CLIO 35:1 2005

CHRISTOPHER ANDERSON-IRWIN
"But the serpent did not lie": Reading,
History, and Hegel's Interpretation of
Genesis Chapter 3

G.W.F. Hegel has been widely criticized for bis failure to

understand properly Jewisb religious culture and its
foundational text, tbe Jewisb Bible. Yet tbrougbout bis
work, Hegel turns to tbe Jewisb Bible in order to develop bis
interpretation of pivotal moments in tbe bistory of self-
consciousness. Tbis is evident, for example, in tbe lectures
on tbe pbilosopby of bistory in wbicb he claims that the form
of subjectivity tbat is expressed tbrough the Psalms and the
books of tbe propbets represents tbe infinite longing tbat
makes tbe transition to fully realized self-consciousness
possible (a transition he associates with the relationship
between Judaism and tbe origins of Cbristianity in tbe
ancient world).^ Tbe importance of tbe Jewisb Bible to
Hegel's work is most strongly demonstrated by bis inter-
pretation of Genesis 3. Tbe story of "tbe fall" of tbe first
buman beings, not from grace but into self-consciousness
and bistorical existence, is pivotal for Hegel. Despite
making occasional references to otber ancient mytbs about
a "golden age," be does not attribute tbe same pbilosopbical
significance to tbese mytbs as be does to tbe story found in
Genesis. It is tbe Garden of Eden story, witb its paradoxical
structure, witb its seemingly ambiguous message about tbe
origins of bumanity (is tbe fall a tragedy, or is it logically

1. G. W. F. Hegel, The Philosophy of History, trans. J. Sihree (New York:

Dover, 1956), 320-23.
30 "But the serpent did not lie"

and existentially necessary?) that captures in narrative form

the origins of self-consciousness that Hegel describes in
pbilosopbical terms.
And yet Hegel also expresses a certain ambivalence
towards tbe Garden of Eden story. Tbere are two distinct
but interrelated reasons for tbis ambivalence. First, Hegel
argues tbat tbe spiritual insigbts of tbe Bible are limited by
tbeir narrative form. Tbe fact tbat tbe story is a story, or a
"mytb," wbicb depicts singular events tbat bave allegedly
taken place in a remote past limits its capacity to express
fully and accurately tbe universal trutb of spirit. Tbis
objection follows from Hegel's famous critique of modes of
tbinking wbicb use Vorstellung. As Quentin Lauer observes,
tbe term Vorstellung, wbicb is most frequently translated as
"representation" by Englisb commentators, can be difficult
to grasp because of its diverse connotations.^ On tbe one
band, Vorstellung means "idea," and thus is directly
connected to the act of thinking. However, when Hegel
opposes "representation" (Vorstellung) to "concept" (Begriff),
he argues that the type of thinking involved in the former is
too dependent on particular, finite images, a problem tbat is
not shared by conceptual tbinking (I will elaborate on
Hegel's definition of conceptual, pbilosopbical tbinking
below). In Hegel's view, tbe "representations" used in tbe
Garden of Eden story—tbe figures of Adam, Hawa, tbe ser-
pent, God "walking in tbe garden," tbe setting of tbe Garden
of Eden, even tbe very temporality of tbe story as a series of
events—serve to limit tbe trutb of wbat they represent,
namely, the universal story of the origins of human self-
consciousness, which is not limited to any particular time,
place, or figure. Hegel's concerns with the narrative form of
the story are further complicated by a second factor: bis
attitudes towards Judaism. Hegel regards tbe "Jewisb
religious consciousness" tbat produced Genesis 3 as being
inberently limited because it defines itself as separate from
tbe infinite subjectivity of God. It is tbis separation, be
argues, tbat renders Jewisb religious consciousness unable
to grasp in full tbe trutb tbat it implicitly produces tbrougb
its biblical narratives.

2. See Quentin Lauer's discussion of Vorstellung, in Hegel's Concept of God

(Albany: State U of New York P, 1982), 34-35.
Christopher Anderson-Irwin 31

However, even though Hegel maintains that both the

Bible and Jewish religious consciousness are limited, the
actual practice of his reading—the method of his own
particular biblical hermeneutic—implies that, in order to
read the Bible as a source of philosophical truth, one has to
presuppose that there is a dialectical relationship between
the self-conscious reader and the self-conscious presentation
of the text. This relationship between reader and text cuts
across Hegel's distinction between representational and
conceptual language and challenges the assumption that the
Bible needs philosophy to realize fully the truth of its
content. It also challenges the assumption that the Jewish
religious consciousness that produced the text is somehow
"limited" and unable to interpret the text with the kind of
critical self-consciousness Hegel associates with philosophy,
or even Christianity, which he regards as more spiritually
developed than Judaism, and therefore closer to philosophy.
There is an implicit dialectical method revealed in Hegel's
readings of the Garden of Eden story in Genesis 3 that
conflicts with his explicitly stated position on both Scripture
and Judaism. This method relies on a critical reader to
discern the truth of the text, as well as on certain operations
within the text that draw a critical response from the
reader. The relationship between the reader and the biblical
story borders on becoming dialogical, although Hegel stops
short of recognizing this. The text "speaks," as it were, to
the reader through its apparent contradictions, inconsis-
tencies and paradoxes; it demands a response. In order to
show how this dialogical approach to the text operates
within Hegel's reading, I will introduce the theory of biblical
hermeneuties developed by Martin Buber and Franz
Rosenzweig. This comparison between Hegel's reading and
Rosenzweig and Buber's biblical hermeneuties further
demonstrates that Hegel's approach to the Garden of Eden
story undermines his efforts to maintain hierarchical
distinctions between philosophical thought and biblical text.
If the story told in Genesis 3 presents a "true" account of the
origins of human history via self-consciousness, as Hegel
claims it does, then these distinctions cannot be maintained.
On the contrary, the story itself-its textual content as well
as its form-must make possible and support Hegel's
philosophical reading.
32 "But the serpent did not lie"

