PANGASINAN TRANSPORTATION CO., INC. vs.

THE PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION

G.R. No. 47065 June 26, 1940

FACTS: Pangasinan Transportation Company Inc. (PTI) has been engaged for 20 years in the
business of transporting passengers in Pangasinan, Tarlac and Nueva Ecija through TPU buses
in accordance with the terms and conditions of the certificates of public convenience issued
by the Public Utility Commission (later called Public Service Commission). The company
applied for an authorization to operate ten additional Brockway trucks on the ground that
they were needed to comply with the terms and conditions of its existing certificates and as a
result of the application of the Eight Hour Labor Law. PSC agreed to grant the authorization,
but with two conditions as provided for by section 1 of Commonwealth Act No. 454: First,
that the certificates of authorization issued to it would be valid only for a period of 25 years
counted from the date of promulgation; and second, that the company may be acquired by
the Philippine Commonwealth with proper payment of the cost price of its equipment,
taking into account reasonable depreciation to be fixed by the Commission at the time of it
acquisition. PTI did not agree with the conditions, and instead asked the Supreme Court to
declare Commonwealth Act No. 454.

ISSUE: Whether or not Commonwealth Act No. 454 is unconstitutional for being undue
delegation of legislative power on the ground that without limitation, guide or rule except
the unfettered discretion and judgment of the Commission, constitute a complete and total
abdication by the Legislature of its functions in the premises, and for that reason, the Act, in
so far as those powers are concerned.

HELD: No, the law is not unconstitutional. The law is made subject to a sufficient standard
that the PSC must strictly follow. Inasmuch as the period to be fixed by the Commission
under section 15 is inseparable from the certificate itself, said period cannot be disregarded
by the Commission in determining the question whether the issuance of the certificate will
promote the public interests in a proper and suitable manner. Conversely, in determining "a
definite period oftime," the Commission will be guided by "public interests," the only
limitation to its power being that said period shall not exceed fifty years (sec. 16 (a),
Commonwealth Act No. 146; Constitution, Art. XIII, sec. 8.) The Supreme Court had earlier
ruled that "public interest" furnishes a sufficient standard.

Defensor-Santiago vs. COMELEC (G.R. No. 127325. March 19, 1997)

FACTS: On 6 Dec 1996, Atty. Jesus S. Delfin filed with COMELEC a “Petition to Amend the
Constitution to Lift Term Limits of elective Officials by People’s Initiative” The COMELEC
then, upon its approval, a.) set the time and dates for signature gathering all over the
country, b.) caused the necessary publication of the said petition in papers of general
circulation, and c.) instructed local election registrars to assist petitioners and volunteers in
establishing signing stations. On 18 Dec 1996, MD Santiago et al filed a special civil action for
prohibition against the Delfin Petition. Santiago argues that 1.) the constitutional provision
on people’s initiative to amend the constitution can only be implemented by law to be passed
by Congress and no such law has yet been passed by Congress, 2.) RA 6735 indeed provides
for three systems of initiative namely, initiative on the Constitution, on statues and on local
legislation. The two latter forms of initiative were specifically provided for in Subtitles II and
III thereof but no provisions were specifically made for initiatives on the Constitution. This
omission indicates that the matter of people’s initiative to amend the Constitution was left to
some future law – as pointed out by former Senator Arturo Tolentino.

ISSUE: Whether or not RA 6735 was intended to include initiative on amendments to the
constitution and if so whether the act, as worded, adequately covers such initiative.

HELD: RA 6735 is intended to include the system of initiative on amendments to the

constitution but is unfortunately inadequate to cover that system. Sec 2 of Article 17 of the
Constitution provides: “Amendments to this constitution may likewise be directly proposed
by the people through initiative upon a petition of at least twelve per centum of the total
number of registered voters, of which every legislative district must be represented by at
least there per centum of the registered voters therein. . . The Congress shall provide for the
implementation of the exercise of this right” This provision is obviously not self-executory as
it needs an enabling law to be passed by Congress. Joaquin Bernas, a member of the 1986
Con-Con stated “without implementing legislation Section 2, Art 17 cannot operate. Thus,
although this mode of amending the constitution is a mode of amendment which bypasses
Congressional action in the last analysis is still dependent on Congressional action.” Bluntly
stated, the right of the people to directly propose amendments to the Constitution through
the system of inititative would remain entombed in the cold niche of the constitution until
Congress provides for its implementation. The people cannot exercise such right, though
constitutionally guaranteed, if Congress for whatever reason does not provide for its
implementation.

ABAKADA Guro Party List vs. Ermita

G.R. No. 168056 September 1, 2005

Facts:
ABAKADA GURO Party List, et al., filed a petition for prohibition o questioning the
constitutionality of Sections 4, 5 and 6 of R.A. No. 9337, amending Sections 106, 107 and 108,
respectively, of the National Internal Revenue Code (NIRC).
Section 4 imposes a 10% VAT on sale of goods and properties;
Section 5 imposes a 10% VAT on importation of goods; and
Section 6 imposes a 10% VAT on sale of services and use or lease of properties;

These provisions contain a provision which authorizing the President, upon

recommendation of the Secretary of Finance, to raise the VAT rate to 12%, effective January
1, 2006, after specified conditions have been satisfied.

Issues:
Whether or not there is a violation of Article VI, Section 24 of the Constitution.\
Whether or not there is undue delegation of legislative power in violation of Article VI Sec
28(2) of the Constitution.
Whether or not there is a violation of the due process and equal protection of the
Constitution.

