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THE HEIRS OF PROTACIO GO, SR. and G.R. No.

G.R. No. 157537 Servacio and Rito countered that Protacio, Sr. had exclusively owned the
MARTA BAROLA, namely: LEONOR, property because he had purchased it with his own money. [7]
SIMPLICIO, PROTACIO, JR., ANTONIO,
BEVERLY ANN LORRAINNE, TITA, On October 3, 2002,[8] the RTC declared that the property was the conjugal property
CONSOLACION, LEONORA and . of Protacio, Sr. and Marta, not the exclusive property of Protacio, Sr., because there
ASUNCION, all surnamed GO, represented were three vendors in the sale to Servacio (namely: Protacio, Sr., Rito, and Dina); that
by the participation of Rito and Dina as vendors had been by virtue of their being heirs of
LEONORA B. GO, the late Marta; that under Article 160 of the Civil Code, the law in effect when the
September 7, 2011 property was acquired, all property acquired by either spouse during the marriage was
-versus - conjugal unless there was proof that the property thus acquired pertained exclusively
to the husband or to the wife; and that Protacio, Jr.s renunciation was grossly
ESTER L. SERVACIO and RITO B. GO, insufficient to rebut the legal presumption.[9]

BERSAMIN, J.: Nonetheless, the RTC affirmed the validity of the sale of the property, holding that:
xxx As long as the portion sold, alienated or encumbered will not be allotted to the
The disposition by sale of a portion of the conjugal property by the surviving spouse other heirs in the final partition of the property, or to state it plainly, as long as the
without the prior liquidation mandated by Article 130 of the Family Code is not portion sold does not encroach upon the legitimate (sic) of other heirs, it is
necessarily void if said portion has not yet been allocated by judicial or extrajudicial valid.[10] Quoting Tolentinos commentary on the matter as authority, [11] the RTC
partition to another heir of the deceased spouse. At any rate, the requirement of prior opined:
liquidation does not prejudice vested rights.
In his comment on Article 175 of the New Civil Code regarding the
Antecedents dissolution of the conjugal partnership, Senator Arturo Tolentino,
says [sic]
On February 22, 1976, Jesus B. Gaviola sold two parcels of land with a total area of
17,140 square meters situated in Southern Leyte to Protacio B. Go, Jr. (Protacio, Jr.). Alienation by the survivor. After the death of one of the
Twenty three years later, or on March 29, 1999, Protacio, Jr. executed an Affidavit of spouses, in case it is necessary to sell any portion of the
Renunciation and Waiver,[1] whereby he affirmed under oath that it was his father, community property in order to pay outstanding obligation
Protacio Go, Sr. (Protacio, Sr.), not he, who had purchased the two parcels of land (the of the partnership, such sale must be made in the manner and
property). with the formalities established by the Rules of Court for the
sale of the property of the deceased persons. Any sale, transfer,
On November 25, 1987, Marta Barola Go died. She was the wife of Protacio, Sr. and alienation or disposition of said property affected without said
mother of the petitioners.[2] On December 28, 1999, Protacio, Sr. and his son Rito B. formalities shall be null and void, except as regards the portion
Go (joined by Ritos wife Dina B. Go) sold a portion of the property with an area of that belongs to the vendor as determined in the liquidation and
5,560 square meters to Ester L. Servacio (Servacio) for ₱5,686,768.00.[3] On March 2, partition. Pending the liquidation, the disposition must be
2001, the petitioners demanded the return of the property, [4] but Servacio refused to considered as limited only to the contingent share or interest of
heed their demand. After barangay proceedings failed to resolve the dispute, [5] they the vendor in the particular property involved, but not to the
sued Servacio and Rito in the Regional Trial Court in Maasin City, Southern Leyte corpus of the property.
(RTC) for the annulment of the sale of the property.
This rule applies not only to sale but also to mortgages. The
The petitioners averred that following Protacio, Jr.s renunciation, the property became alienation, mortgage or disposal of the conjugal property
conjugal property; and that the sale of the property to Servacio without the prior without the required formality, is not however, null ab initio,
liquidation of the community property between Protacio, Sr. and Marta was null and for the law recognizes their validity so long as they do not
void.[6] exceed the portion which, after liquidation and partition, should

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pertain to the surviving spouse who made the contract.
[underlining supplied] The appeal lacks merit.

It seems clear from these comments of Senator Arturo Tolentino on Article 130 of the Family Code reads:
the provisions of the New Civil Code and the Family Code on the
alienation by the surviving spouse of the community property that Article 130. Upon the termination of the marriage by death,
jurisprudence remains the same - that the alienation made by the the conjugal partnership property shall be liquidated in the same
surviving spouse of a portion of the community property is not proceeding for the settlement of the estate of the deceased.
wholly void ab initiodespite Article 103 of the Family Code, and
shall be valid to the extent of what will be allotted, in the final If no judicial settlement proceeding is instituted, the
partition, to the vendor. And rightly so, because why invalidate the surviving spouse shall liquidate the conjugal partnership property
sale by the surviving spouse of a portion of the community property either judicially or extra-judicially within one year from the death of
that will eventually be his/her share in the final partition? Practically the deceased spouse. If upon the lapse of the six month period no
there is no reason for that view and it would be absurd. liquidation is made, any disposition or encumbrance involving the
conjugal partnership property of the terminated marriage shall be
Now here, in the instant case, the 5,560 square meter portion of the void.
17,140 square-meter conjugal lot is certainly mush (sic) less than
what vendors Protacio Go and his son Rito B. Go will eventually get Should the surviving spouse contract a subsequent marriage
as their share in the final partition of the property. So the sale is still without compliance with the foregoing requirements, a mandatory
valid. regime of complete separation of property shall govern the property
relations of the subsequent marriage.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, complaint is hereby
DISMISSED without pronouncement as to cost and damages. Article 130 is to be read in consonance with Article 105 of the Family Code, viz:

SO ORDERED.[12] Article 105. In case the future spouses agree in the marriage
The RTCs denial of their motion for reconsideration[13] prompted the petitioners to settlements that the regime of conjugal partnership of gains shall
appeal directly to the Court on a pure question of law. govern their property relations during marriage, the provisions in
this Chapter shall be of supplementary application.
Issue
The provisions of this Chapter shall also apply to conjugal
The petitioners claim that Article 130 of the Family Code is the applicable law; and partnerships of gains already established between spouses
that the sale by Protacio, Sr., et al. to Servacio was void for being made without prior before the effectivity of this Code, without prejudice to vested
liquidation. rights already acquired in accordance with the Civil Code or
other laws, as provided in Article 256. (n) [emphasis supplied]
In contrast, although they have filed separate comments, Servacio and Rito
both argue that Article 130 of the Family Code was inapplicable; that the want of the It is clear that conjugal partnership of gains established before and after the
liquidation prior to the sale did not render the sale invalid, because the sale was valid effectivity of the Family Code are governed by the rules found in Chapter 4 (Conjugal
to the extent of the portion that was finally allotted to the vendors as his share; and that Partnership of Gains) of Title IV (Property Relations Between Husband And Wife) of
the sale did not also prejudice any rights of the petitioners as heirs, considering that the Family Code. Hence, any disposition of the conjugal property after the dissolution
what the sale disposed of was within the aliquot portion of the property that the vendors of the conjugal partnership must be made only after the liquidation; otherwise, the
were entitled to as heirs.[14] disposition is void.

Ruling

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Before applying such rules, however, the conjugal partnership of gains must not present any public document on the allocation among her heirs, including
be subsisting at the time of the effectivity of the Family Code. There being no dispute themselves, of specific shares in Martas estate. Neither did they aver that the conjugal
that Protacio, Sr. and Marta were married prior to the effectivity of the Family Code on properties had already been liquidated and partitioned. Accordingly, pending a
August 3, 1988, their property relation was properly characterized as one of conjugal partition among the heirs of Marta, the efficacy of the sale, and whether the extent of
partnership governed by the Civil Code. Upon Martas death in 1987, the conjugal the property sold adversely affected the interests of the petitioners might not yet be
partnership was dissolved, pursuant to Article 175 (1) of the Civil Code,[15] and an properly decided with finality. The appropriate recourse to bring that about is to
implied ordinary co-ownership ensued among Protacio, Sr. and the other heirs of commence an action for judicial partition, as instructed in Bailon-Casilao v. Court of
Marta with respect to her share in the assets of the conjugal partnership pending a Appeals,[23] to wit:
liquidation following its liquidation.[16] The ensuing implied ordinary co-ownership
was governed by Article 493 of the Civil Code,[17] to wit: From the foregoing, it may be deduced that since a co-owner is
entitled to sell his undivided share, a sale of the entire property by one co-
Article 493. Each co-owner shall have the full ownership of his part owner without the consent of the other co-owners is not null and void.
and of the fruits and benefits pertaining thereto, and he may therefore However, only the rights of the co-owner-seller are transferred, thereby
alienate, assign or mortgage it, and even substitute another person in its making the buyer a co-owner of the property.
enjoyment, except when personal rights are involved. But the effect of the
alienation or the mortgage, with respect to the co-owners, shall be limited to The proper action in cases like this is not for the nullification of the
the portion which may be allotted to him in the division upon the termination sale or for the recovery of possession of the thing owned in common from
of the co-ownership. (399) the third person who substituted the co-owner or co-owners who alienated
their shares, but the DIVISION of the common property as if it continued to
Protacio, Sr., although becoming a co-owner with his children in respect of Martas remain in the possession of the co-owners who possessed and administered
share in the conjugal partnership, could not yet assert or claim title to any specific it [Mainit v. Bandoy, supra].
portion of Martas share without an actual partition of the property being first done
either by agreement or by judicial decree. Until then, all that he had was an ideal or Thus, it is now settled that the appropriate recourse of co-owners
abstract quota in Martas share.[18] Nonetheless, a co-owner could sell his undivided in cases where their consent were not secured in a sale of the entire
share; hence, Protacio, Sr. had the right to freely sell and dispose of his undivided property as well as in a sale merely of the undivided shares of some of
interest, but not the interest of his co-owners.[19] Consequently, the sale by Protacio, the co-owners is an action for PARTITION under Rule 69 of the
Sr. and Rito as co-owners without the consent of the other co-owners was not Revised Rules of Court. xxx[24]
necessarily void, for the rights of the selling co-owners were thereby effectively
transferred, making the buyer (Servacio) a co-owner of Martas share.[20] This result In the meanwhile, Servacio would be a trustee for the benefit of the co-heirs
conforms to the well-established principle that the binding force of a contract must be of her vendors in respect of any portion that might not be validly sold to her. The
recognized as far as it is legally possible to do so (quando res non valet ut ago, valeat following observations of Justice Paras are explanatory of this result, viz:
quantum valere potest).[21]
xxx [I]f it turns out that the property alienated or mortgaged really
Article 105 of the Family Code, supra, expressly provides that the would pertain to the share of the surviving spouse, then said
applicability of the rules on dissolution of the conjugal partnership is without prejudice transaction is valid. If it turns out that there really would be, after
to vested rights already acquired in accordance with the Civil Code or other laws. This liquidation, no more conjugal assets then the whole transaction
provision gives another reason not to declare the sale as entirely void. Indeed, such a is null and void. But if it turns out that half of the property thus
declaration prejudices the rights of Servacio who had already acquired the shares of alienated or mortgaged belongs to the husband as his share in the
Protacio, Sr. and Rito in the property subject of the sale. conjugal partnership, and half should go to the estate of the wife,
then that corresponding to the husband is valid, and that
In their separate comments,[22] the respondents aver that each of the heirs had corresponding to the other is not. Since all these can be determined
already received a certain allotted portion at the time of the sale, and that Protacio, Sr. only at the time the liquidation is over, it follows logically that a
and Rito sold only the portions adjudicated to and owned by them. However, they did disposal made by the surviving spouse is not void ab initio. Thus, it

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has been held that the sale of conjugal properties cannot be made by REYNALDO BALOLOY/ADELINA BALOLOY-HIJE vs. ALFREDO HULAR
the surviving spouse without the legal requirements. The sale is void G.R. No. 157767 September 9, 2004
as to the share of the deceased spouse (except of course as to that CALLEJO, SR., J.:
portion of the husbands share inherited by her as the surviving
spouse). The buyers of the property that could not be validly sold Before us is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of
become trustees of said portion for the benefit of the husbands other Court, as amended, of the Decision[1] of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No.
heirs, the cestui que trust ent. Said heirs shall not be barred by 51081, which affirmed the Decision[2] of the Regional Trial Court of Sorsogon, Branch
prescription or by laches (See Cuison, et al. v. Fernandez, et al.,L- 51, in Civil Case No. 93-5871.
11764, Jan.31, 1959.)[25]
WHEREFORE, we DENY the petition for review on certiorari; The antecedents are as follows:
and AFFIRM the decision of the Regional Trial Court.
On May 11, 1993, respondent Alfredo Hular filed a complaint for quieting of title of
real property with damages against the children and heirs of Iluminado Baloloy,
namely, Anacorita, Antonio, and petitioners Reynaldo and Adelina, all surnamed
Baloloy. The respondent alleged, inter alia, in his complaint that his father, Astrologo
Hular, was the owner of a parcel of residential land located in Sitio Page, Biriran,
Juban, Sorsogon, with an area of 287 square meters, and that such lot was part of Lot
No. 3347 of the Juban Cadastre. The respondent alleged that Iluminado Baloloy, the
petitioners predecessor-in-interest, was able to secure a Free Patent over the property
through fraud on March 1, 1968, on the basis of which the Register of Deeds issued
Original Certificate of Title (OCT) No. P-16540 in his name. The respondent later
discovered that in the cadastral survey of lands in Juban, the property of his father,
which actually consisted of 1,405 square meters was made to form part of Lot No.
3353, the property of Iluminado Baloloy. According to the respondent, even if the
residential land was made to form part of Lot No. 3353 registered under the name of
Iluminado Baloloy, he had acquired ownership of the property by acquisitive
prescription, as he and his predecessors had been in continuous, uninterrupted and
open possession of the property in the concept of owners for more than 60 years.