The controversial and paradoxical claim that shapes

Hegel's Lectures on the Philosophy of Religion is that
philosophy and religion share the same content and the
same object: "it must be said tbat the content of philosophy,
its need and interest, is wholly in common with that of
religion. The object of religion, like that of philosophy, is the
eternal truth, God and nothing but God and tbe explication
of God. Pbilosopby is only explicating itself wben it expli-
cates religion, and wben it explicates itself it is explicating
religion."^
Tbe above formulation is striking because it suggests tbe
possibility that the interpretive relationship between pbilo-
sophy and religion is reciprocal. If philosophy is only expli-
cating itself when it explicates religion, then it must be tbe
case tbat, wben religion explicates philosophy, it is only
explicating itself. Yet Hegel will not admit the latter possi-
bility, insisting instead tbat tbere is a distinction between
the logical, conceptual form of philosophy and the repre-
sentational forms through which the truths of religion are
expressed.
The distinction between pbilosopbical tbougbt and repre-
sentation (Vorstellung) is central to Hegel's views on the
problematic nature of religious modes of tbougbt. In bis
view, religious consciousness (tbe consciousness of believers
or adberents in a religious tradition) relates to divinity only
tbrough various modes of representation, whether it be
mytbological narratives, artistic images, natural elements,
or ceremonial objects and acts. Insofar as religious con-
sciousness posits tbe divine as a being otber tban itself in
the form of these representations, consciousness always
posits itself as different from (or other than) divinity. In the
case of Genesis 3, for example, the mind of the believer-
reader is always separate from God because God's activities
are located witbin tbe space of wbat Hegel regards as a
mytbobistorical account of a remote past, a past in wbicb
tbe reader cannot participate. Tbis separation from God via
tbese representational elements is complicated by tbe fact
tbat representations are inberently finite, tbat is, they are

3. G. W. F. Hegel, Lectures on the Philosophy of Religion: One-Volume Edition,

The Lectures of 1827, ed. Peter C. Hodgson (Berkeley: U of California P, 1988), 78-
79. My analysis wül be based primarily on tbe 1827 lectures, arguably tbe most
pbilosopbically refined version of tbe lectures be gave between 1821 and 1831.
Christopher Anderson-Irwin 33
singular, limited depictions of ideas using things, persons,
or events. According to Hegel, it is precisely this singularity
that is essential to their meaning from the perspective of
religious consciousness. Hegel does not object to the
concretization of ideas; indeed, this is essential to spirit's
development. Rather, what is at issue is the tendency of
religious consciousness to define spirit using certain
particular representations that must always remain "other"
to itself. It is because of the "form" of these representations
that religious consciousness is unable to grasp in full the
truth that it represents through its "content."
Hegel contrasts religious representations with a philo-
sophical approach to God, arguing that, when human self-
consciousness reaches the level where it thinks philoso-
phically, it recognizes that thought itself is divine—that God
is not simply other to human beings and therefore radically
particular (that is, a supreme Being different from all other
beings). The divinity of thought is found in its capacity to
overcome all the finite determinations that have afflicted
spirit throughout its development. Philosophy not only com-
prehends but articulates in an analytic, conceptual manner
the universality of the operations of spirit. The difference
between philosophy and religious consciousness on this
point is not simply one of language, however, but of the form
of thinking. According to Hegel, philosophy has a critical
distance from the representational content of religion that
allows it to at once see its truth, but also to recognize that
that truth is not limited to the form in which it is arti-
culated. Thus it is only philosophy which can adequately
describe the universality of the dialectic between God and
human beings, a dialectic that is manifested in diverse ways
through particular religions.
If we accept this view of the relationship between philo-
sophy and religion, what happens to a religious text such as
the Bible? If philosophy eventually comes to speak the truth
of religion more truthfully than religion itself, no text, no
ceremony, no prayer can retain its "religious" meaning or
relevance, at least not without disputing the authority of
philosophy. And yet, as Werner Hamacher recognizes, the
operation of Hegelian hermeneutics depends upon repre-
sentational content, a "text," as it were, which is to be read
philosophically. Hamacher argues that Hegel is unable to
overcome the relationship between the philosophical inter-
34 "But tbe serpent did not lie"

pretation of religion and its textual content because tbe

content always demands a reading of its "representations,"
that is, its words, images, or symbols are tbe very condition
for tbe possibility of all philosophical reading of religion.
The fact that philosophy must continue to read, even as it
strives to raise itself above tbe limits of representation, is,
in Hamacber's view, a constant source of frustration and
disruption for Hegel's tbinking: "Reading is the work of
mourning over the loss of this unity of objectivation and
subjectivity, a loss wbicb tbe act of reading itself produces.
Reading is tberefore potentially infinite, a melancbolia,
because it repeats tbe very tear it attempts to mend."* Tbe
tear tbat pbilosopbical reading attempts to mend is tbat
wbicb rends concept and representation, or, more specifi-
cally in tbe case of tbe Bible, tbe tear tbat divides tbe pre-
sentation of spirit tbrougb narrative and its (re)articulation
in pbilosopbical language.
If in fact Hegelian tbougbt finds success only wben it
mends tbe tear between pbilosopbical and religious langu-
age in sucb a way tbat religion becomes pbilosopby, tben it
seems tbat Hamacber must be correct. The need to "read"
a religious text such as the Bible will always be a reminder
of tbe failure of pbilosopbical exegesis as it attempts to
overcome tbe limits of otber modes of tbougbt, for tbe text
will endure as tbe basis, tbe point of reference, tbe begin-
ning of tbe very act of reading tbat is inextricably bound to
tbe act of tbinking.
Yet, it could be argued, Hegel's views on representation do
not actually lead to sucb an extreme polarization of religion
and pbilosopby. Paul Ricoeur makes the case that Hegel
came to realize that his mistrust of representational modes
of thinking actually threatened to falsify the claim that
philosophy and religion share the same content or object.
Ricoeur furtber suggests tbat Hegel found tbe bridge
between representation and pbilosopby be was looking for
in tbe Cbristian tbeological tradition.^ But wbile Ricoeur

