J Forensic Sci, 2016

doi: 10.1111/1556-4029.13170
PAPER Available online at: onlinelibrary.wiley.com

PSYCHIATRY AND BEHAVIORAL SCIENCES

Samuel J. Leistedt,1,2,3,4 M.D., Ph.D.

On the Radicalization Process

ABSTRACT: This study aimed to provide an in-depth description of the radicalization process, which is a very important step in terrorist
activities. The author proposes a translational analysis that is first based on the author’s experience in the psychological evaluation of terrorist
behavior and second on an exhaustive review of the current literature. The search terms “terrorism,” “radicalization,” “social psychology,” and
“psychopathology” were used to identify relevant studies in the following databases: Scopus, Medline, PubCentral, and Science Direct. Because
of its importance, understanding radicalization process should be one of the priorities of behavioral scientists. International studies should be
performed with a focus on several aspects, such as radicalization risk factors, brainwashing, the role of the media, and finally, in de-radicaliza-
tion programs.

KEYWORDS: forensic science, radicalization, social psychology, social networks, terrorism, intelligence gathering

The radicalization of young men and women by terrorist
organizations has become an overwhelming problem in the world
(1–4). Recently, Mohammed Merah and the Kouachi Brothers in
France and Mehdi Nemmouche in Belgium appear to have been
motivated by a complex mix of politics and faith, and their com-
munications illustrate the tactics used to try to recruit other young
Europeans and Americans to their cause (1–4). Recently, two 21-
year-old men from Birmingham, England were charged with trav-
eling to Syria to carry out acts of terrorism. Even more recently,
in January of 2014, two 15-year-old boys from France left Tou-
louse to join the fighting in Syria. The possibility of French citi-
zens returning from Syria as hardened jihadists is the “biggest
threat that the country faces in the coming years,” said Manuel
Valls, the interior minister (3–5). He added that France and Eur-
ope risk being “overwhelmed” by the phenomenon. Mr. Valls
estimated that 700 French nationals have either travelled to Syria,
have travelled to Syria and returned to France, or are currently en
route. Some 21 French nationals have been killed. Shiraz Maher,
a senior research fellow at the International Centre for the Study
of Radicalization at King’s College London, estimated recently
that up to 50 British fighters have already returned home (2–5).
A few months ago, Richard Walton, the head of Scotland Yard’s
counter-terrorism command, said there were already indications
that Britons were returning from Syria with orders to carry out
attacks, with the Metropolitan Police carrying out a “huge num-
ber of operations” to protect the public (2–5).
1
Forensic Mental Health Hospital “Les Marronniers”, Rue Despars 94,
Tournai 7500, Belgium.
2
Department of Medicine, ULB, Route de Lennik, 808, 1070, Brussels,
Belgium.
3
Department of Medicine, UMons, Place du Parc, 20, 7000, Mons,
Belgium.
4
SPF Justice, Boulevard de Waterloo, 115, 1000, Brussels, Belgium.
Received 27 Jan. 2015; and in revised form 20 Aug. 2015; accepted 22
Aug. 2015.
As introduced in the above examples, this study deals with
the radicalization process in terrorist activities. In fact, in light of
these facts, and in order to optimally counter terrorists, it is
imperative to have a clear understanding of the psychology
underlying their actions. In recent years, research efforts have
investigated radicalization, de-radicalization, and disengagement
(2–5). In this report, the author describes findings from a litera-
ture review and analyzes the factors that are involved in the pro-
cess of terrorist recruitment, focusing on the radicalization
process.
Sources and Database
Based on the author’s experience in evaluating terrorist psy-
chology and on an exhaustive literature review, the aim of this
study was to describe and discuss the radicalization process in a
translational manner.
The search terms “terrorism,” “radicalization,” “social psy-
chology,” and “psychopathology” were used to identify relevant
studies in the following databases: Scopus, Medline, PubCentral,
and Science Direct (the latter is a science-based web portal).
Several textbooks were examined, and manual searches of the
reference lists of relevant studies were used to identify additional
studies.
The Radicalization Process as a Complex Phenomenon
In the author’s opinion, to better understand the radicalization
process, several elements must be considered:
• Risk factors must be present. As described below, the author
prefers to discuss the concept of risk factors rather than the
concept of a terrorist profile or personality.
• When risk factors are present, persuasion techniques/brain-
washing must be used for radicalization to occur.
• Although these two elements are important, they are insuffi-
cient for radicalization. In the modern world of “new
terrorism,” networks, communication, social engineering, and