The respondent prayed for alternative reliefs that, after due hearing, judgment
be rendered in his favor, thus:

a) Declaring the plaintiff as the absolute owner of the land in question;

b) Ordering the defendants to perpetually refrain from disturbing plaintiff


in his peaceful possession in the land in question;

c) Ordering the defendants to remove their houses in the land in question,


and to declare OCT No. P-16540, and whatever paper, form, document
or proceeding the defendants may have, as null and void and without any
effect whatsoever as far as the land in question is concerned as they cast
cloud upon the title of the plaintiff;

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d) In the alternative, defendants be ordered to reconvey the title in favor 4,651 square meters. He declared the property under his name under Tax Declaration
of the plaintiff as far as the land in question is concerned; No. 191 with the following boundaries: North: Lot No. 3353 (portion) Alejandro
Gruta; South: trail; East: creek; West: Lot No. 3349.[8]
e) Ordering the defendants to jointly and severally pay the plaintiff the
amount of P50,000.00 as moral damages; P5,000.00 as attorneys fee On June 4, 1951, Balbedina executed a Deed of Absolute Sale over Lot No.
plus P500.00 for every appearance or hearing of his lawyer in 3353 with an area of only 4,651 square meters in favor of Iluminado. [9] The latter
court; P1,500.00 as consultation fee; P5,000.00 as incidental litigation declared the property in his name under Tax Declaration No. 5359. [10] Iluminado filed
expenses; P20,000.00 as exemplary damages; and to pay the costs. an application with the Bureau of Lands for a free patent over the entirety of Lot No.
3353 on January 5, 1960.[11] He indicated in his application that the property was not
Plaintiff further prays for such other relief [as are] just and equitable in the occupied by any person and was disposable or alienable public land. In support
premises.[3] thereof, he executed an affidavit wherein he declared that he purchased about one-half
portion of the property in 1951 based on a deed of absolute sale attached to said
The Evidence of the Respondent affidavit; that in 1957, he purchased the other one-half portion, but for economic
The respondent adduced evidence that the Spouses Lino and Victoriana reasons, no deed of sale was executed by the parties. He also alleged that the
Estopin were the original owners of a parcel of land located in Barangay Biriran, improvements on the land consisted of coconut trees. [12] The Bureau of Lands
Juban, Sorsogon, designated as Lot No. 3347 of the Juban Cadastre. A major portion processed the application in due course.
of the property, where a house of strong materials was constructed, was agricultural,
while the rest was residential. The respondent also averred that the Spouses Estopin In the meantime, Iluminado constructed his house on a portion of Lot No. 3353 near
declared the property in their names under Tax Declaration No. 4790. On the north of the trail (road) leading to Biriran. He and his family, including his children, forthwith
the agricultural portion of the property was the road leading to Biriran, while north of resided in said house.
the residential portion was a creek (canal) and the property of Iluminado.
On March 1, 1968, the Secretary of Agricultural and Natural Resources
When Lino Estopin died intestate, his widow, Victoriana Lagata, executed a approved Iluminados application and issued Free Patent No. 384019 covering Lot No.
Deed of Absolute Sale[4] on November 11, 1961 over the agricultural portion of Lot 3353 with an area of 9,302 square meters, on the basis of which OCT No. P-16540
No. 3347, which had an area of 15,906 square meters, more or less, in favor of was thereafter issued by the Register of Deeds on March 1, 1968. [13]
Astrologo Hular, married to Lorenza Hular. Shortly thereafter, on November 25, 1961,
Lagata executed a Deed of Absolute Sale[5] over the residential portion of the property On August 2, 1975, Alejandro Gruta had executed a deed of absolute sale
with an area of 287 square meters, including the house constructed thereon, in favor over a portion of Lot No. 3353 with an area of 4,651 square meters in favor of Estelito
of Hular. Hular and his family, including his son, the respondent, then resided in the Hije, the husband of petitioner Adelina Baloloy, one of Iluminados children.[14]
property. In 1961 or thereabouts, Iluminado asked Hulars permission to construct a
house on a portion of Lot No. 3347 near the road, and the latter agreed. In l977, Before he left for employment in Saudi Arabia in 1979, respondent Hular had his house
Lorenza Hular, wife of Astrologo, declared the residential land in the latters name constructed near the trail (road) on Lot No. 3347, which, however, occupied a big
under Tax Declaration No. 6841.[6] portion of Lot No. 3353.[15]

Earlier, or on August 14, 1945, Irene Griarte had executed a Deed of Absolute Sale Iluminado died intestate on November 29, 1985. His widow and their children
over a coconut land located in Barangay Biriran, Juban, with an area of 6,666 square continued residing in the property, while petitioner Reynaldo Baloloy, one of
meters in favor of Martiniano Balbedina, with the following boundaries: North, Iluminados children, later constructed his house near that of his deceased father. When
Alejandro Gruta; South, Lino Estopin; East, River Page; West, Pedro Grepal and Astrologo died intestate on December 25, 1989, he was survived by his children, Jose,
Esteban Grepal.[7] Subsequently, after a cadastral survey was conducted on lands in Romeo, Anacleto, Elena, Leo, Teresita, and the respondent, among others, [16] who
Juban, the property of Balbedina was designated as Lot No. 3353, with the following continued to reside in their house.[17]
boundaries: North: Lot No. 3353 (portion), Alejandro Gruta; South: Lino Estopin; Sometime in l991, the respondents house helper was cleaning the backyard,
West: Lot No. 3349; East: creek. A trail was then established between Lot No. 3353 but was prevented from doing so by petitioner Adelina Baloloy who claimed that their
and Lot No. 3347 resulting in the decrease of Lot No. 3353 owned by Balbedina to father Iluminado owned the land where the respondents house was located. To

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determine the veracity of the claim, the respondent had Lot No. 3353 surveyed by Sometime in 1982, Hular asked permission from Iluminado to construct his
Geodetic Engineer Rodolfo Cunanan on February 16, 1993, in the presence of house on Lot No. 3353 near the road leading to Biriran. Iluminado agreed, in the
Balbedina, Antonio Baloloy and petitioner Reynaldo Baloloy.Cunanan prepared a presence of his daughter, petitioner Adelina Baloloy. As per the plan of Lot No. 3353
Special Sketch Plan of Lot No. 3353[18] showing that the house of Iluminado was certified by a Director of the Bureau of Lands on November 6, 1961, Lot No. 3353
constructed on Lot No. 3353[19] near the road behind the houses owned by Astrologo had an area of 9,302 square meters.[23]
and Alfredo.[20] The engineer discovered that the residential area deeded by Lagata to
Hular had an area of 1,405 square meters, instead of 287 square meters only. [21] As gleaned from the Sketch Plan of Lot Nos. 3347 and 3353 prepared on
February 7, 1991 by Geodetic Engineer Salvador Balilo, the houses of the Baloloy
In their Answer to the complaint, the heirs of Iluminado Baloloy averred that siblings and those of Astrologo and Alfredo were located in Lot No. 3353. [24] In the
Iluminados house was built in 1962 on a portion of Lot No. 3353, which the latter said sketch plan, Lot No. 3353 had an area of 9,302 square meters, while Lot No. 3347
purchased from Balbedina, and not on a portion of Lot No. 3347 which Hular had an area of 15,905 square meters. When apprised of Hulars claim over the property,
purchased from Lagata. They alleged that Hular constructed his house on a portion of the petitioners and their co-heirs filed a complaint for unlawful detainer with the
Lot No. 3353 after securing the permission of their father Iluminado, and that the Municipal Trial Court of Juban, docketed as Civil Case No. 331. The case was,
respondent had no cause of action for the nullification of Free Patent No. 384019 and however, dismissed for lack of jurisdiction.
OCT No. P-16540 because only the State, through the Office of the Solicitor General,
may file a direct action to annul the said patent and title; and even if the respondent On December 4, 1995, the trial court rendered judgment in favor of the
was the real party in interest to file the action, such actions had long since respondent. The fallo of the decision reads:
prescribed. The heirs of Baloloy prayed that judgment be rendered in their favor, thus:
WHEREFORE, it is most respectfully prayed of the Honorable Court to a/ Declaring plaintiff the absolute owner of the land in question, consisting
DISMISS this case pursuant to paragraph 15, et seq., hereof, and/or DECIDE of 1,405 square meters, more or less, and entitled to the peaceful
it in favor of the defendants by UPHOLDING the sanctity of OCT No. P- possession thereof;
16540 and ordering plaintiff to:
b/ Ordering the defendants to reconvey the title to the plaintiff as far as the
1. RESPECT defendants proprietary rights and interests on the property in land in question is concerned within fifteen (15) days counted from
question covered by OCT No. P-16540; the finality of the decision, failing in which, the Clerk of Court is
2. VACATE it at his sole and exclusive expense, and never to set foot on hereby ordered to execute the necessary document of reconveyance
it ever again; of the title in favor of the plaintiff after an approved survey plan is
3. PAY defendants: made;
a) MORAL DAMAGES at P50,000.00 EACH;
b) ACTUAL DAMAGES and UNREALIZED PROFITS c/ Ordering defendants to remove their houses from the land in question at
at P1,000.00/MONTH COMPUTED UP TO THE TIME OF their own expense within fifteen (15) days after the decision has
PAYMENT PLUS LEGAL RATE OF INTEREST; become final;
c) EXEMPLARY DAMAGES of P50,000.00
d) ATTYS FEES and LITIGATION EXPENSES d/ Ordering the defendants to pay jointly and severally plaintiff the amount
of P100,000.00; and of P5,000.00 as attorneys fees. P5,000.00 as incidental litigation
e) THE COSTS OF THIS SUIT. expenses;

DEFENDANTS pray for all other reliefs and remedies consistent e/ To pay the costs.
with law and equity.[22]
SO ORDERED.[25]
The Evidence for the Petitioners
The trial court ruled that the property subject of the complaint, with an area
of 1,405 square meters, was part of Lot No. 3347 which the Spouses Estopin

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owned, and which they later sold to Astrologo Hular. The trial court parents died intestate, they were survived by their children, the respondent and his
also held that Iluminado committed fraud in securing the free patent and the siblings Elena, Jose, Romeo, Anacleto, Leo, and Teresita. Article 1078 of the Civil
title for the property in question, and that when Victoriana Lagata executed Code provides that where there are two or more heirs, the whole estate of the decedent
the deed of absolute sale on the residential portion of Lot No. 3347, she did is, before partition, owned in common by such heirs, subject to the payment of the
not know that it formed part of Lot No. 3353. It further held that the action of debts of the deceased. Until a division is made, the respective share of each cannot be
the plaintiff to nullify the title and patent was imprescriptible. determined and every co-owner exercises, together with his co-participants, joint
The petitioners filed on December 8, 1995 a motion to reopen the case to admit Tax ownership over the pro indiviso property, in addition to the use and enjoyment of the
Declaration Nos. 6957 and 4790 covering Lot No. 3347, under the names of Astrologo same.
Hular and Victoriana Lagata, respectively, in which it was declared that Lot No. 3347
was coconut land. The trial court ruled that the motion had been mooted by its Under Article 487 of the New Civil Code, any of the co-owners may bring an
decision. action in ejectment. This article covers all kinds of actions for the recovery of
possession, including an accion publiciana and a reinvidicatory action. A co-owner
On appeal, the Court of Appeals rendered judgment affirming the decision of the trial may bring such an action without the necessity of joining all the other co-owners as
court, and thereafter denied the motion for reconsideration thereof. co-plaintiffs because the suit is deemed to be instituted for the benefit of all. [27] Any
judgment of the court in favor of the co-owner will benefit the others but if such
The Present Petition judgment is adverse, the same cannot prejudice the rights of the unimpleaded co-
The petitioners, who are still residing on the subject property, filed their owners. If the action is for the benefit of the plaintiff alone who claims to be the sole
petition for review on certiorari for the reversal of the decision and resolution of the owner and entitled to the possession thereof, the action will not prosper unless he
Court of Appeals. impleads the other co-owners who are indispensable parties.

