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PCSO vs NDMGC

FACTS:
A REM was constituted over the property of Peralta in favor of PCSO to secure the former's sweepstakes
tickets purchased by one of its provincial distributors Galang. Peralta then sold the land to New Dagupan (NDMGC)
for 800k in installments but showed the TCT without liens. NDGMC then withheld the last payment because of the
failure to deliver the TCT. It then sued peralta for specific performance. During the pendency, PCSO caused the
registration of the morgage then filed for a EJF for the failure of Galang to pay. PCSO was the highest bidder and
was given a cert. of sale. A TCT was obtained by NDGMC but found out of the mortgage and informed PCSO of the
same and demanded the TCT copy. PCSO said that it had already foreclosed the property and had a TCT issued in
its name as the highest bidder and that the REM was constituted to cover future debts of Galang.

Contention of Repondents: The mortgage has already been discharged by the reason of payment of Galang.
Contention of PCSO: Mortgage is a continuing guaranty and its intent is to secure galang's future debts, even those
which are incurred after the payment of the tickets. This is evidenced by the clause in the contract that Galang will still
be liable "after each draw".

Held:
It was not specifically mentioned in the mortgage contract that the mortgage will cover future debts. The
petitioner cannot rely on the phrase on the provision that states "after each draw" to secure Galang's future debts.
Therefore, since the subject mortgage is not in the nature of a continuing guaranty and given the automatic
termination thereof, PCSO cannot claim that Galang’s ticket purchases in 1992 are also secured. From the time the
amount of P450,000.00 was fully settled, the subject mortgage had already been cancelled such that Galang’s
subsequent ticket purchases are unsecured. Simply put, PCSO had nothing to register, much less, foreclose.
Consequently, PCSO’s registration of its non-existent mortgage lien and subsequent foreclosure of a mortgage that
was no longer extant cannot defeat New Dagupan’s title over the subject property.

ADB vs TUBLE
677 SCRA 519

FACTS:
Tuble (VP of ADB) availed of the car incentive loan and loan privileges offered by the bank. He was also
entitled to a Senior Managers Deferred Incentive Plan (DIP). He acquired a van through the incentive plan . As to the
loan privileges he acquired 3 separate loans. The first secured by a mortgage upon his property, the second was a
consumption loan and the third was a salary loan. Subsequently he retired from the bank and had the obligation of
returning or purchasing the car and pay his loans. The petitioner however owed Tuble its share on his DIP and his
13th month salary. Respondent claimed offsetting of each others obligation but the bank refused and demanded his
obligations. Subsequently, the bank agreed. Tuble's liabilities were reduced to 970k plus the value of the unreturned
car.
ADB filed for replevin and EJF over the REM and was able to recover the same. Tuble complied and
redeemed the property for 1.3M. Bank unilaterally included annual 18% interest on the bid price of 421k and penalties
and interests as redemption price. He then questioned the validity of the ballooning of the redemption price alleging
that it was unlawful. The bank based the imposition of interest on the dragnet clause in the contract.

Contention of Tuble: The 18% annual interest on the bid price is unlawful
Contention of Bank: 18% is the correct basis of the interest because of the dragnet clause in the contract.
"All obligations of the Borrower and/or Mortgagor, its renewal, extension, amendment or novation irrespective
of whether such obligations as renewed, extended, amended or novated are in the nature of new, separate or additional
obligations;

All other obligations of the Borrower and/or Mortgagor in favor of the Mortgagee, executed before or after the
execution of this document whether presently owing or hereinafter incurred and whether or not arising from or
connection with the aforesaid loan/Credit accommodation; x x x."

Issue: WON the Petitioner is correct

Held: The dragnet clause does not jusitify an imposition of 18% annual interest on the redemption price. There is no
specific mention in the contract of interest to be added in case of either default or redemption. In the absence of a
clear and supportive evidence of a contrary intention, a mortgage containing a dragnet clause will not be extended to
cover future advances, unless the document evidencing the subsequent advance refers to the mortgage providing
security therefor. The second loan which was the consumption loan made no reference to the earlier loan with an
REM. The bank cannot argue that it relied on the previous security in granting the consumption loan. The second
loan (consumption loan) was given was not given as an ordinary loan but as a privelege as the VP.

