns houses in Pagsanjan and Cabuyao. His ownership of properties in other places
has been taken to mean that petitioner did not intend to make Sta. Rosa his permanent residence or that
he had not abandoned his domicile of origin. Although it is true that the latest acquired abode is not
necessarily the domicile of choice of a candidate, there is nothing in the Constitution or our election laws
which require a congressional candidate to sell a previously acquired home in one district and buy a new
one in the place where he seeks to run in order to qualify for a congressional seat in that other district.
Certainly, the Constitution does not require a congressional candidate to be a property owner in the
district where he seeks to run but only that he resides in that district for at least a year prior to election
day. To use ownership of property in the district as the determinative indicium of permanence of domicile
or residence implies that only the landed can establish compliance with the residency requirement.

32 Sema v. COMELEC

G.R. No. 177597. July 16, 2008.*

BAI SANDRA S. A. SEMA, petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and DIDAGEN P.
DILANGALEN, respondents.

Ponente: J. Tinga
Topic(s): Powers of Congress
Synopsis:
The power to reapportion legislative districts necessarily includes the power to create legislative districts
out of existing ones. Congress exercises these powers through a law that Congress itself enacts, and not
through a law that regional or local legislative bodies enact. The allowable membership of the House of
Representatives can be increased, and new legislative districts of Congress can be created, only through
a national law passed by Congress. In Montejo v. COMELEC, 242 SCRA 415 (1995), we held that the
“power of redistricting x x x is traditionally regarded as part of the power (of Congress) to make laws,”
and thus is vested exclusively in Congress.

Digest:
FACTS
These consolidated petitions seek to annul Resolution No. 7902, dated 10 May 2007, of the Commission
on Elections (COMELEC) treating Cotabato City as part of the legislative district of the Province of Shariff
Kabunsuan. The Ordinance appended to the 1987 Constitution apportioned two legislative districts for the
Province of Maguindanao. The first legislative district consists of Cotabato City and eight municipalities.
Maguindanao forms part of the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao (ARMM), created under its
Organic Act, Republic Act No. 6734 (RA 6734), as amended by Republic Act No. 9054 (RA 9054).
Although under the Ordinance, Cotabato City forms part of Maguindanao’s first legislative district, it is not
part of the ARMM but of Region XII, having voted against its inclusion in the ARMM in the plebiscite held
in November 1989. On 28 August 2006, the ARMM’s legislature, the ARMM Regional Assembly, exercising
its power to create provinces under Section 19, Article VI of RA 9054, enacted Muslim Mindanao
Autonomy Act No. 201 (MMA Act 201) creating the Province of Shariff Kabunsuan composed of the eight
municipalities in the first district of Maguindanao.

ISSUE(S)
Does the ARMM have the power to create provinces and legislative districts?

RULING
No. The Supreme Court in this case ruled that Section 19, Article VI of RA 9054, insofar as it grants to
the ARMM Regional Assembly the power to create provinces and cities, is void for being contrary to
Section 5 of Article VI and Section 20 of Article X of the Constitution, as well as Section 3 of the
Ordinance appended to the Constitution. Only Congress can create provinces and cities because the
creation of provinces and cities necessarily includes the creation of legislative districts, a power only
Congress can exercise under Section 5, Article VI of the Constitution and Section 3 of the Ordinance
appended to the Constitution. The ARMM Regional Assembly cannot create a province without a
legislative district because the Constitution mandates that every province shall have a legislative district.
Moreover, the ARMM Regional Assembly cannot enact a law creating a national office like the office of a
district representative of Congress because the legislative powers of the ARMM Regional Assembly
operate only within its territorial jurisdiction as provided in Section 20, Article X of the Constitution.
Consequently, MMA Act 201, enacted by the ARMM Regional Assembly and creating the Province of
Shariff Kabunsuan, was declared void.

33 Aldaba v. COMELEC

G.R No. 188078. January 25, 2010.*

VICTORINO B. ALDABA, CARLO JOLETTE S. FAJARDO, JULIO G. MORADA, and MINERVA
ALDABA MORADA, petitioners, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, respondent.

Ponente: J. Carpio
Topic(s): House of Representatives – Legislative Districts
Synopsis:
The 1987 Constitution requires that for a city to have a legislative district, the city must have “a
population of at least two hundred fifty thousand.” The Certification of Regional Director Miranda, which
is based on demographic projections, is without legal effect because Regional Director Miranda has no
basis and no authority to issue the Certification. The Certification is also void on its face because based
on its own growth rate assumption, the population of Malolos will be less than 250,000 in the year 2010.

Digest:
FACTS
The province of Bulacan was represented in Congress through 4 legislative districts. The 1st Legislative
District comprised of of the city of Malolos and the municipalities of Hagonoy, Calumpit, Pulilan, Bulacan,
and Paombong. On 1 May 2009, RA 9591 lapsed into law, amending Malolos’ City Charter, by creating a
separate legislative district for the city. At the time the legislative bills for RA 9591 were filed in Congress
in 2007, namely, House Bill No. 3162 (later converted to House Bill No. 3693) and Senate Bill No. 1986,
the population of Malolos City was 223,069. The population of Malolos City on 1 May 2009 is a contested
fact but there is no dispute that House Bill No. 3693 relied on an undated certification issued by a
Regional Director of the National Statistics Office (NSO) that “the projected population of the Municipality
of Malolos will be 254,030 by the year 2010 using the population growth rate of 3.78 between 1995 to
2000.”

Petitioners, filed this petition contending that RA 9591 is unconstitutional for failing to meet the
minimum population threshold of 250,000 for a city to merit representation in Congress provided under
the Constitution.

ISSUE(S)
Whether RA 9591 is unconstitutional

RULING
Yes. The 1987 Constitution requires that for a city to have a legislative district, the city must have “a
population of at least two hundred fifty thousand.”

The Certification of Regional Director Miranda, which is based on demographic projections, is without
legal effect because Regional Director Miranda has no basis and no authority to issue the Certification.
The Certification is also void on its face because based on its own growth rate assumption, the population
of Malolos will be less than 250,000 in the year 2010. In addition, intercensal demographic projections
cannot be made for the entire year. In any event, a city whose population has increased to 250,000 is
entitled to have a legislative district only in the “immediately following election” after the attainment of
the 250,000 population.

34 Aquino v. COMELEC

G.R. No. 189793. April 7, 2010.*

SENATOR BENIGNO SIMEON C. AQUINO III and MAYOR JESSE ROBREDO, petitioners, vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS represented by its Chairman JOSE A.R. MELO and its
Commissioners, RENE V. SARMIENTO, NICODEMO T. FERRER, LUCENITO N. TAGLE,
ARMANDO VELASCO, ELIAS R. YUSOPH AND GREGORIO LARRAZABAL, respondents.

Ponente: J. Perez
Topic(s): House of Representatives – Legislative Districts
Synopsis:
There is no specific provision in the Constitution that fixes a 250,000 minimum population that must
compose a legislative district. As already mentioned, the petitioners rely on the second sentence of
Section 5(3), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution, coupled with what they perceive to be the intent of the
framers of the Constitution to adopt a minimum population of 250,000 for each legislative district. The
second sentence of Section 5(3), Article VI of the Constitution, succinctly provides: “Each city with a
population of at least two hundred fifty thousand, or each province, shall have at least one
representative.” The provision draws a plain and clear distinction between the entitlement of a city to a
district on one hand, and the entitlement of a province to a district on the other.

Digest:
FACTS
Petitioners Senator Benigno Simeon C. Aquino III and Mayor Jesse Robredo, as public officers, taxpayers
and citizens, seek the nullification as unconstitutional of Republic Act No. 9716, entitled “An Act
Reapportioning the Composition of the First (1st) and Second (2nd) Legislative Districts in the Province of
Camarines Sur and Thereby Creating a New Legislative District From Such Reapportionment.” Hence, the
first district municipalities of Libmanan, Minalabac, Pamplona, Pasacao, and San Fernando were combined
with the second district municipalities of Milaor and Gainza to form a new second legislative district.
Petitioners contend that the reapportionment introduced by Republic Act No. 9716, runs afoul of the
explicit constitutional standard that requires a minimum population of two hundred fifty thousand
(250,000) for the creation of a legislative district.5 The petitioners claim that the reconfiguration by
Republic Act No. 9716 of the first and second districts of Camarines Sur is unconstitutional, because the
proposed first district will end up with a population of less than 250,000 or only 176,383.

ISSUE(S)
Whether or not RA 9716 is unconstitutional for running afoul with Section 5(3) of Article VI of the
Constitution

RULING
No, RA 9716 is a valid law. The apportioning of the Composition of the First (1st) and Second (2nd)
Legislative Districts in the Province of Camarines Sur and Thereby Creating a New Legislative District
From Such Reapportionment” is a VALID LAW despite the fact that the new district is less than
250,000.00 in population.

While Section 5(3), Article VI of the Constitution requires a city to have a minimum population of 250,000
to be entitled to a representative, it does not have to increase its population by another 250,000 to be
entitled to an additional district.

35 Bagabuyo v. COMELEC

35. G.R. No. 176970 December 8, 2008

ROGELIO Z. BAGABUYO, petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, respondent.

Ponente: J. Perez
Topic(s): House of Representatives – Reapportionment of legislative districts
Synopsis:
A pronounced distinction between Article VI, Section 5 and, Article X, Section 10 is on the requirement of
a plebiscite. The Constitution and the Local Government Code expressly require a plebiscite to carry out
any creation, division, merger, abolition or alteration of boundary of a local government unit. In contrast,
no plebiscite requirement exists under the apportionment or reapportionment provision.

Digest:
FACTS
RA. 9371 increased Cagayan de Oro's legislative district from one to two. For the election of May 2007,
Cagayan de Oro's voters would be classified as belonging to either the first or the second district,
depending on their place of residence. The constituents of each district would elect their own
representative to Congress as well as eight members of the Sangguniang Panglungsod. On March 13,
2007, the COMELEC en Banc promulgated Resolution No. 7837 implementing R.A. No. 9371.

Petitioner Bagabuyo filed the present petition against the COMELEC on March 27, 2007 asking for the
nullification of R.A. No. 9371 and Resolution No. 7837 on constitutional grounds arguing that the
COMELEC cannot implement R.A. No. 9371 without providing for the rules, regulations and guidelines for
the conduct of a plebiscite which is indispensable for the division or conversion of a local government
unit. He prayed for the issuance of an order directing the respondents to cease and desist from
implementing R.A. No. 9371 and COMELEC Resolution No. 7837, and to revert instead to COMELEC
Resolution No. 7801 which provided for a single legislative district for Cagayan de Oro.
Since the Court did not grant the petitioner's prayer for a temporary restraining order or writ of
preliminary injunction, the May 14 National and Local Elections proceeded according to R.A. No. 9371 and
Resolution No. 7837.

One of the commecnts of the respondent to the petition was that xxx3) the criteria established under
Section 10, Article X of the 1987 Constitution only apply when there is a creation, division, merger,
abolition or substantial alteration of boundaries of a province, city, municipality, or barangay; in this case,
no such creation, division, merger, abolition or alteration of boundaries of a local government unit took
place; and 4) R.A. No. 9371 did not bring about any change in Cagayan de Oro's territory, population and
income classification; hence, no plebiscite is required. The petitioner insists that R.A. No. 9371 converts
and divides the City of Cagayan de Oro as a local government unit, and does not merely provide for the
City's legislative apportionment.

ISSUE(S)
WON R.A. No. 9371 involve the division and conversion of a local government unit and violates the
equality of representation doctrine

RULING

NO.The petition is totally without merit. Legislative apportionment is defined by Black's Law Dictionary
as the determination of the number of representatives which a State, county or other subdivision may
send to a legislative body. It is the allocation of seats in a legislative body in proportion to the population;
the drawing of voting district lines so as to equalize population and voting power among the districts.
Reapportionment, on the other hand, is the realignment or change in legislative districts brought about
by changes in population and mandated by the constitutional requirement of equality of representation .

Article VI (entitled Legislative Department) of the 1987 Constitution lays down the rules on legislative
apportionment under its Section 5 which provides:

Sec. 5(1). (1) The House of Representatives shall be composed of not more than two hundred
fifty members unless otherwise fixed by law, who shall be elected from legislative districts
apportioned among the provinces, cities, and the Metropolitan Manila area in accordance with the
number of their respective inhabitants, and on the basis of a uniform and progressive ratio, and
those who, as provided by law, shall be elected through a party-list system of registered national,
regional and sectoral parties or organizations.
xxx
(3) Each legislative district shall comprise, as far as practicable, continuous, compact, and
adjacent territory. Each city with a population of at least two hundred fifty thousand, or each
province, shall have at least one representative.
(4) Within three years following the return of every census, the Congress shall make a
reapportionment of legislative districts based on the standards provided in this section.

In its strict and proper sense, a municipality has been defined as "a body politic and corporate
constituted by the incorporation of the inhabitants of a city or town for the purpose of local government
thereof." The creation, division, merger, abolition or alteration of boundary of local government units,
i.e., of provinces, cities, municipalities, and barangays, are covered by the Article on Local Government

(Article X). Section 10 of this Article provides:

No province, city, municipality, or barangay may be created, divided, merged, abolished, or its boundary
substantially altered, except in accordance with the criteria established in the local government code and
subject to approval by a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite in the political unit directly affected.
As above stated, the aim of legislative apportionment is "to equalize population and voting power among
districts.”

A pronounced distinction between Article VI, Section 5 and, Article X, Section 10 is on the requirement of
a plebiscite. The Constitution and the Local Government Code expressly require a plebiscite to carry out
any creation, division, merger, abolition or alteration of boundary of a local government unit. In contrast,
no plebiscite requirement exists under the apportionment or reapportionment provision.

R.A. No. 9371 is, on its face, purely and simply a reapportionment legislation passed in accordance with
the authority granted to Congress under Article VI, Section 5(4) of the Constitution. Its core provision -
Section 1 - provides:

SECTION 1. Legislative Districts. - The lone legislative district of the City of Cagayan de Oro is
hereby apportioned to commence in the next national elections after the effectivity of this Act.
Henceforth, barangays Bonbon, Bayabas, Kauswagan, Carmen, Patag, Bulua, Iponan, Baikingon,
San Simon, Pagatpat, Canitoan, Balulang, Lumbia, Pagalungan, Tagpangi, Taglimao, Tuburan,
Pigsag-an, Tumpagon, Bayanga, Mambuaya, Dansulihon, Tignapoloan and Bisigan shall comprise
the first district while barangays Macabalan, Puntod, Consolacion, Camaman-an, Nazareth,
Macansandig, Indahag, Lapasan, Gusa, Cugman, FS Catanico, Tablon, Agusan, Puerto, Bugo and
Balubal and all urban barangays from Barangay 1 to Barangay 40 shall comprise the second
district.

Under these wordings, no division of Cagayan de Oro City as a political and corporate entity takes place
or is mandated. Cagayan de Oro City politically remains a single unit and its administration is not divided
along territorial lines. Its territory remains completely whole and intact; there is only the addition of
another legislative district and the delineation of the city into two districts for purposes of representation
in the House of Representatives. Thus, Article X, Section 10 of the Constitution does not come into play
and no plebiscite is necessary to validly apportion Cagayan de Oro City into two districts.

Admittedly, the legislative reapportionment carries effects beyond the creation of another congressional
district in the city by providing, as reflected in COMELEC Resolution No. 7837, for additional Sangguniang
Panglunsod seats to be voted for along the lines of the congressional apportionment made. The effect on
the Sangguniang Panglunsod, however, is not directly traceable to R.A. No. 9371 but to another law -
R.A. No. 663641 - whose Section 3 provides:

SECTION 3. Other Cities. - The provision of any law to the contrary notwithstanding the City of
Cebu, City of Davao, and any other city with more than one representative district shall have
eight (8) councilors for each district who shall be residents thereof to be elected by the qualified
voters therein, provided that the cities of Cagayan de Oro, Zamboanga, Bacolod, Iloilo and other
cities comprising a representative district shall have twelve (12) councilors each and all other
cities shall have ten (10) councilors each to be elected at large by the qualified voters of the said
cities: Provided, That in no case shall the present number of councilors according to their
charters be reduced.

However, neither does this law have the effect of dividing the City of Cagayan de Oro into two political
and corporate units and territories. Rather than divide the city either territorially or as a corporate entity,
the effect is merely to enhance voter representation by giving each city voter more and greater say, both
in Congress and in the Sangguniang Panglunsod.

The principle of equality of representation.

The petitioner argues that the distribution of the legislative districts is unequal. District 1 has only 93,719
registered voters while District 2 has 127,071. District 1 is composed mostly of rural barangays while
District 2 is composed mostly of urban barangays. Thus, R.A. No. 9371 violates the principle of equality
of representation.

The law clearly provides that the basis for districting shall be the number of the inhabitants of a city or a
province, not the number of registered voters therein.

The Constitution, however, does not require mathematical exactitude or rigid equality as a standard in
gauging equality of representation.In fact, for cities, all it asks is that "each city with a population of at
least two hundred fifty thousand shall have one representative," while ensuring representation for every
province regardless of the size of its population. To ensure quality representation through commonality of
interests and ease of access by the representative to the constituents, all that the Constitution requires is
that every legislative district should comprise, as far as practicable, contiguous, compact, and adjacent
territory. Thus, the Constitution leaves the local government units as they are found and does not require
their division, merger or transfer to satisfy the numerical standard it imposes. Its requirements are
satisfied despite some numerical disparity if the units are contiguous, compact and adjacent as far as
practicable.

WHEREFORE, we hereby DISMISS the petition for lack of merit.

36 Abayon v. HRET/Palparan v. HRET, GR. No. 189506

G.R. No. 189466. February 11, 2010.*

DARYL GRACE J. ABAYON, petitioner, vs. THE HONORABLE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL, PERFECTO C. LUCABAN, JR., RONYL S. DE LA CRUZ and AGUSTIN C.
DOROGA, respondents.
G.R. No. 189506. February 11, 2010.*
CONGRESSMAN JOVITO S. PALPARAN, JR., petitioner, vs. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL (HRET), DR. REYNALDO LESACA, JR., CRISTINA PALABAY, RENATO M.
REYES, JR., ERLINDA CADAPAN, ANTONIO FLORES and JOSELITO USTAREZ, respondents

Ponente: J. Abad
Topic: House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal
Synopsis:
What is inevitable is that Section 17, Article VI of the Constitution provides that the HRET shall be the
sole judge of all contests relating to, among other things, the qualifications of the members of the House
of Representatives. Since, as pointed out above, party-list nominees are “elected members” of the House
of Representatives no less than the district representatives are, the HRET has jurisdiction to hear and
pass upon their qualifications. By analogy with the cases of district representatives, once the party or
organization of the party-list nominee has been proclaimed and the nominee has taken his oath and
assumed office as member of the House of Representatives, the COMELEC’s jurisdiction over election
contests relating to his qualifications ends and the HRET’s own jurisdiction begins.

Digest:
FACTS
Petitioners Abayon and Palparan are the chosen representatives of the party list Aangat Tayo and Bantay,
respectively, during the 2007 elections. Quo warranto proceedings were initiated against them before the
HRET, claiming that they were not qualified to represent the marginalized and underrepresented sectors
embodied by their party list. Abayon countered that in his complaint, Lucaban collaterally attacked the
qualification of Aangat party list when it claimed that the latter itself did not represent marginalized
sectors, a question that belongs to the jurisdiction of the COMELEC, and not the HRET. For his part,
Palparan questioned the jurisdiction of the HRET over his person, since it was actually the party-list
Bantay, not he, that was elected to and assumed membership in the House of Representatives. Palparan
claimed that he was just Bantay’s nominee. Consequently, any question involving his eligibility as first
nominee was an internal concern of Bantay. Such question must be brought, he said, before that party-
list group, not before the HRET.

ISSUE(S)
Does the HRET have jurisdiction over the qualification of nominees of elected party list organizations?

RULING
Yes. Clearly, the members of the House of Representatives are of two kinds: members who shall be
elected from legislative districts and those who shall be elected through a party-list system of registered
national, regional, and sectoral parties or organizations. The Senate and the House of Representatives
shall each have an Electoral Tribunal which shall be the sole judge of all contests relating to the election,
returns, and qualifications of their respective Members. It means that, from the Constitution’s point of
view, it is the party-list representatives who are “elected” into office, not their parties or organizations.
These representatives are elected, however, through that peculiar party-list system that the Constitution
authorized and that Congress by law established where the voters cast their votes for the organizations
or parties to which such party-list representatives belong. It may not be amiss to point out that the Party-
List System Act itself recognizes party-list nominees as “members of the House of Representatives.”

What is inevitable is that Section 17, Article VI of the Constitution provides that the HRET shall be the
sole judge of all contests relating to, among other things, the qualifications of the members of the House
of Representatives. Since, as pointed out above, party-list nominees are “elected members” of the House
of Representatives no less than the district representatives are, the HRET has jurisdiction to hear and
pass upon their qualifications. By analogy with the cases of district representatives, once the party or
organization of the party-list nominee has been proclaimed and the nominee has taken his oath and
assumed office as member of the House of Representatives, the COMELEC’s jurisdiction over election
contests relating to his qualifications ends and the HRET’s own jurisdiction begins.

37 Banat v. COMELEC

BARANGAY ASSOCIATION FOR NATIONAL ADVANCEMENT AND TRANSPARENCY (BANAT),

petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS (sitting as the National Board of Canvassers),
respondent. ARTS BUSINESS AND SCIENCE PROFESSIONALS, intervenor. AANGAT TAYO,
intervenor. COALITION OF ASSOCIATIONS OF SENIOR CITIZENS IN THE PHILIPPINES, INC.
(SENIOR CITIZENS), intervenor.

Ponente: J. Carpio
Topic: House of Representatives – Party List
Synopsis:
In computing the allocation of additional seats, the continued operation of the two percent threshold for
the distribution of the additional seats as found in the second clause of Section 11(b) of R.A. No. 7941 is
unconstitutional. This Court finds that the two percent threshold makes it mathematically impossible to
achieve the maximum number of available party list seats when the number of available party list seats
exceeds 50. The continued operation of the two percent threshold in the distribution of the additional
seats frustrates the attainment of the permissive ceiling that 20% of the members of the House of
Representatives shall consist of party-list representatives.

The two percent threshold presents an unwarranted obstacle to the full implementation of Section 5(2),
Article VI of the Constitution and prevents the attainment of “the broadest possible representation of
party, sectoral or group interests in the House of Representatives.”
Digest:
FACTS
The 14 May 2007 elections included the elections for the party-list representatives. The COMELEC
counted 15,950,900 votes cast for 93 parties under the Party-List System. BANAT filed petition as quoting
the COMELEC of using the Panganiban formula used in Veterans case in allocating party-list seats. BANAT
contend that Article 6 Section 5 should be followed and that 20%of party-list representatives shall be
proclaimed. COMELEC denied said petition. BANAT filed mandamus for certiorari.

ISSUE(S)
1. Whether or not the 20% allocation for party-list representatives provided in Article 6 Section 5
(2) of the Constitution mandatory?
2. Is the two percent threshold and qualifier votes prescribed by the same Section 11(b) of RA 7941
constitutional?
3. How shall the party-list representative seats be allocated?
4. Does the Constitution prohibit the major political parties from participating in the party-list
elections? If not, can the major political parties be barred from participating in the party-list elections?

RULING
1. Petition has partial merit.
The party-list election has four inviolable parameters stated in Veterans.
(1)First, the twenty percent allocation the combined number of all party-list congressmen shall not
exceed twenty percent of the total membership of the House of Representatives, including those elected
under the party list; (2)Second, the two percent threshold only those parties garnering a minimum of two
percent of the total valid votes cast for the party-list system are qualified to have a seat in the House of
Representatives;
(3)Third, the three-seat limit each qualified party, regardless of the number of votes it actually obtained,
is entitled to a maximum of three seats; that is, one qualifying and two additional seats;
(4)Fourth, proportional representation the additional seats which a qualified party is entitled to shall be
computed in proportion to their total number of votes.

2. Yes, We rule that, in computing the allocation of additional seats, the continued operation of the
two percent threshold for the distribution of the additional seats as found in the second clause of Section
11(b) of R.A. No. 7941 is unconstitutional. This Court finds that the two percent threshold makes it
mathematically impossible to achieve the maximum number of available party list seats when the number
of available party list seats exceeds 50. The continued operation of the two percent threshold in the
distribution of the additional seats frustrates the attainment of the permissive ceiling that 20% of the
members of the House of Representatives shall consist of party-list representatives.
The two percent threshold presents an unwarranted obstacle to the full implementation of Section 5(2),
Article VI of the Constitution and prevents the attainment of “the broadest possible representation of
party, sectoral or group interests in the House of Representatives.”—We therefore strike down the two
percent threshold only in relation to the distribution of the additional seats as found in the second clause
of Section 11(b) of R.A. No. 7941. The two percent threshold presents an unwarranted obstacle to the
full implementation of Section 5(2), Article VI of the Constitution and prevents the attainment of “the
broadest possible representation of party, sectoral or group interests in the House of Representatives.”

3. Procedure in determining the allocation of seats for party-list representatives under Section 11 of
R.A. No. 7941.—In determining the allocation of seats for party-list representatives under Section 11 of
R.A. No. 7941, the following procedure shall be observed: 1. The parties, organizations, and coalitions
shall be ranked from the highest to the lowest based on the number of votes they garnered during the
elections. 2. The parties, organizations, and coalitions receiving at least two percent (2%) of the total
votes cast for the party-list system shall be entitled to one guaranteed seat each. 3. Those garnering
sufficient number of votes, according to the ranking in paragraph 1, shall be entitled to additional seats in
proportion to their total number of votes until all the additional seats are allocated. 4. Each party,
organization, or coalition shall be entitled to not more than three (3) seats. The remaining available seats
for allocation as “additional seats” are the maximum seats reserved under the Party List System less the
guaranteed seats.—In computing the additional seats, the guaranteed seats shall no longer be included
because they have already been allocated, at one seat each, to every two-percenter. Thus, the remaining
available seats for allocation as “additional seats” are the maximum seats reserved under the Party List
System less the guaranteed seats. Fractional seats are disregarded in the absence of a provision in R.A.
No. 7941 allowing for a rounding off of fractional seats.

4. Neither the Constitution nor R.A. No. 7941 prohibits major political parties from participating in
the party-list system. On the contrary, the framers of the Constitution clearly intended the major political
parties to participate in party-list elections through their sectoral wings.
By a vote of 8-7, the Court decided to continue the ruling in Veterans disallowing major political parties
from participating in the party-list elections, directly or indirectly.

38 Alliance for Rural & Agrarian Reconstruction, Inc. (ARARO) v. COMELEC

G.R. No. 192803. December 10, 2013.*

ALLIANCE FOR RURAL AND AGRARIAN RECONSTRUCTION, INC., ALSO KNOWN AS ARARO
PARTY-LIST, petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, respondent.

Ponente: J. Leonen
Topic: House of Representatives – Party List
Synopsis:
Votes cast validly for a party-list group listed in the ballot but later on disqualified should be counted as
part of the divisor. To do otherwise would be to disenfranchise the voters who voted on the basis of good
faith that that ballot contained all the qualified candidates. However, following this rationale, party-list
groups listed in the ballot but whose disqualification attained finality prior to the elections and whose
disqualification was reasonably made known by the Commission on Elections to the voters prior to such
elections should not be included in the divisor.

Digest:
FACTS
Petitioner was a duly accredited party-list under Republic Act No. 7941. Petitioner then filed an election
protest before the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal questioning the Resolution of the
Commission on Elections that proclaimed the 28 party-list groups.

Without waiting for the resolution of HRET, the petitioner filed the present Petition for Review on
Certiorari with Prayer for Preliminary Injunction and TRO The petitioner asks that this Court modify the
Commission on Elections’ interpretation of the formula stated in BANAT v. COMELEC by making the
divisor for the computation of the percentage votes, from total number of votes cast minus the votes for
the disqualified party-list candidates, to the total number of votes cast regardless whether party-list
groups are disqualified.

ISSUE(S)
W/ON COMELEC used the correct divisor for the computation of the percentage votes for the party-list
system

RULING
The petitioner claims that there should be no distinction in law between valid and invalid votes. Invalid
votes include those votes that were made for disqualified party-list groups, votes that were spoiled due to
improper shading, erasures in the ballots, and even those that did not vote for any party-list candidate at
all.50 All of the votes should be included in the divisor to determine the 2% threshold.

We agree with the petitioner but only to the extent that votes later on determined to be invalid due to no
cause attributable to the voter should not be excluded in the divisor. In other words, votes cast validly for
a party-list group listed in the ballot but later on disqualified should be counted as part of the divisor. To
do otherwise would be to disenfranchise the voters who voted on the basis of good faith that that ballot
contained all the qualified candidates. However, following this rationale, party-list groups listed in the
ballot but whose disqualification attained finality prior to the elections and whose disqualification was
reasonably made known by the Commission on Elections to the voters prior to such elections should not
be included in the divisor.

Not all votes cast in the elections should be included in the divisor. Contrary to the argument of the
petitioner, Section 11(b) of Republic Act No. 7941 is clear that only those votes cast for the party-list
system shall be considered in the computation of the percentage of representation:

b) The parties, organizations, and coalitions receiving at least two percent (2%) of the total votes cast
for the party-list system shall be entitled to one seat each: Provided, That those garnering more than two
percent (2%) of the votes shall be entitled to additional seats in proportion to their total number of
votes: Provided, finally, That each party, organization, or coalition shall be entitled to not more than
three (3) seats. (Emphasis provided)

The total votes cast do not include invalid votes. The invalid votes, for the determination of the
denominator, may be votes that were spoiled or votes that resulted from the following: improper shading
or having no shade at all;51 existence of stray or ambiguous marks;52 tears in the ballot; and/or ballots
rejected by the Precinct Count Optical Scan (PCOS) machines under the paper-based53 automated
election system. All these are causes that nullify the count for that vote that can be attributable to the
voter’s action.

Votes cast for the party-list system should, however, include all votes cast for party-list groups contained
in the ballot even if subsequently they are disqualified by the Commission on Elections or by our courts.
Thus, the content of the divisor in the formula to determine the seat allocation for the party-list
component of the House of Representatives should be amended accordingly.

We qualify that the divisor to be used in interpreting the formula used in BANAT is the total votes cast for
the party-list system. This should not include the invalid votes. However, so as not to disenfranchise a
substantial portion of the electorate, total votes cast for the party-list system should mean all the votes
validly cast for all the candidates listed in the ballot. The voter relies on the ballot when making his or her
choices.

To the voter, the listing of candidates in the official ballot represents the extent of his or her choices for
an electoral exercise. He or she is entitled to the expectation that these names have properly been vetted
by the Commission on Elections. Therefore, he or she is also by right entitled to the expectation that his
or her choice based on the listed names in the ballot will be counted.

Thus, the formula to determine the proportion garnered by the party-list group would now henceforth be:

Number of votes of party-list Proportion or

Total number of valid votes for = Percentage of votes
party-list candidates garnered by party-list
The total votes cast for the party-list system include those votes made for party-list groups indicated in
the ballot regardless of the pendency of their motions for reconsideration or petitions before any tribunal
in relation to their cancellation or disqualification cases. However, votes made for those party-list groups
whose disqualification attained finality prior to the elections should be excluded if the electorate is
notified of the finality of their disqualification by the Commission on Elections. The divisor also shall not
include invalid votes. ###

39 ATONG PAGLAUM, Inc., et al., v. COMELEC

G.R. No. 203766. April 2, 2013.*

ATONG PAGLAUM, INC., represented by its President, Mr. Alan Igot, petitioner, vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, respondent.
*Partially abandoned Ang Bagong Bayani vs COMELEC & BANAT vs COMELEC rulings

Ponente: J. Carpio
Topic: House of Representatives – Party List
Synopsis:
the party-list system is NOT RESERVED for the “marginalized and underrepresented” or for parties who
lack “well-defined political constituencies”. It is also for national or regional parties. It is also for small
ideology-based and cause-oriented parties who lack “well-defined political constituencies”. The common
denominator however is that all of them cannot, they do not have the machinery – unlike major political
parties, to field or sponsor candidates in the legislative districts but they can acquire the needed votes in
a national election system like the party-list system of elections. If the party-list system is only reserved
for marginalized representation, then the system itself unduly excludes other cause-oriented groups from
running for a seat in the lower house.

Digest:
FACTS
Atong Paglaum, Inc. and 51 other parties were disqualified by the Commission on Elections in the May
2013 party-list elections for various reasons but primarily for not being qualified as representatives for
marginalized or underrepresented sectors.

Atong Paglaum et al then filed a petition for certiorari against COMELEC alleging grave abuse of
discretion on the part of COMELEC in disqualifying them.

ISSUE(S)
Whether or not the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion in disqualifying the said party-list
representatives

RULING
NO. The COMELEC merely followed the guidelines set in the cases of Ang Bagong Bayani and BANAT.
However, the Supreme Court remanded the cases back to the COMELEC as the Supreme Court now
provides for new guidelines which abandoned some principles established in the two aforestated cases.
The new guidelines are as follows:

1. Parameters. In qualifying party-list representatives, the COMELEC must use the following
parameters:
2. Three different groups may participate in the party-list system: (1) national parties or
organizations, (2) regional parties or organizations, and (3) sectoral parties or organizations.
3. National parties or organizations and regional parties or organizations do not need to organize
along sectoral lines and do not need to represent any “marginalized and underrepresented”
sector.
 4. Political parties can participate in party-list elections provided they register under the party-list
system and do not field candidates in legislative district elections. A political party, whether major
or not, that fields candidates in legislative district elections can participate in party-list elections
only through its sectoral wing that can separately register under the party-list system. The
sectoral wing is by itself an independent sectoral party, and is linked to a political party through a
coalition.
5. Sectoral parties or organizations may either be “marginalized and underrepresented” or lacking in
“well-defined political constituencies.” It is enough that their principal advocacy pertains to the
special interest and concerns of their sector. The sectors that are “marginalized and
underrepresented” include labor, peasant, fisherfolk, urban poor, indigenous cultural
communities, handicapped, veterans, and overseas workers. The sectors that lack “well-defined
political constituencies” include professionals, the elderly, women, and the youth.
6. A majority of the members of sectoral parties or organizations that represent the “marginalized
and underrepresented” must belong to the “marginalized and underrepresented” sector they
represent. Similarly, a majority of the members of sectoral parties or organizations that lack
“well-defined political constituencies” must belong to the sector they represent. The nominees of
sectoral parties or organizations that represent the “marginalized and underrepresented,” or that
represent those who lack “well-defined political constituencies,” either must belong to their
respective sectors, or must have a track record of advocacy for their respective sectors. The
nominees of national and regional parties or organizations must be bona-fide members of such
parties or organizations.
7. National, regional, and sectoral parties or organizations shall not be disqualified if some of their
nominees are disqualified, provided that they have at least one nominee who remains qualified.

In the BANAT case, major political parties are disallowed, as has always been the practice, from
participating in the party-list elections. But, since there’s really no constitutional prohibition nor a
statutory prohibition, major political parties can now participate in the party-list system provided that
they do so through their bona fide sectoral wing (see parameter 3 above).
Allowing major political parties to participate, albeit indirectly, in the party-list elections will encourage
them to work assiduously in extending their constituencies to the “marginalized and underrepresented”
and to those who “lack well-defined political constituencies.”

Ultimately, the Supreme Court gave weight to the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission when
they were drafting the party-list system provision of the Constitution. The Commissioners deliberated that
it was their intention to include all parties into the party-list elections in order to develop a political
system which is pluralistic and multiparty. (In the BANAT case, Justice Puno emphasized that the will of
the people should defeat the intent of the framers; and that the intent of the people, in ratifying the 1987
Constitution, is that the party-list system should be reserved for the marginalized sectors.)

The Supreme Court also emphasized that the party-list system is NOT RESERVED for the “marginalized
and underrepresented” or for parties who lack “well-defined political constituencies”. It is also for national
or regional parties. It is also for small ideology-based and cause-oriented parties who lack “well-defined
political constituencies”. The common denominator however is that all of them cannot, they do not have
the machinery – unlike major political parties, to field or sponsor candidates in the legislative districts but
they can acquire the needed votes in a national election system like the party-list system of elections.

If the party-list system is only reserved for marginalized representation, then the system itself unduly
excludes other cause-oriented groups from running for a seat in the lower house.
As explained by the Supreme Court, party-list representation should not be understood to include only
labor, peasant, fisherfolk, urban poor, indigenous cultural communities, handicapped, veterans, overseas
workers, and other sectors that by their nature are economically at the margins of society. It should be
noted that Section 5 of Republic Act 7941 includes, among others, in its provision for sectoral
representation groups of professionals, which are not per se economically marginalized but are still
qualified as “marginalized, underrepresented, and do not have well-defined political constituencies” as
they are ideologically marginalized.

40 Abang Lingkod Party List v. COMELEC

G.R. No. 206952. October 22, 2013.*

ABANG LINGKOD PARTY-LIST (ABANG LINGKOD), petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON
ELECTIONS, respondent.

Ponente: J. Reyes
Topic: House of Representatives – Party List
Synopsis:
Contrary to the COMELEC’s claim, sectoral parties or organizations, such as ABANG LINGKOD, are no
longer required to adduce evidence showing their track record, i.e. proof of activities that they have
undertaken to further the cause of the sector they represent. Indeed, it is enough that their principal
advocacy pertains to the special interest and concerns of their sector. Otherwise stated, it is sufficient
that the ideals represented by the sectoral organizations are geared towards the cause of the sector/s,
which they represent. If at all, evidence showing a track record in representing the marginalized and
underrepresented sectors is only required from nominees of sectoral parties or organizations that
represent the marginalized and underrepresented who do not factually belong to the sector represented
by their party or organization.

Digest:
FACTS
On May 31, 2012, ABANG LINGKOD manifested before the COMELEC its intent to participate in the May
2013 elections. COMELEC then issued Resolution No. 9513,2 which, inter alia, required previously
registered party-list groups that have filed their respective Manifestations of Intent to undergo summary
evidentiary hearing for purposes of determining their continuing compliance with the requirements under
Republic Act (R.A.) No. 79413 and the guidelines set forth in Ang Bagong Bayani-OFW Labor Party v.
COMELEC. ABANG LINGKOD, in compliance with the COMELEC’s August 9, 2012 Resolution, filed with the
COMELEC pertinent documents to prove its continuing compliance with the requirements under R.A. No.
7941.

After due proceedings, the COMELEC En Banc, in a Resolution dated November 7, 2012, cancelled ABANG
LINGKOD’s registration as a party-¬list group. The COMELEC En Banc pointed out that ABANG LINGKOD
failed to establish its track record in uplifting the cause of the marginalized and underrepresented; that it
merely offered photographs of some alleged activities it conducted after the May 2010 elections. The
COMELEC En Banc further opined that ABANG LINGKOD failed to show that its nominees are themselves
marginalized and underrepresented or that they have been involved in activities aimed at improving the
plight of the marginalized and underrepresented sectors it claims to represent.

ISSUE(S)
Whether or not the COMELEC gravely abused its discretion in cancelling the registration of ABANG
LINGKOD under the party-list system

RULING
YES. It was ruled that under Section 5 of R.A. No. 7941, groups intending to register under the party-list
system are not required to submit evidence of their track record; they are merely required to attach to
their verified petitions their “constitution, by-laws, platform of government, list of officers, coalition
agreement, and other relevant information as may be required by the COMELEC.” Track record is not the
same as the submission or presentation of “constitution, by-laws, platform of government, list of officers,
coalition agreement, and other relevant information as may be required by the COMELEC,” which are but
mere pieces of documentary evidence intended to establish that the group exists and is a going concern.
The said documentary evidence presents an abstract of the ideals that national, regional, and sectoral
parties or organizations seek to achieve. This is not merely a matter of semantics; the delineation of what
constitutes a track record has certain consequences in a group’s bid for registration under the party-list
system.

Moreover, contrary to the COMELEC’s claim, sectoral parties or organizations, such as ABANG LINGKOD,
are no longer required to adduce evidence showing their track record, i.e. proof of activities that they
have undertaken to further the cause of the sector they represent. Indeed, it is enough that their
principal advocacy pertains to the special interest and concerns of their sector. Otherwise stated, it is
sufficient that the ideals represented by the sectoral organizations are geared towards the cause of the
sector/s, which they represent. If at all, evidence showing a track record in representing the marginalized
and underrepresented sectors is only required from nominees of sectoral parties or organizations that
represent the marginalized and underrepresented who do not factually belong to the sector represented
by their party or organization.

41 Amores v. HRET

G.R. No. 189600. June 29, 2010.*

MILAGROS E. AMORES, petitioner, vs. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL
and EMMANUEL JOEL J. VILLANUEVA, respondents.

Ponente: J. Carpio Morales

Topic: House of Representatives – Party List
Synopsis:
As the law states in unequivocal terms that a nominee of the youth sector must at least be twenty-five
(25) but not more than thirty (30) years of age on the day of the election, so it must be that a candidate
who is more than 30 on election day is not qualified to be a youth sector nominee. Since this mandate is
contained in RA No. 7941, the Party List System Act, it covers ALL youth sector nominees vying for party-
list representative seats.

What is clear is that the wording of Section 15 covers changes in both political party and sectoral
affiliation. And the latter may occur within the same party since multi-sectoral party-list organizations are
qualified to participate in the Philippine party-list system. Hence, a nominee who changes his sectoral
affiliation within the same party will only be eligible for nomination under the new sectoral affiliation if the
change has been effected at least six months before the elections.

Digest:
FACTS
Milagros E. Amores filed a quo warranto petition questioning the legality of the assumption of office of
Emmanuel Joel J. Villanueva as representative of the party-list organization Citizens’ Battle Against
Corruption (CIBAC) in the House of Representatives. In her petition, petitioner alleged: that he was
disqualified to be a nominee of the youth sector of CIBAC since, at the time of the filing of his certificates
of nomination and acceptance, he was already 31 years old or beyond the age limit of 30 pursuant to
Section 9 of Republic Act (RA) No. 7941, and that his change of affiliation from CIBAC’s youth sector to
its overseas Filipino workers and their families sector was not effected at least six months prior to the
May 14, 2007 elections so as to be qualified to represent the new sector under Section 15 of RA No.
7941.

In his defense, private respondent alleged that the age qualification for youth sectoral nominees applied
only to to those nominated as such during the first three congressional terms after the ratification of the
Constitution or until 1998, unless a sectoral party is thereafter registered exclusively as representing the
youth sector, which CIBAC, a multi-sectoral organization, is not. He further stated that his shift of
affiliation does not serve to make Section 15 applicable to him, as there had been no resultant change in
the party-list affiliation.

ISSUE(S)
Does Section 9 and 15 of the Party List Act apply to private respondent?

RULING
Yes. As to Section 9, the Court found no support for respondent’s contention that it does not apply to
those sectoral parties representing the youth registered after 1998. As the law states in unequivocal
terms that a nominee of the youth sector must at least be twenty-five (25) but not more than thirty (30)
years of age on the day of the election, so it must be that a candidate who is more than 30 on election
day is not qualified to be a youth sector nominee. Since this mandate is contained in RA No. 7941, the
Party List System Act, it covers ALL youth sector nominees vying for party-list representative seats.

Respecting Section 15 of RA No. 7941, the Court fails to find even an iota of textual support for public
respondent’s ratiocination that the provision did not apply to private respondent’s shift of affiliation from
CIBAC’s youth sector to its overseas Filipino workers and their families sector as there was no resultant
change in party-list affiliation. What is clear is that the wording of Section 15 covers changes in both
political party and sectoral affiliation. And the latter may occur within the same party since multi-sectoral
party-list organizations are qualified to participate in the Philippine party-list system. Hence, a nominee
who changes his sectoral affiliation within the same party will only be eligible for nomination under the
new sectoral affiliation if the change has been effected at least six months before the elections. Again,
since the statute is clear and free from ambiguity, it must be given its literal meaning and applied without
attempted interpretation.

