G.R. No. 145368 April 12, 2002
Appropriations for succeeding years
SALVADOR H. LAUREL, petitioner,
vs.
HON. ANIANO A. DESIERTO, in his capacity as
Ombudsman, respondent.
KAPUNAN, J.:
On June 13, 1991, President Corazon C. Aquino issued
Administrative Order No. 223 "constituting a Committee for
the preparation of the National Centennial Celebration in
1998." The Committee was mandated "to take charge of the
nationwide preparations for the National Celebration of the
Philippine Centennial of the Declaration of Philippine
Independence and the Inauguration of the Malolos Congress."1
Subsequently, President Fidel V. Ramos issued Executive Order
No. 128, "reconstituting the Committee for the preparation of
the National Centennial Celebrations in 1988." It renamed the
Committee as the "National Centennial Commission."
Appointed to chair the reconstituted Commission was Vice-
President Salvador H. Laurel. Presidents Diosdado M.
Macapagal and Corazon C. Aquino were named Honorary
Chairpersons.2
Characterized as an "i body," the existence of the Commission
"shall terminate upon the completion of all activities related to
the Centennial Celebrations."3 Like its predecessor Committee,
the Commission was tasked to "take charge of the nationwide
preparations for the National Celebration of the Philippine
Centennial of the Declaration of Philippine Independence and
the Inauguration of the Malolos Congress."
Per Section 6 of the Executive Order, the Commission was also
charged with the responsibility to "prepare, for approval of the
President, a Comprehensive Plan for the Centennial
Celebrations within six (6) months from the effectivity of" the
Executive Order.
E.O. No. 128 also contained provisions for staff support and
funding:
Sec. 3. The Commission shall be provided with
technical and administrative staff support by a
Secretariat to be composed of, among others,
detailed personnel from the Presidential
Management Staff, the National Commission for
Culture and the Arts, and the National Historical
Institute. Said Secretariat shall be headed by a full
time Executive Director who shall be designated by
the President.
Sec. 4. The Commission shall be funded with an initial
budget to be drawn from the Department of Tourism
and the president’s Contingent Fund, in an amount to
be recommended by the Commission, and approved
by the President.
shall be incorporated in the budget of the Office of
the President.
Subsequently, a corporation named the Philippine Centennial
Expo ’98 Corporation (Expocorp) was created.4Petitioner was
among the nine (9) Expocorp incorporators, who were also its
first nine (9) directors. Petitioner was elected Expocorp Chief
Executive Officer.
On August 5, 1998, Senator Ana Dominique Coseteng delivered
a privilege speech in the Senate denouncing alleged anomalies
in the construction and operation of the Centennial Exposition
Project at the Clark Special Economic Zone. Upon motion of
Senator Franklin Drilon, Senator Coseteng’s privilege speech
was referred to the Committee on Accountability of Public
Officers and Investigation (The Blue Ribbon Committee) and
several other Senate Committees for investigation.
On February 24, 1999, President Joseph Estrada issued
Administrative Order No. 35, creating an ad hoc and
independent citizens’ committee to investigate all the facts
and circumstances surrounding the Philippine centennial
projects, including its component activities. Former Senator
Rene A.V. Saguisag was appointed to chair the Committee.
On March 23, 1999, the Senate Blue Ribbon Committee filed
with the Secretary of the Senate its Committee Final Report
No. 30 dated February 26, 1999. Among the Committee’s
recommendations was "the prosecution by the
Ombudsman/DOJ of Dr. Salvador Laurel, chair of NCC and of
EXPOCORP for violating the rules on public bidding, relative to
the award of centennial contracts to AK (Asia Construction &
Development Corp.); for exhibiting manifest bias in the
issuance of the NTP (Notice to Proceed) to AK to construct the
FR (Freedom Ring) even in the absence of a valid contract that
has caused material injury to government and for participating
in the scheme to preclude audit by COA of the funds infused
by the government for the implementation of the said
contracts all in violation… of the anti-graft law."5
Later, on November 5, 1999, the Saguisag Committee issued
its own report. It recommended "the further investigation by
the Ombudsman, and indictment, in proper cases of," among
others, NCC Chair Salvador H. Laurel for violations of Section
3(e) of R.A. No. 3019, Section 4(a) in relation to Section 11 of
R.A. No. 6713, and Article 217 of the Revised Penal Code.
The Reports of the Senate Blue Ribbon and the Saguisag
Committee were apparently referred to the Fact-finding and
Intelligence Bureau of the Office of the Ombudsman. On
January 27, 2000, the Bureau issued its Evaluation Report,
recommending:
1. that a formal complaint be filed and preliminary
investigation be conducted before the Evaluation and
Preliminary Investigation Bureau (EPIB), Office of the
 Ombudsman against former NCC and EXPOCORP
chair Salvador H. Laurel, former EXPOCORP President
Teodoro Q. Peña and AK President Edgardo H.
Angeles for violation of Sec. 3(e) and (g) of R.A. No.
3019, as amended in relation to PD 1594 and COA
Rules and Regulations;
2. That the Fact Finding and Intelligence Bureau of this
Office, act as the nominal complainant.6
In an Order dated April 10, 2000, Pelagio S. Apostol, OIC-
Director of the Evaluation and Preliminary Investigation
Bureau, directed petitioner to submit his counter-affidavit and
those of his witnesses.
On April 24, 2000, petitioner filed with the Office of the
Ombudsman a Motion to Dismiss questioning the jurisdiction