4. See Werner Hamacher, Pleroma—Reading in Hegel, trans. Nicholas Walker

and Simon Jarvis (Stanford: Stanford UP, 1998), 106.
5. See Paul Ricoeur, "The Status of Vorstellung in Hegel's Philosophy of
Religion," in Meaning, Truth, and God, ed. Leroy S. Rouner (Notre Dame: U of
Notre Dame P, 1982), 85.
Christopher Anderson-Irwin 35

seems to think that Hegel's appeal to Christian theological

traditions of interpretation is a plausible solution to tbe
problem of Cbristianity's representational content, be does
not directly address tbe question of wbat becomes of tbe
Bible itself. He does suggest tbat tbe "narrative and
symbolic representations" of a text like tbe Bible would
indicate tbe attempt on tbe part of religious consciousness
to negate tbe first immediate experience of a revelation. As
an example of tbis process, be cites tbe "appearance" of tbe
bistorical Jesus as tbe immediate stage of Cbristianity,
wbicb is tben taken up and transformed via tbe Gospels and
developed furtber tbrougb tbe traditions of Cbristian
tbeology.
Tbe central problem identified by Hamacber remains,
bowever, in Ricoeur's attempt to smootb tbe tensions be-
tween religious representations and pbilosopbical inter-
pretation. It follows from Ricouer's argument tbat tbe
narratives of tbe Bible—Jewish or Christian—would still be
notbing otber tban transitional moments (for example, in
tbe form of bistorical narratives sucb as tbe Gospels) tbat
must be passed tbrougb as religious consciousness pusbes to
develop progressively more rational understandings of its
own content. Witb the shift away from the focus on the text
as a depiction of "immediate" events and towards rational
interpretation, the status of the text becomes unclear.
Ricoeur's assessment of Hegel's bermeneutics seems to
entail tbat tbe fate of tbe text would be to endure wbat be
describes as tbe "endless deatb of tbe representation," tbe
endless Aufhebung tbrougb wbicb it is rearticulated but
never cbanges in itself (87).
To explore tbe tensions between pbilosopbical tbougbt
and tbe content of religion in a way tbat goes beyond
inflexible distinctions, it is necessary to look more closely at
Hegel's understanding of bow pbilosopbical interpretation
works wben applied to tbe Bible. Hegel's discussion of tbe
Bible presupposes a sbarp division between tbe act of
interpretation and tbe text itself. He models bis basic
principle of scriptural interpretation on tbe Pauline
distinction between letter and spirit: "One does not take tbe
words [of tbe Bible] as tbey stand, because wbat is
understood by tbe biblical 'word' is not words or letters as
36 "But the serpent did not lie"

such but the spirit with which they are grasped."® It could
be argued that Hegel is not really denigrating the status of
the Bible as text (as "letter" or "words") so much as he is
arguing for an authoritative interpretation of the text based
on a philosophical conception of the infinite nature of spirit.
But the possibility of such an authoritative, philosophical
reading raises the question of what happens to the letter of
the text, to its significance and to its integrity. To what
extent could a philosophical reading be justified in
attributing "errors" or "contradictions" to a passage from the
Bible if the content of the passage did not lend itself to the
reading the philosophical interpreter wants to give it? It
would seem to follow from Hegel's position that the text
cannot be used to hold the interpreter accountable for his or
her hermeneutic choices.
Through the act of interpretation, philosophical reading
becomes increasingly less dependent on the language of the
Bible, to the point where philosophy will substitute its own
language for that of the text:
But just as soon as religion is no longer simply the reading and
repetition of passages, as soon as what is called explanation or
interpretation begins, as soon as an attempt is made by inference
and exegesis to find out the meaning of the words in the Bible,
then we embark upon the process of reasoning, reflection,
thinking; and the question then becomes how we should exercise
this process of thinking, and whether our thinking is correct or
not. It helps not at all to say that one's thoughts are based on
the Bible. As soon as these thoughts are no longer simply the
words of the Bible, their content is given a form, more
specifically, a logical form. (400)
The distinction between reading and interpretation in the
first sentence suggests that Hegel is reacting to a highly
conventional and limited understanding of what it means to
read the Bible. But as the passage goes on, it becomes
apparent that philosophical interpretation transforms that
which it interprets, thus leaving the words of the Bible in an
ambiguous position. It is not sufficient to say that the trans-
formation refers to the form of the text rather than its sub-
stantial content, for if the act of interpretation is understood
as giving the words of the Bible a "logical form," it begs the
question of what form they took previously, and why it was