42 Ang Ladlad v. COMELEC

G.R. No. 190582 April 8, 2010

ANG LADLAD LGBT PARTY represented herein by its Chair, DANTON REMOTO, Petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS Respondent.

Ponente: J. Del Castillo

Topic: Party List – Registration
Synopsis:
A cursory perusal of Ang Ladlad’s initial petition shows that it never claimed to exist in each province of
the Philippines. Rather, petitioner alleged that the LGBT community in the Philippines was estimated to
constitute at least 670,000 persons; that it had 16,100 affiliates and members around the country, and
4,044 members in its electronic discussion group. Since the COMELEC only searched for the names ANG
LADLAD LGBT or LADLAD LGBT, it is no surprise that they found that petitioner had no presence in any
of these regions. Against this backdrop, we find that Ang Ladlad has sufficiently demonstrated its
compliance with the legal requirements for accreditation. Indeed, aside from COMELEC’s moral objection
and the belated allegation of non-existence, nowhere in the records has the respondent ever found/ruled
that Ang Ladlad is not qualified to register as a party-list organization under any of the requisites under
RA 7941.

Digest:
FACTS
Incorporated in 2003, ANG LADLAD LGBT Party first applied for registration with the COMELEC in 2006,
seeking to represent the sector composed of men and women who identify themselves as lesbians, gays,
bisexuals, or trans-gendered individuals (LGBTs). Before the COMELEC, petitioner argued that the LGBT
community is a marginalized and under-represented sector that is particularly disadvantaged because of
their sexual orientation and gender identity. COMELEC however, dismissed the petition on moral grounds,
contending that such a party list advocates sexual immorality. Furthermore, respondent also argues that
Ang Ladlad made untruthful statements in its petition when it alleged that it had nationwide existence
through its members and affiliate organizations. The COMELEC claims that upon verification by its field
personnel, it was shown that "save for a few isolated places in the country, petitioner does not exist in
almost all provinces in the country."

ISSUE(S)
Is the alleged misrepresentation sufficient to deny ANG LADLAD’s accreditation as party list?

RULING
No. Firstly, the argument that a party’s accreditation should be denied because of misrepresentation as to
the extent of its organization is unfounded. Furthermore, a cursory perusal of Ang Ladlad’s initial petition
shows that it never claimed to exist in each province of the Philippines. Rather, petitioner alleged that the
LGBT community in the Philippines was estimated to constitute at least 670,000 persons; that it had
16,100 affiliates and members around the country, and 4,044 members in its electronic discussion group.
Since the COMELEC only searched for the names ANG LADLAD LGBT or LADLAD LGBT, it is no surprise
that they found that petitioner had no presence in any of these regions. In fact, if COMELEC’s findings
are to be believed, petitioner does not even exist in Quezon City, which is registered as Ang Ladlad’s
principal place of business. Against this backdrop, we find that Ang Ladlad has sufficiently demonstrated
its compliance with the legal requirements for accreditation. Indeed, aside from COMELEC’s moral
objection and the belated allegation of non-existence, nowhere in the records has the respondent ever
found/ruled that Ang Ladlad is not qualified to register as a party-list organization under any of the
requisites under RA 7941.

43 Magdalo Para sa Pagbabago v. COMELEC

MAGDALO PARA SA PAGBABAGO, petitioner, versus COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS,

respondent.
G.R. No. 190793. June 19, 2012

Ponente: J. Sereno
Topic: Party List – Registration
Synopsis:
Under Article IX-C, Section 2(5) of the 1987 Constitution, parties, organizations and coalitions that seek
to achieve their goals through violence or unlawful means shall be denied registration. This
disqualification is reiterated in Section 61 of B.P. 881, which provides that no political party which seeks
to achieve its goal through violence shall be entitled to accreditation. Violence is the unjust or
unwarranted exercise of force, usually with the accompaniment of vehemence, outrage or fury. It also
denotes physical force unlawfully exercised; abuse of force; that force which is employed against
common right, against the laws, and against public liberty. In the present case, the Oakwood incident
was one that was attended with violence. As publicly announced by the leaders of MAGDALO during the
siege, their objectives were to express their dissatisfaction with the administration of former President
Arroyo, and to divulge the alleged corruption in the military and the supposed sale of arms to enemies of
the state. The assertions of MAGDALO that no one was held hostage or that no shot was fired do not
mask its use of impelling force to take over and sustain the occupation of Oakwood.

Digest:
FACTS
On 2 July 2009, Petitioner Magdalo sa Pagbabago (MAGDALO), represented by its Chairperson, Senator
Antonio Trillanes IV, filed its Petition for Registration with the COMELEC, seeking its registration and/or
accreditation as a regional political party based in the National Capital Region (NCR) for participation in
the 10 May 2010 National and Local Elections. On 26 October 2009, the COMELEC Second Division denied
the petition, on the ground that the partys organizer and Chairman and some members participated in
the take-over of the Oakwood Premier Apartments in Ayala Center, Makati City on July 27, 2003, wherein
several innocent civilian personnel were held hostage. This and the fact that they were in full battle gear
at the time of the mutiny clearly show their purpose in employing violence and using unlawful means to
achieve their goals in the process defying the laws of organized societies. In the immediate case,
Magdalo claims that the COMELEC abused its discretionary power in the following instances: it took
judicial notice of the Oakwood incident; it found that Magdalo uses violence or unlawful means to achieve
its goals; and that the latter fact served as a prejudgment of the criminal case filed against Magdalo
members, which was still pending at the time the COMELEC refused the organization accreditation as a
party list.

ISSUE(S)
Did the COMELEC abuse its discretion in denying Magdalo’s petition for registration?

RULING
No. Under the Rules of Court, judicial notice may be taken of matters that are of public knowledge, or are
capable of unquestionable demonstration. Further, Executive Order No. 292, otherwise known as the
Revised Administrative Code, specifically empowers administrative agencies to admit and give probative
value to evidence commonly acceptable by reasonably prudent men, and to take notice of judicially
cognizable facts. The Supreme Court, in a string of cases, has already taken judicial notice of the factual
circumstances surrounding the Oakwood standoff.

Under Article IX-C, Section 2(5) of the 1987 Constitution, parties, organizations and coalitions that seek
to achieve their goals through violence or unlawful means shall be denied registration. This
disqualification is reiterated in Section 61 of B.P. 881, which provides that no political party which seeks
to achieve its goal through violence shall be entitled to accreditation. Violence is the unjust or
unwarranted exercise of force, usually with the accompaniment of vehemence, outrage or fury. It also
denotes physical force unlawfully exercised; abuse of force; that force which is employed against
common right, against the laws, and against public liberty. In the present case, the Oakwood incident
was one that was attended with violence. As publicly announced by the leaders of MAGDALO during the
siege, their objectives were to express their dissatisfaction with the administration of former President
Arroyo, and to divulge the alleged corruption in the military and the supposed sale of arms to enemies of
the state. The assertions of MAGDALO that no one was held hostage or that no shot was fired do not
mask its use of impelling force to take over and sustain the occupation of Oakwood.

Lastly, the power vested by Article IX-C, Section 2(5) of the Constitution and Section 61 of BP 881 in the
COMELEC to register political parties and ascertain the eligibility of groups to participate in the elections is
purely administrative in character. In exercising this authority, the COMELEC only has to assess whether
the party or organization seeking registration or accreditation pursues its goals by employing acts
considered as violent or unlawful, and not necessarily criminal in nature. In the case at bar, the
challenged COMELEC Resolutions were issued pursuant to its administrative power to evaluate the
eligibility of groups to join the elections as political parties, for which the evidentiary threshold of
substantial evidence is applicable. In finding that MAGDALO resorts to violence or unlawful acts to fulfil its
organizational objectives, the COMELEC did not render an assessment as to whether the members of
petitioner committed crimes, as respondent was not required to make that determination in the first
place.
44 V.C. Cadangen c. COMELEC

V.C. CADANGEN and ALLIANCE OF CIVIL SERVANTS, INC., petitioners, versus THE
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, respondent.
G.R. No. 177179. June 5, 2009

Ponente: J. Nachura
Topic: Party List – Registration
Synopsis:
In the registration of a party, organization, or coalition under R.A. No. 7941, the COMELEC may require
the submission of any relevant information; and it may refuse, after due notice and hearing, the
registration of any national, regional or sectoral party, organization or coalition based on any of the
grounds enumerated in Section 6 thereof, among which is that the organization has declared untruthful
statements in its petition. The COMELEC, after evaluating the documents submitted by petitioner, denied
the latter’s plea for registration as a sectoral party, not on the basis of its failure to prove its nationwide
presence, but for its failure to show that it represents and seeks to uplift marginalized and
underrepresented sectors. Further, the COMELEC found that petitioner made an untruthful statement in
the pleadings and documents it submitted.

Digest:
FACTS
Alliance of Civil Servants, Inc. (Civil Servants) filed a petition for registration as a sectoral organization
under RA No. 79413 or the Party-List System Act. It claimed that it had been in existence since December
2004 and it sought to represent past and present government employees in the party-list system.

The COMELEC Second Division issued an order requiring them to file a memorandum that would prove its
presence or existence nationwide, track record, financial capability to wage a nationwide campaign,
platform of government, officers and membership, and compliance with the provisions of said law and
the 8-point guideline laid down in Ang Bagong Bayani-OFW Labor Party v. COMELEC.

Civil Servants consequently filed the required memorandum attaching thereto: (1) copies of its letters to
the respective election directors/officers/registrars of the Cordillera Administrative Region, Second District
of Quezon City, and the cities of Iloilo, Cotabato, Urdaneta and Dagupan, informing them of the names
and addresses of its members in the said localities; (2) revised list of its members as of November 30,
2006; (3) list of its incorporators with brief descriptions of their credentials, including their
designations/appointments in government offices; (4) printed screen shot of the Internet homepage of its
on-line forum; (5) summary of its major activities and accomplishments since its inception; (6) financial
statement showing its net asset of P399,927.00; (7) platform of government; and (8) list of its current
officers with a summary of their credentials. However, the COMELEC Second Division denied the Civil
Servants petition for registration, for failing to prove its existence nationwide and for having declared an
untruthful statement in its memorandum.

Aggrieved petitioners moved for reconsideration, but the COMELEC en banc assailed the resolution of the
COMELEC Second Division and denied the motion.

ISSUE(S)
Whether the COMELEC erred in denying the petitioner’s petition for registration

RULING
No. In the registration of a party, organization, or coalition under R.A. No. 7941, the COMELEC may
require the submission of any relevant information; and it may refuse, after due notice and hearing, the
registration of any national, regional or sectoral party, organization or coalition based on any of the
grounds enumerated in Section 6 thereof, among which is that the organization has declared untruthful
statements in its petition.

45 Bantay Republika v. COMELEC

BANTAY REPUBLIC ACT OR BA-RA 7941, represented by MR. AMEURFINO E. CINCO,

Chairman, AND URBAN POOR FOR LEGAL REFORMS (UP-LR), represented by MRS. MYRNA P.
PORCARE, Secretary-General, petitioners, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, et al.,
respondents
G.R. No. 177271 May 4, 2007

Ponente: J. Garcia
Topic: Party List – Registration
Synopsis:
Petitioners BA-RA 7941’s and UP-LR’s posture that the Comelec committed grave abuse of discretion
when it granted the assailed accreditations without simultaneously determining the qualifications of their
nominees is without basis. Nowhere in R.A. No. 7941 is there a requirement that the qualification of a
party-list nominee be determined simultaneously with the accreditation of an organization. And as aptly
pointed out by private respondent Babae Para sa Kaunlaran (Babae Ka), Section 4 of R.A. No. 7941
requires a petition for registration of a party-list organization to be filed with the Comelec "not later than
ninety (90) days before the election" whereas the succeeding Section 8 requires the submission "not later
than forty-five (45) days before the election" of the list of names whence party-list representatives shall
be chosen.

Comelec should disclose or publish the names of the nominees of party-list groups, sectors or
organizations accredited to participate in the May 14, 2007 elections. Comelec cannot justify its assailed
non-disclosure stance which comes, as it were, with a weighty presumption of invalidity, impinging, as it
does, on a fundamental right to information.

Digest:
FACTS
On January 12, 2007, the Comelec issued Resolution No. 7804 prescribing rules and regulations to
govern the filing of manifestation of intent to participate and submission of names of nominees under the
party-list system of representation in connection with the May 14, 2007 elections. Pursuant thereto, a
number of organized groups filed the necessary manifestations.

In the first of these consolidated petitions, docketed as G.R. No. 177271, petitioners Bantay Republic Act
(BA-RA 7941, for short) and the Urban Poor for Legal Reforms (UP-LR, for short) assail the various
Comelec resolutions accrediting private respondents Biyaheng Pinoy et al., to participate in the
forthcoming party-list elections on May 14, 2007 without simultaneously determining whether or not their
respective nominees possess the requisite qualifications defined in Republic Act (R.A.) No. 7941, or the
"Party-List System Act" and belong to the marginalized and underrepresented sector each seeks to
represent.

In the second petition, docketed as G.R. No. 177314, petitioners Loreta Ann P. Rosales, Kilosbayan
Foundation and Bantay Katarungan Foundation impugn Comelec Resolution 07-0724 dated April 3, 2007
effectively denying their request for the release or disclosure of the names of the nominees of the
fourteen (14) accredited participating party-list groups mentioned in petitioner Rosales’ previous letter-
request.

ISSUE(S)
1. Should the COMELEC’s accreditation of a party list include a simultaneous determination of its
qualifications?
2. Should the COMELEC disclose the names of party list nominees?

RULING
1. No. Petitioners BA-RA 7941’s and UP-LR’s posture that the Comelec committed grave abuse of
discretion when it granted the assailed accreditations without simultaneously determining the
qualifications of their nominees is without basis. Nowhere in R.A. No. 7941 is there a requirement that
the qualification of a party-list nominee be determined simultaneously with the accreditation of an
organization. And as aptly pointed out by private respondent Babae Para sa Kaunlaran (Babae Ka),
Section 4 of R.A. No. 7941 requires a petition for registration of a party-list organization to be filed with
the Comelec "not later than ninety (90) days before the election" whereas the succeeding Section 8
requires the submission "not later than forty-five (45) days before the election" of the list of names
whence party-list representatives shall be chosen.

2. Yes, Comelec should disclose or publish the names of the nominees of party-list groups, sectors or
organizations accredited to participate in the May 14, 2007 elections. Comelec cannot justify its assailed
non-disclosure stance which comes, as it were, with a weighty presumption of invalidity, impinging, as it
does, on a fundamental right to information.

46 Lokin, Jr. v. COMELEC

G.R. Nos. 179431-32 June 22, 2010

LUIS K. LOKIN, JR., as the second nominee of CITIZENS BATTLE AGAINST CORRUPTION
(CIBAC), Petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and the HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,
Respondents.

Ponente: J. Bersamin
Topic: Party List – Nomination
Synopsis:
Although the power to make laws cannot be delegated by the Legislature to any other authority, a power
that is not legislative in character may be delegated. Under certain circumstances, the Legislature can
delegate to executive officers and administrative boards the authority to adopt and promulgate IRRs. To
render such delegation lawful, the Legislature must declare the policy of the law and fix the legal
principles that are to control in given cases.

For as long as the policy is laid down and a proper standard is established by statute, there can be no
unconstitutional delegation of legislative power when the Legislature leaves to selected instrumentalities
the duty of making subordinate rules within the prescribed limits,

The authority to make IRRs in order to carry out an express legislative purpose, or to effect the operation
and enforcement of a law is not a power exclusively legislative in character, but is rather administrative in
nature. The rules and regulations adopted and promulgated must not, however, subvert or be contrary to
existing statutes.
Indeed, administrative or executive acts shall be valid only when they are not contrary to the laws or the
Constitution
To be valid, therefore, the administrative IRRs must comply with the following requisites to be valid:
1. Its promulgation must be authorized by the Legislature;
2. It must be within the scope of the authority given by the Legislature;
3. It must be promulgated in accordance with the prescribed procedure; and
4. It must be reasonable.
The COMELEC, despite its role as the implementing arm of the Government in the enforcement and
administration of all laws and regulations relative to the conduct of an election, has neither the authority
nor the license to expand, extend, or add anything to the law it seeks to implement thereby. The IRRs
the COMELEC issues for that purpose should always accord with the law to be implemented, and should
not override, supplant, or modify the law. It is basic that the IRRs should remain consistent with the law
they intend to carry out.

Digest:
FACTS
CIBAC (Citizens’ Battle Against Corruption), through its president, Emmanuel Joel J. Villanueva, submitted
a list of five nominees from which its representatives would be chosen should CIBAC obtain the required
number of qualifying votes to participate in the May 14, 2007 synchronized national and local elections.
Prior to the elections, however, CIBAC, still through Villanueva, filed a certificate of nomination,
substitution and amendment of the list of nominees whereby it withdrew the nomination of (among
others) Lokin. Following the close of the polls, or on June 20, 2007, Villanueva sent a letter to COMELEC
Chairperson transmitting therewith the signed petitions of more than 81% of the CIBAC members, in
order to confirm the withdrawal of the nomination of (among others) Lokin and the substitution of Borje.
On June 26, 2007, CIBAC, supposedly through its counsel, filed with the COMELEC en banc sitting as the
National Board of Canvassers a motion seeking the proclamation of Lokin as its second nominee. The
motion was opposed by Villanueva and Cruz-Gonzales. On July 6, 2007, the COMELEC issued Resolution
No. 8219, whereby it resolved to set the matter pertaining to the validity of the withdrawal of the
nominations of Lokin and 2 others and the substitution of Borje for proper disposition and hearing. The
case was docketed as E.M. No. 07-054.

In the meantime, the COMELEC en banc, sitting as the National Board of Canvassers, issued National
Board of Canvassers (NBC) Resolution No. 07-60 dated July 9, 2007 to partially proclaim CIBAC, along
with others, as having won in the May 14, 2007 elections. The COMELEC en banc issued another
resolution, NBC Resolution No. 07-72 dated July 18, 2007, proclaiming CIBAC (along with others) to an
additional seat each; and holding in abeyance the proclamation of the nominees of said parties,
organizations and coalitions with pending disputes until the final resolution of their respective cases. With
the formal declaration that CIBAC was entitled to an additional seat, Ricardo de los Santos, purportedly
as secretary general of CIBAC, informed Roberto P. Nazareno, Secretary General of the House of
Representatives, of the promulgation of NBC Resolution No. 07-72 and requested that Lokin be formally
sworn in by Speaker Jose de Venecia, Jr. to enable him to assume office. Nazareno replied, however, that
the request of Delos Santos could not be granted because COMELEC Law Director Alioden D. Dalaig had
notified him of the pendency of E.M. 07-054.

On September 14, 2007, the COMELEC en banc resolved E.M. No. 07-054 and approved the withdrawal
of the nomination of Atty. Luis K. Lokin (along with others) and the substitution. As a result, the
COMELEC en banc proclaimed Cruz-Gonzales as the official second nominee of CIBAC her oath of office
as a Party-List Representative of CIBAC on September 17, 2007.

In G.R. No. 179431 and G.R. No. 179432, Lokin seeks through mandamus to compel respondent
COMELEC to proclaim him as the official second nominee of CIBAC while In G.R. No. 180443, Lokin
assails Section 13 of Resolution No. 7804 promulgated on January 12, 2007; and the resolution dated
September 14, 2007 issued in E.M. No. 07-054 alleging that Section 13 of Resolution No. 7804 expanded
Section 8 of R.A. No. 7941. the law that the COMELEC seeks to thereby implement.

The COMELEC asserts that a petition for certiorari is an inappropriate recourse in law due to the
proclamation of Cruz-Gonzales as Representative and her assumption of that office; that Lokin’s proper
recourse was an electoral protest filed in HRET and that, therefore, the Court has no jurisdiction over the
matter being raised by Lokin.

ISSUE(S)
Whether or not Section 13 of Resolution No. 7804 is unconstitutional and violates the Party-List System
Act

RULING
YES. Section 8 of R.A. No. 7941 reads:

Section 8. Nomination of Party-List Representatives.-Each registered party, organization or coalition shall

submit to the COMELEC not later that forty-five (45) days before the election a list of names, not less
than five (5), from which party-list representatives shall be chosen in case it obtains the required number
of votes.

A person may be nominated in one (1) list only. Only persons who have given their consent in writing
may be named in the list. The list shall not include any candidate of any elective office or a person who
has lost his bid for an elective office in the immediately preceding election. No change of names or
alteration of the order of nominees shall be allowed after the same shall have been submitted to the
COMELEC except in cases where the nominee dies, or withdraws in writing his nomination, becomes
incapacitated in which case the name of the substitute nominee shall be placed last in the list. Incumbent
sectoral representatives in the House of Representatives who are nominated in the party-list system shall
not be considered resigned.

The provision is daylight clear.

When the law speaks in clear and categorical language, there is no reason for interpretation or
construction, but only for application. Section 8 does not unduly deprive the party-list organization of its
right to choose its nominees, but merely divests it of the right to change its nominees or to alter the
order in the list of its nominees’ names after submission of the list to the COMELEC. It enumerates only
three instances in which the party-list organization can substitute another person in place of the nominee
whose name has been submitted to the COMELEC, namely: (a) when the nominee dies; (b) when the
nominee withdraws in writing his nomination; and (c) when the nominee becomes incapacitated.

Section 13 of Resolution No. 7804 states:

Section 13. Substitution of nominees. - A party-list nominee may be substituted only when he dies, or his
nomination is withdrawn by the party, or he becomes incapacitated to continue as such, or he withdraws
his acceptance to a nomination. In any of these cases, the name of the substitute nominee shall be
placed last in the list of nominees.
No substitution shall be allowed by reason of withdrawal after the polls.

Unlike Section 8 of R.A. No. 7941, the foregoing regulation provides four instances, the fourth being
when the "nomination is withdrawn by the party." The COMELEC gravely abused its discretion in
expanding to four the three statutory grounds for substituting a nominee.

The COMELEC explains that Section 13 of Resolution No. 7804 has added nothing to Section 8 of R.A. No.
7941 because it has merely reworded and rephrased the statutory provision’s phraseology. To reword
means to alter the wording of or to restate in other words; to rephrase is to phrase anew or in a new
form. Both terms signify that the meaning of the original word or phrase is not altered.

The COMELEC did not merely reword or rephrase the text of Section 8 of R.A. No. 7941, because it
established an entirely new ground not found in the text of the provision. The new ground granted to the
party-list organization the unilateral right to withdraw its nomination already submitted to the COMELEC,
which Section 8 of R.A. No. 7941 did not allow to be done. Neither was the grant of the unilateral right
contemplated by the drafters of the law, who precisely denied the right to withdraw the nomination (as
the quoted record of the deliberations of the House of Representatives has indicated). The grant thus
conflicted with the statutory intent to save the nominee from falling under the whim of the party-list
organization once his name has been submitted to the COMELEC, and to spare the electorate from the
capriciousness of the party-list organizations. The new ground would not secure the object of R.A. No.
7941 of developing and guaranteeing a full, free and open party-list electoral system. The success of the
system could only be ensured by avoiding any arbitrariness on the part of the party-list organizations, by
seeing to the transparency of the system, and by guaranteeing that the electorate would be afforded the
chance of making intelligent and informed choices of their party-list representatives.

The insertion of the new ground was invalid. An axiom in administrative law postulates that
administrative authorities should not act arbitrarily and capriciously in the issuance of their IRRs, but
must ensure that their IRRs are reasonable and fairly adapted to secure the end in view. If the IRRs are
shown to bear no reasonable relation to the purposes for which they were authorized to be issued, they
must be held to be invalid and should be struck down.

The COMELEC’s approval of CIBAC’s petition of withdrawal of the nominations and its recognition of
CIBAC’s substitution, both through its assailed September 14, 2007 resolution, should be struck down for
lack of legal basis.

WHEREFORE petitions for certiorari and mandamus are granted.

Section 13 of Resolution No. 7804 was declared invalid and of no effect to the extent that it authorizes a
party-list organization to withdraw its nomination of a nominee once it has submitted the nomination to
the Commission on Elections.

- RIVERA

Notes: (read or not is entirely up to you) As for the issue of jurisdiction.

An election protest proposes to oust the winning candidate from office. It is strictly a contest between the
defeated and the winning candidates, based on the grounds of electoral frauds and irregularities, to
determine who between them has actually obtained the majority of the legal votes cast and is entitled to
hold the office. It can only be filed by a candidate who has duly filed a certificate of candidacy and has
been voted for in the preceding elections.

A special civil action for quo warranto refers to questions of disloyalty to the State, or of ineligibility of the
winning candidate. The objective of the action is to unseat the ineligible person from the office, but not
to install the petitioner in his place. Any voter may initiate the action, which is, strictly speaking, not a
contest where the parties strive for supremacy because the petitioner will not be seated even if the
respondent may be unseated.

The controversy involving Lokin is neither an election protest (it is not one in which a nominee of a
particular party-list organization thereby wants to unseat another nominee of the same party-list
organization ) nor an action for quo warranto(considering that the case does not involve the ineligibility
and disloyalty of Cruz-Gonzales to the Republic of the Philippines, or some other cause of disqualification
for her) , for it concerns a very peculiar situation in which Lokin is seeking to be seated as the second
nominee of CIBAC.

Lokin has correctly brought this special civil action for certiorari against the COMELEC to seek the review
of the September 14, 2007 resolution of the COMELEC in accordance with Section 7 of Article IX-A of the
1987 Constitution, notwithstanding the oath and assumption of office by Cruz-Gonzales. The
constitutional mandate is now implemented by Rule 64 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, which
provides for the review of the judgments, final orders or resolutions of the COMELEC and the Commission
on Audit. As Rule 64 states, the mode of review is by a petition for certiorari in accordance with Rule 65
to be filed in the Supreme Court within a limited period of 30 days. Undoubtedly, the Court has original
and exclusive jurisdiction over Lokin’s petitions for certiorari and for mandamus against the COMELEC.

Petitioner is not guilty of forum shopping

Forum shopping consists of the filing of multiple suits involving the same parties for the same cause of
action, either simultaneously or successively, for the purpose of obtaining a favorable judgment. It may
arise: (a) whenever as a result of an adverse decision in one forum, a party seeks a favorable decision
(other than by appeal or certiorari) in another; or (b) if, after having filed a petition in the Supreme
Court, a party files another petition in the Court of Appeals, because he thereby deliberately splits
appeals "in the hope that even as one case in which a particular remedy is sought is dismissed, another
case (offering a similar remedy) would still be open"; or (c) where a party attempts to obtain a writ of
preliminary injunction from a court after failing to obtain the writ from another court.
What is truly important to consider in determining whether forum shopping exists or not is the vexation
caused to the courts and the litigants by a party who accesses different courts and administrative
agencies to rule on the same or
related causes or to grant the same or substantially the same reliefs, in the process creating the
possibility of
conflicting decisions being rendered by the different fora upon the same issue.
The filing of identical petitions in different courts is prohibited, because such act constitutes forum
shopping, a malpractice that is proscribed and condemned as trifling with the courts and as abusing their
processes. Forum shopping is an improper conduct that degrades the administration of justice.
Nonetheless, the mere filing of several cases based on the same incident does not necessarily constitute
forum shopping. The test is whether the several actions filed involve the same transactions and the same
essential facts and circumstances. The actions must also raise identical causes of action, subject matter,
and issues. Elsewise stated, forum shopping exists where the elements of litis pendentia are present, or
where a final judgment in one case will amount to res judicata in the other.

Lokin has filed the petition for mandamus to compel the COMELEC to proclaim him as the second
nominee of CIBAC upon the issuance of NBC Resolution No. 07-72 (announcing CIBAC’s entitlement to an
additional seat in the House of Representatives), and to strike down the provision in NBC Resolution No.
07-60 and NBC Resolution No. 07-72 holding in abeyance "all proclamation of the nominees of concerned
parties, organizations and coalitions with pending disputes shall likewise be held in abeyance until final
resolution of their respective cases." He has insisted that the COMELEC had the ministerial duty to
proclaim him due to his being CIBAC’s second nominee; and that the COMELEC had no authority to
exercise discretion and to suspend or defer the proclamation of winning party-list organizations with
pending disputes.

On the other hand, Lokin has resorted to the petition for certiorari to assail the September 14, 2007
resolution of the COMELEC (approving the withdrawal of the nomination of Lokin, Tugna and Galang and
the substitution by Cruz-Gonzales as the second nominee and Borje as the third nominee); and to
challenge the validity of Section 13 of Resolution No. 7804, the COMELEC’s basis for allowing CIBAC’s
withdrawal of Lokin’s nomination.

Applying the test for forum shopping, the consecutive filing of the action for certiorari and the action for
mandamus did not violate the rule against forum shopping even if the actions involved the same parties,
because they were based on different causes of action and the reliefs they sought were different.

47 Philippine Guardians Bros., Inc. (PGBI) v. COMELEC

PHILIPPINE GUARDIANS BROTHERHOOD, INC. (PGBI), represented by its Secretary-General
GEORGE FGBF GEORGE DULDULAO, Petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS,
Respondent.
G.R. No. 190529. April 29, 2010.

Ponente: J. Brion
Topic: Party List – Delisting of party list representatives
Synopsis:
The law is clear the COMELEC may motu proprio or upon verified complaint of any interested party,
remove or cancel, after due notice and hearing, the registration of any national, regional or sectoral
party, organization or coalition if it: (a) fails to participate in the last two (2) preceding elections; or (b)
fails to obtain at least two per centum (2%) of the votes cast under the party-list system in the two (2)
preceding elections for the constituency in which it has registered. The word or is a disjunctive term
signifying disassociation and independence of one thing from the other things enumerated; it should, as a
rule, be construed in the sense in which it ordinarily implies, as a disjunctive word. Thus, the plain, clear
and unmistakable language of the law provides for two (2) separate reasons for delisting. Minero
therefore simply cannot stand. Its basic defect lies in its characterization of the non-participation of a
party-list organization in an election as like a failure to garner the 2% threshold party-list vote.

The disqualification for failure to get 2% party-list votes in two (2) preceding elections should therefore
be understood in light of the Banat (BANAT v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 179271, April 21, 2009) ruling that
party-list groups or organizations garnering less than 2% of the party-list votes may yet qualify for a seat
in the allocation of additional seats.

Digest:
FACTS
For the upcoming May 2010 elections, the COMELEC en banc issued on October 13, 2009 Resolution No.
8679 deleting several party-list groups or organizations from the list of registered national, regional or
sectoral parties, organizations or coalitions. Among the party-list organizations affected was PGBI; it was
delisted because it failed to get 2% of the votes cast in 2004 and it did not participate in the 2007
elections. Nevertheless, the COMELEC stated in this Resolution that any national, regional sectoral party
or organizations or coalitions adversely affected can personally or through its authorized representative
file a verified opposition on October 26, 2009.

PGBI opposed, stating that the resolution negates the right of movant and those similarly situated to
invoke Section 4 of R.A. No. 7941, which allows any party, organization and coalition already registered
with the Commission to no longer register anew; the party though is required to file with the
Commission, not later than ninety (90) days before the election, a manifestation of its desire to
participate in the party-list system; since PGBI filed a Request/Manifestation seeking a deferment of its
participation in the 2007 elections within the required period prior to the 2007 elections, it has the option
to choose whether or not to participate in the next succeeding election under the same conditions as to
rights conferred and responsibilities imposed;

ISSUE(S)
Was there a legal basis in the delisting of PGBI?

RULING
No. In this case, the Supreme Court had the occasion to rule that the Minero ruling, which the COMELEC
hinged its main defense on, in which Minero was delisted as it failed to get 2% of the votes in 2001 and
did not participate at all in the 2004 elections, is erroneous.
First, the law is clear the COMELEC may motu proprio or upon verified complaint of any interested party,
remove or cancel, after due notice and hearing, the registration of any national, regional or sectoral
party, organization or coalition if it: (a) fails to participate in the last two (2) preceding elections; or (b)
fails to obtain at least two per centum (2%) of the votes cast under the party-list system in the two (2)
preceding elections for the constituency in which it has registered. The word or is a disjunctive term
signifying disassociation and independence of one thing from the other things enumerated; it should, as a
rule, be construed in the sense in which it ordinarily implies, as a disjunctive word. Thus, the plain, clear
and unmistakable language of the law provides for two (2) separate reasons for delisting. Minero
therefore simply cannot stand. Its basic defect lies in its characterization of the non-participation of a
party-list organization in an election as like a failure to garner the 2% threshold party-list vote.

The disqualification for failure to get 2% party-list votes in two (2) preceding elections should therefore
be understood in light of the Banat (BANAT v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 179271, April 21, 2009) ruling that
party-list groups or organizations garnering less than 2% of the party-list votes may yet qualify for a seat
in the allocation of additional seats. To reiterate, (a) Section 6(8) of RA 7941 provides for two separate
grounds for delisting; these grounds cannot be mixed or combined to support delisting; and (b) the
disqualification for failure to garner 2% party-list votes in two preceding elections should now be
understood, in light of the Banat ruling, to mean failure to qualify for a party-list seat in two preceding
elections for the constituency in which it has registered. PGBIs situation, a party list group or organization
that failed to garner 2% in a prior election and immediately thereafter did not participate in the preceding
election is something that is not covered by Section 6(8) of RA 7941.

48 COCOFED v. COMELEC

G.R. No. 207026 August 6, 2013

COCOFED-PHILIPPINE COCONUT PRODUCERS FEDERATION, INC., Petitioner, vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, Respondent.

Ponente: J. Brion
Topic: Party List – Nominees
Synopsis:
Section 8 of RA No. 7941 does not only use the word "shall" in connection with the requirement of
submitting a list of nominees; it uses this mandatory term in conjunction with the number of names to be
submitted that is couched negatively, i.e., "not less than five." The use of these terms together is a plain
indication of legislative intent to make the statutory requirement mandatory for the party to undertake.
all registered parties who wished to participate in the May 2013 party-list elections that they "shall file
with the COMELEC a Manifestation of Intent to participate in the part-list election together with its list of
at least five (5) nominees, no later than May 31, 2012."

Under Section 6(5) of RA No. 7941, violation of or failure to comply with laws, rules or regulations
relating to elections is a ground for the cancellation of registration.

Digest:
FACTS
Petitioner COCOFED-Philippine Coconut Producers Federation, Inc. (COCOFED) is an organization and
sectoral party whose membership comes from the peasant sector, particularly the coconut farmers and
producers. On May 29, 2012, COCOFED manifested with the COMELEC its intent to participate in the
party-list elections of May 13, 2013 and submitted the names of only two nominees – Atty. Emerito S.
Calderon (first nominee) and Atty. Domingo P. Espina.
In its November 7, 2012 resolution, the COMELEC cancelled COCOFED’s registration and accreditation as
a party-list organization on several grounds. Notably, the Concurring Opinion of Commissioner Christian
Lim cited, as additional ground, that since COCOFED submitted only two nominees, then it failed to
comply with Section 8 of Republic Act (RA) No. 7941 that requires the party to submit to COMELEC a list
of not less than five nominees. In its defense, COCOFED interposed that its failure to submit the required
number of nominees was based on the good faith belief that its submission was sufficient for purposes of
the elections and that it could still be remedied since COCOFED could simply submit the names of its
additional two nominees. COCOFED adds that the number of nominees becomes significant only "when a
party-list organization is able to attain a sufficient number of votes which would qualify it for a seat in the
House of Representatives."

ISSUE(S)
Did COMELEC gravely err in cancelling the registration of COCOFED?

RULING
No. Failure to submit the list of five nominees before the election warrants the cancellation of its
registration. The law, through Section 8 of RA No. 7941, expressly requires the submission of a list
containing at least five qualified nominees. As early as February 8, 2012, the COMELEC had informed,
through Resolution No. 9359, COCOFED’s failure to submit a list of five nominees, despite ample
opportunity to do so before the elections, is a violation imputable to the party under Section 6(5) of RA
No. 7941.

First, the language of Section 8 of RA No. 7941 does not only use the word "shall" in connection with the
requirement of submitting a list of nominees; it uses this mandatory term in conjunction with the number
of names to be submitted that is couched negatively, i.e., "not less than five." The use of these terms
together is a plain indication of legislative intent to make the statutory requirement mandatory for the
party to undertake. all registered parties who wished to participate in the May 2013 party-list elections
that they "shall file with the COMELEC a Manifestation of Intent to participate in the part-list election
together with its list of at least five (5) nominees, no later than May 31, 2012."

Under Section 6(5) of RA No. 7941, violation of or failure to comply with laws, rules or regulations
relating to elections is a ground for the cancellation of registration. However, not every kind of violation
automatically warrants the cancellation of a party-list group’s registration. Since a reading of the entire
Section 6 shows that all the grounds for cancellation actually pertain to the party itself, then the laws,
rules and regulations violated to warrant cancellation under Section 6(5) must be one that is primarily
imputable to the party itself and not one that is chiefly confined to an individual member or its nominee.

Second, while COCOFED’s failure to submit a complete list of nominees may not have been among the
grounds cited by the COMELEC in earlier canceling its registration, this is not sufficient to support a
finding of grave abuse of discretion. Apart from the clear letter of Section 8 of RA No. 7941 and the
COMELEC resolutions issued more or less a year before the 2013 elections, COCOFED’s belated
submission of a Manifestation with Urgent Request to Admit Additional Nominees several days after the
elections betrays the emptiness of COCOFED’s formalistic plea for prior notice.

49 Coalitions of Associations of Senior Citizens v. COMELEC

COALITION OF ASSOCIATIONS OF SENIOR CITIZENS IN THE PHILIPPINES, INC. [SENIOR

CITIZENS PARTY-LIST], represented herein by its Chairperson and First Nominee,
FRANCISCO G. DATOL, Jr., petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, respondent.
G.R. Nos. 206844-45 July 23, 2013
Ponente: J. Leonardo-De Castro
Topic: Party List – Term Sharing
Synopsis:
The term-sharing agreement among the nominees of SENIOR CITIZENS, was not implemented. This fact
was manifested by the Arquiza Group even during the April 18, 2012 hearing conducted by the COMELEC
En Banc in E.M. No. 12-040 wherein the Arquiza Group manifested that it was withdrawing its petition for
confirmation and approval of Rep. Kho’s replacement. Thereafter, in its Resolution dated June 27, 2012 in
E.M. No. 12-040, the COMELEC En Banc itself refused to recognize the term-sharing agreement and the
tender of resignation of Rep. Kho. The COMELEC even declared that no vacancy was created despite the
execution of the said agreement. Subsequently, there was also no indication that the nominees of
SENIOR CITIZENS still tried to implement, much less succeeded in implementing, the term-sharing
agreement. Before the Supreme Court, the Arquiza Group and the Datol Group insist on this fact of non-
implementation of the agreement. Thus, for all intents and purposes, Rep. Kho continued to hold his seat
and served his term as a member of the House of Representatives, in accordance with COMELEC
Resolution No. 9366 and the COMELEC En Banc ruling in E.M. No. 12-040. Curiously, the COMELEC is
silent on this point.

Digest:
FACTS
On March 2007, COMELEC accredited Senior Citizen as a party-list organization. Senior Citizen then
participated in the May 2007 elections, however failed to get the 2% total votes cast. In accordance with
the procedure set forth in BANAT for the allocation of additional seats under the party-list system, Senior
Citizen was given one seat.
Subsequently, Senior Citizen was allowed to participate in the May 2010 elections. After the conduct of
the May 10, 2010 elections, SENIOR CITIZENS ranked second among all the party-list candidates and
was allocated two seats in the House of Representatives. The first seat was occupied by its first nominee,
Rep. Arquiza, while the second was given to its second nominee, David L. Kho (Rep. Kho).

Later, David Kho tendered his resignation letter as representative which was followed by a board
resolution of Senior Citizen accepting such resignation in accordance with the term-sharing agreement
made between the nominees of the party-list. COMELEC, however, did not recognize the resignation
saying that it is against public policy. The term of public officials cannot be made subject to any
agreement of private parties for public office is not a commodity that can be shared, apportioned or be
made subject to any private agreement. COMELEC resolved to cancel the registration of the Senior
Citizens as party-list.

On December 11, 2012, SC initially granted status quo ante orders of Senior Citizens and directed
COMELEC to include the name of Senior Citizens in the printing of official ballots for the May 2013
elections. SC later ruled that the cancellation of registration was in order. Thus, this petition.

ISSUE(S)
Was the COMELEC justified in cancelling the registration of SENIOR CITIZENS for implementing a term-
sharing agreement?

RULING
No. The term-sharing agreement among the nominees of SENIOR CITIZENS, was not implemented. This
fact was manifested by the Arquiza Group even during the April 18, 2012 hearing conducted by the
COMELEC En Banc in E.M. No. 12-040 wherein the Arquiza Group manifested that it was withdrawing its
petition for confirmation and approval of Rep. Kho’s replacement. Thereafter, in its Resolution dated June
27, 2012 in E.M. No. 12-040, the COMELEC En Banc itself refused to recognize the term-sharing
agreement and the tender of resignation of Rep. Kho. The COMELEC even declared that no vacancy was
created despite the execution of the said agreement. Subsequently, there was also no indication that the
nominees of SENIOR CITIZENS still tried to implement, much less succeeded in implementing, the term-
sharing agreement. Before the Supreme Court, the Arquiza Group and the Datol Group insist on this fact
of non-implementation of the agreement. Thus, for all intents and purposes, Rep. Kho continued to hold
his seat and served his term as a member of the House of Representatives, in accordance with COMELEC
Resolution No. 9366 and the COMELEC En Banc ruling in E.M. No. 12-040. Curiously, the COMELEC is
silent on this point.

Indubitably, if the term-sharing agreement was not actually implemented by the parties thereto, it
appears that SENIOR CITIZENS, as a party-list organization, had been unfairly and arbitrarily penalized
by the COMELEC En Banc. Verily, how can there be disobedience on the part of SENIOR CITIZENS when
its nominees, in fact, desisted from carrying out their agreement? Hence, there was no violation of an
election law, rule, or regulation to speak of. Clearly then, the disqualification of SENIOR CITIZENS and
the cancellation of its registration and accreditation have no legal leg to stand on.

50 Pobre v. Santiago

A.C. No. 7399. August 25, 2009.*

ANTERO J. POBRE, complainant, vs. Sen. MIRIAM DEFENSOR-SANTIAGO, respondent.

Ponente: J. Velasco, Jr.

Topic: Legislative Department – Parliamentary Immunity
Synopsis:
This Court is aware of the need and has in fact been in the forefront in upholding the institution of
parliamentary immunity and promotion of free speech. Neither has the Court lost sight of the importance
of the legislative and oversight functions of the Congress that enable this representative body to look
diligently into every affair of government, investigate and denounce anomalies, and talk about how the
country and its citizens are being served. Courts do not interfere with the legislature or its members in
the manner they perform their functions in the legislative floor or in committee rooms. Any claim of an
unworthy purpose or of the falsity and mala fides of the statement uttered by the member of the
Congress does not destroy the privilege. The disciplinary authority of the assembly and the voters, not
the courts, can properly discourage or correct such abuses committed in the name of parliamentary
immunity.

Digest:
FACTS
Pobre invited the Court’s attention to the following excerpts of Senator Miriam Defensor-Santiago’s
speech delivered on the Senate floor:

“x x x I am not angry. I am irate. I am foaming in the mouth. I am homicidal. I am suicidal. I am

humiliated, debased, degraded. And I am not only that, I feel like throwing up to be living my middle
years in a country of this nature. I am nauseated. I spit on the face of Chief Justice Artemio Panganiban
and his cohorts in the Supreme Court, I am no longer interested in the position [of Chief Justice] if I was
to be surrounded by idiots. I would rather be in another environment but not in the Supreme Court of
idiots x x x.”
To Pobre, the foregoing statements reflected a total disrespect on the part of the speaker towards then
Chief Justice Artemio Panganiban and the other members of the Court and constituted direct contempt of
court. Accordingly, Pobre asks that disbarment proceedings or other disciplinary actions be taken against
the lady senator.