of said office.
In an Order dated June 13, 2000, the Ombudsman denied
petitioner’s motion to dismiss.
On July 3, 2000, petitioner moved for a reconsideration of the
June 13, 2000 Order but the motion was denied in an Order
dated October 5, 2000.
On October 25, 2000, petitioner filed the present petition for
certiorari.
On November 14, 2000, the Evaluation and Preliminary
Investigation Bureau issued a resolution finding "probable
cause to indict respondents SALVADOR H. LAUREL and
TEODORO Q. PEÑA before the Sandiganbayan for conspiring to
violate Section 3(e) of Republic Act No. 3019, in relation to
Republic Act No. 1594." The resolution also directed that an
information for violation of the said law be filed against Laurel
and Peña. Ombudsman Aniano A. Desierto approved the
resolution with respect to Laurel but dismissed the charge
against Peña.
In a Resolution dated September 24, 2001, the Court issued a
temporary restraining order, commanding respondents to
desist from filing any information before the Sandiganbayan or
any court against petitioner for alleged violation of Section 3(e)
of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act.
On November 14, 2001, the Court, upon motion of petitioner,
heard the parties in oral argument.
Petitioner assails the jurisdiction of the Ombudsman on the
ground that he is not a public officer because:
A.
EXPOCORP, THE CORPORATION CHAIRED BY PETITIONER
LAUREL WHICH UNDERTOOK THE FREEDOM RING PROJECT IN
CONNECTION WITH WHICH VIOLATIONS OF THE ANTI-GRAFT
AND CORRUPT PRACTICES WERE ALLEGEDLY COMMITTED,
WAS A PRIVATE CORPORATION, NOT A GOVERNMENT-
OWNED OR CONTROLLED CORPORATION.
B.
THE NATIONAL CENTENNIAL COMMISSION (NCC) WAS NOT A
PUBLIC OFFICE.
C.
PETITIONER, BOTH AS CHAIRMAN OF THE NCC AND OF
EXPOCORP WAS NOT A "PUBLIC OFFICER" AS DEFINED UNDER
THE ANTI-GRAFT & CORRUPT PRACTICES ACT.7
In addition, petitioner in his reply8 invokes this Court’s decision
in Uy vs. Sandiganbayan,9 where it was held that the
jurisdiction of the Ombudsman was limited to cases cognizable
by the Sandiganbayan, i.e., over public officers of Grade 27 and
higher. As petitioner’s position was purportedly not classified
as Grade 27 or higher, the Sandiganbayan and, consequently,
the Ombudsman, would have no jurisdiction over him.
This last contention is easily dismissed. In the Court’s decision
in Uy, we held that "it is the prosecutor, not the Ombudsman,
who has the authority to file the corresponding information/s
against petitioner in the regional trial court. The Ombudsman
exercises prosecutorial powers only in cases cognizable by the
Sandiganbayan."
In its Resolution of February 22, 2000, the Court expounded:
The clear import of such pronouncement is to
recognize the authority of the State and regular
provincial and city prosecutors under the Department
of Justice to have control over prosecution of cases
falling within the jurisdiction of the regular courts.
The investigation and prosecutorial powers of the
Ombudsman relate to cases rightfully falling within
the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan under Section
15 (1) of R.A. 6770 ("An Act Providing for the
Functional and Structural Organization of the Office
of the Ombudsman, and for other purposes") which
vests upon the Ombudsman "primary jurisdiction
over cases cognizable by the Sandiganbayan…" And
this is further buttressed by Section 11 (4a) of R.A.
6770 which emphasizes that the Office of the Special
Prosecutor shall have the power to "conduct
preliminary investigation and prosecute criminal
cases within the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan."
Thus, repeated references to the Sandiganbayan’s
jurisdiction clearly serve to limit the Ombudsman’s
and Special Prosecutor’s authority to cases cognizable
by the Sandiganbayan. [Emphasis in the original.]
The foregoing ruling in Uy, however, was short-lived. Upon
motion for clarification by the Ombudsman in the same case,
the Court set aside the foregoing pronouncement in its
Resolution dated March 20, 2001. The Court explained the
rationale for this reversal:
The power to investigate and to prosecute granted by
law to the Ombudsman is plenary and unqualified. It
pertains to any act or omission of any public officer or
employee when such act or omission appears to be
illegal, unjust, improper or inefficient. The law does
not make a distinction between cases cognizable by
the Sandiganbayan and those cognizable by regular
courts. It has been held that the clause "any illegal act
or omission of any public official" is broad enough to
embrace any crime committed by a public officer or
employee.
The reference made by RA 6770 to cases cognizable
by the Sandiganbayan, particularly in Section 15(1)
giving the Ombudsman primary jurisdiction over
cases cognizable by the Sandiganbayan, and Section
11(4) granting the Special Prosecutor the power to
conduct preliminary investigation and prosecute
criminal cases within the jurisdiction of the
Sandiganbayan, should not be construed as confining
the scope of the investigatory and prosecutory power
of the Ombudsman to such cases.
Section 15 of RA 6770 gives the Ombudsman primary
jurisdiction over cases cognizable by the
Sandiganbayan. The law defines such primary
jurisdiction as authorizing the Ombudsman "to take
over, at any stage, from any investigatory agency of
the government, the investigation of such cases." The
grant of this authority does not necessarily imply the
exclusion from its jurisdiction of cases involving public
officers and employees by other courts. The exercise
by the Ombudsman of his primary jurisdiction over
cases cognizable by the Sandiganbayan is not
incompatible with the discharge of his duty to
investigate and prosecute other offenses committed