Ruling:
No, the revenue bill exclusively originated in the House of Representatives, the Senate was
acting within its constitutional power to introduce amendments to the House bill when it
included provisions in Senate Bill No. 1950 amending corporate income taxes, percentage,
and excise and franchise taxes.

No, there is no undue delegation of legislative power but only of the discretion as to the
execution of a law. This is constitutionally permissible. Congress does not abdicate its
functions or unduly delegate power when it describes what job must be done, who must do
it, and what is the scope of his authority; in our complex economy that is frequently the only
way in which the legislative process can go forward. In this case, it is not a delegation of
legislative power but a delegation of ascertainment of facts upon which enforcement and
administration of the increased rate under the law is contingent.

No, the power of the State to make reasonable and natural classifications for the purposes of
taxation has long been established. Whether it relates to the subject of taxation, the kind of
property, the rates to be levied, or the amounts to be raised, the methods of assessment,
valuation and collection, the State’s power is entitled to presumption of validity. As a rule,
the judiciary will not interfere with such power absent a clear showing of unreasonableness,
discrimination, or arbitrariness.
Article VI: The Legislative Department, Section 1 Issues on Delegation of Legislative
Power (Filling in the Details: authority to reorganize)

Chiongbian vs Orbos

Chiongbian - Congressman in third district, South Cotabato; Orbos - Executive Secretary

Date of Promulgation: June 22, 1995 Ponente:MendozaMotion: Certiorari and Prohibition;
Special Civil Action in the Supreme Court

Background

In 1968, R.A. 5435 authorized the President of the Philippines, with the help of Commission
on Reorganization, to recognize the different executive departments, bureaus, offices,
agencies, and instrumentalities of the government, including banking or financial institutions
and corporations owned or controlled by it.
Purpose was to promote simplicity, economy and efficiency in the government.

Facts
The Congress passed the Organic Act for the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao (RA
6743)pursuant to Article 10, Section 18 of the Constitution. A plebiscite was called in some
provinces which resulted to 4 provinces (Lanao del Sur, Maguindanao, Sulu and Tawi Tawi)
in favor of creating an autonomous region and therefore became the ARMM. The RA says
that those provinces and cities who did not vote in favor of it shall remain in their existing
administrative regions provided, however, that the President may merge the existing regions
through administrative determination. President Cory then issued the EO containing the
provinces/cities that will be “merged,” transferring provinces from their existing region to
another. The petitioners who are members of the Congress representing legislative districts
protested the Executive Order, saying that there is no law which authorizes the President to
pick certain provinces and cities within existing regions and restructure them to new
administrative regions. The transfer of one province under its current region to another (ex:
Misamis Occidental from Region X to IX) is a form of reorganization, an alteration of the
existing structures of the government. The RA 6743 only holds authority of the president to
merge existing regions and cannot be construed as reorganizing them.

Issue

W/N the power to merge administrative regions is legislative (petitioner’s stand) in

character or executive as the respondents contend
Petitioners: It unduly delegates power to the President to merge regions through
administrative determination or at any rate provides no standard for the exercise of the
power delegated

Respondents: No undue delegation but only a grant of power to fill up or provide the details
of legislation because the Congress did not have the facility to provide for them

Ruling:
Petition is DISMISSED.

The creation and subsequent reorganization of administrative regions have been by the
President pursuant to authority granted to him by law . In conferring on the President the
power to merge the existing regions following the establishment of the Autonomous Region
in Muslim Mindanao, Congress merely followed the pattern set in previous legislation dating
back to the initial organization of administrative regions in 1972. (RA5453)

This was also the basis for the sufficient standard by which the President is to be guided in
the exercise of power. Standard can be gathered or implied
.
Standard can be found in the same policy underlying grant of power to the President in RA
No. 5435 of the power to reorganize the Executive Department:“to promote simplicity,
economy, efficiency, in the government to enable it to pursue its programs consisted with
the national goals for accelerated social and economic development.”

ANG TIBAY vs. CIR

FACTS:
The respondent National Labor Union, Inc. avers that: (1) Toribio Teodoro, who is the
manager and proprietor of Ang Tibay, was falsely claiming that there is a shortage of leather
soles for himto temporarily lay off the Members of the National Labor Union, Inc. as it was
unsupported byrecords; (2) the alleged lack of materials was a scheme to discharge
systematically the Membersof the NLU, Inc. from work; (3) The National Workers’
Brotherhood of Ang Tibay is an illegal unionwhich is dominated by Toribio Teodoro; and
that (4) The employer, Toribio Teodoro, was guilty of unfair labor practice for discriminating
against the NLU, Inc, and unjustly favoring the NationalWorkers’ Brotherhood.The case
enumerated the specific powers of the Court of Industrial Relations. The CIR, as theCourt
observed is not constrained by technical rules of procedure in hearing the matters before
it,but it does not mean that it can ignore entirely the fundamental and essential requirements
of dueprocess in trials and investigations of an administrative character.
ISSUE:
What are the cardinal rights or the requisites of procedural due process which must
berespected in administrative proceedings?
HELD:
The Court provided the ff. as the requisites of procedural due process in
administrativeproceedings:
1.The right to a hearing, which includes the right to present one’s case and submitevidence
in support thereof.
2.Tribunal must consider the evidence presented.
3.Decision must have something to support it.
4.Evidence must be substantial (more than a mere “scintilla”, relevant evidence areasonable
mind accepts to support a conclusion)
5.Decision must be rendered on the evident presented at the hearing, or at least containedin
the record or disclosed to the parties affected.
6.Tribunal or body or any of its judges must act on its or his own independent
considerationof the law and facts of the controversy and not simply accept the views of a
subordinatein arriving at a decision.
7.The board or body should, in all controversial questions, render its decision in such
amanner that the parties to the proceeding can know the various issues involved, and
thereason for the decision rendered.