In her comment on the complaint dated April 25, 2007, Senator Santiago, through counsel, does not
deny making the aforequoted statements. She, however, explained that those statements were covered
by the constitutional provision on parliamentary immunity, being part of a speech she delivered in the
discharge of her duty as member of Congress or its committee.

ISSUE(S)
W/ON imputations of Senator Santiago is covered by the constitutional provision on parliamentary
immunity

RULING
Yes. This Court is aware of the need and has in fact been in the forefront in upholding the institution of
parliamentary immunity and promotion of free speech. Neither has the Court lost sight of the importance
of the legislative and oversight functions of the Congress that enable this representative body to look
diligently into every affair of government, investigate and denounce anomalies, and talk about how the
country and its citizens are being served. Courts do not interfere with the legislature or its members in
the manner they perform their functions in the legislative floor or in committee rooms. Any claim of an
unworthy purpose or of the falsity and mala fides of the statement uttered by the member of the
Congress does not destroy the privilege. The disciplinary authority of the assembly and the voters, not
the courts, can properly discourage or correct such abuses committed in the name of parliamentary
immunity.

For the above reasons, the plea of Senator Santiago for the dismissal of the complaint for disbarment or
disciplinary action is well taken. Indeed, her privilege speech is not actionable criminally or in a
disciplinary proceeding under the Rules of Court.

It is felt, however, that this could not be the last word on the matter. A careful re-reading of her
utterances would readily show that her statements were expressions of personal anger and frustration at
not being considered for the post of Chief Justice. In a sense, therefore, her remarks were outside the
pale of her official parliamentary functions. Even parliamentary immunity must not be allowed to be used
as a vehicle to ridicule, demean, and destroy the reputation of the Court and its magistrates, nor as
armor for personal wrath and disgust. Authorities are agreed that parliamentary immunity is not an
individual privilege accorded the individual members of the Parliament or Congress for their personal
benefit, but rather a privilege for the benefit of the people and the institution that represents them. ###

51 Santiago v. Sandiganbayan

G.R. No. 128055. April 18, 2001

MIRIAM DEFENSOR SANTIAGO, petitioner, vs. SANDIGANBAYAN, FRANCIS E.
GARCHITORENA, JOSE S. BALAJADIA AND MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIO, AS PRESIDING
JUSTICE AND MEMBERS OF THE FIRST DIVISION, respondents.

Ponente: J. Vitug
Topic: Legislative Department – Punitive Powers
Synopsis:
It is true that the Constitution provides that each house may determine the rules of its proceedings,
punish its members for disorderly behavior, and, with the concurrence of two-thirds of all its members, as
well as suspend or expel a member. A penalty of suspension, when imposed, shall not exceed sixty days.
But on the other hand, Section 13 of RA 3019 provides that any incumbent public officer against whom
any criminal prosecution under a valid information under this Act or under Title 7, Book II of the Revised
Penal Code or for any offense involving fraud upon government or public funds or property whether as a
simple or as a complex offense and in whatever stage of execution and mode of participation, is pending
in court, shall be suspended from office. Should he be convicted by final judgment, he shall lose all
retirement or gratuity benefits under any law, but if he is acquitted, he shall be entitled to reinstatement
and to the salaries and benefits which he failed to receive during suspension, unless in the meantime
administrative proceedings have been filed against him.

Digest:
FACTS
The instant case arose from complaints filed by a group of employees of the Commission of Immigration
and Deportation (CID) against petitioner, then CID Commissioner, for alleged violation of the Anti-Graft
and Corrupt Practices Act. Allegedly, herein petitioner, with evident bad faith and manifest partiality in
the exercise of her official functions, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and criminally approve the
application for legalization of the stay of several aliens who arrived in the Philippines after January 1,
1984 in violation of Executive Order no. 324 dated April 13, 1988 which prohibits the legalization of said
disqualified aliens knowing fully well that said aliens are disqualified, thereby giving unwarranted benefits
to said aliens whose stay in the Philippines was unlawfully legalized by said accused. Pursuant to the
information filed with the Sandiganbayan, Presiding Justice Francis E. Garchitorena issued an order for
the arrest of petitioner, who then posted a cash bail without need for physical appearance as she was
then recuperating from injuries sustained in a vehicular accident. The Sandiganbayan granted her
provisional liberty until 05 June 1991 or until her physical condition would warrant her physical
appearance in court. In 1995, a motion was filed with the Sandiganbayan for the suspension of Santiago,
who was already a senator by then. The Sandiganbayan ordered the Senate President (Maceda) to
suspend Santiago from office for 90 days.

ISSUE(S)
Does the Sandiganbayan have the authority to suspend a member of the Senate without violating the
constitution?

RULING
Yes. It is true that the Constitution provides that each house may determine the rules of its proceedings,
punish its members for disorderly behavior, and, with the concurrence of two-thirds of all its members, as
well as suspend or expel a member. A penalty of suspension, when imposed, shall not exceed sixty days.
But on the other hand, Section 13 of RA 3019 provides that any incumbent public officer against whom
any criminal prosecution under a valid information under this Act or under Title 7, Book II of the Revised
Penal Code or for any offense involving fraud upon government or public funds or property whether as a
simple or as a complex offense and in whatever stage of execution and mode of participation, is pending
in court, shall be suspended from office. Should he be convicted by final judgment, he shall lose all
retirement or gratuity benefits under any law, but if he is acquitted, he shall be entitled to reinstatement
and to the salaries and benefits which he failed to receive during suspension, unless in the meantime
administrative proceedings have been filed against him.

In the immediate case, the order of suspension prescribed by the law is distinct from the disciplinary
powers of Congress. The suspension contemplated in the above constitutional provision is a punitive
measure that is imposed upon determination by the Senate or the Lower House, as the case may be,
upon an erring member. This is quite distinct from the suspension spoken of in Section 13 of RA 3019,
which is not a penalty but a preliminary, preventive measure, prescinding from the fact that the latter is
not being imposed on petitioner for misbehavior as a Member of the Senate.

Republic Act No. 3019 does not exclude from its coverage the members of Congress and that, therefore,
the Sandiganbayan did not err in thus decreeing the assailed preventive suspension order.

52 Trillanes v. Judge Pimentel

G.R. No. 179817 June 27, 2008

ANTONIO F. TRILLANES IV, petitioner, vs. HON. OSCAR PIMENTEL, SR., IN HIS CAPACITY AS
PRESIDING JUDGE, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT- BRANCH 148, MAKATI CITY; GEN.
HERMOGENES ESPERON, VICE ADM. ROGELIO I. CALUNSAG, MGEN. BENJAMIN DOLORFINO,
AND LT. COL. LUCIARDO OBEÑA, respondents.

Ponente: J. Carpio Morales

Topic: Legislative Department – Officers in custody
Synopsis:
Petitioner posits that his election provides the legal justification to allow him to serve his mandate, after
the people, in their sovereign capacity, elected him as Senator. He argues that denying his Omnibus
Motion is tantamount to removing him from office, depriving the people of proper representation,
denying the people’s will, repudiating the people’s choice, and overruling the mandate of the people. The
assertion is unavailing. The case against petitioner is not administrative in nature. And there is no "prior
term" to speak of. In a plethora of cases, the Court categorically held that the doctrine of condonation
does not apply to criminal cases. Election, or more precisely, re-election to office, does not obliterate a
criminal charge.

Digest:
FACTS
A group of more than 300 heavily armed soldiers led by junior officers of the Armed Forces of the
Philippines (AFP) stormed into the Oakwood Premier Apartments in Makati City and publicly demanded
the resignation of the President and key national officials. Later in the day, President Gloria Macapagal
Arroyo issued Proclamation No. 427 and General Order No. 4 declaring a state of rebellion and calling out
the Armed Forces to suppress the rebellion. Petitioner Antonio F. Trillanes IV was charged, along with his
comrades, with coup d’ etat. Close to four years later, petitioner, who has remained in detention, threw
his hat in the political arena and won a seat in the Senate with a six-year term commencing at noon on
June 30, 2007.

Petitioner then filed with the RTC, Makati City, Branch 148, an “Omnibus Motion for Leave of Court to be
Allowed to Attend Senate Sessions and Related Requests” (Omnibus Motion) that include among other be
allowed to go to the Senate to attend all official functions of the Senate; be allowed to set up a working
area at his place of detention at the Marine Brig, Marine Barracks Manila, Fort Bonifacio, Taguig City, with
a personal desktop computer and the appropriate communications equipment; be allowed to receive
members of his staff at the said working area at his place of detention; be allowed to give interviews and
to air his comments, reactions and/or opinions to the press or the media regarding the important issues
affecting the country and the public; and be allowed to attend the organizational meeting and election of
officers of the Senate and related activities. The trial court denied all the requests in the Omnibus Motion.
Petitioner moved for reconsideration in which the trial court just the same denied the motion.

ISSUE(S)
Whether or not Senator Trillanes can perform his duties or profession while in detention

RULING
NO. In the case of People v. Hon. Maceda, the Court ruled that “as a matter of law, when a person
indicted for an offense is arrested, he is deemed placed under the custody of the law. He is placed in
actual restraint of liberty in jail so that he may be bound to answer for the commission of the offense. He
must be detained in jail during the pendency of the case against him, unless he is authorized by the court
to be released on bail or on recognizance. Let it be stressed that all prisoners whether under preventive
detention or serving final sentence cannot practice their profession nor engage in any business or
occupation, or hold office, elective or appointive, while in detention. This is a necessary consequence of
arrest and detention.” The presumption of innocence does not carry with it the full enjoyment of civil and
political rights.
53 Limkaichong v. COMELEC

JOCELYN SY LIMKAICHONG, Petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, NAPOLEON N.

CAMERO and RENALD F. VILLANDO, Respondents.
G.R. Nos. 178831-32. April 1, 2009.

Ponente: J. Peralta
Topic: Legislative Department – HRET
Synopsis:
The HRET must exercise jurisdiction after Limkaichong’s proclamation. The SC has invariably held that
once a winning candidate has been proclaimed, taken his oath, and assumed office as a Member of the
lower house, the COMELEC’s jurisdiction over election contests relating to his election, returns, and
qualifications ends, and the HRET’s own jurisdiction begins. It follows then that the proclamation of a
winning candidate divests the COMELEC of its jurisdiction over matters pending before it at the time of
the proclamation. The party questioning his qualification should now present his case in a proper
proceeding before the HRET, the constitutionally mandated tribunal to hear and decide a case involving a
Member of the House of Representatives with respect to the latter’s election, returns and qualifications.
The use of the word “sole” in Section 17, Article VI of the Constitution and in Section 250 of the OEC
underscores the exclusivity of the Electoral Tribunals’ jurisdiction over election contests relating to its
members.

Digest:
FACTS
Two petitions were consolidated on the issue about the qualifications of Jocelyn Limkaichong to run for,
be elected to, and assume and discharge the position as Representative of the 1st District of Negros
Oriental. The contention of the parties who sought her disqualification is that she is not a natural-born
citizen, hence, she lacks the citizenship requirement in Section 6, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution. In
the election that ensued, she was voted for by the constituents of Negros Oriental and garnered the
highest votes. She was eventually proclaimed as the winner and has since performed her duties and
responsibilities as Member of the House of Representatives. About 2 days after the counting of votes,
COMELEC declared Limkaichong as a disqualified candidate.

On the following days however, notwithstanding their proclamation disqualifying Limkaichong, the
COMELEC issued a proclamation announcing Limkaichong as the winner of the recently conducted
elections. This is in compliance with Resolution No. 8062 adopting the policy-guidelines of not suspending
the proclamation of winning candidates with pending disqualification cases which shall be without
prejudice to the continuation of the hearing and resolution of the involved cases. Paras countered the
proclamation and she filed a petition before the COMELEC. Limkaichong asailed Paras’ petition arguing
that since she is now the proclaimed winner, the COMELEC can no longer exercise jurisdiction over the
matter. It should be the HRET which should exercise jurisdiction from then on. COMELEC agreed with
Limkaichong.

ISSUE(S)
Does the HRET have jurisdiction over the matter?

RULING
Yes. The HRET must exercise jurisdiction after Limkaichong’s proclamation. The SC has invariably held
that once a winning candidate has been proclaimed, taken his oath, and assumed office as a Member of
the lower house, the COMELEC’s jurisdiction over election contests relating to his election, returns, and
qualifications ends, and the HRET’s own jurisdiction begins. It follows then that the proclamation of a
winning candidate divests the COMELEC of its jurisdiction over matters pending before it at the time of
the proclamation. The party questioning his qualification should now present his case in a proper
proceeding before the HRET, the constitutionally mandated tribunal to hear and decide a case involving a
Member of the House of Representatives with respect to the latter’s election, returns and qualifications.
The use of the word “sole” in Section 17, Article VI of the Constitution and in Section 250 of the OEC
underscores the exclusivity of the Electoral Tribunals’ jurisdiction over election contests relating to its
members.

54 Vinzons-Chato v. COMELEC

LIWAYWAY VINZONS-CHATO, Petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and RENATO J.

UNICO, Respondents.
G.R. No. 172131. April 2, 2007.

Ponente: J. Callejo, Sr.

Topic: Legislative Department – HRET
Synopsis:
As for the phrase "election, returns, and qualifications", the Court ruled that it should be interpreted in
its totality as referring to all matters affecting the validity of the contestee’s title. But if it is necessary to
specify, it can be said that "election" referred to the conduct of the polls, including the listing of voters,
the holding of the electoral campaign, and the casting and counting of votes; "returns" to the canvass of
the returns and the proclamation of the winners, including questions concerning the composition of the
board of canvassers and the authenticity of the election returns; and "qualifications" to matters that could
be raised in a quo warranto proceeding against the proclaimed winner, such as his disloyalty or
ineligibility or the inadequacy of his certificate of candidacy. The Court has invariably held that once a
winning candidate has been proclaimed, taken his oath, and assumed office as a Member of the House of
Representatives, the COMELEC’s jurisdiction over election contests relating to his election, returns, and
qualifications ends, and the HRET’s own jurisdiction begins.

Digest:
FACTS
Petitioner Chato and respondent Renato J. Unico were among the candidates for the lone congressional
district of Camarines Norte during the May 10, 2004 elections. Subsequently, the provincial board of
canvassers of Labo proclaimed Unico as representative-elect. Petitioner filed charges before the
COMELEC, alleging certain manifest errors or obvious discrepancies in the election returns from various
precincts of the municipality of Labo. On July 2, 2004, the COMELEC (First Division) ordered the
suspension of the effects of the proclamation of respondent Unico. On July 23, 2004, it lifted the said
order on the ground that respondent Unico’s proclamation and taking of oath of office had not only
divested the Commission of any jurisdiction to pass upon his election, returns, and qualifications, but also
automatically conferred jurisdiction to another electoral tribunal.

ISSUE(S)
Does the COMELEC still have jurisdiction to pass upon the suspension order?

RULING
No. The COMELEC did not err in ruling against the suspension of the effects of the proclamation of Unico.
In interpreting Section 17, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution, the Supreme Court ruled that the Senate
and the House of Representatives now have their respective Electoral Tribunals which are the "sole judge
of all contests relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of their respective Members," thereby
divesting the Commission on Elections of its jurisdiction under the 1973 Constitution over election cases
pertaining to the election of the Members of the Batasang Pambansa. As for the phrase "election, returns,
and qualifications", the Court ruled that it should be interpreted in its totality as referring to all matters
affecting the validity of the contestee’s title. But if it is necessary to specify, it can be said that "election"
referred to the conduct of the polls, including the listing of voters, the holding of the electoral campaign,
and the casting and counting of votes; "returns" to the canvass of the returns and the proclamation of
the winners, including questions concerning the composition of the board of canvassers and the
authenticity of the election returns; and "qualifications" to matters that could be raised in a quo warranto
proceeding against the proclaimed winner, such as his disloyalty or ineligibility or the inadequacy of his
certificate of candidacy. The Court has invariably held that once a winning candidate has been
proclaimed, taken his oath, and assumed office as a Member of the House of Representatives, the
COMELEC’s jurisdiction over election contests relating to his election, returns, and qualifications ends, and
the HRET’s own jurisdiction begins. In the present case, it is not disputed that respondent Unico has
already been proclaimed and taken his oath of office as a Member of the House of Representatives;
hence, the COMELEC correctly ruled that it had already lost jurisdiction over petitioner Chato’s petition.

55 Reyes v. COMELEC

REGINA ONGSIAKO REYES, Petitioner, vs. COMISSION ON ELECTIONS AND JOSEPH

SOCCORO B. TAN, Respondents.
G.R. No. 207264. October 22, 2013.

Ponente: J. Perez
Topic: House of Representatives – HRET
Synopsis:
The action for cancellation of petitioner’s COC, the decision in which is the indispensable determinant of
the right of the petitioner to proclamation, was correctly lodged in the COMELEC. The decision of the
COMELEC sealed petitioner’s ineligibility as a candidate for Representative of Marinduque. The decision
erected the bar to the petitioner’s proclamation. The HRET’s constitutional authority opens, over the
qualification of its MEMBER, who becomes so only upon a duly and legally based proclamation, the first
and unavoidable step towards such membership.

Digest:
FACTS
Reyes had the highest votes as a candidate for a Representative position in Marinduque. However prior to
proclamation COMELEC issued a resolution that her COC is cancelled which is a definite bar to her
proclamation. Petitioner posits that it is the HRET who has jurisdiction over her qualifications as a
Member of the House of Representative.

ISSUE(S)
Whether HRET has jurisdiction

RULING
No. She is not a member of the House at present. The COMELEC never ordered her proclamation as the
rightful winner in the election for such membership. The action for cancellation of petitioner’s COC, the
decision in which is the indispensable determinant of the right of the petitioner to proclamation, was
correctly lodged in the COMELEC. The decision of the COMELEC sealed petitioner’s ineligibility as a
candidate for Representative of Marinduque. The decision erected the bar to the petitioner’s
proclamation. The HRET’s constitutional authority opens, over the qualification of its MEMBER, who
becomes so only upon a duly and legally based proclamation, the first and unavoidable step towards such
membership.
56 Abayon v. HRET

HARLIN C. ABAYON, Petitioner, vs. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL and

RAUL A. DAZA, Respondents.
G.R. No. 222236. May 3, 2016

Ponente: J. Mendoza
Topic: Legislative Department – HRET
Synopsis:
The HRET, as the sole judge of all contest relating to the election, returns and qualifications of members
of the House of Representative, may annul election results if in its determination, fraud, terrorism or
other electoral irregularities existed to warrant the annulment.

Digest:
FACTS
Abayon and Daza were contenders for the position of Rep. in the First legislative District of Northern
Samar during the May 2013 elections. Abayon emerged as the winner after obtaining the majority vote.
Daza placed second. The difference was 52 votes. The Provincial Board of Canvassers of Northern Samar
proclaimed Abayon as the duly elected member of the House of Representatives for the said legislative
district. Daza filed his election protest challenging the election results in 25 clustered precincts in the
Municipalities of Biri, Capul, Catarman, Lavezares, San Isidro and Victoria. In his protest, he bewailed that
there was massive fraud, vote-buying, intimidation, employment of illegal and fraudulent devices and
schemes before, during and after the elections benefiting Abayon and that terrorism was committed by
the latter and his unidentified cohorts, agents, and supporters.

ISSUE(S)
Whether HRET has jurisdiction to annul the election

RULING
Yes. The HRET, as the sole judge of all contest relating to the election, returns and qualifications of
members of the House of Representative, may annul election results if in its determination, fraud,
terrorism or other electoral irregularities existed to warrant the annulment. Because in doing so, it is
merely exercising its constitutional duty to ascertain who among the candidates received the majority of
the votes cast.

57 Velasco v. Belmonte

LORD ALLAN JAY Q. VELASCO, Petitioner, vs. HON. SPEAKER FELICIANO R. BELMONTE, JR.,
SECRETARY GENERAL MARILYN1 B. BARUA-YAP AND REGINA ONGSIAKO REYES,
Respondents.
G.R. No. 211140

Ponente: J. Leonardo-De Castro

Topic: Legislative Department – HRET
Synopsis:
The jurisdiction of the HRET begins only after the candidate is considered a Member of the House of
Representatives. And to be considered a Member of the House of Representatives, there must be a
concurrence of the following requisites: (1) a valid proclamation, (2) a proper oath, and (3) assumption
of office.

Digest:
FACTS
On October 2012, one Joseph Soccoro Tan, in his capacity as a registered voter, initiated a petition
before the COMELEC for the cancellation of the Certificate of Candidacy of herein respondent Reyes for
representative of the lone district of the Province of Marinduque. In his petition, Tan alleged that Reyes
made several material misrepresentations in her COC with respect to his residence and citizenship. The
COMELEC First Division granted the petition, but pending the appeal of Reyes, the 2013 election
happened, and despite receipt of the COMELEC en banc affirmation of the Tan petition, the Marinduque
Board of Canvassers proclaimed Reyes as the winner. Velasco, having attained the second highest
number of votes, thus filed an election protest and a quo warranto proceeding before the HRET. The
COMELEC en banc resolution attained finality in the interim. In line with these, Velasco requested
Speaker Belmonte that he be allowed to take the seat as representative of the lone district, and then
subsequently requested Secretary General Barua-Yap that the name of Reyes be stricken from the Roll of
members and his name be placed therein. His efforts proving futile, he filed a mandamus case against
the respondents. Reyes however, countered, stating that the COMELEC had, in the first place, no
jurisdiction to rule on the cancellation of her COC, seeing as the HRET is the sole forum that decides
election protests and contests relating to the House of Representatives.

ISSUE(S)
Is the annulment made by the COMELEC valid?

RULING
Yes. In the present cases, before respondent Regina Reyes was proclaimed on May 18, 2013, the
COMELEC En Banc, in its Resolution of May 14, 2013, had already resolved that the COMELEC First
Division correctly cancelled her COC on the ground that she lacked the Filipino citizenship and residency
requirements. Thus, the COMELEC nullified her proclamation. When Regina Reyes challenged the
COMELEC actions, the Supreme Court En Banc, in its Resolution of June 25, 2013, upheld the same. With
the COMELEC's cancellation of respondent Regina Reyes' COC, resulting in the nullification of her
proclamation, the Tribunal cannot assume jurisdiction over the present petitions. The jurisdiction of the
HRET begins only after the candidate is considered a Member of the House of Representatives. And to be
considered a Member of the House of Representatives, there must be a concurrence of the following
requisites: (1) a valid proclamation, (2) a proper oath, and (3) assumption of office.

58 Lico v. COMELEC

ATTY. ISIDRO Q. LICO et. al. petitioners, vs. THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS EN BANC and
the self-styled sham ATING KOOP PARTYLIST represented by AMPARO T. RIMAS,
respondent.
G.R. No. 205505. September 29, 2015.*

Ponente: C.J. Sereno

Topic: Legislative Department – HRET
Synopsis:
Section 17, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution endows the HRET with jurisdiction to resolve questions on
the qualifications of members of Congress. In the case of party-list representatives, the HRET acquires
jurisdiction over a disqualification case upon proclamation of the winning party-list group, oath of the
nominee, and assumption of office as member of the House of Representatives. In this case, the
COMELEC proclaimed Ating Koop as a winning party-list group; petitioner Lico took his oath; and he
assumed office in the House of Representatives. Thus, it is the HRET, and not the COMELEC, that has
jurisdiction over the disqualification case.
In the present case, the fact that petitioner Lico was a member of Congress at the time of his expulsion
from Ating Koop removes the matter from the jurisdiction of the COMELEC. The rules on intra-party
matters and on the jurisdiction of the HRET are not parallel concepts that do not intersect. Rather, the
operation of the rule on intra-party matters is circumscribed by Section 17 of Article VI of the 1987
Constitution and jurisprudence on the jurisdiction of electoral tribunals. The jurisdiction of the HRET is
exclusive. It is given full authority to hear and decide the cases on any matter touching on the validity of
the title of the proclaimed winner.

Digest:
FACTS
Ating Koop is a multi-sectoral party-list organization which was registered on 16 November 2009 under
Republic Act (R.A.) No. 7941. Under Ating Koop’s Constitution and By-Laws, its highest policy-making
body is the National Convention. The Central Committee, however takes over when the National
Convention is not in session.

Ating Koop filed its Manifestation of Intent to Participate in the Party-List System of Representation for
the May 2010 Elections. On March 6, 2010, it filed with the COMELEC the list of its nominees. On
December 8, 2010, COMELEC proclaimed Ating Koop as one of the winning party-list groups.

Several months prior to its proclamation as one of the winning party-list organizations, Ating Koop issued
Cental Committee Resolution 2010-01, which incorporated a term sharing agreement signed by its
nominees. Under the agreement, petitioner Lico was to serve as Party-list Representative for the 1st year
of the three-year term. On May 14, 2011, Ating Koop held its 2nd National Convention, during which it
introduced amendments to its Constitution and Bylaws. In effect, the amendments cut short the three-
year term of the incumbent members of the Central Committee.

Almost 1 year after Lico had assumed office, the Interim Central Committee expelled him from Ating
Koop for disloyalty. On December 8, 2011, Congressman Lico filed a Motion for Reconsideration with the
Interim Central Committee, which subsequently denied the same.

On March 16, 2012, the Rimas Group, claiming to represent Ating Koop, filed with COMELEC a Petition
against Lico. In a Resolution, the COMELEC 2nd Division upheld the expulsion of Lico from Ating Koop
and declare Mascarina as the duly qualified nominee. Consequently, the Lico Group filed a Motion for
Reconsideration from the 2nd Division’s Resolution, which the COMELEC En Banc denied for lack of
jurisdiction.

ISSUE(S)
Whether the COMELEC En Banc erred in dismissing the case for lack of jurisdiction

RULING
No, but yes in respect to the action of the COMELEC in upholding the validity of the expulsion of Lico
from Ating Koop.

Section 17, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution endows the HRET with jurisdiction to resolve questions on
the qualifications of members of Congress. In the case of party-list representatives, the HRET acquires
jurisdiction over a disqualification case upon proclamation of the winning party-list group, oath of the
nominee, and assumption of office as member of the House of Representatives. In this case, the
COMELEC proclaimed Ating Koop as a winning party-list group; petitioner Lico took his oath; and he
assumed office in the House of Representatives. Thus, it is the HRET, and not the COMELEC, that has
jurisdiction over the disqualification case.

In the present case, the fact that petitioner Lico was a member of Congress at the time of his expulsion
from Ating Koop removes the matter from the jurisdiction of the COMELEC. The rules on intra-party
matters and on the jurisdiction of the HRET are not parallel concepts that do not intersect. Rather, the
operation of the rule on intra-party matters is circumscribed by Section 17 of Article VI of the 1987
Constitution and jurisprudence on the jurisdiction of electoral tribunals. The jurisdiction of the HRET is
exclusive. It is given full authority to hear and decide the cases on any matter touching on the validity of
the title of the proclaimed winner.

In the present case, the Petition for petitioner Lico’s expulsion from the House of Representatives is
anchored on his expulsion from Ating Koop, which necessarily affects his title as member of Congress. A
party-¬list nominee must have been, among others, a bona fide member of the party or organization for
at least ninety (90) days preceding the day of the election. Needless to say, bona fide membership in the
party-list group is a continuing qualification. We have ruled that qualifications for public office, whether
elective or not, are continuing requirements. They must be possessed not only at the time of
appointment or election, or of assumption of office, but during the officer’s entire tenure.

Consequently, the COMELEC failed to recognize that the issue on the validity of petitioner Lico’s expulsion
from Ating Koop is integral to the issue of his qualifications to sit in Congress. This is not merely an error
of law but an error of jurisdiction correctible by a writ of certiorari; the COMELEC should not have
encroached into the expulsion issue, as it was outside its authority to do so.

59 Drilon v. De Venecia

FRANKLIN M. DRILON, as President and in Representation of the LIBERAL PARTY OF THE

PHILIPPINES, et al., Petitioners, vs. Hon. Jose De Venecia, in his official capacity as Speaker
of the House of Representatives, et al., Respondents.
G.R. No. 180055. July 31, 2009.

Ponente: J. Carpio Morales

Topic: Legislative Department – Representation in the Commission on Appointments
Synopsis:
The Constitution expressly grants to the House of Representatives the prerogative, within constitutionally
defined limits, to choose from among its district and party-list representatives those who may occupy the
seats allotted to the House in the HRET and the CA. Section 18, Article VI of the Constitution explicitly
confers on the Senate and on the House the authority to elect among their members those who would fill
the 12 seats for Senators and 12 seats for House members in the Commission on Appointments. Under
Section 17, Article VI of the Constitution, each chamber exercises the power to choose, within
constitutionally defined limits, who among their members would occupy the allotted 6 seats of each
chamber’s respective electoral tribunal.

Under the doctrine of primary jurisdiction, prior recourse to the House is necessary before petitioners
may bring the instant case to the court. Consequently, petitioner’s direct recourse to this Court is
premature.

Digest:
FACTS
In August 2007, the Senate and the House of Representatives elected their respective contingents to the
Commission on Appointments (CA).

In the 2nd week of August 2007, petitioners in G.R. 180055, went to respondent to ask for one seat for
the Liberal Party in the CA but the Speaker merely said that he would study the demand. During the
session of the House of Representatives, Rep. Tanada, requested from the House one seat in the CA for
the Liberal Party. To his request Rep. Gonzales II begged the indulgence of the Liberal Party “to allow the
Legal Dept. to make a study on the matter.” In a separate move Rep. Tanada by letter requested the
Secretary General of the House of Representatives the reconstruction of the House contingent in the CA
to include one seat for the Liberal Party in compliance with the Constitution.

However no report or recommendation was proffered hence this petition.

Meanwhile, Senator Madrigal of PDP-Laban by separate letter to Senator Villar and Speaker Nograles,
claimed that the composition of the Senate contingent in the CA violated the constitutional requirement
of proportional representation. Thus, she requested the reorganization of the membership of the CA and
that in the meantime, “all actions of the CA be held in abeyance as the same may be construed as illegal
and unconstitutional.” Hence, she filed a petition G.R. No. 183055.

ISSUE(S)
Whether Senator Madrigal erred in seeking direct recourse before the SC

RULING
Yes. “The Constitution expressly grants to the House of Representatives the prerogative, within
constitutionally defined limits, to choose from among its district and party-list representatives those who
may occupy the seats allotted to the House in the HRET and the CA. Section 18, Article VI of the
Constitution explicitly confers on the Senate and on the House the authority to elect among their
members those who would fill the 12 seats for Senators and 12 seats for House members in the
Commission on Appointments. Under Section 17, Article VI of the Constitution, each chamber exercises
the power to choose, within constitutionally defined limits, who among their members would occupy the
allotted 6 seats of each chamber’s respective electoral tribunal.

Under the doctrine of primary jurisdiction, prior recourse to the House is necessary before petitioners
may bring the instant case to the court. Consequently, petitioner’s direct recourse to this Court is
premature.

Note: G.R. No. 180055 was declared moot and academic with the designation of Rep. Umali Jr. of the
Liberal Party as a member of the House of Representative contingent in the CA in replacement of Rep.
Gullas of KAMPI.

60 Garcillano v. House of Representatives

Virgilio O. Garcillano (‘er) vs House of Representatives Committees on Public Information,

Public Order and Safety, National Defense and Security, Information and Communications
Technology, and Suffrage and Electoral Reforms (‘dents)
G.R. No. 170338 December 23, 2008

Ponente: J. Nachura
Topic: Senate Inquiry – Publication
Synopsis:
The Senate cannot be allowed to continue with the conduct of the questioned legislative inquiry without
duly published rules of procedure, in clear derogation of the constitutional requirement. Section 21,
Article VI of the 1987 Constitution explicitly provides that “[t]he Senate or the House of Representatives,
or any of its respective committees may conduct inquiries in aid of legislation in accordance with its duly
published rules of procedure.”

Digest:
FACTS
This is a consolidated case pertaining to illegal act of wiretapping. The first case GR no. 170338 involve
the "Hello Garci" tapes. It allegedly contained the President's instructions to COMELEC Commissioner
Virgilio Garcillano to manipulate in her favor results of the 2004 presidential elections. These recordings
were to become the subject of heated legislative hearings conducted separately by committees of both
Houses of Congress. After prolonged and impassioned debate by the committee members on the
admissibility and authenticity of the recordings, the tapes were eventually played in the chambers of the
House.

On August 3, 2005, the respondent House Committees decided to suspend the hearings indefinitely and
had decided to prepare reports out of the recordings and the testimonies of the resource speaker.
Alarmed by this, petitioner Virgilio O. Garcillano (Garcillano) filed with this Court a Petition for Prohibition
and Injunction, with Prayer for Temporary Restraining Order and/or Writ of Preliminary Injunction.
Without reaching finality, the proceedings stopped. After two years of being held in abeyance. Senator
Lacson delivered a prevelege speech promising to expose "the whole unvarnished truth — the what's,
when's, where's, who's and why's" of the alleged wiretap.

On the second case, GR no. 179275, petitioners Ranada and Agcaoili filed before same Court for the
issuance of TRO seeking to bar the Senate from conducting its scheduled legislative inquiry. The Court
did not issue an injunctive writ, the Senate proceeded with its proceedings on the “Halu Garci”.
It may be noted that while both petitions involve the "Hello Garci" recordings, but they have different
objectives — the first is poised at preventing the playing of the tapes in the House and their subsequent
inclusion in the committee reports, and the second seeks to prohibit and stop the conduct of the Senate
inquiry on the wiretapped conversation.The Court dismisses the first petition, G.R. No. 170338, and
grants the second, G.R. No. 179275.

ISSUE(S)
Whether or not the Senate may be allowed to continue with the conduct of the questioned legislative
inquiry without duly published rules of procedure

RULING
As to the petition in G.R. No. 179275, the Court grants the same. The Senate cannot be allowed to
continue with the conduct of the questioned legislative inquiry without duly published rules of procedure,
in clear derogation of the constitutional requirement. Section 21, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution
explicitly provides that “[t]he Senate or the House of Representatives, or any of its respective committees
may conduct inquiries in aid of legislation in accordance with its duly published rules of procedure.” The
requisite of publication of the rules is intended to satisfy the basic requirements of due process.

Publication is indeed imperative, for it will be the height of

1. injustice to punish or
2. otherwise burden a citizen for the transgression of a law or
3. rule of which he had no notice whatsoever, not even a constructive one.
What constitutes publication is set forth in Article 2 of the Civil Code, which provides that “[l]aws shall
take effect after 15 days following the completion of their publication either in the
1. Official Gazette, or in a
2. newspaper of general circulation in the Philippines.”

The respondents in G.R. No. 179275 admit in their pleadings and even on oral argument that the Senate
Rules of Procedure Governing Inquiries in Aid of Legislation had been published in newspapers of general
circulation only in 1995 and in 2006. With respect to the present Senate of the 14th Congress, however,
of which the term of half of its members commenced on June 30, 2007, no effort was undertaken for the
publication of these rules when they first opened their session.
PS. As to G.R. No. 170338 the Court dismissed for being moot and academic; The exercise by the Court
of judicial power is limited to the determination and resolution of actual cases and controversies.

61 Lerias v. Mercado

ROSETTE YNIGUEZ LERIAS, petitioner, vs. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES ELECTORAL

TRIBUNAL and ROGER G. MERCADO, respondent.
G.R. No. 97105 October 15, 1991

Ponente: J. Paras
Topic: Judicial Review of Decisions of the HRET
Synopsis:
The independence of the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal, (HRET, for brevity) as a
constitutional body has time and again been upheld by this Court in many cases. The power of the HRET,
as the "sole judge" of all contests relating to the election returns and qualifications of its members is
beyond dispute. (Art. VI, Sec. 17 of the 1987 Constitution) Thus, judicial review of decisions or final
resolutions of the HRET is possible only in the exercise of this Court's so-called "extra-ordinary
jurisdiction" – upon a determination that the tribunal's decision or resolution was rendered without or in
excess of its jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion or upon a clear showing of such arbitrary and
improvident use by the Tribunal of its power as constitutes a denial of due process of law, or upon a
demonstration of a very clear unmitigated error, manifestly constituting such a grave abuse of discretion
that there has to be a remedy for such abuse. Then only where such grave abuse of discretion is clearly
shown that the Court interferes with the HRET's judgment or decision.

Digest:
FACTS
Petitioner Lerias was a candidate of the UPP-KBL for the position of Representative for the lone district of
Southern Leyte in the May 11, 1987 elections while respondent Mercado was the administration
candidate for the same position.

In the provincial board's copy of the certificate of canvass for the municipality of Libagon, Lerias received
1,811 votes while Mercado received 1,351. Thus, if said copy would be the one to be included in the
canvass, Lerias would have received 35,939 votes as against Mercado's 35,793 votes, giving Lerias a
winning margin of 146 votes. But, the provincial board of canvassers ruled that their copy of the
certificate of canvass contained erasures, alterations and superimpositions and therefore, cannot be used
as basis of the canvass. It rejected the explanation of the members of the municipal board of canvassers
of Libagon that said corrections were made to correct honest clerical mistakes which did not affect the
integrity of the certificate and said corrections were made in the presence of the watchers of all the nine
(9) candidates for the position, including those of Mercado who offered no objection.

Lerias appealed the ruling of the provincial board of canvassers to the Comelec praying that the
Commission order the provincial board of canvassers to use their copy of the certificate of canvass for
Libagon.

At the scheduled hearing on June 5, 1987, the counsel for Lerias, agreed to use the Comelec copy of the
certificate of canvass provided that it be found to be authentic and genuine. A similar reservation was
made by counsel for Mercado.

The Comelec’s copy showed that Lerias received only 1,411 votes in Libagon because in Precincts 6, 10,
18 and 19 she received in each of the said precincts 100 votes less than what she received as shown in
the provincial board of canvasser's copy of the certificate of canvass. Nevertheless, the Comelec, (Second
Division) in its Resolution dated June 6, 1987, directed the provincial board of canvassers to complete the
canvass by crediting Mercado 1,351 votes and Lerias 1,411 votes, the votes received by them,
respectively, as shown in the Comelec copy of the certificate of canvas. So, on June 7, 1987, the
provincial board of canvassers proclaimed Mercado, as the winning candidate,

On June 7, 1987, Lerias filed an urgent ex-parte motion for the reconsideration of the June 6, 1987
resolution praying that the members of the municipal board of canvassers be summoned to testify on the
authenticity and veracity of the Comelec copy of the certificate of canvass and statement of votes
submitted to the Comelec and that the election returns for the 4 precincts produced.

On June 15, 1987 Lerias filed with the Comelec a petition (SPC No. 87-488) for the annulment of the
canvass and proclamation of Mercado, praying that the ballot boxes of the 4 precints be ordered opened
and the votes therein recounted. On June 21, 1987, she filed a motion to suspend the effects of the
proclamation of Mercado.

There being no action taken by the Comelec on the said motion and since the term of office of the
members of the House of Representatives would commence on June 30, 1987, Lerias filed on June 30,
1987 before this Court a petition (G.R. No. 78833) for the annulment of the Comelec resolution of June 6,
1987 and the proclamation of Mercado.

Meanwhile, in SPC-87-488, the Comelec en banc required Mercado to file an answer. Instead of filing an
answer, however, Mercado filed a motion to dismiss on the grounds that (a) the resolution dated June 6,
1987 had already become final because the motion for reconsideration filed by Lerias was ex-parte and
did not stop the running of the period to appeal therefrom and (b) since Lerias filed with the Supreme
Court a petition for the annulment of the Comelec's June 6, 1987 resolution and the subsequent
proclamation of Mercado, she had abandoned her previous petition with the Comelec.

At the scheduled hearing on June 16, 1987 of SPC-87-488, the members of the municipal board of
canvassers of Libagon and the school teachers who served as inspectors of the 4 Precincts 6, 10, 18 and
19 were present and manifested that they were ready to testify. The Comelec did not want to hear the
case on the merits opting instead to merely hear Mercado's motion to dismiss. The said witnesses were
not given the chance to testify.

On June 17, 1987, the Comelec resolved to dismiss SPC-87-488 because the petitioner had filed a case
with the Supreme Court and had, therefore, abandoned her case with the Comelec.

On July 22, 1987 Lerias filed with this Court a second petition to set aside not only the Comelec's
resolution of July 6, 1987 but also the resolution of July 17, 1987.

The petition was heard on oral argument and on September 10, 1987, this Court dismissed the petition
because (a) the Comelec resolution of June 6, 1987 and the proclamation of Mercado had already
become executory inasmuch as five days had elapsed from receipt of a copy of said resolution by
petitioner and no restraining order had been issued by the Court citing Sec. 246 of the Omnibus Election
Code, and (b) Lerias thru counsel had agreed before the Comelec (Second Division) during the hearing
therein on June 5, 1987 to use the Comelec copy of the certificate of canvass.

Lerias filed a motion for reconsideration but the same was denied. Hence, on October 1, 1987, she filed
an election protest with respondent HRET.

Lerias contested the results of the election in the 4 Precincts asserting that the total votes credited to her
in the said four precincts (1,411 votes) were less than or short by 400 votes from that actually obtained
by her (1,811 votes) and if the provincial board of canvassers' copy of the certificate of canvass for
Libagon were to be used as basis of the canvass instead of the Comelec copy, she would have garnered
35,930 votes as against Mercado's 35,793 votes or a winning margin of 146 votes.

Mercado filed his Answer with Counter-Protest, denying the material allegations of the protest and
counter-protesting the results of the elections in 377 precincts. He alleged that the votes cast for him
were (a) intentionally misread in favor of Lerias; (b) not counted or tallied, and/or counted or tallied in
favor of Lerias; (c) considered marked or were intentionally marked and; (d) tampered and changed. The
counter-protest also charged that blank spaces in the ballots were filled with Lerias' name; that various
ballots for Lerias, pasted with stickers, were considered valid and counted for Lerias; that votes in the
election returns were tampered with and altered in favor of Lerias, and that terrorism and massive vote-
buying were employed by her.

The initial hearing was scheduled for August 22, 1988, but on March 7, 1988 unidentified uniformed
armed men raided the municipal building of Libagon and stole the ballot boxes for the 20 precincts of
Libagon stored in the office of the municipal treasurer. Fortunately, these armed mem overlooked the
ballot box which was kept in the office of the election registrar at the second floor of said municipal
building. Said ballot box contained all the copies of the election returns of Libagon which were used in
the municipal canvass. It is in the said office that said ballot box remained until a representative of the
HRET went to Libagon on March 23 and 24, 1988 to take possession of the contents of the same
particularly the election returns kept in said ballot box.

On December 6, 1990, the Tribunal (by a vote of 5-4) promulgated its now assailed Decision Protestee
Mercado wins by a plurality of 46 votes)

ACCORDINGLY, THE PROTEST of protestant Lerias is dismissed. The Tribunal declared Mercado the duly
elected Representative of the Lone District of the Province of Southern Leyte,

The dissenting opinon of Justice Ameurfina M. Herrera, Honorable, Justice Isagani Cruz, Justice Emilio
Gancayco , Representative Antonio H. Cerilles was in favor of Lerias as the winner since the “the plurality
of 20 votes obtained by her in the counter-protested precincts according to the outcome of the
appreciation of ballots, must be added the 400 votes that should have been counted in her favor in the
municipality of Libagon and that Protestant Lerias should, therefore, be credited with a total of 36,008
votes as against 35,588 votes for Protestee Mercado, or a margin of four hundred twenty (420) votes.
“I cannot help noting that, as in several earlier cases, all the five members representing the majority
party are again voting together in favor of the Protestee, who also happens to belong to their party.
Whatever this coincidence may import, I repeat my observation in the Ong cases (HRET Nos. 13 and 15,
Nov. 6, 1989) that `although the composition of the Tribunal is predominantly legislative, the function of
this body is purely judicial, to be discharged on the basis solely of legal considerations, without regard to
political, personal and other irrelevant persuasions.”
– J. Cruz

Lerias filed a motion for reconsideration. Mercado also filed a partial motion for reconsideration. The
Tribunal Resolved to DENY protestant's Motion for Reconsideration for lack of merit. Protestee's Partial
Motion for Reconsideration, is hereby GRANTED.