by public officers and employees. Indeed, it must be
stressed that the powers granted by the legislature to
the Ombudsman are very broad and encompass all
kinds of malfeasance, misfeasance and non-feasance
committed by public officers and employees during
their tenure of office.
Moreover, the jurisdiction of the Office of the
Ombudsman should not be equated with the limited
authority of the Special Prosecutor under Section 11
of RA 6770. The Office of the Special Prosecutor is
merely a component of the Office of the Ombudsman
and may only act under the supervision and control
and upon authority of the Ombudsman. Its power to
conduct preliminary investigation and to prosecute is
limited to criminal cases within the jurisdiction of the
Sandiganbayan. Certainly, the lawmakers did not
intend to confine the investigatory and prosecutory
power of the Ombudsman to these types of cases.
The Ombudsman is mandated by law to act on all
complaints against officers and employees of the
government and to enforce their administrative, civil
and criminal liability in every case where the evidence
warrants. To carry out this duty, the law allows him to
utilize the personnel of his office and/or designate
any fiscal, state prosecutor or lawyer in the
government service to act as special investigator or
prosecutor to assist in the investigation and
prosecution of certain cases. Those designated or
deputized to assist him work under his supervision
and control. The law likewise allows him to direct the
Special Prosecutor to prosecute cases outside the
Sandiganbayan’s jurisdiction in accordance with
Section 11 (4c) of RA 6770.
The prosecution of offenses committed by public
officers and employees is one of the most important
functions of the Ombudsman. In passing RA 6770, the
Congress deliberately endowed the Ombudsman with
such power to make him a more active and effective
agent of the people in ensuring accountability in
public office. A review of the development of our
Ombudsman law reveals this intent. [Emphasis in the
original.]
Having disposed of this contention, we proceed to the principal
grounds upon which petitioner relies. We first address the
argument that petitioner, as Chair of the NCC, was not a public
officer.
The Constitution10 describes the Ombudsman and his Deputies
as "protectors of the people," who "shall act promptly on
complaints filed in any form or manner against public
officials or employees of the government, or any subdivision,
agency or instrumentality thereof, including government-
owned or controlled corporations." Among the awesome
powers, functions, and duties vested by the
Constitution11 upon the Office of the Ombudsman is to
"[i]nvestigate… any act or omission of any public official,
employee, office or agency, when such act or omission appears
to be illegal, unjust, improper, or inefficient."
The foregoing constitutional provisions are substantially
reproduced in R.A. No. 6770, otherwise known as the
"Ombudsman Act of 1989." Sections 13 and 15(1) of said law
respectively provide:
SEC. 13. Mandate. – The Ombudsman and his
Deputies, as protectors of the people shall act
promptly on complaints file in any form or manner
against officers or employees of the Government, or
of any subdivision, agency or instrumentality thereof,
including government-owned or controlled
corporations, and enforce their administrative, civil
and criminal liability in every case where the evidence
 warrants in order to promote efficient service by the
Government to the people.
SEC. 15. Powers, Functions and Duties. – The Office of
the Ombudsman shall have the following powers,
functions and duties:
(1) Investigate and prosecute on its own or on
complaint by any person, any act or omission of any
public officer or employee, office or agency, when
such act or omission appears to be illegal unjust,
improper or inefficient. It has primary jurisdiction
over cases cognizable by the Sandiganbayan and, in
the exercise of this primary jurisdiction, it may take
over, at any stage, from any investigatory agency of
Government, the investigation of such cases;
x x x.
The coverage of the law appears to be limited only by Section
16, in relation to Section 13, supra:
SEC 16. Applicability. – The provisions of this Act shall
apply to all kinds of malfeasance, misfeasance and
non-feasance that have been committed by any
officer or employee as mentioned in Section 13
hereof, during his tenure of office.
In sum, the Ombudsman has the power to investigate any
malfeasance, misfeasance and non-feasance by a public officer
or employee of the government, or of any subdivision, agency
or instrumentality thereof, including government-owned or
controlled corporations.12
Neither the Constitution nor the Ombudsman Act of 1989,
however, defines who public officers are. A definition of public
officers cited in jurisprudence13 is that provided by Mechem, a
recognized authority on the subject:
A public office is the right, authority and duty, created
and conferred by law, by which, for a given period,
either fixed by law or enduring at the pleasure of the
creating power, an individual is invested with some
portion of the sovereign functions of the government,
to be exercised by him for the benefit of the public.
The individual so invested is a public officer. 14
The characteristics of a public office, according to Mechem,
include the delegation of sovereign functions, its creation by
law and not by contract, an oath, salary, continuance of the
position, scope of duties, and the designation of the position
as an office.15
Petitioner submits that some of these characteristics are not
present in the position of NCC Chair, namely: (1) the delegation
of sovereign functions; (2) salary, since he purportedly did not