UP Board of Regents VS Court of Appeals and AROKIASWAMY WILLIAM

MARGARET CELINE G.R. No. 134625. August 31, 1999

Facts: Private respondent Ms Arokiaswamy William Margaret Celine a citizen of

India enrolled doctoral program in UP CSSP Diliman QC. She is ready for oral defense
with selected panel members Drs. E. Arsenio Manuel, Serafin Quiason, Sri Skandarajah, Noel
Teodoro, and Isagani Medina, the last included as the dean’s representative. Even though
Dr. Medina noticed that there were portions of her dissertation that was lifted
from different sources without proper acknowledgement, she was still allowed to continue
to with her oral defense. Four (4) out fi ve (5) give her a passing mark with
condition to incorporate the suggestion made by the panel m e m b e r s . D r .
Medina did not sign the approval form. Dr. Teodoro also noted that a
r e v i s i o n s h o u l d b e submitted. On March 24, 1993, The CSSP College Faculty Assembly
approved her graduation pending the final revised copies of her dissertation. Private
respondent submitted the supposedly final revised copies although petitioners maintained
that suggestions were not incorporated. She left a copy for Dr. Teodoro and Dr. Medina and
did not wait for their approval relying to the Dean Paz remarks during previous meeting that
a majority vote was sufficient for her to pass. The supposedly revised copies were later
disapproved by Dr. Teodoro and Dr. Medina. Private respondent was disappointed with the
administration. She charge Dr. Diokno and Medina with maliciously working for the
disapproval of her dissertation and further warned Dean Paz against encouraging perfidious
act against her. Dean Paz attempts to exclude the private respondent in the graduating list in
a letter addressed to the Vice Chancellor for Academic Affairs (Dr. Milagros Ibe),
pending for clarifi cation of her charges against panel members and accusations relating
to her dissertation. Unfortunately the letter did not reach on time and the respondent was
allowed to graduate. Dean Paz wrote a letter that she would not be granted an academic
clearance unless she substantiated the accusations. In a letter addressed to Dean
Paz, Dr. Medina formally charged private respondent with plagiarism and
recommended for the withdrawal of her doctorate degree. D e a n P a z f o r m e d a n
ad-hoc committee (Ventura Committee) to investigate and recommend
t o Chancellor Dr. Roman to withdraw her doctorate degree. Private respondent was
informed of the charges in a letter. Ventura Committee finds at 90 instances or portions of
thesis lifted from other sources with no proper acknowledgement. After it was
unanimously approved and endorsed from the CSSP and Univ. Council the
recommendation for withdrawal was endorsed to Board of Regents who deferred its actions
to study further for legal implications. Private respondent was provided with a copy of
findings and in return she also submitted her written explanation. Another meeting was
scheduled to discuss her answer. Zafaralla Committee was also created and recommends
private respondent for withdrawal of her degree after establishing the facts the there were
massive lifting from published sources and the private respondent also admits herself of
being guilty of plagiarism. On the basis of the report and recommendation of the University
Council, the Board of Regents send a letter to inform private respondent that it was resolved
by majority to withdraw your doctorates degree. On August 10, 1995, private respondent
then filed a petition for mandamus with a prayer for a writ of preliminary mandatory
injunction and damages to RTC QC. She alleged that petitioners had unlawfully withdrawn
her degree without justification and without affording her procedural due process. She
prayed that petitioners be ordered to restore her degree and to pay her P500, 000.00 as moral
and exemplary damages andP1, 500,000.00 as compensation for lost earnings.
RTC dismissed for lack of merit. The Court of Appeals reversed the lower court’s decision and
ordered to restore her doctorates degree.
Issue/s:
1.
Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in granting the writ of mandamus and ordering petitioners torestore
doctoral degree.
2.
Whether or not the court of appeals erred in holding that respondent’s doctoral degree
cannot be recalledwithout violating her right to enjoyment of intellectual property and to
justice and equity.
Held/Ruling:The decision of Court of Appeals was reversed.

1.Yes. The court of appeals decisions was based on grounds that the private respondent was denied of
due process and that she graduated and no longer in the ambit of disciplinary powers of
UP. In all investigations held by the different committee assigned to investigate the charges,
the privaterespondent was heard on her defense. In fact she was informed in writing about
the charges and was provided with a copy from the investigating committee. She was asked
to submit her explanation which she forwarded. Private respondent also discussed her case
with the UP Chancellor and Zafaralla Committee during their meetings. She was given the
opportunity to be heard and explain her side but failed to refute the charges of plagiarism
against her.The freedom of a university does not terminate upon the "graduation"
of a student, as the Court of Appeals held because the "graduation" of such a student
that is in question. The investigation began before graduation. She was able to graduate
because there were many investigations conducted before the Board finallydecided that she
should not have been allowed to graduate.
2.Yes. The court held that academic freedom is guaranteed to institutions of higher learning
by Art XIV of the 1987 Constitution. This freedom includes deciding whom a university will
confer degrees on. If the degree is procured by error or fraud then the Board of Regents,
subject to due process being followed, may cancel thatdegree.
Art. XIV, Section 5 par. 2 of the Constitution provides that "academic freedom shall be
enjoyed in all institutions of higher learning."
It is a freedom granted to "institutions of higher learning" which is thus given
"a wide sphere of authority certainly extending to the choice of students." If such
institution of higher learning can decide who canand who cannot study in it, it certainly can
also determine on whom it can confer the honor and distinction of being its graduates

