ARTICLE XII National Economy and Patrimony

Section 1.
The goals of the national economy are a more equitable distribution of
opportunities, income, and wealth; a sustained increase in the amount of goods and
services produced by the nation for the benefit of the people; and an expanding
productivity as the key to raising the quality of life for all, especially the
underprivileged.
The State shall promote industrialization and full employment based on sound
agricultural development and agrarian reform, through industries that make full and
efficient use of human and natural resources, and which are competitive in both
domestic and foreign markets. However, the State shall protect Filipino enterprises
against unfair foreign competition and trade practices.
In the pursuit of these goals, all sectors of the economy and all regions of the
country shall be given optimum opportunity to develop. Private enterprises,
including corporations, cooperatives, and similar collective organizations, shall be
encouraged to broaden the base of their ownership.
 Three fold goals of the national economy:

- Equity, a more equitable distribution of opportunities, income and

wealth

- Growth, a sustained increase in the amount of goods and services

produced by a nation for the benefit of the people

- Productivity, capacity or degree of effectiveness for making greater

output out of every unit of input employed.

 Strategies to accomplish goals:

1. To develop a self-reliant and independent national economy effectively

controlled by Filipinos

2. Promote industrialization and full employment

3. Protect Filipino enterprises against unfair foreign competition

4. To give all economic sectors optimum opportunity to develop

5. Encourage private enterprises, cooperatives and similar collective

organizations

 The Regalian Doctrine

- Imperium, government auhoroity expressed through sovereignty

- Dominium, capacity of the state to own or acquire property

- Jura Regalia, that all lands were held from the crown  Ownership is
vested in the state, not in the head of the state.

- All lands that were not acquired from the government, either by
purchase or by grant, belong to the public domain. An exception to the
 rule would be any land that should have been in the possession and
occupant and of his predecessors-in-interest since time immemorial

- LIMITS

 Only agricultural lands of the public domain may be alienated

 Exploration, development and utilization of natural resources

shall be under the full control and supervision of the state either
by directly undertaking such EDU or through co-production, joint
venture or production sharing agreements

 All agreements with qualified private sector may be for a period

not exceeding 25 years, renewable for another 25 years

 The use and enjoyment of the marine wealth of the archipelagic

waters, territorial sea, territorial sea, and exclusive economic
zone shall be reserved for Filipino citizens

 Utilization of natural resources in rivers, lakes, bays and lagoons

may be allowed on a “small scale” to Filipino citizens or
cooperatives

THE IPRA CASE – CRUZ V. SEC. OF DENR, et al.

 Petitioners Isagani Cruz and Cesar Europa brought this suit for prohibition and
mandamus, assailing constitutionality of certain provisions of Republic Act
8371, otherwise known as the Indigenous Peoples Rights Act of 1997. And its
Implementing Rules and Regulations

 Some provisions of the IPRA amount to an unlawful deprivation of the State’s

ownersip over lands of the public domain as well as minerals and other
natural resources therein, in violation of the regalia doctrine embodies in Sec
2, Article XII of the Constitution:

1. Section 3(a) – defines the extent and coverage of ancestral domains,

Section 3(b) defines ancestral lands

2. Section 5, Ancestral domains, inalienable public lands, bodies of water,

mineral and other resources found within ancestral domains are
private but community property of the indigenous peoples

3. Section 6 defines composition of ancestral domains and ancestral

lands

4. Section 7 rights of IPs over ancestral domains

5. Section 8 rights of IPs over ancestral lands

6. Section 57 which provides for priority rights of IPs in benefits over

natural resources within the areas they claim, right to enter into
agreements with non-IPs for a period not exceeding 25 years,
renewable for not more than 25 years
 7. Section 58 which gives IPs responsibility over the area they claim

 All encompassing definition of AL and AD violate rights of private landowners

 Petitioners question provision of the IPRA defining the powers and jurisdiction
of the NCIP and making customary law applicable to the settlement of
disputes involving AL and AD on the ground that these provisions violate the
due process clause.