UBP v. CA
FACTS:
D’Rossa Incorporated (DRI) agreed to mortgage its parcels of land in favor of Union Bank of the Philippines (Union
Bank) as security for the credit facility of Josephine Marine Trading Corporation (JMTC). JMTC availed P3 million from
the credit line. Subsequently, Union Bank increased the credit facility of JMTC to P27 million. Upon JMTC’s failure to
pay its obligation, Union Bank instituted foreclosure proceedings on DRI’s properties. DRI’s properties were auctioned
where Union Bank was declared the highest bidder for P15,300,000.00. DRI filed a supplemental complaint seeking to
declare the public sale as null. It claimed that its liability is only P3 million which was the liability incurred by JMTC
under its first agreement with Union Bank. However, Union Bank alleged that DRI was liable to JMTC’s total
outstanding obligations, regardless of whether it was incurred during or subsequent to the first agreement.

On appeal, the Court of Appeals reversed the decision of the trial court. While it upheld Union Bank’s right to
foreclose, it found that DRI’s mortgage liability is pegged at P3 million and which was later amended and increased to
P8.61 million. It ruled that DRI could not be held liable for more than P8.61 million even if JMTC availed more than
this amount. It also noted that the date of the public sale as contained in the notice varies with the actual date of
sale. As such, it declared as null the foreclosure sale because a foreclosure sale carried out on a day different from
the published notice is a total nullity.

ISSUE: Whether the Court of Appeals erred in holding that the liability of DRI is limited only to P8.61 million

HELD: YES, Dragnet Clause (kahet wag nyo na isulat yung provisions ng mortgage nilagay ko lang para
Makita kung ano yung provisions hehe)

a) All the obligations of the Borrower and/or the Mortgagor under: (i) the Notes, the Agreement and this
Mortgage; (ii) any and all instruments or documents issued upon the renewal, extension, amendment or
novation of the Notes, the Agreement and this Mortgage, irrespective of whether such obligations as renewed,
extended, amended or novated are in the nature of new, separate or additional obligations; and (iii) any and
all instruments or documents issued pursuant to the Notes, the Agreement and this Mortgage;

b) All other obligations of the Borrower and/or the Mortgagor in favor of the Mortgagee, whether presently
owing or hereinafter incurred and whether or not arising from or connected with the Agreement, the Notes
and/or this Mortgage;

The foregoing provisions clearly show the parties’ intent to constitute DRI’s real estate properties as continuing
securities, liable for the current as well as the future obligations of JMTC. Indeed, a mortgage liability is usually
limited to the amount mentioned in the contract, but where the intent of the contracting parties is manifest that
the mortgage property shall also answer for future loans or advancements, the same is valid and binding
between the parties. In this case, DRI expressly agreed to secure all the obligations of JMTC, whether
presently owing or subsequently incurred. Thus, its liability is not limited to P8.61 million only.
Likewise, the evidence presented during the proceedings in the trial court reveal that DRI acknowledged and
consented to the renewal and increase of the credit facilities of JMTC. Thus, by agreeing to secure JMTC’s future
loans or advancements with its real properties, DRI is estopped from questioning the foreclosure proceedings
conducted upon the failure of JMTC to pay its obligations to Union Bank.

Producers Bank v. Excelsa

FACTS:

Producers Bank of the Philippines vs. Excelsa Industries, Inc.,669 SCRA 470

FACTS:
Excelsa obtained a loan from Producers Bank in the form of a bill discounted andsecured credit accommodation in
the amount of P200,000.00, secured by a real estatemortgage over real estate properties. Excelsa extended its loan
by applying for apacking credit line or a credit export advance with petitioner supported by a letter of credit issued by
its Korean buyers. Upon collection, the Korean buyer refused to pay the export documents prompting Prudential Bank
to demand from Excelsa the payment of the peso equivalent of said export documents together with its due and
unpaid loans.Excelsa failed to make the payment. As a result, Prudential Bank extrajudiciallyforeclosed the real
estate mortgage.

The RTC thereafter ordered the consolidation of the two cases and rendered a decision upholding the validity of the
extrajudicial foreclosure and ordering the issuance of a writ of possession in favor of Producers Bank. Excelsa. The
Court of Appeals invalidated the extrajudicial foreclosure of the real estate mortgage on the ground that the posting
and publication of the notice of extrajudicial foreclosure proceedings did not comply with the personal notice
requirement under paragraph 1227 of the real estate mortgage executed between petitioner and respondent. The
Court of Appeals also overturned the RTC’s finding that respondent was guilty of estoppel by laches in questioning
the extrajudicial foreclosure sale.