PROCEDURAL DUE PROCESS (Art. III, Sec 1)Rivera vs. CSC, Land Bank of the
Philippines (January 4, 1995)
Facts:
Petitioner was the manager of Corporate Banking Unit of LBP and was charged with
dishonesty, receiving for personal use of fee, gift or other valuable thing in the course of
official duties, committing acts punishable under the Anti-Graft Laws, and pursuit of private
business vocation or profession without permission required by CSC. Rivera allegedly
toldPerez that he would facilitate the processing, approval and release of his loan if he would
be given 10% commission. Riverawas further charged having served and acted, without
prior authority required by CSC, as the personal consultant of Lao andconsultant in various
companies where Lao had investments. LBP held Rivers guilty of grave misconduct and
actsprejudicial to the best interest of the service in accepting employment from a client of
the bank. The penalty of forcedresignation, without separation benefits and gratuities, was
thereupon imposed on Rivera.

Issue:
Whether the CSC committed grave abuse of discretion in composing the capital penalty of
dismissal on the basis of unsubstantiated finding and conclusions

Ruling:
Given the circumstances in the case at bench, it should have behooved Commissioner
Gaminde to inhibit herself totally from any participation in resolving Rivera’s appeal to CSC
to give full meaning and consequence to a fundamentalaspect of due process.CSC resolution
is SET ASIDE and the case is remanded to CSC for the resolution, sans the participation of
CSCCommissioner Gaminde, as she was the Board Chairman of MSPB whose ruling is thus
appealed

175 Phil. 225

BACHRACH MOTORS VS> CIR

MUÑOZ PALMA, J.:

In 1958 the Bachrach Motor Co., Inc. and/or the "Bachrach Transportation Co., Inc.", now
petitioner in this case, was in the transportation business and operated what was then known
as the "Rural Transit". In that year the Rural Transit Employees Association went on strike
and the dispute between the management and the union reached the Court of Industrial
Relations for compulsory arbitration. The case was docketed as Case No. 22-IPA, entitled:
"Rural Transit Employees Association vs. Bachrach Motor Co., and Bachrach Transportation
Co.". The Court of Industrial Relations (CIR for short) immediately issued an order on
August 7, 1958 by which the strikers were ordered to return to work and the management to
take them back under the terms and conditions existing before the disputes arose. [1]

While this labor dispute was pending with the CIR, Bachrach filed a "Petition for Authority
to discharge driver Maximo Jacob from the service", dated July 24, 1961. The reasons given
for the petition were alleged violations of the Motor Vehicle Law by Maximo Jacob resulting
in damage to property and injuries to third parties, the latest of which occurred on June 9,
1961 resulting in the "total destruction of bus 170" of the company.
An "Answer and Counter-Petition" was filed in behalf of Maximo Jacob by the Rural Transit
Employees Association whereby it denied the charges and alleged that the June 9, 1961
accident was due to a mechanical defect of the bus which was beyond the control of the
driver Jacob, hence, the latter's suspension from the service was not justified.

The petition of Bachrach docketed as Case No. 22-IPA (11) was heard on January 23, 1963,
during which petitioner presented its one and only witness, Mr. Joseph Kaplin, general
manager of Rural Transit, and various documents marked as Exhibits "1" to "8-F" inclusive.
After Mr. Kaplin concluded his direct testimony, with agreement of the parties, the hearing
was scheduled for another date for purposes of cross-examination of the witness. The case
was reset on various dates but Mr. Kaplin failed to appear because he had left for abroad.

Sometime on March 8, 1965, the employees' association filed a motion praying that:

a. the testimony of Mr. Joseph Kaplin be stricken from the records;

b. the petition of the Company for authority to dismiss Maximo Jacob from the
service be denied; and

c. the Company be ordered to reinstate Maximo Jacob immediately with

backwages from June 9, 1961 up to the date of his actual reinstatement.[2]

In an order dated March 1, 1966, the CIR through then Presiding Judge Arsenio I. Martinez
dismissed the company's petition, lifted the suspension of driver Jacob, and ordered his
reinstatement with backwages from the date of his suspension up to his actual reinstatement.
[3]

Bachrach's motion for reconsideration[4] having been denied[5], it filed the instant Petition for
Certiorari on June 15, 1966 which in the Court's Resolution of July 18, 1966 was given due
course.[6]

The following errors are now assigned by petitioner, viz:[7]

The respondent court erred in dismissing the petition of the herein petitioner, after ordering
the testimony of Joseph Kaplin to be stricken off the record, notwithstanding the fact that
the service records of Maximo Jacob, upon the basis of which his dismissal could be justified
were admitted by it.
II

The respondent court erred in not admitting the petitioner's exhibits unqualifiedly and in
admitting them "for whatever worth they may have" only to disregard them entirely
thereafter on the alleged ground that "the contents of the same were not proven."

III

The respondent court erred in not ordering the dismissal of Maximo Jacob.

IV

The respondent court erred in granting the respondent union's counter-petition without
reception of evidence, especially after it earlier dismissed the petitioner's petition on the
technical ground that Joseph Kaplin was not cross-examined by the respondent union.

The respondent court erred in granting backwages to Maximo Jacob from the date of his
suspension up to actual reinstatement without evidence to prove that he has exercised
reasonable diligence to secure other employment during the time of his alleged suspension.

