EDITORIALS
A New Political Protocol
Much greater thought and debate are needed to understand how democratic polities are to deal with social media.
T
he aftermath of the recent (and unfortunately, ongoing)
violence in western Assam saw panic spread among citi-
zens from the north-eastern states living in other states
of India, particularly Karnataka. The fear was that they would
be targeted by “Muslims” in revenge for Bodo militants’ attacks
on Muslims in Assam. These rumours were spread through
mass text messages on mobile phones and led to thousands of
people from the north-east rushing back home from cities like
Bangalore, Hyderabad and Mumbai. This panic, fed by doctored
images, some extremely gruesome, had been circulating on
the internet and various social media sites like Facebook and
Twitter for some days. Together, these suddenly transmitted
the social tensions of western Assam to different parts of the
country and created an atmosphere of uncertainty and fear.
Two days into the panicked exodus of people from the north-
eastern states, the central government moved to restrict text
message services on mobile phones, blocked about 300 web pages
and asked Twitter to suspend a number of accounts, including
of bona fide journalists, which, it claimed, had been spreading
rumours and giving out false information, as well as those
which were impersonating the prime minister. This move of the
government has come in for strong condemnation for arbitrarily
restricting the freedom of expression guaranteed by the Consti-
tution. It has been pointed out that the new rules for governing
the internet give the government unacceptable powers to block
and control the flow of information and that there is little trans-
parency in the manner in which this power is exercised. The
government justified its action claiming that these web pages,
Twitter accounts and mass mobile messages were being used to
exacerbate tensions and spread violence through rumours and
false information. Many of the doctored photos were traced to
fundamentalist Muslim websites (some in Pakistan) while the
mass text messages were traced to extremist Hindu groups
who wanted to use this opportunity to create distrust between
Muslims and tribal peoples of the north-eastern states.
However, the actions of the government, especially with
regard to blocking of web pages and Twitter accounts, were
ham-handed, strikingly incompetent and showed that it has
little idea of how these information and communication tech-
nologies and social media work. While there may be a case
for blocking accounts which mimic the prime minister or delib-
erately spread false information, it is unacceptable to block
accounts which caricature a public office. Similarly, among web
pages it wanted blocked were those of newspapers like The
Independent of London. However, even in this, the government
8 september 15, 2012
proved incompetent. While some of the “blocked” Twitter
accounts kept working, that of Union Minister of State for
Information and Broadcasting Sachin Pilot was suspended for
a day and more! What is worse, the government seems not to
have followed the very rules it laid out for such actions and
may thus have been, legally, in violation of the very laws it has
imposed. It did not, as required, publish with reasons a list of
web pages and Twitter accounts it wanted blocked and the
order was conveyed to the internet service providers by a rela-
tively junior officer without the proper protocol which needs
to be followed in such situations. Allowing bureaucrats at
many levels to close websites and block social media accounts
is a dangerous abuse of government power and needs to be
strongly condemned.
This incident also points to the need for a more engaged and
sustained debate over how fundamental rights are exercised in
social media and over these new telecommunication tools, as
well as what the checks and balances need to be. Given the
manner in which the mobile phone and social media were being
used to deliberately spread fear and create social divisions, it
was necessary to take measures to stop that. Further, hate
speech and deliberate dissemination of misinformation cannot
be a fundamental right, even if they are being peddled by
bona fide members of civil society, like journalists. We have,
as a polity, worked out reasonable checks and balances on
defending fundamental rights and freedoms while protecting
people from hate, slander, vilification and invasion of privacy.
The new tools of communication, whether the mobile phone
which is now fairly ubiquitous across social classes and regions
or the internet and social media which are spreading faster
than we recognise, present us with new challenges. While they
have democratised information and communication and un-
dercut the ability of corporate and state media to “manufac-
ture consent” through their monopoly over news and views,
these new tools also amplify both the speed and spread of
falsehood and misinformation. They also enable the very same
state and corporate bodies – through their control of the inter-
net and communication channels – to have unprecedented pow-
er over the individual.
Public conversations and debates over the protocols of using
these new technologies already lag far behind their power of
dissemination. Unless a political solution is found to the issues
that the use of information and communication technologies
throw up, we will continue to be at the mercy of states and
other vested interests.
vol xlviI no 37 EPW Economic & Political Weekly
 september 15, 2012
Delivering Justice
Justice has been done in the Naroda Patiya case, but what if the Supreme Court had not intervened?
T
en years after 97 people were brutally killed in an
organised attack by Hindutva groups on the Muslim
majority neighbourhood of Naroda Patiya in northern
Ahmedabad, the victims and survivors have finally got a measure
of justice. A special court has found 32 of the accused guilty of
barbaric murders that still sicken people everywhere on their
retelling. Maya Kodnani, former minister in the cabinet of
Gujarat Chief Minister Narendra Modi, has been imprisoned for
28 years and Babu Bajrangi, senior Bajrang Dal activist, has
been handed a life sentence. Since Independence, this is the
largest number of people to be convicted in a case of communal
violence and the first time that criminal responsibility has been
fixed on politicians.
The judgment delivered by justice Jyotsna Yagnik marks an
important moment in the fight for justice after the Gujarat
communal carnage of 2002. It is the first time that high profile
individuals like Kodnani and Bajrangi have been punished for
their role in the murders. The verdict is also significant in that
though the prosecution sought the death sentence, the judge
concluded that capital punishment undermined “human dig-
nity” and so handed down life sentences.
Kodnani has been punished for inciting the mobs that
participated in the killing of 97 persons and causing injuries to
many others. Bajrangi was caught on camera in a sting opera-
tion by the Tehelka magazine brazenly and chillingly describ-
ing how he led a mob killing, burning, raping and maiming
Muslims. In that interview, Bajrangi also claimed that Chief
Minister Narendra Modi allowed him to initially hide from the
law and later got him released on bail.
The Naroda Patiya case is one of eight cases where the
Supreme Court, in response to petitions filed by the National
Human Rights Commission (NHRC) and the Citizens for Justice
and Peace, had in 2008/2009 ordered the formation of a
Special Investigation Team (SIT), the framing of supplementary
charges, and the establishment of fast track courts to hear
cases on a day-to-day basis. Of those eight cases (which includ-
ed the Godhra train deaths), trials have resulted in convictions
in six; the two remaining are the Naroda Gaon and the terrible
Gulberg Society cases.
These convictions in the Gujarat killings mark a departure
from other cases involving large-scale communal violence. In
Economic & Political Weekly EPW september 15, 2012 vol xlviI no 37
cases arising from the anti-Sikh riots of November 1984 and
the targeting of Muslims in Mumbai in January 1993, there
have been few successful prosecutions. The difference in
Gujarat has clearly been the intervention of the Supreme
Court. In 2004, the Court had first ordered the reopening of
as many as 2,000 cases closed by the state police for lack
of evidence; later it ordered the formation of the SIT in a
select number of cases. Yet, important as is this intervention,
we must ask why, when local investigation agencies are
in charge, the investigations are poorly conducted and cases
of communal violence are either dismissed for want of
evidence or result in few convictions. The answer is obvious:
local officials and police who either actively encourage the
killings or look the other way when the violence is first com-
mitted are unlikely to make serious efforts to punish the
guilty. But, what if the Supreme Court had not taken a direct
interest in the Gujarat 2002 cases? And must the Supreme
Court always intervene to ensure justice in cases of mass
communal violence?
In addition to the courts, the role of the NHRC in the Gujarat
cases too must be commended. It was the NHRC that took
up the Bilkis Bano case of rape and murder that the courts in
Gujarat had dismissed. The Supreme Court ordered a retrial
outside the state, leading to conviction of 11 for life. In the
Naroda Patiya case, the NHRC directed that the Tehelka
tapes be used as evidence, thereby strengthening the already
damning evidence against the main accused. We must also
acknowledge and praise the work of activists who took up the
cause of the victims and worked for years to secure justice.
The leading crusader has been Teesta Setalvad of the Citizens
for Justice and Peace. Against all odds and despite sustained
attempts to defame her, she has devoted a decade to help the
victims and survivors of Naroda Patiya and other cases from
Gujarat 2002.
In stark contrast to the role of the higher judiciary, sections
of civil society and the media is that of the executive and
the legislature in Gujarat. Headed by Narendra Modi, the
executive has shown no inclination whatsoever to secure
justice for the victims. This is no surprise as many believe that
Modi facilitated the carnage by turning a blind eye to the
flames of violence. On its part, the main opposition party in
7
EDITORIALS

Gujarat, the Congress Party, has never made justice for the then remains on the judiciary, civil society and the media to
victims of 2002 an important part of its programme. Instead, it ensure that the guilty are convicted in the many cases that are
has tried to articulate a softer form of the Hindutva philosophy still pending – the most prominent of them being the Gulberg
to garner votes in a communally polarised state. The onus Society case.

8 september 15, 2012 vol xlviI no 37 EPW Economic & Political Weekly
COMMENTARY
Evaluating the Performance of
the National Clean Energy Fund
Gyana Ranjan Panda, Narendra Jena
The National Clean Energy
Fund has been created as a
funding mechanism ostensibly
for research and development
in the field of clean energy
technologies. So far, the fund has
collected Rs 8,200 crore from
the clean energy cess, but the
processes of disbursement are
mired with confusion. This note
evaluates the fund’s functioning
by accessing, through Right
to Information applications,
the minutes of the first three
meetings of the Inter-Ministerial
Group, the highly empowered
bureaucratic body responsible
for determining guidelines,
eligibility and appraisal criteria
and recommending projects for
final approval.
In the preparation of this note, the authors
acknowledge the contributions of Kunal
Sharma and Sriya Mohanty of the Sakti
Sustainable Energy Foundation and of Pooja
Parvati and Soumya of the Centre for Budget
and Governance Accountability. The note is a
condensed version of the policy brief published
by the CBGA.
Gyana Ranjan Panda (panda.gyana77@gmail.
com) and Narendra Jena (narendra@cbgaindia.
org) are with the Centre for Budget and
Governance Accountability, New Delhi.
18
T
he National Clean Energy Fund
(NCEF), operational since the finan-
cial year (FY) 2010-11, has been
primarily conceived as a separate non-
lapsable corpus to support research and
innovative projects in the field of clean
energy technology, with the possibility
of additional funds. It is specifically
located under the Public Accounts of
India.1 The inflow into this fund has
come primarily through the levy of a
clean energy cess at a nominal rate of Rs 50
per tonne on both domestic and imported
coal. The present architecture of the
fund suggests that the Central Board of
Excise and Customs (CBEC) collects the
clean energy cess. The Plan Finance II
(PF-II) Division of the Department of
Expenditure, Ministry of Finance (MOF),
is the agency which finalises the modali-
ties of disbursing NCEF money to projects
that promote “research and innovation
in clean energy technologies”. As per NCEF
mechanics, the Inter-Ministerial Group
(IMG) is conceived as a highly empowered
bureaucratic body entrusted with deter-
mining the guidelines, the eligibility and
appraisal criteria and recommending
projects for final approval from compe-
tent authorities (Office Memorandum on
Guidelines 2011a).2 Though the NCEF has
collected revenues to the tune of Rs 1,066
crore (actuals) in FY 2010-11, Rs 3,249
crore in FY 2011-12 (revised estimate),
and Rs 3,864 in FY 2012-13 (budgetary
estimate), the process of disbursing the
fund is mired in confusion.3
This commentary hence attempts to
meet the knowledge gap on the NCEF’s
functioning by accessing the crucial
september 15, 2012
minutes of first three IMG meetings
through the Right to Information (RTI)
Act (2005).4 The documents reviewed
for this assessment include guidelines
for appraisal and approvals of projects/
schemes eligible for financing under the
NCEF, the application format for propos-
als, and the meeting minutes covering
the proceedings of the three meetings of
the IMG held prior to 24 February 2012.5
Even recognising that basing the evalua-
tion on just these documents has its own
limitations, a fairly insightful assessment
of the performance of the NCEF is possible
and can throw light on its functioning.
Decoding Inconsistency
It can be fairly observed from the assess-
ment that the NCEF 2011 guidelines are too
broad. There are inconsistencies between
the stated objectives, operational guide-
lines and final approval of the projects.
Although the core objective of the NCEF
is to “fund research and innovative
projects in clean energy technologies”,6
the guidelines permit projects having
limited, if any, links to development of
the field. For instance, the existing eligi-
bility criteria allow “projects related to
environmental management particularly
in geographical areas surrounding energy
sector projects”.7
However it was found out in the second
IMG meeting minutes, held on 11 August
2011 that this link has been compromised
in the way guidelines have been executed.
This is evidenced by the IMG approval
for a Ministry of Environment and Forests
(MoEF) project seeking funds for “reme-
diation of selected hazardous waste
contaminated dump sites”.8 By permit-
ting projects of such varying scope, the
guidelines have compromised the ability
of the NCEF to achieve its stated objective.
Hence, there is a need to revise the guide-
lines to only permit those projects whose
focus involves research, development or
adoption of clean energy technologies.
vol xlviI no 37 EPW Economic & Political Weekly

The most visible inconsistency can be are many instances when the approved
found in the way the eligibility criteria for funding exceeds 40% of the total project
seeking funding support from the NCEF cost (Table 1). These include proposals
have been explained in the guidelines. by the Ministry of New and Renewable
As per the guidelines, projects are eligible Energy (MNRE) for installation of solar
to receive support in the form of loan or photovoltaic (SPV) projects systems in
viability gap funding, which in no case Chhattisgarh, Jammu and Kashmir
shall exceed 40% of the total project cost. (J&K), Rajasthan, Sikkim, Uttar Pradesh
Setting a clause of 40% funding under (UP) and West Bengal, and for pilot
NCEF guidelines seems arbitrary; it is not projects of 5,500 community-size portable
clear on what basis the benchmark has and fixed biomass cook-stoves, as well as
been agreed upon under the NCEF. Many the MOEF’s proposal-seeking funds to
projects with very innovative ideas, support the Green India Mission. It seems
research and technology, particularly in the IMG is following a case-specific or
promoting clean energy, may justifiably ad hoc approach to approving various
require higher public investments and projects under the NCEF.
necessary infrastructure. To cap funding While the application process is open
just at 40% would endanger the viability to all and project proposals can be sub-
of the project itself, given the fact that there mitted by individual/consortia of organi-
are associated risks of high technological sations in the government/public sector
inputs and uncertain revenue projection or private sector, certain additional clauses
in the process of actual implementation. in the eligibility criteria may make the
Further, even though the IMG has participation of private players, including
emphasised the importance of 40% the involvement of Indian research insti-
financial support from the NCEF, there tutes and industries, extremely difficult.
Table 1: Project Proposals Considered in the First Three IMG Meetings
Projects Considered/Approved by IMG Meeting Project Cost NCEF Request
(Rs crore) (Rs crore)
Small grid-connected solar power projects under 14 June 2011 95 95
Jawaharlal Nehru National Solar Mission (JNNSM)
Off-grid subsidy-cum-refinance scheme under 14 June 2011 290 290
the JNNSM
Installation of SPV power plants of capacity aggregating 14 June 2011 and 72.67 53.49
to 1.4MW, extension of localised grid, etc, in 50 villages 11 August 2011
of Gumla district, Jharkhand
Additional subsidy for solar lantern charging facility 14 June 2011 13.30 13.30
and for rice husk based gasifier system in left wing
extremism (LWE) affected areas
Installation of SPV lights and other small capacity 11 August 2011 117 Unclear
photovoltaic (PV) systems in rural, semi-urban
and urban areas through the National Bank for Agri-
culture and Rural Development (NABARD) (JNNSM)
Installation of solar thermal systems in 16 states 11 August 2011 178.03 64.14
Installation of SPV systems in Chhattisgarh, J&K, 11 August 2011 204.92 85.88
Rajasthan, Sikkim, UP and West Bengal
Installation of 1,200 solar lanterns in 60 LWE- affected 11 August 2011 16.20 16.20
districts in eight states
Pilot projects – 5,500 community-size portable and 11 August 2011 6.55 6.55
fixed biomass cook-stoves
Remediation of 12 selected hazardous waste 11 August 2011 805 563.50
contaminated dump sites
Financing a study to assess wind energy resource 25 November 2011 20.48 20.48
potential in seven states
To carry out preparatory activities in FY 2011-12 25 November 2011 200 200
under Green India Mission
Installation of one solar heating system and 10 solar 25 November 2011 16.68 16.68
street lighting system at all the six advanced
training institutes
Source: Compiled from the first three IMG meeting minutes.
Economic & Political Weekly EPW september 15, 2012 vol xlviI no 37
COMMENTARY
The clause that participating organisations
must put in a minimum financial com-
mitment of at least 40% of the project
cost before seeking assistance from the
NCEF, along with another qualification
that projects funded by any other arm of
the Government of India or those that
have received grants from any other
national/international body are ineligible
for funding, seem intransigent. They
overlook the prospect of public-private
partnerships or effective collaboration
with eligible partners to pursue research
and innovation in the development of
clean energy technologies; in turn, they
deny the possibility of technology transfer.
It can be fairly argued from these re-
strictive criteria that only ministry-
sponsored projects would be eligible to
funding from the NCEF.
Adjunct to General Budgets
It clearly emerged from the assessment
that the funds available under the NCEF
are being allocated to meet the budget
Status of Approval Approved Sponsor
(Rs Crore)/ Ministry
(%Project Cost)
IMG requested proposal be - MNRE
resubmitted in approved format
IMG requested proposal be - MNRE
resubmitted in approved format
Withdrawn by MNRE in June 2011, - MNRE
resubmitted in August 2011. In
principle approval, but balance
60% funding to be identified before
proposal will be considered by IMG
“In principle” approval by 13.30 [100%] MNRE
the IMG
Approved, subject to revisions Unclear MNRE
proposed by IMG in structure
of proposal
Approved 64.14 [36%] MNRE
Approved 85.88 [42%] MNRE
Rejected, 40% NCEF funding - MNRE
threshold exceeded
Approved 6.55 [100%] MNRE
Subject to several conditions, 60 [scope of MoEF
approved funding of Rs 60 crore proposal
to prepare DPRs for 12 sites revised]
Rejected, proposed that MNRE - MNRE
seek GBS for financing
Approved. MoEF clarified 200 [100%] MoEF
during meeting that only Rs 60
crore was required in current year
Rejected, proposal can be - Ministry of
covered under existing scheme Labour and
under JNNSM Employment
(MoLE)
19
COMMENTARY

shortfalls in certain regular projects imple-
mented by various ministries departments.
The IMG, for instance on 11 August 2011,
approved the Solar Thermal Systems
Installation project of MNRE in 16 states,
whose funding could have been met
from the union budget. Further, the IMG
meeting held on 25 November 2011 sanc-
tioned Rs 200 crore from the NCEF to
MOEF to carry out preparatory activities
for the Green India Mission, one of eight
missions under the National Action Plan
on Climate Change, which could have re-
ceived support from the FY 2012-13 secto-
ral budget of the ministry.
Considering NCEF as an adjunct fund-
ing mechanism to meet shortfalls of
regular budgets of various ministry pro-
grammes is an area of concern high-
lighted in the IMG meeting. The then
finance secretary, Sunil Mitra observed
in the first IMG meeting:9
The NCEF was conceived with a specific pur-
pose, namely, to support research and inno-
vative projects in clean energy technologies.
Any project/scheme relating to innovative
methods to adopt to Clean Energy techno-
logy and Research & Development shall be
eligible for funding under the NCEF….the
Fund cannot be treated as an adjunct to the
general Budget, wherefrom shortfalls in
meeting budgetary requirements of already
approved Plan schemes can be met.
Hence, it is necessary to revise the
guidelines to eliminate ambiguities sur-
rounding the use of the fund to meet
budgetary shortfalls by ministries. Fund-
ing to support a ministry’s regular activi-
ties should be met from the appropriate
sources available with the existing fin-
ancing structure of the general budget.
A conservative estimate, based on re-
view of relevant documents accessed
though the RTI, suggests that nearly 80%
of the corpus has remained unutilised.
As per information provided by Budget
Division of the MoF on 12 March 2012, only
Rs 1,066 crore (actual) have been dis-
bursed so far, even though approximately
Rs 7,200 crore are still parked in the
funds. This suggests that the sponsored
ministries lack the capacity to develop
quality proposals consistent with NCEF
guidelines, to tap the full potential of the
fund. The first three IMG meetings min-
utes suggest that nearly half of the pro-
posals appraised by the IMG were either
rejected or not approved in their entirety
as they were found ineligible. Hence, there
is need to enhance the proposal genera-
tion capacity of sponsor ministries by insti-
tutionalising robust proposal development
processes, through increased in-house
technical expertise in ministries, greater
access to external technical resources, and
development of collaborative proposals
with Indian research institutes and in-
dustry. Additionally, improving due dili-
gence of sponsor ministries while devel-
oping and appraising proposals would
substantially help in increasing the uti-
lisation of funds in various projects.
Operational Gaps
The present NCEF setting is marred with
major operational drawbacks. The pro-
cess architecture is skewed towards re-
ceiving projects proposals and apprais-
ing them through in-built mechanisms
within relevant ministries, and finally
getting the necessary go-ahead from the
IMG. The mechanics of NCEF processes
operate within three months from the
entry of the project proposal till its final
approval.10 But in the absence of an

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20 september 15, 2012 vol xlviI no 37 EPW Economic & Political Weekly

appropriate and robust screening frame-
work, project suitability in access to
NCEF comes under scrutiny.
At present, the NCEF has attached high
priority to those projects which promote
small-scale technology with demonstrative
effects. Underlining the fact that micro-
technology projects most often deliver
benefits in catalysing development of
clean energy technologies in backward
and underdeveloped areas, financing of
such projects through extra-budgetary
support is an ad hoc option.11 Given their
small scale and use of relatively mature
technologies, it can be further argued
that demonstration projects will have
minimal impact on increasing market
demand for clean energy technologies or
in bringing down the cost of such tech-
nologies. Hence, opportunities need to
be explored to use the NCEF to attain
greater impact by supporting research
and development (R&D) in potentially
breakthrough technologies and activi-
ties that facilitate commercialisation,
leverage additional resources from the
private sector, and create new institu-
tions and mechanisms for deployment of
clean energy technologies at scale.
Significantly, the NCEF does not inspire
private sector involvement, irrespective
of the fact that certain guidelines allow
project proposals to be developed by the
private sector, both independently and in
collaboration with government and public
sector entities, by seeking 40% of funds
as loan or viability gap funding. In the
first three IMG meeting, not a single pro-
posal from private players was discussed
and passed. This suggests limited aware-
ness amongst the private sector regarding
this funding opportunity, which to some
extent reflects on the limited efforts made
to-date by sponsoring ministries to attract
the private sector as an effective partner
on potential projects. Given that sponsor-
ing ministries can only play a limited role
in clean energy technology R&D, strong
private sector interest and good working
partnerships with sponsoring ministries
is essential if the NCEF is to realise its
maximum potential. The recent awards
announced under the Indo-United States
(US) Joint Clean Energy Research and
Development Centre (JCERDC) are indica-
tive of the role that Indian industry and
Economic & Political Weekly EPW september 15, 2012
research institutes can play in advancing
clean energy technologies in this country.12
In the end, the guidelines are marred by
the conspicuous absence of project moni-
toring mechanisms. The Office Memo-
randum (2011a) explicitly states that “to
monitor progress of NCEF funded projects,
the IMG will identify/appoint appropriate
professional agencies”.13 It seems the
IMG has not acted upon this requirement
as yet, even though it has started ap-
proving funding as per the guidelines.
Additionally, review of the IMG meeting
suggests that no discussions have taken
place on institutionalising a monitoring
framework, including measures that will
be used for evaluating progress of projects.
The application of such a framework is
critical to monitoring progress and en-
suring accountability in quality utilisa-
tion of the approved funding.
To sum up, the constitution of the NCEF
through the levy of the clean energy cess
can be still considered an innovative at-
tempt by the union government to garner
additional resources to support R&D in the
field of clean energy technology. As the
world’s second-fastest growing economy,
India will see significant increases in
energy consumption with concomitant
effects on the rise of greenhouse gas
emissions; even though the country’s
carbon dioxide emission intensity per unit
of gross domestic product (GDP) has fallen
from 68.8 grams of carbon dioxide equiva-
lent from 1994 to 56.2 grams in 2007.
Transforming from a traditional econ-
omy to a low carbon economy is a process
of economic development emphasising
high energy efficiency, an optimised
energy structure and rational consumption
of energy. This can be achieved by blend-
ing the economy achieved through
changing public policies, with high in-
vestments in the energy-intensive sectors,
technological innovation, and necessary
institutional boundaries. Further, if the
country aims to reduce emissions intensity
by 20-25% by 2020, new economic and
policy instruments must be evolved to
increase the competitiveness of low-carbon
technologies. Hereafter, the performance
of the NCEF as a new fund mechanism,
will be considered critically in broad
public policy discourses on mitigating
climate change in India.
vol xlviI no 37
COMMENTARY
Notes
1 There are three main accounts of the Government
of India: (1) Consolidated Fund of India, (2) Public
Account of India, (3) Contingency Fund of India.
The Public Account of India as referred in Arti-
cle 266 (2) of the Constitution consists of receipts
and disbursements such as deposits, reserve
funds, remittances, etc, which do not form part
of the Consolidated Fund of India. Disburse-
ments from the Public Account are not subject to
vote by Parliament. See Budget Manual (2010),
Ministry of Finance, Government of India.
2 The competent authorities in the NCEF have
various final approval mechanisms which sanc-
tion funding on the basis of the recommenda-
tions of the IMG. For projects with budgets up to
Rs 150 crore, the final approval authority rests
with the minister-in-charge of the administrative
ministry/department that has initially received
the preliminary proposals. For projects with
budgets between Rs 150 crore and Rs 300 crore,
the approval authority is jointly managed by the
concerned Administrative Ministry/Department
and MoF. The Cabinet Committee on Economic
Affairs (CCEA) takes the final decision regarding
proposals with budgets of more than Rs 300 crore.
3 Receipt Budget, 2012-13, Ministry of Finance,
Government of India
4 The authors received the minutes of the three
IMG meetings held on 14 June 2011, 11 August
2011, and 25 November 2011 from the Plan Finance
II Division, Department of Expenditure, MoF
through the Right to Information Act 2005 on
24 February 2012, on an application received
by the designated authority on 11 January 2012.
5 This is the RTI response date of Plan Finance II
Division, Department of Expenditure, MoF.
Meeting minutes were received as part of the
RTI response.
6 See Office Memorandum (2011a: 2).
7 See note No 6.
8 See Office Memorandum (2011c: 5).
9 Excerpt from the first IMG meeting held on
14 June 2011, IMG meeting minutes accessed
through RTI Act 2005.
10 See Office Memorandum (2011b).
11 Many of these demonstration projects are
planned in backward areas and those affected
by left-wing extremism. Provision of renewa-
ble energy solutions to such underserved com-
munities is certainly a progressive measure.
However, as observed by the IMG during its de-
liberations, several government programmes
already exist to specifically support such
projects in these areas.
12 The JCERDC award announcement, including
a listing of winning organisations, is available
at: www.indousstf.org/doc/JCERDC_Announce-
ment.pdf (accessed on 2 May 2012).
13 For full source, see note 2 above.
References
Office Memorandum (2011a): “Guidelines for Apprais-
al and Approval of Projects/Schemes Eligible for
Financing under the National Clean Energy Fund”,
Plan Finance Division, Department of Expendi-
ture, MoF, F No 16 (5)/PF-II/2010, 18 April.
– (2011b): “Format for Memorandum to Invite
Proposals under the National Clean Energy
Fund for Consideration of the Inter Ministerial
Group Constituted to Approve/Appraise Projects
under National Clean Energy Fund”, Plan
Finance Division, Department of Expenditure,
MoF, F No 16 (5)/PF-II/2010, 16 June.
– (2011c): “Second Meeting of the Inter-Ministe-
rial Group Constituted to Approve/Appraise the
Projects under National Clean Energy Fund”,
Minutes of the Meeting, Plan Finance Division,
Department of Expenditure, MoF, F No 16 (05)
PF II/2010, 17 August.
21
 COMMENTARY

the department of consumer affairs,

GM Labelling in India Ministry of Consumer Affairs, Food and
Civil Supplies. It proclaimed amendments
A Step Forward? to the Legal Metrology Act 2009, updating
the Legal Metrology (Packaged Commodi-
ties) Rules 2011 to the Legal Metrology
Kavitha Kuruganti (Packaged Commodities) Amendment
Rules, 2012. This was a fait accompli, deli-

The department of consumer
affairs recently mandated
compulsory labelling of
packaged genetically modified
food. Though segregation and
testing to ensure compliance is
a great challenge under Indian
conditions, implementation
is not difficult because India
has only a limited number of
genetically modified imports and
only one commercially produced
domestic crop – Bt cotton. This
note provides the international
context for the new rules and the
background on previous attempts
to mandate GM labelling.
Kavitha Kuruganti (kavitha.kuruganti@gmail.
com) is with the Alliance for Sustainable and
Holistic Agriculture.
Economic & Political Weekly EPW september 15, 2012
G
enetically modified (GM) product
labelling is back in the news. The
California Proposition (or Prop)
37 (also known as the Right To Know
Genetically Engineered Food Act) is a
keenly watched fight, to be decided in a
November ballot, between well-organised
citizens’ groups which want GM food to
be labelled and the powerful American
food industry which is keen on defeating
the initiative, by pumping in tens of
thousands of dollars in its lobbying.
In July 2011, a Codex Alimentarius
agreement on GM labelling was reached
after years of negotiation, which makes
national labelling laws less vulnerable
to World Trade Organisation (WTO)
challenges. It was decided that countries
are free to decide on whether to label foods
derived from modern biotechnology.
It is reported that worldwide, around
40 countries have developed some form
of labelling requirement (mandatory as
well as voluntary) including major food
importers like the European Union (EU)
and Japan, in addition to China, Australia,
New Zealand, South Korea, Brazil, Russia,
etc. While some countries go in for label-
ling for only those commodities which
can be tested for transgenic protein traces,
others require labelling as pertaining to
the production process itself, irrespec-
tive of whether the end product has GM
protein traces or not. India however has
been floundering on this for years now,
with the Ministry of Health and Family
Welfare trying to take a lead, but not
progressing much on this front.
An Unexpected Development
India recently took a small step towards
labelling of GM food. This has been a
vexatious issue in the country, cropping
up again and again in various debates
pertaining to GM technology. Suddenly,
out of the blue, a notification (GSR 427 (E))
appeared on 5 June 2012 in an Extra-
ordinary Gazette publication, issued by
vol xlviI no 37
vered without much discussion. Through
this amendment, Rule 6 got a sub-rule
(6) inserted, requiring “every package
containing genetically modified food
shall bear at the top of its principal dis-
play panel the words ‘GM’ ”, to come into
effect from 1 January 2013. Admittedly,
many groups engaging closely with the GM
issue were also caught somewhat un-
awares when this development emerged.
The notification is clearly a step out of
the inertia that the labelling issue has
been caught in. By initiating the measure
with packaged commodities, at least one
aspect of the debate has been squarely
addressed: how labelling can be imple-
mented when most consumption occurs
in open, loose fashion is an oft-heard
argument. However, by applying it to
packaged commodities to begin with,
the front-end on the retail side has been
addressed, so to speak.
This is not all though. For something
to show up as a GM or non-GM product,
the entire supply chain has to be clearly
demarcated. In that sense, the back-end is
not ready, since starting from the farmer’s
household, much mixing up and aggre-
gation occurs, not to mention contamina-
tion through biological and other means.
Segregation of GM from non-GM is a great
challenge in this country and we might
end up in a situation where all packaged
foods might have to declare themselves
GM in any case, except if they are organic!
The next challenge is to be able to
catch those who are not complying with
the statutory requirement, which means
a system of sampling and testing in des-
ignated laboratories. It appears that the
department of consumer affairs is not
equipped for such a system as of now,
even though it is not difficult to put into
place such mechanisms. Testing labs do
exist in the country.
The good news, however, is that at this
point of time, GM imports can be traced,
since particular countries and particular
15
COMMENTARY
ingredients are easily correlated to GM
contamination possibilities. With only
one GM crop approved for cultivation in
the country – Bt cotton, whose seed oil is
entering the edible oil supply chain – im-
plementation of the new notification
should not be an issue. Further, the soy-
bean oil being imported is also mixed
with GM, because India imports from GM
soy-producing countries, with the Genetic
Engineering Approval Committee (GEAC)
sanction. Any agency not labelling its
edible oil product as GM should be able
to show that no blending of cotton seed
oil or imported soy oil has taken place.
Earlier Attempts
While the new development applies to
packaged foods, the efforts to legislate
around labelling go back to 2006, when
India attempted to amend the Preven-
tion of Food Adulteration (PFA) Act of
1955 to bring in mandatory labelling
of all GM foods. At that time, a draft
of an amendment to the PFA rules were
announced through Notification 152 (E)
by the Ministry of Health and Family
Welfare, on 10 March 2006 (in Section
23 of the Act, with a new insertion after
Rule 37D).
The amendment stipulated that:
– a GM food, derived there from, whether it
is primary or processed or any ingredient of
food, food additives or any food product that
may contain GM material shall be compulso-
rily labelled, without any exceptions;
– the label of all package(s) of GM food(s) or
foods containing ingredients, derived from
biotechnology or bio-engineering or food ad-
ditives or any food product that may contain
GM material shall indicate that they have been
subject to genetic modification. These provi-
sions will be applicable to all such products
both imported or domestically produced; and
– the label of imported GM food or derived
there from, whether it is primary or proc-
essed or any ingredient of food, food addi-
tives or any food product that may contain
GM material shall also indicate that the
product has been cleared for marketing and
use in the country of origin so that the veri-
fication, if needed can be taken up with that
country without having to resort to testing.
The definition given to genetically
engineered (GE)/GM foods in the draft
amendment was as follows:
Genetically engineered or modified foods
means food and food ingredients composed
of or containing genetically modified or
16
engineered organisms obtained through
modern biotechnology, or food and food in-
gredients produced from but not contained
genetically modified or engineered organisms
obtained through modern biotechnology.
Another rule proposed to be inserted
clearly reinforced the need for obtaining
prior approval of the GEAC (and subject
to conditions imposed by it) before the
sale of GM food (see 48-F: Restriction on
Sale of Genetically Modified Food).
This attempted notification came about
a decade after GM foods entered the
scene in a country like the United States
(US), and four years after India officially
allowed Bt cotton. The cotton seed cake
was being fed to cattle, dairy products
from such livestock were entering the
human food chain and seed oil was enter-
ing the food chain. The features that
stood out in the draft notification included
the following:
– It was mandatory to conform to the
labelling rules without any exception;
– Primary as well as processed foods,
which might have ingredients created
out of modern biotechnology, would come
under labelling rules: living modified
organisms as well as “products thereof”
got covered;
– There would be “zero tolerance” so
to speak, when it came to labelling
requirements;
– Food additives derived from modern
biotechnology would also be covered;
– Imports would have to meet an addi-
tional requirement of showing regulatory
clearance in the country of origin.
Public feedback was collected on the
draft notification and an expert committee
constituted to consolidate the feedback
and finalise the amendment accordingly.
Discussions in the two meetings held by
the expert committee focused on segre-
gation, traceability and identity preser-
vation issues, on validating testing meth-
ods and identifying designated referral
centres for testing, etc. The committee
finalised the rules as originally drafted,
in a meeting on 24 August 2006, with in-
dustry, farmers’ and consumers’ repre-
sentatives included in the committee.1
Inaction on GM Labelling
However, any movement forward on this
labelling regime was pushed into limbo.
september 15, 2012
Speculated reasons centred around the
American comments received in the
Committee on Technical Barriers to Trade
(TBT) in the WTO, on the Health Ministry’s
proposed labelling rules in addition to
the Directorate General of Foreign Trade
(DGFT) notifications, vide which impor-
tant requirements were prescribed with
respect to GM food, feed and GM organism
(GMO) imports.2 The DGFT notified the
WTO TBT on 23 May 2006, close to the
17 May 2006 notification by the Ministry
of Health and Family Welfare on the
proposed PFA amendments enforcing
mandatory labelling.3
The US expressed concern that the
proposed amendment will have the “un-
intended effect of discriminating against
foods produced through modern bio-
technology or containing ingredients or
additives from such foods”. It went on to
question the scope of the 1989 “Rules for
the Manufacture, Use/Import/Export and
Storage of Hazardous Micro Organisms/
Genetically Engineered Organisms or
Cells” notified under the Environment
(Protection) Act (EPA) in India, governing
genetically modified organisms, arguing
that “the scope is vague and appears to
be broader than any other existing regu-
latory system in the world”. It is reported
that the approval system and labelling
scheme were also subject to concern from
Argentina, Brazil, Canada and Chile.
India responded by recalling that the
GEAC had existed since 1989 and that the
measures only required a more thorough
approach to applying existing measures.4
The DGFT conditions imposed on 7 April
2006 did not change. (Only an exception
was provided to the import of soybean
oil in July 2006.) These conditions man-
dated that:
at the time of import, all consignments con-
taining products which have been subjected
to genetic modification will carry a declara-
tion stating that the product is genetically
modified. In case a consignment does not
carry such a declaration and is later found
to contain GM material, the importer is
liable to penal action under Foreign Trade
(Development & Regulation) Act, 1992.
It is another matter that so far, not a
single case has been seen where importers
of GM containing consignments have been
caught. Foods containing GM ingredients,
imported from the US, Canada, etc – crops
vol xlviI no 37 EPW Economic & Political Weekly

like corn, canola, soybean are grown
from GM seeds in these countries, and
there is no system of segregation – have
not been cleared by the GEAC as per its
minutes over the years, though this is
a requirement of the DGFT notification
on the subject. In at least one instance,
testing by a civil society organisation
showed lack of conformity but GEAC did
not take the complaint to its logical con-
clusion. In one other case of an applica-
tion for importing 64 kg of pickles from
Japan containing GM ingredients (corn
and soybean) for a Japanese restaurant
in Delhi, the decision was deferred and
no subsequent discussion seen in the
GEAC minutes.5
The PFA Act, along with similar statutes/
orders, got consolidated in the Food
Safety and Standards Act of 2006. All
matters related to food safety and stand-
ards were brought under a single inde-
pendent statutory authority called the
Food Safety and Standards Authority of
India (FSSAI). It is noteworthy that the
FSSAI has not proceeded with the final
notification and enforcement of the
labelling rules till this day.
Initially, in response to queries includ-
ing by this author, FSSAI officials said that
they were still setting up the required
institutional and organisational mecha-
nisms for enforcing the statute. Only once
it was ready would they get into a labelling
regime for GMOs and products thereof.
Thereafter, the GM foods issue within the
FSSAI got entangled with developments
related to the proposed Biotechnology
Regulatory Authority of India (BRAI) Bill.
The BRAI Bill proposed that all living
modified organisms and food derived
from them (with or without GMOs) would
come under the purview of the Biotech-
nology Regulatory Authority, though GM
labelling might continue to be under FSSAI.
The FSSAI chief executive officer’s (CEO)
report for 2010-11 clearly shows that by
July 2010, all sections of the Act were
notified, except the provision regarding
GM food in Section 22. According to the
report, in compliance of a direction of
the Supreme Court, a schedule for the
framing of regulations on GM food label-
ling was submitted to the court and a sci-
entific committee within the FSSAI was
looking into the matter.6
Economic & Political Weekly EPW september 15, 2012
Further, when the FSSAI notified its
Food Safety and Standards (Packaging
and Labelling) Regulation 2011, dated
1 August 2011, it was apparent that the
regulations mysteriously covered every
aspect, including mandatory labelling of
irradiated food, but not GM foods! Inter-
estingly enough, the matter of GM foods
does not figure in the 2011 regulations
related to Prohibition and Restriction on
Sales either! Subsequent amendments to
regulations also do not touch upon GM,
despite the fact that the Food Safety and
Standards Act clearly covers GM/GE food
or food containing such ingredients.
Section (22) expressly states that:
save as otherwise provided under this Act
and regulations made thereunder, no person
shall manufacture, distribute, sell or import
any genetically modified articles of food.
Today, FSSAI has its scientific panels
and committees in place, including for
GM foods and labelling. However, the
labelling issue is still in limbo.
Labelling as a Regular Feature
The issue of labelling has been frequently
brought up in various debates in the
country, including when the fate of Bt
brinjal’s commercial approval was dis-
cussed. The moratorium decision note
of the then Minister of Environment
and Forests suggested that FSSAI would
come out with mandatory labelling in
a footnote.
It appears that labelling questions were
explored by the Parliamentary Standing
Committee on Agriculture too. Recom-
mendation Para No 6.148 of the 37th
Report of the Committee on “Cultivation
of Genetically Modified Food Crops –
Prospects and Effects”, presented to the
Lok Sabha on 9 August 2012 says:7
Having found out that during the last decade
or so of Bt cotton cultivation in the country,
lacs of tonnes of cotton seed oil extracted
from Bt cotton has gotten into the food
chain, with various agencies including the
Department of Consumer Affairs, FSSAI, etc.
being oblivious of this fact, the Committee
have sought an explanation of the Department
of Consumer Affairs from the point of view
of consumer protection, consumer rights, in-
formed consumer choice, etc, immediately.
It is interesting to note that depart-
ment of consumer affairs moved deci-
sively on the matter referring to the
vol xlviI no 37
COMMENTARY
committee, even before the committee’s
report was tabled. It is also reported that
the ministry elicited the views of state
governments and received an overwhelm-
ing response in favour of the move.8
The only thing that can be said about
FSSAI not notifying the labelling rules is
that there was a lack of political will as
well as problems relating to practicability
of implementation in many cases. But as
argued in the beginning of this article,
implementation is not a major challenge
at this point of time, given that India
has a few GM imports and only one com-
mercially produced GM crop domestically.
In that sense, upholding the consumer
right to know and to informed choice is
not difficult and therefore, should not
be withheld.
Incidentally, the Cartagena Biosafety
Protocol (CBP), centred around prior in-
formed consent related to trans-boundary
trade of GMOs and products thereof, will
have its Conference of the Parties serving
as the Meeting of the Parties to the
protocol (COP-MOP) in Hyderabad next
month. India and 162 other countries
are party to the protocol as of now. It is
legitimate to expect that the central
principle of this international agreement
will be extended into national legislations
also, with clear identification requirements
put into place, and appropriate standards
developed. Article 18 of the CBP relates
to handling, transport, packaging and
identification issues vis-à-vis living modi-
fied organisms (LMOs) and is part of the
COP-MOP discussions to be taken up in
Hyderabad in October.
Notes
1 “Minutes of the Second Meeting of the Expert
Group to finalise the draft notification GSR
152 (E) dated 10 March 2006 regarding label-
ling of GM Food held on 15 February 2007
at 10.30 am in Nirman Bhawan, New Delhi”,
chaired by Shiv Lal, additional director general
and director, National Institute of Communi-
cable Diseases.
2 See DGFT, Ministry of Commerce and Industry
Notifications No 2 (RE-2006/2004-2009) and
No 4 (RE-2006), 7 April 2006 and 4 May 2006,
respectively.
3 Indian authorities notified the TBT that the
amendment was “to regulate sale and import
of genetically engineered or modified foods
and food ingredients composed of or contain-
ing genetically modified or engineered organism
obtained through modern biotechnology”, with
the rationale being to “provide correct infor-
mation to consumer about the nature of food
being purchased by them for consumption”.
17
COMMENTARY
4 See “Specific Trade Concerns: The Beetles, GMOs
and Those Novel Foods Again”, “Christmas
May Come Late This Year for the SPS Committee”,
Sanitary, Phytosanitary Measures Committee,
27-28 June 2006, last accessed on 22 August 2012:
www.wto.org/english/news_e/news06_e/sps_
june06_e.htm. See also minutes of the meeting
of the Committee on Technical Barriers to Trade,
18
7-9 June 2006, G/TBT/M/39, 31 July 2006,
para 9, commenting on G/TBT/N/IND/12 and
G/TBT/N/IND/17
5 GEAC, July 2009.
6 “Report of the Chief Executive Officer, FSSAI,
for the year 2010-11”, dated 27 August 2011. Last
accessed on 22 August 2012: www.fssai.gov.in/
Portals/0/Pdf/Report_of_CEO(27-08-2011).pdf
september 15, 2012
7 As reported in Lok Sabha Secretariat, press re-
lease, 9 August 2012, p 2. For the report itself, last
accessed on 22 August 2012, see: http://164.100.
47.134/lsscommittee/Agriculture/GM_Report.pdf
8 Gargi Parsai (2012), “Centre Makes Labelling of
GM Foods Mandatory”, The Hindu, 21 June. Last
accessed on 22 August 2012, http://www.the-
hindu.com/news/national/article3551679.ece
vol xlviI no 37 EPW Economic & Political Weekly

India’s Agri-Imperialism
Indian agribusiness is set to reap super-profits from its large-scale acquisitions of farmland in Ethiopia.
M
eles Zenawi was the favourite of western imperialists
in the Horn of Africa, the apple of every US president’s
eye. They backed him to the hilt even in the 1980s when,
in the Marxist-Leninist idiom, he claimed to represent the forces
of “revolutionary democracy”. The reason, of course, was that
the Tigrayan People’s Liberation Front (TPLF) and the Ethiopian
People’s Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF) that he headed
from the mid-1980s onwards in the civil war were fighting to
overthrow the Soviet-backed Mengistu-led government of the
then People’s Democratic Republic of Ethiopia. Heavily backed by
US imperialism, the TPLF and the EPRDF won the war, and Meles
Zenawi took power in 1991. He remained at the helm for the next
21 years until his death last month on 20 August. Now that he is
gone, not only Washington, but also New Delhi and some Indian
business groups which have leased large tracts of land in the
country, must be hoping that the political transition in Ethiopia is
navigated in a manner that maintains their business advantage.
The political transition post-Zenawi is certainly not going to be
smooth. Zenawi not only held tight control of the military and
what was virtually a single-party state (the multiparty system did
get off the ground when some opposition party candidates won a
few seats in the 2005 elections), but also had a direct stake in the
economy through the “endowment companies”, the largest and
most influential of which is EFFORT, the conglomerate owned by the
TPLF. And, most importantly, Zenawi had a big hand in the large-
scale land acquisition by foreign investors, which is rapidly shift-
ing the agrarian structure from smallholder to large-scale farming.
As a background paper entitled “Rural Land Policy, Rural Trans-
formation and Recent Trends in Large-Scale Land Acquisitions in
Ethiopia” by Getnet Alemu of Addis Ababa University for the
European Report on Development 2011/2012 makes clear, “the
government plans to identify, prepare and transfer 3.3 million ha
of land to commercial farming investors in the GTP [Growth and
Transformation Plan] period [2010-11 to 2014-15], primarily for
export crops. It also plans to increase ninefold the area under
horticulture in the GTP period”. Indeed, despite the country’s
acute problem of food insecurity, foreign investors “receive more
incentives to export their products”. The largest investors are
Indian companies: there are over 35 Indian firms, a few of which
have leased land measuring over 1,00,000 ha, the Ethiopian
government being “particularly well-disposed to Indian capital
Economic & Political Weekly EPW september 15, 2012 vol xlviI no 37
EDITORIALS
and is keenly encouraging it”. The pace of such large-scale land
acquisitions picked up in the wake of the spike in food commodity
prices in 2007 and the opportunity to make significant profits in
expectation of prices remaining at significantly higher levels, as
also the highly concessionary terms on offer, including the very
low rents on land. If all goes well, the Ethiopian government
hopes that by the end of 2014-15, 7 million ha or more of land
will have been transferred to investors, domestic and foreign.
Of course, the resources transferred to investors “include not
just land but also sources of water”.
US President Barack Obama has hailed Zenawi’s “unyielding
commitment to Ethiopia’s poor...his desire to lift millions of
Ethiopians out of poverty through his drive for food security”.
But, the background paper by Alemu points out that when his
government decided to give away so much of the country’s farm-
land to rich investors, Zenawi did not bother to consult with local
communities; indeed, he did all of this without their knowledge
or consent. Yet, these acts pose a threat to the viability of peasant
agriculture; they will lead to loss of farmland, deprivation of pastur-
age and grazing rights, and of access to water resources, firewood
and flora. There has already been displacement and resettlement
of people away from their home areas in order to provide the
investors “unencumbered access to land and other resources”.
What about the claim of additional employment? This is merely
for short-term and seasonal work. Of course, Indian companies
like Karuturi Agro Products have employed casual labourers in
land clearing and other heavy work, but for relatively skilled work,
even for work Ethiopians could have done, they have brought
employees from India. The wages paid to local casual labourers
have been low even by Ethiopian standards. The technology
employed is, no doubt, not appropriate for smallholder agricul-
ture. Indeed, Zenawi’s government did not even incorporate
any obligations in the contracts that the lessees of the large tracts
of farmland would contribute to the country’s food security.
Now, as Indian companies are taking over farmland more than
the size of the National Capital Region of Delhi in Ethiopia and New
Delhi is expecting Washington to ensure a smooth political transi-
tion in Addis Ababa, in order to gain the most from its special ex-
ploitation zones over there, we ought to remember what Marx, in
the 19th century, said about England in relation to its oldest colony
Ireland – a nation which oppresses others cannot itself be free.
9
SPECIAL ARTICLE
Infliction, Acceptance and Resistance
Containing Violence on Women in Rural Haryana
Prem Chowdhry
This study seeks to determine the effect of property
ownership and economic independence of women on
the reduction of violence, especially spousal violence, in
rural Haryana – a state well known for its violent past
and equally violent present towards women. Based on
extensive fieldwork, the paper argues that the rapidly
changed and changing political economy of this region
has thrown up certain contradictions in society which
have come to pose a challenge to the hitherto
established cultural norms that decree infliction and
widespread acceptance of violence upon women.
Through individual life experiences of rural women, it
highlights women’s understanding of violence, their
self-assertion and resistance as well as the importance
given by them to different options in handling or
containing violence.
This paper is based upon a study undertaken for United Nations (UN)
Women on determining the effects of women’s property ownership and
economic independence on reduction of violence against them in rural
Haryana. This extensive study is available at: www.unwomensouthasia.org
I wish to acknowledge the warm and generous hospitality offered by
R P Hooda, Vice-Chancellor, Maharshi Dayanand University, Rohtak,
which enabled me to avail of the much-needed space for research and
discussions, as and when I needed it. I also wish to profoundly thank
my short-term research assistants, Yudhvir Zaildar and Rekha Lohan
for providing me with extremely rich inputs from the field and several
incisive insights. Kavita rendered a short, but able spell, and had to
opt out due to her ill-health. I may add here that the use of the field
data, its analysis and conclusions, including all the errors which may
have crept in, are strictly mine and in no way reflect on the work of my
research assistants. Last, but not the least, I wish to record my very deep
appreciation and thankfulness for the help in editing and
formatting of this lengthy piece of writing provided by Sugandha
Nagpal and Leena Patel of UN Women, New Delhi.
Prem Chowdhry (chowdhryprem@gmail.com) is former professorial
fellow at the Nehru Memorial Museum and Library, New Delhi, and is
currently an independent researcher.
Economic & Political Weekly EPW september 15, 2012 vol xlviI no 37
T
he power structure within the household, operating
through specific gender hierarchies, uses violence on
women as the most potent tool of control and domina-
tion. Arising out of the very structure of society and deriving
legitimacy and acceptance in its ideological and cultural
matrix, wide-scale prevalence of violence in rural households
shows how gender works with other sociocultural structures
not only to reinforce, but to further tighten the existing
inequalities. In this respect, the influence of marital violence,
especially spousal violence, has been most pronounced. What
can be done to effect a reduction in it? A large number of re-
cent feminist scholars have engaged with this problem and
have conclusively accepted that two factors, viz, property
ownership and economic independence of women have had a
decisive effect on reducing it.1
The present study attempts to determine the effect of these
two factors in relation to rural Haryana. It analyses how and
why women may acquire ownership or/and control over land/
property/assets and avail employment opportunities in a
deep-rooted cultural milieu of northern India which, in prac-
tice, is given to negating such acquisitions. In other words, do
social and cultural norms sanctioning violence change when
women acquire control of land/property/assets? It will be a
challenge to evaluate these questions in the context of a strong
patrilineal and patriarchal society like that of Haryana – a
state where custom and cultural patterns deny any property
rights to women; a state which makes a mockery of the legal
enablement by not allowing women to exercise property
rights; a state notorious for its mindless violence as seen in the
so-called “crimes of honour”, and finally, a state well known to
wipe out all future property-related claims of girls by eliminat-
ing them in the womb itself. In other words, the state at its vio-
lent best. In such a violent scenario, can the dual contention of
property ownership and economic independence of women
become effective at all, to achieve a reduction in violence
against them?
The findings presented in this paper are based upon extensive
fieldwork conducted in the months of June, July and August
2011 in the districts primarily of Rohtak, Jhajjar, Sonepat and
Panipat. These districts were selected because this region forms
an arc surrounding the national capital and constitutes a part of
the National Capital Region (NCR). As such, it has undergone
drastic changes geoeconomically as well as socially. In these
districts, the villages were randomly selected, resulting in sev-
eral rounds of interviews, both structured and unstructured,
43
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with women and men of varying ages, social classes, castes and
professions. Similarly, focus group discussions were held in
mixed men-women groups as well as with only women and only
men. Apart from these, interactions with wider village commu-
nities as well as with activists, lawyers, state administrative and
police officials also took place. The exhaustive study of individ-
ual cases has resulted in an indepth understanding of the vari-
ous contradictions thrown up by the changing political economy
of Haryana in relation to the infliction of violence upon women.
I propose to tackle this problematic in four sections: Section 1
deals with the cultural and historical context of how violence
is perceived in this region, which is crucial to understanding
the widespread acceptance of violence. This leads to a brief
discussion of the customary norms regulating inheritance of
property by women, and how and why these norms stand to be
challenged by women in the contemporary period; this would
mean delineating the changed political economy of this region
and its effects on gender relations. Section 2, in certain ways,
is the major section. It deals with case studies based upon the
life experiences of women regarding infliction of violence
upon them. These women belong to different categories, for
example, those women who have staked their claim to the
money made out of the sale of the ancestral land by the natal
family male members; women who are laying claims to or
have come in possession of their share in the “patrilineal”
land; women whose husbands have become ghar jamais (resi-
dent sons-in-law); women who have some benami (proxy)
property in their names; women whose husbands have gone
out for work or those who have absentee husbands; employed
women who are earning their livelihood or generating some
income; and finally women who opt out of marriage. Section 3
deals with women’s resistance to violence and Section 4 takes
up some of the major points thrown up in the discussions and
case studies, highlighting the importance given to different
options in handling marital violence, by rural women them-
selves in their individual and collective capacities.
1 Acceptance of Violence
1.1 Understanding the Cultural and Historical Context
Spousal violence in Haryana is fairly widespread. According to
the National Family Health Survey-3 (NFHS) of 2005-06, 27%
of all married women in Haryana have experienced physical,
emotional and sexual violence.2 The activists pitch the per-
centage much higher, especially after the passing of the Pro-
tection of Women from Domestic Violence Act in 2005,3 and
the subsequent drive, undertaken by the government, political
parties and the non-governmental organisations (NGOs), to
raise awareness of women regarding domestic violence.4 In
order to understand violence, it is important to delineate its
cultural context in this state. How is marital violence per-
ceived by the local populace, both men and women, and what
is the level of its acceptance? This alone would enable us to
determine whether there has been any change or breach in its
infliction and acceptance over the years, especially in relation
to the rapid changes in the political economy of this region.
44
Culturally, beating of women is very much a part of Hary-
anavi rural culture, accepted as a matter of course both by
males and females. To understand this, the ideology summed
up in a very popular proverb is useful: joru khasam ki larai
keya (a quarrel between a married couple is of no conse-
quence).
This proverb, common throughout northern India, shows
the acceptance of larai (quarrel), as a “verbal duel”, which is
considered innocuous; but in reality and more frequently, it
very often means infliction of physical violence on the woman.
Moreover, the husband-wife larai is considered private and
very much between them alone. The neighbours may interfere
in saas-bahu ki larai (mother-in-law and daughter-in-law – in
which the latter is not infrequently beaten by the former), but
almost never when a couple fight. In fact, the wife herself
resents outside interference, if any is forthcoming, perhaps
fearing her husband’s wrath if she were to invite or accept it.
Instances are given when any hint of interference is aggres-
sively dealt with by the wife herself who says: mhara mard sai,
kuchh bhi kare, tanne kya (Whatever my man may do is none
of your business.)
In fact, rural society has always sanctioned wife-beating.
“The man who beats his wife or the family that beats its bahu
are all considered to do the right thing”, remembers an 80-
year old Haryanavi male in village Chhara of Jhajjar district.
Noting why rural men beat up their wives so frequently,
Malcolm Lyal Darling, a scholar and one of the most distin-
guished of Punjab officials, with an obvious bias in favour of
“male complaints”, quoted in his diary the following explana-
tions of men, as a justification of their “correct behaviour” dur-
ing his tours of Punjab-Haryana villages, in 1930-31:
They [women] have so many ways of giving trouble to their menfolk.
One of the commonest is to slap the children and make them cry when
the husband comes in from his work and wants to smoke his huqqa in
peace (It can always be deferred till the husband goes out), or they’d
bring his rotis in the field late, or they’ll cook his food badly, or when a
guest comes they will disgrace him by pretending there is nothing in
the house fit to set before him. And what can a man do if he is dis-
pleased, only beat her, there is nothing else.5
To this may be added the “neglect of children” as a justifia-
ble explanation for beating up women, offered by F L Brayne in
1930, another eminent British administrator, well known for
his village uplift work in Punjab-Haryana.6 Interestingly, these
are some of the very reasons behind infliction of violence high-
lighted by women who were interviewed recently in connec-
tion with the present project.7
In the past, however, the beating of women was considered
such a normal activity that no valid reason or cause was really
needed to justify it. It had almost achieved the status of routine.
So much so that popular stories abound regarding this practice.
An 84-year-old man from village Mehrana in district Jhajjar re-
membering a story from his childhood, narrated the following:
A Jat was always beating up his wife on the most frivolous of excuses,
for example, the fact that she hadn’t cooked well or given adequate
fodder to the cow, etc. The wife started becoming more and more
careful and soon he ran out of excuses. Still wanting to beat her up, he
started to harness the oxen backwards, towards the plough, to get a
comment out of her. The wife, however said: “jut ja bhai joken tera
september 15, 2012 vol xlviI no 37 EPW Economic & Political Weekly

dhanni jutave” (get harnessed, you oxen, as your master wishes). Till
late evening he could find no excuse. As the night approached he
asked his wife to put his khat (cot) on the roof, as it was summer time.
Once on the roof he asked, ‘aakash mein voh safed rahi kai sai’ (what is
that Milky Way in the sky?). The wife replied, ‘yo to bhuton ki rahi sai’
(that is the ghost way). The man said, ‘tanne bhutan ki rahi neeche meri
charpai dal di aur bhut mere upar pad gaya to?’ (You have put my cot
under the ghost way, supposing a ghost were to fall on me, then?), and
started to beat her up soundly.
Unanimous opinion gathered from the group discussions
suggests that this kind or extent of beating is hardly prevalent
and chronic wife beating, summed up in “uthte lat, baithte
ghunsa” (when he is up, he kicks her; when he is sitting, he hits
her), is no longer considered normal.
The general impression of both men and women is that
physical violence has declined over the years. The opinion
voiced by a number of educated Haryanavi men, urban and
rural, is that it is “only the dehati (ruralites) and uneducated
who beat their women”. Yet, all along, the rural areas have al-
ways maintained aurat par hath uthana achcha nahein8 (it is
not right to beat a woman). Clearly, the cultural ambivalence
had always accommodated different sets of values. In a way,
this is reflected in the National Family Health Survey (NHFS)
data of 2005-06, which shows that among educated men, 28%
to 29% considered wife beating to be justified as compared to
38% among the uneducated.9 The fact that educated men are
less violent towards their wives, especially if the wives also
happen to be educated, has been testified by certain contem-
porary studies as well.10 NFHS statistics suggest that preva-
lence of spousal violence is certainly lower among “more edu-
cated women”. Even then, more than one in seven women,
who have had at least 10 years of education, have experienced
spousal violence in Haryana (IIPS 2008: 26).
It may be noted here that lesser number of men than women
justify the infliction of violence on their wives, suggesting an
internalisation of violence by women. According to the NFHS
(2005-06) data, 46% of women (grown from 26.4% in 1998-99)
(Kishor and Gupta 2004: 694-712) and 33% of men in Haryana
believe that it is justified for a husband to beat his wife under
certain circumstances (IIPS 2008: 25). In interviews, men’s an-
swers regarding infliction of violence on their wives range
from total denials to prevarications. A few confessed at having
used a “couple of slaps” here and there “to keep the women in
line”. Others said, it was the women who “invite violence” as
“they provoke” or say: “jo zada bolti hai wohi pitati sai” (the
one who talks too much gets beaten up).
1.2 Political Economy of Haryana:
Changes in Gender Relationships
In a society that culturally accepts violence on women, it is not
difficult to visualise the fate of legal rights enabling her to in-
herit property in a situation when these rights go against the
customary norms of society. In this regard, I briefly summarise
the situation below.
In strong patrilineal societies like that of Haryana (as well
as that of Punjab and Uttar Pradesh), the land of the village is
taken to belong to the male descendants of ancestors, who
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SPECIAL ARTICLE
originally settled and worked on it. The male agnatic descend-
ants, as members of the localised clan, alone are considered to
have reversionary rights in the estate. Land is ordinarily not to
be alienated outside this group. This means basically that
daughters and sisters who are potential introducers of fresh
blood and new descent lines through their husbands are to be
kept from exercising their inheritance rights. This is clearly
evidenced in the emphasis placed and even violence inflicted
upon the compulsory observance of village and territorial ex-
ogamy and caste endogamy in marriage alliances. The intro-
duction of a rank outsider into the family who can and may
claim the property on behalf of his wife is forcibly and vio-
lently stopped. As an outsider, he remains outside the influ-
ence of the family and caste/community rules and ethics
which ensure a patrilineal inheritance. Similarly, the location
of a married daughter within the natal village also spells
danger for patrilineal inheritance as it facilitates and could
lead to assumption of land inherited by her.
The widespread phenomenon of “honour killings” is directly
related to the breaches in these customary norms. This fear
emanates from the property enablement clauses of the Act of
Succession, 1956 and its recent amendment in 2005. Legally,
the right to inherit land with full proprietary rights to its dis-
posal by a woman in her capacity as a daughter, sister, wife
and widow came to exist under the 1956 Act. As this Act
evoked great tension in the rural society, the landowners of
Haryana were unanimous in the urgency of abolishing it. On
the one hand, they tried to abolish it through the legislative
procedures, and on the other, they accelerated their attempts
through the caste panchayats to control its fallout. The move
to deprive women of their property rights cuts across political
parties. This was done in 1967, 1979 and 1989. All these moves
failed, but not the spirit behind it.
Thwarted in their attempts, the rural patriarchal forces
devised several ways to stem the progressive fallout of the legal
enablement through a variety of means. Many advocates tes-
tify to the stream of male members with the potential female
inheritors in tow to get them to write off their land claims in
favour of their brothers in anticipation of the Act enforce-
ment.11 In the court, one of the routine questions asked before
likhat-padhat (formalisation of rights), takes place is “tum
khush ho ker bhaiyon ko de rahi ho” (are you giving [the land]
to your brothers on your own sweet will?). Several gift and
sale deeds were registered in favour of male members at this
time. In some cases, the land is automatically registered in the
girl’s name but remains in de facto possession of the brother.
However, more recently, I discovered that she cannot always
sign away her inheritance as her brothers would have her do,
as rural consensus puts the marriage age well below the age of
attaining majority. In cases where she does sign away her
right, after marriage she is invariably taunted for having been
“so very generous to have gifted away the land”.
However, a way out of this has been found, which is not
infrequently adopted. This is to seek the prior sanction of the
husband-to-be and his family about her not claiming the due
inheritance. In many cases this is forthcoming, perhaps
45
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because they too have daughters and are afraid of establishing
a precedent and of the social taunts regarding the obvious
double standards. But in these cases, where the assent is not
forthcoming, the de facto control of the father and brother re-
tains its upper hand. Violence and compulsion have been very
effective in making women sign away their rights. An important
way has been to pose the inheritance right of a daughter and a
sister against that of the brother; reasons for the growing men-
ace of dowry are again related to the patrilineal insistence upon
an alternative settlement of a girl’s claims/right to property.
It was not only the daughter or sister, but also the widow
whose traditional rights of inheritance proved to be a menace
to the patriarchal system. As I have discussed at length else-
where, a way out of this was available in the form of widow
remarriage, called the custom of karewa or levirate, in which
the widow was remarried to her devar (younger brother-in-
law), or failing him the jeth (older brother-in-law), or a collat-
eral cousin. Enforcement of this custom, both in the colonial
and post-colonial period (in which her economic benefits have
increased enormously due to recent increases in pension, and
other compensations, etc), is directly related to the property
inherited by her and the patriarchal desire to retain it in the
family. The widow who wanted sexual as well as economic
freedom, and we may add freedom from institutionalised mar-
ital violence, resisted it vehemently then, and continues to do
it even now, with differing results.
Indeed, the legal possibility of and claims of her inheritance
rights meant that the violence is perpetrated on females in
their infancy or in the womb itself to eliminate the root cause
of property going to her. The new technology, readily available
and extensively used, for determining the sex of the foetus
leading to female foeticide has wreaked havoc in society. The
census figures of Haryana, 2001, show only 819 females to
1,000 males in the category of 0-6 years of age.12 Such low
female figures effectively negate the progressive fallout of the
inheritance enablement law on the female population.
Hostility to Women and Property
Although things are changing and customs have had to be re-
vised, as will be clear presently, there continues to be hostility
to women inheriting property. In an all-men group discussion,
men frankly admitted that they, whether as father, brother,
husband or son would not want women to have property. They
openly acknowledge that it would give women tremendous lev-
erage and yeh hamare sir per he nachengi (literally, they will
dance on our heads). Also there seems to be an overwhelming
unanimity about the inappropriateness of girls getting property
from two sources: the parents and the in-laws. These shares are,
according to them, “over and above the dowry that we give
them”. With dowry, men do not have so much of problem, as that
gives them much sought-after status. It is a woman’s claim to
property that is under attack. The men want her share in the
parental property to be abolished which, according to them, must
go to the male lineal heirs. “Why should women get two shares?
Isn’t it enough that we get them married?” they ask. The appre-
hensions of men about their patriarchal power and authority
46
being compromised are quite apparent. But as the changes are
now surfacing noticeably, they have no option, but to either
accept it or physically eliminate the woman. Confirming this,
women stated: “land or its possession is the cause of our deaths”,
and cited several cases from different villages where women
were allegedly killed for property.
Many women in all-women group discussions similarly felt
that “a daughter should have the right of property only in her
sasural (conjugal home) not in her maika (natal home)”. Others
also maintained: “Only if a daughter is not married, she has
the right to her maike ki (parental) property”. Condemning
those women who are now demanding their share, another
woman maintained: “Kuch bhi ho bhaiyan ki zaroorat to pade
he kare. Un ke bina ke sare hai. Eesa peese ka kei karnna jo ad-
ami ne kho de” (Whatever may be, one needs one’s brothers.
One cannot do without them. What good is this money which
cuts off your relationship with your natal males?) A contrary
opinion does exist, as we shall see presently, but is not being
readily voiced; those who hold this opinion prefer to maintain
silence for fear of being shouted down or even ostracised.
Sumitra Devi of village Meham opined very insightfully:
“Yahan to lugai adami ki sampati maani jaave hai vo keesa sam-
pati mein adhikar maange?” (Here [in Haryana], a woman is
considered the property of a man. Where does the question of
her claiming her share in the property arise?)
In such a society how does one determine the link between
women’s economic situation and reduction of violence on her?
First, it is important to delineate those social situations in which
the possibility of a woman’s control or possession and utilisation
of property and other productive assets may occur and has
occurred; only then can the scale of violence inflicted upon
women be evaluated. Listed here are some of these situations:
• As a daughter (with or without brother/s), she may come into
possession of assets in the lifetime or after the death of her
parents. Or she may by herself, or prompted by her husband
and/or his family lay claim to her share of property and
acquire it; or her husband may claim her share on her behalf.
• As a widow, she may claim separate possession of her hus-
band’s share and if she does not remarry, she goes on to estab-
lish a “female-headed household”. To this may be added those
women who become de facto heads of their households in
certain extraordinary situations. According to the National
Health Service Corps (NHSC) report, Haryana has 11% house-
holds headed by women.
• In certain cases, where a woman may be given property
which may or may not be benami in nature to escape the state
tax or land ceiling structure, which under the law is consider-
ably lower on women owners of property.
• A woman could be in actual control and management of
property due to the migration of her husband or in his absence,
when he is away at work.
• Employment or self-employment of a woman may make her
an earning member of the family.
• Those who opt out of marriage.
The above-mentioned cases of women need to be located
afresh in the changed political economy of today, as the
september 15, 2012 vol xlviI no 37 EPW Economic & Political Weekly

customary norms governing questions of inheritance and
property of women have been undergoing changes. Very
briefly, a number of factors have contributed to this: the great
increase in population after independence, the coming of the
green revolution, fragmentation of landholdings, extensive
commercialisation, rapid urbanisation, and consequent pres-
sure on land; the coming in of major and minor industries, in-
dustrial zones and special economic zones (SEZs), resulting in
enormous escalation in land prices, which have shot up several
hundredfold in the last quarter of the century or so. Together,
these have had a radical fallout on women, on their aspira-
tions, demands and hitherto accepted behavioural patterns.
Clarifying details of the above-stated features is not possible
here. For the purposes of this study, I wish to emphasise just
three aspects in the changed political economy of this region
that have direct bearing on shifting gender relations and the
extent of violence women have to face. Out of these, the last
two aspects have been highlighted by women themselves dur-
ing interviews and group discussions.
Commercialisation of Land Prices: The single-most impor-
tant change, which has had the most profound effect, is the
enormous increase of land prices in Haryana which has
brought a rethink among women about claiming their share.
The case studies given here are ample testimony of the
changed situation. This is especially valid for the land encir-
cling the capital, on three sides. For example, in my fieldwork
area, the escalation in land prices in district Jhajjar has been
enormous; one acre of cultivable land in village Dujjana, for
example, in 2011, was estimated to approximate close to a
crore of rupees, rising from Rs 35,000 in 1988. The cost of this
land was less than Rs 1,000 in 1966, the year of the creation of
Haryana state. Similarly, in Karnal district, the centre of the
green revolution, the price of one acre is estimated to have
risen from anything between Rs 2,000 and Rs 4,000 per acre
available before the green revolution to Rs 50,000 to Rs 1 lakh
and above, as a result of the green revolution and now in 2011,
it stands well over a crore of rupees.
The increase in the prices of agricultural lands for urban
purposes in the areas surrounding Delhi as well as major
towns of Haryana itself has been unparalleled. Not only have
the number of towns grown in this state from 58 in 1961 to 106
in 2001, there has also been a steady growth of urban popula-
tion of Haryana. Statistically, the growth of population in the
towns since the creation of the state has been: 17,72,959 in 1971
to 6,11,14,139 in 2001, a growth of 334.86%.13 In the last decade
alone for which the figures are available, i e, from 1999 to 2001,
the urban area of Haryana has increased from 966.73 km to
1,287.93 km, a growth of 33.23% (Census of India, Haryana,
2001, p 36). Even more importantly, out of 19 districts of Haryana,
seven districts fall in the NCR, containing 41.21% of the total popu-
lation of Haryana according to the 2001 Census (ibid, p 68). This
NCR region of the state contains 40 towns and 2,496 villages
out of a total of 106 towns and 6,955 villages in Haryana. In
other words, 37.74% of the towns and 35.89% of the villages of
Haryana are included in the NCR. It covers about 30.46% of the
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SPECIAL ARTICLE
total area of this state. These areas have seen massive escala-
tion in land prices. Land around major NCR towns in Haryana,
like Panipat, Sonipat, Rohtak, Bahadurgarh, Rewari, Gurgaon,
and Faridabad measured in square yards rather than in acres
has enormous price tags due to demands of urban residential,
commercial and industrial expansion. In Rohtak district, for
example, known as the “CM City”, as it is the Chief Minister
Bhupinder Hooda’s constituency, the price of residential plots
has gone beyond Rs 65,000 per sq yard.14 This land and
income hunger is reinforced by the rising social expenditure,
along with the growing demands of a new generation with a
taste for urban life and consumerism.
The next two points are intrinsic part of the changing politi-
cal economy of Haryana which is deeply influencing the way
its society is taking shape and its effect on gender relations.
These, interestingly, were highlighted by women themselves
and are borne out of the wide-scale group discussions, inter-
views and case studies held in different villages of Haryana.
Two factors given overriding importance by most of the
women, in their individual and collective take on violence,
were: alcoholism and unemployment of men. Both accent the
frustration of males which is frequently taken out on women,
especially their wives.
Growing Alcoholism: Women voiced a strong correlation bet-
ween alcoholism and violence. The existence of a vast network
of sharab ke theke (licensed liquor shops) has become a con-
tinually growing problem in the whole of northern India. The
women of Haryana openly complain how their men spend
their incomes on alcohol and ruin their health. They consider
the spread of liquor and intoxicants as the cause of tension in
home, leading to shortage of money for family expenses, fre-
quent quarrels, and forcible extraction of money from women
and violence. Liquor is clearly behind the deteriorating quality
of women’s life and cuts across region, caste and class lines. In
fact, the greater the poverty, the worse is its impact on women
and children.
The growing menace of extensive liquor consumption
provided the one occasion in 1985, when women came
together to demonstrate. In Nahiri, a village in the Sonepat
district, a few women along with several men successfully
demonstrated against the liquor theka, which had to be closed
down. Along with this village, other villages like Ferozepur
Boangar in Sonepat district and Bhor Saidan in Kurukshetra
district emerged as important centres of this protest. The pro-
test movement, despite great optimism, and yet greater efforts
of several interested organisations, did not catch on.
The consumption of liquor is enormous and is said to be
growing: between 1981 and 2006-07, the consumption of
foreign liquor rose 8.13 fold and wine and beer, 10.12 fold (GOH
2001: 572). Not all this alcohol is consumed in Haryana itself,
as the state is an exporter of spirits and beer to other states.
But even if we take the consumption of country liquor alone,
locally known as thharra, the increase in its consumption has
been startling: from 14,20,345 in 1966-67 to 49,93,664 proof
litres in 1980-81 – an increase of 351.58%. It now stands in
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2006-07 (when the figures are available) at 57,540,753 proof
litres – a rise of 1,152.27% (GOH 2010: 558-59). This excludes
the enormous illicit distillation carried out in the state.
This increase in the consumption of liquor has been caused
by a cluster of inter-related causes, peculiar to different classes
and even castes.15 Among these causes, the increased paying
capacity of the consumers, particularly in the rural areas has
been an important decisive factor both in the eyes of academ-
ics and in rural perceptions. Interestingly, the two reasons ad-
vocated for the popularity of alcohol among lower castes and
classes in direct opposition to higher castes and classes is eco-
nomic deprivation and low self-esteem. The increase in alco-
hol consumption has also been indirectly encouraged by the
state with a major stake in its revenues – through its excise
policy and licensing of an increasing number of retail shops.16
Unemployment: “Bekar hain, peevain hain aur peettain hain”
(Men are unemployed: they drink and beat us), opine women
in the all-women group discussion. Women correlate alcohol-
ism and the unemployment of men, which together in their
view are responsible for inflicting violence upon them. This
brings us to the basic problem of unemployment which is caus-
ing a great deal of anxiety in Haryana. The great increase in
population and pressure on land due to limited expansion in
commerce and industry in the province and the overburden-
ing of the agrarian sector have created severe unemployment
in the state. According to the official figures of the unemployed
in Haryana available for 2001 only, there are a total of 7,85,408
persons, with 6,42,719 males and 1,42,689 females registered
in employment exchanges.17 Since 1980-81, these unemployed
figures have more than doubled and have not shown a down-
ward trend.18 Rural unemployment is calculated to be almost
twice urban unemployment.
Apart from the registered unemployed, there are 74,93,058
persons who are employable non-workers in Haryana. The
widespread unemployment and the consequent inability of a
man to support his family are a major cause of frustration, lack
of confidence and an onslaught on their masculinity. Together,
these factors lead to domestic violence. The special cell of the
protection officer (in relation to violence) in Rohtak shows that in
50% of the cases of domestic violence, the man is unemployed
and unable to provide any money for household expenses and the
children’s upkeep. In combination with alcoholism, unemploy-
ment becomes an even more lethal factor for inflicting v iolence
in the domestic situation.
Among the unemployed, the plight of the educated male is
particularly alarming. Among the total number of registered
unemployed, 2,32,312 are illiterate and 5,53,096 are educated.
Those among the educated who are employed, may well be
holding a job not in any equivalence with their educational
status. This factor, according to women, causes more frustra-
tion than men can handle. There are many stories of MAs and
PhDs holding peon or chowkidar jobs. Unemployment is espe-
cially aggravated as the young boys are not willing to settle
down to an agricultural life in the village. Income-generation
in the green revolution areas has driven away rather than
48
attracted the younger generation to agriculture. There is,
therefore, a great scramble for any employment, high or low,
whatever the social status. The jobs in their own villages are
very greatly limited and very few can be absorbed in them.
The village women also opine that even those boys who have
only studied up to matriculation (Class X) and have, in fact,
qualified by nakkal (copying or cheating) want jobs in the
white-collar professions. This observation is confirmed by
another study which similarly comments that a large chunk of
the educated and semi-educated rural population under the
age of 25 in Haryana, ranging from the most difficult category
of “tenth class failed” to “BA – third class”, want non-farm jobs
and cannot get them. So much unemployment is leading to
social disorder, lawlessness and violence in Haryanavi society
– both public and private.
2 Case Studies: Observable Changes
It is in this changed political economy and its shifting gender
relations that the case studies have to be located and under-
stood. Cases for each of the listed situations help assess the
effect of having productive assets or employment on the inflic-
tion of violence on women.
2.1 Women Staking a Claim to Money from Land Sale
The rapidly changed and still changing socio-political econ-
omy has had an effect on customary cultural patterns hitherto
held sacrosanct in the rural areas. These have been influential
enough for women to claim their inheritance and share in the
property, and also for some men to activate the inheritance
law on behalf of their wives. Even children have reclaimed the
share once orally declined by their mother as it is legally re-
claimable. As a woman astutely commented in village Man-
dotthi, “Pahle ladkiyan mangti zaroor thi per leti na thi, eeb
ladkiyan apna haq mangti hain aur le bhi rahi hain” (Earlier
the girls were asking for their share, but not claiming it; now,
the girls are asking for their share and even claiming it).19 This
is a change noticeably coming to the surface and in the long
term stands to readjust social equations between males
and females.
Women may still write off their land rights, but they are now
demanding a share in the sale of the land which has brought
huge economic returns in the NCR region. In village Baniara of
Rohtak district, for example, which falls under the “acquisition
of land” plans of the Haryana government, there has been
enormous rise in the price of land. These highly attractive
commercial prices have reportedly elicited a response. About
10-15 married women in this single village have staked their
claim for their share in the money which their brothers/
fathers have received from the sale of the land. Many women
are known to have already received this money. However,
there is a shroud of silence regarding this exchange as there
continues to be social censure of all such demands. The con-
cerned parties are wary of admitting that they have had to ac-
commodate the demands of their family women. There is con-
sequent denial by those concerned, but many people in the
know confirmed reports. In this respect, I take up just one case
september 15, 2012 vol xlviI no 37 EPW Economic & Political Weekly

in which the female claimant has made such a demand, which
highlights the pulls and pressures experienced by the woman
in order to either strengthen her agency or to create it. Out of
many cases that reportedly exist, she alone was willing to be
interviewed.
Rekha from village Ratthdhanna was married off to Rajbir,
a policeman when she was 22 years of age and had studied up
till BA. Her father originally had nine acres of land, out of
which six acres were sold off at the rate of one lakh per acre
much before her marriage. However, with the passage of time,
urbanisation in Sonepat, its industrial development and com-
mercialisation of the surrounding territory in the coveted
urban category, the price of land skyrocketed. As her father’s
land fell in this commercialised area, he sold off his three acres
at one crore per acre. Rekha, prompted by her in-laws, asked
for her share in this sale of land. In return, all that she was
given were some pieces of jewellery. She realised, as she puts
it, the “unfairness” of it all. Consequently, she asked her father
for her “proper share”. “Why should my father discriminate
between me and my two brothers?” she inquired. Till date, she
has not received her share.
During the interview, Rekha agitatedly complained that
both her brothers were unemployed. Yet, they were still “enjoy-
ing themselves” with this money, while she was constantly
being nagged and taunted by her husband and father-in-law
about her share which her father had so far refused to hand
over to her. Clearly there was emotional and psychological
pressure on Rekha which had intensified in the wake of the
sale of the land by her father. But, since this matter came to the
surface, she maintained, there was no physical violence on her
any more.
Rekha acknowledged that Rajbir, her husband, had a
“temper” and was given to airing it freely. Rajbir confirming
this, stating that he indeed was given to “slapping” Rekha
“now and then” to “keep her straight” as she was considered
very bholi (simple or unworldly). Even this “slapping” ceased
since her property claims came to be voiced. When asked
whether society now accepted the daughters’ share in their
father’s property, Rajbir, underlining the changing norms,
maintained:
Society doesn’t say anything. All households are nowadays facing such
demands from their daughters who are claiming their share, and in
fact, even getting it. Only money matters. This is especially so when
relationship between the in-laws sours for some reason, as in our case.
I hope the eventuality of moving the court doesn’t arise. So far neither
have we moved the court to claim Rekha’s share nor have they given
her share to us. Let us see what happens in the future.
It may be added here that claiming money or supporting the
wife in her claim is far easier for the husband; instead of land,
money can be taken shaan se (with respect or pride), as one man
put it. The money transaction also makes the husband of the
recipient escape the slur of being a ghar jamai – a position, by and
large, considered “demeaning”. Even women who ask for the
share of land, which many from financially weak conjugal homes
do, generally sell it off for the same reasons, as is evident in the
following cases.
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SPECIAL ARTICLE
2.2 Women Claiming Land Shares in Parental Property
Despite the continuing strongholds of opinion among both
men and women that a woman has no right to her parental
property, cases are steadily growing where women are claim-
ing their share even after several years of not claiming it and
despite there being a male heir. The following case study high-
lights how property in the hands of women acts as a protective
shield to violence.
Dhanpati, a Jat woman from village Shari Khawda, district
Rohtak, is now 56 years old. She married Ram Prasad of vil-
lage Dobh, at the age of 16, some 40 years ago. Their monthly
income from two acres of land, as well as their pension and
sale of milk comes to a little over Rs 5,000 a month.
Dhanpati and her three sisters had not laid any claims to
their parental property. Her two brothers had consequently in-
herited two acres each from their father. Out of the two broth-
ers, the younger one had been close to the four sisters and had
observed all the rituals by presenting them with kothali (gifts
on social and festive occasions). He was unmarried and died
early. The older brother had always been very unpleasant to
his sisters; he did not observe any of the rituals, and in fact, did
not allow even his sisters to visit him. A violent person, he had
also hit their mother on one occasion. When the sisters staked
their share in their father’s property, they together got one
acre in 2001 which they sold off to someone in their natal vil-
lage itself. The sale got them Rs 2 lakh, which was distributed
among the four of them, i e, Rs 50,000 each.
Belonging to a region which remains critical of daughters
claiming their share, especially, if there is a son/brother to in-
herit, Dhanpati during the interview felt the need to justify her
action. Rationalising her initiative, she said “I claimed my
share as my brother was misbehaving with me and my sisters
and not fulfilling his brotherly obligations”. Only one of her
sisters has any regrets.
After this incident, the relationship between the brother
and his four sisters totally broke down. It is well known that if
the sisters were to claim what is legally theirs, they have to
completely write off any relationship with the natal family.
Interestingly, when this move to claim their share was under
consideration, Dhanpati’s husband and those of her sisters’ had
encouraged them to take their share. More and more cases of
the husband and/or the conjugal family encouraging the bahu
to stake her claim to inheritance are coming up. This is in spite
of the likely public censure which the family may have to
endure. Cultural patterns are set to change though not with-
out some protests.
The effect of having claimed her share became visible very
soon. In Dhanpati’s words: “Our (the sisters’) condition im-
proved after we claimed our property. Now our husbands, in-
stead of talking to us in anger and constantly scolding and
abusing us, speak to us in normal tones almost lovingly.”
Out of the money Dhanpati received from the sale of the
property, she bought a buffalo whose milk is providing
sustenance to her entire family. For the rest of the money, her
husband suggested that they convert their kachcha (made of
mud) house into a pucca one. She agreed, as it had not been
49
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possible for them to have a pucca house earlier because of lack
of finances. It may be noticed that, after claiming her share,
Dhanpati clearly came to assume a position where she was
taking both individual and joint decisions.
The case does not end here. It is carried on in the sub-case of
her daughter. Dhanpati had a son and a daughter. The son died
early in 2003 due to drug abuse. The girl had been married off
at the age of 16 in 1998; she now has a son and two daughters.
For the first five years, the girl was beaten black and blue
almost everyday by her husband. This, however, changed once
Dhanpati’s only son died, leaving her daughter as the only
inheritor of Dhanpati’s property, which included land, house
and cattle. “From the day my son died till today”, maintained
Dhanpati, “our son-in-law has not raised his hand on our
daughter”. Earlier to escape violence, her daughter had to flee
from her home to her parents several times, but her husband
refused to relent. After the death of her son, Dhanpati and her
husband declared that, after their death, their two acres of
land and other property would go to their only daughter. The
price of land in this area, close to the urban colonies of Rohtak,
is estimated to be about Rs 1 crore per acre. Dhanpati said that
they also warned their son-in-law, in so many words, that if he
were to inflict violence of any kind upon their daughter, he will
have to be prepared for consequences. The implications were
clear. Inheritance of the wife and the growing old age of her
parents were inducement enough to stop all aggression from
him and other family members.
In another breach of hallowed tradition, the daughter started
to be sent frequently to be with her parents, whenever her pres-
ence was required due to their ill-health or any other work.
Indeed, now even the son-in-law readily accompanies his wife
and stays with his in-laws to help them out in peak agricultural
seasons. For example, when this year’s wheat crop had to be cut
and threshed he was there helping out. In Dhanpati’s words:
As long as our only son was alive my daughter was beaten by her hus-
band as well as his other family members. Now that he is no more and
the son-in-law knows that all the property will go to my daughter,
there is no violence; my daughter is now very happy in her conjugal
home. There is no violence from anyone. When we need her she is sent
readily to be with us.
I may add here that although it is true that the husband
comes to have enormous rights over his wife’s property, it still
remains in the woman’s name. That is crucial, because in all
future negotiations/sale, etc, her signature/consent is needed
and necessary, and may or may not be forthcoming.
2.3 The Changing Institution of Ghar Jamai
One of the major reasons why a daughter/sister may be wary
of claiming her share in the property of her father is the nega-
tive connotation associated with the word ghar jamai. In Uttar
Pradesh, Punjab and Haryana, the cultural prejudice against
ghar jamai among landowning caste groups is so strong that it
has become the butt of many jokes and stories. An oft-quoted
proverb runs: sohre ke ghar jamai kutta, bahen ke ghar bhai
kutta (A man living in his father-in-law’s house, A brother
living in his sister’s house, are both akin to a dog).
50
In ordinary circumstances, a son-in-law is treated with honour
and respect, especially when he is on a visit to his wife’s
village. Great respect is shown to him not only by the wife’s
immediate kinsmen, but also by her classificatory kin, such as
her lineage males and fellow villagers. In fact, in the whole of
north India, he is generally referred to as the bateu or a meh-
man, both words literally meaning a guest, and his honour lies
in remaining one, i e, a jamai, and not a ghar jamai. The col-
laterals would not like to see an outsider taking a share of the
ancestral property. So, if he were to go and live in his wife’s
village and become ghar jamai, he would be despised and
would incur considerable shame.
Cultural constraints and popular prejudices, however, did
not entirely prevent the jamais from making claims on behalf
of their wives. The colonial administration recorded a series of
cases in which ghar jamais were turned out of the house by the
collaterals after the father-in-law’s death and forcibly deprived
of the land or given only half (Dunnett 1911:107-08). In post-
Independence India, the antagonism towards such situations
remained pronounced, especially after the passing of the
Hindu Succession Act, 1956. In fact, 23 years later, in Septem-
ber 1979, Haryana Vidhan Sabha members testified to a
“trend” showing sons-in-law shifting to their wives’ villages to
claim land as also the “greed” among people who after the
1956 Act wanted their sons to marry only those girls who had
no brothers.20 They also openly acknowledged violence, and
even murder of ghar jamais. However, statistics regarding the
number of cases which may actually have been effectuated are
not available.
Given below is just one case from Rohtak district, out of quite
a few that I came across, regarding women inheriting property
turning a jamai into a ghar jamai. This case underlines the con-
tinuing and even acceleration of change in Haryanavi rural
society, which is on its way to accepting a significant breach in
the time-honoured tradition of patrilocality by relocating the
husband to the natal village of the wife, allowing and accept-
ing the daughter and her husband to take over the ancestral
property. This act was once vehemently resisted by the family
members, the collaterals, the community as well as the villag-
ers. This case shows the most respected jamai turning into a
ghar jamai, but with hardly any negative connotations in real
life. Some reservations may still be there, but they have not
proved to be of any great hindrance. Daughters have taken over
property, changing personal equations between husbands and
wives, with decisive impact on marital violence and bestowing
upon women a freedom not otherwise enjoyed.
The following is a case in which two brothers who got
married to two sisters translocated themselves from their own
village to their wives’ village, became ghar jamais and have
been successfully cultivating the land of their father-in-law
without incurring social disapproval or strictures.
In the village Ballam, 20 km from Rohtak city, a Gujjar fam-
ily of Banwari, 82 years of age and Shayam Bai, 72 years old,
both ailing and unable to cultivate their 11-acre landholding,
invited Sunil and Anil, their sons-in-law, to stay with them
and cultivate the land on their behalf. This was in 2000. The
september 15, 2012 vol xlviI no 37 EPW Economic & Political Weekly

sons-in-law agreed as their own ancestral land was a mere
five acres and also not so fertile. Five brothers jointly held and
cultivated it in village Ojha of Bhiwani district. In any case,
their wives had no brother and the land would have eventually
been inherited by them. Their own land, were it to be divided,
would have meant uneconomic holdings of just one acre each
for the five brothers. After shifting to village Ballam, the two
sisters, Kausalya and Saroj, took turns to go and stay in their
conjugal home and village for six months each. This is prima-
rily because of their children’s schooling in village Ojha.
A nother important reason was disclosed candidly by one of
the sisters who stated: “It is important that one of us stays in
our sasural because after all, our husbands have their share –
however little – in that property as well”.
Interestingly, village folk do not condemn these ghar
jamais, suggesting a certain reversal of opinion that has been
gradually taking place in rural areas. The villagers, both men
and women opined that the two brothers are village bateau
who always give them (the villagers) “full respect” and are
“respected in return”. Once when accidentally the neighbour-
ing field caught fire from the actions of one of the jamais, the
village panchayat refused to impose any penalty as they would
have invariably done in any other case, and were satisfied with
the apology tendered by the jamais. Explaining this they said:
“How can we impose a fine on our own daughters? After all, it
is our daughters who are the owners of this land”. Elaborating
further, they maintained:
There is a great deal of pressure upon a ghar jamai. He has to behave
himself, give full respect to all in the village and not pick up any quar-
rel with any one of them or his wife as that will not be tolerated. Also,
he cannot drink publicly or misbehave.
Clearly, what is tolerated in relation to the bahus like daily
quarrels, abuses and beating by the husband is not tolerated
for the betis (daughters), when they are in their natal home,
and when the inflictor of violence is the ghar jamai.
Regarding the same, the mother of the two girls, Shyam Bai,
had the following to say:
We have made a will leaving our 11 acres of land to be divided equally
between our two daughters. No one has any objections, neither the
collaterals, nor my husband’s brothers who had received their own
share of 11 acres each some 50 years ago, nor any of the villagers. So
far our bateu have not raised their hand on our daughters or even
raised their voice or scolded them.
An interesting angle was provided by Anil and Sunil on their
ghar jamai status. The husbands explained candidly:
Truth is that a ghar jamai’s status is like that of a housewife. Our hands
are tied. All the land belongs to our wives, the house that we live in
belongs to them; we have nothing. A ghar jamai can hardly abuse his
wife or beat her. Even when she is at fault, we just have to ignore it. We
cannot even raise our voices in front of our in-laws. If this happens, the
villagers will say that the ghar jamai is misbehaving despite being given
everything. They will stop respecting us. There is constant though un-
stated pressure of our wives and their parents on everything that we do
or say. But we are happy here. Why not? This is where the money is!
Speaking of the change they perceived in their situation,
Kausalya said:
When we were in our sasural, there was constant tension between our
devranis (sisters-in-law) and us. There was always stress to complete
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SPECIAL ARTICLE
the work in certain time frame. If we couldn’t, we invited trouble from
all, including our husbands, who would scold and beat us. We couldn’t
go out as we liked and meet who we liked. There was complete restric-
tion on our movement. We had to remain in ghunghat. Not knowing
anyone we felt isolated. Here in our maike we know all, do not observe
ghunghat, go where we like; meet who we like. There no one even
knew our names. When we are ill, our husbands take over all the work
even that of the animals like cutting and carrying fodder, etc. There is
no beating or scolding as our husbands are afraid of badnami. We take
our own decision to buy, eat and purchase what we like.
2.4 Woman as Virtual Head of the Household
It is possible for a propertied woman to “act as a man” and take
over the entire responsibility of work – domestic and agricul-
tural. Such a case concerns Kamla Devi, brahmin by caste,
who shifted with her husband to her natal village Meham, in
Rohtak district, after her parents’ death to look after the six
acres of land which they had owned. Kamla has two more sis-
ters but no brother. Consequently, her father divided the prop-
erty into three, leaving two acres each to his three daughters.
Although the husbands of Kamla’s sisters did not shift, Kamla’s
husband did. He has two other brothers and was encouraged
by Kamla’s mother-in-law to shift to his wife’s natal home. Ini-
tially, her husband would drink heavily and go back to his own
house, but slowly as his health declined noticeably, and he was
unable to perform agricultural work, he started to stay with
his wife in her natal home and village.
Interestingly, it was Kamla who took over the actual cultiva-
tion of her parental land, her own as well as that of her sisters.
This was primarily because of her husband’s acute health
problems. She was able to do this with the help of hired labour.
As her sons grew up, they started to help her during their holi-
days; one son is employed in a factory and the other is in
school. The work involved watering the fields, sowing the
seeds, spraying insecticide, cutting, threshing, sifting and all
other operations associated with cultivation as well as negoti-
ating with males in charge of other agricultural work like mar-
keting, etc. Kamla grows wheat, jowar, bajra and sesame
crops. Out of the profits made she has converted the kachcha
house of her parents into a masonry one, bought two buffaloes
for milk and an oxen for undertaking agricultural operations.
Her household expenditure is met by the sale of milk alone as
the fodder is available free from the fields. The rest of the
income from cultivation is “fairly and honestly” divided into
three shares – one for herself and the other two for her sisters.
In all this, her husband and his family as well as her sisters
and their families have supported her fully. A few people have
certainly been critical of her. Their objections have been two-
fold, as is clear from their criticism of her: one, they have told
her to stop all mardon ke kaam (men’s work), and two, to go
back to her sasural which alone, according to them, she is enti-
tled to. Agreeing to the first charge, Kamala Devi, significantly,
confirmed: “for the last 14 years (since 1997), I have been man-
aging like a man”. Explaining this, Kamla elaborated:
If I had not taken over the land, it would have been misappropriated
by my chacha-tau (uncles) and we would not have been able to do
anything. Now I stand in place of a brother for both my sisters, fulfilling
51
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all the social and ritual obligations that a brother is expected to ob-
serve towards his sisters, like bhat and kothali, etc, and even provide
them with a place (natal home) they can visit, when they like.
In other words, property acquisition by the woman in cer-
tain cases has meant a de facto female-headed household. In a
complete role reversal, the entire work, agricultural, house-
hold and animal husbandry is being performed by her.
2.5 Benami Property: Proxy Ownership by Women
There are women in Haryana who have property from their
husband or of other members of their conjugal families regis-
tered in their names. They are benami owners of this property.
The case of Rekha of village Ratthandhana in Rohtak district,
cited above, is a case in point. Her in-laws got a 200 sq yards of
land registered in her name. Such registration of property in
women’s names is now on the increase in Haryana. It is done
to save registration and stamp duty which used to be 8% on
the urban immovable property and 6% on rural property; this
was reduced in July 2005 for women owners only, to 6% and
4%, respectively. Although figures are not available, this step
is stated to have greatly encouraged ownership of property by
women, even though it may be in name only.
However, even this benami ownership is empowering to
women. During one all-women group discussion in the village
Dujjana of Jhajjar district, I was told by a young bahu about
her mother-in-law who told off her husband when he was be-
ing particularly objectionable and verbally abusive by stating:
“mera makan sai bahar nikal” (this is my house, just get out of
it).21 “Taken aback”, the bahu stated, “my father-in-law did not
provide an occasion to my mother-in-law to issue such a com-
mand ever again”. The mother-in-law was the benami holder
of the property which was made over to her by the father-in-
law in order to escape heavy registration duty.
2.6 Woman-in-Charge: The Absentee Husband
When men migrate for work, the possibility exists for gender
relations within domesticity to be pushed in new directions.
There are some indications that women left behind may be ne-
gotiating new possibilities and re-evaluating themselves and
their activities in the absence of the male spouse; the meaning
and performance of work may change for women and she may
become more effective in challenging gender subordination in
the family. However, it is undeniable that there are also other
women who may not be able to cope.
Rajbala, belonging to the dominant Jat caste, of Kathuria vil-
lage in Sonepat district got married at the age of 16 to Baljit of
Gohana village, also in the same district. Now she has been mar-
ried for 22 years and has two daughters and a son. Baljit is in the
army and comes home after two months or so and that for four to
five days only. For all purposes, Rajbala heads the family. At the
time of her marriage, her husband’s family had been a joint one
with eight family members including her. She had to undertake
all household work, as well as care of the animals. Her conflict
with her mother-in-law started early. There were daily quarrels
between them and when she complained to her husband, she
was beaten by him. This physical violence kept on increasing.
52
With the birth of her children, her duties increased so also her
differences with her mother-in-law. Because of this constant
squabbling, her husband decided to move out of the joint family.
He shifted to village Gohana, where they had a plot of land.
Once in Gohana, the relationship improved dramatically. In
the absence of her husband who was most of the time away on
duty, it was Rajbala who took over the charge. She takes all
major and minor decisions. Her husband transfers the money
to her account every month and she is free to spend it as she
likes. She takes decisions not only in matters of clothing, food,
etc, but also which school should the children go to, whom to
rent out the land for cultivation, whether to keep the milch
cattle or not, etc. According to Rajbala, her husband takes over
whenever he comes home, but that also because, she main-
tains, “he wants her to rest”.22
In Rajbala’s words:
I feel if my husband had not been in the army and had been a cultiva-
tor, we would have had daily quarrels and attendant physical violence
as I witness in other families. I feel that an army man for a husband is
better for a woman as in his absence a wife gets to perform all the
tasks; she takes all the decisions; she also handles all the money. It is
not as if I do not consult my husband. I do. For important matters his
decisions are final, for example, regarding the marriage of our daugh-
ter. My daughter is also getting married to an army man. We have
consciously chosen him, as with an army man a wife gets to call the
shots in most matters. She is under no pressure and there is no vio-
lence. It is because of my own experience as an army man’s wife that I
gave preference to an army man as a groom for my daughter. The one
thing that my daughter’s in-laws wanted was an educated bride – at
least a BA and my daughter is BEd.
The preferences of Rajbala are clear: one, nuclear family
and two, on decision-making power in her hands which in the
case of an absentee husband can and does become a reality.
Clearly, power to make decisions by a woman makes for a dif-
ferent spousal relationships, not necessarily of full equality but
ones in which violence is contained. However, it may be re-
called that not all absentee husbands, even those working in
the army, are so accommodating to their wives. The following
story of Ishanti Devi of village Sunaria is a case in point.
Regarding the nuclear family too, there is divided opinion.
A minuscule minority felt that many times, the joint family
acted as a shield to support the victim from violence of the
husband. However, an overwhelming number of women inter-
viewed felt that nuclear family was better because violence was
considerably less. The woman was the “mistress” of the house
and took decisions which were earlier taken by the seniormost
female in the family hierarchy, like the mother-in-law. Also the
family tension, constant bickering among family members, es-
pecially female family members, was absent. They felt that
husband, when alone, could be “managed”, as he was not “in-
stigated” by others. Also, women literally and metaphorically
have more space to act in a nuclear family.
2.7 Those Who Earn: Employed Women
Statistics on married women who are employed in Haryana
are not very impressive. The figures compiled by the NFHS,
2005-2006 (IIPS 2008:24) show that among currently married
and employed women in Haryana, only 28% are employed.
september 15, 2012 vol xlviI no 37 EPW Economic & Political Weekly