6. Hegel, Lectures on the Philosophy of Religion: 1827 Lectures, 93.

Christopher Anderson-Irwin 37

inadequate. While it is obvious tbat the Bible is not written

as a philosophical treatise, it could nevertheless be argued
tbat it expresses tbe "logic" of spirit in and tbrougb tbe
particularity of its own language.
Anotber factor tbat complicates Hegel's reading of tbe
Jewisb Bible is the hierarchical distinction he maintains
between Judaism and Cbristianity. Altbougb Hegel will
criticize Cbristianity for its dependence on representational
images and stories, be will also attribute to it a spiritual
self-consciousness tbat interprets tbe Bible in sucb a way
tbat it can overcome tbe limits of representational form and
develop and enricb tbe text's content. But wbile Hegel
regards tbe spirit of Cbristianity as producing creative
interpretations and reinterpretations of tbe "letter" of its
text, be treats tbe relationship between letter and spirit in
Judaism differently. His lectures on religion contain discus-
sions of the limits of Judaism that echo his early writings in
which Judaism appears as hopelessly dependent upon an
abstract conception of God and religious practices that are
viewed as "external" commands.^ Because he continues to
emphasize what he identifies as the "servile" nature of
Jewish religious consciousness and the "abstract" nature of
tbe Jewisb God in bis later work, the idea that Jewish
religious consciousness is limited filters through to his
interpretation of the Jewish Bible.
However, it is also true tbat, as Hegel's interpretation of
tbe bistory of spirit develops in bis later work, it is Judaism
that makes possible the origins of Christianity, the culture
that he regards as providing the foundation for what will
eventually become tbe modern European world. In tbe
lectures on tbe pbilosopby of bistory, Hegel ascribes to
Judaism a concept of infinite subjectivity tbat be does not
identify witb tbe Roman world wbose culture only produces
finite oppositions tbat are experienced as tbe blind power of
"fate."* Tbat Hegel associates an infinite concept of sub-
jectivity witb Judaism demonstrates tbat be recognizes
—bowever indirectly—that it is beyond tbe limits of deter-
minate, finite consciousness. Eurtbermore, tbe lectures on

7. See The Spirit of Christianity and Its Fate, in Hegel's Early Theological
Writings, trans. T. M. Knox (Pbiladelpbia: U of Pennsylvania P, 1971).
8. See Hegel, The Philosophy of History, 320-23.
38 "But the serpent did not lie"

religion from the 1820s emphasize the role of the infinite

subject in both the Jewish conception of God and in Jewish
religious consciousness. In the 1824 version of the lectures,
he claims that the fear of the lord in Jewish consciousness
represents the recognition of the power of infinite negativity,
the power to overcome any finite limit or determination,^
Much like the experience of the bondsman in the Pheno-
menology of Spirit, religious consciousness experiences this
"fear" not simply as anxiety but as the consciousness of the
natural, finite limits of subjectivity melting away. It is for
this reason, Hegel claims, that the fear of the lord is asso-
ciated with the beginning of wisdom, for once consciousness
has experienced the negation of finite limits, it has begun to
recognize the power of spirit. Along with the negation of
finite limits, he adds, is the negation of the sense of depen-
dence in Jewish consciousness, and the first experience of
freedom via the "sublation of all dependence" (444).
However, in Hegel's view, there still remains in Jewish
consciousness a problematic separation between itself and
God's power, which is precisely why he does not speak of
Jewish consciousness as having obtained self-consciousness.
Yet even if Hegel insists on this separation in Jewish
consciousness, the notion of subjectivity he attributes to it is
such that it cannot be recognized by consciousness qua
consciousness: seZ/-consciousness would be required. Other-
wise, Jewish religious consciousness would not be able to
overcome the limits generated by a finite opposition between
human beings and God in order to develop the concept of
God as infinite subjectivity. Following the logic of Hegel's
analysis, the Jewish concept of God presented through the
Bible could only be conceived by a self-consciousness that
has already made the distinction between infinite spirit and
finite limits and that can then take a stand in relation to
God, as infinite subjectivity relating to infinite subjectivity.
While Hegel will stop short of saying that within Judaism
human beings stand in relation to God as infinite subject to
infinite subject, it seems that the only way to understand his
reading of the philosophical significance of the Jewish Bible

9, See Hegel, Lectures on the Philosophy of Religion, Volume IL Determinate

Religion, ed, Peter C, Hodgson, trans, R, F, Brown, P, C, Hodgson and J, M,
Stewart (Berkeley: U of California P, 1987), 443-44,
Christopber Anderson-Irwin 39
is by pressing bis conclusions at tbe precise moment tbat be
retreats to bis standard account of Judaism's limits.
Hegel's reading of tbe Garden of Eden story undermines
his generic statements about tbe limitations of the Jewish
Bible, botb as a text and as a product of Judaism. Hegel
refers to tbis story tbrougbout his work, and, while there are
variations in his interpretations of it, certain features
remain constant. First, he sees the story of the Garden of
Eden as revealing "the eternal and necessary history of
humanity" through its portrayal of the origin of self-con-
sciousness.^" The emergence of the consciousness of good
and evil represents the moment at whicb self-consciousness
makes a distinction between itself and immediate or natural
existence. Second, be always reads tbe story tbrougb tbe
lens of Cbristianity. He argues tbat it is Cbristianity and
not Judaism tbat grasps tbe spiritual trutb tbat tbe story
presents—namely tbe "reconciliation" between buman and
divine spirit tbrougb knowledge and self-consciousness
—and tbat Jewisb consciousness is incapable of compre-
bending tbis trutb because it regards itself as being
separated from God and tbus as finite. In one of bis more
extreme formulations, Hegel contends tbat tbe story's
meaning "remained dormant among tbe Jewisb people and
was not developed in the Hebraic [biblical] writings."" Tbe
final feature of Hegel's account of tbe Garden story tbat
remains constant is tbat it deploys tbe distinction between
wbat pbilosopby can glean from tbe content of tbe story and
tbe limitations of tbe form in wbicb it is presented. In tbe
1827 lectures on religion be argues tbat tbe narrative form
of tbe story leads inevitably to certain "inconsistencies" tbat
can only be overcome if tbe content of tbe story is grasped by
and rearticulated tbrougb tbougbt. ^^
Tbese tbree features reveal tbe paradox of Hegel's
interpretation of tbe story of tbe Garden Eden quite clearly.
But, as Hegel will sbow tbrougb bis own reading, tbis dis-
tinction between tbe limitations of tbe Bible and a pbilo-
sopbical reading tbat overcomes tbose limitations is not