VI

The respondent court erred in not holding that the union has the burden to prove that
Maximo Jacob is entitled to backwages.

VII

The respondent court erred in not holding that, if at all, Maximo Jacob is only entitled to
three months back wages according to the Sta. Cecilia Sawmill case.

1. Respondent court did not err in ordering the dismissal of Bachrach's petition to discharge
Maximo Jacob.
Petitioner presented only one witness, Joseph Kaplin, to prove its case against driver Jacob.
The witness failed however to appear at the scheduled hearings for his cross-examination for
the simple reason that he left for abroad. Having been deprived, without fault on its part, of
its right to cross-examine Kaplin, respondent association was entitled to have the direct
testimony of the witness stricken off the record.

"The right of a party to confront and cross-examine opposing witnesses in a judicial

litigation, be it criminal or civil in nature, or in proceedings before administrative tribunals
with quasi-judicial powers, is a fundamental right which is part of due process." ( Savory
Luncheonette v. Lakas ng Manggagawang Filipino, et al., 1975, 62 SCRA 258)

In Ortigas Jr. v. Lufthansa German Airlines , 1975, defendant's witness failed to appear at the
continuation of hearing during which the witness was to be cross-examined by plaintiff's
counsel. The trial court denied defendant's motion for postponement and ordered the
unfinished testimony of the witness Lazzari stricken off the record. In sustaining said order,
this Court held inter alia:

"Oral testimony may be taken into account only when it is complete, that is, if the witness
has been wholly cross-examined by the adverse party or the right to cross-examine is lost
wholly or in part thru the fault of such adverse party . But when cross-examination is not and
cannot be done or completed due to causes attributable to the party offering the witness, the
uncompleted testimony is thereby rendered incompetent.

"The right of a party to cross-examine the witness of his adversary is invaluable as it is

inviolable in civil cases, no less than the right of the accused in criminal cases. The express
recognition of such right of the accused in the Constitution does not render the right thereto
of parties in civil cases less constitutionally based, for it is an indispensable part of the due
process guaranteed by the fundamental law. x x x Until such cross-examination has been
finished, the testimony of the witness cannot be considered as complete and may not,
therefore, be allowed to form part of the evidence to be considered by the court in deciding
the case." (64 SCRA 610, 636-637; italics supplied)

Parenthetically, the situation in Savory Luncheonette v. Lakas ng Manggagawang Pilipino, et

al., supra, was different. There, the witness, Atty. Morabe, had finished his direct testimony
and he was ready and available for cross-examination. Motions for postponement of the
cross-examination were made however by the adverse counsel from time to time until one
day Atty. Morabe succumbed to a fatal heart attack without the cross-examination having
been accomplished. On motion of the respondents the Court of Industrial Relations ordered
the testimony of Atty. Morabe deleted from the record . On a petition for certiorari by Savory
Luncheonette, this Court set aside the order and held that by their own actuations,
respondents were considered to have impliedly waived and thereupon lost their right to
cross-examine the witness, for such a right may be forfeited by a party litigant through his
own conduct.

Petitioner contends however that it was ready to present another witness, Mrs. Ursula Silva,
to identify the documents, Exhibits "1" to "8-F", but it did not proceed to call the witness for
the reason that during the hearing of January 16, 1965, respondent's counsel, Atty. Santiago,
manifested that he was admitting the signatures of Joseph Kaplin on the aforesaid
documents.[8] However true that may be, what Atty. Santiago admitted merely was the
signature of Mr. Kaplin and not the truth of the contents of the documents.[9] The opposing
party was still entitled to cross-examine the witness on the matters written on Exhibits "1" to
"8-F" especially if they adversely affected the substantial rights of the party against whom
they were being presented, namely, driver Maximo Jacob. When Atty. Santiago admitted
that the signature appearing in Exhibits "1" to "8-F" was that of witness Kaplin, the counsel of
petitioner then, Atty. Joven Enrile, should have inquired if the party was admitting likewise
the veracity of the contents of the documents; not having done so, petitioner must now
suffer the consequences.

Exhibits "1" to "8-F" were admitted by respondent court only for "whatever they may be
worth." Evaluating them, however, it did not consider said documents, and rightly so, as
competent proof of the truthfulness of their contents without the supporting testimony of
witness Kaplin. As stated in the order under review "(N)o other witness was presented by
respondent company (now petitioner) to testify on the intrinsic value of those exhibits";
consequently, they are hearsay.

Inasmuch as the testimony of Joseph Kaplin is stricken off the record and the contents of
Exhibits "1" to "8-F" are hearsay, and there is no other evidence which substantiates the
charges against Maximo Jacob, the dismissal of the company's petition to discharge Jacob
from its service is in order.

2. No error was committed when the CIR, without receiving evidence, granted relief to
private respondent herein on its counter-petition.

At the time Bachrach filed its petition to discharge Maximo Jacob, there was a pending labor
dispute in the CIR between the company and the employee's union. The CIR ordered the
strikers to return to work. The company in the meantime suspended its driver Maximo Jacob
after the alleged June 9, 1961 accident.[10]

Considering the dismissal of Bachrach's petition to discharge Maximo Jacob, the lifting of the
latter's suspension and his reinstatement in the service were but a necessary consequence
thereof. For obvious reasons, the relief could be granted without need of evidence. The onus
probandi was on the company, now petitioner, to justify the suspension of Jacob and his
eventual separation from the service. Having failed to discharge that burden, there were no
valid grounds for it to keep its employee away from his work.