receive any compensation; and (3) continuance, the tenure of
the NCC being temporary.
Mechem describes the delegation to the individual of some of
the sovereign functions of government as "[t]he most
important characteristic" in determining whether a position is
a public office or not.
The most important characteristic which
distinguishes an office from an employment or
contract is that the creation and conferring of an
office involves a delegation to the individual of some
of the sovereign functions of government, to be
exercised by him for the benefit of the public; – that
some portion of the sovereignty of the country, either
legislative, executive or judicial, attaches, for the time
being, to be exercised for the public benefit. Unless
the powers conferred are of this nature, the individual
is not a public officer.16
Did E.O. 128 delegate the NCC with some of the sovereign
functions of government? Certainly, the law did not delegate
upon the NCC functions that can be described as legislative or
judicial. May the functions of the NCC then be described as
executive?
We hold that the NCC performs executive functions. The
executive power "is generally defined as the power to enforce
and administer the laws. It is the power of carrying the laws
into practical operation and enforcing their due
observance."17 The executive function, therefore, concerns the
implementation of the policies as set forth by law.
The Constitution provides in Article XIV (Education, Science
and Technology, Arts, Culture, and Sports) thereof:
Sec. 15. Arts and letters shall enjoy the patronage of
the State. The State shall conserve, promote, and
popularize the nation’s historical and cultural
heritage and resources, as well as artistic creations.
In its preamble, A.O. No. 223 states the purposes for the
creation of the Committee for the National Centennial
Celebrations in 1998:
Whereas, the birth of the Republic of the Philippines
is to be celebrated in 1998, and the centennial
presents an important vehicle for fostering
nationhood and a strong sense of Filipino identity;
Whereas, the centennial can effectively showcase
Filipino heritage and thereby strengthen Filipino
values;
Whereas, the success of the Centennial Celebrations
may be insured only through long-range planning and
continuous developmental programming;
 Whereas, the active participation of the private sector
in all areas of special expertise and capability,
particularly in communication and information
dissemination, is necessary for long-range planning
and continuous developmental programming;
Whereas, there is a need to create a body which shall
initiate and undertake the primary task of harnessing
the multisectoral components from the business,
cultural, and business sectors to serve as effective
instruments from the launching and overseeing of
this long-term project;
x x x.
E.O. No. 128, reconstituting the Committee for the National
Centennial Celebrations in 1998, cited the "need to strengthen
the said Committee to ensure a more coordinated and
synchronized celebrations of the Philippine Centennial and
wider participation from the government and non-
government or private organizations." It also referred to the
"need to rationalize the relevance of historical links with other
countries."
The NCC was precisely created to execute the foregoing policies
and objectives, to carry them into effect. Thus, the Commission
was vested with the following functions:
(a) To undertake the overall study, conceptualization,
formulation and implementation of programs and
projects on the utilization of culture, arts, literature
and media as vehicles for history, economic
endeavors, and reinvigorating the spirit of national
unity and sense of accomplishment in every Filipino in
the context of the Centennial Celebrations. In this
regard, it shall include a Philippine National
Exposition ’98 within Metro Manila, the original eight
provinces, and Clark Air Base as its major venues;
(b) To act as principal coordinator for all the activities
related to awareness and celebration of the
Centennial;
(c) To serve as the clearing house for the preparation
and dissemination of all information about the plans
and events for the Centennial Celebrations;
(d) To constitute working groups which shall
undertake the implementation of the programs and
projects;
(e) To prioritize the refurbishment of historical sites
and structures nationwide. In this regard, the
Commission shall formulate schemes (e.g. lease-
maintained-and-transfer, build-operate-transfer, and
similar arrangements) to ensure the preservation and
maintenance of the historical sites and structures;
(f) To call upon any government agency or
instrumentality and corporation, and to invite private
individuals and organizations to assist it in the
performance of its tasks; and,
(g) Submit regular reports to the President on the
plans, programs, projects, activities as well as the
status of the preparations for the Celebration.18
It bears noting the President, upon whom the executive power
is vested,19 created the NCC by executive order. Book III (Office
of the President), Chapter 2 (Ordinance Power), Section 2
describes the nature of executive orders:
SEC. 2. Executive Orders. – Acts of the President
providing for rules of a general or permanent
character in implementation or execution of
constitutional or statutory powers shall be
promulgated in executive orders. [Underscoring
ours.]
Furthermore, the NCC was not without a role in the country’s
economic development, especially in Central Luzon. Petitioner
himself admitted as much in the oral arguments before this
Court:
MR. JUSTICE REYNATO S. PUNO:
And in addition to that expounded by Former
President Ramos, don’t you agree that the