© 2016 American Academy of Forensic Sciences 1

2 JOURNAL OF FORENSIC SCIENCES
propaganda using information techniques must be present as
well. All of these can be found via the media and on the
Internet.
• The use of coercive psychology leads to cognitive modifica-
tions. The availability cascade is a good example of the
potential influence of the media on cognitive functions.
Risk Factors
In the 1970s, the view of terrorism as a clinical disorder was
popular. In the 1980s and the 1990s, this view was often dis-
missed outright but, interestingly, there was insufficient evidence
supporting the dismissal (6). The earlier, more heavy-handed
characterization of terrorists was replaced by the subtler notion
that while terrorists could not really be characterized by a partic-
ular personality type, they often almost had certain personality
traits. For example, narcissism and paranoia are the two traits
most commonly associated with terrorists in this particular
literature (6).
Contemporary scholars of terrorism consider much of that
research quite dated and even obscure. The fact that the lessons
that emerged from early studies have almost disappeared from
contemporary psychological research on terrorism raises trou-
bling questions about the state of affairs in terrorist psychology
today (6,7). Nevertheless, at this point, it may be worth summa-
rizing some basic assertions (6–9):
• Explanations of terrorism at the individual level, in terms of
psychology/psychopathology, are insufficient for understand-
ing why people become involved in terrorism. This is not
exactly the same as saying that psychological explanations
alone are insufficient in accounting for why people turn to
terrorism, because it seems that the “terrorist personality”
issue needs to be temporarily isolated as far as its explicit
and implicit purported importance is concerned, at least in
this context. Although the frustration-aggression hypothesis
and its derivatives have found their way into several political
science theories of terrorism, there is a persistent lack of
acknowledgment of the conceptual problems that are involved
(8,9).
• By themselves, personality traits are insufficient in terms of
explaining why some people become terrorists and others do
not, or, more generally, why people join terrorist groups. This
point is not the same as the first point. This assertion is
related to the inherent attractiveness, and yet the danger, in
placing too much emphasis on the “needs-fulfillment” stance,
for the same conceptual reasons that might be used to criti-
cize other trait-based approaches (and the interpretations of
personality type and traits in this context altogether). In main-
stream contemporary psychology, trait theories do not attempt
to be all encompassing or to explain all behavior, and the
same mistakes should not be made when applying such mod-
els to explain terrorism. Future attempts at developing indi-
vidual terrorist profiles ought to bear this in mind. Whether
terrorist profiles ought ideally to be described in terms of
demographics or even in terms of psychological types (as
opposed to characterization of actual behavior) merits real
consideration. Profiles that comprise behavioral analysis may
ultimately be more productive in terms of offering a means
of detecting, and thus controlling, terrorism (6–9).
• There are conceptual, theoretical, and methodological prob-
lems with explaining terrorism in terms of personality traits
that suggest why some people become terrorists and others
do not. Such explanations are not only inconsistent; they