3. On the matter of backwages, We agree with petitioner's counsel that the judicial trend is
to fix a reasonable period for the payment of backwages, the philosophy being to avoid
protracted delay in post-judgment hearings to prove or disprove earnings of the worker
elsewhere during the period he had not been reinstated to his employment. [11] Following this
principle, We hold that payment of backwages for a period of three (3) years is fair and
reasonable under the circumstances of the case.

WHEREFORE, We hereby render judgment affirming the order of respondent Court of

Industrial Relations dated March 1, 1966, now under review, with the sole modification that
petitioner shall pay its driver Maximo Jacob three (3) years backwages at the rate of the last
salary received before he was suspended, without qualification and deduction.

With costs against petitioner.

Globe Telecoms v NTC

G.R. No. 143964

July 26, 2004

FACTS:

1. On 4 June 1999, Smart filed a Complaint with public respondent NTC, praying that NTC
order the immediate interconnection of Smarts and Globes GSM networks. Smart alleged that
Globe, with evident bad faith and malice, refused to grant Smarts request for the
interconnection of SMS.
2. Globe filed its Answer with Motion to Dismiss on 7 June 1999, interposing grounds that the
Complaint was premature, Smarts failure to comply with the conditions precedent required
in Section 6 of NTC Memorandum Circular 9-7-93,19 and its omission of the mandatory
Certification of Non-Forum Shopping.
3. On 19 July 1999, NTC issued the Order now subject of the present petition.
a. both Smart and Globe were equally blameworthy for their lack of cooperation in the submission of the documentation
required for interconnection and for having unduly maneuvered the situation into the present impasse
b. NTC held that since SMS falls squarely within the definition of value-added service or enhanced-service given in
NTC Memorandum Circular No. 8-9-95 (MC No. 8-9-95) the implementation of SMS interconnection is
mandatory
c. The NTC also declared that both Smart and Globe have been providing SMS without authority from it
4. Globe filed with the Court of Appeals a Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition25 to nullify
and set aside the Order and to prohibit NTC from taking any further action in the case.
Globe
a. reiterated its previous arguments that the complaint should have been dismissed for failure to comply with conditions
precedent and the non-forum shopping rule.
b. claimed that NTC acted without jurisdiction in declaring that it had no authority to render SMS, pointing out that the
matter was not raised as an issue before it at all.
c. alleged that the Order is a patent nullity as it imposed an administrative penalty for an offense for which neither it
nor Smart was sufficiently charged nor heard on in violation of their right to due process
5. The CA issued a TRO on 31 Aug 1999.
6. In its Memorandum, Globe called the attention of the CA in an earlier NTC decision
regarding Islacom, holding that SMS is a deregulated special feature and does not require the
prior approval of the NTC. Globe that its departure from its ruling in the Islacom case
constitutes a denial of equal protection of the law.
7. On 22 Nov 1999, the CA affirmed in toto the NTC Order.
 8. On 21 December 1999, Globe filed a Motion for Partial Reconsideration, seeking to
reconsider only the portion of the Decision that upheld NTCs finding that Globe lacked the
authority to provide SMS and its imposition of a fine. After the Court of Appeals denied the
Motion , Globe elevated the controversy to this Court

ISSUES:
1. Whether NTC may legally require Globe to secure NTC approval before it continues
providing SMS;
2. Whether SMS is a VAS under the PTA, or special feature under NTC MC No. 14-11-97; and
3. Whether NTC acted with due process in levying the fine against Globe

RULING:

1. The petition is GRANTED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals dated 22 November 1999, as
well as its Resolution dated 29 July 2000, and the assailed Order of the NTC dated 19 July
1999 are hereby SET ASIDE.
2. The assailed NTC Decision invokes the NTC Implementing Rules of the PTA (MC No. 8-9-95)
to justify its claim that Globe and Smart need to secure prior authority from the NTC before
offering SMS.
a. The statutory basis for the NTCs determination must be thoroughly examined.
b. Next, the regulatory framework devised by NTC in dealing with VAS should be
examined. In short, the legal basis invoked by NTC in claiming that SMS is VAS has
not been duly established. The fault falls squarely on NTC.
4. NTC violated several of these cardinal rights due Globe in the promulgation of the assailed
Order.
a. The NTC Order is not supported by substantial evidence. Neither does it sufficiently
explain the reasons for the decision rendered.

b. Globe and Smart were denied opportunity to present evidence on the issues relating
to the nature of VAS and the prior approval. Another disturbing circumstance
attending this petition is that until the promulgation of the assailed Order Globe and
Smart were never informed of the fact that their operation of SMS without prior
authority was at all an issue for consideration.

c. The imposition of fine is void for violation of due process. The matter of whether
NTC could have imposed the fine on Globe in the assailed Order is necessarily related
to due process considerations

5. In summary:

a. there is no legal basis under the PTA or the memorandum circulars promulgated by
the NTC to denominate SMS as VAS, and any subsequent determination by the NTC
 on whether SMS is VAS should be made with proper regard for due process and in
conformity with the PTA;

b. the assailed Order violates due process for failure to sufficiently explain the reason for
the decision rendered, for being unsupported by substantial evidence, and for
imputing violation to, and issuing a corresponding fine on, Globe despite the absence
of due notice and hearing which would have afforded Globe the right to present
evidence on its behalf

Globe Telecom, Inc v. NTC et. al.

Chester Cabalza recommends his visitors to please read the original & full text of the case
cited. Xie xie!