However, they show an enormous growth from 12.6% in 1998-99
(Kishore and Gupta 2004: 704)), as against 98% of married
men. Out of these, 52% of employed married women earn cash,
a huge increase from a mere 9.7% in 1998-99 (ibid), the rest
either receive no payment for their work or are paid in kind.
Among those who earn cash, 82% of women are able to decide
how their earnings will be spent, either by themselves or in con-
sultation with their husbands. Out of those who earn cash, one-
fifth of women earn as much or even more than their husbands.
Women Outnumbering Men
On the other hand, the 2001 Census reveals that women work-
ers in most categories (except “other workers”) outnumber
men in Haryana (IIPS 2008: 25). For example, among the cate-
gory of cultivators, females are 43.67% to 32.47% of males;
among agricultural labourers, females are 21.1% to 12.55%
males; and women working in the household industries are
3.11% females to 2.31% males. Importantly, the employment
and the earnings change a woman’s status from that of house-
wife into an earning wife. Housework or work performed on
one’s own land (where her work is most intensive and sustains
agriculture) or animal husbandry is not recognised as “work”
for women. It grants her no recognition or value. Agricultural
work certainly qualifies a male cultivator as an “earner”, but
not a woman who may be designated as a cultivator, but who is
deemed as not earning.
Given below are certain cases to evaluate the effects of employ-
ment and income on women and their experience of violence.
Ramkali’s case shows how a woman, who experienced
repeated violence for a number of years during her married
life, overcame it by generating her own income. Now, with her
husband absconding, she has gone on to become the head of
the family, takes all decisions and is currently leading an inde-
pendent and violence-free life. Regarding such cases the NFHS
2005-06 data (IIPS 2008) testifies that women who are
widowed, divorced, separated or deserted have not only more
freedom of movement than other women, but also control over
their money (ibid: 25).
Ramkali, a woman of 49 years of age, is currently living in
village Bichpadi, near Panipat; Khati by caste (Other Back-
ward Classes), at the time of marriage, she was 15 years old
and illiterate. Her husband was an alcoholic. Violence on
Ramkali began early in her marriage and increased with
time. Over the years, she had four children: two boys, two
girls, out of which one girl died in 2009. To make both ends
meet, both Ramkali and her husband worked as agricultural
and construction labourers. All this time her husband’s
alcohol intake had kept on increasing as also the battering of
Ramkali. In order to escape this violence, Ramkali often had
to flee with her children, to hide in the fields or sleep on the
roof of some neighbour. Ramkali spent the major portion of
her married life suffering such violence. Once she even com-
plained to the police, who first refused to write a first infor-
mation report (FIR) and then asked her for money to write it.
On another occasion, she thought of committing suicide but
relented because of her children.
Economic & Political Weekly EPW september 15, 2012 vol xlviI no 37
SPECIAL ARTICLE
After 18 years of married life, Ramkali decided to educate
herself. She came across a social worker who motivated her to get
educated. Under her instructions, she joined the Saksharta Abhi-
yan23 to become literate and aware of her rights. According to her,
education and awareness of her rights, in combination with her
earning an income, her ability to bring up her children single-
handedly, gave her enough courage and self-confidence to refuse
to take her husband’s violence lying down. She retaliated and on
one such occasion, revolted by picking up a stout wooden staff and
hitting her inebriated husband on his head. After this incident, her
husband became more restrained. According to her, he was “al-
most afraid” and she “benefited” by this feeling. Instead of listen-
ing quietly, she even started to shout back at him whenever he
abused her. She saw to it that he did not get access to her money.
Although after drinks he was back with his attempts to beat her,
but much less, and was easily restrained by her tough stand.
Gradually, Ramkali started to perform a variety of jobs. She
started to work as a cleaning maid in a number of houses.
Later, to improve her prospects, she took to factory work where
after putting in 8-8½ hours she was given Rs 1,200 per month.
A little later, after collecting a little money she took to self-
employment and became a vendor of bindis and churies (ban-
gles) for women. She also started to hire out her cooking/
cleaning services whenever there was some wedding in the
village or any other social function. She now works for 8-9
hours, and comfortably makes Rs 3,000 per month, with
which she states, she is very satisfied as she maintains that she
is “not dependent on anybody” or “reduced to asking other
people for money and support”.
In the meanwhile, her husband had started to sell spurious
liquor illegally. As this activity resulted in the death of some
men, he was caught by the police and incarcerated. His family
was asked to pay Rs 5,000 in order to release him. Ramkali
refused to pay as she maintained that she “felt relieved to get
rid of him”. After a few months when she went to get him out
of jail, he had been shifted elsewhere. After a year, he came
back for a brief while, only to go away again. For all purposes,
he has abandoned the family and now comes very rarely.
In the absence of her husband, Ramkali has assumed full
charge of her small business and the household. She is effec-
tively the head of the household and for this, she has strength-
ened herself immensely. From her savings, she has bought a
plot of land measuring 150 sq yards and built a house on it;
both land and the house are registered in her name. Her older
son, now 26 years of age, is resentful of the fact that the house
is in her name and often asks her to transfer it to him and even
threatens her by saying “Makan mere naam ker de ke karegi
budhpe mein, mer jagi mere hath te kade-n-kade” (Get the
house transferred to my name. What will you do with it in
your old age? One of these days I shall kill you.)
Ramkali maintained: “Since I keep my money with me and
spend it as I like, take all the decisions myself, do not consult
my son in various matters, go where I want to, eat and wear
what I like, my son does not like it and is constantly complain-
ing; he is deeply resentful, but cannot do anything.” So far the
son has not taken recourse to violence.
53
SPECIAL ARTICLE
I shall now cite very briefly as examples three more cases
out of several that I came across and which are spread across
Haryana; in these cases and others like them, earning an
income has reduced the level of violence on women.
Sunita, from village Meham in district Rohtak, is a 40-year
old woman from a “Punjabi refugee” family (caste unknown),
with two children, one boy (six years) and a girl (four years).
The husband works in a shop which makes sandook (storage
boxes made of tin), but is not a regular worker. He also drinks
heavily. Her life was violence-free only in the initial two to
three months of her marriage but it started soon after that. A
heavy drinker, her husband would beat her up frequently and
cruelly. She was often thrown out of the house and had to
spend nights shivering in the cold in the open. Once he even
attacked her with a knife. On that occasion, she complained to
the police and informed her brother who took it up with her
husband. Her brother is fairly well-to-do; he runs a general
store in Delhi and has four acres of land. She used to frequently
ask for and receive money from her brother.
Sunita’s complaint to the police and also informing her
brother had some effect on her husband who scaled his vio-
lence on her for some time. Around this time, Sunita also
started to hit back and give abuse for abuse, which also had
some restraining effect on him. But what really brought about
a change was her having started stitching business about two
years ago. Educated up to 10th class, she knew stitching. With
the help of her brother, she bought a sewing machine and
started to stitch clothes for the neighbourhood families and
even the local shop. She made enough income to meet her im-
mediate needs. As the money started to come and she stopped
asking her husband for money, she experienced a change in
herself, and indeed, even in her husband. In her own words:
There is a change in my life. I feel more confident and have greater
self-respect which was earlier missing. I no longer ask my husband for
any money. I stitch clothes and am able to meet my own needs. I spend
the money as I like or at least as is needed. Since I do not ask him for
money, his violence has also lessened considerably. Now he is not
physically violent but only abusive.
Suman, also from village Meham in district Rohtak, is a 35-
year old Ahir woman. Hardly literate, she put up with violence
from her husband for many years even after her three children
were born. The entire neighbourhood was in the know of it as
it was fairly open behaviour. She never retaliated but fre-
quently thought of ending her life out of depression. Once,
after a particularly violent bout, she contacted her brother out
of desperation. Her brother bought her a buffalo. According to
her, he felt beholden to her as she had refused to take her share
of parental property even when advised by their mother. She
now sells milk and also makes some money by making cow
dung cakes for other households.
According to her after she started to earn, there was a
change in her husband’s behaviour and the violence declined.
Suman, like Sunita, attributes this to her earning made possi-
ble by her natal family which enabled her to stop making any
financial demands on her husband. Used to heavy drinking
and because of his inability to fulfil his family’s needs and
54
expectations, her husband had turned very violent. Once this
pressure was taken off, at least the physical beatings took a
back seat. Even if it occurs now and then the conjugal family
supports her, as the mother-in-law has also been at the receiv-
ing end of Suman’s husband’s violence. They also help her
whenever he tries to forcibly take money from her. However,
other forms of violence – verbal, psychological and sexually –
have continued.
Ishvanti Devi of village Sunaria in Rohtak district who got
married at the age of 15 had to put up with a great deal of phys-
ical violence from her husband who was in the army. He “drank
away” all his salary and did not contribute anything to the
household. Even during his brief visits to the village while on
leave, he made it a point to beat her up and was even sexually
violent. The mother-in-law considered her a bojh (burden), and
was also very abusive. With the husband away on his postings,
Ishvanti managed to somehow finish her tenth class. A fter 13
years of her marriage, she started to work as a bima (insur-
ance) agent. Things, according to her, began to change once
she started to earn. When the income started coming in, the
violence also lessened. Her husband who had earlier tried to
stop her initiatives at getting educated and also prevented her
from working, now saw the benefits of her earnings. More im-
portantly, he also realised that she was the one bearing the
household expenses, especially as he was contributing nothing.
Slowly as she saved she also bought a bicycle and would bicycle
to work. “That day was the happiest day in my life” reminisced
Ishvanti Devi.
I conclude these accounts by pointing out that instances also
exist where woman’s employment or earning is held against
her. It is also commented that because she is earning us ka
dimag chddh gaya sai (she has become arrogant or thinks no
end of herself). Income generation by a woman may lead to a
tendency to further control her.
2.8 Women Who Opt Out
There are women who opt out of marriage. However, such cases
are few and far between. Legal divorce in Haryana is considered
a very serious step. The exposure arising out of the divorce pro-
ceedings, and the expense incurred has given it a bad name.
However, the informal separation known as chhor dena (having
left) still continues to be customarily accepted by both low and
high caste and class groups.24 This practice is sanctified by the
caste panchayat or a panchayat of the village elders, or just an
assembly of the elders of the kunba (joint family) of the two
sides. The panchayat, mostly consisting of “big people”, is gen-
erally known to make the financial settlement dependent on the
“status” of the woman’s natal family. This custom has the valid-
ity of a socially recognised divorce. Interestingly, even the Hindu
Marriage Act, 1955, Section 29(2) preserves the customary
modes of divorces.25 However, most rural women perceive
divorce or informal chhordena to be highly problematic.
Discussed below are two special cases. In one, a variety of fac-
tors combined to enable a woman to opt out of a violent marital
relationship and in the other, the abandoned woman refused to
go back to her violent husband. Why and how were they able to
september 15, 2012 vol xlviI no 37 EPW Economic & Political Weekly

take this decision? However, it may be remembered that regard-
less of certain supportive factors available to women who wish
to opt out of a violent marriage, familial ideologies about roles
and responsibilities, and societal expectations may and often
lead them to continue in marriage, even the most violent one.
The few and far-between divorce cases in Haryana are a testi-
mony to that. An estimate can be made from the 1,620 divorced
or separated women in the age group of 15 to 44 years of age in
rural Haryana out of the total numbers of 2,487,864 ever mar-
ried women in this age group – a mere .065%.26
Bimla, Jat by caste, from village Kharkadi, district Bhiwani,
was just 16 years of age when she was married off. She had
studied up to 10th class. Her husband belonged to a fairly pros-
perous family and worked in a bank. It was a joint family and
after marriage, she was allowed to pursue her studies further.
After her devar’s marriage, the joint household got split and
Bimla and her husband set up a separate household. Her in-
laws shifted with her. By now she had two children, a girl and
a boy. She had also undertaken a temporary research job in
the Hissar University. Notwithstanding the positive features in
her favour like her children (especially a boy), education and
employment, her husband’s violence on her increased greatly.
The husband would come home drunk with his friends, mis-
behave and beat her up. She resisted this by complaining to
the police, even hitting him back, but to no avail. When things
got out of hand she decided to seek a legal divorce.27 In this she
was fully supported by her father, an ex-army officer, who
came to know of her violent marital relationship. She suc-
ceeded in getting the divorce, the custody of her children, as
well as maintenance for herself and her children.
Bimla’s father also gifted her a house for her to live in. Bimla
had four siblings – two sisters and two brothers. The father
had divided his property equally between his four children.
Complications emerged when one of her brothers died at the
age of 37, leaving behind a daughter. The younger brother as
the only male heir started to put pressure upon the father to
make over the entire property to him, including the house that
had been gifted to Bimla. The father resisted this demand as
long as he was alive. After his death the pressure and the de-
mands increased. Bimla’s brother demanded that their mother,
who was living with Bimla, should shift with him and he
should get “the benefit of her pension” as well as the interest
from the fixed deposit that the father had left for her.
The brother when interviewed was defiant and aggressive
about these demands and felt that he was “fully justified”
in making them. Indeed, old-age pension in Haryana has
emerged as a potent reason for the frequent fights between
siblings (mostly male) over the custody of their old parents.
The village biradari and other relatives were also of the opin-
ion that it was “the son’s right to get all the property”. The
mother and two sisters refused all his demands. The younger
sister’s conjugal family also put pressure upon their bahu not
to be a party to this arrangement. They argued: “old customs
and tradition must be honoured and these decreed that pro-
perty must go to the son/s and the parents should live with the
son instead of the daughter/s”.
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SPECIAL ARTICLE
Bimla is now 57 years old and lives with four of her family
members in Hissar. She has with her the mother, her deceased
brother’s daughter, as well as her own son and her daughter.
She also has some land in village Kharkadi, a share in the land
of her former in-laws, as also a house which she received from
the court as part of her divorce settlement. She has sold this
house and put the money in the name of her two children. In
Bimla’s words:
If I had not been educated, I would not have been able to oppose my
husband and had I not been earning I would not have been able to take
a decision to seek a divorce. My father was educated so he understood
and supported me throughout, otherwise I may have been compelled
to remain with my husband while holding, like many others, that such
is my kismet (fate) and I have to put up with it.
Clearly, a combination of education, employment and her
parental support provided Bimla with an exit option enabling
her to get out of a violent marriage.
There is then the case of Santro Devi, Chamar by caste, in
village Sarsa in Panipat district, who refused to go back to a
violent marital relationship. Santro, despite putting up with a
very violent marriage was abandoned by her husband after 10
years of marriage for being banjh (barren), because she was
unable to produce a child. Her husband started to live with
another woman, but this woman also could not conceive. The
fault clearly lay with the man. The husband and the family
members then made repeated overtures towards Santro to
invite her to come back but she refused. Her decision not to go
back to her husband and face violence again was crucially
taken because in this interim she had started to earn. She was
already 9th pass and with the support from her brother, she
became a teacher. Santro is now 50 years old and is the prad-
han (chief) of Anganwadi, a self-help organisation in village
Ahirka in Panipat district. She works two to three hours and
gets Rs 2,000 to Rs 2,500 per month.
3 Women’s Resistance
There is enough evidence thrown up from the fieldwork to
show that despite a strong patriarchal/patrilineal system in
Haryana, where women hardly enjoy any worthwhile status,
they, like other subordinate/subaltern groups, have only seem-
ingly acquiesced to their being dominated in public. In private,
they have shown enough resistance in their own subtle and not
so subtle ways, and have not consented to the wielding of patri-
archal authority. Careful attention has to be paid to what lies
beneath the surface of evident conformist public behaviour. In
academia, it is a well-argued case that in public, those who are
oppressed accept their domination, but they do question their
domination in private. James Scott, for example, argues that
the everyday resistance of subalterns shows that they have not
consented to dominance.28 There is a high level of resistance by
women, which may have been responsible in varying degrees
in lessening the infliction of physical violence on them. This,
however, cannot be said of other forms of violence, which con-
tinue. Women’s resistance and standing up for themselves
does have the potential to change the power-relationship
within the family.
55
SPECIAL ARTICLE
Historically women of Haryana, far from being mute vic-
tims, have always exercised a great deal of agency to thwart
the unnecessary and unequal demands of the patriarchal
system. This is amply demonstrated in their response, as sug-
gested earlier, to the customary practice of widow remarriage,
i e, widow’s resistance to levirate remarriage (which drives her
once more into the fold of potentially violent marital relation-
ship), in order to safeguard economic and sexual freedom.
Also, cases of women eloping to get married to persons of their
own choice, whether in the past or present, are all too well
known. The case studies listed above similarly show women
claiming inheritance as per their legal entitlement, and much
against the dictates of the male members of their families.
An example of women’s successful resistance to male objec-
tions can also be exemplified by the singing of songs and danc-
ing during various festivals and weddings, which celebrate the
sexuality of women in no uncertain terms.29 Declared as ash-
leel geet or behuda gane (indecent songs and dances), by
reformers and caste panchayats ever since the colonial period,
these have sought to be curbed and replaced by “decent songs”.
All these attempts have failed as most rural women across dif-
ferent castes and classes justify the songs as part of their dehati
(rural) culture which they would not like to give up. This is
one of the interesting instances when women have appropri-
ated the male logic of keeping the dehati “culture” or “custom”
alive in order to justify retention of this space for themselves.
A cultural customary practice which is being discarded is
the observance of ghunghat (veil).30 New technology has, in
fact, prompted this move. The fact that many marriages in
Haryana are now increasingly being videotaped has meant
that a newlywed woman’s face is visible to all who view the
recording – young, old, males and females. This fact has led
many bahus to discard the ghunghat at home though not in the
village or in public. This move has also not been without
opposition. Working women contend that they have overcome
this successfully and are discarding their ghungaht even
publicly once they are out of the village periphery.
To these may be added the quiet but determined defiance by
women of men’s dictates, regarding the exercise of their voting
rights in Vidhan Sabha and Lok Sabha elections in Haryana. I
am a personal witness to this phenomenon from 1960 to 1997.
My observation also stands amply evidenced by the 1996-97
Haryana Vidhan Sabha elections, which returned Bansi Lal as
chief minister. He had fought and won against heavy odds on
the plank of women’s popular demand of imposing prohibition
of liquor in the state. Women of Haryana voted almost en bloc
in favour of Bansi Lal despite strict instructions and threats of
violence made by their male family members.31 It may, how-
ever, be added here that not all men favour alcohol consump-
tion, many are against it.
Resistance in the form of counter-violence by women may be
seen as another way of self-assertion. This is not something
new. But the older generation of women maintains that this
has steadily grown over time. They attribute this to growing
alchoholism among men. Fieldwork throws up the fact that
women are able to use the weapon of counter-violence only
56
when the man is under the influence of alcohol. Women stated
that only in such a “state” can he be “easily controlled” by
them. Many women stated that now women do not take vio-
lence lying down, they hit back. A woman involved in such a
case, without acknowledging that she had effectively coun-
tered violent behaviour of her husband, firmly maintained
that: “it all depends on the woman, some women retaliate
physically, some do not”. The recent NHFS figures, however,
show only insignificant numbers, i e, 0.2% of women who have
ever “initiated” violence against the husband (IIPS 2008:25).
But here I am talking of “retaliatory violence” from wives, not
“initiatory” violence of wives on their husbands. The use of
counter-violence, although not physical, but verbal has been
reported in a few instances from other regions as well.32
Explanation of Counter-Violence
Resistance as counter-violence from women needs some
explanation. In a situation, where violence on wife is accepted
as normal and dismissed as a fact of life, women can hardly
expect any help from the outside to stem it. In their conjugal
home, they are not given any help by the husband’s family
members, who generally stand and watch or even instigate in
certain cases; friends and neighbours refuse to intervene. The
2005-06 NHFS figures show that seven out of 10 married
women have not sought help from anyone (IIPS 2008: 27).
They may later seek help from their own families. These find-
ings also state that “women in Haryana do not seek help from
any institutional sources, such as the police or social service
organisations”. Complaining to the police is also construed as
resistance to violence, and in fact, retaliatory behaviour by a
woman; it shames the man because people taunt that “is ghar
mein lugai ki chalti hai” (the woman decree runs in this house).
Even when women approach the local thana (police station),
as some do,33 they are not heeded or taken seriously and gener-
ally dismissed, as some of the case studies, given above, show.
In certain cases the policemen brutally tell them to “behave
themselves”. In this given situation, it is entirely understand-
able that some of the women take matters into their own hands
and confront the man in their own way. It is their way of refus-
ing to be a victim of violence. We may remember here that self-
defence does have legal validity.34
On the whole, this form of resistance by wives is an extremely
sensitive issue and people – both victims and perpetrators –
are not willing to acknowledge it. The men, especially, never
admit such reaction or retaliatory behaviour from their wives.
The slur cast on them, especially on their masculinity, is too
horrendous, are they may never be able to live down. A cul-
tural system which considers lugai admi ki juti ho sai (woman
is no better than a man’s shoe), and inferior to him in morality,
knowledge and wisdom will certainly be given to ridiculing
the reversal of these known values. For a man, the right to beat
his wife shows wielding of power and authority and assertion
of his superiority; a role reversal makes him, in the local par-
lance, a chutiya (used as an abuse, literally it means a man
with a vagina instead of a penis, therefore a weakling and a
coward like a woman). This is perceived to lead to aurat ka raj
september 15, 2012 vol xlviI no 37 EPW Economic & Political Weekly

(a household ruled by a woman). This impression is enough to
damn that house forever. Explaining this, local male opinion
maintains that jis ghar main aurton ki chalti hai us main rishta
bhi nahin karte hain, kahten hain ki us main mard ki moonchh
nahin hoti (no one wants to enter into a marriage in a family
where the woman dominates and the husband is henpecked).
Perhaps, it is because of these hard realities and public censure
that women appear most subservient in Haryana. For exam-
ple, they continue to conform to the “submissive woman”
stereotype that in ghunghat walks three paces behind her hus-
band and carries the heavier load.
A woman, therefore, is not really forthcoming on her asser-
tive behaviour and use of this form of resistance. She generally
maintains silence, because it is the husband who would be de-
clared “weak”.35 But unofficially, it is stated to exist fairly
widely and is said to have a major impact on containing
spousal violence in Haryana. For example, men agree privately
that if such a thing were to happen, and they insist “if at all”, a
man will never “touch” (meaning beat) his wife again. The
case studies show this to be, by and large, true.
The reverse face of retaliatory violence by women is inflic-
tion of violence by women on themselves. There is ample testi-
mony of women in the case studies and group interviews which
indicate that many women when faced with daily trauma of vi-
olence think of ending their lives. Such women reportedly “feel
isolated” in bearing up the stress of daily violence with no one
to support her and when her patience reaches a saturation
point, when the taunts and her own feeling of tu to khoonti se
bandhi gai hai kit jaagi (you are a cow tied to a peg) becomes
overwhelming, she revolts, but this time in an attempt to des-
troy herself. Although we do not have official statistics, Harya-
navis are considered among the more suicide-prone communi-
ties in India. There are said to be nearly 3,500 attempted sui-
cides every year in this state; unofficial statistics gathered by
the daily newspaper, Tribune (Chandigarh) from the district
towns of Haryana show Rohtak to be the worst-affected district
with 35 persons attempting suicides every month.36 In rural
areas, women outnumber men in committing or attempting to
commit suicide. Experts opine that marital discord and vio-
lence is the main cause for this in the villages.
4 Women’s Options: Property, Education
and Employment
In such a complex scenario, where political economy or gender
relations are in a flux and still underway, what options do
women consider important in order to contain/reduce or elim-
inate violence? Given below are three important areas, which
in the opinion of women themselves, need to be strengthened.
Among the options, property certainly scored high with
women in its ability to deal with violence. Possessing means of
production not only entails owning source of income, but also
a source of authority/power/status and mobility – leading to
access to education and health facilities. All these are nega-
tively related to violence. The case studies also show that the
first thing that women do after acquiring some money by
inheritance or through earning is to acquire some productive
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SPECIAL ARTICLE
resources as means of generating income. But as they them-
selves point out, how many women are in a position to acquire
or inherit property or even other productive assets? This leaves
out a vast number of women, especially those belonging to
lower caste and economic categories. Therefore, factors other
than property also assume importance. These identified by
women were: education and employment.
In the opinion of women, education is linked with the ability
to seek and get employment. Suman from village Meham
(Rohtak district) who had studied only up to Class IV, for ex-
ample, firmly believes that if she had been educated at least up
till Class X, she could have landed herself an “honourable job”.
There were several women who regretted not having studied
and thus having lost an opportunity to earn izzatwali money,
instead of doing menial jobs. One woman from village Suna-
ria, Rohtak district, speaking from personal experience while
making a clear connection between education and employ-
ment, said: “I wanted to bring up my children well and not al-
low them to become alcoholics. I, therefore, had to struggle
hard as I needed money and money could only come through a
job and for a job, education is necessary.” Interestingly, in
women’s minds education is also related to procuring a “better
husband”, who “would not be given to drinking”. This may be
wishful thinking but it exists in the rural areas.
Delineating the difference between an educated and unedu-
cated woman, Sheila, the in-charge of the Janwadi Mahila
Samiti, Hissar, stated:
The illiterate do not have the courage to opt out of marriage, to live life
alone, but the new generation of the educated women does have this
courage. Therefore, they can opt out of a violent marriage. The edu-
cated women are often given to say ‘what my mother has undergone I
shall not undergo’. They also do not see marriage as the beginning and
end of life itself.
Although women’s education has been growing at a fast pace,
it still leaves much to be desired. It grew from 19.9% literacy rate
for women in 1961 to 22.3% in 1980-81 and to 56.31% in 2001
(GOH 2006: 1-2). It is, however, still way below (about 22%) that
of the men which stands at 78.49%, and needs to be encouraged
much more. Among the educated women also, only 27.31% out of
56.31% of educated women are working in Haryana.37
Despite the positive rating education received from women
themselves, it was not without a contrary viewpoint. In the
group discussions, some of the women opposed these views.
They felt that education among women had acted to spur
domestic violence, rather than reduce it. Bhagwati, an elderly
woman in village Chhara, Rohtak district, for example, stated:
“In my time women were illiterate and used to put up with vio-
lence because any resistance to it increased it. Now women are
educated and do not put up with it. They not only resist it, but
also complain to the authorities.”
Establishing the connection of violence with education, a
few other women similarly felt that:
educated women want equality; they want freedom to eat, drink and
dress as they like, and are unable to tolerate v iolence or repression. The
illiterate, on the other hand, keep quiet; they do suffer because of this,
but silence does not incite violence which then has a shorter duration.
57
SPECIAL ARTICLE

Stating a contradiction between the desire to have an
educated earning wife and men’s inability to handle them,
another woman stated: “All men want educated wives. They
also want them to earn, but want to reserve the right to set
boundaries for her. They cannot accept her equality. There is
violence on her because they want her to be always under
them. Is that possible?”
Yet another one opined:
They (men) cannot accept her economic and social freedom which she
comes to enjoy as a result of her education and by virtue of holding a
job. Her going out to work, meeting all sorts of people is always looked
at with suspicion by the husband. It becomes a primary cause of fric-
tion, as also of drinking and violence.
Employment as a Counter
Along with education, employment emerged as one of the key
factors for women to deal with violence. Indeed, the 2005-06
figures for Haryana show the propensity to self-employment
(in different categories of employment) among rural women
to be higher than among men, i e, 860 per thousand rural
women as compared to only 590 for rural men.38 Employment
of women has meant, in women’s opinion, “an increasing self-
dependence that has changed the way they are looked at; they
are respected in society as a person who earns”. Women are
being consulted even though it may be in form only, as the
final decision lies in the hands of the man; as earners, they
have acquired some right to spend that money. Cited below are
a sum of the opinions and observations of women regarding
employment and their ability to earn money:
Apani kamai se kisi ke age hath nahin phfailane padte (If you have your
own earnings you don’t have to beg anyone for money).
Apni kamai ya apni sampati se man mein ek atam-samman ho jaata hai
(Your earnings or your owning property gives you self-confidence).
Agar kamati hai to kisi ka munh nahin dekhana padata (If you are
earning you don’t have to look at others for charity).
Jab mein us se paisa hi nahin leti to mein us ka virodh bhi kar sakti hun.
Apna paisa kamati thi to apne dum per reh pai (When I don’t take any
money from my husband I can also confront him. If I could earn my-
self, I could also live on my own).
Increasing entry of women into the workforce is not always
a guarantee of the emergence of fundamentally more egalitar-
ian familial relationships, especially when men’s jobs are
threatened. The result may well be estrangement. Employ-
ment and earning by women also means further violence in an
attempt to control and dominate them, especially as it stands
to challenge the ideology of man as “bread-earner” and is in-
strumental in erasing his self-confidence. The only answer
may be all-round development and creation of jobs which may
open employment avenues for both – men and women.
I close my analysis with a final indictment of violence and a
strategy of action against a firmly established tradition/cus-
tom in Haryana, which came from a woman in village Sunaria
of Rohtak district and is worth quoting. She attacked the
hypergamous marriage tradition in Haryana (as in most other
parts of India) in which women always married upwards. She
advocated hypogamy: Rishta apne kamzor ghar mein karna
chahiye taaki dabaav banna rahe, ooche ki mang ki to maar dei
ke peet ke mare (marriage alliance of a girl should be made
with a family which has a lesser social status than your own. A
higher status man will either kill you [for dowry] or his beat-
ing [marital violence] will kill you.)
The three aspects flagged by women themselves: property,
education and employment, have complex linkages with vio-
lence, both negative and positive. As the case studies also indi-
cate, they do have the potential of negotiating a more equita-
ble relationship and creating commotion and fluidity in the
hitherto accepted gender role, which are heavily tilted in
favour of males. Once a woman’s role in the household changes
from “recipient” to “provider”, and therefore, an economic as-
set, her decision-making function also stands to be recognised
and consolidated, erasing the social sanction for violence.

Notes
1 The two most noteworthy publications in this
regard have been Panda and Agarwal (2005:
823-50); and the recent study by Bhattacharya
et al (2011: 1-14); also see the studies on vio-
lence made by ICRW (1999; 2000 and 2002).
Other major works dealing with the subject are
cited as and when required.
2 However, Haryana is much lower in the cate-
gory of infl icting spousal violence calculated
for different states of India. It holds 12th posi-
tion in ascending order; the lowest is Himachal
Pradesh with 6% and the “top honour” in this
category goes to states like Bihar with 59%
and to Rajasthan and Madhya Pradesh, with
46% each. See IIPS (2008: 25-26).
3 For an evaluation of this Act in 15 different
states, including Haryana, see Jhamb (2011:
45-50).
4 This especially relates to Janwadi Mahila Samiti
in Rohtak and Hissar whats has set aside a day
in a week to deal with such cases. According to
them, the cases of marital violence are now
competing neck to neck with the influx of
dowry-related cases, and are noticeably surfac-
ing after the passing of the 2005 Act. Also, spe-
cial cells have been established in the office of
the superintendent of police in each district
where women protection officers on contract
basis are located to undertake the implementa-
tion of this Act. Surinder Kaur, the protection
officer of the Rohtak cell, who deals with both
urban and rural areas claims to receive two to
three such cases per day.
5 Darling Papers, Cambridge, Box No II, Tour
Diary, 1930-31, p 48.
6 Brayne Collection, India Office Records, Lon-
don, 52/33, Indian Village Life Albums, C 1930,
no 27.
7 All women were unanimous in the opinion that
violence perpetrated on them was for “very
petty reasons”. These ranged from not cooking
properly, putting less or more salt in the food,
not looking after the household or the children,
speaking loudly or answering back, talking to
the neighbours, or just standing outside the
house; or the husband’s charging them with
“false and dirty’” allegations regarding other
men, for example, or castigating them for
wanting to go to their natal home too often or
asking for money to run the house, etc. See also
Jejeebhoy (1998: 855-62).
8 Also included in the collection of Fallon (1886: 22).
9 IIPS (2008: 25). For a detailed analysis of NFHS
data at the all-India level see Visaria (2008:
60-82).
10 In rural Gujarat, for example, Leela Visaria’s
study shows that level of education of both men
and women is statistically significant in show-
ing restrain in the infliction of physical vio-
lence, although not necessarily verbal violence.
See Visaria (2000: 1742-51).
11 Jasbir Singh Malik, advocate, village Gohana.
12 According to the 2001 Census, in parts of Har-
yana the female sex ratio dips really low; for
example, in Kurukshetra, it is 770; in Sonepat,
783 and in Ambala, 784. Activists in Haryana
observe that in some villages it is as low as 500-
550. The government, according to them is
pressuring the village authorities not to dis-
close this fact or recognise it officially.
13 Census of India, Haryana, 2001, series 7, provi-
sional population totals, paper 3 of Director of
Census Operations, Haryana, Controller of
publications, Delhi, nd, p 26.
14 Information given by the government assessers
and property dealers of Rohtak.
15 For details of these overriding causes ranging
from cultural, psychological, religious and
socio-economic, as well as the earlier interpre-
tations behind alcohol intake, see Dorschver
(1983).
16 For the state’s role and responsibility in the
growing scourge of alcoholism in Haryana, see
Chowdhry (2010: 278-83).
17 Census of India, Haryana, 2001, pp 130-38.

58 september 15, 2012 vol xlviI no 37 EPW Economic & Political Weekly

18 Statistical Abstract of Haryana, 1999-2000,
pp 530-31.
19 There is an extreme case reported in the news
papers regarding a young girl Sonia who killed
eight members of her parental family in Hissar
and then tried to commit suicide. Her suicide
note read: “I am fed up with my family for not
giving me my due share of the property and I
am going to eliminate them as well as myself”,
Tribune, Chandigarh, Sunday, 26 August 2001.
20 See debate relating to the Hindu Succession
(Haryana Amendment) Bill 1979, Haryana
Vidhan Sabha Debates, 25 September 1979.
21 Mukti Devi of village Dujjana, in a group
discussion.
22 The general pattern observable in such situa-
tions is somewhat different. The husband,
when he comes back home on leave, does take
up agricultural and other related works but the
woman does not go stop this work at all. Gener-
ally, there is no question of her “resting” as
suggested
23 Saksharta Abhiyan was formally launched in
Haryana in April 2002 in an effort to universal-
ise elementary education by community own-
ership of the school system. Apart from impart-
ing reading and writing and counting skills, it
also emphasises the social equality, equal
rights of women and other related social and
environment issues. It was started in all the
districts so that males and females get literate
about their rights. From 2009 onwards, it is
being operated only in 10 districts of Haryana
where less than 50% of women are literate.
24 Ram Meher Hooda, a divorce lawyer, Rohtak.
25 See Section 29Ä, Sub-section 2, of the Hindu
Marriage Act 1955, in Hindu Law, Vol II,
Nagpur, All India Reporter, A V Chitaley, third
edition, 1981, pp 892-95.
26 Census of India, Haryana, 1991, Part IV, series
A-C Socio-cultural tables, Registrar General,
Census Commission, India, New Delhi, June
1998, pp 22-23.
27 It may be noted that divorce in rural areas is
nearly always initiated by the man.
28 For details, see Scott (1986).
29 For details, see Chowdhry (2001: 23-50).
30 For details, see Chowdhry (1993: 130-58).
31 Within a year, in April 1998, Bansi Lal reversed
the imposed prohibition in Haryana due to
considerations of excise tax revenue. The
financial loss to the state exchequer was calcu-
lated to be Rs 1,200 crore per year.
32 See for example, Visaria (2000: 1742-51).
33 Even when she complains chances, are that no
member of her family will support her; if her
natal family refuses to accept her back she has
only one option – to commit suicide. Many
women are known to commit suicide in order
to escape marital violence.
34 Kiranjit Ahluwalia’s retaliatory violence is a case
in point. In 1989 Kiranjit Ahluwalia, a woman of
Indian origin in the United Kingdom (UK) burnt
her husband after suffering intense domestic
violence at his hands. She was first convicted of
murder and then on appeal her conviction was
overturned and replaced with manslaughter as
it was judged to be done in self-defence and in
the face of prolonged violent provocation lead-
ing to changes in law for domestic abuse vic-
tims in the UK. This case changed not only the
legal definition of violence in cases of battered
women, but also public opinion against abusive
and violent husbands and women who were
v iolent in retaliation.
35 A parallel can be found in the concept of banjh
woman – a barren woman, considered inauspi-
cious and used as an abuse; blame is laid only
Economic & Political Weekly EPW september 15, 2012
SPECIAL ARTICLE
on the woman and never on the husband. This GoH (2006): Literacy Status of Haryana, State Resource
myth is maintained by all, men and women, Centre, Government of Haryana, Chandigarh.
despite the knowledge that it may well be the – (2001): Statistical Abstract of Haryana, 1999-
man’s inability to father a child. 2000 (Planning Department, Economic and
36 Cited in an article by Raman Mohan, “Hary- Statistical Organisation,Chandigarh), 572
anavis – Suicide Prone Community”, The Hindu, – (2010): Statistical Abstract of Haryana, 2008-
Business Line, 29 June 2007. According to the 2009 (Department of Economic and Statistical
paper heated arguments over trivial issues Analysis, Chandigarh:), 558-59.
between husband and wife are routine affairs ICRW (1999): Domestic Violence in India: A Sum-
in rural Haryana and these invariably lead to mary Report of Three Studies, International
violence and later attempted suicides by women Centre for Research on Women, Washington.
in a fit of anger, frustration and depression.
– (2000): Domestic Violence in India: A Summary
37 Census of India, Haryana, 2001, p 138. Report of a Multi-Site Household Survey, Inter-
38 Census of India, Haryana, 2001, p 132. national Centre for Research on Women,
Washington.
– (2002): Men Masculinity and Domestic Violence
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Survey
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that an economist demands from his model. Modelling itself on mathematics, mainstream economics
is primarily deductive and based on axiomatic foundations. Econophysics seeks to be inductive, to
be an empirically founded science based on observations, with the tools of mathematics and logic
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vol xlviI no 37 59
DISCUSSION
NCAER on Mining in Goa
Inconvenient Truths
Rahul Basu
T
he report on mining in Goa by the
National Council of Applied Eco-
nomic Research (NCAER 2010b)
was criticised by Pranab Mukhopadhyay
and Gopal K Kadekodi (hereafter MG) in
EPW (12 November 2011). This author
also commented on the conclusions of
the report and raised several ethical
issues (EPW, 21 January 2012) (hereafter
Basu). R Venkatesan, the lead author of
NCAER (2010b), responded to the criti-
cism (EPW, 27 March 2012).
This note examines the response to
Basu and elaborates the ethical concerns.
Venkatesan asserts that our comments
on NCAER (2010b) assume that MG’s
critique is valid and try to add to them.
We point out that our commentary
and its conclusions are independent of
MG’s critique.
We compare the three principal con-
clusions of NCAER (ibid) with the revised
conclusions reached in Basu, before deal-
ing with the rejoinders in Venkatesan:
(1) Mining Share of GSDP: Mining con-
tributes around 5% of Goa’s gross state
domestic product (GSDP) when measured
at constant 1999-2000 prices. World iron
ore prices increased sharply in January
2008. NCAER (ibid) re-estimates the share
of mining in Goa’s GSDP and anticipates
this to be the long-term contribution as-
suming that the higher iron prices are
permanent. At current (2007-08) prices,
this would imply a direct plus indirect
contribution by mining of 16.94% of
Goa’s GSDP (ibid: 26).
In contrast, we found that NCAER’s
price expectations are poorly informed
and iron ore should be expected to main-
tain its contribution at around 5% of
Goa’s GSDP as anticipated by the constant
price series of Goa government’s depart-
ment of planning, statistics and evalua-
tion (DPSE).
Economic & Political Weekly EPW SEPTEMBER 15, 2012
(2) Employment: NCAER (ibid: 18) claims
that in 2004-05, mining employed,
directly and indirectly, about 75,000
workers of the state’s workforce of
5,82,274. This is close to the estimated
tourism employment of 84,150 (ibid: 18).
In contrast, we estimated a bottom-up
employment figure of only 21,873. Fur-
ther, as mining stops during the mon-
soon, the real core employment of Goans
is unlikely to exceed 5,500.
(3) Social Benefits: NCAER (ibid) con-
cludes that the annual social benefits
of the iron ore mining industry of
Rs 2,309.5 crore is greater than the
Rs 548.4 crore of environmental losses
(ibid: 43). In contrast, we found that just
the annual depletion cost of iron ore is
much in excess of the annual social
benefits (Rs 3,615.55 crore compared to
Rs 2,309.5 crore).
The Rejoinders
Venkatesan points out that since Goan
iron ore is often blended with higher
grade ore, excluding non-Goan iron ore
when calculating employment on barges
would lead to an underestimate. Accu-
rate segregation of non-Goan iron ore
into its three uses (sponge iron, direct
exports and blending with Goan iron ore)
is not available (KA 2011: 57). Assuming
that 100% of the non-Goan iron ore is
blended, the number of barges would
increase by 49 (300-251) and indirect
employment by 441 workers (49* (7 + 2)).
Total Goan employment would only
increase from 21,873 to 22,314 workers,
which is still far below the 75,000 esti-
mated by NCAER (2010b). Our estimate
of core Goan employment of 5,500
workers remains unaffected.
As regards calculation of depletion
premium, Venkatesan refers to ADB (1997),
which defines it as “the premium imposed
vol xlvii no 37
on the economic cost of depletable
resources representing the loss to the
national economy in future of using up the
resources today”. Venkatesan states that
“In the case of iron ore, since Goa ore is
of low grade an application of depletion
premium is not warranted”. Low grade is
not zero value! When the ore is depleted,
Goa’s economy will no longer have this
stock of natural wealth. As can be seen,
the main conclusions of Basu stand.
Ethical Issues
Our comment raised the need for
(a) disclosure of conflicts of interest,
and (b) the need to place source data
and calculations in the public domain
(McCullough and McKitrick 2009). We
had also commented that the high price
of the report ensures that the average
citizen does not buy it. This raised the
broader need for a “Code of Ethics in
Economics” (CIE 2011).
Venkatesan states,
Basu’s contention that the 62 page report is
priced at Rs 1,000, etc, and sold by the
NCAER is incorrect. Indeed, some of the re-
ports prepared for the ministries/depart-
ments are placed on their respective web-
sites. As a researcher, I do not wish to com-
ment further on ethical concerns.
Venkatesan is being disingenuous. Many
other reports by NCAER are placed in the
public domain through the NCAER website;
but not this one. It is priced at Rs 1,000 de-
spite being sponsored by the Goa Mineral
Ore Exporters’ Association (GMOEA).
A simple test of ethics is to check
whether the report reflects NCAER’s stat-
ed core values of “rigour, quality and
independence” (NCAER 2010a: 5-6). We
find that the report undermines these
values in many ways.
Rigour and Quality
We can identify some major examples of
poor quality/rigour in the report. There are
numerous other minor methodological,
factual, arithmetic and spelling errors.
(1) Permanent Increase in Price of
Iron Ore: As previously noted, NCAER
has ignored commodity price cycles,
public information on the reasons for
73
DISCUSSION
the sharp spurt in iron ore prices
(demand from China), the publicly
stated expectations of Sesa Goa (Goa’s
largest iron ore exporter) of price de-
clines in 2014, and especially NCAER’s
own Table 2.5 that implies a 33% drop
in price per tonne of Goan exports
between 2007-08 and 2008-09 from
Rs 3,017 per tonne to Rs 2,012 per tonne
(NCAER 2010b: 18).
Instead, NCAER relied on a brief analy-
sis in the Economic Survey 2008-09 of
commodity price movement, global deve-
lopments and the Indian economy. The
Economic Survey analyses the iron ore
market vis-à-vis other commodities such
as crude oil, edible oil, etc. The structur-
al change in iron ore prices was inferred
from the Economic Survey analysis.
The Economic Survey, when discussing
a global supply shock, refers to the
impact of commodity price increase on
inflation, not on the demand-supply
situation of the commodity. While the
Economic Survey comments that a judg-
ment had to be made on the permanence
of the price increase, no conclusion is
actually disclosed. NCAER also ignores
the statement in the Economic Survey
that “The global financial meltdown re-
sulted in a bursting of the commodity
bubble, leading to a dramatic drop in
most commodity prices” (ES 2009: 18). A
burst bubble could hardly be considered
permanent. NCAER also ignores the
different time frames used in viewing
inflation and social cost benefits (long-
term is a few years in one case, decades
in the other).
Despite referring to the World Bank’s
Commodity Price Series in the bibliogra-
phy, the report uses domestic Wholesale
Price Index (WPI) iron ore prices instead
of international prices more suited to
exported ore (NCAER 2010b: 12).
(2) Input-Output Table: We have already
pointed out that the input-output table
used to calculate the direct and indirect
impact of mining on the Goan economy
makes some puzzling assumptions, such
as transportation being a minor cost
(9% compared to Sesa Goa’s 49%), or a
large part of the iron ore being used
within the Goan economy, in sectors
such as construction and electricity, and
74
gas and water supply. This is clearly at mining companies on account of royalty,
odds with reality. barge tax, and road infrastructure cess,
As suggested by Venkatesan, we con- and to the central government. Public
tacted the lead author and the project data show that the first three items are
consultant. For the input-output tables, highly overstated. No public data source
the project consultant has provided was found for the taxes paid to the
some vague explanation and has prom- central government (Table 2).
ised to discuss the details when this The lead author was requested to pro-
author is in Delhi next. “It will not be vide either the GMOEA document refer-
easy for me to send the worksheets”, ence for their figures (none was provided
he stated. It is obviously difficult for in the report) or put us in touch with the
outsiders to reproduce NCAER’s analysis appropriate person. No response has
or check its calculations without ready been forthcoming.
access to the underlying data.
(5) Costs of Mining: The report derives
(3) Employment in Iron-Ore Mining: the costs of mining from the Integrated
We had earlier highlighted NCAER’s Research and Action for Development
assumption that the rural population is (IRADe) report on Natural Resource
insignificant in Goa (ibid: 17, 19). If Accounting for Goa (IRADe 2008: 41).
NCAER had used the National Sample The IRADe report is quite inappropriate,
Survey Office (NSSO) report 515 consist- and improperly used.
ently, the direct employment figure in (a) Solid waste costs: NCAER takes 100%
2004-05 would be 6,000 instead of of the unaccounted costs of landfill sites
19,000 (Table 1). of Rs 11 crore and avoidance cost of solid
Table 1: Employment in Iron-Ore Mining (NSSO 2005)
Units Rural Urban Total Source: NSSO 2005
Population (000s) 638 399 1,037 A-5 and A-7
% 61.5% 38.5% 100.0% Calculated by author
Labour Force Participation Rate % 38.5% 39.8% 39.0% Pages 69 and 70
Labour force (000s) 246 159 404 Calculated by author
Unemployment rate % 11.1% 8.7% 10.2% Pages 166 and 167
Unemployed (000s) 27 14 41 Calculated by author
Usually working persons (000s) 218 145 363 Calculated by author
Usually working persons in mining and quarrying % 0.0% 4.0% 1.5% Pages 142 and 145
Usually working persons in mining and quarrying (000s) – 6 6 Calculated by author
Table 2: Tax Estimates for Mining Companies (NCAER/GMOEA)
Rs Crore NCAER/GMOEA Actual Source
1 Barge tax 12 5.36 GBTAB 2009
2 Road infrastructure cess 50 20.46 GSB 2010b
3 Royalty paid at 10% ad valorem tax 300 33.97 GSB 2010a
4 Taxes paid to central government including export duty 250 NA No public data found
As already noted, the Fifth Economic waste management of Rs 0.4 crore from
Census in 2005 (DPSE 2005:12) reports IRADe. However, IRADe’s calculation is
that the total number of people usually for municipal solid waste (IRADe 2008:
working in Goan mining and quarrying 13). Total solid waste under the IRADe
is 3,412, plus 3,161 hired workers, tota- report is 41,423 tonnes per year (ibid:
lling to 6,573 workers, not very different 33). The iron ore overburden for 2007-
from the NSSO calculations of 6,000. 08 works out to 7,68,99,187 tonnes.1 If
Basu detailed how GMOEA has highly we simply scale the landfill number, we
overestimated indirect employment from get an astounding cost of Rs 20,421 crore
mining. NCAER appears to have repro- per annum.
duced data from its sponsor without (b) Pollution costs: NCAER (ibid: 42)
independent scrutiny. states:
Air pollution due to Iron Ore mining is
(4) Benefits of Mining: NCAER (2010b) considered to be approximately 10% of
uses GMOEA’s estimates of taxes paid by the total industrial air pollution in Goa.
SEPTEMBER 15, 2012 vol xlvii no 37 EPW Economic & Political Weekly

This is because the mining industry only
occupies <3% of the total area in Goa.
Pollution caused by industries in an area
can’t exceed more than three times the
area occupied.
The report takes 10% of the IRADe
estimate of the cost of pollution by
industries to derive the cost of mining
air pollution.
The logic is untenable. Further, the
IRADe bottom-up estimate of industrial
air pollution cost does not include min-
ing or transport (IRADe 2008: 43). Air
pollution from mining and its associated
transport can be many multiples of that
of Goan industry.
(c) Recalculation of forest values: NCAER
adapts the Madhu Verma report in 2000
(NCAER 2010b: 61) rather than use the
higher figures from the IRADe report in
2005. IRADe correctly used the 2,156 sq km
estimate for Goa forests from the 2003
State of Forest Report (IRADe 2008: 59).
Instead of following IRADe, NCAER used
the officially notified estimate of 1,424
sq km of forests in Goa and simply
scaled IRADe’s numbers proportionately
(1,424/2,156) (NCAER 2010b: 61).
Many of the IRADe estimates should not
be scaled by forest area. For example, the
ecotourism benefit is estimated using the
number of tourists visiting Goa, and has
no direct connection to the forest area.
NCAER has completely ignored the ear-
lier report on natural resource account-
ing for Goa by The Energy and Resources
Institute (TERI) in 2000, which included
estimates of the resource depletion costs
of mining (TERI 2000). In fact, the IRADe
report is a follow-up of the TERI report.
IRADe comments on the TERI report’s
analysis of mineral resources:
Apart from depletion of ores, the other external
costs of mining are resource costs (due
to depletion of mineral and groundwater
depletion), environmental costs (due to loss
of forests and biodiversity), health and other
costs (due to air and water pollution) and
other social costs such as loss of agricultural
livelihoods (IRADe 2008: 107).
NCAER has also ignored the detailed
study by TERI on the impact of mining on
society and health in the mining belt
(TERI 2006).
The many basic errors in NCAER
(2010b) leave readers with the strong
impression that the analysis has been
Economic & Political Weekly EPW SEPTEMBER 15, 2012
force-fitted to the conclusion because
time after time the report errs in favour
of mining relative to highly respected
independent sources.
The internal quality assurance process
of NCAER appears to be severely compro-
mised. These failures may be recurrent,
even common (MZPSG 2010). There seems
to be nothing exceptional or different
about this report. In this light, all research
output of NCAER should be handled with
extreme caution.
Conclusions
We call on NCAER to (a) immediately
withdraw this report and apologise to
the citizens of Goa, (b) investigate the
root causes of the failure, (c) scrutinise
other recent reports that may have
been affected by similar issues and
concerns, and publicly report the find-
ings of the investigation, and (d) put
in place mechanisms to prevent this
massive governance failure, including
a proper code of ethics encompassing
full disclosure of conflicts of interest
and placing assumptions, data and
calculations in the public domain. The
American Economic Association has
recently adopted a policy for all its
journals that could serve as a model
(AEA 2012).
Goan state policy should take into
account a steep decrease in mining that
is likely in the near future and the
accompanying social disruption. The
expected decline in mining taxes makes
it especially important that planning
begin now.
The author would like to acknowledge helpful
inputs from Sudipta Basu.
Rahul Basu (rahulbasu1@gmail.com) is the
founder and CEO of Ajadé and is based in Goa.
Note
1 Goan iron ore exports in 2007-08 (3,34,34,429
tonnes) (GMOEA 2010) times the overburden
ratio of 2.3 (DMG 2011).
References
ADB (1997): Guidelines for the Economic Analysis of
Projects (Asian Development Bank: Economics
and Development Resource Centre).
AEA (2012): American Economic Association Disclo-
sure Policy (American Economic Association),
viewed on 11 August (http://www.aeaweb.org
/aea_ journals/AEA_Disclosure_Policy.pdf).
vol xlvii no 37
DISCUSSION
CIE (2011): “Conflicts of Interest in Economics”,
Tilman Börgers, viewed on 8 August (http://
sites.google.com/site/cointrest/home).
DMG (2011): “Mining Areas”, Directorate of Mines
& Geology, Government of Goa, Panaji, viewed
on 26 June (http://www.goadmg.gov.in/min-
ingarea.htm).
DPSE (2005): Report on Fifth Economic Census,
Directorate of Planning, Statistics & Evalua-
tion, Government of Goa, Panaji, viewed on
26 June (http://goadpse.gov.in/publications/
goa-eco-census-report-2005.pdf).
ES (2009): “Challenges, Policy Response and Medi-
um-term Prospects” (Chapter 2), Economic Sur-
vey 2008-09.
GBTAB (2009): The Goa Barge Tax (Amendment)
Bill, 2009 – Bill No 31 of 2009, Official Gazette
Series No 39, Government of Goa, Panaji,
24 December, viewed on 27 June 2011 (http://
www.goachamber.org/cms/index.php?option
=com_docman&task=doc_download&gid=274).
GMOEA (2010): “GMOEA Selected Statistics 2009-10”,
Goa Mineral Ore Exporters’ Association, Panaji.
GSB (2010a): “Revenue from Mines”, Goa State
Budget 2010-11, Finance Department, Govern-
ment of Goa, Panaji, viewed on 27 July 2011
(http://www.goa.gov.in/portalweb/com/info-
tech/goaonline/importantupdates/budget 2010-
11 /receipts/d83.htm).
– (2010b): “Revenue from Transport”, Goa State
Budget 2010-11, Finance Department, Govern-
ment of Goa, Panaji, viewed on 27 July 2011
(https://www.goa.gov.in/portalweb/com/in-
fotech/goaonline/importantupdates/budget
201011/receipts/d13.htm).
IRADe (2008): Natural Resource Accounting for
Goa, Integrated Research and Action for
Development (IRADe), New Delhi, March,
viewed on 27 June 2011 (http://www.irade.
o r g /g o a % 2 0 N a t u r a l % 2 0 r e s o u r c e % 2 0
accounting%20report.pdf).
KA (2011): Report on the Reference Made by the Gov-
ernment of Karnataka under Section 7(2-A) of
the Karnataka Lokayukta Act, 1984 (Part – II),
Karnataka Lokayukta, Bangalore, 27 July.
McCullough, Bruce D and Ross McKitrick (2009):
“Check the Numbers: The Case for Due Dili-
gence in Policy Formation”, Fraser Institute
(February).
MZPSG (2010): Iron and Steal: The POSCO-India
Story, Mining Zone Peoples’ Solidarity Group
(October).
NCAER (2010a): Annual Report 2010, National
Council of Applied Economic Research, New
Delhi, viewed on 9 July 2011 (http://www.
ncaer.org/downloads/AnnualReports/Annual
Report_2010.pdf).
– (2010b): A Study of Goan Iron Ore Mining Indu-
stry, National Council of Applied Economic
Research, New Delhi.
NSSO (2005): National Sample Survey Report 515:
Employment and Unemployment Situation in
India, 2004-05, National Sample Survey Office,
Ministry of Statistics and Programme Imple-
mentation, Government of India, New Delhi,
viewed on 26 June 2011 (http://www.mospi.
gov.in/mospi_nsso_rept_pubn.htm).
TERI (2000): Pilot Project on Natural Resources
Accounting in Goa (Phase 1), TERI Project re-
port No 99RD61, The Energy and Resources
Institute, New Delhi.
– (2006): Environmental & Social Performance
Indicators and Sustainability Markers in
Minerals Development: Reporting Progress to-
wards Improved Ecosystem Health & Human
Well-being, Phase III, TERI Project Report No
2002 WR41, TERI – Western Regional Centre,
Goa, viewed on 26 June 2011 (http://idl-
bnc.idrc.ca/dspace/bitstream/10625/33366/1/
125313.pdf).
75
DISCUSSION
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COMMENTARY
Telangana Movement
Democratisation or Authoritarianism?
G Vijay
In spite of widespread support
in Andhra Pradesh for the
Telangana cause, there seems to
be an impasse over statehood for
the region. This can be traced to
the nexus between the state and
the mafia-backed Seemandhra
oligarchy, which has increasingly
been calling the shots in recent
years. The Telangana movement
offers the only credible hope
of changing the iniquitous
structures of power and control
in the state and its failure could
see the forces of lawlessness
acquiring new strength, with
disastrous consequences for the
common people.
G Vijay (gudavarthyvijay@rediffmail.com) is
at the department of economics, University of
Hyderabad.
22
T
here seems to be an indecisiveness
in declaring statehood for the
Telangana region. The procrasti-
nation continues in spite of student agi-
tations, hunger strikes, suicides, resigna-
tions by legislators, a sakala jenula samme
(general strike) in which employees and
workers participated and, more recently,
election results. The strike almost para-
lysed governance in Andhra Pradesh in
late 2011 and the election results of 2012
seem to have caused panic defections
from the Congress Party.
The indecisiveness is one of the mani-
festations of the weakening of both
democratic institutions and the state
vis-à-vis the oligarchy of economic power,1
predominantly from Seemandhra (the
Rayalaseema and Andhra regions of the
state). While the oligarchy was earlier
essentially an economic power with
certain mafia traits, over the years, a
certain mafia has become a significant
force with deep economic interests within
this oligarchy. The rise of the oligarchy
and the mafia class has changed the re-
lationship between political representa-
tives and the corporate economy. While
political representatives earlier depended
on the corporate economy to meet current
needs, the rise of these classes has merged
the interests of the political classes with
these classes. Political representatives no
longer look for donations from the cor-
porate economy, rather they are on the
lookout for avenues that generate yields.
This shift in the nature of the oligarchy is
likely to be of great significance for the
future of politics in Andhra Pradesh.2
These classes, after having captured the
reins of power and authority in the state
in the course of pursuing a new model of
development, have grown so powerful
as to threaten to destabilise the central
government when it does not concede
their demands. To interpret the rise of
these new centres of power as decentrali-
sation of authority, a strengthening of
september 15, 2012
federal structures represented by regional
parties, or a democratisation of the erst-
while hierarchical flow of power and
authority from the central high command
of a national party would be erroneous.
First, what have emerged as decentra-
lised power structures are composed of
classes that are not engaged in produc-
tion but in making surpluses through
fictitious capital and the blatant misuse
of authority. Second, these classes have no
respect for constitutional values or legal
procedures. They have built pockets of
local tyrannies, operating through com-
mercial cartels and the mafia. They
draw impunity from their nexus with
state power, which provides them access
to new wealth in the form of development
contracts, underlying which are networks
of beneficiaries built on caste and regional
identities cutting across party lines and
ideologies. These classes initially ploughed
their surpluses from commercial agri-
culture into the manufacturing3 and
entertainment sectors. Their nature soon
changed and they multiplied their wealth
by investing in real estate, construction
and, more recently, mining. These classes
have also diversified their investments
into the education and health sectors.
The devolution of power from the
centre is a result of the rise of classes
engaged in anarchic and lawless accu-
mulation rather than a legitimate political
diffusion of authority. While this process
of accumulation has helped provide high
technology and high-skilled commercial
services in the private sector, it has also
resulted in a lack of legal protection for
civilians in several forms and hindered
access to services linked to quality of life
to large sections of the middle and lower-
middle classes. This mode of develop-
ment has caused difficulties in access to
housing for poor people, especially in
urban areas, and led to a collapse of public
institutions, in particular the education
and health systems, excluding large
sections of the poor. The oligarchy did not
merely muster power from its commer-
cial activities or nexus with the state in
general and the bureaucracy in particular.
The source of its power includes organised
mafia groups drawn from the traditional
loyalties that exist in factional politics
and the commercialisation of crime in the
vol xlviI no 37 EPW Economic & Political Weekly

liquor, finance and real estate sectors. The
mafia, as recent election results have
suggested, has been promoted to an in-
dependent political class by global as well
as local corporate interests. The with-
drawal of the state and lawless accumu-
lation, however, had already become a
hindrance to legitimate interests some
years ago.4 This was the ideal condition
for the development of a “market for pro-
tection”, as Gambetta5 (1996) describes it.
Men of Honour
Given Y S Rajasekhara Reddy’s back-
ground in factional politics, he had all
the requirements to fulfil the role of a
“man of honour”, effectively enforcing
contracts and securing the interests of the
oligarchy, with credible violence back-
ing him. This role promised to take care
of the risk of high transaction costs in a
market that operated under conditions
of lack of trust and regulatory failure. It
also cleared legal hurdles, promising
immunity from the state to complement
the lawless accumulators and effectively
suppressed democratic struggles that
hampered the aspiration to accumulate.
Rajasekhara Reddy came to power when
there was antipathy towards a neo-liberal
policy regime and he introduced certain
welfare policies that effectively became
personalised patronage systems. An
example of this could be seen in the
feedback reports of the Arogyasri health
insurance programme.6 What they pro-
moted was his image or, as Gambetta puts
it, they subserved the “advertisement”
function. Such benevolence promoted a
normative image, which is a prerequisite
for performing parastatal regulatory roles
at several levels. These processes made
the mafia, which was but one element of
the oligarchy, aspire for the control of
governance with the promise of becoming
an effective substitute for direct state
coercion in promoting primitive accu-
mulation.7 More so, it enjoyed legitimacy
by having engaged in welfare and patron-
age activities. Jagan Mohan Reddy is the
new “man of honour”, albeit a bit contro-
versial from the point of view of those
classes engaged in lawless accumulation.
The influence of these classes is enhanced
by the fact that they hold investments in
the media – both print and electronic.
Economic & Political Weekly EPW september 15, 2012
The Telangana movement, despite its
limitations, has to be credited for taking
on such powerful classes. The defeat of
the YSR Congress Party in the Parakala
constituency in Warangal district, although
by a slender margin, is a significant mile-
stone. The consequences of this victory
go much beyond electoral politics and
the Telangana Rashtra Samithi (TRS). It
marks an assertion by civil society and the
recovery of democratic space through a
political struggle against the mafia class
and its claim to be the new social manager
in its role as a leader of the oligarchy. The
credit for this ought to go to the Telangana
struggle as a political movement.
The Telangana political elite have been
engaged in electoral politics for long,
moulded by the wealth of the oligarchy
that has no local roots in Telangana. The
injustice in water distribution and the
flouting of rules and norms in land
acquisition and employment are evidence
of the asymmetry of power and the
structure of control that exists among the
regional political elites. In the course of
building these structures, the Seemandhra
oligarchy seems to have put up barriers to
entry that have affected certain sections
of Telangana rent-seekers and entrepre-
neurs, consisting of private investors,
bureaucrats, government employees and
non-resident Indians (NRIs). Seen from
this viewpoint, the Telangana movement
evinces little hope of ushering in an alter-
native developmental and political proc-
ess. But the relevance of the Telangana
movement is that it is a step forward,
however small, in a long-drawn process of
democratisation of power and production.
The success of the movement may not in
itself alter structures, but it could usher
in a context that opens up new possibili-
ties, which cannot happen under the
current structures of power and control.
The dilution, if not dissolution, of the
structures of power and control among
the regional political elites is important.
This change is a necessary precondition
for democratising the structures of power
and control between the people and their
political representatives. Such an inter-
linked change will open up spaces for the
emergence of new political elites, which
includes new sections of the backward
classes, dalits, tribals and minorities. This
vol xlviI no 37
COMMENTARY
is not possible under the existing condi-
tions of monopolisation, institutional cap-
ture, asymmetry and coercion. The Tel-
angana movement must be credited for
bringing the concerns of the agrarian
and rural classes, which were engulfed
in a crisis, suicides and starvation deaths,
back to the top of the political agenda of
the region. The critical minimum resources
and freedoms necessary for the rise of
new social elites are not easy to build
without altering the existing structures
of power and control.
Maoist Movement
The existence of the aspiration for change
without the systemic resources for such a
process partly explains the existence of
the Maoist movement. The classes in the
oligarchy, which lack the critical minimum
resources to matter politically, stand apart
from the social classes that form the major
social base of the Maoist movement. But
this base of the Maoist movement simply
does not stand any chance of being part
of the system, perhaps even in a separate
state of Telangana. This distance from
the system probably explains how in a
setting of irresponsiveness and injustice,
violence becomes a “rational choice” of
the excluded people who do not have any
other resource to bargain with. One has to
understand the peculiar social condition
of a “bargain” where economic transac-
tions are mediated by fear at one end and
impunity on the other, to be able to ana-
lyse the role of non-systemic entities.
When one lacks resources to enter into
transactions for win-win outcomes, one’s
capacity to inflict injury may provide a
seat at the bargaining table. If the mafia
class were to succeed in capturing autho-
rity in the state, society may be compelled
to look towards forces like the Maoist
movement in urban locales as well.
The Telangana political elites have
both contributed to the growth of the
economic oligarchy and the mafia and
benefited from it. This process spanned
the nine years of Telugu Desam rule under
Chandrababu Naidu.8 The oligarchy and
the mafia then consolidated themselves
under Rajasekhara Reddy. It was then
that the Telangana political elites suddenly
realised that while the oligarchy was
growing, the marginalised and the
23
COMMENTARY
excluded had been victims and that with
its consolidation, they themselves would
be no exception. The political marginali-
sation of the Telangana political elites
is now a fact and felt by everyone from
the top brass of the bureaucracy to the
migrant cotton farmer. And all along,
power and control have been exercised
through asymmetries in wealth, caste
and regional networks of patronage,
corruption and the manipulation of reg-
ulatory institutions. Added to this, dif-
ferent forms of violence and coercion
have made powerlessness, indignity,
fear and insecurity generated by the oli-
garchy almost the generic experience of
the people of an entire region.
Unity in Adversity
Following Rajasekhara Reddy’s death and
the antagonism that developed between
Jagan Reddy and the central government,
the leadership of the Congress Party has
recognised the danger of the autono-
mous rise of local oligarchies that do not
respect autonomy or tolerate sharing of
power. This has caused a cleavage in the
oligarchy and given scope for a highly
heterogeneous spectrum of social and
economic classes and political ideologies
to come together in the Telangana move-
ment. It has apparently transformed
local rent-seekers into revolutionaries,
and it seems as if they are all converging
on a common objective, a process often
presented as beads on a single string.
The geographical Telangana, the demo-
cratic Telangana and the social Telangana,
however, remain in intense debate with-
in. This debate has been asymmetric and
hierarchical in nature, with the demo-
cratic Telangana enjoying much less
space than the social Telangana, which
in turn enjoys much less space than the
politics of the geographical Telangana.
In itself, this string is incoherent, sym-
bolic and unsustainable, but pitted
against the oligarchy, it holds together,
signifying a hope of greater political
space for everyone, in different senses.
The economic oligarchy of Seemandhra,
however, has no loyalties to its own region.
The pathetic situation of the people in
Srikakulam, Visakhapatnam, Anantapur
and Cuddapah districts on any indicator
of human development testifies to these
24
classes being self-centric, minus any
regional empathies.9 Ironically, the fact
that these districts suffer tremendous
neglect is cited as evidence of the lack of
any regional bias in development. That
these classes happen to have a regional
identity is a historical coincidence related
to a mix of factors, including the nature
of governance in the past, colonial rule,
English education and the early rise of
political elites, rather than a consciously
planned social collaboration based on
regional interests. The regional identity
of the economic oligarchy helps bind the
actors within it together but does not bind
the oligarchy to its own region of origin. So
the region to which these classes belong
suffer utter neglect, while sectors of the
economy or the social classes that contri-
bute to strengthening the oligarchy thrive.
While questions are being raised about
the revival of the erstwhile feudal classes
under the Nizam and caste domination in
the name of Telangana, democratisation of
caste relations is not guaranteed in today’s
united Andhra Pradesh either. The rigidity
of the caste factor is apparent in the most
ghastly forms of caste violence that have
been perpetrated by the oligarchy on the
oppressed castes of its own region.10 It is
because of this that several sections of
dalits and other classes from Rayalaseema
and Coastal Andhra have come out
openly in support of the Telangana cause.
Hyderabad Matters
The deep-seated interest of the oligarchy
and the mafia in a united Andhra
Pradesh does not come from historical,
social or cultural solidarity, but from
fear of losing control over the golden
goose, the pocket of wealth that is the
capital city of Hyderabad. The develop-
ment process of urbanisation in capitalism
offers what are called agglomeration
economies, derived from the common
use of high fixed-cost infrastructure, an
assured supply of skilled labour, and so
on. These economies, however, are not
inexhaustible. Like the usual logic of scale,
the curve has an inverted U-shape. There
is bound to be an optimal size, beyond
which problems of overcrowding and
inefficiency in administration will out-
weigh benefits. If the economic activity
of the holding classes in the capital were
september 15, 2012
productive in nature, they would see
sense in decentralisation and diversifi-
cation of pockets of development. Inno-
vative capital would search for new ave-
nues for circulation and accumulation.
However, in today’s Andhra Pradesh, the
capital has been expanded into a Greater
Hyderabad, taking into itself rural areas
in several surrounding districts. This in-
clusion has been without any urbanisa-
tion of these regions in terms of infra-
structure or services, but it has expanded
the geographical radius for speculation
by the realty business. The classes that
benefit from rents generated by scarcity,
rather than from expansion of producti-
vity, have every reason to hold on to the
current centre of economic activity.
Speculation has been further driven
by the recent global economic downturn
because land is now valued as a relatively
less risky repository of value than the
stock market. The savings of NRIs, the
rent-seeking classes and even the mafia
cartels pour into it. This in turn is likely
to cause a mismatch between structures
of subsistence (the cost of food, clothing,
housing, health, education, transporta-
tion, etc, inflated by capture of land,
credit and other markets) and structures
of productive economic activities (the
increasing need of a non-innovative pro-
duction enterprise to resort to cutting
down on labour costs to cope with com-
petition). Decentralisation of economic
activity, on the other hand, would have
to involve the development of infrastruc-
ture and human capital, necessitating an
engagement with those contributing to
the development of civil society. It would
require economic agents to transform
social relations, build institutions and
enhance the productivity of existing
resources. This process would involve
positive social and economic externali-
ties spanning generations, the benefits
of which might come only after a long
period of gestation. The oligarchy is
neither interested in such a social or
political role nor has the patience to reap
the benefits of the productive contributions
for the people of its own region. It looks
for quick returns by circulating capital
within the already clogged domains of
activity. It is therefore interested in
spreading insecurity among the settlers.
vol xlviI no 37 EPW Economic & Political Weekly

The nature of the capital held by the
Seemandhra oligarchy can also be inferred
from the cultural experience of these
regions. That there has been a gradual
degeneration of the university system,
which once enjoyed great repute, and that
only a minuscule number of literary or
intellectual stalwarts of the new genera-
tion stand by these classes suggest how
the oligarchy is valued by its own society.
A social and cultural depletion has been
caused by the rent-seeking commercial
activity of these classes, which has grad-
ually become all pervasive, influencing
every walk of life. The oligarchy has taken
away the moral resources and dreams of
Seemandhra society and earned the ire of
its own people. In this sense, the formation
of a separate state is not only in the interest
of the people of Telangana, but also the
people of all regions in Andhra Pradesh. In
the eyes of the dominant economic agents,
the three regions of the state (Telangana,
Coastal Andhra and Rayalaseema) and
the subregions within them facilitate a
smooth supply of raw materials and la-
bour and enable the circulation of capi-
tal with quick returns. With the mafia as
the social manager at the helm, the oli-
garchy intends to hold on to the reins of
power and control over this process.
Finding New Ground
The division of the state therefore tops the
people’s agenda, cutting across regions.
The paradox is that subregional move-
ments seem parochial in form while
having a substantive democratic content,
whereas the slogan of a unified state is
parochial in its content and only preten-
tiously enlightened in its articulation.
The new space, the political and cultural
forms of mobilisation, the spirit of a
public cause, the collective struggles and
the objective of ensuring the account-
ability of political agencies nurtured by
the Telangana movement must find the
necessary structures independent of the
old political elites. The new generation
of students and the working class who
have undone the inertia brought on by
depoliticising development must find the
means to continue to change the nature
of politics while resisting attempts to
dilute it as it moves closer to power. It
is sustaining and consolidating these
Economic & Political Weekly EPW september 15, 2012
unfolding spaces of hope that will deter-
mine the future of economic develop-
ment and the nature of politics in what
are today the regions of a unified state.
The realisation of substantive changes
for democratisation, such as land re-
forms, forest rights for tribals, social and
gender justice, and broader control over
resources and institutions through de-
centralisation of power and decision-
making, will depend on the new politi-
cal spaces and formations emerging
from the altered structures. If the new
spaces and mobilisations fizzle out for
some reason, and Andhra Pradesh re-
mains as it is, the worst-case scenario
will be a reorganisation of the oligarchy
(including the old regional political elit-
es of Telangana) under the leadership of
the mafia, which will harshly come
down on the people and their aspira-
tions in every region of the state. Andhra
Pradesh as a unified state with a mafia-
led oligarchy could witness a civil war
among common people across regional,
caste and communal lines,11 leading to
the emergence of an authoritarian re-
gime. On the other hand, the criminal-
ised rent-seeking classes, the political
elites and bureaucrats would use law-
lessness to complement the oligarchy,
engaging in heightened exploitation.
And they would simultaneously repress
democratic voices in the name of restor-
ing law and order and democracy.
Notes
1 Oligarchy refers to those classes that enjoy a
socially-mediated (predominantly caste, region-
al and linguistic identities) nexus of financial,
industrial and agrarian capita, with the politi-
cal and permanent executive, and engaging in
capture of policymaking and regulatory insti-
tutions through a systematic use of organised
middlemen and a mafia. While monopolisation
through social mediation remains the constant
phenomena of the oligarchy, the social spaces
(market, politics, bureaucracy, judiciary, middle-
men and mafia) and functions of specific actors
are often interchangeable and overlapping.
2 This may well be the new model of localised
authoritarian governance (an emerging mode of
fascist governance backed by corporate interests)
as an alternative to the failed saffron fascism.
3 The business organisations in the manufactur-
ing sector are predominantly cost-cutting in
nature. The industries in Telangana do not employ
local people. They are structurally motivated to
take advantage of rural distress and the circula-
tion of labour rather than solve distress. They
engage in practices involving evasion of taxes
and violation of environmental norms and laws.
4 Way back in 2002, Telugu daily Eenadu, which
otherwise supported Chandrababu Naidu,
vol xlviI no 37
COMMENTARY
reported that in some instances public contracts
that were given to some multinational compa-
nies through a bidding process were reawarded
to companies floated by mafia groups, which
forcibly took over the contracts in certain places
in Rayalaseema (Eenadu, 27 October 2002).
5 Diego Gambetta (1996), The Sicilian Mafia: The
Business of Private Protection (Cambridge:
Harvard University Press).
6 The Arogyasri programme, although intro-
duced as a part of the right to health of poor
households, did not contribute to any thinking
of a social contract or to raising a civilian con-
sciousness on the right to health. The feedback
reports are full of proclamations of personal
indebtedness to Rajasekhara Reddy, who was
seen as a saviour of lives in beneficiary house-
holds that could not afford exorbitantly expen-
sive medical intervention. The tragedy was
that the access to medication was a contribu-
tion of the same oligarchy that further consoli-
dated itself while providing the facility.
7 This role ensures managing conflict through
socialised coercion, which, unlike repression
by the state, can exist without signalling a
conflict or crisis.
8 To give an illustration of this historical process,
the deregulation under Chandrababu Naidu’s
regime bordered on permitting illegality and
openly flouting laws for accumulation. As
pointed out, “The chief minister himself had
made a statement which appeared in the press
during the final months of 1997 asking the PCB
authorities to ‘go slow’ (on polluting industries)
as it would hamper industrial growth. He made
a similar statement again in the assembly”
(G Vijay (2003): “Other Side of New Industriali-
sation”, Economic & Political Weekly, 38 (48),
pp 5026-30). Recently, the managing directors
of Hetero Drugs, Arabindo Pharma, Matrix and
Ramky Pharma were arrested along with Jagan
Reddy in a disproportionate assets case by the
Central Bureau of Investigation. These industries
have all been accused of violating environmental
laws for two decades (WP 1056/90). They have
been operating with impunity despite several
Supreme Court judgments seeking their closure.
The vulnerability of the industry has been used
by the mafia to raise the threshold of illegality,
further extending into quid pro quo transactions.
9 In a study done by the author for the CDS,
ASSR and HIVOS on Arogyasri, it was found
that the normalised figures for the beneficiar-
ies of the programme across districts showed
that Ananthapur, Cuddapah, Srikakulam and
several Telangana districts had least benefited
in terms of both the number of patients treated
and the amount of money claimed, while West
Godavari, East Godavari and Guntur had ben-
efited the most. Further, deaths of tribals in the
Vishaka agency area due to malaria have been
reported for the past two decades without much
respite. G Vijay (2012), “The Business of Health
Care and the Challenges of Health Security: The
Case of Arogyasri Health Insurance Programme
in Andhra Pradesh” in K P Kannan and Jan Bre-
man, The Long Road to Social Security (New
Delhi: Oxford University Press), (forthcoming).
10 Note the massacres in Karamchedu of Prakasam
district (22 July 1985; for details, see Balagopal
(1985), “The Karamchedu Killings: The Essence
of the NTR Phenomenon”, Economic & Political
Weekly, Vol 20, No 31), and Chunduru of Guntur
district (6 August 1991; for details, see Balagopal
(1991), “Post Chundur and Other Chundurs”,
Economic & Political Weekly, Vol 24, No 42).
More recently, on 12 June 2012 four dalits were
done to death and 25 injured in a land dispute
in Laxmipeta of Srikakulam district.
11 The victory of the Bharatiya Janata Party in
Mahabubnagar has to be taken as representing
a warning.
25
COMMENTARY
The Meaning of the Attack
on the CAG
B P Mathur
The office of the Comptroller and
Auditor General is an essential
instrument for enforcing the
accountability of the executive
to Parliament. It is wrong, as
in the coal blocks and other
recent cases, to cast aspersions
on the CAG for pointing out the
omissions and commissions of the
government. The office of the
CAG has done what it is expected
to do as a guardian of national
finance. Unfortunately the issue
has got politicised with the
leading opposition party upping
the ante. The recent CAG’s reports
will have served their purpose
if attention is drawn to some
critical policy issues on the role
and conduct of private sector in
infrastructure development.
B P Mathur (drbpmathur@gmail.com) has
worked as deputy comptroller and auditor
general, Government of India. He is the author
of the book Government Accountability and
Public Audit.
12
T
he Comptroller and Auditor Gen-
eral’s (CAG) report on allocation
of coal blocks has become a sub-
ject of acrimonious debate all over the
country. The opposition Bharatiya Jana-
ta Party (BJP) has stalled the working of
Parliament and has demanded the resig-
nation of Prime Minister Manmohan
Singh. The ruling Congress has been de-
fending its action and the prime minster
has taken the unprecedented step of
making a statement in the House and has
observed that the report is flawed and
disputable. Charges have been made
that the CAG has overstepped his man-
date. The controversy raises a vital issue
about the role and function of the CAG.
Let us first look at the main contents of
three reports submitted in the monsoon
session of Parliament relating to alloca-
tion of coal blocks, mega power projects
and private participation in the Indira
Gandhi Airport.1
Allocation of Coal Blocks
The country is facing a severe shortage
of electricity largely due to inadequate
production of coal which is the main raw
material for thermal power projects. The
production is around 560 million tonnes
(mt) against a demand of 650 mt and the
balance is met by imports. The country
is currently importing about 75 mt of
coal (costing around $6,700 million),
which may go up to 100 mt, and this has
put severe pressure on foreign exchange
resources. The government has formu-
lated a policy that private players may be
brought in for production of coal as pub-
lic sector Coal India and its subsidiaries
are unable to meet the demand. The CAG
report highlights the fact that the man-
ner of allotment of coal blocks was non-
transparent and lacked rational criteria
and resulted in huge financial benefits
to the allottees. The issue of competitive
september 15, 2012
bidding was under consideration of the
Ministry of Coal since 2004 and could
have been introduced by July 2006 when
the Ministry of Law had given its clear-
ance, but the government kept dilly-
dallying and continued to follow arbi-
trary procedures. Hardly any coal has
been produced from the mines allocated,
although there was a condition that open
cast mines should produce within 36
months and underground mines within
48 months from the date of issue of letter
of allocation.
A system of bank guarantees to ensure
timely production of coal was introduced
but hardly any bank guarantee has been
encashed and most of them have lapsed.
Thus the mines were allocated almost
free, and the allottees could sit on valua-
ble reserves without any liability (except
that they had to pay a small fee as devel-
opment charges and would be required to
pay royalty to states when production
commences). The value of coal reserves
over the entire life cycle of the mines,
which has been allocated to 57 parties, if
marketed, could earn a surplus of Rs 1.86
lakh crore, at current prices, if calculated
on the normative basis of the difference
between cost of production and sale price.
How a private player can derive extra-
ordinary benefits through discretionary
allotment becomes evident in the manner
in which coal blocks have been allocated
for power projects owned by Reliance
Power (RPL). Out of four contracts for
ultra mega power projects three, includ-
ing in Sasan, have been bagged by RPL
with 3,960 MW capacity each. While
awarding the contract to RPL, several
bid conditions such as equity holding,
net worth, etc, were diluted. Two coal
mines were allocated for Sasan and a
tariff of Rs 1.196 per unit fixed for a
20-year-period. Subsequently, a third
coal block Chhatrasal which was not
included in the bid proposal, was also
allocated to Sasan, after deallocating
it from the National Thermal Power
Corporation (NTPC), and a special dis-
pensation given that surplus coal could
be used for the Chitrangi projects. As the
tariff for these two plants in Madhya
Pradesh and Uttar Pradesh has been fixed
vol xlviI no 37 EPW Economic & Political Weekly

higher (Rs 2.450 and Rs 3.702), due to the
fact that they have to source coal from
the market, RPL will get the benefit of using
9 mt of coal annually from the captive
mines of Sasan plant, which would help
in substantially reducing the cost of
production of electricity. Due to this
beneficent allocation of coal, the elec-
tricity when sold will yield financial
gain to Reliance to the tune of Rs 29,033
crore, over the 20 years life of the contract,
whose present net value is Rs 11,852 crore.
The prime minster in his statement in
the House has rebutted CAG’s findings. The
auction route could not be adopted due
to the compulsion of federalism as many
state governments had opposed it. Further,
the Mines and Minerals (Development
and Regulation) Act had to be amended
before resorting to a bidding process
and this took considerable time. It is dif-
ficult to accept this logic. If the govern-
ment had the necessary “will” it could
have introduced an auction system which
was well within its executive power. It
dragged its feet and continued with the
policy of discretionary allotment as it
yielded huge rents to those in power, as
has been coming out in the media both
electronic and printed. The prime minister
has also pointed out that the quantum
of financial benefit which has accrued to
private players is exaggerated and can
be disputed. Yes it is true that the quan-
tum of financial benefit pointed out by
CAG may not be the best estimate. There
are a large number of methods by which
financial valuation of a company or nat-
ural resource or asset can be done – the
profit earning method; asset-oriented
method; earning capacity method; and
discounted cash flow method. But that
does not take away the main thrust of
the report that there has been substan-
tial loss to the public exchequer.
PPP at Delhi Airport
The CAG’s report points out that huge
concessions were given to Delhi Inter-
national Airports (DIAL), which is a joint
venture company in which the government
undertaking – Airport Authority of India
(AAI) – has a 26% stake and GMR Group
has a 74% stake in development and oper-
ation of the Indira Gandhi Airport. Out of
the capital expenditure of Rs 12,857 crore
Economic & Political Weekly EPW september 15, 2012
the promoter GMR has put in capital of
Rs 1,813 crore only by way of equity, the
balance was financed through loans;
security deposits and collections from
passengers as a development fee. By
putting in less than 20% of capital in-
vestment the GMR Group has acquired
complete control on the operation of the
airport. Under the original agreement
the DIAL was to arrange full financing of
the project, but a post-contract benefit
was provided by permitting it to levy a
development fee from passengers. The
company has collected Rs 3,415 crore
on this account, which has imposed an
additional burden on passengers.
The original contract with DIAL envis-
aged a 30-year-period for the contract,
with a proviso that it can be extended by
another 30 years subject to mutual agree-
ment and negotiation of terms. However,
in the final agreement this clause was
omitted and DIAL has been given sole
right to operate for 60 years without any
review of the terms. Under the agreement,
the DIAL has been permitted use of 5% of
4,799 acres of land with AAI, for com-
mercial exploitation which works out to
240 acres. For use of commercial land DIAL
was charged hardly any money – it was
required to make a one-time payment of
Rs 31 lakh and an annual lease rent of
Rs 100. The current value of land availa-
ble to DIAL for commercial exploitation is
estimated at Rs 24,000 crore and has a
projected earning capacity of Rs 1,63,557
crore during the contract period. It is
evident that the Ministry of Civil Aviation
went overboard to grant concessions
and favours to DIAL in total detriment to
the interest of AAI and the government.
CAG’s Role
The government has been very uncom-
fortable with the audit findings. In order
to defend its position, some members of
the ruling party have raised questions
about CAG’s jurisdiction and observed
that he has exceeded his mandate. What
is the veracity of such criticism?
The CAG’s role should be viewed in the
context of our constitutional scheme
under which the executive is accountable
to Parliament. CAG is an essential instru-
ment for enforcing the accountability
mechanism as the CAG’s reports on
vol xlviI no 37
COMMENTARY
government’s stewardship of public fin-
ance are required to be placed in Parlia-
ment and state legislatures under Arti-
cle 151 of the Constitution. To enable
him to discharge this responsibility,
without fear or favour, he has been
given an independent status under Arti-
cle 148 analogous to that of a Supreme
Court judge. B R Ambedkar observed in
Constituent Assembly that he is “prob-
ably the most important officer in the
Constitution of India, and his duties are
far more important than the duties even
of the judiciary”.
Rajendra Prasad, the first president, had
commented that CAG “has the power to
call to account any officer, however highly
placed, so far as State money is concerned”.
In India we have adopted the British
system of parliamentary democracy.
Britain had to undergo centuries of
struggle to secure Parliament’s suprema-
cy over the executive (monarchy), dating
back to Magna Carta (1215) and Bill of
Rights (1688) and measures such as en-
actment of the Exchequer and the Audit
Act of 1866, which created an independent
office of CAG, who would audit all govern-
ment departments and make a report
to Parliament to be examined by its
Public Accounts Committee (PAC).
The institution of public audit has
been evolving all over the world in keep-
ing with the deepening of democracy
and need for greater accountability of
government in view of its increased role
in a complex globalised economic envi-
ronment. In order to strengthen parlia-
mentary control, the UK Audit Act was
amended in 1983 and the CAG made an
Officer of the House of Commons and
legal backing given to him for conducting
economy, efficiency and effectiveness
audit.2 During the 1990s, all the ad-
vanced Commonwealth countries such
as Australia and New Zealand amended
their audit acts and made provision sim-
ilar to that of the UK, and made the CAG
an officer of Parliament with powers to
conduct an efficiency audit of govern-
ment operations. The US Government
Accountability Office since its inception
has been recognised as a legislative
branch agency and reports on a wide
variety of subjects from federal fiscal is-
sues and debt control to aviation security,
13
COMMENTARY
gun control and counterterrorism matters.
In continental countries such as France,
Germany, Italy, Austria and Belgium,
there is a system of audit courts, which
while performing functions of expendi-
ture control on behalf of Parliament,
enjoy wide powers and act like judicial
bodies. The French Cour des Comptes is
assisted by the prosecutor general res-
ponsible for providing legal advice, and
has power to recover improperly ex-
pended public funds or cash deficits
from defaulting officers.
Most democratic countries have a stat-
utory provision of securing Parliament’s
consent for appointment of the head of
the supreme audit institution (SAI). Not
only Commonwealth countries such as UK,
Canada and New Zealand, but countries
with such diverse political systems as
the US, Germany, Japan, South Korea,
South Africa and Thailand have this re-
quirement and the appointment of head
of SAI is ratified by their legislature. This
is in recognition of the fact that SAIs have
to do very delicate work, while comment-
ing on deeds and misdeeds of the govern-
ment, a task which they can perform
effectively only when they are given not
only independence from the executive
but parliamentary backing as well.
Because of the sensitive nature of the
work of public audit friction and tension
can arise with the government. Franz
Fiedler,3 secretary general of the Inter-
national Organisation of Supreme Audit
Institutions (INTOSAI) and president of
the Austrian Court of Audit observes,
Unlike the classical model of the constitutional
state with its traditional juxtaposition of Par-
liament and the government, the dividing line
in many modern parliamentary democracies
no longer runs between Parliament as a
whole and the government, but between the
parliamentary opposition, on the one hand,
and the government and the governing par-
ties on the other…The parliamentary groups
of the governing parties take an overriding
interest in keeping the government in power
and in expressing its solidarity with it, as the
political destiny of the governing parties and
their representatives is inseparably linked to
that of the government. Hence, it is no surprise
that members of Parliament representing the
governing parties rarely muster the courage to
support the criticism by the SAI, let alone use
of the arsenal of parliamentary instruments to
control and/or sanction the government.
Therefore, it remains primarily for the parlia-
mentary opposition to take up the reports of
14
the SAI and use the findings and the criticism
they contain as a weapon not only in parlia-
mentary debate, but also in the context of other
domestic policy issues. It goes without saying
that the opposition parties – just like the
governing parties with their opposing inter-
ests – are motivated by practical considerations
of party politics rather that declared interest in
government audit. Nevertheless, there is a
convergence of interests between government
audit and the parliamentary opposition.
Fiedler elucidates that criticism of
audit is unfounded as politicians react to
audit reports according to their party
affiliation. The situation often results in
confrontation between the parliamen-
tarians of the ruling party and the repre-
sentatives of SAI. “In many cases it is not
the audited body which has to justify the
behaviour it is blamed for, but the SAI
that has to defend its own criticism”.
The international practice regarding
SAIs and our own laws and precedents
makes it amply clear that the CAG has been
acting well within the parameter of his
duty as envisaged in the Constitution.
Much of the criticism about his role is
based on an inadequate appreciation of
his role in a fast changing economic en-
vironment, which requires greater vigi-
lance over governmental operations and
enhanced accountability over actions of
public functionaries for larger public good.
Unfortunately the issue has got politicised.
Sensing political advantage the leading
opposition party has upped the ante and
has demanded the prime minister’s resig-
nation and the government had to come
out with its defence. The statement of the
prime minister should therefore be under-
stood in the context of a political compul-
sion to defend the action of the govern-
ment. A desirable course of action would
have been to discuss the report in the PAC
as per established procedure and await
its outcome. The PAC is expected to work
objectively on non-party lines, free from
the passions of parliamentary debate.
As the present circumstances are un-
usual, it is the responsibility of the
government, its ministers and other senior
party functionaries not to denigrate the
CAG, as it may cause long-term damage
to an institution which is an integral
part of our parliamentary framework.
The CAG’s report would serve its pur-
pose, if attention is drawn to some criti-
cal policy issues, beyond malfeasance of
september 15, 2012
public functionaries – the role and con-
duct of private sector in infrastructure
development in areas such as coal ex-
ploration, electricity generation and air-
port development. Surely it cannot be the
intention of government to reduce the
role of Coal India, NTPC and other public
sector undertakings by not providing
them adequate support and level playing
ground. It must be recognised that there
is enough scope for both the public and
private sectors in the country’s economic
development in view of our vast infra-
structural needs. But should the private
sector be allowed to thrive and corner
valuable national resources at the cost of
public interest and the public exchequer?
Today, the situation that has emerged is
a typical case of “privatisation of profit
and nationalisation of loss”, to use econ-
omist J K Galbraith’s terminology.
It is no use casting aspersions on the CAG
for pointing his finger at omissions and
commissions of the government, what he
is expected to do, as a guardian of na-
tional finance. An attempt to undermine
the institution of CAG will dilute the gov-
ernment’s accountability to Parliament, a
fundamental principle on which our par-
liamentary democracy rests.
Notes
1 Report of the Comptroller and Auditor Gener-
al, Year 2011-12: Allocation of Coal Blocks and
Augmentation of Coal Production, Ministry of
Coal, Report No 7; Ultra Mega Power Projects
under Special Purpose Vehicle, Ministry of
Power, Report No 6; Implementation of Public
Private Partnership, Indira Gandhi Interna-
tional Airport, Delhi, Ministry of Civil Avia-
tion, No 5.
2 For the position and status of supreme audit
institution in various countries see: B P Mathur:
Government Accountability and Public Audit
(New Delhi: Uppal Publishing House), 2007,
and INTOSAI website.
3 Franz Fiedler, “The Independence of Supreme
Audit Institutions”; INTOSAI: 50 Years (1953-
2003).
Appointments/Programmes/
Announcemnents
For the convenience of readers and advertisers,
all adver tisements on appointments,
programmes, call for papers etc are now placed
together at the end of each issue every week.
This section is also listed in the Contents page
Advertisements for books are published as
before in the Book Review section.
vol xlviI no 37 EPW Economic & Political Weekly
PERSPECTIVES
A Tiger in the Drawing Room
Can Luxury Tourism Benefit Wildlife?
K Ullas Karanth, Krithi K Karanth
With decisions like the Supreme
Court’s interim order banning
tourism inside tiger sanctuaries
becoming inevitable in the
face of increasing political and
executive resistance to expansion
of protected nature reserves on
public land, the issue of tiger
tourism calls for a pragmatic
approach that can resolve
contradictions between the
burgeoning tourism demand and
the tiger’s shrinking habitats. A
“Tiger Habitat Expansion Model”,
based on a shared profit motive
between private landowners and
tourism entrepreneurs rather
than government intervention,
is one that can help the tourism
industry move towards a
sustainable growth model that
leverages its economic strength to
expand tiger habitats.
We are grateful to Mahesh Rangarajan, Shekar
Dattatri, Govardhan Rathore, Raghu Chundawat,
Joanna Van Gruisen and Ruth DeFries for useful
interactions on the subject. We acknowledge
the Wildlife Conservation Society, Centre for
Wildlife Studies, Columbia University and
Duke University for supporting our related work.
K Ullas Karanth (ukaranth@gmail.com) is with
the Centre for Wildlife Studies, Bangalore and
the Wildlife Conservation Society, USA.
Krithi K Karanth (krithi.karanth@gmail.com)
is with the Centre for Wildlife Studies,
Bangalore and the Nicholas School of
Environment, Duke University, USA.
38
T
he interim order of the Supreme
Court in Writ Petition 12351/2010
(Ajay Dubey vs the National Tiger
Conservation Authority) has triggered a
polarised debate between proponents
and opponents of tourism inside tiger
reserves. Coverage in public and social
media has convinced many that all wild-
life tourism has been banned forever in
India. And, this “total ban” will drive wild
tigers to extinction because: (1) tigers
survive only where tourists can protec-
tively watch over them, and (2) public
support, vital for tiger conservation,
would evaporate when “tiger tourism”
ends (Pidd 2012). The opposing view,
more prevalent in regional language
media, appears to be that tourism is the
biggest threat to wild tigers, and that
this court order is a panacea that will
provide wild tigers the space and peace
they need to survive. Allied to the latter
is a “rich versus poor” view where all
tourists are seen as the representative
elite who will take over forest tracts
from resident local users (Ghosh 2012).
Before exploring potential solutions,
we point out a few relevant facts. The
Supreme Court’s order (21339/2011) is
interim in nature, with the proponents
of divergent views having time to seek
remedial modifications. A subcommittee
of the National Tiger Conservation Au-
thority (NTCA), chaired by environmen-
talist Sunita Narain (who had also
chaired the prime minister’s Tiger Task
Force in 2005), recommended phasing
out all tourism away from notified “criti-
cal tiger habitats” towards “buffer zones”,
over the next five years. The Ministry of
Environment and Forests’ (MoEF) first
response in the Dubey case appeared to
be that tiger tourism should be a govern-
ment monopoly (MoEF 2012). In this
view, the role of private entrepreneurs
is limited. “Local people” are seen as
september 22, 2012
passive recipients of subsidies generated
by taxing rich tourists (Kiss 2004; Sand-
brook 2010). There appears to be no
clearly articulated concession even for
ordinary tourists (MoEF 2012). However,
the NTCA tried to modify its stand before
the Court on 22 August, moving closer to
the tourism industry’s position, allegedly
under political pressure. This earned it a
rebuke from the Court, as well as continued
suspension of tourism. From the Court’s
interim order, its basic intent appears to
be to make “recalcitrant states” declare
buffer zones around the notified critical
tiger habitats. Prima facie, this order
already appears to be forcing some states
to hasten notification of buffers, which
they have been slow to act on because of
local political pressures. Media coverage
has largely ignored the fact that wild-
life tourism continues unhindered in all
other wildlife sanctuaries, and even in
tiger reserves, which have notified buffer
areas. There are over 600 protected areas
in India of which only 43 are tiger
reserves, among which a handful of
well-known ones have been the foci of
the controversy, perhaps excessively so.
To portray this “interim order” as a per-
manent ban on all wildlife tourism in
India (Pidd 2012) is misleading.
It has been pointed out that the process
of notifying critical tiger habitats is not
ecologically justifiable, and is admini-
stratively flawed. While this argument
has an element of truth in some specific
cases, the same can be said of problems
with other conservation legislation crucial
for saving wildlife and forests. Such legal
initiatives range all the way from the
process of “Forest Reservation” initiated
in the 19th century to more recent laws
dealing with wildlife protection (in 1972),
forest conservation (in 1980) and environ-
mental protection (in 1984) (Rangarajan
2001). Incidentally, such contradictions
are embedded in the Forest Rights Act
(2006) also.
Litigation has become inevitable in
conservation mainly because elected
legislators, key state governments and to
an extent, even the Union, are turning
their backs on conservation all across the
country, regardless of party affiliations.
vol xlviI no 38 EPW Economic & Political Weekly