The issues for resolution are: In this case, the respondent alone filed the complaint, claiming sole
ownership over the subject property and praying that he be declared the sole owner
(1) whether all the indispensable parties had been impleaded by the thereof. There is no proof that the other co-owners had waived their rights over the
respondent in the trial court; subject property or conveyed the same to the respondent or such co-owners were aware
(2) whether the said respondent had a cause of action against the petitioners of the case in the trial court. The trial court rendered judgment declaring the respondent
for the nullification of Free Patent No. 384019 and OCT No. P-16540; for as the sole owner of the property and entitled to its possession, to the prejudice of the
reconveyance and for possession of the subject property; and for damages; and latters siblings. Patently then, the decision of the trial court is erroneous.
(3) whether the respondent had acquired ownership over the property through
acquisitive prescription. Under Section 7, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court, the respondent was mandated
to implead his siblings, being co-owners of the property, as parties. The respondent
The first issue, while not raised by the parties in the trial court and in the Court of failed to comply with the rule. It must, likewise, be stressed that the Republic of the
Appeals, is so interwoven with the other issues raised therein and is even decisive of Philippines is also an indispensable party as defendant because the respondent sought
the outcome of this case; hence, such issue must be delved into and resolved by this the nullification of OCT No. P-16540 which was issued based on Free Patent No.
Court.[26] 384019. Unless the State is impleaded as party-defendant, any decision of the Court
would not be binding on it. It has been held that the absence of an indispensable party
We note that the action of the respondent in the trial court is for: (a) reinvidicatoria, in a case renders ineffective all the proceedings subsequent to the filing of the
to declare the respondent the absolute owner of the subject property and its complaint including the judgment.[28] The absence of the respondents siblings, as
reconveyance to him as a consequence of the nullification of Free Patent No. 384019 parties, rendered all proceedings subsequent to the filing thereof, including the
and OCT No. P-16540; (b) publiciana, to order the petitioners and the other heirs of judgment of the court, ineffective for want of authority to act, not only as to the absent
Iluminado Baloloy to vacate the property and deliver possession thereof to him; and parties but even as to those present.[29]
(c) damages and attorneys fees.
It is the contention of the respondent that the subject property was sold by
Lagata to his father, Astrologo Hular, in 1961. He adduced evidence that when his

CO-OWNERSHIP 7
Even if we glossed over the procedural lapses of the respondent, we rule that The trial and appellate courts erred in their decisions.
he failed to prove the material allegations of his complaint against the petitioners; and
that he is not entitled to the reliefs prayed for. The evidence on record shows that Irene Griarte owned a parcel of land with
The burden of proof is on the plaintiff to establish his case by the an area of 6,666 square meters, more or less. [35] When she sold the property to
requisite quantum of evidence. If he claims a right granted as created by law or under Martiniano Balbedina on August 14, 1945, it was bounded on the south by the property
a contract of sale, he must prove his claim by competent evidence. He must rely on the of Lino Estopin. There was no trail yet between the property of Griarte on the south
strength of his own evidence and not on the weakness or absence of the evidence of and of Lino Estopin on the north. In the
that of his opponent.[30] He who claims a better right to real estate property must prove meantime, however, a road (trail) leading to Biriran was established between the
not only his ownership of the same but also the identity thereof. [31] In Huy v. property of Balbedina on the south and that of Lino Estopin on the north.Thereafter, a
Huy,[32] we held that where a property subject of controversy is duly registered under cadastral survey of the lands in Juban was conducted by the Bureau of Lands. The
the Torrens system, the presumptive conclusiveness of such title should be given property of Balbedina was designated as a portion of Lot No. 3353, while that of
weight and in the absence of strong and compelling evidence to the contrary, the holder Estopin was designated as Lot No. 3347. The other portion of Lot No. 3353, with an
thereof should be considered as the owner of the property until his title is nullified or area of 4,561 square meters, belonged to Alejandro Gruta. Because of the construction
modified in an appropriate ordinary action. A Torrens Certificate is evidence of an of the road, the property of Balbedina, which was a part of Lot No. 3353, was reduced
indefeasible title to property in favor of the person in whose name appears to 4,651 square meters. Balbedina declared, under Tax Declaration No. 391, that Lot
therein.[33] Such holder is entitled to the possession of the property until his title is No. 3353 had an area of 4,651 square meters and was coconut land [36] and that his
nullified. property was bounded on the south by a trail (road). Lino Estopin declared Lot No.
3347 under his name for taxation purposes, in which he stated that his property was
The petitioners aver that Lot No. 3347 owned by the Spouses Estopin was bounded on the north by the trail going to Biriran.[37] Clearly, then, Lot No. 3353 and
coconut, and not residential, land. The petitioners contend that, under the deed of Lot No. 3347 had a common boundary the trail (road) going to Biriran.
absolute sale, Victoriana Lagata executed on November 25, 1961 in favor of Astrologo
Hular, she sold the residential portion of Lot No. 3347; however, the latter constructed Balbedina sold his property, which was a portion of Lot No. 3353, with an
his house on a portion of Lot No. 3353 which Iluminado had purchased from area of 4,651 square meters to Iluminado Baloloy on June 4, 1951. [38] Under the deed
Balbedina, now covered by OCT No. P-16540. The petitioners assert that along with of absolute sale, the property was bounded on the south by the trail (road) owned by
their mother Anacorita and their brother Antonio Baloloy, they constructed their Lino Estopin.[39] The English translation of the deed of sale attached as page 85 to the
houses on a part of Lot No. 3353, titled in the name of their father Iluminado; hence, RTC Records, which both the trial court and the appellate court relied upon, is
they could not be dispossessed of the said property. The petitioners posit that, whether incorrect.
the house of Hular was constructed on a portion of Lot No. 3353 of the property of The original deed of absolute sale, which is in Spanish, states that the
Balbedina or Gruta is irrelevant because both properties are now covered boundary of the property on the south is con camino, Lino Estopin, while the English
by OCT No. P-16540 under the name of Iluminado, their predecessor-in-interest. version of the deed, indicates that the property is bounded on the south by Lino
Estopin. Being an earlier document, the deed in Spanish signed by the parties therefore
The Court of Appeals ruled that Victoriana Lagata owned the subject should prevail. Conformably to such deed, Iluminado Baloloy declared in Tax
property, which turned out to be 1,405 square meters, and sold the same to Hular. In Declaration No. 5359 under his name that the property is bounded on the south by a
contrast, the RTC declared in its decision that while under the deed of absolute sale trail,[40] and not by Lot No. 3347 owned by Lino Estopin.
executed by Irene Griarte in favor of Balbedina, Lot No. 3353 had an area of 6,666
square meters, Griarte actually owned only 4,651 square meters; a portion of the lot The respondent failed to adduce any documentary evidence to prove how the
was actually owned by Lino Estopin. Hence, Balbedina sold only 4,651 square meters Spouses Estopin acquired the disputed property. The respondents reliance on the
to Iluminado[34] because he was aware that he owned only 4,651 square meters of the testimonies of Melissa Estopin, the daughter of the Spouses Estopin, and on Porfirio
land. It also held that, unknown to Lagata, a portion of Lot No. 3347 was declared as Guamos as well as the May 8, 1993 Affidavit of Martiniano Balbedina, and the deed
part of Lot No. 3353 when the lands in Juban were surveyed. The trial court concluded of sale executed by Victoriana Lagata on November 27, 1961 in favor of Astrologo
that Lagata erroneously declared, under the deed of absolute sale executed on Hular to corroborate his claim over the lot in question, is misplaced.
November 25, 1961 in favor of Hular, that the property was part of Lot No. 3347.

CO-OWNERSHIP 8
First. Per the testimony of Porfirio Guamos, the witness of the respondent,
Lino Estopin purchased the disputed property in 1941 from Irene Griarte and insisted Q How was it used when you did not see that document?
that there was a deed of sale evidencing the sale: A When the deed of sale was executed I did not see the document, but I insist
there was a document.
Atty. Dealca:
Q The area of the land in question is 1,405 sq. m., you claim that way back Q Thats why, how were you able to say before the court that there was a
in 1944 the owner of the land was Lino Estopin; 41 to 44? document when you contend that you did not see any?
A 1941. A There was basis in the sale the sale was based on a document. You cannot
sell a property without document? (sic)
Q And you said that Lino Estopin was able to acquire the land by purchase?
A That was very long time when Lino Estopin sold the property. Q Is that your belief?
A Yes, Sir.
Q My question is whether you know because you testified earlier that Lino
Estopin was able to acquire the land by purchase; do you confirm Q But you did not see any document?
that?
A Yes, Sir. Atty. Diesta:

Q From whom? Already answered.


A From Irene Griarte.
Witness:
Q Were you present when that sale was consummated?
A I was not there. A I did not see.

Q So you do not know how much was it bought by Lino Estopin from Irene
Griarte?
A No, Sir. Atty. Dealca:

Q You do not know whether a document to that effect was actually drafted Q You said that that document was used when the property was sold by Lino
and executed? Estopin to Alfredo Hular. . .
A There was. A In 1961. Yes.[41]

Q Have you seen the document? However, the respondent failed to adduce in evidence the said deed or even
A I did not see but there was a document. an authentic copy thereof. The respondent did not offer any justification for his failure
Q You maintain there was a document but you did not see a document, is that to adduce the same in evidence. As against the respondents verbal claim that his father
it? acquired the property from Lagata, the Torrens title of Iluminado Baloloy must
A In my belief there was a document. prevail.[42]
Second. The respondent even failed to adduce in evidence any tax
Q In your belief, how did you organize that belief when you did not see a declarations over the disputed property under the name of Irene Griarte and/or Lino
document? Estopin, or realty tax payment receipts in their names from 1941 to November 1961.
A I insist there was a document. The documents are circumstantial evidence to prove that Irene Griarte claimed
ownership over the disputed property and that Lino Estopin acquired the same from
Q That is why, why are you insisting when you did not see a document? her. After all, such tax declarations and tax receipts can be strong evidence of
A Well, during the sale that document was used.