G.R. No. 143964 July 26, 2004

GLOBE TELECOM, INC., petitioner,

vs.
THE NATIONAL TELECOMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION, COMMISSIONER JOSEPH A.
SANTIAGO, DEPUTY COMMISSIONERS AURELIO M. UMALI and NESTOR DACANAY,
and SMART COMMUNICATIONS, INC. respondents.

Telecommunications services are affected by a high degree of public interest. Telephone companies
have historically been regulated as common carriers, and indeed, the 1936 Public Service Act has
classified wire or wireless communications systems as a "public service," along with other common
carriers. The present petition dramatizes to a degree the clash of philosophies between traditional
notions of regulation and the au corant trend to deregulation. Appropriately, it involves the most
ubiquitous feature of the mobile phone, Short Messaging Service ("SMS") or "text messaging," which
has been transformed from a mere technological fad into a vital means of communication.

Facts:

Globe and private respondent Smart Communications, Inc. are both grantees of valid and subsisting
legislative franchises, authorizing them, among others, to operate a Cellular Mobile Telephone
System ("CMTS"), utilizing the Global System for Mobile Communication ("GSM") technology.
Among the inherent services supported by the GSM network is the Short Message Services (SMS),also
known colloquially as "texting," which has attained immense popularity in the Philippines as a mode
of electronic communication.

On 4 June 1999, Smart filed a Complaint with NTC to interconnect Smart's and Globe's GSM
networks, particularly their respective SMS or texting services. The Complaint arose from the
inability of the two leading CMTS providers to effect interconnection. Smart alleged that Globe, with
evident bad faith and malice, refused to grant Smart's request for the interconnection of SMS. But
NTC also declared that both Smart and Globe have been providing SMS without authority from it, in
violation of Section 420 (f) of MC No. 8-9-95 which requires PTEs intending to provide value-added
services (VAS) to secure prior approval from NTC through an administrative process.

Globe filed with the Court of Appeals a Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition to nullify and set aside
the Order and to prohibit NTC from taking any further action in the case. It reiterated its previous
arguments that the complaint should have been dismissed for failure to comply with conditions
precedent and the non-forum shopping rule. It also claimed that NTC acted without jurisdiction in
declaring that it had no authority to render SMS, pointing out that the matter was not raised as an
issue before it at all. Finally, Globe alleged that the Order is a patent nullity as it imposed an
administrative penalty for an offense for which neither it nor Smart was sufficiently charged nor
heard on in violation of their right to due process.

After the Court of Appeals denied the Motion for Partial Reconsideration, Globe elevated the
controversy to the Supreme Court.

Issues:

1. Whether NTC may legally require Globe to secure NTC approval before it continues providing
SMS;

2. Whether SMS is a VAS under the PTA, or special feature under NTC MC No. 14-11-97;

3. Whether NTC acted with due process in levying the fine against Globe; and

4. Whether Globe should have first filed a motion for reconsideration before the NTC, but this
relatively minor question can be resolved in brief.

Held:

Necessity of Filing Motion for Reconsideration

Globe deliberately did not file a motion for reconsideration with the NTC before elevating the matter
to the Court of Appeals via a petition for certiorari. Generally, a motion for reconsideration is a
prerequisite for the filing of a petition for certiorari.
In opting not to file the motion for reconsideration, Globe asserted before the Court of Appeals that
the case fell within the exceptions to the general rule. The appellate court in the questioned Decision
cited the purported procedural defect, yet chose anyway to rule on the merits as well.

Globe's election to elevate the case directly to the Court of Appeals, skipping the standard motion for
reconsideration, is not a mortal mistake. According to Globe, the Order is a patent nullity, it being
violative of due process; the motion for reconsideration was a useless or idle ceremony; and, the issue
raised purely one of law. Indeed, the circumstances adverted to are among the recognized exceptions
to the general rule.

The Merits

Globe hinges its claim of exemption from obtaining prior approval from the NTC on NTC
Memorandum Circular No. 14-11-97 ("MC No. 14-11-97"). Globe notes that in a 7 October 1998
ruling on the application of Islacom for the operation of SMS, NTC declared that the applicable
circular for SMS is MC No. 14-11-97. Under this ruling, it is alleged, NTC effectively denominated
SMS as a "special feature" which under MC No. 14-11-97 is a deregulated service that needs no prior
authorization from NTC. Globe further contends that NTC's requiring it to secure prior authorization
violates the due process and equal protection clauses, since earlier it had exempted the similarly
situated Islacom from securing NTC approval prior to its operation of SMS.

The statutory basis for the NTC's determination must be thoroughly examined. Our first level of
inquiry should be into the PTA. It is the authority behind MC No. 8-9-95. It is also the law that
governs all public telecommunications entities ("PTEs") in the Philippines.

Public Telecommunications Act

The PTA has not strictly adopted laissez-faire as its underlying philosophy to promote the
telecommunications industry. In fact, the law imposes strictures that restrain within reason how
PTEs conduct their business. For example, it requires that any access charge/revenue sharing
arrangements between all interconnecting carriers that are entered into have to be submitted for
approval to NTC. At the same time, the general thrust of the PTA is towards modernizing the legal
framework for the telecommunications services sector. The transmutation has become necessary due
to the rapid changes as well within the telecommunications industry.

One of the novel introductions of the PTA is the concept of a "value-added service" ("VAS"). Section
11 of the PTA governs the operations of a "value-added service provider," which the law defines as
"an entity which relying on the transmission, switching and local distribution facilities of the local
exchange and inter-exchange operators, and overseas carriers, offers enhanced services beyond those
ordinarily provided for by such carriers." Section 11 recognizes that VAS providers need not secure a
franchise, provided that they do not put up their own network. However, a different rule is laid
down for telecommunications entities such as Globe and PLDT.