They are aggressively promoting com-
mercial as well as populist demands
on nature reserves. Courts intervene
through landmark cases, like the well-
known writ petition (WP 202/1995)
Godavarman Tirumulpad vs Union of
India: a case that led to the interim order
protecting “deemed forests” in 1996,
and constituting the Central Empowered
Committee (CEC) in 2002, buttressing
nature conservation in the face of increas-
ing political and executive resistance.
Retrospectively tunnelling through this
legal labyrinth is beyond the scope of
our essay. More importantly, such an
approach is unlikely to generate practi-
cal solutions to the current dilemma.
One can only hope that courts and
conser vationists will collectively find
the wisdom to cut through this knot
of contradictory laws. But the issues
demand more than stringent laws: they
call for effective practices that combine
sound ecological science with sensitivity
to local social contexts. Our approach
in this essay is pragmatic rather than
legalistic or moralistic. We find some
merit in arguments being put forth by
the “pro-tourism” as well as “anti-tourism”
groups. We rely on published data as
well as our empirical experiences to
suggest some long-term solutions.
How Important Is Tiger Tourism?
The tiger’s global range has shrunk by
93% in the last 150 years. About 1,500-
2,000 wild tigers now survive in India,
out of a globally estimated population of
3,000-4,000 (K U Karanth et al 2009;
Jhala et al 2011; Walston et al 2011). Wild
tigers occur locally in small “source pop-
ulations”, within five disjunct land-
scapes (Jhala et al 2011). Although there
is about 2,50,000 sq km of forest area
in which tigers could potentially live,
tiger populations at reasonable densities
that now breed surpluses occupy only 10%
of it. These source populations survive
primarily in wildlife sanctuaries and
national parks (K K Karanth et al 2009,
2010; Karanth et al 2011a). Even in most
of these source areas, tourists rarely
see tigers (Karanth and DeFries 2011;
Karanth et al 2012). Easy viewing by
tourists depends on availability of open
habitats and getting a few individual
Economic & Political Weekly EPW september 22, 2012
tigers habituated to tourists. Such “tiger
tourism” now occurs in about 2,500 sq km
area, mainly in a few high profile reserves
such as Ranthambore, Bandavgarh and
Kanha. Thus, tiger tourism covers less
than 1% of all potential tiger habitat
(Karanth et al 2010; Karanth and DeFries
2011). Therefore, from a countrywide
spatial perspective, tiger tourism has an
impact on a limited area. Clearly, ex-
pansion of tiger “source population are-
as” is urgently needed, but the reality is
that there is increasing political resist-
ance to expansion of strictly protected
nature reserves on public land.
Has tiger tourism contributed to the
recovery of wild tigers in India as often
claimed by its proponents? Tigers were
recovered from the brink of virtual extinc-
tion in the 1970s, following establishment
of strictly protected wildlife reserves.
This effort was almost entirely the handi-
work of the forest department’s staff,
and middle-class conservationists who
generated public support for them from
outside. All of this was made possible
only with strong support from the apex
of the political system as well as state
government leaderships, a point not con-
tested even by critics of “the top-down
model” (Rangarajan 2001; Saberwal and
Rangarajan 2003). Conservation may
have been from above, but it worked
and tourism had little to do with it;
public action legitimised by a sense of
ecological nationalism and regional pride
did. On the other hand, high-end tiger
tourism emerged two decades after tiger
recovery, and its most explosive growth
has occurred only in the last decade
(Karanth and DeFries 2011). Therefore,
suspension (or even termination) of tiger
tourism will not doom tigers to extinction
as has been portrayed (Pidd 2012). The
historical and spatial analyses we have
presented above do not support such a
conclusion. Undeniably, within this limited
spatial scale, high-end tiger tourism helps
generate profits, local businesses, jobs,
and additional government revenues
(Balmford et al 2009; Karanth and
DeFries 2011). It also enables some better-
off citizens to actually see wild tigers. Its
economic impact, however, is limited in
the context of national or even local
economies (Karanth and DeFries 2011).
vol xlviI no 38
PERSPECTIVES
However, tourism is not the greatest
threat now facing tigers as it is some-
times made out to be. Several far more
important factors affect the tiger’s fate
in India. These include: depletion of wild
ungulate prey by local hunters across all
habitats that can potentially support
wild tigers; illegal killing of tigers in sur-
viving source populations by criminal
gangs (often traditional hunting com-
munities) to serve the massive illegal
wildlife trade; degradation of tiger habi-
tat from a variety of rural pressures such
as land encroachment (sometimes facili-
tated by the misapplication of the Forest
Rights Act), cattle grazing, arson, forest-
product collection, as well as from the
impacts of developmental activities such
as mines, dams, roads and other intru-
sions (Karanth et al 2004; Das et al 2006;
Karanth and DeFries 2010). Of increas-
ing concern is the needless habitat
damage from the forest department’s
management actions and mission-drift
(Gubbi 2010), which, in turn, are fuelled
by excessive funding of some tiger
reserves. A key long-term requirement,
incentive-driven voluntary relocation of
settlements from key tiger habitats is of-
ten not handled with the necessary sen-
sitivity (Shahabuddin and Rangarajan
2007), although good examples exist,
too (Karanth 2007).
In this overall context, we pick up
a few pertinent threads from the ongo-
ing debate to suggest approaches to
resolve contradictions between needs
of the burgeoning tourism demand and
the tiger’s shrinking habitats in India,
in a manner that could potentially
benefit both.
From Conservation to Profits
While luxury tourism is certainly not a
primary threat to tigers, it is necessary
to recognise that its pressures are inten-
sifying around important tiger source
populations, as well as spreading to
new areas virtually uncontrolled. This
growth of tiger tourism is fuelled by
macroeconomic factors, such as rising
disposable incomes in affluent social
classes, advertising campaigns that fuel
an obsession to “see wild tigers”, and
businesses that exploit these opportunities
(Karanth and DeFries 2011; Karanth et al
39
PERSPECTIVES
2012). The following consequences of
these trends are clear:
(1) Since the total area covered by tiger
tourism within individual tiger reserves
has not increased, its intensification has
led to greater levels of disturbance, habitat
damage by roads, riding elephants and
vehicle tracks, excessive water source
development, and other construction.
Serious regulation and reduction in
tourism intensity is urgently needed at
many high-profile tiger tourism sites.
Sensible “zoning” of protected areas for
regulated tourist movement based on
prioritised booking of visitors, rather
than on a “walk-in” basis, is a critical
need at many sites.
(2) The burgeoning sprawl of tourist
residential facilities, even deep inside tiger
reserves and dispersal corridors just out-
side them, also poses a problem (DeFries
et al 2010). Such proliferation, often in-
cluding swimming pools, spas, fountains,
etc, does lead to depletion of resources:
fuel wood for “campfires”, impoundment
and diversion of natural streams, litter-
ing, noise and disruption of animal
movement by fencing, and a host of oth-
er impacts (DeFries et al 2010; Karanth
and DeFries 2011; Karanth and Nepal
2012). Although most new residential
construction occurs on private land, in
some cases even publicly-owned lands
(that clearly qualify as “deemed forests”)
are being affected (Forest Advisory
Committee 2011). In fact, the guidelines
of the NTCA, by arguing for recycling of
water, solar panels and low impact ven-
tilation (no air conditioners), make good
sense (MOEF 2012).
(3) In many wildlife reserves, vigorous
pursuit of the high-end tourism model,
even by government enterprises, has
driven up costs of visitation and residence
beyond the reach of less affluent citizens.
The direct employment of locals gener-
ated by tourism is, at present, relatively
negligible when compared to the size of
populations that live around reserves
(Karanth and DeFries 2011). The counter-
claim, that the “trickle down” effect exists
and contributes to local economies, re-
mains unsubstantiated in India so far
(there is some support for these economic
benefits in countries such as Uganda and
Nepal; for contrasting evidence see
40
Archabald and Naughton 2001; Book-
binder et al 1998; He et al 2008; Spiteri
and Nepal 2008; Sandbrook 2010).
The middle-class tourists and students,
who are supposed to form the backbone
of Indian conservation efforts, are, in
fact, being squeezed out to make room
for visitors with deeper pockets (Karanth
and Nepal 2012; Karanth et al 2012).
This fundamental shift in the purpose
of wildlife tourism in India, from
“conservation education” to “maximising
profits”, has crept in insidiously. This
happens most often under the guise of
innovative African models of tourism,
with little awareness of the alienation
it has bred locally. We believe such a
shift in core values is likely to decrease
support for conservation among non-
affluent tourists specifically, and local
communities generally (King and Stewart
1996; Stem et al 2003; Kiss 2004; Karanth
and Nepal 2012).
This point was made most recently by
the Elephant Task Force, which in its
report of August 2010 argued strongly for
local clubs, priority access to district school
and college students and youth. Free ac-
cess on weekends, dedicated education
teams and close contact with those who
work in local languages on nature were
seen as essential (Rangarajan et al 2010).
Such initiatives have been attempted
only in a few locations by some officials,
but remain the core of any future effort
to create, sustain and expand local con-
stituencies for conservation. Furthermore,
while curbs on rural impacts from cattle
grazing and forest-product collection
are necessary to sustain recovery of
wildlife populations, there is a real
danger that rural people so denied access
will view tiger tourism as an unfair en-
couragement of rich tourists (Soto 2001;
Sekhar 2003; Spiteri and Nepal 2008;
Karanth and Nepal 2012). While it is
true that negative impacts of consump-
tive rural uses can be more severe than
non-consumptive wildlife viewing, this
subtle truth may be obscured in the face
of rural hostility.
With legislators across the country
now aggressively united in undermining
current conservation laws, such a poten-
tial loss of local social support will be
a serious problem. We find it ironic
september 22, 2012
that supporters of high-end tourism,
who are blaming the interim order of
the Supreme Court for eroding public
support for tigers, have failed to notice
how it is gradually squeezing out ordi-
nary citizens from our nature reserves.
We believe all these issues related to
“tiger tourism” need innovative solu-
tions based on science and pragmatism,
rather than just emotion and good
intent. Unfortunately, the present debate
has not thrown up much careful analy-
sis or practical solutions sustainable in
the long run.
Tiger in the Drawing Room
Tiger tourism’s opponents propose two
solutions: (1) banning it totally, or banish-
ing it to the buffer zones, and (2) effec-
tively nationalising tiger tourism by mak-
ing it a forest department monopoly. A
variant of both these positions seems to
underlie the Ministry of Environment and
Forests’ position (MOEF 2012). Karnataka,
for example, has virtually nationalised
tourist-viewing of wildlife in tiger reserves.
Clearly, the bureaucracy is being oblivi-
ous to the legitimate role of other con-
stituencies and economic forces. We be-
lieve efforts to simply banish tourism will
meet the same fate as other pious but
futile gestures of the past, such as ban-
ning liquor, promoting handspun cloth,
etc. Indeed, there are already examples
of illegal proliferation of luxury tourism
under local political patronage in many
places (Vinaya 2012; Mazoomdaar 2012).
We cannot ignore the basic fact that
India’s rapid economic growth has gen-
erated large disposable incomes that are
now flowing towards nature reserves in
the form of high-end tourism. While
short-term profit maximisation may be
driving it, we need to acknowledge that
this constituency also has a vested interest
in having protected wildlife populations.
Thus, unlike with other industrial or
rural claimants on natural resources from
tiger habitats, in the long run, the tourism
industry’s interests overlap with goals of
tiger conservation. We are also not in
favour of viewing the “profit seeking
private enterprise” as a social sin that
should have no role in wildlife conserva-
tion (Robinson 2012). If privatisation has
been the driving force of India’s economic
vol xlviI no 38 EPW Economic & Political Weekly

trajectory for two decades, what is the
logic in excluding it by government dik-
tat from the wildlife tourism sector?
Instead, we propose that tiger tourism
be regulated, reinvented and its economic
power harnessed to expand tiger habitats
and augment tiger conservation, instead
of being largely a nuisance and bane, as
it is at present.
Exploring Alternatives
To be viable demographically, a tiger
source population must harbour at least 25
breeding females (about 100 tigers, includ-
ing adults, juveniles and cubs; Karanth
and Stith 1999). Except for tiger popula-
tions in a few areas such as Bandipur-
Nagarahole, Kanha-Pench, Corbett-Rajaji,
Kaziranga-Orang, and possibly the Sundar-
bans, most populations in India are
well below this threshold of viability
(Karanth et al 2004; Karanth et al 2011b).
Given the ecologically essential 1:500
tiger to prey ratio (Karanth et al 2004),
a major concern is that even tiger popu-
lations below viability levels are already
at saturation densities. They can be
viable in the long term only if their
connectivity to other populations can
be achieved. The critical conservation
need now is to ecologically reorient tiger
tourism to contribute towards expanding
tiger habitats rather than fragmenting
them further.
Realistically, such profit-driven expan-
sion of wildlife habitat can occur either
on limited public lands adjoining tiger
reserves, or on more abundant private
agricultural land. Although attempts
should be made to expand tiger habitats
on such public lands as well, how feasi-
ble is this? Public lands administered by
deputy commissioners or collectors are
often heavily overused, or at least eagerly
coveted by many local groups ranging
from cultivators, miners, resort owners
and others, either hoping to establish
ownership or rent them at low cost.
Sporadic success has been achieved in
getting such lands notified as buffer
zones of nature reserves (under the
Wildlife Protection Act) or ecologically
sensitive areas (under the Environmental
Protection Act). Practically, however, the
scope for regulating human uses suffi-
ciently to enable such lands to support
Economic & Political Weekly EPW september 22, 2012
prey populations and tiger viewing ap-
pears rather limited.
Reserved forests adjacent to tiger
reserves, which are managed by the forest
department, also offer some scope for
future protection and habitat recovery.
But to achieve such recovery to levels
appropriate for wildlife viewing will
require drastic curbs on current uses and
dependencies. The resistance from present
users and claimants of multiple-use lands,
who are likely to view this as “privatising
the commons”, would be significant.
Corporate tourism groups may have the
capacity to take over, enclose, and guard
large areas of public revenue land. Yet,
even these schemes are unlikely to make
headway, because they will be perceived
as encroachers on public domain. The
controversial issues around land acquisi-
tion by the government would reappear,
but in a far more polarising way. Also, it
is as yet unproven if any corporate
group in India has the capacity for long-
term management of wildlife. The closest
examples were the princely hunting
reserves in colonial times, a model un-
likely to find favour again in a modern,
democratic society.
There have been small-scale successes
in Nepal, where community land next to
Chitwan National Park attracts suffi-
cient wildlife to make tourism practical.
A 50:50 revenue sharing model has
expanded the area by a few square kilo-
metres for rhinoceros (Bookbinder et al
1998; Dinerstein 2003). This may be a
model worth exploring in parts of India
where elected local bodies control large
tracts of public land. However, given the
reality that panchayati raj institutions in
India do not have a satisfactory record of
natural resource management generally,
this model is worth trying only in areas
where ecological opportunities exist and
such institutions are robust.
The Tiger Habitat Expansion Model
Overall, the most obvious land-base for
future large-scale expansion of tiger
habitats exists on privately-owned agri-
cultural land adjacent to reserves that
now hold tiger source populations at
reasonable densities. Further, scientific
studies show that these populations,
even while maintaining high densities of
vol xlviI no 38
PERSPECTIVES
10-15 tigers/100 sq km, are losing about
20% of individuals each year from mor-
talities and dispersal (Karanth et al
2006). If their boundaries were to be ex-
panded outwards, some of the surpluses
now being lost can rapidly occupy such
space. Given relatively high tiger densities,
large annual losses, and wide-ranging
behaviour of tigers, converting land from
agriculture to wildlife viewing can be
rapid. This holds the key to leveraging the
economic power of the tourism industry.
This idea rests on promoting the eco-
nomic self-interest of landowners and
the tourism industry, using private en-
terprise rather than government inter-
vention. Under this Tiger Habitat Expan-
sion Model (THEM) individual farmers
leave land uncultivated to earn more
from a hectare of land from tourism, as
compared to agriculture. We are not
aware of any serious economic analysis
of the proposed model by the tourism
industry. Recent research by Karanth
et al (2012) suggests that high-end tourists
do value such opportunity to see tigers,
and are willing to pay even higher fees.
However, they are unsatisfied with the
current quality of tourism experience.
The key element in our proposed model
for inducing the desired land use change
is not “coercive government diktat” or
even “goodwill for the tiger”; it is a
shared profit motive between landown-
ers and tourism entrepreneurs.
Comparable models of wildlife tour-
ism generating profits on private lands
exist in other countries in Africa and
Latin America (Kiss 2004; Naidoo and
Adamowicz 2005; Balmford et al 2009;
Sandbrook 2010). However, there are
major differences in context. The average
individual holding is not a 1,000 hectare
poor quality bush ranch here, but two
hectares of highly productive agriculture.
Given the human demographics (364
persons/sq km in India versus 42 per-
sons/sq km in South Africa or 23 per-
sons/sq km in Brazil), implementing the
model of public reserves ringed by
private nature reserves or cooperatively
managed public lands for conservation
will be vastly more complicated in India.
However, India does enjoy a unique
advantage compared to Africa: much
greater traditional cultural tolerance for
41
PERSPECTIVES

presence of wildlife in the proximity of
human settlements (Karanth et al 2010;
Athreya et al 2011; Karanth and Nepal
2012). Other potential advantages include:
(1) an ongoing demographic shift to non-
agricultural sectors, (2) increasing non-
viability of agriculture in many non-op-
timal situations, (3) culturally loosened
ties to the land among rural people with
a preference for urban jobs, (4) reduced
demand for draught cattle and pastures
following mechanisation of farming and
transport, and (5) higher levels of skills
and education (United Nations 2011).
The decline in the rural labour force is
often masked in larger studies, but has
been pointed out by Gupta (2010) where
he shows that only 45% of the labour
force is now reliant on agriculture. The
new National Sample Survey data also
shows a shift from agriculture of 15 mil-
lion since 2004 (Raghavan 2012). While
these phenomena vary across regions,
there is reason to believe that many
parts of India are witnessing a reduced
dependence on agricultural land.
We are not suggesting that THEM will
be simple to formulate or implement in
India. However, there are many durable
examples of Indian corporate sector’s
engagement with farmers on a mutually
profitable basis. Companies that deal with
agricultural products such as tobacco,
coffee, tea, rubber, bamboo, softwoods,
and export-quality flowers or vegetables
have built up long-term business relation-
ships with individual landholders and
incentivised them to achieve the desired
land use changes. In fact, skills and
patience necessary to implement our
THEM may lie with these agro-corporates,
rather than in the tourism industry, whose
genetic need for instant gratification
comes from the hospitality industry. With
the right policy and legislative interven-
tions from the government, it may be
possible to empirically test high-end
tourism projects that generate profits at
the right spatial and economic scales
under circumstances that work for both
the industry and landowners.
Given the growth in disposable in-
comes and tourism demands in India,
we believe the wildlife tourism industry
cannot be sustainably scaled up to meet
these, if it continues to ignore the long-
term challenge of expanding our nature
reserves outwards. Also, this is the only
way by which regulated tourism afford-
able to ordinary citizens can exist in public
nature reserves, while high-end tourism
thrives in surrounding private lands. If
the THEM can be made to work, as the
market demand for high-end tourism
increases with India’s economic growth,
the extent of habitat for tigers and other
wildlife would also expand to keep pace.
Such a “mixed economy” model will be
fully compatible with the broad path of
development chosen by virtually all gov-
ernments in the states and the centre for
the last two decades.

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42 september 22, 2012 vol xlviI no 38 EPW Economic & Political Weekly

The practitioners in the high-end
wildlife tourism industry have simply
watched from the sidelines, as the gov-
ernment and the conservationists have
struggled for the last two decades – how-
ever imperfectly – to recover tiger popu-
lations. They have only descended there-
after, and profited from the tigers with
no risk or involvement in the recovery
efforts. Public criticism or even long-
term self-interest, has failed to sway this
industry from its single-minded pursuit
of short-term profits.
We believe tiger conservationists with
expertise in wildlife tourism, public sec-
tor wildlife tourism companies, and cor-
porates with experience in both tourism
and agricultural businesses can play a
leveraging role in inspiring such an
enlightened vision and leadership in the
wildlife industry as a whole. Merely
critiquing the government policies, the
courts, or praising the largely imaginary
contributions of tourism to tiger conser-
vation will help neither tigers nor tourism
in the long run. We hope the present
Supreme Court case will catalyse the
tourism industry and nudge it towards a
sustainable growth model that leverages
its economic strength to expand tiger
habitats. That is the only way we can get
this tiger out of the drawing room.
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Athreya, V, M Odden, J D Linnell and K U Karanth
(2011): “Translocation as a Tool for Mitigating
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43
EDITORIALS
A ‘Twisted’ Health Scheme
State health insurance schemes are being abused to profit private care providers.
T
he “uterus removal scams” in Chhattisgarh and Bihar
that came to light recently are a textbook case of how
government welfare schemes, supposedly meant for the
poor, end up harming them when there are no monitoring
and accountability mechanisms in place. Under the Rashtriya
Swasthya Bima Yojana (RSBY or the National Health Insurance
Scheme), families living below the poverty line (BPL) can claim
insurance of up to Rs 30,000 for treatment. This provision was
misused by private doctors to remove the uteruses of 16,765
women in 11 districts of Bihar in the last two years and 1,800
hysterectomies were performed in Chhattisgarh. According to
preliminary reports from district magistrates, a majority of
these surgeries were not required; both state governments have
ordered further probes into the surgeries. In 2010, a similar
racket came to light in Andhra Pradesh when health activists
reported (and the government admitted) that unnecessary
hysterectomies were being performed on a massive scale to
gain insurance money under the state health insurance scheme,
Arogyasri. In fact, these rackets are a result of the coming to-
gether of many aspects that plague the Indian health system,
both public and private. (In Bihar and Chhattisgarh all the
surgeries were performed in private hospitals.)
Many of the women questioned by the media and health
activists said that they were forced to go to private clinics
because the government healthcare centres did not treat them.
Whether this was because the government centres could not or
would not treat them requires further investigation, but in either
case this shows that women’s gynaecological problems are not
considered important enough in the provision of primary
healthcare. In any case, a hysterectomy is the last resort when
other forms of medication, therapies and less invasive surgeries
have failed or would be ineffective to treat the conditions. The
removal of the uterus not only means that the woman will not
8 september 22, 2012
be able to reproduce but when accompanied by the removal of
ovaries, it also leads to hormonal changes that can severely
affect her health and quality of life. Medical literature is replete
with the physical and psychological side-effects of this surgery.
A large number of the women subjected to these surgeries in the
three states are below 40, with some of them being in their late
teens and early 20s. The enormity of the toll such an operation
will take on the health of many of these women, who are poor,
undernourished and have to work in brutally hard conditions,
cannot perhaps even be imagined.
The issue here is not just the fact of these surgeries but that they
were conducted under the RSBY scheme. This has to be more
closely scrutinised. Media reports and the findings by health
activists suggest that a large number of the registered clinics
are not owned by qualified medical practitioners and are also
not well-equipped. The examples of Chhattisgarh and Bihar
show how lax is government oversight on the health sector.
As far as the role of the surgeons involved in these scams is
concerned, it is the responsibility of medical associations to
ensure that their fraternity adheres to medical ethics. The
doctors in Chhattisgarh threatened to go on strike saying that
all of them are being tarred by the same brush and hounded by
the authorities. There was a similar situation in Maharashtra
when the crackdown on sex-selective abortions began in Beed
and Yavatmal districts a few months ago. The doctors’ repre-
sentatives said that their members were “scared” to perform
even medically required pregnancy terminations in the face of
“harassment” from the authorities. If upright doctors are indeed
being persecuted by the authorities, their professional associa-
tions are all the more obliged to treat this as a priority issue.
The hysterectomy scams in Chhattisgarh and Bihar should
serve as a wake-up call about problems in our public health
policies and their dire consequences.
vol xlviI no 38 EPW Economic & Political Weekly
DISCUSSION
Child Sex Ratio and Sex Selection
Old Fallacies in New Bottles
Jean Drèze
Two comments point out
fundamental flaws in the article
“Declining Child Sex Ratio
and Sex-Selection in India”
(EPW, 18 August 2012), which
tried to demonstrate that stopping
rules can affect the sex ratio and
that sex-selective abortions do not
influence the child sex ratio.
I am grateful to Diane Coffey, Aashish Gupta,
Srinivas Goli and Reetika Khera for helpful
comments.
Jean Dreze (jaandaraz@gmail.com) is at the
department of economics, Allahabad University.
Economic & Political Weekly EPW
I
n an otherwise scholarly article
(“Declining Child Sex Ratio and Sex-
Selection in India”, EPW, 18 August
2012), Shahid Perwez, Roger Jeffery and
Patricia Jeffery – hereafter PJJ – fall into
the trap of assuming that stopping rules
affect the sex ratio at birth in the popu-
lation. Misled by this common fallacy,
the authors present a rather confused
and confusing analysis of the problem of
declining child sex ratio in India.
Three aspects of this confusion are
briefly discussed below. To keep things
simple, I ignore female infanticide and
gender differentials in child mortality –
their influence on the child sex ratio is
relatively well understood.1
Child Sex Ratio
and Sex-selective Abortion
PJJ’s most startling claim is that the
decline of the child sex ratio (CSR, un-
derstood as a female-male ratio) in In-
dia may not have much to do with sex-
selective abortion. In fact, the authors
go further: “We shall demonstrate that
the assumed association between sex-
selective abortion… and masculine CSRs
is not only theoretically flawed, but
also empirically unproven” (p 73). One
is at a loss to find any evidence of this
“demonstration” in the paper. On care-
ful reading, the argument appears to be
something like this.
The authors present some evidence
suggesting that the ratio of girls to boys
is often relatively high in families that
practise sex-selective abortion. This is
perfectly plausible. Indeed, the probability
of a female foetus being aborted may
well be relatively high if the concerned
family already has many daughters. But
according to PJJ, this leads to a “paradox”
(p 73): “how can sex-selective abortion…
account for a decline in the CSR when
families practising them had already
september 22, 2012 vol xlviI no 38
contributed more girls than boys in a
given population?” This alleged paradox
seems to be the basis of their dismissal
of the “assumed association” between
sex-selective abortion and masculine
CSRs in India.
This argument does not make sense. It
is a little bit like saying that deporting
foreigners would not reduce the propor-
tion of foreigners in the national popula-
tion as long as the deportations happen
in cities that have a high density of for-
eigners (so that they “contribute” more
than their share of foreigners even after
deporting some of them). Sex-selective
abortion (of female foetuses) drives
down the female-male ratio at birth,
irrespective of where it takes place in
the population. Any female foeticide
contributes to the problem of “missing
girls”, whether it is preceded by a female
birth or a male birth in the same family.
The authors’ lack of clarity on this
seems to derive from their tendency to
think of the sex ratio at birth as some sort
of decision variable (integrally related
to other aspects of family planning), as
explained below.
CSR and Stopping Rules
Having allegedly debunked the “prevailing
understanding of the reasons behind
a declining child sex ratio” (p 73), PJJ
present an “alternative explanation” (p 75).
This explanation builds mainly on the
idea that stopping rules affect the sex ratio
at birth in the population (independ-
ently of sex-selective abortion). This is
– with minor qualifications – incorrect.
Indeed, the sex ratio at birth in the
population is simply Bf/Bm, where Bf and
Bm are the numbers of female and male
births, respectively. Now, if p is the bio-
logical probability of a given birth being
female (in the absence of sex-selective
abortion), then, by the law of large
numbers, in a large population Bf ≃ p.B
and Bm ≃ (1-p).B, where B is the total
number of births. Thus, for practical
purposes, the sex ratio at birth is simply
p/(1-p). No stopping rule can affect this
– at least not unless some other factor,
such as sex-selective abortion, is brought
into the picture.
97
DISCUSSION
One minor qualification is due. If the
biological probability of a birth being
female (p) varies in the population, and
is correlated – for some reason – with
stopping rules, then stopping rules could
possibly have an influence on the sex
ratio at birth. But this is not the argument
invoked by PJJ, and nor is it likely to
have an important bearing on the recent
decline of CSRs in India.2
It is surprising that the authors made
the mistake of assuming that stopping
rules affect the sex ratio at birth in the
population even after citing scientific
papers that formally demonstrate the
point made in the preceding paragraphs.
For instance (p 76, emphasis added): “Two
studies suggest that the male-preferring
stopping behaviour of a couple affects the
sex ratio only if the population of such
couples is heterogeneous regarding the
probability of having a boy…; if the pop-
ulation of such couples is homogeneous
regarding the probability of having a boy,
the stopping behaviour would not affect the
sex ratio (Goodman 1961; Weiler 1959)”.
Even more puzzling is the next sentence
in PJJ (p 76): “Likewise [sic], Keyfitz (1968)
showed that couples using male-prefer-
ring stopping behaviour tend to produce
large proportions of boys in a given popu-
lation”. The word “likewise” is quite a
brain-teaser, because PJJ’s rendering of
what Keyfitz “showed” is the opposite of
what the two other studies (Goodman
and Weiler) “suggest”. But this rendering,
as it happens, is itself the opposite of what
Keyfitz actually said! Indeed, Keyfitz
could not have been clearer in his state-
ment that stopping rules do not affect
the sex ratio at birth: “…as long as having
children meets the conditions of a fair
gambling game, parents cannot alter the
chances of winning boys by choosing their
time of entering and leaving” (Keyfitz
1968: 383).3 Thus, as it turns out, Keyfitz
is indeed on the same page as Goodman
and Weiler – they are unanimous in con-
tradicting PJJ’s view of stopping rules.
CSR and Fertility Decline
What a stopping rule can certainly affect
is the relationship between CSR and
family size.4 For instance, it is easy to
show that if parents stop having children
as soon as they have a boy, then larger
98
families will tend to have a more feminine
CSR. As the authors correctly note (p 76),
there is indeed some evidence of a posi-
tive relation between family size and the
female-male ratio among children in
India. This observation, however, leads
them to another non sequitur: they infer
that reduced fertility is likely to reduce
the female-male ratio among children.5
This is superficially plausible: if larger
families have a higher CSR, then surely,
when family size declines, the CSR will
go down? That this is, in fact, not the
case, follows from the argument of the
previous section. Whatever the stopping
rules, fertility rate, family size, and so
on, the sex ratio at birth in a large popu-
lation (in the absence of sex-selective
abortion) is still p/(1-p).6
To see the fallacy, consider again the
example where parents stop having chil-
dren as soon as they have a boy. In this
population, the CSR in (completed) single-
child families will be zero – all these
families have a single son. Now, suppose
that all the parents in the population
change their mind and decide to have
just one child, whether it is a boy or a girl.
After this fertility transition is completed,
will the female-male ratio in single-child
families still be zero? Not at all – it will
be p/(1-p). And the CSR in the entire pop-
ulation will be p/(1-p) both before and
after the fertility transition.
Conclusion
This is just a sample of the mistakes and
inaccuracies that pepper PJJ’s paper. Far
from challenging the “prevailing under-
standing” of the recent decline of the
child sex ratio in India and establishing
the need for an alternative approach,
this article is mainly a useful warning of
the perils of trying to reinvent the wheel.
Notes
1 Accordingly, the terms “sex ratio at birth” and
“child sex ratio” are used more or less inter-
changeably in this note.
2 The authors do suggest (p 76) that the probability
of a female birth may vary depending on various
factors such as maternal nutrition, smoking, hor-
monal factors, and so on; but there is no obvious
reason for any of these factors to be correlated
with stopping rules, and nor do the authors dis-
cuss this possible connection. On the conse-
quences of various stopping rules when the prob-
ability of a female birth varies in the population,
see, e g, Ellis (2008) and the literature cited there.
3 Similarly Clark (2000), also cited by PJJ, states
very clearly: “… the effect of son preference on sex
september 22, 2012
composition is undetectable in national estimates
that aggregate across different parities” (p 106).
4 Stopping rules can also affect other demographic
patterns, including some that involve the sex ratio
at birth. For instance, they can obviously affect
the sex ratio among last-born children, as the
authors mention (p 76) with reference to Nepal.
5 “These data also suggest that the sex ratio of
living children is more adverse to girls in small-
er families. It is plausible, therefore, that the
squeeze on family size might be a major con-
tributor to changing CSRs even in the absence of
sex-selective abortion or female infanticide”
(PJJ, p 76, emphasis in the original).
6 Here again, a minor qualification applies: if p
varies in the population and is correlated with
family size, then family size could affect the
sex ratio at birth. But this is not the point being
discussed by PJJ, and nor does it have any obvi-
ous relevance to the CSR decline in India.
References
Clark, Shelley (2000): “Son Preference and Sex
Composition of Children: Evidence from India”,
Demography, 37(1).
Ellis, Jas (2008): “Son Preference and Sex Ratios”,
mimeo, DESTIN, London School of Economics,
(http://www.umb.no/statisk/ncde-2009/jas_
ellis.pdf).
Goodman, L A (1961): “Some Possible Effects of
Birth Control on the Human Sex Ratio”, Annals
of Human Genetics, 25(1).
Keyfitz, Nathan (1968): Introduction to the Mathe-
matics of Population (Reading: Addison-Wesley).
Perwez, S, R Jeffery and P Jeffery (2012): “Declin-
ing Child Sex Ratio and Sex Selection in India:
A Demographic Epiphany?”, Economic & Politi-
cal Weekly, 18 August.
Weiler, H (1959): “Sex Ratio and Birth Control”,
American Journal of Sociology, 65(3).
Survey
August 11, 2012
Econophysics: An Emerging Discipline
by
Sitabhra Sinha, Bikas K Chakrabarti
Contemporary mainstream economics has
become concerned less with describing reality
than with an idealised version of the world.
However, reality refuses to bend to the desire
for theoretical elegance that an economist
demands from his model. Modelling itself
on mathematics, mainstream economics is
primarily deductive and based on axiomatic
foundations. Econophysics seeks to be inductive,
to be an empirically founded science based on
observations, with the tools of mathematics and
logic used to identify and establish relations
among these observations. Econophysics
does not strive to reinterpret empirical data
to conform to a theorist’s expectations, but
describes the mechanisms by which economic
systems actually evolve over time.
For copies write to:
Circulation Manager,
Economic and Political Weekly,
320-321, A to Z Industrial Estate,
Ganpatrao Kadam Marg, Lower Parel,
Mumbai 400 013.
email: circulation@epw.in
vol xlviI no 38 EPW Economic & Political Weekly

An Argument without Any Basis
Anand Shrivastava
T
he key message of the article
“Declining Child Sex Ratio and Sex-
Selection in India: A Demographic
Epiphany” by Shahid Perwez, Roger Jeffery
and Patricia Jeffery (EPW, 18 August 2012)
is that the skewed child sex ratio observed
in our country may not have resulted
primarily from sex-selective abortions
and that biased family planning, where
families stop having children after having
one or two male children (referred to as
differential stopping rule behaviour), is a
major factor that needs to be addressed.
I agree that a shift from an excessive focus
on sex-selective abortions as the cause of
an increasingly masculine child sex ratio
to a more multi-causal approach, which
includes female infanticide and neglect of
the girl child, is required. However, the
argument that the role of sex-selective
abortions in skewing the child sex ratio
is doubtful and that differential stopping
rule behaviour is a primary cause, does
not have any basis.
One of the articles that the authors
refer to has already addressed the fallacy
in the second part of the argument. Weiler
(1959) describes as “fallacious” the argu-
ment that “If families continued produc-
ing offspring when a girl is born but used
birth control to stop production once a
boy is born, the ultimate result would be
that the number of males born would be
greater than expected under uncontrolled
conditions”. He then goes on to provide a
rigorous mathematical proof of the fallacy
in his paper, which I will attempt to
describe through a simple example.
The main contentions of the article are
(1) Families with more daughters are
more likely to indulge in sex-selective
abortions. (2) Hence, the families which
do indulge in sex-selective abortions have
a more feminine within-family child sex
ratio. (3) Hence, they cannot be respon-
sible for the overall masculine child-sex
ratio. (4) It is the families that stop re-
producing after having boys, thus having
a more masculine within-family child sex
ratio, who are responsible.
Economic & Political Weekly EPW september 22, 2012
Point 2 follows from (1) without doubt.
However, the jump from argument (2) to
argument (3) is very problematic and ar-
gument (4) is just wrong, as is explained
in the following example.
Let us consider an artificial society
where the probability of having a girl
child is 0.5 and the society practises the
rule that a family keeps having children
until it has its first boy. A sample of two
families would probably look like
(1) B
(2) GB
The sex ratio is equivalent to 500 girls
to a 1,000 boys. The author’s logic seems
right. What happens if we take a sample
of eight families?
(1) B (5) GB
(2) B (6) GB
(3) B (7) GGB
(4) B (8) GGGB
The sex ratio here is 875.
For 16 families?
(1) B (5) B (9) GB (13) GB
(2) B (6) B (10) GB (14) GGB
(3) B (7) B (11) GB (15) GGGB
(4) B (8) B (12) GB (16) GGGGB
The sex ratio is 937.5. I think it is clear
that in samples like these, the number of
girls will always be one less than the
number of boys. In a large sample of
families, the sex ratio will tend towards
the natural sex ratio, which in this case
would be 1,000. A similar trend will
emerge even if we consider more compli-
cated rules. For instance, families have
at least two children, regardless of their
sex. They stop at two children unless
both are girls, in which case they con-
tinue having children until they have a
boy. This is not to say that such behav-
iour is acceptable. Reprehensible as it
may be, this behaviour just does not
cause skewing of the child sex ratio.
This can also be understood as a very
simple statistical argument: As long as
each birth is an independent event with
a constant probability of having a girl,
the decisions of families on when to stop
reproducing have absolutely no effect on
vol xlviI no 38
DISCUSSION
the proportion of girls in the new-born
population which will always be distrib-
uted around a mean equal to that fixed
probability. Hence, differential stopping
rule behaviour does not lead to skewed
child sex ratios.
Now let us introduce sex-selective
abortion into this society. Families whose
first two children are daughters abort girl
foetuses until they get a boy. Therefore,
families 15 and 16 in the sample above
will indulge in this practice and the sample
would look like this.
(1) B (5) B (9) GB (13) GGB
(2) B (6) B (10) GB (14) GGB
(3) B (7) B (11) GB (15) GGGB
(4) B (8) B (12) GB (16) GGGGB
The sex ratio reduces from 937.5 to
750 because of sex-selective abortions.
Let us look at the within-family sex
ratios. The families which indulged in sex-
selective abortion have a within-family
sex ratio of 2000! Does that mean that
they are not responsible for the reduction
of the overall sex ratio? This is where the
problem in jumping from argument (2) to
argument (3) becomes clear. Son prefer-
ence will obviously mean that families with
higher number of daughters will indulge in
sex-selective abortion. Hence, families who
have indulged in sex-selective abortion
will have a more feminine within-family
child sex ratio. However, the very act of
aborting girl foetuses skews the societal
sex ratio. The logic that these families have
“contributed more girls than boys” and
are hence not to blame is deeply flawed.
The article does raise a valid point
about looking at factors besides sex-
selective abortion that could influence the
increasing skewing of the child sex ratio
in India. But by trying to imply that sex-
selective abortions may not be responsible
for skewing of the child sex ratio and that
biased family planning is to be blamed,
the article sends out an absolutely wrong
message which may have dangerous
implications if taken seriously by policy-
makers and the general public.
Anand Shrivastava (as2073@cam.ac.uk) is a
graduate student at the Faculty of Economics
in the University of Cambridge, UK.
Reference
Weiler, H (1959): “Sex Ratio and Birth Control”,
American Journal of Sociology, 65(3): 298-99.
99
 LETTERS
Issn 0012-9976
Ever since the first issue in 1966,
EPW has been India’s premier journal for Citizens’ Statement: 22%. If only they were united, they
comment on current affairs
and research in the social sciences.
Repression in Koodankulam would be a force to reckon with. Even
It succeeded Economic Weekly (1949-1965), the two Dravidian parties would have to

W
which was launched and shepherded e are appalled at the police repres- show more respect and consideration
by Sachin Chaudhuri,
who was also the founder-editor of EPW. sion unleashed on the people pro- towards them. The different factions
As editor for thirty-five years (1969-2004) testing peacefully against the Koodan- and parties of the dalits do not come to-
Krishna Raj
gave EPW the reputation it now enjoys. kulam nuclear plant. The repression has gether since the leaders fear that their
editor
forced them to take to a jal satyagraha. personal importance would get diluted.
C Rammanohar Reddy Their legitimate, and as yet unaddres- A few years ago when Mayawati formed
Deputy Editor sed, concerns about the plant’s safety the Bahujan Samaj Party unit of Tamil
Bernard D’Mello were heightened by the Atomic Energy Nadu, Krishnasamy and Tiruma oppo-
web Editor
subhash rai Regulatory Board’s recent admission sed it, very unconvincingly.
chief copy editor that it has not implemented the recom- Secondly, dalit leaders also imitate the
roger alexander mendations of its own review committee, style of the cine-influenced leaders of the
Senior Assistant Editors including revision of safety parameters, Dravidian parties who concentrate on
Lina Mathias
aniket Alam and installation of backup freshwater and their public presentation through the
Srinivasan ramani power sources. No emergency-evacuation media. Thus dalit leaders ensure their own
ashima sood
Bharati Bhargava drill was conducted as mandated, in a appearance in the media by garlanding the
copy editors 16-kilometre radius, prior to fuel-loading. statues of famous leaders like Ambedkar,
Prabha Pillai The government has refused to disclose Periyar, Annadurai, etc, or put up their
jyoti shetty
pertinent information, including the Site flexiboard photographs on highways, all
Assistant editor
P S Leela Evaluation and Safety Analysis Reports, of which is just some hollow glory.
editorial Assistant nuclear-waste management plans, and the Further, my impression all along has
lubna duggal agreement indemnifying the Russian sup- been that the dalit leaders are in the
production plier against accidents, which mocks the pockets of some or the other casteist or
u raghunathan
s lesline corera absolute liability principle. These docu- Dravidian party for monetary gain. In the
suneethi nair ments need to be discussed publicly and at process they lose their dalit identity and
Circulation least with the people affected by the plant. are disabled from fighting against atroci-
Gauraang Pradhan Manager
B S Sharma Instead, the government is accusing ties committed on their own community.
Advertisement Manager the protesters of sedition, and the protest This article gives reasons for this situation.
Kamal G Fanibanda of being “foreign” inspired, despite an Finally, and perhaps most important,
General Manager & Publisher absence of evidence. This is part of a pro- unless dalits abjure from practising un-
K Vijayakumar
editorial
foundly undemocratic pattern, recently touchability among their own sub-castes
edit@epw.in increasing, of demonising dissent, dis- there is very little hope for their emer-
Circulation missing people’s concerns about hazards, gence as a powerful political force.
circulation@epw.in
Advertising
and brutally repressing protests. M R Rajagopalan
advt@epw.in We urge the government to suspend Gandhigram Trust
Economic and Political Weekly work at Koodankulam and engage directly Tamil Nadu
320-321, A to Z Industrial Estate and democratically with the concerns of the
Ganpatrao Kadam Marg, Lower Parel
Mumbai 400 013 people who live in the vicinity, so that if the Strengthen the CAG
Phone: (022) 4063 8282 plant is to proceed it has their acceptance.

I
FAX: (022) 2493 4515
Praful Bidwai, Romila Thapar, endorse your editorial “Accountability
EPW Research Foundation
Amit Bhaduri, Darrl D’monte, – Is It Just a Word?” (EPW, 1 September
EPW Research Foundation, established in 1993, conducts Arundhati Roy, Jean Dreze, K N Panniker, 2012). However, I also feel that you are
research on financial and macro-economic issues in India. Admiral Ramdas, M V Ramana and others.
rather soft in raising your pointers regar-
Director
k kanagasabapathy
ding the allocation of the coal blocks,
C 212, Akurli Industrial Estate
On Dalit Unity
Kandivali (East), Mumbai 400 101
Phones: (022) 2887 3038/41
Fax: (022) 2887 3038
epwrf@vsnl.com
Printed by K Vijayakumar at Modern Arts and Industries,
T his is with regard to the well-
researched article “Dalit Political Im-
agination and Replication in Contempo-
Corrigendum
In the article “Bodoland: The Burden of His-
151, A-Z Industrial Estate, Ganpatrao Kadam Marg, tory” by Udayon Misra (EPW, 15 September
Lower Parel, Mumbai-400 013 and rary Tamil Nadu” (EPW, 8 September 2012) 2012), on p 38 in the para “The present clash-
published by him on behalf of Sameeksha Trust
from 320-321, A-Z Industrial Estate,
by Karthikeyan, Rajangam and Gorringe. es...the percentage of Bodo population in
Ganpatrao Kadam Marg, Lower Parel, Mumbai-400 013. The first point is that Tamil Nadu’s the BTAD area should read 30% and not 3%
Editor: C Rammanohar Reddy.
dalit population is a little more than as has been printed. The error is regretted.
4 september 22, 2012 vol xlviI no 38 EPW Economic & Political Weekly

establishment of the Indira Gandhi
International Airport in Delhi under the
public-private partnership model and
several other projects that pushed the
government on the defensive, with reac-
tions that were totally unacceptable. Not
only is the government bent on repeat-
ing the same mistakes under different
pretexts, the Comptroller and Auditor
General (CAG) and his countrywide net-
work of Auditor Generals (AGs) have
been treated as a nuisance. Rarely have
governments shown the patience to
appreciate the point raised or the will-
ingness to act on them. One argument
that is frequently made is that the CAG
does not have anything to do with policy,
not quite appreciating that policies are
but guidelines for executive action and
unless the policy is brought under the
scanner, the actions following from
them cannot be stalled.
About the argument that the CAG was
not correct in raising the issue of under-
pricing the coal blocks and that these
prices are but presumptive, does not
hold water. The officialdom has chal-
lenged the proposition that govern-
ment’s losses have been colossal by
terming them presumptive and gross
overstatements. Rather, if the methods
of marine insurance and its concept of
“constructive total loss” had been used,
the losses shown by the CAG would have
been much higher. Thus it is arguable
that the CAG put the loss figures on the
lower side.
Various CAG reports on the entire
gamut of activities of the union and state
governments generally remain unread
and unacted upon, not only by the gov-
ernment departments but also by the
public at large. A rich fund of knowledge
and information available in these
reports has remained unutilised. I sug-
gest that the powers originally bestowed
on the CAG by the framers of the Con-
stitution be restored and his tenure be
extended to at least 10 years. In the
meanwhile, the CAG must have guaran-
teed access to all official information,
as was the wont earlier, to lend some
meaning to what you have rightly called
accountability.
P Chattopadhyay
Kolkata
Economic & Political Weekly EPW september 22, 2012
India, China, Myanmar
M yanmar’s recent opening up to
the outside world has presented
India with a new opportunity. In May,
Manmohan Singh made the first visit to
Myanmar by an Indian prime minister
in 25 years and signed agreements on
education, trade, culture and infrastruc-
ture. India can seize a prime opportu-
nity to revitalise its relations with south-
east Asian countries through the new
gateway of Myanmar, and in the process
balance China’s growing influence in
the region.
For now, China has much greater influ-
ence in Myanmar. In the year that ended
in March 2011, China was Myanmar’s
largest trade partner; their $4.7 billion
bilateral trade accounted for more than
a third of Myanmar’s total trade. And it
was more than triple the value of India’s
$1.4 billion trade with Myanmar. China is
also the top foreign investor in Myanmar,
with total commitments thus far of $8.3
billion, compared to India’s $189 million,
according to available data.
India can improve its situation if it im-
plements the agreements on building land,
rail and air links that were signed during
Manmohan Singh’s visit. They include a
bus service from Imphal in India’s Manipur
state to Mandalay in central Myanmar and
increasing the number of flights between
Kolkota and Yangon. Work continues on
a project that would link Indian ports on
the eastern seaboard with Sittwe port in
Myanmar and link Sittwe to Mizoram by
road and inland waterways. Both sides
also want to finish a road to connect Moreh
in Manipur with Mae Sot in Thailand
through Myanmar. Completion of the
road would make trilateral connectivity
a reality. India and Myanmar also agreed
to explore the possibility of freight trans-
port from India through Myanmar to the
rest of south-east Asia.
Web Exclusives
The following articles have been uploaded in the past week in the Web Exclusives
section of the EPW website. They have not been published in the print edition.
Read them at http://epw.in
“India and the Autumn of the African Patriarch” – S Arun Mohan
“A Judicial Doctrine of Postponement and the Demands of Open Justice”
– Sukumar Muralidharan
Articles posted before August 31 remain available in the Web Exclusives section.
vol xlviI no 38
LETTERS
Even though India’s “Look East” policy
was launched in 1991 many experts say
that results have been disappointing, in
particular due to delays in infrastructure
projects that are vital for trade links.
Although India and the Association of
Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) signed
a free trade agreement in 2010, India-
ASEAN trade was worth only $50 billion in
2011, expected to rise to $70 billion in 2012.
Over the past year or so, India has
significantly bolstered ties with south-
east Asia, most visibly in security. Both
sides have common interests in suppress-
ing terrorism, piracy and narcotics traf-
ficking, protecting the sea lanes, and bal-
ancing the influence of China. India’s naval
cooperation with Vietnam is a case in point.
New Delhi has moved closer to offering
Hanoi the use of naval facilities for train-
ing. Indian warships have been permitted
to dock at Nha Trang port in southern Vi-
etnam. India’s ONGC Videsh Limited has
been pursuing oil and natural gas explora-
tion in two Vietnamese blocs in the South
China Sea, despite Chinese displeasure. In
jockeying with China in south-east Asia,
India has the advantage of greater cultural
proximity with Thailand and Indonesia.
Apart from this there is now a growing
interest of the United States in reinvigor-
ating its Asian presence and the warming
of relations between China and Russia.
The fear is that as countries become more
powerful economically, they build up
their militaries and become more aggres-
sive on territorial and trade matters,
sparking disputes with neighbours.
Given this context, India’s policymakers
face important questions ahead. The
centrality of Myanmar to building India’s
relations with south-east Asia cannot be
overstressed. Myanmar can also play an
added role in helping India and China
cement their ties.
Reena Marwah
Delhi University
5
COMMENTARY
CoP-11 on Biodiversity
An Opportunity to Go
beyond Business as Usual
Milind Wani, Persis Taraporevala
With the Convention on Biological
Diversity’s 11th Conference
of the Parties to take place in
Hyderabad, this article points out
that the treaty’s implementation
the world over has lacked resolve.
India is no exception, with a great
gap between the impression
given by reports and the reality
on the ground.
Milind Wani (milindwani@yahoo.com) and
Persis Taraporevala (persis.taraporevala@
gmail.com) are with the Pune-based
environment action group Kalpavriksh.
10
T
he Convention on Biological
Diversity (CBD)1 is an international
treaty with three main objectives
– conservation of biological diversity;
sustainable use of its components; and
fair and equitable sharing of benefits
arising from genetic resources. The con-
vention was tabled at the United Nations
Conference on Environment and Develop-
ment (UNCED), also known as the Earth
Summit, in Rio de Janeiro on 5 June 1992
and came into force on 29 December
1993. Its primary objective is to develop
national strategies for the conservation
and sustainable use of biological diversity.
It is also seen as a key document on
sustainable development.
The convention recognises, under inter-
national law, that conservation of biologi-
cal diversity is a common concern and is
integral for the sociocultural and economic
development of humanity. The agreement
covers all ecosystems, species, and genetic
resources. It links traditional conservation
efforts to the economic goal of using bio-
logical resources sustainably. It sets princi-
ples for the fair and equitable sharing of
benefits arising from the use of genetic
resources, notably those destined for com-
mercial use. It also covers the rapidly ex-
panding field of biotechnology through its
Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety, address-
ing technology development and transfer,
benefit-sharing and biosafety issues.
Countries that join the convention are
obliged to implement its provisions and it
reminds decision-makers that biological
resources are finite and sets out a philo-
sophy of sustainable use. The CBD currently
has 193 nations as signatories, known as
Parties, to combat the decline of biological
diversity throughout the globe.
The highest decision-making body of
the CBD, known as the Conference of the
september 22, 2012
Parties (CoP), convenes every two years
and in October 2012, India will host the
11th Conference of the Parties (CoP-11)
in Hyderabad.
This article argues that as the CBD
secretariat moves towards achieving the
three objectives, it has placed undue em-
phasis on engaging with the business
sector at the cost of concerns over failing
to enforce the legally binding conven-
tion, which entails divesting the Parties of
their responsibilities. The second section
of the article delves into the disparity
between the portrayal of the implemen-
tation of the convention in India and the
ground reality. The article concludes
that the convention is an important piece
of legislation, which, if implemented
properly, could achieve its goals.
1 Challenges
Many agree that the implementation
record of the convention has been dismal
so far. Brazilian scientist and environ-
mentalist Braulio Ferreira de Souza Dias,
who took over as the executive secretary
of the CBD secretariat on 15 February
2012, in an interview, stresses that his
main focus is on implementing the con-
vention “in a more effective manner”.2
His major priorities include streamlining
the work of the CoP; mainstreaming of
biodiversity into development agendas;
promoting biodiversity concerns across
society and government departments/
ministries; resource mobilisation; con-
tinuous monitoring of the Aichi Targets;3
enhancing support to the Parties; pro-
moting more effective scientific and tech-
nical cooperation; promoting recogni-
tion and support for community-based
approaches; expanding the engagement
of the business sector; and promoting the
early ratification of the Nagoya Protocol.4
While these are commendable priori-
ties there are some reservations regard-
ing their feasibility.
Limited Time
The secretary acknowledges that the
2010 biodiversity targets were not
achieved (Kothari 2008).5 Given this
failure, we must ask whether the Aichi
Targets are achievable in the given time
vol xlviI no 38 EPW Economic & Political Weekly

frame. What is the guarantee, given the
limitations of the secretariat’s powers in
enforcement, that these initiatives will
not lose steam? Given the urgency of the
problem, will the pro-business tilt of the
CBD secretariat be beneficial or harmful
to the agenda of the convention? Only
time will tell whether the Aichi Targets
are achieved. Time, however, is perhaps
a luxury in short supply, considering
that the issues of global warming and its
consequences – climate change, deserti-
fication, biodiversity loss, peak oil and
the rise in sea levels – are no longer con-
cerns of the future but are on the world’s
agenda today (Hamilton 2010).
Legally Binding
Ecologists like S Faizi, member of the
CBD Expert Group on Biodiversity and
Poverty, insist that the key reason why
the CBD has failed to live up to its poten-
tial is that the legally binding nature of
the treaty has been bypassed. The con-
vention is multilaterally negotiated, in
line with the terms of treaty-making set
by the Vienna Convention on the Law of
Treaties, and its articles exist for en-
forcement and not for further negotia-
tion. Despite the progressive nature of
the treaty, CoPs have so far not effectively
reviewed and acted on infractions, thus
leading to escalating biopiracy, zero
reduction in the loss of biodiversity, con-
tinued alienation of indigenous commu-
nities, and the creation of administra-
tive, policy and legal measures which
remain paper tigers.
The Business of Government
or Government for Business?
A recurring motif of the secretary’s
interview is the imperative to mainstream
biodiversity by engaging with the busi-
ness sector. However, many fear that
such an engagement would dilute the
force of the environmental aspect of the
CBD and hence its effectiveness. Al-
though the secretary speaks about struc-
tural changes in the way governments
and businesses deal with biodiversity
and the need to promote sustainable
products so that the market internalises
its responsibility towards biodiversity,
how is this going to be enforced? When
the legally binding convention is not
Economic & Political Weekly EPW september 22, 2012
implemented, can the market be tamed?
What sanctions can be brought to bear
on erring corporations?
While the secretary underlines the
need to engage with and promote better
business attitudes so that businesses,
driven by consumer demand, will learn
to respect the rights of the custodians of
biodiversity by incorporating better
business practices, there is no critique of
how ecologically harmful consumerism
is artificially manufactured by the same
business sector. Neither is there any cri-
tique of the economic system – a profit-
driven social-production process, which
produces goods and services at the cost
of creating social inequality and envi-
ronmental degradation – and its policy
framework that legitimises ecological
depredations by the business sector.
Involving businesses also raises con-
cerns about access to genetic resources
and benefit sharing. Corporations have
often claimed patents without respec-
ting either the traditional rights of
people or the sovereignty of nation
states. Relying on market mechanisms
for biodiversity conservation has been
criticised because
financialisation of biodiversity is a product
of the neo-liberal economic system where
monetisation is the main tool for using and
conserving biological resources. It implies
putting a price tag for the use and exchange
of biodiversity…it is difficult to define biodi-
versity in monetary terms and that there are
limitations to the use of markets in the
protection of biodiversity (Lovera and Titu-
mu 2012).
The issue is systemic and cannot be
resolved by merely appealing to the
goodwill of individuals in the business
or the political class. Using Karl Marx’s
analysis, James O’Connor speaks about
three types of conditions of production
on which the survival of the current cap-
italist system depends and which it im-
pairs. These are – (1) the personal condi-
tions of production associated with the
reproduction of human labour power;
(2) the external natural conditions of
production such as forests, oilfields, water
supplies, bird species, and so on; and
(3) the general communal conditions of
production, which include the built
environment, for example, villages and
cities and their infrastructure. Capitalism
vol xlviI no 38
COMMENTARY
is dependent for its own production on
the use and transformation of such con-
ditions of production, which it has
proved incapable of “preserving intact and
in relatively costless form. Degradation of
these conditions of production generates
rising costs for capitalism, squeezing
profits”, which business firms then seek
to externalise (Foster 2002).
It is a secular theodicy that the eco-
logical crisis can be addressed within
the paradigm of the free-market econo-
my and that persuading the business
sector to change its ways is a matter of
political goodwill. First, whether a suffi-
cient percentage of private enterprises
will prioritise ecological sustainability
over profits is a moot question. Second,
and by implication, will an overdepend-
ence on the business sector to do the
right thing not increase the risk of slowly
divesting nation states of their obligatory
responsibility to enforce the convention
and their power to act decisively in cases
of infractions? How realistic is it to expect
this in an era of neo-liberal globalisation
marked by a retreat of the nation state
and unfettered capitalism giving vent to
its predatory instincts through an imper-
sonal structural logic that results in the
privatisation of profits/benefits and the
socialisation of losses/costs, and untold
ecological havoc?
2 India and the CBD
India’s Fourth National Report to the CBD
(2009)6 paints a rather rosy picture of
the way the CBD is implemented. How-
ever, there are concerns about the gap
between the image portrayed and the
reality on the ground. This article focuses
on two important concerns – people’s
Appointments/Programmes/
Announcemnents
For the convenience of readers and advertisers,
all advertisements on appointments,
programmes, call for papers etc are now
placed together at the end of each issue
every week.
This section is also listed in the Contents page
Advertisements for books are published as
before in the Book Review section.
11
COMMENTARY

participation in ecological conservation
and legislative spaces.
People’s Participation
Although the National Biodiversity
Action Plan (NBAP) of 2008 documents
India’s strategic response towards doing
its bit to meet its global responsibility,
the government’s sincerity can be meas-
ured against the speed with which state
governments have signed contracts with
Indian and multinational corporations
(MNCs) for the sake of what they call
“development-related projects”, with no
concern for biodiversity conservation
and sustainability and little monitoring
by the Ministry of Environment and
Forests (MoEF). There are any number of
case studies showing the harmful effects
these have had on India’s natural re-
source systems and their rich biodiver-
sity, as also on the people who depend
on them. Project clearances take place
with faulty or no implementation of
mandated procedures like holding pub-
lic hearings and conducting environ-
mental impact assessments (EIAs) (Kohli
and Menon 2005). For example, more
than 60 memoranda of understanding
(MoUs) have been signed by the state
government of Odisha – in the teeth of
opposition by local communities – for
mining and other projects (Wani 2010).
These will necessarily imperil the abun-
dant biodiversity of the state. News from
the states in the north-east, which are
planning to build 168 hydroelectric
projects, is another reason for concern
about the irreversible damage this will
do to the ecosystems and rich cultural
heritage of the region (Vagholikar and
Das 2010). Stories of shoddy EIAs cleared
by a half-hearted MoEF leading to large-
scale deforestation, degradation, biodi-
versity loss and dislocation of people can
be found across the nation.
The resistance of the MoEF towards
seeking people’s participation can be
judged by a recent Delhi High Court or-
der7 asking it to disclose the summary of
the Western Ghats Ecology Panel report8
of August 2011 authored by Madhav
Gadgil. The ministry attempted to hide
the report under the fig leaf of an excuse
that it was not final and that releasing it
would hamper decision-making proc-
esses. The report recommends that the
Western Ghats be declared ecologically
sensitive and mining be completely
banned in 60% of its area by 2016. It
raises doubts about the processes that
have been followed to compile EIAs – re-
quired for mining, infrastructure, power
and tourism activities. The MoEF had
maintained that the report would hurt
the economic interests of the states
involved but finally released it, nearly a
year after it was submitted, with a dis-
claimer that the ministry has not accept-
ed the recommendations. The govern-
ment has now set up an expert commit-
tee to review the report after several
states vehemently objected to its recom-
mendations on the one hand, and vari-
ous quarters, including civil society and
industry,9 reacted in an unprecedented
manner on the other. Gadgil has criti-
cised this as a premature move that does
not seek the people’s participation.10
Such actions prove that even though
India has accepted the CBD, those in power
still prefer the exclusionary and conven-
tional top-down models of conservation
rather than participatory systems that link
sustainable livelihoods with conservation.
Public Policy and Legislation
Articles 6a and 10c of the CBD mandate
developing national strategies for conser-
vation and sustainable use of biological

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12 september 22, 2012 vol xlviI no 38 EPW Economic & Political Weekly

resources and the protection and
encouragement of traditional cultural
practices of biological resources use.
Article 8j exhorts Parties to “respect,
preserve and maintain knowledge, inno-
vations and practices of indigenous and
local communities…encourage equita-
ble sharing of the benefits”. Plans like
the draft National Biodiversity Strategy
and Action Plan (NBSAP) of 2003 and the
NBAP of 2008 are spaces where the
objectives of 6a could have been realised.
Unfortunately, the former, based on one
of world’s largest environmental plan-
ning exercises, involving thousands of
individuals, hundreds of stakeholder
communities and scores of non-govern-
mental organisations (NGOs) across
India, was not accepted by the MoEF
(Kothari 2012). Through a combination
of the Wildlife Protection Amendment
(2003) Act, the Biological Diversity Act
(2002) and the Scheduled Tribes and
Other Forest Dwellers (Recognition of
Forest Rights) Act (FRA), 2006 several
legal spaces have been created for par-
ticipatory conservation processes that
acknowledge the legitimacy of tradition-
al practices in conservation. The chal-
lenge lies in translating these good
intentions into actions.
A study of India’s Fourth National
Report to the CBD gives the impression
that great strides have been made, but
have these only been at the policy level?
The report does not provide a substan-
tive picture of the situation on the
ground. A close reading reveals a lan-
guage of half-truths that masks the
ground reality. The protected area (PA)
networks in India may have grown by
15% since 2002, as the report claims, but
in what condition are these PAs? And
what happened to the people residing in
them? Was settlement of rights carried
out satisfactorily? Have people been
relocated without coercion and rehabili-
tated according to the norms? There may
be 43 conservation reserves since 2003
but how are they managed? To what ex-
tent have local communities been em-
powered to conserve and manage these
reserves, as required by the FRA?11
These are important concerns. Gloss-
ing them over makes it possible to
quietly subvert the aims of participatory
Economic & Political Weekly EPW september 22, 2012
and sustainable conservation. This cre-
ates a situation where, on paper, India is
working towards fulfilling the needs of
the convention, but at the ground level
the exclusionary conservation model with
its powerful authoritarian hierarchies
continues to prevail.
Future Imperfect
India’s fixation with gross domestic
product-led growth resulted in the MoEF
granting, in 2011 alone, “environmental
clearance to 181 coal mines, 267 thermal
power plants, 188 steel plants and 106
cement units…2,10,000 MW of thermal
power capacity…that’s 60,000 MW more
than what has been proposed till 2017!”
(Dutt 2012). On the other hand, Faizi’s
concern over more than 2,000 patents –
based on Indian genetic resources and
traditional knowledge – being taken
abroad in the last year without the con-
sent of the government point to a lack of
political will (Kohli and Bhutani 2012).
And yet, alternatives emerging out of re-
silient initiatives by local communities
and NGOs do exist (Shrivastava and Ko-
thari 2012). Giving them official recogni-
tion and aid would prove the govern-
ment’s commitment.
In a country like India, with an
entrenched and exclusionary conserva-
tion regime, it will take time to implement
the new laws and programmes. Imple-
mentation of CBD-inspired laws will need
to focus on changing the official mindset
as well. The convention certainly has po-
tential if applied in the right spirit. One
hopes that CoP-11 will force Indian policy-
makers to address these issues.
Notes
1 See http://www.cbd.int/
2 See “Fewer Decisions, More Implementation”,
Square Brackets (CBD Newsletter), May 2012,
www.cbd.int/ngo/square-brackets/square-
brackets-2012-05-en.pdf
3 The Nagoya Biodiversity Summit (Japan, Octo-
ber 2010) closed with agreement to adopt the
Strategic Plan of the Convention on Biological
Diversity or the Aichi Targets. The plan includes
20 headline targets, organised under five stra-
tegic goals that aim to address the underlying
causes of biodiversity loss by mainstreaming
biodiversity across government and society;
reduce the direct pressures on biodiversity and
promote sustainable use; improve the status of
biodiversity by safeguarding ecosystems, spe-
cies and genetic diversity; enhance the benefits
to all from biodiversity and ecosystem services
and enhance implementation through partici-
patory planning, knowledge management and
vol xlviI no 38
COMMENTARY
capacity building. For details, see http://www.
cbd.int/sp/targets/
4 The Nagoya Protocol on Access to Genetic
Resources and the Fair and Equitable Sharing
of Benefits Arising from their Utilisation (ABS)
to the Convention on Biological Diversity, a sup-
plementary agreement to the CBD, provides a
transparent legal framework for the effective
implementation of one of the three objectives of
the CBD. See http://www.cbd.int/abs/about/
5 In 2002, governments of the world decided to
achieve, by 2010, a significant reduction of the
current rate of biodiversity loss at the global,
regional and national level as a contribution to
poverty alleviation and to benefit all life on
earth. This was endorsed by the UN General
Assembly and incorporated into the Millenni-
um Development Goals.
6 This was the latest report available on the
Ministry of Environment and Forests website.
7 “Release Western Ghats report, Delhi High
Court Tells Environment Ministry”, Abhinav
Garg, Times of India, 20 May 2012, http://arti-
cles.timesofindia.indiatimes.com/2012-05-20/
pune/31788144_1_moef-rti-applicant-wgeep
8 The report is available at http://www.indiaenvi-
ronmentportal.org.in/reports-documents/report-
western-ghats-ecology-expert-panel-2011
9 “MoEF Panel to Review Western Ghats Report”,
Akriti Vasudeva, Indian Express, 21 August 2012.
10 “Review Panel Premature, Meaningless Without
People’s Inputs”, Indian Express, 22 August 2012.
11 Both are rights that can be claimed under
the FRA.
References
Dutt, Bahar (2012): “The Environment Ministry Is
Back to Its Old Days”, 23 July, http://ibnlive.
in.com/blogs/bahardutt/258/63721/the-envi-
ronment-ministry-is-back-to-its-old-days.html
Foster, John Bellamy (2002): “Capitalism and
Ecology – The Nature of the Contradiction”,
Monthly Review, Vol 54, No 4.
Hamilton, Clive (2010): Requiem for a Species: Why
We Resist the Truth about Climate Change
(London: Earthscan).
Kohli, Kanchi and Manju Menon (2005): Eleven
Years of the Environment Impact Assessment
Notification, 1994: How Effective Has It Been?
(Pune: Kalpavriksh, Just Environment Trust,
Environment Justice Initiative).
Kohli, Kanchi and Shalini Bhutani (2012): “Chasing
Benefits: A Post-Nagoya Protocol View on Access
and Benefit Sharing”, Briefing Paper (Pune:
Kalpavriksh and World Wide Fund for Nature).
Kothari, Ashish (2008): “Are We Missing the 2010
Target?”, Infochange India, June, http://www.
infochangeindia.org/environment/politics-of-
biodiversity/are-we-missing-the-2010 target.html.
– (2012): “Inaction – India’s Environment Story”,
Tehelka, Vol 9, No 27, July.
Lovera, Simone and Rasheed Al Mahmud Titimu
(2012): “Scaling up Biodiversity Finance, Resource
Mobilisation and IFMs – The Civil Society View”,
Square Brackets, May.
Ministry of Environment and Forests (2009):
India’s Fourth National Report to the Conven-
tion on Biological Diversity, Government of
India, New Delhi.
Shrivastava, Aseem and Ashish Kothari (2012):
Churning the Earth: The Making of Global India
(New Delhi: Penguin India).
Vagholikar, Neeraj and Partha K Das (2010):
Damming Northeast India (Pune: Kalpavriksh,
Action Aid).
Wani, Milind, ed. (2010): Nought without Cause:
Almost Everyone’s Guide to the Underlying Causes
of Deforestation and Forest Degradation in the
Era of Neoliberal Globalisation (Pune: Kalpa-
vriksh, Vasundhara, Global Forest Coalition).
13
COMMENTARY
Criminalising Dissent
Consequences of UAPA
Anushka Singh
The Unlawful Activities
(Prevention) Act not only
criminalises the fundamental
right to association but also
dilutes the distinction between
political dissent and criminal
activity by criminalising dissident
voices and acts. In the process,
political dissent suffers major
delegitimisation since particular
ideologies, groups and beliefs
are rendered criminal. This
engenders a culture of political
witch-hunts where selected
organisations that question the
legitimacy of the State and the
ruling classes are outlawed.
The Coordination of Democratic Rights
Organisations’ report, The Terror of Law: UAPA
and the Myth of National Security, which is
summarised over here, can be accessed at
www.pudr.org.
Anushka Singh (anushkasingh2987@gmail.com)
is a civil rights activist based in Delhi.
14
T
he current state of affairs in the
largest democracy in the world is
characterised by an outright vio-
lation of democratic rights of people
through obtrusive state violence sanc-
tioned by national security legislations.
The Coordination of Democratic Rights
Organisations (CDRO) report, The Terror
of Law: UAPA and the Myth of National
Security is an attempt to unravel the
same through a nuanced study of the
Unlawful Activities Prevention Act (UAPA).
It seeks to understand and expose how
laws such as the UAPA represent the
same colonial mindset and strategy of
banning and criminalising dissent.
The UAPA is an extraordinary law that
criminalises the fundamental freedom
to associate and assemble by allowing
the government to simply ban political
organisations that question the status
quo. It allows the executive to wield ex-
cessive power to restrict the democratic
rights of citizens to organise and agitate
democratically. The course of Indian
democracy provides glaring examples of
how the UAPA facilitates the executive to
violate the democratic rights of citizens
and implicate them for being proactive
members of society. Soni Sori’s arrest
and detention under UAPA and other
sections of the Indian Penal Code such
as 124A (sedition), 120B (criminal cons-
piracy), etc, embodies such an attempt.
The Communist Party of India (Maoist)
politburo member Amitabh Bagchi’s arrest
under the UAPA represents the same
effort of the executive to ban critical
thinking where he was detained under
the Act despite the absence of retrieval
of any firearms from him. The literature
that was recovered from him and the
fact that he belonged to a banned organ-
isation were enough reasons for him to
be indicted. While the invocation of UAPA
against left-wing extremism passes in
the name of national security, the Hindu
right wing terror does not face any
september 22, 2012
persecution under the Act as its activi-
ties are not considered “organised” and
detrimental to “national security” by the
government. The attempt to maintain
the status quo through legislations such
as these cannot be more obvious.
Making ‘Unlawful’
Legislations such as the UAPA are in
direct contravention of the fundamental
freedoms guaranteed by the Constitu-
tion that are indispensable for the func-
tioning of democracy. These freedoms
give the right to people to express them-
selves through demonstrations and pro-
test, and also allow for public mobilisa-
tions of opinion, irrespective of whether
these opinions are critical of the govern-
ment or not. An extraordinary law like
the UAPA represents the same colonial
style of functioning in dealing with dis-
sent. The UAPA can be traced back to co-
lonial times. In 1908, the Criminal Law
Amendment Act first used the term “un-
lawful association” to criminalise the
Indian national movement. Ironically,
post-Independence, the government uses
the same powers to curb political dissent
by the use of laws such as the UAPA.
The Constitution guarantees its citizens
certain fundamental freedoms as men-
tioned in Article 19 of the Constitution,
but there have been efforts by the State
to curb these freedoms. However, the
judiciary has taken a pro-liberal stand
and upheld these fundamental freedoms
in three landmark cases in the decade fol-
lowing the independence. In three ver-
dicts namely, Romesh Thapar versus the
State of Madras (1950), V G Row versus the
State of Madras (1950) and A K Gopalan
versus the State of Madras (1950), it was
asserted that fundamental freedoms
can be curbed only in the most extreme
cases and laws that curb fundamental
rights are essentially unconstitutional.
All three judgments decided against the
State prompting a need for an amend-
ment to the Constitution that would allow
it to counter movements questioning
the status quo.
The first amendment of 1951 was
claimed to institute measures to push
forward the directive principles of state
policy. While the rhetoric of enforcing
the directive principles was at work, in
vol xlviI no 38 EPW Economic & Political Weekly

actuality, it led to the curtailment of the
Fundamental Rights. The amendment
in relation to Article 19 inserted the word
“public order” and “friendly relation with
states” as “reasonable restrictions” on
Article 19. The implication of the amend-
ment was that laws such as Section 124A
that had been removed from the sec-
tion restricting fundamental freedoms
were invigorated to restrict the same
through interpretation of words such as
“public order”.
In 1963, in the context of the war with
China and demands made by regional
groups such as the Dravida Munnetra
Kazhagam, the sixteenth amendment
was enacted. The 1963 amendment was
another attempt at stifling freedom of
expression, assembly and association.
The amendment of Article 19 added that
government might place reasonable re-
strictions on expressions in the interest of
“the sovereignty and integrity of India”.
This was done to give appropriate powers
“to impose restrictions against those
individuals or organisations who want
to make secession from India or disinte-
gration of India as political purposes for
fighting elections”. It was the sixteenth
amendment that paved the way for the
enactment of the UAPA. The UAP Bill was
passed in Parliament in 1967 after being
tabled and withdrawn due to opposition,
twice before. It empowered the central
executive to ban organisations, a right
that until then had been the prerogative
of the provinces under the Criminal Law
Amendment Act. The bill was met with
staunch opposition in Parliament. Sec-
tion 5 of the bill – which empowered the
centre to constitute the “Unlawful
Activities Prevention Tribunal” – was
contested the most. This gave overriding
powers to the centre in determining
what is deemed “unlawful”.
The UAPA 1967 enables the central gov-
ernment to impose “reasonable restric-
tions” on the right to association and it
does that by banning any association on
the basis of a simple announcement
made by the government about it being
“unlawful”. In 2004 and 2008, amend-
ments were made to the 1967 Act to in-
corporate provisions from the earlier
Terrorist and Disruptive Activities (Pre-
vention) Act (TADA) and the Prevention
Economic & Political Weekly EPW september 22, 2012
of Terrorism Act (POTA), the two notorious
Acts that had been repealed following
opposition. The 2004 amendment changed
the definition of “unlawful activity”
through inclusion of the definition of
“terrorist act” from POTA. It also intro-
duced the concept of a “terrorist gang”.
In 2008, another amendment followed,
rendering more powers to the central
executive. Now the UAPA allowed the
centre to ban associations on two
grounds, for being “unlawful” and for
being a “terrorist organisation”.
On 3 February 2012, the central govern-
ment made another attempt at violating
the rights of people through the notifi-
cation of setting up a specialised body
called National Counter Terrorism Centre
(NCTC). The NCTC will derive powers
from the UAPA for forming intelligence
and investigation-related functions. As
designed, it will be authorised under
UAPA to exercise the power to arrest,
search, etc, without consulting the state
governments. While bodies such as NCTC
and the National Investigation Agency
(constituted in the wake of the Mumbai
attack of 2008) enjoy enormous power
under the UAPA, they also work on the
same prejudices with which the UAPA
has been invoked. The honours of the
ruling elite and Hindu right-wing order
are protected at the cost of the freedoms
of minorities and dissenters.
What Does the UAPA Criminalise?
The UAPA criminalises two kinds of acti-
vities – “unlawful activity” and “terrorist
act”. As per the 2004 amendment,
Section 2(o) defines unlawful activity as
any action taken by an individual or
association (whether by committing an act
or by words, either spoken or written, or
by visible representation or otherwise),
(i) which is intended, or supports any claim
to bring about, on any ground whatsoever,
the cession of a part of the territory of India
or the secession of a part of the territory of
India from the Union, or which incites any
individual or group of individuals to bring
about such cession or secession; or (ii) which
disclaims, questions, disrupts or is intended
to disrupt the sovereignty and territorial in-
tegrity of India; or (iii) which causes or is in-
tended to cause disaffection against India.
The definition makes it clear that “un-
lawful activity” does not involve a physical
act of violence. Such is the ambivalence
vol xlviI no 38
COMMENTARY
and vastness of the crime that it can
penalise any view, belief or person that
may be considered threatening to those
in power. To take the case of the term
disaffection, it can mean anything from
a grudge to a rebellion. As the definition
of unlawful activities stand in the Act, it
can penalise even “unintentional” or
“unintended” disaffection. However, the
Act is not used to criminalise all forms of
disaffection, rather single out those voices
that the state needs to quash.
The other activity criminalised by the
law, a “terrorist act” is defined through
its intent in Section 15 as
whoever does any act with intent to threaten
or likely to threaten the unity, integrity,
security or sovereignty of India or with intent
to strike terror or likely to strike terror in
people or any section of the people in India
or in any foreign country.
This definition of terrorist activity
goes far beyond the general conception
of a terrorist activity as that of mass
murder of civilians or commission of
war crimes during peace times. It goes
on to include in its ambit acts such as
the death of, or injuries to any person,
damage to property, attempt to overawe
by means of criminal force any public
functionary, any act to compel the govern-
ment or any person to do or abstain from
doing any act, etc. Such is the vagary
and extent of the offence under this Act
that it persecutes people’s right to pro-
test or put pressure on the government
for any demand. It is imperative to point
out that communal violence is not con-
sidered to be a terrorist activity as per
this Act, while damaging property is.
Acts such as the anti-Muslim pogrom in
Gujarat enjoy absolute impunity under
the UAPA towards securing majoritarian
nationalism and are not considered
threatening the unity of the country.
The impeachment of those who do not
belong to the majority community under
the UAPA violates the principle of equality
before the law quite conspicuously.
The penalty for an unlawful activity
may extend up to seven years’ imprison-
ment with fine, while for a terrorist act it
may result in death sentence or life
imprisonment with fine. In the case of
the latter, the minimum penalty is five
years imprisonment. It is to be noted
15
COMMENTARY

that the UAPA punishes even the attempt
of trying to commit what is considered
unlawful or a terrorist act. This is to say
that a person may be prescribed life
imprisonment for an act that has not
even been committed. The UAPA also
has the provision for enhancing punish-
ment in case the accused is found guilty
of flouting any other law besides UAPA.
The police often make use of this to im-
plicate the accused under other laws
along with UAPA to warrant an extended
term of incarceration.
The Repercussions of Banning
The nature and designing of the Act is
such that it requires almost no rationale
on the part of the government to book
a person under the UAPA. The central
government’s opinion of a certain person
or association in being either unlawful
or terrorist is enough to inflict a ban.
Section 3 of the Act requires the prior
approval of a tribunal to impose a ban
while Section 35 does away with any
such requirement. Alarmingly, the ban
imposed under Section 3 remains in
force for two years while the ban under
Section 35 can be made perpetual. In
case of redress for lifting the ban on an
implicated organisation, the organisation
needs to make an appeal to the govern-
ment and if disposed, the appeal goes to
a review committee which is evidently
an extended body of the government. The
organisation is allowed no space to argue
its case. Such is the disdained procedure
that the same authority categorises a
said organisation as terrorist, imposes a
ban on it, hears an appeal for redress
and also appoints the body that would
consider the second round of appeal.
In case of an organisation banned as
“terrorist”, the consequences are much
severe. Under Section 38, a member of
any such organisation is defined as a
person “who associates himself, or pro-
fesses to be associated with a terrorist
organisation with intention to further its
activities”. Going by that definition, a
doctor treating a person who is a mem-
ber of a banned organisation can also be
charged under the UAPA.
There is no distinction made between
a criminal association and a legitimate
association. The democratic right of
dissemination or receiving information,
of generating public debate, of voicing
opposition to government policies, all
belong to the realm of “unlawful” and
“terrorist” activity under the UAPA if the
central government so desires. These are
activities that would otherwise channel
the democratic process but the govern-
ment chooses to ban them as terrorist
activities. Against a similar background,
Binayak Sen’s incarceration was justified
under the UAPA while he was actually
victimised for voicing opposition to govern-
ment operations such as Salwa Judum.
Section 39 of the law actually prevents
the expression of any progressive political
ideas or even opposition to injustices in
people’s daily life. Invocation of the UAPA
on these accounts acts as a preventive
measure to suppress voices that speak
even before they are heard.
Unremitting Power
The UAPA increases police power to arrest,
search and seizure (Section 43A and
43B), makes all offences cognisable (Sec-
tion 14, 43D(1)), enhances the period of
detention (Section 43D(2)), undermines

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the power of the court to demand the at-
tendance of accused in their trials (Sec-
tion 43D(3)), disallows anticipatory bail
(Section 43D(4)), enhances the restric-
tion on bail (Section 43D(5)), presumes
the guilt of the accused (Section 43E),
permits in-camera trials and the with-
holding of the identity of the witness
(Section 44), and finally allows inter-
cepted communications to be used as
evidence (Section 46). All these pro-
visions entail overwhelming powers to
the executive.
The mode of operation of the UAPA
goes completely against the ethics of a
fair trial. Preventive detention is prohi-
bited by Article 22 of the Constitution
and the Criminal Procedure Code (CrPC)
allows a maximum period of 90 days in
case of an offence carrying punishment
of 10 years or above, and 60 days in other
cases. Under UAPA the constitutional
norms are violated when all offences,
including the most minor ones entail a
90-day detention.
Judicial morality is based on the assum-
ption of innocence until proven other-
wise. This is reflective in the fact that
the judiciary considers granting bail to
be a norm and its refusal to be an excep-
tion. But, under the UAPA, the contrary
becomes the norm. Bails are refused on
a number of criteria, the foremost being
the apprehension of the accused going
absconding or committing another offence
that may threaten the witness.
Most stark and distressing is the
unapologetic impunity that the law pro-
vides to the police. It has been men-
tioned that when POTA was annulled, its
sections were imported to UAPA. How-
ever, one clever omission was made.
POTA contained Section 58 which pun-
ished the police for maliciously charging
a person under the Act. But this section
was dropped from the UAPA. The inten-
tion with which the Act was amended in
2004 and 2008 becomes most palpable
through this one omission.
The Case of SIMI
The UAPA charges against Students
Islamic Movement of India (SIMI) are
reflective of the fact that “national security”
and its threats are constructed myths that
the government conceives to suppress
Economic & Political Weekly EPW september 22, 2012
any potential challenge to its hegemonic
position. Following the 11 September
2001 attack on the United States, the
Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP)-led regime
in India banned the SIMI under the UAPA
1967 in 2001. SIMI, which came into
existence in 1977, had no record of being
implicated in any act of “striking terror”
or promoting enmity between groups. It
was the government’s perception of
SIMI as a possible political challenge to
the right-wing dominated government
that led to the ban on SIMI. The ban
blatantly exemplifies the farce that Acts
such as the UAPA make out of the judi-
cial system. In case of the charges
against SIMI, it became evident that the
Tribunals function as per the will of the
government. SIMI was banned in 2001,
2003 and 2006; each time a new Tribu-
nal was constituted, the ban on SIMI
was upheld.
In the process, not only the biases
with which the government works get
exposed but also a stereotypical image
of certain organisations that are banned
gets created in the popular imagination.
The Tribunal’s judgment against SIMI
painted a picture of the organisation
which is meant to excite suspicion about
Islamic beliefs and practices as though
the practices themselves constitute the
“unlawful”. In an utterly contrasting
case, the attitude towards right-wing
organisations engaged in communal vio-
lence narrate a different story altogether.
The 2004 amendment to UAPA intro-
duced the category of a “Terrorist Gang”.
It is under this category that the cases
related to Hindutva groups are dealt
with. It has a much severe political and
clandestine logic. The acts under this
category refer to mafia-like or organised
crime groups or a few people who come
together to plan and carry out a crime.
The implication of it is that while some
members of an organisation can be
booked as a terrorist gang, the organisa-
tion as a whole is not banned. Only those
who plan and perpetrate are penalised
under this category while the category
of “unlawful activity” and “terrorist act”
finds culpable every member, supporter
or sympathiser, whether or not he/she
has participated in planning or perform-
ing any violent act.
vol xlviI no 38
COMMENTARY
Such instances and the pattern of
invocation of the law not only raise ques-
tions about the ulterior motive of the
government but also more fundamental
questions about the need to invoke
extraordinary laws such as UAPA in peace
time within a democracy.
Constructing Criminals
The UAPA helps the government specifi-
cally target those whose voices it considers
as “threatening” or those whose identity
makes them vulnerable in front of the
ruling elite. This is most obvious in the
list of case studies that our report under-
takes. In the last seven years since the
Congress-led United Progressive Alli-
ance government came to power, it has
ordered a large number of arrests under
the amended UAPA. What is common
across these cases of arrest is that most
people booked under the law are not
guilty of any cognisable criminal offence
or activity. Their alleged association
with organisations critical of the gov-
ernment has been their “crime”. Some
cases at a glance paint a desolate picture
of the state of Indian democracy.
Imran Kirmani, an aeronautical engi-
neer from Kashmir working as a techni-
cian in Delhi, was picked up in 2006 by
members of the Special Cell of Delhi
Police alleging association with Lashkar-e-
Taiba, a banned organisation. He, along
with Ghulam Rasool, was incarcerated
for five years only to be acquitted for a
crime not committed. Cases such as
these represent the grave miscarriage of
justice that the UAPA allows. In another
case, in Uttar Pradesh, Seema Azad, a
human rights activist, along with her
EPW Index
An author-title index for EPW has been
prepared for the years from 1968 to 2010.
The PDFs of the Index have been uploaded,
year-wise, on the EPW web site. Visitors can
download the Index for all the years from the
site. (The Index for a few years is yet to be
prepared and will be uploaded when ready.)
EPW would like to acknowledge the help of
the staff of the library of the Indira Gandhi
Institute for Development Research, Mumbai,
in preparing the index under a project
supported by the RD Tata Trust.
17
COMMENTARY
husband, was picked up on charges of
being a Maoist and for sedition in Febru-
ary 2010. Cases were slapped under
UAPA. Her “crime” was that of running a
radical and progressive magazine Dastak
which sided with people’s movements,
and for being a civil rights activist. She
continues to be imprisoned. Under a very
similar plot, Angela Sontakke, a dalit acti-
vist from Maharashtra, was arrested by
the Maharashtra Police’s Anti-Terrorist
Squad (ATS) in April 2011 for alleged links
with Maoists. Twenty cases were foisted
on her for “crimes” that she allegedly
committed in Gadchiroli and Gondia,
two places she has never visited.
These illustrations show how laws
such as UAPA allow for common people
to be falsely implicated for thinking and
speaking about the gross injustice being
committed by the State and its agencies.
Criminal charges under the UAPA against
persons not only facilitates their deten-
tion and hence suppression; they, in fact,
already create the identity of a criminal
out of an undertrial. This is most obvious
in case of Kanchan Bala, a women’s rights
activist from Delhi. She was arrested on
suspicion of being a member of a banned
organisation, CPI(Maoist) in April 2010.
Her husband Gopal, a trade union acti-
vist was also arrested on the same pre-
text. The police claimed that an impeach-
ing letter was recovered from Kanchan
received from Seema Azad (which only
contained a list of books). The fact that
Seema was still an undertrial was under-
lined to implicate Kanchan by associat-
ing her with Seema who had already
been given the status of a criminal and
member of a banned organisation with-
out being proven guilty in court.
If incarceration of the innocent seems
to be the rule under the UAPA, death of
those in custody is also not an exception.
The case of Swapan Dasgupta bears testi-
mony to the fact that police gives not
even an iota of significance to the health
of political prisoners. Dasgupta, charged
under the UAPA in February 2010, for
being the editor of the magazine People’s
March [allegedly an organ of CPI(Maoist)]
died in custody due to ill-treatment and
neglect of his deteriorating health. It is
a fact to note that the magazine for the
publication of which he was charged was
18
registered under the Registration of News- extraordinary repressive laws such as the
paper Act. Ranjit Murmu’s death in cus- UAPA but fair judicial process backed by
tody represents an even more gruesome professional investigation. The unbridled
state of affairs where a prisoner charged power enjoyed by the central government
under the UAPA and other sections of with all its prejudices only makes a
IPC died in less than a month’s time after mockery of democracy in the name of
his conviction, where he suffered from protecting the democratic nation. Even
no prior ailment. This case of custodial if there are cases of acquittal such as
death in West Bengal in September 2011 those of Kobad Ghandy from charges
was conveniently passed off as a case of under the UAPA, in addition to venera-
death succumbing to ailment. tion of the effort of the judiciary, it is
also imperative to implicate the police
Conclusions for incarcerating him for two years on
The study of the course of repressive laws false charges. The malicious prosecution
such as UAPA reveals how successive under the UAPA and the impunity of the
governments have attempted to constrict police for getting away with it needs to
the fundamental freedoms guaranteed by be challenged.
the Constitution to its citizens. While The emergence of organisations chal-
there has been a dearth of attempts to lenging the government has to be seen
uphold the directive principles of state in the context of deprivation, denial,
policy, constriction on fundamental rights neglect and injustice. It remains unex-
has been on the pretext of “national plained how the anti-nuclear protest in
security”. This myth of national security Koodankulam becomes unlawful where
incessantly works towards favouring the government’s response has been
state agencies and right-wing extremist one of cutting down essential supplies
groups. The UAPA not only criminalises to villages that are protesting. For their
the fundamental right to association but protest, the villagers have been booked
also dilutes the distinction bet ween po- for crimes under the UAPA and report-
litical dissent and criminal activity by edly 180 people have been charged
criminalising dissident voices and acts. for sedition.
In the process of this persecution, politi- The CDRO condemns the act of banning
cal dissent suffers major delegitimisation to silence dissent and constriction of
where particular ideologies, groups and fundamental right to freedom of expres-
beliefs are rendered criminal. This rep- sion and association. What is ignored in
resents a culture of political witch- the discourse around the UAPA is that
hunts wherein selected organisations freedom of expression is not just an indi-
that question the legitimacy of the State vidual right but also a collective right of
and the ruling classes are outlawed. groups, unions and political parties. A
The need is to recognise political dis- State that relies on repressive laws such
sent in the public domain as energising as the UAPA is a weak State that attacks
democratic processes and, at the same its vulnerable sections and serves the
time, having the potential to resolve dif- powerful. The struggle against draconian
ferences peacefully. Suppression only laws such as the UAPA is an essential
leads to greater discontent resulting in component of the movement towards a
violent eruptions. What is required is not democratic and just society.
W
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september 22, 2012 vol xlviI no 38 EPW Economic & Political Weekly
 september 22, 2012
Damned by the Dam
The protest by Omkareshwar oustees illustrates development without humanity.
T
he poignant jal satyagraha earlier this month by over 50
men and women, many of them elderly, standing in the
waters of the Narmada River is a reminder of the “collat-
eral damage” caused by so many of India’s large dams, its so-
called “temples” of progress. It is the story of the displacement
and pauperisation of thousands of people living in the shadow
of these dams who have lost their lands and their livelihoods
and gained nothing. It is a stark illustration of the meaning of
the term “destructive development”.
The struggles against the 30 large dams on the Narmada River,
led by the Narmada Bachao Andolan (NBA) from the mid-1980s,
have receded from public memory. But the images of the jal
satyagraha in Gopalgaon village, Khandwa district, Madhya
Pradesh, where representatives of the thousands of families dis-
placed by the 520 MW Omkareshwar Hydroelectric Project
stood in waist to neck-deep water for 17 days, reminded us that
these struggles are far from over. And the issues remain the
same – the unfinished business of resettlement and rehabilita-
tion for those whose lands have been submerged.
Media played an important role in compelling the Madhya
Pradesh government to respond to the Omkareshwar dam oust-
ees. As a result, the process of hearing their grievances is now
underway. According to the resettlement and rehabilitation
(R&R) policy of the state government – incidentally the Madhya
Pradesh government’s policy was once lauded as the most pro-
gressive – each family affected by the backwaters of the dam
should be offered two hectares of agricultural land and a finan-
cial package for rehabilitation. All this was supposed to have
been done, as laid down by the Supreme Court, six months be-
fore the lands on which these people lived were submerged.
Many, like those protesting in Omkareshwar, believed the dam
authorities would adhere to the guidelines and avoid further
submergence of areas not yet resettled.
Yet despite the Supreme Court’s orders and the slow pace of
resettlement, the reservoir level in the case of the Omkareshwar
dam exceeded the 189 metre limit laid down by the Court.
Similarly in the upstream Indira Sagar dam, one of the three
mega dams on the Narmada River that has the largest reservoir
in India, the storage limit was exceeded. This cavalier defiance
of the Court’s ruling, and the subsequent submergence of more
areas, triggered the latest round of protests.
Economic & Political Weekly EPW september 22, 2012 vol xlviI no 38
Irrespective of whether the Omkareshwar oustees have a case
or not, their protest illustrates a more fundamental develop-
mental challenge. Is it possible to meet the needs of a modern
economy, by way of electricity and water for surface irrigation by
harnessing our rivers and building dams without destroying the
lives of millions of people who happen to live in the shadow of
these dams? Is it possible to do this by minimising the destruction
of lives and the environment?
These were some of the fundamental questions raised when
the NBA launched its campaign more than two decades ago
against the Sardar Sarovar Project (SSP), downstream from the
Indira Sagar dam. The decades-long struggle, through mass
mobilisation followed up by multiple petitions in the courts,
slowed down the pace of construction, brought in policies for
R&R of affected communities and institutionalised environmen-
tal safeguards. It also forced the World Bank, the largest lender
in the case of the SSP, to pull back. This was followed by the con-
stitution of a World Commission on Dams. The commission con-
ducted hearings around the world, noted the social and ecologi-
cal questions that remained unresolved and recommended crite-
ria that governments should incorporate before constructing
large dams. The Government of India’s response to the commis-
sion’s report was predictably lukewarm.
Despite these significant interventions, and the NBA’s concerted
campaigns, the SSP and the Indira Sagar Project were completed
and commissioned and six other dams including Omkareshwar,
Bargi, Barna and Tawa are operational. The Maheshwar dam,
after delays because of non-compliance with social and ecological
criteria, is under construction. Yet all of these projects still face
numerous unresolved issues concerning communities affected
by them. The voices of those affected are only being heard because
of the dogged efforts of a group like the NBA that continues to
work with them.
Also, apart from the question of resettlement, bad planning
has led to other kinds of disasters post-completion. For instance,
in both the Bargi and Barna dams, waterlogging in the command
area has negated the benefits of irrigation from the Narmada
waters. Fishing communities that survived on their catch from
the free-flowing river are not accepted as “project affected” and
have had to struggle for fishing rights in the reservoirs. And vast
stretches of prime riparian forests have been submerged while
7
EDITORIALS

the token compensatory forestry undertaken by the project development. It needed those heart-rending images of the
authorities has made little difference to make up for this per- calloused feet of the men and women in Gopalgaon who stood
manent scar on the natural environment. These issues are so for so many days in water, to remind us of the true nature of
easily forgotten because they constitute a process of destructive current developmental agendas that are devoid of humanity.

