EN BANC RELATION TO THE VISITING FORCES AGREEMENT
[G.R. No. 138570. October 10, 2000]
BAYAN (Bagong Alyansang Makabayan), a JUNK VFA MOVEMENT,
BISHOP TOMAS MILLAMENA (Iglesia Filipina Independiente), BISHOP
ELMER BOLOCAN (United Church of Christ of the Phil.), DR.
REYNALDO LEGASCA, MD, KILUSANG MAMBUBUKID NG
PILIPINAS, KILUSANG MAYO UNO, GABRIELA, PROLABOR, and
the PUBLIC INTEREST LAW CENTER, petitioners, vs. EXECUTIVE
SECRETARY RONALDO ZAMORA, FOREIGN AFFAIRS
SECRETARY DOMINGO SIAZON, DEFENSE SECRETARY
ORLANDO MERCADO, BRIG. GEN. ALEXANDER AGUIRRE,
SENATE PRESIDENT MARCELO FERNAN, SENATOR FRANKLIN
DRILON, SENATOR BLAS OPLE, SENATOR RODOLFO BIAZON, and
SENATOR FRANCISCO TATAD, respondents.
[G.R. No. 138572. October 10, 2000]
PHILIPPINE CONSTITUTION ASSOCIATION, INC.(PHILCONSA),
EXEQUIEL B. GARCIA, AMADOGAT INCIONG, CAMILO L. SABIO,
AND RAMON A. GONZALES, petitioners, vs. HON. RONALDO B.
ZAMORA, as Executive Secretary, HON. ORLANDO MERCADO, as
Secretary of National Defense, and HON. DOMINGO L. SIAZON, JR., as
Secretary of Foreign Affairs, respondents.
[G.R. No. 138587. October 10, 2000]
TEOFISTO T. GUINGONA, JR., RAUL S. ROCO, and SERGIO R.
OSMEA III, petitioners, vs. JOSEPH E. ESTRADA, RONALDO B.
ZAMORA, DOMINGO L. SIAZON, JR., ORLANDO B. MERCADO,
MARCELO B. FERNAN, FRANKLIN M. DRILON, BLAS F. OPLE and
RODOLFO G. BIAZON, respondents.
[G.R. No. 138680. October 10, 2000]
INTEGRATED BAR OF THE PHILIPPINES, Represented by its National
President, Jose Aguila Grapilon, petitioners, vs. JOSEPH EJERCITO
ESTRADA, in his capacity as President, Republic of the Philippines, and
HON. DOMINGO SIAZON, in his capacity as Secretary of Foreign
Affairs,respondents.
[G.R. No. 138698. October 10, 2000]
JOVITO R. SALONGA, WIGBERTO TAADA, ZENAIDA QUEZON-
AVENCEA, ROLANDO SIMBULAN, PABLITO V. SANIDAD, MA.
SOCORRO I. DIOKNO, AGAPITO A. AQUINO, JOKER P. ARROYO,
FRANCISCO C. RIVERA JR., RENE A.V. SAGUISAG, KILOSBAYAN,
MOVEMENT OF ATTORNEYS FOR BROTHERHOOD, INTEGRITY
AND NATIONALISM, INC. (MABINI), petitioners, vs. THE EXECUTIVE
SECRETARY, THE SECRETARY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS, THE
SECRETARY OF NATIONAL DEFENSE, SENATE PRESIDENT
MARCELO B. FERNAN, SENATOR BLAS F. OPLE, SENATOR
RODOLFO G. BIAZON, AND ALL OTHER PERSONS ACTING THEIR
CONTROL, SUPERVISION, DIRECTION, AND INSTRUCTION IN
(VFA), respondents.
DECISION
BUENA, J.:
Confronting the Court for resolution in the instant consolidated
petitions for certiorari and prohibition are issues relating to, and borne by, an
agreement forged in the turn of the last century between the Republic of the
Philippines and the United States of America -the Visiting Forces Agreement.
The antecedents unfold.
On March 14, 1947, the Philippines and the United States of America
forged a Military Bases Agreement which formalized, among others, the use of
installations in the Philippine territory by United States military personnel. To
further strengthen their defense and security relationship, the Philippines and the
United States entered into a Mutual Defense Treaty on August 30, 1951. Under
the treaty, the parties agreed to respond to any external armed attack on their
territory, armed forces, public vessels, and aircraft.[1]
In view of the impending expiration of the RP-US Military Bases
Agreement in 1991, the Philippines and the United States negotiated for a
possible extension of the military bases agreement. On September 16, 1991, the
Philippine Senate rejected the proposed RP-US Treaty of Friendship,
Cooperation and Security which, in effect, would have extended the presence of
US military bases in the Philippines.[2] With the expiration of the RP-US
Military Bases Agreement, the periodic military exercises conducted between
the two countries were held in abeyance. Notwithstanding, the defense and
security relationship between the Philippines and the United States of America
continued pursuant to the Mutual Defense Treaty.
On July 18, 1997, the United States panel, headed by US Defense
Deputy Assistant Secretary for Asia Pacific Kurt Campbell, met with the
Philippine panel, headed by Foreign Affairs Undersecretary Rodolfo Severino
Jr., to exchange notes on the complementing strategic interests of the United
States and the Philippines in the Asia-Pacific region. Both sides discussed,
among other things, the possible elements of the Visiting Forces
Agreement (VFA for brevity). Negotiations by both panels on the VFA led to a
consolidated draft text, which in turn resulted to a final series of conferences and
negotiations[3] that culminated in Manila on January 12 and 13, 1998.
Thereafter, then President Fidel V. Ramos approved the VFA, which was
respectively signed by public respondent Secretary Siazon and Unites States
Ambassador Thomas Hubbard on February 10, 1998.
On October 5, 1998, President Joseph E. Estrada, through respondent
Secretary of Foreign Affairs, ratified the VFA.[4]
 On October 6, 1998, the President, acting through respondent
Executive Secretary Ronaldo Zamora, officially transmitted to the Senate of the
Philippines,[5] the Instrument of Ratification, the letter of the President[6] and the
VFA, for concurrence pursuant to Section 21, Article VII of the 1987
Constitution. The Senate, in turn, referred the VFA to its Committee on Foreign
Relations, chaired by Senator Blas F. Ople, and its Committee on National
Defense and Security, chaired by Senator Rodolfo G. Biazon, for their joint
consideration and recommendation. Thereafter, joint public hearings were held
by the two Committees.[7]
On May 3, 1999, the Committees submitted Proposed Senate
Resolution No. 443[8] recommending the concurrence of the Senate to the VFA
and the creation of a Legislative Oversight Committee to oversee its
implementation. Debates then ensued.
On May 27, 1999, Proposed Senate Resolution No. 443 was approved
by the Senate, by a two-thirds (2/3) vote[9] of its members. Senate Resolution
No. 443 was then re-numbered as Senate Resolution No. 18.[10]
On June 1, 1999, the VFA officially entered into force after an Exchange of
Notes between respondent Secretary Siazon and United States Ambassador
Hubbard.
The VFA, which consists of a Preamble and nine (9) Articles, provides
for the mechanism for regulating the circumstances and conditions under which
US Armed Forces and defense personnel may be present in the Philippines, and
is quoted in its full text, hereunder:
Article I
Definitions
As used in this Agreement, United States personnel means United
States military and civilian personnel temporarily in the Philippines in
connection with activities approved by the Philippine Government.
Within this definition:
1. The term military personnel refers to military members of the United States
Army, Navy, Marine Corps, Air Force, and Coast Guard.
2. The term civilian personnel refers to individuals who are neither nationals of,
nor ordinary residents in the Philippines and who are employed by the United
States armed forces or who are accompanying the United States armed forces,
such as employees of the American Red Cross and the United Services
Organization.
Article II
Respect for Law
It is the duty of the United States personnel to respect the laws of the
Republic of the Philippines and to abstain from any activity inconsistent with the
spirit of this agreement, and, in particular, from any political activity in the
Philippines. The Government of the United States shall take all measures within
its authority to ensure that this is done.
Article III
Entry and Departure
1. The Government of the Philippines shall facilitate the admission of United
States personnel and their departure from the Philippines in connection with
activities covered by this agreement.
2. United States military personnel shall be exempt from passport and visa
regulations upon entering and departing the Philippines.
3. The following documents only, which shall be presented on demand, shall be
required in respect of United States military personnel who enter the
Philippines:
(a) personal identity card issued by the appropriate United States authority
showing full name, date of birth, rank or grade and service number (if any),
branch of service and photograph;
(b) individual or collective document issued by the appropriate United States
authority, authorizing the travel or visit and identifying the individual or group
as United States military personnel; and
(c) the commanding officer of a military aircraft or vessel shall present a
declaration of health, and when required by the cognizant representative of the
Government of the Philippines, shall conduct a quarantine inspection and will
certify that the aircraft or vessel is free from quarantinable diseases. Any
quarantine inspection of United States aircraft or United States vessels or
cargoes thereon shall be conducted by the United States commanding officer in
accordance with the international health regulations as promulgated by the
World Health Organization, and mutually agreed procedures.
4. United States civilian personnel shall be exempt from visa requirements but
shall present, upon demand, valid passports upon entry and departure of the
Philippines.
5. If the Government of the Philippines has requested the removal of any United
States personnel from its territory, the United States authorities shall be
responsible for receiving the person concerned within its own territory or
otherwise disposing of said person outside of the Philippines.
Article IV
Driving and Vehicle Registration
1. Philippine authorities shall accept as valid, without test or fee, a driving
permit or license issued by the appropriate United States authority to United
States personnel for the operation of military or official vehicles.
2. Vehicles owned by the Government of the United States need not be
registered, but shall have appropriate markings.
Article V
Criminal Jurisdiction
1. Subject to the provisions of this article:
(a) Philippine authorities shall have jurisdiction over United States personnel
with respect to offenses committed within the Philippines and punishable under
the law of the Philippines.
(b) United States military authorities shall have the right to exercise within the
Philippines all criminal and disciplinary jurisdiction conferred on them by the
military law of the United States over United States personnel in the Philippines.
2. (a) Philippine authorities exercise exclusive jurisdiction over United States
personnel with respect to offenses, including offenses relating to the security of
the Philippines, punishable under the laws of the Philippines, but not under the
laws of the United States.
(b) United States authorities exercise exclusive jurisdiction over United States
personnel with respect to offenses, including offenses relating to the security of
the United States, punishable under the laws of the United States, but not under
the laws of the Philippines.
(c) For the purposes of this paragraph and paragraph 3 of this article, an offense
relating to security means:
(1) treason;
(2) sabotage, espionage or violation of any law relating to national defense.
3. In cases where the right to exercise jurisdiction is concurrent, the following
rules shall apply:
(a) Philippine authorities shall have the primary right to exercise jurisdiction
over all offenses committed by United States personnel, except in cases
provided for in paragraphs 1(b), 2 (b), and 3 (b) of this Article.
(b) United States military authorities shall have the primary right to exercise
jurisdiction over United States personnel subject to the military law of the
United States in relation to.
(1) offenses solely against the property or security of the United States or
offenses solely against the property or person of United States personnel; and
(2) offenses arising out of any act or omission done in performance of official
duty.
(c) The authorities of either government may request the authorities of the other
government to waive their primary right to exercise jurisdiction in a particular
case.
(d) Recognizing the responsibility of the United States military authorities to
maintain good order and discipline among their forces, Philippine authorities
will, upon request by the United States, waive their primary right to exercise
jurisdiction except in cases of particular importance to the Philippines. If the
Government of the Philippines determines that the case is of particular
importance, it shall communicate such determination to the United States
authorities within twenty (20) days after the Philippine authorities receive the
United States request.
(e) When the United States military commander determines that an offense
charged by authorities of the Philippines against United states personnel arises
out of an act or omission done in the performance of official duty, the
commander will issue a certificate setting forth such determination. This
certificate will be transmitted to the appropriate authorities of the Philippines
and will constitute sufficient proof of performance of official duty for the
purposes of paragraph 3(b)(2) of this Article. In those cases where the
Government of the Philippines believes the circumstances of the case require a
review of the duty certificate, United States military authorities and Philippine
authorities shall consult immediately. Philippine authorities at the highest levels
may also present any information bearing on its validity. United States military
authorities shall take full account of the Philippine position. Where appropriate,
United States military authorities will take disciplinary or other action against
offenders in official duty cases, and notify the Government of the Philippines of
the actions taken.
(f) If the government having the primary right does not exercise jurisdiction, it
shall notify the authorities of the other government as soon as possible.
(g) The authorities of the Philippines and the United States shall notify each
other of the disposition of all cases in which both the authorities of the
Philippines and the United States have the right to exercise jurisdiction.
4. Within the scope of their legal competence, the authorities of the Philippines
and United States shall assist each other in the arrest of United States personnel
in the Philippines and in handling them over to authorities who are to exercise
jurisdiction in accordance with the provisions of this article.
5. United States military authorities shall promptly notify Philippine authorities
of the arrest or detention of United States personnel who are subject of
Philippine primary or exclusive jurisdiction. Philippine authorities shall
promptly notify United States military authorities of the arrest or detention of
any United States personnel.
6. The custody of any United States personnel over whom the Philippines is to
exercise jurisdiction shall immediately reside with United States military
authorities, if they so request, from the commission of the offense until
completion of all judicial proceedings. United States military authorities shall,
upon formal notification by the Philippine authorities and without delay, make
such personnel available to those authorities in time for any investigative or
judicial proceedings relating to the offense with which the person has been
charged in extraordinary cases, the Philippine Government shall present its
position to the United States Government regarding custody, which the United
States Government shall take into full account. In the event Philippine judicial
proceedings are not completed within one year, the United States shall be
relieved of any obligations under this paragraph. The one-year period will not
include the time necessary to appeal. Also, the one-year period will not include
any time during which scheduled trial procedures are delayed because United
States authorities, after timely notification by Philippine authorities to arrange
for the presence of the accused, fail to do so.
7. Within the scope of their legal authority, United States and Philippine
authorities shall assist each other in the carrying out of all necessary
investigation into offenses and shall cooperate in providing for the attendance of
witnesses and in the collection and production of evidence, including seizure
and, in proper cases, the delivery of objects connected with an offense.
8. When United States personnel have been tried in accordance with the
provisions of this Article and have been acquitted or have been convicted and
are serving, or have served their sentence, or have had their sentence remitted or
suspended, or have been pardoned, they may not be tried again for the same
offense in the Philippines. Nothing in this paragraph, however, shall prevent
United States military authorities from trying United States personnel for any
violation of rules of discipline arising from the act or omission which constituted
an offense for which they were tried by Philippine authorities.
9. When United States personnel are detained, taken into custody, or prosecuted
by Philippine authorities, they shall be accorded all procedural safeguards
established by the law of the Philippines. At the minimum, United States
personnel shall be entitled:
(a) To a prompt and speedy trial;
(b) To be informed in advance of trial of the specific charge or charges made
against them and to have reasonable time to prepare a defense;
(c) To be confronted with witnesses against them and to cross examine such
witnesses;
(d) To present evidence in their defense and to have compulsory process for
obtaining witnesses;
(e) To have free and assisted legal representation of their own choice on the
same basis as nationals of the Philippines;
(f) To have the service of a competent interpreter; and
(g) To communicate promptly with and to be visited regularly by United States
authorities, and to have such authorities present at all judicial proceedings.
These proceedings shall be public unless the court, in accordance with
Philippine laws, excludes persons who have no role in the proceedings.
10. The confinement or detention by Philippine authorities of United States
personnel shall be carried out in facilities agreed on by appropriate Philippine
and United States authorities. United States Personnel serving sentences in the
Philippines shall have the right to visits and material assistance.
11. United States personnel shall be subject to trial only in Philippine courts of
ordinary jurisdiction, and shall not be subject to the jurisdiction of Philippine
military or religious courts.
Article VI
Claims
1. Except for contractual arrangements, including United States foreign military
sales letters of offer and acceptance and leases of military equipment, both
governments waive any and all claims against each other for damage, loss or
destruction to property of each others armed forces or for death or injury to their
military and civilian personnel arising from activities to which this agreement
applies.
2. For claims against the United States, other than contractual claims and those
to which paragraph 1 applies, the United States Government, in accordance with
United States law regarding foreign claims, will pay just and reasonable
compensation in settlement of meritorious claims for damage, loss, personal
injury or death, caused by acts or omissions of United States personnel, or
otherwise incident to the non-combat activities of the United States forces.
Article VII
Importation and Exportation
1. United States Government equipment, materials, supplies, and other property
imported into or acquired in the Philippines by or on behalf of the United States
armed forces in connection with activities to which this agreement applies, shall
be free of all Philippine duties, taxes and other similar charges. Title to such
property shall remain with the United States, which may remove such property
from the Philippines at any time, free from export duties, taxes, and other similar
charges. The exemptions provided in this paragraph shall also extend to any
duty, tax, or other similar charges which would otherwise be assessed upon such
property after importation into, or acquisition within, the Philippines. Such
property may be removed from the Philippines, or disposed of therein, provided
that disposition of such property in the Philippines to persons or entities not
entitled to exemption from applicable taxes and duties shall be subject to
payment of such taxes, and duties and prior approval of the Philippine
Government.
2. Reasonable quantities of personal baggage, personal effects, and other
property for the personal use of United States personnel may be imported into
and used in the Philippines free of all duties, taxes and other similar charges
during the period of their temporary stay in the Philippines. Transfers to persons
or entities in the Philippines not entitled to import privileges may only be made
upon prior approval of the appropriate Philippine authorities including payment
by the recipient of applicable duties and taxes imposed in accordance with the
laws of the Philippines. The exportation of such property and of property
acquired in the Philippines by United States personnel shall be free of all
Philippine duties, taxes, and other similar charges.