10. Hegel, Lectures on the Philosophy of Religion: 1827 Lectures, 215.

11. From the 1831 lectures on the philosophy of religion. See Hegel's Lectures
on the Philosophy of Religion, Volume II: Determinate Religion, 440 n. 541.
12. Hegel, Lectures on the Philosophy of Religion: 1827 Lectures, 215.
40 "But the serpent did not lie"

sustainable. If tbe "Jewisb" story in Genesis 3 does not

already present tbe trutb of spirit in a consistent form, tben
neitber Cbristianity nor pbilosopby could produce tbe trutb
from it. In order for Cbristianity and/or pbilosopby to be
able to see tbe trutb in tbe "Hebraic writing" of the Jewish
Bible, the text itself must indicate an awareness of the
position it contains. Without this awareness, the story could
not produce a division between self-consciousness and
nature but would be limited to generating tbe finite opposi-
tion—or, wbat is tbe same, the immediate unity—of nature
and consciousness. Therefore, a philosophical reading of the
biblical story is only possible if tbe text itself is capable of
supporting tbat reading, if tbrough its structure, figures,
themes, and language it reflects the movement of spirit
through the origins of self-consciousness.
The tensions in Hegel's philosophical interpretation of
Genesis 3 are best exemplified in tbe 1827 lectures on tbe
pbilosopby of religion. In tbese lectures, be discusses tbe
Garden story in tbe context of a critique of mytbical
representations of an "original condition" tbat was somebow,
lamentably, lost. He defines tbe original condition as a state
in wbicb bumanity was supposed to bave enjoyed immediate
unity witb God and nature and argues tbat tbis "image" of
unity falsifies tbe genuine goal of bistory—tbe reconciliation
of buman existence witb God and nature. Tbis critique of
tbe original condition is situated at tbe outset of bis
discussion of natural religions, tbose religions tbat recognize
tbe unity of spirit and nature only in the form of a particular
individual (Hegel cites the human being as tbe most
"immediate mode" taken by religion as tbis stage). Wben
spirit is still conflated with natural particularity, it is not
yet recognized as free (207). There is no separation between
spirit and nature and bence no mediation; tbus tbere can
only be consciousness of spirit as a particular, not self-
conscious spirit. Even tbougb Judaism is not among tbe
natural religions in tbe 1827 lectures, Hegel describes tbe
story of tbe fall as an attempt to portray a naturalistic,
imaginary state from tbe remote past of buman bistory:
"We find in tbe Bible a well-known story (eine bekannte
Vorstellung) abstractly termed the fall (der Sündenfall). Tbis
representation is very profound and is not just a contingent
bistory but tbe eternal and necessary bistory of bumanity
Christopher Anderson-Irwin 41
—though it is indeed expressed here in an external and
mythical mode" (215).'^
The problem with the form of the Garden of Eden story,
Hegel suggests, is that it depicts the "eternal" moments of
spirit as though they were singular events that have
"happened" and now remain fixed in a distant past. But by
taking this approach to the text he only presses the question
of how the supposed inconsistencies of this mythical story
could at the same time present the true history of humanity
as spirit. He claims that the story itself contains "the
essential or basic features of the idea" of human history:
"although human beings are implicitly this unity [with God/
nature], they depart from this in-itself or leave the natural
state behind because they are spirit, so that they must come
into distinction, into (primal) division, must come to judg-
ment between what is theirs and what is natural. Only thus
do they first know God and the good" (215-16).
Reading the Garden of Eden story in these terms directly
contradicts the idea that it portrays the false image of the
original condition. On the contrary, what Hegel suggests is
that the biblical story itself sets a standard by which false
images of origins and history can be judged. Rather than
describing the limits of the story, he indicates that it is
through the narrative that attentive readers are able to
discern the distinction between nature and spirit that allows
them to judge between true and false interpretations of the
origin of self-consciousness.
Continuing with his commentary on Genesis 3, Hegel
claims that (philosophical) consciousness "grasps the double
aspect" of rupture and reconciliation "within itself." He then
compares this mode of self-conscious comprehension to the
way the text expresses both "aspects" through the figures of
God and the serpent in the Garden of Eden story.
The one aspect, that the standpoint of cleavage [Entzweiung]
ought not to persist, is implied by the statement that a crime has
been committed, something that ought not to be, ought not to
endure. It was the serpent who said: "You will be like God." The

13. For the German original see Hegel, Vorlesungen über die Philosophie der
Religion, Teil 2: Die bestimmte Religion {Lectures on the Philosophy of Religion,
Part Two: Determinate Religion), ed. Walter Jaeschke (Hamburg: Felix Meiner,
1985), 425. Hereafter, all references to the German edition of these lectures will
be cited with the abbreviation VPR 2.
42 "But the serpent did not lie"

arrogance of freedom is the standpoint that ought not to persist.

The other aspect, that the cleavage ought to persist, insofar as it
contains the source of its healing, is expressed with the speech of
God: "Behold, Adam has hecome like one of us, knowing good
and evil." So what the serpent said was no lie; on the contrary,
even God himself corrohorated it. But this verse is usually
overlooked, or else nothing is said about it. (217)"
Tbe serpent expresses one side of tbe trutb of spirit, tbat
freedom makes buman beings like God, makes tbem able to
distinguisb between tbemselves and tbe order of nature.
But Hegel sees tbe serpent as confirming tbe trutb of the
spirit-nature distinction alone, without any form of media-
tion, and thus as presenting only an abstract, oppositional
mode of freedom. It is only wben God confirms the serpent's
words that the text alludes to the doctrine of reconciliation.
Hegel suggests that the figure of God represents the
fullness or universality of the truth of spirit, whereas the
serpent captures only its particularity, and that through
God's words the text acknowledges that the truth of human
freedom is found in reconciliation, not alienation. Hegel
even goes so far as to indicate that the text comprehends the
unity of rupture and reconciliation in the same way that
self-consciousness does. The last line in the passage above
points to tbe failure of readers to recognize tbe relationsbip
between tbe positions of God and tbe serpent. It is signi-
ficant that the fault here rests with the reader and not the
text, as it implies that the text expresses a truth the reader
must discern, not by imposing a meaning on its words, but
by understanding how its various narrative aspects come
together to present a true account of the origins of self-
consciousness.
Hegel's commentary on the Garden story ends with the
claim that, when the content of the story is read properly, it
corresponds to the "genuine idea" (wahrhafte Idee) of
reconciliation and not the "mere image of paradise" (bloße
Vorstellung des Paradieses)(2n).^^ By taking this position,
Hegel opposes what he considers to be tbe conventional
reading of "tbe fall" tbat appears to dominate tbe Cbristian
tbeological tradition, beginning witb tbe patristic literature
of early Catbolic tbinkers wbo explained tbe alleged act of