CO-OWNERSHIP 9
ownership of land when accompanied by possession for a period sufficient for determined and known that Lot No. 2623 is bounded on the northeast,
acquisitive prescription.[43] southeast, southwest and west by Lot No. 4443 (as we have seen in our
narration of facts, the subject lot is a subdivision lot of Lot No. 6552 which
Third. The respondent even failed to adduce in evidence Tax Declaration No. 4790 was originally identified as Lot No. 4443-B-1, Dipolog Cadastre 85 Ext.:
covering the two parcels of land under the name of Lino Estopin to prove his claim hence, the subject lot is a portion of Lot No. 4443); and (4) O.C.T. No. 0-357
that Lot No. 3347 consisted of agricultural and residential lands. We note that the was issued on October 11, 1965 on the strength of the judgment rendered on
petitioners appended a certified true copy of Tax Declaration No. 4790 under the name July 31 (sic), 1941 by the then Court of First Instance of Zamboanga del Norte
of Victoriana Lagata over Lot No. 3347 to their Motion to Reopen the Case. In the in Cadastral Case No. 6, LRC Cadastral Record No. 756.
said declaration, Lot No. 3347 was described as coconut land; this is contrary to the
respondents claim that the said lot was then residential, and that the boundary of the From the foregoing facts, we find that as early as January, 1923 when the
property on the north was the road to Biriran which, in turn, is consistent with the cadastral survey was started, the boundaries of Lot Nos. 2623 and 4443 were
petitioners claim.[44] Unfortunately, the trial court denied the said motion on the ground already determined and delineated. Since the subject lot was surveyed to be
that it was mooted by its decision. part of Lot No. 4443, it means that during that time defendants predecessors-
in-interest never claimed ownership or possession over the subject
Fourth. During the cadastral survey of lands in Juban, the lot of Gruta and that of lot. Otherwise, they would have complained so that the subject lot could be
Balbedina, inclusive of the subject property, were designated as Lot No. 3353 with a excluded from Lot No. 4443 and included in Lot No. 2623, they being
total area of 9,302 square meters under their names, while that of Lino Estopin was adjacent lots. It is obvious then that defendants predecessors only claimed
designated as Lot No. 3347 with an area of 15,906 square meters.Iluminado Baloloy Lot No. 2623 and they pursued their claim in Cadastral Case No. 6, LRC
applied for a free patent over Lot No. 3353, including the disputed property, under his Cadastral Record No. 756 until O.C.T. No. 0-357 was issued to them. The
name. The respondent failed to adduce any evidence that the Spouses Estopin and/or contention of defendants that they and their predecessors-in-interest occupied
Astrologo Hular opposed Balbedina and/or Iluminados claim of ownership of Lot No. and possessed the subject lot since time immemorial therefore is not true.[46]
3353 during the survey and after the filing of the application. A propos is our ruling
in Urquiaga v. Court of Appeals: [45] Fifth. Under the deed of absolute sale dated November 25, 1961, Lagata sold
to Astrologo Hular Lot No. 3347, and not Lot No. 3353. In Veterans Federation of the
As succinctly observed by respondent Court of Appeals in assessing Philippines v. Court of Appeals,[47] we ruled that:
the totality of the evidence
Petitioner VFP maintains that the deed of sale was valid and
We do not agree with defendants that they are also the occupants and enforceable and that it was perfected at the very moment that the parties
possessors of the subject lot just because it is adjacent to their titled agreed upon the thing which was the object of the sale and upon the price. The
property. Precisely, the boundaries of defendants titled property were parties herein had agreed on the parcel of land that petitioner would purchase
determined, delineated and surveyed during the cadastral survey of Dipolog from respondent PNR, and the same was described therein; thus, petitioner
and thereafter indicated in their certificate of title in order that the extent of VFP cannot conveniently set aside the technical description in this agreement
their property will be known and fixed. Since the subject lot was already and insist that it is the legal owner of the property erroneously described in
found to be outside their titled property, defendants have no basis in claiming the certificate of title. Petitioner can only claim right of ownership over the
it or other adjacent lots for that matter. Otherwise, the very purpose of the parcel of land that was the object of the deed of sale and nothing else. [48]
cadastral survey as a process of determining the exact boundaries of adjoining
properties will be defeated. Sixth. Under the said deed of sale dated November 11, 1961, Victoriana
Defendants own title, O.C.T. No. 0-357 (in the names of Jose Aguirre and Lagata sold Lot No. 3347 which had an area of 15,906 square meters and covered by
Cristina Gonzales), in fact belies their claim of occupation and possession Tax Declaration No. 4790. The deed does not state that what was sold was only a
over the adjacent subject lot. Examining said title, we note that: (1) the portion of Lot No. 3347, excluding therefrom the disputed property. This is
cadastral survey of Dipolog was conducted from January, 1923 to November understandable, since the subject property is a portion of Lot No. 3353 owned by
1925; (2) defendants titled property was one of those lots surveyed and this Alejandro Gruta and Iluminado Baloloy, and not of Lino Estopin and/or Victoriana
was designated as Lot No. 2623; (3) during the survey, it was already

CO-OWNERSHIP 10
Lagata. Lagata could not have sold a portion of Lot No. 3353 which she does not
own. As the Latin adage goes: NEMO DAT QUOD NON HABET.
Seventh. The Balbedinas Affidavit dated May 8, 1993 offered by the
respondent to prove the contents thereof is inadmissible in evidence against the
petitioners. Balbedina did not testify; as such, the petitioners were deprived of their
right to cross-examine him. The said affidavit is thus hearsay and barren of probative BETTY B. LACBAYAN, G.R. No. 165427
weight. The affidavit varies the contents of the deed of absolute sale which he - versus -
(Balbedina) executed in favor of Iluminado more than forty years earlier. In the said BAYANI S. SAMOY, JR., March 21, 2011
affidavit, it was made to appear that Balbedina sold to Iluminado on June 4, 1951 only
a portion of Lot 3353 with an area of 3,333 square meters, when under the said deed
VILLARAMA, JR., J.:
of absolute sale, the property that was sold consisted of 4,651 square meters. The
affidavit is proscribed by Section 9, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court, which provides: This settles the petition for review on certiorari filed by petitioner Betty B. Lacbayan
Section 9. Evidence of written agreements. - When the terms of an against respondent Bayani S. Samoy, Jr. assailing the September 14, 2004
agreement have been reduced to writing, it is considered as containing all the Decision[1] of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 67596. The CA had
terms agreed upon and there can be, between the parties and their successors affirmed the February 10, 2000 Decision[2] of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch
in interest, no evidence of such terms other than the contents of the written 224, of Quezon City declaring respondent as the sole owner of the properties involved
agreement. in this suit and awarding to him P100,000.00 as attorneys fees.
... This suit stemmed from the following facts.
It bears stressing that the deed of absolute sale executed by Balbedina in favor Petitioner and respondent met each other through a common friend sometime in 1978.
of Baloloy was notarized by the Justice of the Peace who was an Ex-Officio Notary Despite respondent being already married, their relationship developed until petitioner
Public; hence, entitled to full probative weight. gave birth to respondents son on October 12, 1979. [3]
During their illicit relationship, petitioner and respondent, together with three
Eighth. The Special Sketch Plan of Lot No. 3353 prepared by Geodetic Engineer more incorporators, were able to establish a manpower services company. [4]Five
Rodolfo P. Cunanan[49] cannot prevail over OCT No. P-16540. In fact, the plan even parcels of land were also acquired during the said period and were registered in
buttressed the case for the petitioners because it shows that the subject property is a petitioner and respondents names, ostensibly as husband and wife. The lands are
portion of Lot No. 3353, and not of Lot No. 3347, covered by OCT No. P-16540 under briefly described as follows:
the name of Iluminado Baloloy, the deceased father of the petitioners. 1. A 255-square meter real estate property located at Malvar St., Quezon City
covered by TCT No. 303224 and registered in the name of Bayani S. Samoy,
Ninth. The conclusion of the RTC that Lagata in fact sold a portion of Lot No. 3347 Jr. married to Betty Lacbayan.[5]
under the deed of absolute sale dated November 25, 1961, unaware that the property
was a part of Lot No. 3353, is based on mere speculations and surmises.
2. A 296-square meter real estate property located at Main Ave., Quezon
Iluminado Baloloy included in his application for a free patent the property of City covered by TCT No. 23301 and registered in the name of Spouses
Alejandro Gruta, and was able to secure a free patent over said property in addition to Bayani S. Samoy and Betty Lacbayan.[6]
his own. As such, Gruta, not the respondent, is the proper party to assail such free 3. A 300-square meter real estate property located at Matatag St., Quezon
patent, as well as OCT No. P-16540 which was issued based thereon. City covered by TCT No. RT-38264 and registered in the name of
Bayani S. Samoy, Jr. married to Betty Lacbayan Samoy. [7]
IN LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the petition is GRANTED. The decisions 4. A 183.20-square meter real estate property located at Zobel St., Quezon City
of the Regional Trial Court and the Court of covered by TCT No. 335193 and registered in the name of Bayani S. Samoy,
Appeals are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The complaint of the respondent Jr. married to Betty L. Samoy.[8]
is DISMISSED. No costs. 5. A 400-square meter real estate property located at Don Enrique Heights,
Quezon City covered by TCT No. 90232 and registered in the name of
Bayani S. Samoy, Jr. married to Betty L. Samoy. [9]

CO-OWNERSHIP 11
Initially, petitioner lived with her parents in Mapagbigay St., V. Luna, Unimpressed with petitioners arguments, the appellate court denied the appeal,
Quezon City. In 1983, petitioner left her parents and decided to reside in the property explaining in the following manner:
located in Malvar St. in Project 4, Quezon City. Later, she and their son transferred to Appellants harping on the indefeasibility of the certificates of title
Zobel St., also in Project 4, and finally to the 400-square meter property in Don covering the subject realties is, to say the least, misplaced. Rather
Enrique Heights.[10] than the validity of said certificates which was nowhere dealt with
Eventually, however, their relationship turned sour and they decided to part in the appealed decision, the record shows that what the trial court
ways sometime in 1991. In 1998, both parties agreed to divide the said properties and determined therein was the ownership of the subject realties itself an
terminate their business partnership by executing a Partition Agreement.[11] Initially, issue correlative to and a necessary adjunct of the claim of co-
respondent agreed to petitioners proposal that the properties in Malvar St. and Don ownership upon which appellant anchored her cause of action for
Enrique Heights be assigned to the latter, while the ownership over the three other partition. It bears emphasizing, moreover, that the rule on the
properties will go to respondent.[12] However, when petitioner wanted additional indefeasibility of a Torrens title applies only to original and not to
demands to be included in the partition agreement, respondent refused.[13] Feeling subsequent registration as that availed of by the parties in respect to
aggrieved, petitioner filed a complaint for judicial partition[14] of the said properties the properties in litigation. To our mind, the inapplicability of said
before the RTC in Quezon City on May 31, 1999. principle to the case at bench is even more underscored by the
In her complaint, petitioner averred that she and respondent started to live admitted falsity of the registration of the selfsame realties in the
together as husband and wife in 1979 without the benefit of marriage and worked together parties name as husband and wife.
as business partners, acquiring real properties amounting The same dearth of merit permeates appellants imputation of
to P15,500,000.00.[15] Respondent, in his Answer,[16] however, denied petitioners claim of reversible error against the trial court for supposedly failing to make
cohabitation and said that the properties were acquired out of his own personal funds the proper delineation between an action for partition and an action
without any contribution from petitioner.[17] involving ownership. Typically brought by a person claiming to be
During the trial, petitioner admitted that although they were together for co-owner of a specified property against a defendant or defendants
almost 24 hours a day in 1983 until 1991, respondent would still go home to his wife whom the plaintiff recognizes to be co-owners, an action for
usually in the wee hours of the morning.[18] Petitioner likewise claimed that they partition may be seen to present simultaneously two principal
acquired the said real estate properties from the income of the company which she and issues, i.e., first, the issue of whether the plaintiff is indeed a co-
respondent established.[19] owner of the property sought to be partitioned and, second assuming
Respondent, meanwhile, testified that the properties were purchased from his that the plaintiff successfully hurdles the first the issue of how the
personal funds, salaries, dividends, allowances and commissions.[20] He countered that property is to be divided between plaintiff and defendant(s).
the said properties were registered in his name together with petitioner to exclude the Otherwise stated, the court must initially settle the issue of
same from the property regime of respondent and his legal wife, and to prevent the ownership for the simple reason that it cannot properly issue an
possible dissipation of the said properties since his legal wife was then a heavy order to divide the property without first making a determination as
gambler.[21] Respondent added that he also purchased the said properties as to the existence of co-ownership. Until and unless the issue of
investment, with the intention to sell them later on for the purchase or construction of ownership is definitely resolved, it would be premature to effect a
a new building.[22] partition of the properties. This is precisely what the trial court did
On February 10, 2000, the trial court rendered a decision dismissing the complaint for when it discounted the merit in appellants claim of co-ownership.[26]
lack of merit.[23] In resolving the issue on ownership, the RTC decided to give Hence, this petition premised on the following arguments:
considerable weight to petitioners own admission that the properties were acquired not I. Ownership cannot be passed upon in a partition case.
from her own personal funds but from the income of the manpower services company II. The partition agreement duly signed by respondent contains
over which she owns a measly 3.33% share.[24] an admission against respondents interest as to the existence
Aggrieved, petitioner elevated the matter to the CA asserting that she is the pro of co-ownership between the parties.
indiviso owner of one-half of the properties in dispute. Petitioner argued that the trial III. An action for partition cannot be defeated by the mere
courts decision subjected the certificates of title over the said properties to collateral expedience of repudiating co-ownership based on self-
attack contrary to law and jurisprudence. Petitioner also contended that it is improper serving claims of exclusive ownership of the properties in
to thresh out the issue on ownership in an action for partition. [25] dispute.