Article VIII
Movement of Vessels and Aircraft
1. Aircraft operated by or for the United States armed forces may enter the
Philippines upon approval of the Government of the Philippines in accordance
with procedures stipulated in implementing arrangements.
2. Vessels operated by or for the United States armed forces may enter the
Philippines upon approval of the Government of the Philippines. The movement
of vessels shall be in accordance with international custom and practice
governing such vessels, and such agreed implementing arrangements as
necessary.
3. Vehicles, vessels, and aircraft operated by or for the United States armed
forces shall not be subject to the payment of landing or port fees, navigation or
over flight charges, or tolls or other use charges, including light and harbor dues,
while in the Philippines. Aircraft operated by or for the United States armed
forces shall observe local air traffic control regulations while in the Philippines.
Vessels owned or operated by the United States solely on United States
Government non-commercial service shall not be subject to compulsory pilotage
at Philippine ports.
 Article IX
Duration and Termination
This agreement shall enter into force on the date on which the parties have
notified each other in writing through the diplomatic channel that they have
completed their constitutional requirements for entry into force. This agreement
shall remain in force until the expiration of 180 days from the date on which
either party gives the other party notice in writing that it desires to terminate the
agreement.
Via these consolidated[11] petitions for certiorari and prohibition, petitioners - as
legislators, non-governmental organizations, citizens and taxpayers - assail the
constitutionality of the VFA and impute to herein respondents grave abuse of
discretion in ratifying the agreement.
We have simplified the issues raised by the petitioners into the following:
I specifically prove that he has sufficient interest in preventing the illegal
Do petitioners have legal standing as concerned citizens, taxpayers, or
legislators to question the constitutionality of the VFA?
II
Is the VFA governed by the provisions of Section 21, Article VII or of Section
25, Article XVIII of the Constitution?
III
Does the VFA constitute an abdication of Philippine sovereignty?
a. Are Philippine courts deprived of their jurisdiction to hear and try offenses
committed by US military personnel?
b. Is the Supreme Court deprived of its jurisdiction over offenses punishable by
reclusion perpetua or higher?
IV
Does the VFA violate:
a. the equal protection clause under Section 1, Article III of the Constitution?
b. the Prohibition against nuclear weapons under Article II, Section 8?
c. Section 28 (4), Article VI of the Constitution granting the exemption from
taxes and duties for the equipment, materials supplies and other properties
imported into or acquired in the Philippines by, or on behalf, of the US Armed
Forces?
LOCUS STANDI
At the outset, respondents challenge petitioners standing to sue, on the
ground that the latter have not shown any interest in the case, and that
petitioners failed to substantiate that they have sustained, or will sustain direct
injury as a result of the operation of the VFA. [12] Petitioners, on the other hand,
counter that the validity or invalidity of the VFA is a matter of transcendental
importance which justifies their standing.[13]
A party bringing a suit challenging the constitutionality of a law, act, or
statute must show not only that the law is invalid, but also that he has sustained
or in is in immediate, or imminent danger of sustaining some direct injury as a
result of its enforcement, and not merely that he suffers thereby in some
indefinite way. He must show that he has been, or is about to be, denied some
right or privilege to which he is lawfully entitled, or that he is about to be
subjected to some burdens or penalties by reason of the statute complained of. [14]
In the case before us, petitioners failed to show, to the satisfaction of this Court,
that they have sustained, or are in danger of sustaining any direct injury as a
result of the enforcement of the VFA. As taxpayers, petitioners have not
established that the VFA involves the exercise by Congress of its taxing or
spending powers.[15] On this point, it bears stressing that a taxpayers suit refers
to a case where the act complained of directly involves the illegal disbursement
of public funds derived from taxation.[16] Thus, in Bugnay Const. &
Development Corp. vs. Laron[17], we held:
x x x it is exigent that the taxpayer-plaintiff sufficiently show that he would be
benefited or injured by the judgment or entitled to the avails of the suit as a real
party in interest. Before he can invoke the power of judicial review, he must
expenditure of money raised by taxation and that he will sustain a direct injury
as a result of the enforcement of the questioned statute or contract. It is not
sufficient that he has merely a general interest common to all members of the
public.
Clearly, inasmuch as no public funds raised by taxation are involved in
this case, and in the absence of any allegation by petitioners that public funds
are being misspent or illegally expended, petitioners, as taxpayers, have no legal
standing to assail the legality of the VFA.
Similarly, Representatives Wigberto Taada, Agapito Aquino and Joker
Arroyo, as petitioners-legislators, do not possess the requisite locus standi to
maintain the present suit. While this Court, in Phil. Constitution Association vs.
Hon. Salvador Enriquez,[18] sustained the legal standing of a member of the
Senate and the House of Representatives to question the validity of a
presidential veto or a condition imposed on an item in an appropriation bull, we
cannot, at this instance, similarly uphold petitioners standing as members of
Congress, in the absence of a clear showing of any direct injury to their person
or to the institution to which they belong.
Beyond this, the allegations of impairment of legislative power, such as
the delegation of the power of Congress to grant tax exemptions, are more
apparent than real. While it may be true that petitioners pointed to provisions of
the VFA which allegedly impair their legislative powers, petitioners failed
however to sufficiently show that they have in fact suffered direct injury.
In the same vein, petitioner Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) is stripped of
standing in these cases. As aptly observed by the Solicitor General, the IBP
lacks the legal capacity to bring this suit in the absence of a board resolution
from its Board of Governors authorizing its National President to commence the
present action.[19]
Notwithstanding, in view of the paramount importance and the
constitutional significance of the issues raised in the petitions, this Court, in the
exercise of its sound discretion, brushes aside the procedural barrier and takes
cognizance of the petitions, as we have done in the early Emergency Powers
Cases,[20] where we had occasion to rule:
x x x ordinary citizens and taxpayers were allowed to question the
constitutionality of several executive orders issued by President Quirino
although they were involving only an indirect and general interest shared in
common with the public. The Court dismissed the objection that they were not
proper parties and ruled that transcendental importance to the public of these
cases demands that they be settled promptly and definitely, brushing aside,
if we must, technicalities of procedure. We have since then applied the
exception in many other cases. (Association of Small Landowners in the
Philippines, Inc. v. Sec. of Agrarian Reform, 175 SCRA 343). (Underscoring
Supplied)
This principle was reiterated in the subsequent cases of Gonzales vs.
COMELEC,[21] Daza vs. Singson,[22] and Basco vs. Phil. Amusement and
Gaming Corporation,[23] where we emphatically held:
Considering however the importance to the public of the case at bar, and in
keeping with the Courts duty, under the 1987 Constitution, to determine whether
or not the other branches of the government have kept themselves within the
limits of the Constitution and the laws and that they have not abused the
discretion given to them, the Court has brushed aside technicalities of procedure
and has taken cognizance of this petition. x x x
Again, in the more recent case of Kilosbayan vs. Guingona,
Jr.,[24] thisCourt ruled that in cases of transcendental importance, the Court
may relax the standing requirements and allow a suit to prosper even where
there is no direct injury to the party claiming the right of judicial review.
Although courts generally avoid having to decide a constitutional question based
on the doctrine of separation of powers, which enjoins upon the departments of
the government a becoming respect for each others acts, [25] this Court
nevertheless resolves to take cognizance of the instant petitions.
APPLICABLE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISION
One focal point of inquiry in this controversy is the determination of
which provision of the Constitution applies, with regard to the exercise by the
senate of its constitutional power to concur with the VFA. Petitioners argue that
Section 25, Article XVIII is applicable considering that the VFA has for its
subject the presence of foreign military troops in the Philippines.Respondents,
on the contrary, maintain that Section 21, Article VII should apply inasmuch as
the VFA is not a basing arrangement but an agreement which involves merely
the temporary visits of United States personnel engaged in joint military
exercises.
The 1987 Philippine Constitution contains two provisions requiring the
concurrence of the Senate on treaties or international agreements. Section 21,
Article VII, which herein respondents invoke, reads:
No treaty or international agreement shall be valid and effective unless
concurred in by at least two-thirds of all the Members of the Senate.
Section 25, Article XVIII, provides:
After the expiration in 1991 of the Agreement between the Republic of
the Philippines and the United States of America concerning Military Bases,
foreign military bases, troops, or facilities shall not be allowed in the Philippines
except under a treaty duly concurred in by the senate and, when the Congress so
requires, ratified by a majority of the votes cast by the people in a national
referendum held for that purpose, and recognized as a treaty by the other
contracting State.
Section 21, Article VII deals with treatise or international agreements
in general, in which case, the concurrence of at least two-thirds (2/3) of all the
Members of the Senate is required to make the subject treaty, or international
agreement, valid and binding on the part of the Philippines. This provision lays
down the general rule on treatise or international agreements and applies to any
form of treaty with a wide variety of subject matter, such as, but not limited to,
extradition or tax treatise or those economic in nature. All treaties or
international agreements entered into by the Philippines, regardless of subject
matter, coverage, or particular designation or appellation, requires the
concurrence of the Senate to be valid and effective.
In contrast, Section 25, Article XVIII is a special provision that applies
to treaties which involve the presence of foreign military bases, troops or
facilities in the Philippines. Under this provision, the concurrence of the Senate
is only one of the requisites to render compliance with the constitutional
requirements and to consider the agreement binding on the Philippines.Section
25, Article XVIII further requires that foreign military bases, troops, or facilities
may be allowed in the Philippines only by virtue of a treaty duly concurred in by
the Senate, ratified by a majority of the votes cast in a national referendum held
for that purpose if so required by Congress, and recognized as such by the other
contracting state.
It is our considered view that both constitutional provisions, far from
contradicting each other, actually share some common ground. These
constitutional provisions both embody phrases in the negative and thus, are
deemed prohibitory in mandate and character. In particular, Section 21 opens
with the clause No treaty x x x, and Section 25 contains the phrase shall not be
allowed. Additionally, in both instances, the concurrence of the Senate is
indispensable to render the treaty or international agreement valid and effective.
To our mind, the fact that the President referred the VFA to the Senate under
Section 21, Article VII, and that the Senate extended its concurrence under the
same provision, is immaterial. For in either case, whether under Section 21,
Article VII or Section 25, Article XVIII, the fundamental law is crystalline that
the concurrence of the Senate is mandatory to comply with the strict
constitutional requirements.
On the whole, the VFA is an agreement which defines the treatment of
United States troops and personnel visiting the Philippines. It provides for the
guidelines to govern such visits of military personnel, and further defines the
rights of the United States and the Philippine government in the matter of
criminal jurisdiction, movement of vessel and aircraft, importation and
exportation of equipment, materials and supplies.
Undoubtedly, Section 25, Article XVIII, which specifically deals with
treaties involving foreign military bases, troops, or facilities, should apply in the
instant case. To a certain extent and in a limited sense, however, the provisions
of section 21, Article VII will find applicability with regard to the issue and for
the sole purpose of determining the number of votes required to obtain the valid
concurrence of the Senate, as will be further discussed hereunder.
It is a finely-imbedded principle in statutory construction that a special provision
or law prevails over a general one. Lex specialis derogat generali. Thus, where
there is in the same statute a particular enactment and also a general one which,
in its most comprehensive sense, would include what is embraced in the former,
the particular enactment must be operative, and the general enactment must be
taken to affect only such cases within its general language which are not within
the provision of the particular enactment.[26]
In Leveriza vs. Intermediate Appellate Court,[27] we enunciated:
x x x that another basic principle of statutory construction mandates that general
legislation must give way to a special legislation on the same subject, and
generally be so interpreted as to embrace only cases in which the special
provisions are not applicable (Sto. Domingo vs. de los Angeles, 96 SCRA 139),
that a specific statute prevails over a general statute (De Jesus vs. People, 120
SCRA 760) and that where two statutes are of equal theoretical application to a
particular case, the one designed therefor specially should prevail (Wil
Wilhensen Inc. vs. Baluyot, 83 SCRA 38).
Moreover, it is specious to argue that Section 25, Article XVIII is
inapplicable to mere transient agreements for the reason that there is no
permanent placing of structure for the establishment of a military base. On this
score, the Constitution makes no distinction between transient and
permanent. Certainly, we find nothing in Section 25, Article XVIII that requires
foreign troops or facilities to be stationed or placed permanently in the
Philippines.
It is a rudiment in legal hermenuetics that when no distinction is made
by law, the Court should not distinguish- Ubi lex non distinguit nec nos
distinguire debemos.
In like manner, we do not subscribe to the argument that Section 25,
Article XVIII is not controlling since no foreign military bases, but merely
foreign troops and facilities, are involved in the VFA. Notably, a perusal of said
constitutional provision reveals that the proscription covers foreign military
bases, troops, or facilities. Stated differently, this prohibition is not limited to
the entry of troops and facilities without any foreign bases being
established. The clause does not refer to foreign military bases,
troops, or facilities collectively but treats them as separate and independent
subjects. The use of comma and the disjunctive word or clearly signifies
disassociation and independence of one thing from the others included in the
enumeration,[28]such that, the provision contemplates three different situations -
a military treaty the subject of which could be either (a) foreign bases, (b)
foreign troops, or (c) foreign facilities - any of the three standing alone places it
under the coverage of Section 25, Article XVIII.
To this end, the intention of the framers of the Charter, as manifested
during the deliberations of the 1986 Constitutional Commission, is consistent
with this interpretation:
MR. MAAMBONG. I just want to address a question or two to Commissioner
Bernas.
This formulation speaks of three things: foreign military bases, troops
or facilities. My first question is: If the country does enter into such kind of a
treaty, must it cover the three-bases, troops or facilities-or could the treaty
entered into cover only one or two?
FR. BERNAS. Definitely, it can cover only one. Whether it covers only one
or it covers three, the requirement will be the same.
MR. MAAMBONG. In other words, the Philippine government can enter
into a treaty covering not bases but merely troops?
FR. BERNAS. Yes.
MR. MAAMBONG. I cannot find any reason why the government can enter
into a treaty covering only troops.
FR. BERNAS. Why not? Probably if we stretch our imagination a little bit more,
we will find some. We just want to cover everything.[29] (Underscoring
Supplied)
Moreover, military bases established within the territory of another
state is no longer viable because of the alternatives offered by new means and
weapons of warfare such as nuclear weapons, guided missiles as well as huge
sea vessels that can stay afloat in the sea even for months and years without
returning to their home country. These military warships are actually used as
substitutes for a land-home base not only of military aircraft but also of military
personnel and facilities. Besides, vessels are mobile as compared to a land-based
military headquarters.
At this juncture, we shall then resolve the issue of whether or not the
requirements of Section 25 were complied with when the Senate gave its
concurrence to the VFA.
Section 25, Article XVIII disallows foreign military bases, troops, or
facilities in the country, unless the following conditions are sufficiently
met, viz: (a) it must be under a treaty; (b) the treaty must be duly concurred in
by the Senate and, when so required by congress, ratified by a majority of the
votes cast by the people in a national referendum; and (c) recognized as a
treaty by the other contracting state.
 There is no dispute as to the presence of the first two requisites in the
case of the VFA. The concurrence handed by the Senate through Resolution No.
18 is in accordance with the provisions of the Constitution, whether under the
general requirement in Section 21, Article VII, or the specific mandate
mentioned in Section 25, Article XVIII, the provision in the latter article
requiring ratification by a majority of the votes cast in a national referendum
being unnecessary since Congress has not required it.
As to the matter of voting, Section 21, Article VII particularly requires
that a treaty or international agreement, to be valid and effective, must
be concurred in by at least two-thirds of all the members of the Senate. On
the other hand, Section 25, Article XVIII simply provides that the treaty be duly
concurred in by the Senate.
Applying the foregoing constitutional provisions, a two-thirds vote of
all the members of the Senate is clearly required so that the concurrence
contemplated by law may be validly obtained and deemed present. While it is
true that Section 25, Article XVIII requires, among other things, that the treaty-
the VFA, in the instant case-be duly concurred in by the Senate, it is very true
however that said provision must be related and viewed in light of the clear
mandate embodied in Section 21, Article VII, which in more specific terms,
requires that the concurrence of a treaty, or international agreement, be made by
a two -thirds vote of all the members of the Senate. Indeed, Section 25, Article
XVIII must not be treated in isolation to section 21, Article, VII.
As noted, the concurrence requirement under Section 25, Article XVIII
must be construed in relation to the provisions of Section 21, Article VII. In a
more particular language, the concurrence of the Senate contemplated under
Section 25, Article XVIII means that at least two-thirds of all the members of
the Senate favorably vote to concur with the treaty-the VFA in the instant case.
Under these circumstances, the charter provides that the Senate shall be
composed of twenty-four (24) Senators.[30] Without a tinge of doubt, two-thirds
(2/3) of this figure, or not less than sixteen (16) members, favorably acting on
the proposal is an unquestionable compliance with the requisite number of votes
mentioned in Section 21 of Article VII. The fact that there were actually twenty-
three (23) incumbent Senators at the time the voting was made, [31] will not alter
in any significant way the circumstance that more than two-thirds of the
members of the Senate concurred with the proposed VFA, even if the two-thirds
vote requirement is based on this figure of actual members (23). In this regard,
the fundamental law is clear that two-thirds of the 24 Senators, or at least 16
favorable votes, suffice so as to render compliance with the strict constitutional
mandate of giving concurrence to the subject treaty.
Having resolved that the first two requisites prescribed in Section 25,
Article XVIII are present, we shall now pass upon and delve on the requirement
that the VFA should be recognized as a treaty by the United States of America.
Petitioners content that the phrase recognized as a treaty, embodied in
section 25, Article XVIII, means that the VFA should have the advice and
consent of the United States Senate pursuant to its own constitutional process,
and that it should not be considered merely an executive agreement by the
United States.
In opposition, respondents argue that the letter of United States
Ambassador Hubbard stating that the VFA is binding on the United States
Government is conclusive, on the point that the VFA is recognized as a treaty by
the United States of America. According to respondents, the VFA, to be binding,
must only be accepted as a treaty by the United States.