- Section 51-53, 59, process of delineation and recognition of AD, vest

on NCIP the sole authority to delineate AD and AL

- Section 52 Upon certification from NCIP that a particular area is an AD,

the jurisdiction of other officials over said land terminates

- Section 63, customary law shall be applied first, in case of doubt /

ambiguity in the interpretation thereof shall be resolved in favor of the
IPs

- Customary law shall be used

- Section 66 NCIP has jurisdiction over all claims and disputes involving
rights of the IPs

 Petitioners assail validity of Rule VII, Part II, Section 1 of the NCIP
administrative order #1, series of 1998, which provides that the
administrative relation of the NCIP to the office of the president is
characterized as a lateral but autonomous relationship for purposes of policy
and program coordination.

 As the votes were equally divided 7 to 7, the necessary majority was not
obtained, the case was redeliberated upon. After redeliberation, voting
remained the same. Pursuant to Tule 56, Section 7, of the rules of civil
procedure, the petition is dismissed.

 PUNO – provisions of the IPRA do not contravene the constitution

- Ancestral domains refer to all areas generally belonging to ICCs/IPs

comprising lands, inland waters, coastal areas, and natural resources
therein held under a claim of ownership through their ancestors,
communally or individually since time immemorial

- Ancestral lands refers to lands occupied, possessed and utilized by

individuals, families and clans who are members of the ICCs/IPs since
time immemorial, by themselves or through their predecessor-in-
interest, under claims of individual or traditional group ownership,
continuously to the present

- Native title refers to pre-conquest rights to lands and domains which,

as far bak as memory reaches, have been held under a claim of private
ownership by ICCs/IPs, have never been public lands
 - Carino v. Insular government – Carino was awarded his land. The
decision largely rested on the North American constitutionalist’s
concept of “due process” as well as the pronounced policy to “do
justice to the natives”, Carino is the only case that specifically and
categorically recognizes native title

- In light of the Carino case, AL and AD are not part of the lands of public
domain, they are private

- Public domain: agricultural, forest or timber, mineral lands and national

parks

- Examining the IPRA, there is nothing in the law that grants to the
ICCs/IPs ownership over the natural resources within their ancestral
domains

- ICCs/IPs are merely granted the right to “manage and conserve” them
for future generations, “benefit and share” the profits from their
allocation utilization, and “negotiate the terms and conditions for their
exploration” for the purpose of “ensuring ecological environmental
protection and conservation measures” – stewardship

Alienation of natural resources

SANTA ROSA MINING CO. V. LEIDO, JR.

 Petitioner assails validity of Presidential Decree No 1214 which requires

holders of subsisting and valid patentable mining claims located under the
provisions of the Philippine Bill of 1902 to file a mining lease application
within one year from the approval of the decree.

 Petitioner accordingly filed a mining lease application, but “under protest”

 Petitioner contends tthat its 50 mining claims had already been declared as
its own private and exclusive property by a judgment of the CFI. Also, that
they already had a vested right over its mining claims even before PD1214

 Respondents claim that petitioner did not exhaust all administrative

remedies. They also cited the pendency of petitioner’s appeal with the office
of the president, of the ruling of the respondent secretary of natural
resources which stated that 44 of the mining claims were void for lack of
valid “tie points” as required under the Philippine Bill of 1902, and that all the
mining claims have been abandoned and cancelled for petitioner’s non
compliance.

 W/N property right is absolute

 Decision: Property right is not absolute but is merely a possessory right.

Petitioner’s claims are still unpatented. They can be lost through
abandonment of forfeiture or they may be revoked for valid legal grounds.

 W/N PD1214 is unconstitutional

  Decision: PD1214 is constitutional. It is a valid exercise of the sovereign
power of the state, as owner, over lands of public domain of which
petitioner’s mining claims still form a part, and over the patrimony of the
nation, which mineral deposits are a valuable asset.

 Mere location does not mean absolute ownership over the land / mining
claim, to rule otherwise would imply that location is all that is needed to
acquire and maintain rights over a located mining claim. The locator should
faithfully and consistently comply with the requirements for annual work and
improvements in the located mining claim.

SMC V. CA

 SMC purchased land from Silverio Perez and filed and application for its
registration (CFI)

 Solicitor General alleges that said parcel of land was included in public
domain and that SMC being a private corporation, is disqualified from holding
alienable lands of the public domain.

 CFI granted the application

 CA reversed lower courts decision

 SC: W/N the evidence presented by the petitioner is sufficient enough to

warrant a ruling that SMC and/or its predecessor-in-interest has a registrable
right to property

 Decision: Open, exclusive and undisputed possession of alienable public land

for the period prescribed by law creates the legal fiction whereby the land,
upon completion of the requisite period of 30 years ceases to be public land
and becomes private property. However, it must be CONCLUSIVELY
ESTABLISHED.