Honorable Justice Herrera revised her Dissenting Opinion finding that the Plurality of Protestant Lerias -
12 votes (instead of 20 in the original dissent) while Justice Cruz maintained his original dissent.

Representative Cerilles filed a "Dissenting Opinion on Denial of Protestant's Motion for Reconsideration"
saying “In sum, Protestant should therefore be declared winner in the May 11, 1987 election for the Lone
District of Southern Leyte having obtained a plurality of four hundred four (404) votes over the Protestee,
and thus further declare Protestant Rosette Y. Lerias as the duly elected Representative of the Lone
District of Southern Leyte. “
“We have read and examined, with utmost interest and care, the contentions of the parties, the majority
opinion of the five members of the Tribunal as well as the separate dissenting opinions of the chairperson
and some members of the electoral tribunal, and the Court arrived at the conclusion, without any
hesitation, reservation, or doubt, that the Tribunal (the majority opinion) in rendering its questioned
Decision and Resolution had acted whimsically and arbitrarily and with very grave abuse of discretion. It
is for this reason that We cannot bring ourselves to agree with their decision. “

Lerias contended that in the 4 precincts of Libagon where her votes were determined to be 1,411 only,
the same were allegedly reduced by 100 votes in each precinct, thus totalling 400. Should her claimed
votes as aforestated be sustained Lerias' total votes from the municipality of Libagon shall be 1,811
votes. In such an eventuality, Lerias shall have been able to recover 400 votes, more than sufficient to
overcome the winning margin of Mercado, thereby prevailing by a plurality of 146 votes.

To prove her contention, Lerias submitted original copies of the certificate of canvass of the municipal
board of canvassers and the provincial board of canvassers. She also invoked the original copy of the
election returns for the municipal board of canvassers of Libagon.

Mercado relied mainly on the xerox copy of the certificate of canvass for the Comelec.

The HRET majority opinion rejected the election returns and sustained the certificate of canvass because
(1) the Comelec found that the Comelec copy of the certificate of canvass is "regular, genuine and
authentic on its face" and said finding of the Comelec had been sustained by the Supreme Court; (2) the
protestant (meaning Lerias) had agreed during the pre-proclamation proceedings to the use of the
Comelec copy of the certificate of canvass; and (3) the authenticity of the election returns from the four
(4) disputed precincts had not been established.

The reasons given by the majority for doubting the authenticity of the election returns are: (a) the non-
production of the election returns during the entire pre-proclamation proceedings definitely creates much
doubt as to their authenticity especially so when they surfaced only almost a year later after the ballots
had been stolen; (b) during that time, the election returns may have been tampered with and "doctored"
to Lerias' advantage; (c) no proof whatsoever was offered to show that the integrity of the ballot box in
which they were kept was not violated; and (d) thewitnesses presented by Lerias had shown their
partisanship in her favor by executing affidavits to support her protest.
The foregoing findings and pronouncements of the HRET (majorirty opinion) are totally bereft of any
support in law and settled jurisprudence.

In an election contest where what is involved is the correctness of the number of votes of each
candidate, the best and most conclusive evidence are the ballots themselves. But where the ballots
cannot be produced or are not available, the election returns would be the best evidence. Canvassing
boards, the Comelec and the HRET must exercise extreme caution in rejecting returns and may do so
only upon the most convincing proof that the returns are obviously manufactured or fake. And,
conformably to established rules, it is the party alleging that the election returns had been tampered
with, who should submit proof of this allegation.

At this juncture, it is well to stress that the evidence before the HRET is the original copy of the election
returns while the Comelec's copy of the certificate of canvass, is merely a xerox copy, the original thereof
had not been produced.
Under the best evidence rule, "there can be no evidence of a writing, the contents of which are the
subject of inquiry, other than the original writing itself" except only in the cases enumerated in Rule 130,
Sec. 2 of the Rules of Court. The exceptions are not present here. Moreover, the xerox copy of the
certificate of canvass is inadmissible as secondary evidence because the requirements of Sec. 4 of the
same Rule have not been met. The finding of the Comelec in the pre-proclamation proceedings that its
copy of the certificate of canvass is "genuine and authentic" and which finding was sustained by this
Court (G.R. No. 78833; 79882-83) is not binding and conclusive.

Anent the pronouncement of the HRET (majority opinion) that having agreed to the use of the Comelec's
copy of the certificate of canvass, Lerias is now estopped from assailing it, suffice it to state that Lerias
agreed to the use of said copy because she was not aware then that the figures therein had been
altered. It is a matter of record that she immediately objected after she discovered the discrepancy. At
any rate, she cannot be estopped from protesting a falsification of the voters' will because such estoppel
would contravene public policy. (Dissent of J. Cruz, p. 5) Moreover, as indicated in the discussion
hereinabove, under the circumstances relating to pre-proclamation, estoppel certainly cannot apply.

The authenticity of said returns, particularly those of the four disputed precincts, had been further
established by the testimonies of the members of the Board of Election Inspectors of said precincts
during the hearing before the Tribunal and before the hearing officer designated to hear the case. More
importantly, examination of said returns conclusively established the Identity of said returns as the very
same ones prepared by the respective Board of Election Inspectors during the counting of the votes. It
would appear then that the votes of Lerias as indicated in the Comelec copy of the Certificate of Canvass
had been systematically reduced by 100 votes in each of the four precincts.

The number of votes received by protestant and protestee in the four disputed precincts of Libagon as
shown in the election returns for said precincts is substantiated by documentary evidences. Also, the fact
that the members of the board of election inspectors in the disputed precincts had executed affidavits in
support of the claim of Lerias cannot be considered as partisanship since it is the duty of said members of
the board to inform the Comelec, of the actual results of voting in their respective precincts.

All told, the Court is of the considered opinion that the HRET (majority opinion) had no basis at all in
considering the election returns from Precincts 6, 10, 18 & 19 as not authentic.

The Counter-Protest:

Where only the first name of the candidate is written on line 1 for senator, the neighborhood rule will not
apply. According to the majority the neighborhood rule itself is but an exception to that accepted rule on
appreciation that the candidate's name placed in another line not the proper space for the position he is
aspiring is a stray vote, and being already an exception the same must be applied most rigidly and very
strictly. Thus, according to the majority, ballots with "Rosette" or "roset" or "rosit" written on line 1 for
senators, even if the space for congressman is blank and no other candidate for congress is written on
the ballot, were rejected and denied admission by the majority.
In said particular ballots they cannot be considered as votes cast for senatorial candidate Yniguez
inasmuch as in the same ballot Yniguez had also been voted for as senator in the proper space for
senators.

Some of the ballots rejected by the majority also contain the name "Lerias" on line 1 for Senator. These
ballots were written by assistors, and therefore, were admitted as valid. (Timbol v. Lazatin, HRET Case
No. 46, 22 March 1990). The majority rejected these ballots by discounting the applicability of the
"neighborhood rule".

SC’s Conclusio:

Considering the indubitable evidence on record the 400 votes fraudulently taken away from Lerias should
be returned to her. So that in the entire municipality of Libagon, she received 1,811 votes. From the
original 35,539 votes, Lerias should be credited with 35,939 votes as against the 35,793 votes of Mercado
giving her a margin of 146 votes. Whatever the results of the review of the ballots in the counter-
protested precincts would be, Lerias would still be the winner.
ISSUE(S)
WON the SC (in this case) can excercise the power of judicial review over decisions and orders of the
HRET and if in the negative, is it present in this case the exception

RULING
“The General rule, no. as for the exception, there is none.” This conclusion is according to PADILLA, J
dissenting opinion as can be read below.

PADILLA, J., dissenting:

“xxx In the present case, the questioned decision of the House Electoral Tribunal revolves around
questions of fact in the connection with alleged irregularities in the conduct of a congressional election.
Regardless of how far we may differ from the factual findings of the House Electoral Tribunal, under the
Constitution, is the sole judge thereof.

The farmers of the 1987 Constitution, in no certain terms, provided that:

SEC. 17. The Senate and the House of Representatives shall each have an Electoral Tribunal which shall
be the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications of their respecti ve
member. Each Electoral Tribunal shall be composed of nine Members, three of whom shall be justices of
the Supreme Court to be designated by the Chief Justice, and the remaining six shall be Members of the
Senate of the House of Representatives, as the case my be, who shall be chosen on the basis of
proportional representation from the political parties or organizations registered under the party-list
system represented therein. The Senior Justice in the Electoral Tribunal shall be its chairman. 1
(Emphasis supplied)

It is clear that the intent of the 1987 Constitution is to make the Electoral Tribunals of both the Senate
and the House of Representatives the sole of all election contests concerning their respective Members.

The use the words "sole" emphasizes the exclusive character of the jurisdiction conferred on the House
Electoral Tribunal such that judicial review of final decisions or resolutions of the House Electoral Tribunal
is possible only in the exercise of the Supreme Court's 'extra-ordinary jurisdiction', i.e., upon a
determination tha the electoral tribunal's decision or resolution was rendered, without or in excess of its
jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion or, upon a clear showing of such arbitrary and improvident
use by the Tribunal of its power as constitutes a clear unmitigated error, manifestly consituting such a
grave abuse of discretion that there has to be a remedy for such abuse. 3
The House Electoral Tribunal is not an ordinary agency established by statute or executive fiat to better
handle administrative concerns assumed by line departments of the executive branch. It is a
constitutional body created precisely to be the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns
and qualifications of members of the House of Representative.

The House Electoral Tribunal, being the sole judge of all contest relating to the election, returns and
qualifications of members of the House of Representatives, the Supreme Court may not review its
decisions except when the Tribunal is lcearly shown to have issued them with grave abuse of discretion
as to amount to lack or excess of jurisdiction. 5 It is fundamental that for grave abuse of discretion to
exist, there must be a "capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment as is equivalent to lack of
jurisdiction; or that the power is exercised in an arbitrary or despotic manner by reason of passion,
prejudice or personal hostility, amounting to an evasion of positive duty or to a virtual refusal to perform
the duty enjoined or to act at all in contemplation of law.

The House Electoral Tribunal is a tribunal in the true in the true and strict sense of the term, with the
limited but exclusive jurisdiction granted to it by the fundamental law and its functions are properly
judicial. This power granted by the Constitution is not as abstract or empty as a carcass, but real and
positive, with all the attributes for effective manifestation in the external world and, like all human
powers, needs the tools and instruments linking the cause and effect.

I submit that the Supreme Court cannot excercise the power of judicial review over decisions and orders
of the House Electoral Tribunal, except only upon the strongest showing that a constitutional norm-like
the mandate of natural-born citizenship for members of the House of Representative-has been violated,
or a patently manifest grave abuse of authority committed; for "courts are mere creatures of the state
and of its power, and while their life as courts continues, they must obey the law of their creator.

The records of this case, disclose that the petitioners anchors her arguments on alleged election
abormalities. And yet, all her allegations are based on questions of fact the appreciation of which vests
solely within the jurisdiction and competence of the House Electoral Tribunal. Nowhere in the records of
this case is it disclosed that the House Electoral Tribunal resorted to arbitrary or improvident use of its
power as to constitute a denial of due process nor is there any evidence of a clear unmitigated error
manifestly constituting such a grave abuse of discretion for which the Court should afford a remedy. The
absence of grave abuse of discretion in the appreciation of the facts, is demonstrated by the fact that the
Tribunal was so closely divided, which means that the facts were susceptible of appreciation one way or
the other. It is precisely because of such situations that the Constitution has constituted the House
Electoral Tribunal-not this Court-as the sole judge of all election contests involving members of the House
of Representatives. The proper role for the Court to perform is to apply the law based on the findings of
fact of the electoral tribunal. This inevitably leads to a dismissal of the petition in this case.
This Court cannot remedy, as the majority would have it, a situation where the House Electoral Tribunal
has arrived at a conclusion which, in the perception of the majority in this Court, is gravely erroneous.
The Supreme Court is, in my opinion, powerless to review, much more, revise the decision of the House
Electoral Tribunal in this case; for otherwise it can be charged with usurping power not granted to it by
the Constitution. The Supreme Court, moreover, is not a trier of facts and can do no more than to abide
by the House Electoral Tribunal's appreciation of the facts in cases within its unquestioned exclusive
jurisdiction. True, the circumstance that the decisions of the House Electoral Tribunal are final and
without appeal may seem unreasonable, or better still, inequitable, but then the decisions of this Court in
matters within its jurisdiction are likewise final and without appeal. "There must be a final tribunal
somewhere for deciding every question in the world. Injustice may take place in all tribunals for all
human institutions are imperfect-courts as well as commissions and legislatures ... It may be that our
legislatures , (or, in this case, our electoral tribunals), are invested with too much power, open as they
are, to influences so dangerous to the interests of individuals, corporations and society. But such is the
Constitution of our republican form of government and we are bound to abide by it until it can be
corrected in a legitimate way. 9 After all, "the courts are without authority to repress evil save as the law
has proscribed it and then only according to law. 10

Believing, therefore, that what the Court seeks to do today in this case carries unwarranted and even
dangerous consequences four our state, government and people, in that it blurs (if not demolishes) the
constitutional boundaries between the Court and the Electoral Tribunals in matters where the latter are,
by express constitutional design, and mandate, made sole judges, I vote to DISMISS the petition.”

62 Dela Paz v. Senate

SPOUSES PNP DIRECTOR ELISEO D. DELA PAZ (Ret.) and MARIA FE C. DELA PAZ, petitioners,
vs. SENATE COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS and the SENATE SERGEANT-AT-ARMS
JOSE BALAJADIA, JR., respondents.
G.R. No. 184849. February 13, 2009

Ponente: J. Nachura
Topic: Judicial Review of House Rules of Proceeding
Synopsis:
The exercise of the power of each house to determine the rules of its proceedings is generally exempt
from judicial supervision and interference, except on a clear showing of such arbitrary and improvident
use of the power as will constitute a denial of due process.—Section 16(3), Article VI of the Philippine
Constitution states: “Each House shall determine the rules of its proceedings.” This provision has been
traditionally construed as a grant of full discretionary authority to the Houses of Congress in the
formulation, adoption and promulgation of its own rules. As such, the exercise of this power is generally
exempt from judicial supervision and interference, except on a clear showing of such arbitrary and
improvident use of the power as will constitute a denial of due process.

Digest:
FACTS
In October 2008, Gen. De La Paz, a senior officer of the PNP, headed a delegation of 8 to attend an
Interpol GA. De La Paz brought with him his wife and 3 days after the scheduled GA, de la Paz is also
scheduled to retire. After the GA, De La Paz was apprehended in the departure area for he was carrying
with him €105,000.00 (P6,930,000.00). He was also carrying with him €45,000.00 (P2,970,000.00). He
failed to declare in writing that he is carrying such an amount and this is in violation of the United Nations
Convention Against Corruption and the United Nations Convention Against Transnational Organized
Crime. De La Paz and his group was later released but the €s were confiscated by the Russians. Upon
arrival to the Philippines, De La Paz was issued a subpoena by the Senate Committee on Foreign
Relations for the investigation it was to conduct involving the Moscow incident. De La Paz averred that
the said committee does not have jurisdiction of the case. De La Paz argued that the Committee is devoid
of any jurisdiction to investigate the Moscow incident as the matter does not involve state to state
relations as provided in paragraph 12, Section 13, Rule 10 of the Senate Rules of Procedure (Senate
Rules). They further claim that respondent Committee violated the same Senate Rules when it issued the
warrant of arrest without the required signatures of the majority of the members of respondent
Committee. They likewise assail the very same Senate Rules because the same were not published as
required by the Constitution, and thus, cannot be used as the basis of any investigation involving them
relative to the Moscow incident.

ISSUE(S)
Whether or not the said Committee has jurisdiction over the matter

RULING
The SC ruled against De La Paz. Section 16(3), Article VI of the Philippine Constitution states:”Each
House shall determine the rules of its proceedings.” This provision has been traditionally construed as a
grant of full discretionary authority to the Houses of Congress in the formulation, adoption and
promulgation of its own rules. The challenge to the jurisdiction of the Senate Foreign Relations
Committee, raised by petitioner in the case at bench, in effect, asks this Court to inquire into a matter
that is within the full discretion of the Senate. The issue partakes of the nature of a political question.
Also, the signatures were properly obtained as evidenced by the approval of the Senate president and it
is shown that the gathering of the signatures is in accordance with the Rules. It is also shown that the
Rules of Procedure Governing Inquiries in Aid of Legislation were also published in two newspapers of
general circulation.

63 ABAKADA Guro Party List v. Purisima

ABAKADA GURO PARTY LIST (Formerly AASJAS) OFFICERS SAMSON S. ALCANTARA and ED
VINCENT S. ALBANO, Petitioners, versus THE HONORABLE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY EDUARDO
ERMITA; HONORABLE SECRETARY OF THE DEPARTMENT OF FINANCE CESAR PURISIMA; and
HONORABLE COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE GUILLERMO PARAYNO, JR.,
Respondents.
G.R. No. 168056. September 1, 2005

Ponente: J. Austria-Martinez
Topic: Legislative Department – How a Bill Becomes a Law
Synopsis:
The no-amendment rule refers only to the procedure to be followed by each house of Congress with
regard to bills initiated in each of said respective houses, before said bill is transmitted to the other house
for its concurrence or amendment. Verily, to construe said provision in a way as to proscribe any further
changes to a bill after one house has voted on it would lead to absurdity as this would mean that the
other house of Congress would be deprived of its constitutional power to amend or introduce changes to
said bill.

Digest:
FACTS
This case is a consolidation of several petitions for prohibition, praying that the Supreme Court enjoin the
enactment of Republic Act 9335, or the Attrition Act of 2005. One such petition is a petition for certiorari
filed by several members of the House of Representatives, led by Rep. Escudero, questioning the
propriety of the insertion by the Bicameral Conference of several sections of the proposed House Bill No.
3705 and Senate Bill No. 1950. Specifically, it questions whether the changes made violate Article VI,
Section 26(2) as well as Article VI, Section 24 of the Constitution.

ISSUE(S)
1. Does the law violate the no-amendment rule?
2. Does the law violate the constitutional rule on tariff bills originating from HR?

RULING
No. As to the first point, petitioners argue that the practice where a bicameral conference committee is
allowed to add or delete provisions in the House bill and the Senate bill after these had passed three
readings is in effect a circumvention of the no amendment rule. However, the Court ruled that the no-
amendment rule refers only to the procedure to be followed by each house of Congress with regard to
bills initiated in each of said respective houses, before said bill is transmitted to the other house for its
concurrence or amendment. Verily, to construe said provision in a way as to proscribe any further
changes to a bill after one house has voted on it would lead to absurdity as this would mean that the
other house of Congress would be deprived of its constitutional power to amend or introduce changes to
said bill.

Secondly, it is not the law but the revenue bill which is required by the Constitution to originate
exclusively in the House of Representatives. It is important to emphasize this, because a bill originating in
the House may undergo such extensive changes in the Senate that the result may be a rewriting of the
whole. At this point, what is important to note is that, as a result of the Senate action, a distinct bill may
be produced. To insist that a revenue statute and not only the bill which initiated the legislative process
culminating in the enactment of the law must substantially be the same as the House bill would be to
deny the Senates power not only to concur with amendments but also to propose amendments. It would
be to violate the coequality of legislative power of the two houses of Congress and in fact make the
House superior to the Senate.

64 Senate v. Ermita
SENATE OF THE PHILIPPINES, represented by FRANKLIN M. DRILON, et al., Petitioners, vs.
EDUARDO R. ERMITA, in his capacity as Executive Secretary and Alter-Ego of President
GLORIA MACAPAGAL-ARROYO
G.R. No. 169659. April 20, 2006.

Ponente: J. Carpio Morales

Topic: Legislative Investigation – Question Hour
Synopsis:
The power to conduct inquiry during question hours is recognized in Article 6, Section 22 of the 1987
Constitution. The objective of conducting a question hour is to obtain information in pursuit of Congress’
oversight function. When Congress merely seeks to be informed on how department heads are
implementing the statutes which it had issued, the department heads’ appearance is merely requested.

Digest:
FACTS
This case is regarding the railway project of the North Luzon Railways Corporation with the China
National Machinery and Equipment Group as well as the Wiretapping activity of the ISAFP, and the
Fertilizer scam.

The Senate Committees sent invitations to various officials of the Executive Department and AFP officials
for them to appear before Senate on Sept. 29, 2005. Before said date arrived, Executive Sec. Ermita sent
a letter to Senate President Drilon, requesting for a postponement of the hearing on Sept. 29 in order to
“afford said officials ample time and opportunity to study and prepare for the various issues so that they
may better enlighten the Senate Committee on its investigation.” Senate refused the request.

On Sept. 28, 2005, the President issued EO 464, effective immediately, which, among others, mandated
that “all heads of departments of the Executive Branch of the government shall secure the consent of the
President prior to appearing before either House of Congress.” Pursuant to this Order, Executive Sec.
Ermita communicated to the Senate that the executive and AFP officials would not be able to attend the
meeting since the President has not yet given her consent. Despite the lack of consent, Col. Balutan and
Brig. Gen. Gudani, among all the AFP officials invited, attended the investigation. Both faced court
marshal for such attendance.

ISSUE(S)
Whether or not E.O. 464 contravenes the power of inquiry vested in Congress

RULING
To determine the constitutionality of E.O. 464, the Supreme Court discussed the two different functions
of the Legislature: The power to conduct inquiries in aid of legislation and the power to conduct inquiry
during question hour.

Question Hour:

The power to conduct inquiry during question hours is recognized in Article 6, Section 22 of the 1987
Constitution, which reads:

“The heads of departments may, upon their own initiative, with the consent of the President, or upon the
request of either House, as the rules of each House shall provide, appear before and be heard by such
House on any matter pertaining to their departments. Written questions shall be submitted to the
President of the Senate or the Speaker of the House of Representatives at least three days before their
scheduled appearance. Interpellations shall not be limited to written questions, but may cover matters
related thereto. When the security of the State or the public interest so requires and the President so
states in writing, the appearance shall be conducted in executive session.”
The objective of conducting a question hour is to obtain information in pursuit of Congress’ oversight
function. When Congress merely seeks to be informed on how department heads are implementing the
statutes which it had issued, the department heads’ appearance is merely requested.

The Supreme Court construed Section 1 of E.O. 464 as those in relation to the appearance of department
heads during question hour as it explicitly referred to Section 22, Article 6 of the 1987 Constitution.

In aid of Legislation:

The Legislature’s power to conduct inquiry in aid of legislation is expressly recognized in Article 6,
section21 of the 1987 Constitution, which reads:

“The Senate or the House of Representatives or any of its respective committees may conduct inquiries in
aid of legislation in accordance with its duly published rules of procedure. The rights of persons appearing
in, or affected by, such inquiries shall be respected.”

The power of inquiry in aid of legislation is inherent in the power to legislate. A legislative body cannot
legislate wisely or effectively in the absence of information respecting the conditions which the legislation
is intended to affect or change. And where the legislative body does not itself possess the requisite
information, recourse must be had to others who do possess it.

But even where the inquiry is in aid of legislation, there are still recognized exemptions to the power of
inquiry, which exemptions fall under the rubric of “executive privilege”. This is the power of the
government to withhold information from the public, the courts, and the Congress. This is recognized
only to certain types of information of a sensitive character. When Congress exercise its power of inquiry,
the only way for department heads to exempt themselves therefrom is by a valid claim of privilege. They
are not exempt by the mere fact that they are department heads. Only one official may be exempted
from this power -- the President.

Section 2 & 3 of E.O. 464 requires that all the public officials enumerated in Section 2(b) should secure
the consent of the President prior to appearing before either house of Congress. The enumeration is
broad. In view thereof, whenever an official invokes E.O.464 to justify the failure to be present, such
invocation must be construed as a declaration to Congress that the President, or a head of office
authorized by the President, has determined that the requested information is privileged.

The letter sent by the Executive Secretary to Senator Drilon does not explicitly invoke executive privilege
or that the matter on which these officials are being requested to be resource persons falls under the
recognized grounds of the privilege to justify their absence. Nor does it expressly state that in view of the
lack of consent from the President under E.O. 464, they cannot attend the hearing. The letter assumes
that the invited official possesses information that is covered by the executive privilege. Certainly,
Congress has the right to know why the executive considers the requested information privileged. It does
not suffice to merely declare that the President, or an authorized head of office, has determined that it is
so.

The claim of privilege under Section 3 of E.O. 464 in relation to Section 2(b) is thus invalid per se. It is
not asserted. It is merely implied. Instead of providing precise and certain reasons for the claim, it merely
invokes E.O. 464, coupled with an announcement that the President has not given her consent.

65 Chartered Bank v. Senate

STANDARD CHARTERED BANK, et al., Petitioners, vs. SENATE COMMITTEE ON BANKS,
FINANCIAL INSTITUTINOS, AND CURRENCIES, as represented by its Chairperson HON.
EDGARDO J. ANGARA
G.R. No. 167173. December 27, 2007

Ponente: J. Nachura
Topic: Legislative Inquiry – Pending Cases
Synopsis:
The Supreme Court ruled that the mere filing of a criminal or an administrative complaint before a court
or a quasi-judicial body should not automatically bar the conduct of legislative investigation. Otherwise, it
would be extremely easy to subvert any intended inquiry by Congress through the convenient ploy of
instituting a criminal or an administrative complaint. Surely, the exercise of sovereign legislative
authority, of which the power of legislative inquiry is an essential component, cannot be made
subordinate to a criminal or an administrative investigation.

Digest:
FACTS
On February 1, 2005, Senator Juan Ponce Enrile, Vice Chairperson of respondent, delivered a privilege
speech entitled “Arrogance of Wealth” before the Senate based on a letter from Atty. Mark R. Bocobo
denouncing SCB-Philippines for selling unregistered foreign securities in violation of the Securities
Regulation Code (R.A. No. 8799) and urging the Senate to immediately conduct an inquiry, in aid of
legislation, to prevent the occurrence of a similar fraudulent activity in the future. Prior to the privilege
speech, Senator Enrile had introduced P.S. Resolution No. 166 to direct the Committee on Banks,
Currencies, and Financial Institutions, to conduct an inquiry, in aid of legislation, into the reported sale of
unregistered and high-risk securities by Standard Chartered Bank which resulted in billions of losses to
the investing public.”

Respondent invited petitioners, among others, to attend the hearing, requesting them to submit their
written position paper. Petitioners, through counsel, submitted to respondent a letter dated February 24,
2005 presenting their position, particularly stressing that there were cases pending in court allegedly
involving the same issues subject of the legislative inquiry, thereby posing a challenge to the jurisdiction
of respondent to continue with the inquiry.

ISSUE(S)
Whether or not the cases pending in regular court involving the same issues of the legislative inquiry bar
the Congress to conduct hearing in aid of legislation

RULING
NO. The Supreme Court ruled that the mere filing of a criminal or an administrative complaint before a
court or a quasi-judicial body should not automatically bar the conduct of legislative investigation.
Otherwise, it would be extremely easy to subvert any intended inquiry by Congress through the
convenient ploy of instituting a criminal or an administrative complaint. Surely, the exercise of sovereign
legislative authority, of which the power of legislative inquiry is an essential component, cannot be made
subordinate to a criminal or an administrative investigation. As succinctly stated in the landmark case
Arnault v. Nazareno, 87 Phil. 29 (1950) — The power of inquiry — with process to enforce it — is an
essential and appropriate auxiliary to the legislative function. A legislative body cannot legislate wisely or
effectively in the absence of information respecting the conditions which the legislation is intended to
affect or change; and where the legislative body does not itself possess the requisite information —
which is not infrequently true — recourse must be had to others who possess it.

66 Araullo v. Aquino (with MR on Feb. 3, 2015)

MARIA CAROLINA P. ARAULLO, CHAIRPERSON, BAGONG ALYANSANG MAKABAYAN; JUDY M.
TAGUIWALO, PROFESSOR, UNIVERSITY OF THE PHILIPPINES DILIMAN, CO-CHAIRPERSON,
PAGBABAGO; HENRI KAHN, CONCERNED CITIZENS MOVEMENT; REP. LUZ ILAGAN,
GABRIELA WOMEN'S PARTY REPRESENTATIVE; REP. CARLOS ISAGANI ZARATE, BAY AN
MUNA PARTY-LIST REPRESENTATIVE; RENATO M. REYES, JR., SECRETARY GENERAL OF
BAYAN; MANUEL K. DAYRIT, CHAIRMAN, ANG KAPATIRAN PARTY; VENCER MARI E.
CRISOSTOMO, CHAIRPERSON, ANAKBAYAN; VICTOR VILLANUEVA, CONVENOR, YOUTH ACT
NOW, Petitioners, vs. BENIGNO SIMEON C. AQUINO III, PRESIDENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF
THE PHILIPPINES; PAQUITO N. OCHOA, JR., EXECUTIVE SECRETARY; AND FLORENCIO B.
ABAD, SECRETARY OF THE DEPARTMENT OF BUDGET AND MANAGEMENT, Respondents.
G.R. No. 209287. July 1, 2014.

Ponente: J. Bersamin
Topic: Legislative Department – Appropriations
Synopsis:
DAP was merely a program by the Executive and is not a fund nor is it an appropriation in Section 29(1),
Art. VI of the Constitution. In DAP no additional funds were withdrawn from the Treasury otherwise, an
appropriation made by law would have been required. Funds, which were already appropriated for by the
GAA, were merely being realigned via the DAP. However, the Court in this case ruled that the transfers
made through the DAP were unconstitutional. It is true that the President (and even the heads of the
other branches of the government) are allowed by the Constitution to make realignment of funds,
however, such transfer or realignment should only be made “within their respective offices”.

Digest:
FACTS
When President Benigno Aquino III took office, his administration noticed the sluggish growth of the
economy. The World Bank advised that the economy needed a stimulus plan. Budget Secretary Florencio
Abad then came up with a program called the Disbursement Acceleration Program (DAP).

The DAP was seen as a remedy to speed up the funding of government projects. DAP enables the
Executive to realign funds from slow moving projects to priority projects instead of waiting for next year’s
appropriation. So what happens under the DAP was that if a certain government project is being
undertaken slowly by a certain executive agency, the funds allotted therefor will be withdrawn by the
Executive. Once withdrawn, these funds are declared as “savings” by the Executive and said funds will
then be reallotted to other priority projects. The DAP program did work to stimulate the economy as
economic growth was in fact reported and portion of such growth was attributed to the DAP (as noted by
the Supreme Court).

Meanwhile, in September 2013, Senator Jinggoy Estrada made an exposé claiming that he, and other
Senators, received Php50M from the President as an incentive for voting in favor of the impeachment of
then Chief Justice Renato Corona. Secretary Abad claimed that the money was taken from the DAP but
was disbursed upon the request of the Senators.

This apparently opened a can of worms as it turns out that the DAP does not only realign funds within
the Executive. It turns out that some non-Executive projects were also funded. This prompted Maria
Carolina Araullo, Chairperson of the Bagong Alyansang Makabayan, and several other concerned citizens
to file various petitions with the Supreme Court questioning the validity of the DAP. Among their
contentions was that DAP is unconstitutional because it violates the constitutional rule which provides
that “no money shall be paid out of the Treasury except in pursuance of an appropriation made by law.”

ISSUE(S)
Is the DAP in violation of Section 29(1), Art. VI of the Constitution?
RULING
No. It is a program for prioritizing government spending. As such, it did not violate the Constitutional
provision cited The DAP did not violate Section 29(1), Art. VI of the Constitution. DAP was merely a
program by the Executive and is not a fund nor is it an appropriation in Section 29(1), Art. VI of the
Constitution. In DAP no additional funds were withdrawn from the Treasury otherwise, an appropriation
made by law would have been required. Funds, which were already appropriated for by the GAA, were
merely being realigned via the DAP. However, the Court in this case ruled that the transfers made
through the DAP were unconstitutional. It is true that the President (and even the heads of the other
branches of the government) are allowed by the Constitution to make realignment of funds, however,
such transfer or realignment should only be made “within their respective offices”. Thus, no cross-border
transfers/augmentations may be allowed. But under the DAP, this was violated because funds
appropriated by the GAA for the Executive were being transferred to the Legislative and other non-
Executive agencies.

67 Giron v. COMELEC (En banc decision)

HENRY R. GIRON, petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, respondent, ALMARIO E.

FRANCISCO, FEDERICO S. JONG JR., and RICARDO L. BAES JR., petitioners-in-intervention.
G.R. No. 188179. January 22, 2013.

Ponente: C.J. Sereno

Topic: Legislative Department – One-Subject-One-Title Rule
Synopsis:
Constitutional provisions relating to the subject matter and titles of statutes should not be so narrowly
construed as to cripple or impede the power of legislation. The requirement that the subject of an act
shall be expressed in its title should receive a reasonable and not a technical construction. It is sufficient
if the title be comprehensive enough reasonably to include the general object which a statute seeks to
effect, without expressing each and every end and means necessary or convenient for the accomplishing
of that object. Mere details need not be set forth. The title need not be an abstract or index of the Act.

The assailed Section 12 (Substitution of Candidates) and Section 14 (Repealing Clause) are indeed
germane to the subject expressed in the title of R.A. 9006: An Act to Enhance the Holding of Free,
Orderly, Honest, Peaceful and Credible Elections through Fair Election Practices.

Digest:
FACTS
Henry R. Giron (Giron) asserts that the insertion of Sections 12 and 14 in the Fair Election Act violates
Section 26(1), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution, which specifically requires: “Every bill passed by the
Congress shall embrace only one subject which shall be expressed in the title thereof.” Petitioner avers
that these provisions are unrelated to the main subject of the Fair Election Act: the lifting of the political
ad ban. Section 12 refers to the treatment of the votes cast for substituted candidates after the official
ballots have been printed, while Section 14 pertains to the repeal of Section 67 (Candidates holding
elective office) of Batas Pambansa Blg. 881, otherwise known as the Omnibus Election Code. Section 67
of this law concerns the ipso facto resignation of elective officials immediately after they file their
respective certificates of candidacy for an office other than that which they are currently holding in a
permanent capacity.

ISSUE(S)
Whether the inclusion of Sec. 12 and 14 in the Fair Election Act violates the “one subject-one title rule”
RULING
No. To determine whether there has been compliance with the constitutional requirement that the
subject of an act shall be expressed in its title, the Court laid down the rule that—

Constitutional provisions relating to the subject matter and titles of statutes should not be so narrowly
construed as to cripple or impede the power of legislation. The requirement that the subject of an act
shall be expressed in its title should receive a reasonable and not a technical construction. It is sufficient
if the title be comprehensive enough reasonably to include the general object which a statute seeks to
effect, without expressing each and every end and means necessary or convenient for the accomplishing
of that object. Mere details need not be set forth. The title need not be an abstract or index of the Act.

The assailed Section 12 (Substitution of Candidates) and Section 14 (Repealing Clause) are indeed
germane to the subject expressed in the title of R.A. 9006: An Act to Enhance the Holding of Free,
Orderly, Honest, Peaceful and Credible Elections through Fair Election Practices. The title was worded
broadly enough to include the measures embodied in the assailed sections. Consequently, we dismiss the
Petition and the petitions-in-intervention for failure to establish a clear breach of the Constitution.

68 Soliven v. Makasiar

Maximo Soliven, Antonio V. Roces, Frederick Agcaoili and Godofredo Manzanas (‘ers) vs
Ramon Makasiar, Undersecretary Silvestre Bello III, Luis Victor, Corazon Aquino (‘dents)
G.R. No. 82585, Nov 14, 1988.

Ponente: PER CURIAM

Topic: Executive Department – Presidential Immunity
Synopsis:
The rationale for the grant to the President of the privilege of immunity from suit is to assure the exercise
of Presidential duties and functions free from any hindrance or distraction, considering that being the
Chief Executive of the government is a job that demands undivided attention. But this privilege of
immunity from suit, pertains to the President by virtue of the office, and may thus be invoked only by he
holder of the office. Moreover, there is nothing in our laws that would prevent the President from waiving
the privilege. Thus, if so minded, the President may shed the protection afforded by the privilege as a
defense to prevent the case from proceeding.

Digest:
FACTS
This is a consolidated case (the full text-not stating the complete elaboration of facts of the case).
On March 30, 1988, the Secretary of Justice denied petitioners' motion for reconsideration and upheld the
resolution of the Undersecretary of Justice sustaining the City Fiscal's finding of a prima facie case against
petitioners. A second motion for reconsideration filed by petitioner Beltran was denied by the Secretary of
Justice on April 7, 1988. On appeal, the President, through the Executive Secretary, affirmed the
resolution of the Secretary of Justice on May 2, 1988. The motion for reconsideration was denied by the
Executive Secretary on May 16, 1988. With these developments, petitioner's contention that they have
been denied the administrative remedies available under the law has lost factual support.

Petitioners now seek the help of SC to reverse the adverse decision against them.

ISSUE(S)
(1) Whether or not petitioners were denied due process when informations for libel were filed against
them although the finding of the existence of aprima facie case was still under review by the Secretary of
Justice and, subsequently, by the President
(2) Whether or not the constitutional rights of Beltran were violated when respondent RTC judge issued a
warrant for his arrest without personally examining the complainant and the witnesses, if any, to
determine probable cause

RULING
1. No, due process is not denied. It may also be added that with respect to petitioner Beltran, the
allegation of denial of due process of law in the preliminary investigation is negated by the fact that
instead of submitting his counter-affidavits, he filed a "Motion to Declare Proceedings Closed," in effect
waiving his right to refute the complaint by filling counter-affidavits. Due process of law does not require
that the respondent in a criminal case actually file his counter-affidavits before the preliminary
investigation is deemed completed. All that is required is that the respondent be given the opportunity to
submit counter-affidavits if he is so minded.
2. No, RTC judge did not act with grave abuse of discretion. "What the Constitution underscores is the
exclusive and personal responsibility of the issuing judge to satisfy himself of the existence of probable
cause. In satisfying himself of the existence of probable cause for the issuance of a warrant of arrest, the
judge is not required to personally examine the complainant and his witnesses. Following established
doctrine and procedure, he shall:
(1) personally evaluate the report and the supporting documents submitted by the fiscal regarding the
existence of probable cause and, on the basis thereof, issue a warrant of arrest; or
(2) if on the basis thereof he finds no probable cause, he may disregard the fiscal's report and require
the submission of supporting affidavits of witnesses to aid him in arriving at a conclusion as to the
existence of probable cause. Sound policy dictates this procedure, otherwise judges would be unduly
laden with the preliminary examination and investigation of criminal complaints instead of concentrating
on hearing and deciding cases filed before their courts. On June 30,1978, the Supreme Court
unanimously adopted Circular No. 12, setting down guidelines for the issuance of warrants of arrest. The
procedure therein provided is reiterated and clarified in this resolution."

69 Estrada v. Disierto

JOSEPH EJERCITO ESTRADA, Petitioner, vs. ANIANO DESIERTO, in his capacity as

Oombudsman, RAMON GONZALES, et al., Respondents
G.R. No. 146710-15. March 2, 2001.

Ponente: J. Puno
Topic: Executive Department – Presidential Immunity
Synopsis:
To be sure, the debates in the Constitutional Commission make it clear that when impeachment
proceedings have become moot due to the resignation of the President, the proper criminal and civil
cases may already be filed against him. Indeed, incumbent Presidents are immune from suit or from
being brought to court during the period of their incumbency and tenure but not beyond. Considering the
peculiar circumstance that the impeachment process against the petitioner has been aborted and
thereafter he lost the presidency, petitioner Estrada cannot demand as a condition sine qua non to his
criminal prosecution before the Ombudsman that he be convicted in the impeachment proceedings.

Digest:
FACTS
In the wake of the stepping down from office of President Joseph Ejercito Estrada, and the assumption of
office by then Vice-President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo, several criminal cases were filed against the
former. In his defense, Estrada posits the contention that such cases should be dismissed, as he has not
actually been convicted in the impeachment proceedings against him, raising the presidential privilege of
immunity from suit.
ISSUE(S)
Is Estrada immune from suit?

RULING
No. The contention that the President cannot be prosecuted absent a conviction in the impeachment
court is unavailing. The impeachment trial of petitioner Estrada was aborted by the walkout of the
prosecutors and by the events that led to his loss of the presidency. Indeed, on February 7, 2001, the
Senate passed Senate Resolution No. 83 Recognizing that the Impeachment Court is Functus Officio.
Since the Impeachment Court is now functus officio, it is untenable for petitioner to demand that he
should first be impeached and then convicted before he can be prosecuted. The plea if granted, would
put a perpetual bar against his prosecution. Such a submission has nothing to commend itself for it will
place him in a better situation than a non-sitting President who has not been subjected to impeachment
proceedings and yet can be the object of a criminal prosecution. To be sure, the debates in the
Constitutional Commission make it clear that when impeachment proceedings have become moot due to
the resignation of the President, the proper criminal and civil cases may already be filed against him.
Indeed, incumbent Presidents are immune from suit or from being brought to court during the period of
their incumbency and tenure but not beyond. Considering the peculiar circumstance that the
impeachment process against the petitioner has been aborted and thereafter he lost the presidency,
petitioner Estrada cannot demand as a condition sine qua non to his criminal prosecution before the
Ombudsman that he be convicted in the impeachment proceedings.

70 Lozada v. PGMA

RODOLFO NOEL LOZADA, JR., VIOLETA LOZADA and ARTURO LOZADA, petitioners, vs.
PRESIDENT GLORIA MACAPAGAL-ARROYO, EDUARDO ERMITA, AVELINO RAZON, ANGEL
ATUTUBO and SPO4 ROGER VALEROSO,** respondents
G.R. No. 184379-80. April 24, 2012.

Ponente: J. Sereno
Topic: Executive Department – Presidential Immunity
Synopsis:
It is settled in jurisprudence that the President enjoys immunity from suit during his or her tenure of
office or actual incumbency. Conversely, this presidential privilege of immunity cannot be invoked by a
non-sitting president even for acts committed during his or her tenure. In the case at bar, the events that
gave rise to the present action, as well as the filing of the original petition and the issuance of the CA
decision, occurred during the incumbency of former President Arroyo. In that respect, it was proper for
the court a quo to have dropped her as respondent on account of her presidential immunity from suit. It
must be underscored however, that since her tenure of office has already ended, the former president
can no longer invoke the privilege as a defense to evade judicial determination of her responsibility for
the alleged violation or threatened violation of the right to life, liberty, and security of Lozada.

Digest:
FACTS
The instant Petition stems from the alleged corruption scandal precipitated by a transaction between the
Philippine government, represented by the National Broadband Network (NBN), and ZTE Corporation, a
Chinese manufacturer of telecommunications equipment. Former NEDA Secretary Neri sought the
services of Lozada as an unofficial consultant in the ZTE-NBN deal. The latter avers that during the
course of his engagement, he discovered several anomalies in the said transaction involving certain public
officials. These events impelled the Senate of the Philippines Blue Ribbon Committee to conduct an
investigation thereon, for which it issued a subpoena directing Lozada to appear and testify on 30
January 2008.

Lozada did not appear at the Blue Ribbon Committee. DENR Sec. Atienza announced that Lozada was in
an official trip to London. Because of this, Senate issued an order (1) citing Lozada in contempt; (2)
ordering his arrest and detention; (3) directing the sergeant-at-arms to implement such order and make
a return.