This Court is of the firm view that the phrase recognized as a
treaty means that the other contracting party accepts or acknowledges the
agreement as a treaty.[32] To require the other contracting state, the United States
of America in this case, to submit the VFA to the United States Senate for
concurrence pursuant to its Constitution,[33] is to accord strict meaning to the
phrase.
Well-entrenched is the principle that the words used in the Constitution
are to be given their ordinary meaning except where technical terms are
employed, in which case the significance thus attached to them prevails. Its
language should be understood in the sense they have in common use. [34]
Moreover, it is inconsequential whether the United States treats the VFA only as
an executive agreement because, under international law, an executive
agreement is as binding as a treaty.[35] To be sure, as long as the VFA possesses
the elements of an agreement under international law, the said agreement is to be
taken equally as a treaty.
A treaty, as defined by the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties,
is an international instrument concluded between States in written form and
governed by international law, whether embodied in a single instrument or in
two or more related instruments, and whatever its particular
designation.[36] There are many other terms used for a treaty or international
agreement, some of which are: act, protocol, agreement, compromis d arbitrage,
concordat, convention, declaration, exchange of notes, pact, statute, charter
and modus vivendi. All writers, from Hugo Grotius onward, have pointed out
that the names or titles of international agreements included under the general
term treaty have little or no legal significance. Certain terms are useful, but they
furnish little more than mere description.[37]
Article 2(2) of the Vienna Convention provides that the provisions of
paragraph 1 regarding the use of terms in the present Convention are without
prejudice to the use of those terms, or to the meanings which may be given to
them in the internal law of the State.
Thus, in international law, there is no difference between treaties and
executive agreements in their binding effect upon states concerned, as long as
the negotiating functionaries have remained within their powers.[38] International
law continues to make no distinction between treaties and executive agreements:
they are equally binding obligations upon nations.[39]
In our jurisdiction, we have recognized the binding effect of executive
agreements even without the concurrence of the Senate or
Congress. In Commissioner of Customs vs. Eastern Sea Trading,[40] we had
occasion to pronounce:
x x x the right of the Executive to enter into binding agreements without the
necessity of subsequent congressional approval has been confirmed by long
usage. From the earliest days of our history we have entered into executive
agreements covering such subjects as commercial and consular relations, most-
favored-nation rights, patent rights, trademark and copyright protection, postal
and navigation arrangements and the settlement of claims. The validity of these
has never been seriously questioned by our courts.
xxxxxxxxx
Furthermore, the United States Supreme Court has expressly
recognized the validity and constitutionality of executive agreements entered
into without Senate approval. (39 Columbia Law Review, pp. 753-754) (See,
also, U.S. vs. Curtis Wright Export Corporation, 299 U.S. 304, 81 L. ed.
255; U.S. vs. Belmont, 301 U.S. 324, 81 L. ed. 1134; U.S. vs. Pink, 315 U.S.
203, 86 L. ed. 796; Ozanic vs. U.S. 188 F. 2d. 288; Yale Law Journal, Vol. 15
pp. 1905-1906; California Law Review, Vol. 25, pp. 670-675; Hyde on
International Law [revised Edition], Vol. 2, pp. 1405, 1416-1418;
willoughby on the U.S. Constitution Law, Vol. I [2d ed.], pp. 537-540;
Moore, International Law Digest, Vol. V, pp. 210-218; Hackworth,
International Law Digest, Vol. V, pp. 390-407). (Italics Supplied) (Emphasis
Ours)
The deliberations of the Constitutional Commission which drafted the
1987 Constitution is enlightening and highly-instructive:
MR. MAAMBONG. Of course it goes without saying that as far as ratification
of the other state is concerned, that is entirely their concern under their own
laws.
FR. BERNAS. Yes, but we will accept whatever they say. If they say that we
have done everything to make it a treaty, then as far as we are concerned, we
will accept it as a treaty.[41]
The records reveal that the United States Government, through Ambassador
Thomas C. Hubbard, has stated that the United States government has fully
committed to living up to the terms of the VFA.[42] For as long as the united
States of America accepts or acknowledges the VFA as a treaty, and binds itself
further to comply with its obligations under the treaty, there is indeed marked
compliance with the mandate of the Constitution.
Worth stressing too, is that the ratification, by the President, of the VFA and the
concurrence of the Senate should be taken as a clear an unequivocal expression
of our nations consent to be bound by said treaty, with the concomitant duty to
uphold the obligations and responsibilities embodied thereunder.
Ratification is generally held to be an executive act, undertaken by the
head of the state or of the government, as the case may be, through which the
formal acceptance of the treaty is proclaimed.[43] A State may provide in its
domestic legislation the process of ratification of a treaty. The consent of the
State to be bound by a treaty is expressed by ratification when: (a) the treaty
provides for such ratification, (b) it is otherwise established that the negotiating
States agreed that ratification should be required, (c) the representative of the
State has signed the treaty subject to ratification, or (d) the intention of the State
to sign the treaty subject to ratification appears from the full powers of its
representative, or was expressed during the negotiation. [44]
In our jurisdiction, the power to ratify is vested in the President and not,
as commonly believed, in the legislature. The role of the Senate is limited only
to giving or withholding its consent, or concurrence, to the ratification. [45]
With the ratification of the VFA, which is equivalent to final acceptance, and
with the exchange of notes between the Philippines and the United States of
America, it now becomes obligatory and incumbent on our part, under the
principles of international law, to be bound by the terms of the agreement. Thus,
no less than Section 2, Article II of the Constitution, [46]declares that the
Philippines adopts the generally accepted principles of international law as part
of the law of the land and adheres to the policy of peace, equality, justice,
freedom, cooperation and amity with all nations.
As a member of the family of nations, the Philippines agrees to be
bound by generally accepted rules for the conduct of its international
relations. While the international obligation devolves upon the state and not
upon any particular branch, institution, or individual member of its government,
the Philippines is nonetheless responsible for violations committed by any
branch or subdivision of its government or any official thereof. As an integral
part of the community of nations, we are responsible to assure that our
government, Constitution and laws will carry out our international
obligation.[47] Hence, we cannot readily plead the Constitution as a convenient
excuse for non-compliance with our obligations, duties and responsibilities
under international law.
Beyond this, Article 13 of the Declaration of Rights and Duties of
States adopted by the International Law Commission in 1949 provides: Every
State has the duty to carry out in good faith its obligations arising from treaties
and other sources of international law, and it may not invoke provisions in its
constitution or its laws as an excuse for failure to perform this duty. [48]
Equally important is Article 26 of the convention which provides that
Every treaty in force is binding upon the parties to it and must be performed by
them in good faith. This is known as the principle of pacta sunt servanda which
preserves the sanctity of treaties and have been one of the most fundamental
principles of positive international law, supported by the jurisprudence of
international tribunals.[49]
NO GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION
In the instant controversy, the President, in effect, is heavily faulted for
exercising a power and performing a task conferred upon him by the
Constitution-the power to enter into and ratify treaties. Through the expediency
of Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, petitioners in these consolidated cases
impute grave abuse of discretion on the part of the chief Executive in ratifying
the VFA, and referring the same to the Senate pursuant to the provisions of
Section 21, Article VII of the Constitution.
On this particular matter, grave abuse of discretion implies such
capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment as is equivalent to lack of
jurisdiction, or, when the power is exercised in an arbitrary or despotic manner
by reason of passion or personal hostility, and it must be so patent and gross as
to amount to an evasion of positive duty enjoined or to act at all in
contemplation of law.[50]
By constitutional fiat and by the intrinsic nature of his office, the
President, as head of State, is the sole organ and authority in the external affairs
of the country. In many ways, the President is the chief architect of the nations
foreign policy; his dominance in the field of foreign relations is (then)
conceded.[51] Wielding vast powers an influence, his conduct in the external
affairs of the nation, as Jefferson describes, is executive altogether."[52]
As regards the power to enter into treaties or international agreements,
the Constitution vests the same in the President, subject only to the concurrence
of at least two-thirds vote of all the members of the Senate. In this light, the
negotiation of the VFA and the subsequent ratification of the agreement are
exclusive acts which pertain solely to the President, in the lawful exercise of his
vast executive and diplomatic powers granted him no less than by the
fundamental law itself. Into the field of negotiation the Senate cannot intrude,
and Congress itself is powerless to invade it.[53] Consequently, the acts or
judgment calls of the President involving the VFA-specifically the acts of
ratification and entering into a treaty and those necessary or incidental to the
exercise of such principal acts - squarely fall within the sphere of his
constitutional powers and thus, may not be validly struck down, much less
calibrated by this Court, in the absence of clear showing of grave abuse of
power or discretion.
It is the Courts considered view that the President, in ratifying the VFA
and in submitting the same to the Senate for concurrence, acted within the
confines and limits of the powers vested in him by the Constitution. It is of no
moment that the President, in the exercise of his wide latitude of discretion and
in the honest belief that the VFA falls within the ambit of Section 21, Article VII
of the Constitution, referred the VFA to the Senate for concurrence under the
aforementioned provision. Certainly, no abuse of discretion, much less a grave,
patent and whimsical abuse of judgment, may be imputed to the President in his
act of ratifying the VFA and referring the same to the Senate for the purpose of
complying with the concurrence requirement embodied in the fundamental
law. In doing so, the President merely performed a constitutional task and
exercised a prerogative that chiefly pertains to the functions of his office. Even
if he erred in submitting the VFA to the Senate for concurrence under the
provisions of Section 21 of Article VII, instead of Section 25 of Article XVIII of
the Constitution, still, the President may not be faulted or scarred, much less be
adjudged guilty of committing an abuse of discretion in some patent, gross, and
capricious manner.
For while it is conceded that Article VIII, Section 1, of the Constitution
has broadened the scope of judicial inquiry into areas normally left to the
political departments to decide, such as those relating to national security, it has
not altogether done away with political questions such as those which arise in
the field of foreign relations.[54] The High Tribunals function, as sanctioned by
Article VIII, Section 1, is merely (to) check whether or not the governmental
branch or agency has gone beyond the constitutional limits of its jurisdiction,
not that it erred or has a different view. In the absence of a showing (of) grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction, there is no occasion for the
Court to exercise its corrective powerIt has no power to look into what it thinks
is apparent error.[55]
As to the power to concur with treaties, the constitution lodges the
same with the Senate alone. Thus, once the Senate[56] performs that power, or
exercises its prerogative within the boundaries prescribed by the Constitution,
the concurrence cannot, in like manner, be viewed to constitute an abuse of
power, much less grave abuse thereof. Corollarily, the Senate, in the exercise of
its discretion and acting within the limits of such power, may not be similarly
faulted for having simply performed a task conferred and sanctioned by no less
than the fundamental law.
For the role of the Senate in relation to treaties is essentially legislative
in character;[57] the Senate, as an independent body possessed of its own erudite
mind, has the prerogative to either accept or reject the proposed agreement, and
whatever action it takes in the exercise of its wide latitude of discretion, pertains
to the wisdom rather than the legality of the act. In this sense, the Senate
partakes a principal, yet delicate, role in keeping the principles of separation of
powers and of checks and balances alive and vigilantly ensures that these
cherished rudiments remain true to their form in a democratic government such
as ours. The Constitution thus animates, through this treaty-concurring power of
the Senate, a healthy system of checks and balances indispensable toward our
nations pursuit of political maturity and growth. True enough, rudimentary is the
principle that matters pertaining to the wisdom of a legislative act are beyond
the ambit and province of the courts to inquire.
 In fine, absent any clear showing of grave abuse of discretion on the
part of respondents, this Court- as the final arbiter of legal controversies and
staunch sentinel of the rights of the people - is then without power to conduct an
incursion and meddle with such affairs purely executive and legislative in
character and nature. For the Constitution no less, maps out the distinct
boundaries and limits the metes and bounds within which each of the three
political branches of government may exercise the powers exclusively and
essentially conferred to it by law.
WHEREFORE, in light of the foregoing disquisitions, the instant petitions are
hereby DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C.J., Bellosillo, Kapunan, Quisumbing, Purisima, Pardo, Gonzaga-
Reyes, Ynares-Santiago, and De Leon, Jr., JJ., concur.
Melo, and Vitug, JJ., join the dissent of J. Puno.
Puno, J., see dissenting opinion.
Mendoza, J., in the result.
Panganiban, J., no part due to close personal and former professional relations
with a petitioner, Sen. J.R. Salonga.
BAYAN vs. Zamora G.R. No. 138570 October 10, 2000
July 11, 2009 at 9:51 am (1)
(https://angelcapacio.wordpress.com/2009/07/11/bayan-vs-zamora-g-r-no-
138570-october-10-2000/)
FACTS: On March 14, 1947, the Philippines and the United States of America
forged a military bases agreement which formalized, among others, the use of
installations in the Philippine territory by the US military personnel. To further
strengthen their defense and security relationship, the Philippines and the US
entered into a Mutual Defense Treaty on August 30, 1951. Under the treaty, the
parties agreed to respond to any external armed attack on their territory, armed
forces, public vessels and aircraft.
In 1991, with the expiration of RP-US Military Bases Agreement, the
periodic military exercises between the two countries were held in abeyance.
However, the defence and security relationship continued pursuant to the Mutual
Defense Treaty. On July 18, 1997 RP and US exchanged notes and discussed,
among other things, the possible elements of the Visiting Forces Agreement
(VFA). Negotiations by both panels on VFA led to a consolitdated draft text and
a series of conferences. Eventually, President Fidel V. Ramos approved the
VFA.
On October 5, 1998 President Joseph E. Estrada ratified the VFA thru
respondent Secretary of Foreign Affairs. On October 6, 1998, the President,
acting thru Executive Secretary Zamora officially transmitted to the Senate, the
Instrument of Ratification, letter of the President and the VFA for approval. It
was approved by the Senate by a 2/3 vote of its members. On June 1, 1999, the
VFA officially entered into force after an exchange of notes between Secretary
Siazon and US Ambassador Hubbard.
The VFA provides for the mechanism for regulating the circumstances
and conditions under which US Armed Forces and defense personnel may be
present in the Philippines. Hence this petition for certiorari and prohibition,
assailing the constitutionality of the VFA and imputing grave abuse of discretion
to respondents in ratifying the agreement.
ISSUE: Whether or not the VFA is unconstitutional.
RULING: Petition is dismissed.
The 1987 Philippine Constitution contains two provisions requiring the
concurrence of the Senate on treaties or international agreements. Sec. 21 Art.
VII, which respondent invokes, reads: “No treaty or international agreement
shall be valid and effective unless concurred in by at least 2/3 of all the
Members of the Senate. Sec. 25 Art. XVIII provides : “After the expiration in
1991 of the Agreement between the RP and the US concerning Military Bases,
foreign military bases, troops or facilities shall not be allowed in the Philippines
except under a treaty duly concurred in and when the Congress so requires,
ratified by a majority of votes cast by the people in a national referendum held
for that purpose, and recognized as a treaty by the Senateby the other contracting
state”.
The first cited provision applies to any form of treaties and international
agreements in general with a wide variety of subject matter. All treaties and
international agreements entered into by the Philippines, regardless of subject
matter, coverage or particular designation requires the concurrence of the Senate
to be valid and effective.
In contrast, the second cited provision applies to treaties which involve presence
of foreign military bases, troops and facilities in the Philippines. Both
constitutional provisions share some common ground. The fact that the
President referred the VFA to the Senate under Sec. 21 Art. VII, and that Senate
extended its concurrence under the same provision is immaterial.
Undoubtedly, Sec. 25 Art. XVIII which specifically deals with treaties involving
foreign military bases and troops should apply in the instant case. Hence, for
VFA to be constitutional it must sufficiently meet the following requisites :
a) it must be under a treaty
b) the treaty must be duly concurred in by the Senate, and when so required by
Congress, ratified by a majority of votes cast by the people in a national
referendum
c) recognized as a treaty by the other contracting State
There is no dispute in the presence of the first two requisites. The third requisite
implies that the other contracting party accepts or acknowledges the agreement
as a treaty. Moreover, it is inconsequential whether the US treats the VFA only
as an executive agreement because, under international law, an executive
agreement is as binding as a treaty. They are equally binding obligations upon
nations. Therefore, there is indeed marked compliance with the mandate of the
constitution.
The court also finds that there is no grave abuse of discretion on the part of the
executive department as to their power to ratify the VFA.
EN BANC
[G. R. No. 140835. August 14, 2000]
RAMON A. GONZALES, petitioner, vs. HON. ANDRES R. NARVASA, as
Chairman, PREPARATORY COMMISSION ON CONSTITUTIONAL
REFORMS; HON. RONALDO B. ZAMORA, as Executive Secretary;
COMMISSION ON AUDIT; ROBERTO AVENTAJADO, as Presidential
Consultant on Council of Economic Advisers/Economic Affairs;
ANGELITO C. BANAYO, as Presidential Adviser for/on Political Affairs;
VERONICA IGNACIO-JONES, as Presidential Assistant/ Appointment
Secretary (In charge of appointments), respondents.
DECISION
GONZAGA-REYES, J.:
In this petition for prohibition and mandamus filed on December 9,
1999, petitioner Ramon A. Gonzales, in his capacity as a citizen and taxpayer,
assails the constitutionality of the creation of the Preparatory Commission on
Constitutional Reform (PCCR) and of the positions of presidential consultants,
advisers and assistants. Petitioner asks this Court to enjoin the PCCR and the
presidential consultants, advisers and assistants from acting as such, and to
enjoin Executive Secretary Ronaldo B. Zamora from enforcing their advice and
recommendations. In addition, petitioner seeks to enjoin the Commission on
Audit from passing in audit expenditures for the PCCR and the presidential
consultants, advisers and assistants. Finally, petitioner prays for an order
compelling respondent Zamora to furnish petitioner with information on certain
matters.