14. German edition: VPR 2, 426-27.

15. German edition: VPR 2, 427.
Christopher Anderson-Irwin 43

disobedience in the Garden as the product of human weak-

ness, greed, or pride.^'^ This approach to the Christian
tradition of interpreting Genesis 3 raises the question of how
Hegel might respond to Jewish interpretations of the text.
Since Hegel never addresses any postbiblical Jewish
traditions, the only way to address this question is by
comparing his interpretation of the Garden story with some
Jewish readings.
There is a tradition in Midrash that closely parallels the
Christian idea that Genesis 3 depicts the fall of human
beings away from God and, in certain commentaries on the
expulsion, God is regarded as lamenting the fact that human
beings were once like him but are no longer, that they have
forsaken their likeness to God.^^ But there are also other
commentaries that are similar to Hegel's reading of the
story. R. Levi and R. Judah b. R. Simon suggest that the
temptation the serpent presents to human beings is to
embrace a false notion of what it means to be like God. The
temptation would be to equate being like God with the
possession of some form of finite power, whether it be the
power to create "other worlds" or the ability to oppose God's
power of creation so that he cannot make any alteration that
would unseat human beings from their privileged position in
creation.^® These two positions, which the rabbinic commen-
tators recognized to be false, would involve comprehending
both the divine and the human in what Hegel would call
finite terms, as powers that seek to dominate one another.
These midrashic commentaries show that the critique of the
idols of finitude that Hegel denies to Jewish consciousness
in his work is operative in a major Jewish interpretive
tradition. This indicates that there are correlations between
Hegel's dialectical reading of Genesis 3 and the approach the

16, See G, M, Lukken, Original Sin and the Roman Liturgy (Leiden: E, J, Brill,
1973), Lukken outlines the way that the Eastern Church fathers tended to regard
the first sin as a result of some form of human weakness, while Augustine and the
Western Church argued that it was a product of human pride (52-60),
17, See, for example. Genesis Rabbah 21:4 and 21:6 in Midrash Rabbah:
Genesis, Volume 1, trans, H, Freedman and Maurice Simon (London: Soncino P,
1939),
18, As cited in Gerald J, Bildstein's In the Rabbi's Garden: Adam and Eve in the
Midrash (Northvale, NJ: Jason Aronson, 1997), 36-41,
44 "But tbe serpent did not lie"

rabbis take as tbey attempt to present tbe various inter-

pretive possibilities at work within the text.
Another connection between Hegel's interpretation and
Jewisb interpretive traditions can be found in tbe role
assigned to the relationship between reader and text. My
analysis of Hegel's reading of Genesis 3 suggests a perbaps
somewbat unexpected correlation between bis bermeneutic
approacb to tbe Jewish Bible and tbat taken by Buber and
Rosenzweig. Buber and Rosenzweig approacb tbe Bible as
Jewisb tbinkers and are deeply critical of the modern
European philosophical tradition, and of Hegelian thought
in particular. Yet their discussions of what it means to read
the Bible and, even more importantly, of tbe kind of reader
the Bible demands, provide a way to overcome tbe division
between tbe actual content of Hegel's reading and his
insistence that the Bible can only be properly interpreted in
a language otber tban its own.
Rosenzweig and Buber collaborated on a translation of tbe
Jewisb Bible into German tbat attempted to be faitbful to
wbat tbey perceived to be tbe dialogic or "spoken" quality of
its language. Rosenzweig claims tbat tbeir translation is
based on tbe relationsbip of reader and autbor tbrougb tbe
language of tbe text: "Tbe vision that seeks to regard the
book [tbe Bible], not from outside, but in inward relatedness
and belonging, will find tbe unity of tbe book as written and
tbe unity of tbe book as read equally evident. Sucb a vision
will see in tbe one tbe unity of teacbing, in tbe otber tbe
unity of learning."^® In keeping witb tbe idea tbat tbe unity
of tbe text is found in tbe way it is written and tbe way it is
read, Rosenzweig describes the relationship between the
Bible and its readers as being dialogical. He writes tbat the
"incorporation of a dialogic element, framing the narrative
about an alteration of question and answer, speecb and
counter speecb, proposition and qualification" is central to
all Jewish biblical texts. Tbe dialogicality of tbe texts draws
tbe readers in so tbat tbey are not simply observing a dialo-
gue from witbout but are called to participate in it, to be