Lozada asked Sec. Atienza if he can go back to the Philippines. Upon approval, he informed his family
that he would be arriving in Manila, Feb 5 at 4 pm.

In his petition, Lozada claims that upon disembarking, several men held his arms and took his bag. He
allegedly insisted on joining his family but realized that it would be wiser to go with the men when he
heard them say in their handheld radio ‘[H]wag kayong dumaan diyan sir nandyan ang mga taga
senado.’

Lozada asked to go to the comfort room and while there, called his brother, Arturo and informed him of
his situation. He observed that there were several cars tailing their car. Sec. Atienza called him and
assured him that he was with government people and that Sec. Atienza would confer with ES and Ma’m.
Lozada surmised them to be ES Ermita and the President. He was also told to pacify his wife, Violeta,
who was making public statements asking for her husband’s return. Along the way, the men asked
Lozada to draft an antedated letter requesting police protection. Lozada asked to be brought to his home
in Pasig, but was refused due to security risks. They stopped at Outback restaurant to meet with Atty.
Antonio Bautista and Col. Mascarinas, Lozada claimed that he was made to fill in the blanks of an
affidavit. He was then brought to LSGH per his request. He observed that policemen, purportedly
restraining his liberty and threatening the security of his, his family and the LS brothers, guarded the
perimeter of LSGH.

On Feb 6, Col. Mascarinas supposedly brought Lozada to the office of Atty. Bautista to finalize and sign
an affidavit. On the same day his wife petitioned for Habeas Corpus and his brother petitioned for a Writ
of Amparo with the Supreme Court, and prayed for the issuance of (a) the writ of amparo; (b) a
Temporary Protection Order (TPO); and (c) Inspection and Production Orders as regards documents
related to the authority ordering custody over Lozada, as well as any other document that would show
responsibility for his alleged abduction.

Lozada alleged that he was made to sign a letter requesting police protection. On 7 February 2008,
Lozada decided to hold a press conference and contact the Senate Sergeant-at-Arms, who served the
warrant of arrest on him. He claimed that after his press conference and testimony in the Senate, he and
his family were since then harassed, stalked and threatened.

Respondents: Lozada had knowledge and control of what happened from the time of his arrival, he
voluntarily entrusted himself to their company and was never deprived of his liberty and that since Feb 8,
Lozada has been in the custody of the Senate.

CA’s decisions:
1. Habeas Corpus case moot.
2. Denied issuance of Subpoena Ad Testificandum and Presentation of Hostile Witnesses and Adverse
Parties – irrelevant to Amparo Case, to require them to testify would be a fishing expedition.
3. Dropped Pres. Arroyo as a respondent because she enjoys immunity from suit as president.
4. Dismissed Writ of Amparo. – Petitioners unable to prove through substantial evidence that respondents
violated Lozada’s right to life, liberty and security.

ISSUE(S)
Whether circumstances are adequately alleged and proven by petitioner Lozada to entitle him to the
protection of the writ of amparo

RULING
NO. The writ of amparo is an independent and summary remedy that provides rapid judicial relief to
protect the people’s right to life, liberty and security. Having been originally intended as a response to the
alarming cases of extrajudicial killings and enforced disappearances in the country, it serves both
preventive and curative roles to address the said human rights violations. It is preventive in that it breaks
the expectation of impunity in the commission of these offenses, and it is curative in that it facilitates the
subsequent punishment of perpetrators by inevitably leading to subsequent investigation and action.
As it stands, the writ of amparo is confined only to cases of extrajudicial killings and enforced
disappearances, or to threats thereof. Considering that this remedy is aimed at addressing these serious
violations of or threats to the right to life, liberty and security, it cannot be issued on amorphous and
uncertain grounds, or in cases where the alleged threat has ceased and is no longer imminent or
continuing. Instead, it must be granted judiciously so as not to dilute the extraordinary and remedial
character of the writ, thus: The privilege of the writ of amparo is envisioned basically to protect and
guarantee the rights to life, liberty, and security of persons, free from fears and threats that vitiate the
quality of this life. It is an extraordinary writ conceptualized and adopted in light of and in response to
the prevalence of extra-legal killings and enforced disappearances. Accordingly, the remedy ought to be
resorted to and granted judiciously, lest the ideal sought by the Amparo Rule be diluted and undermined
by the indiscriminate filing of amparo petitions for purposes less than the desire to secure amparo reliefs
and protection and/or on the basis of unsubstantiated allegations.

Writ of Amparo Denied

In cases where the violation of the right to life, liberty or security has already ceased, it is necessary for
the petitioner in an amparo action to prove the existence of a continuing threat.
In the present case, the totality of the evidence adduced by petitioners failed to meet the threshold of
substantial evidence. Sifting through all the evidence and allegations presented, the crux of the case boils
down to assessing the veracity and credibility of the parties’ diverging claims as to what actually
transpired on 5-6 February 2008. In this regard, this Court is in agreement with the factual findings of
the CA to the extent that Lozada was not illegally deprived of his liberty from the point when he
disembarked from the aircraft up to the time he was led to the departure area of the airport, as he
voluntarily submitted himself to the custody of respondents.
• He was able to go to the men’s bathroom and call his brother
• He was avoiding the people from the Office of the Senate Sergeant-at-Arms, detour appears to
explain why they did not get out at the arrival area, where [Lozada] could have passed through
immigration so that his passport could be properly stamped
• No evidence on record that Lozada struggled or made an outcry for help
• He testified that nobody held, shouted, or was hostile to him
• He knew and agreed with the plan that he would be fetched at the airport because at that time,
it was his decision not to testify before the Senate
• it must be emphasized that if Lozada had in fact been illegally restrained, so much so that his
right to liberty and security had been violated, the acts that manifested this restraint had already ceased
and has consequently rendered the grant of the privilege of the writ ofamparo moot.
• The supposed announcement of General Razon over the radio that [Lozada] was in the custody
of the PNP can neither be construed as a threat to [Lozada’s] life, liberty and security. Certainly, no
person in his right mind would make that kind of media announcement if his intent was indeed to
threaten somebody’s life, liberty and security
• Presence of armed men riding in motorcycle passing outside the LSGH premises where he and
his family are staying and by alleged threats of armed men around him at places where he went to.
Again, these alleged threats were not proven by any evidence at all, as having originated from any of the
respondents
• Installation of the surveillance camera at the De La Salle and at St. Scholastica as indirect threat
to his right to life, liberty and security. He claims that these are spy cameras. However, save for
[Lozada’s] self-serving claim, he simply failed to prove that they were installed or ordered installed by the
respondents for the purpose of threatening his right to life, liberty and security
• No evidence on record that the bomb threats were made by the respondents or done upon their
instigation.
• He did not ascertain from the Bureau of Immigration whether his name was actually in the official
watch list of the Bureau
• [Lozada] himself testified that he does not know whether the respondents or any of the
respondents ordered the filing of these ‘frivolous’ cases against him. In any event, said purported cases
are to be determined based on their own merits and are clearly beyond the realm of the instant amparo
petition filed against the respondents
• The failure to establish that the public official observed extraordinary diligence in the
performance of duty does not result in the automatic grant of the privilege of the amparo writ. It does
not relieve the petitioner from establishing his or her claim by substantial evidence (Yano v. Sanchez)

Sec. 22 of the Amparo Rule proscribes the filing of an amparo petition should a criminal action have, in
the meanwhile, been commenced.
Sec. 23, on the other hand, provides that when the criminal suit is filed subsequent to a petition for
amparo, the petition shall be consolidated with the criminal action where the Amparo Rule shall
nonetheless govern the disposition of the relief under the Rule.

71 Romualdez v. Sandiganbayan

ALFREDO T. ROMUALDEZ, petitioner, vs. The Honorable SANDIGANBAYAN (Fifth Division)

and the PEOPLE of the PHILIPPINES, respondents.
G.R. No. 152259. July 29, 2004

Ponente: J. Panganiban
Topic: Executive Department – Presidential Immunity
Synopsis:
Executive immunity applied only during the incumbency of a President. It could not be used to shield a
non-sitting President from prosecution for alleged criminal acts done while sitting in office. The reasoning
of petitioner must therefore fail, since he derives his immunity from one who is no longer sitting as
President. Verily, the felonious acts of public officials and their close relatives are not acts of the State,
and the officer who acts illegally is not acting as such but stands on the same footing as any other
trespasser.

Digest:
FACTS
The PCGG, on July 12, 1989, in behalf of the People of the Philippines, filed an information before the
anti-graft court charging herein accused with violation of R.A. 3019. Allegedly, herein petitioner-accused,
brother-in-law of former president Ferdinand E. Marcos, intervened directly in a contract between the
National Shipyard and Steel Corporation (NASSCO), a government-owned and controlled corporation and
the Bataan Shipyard and Engineering Company (BASECO), a private corporation, the majority stocks of
which is owned by former President Ferdinand E. Marcos, whereby the NASSCO sold, transferred and
conveyed to the BASECO its ownership and all its titles and interests over all equipment and facilities
including structures, buildings, shops, quarters, houses, plants and expendable and semi-expendable
assets, located at the Engineer Island known as the Engineer Island Shops including some of its
equipment and machineries from Jose Panganiban, Camarines Norte needed by BASECO in its
shipbuilding and ship repair program for the amount of P5,000,000.00. Romualdez however argued that
he enjoys derivative immunity, because he allegedly served as a high-ranking naval officer -- specifically,
as naval aide-de-camp -- of former President Marcos.

ISSUE(S)
Does the presidential immunity privilege extend to Romualdez?

RULING
No. Primarily, as the Sandiganbayan pointed out, the defense of immunity from suit is not applicable to
petitioner because the immunity amendment became effective only in 1981 while the alleged crime
happened in 1975. Furthermore, executive immunity applied only during the incumbency of a President.
It could not be used to shield a non-sitting President from prosecution for alleged criminal acts done
while sitting in office. The reasoning of petitioner must therefore fail, since he derives his immunity from
one who is no longer sitting as President. Verily, the felonious acts of public officials and their close
relatives are not acts of the State, and the officer who acts illegally is not acting as such but stands on
the same footing as any other trespasser.

72 Neri v. Senate

ROMULO L. NERI, petitioner, vs. SENATE COMMITTEE ON ACCOUNTABILITY OF PUBLIC

OFFICERS AND INVESTIGATIONS, SENATE COMMITTEE ON TRADE AND COMMERCE, AND
SENATE COMMITTEE ON NATIONAL DEFENSE AND SECURITY, respondents.
G.R. No. 180643. September 4, 2008.*

Ponente: J. Leonardo-De Castro

Topic: Executive Department – Presidential Communications Privilege
Synopsis:
The Court, in the earlier case of Almonte v. Vasquez, affirmed that the presidential communications
privilege is fundamental to the operation of government and inextricably rooted in the separation of
powers under the Constitution. Even Senate v. Ermita, the case relied upon by respondent Committees,
reiterated this concept. There, the Court enumerated the cases in which the claim of executive privilege
was recognized, among them Almonte v. Chavez, Chavez v. Presidential Commission on Good
Government (PCGG), and Chavez v. PEA. The Court articulated in these cases that “there are certain
types of information which the government may withhold from the public,” that there is a “governmental
privilege against public disclosure with respect to state secrets regarding military, diplomatic and other
national security matters”; and that “the right to information does not extend to matters recognized as
‘privileged information’ under the separation of powers.

Digest:
FACTS
Petitioner appeared before respondent Committees and testified for about 11 hours on matters
concerning NBN Project, a project awarded by DOTC to Zhong Xing Telecommunications Equipment
(“ZTE”). Petitioner disclosed that then COMELEC Chairman Benjamin Abalos offered him P200 Million in
exchange for his approval of the NBN Project. He further narrated that he informed President Arroyo of
the bribery attempt and that she instructed him not to accept the bribe. However, when probed further
on President Arroyo and petitioner’s discussions relating to the NBN Project, petitioner refused to answer,
invoking “executive privilege.” To be specific, petitioner refused to answer questions on: (a) whether or
not President Arroyo followed up the NBN Project, (b) whether or not she directed him to prioritize it, and
(c) whether or not she directed him to approve it.

Respondent Committees persisted in knowing petitioner’s answers to these three questions by requiring
him to appear and testify once more. Executive Secretary Eduardo R. Ermita wrote to respondent
Committees and requested them to dispense with petitioner’s testimony on the ground of executive
privilege.

The context in which executive privilege is being invoked is that the information sought to be disclosed
might impair our diplomatic as well as economic relations with the People’s Republic of China. Given the
confidential nature in which these information were conveyed to the President, he cannot provide the
Committee any further details of these conversations, without disclosing the very thing the privilege is
designed to protect. In light of the above considerations, they are constrained to invoke the settled
doctrine of executive privilege as refined in Senate v. Ermita, and has advised Secretary Neri accordingly.

ISSUE(S)
W/ON Petitioner can invoke executive privilege on matters pertaining to diplomatic relations

RULING
There Is a Recognized Presumptive Presidential Communications Privilege

Respondent Committees ardently argue that the Court’s declaration that presidential communications are
presumptively privileged reverses the “presumption” laid down in Senate v. Ermita11 that “inclines
heavily against executive secrecy and in favor of disclosure.” Respondent Committees then claim that the
Court erred in relying on the doctrine in Nixon.

Respondent Committees argue as if this were the first time the presumption in favor of the presidential
communications privilege is mentioned and adopted in our legal system. That is far from the truth. The
Court, in the earlier case of Almonte v. Vasquez, affirmed that the presidential communications privilege
is fundamental to the operation of government and inextricably rooted in the separation of powers under
the Constitution. Even Senate v. Ermita, the case relied upon by respondent Committees, reiterated this
concept. There, the Court enumerated the cases in which the claim of executive privilege was recognized,
among them Almonte v. Chavez, Chavez v. Presidential Commission on Good Government (PCGG), and
Chavez v. PEA. The Court articulated in these cases that “there are certain types of information which the
government may withhold from the public,” that there is a “governmental privilege against public
disclosure with respect to state secrets regarding military, diplomatic and other national security
matters”; and that “the right to information does not extend to matters recognized as ‘privileged
information’ under the separation of powers, by which the Court meant Presidential conversations,
correspondences, and discussions in closed-door Cabinet meetings.” ###

73 Biraogo v. Truth Commission

LOUIS “BAROK” C. BIRAOGO, petitioner, vs. THE PHILIPPINE TRUTH COMMISSION OF 2010,
respondent.
G.R. No. 192935-193036. December 7, 2010.

Ponente: J. Mendoza
Topic: Powers of the President – Creation of Ad Hoc Committees
Synopsis:
Reorganization refers to situations where a body or an office is already existent but a modification or
alteration thereof has to be effected. The creation of an office is nowhere mentioned, much less
envisioned in said provision. To say that the PTC is borne out of a restructuring of the Office of the
President under Section 31 is a misplaced supposition, even in the plainest meaning attributable to the
term “restructure”—an “alteration of an existing structure.”
The powers of the President are not limited to those specific powers under the Constitution. One of the
recognized powers of the President granted pursuant to this constitutionally-mandated duty is the power
to create ad hoc committees. This flows from the obvious need to ascertain facts and determine if laws
have been faithfully executed. It should be stressed that the purpose of allowing ad hoc investigating
bodies to exist is to allow an inquiry into matters which the President is entitled to know so that he can
be properly advised and guided in the performance of his duties relative to the execution and
enforcement of the laws of the land. There is no usurpation on the part of the Executive of the power to
appropriate funds where there is only allotment or allocations of existing funds already appropriated.

Digest:
FACTS
The Philippine Truth Commission is a mere ad hoc body formed under the Office of the President with the
primary task to investigate reports of graft and corruption committed by third-level public officers and
employees, their co-principals, accomplices and accessories during the previous administration, and
thereafter to submit its finding and recommendations to the President, Congress and the Ombudsman.
Though it has been described as an “independent collegial body,” it is essentially an entity within the
Office of the President Proper and subject to his control. Doubtless, it constitutes a public office, as an ad
hoc body is one.

Barely a month after its creation, the petitioners asked the court to declare it unconstitutional and enjoin
the PTC to performing its functions. One of the arguments presented were, that the provision of Book III,
Chapter 10, Section 31 of the Administrative Code of 1987 cannot legitimize E.O. 1 because the
delegated authority of the President to structurally reorganize the Office of the President to achieve
economy simplicity and efficiency does not include the power to create an entirely new public office
which was hither to inexistent like the “truth commission.”

ISSUE(S)
1. Whether the PTC fall within the ambit of power to reorganize as expressed in Sec. 31 of the
Administrative Code.
2. Whether the President has the power to create ad hoc committees.

RULING
1. NO. Section 31 contemplates “reorganization” as limited by the following functional and structural
lines: (1) restructuring the internal organization of the Office of the President Proper by abolishing,
consolidating or merging units thereof or transferring functions from one unit to another; (2) transferring
any function under the Office of the President to any other Department/Agency or vice versa; or (3)
transferring any agency under the Office of the President to any other Department/Agency or vice versa.
Clearly, the provision refers to reduction of personnel, consolidation of offices, or abolition thereof by
reason of economy or redundancy of functions. These points refer to situations where a body or an office
is already existent but a modification or alteration thereof has to be effected. The creation of an office is
nowhere mentioned, much less envisioned in said provision. To say that the PTC is borne out of a
restructuring of the Office of the President under Section 31 is a misplaced supposition, even in the
plainest meaning attributable to the term “restructure”—an “alteration of an existing structure.” Evidently,
the PTC was not part of the structure of the Office of the President prior to the enactment of Executive
Order No. 1.

2. YES. The powers of the President are not limited to those specific powers under the Constitution. One
of the recognized powers of the President granted pursuant to this constitutionally-mandated duty is the
power to create ad hoc committees. This flows from the obvious need to ascertain facts and determine if
laws have been faithfully executed. It should be stressed that the purpose of allowing ad hoc
investigating bodies to exist is to allow an inquiry into matters which the President is entitled to know so
that he can be properly advised and guided in the performance of his duties relative to the execution and
enforcement of the laws of the land. There is no usurpation on the part of the Executive of the power to
appropriate funds where there is only allotment or allocations of existing funds already appropriated.

74 PhilConsA v. Enriquez

PHILIPPINE CONSTITUTION ASSOCIATION, EXEQUIEL B. GARCIA and A. GONZALES,

petitioners, vs. HON. SALVADOR ENRIQUEZ, as Secretary of Budget and Management; HON.
VICENTE T. TAN, as National Treasurer and COMMISSION ON AUDIT, respondents.
G.R. No. 113105. August 19, 1994.

Ponente: J. Quiason
Topic: Powers of the President – Duty of Faithful Execution
Synopsis:
There is less basis to complain when the President said that the expenditures shall be subject to
guidelines he will issue. Until the guidelines are issued, it cannot be determined whether they are proper
or inappropriate. The issuance of administrative guidelines on the use of public funds authorized by
Congress is simply an exercise by the President of his constitutional duty to see that the laws are
faithfully executed (1987 Constitution, Art. VII, Sec. 17). Under the Faithful Execution Clause, the
President has the power to take "necessary and proper steps" to carry into execution the law.

Digest:
FACTS
Petitioners assailed the validity of RA 7663 or General Appropriations Act of 1994. GAA contains a special
provision that allows any members of the Congress the Realignment of Allocation for Operational
Expenses, provided that the total of said allocation is not exceeded. Philconsa claims that only the Senate
President and the Speaker of the House of Representatives are the ones authorized under the
Constitution to realign savings, not the individual members of Congress themselves. President signed the
law, but Vetoes certain provisions of the law and imposed certain provisional conditions: that the AFP
Chief of Staff is authorized to use savings to augment the pension funds under the Retirement and
Separation Benefits of the AFP.

ISSUE(S)
Whether or not RA 7663 is violative of Article VI, Section 25 (5) of 1987 Constitution

RULING
Yes. Only the Senate President and the Speaker of the House are allowed to approve the realignment.
Furthermore, two conditions must be met: 1) the funds to be realigned are actually savings, and 2) the
transfer is for the purpose of augmenting the items of expenditures to which said transfer to be made.

As to the certain condition given to the AFP Chief of Staff, it is violative of Sections 25(5) and 29(1) of the
Article VI of the Constitution. The list of those who may be authorized to transfer funds is exclusive. the
AFP Chief of Staff may not be given authority.

75 Pimentel, Jr., et al. v. Ermita

AQUILINO Q. PIMENTEL, et al. vs. EXEC. SECRETARY EDUARDO R. ERMITA

G.R. No. 164978. October 13, 2005

Ponente: J. Carpio
Topic: Powers of the President – Appointment
Synopsis:
Section 17, Chapter 5, Title I, Book III of EO 292 states that “[t]he President may temporarily designate
an officer already in the government service or any other competent person to perform the functions of
an office in the executive branch.” Thus, the President may even appoint in an acting capacity a person
not yet in the government service, as long as the President deems that person competent.

Ad interim appointments must be distinguished from appointments in an acting capacity. Both of them
are effective upon acceptance. But ad interim appointments are extended only during a recess of
Congress, whereas acting appointments may be extended any time there is a vacancy. Moreover ad
interim appointments are submitted to the Commission on Appointments for confirmation or rejection;
acting appointments are not submitted to the Commission on Appointments.

Digest:
FACTS
The Congress commenced their regular session on July 26, 2004. The Commission on Appointment, was
constitutes on August 25, 2004. Meanwhile, President Arroyo issued appointments to the following as
acting secretaries of their respective departments:

Appointee Department Date of Appointment

Arthur C. Yap Agriculture 15 August 2004
Alberto G. Romulo Foreign Affairs 23 August 2004
Raul M. Gonzalez Justice 23 August 2004
Florencio B. Abad Education 23 August 2004
Avelino J. Cruz, Jr. National Defense 23 August 2004
Rene C. Villa Agrarian Reform 23 August 2004
Joseph H. Durano Tourism 23 August 2004
Michael T. Defensor Environment and 23 August 2004
Natural Resources

Congress adjourned. Respondents took their oath of office and assumed duties as acting secretaries.
President Arroyo issued ad interim appointments to respondents as secretaries of the departments to
which they were previously appointed in an acting capacity.

ISSUE(S)
1. Whether the acting appointments are valid.
2. Whether the ad interim appointments are valid.

RULING
1. YES. The law expressly allows the President to make such acting appointment. Section 17, Chapter 5,
Title I, Book III of EO 292 states that “[t]he President may temporarily designate an officer already in the
government service or any other competent person to perform the functions of an office in the executive
branch.” Thus, the President may even appoint in an acting capacity a person not yet in the government
service, as long as the President deems that person competent.

2. YES. Ad interim appointments must be distinguished from appointments in an acting capacity. Both of
them are effective upon acceptance. But ad interim appointments are extended only during a recess of
Congress, whereas acting appointments may be extended any time there is a vacancy. Moreover ad
interim appointments are submitted to the Commission on Appointments for confirmation or rejection;
acting appointments are not submitted to the Commission on Appointments. Acting appointments are a
way of temporarily filling important offices but, if abused, they can also be a way of circumventing the
need for confirmation by the Commission on Appointments. However, we find no abuse in the present
case. The absence of abuse is readily apparent from President Arroyo’s issuance of ad interim
appointments to respondents immediately upon the recess of Congress, way before the lapse of one
year.

76 Rufino, et al., v. Endriga, et al.

RUFINO, et al. vs. ENDRIGA, et al. / ENDRIGA, et al. vs. RUFINO, et al.
G.R. No. 139554/ 139565 July 21, 2006.

Ponente: J. Carpio
Topic: Powers of the President – Appointment
Synopsis:
The present case involves the interpretation of Section 16, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution with
respect to the appointment of this fourth group (lower-ranked officers whose appointments Congress
may by law vest in the heads of departments, agencies, commissions, or boards) of officers. The
President appoints the first group of officers with the consent of the Commission on Appointments. The
President appoints the second and third groups of officers without the consent of the Commission on
Appointments. The President appoints the third group of officers if the law is silent on who is the
appointing power, or if the law authorizing the head of a department, agency, commission, or board to
appoint is declared unconstitutional. Thus, if Section 6(b) and (c) of PD 15 is found unconstitutional, the
President shall appoint the trustees of the CCP Board because the trustees fall under the third group of
officers.

Section 6(b) and (c) of PD 15 makes the CCP trustees the independent appointing power of their fellow
trustees. The creation of an independent appointing power inherently conflicts with the President’s power
to appoint.

Digest:
FACTS
Then President Marcos issued E.O. 30 creating the Cultural Center of the Philippines as a trust governed
by a Board of Trustees of 7 members to preserve and promote Philippine culture. Soon after the
declaration of Martial Law, President Marcos issued P.D. 15, the CCP’s charter, which converted the CCP
under E.O 30 into a non-municipal public corporation free from the “pressure or influence of politics.”
P.D.15 increased the members of CCP’s Board from 7 to 9 trustees. Later Executive Order No. 1058,
increased it further to 11.

On December 22, 1998, then President Estrada appointed 7 new trustees to the CCP Board for a term of
4 years to replace the Endriga group as well as 2 other incumbent trustees. Except for Tantoco, the
Rufino group took their oaths of office and assumed the performance of their duties in early January
1999.

On January 6, 1999, the Endriga group filed a petition for quo warranto before this Court questioning
President Estrada’s appointment of 7 new members to the CCP Board. They alleged that under Sec. 6(b)
of PD 15, vacancies in the CCP Board “shall be filled by election by a vote of a majority of the trustees
helf at the next regular meeting x x x.” In case “only one trustee survive(s), the vacancies shall be filled
by the surviving trustee acting in consultation with the ranking officers of the [CCP].” The Endriga group
claimed that it is only when the CCP Board entirely vacant may the President of the Philippines fill such
vacancies, acting in consultation with the ranking officers of the CCP.

ISSUE(S)
1. Whether the President has the power to appoint the trustees in the CCP Board.
2. Whether Sec. 6 b and c of PD 15 is inherently in conflict with the President’s power to appoint.

RULING
1. YES. The power to appoint is the prerogative of the President, except in those instances when the
Constitution provides otherwise. Usurpation of this fundamentally Executive power by the Legislative and
Judicial branches violates the system of separation of powers that inheres in our democratic republican
government. Under Section 16, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution, the President appoints three groups
of officers. The first group refers to the heads of the Executive departments, ambassadors, other public
ministers and consuls, officers of the armed forces from the rank of colonel or naval captain, and other
officers whose appointments are vested in the President by the Constitution. The second group refers to
those whom the President may be authorized by law to appoint. The third group refers to all other
officers of the Government whose appointments are not otherwise provided by law. Under the same
Section 16, there is a fourth group of lower-ranked officers whose appointments Congress may by law
vest in the heads of departments, agencies, commissions, or boards. The present case involves the
interpretation of Section 16, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution with respect to the appointment of this
fourth group of officers. The President appoints the first group of officers with the consent of the
Commission on Appointments. The President appoints the second and third groups of officers without the
consent of the Commission on Appointments. The President appoints the third group of officers if the law
is silent on who is the appointing power, or if the law authorizing the head of a department, agency,
commission, or board to appoint is declared unconstitutional. Thus, if Section 6(b) and (c) of PD 15 is
found unconstitutional, the President shall appoint the trustees of the CCP Board because the trustees fall
under the third group of officers.

2. YES. Section 6(b) and (c) of PD 15 makes the CCP trustees the independent appointing power of their
fellow trustees. The creation of an independent appointing power inherently conflicts with the President’s
power to appoint. This inherent conflict has spawned recurring controversies in the appointment of CCP
trustees every time a new President assumes office. In the present case, the incumbent President
appointed the Endriga group as trustees, while the remaining CCP trustees elected the same Endriga
group to the same positions. This has been the modus vivendi in filling vacancies in the CCP Board,
allowing the President to appoint and the CCP Board to elect the trustees. In effect, there are two
appointing powers over the same set of officers in the Executive branch. Each appointing power insists
on exercising its own power, even if the two powers are irreconcilable.

77 Matibag v. Benipayo

MA. J. ANGELINA G. MATIBAG, vs. ALFREDO L. BENIPAYO, et al.

G.R. No. 149036. April 2, 2002

Ponente: J. Carpio
Topic: Powers of the President – Appointment
Synopsis:
An ad interim appointment is a permanent appointment because it takes effect immediately and can no
longer be withdrawn by the President once the appointee has qualified into office. The fact that it is
subject to confirmation by the Commission on Appointments does not alter its permanent character. The
Constitution itself makes an ad interim appointment permanent in character by making it effective until
disapproved by the Commission on Appointments or until the next adjournment of Congress.

The prohibition on reappointment in Section 1 (2), Article IX-C of the Constitution applies neither to
disapproved nor by-passed ad interim appointments. A disapproved ad interim appointment cannot be
revived by another ad interim appointment because the disapproval is final under Section 16, Article VII
of the Constitution, and not because a reappointment is prohibited under Section 1 (2), Article IX-C of the
Constitution. A by-passed ad interim appointment can be revived by a new ad interim appointment
because there is no final disapproval under Section 16, Article VII of the Constitution, and such new
appointment will not result in the appointee serving beyond the fixed term of seven years.

(A by-passed appointment is one that has not been finally acted upon on the merits by the Commission
on Appointments at the close of the session of Congress. There is no final decision by the Commission on
Appointments to give or withhold its consent to the appointment as required by the Constitution. Absent
such decision, the President is free to renew the ad interim appointment of a by-passed appointee.)

Digest:
FACTS
The COMELEC en banc appointed Matibag (petitioner) as “Acting Director IV” of the Education and
Information Department (EID). On February 15, 2000, then Chairperson Demetriou renewed the
appointment of petitioner in a “Temporary Capacity.” On February 15, 2001, Commissioner Javier again
renewed her appointment to the same position in a “Temporary” capacity.

On March 22, 2001, President Arroyo appointed, ad interim Benipayo as COMELEC Chairman and Borra
and Tuason as COMELEC Commissioners, each for a term of 7 years. Benipayo took his oath of office and
assumed the position of COMELEC Chairman. Borra and Tuason likewise took their oaths of office and
assumed their positions. The Office of the President submitted to the Commission on Appointments
(COA) the ad interim appointments of Benipayo, Borra and Tuason. However, the COA did not act on said
appointments.

On June 1, 2001, President Arroyo renewed the ad interim appointments of Benipayo, Borra and Tuason
to the same positions and for the same term. They took their oaths of office for the second time. The
Office of the President transmitted their appointments to COA for confirmation.

Congress adjourned before the COA could act in their appointments. Thus President Arroyo renewed
again the ad interim appointments of Benipayo, Borra and Tuason to the same positions. The Office of
President transmitted their appointments for confirmation to the Commission on Appointments. They took
their oaths of office anew.

In his capacity as COMELEC Chairman, Benipayo issued a Memorandum addressed to petitioner as

Director IV of the EID and to Cinco as Director III also of the EID, designating Cinco Officer-in-Charge of
the EID and reassigning petitioner to the Law Department, COMELEC EID Commissioner-in-Charge Mehol
K. Sadain objected to petitioner’s reassignment in a Memorandum addressed to the COMELEC en banc.
Commissioner Sadain questioned Benipayo’s failure to consult the Commissioner-in-Charge of the EID in
the reassignment of petitioner.

On April 16, 2001, petitioner requested Benipayo to reconsider her relief as Director IV of EID and her
reassignment to the Law Department. But Benipayo denied her request for reconsideration. During the
pendency of her complaint before the Law Department, Matibag filed the instant petition questioning the
appointment and the right to remain in office of Benipayo, Borra and Tuason as Chairman and
Commissioners of COMELEC, as well as on the prohibitions on temporary appointments and
reappointments of its Chairman and members.

In the meantime, President Arroyo renewed once again the ad interim appointments of Benipayo, Borra
and Tuason and they took their oaths of office anew.

ISSUE(S)
1. Whether the assumption of office of Benipayo, Borra and Tuason on the basis of the ad interim
appointments issued by President amounts to a temporary appointment prohibited by the Constitution.
2. Whether the renewal of the ad interim appointments and subsequent assumption of office to the same
positions violate the prohibition on reappointment under the Constitution.

RULING
1. NO. An ad interim appointment is a permanent appointment because it takes effect immediately and
can no longer be withdrawn by the President once the appointee has qualified into office. The fact that it
is subject to confirmation by the Commission on Appointments does not alter its permanent character.
The Constitution itself makes an ad interim appointment permanent in character by making it effective
until disapproved by the Commission on Appointments or until the next adjournment of Congress. The
second paragraph of Section 16, Article VII of the Constitution provides as follows: “The President shall
have the power to make appointments during the recess of the Congress, whether voluntary or
compulsory, but such appointments shall be effective only until disapproval by the Commission on
Appointments or until the next adjournment of the Congress.” (Emphasis supplied) Thus, the ad interim
appointment remains effective until such disapproval or next adjournment, signifying that it can no longer
be withdrawn or revoked by the President. The fear that the President can withdraw or revoke at any
time and for any reason an ad interim appointment is utterly without basis.

2. NO. The prohibition on reappointment in Section 1 (2), Article IX-C of the Constitution applies neither
to disapproved nor by-passed ad interim appointments. A disapproved ad interim appointment cannot be
revived by another ad interim appointment because the disapproval is final under Section 16, Article VII
of the Constitution, and not because a reappointment is prohibited under Section 1 (2), Article IX-C of the
Constitution. A by-passed ad interim appointment can be revived by a new ad interim appointment
because there is no final disapproval under Section 16, Article VII of the Constitution, and such new
appointment will not result in the appointee serving beyond the fixed term of seven years.

Section 1 (2), Article IX-C of the Constitution provides that “[t]he Chairman and the Commissioners shall
be appointed x x x for a term of seven years without reappointment.”(Emphasis supplied) There are four
situations where this provision will apply. The first situation is where an ad interim appointee to the
COMELEC, after confirmation by the Commission on Appointments, serves his full seven-year term. Such
person cannot be reappointed to the COMELEC, whether as a member or as a chairman, because he will
then be actually serving more than seven years. The second situation is where the appointee, after
confirmation, serves a part of his term and then resigns before his seven-year term of office ends. Such
person cannot be reappointed, whether as a member or as a chair, to a vacancy arising from retirement
because a reappointment will result in the appointee also serving more than seven years. The third
situation is where the appointee is confirmed to serve the unexpired term of someone who died or
resigned, and the appointee completes the unexpired term. Such person cannot be reappointed, whether
as a member or chair, to a vacancy arising from retirement because a reappointment will result in the
appointee also serving more than seven years.

The fourth situation is where the appointee has previously served a term of less than seven years, and a
vacancy arises from death or resignation. Even if it will not result in his serving more than seven years, a
reappointment of such person to serve an unexpired term is also prohibited because his situation will be
similar to those appointed under the second sentence of Section 1 (2), Article IX-C of the Constitution.
This provision refers to the first appointees under the Constitution whose terms of office are less than
seven years, but are barred from ever being reappointed under any situation. Not one of these four
situations applies to the case of Benipayo, Borra or Tuason.

Note:

A by-passed appointment is one that has not been finally acted upon on the merits by the Commission on
Appointments at the close of the session of Congress. There is no final decision by the Commission on
Appointments to give or withhold its consent to the appointment as required by the Constitution. Absent
such decision, the President is free to renew the ad interim appointment of a by-passed appointee.
78 Fetalino v. COMELEC

FETALINO vs. COMELEC

G.R. No. 191890. December 4, 2012

Ponente: J. Brion
Topic: Powers of the President – Appointment
Synopsis:
The termination of the petitioners’ ad interim appointments could hardly be considered as incapacity
since it was not the result of any disability that rendered them incapable of performing the duties of a
Commissioner. Thus, petitioners cannot claim to be entitled to the five-year lump sum gratuity under
Section 1 of R.A. No. 1568 on the basis of incapacity.

Digest:
FACTS
President Ramos extended an interim appointment to Fetalino and Calderon as COMELEC Commissioners,
each for a term of 7 years. Then, 11 days later, Pres. Ramos renewed the petitioners’ ad interim
appointments for the same position. Congress, however, adjourned in May 1998 before the CA could act
on their appointments. The constitutional ban on presidential appointments late took effect and the
petitioners were no longer re-appointed as COMELEC Commissioners. Thus, Fetalino and Calderon served
as COMELEC Commissioners for more than 4 months.

Subsequently, the petitioners applied for their retirement benefits and monthly pension with the
COMELEC. Initially the application was approved pursuant to Resolution No. 06-1369. On February 6,
2007, COMELEC issued Resolution No. 07-0202 granting the petitioners a pro-rated gratuity and pension.
Then on October 5, 2007, the petitioners asked for a re-computation of their retirement pay on the
principal ground that R.A. No. 1568, does not cover a pro-rated computation of retirement pay. In
response, COMELEC issued a resolution referring the matter to its Financial Services Dept. for comment
and recommendation. On July 14, 2009, the COMELEC issued another resolution referring the same to its
Law Dept. for study and recommendation.

In the presently assailed Resolution No. 8808, on the basis of the Law Dept.’s study, completely
disapproved the petitioners’ claim for a lump sum.

ISSUE(S)
1. Whether the petitioners are entitled to the lump sum gratuity.
2. Whether petitioners were denied due process.

RULING
1. NO. To be entitled to the five-year lump sum gratuity under Section 1 of R.A. No. 1568, any of the
following events must transpire:
(1) Retirement from the service for having completed the term of office;
(2) Incapacity to discharge the duties of their office;
(3) Death while in the service; and
(4) Resignation after reaching the age of sixty (60) years but before the expiration of the term
of office.

In addition, the officer should have rendered not less than twenty years of service in the government at
the time of retirement. Death during the service obviously does not need to be considered in the present
case, thus leaving retirement, incapacity and resignation as the event that must transpire in order to be
entitled to the lump sum gratuity.

We note that the termination of the petitioners’ ad interim appointments could hardly be considered as
incapacity since it was not the result of any disability that rendered them incapable of performing the
duties of a Commissioner. Thus, incapacity is likewise effectively removed from active consideration.
“Resignation is defined as the act of giving up or the act of an officer by which he declines his office and
renounces the further right to it. To constitute a complete and operative act of resignation, the officer or
employee must show a clear intention to relinquish or surrender his position accompanied by the act of
relinquishment.” In this sense, resignation likewise does not appear applicable as a ground because the
petitioners did not voluntarily relinquish their position as Commissioners; their termination was merely a
consequence of the adjournment of Congress without action by the CA on their ad interim appointments.
The petitioners obviously did not retire under R.A. No. 1568, as amended, since they never completed
the full seven-year term of office prescribed by Section 2, Article IX-D of the 1987 Constitution; they
served as Comelec Commissioners for barely four months, i.e., from February 16, 1998 to June 30, 1998.

2. NO. “[a] party cannot successfully invoke deprivation of due process if he was accorded the
opportunity of a hearing, through either oral arguments or pleadings. There is no denial of due process
when a party is given an opportunity through his pleadings.” In the present case, the petitioners cannot
claim deprivation of due process because they actively participated in the Comelec proceedings that
sought for payment of their retirement benefits under R.A. No. 1568. The records clearly show that the
issuance of the assailed Comelec resolution was precipitated by the petitioners’ application for retirement
benefits with the Comelec. Significantly, the petitioners were given ample opportunity to present and
explain their respective positions when they sought a re-computation of the initial pro-rated retirement
benefits that were granted to them by the Comelec. Under these facts, no violation of the right to due
process of law took place.

79 Kida v. Senate

DATU MICHAEL ABAS KIDA, in his personal capacity, and in representation of

MAGUINDANAO FEDERATION OF AUTONOMOUS IRRIGATORS ASSOCIATION, INC., et al.,
Petitioners, vs SENATE OF THE PHILIPPINES, represented by its President JUAN PONCE
ENRILE, et al., Respondents
G.R. No. 196271

Ponente: J. Brion
Topic: Powers of the President – Appointment
Synopsis:
The power of supervision is defined as “the power of a superior officer to see to it that lower officers
perform their functions in accordance with law.” This is distinguished from the power of control or “the
power of an officer to alter or modify or set aside what a subordinate officer had done in the
performance of his duties and to substitute the judgment of the former for the latter.”

The petitioners’ apprehension regarding the President’s alleged power of control over the OICs is rooted
in their belief that the President’s appointment power includes the power to remove these officials at will.
In this way, the petitioners foresee that the appointed OICs will be beholden to the President, and act as
representatives of the President and not of the people.

The wording of the law is clear. Once the President has appointed the OICs for the offices of the
Governor, Vice Governor and members of the Regional Legislative Assembly, these same officials will
remain in office until they are replaced by the duly elected officials in the May 2013 elections. Nothing in
this provision even hints that the President has the power to recall the appointments he already made.

Digest:
FACTS
The herein petitioners assailed the Supreme Court’s Decision dated October 18, 2011, where the latter
upheld the constitutionality of Republic Act (RA) No. 10153 – An Act Providing for the Synchronization of
the Elections in the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao (ARMM) with the National and Local
Elections and for Other Purposes. Pursuant to the constitutional mandate of synchronization, RA No.
10153 postponed the regional elections in the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao (ARMM) (which
were scheduled to be held on the second Monday of August 2011) to the second Monday of May 2013
and recognized the President’s power to appoint officers-in-charge (OICs) to temporarily assume these
positions upon the expiration of the terms of the elected officials.

The petitioners assert that RA No. 10153, in granting the President the power to appoint OICs in elective
positions, violates Section 16, Article X of the Constitution, which merely grants the President the power
of supervision over autonomous regions.

ISSUE(S)
Whether or not R.A. No. 10153 violates Section 16, Article X of the Constitution

RULING
NO. There is no incompatibility between the President’s power of supervision over local governments and
autonomous regions, and the power granted to the President, within the specific confines of RA No.
10153, to appoint OICs.

The power of supervision is defined as “the power of a superior officer to see to it that lower officers
perform their functions in accordance with law.” This is distinguished from the power of control or “the
power of an officer to alter or modify or set aside what a subordinate officer had done in the
performance of his duties and to substitute the judgment of the former for the latter.”

The petitioners’ apprehension regarding the President’s alleged power of control over the OICs is rooted
in their belief that the President’s appointment power includes the power to remove these officials at will.
In this way, the petitioners foresee that the appointed OICs will be beholden to the President, and act as
representatives of the President and not of the people.

Section 3 of RA No. 10153 expressly contradicts the petitioners’ supposition. The provision states:

“Section 3. Appointment of Officers-in-Charge. — The President shall appoint officers-in-charge for the
Office of the Regional Governor, Regional Vice Governor and Members of the Regional Legislative
Assembly who shall perform the functions pertaining to the said offices until the officials duly elected in
the May 2013 elections shall have qualified and assumed office.”

The wording of the law is clear. Once the President has appointed the OICs for the offices of the
Governor, Vice Governor and members of the Regional Legislative Assembly, these same officials will
remain in office until they are replaced by the duly elected officials in the May 2013 elections. Nothing in
this provision even hints that the President has the power to recall the appointments he already made.

80 ABAKADA Guro Party List v. Executive Secretary

ABAKADA GURO PARTY LIST (Formerly AASJAS) OFFICERS SAMSON S. ALCANTARA and ED
VINCENT S. ALBANO, Petitioners, versus THE HONORABLE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY EDUARDO
ERMITA; HONORABLE SECRETARY OF THE DEPARTMENT OF FINANCE CESAR PURISIMA; and
HONORABLE COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE GUILLERMO PARAYNO, JR.,
Respondents.
G.R. No. 168056. September 1, 2005

Ponente: J. Austria-Martinez
Topic: Legislative Department – Bicameral Conference
Synopsis:
To reconcile or harmonize disagreeing provisions, the Bicameral Conference Committee may then (a)
adopt the specific provisions of either the House bill or Senate bill, (b) decide that neither provisions in
the House bill or the provisions in the Senate bill would be carried into the final form of the bill, and/or
(c) try to arrive at a compromise between the disagreeing provisions. In the present case, the changes
introduced by the Bicameral Conference Committee on disagreeing provisions were meant only to
reconcile and harmonize the disagreeing provisions for it did not inject any idea or intent that is wholly
foreign to the subject embraced by the original provisions.