task of the centennial commission was also
to focus on the long term over all socio
economic development of the zone and
Central Luzon by attracting investors in the
area because of the eruption of Mt.
Pinatubo.
FORMER VICE PRESIDENT SALVADOR H. LAUREL:
I am glad Your Honor touched on that
because that is something I wanted to touch
on by lack of material time I could not but
that is a very important point. When I was
made Chairman I wanted the Expo to be in
Batangas because I am a Batangeño but
President Ramos said Mr. Vice President the
Central Luzon is suffering, suffering because
of the eruption of Mt. Pinatubo let us try to
catalize [sic] economic recovery in that area
by putting this Expo in Clark Field and so it
was done I agreed and Your Honor if I may
also mention we wanted to generate
employment aside from attracting business
investments and employment. And the
Estrada administration decided to junk this
project there 48, 40 thousand people who
lost job, they were employed in Expo. And
 our target was to provide 75 thousand jobs.
It would have really calibrated, accelerated
the development of Central Luzon. Now, I
think they are going back to that because
they had the airport and there are plan to
revive the Expo site into key park which was
the original plan.
There can hardly be any dispute that the promotion of
industrialization and full employment is a fundamental state
policy.20
Petitioner invokes the ruling of this Court in Torio vs.
Fontanilla21 that the holding by a municipality of a
town fiesta is a proprietary rather than a governmental
function. Petitioner argues that the "holding of a nationwide
celebration which marked the nation’s 100th birthday may be
likened to a national fiesta which involved only the exercise of
the national government’s proprietary function."22 In Torio, we
held:
[Section 2282 of the Chapter on Municipal Law of the
Revised Administrative Code] simply gives authority
to the municipality to [celebrate] a yearly fiesta but it
does not impose upon it a duty to observe one.
Holding a fiesta even if the purpose is to
commemorate a religious or historical event of the
town is in essence an act for the special benefit of the
community and not for the general welfare of the
public performed in pursuance of a policy of the state.
The mere fact that the celebration, as claimed, was
not to secure profit or gain but merely to provide
entertainment to the town inhabitants is not a
conclusive test. For instance, the maintenance of
parks is not a source of income for the town,
nonetheless it is [a] private undertaking as
distinguished from the maintenance of public schools,
jails, and the like which are for public service.
As stated earlier, there can be no hard and fast rule
for purposes of determining the true nature of an
undertaking or function of a municipality; the
surrounding circumstances of a particular case are to
be considered and will be decisive. The basic element,
however beneficial to the public the undertaking may
be, is that it is government in essence, otherwise, the
function becomes private or propriety in character.
Easily, no governmental or public policy of the state is
involved in the celebration of a town fiesta.
Torio, however, did not intend to lay down an all-
encompassing doctrine. Note that the Court cautioned that
"there can be no hard and fast rule for purposes of determining
the true nature of an undertaking or function of a municipality;
the surrounding circumstances of a particular case are to be
considered and will be decisive." Thus, in footnote 15 of Torio,
the Court, citing an American case, illustrated how the
"surrounding circumstances plus the political, social, and
cultural backgrounds" could produce a conclusion different
from that in Torio:
We came across an interesting case which shows that
surrounding circumstances plus the political, social,
and cultural backgrounds may have a decisive bearing
on this question. The case of Pope v. City of New
Haven, et al. was an action to recover damages for
personal injuries caused during a Fourth of July
fireworks display resulting in the death of a bystander
alleged to have been caused by defendants’
negligence. The defendants demurred to the
complaint invoking the defense that the city was
engaged in the performance of a public governmental
duty from which it received no pecuniary benefit and
for negligence in the performance of which no
statutory liability is imposed. This demurrer was
sustained by the Superior Court of New Haven
Country. Plaintiff sought to amend his complaint to
allege that the celebration was for the corporate
advantage of the city. This was denied. In affirming
the order, the Supreme Court of Errors of Connecticut
held inter alia:
Municipal corporations are exempt from liability for
the negligent performance of purely public
governmental duties, unless made liable by statute….
A municipality corporation, which under permissive
authority of its charter or of statute, conducted a
public Fourth of July celebration, including a display
of fireworks, and sent up a bomb intended to explode
in the air, but which failed to explode until it reached
the ground, and then killed a spectator, was engaged
in the performance of a governmental duty. (99 A.R.
51)
This decision was concurred in by three Judges while
two dissented.
At any rate the rationale of the Majority Opinion is
evident from [this] excerpt:
"July 4th, when that date falls upon Sunday, July 5th,
is made a public holiday, called Independence Day, by
our statutes. All or nearly all of the other states have
similar statutes. While there is no United States
statute making a similar provision, the different
departments of the government recognize, and have