19. See Franz Rosenzweig's "The Unity of the Bihle: A Position Paper vis-à-vis
Orthodoxy and Liberalism," in Scripture and Translation, trans, and ed. Lawrence
Rosenwald and Everett Fox (Bloomington: Indiana UP, 1994), 23. This hook is a
compilation of various articles authored or coauthored hy Buher and Rosenzweig.
Christopher Anderson-Irwin 45

respondents: "it catches these hearers who are distant from

it in the net of the secret dialogue that is extended through
it; it transforms distant hearers into collaborators, in a
conversation tbat beneatb tbe sbell of its epic past extends
itself to tbem in full anecdotal presence."^"
Rosenzweig's comments about tbe unity of tbe text as
written and as read are complemented by Buber's discussion
of tbe reader of tbe Jewisb Bible. According to Buber, a true
reader of tbe Jewisb Bible is one wbo "lets bimself be
addressed by tbe voice tbat speaks to bim in tbe Hebrew
Bible and wbo responds to it witb bis life."^^ The biblical
reader, tben, does not appropriate tbe text as tbougb it were
sometbing to be consumed or approacb it as tbougb it were
an object of worsbip; nor can he or she remain passive in
relation to it. Reading involves an existential relationship
to the text, an opening of one's sense of self and one's
perception of the world to the otherness of the text. Buber
describes tbe Jewisb Bible as engaging tbe reader in a
relationsbip. In bis view, tbe Bible speaks to tbe reader, "it
is an event in mutuality": "Its intent is not tbe person wbo
is sbut up witbin bimself, but tbe open one; not tbe form,
but tbe relation" (216).
Tbe primary difference between Hegel's reading of
Genesis 3 and Buber and Rosenzweig's dialogical under-
standing of tbe Jewisb Bible is tbat Hegel does not suf-
ficiently address tbe dialectical relationsbip between reader
and biblical text. To bridge tbis gap between Hegel's inter-
pretation and tbe idea tbat tbe Bible "speaks" to tbe reader
as a partner in dialogue, I will offer a reading of Genesis 3
tbat is consistent witb Hegel's and witb Buber and
Rosenzweig's understanding of tbe relation between tbe
Bible and its readers. Tbe story tests tbe reader's faith in
the historical task of human beings, a task tbat involves
living life witb God in tbe world, or, in Hegel's terms, living
as subjects wbo are not defined by finite relations to persons
or tbings but ratber by tbeir desire for a life of self-conscious
freedom tbat can only be realized tbrougb bistorical exis-
tence.

20. Franz Rosenzweig, "The Secret of Biblical Narrative Form," in Scripture and
Translation, 141-42.
21. Martin Buber, On the Bible: Eighteen Studies, ed. Nabum N. Glatzer (New
York: Scbocken Books, 1968), 212-13.
46 "But the serpent did not lie"

To understand how the Garden story would test the

reader, it has to be interpreted in light of the creation
accounts of Genesis 1 and 2 that begin the discussion of
historical existence and that are then developed through the
rest of the text. In Genesis 1:28, after God has created
human beings, he blesses them and says: "Bear fruit and be
many and fill the earth / and subdue it! / Have dominion
over the fish of the sea, the fowl of the heavens, / and all
living things that crawl about upon the earth!"^^ The
narrative that follows through the rest of Genesis describes
how the families of the patriarchs grow and spread out in
order to fulfill the blessings of God. Thus, the connection
between God's blessing and human historical existence is
established from "the beginning," in Genesis 1, with the
creation of human existence and the order of the world. The
terms of God's blessing suggest that human beings are not
meant to enjoy a docile existence, that a passive life in Eden
is not consistent with the promise that human existence is
meant to realize, but that, on the contrary, the blessing can
only be fulfilled by the active participation of human beings.
God's blessing in the first creation narrative might be seen
as contradicting the story told in Genesis 2, where Adam
and Hawa live together under the supervision of God. The
differences between chapters 1 and 2 confront the reader
with what Hegel would call the "inconsistency" of the
biblical text. On the one hand, the desire to live in the
world, to build communities, to have children, is seen as
good, even "exceedingly good," and thus is sanctioned by
God. But on the other, the image of humanity in the Garden
seems to suggest that it is desirable to live under God's care,
and thus to live without knowledge of the power of agency
that makes life in the world—the life of labor and
strife—possible.
In order to negotiate between these two visions of what is
"good" for human beings, the reader must remember that
Genesis tells the story of humanity's dealings with God not
only before, but after the expulsion from Eden. In this

22. All passages from the Book of Genesis are taken from Everett Fox's
translation in The Schocken Bible, Volume 1: The Five Books of Moses (Schocken
Books: New York, 1995). In keeping with Fox's translation, I am using his
transliterations of the Hebrew names, hence the spelling "Hawa" instead of the
more standard "Eve."
Christopher Anderson-Irwin 47

sense, the text seems to presuppose that the reader is

already aware of the "post-expulsion" history that has
unfolded, which, paradoxically, is the history of the promise
of God. One of the most striking features of the Book of
Genesis is that the entire history of Israel begins only after
tbe first buman beings leave tbe Garden.
Tbe biblical reader would recognize this and acknowledge
that the history of post-Edenic life is not the tragic story of
humanity's loss of unity with God. To read the story as a
"fall" is to uphold the immediate unity of the original
condition as the highest form of existence. The narrative of
Genesis indicates that the only way to fulfill the promise
made by God is by consciously knowing what it means to do
good and to do evil, and to choose one over the other. Thus
it follows that the conditions of agency—self-consciousness,
the desire for goodness and for the blessing of God—are not
compatible witb a life of blissful ignorance in tbe Garden. It
is at tbis point tbat tbe reader's active attempt to work
tbrough the story becomes important. Tbe biblical text
confronts readers witb tbe question of bow buman beings
could fall away from God if they are, as it says, made in his
likeness and image. The choice H a w a and Adam make in
Eden marks the beginning of a life of responsibility, labor,
and struggle, but it also inaugurates tbe moment that they
can actually distinguish between a spiritual and natural
existence, the moment that they can see themselves as being
like God.
Tbe placement in tbe text of tbe "act of rebellion" and tbe
subsequent expulsion of Adam and Hawa from Eden
suggests tbat tbese moments are linked closely to tbe
passages on bumanity's likeness to God. Tbe tbeme of tbe
likeness to God appears at key moments in Genesis, first in
tbe creation account of cbapter 1, and then again in chapter
3. Genesis 1:26-27 declares the likeness of human beings to
God, tbougb remarkably little is said about wbat tbis
likeness entails, otber tban tbat buman beings are assigned
dominion over tbe eartb. But in Genesis 3:5, tbe theme of
likeness is reintroduced when the serpent tells H a w a that
the only consequence of eating from the tree of knowledge
will be tbat sbe will become like God. Tbe notion of likeness
bere seems to differ from tbat in 1:26-27, as tbe "becoming"
like implies tbat sbe is not yet like God. But, as Hegel notes,
tbe serpent promises sometbing tbat is true, sometbing tbat
48 "But the serpent did not lie"