 Perez’s documentary evidence, and testimony, being uncorroborated, is

simply self serving and undeserving of any weight.

CHAVEZ vs PEA, (G.R. No. 133250, November 11, 2003)

FACTS:
This petition asked the Court to legitimize a government contract that conveyed to
a private entity 157.84 hectares of reclaimed public lands along Roxas Boulevard in
Metro Manila at the negotiated price of P1,200 per square meter. However,
published reports place the market price of land near that area at that time at a
high of P90,000 per square meter. The difference in price is a staggering P140.16
billion, equivalent to the budget of the entire Judiciary for seventeen years and
more than three times the Marcos Swiss deposits that this Court forfeited in favor of
the government.
Public Estates Authority (PEA), under the JVA, obligated itself to convey title and
possession over the Property, consisting of approximately One Million Five Hundred
Seventy Eight Thousand Four Hundred Forty One (1,578,441) Square Meters for a
total consideration of One Billion Eight Hundred Ninety Four Million One Hundred
Twenty Nine Thousand Two Hundred (P1,894,129,200.00) Pesos, or a price of One
Thousand Two Hundred (P1,200.00) Pesos per square meter.

ISSUE:
Whether or not stipulations in the Amended JVA for the transfer to AMARI of lands,
reclaimed or to be reclaimed on portions of Manila Bay, violate the Constitution?

RULING:
Submerged lands, like the waters (sea or bay) above them, are part of the State’s
inalienable natural resources. Submerged lands are property of public dominion,
absolutely inalienable and outside the commerce of man. This is also true with
respect to foreshore lands. Any sale of submerged or foreshore lands is void being
contrary to the Constitution as it violates Section 2, Article XII. In the instant case,
the bulk of the lands subject of the Amended JVA are still submerged lands even to
this very day, and therefore inalienable and outside the commerce of man. Of the
750 hectares subject of the Amended JVA, 592.15 hectares or 78% of the total area
are still submerged, permanently under the waters of Manila Bay. Under the
Amended JVA, the PEA conveyed to Amari the submerged lands even before their
actual reclamation, although the documentation of the deed of transfer and
issuance of the certificates of title would be made only after actual reclamation.
This Resolution does not prejudice any innocent third party purchaser of the
reclaimed lands covered by the Amended JVA. Neither the PEA nor Amari has sold
any portion of the reclaimed lands to third parties. Title to the reclaimed lands
remains with the PEA. As held in the 9 July 2002 Decision, the Amended JVA
"violates glaringly Sections 2 and 3, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution."

LAUREL V. GARCIA

 Petitions for prohibition seeking to enjoin respondents from proceeding with

the bidding of the Roponggi property

 4 properties under the reparations agreement – Nampeidai, Kobe

commercial, Kobe residential, Roponggi

 Petitioners raise the ff issues:

o Can the Roponggi property and others of its kinds be alienated by the
Philippine govt?

o Does the CE, etc. have the authority and jurisdiction to sell Roponggi
property?

o Authority of the government to alienate the Roponggi property and

make it available for the sale to non-Filipino citizens and entities

o Bidding procedures being discriminatory against Filipino citizens by

denying them right to be informed

 Respondents aver that the subject property is not under our laws but under
Japanese laws, that Roponggi has ceased to become property of public
dominion, that is has become patrimonial property and that the intention to
convert it to private use has been manifested by overt acts such as the
 transfer of embassy to Nampeidai, issuance of AOs for the alienation of
Japanese properties, issuance of EO296, Enactment of CARP, holding of public
bidding, acknowledgement of the senate of government’s intention to
remove Roponggi from public purpose, the court’s dismissal of petition in
Ojeda v. Bidding Committee

 Decision: Roponggi is of public dominion unless it is convincingly shown that

the property has become patrimonial. The respondents failed to do this.

 Roponggi property outside the commerce of man

 The fact that the Roponggi property has not been used for a long time does
not automatically convert it to patrimonial property

 There is no formal declaration from the government to withdraw it from being

such

 Abandonment cannot be inferred from non-use alone, it must be a certain

and positive act based on correct legal premises

 Lex situs rule is misplaced. The opinion does not tackle the alienablity of the
real properties procured through reparations nor the existence in what body
of the authority to sell them

 Petition granted

Miners Association vs. Factoran, Jr.