recognized since the government was established,
July 4th as a national holiday. Throughout the country
it has been recognized and celebrated as such. These
celebrations, calculated to entertain and instruct the
people generally and to arouse and stimulate
patriotic sentiments and love of country, frequently
take the form of literary exercises consisting of
patriotic speeches and the reading of the
Constitution, accompanied by a musical program
 including patriotic air sometimes preceded by the
firing of cannon and followed by fireworks. That such
celebrations are of advantage to the general public
and their promotion a proper subject of legislation
can hardly be questioned. x x x"
Surely, a town fiesta cannot compare to the National
Centennial Celebrations. The Centennial Celebrations was
meant to commemorate the birth of our nation after centuries
of struggle against our former colonial master, to memorialize
the liberation of our people from oppression by a foreign
power. 1998 marked 100 years of independence and
sovereignty as one united nation. The Celebrations was an
occasion to reflect upon our history and reinvigorate our
patriotism. As A.O. 223 put it, it was a "vehicle for fostering
nationhood and a strong sense of Filipino identity," an
opportunity to "showcase Filipino heritage and thereby
strengthen Filipino values." The significance of the
Celebrations could not have been lost on petitioner, who
remarked during the hearing:
Oh, yes, certainly the State is interested in the unity
of the people, we wanted to rekindle the love for
freedom, love for country, that is the over-all goal
that has to make everybody feel proud that he is a
Filipino, proud of our history, proud of what our
forefather did in their time. x x x.
Clearly, the NCC performs sovereign functions. It is, therefore,
a public office, and petitioner, as its Chair, is a public officer.
That petitioner allegedly did not receive any compensation
during his tenure is of little consequence. A salary is a usual but
not a necessary criterion for determining the nature of the
position. It is not conclusive. The salary is a mere incident and
forms no part of the office. Where a salary or fees is annexed,
the office is provided for it is a naked or honorary office, and is
supposed to be accepted merely for the public good. 23 Hence,
the office of petitioner as NCC Chair may be characterized as
an honorary office, as opposed to a lucrative office or an office
of profit, i.e., one to which salary, compensation or fees are
attached.24 But it is a public office, nonetheless.
Neither is the fact that the NCC was characterized by E.O. No.
128 as an "ad-hoc body" make said commission less of a public
office.
The term office, it is said, embraces the idea of tenure
and duration, and certainly a position which is merely
temporary and local cannot ordinarily be considered
an office. "But," says Chief Justice Marshall, "if a duty
be a continuing one, which is defined by rules
prescribed by the government and not by contract,
which an individual is appointed by government to
perform, who enters on the duties pertaining to his
station without any contract defining them, if those
duties continue though the person be changed, -- it
seems very difficult to distinguish such a charge or
employment from an office of the person who
performs the duties from an officer."
At the same time, however, this element of
continuance can not be considered as indispensable,
for, if the other elements are present "it can make no
difference," says Pearson, C.J., "whether there be but
one act or a series of acts to be done, -- whether the
office expires as soon as the one act is done, or is to
be held for years or during good behavior."25
Our conclusion that petitioner is a public officer finds support
in In Re Corliss.26 There the Supreme Court of Rhode Island
ruled that the office of Commissioner of the United States
Centennial Commission is an "office of trust" as to disqualify
its holder as elector of the United States President and Vice-
President. (Under Article II of the United States Constitution, a
person holding an office of trust or profit under the United
States is disqualified from being appointed an elector.)
x x x. We think a Commissioner of the United States
Centennial Commission holds an office of trust under
the United States, and that he is therefore
disqualified for the office of elector of President and
Vice-President of the United States.
The commission was created under a statute of the
United States approved March 3, 1871. That statute
provides for the holding of an exhibition of American
and foreign arts, products, and manufactures, "under
the auspices of the government of the United States,"
and for the constitution of a commission, to consist of
more than one delegate from each State and from
each Territory of the United States, "whose functions
shall continue until close of the exhibition," and
"whose duty it shall be to prepare and superintend
the execution of the plan for holding the exhibition."
Under the statute the commissioners are appointed
by the President of the United States, on the
nomination of the governor of the States and
Territories respectively. Various duties were imposed
upon the commission, and under the statute
provision was to be made for it to have exclusive
control of the exhibit before the President should
announce, by proclamation, the date and place of
opening and holding the exhibition. By an act of
Congress approved June 1st, 1872, the duties and
functions of the commission were further increased
and defined. That act created a corporation, called
"The Centennial Board of Finance," to cooperate with
the commission and to raise and disburse the funds.