8 september 22, 2012 vol xlviI no 38 EPW Economic & Political Weekly
SURVEY
Identity, Community, and Conflict
A Survey of Issues and Analyses
N Jayaram
Identity and its relation to ethnicity and community, on
one side, and conflict, on the other, have emerged as
salient topics for scholarly investigation in the social
sciences. Both internationally and domestically, there
has been a steady outpouring of writings on the subject.
This paper surveys the trends in this engagement in
India during the last three decades, exploring the
aspects and dimensions of the relationship among
identity, community and conflict seen in the literature in
different social sciences.
N Jayaram (njayaram2@rediffmail.com) is currently a Fellow at the
Indian Institute of Advanced Study, Shimla.
44
A sense of identity can be a source not merely of pride and joy, but also
of strength and confidence. ... And yet identity can also kill – and kill
with abandon. A strong – and exclusive – sense of belonging to one
group can in many cases carry with it the perception of distance and
divergence from other groups. Within-group solidarity can help to
feed between-group discord
– Amartya Sen (2006: 1-2).
O
“ ur world, and our lives, are being shaped by the
conflicting trends of globalisation and identity”,
observes Manuel Castells in the second volume of
his influential work The Power of Identity (1997: 1). It is through
articulation and expression of their identity that people make
sense of their collective existence and experience. The result-
ing distinction between “self” and “other”, “we” and “they” is,
contrary to popular belief, not primordial, but socially con-
structed. The self-knowledge implied by identity, as Craig Cal-
houn aptly points out, “is never altogether separable from
claims to be known in specific ways by others” (cited in Cas-
tells 1997: 10). This implies that not only do individuals identi-
fy themselves with, or define themselves as belonging to, com-
munities, but are so identified by others. When identities are
essentialised or aggrandised on one axis, people belonging to
communities – be they caste-, clan-, religion-, language-, re-
gion-, or nation-based – develop antagonisms and tend to
come into conflict with one another. While such conflicts be-
tween communities could, no doubt, be spontaneous outbursts
for protecting a community’s identity or protesting against its
violation, most often they are engineered by powerful sections
of the communities. Instances of violence and the destruction
of life and property in such intercommunity conflicts are le-
gion in human history.
Contrary to expectations, the forces of globalisation, includ-
ing the demise of statism, the information technology revolu-
tion, and the transformation of capitalism, do not seem to have
weakened communitarian identities. If anything, evidence to
go by only confirms that, during the last three decades or so,
there has been a “widespread surge of powerful expressions of
collective identity that challenge globalisation and cosmopoli-
tanism on behalf of cultural singularity and people’s control
over their lives and environment” (Castells 1997: 2). The mani-
festations of these expressions are expectedly many and diver-
sified, depending on the socio-historical situation. Of particu-
lar concern are “a whole array of reactive movements that
build trenches of resistance on behalf of God, nation, ethni-
city, family, locality, that is, the fundamental categories of
millennial existence now threatened under the combined,
SEPTEMBER 22, 2012 vol xlvii no 38 EPW Economic & Political Weekly

contradictory assault of techno-economic forces and trans-
formative social movements” (Castells 1997).1
Not surprisingly, the concern with and discussion on iden-
tity has become pervasive among different communities in dif-
ferent parts of the world. In India, languages that did not origi-
nally have a term to designate the concept of identity have now
evolved terms, often based on Sanskrit roots, or adapted an
existing word for the purpose (Jayaram 2004). The fact that
“identity” did not have a semantic location in many Indian lan-
guages is a significant factor that should be taken into consid-
eration in understanding people’s concern with their collective
identities today.
Identity and its relation to ethnicity and community, on the
one hand, and conflict, on the other, have emerged as salient
topics for scholarly investigation in the social sciences. Inter-
nationally, there has been a steady outpouring of literature on
the subject, as evidenced by the publication of several readers
on it (Calhoun 1994; Hall and du Gay 1997; du Gay et al 2000;
Tazi 2004). In India, too, social scientists have been increas-
ingly engaged in understanding identity and the related issues.
This essay is intended to survey the trends in this engagement
during the last three decades.
As an analytical category, identity has been integral to psy-
chology; especially in discussions on personality, “identity cri-
sis” is viewed as a manifestation of personality disorder. How-
ever, even in psychology in India, intensive research on the
themes of self and identity is of recent origin. In their review of
psychological research (for the Indian Council of Social
Science Research; ICSSR) on the subject during 1993-2003,
Arvind K Mishra et al observe that in the earlier ICSSR surveys
of research in psychology “there was no specific chapter on
the theme of self and identity as such”; the reviews on the
theme “had only peripheral presence” (2009: 54). Although in
surveying the literature on the subject they chart out “a route
to traverse through…from the individual to the collective/
social affairs” (55), their emphasis on the theoretical and
empirical aspects of the self and identity is basically psycho-
logical in orientation.
Identity, however, has an important sociological connota-
tion in that it gets expressed, mediated, and contested in col-
lectivist or group terms. It is in this collectivist sense that the
concept of “identity” gets linked to the concepts of “commu-
nity” and “conflict”. Thus, the focus of this essay is primarily
sociological; it explores the aspects and dimensions of the rela-
tionship among the triumvirate of identity, community and
conflict as revealed in the literature on the subject in different
social sciences.
Within the limited scope of this essay, it is neither possible
nor necessary to review all writings on the subject of identity,
community and conflict. What is done here is to delineate the
thematic of the subject as revealed by empirically and analyti-
cally significant studies with reference to India. For the benefit
of scholars, however, the bibliography provides a more com-
prehensive, if not exhaustive, documentation of research on
the subject. Besides the important research works published
on the subject during the last quarter century or so, the essay
Economic & Political Weekly EPW SEPTEMBER 22, 2012 vol xlvii no 38
SURVEY
covers research-based and/or exegetical articles published in
the following journals during 2000-12 – Contributions to
Indian Sociology, Economic and Political Weekly, Indian Eco-
nomic and Social History Review, Sociological Bulletin and
The Indian Journal of Social Work.2
1 The Concepts
Perhaps the most cogent definition of identity and its concep-
tual analysis is provided by Castells (1997). According to him,
identity, as it refers to human beings in society, is “the process
of construction of meaning on the basis of a cultural attribute,
or related set of cultural attributes that is/are given priority
over other sources of meaning” (1997: 6). He recognises that a
given individual or a collective actor may have plurality of
identities. Such a plurality, he points out, is “a source of stress
and contradiction in both self-representation and social
action” (ibid: 6). Accordingly, he distinguishes “identity” from
what sociologists like Robert K Merton have called “roles, and
role-sets” (ibid: 6).
It is well known that identities can originate from the domi-
nant institutions of a society. However, they become identities,
Castells argues, “only when and if social actors internalise
them, and construct their meaning around this internalisa-
tion” (ibid: 7). Since social relations are also relations of power,
“the social construction of identity always takes place in a con-
text marked by power relationships” (ibid: 7). Accordingly,
Castells delineates three forms and origins of identity building.
• Legitimising identity: introduced by the dominant institu-
tions of society to extend and rationalise their domination
vis-à-vis social actors...
• Resistance identity: generated by those actors that are in po-
sitions/conditions devalued and/or stigmatised by the logic of
domination, thus building trenches of resistance and survival
on the basis of principles different from, or opposed to, those
permeating the institutions of society...
• Project identity: when social actors, on the basis of which-
ever cultural materials are available to them, build a new iden-
tity that redefines their position in society and, by so doing,
seek the transformation of overall social structure (ibid: 8).
These three forms, to be sure, are only analytically distinct.
In reality, “identities that start as resistance may induce
projects, and may also, along the course of history, become
dominant in the institutions of society, thus becoming legiti-
mising identities to rationalise their domination” (ibid: 8).
One point needs clarification here. Although an individual
may have plurality of identities, s/he will invoke a specific
identity depending on the situation and context. However,
the context-specificity of identity is not always neat. Often an
individual make invoke an identity outside the context in which
the interaction takes place or others may relate to or interact
with an individual in terms of an identity that is not relevant
to that context. For instance, an individual may invoke the
identity of the caste or religion to which s/he belongs when the
context is secular (say, in a public place). Similarly, in the media,
the identity of an individual is expressed in terms of his religion
or caste even when it is incidental to the incident reported.
45
SURVEY
Identity has immense import for collectivities, just as the
identity of a collectivity has immense import for the individuals
belonging to it. Sociologically speaking, this firmly relates the
concept of identity to the concepts of community and also
ethnicity. The concept underlying the term community, which
has been in the English language since the 14th century
(Williams 1976: 65-66), has metamorphosed over time, especially
during the last century or so, and is devoid of any accepted
definition today. The definitional criterion of the concept
“now revolves around ‘identity’, which has to do more with
imagined commonalities even among people who may not be
personally acquainted…than with face-to-face interactions
among people living in physical contiguity. Of course, face-to-
face interaction can solidify and reinforce community identity”
(Jayaram 2009: 395).
Similarly, the concept of ethnicity is also fuzzy; in the large
body of literature on the subject, there appears to be no con-
sensus on what ethnicity is. The terms “ethnicity” and “ethnic
group” are “among the most complicated, volatile and emo-
tionally charged words and ideas in the lexicon of social
science”, writes Manning Nash (1989: 1), a theorist of ethnic-
ity. Because of their roots in history, ethnic identities are often
regarded as intransigent. However, as Arjun Appadurai (1997:
139-57) has argued, identities are not immutable; they are fluid
and amorphous and constantly being reinvented.
While the literature on ethnic identity presumes that ethnicity
shapes the behaviour of individuals and groups, it is not clear
how it does that. Prema A Kurien finds the power of ethnicity,
the strong sense of subjective identification, to lie “in the latent
way in which it produces and reproduces individuals and
groups” (2004: 2). It is the production and reproduction of
groups that is of particular interest to this essay.
Identities expressed in collectivist terms of a community or
ethnic group are often the outcome of consultation and confabu-
lation, especially in situations where multiple communities or
ethnic groups exist. Sometimes, communities are “imagined”
(Anderson 1983) and identities are “invented” (Leslie and McGee
2000). That community identities are socially constructed im-
plies the conscious mobilisation of people in defence of their com-
munity’s interests and the invoking and reinforcement of identi-
ties in the process. Associations (based on religion, sect, caste,
language, ethnicity, and so on) are formed and the mass media
(including the internet) are used for this. Gopa Sabharwal (2006)
analyses the origins of the concept of ethnicity, and explores its
relation to identity formation and social discourse on it through
the exhaustive study of an Indian city. Her main intention is to
suggest a departure from the definition of ethnic groups as caste
or religion based and to widen the discussion to the actual con-
stituents of an ethnic group both in rural and urban settings.
The “we and they” and “us and them” feelings integral to com-
munity and ethnic identities are often phrased in antagonistic/
belligerent terms and bring communities so articulated into con-
flict with each other. As Amartya Sen has observed, “Many of the
conflicts and barbarities in the world are sustained through the
illusion of a unique and choiceless identity” (2006: xv) and “the
cultivated violence associated with identity conflicts seems to
46
repeat itself around the world with increasing persistence”
(2006: 3). India has been a theatre of conflict between commu-
nities – communal conflicts involving religion-/sect-based
groups, caste conflicts, ethnic group conflicts, linguistic group
conflicts, and the like (Jayaram and Saberwal 2011). Often,
these conflicts have been violent, resulting in destruction of life
and property and the hardening of community veins.
Thus, theoretically, the analysis of identity as a sociological
phenomenon is intrinsically tied to the idea of ethnicity and
community, on the one hand, and conflict and violence, on the
other. In what follows, we shall try to understand the various
levels, dimensions and aspects of the dynamics of identity as
revealed by social science scholarship in the country.
2 Nation, Nationalism and Sub-nationalism
The broadest identity for human beings is naturally their species
being Homo sapiens, an identity that distinguishes them from
other animal species. While this identity may appear to be
inconsequential in social terms, the way human beings relate
to animals has been problematised by Krithika Srinivasan
(2010). Insightful as her analysis is, it does not concern this
essay, which focuses on “we” and “they” among human beings.
Perhaps, the broadest categorisation of human beings in these
terms is the distinction that is made in terms of race and civili-
sation. Given the predominantly biological connotation of the
concept of race, and the debunking of the idea of “pure” races
(Gould 1996) and the trenchant criticism of racism (Gilroy 2002;
Rattansi 2007), we may exclude the discussion of race from the
purview of this essay.3 Civilisational partitioning of the world
population, as Samuel Huntington did in his controversial work
The Clash of Civilisations and the Remaking of World Order (1996),
yields what Amartya Sen describes as “a ‘solitarist’ approach to
human identity” which “can be a good way of misunderstand-
ing nearly everyone in the world” (2006: xii).
In contrast to race and civilisation as identity markers, the
ideas of “nation” and its derivative “nationalism” (through the
derived adjective “national”)4 have animated the elite and the
masses and generated considerable scholarly discussion. This
discussion in contemporary times has been notably influenced
by Ernest Gellner’s examination of the relation between mod-
ernity and nationalism (1997)5 and Thomas Eriksen’s analysis
of the relation between ethnicity and nationalism (2002). That
our concepts of nation and nation state have been derived
mainly from the west is the thrust of the volume edited by
S L Sharma and T K Oommen (2000). Making forays into an
area hitherto dealt with mainly by political scientists, the socio-
logical essays in this volume seek to conceptualise the experi-
ences of “nation formation” and “de-formation” in south Asia.6
In a short but insightful essay on nationalism, Sudipta Kaviraj
has drawn attention to a familiar problem in approaching the
history of Indian nationalism, namely, “the partially helpful,
partly obstructive presence of Western political theory” which
This survey has been prepared as part of the UGC-sponsored project
on promoting the social sciences in India. EPW is grateful to the
authors for writing this survey.
SEPTEMBER 22, 2012 vol xlvii no 38 EPW Economic & Political Weekly

has produced “as much confusion as help in understanding our
nationalism” (2010: 317). Among other aspects, he discusses
the “historical preconditions for Indian identity” (ibid: 319-20),
“the nationalist history of nationalism” (ibid: 320-21), and the
“internal complexities of Indian nationalism” (ibid: 325-27).
His review suggests that “Indian nationalism is at the thresh-
old of a new stage, rather than the end of its story” (ibid: 321).
Using the protean relationship between citizenship and
national identity as the vantage point, the contributors to Oom-
men’s Citizenship and National Identity: From Colonialism to
Globalism (1997a) review the conceptual framework of nation
and nationalism vis-à-vis the emergent reality. In his editorial
introduction, Oommen (1997b) articulates the problematic of
the citizenship-nationality nexus in terms of the interface bet-
ween identity and equality. He clarifies the concepts of citizen-
ship, nationality and ethnicity, and shows their linkages. He ex-
plains why it is necessary to avoid their reciprocal conflations –
state (citizenship) and nation (nationality), and nation (nation-
ality) and ethnic (ethnicity) – and to specify the “critical mini-
mum elements” by which one can distinguish them from other
concepts. And he emphasises the need for “a conceptualisation
which can account for equality based on groups” (1997b: 110).
“The age of globalisation”, paradoxically, “is also the age of
nationalist resurgence” (Castells 1997: 27). On the one hand,
there is “the widespread (re)construction of identity on the
basis of nationality, always affirmed against the alien” and, on
the other hand, there is “the challenge to established nation-
states” from within (Castells 1997: 27), often expressed in the
form of sub-nationalism. This is, indeed, surprising, as nation-
alism had been declared dead from “a triple death”.
The globalisation of economy and the internationalisation of political
institutions; the universalism of a largely shared culture, diffused by
electronic media, education, literacy, urbanisation, and modernisa-
tion; and the scholarly assault on the very concept of nations, declared
to be ‘imagined communities’ [Anderson 1983] in the mild version of
anti-nationalist theory, or even ‘arbitrary historical inventions’, in
Gellner’s forceful formulation [Gellner 1983: 56], arising from elite-
dominated nationalist movements in their way to build the modern
nation-state (Castells 1997: 27-28).
Explaining the paradox, Michael Mann (2005) identifies
four supposed “threats” to contemporary nation states – capi-
talist transformation, environmental limits, identity politics
and post-militarism. He cautions,
We must beware the more enthusiastic of the globalists and transna-
tionalists. With little sense of history, they exaggerate the former
strength of nation-states; with little sense of global variety, they exag-
gerate their current decline; with little sense of their plurality, they
downplay international relations. In all four spheres of ‘threat’ we
must distinguish: (a) differential impacts on different types of state in
different regions; (b) trends weakening and some trends strengthen-
ing nation states; (c) trends displacing national regulation to interna-
tional as well as to transnational networks; and (d) trends simultane-
ously strengthening nation states and transnationalism (2005: 299).
One aspect of identity dynamics in relation to the idea of
nation, and more so to that of the nation state, in India is what
has been described as sub-nationalism (Nag 1993). This phe-
nomenon derives from the fact that India is not a single nation,
but a plurality of nations. The sociopolitical construction of
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SURVEY
“India as a nation” is a colonial phenomenon and it is well cap-
tured in the post-Independence concern with “nation-build-
ing” (Srinivas 2002; Masselos 1990). In India, sub-nationalism
has manifested in two ways – (i) the demand for separate
statehood or autonomy (called regionalism), which is articu-
lated within the constitutional framework of the state and
does not challenge the idea of India as a nation per se,7 and
(ii) the demand for self-determination (dubbed as secessionism),
which by definition challenges the idea of India as a nation
state. The latter manifestation is often described as “regions
within regions” (Ashutosh Kumar 2011). The agitation for a
separate state of Telangana is an example of the former (Reddy
and Sharma 1978) and what is euphemistically termed the
“Kashmir problem” is illustrative of the latter (Engineer 1991;
Kadian 1993; Ganguli 1997; Suri and Chandran 2008; Chandhoke
2011). That both these manifestations of sub-nationalism
have adverse implications for development can hardly be
exaggerated (Majeed 1984).
Shankar P Jha (2003; see also Thomas 1992) examines the
origin of the Kashmir problem, and D N Panigrahi (2009)
locates it within the international politics of the time, during
the cold war, and in the context of India’s relationship with the
UK. Robert Wirsing (1998, 2003) and Victoria Schofield (2003)
view the “Kashmir dispute” as a manifestation of regional ri-
valry between India and Pakistan. Moving away from conven-
tional analyses, Neera Chandhoke (2011) explains the “Kash-
mir Problem” as a case of “contested secession”. She reflects on
what kind of right the right of secession is, what circumstances
justify this right, and what moral considerations affect this
right. By building additional factors that characterise con-
tested secessions into liberal theories, she reworks existing un-
derstandings of secession. Ashok Kaul (2011) examines the
“contested identity” of Kashmir.
Sub-Nationalism in the North-East
The expression of sub-nationalism in north-east India is differ-
ent in that tribal ethnicity is an intractable issue there and in-
surgency has been a perennial problem for the Indian state
(Kikhi 2009). Bibhu Prasad Routray (2008) describes the
region as an “island of peace and ocean of conflict”. Nikhlesh
Kumar (2005) discusses identity politics in the hill tribal com-
munities in the region. Biswajit Ghosh (2003) examines the
genesis, growth and continuance of ethnicity and insurgency in
Tripura. Contributors to the volume put together by Bhattach-
arjee (2007) examine the roots of insurgency in the region
(see also Nag 1990). The essays compiled by B Pakeem (1997)
discuss the nature and implications of insurgency in the region.
S Nag (2002) views ethnicity and insurgency in the region as a
reaction of communities to the experience of marginality.
B G Verghese (1996) analyses the implications of ethnicity and
insurgency for governance and development. That breaking the
impasse in the region requires a strategy beyond counter-insur-
gency is argued by essayists in Sanjib Baruah’s volume (2011).
Secessionism is seldom peaceful and insurgency invariably
involves armed conflict between the group articulating the
secessionist demand and the armed forces of the state resisting
47
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it. D Suba Chandran and P R Chari (2009, 2010) have put
together volumes sketching the emergence of armed conflict
in south Asia, the factors sustaining violence, and the com-
plicit management processes, while charting the direction
these conflicts are likely to take. The consequences of such
armed conflicts for vulnerable sections like women and chil-
dren will be discussed later.
People are often uprooted and dislocated because of armed
conflicts or in resistance to attacks on their identity. Inter-
nationally, this results in the refugee problem and what could
be called “long-distance nationalism”. Pia Oberoi (2006)
traces the history of refugee policymaking and its motivations
in the Indian subcontinent since 1947, examining in detail the
six major instances of forced displacement on the territory of
states in the region. Honey Oberoi Vahali (2009) explores the
psychological consequences of a historical event, the expulsion
of Tibetans from their homeland by the Chinese government
in 1959 to India. Taking a postcolonial approach to inter-
national relations, Dibyesh Anand (2009) looks at two crucial
elements of the Tibet question – the framing of the debate over
its political status and Tibetan identity discourses. Fiona
McConnell (2009) examines the uniqueness and limitations of
the Tibetan democracy-in-exile.
A key element in the social construction of India as a nation
was the division of the subcontinent and the creation of Pakistan
in 1947. Partition has had a profound impact on the history of
both India and Pakistan, so much so that it has never ceased to
be an area of scholarly interest, and a new genre called “Parti-
tion studies” has come into existence (Pandey 2001; Mushirul
Hasan 1993; J Chatterjee 2008). Satish Saberwal (2010; see
also Saberwal 2006) examines the social-psychological proc-
esses that led to Partition, and Kaushik Roy (2011) has put
together an anthology of seminal studies by leading scholars
on the timing and causes of Partition. From first-hand accounts
of the process of division to the reconstruction of experiences
of the subordinate and the marginal, this volume discusses the
events leading to Partition. Sudhir Ghosh (2007) gives an
individual’s informed account of the principal actors in the
drama leading to Partition and the creation of parliamentary
democracy in India.
Moving beyond conventional analyses, Nonica Datta (2009)
provides a parallel account of events and non-events, memory
and history, and testimony and experience surrounding Parti-
tion. Breaking the silence of oral testimony and presenting
memory as history, her work widens historians’ territory. Papiya
Ghosh (2007) further widens the scope of Partition studies by
considering its residual impact on the lives of migrants and mi-
norities in an increasingly transnational context. Ravinder
Kaur (2007) summarises the nearly six-decade-long efforts at
restoring homes and livelihoods lost in 1947. She tells the story
of Hindus and Sikhs from the North West Frontier Province
and West Punjab who made India’s capital their new home.
The changes in the social and political landscape of Bengal
resulting from Partition and the creation of minorities – Muslims
in West Bengal and Hindus in Bangladesh – is the theme of
the essays in the volume put together by Abhijit Dasgupta
48
et al (2011). On the Indian side, the post-Partition Muslim
minority and the riots of 1950 (Bandyopadhyay 2011b) and the
assimilation of refugees in West Bengal (Nakatami 2011) are
discussed. On the Bangladesh side, the deprivation suffered by
the Hindu minority due to the Vested Property Act (Barkat
2011) and their marginalisation (Togawa 2011) are examined.
In an interesting essay, Abu Doyen (2011) analyses the plight of
the Hindu minority as depicted in contemporary fiction in
Bangladesh. In a separate book, Tarun K Saint (2010) has
looked at fictional representations of the violence that accom-
panied the Partition in 1947.
3 Religion as Identity
Perhaps the most fundamental cleavage in modern India has
been in terms of religious affiliations. That the demand for
Partition was made on religious grounds and that Pakistan
was founded on the principles of Islam explains, at least partly,
aggrandisement in terms of religion in the post-Independence
era. The religious groups in India are not just different in terms
of doctrines and rituals. They are, for the most part, also different
in terms of marriage, divorce and inheritance patterns, family
and kinship, gender norms and behaviour, and occupational
specialisations, economic positions, and educational attain-
ments. These multidimensional differences among religious
communities in India have led some scholars to describe them
as “ethnic” groups (Schermerhorn 1978; Phadnis 1990; Brass
1991; Varshney 1998). The variations among religious groups
(and castes, to be discussed later) are recognised not only by
the people but also by the central and the state governments.
The religious groups in India are amorphous and they are
characterised by regional differences internally. Overlooking
intra-religious differences has frequently resulted in essential-
ising religious identities and communalism. In India, the term
communalism essentially carries a negative connotation,
implying the hardening of communal veins and intercommu-
nity conflicts and violence. Such conflicts are often discussed
under the rubric “communal conflicts”. Although such con-
flicts have taken place between different religious groups (and
sects within a religious group), in academic parlance as well as
popular imagination the terms “communal conflict” or “com-
munal riot” conjure the image of Hindu-Muslim conflagration.
Communal conflicts and riots involving Hindus and Muslims
have a long history in India (Chandra 2004). Gyanendra Pandey
(1990) shows how communalism was sociopolitically constructed
in colonial north India (see also Mushirul Hasan 2004; Copland
2008). Based on archival, institutional and individual record
collections, Papiya Ghosh (2010) examines community-ori-
ented formations and communal politics in pre-Partition north
India, showing how community, religion and nation-making
in Bihar in the 1940s were intimately related. Vasanthi Raman
(2010) studies the impact of communal violence of the early
1990s on the lives of individual Muslim weavers in Banaras.
There is no gainsaying that religious identities became more
rigid during the nationalist movement and in the aftermath
of Partition (Pandey 2001). Repeated communal conflict has
prompted scholars to look at the formation and change of
SEPTEMBER 22, 2012 vol xlvii no 38 EPW Economic & Political Weekly

religious identities (Beckerlegge 2008). Research on Muslims
has pointed to the existence of multiple identities among them
(Mushirul Hasan 1998). Narratives from villages in Bihar led
Peter Gottschalk (2005) to question the conventional depiction
of India as a nation divided by religious communities. He
shows that individuals living in rural India have multiple iden-
tities, some of which cut across religious boundaries, and that
their everyday social interactions transcend the religious divide.
S A Zaidi (2010) shows how multiple and contested interpre-
tations of the practices and scriptures of Islam emerged in
north India in the second half of the 19th century as different
groupings of faith became formalised. Even a question such as
“Who is a Muslim?” was answered differently by each group,
even to the exclusion of all other Muslims who did not sub-
scribe to its school of thought. The British, in their efforts to
count and classify, used very different criteria, which were
quite alien to how Muslims appropriated their own sense of
authenticity. Nilanjana Gupta (2010) traces the emergence and
flourishing of madrasas and the myriad ways in which they
affect local Muslim communities, especially in West Bengal.
N Kirmani (2008) emphasises localised constructions of inse-
curity. The Handbook of Muslims in India, edited by Rakesh
Basant and Abusaleh Shariff (2009), examines the status of
Muslims in contemporary India by focusing on their socio-
historical background, their demographics, and their educa-
tional and socio-economic conditions. It also looks at policy
options to improve their condition.
Considerable research has been done on Hindu revivalism,
described as “Hindutva”. Walter Anderson and Shridhar
Damle (1987) have explored the role of the Rashtriya Swayam-
sevak Sangh (RSS) in Hindu revivalism (see also Tapan Basu et
al 1993; Amrita Basu 1996; Satish Deshpande 2000). The use
of videos and the politics of representation vis-à-vis Hindutva
have been discussed by Christiane Brosius (2002). In an inter-
esting study, Susan Visvanathan (1999) explores the relation-
ship between Christianity and Hinduism by using the catego-
ries of time, space, architecture and the body, and examines
the rich cultural tapestry of Hindu and Roman and Syrian
Christian life in Kerala.
Anshu Malhotra (2004) explores the construction of new
class, caste, religious and gender identities in colonial Punjab.
She examines how the notion of being high caste, as it devel-
oped and transformed during the colonial period, contributed
to the formation of a middle class among Hindus and Sikhs.
The essays put together by Doris R Jakobsh (2010) show how
Sikh identity involves the intermeshing of several historical
and present strands of consciousness. Paramjit S Judge and
Manjit Kaur (2010) examine the basic paradox of Sikh identity
by delineating “how ambivalence creates inclusion and exclu-
sion within the Sikh community” (345). The issue of Sikh
identity, they observe, “has been swinging like a pendulum
from one extreme to another. Instead of recognising diversity
in the Sikh tradition, there have been attempts to construct a
singular identity” (ibid: 345). Considerations of political prag-
matism and the extremist threat, they argue, have constrained
the Akali Dal, which controls both political power in the
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state and religious affairs through the Shiromani Gurdwara
Parbandhak Committee (SGPC), to remain ambivalent.
Gender Dimension
The gender dimension in identity politics has been examined
with reference to the Hindu right by contributors to the volume
edited by T Sarkar and U Butalia (1995). While recognising the
validity of community identity and discourse, contributors to the
volume edited by Zoya Hasan and Ritu Menon (2005) emphasise
the force of material and social circumstances in shaping the
lives of Muslim women. They reiterate that there exists no
“fixed identity” for Muslim women – rather that it is contingent
and contextually determined (see also Hasan and Menon 2004).
It is in Hindu revivalism that one finds the blending of
nationalism with religious-cum-cultural assertion. While the
roots of “Hindu nationalism” can be traced to pre-Independence
times, the advancement of the idea of “cultural nationalism”
for political purposes is essentially a post-Emergency develop-
ment. Hindu nationalism has been explored and discussed at
length by scholars (Graham 1990; Jurgensmeyer 1993; Malik
and Singh 1994; van der Veer 1994; Chatterjee 1995; Ludden
1996; Jaffrelot 1996, 1998; Partha Ghosh 1999; Hansen 1998,
1999; Jyotirmaya Sharma 2003; Froerer 2007). Jayant Lele
(1995) has examined the “saffronisation” of the Shiv Sena
in Maharashtra.
Two studies move beyond the conventional analysis of reli-
gion in relation to nationalism. Based on the constructivist
literature, Gitika Commuri (2010) has argued that identity
conceptions influence state behaviour in terms of both end
goals and strategies. She analyses the construction of the “sec-
ular” and “religious-cultural” self in India, and the discourses
on national identity (1926-2003) and key events (1990-2003)
– the Ram Janmabhoomi movement, the Godhra incident in
Gujarat, the rewriting of history textbooks, and the assertion
of Hindutva or Hinduness – “to understand if, and in what
manner, conceptions of national self have influenced engage-
ment with others” (xi). She examines India’s relations with
Jammu and Kashmir, Pakistan and China.
Based on her findings, Commuri argues
that the relationship between internal and external others must be
treated with caution as the treatment of internal and external others
may vary; that different identity discourses may lead to similar per-
ceptions of threat though not necessarily similar policies; that secular,
inclusive, tolerant identities do not necessarily engage in more coop-
erative action as opposed to religious-cultural, exclusive identities;
that under certain circumstances, identity conceptualisations (espe-
cially religious-cultural) may lead to more conflict-prone action; and
finally, that while identity discourses help us understand broad goals
of the state, they do not necessarily explain the strategies adopted in
dealing with the national or international other (xi-xii).
These findings also caution us against making any facile
assumptions about security and foreign policy practices in the
context of national identity discourses (xii).
Based on an ethnographic study conducted during 2001-04,
Farhana Ibrahim (2008) analyses how, within the context of
contemporary religious nationalism, communal strife and
border politics in Gujarat, a region (Kachchh) becomes a
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meaningful place for its inhabitants and how different peoples
relate to locality through time. She argues that the concept of
asmitā (self-pride, identity) may be seen as a regional variation
of the Hindutva ideology in contemporary Gujarat. Substan-
tively, she discusses the narratives of people living along the
Kachchh-Sindh border about state formation in the region. She
interrogates the presumed impermeability of nationalist dis-
course and territorial boundaries. Her analysis reveals both
“state-making” and “place-making” as emergent and unfin-
ished processes, and she treats “the politics of asmitā” as well
as “people’s responses to it” as continuing processes.
The thickening of communal arteries and the repeated
occurrence of communal conflicts has significantly affected
the social organisation of space, especially in urban areas
(Chandhoke 1993). Jyoti Punwani (2003) describes how com-
munal riots changed Mumbai (see also Srikrishna 1998), and
M Kothari and N Contractor (1996) report on planned segre-
gation resulting from riots, evictions and dispossession in
Jogeshwari East, a suburb of Mumbai.
Considerable work has been done on violence associated
with communal conflicts. Asgar Ali Engineer (2003) and Rafiq
Zakaria (2002) provide comprehensive accounts of communal
riots after independence. Robin Jeffery and Patricia Jeffery
(1994) discuss the Bijnor riots of October 1990. Hindu-Muslim
violence in contemporary India is the theme of Paul R Brass’
work (2003). Roma Chatterji and Deepak Mehta (2007) pro-
vide a detailed account of the riots that took place in Mumbai
in 1992-93, following the demolition of the Babri Masjid, and
engage with the riot and its aftermath, especially focused on
the residents of the largest shanty town, Dharavi. A similar
exploration has been done on riots in Jogeshwari, a suburb of
Mumbai, by Meena Menon (2012). Based on the narratives col-
lected from people in the respective areas, both these works
recount the trauma suffered by the affected people, the loss of
livelihoods and the experience of alienation. Broadening the
scope of her study on the history of riots, Menon observes how
riots have created a schism between Hindus and Muslims, and
the manipulations that ordinary people are subjected to by po-
litical parties. The broad canvas that Menon has chosen sug-
gests that while the cosmopolitan image of the city has suf-
fered severely, the communities have negotiated reconciliation
– though with no any real justice – and live together despite
much brutality and strife.
Based on ethnographic narratives and interviews, Rowena
Robinson (2005) has documented the life and coping strate-
gies of Muslim survivors of communal conflict in Mumbai
and two major cities of Gujarat. She weaves several stories of
devastating loss, the painful and never-ending process of
recovery, and battles for survival and redress from the state.
S Varadarajan (2002) has put together a volume recounting
the tragedy of communal riots in Gujarat. Analysing the
narratives of people and the vernacular press on the 2002 riots
in Gujarat, Lancy Lobo and Biswaroop Das (2010) show how
“political power gets” a “religious cover”. Adopting a long-term
view, Nikita Sud (2012) examines the puzzling coexistence
of “economic liberalism” and “political illiberalism” (which
50
also implies pro-Hindu cultural nationalism and intolerance
to minorities).
Methodologically as well as substantively, Ashutosh Varsh-
ney’s comparative study of communal conflict in three pairs of
cities – Aligarh and Calicut, Hyderabad and Lucknow, and
Ahmedabad and Surat – is unique (2002; see also Varshney
2001). The choice of these pairs is purposive – one city in each
pair has a history of communal violence, the other has a his-
tory of relative communal harmony. The question then is why
violence between Hindus and Muslims occurs in some situa-
tions but not in others? Varshney focuses on the “networks of
civic engagement” – either associational (integrated business
organisations, trade unions, political parties and professional
associations) or everyday interactions – that bring the two
communities together. He concludes that cities like Calicut,
Lucknow and Surat, which are strong in civic engagement, are
better able to control outbreaks of communal violence, com-
pared to Aligarh, Hyderabad and Ahmedabad, which are weak
in civic engagement. The study suggests that a vigorous and
communally integrated associational life can serve as an agent
of peace by restraining those, including politicians, who would
polarise Hindus and Muslims along communal lines.
Conflict, and the associated violence, results in “social suf-
fering” (Das et al 2001). Veena Das (2007) weaves together
rich fieldwork with a compelling critical analysis to make a
signal contribution to contemporary thinking about violence
and how it affects everyday life (see also Mehta 2006). Vio-
lence, when based on ideological premises, often takes on an
extreme form. Rabindra Ray (2011) analyses the contradic-
tions faced by the Naxalite movement in trying to put an ideo-
logy based on Marxist-Leninist and Maoist thought into prac-
tice in an Indian context. He provides a profile of what it means
to be a Naxalite and what Naxalism really means to its adher-
ents. Taking the case of Sikh militancy in the 1980s, Birinder
Pal Singh (2002) explains violence as political discourse. The
growing political violence resulting from conflicts around reli-
gious, caste and regional identities and their relationship to
changes in the character of the state are probed by essays in the
volume put together by Amrita Basu and Atul Kohli (1998).
Diversity, Multiculturalism and Secularism
India is a country of diversities; there are many intersecting
axes on which communities are formed and identities are
expressed.8 To deal with these diversities as lived-in reality and
to counter the hegemonic tendencies resulting from essentialis-
ing differences on any one axis – religion, region, language –
the concepts of “multiculturalism” and “secularism” have been
advanced. T N Madan (2009) reflects on contemporary con-
cerns about the inadequacies of secularism in the context of
religious assertiveness in recent decades. He examines the
ideologies of secularism and fundamentalism in the setting of
the Hindu, Muslim and Sikh religious traditions. The essayists
in the volume edited by T N Srinivasan (2007) discuss trends
in secularism in social, political, legal and administrative
organs, including academic institutions and the media. The
nature and critique of secularism in India is the theme
SEPTEMBER 22, 2012 vol xlvii no 38 EPW Economic & Political Weekly

pursued by contributors to Rajeev Bhargava’s Secularism and
Its Critics (1998).
Multiculturalism
The concept of multiculturalism has been elucidated in detail
by Bhargava (1999; see also other essays in Bhargava et al
1999). He discusses the relation between multiculturalism
and identity formation and between identity and community,
the politics of different collective goals, and levels and prob-
lems of multiculturalism. Since cultural conflicts do not al-
ways occur “within the parameters of civic peace” and are not
“fairly controlled” (ibid: 51), often resulting in civil wars or ap-
proaching them, he also analyses the contestations and con-
flicts vis-à-vis multiculturalism. N Jayaram (2000) provides a
south Indian perspective on the experience of multiculturalism
and nation-building.
According to Shail Mayaram (1999; see also Mayaram 1997),
scholarship on ethnicity and multiculturalism generally
presupposes a “a segmented view of society” – “Societies are
seen as comprising several communities which have distinct
identities derived from religion, language, race, and so on”
(ibid: 380). Such presupposition is problematic, she observes,
“with respect to a universe of highly complex multiple, plural
and cross-cutting identities, of overlapping circles within circles,
and ambiguities where boundaries are both fluid and highly
permeable” (ibid: 380). She illustrates this with reference to
the Mer (also spelt Mair), a community that has “inhabited a
complex interstitial space in between Hinduism and Islam, in
rural areas of Ajmer (in Rajasthan) that is locally called
Magra-Merwara” (ibid: 380). Contemporary identity politics,
Mayaram observes, has cleaved this community into two sec-
tions, the Muslim Merat and Hindu Rawat.
The suspension of intermarriage between them in this century is the
primary sign of ethnicity and community. But even in a state of acute
tension arising from the attempts at Hindu and Muslim religio-
ideological groups to convert them, their religion and social practice
continues to be extremely complex and variegated (ibid: 384).
The concept of multiculturalism, Mayaram notes, valorises
religious community, and “upholds the scriptural interpreta-
tion of the dominant voice and its version of what constitute
appropriate texts, canon, curricula and practice” (ibid: 399).
She, therefore, makes out a case for decentring “the divergent
notions within Muslim and Hindu groups of legitimate theology,
ritual and cultural practice” (ibid: 399). She argues,
The question of legal pluralism cannot halt at personal laws of reli-
gious communities but must address a range of practice. Multicultur-
alism must transcend the binaries on which much of political and
academic discourse is presently hinged – of state and community,
majority and minority, universalism and culturalism (ibid: 399).
Allied to nationalism, Partition, religion and multicultural-
ism in the discourse on identity is the minority problématique,
which has been, as elsewhere globally, a product of “the modern
triumvirate of state, nation and liberal democracy”, observes
Rita Manchanda (2010a: 4). She endorses Andreas Wimmer’s
argument that “nationalist and ethnic politics are not just a
by-product of modern state-formation” (built on democracy,
Economic & Political Weekly EPW SEPTEMBER 22, 2012 vol xlvii no 38
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citizenship and popular sovereignty), but “that modern princi-
ples and institutions of inclusion (of belonging to the ‘true
nation’) are tied to ethnic and national forms of exclusion”
(2002: 4-5, cited in Manchanda 2010a: 4).
Contrary to the expectations of the then political elite, Parti-
tion in 1947 “did not resolve the subcontinent’s minority ques-
tion”; it only made the issue “hydra-headed” – “it produced a
South Asian state system of ethnic kin states where a majority
in one state was a minority across the border, entangling the
minority question in the power intricacies of inter-state rela-
tions” (Manchanda 2010a: 30). Assertion of rights by the mi-
nority communities, on the one hand, and the resistance to
granting too many such rights, or what is termed “minority-
ism”, by the majority community has not infrequently resulted
in conflict between the two. Numerically, phrased in religious
terms, Hindus constitute the majority of the population of
India and Muslims constitute the single largest and most sig-
nificant minority, with people belonging to other religions being
insignificant in their percentage in the total population, if not
in absolute terms. Accordingly, majority-minority conflicts in
India have invariably taken on a “communal” colour.
Lipi Ghosh (2009) analyses the current scenario in south Asia
and south-east Asia with respect to the position of minority
groups. Partha S Ghosh (2007) examines the controversy sur-
rounding the issue of a uniform civil code vis-à-vis personal laws
and how it is entangled in the threads of identity politics, minor-
ity rights, women’s rights, national integration, global Islamic
politics and universal human rights. Sheena Jain (2007) reviews
the Shah Bano case through Pierre Bourdieu’s “theory of the sym-
bolic”. Apart from exploring the power and scope of Bourdieu’s
concepts, Jain highlights the heuristic significance of his analysis
of “the state, and of symbolic violence and misrecognition” (3).
Manchanda observes that nation states produce minorities
as “an essential part of their construction process; since the
majority, in producing the state, also produces the ‘others’ or
the minorities. Minority is posited as a political category, un-
derstood in contradistinction to the nation-state” (2010a: 4).
Not surprisingly, minorities come into conflict with the state,
and this is discussed at length in the volume put together by
her (Manchanda 2010b). Besides the situation in India (dis-
cussed by Ashish Nandy, Javeed Alam, Sukumar Muralidha-
ran), the volume covers the situations in Bangladesh (dis-
cussed by Asfan Chowdhury, Amena Mohsin), Pakistan (dis-
cussed by Shahla Zia, Ishtiaq Hussain, Rubina Saigol), Sri
Lanka (discussed by Jayadeva Uyangoda, Farzana Haniffa)
and Nepal (Mahendra Lawoti). The thrust of the volume is its
conceptualisation of minority as “a political category of non-
dominance and powerlessness as distinct from a numerical or
cultural statement” (Manchanda 2010a: 4).
Of special interest is Sukumar Muralidharan’s essay, which
argues that minority attributes are not innate in social identi-
ties, but are “a function of the contingent distribution of power
within society and the exercise of power by the national state”
(2010: 71). The danger in viewing identities as innate, according
to Muralidharan, is that “nationhood” comes to be treated as
inerasable. Essentially, he treats identity as a matter of individual
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choice and “innatism”, as an invention of the modernisation
process, a consequence of the coercive nature of nation-building.
Viewed thus, it is easy to understand how identity politics –
defined as the struggle for recognition and redistribution of a
variety of resources – has become the paradigmatic form of
political conflict in our times (Manchanda 2010a: 6).
Conversion and Religious Identity
Proselytisation has often been advocated for and practised by
communities that have been traditionally discriminated
against and suppressed by entrenched dominant communities
as a way out of discrimination and suppression. India is a clas-
sic case of a society in which a substantial section of the popu-
lation was kept out of the pale by brahminical Hinduism and
subjected to humiliation, even treated as untouchables. Pro-
testing against this, these communities have rearticulated
their identity as dalits (literally, the oppressed) and have even
left the fold by converting to other religions. Conversion of
such communities into Christianity took place under the initi-
ative of missionaries, and into Buddhism, encouraged by
B R Ambedkar. Similarly, tribal communities, which had expe-
rienced isolation from mainstream Hinduism, were converted
to Christianity by the missionaries. Has conversion radically
changed the identity of the castes and tribes? What has been
the post-conversion experience of people belonging to these
castes and tribes? (see Jayaram 1992).
Sociologist Rowena Robinson has for long been interested in
the phenomenon of religious conversion (Robinson 1993). The
essays put together by her with Sathianathan Clarke (Robinson
and Clarke 2007) examine the various facets of religious conver-
sion in India. More particularly, the essays she has put together
with Joseph Marianus Kujur (Robinson and Kujur 2010a) focus on
dalit and tribal Christian communities, who are found to be not
only marginalised but also constituted negatively – “They are
characterised more by their deficiencies in relation to dominant
framework, which is elite and Brahminical” (viii). Interestingly,
these “independent expressions of faith” are not only “not
adequately treated in the literature”, but also “marginalised
by mainstream Christianity, regardless of denomination” (vii).
Accordingly, the contributors to the Robinson and Kujur volume
“look at what are dalit and tribal Christianities, rather than at
what they are not and what they, presumably, lack” (vii).
The process of marginalisation of dalit Christians in the
north Indian context is well recorded by Mathew Schmalz
(2005). The Catholics are distinguished from converted
Chamars; the former is the asli (real, true) and the latter is the
phasali (trapped) Christian. “The phasali Christian is regarded
as caught between Catholicism and ‘untouchability’” (cited in
Robinson and Kujur 2010b: 2). Dalit Christians continue to face
marginalisation and discrimination elsewhere in the country,
too. They continue to be treated as dalits both by caste Hindus
(Kumar and Robinson 2010) and by those regarded as “upper-
caste Christians” (Mosse 2010). S M Michael (2010) notes dis-
criminatory treatment meted out to dalits within the church –
separate seating arrangements (sometimes they are asked to
sit on the floor, even where raised seating is available), liturgical
52
services (as in separate queues for receiving Holy Communion),
and even separate hearses and cemeteries.
The state also discriminates against dalit Christians, as they
are excluded from the privileges of protective discrimination
that are extended to the scheduled castes (SCs), though in
some states like Andhra Pradesh they are included under the
Other Backward Classes (OBCs). Interestingly, the state has
played a significant role in creating special categories like the
SCs and backward classes. Apart from becoming essentialised
and reified, these categories have been subject of controversy
and contestation by communities excluded from them as well
as those belonging to them.
Tribal communities that have converted to Christianity have
been constrained to contend with what Kujur (2010) calls
“double marginalisation” (see also Pati 2003). Based on ethno-
graphic data from Malti village in Mandar block of Ranchi dis-
trict in Jharkhand, he observes how, on the one hand, those at
the local level accuse the tribal church of destroying the tradi-
tional culture and dividing the community and, on the other,
the orthodoxy within the church hierarchy criticises its experi-
ments in tribal liturgy and theory as divisive and anti-univer-
sal. There is also the fear, as observed by Peggy Froerer (2010),
that the Oraons, a tribal people converted to Christianity by
civilising zeal, may backslide into supposedly “superstitious”
beliefs and practices.
Throughout the world, the identities of the dominant sections
of society tend to be superimposed on the weaker ones. Robin-
son and Kujur observe that “tribal worldviews have more often
than not suffered from the insinuation of primitivism in relation
to the sophisticated universe of Sanskritic Hinduism” (2010b: 1).
Of course, conversion to Christianity by tribes in north-east India
has had a similar impact. A similar process of marginalisation is
observed in the case of dalit converts to Christianity – “the tradi-
tional focus on caste Hinduism within the Brahminical or San-
skritic framework tends to put dalits on the periphery. Dalit reli-
gion is constituted negatively; it is characterised by what it ‘lacks’
in terms of the dominant framework” (2010b: 1-2).
Robinson and Kujur point out, “The worlds of dalit (and tribal)
Christians offer us the opportunity to examine the ways in which
they might create counter-cultures or manifest their opposition
and resistance both to Sanskritic Hinduism as well as to authori-
tative, elite Christian missionary discourses” (2010b: 5). It is in
this light that we need to understand the retention and even
revival of jati or tribal traditions, including artistic forms
(Kalapura 2010) or deities and ancestor spirits (Froerer 2010;
Lobo 2010), by dalit Christian and tribal Christian communities.
The dalit and tribal Christian identities are now “deeply
entangled in understandings (and misunderstandings) of the
idea of the nation”, note Robinson and Kujur (2010b: 18). As
Christians, they obviously fall outside the idea of nation as
defined by Hindu nationalist organisations; from the perspec-
tive of the state, they are minorities. The issues surrounding
this are discussed by Lancy Lobo (2010), David Mosse (2010)
and Chad M Bauman (2010).
Bauman (2010) highlights conflicts and violence involving
dalits (scheduled castes) and adivasis (scheduled tribes) in
SEPTEMBER 22, 2012 vol xlvii no 38 EPW Economic & Political Weekly

Odisha. He focuses on the situation in the state’s Kandhamal
district, which witnessed horrific forms of violence against the
dalit Christian community perpetrated by the tribal people.
He highlights how the Hindu right was able to create a wedge
between two extremely deprived sections whom one would
have expected to unitedly resist the regimes of domination.
Proselytisation, however, is not a recent phenomenon. From
a comparative perspective, Antony Copley (1997) discusses the
story of conversion of Hindus, Muslims and Sikhs to Christian-
ity by protestant missionaries in the mid-19th century. He
highlights the conflict of cultural loyalties within the Indian
Christian elite.
4 Caste and Tribe as Identities
For both individuals and communities to which they belong,
caste has been a tenacious and persistent signifier of identity
in India (Béteille 2012) and, to some extent, also in the Indian
diaspora (Jayaram 2006). The volume edited by Ishita Baner-
jee-Dube (2006) provides a historical perspective on caste and
related sociocultural processes by bringing together essays on
the linkages of caste with colonialism and politics, and its
practice and presence in everyday life in India. The persistence
of caste and caste-based discrimination and exclusion even after
five decades of independence and constitutional and govern-
mental efforts at mitigating its role in public life is noteworthy
(Béteille 2012). Not surprisingly, most of the studies on caste
during the last three decades have dealt with caste groups that
have been at the receiving end of caste and their responses to
the subjugation and humiliation inflicted on them.9
Focusing on the low-caste Chamar community, Manuela Ciotti
(2010) examines how some of them abandoned their traditional
“polluting” work and strategically entered the upper-caste weav-
ing profession. Drawing on empirical evidence from a Karnataka
village, Gopal K Karanth (2004) attempts to refute the idea of a
passive acceptance of low and subordinate status by the former
“untouchable” castes. Smita Tiwari Jassal (2001) examines the
process of caste identity formation with a focus on the fishing and
river-faring group of castes, the Mallah or Nishad of the Bojpuri-
speaking region in eastern Uttar Pradesh and western Bihar.
The process of upward mobility and sociopolitical organisa-
tion of the traditionally lower castes has attracted the atten-
tion of some scholars. Sekhar Bandyopadhyay (2011a) chrono-
logically delineates critical moments in the history of the
Namasudras. He examines their influence in nationalist and
local politics from the 1870s to the 1930s to their appropriation
into larger political groups such as the Congress, the Hindu
Mahasabha and the Kisan Sabha after independence. Minna
Saavala (2001) analyses some religious means that socio-eco-
nomically mobile low-caste families use to identify themselves
as “middle-class people” in Hyderabad.
What is noteworthy in the articulation of caste as commu-
nity is the sociopolitical assertion by historically marginal-
ised and traditionally oppressed castes groups. Focusing on
Yadavs, Lucia Michelutti (2008) explains how, using popular
democracy on the ground, the community has become very
assertive and politically powerful in north India. Based on her
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fieldwork in selected villages of Meerut district in Uttar
Pradesh, Sudha Pai (2000) examines “new” forms of dalit as-
sertion. It is important to note that the key caste conflict now is
between the “backward castes” and dalits.
Based on extensive fieldwork, Badri Narayan Tiwari (2011)
analyses the politics and political consciousness, participation
and mobilisation among the dalits of Uttar Pradesh. He also
deals with dalit social and political history in the state from
1950 to the present. Eva-Maria Hardtmann’s anthropological
study (2009) examines the nature and context of dalit dis-
courses, their organisational structure, and the local practices
of activists. She focuses on the heterogeneity, internal tensions
and transnational connections of the movement. The volume
edited by Sathianathan Clarke et al (2010) also looks at vari-
ous dalit movements that struggle against insidious forms of
caste-, class-, ethnicity- and religion-based violence and viola-
tion. John C B Webster (1996) discusses the issues in under-
standing the modern dalit movement.
Manu Bhagavan and Anne Feldhaus have put together two
volumes on identity issues vis-à-vis the subalterns. The essays
in the first volume (2009a) investigate a wide variety of issues
related to dalit politics and literature. Underlining the emergence
of “dalit” as a new political subject, this volume brings together
case studies from different regions and sectors – the politics of
the Chamars of Uttar Pradesh; the multiple identities of back-
ward-caste Muslims; the colonial oppression of peasants in
Bombay Presidency; the schooling of dalit women; and the
lives and stories of Bangladesh war victims of 1971. Their second
volume (2009b) focuses on the role of religion – encompassing
beliefs, ethics, ritual, devotional literature, folk culture, popu-
lar narratives and artistic expression – and its role in the con-
struction and deconstruction of caste and power in India.
An important aspect of hierarchy associated with caste,
apart from discrimination and oppression, is humiliation. The
volume edited by Gopal Guru (2011) theorises and defines the
concept of humiliation within an interdisciplinary frame-
work. The essays in the volume suggest that sociocultural con-
texts have a bearing on the meaning assigned to humiliation.
It is significant that the policy of protective discrimination
intended to ameliorate the conditions of the SCs has latently
stigmatised them. Ajay Gudavarthy (2012) examines the pos-
sibility of de-stigmatising reservations.
How do people come to live as they ought to live? Anand
Pandian (2011) addresses this enduring question through the
lens of “cultivation” – at work in the moral horizons of modern
development, in the personal life of desires, deeds and habits,
and in the making of living environments for both moral and
natural growth. Pandian argues that the work of cultivation in
all these senses has been central to the fate of the Piramalai
Kallar caste of south India, condemned and policed for decades
as a “criminal tribe”.
Javeed Alam (2004: 45-60) discusses the process of identity
formation among the oppressed castes, whom, borrowing a
phrase from Partha Chatterjee, he describes as having been
and experiencing “collective unfreedom” (ibid: 46). Rudolf C
Heredia argues that “subaltern alternatives represent a
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horizon of revolt and revolution, which can fuse with others to
construct the identities and ideologies for a brave new world”
(2000: 37).
Badri Narayan (2004) shows how dalit communities are
inventing their caste histories in the present context as stories
of self-respect. Joe Arun (2007) examines the process by which
the Paraiyars, one of the dalit communities of Tamil Nadu
have sought to reconstruct their identity by revalorising the
“parai drum”, a symbol of pollution that defined them as low
and defiled, into a positive symbol of their culture.
Taking the cue from a recent conflict between Ad-Dharmis
and Jats in a village of Punjab over the question of representa-
tion in the management of a religious shrine, Surinder S Jodhka
(2004) looks at caste in relation to Sikhism and in the regional
context of contemporary Punjab. He argues that, as in the
case of other structures of social relations, caste identities
too undergo change and that they have never functioned as
“pure ideological systems” (see also Judge 2002). For a region-
specific understanding of caste, we need to “disentangle it from
Hinduism and look at caste from an historical perspective”.
He argues that “while caste is nearly dead in contemporary
Punjab, as an ideology, it survives and thrives as a source of
identity” (2004: 165). In another paper (Jodhka 2006), he has
analysed assertion and identity among the dalits of rural Punjab.
Ronki Ram (2004) argues that recent dalit assertion in Punjab
ought to be traced back to the Ad-Dharm movement of the
1920s, which emerged along with several similar movements
in a number of regions in India. The movement aimed at carv-
ing out a distinct identity for the untouchables, independent of
the Hindus, Sikhs and Muslims.
The essays in Sukhadeo Thorat and Katherine S Newman’s
volume (2009) explore contemporary patterns of economic dis-
crimination faced by dalits and religious minorities like Mus-
lims and the underlying attitudinal orientations that contrib-
ute to inequality in various spheres of life. The volume investi-
gates empirical evidence of discrimination by focusing on the
urban labour market as well as other markets in rural areas.
There have been important historical excursions into caste as
identity. Awadhendra Sharan (2003) seeks to unpack the admin-
istrative and knowledge practices through which the community
of “depressed classes” (SCs) was delineated in colonial Bihar. He
shows that right through the colonial period, there remained a
great deal of ambiguity about how to distinguish lower castes
from tribes, unclean castes from “untouchables” and these from
the depressed classes – ambiguities that were consequent on the
particular enumerative exercise being undertaken.
Anand Pandian (2005) examines the politics of security and
caste difference in the late 19th century Madras Presidency.
Relying on a vernacular principle of interpretation emerging
from the colonial archive itself – a Sanskrit “Law of Coinci-
dence” – he makes a case for collective identity in colonial India
as a conjunctural attribution. He examines “the trajectory of a
widespread peasant movement that sought in 1896 to evict a
single caste from hundreds of settlements altogether” and
“tracks an intimate traffic between administrative sociology
and native stereotype that converged on an assessment of this
54
caste as thieving and predatory by nature” (2005: 1). Birinder
Pal Singh (2010) looks at seven tribes of colonial Punjab that
were declared “criminal” by the British administration and
finds that, even today, they constitute the most oppressed
population in an otherwise relatively prosperous state.
The transformation of the category “Maratha” from its
precolonial register as a military ethos to that of a caste in the
early 20th century is the theme of Prachi Deshpande’s paper
(2004). Surveying the category’s genealogy in non-brahmin
literature and colonial ethnographic writings and policy, she
argues that “this caste-based register of “Maratha” was shaped
through a complex, interactive process by both colonial and
Indian discourses” (7). In doing so, she historicises “Maratha”
and emphasises the importance of locating the modern his-
tory of caste and its encounter with colonialism in regional/
local contexts.
Tribe has also been invoked as a primordial category in the
discourse on and contestations about identity (K Suresh Singh
2002). Archana Prasad (2003) provides a systematic critique
of the romanticised notion of tribal life, identity and ecology
that informs much of today’s scholarship as well as popular
perceptions related to tribes. She examines the genesis of a
certain vision found in the work of Verrier Elwin and how it
links up with the contemporary realities of ethnicity, caste and
community and a hegemonic Hindutva politics. Anthony R
Walker (1991) deals with the “western romance” of the Todas
of the Nilgiri hills in south India. Kumkum Yadav (2003) anal-
yses the way the tribal question is engaged with Indian narra-
tives. Sujit Choudhury (2007) throws light on the complex
process of formation of the Assamese nationality10 vis-à-vis the
evolution of Bodo society. He traces the different phases of his-
tory through which the Bodos emerged as the most dominant
ethnic minority in Assam.
Using the case of the Bhutias, the Lepchas and the Limbus,
who are defined as tribes in contemporary Sikkim, Vibha Arora
(2007) discusses the “politics of identity” and the “identity
politics” of being and becoming tribal in India. She argues,
“The cultural politics transforming a group into a tribe and a
‘Scheduled Tribe’ reflects its political strength and power to
influence the regime of representation in order to appropriate
preferential entitlements and resources” (ibid: 195). Thus,
“Being tribal does not necessarily indicate indigeneity, oppres-
sion, or subaltern status; it signifies political assertion and
empowerment in Sikkim” (ibid: 195).
5 Migration, Diaspora and Identity
We are now living in what has been called “the age of migra-
tion” (Castles and Miller 1993). Migration of people and their
resettlement elsewhere necessarily results in identity issues,
and in conflict. This theme is often discussed under the rubric
of “insider-outsider” politics. The essayists in the volume put
together by S Irudaya Rajan (2011) deal with issues related to
migration, identity and conflict. The essay by Rajan et al (2011)
particularly focuses on the politics of conflict resulting from
migration. Nel Vandekerckhove (2009) examines the battle
over “indigenous homelands” in Assam.
SEPTEMBER 22, 2012 vol xlvii no 38 EPW Economic & Political Weekly

A significant aspect of migration has been the movement of
people across the boundaries of nation states. Such inter-
national migration from India has resulted in the formation of
what is called the Indian diaspora. The volume edited by
William Safran et al (2009) contains essays on the Indian
diaspora – approximately 20 million across the world – in dif-
ferent contexts such as post-9/11 challenges, ethnicity in the US,
cultural identity versus national identity, gender issues among
the diaspora, and so on. Sreelekha Nair (2011) has explored the
“multiple identities” of nurses working in the Arabian Gulf.
Karen Isaksen Leonard (2007) has done a comparative study of
Hyderabadi emigrants – in Pakistan, the UK, Australia, the US,
Canada, Kuwait and the UAE – from the late 1960s to the end of
the 20th century. Pravin J Patel and Mario Rutten (2010) dis-
cuss Gujarati ‘Patidars’ as a metaphor of the Indian diaspora.
The volume put together by Susan Koshy and R Radhakrishnan
(2008) examines practices of political organisation, civic parti-
cipation, religious activity, cultural production, sexual rela-
tionships, family organisation and economic activity through
which displaced communities reconstruct themselves. It al-
lows us to probe scalar levels from the individual to the com-
munity, to the national and to the global. Ideas of home, cast in
a world-in-motion, offer new understandings of globality and
belonging. Combining psychoanalytical practices with clinical
data, Alan Roland (2011) explores the psychological effects of
immigration on Asians and Asian Americans.
The Indian diaspora, however, is not homogeneous. Not only
is it heterogeneous, Indian diasporic communities are also di-
verse, reflecting the diversities in the population in India. The
contributors to the volume edited by Jayaram (2011c; see also
Jayaram 2011a) examine the notion of “diversity” in the con-
text of diasporic communities such as the Punjabis, Tamils,
Jains and Indian Jews. Jayaram (2011b) further elucidates the
diasporic perceptions of “India” and “Indian-ness”.
In an interesting study based on ethnographic research on
three prominent communities in Kerala – Ezhava Hindu, Map-
pila Muslim and Syrian Christian – whose members have mi-
grated to west Asia in search of jobs and livelihoods, Prema A
Kurien (2004) explores the factors responsible for the striking
differences between the communities in their patterns of mi-
gration and the resultant social change. She shows that in
each of these communities their different ethnicities influ-
enced patterns of Gulf migration and outcomes of migration,
in turn, affected ethnic identity. Her work contributes to our
understanding of both modern Kerala and ethnicity as a con-
cept for comprehending social identity in the modern world.
The religious background of the three communities deter-
mined their social location within colonial and postcolonial
Kerala. This, in turn, affected their occupational profiles, family
structures and social networks, as well as their conceptions of
gender and status, and was thus fundamental in shaping
migration patterns. The rapid improvement in socio-economic
status brought about by international migration resulted in a
reinterpretation of religious identity and practice. This was
manifest in changes in patterns of gendered behaviour and
status in each of the three communities. Thus, Kurien’s book
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SURVEY
studies patterns that compose an identity shift in response to
circumstance and opportunity that occurs differently, but
markedly, on the three poles of religion, gender and status. Yet
within this story of change, identities reconstitute themselves,
they do not dissolve or disappear.
6 Gender and Identity
Gender has emerged as an important reality around which identi-
ties are articulated. The essayists in the volume edited by Julia
Leslie and Mary McGee (2000) examine processes by which gen-
der identities are formalised and ritualised through language,
ritual, narrative and politics. As noted earlier, the gender dimen-
sion in identity politics has been examined with reference to the
Hindu right by contributors to the volume edited by Sarkar and
Butalia (1995). Muslim women in Mumbai (S Khan 2007), gender
politics in the Muslim community (Zoya Hasan 1998), and wom-
en’s narratives on being Muslim (Kirmani 2009) are some note-
worthy discussions on the identity of Muslim women. Atrayee
Sen (2008) provides an interesting account of the role of Shiv
Sena women in communal violence in a Mumbai slum.
The construction of gendered identity, to be sure, is socio-
historically contextualised. Thus, Malhotra (2004) explores
the construction of gender identity among middle-class Hin-
dus and Sikhs. Focusing on the Singh Sabha reform movement
spearheaded by British-educated Sikhs in the late 19th and
early 20th centuries, Jakobsh (2005) traces the development
of gender ideals under the Sikh gurus and their adaptation,
and in some cases transformation, by the new intellectual
elite. The essays put together by her (Jakobsh 2010) show that,
as in other religions, the situation of Sikh women and their
experiences are conditioned by multiple factors including
identity, socio-economic status and the political context. They
cover three distinct themes – texts, conditions of Sikh women
in India and women in diasporic contexts – dealing with
women’s lives and religious experiences.
That women as a category are more vulnerable and subject
to violence is well known (Zoya Hasan 1994; Chatterjee and
Jeganathan 2000). Based on extensive fieldwork and sifting of
archival material, Prem Chowdhry (2009) analyses the pheno-
menon of contentious marriages and elopements in rural and
semi-urban north India, which has frequently resulted in
extreme violence against women. Women as victims of vio-
lence resulting from insurgency, militarisation and armed
conflict in Kashmir have been covered extensively by Urvashi
Butalia (2002), Sabha Husain (2002), Seema Kazi (2009) and
Nyla A Khan (2009).
7 Conclusions: Trends and Scope
The foregoing survey and the accompanying bibliography
show the wide and intensive coverage that identity as a theme
has received in the work of social scientists, historians and
journalists alike. What is noteworthy, identity has been invari-
ably discussed in conjunction with community, even as com-
munity has become a fuzzy concept far from the definitive con-
cept that it once was in sociology. Further, while community
identity has a positive dimension in that it helps individuals
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associate themselves with a community and reinforces com-
munity solidarity, it is its negative connotation that seems to
have attracted more attention.
Rather than being primordial, identity is constructed, and
its construction is strongly influenced by politico-historical
and sociocultural conditions. The construction of identity is
pitched at different and often overlapping levels – the nation,
region, language, religion and caste/tribe. Depending on the
context, an individual invokes different identities at different
times. Conversely, an individual may be ascribed/denied a
given identity, irrespective of whether s/he is agreement with
it. The play of community identities when resources and sym-
bols are involved often results in conflict, not infrequently vio-
lent. Conflict between communities reinforces their identities
and hardens community boundaries. It is the burden of the
state to ensure that community identities and interests are
protected and that communities do not conflict with each
other. However, given the nature of democratic politics, the
state and its machinery cannot or does not act as an impartial
referee – either it tries, in vain, to please all communities, or
sides with one community that serves its political interest the
best. This dynamics of identity in relation to community and
conflict is well illustrated by the studies surveyed.
At each level of its construction and play, serious scholarship
has engaged with identity. Significant contributions towards
conceptualising identity have come from Arjun Appadurai,
N Jayaram, Prema A Kurien, Gopa Sabhwarwal and Amartya
Sen. On nation, nationalism and sub-nationalism, the leading
contributors include Sanjib Baruah, Neera Chandoke, Partha
Chatterjee, Nirad C Choudhury, Sudipta Kaviraj, Ashutosh
Kumar, Sajal Nag, T K Oommen and B G Verghese. Incisive
analyses on Partition have been carried out by Papiya Ghosh,
Mushirul Hasan, Gyanendra Pandey and Satish Saberwal.
Religion and communalism have attracted the widest of schol-
arship; Amrita Basu, Neera Chandoke, Bipin Chandra, Gitika
Commuri, Veena Das, Asghar Ali Engineer, Papiya Ghosh, Partha
Ghosh, Mushirul Hasan, Farhana Ibrahim, Surinder S Jodhka,
Paramjit S Judge, Gyanendra Pandey, Rowena Robinson and
Ashutosh Varshney. The identity dynamics surrounding caste/
tribe have been examined at length by Sekhar Bandyopadhyay,
Ishita Banerjee-Dube, André Béteille, Gopal Guru, Surinder S
Jodhka and Badri Narayan Tiwari. The discussion on diversity,
multiculturalism and secularism has been enriched by Rajeev
Bhargava, T N Madan, Rita Manchanda, Sahil Mayaram and
T N Srinivasan. Gender issues in relation to identity have been
addressed by Urvashi Butalia, Prem Chowdhry, Zoya Hasan
and Tanika Sarkar. Finally, identity issues arising from migra-
tion and diaspora have been dealt with by Prema A Kurien,
N Jayaram and S Irudaya Rajan.
The subject has been of interest to many disciplines. Con-
tributors to it include anthropologists (Appadurai, Ibrahim,
Mayaram), demographers (Rajan), economists (Amartya Sen),
historians (Chandra, Mushirul Hasan, Pandey), political scien-
tists (Bhargava, Chandoke, Partha Chatterjee, Zoya Hasan,
Kaviraj) and sociologists (Jayaram, Jodhka, Judge, Kurien,
Madan, Oommen, Saberwal). Very few scholars appear will-
ing to cross their disciplinary boundaries; most of them oper-
ate with the conceptual frameworks and methodological ap-
paratus of their disciplines. The disciplinary orientation obvi-
ously circumscribes the understanding of the phenomenon.
By and large, there is a tendency among scholars working on
identity to engage themselves in exegetical work. Often ideas
(and opinions) are sought to be substantiated by anecdotal evi-
dence or delineated in analytical mode. This is more so among
scholars dealing with concepts – such as nationalism, secular-
ism and multiculturalism – at the most general level. Discus-
sion stemming from this often takes on a polemical overtone.
There are, however, intensive field-based studies exploring
the issues of identity and community at the micro level. These
studies use the ethnographic method and the analysis of nar-
ratives. Such studies yield incisive insights on identity and
community dynamics at the ground level. However, the gener-
alisations that they yield are expectedly socio-historically
circumscribed. This suggests the significance of and the need
for comparative analysis of identity and conflict. Scholars
working on the historical dimension of identity and commu-
nity make extensive use of archival material and oral testimo-
nies. The importance of their work lies in highlighting the
processual dimension of the construction of identities as also
the metamorphosis of community.
While much is known and theorised about identity, commu-
nity and conflict, one dare not say that there is nothing more to
be known. The fluid and metamorphosing nature of identity
and community as social constructions necessarily implies
that the subject needs continuous scholarly engagement. Sub-
stantively, the survey suggests the following directions for
further research.
(a) At the broadest level: The changing nature of the Indian nation-
state in the light of a changed international configuration and glo-
balising forces; the conjunction and disjunction between global forces
and local realities; the implications of the rise of states for the federal
set-up; and the phenomenon of regions within regions.
(b) At the ground level: Comparative analysis of inter-community rela-
tions (peaceful as well as conflictual) and identity articulations; the
changing nature of inter-caste relations (hierarchy and/or identity); and
the gender dimension in both inter-community and inter-caste relations.
More important, given the significance of identity-community-
conflict as an interrelated theme, social science programmes
must accord due place to it in both curriculum and pedagogy.

Notes
1 Rowena Robinson (2001) has explored the
global reach of Hindu fundamentalism via
the Internet.
2 My thanks are due to Kaivalya T Desai for help-
ing me in sourcing the material from various
journals.
3 The essays in Peter Robb’s volume (1997)
examine whether there were south Asian con-
cepts of race, or, as has often been argued, race
became an issue in the subcontinent only
under western influence after the 18th century.
In this context, one may recall the debate on
“caste as race” that animated the World
Conference against Racism organised by the
United Nations in Durban, South Africa,
21 August-7 September 2001 (Ramanathan 2001;
Shiv Visvanathan 2001).
4 Nirad C Chaudhuri draws attention to the fact
that “the same long time interval separates the
derivative from the original. The first citation of
the word ‘nation’ in the OED [The Oxford English
Dictionary] is from AD 1300 whereas the derived
abstract noun did not appear till 1836” (1997: 51).

56 SEPTEMBER 22, 2012 vol xlvii no 38 EPW Economic & Political Weekly

5 For a critical appraisal of the Gellnerian theory
of nation and nationalism by an Indian, see
D V Kumar (2010).
6 Among sociologists in India, Oommen has
made a significant contribution to the discus-
sion on nation, nationality and nationalism in
the south Asian context. His elucidation of the
concepts of nation and nationality (2004: 23-
41), nationalism and collective rights (42-62),
the untenable linkage between religious na-
tionalism and democratic polity (63-83), and
the relation between language and nation (84-
104) are particularly noteworthy.
7 Not surprisingly, there has been rethinking on
the nature of federalism in India (see Rasheed-
uddin Khan 1997; see also Narang 1995).
8 The essays in the volume edited by Chetan
Singh (2011) show how, despite the similarities,
Himalayan societies are diverse in terms of
various aspects such as environment, inter-
caste relations, marriage customs, religious
practices and folk traditions.
9 Among the notable exceptions is the case study
of Kammas, a Telugu-speaking dominant caste
in Andhra Pradesh, by Yamada Keiko (2008).
Keiko traces the role played by the modern his-
torical consciousness of region and language in
the writing of caste historiography during the
first half of the 20th century. His analysis of the
development of different historiographies –
from those of non-brahmin leaders Suriyade-
vara Raghavayya Chaudari and Tripuraneni
Ramaswami Chaudari to socialist-cum-nation-
alist leader N G Ranga and a caste movement
ideologue Kotta Bhavayya Chaudari – demon-
strates the correlation and complicity between
history and caste identity and homeland lan-
guage movements.
10 The nationalist upsurge in Assam is discussed
at length by Hussain (1993), Baruah (1999),
and the essayists in Bhuyan (2000).
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61
 LETTERS
Issn 0012-9976
Ever since the first issue in 1966,
EPW has been India’s premier journal for Citizens’ Statement: 22%. If only they were united, they
comment on current affairs
and research in the social sciences.
Repression in Koodankulam would be a force to reckon with. Even
It succeeded Economic Weekly (1949-1965), the two Dravidian parties would have to

W
which was launched and shepherded e are appalled at the police repres- show more respect and consideration
by Sachin Chaudhuri,
who was also the founder-editor of EPW. sion unleashed on the people pro- towards them. The different factions
As editor for thirty-five years (1969-2004) testing peacefully against the Koodan- and parties of the dalits do not come to-
Krishna Raj
gave EPW the reputation it now enjoys. kulam nuclear plant. The repression has gether since the leaders fear that their
editor
forced them to take to a jal satyagraha. personal importance would get diluted.
C Rammanohar Reddy Their legitimate, and as yet unaddres- A few years ago when Mayawati formed
Deputy Editor sed, concerns about the plant’s safety the Bahujan Samaj Party unit of Tamil
Bernard D’Mello were heightened by the Atomic Energy Nadu, Krishnasamy and Tiruma oppo-
web Editor
subhash rai Regulatory Board’s recent admission sed it, very unconvincingly.
chief copy editor that it has not implemented the recom- Secondly, dalit leaders also imitate the
roger alexander mendations of its own review committee, style of the cine-influenced leaders of the
Senior Assistant Editors including revision of safety parameters, Dravidian parties who concentrate on
Lina Mathias
aniket Alam and installation of backup freshwater and their public presentation through the
Srinivasan ramani power sources. No emergency-evacuation media. Thus dalit leaders ensure their own
ashima sood
Bharati Bhargava drill was conducted as mandated, in a appearance in the media by garlanding the
copy editors 16-kilometre radius, prior to fuel-loading. statues of famous leaders like Ambedkar,
Prabha Pillai The government has refused to disclose Periyar, Annadurai, etc, or put up their
jyoti shetty
pertinent information, including the Site flexiboard photographs on highways, all
Assistant editor
P S Leela Evaluation and Safety Analysis Reports, of which is just some hollow glory.
editorial Assistant nuclear-waste management plans, and the Further, my impression all along has
lubna duggal agreement indemnifying the Russian sup- been that the dalit leaders are in the
production plier against accidents, which mocks the pockets of some or the other casteist or
u raghunathan
s lesline corera absolute liability principle. These docu- Dravidian party for monetary gain. In the
suneethi nair ments need to be discussed publicly and at process they lose their dalit identity and
Circulation least with the people affected by the plant. are disabled from fighting against atroci-
Gauraang Pradhan Manager
B S Sharma Instead, the government is accusing ties committed on their own community.
Advertisement Manager the protesters of sedition, and the protest This article gives reasons for this situation.
Kamal G Fanibanda of being “foreign” inspired, despite an Finally, and perhaps most important,
General Manager & Publisher absence of evidence. This is part of a pro- unless dalits abjure from practising un-
K Vijayakumar
editorial
foundly undemocratic pattern, recently touchability among their own sub-castes
edit@epw.in increasing, of demonising dissent, dis- there is very little hope for their emer-
Circulation missing people’s concerns about hazards, gence as a powerful political force.
circulation@epw.in
Advertising
and brutally repressing protests. M R Rajagopalan
advt@epw.in We urge the government to suspend Gandhigram Trust
Economic and Political Weekly work at Koodankulam and engage directly Tamil Nadu
320-321, A to Z Industrial Estate and democratically with the concerns of the
Ganpatrao Kadam Marg, Lower Parel
Mumbai 400 013 people who live in the vicinity, so that if the Strengthen the CAG
Phone: (022) 4063 8282 plant is to proceed it has their acceptance.