G.R. No. 98332 January 16, 1995

Facts :

Former President Corazon Aquino issued Executive Order Nos 211 and 279 in the
exercise of her legislative powers. EO No. 211 prescribes the interim procedures in
the processing and approval of applications for the exploration, development and
utilization of minerals pursuant to Section 2, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution. EO
No. 279 authorizes the DENR Secretary to negotiate and conclude joint-venture, co-
production, or production- sharing agreements for the exploration, development,
and utilization of mineral resources.

The issuance and the impeding implementation by the DENR of Administrative

Order Nos. 57 which declares that all existing mining leases or agreements which
were granted after the effectivity of the 1987 Constitution…shall be converted into
production-sharing agreements within one (1) year from the effectivity of these
guidelines.” and Administrative Order No. 82 which provides that a failure to submit
Letter of Intent and Mineral Production-Sharing Agreement within 2 years from the
effectivity of the Department Administrative Order No. 57 shall cause the
abandonment of the mining, quarry, and sand and gravel claims, after their
respective effectivity dates compelled the Miners Association of the Philippines, Inc.,
an organization composed of mining prospectors and claim owners and claim
holders, to file the instant petition assailing their validity and constitutionality
before this Court.
Issue :
Are the two Department Administrative Orders valid?

Ruling :

Yes. Petitioner's insistence on the application of Presidential Decree No. 463, as

amended, as the governing law on the acceptance and approval of declarations of
location and all other kinds of applications for the exploration, development, and
utilization of mineral resources pursuant to Executive Order No. 211, is erroneous.
Presidential Decree No. 463, as amended, pertains to the old system of exploration,
development and utilization of natural resources through "license, concession or
lease" which, however, has been disallowed by Article XII, Section 2 of the 1987
Constitution. By virtue of the said constitutional mandate and its implementing law,
Executive Order No. 279 which superseded Executive Order No. 211, the provisions
dealing on "license, concession or lease" of mineral resources under Presidential
Decree No. 463, as amended, and other existing mining laws are deemed repealed
and, therefore, ceased to operate as the governing law. In other words, in all other
areas of administration and management of mineral lands, the provisions of
Presidential Decree No. 463, as amended, and other existing mining laws, still
govern. Section 7 of Executive Order No. 279 provides, thus:
Sec. 7. All provisions of Presidential Decree No. 463, as amended, other existing
mining laws, and their implementing rules and regulations, or parts thereof, which
are not inconsistent with the provisions of this Executive Order, shall continue in
force and effect.

Well -settled is the rule, however, that regardless of the reservation clause, mining
leases or agreements granted by the State, such as those granted pursuant to
Executive Order No. 211 referred to this petition, are subject to alterations through
a reasonable exercise of the police power of the State.
Accordingly, the State, in the exercise of its police power in this regard, may not be
precluded by the constitutional restriction on non-impairment of contract from
altering, modifying and amending the mining leases or agreements granted under
Presidential Decree No. 463, as amended, pursuant to Executive Order No. 211.
Police Power, being co-extensive with the necessities of the case and the demands
of public interest; extends to all the vital public needs. The passage of Executive
Order No. 279 which superseded Executive Order No. 211 provided legal basis for
the DENR Secretary to carry into effect the mandate of Article XII, Section 2 of the
1987 Constitution.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit.

LA BUGAL B’LAAN TRIBAL ASSOC. V. DENR

Facts :

On July 25, 1987, then President Corazon C. Aquino issued Executive Order (E.O.)
No. 2796 authorizing the DENR Secretary to accept, consider and evaluate
proposals from foreign-owned corporations or foreign investors for contracts or
agreements involving either technical or financial assistance for large-scale
exploration, development, and utilization of minerals, which, upon appropriate
recommendation of the Secretary, the President may execute with the foreign
proponent.

On March 3, 1995, then President Fidel V. Ramos approved R.A. No. 7942 to "govern
the exploration, development, utilization and processing of all mineral resources."
R.A. No. 7942 defines the modes of mineral agreements for mining operations,
outlines the procedure for their filing and approval, assignment/transfer and
withdrawal, and fixes their terms. Similar provisions govern financial or technical
assistance agreements.