It was to be organized under the direction of the
commission. The seventh section of the act provides
"that the grounds for exhibition shall be prepared and
the buildings erected by the corporation, in
accordance with plans which shall have been adopted
by the United States Centennial Commission; and the
rules and regulations of said corporation, governing
 rates for entrance and admission fees, or otherwise
affecting the rights, privileges, or interests of the
exhibitors, or of the public, shall be fixed and
established by the United States Centennial
Commission; and no grant conferring rights or
privileges of any description connected with said
grounds or buildings, or relating to said exhibition or
celebration, shall be made without the consent of the
United States Centennial Commission, and said
commission shall have power to control, change, or
revoke all such grants, and shall appoint all judges and
examiners and award all premiums." The tenth
section of the act provides that "it shall be the duty of
the United States Centennial Commission to
supervise the closing up of the affairs of said
corporation, to audit its accounts, and submit in a
report to the President of the United States the
financial results of the centennial exhibition."
It is apparent from this statement, which is but
partial, that the duties and functions of the
commission were various, delicate, and important;
that they could be successfully performed only by
men of large experience and knowledge of affairs;
and that they were not merely subordinate and
provisional, but in the highest degree authoritative,
discretionary, and final in their character. We think
that persons performing such duties and exercising
such functions, in pursuance of statutory direction
and authority, are not to be regarded as mere
employees, agents, or committee men, but that they
are, properly speaking, officers, and that the places
which they hold are offices. It appears, moreover,
that they were originally regarded as officers by
Congress; for the act under which they were
appointed declares, section 7, that "no compensation
for services shall be paid to the commissioners or
other officers, provided for in this act, from the
treasury of the United States." The only other
officers provided for were the "alternates" appointed
to serve as commissioners when the commissioners
were unable to attend.
Having arrived at the conclusion that the NCC performs
executive functions and is, therefore, a public office, we need
no longer delve at length on the issue of whether Expocorp is
a private or a public corporation. Even assuming that Expocorp
is a private corporation, petitioner’s position as Chief Executive
Officer (CEO) of Expocorp arose from his Chairmanship of the
NCC. Consequently, his acts or omissions as CEO of Expocorp
must be viewed in the light of his powers and functions as NCC
Chair.27
Finally, it is contended that since petitioner supposedly did not
receive any compensation for his services as NCC or Expocorp
Chair, he is not a public officer as defined in Republic Act No.
3019 (The Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act) and is,
therefore, beyond the jurisdiction of the Ombudsman.
Respondent seeks to charge petitioner with violation of
Section 3 (e) of said law, which reads:
SEC. 3. Corrupt practices of public officers. – In
addition to acts or omissions of public officers already
penalized by existing law, the following shall
constitute corrupt practices of any public officer and
are hereby declared to be unlawful:
xxx
(e) Causing any undue injury to any party, including
the Government, or giving any private party any
unwarranted benefits, advantage or preference in the
discharge of his official, administrative or judicial
functions through manifest partiality, evident bad
faith or gross inexcusable negligence. This provision
shall apply to officers and employees of offices or
government corporations charged with the grant of
licenses or permits or other concessions.
A "public officer," under R.A. No. 3019, is defined by Section 2
of said law as follows:
SEC. 2. Definition of terms. – As used in this Act, the
term –
xxx
(b) "Public officer" includes elective and appointive
officials and employees, permanent or temporary,
whether in the classified or unclassified or exemption
service receiving compensation, even nominal, from
the government as defined in the preceding
paragraph. [Emphasis supplied.]
It is clear from Section 2 (b), above, that the definition of a
"public officer" is expressly limited to the application of R.A.
No. 3019. Said definition does not apply for purposes of
determining the Ombudsman’s jurisdiction, as defined by the
Constitution and the Ombudsman Act of 1989.
Moreover, the question of whether petitioner is a public
officer under the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act involves
the appreciation of evidence and interpretation of law,
matters that are best resolved at trial.
To illustrate, the use of the term "includes" in Section 2 (b)
indicates that the definition is not restrictive.28 The Anti-Graft
and Corrupt Practices Act is just one of several laws that define
"public officers." Article 203 of the Revised Penal Code, for
example, provides that a public officer is:
x x x any person who, by direct provision of law,
popular election or appointment by competent
authority, takes part in the performance of public
functions in the Government of Philippines, or
 performs in said Government or in any of its branches WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED. The preliminary
public duties as an employee, agent or subordinate injunction issued in the Court’s Resolution dated September
official, of any rank or class. 24, 2001 is hereby LIFTED.