I
FAX: (022) 2493 4515
Praful Bidwai, Romila Thapar, endorse your editorial “Accountability
EPW Research Foundation
Amit Bhaduri, Darrl D’monte, – Is It Just a Word?” (EPW, 1 September
EPW Research Foundation, established in 1993, conducts Arundhati Roy, Jean Dreze, K N Panniker, 2012). However, I also feel that you are
research on financial and macro-economic issues in India. Admiral Ramdas, M V Ramana and others.
rather soft in raising your pointers regar-
Director
k kanagasabapathy
ding the allocation of the coal blocks,
C 212, Akurli Industrial Estate
On Dalit Unity
Kandivali (East), Mumbai 400 101
Phones: (022) 2887 3038/41
Fax: (022) 2887 3038
epwrf@vsnl.com
Printed by K Vijayakumar at Modern Arts and Industries,
T his is with regard to the well-
researched article “Dalit Political Im-
agination and Replication in Contempo-
Corrigendum
In the article “Bodoland: The Burden of His-
151, A-Z Industrial Estate, Ganpatrao Kadam Marg, tory” by Udayon Misra (EPW, 15 September
Lower Parel, Mumbai-400 013 and rary Tamil Nadu” (EPW, 8 September 2012) 2012), on p 38 in the para “The present clash-
published by him on behalf of Sameeksha Trust
from 320-321, A-Z Industrial Estate,
by Karthikeyan, Rajangam and Gorringe. es...the percentage of Bodo population in
Ganpatrao Kadam Marg, Lower Parel, Mumbai-400 013. The first point is that Tamil Nadu’s the BTAD area should read 30% and not 3%
Editor: C Rammanohar Reddy.
dalit population is a little more than as has been printed. The error is regretted.
4 september 22, 2012 vol xlviI no 38 EPW Economic & Political Weekly

establishment of the Indira Gandhi
International Airport in Delhi under the
public-private partnership model and
several other projects that pushed the
government on the defensive, with reac-
tions that were totally unacceptable. Not
only is the government bent on repeat-
ing the same mistakes under different
pretexts, the Comptroller and Auditor
General (CAG) and his countrywide net-
work of Auditor Generals (AGs) have
been treated as a nuisance. Rarely have
governments shown the patience to
appreciate the point raised or the will-
ingness to act on them. One argument
that is frequently made is that the CAG
does not have anything to do with policy,
not quite appreciating that policies are
but guidelines for executive action and
unless the policy is brought under the
scanner, the actions following from
them cannot be stalled.
About the argument that the CAG was
not correct in raising the issue of under-
pricing the coal blocks and that these
prices are but presumptive, does not
hold water. The officialdom has chal-
lenged the proposition that govern-
ment’s losses have been colossal by
terming them presumptive and gross
overstatements. Rather, if the methods
of marine insurance and its concept of
“constructive total loss” had been used,
the losses shown by the CAG would have
been much higher. Thus it is arguable
that the CAG put the loss figures on the
lower side.
Various CAG reports on the entire
gamut of activities of the union and state
governments generally remain unread
and unacted upon, not only by the gov-
ernment departments but also by the
public at large. A rich fund of knowledge
and information available in these
reports has remained unutilised. I sug-
gest that the powers originally bestowed
on the CAG by the framers of the Con-
stitution be restored and his tenure be
extended to at least 10 years. In the
meanwhile, the CAG must have guaran-
teed access to all official information,
as was the wont earlier, to lend some
meaning to what you have rightly called
accountability.
P Chattopadhyay
Kolkata
Economic & Political Weekly EPW september 22, 2012
India, China, Myanmar
M yanmar’s recent opening up to
the outside world has presented
India with a new opportunity. In May,
Manmohan Singh made the first visit to
Myanmar by an Indian prime minister
in 25 years and signed agreements on
education, trade, culture and infrastruc-
ture. India can seize a prime opportu-
nity to revitalise its relations with south-
east Asian countries through the new
gateway of Myanmar, and in the process
balance China’s growing influence in
the region.
For now, China has much greater influ-
ence in Myanmar. In the year that ended
in March 2011, China was Myanmar’s
largest trade partner; their $4.7 billion
bilateral trade accounted for more than
a third of Myanmar’s total trade. And it
was more than triple the value of India’s
$1.4 billion trade with Myanmar. China is
also the top foreign investor in Myanmar,
with total commitments thus far of $8.3
billion, compared to India’s $189 million,
according to available data.
India can improve its situation if it im-
plements the agreements on building land,
rail and air links that were signed during
Manmohan Singh’s visit. They include a
bus service from Imphal in India’s Manipur
state to Mandalay in central Myanmar and
increasing the number of flights between
Kolkota and Yangon. Work continues on
a project that would link Indian ports on
the eastern seaboard with Sittwe port in
Myanmar and link Sittwe to Mizoram by
road and inland waterways. Both sides
also want to finish a road to connect Moreh
in Manipur with Mae Sot in Thailand
through Myanmar. Completion of the
road would make trilateral connectivity
a reality. India and Myanmar also agreed
to explore the possibility of freight trans-
port from India through Myanmar to the
rest of south-east Asia.
Web Exclusives
The following articles have been uploaded in the past week in the Web Exclusives
section of the EPW website. They have not been published in the print edition.
Read them at http://epw.in
“India and the Autumn of the African Patriarch” – S Arun Mohan
“A Judicial Doctrine of Postponement and the Demands of Open Justice”
– Sukumar Muralidharan
Articles posted before August 31 remain available in the Web Exclusives section.
vol xlviI no 38
LETTERS
Even though India’s “Look East” policy
was launched in 1991 many experts say
that results have been disappointing, in
particular due to delays in infrastructure
projects that are vital for trade links.
Although India and the Association of
Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) signed
a free trade agreement in 2010, India-
ASEAN trade was worth only $50 billion in
2011, expected to rise to $70 billion in 2012.
Over the past year or so, India has
significantly bolstered ties with south-
east Asia, most visibly in security. Both
sides have common interests in suppress-
ing terrorism, piracy and narcotics traf-
ficking, protecting the sea lanes, and bal-
ancing the influence of China. India’s naval
cooperation with Vietnam is a case in point.
New Delhi has moved closer to offering
Hanoi the use of naval facilities for train-
ing. Indian warships have been permitted
to dock at Nha Trang port in southern Vi-
etnam. India’s ONGC Videsh Limited has
been pursuing oil and natural gas explora-
tion in two Vietnamese blocs in the South
China Sea, despite Chinese displeasure. In
jockeying with China in south-east Asia,
India has the advantage of greater cultural
proximity with Thailand and Indonesia.
Apart from this there is now a growing
interest of the United States in reinvigor-
ating its Asian presence and the warming
of relations between China and Russia.
The fear is that as countries become more
powerful economically, they build up
their militaries and become more aggres-
sive on territorial and trade matters,
sparking disputes with neighbours.
Given this context, India’s policymakers
face important questions ahead. The
centrality of Myanmar to building India’s
relations with south-east Asia cannot be
overstressed. Myanmar can also play an
added role in helping India and China
cement their ties.
Reena Marwah
Delhi University
5
SPECIAL ARTICLE
Invoking Everydayness in Poverty Studies in India
A Note on Approach and Method
Mukul Kumar
The field of research on poverty is served mainly by
scholars who are influenced by the demands of
measurement rather than contextualisation. This has led
to a lack of focus on the relational and political side of the
problem of poverty, as well as on the lives of the poor.
The domain of strategic decision-making of the poor has
also not been adequately researched. This paper calls for
further exploration of this domain by employing a
combination of methods/techniques used in the field of
social anthropology. Such depictions of the poor and of
poverty would not only correct a bias in the orientation
of studies on poverty, but would also serve a political
end by possibly dislodging our complacent attitudes
towards poverty and destitution.
I express my gratitude to Suman, Shubhangi, Shashi, Anand, Virginius
Xaxa and Tulsi Patel for their kindness, support and forbearance.
Mukul Kumar (mukul@irma.ac.in) is with the Institute of Rural
Management Anand, Gujarat.
Economic & Political Weekly EPW september 22, 2012 vol xlviI no 38
A
ny scholar venturing into the fields of political econ-
omy, development studies, economics, political science,
democracy, and socialism has to willy-nilly engage in
discussions related to the marginalised, the deprived, the
downtrodden, the destitute, in short, the poor. These discus-
sions are focused mostly on issues of resource distribution,
equity, welfare assistance, market opportunities for the poor,
financial prudence, etc. These engagements are either direct
or indirect, depending upon a host of factors, such as discipli-
nary inclinations, the theme being researched, or the need for
making the social sciences more relevant and useful. Yet in
strange ways, the poor remain the most poorly represented of
the lot of human subjects. Their voices are drowned out in the
din of voices of scholars and practitioners claiming to repre-
sent the poor in India. These disciplines offer the poor an
opportunity to be cast in different hues and colours. The statis-
tical exercise of aggregation in narratives based on numbers
also renders them unrecognisable. They become average
types, and lose their identity and individuality. A significant
part of social policy is based on this exercise of measurement.
Poverty research is a science that usually elevates measure-
ment and disregards contextualisation (Harriss 2007). And
economists are clearly the leaders in this field. This happens in
the other social sciences as well, as real people are often lost in
descriptions of patterns, statuses, roles, and other concepts
(Lewis 1967).
Some studies have attempted to capture the everydayness
and relational aspects of poverty in India, such as studies by
Leela Gulati (1981), Jan Breman (2007) and his earlier works,
Beck (1994), Dube (1998) and Drèze (1990). Dube’s (1998)
study traces the history of deprivation and powerlessness ex-
perienced by an untouchable family over five decades. Gulati’s
(1981) study is another outstanding account of the travails of
working women trying to overcome poverty and destitution.
Drèze’s (1990) work on widows, and the poverty and depriva-
tion in which they live, combines quantitative and descriptive
materials in an effective way. It is based mainly on an analysis
of government data, but uses profiles of widows and personal
insights to bring out the social and relational conditions of
widows in Indian society. Beck’s (1994) work on poverty in
Bengal blends survey data with a very good appreciation of
the issues of everyday life based on in-depth fieldwork, and
hence has been able to focus beautifully on the relational and
political dimensions of the life of the poor. Last but not the
least, Breman, who has been the pioneer in the field of poverty
71
SPECIAL ARTICLE
studies in India, has combined profiles of the poor with formal
analysis based on survey data and other forms of data. Other
important academic studies that have used mainly quantita-
tive methods, but have also used qualitative and everyday in-
formation in more limited ways, are by Krishna (2003) and
Lanjouw and Stern (1998). Enlightening poverty studies by
Krishna (2003, 2004) and Krishna et al (2003, 2004) have
enabled us to understand the important reasons that lead
people to either escape or fall into poverty. But these studies
do not provide us with live descriptions of the poor nor of
their relationships with the non-poor. This is an unsatisfactory
state of affairs because we lack deeper, more detailed profiles
of the poor and the destitute in India. We still know little
about their decision-making processes. Saith and Tankha’s
(1972) conceptual study examines decision-making in poor
peasant households. There is, however, no notable work to my
knowledge that views economic decision-making by the
poor as a subset of the political and strategic choices available
to them in the sociopolitical environment of the village or
the community.
The policy world is significantly influenced by literature that
focuses on the measurement of poverty. This has led to signifi-
cant debates on numbers and methodologies, and their com-
parability, pertaining to the enumeration and aggregation of
the poor. This debate itself is profoundly political (Harriss
2007). Due to this focus on measurements, other social scien-
tists have fallen behind their economist friends when it comes
to discussions on poverty. Their own disciplinary predilections
are also responsible for this situation. For example, the socio-
logy in India has been far too preoccupied by caste, social
anthropology by tribe, and political science by formal institu-
tions of state and democracy. Another related reason is a
methodological one that pertains to the social sciences other
than economics. The difficulty of defining poverty is an acute
one for other disciplines because they do not easily agree on
the economic and technical measurements of poverty. This
has led to a lack of focus on the relational aspects of the lives of
the poor and the non-poor, and to a neglect of an understand-
ing of the processes that produce poverty and the poor (Harriss
2007; Breman 2007). Regarding mainstream poverty research,
Harriss writes:
The core of their arguments is that poverty becomes a tangible entity
through its conceptualisation in mainstream poverty research. It is a
state that is external to the people affected by it: individuals or house-
holds fall into it, or are trapped in it, or they escape from it. It is not
seen as the consequence of social relations or of the categories through
which people identify and act upon in the social world. Notably, the
way in which poverty is conceptualised over time separates it from the
social processes of the accumulation and distribution of wealth, depo-
liticising it. And depoliticisation is, of course, a profoundly political
intellectual act (2007: 3).
Robert Chambers (1992) has attempted to separate the dif-
ferent forms of deprivation from the technical definitions and
measurements of poverty that are usually considered to be
synonymous with it. He regards technical definitions as only
some ways of classifying and measuring poverty, but does not
consider that these definitions by themselves exhaust the
72
entire domain of poverty. This problem has been recognised
by many and some of them have tried to correct it by using
different techniques to study poverty. This attempt led to a
workshop and then a book edited by Pranab Bardhan (1989),
Conversations between Economists and Anthropologists, which
attempted to discuss the advantages of both kinds of research.
But Breman (2007) says that nothing concrete has come out of
this attempt. The World Bank also came out with a book,
Voices of the Poor, which attempts to capture the narratives of
the poor. However, this alternative approach to knowledge as
the basis for poverty action has been largely ignored in the
field (Harriss 2007).
Since the focus has moved away from everydayness poverty
studies no longer adequately illuminate the lived experiences of
deprivation and nor do they focus enough on strategic decision-
making by the poor. This scenario can be appropriately
amended by resurrecting the everyday life of the poor in the
social sciences. This will work to the benefit of both the social
sciences and policymaking. It will also help us understand the
quotidian processes, strategies, and politics at work that ena-
ble the poor to eke out a living. This is critically important be-
cause attempts to remove poverty sometimes undermine the
quotidian processes that are helpful to the poor but without
creating adequate new support structures.
Theoretical Field of Everyday Life
An analysis of everyday life involves a discussion of the ordi-
nary and routine things of life. It is understood mainly as a
narrative from the point of view of an individual or individual
household. In an extended sense, it can also be a constellation
of narratives about any social space where interactions in daily
life take place. It is an exposition of the everyday strategies
and machinations employed by members of a household while
attempting to earn a living. Everyday life is a heterogeneous
and incompatible bundle of cultural values, norms, mores, and
activities, and is not easily captured by most formal concepts
of the social sciences. It is highly mercurial and changeable for
all, but probably the most in the case of the poor because they
do not have adequate control over resources.
It is important to understand the full meaning and signifi-
cance of everyday life in all its richness and complexity. Bor-
rowing from Nietzsche’s idea of the everyday as an “eternal
recurrence”, Lefebvre defines everyday life as repetitive, dif-
fused, endless, and marked by cycles of birth and death (Gar-
diner 2000). It is influenced by customs and habits, and char-
acterised by particularism. In the premodern world, everyday
life was constituted mostly in response to the rhythms of the
natural world. While discussing different everyday thinkers,
Gardiner makes it amply clear that in the modern world, apart
from the influences of the natural world, everyday life is condi-
tioned by the effects of technology, work, and production
(ibid). Agnes Heller considers that everyday life has been
treated as trivial, parochial, and low and has been insulated
from the higher domains, such as science, art, and religion in
the modern world (ibid). The hidden possibilities and trans-
formative potential of everyday life were rarely appreciated until
september 22, 2012 vol xlviI no 38 EPW Economic & Political Weekly

some scholars looked at it as a mechanism of dis-alienation in
the neo-capitalist world. Lefebvre (1991) and Heller (1984) are
convinced of the transformative potential of everyday life. La-
bour is alienated in the capitalist form of production, and both
Lefebvre and Heller hope that dis-alienation will unleash the
potentialities of everyday life (Gardiner 2000). Heller, how-
ever, understands that transformation can be brought about
only after one has made space for oneself in this world. She
defines everyday life as that part of human life that helps an
individual reproduce not only him but also one that makes so-
cial reproduction possible. Heller writes:
Man is born into a world which exists independently of him. This
world presents itself to him as a ready-made datum; but it is in this
world that he must support himself, and put his viability to the test. He
is born into concrete social conditions, concrete sets of postulates and
demands, concrete things and concrete institutions. First and fore-
most, he must learn to ‘use’ things, to acquire the customs and meet
the demands of his society, so that he may bear himself in a way that is
both expected and possible in the given circumstances of that society
(Heller 1984: 4).
To eke out a living, one should be ready to use this “ready-
made datum” of the world. This datum would necessarily not
be logical and linear, and could even be incompatible and
inconsistent. Learning to live with this incompatibility, or
using this incompatibility to one’s advantage, is the crux of
everyday life.
One learning that emerges from the theoretical literature on
everyday life is that poverty studies should be able to capture
the extraordinary array of the everyday strategies and actions
of the poor who struggle with poverty. That is why I want stud-
ies on poverty to be located at the confluence of the analyses of
the structure and everyday lives of the poor. This approach, if
followed, would offer considerable advantage over the sys-
temic and structural approaches to the study of the poor and
of poverty. However, neither of these two approaches is ade-
quate by itself. By knowing the everyday life of a few people
located in different positions in the social structure, we cannot
claim to know the problem entirely. Heller (1984) confirms
this when she says that by knowing the everyday life of a serf
or a knight, one cannot fully express or grasp the nature and
significance of the structure of feudalism. The structure needs
to be grasped separately. A comprehensive study of the poor
and of poverty cannot be complete without reference to the
social structure in which both the phenomenon of poverty and
the poor are located. There is a need to study both the struc-
tural conditions as well as the everyday life of the poor. The
influence of structural factors on the fate of the poor will
always exist, but many amongst the poor, through their every-
day knowledge and practices, make signal differences to their
own lives and manage to escape the trap of poverty. That is why
we occasionally come across the proverbial “rags to riches”
story. Certeau (1988) talks about the space for creativity at
the level of subjects and that is why distinguishes between
strategy and tactics. On the other hand, there are others who,
through their daily practices of life, make it much more diffi-
cult for themselves to live peacefully. This is why Galbraith
(1979) talks about the examples of case poverty, it means that
Economic & Political Weekly EPW september 22, 2012 vol xlviI no 38
SPECIAL ARTICLE
the individual poor could be found even in midst of general
prosperity and affluence in society.
Scope of Quotidian Lives and Living
To partly address this problem, I want to identify threads in
strategic and political content of the relationship amongst and
between the poor, as well as their relationship with the higher
classes. Hence, I had proposed the concept of the “culture of
daily life (CDL)” to describe quotidian conventions and strate-
gies that emerge under specific structural conditions (Kumar
2009, 2010). These processes and conventions meet the basic
requirements of resources and living in the lives of the poor. I
am purposefully using the word “living” in place of other pos-
sible words, such as livelihoods and subsistence, mainly be-
cause everyday lives do not just support livelihoods but also
provide a frame of meaning to the poor to make their lives less
miserable and more acceptable to them. Living requires the
mobilisation of physical, moral, social, and emotional resour-
ces needed for leading a peaceful and adequately human life.
A word of caution is relevant here. In this paper, I am not refer-
ring to leisure, cultural activities, aesthetics, etc, as being
constitutive of living.
While discussing CDL, the aim is to understand the daily
lives of the poor in the natural conditions of their everyday
existence. CDL is not an appropriate concept for explaining
extraordinary conditions in a fully blown conflict or when the
polarisation of classes has already taken place. CDL is close to
the concept of habitus posited by Bourdieu (1977), which
emerges under the influence of structural and cultural factors.
It is a system of durable “dispositions” that influence individu-
als, but without determining the content of individual actions.
It is an acquired scheme of perception, thought, and action; it
develops under the influence of the structures of economy,
polity, and society, endowing people with practical skills, but
without affecting them all in a similar manner, and hence
leading to different outcomes (ibid).
I conceived this idea while doing ethnographic fieldwork in
a village called Subhanpura (name changed) in Kanpur Nagar
district in Uttar Pradesh. The main fieldwork in the village was
done during the period from September 2004 to June 2005,
and was followed up for one week each year until 2008. Sub-
hanpura is a multi-caste village. The Thakur caste, the major-
ity one, is also the dominant caste in the village. The other
main castes living in the village are Nai, Kumbhar, Baniah,
Pal, Rawat, Vishwakarma, Kahar, Mali, Jamadar, Swarnakar,
and Pasi. While living in the village, I regularly encountered
different views and attitudes that are typically expressed by
the same set of people facing any specific set of conditions. At
one level, people were averse to, and in conflict with, another
group of people, or an individual, or a social situation. At an-
other level, people were inclined to cooperate and work to-
gether with/for them. Based on this situation, I understood
that the poor needed to be open for cooperation, despite un-
derlying contradictions and conflicts with people either from
one’s own ranks or with people from other classes. This dual-
ity in the strategies of the poor affected their approach and
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SPECIAL ARTICLE
orientation to community members and to their superordi-
nates in the class structure. There were multiple variations of
this essential division, with each individual essentially being
different and adopting an orientation that suited him/her.
This situation had a temporal dimension and was subject to
change. The orientation of people was also subject to change,
depending on the sites of association and the issues at stake.
This dichotomy is, in some instances, found to be so wide that
it becomes difficult to believe that these roles are performed
variously by the same person.
While discussing everyday politics, Kerkvliet (2009) gives a
more nuanced picture. Apart from everyday forms of resist-
ance, he also refers to everyday forms of support and compli-
ance, as well as everyday forms of modification and evasion.
He distinguishes the latter from everyday forms of resistance
in that everyday forms of modification and evasion (the latter)
only aim to “cut corners” and to evade resistance or conflict
(ibid). I find this taxonomy of everyday politics a complex vari-
ation on the fundamental dichotomy of everyday forms of con-
flict and cooperation. CDL incorporates elements of both con-
flict and cooperation across and within groups and classes. It
is not the culture of a group, but of many groups and classes
put together. By its very nature, it is associational in orienta-
tion. Michael Walton (2007) offers a similar concept when he
talks about culturally shaped inequality traps that influence
the human behaviour of the poor. He describes inequality
traps as self-enforcing equilibria, sustained either by rational
behaviour or by interactions across unequal social groups. Apart
from cultural processes, there are also economic and political
processes involved in maintaining this equilibria (ibid).
In normal conditions when inequalities exist but have not
yet obstructed cooperation, it is not uncommon to find poor
people surviving through vertical networks. In some instances,
there is substantial dependence on vertical networks, almost
to the exclusion of any support coming from their ranks. These
are exceptional cases of patron-client relationships. In their own
communities, such people are known as agents, attendants, or,
in extreme cases, as spies, acting on behalf of some other class.
A few individuals in Subhanpura, had a similar reputation.
I found multiple forms of inequality in Subhanpura, but this
inequality had not yet reached a point where the polarisation
of classes had taken place or where serious catastrophic con-
flicts had occurred. Indeed, it is rare to find serious conflicts in
any place, as inequalities are mostly not cumulative and do not
add up neatly. The substantive point underlying the argument
is that people use both horizontal as well as vertical networks
for earning their living. Space for building individual relation-
ships and personal bonds across classes is found in most social
contexts, but is influenced by the structural conditions of ine-
quality in the community. The cleavage between classes is
mostly not prohibitive of cooperation across it. Notwithstand-
ing structural contradictions with other classes, the poor mostly
develop everyday ways of cooperating with others outside of
their own class. The other group also needs to cooperate in
order to accomplish many of its tasks that require cross-class
cooperation. In an earlier paper, I had shown how this happened
74
by citing examples of traditional jajmani relations and tenancy
relations in a north Indian village (Kumar 2010). Scott (1976)
talks about exchanges between elites and peasants. Some of
these exchanges are balanced, while others are exploitative, as
they do not adhere to the moral norms of the community that
call for balanced exchange and adequate provision for the sub-
sistence of the poor (ibid). Scott also refers to cooperation
among the ranks of the poor, describing processes of self-help
amongst small farmers. In my village, I found people treasur-
ing inter-class relationships and nurturing them over genera-
tions (Kerkvliet calls this everyday form of support).
Everyday Cooperation and Resistance
Ochoa (1999) also talks about everyday forms of cooperation
between Mexican Americans and the new Mexican immi-
grants aimed at facilitating a congenial environment that will
allow them to adjust to American conditions. But the forms of
cooperation that they worked towards were possible due to the
common experiences of prejudice and discrimination faced by
both old and new Mexican immigrants (ibid). In this case, co-
operation was possible because of a fundamental similarity
between the new and the old. I am, however, talking about
everyday forms of cooperation, not only those between similar
groups/individuals but also those between groups/individuals
who are different and are locked into a contradictory yet inter-
dependent relationship.
James C Scott, the noted political scientist, who is well
known for his work on subsistence farmers and rural communi-
ties in south-east Asia, in two of his most important books (The
Moral Economy of the Peasant and Weapons of the Weak) traces
the withering away of the moral economy of the community
whereby the community was responsible to some extent for
taking care of the basic needs of the people before the struc-
ture of production underwent changes. Scott also argues that
weak and marginalised people rarely seek to bring about a
revolution because they are confronted with the basic problem
of ensuring subsistence for themselves. According to Scott, any
decisive act aimed at organising a revolt and rebellion can be
possible either in a state of absolute hopelessness or in a state
of emerging hope of the possibility of changing the conditions
that have hitherto severely limited the people’s life chances and
livelihoods. The poor farmers have mostly been content with
the everyday forms of expressing discontent and disagree-
ment, such as going slow, mumbling, and dragging their feet,
rather than taking any decisive political step to organise their
fellows to fight the problems that affect them (Scott 1976, 1990).
In Subhanpura village, many such everyday forms of resist-
ance are found. Delay in starting agricultural operations and
irrigation, backbiting, stealthily carrying away the produce,
inadequate care of the produce, disagreement over the share
of the produce and crop residues are different everyday forms
of resistance. There is, however, a strategic element involved
in adopting everyday forms of resistance, as this also leaves
space for engaging in everyday forms of cooperation. The
villagers usually do not want to settle the issue of contention
once and for all. It is only in certain extraordinary scenarios
september 22, 2012 vol xlviI no 38 EPW Economic & Political Weekly

that everyday forms of resistance degenerate into full-blown
conflict, thereby leading people to depend almost completely
on horizontal relationships and networks, or to side with other
classes across the line of cleavage. Beck (1994) finds that the
rich and the poor are mutually bound in many ways. The poor
are bound because they need to obtain resources such as common
property resources (CPRs), credit, and livestock, as much as they
need or desire social recognition from the rich. The rich are bound
because they seek to enjoy a good reputation and to get com-
pliant labour through the adoption of a cooperative demeanour.
This mutual relationship of cooperation is also backed by a
series of symbolic and sumptuary practices that confirm and
underscore the need for such forms of cooperation.
Earning a living is as much a matter of economics as politics,
because one has to take many decisions that have political and
strategic significance. This includes what one would like to
earn from and what kinds of associations one would like to
make while earning a living. This is the politics of livelihood
and, in an extended sense, also of living. It also means decid-
ing the extent to which one wants to get involved in any con-
flict, and how one can use these conflicts to cajole, coerce, or
intimidate people to cooperate. The poor also have to make
these choices. The very poor do not get much space or freedom
to make such choices because they are overburdened by the
pressure of earning a subsistence living and do not have the
time to worry about such matters. But as their incomes rise
and their well-being at the household level improves, they,
too, face these questions and take appropriate decisions after
rationally weighing the pros and cons of the situation. While
choosing their options, the poor are clear about their social
position vis-à-vis other classes. They are aware that they share
common features with certain kinds of poor people, such as
the landless poor, marginal farmers, the infirm poor, the
scheduled caste (SC) poor, and the sharecropping poor.
However, this social positioning is a matter of “class-in-it-
self” (in terms of their objective location) and not “class-for-it-
self”, because the poor usually lack any subjective conscious-
ness of belonging to a class. A “class-for-itself” consciousness is
usually a difficult thing for them to achieve. In any case, class
consciousness helps them only to a limited extent in earning
their daily living. Overly emphasising the importance of class
would mean discounting the possibilities of inter-class coop-
eration. There are not only everyday forms of expressing dis-
sent and dissatisfaction in the village, but are also everyday
forms of developing relationships and bonds. The poor even
use idleness as a resource for developing the relationships,
networks, and compacts that are essential for their livelihood
and survival (Kumar 2010). Some of them prefer sitting idle
and working on developing relationships that support their
livelihoods rather than on furthering the cause of the class to
which they belong, but which can help them only to a limited
extent in their everyday life. However, the opportunities that
are made available through such contacts do not change their
relative position with their patrons, but help them in absolute
terms (ibid). By engendering different forms of cooperation
and by restricting conflict, CDL facilitates the meeting of the
Economic & Political Weekly EPW september 22, 2012 vol xlviI no 38
SPECIAL ARTICLE
living requirements (housing, clothing, food, medicines, etc)
of the poor and the marginalised. Nevertheless, CDL inhibits
the further growth and restructuring of productive forces.
It is status-quoist and oriented towards the pragmatic consid-
erations of life. Insofar as it is a conservative force and
prohibits progressive change in society, it both facilitates
and constricts at the same time. In an illuminating paper,
Singh and Tripathi (2010) describe how bonded labourers
fear freedom. They write:
The bonded labourers assess the challenges and risks involved in the
gains of freedom which were likely to accrue to them in future against
the losses accruing to them in the existing bondage situations, linked
as it was with a typical protection and survival support from the
employer (Singh and Tripathi 2010: 292).
The dependence of bonded labourers on their employers
leads to the development of a belief system that makes their
relationship more acceptable and less painful for the bonded
labourers. The security and predictability of cooperation,
although occurring within a subservient socio-economic rela-
tionship (“everyday form of compliance”, in Kerkvliet’s words),
is seen as a safety net by the bonded labourers in handling the
vicissitudes of an unpredictable life. There is enough historical
evidence of the difficulties experienced by free labour when it
was released from feudal relationships during the transition to
capitalism. Rising numbers of free labour led to floating popu-
lations and to increased vagrancy in the early phase of capital-
ism. Their newfound freedom brought in its trail a lot of miser-
ies for them, because their former employers were also freed
from their moral obligation of ensuring the subsistence of their
former dependents.
The complexity of the lives of the poor, as discussed in this
section, cannot be covered in formalistic and classificatory
studies on poverty. Social anthropology can perhaps bail pov-
erty studies out of this difficulty.
Social Anthropology in the Service of Poverty Studies
Poverty studies need an anthropological turn, one that would
help focus on everydayness and bring to the fore the complexity
and multidimensionality of poverty. The aim of this anthro-
pological turn would not be to undermine the validity or use-
fulness of the statistics on poverty, but rather to make them
more meaningful. Such studies would also help us interpret
the findings based on analysed quantitative data gathered
from large-scale surveys far more effectively. They would
also introduce newer dimensions pertaining to data collec-
tion and analyses. We need to discuss anthropological ap-
proaches, methods, and techniques (which can be used in
different combinations) that can make this anthropological
turn possible. Researchers working in other disciples can also
use these methods/techniques to focus on everydayness
while studying poverty.
Ethnography is an important method for gaining and devel-
oping a descriptive and analytical view of society. It focuses
primarily on intensive and first-hand fieldwork in those
communities it seeks to observe and understand. Modern
ethnography largely revolves around the technique of participant
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SPECIAL ARTICLE
observation and the fieldwork is usually a long-standing one.
In addition, other research techniques, such as interviews, ques-
tionnaires, and video and audio documentation, are also used.
Ethnography aims to provide an insider’s view, which is to
know the way in which natives see themselves as living in
their own society. Ethnography, due to its distinguishing
approach makes social/cultural anthropology a specialised
discipline in social science.
Truths: Partial and Authorial
Ethnographic fieldwork in anthropology began mainly with
Bronislaw K Malinowski’s fieldwork in the Trobriand Islands,
located off the eastern coast of New Guinea. Margaret Mead’s
(1928) work in Samoa is also part of the initial pioneering
studies in the discipline. Before Malinowski, works in anthro-
pology were neither systematic nor recorded personally by the
researcher. They were mostly based on informants’ accounts.
As a result of the outbreak of the first world war, Malinowski,
an Austrian national and hence on the losing side of the war,
lived in the Trobriand Islands. He would otherwise have been
interned in Europe. He transformed this circumstance into a
great opportunity and did prodigious fieldwork in the Trobri-
and Islands. He learned the language of the islanders, re-
corded their activities in great detail, and engaged in empathic
field observation. He recorded data on both the social organi-
sation and culture of the islanders and gave a detailed descrip-
tion of what he called the “impoderabilia of actual life”, that is,
details of ordinary life. He believed that the goals of ethno-
graphic fieldwork were describing social organisation and the
details of daily life, as well as collecting ethnographic state-
ments, characteristic narratives, typical utterances, folklore,
and magical formulae, with all of these aimed at achieving an
understanding of the natives’ point of view and their relation
to life (Malinowski 1922). He attributed great importance to
the collection of natives’ concepts, systems of classification,
and narratives.
In contrast to Malinowski’s position, A R Radcliffe-Brown,
another founding father of social anthropology, did not give
much importance to narratives and to the views of insiders, as
he was motivated by the desire to establish the discipline as a
natural science. His writings were more formal and abstract,
and were focused on describing the principles of the operation
of society. Radcliffe-Brown believed in the methodology of the
natural sciences and the possibility of sociological laws. How-
ever, another noted anthropologist, E E Evans-Pritchard, be-
lieved that anthropology should look only for regularities and
not for laws. He argued that anthropology should look for pat-
terns rather than laws because social systems are not natural,
but rather are moral and symbolic systems, and hence the aim
of anthropology should be to interpret social reality rather
than to explain it (Evans-Pritchard 1951; Mair 1988). However,
the latter trend has become more common with the increased
prominence of cultural anthropology, where the focus is on
finding and analysing the underlying meaning of symbols and
metaphors as part of culture. In the cultural and humanistic
sciences, there was increasing realisation that all studies
76
arrive only at partial truths. Clifford and Marcus (1986) in
Writing Culture: The Poetics and Politics of Ethnography sup-
port this view. The influence of Foucault, Lyotard, and Derrida
on anthropological writings was obvious, and an ethnographic
narrative by a researcher was seen as a particular reading of
the field and not the ultimate truth.
Cultural analysis is intrinsically incomplete. And, worse than that, the
more deeply it goes the less complete it is. It is a strange science whose
most telling assertions are its most tremulously based, in which to get
somewhere with the matter at hand is to intensify the suspicion, both
your own and that of others, that you are not quite getting it right. But
that, along with plaguing subtle people with obtuse questions, is what
being an ethnographer is like (Geertz 1973: 29).
In writing ethnography, the authority of the ethnographer
to communicate a truth has also been undermined over the
years, because it is now seen as the outcome of a collaborative
exercise between the ethnographer and informants and inter-
preters (Clifford 1986, 2006). With the gradual disillusion-
ment with the natural science methodology in the social and
cultural sciences over the years, anthropology has moved
ahead of Radcliffe-Brownian prescriptions for the discipline,
notwithstanding the occasional doubts expressed in some
quarters about the scientific character of the method and the
outputs delivered through it. Clifford Geertz is the most repre-
sentative example of such a scholar. He has been interested in
interpretation that is, in uncovering the different layers of the
meaning surrounding any act or event, and not in scientific
explanation as it is usually understood in positivistic ap-
proaches. The interpretation would happen only through the
thick description, a concept borrowed from Gilbert Ryle.
Geertz refers to the distinction made by Gilbert Ryle between a
twitch of an eye, a wink, and a caricature of a wink. The dis-
tinction between the three can be made only by understanding
the context and by providing a good description of the happen-
ings around the act and understanding layers of meanings em-
bedded in them. Since Geertz, the interaction between field
and fieldworker is now considered more dynamic and subjec-
tive than ever before, and the resultant ethnography is an out-
come of this interaction rather than being an objective or a
final account. In his foreword to The Remembered Village by
M N Srinivas, Sol Tax writes:
Ethnography is an art in so far as it is a purposeful attempt to describe
for outsiders how a society of necessarily heterogeneous persons see
one another and their ideas and their behaviour collectively… The
least likely ideal one imagines is the vacuum of a false ‘objectivity’
which is in fact polluted with all of the intrusions of the unconscious. A
good ethnography must necessarily be a high art (Tax 1976: viii).
At an operational level, the anthropological method is now
focused on observing people’s conduct in their daily life and in
their daily business in their natural setting. The insider per-
spective remains crucial in making anthropology a humane
science. After his/her entry into the field, the researcher
affects the natural environment to some extent, but gradually
the situation becomes normal if he conducts himself impar-
tially and honourably. The focus is on conducting unobtrusive
observation. The challenge before the researcher is to locate
september 22, 2012 vol xlviI no 38 EPW Economic & Political Weekly

himself between two extreme ends – first, of complete immer-
sion in the natives’ culture, and, second, of non-participation in
the field. This tension has been examined by Whyte (1955) in
his classic study, Street Corner Society: The Social Structure of
an Italian Slum. The strength of the ethnographic method lies
in its informality; it does not mainly rely on formally struc-
tured interviews of inhabitants in the field. This enables the
researcher to get back repeatedly to the same people who help
him understand the same event or issue many times. This pro-
vides an opportunity for conducting a veracity check as well,
as the same things are told to the researcher on different occa-
sions both by the same and by different people. Informal dis-
cussion is part of the method and should be carried out with
the purpose of finding answers to the research question.
Whyte (1955) said that he did little formal interviewing while
conducting his fieldwork in a street-corner society. Indeed,
Whyte was counselled by one of his key informants to go easy
on questions such as how, what, why, and where, because
these questions make people uncomfortable and suspicious. In
any case, these questions are likely to be answered through
extended interaction while the researcher is in the field and
once a certain level of trust has been established between the
ethnographer and the respondents. With regard to poverty
studies, ethnography can be used to gain a real picture of
the lives of the poor and of changes in their economic and
social status, and also to gain an understanding of the ration-
ality underlying their behaviour, which is otherwise often
considered irrational.
Once the researcher has spent a sufficiently long time with a
group of the poor, he sees small changes taking place. He
locates these changes as taking place over a longer span of
time, as conversations with people enable him to determine
whether the changes that he sees are part of long-term
changes, which he figures out by talking to people, or whether
these changes are an aberration. Whyte calls this kind of field-
work a moving film. He writes (1955: 323):
I now came to realise that time itself was one of the key elements in my
study. I was observing, describing, and analysing groups as they
evolved and changed through time. It seemed to me that I could ex-
plain much more effectively the behaviour of men when I observed
them over time than would have been the case if I had got them at one
point in time. In other words, I was taking a moving picture instead of
a still photograph.
In the Indian context, almost all village studies that are
based on ethnographic fieldwork studies have reported on
sociocultural change. Some of the major studies are by M N Srini-
vas (1976), Béteille (1971) and Wiser (1936). Epstein’s (1962)
book on social change in two villages in the Mysore region of
Karnataka is based on ethnographic fieldwork in Wangala and
Dalena. S C Dube (1959) discusses using oral tradition and the
memories of people insofar as these do not glorify certain fam-
ilies and individuals in the village in an attempt to understand
change along with the use of other documentary evidence.
Anand Chakravarti (1975) raises the issue of reconstructing
the past based on the statements of individuals, which in turn
are based on the memory of these informants. Chakravarti
Economic & Political Weekly EPW september 22, 2012 vol xlviI no 38
SPECIAL ARTICLE
cross-checked many of these statements and assessed their
effects during his stay in the village (ibid). Shah (1979) describes
his experience of gathering revenue data about family, caste,
religion, economy, administration, landownership, and tenure.
He also refers to having used information from genealogists,
but admits that the information about the past was collected in
bits and pieces, and hence needed to be woven together. He
found that an understanding of the past helped in an under-
standing of the present, and vice versa.
The nature and scope of historical analysis as part of
anthropological fieldwork depends on the nature and scope
of the larger study. At this stage, however, I can say with
some certainty that ethnographic accounts can yield good
insights about the nature of change and its effects as these are
experienced by the poor.
Use of Narratives
Narratives are an essential part of ethnography while ethnog-
raphy itself is a type of narrative. The importance of narratives
has increased in the social sciences since the 1960s, as inter-
pretive approaches to the study of society have become more
widespread. Narratives can be put to two broad uses. In the
first scenario, the researcher is not interested in inferring
social reality from narratives. The researcher is interested
only in the subjectivity of the narrator. The aim is to know how
the social structure and other forces are perceived to be affect-
ing the narrator. In such cases, the story of the narrator cannot
be assumed to be truthful. The researcher is also not inter-
ested in exploring the truth value of such narratives, although
he or she does create a suitable environment that will enable
the narrator to give a real account. But a narrative is a selective
representation of reality and emerges from a dialogic (in the
sense of M Bakhtin’s idea) interaction between the researcher
and the subject.
In the second scenario, researchers also use narratives to
make inferences about the actual social reality. This is a com-
mon practice in ethnography, and informal interviews are con-
ducted for such studies. In this scenario, the researcher needs
to assess these narratives for their truth value. These narra-
tives are usually checked on different occasions with the same
respondent as well as with other respondents (Moen 2006).
Triangulation is a normal practice in writing ethnography. But
verifying narratives based on the narratives of other respond-
ents is sometimes difficult because it is not easy to find the
right people for the task. In studies that explore the narratives of
respondents at a deeper level, it is crucial that the researcher
should have built a necessary level of trust and understand-
ing, and should not allow respondents any opportunity to
mislead the researcher. That is why interpretive approaches
are now said not to have discovered or recovered narratives,
but rather to have developed them along with respondents
and interpreters (Clifford and Marcus 1986).
Even in the case of formal interviews that have closed-
ended options, the respondents on many occasions respond to
different questions based on an underlying and sometimes
unconscious or unstated idea that they bear in mind. It is only
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SPECIAL ARTICLE
in disciplines and methodologies where the experiment is the
basis of the production of knowledge that one can dispense
with narratives. Even in the case of supposedly positivist ap-
proaches, there are instances of the narratives of people being
packed into findings that are claimed to be objective. A sub-
stantial part of statistics pertaining to income and consump-
tion expenditure is an aggregation based on the narratives of
individual respondents that scholars have no way but to take as
a given. What one needs is not to dispense with narratives, but
rather to exercise caution in using them appropriately. In the
latter scenario, a complete reliance on narratives on the part of
the researcher without any understanding of the social struc-
ture would make his/her findings less close to the reality.
For studying poverty, narratives are extremely important in
both the ways, that is, as a way to understand the life-worlds
(in the Habermasian sense, the life-world is a realm of mean-
ings and practices marking a group, ranging from families to
communities) of the deprived, as well as to create pictures of
the actual reality. Narratives have also been used for creating
life histories and life stories. Historians have used oral history,
which does not focus so much on historical events but rather
on how these events have affected those who lived in those
circumstances. The Chicago School of sociologists focused on
life history. Thomas and Znaniecki’s The Polish Peasant in Eu-
rope and America: Monograph of an Immigrant Group (1918)
was the first significant study that used the life-history method.
The method later fell out of fashion for some time before Oscar
Lewis used it for his study of poverty (Chase 2005).
Use of Case Studies
Case studies of households, families, and individuals could
be very useful for poverty studies in India. They are currently
being used more in application-oriented studies on poverty.
There is a considerable body of literature on the use of differ-
ent kinds of case studies in the social sciences. There have
been case studies of countries, districts, villages, wards,
individuals, households, etc. The most important question
about the selection and use of case studies pertains to their
representativeness or otherwise. This concern is usually
motivated by a desire to transform the social sciences into an
objective science.
While discussing village-level studies (VLS) on different
facets of poverty in India, Barbara Harriss (1992) talks about
two kinds of village studies. She says that VLS have been used
to test specific theories; she cites the Palanpur study done by
Bliss and Stern in 1982. This study focused on agriculture in an
Indian village from the standpoint of theories of economic
development. Harriss describes the second kind of VLS that are
inductive and exploratory, and are not influenced by any
explicitly acknowledged theories. An example of this, although
in the American context, is Liebow’s (1967) study of the Negro
street corner. The writing of case studies is usually done to
verify or falsify some theory. The aim is either to validate it by
using a case representing one class of phenomena or to dis-
prove the theory. In the latter scenario, a new theory would be
needed to explain the reality better. Many scholars in the
78
cultural and humanistic sciences do not always regard cases as
apt illustrations of some principles of operation of social struc-
tures. F G Bailey (1960) says in this regard:
A low level of generalisation is less exact, less elegant, and infinitely
more untidy and incomplete than high abstraction. Its advantage is
that it can present data from which generalisations are made and it
allows the reader some kind of check on these abstractions, not by the
test of internal consistency only, but also by relating the analysis to what
goes on. It is particularly necessary to make use of case material in
studying social change, because our theoretical apparatus for the study of
change scarcely exists. The beginnings must be empirical (ibid 1960: 15).
Glaser and Strauss (1967) seek the development of a
grounded theory based on empirical evidence. Liebow (1967)
says that he did not collect data to test a hypothesis or a theory.
He tried making sense of the data after it had been collected,
and hence the study was truly exploratory in scope. Such studies
are quite common in social anthropology wherein cases are
purposively selected to understand the complexity of the pro-
cesses at work and the insights they impart, and not to test any
existing theory or to arrive at a new one. They focus on finding
answers to any empirical research question which drives the
research and the researcher.
Some anthropologists consider fieldwork in general as an
extended case that is constituted of multiple smaller cases.
These smaller cases offer new insights and understanding,
and help anthropologists construct the larger picture. For
Gluckman, the extended case is usually centred on connected
cases in some area of social life (Gluckman 1961). He argues
that the use of the extended case method reflects the structural
issues of the local society because the activities of the same
groups or individuals are traced across different incidents. The
use of the extended case method can reveal the main problem
of the research study. One example of this is the discussion
by Anand Chakravarti (1975) of the relationship between
Survey
August 27, 2011
Experimental Economics: A Survey
by
Sujoy Chakravarty, Daniel Friedman, Gautam Gupta, Neeraj Hatekar,
Santanu Mitra, Shyam Sunder
Over the past few decades, experimental methods have given
economists access to new sources of data and enlarged the set of
economic propositions that can be validated. This field has grown
exponentially in the past few decades, but is still relatively new to the
average Indian academic. The objective of this survey is to familiarise
the Indian audience with some aspects of experimental economics. The
survey attempts to bring to the interested reader a flavour of this field.
The survey is presented in five separate articles after this introduction.
The notes and references for all articles are at the end of the survey.
For copies write to:
Circulation Manager,
Economic and Political Weekly,
320-321, A to Z Industrial Estate,
Ganpatrao Kadam Marg, Lower Parel, Mumbai 400 013.
email: circulation@epw.in
september 22, 2012 vol xlviI no 38 EPW Economic & Political Weekly

Sher Singh and Bhim Singh in Devisar village in Rajasthan,
which describes the transition from traditional to rational legal
authority in the village. An ethnographer, however, does not
report all the small cases that he sees in a written work, but
selects only those that are pertinent to the interpretation that
he makes. Many small cases are considered only incidental
when it comes to answering the main research question. The
ethnographer makes a selection not only in writing the case
studies of individuals, but also in describing the daily mun-
dane and pedestrian facts and incidents of life. Hence, a report
based on ethnographic fieldwork is a particular reading of
the field. In the past, anthropologists such as Max Gluckman,
F G Bailey, and Anand Chakravarti used cases as a method of
exposition in social anthropology. Case studies are useful not
only for conducting in-depth research, but also for planning
large-scale sample studies and for explaining analysed data
with reference to the real world. Unless some exploratory
case studies have been done at the beginning of a research
study, the questionnaire/schedule cannot be sufficiently
broadened to exhaust all possible questions that might need to
be asked. The case study is useful because it provides an in-
depth understanding of a case that can be explored through
different techniques. This, on many occasions, becomes a
transformative experience for the researcher as well.
The use of case studies presents certain problems, and these
are sought to be corrected in an objectivist tradition of explor-
ing knowledge. One problem pertains to the reliability of the
findings based on the case study method. This is, to some extent,
addressed through the adoption of a common theoretical
framework. Another problem with regard to the case study
method is the difficulty in predicting or determining the
extent to which explorations should continue for the case
study (Goode and Hatt 1981). Case studies are illuminating
about the cases being studied, but offer no justification for not
undertaking a larger structural analysis and use of other tech-
niques. Both are needed because they can enrich one another
in studies on poverty.
Family Studies
The use of family studies for understanding the complexity of
poverty and how it affects the individual members of the fam-
ily was pioneered mainly by Oscar Lewis. Lewis used different
methods for undertaking family studies. In Five Families: Mex-
ican Case Studies in the Culture of Poverty, Etc (1962), he pro-
vided a window into the daily lives of five Mexican families on
five ordinary days. In The Children of Sanchez: Autobiography
of a Mexican Family (1961), he asked each member of the
household to tell his or her own story. Lewis wanted readers to
understand the issues and concerns of people who grow up
and live in a single-room slum-dwelling. Incorporating details
from the autobiographies of different members of the family
helped him reduce the investigator’s bias (Lewis 1967). Lewis
considered the family an important location of interaction be-
tween cultural and individual factors, and he felt that family
studies could help explore the networks within which families
spend most of their lives (Lewis 1966, 1967).
Economic & Political Weekly EPW september 22, 2012 vol xlviI no 38
SPECIAL ARTICLE
In Pedro Martinez, Lewis narrates a tape-recorded story of a
Mexican peasant family as told by three of its members. He
wanted to communicate to readers the feeling and thinking of
peasants in a period of rapid sociocultural change (Lewis
1980). In La Vida, a study of a hundred Puerto Rican families
from the slums of Greater San Juan and New York city, Lewis
focused on urban slum life and adaptation in the family life of
migrants to New York city. In the same study, 16 members of a
family in Greater San Juan and New York city tell their life
stories and those of their parents and grandparents (Lewis
1966). In this book, Lewis used a combination of multiple biog-
raphies and observed representative days, that is, any usual
day. Lewis (1967) says that the focus on biographies brought
into the picture the subjective views of the people concerned,
while descriptions of their daily lives provided insights into
the complexity of their existence. He notes that the family case
study is not a new phenomenon and has been used by social
workers, sociologists, psychologists, and others, but has mostly
focused on families in trouble, depression, problem children,
divorce, etc (ibid). Lewis gave a new direction to family stud-
ies because his work was descriptive and holistic as opposed to
quantitative studies, which mostly focused on certain varia-
bles. Of late, studies have focused on livelihoods of the house-
holds as a unit of production and consumption. But these stud-
ies are mostly limited to the field of development practice.
Lewis used different techniques in his family studies. He was
mainly interested in finding those traits in the family that he
had identified while validating his theory of the culture of pov-
erty. Limiting our studies to the culture of poverty framework
could be avoided, but the holism of the family/household
could be retained for analysis because it is in the context of the
family/household that personality, culture, and social struc-
ture interact in complex and as yet unexplored ways to deter-
mine the behaviour of the poor.
Difficulties and the Rewards
of Overcoming These Problems
There are two kinds of difficulties in following this route. One
is methodological, and the other is political. The methodological
difficulty is that while becoming deeply involved in the study
of everyday life, it becomes difficult to extricate one’s self from
the phenomenological domains of the subjects and to reflect
on the social structure. Highly skilled and competent research-
ers are required to handle such assignments, so that they are
able to reflect on both the life-worlds and the social structure
simultaneously.
The other major difficulty is a political one. The focus on the
everyday life of the poor, and its description, has led to huge
debates in the social sciences with regard to the negative
stereotyping of the poor and its effect on social policy in the US
(Bourgois 2003). This happened mainly with regard to the
writings of Oscar Lewis, but also with a few others. Lewis, who
undertook ethnographic field studies of lower-class house-
holds in Mexico, Puerto Rico, and the US, put forward the con-
cept of the culture of poverty. The concept was defined as a
design of life for the poor. It emerges in response to situational
79
SPECIAL ARTICLE

factors but becomes autonomous over a period of time. It plays
an important role in organising the everyday lives of the poor.
The concept became the centre of a serious debate because
Lewis provided intimate details of some households of the
poor based on his ethnographic studies. His writing was also
criticised for giving credence to blame-the-poor explanations
of poverty (Bourgois 2001). Bourgois (2003) and Wilson
(1996) point out that blame-the-poor explanation bolstered
conservative arguments for reducing welfare support to the
poor in the US. Conservatives usually criticise a section of the
poor as undeserving and as lacking individual self-worth, and
hence argue that welfare support should not be extended to
these people. This stance discouraged in-depth studies of the
poor in the 1970s and 1980s in the US. Similarly, in the Indian
context as well, studies that can focus on the detailed and
inner lives of the poor can be used as an alibi for not making
available adequate welfare support to the deprived sections of
society as they can be accused of not being capable/responsible
enough to use this support effectively. This is more likely
in the new economy where welfare support could be seen as
increasing the financial burden of the state and hence as
wasteful. The opposition to the National Rural Employment
Guarantee Act (NREGA) in India is a case in point. An Indian
counterpart of blame-the-poor explanation can be the argu-
ment that tribal communities are responsible for their own
lack of development as well as for acting as serious obstacles to
the process of liberalisation, globalisation and ensuing growth
and prosperity.
Despite these risks, Bourgois considers it important to
focus on everyday life. He argues that negative representa-
tions of the poor should not come at the cost of sanitising the
pain and suffering experienced by the poor (Bourgois 2003).
Anthropological approaches can help poverty studies in In-
dia in producing detailed, in-depth accounts of the poor and
of poverty. Ethnography offers great possibilities for future
research in the field. The focus on quotidianity can make
poverty studies richer and bring them closer to the complex
reality of everyday life. It would be interesting to look for
terms of association/exchange across classes in any existing
community on a daily basis. This will also reveal the nature
of politics in such scenarios, because power is not enjoyed by
the superordinates unequivocally and in equal measure, in-
dependent of time and of the sites of operation. Another im-
portant aspect in this regard is the exploration of conditions
that lead to the abandonment of local conventions and prac-
tices, and to the emergence of all-out conflict. The focus on
quotidianity is important for making the effect of structural
factors more intelligible. That is why Bourgois (2003) describes
his study on East Harlem as a recounting of the “individual
experience of social structural oppression”. The study of every-
day lives and the analysis of social structures are not mutu-
ally exclusive processes. They go hand in hand and enrich one
another in the attempt to understand poverty. These studies
and analyses would make poverty a sufficiently human problem
leading to moral indignation that demands the resolution of
the grossest forms of inequality and deprivation. The political
resolve to address the problem of poverty will not come about
as much from making numerical or statistical representa-
tions as from making the agonies of the poor people visible.
This can possibly dislodge our “social deafness and moral
blindness”, which Nandy (2004) holds as being primarily
responsible for the normal functioning of our democratic
polity without bothering much about the need to tackle
poverty and destitution.

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– Eric Denis, Partha Mukhopadhyay, Marie-Hélène Zérah
For copies write to:
Circulation Manager,
Economic and Political Weekly,
Lower Parel, Mumbai 400 013.
email: circulation@epw.in
vol xlviI no 38
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– Anna Zimmer
81

NABARD and RBI
A 30-Year Legacy Being Upturned
P S Rao
The effort to edge out the Reserve
Bank of India from the National
Bank for Agriculture and Rural
Development’s shareholding does
not bode well for the future of
agricultural and rural credit in
the country. This is particularly
so, if the past experience with the
Industrial Development Bank of
India and the Unit Trust of India
is any guide.
P S Rao (psrao.99@rediffmail.com) is a
Pune-based development professional who has
worked with the RBI and NABARD.
Economic & Political Weekly EPW september 22, 2012
T
he finance minister’s budget speech
earlier this year contained a
seemingly innocuous statement,
To take forward the process of financial
sector legislative reforms, the govern-
ment would move the following bills in
the budget session of the parliament: the
Micro Finance Institutions (Development
and Regulation) Bill, 2012; the National
Housing Bank (Amendment) Bill, 2012;
the Small Industries Development Bank of
India (Amendment) Bill, 2012; the National
Bank for Agriculture and Rural Develop-
ment (Amendment) Bill 2012; Regional
Rural Banks (Amendment) Bill, 2012; Indian
Stamp (Amendment) Bill 2012 and Public
Debt Management Agency of India Bill, 2012
(GoI 2012).
While there is a rationale for bringing
each bill before Parliament, one is per-
plexed why amendments are being pro-
posed to the National Bank for Agricul-
ture and Rural Development (NABARD)
Act, 1981. The Act in its present form has
not hindered the functioning of the
institution and has given it enough
manoeuvrability to expand the scope of
its activities and facilitate new innova-
tions and developmental interventions.
The amendments to the Act carried out
in 2000 have cleared whatever technical
difficulties or obstacles the institution
might have faced in its functioning. The
only plausible reason for the proposed
vol xlviI no 38
COMMENTARY
amendment is easing out the Reserve Bank
of India (RBI) from the shareholding of
NABARD to make it a wholly government-
owned entity. This step would alter the
basic structure of the institution as envis-
aged by the Sivaraman Committee that
conceived and recommended its estab-
lishment and the vision the government
of the day, led by Indira Gandhi, had for it.
In striking contrast to other central
banks, the RBI, by its statute, has been
given an important role in the sphere of
rural credit because of the predominantly
agricultural character of the Indian
economy and the need to expand and
coordinate the credit facilities available
to the agricultural sector. The RBI Act
laid down that the bank would create a
special agricultural credit department to
maintain an expert staff to study all
questions related to agricultural credit
and be available for consultation by the
central government, state governments,
state cooperative banks and other bank-
ing organisations. It was also to coordinate
the operations of the bank in connection
with agricultural credit and its relations
with state cooperative banks and any other
banks or organisations engaged in the
business of agricultural credit (RBI 1934).
The agricultural credit department was
one of the first departments of the RBI.
After the recommendations of the Infor-
mal Conference (of 1951) were accepted,
the RBI began refinancing cooperative
banks. By shedding the orthodox ap-
proach of a central bank and involving
itself directly in areas concerned with
rural credit, the RBI earned a unique place
for itself among central banks. This
27
COMMENTARY
approach brought it closer to cooperative
credit institutions and through them to
the rural people and thus took it nearer
to “what the central bank of this country
ought to be”, as visualised by the All India
Rural Credit Survey Committee (RBI 1985).
The NABARD was established as an exer-
cise to decentralise the RBI’s functions.
Close and Organic Links
The creation of NABARD was a part of the
post-Independence Nehruvian vision of
institution building carried forward by
Indira Gandhi, who dedicated it to the
nation on 5 November 1982 in the pres-
ence of Pranab Mukherjee, who was
then the finance minister. At that time,
the Committee to Review Arrangements
for Institutional Credit for Agriculture
and Rural Development (CRAFICARD)
had envisaged an institution that would
give undivided attention, forceful direc-
tion and pointed focus to rural develop-
ment in the country. It recommended
that the new bank take over the oversight
of the entire rural credit system from the
RBI, including the statutory inspection
of cooperative banks and regional rural
banks (RRBs). It also envisaged close
and organic links between the RBI and
NABARD and emphasised that the new
entity should be able to draw upon the
financial resources of the central bank.
It was due to these factors that CRAFICARD
provided for 50% of the share capital to
be contributed by the RBI. It also stated
that the central bank of the country
should be fully behind NABARD and seen
to be so (RBI 1981). The institution was
thus owned by the people of India through
the central government and also by the
RBI, which indicated its solidity and
financial soundness.
The 2009 Report of the Committee on
Financial Sector Assessment (CFSA) was
of the view that the structure of the RBI
as the monetary policymaker, the lender
of last resort and the regulator and
supervisor, though quasi independent,
was appropriate and could continue. It
reduces the information risk that would
otherwise be there between the mone-
tary authority and the regulator and
supervisor. This analysis is sound and
practical, especially in view of the expe-
rience gained during the recent global
28
financial crisis. This puts the RBI in a
position of advantage on information
flow from the regulator and supervisor
to the monetary authority and vice ver-
sa. The report notes that the effective
exploitation of synergy between the reg-
ulator, monetary policymaker and lend-
er of last resort is advantageous from the
stability perspective (RBI 2009).
The Narasimham Committee-II stated,
The RBI as a regulator of the monetary sys-
tem should not be also the owner of a bank
in view of the potential for possible conflict
of interest. It would be necessary for the
government/RBI to divest their stake in the
nationalised banks and in the State Bank of
India (RBI 1998).
It is interesting to note that the com-
mittee refers only to banks and that too
to ownership by both the RBI and the
government. By a selective reading of
the recommendations it was interpreted
to mean that the RBI needed to divest
from the State Bank of India (SBI), NABARD
and the National Housing Bank (NHB),
and this was enunciated in the Monetary
and Credit Policy statement for 2001-02
(RBI 2001). The other part of the recom-
mendation, that the government divest
its stake in the nationalised banks and
the SBI, was conveniently forgotten. The
RBI exiting from holding shares of the
SBI can be considered reasonable as that
bank is a purely retail banking institution.
Institutions like NABARD and the NHB,
which are apex institutions with super-
visory and regulatory responsibilities,
cannot be equated with the SBI. Further,
for discharging their assigned roles ef-
fectively, these institutions should carry
with them their central banking pedigree.
Viewed in this context, the argument that
the RBI’s shareholding in NABARD would
be in conflict with its role as a regulator of
the financial system has no validity at all.
The Successes
In the last 30 years, NABARD has built
itself up into a unique institution. One
could hardly find an institution of a sim-
ilar nature in the banking sector any-
where else in the world. It combines the
roles of a central bank, a development
agency, a financial institution, an infra-
structure funding agency, a microfinance
institution, a planning board and an
apex-level policymaker. NABARD plays an
september 22, 2012
important role in grass-roots level credit
planning and monitoring through its
district presence. Its effectiveness in this
role has been possible only because it is
seen as an implementing instrument of
the RBI. It has been able to leverage the
knowledge and information of each of its
functional areas to fine-tune and streng-
then its effectiveness in other areas. For
instance, it has drawn on its strengths with
non-governmental organisations (NGOs)
and other civil society organisations in
watershed development initiatives and
with the government’s development
agencies to build up the institutional base
for the Self-Help Group-Bank Linkage
Programme. By investing huge energy
and manpower in this programme and
drawing on the synergies emanating
from its myriad roles, NABARD has suc-
ceeded in making it the largest microfi-
nance programme in the world, reach-
ing nearly 100 million poor households.
Apart from microfinance, as part of
the developmental mandate, NABARD
has been undertaking a wide range of
promotional initiatives aimed at improv-
ing the productivity of land, water con-
servation, rural non-farm sector, rural
marketing and increasing farm yields to
create models for replication that will be
taken up gradually by other downstream
organisations. Its success in these efforts
has been mainly due to its ability to draw
on the participation of a wide spectrum
of institutions and exploit the synergy of
its presence in the finance, development,
planning and regulation/supervision
spaces in the rural sector, and also be-
cause it is seen as an institution that has
the backing of the RBI.
NABARD has a responsibility for insti-
tutional development in the rural finan-
cial sector. It took up an extended role in
this area in the form of turnaround
strategies for rural financial institutions
(RFIs) in the period 1994-99 with rea-
sonably positive results. The Develop-
ment Action Plan (DAP) proved that it
was possible to restructure and turn
around state-owned RFIs without priva-
tising them or neglecting their outreach.
This effort had a substantial effect on
the revitalisation of RRBs, which have
today emerged as strong institutions
catering to the financial needs of the
vol xlviI no 38 EPW Economic & Political Weekly

rural clientele. The revitalisation package
recommended by the Vaidyanathan Com-
mittee (2006) for short-term cooperatives
is now at an advanced stage of imple-
mentation. The reform programme has
been successful in turning around a major
part of the short-term cooperative credit
structure in the country, enabling it to
play a more meaningful role. In addition
to these, NABARD has had a huge training
and capacity-building involvement with
RFIs since its inception. In the case of its
other major function, refinance, NABARD
has been using it as a fine instrument to
direct credit flow to desired sectors of
national importance and to institutions
that may be weak but provide credit to
vulnerable sections of the population.
NABARD has been able to carry out these
institutional development and refinance
roles effectively, only because it has a
role in supervisory and credit planning
and because of its ownership by the RBI.
The Shortcomings
However, this does not imply that
NABARD has been able to do full justice
to its mandate. There are many areas in
which it has to take on greater responsi-
bilities. The Agricultural Credit Review
Committee (ACRC) of 1989, which, among
other issues, reviewed the role and per-
formance of NABARD, was critical of its
focus on refinance business. It was of the
view that NABARD needed to play a greater
role in the development arena, especially
in institutional development, and should
have taken on a bolder developmental
role in reforming cooperative banks as
well as RRBs (RBI 1989). NABARD’s lack of
initiative led to the cooperative banking
system being debilitated until the Vaidy-
anathan Committee came forward with
a reform package. Another area that
NABARD missed was risk mitigation in
agriculture. It should have in its initial
years come out with robust mechanisms
such as agriculture insurance and an
agricultural relief fund. It did become a
promoting shareholder of the Agricul-
tural Insurance Company of India, but it
still plays only a passive role in this area.
On the complementary roles of the RBI
and NABARD in rural credit, it suffices to
quote what Prime Minister Manmohan
Singh said when he was RBI governor,
Economic & Political Weekly EPW september 22, 2012
The Reserve Bank has always been con-
scious of the fact that under Indian condi-
tions, the central monetary authority must
never lose sight of the strategic role of agri-
culture in promoting a balanced, equitable
and a self-reliant pattern of development. An
efficient system of rural credit is an essential
ingredient of any viable strategy for the re-
moval of poverty and for the modernisation
of our rural economy. The Reserve Bank,
both on account of the historical compul-
sions of the Indian economy and the special
responsibility cast on it in terms of its statute,
from its very inception, has, therefore, been
actively involved in the process of institution
building in rural credit. It has made deter-
mined efforts to ensure that the system of
rural credit serves both the cause of acceler-
ated growth and greater equity in the devel-
opment process. … With the establishment
of the National Bank for Agriculture and Ru-
ral Development on 12 July 1982, the respon-
sibility for refinance and development of ru-
ral credit institutions has now passed on to
the new bank, which conceptually repre-
sents an exercise in decentralisation of the
Reserve Bank’s functions. Thus, in a sense,
this marks the end of an era of the Reserve
Bank’s direct involvement in rural credit and
the Reserve Bank’s proud legacy becomes
the heritage of the National Bank for Agri-
culture and Rural Development. Of course,
this change will in no way affect the Reserve
Bank’s deep and abiding interest in the or-
derly growth of the rural credit system, in
line with the broad national objectives and
priorities of development (RBI 1985).
It should therefore be amply clear that
NABARD has been envisaged as an insti-
tution that takes on a part of the RBI’s
functions in a process of decentralisa-
tion. As such, as long as licensing, lend-
ing of last resort, refinance, administra-
tive guidance, supervision, regulation,
and also management of the banking
sector are under the RBI’s purview, along
with its role as the central monetary
authority, and no conflict of interest is
discerned in this role, its role as a share-
holder of NABARD should continue so
that NABARD can effectively play its all-
encompassing role in rural development
and the rural banking sector, which
includes development, refinance and
regulation/supervision.
Draw on Experience
The effort to delink NABARD from the
RBI have to be seen in the light of similar
experiences with the Industrial Develop-
ment Bank of India (IDBI) and the Unit
Trust of India (UTI), which had pioneered
industrial finance and retail public
vol xlviI no 38
COMMENTARY
investment respectively. The IDBI was
established in 1964 as a wholly owned
subsidiary of the RBI and played a leading
role in catalysing broad-based industrial
development in the country. As a devel-
opment finance institution (DFI) it took a
lead in project finance for industries as
well as refinancing banks and state
finance corporations for their industrial
finance activities. The delinking of the
IDBI from the RBI took place in 1976. In
his evidence before the joint parlia-
mentary committee, then RBI Governor
S Jagannathan stated,
Broadly in the Reserve Bank and IDBI, we
were not very clear as to the specific objec-
tives which the government had in mind and
we expressed the view that we were not able
to see much advantage in the reconstitution
proposed. Delinking will not be helpful be-
cause coordination work would become dif-
ficult. It was our view that there was not any
substantial advantage in delinking, but there
could be many disadvantages (RBI 2005).
Highlighting the performance of the
IDBI in industrial finance as an associate
institution of the RBI, C V Nair of the RBI
Officers’ Association cautioned that
delinking would mean a higher degree
of bureaucratisation and a higher degree
of non-professional management in the
new IDBI. Describing the bill as a retro-
grade piece of legislation, the dissenting
members of the joint parliamentary
committee said,
The proposal to delink IDBI from RBI and
functioning under the administrative con-
trol of the finance ministry will destroy the
very foundation of the credit structure which
has been built up in the last two decades. ...
The evidence before the committee very
clearly indicates that the Bill has been mis-
conceived and should therefore be scrapped.
The evidence further indicates that there is
no valid economic or administrative reason
for delinking the IDBI from RBI. The reconsti-
tution of the IDBI as proposed in the Bill will
not improve the operational efficiency of the
IDBI nor will create better machinery for de-
velopmental financing, better coordination
of credit operations, etc (RBI 2005).
The UTI was also a wholly owned sub-
sidiary of the RBI, but the latter main-
tained an arm’s length relationship with
it. The UTI was delinked from the RBI at
the same time as the IDBI and was placed
under the IDBI’s control. A former execu-
tive trustee of the UTI stated,
I think the transfer was a grave mistake.
After all IDBI is a lending institution, not
29
COMMENTARY
a lender of the last resort. Also it does not
have the comprehensive knowledge of the
economy and the kind of research capabil-
ity which the Reserve Bank has and which
is necessary to give guidance to an investor-
oriented institution like UTI. Moreover,
since IDBI was now under the direct control
of the finance ministry, this transfer meant
that government could, if it chooses, influ-
ence UTI through IDBI. The original idea of
the Trust being free from control of govern-
ment was whittled down with this transfer
(Pendharkar 2003).
The negative effects of the delinking
from the RBI and complete government
control of the IDBI and the UTI were
noticeable within a decade of separation.
In 2000-01, the IDBI reported gross non-
performing assets (NPAs) of Rs 10,875
crore, which had wiped out its entire net
worth of Rs 9,126 crore. It had written
off Rs 500 crore as lost assets and other
assets aggregating to Rs 6,285 crore had
been restructured and rescheduled. The
contamination of IDBI’s portfolio was a
consequence of the control exercised by
the bureaucracy, making it an organ of
directed lending by the government,
which in effect meant the political
authorities. The UTI had to be bailed out
by the government after the flawed US-
64 scheme with a package of Rs 14,561
crore in 2002. In 2003, the UTI was reor-
ganised into the UTI Mutual Fund and
the Specified Undertaking of UTI (SUUTI).
Ultimately, the IDBI had to give up its
role as a DFI and reverse-merge into its
own subsidiary, IDBI Bank, in 2004. The
deterioration in the functioning of both
these institutions can be directly attrib-
uted to absence of the tutelage and over-
sight of the RBI and the direct interference
in their functioning by the bureaucracy
and the political bosses. Direct govern-
ment interventions in influencing credit
decisions in the case of the IDBI and in-
vestment decisions in the case of the UTI,
in the absence of the moderating role of
the RBI, were largely responsible for the
deterioration in their financial health
and eventual collapse. This danger looms
large even in the case of NABARD.
The ominous nature of direct govern-
ment control has to be viewed in the
context of the increasing tendency of the
department of financial services (DFS) of
the ministry of finance to micromanage
the day-to-day affairs of public sector
30
banks (PSBs) and financial institutions by
issuing a plethora of circulars. This has
been widely commented on in the
financial press. One such article says,
By micromanaging PSBs without being fully
equipped to do, the government officials could
end up harming them through inappropriate
advice … it is high time that the tendency of
officials to shackle PSBs with circular-a-day
on operational issues is curbed. Such matters
are best left to RBI which has experts who
have acquired long expertise in properly
guiding banks (Viswanathan 2012).
The RBI governor had also made his
displeasure known on this:
Occasionally, there are concerns over the
government exercising ownership rights not
through the established channel, which is the
Board mechanism, but outside the Board ...it
is not an exemplary corporate governance.
In the case of NABARD, the proposed
amendment tries to tamper with the
board mechanism by whittling down its
role and powers in the existing Act. The
mandarins of the DFS are proposing to
make it mandatory that all board deci-
sions, including those regarding day-to-
day business and administrative issues,
be subject to government approval,
which, in practice, implies a faceless sec-
tion officer who does not have an iota of
idea of banking and finance.
Dangerous Proposal
Any effort to disturb the sound arrange-
ments for ownership and governance laid
out in the present Act is not only illogical
but also goes against the spirit with
which those like B Sivaraman, G V K Rao,
M R Shroff, L C Jain and other eminent
development practitioners conceptualised
this institution under the leadership of
Indira Gandhi. It is shocking that this is
being negated by the United Progressive
Alliance (UPA) government led by the
Congress Party, which claims to carry
forward her policies and programmes.
Perhaps one should not be surprised as the
present ruling dispensation has abdicated
its responsibilities to the bureaucracy. As
political commentator Yogendra Yadav
says, “Congress has surrendered govern-
ance to babus or babu-like politicians and
outsourced politics to a few too-clever-by-
half backroom boys” (Yadav 2012).
This can be observed in the proposed
amendments to the NABARD Act. The
september 22, 2012
know-all babus of the banking division
of the finance ministry, who neither
have an understanding of banking and
development finance nor the experience,
seek to keep out the RBI from NABARD
and bring the institution completely under
its control. Through this amendment it
also seeks to subvert the autonomy of the
institution, render the board powerless
and emasculate its functioning. The stellar
achievements of NABARD in the 30 years
of its existence have been principally
due to the relative freedom of operation
permitted by the existing Act, the guid-
ance of its board and the presence and
support of the RBI as its stakeholder. All
these are being sought to be upturned. An
institutional legacy is sought to be oblit-
erated by petty-minded and self-serving
bureaucrats for whom “institution build-
ing” and “vision” are esoteric concepts.
It is therefore in the fitness of the
things to ensure that the RBI’s role as a
shareholder of NABARD continues in the
overall interest of the agricultural and
rural finance sector of the country.
Development practitioners, civil society
activists, parliamentarians, public per-
sons and the farmers of the country
should raise their voice so that a 30-year
legacy of the people is not lost forever.
References
GoI (2012): “Budget 2012-13: Speech of the Finance
Minister”, Ministry of Finance, Government of
India, New Delhi.
Pendharkar, V G (2003): Unit Trust of India: Retro-
spect and Prospect (New Delhi: UBS Publishers).
RBI (1934): “Reserve Bank of India Act, 1934”,
Reserve Bank of India, Bombay.
– (1981): “Report of the Committee to Review
Arrangements for Institutional Credit for Agri-
culture and Rural Development (CRAFICARD)”,
(Chairman: B Sivaraman), Reserve Bank of
India, Bombay.
– (1985): “The Reserve Bank and Rural Credit”,
Rural Planning and Credit Department,
Reserve Bank of India, Bombay.
– (1989): “Report of the Agricultural Credit Review
Committee (ACRC)”, (Chairman: A M Khusro),
Reserve Bank of India, Bombay.
– (1998): “Report of the Committee on Banking
Sector Reforms”, (Chairman: M Narasimham),
Reserve Bank of India, Mumbai.
– (2001): “Statement of Monetary and Credit Poli-
cy for 2001-02”, Reserve Bank of India, Mumbai.
– (2005): History of the Reserve Bank of India, Vol III
(1967-1981), Reserve Bank of India, Mumbai.
– (2009): “Report of the Committee on Financial
Sector Assessment (CFSA)”, (Chairman: Rakesh
Mohan), Reserve Bank of India, Mumbai.
Viswanathan, R (2012): “Micro-management of
Banks by Govt”, Business Line, 23 July.
Yadav, Yogendra (2012): “Much Ado About Nothing”,
Times of India, 28 April.
vol xlviI no 38 EPW Economic & Political Weekly
NOTES
Paanwalas in Mumbai
Property Rights, Social Capital
and Informal Sector Livelihood
Abodh Kumar, Rajani Mathur, Neeraj Hatekar
How institutions frame economic
transactions is crucial to the
ability of the poor in the informal
sector to find their way out of
poverty. The literature points to
two crucial aspects of the lived
reality of the urban informal
sector: the network of social
relationships and property
rights. This article investigates
the manner in which the two
interact to determine earning
opportunities in the urban
informal sector. The study is
based on a sample of informal
sector paanwalas or retail
paan shops across Mumbai. We
point out the significant role
continuous access to physical
space, the arena where property
rights and social capital interface,
plays in determining earnings.
Abodh Kumar (abodhkumar@gmail.com) is
with the Symbiosis Centre for Management
and Human Resource Development and the
Department of Economics, University of
Mumbai. Rajani Mathur is with SIES College of
Arts, Science and Commerce, Mumbai. Neeraj
Hatekar is with the Centre for Computational
Social Sciences, University of Mumbai.
90
L
egal rights to the use, sale and
transfer of an asset are different
aspects of property rights. When
informally owned assets are endowed
with a measure of legality, it becomes
easier to realise their potential value.
Clarity of ownership with regard to what
belongs to whom, eases access to the for-
mal credit system, promotes investment
and reduces market uncertainties. It also
makes transactions credible and thus
minimises the risk involved in any trans-
action. Legal property rights, by limiting
expropriation risk and creating security
beyond the short-term incentivise invest-
ment over the long-term, i e, enhance
dynamic efficiency.
The legal provision to use space in
modern cities carries utmost significance
for the urban self-employed informal
sector participants. The interaction of
legal provisions with social capital can
lead to significant differences in devel-
opmental outcomes. Social capital is a
multidimensional concept. It would be
only proper to enunciate at the outset
the particular sense in which the con-
cept is used here. Putnam (2000: 19)
writes: “[s]ocial capital refers to con-
nections among individuals’ social
networks and the norms of reciprocity
and trustworthiness that arise from
them”. Dasgupta (2009) pins the con-
cept down as, “interpersonal networks
where members develop and maintain
trust in one another to keep their promises
by the device of ‘mutual enforcement’
of agreements”.
Social capital in this sense is quite cru-
cial to the business of selling paan,
where success is synonymous with the
ability to attract and retain customers
on the one hand and ability to obtain
credit from suppliers on the other. One
SEPTEMBER 22, 2012
of our respondents, in response to a query
on the single-most crucial ingredient for
success in this business, replied jabban,
meaning trustworthiness developed es-
sentially through scrupulous keeping of
informal promises. By social capital,
here, we mean those interpersonal net-
works that contribute to success in an
unorganised activity like selling paan.
These could be relationships of trust with
suppliers or customers, or ties of taste
and likeability with customers that are
developed over extended periods of time.
The role of social capital becomes
prominent in settings where formal pub-
lic institutions underperform and lose
the trust of their citizens. In these infor-
mal sector dominated economies, eco-
nomic transactions lack legal backing
and the very basis of transaction is the
strength of the social network, i e, the
mutual trust among the market partici-
pants. Here, the scope of business or
volume of trade is also limited because
they cannot deal with strangers and are
restricted to transacting within their
limited social network. In this market,
informal arrangements replace the formal
construct. Mutual trust is a kind of social
insurance in the informal sector; legal
ownership of property is uncommon and
business transactions are often conducted
in a risky and uncertain environment.
However, developing networks of
trust requires some degree of perma-
nence in the sense of being at one place
over an extended period of time. It helps
if business is carried out from the same
location for extended periods. Fixity of
location is important both for suppliers
on credit as well as customers. Paan
shops that change location frequently
might not be able to develop strong
interpersonal networks with their custo-
mers. In that sense, social capital inter-
acts with secure property rights to bring
about favourable opportunities for the
conduct of business. More secure prop-
erty rights lead to longer and more con-
tinuous use of physical space. This ena-
bles the creation of a stronger and more
stable network of social relationships
which can be fruitfully exploited. It can
catalyse the process of accumulation of
vol xlvii no 38 EPW Economic & Political Weekly

social capital in the market of strangers,
which subsequently reduces the role of
intermediaries in the urban informal
market. Thus, we would predict that
informal sector businesses that have
been able to occupy the same physical
space for longer time periods would also
show favourable economic outcomes,
when everything else is controlled for.
In this study, we focus on the relation-
ship between the length of time a shop
has stood at the same location and vari-
ous economic outcomes, when other
causal variables are controlled for, in
order to test the hypothesis that longer
occupation of the same space is impor-
tant for economic success.
The article is organised as follows: In
Section 1, we sketch out some back-
ground issues and describe the role of
social capital and property rights in the
urban informal sector. Section 2 descri-
bes the data collected for the present
study. Drawing on the preceding sec-
tion, Section 3 presents empirical find-
ings. Section 4 concludes.
1 The Background
A growing body of evidence shows the
importance of legal property rights and
their significant positive impact on socio-
economic development. The issue of se-
cure property rights and their effect on
the efficient functioning of markets and
economic growth has received theoreti-
cal underpinning1 and empirical sup-
port2 from various researchers.
In India, six out of every ten workers
in the urban informal sector are self-em-
ployed. Earnings/income data for infor-
mal sector workers are not available at
the aggregate level and is difficult to
estimate from secondary sources as they
operate outside the ambit of official ac-
counts. Nevertheless, institutions are
crucial determinants of earnings and
savings of informal sector workers.3
Informal institutions support migrants
from the time they step into the new city
till they are established in their busi-
nesses. Some researchers find the role of
formal institutions hostile towards the
informally self-employed (for instance,
see De Soto 2000; Bhowmik 2003;
Anjaria 2006; Sundaram 2008). These
studies argue that if these self-employed
Economic & Political Weekly EPW SEPTEMBER 22, 2012
get support in the form of secure prop-
erty rights or licences to do business
from formal public institutions, their
earnings and savings may increase.
Social capital is another important de-
terminant of earning opportunities in
the informal sector poor. Immigrants
add themselves to the city’s population
through their social networks and form
the bulk of the urban poor. The different
nodes of their social networks are made
up of prior migrants, including friends,
relatives, and migrants from the same
village. In the beginning, the latter may
help the new incumbents with living
arrangements, guidance, job searches or
a space hunt to start new businesses.
They may also train them in the same
business in which they themselves are
engaged and crucially, introduce them
to their network for further assistance.
The two determinants interact with
each other. If a business operates from
the same physical location for an exten-
ded period, it might develop a large cus-
tomer network based on locational rela-
tionships. In many businesses, networks
rather than markets of buyers and sellers
and word of mouth are features common
to the exchange environment, affecting
competition for goods and potential
gains from trade. Such networks can be
embodied in individuals and businesses
that have fixed physical locations like
neighbourhoods. The ability to occupy
the same physical space for a sufficiently
long period of time may be a critical
determinant of a business’ ability to suc-
cessfully work these intangibles in its fa-
vour. In addition, comparatively old
businesses may earn more by establish-
ing high levels of trust.
In this sense, property rights guaran-
teeing continued access to the same
physical space to do business over exten-
ded periods might interact with social
capital in order to provide better earning
opportunities for the urban poor. Social
capital of informal sector businesses
may be highly location specific. This
possibility has interesting implications
for urban planners. The “freeing” of space
“encroached” upon by the informal sector
might come at a significant economic
cost when the lost earnings opportuni-
ties are accounted for. It also means that
vol xlvii no 38
NOTES
the policy of relocating informal sector
businesses into areas marked for them
might have adverse implications for the
earning opportunities of those relocated.
Most of the times, the relocation hap-
pens at places decided upon by urban
planners rather than the hawkers them-
selves. Such decisions do not take into
account the social capital aspect of
property rights and hence might not be
utilised by informal sector businesses
that depend upon location-specific
social capital.
2 The Sample
This study examines the earnings and
savings of an important segment of the
urban informal sector, i e, paanwalas or
betel leaf sellers. In spite of the ubiquity
of this segment, there is very little litera-
ture available that studies the earnings
and savings of paanwalas, barring the
paper by Ramachandran (1989). Focus-
ing on one specific occupational segment
also allows us to focus better on specific
institutional mechanisms that are im-
portant to our argument. In addition,
this activity is highly location specific
and hence well suited to examine the
location specificity of social capital. Our
preliminary research demonstrated that
the business of selling paan depends to
a large extent on the goodwill and trust
that the paan seller enjoys, which in
turn is likely to be specific to his or her
physical location. This is another reason
for choosing this particular occupation
for study.
This study utilises primary data col-
lected from 100 paanwalas from six are-
as of Mumbai. The data were collected
through detailed questionnaires and in-
terviews with retail paan shops on the
streets of Mumbai. The variables on
which data were collected included gen-
der, caste, religion, birthplace, occupa-
tion, shop age, education, house and
shop ownership, migration, various fac-
ets of the social network, generalised
and institutional trust, the nature of
competition in the market, transaction,
earnings, expenditures, etc.
All the respondents were male and
more than three-fourths were between
the ages of 16-45. The average age of our
sample was approximately 37 years, and
91
NOTES
96% were migrants from other states,
mainly Uttar Pradesh (UP). Hindus con-
stituted 82% of our sample and Muslims
17%, with 59% of the sample being back-
ward caste. Upper castes formed 38%.
Two castes – Barai (a caste of paan grow-
ers, which comprised 15%) and brahmin
(another 15%) – made up 30% of our
sample. Some more features included
the following:
• 48% of the sample shops were more
than 20 years old.
• 89% of respondents were at least liter-
ate in the sense of being able to read and
write with comprehension.
• 49% claimed that they had their own
housing accommodation and own shop
in Mumbai.
• 50% did not have their own bank ac-
counts and were thus excluded from the
formal financial system.
The importance of social networks is
brought out by the fact that 96% of our
sample received assistance from people
of their social network (like relatives,
friends, or own family member) in
Mumbai in some way or other. Another
39% had their own family paan busi-
ness in Mumbai and inherited their
current shop.
In our sample, all the paanwalas sold
their products on credit to the custom-
ers and among them, 85% borrowed
regularly from their supplier for their
working capital, without any guarantee
or interest payment. This practice is
quite common in the informal sector.
Transmission of credit without any in-
terest payment and without any guar-
antee from suppliers to shopkeepers
and further to customers indicates the
role of trust.
Average daily earnings and savings
(earnings minus the costs incurred in
running the business) in our sample
were Rs 263 and Rs 152 respectively. The
median earnings, however, were only
Rs 175, while the median savings were a
mere Rs 82. This suggests that the average
monthly “take home” income of Mumbai
paanwalas is in the range of Rs 4,700 to
Rs 5,000 per month. However, the medi-
an “take home” per month is less than
Rs 3,000. Assuming a household size of
five, this implies that the median paan-
wala household in Mumbai is well below
92
the poverty line. Thus, the typical paan-
wala in Mumbai is a small entrepreneur,
who does not earn enough for him to
find his way out of poverty. Further 9%
of our sample earned below Rs 100 per
day, while 61% earned in the range of
Rs 100-300. Daily savings (daily earn-
ings minus daily expenditures related to
running the shops) of 40% of our sample
was below Rs 100, while 37% saved in
the range of Rs 100-200.
While these summary statistics are
based on 100 observations, two outliers,
very large and atypical paan businesses,
were removed from the data before
econometric analysis. After removal of
the outliers (i e, with 98 observations),
the average total daily transactions,
earnings and savings were Rs 3,539.03,
Rs 246.35 and Rs 137.42 respectively.
3 The Methodology
In this section, we aim to empirically
examine the various determinants of
earnings/income and savings of paan-
walas and in particular, examine the
manner in which property rights and
social capital interact to produce favour-
able outcomes for the urban poor as
evidenced in this case. We do not have a
pre-specified model, which we can esti-
mate in an exploratory work like this.
This makes the usual ordinary least
squares (OLS)-based method of estimat-
ing models problematic. This is because
in the absence of a theoretically speci-
fied model, we need to empirically esti-
mate a variety of models with a view to
finding the “best fitting” one. However,
this will mean that we are faced specifi-
cations that are far from ideal which
might be beset with serious problems
like endogeneity and omitted variable
bias. It is well known that in such cases,
OLS estimators are neither unbiased
nor consistent.
The above challenge motivates the
use of Bayesian methodology, using Zell-
ner’s (1986) “g priors” to estimate the
best model. Our task is to find the subset
of a pre-specified set of potential covari-
ates that best describe a “dependent”
variable that is of interest. A natural way
to think about model uncertainty is to
admit that we do not know which model is
“true” and, instead, attach probabilities
SEPTEMBER 22, 2012
to different possible models, and then
select the model with the highest “pre-
dictive” density (Albert 2009).
For a g prior, we assume that the re-
gression vector ß, conditional on σ, has a
multivariate normal prior distribution
with mean ß0 and variance-covariance
matrix cσ2X ' X)–1. Then we assign σ2 the
standard non-informative prior propor-
1
tional to σ 2 . To use this prior, we need
to specify ß0 at the regression vector, and
a constant c that reflects the amount of
information in the data relative to the
prior. Choosing a large value of c would
have an effect similar to choosing the
standard non-informative prior for ( ß,σ2).
Choosing a small value of c reflects one’s
strong belief in the prior guess. We repre-
sent the joint posterior density of ( ß,σ2) as
g ( ß,σ2|y)=g ( ß |y, σ2) g (σ2|y)
The posterior distribution of the
regression vector ß conditional on σ2,
g (ß|y, σ2), is multivariate normal and
has mean ß1 and variance-covariance
matrix V1, with (Albert 2009):
ß1 = ( )
c ß0
c+1 c
+ ß̂
σ2
V1 = (X ' X)–1
c+1
The marginal posterior distribution of
σ2 is inverse gamma (a1, b1), where
a1= n , b = S + 1 ( ß0 –ß̂)' X' X( ß0 – ß̂)
2 1 2 2(c+1)
Now, a value of the variance can be
simulated from the inverse gamma distri-
bution, and then one simulates ß from the
conditional multivariate normal density.
Zellner’s class of g priors can be used
to select the best model in a regression
problem. Suppose that there are k
potential predictors of the response var-
iable y. There are a total of 2k possible
regression model, corresponding to the
inclusion or exclusion of each particular
predictor in the model.
In the above model, there are 13 cov-
ariates, so there will be 213 (=8,192) pos-
sible regression models, corresponding
to the inclusion or exclusion of each pre-
dictor in the model. Let ß denote the full
model including all of the predictors. We
assign ß a g prior with a prior guess ß0=0
and a large value of c, say c=100, corre-
sponding to vague prior information
vol xlvii no 38 EPW Economic & Political Weekly

about the location of ß. Then if ßP de-
notes a regression model containing a
subset P of the predictors, we assign ßP a
g prior of the same functional form with
a prior guess of 0 and the same value of
c. We compare the different regression
models by computing the prior predic-
tive density.
Given the sampling density of the re-
sponse variable f(y|ß,σ2) and a parame-
ter vector ( ß,σ2) assigned the prior den-
sity g( ß,σ2), then the integral gives the
prior predictive density of y (Albert
2009: 221):
m(y) = ∫ f (y|ß,σ2)g( ß,σ2)d ß, dσ2.
If we transform σ2 by a logarithm
where η = log σ, then this integral over
( ß,η), can be accurately approximated
using Laplace’s method, implemented
using the R function laplace in the Learn-
Bayes package in the R repository. We
computed the predictive densities for each
of the 213 model and selected the model
with the highest predictive density.4
The entire list of explanatory varia-
bles is given below:
Age: This variable, measuring the age of
the respondent, is expected to have an
impact on earnings positively through
greater experience. Shops with older,
more mature paanwalas are expected to
exhibit higher earnings because they are
better rooted in the locality, another form
of social capital. On the other hand, with
increases in age, earning falls. Selling
paan involves physical dexterity. The
owner has to spend a very long time (on
an average 13-14 hours per day) in the
shop, sitting in a narrow space. With age,
the efficiency of the shopkeeper goes
down. This indicates that experience by
itself may not yield positive returns in the
paan business. This is typical of most low
skill activities. Hence, returns to time
spent on paan selling do not rise with ex-
perience. Here, we cannot place expecta-
tions about the sign on ß1.
Age2: It is often observed that income
tends to rise more rapidly in the later
years than in the early ones before drop-
ping off due to old age. To accommodate
this possibility, we take age2 as a varia-
ble. We would expect the coefficient of
age2 to be negative.
Economic & Political Weekly EPW SEPTEMBER 22, 2012
Edu: In general, earnings may vary with
the levels of education. Here “edu” is a
binary variable, i e, illiterate = 0, and at
least literate = 1.
House: The independent variable “house”
in our model is a binary variable equated
to 1, if the paanwala resides in the house
for that he does not pay rent or his own
home and 0, if he resides in a rented
home or others (footpath, with relatives,
etc). This is a proxy for the wealth of
the paanwala.
Shop: The independent variable “shop”
in our model is a binary variable which
equals 1, if the paanwala is the owner of
the shop (or if he does not pay any rent)
from where he is running the business
and 0, when he is running the business
through a rented shop.
Area: The variable “area” refers to the
locality of Mumbai (out of 13) where the
primary survey was conducted. It in-
cludes Chembur, Dadar, Dharavi, Gov-
andi, Kalina, Khar, Kurla, Mahalaxmi,
Mahim, Mankhurd, Parel, Santacruz
and Wakola. The inclusion of this varia-
ble, coded as 1 if the paanwala is located
in the specific locality and 0 otherwise,
in the regression equation controls for
fixed area effects.
Shop_age: “Shop_age” measures the
length of time, in years, that the shop
has been operational in its present loca-
tion. As already pointed out above, this
variable refers to the interaction be-
tween property rights and social capital.
Doing business at a fixed location for
longer period helps an entrepreneur in
myriad ways. It makes customers and
people residing in that locality aware of
the time length during which the partic-
ular shop remains open on a particular
day. It makes customers well informed
about the nature and quality of the prod-
ucts they can get from that particular
shop and also about the behaviour of the
seller. It assists the seller with trust and
brand building, an increase in the cus-
tomer network and retention of the ex-
isting customer base. It makes suppliers
to the shop confident of supplying on
credit and protects them against the risk
vol xlvii no 38
NOTES
of default.5 A fixed location for the shop
over an extended time period also im-
plies that the seller has served a large
number of customers over that period,
which helps build brand value in the
market. Thus, older shops succeed in
accumulating large amounts of social
capital with time which manifests in
more transactions and earnings. It also
assists in retention of market share in
the face of intense competition at the
marketplace.
Floor: This variable measures the shop
floor area, measured in square feet.
Larger floor areas allow the owner to
diversify business by stocking and selling
a greater variety of goods and also allow
for some attractive decoration.
Group_mem: “Group_mem” is a binary
variable which shows the association
of paanwalas with any socio-religious
organisation, political group or any reg-
ular gathering attendance. Attending a
meeting shows the breadth of his social
network. The variable is equated to 0, if
the respondent is not associated with
any such groups and 1, otherwise.
The respondents almost invariably
could not find the time for membership.
Just about 10 respondents were mem-
bers of any organisation. An alternative
way of measuring membership could
have been a summative index of the
number of associations that a given paan-
wala was a member of, but given the lack
of general membership as reflected in the
data, this variable was coded as 1, if the
paanwala was a member of at least 1 as-
sociation, and 0 otherwise. This kind of
social capital is different from that indi-
cated by the shop_age variable. The
shop_age variable measures the infor-
mal ties and connections that shopkeep-
ers develop, mainly with customers and
suppliers, whereas group membership
is a more organised activity, oriented
towards a formal or informal groups
rather than individuals.
Trust: The variable “trust” is an institu-
tional variable which shows how much
the respondent trusts formal government
institutions like the judicial system,
government, local administration and
93
NOTES

police. In our questionnaire, we have Dum_leg: The “dum_leg” variable asks savings; accumulated savings can be
asked the respondents to answer four whether the shop has a legal identity or used to diversify the business.
questions related with generalised trust not. If a shop is legally owned, that has
on formal public institutions. The ques- several benefits. Legal ownership of Model Selection
tions are: “How much do you trust in the the shop (i e, registration/licensing)
Table 1: Levels of Trust in Government Institutions among Survey empowers sellers to not Model 1: Model 1 describes the highest
Respondents (in percentage per response rating category) to pay bribes to the police predictive density model for log (tde),
Trust in the Trust in the Trust in Police Trust in the
Legal System Administration Government and municipal officials, where tde is the total daily earnings of
None at all 22 36 49 24 allows easy establishment respondent paanwalas. Daily earning is
Not very much 25 29 23 30 of trust and enhances a part of daily transaction and the sum of
Quite a lot 40 32 26 39 customers and suppliers’ profit margins received by selling various
A great deal 13 2 2 6 confidence. It also im- products like paan, cigarette, bidi, gutkha
Hard to answer 1 1 proves access to the infor- and few other products like mouth fresh-
Source: Survey data.
mal credit market and eners, mint, chocolate, candies, etc.
legal system (tls)”, “the administration insulates from fear of doing business at a Table 2: Zellner’s g Prior Model Selection for
(ta)”, “the police (tp)” and “the govern- new place. It may lead to a rise in trans- Total Daily Earnings
Variable 90% Quantile 10% Quantile
ment (tg)”. The responses were gather actions, earnings, savings and invest-
Shop_age 0.5393412 -0.2571744
into four categories or ratings, with 0= ment. The variable Dum_leg is a binary Edu 0.4934651 -0.05767504
“not at all”, 1= “not very much”, 2= variable which is equated to 1, when the Bank 0.7170079 -0.05686725
“quite a lot” and 3= “a great deal”. Trust responder runs his business from legal Shop -0.1434153 -0.485304
towards these four public institutions licensed shop and 0, if from an illegal shop. Source: Author’s analysis.

seems to be related. The responses for Our model is linear in parameters with
each category are summarised in Table 1. Help_bus: The variable “help_bus” is a 13 potential regressors and a constant
Police and local administration are qualitative variable which answers the term. This implies that the Bayesian
the formal public institutions with question “who helped you to start this simulation chooses the most likely model
which the paanwalas interact with on a business?”, i e, whether the respondent out of 213 possible models. In Bayesian
day-to-day basis. Table 1 reveals that started his business on his own (i e, analysis, we obtain the posterior distri-
72% of our sample showed low levels of without anybody’s help), with the help bution of the parameter vector directly,
trust (i e, none at all or not very much) of prior migrants or a family business. instead of a point estimate as in OLS. We
in the police, while 65% showed low These responses are equated to 0, 1 and have reported below the median value
levels of trust in the local administra- 2 respectively. for the posterior distributions of the
tion. In the empirical exercise here, we selected variables, as well as the 10%
derive a composite index of these four Bank: “Bank” is a binary variable which and 90% quantiles in Table 2, and
indicators of trust by using principal is equated to 0, if the responder does also presented them diagrammatically
components from the addition of the not own a bank account and 1, if he in Figure 1. Zellener’s g priors select a
separate indicator. does. Having a bank account promotes model with the following variables as
Figure 1: Simulated Posterior Distribution of Coefficients of Most Probable Model Variables for Total Daily Earnings
Edu Shop
1400
800
1000
Frequency

600
Frequency

600
400
200
200
0
0
-0.6 0.0 0.5 1.0 -0.8 -0.6 -0.4 -0.2 0.0 0.2
β3 β5

Shop_Age Bank

100 100
Frequency
Frequency

600 600

200 200
0 0
-1.5 -1.0 -0.5 0.0 0.5 1.0 1.5 -1.5 -1.0 -0.5 0.0 0.5 1.0 1.5
β7 β11
Source: Author’s analysis.

