Willbanks 1

Jonathan Willbanks

Writing 140

Michael Cucher

November 9, 2007

Red Blood, Black Oil

Why didn’t we do anything? How could we stand back and just let it happen?

These are the questions the world has asked itself in the wake of atrocities like the

holocaust, the Cambodian genocide, and the ethnic cleansing of Rwanda. If international

policy does not soon change, we will find ourselves asking the same questions about

Darfur. It is in this region of Sudan that government-backed Arab militias are actively

embarking on a widespread campaign to cleanse blacks from the oil-rich fields in the

region. Thankfully, some groups are trying to affect this change. Rebel groups are

actively involved in armed conflict to protect displaced refuges from the Darfur region.

Unfortunately, this is little more than a band-aid on a gaping wound. The Sudanese

government’s disregard for international outcry and public opinion also renders purely

political or diplomatic efforts insufficient to stop the violence in the region. Exacerbate

the dilemma, political initiatives are often hindered by western governments’

unwillingness to commit to the expenditure of political capital necessary to impact

Sudanese policy. Economic pressures prove to be the best means to bring peace to Sudan

because they can be implemented both at the national and grassroots level, cutting off the

government-dependent military from the cash flow it desperately needs to fund militia

groups and their ethnic cleansing in the Darfur. If there is a solution to the Darfur crisis it

is an economic one; historically, economic pressure has been one of the few effective
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means of coercion against the Sudanese government, and it is only through economic

measures such as targeted sanctions and divestment that the world community has seen

any significant tangible moves toward peace in the war-torn region, and it is only through

measures such as these, specifically against heavily invested oil companies in the region

that further progress toward peace can be made and the oil-driven ethnic cleansing will

come to an end.

In the exploration of economic measures against Sudan, it becomes apparent that

oil in inextricably entwined in the Sudanese economy and may in fact motivate many of

the government’s ethnic cleansing efforts in Darfur. When the oil industry emerged in

Sudan in the late 1990’s, the sleepy isolationist policies of a destitute Khartoum began to

give way to a growing economy that embraced foreign trade, leading to massive

economic growth. “With the construction of a[n oil] pipeline, oil extracted from the south

is now earning the Sudan's government well over a million dollars a day,” by far the

government’s largest source of income (Martin, 1). With the emergence of its oil

industry, Khartoum became acutely aware of its own economic potential. Driven largely

by a desire to satiate hungry foreign oil companies like PetroChina, Petronas, Total, and

Talisman, the Sudanese government began looking to increase production by creating

more drill sites (Martin, 3). Unfortunately for the people of Sudan’s Darfur region, many

of them populate the fields directly above the valuable oil reserves. Though the global

community can do little more than speculate, some believe that the Sudanese

government’s ethnic cleansing campaign against the black population of Darfur is largely

motivated by a desire to clear the land for oil production. According to foreign affairs

analyst Randolf Martin, “Some of the world’s largest oil companies have large financial
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interests in Sudan, making “foreign emissaries […] more circumspect in their criticism of

the regime. (Martin, 3). Because of their large oil interests, few foreign countries are

willing to criticize or pressure Khartoum to end the violence in Darfur for fear of

alienating an oil supplier and trading partner. The US is the only country to virtually

eliminate oil imports from Sudan, a move that instantly raised oil prices for the American

people. But its efforts alone will not be enough to sufficiently impact the Sudanese oil

industry or its economy because even if the US is not directly buying oil from Sudan, all

foreign contracts are conducted in US dollars, essentially forcing an economic

relationship between the two countries. Further efforts through international forums like

the UN are frequently hindered by Sudan’s powerful oil-dependent trading partners, most

notably China, a UN Security Council member whose PetroChina has a massive stake in

Sudanese oil production. For sanction and divestment strategies to be effective, broad

international support will be required, particularly from Sudan’s neighbor states.