CO-OWNERSHIP 12
IV. A Torrens title is the best evidence of ownership which While it is true that the complaint involved here is one for partition, the same
cannot be outweighed by respondents self-serving assertion is premised on the existence or non-existence of co-ownership between the parties.
to the contrary. Petitioner insists she is a co-owner pro indiviso of the five real estate properties based
V. The properties involved were acquired by both parties on the transfer certificates of title (TCTs) covering the subject properties. Respondent
through their actual joint contribution of money, property, or maintains otherwise. Indubitably, therefore, until and unless this issue of co-ownership
industry.[27] is definitely and finally resolved, it would be premature to effect a partition of the
Noticeably, the last argument is essentially a question of fact, which we feel disputed properties.[30] More importantly, the complaint will not even lie if the
has been squarely threshed out in the decisions of both the trial and appellate claimant, or petitioner in this case, does not even have any rightful interest over the
courts. We deem it wise not to disturb the findings of the lower courts on the said subject properties.[31]
matter absent any showing that the instant case falls under the exceptions to the general Would a resolution on the issue of ownership subject the Torrens title issued
rule that questions of fact are beyond the ambit of the Courts jurisdiction in petitions over the disputed realties to a collateral attack? Most definitely, it would not.
under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended. The issues may be There is no dispute that a Torrens certificate of title cannot be collaterally
summarized into only three: attacked,[32] but that rule is not material to the case at bar. What cannot be collaterally
I. Whether an action for partition precludes a settlement on attacked is the certificate of title and not the title itself.[33] The certificate referred to is
the issue of ownership; that document issued by the Register of Deeds known as the TCT. In contrast, the title
II. Whether the Torrens title over the disputed properties was referred to by law means ownership which is, more often than not, represented by that
collaterally attacked in the action for partition; and document.[34] Petitioner apparently confuses title with the certificate of title. Title as a
III. Whether respondent is estopped from repudiating co- concept of ownership should not be confused with the certificate of title as evidence
ownership over the subject realties. of such ownership although both are interchangeably used. [35]
We find the petition bereft of merit. Moreover, placing a parcel of land under the mantle of the Torrens system
Our disquisition in Municipality of Bian v. Garcia[28] is definitive. There, we does not mean that ownership thereof can no longer be disputed. Ownership is
explained that the determination as to the existence of co-ownership is necessary in different from a certificate of title, the latter only serving as the best proof of ownership
the resolution of an action for partition. Thus: over a piece of land. The certificate cannot always be considered as conclusive
The first phase of a partition and/or accounting suit is taken up evidence of ownership.[36] In fact, mere issuance of the certificate of title in the name
with the determination of whether or not a co-ownership in fact of any person does not foreclose the possibility that the real property may be under co-
exists, and a partition is proper (i.e., not otherwise legally ownership with persons not named in the certificate, or that the registrant may only be
proscribed) and may be made by voluntary agreement of all the a trustee, or that other parties may have acquired interest over the property subsequent
parties interested in the property. This phase may end with a to the issuance of the certificate of title.[37] Needless to say, registration does not vest
declaration that plaintiff is not entitled to have a partition either ownership over a property, but may be the best evidence thereof.
because a co-ownership does not exist, or partition is legally Finally, as to whether respondents assent to the initial partition agreement
prohibited. It may end, on the other hand, with an adjudgment that a serves as an admission against interest, in that the respondent is deemed to have
co-ownership does in truth exist, partition is proper in the premises admitted the existence of co-ownership between him and petitioner, we rule in the
and an accounting of rents and profits received by the defendant negative.
from the real estate in question is in order. x x x An admission is any statement of fact made by a party against his interest or
The second phase commences when it appears that the parties are unfavorable to the conclusion for which he contends or is inconsistent with the facts
unable to agree upon the partition directed by the court. In that alleged by him.[38] Admission against interest is governed by Section 26 of Rule 130
event[,] partition shall be done for the parties by the [c]ourt with the of the Rules of Court, which provides:
assistance of not more than three (3) commissioners. This second Sec. 26. Admissions of a party. The act, declaration or
stage may well also deal with the rendition of the accounting itself omission of a party as to a relevant fact may be given in evidence
and its approval by the [c]ourt after the parties have been accorded against him.
opportunity to be heard thereon, and an award for the recovery by To be admissible, an admission must (a) involve matters of fact, and not of
the party or parties thereto entitled of their just share in the rents and law; (b) be categorical and definite; (c) be knowingly and voluntarily made; and (d)
profits of the real estate in question. x x x[29] (Emphasis supplied.)

CO-OWNERSHIP 13
be adverse to the admitters interests, otherwise it would be self-serving and
inadmissible.[39]
A careful perusal of the contents of the so-called Partition Agreement
indicates that the document involves matters which necessitate prior settlement of
questions of law, basic of which is a determination as to whether the parties have the LEONOR B. CRUZ vs. TEOFILA M. CATAPANG,
right to freely divide among themselves the subject properties. Moreover, to follow G.R. No. 164110 February 12, 2008
petitioners argument would be to allow respondent not only to admit against his own QUISUMBING, J.:
interest but that of his legal spouse as well, who may also be lawfully entitled co-
ownership over the said properties. Respondent is not allowed by law to waive This petition for review seeks the reversal of the Decision[1] dated September
whatever share his lawful spouse may have on the disputed properties. Basic is the rule 16, 2003 and the Resolution[2] dated June 11, 2004 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R.
that rights may be waived, unless the waiver is contrary to law, public order, public SP No. 69250. The Court of Appeals reversed the Decision[3] dated October 22, 2001 of
policy, morals, good customs or prejudicial to a third person with a right recognized the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 86, Taal, Batangas, which had earlier affirmed
by law.[40] the Decision[4] dated September 20, 1999 of the 7th Municipal Circuit Trial Court
Curiously, petitioner herself admitted that she did not assent to the Partition (MCTC) of Taal, Batangas ordering respondent to vacate and deliver possession of a
Agreement after seeing the need to amend the same to include other matters. Petitioner portion of the lot co-owned by petitioner, Luz Cruz and Norma Maligaya.
does not have any right to insist on the contents of an agreement she intentionally The antecedent facts of the case are as follows.
refused to sign. Petitioner Leonor B. Cruz, Luz Cruz and Norma Maligaya are the co-owners
As to the award of damages to respondent, we do not subscribe to the trial of a parcel of land covering an area of 1,435 square meters located at Barangay
courts view that respondent is entitled to attorneys fees. Unlike the trial court, we do Mahabang Ludlod, Taal, Batangas.[5] With the consent of Norma Maligaya, one of the
not commiserate with respondents predicament. The trial court ruled that respondent aforementioned co-owners, respondent Teofila M. Catapang built a house on a lot
was forced to litigate and engaged the services of his counsel to defend his interest as adjacent to the abovementioned parcel of land sometime in 1992. The house intruded,
to entitle him an award of P100,000.00 as attorneys fees. But we note that in the first however, on a portion of the co-owned property.[6]
place, it was respondent himself who impressed upon petitioner that she has a right In the first week of September 1995, petitioner Leonor B. Cruz visited the
over the involved properties. Secondly, respondents act of representing himself and property and was surprised to see a part of respondents house intruding unto a portion
petitioner as husband and wife was a deliberate attempt to skirt the law and escape his of the co-owned property. She then made several demands upon respondent to
legal obligation to his lawful wife. Respondent, therefore, has no one but himself to demolish the intruding structure and to vacate the portion encroaching on their
blame the consequences of his deceitful act which resulted in the filing of the property. The respondent, however, refused and disregarded her demands. [7]
complaint against him. On January 25, 1996, the petitioner filed a complaint[8] for forcible entry
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The September 14, 2004 Decision against respondent before the 7th MCTC of Taal, Batangas. The MCTC decided in
of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 67596 is AFFIRMED with favor of petitioner, ruling that consent of only one of the co-owners is not sufficient to
MODIFICATION. Respondent Bayani S. Samoy, Jr. is hereby declared the sole justify defendants construction of the house and possession of the portion of the lot in
owner of the disputed properties, without prejudice to any claim his legal wife may question.[9] The dispositive portion of the MCTC decision reads:
have filed or may file against him. The award of P100,000.00 as attorneys fees in WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered ordering the
respondents favor is DELETED. defendant or any person acting in her behalf to vacate and deliver
the possession of the area illegally occupied to the plaintiff; ordering
the defendant to pay plaintiff reasonable attorneys fees of
P10,000.00, plus costs of suit.
SO ORDERED.[10]
On appeal, the RTC, Branch 86, Taal, Batangas, affirmed the MCTCs ruling
in a Decision dated October 22, 2001, the dispositive portion of which states:
Wherefore, premises considered, the decision [appealed]
from is hereby affirmed in toto.
SO ORDERED.[11]

CO-OWNERSHIP 14
After her motion for reconsideration was denied by the RTC, respondent filed a basic principle in the law of co-ownership that no individual co-owner can claim title
petition for review with the Court of Appeals, which reversed the RTCs decision. The to any definite portion of the land or thing owned in common until partition.
Court of Appeals held that there is no cause of action for forcible entry in this case because On the other hand, respondent in her memorandum[17] counters that the
respondents entry into the property, considering the consent given by co-owner Norma complaint for forcible entry cannot prosper because her entry into the property was not
Maligaya, cannot be characterized as one made through strategy or stealth which gives rise through strategy or stealth due to the consent of one of the co-owners. She further argues
to a cause of action for forcible entry.[12] The Court of Appeals decision further held that that since Norma Maligaya is residing in the house she built, the issue is not
petitioners remedy is not an action for ejectment but an entirely different recourse with the just possession de facto but also one of possession de jure since it involves rights of co-
appropriate forum. The Court of Appeals disposed, thus: owners to enjoy the property.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant Petition As to the issue of whether or not the consent of one co-owner will warrant
is hereby GRANTED. The challenged Decision dated 22 October the dismissal of a forcible entry case filed by another co-owner against the person who
2001 as well as the Order dated 07 January 2002 of the Regional was given the consent to construct a house on the co-owned property, we have held
Trial Court of Taal, Batangas, Branch 86, are that a co-owner cannot devote common property to his or her exclusive use to the
hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE and, in lieu thereof, another prejudice of the co-ownership.[18] In our view, a co-owner cannot give valid consent
is entered DISMISSING the complaint for forcible entry docketed to another to build a house on the co-owned property, which is an act tantamount to
as Civil Case No. 71-T. devoting the property to his or her exclusive use.
SO ORDERED.[13] Furthermore, Articles 486 and 491 of the Civil Code provide:
After petitioners motion for reconsideration was denied by the Court of Art. 486. Each co-owner may use the thing owned in
Appeals in a Resolution dated June 11, 2004, she filed the instant petition. common, provided he does so in accordance with the purpose for
Raised before us for consideration are the following issues: which it is intended and in such a way as not to injure the interest of
I. the co-ownership or prevent the other co-owners from using it
WHETHER OR NOT THE KNOWLEDGE AND CONSENT OF CO- according to their rights. The purpose of the co-ownership may be
OWNER NORMA MALIGAYA IS A VALID LICENSE FOR THE changed by agreement, express or implied.
RESPONDENT TO ERECT THE BUNGALOW HOUSE ON THE Art. 491. None of the co-owners shall, without the consent
PREMISES OWNED PRO-INDIVISO SANS CONSENT FROM THE of the others, make alterations in the thing owned in common, even
PETITIONER AND OTHE[R] CO-OWNER[.] though benefits for all would result therefrom. However, if the
II. withholding of the consent by one or more of the co-owners is
WHETHER OR NOT RESPONDENT, BY HER ACTS, HAS ACQUIRED clearly prejudicial to the common interest, the courts may afford
EXCLUSIVE OWNERSHIP OVER THE PORTION OF THE LOT SUBJECT adequate relief.
OF THE PREMISES PURSUANT TO THE CONSENT GRANTED UNTO Article 486 states each co-owner may use the thing owned in common
HER BY CO-OWNER NORMA MALIGAYA TO THE EXCLUSION OF provided he does so in accordance with the purpose for which it is intended and in
THE PETITIONER AND THE OTHER CO-OWNER.[14] such a way as not to injure the interest of the co-ownership or prevent the other co-
III. owners from using it according to their rights. Giving consent to a third person to
. . . WHETHER OR NOT RESPONDENT IN FACT OBTAINED construct a house on the co-owned property will injure the interest of the co-ownership
POSSESSION OF THE PROPERTY IN QUESTION BY MEANS OF and prevent other co-owners from using the property in accordance with their rights.
SIMPLE STRATEGY.[15] Under Article 491, none of the co-owners shall, without the consent of the others,
Petitioner prays in her petition that we effectively reverse the Court of make alterations in the thing owned in common. It necessarily follows that none of the co-
Appeals decision. owners can, without the consent of the other co-owners, validly consent to the making of
Simply put, the main issue before us is whether consent given by a co-owner an alteration by another person, such as respondent, in the thing owned in common.
of a parcel of land to a person to construct a house on the co-owned property warrants Alterations include any act of strict dominion or ownership and any encumbrance or
the dismissal of a forcible entry case filed by another co-owner against that person. disposition has been held implicitly to be an act of alteration.[19] The construction of a house
In her memorandum,[16] petitioner contends that the consent and knowledge on the co-owned property is an act of dominion. Therefore, it is an alteration falling under
of co-owner Norma Maligaya cannot defeat the action for forcible entry since it is a Article 491 of the Civil Code.There being no consent from all co-owners, respondent had
no right to construct her house on the co-owned property.