On January 28, 2000, respondent Hon. Andres R. Narvasa, impleaded
in his capacity as Chairman of the PCCR, filed his Comment to the Petition. The
rest of the respondents, who are being represented in this case by the Solicitor
General, filed their Comment with this Court on March 7, 2000. Petitioner then
filed a Consolidated Reply on April 24, 2000, whereupon this case was
considered submitted for decision.
I. Preparatory Commission on Constitutional Reform
The Preparatory Commission on Constitutional Reform (PCCR) was
created by President Estrada on November 26, 1998 by virtue of Executive
Order No. 43 (E.O. No. 43) in order to study and recommend proposed
amendments and/or revisions to the 1987 Constitution, and the manner of
implementing the same.[1] Petitioner disputes the constitutionality of the PCCR
on two grounds. First, he contends that it is a public office which only the
legislature can create by way of a law.[2] Secondly, petitioner asserts that by
creating such a body the President is intervening in a process from which he is
totally excluded by the Constitution the amendment of the fundamental
charter.[3]
It is alleged by respondents that, with respect to the PCCR, this case
has become moot and academic. We agree.
 An action is considered moot when it no longer presents a justiciable
controversy because the issues involved have become academic or
dead.[4] Under E.O. No. 43, the PCCR was instructed to complete its task on or
before June 30, 1999.[5] However, on February 19, 1999, the President issued
Executive Order No. 70 (E.O. No. 70), which extended the time frame for the
completion of the commissions work, viz
SECTION 6. Section 8 is hereby amended to read as follows:
Time Frame. The Commission shall commence its work on 01 January 1999 and
complete the same on or before 31 December 1999. The Commission shall
submit its report and recommendations to the President within fifteen (15)
working days from 31 December 1999.
The PCCR submitted its recommendations to the President on
December 20, 1999 and was dissolved by the President on the same day. It had
likewise spent the funds allotted to it.[6]Thus, the PCCR has ceased to exist,
having lost its raison detre. Subsequent events have overtaken the petition and
the Court has nothing left to resolve.
The staleness of the issue before us is made more manifest by the
impossibility of granting the relief prayed for by petitioner. Basically, petitioner
asks this Court to enjoin the PCCR from acting as such. [7] Clearly, prohibition is
an inappropriate remedy since the body sought to be enjoined no longer exists. It
is well established that prohibition is a preventive remedy and does not lie to
restrain an act that is already fait accompli.[8] At this point, any ruling regarding
the PCCR would simply be in the nature of an advisory opinion, which is
definitely beyond the permissible scope of judicial power.
In addition to the mootness of the issue, petitioners lack of standing constitutes
another obstacle to the successful invocation of judicial power insofar as the
PCCR is concerned.
The question in standing is whether a party has alleged such a personal
stake in the outcome of the controversy as to assure that concrete adverseness
which sharpens the presentation of issues upon which the court so largely
depends for illumination of difficult constitutional questions. [9] In assailing the
constitutionality of E.O. Nos. 43 and 70, petitioner asserts his interest as a
citizen and taxpayer.[10] A citizen acquires standing only if he can establish that
he has suffered some actual or threatened injury as a result of the allegedly
illegal conduct of the government; the injury is fairly traceable to the challenged
action; and the injury is likely to be redressed by a favorable
action.[11] In Kilosbayan, Incorporated v. Morato,[12]we denied standing to
petitioners who were assailing a lease agreement between the Philippine Charity
Sweepstakes Office and the Philippine Gaming Management Corporation,
stating that, in Valmonte v. Philippine Charity Sweepstakes Office, G.R. No.
78716, Sept. 22, 1987, standing was denied to a petitioner who sought to declare
a form of lottery known as Instant Sweepstakes invalid because, as the Court
held, Valmonte brings the suit as a citizen, lawyer, taxpayer and father of three
(3) minor children. But nowhere in his petition does petitioner claim that his
rights and privileges as a lawyer or citizen have been directly and personally
injured by the operation of the Instant Sweepstakes. The interest of the person
assailing the constitutionality of a statute must be direct and personal. He must
be able to show, not only that the law is invalid, but also that he has sustained or
in immediate danger of sustaining some direct injury as a result of its
enforcement, and not merely that he suffers thereby in some indefinite way. It
must appear that the person complaining has been or is about to be denied some
right or privilege to which he is lawfully entitled or that he is about to be
subjected to some burdens or penalties by reason of the statute complained of.
We apprehend no difference between the petitioner in Valmonte and the
present petitioners. Petitioners do not in fact show what particularized interest
they have for bringing this suit. It does not detract from the high regard for
petitioners as civic leaders to say that their interest falls short of that required to
maintain an action under Rule 3, d 2.
Coming now to the instant case, petitioner has not shown that he has
sustained or is in danger of sustaining any personal injury attributable to the
creation of the PCCR. If at all, it is only Congress, not petitioner, which can
claim any injury in this case since, according to petitioner, the President has
encroached upon the legislatures powers to create a public office and to propose
amendments to the Charter by forming the PCCR. Petitioner has sustained no
direct, or even any indirect, injury. Neither does he claim that his rights or
privileges have been or are in danger of being violated, nor that he shall be
subjected to any penalties or burdens as a result of the PCCRs activities. Clearly,
petitioner has failed to establish his locus standi so as to enable him to seek
judicial redress as a citizen.
A taxpayer is deemed to have the standing to raise a constitutional issue
when it is established that public funds have been disbursed in alleged
contravention of the law or the Constitution.[13], Thus payers action is properly
brought only when there is an exercise by Congress of its taxing or spending
power.[14] This was our ruling in a recent case wherein petitioners
Telecommunications and Broadcast Attorneys of the Philippines (TELEBAP)
and GMA Network, Inc. questioned the validity of section 92 of B.P. No. 881
(otherwise knows as the Omnibus Election Code) requiring radio and television
stations to give free air time to the Commission on Elections during the
campaign period.[15] The Court held that petitioner TELEBAP did not have any
interest as a taxpayer since the assailed law did not involve the taxing or
spending power of Congress.[16]
Many other rulings have premised the grant or denial of standing to
taxpayers upon whether or not the case involved a disbursement of public funds
by the legislature. In Sanidad v. Commission on Elections,[17] the petitioners
therein were allowed to bring a taxpayers suit to question several presidential
decrees promulgated by then President Marcos in his legislative capacity calling
for a national referendum, with the Court explaining that
...[i]t is now an ancient rule that the valid source of a statute Presidential
Decrees are of such nature may be contested by one who will sustain a direct
injury as a result of its enforcement.At the instance of taxpayers, laws providing
for the disbursement of public funds may be enjoined, upon the theory that the
expenditure of public funds by an officer of the State for the purpose of
executing an unconstitutional act constitutes a misapplication of such funds. The
breadth of Presidential Decree No. 991 carries an appropriation of Five Million
Pesos for the effective implementation of its purposes. Presidential Decree No.
1031 appropriates the sum of Eight Million Pesos to carry out its provisions. The
interest of the aforenamed petitioners as taxpayers in the lawful expenditure of
these amounts of public money sufficiently clothes them with that personality to
litigate the validity of the Decrees appropriating said funds.
In still another case, the Court held that petitioners the Philippine
Constitution Association, Inc., a non-profit civic organization - had standing as
taxpayers to question the constitutionality of Republic Act No. 3836 insofar as it
provides for retirement gratuity and commutation of vacation and sick leaves to
Senators and Representatives and to the elective officials of both houses of
Congress.[18] And in Pascual v. Secretary of Public Works,[19] the Court allowed
petitioner to maintain a taxpayers suit assailing the constitutional soundness of
Republic Act No. 920 appropriating P85,000 for the construction, repair and
improvement of feeder roads within private property. All these cases involved
the disbursement of public funds by means of a law.
Meanwhile, in Bugnay Construction and Development Corporation v.
Laron,[20] the Court declared that the trial court was wrong in allowing
respondent Ravanzo to bring an action for injunction in his capacity as a
taxpayer in order to question the legality of the contract of lease covering the
public market entered into between the City of Dagupan and petitioner. The
Court declared that Ravanzo did not possess the requisite standing to bring such
taxpayers suit since [o]n its face, and there is no evidence to the contrary, the
lease contract entered into between petitioner and the City shows that no public
funds have been or will be used in the construction of the market building.
Coming now to the instant case, it is readily apparent that there is no
exercise by Congress of its taxing or spending power. The PCCR was created by
the President by virtue of E.O. No. 43, as amended by E.O. No. 70. Under
section 7 of E.O. No. 43, the amount of P3 million is appropriated for its
operational expenses to be sourced from the funds of the Office of the President.
The relevant provision states -
Appropriations. The initial amount of Three Million Pesos (P3,000,000.00) is
hereby appropriated for the operational expenses of the Commission to be
sourced from funds of the Office of the President, subject to the usual
accounting and auditing rules and regulations. Additional amounts shall be
released to the Commission upon submission of requirements for expenditures.
The appropriations for the PCCR were authorized by the President, not
by Congress. In fact, there was no an appropriation at all. In a strict
sense, appropriation has been defined as nothing more than the legislative
authorization prescribed by the Constitution that money may be paid out of the
Treasury, while appropriation made by law refers to the act of the legislature
setting apart or assigning to a particular use a certain sum to be used in the
payment of debt or dues from the State to its creditors. [21] The funds used for the
PCCR were taken from funds intended for the Office of the President, in the
exercise of the Chief Executives power to transfer funds pursuant to section 25
(5) of article VI of the Constitution.
In the final analysis, it must be stressed that the Court retains the power
to decide whether or not it will entertain a taxpayers suit. [22] In the case at bar,
there being no exercise by Congress of its taxing or spending power, petitioner
cannot be allowed to question the creation of the PCCR in his capacity as a
taxpayer, but rather, he must establish that he has a personal and substantial
interest in the case and that he has sustained or will sustain direct injury as a
result of its enforcement.[23] In other words, petitioner must show that he is a real
party in interest - that he will stand to be benefited or injured by the judgment or
that he will be entitled to the avails of the suit.[24] Nowhere in his pleadings does
petitioner presume to make such a representation.
II. Presidential Consultants, Advisers, Assistants
The second issue raised by petitioner concerns the presidential
consultants. Petitioner alleges that in 1995 and 1996, the President created
seventy (70) positions in the Office of the President and appointed to said
positions twenty (20) presidential consultants, twenty-two (22) presidential
advisers, and twenty-eight (28) presidential assistants.[25] Petitioner asserts that,
as in the case of the PCCR, the President does not have the power to create these
positions.[26]
Consistent with the abovementioned discussion on standing, petitioner
does not have the personality to raise this issue before the Court. First of all, he
has not proven that he has sustained or is in danger of sustaining any injury as a
result of the appointment of such presidential advisers. Secondly, petitioner has
not alleged the necessary facts so as to enable the Court to determine if he
possesses a taxpayers interest in this particular issue. Unlike the PCCR which
was created by virtue of an executive order, petitioner does not allege by what
official act, whether it be by means of an executive order, administrative order,
memorandum order, or otherwise, the President attempted to create the positions
of presidential advisers, consultants and assistants. Thus, it is unclear what act of
the President petitioner is assailing. In support of his allegation, petitioner
merely annexed a copy of the Philippine Government Directory (Annex C)
listing the names and positions of such presidential consultants, advisers and
assistants to his petition. However, appointment is obviously not synonymous basis whether the matter at issue is of interest or importance, as it relates to or
with creation. It would be improvident for this Court to entertain this issue given affects the public.[32]
the insufficient nature of the allegations in the Petition.
Thus, we agree with petitioner that respondent Zamora, in his official
III. Right to Information capacity as Executive Secretary, has a constitutional and statutory duty to
Finally, petitioner asks us to issue a writ of mandamus ordering answer petitioners letter dealing with matters which are unquestionably of public
Executive Secretary Ronaldo B. Zamora to answer his letter (Annex D) dated concern that is, appointments made to public offices and the utilization of public
October 4, 1999 requesting for the names of executive officials holding multiple property. With regard to petitioners request for copies of the appointment papers
positions in government, copies of their appointments, and a list of the recipients of certain officials, respondent Zamora is obliged to allow the inspection and
of luxury vehicles seized by the Bureau of Customs and turned over to copying of the same subject to the reasonable limitations required for the orderly
Malacanang.[27] conduct of official business.[33]
WHEREFORE, the petition is dismissed, with the exception that respondent
The right to information is enshrined in Section 7 of the Bill of Rights Zamora is ordered to furnish petitioner with the information requested.
which provides that The right of the people to information on matters of public SO ORDERED.
concern shall be recognized. Access to official records, and to documents, and Davide, Jr., C.J., Melo, Vitug, Kapunan, Mendoza, Panganiban, Quisumbing,
papers pertaining to official acts, transactions, or decisions, as well as to Purisima, Pardo, Buena, Ynares-Santiago, and De Leon, Jr., JJ., concur.
government research data used as basis for policy development, shall be Bellosillo, J., abroad, on official business.
afforded the citizen, subject to such limitations as may be provided by law. Puno, J., vote to dismiss on the ground that the case is moot.
Under both the 1973[28] and 1987 Constitution, this is a self-executory provision
which can be invoked by any citizen before the courts. This was our ruling
in Legaspi v. Civil Service Commission,[29] wherein the Court classified the right
to information as a public right and when a [m]andamus proceeding involves the
assertion of a public right, the requirement of personal interest is satisfied by the
mere fact that the petitioner is a citizen, and therefore, part of the general public
which possesses the right. However, Congress may provide for reasonable
conditions upon the access to information. Such limitations were embodied in
Republic Act No. 6713, otherwise knows as the Code of Conduct and Ethical
Standards for Public Officials and Employees, which took effect on March 25,
1989. This law provides that, in the performance of their duties, all public
officials and employees are obliged to respond to letters sent by the public
within fifteen (15) working days from receipt thereof and to ensure the
accessibility of all public documents for inspection by the public within
reasonable working hours, subject to the reasonable claims of confidentiality. [30]
Elaborating on the significance of the right to information, the Court said
in Baldoza v. Dimaano[31] that [t]he incorporation of this right in the
Constitution is a recognition of the fundamental role of free exchange of
information in a democracy. There can be no realistic perception by the public
of the nations problems, nor a meaningful democratic decisionmaking if they are
denied access to information of general interest. Information is needed to enable
the members of society to cope with the exigencies of the times. The
information to which the public is entitled to are those concerning matters of
public concern, a term which embrace[s] a broad spectrum of subjects which the
public may want to know, either because these directly affect their lives, or
simply because such matters naturally arouse the interest of an ordinary
citizen. In the final analysis, it is for the courts to determine in a case by case
 GONZALES VS. NARVASA
G.R. No. 140835, August 14 2000
(http://whateverinfos.blogspot.com/2013/07/gonzales-vs-narvasa.html)
FACTS: Petitioner Ramon A. Gonzales, in his capacity as a citizen and
taxpayer, filed a petition for prohibition and mandamus filed on December 9,
1999, assailing theconstitutionality of the creation of the
Preparatory Commission on Constitutional Reform (PCCR) and of the positions
of presidential consultants, advisers andassistants. The
Preparatory Commission on Constitutional Reform (PCCR) was created
by President Estrada on November 26, 1998 by virtue of Executive OrderNo. 43
(E.O. No. 43) in order “to study and recommend proposed amendments and/or
revisions to the 1987 Constitution, and the manner of implementing the same.”
Petitioner disputes the constitutionality of the PCCR based on the grounds that it
is a public office which only the legislature can create by way of a law.
ISSUE: Whether or not the petitioner has a legal standing to assail
the constitutionality ofExecutive Order No. 43
HELD: The Court dismissed the petition. A citizen acquires standing only if he
can establish that he has suffered some actual or threatened injury as a result of
the allegedly illegal conduct of the government; the injury is fairly traceable to
the challenged action; and the injury is likely to be redressed by
a favorable action. Petitioner has not shown that he has sustained or is
in danger of sustaining any personal injury attributable to the creation of the
PCCR. If at all, it is onlyCongress, not petitioner, which can claim any “injury”
in this case since, according to petitioner, the President has encroached upon the
legislature’s powers to createa public office and to propose amendments to the
Charter by forming the PCCR. Petitioner has sustained no direct, or even any
indirect, injury. Neither does he claim that his rights or privileges have been or
are in danger of being violated, nor that he shall be subjected to any penalties or
burdens as a result of the PCCR’s activities. Clearly, petitioner has failed to
establish his locus standi so as to enable him to seek judicial redress as a citizen.
Furthermore, a taxpayer is deemed to have the standing to raise a constitutional
issue when it is established that public funds have been disbursed in alleged
contravention of the law or the Constitution. It is readily apparent that there is
no exercise by Congress of its taxing or spending power. The PCCR was
created by thePresident by virtue of E.O. No. 43, as amended by E.O. No. 70.
Under section 7 of E.O. No. 43, the amount of P3 million is “appropriated” for
its operational expenses “to be sourced from the funds of the Office of
the President.” Being that case, petitioner must show that he is a real party in
interest - that he will stand to be benefited or injured by the judgment or that he
will be entitled to the avails of the suit. Nowhere in his pleadings does petitioner
presume to make such a representation.
EN BANC
G.R. No. 112497 August 4, 1994
HON. FRANKLIN M. DRILON, in his capacity as SECRETARY OF
JUSTICE, Petitioner,v. MAYOR ALFREDO S. LIM, VICE-MAYOR JOSE
L. ATIENZA, CITY TREASURER ANTHONY ACEVEDO,
SANGGUNIANG PANGLUNSOD AND THE CITY OF
MANILA,Respondents.
The City Legal Officer for petitioner.chanrobles virtual law library
Angara, Abello, Concepcion, Regala & Cruz for Caltex (Phils.).chanrobles
virtual law library
Joseph Lopez for Sangguniang Panglunsod of Manila.chanrobles virtual law
library
L.A. Maglaya for Petron Corporation.