Digest:
FACTS
This case is a consolidation of several petitions for prohibition, praying that the Supreme Court enjoin the
enactment of Republic Act 9335, or the Attrition Act of 2005. One such petition is a petition for certiorari
filed by several members of the House of Representatives, led by Rep. Escudero, questioning the
propriety of the insertion by the Bicameral Conference of several sections of the proposed House Bill No.
3705 and Senate Bill No. 1950.

ISSUE(S)
Does the Bicameral Conference have the power to delete or add provisions to a proposed bill?

RULING
Yes. The creation of such conference committee was apparently in response to a problem, not addressed
by any constitutional provision, where the two houses of Congress find themselves in disagreement over
changes or amendments introduced by the other house in a legislative bill. Given that one of the most
basic powers of the legislative branch is to formulate and implement its own rules of proceedings and to
discipline its members, may the Court then delve into the details of how Congress complies with its
internal rules or how it conducts its business of passing legislation? Note that in the present petitions, the
issue is not whether provisions of the rules of both houses creating the bicameral conference committee
are unconstitutional, but whether the bicameral conference committee has strictly complied with the rules
of both houses, thereby remaining within the jurisdiction conferred upon it by Congress. In the
immediate case, the high Court observed that here was a necessity for a conference committee because
a comparison of the provisions of House Bill Nos. 3555 and 3705 on one hand, and Senate Bill No. 1950
on the other, reveals that there were indeed disagreements.

To reconcile or harmonize disagreeing provisions, the Bicameral Conference Committee may then (a)
adopt the specific provisions of either the House bill or Senate bill, (b) decide that neither provisions in
the House bill or the provisions in the Senate bill would be carried into the final form of the bill, and/or
(c) try to arrive at a compromise between the disagreeing provisions. In the present case, the changes
introduced by the Bicameral Conference Committee on disagreeing provisions were meant only to
reconcile and harmonize the disagreeing provisions for it did not inject any idea or intent that is wholly
foreign to the subject embraced by the original provisions.
81 League of Provinces v. Executive Secretary

LEAGUE OF PROVINCES OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs. DEPARTMENT OF

ENVIRONMENT and NATURAL RESOURCES and HON. ANGELO T. REYES, in his capacity as
Secretary of DENR, respondents
G.R. No. 175368. April 11, 2013

Ponente: J. Peralta
Topic: Powers of the President – Control
Synopsis:
Section 3, Article X of the Constitution mandated Congress to “enact a local government code which shall
provide for a more responsive and accountable local government structure instituted through a system of
decentralization with effective mechanisms of recall, initiative, and referendum, allocate among the
different local government units their powers, responsibilities, and resources, and provide for the
qualifications, election, appointment and removal, term, salaries, powers and functions and duties of local
officials, and all other matters relating to the organization and operation of the local units.” The power of
the President over local government units is only that of general supervision, and not of control.

Digest:
FACTS
Golden Falcon Mineral Exploration Corporation (Golden Falcon) filed with DENR Mines and Geosciences
Bureau Regional Office No. III (MGB R-III) and Application for Financial and Technical Assistance
Agreement (FTAA).

The MGB R-III issued an Order denying their application for failure to secure area clearances from the
Forest Management Sector and Lands Management Sector of the DENR Regional Office No. III.
Therefore, Golden Falcon filed an appeal with the DENR Mines and Geosciences Bureau Central Office
(MGB-Central Office), and sought reconsideration of the Order dated April 29, 1988.

Pending appeal, Eduardo Mercado, Benedicto Cruz, Gerardo Cruz and Liberato Sembrano filed with the
PENRO of Bulacan of their respective Applications for Quarry Permit, which covered the same area
subject of Golden Falcon’s application.

On July 16, 2004 the MGB-Central Office issued an Order denying Golden Falcon’s appeal.

On September 13, 2004, Atlantic Mines and Trading Corporation (AMTC) filed with the PENRO of Bulacan
an Application for Exploration Permit covering 5,281 hectares of the area covered by Golden Falcon’s
Appplication.

On October 19, 2004, DENR-MGB Director Horacio C. Ramos, in response to MGB R-III Director Arnulfo
V. Cabantog’s memorandum query dated September 8, 2004, categorically stated that the MGB-Central
Office’s Order dated July 16, 2004 became final on August 11, 2004, fifteen (15) days after Golden Falcon
received the said Order. Through letters AMTC notified the PENRO of Bulacan and the MGB R-III Director,
that the subject Applications for Quarry Permit fell within its (AMTC’s) existing valid and prior Application
for Exploration Permit, and the former area of Golden Falcon was open to mining location only on August
11, 2004 per the Memorandum dated October 19, 2004 of the MGB Director, Central Office.

AMTC filed with the PMRB of Bulacan a formal protest against the aforesaid Applications for Quarry
Permit. On August 8, 2005 the said application was endorsed to Gov. dela Cruz and aforesaid application
had been converted to Applications for Small-Scale Mining Permit of Eduardo Mercado, Benedicto Cruz,
Gerardo Cruz and Lucila Valdez (formely Liberato Sembrano).
The PENRO Bulacan issued 4 memoranda recommending to Gov. dela Cruz the approval of the
applications. Subsequently, AMTC appealed to the respondent DENR Secretary for the grant of said
permit saying that the PMTB of Bulacan erred in giving due course to the applications. The DENR
Secretary rendered a decision in favor of AMTC.

Hence this petition, petitioner contends that Sec. 17 (b)(3)(iii) of the LGC of 1991 and Sec. 24 of RA
7076, which confer upon respondents DENR and DENR Secretary the power and control are
unconstitutional, as the Constitution states that the President has the power of supervision only, not
control, over acts of the local government units, and grants the local government units autonomy.

ISSUE(S)
Whether Section 17 (b)(3)(iii) of the Local Government Code of 1991 and Section 24 of R.A. No. 7076,
which confer upon respondents DENR and the DENR Secretary the power of control is unconstitutional

RULING
No. Section 4, Article X (Local Government) of the Constitution states that “[t]he President of the
Philippines shall exercise general supervision over local governments,” and Section 25 of the Local
Government Code reiterates the same. General supervision by the President means no more than seeing
to it that laws are faithfully executed or that subordinate officers act within the law.

The Court has clarified that the constitutional guarantee of local autonomy in the Constitution [Art. X,
Sec. 2] refers to the administrative autonomy of local government units or, cast in more technical
language, the decentralization of government authority. It does not make local governments sovereign
within the State. Administrative autonomy may involve devolution of powers, but subject to limitations
like following national policies or standards, and those provided by the Local Government Code, as the
structuring of local governments and the allocation of powers, responsibilities, and resources among the
different local government units and local officials have been placed by the Constitution in the hands of
Congress under Section 3, Article X of the Constitution.

Section 3, Article X of the Constitution mandated Congress to “enact a local government code which shall
provide for a more responsive and accountable local government structure instituted through a system of
decentralization with effective mechanisms of recall, initiative, and referendum, allocate among the
different local government units their powers, responsibilities, and resources, and provide for the
qualifications, election, appointment and removal, term, salaries, powers and functions and duties of local
officials, and all other matters relating to the organization and operation of the local units.”

82 Gudani v. Senga

Francisco Gudani and Alexander Balutan (‘ers) vs Generoso S. Senga (COS AFP), Gilberto
Jose ROA, The Provost Marshall General of The AFP, General Court Martial (‘dents)
G.R. NO. 1701165 August 15, 2006

Ponente: J. Tinga
Topic: Powers of the President – Control/Military
Synopsis:

Digest:
FACTS
Petitioners are Military Officials who seek the annulment of a directive from President Gloria Macapagal-
Arroyo enjoining them and other military officers from testifying before Congress without the President's
consent. The prohibition occurred as a result of invitation from the Senate on September 2005
concerning the conduct of 2004 election which allegedly exposed to massive cheating. At the time of the
2004 elections, Gen. Gudani had been designated as commander, and Col. Balutan a member, of "Joint
Task Force Ranao" by the AFP Southern Command. "Joint Task Force Ranao" was tasked with the
maintenance of peace and order during the 2004 elections in the provinces of Lanao del Norte and Lanao
del Sur.

On 27 Sept 2005 at around 10:10pm, PGMA released an instruction stating that “No AFP Personnel shall
appear before any congressional or Senate hearing without her approval. The following day, Petitioners,
during the hearing informed the Senators that they were not given authority by PGMA to appear before
the hearing. However, the petitioners both testified as to the conduct of the 2004 elections.

A few hours after petitioners concluded their testimony, they were charged with violation of Article 65-
willfully disobeying superior officer. Hence, they will be subjected to general court martial proceedings.

They were likewise both relieved from their respective assignments.

This triggered the petitioners to (1) petition with the SC for certiorari and prohibition seeking to declare
as unconstitutional the order of PGMA to seek first approval from her office in order to appear in any
congressional/senate hearing and (2) to enjoin respondents in trying the petitioners for the violation of
Article 65 due to their appearance in the Senate on 25 September 2005.

ISSUE(S)
1. Whether or not the order of GMA for the petitioners to seek prior approval from her office in order to
appear in any congressional/senate hearing is constitutional
2. Whether or not the legislative body seeking testimony of the petitioners may seek judicial relief to
compel their attendance despite the opposition of PGMA

RULING
1. Yes, PGMA can validly impose said order. Critical to military discipline is obeisance to the military chain
of command. Willful disobedience of a superior officer is punishable by court-martial under Article 65 of
the Articles of War. “An individual soldier is not free to ignore the lawful orders or duties assigned by his
immediate superiors. For there would be an end of all discipline if the seaman and marines on board a
ship of war [or soldiers deployed in the field], on a distant service, were permitted to act upon their own
opinion of their rights [or their opinion of the President’s intent], and to throw off the authority of the
commander whenever they supposed it to be unlawfully exercised.” Further traditional restrictions on
members of the armed forces are those imposed on free speech and mobility.

2. Yes, if the President or the Chief of Staff refuses to allow a member of the AFP to appear before
Congress, the legislative body seeking such testimony may seek judicial relief to compel the attendance.
Courts are empowered, under the constitutional principle of judicial review, to arbitrate disputes between
the legislative and executive branches of government on the proper constitutional parameters of power;
And if emphasis be needed, if the courts so rule, the duty falls on the shoulders of the President, as
commander-in-chief, to authorize the appearance of the military officers before Congress. Even if the
President has earlier disagreed with the notion of officers appearing before the legislature to testify, the
Chief Executive is nonetheless obliged to comply with the final orders of the courts.

83 David v. Arroyo

PROF. RANDOLF DAVID, LORENZO TANADA III, et al., Petitioners, vs. GLORIA MACAPAGAL-
ARROYO, Executive Secretary EDUARDO ERMITA, et al., Respondents.
G.R. No. 171396. May 3, 2006.
Ponente: J. Sandoval-Guttierez
Topic: Powers of the President – Military/Emergency
Synopsis:
The 1987 Constitution has adopted a balanced power structures within the three pillars of government.
Executive, legislative, and judicial powers are dispersed to the President, the Congress, and the Supreme
Court, respectively. Each is supreme within its own sphere. But none has the monopoly of power in
times of emergency. Each branch is given a role to serve as limitation or check upon the other. This
system does not weaken the President, it just limits his power. In other words, in times of
emergency, our Constitution reasonably demands that we repose a certain amount of faith in the basic
integrity and wisdom of the Chief Executive but, at the same time, it obliges him to operate within
carefully prescribed procedural limitations.

Digest:
FACTS
On February 24, 2006, as the nation celebrated the 20th Anniversary of the Edsa People Power I,
President Arroyo issued PP 1017 declaring a state of national emergency. On March 3, 2006, exactly one
week after the declaration of a state of national emergency and after all these petitions had been filed,
the President lifted PP 1017. In defense of the proclamation, the herein respondents stated that there
was conspiracy among some military officials, leftist NPA agents, and other members of the political
opposition. During the oral arguments held on March 7, 2006, the Solicitor General argued that the intent
of the Constitution is to give full discretionary powers to the President in determining the necessity of
calling out the armed forces. He emphasized that none of the petitioners has shown that PP 1017 was
without factual bases, and that it was not the job of the herein respondents to prove the factual bases of
the proclamation in the outset.

ISSUE(S)
Does the executive enjoy unfettered (monopolized) power in times of emergency?

RULING
NO. The 1987 Constitution has adopted a balanced power structures within the three pillars of
government. Executive, legislative, and judicial powers are dispersed to the President, the Congress, and
the Supreme Court, respectively. Each is supreme within its own sphere. But none has the monopoly of
power in times of emergency. Each branch is given a role to serve as limitation or check upon the other.
This system does not weaken the President, it just limits his power. In other words, in times of
emergency, our Constitution reasonably demands that we repose a certain amount of faith in the basic
integrity and wisdom of the Chief Executive but, at the same time, it obliges him to operate within
carefully prescribed procedural limitations.

84 Kulayan v. Tan

JAMAR M. KULAYAN, TEMOGEN S. TULAWIE, HJI. MOH. YUSOP ISMI, JULHAJAN AWADI, and
SPO1 SATTAL H. JADJULI, Petitioners,
- versus -
GOV. ABDUSAKUR M. TAN, in his capacity as Governor of Sulu; GEN. JUANCHO SABAN, COL.
EUGENIO CLEMEN PN, P/SUPT. JULASIRIM KASIM and P/SUPT. BIENVENIDO G. LATAG, in
their capacity as officers of the Phil. Marines and Phil. National Police, respectively,
Respondents.
G.R. No. 187298. July 3, 2012.

Ponente: J. Sereno
Topic: Powers of the President – Calling Out/Military
Synopsis:
Only the President is vested with calling-out powers, as the commander-in-chief of the Republic One
executive, one commander-in-chief. While the President exercises operational supervision over the police,
and may exercise control only in day-to-day operations. Only the President has full discretion to call the
military when in his judgement it is necessary to do in order to prevent or suppress lawless violence,
invasion or rebellion. Kidnapping situation cannot be considered a calamity or disaster as contemplated
by Sec. 465 of the LGC, which allows the Chief Executive to “carry out emergency measures as may be
necessary during and in the aftermath of a man-made and natural calamities.

Digest:
FACTS
15 January 2009, 3 members from the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) were kidnapped
in Patikul Sulu by the Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG). A task force was created by the ICRC and PNP which then
organized a parallel local group - Local Crisis Committee later renamed Sulu Crisis Management
Committee under the leadership of respondent Abdusakur Mahail Tan, the Provincial Governor of Sulu.
Gov. Tan organized the Civilian Emergency Force (CEF) (embodied in a "Memorandum of Understanding"
between the provincial government of Sulu, AFP and PNP) - a group of armed male civilians coming from
different municipalities, who were redeployed to surrounding areas of Patikul. The Whereas clauses of
the Memorandum alluded to the extraordinary situation in Sulu, and the willingness of civilian supporters
of the municipal mayors to offer their services in order that "the early and safe rescue of the hostages
may be achieved." This Memorandum, which was labeled ‘secret’ on its all pages, also outlined the
responsibilities of each of the party signatories.

4 April 2009, the office of Gov Tan distributed to civic organizations, copies of the "Guidelines for the
Implementation of Proclamation No. 1, Series of 2009 Declaring a State of Emergency in the Province of
Sulu."

16 April 2009, some residents of Patikul Sulu, filed the present Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition
claiming that Proclamation 1-09 was issued with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction, as it threatened fundamental freedoms guaranteed under Article III of the 1987 Constitution;
that it violates Sections 1 and 18, Article VII of the Constitution, which grants the President sole authority
to exercise emergency powers and calling-out powers as the chief executive of the Republic and
commander-in-chief of the armed forces; and that the Provincial Governor is not authorized by any law
to create civilian armed forces.

ISSUE(S)
Whether Proclamation No. 1 S. 2009 is constitutional

RULING
NO. Only the President is vested with calling-out powers, as the commander-in-chief of the Republic One
executive, one commander-in-chief. There is one repository of executive powers, and that is the
President of the Republic. This means that when Section 1, Article VII of the Constitution speaks of
executive power, it is granted to the President and no one else. - Villena v. Secretary of Interior.

Article VII of the Constitution "The executive power shall be vested in a President of the Philippines." This
means that the President of the Philippines is the Executive of the Government of the Philippines, and no
other. Only the President, as Executive, who is authorized to exercise emergency powers as provided
under Section 23, Article VI, of the Constitution, as well as what became known as the calling-out powers
under Section 7, Article VII thereof.

While the President exercises operational supervision over the police, and may exercise control only in
day-to-day operations. Only the President has full discretion to call the military when in his judgement it
is necessary to do in order to prevent or suppress lawless violence, invasion or rebellion. Kidnapping
situation cannot be considered a calamity or disaster as contemplated by Sec. 465 of the LGC, which
allows the Chief Executive to “carry out emergency measures as may be necessary during and in the
aftermath of a man-made and natural calamities.

85 Risos-Vidal and Lim v. COMELEC and Estrada

ATTY. ALICIA RISOS-VIDAL, petitioner, ALFREDO S. LIM, petitioner-intervenor, vs.

COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and JOSEPH EJERCITO ESTRADA, respondents.
G.R. No. 206666. January 21, 2015.

Ponente: J. Leonardo-De Castro

Topic: Powers of the President – Pardon
Synopsis:
A close scrutiny of the text of the pardon extended to former President Estrada shows that both the
principal penalty of reclusion perpetua and its accessory penalties are included in the pardon. The
sentence which states that “(h)e is hereby restored to his civil and political rights,” expressly remitted the
accessory penalties that attached to the principal penalty of reclusion perpetua. Hence, even if we apply
Articles 36 and 41 of the Revised Penal Code, it is indubitable from the text of the pardon that the
accessory penalties of civil interdiction and perpetual absolute disqualification were expressly remitted
together with the principal penalty of reclusion perpetua. If former President Arroyo intended for the
pardon to be conditional on Respondent’s promise never to seek a public office again, the former ought
to have explicitly stated the same in the text of the pardon itself.

Digest:
FACTS
In September 12, 2007, the Sandiganbayan convicted former President Estrada for the crime of plunder
and was sentenced to suffer the penalty of Reclusion Perpetua and the accessory penalties of civil
interdiction during the period of sentence and perpetual absolute disqualification. On October 25, 2007,
however, former President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo extended executive clemency, by way of pardon, to
former President Estrada, explicitly stating that he is restored to his civil and political rights.

In 2009, Estrada filed a Certificate of Candidacy for the position of President. None of the disqualification
cases against him prospered but he only placed second in the results.

In 2012, Estrada once more ventured into the political arena, and filed a Certificate of Candidacy, this
time vying for a local elective post, that of the Mayor of the City of Manila.

Petitioner Risos-Vidal filed a Petition for Disqualification against Estrada before the Comelec stating that
Estrada is disqualified to run for public office because of his conviction for plunder sentencing him to
suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua with perpetual absolute disqualification. Petitioner relied on
Section 40 of the Local Government Code (LGC), in relation to Section 12 of the Omnibus Election Code
(OEC).

The Comelec dismissed the petition for disqualification holding that President Estrada’s right to seek
public office has been effectively restored by the pardon vested upon him by former President Gloria M.
Arroyo.

Estrada won the mayoralty race in May 13, 2013 elections. Alfredo Lim, who garnered the second highest
votes, intervened and sought to disqualify Estrada for the same ground as the contention of Risos-Vidal
and praying that he be proclaimed as Mayor of Manila.
ISSUE(S)
May former President Joseph Estrada run for public office despite having been convicted of the crime of
plunder which carried an accessory penalty of perpetual disqualification to hold public office

RULING
Yes. Estrada was granted an absolute pardon that fully restored all his civil and political rights, which
naturally includes the right to seek public elective office, the focal point of this controversy. The wording
of the pardon extended to former President Estrada is complete, unambiguous, and unqualified. It is
likewise unfettered by Articles 36 and 41 of the Revised Penal Code. The only reasonable, objective, and
constitutional interpretation of the language of the pardon is that the same in fact conforms to Articles 36
and 41 of the Revised Penal Code.

It is insisted that, since a textual examination of the pardon given to and accepted by former President
Estrada does not actually specify which political right is restored, it could be inferred that former
President Arroyo did not deliberately intend to restore former President Estrada’s rights of suffrage and to
hold public office, orto otherwise remit the penalty of perpetual absolute disqualification. Even if her
intention was the contrary, the same cannot be upheld based on the pardon’s text.

The pardoning power of the President cannot be limited by legislative action.

The 1987 Constitution, specifically Section 19 of Article VII and Section 5 of Article IX-C, provides that the
President of the Philippines possesses the power to grant pardons, along with other acts of executive
clemency, to wit:
Section 19. Except in cases of impeachment, or as otherwise provided in this Constitution, the President
may grant reprieves, commutations, and pardons, and remit fines and forfeitures, after conviction by final
judgment.

He shall also have the power to grant amnesty with the concurrence of a majority of all the Members of
the Congress.
xxxx
Section 5. No pardon, amnesty, parole, or suspension of sentence for violation of election laws, rules, and
regulations shall be granted by the President without the favorable recommendation of the Commission.
It is apparent from the foregoing constitutional provisions that the only instances in which the President
may not extend pardon remain to be in: (1) impeachment cases; (2) cases that have not yet resulted in a
final conviction; and (3) cases involving violations of election laws, rules and regulations in which there
was no favorable recommendation coming from the COMELEC. Therefore, it can be argued that any act
of Congress by way of statute cannot operate to delimit the pardoning power of the President.

The proper interpretation of Articles 36 and 41 of the Revised Penal Code.

A close scrutiny of the text of the pardon extended to former President Estrada shows that both the
principal penalty of reclusion perpetua and its accessory penalties are included in the pardon. The
sentence which states that “(h)e is hereby restored to his civil and political rights,” expressly remitted the
accessory penalties that attached to the principal penalty of reclusion perpetua. Hence, even if we apply
Articles 36 and 41 of the Revised Penal Code, it is indubitable from the text of the pardon that the
accessory penalties of civil interdiction and perpetual absolute disqualification were expressly remitted
together with the principal penalty of reclusion perpetua.

The disqualification of former President Estrada under Section 40 of the LGC in relation to Section 12 of
the OEC was removed by his acceptance of the absolute pardon granted to him

While it may be apparent that the proscription in Section 40(a) of the LGC is worded in absolute terms,
Section 12 of the OEC provides a legal escape from the prohibition – a plenary pardon or amnesty. In
other words, the latter provision allows any person who has been granted plenary pardon or amnesty
after conviction by final judgment of an offense involving moral turpitude, inter alia, to run for and hold
any public office, whether local or national position.

The third preambular clause of the pardon did not operate to make the pardon conditional.

Contrary to Risos-Vidal’s declaration, the third preambular clause of the pardon, i.e., "[w]hereas, Joseph
Ejercito Estrada has publicly committed to no longer seek any elective position or office," neither makes
the pardon conditional, nor militate against the conclusion that former President Estrada’s rights to
suffrage and to seek public elective office have been restored.

This is especially true as the pardon itself does not explicitly impose a condition or limitation, considering
the unqualified use of the term "civil and political rights" as being restored. Jurisprudence educates that a
preamble is not an essential part of an act as it is an introductory or preparatory clause that explains the
reasons for the enactment, usually introduced by the word "whereas." Whereas clauses do not form part
of a statute because, strictly speaking, they are not part of the operative language of the statute. In this
case, the whereas clause at issue is not an integral part of the decree of the pardon, and therefore, does
not by itself alone operate to make the pardon conditional or to make its effectivity contingent upon the
fulfilment of the aforementioned commitment nor to limit the scope of the pardon.

Besides, a preamble is really not an integral part of a law. It is merely an introduction to show its intent
or purposes. It cannot be the origin of rights and obligations. Where the meaning of a statute is clear and
unambiguous, the preamble can neither expand nor restrict its operation much less prevail over its text.

If former President Arroyo intended for the pardon to be conditional on Respondent’s promise never to
seek a public office again, the former ought to have explicitly stated the same in the text of the pardon
itself. Since former President Arroyo did not make this an integral part of the decree of pardon, the
Commission is constrained to rule that the 3rd preambular clause cannot be interpreted as a condition to
the pardon extended to former President Estrada. (Risos-Vidal vs. Comelec, G.R. No. 206666, January 21,
2015)

86 Bayan Muna v. Romulo

BAYAN MUNA, as represented by Rep. SATUR OCAMPO, Rep. CRISPIN BELTRAN, and Rep.
LIZA L. MAZA, petitioner, vs. ALBERTO ROMULO, in his capacity as Executive Secretary, and
BLAS F. OPLE, in his capacity as Secretary of Foreign Affairs, respondents
G.R. No. 159618. February 1, 2011

Ponente: J. Velasco, Jr.

Topic: Powers of the President – Negotiation/Representation in International Relations
Synopsis:
The Court has, in Eastern Sea Trading, as reiterated in Bayan, given recognition to the obligatory effect
of executive agreements without the concurrence of the Senate. As it were, the Agreement is but a form
of affirmance and confirmance of the Philippines’ national criminal jurisdiction. National criminal
jurisdiction being primary, as explained above, it is always the responsibility and within the prerogative of
the RP either to prosecute criminal offenses equally covered by the Rome Statute or to accede to the
jurisdiction of the ICC. Thus, the Philippines may decide to try “persons” of the US, as the term is
understood in the Agreement, under our national criminal justice system. Or it may opt not to exercise its
criminal jurisdiction over its erring citizens or over US “persons” committing high crimes in the country
and defer to the secondary criminal jurisdiction of the ICC over them.
Digest:
FACTS
Having a key determinative bearing on this case is the Rome Statute establishing the International
Criminal Court (ICC) with “the power to exercise its jurisdiction over persons for the most serious crimes
of international concern x x x and shall be complementary to the national criminal jurisdictions.”
Philippines is signatory to Rome Statute.

In connection with this, Ambassador Francis J. Ricciardone sent US Embassy Note to DFA proposing the
terms of the non-surrender bilateral agreement between the USA and the RP.

Via Exchange of Notes, the RP, represented by then DFA Secretary Ople, agreed with and accepted the
US proposals embodied under the US Embassy Note adverted to and put in effect the Agreement with
the US government. In esse, the Agreement aims to protect what it refers to and defines as “persons” of
the RP and US from frivolous and harassment suits that might be brought against them in international
tribunals. It is reflective of the increasing pace of the strategic security and defense partnership between
the two countries.

It was said that the exchange of diplomatic notes constituted a legally binding agreement under
international law; and that, under US law, the said agreement did not require the advice and consent of
the US Senate. For their part, respondents alleged that the Agreement, being in the nature of an
executive agreement, does not require Senate concurrence for its efficacy.

ISSUE(S)
W/ON RP-US Non-Surrender Agreement requires Senate concurrence

RULING
NO. The RP-US Non-Surrender Agreement is but a form of affirmance and confirmance of the Philippines’
national criminal jurisdiction.

The Court has, in Eastern Sea Trading, as reiterated in Bayan, given recognition to the obligatory effect
of executive agreements without the concurrence of the Senate.

As it were, the Agreement is but a form of affirmance and confirmance of the Philippines’ national
criminal jurisdiction. National criminal jurisdiction being primary, as explained above, it is always the
responsibility and within the prerogative of the RP either to prosecute criminal offenses equally covered
by the Rome Statute or to accede to the jurisdiction of the ICC. Thus, the Philippines may decide to try
“persons” of the US, as the term is understood in the Agreement, under our national criminal justice
system. Or it may opt not to exercise its criminal jurisdiction over its erring citizens or over US “persons”
committing high crimes in the country and defer to the secondary criminal jurisdiction of the ICC over
them. ###

87 Saguisag v. Executive Secretary

SAGUISAG VS. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

G.R. No. 212426 January 12, 2016

Ponente: J. Sereno
Topic: Powers of the President – Negotiation/Representation in International Relations
Synopsis:
The power of the President to enter into binding executive agreements without Senate concurrence is
already well-established in this jurisdiction. That power has been alluded to in our present and past
Constitutions. As the sole organ of our foreign relations and the constitutionally assigned chief architect
of our foreign policy, the President is vested with the exclusive power to conduct and manage the
country’s interface with other states and governments. This constitutional mandate emanates from the
inherent power of the President to enter into agreements with other states, including the prerogative to
conclude binding executive agreements that do not require further Senate concurrence.

Digest:
FACTS
Petitioners prayed for the declaration of the Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement (EDCA) entered
into by the respondents for the Philippine government, with the United States of America,
UNCONSTITUTIONAL AND INVALID and to permanently enjoin its implementation.

Petitioners claim the Court erred when it ruled that EDCA was not a treaty. In connection to this,
petitioners move that EDCA must be in the form of a treaty in order to comply with the constitutional
restriction under Section 25, Article XVIII of the 1987 Constitution on foreign military bases, troops, and
facilities. Additionally, they reiterate their arguments on the issues of telecommunications, taxation, and
nuclear weapons

Petitioners assert that the Court contradicted itself when it interpreted the word "allowed in" to refer to
the initial entry of foreign bases, troops, and facilities, based on the fact that the plain meaning of the
provision in question referred to prohibiting the return of foreign bases, troops, and facilities except
under a treaty concurred in by the Senate

Secondly, by interpreting "allowed in" as referring to an initial entry, the Court has simply applied the
plain meaning of the words in the particular provision. Necessarily, once entry has been established by a
subsisting treaty, latter instances of entry need not be embodied by a separate treaty. After all, the
Constitution did not state that foreign military bases, troops, and facilities shall not subsist or exist in the
Philippines.

ISSUE(S)
Whether or not the Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement (EDCA) between the Republic of the
Philippines and the United States of America (U.S.) is constitutional

RULING
EDCA did not go beyond the framework. The entry of US troops has long been authorized under a valid
and subsisting treaty, which is the Visiting Forces Agreement (VFA). Reading the VFA along with the
longstanding Mutual Defense Treaty (MDT) led the Court to the conclusion that an executive agreement
such as the EDCA was well within the bounds of the obligations imposed by both treaties.

Thus, the Court find no reason for EDCA to be declared unconstitutional. It fully conforms to the
Philippines' legal regime through the MDT and VFA. It also fully conforms to the government's continued
policy to enhance our military capability in the face of various military and humanitarian issues that may
arise. This Motion for Reconsideration has not raised any additional legal arguments that warrant
revisiting the Decision.

The settled rule is that the plain, clear and unambiguous language of the Constitution should be
construed as such and should not be given a construction that changes its meaning
Honorable Chief Justice Maria Lourdes P. A. Sereno's theory of "initial entry" mentioned above ventured
into a construction of the provisions of Section 25, Article XVIII of the Constitution which is patently
contrary to the plain language and meaning of the said constitutional provision.

Petitioners' own interpretation and application of the verba legis rule will in fact result in an absurdity,
which legal construction strictly abhors.
88 Pimentel vs. Executive Secretary

SENATOR AQUILINO PIMENTEL, JR., REPRESENTATIVE ETTA ROSALES, et al., Petitioners, vs.
OFFICE OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, HON. ALBERTO ROMULO, and THE DEPARTMENT OF
FOREIGN AFFAIRS, Respondents.
G.R. No. 158088. July 6, 2005

Ponente: J. Puno
Topic: Powers of the President – Negotiation/Representation in International Relations
Synopsis:
The President cannot be compelled by mandamus to transmit a copy of an executive agreement for
concurrence by Senate. Under our Constitution, the power to ratify is vested in the President, subject to
the concurrence of the Senate. The role of the Senate, however, is limited only to giving or withholding
its consent, or concurrence, to the ratification. Hence, it is within the authority of the President to refuse
to submit a treaty to the Senate or, having secured its consent for its ratification, refuse to ratify it.
Although the refusal of a state to ratify a treaty which has been signed in its behalf is a serious step that
should not be taken lightly, such decision is within the competence of the President alone, which cannot
be encroached by this Court via a writ of mandamus.

Digest:
FACTS
The petitioners filed a Petition for Mandamus to compel the Office of the Executive Secretary and the
Department of Foreign Affairs to transmit the signed copy of the Rome Statute of the International
Criminal Court to the Senate of the Philippines for its concurrence in accordance with Section 21, Article
VII of the 1987 Constitution. The Philippines signed the Statute on December 28, 2000 through Charge d’
Affairs Enrique A. Manalo of the Philippine Mission to the United Nations. Its provisions, however, require
that it be subject to ratification, acceptance or approval of the signatory states.

It is the theory of the petitioners that ratification of a treaty, under both domestic law and international
law, is a function of the Senate. Hence, it is the duty of the executive department to transmit the signed
copy of the Rome Statute to the Senate to allow it to exercise its discretion with respect to ratification of
treaties. Moreover, petitioners submit that the Philippines has a ministerial duty to ratify the Rome
Statute under treaty law and customary international law. Petitioners invoke the Vienna Convention on
the Law of Treaties enjoining the states to refrain from acts which would defeat the object and purpose
of a treaty when they have signed the treaty prior to ratification unless they have made their intention
clear not to become parties to the treaty.

ISSUE(S)
Whether the Executive Secretary and the Department of Foreign Affairs have a ministerial duty to
transmit to the Senate the copy of the Rome Statute signed by a member of the Philippine Mission to the
United Nations even without the signature of the President

RULING
NO. In our system of government, the President, being the head of state, is regarded as the sole organ
and authority in external relations and is the country’s sole representative with foreign nations. In the
realm of treaty-making, the President has the sole authority to negotiate with other states.
Nonetheless, while the President has the sole authority to negotiate and enter into treaties, the
Constitution provides a limitation to his power by requiring the concurrence of 2/3 of all the members of
the Senate for the validity of the treaty entered into by him.
It should be emphasized that under our Constitution, the power to ratify is vested in the President,
subject to the concurrence of the Senate. The role of the Senate, however, is limited only to giving or
withholding its consent, or concurrence, to the ratification. Hence, it is within the authority of the
President to refuse to submit a treaty to the Senate or, having secured its consent for its ratification,
refuse to ratify it. Although the refusal of a state to ratify a treaty which has been signed in its behalf is a
serious step that should not be taken lightly, such decision is within the competence of the President
alone, which cannot be encroached by this Court via a writ of mandamus.

89 Macalintal v. PET

ATTY. ROMULO B. MACALINTAL, Petitioner, vs. PRESIDENTIAL ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL,

Respondent.
G.R. No. 191618. November 23, 2010.

Ponente: J. Nachura
Topic: Non-Transmissibility of the Power of Appointment
Synopsis:
Republic Act No. 1793 has not created a new or separate court. It has merely conferred upon the
Supreme Court the functions of a Presidential Electoral Tribunal. The result of the enactment may be
likened to the fact that courts of first instance perform the functions of such ordinary courts of first
instance, those of court of land registration, those of probate courts, and those of courts of juvenile and
domestic relations. It is, also, comparable to the situation obtaining when the municipal court of a
provincial capital exercises its authority, pursuant to law, over a limited number of cases which were
previously within the exclusive jurisdiction of courts of first instance. In all of these instances, the court
(court of first instance or municipal court) is only one, although the functions may be distinct and, even,
separate. Hence, the enactment of Republic Act No. 1793, does not entail an assumption by Congress of
the power of appointment vested by the Constitution in the President. It merely connotes the imposition
of additional duties upon the Members of the Supreme Court.

Digest:
FACTS
In this case, Atty. Romulo Macalintal questions the creation of the Presidential Electoral Tribunal,
contending that the creation of a separate tribunal, complemented by a budget allocation, a seal, and a
set of personnel and confidential employees through RA No. 1793 is an assumption by Congress of the
Executive power of appointment.

ISSUE(S)
Is the creation of the PET valid?

RULING
Yes. Republic Act No. 1793 has not created a new or separate court. It has merely conferred upon the
Supreme Court the functions of a Presidential Electoral Tribunal. The result of the enactment may be
likened to the fact that courts of first instance perform the functions of such ordinary courts of first
instance, those of court of land registration, those of probate courts, and those of courts of juvenile and
domestic relations. It is, also, comparable to the situation obtaining when the municipal court of a
provincial capital exercises its authority, pursuant to law, over a limited number of cases which were
previously within the exclusive jurisdiction of courts of first instance. In all of these instances, the court
(court of first instance or municipal court) is only one, although the functions may be distinct and, even,
separate. Hence, the enactment of Republic Act No. 1793, does not entail an assumption by Congress of
the power of appointment vested by the Constitution in the President. It merely connotes the imposition
of additional duties upon the Members of the Supreme Court.
90 Imbong v. Ochoa, Jr.

JAMES M. IMBONG and LOVELY-ANN C. IMBONG, for themselves and in behalf of their minor
children, LUCIA CARLOS IMBONG and BERNADETTE CARLOS IMBONG and MAGNIFICAT
CHILD DEVELOPMENT CENTER, INC., Petitioners, vs. HON. PAQUITO N. OCHOA, JR.,
Executive Secretary, HON. FLORENCIO B. ABAD, Secretary, Department of Budget and
Management, et al., Respondents.
G.R. No. 204819. April 8, 2014.

Ponente: J. Mendoza
Topic: Judicial Department – Power of Judicial Review
Synopsis:
The Court may pass upon the constitutionality of acts of the legislative and the executive branches, since
its duty is not to review their collective wisdom but, rather, to make sure that they have acted in
consonance with their respective authorities and rights as mandated of them by the Constitution. If after
said review, the Court finds no constitutional violations of any sort, then, it has no more authority of
proscribing the actions under review.

Digest:
FACTS
The consolidated cases herein (14 petitions and 2 petitions-in-intervention) question the propriety and
constitutionality of R.A. 10354, otherwise known as the Reproductive Health Law. Shortly after the
President placed his imprimatur on the said law, challengers from various sectors of society came
knocking on the doors of the Court, beckoning it to wield the sword that strikes down constitutional
disobedience. Shortly after the President placed his imprimatur on the said law, challengers from various
sectors of society came knocking on the doors of the Court, beckoning it to wield the sword that strikes
down constitutional disobedience. In its attempt to persuade the Court to stay its judicial hand however,
the OSG asserts that it should submit to the legislative and political wisdom of Congress and respect the
compromises made in the crafting of the RH Law, it being "a product of a majoritarian democratic
process" and "characterized by an inordinate amount of transparency."

ISSUE(S)
May the Supreme Court exercise its power of judicial review over the controversy surrounding the RH
Law?

RULING
Yes. In many cases involving the determination of the constitutionality of the actions of the Executive and
the Legislature, it is often sought that the Court temper its exercise of judicial power and accord due
respect to the wisdom of its co-equal branch on the basis of the principle of separation of powers. To be
clear, the separation of powers is a fundamental principle in our system of government, which obtains
not through express provision but by actual division in our Constitution. Each department of the
government has exclusive cognizance of matters within its jurisdiction and is supreme within its own
sphere. Thus, the 1987 Constitution provides that the judicial power shall be vested in one Supreme
Court and in such lower courts as may be established by law. In this connection, it bears adding that
while the scope of judicial power of review may be limited, the Constitution makes no distinction as to the
kind of legislation that may be subject to judicial scrutiny, be it in the form of social legislation or
otherwise. The reason is simple and goes back to the earlier point. The Court may pass upon the
constitutionality of acts of the legislative and the executive branches, since its duty is not to review their
collective wisdom but, rather, to make sure that they have acted in consonance with their respective
authorities and rights as mandated of them by the Constitution. If after said review, the Court finds no
constitutional violations of any sort, then, it has no more authority of proscribing the actions under
review. In the scholarly estimation of former Supreme Court Justice Florentino Feliciano, "judicial review
is essential for the maintenance and enforcement of the separation of powers and the balancing of
powers among the three great departments of government through the definition and maintenance of
the boundaries of authority and control between them. To him, judicial review is the chief, indeed the
only, medium of participation - or instrument of intervention - of the judiciary in that balancing operation.

91 Resident Marine Mammals v. Secretary Angelo Reyes

RESIDENT MARINE MAMMALS OF THE PROTECTED SEASCAPE TAÑON STRAIT, e.g.,

TOOTHED WHALES, DOLPHINS, PORPOISES, AND OTHER CETACEAN SPECIES vs.
SECRETARY ANGELO REYES, in his capacity as Secretary of the Department of Energy (DOE)
G.R. No. 180771/ G.R. No. 181527. April 21, 2015

Ponente: J. Leonen
Topic: Executive Department – Presidential Immunity
Synopsis:
In our jurisprudence, there is neither reason nor any legal basis for the concept of implied petitioners,
most especially when the implied petitioner was a sitting President of the Republic. In the immediate
case, petitioners impleaded former President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo as an unwilling co-petitioner for
her express declaration and undertaking in the ASEAN Charter to protect Tanon Strait. Besides, the
President cannot be a party to the suit. Furthermore, the President cannot be presumed to need to resort
to a co-equal branch, the judiciary, merely to compel his alter-egos to enforce the law.

Digest:
FACTS
Petitioners are Resident Marine Mammals and Central Visayas Fisherfolk Development Center (FIDEC),
who questions the legality of SC-46 and the adverse ecological impact of JAPEX’s oil exploration activities.

The Government of the Philippines, through the DOE, entered into a Geophysical Survey and Exploration
Contract-102 (GSEC-102) with JAPEX, which involved geological and geophysical studies of the Tañon
Strait. JAPEX assisted by DOE, also conducted geophysical and satellite surveys, as well as oil and gas
sampling in Tañon Strait.

On December 21, 2004, DOE and JAPEX formally converted GSEC-102 into SC-46 for the exploration,
development, and production of petroleum resources in a block covering approximately 2,850 sq. km.
offshore Tañon Strait. And from May 9 to 18, 2005, JAPEX conducted seismic surveys in and around the
Strait.

JAPEX committed to drill one exploration well during the 2nd sub-phase of the project. Since the well was
to be drilled in the marine waters of Aloguinsan and Pinamungajan, where the Tañon Strait was declared
protected seascape in 1988, JAPEX agreed to comply with the Environmental Impact Assessment
requirements pursuant to PD 1586.

On January 31, 2007, the PAMB- Tañon Strait issued a resolution wherein it adopted the Initial
Environmental Examination (IEE) commissioned by JAPEX, and recommended the approval of JAPEX’s
application for an ECC.

On March 6, 2007, the EMB of DENR Region VII granted the ECC to the DOE and JAPEX for offshore oil
and gas exploration project in Tañon Strait. Months later, JAPEX began to drill and exploratory well and it
lasted until February 8, 2008.
Petitioners alleged that after the seismic survey the fish catch was drastically reduced and the fisherfolk
were barred from entering and fishing within a 7km radius from where the oilrig was located, an area
greater that the 1.5 km radius stated in the IEE.

But the public respondents through the Sol. Gen., contend that petitioners Resident Marine Mammals and
Stewards have no legal standing to file present petition and the SC-46 does not violate the constitution.

ISSUE(S)
1. Whether petitioner has locus standi
2. Whether SC-46 is constitutional

RULING
1. Yes. Recently, the Court passed the landmark Rules of Procedure for Environmental Cases, which allow
for a “citizen suit,” and permit any Filipino citizen to file an action before our courts for violations of our
environmental laws:
SEC. 5. Citizen suit.—Any Filipino citizen in representation of others, including minors or generations
yet unborn, may file an action to enforce rights or obligations under environmental laws. Upon the filing
of a citizen suit, the court shall issue an order which shall contain a brief description of the cause of
action and the reliefs prayed for, requiring all interested parties to manifest their interest to intervene in
the case within fifteen (15) days from notice thereof. The plaintiff may publish the order once in a
newspaper of a general circulation in the Philippines or furnish all affected barangays copies of said
order.
Citizen suits filed under R.A. No. 8749 and R.A. No. 9003 shall be governed by their respective provisions.
Explaining the rationale for this rule, the Court, in the Annotations to the Rules of Procedure for
Environmental Cases, commented:
Citizen suit. To further encourage the protection of the environment, the Rules enable litigants enforcing
environmental rights to file their cases as citizen suits. This provision liberalizes standing for all cases filed
enforcing environmental laws and collapses the traditional rule on personal and direct interest, on the
principle that humans are stewards of nature. The terminology of the text reflects the doctrine first
enunciated in Oposa v. Factoran, insofar as it refers to minors and generations yet unborn.