Section 2 (14) of the Introductory Provisions of the SO ORDERED.

Administrative Code of 1987,29 on the other hand, states:
Puno, and Ynares-Santiago, JJ., concur.
Officer – as distinguished from "clerk" or "employee", Davide, Jr., C.J., (Chairman), no part due to close relation to a
refers to a person whose duties not being of a clerical party.
or manual nature, involves the exercise of discretion
in the performance of the functions of the
government. When used with reference to a person
having authority to do a particular act or perform a
particular person in the exercise of governmental
power, "officer" includes any government employee,
agent or body having authority to do the act or
exercise that function.

It bears noting that under Section 3 (b) of Republic Act No.

6713 (The Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public
Officials and Employees), one may be considered a "public
official" whether or not one receives compensation, thus:

"Public Officials" include elective and appointive

officials and employees, permanent or temporary,
whether in the career or non-career service including
military and police personnel, whether or not they
receive compensation, regardless of amount.

Which of these definitions should apply, if at all?

Assuming that the definition of public officer in R.A. No. 3019

is exclusive, the term "compensation," which is not defined by
said law, has many meanings.

Under particular circumstances, "compensation" has

been held to include allowance for personal
expenses, commissions, expenses, fees, an
honorarium, mileage or traveling expenses, payments
for services, restitution or a balancing of accounts,
salary, and wages.30

How then is "compensation," as the term is used in Section 2

(b) of R.A. No. 3019, to be interpreted?

Did petitioner receive any compensation at all as NCC Chair?

Granting that petitioner did not receive any salary, the records
do not reveal if he received any allowance, fee, honorarium, or
some other form of compensation. Notably, under the by-laws
of Expocorp, the CEO is entitled to per diems and
compensation.31 Would such fact bear any significance?

Obviously, this proceeding is not the proper forum to settle

these issues lest we preempt the trial court from resolving
them.