CRUZ, J.:
The principal issue in this case is the constitutionality of Section 187 of
the Local Government Code reading as follows:
Procedure For Approval And Effectivity Of Tax Ordinances And Revenue
Measures; Mandatory Public Hearings. - The procedure for approval of local
tax ordinances and revenue measures shall be in accordance with the provisions
of this Code: Provided, That public hearings shall be conducted for the purpose
prior to the enactment thereof; Provided, further, That any question on the
constitutionality or legality of tax ordinances or revenue measures may be raised
on appeal within thirty (30) days from the effectivity thereof to the Secretary of
Justice who shall render a decision within sixty (60) days from the date of
receipt of the appeal: Provided, however, That such appeal shall not have the
effect of suspending the effectivity of the ordinance and the accrual and payment
of the tax, fee, or charge levied therein: Provided, finally, That within thirty (30)
days after receipt of the decision or the lapse of the sixty-day period without the
Secretary of Justice acting upon the appeal, the aggrieved party may file
appropriate proceedings with a court of competent jurisdiction.
Pursuant thereto, the Secretary of Justice had, on appeal to him of four
oil companies and a taxpayer, declared Ordinance No. 7794, otherwise known as
the Manila Revenue Code, null and void for non-compliance with the prescribed
procedure in the enactment of tax ordinances and for containing certain
provisions contrary to law and public policy. 1chanrobles virtual law library
In a petition for certiorari filed by the City of Manila, the Regional
Trial Court of Manila revoked the Secretary's resolution and sustained the
ordinance, holding inter alia that the procedural requirements had been
observed. More importantly, it declared Section 187 of the Local Government
Code as unconstitutional because of its vesture in the Secretary of Justice of the
power of control over local governments in violation of the policy of local
autonomy mandated in the Constitution and of the specific provision therein
conferring on the President of the Philippines only the power of supervision over
local governments. 2chanrobles virtual law library
 The present petition would have us reverse that decision. The Secretary
argues that the annulled Section 187 is constitutional and that the procedural
requirements for the enactment of tax ordinances as specified in the Local
Government Code had indeed not been observed.
Parenthetically, this petition was originally dismissed by the Court for
non-compliance with Circular 1-88, the Solicitor General having failed to
submit a certified true copy of the challenged decision. 3However, on motion for
reconsideration with the required certified true copy of the decision attached, the
petition was reinstated in view of the importance of the issues raised therein.
We stress at the outset that the lower court had jurisdiction to consider
the constitutionality of Section 187, this authority being embraced in the general
definition of the judicial power to determine what are the valid and binding laws
by the criterion of their conformity to the fundamental law. Specifically, BP 129
vests in the regional trial courts jurisdiction over all civil cases in which the
subject of the litigation is incapable of pecuniary estimation, 4even as the
accused in a criminal action has the right to question in his defense the
constitutionality of a law he is charged with violating and of the proceedings
taken against him, particularly as they contravene the Bill of Rights. Moreover,
Article X, Section 5(2), of the Constitution vests in the Supreme Court appellate
jurisdiction over final judgments and orders of lower courts in all cases in which
the constitutionality or validity of any treaty, international or executive
agreement, law, presidential decree, proclamation, order, instruction, ordinance,
or regulation is in question.
In the exercise of this jurisdiction, lower courts are advised to act with
the utmost circumspection, bearing in mind the consequences of a declaration of
unconstitutionality upon the stability of laws, no less than on the doctrine of
separation of powers. As the questioned act is usually the handiwork of the
legislative or the executive departments, or both, it will be prudent for such
courts, if only out of a becoming modesty, to defer to the higher judgment of
this Court in the consideration of its validity, which is better determined after a
thorough deliberation by a collegiate body and with the concurrence of the
majority of those who participated in its discussion. 5chanrobles virtual law
library
It is also emphasized that every court, including this Court, is charged
with the duty of a purposeful hesitation before declaring a law unconstitutional,
on the theory that the measure was first carefully studied by the executive and
the legislative departments and determined by them to be in accordance with the
fundamental law before it was finally approved. To doubt is to sustain. The
presumption of constitutionality can be overcome only by the clearest showing
that there was indeed an infraction of the Constitution, and only when such a
conclusion is reached by the required majority may the Court pronounce, in the
discharge of the duty it cannot escape, that the challenged act must be struck
down.
In the case before us, Judge Rodolfo C. Palattao declared Section 187
of the Local Government Code unconstitutional insofar as it empowered the
Secretary of Justice to review tax ordinances and, inferentially, to annul them.
He cited the familiar distinction between control and supervision, the first being
"the power of an officer to alter or modify or set aside what a subordinate officer
had done in the performance of his duties and to substitute the judgment of the
former for the latter," while the second is "the power of a superior officer to see
to it that lower officers perform their functions in accordance with law." 6His
conclusion was that the challenged section gave to the Secretary the power of
control and not of supervision only as vested by the Constitution in the President
of the Philippines. This was, in his view, a violation not only of Article X,
specifically Section 4 thereof, 7and of Section 5 on the taxing powers of local
governments, 8and the policy of local autonomy in general.
We do not share that view. The lower court was rather hasty in
invalidating the provision.
Section 187 authorizes the Secretary of Justice to review only the
constitutionality or legality of the tax ordinance and, if warranted, to revoke it
on either or both of these grounds. When he alters or modifies or sets aside a tax
ordinance, he is not also permitted to substitute his own judgment for the
judgment of the local government that enacted the measure. Secretary Drilon did
set aside the Manila Revenue Code, but he did not replace it with his own
version of what the Code should be. He did not pronounce the ordinance unwise
or unreasonable as a basis for its annulment. He did not say that in his judgment
it was a bad law. What he found only was that it was illegal. All he did in
reviewing the said measure was determine if the petitioners were performing
their functions in accordance with law, that is, with the prescribed procedure for
the enactment of tax ordinances and the grant of powers to the city government
under the Local Government Code. As we see it, that was an act not of control
but of mere supervision. w library
An officer in control lays down the rules in the doing of an act. If they
are not followed, he may, in his discretion, order the act undone or re-done by
his subordinate or he may even decide to do it himself. Supervision does not
cover such authority. The supervisor or superintendent merely sees to it that the
rules are followed, but he himself does not lay down such rules, nor does he
have the discretion to modify or replace them. If the rules are not observed, he
may order the work done or re-done but only to conform to the prescribed rules.
He may not prescribe his own manner for the doing of the act. He has no
judgment on this matter except to see to it that the rules are followed. In the
opinion of the Court, Secretary Drilon did precisely this, and no more nor less
than this, and so performed an act not of control but of mere supervision.
The case of Taule v. Santos 9cited in the decision has no application
here because the jurisdiction claimed by the Secretary of Local Governments
over election contests in the Katipunan ng Mga Barangay was held to belong to
the Commission on Elections by constitutional provision. The conflict was over
jurisdiction, not supervision or control.
Significantly, a rule similar to Section 187 appeared in the Local
Autonomy Act, which provided in its Section 2 as follows:
A tax ordinance shall go into effect on the fifteenth day after its
passage, unless the ordinance shall provide otherwise: Provided, however, That
the Secretary of Finance shall have authority to suspend the effectivity of any
ordinance within one hundred and twenty days after receipt by him of a copy
thereof, if, in his opinion, the tax or fee therein levied or imposed is unjust,
excessive, oppressive, or confiscatory, or when it is contrary to declared national
economy policy, and when the said Secretary exercises this authority the
effectivity of such ordinance shall be suspended, either in part or as a whole, for
a period of thirty days within which period the local legislative body may either
modify the tax ordinance to meet the objections thereto, or file an appeal with a
court of competent jurisdiction; otherwise, the tax ordinance or the part or parts
thereof declared suspended, shall be considered as revoked. Thereafter, the local
legislative body may not reimpose the same tax or fee until such time as the
grounds for the suspension thereof shall have ceased to exist.
That section allowed the Secretary of Finance to suspend the effectivity
of a tax ordinance if, in his opinion, the tax or fee levied was unjust,
excessive, oppressive or confiscatory. Determination of these flaws would
involve the exercise of judgment or discretion and not merely an examination of
whether or not the requirements or limitations of the law had been observed;
hence, it would smack of control rather than mere supervision. That power was
never questioned before this Court but, at any rate, the Secretary of Justice is not
given the same latitude under Section 187. All he is permitted to do is ascertain
the constitutionality or legality of the tax measure, without the right to declare
that, in his opinion, it is unjust, excessive, oppressive or confiscatory. He has no
discretion on this matter. In fact, Secretary Drilon set aside the Manila Revenue
Code only on two grounds, to with, the inclusion therein of certain ultra
vires provisions and non-compliance with the prescribed procedure in its
enactment. These grounds affected the legality, not the wisdom
or reasonableness, of the tax measure.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles
virtual law library
The issue of non-compliance with the prescribed procedure in the
enactment of the Manila Revenue Code is another matter. law library
In his resolution, Secretary Drilon declared that there were no written
notices of public hearings on the proposed Manila Revenue Code that were sent
to interested parties as required by Art. 276(b) of the Implementing Rules of the
Local Government Code nor were copies of the proposed ordinance published in
three successive issues of a newspaper of general circulation pursuant to Art.
276(a). No minutes were submitted to show that the obligatory public hearings
had been held. Neither were copies of the measure as approved posted in
prominent places in the city in accordance with Sec. 511(a) of the Local
Government Code. Finally, the Manila Revenue Code was not translated into
Pilipino or Tagalog and disseminated among the people for their information
and guidance, conformably to Sec. 59(b) of the
Code.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
Judge Palattao found otherwise. He declared that all the procedural
requirements had been observed in the enactment of the Manila Revenue Code
and that the City of Manila had not been able to prove such compliance before
the Secretary only because he had given it only five days within which to gather
and present to him all the evidence (consisting of 25 exhibits) later submitted to
the trial court.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
To get to the bottom of this question, the Court acceded to the motion
of the respondents and called for the elevation to it of the said exhibits. We have
carefully examined every one of these exhibits and agree with the trial court that
the procedural requirements have indeed been observed. Notices of the public
hearings were sent to interested parties as evidenced by Exhibits G-1 to 17. The
minutes of the hearings are found in Exhibits M, M-1, M-2, and M-3. Exhibits B
and C show that the proposed ordinances were published in theBalita and the
Manila Standard on April 21 and 25, 1993, respectively, and the approved
ordinance was published in the July 3, 4, 5, 1993 issues of the Manila Standard
and in the July 6, 1993 issue of Balita, as shown by Exhibits Q, Q-1, Q-2, and
Q-3. brary
The only exceptions are the posting of the ordinance as approved but
this omission does not affect its validity, considering that its publication in three
successive issues of a newspaper of general circulation will satisfy due process.
It has also not been shown that the text of the ordinance has been translated and
disseminated, but this requirement applies to the approval of local development
plans and public investment programs of the local government unit and not to
tax ordinances.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
We make no ruling on the substantive provisions of the Manila
Revenue Code as their validity has not been raised in issue in the present
petition.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
WHEREFORE, the judgment is hereby rendered REVERSING the
challenged decision of the Regional Trial Court insofar as it declared Section
187 of the Local Government Code unconstitutional but AFFIRMING its
finding that the procedural requirements in the enactment of the Manila Revenue
Code have been observed. No pronouncement as to
costs.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, C.J., Feliciano, Padilla, Bidin, Regalado, Davide, Jr., Romero,
Bellosillo, Melo, Quiason, Puno, Vitug, Kapunan and Mendoza, JJ., concur.

EN BANC
[G.R. No. 161434. March 3, 2004]
MARIA JEANETTE C. TECSON and FELIX B. DESIDERIO,
JR., petitioners, vs. The COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, RONALD
ALLAN KELLY POE (a.k.a. FERNANDO POE, JR.) and VICTORINO X.
FORNIER, respondents.
[G.R. No. 161634. March 3, 2004]
ZOILO ANTONIO VELEZ, petitioner, vs. RONALD ALLAN KELLEY
POE, a.k.a. FERNANDO POE, JR., respondent.
[G. R. No. 161824. March 3, 2004]
VICTORINO X. FORNIER, petitioner, vs. HON. COMMISSION ON
ELECTIONS and RONALD ALLAN KELLEY POE, ALSO KNOWN AS
FERNANDO POE JR., respondents.
DECISION
VITUG, J.:
Citizenship is a treasured right conferred on those whom the state believes
are deserving of the privilege. It is a precious heritage, as well as an
inestimable acquisition,[1]that cannot be taken lightly by anyone - either by
those who enjoy it or by those who dispute it.
Before the Court are three consolidated cases, all of which raise a single
question of profound importance to the nation. The issue of citizenship is
brought up to challenge the qualifications of a presidential candidate to hold the
highest office of the land. Our people are waiting for the judgment of the Court
with bated breath. Is Fernando Poe, Jr., the hero of silver screen, and now one of
the main contenders for the presidency, a natural-born Filipino or is he not?
The moment of introspection takes us face to face with Spanish and American
colonial roots and reminds us of the rich heritage of civil law and common law
traditions, the fusion resulting in a hybrid of laws and jurisprudence that could
be no less than distinctly Filipino.
Antecedent Case Settings
On 31 December 2003, respondent Ronald Allan Kelly Poe, also
known as Fernando Poe, Jr. (hereinafter "FPJ"), filed his certificate of candidacy
for the position of President of the Republic of the Philippines under the
Koalisyon ng Nagkakaisang Pilipino (KNP) Party, in the forthcoming national
elections. In his certificate of candidacy, FPJ, representing himself to be a
natural-born citizen of the Philippines, stated his name to be "Fernando Jr.," or
"Ronald Allan" Poe, his date of birth to be 20 August 1939 and his place of birth
to be Manila.
Victorino X. Fornier, petitioner in G.R. No. 161824, entitled "Victorino X.
Fornier, Petitioner, versus Hon. Commission on Elections and Ronald Allan
Kelley Poe, also known as Fernando Poe, Jr., Respondents," initiated, on 09
January 2004, a petition docketed SPA No. 04-003 before the Commission on
Elections ("COMELEC") to disqualify FPJ and to deny due course or to cancel
his certificate of candidacy upon the thesis that FPJ made a material
misrepresentation in his certificate of candidacy by claiming to be a natural-born
Filipino citizen when in truth, according to Fornier, his parents were foreigners;
his mother, Bessie Kelley Poe, was an American, and his father, Allan Poe, was
a Spanish national, being the son of Lorenzo Pou, a Spanish subject. Granting,
petitioner asseverated, that Allan F. Poe was a Filipino citizen, he could not have
transmitted his Filipino citizenship to FPJ, the latter being an illegitimate child
of an alien mother. Petitioner based the allegation of the illegitimate birth of
respondent on two assertions - first, Allan F. Poe contracted a prior marriage to a
certain Paulita Gomez before his marriage to Bessie Kelley and, second, even if
no such prior marriage had existed, Allan F. Poe, married Bessie Kelly only a
year after the birth of respondent.
In the hearing before the Third Division of the COMELEC on 19 January 2004,
petitioner, in support of his claim, presented several documentary exhibits - 1) a
copy of the certificate of birth of FPJ, 2) a certified photocopy of an affidavit
executed in Spanish by Paulita Poe y Gomez attesting to her having filed a case
for bigamy and concubinage against the father of respondent, Allan F. Poe, after
discovering his bigamous relationship with Bessie Kelley, 3) an English
translation of the affidavit aforesaid, 4) a certified photocopy of the certificate of
birth of Allan F. Poe, 5) a certification issued by the Director of the Records
Management and Archives Office, attesting to the fact that there was no record
in the National Archives that a Lorenzo Poe or Lorenzo Pou resided or entered
the Philippines before 1907, and 6) a certification from the Officer-In-Charge of
the Archives Division of the National Archives to the effect that no available
information could be found in the files of the National Archives regarding the
birth of Allan F. Poe.
On his part, respondent, presented twenty-two documentary pieces of evidence,
the more significant ones being - a) a certification issued by Estrella M.
Domingo of the Archives Division of the National Archives that there appeared
to be no available information regarding the birth of Allan F. Poe in the registry
of births for San Carlos, Pangasinan, b) a certification issued by the Officer-In-
Charge of the Archives Division of the National Archives that no available
information about the marriage of Allan F. Poe and Paulita Gomez could be
found, c) a certificate of birth of Ronald Allan Poe, d) Original Certificate of
Title No. P-2247 of the Registry of Deeds for the Province of Pangasinan, in the
name of Lorenzo Pou, e) copies of Tax Declaration No. 20844, No. 20643, No.
23477 and No. 23478 in the name of Lorenzo Pou, f) a copy of the certificate of
death of Lorenzo Pou, g) a copy of the purported marriage contract between
Fernando Pou and Bessie Kelley, and h) a certification issued by the City Civil
Registrar of San Carlos City, Pangasinan, stating that the records of birth in the
said office during the period of from 1900 until May 1946 were totally
destroyed during World War II.
On 23 January 2004, the COMELEC dismissed SPA No. 04-003 for lack of
merit. Three days later, or on 26 January 2004, Fornier filed his motion for
reconsideration. The motion was denied on 06 February 2004 by the
COMELEC en banc. On 10 February 2004, petitioner assailed the decision of
the COMELEC before this Court conformably with Rule 64, in relation to Rule
65, of the Revised Rules of Civil Procedure. The petition, docketed G. R. No.
161824, likewise prayed for a temporary restraining order, a writ of preliminary
injunction or any other resolution that would stay the finality and/or execution of
the COMELEC resolutions.
The other petitions, later consolidated with G. R. No. 161824, would include G.