2. Yes. Paragraph 4, with the safeguards in place, is the exception to paragraph 1, Section 2 of Article
XII. The following are the safeguards this Court enumerated in La Bugal:
Such service contracts may be entered into only with respect to minerals, petroleum and other mineral
oils. The grant thereof is subject to several safeguards, among which are these requirements:
(1) The service contract shall be crafted in accordance with a general law that will set standard or
uniform terms, conditions and requirements, presumably to attain a certain uniformity in provisions and
avoid the possible insertion of terms disadvantageous to the country.
(2) The President shall be the signatory for the government because, supposedly before an agreement
is presented to the President for signature, it will have been vetted several times over at different levels
to ensure that it conforms to law and can withstand public scrutiny.
(3) Within thirty days of the executed agreement, the President shall report it to Congress to give that
branch of government an opportunity to look over the agreement and interpose timely objections, if any.
Adhering to the aforementioned guidelines, this Court finds that SC-¬46 is indeed null and void for
noncompliance with the requirements of the 1987 Constitution.

92 Hontiveros-Baraquel v. Toll Regulatory Board

ATTY. THERESIA HONTIVEROS-BARAQUEL, et. Al., Petitioners, vs. TOLL REGULATORY
BOARD, SECRETARY OF THE DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATINO AND COMMUNICATIONS,
et al., Respondents.
G.R. No. 181293. February 23, 2015.

Ponente: C.J. Sereno

Topic: Executive Department – Doctrine of Qualified Political Agency
Synopsis:
There can be no valid objection to the approval of the ASTOA by the DOTC Secretary, because he was
authorized by the President to do so by virtue of EO 497. Also, the phrase subject to the approval of the
President does not mean that the presidential approval must be obtained prior to the execution of a
contract, or that the approval be made personally by the President. The presidential approval may be
obtained under the doctrine of qualified political agency, which states that acts of the alter-egos of the
President are considered his own acts unless refuted by the latter.

Digest:
FACTS
On 30 August 1995, Philippine National Construction Corporation (PNCC) and PT Citra Lamtoro Gung
Persada (CITRA) entered into a Business and Joint Venture Agreement and created the Citra Metro
Manila Tollways Corporation (CMMTC). CMMTC was a joint venture corporation organized under
Philippine laws to serve as a channel through which CITRA shall participate in the construction and
development of the Skyway project.

On 27 November 1995, the Republic of the Philippines — through the Toll Regulations Board (TRB) — as
Grantor, CMMTC as Investor, and PNCC as Operator executed a Supplemental Toll Operation Agreement
(STOA) covering Stage 1, Phases 1 and 2; and Stage 2, Phase 1 of the South Metro Manila Skyway. The
operation and maintenance of the project roads became the primary and exclusive privilege and
responsibility of the PNCC Skyway Corporation (PSC), a wholly owned subsidiary of PNCC.

On 18 July 2007, the Republic of the Philippines, through the TRB, CMMTC, and PNCC executed the
assailed Amendment to the Supplemental Toll Operation Agreement (ASTOA). The ASTOA incorporated
the amendments, revisions, and modifications necessary to cover the design and construction of Stage 2
of the South Metro Manila Skyway. Also under the ASTOA, Skyway O & M Corporation (SOMCO) replaced
PSC in performing the operations and maintenance of Stage 1 of the South Metro Manila Skyway.
Pursuant to the authority granted to him under Executive Order No. (E.O.) 497 dated 24 January 2006,
Department of Transportation and Communications (DOTC) Secretary Leandro Mendoza approved the
ASTOA through the challenged Memorandum dated 20 July 2007.

Meanwhile, on 28 December 2007, petitioner PNCC Traffic Management and Security Department
Workers Organization (PTMSDWO) filed a Notice of Strike against PSC on the ground of unfair labor
practice, specifically union busting. The Secretary of Labor and Employment assumed jurisdiction over
the dispute in an Order dated 31 December 2007 and set the initial hearing of the case on 2 January
2008.

On 3 January 2008, petitioners PTMSDWO and PNCC Skyway Corporation Employees Union (PSCEU) filed
before the Regional Trial Court of Parañaque City, Branch 258 (RTC), a complaint against respondents
TRB, PNCC, PSC, CMMTC, and SOMCO. The RTC dismissed the case without prejudice. The RTC likewise
denied the motion for partial reconsideration dated 13 June 2008. Hence, this appeal for certiorari and
prohibition under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, with a prayer for the issuance of a writ of preliminary
injunction and/or temporary restraining order, seeking the annulment of the following:
Xxx
2. The Memorandum dated 20 July 2007 of the Secretary of Transportation and Communications,
approving the Amendment to the Supplemental Toll Operation Agreement;
xxx
The annulment of the above is sought for being unconstitutional, contrary to law, and grossly
disadvantageous to the government. Petitioners also seek to prohibit Skyway O & M Corporation from
assuming operations and maintenance responsibilities over the Skyway toll facilities.

ISSUE(S)
Whether the approval of the ASTOA by the DOTC Secretary was valid

RULING
Yes, the approval of the ASTOA by the DOTC Secretary was valid. The doctrine of qualified political
agency declares that, save in matters on which the Constitution or the circumstances require the
President to act personally, executive and administrative functions are exercised through executive
departments headed by cabinet secretaries, whose acts are presumptively the acts of the President
unless disapproved by the latter.

There can be no question that the act of the secretary is the act of the President, unless repudiated by
the latter. In this case, approval of the ASTOA by the DOTC Secretary had the same effect as approval by
the President. The same would be true even without the issuance of E.O. 497, in which the President, on
24 January 2006, specifically delegated to the DOTC Secretary the authority to approve contracts entered
into by the TRB.

Further, the power to grant franchises or issue authorizations for the operation of a public utility is not
exclusively exercised by Congress as claimed by the petitioners. Second, except where the situation falls
within that special class that demands the exclusive and personal exercise by the President of
constitutionally vested power, the President acts through alter egos whose acts are as if the Chief
Executive's own.Third, no lease, transfer, grant of usufruct, sale, or assignment of franchise by PNCC or
its merger with another company ever took place.

93 Southern Hemisphere v. Anti-Terrorism Council

SOUTHERN HEMISPHERE ENGAGEMENT NETWORK, INC., Petitioners, vs. ANTI-TERRORISM

COUNCIL, THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, et. Al., Respondents
G.R. No. 178552. October 5, 2010.

Ponente: J. Carpio Morales

Topic: Judicial Department – Judicial Review
Synopsis:
In a series of cases, the Supreme Court has ruled that the power of judicial review is limited to actual
cases or controversies to be exercised after full opportunity of argument by the parties. Any attempt at
abstraction could only leads to dialectics and barren legal questions and to sterile conclusions unrelated
to actualities. An actual case or controversy means an existing case or controversy that is appropriate or
ripe for determination. In the immediate case, petitioners have failed to show that the challenged
provisions of RA 9372 forbid constitutionally protected conduct or activity that they seek to do.

Digest:
FACTS
Consolidated in this case are six petitions challenging the constitutionality of Republic Act No. 9372, or
the Human Security Act of 2007. In justifying their locus standi and controversy raised, some of the
petitioners contend that they have been subject to close security surveillance by state security forces,
and that they have been branded as enemies of the state.

ISSUE(S)
Given the allegations, may the court exercise judicial review in determining the constitutionality of the
law?

RULING
No. In a series of cases, the Supreme Court has ruled that the power of judicial review is limited to actual
cases or controversies to be exercised after full opportunity of argument by the parties. Any attempt at
abstraction could only leads to dialectics and barren legal questions and to sterile conclusions unrelated
to actualities. An actual case or controversy means an existing case or controversy that is appropriate or
ripe for determination. In the immediate case, petitioners have failed to show that the challenged
provisions of RA 9372 forbid constitutionally protected conduct or activity that they seek to do. No
demonstrable theat has been established, much less a real and existing one. Petitioners’ obscure
allegations of sporadic surveillance and being tagged as communist fronts in no way approximate a
credible threat of prosecution. Under these circumstances, the Court is being lured to render an advisory
opinin, which is outside of its office.

94 PhilConSa v. Philippine Government

PHILIPPINE CONSTITUTION ASSOCIATION (PHILCONSA), represented by its President

Ferdinand Martin G. Romualdez, FRANCISCO S. TATAD, ARCHBISHOP RAMON C. ARGUELLES,
ARCHBISHOP ROMULO T. DE LA CRUZ, ARCHBISHOP FERNANDO R. CAPALLA, and
NORBERTO B. GONZALES, Petitioners, vs. PHILIPPINE GOVERNMENT (GPH), represented by
MARVIC M.V.F. LEONEN, and MIRIAM CORONEL FERRER, MORO ISLAMIC LIBERATION
FRONT, FLORENCIO B. ABAD, and COMMISSION ON AUDIT, Respondents
G.R. No. 218406. November 29, 2016.

Ponente: J. Carpio
Topic: Judicial Department – Power of Judicial Review
Synopsis:
Section 1, Article VIII of the Constitution spells out what judicial power is, in that it includes the duty of
the courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and
enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government. Pursuant to
this constitutional provision, it is clear that the Court's judicial review power is limited to actual cases or
controversies. The Court generally declines to issue advisory opinions or to resolve hypothetical or
feigned problems, or mere academic questions.

Digest:
FACTS
Herein are consolidated petitions challenging the constitutionality and validity of the Comprehensive
Agreement on the Bangsamoro (CAB) and the Framework Agreement on the Bangsamoro (FAB) entered
into between the Government of the Philippines and the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) on 27
March 2014 and 12 October 2012. The framework for the Bangsamoro law has been in inception since
the time of President Ramos. The assailed agreements however, were penned at the time of President
Aquino III. On November 2016, President Duterte issued EO No. 08, expanding the membership and
functions of the Bangsamoro Transition Commission, which include drafting proposals for a Bangsamoro
Basic Law, to be submitted to the Office of the President for submission to Congress, and recommending
to Congress or the people proposed amendments to the 1987 Philippine Constitution. Furthermore, the
Court held in Montesclaros v. COMELEC that it has no power to declare a proposed bill constitutional or
unconstitutional because that would be in the nature of rendering an advisory opinion on a proposed act
of Congress.

ISSUE(S)
Should the court take cognizance of the case given its power of judicial review?

RULING
No. Section 1, Article VIII of the Constitution spells out what judicial power is, in that it includes the duty
of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and
enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government. Pursuant to
this constitutional provision, it is clear that the Court's judicial review power is limited to actual cases or
controversies. The Court generally declines to issue advisory opinions or to resolve hypothetical or
feigned problems, or mere academic questions. An actual case or controversy involves a conflict of legal
rights, an assertion of opposite legal claims, susceptible of judicial resolution as distinguished from a
hypothetical or abstract difference or dispute. There must be a contrast of legal rights that can be
interpreted and enforced on the basis of existing law and jurisprudence. In the present case, however,
the Court agrees with the Solicitor General that there is no actual case or controversy requiring a full-
blown resolution of the principal issue presented by petitioners.

Unlike the unconstitutional MOA-AD (see Province of North Cotabato v. GRP), the CAB, including the FAB,
mandates the enactment of the Bangsamoro Basic Law in order for such peace agreements to be
implemented. In the MOA-AD case, there was nothing in the MOA-AD which required the passage of any
statute to implement the provisions of the MOA-AD, which in essence would have resulted in dramatically
dismembering the Philippines by placing the provinces and areas covered by the MOA-AD under the
control and jurisdiction of a Bangsamoro Juridical Entity. Further, under the MOA-AD, the Executive
branch assumed the mandatory obligation to amend the Constitution to conform to the MOA-AD. Even if
there were today an existing bill on the Bangsamoro Basic Law, it would still not be subject to judicial
review. The Court held in Montesclaros v. COMELEC that it has no power to declare a proposed bill
constitutional or unconstitutional because that would be in the nature of rendering an advisory opinion on
a proposed act of Congress.

95 Baguio Market Vendors v. Executive Judge

BAGUIO MARKET VENDORS MULTI-PURPOSE COOPERATIVE (BAMARVEMPCO), represented

by RECTO INSO, Operations Manager, petitioner, vs. HON. ILUMINADA CABATO-CORTES,
Executive Judge, Regional Trial Court, Baguio City, respondent.
G.R. No. 165922. February 26, 2010.*

Ponente: J. Carpio
Topic: Judicial Department – Rule-Making Power
Synopsis:
The 1987 Constitution textually altered the power-sharing scheme under the previous charters by
deleting in Section 5(5) of Article VIII Congress’ subsidiary and corrective power. This glaring and
fundamental omission led the Court to observe in Echegaray v. Secretary of Justice that this Court’s
power to promulgate judicial rules “is no longer shared by this Court with Congress”:

The rule making power of this Court was expanded. This Court for the first time was given the power to
promulgate rules concerning the protection and enforcement of constitutional rights. The Court was also
granted for the first time the power to disapprove rules of procedure of special courts and quasi-judicial
bodies. But most importantly, the 1987 Constitution took away the power of Congress to repeal, alter, or
supplement rules concerning pleading, practice and procedure.

Digest:
FACTS
Petitioner Baguio Market Vendors Multi-Purpose Cooperative is a credit cooperative organized under RA
6938 or the Cooperative Code of the Philippines. Article 62(6) of RA 6938 exempts cooperatives: from the
payment of all court and sheriff’s fees payable to the Philippine Government for and in connection with all
actions brought under this Code, or where such action is brought by the Cooperative Development
Authority before the court, to enforce the payment of obligations contracted in favor of the cooperative.

In 2004, petitioner, as mortgagee, filed with the Clerk of Court of RTC Baguio a petition to extrajudicially
foreclose a mortgage under Act 3135, as amended. Under Section 7(c) of Rule 141, as amended,
petitions for extrajudicial foreclosure are subject to legal fees based on the value of the mortgagee’s
claim. Invoking Article 62(6) of RA 6938, petitioner sought exemption from payment of the fees.

ISSUE(S)
W/ON petitioner’s application for extrajudicial foreclosure is exempt from legal fees under Article 62(6) of
RA 6938

RULING
NO. The court hold that Article 62(6) of RA 6938 does not apply to petitioner’s foreclosure proceeding.

The scope of the legal fees exemption Article 62(6) of RA 6938 grants to cooperatives is limited to two
types of actions, namely: (1) actions brought under RA 6938; and (2) actions brought by the Cooperative
Development Authority to enforce the payment of obligations contracted in favor of cooperatives. By
simple deduction, it is immediately apparent that Article 62(6) of RA 6938 is no authority for petitioner to
claim exemption from the payment of legal fees in this proceeding because first, the fees imposable on
petitioner do not pertain to an action brought under RA 6938 but to a petition for extrajudicial foreclosure
of mortgage under Act 3135. Second, petitioner is not the Cooperative Development Authority which can
claim exemption only in actions to enforce payments of obligations on behalf of cooperatives.

The Court also discussed the Power of the Legislature vis a vis the Power of the Supreme Court to Enact
Judicial Rules.

The 1987 Constitution textually altered the power-sharing scheme under the previous charters by
deleting in Section 5(5) of Article VIII Congress’ subsidiary and corrective power. This glaring and
fundamental omission led the Court to observe in Echegaray v. Secretary of Justice that this Court’s
power to promulgate judicial rules “is no longer shared by this Court with Congress”:

The rule making power of this Court was expanded. This Court for the first time was given the power to
promulgate rules concerning the protection and enforcement of constitutional rights. The Court was also
granted for the first time the power to disapprove rules of procedure of special courts and quasi-judicial
bodies. But most importantly, the 1987 Constitution took away the power of Congress to repeal, alter, or
supplement rules concerning pleading, practice and procedure. In fine, the power to promulgate rules of
pleading, practice and procedure is no longer shared by this Court with Congress, more so with the
Executive.

Thus, as emphazised: “[T]he payment of legal fees is a vital component of the rules promulgated by this
Court concerning pleading, practice and procedure, it cannot be validly annulled, changed or modified by
Congress. As one of the safeguards of this Court’s institutional independence, the power to promulgate
rules of pleading, practice and procedure is now the Court’s exclusive domain.” ###
96 Agdeppa v. Ombudsman, et al.

RODOLFO M. AGDEPPA, Petitioner, vs. THE HONORABLE OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN,

Respondent
G.R. No. 146376 April 23, 2014

Ponente: J. Leonardo-De Castro

Topic: Judicial Department – Judicial Review
Synopsis:
Not every error in the proceedings, or every erroneous conclusion of law or fact, constitutes grave abuse
of discretion. While the prosecutor or the investigating officers of the Ombudsman may err or even abuse
the discretion lodged in them by law, such error or abuse alone does not render their act amenable to
correction and annulment by the extraordinary remedy of certiorari. The requirement for judicial intrusion
is still for the petitioner to demonstrate clearly that the Office of the Ombudsman committed grave abuse
of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. Unless such a clear demonstration is made, the
intervention is disallowed in deference to the doctrine of non-interference.

Digest:
FACTS
Junia, then Group Manager for the Project Technical Services Group of the National Housing Authority
(NHA), filed a Complaint before the Office of the Ombudsman against several NHA officials, together with
Agdeppa and Castillo, resident auditors of the Commission on Audit (COA) at the NHA. Junia’s Complaint
was docketed as OMB-0-99-1015. Junia alleged that Supra Construction (SupraCon), the contractor for
the NHA project was overpaid in the total amount of P2,044,488.71. The overpayment was allegedly
facilitated through the dubious and confusing audit reports prepared by Agdeppa and endorsed by
Castillo, to the detriment, damage, and prejudice of the Government.

Agdeppa filed his Answer on July 26, 1999, denying Junia’s allegations against him and praying for the
dismissal of the Complaint in OMB-0-99-1015 for utter lack of merit. Jarlos-Martin issued a Resolution in
OMB-0-99-1015 finding probable cause to indict Agdepa and Castillo for violation of section 3(e) of the
Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act relative to the overpayment of the amount of P182,543.43 to SUPRA
Construction and orders that an information be filed against them in the proper court.

Meanwhile, as his Motion to Resolve in OMB-0-99-1015 was still unacted upon, Agdeppa filed before the
Office of the Ombudsman an Affidavit-Complaint against Jarlos-Martin, Laurezo, and Junia, docketed as
OMB-MIL-CRIM-00-0470. Agdeppa accused Jarlos-Martin, Laurezo, and Junia of violating Section 3(a),
(e), (f), and (j) of Republic Act No. 3019; and Rule II, Section 4(a), (b), and (g) of Supreme Court
Administrative Order No. 07, dated April 10, 1990, otherwise known as the Rules of Procedure of the
Office of the Ombudsman.

ISSUE(S)
Whether respondent Jarlos-Martin caused damage and injury to Agdeppa because she set aside the
records of OMB-0-99-1015, which was already complete when she issued her Order dated 6 October
1999

RULING
To warrant the indictment of the respondents for violation of Section 3(e) of RA 3019, it is not enough
that the act of the respondents in the discharge of their official function caused undue injury to Agdeppa.
It behooves Agdeppa to prove that the assailed act must have been done with manifest partiality, evident
bad faith, or gross inexcusable negligence (Alejandro vs. People, 170 SCRA 400). Moreover, unlike in
actions for torts, undue injury in Section 3(e) of RA 3019 cannot be presumed even after a wrong or a
violation of right has been established, its existence must be proven as one of the elements of the crime,
and that the injury be specified, quantified, and proven to the point of moral certainty. They cannot be
based on flimsy and non-substantial evidence or upon speculation, conjecture or guesswork; mere
inconvenience is not constitutive of undue injury (Llorente vs. Sandiganbayan, 287 SCRA 382).
There is no merit to Agdeppa’s contention that by dismissing his Affidavit-Complaint in OMB-MIL-CRIM-
00-0470, the Office of the Ombudsman tolerated the realignment of the Ombudsman Rules of Procedure
and violation of Agdeppa’s right to the speedy disposition of his case. There is utter lack of evidence
presented by Agdeppa that Jarlos-Martin, Laurezo, and Junia conspired to maliciously and deliberately
conduct the preliminary investigation in OMB-0-99-1015 to Agdeppa’s prejudice.

97 League of Cities of the Philippines v. COMELEC

LEAGUE OF CITIES OF THE PHILIPPINES (LCP), Represented by LCP National President

MAYOR JERRY TRENAS, CITY OF ILOILO, et al., Petitioners, vs. COMMISSION ON
ELECTIONS, MUNICIPALITY OF BAYBAY, et. al., Respondents
[G.R. NO. DATE.]

Ponente: J. Carpio
Topic: Local Government
Synopsis:
The Constitution is clear. The creation of local government units must follow the criteria established in
the Local Government Code and not in any other law. There is only one Local Government Code. The
Constitution requires Congress to stipulate in the Local Government Code all the criteria necessary for the
creation of a city, including the conversion of a municipality into a city. Congress cannot write such
criteria in any other law, like the Cityhood Laws.

Digest:
FACTS
During the 12th Congress, Congress enacted into law Republic Act No. 9009 (RA 9009), which took effect
on 30 June 2001. RA 9009 amended Section 450 of the Local Government Code by increasing the annual
income requirement for conversion of a municipality into a city from P20 million to P100 million. The
rationale for the amendment was to restrain, in the words of Senator Aquilino Pimentel, "the mad rush"
of municipalities to convert into cities solely to secure a larger share in the Internal Revenue Allotment
despite the fact that they are incapable of fiscal independence. The Cityhood Laws direct the COMELEC to
hold plebiscites to determine whether the voters in each respondent municipality approve of the
conversion of their municipality into a city. Petitioners filed the present petitions to declare the Cityhood
Laws unconstitutional for violation of Section 10, Article X of the Constitution.

ISSUE(S)
Are the Cityhood Laws in violation of Article X of the Constitution?

RULING
Yes. The Constitution is clear. The creation of local government units must follow the criteria established
in the Local Government Code and not in any other law. There is only one Local Government Code. The
Constitution requires Congress to stipulate in the Local Government Code all the criteria necessary for the
creation of a city, including the conversion of a municipality into a city. Congress cannot write such
criteria in any other law, like the Cityhood Laws.

The criteria prescribed in the Local Government Code govern exclusively the creation of a city. No other
law, not even the charter of the city, can govern such creation. The clear intent of the Constitution is to
insure that the creation of cities and other political units must follow the same uniform, non-
discriminatory criteria found solely in the Local Government Code. Any derogation or deviation from the
criteria prescribed in the Local Government Code violates Section 10, Article X of the Constitution.

RA 9009 amended Section 450 of the Local Government Code to increase the income requirement from
P20 million to P100 million for the creation of a city. This took effect on 30 June 2001. Hence, from that
moment the Local Government Code required that any municipality desiring to become a city must satisfy
the P100 million income requirement. Section 450 of the Local Government Code, as amended by RA
9009, does not contain any exemption from this income requirement.

98 Araullo v. Aquino (with MR on Feb. 3, 2015)

MARIA CAROLINA P. ARAULLO, CHAIRPERSON, BAGONG ALYANSANG MAKABAYAN; JUDY M.

TAGUIWALO, PROFESSOR, UNIVERSITY OF THE PHILIPPINES DILIMAN, CO-CHAIRPERSON,
PAGBABAGO; HENRI KAHN, CONCERNED CITIZENS MOVEMENT; REP. LUZ ILAGAN,
GABRIELA WOMEN'S PARTY REPRESENTATIVE; REP. CARLOS ISAGANI ZARATE, BAY AN
MUNA PARTY-LIST REPRESENTATIVE; RENATO M. REYES, JR., SECRETARY GENERAL OF
BAYAN; MANUEL K. DAYRIT, CHAIRMAN, ANG KAPATIRAN PARTY; VENCER MARI E.
CRISOSTOMO, CHAIRPERSON, ANAKBAYAN; VICTOR VILLANUEVA, CONVENOR, YOUTH ACT
NOW, Petitioners, vs. BENIGNO SIMEON C. AQUINO III, PRESIDENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF
THE PHILIPPINES; PAQUITO N. OCHOA, JR., EXECUTIVE SECRETARY; AND FLORENCIO B.
ABAD, SECRETARY OF THE DEPARTMENT OF BUDGET AND MANAGEMENT, Respondents.
G.R. No. 209287. July 1, 2014.

Ponente: J. Bersamin
Topic: Executive Department – Power of Executive Impoundment
Synopsis:
Impoundment of funds refers to the President’s power to refuse to spend appropriations or to retain or
deduct appropriations for whatever reason. Impoundment is actually prohibited by the GAA unless there
will be an unmanageable national government budget deficit (which did not happen). Nevertheless,
there’s no impoundment in the case at bar because what’s involved in the DAP was the transfer of funds.

Digest:
FACTS
When President Benigno Aquino III took office, his administration noticed the sluggish growth of the
economy. The World Bank advised that the economy needed a stimulus plan. Budget Secretary Florencio
Abad then came up with a program called the Disbursement Acceleration Program (DAP).

The DAP was seen as a remedy to speed up the funding of government projects. DAP enables the
Executive to realign funds from slow moving projects to priority projects instead of waiting for next year’s
appropriation. So what happens under the DAP was that if a certain government project is being
undertaken slowly by a certain executive agency, the funds allotted therefor will be withdrawn by the
Executive. Once withdrawn, these funds are declared as “savings” by the Executive and said funds will
then be reallotted to other priority projects. The DAP program did work to stimulate the economy as
economic growth was in fact reported and portion of such growth was attributed to the DAP (as noted by
the Supreme Court).

Meanwhile, in September 2013, Senator Jinggoy Estrada made an exposé claiming that he, and other
Senators, received Php50M from the President as an incentive for voting in favor of the impeachment of
then Chief Justice Renato Corona. Secretary Abad claimed that the money was taken from the DAP but
was disbursed upon the request of the Senators.
This apparently opened a can of worms as it turns out that the DAP does not only realign funds within
the Executive. It turns out that some non-Executive projects were also funded. This prompted Maria
Carolina Araullo, Chairperson of the Bagong Alyansang Makabayan, and several other concerned citizens
to file various petitions with the Supreme Court questioning the validity of the DAP. Among their
contentions was that DAP is unconstitutional because it violates the constitutional rule which provides
that “no money shall be paid out of the Treasury except in pursuance of an appropriation made by law.”

ISSUE(S)
1. Is the DAP in violation of Section 29(1), Art. VI of the Constitution?
2. Is the DAP a form of executive impoundment?

RULING
No. It is a program for prioritizing government spending. As such, it did not violate the Constitutional
provision cited The DAP did not violate Section 29(1), Art. VI of the Constitution. DAP was merely a
program by the Executive and is not a fund nor is it an appropriation in Section 29(1), Art. VI of the
Constitution. In DAP no additional funds were withdrawn from the Treasury otherwise, an appropriation
made by law would have been required. Funds, which were already appropriated for by the GAA, were
merely being realigned via the DAP.

The DAP is likewise also not considered executive impoundment. Impoundment of funds refers to the
President’s power to refuse to spend appropriations or to retain or deduct appropriations for whatever
reason. Impoundment is actually prohibited by the GAA unless there will be an unmanageable national
government budget deficit (which did not happen). Nevertheless, there’s no impoundment in the case at
bar because what’s involved in the DAP was the transfer of funds.

However, the Court in this case ruled that the transfers made through the DAP were unconstitutional. It
is true that the President (and even the heads of the other branches of the government) are allowed by
the Constitution to make realignment of funds, however, such transfer or realignment should only be
made “within their respective offices”. Thus, no cross-border transfers/augmentations may be allowed.
But under the DAP, this was violated because funds appropriated by the GAA for the Executive were
being transferred to the Legislative and other non-Executive agencies.

99 Republic v. Manalo

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, represented by the ANTI-MONEY LAUNDERING COUNCIL,

petitioner, vs. RAFAEL A. MANALO, GRACE M. OLIVA, and FREIDA Z. RIVERA-YAP,
respondents.
G.R. No. 192302. June 4, 2014.*

Ponente: J. Perlas-Bernabe
Topic: Judicial Department – Moot and Academic Issues
Synopsis:
A case or issue is considered moot and academic when it ceases to present a justiciable controversy by
virtue of supervening events, so that an adjudication of the case or a declaration on the issue would be
of no practical value or use. In such instance, there is no actual substantial relief which a petitioner would
be entitled to, and which would be negated by the dismissal of the petition. Courts generally decline
jurisdiction over such case or dismiss it on the ground of mootness, as a judgment in a case which
presents a moot question can no longer be enforced.

Digest:
FACTS
Petitioner Republic of the Philippines (Republic), represented in this case by the Anti-Money Laundering
Council (AMLC), filed a complaint for civil forfeiture, entitled “Republic v. R.A.B. Realty (Civil Case No. 03-
107308). Subsequently, it filed a second complaint for civil forfeiture, entitled “Republic v. Ariola, Jr., et
al.,” (Civil Case No. 03-107325) before the same court. The Republic sought the forfeiture in its favor of
certain deposits and government securities maintained in several bank accounts by the defendants
therein, which were related to the unlawful activity of fraudulently accepting investments from the public,
in violation of the Securities Regulation Code[10] as well as the Anti-Money Laundering Act of 2001.

On September 2006, herein respondents filed separate Motions for Leave to Intervene and Admit
Attached Answer-in-Intervention. In the civil forfeiture cases, respectively, alleging, inter alia, that they
have a valid interest in the bank accounts subject thereof. In this relation, they asserted that in a
separate petition for involuntary insolvency proceedings filed before the RTC of Makati City, where they
were appointed as assignees of the properties of Spouses Saturnino and Rosario Baladjay (Sps. Baladjay)
(as well as their conduit companies) who were impleaded as defendants in the aforementioned civil
forfeiture cases.

The Manila RTC rendered a Joint Order denying respondents’ separate motions for intervention.
Dissatisfied, respondents moved for reconsideration, which was likewise denied by the Manila RTC in an
Order dated January 10, 2008, prompting them to elevate the case to the CA on certiorari.

The CA granted respondents’ petition, ruling that the Manila RTC gravely abused its discretion in denying
respondents’ separate motions for intervention. It found that respondents were able to establish their
rights as assignees in the insolvency case filed by Sps. Baladjay. As such, they have a valid interest in the
bank accounts subject of the civil forfeiture cases.

ISSUE(S)
Whether the RTC committed grave abuse of discretion in denying the separate motion for intervention

RULING
No. The petition must be dismissed for having become moot and academic.

A case or issue is considered moot and academic when it ceases to present a justiciable controversy by
virtue of supervening events, so that an adjudication of the case or a declaration on the issue would be
of no practical value or use. In such instance, there is no actual substantial relief which a petitioner would
be entitled to, and which would be negated by the dismissal of the petition. Courts generally decline
jurisdiction over such case or dismiss it on the ground of mootness, as a judgment in a case which
presents a moot question can no longer be enforced.

Note: During the pendency of the petition, the Manila RTC rendered a Decision in Civil Case No. Civil
Case No. 03-107325 and Civil Case No. 03-107308, which ordered the assets subject of said cases
forfeited in favor of the government. In view thereof, the Republic prayed it be excused from filing the
required reply which the Court granted in a Resolution dated June 3, 2013.

100 Philippine Migrant Rights Watch v. OWWA

Philippine Migrants Rights Watch, Inc. vs. Overseas Workers Welfare Administration
G.R. No. 166923. November 26, 2014.

Ponente: J. Peralta
Topic: Judicial Department – Jurisdiction on Constitutionality
Synopsis:
The RTC has jurisdiction in resolving the constitutionality of a:
1. statute,
2. presidential decree (PD),
3. executive order (EO), or
4. administrative regulation, as recognized in
Section 2(a), Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution.

Digest:
FACTS
On September 19, 2003, respondent Overseas Workers Welfare Administration (OWWA) issued Board
Resolution No. 038 entitled the OWWA Omnibus Policies to provide guidelines on matters concerning
OWWA membership and its coverage, collection of contributions, and availment of benefits. Petitioners
filed a complaint before the RTC of Pasay assailing the unconstitutionality of the policy. On August 31,
2004, the RTC promulgated its Order dismissing the complaint saying that it has no jurisdiction over the
complaint. As such, it ruled that the appropriate remedy to annul and set aside the subject issuance was
a special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court.

ISSUE(S)
Whether or not the RTC committed reversible error of law in dismissing the complaint on the ground of
lack of jurisdiction to try cases involving the constitutionality of administrative rules and regulations

RULING
Yes, RTC erred in dismissing the complaint of the petitioners. It is settled in law and jurisprudence that
the Regional Trial Court (RTC) has jurisdiction to resolve the constitutionality of a
1. statute,
2. presidential decree (PD),
3. executive order (EO), or
4. administrative regulation, as recognized in
Section 2(a), Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution.-

Further, RTC erred in saying that the proper remedy is a special civil action under Rule 65. Certiorari, as a
special civil action, is available only if: (1) it is directed against a tribunal, board, or officer exercising
judicial or quasi-judicial functions; (2) the tribunal, board, or officer acted without or in excess of
jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction; and (3) there is
no appeal nor any plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law.

101 De Castro v. JBC

[CASE TITLE]
[G.R. NO. DATE.]

Ponente: J.
Topic:
Synopsis:

Digest:
FACTS

ISSUE(S)
RULING

102 Chavez v. JBC (with MR on April 16, 2013)

[CASE TITLE]
[G.R. NO. DATE.]

Ponente: J.
Topic:
Synopsis:

Digest:
FACTS

ISSUE(S)

RULING

103 Jardeleza v. Chief Justice Sereno

[CASE TITLE]
[G.R. NO. DATE.]

Ponente: J.
Topic:
Synopsis:

Digest:
FACTS

ISSUE(S)

RULING

104 Villanueva v. JBC

[CASE TITLE]
[G.R. NO. DATE.]
Ponente: J.
Topic:
Synopsis:

Digest:
FACTS

ISSUE(S)

RULING

105 Aguinaldo v. Aquino (with MR on February 21, 2017)

[CASE TITLE]
[G.R. NO. DATE.]

Ponente: J.
Topic:
Synopsis:

Digest:
FACTS

ISSUE(S)

RULING

106 Re: Seniority among the 4 Most Recent Appointments to the CA

[CASE TITLE]
[G.R. NO. DATE.]

Ponente: J.
Topic:
Synopsis:

Digest:
FACTS

ISSUE(S)
RULING

107 In the Matter of: SC Judicial Independence vs. Abolishment of JDF

[CASE TITLE]
[G.R. NO. DATE.]

Ponente: J.
Topic:
Synopsis:

Digest:
FACTS

ISSUE(S)

RULING

108 Re: Allegations made under oath at the Senate Blue Ribbon Hearing

[CASE TITLE]
[G.R. NO. DATE.]

Ponente: J.
Topic:
Synopsis:

Digest:
FACTS

ISSUE(S)

RULING

109 Re: Anonymous Letter Complaint on the alleged…of Ms. Dolores Lopez,...

[CASE TITLE]
[G.R. NO. DATE.]

Ponente: J.
Topic:
Synopsis:

Digest:
FACTS

ISSUE(S)

RULING

110 Ampong v. CSC

[CASE TITLE]
[G.R. NO. DATE.]

Ponente: J.
Topic:
Synopsis:

Digest:
FACTS

ISSUE(S)

RULING

111 Re: Complaint dated January 28, 2014 of Wenefredo Parreno… (J. Bersamin)

[CASE TITLE]
[G.R. NO. DATE.]

Ponente: J.
Topic:
Synopsis:

Digest:
FACTS

ISSUE(S)

RULING
112 Reyes v. Reyes

[CASE TITLE]
[G.R. NO. DATE.]

Ponente: J.
Topic:
Synopsis:

Digest:
FACTS

ISSUE(S)

RULING

113 CSC v. DBM

[CASE TITLE]
[G.R. NO. DATE.]

Ponente: J.
Topic:
Synopsis:

Digest:
FACTS

ISSUE(S)

RULING

114 Funa v. Villar

[CASE TITLE]
[G.R. NO. DATE.]

Ponente: J.
Topic:
Synopsis:

Digest:
FACTS

ISSUE(S)

RULING

115 Funa v. Agra

[CASE TITLE]
[G.R. NO. DATE.]

Ponente: J.
Topic:
Synopsis:

Digest:
FACTS

ISSUE(S)

RULING

116 Public Interest Center, Inc., v. Elma

[CASE TITLE]
[G.R. NO. DATE.]

Ponente: J.
Topic:
Synopsis:

Digest:
FACTS

ISSUE(S)

RULING
117 Funa v. Executive Secretary

[CASE TITLE]
[G.R. NO. DATE.]

Ponente: J.
Topic:
Synopsis:

Digest:
FACTS

ISSUE(S)

RULING

118 Funa v. Duque

[CASE TITLE]
[G.R. NO. DATE.]

Ponente: J.
Topic:
Synopsis:

Digest:
FACTS

ISSUE(S)

RULING

119 Pareno v. COA

[CASE TITLE]
[G.R. NO. DATE.]

Ponente: J.
Topic:
Synopsis:
Digest:
FACTS

ISSUE(S)

RULING

120 Carolino v. Senga

[CASE TITLE]
[G.R. NO. DATE.]

Ponente: J.
Topic:
Synopsis:

Digest:
FACTS

ISSUE(S)

RULING

121 Maritime Industry Authority v. COA

[CASE TITLE]
[G.R. NO. DATE.]

Ponente: J.
Topic:
Synopsis:

Digest:
FACTS

ISSUE(S)

RULING
122 NTC v. COA

[CASE TITLE]
[G.R. NO. DATE.]

Ponente: J.
Topic:
Synopsis:

Digest:
FACTS

ISSUE(S)

RULING

123 Civil Service Commission v. Court of Appeals

[CASE TITLE]
[G.R. NO. DATE.]

Ponente: J.
Topic:
Synopsis:

Digest:
FACTS

ISSUE(S)

RULING

124 Department of Finance v. Hon. Mariano Dela Cruz

[CASE TITLE]
[G.R. NO. DATE.]

Ponente: J.
Topic:
Synopsis:
Digest:
FACTS

ISSUE(S)

RULING

125 CSC v. Pobre

[CASE TITLE]
[G.R. NO. DATE.]

Ponente: J.
Topic:
Synopsis:

Digest:
FACTS

ISSUE(S)

RULING

126 Nacion v. COA, et al.

[CASE TITLE]
[G.R. NO. DATE.]

Ponente: J.
Topic:
Synopsis:

Digest:
FACTS

ISSUE(S)

RULING
127 Espinas, et al. v. COA

[CASE TITLE]
[G.R. NO. DATE.]

Ponente: J.
Topic:
Synopsis:

Digest:
FACTS

ISSUE(S)

RULING

128 The Law Firm of Laguesma, etc. v. COA

[CASE TITLE]
[G.R. NO. DATE.]

Ponente: J.
Topic:
Synopsis:

Digest:
FACTS

ISSUE(S)

RULING

129 TESDA v. COA

[CASE TITLE]
[G.R. NO. DATE.]

Ponente: J.
Topic:
Synopsis:

Digest:
FACTS

ISSUE(S)

RULING

130 PEZA v. COA

[CASE TITLE]
[G.R. NO. DATE.]

Ponente: J.
Topic:
Synopsis:

Digest:
FACTS

ISSUE(S)

RULING

131 Re: COA opinion on the Computation of Appraised Value of Properties…

[CASE TITLE]
[G.R. NO. DATE.]

Ponente: J.
Topic:
Synopsis:

Digest:
FACTS

ISSUE(S)

RULING
132 Causing v. COMELEC

[CASE TITLE]
[G.R. NO. DATE.]

Ponente: J.
Topic:
Synopsis:

Digest:
FACTS

ISSUE(S)

RULING

133 Blajonda v. COMELEC

[CASE TITLE]
[G.R. NO. DATE.]

Ponente: J.
Topic:
Synopsis:

Digest:
FACTS

ISSUE(S)

RULING

134 Galang v. Geronimo

[CASE TITLE]
[G.R. NO. DATE.]

Ponente: J.
Topic:
Synopsis:

Digest:
FACTS
ISSUE(S)

RULING

135 Bulilis v. Nuez

[CASE TITLE]
[G.R. NO. DATE.]

Ponente: J.
Topic:
Synopsis:

Digest:
FACTS

ISSUE(S)

RULING

136 Fernandez v. COMELEC

[CASE TITLE]
[G.R. NO. DATE.]

Ponente: J.
Topic:
Synopsis:

Digest:
FACTS

ISSUE(S)

RULING

137 Cawasa v. COMELEC

[CASE TITLE]
[G.R. NO. DATE.]

Ponente: J.
Topic:
Synopsis:

Digest:
FACTS

ISSUE(S)

RULING

138 COMELEC v. Espanol

[CASE TITLE]
[G.R. NO. DATE.]

Ponente: J.
Topic:
Synopsis:

Digest:
FACTS

ISSUE(S)

RULING

139 Mutilan v. COMELEC

[CASE TITLE]
[G.R. NO. DATE.]

Ponente: J.
Topic:
Synopsis:

Digest:
FACTS
ISSUE(S)

RULING

140 Sevilla v. COMELEC

[CASE TITLE]
[G.R. NO. DATE.]

Ponente: J.
Topic:
Synopsis:

Digest:
FACTS

ISSUE(S)

RULING

141 Philippine Press Institute v. COMELEC

[CASE TITLE]
[G.R. NO. DATE.]

Ponente: J.
Topic:
Synopsis:

Digest:
FACTS

ISSUE(S)

RULING

142 Telecommunications & Broadcast Attorneys of the Phils. v. COMELEC

[CASE TITLE]
[G.R. NO. DATE.]

Ponente: J.
Topic:
Synopsis:

Digest:
FACTS

ISSUE(S)

RULING

143 GMA Network, Inc., et al. v. COMELEC

[CASE TITLE]
[G.R. NO. DATE.]

Ponente: J.
Topic:
Synopsis:

Digest:
FACTS

ISSUE(S)

RULING

144 1-Utak v. COMELEC

[CASE TITLE]
[G.R. NO. DATE.]

Ponente: J.
Topic:
Synopsis:

Digest:
FACTS
ISSUE(S)

RULING

145 Maruhom v. COMELEC

[CASE TITLE]
[G.R. NO. DATE.]

Ponente: J.
Topic:
Synopsis:

Digest:
FACTS

ISSUE(S)

RULING

146 Gunsi, Sr. v. COMELEC

[CASE TITLE]
[G.R. NO. DATE.]

Ponente: J.
Topic:
Synopsis:

Digest:
FACTS

ISSUE(S)

RULING

147 Quinto v. COMELEC

[CASE TITLE]
[G.R. NO. DATE.]

Ponente: J.
Topic:
Synopsis:

Digest:
FACTS

ISSUE(S)

RULING

148 Luna v. COMELEC

[CASE TITLE]
[G.R. NO. DATE.]

Ponente: J.
Topic:
Synopsis:

Digest:
FACTS

ISSUE(S)

RULING

149 Cerafica v. COMELEC

[CASE TITLE]
[G.R. NO. DATE.]

Ponente: J.
Topic:
Synopsis:

Digest:
FACTS

ISSUE(S)
RULING

150 Jalover v. Osmena and COMELEC

[CASE TITLE]
[G.R. NO. DATE.]

Ponente: J.
Topic:
Synopsis:

Digest:
FACTS

ISSUE(S)

RULING

151 Timbol v. COMELEC

[CASE TITLE]
[G.R. NO. DATE.]