94 SEPTEMBER 22, 2012 vol xlvii no 38 EPW Economic & Political Weekly

constituting the most likely model to be
associated with the total daily earnings
of paanwalas:
1 Shop_ age with the median coefficient
value 0.0077654816
2 Edu with the median coefficient value
0.1977663
3 Bank with the median coefficient value
0.19229108
4 Shop with the median coefficient value
-0.3184752
The log marginal density and posterior
probability are -620.46 and 0.02508
respectively.
Figure 1 shows the simulated posterior
distribution of the coefficients of the
variables edu, shop, shop_age and bank,
which appear in the model with the
highest predictive density.
The shop_age variable appears in the
selected model, as well as edu. The me-
dian value of 0.19 shows that illiterate
paanwalas earn less than those that are
at least literate. There are clearly pecu-
niary benefits to obtaining an education
in this specific case.
The results also show that access to
banking facilities is associated with
higher earnings. The earnings of those
who own bank accounts are demonstra-
bly higher in comparison to those who
do not have a bank account. Our data
also show that the majority (64%) of
those who hold a bank account are doing
business at the same location for at least
two decades. Therefore, access to bank-
ing and secure property rights also go
hand in hand.
One of our major findings is that the
earnings of those who are doing busi-
ness from rented shops are more than
Table 3: Zellner’s g Prior Model Selection for
Total Daily Savings
Variable 90% Quantile 10% Quantile
Help_bus 2.528368 0.1663869
Bank 1.77374 0.2998063
Source: Author’s analysis.
those who do not pay any rent or are doing
business from their own shop. This should
seem paradoxical. After all, why should
those who rent their premises earn more
than those who either own their premises
or do not pay any rent? A significant
possibility is that those who own the
more profitable paan businesses are ab-
sentee owners. These owners typically
Economic & Political Weekly EPW SEPTEMBER 22, 2012
own/manage several lines of businesses
like restaurants and beer bars, real es-
tate, etc. They do not operate their own
shops, but give them away on rent.
Model 2: In this model, we take the tds
(total daily savings) as the dependent
variable and keep the independent vari-
ables the same as in model 1. Daily sav-
ings has been calculated by deduction of
daily expenditures from earnings. We
have reported below the median value
for the posterior distributions of the
selected variables, as well as the 10% and
90% quantiles in Table 3. These are also
presented diagrammatically in Figure 2.
Zellenr’s g priors selected a model
with the following variables as consti-
tuting the most likely model to be asso-
ciated with the total daily savings of
paanwalas:
1 Help_bus with the median coefficient
value (14.67719).
Figure 2: Simulated Posterior Distribution of Coefficients of Most Probable Model Variables for Total
Daily Savings
Help_bus
Frequency
1,000
500
0
-100 0 100
β10
Bank
1,400
Frequency
800
400
0
-100 0 100
Source: Author’s analysis.
2 Bank with the median coefficient
value (37.57105).
The log marginal density and posteri-
or probability are -607.59 and 0.13429
respectively.
Figure 2 shows the simulated posteri-
or distribution of coefficients of varia-
bles Bank and Help_bus, which appear
as the components of most likely model
for model 2.
The qualitative response variable
“help_bus” was selected in model 2.
Given the coding for this variable, this
indicates that family business shops (91%
of which have been in business for more
than 20 years and at the same location)
saved more than the shops established
with the help of prior migrants (i e,
friends and distant relatives) and in turn
vol xlvii no 38
NOTES
that the latter shops saved more than
those who established their shops on
their own. This is mainly achieved by
cutting down expenses.
For instance, in our sample size of
100, 32 shops are family business shops.
Out of these, 22 were shop owners and
27 owned a house in Mumbai for which
they did not pay any rent. The average
rent paid by this sample segment for the
house and shops was approximately
Rs 197 and Rs 1,012 respectively. For
those who established their business
with the help of prior migrants, average
rent payments for house and shop were
Rs 875 and Rs 1,530 respectively. Only 19
respondents in our sample had started
their business on their own and paid
average house and shop rents of Rs 680
and Rs 1,337 respectively. Thus, owner-
ship of pre-existing assets like house or
shop led to substantial savings in busi-
ness for paanwalas. As a result, this
200 300 400
200 300 400
β11
variable also demonstrates the impor-
tance of secure property rights interact-
ing with social networks.
Results from model 2 also show that
access to banking facilities is associated
with higher savings. Again, the data show
that those who own a house in Mumbai
or operate a family-owned business are
more likely to have a bank account. Out
of those who held a bank account (50 re-
spondents), 35 (or 70%) had their own
house and 32 (64%) owned a family busi-
ness shop in Mumbai for which they did
not pay any rent.6 This again shows the
importance of secure property rights.
4 Conclusions
Our study points to the poverty of the
median paanwala. What are the crucial
95
NOTES
factors determining the earnings and
savings that come out from our study?
Our empirical results demonstrate the
role of access to a fixed space for longer
period of time, resulting in the accumu-
lation of more social capital are crucial
determinants for earnings and savings
of paanwalas. With time, social capital
accumulation helps older shops to earn
more. This further helps in acquiring legal
ownership of assets, reduce police and
municipal officials’ depradations, and
also helps augment savings.7
Legal ownership also helps reduce
expenditure, enhances the scope of
business beyond the social network and
makes financial inclusion possible.
Financial inclusion has a multiplier ef-
fect by promoting savings and invest-
ment and helping in expansion and
diversification of businesses. Together
this chain leads to more capital accumu-
lation in the urban informal sector in
terms of physical as well as human capi-
tal. Approximately, three-fifths of our
samples are dispossessed of legal own-
ership of any assets and are thus finan-
cially excluded. Thus, in the urban
informal sector, suboptimal use of re-
sources could be improved by the provi-
sion of legal property rights, thereby
having a significant impact on poverty.
Notes
1 See Smith (1982), Hayek (1944), Freidman
(1964), Dreze and Sen (1995), North (1981),
Williamson (2005), Khan (2005), Dixit (2004),
Acemoglu et al (2002), Baharoglu (2002), De
Soto (2000).
2 See Knack and Keefer (1995), Besley (1995), Le-
blang (1996), Banerjee et al (2002), Carter and
Olinto (2003), Alston et al (1999), Lanjouw and
Levy (2002), La Porta et al (1998), Jacoby et al
(2002), Johnson et al (2002), Field (2007).
3 North (1990) conceptualises institutions as rules
of the game of a society. They include formal
rules (constitutional, property rights and con-
tracts), informal constraints (conventions, norms
of behaviour, and self-imposed codes of conduct),
and the enforcement characteristics of both.
4 We compute the predictive density for a collec-
tion of plausible models in R, with the help of
the function bayes.model.selection.
5 During data collection, we came to know that
credit-based transaction played a significant role
in the paan business. Sales are significantly
reduced in the recent past as various substitutes
(gutkha) are available and the new generation
are more inclined to taste gutkha and cigarettes,
which can be bought from local grocery stores
also. Moreover, numerous paan shop are availa-
ble in any given locality. Thus to retain custom-
ers, the seller are forced to sell on credit, which
subsequently forces the seller to purchase the
materials from suppliers on credit. The denial of
credit may result in loss of customers.
96
6 Own shops for which the paanwalas did not pay Freidman, M (1964): Capitalism and Freedom
any rent were not necessarily legally owned. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press).
7 It is evident from our sample that (at least two Hayek, Friedrich (1944): The Road to Serfdom
decades) old shops are generally family busi- (Chicago: University of Chicago Press).
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house or a shop, or both in the city of Mumbai. “Hazards of Expropriation: Tenure Insecurity
and Investment in Rural China”, American
Economic Review, 92(5): 1420-47.
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 LETTERS
Issn 0012-9976
Ever since the first issue in 1966,
EPW has been India’s premier journal for Citizens’ Statement: 22%. If only they were united, they
comment on current affairs
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Repression in Koodankulam would be a force to reckon with. Even
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W
which was launched and shepherded e are appalled at the police repres- show more respect and consideration
by Sachin Chaudhuri,
who was also the founder-editor of EPW. sion unleashed on the people pro- towards them. The different factions
As editor for thirty-five years (1969-2004) testing peacefully against the Koodan- and parties of the dalits do not come to-
Krishna Raj
gave EPW the reputation it now enjoys. kulam nuclear plant. The repression has gether since the leaders fear that their
editor
forced them to take to a jal satyagraha. personal importance would get diluted.
C Rammanohar Reddy Their legitimate, and as yet unaddres- A few years ago when Mayawati formed
Deputy Editor sed, concerns about the plant’s safety the Bahujan Samaj Party unit of Tamil
Bernard D’Mello were heightened by the Atomic Energy Nadu, Krishnasamy and Tiruma oppo-
web Editor
subhash rai Regulatory Board’s recent admission sed it, very unconvincingly.
chief copy editor that it has not implemented the recom- Secondly, dalit leaders also imitate the
roger alexander mendations of its own review committee, style of the cine-influenced leaders of the
Senior Assistant Editors including revision of safety parameters, Dravidian parties who concentrate on
Lina Mathias
aniket Alam and installation of backup freshwater and their public presentation through the
Srinivasan ramani power sources. No emergency-evacuation media. Thus dalit leaders ensure their own
ashima sood
Bharati Bhargava drill was conducted as mandated, in a appearance in the media by garlanding the
copy editors 16-kilometre radius, prior to fuel-loading. statues of famous leaders like Ambedkar,
Prabha Pillai The government has refused to disclose Periyar, Annadurai, etc, or put up their
jyoti shetty
pertinent information, including the Site flexiboard photographs on highways, all
Assistant editor
P S Leela Evaluation and Safety Analysis Reports, of which is just some hollow glory.
editorial Assistant nuclear-waste management plans, and the Further, my impression all along has
lubna duggal agreement indemnifying the Russian sup- been that the dalit leaders are in the
production plier against accidents, which mocks the pockets of some or the other casteist or
u raghunathan
s lesline corera absolute liability principle. These docu- Dravidian party for monetary gain. In the
suneethi nair ments need to be discussed publicly and at process they lose their dalit identity and
Circulation least with the people affected by the plant. are disabled from fighting against atroci-
Gauraang Pradhan Manager
B S Sharma Instead, the government is accusing ties committed on their own community.
Advertisement Manager the protesters of sedition, and the protest This article gives reasons for this situation.
Kamal G Fanibanda of being “foreign” inspired, despite an Finally, and perhaps most important,
General Manager & Publisher absence of evidence. This is part of a pro- unless dalits abjure from practising un-
K Vijayakumar
editorial
foundly undemocratic pattern, recently touchability among their own sub-castes
edit@epw.in increasing, of demonising dissent, dis- there is very little hope for their emer-
Circulation missing people’s concerns about hazards, gence as a powerful political force.
circulation@epw.in
Advertising
and brutally repressing protests. M R Rajagopalan
advt@epw.in We urge the government to suspend Gandhigram Trust
Economic and Political Weekly work at Koodankulam and engage directly Tamil Nadu
320-321, A to Z Industrial Estate and democratically with the concerns of the
Ganpatrao Kadam Marg, Lower Parel
Mumbai 400 013 people who live in the vicinity, so that if the Strengthen the CAG
Phone: (022) 4063 8282 plant is to proceed it has their acceptance.

I
FAX: (022) 2493 4515
Praful Bidwai, Romila Thapar, endorse your editorial “Accountability
EPW Research Foundation
Amit Bhaduri, Darrl D’monte, – Is It Just a Word?” (EPW, 1 September
EPW Research Foundation, established in 1993, conducts Arundhati Roy, Jean Dreze, K N Panniker, 2012). However, I also feel that you are
research on financial and macro-economic issues in India. Admiral Ramdas, M V Ramana and others.
rather soft in raising your pointers regar-
Director
k kanagasabapathy
ding the allocation of the coal blocks,
C 212, Akurli Industrial Estate
On Dalit Unity
Kandivali (East), Mumbai 400 101
Phones: (022) 2887 3038/41
Fax: (022) 2887 3038
epwrf@vsnl.com
Printed by K Vijayakumar at Modern Arts and Industries,
T his is with regard to the well-
researched article “Dalit Political Im-
agination and Replication in Contempo-
Corrigendum
In the article “Bodoland: The Burden of His-
151, A-Z Industrial Estate, Ganpatrao Kadam Marg, tory” by Udayon Misra (EPW, 15 September
Lower Parel, Mumbai-400 013 and rary Tamil Nadu” (EPW, 8 September 2012) 2012), on p 38 in the para “The present clash-
published by him on behalf of Sameeksha Trust
from 320-321, A-Z Industrial Estate,
by Karthikeyan, Rajangam and Gorringe. es...the percentage of Bodo population in
Ganpatrao Kadam Marg, Lower Parel, Mumbai-400 013. The first point is that Tamil Nadu’s the BTAD area should read 30% and not 3%
Editor: C Rammanohar Reddy.
dalit population is a little more than as has been printed. The error is regretted.
4 september 22, 2012 vol xlviI no 38 EPW Economic & Political Weekly

establishment of the Indira Gandhi
International Airport in Delhi under the
public-private partnership model and
several other projects that pushed the
government on the defensive, with reac-
tions that were totally unacceptable. Not
only is the government bent on repeat-
ing the same mistakes under different
pretexts, the Comptroller and Auditor
General (CAG) and his countrywide net-
work of Auditor Generals (AGs) have
been treated as a nuisance. Rarely have
governments shown the patience to
appreciate the point raised or the will-
ingness to act on them. One argument
that is frequently made is that the CAG
does not have anything to do with policy,
not quite appreciating that policies are
but guidelines for executive action and
unless the policy is brought under the
scanner, the actions following from
them cannot be stalled.
About the argument that the CAG was
not correct in raising the issue of under-
pricing the coal blocks and that these
prices are but presumptive, does not
hold water. The officialdom has chal-
lenged the proposition that govern-
ment’s losses have been colossal by
terming them presumptive and gross
overstatements. Rather, if the methods
of marine insurance and its concept of
“constructive total loss” had been used,
the losses shown by the CAG would have
been much higher. Thus it is arguable
that the CAG put the loss figures on the
lower side.
Various CAG reports on the entire
gamut of activities of the union and state
governments generally remain unread
and unacted upon, not only by the gov-
ernment departments but also by the
public at large. A rich fund of knowledge
and information available in these
reports has remained unutilised. I sug-
gest that the powers originally bestowed
on the CAG by the framers of the Con-
stitution be restored and his tenure be
extended to at least 10 years. In the
meanwhile, the CAG must have guaran-
teed access to all official information,
as was the wont earlier, to lend some
meaning to what you have rightly called
accountability.
P Chattopadhyay
Kolkata
Economic & Political Weekly EPW september 22, 2012
India, China, Myanmar
M yanmar’s recent opening up to
the outside world has presented
India with a new opportunity. In May,
Manmohan Singh made the first visit to
Myanmar by an Indian prime minister
in 25 years and signed agreements on
education, trade, culture and infrastruc-
ture. India can seize a prime opportu-
nity to revitalise its relations with south-
east Asian countries through the new
gateway of Myanmar, and in the process
balance China’s growing influence in
the region.
For now, China has much greater influ-
ence in Myanmar. In the year that ended
in March 2011, China was Myanmar’s
largest trade partner; their $4.7 billion
bilateral trade accounted for more than
a third of Myanmar’s total trade. And it
was more than triple the value of India’s
$1.4 billion trade with Myanmar. China is
also the top foreign investor in Myanmar,
with total commitments thus far of $8.3
billion, compared to India’s $189 million,
according to available data.
India can improve its situation if it im-
plements the agreements on building land,
rail and air links that were signed during
Manmohan Singh’s visit. They include a
bus service from Imphal in India’s Manipur
state to Mandalay in central Myanmar and
increasing the number of flights between
Kolkota and Yangon. Work continues on
a project that would link Indian ports on
the eastern seaboard with Sittwe port in
Myanmar and link Sittwe to Mizoram by
road and inland waterways. Both sides
also want to finish a road to connect Moreh
in Manipur with Mae Sot in Thailand
through Myanmar. Completion of the
road would make trilateral connectivity
a reality. India and Myanmar also agreed
to explore the possibility of freight trans-
port from India through Myanmar to the
rest of south-east Asia.
Web Exclusives
The following articles have been uploaded in the past week in the Web Exclusives
section of the EPW website. They have not been published in the print edition.
Read them at http://epw.in
“India and the Autumn of the African Patriarch” – S Arun Mohan
“A Judicial Doctrine of Postponement and the Demands of Open Justice”
– Sukumar Muralidharan
Articles posted before August 31 remain available in the Web Exclusives section.
vol xlviI no 38
LETTERS
Even though India’s “Look East” policy
was launched in 1991 many experts say
that results have been disappointing, in
particular due to delays in infrastructure
projects that are vital for trade links.
Although India and the Association of
Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) signed
a free trade agreement in 2010, India-
ASEAN trade was worth only $50 billion in
2011, expected to rise to $70 billion in 2012.
Over the past year or so, India has
significantly bolstered ties with south-
east Asia, most visibly in security. Both
sides have common interests in suppress-
ing terrorism, piracy and narcotics traf-
ficking, protecting the sea lanes, and bal-
ancing the influence of China. India’s naval
cooperation with Vietnam is a case in point.
New Delhi has moved closer to offering
Hanoi the use of naval facilities for train-
ing. Indian warships have been permitted
to dock at Nha Trang port in southern Vi-
etnam. India’s ONGC Videsh Limited has
been pursuing oil and natural gas explora-
tion in two Vietnamese blocs in the South
China Sea, despite Chinese displeasure. In
jockeying with China in south-east Asia,
India has the advantage of greater cultural
proximity with Thailand and Indonesia.
Apart from this there is now a growing
interest of the United States in reinvigor-
ating its Asian presence and the warming
of relations between China and Russia.
The fear is that as countries become more
powerful economically, they build up
their militaries and become more aggres-
sive on territorial and trade matters,
sparking disputes with neighbours.
Given this context, India’s policymakers
face important questions ahead. The
centrality of Myanmar to building India’s
relations with south-east Asia cannot be
overstressed. Myanmar can also play an
added role in helping India and China
cement their ties.
Reena Marwah
Delhi University
5
SPECIAL ARTICLE
Constructing Facts
Bt Cotton Narratives in India
Glenn Davis Stone
A group of researchers and industry writers have
constructed a narrative of technological triumph for Bt
cotton in India, based on an empirical record of
superior performance compared to conventional seed.
Counterclaims of Bt cotton failure are attributed to
mutually reinforcing interactions among
non-governmental organisations which avoid rigorous
comparisons. However, researchers and the
biotechnology industry are also engaged in a similar
authentication loop for generating, validating, and
publicising such facts. With Bt cotton, the convention of
routinely ignoring the effects of selection bias and
cultivation bias benefits researchers, journals and the
industry, but keeps us from drawing meaningful
conclusions about the relative performance of the
technology. But as poor as the case for isolating the
technology impact of Bt cotton in India has been, it is
useful in helping us understand the social conventions
for creating one’s “own facts”.
For comments and discussion I am grateful to Melinda Smale, Mike
Fischer, Guillame Gruère, Keshav Kranthi, Steve Fazzari, Matin Qaim,
and Rick Wilk. But none are responsible for the content of this article,
and some may not even agree with it.
Glenn Davis Stone (stone@wustl.edu) is at the department of
anthropology, Washington University, St Louis, United States.
62
Y
ou are entitled to your own opinions, according to the
saying, just not your own facts.
In the global controversies over genetically modified
(GM) crops, few “facts” are as pivotal as Bt cotton’s perform-
ance in India. The developing world in general, and its
smallholders in particular, have long been central to the GM
debate (Stone 2002), and India has far more smallholder
adopters of GM crops than any other country. GM technology
also arrived at a critical moment in Indian agriculture: Bt
cotton seeds, designed to kill bollworms, entered field trials
just as the widespread adoption of hybrid pesticide-intensive
seeds was sending smallholder farmers onto a catastrophic
treadmill of pesticide and debt (Vasavi 2011). Therefore the
impact of this one GM crop in this one country has taken on
unusual importance.
Proponents and opponents staked out their positions during
the field trials (James 2002; Shiva and Jafri 1998). But the
official release of Bt cotton for the 2002 season should have set
the stage for an empirical verdict on its performance relative to
conventional seed.1 Many assumed this was a straightforward
question; “[m]easuring inputs and yields in agriculture is not
rocket science”, note Herring and Rao (2012: 46).
Yet by early 2003, starkly divergent accounts had emerged,
one claiming a technological triumph and the other an abject
failure. Economists Matin Qaim and David Zilberman (2003)
used test plot data from seed manufacturer Mahyco to report
an 87% yield advantage for Bt cotton over a popular seed.
Meanwhile, a study of cotton farmers in Andhra Pradesh (AP)
by agricultural scientists Abdul Qayum and Kiran Sakkhari
(2003) reported a 53% yield disadvantage for Bt as compared
to conventional seed.2
There followed a steady stream of field-level studies of
Bt cotton’s impacts in India (for reviews, see Smale et al 2010;
Smale, Zambrano and Cartel 2006; Tripp 2009), with new
writing appearing daily in the scientific literature, newspapers,
industry publications and blogs. Yet the facts on Bt cotton’s
impact remain in heated dispute, with most writing falling
into the two polarised narratives signalled at the outset. The
“triumph narrative” flows mainly from economists and the
biotech industry (and its academic allies), including more
peer-reviewed writing (recent examples are Herring and Rao
2012; James 2012). It claims Bt seed to be a “remarkable success”
(Choudhary and Gaur 2010) and a revolution that has raised
yields by 70% (Government of India 2012: 7). The counter-
narrative comes largely from non-governmental organisations
september 22, 2012 vol xlviI no 38 EPW Economic & Political Weekly

(NGOs) along with some journalists and academics, usually in
non-peer-reviewed writing; it depicts Bt cotton as a failure, a
farce, and a cause of farmer suicides (recent examples are
Kuruganti 2012; Shiva 2011).
Each narrative is highly empirical, based on its “own facts”,
although generated from utterly different systems for collect-
ing, authenticating, and disseminating those facts. I will
argue that both “authentication systems” serve the interests
of their constituent parties, but that both are so flawed
that we simply cannot say how Bt seed has affected cotton
production in India. Both categories of writing usually cite
other works emerging from its own authentication system,
emphasise empirical specifics, and generalise about Bt cotton
being a disaster or triumph. Both obscure the fact that
they are generated by, and designed to be propagated by,
authentication systems that are structured by their own
social conventions for creating certain forms of knowledge
while nullifying others.
The Indian case has been a poor laboratory for isolating the
impacts of Bt seeds, and the time for valid comparisons is past
because non-Bt cotton seed has virtually disappeared; what it
does offer is a showcase on how very different authentication
systems create their own facts. The general problem of how
groups of people establish their own rules for facticity has long
interested scholars, notably including Kuhn (1962), Foucault
(1970) and Latour (2010), and the social nature of this process
has been a central topic in science and technology studies
(see, for instance, Fischer 2009). My focus here is much more
limited. I am specifically concerned with the key issue of
Bt cotton’s effects on Indian smallholder farming, and with
identifying and analysing the dynamics of the two authentica-
tion systems that provide us with most of what we know on the
topic. We can understand very little about Bt cotton’s impacts
without recognising and understanding the functioning of
these systems.
We will look first at the “reciprocal NGO authentication
system”, drawing on Herring’s analysis of how anti-GM know-
ledge is created through interactions among separate interested
parties (for example, Herring 2008a, b, c, 2009; Herring and
Rao 2012). We will then look at the “industry-journal authenti-
cation system”, which creates pro-GM facts through the inter-
action of a different set of interested parties. As background to
this system, we will first consider the rise of a particular set of
assumptions on how to study technology impacts; we will then
examine how these assumptions allow for conventions on ig-
noring bias, and finally at the components of (and interaction
among) the parties of this authentication system.
The NGO Reciprocal Authentication System
Herring and Rao (2012: 45) note that most accounts of Bt cotton
failure in India have come from writers and researchers
working with NGOs. With few exceptions, this work is authen-
ticated and propagated without use of peer-reviewed journals.
Clearly impatient with what he saw as yarns being spun by
GM opponents, Herring analysed how a narrative of field-
level failure is generated and maintained. He terms it a
Economic & Political Weekly EPW september 22, 2012 vol xlviI no 38
SPECIAL ARTICLE
“reciprocal authenticity dynamic” – a “Janus-faced brokerage”
in which (2009: 19):
ex-colonial powers and their press authenticate global narratives for
local networks; local reports legitimated by indigeneity provide con-
firmation for global narratives. The concreteness of local stories finds
credibility where abstract numbers fail.
Herring’s example is United Kingdom (UK)-based GM Watch
relying on Hyderabad-based Deccan Development Society
(DDS) to provide local accounts of “GM catastrophes” to be dis-
tributed and incorporated into anti-GM discourse. The DDS
does indeed construct local accounts of GM catastrophe that
are picked up by the European anti-GM press. In December
2002, with the first season of legal Bt cotton cultivation wrap-
ping up, the DDS convened a coalition of NGOs under the title
of “AP Coalition for the Defence of Diversity” and held a major
meeting in Warangal City. The meeting agenda included the
“launching” of the aforementioned Qayum and Sakkhari
(2003) study, which it had commissioned, a summit of NGO
leaders, and a plenary session where individual farmers could
report on their experience with the new seed.
The Qayum and Sakkhari study (2003) did have some quali-
ties associated with peer-reviewed research – the authors had
scientific credentials, and some respondents had been selected
randomly. However, the study was “largely facilitated” by the
head of a Warangal NGO active in mobilising farmers against
GM crops (DDS 2006). At the launch, there was little doubt
that the study was intended as a shot across the bow of the
Bt cotton project, and meant to provide fodder for the canons
of European greens. I have elsewhere described the plenary
session (Stone 2005), which was engineered to provide the ever-
present video cameras with farmer accounts of agronomic dis-
appointment. The same farmers appeared in the video (DDS
2003) about “the dream which became a nightmare”, each
refusing to plant Bt seeds again. The report and video were
soon featured in anti-GM narratives in Europe, such as the
Amsterdam-based Friends of the Earth International (nd: 48)
and the UK-based Combat Monsanto (2008), as well as organi-
sations in the south, such as Malaysia-based Biosafety Informa-
tion Centre (2004). Herring’s general point is an important
one: this system for authenticating and publicising accounts of
the cotton’s performance hinges on the dynamics of reciproc-
ity and the interlocking of interests among the parties.
However this analysis takes the NGO “reciprocal authenticity
dynamic” to be essentially non-empirical, acting to “prevent
confrontation with empirical findings” and to avoid “facts”
(Herring 2009: 19-20):
the radical freedom of movement leaders from the dull compulsion
of economic facts means there is no penalty for getting it wrong...
Because of the extra-local nature of knowledge consumption, facticity
itself retreats from salience.
Actually, the anti-GM dynamic is heavily based on empiri-
cism and “facticity”. In fact, the primary deliverables from
Indian NGOs are both the concrete factual exemplars of failure
and statistical data from the field. “Name and face” examples
of Indian farmers with bad Bt cotton experiences appear in
documentaries, such as the Warangal documentary mentioned
63
SPECIAL ARTICLE
above, and the gallery by the Southern Action on Genetic
Engineering (2011). Statistical field data are even more impor-
tant. The Warangal meeting was intended to highlight Qayum
and Sakkhari’s empirical findings, and the DDS later published
two more highly empirical reports by the same authors
(Qayum and Sakkhari 2004, 2005). P V Satheesh, head of the
DDS, has published his own articles on the NGO’s website
emphasising empirical “farmyard truths” (Satheesh 2007).
Vandana Shiva, Greenpeace, and Friends of the Earth offer
a stream of statistics on cotton yields, farmer profits, and
pesticide use (for example, Shiva 2006).
Not surprisingly, claims of an empirical basis for the failure
narrative leave many observers unimpressed. While Herring
offers a sceptical analysis of the system of knowledge produc-
tion, some simply ignore the NGOs’ “facts” because they do not
appear in peer-reviewed forums. Biotechnologist Shanthu
Shantharam (2005) is infuriated by the failure to follow what
he sees as the rules of scientific rigour:
A critical review of all the reports from NGOs on Bt-cotton in India
serves as fine examples of how not to conduct a field survey. These
reports claim to be ‘independent’ and ‘scientific’ whatever they
mean!!! The things that they seem to be ‘independent’ of are scientific
rigor and objectivity. Most of them have conducted either post-ante
polls or post-harvest surveys or memory recall opinion surveys, and
none of them have been designed with any standard scientific method-
ology, sampling is spotty and size so small that they cannot be used to
draw any meaningful conclusions for the entire country. Bias against
Bt-cotton becomes glaring when one notices that they descended in
those villages in AP only after they heard that Bt-cotton had failed.
These critics are not without merit; the main proponents of
the failure narrative would be certain to reject positive
impacts even if they could be convincingly shown (Stone 2002),
while they accept dubious claims of negative impacts (for example,
of Bt plants killing livestock; for a critique see Kranthi 2011a).
The narrative is facilitated by the NGO reciprocal authentication
system which generally avoids peer-reviewed journals and
often breaks rules such as those listed by Shantharam. But the
problem with these critics is their rather credulous conviction
that the rules being followed by the authors of the peer-
reviewed literature allow for the isolation of the impact of
Bt seed. The critics’ important lesson is that we are naïve in
swallowing empirical claims without a careful consideration
of how vested interests affect the creation of facts. However,
could this caveat be relevant to the triumph narrative? Having
looked critically at the NGO authentication system, let us con-
sider its counterpart, beginning with a brief consideration of
the history of its key assumptions.
Whose Numbers Count?
While writing in the triumph tradition appears in many non-
peer-reviewed sources, most of it refers to peer-reviewed
research that is at the centre of the authentication system. This
research distinguishes itself on the quality of its facts, based
on agreed-on conventions of evidence and peer review.
Yet facts do not fall simply onto a linear scale of quality. Even in
peer-reviewed literatures, conventions on what constitutes
significance and empirical support vary between disciplines
64
and schools of thought; conventions also vary through time.
Herring’s (2008c) question of “whose numbers count” is parti-
cularly important in peer-reviewed studies of technology
adoption. Research on this was pioneered by sociologists, who
focused on the “laws of imitation” that generated the S-curve
pattern of adoption. The seminal work was Bryce Ryan and
Neal Gross’ study of the diffusion of hybrid corn (maize) seed
in Iowa, United States (US) (Gross 1942; Ryan and Gross 1943),
where they had been hired by breeders to investigate farmers’
apparently irrational reluctance to adopt the new hybrid seed.
Ryan and Gross focused on the social aspects of adoption, such
as who adopted early versus late and how farmers influenced
each other. There followed a stream of sociological studies
showing variations on the themes established by Ryan and
Gross. Although social scientists would later refine the models
– for instance, recognising a pro-innovation bias and an under-
appreciation of the effects of marketing (Bulte and Lilien 2001)
– the key drivers of technology adoption seemed to have been
largely figured out, and research on the subject declined
sharply after the 1950s. It was, as Rogers (2003: 59) put it,
“a victim of its own success”.
Innovation adoption studies then quickly came to be domi-
nated by economists (Ruttan 1996), who brought about a shift:
the social questions were replaced by an emphasis on isolating
the economic impacts of specific technologies. The new direc-
tion was signalled in studies of hybrid corn adoption by
Zvi Griliches (1957, 1960), which saluted the agronomic superi-
ority of hybrid corn and then modelled adoption not as a social
process but as a function of the spatial aspects of yield advan-
tage. Griliches attributed the rise in corn productivity from the
1930s to the 1950s entirely to hybrid seed; his data on spatial
patterning of hybrid adoption came from geographer Andreas
Grotewold’s (1955) “Regional Changes in Corn Production in
the United States from 1909 to 1949”.
The problem was that while claiming to analyse the impact
of hybrid corn, Griliches actually did nothing of the kind, as is
clear in Grotewold’s actual study. Grotewold did write that
hybrid seed was an important factor in the rise in corn produc-
tivity between 1935 and 1955, but that other key technologies
were being adopted simultaneously. Use of commercial fertiliser
increased steadily with the introduction of hybrid corn, more
than doubling during the years of hybrid adoption; chemical
weed and insect control were spreading throughout the Corn
Belt, the most effective chemicals appearing since the war;
and farm machinery was being widely adopted, including a
fourfold increase in mechanical harvesters and tractors between
1935 and 1955. Griliches’ assertions about economic benefits
that he had not actually isolated established a pattern that
has continued, and which is particularly evident today in the
“counterfactual issue” in research on Bt cotton effects.
Statements on impacts of agricultural technology are by
their nature comparative: they comprise claims about what
would have happened had the technology not been adopted.
Whatever the adopters are compared to is called the “counter-
factual” (Ravallion 2005: 3; Smale et al 2006: 30). But since
history is an experiment run with only one iteration, there is
september 22, 2012 vol xlviI no 38 EPW Economic & Political Weekly

almost never a perfect counterfactual. “The essential problem”,
as Ravallion points out (1994: 4),
is that we do not observe the outcomes for participants if they had not
participated. So evaluation is essentially a problem of missing data. A
‘comparison group’ is used to identify the counter-factual of what
would have happened without the program. The comparison group is
designed to be representative of the ‘treatment group’ of participants
with one key difference: the comparison group did not participate.
The effect of the “treatment” (adoption of Bt seed) cannot
be isolated without a proper counterfactual, but almost all
peer-reviewed Bt cotton studies in India have problems with
the counterfactual that leave it unclear if anything significant
has been learned. Following Griliches’ precedent, Bt cotton
impact studies routinely fail to isolate the effect of Bt cotton by
failing to control for key factors that affect yields. I will look
specifically at the two most glaring and systemic problems
with counterfactuals in these studies: selection bias and culti-
vation bias.3 We will then consider the interests shaping the
peer-reviewed authentication system to try to understand why
the system tolerates – in fact, celebrates – the findings and con-
sensuses that it does.
Selection Bias
This results from the tendency for early adopters of agricultural
technologies to not be a random or representative sample of all
farmers, but rather a group biased towards high production.
This effect is well documented in various kinds of innovation
adoption (Rogers 2003), but especially in agriculture, having
been identified in the early hybrid seed studies noted above:
Ryan and Gross found early adopters to be better travelled, and
to have larger farms, higher incomes, more education (Gross 1942;
Rogers 2003: 34). Many subsequent studies of agricultural
technologies show that early adopters in general tend to be
more educated, of higher social status, and possessed of larger
farms, not to mention more intelligent and better able to cope
with uncertainty (Barrett et al 2004; Rogers 2003: 287-91).4
Selection bias is the elephant in the room because early
adopters are the kind of farmers who would get relatively high
crop yields even if they had not adopted. Since we expect early
Bt adopters to get higher yields, finding that they get higher
yields tells us nothing about Bt, regardless of whether the
research is authenticated by peer review or not. The problem is
not new or obscure, having been noted by various writers,
economists included (Glover 2010b: 492-94; Smale 2012;
Smale et al 2010; Smale et al 2009; Stone 2011). It has also
been recognised in the economics literature on Indian Bt cotton
(Crost et al 2007: 25-26):
Generally speaking, the problem is that if the adoption of Bt crops
is endogenously determined (that is farmers choose themselves
whether to adopt or not) it is impossible to determine a priori the di-
rection of the causal effect underlying an observed correlation. If a
correlation between Bt adoption and high yields is observed, it could
be due to a positive effect caused by the technology, but there could
also be a self-selection effect if farmers who are already more effi-
cient than their peers adopt the technology more eagerly. It is well
known that, especially in the first years after their introduction, agri-
cultural technologies are adopted unevenly by different parts of the
Economic & Political Weekly EPW september 22, 2012 vol xlviI no 38
SPECIAL ARTICLE
population, as some farmers are constrained by their level of access
to information and credit.
Selection bias is noted by Morse et al (2007b), Morse et al
(2012) as “farmer effect”, and by Bennet et al (2006: 61). It has
recently been recognised by Matin Qaim who, after co-authoring
numerous articles claiming substantial yield benefits without
taking selection bias into account, wrote that Kathage and
Qaim (2012: 11652):
most impact studies do not properly control for nonrandom selection
bias, which may occur when more successful farmers adopt the new
technology earlier or more widely. As these successful farmers may
have higher crop yields and profits anyway, this can result in inflated
benefit estimates.
In India, whenever researchers have taken the trouble to
look, they have always found that early Bt adopters have the
hallmarks of early adopters elsewhere. Morse et al (2007a,
Table 3) found that Bt adopters in Maharashtra owned an
average of 58% more land and 75% more non-land assets;
Sadashivappa and Qaim (2009: 175) found Bt adopters in four
states owned 8-36% more land; Lalitha et al (2009: 143)
found Bt adopters in Maharashtra had 91% more land and
18% more education; Mal et al (2011) found that early adop-
ters in Punjab and Haryana were more educated and more
committed to cotton farming; Narayanamoorthy and Kalam-
kar (2006) found early adopters in Maharashtra had 33%
more education, 7% more landholdings, and 22% more land
under irrigation.
One study even quantified the effects of selection bias in
Bt cotton adoption. Working in Maharashtra in 2002-03,
Morse et al (2007a) compared yields obtained by non-Bt adopters
with yields on the non-Bt fields of partial adopters (i e, farmers
who planted both types). The partial adopters’ non-Bt fields
produced 29% more than the non-adopters’ fields in 2002, and
43% more in 2003 (Morse et al 2007a: 47). The finding is worth
noting: In the only study to measure the effect of selection bias
on yields, the bias alone was found to account for 29-43% of
Bt cotton’s “yield advantage”.
It is no secret why researchers would prefer to ignore selec-
tion bias: it is a nettlesome problem in field research. Crost
et al (2007) suggest four strategies, two of which actually
avoid selection bias and two that attempt to neutralise it statis-
tically. The first is to dictate adoption decisions – for instance,
by getting farmers to adopt according to a random scheme.
This is rarely possible. The second is to use a natural experi-
ment in which adoption is shaped by a factor unrelated to
farmers’ characteristics – “arbitrary reasons such as regulatory
differences”. The third is the instrumental variables approach,
in which a correction factor is based on a variable that for
some reason correlates with adoption but not with yields. The
last is the fixed effects approach in cases where more than one
year of production is available.
Each of these approaches poses its own problems, and
several observers now agree that the problem of selection bias
has rarely been managed with any success (Crost et al 2007: 25;
Kathage and Qaim 2012: 11652; Smale et al 2009). This can be
seen in a selective survey.
65
SPECIAL ARTICLE
The Mahyco-instigated study noted above (Qaim 2003;
Qaim and Zilberman 2003) was unique in using the first
method: farmers were recruited to grow test plots of Bt cotton,
the non-Bt isoline, and a locally popular hybrid. However com-
pany data on the plots showed an unbelievable 87% yield ad-
vantage over the popular hybrid (80% over the non-Bt isoline);
this has never been approached with independently collected
data, and many questions remain about this heavily criticised
study (see, for instance, Crost et al 2007: 28; Sahai 2003;
Shantharam et al 2008).
Bennett et al (2006) report on early adopters also used data
from Mahyco. They assert (2006: 61) that “[i]n most cases,
farmers grew Bt and conventional cotton varieties on the
same farm”, omitting any numbers on this point. As with the
other Mahyco data, the Bt yield advantages were suspiciously
impressive: 45% and 63% in the two years.
The Barwale et al (2004: 25) study, authored by Mahyco
employees, reported on Mahyco’s surveys in six states in 2002.
It reported an overall yield advantage of 61% for Bt cotton,
with the counterfactual simply being identified as “non-Bt”.
Although peer-reviewed, the article provided no information
on how the Bt or counterfactual farmers were selected.
The Naik et al (2005) study interviewed farmers in four
states, with no control for selection bias and no figures offered
on the characteristics of adopters except that their farms were
9% larger.
Dev and Rao collected data in 2004-05, finding a 32% yield
advantage for Bt seed, which they said “clearly shows the supe-
riority of BT cotton” (2007: 40). They too ignored selection
bias, but did provide figures suggesting the bias to not be very
large in this case. Bt adopters had somewhat larger farms with
more irrigated plots and more black cotton soil but the differ-
ences were not great. (In this case, the more striking bias was
cultivation bias, discussed below.)
The instrumental variables approach has not been used suc-
cessfully in India, and with very limited success elsewhere
(Crost et al 2007).
A series of the studies by Qaim and colleagues, based on
data series begun in four states in 2003 and updated three
times (Krishna and Qaim 2012, Table 1), reported yield advan-
tages of 30-40%. This project accounts for a plurality of the
peer-reviewed articles on Bt cotton in India that neglect selection
bias (Krishna and Qaim 2012; Naik et al 2005; Qaim et al 2006;
Sadashivappa and Qaim 2009; Subramanian and Qaim 2009,
2010). Actually, “most Bt adopters” in their sample also grew
conventional cotton (Qaim et al 2006: 51), but rather than using
partial adopters’ conventional fields as a check on selection
bias (as Morse et al 2007a did), their conventional fields were
lumped with non-adopters’ fields (Qaim et al 2006: 51). Few
details were provided on characteristics of adopters and counter-
factual farmers, until an addendum to a 2012 paper, which
revealed that Bt adopters in the different periods had 10-55%
more education and 1-15% more land (Kathage and Qaim
2012). The latest paper in this series, uses a fixed effects model
to adjust for selection bias (ibid). This study acknowledges
that previous work has failed to address selection bias, and
66
then does a much better job of isolating Bt effects, producing
an average 24% yield advantage.
A longitudinal study in Warangal, AP essentially avoided
selection and cultivation bias by comparing samples of farmers
in four villages before and after the virtually complete adop-
tion of Bt seed between 2003 and 2007 (Stone 2011). Such a
study is sensitive to differences in growing conditions between
the two years (though fortunately rainfall differences were
slight). It found a yield advantage of 18%, but with enormous
variation among villages, and significant decreases in pesti-
cide use. (However it also raised the question of whether
short-term yield advantages were at the expense of exacerbat-
ing underlying problems in farmers’ fraught relationship with
agricultural technology.)
There is no escaping the problem: selection bias poses an
enormous obstacle to isolating the effects of Bt seed, and
recognising selection bias would pose an enormous obstacle
to the flow of peer-reviewed publications on this much-
followed topic. Ignoring the elephant accords not only with
the interests of key players as argued below. But this is not
the only bias that has been ignored; let us next consider
cultivation bias.
Cultivation Bias
This results from seeds that are relatively costly, or for which
the farmer has particularly high expectations, being planted in
preferred locations and given greater care and expense than
other seeds. This has major impacts on yields, as farmers’
fields vary greatly in their water supply, their distance from
the residence, their level of attention and investment. Espe-
cially in its first few years of availability, when it was much
touted and very expensive, Bt seed would have received pref-
erential treatment. For instance, this author’s fieldwork found
a farmer who was the first adopter of Bt seeds in a village in
Warangal district.5 At Rs 1,600, the box of seed was four times
the cost of conventional seed. When several rainless days had
passed after planting, she went into the field with a hired
worker to hand-water each seed to ensure germination – an
extraordinary level of attention to a cotton field.
Cultivation bias also is a vexing challenge in field research.
Agricultural labour inputs can be accurately tracked only with
intensive fieldwork and daily records (for example, Stone et al
1990; Stone et al 1995). Measuring plot-specific material in-
puts also requires concerted effort and time by the researcher,
as farmers rarely keep specific records.
Cultivation bias has been ignored in most Bt cotton studies
in India, and even where it is noted, there is little or no expla-
nation of how these difficult data were collected. But some
reflection of cultivation bias is apparent. One study found Bt
fields receive 30% more fertiliser and 38% more irrigation,
although 6% less labour and 58% fewer sprayings (Mal et al
2011: 167). (No data were recorded on whether Bt seed was
planted on better soils or more accessible locations, or how much
more labour was invested.) Another found Bt fields received
40% more chemical fertiliser, 80% more manure, 9% more
labour, 35% more tractor hours, and 110% more irrigation;
september 22, 2012 vol xlviI no 38 EPW Economic & Political Weekly

pesticide use was 5% lower (Narayanamoorthy and Kalamkar
2006).6 In another, Bt fields received 28% more human labour
and 21% more machine labour, 83% more irrigation, and 27%
more manure (but 2% less chemical fertiliser) (Dev and Rao
2007: 41). Qaim and colleagues reported that Bt fields received
23-26% more irrigation, 13-25% more fertiliser, and 11-18%
more labour (Kathage and Qaim 2012: Supporting Information).
Most studies claim to isolate the impacts of Bt without taking
cultivation bias into account. In some cases, authors use the
Cobb-Douglas production function to adjust for a few of the
more measurable inputs (Naik et al 2005; Sadashivappa and
Qaim 2009). This is a very partial solution even if reliable
plot-specific data on inputs are available; the approach itself is
viewed by many as flawed (McCombie 1998), and it has come
in and out of fashion. The convention of using this function, or
more commonly simply ignoring cultivation bias, and still
claiming to have isolated a technology’s impact, is a major
expedient to researchers. But the result is clear: while purport-
ing to isolate the field-level impact of Bt cotton in India, the
peer-reviewed research actually focuses on the most favoured
fields of the most productive farmers, and thus isolates nothing.
If Indian research has helped solidify the convention of
playing fast and loose with counterfactuals, research in less
scrutinised areas has carried the convention to the extreme.
Consider the recent triumph narrative of Bt cotton in Burkina
Faso. Reports of an 18.2% Bt yield advantage over “conven-
tional cotton” appeared in peer-reviewed articles, with no in-
formation whatsoever on how farmers or fields were chosen
for the counterfactual (Vitale et al 2008; Vitale et al 2010).
Upon further inquiry, it turns out that the Burkinabe farmers
have little choice and adoption is usually close to 100%; for a
counterfactual, economists used yields from the refuge areas
planted around Bt fields (Vitale 2011). Refuges are small strips
of cotton that farmers were obliged to plant to support the
Bt fields by hosting populations of Bt-sensitive caterpillars. It is
unclear that there is any scientific value in such a comparison,
but the “facts” (including the trappings of the “scientific rigor
and objectivity” demanded by Shantu Shantharam), have pro-
vided the basis for a triumph narrative in academic literature
and industry-supported media (James 2011). Peer-reviewed
journals did not even require the authors to explain what Bt
cotton yields were being compared to.
How and why could such research, in India and elsewhere,
have acquired its “facticity”?
The Industry-Journal Authentication System
Like the “failure” narrative, the triumph narrative has a prob-
lematic empirical basis that has been generated, authenti-
cated, and disseminated by a particular system of interacting
parties with overlapping interests. The key components of this
industry-journal authentication system are (1) the biotechnology
industry, (2) academic journals, and (3) a set of professional
scholars (in particular, academic agricultural economists).
The vested interests of the components in this authentication
system are relatively straightforward, even if the interactions
among them are not.
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SPECIAL ARTICLE
Industry plays a more active role in promoting empirical
impact narratives than with previous agricultural technologies;
given opposition to the technology, and the industry’s public
relations strategy of emphasising developing world applications
(Glover 2010a; Stone 2002; Witt et al 2006), biotechnology firms
are understandably anxious about field performance in India.
Scholastic journals have the goal of maximising the impact
and perceived quality of the articles they publish, and their
prestige and thus power as an authentication agent. The
common measure of impact factor, based on how frequently a
journal’s articles are cited in other peer-reviewed journals,
indirectly indexes “quality” and the level of interest in their
articles. As authentication agents, journals rely on prestige
gained from their use of peer review, which requires them to
extract unpaid work from reviewers.
Scholars are rewarded for the number and the impact of
their publications; impact results from numerous factors, in-
cluding how much it cited, discussed, and covered in the press.
Scholars submit articles to journals in the hope of being
accepted for publication; journals solicit the uncompensated
work of peer review by scholars. Industry sometimes provides
scholars with data (examples above) and funding, and pro-
vides economists and journals with publicity; economists and
other scholars provide journals with high-impact articles;
journals provide economists with career advancement and
industry with the raw material for a success narrative.
The overlapping interests of all three stakeholders promote
the routine neglect of the biases described above. For economists
and other scholars, the benefits are clear: taking selection and
cultivation biases into account would both slow down the pace
of publication and make for much more qualified conclusions,
resulting in fewer publications, in less selective journals, with
lower impact. It would also lead to results showing lower
yield advantages, which could mean less responsiveness from
biotech firms and less propagation of their findings in non-
peer-reviewed forums.
For journals, there are two paramount benefits. The first
pertains to the refereeing process. The essential pillar of scholarly
literature is the skilled and time-consuming work of peer review.
The business model of most peer-reviewed journals is to capitalise
on this uncompensated work as a free good.7 There may be a
component of altruism in scholars consenting to referee manu-
scripts, but there are also instrumental incentives pertaining
to their own work: refereeing provides opportunities to insist
that their own work be recognised and to validate the types of
methods they use themselves. A study on Bt cotton impacts is
unlikely to be panned for ignoring selection and cultivation
biases if the referees ignore the same biases in their own work.
In this way, authors, referees, and journals implicitly collude
in ignoring biases. The second benefit for journals is obviously
that this collusion in overlooking potentially disqualifying
biases allows them to attract more manuscripts on a hotly
debated topic, with favourable effects on their impact factor.
For the biotech industry (and its academic interlocutors), the
benefits are enormous because ignoring biases allows studies to
find exaggerated yield advantages for their products. Industry
67
SPECIAL ARTICLE
therefore participates in the authentication system in various
ways, including providing funding for certain kinds of studies
and data and taking a pivotal role in disseminating the success
narrative. Industry expenditure on media dwarfs that spent
by GM critics, with results from favourable field studies being
repeated in advertisements, web postings, pamphlets, and
through neutral publications via press releases, and various
pronouncements by allied researchers. The Council for
Biotechnology Information, the industry public relations en-
tity, which has aggressively promoted the success narrative of
Bt cotton in India, had a starting budget equivalent to Rs 1.4
crore (Lambrecht 2000).
Included in this authentication system is the International
Service for the Acquisition of Agri-biotech Applications
(ISAAA), an industry-supported entity whose main mission is
“sharing and disseminating scientific knowledge”, particularly
emphasising “the benefits of crop biotechnology to various
stakeholders, particularly resource-poor farmers in develop-
ing countries” (ISAAA 2012). None of the ISAAA’s stream of
reports is peer-reviewed, but they are routinely cited in the
peer-reviewed literature. The ISAAA propagates the narrative
of “remarkable success” (Choudhary and Gaur 2010), citing
favourable findings on advantages of Bt cotton. Thus industry-
supplied test plot data are published with claims of 80-87%
yield advantage, which are then broadcast by ISAAA reports
and pamphlets (ISAAA 2003) and announced in the mainstream
press (Neergaard 2003) with the assumed validity imparted
by peer review. The ISAAA often touts the studies’ rigour,
including in the Burkina Faso study with its dubious compari-
sons of Bt yields to refuge yields, which was heralded as a
“well-conducted survey” (James 2011).
ISAAA announcements then feed into an echo chamber of
interlocutors, such as when its recent list of economics studies
– lacking valid counterfactuals and allowances for cultivation
bias, and several based on the same data – was blogged about
by Calestous Juma (2012b) who also tweeted (Juma 2012a) to
his thousands of followers, many of whom retweeted the
“fact”-based narrative about how evidence was “stacking up
against biotechnology critics”.
Inconclusions
As we pass the decade mark since Bt cotton was approved in
India, we should admit that we cannot say what the effect of
the technology has been. Isolating the technology’s impact is
much more difficult than is commonly assumed, and few
comparison studies have done it well; most have not done it at
all. It is not “rocket science” (Herring and Rao 2012), but it
certainly has been “rough terrain” (Smale 2012), and since
conventional seed has virtually disappeared, the time for
comparative impact research has passed.
Nor can we look to adoption rates as prima facie evidence
of field-level impact; after all, the cotton hybrid-pesticide package
was rapidly and enthusiastically adopted in the 1990s, bring-
ing not prosperity but the agricultural train wreck of 1998-2002
(Stone 2011). It was because of that catastrophe that there was
an eager market for Bt as a new way to kill bollworms.
68
Statistics on trends in cotton production are also inconclu-
sive. It is true, as GM enthusiasts stress, that cotton yields have
risen in the Bt era: nationwide average cotton lint yields climbed
59.3%, from 302-481 kilogramme/hectare, between 2002 and
2011 (Figure 1). But 94% of this rise (from 302 to 470 kg/ha)
occurred between 2002 and 2004, before adoption had even
topped 6% (see the shaded portion of Figure 1). Cotton yields
were probably climbing in the early 2000s because of factors
that, in the tradition of Griliches, many economists and indus-
try writers have ignored in their haste to claim to have isolated
the impacts of Bt cotton. K R Kranthi, director general of the
Central Institute of Cotton Research, points out that bollworm
infestations dropped over the past 12 years “mainly because of
a significant decline in the use of the insecticide ‘synthetic-
pyrethroid’ coupled with enhanced usage of some potent boll-
worm-controlling insecticides such as Spinosad, Emamectin and
Indoxacarb” (Menon 2012). He concludes (2011b) that “it is prob-
able that the new pesticides, new hybrids, new micro-irrigation
systems, new areas, and Bt-cotton together may have been
effectively contributing to the enhanced rate of production
and productivity” since the early 2000s. Gruère and Sun’s
(2012) analysis of trends suggests a 19% overall contribution of
Bt to cotton yields, but finds this inseparable from changes in
fertiliser, hybrids, labour, pesticides, and irrigation. Bt seed was
being planted only by a small group of early adopters until 2006,
when it reached 38% (Figure 1). Since then, adoption has topped
92% and yields have dropped 7.6%.8 State-specific trends are also
completely inconclusive; for instance, in AP, the surge in yields
began eight years before Bt became popular, and since then yields
have dropped back to where they were before (Stone 2012).
Figure 1: Cotton Yields and Percentage of Fields Planted to Bt Seed
600 100
90
550
80
Countrywide yields (kg/ha)
500 70
Yields
Bt percentage
60
450
50
400
40
BT%
350 30
20
300
10
250 0
1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011
Source: Yield data are from the Cotton Corporation of India, Bt adoption data are from ISAAA.
What we do know is that farmer experiences with Bt seed
have been highly variable (Smale 2012; Smale et al 2009; Tripp
2009), and single numbers can obscure as much as they reveal.
But the demand for the “bottom line” is ravenous and we now
have three longitudinal studies that give us a glimpse, through
a glass darkly, of the technology’s isolated impact. These stud-
ies offer a somewhat surprising degree of agreement on num-
bers that are nothing like the early claims of very large yield
advantages. Kathage and Qaim’s (2012) multi-village fixed-
effects study gives us the number 24%; Stone’s (2011) multi-
village before-and-after analysis gives us 18%; and Gruère and
Sun’s (2012) trend analysis gives us 19%.
september 22, 2012 vol xlviI no 38 EPW Economic & Political Weekly
 SPECIAL ARTICLE

But we should expect no letting up in the dichotomous flow
of claims about this crucial case. Indeed, at the same time
that the authentication systems are in direct competition over
the acceptance of empirical narratives, they are also deeply
co-dependent; and in some ways, they encourage each other.
The NGO reciprocal authentication system, with its sometimes
dubious claims and disregard for peer review, irritates many
scholars and policymakers and leads to a fetishising of journal
standards that have their own flaws. The industry-journal
authentication system, with its myopic view of Bt as a readily
isolatable technological tweak and its cosy alliance between
GM manufacturers and ostensibly independent researchers,
encourages many to seek out the more critical perspectives of-
fered by NGOs. Therefore demand for both narratives will per-
sist and both authentication systems will continue to entitle
both sides in the GM debates to “their own facts”.

Notes
1 In India, the cotton season often spans two
calendar years. To simplify the wording, I refer
to the season by the year of planting: for exam-
ple 2002, rather than 2002-03.
2 Even before we consider the issues behind the
conflicting accounts, it is worth noting that the
simple question of yields, especially short-term
yields, is blinkered and potentially misleading.
Both studies were looking at farmers’ first brush
with a technology about which they had little
knowledge and none of the locally developed
management skill that is the sine qua non of
smallholder farming (Brookfield 2001; Netting
1993; Stone 2007; Stone 2011). Claims such as
Qaim and Zilberman’s (2003) that the 2001 tri-
als of Bt cotton “were managed by the farmers
themselves using customary practices” make
little sense.
3 My focus here is on yield advantage. Economic
impacts, usually assessed through partial budget
analyses, raise their own problems, some of
which Glover (2010) has examined.
4 Moreover, later adopters have been shown
convincingly to be driven in part by cultural
factors that have little to do with yield advantage
(Henrich 2001; McElreath 2004; Stone 2007).
5 An accompanying photograph, placed on the
Economic & Political Weekly website, documents
cultivation bias. It shows this farmer on her
field hand-watering each seed.
6 Morse et al (2007: 47) compare cultivation costs
for Bt fields, adopters’ non-Bt fields, and non-
adopters’ fields. The results are curious, show-
ing adopters as applying less fertiliser and irri-
gation but more bollworm insecticide on their
Bt fields; see Glover (2010b) and Stone (2007: 85).
7 Since some journals turn a profit, this model
clearly offers grounds for resentment. A group
of mathematicians has recently announced a
boycott of one publisher, denouncing “a system in
which commercial publishers make profits based
on the free labour of mathematicians” (Lin 2012).
8 These figures are the most widely accepted but
they differ from numbers from the Directorate
of Economics and Statistics (Government of
India 2012, Figure 1.8).
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Economic & Political Weekly EPW september 22, 2012 vol xlviI no 38 69
SPECIAL ARTICLE
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vol xlviI no 38 EPW Economic & Political Weekly

Ten Years of the
Biological Diversity Act
Shalini Bhutani, Kanchi Kohli
As India plays host to the
Convention on Biological
Diversity’s 11th Conference of the
Parties in Hyderabad in October
2012, this article takes a closer
look at the country’s legislation on
the subject – the Biological
Diversity Act (2002).
Shalini Bhutani (emailsbhutani@gmail.com)
is trained as a lawyer and works on trade,
agriculture and biodiversity. Kanchi Kohli
(kanchikohli@gmail.com) is an independent
writer and researcher. Both are based in Delhi
and coordinate the national-level Campaign
for Conservation and Community Control over
Biodiversity.
Economic & Political Weekly EPW september 29, 2012
I
ndia’s Biological Diversity (BD) Act
was enacted in 2002. There is now a
decade of its existence to reflect on.
The genesis of the law can be traced to
the Convention on Biological Diversity
(CBD), which was signed at the Rio Sum-
mit in 1992. While assessing the 10 years
of the Act, one has to be mindful of how
India itself has undergone change in
these years. By the time the Act came
into force, trade imperatives had begun
to influence environmental law and policy-
making both at the national and global
level. The final shape of the Act and the
manner of its implementation through
the BD rules issued by the Ministry of
Environment and Forests (MoEF) in
2004 reflect that bent.
The “economic reforms” introduced in
1991 meant greater reliance on market
forces, encouragement of the private
sector and restructuring the role of the
government. In 1995, the country had
also become a member of the World Trade
Organisation (WTO). This, among other
things, meant changes in the country’s
intellectual property (IP) regime. Economic
liberalisation has created many new chal-
lenges for local communities. Situating the
10 years of the BD Act in this post-“reforms”,
post-WTO context, helps to better under-
stand the direction it has taken.
Building Institutions
The BD Act prescribed an institutional
framework in order to implement the
three CBD objectives of conservation,
sustainable use, and equitable sharing of
benefits arising out of the use of biological
resources and related knowledge. So
vol xlviI no 39
COMMENTARY
from the start, the central government
was preoccupied with establishing the
institutional structure, particularly at
the national level. In 2003, the National
Biodiversity Authority (NBA) was set up
by the MoEF at Chennai.1 It has seen seven
chairpersons up to date. The 15-member
authority has largely consisted of bureau-
crats or senior scientists, mostly ex officio
appointments. Apart from that, the NBA
has had the prescribed five non-official
“specialists” and “expert” members. The
NBA is required to function as the biodi-
versity board for the union territories but
there is little to show on that front.
Meanwhile, almost all states have state
biodiversity boards (SBBs). The count on
date is 26 out of 28,2 with Kerala, Karnataka
and Madhya Pradesh being amongst the
first to set up their SBBs. Most boards
have forest and wildlife officials doubling
up as chairpersons and member secre-
taries. Clearly, each of the SBBs is at dif-
ferent stages of implementation of the
BD Act, yet their role has remained lim-
ited to that of receiving intimation from
Indian institutions, corporate bodies or
individuals who wish to use biological
resources and related knowledge. Most
SBBs have busied themselves with steering
processes for biodiversity management
committees (BMCs) to be set up at village,
municipality or block levels and the doc-
umentation of local resources to be under-
taken by them. Till December 2011, only
14 states had notified their BD rules.
The Act mandates that seven-member
BMCs be set up by every local body.
There are 33,077 BMCs across 23 states of
India as of September 2012, of which
27,712 are in Madhya Pradesh.3 Only
very few states such as Nagaland are
willing to integrate existing customary
institutions such as village councils and
Tribal Hohos with BMCs.4 By and large,
the emphasis by the NBA and SBBs has
been to have as many BMCs ready on paper.
In many places that the authors visited,
15
COMMENTARY

for instance, north Karnataka and cen-
tral India, not all the local individuals
listed as BMC members were even aware
of their position on these committees.
Both civic bodies in the urban centres
and panchayat samitis in the rural areas
have been reluctant to set up BMCs since
it creates additional work with no guar-
antee of visible benefits to show their
immediate constituencies. In urban areas
there are very few BMCs set up with the
exception of some districts in Madhya
Pradesh and Maharashtra. So the BMC
experience largely remains a rural exer-
cise. National guidelines for BMCs are
being finalised by the NBA.
Meanwhile, the NBA has been setting
up several short-term (two-three years)
expert committees on specific issues on
need basis. The ones currently functional
are on agro biodiversity, medicinal plants,
training modules and access and benefit
sharing (ABS).5 An Indian Institute of
Biodiversity and likewise an Institute of
Marine Biodiversity have also been
approved since 2005. Earlier this year, a
Centre for Biodiversity Policy and Law
(CEBPOL) was created in April6 and
Regional Biodiversity and Bio-resources
Centres (RBBC) too are envisaged. There
is a suggestion to have a regional office
of NBA at Shillong for the north-eastern
states.7 So 10 years on, there is still
unfinished work in building institutions.
Access Rules
The other objectives of conservation,
sustainable use and benefit sharing have
not received as much attention as access
to biological resources and associated
knowledge of the people of India by foreign
persons, which requires the prior approval
of the NBA. This is in line with the CBD
requirement for the accessor to have the
prior informed consent (PIC) of the coun-
try providing genetic resources.8 The CBD
also requires that in exchange, domestic
laws provide for fair and equitable benefit
sharing on mutually agreed terms (MAT)
when access is granted9 and the benefits
are to be routed back to local peoples
who are the real keepers of biodiversity.
The legal provisions dealing with
grant of access were brought into effect
only in 2004 after the NBA was fully in
place.10 At its second meeting in 2004,
the NBA processed the first eight access
applications for biological resources re-
ceived by it. By its third meeting in July
2005, the ABS agreements for access,
material transfer and intellectual prop-
erty rights were prepared using the ex-
pertise of different lawyers from various
government departments. There was still
concern that SBBs had not been formed in
all states, which also meant that there
were no functioning BMCs in some states
at that time. Yet the work of processing
access applications continued unabated
despite the fact that the Act makes it
mandatory for NBA and SBBs to consult
BMCs before taking any decision.11 In
2005, at an NBA meeting members
stressed the need to prioritise commer-
cialisation with fair and just benefit shar-
ing because out of all resources spent by
NBA so far, not one penny has gone to
the communities whose knowledge and
resources we are supposed to care for.12
After 10 years of the Act, India has 100
ABS agreements to show.13 These were
publicly announced by the union envi-
ronment secretary in July 2012 at a CBD
meeting in Delhi. It is yet to be seen if

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Edited By
INDRA MUNSHI
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This volume situates the issues concerning the adivasis in a historical context while discussing the challenges they
face today.
The introduction examines how the loss of land and livelihood began under the British administration, making the
adivasis dependent on the landlord-moneylender-trader nexus for their survival.
The articles, drawn from writings of almost four decades in EPW, discuss questions of community rights and ownership,
management of forests, the state’s rehabilitation policies, and the Forest Rights Act and its implications. It presents
diverse perspectives in the form of case studies specific to different regions and provides valuable analytical insights.

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16 september 29, 2012 vol xlviI no 39 EPW Economic & Political Weekly

monetary collections from these 100 agree-
ments going into the National Biodiver-
sity Fund translate into real “benefits”
for at least 100 local communities in India.
The challenge with respect to many of
these agreements is to reach out to the
legitimate local “benefit claimers” who
are yet to be fully identified in most cases.
ABS implies that a user of genetic
resources or related knowledge is now
using them with permission; however,
there is no mechanism to monitor post-
access conduct of the accessor and com-
pliance with the terms of conditions on
which access was originally granted. At
the global level, to make countries abide
by each other's ABS procedures, in 2010 a
global protocol was established under
CBD at Nagoya, Japan.14 Though India
has signed it, the protocol is yet to come
into force. In any case, there is a need to
build more capacity to deal with ABS-re-
lated issues at different levels.
Another important aspect of access, as
CBD insists, is that genetic resources be
used sustainably and for environmentally-
sound purposes. Yet many applications
before the NBA also seek clearance for use
or transfer of genetic material from India
for developing products through modern
biotechnology. In 2005, the private seed
company Maharashtra Hybrid Seeds
Corporation (MAHYCO) sought NBA ap-
proval for “transfer results of research” to
ship out parental eggplant seeds from
India to Bangladesh. This was required
as the source population of eggplant
RHR-51 used was from India into which
MAHYCO had inserted its Cry 1AC gene to
make genetically modified (GM) brinjal.15
In the absence of an effective biosafety
regime in the country, there are con-
cerns that the access regime will only
encourage India's genetic wealth being
marketed for the manufacture of poten-
tially hazardous GM seeds and breeds.
Intellectual Property
A key expectation from the legislation was
that it would check the grant of illegal
and unjustified patents or other intellectu-
al property rights (IPR) based on India’s
biological resources by other countries
and foreign companies. The country had
been at the receiving end of “biopiracy”,
with the basmati rice and neem fungicide
Economic & Political Weekly EPW september 29, 2012
patent cases making much news since the
1980s. Council of Scientific and Industrial
Research (CSIR), on behalf of the central
government, had successfully challenged
one such patent on use of turmeric in the
US patent office in 1996. Post-BD Act, CSIR
was amongst the first public research in-
stitutes to seek approval for IPR applica-
tions from the NBA. And in the last 10
years there has been no instance of the
NBA invoking the legal provision that gives
it the function and power to oppose the
grant of any IPR in any foreign country on
any biological resource or knowledge from
India.16 The CBD itself does not provide for
a global forum to take such cases.
Nonetheless, the BD Act does not take a
clear position on IPR on living matter or
people’s know-how. Meanwhile, at the
WTO India’s position had long shifted from
“no patents on life forms” to patents on bi-
ological resources on fulfilment of certain
conditions. The BD Act does not outrightly
disallow IPR for any invention based on
research or information on a biological
resource obtained from India; it simply
requires approval of NBA and compliance
with the benefit sharing and other condi-
tions that NBA may impose. So the NBA has
become an office to screen requests for
approval being sought for IPR applications
by both foreign and Indian entities.
Of the 100 ABS agreements approved
and endorsed by the NBA till date, 54 are
agreements allowing applicants to seek
IPR17 and 51 of these 54 are from Indian
applicants, whether individuals or insti-
tutes. (The three granted during 2012-13
have not yet been made public.)
Ironically, India’s patent law does not
regard anything in the area of traditional
knowledge (TK) as patentable;18 however,
only a few states like Kerala have articu-
lated their own IPR policy with respect
to TK in medicine. Moreover, Nagaland’s
draft BD rules define “community intel-
lectual property” as belonging to the
community as a whole rather than to in-
dividual inventors.19 Under the Act, the
central government has the statutory duty
to “respect and protect the knowledge of
local people relating to biological diver-
sty.”20 On the basis of an non-governmen-
tal organisation (NGO) text, NBA did issue
the draft “Protection, Conservation and
Effective Management of Traditional
vol xlviI no 39
COMMENTARY
Knowledge relating to Biological Diver-
sity Rules, 2009” but this text has not
been finalised. Not surprisingly, the
Ministry of Commerce and its depart-
ment of industrial policy and promotion
(DIPP) that handles IP-related issues is
now working on a draft TK Bill for India
through a DIPP-approved FICCI task force
on traditional knowledge.
Documentation
The BD rules make documentation the
main function of BMCs. Many local groups
and people’s campaigns have consistently
questioned these rules and pointed out
that they dilute the Act since knowledge
holders at the local level are reduced to
mere data providers rather than facili-
tating self-governance of India’s many
(bio) knowledge-based local communi-
ties. The BD rules require the authority
to take steps to specify the form of People’s
Biodiversity Registers (PBRs), the partic-
ulars these registers will contain and the
format for the electronic database. As a
result, an NBA expert committee prepared
the methodology for PBRs for which guide-
lines were issued in 2009. Ever since, the
work of making and digitising PBRs has
been going on in several states and a little
over 1,100 had been made by the end of
2011. SBBs guide the BMCs in its documen-
tation with the help of a technical support
group (TSG). The “experts” in the TSG are
drawn from various disciplines, govern-
ment line departments, universities, re-
search institutes, colleges and schools and
NGOs. But the proposed digital Indian
Biodiversity Information System (IBIS) is
yet to be fully set up. Meanwhile, BMCs
such as those in Heggarni village of Uttara
Kannada or Purola tehsil in Uttarakhand
are waking up to the fact that this official
documentation process can be extractive.
Conservation Objectives
The Act opens with the words that it is
meant to “provide for the conservation
of biological diversity.” That is also the
primary objective of the CBD and con-
cern of local communities whose lives
and livelihoods depend on it. Early
meetings of NBA reiterated the point that
it was not meant to be an institution to
promote trade but was constituted to
protect the biodiversity of the country.
17
COMMENTARY
Certain provisions of the BD Act lay
down the duties and responsibilities of
the central government (through MoEF)
towards ensuring conservation.21 These
have hardly even been put to use. Even
though in the last decade several large
“development” projects including on min-
ing, big dams, etc, have invited controversy
for their likely impact on biodiversity, they
have never been either questioned from
the point of view of the BD Act or required
to undertake a biodiversity impact assess-
ment other than the environment and for-
est clearances. In this context, it is im-
portant to point out that the central gov-
ernment is not bound by the NBA’s rec-
ommendations, which are only advisory
in nature. On the contrary, NBA remains
bound by the directions on questions of
policy given by the central government.
The BD Act has also created a new cate-
gory of conservation, Biodiversity Heritage
Sites (BHS), and NBA issued its guidelines
for the declaration of the same in 2009. So
far four BHS have been declared in the
country, all being in Karnataka.22
Regarding resources, the thinking
vis-à-vis the biodiversity regime is that it
will generate its own funds through sell-
ing genetic material, which can then be
used for conservation. NBA charges a
standard 5% of estimated benefits as its
non-refundable administrative fee, apart
from the costs of the prescribed forms
and any other royalty imposed on an
applicant seeking access. The benefit-
sharing mechanism is meant to plough
back (monetary) “benefits” to the local
biodiversity funds. However, there are
few instances to speak of. For example,
the Hyderabad-based Bio India Biologi-
cals Corporation had exported neem
leaves accessed from Amarchinta BMC in
Mahbubnagar district of Andhra Pradesh
by paying a “royalty” of Rs 53,000 to NBA.
Earlier this year the authority reportedly
transferred Rs 20,000 to Amarchinta
BMC and the money was utilised for
planting saplings, fencing, etc.
The central government is also required
by CBD and the BD Act to develop national
strategies, plans and programmes for
conservation and sustainable use of bio-
logical diversity. Between 2000 and 2003,
MoEF, with United Nations Development
Programme-Global Environment Facility
18
support, commissioned the civil society
group Kalpavriksh to prepare India’s Na-
tional Biodiversity Strategy and Action
Plan (NBSAP). After a four-year process
with over 100 organisations from across
India being involved, the final report was
not accepted by the MoEF. In August 2007,
MoEF released its own draft National
Biodiversity Action Plan (NBAP) made by
technocrats, which was then approved
by the union cabinet in 2008.
To ensure that business-as-usual should
not be disrupted by the workings of the BD
Act, a list of 190 “normally traded com-
modities” have been kept out of the pur-
view of the Act;23 only conservation con-
cerns can keep certain threatened species
out of the list. A MoEF notification to that
effect was issued in early 2010. However,
an NBA consultation on the subject con-
firms that on this issue there is a difference
of opinion between technical institutions
and those dealing with trade in species.24
Biodiversity Governance
Though CBD laid down the principle
of national sovereignty over biological
resources, from the point of view of people
it was to translate into community sov-
ereignty. The real biodiversity-keepers,
be it farmers, fisherfolk, pastoralists, etc,
are required to be central to preserving
biodiversity, not simply their knowledge,
innovations and practices. Integrating
women's concerns also remains an issue
that needs attention. In the villages in
Uttarakhand women were denied an
all-female BMC because it deemed to be
legally impermissible.
The BD Act so far only requires “consul-
tation” with local communities, not their
full or free PIC. BMCs have not breathed life
into the idea of a grass-roots democracy.
They are still to become the authorities
on decision-making on local resources
as prescribed by both the BD Act and CBD.
Till the Act delivers, people require the
immediate benefit of the living resources
and intellectual heritage through which
they get by. However, in the current devel-
opment model, communities are being
forced to move or migrate from their lands.
With such shifting populations, who will
constitute the BMC and who are “local”
communities are fundamental questions
that confront the administration.
september 29, 2012
Given the law and the reality in which
it operates, the question is whether the BD
Act will come anywhere near to effect-
ing biodiversity justice in the next 10
years, or will our most biodiversity-rich
areas and peoples from them continue to
remain in poverty.
Notes
1 National Biodiversity Authority (Salary, Allow-
ances and Conditions of Service of Chairperson
and Other Members) Rules, 2003; about NBA
http://nbaindia.org/content/16/14//introduc-
tion.html
2 http://nbaindia.org/link/241/34//SBBs.html
Barring Bihar and J&K, all other states in India
have an SBB at least on paper.
3 http://nbaindia.org/content/20/35//bmc.html
4 Proposed Nagaland Biological Diversity Rules,
2011.
5 http://nbaindia.org/content/21/18//commit-
tees.html
6 Launch of CEBPOL, http://nbaindia.org/blog/
466/47//LaunchofCenterfor.html
7 First meeting of SBBs in the NE Region, 4-5
May 2012, Shillong, Meghalaya, http://nbaindia.
org/blog/469/47//TheFIRSTMeetingof.html
8 Article 15 of the Convention on Biological Diversity.
9 Article 15(7) of the Convention.
10 Sections 3, 4, 5, 6 and 7 of the Chapter on “Reg-
ulation of Access to Biological Diversity” in the
BD Act came into effect only from 1 July 2004.
11 Section 41(2) of the BD Act.
12 Minutes of the fourth meeting of the NBA held
on 6 October 2005 at Port Blair. http://nbain-
dia.org/uploaded/docs/fourth_meeting.pdf
13 Agreements signed by the applicant with NBA
(MAT), http://nbaindia.org/text/19/Statusap-
provalsagreementsigned.html
14 The Nagoya Protocol on Access to Genetic Re-
sources and the Fair and Equitable Sharing of
Benefits Arising from their Utilisation to the
Convention on Biological Diversity is an inter-
national agreement under the CBD. http://
www.cbd.int/abs/
15 Application reference no: F. No. 9-68/2005 dis-
cussed at the fifth meeting of the NBA on 20
January 2006.
16 Section 18(4) of the BD Act.
17 http://www.nbaindia.org/approvals/agree-
ment_signed_total_form3.htm
18 Section 3 (p) of the Patent Act.
19 Proposed Section 2(6) of the Nagaland Biologi-
cal Diversity Rules, 2011.
20 Section 36(5) of the BD Act.
21 Section 36 of the BD Act.
22 http://nbaindia.org/content/106/29//bhs.html
23 Section 40 of the BD Act.
24 Report of national consultation on normally
traded commodities http://nbaindia.org/
blog/504/1/Reportof.html
References
Kalpavriksh and GRAIN (2009): “Six Years of the
Biological Diversity Act in India”, Kalpavriksh
and GRAIN, Delhi/ Pune.
Kohli, Kanchi and Shalini Bhutani (2011): “Chasing
Benefits: A Post-Nagoya Protocol View on Access
and Benefit Sharing”, briefing paper, Kalpa-
vriksh and World Wide Fund for Nature, Pune.
Shalini Bhutani (2012): “Prized or Priced: Protec-
tion of India’s Traditional Knowledge Related to
Biological Resources and Intellectual Property”,
briefing paper (Delhi: WWF-India).
vol xlviI no 39 EPW Economic & Political Weekly
EDITORIALS
Enemies of the State?
Far from allaying concerns about the Koodankulam plant, the state persists in criminalising the protesters.
S
ince when has the act of holding a peaceful protest
become an act of sedition? Section 124A of the Indian
Penal Code (IPC) is only one of the many provisions that
the Government of Tamil Nadu has used in its attempt to sup-
press the year-long agitation against the commissioning of the
nuclear power plant at Koodankulam in Tirunelveli district.
On 10 and 11 September, when the protesters decided to lay
siege to the plant, the state police resorted to ever greater
brutality, firing tear gas shells and having a coast guard plane
fly repeatedly at a low altitude over the crowd of protesters.
The latest protest was in response to the Madras High Court’s
decision to quash a petition seeking to stop the commissioning
of the Koodankulam Nuclear Power Plant (KNPP), and to the
Atomic Energy Regulatory Board (AERB) giving its clearance to
the loading of fuel rods into the reactors.
The situation in the villages around Koodankulam need not
have taken this turn if the Indian state had made a genuine
attempt to allay the fears of the residents in the area about the
safety features of the nuclear project. Instead of accepting their
apprehensions as genuine, the state and central governments
chose to treat the People’s Movement Against Nuclear Energy
(PMANE), which has spearheaded the campaign against the
commissioning of the project, with contempt by repeatedly
insinuating the presence of a “foreign hand” in its activism. It is
as if Indians do not have the intelligence to assess for them-
selves if a particular project will affect them adversely. And in
line with this attitude, cases of sedition (Section 124A of the
IPC) and waging war against the state (Section 121) have been
slapped on many activists as well as the PMANE leadership.
Despite the many assurances about safety made by the
Nuclear Power Corporation of India Limited (NPCIL) and the
KNPP officials, there continue to remain serious concerns about
plant safety, power backup in the reactors and disposal of nu-
clear waste. Information such as the site evaluation and safety
analysis reports, nuclear-waste management plans and liability
agreements with the Russian supplier for reactors has been kept
away from the public domain. Also, the Comptroller and Audi-
tor General had recently pulled up the AERB for not preparing
27 out of 168 safety documents required by a mandate and
coming up short on nuclear radiation and safety policy since its
commencement in 1983.
8 september 29, 2012
In the light of these facts, it is hardly surprising that there is
a loss of faith in the nuclear establishment and that people
living in close proximity of the plant are genuinely fearful
about the future.
Apart from the central government and the nuclear establish-
ment, the state government’s role also demands scrutiny. It
must be remembered that the All India Anna Dravida Munnetra
Kazhagam (AIADMK) government had demanded a suspension
of work last year until the concerns about safety among the resi-
dents in the area were allayed. But this only seemed to be a
manoeuvre to buy time till the completion of local bye-elections,
after which the clearances for commissioning were promptly
given by the state government.
Following the Fukushima nuclear disaster last year, there
has been a serious rethink on the use of nuclear energy all
over the world. There has come a point where many countries,
including Japan which relies on nuclear power as an impor-
tant energy source, have begun to take steps to halt their
nuclear programmes and switch over to other forms of energy.
This contrasts with the ambitious plans for nuclear energy
expansion in India through imported nuclear reactors, in
particular. Experts have repeatedly questioned these plans
and have asked for moderation and greater emphasis on
nuclear safety and procedures for appraisal of even the exist-
ing plants in the country. The Nuclear Safety Regulatory
Authority Bill, which seeks to set up a new institution to
replace the relatively toothless AERB, has still not been passed
although in its present form it falls short of instituting a truly
independent regulatory authority similar to what exists in
some other countries.
In other words, the issue of nuclear safety and the debate
on rational use of nuclear power has not been given its
necessary due by the Indian establishment. Combined with
a trust deficit in the Indian state, protesters against nuclear
energy have justifiably found various reassurances unconvinc-
ing. Trust and confidence cannot be built by suppressing
dissent by using outdated and draconian laws. A resolution
is possible only if those opposing the nuclear plant see credible
steps by the government and the nuclear establishment
which demonstrate that the safety of ordinary people is
top priority.
vol xlviI no 39 EPW Economic & Political Weekly
COMMENTARY
Flunking Atomic Audits
CAG Reports and Nuclear Power
M V Ramana
The recent Comptroller and
Auditor General’s report on the
Atomic Energy Regulatory Board
and, more broadly, on nuclear
safety regulation has highlighted
many serious organisational and
operational flaws. The report
follows on a series of earlier CAG
reports that documented cost and
time overruns and poor
performance at a number of
nuclear facilities in the country.
On the whole, the CAG reports
offer a powerful indictment of the
department of atomic energy and
its nuclear plans.
M V Ramana (ramana@princeton.edu) is a
physicist who works at the Nuclear Futures
Laboratory and the Program on Science and
Global Security, both at Princeton University,
on the future of nuclear power in the context
of climate change and nuclear disarmament.
10
T
he new report (Report No 9 of
2012/13) of the Comptroller and
Auditor General (CAG) on the acti-
vities of the Atomic Energy Regulatory
Board (AERB) could not have come at a
more appropriate time (CAG 2012). Con-
cern about nuclear safety has naturally
increased significantly since the multiple
accidents at the Fukushima Daichi
nuclear reactors. The response of the
Indian nuclear establishment and, more
generally the Government of India, to
Fukushima can largely be characterised
as an attempt to placate people’s con-
cerns about the potential for accidents at
Indian nuclear facilities. One element in
that strategy was to emphasise that safety
regulation at the Nuclear Power Corpo-
ration’s (NPC) facilities was impeccable.
The CAG report has essentially demo-
lished this claim.
Independence of Regulator
A basic tenet of regulation is that the
safety regulator must be independent of
industry and government. Article 8 of
the international Convention on Nuclear
Safety, which India has signed and rati-
fied, calls upon signatores to “take the
appropriate steps to ensure an effective
separation between the functions of the
regulatory body and those of any other
body or organisation concerned with
the promotion or utilisation of nuclear
energy” (CNS 1994). The absence of such
separation has been identified as one of
the factors that led to the Fukushima ac-
cidents by the Independent Investiga-
tion Commission.1
India’s nuclear regulatory regime suffers
from the same lack of effective separa-
tion. Despite India’s international commit-
ments, awareness of best practices, and
criticism by various outsiders, the CAG
report pointed out, “the legal status of
AERB continued to be that of an authority
september 29, 2012
subordinate to the central government,
with powers delegated to it by the latter”
(CAG 2012: vi).
At first glance the AERB does seem in-
dependent of the department of atomic
energy (DAE) and the NPC. It reports to
the Atomic Energy Commission (AEC)
rather than the DAE. The problem, as the
CAG observed, arises from the “fact that
the chairman, AEC and the secretary, DAE
are one and the same” and this fact
“negates the very essence of institutional
separation of regulatory and non-regu-
latory functions” (p 12). The chairman of
the NPC is also a member of the AEC.
Another significant constraint on the
AERB’s activities is that the organisation
“is dependent on DAE for budgetary and
administrative support” (p 13). What all
this means, in effect, is that despite all
pretences and claims to the contrary by
the DAE and its attendant institutions,
the AERB lacks power and independ-
ence. As common experience would in-
dicate, it is hard to criticise one’s boss or
force action in ways that he or she does
not want. Of the 3,200 recommenda-
tions by the AERB’s Safety Review Com-
mittee for Operating Plants, the DAE had
not complied with 375, with 137 recom-
mendations dating back to earlier than
2005 (p 42).2
The lack of separation is not an accident,
but a choice made by the nuclear estab-
lishment. As early as the 1970s, Ashok
Parthasarathi, a senior bureaucrat and
science adviser to the prime minister,
had suggested that the
inspection of all nuclear installations from
the point of view of health and environ-
mental safety should be administered by a
body with a suitable name and located in de-
partment of science and technology, as that
department had been assigned the national
responsibility for ensuring the preservation of
environmental quality (Parthasarathi 2007:
131-32).
But even the idea of having an exter-
nal agency monitor its environmental
record was not acceptable to the AEC, let
alone having someone monitor safety in
its facilities.
In the subsequent decades, many
have emphasised the importance of
having an effective and independent
vol xlviI no 39 EPW Economic & Political Weekly

regulator, in particular, A Gopalakrishnan,
the chairman of AERB from 1993 to 1996
(for example, Gopalakrishnan 1999).
Gopalakrishnan has also recounted many
instances where the DAE and NPC have
actively interfered with the safety activities
of the AERB. Others from AERB have tried
to defend the board, its independence,
and its ability to monitor safety (for
example, Parthasarathy 2011). Unfortu-
nately, the situation for any regulatory
agency is like that of Pompeia, Julius
Caesar’s wife, of whom, Caesar is supposed
to have said, “Caesar’s wife must be
above suspicion”. Now, the CAG report
adds to public suspicion of the independ-
ence of the AERB and it is not going to be
easy for the AERB to be seen as capable
of effectively regulating nuclear power.
From the AERB to the NSRA
The situation described by the CAG
might change with the Nuclear Safety
Regulatory Authority (NSRA) Bill of Sep-
tember 2011 being introduced in Parlia-
ment by the Government of India.
Indeed, the DAE did state to the CAG
“that the process of improving the existing
legal framework for introducing greater
clarity in respect of separation of legal
responsibilities concerning promotional
and regulatory functions had already
been taken up”, mentioning the NSRA
Bill (p 11). Essentially, the same argu-
ment has been offered by AERB secretary
R Bhattacharya in response to the CAG
report (Jog 2012).
Technically, that may be a valid defence,
but just because the AERB is to be replaced
by the NSRA – assuming, of course, that
the government manages to get it
through Parliament – should we be con-
fident of the safety of the DAE’s nuclear
facilities? The underlying problem high-
lighted by the CAG is not just the legal
status, but one of effectiveness. And
looking at the content of the bill and the
context under which the NSRA has been
created, it seems unlikely that it will
create an effective separation between
the regulatory authority and the nucle-
ar establishment.
In the NSRA as has been envisioned,
many of the key processes involved in
ensuring effective regulation will contin-
ue to be controlled by the AEC. The power
Economic & Political Weekly EPW september 29, 2012
for crucial steps like the appointment of
members is vested with the central gov-
ernment. But for most purposes, the au-
thority empowered to act on behalf of
the central government is the AEC. The
AEC chairman will also be one of the key
members of the Council of Nuclear Safety
that will set the policies with respect to
radiation and nuclear safety that will
fall under the purview of the NSRA.
There is another problem that the CAG
did not discuss. The AERB suffers from
a lack of technical staff and technical
facilities, and this lacuna has been ex-
ploited by the DAE (Ramana and Kumar
2010: 53). Further, there is little expertise
outside the nuclear establishment on
technical issues relating to nuclear facil-
ities, and no proposed method of enhanc-
ing such independent expertise. For
these reasons, there will continue to be
cause for concern about nuclear safety in
the country.
Plan Not, Care Not?
A different structural and institutional
problem highlighted by the CAG report
has to do with protection of workers from
radiation. Earlier, each nuclear plant
had a Health Physics Unit that was part
of the Bhabha Atomic Research Centre
(BARC). However, in 2009, these units
were transferred from BARC to NPC. This
“meant that the functions of monitoring
of radiological exposure as well as the
responsibility of radiological surveillance”
is now with NPC – the operator of the
reactors (p 45). In other words, “AERB
had no direct role in conducting inde-
pendent assessments and monitoring to
ensure radiological protection of workers
despite being the nuclear regulator of
India” (p vii).
The CAG report also shows that the
AERB has not exactly been particularly
zealous about promoting nuclear safety,
illustrating this through a plethora of
examples. One is that it never fulfilled
an official requirement from 1983 to
prepare an overall nuclear and radiation
safety policy, which would have given
structure to practical radiation safety
planning at lower levels. The AERB has not
been proactive in participating in emer-
gency planning exercises; the CAG notes
that these exercises have highlighted
vol xlviI no 39
COMMENTARY
inadequate emergency preparedness
(p 61). Nor does the AERB have the man-
date to take follow-up action with dis-
trict or state authorities when it detects
deficiencies in emergency preparedness
(p 60).
The AERB has also not paid any atten-
tion to planning for decommissioning
nuclear reactors. Nor has NPC. All nucle-
ar plants in the country were operating
without any decommissioning plans, in-
cluding plants that are over 30 years old
(p 65). The AERB did put out a safety
manual on decommissioning in 1998,
but neither the plants that were operat-
ing then nor the ones that were commis-
sioned subsequently have produced a
decommissioning plan. Now, on paper,
each reactor that started operations
after 1998 was required to submit such
a plan before the AERB issued a construc-
tion or operating licence. This leaves two
possibilities: The AERB did not insist on
NPC following its regulations – or NPC
did not bother to comply with the re-
quirement, and there was not much
AERB could do about it. Neither of these
possibilities is comforting.
The CAG vs the DAE
Though this is the first time the CAG has
looked at nuclear regulation, the agency
has exposed various other problems
with the DAE in its audits from earlier
years. It is perhaps the most prominent
government body to openly criticise sev-
eral aspects of the DAE’s functioning.
The few examples listed below should
illustrate the agency’s ongoing monitor-
ing of various facets of the DAE and how
the nuclear establishment has fallen
short on so many dimensions.
The trend started with the 1985-86
report, which included for the first time
an audit of a nuclear power project
(Chandrasekharan 1990: 1024).3 In what
was to become a pattern, this first report
documented cost and time overruns in
the case of the Madras Atomic Power
Station (MAPS). Approved in 1965 at a
cost of Rs 60 crore each, the capital cost
more than doubled for each of the reac-
tors, with substantial increases in 14 of
20 expenditure heads, and the projects
were delayed by over eight years for each
reactor. These “constituted inadequacies
11
COMMENTARY
in planning of the projects rather than
wages of development of indigenous tech-
nology” (Chandrasekharan 1990: 1026).
Even with inadequate provisions for de-
commissioning, repairs, waste manage-
ment, and so on, the CAG found that the
rate of return on capital was only 3.5% and
not the 12% expected of power projects.
A couple of years later, the CAG found
a similar pattern of cost and construction
time increases with the Narora reactor,
noting that in 10 major heads of expend-
iture there had been cost overruns of
188% or more (CAG 1988). This was well
before the reactor was commissioned,
and the final cost figures were signifi-
cantly higher. What was important was
that the CAG’s conclusion that the revision
of costs indicated that the project got
“approved on unrealistic cost estimates”
and its censure of the DAE saying, “Unre-
alistic cost estimates and optimistic time
schedules make financial allocations and
controls less meaningful” (CAG 1988).
Some years later, in 1993, the CAG
studied yet another reactor – the Fast
Breeder Test Reactor (FBTR) – and found
again not only the pattern of cost in-
creases and time overruns, but also that
its performance was wanting (CAG 1993).
The CAG documented that by the time
the reactor first became critical in 1985,4
the net time overrun had become 220%
and the corresponding increase in cost
had gone up by 164%. The CAG also de-
scribed several of the incidents and acci-
dents involving the FBTR during just the
first five years of operation. These in-
cluded a nitrogen leak in 1987, followed
by “a complex mechanical interaction
due to fuel handling error in the reactor
damaged certain ‘in-vessel’ components”
that took two years to rectify; and the
failure of the load cell and damage to the
Capsule Transfer Gripper (CTG) in 1989.
Over the years, the CAG has also docu-
mented cost increases, time overruns,
and/or poor functioning with a number of
other nuclear facilities. These include the
Tuticorin (Chandrasekharan 1990: 1028-
29), Baroda (CAG 1988), and Manuguru
heavy water plants (CAG 1994),5 Dhruva
research reactor (Chandrasekharan 1990:
1029), Waste Immobilisation Plant (WIP)
and Solid Storage Surveillance Facility
(S3F) at Tarapur (CAG 1996), the Nuclear
12
Fuel Complex (CAG 1998), and the
Nuclear Desalination Demonstration Plant
at Kalpakkam (CAG 2008).
In 1999, the CAG audited another aspect
of the DAE’s functioning: its propensity
for making large-scale expansion plans.
Such grandiose projections have been a
staple of the DAE’s strategies to garner
political and financial support (Ramana
forthcoming). In 1984, the DAE drew up
a plan to set up 10,000 MW of nuclear
power by the year 2000. What actually
materialised from the profile was shocking:
Against the targeted additional power gen-
eration of 940 MW by 1995-96, gradually in-
creasing to 7,880 MW by 2001 AD, the actual
additional generation of power under the pro-
file as of March 1998 was nil in spite of having
incurred an expenditure of Rs 5,291.48 crore”
(CAG 1999: 20).
The implications of this abject failure
to deliver for current projections of nu-
clear expansion are profound.
This impressive, if depressing, series
of reports by the CAG points to an even
more depressing reality: the DAE cannot
be easily forced to change its ways. For
example, despite the CAG’s warning after
its Narora case study not to get projects
approved on “unrealistic cost estimates
and optimistic time schedules”, the DAE
continues with this practice till today. Its
flagship project – the Prototype Fast
Breeder Reactor – was initially expected
to be commissioned in 2010 (Subramanian
2004), but has been delayed by more
than three years; the update from Janu-
ary 2012 was that the reactor would go
critical in early 2013 but that would be
followed by “a year of testing” before it
is declared commercial (IANS 2012). Its
cost estimate has gone up from Rs 3,492
crore to Rs 5,677 crore, as of November
2011, when approximately 80% of the
work on the reactor had been completed
(Srikanth 2011).
Conclusions
Many have written about the nuclear
establishment’s safety problems, prob-
lems with radiation exposure, account-
ing problems, and so on (some exam-
ples are Bidwai 1978; Subbarao 1998;
Gopalakrishnan 1999; Gopalakrishnan
2000; Subbarao 1999; Dias 2005; Ramana
2007; Ramana and Kumar 2010). The
september 29, 2012
CAG’s advantage has been in its access to
various documents that would be una-
vailable to members of the public.6 Put
together, the CAG reports, including the
latest one, amount to a pretty damning
assessment of the DAE and its activities.
The CAG has done its bit. It is up to Par-
liament, and to the population at large,
to hold the DAE accountable.
Notes
1 As the Fukushima Nuclear Accident Independ-
ent Investigation Commission’s Official Report
to Japan’s Diet put it, “The TEPCO Fukushima
Nuclear Power Plant accident was the result of
collusion between the government, the regu-
lators and TEPCO, and the lack of governance
by said parties. They effectively betrayed the
nation’s right to be safe from nuclear accidents”
(Fukushima Nuclear Accident Independent
Investigation Commission 2012: 16).
2 There are other ways in which the DAE has
marginalised the AERB. In the case of the
Kalpakkam Atomic Reprocessing Plant, AERB
approval for construction was sought only in
1994 when “construction of the plant was already
in progress” (Sundararajan, Parthasarathy and
Sinha 2008: 26). What, one wonders, were the
odds that AERB would disapprove of the project
even if it had found a problem with the design?
3 Earlier reports had, in the words of an official
history of the CAG, not included any “worth-
while comments” on the AEC or the DAE
“despite the massive expenditure incurred in the
development of nuclear energy and connected
research and development” all of which was
“virtually kept shrouded in mystery and secrecy,
except the publicised benefits leaked out to
the media by the Department/Commission”
(Chandrasekharan 1990: 1024).
4 Even then, the reactor was not fully functional
and the steam generator, essential for produc-
ing electricity, began operating only in 1993
(Hibbs 1997).
5 We have already written about the case of the
CAG and heavy water plants in the pages of
this journal (Ramana 2007).
6 The CAG “scrutinised records relating to issue of
consents, authorisations, licences, and regulatory
inspections; minutes of various committee meet-
ings; utility correspondence files; project reports,
etc, during the period September to November
2010 and September to October 2011” (p 5).
References
Bidwai, Praful (1978): “Nuclear Power in India – A
White Elephant?”, Business India, 4 September.
CAG (1988): Report by the Comptroller and Auditor
General of India, Comptroller and Auditor
General, New Delhi.
– (1993): Report by the Comptroller and Auditor
General of India, Comptroller and Auditor
General of India, New Delhi.
– (1994): Report by the Comptroller and Auditor
General of India, Comptroller and Auditor
General of India, New Delhi.
– (1996): Report by the Comptroller and Auditor
General of India, Comptroller and Auditor
General of India, New Delhi.
– (1998): Report by the Comptroller and Auditor
General of India, Comptroller and Auditor
General of India, New Delhi.
– (1999): Report by the Comptroller and Auditor
General of India, Comptroller and Auditor
General of India, New Delhi.
vol xlviI no 39 EPW Economic & Political Weekly