CO-OWNERSHIP 15
Consent of only one co-owner will not warrant the dismissal of the complaint for
forcible entry filed against the builder. The consent given by Norma Maligaya in the
absence of the consent of petitioner and Luz Cruz did not vest upon respondent any right
to enter into the co-owned property. Her entry into the property still falls under the
classification through strategy or stealth. LILIA SANCHEZ vs. COURT OF APPEALS, HON. VICTORINO S. ALVARO
The Court of Appeals held that there is no forcible entry because respondents as Presiding Judge, RTC-Br. 120, Caloocan City, and VIRGINIA
entry into the property was not through strategy or stealth due to the consent given to TERIA,
her by one of the co-owners. We cannot give our imprimatur to this sweeping
conclusion. Respondents entry into the property without the permission of petitioner [G.R. No. 152766. June 20, 2003]
could appear to be a secret and clandestine act done in connivance with co-owner BELLOSILLO, J.:
Norma Maligaya whom respondent allowed to stay in her house.Entry into the land
effected clandestinely without the knowledge of the other co-owners could be This is a Special Civil Action for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of
categorized as possession by stealth.[20] Moreover, respondents act of getting only the Court to annul and set aside the Decision of the Court of Appeals dated 23
consent of one co-owner, her sister Norma Maligaya, and allowing the latter to stay in May 2001 as well as its Resolution dated 8 January 2002 in CA-G.R. SP No.
the constructed house, can in fact be considered as a strategy which she utilized in 59182.
order to enter into the co-owned property. As such, respondents acts constitute forcible
entry. Lilia Sanchez, petitioner, constructed a house on a 76-square meter lot
Petitioners filing of a complaint for forcible entry, in our view, was within the one-year owned by her parents-in-law. The lot was registered under TCT No. 263624
period for filing the complaint. The one-year period within which to bring an action for with the following co-owners: Eliseo Sanchez married to Celia Sanchez,
forcible entry is generally counted from the date of actual entry to the land. However, when Marilyn Sanchez married to Nicanor Montalban, Lilian Sanchez, widow, Nenita
entry is made through stealth, then the one-year period is counted from the time the Sanchez, single, Susana Sanchez married to Fernando Ramos, and Felipe
petitioner learned about it.[21] Although respondent constructed her house in 1992, it was Sanchez.[1] On 20 February 1995, the lot was registered under TCT No.
only in September 1995 that petitioner learned of it when she visited the 289216 in the name of private respondent Virginia Teria by virtue of a Deed of
property. Accordingly, she then made demands on respondent to vacate the Absolute Sale supposed to have been executed on 23 June 1995 [2] by all six
premises. Failing to get a favorable response, petitioner filed the complaint on January 25, (6) co-owners in her favor.[3] Petitioner claimed that she did not affix her
1996, which is within the one-year period from the time petitioner learned of the signature on the document and subsequently refused to vacate the lot, thus
construction. prompting private respondent Virginia Teria to file an action for recovery of
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision dated September possession of the aforesaid lot with the Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC) of
16, 2003 and the Resolution dated June 11, 2004 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. Caloocan City sometime in September 1995, subsequently raffled to Br. 49 of
SP No. 69250 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Decision dated October 22, that court.
2001 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 86, Taal, Batangas is REINSTATED. Costs
On 12 February 1998, the MeTC-Br. 49 of Caloocan City ruled in favor of
against respondent.
private respondent declaring that the sale was valid only to the extent of 5/6 of
the lot and the other 1/6 remaining as the property of petitioner, on account of
her signature in the Deed of Absolute Sale having been established as a
forgery.
Petitioner then elevated her appeal to the Regional Trial Court of
Caloocan City, subsequently assigned to Br. 120, which ordered the parties to
file their respective memoranda of appeal. Counsel for petitioner did not
comply with this order, nor even inform her of the developments in her
case. Petitioner not having filed any pleading with the RTC of Caloocan City,
the trial court affirmed the 27 July 1998 decision of the MeTC.

CO-OWNERSHIP 16
On 4 November 1998, the MeTC issued an order for the issuance of a The Rules of Court should be liberally construed in order to promote their
writ of execution in favor of private respondent Virginia Teria, buyer of the object of securing a just, speedy and inexpensive disposition of every action
property. On 4 November 1999 or a year later, a Notice to Vacate was served or proceeding.[4]
by the sheriff upon petitioner who however refused to heed the Notice.
The rules of procedure should be viewed as mere tools designed to aid
On 28 April 1999 private respondent started demolishing petitioners the courts in the speedy, just and inexpensive determination of the cases
house without any special permit of demolition from the court. before them. Liberal construction of the rules and the pleadings is the
controlling principle to effect substantial justice.[5] Litigations should, as much
Due to the demolition of her house which continued until 24 May 1999 as possible, be decided on their merits and not on mere technicalities.[6]
petitioner was forced to inhabit the portion of the premises that used to serve
as the houses toilet and laundry area. Verily, the negligence of petitioners counsel cannot be deemed as
negligence of petitioner herself in the case at bar. A notice to a lawyer who
On 29 October 1999 petitioner filed her Petition for Relief from appears to have been unconscionably irresponsible cannot be considered as
Judgment with the RTC on the ground that she was not bound by the inaction notice to his client.[7] Under the peculiar circumstances of this case, it appears
of her counsel who failed to submit petitioners appeal memorandum. However from the records that counsel was negligent in not adequately protecting his
the RTC denied the Petition and the subsequent Motion for Reconsideration. clients interest, which necessarily calls for a liberal construction of the Rules.
On 14 June 2000 petitioner filed her Petition for Certiorari with the Court The rationale for this approach is explained in Ginete v. Court of
of Appeals alleging grave abuse of discretion on the part of the court a quo. Appeals - [8]
On 23 May 2001 the appellate court dismissed the petition for lack of This Court may suspend its own rules or exempt a particular case from its operation
merit. On 18 June 2001 petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration but the where the appellate court failed to obtain jurisdiction over the case owing to
Court of Appeals denied the motion in its Resolution of 8 January 2002. appellants failure to perfect an appeal. Hence, with more reason would this Court
The only issue in this case is whether the Court of Appeals committed suspend its own rules in cases where the appellate court has already obtained
grave abuse of discretion in dismissing the challenged case before it. jurisdiction over the appealed case. This prerogative to relax procedural rules of the
most mandatory character in terms of compliance, such as the period to appeal has
As a matter of policy, the original jurisdiction of this Court to issue the so- been invoked and granted in a considerable number of cases x x x x
called extraordinary writs should generally be exercised relative to actions or
proceedings before the Court of Appeals or before constitutional or other Let it be emphasized that the rules of procedure should be viewed as mere tools
tribunals or agencies the acts of which for some reason or other are not designed to facilitate the attainment of justice. Their strict and rigid application,
controllable by the Court of Appeals. Where the issuance of the extraordinary which would result in technicalities that tend to frustrate rather than promote
writ is also within the competence of the Court of Appeals or the Regional Trial substantial justice, must always be eschewed. Even the Rules of Court reflect this
Court, it is either of these courts that the specific action for the procurement of principle. The power to suspend or even disregard rules can be so pervasive and
the writ must be presented. However, this Court must be convinced thoroughly compelling as to alter even that which this Court itself has already declared to be
that two (2) grounds exist before it gives due course to a certiorari petition final, as we are now constrained to do in the instant case x x x x
under Rule 65: (a) The tribunal, board or officer exercising judicial or quasi-
judicial functions has acted without or in excess of its or his jurisdiction; and
The emerging trend in the rulings of this Court is to afford every party litigant the
(b) There is no appeal nor any plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the
amplest opportunity for the proper and just determination of his cause, free from the
ordinary course of law.
constraints of technicalities. Time and again, this Court has consistently held that
Despite the procedural lapses present in this case, we are giving due rules must not be applied rigidly so as not to override substantial justice.
course to this petition as there are matters that require immediate resolution
on the merits to effect substantial justice. Aside from matters of life, liberty, honor or property which would warrant
the suspension of the Rules of the most mandatory character and an
examination and review by the appellate court of the lower courts findings of

CO-OWNERSHIP 17
fact, the other elements that should be considered are the following: (a) the The characteristics of co-ownership are: (a) plurality of subjects, who are
existence of special or compelling circumstances, (b) the merits of the case, the co-owners, (b) unity of or material indivision, which means that there is a
(c) a cause not entirely attributable to the fault or negligence of the party single object which is not materially divided, and which is the element which
favored by the suspension of the rules, (d) a lack of any showing that the binds the subjects, and, (c) the recognition of ideal shares, which determines
review sought is merely frivolous and dilatory, and (e) the other party will not the rights and obligations of the co-owners.[14]
be unjustly prejudiced thereby.[9]
In co-ownership, the relationship of such co-owner to the other co-owners
The suspension of the Rules is warranted in this case since the is fiduciary in character and attribute. Whether established by law or by
procedural infirmity was not entirely attributable to the fault or negligence of agreement of the co-owners, the property or thing held pro-indiviso is
petitioner. Besides, substantial justice requires that we go into the merits of the impressed with a fiducial nature so that each co-owner becomes a trustee for
case to resolve the present controversy that was brought about by the absence the benefit of his co-owners and he may not do any act prejudicial to the
of any partition agreement among the parties who were co-owners of the interest of his co-owners.[15]
subject lot in question. Hence, giving due course to the instant petition shall
put an end to the dispute on the property held in common. Thus, the legal effect of an agreement to preserve the properties in co-
ownership is to create an express trust among the heirs as co-owners of the
In Peoples Homesite and Housing Corporation v. Tiongco[10] we held: properties. Co-ownership is a form of trust and every co-owner is a trustee for
the others.[16]
There should be no dispute regarding the doctrine that normally notice to counsel is
notice to parties, and that such doctrine has beneficent effects upon the prompt Before the partition of a land or thing held in common, no individual or co-
dispensation of justice. Its application to a given case, however, should be looked owner can claim title to any definite portion thereof. All that the co-owner has
into and adopted, according to the surrounding circumstances; otherwise, in the is an ideal or abstract quota or proportionate share in the entire land or thing.[17]
courts desire to make a short-cut of the proceedings, it might foster, wittingly or
unwittingly, dangerous collusions to the detriment of justice. It would then be easy Article 493 of the Civil Code gives the owner of an undivided interest in
for one lawyer to sell ones rights down the river, by just alleging that he just forgot the property the right to freely sell and dispose of it, i.e., his undivided
every process of the court affecting his clients, because he was so busy. Under this interest. He may validly lease his undivided interest to a third party
circumstance, one should not insist that a notice to such irresponsible lawyer is also independently of the other co-owners.[18] But he has no right to sell or alienate
a notice to his clients. a concrete, specific or determinate part of the thing owned in common because
his right over the thing is represented by a quota or ideal portion without any
physical adjudication.[19]
Thus, we now look into the merits of the petition.
Although assigned an aliquot but abstract part of the property, the metes
This case overlooks a basic yet significant principle of civil law: co- and bounds of petitioners lot has not been designated. As she was not a party
ownership. Throughout the proceedings from the MeTC to the Court of to the Deed of Absolute Sale voluntarily entered into by the other co-owners,
Appeals, the notion of co-ownership[11] was not sufficiently dealt with. We her right to 1/6 of the property must be respected. Partition needs to be
attempt to address this controversy in the interest of substantial effected to protect her right to her definite share and determine the boundaries
justice. Certiorari should therefore be granted to cure this grave abuse of of her property. Such partition must be done without prejudice to the rights of
discretion. private respondent Virginia Teria as buyer of the 5/6 portion of the lot under
Sanchez Roman defines co-ownership as the right of common dominion dispute.
which two or more persons have in a spiritual part of a thing, not materially or WHEREFORE, the Petition is GRANTED. The Decision of the Court of
physically divided.[12] Manresa defines it as the manifestation of the private Appeals dated 23 May 2001 as well as its Resolution dated 8 January 2002 in
right of ownership, which instead of being exercised by the owner in an CA-G.R. SP No. 59182 is ANNULLED and SET ASIDE. A survey of the
exclusive manner over the things subject to it, is exercised by two or more questioned lot with TCT No. 289216 (formerly TCT No. 263624) by a duly
owners and the undivided thing or right to which it refers is one and the licensed geodetic engineer and the PARTITION of the aforesaid lot are
same.[13] ORDERED.