On April 9, 1995, 30 days following its publication on March 10, 1995 in Malaya and
Manila Times, two newspapers of general circulation, R.A. No. 7942 took effect.
Shortly before the effectivity of R.A. No. 7942, however, or on March 30, 1995, the
President entered into an FTAA with WMCP covering 99,387 hectares of land in
South Cotabato, Sultan Kudarat, Davao del Sur and North Cotabato.

On August 15, 1995, then DENR Secretary Victor O. Ramos issued DENR
Administrative Order (DAO) No. 95-23, s. 1995, otherwise known as the
Implementing Rules and Regulations of R.A. No. 7942. This was later repealed by
DAO No. 96-40, s. 1996 which was adopted on December 20, 1996.

On January 10, 1997, counsels for petitioners sent a letter to the DENR Secretary
demanding that the DENR stop the implementation of R.A. No. 7942 and DAO No.
96-40, giving the DENR fifteen days from receipt to act thereon. The DENR,
however, has yet to respond or act on petitioners' letter.

Petitioners claim that the DENR Secretary acted without or in excess of jurisdiction.

They pray that the Court issue an order:

(a) Permanently enjoining respondents from acting on any application for Financial
or Technical Assistance Agreements;
(b) Declaring the Philippine Mining Act of 1995 or Republic Act No. 7942 as
unconstitutional and null and void;
(c) Declaring the Implementing Rules and Regulations of the Philippine Mining Act
contained in DENR Administrative Order No. 96-40 and all other similar
administrative issuances as unconstitutional and null and void; and
(d) Cancelling the Financial and Technical Assistance Agreement issued to Western
Mining Philippines, Inc. as unconstitutional, illegal and null and void.

Issue :

Whether or not Republic Act No. 7942 is unconstitutional.

Ruling :
The Court finds the following provisions of R.A. No. 7942 to be violative of Section 2,
Article XII of the Constitution and hereby declares unconstitutional and void:
(1) The proviso in Section 3 (aq), which defines "qualified person," to wit:
Provided, That a legally organized foreign-owned corporation shall be deemed a
qualified person for purposes of granting an exploration permit, financial or
technical assistance agreement or mineral processing permit.

(2) Section 23, which specifies the rights and obligations of an exploration
permittee, insofar as said section applies to a financial or technical assistance
agreement,

(3) Section 33, which prescribes the eligibility of a contractor in a financial or

technical assistance agreement;

(4) Section 35, which enumerates the terms and conditions for every financial or
technical assistance agreement;

(5) Section 39, which allows the contractor in a financial and technical assistance
agreement to convert the same into a mineral production-sharing agreement;

(6) Section 56, which authorizes the issuance of a mineral processing permit to a
contractor in a financial and technical assistance agreement;
The following provisions of the same Act are likewise void as they are dependent on
the foregoing provisions and cannot stand on their own:

(1) Section 3 (g), which defines the term "contractor," insofar as it applies to a
financial or technical assistance agreement.

Section 34, which prescribes the maximum contract area in a financial or technical
assistance agreements;

Section 36, which allows negotiations for financial or technical assistance

agreements;

Section 37, which prescribes the procedure for filing and evaluation of financial or
technical assistance agreement proposals;

Section 38, which limits the term of financial or technical assistance agreements;

Section 40, which allows the assignment or transfer of financial or technical

assistance agreements;

Section 41, which allows the withdrawal of the contractor in an FTAA;

The second and third paragraphs of Section 81, which provide for the Government's
share in a financial and technical assistance agreement; and

Section 90, which provides for incentives to contractors in FTAAs insofar as it

applies to said contractors;

When the parts of the statute are so mutually dependent and connected as
conditions, considerations, inducements, or compensations for each other, as to
warrant a belief that the legislature intended them as a whole, and that if all could
not be carried into effect, the legislature would not pass the residue independently,
then, if some parts are unconstitutional, all the provisions which are thus
dependent, conditional, or connected, must fall with them.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED.