– (2008): Report by the Comptroller and Auditor
General of India, Comptroller and Auditor
General of India, New Delhi.
– (2012): Report by the Comptroller and Auditor
General of India, Comptroller and Auditor
General of India, New Delhi.
Chandrasekharan, R K (1990): The Comptroller &
Auditor General of India: Analytical History
1947-1989 (New Delhi: Ashish Publishing House).
CNS (1994): “INFCIRC/449 – Convention on Nucle-
ar Safety”, http://www.iaea.org/Publications/
Documents/Infcircs/Others/inf449.shtml
Dias, Xavier (2005): “DAE’s Gambit”, Economic &
Political Weekly, XL (32): 3567-69.
Fukushima Nuclear Accident Independent Investi-
gation Commission (2012): The Official Report
of the Fukushima Nuclear Accident Independent
Investigation Commission (Tokyo: The National
Diet of Japan), http://naiic.go.jp/en
Gopalakrishnan, A (1999): “Issues of Nuclear Safety”,
Frontline, 13 March. http://www.flonnet.com/
fl1606/16060820.htm
Economic & Political Weekly EPW september 29, 2012
– (2000): “Undermining Nuclear Safety”, Frontline,
24 June.
Hibbs, Mark (1997): “Kalpakkam FBR to Double Core,
Load First Thorium-232 Blanket”, Nucleonics
Week, 38 (48): 10.
IANS (2012): “India’s First PFBR to Go Critical Early
2013”, Zee News, 21 January, http://zeenews.
india.com/news/nation/igcar-finalises-design-
of-commercial-fbrs_733411.html
Jog, Sanjay (2012): “AERB Downplays CAG Report,
Says High Safety Standards Maintained”,
Business Standard India, 24 August, http://www.
business-standard.com/india/news/aerb-down-
plays-cag-report-says-high-safety-standards-
maintained/484198
Parthasarathi, Ashok (2007): Technology at the
Core: Science and Technology with Indira Gandhi
(New Delhi: Pearson Longman).
Parthasarathy, K S (2011): “Atomic Energy Regula-
tory Board Not Quite Subatomic”, Economic
Times, 19 April.
Ramana, M V (2007): “Heavy Subsidies in Heavy
vol xlviI no 39
COMMENTARY
Water”, Economic & Political Weekly, XLII (34):
3483-90.
– (forthcoming): The Power of Promise: Examining
Nuclear Energy in India (New Delhi: Penguin
India).
Ramana, M V and Ashwin Kumar (2010): “Safety
First? Kaiga and Other Nuclear Stories”,
Economic & Political Weekly, XLV (7): 47-54.
Srikanth, R (2011): “80% of Work on Fast Breeder
Reactor at Kalpakkam Over”, The Hindu,
27 November.
Subbarao, Buddhi Kota (1998): “India’s Nuclear
Prowess: False Claims and Tragic Truths”,
Manushi, 109: 20-34.
– (1999): “Is Our Nuclear Regulator Effective?”,
The Observer of Business and Politics, 9 December.
Subramanian, T S (2004): “A Milestone at Kalpakkam”,
Frontline, 19 November.
Sundararajan, A R, K S Parthasarathy and S Sinha,
ed. (2008): Atomic Energy Regulatory Board: 25
Years of Safety Regulation, Atomic Energy Reg-
ulatory Board, Mumbai.
13

In the Name of Tradition
Parinitha
O
The recent attack on a birthday n 28 July this year a group of
party in a homestay near young people celebrating a birth-
day party at a home stay in Man-
Mangalore by members of the
galore were attacked by a group of
Hindu Jagarane Vedike and young men claiming to belong to the
the earlier attack on women Hindu Jagarane Vedike (HJV). On 24
in a pub in the same city are January 2009, the Sri Ram Sene had at-
tacked girls and boys in a pub in Manga-
both indicative of a battle over
lore. In both these cases the event was
the meaning of tradition at a recorded and disseminated through the
time of sociocultural change. technological apparatus1 of the mass
At such times it is the women media. In both cases again, the re-
sponses to the attacks were also largely
who are expected and forced
organised, structured and disseminat-
to maintain tradition. How do ed by the same technological apparatus
educated and economically of the mass media. However, there was
independent women deal with a disturbing excess in these spectacles
of violence that could not be recuperated
the ramifications of the consumer
(recuperation means the process by
culture that offers them a range which radical or subversive ideas are
of goods which are associated appropriated by mainstream media)
with their emancipation, into the grammar of media representa-
tion.2 Does this signify the extra repre-
happiness and empowerment?
sentational provenance of these events
that could not be seamlessly accommo-
dated by their media representations?
If so we need to retrieve this excess
through devising new frameworks of
legibility for making sense of these
events. Perhaps such new frameworks
of legibility will enable us to unravel
the historical intersections at which
these events originated and provide
us with more effective means of con-
fronting them.
The perpetrators of the violence justi-
fied it in the name of tradition. This vio-
lence became a spectacular display of
the power of tradition to rein in unruly
women. In both the above-mentioned
events the recording of the violence took
place even as it was being perpetrated.
Tradition was marked out and violently
reaffirmed on the site of the women’s
bodies. Of course this is not new. How-
ever, the historical juncture at which
they occurred and the technologies for
Parinitha (parinith007@yahoo.com) is with reproducing the real that displayed and
the department of english, Mangalore disseminated these events inflected
University, Karnataka.
them in new ways.
Economic & Political Weekly EPW september 29, 2012 vol xlviI no 39
COMMENTARY
The Karavali Karnataka region where
this event took place has seen the prolif-
eration and consolidation of right-wing
Hindu groups like the Ram Sene and the
HJV. Used as terror brigades of the Sangh
parivar they justify their actions in the
name of protecting Hindu tradition.
There is a silent assent to this violence
by large segments of the society, which,
while it may be repulsed by the modus
operandi of these groups concurs with
their overtly stated agenda, namely, the
protection of Hindu tradition. Recent in-
cidents in this region like the ban on
wearing of burkhas to college or making
it mandatory to wear bangles and bindis
to college3 make it evident that the at-
tempt is to etch tradition on the bodies
of women through mandating a para-
phernalia of femininity. Tradition is
conflated with nationality and its purity
is displayed and reinstated through a
coerced performance of the feminine.
The commonsensical understanding
of tradition that is being reaffirmed through
these events is that of a largely unchang-
ing and unchangeable legacy of modes
of being, sanctioned by a combination of
beliefs and values and reaffirmed by the
rituals of corporeality, through which a
national community maps its differences
from alien communities, both within
and outside its geographical and reli-
gious boundaries. Through the con-
struction of a tradition this community
makes itself legible and achieves a his-
torical continuity. The “contamination”
or overlapping of a legitimised tradition
by other traditions is seen as a threat
to the very identity of the community
which seeks to be recognised through
that tradition.
However, in practice, traditions are
never stable, always overlapping with
each other and constantly being formed
and reformed, especially so in a pluralis-
tic country like India. Since individuals
are simultaneously members of different
communities, as a lived experience, tra-
dition is always amorphous and fluid.
This instability becomes overt and dis-
ruptive to the maintenance of both per-
sonal and social coherence when new
categories of social stratification or new
cartographies of social mapping blur or
erase older distinctions.
19
COMMENTARY
The battles over the meaning and
origin of tradition become especially
fraught with violence at moments of his-
torical transition when radically discon-
tinuous and incommensurate practices
of being come together to occupy the
same social space. At such moments
existing systems of legibility that pro-
vide cultural intelligibility to modes of
being become inadequate or get de-
familiarised. This may be enabling for
certain segments of the society and lead
to creative and enabling modes of being.
But for others it may exacerbate existing
hierarchies and the attempt to retrieve
and safeguard an imagined purity of tra-
dition may be part of the backlash to this
change. It is at such points in history
that the debate on tradition becomes ac-
rimonious and violent and threats to
what is seen as the purity of tradition are
eliminated with extreme brutality. It is
also at such moments that women are
coerced into sustaining and perpetuat-
ing tradition under the threat of invisibi-
lising them if they refuse to do so.
On 24 January 2009, the Sri Ram Sena at-
tacked girls in a pub in Mangalore, India.[1][2]
[3] A group of 40 activists of the Sri Ram Sena
barged into the pub ‘Amnesia – The Lounge’
and beat up a group of young women and
men, claiming the women were violating
traditional Indian values. Two of the women
were hospitalised. The video of the incident
has become one of the most watched clips on
YouTube, though how the TV crew happened
to be ready at the ‘unannounced’ attack is
not known.4
This is how Wikipedia has archived
an event that has entered the common
sense of our present as the “Mangalore
pub attack”. A videographed spectacle5
of the event was repeatedly telecast, dis-
seminated through cyberspace and
widely debated in and through the pub-
lic spheres created by modern techno-
logies of representation and communi-
cation. The event, as it was available for
public viewing, was at one level the
product of a lucrative and powerful
media business that depends on politi-
cal patronage6 and corporate funding
through advertisements. While increas-
ingly taking upon itself the onus of de-
fining and maintaining public ethics and
justice, it simultaneously peddles titilla-
tion, voyeurism and sensationalism. At
20
another level the events were perpetrat-
ed and packaged for public viewing7 by
groups that define, espouse, and defend
a popular contemporary understanding
of cultural nationalism within which
questions of morality and justice are
equally important. Are these two sites
opposed to each other? Or are they mu-
tually dependent on each other such that
the language of media representation in-
cites, informs and shapes the spectacles
of violent anger displayed on the bodies
of women in the name of tradition?
Tensions and Conflicts
Media presentations of the real achieve
a representational transparency and
neutrality through the use of conven-
tions of signification that have been nat-
uralised for their viewers. Hence, there
is a concurrence between the structures
of cultural intelligibility through which
the media as well as its viewers make
sense of their world. The pub incident
evoked a range of responses and was ex-
plained in a number of ways. It occurred
and was displayed at the nexus of sever-
al tensions and conflicts in the present:
the tension between contesting under-
standings of nation and nationality, the
tension created by increasing economic
disparities and the tension between the
allowed and desired possibilities and
practices of gender and sexuality.
Why did a large segment of viewers
feel that these young women, who had
been chased out of the pub, needed to be
brought back within the fold of tradi-
tion, albeit, through less violent and
more civilised means? Why did these
viewers find the sight of women in a pub
disturbing or maybe more disturbing
than the sight of them being dragged
and chased out of the pub? In what way
were these women seen to be transgress-
ing the boundaries of tradition? Women
of several communities in the region do
consume alcohol. Free and friendly
camaraderie between the sexes is to be
seen in most co-ed educational institu-
tions of the region. The women were
dressed in a manner that is largely ac-
ceptable. What was disturbing for view-
ers was that the consumption of alcohol
was linked to the camaraderie between
the sexes and that it was taking place in
september 29, 2012
a pub, a space connoting a degenerate
modernisation imported from the west.
Here was a disturbing instance of a new
and dangerous mobility that was availa-
ble, affordable and was becoming in-
creasingly normalised for the educated
and economically independent women
of the middle classes. In these new spaces
opened up by consumer culture new
traditions are being evolved and imitat-
ed, and existing distinctions of gender,
caste and religion and the values that
sustain them were being eroded. Here
women would learn and create new
practices of the feminine which would
undermine accepted normative practic-
es of the feminine constructed to legiti-
mise, among other things, a popular un-
derstanding of the nation, stridently
propagated and violently implemented.
Versions of Femininity
For the women who went to the pub and
later refused to register a complaint with
the police, the situation is equally dis-
turbing. They too find themselves suf-
fering the difficult contradictions of be-
ing positioned within different social
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describes the mechanisms by which economic
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vol xlviI no 39 EPW Economic & Political Weekly

spaces which provide them with differ-
ent practices and understandings of the
feminine. On the one hand, the pub may
spatially denote for them emancipation,
new peer approved modes of recreation,
defiance, modernisation and new rituals
of heterosexual intimacy. On the other,
they would also have internalised a
model and practice of the feminine
which cannot be accommodated within
a socio-spatial enclosure like the pub
without being marked as depraved and
immoral. While entering and occupying
spaces like the pub, not only would they
carry the conflict of having internalised
these contradictory versions of feminin-
ity within themselves but they would
also be marked as sexually available
women by the larger society and some-
times even by their male partners. To be
perceived so would also mean to be
treated as lacking bodily and subjective
integrity, the violent repercussions of
which these young women would be
unprepared and ignorant to handle.
For a large segment of the society, the
deviance of the pub-going women is a
manifestation of disturbing and rapid
changes that they find difficult to com-
prehend and manage. This is the seg-
ment that sympathised with the stated
intentions of the pub attack but could
not countenance its methods. For these,
the tradition that is espoused and co-
erced by these fringe groups would be
appealing as a disciplinary measure that
through violence and fear regulates the
deviant mobility of the younger genera-
tion. A mobility expressed through the
possibilities opened up by consumer cul-
ture. This is the group that became more
vociferous and showed its anger against
the attacks on the young people cele-
brating a birthday party at the homestay.
In contrast to the pub attack, that on
the homestay in July 2012 evoked an in-
tense and articulate anger from many
segments of its viewers. The parents of
those attacked spoke out against it and
some even appeared on television. Is this
indicative of a changing society that is
repulsed by the excesses of groups like
the Hindu Yuva Sene, the HJV, Ram Sene
and the Bajrang Dal?8 Or is it that a
birthday party is a more innocuous form
of socialisation between the sexes than a
Economic & Political Weekly EPW september 29, 2012
drink in the pub? Consumer culture has
given rise to the proliferation of desires
consciously manufactured and relent-
lessly displayed.
These displays are so ubiquitous and
appealing that they have seeped into the
very structures of cultural intelligibility
through which we shape our most private
fantasies. In their reach and viewership,
cutting across divisions of class, caste, re-
gion and religion they create an illusion of
equality of access and the democracy of
viewership. The promise of unlimited and
infinite supply of happiness and its actual
unavailability to a vast majority of those
who are subjected to a blitzkrieg of imag-
es of the good life, because they lack the
economic wherewithal to buy this happi-
ness, has exacerbated a class divide that is
becomingly increasingly wider.
Among members of the class that has
the economic wherewithal to buy this
promised happiness there is a guarded
and graded acceptance of some of the
genders and sexualities that are touted
to them as structuring and being struc-
tured by the desirable life. There is now
an attempt at separating the innocuous
from the depraved. Hence, the birthday
party as a harmless form of socialisation
had the consent of the parents and most
of the viewers, for whom the good life
available through consumer culture is
both appealing as well as affordable. But
the problem about desire is that it refus-
es to be straitjacketed into a normative
social ritual. It veers in unthought-of-di-
rections smudging the dividing line be-
tween the innocuous and the depraved.
At the level of media manufactured im-
ages this unpredictability is what contrib-
utes to the appeal of the image. But when
genders and sexualities that are tantalis-
ingly unstable in advertisements are at-
tempted to be lived out, that very instabil-
ity can become threatening to women.
Enacting Fantasies
Later investigation into the case of the
homestay attack revealed that the per-
petrators of the incident had deliberately
manipulated the visuals of this event
that were projected for public viewing
by pulling off or dishevelling the clothes
of those attacked and herding one of the
boys and the girls together on a bed. A
vol xlviI no 39
COMMENTARY
birthday party was being represented as
a rave party. On the one hand the cam-
era followed the attack like a voyeuristic
eye that was giving the viewers visual
access to a scene of depravity or to use
the popular term that has been coined
for such celebrations, a rave party. On
the other it was also recording the
reinstatement of order and tradition
through the spectacle of punitive vio-
lence. However, there was something
awry about these images. The protectors
of tradition seemed to be indulging in an
erotic fantasy of their own. The women
they claimed to be protecting had become
objects of their desire. Under the licence
they had given themselves of policing
these women, these men were enacting
the fantasies of desire that inundate
them as images but are unavailable to
them as a lived experience. To their mid-
dle class viewers these images would be
jarring in the way they distorted the
grammar of the erotic that had been nat-
uralised for them by television and cine-
ma. There was an excess of violence in
the gestural repertoire of the men that
came from anger and an obvious class
difference. Here were lower class men
roughly and crudely touching upper
class women. Here was a man slapping a
woman so hard that she falls down. Pa-
triarchal control of unruly women was
being carried out at the expense of eras-
ing class distinctions. The gestural con-
ventions of the erotic had become dis-
torted and inflected by anger and vio-
lence. There was an excess of violence
here that refused to be recuperated not
only by the rhetoric of the “protectors of
tradition” but also by the media-dissem-
inated grammar of the erotic.
The public opinion that considered
the pub going and partying women as
Appointments/Programmes/
Announcemnents
For the convenience of readers and advertisers,
all adver tisements on appointments,
programmes, call for papers etc are now placed
together at the end of each issue every week.
This section is also listed in the Contents page
Advertisements for books are published as
before in the Book Review section.
21
COMMENTARY
transgressive, located the education of
women and its misuses as one of the sig-
nificant provenances for such transgres-
sion. Patriarchal anxieties regarding
women’s access to institutionalised edu-
cation which go back to the 19th century
were once again evoked by this event.
Unlike in that period for the educated
women of today there are new locations
from where their femininity is being
constituted and lifestyles are being touted.
Consumer culture offers the educated
and economically independent woman a
range of goods which it associates with
her emancipation, happiness and em-
powerment. It appropriates the lan-
guage and symbols of the difficult and
incomplete battles of women in pursuit
of happiness and agency and simplifies it
to the pleasures to be got from the con-
sumption of the products that the mar-
ket offers. It creates desire for her and
offers her lifestyles that are not rooted in
her social context, and touts them as the
utopias of the economically empowered
woman. Maybe the pub is the site of one
such utopia of emancipation and pleas-
ure that consumer culture offers women
today. Can women inhabit that site on
their own terms and explore through it
new and enabling possibilities of the
feminine? If that is possible, how will it
change existing traditions of the femi-
nine in ways that are enabling for women
at large? Or do we need to rethink our
questions and femininities, in a histori-
cal context where global business inter-
ests are bringing together fragments of
different traditions, creating a collage of
“the feminine” out of them, in virtual
space, and disseminating it through the
use of new and effective communicative
technologies?
Notes
1 By apparatus I mean the combination of tech-
nological devices and representational conven-
tions through which the mass media constructs
the reality of the world for its viewers and readers.
2 There is no single grammar of representation
that we can attribute to the media. But the
media very powerfully contributes to the con-
struction of a familiar world and authenticates
its truth through eliding the conventions of
representation through which this familiarity
is constructed and naturalised.
3 Aysha Ashmin of SVS college, Bantwal, and Hdiya
Iqbal of Jain PU College, Moodbidri, were not
allowed to wear a hijab to college in 2009 and
2011 respectively. “In 2012 St Aloysius College
hit the headlines for introducing a blanket ban
on burqa in classrooms. In July 2012 the admin-
istrative board of Vivekananda Vidyavardhaka
Sanga, Puttur, mandated women – students,
teaching and non-teaching staff – to wear ban-
gles and bindi on the campus”, The Times of
India, 9 August 2012.
4 En.wikipedia.org/wiki /2009 _Mangalore_
pub_attack
5 The narrative accompaniment to this spectacle
was given by news readers, television discus-
sions and chat shows and newspaper reports.
6 Visuals of the homestay attack were first aired
by Kasturi channel, the channel owned by the
JDS leader in Karnataka, Kumaraswamy.
7 In the case of both events it is not clear as to
how the videographers were on the spot while
the attack was taking place.
8 The Karavali region of Karnataka has been ex-
periencing the oppressive surveillance and pu-
nitive violence of these groups under the claim
of policing and guarding Hindu women and
Hindu tradition.

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22 september 29, 2012 vol xlviI no 39 EPW Economic & Political Weekly
SPECIAL ARTICLE
Law and ‘Live-in’ Relationships in India
Anuja Agrawal
This paper focuses upon some of the legal moves
which have brought adult heterosexual non-marital
cohabitation patterns, popularly termed “live-in”
relations, into public focus in India. These legal moves
do not unambiguously signify legal sanction and
recognition of new forms of non-marital heterosexual
cohabitation patterns in India as some popular and
judicial readings seem to suggest. Through a critical
examination of some recommendations and aspects of
the Malimath Committee and the debates ensuing from
the Protection of Women from Domestic
Violence Act 2005, it is shown that the legal changes
are primarily directed at taking cognisance of women’s
vulnerable position within conventional forms of
non-marital relations. Contradictory interpretations
and conflicting implications arise in the absence of
such legal changes being explicitly cognisant of and
responsive to diverse forms of live-in relations prevalent
in contemporary society.
This is a revised version of a paper presented at the International
Seminar “In the Name of Honour: A Dialogue on Androcentric
Matrimonial Practices and Women’s Subjugation in South Asia”,
organised by Women’s Studies & Development Centre, University of
Delhi, 16 to 18 February 2011.
Anuja Agrawal (anujaagrawal@gmail.com) teaches at the department of
sociology, Delhi School of Economics, University of Delhi.
50
T
here are two legal sites which have brought non-marital
heterosexual relations into focus in India over the period
of almost a decade. First, in 2008 the Maharashtra gov-
ernment’s attempt to amend Section 125 of the Criminal Proce-
dure Code (hereinafter CrPC) brought this issue to the fore.
The amendment sought to broaden the definition of the term
“wife” in this section to include a woman who was living with
a man “like his wife” for a reasonably long period. This move
followed the recommendations of the Malimath Committee in
2003. Second, the Protection of Women from Domestic
Violence Act (PWDVA) 2005, is considered to be the first piece
of legislation that, in having covered relations “in the nature of
marriage”, has provided a legal recognition to relations out-
side marriage. In what follows I will examine in detail the con-
text and implications of these two legal moves for different
forms of non-marital cohabitation.
Malimath Committee Report
The Malimath Committee, i e, the Committee on Reforms of
Criminal Justice System, was set up in November 2000. It was
constituted by the then home minister and deputy prime min-
ister L K Advani under the chairmanship of V S Malimath,
former chief justice of the Karnataka and Kerala High Courts.
In 2003 when the Malimath Committee submitted its report
(Government of India 2003, hereinafter GOI 2003), it made
several recommendations under the head “offences against
women” (pp 189-94). The first of these recommendations was
to amend Section 125 of the CrPC. This section is concerned
with maintenance rights of the “neglected wife, children and
parents”. It seeks “to prevent starvation and vagrancy by com-
pelling the person to perform the obligation which he owes in
respect of his wife, child, father or mother who are unable to
support themselves” (GOI 2003: 189).
The committee sought to extend the definition of “wife” in
Section 125 “to include a woman who was living with the man
as his wife for a reasonably long period, during the subsistence
of the first marriage” (p 189, emphasis added). The extended
definition of “wife” is thus clearly set against the backdrop of
secondary relationships of already married men and is not
directed at taking cognisance of what may be regarded as
emergent forms of non-marital cohabitation. Providing an
explanation for its recommendation, the report argues:
A woman in a second marriage [of a man] is not entitled to claim main-
tenance as in law a second marriage during the subsistence of the first
marriage is not legal and valid. Such a woman though she is de facto the
wife of the man[,] in law she is not his wife. Quite often the man marries
the second wife suppressing the earlier marriage. In such a situation the
second wife can’t claim the benefit of Section 125 for no fault of hers.
September 29, 2012 vol xlviI no 39 EPW Economic & Political Weekly

The husband is absolved of his responsibility of maintaining his second
wife. This is manifestly unfair and unreasonable. The man should not
be allowed to take advantage of his own illegal acts. Law should not be
insensitive to the suffering of such women (GOI 2003: 189).
It is quite evident from the above that the object of focus here
is not all non-marital adult heterosexual relationships but only
that between a married man and his second wife, particularly
one who has been cheated into believing that she is marrying
an unmarried man. By adding the clause “during the subsist-
ence of the first marriage”, the report has left little room for any
speculation regarding the objective of the recommendation.
In 2008, Maharashtra, following the recommendations of
the Malimath Committee, initiated an aborted attempt to
amend Section 125 which brought the issue of legal status of
live-in relations into the public gaze. The move was construed
as an attempt to confer legal status on secondary unions of
men as well as legalise live-in relations of the modern kind in
which young men and women choose to enter non-marital het-
erosexual relations prior to entering a long-term committed
marriage tie. Thus a news item reported that “…a move has
been proposed to legalise Live-in Relationship (of a woman liv-
ing with a man for a reasonable period, without marrying him)
by according the status of wife to her” (Agrawal 2008), and
another news article titled “Securing Live-in Relations” began
with the story of a modern working woman living in an urban
location and having a live-in boy friend away from the prying
eyes of her family and community. The article also mentions
that men and women working in the business process out-
sourcing (BPO) industry are prone to enter into such relations
(Menon 2008). Discussing “The Socio-legal Dimensions of Live-
in Relationships”, Varun (2011) set out the context as “the advent
of such relationship practised in the metropolitan cities”. Juneja
and Sharma (2009) examine the legal developments in light of
the fact that “a change is visible in our society from arranged
marriages to love marriages and now to ‘live-in-relationships’”.
Such responses deflect away from the focus of government recom-
mendations as most of them do not mention the context of
secondary relationships of men which are the primary trigger.1
There are also instances in which the courts have interpreted
this recommendation in such a light. For instance in Chan-
muniya vs Virendra Kumar Singh Kushwaha and Another (SC 7
October 2010), justices G S Singhvi and A K Ganguly cite the
first part of the recommendation of the Malimath Committee
to support their case for a broad interpretation of the term
wife. For them the above recommendation of the Malimath
Committee suggests that the “evidence regarding a man and
woman living together for a reasonably long period should be
sufficient to draw the presumption that the marriage was per-
formed according to the customary rites of the parties”.2
Therefore, for these judges, the committee recommended that
the word “wife” in Section 125 should be amended to include a
woman who was living with the man like his wife for a reason-
ably long period. This omits the phrase “during the subsistence
of the first marriage”, which as we saw above is very much part
of the original recommendation. It can be argued that the
committee is indeed somewhat vague with regard to the scope
Economic & Political Weekly EPW September 29, 2012 vol xlviI no 39
SPECIAL ARTICLE
of its recommendation as the summary of the report regarding
this recommendation also omits this part of the recommenda-
tion (GOI 2003: 291).3
The judges make no reference to the situation in which a
man or a woman enters a second marriage during the subsis-
tence of the first one. Interestingly their judgment involved a
case in which the woman claimed desertion in a levirate mar-
riage, i e, a customary marriage with the brother of the dead
husband. In the absence of the marriage rituals prescribed in
Section 7 of the Hindu Marriage Act, the high court had decid-
ed against the appellant’s status as “wife”. The notion of a sec-
ond marriage of a man was not the issue here. It may be noted,
however, that even this case pertains to the legal validation of
a customary form of marital relations and not to any emergent
pattern of non-marital ties.4 It can be argued that, if the idea is
to protect women in marriages or marriage like relations
which render women vulnerable, the ground laid down by the
recommendations of the committee needs to be much clearly
stated and broadly defined when incorporated in law.
It may also be pointed out here that Section 125 in its existing
form seeks to secure the rights of a wife (as well as children
and parents) when she is unable to maintain herself. Further-
more the woman seeking maintenance5 under this provision
should not be living in an adulterous relationship and in case
the husband is willing that the wife (or a woman like a wife)
lives with him, she has to show sufficient reason for not being
able to do so. In fact the Act in its existing form suggests that
If a husband has contracted marriage with another woman or keeps a
mistress, it shall be considered to be a just ground for his wife’s refusal
to live with him.
Thus the spirit of this section is the protection of the rights
of the primary wife of a man in a conventional heterosexual
marriage.6 It is not apparent how a simple expansion of the
definition of wife in this section will not, in at least some in-
stances, impinge upon the rights of the primary wife and
hence this does need more discussion and debate.
Other Relevant Recommendations
We will take a brief detour here to consider the Malimath
Committee’s two other recommendations which have a close
bearing on the issue under discussion and which indicate a
lack of consistency in its recommendations regarding adult
non-marital heterosexual cohabitation.
In its section on “Offences against Women”, the second
recommendation concerns Section 494 of Indian Penal Code
(IPC), popularly understood as the law against bigamy, which
is one among a number of sections pertaining to offences
related to marriage. This section delineates as offence the act
of marrying during the lifetime of a husband or a wife and is
applicable to both men and women. However, the committee
addresses primarily men who enter second marriages in its
recommendations regarding this section. While bigamy is an
offence presumably against the rights of the first wife/husband,
the legal provisions can be brought into effect only if it can be
proven that a man/woman has had a second marriage accor-
ding to proper rituals and customs. Curiously, the committee
51
SPECIAL ARTICLE
recommends that this provision regarding the proof of a valid
marriage undermines the rights of the second wife who can
thereby not claim maintenance (presumably, this refers to a
situation in which the proposed amendment of Section 125
was brought into effect) and hence it recommends that
to overcome these practical difficulties a suitable provision be incor-
porated to the effect that if the man and the wife (sic) were living as
husband and wife for a reasonably long period they shall be deemed
to have married in accordance with customary rites of either party
thereto (GOI 2003: 189).7
The recommendations are silent about how this change
would have an impact upon the existing liability for punish-
ment under Section 494 which can extend up to seven years
and a fine. Assuming that there is no change in this liability,
the recommendations entail contradictory results for men and
women: the men who enter bigamous relations would be seen as
having married for a second time on lesser evidence than was
admissible so far and women who have entered such a relation-
ship would also be treated as having married the man on lesser
evidence and can claim some of the rights of a second wife on
this score. It is not clear who is the primary intended benefici-
ary of this recommended change which enforces a more liber-
al definition of bigamy: the first wife, who can claim that the
husband has entered a bigamous relation on lesser evidence
and charge him as such or the second wife, who can ostensibly
also claim some rights on lesser evidence of a customary mar-
riage. However, insofar as this recommendation seeks to ben-
efit the second wife, it rests on the changes recommended in
Section 125 though this is not explicitly stated in the report.
Lack of Consistency
The lack of consistency in the committee’s recommendations is
however most obvious from the changes suggested in the adul-
tery law. Section 497 of the IPC criminalises adultery as an of-
fence that “a man commits when he has sexual intercourse
with the wife of another man without the consent or conniv-
ance of the husband”. It may be noted here that the marital
status of the man who commits adultery is irrelevant to this
section. The committee suggests that “the object of this section
is to preserve the sanctity of marriage. The society abhors
marital infidelity” (GOI 2003: 190). It goes on to argue that
“there is no good reason for not meeting out similar treatment
to wife who has sexual intercourse with a married man” (ibid,
emphasis added). While outwardly it might appear that the
idea of this recommendation is to treat men and women at par,
note that in reference to women, the authors of the report slip
into referring to “wife” rather than to “woman” and curiously
it also refers to a “married man” instead of “man” in general.8
This renders the recommendation rather vague. What if a
married woman has a sexual intercourse with an unmarried
man and what if an unmarried woman has such a relation
with a married man? The existing law criminalises the man in
the former case and, it seems, this situation will remain
unchanged if we follow the above stated logic.
As already pointed out above, in its existing form, the adul-
tery law does not apply only to married men having sexual
52
intercourse with wives of other men. It applies to any man,
married or otherwise, who has sexual intercourse with the
wife of another man. The actual gender asymmetry of the
adultery law is thus that it does not allow a wife to charge
either her husband or another woman with adultery. This is
what has been pointed out in the recent Supreme Court (SC)
verdict in the case of Kalyani vs State Tr Inspector of Police and
Anr (Supreme Court, December 2011) which referred to a situ-
ation in which a wife sought to charge a “girl friend” of her
husband under section 497 of the IPC pertaining to adultery.
The judgment explicitly states that the present law does not
allow any woman to be charged under this section. Though
not stated explicitly, this is true in two senses. First, a married
woman who enters into an adulterous relation with any man
(married or unmarried) cannot be charged under this law by
her husband (who can however charge the man). Second, an
aggrieved wife cannot charge a woman who has sexual inter-
course with her husband. Thus not only can a woman not be
charged under this law, she also cannot use this law in any
way. She can neither invoke the charge of adultery against her
husband nor can she do so against any woman with whom the
husband has sexual relations. However, a husband can use it to
charge another man who has sexual relations with his wife but
he cannot use it to bring about criminal charges against his
wife.9 Interpretations of the gender asymmetry of this provi-
sion usually refer to the “punish-ability” of the man and the
lack of legal culpability of the woman while ignoring that this
law explicitly safeguards a husband’s sexual prerogative over
the wife while providing no such protection to a wife. This law
is thus entirely consistent with the patriarchal paradigm which
treats a woman as the property of her husband not to be vio-
lated by any other man. A gender symmetrical formulation of
the law may, on the other hand, read as follows:
Adultery is an offence that (i) A man/woman commits when he/she
has sexual intercourse with the wife/husband of another man/woman
without the connivance of the husband/wife (ii) A husband/wife
commits when he/she has sexual intercourse with another woman/
man without the connivance of his/her wife/husband.
It is of course debatable whether such laws, insofar as they
criminalise consensual sexual relations, are desirable in the
first place.10 But that is not the focus of my discussion here.
Returning to the recommendations of the Malimath Com-
mittee, it appears that the committee has stringent objection
to a married woman having sexual relations outside marriage
and to punish such a woman is the real objective which set the
committee to make this recommendation. But the actual word-
ing of the recommendation is very parsimonious in suggesting
that Section 497 of the IPC should be suitably amended to the
effect that “whosoever has sexual intercourse with the spouse
of any other person is guilty of adultery…” Surely, this does not
fulfil the avowed goal of the committee to punish the adulterous
wife as long as she is not having “sexual intercourse with the
spouse of any other person”. It seems that the real intention of
the recommendation got lost in its hasty wording. It is at best
speculative to think what this could mean in the context of
commercialised sex relations where neither a woman nor a
September 29, 2012 vol xlviI no 39 EPW Economic & Political Weekly

man may be in a position to know the marital status of their
sexual partner. Should we see all sex workers as adulteresses
when they enter relations of paid sex with married men? But
such nuances and implications have not entered into the think-
ing about this legislation.
If read in continuity with the other recommendations of the
committee, the text of the actual recommendation would imply
that, if implemented, any woman having a sexual relationship
with a married man would be guilty of adultery and vice versa.
By this logic the women in secondary marriages who are
sought to be protected through the amendment of Section 125
of the CrPC and who appear to gain some leverage through the
changes suggested in the bigamy law would end up being
treated as indulging in adulterous relations. So if all the recom-
mendations of the committee were implemented, a woman
can simultaneously seek maintenance under Section 125 of
the CrPC and be charged with adultery under Section 497 of the
IPC. A man on the other hand may be susceptible to charges of
adultery and bigamy at the same time as he pays maintenance to
the woman with whom he is in a bigamous/adulterous relation!
While it is not possible to go into further extrapolations
about the legal implications of these recommendations, which
are yet to be implemented, it is apparent that a clear and
consistent thinking on this issue did not shape the recommen-
dations of the committee. Furthermore, even as we point out
the tensions and contradictions of such moves, it is also impor-
tant to identify the intentions behind these moves which do
not appear to converge with a desire to legitimate all forms of
non-marital relations. As would also be clear from the above
discussion of the different recommendations of the commit-
tee, there is considerable ambiguity towards women in non-
marital relations with men. The intentions, at least of those
who drafted the Malimath Committee report, can be summed
up as aiming at protecting women who have inadvertently
entered marriage like relations with married men while
“wives” who may be in such relationships with other men,
need to be punished.
The gamut of issues which non-marital relations between
unmarried/marriageable men and women are not even
touched upon in the report. It is evident that none of the rec-
ommendations of the committee are concerned with the pat-
terns of cohabitation in which both partners are unmarried
and whose relation is not encumbered by a previous marriage.
However, the recommendations may also have direct implica-
tions for the same. Some of the responses to the Maharashtra
government’s attempt to amend Section 125 point out that this
is a significant category of non-marital relations, particularly
associated with the newly emerging trends in urban Indian so-
ciety and it can be treated as a sign that there is a lot of anxiety
about the implications the legal moves have for such relations.
It may be argued that once enshrined as law, the distinction
between these apparently “traditional” and “modern” forms of
non-marital cohabitation would be insignificant. But it would
be worthwhile to spend some time working out these implica-
tions rather than leaving it to the imagination of people as to
what this would mean. Moreover to bring widely divergent
Economic & Political Weekly EPW September 29, 2012 vol xlviI no 39
SPECIAL ARTICLE
forms of relationships under the ambit of a single law should
be the consequence of very detailed consideration of its impli-
cations for each form rather than an unintended and unclear
by-product which allows for a lot of loopholes and inconsist-
ency. Such problems would become even more obvious in the
following discussion of the inclusion of “relations in the nature
of marriage” in the PWDVA 2005.
The PWDVA and ‘Relations in the Nature of Marriage’
The PWDVA 2005, has been widely hailed as the first legal Act to
recognise the existence of non-marital adult heterosexual rela-
tions.11 This Act defines an “aggrieved person” who will be cov-
ered under this Act as “any woman who is, or has been, in a do-
mestic relationship with the respondent and who alleges to have
been subjected to any Act of domestic violence by the respond-
ent” (Section 2[a], emphasis added). Further the Act defines a
‘domestic relationship’ as ‘a relationship between two persons who
live or have, at any point of time, lived together in a shared house-
hold, when they are related by consanguinity, marriage, or through a
relationship in the nature of marriage, adoption or are family members
living together as a joint family’ (Section 2[f], emphasis added).
From this it is evident that to the broad range of domestic
relationships between a man and her husband, father, brother,
and other male and even female kin related through consan-
guinity or marriage, the PWDVA has added the category of
“relations in the nature of marriage”.
This does not imply that the Act deals with all forms of
domestic relations in a comprehensive manner. Hence it
excludes the domestic relationship between a male employer
and a live-in domestic worker.12 The Act also clearly has no
space for adult same-sex relationships. Nevertheless, it is pos-
sible to say that, unlike the recommendations of the Malimath
Committee, the PWDVA, 2005 has implications for a broader
terrain of non-marital relations as it does not explicitly limit
itself to the secondary relations of men. In having used the
idea of “relations in the nature of marriage”, the Act seems to
have widened the scope of legally recognised domestic rela-
tionships between men and women. In a commentary on one
case arising out of the Act, the report Staying Alive 2009 (Law-
yers Collective and ICRW 2009) suggests that
Whilst this provision has invited much criticism and controversy, it is im-
portant to note that it does not make an invalid marriage valid or provide
legal recognition to bigamous marriages… This provision merely seeks
to denounce domestic violence in any quarter. It is not a judgment call
on the morality of the choice to cohabit outside of marriage (p 7).
It can therefore be argued that it would be mistaken to see
the Act as conferring some sort of a legal status upon non-
marital relations. What it undoubtedly does is to acknowledge
the existence of such relationships and the right of women in
such relations to protection from violence.
However, the connotation of the phrase “in the nature of
marriage” is far from obvious and, as we will see below, this is
already a ground for contestation of the Act. This aspect of the
Act was thus legally challenged in the Delhi High Court in 2008.
In the case of Aruna Parmod Shah vs UOI,13 the petitioner chal-
lenged the constitutionality of the Act on the grounds that,
53
SPECIAL ARTICLE
first, it discriminates against men and second, the definition of
“domestic relationship” contained in Section 2(f) of the Act is
objectionable. Regarding the second, the petitioner argued
that placing “relationships in the nature of marriage” at par
with “married” status leads to the derogation of the rights of
the legally-wedded wife. The Delhi High Court rejected both
these contentions regarding the constitutional status of the
Act. With regard to the second contention, which is of concern
to us, the court said that “there is no reason why equal treat-
ment should not be accorded to a wife as well as a woman who
has been living with a man as his “common law” wife or even as a
mistress” (ibid, emphasis added). In this case the judges inter-
preted “a relation in the nature of marriage” as covering both a
“common law marriage” and a relation with a “mistress” with-
out clarifying the legal and social connotations of these terms.
Referring to this usage in the judgment, Staying Alive 2008,
(Lawyers Collective and ICRW 2008) defines a “Common Law”
marriage as referring to
Individuals who have lived together for a substantial period of time
and who represent to the world that they are married. Some of the
factors taken into account to determine a common law marriage are
whether the parties reside in the same household, have children from
the relationship, share names, etc (ibid: 57n3).
It suggests that such marriages are recognised as valid in
law. Although it does not appear that there is any notion of
common law marriage which exists in Indian law, the “pre-
sumption in favour of marriage and against concubinage” is of
long-standing. In fact there have been a number of past judg-
ments in which the courts have used Section 114 of the Indian
Evidence Act, 1872, which suggests that “the Court may pre-
sume the existence of any fact which it thinks likely to have
happened, regard being had to the common course of natural
events, human conduct and public and private business, in
their relation to the facts of the particular case” to make a pre-
sumption of marriage. In a Supreme Court SC judgment in
2008 thus, for example, it was suggested that “the act of mar-
riage may be presumed from the common course of natural
events and the conduct of parties as they are borne out by the
facts of a particular case”.14 In a 2010 judgment as well, the
judges made a strong argument in favour of presumption of
marriage in any case where a man and woman have been living
together for a reasonably long period of time and cite a long
legal history of judgments which have favoured a presumption
of marriage over that of “concubinage”.15 Hence one can con-
tend that the Indian legal system does not always seek strict
evidence regarding the validity of a marriage in the face of
other circumstantial evidence which indicates the existence of
“a relation in the nature of marriage”.16 This is further evident
from the SC judgment in the famous case involving the south
Indian actress Khushboo (S Khushboo vs Kanniammal & Anr,
28 April 2010) wherein, apart from other prominent issues
such as freedom of speech, etc, judges Deepak Verma and
B S Chauhan clarified the scope of criminality in consensual
adult relationships when they reiterated that:
While it is true that the mainstream view in our society is that sexual
contact should take place only between marital partners, there is no
54
statutory offence that takes place when adults willingly engage in sex-
ual relations outside the marital setting, with the exception of ‘adul-
tery’ as defined under Section 497 IPC.
It is thus obvious that non-marital relations have not had a
criminal or “illegal” status in India insofar as they are not cov-
ered by the adultery law and insofar as the principle of pre-
sumption of marriage prevails. And this is not a new trend.
However, the same is not the case when one of the parties to the
marriage is already married. And it is this that can be seen to
be a newly recognised thorny issue in the Indian legal domain.
A certain amount of dissonance in the interpretation of the
idea of “relation in the nature of marriage” in the PWDVA, 2005
can thus be traced to the legal status of such relationships. In a
judgment delivered in October 2010, the SC has dwelt at length
upon the interpretation of this provision of the Act. In a case
which concerned a woman seeking maintenance from an ap-
parently already married man under Section 125, the judges
observed that:
Unfortunately [the] expression [in the nature of marriage] has not
been defined in the Act [PWDVA, 2005]. Since there is no direct deci-
sion of this Court on the interpretation of this expression we think it
necessary to interpret it because a large number of cases will be com-
ing up before the Courts in our country on this point, and hence an
authoritative decision is required.17
The judgment further observes that:
It seems to us that in the aforesaid Act of 2005 Parliament has taken
notice of a new social phenomenon which has emerged in our country
known as live-in relationship. This new relationship is still rare in our
country, and is sometimes found in big urban cities in India, but it is
very common in North America and Europe.
After making this statement which equates “relation in the
nature of marriage” with “live-in” relations prevalent in the
west, the judges state that in their opinion a “relationship in
the nature of marriage” is akin to a common law marriage.
According to the judgment, common law marriages require
that although not being formally married, (a) The couple must
hold themselves out to society as being akin to spouses,
(b) They must be of legal age to marry, (c) They must be oth-
erwise qualified to enter into a legal marriage, including being
unmarried, (d) They must have voluntarily cohabited and held
themselves out to the world as being akin to spouses for a sig-
nificant period of time.
Interestingly and controversially, this definition of common
law marriage has been taken from “Wikipedia on Google” as
duly acknowledged by the judges in the text of the judgment.
Incidentally, this is not the only reference to a web-based
source in this judgment which refers to “Google” as a source at
two other places.18 But to return to the matter of immediate
concern here, the third criterion which has been set out seems
to considerably delimit the scope of relations covered by the
PWDVA. The judges go on to state that:
In our opinion not all live-in relationships will amount to a relation-
ship in the nature of marriage to get the benefit of the Act of 2005. To
get such benefit the conditions mentioned by us above must be satis-
fied, and this has to be proved by evidence. If a man has a ‘keep’ whom
he maintains financially and uses mainly for sexual purpose and/or as
a servant, it would not, in our opinion, be a relationship in the nature
of marriage.
September 29, 2012 vol xlviI no 39 EPW Economic & Political Weekly

In her commentary on the PWDVA, 2005, Agnes (2011b) has
suggested that the PWDVA has
transformed the yesteryears concubines into present day cohabitees…
While some may dismiss the term cohabitee as a western or urban phe-
nomenon, this term can now be invoked to protect the rights of thou-
sands of women, both urban and rural, who were earlier scoffed at as
mistresses or keeps in the judicial discourse (ibid:154).
But the above fragment from the SC judgment belies the
hopes for such a transformation.19
The judges further state that:
No doubt the view we are taking would exclude many women who
have had a live-in relationship from the benefit of the 2005 Act, but
then it is not for this Court to legislate or amend the law. Parliament
has used the expression ‘relationship in the nature of marriage’ and
not ‘live-in relationship’.
In saying this, the judges appear to be implying that the scope
of the term “live-in relationship” is much broader than that of
“relationship in the nature of marriage”. Indirectly, however, the
judgment also equates what it treats as a “new social pheno-
mena” with the idea of “relationship in the nature of marriage”,
subject to the definition of common law marriage as taken from
Wikipedia. Arguably there is much confusion in the various ar-
guments of the judgment which seems to draw upon contradic-
tory meanings of the phrase “live-in” relationship.
In her commentary on this judgment, Indira Jaising of the Law-
yers Collective, who is one of the main authors of this Act, is evi-
dently dismayed at the manner in which the court has interpreted
this provision.20 She specifically lashed out at the exclusion of cas-
es in which one of the parties is already married. She argues:
This would mean that if a married man deceived a woman into marry-
ing him, and lived with her as if married, this would not be a relation-
ship in the nature of marriage, even though they represent to the world
that they are married and live in a stable relationship and have chil-
dren together. This was not the intention of the Act and it was in some
measure intended to protect women like these.… The phenomena of
a man marrying more than once is well known in this country, and
the history of permitting multiple marriages has not been erased by
the law but continues to influence the behaviour of men. The strange
result of this interpretation has been that the man will not be in a rela-
tionship in the nature of marriage for he is previously married but the
woman will be in a relationship in the nature of marriage, as she is not
previously married (Lawyers Collective and ICRW 2010: iv).
It is worth mentioning here that the Lawyers Collective had
hailed an earlier judgment (Aruna Parmod Shah vs UOI, De-
cided on 7 April 2008, High Court of Delhi) as progressive
which had observed the unequal character of “relations in the
nature of marriage”. I quote from the judgment:
An assumption can fairly be drawn that a “live-in relationship” is in-
variably initiated and perpetuated by the male… The Court should
also not be impervious to social stigma which always sticks to women
and not to the men, even though both partake of a relationship which
is only in the nature of marriage.
The court in making this observation and the Lawyers Col-
lective in approving it appear to be signalling that in this case
there is convergence in both, the intention and the interpreta-
tion of the Act, as being directed at protecting women from
violence within forms of relations between men and women
which are presumed to be unequal.21
Economic & Political Weekly EPW September 29, 2012 vol xlviI no 39
SPECIAL ARTICLE
While it may be open to debate whether all forms of hetero-
sexual relations are unequal, and whether all forms of non-
marital heterosexual relations also ought to be construed to be
so and whether this should be the presumption in drafting all
laws, it needs to be acknowledged that it is this gendered as-
sumption which seems to be giving legal visibility to live-in
relations in India.
From the above brief discussion it is also evident that the
meaning of “relations in the nature of marriage” in PWDVA is
already subject to contestation and contrary to Jaising’s con-
tention that “the expression is self-explanatory... It obviously
relates to those cases in which the parties are not married yet
cohabit”, not everyone seems to agree, at least not judges Mar-
kandey Katju and T S Thakur. They even suggest that the “Par-
liament has used the expression relationship in the nature of
‘marriage’ and not ‘live-in relationship’”, thereby suggesting
that the two have very different connotations.
Conclusions
The public and even judicial responses to the legislative move
to amend Section 125 and the provisions of the PWDVA, 2005
are sometimes deflected by a focus upon presumably western
forms of non-marital cohabitation in which usually unmarried
men and women enter non-marital but exclusive relations
with each other, often as a form of experimentation prior to a
marital commitment. However, it is not evident that the pri-
mary impetus for legal changes is coming from recognition of
the modern style of living together. The legislative measures
are a response to more traditional and even patriarchal forms
of non-marital cohabitation in which the male partner is
already married and enters a relation with another, usually
unattached woman, who may or may not be aware of the mari-
tal status of this man. Thus these legal moves appear to be set
against the backdrop of prevalent practices of married men
entering secondary relations with women. As is evident from
the statement made by Jaising, the main concern of those who
have been pushing for such legislation is to provide some relief
to women who have been in such relations under fairly con-
ventional conditions. This was even more obvious in the case
of the recommendations of the Malimath Committee which
have however not been implemented. Such cases are arguably
quite distinct from a western style cohabitation patterns which
are referred to as “live-in” relationships in popular vocabulary.
However, it is not obvious that all forms of non-marital rela-
tions can or should be treated as legally identical. In any case,
even if they should be treated as such, the decision to do so
should be preceded by a careful consideration of the implica-
tions this will have for the different categories. As things
stand, in the absence of clear social and legal categorisation of
non-marital relations, the field has been left wide open and
even the highest judicial functionaries have allowed them-
selves to pontificate upon the need to separate a “relation in
the nature of marriage” from that with a “servant” or a “keep”
and a “one night stand”. Notwithstanding the political incor-
rectness of a good deal of these ruminations, this reveals the
confusion which has arisen around who might be the beneficiary
55
SPECIAL ARTICLE

of such laws and whether such legal protection is equally de-
sirable in different forms of relationships. Jaising’s statement
that “this provision affords protection against domestic vio-
lence to women in live-in relationships, legally void/voidable
marriages22 and common law marriages” offers us a prelimi-
nary classification of non-marital heterosexual cohabitation
patterns. But clearly there is some dissension regarding the
possibility of treating all of these under one heading, particu-
larly if this entails conferring identical rights upon women in
such relations, at least under certain conditions.
It may also be noted that none of these legislative moves
should be treated as dealing comprehensively either with the
gamut of live-in relations or with the corpus of rights and obli-
gations which might require legal redress in such relations. At
best they extend some of the rights of married women to women
who are in non-marital relations with men. A preliminary
comparison of these legal moves with the legal trajectory of
relations of cohabitation in western societies will show that
the Indian situation is quite far from affording a high degree of
legal protection to modern forms of non-marital relations and
that the desirability of such protection is itself a much debated
terrain. Some western countries such as the Netherlands (Law
on Registered Partnership, 1997) and France (Pacte Civil de
Solidarité or PACS, 1999) have directly legislated on the status
of non-marital relations both heterosexual and homosexual
(Bradley 2001). While both these pieces of legislation deal with
non-marital cohabitation, neither of them address secondary
marital relations of the sort sought to be addressed in the Indi-
an case. Hence, it is useful not to see the legal trend in India as
replicating the western model in any sense as much as asserting
the need to more openly discussing the desirability and nature
of legal remedies for men and women in such relations.

Notes
1 Not all responses to the legal moves are how-
ever impervious to their context. For example
see Prakash Yedhula (2009) for a more nu-
anced response to the legal moves.
2 As will be shown below, this statement has
been made in the Malimath Committee, not in
the context of the amendment of Section 125 of
CrPC, but in their recommendation regarding
the Section 494 of the Indian Penal Code which
pertains to bigamy.
3 The exact wording in the summary is: “Defini-
tion of the word ‘wife’ in Section 125 of the
Code be amended to include a woman who was
living with the man like his wife for reasonable
(sic) long period” (p 291).
4 However, see Chowdhry (2007) for a detailed
discussion of how such contemporary conditions
have enforced leviratic relations upon widowed
women among particular communities.
5 Earlier the maximum amount of maintenance
was 500 but this clause was omitted in an
amendment in 2001. Different states also spec-
ify different amounts of maintenance ranging
between 1500 and 3000.
6 Some studies show that, alongside alcoholism,
a second marriage or an extramarital relation-
ship of the husband is the dominant factor in
desertion of the first wife. See Kulkarni and
Bhat (2010).
7 See n 3 above.
8 In the summary of recommendation, it is again
noted that “As a man can be punished under Sec-
tion 497 of IPC for adultery, for having sexual in-
tercourse with a wife of another man it stands to
reason that wife should likewise be punished if
she has sexual intercourse with another married
man” (GOI 2003: 290, emphasis added).
9 However, both men and women can use the
charge of adultery as a basis for seeking divorce.
10 See Agnes (2011a: 138-40) for a discussion of
the undesirability and inappropriateness of
criminalising such relations in contemporary
societies.
11 See Karanjawala and Chugh (2009: 294).
12 It is worth mentioning here that while domes-
tic workers have been clearly excluded from
the PWDVA, 2005, there has been much am-
bivalence regarding the inclusion of domestic
workers even within the ambit of the Prohibi-
tion of Sexual Harassment of Women at Work-
place Bill 2010, rendering them among the
most vulnerable section of women workers.
See Tandon (2011) for instance.
13 Aruna Parmod Shah vs UOI, Decided on 7 April
2008, High Court of Delhi.
14 See Tulsa & Ors vs Durghatiya & Ors, Decided
on 15 January 2008, Supreme Court of India.
15 Chanmuniya vs Virendra Kumar Singh Kush-
waha and Anr, Decided on 7 October 2010,
Supreme Court of India.
16 Agnes (2011b) recounts a number of legal cases
going back to early 1950s which depend on the
principle of presumption of marriage (ibid:
153-59).
17 D Veluswamy vs D Patchaiammal, Decided on 21
October 2010, Supreme Court of India.
18 See Mahapatra (2010) for a comment on this
controversial reference to a web-based source
in the judgment.
19 The use of the term “mistress” in the case of
Aruna Parmod Shah vs UOI, Decided on 7 April
2008, High Court of Delhi, has already been
noted above. The usage did not come under
flak that it faced in the D Veluswamy vs D
Patchaiammal case, presumably because the
judges accepted the right of “mistress” to
“equal treatment”. As will be shown below, the
Lawyer’s Collective even hailed the judgment
as progressive.
20 See the “Preface” to Staying Alive 2010 (pp iv-v)
for a detailed critique of this judgment and the
language it uses by Jaising.
21 In reference to a case with Mumbai High Court
(Manda R Thaore, W/o Sh Ramaji Ghanshyam
Thaore vs Sh Ramaji Ghanshyam Thaore, Crimi-
nal Revision Application No 317/2006), Staying
Alive 2010 notes approvingly that in this case
court had indicated that PWDVA could step in
where Section 125 failed to address the women
in secondary marriages, once again indicating
the intention of the authors of the Act (see Law-
yers Collective and ICRW 2010: 138-39).
22 Jaising’s further statement includes “bigamous
or fraudulent marriages” in this category.
References
Agnes, Flavia (2011a): Family Law, Volume I, Fami-
ly Laws and Constitutional Claims (New Delhi:
Oxford University Press).
– (2011b): Family Law, Volume II, Marriage, Di-
vorce, and Matrimonial litigation (New Delhi:
Oxford University Press).
Agrawal, Subhash Chandra (2008): “Legalising
Live-in Relationship: Caution Needed”, Mer-
inews, 11 October, viewed on 21 December 2010
(http://www.merinews.com/article/legalis-
ing-live-in-relationship-caution-need-
ed/144116.shtml).
Bradley, David (2001): “Regulation of Unmarried
Cohabitation in West-European Jurisdictions –
Determinants of Legal Policy”, International
Journal of Law, Policy and the Family, 15(1): 22-50.
Chowdhry, Prem (2007): Contentious Marriages,
Eloping Couples: Gender, Caste and Patriarchy in
Northern India (Delhi: Oxford University Press).
GoI (2003): Committee on Reforms of the Criminal
Justice System (Bangalore: Ministry of Home
Affairs, Government of India).
Juneja, Saakshi O and Bhumika Sharma (2009):
“Live-in Relationships: The Indian Perspec-
tive”, India Law Journal, 2(2), viewed on 11
March 2012 (http://indialawjournal.com/vol-
ume2/issue_2/article_by_saakshi.html).
Karanjawala, Tahira and Shivani Chugh (2009): “The
Legal Battle Against Domestic Violence in India:
Evolution and Analysis”, International Journal of
Law, Policy and the Family, 23(3): 289-308.
Kulkarni, Seema and Sneha Bhat (2010): “Issues and
Concerns of Deserted Women in Maharashtra”
in Economic & Political Weekly, 45(38): 59-66.
Lawyers Collective and ICRW (2008): Staying
Alive: Second Monitoring & Evaluation Report
on the Protection of Women from Domestic Vio-
lence Act, 2005.
– (2009): Staying Alive: Third Monitoring & Eval-
uation Report on the Protection of Women from
Domestic Violence Act, 2005.
– (2010): Staying Alive: Fourth Monitoring &
Evaluation Report on the Protection of Women
from Domestic Violence Act, 2005.
Mahapatra, Dhananjay (2010): “Can Wikipedia Be
the Basis of SC Ruling?”, The Times of India,
25 October, viewed on 30 December 2010
(http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/india/
Can-Wikipedia-be-the-basis-of-SC-ruling/
articleshow/6806187.cms).
Menon, Ramesh (2008): “Securing Live-in Rela-
tions”, India Together, 16 November, viewed on
10 January 2011 (http://www.indiatogether.
org/2008/nov/soc-livingin.htm).
Tandon, Aditi (2011): “Sexual Harassment at Work-
place Draft Bill: House Committee, Govt Differ
on Inclusion of Domestic Workers”, Tribune,
8 December, viewed on 11 Macrh 2012 (http://
www.tribuneindia.com/2011/20111209/main3.
htm).
Varun (2011): “The Socio-legal Dimensions of Live-
in Relationships”, 29 August, viewed on
11 March 2012 (http://www.lawyersclubindia.
com/articles/The-Socio-Legal-Dimensions-of-
Live-In-Relationships-3966.asp).
Yedhula, Prakash (2009): “Live-in Relationships in
India Accorded Legal Status”, 11 January,
viewed on 11 March 2012 (http://www.lawyer-
sclubindia.com/articles/Live-In-Relationships-
in-India-Accorded-Legal-Status-598.asp).

56 September 29, 2012 vol xlviI no 39 EPW Economic & Political Weekly

Legislating on Child Labour
The law on child labour is to be tightened but the issue goes much beyond legislation.
T
he union cabinet has approved amendments to the Child
Labour (Prohibition and Regulation) Act, 1986 which will
ban employment of children up to 14 years for commercial
purposes in all industries, homes or on farms. Those between 14
and 18 years of age will be termed “adolescents” and their em-
ployment in mines, chemical, paint, explosives or other hazard-
ous industries will be prohibited. The existing law only bans
employment of children below 14 in hazardous industries and
regulates their work in non-hazardous ones. The 1986 law is also
in contradiction with the Right to Free and Compulsory Education
Act that makes education free and compulsory for children in the
age group of 6-14 years. Legislating a ban on child labour is the
easy part, the hard part will come in implementation. Enforcing
the law on child labour requires the involvement and commit-
ment of a number of agencies and organisations – the labour
inspectorate, police, people’s representatives and civil society.
Child labour is rampant: according to the Census of 2001, India
in that year had an estimated 12.59 million of workers in the 5 to
14 age group. From working in garages, welding units, matches
and incense stick-making units, hotels and eating houses, and
homes to labouring in industries like readymade garments, zari
and sari weaving, construction sites and farms, child workers are
everywhere. They work long hours in abysmal conditions that not
only blight their childhood but also condemn them to an adulthood
of poverty and disease. As the non-governmental organisation
Bachpan Bachao Andolan has pointed out, while 13,60,117 inspec-
tions have been carried out under the law since 1986, only 49,092
prosecutions have been launched and 4,774 employers convicted.
The fines collected amount to very little. The not very encouraging
result of the implementation of the existing law is due to a lack of
coordination between different government agencies. An example
of this is brought out by the 2010 report India’s Childhood in the Pits,
the result of a study across eight states by HAQ: Centre for Child
Rights, Samata and the Alliance of Mines, Minerals and People.
The report documented the terrible conditions of children working
in mines, but more significantly pointed out that this was just a
part of the story. The children living in mining areas, mostly adivasis
and dalits, are far more malnourished than their counterparts in
Economic & Political Weekly EPW september 29, 2012 vol xlviI no 39
EDITORIALS
other areas and much more vulnerable to abuse and trafficking.
However, the mining ministry does not address this issue, leav-
ing it to the child welfare, tribal welfare and other departments
to tackle the problem. The laws relating to mining are blind to
the plight of these children. Similarly, the rehabilitation of
“rescued” child labourers has hardly been a success story. As the
experience of various states like Karnataka and Maharashtra
shows, the efforts to either “mainstream” (admitting these children
to government schools and keeping them away from work) or
rehabilitate them in other ways is beset with a number of hurdles.
Most of the children belong to parents who are migrant workers
or the children themselves have been sent to work far away
from their parental homes. In 2007, the central government had
issued model guidelines for individual care plans for the rescued
children which the states were supposed to follow until they
could come up with their own plans. The crux of the issue re-
mains the same: the need for tremendous effort in coordinating
not merely between different government departments and
voluntary bodies but also between far-flung state administrations.
Child labour is widely and popularly perceived to be a prob-
lem that is almost insurmountable given the poverty and unem-
ployment levels among adults. Attempts to ban it completely are
not only thought to be unrealistic but also “cruel” on the ground
that working children contribute to family income. Government
agencies have failed to create awareness about how child labour
with its attendant lack of education and adverse effect on health
can perpetuate poverty and ill health. While this can be brought
home through awareness campaigns, parents of child labour-
ers, themselves the victims of poverty and exploitation, need to
see definite improvements like a vastly expanded social security
programme before they are convinced of the need to send chil-
dren to school and not to work. In the long run the success of
these efforts will hinge on the handling of more deep-rooted
and fundamental problems like poverty and unemployment.
The efforts to implement the Right to Education Act must go
hand in hand with the efforts to ban child labour. Little can be more
important than enforcing the right of every child to education,
health and a childhood free of brutal and exploitative labour.
9
 september 29, 2012
Loss of Innocence
What can explain the sudden eruption of mass anger among Muslim communities?
T
he past few weeks have seen unprecedented mass
protests all over the world by Muslims against a film
which was made in the United States (US) by relatively
unknown people and has not yet been released. Uploaded
in parts on the social media website, YouTube, the film, The
Innocence of Muslims, seems to be a crude attempt at hurting
the religious beliefs of Muslims by abusing their prophet,
Mohammad, and their religion, Islam. It is clear that it has
been produced with the mala fide intent of spreading hate
against Muslims and their lifestyles. It indicates the deepen-
ing of the cultures of prejudice and intolerance which have
been mainstreamed in the west, particularly in the US, in the
wake of the anti-Muslim discourse emerging out of the so-
called “War on Terror”. It is disingenuous on the part of a gov-
ernment, which has tried to stop and destroy WikiLeaks with
every legal and illegal method possible, to now claim that it
cannot stop the distribution of such a film or take any legal
action against its producers as it would contravene “freedom
of expression”.
What, however, is surprising is the manner in which this
film has become the cause for such widespread outpouring of
angst and anger by Muslims in so many different parts of the
world. Anyone familiar with YouTube and other social media
sites would know that fanatics and lunatics posting innumera-
ble things of all kinds is a widespread phenomenon. This film
is surely not the only anti-Muslim or anti-Islamic rant on
YouTube. So what made this particular film such a target for
worldwide anger? This is a difficult question to answer but
it does point to the possibility of an interplay between mala
fide intentions and deliberate design on one side and the
viral effects of present-day telecommunications, on the other.
Further, the killing of the US ambassador to Libya when the
country’s consulate in Benghazi was attacked by protesters
put The Innocence of Muslims and the protests against it on the
front page of newspapers all over the world and helped spread
information about the film and fuel the protests.
Progressive forces have watched in dismay as these protests
have provided Muslim religious parties and groups in many
countries the opportunity to project themselves as defenders
of the faith. The fact that a large number of Muslims
were demonstrating, often violently, and attacking foreign
Economic & Political Weekly EPW september 29, 2012 vol xlviI no 39
embassies, businesses and individuals while protesting against
a shoddily-made film which few had watched, which had not
even been released for commercial viewing and which had
been condemned by almost everyone in the political and social
circles of the US, has only helped feed the anti-Muslim preju-
dice in the west. It has been a classic illustration of how the
extremists and fundamentalists of each religion feed off one
another’s follies.
While this sorry film has provided Islamist groups and par-
ties a ready platform to mobilise and form public opinion within
their communities, it would be a mistake to think that all the
hundreds of thousands of people who came on the street to
protest have done so only because of hurt religious sentiments.
Religious hurt, as has so often been the case, is often represent-
ative of social, economic and political hurt which people and
communities have faced and continue to deal with. If in Egypt
it is the resentment at the slowing down of the revolution, in
Libya it was clearly popular anger at the manner in which
the US and the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation used the
anti-Gaddafi rebellion to establish their stranglehold on that
country. Similarly, it is not possible to understand the massive
turnout at Hezbollah’s rally in Lebanon without acknowledg-
ing Israel’s criminality in that region for half a century and
more, nor can India’s role in Kashmir be ignored when looking
at the protests in the Valley.
Just as it is wrong to see these protests only as expressions
of religious feelings, it would be erroneous to ignore their
religious content and form. It is a retrogressive step when
social and political protests find their expression in religious
terms. In countries where people have risen to fight authori-
tarianism and social and economic oppression, the growth of
religious fundamentalism on the back of religious hurt is
particularly retrogressive. In the name of understanding the
real causes of this religious anger, it would be dangerous
if progressive forces were to give a free pass to the politics of
religious fundamentalism among the Muslims. In the clash
of the barbarians – between the imperialists and the funda-
mentalists – it would be the progressive forces which will
be decimated.
This incident has also put the focus, yet again, on the role
of social media in our world. There can be no stopping
7
EDITORIALS
individuals and fringe elements from using social media to
spread hate and create divisions among people. It is difficult
to predict when and which particular post or statement goes
“viral” by spreading beyond borders and continents. Whether
we like it or not, we will continue to be bombarded with
images, words and opinions which we detest and dislike.
How do we, as individuals and societies, deal with this? While
some restraint and limits may be legally necessary – imposed
8 september 29, 2012
in minimal and transparent ways – it is also necessary to
debate and discuss the modalities of free speech – individual
and collective – as well as legal rights and duties in a world
turned upside down by the new technologies of commu-
nication. As these columns had argued earlier (“A New
Political Protocol”, 15 September 2012), we need to work
towards a new protocol on the right to expression in the era of
the internet.
vol xlviI no 39 EPW Economic & Political Weekly
DISCUSSION
Measuring Illegal Outflows
from the Indian Economy
Some Methodological Issues
Arun Kumar
The paper “An Empirical Study
on the Transfer of Black Money
from India: 1948-2008”
(EPW, 9 April 2011) by Dev Kar
suffers from definitional and
methodological flaws. As a result,
it is not very clear what is being
captured in the estimate – illicit
financial flows, gross capital flight
or net capital flight.
Arun Kumar (arunkumar1000@hotmail.com)
is with the Centre for Economic Studies and
Planning, School of Social Sciences,
Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi.
Economic & Political Weekly EPW september 29, 2012
1 Introduction
B
“ lack money” held abroad has
attracted much attention recently.
Academic circles have largely
ignored the issue perhaps believing that
it is intractable even if relevant for trade
and capital flows. This is both short-
sighted and analytically incorrect, since
it results in errors in the analysis of the
external sector and leads to policy failure.
Kumar (1999) pointed to the impact of the
black economy on all the macro variables
of the economy, including those relevant
to trade – exports, imports, and the cur-
rent and capital accounts of the nation.
It was pointed out that getting correct
results and policy conclusions requires
that the black economy and the flows
associated with it are taken into account.
It is surprising that so little work has
been done by analysts, given the theo-
retical importance of the subject and
that the magnitudes involved are large.
Cooper (1974), Sen (1975) and Bhagwati
(1975) are a few of the early studies of
the problem of smuggling but that is only
one of the aspects of illicit flows. Most of
the work on the subject has been rather
sketchy and that is why measurement of
illicit flows has posed serious problems.
Kar (2011) presents estimates of
“transfer of black money from India
between 1948 and 2008”. This study on
the subject has come a long while after a
comparable study by Rishi and Boyce
(1990) and before that Nayak (1977) pre-
sented an estimate of smuggling. Kar
(2011) is more comprehensive than these
studies. It is based on two key elements.
First, the study of flight of capital to differ-
ent economies using the overall balance of
payments of an economy and second, the
partner country data approach to trade.
Yet, as discussed below, even this study
vol xlviI no 39
is incomplete in various ways and raises
new methodological issues regarding the
estimation of flight of capital and/or illicit
financial flows from an economy.
Of course, the major problem regard-
ing measurement is the nature of the
black economy and the associated illegal
flows from an economy. Since data is
fudged to generate black incomes and the
associated flows, one has to use “trace
methods”, namely, data has to be inferred
from the available official and white
economy data. In this article, an attempt is
made to provide a more extensive frame-
work for doing further work on the subject.
Much of the discussion below is in rela-
tion to the very useful work of Kar (2011)
which will be referred to as DK.
2 Illegal Flows
and Their Measurement
DK raises the issue of what we are trying to
measure. He uses synonymously several
terms that have distinctly different
meanings. For instance, he interchange-
ably refers to “… black money transfers
(or illicit financial flows)”, “the estimation
of illicit flows (transfers of black money)”
and to “illicit capital”. The three terms used
are distinct and need proper definition
before measurement can be attempted.
Kumar (1999) pointed out the need to
distinguish between black money, black
incomes and black savings. The first
refers to a stock variable while the other
two refer to flows. Hence, the method for
their measurement also has to be rather
different. In brief, there are two kinds of
difficulties regarding the definition. First,
with regard to what are the illegal flows
that need to be measured and second
the need to distinguish between stocks
and flows.
The confusion with regard to stocks and
flows is apparent when DK says in the
abstract, “$213.2 billion was shifted out of
India between 1948 and 2008 or about
17.7% of India’s GDP [gross domestic prod-
uct] at end 2008”. Thus, a stock at the end
of a period is compared to an annual flow.
It would have been better to present the
annual flow of savings going out of
India as a ratio of the annual GDP. Chart 1
in DK attempts to do that but the labelling
71
DISCUSSION
of this chart adds to the confusion. Both
the line diagram and the bars are la-
belled as cumulative flows but this can-
not be correct. What was perhaps in-
tended was to present the annual flows
on the right axis (line diagram) while
the bars in the chart are with reference
to the left axis and present the cumula-
tive flow at the end of a period (a stock).
Chart 2 adds to the confusion. It is stated
that “gross transfer of illicit assets by resi-
dents of India amount to about $462 bil-
lion” at the end of 2008. This is compared
to the black income generated in 2008
(taken as 50% of GDP) and it is stated that
“roughly 72.2% of the illicit assets com-
prising the underground economy is held
abroad while illicit assets held domestically
account for 27.8% of the underground
economy”. This statement is flawed due to
the mixing of stocks and flows. Black in-
comes generated annually are confused
with the illicit assets comprising the under-
ground economy. The latter is likely to
be much larger than the former but the
conclusion reached is that illicit assets
are much smaller than the underground
economy – a highly flawed statement.
With regard to the issue of definition,
Kumar (2012) has suggested distinguish-
ing between four different concepts with
regard to illegality in the balance of pay-
ments (BOP) accounts of a nation – illegal
flows, illicit financial flows, gross flight
of capital and net flight of capital. The
illegal flows are much larger than the
illicit financial flows since they also
account for the illegal flows of goods and
services. Illicit financial flows are larger
than the gross flight of capital which is
larger than the net flight of capital. A
multiplicity of transactions may be used to
move capital around or out of the country,
like, in the case of layering and use of tax
havens. Each time capital is moved it
constitutes an illicit financial flow. Hence
the latter will be a multiple of the former.
Since some capital illegally taken out re-
turns back to the country (“round trip-
ping”), gross flight of capital would be
larger than the net figure. It is not very
clear what is being captured in the esti-
mate given by DK – illicit financial flows,
gross capital flight or net capital flight.
These terms need to be further distin-
guished from the opportunity cost of the
72
illegal flows pertaining to the country and
also from the amount of capital presently
held abroad by Indians and which can be
brought back if those who own it wish to
do so or the government can persuade
them to bring it back through policy
measures. DK by adding the interest likely
to have been earned on the stocks of
savings held abroad seems to be measur-
ing the first of these two concepts but
again not fully since it is admitted by him
that many items of illegal flows are left out
like, mis-invoicing of services, havala and
narcotic drug trafficking. Some of these
correspond to illegal flows generated via
illegal activities which are not accounted
for in the BOP accounts of the nation since
they are social bads. DK states, “…economic
models cannot capture all illicit flows
due to a variety of reasons and therefore
significantly understate their volume.”
Further, “cumulative loss of capital is signi-
ficantly understated...neither capture all
sources for the generation of illicit funds
nor the various means for their transfer.”
However, this formulation does not
account for many items of illegal flows
originating in legal activities that ought
to have been captured in the BOP but are
missed out (Kumar 2012). For instance,
import of gold and precious stones is legal
but these items are also smuggled in.
Thus, illegal flows are generated in legal
activities which should have been ac-
counted for in the BOP.
In brief, the deficiencies pointed to by
DK are not just due to lack of availability
of data but due to definitional and related
methodological problems. The model used
by DK to capture flight of capital itself
poses certain methodological problems.
The model is:
K = [Δ(External Debt) + FDI (net)] –
[CA Deficit + Δ(Reserves)]
In this model the first part represents
the changes in the capital account and the
second part the changes in the current
account and the reserves in the BOP
account of the nation. In the equation,
foreign institutional investment (FII) has
not been separately mentioned even
though in the last more than a decade it is a
significant flow and often larger than the
foreign direct investment (FDI) flows. So,
it has to be taken as a part of the external
debt otherwise the capital account would
september 29, 2012
be in error. This item is especially being
mentioned here since a lot of return of cap-
ital (“round tripping”) has taken place as
FII using the participatory note (PN) route.
Havala Flows
As DK admits, the capital account is in er-
ror to the extent of illegal flows via hav-
ala and so on. But a detailed analysis is
required to see if some of these flows do
get captured in the flows corresponding
to the current account. For instance, the
havala transfers out of the country are
often linked to remittances into the
country. The methodological issue that
such flows pose is that in the above
equation these two flows get netted out
and we obtain the net capital flows. DK
states, the estimate is “based on gross
outflows only with illicit inflows set to
zero”. But the issue is: should the inflows
not be added rather than being set to
zero to get the gross illicit flows?
This method does not make sense
whether we want to capture the gross
flows or the net flows. To get the gross
flows, there is a need to add the inflows
which DK does not. Further, the method
does not capture the net flows since
inflows are set to zero. Thus, DK captures a
part of the gross flows and a part of the net
flows, leading to confusion. DK further
states that he does not want to present net
flows and attempts to capture gross flows
since both inflows and outflows have
economic consequences. But the method
used seems to go contrary to this idea.
Kumar (2012) points out that there are
at least 12 broad items of the BOP that need
to be added to get the gross illegal flows
from the country, for instance, investments,
insurance, remittances, transportation and
tourism. Further, as mentioned above,
the CA deficit is being netted out and this
understates the gross flows. Thus, all the
illegal flows pertaining to the CA need to
be added to get at the illegal flows, illicit
financial flows and gross capital flight.
The change in external debt refers to the
public sector. But as pointed out above,
it needs to also take into account FII flows.
But the bigger lacuna is that the illegal
flows are all private and, therefore, these
constitute a change in the country’s exter-
nal debt on private account. They cannot be
captured in the public sector indebtedness.
vol xlviI no 39 EPW Economic & Political Weekly

Further, since the private financial flows
take place in both directions, to get at
gross financial flows, both the flows
need to be added and not netted. Hence,
these items need to be added separately
in the equation given above.
3 Definitional and
Methodological Problems
Black incomes generated in India are over-
whelmingly property incomes and not
wage or salary incomes (Kumar 1999). A
part of these incomes are consumed and
the rest saved. Of the savings, a part is sent
abroad as flight of capital or illicit flows.
Further, when mis-invoicing is resorted to,
it is tantamount to transfer of profits from
India or back to the country. Profits are
manipulated in several distinct ways and
have different economic consequences.
The funds taken abroad are not entirely
kept as savings since a part of them are
consumed. That part which is consumed
is not available for investment for earning
a return but DK assumes that the entire
amount taken out earns a return. He
says that “gross transfer of illicit assets
by residents of India amount to about
$462 billion” at the end of 2008. This
gives the opportunity cost of the funds
transferred abroad since it includes the
interest earned on the amount taken out
of the country. But because of consump-
tion, it is not the amount of funds held
abroad at end 2008 by Indians. Hence,
DK’s estimated figure does not tell us how
much of the funds are available at any
point of time to be brought back to the
country – a sum that is of great interest to
many political actors in the country. Thus,
savings out of black incomes generated in
India or abroad and black money trans-
ferred abroad need to be distinguished.
DK states the methods used “do not
cover trade in services on a bilateral basis.
Hence, mis-invoicing adjustments pertain
strictly to goods only.” But this is a major
lacuna in the study since trade in services
has grown fast and it is easier to mis-
invoice services than goods. If it is assumed
that mis-invoicing of services is at least
as much as of goods, a crude minimum
estimate could have been obtained.
Further, the flows associated with illegal
activities like havala, narcotic drug traf-
ficking, human trafficking, gun running
Economic & Political Weekly EPW september 29, 2012
and smuggling are left out. Given that
these flows are substantial, an attempt
ought to have been made to use some
rudimentary estimates that are available
for some points of time and for some
countries. Even though difficult, some
indicative figures could have been ob-
tained for these flows.
The partner country method is used
to estimate the mis-invoicing of goods to
obtain an estimate of flight of capital re-
lated to trade. It is stated that a “country’s
exports to the world (valued free-on-board
(fob) in dollars) are compared to what the
world reports as having imported from
that country”. This raises the issue whether
shipments carry two invoices, one for the
originating country and the other for the
destination country. If so, two different
invoices would be presented to the two
customs authorities of the two countries
and that is why the trade data recorded
by the two countries would differ. The
customs persons on one or both sides may
also be implicated in this process of dual
invoicing. The implication also is that
shipments must carry dual invoices and
the shipping company may have some
role in the mis-invoicing. Similarly, the
banking channels that open the letter of
credit and the insurance companies may
also be party to the mis-invoicing.
Further, DK uses the Direction of Trade
Statistics Data available from the Inter-
national Monetary Fund (IMF) but this is
only for a select group of nations. Thus, DK
does not capture the full extent of trade
mis-invoicing. Perhaps a correction could
have been applied on the conservative
assumption that mis-invoicing in the rest
of the trade would be similar to that with
the major partners for which the data is
available. Actually, it is likely that mis-
invoicing would be larger since regulation
would be much more lax in the case of the
countries that do not report data to the IMF.
The study also admits that it does not
take into account transfer pricing prac-
tised by the multinational corporations
(MNCs). But, could this have been esti-
mated assuming the same extent of mis-
pricing as in the rest of the trade?
Putting it to zero seems inappropriate.
DK uses estimates of the size of the black
economy for comparison and in his model
for drivers of illicit flows. He uses the series
vol xlviI no 39
DISCUSSION
generated by Gupta and Gupta (1982)
for the period 1967-68 to 1978-79 and
extends it backward to 1948 and forward
to 2008. This uncritical acceptance of the
monetarist method is surprising since
the flaws in this method are well known
and it is accepted that this method yields
exaggerated figures for the size of the
black economy (for a critique, see NIPFP
1985 and Kumar 1999). Even a monetarist
like Gupta (1992) uses the fiscal approach
to estimate the size of the black economy.
Be that as it may, the study uses an esti-
mate of the black economy of 50% of GDP
for 2008 and 0% for 1948. While the latter
figure is, by assumption, in support of the
50% figure, it is stated, “as found by a
number of researchers”. No reference is
given for this statement. Projecting from
1978-79 to 2008 is difficult since many
structural changes have taken place in that
period. Similarly, projecting backward to
1948 also poses problems. An estimate of
the figure of 50% for 2008 is available us-
ing the fiscal approach but none is availa-
ble using the monetarist method. In fact,
estimates based on the fiscal approach
would have been more appropriate since
analytically this is the correct approach
(Kumar 1999) to measurement and fig-
ures using that approach are available for
some points from 1955 to 1995. Thus,
projecting from this range to 1948 and
2008 would have been more justified.
DK says, “Academics have bandied...
high estimates of the amount of black
money transferred…or have equated illicit
flows with the underground economy.”
No references have been given for these
two statements. Further, he counters the
claim “that Indians held close to $1.4 tril-
lion in illicit funds in foreign accounts”.
An email doing the rounds for the last
five years gives this figure for the amount
held in Swiss Banks alone. It quotes the
Swiss Banker’s Report 2006 as its source.
But this source does not mention any such
figure. Further, since Switzerland is only
one of the possibly 77 tax havens in the
world, the implication would be that the
total held by all Indians in all foreign ac-
counts (in tax havens) would be far higher
than $1.4 trillion, if this figure were to be
true. However, this figure need not be a
point of contention since the source it is
attributed to itself does not mention this
73
DISCUSSION
or any other figure. The Swiss govern-
ment has also denied that such a figure is
mentioned in the source it is attributed
to, so it hardly need be taken seriously.
4 Conclusions
Measurement of illegal flows from India
requires greater definitional and methodo-
logical clarity than at present. DK also
suffers from some of these shortcomings
but this study is an important step in
measuring the size of illegal flows. Fur-
ther, it can be a reference point for other
analysts to arrive at analytically more
correct definitions and methods. These
74
are required to understand this very im-
portant area of macroeconomics which
is crucial for policy purposes and for
governance in any country.
References
Bhagwati, J N, ed. (1975): Illegal Transactions in
International Trade: Theory and Measurement
(North Holland).
Cooper, R N (1974): “Tariff and Smuggling in
Indonesia”, Mimeo. Economic Growth Centre,
Paper No 217, Yale University.
Gupta, P and S Gupta (1982): “Estimates of the
Unreported Economy in India”, Economic &
Political Weekly, 16 January.
Gupta, S (1992): Black Economy in India (New Delhi:
Sage).
Kar, Dev (2011): “An Empirical Study on the Transfer of
Black Money from India: 1948-2008”, Economic
september 29, 2012
& Political Weekly, Vol XLVI, No 15, 9 April.
Kumar, A (1999): The Black Economy in India (New
Delhi: Penguin India).
– (2012): “Illegal Flows in India’s BOP Accounts:
Its Components and Impact on the Economy” in
B Dasgupta (ed.), Dimensions of Global Political
Economy – Non-Mainstream Perspectives, Volume
in Honour of Professor Sunanda Sen, forthcoming.
Nayak, S S (1977): “Illegal Transactions in External
Trade and Payments in India”, Economic &
Political Weekly, 10 December.
NIPFP (1985): Aspects of Black Economy in India
(New Delhi: National Institute of Public Finance
and Policy).
Rishi, M and J K Boyce (1990): “The Hidden Balance
of Payments: Capital Flight and Trade Misinvoic-
ing in India, 1971-1986”, Economic & Political
Weekly, Vol 25, No 30, 28 July, pp 1645-48.
Sen, S (1975): “Smuggling, Exchange Controls and
Indian Economy”, Economic & Political Weekly,
Vol 10, Nos 5-7, Annual Number, February.
vol xlviI no 39 EPW Economic & Political Weekly

Remembering Verghese Kurien
Tushaar Shah
Verghese Kurien, who passed
away recently, will be best known
for building Amul into one of
India’s most valuable brands
which is an organisation of nearly
three million smallholder dairy
producers and a Rs 12,000 crore
farmer-owned business. He will
also be remembered for creating
the National Dairy Development
Board which replicated Amul’s
complex institutional model
across India.
Tushaar Shah (T.Shah@cgiar.org) is senior adviser
to the director general at the Colombo-based
International Water Management Institute. He
works out of Anand, Gujarat.
Economic & Political Weekly EPW september 29, 2012
V
erghese Kurien was a remarkable
man. He leaves behind an equally
remarkable legacy in the institu-
tions he built, the ideas he propounded, a
dairy industry the country can be proud
of, and a deep imprint on our thinking
about development and democracy.
With his passing on 9 September, an
era has ended. Affectionately remem-
bered as the father of India’s white revo-
lution, Kurien was in his prime for over
half a century until the late 1990s during
which he honed and exercised his ex-
traordinary powers as a manager running
a large farmer organisation, as a leader
of men and as a builder of institutions.
I had the privilege of working with
him during the late 1970s and all of the
1980s when he was at his creative peak.
Like hundreds of young men and women
who passed through the “Kurien School of
Life”, I was deeply influenced by his view
vol xlviI no 39
COMMENTARY
of the world, his managerial and leader-
ship style, and his enigmatic personality.
Man, Manager, Leader
Kurien was exceptionally gifted. He had
an exquisite sense of humour which he
often directed at himself. Once in a large
conference at Vigyan Bhawan in New
Delhi, he had the house roaring in laugh-
ter as he narrated how Indian Airlines
had misprinted his name on the board-
ing pass as V K Urine. Outsiders often
found him arrogant but marvelled at his
performance as a manager. An article in
the Food and Agriculture Organisation’s
Ceres (1978) quoted a German economist
saying, “He [Kurien] can be a son-of-a-
bitch in some of his dealings with peo-
ple, but he gets things done”. Kurien
gleefully shared photocopies of the arti-
cle with his friends and family, includ-
ing his mother.
He gave all credit for his achievements
to his early associates, often telling us
youngsters that he let Tribhuvandas Patel
and H M Dalaya to do all the work while he
liberally used his “gift of the gab”. When
he wanted, Kurien could be extremely
29
COMMENTARY
gracious and unleash his irresistible
charm; however, those of us around him
found him a tough taskmaster.
Kurien was not given to sycophancy
but was adept at managing relationships
with the high and mighty. He had a dis-
tinct style of dealing with a succession of
prime ministers, presidents, foreign
heads of state, whom he and his wife
hosted at their home in Anand. Even as
honorary chairman of the National
Dairy Development Board (NDDB), he
always sent in his resignation when a
new prime minister took charge. He also
went out of his way to maintain active
contact with his political friends, espe-
cially when they were out of power.
Kurien was a fighter. He could be
ruthless, even vicious when he sensed a
threat to his institutions and the cause
he had embraced. An article criticising
Operation Flood in Illustrated Weekly in
1983 posed one such threat. A lesser
man would have been unnerved by such
a frontal media assault on his life’s
work, but not Kurien. He mobilised his
war machine and issued a comprehen-
sive response that led to government
intervention and a high-level enquiry.
Eventually, Kurien and his institutions
emerged out of the crisis unscathed
and vindicated.
Kurien was an inspirational leader and
used his gift of the gab to great effect. He
drove his people hard, yet the morale of
his staff remained high because he could
communicate to them his vision and ide-
as in a manner that was compelling and
uplifting. He held his audiences – stu-
dents, officials, journalists, scientists –
in thrall whenever he talked about his
life and work with Amul and his strategy
of modernising Indian dairying on coop-
erative lines. The key source of the grow-
ing aura around Kurien was his unfalter-
ing integrity.
Kurien had a high regard for the Indian
farmer. He abhorred thinking of farmers
as poor, helpless, in need of doles. He
always lauded their wisdom and native
genius and was derisive about anti-
poverty programmes, which he thought
treated farmers as supplicants. He loved
their rusticity and simplicity and despite
a language barrier bonded instantly with
pro-farmer leaders like Tribhuvandas
30
Patel, Devi Lal, Balram Jakhar, Para- inseminated, why don’t you consider get-
masivam, and Lal Bahadur Shastri. Trib- ting your mother artificially inseminat-
huvandas Patel remained Kurien’s guid- ed?” To the merriment of all around, Ku-
ing spirit until his last days. rien never tired of narrating this inci-
In contrast, he was an unrelenting dent all his life.
critic of the bureaucracy and the Indian Kurien was an ardent believer in pro-
Administrative Service (IAS), but had the moting scientific temper. However, he
uncanny knack of winning friends even also believed that for an organisation
while bitterly criticising them. He bad- like the NDDB, which was created to pro-
mouthed the IAS all his life yet his mote farmer cooperatives, vacillating on
closest friends and supporters, starting the core idea of organisational purpose
with the venerable H M Patel, were all could spread confusion and undermine
from the IAS. single-minded pursuit of the goal. He
As Amul and Operation Flood began agreed that private and multinational
getting critically evaluated, he also be- companies could play a role in moder-
came increasingly critical of economists nising India’s dairy industry but to his
and social scientists. At the end of an er- officers he would always say, “The world
udite keynote address he was invited to may have devised many ways to skin the
deliver to the Indian Society of Agricul- cat but for us in the Dairy Board there is
tural Economics in Pune in 1984, he con- only one way, the Amul way”.
cluded by telling the large gathering
how he hated economists: “May your Impact on Indian Dairying
tribe perish. You are never there where Kurien will be best known for building
the action is. You come after the event Amul as one of India’s most valuable
and glibly find faults. If I am born again, brands, which is an organisation of nearly
I will become an economist, so that oth- three million smallholder dairy produ-
ers do all the work, while all I do is criti- cers, and a Rs 12,000 crore farmer-
cise...” He got a standing ovation. One owned business. He will also be remem-
economist he fondly remembered was bered for creating the NDDB, which
V M Dandekar. Both agreed that India’s under Operation Flood I and II, replicat-
large population of unproductive bovines ed Amul’s complex institutional model
was a drag on the livestock economy but across India. Although the replication was
were chary of taking a public stand for uneven, the fact remains that together
cow slaughter. Sometime during the the Amul pattern dairy cooperatives
1960s, both were sharing the stage in a today operate a business of Rs 33,000-
largely attended farmer meeting where 35,000 crore annually and despite the
farmers were sharing their experiences growing competition from the private
of artificial insemination of cattle. A sector over the past two decades, dairy
farmer leader was waxing eloquent cooperatives have not only held forth
about how sending gau-mata to the but are growing their business turnover
slaughterhouse was like sending one’s at a steady 12-15% annually. In 2010,
own mother to her death. Dandekar, around 1,44,000 village dairy coopera-
as irreverent as Kurien, snatched the tives procured an average of 26 million
microphone and asked him, “Now that kg/day of milk from 14.5 million primary
you have got your gau-mata artificially members. Their district unions and
W
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september 29, 2012 vol xlviI no 39 EPW Economic & Political Weekly

state-level federations marketed 22 mil-
lion litres of liquid milk daily (NDDB
2011) and dairy co-ops pump Rs 25,000
crore/year into India’s villages as cash
income to milk producers. As a rural
employment guarantee programme, the
success of dairy co-ops is hard to match.
Kurien’s most significant contribution
was in prevailing upon successive prime
ministers to keep multinational dairy
companies out of India for 30 years
while our own indigenous dairy indus-
try took root and came into its own. But
for this grace period, the complexion of
Indian dairying today would have been
very different. To understand how dif-
ferent, all one needs to do is to walk into
a grocer’s shop in Colombo, Dhaka or
Lahore and ask for a local brand of pack-
aged milk or product. There is hardly
any local dairy industry or indigenous
dairy brand in any other south Asian
country – the bulk of the urban demand
for dairy products in these countries is
met by milk from New Zealand even as
their own local milk producers crave for a
remunerative market. On the other hand,
one can pick up several indigenous co-
operative and private brands of packaged
milk and other dairy products in any
Indian town or city.
Kurien’s thinking is particularly rele-
vant today in the context of the ongoing
debate on foreign direct investment (FDI)
in multi-brand retail. If what FDI has
done to the indigenous dairy industry in
Sri Lanka and Bangladesh is any indica-
tion, FDI in multi-brand retail may not
augur well for Indian agriculture unless
there is some way to ensure that the new
players source the bulk of their farm
products locally.
Cooperative Movement
Kurien was deeply wedded to the co-
operative ideal. He believed that putting
the farmer in control of production, pro-
curement, processing and marketing of
farm produce was the only way to devel-
op Indian agriculture. He also espoused
the view that strong cooperatives under-
pin democratic governance structures at
the state and central level. However, he
also believed that the cooperative
movement in India suffered from a pov-
erty of ideas. He accepted international
Economic & Political Weekly EPW september 29, 2012
cooperative principles as the normative
basis for cooperation but questioned if
adhering to these principles ensured
success of cooperatives.
In the dairy cooperative movement,
Kurien ensured that there was no poverty
of ideas. In replicating Amul under Op-
eration Flood I and II, Kurien distilled a
set of elegant and compelling design
principles derived from the success of
several early dairy unions of Gujarat:
First, the presence of a stable and remu-
nerative market is a precondition for
surplus milk production. Second, one
must capture the market before organis-
ing producers into cooperatives. Third,
initially externally sourced milk sup-
plies need to be used to capture the mar-
ket while cooperatives are being estab-
lished. Fourth, as the market is cap-
tured, extant traditional trade is forced
to withdraw and surplus milk in the vil-
lages has nowhere to go but to the newly-
formed cooperatives. Fifth, for sustain-
ing a distinctive competitive advantage,
a cooperative union must have a powder
plant to deal with seasonal fluctuations
in milk production. Sixth, for the new
structure to remain efficient and subser-
vient to producers, it needs to be man-
aged by professionals accountable to a
board elected by producers.
There is no rocket science in these –
just simple economic logic. Yet, the
ubiquity of these simple design princi-
ples is evident only in their rampant
violation. How many cooperatives in
India have governing boards elected
by members? How many non-govern-
mental organisations and government
programmes ensure a stable and remu-
nerative market before organising pro-
ducer cooperatives? How many of them
assure better prices at their doorstep
before they persevere to help farmers
increase production?
Nation Building
Kurien was a serial institution builder.
During the 1970s and 1980s, he built a
whole family of institutions around
NDDB to realise his dream of a strong
Indian dairy industry founded on co-
operative lines. For the scores of new co-
operatives that were coming up around
the country, there was a need to produce
vol xlviI no 39
COMMENTARY
professional managers. Kurien first went
to his cousin Ravi Matthai, the founder-
director of the Indian Institute of Man-
agement at Ahmedabad (IIMA), and
offered to fund a separate programme at
IIMA to train cooperative managers with
an appropriate value system. When this
did not work out, in 1979 Kurien went
ahead and founded the Institute of Rural
Management at Anand (IRMA) and over
30 years, IRMA graduates have made a
mark in the cooperative, agri-business and
non-profit sectors of the Indian economy.
IRMA’s mandate has a powerful appeal.
Beginning with Indira Gandhi, a succes-
sion of prime ministers, presidents and
other top leaders graced IRMA’s convoca-
tions, which in the early years were at-
tended, besides graduating students, by
tens of thousands of farmers. There was
a period in the late 1980s when whoever
spoke at the IRMA convocation moved to
a position of greater power and influ-
ence soon after. As chairman of IRMA,
Kurien would tickle his convocation
speakers about the strong probability of
them being “kicked upstairs”. Sure
enough, Manmohan Singh, who spoke
at the 1991 convocation became the
finance minister in the Narasimha
Rao government.
Through the 1990s Kurien was a pre-
cious resource the country had. His
achievements were recognised by show-
ering him with awards and honours but
the country failed to put his talents to
good use. Few people understood the
Indian farmer as Kurien did; even fewer
understood what it would take to jump-
start Indian agriculture. As a champion
player in search of a playing field had he
got a few years as India’s food-agriculture
minister, Kurien would have likely to
have done to Indian agriculture what
Manmohan Singh did to reform indus-
try, banking and finance.
For all his impressive accomplish-
ments, however, for the common man,
Kurien will forever remain the man be-
hind the impish Amul girl promoting
with her “utterly, butterly” smile the
Taste of India.
References
CERES No 066 (FAO 1978, p 50).
NDDB (2011): Annual Report (Anand: National
Dairy Development Board).
31
COMMENTARY

are in the process of doing so. However,

Replicating Tamil Nadu’s less attention has been paid to how the
states are able to cope with these systemic
Drug Procurement Model changes and few questions have been
asked about the ease or validity of the
replication. How have the other states
Prabal Vikram Singh, Anand Tatambhotla, Rohini Rao Kalvakuntla, rolled out the TNMSC model? While the
Maulik Chokshi
TNMSC model has worked well in the
context of Tamil Nadu, it may not be sen-

Most states are attempting to copy
the Tamil Nadu Medical Services
Corporation’s model of centralised
tendering and purchase of drugs.
A study of the Kerala Medical
Services Corporation and Odisha’s
State Drug Management Unit
shows that imitating the original
model without factoring in the
local context and building up
the processes does not lead to
success. While Kerala has adapted
the Tamil Nadu model and even
added innovations, Odisha’s
experiment has had dismal results.
W
ith the aim of studying the pub-
lic drug procurement models,
our visits to the states of Tamil
Nadu, Kerala, Odisha and Maharashtra
prompted us to notice some rather intrigu-
ing similarities and differences in their
procurement models. Most states are try-
ing to emulate the Tamil Nadu Medical
Services Corporation (TNMSC) model of
centralised tendering and purchasing to
improve drug accessibility and reduce its
consequent financial burden on the state
and individuals. This model is recom-
mended to all the other states by several
organisations like the World Bank, the
World Health Organisation, the Depart-
ment for International Development and
the High-Level Expert Group (HLEG) con-
stituted recently to propose methodo-
logies of Universal Health Care (UHC) in
India (High Level Expert Group 2011).
Several states like Kerala, Odisha, And-
hra Pradesh, Delhi and Assam have al-
ready adopted this system with some
state-specific changes and many more
like Karnataka, Maharashtra and Bihar
Figure 1: Critical Success Factors for TNMSC Model of Public Drug Procurement
Effective Leadership and Political Support
sible to just engineer the same model in
other states where the local context and
needs may be very different.
Critical Success Factors
The TNMSC was incorporated in the
wake of a massive drug scam in Tamil
Nadu; following which it introduced
multiple reforms and streamlined its
drug purchase, storage and distribution
systems through the medical services
corporation in 1994. More interestingly,
the incorporation happened through a
government order, which is very rare in
our political system. The TNMSC does
central tendering and purchasing of the
essential drugs for the entire state that
are delivered to the district warehouses
by the supplier in stipulated quantities.
From here the drugs are distributed to
the facilities based on a value-based
passbook system (each facility is allotted
a fixed amount and can requisition for
any quantity of drugs in the Essential
Drug List (EDL) within that amount).
The system is claimed to be efficient and

Multi-Stakeholder Participation for Political Buy-in

Sufficient Budget Allocation to Meet Drug Demand and Administration Costs

Outsourcing Non-Care Services Like IT, Quality Testing, Supply Chain Management, etc.