demonstrate a lack of understanding of basic psychological
concepts. The author’s experience in Europe has been that
people who are radicalized have some common experiences
or characteristics (e.g., Mohammed Merah in France, Mehdi
Nemmouche in Belgium, the Kouachi brothers in France,
etc.) (i) They come from immigrant families (second or third
generation); (ii) they have previous police records (for vari-
ous offenses, such as juvenile delinquency); (iii) they have
been in jail (sometimes for short periods, prisons have proved
fertile recruitment grounds for Muslim radicals); (iv) they
have social difficulties, including family problems, economi-
cal difficulties, and identity crises; and (v), most have trav-
eled to and returned from a country in which ISIS or another
extremist group is active.
• Because of these commonalities, the author prefers to speak
of risk factors rather than of a terrorist personality per se.
These last assertions are derived from the observations of the
author of people who have been radicalized, that is, who
returned to Europe and committed terrorist acts.
Brainwashing
Clearing a person of previously held beliefs, that is, “washing
their brains” in order to replace the beliefs with an alien set of
perspectives, is often used to explain how reasonably well-
adjusted citizens can become violent terrorists (10,11). A number
of terms are used to describe this process, including brainwash-
ing, thought reform, coercive persuasion, mind control, a coordi-
nated program of coercive influence and behavioral control, and
exploitive persuasion. This perspective puts people such as
Osama Bin Laden and the Hamas leader Sheikh Yassin in roles
that have only been clearly portrayed in fiction, such as in Du
Maurier’s story of the opera singer Trilby, who is controlled by
the manipulative Svengali. There are real cases of brainwashing,
such as Mao Tse-tung’s thought-reform program, which was
implemented at Chinese revolutionary universities, and the tac-
tics used by Charles Manson and his “family.” However, many
other studies show that it is difficult to demonstrate that such
quasi-occult powers exist (10,11).
Thus, thought reform is a concerted effort to change a person’s
way of looking at the world, which will then change their behav-
ior. It is distinguished from other forms of social learning by the
conditions under which it is conducted and by the techniques of
environmental and interpersonal manipulation that are meant to
suppress certain behaviors and to elicit and train others. It does
not consist of only one program. There are many ways and meth-
ods to conduct thought reform, such as (i) destabilizing a per-
son’s sense of self; (ii) forcing a drastic reinterpretation of the
subject’s life history, resulting in a radically altered worldview,
and a new version and causality; and (iii) developing dependence
on the group, thereby turning the individual into a deployable
agent of the organization (12). Singer’s six conditions describe
what is needed to create an atmosphere that permits brainwashing
to take place. The degree to which these conditions are present
increases the level of restriction enforced by the group and the
overall effectiveness of the program. These conditions are as fol-
lows (12): (i) keep the person unaware that there is an agenda to
control or change the person; (ii) control time and the physical
environment (contact with family); (iii) create a sense of power-
lessness, fear, and dependency; (iv) suppress old behaviors and
attitudes; (v) instill new behaviors and attitudes; and (vi) put forth