La Bugal-B'Laan Tribal Association vs. Ramos

[GR 127882, 2 December 2004]
Resolution En Banc, Panganiban (J): 14 concur
Facts: The Petition for Prohibition and Mandamus before the Court challenges the
constitutionality of (1) Republic Act 7942 (The Philippine Mining Act of 1995); (2) its
Implementing Rules and Regulations (DENR Administrative Order [DAO] 96-40); and
(3) the Financial and Technical Assistance Agreement (FTAA) dated 30 March 1995,
executed by the government with Western Mining Corporation (Philippines), Inc.
(WMCP). On 27 January 2004, the Court en banc promulgated its Decision, granting
the Petition and declaring the unconstitutionality of certain provisions of RA 7942,
DAO 96-40, as well as of the entire FTAA executed between the government and
WMCP, mainly on the finding that FTAAs are service contracts prohibited by the
1987 Constitution. The Decision struck down the subject FTAA for being similar to
service contracts,[9] which, though permitted under the 1973 Constitution, were
subsequently denounced for being antithetical to the principle of sovereignty over
our natural resources, because they allowed foreign control over the exploitation of
our natural resources, to the prejudice of the Filipino nation. The Decision quoted
several legal scholars and authors who had criticized service contracts for, inter
alia, vesting in the foreign contractor exclusive management and control of the
enterprise, including operation of the field in the event petroleum was discovered;
control of production, expansion and development; nearly unfettered control over
the disposition and sale of the products discovered/extracted; effective ownership
of the natural resource at the point of extraction; and beneficial ownership of our
economic resources. According to the Decision, the 1987 Constitution (Section 2 of
Article XII) effectively banned such service contracts. Subsequently, Victor O.
Ramos (Secretary, Department of Environment and Natural Resources [DENR]),
Horacio Ramos (Director, Mines and Geosciences Bureau [MGB-DENR]), Ruben
Torres (Executive Secretary), and the WMC (Philippines) Inc. filed separate Motions
for Reconsideration.
Issue: Whether the Court has a role in the exercise of the power of control over the
EDU of our natural resources
Held: The Chief Executive is the official constitutionally mandated to “enter into
agreements with foreign owned corporations.” On the other hand, Congress may
review the action of the President once it is notified of “every contract entered into
in accordance with this [constitutional] provision within thirty days from its
execution.” In contrast to this express mandate of the President and Congress in
the exploration, development and utilization (EDU) of natural resources, Article XII
of the Constitution is silent on the role of the judiciary. However, should the
President and/or Congress gravely abuse their discretion in this regard, the courts
may -- in a proper case -- exercise their residual duty under Article VIII. Clearly then,
the judiciary should not inordinately interfere in the exercise of this presidential
power of control over the EDU of our natural resources.
Under the doctrine of separation of powers and due respect for co-equal and
coordinate branches of government, the Court must restrain itself from intruding
into policy matters and must allow the President and Congress maximum discretion
in using the resources of our country and in securing the assistance of foreign
groups to eradicate the grinding poverty of our people and answer their cry for
viable employment opportunities in the country. “The judiciary is loath to interfere
with the due exercise by coequal branches of government of their official
functions.” As aptly spelled out seven decades ago by Justice George Malcolm, “Just
as the Supreme Court, as the guardian of constitutional rights, should not sanction
usurpations by any other department of government, so should it as strictly confine
its own sphere of influence to the powers expressly or by implication conferred on it
by the Organic Act.” Let the development of the mining industry be the
responsibility of the political branches of government. And let not the Court
interfere inordinately and unnecessarily. The Constitution of the Philippines is the
supreme law of the land. It is the repository of all the aspirations and hopes of all
the people.
The Constitution should be read in broad, life-giving strokes. It should not be used
to strangulate economic growth or to serve narrow, parochial interests. Rather, it
should be construed to grant the President and Congress sufficient discretion and
reasonable leeway to enable them to attract foreign investments and expertise, as
well as to secure for our people and our posterity the blessings of prosperity and
peace. The Court fully sympathize with the plight of La Bugal B’laan and other tribal
groups, and commend their efforts to uplift their communities. However, the Court
cannot justify the invalidation of an otherwise constitutional statute along with its
implementing rules, or the nullification of an otherwise legal and binding FTAA
contract. The Court believes that it is not unconstitutional to allow a wide degree of
discretion to the Chief Executive, given the nature and complexity of such
agreements, the humongous amounts of capital and financing required for large-
scale mining operations, the complicated technology needed, and the intricacies of
international trade, coupled with the State’s need to maintain flexibility in its
dealings, in order to preserve and enhance our country’s competitiveness in world
markets. On the basis of this control standard, the Court upholds the
constitutionality of the Philippine Mining Law, its Implementing Rules and
Regulations -- insofar as they relate to financial and technical agreements -- as well
as the subject Financial and Technical Assistance Agreement (FTAA).