ISSUE: whether the real estate mortgage also served as security for respondent’s drafts that were not accepted and
paid by the Kwang Ju Bank, Ltd
HELD: Respondent executed a real estate mortgage containing a "blanket mortgage clause," also known as a
"dragnet clause." It has been settled in a long line of decisions that mortgages given to secure future advancements
are valid and legal contracts, and the amounts named as consideration in said contracts do not limit the amount for
which the mortgage may stand as security if from the four corners of the instrument the intent to secure future and
other indebtedness can be gathered.

Petitioner, therefore, was not precluded from seeking the foreclosure of the real estate mortgage based on the unpaid
drafts drawn by respondent. In any case, respondent had admitted that aside from the unpaid drafts, respondent also
had due and demandable loans secured from another account as evidenced by Promissory Notes.

TRADERS V. CASTANARES, 636 SCRA 519

Facts:

Respondent spouses were engaged in the business of exporing shell crfts and other handicrafts. They
obtained from petitioner bank various oans and credit accomodations. The respndents executed two REMs covering
their properties evidenced by PNs. The petioner only released the amount of P35k although the mortgage deeds
indicated the rincipal amounts as P86K and P60K. The respondents failed to pay the loans which prompted the
extrajudicial foreclosure of the REMs.

The respondents argue that the REM covered only a separate loan of P86K which they believed the bank
commited to lend them whereas the . The trial court ruled in favor of the bank; declaring that the evidence clearly
shows that said REM was constituted as security for all PNs. The CA ruled in favor of the respondents in holding the
loan as invalid, which necessarily includes the accessory contract of mortgage. It ruled that the bank failed to deliver
the consideration for which the mortgage was execued because only P35K out of the P86K was released by the said
bank, making the REM valid only to that extent.

Petitioner contends that the CA overlooked the specific stipulation in the REMs that the mortgage extends
not only to the amounts specified therein but also to loans or credits subsequently granted, which include the packing
credits and export advances obtained by the respondents.

Issue: WON the REMs are only partially valid.

Held: NO. The loan and the REMs are valid.

(The subject REMs contain the following provision:

That, for and in consideration of certain loans, overdrafts and other credit accommodations obtained, from
the Mortgagee by the Mortgagor and/or SPS. NORBERTO V. CASTAÑARES & MILAGROS M.
CASTAÑARES and to secure the payment of the same, the principal of all of which is hereby fixed
at EIGHTY-SIX THOUSAND PESOS ONLY – (P86,000.00) Pesos, Philippine Currency, as well as those
that the Mortgagee may hereafter extend to the Mortgagor x x x, including interest and expenses or any
other obligation owing to the Mortgagee, whether direct or indirect, principal or secondary, as appears in the
accounts, books and records of the Mortgagee x x x.)

The above stipulation is also known as "dragnet clause" or "blanket mortgage clause" would subsume all
debts of past and future origins. A reading of the afore-quoted provision of the REMs shows that its terms are broad
enough to cover packing credits and export advances granted by the petitioner to respondents. That the respondents
subsequently availed of letters of credit and export advances in various amounts as reflected in the promissory notes,
buttressed the claim of petitioner that the amounts of P86,000.00 and P60,000.00 stated in the REMs merely
represent the maximum total loans which will be secured by the mortgage. This must be so as respondents confirmed
that the mortgage was constituted for the purpose of obtaining additional capital as dictated by the needs of their
export business.

PREMIERE DEVELOPMENT BANK v. CENTRAL SURETY & INSURANCE COMPANY, INC.

(note: marami nadiscard dahil oblicon yung karamihan at mahaba yung case, basahin niyo na lang kung
gusto niyo at baka ano itanong ni sir gani na hindi credit trans..o_0)

Facts:

Central surety and the owners thereof borrowed P6M ffrom PDB, secured by a deed of assignment and
pledge on some of Central Surety membership, inludinga share in Wack Wack Golf Club(no joke, wack wack).
Central Surety also had other loans outstanding, including P40M to the bank maturing in 2001. Central Surety
defaults, prompting the bank to write a collection letter.Central Surety tender P6M in check, which is at first declined
but was subsequently accepted upon the second tender. The check was supposed to satisfy the P6M loan, but PDB
applied it to other loans. As a result, Central Surety filed a complaint for damages and release of security collateral,
specifically praying that the court render judgment, among others, ordering Premiere Bank to release to Central
Surety its membership certificate of shares in Wack Wack. The trial court ruled in favor Central Surety but was later
reversed by the CA in declaring the shares should not be released.