a closed system of logic. In parallel with Singer’s six conditions
are the eight psychological themes that psychiatrist Robert Lifton
identified as being central to the thought reform environment,
including the environment created by terrorist groups, that invoke
these themes for the purpose of promoting behavioral and attitu-
dinal changes (13): (i) milieu control (total control of communi-
cation); (ii) loading the language (the group’s jargon); (iii)
demand for purity (an “all-or-nothing” belief system); (iv) confes-
sion (to lead members to reveal past and present behavior and
history); (v) mystical manipulation (“you have been chosen to be
here”); (vi) doctrine over person (false memory syndrome); (vii)
sacred science (“respected and historical leaders with connections
with Sigmund Freud, Karl Marx, the Buddha”); and (viii) dis-
pensing existence (the terrorist total environment clearly empha-
sizes that the members are part of an elite group). Schein’s three
stages describe the process of changing attitudes through thought
reform: “unfreezing, changing, and refreezing.” In unfreezing,
which is the first stage, past attitudes, choices, and behavior are
destabilized by the group. Many terrorist groups use a “hot seat”
technique or other forms of criticism to attain the goal of under-
cutting and destabilizing. In the second stage, which is changing,
the person senses that the group’s solutions provide a path. Peer
pressure is very important in this stage. Finally, in refreezing,
which is the last stage, the group reinforces the desired behavior
with social and psychological rewards and punishes unwanted
attitudes and behaviors with harsh criticism, group disapproval,
social ostracism, and the loss of status (14).
These practices by terrorist leaders and their subordinates
imply a very strong hierarchy that is indeed very similar to that
of a rigid military structure or cult organization. In general, as
with illegal groups (especially those spread over a wide area), it
is not possible to maintain the top-down discipline that is classi-
cally found in a standing army (15). Instead, what Atran calls a
“Hydra-headed network” is much more likely to be the norm
(16). Mullins illustrates the evolving structure of such networks
and how they can develop into something that resembles a busi-
ness when they involve frequent kidnaping activities, as
described by Mullins and Phillips (17,18).
The Role of the Media
It is well known that the media has many effects on people,
especially on young people, such as instigating aggression, pro-
moting social stereotypes, and contributing to cognitive develop-
ment, among others (19). In terms of social and terrorist network
theories, it is clear that new technologies allow terrorists to com-
municate more efficiently, to broaden their message, and to
wield unconventional weapons in unexpected ways, all of which
are central characteristics of asymmetrical warfare. Because of
incremental improvements in communications and computer
technologies, terrorists and their supporters will continue to use
them extensively. Likewise, the increasing availability of compo-
nents for weapons of mass destruction will continue to soften
terrorists’ reluctance to use them (20).
The Internet provides opportunities for commercial, private, and
political interests to spread their messages and communicate with
outsiders. In fact, information technologies are being invented and
refined constantly and will continue to be central to the New Ter-
rorism, providing networks between groups and cells and spread-
ing specific tactics, instructions about overall goals, new bomb-
making techniques, and so forth. However, information and com-
puter technologies can also be used offensively. Terrorists today
can adopt cyber warfare techniques to destroy information and
LEISTEDT . RADICALIZATION 3
communication systems. Cyber terrorism may very well become a
central facet of the terrorist environment in the near future (20).
Today more than ever, terrorist networks can be viewed as a
“bunch of grapes” that are strongly interconnected by the media
(electronic communications mainly).
Cognition Modification: The Availability Cascade
An “availability cascade” is a self-reinforcing cycle that
explains the development of certain kinds of collective beliefs
(21,22). A novel idea or insight, especially one that seems to
explain a complex process in a simple or straightforward manner,
gains rapid currency in the popular discourse by its very simplicity
and by its apparent insightfulness. Its rising popularity triggers a
chain reaction within the social network: individuals adopt the
new insight because other people within the network have adopted
it, or because, superficially, the idea seems plausible. The reasons
for the increased use and popularity of the new idea involve both
the availability of the previously obscure term or idea and the need
of the individuals who use the term or idea to appear to be current
with the stated beliefs and ideas of others, regardless of whether
they in fact fully believe in the idea that they are expressing. Their
need for social acceptance, and the apparent sophistication of the
new insight, overwhelm their critical thinking (21).
From our perspective, and in other words, an availability cas-
cade is a self-sustaining chain of events, which may start from
media reports of a relatively minor event and lead to public
panic and large-scale government action. On some occasions, a