The Pertinent NTC Memorandum Circulars

The NTC relied on Section 420(f) of the Implementing Rules of the PTA ("Implementing Rules") as
basis for its claim that prior approval must be secured from it before Globe can operate SMS. Section
420 of the Implementing Rules, contained in MC No. 8-9-95.

In short, the legal basis invoked by NTC in claiming that SMS is VAS has not been duly established.
The fault falls squarely on NTC. With the dual classification of SMS as a special feature and a VAS
and the varying rules pertinent to each classification, NTC has unnecessarily complicated the
regulatory framework to the detriment of the industry and the consumers. But does that translate to a
finding that the NTC Order subjecting Globe to prior approval is void? There is a fine line between
professional mediocrity and illegality. NTC's byzantine approach to SMS regulation is certainly
inefficient. Unfortunately for NTC, its actions have also transgressed due process in many ways, as
shown in the ensuing elucidation.

Case Digest: People of the Philippines vs. Hon. Ruben Ayson and Felipe
Ramos
07 July 1989

G.R. No. 85215

Ponente: Narvasa, J

FACTS:

Felipe Ramos was a ticket freight clerk of the Philippine Airlines, assigned at its Baguio City station.
The PAL manager sent him a letter regarding his involvement on the irregularities of the sales of
plane tickets, wherein an investigation is to be made on 09 February 1986. The day before the said
investigation, Ramos sent a handwritten note to his superiors stating that he is willing to settle the
said irregularities of approximately Php76,000.00.

In the said investigation done by the PAL Baguio Branch Manager, Edgardo Cruz in the presence of
Station Agent Antonio Ocampo, Ticket Freight Clerk Rodolfo Quitasol, and PALEA Shop Steward
Cristeta Domingo, Ramos agreed that his answers be taken down in writing. Two months later,
 Ramos was charged with estafa allegedly committed from March 12, 1986 to January 29, 1987 to
which Ramos entered a plea of “Not Guilty.”

The private prosecutors raised that the statements of Felipe Ramos taken on the investigation of 09
February 1986, together with his handwritten note, were confessions to the crime that the latter was
being accused of. The trial court judge dismissed the use of the said evidences since it does not appear
that the accused was reminded of his constitutional rights to remain silent, and to have counsel, and
that when he waived the same and gave his statement, it was with the assistance actually of a counsel.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Ramos was denied of his rights “not to be compelled to be a witness against himself”
and “to remain silent and to counsel, and to be informed of such right.”

HELD:

The first right, against self-incrimination, mentioned in Section 20, Article IV of the 1973
Constitution, is accorded to every person who gives evidence, whether voluntarily or under
compulsion of subpoena, in any civil, criminal, or administrative proceeding. The right is NOT to "be
compelled to be a witness against himself"

The precept set out in that first sentence has a settled meaning. It prescribes an "option of refusal to
answer incriminating questions and not a prohibition of inquiry." It simply secures to a witness,
whether he be a party or not, the right to refuse to answer any particular incriminatory question, i.e.,
one the answer to which has a tendency to incriminate him for some crime. However, the right can
be claimed only when the specific question, incriminatory in character, is actually put to the witness.
It cannot be claimed at any other time. It does not give a witness the right to disregard a subpoena, to
decline to appear before the court at the time appointed, or to refuse to testify altogether. The witness
receiving a subpoena must obey it, appear as required, take the stand, be sworn and answer questions.
It is only when a particular question is addressed to him, the answer to which may incriminate him
for some offense that he may refuse to answer on the strength of the constitutional guaranty.

It should be noted that the following are the rights of a suspect in a crime:

· BEFORE THE CASE IS FILED IN COURT (or with the public prosecutor, for preliminary investigation), but
after having been taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his liberty in some significant way, and on being
interrogated by the police: the continuing right to remain silent and to counsel, and to be informed thereof, not
 to be subjected to force, violence, threat, intimidation or any other means which vitiates the free will; and to
have evidence obtained in violation of these rights rejected; and

· AFTER THE CASE IS FILED IN COURT —

 to refuse to be a witness;
 not to have any prejudice whatsoever result to him by such refusal;

 to testify in his own behalf, subject to cross-examination by the prosecution;

 WHILE TESTIFYING, to refuse to answer a specific question which tends to incriminate him for
some crime other than that for which he is then prosecuted.

It is clear from the facts that Ramos was not in any sense under custodial interrogation (that which is
initiated by government officers under custody). The constitutional rights of a person under custodial
interrogation under Section 20, Article IV of the 1973 Constitution did not therefore come into play,
were of no relevance to the inquiry. It is also clear, too, that Ramos had voluntarily answered
questions posed to him on the first day of the administrative investigation, February 9, 1986 and
agreed that the proceedings should be recorded, the record having thereafter been marked during the
trial of the criminal action subsequently filed against him, just as it is obvious that the note that he
sent to his superiors on February 8, 1986, the day before the investigation, offering to compromise his
liability in the alleged irregularities, was a free and even spontaneous act on his part. They may not
be excluded on the ground that the so-called "Miranda rights" had not been accorded to Ramos.

Respondent judge misapprehended the nature and import of the disparate rights set forth in the
Constitution. His Orders were thus rendered with grave abuse of discretion. They should hereby be
annulled and set aside.