Central Surety: “The 6M should be applied to the 6M loan makitng it fully paid. Since it is fully paid, the wack wack,
which is the security for that loan, should be released.”
Premiere: “We have the prerogative where to apply the loans, which we did not apply to the 6M loan. So..it’s not yet
paid and we don’t have to release the wack wack. Even if we were to appy it to the 6m loan, the wack wack should
still not be released because of the dragnet clause you agreeed with. ”

Issue: WON Central Surety is entitled to the release of Membership Fee Certificate in the Wack Wack Golf and
Country Club.

(ito lang kasi yung ibang prayers and issues pang oblicon.)

Held: NO. The release of the Wack Wack Membership as the pledged security for hte 6M PN cannot yet be done as
sought by Central Surety.

As held in one case, where deeds absolute in form were executed to secure any and all kinds of
indebtedness that might subsequently become due, a balance due on a note, after exhausting the special security
given for the payment of such note, was in the absence of a special agreement to the contrary, within the protection
of the mortgage, notwithstanding the giving of the special security. This is recognition that while the "dragnet clause"
subsists, the security specifically executed for subsequent loans must first be exhausted before the mortgaged
property can be resorted to so there is a need to respect the existence of the other security given for the other PN .

The chain of contracts concluded between Premiere Bank and Central Surety reveals that the Wack Wack
Membership, which stood as security for the said PN, and which also stands as security for subsequent debts of
Central Surety, is a security in the form of a pledge. Its return to Central Surety upon the pretext that Central Surety is
entitled to pay only the obligation in the 6M PN will result in the extinguishment of the pledge, even with respect to the
subsequent obligations, because Article 2110 of the Civil Code provides:

(I)f the thing pledged is returned by the pledgor or owner, the pledge is extinguished. Any stipulation to the contrary is
void.

This is contrary to the express agreement of the parties, something which Central Surety wants this Court to undo.
We reiterate that, as a rule, courts cannot intervene to save parties from disadvantageous provisions of their
contracts if they consented to the same freely and voluntarily.

Sps. Borommeo vs CA 550 scra 269 G . R . N o . 1 6 9 8 4 6

Mortgagor: Sps Nestor and Nona Borromeo


Mortgagee: Equitable PCI Bank EPCIB now BDO
But Equitable Savings Bank ESB (private respondent) executed the EJ foreclosure

Debt: 4M (own a home loan program)


Mortgaged property: Sps own land of 303 square meters; and the proposed house that was to be built thereon

Facts: Loan documents signed in blank by Spouses but understood to be in favour of EPCIB. Sps. received copies of
the loan documents which they had earlier signed in blank and found out that the Loan Agreement and REM designated
respondent ESB as lender and mortgagor instead.

Contention of petitioner Spouses:


assert that their creditor-mortgagee is EPCIB and not respondent.
Although a wholly-owned subsidiary of EPCIB, has an independent and separate juridical personality from its parent
company. The fact that a corporation owns all of the stocks of another corporation, taken alone, is not sufficient to
justify their being treated as one entity

Contention of ESB:
claims that petitioners have had transactions with it, particularly the five check payments made in the name of ESB

Issue: Is the foreclosure valid?


Ruling: No. Respondent is not the creditor-mortgagee and, therefore, the foreclosure of the property is invalid,
petitioners would be placed in an oppressively unjust situation where they will be tied up in litigation for the recovery of
their property while their debt to the real creditor-mortgagee, EPCIB, would remain unpaid and continue to accrue
interest and other charges.
In case at bar where the identity of the creditor-mortgagor is highly disputable therefore the doctrine on
foreclosure when the debtors are in default of the payment of their obligation is not applicable. Pursuant Article 1311
of CC on privity of contracts, an extrajudicial foreclosure instituted by a third party to the Loan Agreement and the REM
would, therefore, be a violation of petitioners’ rights over their property.
RURAL BANK VS. JEAN VENIEGAS AGTOTO 646 SCRA 288 G.R. No. 175697
Mortgagor: Rodney Agtoto, husband of Jean Veniegas Agtoto (Agtoto) authorized with special power of attorney
(SPA) to secure a loan on her behalf and mortgage

Debt: loan of P130,500.00 divided into

1. the P61,068.00 portion secured by a real estate mortgage on his wife’s land

2. remaining P69,432.00 of the loan with a chattel mortgage over two service boats and one Yanmar Marine
engine.

Mortgagee: Rural Bank of Toboso, Inc. (the Bank)

Facts:After paying only P14,500.00, Agtoto failed to pay her loan with the Bank. Bank extrajudicially foreclosed the
mortgage on her land.