R. No. 161434, entitled "Maria Jeanette C. Tecson, and Felix B. Desiderio, Jr.,
vs. The Commission on Elections, Ronald Allan Kelley Poe (a.k.a. Fernando
Poe, Jr.), and Victorino X. Fornier," and the other, docketed G. R. No. 161634,
entitled "Zoilo Antonio G. Velez, vs. Ronald Allan Kelley Poe, a.k.a. Fernando
Poe, Jr.," both challenging the jurisdiction of the COMELEC and asserting that,
under Article VII, Section 4, paragraph 7, of the 1987 Constitution, only the
Supreme Court had original and exclusive jurisdiction to resolve the basic issue
on the case.
Jurisdiction of the Court
In G. R. No. 161824
In seeking the disqualification of the candidacy of FPJ and to have the
COMELEC deny due course to or cancel FPJs certificate of candidacy for
alleged misrepresentation of a material fact (i.e., that FPJ was a natural-born
citizen) before the COMELEC, petitioner Fornier invoked Section 78 of the
Omnibus Election Code
Section 78. Petition to deny due course to or cancel a certificate of candidacy. --
- A verified petition seeking to deny due course or to cancel a certificate of
candidacy may be filed by any person exclusively on the ground that any
material representation contained therein as required under Section 74 hereof is
false
in consonance with the general powers of COMELEC expressed in Section 52
of the Omnibus Election Code -
Section 52. Powers and functions of the Commission on Elections. In addition to
the powers and functions conferred upon it by the Constitution, the Commission
shall have exclusive charge of the enforcement and administration of all laws
relative to the conduct of elections for the purpose of ensuring free, orderly and
honest elections -
and in relation to Article 69 of the Omnibus Election Code which would
authorize "any interested party" to file a verified petition to deny or cancel the
certificate of candidacy of any nuisance candidate.
Decisions of the COMELEC on disqualification cases may be reviewed by the
Supreme Court per Rule 64[2] in an action for certiorari under Rule 65[3] of the
Revised Rules of Civil Procedure. Section 7, Article IX, of the 1987
Constitution also reads
"Each Commission shall decide by a majority vote of all its Members any case
or matter brought before it within sixty days from the date of its submission for
decision or resolution. A case or matter is deemed submitted for decision or
resolution upon the filing of the last pleading, brief, or memorandum, required
by the rules of the Commission or by the Commission itself. Unless otherwise
provided by this Constitution or by law, any decision, order, or ruling of each
Commission may be brought to the Supreme Court on certiorari by the
aggrieved party within thirty days from receipt of a copy thereof."
Additionally, Section 1, Article VIII, of the same Constitution provides that
judicial power is vested in one Supreme Court and in such lower courts as may
be established by law which power includes the duty of the courts of justice to
settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and
enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch
or instrumentality of the Government.
It is sufficiently clear that the petition brought up in G. R. No. 161824 was aptly
elevated to, and could well be taken cognizance of by, this Court. A contrary
view could be a gross denial to our people of their fundamental right to be fully
informed, and to make a proper choice, on who could or should be elected to
occupy the highest government post in the land.
In G. R. No. 161434 and G. R. No. 161634
Petitioners Tecson, et al., in G. R. No. 161434, and Velez, in G. R. No. 161634,
invoke the provisions of Article VII, Section 4, paragraph 7, of the 1987
Constitution in assailing the jurisdiction of the COMELEC when it took
cognizance of SPA No. 04-003 and in urging the Supreme Court to instead take
on the petitions they directly instituted before it. The Constitutional provision
cited reads:
"The Supreme Court, sitting en banc, shall be the sole judge of all contests
relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of the President or Vice-
President, and may promulgate its rules for the purpose."
The provision is an innovation of the 1987 Constitution. The omission in the
1935 and the 1973 Constitution to designate any tribunal to be the sole judge of
presidential and vice-presidential contests, has constrained this Court to declare,
in Lopez vs. Roxas,[4] as not (being) justiciable controversies or disputes
involving contests on the elections, returns and qualifications of the President or
Vice-President. The constitutional lapse prompted Congress, on 21 June 1957,
to enact Republic Act No. 1793, "An Act Constituting an Independent
Presidential Electoral Tribunal to Try, Hear and Decide Protests Contesting the
Election of the President-Elect and the Vice-President-Elect of the Philippines
and Providing for the Manner of Hearing the Same." Republic Act 1793
designated the Chief Justice and the Associate Justices of the Supreme Court to
be the members of the tribunal. Although the subsequent adoption of the
parliamentary form of government under the 1973 Constitution might have
implicitly affected Republic Act No. 1793, the statutory set-up, nonetheless,
would now be deemed revived under the present Section 4, paragraph 7, of the
1987 Constitution.
Ordinary usage would characterize a "contest" in reference to a post-
election scenario. Election contests consist of either an election protest or a quo
warranto which, although two distinct remedies, would have one objective in
view, i.e., to dislodge the winning candidate from office. A perusal of the
phraseology in Rule 12, Rule 13, and Rule 14 of the "Rules of the Presidential
Electoral Tribunal," promulgated by the Supreme Court en banc on 18 April
1992, would support this premise -
Rule 12. Jurisdiction. - The Tribunal shall be the sole judge of all contests
relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of the President or Vice-
President of the Philippines.
Rule 13. How Initiated. - An election contest is initiated by the filing of an
election protest or a petition for quo warranto against the President or Vice-
President. An election protest shall not include a petition for quo warranto. A
petition for quo warranto shall not include an election protest.
Rule 14. Election Protest. - Only the registered candidate for President or for
Vice-President of the Philippines who received the second or third highest
number of votes may contest the election of the President or the Vice-President,
as the case may be, by filing a verified petition with the Clerk of the Presidential
Electoral Tribunal within thirty (30) days after the proclamation of the winner.
The rules categorically speak of the jurisdiction of the tribunal over contests
relating to the election, returns and qualifications of the "President" or "Vice-
President", of the Philippines, and not of "candidates" for President or Vice-
President. A quo warranto proceeding is generally defined as being an action
against a person who usurps, intrudes into, or unlawfully holds or exercises a
public office.[5] In such context, the election contest can only contemplate a
post-election scenario. In Rule 14, only a registered candidate who would have
received either the second or third highest number of votes could file an election
protest. This rule again presupposes a post-election scenario.
It is fair to conclude that the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court, defined by
Section 4, paragraph 7, of the 1987 Constitution, would not include cases
directly brought before it, questioning the qualifications of a candidate for the
presidency or vice-presidency before the elections are held.
Accordingly, G. R. No. 161434, entitled "Maria Jeanette C. Tecson, et al., vs.
Commission on Elections et al.," and G. R. No. 161634, entitled "Zoilo Antonio
Velez vs. Ronald Allan Kelley Poe a.k.a. Fernando Poe, Jr." would have to be
dismissed for want of jurisdiction.
The Citizenship Issue
Now, to the basic issue; it should be helpful to first give a brief historical
background on the concept of citizenship.
Perhaps, the earliest understanding of citizenship was that given by Aristotle,
who, sometime in 384 to 322 B.C., described the "citizen" to refer to a man who
shared in the administration of justice and in the holding of an office. [6] Aristotle
saw its significance if only to determine the constituency of the "State," which
he described as being composed of such persons who would be adequate in
number to achieve a self-sufficient existence.[7] The concept grew to include one
who would both govern and be governed, for which qualifications like
autonomy, judgment and loyalty could be expected. Citizenship was seen to deal
with rights and entitlements, on the one hand, and with concomitant obligations,
on the other.[8] In its ideal setting, a citizen was active in public life and
fundamentally willing to submit his private interests to the general interest of
society.
The concept of citizenship had undergone changes over the centuries. In the
18th century, the concept was limited, by and large, to civil citizenship, which
established the rights necessary for individual freedom, such as rights to
property, personal liberty and justice.[9] Its meaning expanded during the 19th
century to include political citizenship, which encompassed the right to
participate in the exercise of political power.[10] The 20th century saw the next
stage of the development of social citizenship, which laid emphasis on the right
of the citizen to economic well-being and social security.[11] The idea of
citizenship has gained expression in the modern welfare state as it so developed
in Western Europe. An ongoing and final stage of development, in keeping with
the rapidly shrinking global village, might well be the internationalization of
citizenship.[12]
The Local Setting - from Spanish
Times to the Present
There was no such term as "Philippine citizens" during the Spanish regime but
"subjects of Spain" or "Spanish subjects."[13] In church records, the natives were
called 'indios', denoting a low regard for the inhabitants of the
archipelago. Spanish laws on citizenship became highly codified during the 19th
century but their sheer number made it difficult to point to one comprehensive
law. Not all of these citizenship laws of Spain however, were made to apply to
the Philippine Islands except for those explicitly extended by Royal Decrees. [14]
Spanish laws on citizenship were traced back to the Novisima
Recopilacion, promulgated in Spain on 16 July 1805 but as to whether the law
was extended to the Philippines remained to be the subject of differing views
among experts;[15] however, three royal decrees were undisputably made
applicable to Spaniards in the Philippines - the Order de la Regencia of 14
August 1841,[16] the Royal Decree of 23 August 1868 specifically defining the
political status of children born in the Philippine Islands,[17] and finally, the Ley
Extranjera de Ultramar of 04 July 1870, which was expressly made applicable
to the Philippines by the Royal Decree of 13 July 1870.[18]
The Spanish Constitution of 1876 was never extended to the Philippine Islands
because of the express mandate of its Article 89, according to which the
provisions of the Ultramaramong which this country was included, would be
governed by special laws.[19]
It was only the Civil Code of Spain, made effective in this jurisdiction on 18
December 1889, which came out with the first categorical enumeration of who
were Spanish citizens. -
(a) Persons born in Spanish territory,
(b) Children of a Spanish father or mother, even if they were born outside of
Spain,
(c) Foreigners who have obtained naturalization papers,
(d) Those who, without such papers, may have become domiciled inhabitants of
any town of the Monarchy.[20]
The year 1898 was another turning point in Philippine history. Already in the
state of decline as a superpower, Spain was forced to so cede her sole colony in
the East to an upcoming world power, the United States. An accepted principle
of international law dictated that a change in sovereignty, while resulting in an
abrogation of all political laws then in force, would have no effect on civil laws,
which would remain virtually intact.
The Treaty of Paris was entered into on 10 December 1898 between Spain and
the United States.[21] Under Article IX of the treaty, the civil rights and political
status of the native inhabitants of the territories ceded to the United States would
be determined by its Congress -
"Spanish subjects, natives of the Peninsula, residing in the territory over which
Spain by the present treaty relinquishes or cedes her sovereignty may remain in
such territory or may remove therefrom, retaining in either event all their rights
of property, including the right to sell or dispose of such property or of its
proceeds; and they shall also have the right to carry on their industry, commerce,
and professions, being subject in respect thereof to such laws as are applicable to
foreigners. In case they remain in the territory they may preserve their allegiance
to the Crown of Spain by making, before a court of record, within a year from
the date of the exchange of ratifications of this treaty, a declaration of their
decision to preserve such allegiance; in default of which declaration they shall
be held to have renounced it and to have adopted the nationality of the territory
in which they reside.
Thus
"The civil rights and political status of the native inhabitants of the territories
hereby ceded to the United States shall be determined by the Congress." [22]
Upon the ratification of the treaty, and pending legislation by the United States
Congress on the subject, the native inhabitants of the Philippines ceased to be
Spanish subjects. Although they did not become American citizens, they,
however, also ceased to be "aliens" under American laws and were thus issued
passports describing them to be citizens of the Philippines entitled to the
protection of the United States.
The term "citizens of the Philippine Islands" appeared for the first time in the
Philippine Bill of 1902, also commonly referred to as the Philippine Organic Act
of 1902, the first comprehensive legislation of the Congress of the United States
on the Philippines -
".... that all inhabitants of the Philippine Islands continuing to reside therein,
who were Spanish subjects on the 11th day of April, 1891, and then resided in
said Islands, and their children born subsequent thereto, shall be deemed and
held to be citizens of the Philippine Islands and as such entitled to the
protection of the United States, except such as shall have elected to preserve
their allegiance to the Crown of Spain in accordance with the provisions of the
treaty of peace between the United States and Spain, signed at Paris, December
tenth eighteen hundred and ninety eight." [23]
Under the organic act, a citizen of the Philippines was one who was an
inhabitant of the Philippines, and a Spanish subject on the 11 th day of April
1899. The term inhabitant was taken to include 1) a native-born inhabitant, 2) an
inhabitant who was a native of Peninsular Spain, and 3) an inhabitant who
obtained Spanish papers on or before 11 April 1899. [24]
Controversy arose on to the status of children born in the Philippines from 11
April 1899 to 01 July 1902, during which period no citizenship law was extant
in the Philippines. Weight was given to the view, articulated in jurisprudential
writing at the time, that the common law principle of jus soli, otherwise also
known as the principle of territoriality, operative in the United States and
England, governed those born in the Philippine Archipelago within that
period.[25] More about this later.
In 23 March 1912, the Congress of the United States made the following
amendment to the Philippine Bill of 1902 -
"Provided, That the Philippine Legislature is hereby authorized to provide by
law for the acquisition of Philippine citizenship by those natives of the
Philippine Islands who do not come within the foregoing provisions, the natives
of other insular possession of the United States, and such other persons residing
in the Philippine Islands who would become citizens of the United States, under
the laws of the United States, if residing therein." [26]
With the adoption of the Philippine Bill of 1902, the concept of "Philippine
citizens" had for the first time crystallized. The word "Filipino" was used by
William H. Taft, the first Civil Governor General in the Philippines when he
initially made mention of it in his slogan, "The Philippines for the Filipinos." In
1916, the Philippine Autonomy Act, also known as the Jones Law restated
virtually the provisions of the Philippine Bill of 1902, as so amended by the Act
of Congress in 1912 -
That all inhabitants of the Philippine Islands who were Spanish subjects on
the eleventh day of April, eighteen hundred and ninety-nine, and then resided
in said Islands, and their children born subsequently thereto, shall be deemed
and held to be citizens of the Philippine Islands, except such as shall have
elected to preserve their allegiance to the Crown of Spain in accordance with the
provisions of the treaty of peace between the United States and Spain, signed at
Paris December tenth, eighteen hundred and ninety-eight and except such others
as have since become citizens of some other country; Provided, That the
Philippine Legislature, herein provided for, is hereby authorized to provide for
the acquisition of Philippine citizenship by those natives of the Philippine
Islands who do not come within the foregoing provisions, the natives of the
insular possessions of the United States, and such other persons residing in the
Philippine Islands who are citizens of the United States, or who could become
citizens of the United States under the laws of the United States, if residing
therein."
Under the Jones Law, a native-born inhabitant of the Philippines was deemed to
be a citizen of the Philippines as of 11 April 1899 if he was 1) a subject of Spain
on 11 April 1899, 2) residing in the Philippines on said date, and, 3) since that
date, not a citizen of some other country.
While there was, at one brief time, divergent views on whether or not jus
soli was a mode of acquiring citizenship, the 1935 Constitution brought to an
end to any such link with common law, by adopting, once and for all, jus
sanguinis or blood relationship as being the basis of Filipino citizenship -
Section 1, Article III, 1935 Constitution. The following are citizens of the
Philippines -
(1) Those who are citizens of the Philippine Islands at the time of the adoption
of this Constitution
(2) Those born in the Philippines Islands of foreign parents who, before the
adoption of this Constitution, had been elected to public office in the Philippine
Islands.
(3) Those whose fathers are citizens of the Philippines.
(4) Those whose mothers are citizens of the Philippines and upon reaching the
age of majority, elect Philippine citizenship.
(5) Those who are naturalized in accordance with law.
Subsection (4), Article III, of the 1935 Constitution, taken together with existing
civil law provisions at the time, which provided that women would
automatically lose their Filipino citizenship and acquire that of their foreign
husbands, resulted in discriminatory situations that effectively incapacitated the
women from transmitting their Filipino citizenship to their legitimate children
and required illegitimate children of Filipino mothers to still elect Filipino
citizenship upon reaching the age of majority. Seeking to correct this anomaly,
as well as fully cognizant of the newly found status of Filipino women as equals
to men, the framers of the 1973 Constitution crafted the provisions of the new
Constitution on citizenship to reflect such concerns -
Section 1, Article III, 1973 Constitution - The following are citizens of the
Philippines:
(1) Those who are citizens of the Philippines at the time of the adoption of this
Constitution.
(2) Those whose fathers or mothers are citizens of the Philippines.
(3) Those who elect Philippine citizenship pursuant to the provisions of the
Constitution of nineteen hundred and thirty-five.
(4) Those who are naturalized in accordance with law.
For good measure, Section 2 of the same article also further provided that
"A female citizen of the Philippines who marries an alien retains her Philippine
citizenship, unless by her act or omission she is deemed, under the law to have
renounced her citizenship."
The 1987 Constitution generally adopted the provisions of the 1973
Constitution, except for subsection (3) thereof that aimed to correct the irregular
situation generated by the questionable proviso in the 1935 Constitution.
Section I, Article IV, 1987 Constitution now provides:
The following are citizens of the Philippines:
(1) Those who are citizens of the Philippines at the time of the adoption of this
Constitution.
(2) Those whose fathers or mothers are citizens of the Philippines.
(3) Those born before January 17, 1973 of Filipino mothers, who elect
Philippine citizenship upon reaching the age of majority; and
(4) Those who are naturalized in accordance with law.
The Case Of FPJ
Section 2, Article VII, of the 1987 Constitution expresses:
"No person may be elected President unless he is a natural-born citizen of the
Philippines, a registered voter, able to read and write, at least forty years of age
on the day of the election, and a resident of the Philippines for at least ten years
immediately preceding such election."