is completely consistent with God's already stated (and soon

to be restated) claim that human beings are "like" him.
The reader is therefore confronted with the problem of
how to understand the temptation the serpent presents to
Hawa, if there is any temptation at all. It could be argued
that the serpent tempts Hawa by equating likeness with
absolute identity. If the serpent's statement is taken by the
reader to mean that humanity can transcend its worldliness
and historical existence by rising to the level of God through
knowledge, then the serpent's promise would entail that one
would become devoted to yet another idol of false unity. To
desire a "transcendent" consciousness that would be "God-
like" in its ability to comprehend the world from some
external perspective, as though one were not complicit with
the world, with the flesh, with the earth and labor, is just as
problematic as desiring the state of paradisaical innocence
in Eden. In both cases, desire is invested in a false ideal of
peace and harmony rather than in the task of living in the
world.
The serpent's words tempt the reader to cling to a
reductive vision of the relationship between God and human
existence. The tension and ambiguity in the text are
increased when God validates the serpent's words in
Genesis 3:22: "Here, the human has become like one of us,
in knowing good and evil / So now, lest he send forth his
hand / and take also from the Tree of Life / and eat / and live
throughout the ages . . . !" This passage could be read as
an expression of God's "anxiety" over the prospect that
human beings will become equal to him. But this approach
does not capture the strange tone of this speech and its
location in the text. The speech is framed on one side by
God's "curses" on the serpent, Hawa, and Adam, and by the
expulsion of Adam and Hawa on the other (Genesis 3:14-19
and 3:23-24). It is significant that God's statement is placed
between the curse and the expulsion and yet is not part of
either. The text does not depict God speaking in anger, nor
does it show him as intent on punishing Adam and Hawa.
Rather, his words paradoxically imply that the expulsion is
necessary, not because human beings have transgressed, but
so that they do not continue to seek immediate unity with
him. On this reading, the spiritual likeness of humanity is
not forfeited after they leave the Garden. The two human
beings are sent away from Eden and out of their immediate
Cbristopber Anderson-Irwin 49

relationsbip witb God to enter into bistory, armed witb

knowledge and self-consciousness. By joining God's blessing
and curse togetber, tbe text confronts tbe biblical reader
witb tbe demand that it be read in ligbt of historical
existence.
The above reading of the Garden of Eden story shows not
only how its style, figures, and structure correlate with
Hegel's philosophical interpretation, but also bow tbese
dimensions of tbe text actually facilitate or make tbat
interpretation possible. If tbe story did not utilize multiple
voices, if it did not give tbe appearance of being afflicted
witb a duality, tben it could not place tbe demand tbat it
does on tbe reader. Tbe tension surrounding tbe question of
unity in tbe story is a direct product of its dialogical cbar-
acter, of its implied relationsbip to a reader wbo will regard
it as sometbing otber tban a mythical depiction or imaginary
record of a singular historical event. Buber claims tbat "tbe
Jewisb Bible has always approached and still approaches
every generation with the claim that it must be recognized
as a document of tbe true bistory of tbe world, tbat is to say,
of tbe history according to which the world has an origin and
a goal."^^ On this view. Genesis 3 challenges readers to
decide what their orientation to history will be and tbus to
look upon tbe origin of bistory not as a moment in a distant
past but as a pressing task, a matter of practice, of etbics, a
way of orienting oneself to tbe world. Tbis cballenge
depends on, and even presupposes, tbat tbe reader's
approacb to the text will be one of an interlocutor, a partner
in dialogue.
By supplementing Hegel's reading of Genesis 3 witb tbis
notion of dialogicality, tbe legitimacy of any sbarp distinc-
tion between biblical narrative and logical form is called into
question. Tbis distinction can also be overcome by an
interpretive principle derived from Hegel: only spirit can
bear witness to spirit. Tbe nature of spirit is to know itself
as tbe otber and tbe otber as itself, wbicb means tbat wbile
self-consciousness can misread itself or its otber, it must be
able to interpret its own errors in ligbt of tbe dialectic
between otberness and itself. Tbe same could be said of tbe
Book of Genesis. Tbe "self-consciousness" of tbe text can be

23. Buher, On the Bible, 3.

50 "But the serpent did not lie"

seen as providing a principle for a critical reading of its

content. In light of what Rosenzweig descrihes as the speech
and response model of biblical narrative. Genesis 3 can be
read as demanding tbat its readers decide between com-
peting versions of tbe unity of God witb bumanity, tbat they
make a commitment to one or the other. One can go further
and add that, if Genesis 3 is to be equal to tbe pbilosopbical
interpretation Hegel gives it, tbe text must be regarded as
asking for an intelligent, critical response from its readers.
And for sucb a response to be possible, tbe story of tbe
Garden of Eden, tbe creation accounts, and tbe blessing of
God must be seen in an intelligible relation to one anotber
witbin tbe biblical text itself. For if tbe text could not save
itself from its apparent contradictions and inconsistencies,
pbilosopby would be equally incapable of doing so.

Humber College
Toronto, Ontario, Canada