Contention of Agtoto:
contends that the foreclosure sale was void since she did not authorize her husband, Rodney, to act as her attorney-
in-fact for purposes of the foreclosure proceedings.

Contention of Rural Bank: the powers she vested in Rodney as her attorney-in-fact in connection with the mortgage
of her land included the power to constitute the mortgagee bank as Rodney's attorney-in-fact for foreclosure
purposes for, otherwise, the grant to him of the power to enter into a mortgage contract would have been incomplete
in the usual course.

ISSUE: Whether or not the Bank validly foreclosed on Agtoto's mortgaged land.

Ruling: Yes.

The SPA authorized Rodney to make, sign, execute, and deliver contracts, documents, agreements and other
writings of whatever nature or kind, with any person or persons, upon such terms and conditions as were acceptable
to him as attorney-in-fact. The constitution of the Bank as attorney-in-fact for purposes of extrajudicial foreclosure
was a condition that Rodney accepted and it bound Agtoto as principal, the same being a legitimate exercise of his
powers under the SPA.

****puwedeng HINDI isama pero about foreclosure din kasi


[The foreclosure of a real estate mortgage for the whole amount of the loan when the mortgage covered only a part of
it must be returned such to Agtoto, which amounted to P189,497.10 (P305,000.00 less the P115,502.90 portion
covered by the real estate mortgage.) The proceeds of the foreclosure sale should be applied to satisfy only the debt
and related charges that the foreclosed land secured. Since the Bank collected the entire amount of the loan from
the proceeds of the foreclosure sale, including the portion that was not covered by the real estate mortgage, then
excess need be returned.

The Court cannot simply ignore the importance of surplus foreclosure sale proceeds because they stand in
the place of the land itself and are constructively, at least, real property that belongs to the mortgagor. The
foreclosure sale covering the land was valid, notwithstanding the chattel mortgage that covered the P69,432.00
portion of the loan of P130,500.00. The chattel mortgage was a contract distinct from the real estate mortgage, which
latter mortgage covered the separate amount of P61,068.00. Thus, the Bank had no right to include in the
foreclosure of the land the portion of the loan separately secured by the chattel mortgage.]

Asiatrust v. Carmelo Tuble 677 SCRA 519

Carmelo Tuble, who served as VP of Asiatrust Dev’t Bank, acquired a Nissan Vanette through the company’s car
incentive plan and loan privileges, where Tuble also obtained 3 separate loans: 1.) Real estate loan of P421,800 2.)
Consumption loan of 100k and 3.) Salary loan of P16,250. On June 1, 1995, the bank sent Tuble a demand letter. It
also required the respondent to return the Nissan Vanette. Despite demand, the vehicle was not surrendered. The
bank filed a complaint for replevin and extra-judicial foreclosure of the properties. Tuble timely redeemed the
property for P1,318,401.91. Despite his payment of the redemption price, he questioned how the foreclosure basis of
P421, 800 (REM) ballooned to P,1,318, 401.91. Hence, he sought to collect P896,602.02 before the RTC
representing the excess charges on the redemption price. RTC ruled in favor of Tuble. CA affirmed.

Contention of the bank: The 18% interest rate allegedly referred to in the mortgage deed is the proper basis of the
interest. Pointing to the REM Contract, it highlights the blanket security clause or “dragnet clause” that purports to
cover all obligations owned by Tuble.

Issue: WON the bank is entitled to include these items in the redemption price 1) the interest charges on PN no.
0142 and 2) the 18% annual interest in the bid price of P421,800

Held: N0
In Rural Bank of San Mateo v. IAC, the power to decide whether or not to foreclose is the prerogative of the
mortgagee; however, once it has made the decision by filing a petition with the sheriff, the acts of the latter shall
thereafter be governed by the provisions of the mortgage laws and not by the instruction of the mortgagee. In direct
contravention of this ruling, though, the bank included numerous charges and loans in the redemption price, which
inexplicability ballooned to P1,318,401.91. On this error alone, the claims of petitioner covering all the additional
charges should be denied. Thus, the bank cannot impose the 18% annual interest on the redemption price.
Also, the court finds that the REM Contract itself is silent in the computation of the redemption price. Although it refers
to PN as constitutive of Tuble’s secured obligations, the said contract does not state that the interest to be charged in
case of redemption should be what is specified in the PN. In Phil.Banking v.Ca, such silence or omission of addt’l
charges is construed strictly against the bank.