Some argue that sanction and divestment strategies often prove more harmful to

ordinary citizens than to their corrupt government. In response to these concerns, many

organizations are choosing to implement the “Task Force’ model of divestment,” which

“is tailored to carefully target only the most egregiously offending companies,” such as

the American firm Berkshire Hathaway, the largest domestic shareholder in PetroChina.

The Task Force Divestment Model excludes any company that substantially benefits

those outside of government circles,” thus theoretically preventing the economic

devastation that occurred in South Africa, Cuba, and Iraq in the wake of the similarly

well-intentioned but poorly executed blanketed economic sanctions against those nations

(Sudan Divestment UK). This model takes care to exclude companies involved in
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medicine, agriculture, education, and general consumer goods that the people of Sudan

depend upon in their daily lives. Though there will be some inevitable trickle-down of

these economic measures which may affect the Sudanese people, the situation is

somewhat alleviated by the government’s tendency to invest little in improving its

people’s standard of living, but rather in military and government expansion. With little

money going to the people in the first place, there will not be much for them to miss if it

is taken away. Whatever negative effects targeted sanctions and divestment may have on

the Sudanese people, the impact on their daily lives should be minimal, and the costs are

far outweighed by the potential for peace in the region. (Sudan Divestment UK, 2)

Diplomacy’s ineffectiveness in the case of Sudan leads to economic pressure as the

only effective possible course of action. As a developing nation, one of the Sudanese

government’s greatest priorities is maintaining the flow of foreign investment into the

country. When this is threatened, Khartoum pays attention. In 1997, the US was

successful in ending Sudan’s support of terrorist groups when it levied economic

sanctions on Sudan. Sanctions and divestment initiatives also serve to keep Darfur in the

headlines. “The New York Times, Wall Street Journal, Washington Post, International

Herald Tribune, LA Times, BBC, Financial Times, NPR, Christian Science Monitor, and

many other media outlets,” have given media attention to these economic measures

against Sudan, keeping the Darfur crisis on the forefront of public consciousness

(Rogoff). An informed public is the best mechanism to pressure Western governments

into economic action. But how is this economic pressure implemented?

There are two primary economic means by which Khartoum may be coerced:

sanctions and divestment. Economic sanctions are typically levied on one country by
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another, or by the global community through organizations like the UN. Divestment is

another effective means by which economic pressure can be applied to Sudan. At the

national and grassroots level, divestment initiatives aim to stop investment in companies

or governments contributing to the genocide-sponsoring Sudanese government, and by

extension its military. It is these two methods of economic pressure that should be most

heavily explored in the fight to end genocide in Darfur.

Given the growing Sudanese economy’s heavy dependence upon foreign

investment, it is especially susceptible to economic pressure from its trading partners.

The US in particular has led the charge in implementing coercive economic measures

against Khartoum. Beginning in 2002, the Bush administration levied such sanctions on

Sudan for its failure to stop the genocide in Darfur, “providing $10 million in aid to

Sudanese opposition forces,” and imposing “stock market sanctions on those invested in

Sudan,” effectively evicting them from the New York Stock Exchange (Martin, 4). This

Sudan Peace Act also seeks a UN Security Council Resolution for an arms embargo on

Sudan, instructs US executives to oppose loans, credits, and other guarantees to Sudan,

and most importantly aims to take steps to deny the Sudanese government access to oil

revenue which may be used for military purposes (US Department of State, 1). These

measures have proven somewhat effective, yielding “tangible results on the four major

issues in the negotiations: security arrangements; wealth-sharing; power-sharing; and the

three conflict areas of Abyei, Nuba Mountains, and Southern Blue Nile. Historically

however, the US’ economic sanctions have not always resulted in a desirable outcome,

frequently resulting in unwanted “blowback,” or unforeseen, undesirable consequences as

a result of the sanctions. Such was the case with Iraq in the 1990’s, when US-levied
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economic sanctions crippled the Iraqi economy, consolidating Saddam Hussein’s power

base while harming the Iraqi people. For this reason, the US has chosen to implement

primarily targeted sanctions, or sanctions intended to reduce military and government

income which may be used to sponsor further ethnic cleansing, rather than enacting

blanket economic sanctions and throwing the people of Sudan into further poverty,

hopefully avoiding another disaster like Iraq. While history books can help us avoid the

pitfalls of sanctions of the past, a new means of economic pressure finds itself on less-

certain ground: divestment.