CO-OWNERSHIP 18
Let the records of this case be REMANDED to MeTC-Br. 49, Caloocan
City to effect the aforementioned survey and partition, as well as segregate the
1/6 portion appertaining to petitioner Lilia Sanchez.
The Deed of Absolute Sale by the other co-owners to Virginia Teria shall THE HEIRS OF SALUD DIZON SALAMAT, represented by Lucio Salamat and
be RESPECTED insofar as the other undivided 5/6 portion of the property is Danilo Salamat, VALENTA DIZON GARCIA, represented by
concerned. Raymundo D. Garcia, Jr. as Attorney-in-Fact, THE HEIRS OF
ANSELMA REYES DIZON, represented by Catalina Dizon
Espinosa, petitioners, vs. NATIVIDAD DIZON TAMAYO, THE HEIRS
OF EDUARDO DIZON, represented by Angela R. Dizon, THE HEIRS
OF GAUDENCIO DIZON, represented by Maria Dizon
Jocson, respondents.

[G.R. No. 110644. October 30, 1998]


ROMERO, J.:

Before us is a petition for certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court seeking
the reversal of the decision rendered by the Court of Appeals dated June 15, 1993.
Agustin Dizon died intestate on May 15, 1942 leaving behind his five children
Eduardo, Gaudencio, Salud, Valenta and Natividad as surviving heirs. Among the
properties left by the decedent was a parcel of land in Barrio San Nicolas, Hagonoy,
Bulacan, with an area of 2,188 square meters covered by Original Certificate of Title
No. 10384.[1]
On January 8, 1944, Eduardo sold his hereditary rights in the sum of P3,000 to
his sister Salud Dizon Salamat. The sale was evidenced by a private document bearing
the signatures of his sisters Valenta and Natividad as witnesses.[2]
On June 2, 1949, Gaudencio likewise sold his hereditary rights for the sum
of P4,000 to his sister Salud. The sale was evidenced by a notarized document which
bore the signature of Eduardo Dizon and a certain Angela Ramos as
witnesses.[3] Gaudencio died on May 30, 1951 leaving his daughters Priscila D. Rivera
and Maria D. Jocson as heirs.
Sometime in 1987, petitioners instituted an action for compulsory judicial
partition of real properties registered in the name of Agustin Dizon with the Regional
Trial Court, Branch 18 of Malolos, Bulacan. The action was prompted by the refusal
of herein respondent Natividad Dizon Tamayo to agree to the formal distribution of
the properties of deceased Agustin Dizon among his heirs. Respondents refusal
stemmed from her desire to keep for herself the parcel of land covered by OCT 10384
where she presently resides, claiming that her father donated it to her sometime in
1936 with the conformity of the other heirs. The subject property is also declared for
taxation purposes under Tax Declaration No. 10376 in the name of respondent.

CO-OWNERSHIP 19
The trial court noted that the alleged endowment which was made orally by the The Court of Appeals further stated that the attestation by Eduardo, of the oral
deceased Agustin Dizon to herein respondent partook of the nature of a donation which donation of the subject land made by his father to respondent Natividad, in 1936,
required the observance of certain formalities set by law. Nevertheless, the trial court coupled with the tax declaration and payment of taxes in respondents name would
rendered judgment in favor of respondent, the dispositive portion of which reads as show that the trial court did not err in ruling that the subject land should pertain to
follows: Natividad Tamayo as inheritance from her parents.
WHEREFORE, finding that the partition of the estate of Agustin Dizon is in order, We reverse.
let a project of partition be drawn pursuant to Sec 2, Rule 69, Rules of Court
assigning to each heir the specific share to which he is entitled taking into Art 749 of the Civil Code reads:
consideration the disposition made in favor of Salud Dizon Salamat and the In order that the donation of an immovable may be valid, it must be made in a public
adjudication of Lot 2557, Hagonoy Cadastre 304-D owned by Natividad Dizon document, specifying therein the property donated and the value of the charges
Tamayo, together with the improvements thereon, in her favor and the house owned which the donee must satisfy.
by Valenta Dizon Garcia, executing, if necessary, proper instruments of conveyance
for confirmation and approval by the Court.
The acceptance may be made in the same deed of donation or in a separate public
document, unless it is done during the lifetime of the donor.
Parties are enjoined to draw the prospect of partition as equitably and equally as
possible with the least inconvenience and disruption of those in possession or in
If the acceptance is made in a separate instrument, the donor shall be notified thereof
actual occupation of the property. Should the parties fail to come up with an
in an authentic form and this step shall be noted in both instruments.
acceptable project of partition, the Court will appoint commissioners as authorized
by Sec. 3, Rule 69, Rules of Court, who will be guided by the dispositive portion
hereof. It is clear from Article 749 that a transfer of real property from one person to
another cannot take effect as a donation unless embodied in a public document.
All costs and expenses incurred in connection with the partition are to be shared The alleged donation in the case at bar was done orally and not executed in a
equally by the parties. public document. Moreover, the document which was presented by respondent in
support of her claim that her father donated the subject parcel of land to her was a mere
SO ORDERED. private document of conformity which was executed by her elder brother, Eduardo in
1956.[5] It may not be amiss to point out that the brothers Eduardo and Gaudencio had
Petitioners contend that Lot 2557, Cad 304-D, described and covered by OCT already ceded their hereditary interests to petitioner Salud Dizon Salamat even before
10384 in the name of the heirs of Agustin Dizon is part of the Dizon estate while 1950.
respondent claims that her father donated it to her sometime in 1936 with the consent The Court of Appeals, however, placed much reliance on the said document and
of her co-heirs. In support of her claim, respondent Natividad presented a private made the dubious observation that x x x a cursory reading of the signed statement of
document of conformity which was allegedly signed and executed by her elder brother, Eduardo Dizon, which execution is undisputed, shows that there was an oral donation
Eduardo, in 1936. x x x.
Petitioners, however, question the authenticity of the document inasmuch as it is Significantly, the document relied upon by the Court of Appeals could hardly
marred by the unexplained erasures and alterations. satisfy the requirements of the rule on ancient documents on accounts of unexplained
The Court of Appeals, in affirming the decision of the RTC, stated that alterations.
notwithstanding the unexplained erasures and alterations, a cursory reading of the An ancient document refers to a private document which is more than thirty (30)
signed statement of Eduardo Dizon, which execution is undisputed, showed that there years old, produced from a custody in which it would naturally be found if genuine,
was an oral donation of the litigated land from Agustin Dizon to Natividad Dizon and is unblemished by alterations or circumstances of suspicion.[6]
Tamayo[4] in 1936.

CO-OWNERSHIP 20
To repeat, the document which was allegedly executed by Eduardo was marred the Dizons although respondent has remodelled it, constructed a piggery and has
by unexplained erasures and alterations. While the document was originally penned in planted trees thereon.[12] Respondent herself testified:
black ink, the number thirty-six (36) in blue ink was superimposed on the number fifty-
six (56) to make it appear that the document was executed in 1936 instead of in 1956. xxxxxxxxx
Moreover, a signature was blotted out with a black pentel pen and the three other Q Now, who is in the possession of this particular residential land in Bo. San
signatures[7] of the alleged witnesses to the execution of the document at the lower Nicolas, Hagonoy, Bulacan?
portion of the document were dated June 1, 1951. This could only mean that the
witnesses attested to the veracity of the document 5 years earlier, if the document was A I am in possession of that land, Sir.
executed in 1956 or 15 years later, if we are to give credence to respondents claim,
Q Do you have your residential house there?
that the document was executed in 1936. Curiously, two of the signatories, namely,
Priscila D. Rivera and Maria D. Jocson signed the document as witnesses two days A Yes, sir.
after the death of their father Gaudencio, who, as earlier mentioned, had already sold
his hereditary rights to his elder sister Salud in 1949. Q Now, you said that you have your residential house there, since when have you
stayed there?
In any case, assuming that Agustin really made the donation to respondent, albeit
orally, respondent cannot still claim ownership over the property. While it is true that A I was born there, Sir.
a void donation may be the basis of ownership which may ripen into title by Q And you are staying there up to the present?
prescription,[8] it is well settled that possession, to constitute the foundation of a
prescriptive right, must be adverse and under a claim of title. A Yes, sir.
Respondent was never in adverse and continous possession of the property. It is x x x x x x x x x.[13]
undeniable that petitioners and respondent, being heirs of the deceased, are co-owners
of the properties left by the latter. A co-ownership is a form of a trust, with each owner It is obvious from the foregoing that since respondent never made unequivocal
being a trustee for each other[9] and possession of a co-owner shall not be regarded as acts of repudiation, she cannot acquire ownership over said property through
adverse to other co-owners but in fact is beneficial to them. Mere actual possession by acquisitive prescription. The testimony of her son that she merely allowed her sister
one will not give rise to the inference that the possession was adverse because a co- Valenta to build a house on the lot[14] is pure hearsay as respondent herself could have
owner is, after all, entitled to possession of the property. testified on the matter but chose not to.

In the case of Salvador v. Court of Appeals,[10] we had occasion to state that a Finally, the fact that the subject property is declared for taxation purposes in the
mere silent possession by a co-owner, his receipt of rents, fruits or profits from the name of respondent who pays realty taxes thereon under Tax Declaration No. 14376
property, the erection of buildings and fences and the planting of trees thereon and the is of no moment. It is well settled that tax declarations or realty tax payments are not
payment of land taxes, cannot serve as proof of exclusive ownership, if it is not borne conclusive evidence of ownership.[15]
out by clear and convincing evidence that he exercised acts of possession which As regards the improvements introduced by the respondent on the questioned lot,
unequivocably constituted an ouster or deprivation of the rights of the other co-owners. the parties should be guided by Article 500 of the Civil Code which states that: Upon
The elements in order that a co-owners possession may be deemed adverse to partition, there shall be a mutual accounting for benefits received and reimbursements
the cestui que trust or the co-owner are: (1) that he has performed unequivocal acts of for expenses made. x x x
repudiation amounting to ouster cestui que trust or other co-owners (2) that such WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals is hereby REVERSED.
positive acts or repudiation have been made known to the cestui que trust or other co- Lot 2557, Hagonoy Cadastre 304-D covered by Original Certificate of Title No. 10384
owners and (3) that the evidence thereon must be clear and convincing. [11] is hereby declared to belong the estate of Agustin Dizon. No costs.
Not one of the aforesaid requirements is present in the case at bar. There are two
houses standing on the subject property. One is the house where respondent presently
resides while the other is a house built by respondents sister Valenta. Records show
that the house on Lot 227 where the respondent lives is actually the ancestral house of

CO-OWNERSHIP 21
On November 5, 1998, the co-heirs of Flores discovered the cancellation of Restars Tax
Declaration No. 6696 and the issuance in lieu thereof of Tax Declaration No. 11134 [4] in
his name.

HEIRS OF FLORES RESTAR namely: G.R. No. 161720 On January 21, 1999, the heirs of Flores sisters Dolores R. Cichon, Perpetua Sta.
ESMENIA R. RESTAR, BERNARDITA R. Maria, and Maria Rose who had in the meantime died, together with Flores surviving
RENTINO, LUCIA RESTAR, RODOLFO sisters Dominica Restar-Relojero and Paciencia Restar-Manares, filed a
RESTAR, JANET R. RELOJERO, LORNA R. Complaint[5] against Flores heirs for partition [of the lot], declaration of nullity of
RAMOS, MANUEL RESTAR, NENITA R. documents, ownership with damages and preliminary injunction before the Regional
BELLEZA, MIRASOL R. DELA CRUZ, Trial Court (RTC) of Aklan.
ROSELLE R. MATORRE, POLICARPIO Flores brothers Policarpio and Adolfo were impleaded also as defendants, they being
RESTAR and ADOLFO RESTAR unwilling co-plaintiffs.
Petitioners,
- versus - The plaintiffs, herein respondents, alleged that, inter alia, during the lifetime of Flores,
they were given their shares of palay from the lot and even after Flores death up to
HEIRS OF DOLORES R. CICHON, namely: 1991; after Flores death in 1989, his widow Esmenia appealed to them to allow her to
RUDY R. CICHON, NORMA C. LACHICA, hold on to the lot to finance the education of her children, to which they (the plaintiffs)
NILDA C. JUMAYAO, LYDIA C. SANTOS, and agreed on the condition that after the children had finished their education, it would be
NELSON R. CICHON; HEIRS OF PERPETUA divided into eight (8) equal parts; and upon their demand for partition of the lot, the
R. STA. MARIA, namely GEORGE STA. defendants Heirs of Flores refused, they claiming that they were the lawful owners
MARIA, LILIA M. MANIAGO, DERLY M. thereof as they had inherited it from Flores.
CONCEPCION, GERVY STA. MARIA, DORY
M. INDULO; HEIRS OF MARIA R. ROSE, By Answer[6] filed February 23, 1999, the defendants-herein petitioners Heirs of Flores
namely: TERESITA R. MALOCO, ROLANDO claimed that they had been in possession of the lot in the concept of owner for more
ROSE, EDELYN R. PALACIO and MINERVA than thirty (30) years and have been paying realty taxes since time immemorial. And
R. PASTRANA, DOMINICA RESTAR- Promulgated: they denied having shared with the plaintiffs the produce of the lot or that upon Flores
RELOJERO and PACIENCIA RESTAR November 22, 2005 death in 1989, Esmenia requested the plaintiffs to allow her to hold on to it to finance
MANARES, her childrens education, they contending that by 1977, the children had already finished
Respondents. their respective courses.[7]
CARPIO MORALES, J.:
The defendants Heirs of Flores further claimed that after World War II and under the
In 1935, Emilio Restar (Restar) died intestate, leaving eight (8) children-compulsory new Tax Declaration in 1945, Flores caused the transfer of parcels of ricelands situated
heirs, namely: Flores Restar, Dolores Restar-Cichon, Perpetua Restar-Sta. Maria, in Carugdog, Lezo, Aklan to his siblings as their shares from the estate of their father
Paciencia Restar-Manares, Dominica Restar-Relojero, Policarpio Restar, Maria Restar- Restar;[8] and an extra-judicial partition was subsequently executed on September 28,
Rose and Adolfo Restar. 1973 by Restars heirs, which was notarized by one Atty. Jose Igtanloc, dividing and
apportioning among themselves four (4) parcels of land. [9]
In 1960, Restars eldest child, Flores, on the basis of a July 12, 1959 Joint Affidavit [1] he
executed with one Helen Restar, caused the cancellation of Tax Declaration No. The defendant Adolfo Restar, by separate Answer,[10] alleged that the complaint did not
6696[2] in Restars name covering a 5,918[3] square meter parcel of land, Lot 3177 (the state a cause of action as against him for he interposed no objection to the partition of
lot), located at Barangay Carugdog, Lezo, Aklan which was among the properties left the lot among the heirs of Restar.
by Restar, and the issuance of Tax Declaration No. 11134 in his name.
Flores died on June 10, 1989.