Ponente: J.
Topic:
Synopsis:

Digest:
FACTS

ISSUE(S)

RULING

152 Penera v. COMELEC

[CASE TITLE]
[G.R. NO. DATE.]
Ponente: J.
Topic:
Synopsis:

Digest:
FACTS

ISSUE(S)

RULING

153 Poe v. Macapagal-Arroyo

[CASE TITLE]
[G.R. NO. DATE.]

Ponente: J.
Topic:
Synopsis:

Digest:
FACTS

ISSUE(S)

RULING

154 Santiago v. Ramos

[CASE TITLE]
[G.R. NO. DATE.]

Ponente: J.
Topic:
Synopsis:

Digest:
FACTS

ISSUE(S)
RULING

155 Legarda v. De Castro

[CASE TITLE]
[G.R. NO. DATE.]

Ponente: J.
Topic:
Synopsis:

Digest:
FACTS

ISSUE(S)

RULING

156 Roxas v. Binay

[CASE TITLE]
[G.R. NO. DATE.]

Ponente: J.
Topic:
Synopsis:

Digest:
FACTS

ISSUE(S)

RULING

157 Vinzons-Chato v. HRET/Panotes v. HRET

[CASE TITLE]
[G.R. NO. DATE.]
Ponente: J.
Topic:
Synopsis:

Digest:
FACTS

ISSUE(S)

RULING

158 Mayor Emmanuel Maliksi v. COMELEC

[CASE TITLE]
[G.R. NO. DATE.]

Ponente: J.
Topic:
Synopsis:

Digest:
FACTS

ISSUE(S)

RULING

159 Jalosjos, Jr. v. COMELEC

[CASE TITLE]
[G.R. NO. DATE.]

Ponente: J.
Topic:
Synopsis:

Digest:
FACTS

ISSUE(S)
RULING

160 Maquiling v. COMELEC

[CASE TITLE]
[G.R. NO. DATE.]

Ponente: J.
Topic:
Synopsis:

Digest:
FACTS

ISSUE(S)

RULING

161 Federico v. COMELEC

[CASE TITLE]
[G.R. NO. DATE.]

Ponente: J.
Topic:
Synopsis:

Digest:
FACTS

ISSUE(S)

RULING

162 Jalosjos, Jr. v. COMELEC

[CASE TITLE]
[G.R. NO. DATE.]

Ponente: J.
Topic:
Synopsis:

Digest:
FACTS

ISSUE(S)

RULING

163 Aratea v. COMELEC

[CASE TITLE]
[G.R. NO. DATE.]

Ponente: J.
Topic:
Synopsis:

Digest:
FACTS

ISSUE(S)

RULING

164 Talaga v. COMELEC

[CASE TITLE]
[G.R. NO. DATE.]

Ponente: J.
Topic:
Synopsis:

Digest:
FACTS

ISSUE(S)

RULING
165 Hayudini v. COMELEC

[CASE TITLE]
[G.R. NO. DATE.]

Ponente: J.
Topic:
Synopsis:

Digest:
FACTS

ISSUE(S)

RULING

166 E.R. Ejercito v. COMELEC and San Luis

[CASE TITLE]
[G.R. NO. DATE.]

Ponente: J.
Topic:
Synopsis:

Digest:
FACTS

ISSUE(S)

RULING

167 Maturan v. COMELEC

[CASE TITLE]
[G.R. NO. DATE.]

Ponente: J.
Topic:
Synopsis:

Digest:
FACTS

ISSUE(S)

RULING

168 Pundaodaya v. Noble

[CASE TITLE]
[G.R. NO. DATE.]

Ponente: J.
Topic:
Synopsis:

Digest:
FACTS

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RULING

169 Sabili v. COMELEC

[CASE TITLE]
[G.R. NO. DATE.]

Ponente: J.
Topic:
Synopsis:

Digest:
FACTS

ISSUE(S)

RULING
170 Jalover v. Osmena

[CASE TITLE]
[G.R. NO. DATE.]

Ponente: J.
Topic:
Synopsis:

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FACTS

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RULING

171 In re: Vicente Ching

[CASE TITLE]
[G.R. NO. DATE.]

Ponente: J.
Topic:
Synopsis:

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FACTS

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RULING

172 Cabiling v. Commissioner of Immigration

[CASE TITLE]
[G.R. NO. DATE.]

Ponente: J.
Topic:
Synopsis:
Digest:
FACTS

ISSUE(S)

RULING

173 Republic v. Sagun

[CASE TITLE]
[G.R. NO. DATE.]

Ponente: J.
Topic:
Synopsis:

Digest:
FACTS

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RULING

174 Bengson v. HRET

[CASE TITLE]
[G.R. NO. DATE.]

Ponente: J.
Topic:
Synopsis:

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RULING
175 AASJS v. Datumanong

[CASE TITLE]
[G.R. NO. DATE.]

Ponente: J.
Topic:
Synopsis:

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176 Lewis v. COMELEC

[CASE TITLE]
[G.R. NO. DATE.]

Ponente: J.
Topic:
Synopsis:

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177 Cordora v. COMELEC

[CASE TITLE]
[G.R. NO. DATE.]

Ponente: J.
Topic:
Synopsis:
Digest:
FACTS

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RULING

178 Sobejana-Condon v. COMELEC

[CASE TITLE]
[G.R. NO. DATE.]

Ponente: J.
Topic:
Synopsis:

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179 Republic v. Batuigas

[CASE TITLE]
[G.R. NO. DATE.]

Ponente: J.
Topic:
Synopsis:

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180 Tabasa v. Court of Appeals

[CASE TITLE]
[G.R. NO. DATE.]

Ponente: J.
Topic:
Synopsis:

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181 Japson v. COMELEC

[CASE TITLE]
[G.R. NO. DATE.]

Ponente: J.
Topic:
Synopsis:

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182 Republic v. Huang Te Fu a.k.a. Robert Uy

[CASE TITLE]
[G.R. NO. DATE.]

Ponente: J.
Topic:
Synopsis:

Digest:
FACTS

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183 Jacot v. Dal

[CASE TITLE]
[G.R. NO. DATE.]

Ponente: J.
Topic:
Synopsis:

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184 Mercado v. Manzano

[CASE TITLE]
[G.R. NO. DATE.]

Ponente: J.
Topic:
Synopsis:

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185 Tecson v. COMELEC

[CASE TITLE]
[G.R. NO. DATE.]

Ponente: J.
Topic:
Synopsis:

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FACTS

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RULING

186 David v. Agbay

[CASE TITLE]
[G.R. NO. DATE.]

Ponente: J.
Topic:
Synopsis:

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187 Dennis Go v. Republic

[CASE TITLE]
[G.R. NO. DATE.]

Ponente: J.
Topic:
Synopsis:

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ISSUE(S)

RULING

188 Republic v. Li Ching Chung

[CASE TITLE]
[G.R. NO. DATE.]

Ponente: J.
Topic:
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189 Ledesma v. CA

[CASE TITLE]
[G.R. NO. DATE.]

Ponente: J.
Topic:
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190 Francisco v. House of Representatives

[CASE TITLE]
[G.R. NO. DATE.]

Ponente: J.
Topic:
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191 Guttierez v. House of Representatives Committee on Justice

[CASE TITLE]
[G.R. NO. DATE.]

Ponente: J.
Topic:
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192 Estarija v. Ranada

[CASE TITLE]
[G.R. NO. DATE.]

Ponente: J.
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193 Macalino v. Sandiganbayan

[CASE TITLE]
[G.R. NO. DATE.]

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194 Gonzales III v. Office of the President

[CASE TITLE]
[G.R. NO. DATE.]

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195 Dichaves v. Ombudsman

[CASE TITLE]
[G.R. NO. DATE.]

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196 Salumbides v. Ombudsman

[CASE TITLE]
[G.R. NO. DATE.]

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197 Khan, Jr. v. Ombudsman

[CASE TITLE]
[G.R. NO. DATE.]

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198 Ombudsman v. Estandarte

[CASE TITLE]
[G.R. NO. DATE.]

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199 Ombudsman v. CA (Ombudsman v. Lucero, November 24/ 2006)

[CASE TITLE]
[G.R. NO. DATE.]

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200 Garcia v. Miro

[CASE TITLE]
[G.R. NO. DATE.]

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201 Ledesma v. CA

[CASE TITLE]
[G.R. NO. DATE.]

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202 Ombudsman v. Galica

[CASE TITLE]
[G.R. NO. DATE.]

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203 Garcia-Rueda v. Pascasio

[CASE TITLE]
[G.R. NO. DATE.]

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204 Presidential ad hoc Committee on Behest Loans v. Desierto

[CASE TITLE]
[G.R. NO. DATE.]

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205 Villasenor v. Sandiganbayan

[CASE TITLE]
[G.R. NO. DATE.]
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206 Navarro v. Executive Secretary

[CASE TITLE]
[G.R. NO. DATE.]

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207 Umali v. COMELEC

[CASE TITLE]
[G.R. NO. DATE.]

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208 Dela Rama v. CA

[CASE TITLE]
[G.R. NO. DATE.]

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209 Sangguniang Barangay of Don Mariano Marcos v. PB Martinez

[CASE TITLE]
[G.R. NO. DATE.]

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210 League of Cities of the Philippines v. COMELEC

[CASE TITLE]
[G.R. NO. DATE.]
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211 Acaac v. Azcuna

[CASE TITLE]
[G.R. NO. DATE.]

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212 Damasen v. Tumamao

[CASE TITLE]
[G.R. NO. DATE.]

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213 Tayaban v. People

[CASE TITLE]
[G.R. NO. DATE.]

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214 AC Enterprises, Inc. v. Frabella Properties Corp.

[CASE TITLE]
[G.R. NO. DATE.]

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215 Canet v. Docena

[CASE TITLE]
[G.R. NO. DATE.]

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216 Pimentel, Jr. v. Aguirre

[CASE TITLE]
[G.R. NO. DATE.]

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217 City Government of Quezon, et al. v. Bayan Com.

[CASE TITLE]
[G.R. NO. DATE.]

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218 Batangas CATV v. CA

[CASE TITLE]
[G.R. NO. DATE.]

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219 Asean Pacific Planners v. City of Urdaneta

[CASE TITLE]
[G.R. NO. DATE.]

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220 Provincial Government of Camarines Norte v. Beatriz Gonzales

[CASE TITLE]
[G.R. NO. DATE.]

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221 OSG v. CA and Municipal Government of Saguiran, Lanao Del Sur

[CASE TITLE]
[G.R. NO. DATE.]

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222 Alinsug v. RTC br. 58

[CASE TITLE]
[G.R. NO. DATE.]

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223 Municipality of Hagonoy v. Dumdum

[CASE TITLE]
[G.R. NO. DATE.]

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224 City of Caloocan v. Allarde

[CASE TITLE]
[G.R. NO. DATE.]

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225 Rimando v. Naguilian Emission Testing

[CASE TITLE]
[G.R. NO. DATE.]

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226 Vergara v. Ombudsman

[CASE TITLE]
[G.R. NO. DATE.]

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227 Governor L-Ray Villafuerte, Jr., v. Sec. Robredo

[CASE TITLE]
[G.R. NO. DATE.]

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228 Republic v. City of Paranaque

[CASE TITLE]
[G.R. NO. DATE.]

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229 Hon. Paje v. Jon. Casino

[CASE TITLE]
[G.R. NO. DATE.]

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230 SK Board of Election Supervisors of Subic v. Rigonan

[CASE TITLE]
[G.R. NO. DATE.]

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231 Crisostomo Aquino v. Municipality of Malay, Aklan

[CASE TITLE]
[G.R. NO. DATE.]

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232 Municipality of San Juan v. CA

[CASE TITLE]
[G.R. NO. DATE.]

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233 City of General Santos v. COA

[CASE TITLE]
[G.R. NO. DATE.]

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234 Sebastian v. Lagmay-Ng

[CASE TITLE]
[G.R. NO. DATE.]

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235 Miguel v. Montanez

[CASE TITLE]
[G.R. NO. DATE.]

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236 Borja v. COMELEC

[CASE TITLE]
[G.R. NO. DATE.]

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237 Lonzanida v. COMELEC (Dizon v. COMELEC, GR 182088)

[CASE TITLE]
[G.R. NO. DATE.]

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238 Montebon, et al. v. COMELEC

[CASE TITLE]
[G.R. NO. DATE.]

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239 Abundo v. COMELEC

[CASE TITLE]
[G.R. NO. DATE.]

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240 Ong v. Alegre (Rivera v. COMELEC, GR 167591)

[CASE TITLE]
[G.R. NO. DATE.]

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241 Latasa v. COMELEC

[CASE TITLE]
[G.R. NO. DATE.]

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242 Adormeo v. COMELEC

[CASE TITLE]
[G.R. NO. DATE.]

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243 Aldovino, Jr. v. COMELEC

[CASE TITLE]
[G.R. NO. DATE.]

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244 Naval v. COMELEC

[CASE TITLE]
[G.R. NO. DATE.]

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245 Goh v. Bayron and COMELEC

[CASE TITLE]
[G.R. NO. DATE.]

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246 Espina v. Zamora

[CASE TITLE]
[G.R. NO. DATE.]

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247 Republic v. Pagadian City Timber

[CASE TITLE]
[G.R. NO. DATE.]

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248 Gamboa v. Secretary of Finance

[CASE TITLE]
[G.R. NO. DATE.]

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249 Resident Marine Mammals v. Secretary Angelo Reyes

[CASE TITLE]
[G.R. NO. DATE.]

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250 Yinlu Bicol Mining Corp. v. Trans-Asia Oil and Energy Development Corp.

[CASE TITLE]
[G.R. NO. DATE.]

Ponente: J.
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251 Matthews v. Taylor

[CASE TITLE]
[G.R. NO. DATE.]

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252 Republic v. Register of Deeds

[CASE TITLE]
[G.R. NO. DATE.]

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253 Acebedo Optical v. CA

[CASE TITLE]
[G.R. NO. DATE.]

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254 Avon Cosmetics v. Luna

[CASE TITLE]
[G.R. NO. DATE.]

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255 In re: Benjamin Dacanay

[CASE TITLE]
[G.R. NO. DATE.]

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256 In re: Petition to re-acquire the privilege to practice law

[CASE TITLE]
[G.R. NO. DATE.]

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257 Victor Lingan v. Attys. Romeo Calubaquib and Jimmy Baliga

[CASE TITLE]
[G.R. NO. DATE.]

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258 Airlift Asia v. CA

[CASE TITLE]
[G.R. NO. DATE.]
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259 Carpio-Morales v. CA and Jejomar Erwin Binay, Jr.

[CASE TITLE]
[G.R. NO. DATE.]

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260 Ugdoracion v. COMELEC

[CASE TITLE]
[G.R. NO. DATE.]

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I. Administrative Law

1 MMDA v. Garin

[CASE TITLE]
[G.R. NO. DATE.]

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2 GSIS v. COA

[CASE TITLE]
[G.R. NO. DATE.]

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3 Soriano v. MTRCB

[CASE TITLE]
[G.R. NO. DATE.]

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4 GMA v. MTRCB

[CASE TITLE]
[G.R. NO. DATE.]

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5 Board of Trustees v. Velasco

[CASE TITLE]
[G.R. NO. DATE.]

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6 Garcia v. Molina

[CASE TITLE]
[G.R. NO. DATE.]

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7 NASECOR v. ERC

[CASE TITLE]
[G.R. NO. DATE.]

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8 PNR v. Kanlaon Construction Ent. Co. Inc.

[CASE TITLE]
[G.R. NO. DATE.]

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9 Pharmaceuticals and Health Care Association Phils. v. Duque

[CASE TITLE]
[G.R. NO. DATE.]

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10 Public Hearing Committee of the LLDA v. SM Prime Holdings

[CASE TITLE]
[G.R. NO. DATE.]

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11 Flores v. Montemayor

[CASE TITLE]
[G.R. NO. DATE.]

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12 Carpio-Morales v. CA and Jejomar Erwin Binay, Jr.

[CASE TITLE]
[G.R. NO. DATE.]

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13 Salumbides v. Ombudsman
[CASE TITLE]
[G.R. NO. DATE.]

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14 PAGCOR v. De Guzman

[CASE TITLE]
[G.R. NO. DATE.]

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15 Republic v. Transunion Corp.

[CASE TITLE]
[G.R. NO. DATE.]

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16 Department of Finance v. Hon. Mariano Dela Cruz

[CASE TITLE]
[G.R. NO. DATE.]

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II. Law on Public Officers

1 Eljansantos v. Special Presidential Task Force 156

[CASE TITLE]
[G.R. NO. DATE.]

Ponente: J.
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2 Anonymous Letter Complaint Against Reynaldo C. Alcantara…

[CASE TITLE]
[G.R. NO. DATE.]

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3 CSC and DOST v. ARANDIA

[CASE TITLE]
[G.R. NO. DATE.]

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4 Velasco v. Obispo

[CASE TITLE]
[G.R. NO. DATE.]

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5 Pagaduan v. CSC

[CASE TITLE]
[G.R. NO. DATE.]

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6 CSC v. Andal

[CASE TITLE]
[G.R. NO. DATE.]

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7 Ombudsman v. Cabreroy

[CASE TITLE]
[G.R. NO. DATE.]

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8 Abad v. Dela Cruz

[CASE TITLE]
[G.R. NO. DATE.]

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9 PAGCOR v. De Guzman

[CASE TITLE]
[G.R. NO. DATE.]

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10 Argel v. Singson

[CASE TITLE]
[G.R. NO. DATE.]

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11 DBP v. COA

[CASE TITLE]
[G.R. NO. DATE.]

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12 Ombudsman v. De Zosa

[CASE TITLE]
[G.R. NO. DATE.]

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13 Republic v. Arias

[CASE TITLE]
[G.R. NO. DATE.]

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14 CSC v. Vergel De Rios

[CASE TITLE]
[G.R. NO. DATE.]

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15 SPO4 Laud v. People

[CASE TITLE]
[G.R. NO. DATE.]

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16 Sabijon v. De Juan

[CASE TITLE]
[G.R. NO. DATE.]

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17 Casimiro, et al. v. Rigor

[CASE TITLE]
[G.R. NO. DATE.]

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18 Airlift Asia Customs Brokerage, Inc. v. CA

[CASE TITLE]
[G.R. NO. DATE.]

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19 Buena v. Benito

[CASE TITLE]
[G.R. NO. DATE.]

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20 Lagoc v. Malaga, et al.

[CASE TITLE]
[G.R. NO. DATE.]

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21 Ombudsman v. Caberoy

[CASE TITLE]
[G.R. NO. DATE.]

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22 CSC v. Cotes

[CASE TITLE]
[G.R. NO. DATE.]

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23 Causing v. COMELEC

[CASE TITLE]
[G.R. NO. DATE.]

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24 NTC v. COA

[CASE TITLE]
[G.R. NO. DATE.]

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25 CAAP-EU v. CAAP

[CASE TITLE]
[G.R. NO. DATE.]

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26 Moncayo Integrated Small-Scale Miners Association v. Southeast Mindanao Mining

[CASE TITLE]
[G.R. NO. DATE.]

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27 Zambales II Electric Cooperative, Inc. (Zameco II) v. Castillejos Consumers Assoc.

[CASE TITLE]
[G.R. NO. DATE.]

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28 TESDA v. COA

[CASE TITLE]
[G.R. NO. DATE.]

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29 Provincial Government of Camarines Norte v. Beatriz Gonzales

[CASE TITLE]
[G.R. NO. DATE.]

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30 Re: Anonymous Letter Complaint on the alleged…of Ms. Dolores Lopez,...

[CASE TITLE]
[G.R. NO. DATE.]

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III. Public International Law

1 Pimentel v. Executive Secretary

[CASE TITLE]
[G.R. NO. DATE.]

Ponente: J.
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2 Kuroda v. Jalandoni

[CASE TITLE]
[G.R. NO. DATE.]

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3 Mijares v. Ranada

[CASE TITLE]
[G.R. NO. DATE.]

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4 Razon v. Tagitis

[CASE TITLE]
[G.R. NO. DATE.]

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5 Wright v. CA

[CASE TITLE]
[G.R. NO. DATE.]

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6 Secretary of Justice v. Judge Lantion

[CASE TITLE]
[G.R. NO. DATE.]

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7 US v. Purganan

[CASE TITLE]
[G.R. NO. DATE.]

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8 Government of Hongkong Special Administrative Region v. Judge Olalia, Jr.

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[G.R. NO. DATE.]

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9 Government of Hongkong Special Administrative Region v. Munoz

[CASE TITLE]
[G.R. NO. DATE.]

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10 Republic v. Sandiganbayan

[CASE TITLE]
[G.R. NO. DATE.]

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11 Republic of Indonesia v. Vinzon

[CASE TITLE]
[G.R. NO. DATE.]

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12 China National Machinery & Equipment Corp. v. Santamaria

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13 Vinuya v. Executive Secretary Romulo

[CASE TITLE]
[G.R. NO. DATE.]

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14 Bayan Muna v. Romulo

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15 Saguisag v. Executive Secretary

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16 Mirpuri v. CA

[CASE TITLE]
[G.R. NO. DATE.]

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17 LBP v. Atlanta Industries, Inc.

[CASE TITLE]
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18 Arigo v. Swift

[CASE TITLE]
[G.R. NO. DATE.]

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IV. Constitutional Law II

1 Ynot v. IAC

[CASE TITLE]
[G.R. NO. DATE.]

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2 Beltran v. Secretary of Health

[CASE TITLE]
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3 Philippine Association of Service Exporters, Inc. v. Drilon

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4 PRC v. De Guzman

[CASE TITLE]
[G.R. NO. DATE.]

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5 MMDA v. Bel-Air Village Association

[CASE TITLE]
[G.R. NO. DATE.]

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6 Binay v. Domingo

[CASE TITLE]
[G.R. NO. DATE.]

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7 City of Manila v. Judge Laguio

[CASE TITLE]
[G.R. NO. DATE.]

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8 White Light Corporation v. City of Manila

[CASE TITLE]
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9 City of Manila v. Judge Laguio

[CASE TITLE]
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10 Acebedo Optical v. CA

[CASE TITLE]
[G.R. NO. DATE.]

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11 ABS-CBN v. PMSI

[CASE TITLE]
[G.R. NO. DATE.]

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12 City Government of Quezon v. Judge Ericta

[CASE TITLE]
[G.R. NO. DATE.]

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13 DOH and FDA v. Philip Morris Philippines Manufacturing, Inc.

[CASE TITLE]
[G.R. NO. DATE.]

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14 OSG v. Ayala Land, Inc.

[CASE TITLE]
[G.R. NO. DATE.]

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15 City of Manila v. Melba Tan

[CASE TITLE]
[G.R. NO. DATE.]

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16 Tawang Multi-Purpose Cooperative v. La Trinidad Water District

[CASE TITLE]
[G.R. NO. DATE.]

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17 DAR v. Berina

[CASE TITLE]
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18 DAR v. Spouses Sta. Romana

[CASE TITLE]
[G.R. NO. DATE.]

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19 Mactan Cebu International Airport v. Lozada

[CASE TITLE]
[G.R. NO. DATE.]

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20 Ouano v. Republic/Mactan Cebu v. Inocian/Heirs of Moreno v. Mactan Cebu

[CASE TITLE]
[G.R. NO. DATE.]

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21 Air Transportation Office v. Spouses Ramos

[CASE TITLE]
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22 Secretary of the DPWH v. Spouses Tecson

[CASE TITLE]
[G.R. NO. DATE.]

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23 Secretary of the DPWH v. Spouses Tecson

[CASE TITLE]
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24 City of Manila v. Te

[CASE TITLE]
[G.R. NO. DATE.]

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25 NPC v. Maria Mendoza San Pedro

[CASE TITLE]
[G.R. NO. DATE.]

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26 Reyes v. NHA

[CASE TITLE]
[G.R. NO. DATE.]

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27 NPC v. Manalastas

[CASE TITLE]
[G.R. NO. DATE.]

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28 Manapat v. CA

[CASE TITLE]
[G.R. NO. DATE.]

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29 Republic v. Judge Gingoyon

[CASE TITLE]
[G.R. NO. DATE.]

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30 NPC v. Lucman Ibrahim

[CASE TITLE]
[G.R. NO. DATE.]

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31 Republic v. Sarabia

[CASE TITLE]
[G.R. NO. DATE.]

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32 Francia, Jr. v. Municipality of Meycauayan

[CASE TITLE]
[G.R. NO. DATE.]

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33 Manila Electric Co. v. Pineda

[CASE TITLE]
[G.R. NO. DATE.]

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34 Estate of JBL Reyes v. City of Manila

[CASE TITLE]
[G.R. NO. DATE.]

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35 Lagcao v. Judge

[CASE TITLE]
[G.R. NO. DATE.]

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36 Metropolitan Cebu Water v. J. King & Sons

[CASE TITLE]
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37 Republic v. Lim

[CASE TITLE]
[G.R. NO. DATE.]

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38 Manila International Airport Authority v. City of Pasay, et al.

[CASE TITLE]
[G.R. NO. DATE.]

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39 Tolentino v. Secretary of Finance

[CASE TITLE]
[G.R. NO. DATE.]

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40 Gerochi v. Department of Energy

[CASE TITLE]
[G.R. NO. DATE.]

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41 Batangas City, et al. v. Pilipinas Shell

[CASE TITLE]
[G.R. NO. DATE.]

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42 City Government of Quezon , et al. v. Bayan Com.

[CASE TITLE]
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43 Republic v. City of Paranaque

[CASE TITLE]
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44 Film Development Council of the Philippines v. Colon Heritage Council of Cebu

[CASE TITLE]
[G.R. NO. DATE.]

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45 Nursery Care Corp. v. Acevedo

[CASE TITLE]
[G.R. NO. DATE.]

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46 Chevron Philippines, Inc. v. BCDA

[CASE TITLE]
[G.R. NO. DATE.]

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47 Angeles University Foundation v. City of Angeles

[CASE TITLE]
[G.R. NO. DATE.]

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48 People v. Marti

[CASE TITLE]
[G.R. NO. DATE.]

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49 Armando Yrasegui v. PAL

[CASE TITLE]
[G.R. NO. DATE.]
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50 Zulueta v. CA

[CASE TITLE]
[G.R. NO. DATE.]

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51 Philippine Blooming Mills Employees, et al. v. Philippine Blooming Mills

[CASE TITLE]
[G.R. NO. DATE.]

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52 Ang Tibay v. CIR

[CASE TITLE]
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53 Quisumbing v. Rosales

[CASE TITLE]
[G.R. NO. DATE.]

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54 Shu v. Magpantay

[CASE TITLE]
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55 Jardeleza v. Chief Justice Sereno

[CASE TITLE]
[G.R. NO. DATE.]

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56 Nacion v. COA, et al.

[CASE TITLE]
[G.R. NO. DATE.]

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57 PAGCOR v. De Guzman

[CASE TITLE]
[G.R. NO. DATE.]

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58 Atty. Erece v. Macalingay

[CASE TITLE]
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59 Dela Salle University v. CA

[CASE TITLE]
[G.R. NO. DATE.]

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60 Atienza, et al., v. COMELEC, Roxas, and Drilon

[CASE TITLE]
[G.R. NO. DATE.]

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61 Department of Education v. Cuanan

[CASE TITLE]
[G.R. NO. DATE.]

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62 Dela Salle University v. CA

[CASE TITLE]
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63 Datufac Magudadatu v. HRET

[CASE TITLE]
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64 Atienza, et al., v. COMELEC, Roxas, and Drilon

[CASE TITLE]
[G.R. NO. DATE.]

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65 Republic v. Pilipinas Shell

[CASE TITLE]
[G.R. NO. DATE.]

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66 Timbol v. COMELEC

[CASE TITLE]
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67 Kuwait Airline Corporation v. PAL

[CASE TITLE]
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68 Secretary of Justice v. Judge Lantion

[CASE TITLE]
[G.R. NO. DATE.]

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69 Farinas v. Executive Secretary

[CASE TITLE]
[G.R. NO. DATE.]

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70 ABAKADA Guro Party List v. Purisima

[CASE TITLE]
[G.R. NO. DATE.]

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71 Garcia v. Judge Drilon

[CASE TITLE]
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72 Araullo v. Aquino (with MR on Feb. 3, 2015)

[CASE TITLE]
[G.R. NO. DATE.]

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73 Central Bank Employees Association v. Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas

[CASE TITLE]
[G.R. NO. DATE.]

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74 Guttierez v. DBM

[CASE TITLE]
[G.R. NO. DATE.]

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75 Himagan v. People

[CASE TITLE]
[G.R. NO. DATE.]

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76 Quinto v. COMELEC

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77 Duncan Association v. Glaxo

[CASE TITLE]
[G.R. NO. DATE.]

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78 PT&T v. NLRC

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79 International School Alliance of Educators v. Quisumbing

[CASE TITLE]
[G.R. NO. DATE.]

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80 Central Bank Employees Association v. Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas

[CASE TITLE]
[G.R. NO. DATE.]

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81 Garcia v. Executive Secretary

[CASE TITLE]
[G.R. NO. DATE.]

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82 Prudente v. Dayrit

[CASE TITLE]
[G.R. NO. DATE.]

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83 20th Century Fox v. CA

[CASE TITLE]
[G.R. NO. DATE.]

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84 Sony Music v. Judge Espanol

[CASE TITLE]
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85 Pilipinas Shell v. Romars International Gases Corp.

[CASE TITLE]
[G.R. NO. DATE.]

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86 Leviste v. Alameda

[CASE TITLE]
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87 Pestilos v. Generoso
[CASE TITLE]
[G.R. NO. DATE.]

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88 Anlud Metal Recycling Corp. v. Ang

[CASE TITLE]
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89 Malacat v. CA

[CASE TITLE]
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90 People v. Mengote

[CASE TITLE]
[G.R. NO. DATE.]

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91 People v. Claudio

[CASE TITLE]
[G.R. NO. DATE.]

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92 People v. Aminudin
[CASE TITLE]
[G.R. NO. DATE.]

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93 People v. Tangliben

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94 People v. Malmstedt

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95 People v. De Gracia

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96 People v. Chi Chan Liu

[CASE TITLE]
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97 People v. Mariacos

[CASE TITLE]
[G.R. NO. DATE.]

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98 People v. Escano

[CASE TITLE]
[G.R. NO. DATE.]

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99 People v. Valdez

[CASE TITLE]
[G.R. NO. DATE.]

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100 Villanueva v. People

[CASE TITLE]
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101 People v. Damaso

[CASE TITLE]
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102 Caballes v. CA

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103 George Antiquera v. People

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104 People v. Cogaed

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105 Sanchez v. People

[CASE TITLE]
[G.R. NO. DATE.]

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106 Valeroso v. CA

[CASE TITLE]
[G.R. NO. DATE.]

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107 People v. Bolasa

[CASE TITLE]
[G.R. NO. DATE.]
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108 Disini v. Secretary of Justice

[CASE TITLE]
[G.R. NO. DATE.]

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109 Chavez v. Gonzalez

[CASE TITLE]
[G.R. NO. DATE.]

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110 KMU v. Ermita

[CASE TITLE]
[G.R. NO. DATE.]

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111 Spouses Romualdez v. COMELEC

[CASE TITLE]
[G.R. NO. DATE.]

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112 Spouses Hing v. Choachuy, et al.

[CASE TITLE]
[G.R. NO. DATE.]

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113 Vivares v. St. Theresa's College

[CASE TITLE]
[G.R. NO. DATE.]

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114 Belo-Henares v. Atty. Argee Guevarra

[CASE TITLE]
[G.R. NO. DATE.]

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115 Gamboa v. P/SSupt. Chan

[CASE TITLE]
[G.R. NO. DATE.]

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116 BSB Group, Inc. v. Sally Go

[CASE TITLE]
[G.R. NO. DATE.]

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117 Borjal v. CA

[CASE TITLE]
[G.R. NO. DATE.]

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118 Tulfo v. CA

[CASE TITLE]
[G.R. NO. DATE.]

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119 Estrada v. Sandiganbayan

[CASE TITLE]
[G.R. NO. DATE.]

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120 Newsounds Broadcasting v. Dy

[CASE TITLE]
[G.R. NO. DATE.]

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121 Diocese of Bacolod v. COMELEC

[CASE TITLE]
[G.R. NO. DATE.]

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122 SWS v. COMELEC

[CASE TITLE]
[G.R. NO. DATE.]

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123 GMA Network, Inc., et al. v. COMELEC

[CASE TITLE]
[G.R. NO. DATE.]

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124 1-Utak v. COMELEC

[CASE TITLE]
[G.R. NO. DATE.]

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125 IBP v. Atienza

[CASE TITLE]
[G.R. NO. DATE.]

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126 KMU v. Ermita/Bayan Muna v. Ermita

[CASE TITLE]
[G.R. NO. DATE.]

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127 Soriano v. MTRCB

[CASE TITLE]
[G.R. NO. DATE.]

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128 Iglesia ni Cristo v. CA

[CASE TITLE]
[G.R. NO. DATE.]

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129 Ebralinag v. Division Superintendent of Schools

[CASE TITLE]
[G.R. NO. DATE.]

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130 Islamic Da'wah Council v. Executive Secretary

[CASE TITLE]
[G.R. NO. DATE.]

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131 Victoriano v. Elizalde Rope Workers Union

[CASE TITLE]
[G.R. NO. DATE.]

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132 Manosca v. CA

[CASE TITLE]
[G.R. NO. DATE.]

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133 Ang Ladlad v. COMELEC

[CASE TITLE]
[G.R. NO. DATE.]

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134 Imbong v. Ochoa, Jr.

[CASE TITLE]
[G.R. NO. DATE.]

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135 Centeno v. Villalon-Pornillos

[CASE TITLE]
[G.R. NO. DATE.]

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136 Nollora, Jr. v. People

[CASE TITLE]
[G.R. NO. DATE.]

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137 Estrada v. Escritur

[CASE TITLE]
[G.R. NO. DATE.]

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138 Perfecto v. Esidera

[CASE TITLE]
[G.R. NO. DATE.]

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139 Leus v. St. Scholastica's College, et al.

[CASE TITLE]
[G.R. NO. DATE.]

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140 Re: Letter of Tony Q. Valenciano

[CASE TITLE]
[G.R. NO. DATE.]

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141 Antolin v. Domondon

[CASE TITLE]
[G.R. NO. DATE.]

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142 Bantay Republic Act 7941 v. COMELEC

[CASE TITLE]
[G.R. NO. DATE.]

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143 Request for RadioTV Coverage-Estrada Trial

[CASE TITLE]
[G.R. NO. DATE.]

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144 Bayan Muna v. Ermita

[CASE TITLE]
[G.R. NO. DATE.]

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145 Chavez v. PEA and Amari

[CASE TITLE]
[G.R. NO. DATE.]

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146 PSBank, et al. v/ Senate Impeachment Court

[CASE TITLE]
[G.R. NO. DATE.]

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147 Hilado, et al. v. Judge Amor Reyes

[CASE TITLE]
[G.R. NO. DATE.]

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148 In re: Production of Court Records

[CASE TITLE]
[G.R. NO. DATE.]

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149 Request for a copy of 2006 SALN, PDS, and CV OF SC Justices, Officers…

[CASE TITLE]
[G.R. NO. DATE.]

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150 Sta. Clara Homeowners Association v. Spouses Gaston

[CASE TITLE]
[G.R. NO. DATE.]

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151 GSIS v. Kapisanan ng mga Manggagawa sa GSIS

[CASE TITLE]
[G.R. NO. DATE.]

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152 United BF Homeowners Association, Inc. v. City Mayor, et al.

[CASE TITLE]
[G.R. NO. DATE.]

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153 Yinlu Bicol Mining Corp. v. Trans-Asia Oil and Energy Development Corp.

[CASE TITLE]
[G.R. NO. DATE.]

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154 Philreca v. Secretary of DILG

[CASE TITLE]
[G.R. NO. DATE.]

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155 Frias, Jr., et al. v. Judge Sorongon

[CASE TITLE]
[G.R. NO. DATE.]
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156 Re: Query of Mr. Roger Prioreschi…

[CASE TITLE]
[G.R. NO. DATE.]

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157 People v. Mahinay

[CASE TITLE]
[G.R. NO. DATE.]

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158 BPI v. CASA

[CASE TITLE]
[G.R. NO. DATE.]

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159 People v. Mollejo

[CASE TITLE]
[G.R. NO. DATE.]

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160 De Castro v. People

[CASE TITLE]
[G.R. NO. DATE.]
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161 People v. Cristobal

[CASE TITLE]
[G.R. NO. DATE.]

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162 People v. Tuniaco

[CASE TITLE]
[G.R. NO. DATE.]

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163 People v. Lauga

[CASE TITLE]
[G.R. NO. DATE.]

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164 People v. Obrero

[CASE TITLE]
[G.R. NO. DATE.]

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165 People v. Patungan

[CASE TITLE]
[G.R. NO. DATE.]

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166 People v. Reyes

[CASE TITLE]
[G.R. NO. DATE.]

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167 People v. Wahiman

[CASE TITLE]
[G.R. NO. DATE.]

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168 People v. Rapeza

[CASE TITLE]
[G.R. NO. DATE.]

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169 People v. Endino

[CASE TITLE]
[G.R. NO. DATE.]

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170 People v. Baloloy

[CASE TITLE]
[G.R. NO. DATE.]

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171 Navallo v. Sandiganbayan

[CASE TITLE]
[G.R. NO. DATE.]

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172 People v. Ting Lan Uy

[CASE TITLE]
[G.R. NO. DATE.]

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173 People v. Taliman

[CASE TITLE]
[G.R. NO. DATE.]

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174 People v. Culala

[CASE TITLE]
[G.R. NO. DATE.]

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175 People v. Tomaquin

[CASE TITLE]
[G.R. NO. DATE.]

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176 People v. Velarde

[CASE TITLE]
[G.R. NO. DATE.]

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177 People v. Zuela

[CASE TITLE]
[G.R. NO. DATE.]

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178 People v. Andan

[CASE TITLE]
[G.R. NO. DATE.]

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179 People v. Maqueda

[CASE TITLE]
[G.R. NO. DATE.]

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180 Ho Wai Pang v. People

[CASE TITLE]
[G.R. NO. DATE.]

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181 People v. Bucalon

[CASE TITLE]
[G.R. NO. DATE.]

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182 Qui v. People

[CASE TITLE]
[G.R. NO. DATE.]

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183 Leviste v. Court of A ppeals

[CASE TITLE]
[G.R. NO. DATE.]

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184 Enrile v. Sandiganbayan

[CASE TITLE]
[G.R. NO. DATE.]

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185 US v. Purganan

[CASE TITLE]
[G.R. NO. DATE.]

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186 Government of Hongkong Special Administrative Region v. Olalia, Jr.

[CASE TITLE]
[G.R. NO. DATE.]

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187 Rodriguez v. Judge

[CASE TITLE]
[G.R. NO. DATE.]

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188 Jaylo, et al. v. Sandiganbayan

[CASE TITLE]
[G.R. NO. DATE.]

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189 Taglay v. Daray

[CASE TITLE]
[G.R. NO. DATE.]

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190 People v. CA

[CASE TITLE]
[G.R. NO. DATE.]

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191 Sevilla v. People

[CASE TITLE]
[G.R. NO. DATE.]

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192 Re: Conviction of Judge Adoracion Angeles

[CASE TITLE]
[G.R. NO. DATE.]

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193 Callangan v. People

[CASE TITLE]
[G.R. NO. DATE.]

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194 People v. Bermas

[CASE TITLE]
[G.R. NO. DATE.]

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195 Uyboco v. People

[CASE TITLE]
[G.R. NO. DATE.]

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196 Delgado v. CA

[CASE TITLE]
[G.R. NO. DATE.]

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197 People v. Santocildes

[CASE TITLE]
[G.R. NO. DATE.]

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198 People v. Tulin

[CASE TITLE]
[G.R. NO. DATE.]

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199 Re: Request for TV/Radio Coverage of the Trial v. Joseph Estrada

[CASE TITLE]
[G.R. NO. DATE.]

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200 Go, et al. v. People

[CASE TITLE]
[G.R. NO. DATE.]

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201 People v. Chua

[CASE TITLE]
[G.R. NO. DATE.]

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202 De Villa v. Director of Prisons

[CASE TITLE]
[G.R. NO. DATE.]

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203 De Lima v. Gatdula

[CASE TITLE]
[G.R. NO. DATE.]

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204 So v. Tacla

[CASE TITLE]
[G.R. NO. DATE.]

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205 Teves v. Sandiganbayan

[CASE TITLE]
[G.R. NO. DATE.]

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206 Estrada v. People

[CASE TITLE]
[G.R. NO. DATE.]

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207 People v. Angus, Jr.

[CASE TITLE]
[G.R. NO. DATE.]

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208 People v. Mortera

[CASE TITLE]
[G.R. NO. DATE.]

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209 Adonis, et al. v. Supt. Tesoro (Director of Davao Prisons)

[CASE TITLE]
[G.R. NO. DATE.]

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210 Martinez v. Mendoza

[CASE TITLE]
[G.R. NO. DATE.]

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211 Ilagan v. Enrile

[CASE TITLE]
[G.R. NO. DATE.]

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212 Secretary of National Defense and AFP Chief of Staff v. Manalo

[CASE TITLE]
[G.R. NO. DATE.]

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213 Razon v. Tagitis

[CASE TITLE]
[G.R. NO. DATE.]
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214 De Lima v. Gatdula

[CASE TITLE]
[G.R. NO. DATE.]

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215 Navia, et al. v. Pardico

[CASE TITLE]
[G.R. NO. DATE.]

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216 Spouses Pador v. Brgy. Captain Arcayan, et al.

[CASE TITLE]
[G.R. NO. DATE.]

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217 Spouses Santiago v. Tulfo

[CASE TITLE]
[G.R. NO. DATE.]

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218 Reyes v. CA

[CASE TITLE]
[G.R. NO. DATE.]
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219 So v. Tacla

[CASE TITLE]
[G.R. NO. DATE.]

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220 Barcelona v. Lim, et al.

[CASE TITLE]
[G.R. NO. DATE.]

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221 People v. Olvis

[CASE TITLE]
[G.R. NO. DATE.]

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222 SJS v. DDB

[CASE TITLE]
[G.R. NO. DATE.]

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223 Dela Cruz v. People

[CASE TITLE]
[G.R. NO. DATE.]

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224 Echegaray v. Executive Secretary

[CASE TITLE]
[G.R. NO. DATE.]

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225 Villareal v. People

[CASE TITLE]
[G.R. NO. DATE.]

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226 Lejano v. People/People v. Webb, et al.

[CASE TITLE]
[G.R. NO. DATE.]

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227 People v. Judge Lagos

[CASE TITLE]
[G.R. NO. DATE.]

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228 Bautista v. Cuneta-Pangilinan

[CASE TITLE]
[G.R. NO. DATE.]

Ponente: J.
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229 Dayap v. Sendiong

[CASE TITLE]
[G.R. NO. DATE.]

Ponente: J.
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230 People v. Domingo

[CASE TITLE]
[G.R. NO. DATE.]

Ponente: J.
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231 Herrera v. Sandiganbayan

[CASE TITLE]
[G.R. NO. DATE.]

Ponente: J.
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232 People v. Dumlao

[CASE TITLE]
[G.R. NO. DATE.]

Ponente: J.
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233 People and AAA v. CA

[CASE TITLE]
[G.R. NO. DATE.]

Ponente: J.
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234 Ivler v. San Pedro

[CASE TITLE]
[G.R. NO. DATE.]

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235 SPO2 JAMACA v. People

[CASE TITLE]
[G.R. NO. DATE.]

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236 Republic v. Eugenio

[CASE TITLE]
[G.R. NO. DATE.]

Ponente: J.
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