media story about a particular risk catches the attention of a seg-
ment of the public, which becomes aroused and worried. This
emotional reaction becomes a story in itself, prompting addi-
tional coverage in the media, which in turn produces greater
concern and involvement. The cycle is sometimes perpetuated
deliberately by “availability entrepreneurs,” that is, individuals
or organizations who work to ensure a continuous flow of wor-
rying news. The danger is increasingly exaggerated as the media
compete for attention-grabbing headlines. Scientists and others
who try to dampen the increasing fear and revulsion attract little
attention, most of it hostile: anyone who claims that the danger
is overstated is suspected of association with a “heinous cover-
up.” The issue becomes politically important because it is on
everyone’s mind, and the response of the political system is
guided by the intensity of public sentiment (21).
How is an availability cascade linked to terrorism? In his book,
Thinking Fast and Slow, Kahneman notes that terrorism “speaks
directly to System,” generating an availability cascade that ratchets
up an unreasonable level of fear that system has difficulty counter-
ing. But there is more to the perceived threat of terrorism than
availability. One approach to terrorism is to see it as the use of vio-
lence to trigger and amplify communication: the ultimate target of
terrorist actions is not the people who are attacked but rather audi-
ences that learn about the attack. The mass media are implicated in
this process, because their own assessments of what is newsworthy
give undue attention to violence compared to peaceful protest. In
order to fully understand the popular response to terrorism, we
must understand both the psychological dynamics, such as avail-
ability cascades, and the media dynamics, as well as other factors
such as the internal politics of terrorist groups (23–26).
A Prevalent and Particular Situation: The Lone Wolf
There has been a change in terrorist threats that parallels the
rise of “lone wolves” who are terrorists acting on their own; they
4 JOURNAL OF FORENSIC SCIENCES
may be motivated by various radical ideas, but they are not con-
trolled by terrorist groups (27). Examples of lone wolves include
the Tsarnaev brothers, who attacked the Boston Marathon in
2013, and Maj. Hasan, who went on a shooting rampage at Fort
Hood. Lone wolves are, by definition, more difficult to spot in
advance of their acts; as such, detecting them raises difficult
questions about the balance between civil liberties and preven-
tive surveillance (27).
Unpredictability makes lone wolf attacks very hard to prevent.
Potential perpetrators are difficult to profile and lack the social,
operational, and financial networks that can be used to catch groups
of terrorists. Large-scale terrorist attacks such as the 7/7 London
bombings and the attacks in Mumbai (2008) and at the Westgate
mall in Kenya (2013) require extensive planning, intelligence gath-
ering, and financing, all of which increase the chance of discovery.
An Internet connection and a knife may be all that are needed for
an individual to perform a terrorist act (27).
For these reasons, inciting lone wolf terrorism is an ideal tactic
for a group such as ISIL. Contrary to many views in the West,
ISIL propaganda does not represent an unstoppable force, and only
a tiny fraction of Muslims have answered ISIL’s call to rise up and
attack their Western neighbors. However, its propaganda can cov-
ertly radicalize a small number of susceptible individuals who may
then decide to act. Those individuals may be poorly trained or
even act spontaneously, but, most importantly, their actions sow
fear in civilian populations at minimal cost (27).
Conclusion and Future Perspectives
The radicalization process is an increasing and complex phe-
nomenon. It implies several aspects that are multidimensional
(on the individual and societal levels) and heterogeneous, such
as some individual risk factors, the brainwashing, and cognitive
modifications (i.e. the role of the media in general).
In terms of perspectives, counter-radicalization programs, such
as those run by Saudi Arabia and Sweden, have shown mixed
results. The most successful efforts in Britain have been the
efforts of the so-called Channel program, which is part of the
British government’s counter-terrorism strategy, to divert young
people from extremism. Such efforts, which involve the police,
social services, and local authorities working together, draw on
methods used to help young people leave gangs.
Not all of those returning from radical countries will have
blood on their hands. Governments need to offer a way out for
those who realize that they have made a mistake, and Western
countries may benefit from an even softer approach. Chastened
returning fighters may be the very best people to persuade more
young men to forgo the fight. No one yet knows whether
today’s European jihadists who are fighting for IS will become
tomorrow’s murderers on the streets of Western cities.
On a more practical note, it is clear there are currently not enough
detailed case studies of terrorists to inform psychological analyses
or even to conduct comprehensive reviews of the literature.
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Additional information and reprint requests:
Samuel J. Leistedt, M.D., Ph.D.
Forensic Mental Health Hospital “Les Marronniers”
Rue Despars 94
Tournai 7500
Belgium
E-mail: sleistedt@icloud.com