CO-OWNERSHIP 22
As for the defendant Policarpio Restar, he in his Amended Answer[11] acknowledged WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, the appeal is hereby
Flores as the owner of the lot but claimed that a portion of it, 1,315 square meters, was GRANTED in so far as plaintiffs-appellants Heirs of Dolores
sold to him as shown by a Deed of Absolute Sale dated May 14, 1981.[12] He thus prayed Cichon, et al., are concerned and DENIED in so far as defendant-
that, among other things, an order for the partition of the lot among Restars heirs be appellant Policarpio Restar. The decision of the Regional Trial
issued excluding, however, that portion sold to him by Flores.[13] Court of Kalibo, Aklan, Branch 3, dated June 30, 1999
After trial, Branch 3 of the RTC of Kalibo, Aklan held that Flores share in Restars estate is MODIFIED. The ruling of the said court that the heirs of Flores
was not the lot but that covered by Cadastral Lot No. 3183. Nevertheless, the trial court, Restar have acquired ownership by adverse possession of the land
holding that Flores and his heirs had performed acts sufficient to constitute repudiation in question, Cadastral Lot No. 6686, is hereby REVERSED.
of the co-ownership, concluded that they had acquired the lot by prescription. [14]
SO ORDERED. (Emphasis in the original)
Respecting the defendant Policarpios claim that a portion of the lot was sold to him, the The appellate court having denied reconsideration of its decision, only the defendants
trial court discredited the same upon noting that Flores signature in the purported Deed Heirs of Flores filed the present petition, assigning the following errors:
of Sale differed from those appearing in other documents submitted by the parties; in
1981, when the said Deed of Sale was alleged to have been executed, Flores was A. THE COURT OF APPEALS PATENTLY ERRED IN
admittedly paralyzed and bedridden and could not have written his name in a straight REVERSING THE RULING OF THE LOWER COURT THAT
manner, as in fact his signature appearing in at least two documents dated 1980 was THE PETITIONERS AS HEIRS OF FLORES RESTAR HAVE
crooked, and there existed discrepancies in the spelling of Flores wifes signature which ACQUIRED OWNERSHIP BY ADVERSE POSSESSION OF
read Esmea in the deed, and not as Esmenia.[15] THE LAND IN QUESTION.

The trial court thus dismissed the complaint by Decision of June 30, 1999. [16] B. THE COURT OF APPEALS PATENTLY ERRED IN NOT
On appeal by the defendants Heirs of Flores and Policarpio Restar, the appellate court, RULING THAT THERE WAS ACQUISITIVE PRESCRIPTION
by Decision of October 29, 2002.[17] reversed the decision of the trial court, it finding ON THE LAND IN QUESTION NOTWITHSTANDING THAT
that the defendants Heirs of Flores failed to prove that their possession of the lot THE LAND IN QUESTION HAS BEEN DECLARED IN THE
excluded their co-owners or that they derived title to it from a separate conveyance to NAME OF FLORES RESTAR, FATHER OF PETITIONERS, AS
them by Restar. EARLY AS 1960 AND THAT PETITIONERS AND THEIR
PREDECESSOR-IN-INTEREST HAVE BEEN IN OPEN,
The appellate court further found that there was no adequate notice by Flores to his CONTINUOUS, EXCLUSIVE AND NOTORIOUS
other co-heirs/co-owners of the repudiation of the co-ownership and neither was there POSSESSION OF THE LAND IN QUESTION IN THE
a categorical assertion by the defendants of their exclusive right to the entire lot that CONCEPT OF OWNER FOR MORE THAN THIRTY (30)
barred the YEARS.[20]
plaintiffs claim of ownership.[18]
The petition is impressed with merit.
And the appellate court found it credible for the plaintiffs to have failed to immediately
take legal action to protect their rights on account of forbearance towards their eldest Article 494 of the New Civil Code expressly provides:
brother who had asked them to continue cultivating the lot to support his childrens
education.[19] ART. 494. No co-owner shall be obliged to remain in the co-ownership. Each
co-owner may demand at any time the partition of the thing owned
Respecting the defendant Policarpios claim that part of the lot had been sold to him by in common, insofar as his share is concerned.
Flores, the appellate court sustained the trial courts rejection thereof.
xxx
Accordingly, the appellate court disposed:

CO-OWNERSHIP 23
No prescription shall run in favor of a co-owner or co-heir against his co- When Restar died in 1935, his eight children became pro indiviso co-owners
owners or co-heirs so long as he expressly or impliedly recognizes of the lot by intestate succession. Respondents never possessed the lot, however, much
the co-ownership. less asserted their claim thereto until January 21, 1999 when they filed the complaint
for partition subject of the present petition.
While the action to demand partition of a co-owned property does not prescribe, a co-
owner may acquire ownership thereof by prescription[21] where there exists a clear In contrast, Flores took possession of the lot after Restars death and exercised
repudiation of the co-ownership, and the co-owners are apprised of the claim of adverse acts of dominion thereon tilling and cultivating the land, introducing improvements,
and exclusive ownership.[22] and enjoying the produce thereof.

Acquisitive prescription of dominion and other real rights may be ordinary or The statutory period of prescription, however, commenced not in 1935 but in
extraordinary. Ordinary acquisitive prescription requires possession of things in good 1960 when Flores, who had neither title nor good faith, secured a tax declaration in his
faith and with just title for a period of ten years. Without good faith and just title, name and may, therefore, be said to have adversely claimed ownership of the lot. And
acquisitive prescription can only be extraordinary in character which requires respondents were also deemed to have been on said date become aware of the adverse
uninterrupted adverse possession for thirty years. claim.[24]

Thus, the New Civil Code provides: Flores possession thus ripened into ownership through acquisitive
prescription after the lapse of thirty years in accordance with the earlier quoted Article
ART. 1117. Acquisitive prescription of dominion and other real 1137 of the New Civil Code.
rights may be ordinary or extraordinary.
The following observations of the trial court thus merit this Courts approval.
Ordinary acquisitive prescription requires possession of things in
good faith and with just title for the time fixed by law. The evidence proved that as far back as 1959, Flores Restar
adjudicated unto himself the whole land in question as his share from
ART. 1134. Ownership and other real rights over immovable his father by means of a joint affidavit which he executed with one
property are acquired by ordinary prescription through possession of Helen Restar, and he requested the Provincial Treasurer/Assessor to
ten years. have the land declared in his name. It was admitted by the parties
during the pre-trial that this affidavit was the basis of the transfer of
ART. 1137. Ownership and other real rights over immovables also prescribe Tax Declaration No. 6686 from Emilio Restar to Flores Restar. So
through uninterrupted adverse possession thereof for thirty years, that from 1960 the land was declared in the name of Flores Restar
without need of title or of good faith. (Exhibit 10). This was the first concrete act of repudiation made by
Flores of the co-ownership over the land in question. x x x

Resolving the main issue of whether petitioners acquired ownership over the lot by Plaintiffs did not deny that aside from the verbal partition of one
extraordinary prescription, the appellate court held in the negative. parcel of land in Carugdog, Lezo, Aklan way back in 1945, they also
had an amicable partition of the lands of Emilio Restar in Cerrudo
While this Court is not a trier of facts, if the inference drawn by the appellate and Palale, Banga Aklan on September 28, 1973 (exhibit 20). If they
court from the facts is manifestly mistaken, it may, in the interest of justice, review the were able to demand the partition, why then did they not demand the
evidence in order to arrive at the correct factual conclusions based on the record. [23] inclusion of the land in question in order to settle once and for all the
inheritance from their father Emilio Restar, considering that at that
Contrary to the findings of the appellate court, the records of the case amply time all of the brothers and sisters, the eight heirs of Emilio Restar,
support petitioners claim that the requirements for extraordinary prescription had been were still alive and participated in the signing of the extra-judicial
duly met. partition?

CO-OWNERSHIP 24
Also it was admitted that Flores died only in 1989. Plaintiffs had all continued enjoyment of the property and its produce to the exclusion of respondents.
the chances (sic) to file a case against him from 1960, or a period of And Flores adverse possession was continued by his heirs.
29 years when he was still alive, yet they failed to do so. They filed
the instant case only on January 22, 1999, almost ten (10) years after The appellate courts crediting of respondents justification for failing to
Flores death. immediately take legal action to protect their rights forbearance toward Flores and/or
his wife who asked to be allowed to cultivate the land to support their childrens
From the foregoing evidence, it can be seen that the adverse education does not impress. For assuming such justification to be true, why did not any
possession of Flores started in 1960, the time when the tax of respondents assail Flores continuous possession after his children completed their
declaration was transferred in his name. The period of acquisitive college education in 1977?
prescription started to run from this date. Hence, the adverse
possession of Flores Restar from 1960 vested in him exclusive The trial courts finding and conclusion that Flores and his heirs had for more
ownership of the land considering the lapse of more than 38 years. than 38 years possessed the land in open, adverse and continuous possession in the
Acquisitive prescription of ownership, laches and prescription of the concept of owner − which length of possession had never been questioned, rebutted or
action for partition should be considered in favor of Flores Restar and disputed by any of respondents, being thus duly supported by substantial evidence, he
his heirs. [25] and his heirs have become owner of the lot by extraordinary prescription. It is
unfortunate that respondents slept on their rights. Dura lex sed lex.
While tax declarations and receipts are not conclusive evidence of ownership
and do not prove title to the land, nevertheless, when coupled with actual possession, WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The decision of the Court of
they constitute evidence of great weight[26] and can be the basis of a claim of ownership Appeals is REVERSED and SET ASIDE and the June 30, 1999 decision of the trial
through prescription.[27] court is REINSTATED.

As for respondents claim that they have been receiving shares from the
produce of the land, it was correctly discredited by the trial court.

[P]laintiffs claim that Flores Restar gave them five to eight gantas
each as their shares in the produce cannot be sustained. A few gantas
cannot be considered one-eight share of sixty (60) cavans of palay
produced per cropping. One eight of sixty cavans would be at least
six cavans, not merely gantas after excluding expenses for cultivation
and production. If plaintiffs were to be believed, their whole 7/8 share
of the produce would total two cavans, six gantas only at the usual
rate of 25 gantas per cavan.[28]

Unless there are strong and impelling reasons to disturb the trial courts findings of
facts which must, as a matter of judicial policy, be accorded with the highest respect,
they must remain. Respondents have not, however, proffered any reason warranting
the disturbance of the trial courts findings of facts.

Indeed, the following acts of Flores show possession adverse to his co-heirs:
the cancellation of the tax declaration certificate in the name of Restar and securing
another in his name; the execution of a Joint Affidavit stating that he is the owner and
possessor thereof to the exclusion of respondents; payment of real estate tax and
irrigation fees without respondents having ever contributed any share therein; and

CO-OWNERSHIP 25

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