The term "natural-born citizens," is defined to include "those who are citizens of
the Philippines from birth without having to perform any act to acquire or
perfect their Philippine citizenship."[27]
The date, month and year of birth of FPJ appeared to be 20 August 1939 during
the regime of the 1935 Constitution. Through its history, four modes of
acquiring citizenship - naturalization, jus soli, res judicata and jus
sanguinis[28] had been in vogue. Only two, i.e., jus soli and jus sanguinis, could
qualify a person to being a natural-born citizen of the Philippines.Jus
soli, per Roa vs. Collector of Customs[29] (1912), did not last long. With the
adoption of the 1935 Constitution and the reversal of Roa in Tan Chong vs.
Secretary of Labor[30] (1947), jus sanguinis or blood relationship would now
become the primary basis of citizenship by birth.
Documentary evidence adduced by petitioner would tend to indicate that the
earliest established direct ascendant of FPJ was his paternal grandfather Lorenzo
Pou, married to Marta Reyes, the father of Allan F. Poe. While the record of
birth of Lorenzo Pou had not been presented in evidence, his death certificate,
however, identified him to be a Filipino, a resident of San Carlos, Pangasinan,
and 84 years old at the time of his death on 11 September 1954. The certificate
of birth of the father of FPJ, Allan F. Poe, showed that he was born on 17 May
1915 to an Espaol father, Lorenzo Pou, and a mestiza Espaol mother, Marta
Reyes. Introduced by petitioner was an uncertified copy of a supposed certificate
of the alleged marriage of Allan F. Poe and Paulita Gomez on 05 July 1936. The
marriage certificate of Allan F. Poe and Bessie Kelley reflected the date of their
marriage to be on 16 September 1940. In the same certificate, Allan F. Poe was
stated to be twenty-five years old, unmarried, and a Filipino citizen, and Bessie
Kelley to be twenty-two years old, unmarried, and an American citizen. The
birth certificate of FPJ, would disclose that he was born on 20 August 1939 to
Allan F. Poe, a Filipino, twenty-four years old, married to Bessie Kelly, an
American citizen, twenty-one years old and married.
Considering the reservations made by the parties on the veracity of some of the
entries on the birth certificate of respondent and the marriage certificate of his
parents, the only conclusions that could be drawn with some degree of certainty
from the documents would be that -
1. The parents of FPJ were Allan F. Poe and Bessie Kelley;
2. FPJ was born to them on 20 August 1939;
3. Allan F. Poe and Bessie Kelley were married to each other on 16 September,
1940;
4. The father of Allan F. Poe was Lorenzo Poe; and
5. At the time of his death on 11 September 1954, Lorenzo Poe was 84 years
old.
Would the above facts be sufficient or insufficient to establish the fact that FPJ
is a natural-born Filipino citizen? The marriage certificate of Allan F. Poe and
Bessie Kelley, the birth certificate of FPJ, and the death certificate of Lorenzo
Pou are documents of public record in the custody of a public officer. The
documents have been submitted in evidence by both contending parties during
the proceedings before the COMELEC.
The birth certificate of FPJ was marked Exhibit "A" for petitioner and Exhibit
"3" for respondent. The marriage certificate of Allan F. Poe to Bessie Kelley
was submitted as Exhibit "21" for respondent. The death certificate of Lorenzo
Pou was submitted by respondent as his Exhibit "5." While the last two
documents were submitted in evidence for respondent, the admissibility thereof,
particularly in reference to the facts which they purported to show, i.e., the
marriage certificate in relation to the date of marriage of Allan F. Poe to Bessie
Kelley and the death certificate relative to the death of Lorenzo Pou on 11
September 1954 in San Carlos, Pangasinan, were all admitted by petitioner, who
had utilized those material statements in his argument. All three documents were
certified true copies of the originals.
Section 3, Rule 130, Rules of Court states that -
Original document must be produced; exceptions. - When the subject of inquiry
is the contents of a document, no evidence shall be admissible other than the
original document itself, except in the following cases:
xxxxxxxxx
(d) When the original is a public record in the custody of a public office or is
recorded in a public office.
Being public documents, the death certificate of Lorenzo Pou, the marriage
certificate of Allan F. Poe and Bessie Kelly, and the birth certificate of
FPJ, constitute prima facie proof of their contents. Section 44, Rule 130, of the
Rules of Court provides:
Entries in official records. Entries in official records made in the performance of
his duty by a public officer of the Philippines, or by a person in the performance
of a duty specially enjoined by law, are prima facie evidence of the facts therein
stated.
The trustworthiness of public documents and the value given to the entries made
therein could be grounded on 1) the sense of official duty in the preparation of
the statement made, 2) the penalty which is usually affixed to a breach of that
duty, 3) the routine and disinterested origin of most such statements, and 4) the
publicity of record which makes more likely the prior exposure of such errors as
might have occurred.[31]
The death certificate of Lorenzo Pou would indicate that he died on 11
September 1954, at the age of 84 years, in San Carlos, Pangasinan. It could thus
be assumed that Lorenzo Pou was born sometime in the year 1870 when the
Philippines was still a colony of Spain. Petitioner would argue that Lorenzo Pou
was not in the Philippines during the crucial period of from 1898 to 1902
considering that there was no existing record about such fact in the Records
Management and Archives Office. Petitioner, however, likewise failed to show
that Lorenzo Pou was at any other place during the same period. In his death
certificate, the residence of Lorenzo Pou was stated to be San Carlos,
Pangasinan. In the absence of any evidence to the contrary, it should be sound to
conclude, or at least to presume, that the place of residence of a person at the
time of his death was also his residence before death. It would be extremely
doubtful if the Records Management and Archives Office would have had
complete records of all residents of the Philippines from 1898 to 1902.
Proof of Paternity and Filiation
Under Civil Law.
Petitioner submits, in any case, that in establishing filiation (relationship or civil
status of the child to the father [or mother]) or paternity (relationship or civil
status of the father to the child) of an illegitimate child, FPJ evidently being an
illegitimate son according to petitioner, the mandatory rules under civil law must
be used.
Under the Civil Code of Spain, which was in force in the Philippines from 08
December 1889 up until the day prior to 30 August 1950 when the Civil Code of
the Philippines took effect, acknowledgment was required to establish filiation
or paternity. Acknowledgment was either judicial (compulsory) or
voluntary. Judicial or compulsory acknowledgment was possible only if done
during the lifetime of the putative parent; voluntary acknowledgment could only
be had in a record of birth, a will, or a public document. [32] Complementary to
the new code was Act No. 3753 or the Civil Registry Law expressing in Section
5 thereof, that -
In case of an illegitimate child, the birth certificate shall be signed and sworn to
jointly by the parents of the infant or only by the mother if the father refuses. In
the latter case, it shall not be permissible to state or reveal in the document the
name of the father who refuses to acknowledge the child, or to give therein any
information by which such father could be identified.
In order that the birth certificate could then be utilized to prove voluntary
acknowledgment of filiation or paternity, the certificate was required to be
signed or sworn to by the father. The failure of such requirement rendered the
same useless as being an authoritative document of recognition.[33] In Mendoza
vs. Mella,[34] the Court ruled -
"Since Rodolfo was born in 1935, after the registry law was enacted, the
question here really is whether or not his birth certificate (Exhibit 1), which is
merely a certified copy of the registry record, may be relied upon as sufficient
proof of his having been voluntarily recognized. No such reliance, in our
judgment, may be placed upon it. While it contains the names of both parents,
there is no showing that they signed the original, let alone swore to its contents
as required in Section 5 of Act No. 3753. For all that might have happened, it
was not even they or either of them who furnished the data to be entered in the
civil register. Petitioners say that in any event the birth certificate is in the nature
of a public document wherein voluntary recognition of a natural child may also
be made, according to the same Article 131. True enough, but in such a case,
there must be a clear statement in the document that the parent recognizes the
child as his or her own."
In the birth certificate of respondent FPJ, presented by both parties, nowhere in
the document was the signature of Allan F. Poe found. There being no will
apparently executed, or at least shown to have been executed, by decedent Allan
F. Poe, the only other proof of voluntary recognition remained to be "some other
public document." In Pareja vs. Pareja,[35] this Court defined what could
constitute such a document as proof of voluntary acknowledgment:
"Under the Spanish Civil Code there are two classes of public documents,
those executed by private individuals which must be authenticated by notaries,
and those issued by competent public officials by reason of their office. The
public document pointed out in Article 131 as one of the means by which
recognition may be made belongs to the first class."
Let us leave it at that for the moment.
The 1950 Civil Code categorized the acknowledgment or recognition of
illegitimate children into voluntary, legal or compulsory. Voluntary recognition
was required to be expressedly made in a record of birth, a will, a statement
before a court of record or in any authentic writing. Legal acknowledgment took
place in favor of full blood brothers and sisters of an illegitimate child who was
recognized or judicially declared as natural. Compulsory acknowledgment could
be demanded generally in cases when the child had in his favor any evidence to
prove filiation. Unlike an action to claim legitimacy which would last during the
lifetime of the child, and might pass exceptionally to the heirs of the child, an
action to claim acknowledgment, however, could only be brought during the
lifetime of the presumed parent.
Amicus Curiae Ruben F. Balane defined, during the oral argument, "authentic
writing," so as to be an authentic writing for purposes of voluntary recognition,
simply as being a genuine or indubitable writing of the father. The term would
include a public instrument (one duly acknowledged before a notary public or
other competent official) or a private writing admitted by the father to be his.
The Family Code has further liberalized the rules; Article 172, Article 173, and
Article 175 provide:
Art. 172. The filiation of legitimate children is established by any of the
following:
(1) The record of birth appearing in the civil register or a final judgment; or
(2) An admission of legitimate filiation in a public document or a private
handwritten instrument and signed by the parent concerned.
In the absence of the foregoing evidence, the legitimate filiation shall be proved
by:
(1) The open and continuous possession of the status of a legitimate child; or
(2) Any other means allowed by the Rules of Court and special laws.
Art. 173. The action to claim legitimacy may be brought by the child during his
or her lifetime and shall be transmitted to the heirs should the child die during
minority or in a state of insanity. In these cases, the heirs shall have a period of
five years within which to institute the action.
The action already commenced by the child shall survive notwithstanding the
death of either or both of the parties.
x x x x x x x x x.
Art. 175. Illegitimate children may establish their illegitimate filiation in the
same way and on the same, evidence as legitimate children.
The action must be brought within the same period specified in Article 173,
except when the action is based on the second paragraph of Article 172, in
which case the action may be brought during the lifetime of the alleged parent.
The provisions of the Family Code are retroactively applied; Article 256 of the
code reads:
"Art. 256. This Code shall have retroactive effect insofar as it does not prejudice
or impair vested or acquired rights in accordance with the Civil Code or other
laws.
Thus, in Vda. de Sy-Quia vs. Court of Appeals,[36] the Court has ruled:
"We hold that whether Jose was a voluntarily recognized natural child should be
decided under Article 278 of the Civil Code of the Philippines. Article 2260 of
that Code provides that 'the voluntary recognition of a natural child shall take
place according to this Code, even if the child was born before the effectivity of
this body of laws' or before August 30, 1950. Hence, Article 278 may be given
retroactive effect."
It should be apparent that the growing trend to liberalize the acknowledgment or
recognition of illegitimate children is an attempt to break away from the
traditional idea of keeping well apart legitimate and non-legitimate relationships
within the family in favor of the greater interest and welfare of the child. The
provisions are intended to merely govern the private and personal affairs of the
family. There is little, if any, to indicate that the legitimate or illegitimate civil
status of the individual would also affect his political rights or, in general, his
relationship to the State. While, indeed, provisions on "citizenship" could be
found in the Civil Code, such provisions must be taken in the context of private
relations, the domain of civil law; particularly -
"Civil Law is that branch of law which has for its double purpose the
organization of the family and the regulation of property. It has thus [been]
defined as the mass of precepts which determine and regulate the relations of
assistance, authority and obedience among members of a family, and those
which exist among members of a society for the protection of private
interests."[37]
In Yaez de Barnuevo vs. Fuster,[38] the Court has held:
"In accordance with Article 9 of the Civil Code of Spain, x x x the laws relating
to family rights and duties, or to the status, condition and legal capacity of
persons, govern Spaniards although they reside in a foreign country; that, in
consequence, 'all questions of a civil nature, such as those dealing with the
validity or nullity of the matrimonial bond, the domicile of the husband and
wife, their support, as between them, the separation of their properties, the rules
governing property, marital authority, division of conjugal property, the
classification of their property, legal causes for divorce, the extent of the latter,
the authority to decree it, and, in general, the civil effects of marriage and
divorce upon the persons and properties of the spouses, are questions that are
governed exclusively by the national law of the husband and wife."
The relevance of "citizenship" or "nationality" to Civil Law is best exemplified
in Article 15 of the Civil Code, stating that -
"Laws relating to family rights and duties, or to the status, condition and legal
capacity of persons are binding upon citizens of the Philippines, even though
living abroad" -
that explains the need to incorporate in the code a reiteration of the
Constitutional provisions on citizenship. Similarly, citizenship is significant in
civil relationships found in different parts of the Civil Code, [39] such as on
successional rights and family relations.[40] In adoption, for instance, an adopted
child would be considered the child of his adoptive parents and accorded the
same rights as their legitimate child but such legal fiction extended only to
define his rights under civil law[41] and not his political status.
Civil law provisions point to an obvious bias against illegitimacy. This
discriminatory attitude may be traced to the Spanish family and property laws,
which, while defining proprietary and successional rights of members of the
family, provided distinctions in the rights of legitimate and illegitimate
children. In the monarchial set-up of old Spain, the distribution and inheritance
of titles and wealth were strictly according to bloodlines and the concern to keep
these bloodlines uncontaminated by foreign blood was paramount.
These distinctions between legitimacy and illegitimacy were codified in the
Spanish Civil Code, and the invidious discrimination survived when the Spanish
Civil Code became the primary source of our own Civil Code. Such distinction,
however, remains and should remain only in the sphere of civil law and not
unduly impede or impinge on the domain of political law.
The proof of filiation or paternity for purposes of determining his citizenship
status should thus be deemed independent from and not inextricably tied up with
that prescribed for civil law purposes. The Civil Code or Family Code
provisions on proof of filiation or paternity, although good law, do not have
preclusive effects on matters alien to personal and family relations. The ordinary
rules on evidence could well and should govern. For instance, the matter about
pedigree is not necessarily precluded from being applicable by the Civil Code or
Family Code provisions.
Section 39, Rule 130, of the Rules of Court provides -
Act or Declaration about pedigree. The act or declaration of a person deceased,
or unable to testify, in respect to the pedigree of another person related to him by
birth or marriage, may be received in evidence where it occurred before the
controversy, and the relationship between the two persons is shown by evidence
other than such act or declaration. The word `pedigree includes relationship,
family genealogy, birth, marriage, death, the dates when and the places where
these facts occurred, and the names of the relatives. It embraces also facts of
family history intimately connected with pedigree.
For the above rule to apply, it would be necessary that (a) the declarant is
already dead or unable to testify, (b) the pedigree of a person must be at issue,
(c) the declarant must be a relative of the person whose pedigree is in question,
(d) declaration must be made before the controversy has occurred, and (e) the
relationship between the declarant and the person whose pedigree is in question
must be shown by evidence other than such act or declaration.
Thus, the duly notarized declaration made by Ruby Kelley Mangahas, sister of
Bessie Kelley Poe submitted as Exhibit 20 before the COMELEC, might be
accepted to prove the acts of Allan F. Poe, recognizing his own paternal
relationship with FPJ, i.e, living together with Bessie Kelley and his children
(including respondent FPJ) in one house, and as one family -
"I, Ruby Kelley Mangahas, of legal age and sound mind, presently residing in
Stockton, California, U.S.A., after being sworn in accordance with law do
hereby declare that:
1. I am the sister of the late Bessie Kelley Poe.
2. Bessie Kelley Poe was the wife of Fernando Poe, Sr.
3. Fernando and Bessie Poe had a son by the name of Ronald Allan Poe, more
popularly known in the Philippines as `Fernando Poe, Jr., or `FPJ.
4. Ronald Allan Poe `FPJ was born on August 20, 1939 at St. Luke's Hospital,
Magdalena Street, Manila.
xxxxxxxxx
7. Fernando Poe Sr., and my sister Bessie, met and became engaged while they
were students at the University of the Philippines in 1936. I was also introduced
to Fernando Poe, Sr., by my sister that same year.
8. Fernando Poe, Sr., and my sister Bessie had their first child in 1938.
9. Fernando Poe, Sr., my sister Bessie and their first three children, Elizabeth,
Ronald, Allan and Fernando II, and myself lived together with our mother at our
family's house on Dakota St. (now Jorge Bocobo St.), Malate until the liberation
of Manila in 1945, except for some months between 1943-1944.
10. Fernando Poe, Sr., and my sister, Bessie, were blessed with four (4) more
children after Ronald Allan Poe.
xxxxxxxxx
18. I am executing this Declaration to attest to the fact that my nephew, Ronald
Allan Poe is a natural born Filipino, and that he is the legitimate child of
Fernando Poe, Sr.
Done in City of Stockton, California, U.S.A., this 12th day of January 2004.
Ruby Kelley Mangahas
Declarant
DNA Testing
In case proof of filiation or paternity would be unlikely to satisfactorily establish
or would be difficult to obtain, DNA testing, which examines genetic codes
obtained from body cells of the illegitimate child and any physical residue of the
long dead parent could be resorted to. A positive match would clear up filiation
or paternity. In Tijing vs. Court of Appeals,[42] this Court has acknowledged the
strong weight of DNA testing -
"Parentage will still be resolved using conventional methods unless we adopt the
modern and scientific ways available. Fortunately, we have now the facility and
expertise in using DNA test for identification and parentage testing. The
University of the Philippines Natural Science Research Institute (UP-NSRI)
DNA Analysis Laboratory has now the capability to conduct DNA typing using
short tandem repeat (STR) analysis. The analysis is based on the fact that the
DNA of a child/person has two (2) copies, one copy from the mother and the
other from the father. The DNA from the mother, the alleged father and the child
are analyzed to establish parentage. Of course, being a novel scientific
technique, the use of DNA test as evidence is still open to challenge. Eventually,
as the appropriate case comes, courts should not hesitate to rule on the
admissibility of DNA evidence. For it was said, that courts should apply the
results of science when competently obtained in aid of situations presented,
since to reject said result is to deny progress."