Through targeted divestment, corporations and individuals avoid investing in or

terminate their existing investments in companies that do business with Sudan in an effort

to keep money out of the Sudanese government’s hands. Several large companies

including Xerox, Chevron, and numerous investment firms have led this initiative to

divest in Sudan. Even some state governments are taking an active role in the divestment

efforts, led by Governor Schwarzenegger of California, who recently signed legislation to

divest the state from Sudanese interests. One of the most appealing aspects of divestment

however is the ability of individuals to participate at the grassroots level, making personal

investment choices that avoid companies tied to Sudan. The combined state and

grassroots efforts have made a noticeable impact on the amount of new foreign

investment entering Sudan. “Perceiving the divestment movement as a clear threat, the

Khartoum government has taken considerable steps to publicly oppose divestment,”

going so far as to place “a $1 million advertisement in The New York Times extolling the

virtues of investing in Sudan. and issuing both a press release and an op-ed condemning

the divestment movement,” (Rogoff, 2). Once signs of divestment’s efficacy came to
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light, support quickly gathered for further divestment action. In 2007, the US congress

passed the Darfur Accountability and Divestment Act which authorizes and strongly

encourages state governments to divest, and even goes so far as to prohibit federal

contracts with any foreign companies linked to funding the genocide. Though divestment

is not by itself an answer to the violence in Darfur, it is making a difference. An

emerging economy such as Sudan’s cannot survive sustained foreign divestment and

Khartoum will eventually be forced to react.

In the case of Sudan, traditional diplomatic, political, and military resistance

movements can have at best minimal results, leaving economic action as the primary

means by which to encourage peace in Darfur. Even this is not a clear-cut solution, as

policy-makers must wade through an intricate web of global economic ties to Sudan’s oil

industry, preventing large-scale global action against Sudan. However, through the

sanctions imposed by the US government, as well as the targeted divestment efforts of

companies and individuals around the world, there may be hope to inflict enough

economic pressure on Khartoum that an end to the violence can be reached. If however

our measures do not prove effective, we may soon be asking ourselves the questions,

“Why didn’t we do anything? How could we stand back and just let it happen?”
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Works Cited

VOA NEWS: CONGRESS, PRESIDENT MAY FACE SHOWDOWN OVER DARFUR

SANCTIONS. (2007, October 4). US Fed News Service, Including US State

News, Retrieved November 9, 2007, from General Interest Module database.

(Document ID: 1357235461).

Randolph Martin (2002). Sudan's Perfect War. Foreign Affairs, 81(2), 111-127.

Retrieved November 9, 2007, from ABI/INFORM Global database. (Document

ID: 107398532).

Rogoff, Lisa. "Sleeping with the Enemy: What’s Driving U.S. Policy Toward Sudan?"

Young Professionals in Foreign Policy. 22 Aug. 2007. Young Professionals in

Foreign Policy. 08 Oct. 2007

<http://www.ypfp.org/sleeping_with_the_enemy_what_s_driving_u_s_policy_to

ward_sudan>.

"Darfur Demands Sanctions, Not Words." Human Rights Watch. 13 Dec. 2006. Human

Rights Watch. 9 Nov. 2007

<http://hrw.org/english/docs/2006/12/12/darfur14833.htm>.

"Sudan Peace Act." US Department of State. 21 Oct. 2002. 9 Nov. 2007

<http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2002/14531.htm>.

"Sudan Divestment UK." Sudan Divestment UK. 2007. Sudan Divestment Task

Force. 9 Nov. 2007 <http://www.sudandivestment.co.uk/>.