Uypitching v. Quiamco 510 SCRA 172

In 1982, Quaimco was approached by Juan, Davalan, Josefino Gabutero and Raul Generoso to amicably settle the
civil aspect of a criminal case for robbery filed by Quiamco against them. They surrendered to him a red Honda XL-
100 motorcycle and photocopy of its cert.of registration. Resp asked for the original cert. but the three never came to
see him again. The motorcycle was parked in an open space inside respondent’s business establishment, Avesco-
AVNE Enterprises. It turned out that in Oct 1981, the motorcycle had been sold on installment basis to Gabutero by
petitioner. The motorcycle was mortgaged to petitioner. When Gabutero could no longer pay, Davalan assumed
obligations. However, the latter stopped paying and told petitioner that the motorcycle had allegedly been ‘taken by
respondent’s men.’
On Jan 1991, Uypitching accompanied by policemen went to Avesco-AVNE to recover the motorcycle. On learning
that the respondent was not around, Uypitching took the motorcycle. Hence, he filed a criminal complaint for qualified
theft against respondent. Respondent filed an action for damages against petitioners.

Uypitching:
They should not be liable for its exercise of its right as seller-mortgagee to recover the mortgaged vehicle preliminary
to the enforcement of its right to foreclose on the mortgage in case of default.

Issue:
WON the act of Uypitching of taking the motorcycle is correct

Held: No
True, a mortgagee may take steps to recover the mortgaged property to enable it to enforce or protect its foreclosure
right thereon. There is, however, a well-defined procedure of a mortgaged property for its sale on foreclosure, he
must bring a civil action either to recover such possession as a preliminary step to the sale, or to obtain judicial
foreclosure. Petitioner Corporation failed to bring a proper civil action necessary to acquire legal possession of the
motorcycle. Instead, petitioner descended on respondent’s establishment with his policemen and ordered the seizure
of the motorcycle without a search warrant or court order. Worse, in the course of the illegal seizure of the
motorcycle, petitioner even mouthed slanderous statement. (na magnanakaw raw si Quiamco)

CMC V. PLANTERSBANK, 555 S 465


CMC filed a petition to SEC for the suspension of payment for rehabilitation. SEC granted the petition. Subsequently
SEC ordered that CMC be dissolved. PlantersBank, one of the creditors of CMC proceeded to extrajudicially
foreclose the REM constituted by CMC in favor of the bank. CMC maintains that the foreclosure is void because it
was undertaken without the knowledge and previous consent of the liquidator and other lien holders. CMC adds that
the rules on concurrence and preference of credits should apply in foreclosure proceedings.

ISSUE: whether the bank can foreclose the REM.

RULING: YES. If rehabilitation is no longer feasible and the assets of the corporation are finally liquidated, secured
creditors shall enjoy preference over unsecured creditors, subject only to the provisions of the Civil Code on
concurrence and preference of credits.
Moreover, Section 2248 of the Civil Code provides:
Those credits which enjoy preference in relation to specific real property or real rights, exclude all others to the
extent of the value of the immovable or real right to which the preference refers.
In this case, Planters Bank, as a secured creditor, enjoys preference over a specific mortgaged property and has a
right to foreclose the mortgage under Section 2248 of the Civil Code. The creditor-mortgagee has the right to
foreclose the mortgage over a specific real property whether or not the debtor-mortgagor is under insolvency or
liquidation proceedings. The right to foreclose such mortgage is merely suspended upon the appointment of a
management committee or rehabilitation receiver or upon the issuance of a stay order by the trial court. However,
the creditor-mortgagee may exercise his right to foreclose the mortgage upon the termination of the rehabilitation
proceedings or upon the lifting of the stay order.

UNITED V ROSEMOOR, 534 SCRA 528

United Overseas Bank entered into a loan agreement with Rosemoor (mining company). The total amount to be
loaned was around 80M. The loan was secured by a REM. The lands were located in Bulacan and Nueva Ecija. It
was Rosemoor and Dr. Pascual who executed the REM. Rosemoor defaulted and the bank moved for the extra-
judicial foreclosure of the REM. Rosemoor argued that it signed a blank paper that did not indicate any mortgage, so
it filed a case to invalidate the foreclosure in Malolos, Bulacan. The bank filed a motion to dismiss citing improper
venue (specifically against Pascual) since some of the property were situated in Nueva Ecija.

ISSUE: Whether the venue of the case is proper.

RULING: YES. The case is considered a real action involving several lands. Venue lies at any place where any of the
land is situated. Since one of the lands is situated in Bulacan, Bulacan is considered a proper venue.