Petitioners Argument For
Jurisprudential Conclusiveness
Petitioner would have it that even if Allan F. Poe were a Filipino citizen, he
could not have transmitted his citizenship to respondent FPJ, the latter being an
illegitimate child. According to petitioner, prior to his marriage to Bessie Kelley,
Allan F. Poe, on July 5, 1936, contracted marriage with a certain Paulita Gomez,
making his subsequent marriage to Bessie Kelley bigamous and respondent FPJ
an illegitimate child. The veracity of the supposed certificate of marriage
between Allan F. Poe and Paulita Gomez could be most doubtful at best. But the
documentary evidence introduced by no less than respondent himself, consisting
of a birth certificate of respondent and a marriage certificate of his parents
showed that FPJ was born on 20 August 1939 to a Filipino father and an
American mother who were married to each other a year later, or on 16
September 1940. Birth to unmarried parents would make FPJ an illegitimate
child. Petitioner contended that as an illegitimate child, FPJ so followed the
citizenship of his mother, Bessie Kelley, an American citizen, basing his stand
on the ruling of this Court in Morano vs. Vivo,[43] citing Chiongbian vs. de
Leon[44] and Serra vs. Republic.[45]
On the above score, the disquisition made by amicus curiae Joaquin G. Bernas,
SJ, is most convincing; he states -
"We must analyze these cases and ask what the lis mota was in each of them. If
the pronouncement of the Court on jus sanguinis was on the lis mota, the
pronouncement would be a decision constituting doctrine under the rule of stare
decisis. But if the pronouncement was irrelevant to the lis mota, the
pronouncement would not be a decision but a mere obiter dictum which did not
establish doctrine. I therefore invite the Court to look closely into these cases.
First, Morano vs. Vivo. The case was not about an illegitimate child of a Filipino
father. It was about a stepson of a Filipino, a stepson who was the child of a
Chinese mother and a Chinese father. The issue was whether the stepson
followed the naturalization of the stepfather. Nothing about jus
sanguinis there. The stepson did not have the blood of the naturalized stepfather.
Second, Chiongbian vs. de Leon. This case was not about the illegitimate son of
a Filipino father. It was about a legitimate son of a father who had become
Filipino by election to public office before the 1935 Constitution pursuant to
Article IV, Section 1(2) of the 1935 Constitution. No one was illegitimate here.
Third, Serra vs. Republic. The case was not about the illegitimate son of a
Filipino father. Serra was an illegitimate child of a Chinese father and a Filipino
mother. The issue was whether one who was already a Filipino because of his
mother who still needed to be naturalized. There is nothing there about
invidious jus sanguinis.
Finally, Paa vs. Chan.[46] This is a more complicated case. The case was about
the citizenship of Quintin Chan who was the son of Leoncio Chan. Quintin Chan
claimed that his father, Leoncio, was the illegitimate son of a Chinese father and
a Filipino mother. Quintin therefore argued that he got his citizenship from
Leoncio, his father. But the Supreme Court said that there was no valid proof
that Leoncio was in fact the son of a Filipina mother. The Court therefore
concluded that Leoncio was not Filipino. If Leoncio was not Filipino, neither
was his son Quintin. Quintin therefore was not only not a natural-born Filipino
but was not even a Filipino.
The Court should have stopped there. But instead it followed with an obiter
dictum. The Court said obiter that even if Leoncio, Quintin's father, were
Filipino, Quintin would not be Filipino because Quintin was illegitimate. This
statement about Quintin, based on a contrary to fact assumption, was absolutely
unnecessary for the case. x x x It was obiter dictum, pure and simple, simply
repeating the obiter dictum in Morano vs. Vivo.
xxxxxxxxx
"Aside from the fact that such a pronouncement would have no textual
foundation in the Constitution, it would also violate the equal protection clause
of the Constitution not once but twice. First, it would make an illegitimate
distinction between a legitimate child and an illegitimate child, and second, it
would make an illegitimate distinction between the illegitimate child of a
Filipino father and the illegitimate child of a Filipino mother.
The doctrine on constitutionally allowable distinctions was established long ago
by People vs. Cayat.[47] I would grant that the distinction between legitimate
children and illegitimate children rests on real differences. x x x But real
differences alone do not justify invidious distinction. Real differences may
justify distinction for one purpose but not for another purpose.
x x x What is the relevance of legitimacy or illegitimacy to elective public
service? What possible state interest can there be for disqualifying an
illegitimate child from becoming a public officer. It was not the fault of the child
that his parents had illicit liaison. Why deprive the child of the fullness of
political rights for no fault of his own? To disqualify an illegitimate child from
holding an important public office is to punish him for the indiscretion of his
parents. There is neither justice nor rationality in that. And if there is neither
justice nor rationality in the distinction, then the distinction transgresses the
equal protection clause and must be reprobated.
The other amici curiae, Mr. Justice Vicente Mendoza (a former member of this
Court), Professor Ruben Balane and Dean Martin Magallona, at bottom, have
expressed similar views.The thesis of petitioner, unfortunately hinging solely on
pure obiter dicta, should indeed fail.
Where jurisprudence regarded an illegitimate child as taking after the citizenship
of its mother, it did so for the benefit the child. It was to ensure a Filipino
nationality for the illegitimate child of an alien father in line with the assumption
that the mother had custody, would exercise parental authority and had the duty
to support her illegitimate child. It was to help the child, not to prejudice or
discriminate against him.
The fact of the matter perhaps the most significant consideration is that the 1935
Constitution, the fundamental law prevailing on the day, month and year of birth
of respondent FPJ, can never be more explicit than it is. Providing neither
conditions nor distinctions, the Constitution states that among the citizens of the
Philippines are those whose fathers are citizens of the Philippines. There utterly
is no cogent justification to prescribe conditions or distinctions where there
clearly are none provided.
In Sum
(1) The Court, in the exercise of its power of judicial review, possesses
jurisdiction over the petition in G. R. No. 161824, filed under Rule 64, in
relation to Rule 65, of the Revised Rules of Civil Procedure. G.R. No. 161824
assails the resolution of the COMELEC for alleged grave abuse of discretion in
dismissing, for lack of merit, the petition in SPA No. 04-003 which has prayed
for the disqualification of respondent FPJ from running for the position of
President in the 10th May 2004 national elections on the contention that FPJ has
committed material representation in his certificate of candidacy by representing
himself to be a natural-born citizen of the Philippines.
(2) The Court must dismiss, for lack of jurisdiction and prematurity, the
petitions in G. R. No. 161434 and No. 161634 both having been directly
elevated to this Court in the latters capacity as the only tribunal to resolve a
presidential and vice-presidential election contest under the
Constitution. Evidently, the primary jurisdiction of the Court can directly be
invoked only after, not before, the elections are held.
(3) In ascertaining, in G.R. No. 161824, whether grave abuse of discretion has
been committed by the COMELEC, it is necessary to take on the matter of
whether or not respondent FPJ is a natural-born citizen, which, in turn, depended
on whether or not the father of respondent, Allan F. Poe, would have himself
been a Filipino citizen and, in the affirmative, whether or not the alleged
illegitimacy of respondent prevents him from taking after the Filipino
citizenship of his putative father. Any conclusion on the Filipino citizenship of
Lorenzo Pou could only be drawn from the presumption that having died in
1954 at 84 years old, Lorenzo would have been born sometime in the year 1870,
when the Philippines was under Spanish rule, and that San Carlos, Pangasinan,
his place of residence upon his death in 1954, in the absence of any other
evidence, could have well been his place of residence before death, such that
Lorenzo Pou would have benefited from the en masse Filipinization that the
Philippine Bill had effected in 1902. That citizenship (of Lorenzo Pou), if
acquired, would thereby extend to his son, Allan F. Poe, father of respondent
FPJ. The 1935 Constitution, during which regime respondent FPJ has seen first
light, confers citizenship to all persons whose fathers are Filipino citizens
regardless of whether such children are legitimate or illegitimate.
(4) But while the totality of the evidence may not establish conclusively that
respondent FPJ is a natural-born citizen of the Philippines, the evidence on hand
still would preponderate in his favor enough to hold that he cannot be held guilty
of having made a material misrepresentation in his certificate of candidacy in
violation of Section 78, in relation to Section 74, of the Omnibus Election Code.
Petitioner has utterly failed to substantiate his case before the Court,
notwithstanding the ample opportunity given to the parties to present their
position and evidence, and to prove whether or not there has been material
misrepresentation, which, as so ruled in Romualdez-Marcos vs.
COMELEC,[48] must not only be material, but also deliberate and willful.
WHEREFORE, the Court RESOLVES to DISMISS
1. G. R. No. 161434, entitled "Maria Jeanette C. Tecson and Felix B. Desiderio,
Jr., Petitioners, versus Commission on Elections, Ronald Allan Kelley Poe
(a.k.a. "Fernando Poe, Jr.,) and Victorino X. Fornier, Respondents," and G. R.
No. 161634, entitled "Zoilo Antonio Velez, Petitioner, versus Ronald Allan
Kelley Poe, a.k.a. Fernando Poe, Jr., Respondent," for want of jurisdiction.
2. G. R. No. 161824, entitled Victorino X. Fornier, Petitioner, versus Hon.
Commission on Elections and Ronald Allan Kelley Poe, also known as
Fernando Poe, Jr., for failure to show grave abuse of discretion on the part of
respondent Commission on Elections in dismissing the petition in SPA No. 04-
003.
No Costs.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C.J., see separate opinion, concurring.
Puno, J., on leave but was allowed to vote; see separate opinion.
Panganiban, J., on official leave; allowed to vote but did not send his vote on
the matter.
Quisumbing, J., joins the dissent of Justices Tinga and Morales; case should
have been remanded.
Ynares-Santiago, J., concurs and also with J. Punos separate opinion.
Sandoval-Gutierrez, J., concurs, please see separate opinion.
Carpio, J., see dissenting opinion.
Austria-Martinez, J., concurs, please see separate opinion.
Corona, J., joins the dissenting opinion of Justice Morales.
Carpio-Morales, J., see dissenting opinion.
Callejo, Sr., J., please see concurring opinion.
Azcuna, J., concurs in a separate opinion.
Tinga, J., dissents per separate opinion.
G.R. No. 161434 March 3, 2004
MARIA JEANETTE C. TECSON and FELIX B. DESIDERIO,
JR. vs.COMELEC, FPJ and VICTORINO X. FORNIER,
G.R. No. 161634 March 3, 2004
ZOILO ANTONIO VELEZ vs.FPJ
G. R. No. 161824 March 3, 2004
VICTORINO X. FORNIER, vs. HON. COMMISSION ON
ELECTIONS and FPJ
(http://lapadiday.blogspot.com/2012/11/case-digest-tecson-vs-
comelec.html)
Facts:
Petitioners sought for respondent Poe’s disqualification in the
presidential elections for having allegedly misrepresented material facts
in his (Poe’s) certificate of candidacy by claiming that he is a natural
Filipino citizen despite his parents both being foreigners. Comelec
dismissed the petition, holding that Poe was a Filipino Citizen.
Petitioners assail the jurisdiction of the Comelec, contending that only
the Supreme Court may resolve the basic issue on the case under Article
VII, Section 4, paragraph 7, of the 1987 Constitution.
Issue:
Whether or not it is the Supreme Court which had jurisdiction.
Whether or not Comelec committed grave abuse of discretion in
holding that Poe was a Filipino citizen.
Ruling:
1.) The Supreme Court had no jurisdiction on questions regarding
“qualification of a candidate” for the presidency or vice-presidency
before the elections are held.
"Rules of the Presidential Electoral Tribunal" in connection with Section
4, paragraph 7, of the 1987 Constitution, refers to “contests” relating to
the election, returns and qualifications of the "President" or "Vice-
President", of the Philippines which the Supreme Court may take
cognizance, and not of "candidates" for President or Vice-President
before the elections.
2.) Comelec committed no grave abuse of discretion in holding Poe as a
Filipino Citizen.
The 1935 Constitution on Citizenship, the prevailing fundamental law on
respondent’s birth, provided that among the citizens of the Philippines
are "those whose fathers are citizens of the Philippines."
Tracing respondent’s paternal lineage, his grandfather Lorenzo, as
evidenced by the latter’s death certificate was identified as a Filipino
Citizen. His citizenship was also drawn from the presumption that having
died in 1954 at the age of 84, Lorenzo would have been born in 1980. In
the absence of any other evidence, Lorenzo’s place of residence upon his
death in 1954 was presumed to be the place of residence prior his death,
such that Lorenzo Pou would have benefited from the "en masse
Filipinization" that the Philippine Bill had effected in 1902. Being so,
Lorenzo’s citizenship would have extended to his son, Allan---
respondent’s father.
Respondent, having been acknowledged as Allan’s son to Bessie, though
an American citizen, was a Filipino citizen by virtue of paternal filiation
as evidenced by the respondent’s birth certificate. The 1935 Constitution
on citizenship did not make a distinction on the legitimacy or
illegitimacy of the child, thus, the allegation of bigamous marriage and
the allegation that respondent was born only before the assailed marriage
had no bearing on respondent’s citizenship in view of the established
paternal filiation evidenced by the public documents presented.
But while the totality of the evidence may not establish conclusively that
respondent FPJ is a natural-born citizen of the Philippines, the evidence
on hand still would preponderate in his favor enough to hold that he
cannot be held guilty of having made a material misrepresentation in his
certificate of candidacy in violation of Section 78, in relation to Section
74 of the Omnibus Election Code.
Tecson vs. COMELEC (Digest) respondent prevents him from taking after the Filipino citizenship of his
Tecson vs. COMELEC, G.R. No. 161434. March 3, 2004 putative father. Any conclusion on the Filipino citizenship of Lorenzo
Pou could only be drawn from the presumption that having died in 1954
DISCLAIMER: Contents herein are based on my consolidated at 84 years old, Lorenzo would have been born sometime in the year
research to other sources, please refer to REFERENCES section. 1870, when the Philippines was under Spanish rule, and that San Carlos,
Pangasinan, his place of residence upon his death in 1954, in the absence
(http://comp.lex.ph/2013/07/tecson-vs-comelec.html) of any other evidence, could have well been his place of residence before
death, such that Lorenzo Pou would have benefited from the "en masse
FACTS: Filipinization" that the Philippine Bill had effected in 1902. That
Victorino X. Fornier, petitioner initiated a petition before the COMELEC
citizenship (of Lorenzo Pou), if acquired, would thereby extend to his
to disqualify FPJ and to deny due course or to cancel his certificate of
son, Allan F. Poe, father of respondent FPJ. The 1935 Constitution,
candidacy upon the thesis that FPJ made a material misrepresentation in
during which regime respondent FPJ has seen first light, confers
his certificate of candidacy by claiming to be a natural-born Filipino
citizenship to all persons whose fathers are Filipino citizens regardless of
citizen when in truth, according to Fornier, his parents were foreigners;
whether such children are legitimate or illegitimate.
his mother, Bessie Kelley Poe, was an American, and his father, Allan
But while the totality of the evidence may not establish conclusively that
Poe, was a Spanish national, being the son of Lorenzo Pou, a Spanish
respondent FPJ is a natural-born citizen of the Philippines, the evidence
subject. Granting, petitioner asseverated, that Allan F. Poe was a Filipino
on hand still would preponderate in his favor enough to hold that he
citizen, he could not have transmitted his Filipino citizenship to FPJ, the
cannot be held guilty of having made a material misrepresentation in his
latter being an illegitimate child of an alien mother. Petitioner based the
certificate of candidacy in violation of Section 78, in relation to Section
allegation of the illegitimate birth of respondent on two assertions - first,
74, of the Omnibus Election Code.
Allan F. Poe contracted a prior marriage to a certain Paulita Gomez
before his marriage to Bessie Kelley and, second, even if no such prior
2) No. An examination of the phraseology in Rule 12, 13, and Rule 14 of
marriage had existed, Allan F. Poe, married Bessie Kelly only a year
the "Rules of the Presidential Electoral Tribunal," promulgated by the
after the birth of respondent.
Supreme Court on April 1992 categorically speak of the jurisdiction of
the tribunal over contests relating to the election, returns and
Petitioners also questioned the jurisdiction of the COMELEC in taking
qualifications of the "President" or "Vice-President", of the Philippines,
cognizance of and deciding the citizenship issue affecting Fernando Poe
and not of "candidates" for President or Vice-President. A quo warranto
Jr. They asserted that under Section 4(7), Article VII of the 1987
proceeding is generally defined as being an action against a person who
Constituition, only the Supreme Court had original and exclusive
usurps, intrudes into, or unlawfully holds or exercises a public office. In
jurisdiction to resolve the basic issue of the case.
such context, the election contest can only contemplate a post-election
scenario. In Rule 14, only a registered candidate who would have
received either the second or third highest number of votes could file an
ISSUES:
election protest. This rule again presupposes a post-election scenario. It
1) Whether or not FPJ is a natural born Filipino citizen?
is fair to conclude that the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court, defined by
2) Whether or not the Supreme Court have jurisdiction over the
Section 4, paragraph 7, of the 1987 Constitution, would not include cases
qualifications of presidential candidates?
directly brought before it, questioning the qualifications of a candidate
for the presidency or vice-presidency before the elections are held.
RULING:
1) It is necessary to take on the matter of whether or not respondent FPJ
is a natural-born citizen, which, in turn, depended on whether or not the
father of respondent, Allan F. Poe, would have himself been a Filipino
citizen and, in the affirmative, whether or not the alleged illegitimacy of