Autonomous procurement agency Mandatory (multiple) external quality testing

Prompt payment to suppliers; autonomous

Well defined and localised EDL
payment body

Scientific demand estimation and forecasting Scientific warehousing and inventory management

Effective pre-qualification criteria to promote Real time stock monitoring (at warehouse
Prabal Vikram Singh (prabal.singh@accessh.org), competition and enforce quality and facility level)
Anand Tatambhotla and Rohini Rao
Kalvakuntla are with the ACCESS Health Protocols for regular inspection of supplier premises Dedicated vehicles for warehouse-facility transfers
International at the Indian School of Business.
Maulik Chokshi is with the Indian Institute of Robust IT systems
Public Health, Delhi.
The boxes in grey are process specific factors while the ones in white are overarching and affect the entire procurement system.

26 september 29, 2012 vol xlviI no 39 EPW Economic & Political Weekly
 COMMENTARY
Figure 2: Procurement Process Comparison in Kerala, Odisha and Tamil Nadu required to user institutions with minimal
Parameter Kerala Odisha Tamil Nadu delays. This requires a significant budget
Legal status of procurement organisation Autonomous Government owned Autonomous to cover the fixed costs incurred before
Per capita drug procurement budget (INR) 51 (2011-12) 8.8 (2010-11) 22.5 (2010-11) benefiting from the bulk discounts on
Essential drug list
drugs. Tamil Nadu had a budget of Rs 182
Customised state EDL Yes Yes Yes
crore for 2010-11 (giving a per capita drug
Frequency of EDL revision 1 year 2 years 1 year
Time for EDL preparation/revision 2-3 months 7-8 months 2-3 months
procurement budget of Rs 22.5), for procu-
Demand estimation of drugs and forecast ring about 260 essential drugs. The TNMSC
Methodology for estimation 10 - 15% over No scienfitic 10% of the has been constituted as an autonomous
(facility level) previous year's method; usually previous year agency consisting of government deputed
indent; performed performed by consumption
by facility computer operator/
Indian Administrative Service (IAS) offic-
pharmacist clerk ers and technically qualified contractual
Procurement process staff. This is critical to avoid cumbersome
Procurement mechanism in the state Centralised 80% centralised 90% centralised bureaucratic processes and to improve
procurement state procurement; state procurement;
at state level 20% decentralised 10% decentralised
efficiency from tendering to payment dis-
district procurement district bursements. Also, the TNMSC board con-
procurement sists of people from different fields mak-
Emergency drug budget allocation Yes No Yes ing it a multi-stakeholder composition
(additional funds (purchased from (additional funds
released) existing budget) released) for easier and stronger political support.
Minimum turnover pre-qualification INR 10 crore INR 10 crore INR 35 lakh An effective centralised procurement
criteria organisation should be spearheaded by
Minimum market standing (years) 2 3 3 an effective leader who can run the au-
Exclusion criteria for factory inspections Supply to premier None None tonomous agency like a for-profit entity
institutions like
AIIMS while keeping in mind the public health
Pre-identified list reserved for SSIs/ PSUs None 31 Items (for SSIs) None needs (medicine availability, affordabil-
Quality control ity, quality, etc). While these were some
External quality testing of every Yes (empanelled No Yes (empanelled of the overarching points, processes for
consignment labs) labs)
the formation of the state’s EDL, tender
Testing before distribution Mandatory Not mandatory Mandatory
pre-qualification criteria, tendering terms
Lead time for quality testing ~ 15 days ~ 56 days ~15 days (tablets);
~30 days and conditions and the tender process
(suspension) itself are very important.
Payment mechanisms The centralised pooled procurement
Payment department status Autonomous from Government Autonomous from mechanism is not a panacea to mitigate
government (account general's government
office) issues of corruption, drug affordability,
Lead time for payment ~ 30 days n/a 30 days availability and quality in the public
Inventory management and distribution health system; these issues may still be
Scientific warehousing practices Yes No Yes prevalent and some checks and balances
Supply chain management Outsourced In-house In-house must be in place to prevent them. Such
Inventory management Dynamic (flexibility Static (single Dynamic (flexibility processes are implicit and are usually
of 2nd purchase order) purchase order of 2nd purchase
issued) order) much harder to replicate. We believe
Flexibility for facilities to alter indent Yes (Just No No that this fact is noteworthy because, the
before despatch) TNMSC and centralised pooled procure-
Tracking dispatched/delivered drugs Volume based No tracking Value based ment are used interchangeably (and in-
passbook passbook correctly) in the public domain. Figure 1
(Scientific) inventory management at facility No No No
(p 26) is a mapping of the critical success
Source: Personal interviews with leadership teams of the states’ procurement agencies.
factors for the TNMSC based on observa-
transparent and relies on outsourcing and Food Regulation 2011). Our study of tions and literature review.
and extensive use of information tech- the TNMSC and review of existing litera- We have focused on the experiences
nology (IT). Several reports and articles ture (Narayanan 2010) of its model ena- of two states – Kerala and Odisha – that
have recorded the success of the TNMSC. bled us to draw up a set of points that we have gone a long way into incorporating
According to the Drug and Food Regula- opine as the critical success factors. the TNMSC model, but with different local
tion Authority, all the patients visiting A centralised system of drug procure- contexts and outcomes. While Kerala has
government health facilities (equivalent ment needs trained personnel, stream- successfully adopted, modified and custo-
to almost 40% of all patients as per the lined processes, infrastructure and IT mised it to suit the local context, Odisha is
NSSO 60th round) have received all their enablement in order to procure, store and grappling with several monetary, admini-
medicines for free in Tamil Nadu (Drugs distribute the large quantities of drugs strative and infrastructural challenges
Economic & Political Weekly EPW september 29, 2012 vol xlviI no 39 27
COMMENTARY
Figure 3: Variance in Procurement Prices (Per Tablet/Vial/Amp) the people of Kerala to con- any emergencies and other contingen-
Compared to TNMSC Prices
-45 -30 -15 0 15 30 45 sume branded medicines, cies; the KMSCL claims to be able to deal
Adrenaline which are perceived to be of with emergencies through the release of
Albendazole
Amitriptyline high quality, necessitated additional funds from the state govern-
Amlodipine the introduction of several ment; and contingencies do not arise since
Atenolol
changes. Thus, bidding was it offers the facilities a flexibility to alter
Benzyl Pencillin
Carbamazepine opened for branded gener- their indents several times. Since the incor-
Cefotaxime ics and today the KMSCL poration of the said changes, the KMSCL
Ciprofloxacin
Co-trimoxazole
procures more branded ge- has been touted to function very well in
Diclofenac nerics than pure generics. its autonomy and under the current
Dicyclomine With the opening up of ten- leadership. However, the current system
Dopamine
Erythromycin
dering to branded generic looks markedly different from the origi-
Folic Acid manufacturers, the mini- nal TNMSC model and its processes.
Gamma Benzene Hexachloride mum annual turnover crite-
Glibenclamide
Hydrocortisone ria for tendering companies A Long Way To Go
Ketamine was fixed at Rs 10 crore (up Odisha, on the other hand, provided a
Lignocaine
from the initial Rs 20 lakh) rather grim picture of its adaptation story.
Metformin
Methylergometrine along with a minimum With a minimal drug procurement budget
Norfloxacin market standing of three of Rs 37 crore in 2010-11 (per capita Rs 8.8;
Oxytocin
Pentazocine
years with some special incidentally, this budget allotment is up
Phenobarbitone relaxations for small scale from Rs 16 crore during 2009-10 that
Phenytoin industries (SSI) and public translates into a per capita of Rs 3.8), Odi-
Promethazine
Ranitidine sector units. These criteria sha has a lot to build before it can success-
Thiopentone not only deterred the unre- fully accrue the benefits of a centralised
Kerala Odisha liable suppliers who may purchasing model like the TNMSC. One of
All comparisons were made for similar dosage formulations; The L1 rates for
Odisha are from 2009 while those of Kerala and Tamil Nadu are from 2011. otherwise have participat- the important factors of the TNMSC is the
Source: The L1 rates were obtained from the state procurement organisations.
ed in the tendering process autonomy, coupled with able leadership
that prevent it from accruing the adver- but also influenced competition only mar- that is able to step aside from the bureau-
tised benefits. Needless to say, the modi- ginally (by keeping the minimum turno- cratic hassles and make decisions prompt-
fications to the TNMSC model in both ver relatively low). These criteria are ly and independently.
these states have been so stark that their markedly different from those of the In Odisha, the State Drug Management
resemblance to the TNMSC is currently TNMSC where the minimum annual turno- Unit (SDMU; the central drug purchasing
very little. ver is set at Rs 35 lakh. agency) is a part of the directorate of health
The KMSCL now has its own custom- services and lacks such autonomy. More-
Strong Leadership ised IT system that includes real time over, the success of the TNMSC lies in its
Kerala had brought about changes in the stock monitoring and thus promises processes that have been gradually set up
drug procurement landscape in 2008, more effective forecasting than that of with the help of the available resources in
when it shifted to centralised tendering the TNMSC (KMSCL is not only patenting the state. These processes are implicit and
and purchasing inspired by the TNMSC. this IT solution but is also facilitating its entrenched in the state contexts making
The Kerala Medical Services Corporation implementation in other states). The IT their duplication in a completely different
Limited (KMSCL) was incorporated in usage is being extended even to the last context difficult/invalid. While this holds
2008 and currently has an annual drug mile user institutions to create a com- true for any state, Odisha gives us clear
procurement budget of almost Rs 170 crore mon platform for an accurate and scien- evidence in this regard. Despite the cen-
(translating into a per capita of Rs 51). In tific way of indenting drug requirement. tralised tendering and purchasing, the
the initial phase, the KMSCL was brought The KMSCL has improvised the TNMSC’s system is grappling with systemic prob-
under scrutiny for its malfunctioning. value-based drug allotment to create a lems of governance, poor political sup-
Some of the issues included the presence volume-based indenting where the facil- port, ineffective leadership and constant
of substandard and spurious drugs; unsci- ities submit a quarterly and annual in- reshuffling in the key positions when
entific ways of preparing the EDL, fore- dent of drug requirement, against which trying to push for reforms.
casting demand, procuring and storing it delivers. Yet another change over the State representatives shared how firm
drugs, etc, and posed grave problems to TNMSC model is to make centralised pur- leadership for the SDMU could not be estab-
the system. With the advent of a strong chasing for all the drugs unlike in the lished due to several political reasons gar-
leadership in the KMSCL in 2010, much TNMSC where 90% of funds are used for nering less hope for any change. Illustrating
positive progress was recorded. The exist- purchasing at the central level and 10% an instance of poor system, the strong SSI
ence of a strong doctor-retailer-private at the district level. The 10% district lobby in the state moved the high court to
manufacturer nexus and the preference of allotment in Tamil Nadu is given to meet grant a stay order on the tendering process.
28 september 29, 2012 vol xlviI no 39 EPW Economic & Political Weekly

This was done to protest the SDMU’s
change in the minimum annual turnover
criteria to Rs 10 crore from Rs 10 lakh.
This order stalled the tendering process
in the state for two years rendering the
system helpless. Odisha clearly seems to
illustrate that replicating the TNMSC
model in a state will come with its own
set of issues and the state needs to under-
stand and anticipate these issues and
make effective changes to suit the local
context and demand. Sometimes, it is
even important to look at the existing
systems in place and see if changes or
improvements can be made before
changing the entire landscape.
Figure 2 (p 27) provides a snapshot of
a few similarities and differences in the
procurement processes in Kerala, Odisha
and Tamil Nadu.
Another important factor to compare
and contrast these centralised drug pur-
chasing models is the procurement price.
Figure 3 (p 28) provides the variance
of procurement prices for 30 molecules
across the three states with the TNMSC
Economic & Political Weekly EPW september 29, 2012
prices as the reference. Supporting in-
tuition, the mean variance of KMSCL is
-3.1% while that of Odisha is 4.4%. The
fuzzy nature of the variance plot can be
attributed to multiple factors like type of
manufacturer (SSI/PSU/non-SSI), tender
quantity, supplier’s economy of scale, sup-
plier’s factory location, stringency of the
quality checks, etc. While understanding
the correlations between these parameters
and the procurement price is a detailed
exercise in itself, one fact stands clear in
the plot. It is possible to achieve prices
lower than that of the TNMSC and the
prices do not exhibit strong correlation to
volumes (negative variance for 12 mole-
cules in Odisha proves this hypothesis).
Conclusions
Based on our observations across the
different states, we opine that adaptation
of the TNMSC model should come with a
detailed and objective analysis of the exist-
ing state conditions and its ability (mon-
etary and administrative) to create new
structures. The head of the procurement
vol xlviI no 39
COMMENTARY
cell plays a crucial role in managing and
running the system smoothly, which
implies immense political support and
authority. Adopting the model without the
necessary prerequisites would result in a
state spending more money without nec-
essarily improving outcomes. This is not
to say that the existing structures were
functioning better, it is only a prompter
towards doing and undoing several things
in the current adoption to fit into the state
contexts. Yet, it is important to remember
that the TNMSC has given the states some-
thing to think about and an opportunity
to experiment with their procurement
models while it is too early to comment
on the success of the evolved model.
References
Drugs and Food Regulation (2011): Report of the
Working Group on Drugs and Food Regulation
for the Twelfth Five-Year Plan, New Delhi.
High Level Expert Group (2011): Universal Health Cov-
erage for India, Planning Commission, New Delhi.
Narayanan, D (2010): “Tamil Nadu Medical Services
Corporation: A Success Story”, Forbes India,
27 July.
TNMSC (2010): Retrieved 2012, 28-March from
TNMSC News Bulletin, 15 July, http://www.
tnmsc.com/tnmsc/publication/July2010.pdf
29
DISCUSSION
Subaltern Studies
Turning around the Perspective
Hiren Gohain
While in Gramsci the term
“subaltern” was never detached
from the perspective of a struggle
for social transformation, the
Subaltern school of India gained
a reputation for its determined
endeavour to rescue history
from the Marxist framework.
Marxist orthodoxy in India had
many limitations and it could
straitjacket complex historical
phenomena, but the Subaltern
school abandoned Marxist
premises instead of trying to
enrich and expand its scope.
Hiren Gohain (hiren.gohain@gmail.com) is a
distinguished Assamese literary and
social critic.
74
I
n an erudite and rich essay, “After
Subaltern Studies” (EPW, 1 September
2012), Partha Chatterjee offers us a
comprehensive view of the rise, develop-
ment and eventual dissolution of the
Subaltern school of history over a time
span of three decades. The present dis-
cussion has been prompted not so much
by an urge for theoretical polemics as by
the irrepressible query: what has been
the implication of “the fight within the
academy”, on which Ranajit Guha, pioneer
and leader of the school had insisted in his
correspondence with other members, for
the larger social struggle outside? It might
be said, of course, that there is no struggle
as such, only a multitude of struggles which
may not be theorised by a general
approach. Ironically, in the face of subaltern
reservations about narrativising history,
Chatterjee, himself a prominent exponent,
provides a narrative that connects causal
analysis, motivation, growth and expan-
sion, and loss of momentum with elegant
mastery of the material. This enables and
encourages the reader to examine the
contribution of the school more critically
than Chatterjee in his candid reappraisal
with the benefit of hindsight does.
To begin with, the account obscures the
primordial ties of the movement with
september 29, 2012
Marxism, which it later shrugged off.
Ranajit Guha, a leader of the students’
wing of the Communist Party of India, had
not disowned his links with Marxism when
he authored the penetrating discursive
study of the “Permanent Settlement” of
land tenure imposed by the colonial autho-
rities in the light of their notion of property,
sanctioning two centuries of ruthless
exploitation of the Indian peasantry. At
that time, while communism was a power-
ful political ideology, and with Kosambi’s
Marxism it had begun to provide fruitful
intellectual stimulus to the social sciences,
it was hardly a force in the academy. There
is hardly any doubt that the original im-
pulse behind the school was a passionate
identification with the oppressed masses
(see “Chandra’s Death” in A Subaltern
Studies Reader, edited by Ranajit Guha,
Macmillan India, Calcutta, 1997) from a
leftist point of view, anchored in a general
project of human liberation.
However, within a decade, perhaps
already at odds with a domineering and
blind party orthodoxy, the movement
became known for its resistance to the
Marxist viewpoint and it seemed keen to
liberate the study of “subaltern classes” of
India from the perspective of the educated,
middle-class Marxist leadership. While
in Gramsci the term “subaltern” was never
detached from the perspective of a struggle
for social transformation, the Subaltern
school of India gained a reputation for its
determined endeavour to rescue history
from the Marxist framework. Marxist
orthodoxy in India had many limitations
and it could straitjacket complex historical
vol xlviI no 39 EPW Economic & Political Weekly

phenomena, but the Subaltern school
abandoned Marxist premises instead of
trying to enrich and expand its scope. The
result has been, in our humble opinion,
mutual loss. E P Thompson’s The Making
of the English Working Class remains a
Marxist classic in spite of or rather because
of its departure from the dogmatic party-
line, and hence it continues to be a serious
contribution to the project of emancipa-
tion. What has been the function of this
school in the broader class-struggle?
It appears to divert our attention from
that historic struggle by overlooking or
questioning the transformative impact
of temporal development and focusing
more on the spatial features of historical
phenomena. Ranajit Guha’s pioneering
study in the structure of insurgent peasant
consciousness as manifest in the tribal hul
(uprising) in Chhota Nagpur against colo-
nial rule constructs it as a stable compo-
sition of elements unaffected by time.
There is no reference to the impact of the
Church’s teaching on the leadership by
giving their thinking a millennial orien-
tation. It cannot be regarded as a cameo
frozen in time. Neither is tribal expropria-
tion conceived as a feature of an aggres-
sive colonial programme of systematic
plunder of natural resources and exten-
sion of an alien idea of landownership to
the Indian tribal territory. Emphasis on
this angle would have helped bring tribal
rebellion within the common struggle of
the oppressed people of India against
semi-feudal colonial rule with the latter
as hegemonic force, and forced on the
Communist leadership the necessity of
addressing the tribal question as some-
thing as important as rural semi-feudalism.
Instead, the book practically isolates the
tribal (peasant?) question from the his-
toric evolution of an agenda for national
liberation. It blazed a trail for searching
out other elements of peasant culture like
folklore, role of rumour, local cults and
traditions and so on, which turned the
peasant rebellion into a unique amoeba-
like phenomenon with definable if mer-
curial shape under the microscope. The
earlier crude but less exotic idea of tribal
and peasant revolts as rudimentary
beginnings of the struggle of the Indian
masses for national liberation was
dismissed as an alien imposition of an
Economic & Political Weekly EPW september 29, 2012
educated middle-class outlook upon a
struggle that had nothing to do with it.
Chauri Chaura
The gap between the nationalist middle-
class ideology and the “authentic” peas-
ant mind was documented with extra-
ordinary strenuousness by Shahid Amin in
his retrospective account of the conflict-
ed Chauri Chaura incident (see Guha, op.
cit). He offers a detailed and painstaking
description of his visit to Chauri Chaura,
where the peasants had once turned violent
in flat contradiction to Gandhi’s motto of
non-violent non-co-operation, locked up
eight policemen in a room and burned
them alive, forcing Gandhi to call off the
movement which according to a British
official document quoted by Rajani
Palme Dutt, had thrown the British gov-
ernment into a panic. Amin finds the in-
cident bizarrely commemorated by gov-
ernment in a monument inscribed with
the martyrology of the independence
movement, whereas Gandhi had regard-
ed it as a national disgrace.
Among the peasants he finds that the
memory of the event had not retained
any original lineaments but had been
tainted by subsequent interests and atti-
tudes brought about by the course of
events. For example, there were com-
plaints among descendants and survi-
vors of not receiving due financial com-
pensation after independence from the
government for the death by hanging to
which several members of the rebel
peasant bands had been sentenced. And
a collaborating small landlord, who
helped the British authorities hunt down
the leading elements in the attack on the
police station and the moneylenders, is
remembered as a hero for having saved
the peasants in his own zamindari from
trouble with this service! Thus the al-
leged “structure” of peasant conscious-
ness, contrary to subaltern convictions,
presumably shared by Amin, turns out to
be dependent on ideas and values im-
planted by both ruling-class influence
and modern mercenary motives. Liber-
ated history becomes black comedy.
Subaltern history thus becomes an
amalgam of sheer empiricism and ab-
stract theory. One does not know what
E P Thompson would have made of it.
vol xlviI no 39
DISCUSSION
Chatterjee rightly calls it “eclectic”, but
all the eclecticism is directed towards
one goal, purging history of all traces of
man’s endeavour to shape his own desti-
ny in the light of his knowledge of the past
and vision of the future, dialectically
linked. Doubtless, subaltern “resistance”
to domination is documented in prolific
detail, but it never amounts to class
struggle, as “class” is a peripheral concept
in the events perceived and narrated by
historians of the school. It is true that
castes, ethnic groups and women do not
constitute classes, and identity-politics
has been the response of sections of such
groups to domination. But to construct
their history apart from objective class
conditions is to push the latter to the
margins and help prevent the emergence
(or the “making”) of class-consciousness.
At this point the Marxist distinction be-
tween class-in-itself and class-for-itself
may legitimately be invoked, for true lib-
eration implies basic change in the over-
all social structure and ideology. And, so
far as I have seen, subaltern discursive
practices cannot entirely eliminate ripples
created by the groundswell of class con-
flict. It is also arguable that such intellec-
tual support to the exclusivism (difference)
of identity politics has fortified ideolo-
gical barriers to class consciousness.
Guha, as quoted by Chatterjee, allu-
des to the moment of the emergence of
the school as that of “the explosive dis-
content” triggered by both the disillu-
sionment of the older generation (of the
middle class?) and frustration of those
born after Independence with the nation
state succeeding the colonial rule in
India. There is also a vague reference to
overdetermination by “global temporali-
ties” that acted as a midwife to its birth.
If that actually includes the enthusiasm
for Vietnam, at that time epitomising the
strength of national liberation movements
all over the world against imperialism
under communist leadership, then a closer,
more critical look at the character of the
Indian nation state was quite in order.
Presumably that is not what the founders
did, or if they did, it was in the light of
the new abstract opposition to the nation
state tout court. Chatterjee uses the vocab-
ulary of liberal democracy instead: “Fol-
lowing Emergency we were thoroughly
75
DISCUSSION
convinced that the political order in India
lacked foundation in popular consent and
that the façade of electoral democracy
would be thrown aside once more should
it become convenient again for the Rulers.”
The proofs adduced were the insurgencies
in Assam and Punjab and the responses
of the state to them. Now who are these
rulers? Whom do they represent? A class
analysis was called for and ignored.
The state against which Chatterjee
fulminates, which has such autocratic
and irresistible power, is now supposed
to be making inroads among the people at
large, even among insurgency-infested
regions, from the 1990s onwards, the
time of dissolution of the school. At the
same time corporate capital is perceived
as penetrating and bringing under its
power civil society. What is such a for-
mulation supposed to suggest? That the
state is separate from corporate capital,
an evil powered by its own steam? That
“civil society” in alliance with corporate
capital opposes the autocratic state?
Reductio ad Absurdum
This weaves seamlessly with the declara-
tion that the image of rebel peasant, so far
propped up with so many qualifications
and additions in the face of incessant
criticism, is now obsolete. Colonialism has
been replaced by the “postcolonial state”.
Subsequent developments have given rise
to “the contemporary Indian peasant” who
“would have to be understood within a
new framework of democratic citizenship”,
however problematic both democracy
and citizenship turn out to be today. This
citizenship is different from both the in-
dependent mass-subjectivity of the colo-
nial peasantry and the bourgeois individu-
alised citizen of western liberal democracy.
There is to be a “paradigm shift”. Fine. But
if mass struggle by peasantry is no longer
an option, since the mass subjective con-
sciousness has vanished, are the lakhs of
peasants who had committed suicide in
the last few years to be seen as engaged in
some new type of civic struggle of which
the western liberal citizen is incapable?
I am not happy to caricature the views of
a scholar from whom we all have learnt
quite a lot. Yet this reductio ad absurdum
demonstrates the impossible mess of
contradictions with which he has wrapped
76
himself up by resolutely turning away
from familiar and despised formulations.
Our postcolonial fate is to suffer or en-
joy “hybridity”, irrespective of class, ac-
cording to Chatterjee. As far back as
1989, Dipesh Chakrabarty, another lead-
ing light of the movement now on the ebb,
had forcefully demonstrated “the truth
that the time of colonial and postcolonial
modernity was heterogeneous, that its
practices were hybrid, and the archaic was
in many significant ways, constitutive of
the modern”. Chakrabarty had shown
that “in spite of strenuous efforts of or-
ganisers (of Communist trade unions) to
instil in them the modern habits of class
consciousness, workers in the city ap-
parently never quite stopped behaving
and thinking like peasants”. One would
have thought that the strength of semi-
feudal social relations, reiterated by
Marxists endlessly, would have ex-
plained this adequately. The important
thing to recognise is not the coexistence
of two historical times incommensurate
with each other but that many successful
industrial strikes where workers over-
came those traditions to show remarkable
solidarity took place. But that will of
course not be conceded by the votaries
of the new creed.
Chatterjee finds convincing fresh evi-
dence of persistence of hybridity in the
fact that statuettes of Hindu gods and
goddesses industrially mass-produced in
China are reverently installed in trucks and
buses by drivers and vehicle-owners in a
striking confirmation of commingling of
archaic sensibility and modern technology.
In a country where nuclear reactors are
inaugurated with breaking of coconuts
and bhumi-pujan, this is hardly sensational
stuff. But is there any lack of evidence
that modern working-class consciousness
in the industrial west does not necessarily
exclude adherence to traditional vestigial
faith? Nor does it rule out, given proper
leadership, industrial action of the highest
class solidarity and commitment. Is it dif-
ficult to find similar instances in the histo-
ry of the Indian working class? Is it not also
true that unless maintained by dedicated
and vigilant leadership, proletarian con-
sciousness and morale are subject to cor-
ruption and decay? No amount of intel-
lectual subtlety can be a substitute for it.
september 29, 2012
The theorisation of new space for
political activity in the hybrid democracy
has been brought about by a “paradigm
shift”. Of course conflict and contradiction
have not been ruled out of this new ensem-
ble. Perhaps because postmodernism does
not allow an unclouded harmony while it
frowns on any expectation of overcoming
them through class struggle. Hence we
would have the “sovereignty” of the state
perpetually challenged by ethnic, regional
and other kinds of insurgencies at the grass
roots. On the other hand, and at the same
time, the new farming citizens develop a
stake in the state insofar as they expect
from it supply of electricity to their houses
and water to their fields, access to improved
communications, public health, schooling,
and employment in public works. The
state, without shedding its autocratic coer-
cive powers, demands allegiance to it in
return. Thus the new ensemble turns out to
be some sort of a Foucauldian construct
with an interminable play of “Power and
Resistance”, which learned scholars can
observe and analyse in Olympian detach-
ment. Since imperialism is also obsolete,
the role of western states with their une-
qual terms and conditions of freedom of
capital and trade, enforced with indirect
pressure as well as naked use of force and
intimidation upon the rest of the world (a
game some of their Asian playmates have
learnt too well), ruthlessly sucking out the
natural resources and labour power that
could have sustained millions of lives in
reasonable comfort now plunged in misery,
disease and famine, remains a closed chap-
ter, “the other” of this narrative.
It cannot be denied that the orthodox
Marxist neglect of the relative autonomy
of the state, which is as old as civilisation,
with its proliferating bureaucracy and re-
pressive forces and laws, had resulted
most unfortunately in the corruption of so-
cialism by excesses of its own unregulated
state. It has got to plead guilty to a theo-
retical default of grave dimension. But at
least there is avowal in the canonical texts
of a clear intention to eventually free man-
kind of its shackles, provided conditions
for that are purposefully created. The epi-
logue to the subaltern story, for its adven-
tures were not totally without significance,
might well be a sadder and wiser return to
the beginnings.
vol xlviI no 39 EPW Economic & Political Weekly
PERSPECTIVES
The Sino-Indian Border Dispute
Overcoming Nationalist Myopia
H Srikanth
The nationalist elite has projected
India’s defeat in the Sino-Indian
war of 1962 as the country being
a victim of Chinese aggression.
Nationalist hysteria that preceded
and followed the war did not
allow a dispassionate reflection
on India’s stand on the border
dispute. It is only recently that
people have started listening
to the other side of the story.
Stressing the need to continue a
dialogue, this essay argues that
only a give-and-take policy will
put an end to the vexed dispute
between India and China.
The first draft of this article was presented
at the national seminar on “Voices from the
Border: India’s Response to Chinese Claims
over Arunachal Pradesh”, organised
by ICSSR-NERC at the Rajiv Gandhi
University in Itanagar, Arunachal Pradesh
on 8-9 March 2012.
H Srikanth (hskant@gmail.com) teaches at the
department of political science of
North-Eastern Hill University, Shillong.
38
Introduction
M
ost border disputes that post-
colonial states experienced have
their roots in the omissions
and commissions of colonial rule.1 The
urge to expand and protect the frontiers
of their empire forced the colonial rulers
to draw and redraw the boundaries of
their colonies and at times the fear of ex-
pansion by enemy forces forced them to
create buffer zones. Taking advantage of
the weakness of native rulers/peoples, the
colonial powers often compelled neigh-
bouring countries to accept border pro-
posals that are not in their interest. The
linear demarcation of the borders by the
colonisers ignored the traditional bound-
aries of native communities and king-
doms. Since the concerns of the people
inhabiting border areas were never
deemed important by officials, the natives
were never consulted when decisions
were taken to determine the borders.
The anti-colonial national liberation
struggles should have exposed imperialist
interests and manipulations and united
the new independent states to take a fresh
look at their boundaries without colonial
concerns clouding their minds and ac-
tions. Unfortunately, however, even after
decolonisation, international boundaries
determined by the colonial powers in their
own interests are still fuelling border
disputes among the postcolonial nation
states and affecting friendly relations
between the people on either side. The
unfortunate Sino-India war of 1962 and
the unresolved border dispute between the
two countries demonstrates that imperi-
al thinking still manages to sway public
opinion in decolonised nation states.
Limits of Nationalist Perceptions
Historically, nationalism is a progressive
force as long as it is fighting feudalism
and colonialism. However, once a nation
september 29, 2012
state becomes a reality, nationalism can
become a tool in the hands of reaction-
aries to mislead and manipulate the citi-
zens into serving the interests of certain
privileged classes or groups of people.2 If
one remains only a nationalist, he or she
can never see the mistakes and limita-
tions of his or her own country and
blindly support whatever the ruling elite
thinks and does in the name of the
“motherland”. This is true of both capi-
talist and socialist nations. If citizens are
blinded by jingoism and chauvinism, even
fellow travellers can appear as enemies.
In the world of nation states that we live
in, being a true internationalist is not an
easy task. Nevertheless, one should at
least learn to take a critical look at what
is advocated or justified in the name of
the nation and the national interest. Un-
less one learns to question nationalism
itself, it is difficult to understand the
stand of nations that are viewed as ene-
mies or competitors.
In India, the elite consensus coupled
with effective media management has
led citizens to believe that India was an
innocent victim of Chinese aggression in
1962 and that China has occupied thou-
sands of square miles of territory that le-
gitimately belongs to India. Indeed, poli-
ticians, military officials, journalists and
scholars in India have said and written
as much along these lines.3 While many
intellectuals in universities and research
organisations in India passively and se-
lectively quote these and foreign sources
to make the case for India, or against
China, very few have dared to question
the basis on which India’s territorial
claims against China rest.
What most Indians believe is that the
Sino-Indian border was not drawn by
Indians in consultation with its neigh-
bours; it was conceived and proposed by
the British in their own interest. In fact,
there was no Indian representative at
any of the talks or discussions that took
place between British India, Tibet and
China; yet the people who fought against
colonial rule and won independence from
the British uncritically accept the bor-
ders drawn by them as sacrosanct. It is
now a well-known fact that China never
vol xlviI no 39 EPW Economic & Political Weekly

ratified the Shimla Agreement of 1914
and that the British officials attempted
to incorporate the McMahon Line as the
border between Tibet and India without
China’s knowledge.4 It is strange that
India, which like many other states in
the world recognises Tibet as an integral
part of China, considers the McMahon
Line as inviolable, knowing very well
that China has never recognised the line
as its border with India.
In the western sector too, India’s
claims over Aksai Chin are based on
W H Johnson’s map. Imaginary historical
evidence makes little sense in international
law and the argument that India has been
in possession of this territory from time
immemorial5 holds no water since India
as a nation state is of recent origin. Of
course, India did exist as a civilisational
entity for centuries but the “cultural
borders” of Indian civilisation need not
coincide with the borders of the modern
Indian nation state. If Aksai Chin and
the Thag La Ridge areas are claimed as a
part of Indian territory based only on
what Hindu scriptures say,6 then India
could well claim many areas in Pakistan
and Afghanistan. Indeed, going by that
logic, India should give up some of its
territory in the north-east since it was never
a part of the so-called Indian civilisation.
What the colonial rulers did or what Hindu
scriptures and folklore say cannot be a
rational basis for territorial claims.
Perceptions and Truth
Partly because of relentless nationalist and
imperialist propaganda and partly due
to the legal or informal ban on informa-
tion that contradicts nationalist assump-
tions, common citizens believe that China
mounted an unprovoked attack on India.
However, readers can now access the
writings of eminent scholars like Bertrand
Russell, Neville Maxwell, Steven A Hoff-
man, Karunakar Gupta, A G Noorani,
etc, that question India’s territorial claims
and that argue that war became inevita-
ble partly because of India’s adventurist
Forward Policy and its refusal to negoti-
ate with China.7
Presenting China’s version, John W
Garver has argued that China’s action was
prompted by two sets of perceptions:
first, the feeling that India was trying to
Economic & Political Weekly EPW september 29, 2012
undermine China’s control over Tibet, and,
second, that India needs to be punished
for eyeing Chinese territory.8 Without
heeding China’s protests, India went ahead
creating posts north of the McMahon
Line, wrongly claiming that its boundary
extend up to the Thag La Ridge. Scholarly
accounts like Himalayan Blunder: The
Curtain Raiser to the Sino-Indian War of
1962 by brigadier J P Dalvi (retd) and
The Guilty Men of 1962 by D R Mankekar
reveal how junior officials in the Ministry
of Defence issued orders to the Indian
Army to set up military posts (such as
the Khinzamene and Dhola posts) north
of the McMahon Line although military
officials operating on the ground did not
favour such action.9 However, India not
only insisted that the McMahon Line
was its border with China, it also unilat-
erally decided which areas came within
its purview. India turned down China’s
repeated requests for negotiations and
ignored its threats of retributions.10 Based
on the assumption that China would never
go for a large-scale attack, the Indian
establishment in Delhi decided to carry on
its Forward Policy code-named Operation
Leghorn. Finally, Nehru’s much publicised
comments at Delhi airport on 12 October
1962 wherein he stated that the govern-
ment had given orders to the Indian Army
to evict the Chinese intruders from “our
territory” made China believe that it could
teach India a lesson only through war.
The Chinese invasion in 1962 gave India
and the imperialist forces an opportunity
to project it as aggression. However, they
had no convincing answers as to why
China unilaterally declared a ceasefire
after the People’s Liberation Army (PLA)
had advanced almost up to Tezpur in
Assam and withdrew its forces to north
of the McMahon Line.11 Given that China
never accepted the McMahon Line as its
boundary, what would have prevented
it from retaining Tawang and other parts
of Arunachal Pradesh that it had occupied?
The manner in which the Chinese army
treated the people of North-East Frontier
Agency and prisoners of war (POWs) in
the 1962 war shows China only wanted
to halt the advancing Indian Army from
setting up posts north of the McMahon
Line and to let India know that its warn-
ings should not be taken lightly.
vol xlviI no 39
PERSPECTIVES
Reflecting on the events, brig J P Dalvi,
whose nationalist credentials are unim-
peachable, remarked: “The Chinese in
1962 had prepared both for war and for
talks, if India appreciated the futility of
fighting for her rights. India was prepared
neither for fighting nor for talking”.12
Records show that throughout this period
India’s Forward Policy was premised on
the assumption that the Chinese would
not retaliate but when the “swift and
massive retribution” started, it came as a
surprise/shock even to an officer like
general B M Kaul who reportedly cried:
“Oh my God! You are right, they mean
business”.13
War or Negotiations?
India’s experience of the 1962 indicates
that war cannot resolve the border dis-
pute. It is true that after the 1962 war,
India has diverted much of its meagre re-
sources to substantially increase its mil-
itary capabilities over the decades. How-
ever, during this period China too has
emerged as a strong military force in the
world. More worrisome for India should
be the fact that after Mao, China has
drifted from socialist ideals and has virtu-
ally become a capitalist power. In the post-
Deng era China has embarked on the
capitalist path of development under the
guise of a socialist market economy and
is whipping up nationalist feelings to seek
legitimacy.14 Given the change in the class
character of the China’s political elite, to
what extent will it go in the event of an-
other war is something that cannot be
predicted at this stage. On their part, the
imperialist forces are ever ready to take
advantage of another Sino-India war.
Another war between India and China
would be more brutal and devastating.
In 1962, the socialist regime in China
ensured that the people living along the
borders were not affected adversely;
that cannot be ensured now. Irrespective
of which nation ultimately wins or loses,
the people of Arunachal Pradesh will be
the first and worst sufferers. Therefore,
the most sensible alternative for India is
to continue to engage China in a mean-
ingful, rational and reasonable dialogue.
As a result of the decades of systemic
campaign against China, most people
in India think China is aggressive and
39
PERSPECTIVES
expansionist. What China would become
in the future is nobody’s guess, but if one
looks at China’s record so far, it is clear
that it has been fair in its dealings with
its 12 neighbouring countries with whom
it shares its border. Neville Maxwell,
who has studied China’s border policy,
shows that barring the brief rift with the
Soviet Union and Vietnam, China has
negotiated its borders with all its other
neighbours on the basis of Zhou Enlai’s
border policy enunciated at the Bandung
Conference of 1956.15
While negotiating with its neighbours,
China has thus far never claimed suze-
rainty over all territories over which its
precolonial rulers held sway. It advocates
the need for mutually beneficial negoti-
ated settlements of all border disputes.
Smaller nations like Pakistan, Nepal,
Myanmar, Mongolia, etc, have negotiated
borders with China without much diffi-
culty. Hence, there is no reason to assume
that Beijing would be averse to a meaning-
ful dialogue with New Delhi unless India
becomes sufficiently powerful enough to
enforce its will over China. However,
negotiations will not move forward an
inch if India sticks to its pre-1962 posi-
tion since neither the McMahon Line nor
Johnson’s Map can be the bases for talks.
It is humiliating for the people of both
India and China who have fought against
colonialism and feudalism to base their
negotiations on what the colonisers did
in their own interest. Negotiations should
take into consideration history, geo-
graphical realities, present administrative,
economic and other activities in the region
besides religion, custom, language and
such other issues that evoke deep-rooted
sentiments and emotions. While present-
ing their case, both parties should be re-
ceptive to the arguments, sentiments
and strategic concerns of the other.
India is not the only country that has a
sentimental attachment to the Hima-
laya. India does not need to cite the Mc-
Mahon Line to argue its case for Aru-
nachal Pradesh; the fact that the people
of the state have since Independence re-
mained a part of India, voluntarily asso-
ciated and identified themselves with
the Indian Union and demonstrated
their allegiance to India by participating
in national political processes is enough
40
to argue that Arunachal Pradesh is a
part of the India nation state. The exact
border alignment between Arunachal
Pradesh and China can be decided after
joint surveys and consultations.
Similarly, India needs to recognise the
ground reality that Aksai Chin remains
under China’s control and that geo-
graphically and economically the region
makes little sense to India.16 Earlier,
China dropped the hint that it would
recognise the McMahon Line in return
for India giving up its claims over Aksai
Chin. Scholars like John Lall also feel
this is a better option open to India.17
Despite the changes that have taken
place in China, the regime in Beijing
may still be open to the idea.
If it becomes necessary to appease na-
tionalist sentiments on either side, some
uninhabited parts of India along the
eastern front can be given to China which,
in turn, could reciprocate by ceding
some territory to India on the western
front. It is true that India, which had
whipped up national sentiments on the
issue of Aksai Chin, may find it difficult
to change its position given the manner
in which parliamentary politics work;
however, the task is not impossible.
When India has shown willingness to
give up “Azad Kashmir” and accept the
Line of Control as the border between
India and Pakistan, there is no reason
why it cannot give up its claim over geo-
graphically inaccessible, economically
unviable and sparsely populated Aksai
Chin and demand in return that China
relinquishes its claims over Arunachal
Pradesh. The aspirations of the millions
of people in Arunachal Pradesh are more
important to India than securing control
over Aksai Chin. Fortunately, there are
quite a few sensible political representa-
tives, military officials and diplomats in
India who silently endorse such a give-
and-take approach.18 If India achieves
political consensus on this issue, there is
a likelihood of resolving the vexed border
dispute between the two Asian giants
once for all.
Conclusions
Given the daily tensions along the bor-
ders, it is necessary for both India and
China to resolve the border dispute as
september 29, 2012
early as possible. As long as the dispute
persists, the reactionary ruling elite would
not be averse to whipping up national
sentiments, creating a war psychosis,
and diverting scarce national resources
to meet defence needs and distract the
people’s attention from more significant
domestic problems and crises. It is time
people in both the countries realise that
war is not in their interest. They should
exert strong pressure on their govern-
ments to resolve the border dispute by
adopting a rational and reasonable ap-
proach. The hawks in both the countries
have to be restrained by encouraging
people-to-people contact and by build-
ing up strong peace movement in both
countries. It is time the people of India
and China jettisoned their colonial
baggage, gave up rigidities and looked
at the border problem from the view-
point of what would be in the best and
long-term interests of the people of
both countries.
Notes
1 Most territorial disputes in the world today are
between post-colonial states. That colonialism
has been the root cause of border disputes in
Asia, Africa and Latin America has been recog-
nised in the works of Amadife and Warhola
(1993), Okruhlik (1999), Kocs (1995), Ajala
(1983), Lamb (1968).
2 Elite manipulation of nationalism is discussed
in the works of Lenin (1971), Harman (1992),
Brass (1991), Hobsbawm and Ranger (1983),
Whitmeyer (2002).
3 Some of the works written from India’s official
point of view include Karnik (1963), Kaul (1967),
Mullick (1972), P B Sinha, et al (ed.) (1992) and
Dalal (1993).
4 Scholars like Maxwell (1972, 1999) and Gupta
(1974, 1980) have argued in their writings that
China was not consulted on McMahon Line and
that the objective of the Shimla Conference,
1914 was not to discuss McMahon Line. In one
of his articles, Maxwell writes, “Sir Henry
McMahon used the occasion (Shimla Confer-
ence of 1914) to arrange secret bilateral negoti-
ations in Delhi in March 1914 in which the
Tibetan representative was induced to accept
the desired new border line. …. That map was
not shown, of course, to the Chinese repre-
sentative at the conference. But McMahon
tricked him into initialing a different map, on
a very small scale, while, purporting to illus-
trate only a proposed division of Tibet into In-
ner and Outer zones, also incorporated
McMahon’s secretly drawn alignment.” See,
Maxwell (1999: 907).
5 Till 1959 even Jawaharlal Nehru admitted that
Aksai Chin was a disputed area. But it is said
that S Gopal, the then director of the historical
division of the Ministry of External Affairs,
Government of India, convinced Nehru with
“historical arguments” in support of India’s
claims over Kashmir and Aksai Chin. Later
other nationalist scholars also started using
“thousand years of Indian history” to justify
vol xlviI no 39 EPW Economic & Political Weekly

India’s claims. See Krishna Rao (1962). These
arguments are rubbished by scholars like
Maxwell (1972: 118-19) and Gupta (1980: 1270).
6 Addressing a public meeting in Agra on 10 No-
vember 1959, Nehru gave Hindu mythical twist
to the border issue, by stating that the Himala-
yas were the essence of India’s life and thought
for ages. Commenting on the event Taya
Zinkin, “The Prime Minister’s speech at Agra
was significant not for what he said but for the
way he said it. For the first time since the Chinese
started their pinprick machinegun technique
on Ladakh border, he spoke as a Hindu. He told
his audience that the Himalayas were India’s
‘Crown’ and he referred to the sacred nature of
these mountains which were woven into Indian
thought, as part of the life blood of Hinduism”
Quoted in Gupta (1980: 1270).
7 Some other critical works of the scholars other
than those mentioned thus far include, Gupta
(1974), Russell (1963), Noorani (1970 and 2011).
8 Officially India accepted Tibet as autonomous
part of China and discouraged any discussion
on it in the United Nations. Yet the asylum given
to Dalai Lama and official or unofficial encour-
agement given to the Tibetan rebels during the
1950s made China feel that India was trying to
weaken China’s control over China. For more
details on Chinese perceptions on India’s role in
Tibet, refer Garver (2010). His work is available
online at http://chinaindiaborderdispute.files.
wordpress.com/2010/07/garver.pdf, accessed on
12 March 2012.
9 Army and Assam Rifles officers on the ground,
like brigadier J P Dalvi, general Umrao Singh,
and major general Niranjan Prasad warned
against setting up posts north of McMahon Line.
But Delhi imposed the decision on the reluctant
officers. Questioning who actually instructed
them to create Dhola Post J P Dalvi writes, “the
Thagla-Dhola area was not strictly territory
that ‘we should have been convinced was ours’…
and someone is guilty of exceeding the limits
prescribed by him” Refer, Dalvi (2010: 136). For
other details on the Dhola controversy, see
also, Mankekar (1968).
10 For China’s official position on the 1962 war,
refer, Government of People’s Republic of China,
“The Sino-Indian Boundary Question, State-
ment of the Government of People’s Republic of
China”, Foreign Languages Press, Peking, 1962,
available online at http://www.marxists.org/
subject/india/sino-india-boundary-question/
ch01.htm; also Garver, China’s Decision for War
with India in 1962.
11 Appreciating China’s voluntary ceasefire and
withdrawal of forces, Bertrand Russell, author
of the book, Unarmed Victory, who tried to ne-
gotiate between India and China during the
war period, wrote, “I cannot think of any other
instance in which a victorious army has been
halted in this way by its own Government.”
Quoted in Ghosh (2002).
12 Dalvi (2010: 149).
13 Quoted in Noorani (1970).
14 That People’s Republic of China is no more a
socialist state is argued by many scholars like
Williams (2003), Hughes (2006), McInerney
(2008), Gore (2011), Wu and Lansdowne
(2009), etc.
15 For China’s border policy, refer Maxwell (2006)
and Hongyi (2009).
16 Even general Thimaiah and foreign secretary,
Dutt held that Aksai Chin was strategically not
important and logically not maintainable. To
quote him, “Even if the Chinese did not en-
croach into it, India could not make any use of
it. The boundary had not been demarcated and
had been shifted more than once by the British.
There was an old silk route [across it] which ...
the Chinese had only improved to make their
Economic & Political Weekly EPW september 29, 2012
road. It would be pointless to pick quarrels over
issues in which India had no means of enforcing
her claims” (quoted in Maxwell 1999: 910). See
also, Hoffman (1990: 76-77). Much later, in his
convocation address in JNU, K P S Menon, the
first foreign secretary openly stated that “it
cannot be forgotten that Aksai Chin is of no im-
portance to India, whereas, to China, it is of ut-
most importance, because it is the link be-
tween two historically troublesome regions,
Tibet and Sinkiang.” Quoted in Ghosh (2002).
17 For more information on Aksai Chin, refer
Lall (1989).
18 General (retd) J J Singh, who is presently the
governor of Arunachal Pradesh, has openly
advocated the need for give-and-take approach.
See, “Give and Take Necessary to Solve India-
China Border Dispute, Says Arunachal Governor
J J Singh”, India Today, 20 April 2012. The need
to give up rigid stand on borders was echoed in
the ICSSR-NERC sponsored national seminar
on “Voices from the Border: India’s Response to
China’s Claims over Arunachal Pradesh”, held
on 8-9 March 2012 in Itanagar.
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vol xlviI no 39
PERSPECTIVES
Karnik, V B, ed. (1963): China Invades India (Lon-
don: George Allen & Unwin).
Kaul, B M (1967): The Untold Story (Bombay: Allied
Publishers).
Kocs, Stephen A (1995): “Territorial Disputes and
Interstate War, 1945-1987”, The Journal of Poli-
tics, 57, 159-75.
Lall, John (1989): Aksai Chin and Sino-Indian Con-
flict (New Delhi: Allied Publishers Ltd).
Lamb, Alastair (1968): Asian Frontiers – Studies in a
Continuing Problem (London: Pall Mass Press).
Lenin, V I (1971 edn): The Right of Nations to Self
Determination: Critical Remarks on the Nation-
al Question and the Right of Nations to Self-de-
termination (Moscow: Progress Publishers).
Mankekar, D R (1968): The Guilty Men of 1962
(Bombay: The Tulshi Shah Enterprises).
Maxwell, Neville (1972): India’s China War (Lon-
don: Penguin Books).
– (1999): “Sino-Indian Border Dispute Reconsid-
ered”, Economic & Political Weekly, 34, 905-18.
– (2006): “Settlements and Disputes: China’s Ap-
proach to Territorial Issues”, Economic & Politi-
cal Weekly, 41, 9 September, 3873-81.
McInerney, Andy (2008): China: Revolution and
Counter Revolution (San Francisco: PSL Publi-
cations).
Mullick, B N (1972): My Years with Nehru: The Chi-
nese Betrayal (Bombay: Allied Publishers).
Noorani, A G (1970): “India’s Forward Policy”,
China Quarterly, 43, 36-141.
– (2011): India China Boundary Problem, 1846-
1947: History and Diplomacy (New Delhi: OUP).
Okruhlik, Gwenn and Patrick J Conge (1999): “The
Politics of Border Disputes: On the Arabian Pe-
ninsula’’, International Journal, 54 (Spring),
230-48.
Rao, Krishnam K (1962): “The Sino-Indian Bound-
ary Question and International Law”, Inter-
national and Comparative Law Quarterly, 11,
375-84.
Russell, Bertrand (1963): Unarmed Victory (New
York: Simon and Schuster).
Sinha, P B, A A Athale and S N Prasad, ed. (1992):
History of the Conflict with China, 1962 (New
Delhi: History Division, Ministry of Defence,
Government of India).
Whitemeyer, Joseph M (2002): ‘’Elites and Popular
Nationalism”, British Journal of Sociology, 53
(2), 321-41.
Williams, Susan (2003): Capitalism’s Brutal Come-
back in China (Seattle: Red Letter Press).
Wu, Guoguang and Helen Lansdowne, ed. (2009):
Socialist China, Capitalist China: Social Tension
and Political Adaptation under Economic Glo-
balisation (New York: Routledge).
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41

Violence against the Non-violent
Struggle of Koodankulam
S Senthalir
As the local protests against the
Koodankulam nuclear power
plant continue, the police brutally
attack the villagers and sedition
charges are foisted on women and
children as well.
S Senthalir (senthalir83@gmail.com) is a
Bangalore-based independent journalist who
has been in Idinthakarai during the most
recent wave of protests.
Economic & Political Weekly EPW september 29, 2012
O
n Monday, 17 September, 13-year-
old Stepin lay on her aunt’s lap
outside their house in Idintha-
karai near Koodankulam as her family
waited for her mother, who had been away
in Nagercoil for three days to claim her
husband’s body. Unable to come to terms
with her father’s death, Stepin swallows
every sip of water with great difficulty.
Fourty-two-year-old Sahayam Francis
fell unconscious with shock when the
coast guard flew one of its aircraft at a
very low altitude over the villages pro-
testing against the Koodankulam nuclear
power plant. He was shifted to a hospital
in Nagercoil where he was declared dead
on 13 September. His family and residents
of the village demand that the coast
guard be held responsible for his death.
“We watched in horror as the plane ap-
proached us. Sahayam was standing on
the shore. Terrified by the way the plane
came so close, he fell down. Initially, we
thought that he had just fallen uncon-
scious but it was too late. He had died of
shock”, cries his sister Chellamma.
Two people have lost their lives and
hundreds, including women and children,
injured in the police attack in the second
week of September. The latest phase of
vol xlviI no 39
COMMENTARY
the non-violent movement against the
nuclear power plant in Idinthakarai
completed 400 days on 18 September. This
village has not witnessed any festivities
in the past one year. Even the marriage
ceremonies that were scheduled for
September had to be postponed.
Idinthakarai, Kootampuli, Kuthenkuly,
Perumanal and Koodankulam have turned
into open-air jails. Cut off from the outside
world and without any transportation,
people are being crippled with no means
to reach hospitals, colleges or even to get
their daily provisions from Koodankulam,
which is 4 km from Idinthakarai.
All democratic means of resolving the
issue have been cast aside. The govern-
ment has preferred to use the police,
paramilitary and the coast guard over
dialogue to deal with the protest of
unarmed civilians in all ways possible
through land, air and water. Inside the
village, policemen went a step further to
hurt people’s sentiments and provoke them
by desecrating the statue of Mother Mary
in St Lourdes Matha Church, which has
been the epicentre of the protests.
The demands of the people to discuss
issues on commissioning the nuclear plant
were not heeded by either the government
or the Nuclear Power Corporation of
India Limited (NPCIL) officials. When the
ultimatum given by the people was not
considered, the villagers went on to
peacefully lay siege to the nuclear plant
on 9 September.
When more than 5,000 people appro-
ached the nuclear plant on 10 September,
13
COMMENTARY
the police warned them to leave the
place in five minutes or face the conse-
quences. “After the Madras High Court
gave the go-ahead to load uranium in
reactors, we requested a dialogue with
the government and NPCIL officials to
resolve the dispute. But none of them
were willing to. Hence, we decided to go
ahead and lay siege to the plant”, said
Peter Milton, one of the leaders spear-
heading the anti-nuclear struggle here.
Even as the district collector was talk-
ing to the people, the police charged the
protestors with lathis and fired tear gas
at 11 am on 11 September. No one was
spared the lathi or tear gas. The tear gas
shells burnt the skin of hundreds of
protesters – from children to elderly
women in Idinthakarai.
A tear gas shell directly hit 43-year-old
Selsan. “A few minutes after the protest
began, a tear gas shell was thrown
towards me. The shell burst as it hit me,
burning the skin and peeling it off. I was
admitted to a private hospital in Nagercoil
and could not talk for over two days.
The doctors have told me that the stitches
would be removed after 10 days. My
medical expenses have come to Rs 60,000
so far”, he said.
Hundreds of women and children
exposed to the tear gas have burn injuries
and boils on the lips and even inside
their mouths. Covering her wounds with
a shawl, 15-year-old Sobhana R says that
she has not taken first-aid fearing arrest.
None of them except those who were
grievously injured in the attack got
themselves treated at hospitals. “We
have to travel 38 km to Nagercoil to go
to a hospital. There are no hospitals
close by except for the public health cen-
tres which do not have medicines for
such injuries. But we are scared to move
out of our village fearing arrest,” says
50-year old Rani (name changed).
Even young girls were not spared the
police attack. Seventeen-year-old Nikhi-
ta B from Tsunami Colony, which is just
half a kilometre from Idinthakarai, was
beaten up by the police. “Wielding lathis,
the police hit me warning that this was
not the age to protest,” she said. Residents
of Tsunami Colony alleged that the po-
lice ransacked their houses. “They have
broken the doors, destroyed household
14
articles and even stole money. If the
police behave like this, whom should we
seek protection from?” asked 36-year-
old Anitha. The protest venue has now
become the shelter for hundreds of peo-
ple here. Hailing from Tsunami Colony,
which was worst hit during the police
excess, Nikhita says: “We are scared to
stay in our homes after the police at-
tacked us. We spend the night at St Lour-
des Matha Church and get back to our
house around 3 am to take a bath and
leave before sunrise to the church.”
Sedition Cases on Children
Four boys between 15 and 16 were arres-
ted and charges of sedition and attempt
to murder have been slapped against
them. Media reports state that two
from Koodankulam, and one each from
Vairaavikinaru and Idinthakarai have
been lodged in the juvenile home
near Tirunelveli.
Against the protestors, the Koodankulam
police have registered Section 147 (rioting),
148 (rioting with deadly weapon), 353
(assault or criminal force to deter public
servant from discharge of his duty), 121(A)
(conspiring to overawe, by means of
criminal force or the show of criminal
force, the central government or any state
government), 395 (dacoity), 307 (attempt
to murder) r/w 149 IPC (unlawful assem-
bly) and Section 3 of TNPPDL Act (Tamil
Nadu Public Property Damage Act)
(causing damage to public property),
431 (damaging road, bridge, river,
channel, etc).
It is the children from Koodankulam
who have been booked under Sections 147,
148, 353, 121, 124, 129(b) (sings, recites or
utters any obscene song, ballad or words,
in or near any public place), 307 IPC r/w
149 IOC and Section 4 of Endangered
Species Act and Section 3 of TNPPDL Act.
Further, nearly 62 people, most of
them from Koodankulam, were arrested
during the protest on 10 September. The
protest extending for over a year now
does not seem to reduce despite the po-
lice atrocities. This is the fourth time
they are laying siege to the plant. They
have been on relay fast several times
since the protest began last year. It is not
just the Idinthakarai village with a pop-
ulation of more than 12,000 which is
september 29, 2012
protesting against the commissioning of
the Koodankulam plant; more than 500
villages across the coastal districts have
joined the struggle.
It has been nearly a week since the
fishermen in Idinthakarai and the neigh-
bouring villages and from the east coast
of Kanyakumari district ventured into
the sea for fishing, affecting the livelihood
of the fishermen.
On the other hand, the fishermen
from 16 coastal villages have thronged
Alankara Ubakara Matha church in Kan-
yakumari to observe a fast expressing
their solidarity with the anti-Koodankulam
struggle. Till date, no major political
party in Tamil Nadu has visited this place
to listen to the protestors despite the
people adapting democratic means to
express their grievances.
The people await the government’s
action to break this impasse and restore
normal life in their villages. But no effort
has been initiated by the Tamil Nadu
government to talk to the people or allay
their fears. None of the concerned min-
isters or the expert committee appointed
by the government to look into the safety
aspects of the plant have approached the
people here and bothered to visit the
place where the people have been pro-
testing for more than one year; carrying
out relay fasts, burying themselves neck-
deep in sand near the graveyards and
engaging in a jal satyagraha. The govern-
ment has instead sent police to terrorise
them. Vidudalai Chiruthai (Dalit Panthers)
leader Thol Thirumavalavan who visited
Idinthakarai on 15 September termed
the government’s action as state terror-
ism and the death of Anthony John, the
fisherman who died in police firing, as a
“terrorised murder”. “The village has lost
Sahayam Francis and the government is
even refusing to record his death. No-
where in the world has any such protest
extending for over a year taken place in
a non-violent manner,” he said.
The Constitution guarantees the right
to assemble peacefully and without arms
according to Article 19(1)(b). In lieu of
protecting the life and liberty of the citi-
zens as guaranteed in Article 21 of the
Constitution, the state has unleashed
terror by attacking unarmed citizens.
Police shot dead 47-year-old Anthony
vol xlviI no 39 EPW Economic & Political Weekly

John in Manapadu, a coastal village in
Thoothukudi and Sahayam died of
shock in Idinthakarai during the protest.
Article 21 of the Constitution provides
that no person shall be deprived of life
or personal liberty except according to a
Economic & Political Weekly EPW september 29, 2012
procedure established by law. Here too,
the state has acted against the principles
of the Constitution and failed to protect
the rights of the citizens.
Why did the government use force on
unarmed women and children? What
vol xlviI no 39
COMMENTARY
was the need to terrorise them? Why did
the police arrest four children and slap
serious charges on them? Is this the way
to respond to the democratic voices of
people who continue to raise their de-
mands in a non-violent way?
15
COMMENTARY
Coalgate: A Skewed Debate
V Krishna Ananth
The debate on allocating or
auctioning of coal blocks skirts
the central issue of the efficacy
and desirability of allowing
exploitation of natural resources
by private players. The current
policy which was framed in
the mid-1990s goes against the
spirit of Article 39(b) of the
Constitution which holds that
the ownership and control of
the material resources of
the community are so distributed
as best to subserve the
common good.
V Krishna Ananth (krishnananth@gmail.
com) teaches at the department of journalism
and mass communication, Sikkim University,
Gangtok.
22
T
he current debate involving the
allocation of coal blocks to pri-
vate operators and the presump-
tion of loss in that process glosses over
some important aspects that should be
central to it. While the opposition en-
dorses the Comptroller and Auditor
General’s (CAG) conclusion of a certain
loss to the exchequer due to allocations
done without taking the auction route,
the government, making a virtue of its
commitment to industrial progress and
on the idea of federalism, argues that
the purpose would have been defeated if
it had waited for legislative approval to
ensure auction.
It is indeed a tragedy that the two sides
– as well as those who claim to be on nei-
ther of the two – have skirted the central
issue, viz, the efficacy and desirability of
throwing open exploitation of natural re-
sources by private players. In other words,
the danger of palming off natural resour-
ces, coal in this case, even if it fetches
more money for the state, is lost sight of.
Those who argue this way seem oblivious
of the fact that auctions too can be rigged
by cartels that operate in this sector.
At the outset it may be appropriate to
state that the office of the CAG could not
have dealt with this aspect since the
decision to permit coal mining by private
players is a matter of policy – the CAG has
no business to comment on this. The Coal
Mines (Nationalisation) Act, 1973 as
amended and passed by Parliament in
June 1993 allows Indian companies enga-
ged in power generation, in addition to
october 6, 2012
iron and steel producers, to carry on coal
mining for their captive use. It also allows
washing of coal obtained from a mine at
the pithead. Further, by an enabling pro-
vision contained in the Act, production of
cement was notified as an end use for
mining of coal with effect from 15 March
1996. Thus, as per the existing law, min-
ing of coal by Indian private companies is
allowed for their captive use in iron and
steel production, power generation and
cement production.
Ambedkar’s View
It will make ample sense at this point to
recall the substantial issues that were
raised in the Constituent Assembly, viz,
pressing for a categorical clause in the
Constitution against privatisation of mines
and such other national resources at any
point in the future. B R Ambedkar sub-
mitted a note as early as 24 March 1947
where he stressed the need to render
social, political and economic rights
enforceable and the importance of the
Directive Principles towards achieving
that end. In that note he said:
So far the plan has been considered purely as
a means of safeguarding individual liberty.
But there is also another aspect of the plan
which is worthy of note. It is an attempt to
establish State Socialism without abrogating
parliamentary democracy and without leav-
ing its establishment to the will of a parlia-
mentary democracy…Those who want the
economic structure of society to be modelled
on State Socialism must realise that they
cannot leave the fulfilment of so fundamen-
tal a purpose to the exigencies of ordinary
law which simple majorities – whose politi-
cal fortunes are never determined by ra-
tional causes – have a right to make and
unmake…The way out seems to be to retain
Parliamentary democracy and to prescribe
State Socialism by the law of the Constitu-
tion so that it will be beyond the reach of a
Parliamentary majority to suspend, amend
vol xlviI no 40 EPW Economic & Political Weekly

or abrogate it. It is only by this that one can
achieve the triple object, namely, to estab-
lish socialism, retain Parliamentary democ-
racy and avoid dictatorship.1
There were others who held a similar
view in the assembly and this led to the re-
drafting of the principle to read as it is in
Article 37 of the Constitution.2 For instance,
Krishna Chandra Sharma, representing the
Indian National Congress from the United
Provinces, felt that the principles must be
binding in nature. He said:
I suggest that we make a provision that any
law made in contravention of these princi-
ples shall to that extent be void. This will not
affect the present position. It will give juris-
diction to a court of law, through only nega-
tive rights, to the people to move a court that
any law which goes against the interests of
the people, against providing primary edu-
cation for the children and against providing
work and employment to the people should
be declared void. The court will have juris-
diction to declare that such and such law
is void, because it contravenes the general
principles laid down in Chapter IV.3
Directive Principles
It is interesting to recall the response to
these demands. This was left to Alladi
Krishnaswamy Ayyar who said:
...the Constitution, while it does not commit
the country to any particular form of eco-
nomic structure or social adjustment, gives
ample scope for future legislatures and the
future Parliament to evolve any economic
order and to undertake any legislation they
chose in public interests. In this connection,
the various Articles which are Directive Prin-
ciples of Social policy are not without signifi-
cance and importance. While in the very na-
ture they cannot be justiciable or enforceable
legal rights in a court of law, they are none the
less, in the language of Article 29, fundamen-
tal in the governance of the country and it is
the duty of the State to apply these principles
in making laws. It is idle to suggest that any
responsible government or any legislature
elected on the basis of universal suffrage can
or will ignore these principles.4
The quest for a categorical ban on
future governments privatising mining
operations did not end there. K T Shah,
representing the socialist bloc in the
Congress in the Constituent Assembly,
persisted with this in the House. When
Article 31 of the draft Constitution
(which became Article 39 when the Con-
stitution was adopted), was discussed,
Shah pressed his amendment to Clause
ii of the Article:
Economic & Political Weekly EPW october 6, 2012
That for Clause (ii) of Article 31, the follow-
ing be substituted:
(ii) that the ownership, control and manage-
ment of the natural resources of the country
in the shape of mines and mineral wealth,
forests, rivers and flowing waters as well as
in the shape of the seas along the coast of the
country shall be vested in and belong to the
country collectively and shall be exploited and
developed on behalf of the community by the
State as represented by the Central or Provin-
cial Governments or local governing authority
or statutory corporation as may be provided
for in each case by Act of Parliament…5
Forthright Commitment
The amendment sought to make a forth-
right commitment that no future gov-
ernment would privatise activity in
sectors where exploitation of natural
resources was involved. This certainly
was distinct from the abstraction that
marked the provision in the draft. Shah
made this point during the debate when
he said that the draft provision was
vague, undefined and undefinable, and ca-
pable of being twisted to such a sense in any
court of law, before any tribunal by clever,
competent lawyers, as to be wholly divorced
from the intention of the draftsman, assum-
ing that the draftsman had such intention...
and stressed,
we must have more positive guarantee of their
proper, social and wholly beneficial utilisa-
tion; and that can only be achieved if their
ownership, control and management are
vested in public hands.
Shah’s was not a lone voice. Jadubans
Sahay, representing the Congress from
Bihar, even while making it clear that he
did not belong to the Socialist Party and
that he belonged to the Congress, urged
Ambedkar to consider the spirit of
Shah’s amendment. “May I appeal to
Dr Ambedkar”, he said,
who claims to represent the downtrodden
untouchables of the country not to wash
away this hope from our hearts that in the
future years the natural resources of the
community may belong not to the privileged
few but to the poor people of the country, for
the good and benefit of all.6
At this stage, Ambedkar, notwithstand-
ing his own arguments in the House on an
earlier occasion, refused to see the point
(he was now the chairman of the drafting
committee that commended the Draft
Constitution). Replying to the debate on
vol xlviI no 40
COMMENTARY
Shah’s amendment, he said:
I would have been quite prepared to con-
sider the amendment of Professor Shah if he
had shown that what he intended to do by
the substitution of his own clauses was not
possible to be done under the language as it
stands. So far as I am able to see, I think that
the language that has been used in the Draft is
a much more exhaustive language which also
includes the particular propositions which
have been moved by Professor Shah, and I
therefore do not see the necessity for substi-
tuting these limited particular clauses for the
clauses which have been drafted in general
language deliberately for a set purpose…7
The Constituent Assembly voted out
the amendment.
Socialist Principles
With the benefit of hindsight it may be
argued that Ambedkar was both right
and wrong. The Constitution (First
Amendment) Act, 1951, passed by the
same assembly (now turned into the
Provisional Parliament) was evidence
that socialist principles, in both the social
and economic sense, were proof that
Jawaharlal Nehru’s Congress was seri-
ous about its commitment to the ideals
explicitly stated in the Directive Princi-
ples, particularly in Article 39 (b) of the
Constitution.8 This agenda persisted for
many years and manifests in the fourth,
17th, 25th and 42nd amendments. It was
thus that the word “socialist” finds ex-
plicit mention in the Preamble of our
Constitution (a small part of the 42nd
amendment in 1976) and Article 31-C
(inserted by the 25th amendment in
1972). At another level, the fact that Arti-
cles 31 and 19(f) are no longer part of the
Constitution (thanks to the 42nd amend-
ment) is evidence of the regime under
Jawaharlal Nehru and Indira Gandhi
during the quarter century after the
Constitution was adopted.9
It is relevant to recall the Coal Mines
(Nationalisation) Act, 1973 and its
rationale in the context of the idea in the
constitutional scheme itself. The 1973
legislation was indeed a considered de-
cision of the time and was, in many
ways, the culmination of the process set
in motion in the Constituent Assembly
and was meant to achieve the following:
• to provide for the acquisition and transfer
of the right, title and interest of the owners
in respect of the coal mines with a view to
23
COMMENTARY
reorganising and reconstructing such coal
mines to ensure the rational, coordinated
and scientific development and utilisation of
coal resources consistent with the growing
requirements of the country.
• in order that the ownership and control
of such resources are vested in the State and
thereby so distributed as best to subserve the
common good.10
It may be stressed here that the sec-
ond leg of the objective is just what Arti-
cle 39(b) of the Constitution lays down
among the Directive Principles of State
Policy. It may be argued that this is
merely a directive that is not enforce-
able. But then, a closer look at the timing
of the 1973 legislation will establish
something else: The Coal Mines (Na-
tionalisation) Act, 1973 was among the
legislations passed in the immediate
aftermath of the landmark judgment by
the Supreme Court in the Kesavananda
Bharati case11 in which Article 31-C of
the Constitution was held as valid.12 In
effect, the Supreme Court in that case
placed Article 39(b) on a pedestal.
The law thus laid down also served as
the basis for the Supreme Court to up-
hold the nationalisation of coal mines,
where it was challenged, in the Sanjeev
Coke Manufacturing Company vs Bharat
Coking Coal Limited.13 It may be added
that the relevance of Article 39(b) and
(c) and its centrality to the Constitution-
al scheme in general and the idea of jus-
tice as enshrined in the Preamble of the
Constitution was underscored by the
Supreme Court in a catena of cases since
Kesavananda, the most important being
the Minerva Mills case.14
Old Consensus Reversed
This consensus of the 1970s and the first
half of the 1980s was reversed in the
years after 1991. The 1993 amendment
went against the force behind the Coal
Mines (Nationalisation) Act, 1973. In
just a couple of decades after mines
were taken over from private hands
with a view to ensure that the “owner-
ship and control of such resources are
vested in the state and thereby so distrib-
uted as best to subserve the common
good”, the government, headed by the
same party whose members do not tire
claiming the legacy of Nehru and his
daughter, decided to let private players
24
to engage in coal mining to enhance
power generation.
The argument that Coal India Limited
(CIL), a central public sector undertaking,
could not ensure supply of coal to power
plants, a priority area, is indeed fallacious.
It is a well known fact that coal blocks
were allotted to many entities because of
their political connections rather than any
record of efficiency. This is not to deny that
CIL was inefficient (it is a fact that the Na-
tional Thermal Power Corporation’s plants
are constantly in danger of damage to tur-
bines because CIL had the ability to pass
off stone boulders as coal).
Coming back to the 1993 amendment,
the decision to open coal mines to the
private sector was done with the avowed
purpose to subserve the common good.
Prime Minister Manmohan Singh said as
much in his statement in Parliament on
28 August 2012.15 The fact, as it emerges
from the CAG’s report, is that a number
of those who were allotted coal blocks
for a nominal sum did not extract as
much coal they were permitted to mine
and in some cases did nothing – a clear
case where licences were obtained even
where they had no need for so much coal.
Debate Skewed
The point is that in the couple of years
after the reforms were formalised, the
consensus in Parliament was to pull all
the stops to help meet the country’s
energy needs by throwing open power
generation to the private sector. The
long and short of the story is that both
the Congress and the BJP cooperated in
the passage of the Coal Mines (Nation-
alisation) Amendment Act in June 1993.
Indeed, the amendment would have failed
without the BJP’s support at that time.16
It is here that one finds the debate
skewed – that auctioning coal blocks
rather than allotting them through a
screening committee would have been
better since the government would have
earned more revenue, a part of which
could have been spent on improving the
Human Development Indicators. This
scheme disregards the lofty principle
that Article 39(b) of the Constitution
upholds: That the ownership and control
of the material resources of the com-
munity are so distributed as best to
october 6, 2012
subserve the common good. In addition
to the judgments by the apex court in a
catena of cases holding this principle as
pivotal to the goals set in the Preamble,
which include Socialism and Justice,
Social, Economic and Political in that
order, it will certainly guarantee against
indiscriminate exploitation of natural
resources that are in any case precious
and scarce.
In any case, this constitutional scheme
is necessary to ensure that the genera-
tions to come are not left without natu-
ral resources. The danger of one nation
being drained of its resources to develop
another – the harsh fact about colonial-
ism – had determined the thoughts of
the men who drafted our Constitution.
And Article 39(b), as much as Article
19(1)(a) or Article 21 of the Constitution
were a product of such a thought proc-
ess. This indeed is from where those
who argue that as Article 39(b) was a
need of the times as was the Coal Mines
(Nationalisation) Act, 1973, the amend-
ment to the same in 1993 was also a
need of another era – that all of them
were for the common good. Empirical
evidence suggest to the contrary.
The experience of liberalisation-pri-
vatisation-globalisation has been one of
indiscriminate loot of the common wealth
and the rise of a class, a Mafiosi (for want
of another word to describe those who
have emerged as beneficiaries of this
scheme) who are out there, across the
nation, distorting the democratic scheme
with impunity. It is therefore imperative
that the spirit of Article 39(b) is restored
and natural resources are kept out of the
reach of the private sector. It is idle to
argue just about whether the coal blocks
should have been auctioned or not. It is
possible that an auction might have
fetched more money. What is important
to remember is the fact that the indiscrim-
inate extraction and sale of natural re-
sources is certainly inimical to the com-
mon good. It is necessary that this per-
spective is foregrounded.
Notes
1 See Ambedkar’s “Memorandum and Draft Articles
on the Rights of States and Minorities”, 24 March
1947 in B Shiva Rao (ed.), The Framing of India’s
Constitution: Select Documents, Vol 2, p 101.
2 Article 37 reads as: “The provisions contained
vol xlviI no 40 EPW Economic & Political Weekly

in this part shall not be enforceable by any
court, but the principles therein laid down are
nevertheless fundamental in the governance of
the country and it shall be the duty of the state
to apply these principles in making laws”. This
was substantially different from the first draft
which read: “The principles of policy set forth
in this chapter are intended for the general
guidance of the State. The application of these
principles in legislation and administration
shall be the care of the State and shall not be
cognisable in any court”. See B Shiva Rao (ed.),
op cit, Vol 2, p 142.
3 Constituent Assembly Debates, Vol VII, p 230.
4 Ibid, p 336. It may be noted that Article 29 of
the draft became Article 37 when the Constitu-
tion was adopted on 26 November 1949.
5 Ibid, p 506.
6 Ibid, pp 517-18.
7 Ibid, pp 518-19.
8 The Constitution (First Amendment) Act, 1951,
apart from inserting Article 15(4) providing for
reservation to the scheduled castes and tribes
in institutions of higher learning, added Article
31-B (and the Ninth Schedule) to the Constitu-
tion to ensure that land reforms legislations
were protected adequately and rendered im-
mune from the operation of Articles 31 and 19
(f) of the Constitution.
9 It must be stressed here that while some as-
pects of Article 31-C were struck down on the
ground that it violated the Basic Structure of
the Constitution by the Supreme Court in the
Kesavananda case and once again in the Min-
erva Mills case, the apex court had held on
Economic & Political Weekly EPW october 6, 2012
both the occasions that it was perfectly in order
to protect laws that were in tune with giving
effect to the provisions in Article 39(b) from
being challenged for violating guarantees un-
der Articles 14, 19 and 31.
10 The Coal Mines (Nationalisation) Act, 1973,
(Bare Act) Universal Law Publishers, Hydera-
bad. It may be stressed here that the Act was
one of the many passed at that time of the kind
and notwithstanding the criticism that Indira
Gandhi had resorted to the idea of socialism as
a political strategy rather than out of a commit-
ment, the fact is that nationalisation of resourc-
es, most particularly the banking operations, as
part of that scheme had changed the face of ru-
ral India. The same was true of such other
measures of its kind like the abolition of Privy
Purses, nationalisation of the Steel Sector, etc.
11 AIR-1973-SC-1461. The Supreme Court decided
this case on 23 April 1973 and the Coal Mines
(Nationalisation) Act, 1973, by which mines
operated by private players were nationalised
was enacted in May that year.
12 It may be noted here that the majority in the Kesa-
vananda case held as valid that part of Article 31-C
(inserted by the Constitution 25th amendment)
where it said: “Notwithstanding anything con-
tained in Article 13, no law giving effect to the
policy of the state towards securing the principles
specified in clause b and c of Article 39 shall be
deemed to be void on ground that it is inconsist-
ent with, or takes away or abridges any of the
rights conferred by Article 14 or Article 19 or Arti-
cle 31…”. The court, however, struck down the
second leg of the Constitution 25th amendment
vol xlviI no 40
COMMENTARY
where it said “and no law containing a declaration
that it is for giving effect to such policy shall be
called in question in any court on the ground that
it does not give effect to such policy”.
13 AIR-1983-SC-239. See paragraph 23 in particu-
lar. The judgment was delivered by justice
O Chinnappa Reddy.
14 AIR-1980-SC-1789. In that case, the Supreme
Court held as unconstitutional the extension of
the scope of immunity to the whole of the Di-
rective Principles, was categorical that legisla-
tions that sought securing the implementation
of Articles 39(b) and (c) were immune from at-
tack on grounds of violating Articles 14 and 19
of the Constitution.
15 He said: “Allocation of coal blocks to private
companies for captive use commenced in 1993,
after the Coal Mines (Nationalisation) Act,
1973 was amended. This was done with the ob-
jective of attracting private investments in
specified end uses. As the economy grew in
size, the demand for coal also grew and it be-
came evident that Coal India Limited alone
would not be able to meet the growing demand”.
For a full text of the statement, see http://pmin-
dia.nic.in/speech-details.php?nodeid= 1208 (ac-
cessed on 31 August 2012).
16 The Congress, under P V Narasimha Rao, had yet
to gather majority in the Lok Sabha at that time.
Recall the unseemly manner it was achieved in
July 1993. It came to be known that a number of
MPs received large amounts of money (by stand-
ards that prevailed at that time) and incidentally
defied party whips to save the then government.
25
SPECIAL ARTICLE
Energy Security and Biodiesel
Implications for Land Use and Food Security
Robin Singhal, Ramprasad Sengupta
India, like other net oil-importing developing countries,
faces energy insecurity centred on the uncertainty
surrounding the price of oil and its supply. It has been
exploring the feasibility of developing biofuels that can
replace petroleum products in the transport sector. But
the use of biotic resources may involve changes in the
land use pattern if they are to be derived from plantation
or agrarian products. Since such a change could threaten
the security of food and other agrarian supplies, this
paper focuses on biodiesel production from jatropha
oilseeds, assessing the profitability and competitiveness
of energy cultivation and the chances of it replacing food
or cash crop cultivation.
Robin Singhal (rbnsinghal@gmail.com) and Ramprasad Sengupta
(rps0302@gmail.com) are at the Centre for Economic Studies and
Planning, Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi.
66
1 Introduction
I
ndia’s energy policy has primarily focused on providing
energy security for the macroeconomy’s high rate of growth
and for the basic needs of households. By “energy security”
we mean adequate, clean and efficient supply of energy for the
input requirements of various producing sectors and the basic
needs of households, along with insurance against the risk of a
disruption in supply or volatility of prices (GOI 2006a). Oil being
the dominant fuel in the world, like any other net oil-importing
developing country, India’s energy insecurity is centred on the
uncertainty surrounding oil prices and its supply. Since oil,
like any other fossil fuel, is non-renewable, India faces increas-
ingly difficult challenges in ensuring energy security. Among
all end-uses, the scope for fuel substitution is highly restricted
in the transport sector, which is a very vital one because of its
role in ensuring the mobility of goods and people. There has
been a worldwide search for alternative renewable fuels to
mitigate the problem of energy insecurity and India has been
exploring the feasibility of developing biofuels that can reduce
the dependence on petroleum products for transport.
However, the use of a biotic resource may involve some
change in the land use pattern if it is derived from a cultivated
crop, as is in the case of bioethanol and biodiesel, from sugar
cane and oilseeds respectively. Since changes in land use may
threaten the security of food or other agrarian supplies, this
paper focuses on the production of biodiesel from jatropha
oilseeds and assesses the profitability and competitiveness of
land use for energy cultivation by comparing ground rents (grs)
in different scenarios. To assess the implication of oil price
behaviour on fuel security, the paper tries to assess critical
petroleum product prices such as high speed diesel (HSD)
prices, which, if exceeded, would create a situation in which
the cultivation of food and other crops would lose out to grow-
ing oilseeds and other biomass for the energy market.
2 Background, Objective and Rationale
India has to combine the objective of energy security with the
environmental sustainability of its energy system so that the
eco-capacity of the earth is conserved and the environmental
uncertainty arising from events such as climate change due to
greenhouse gases is reduced. India’s challenge in meeting
these twin objectives arise from that its energy system is highly
dependent on fossil fuels, which are non-renewable and res-
ponsible for a major part of the greenhouse gases in the atmos-
phere (GOI 2006a). Of the total primary energy supplied to the
october 6, 2012 vol xlviI no 40 EPW Economic & Political Weekly

Indian economy in 2008, the share of primary commercial
energy of all kinds was 73.6% and the remaining 26.4% was
from non-commercial fuels supplied by biomass and combus-
tible wastes, procured mostly through manual collection. In
the total commercial energy supply, energy resources such as
coal, oil and natural gas accounted for 57.1%, 31.65% and 8%
respectively, while only 3.3% was from carbon-free hydro, nu-
clear and other new renewable resources (IEA 2010a). The
dominance of coal in energy supply is explained by that the
country’s major energy resource endowment is coal and lig-
nite, although it is a significant importer of metallurgical coal.
The major source of energy insecurity is the heavy and grow-
ing dependence on oil imports, whose price has been volatile
and shown a sharply rising trend, giving rise to a situation of
market uncertainty.
While India had indigenous oil reserves of 769 million
tonnes (mt) as on 1 April 2008, its production during 2008-09
was 33.51 mt. During 2008-09, the total refinery throughput
requirement was 160.77 mt and the difference of 127.26 mt was
met through imports. The actual import of crude oil has often
been more than that for covering such a gap due to some
inventory build-up and also possibly for strategic reasons. India’s
self-sufficiency index for oil has gone down while its import
dependence has gone up over time. The share of imports in the
total supply of oil declined from 65% in 1973 at the time of first
oil price shock to a low of 20% in the early 1980s due to the dis-
covery of the Bombay High offshore oilfield and accretions in
other oil basins in the 1970s and 1980s. But the dependence
ratio has again been reversed, with the share of imports at 75.5%
in 2008-09 and approximately 82% in 2009-10 (GOI 2010a).
In view of this growing dependence on imports, the sharply
rising trend of crude oil prices in the global market, combined
with occasional volatility, has become a great source of con-
cern. The Indian basket of crude oil, which was priced at $36
per barrel (bbl) in May 2004, sharply rose to $132 per bbl in
July 2008, an increase of 267% in just four years or 38.34% per
annum (GOI 2010b). The unit value of gross crude oil imports
rose from Rs 17,272 per tonne in 2005-06 to Rs 26,230 per
tonne in 2008-09. The share of gross imports of crude oil and
petroleum products in India’s total export earnings reached a
high of 50.2% in 2008-09 and net imports of such items is esti-
mated to be 35.8% in the same period (GOI 2010a).
There are a few other factors that add to the vulnerability of
an oil-importing developing country like India. Like electricity,
transport is an infrastructural service required for all kinds of
economic activity and also by households. The transport sector
requires energy as the prime driver in any mode – by rail, road,
air and water – mostly in the form of oil. Road, air and water
transport are almost entirely dependent on oil with no or negli-
gible fuel substitutability. It is only in rail transport that electric
traction can substitute for diesel traction, diesel being indirectly
substituted by coal, gas or some carbon-free resource that gen-
erates power. Of course, the traffic density on the railway route
concerned has to be high enough to make the heavy investment
on installing overhead electrical traction economically viable. As
passenger and freight traffic movement are vital to the economy
Economic & Political Weekly EPW october 6, 2012 vol xlviI no 40
SPECIAL ARTICLE
and also for the internal and external security of the country, the
indispensability of oil for mobility and its non-substitutability
has made it a very critical factor in the economy.
Further, note that the gross domestic product (GDP) elastici-
ty of freight and passenger traffic has been estimated by the
Planning Commission to be 1.0 and 0.8 respectively (GOI
2006a). These imply a high growth of transport services in
units of tonne-km and passenger-km and a high growth of de-
mand for oil in a situation of high economic growth. While the
high economic growth rates of India and China have been ex-
erting an upward pressure in the global oil market, causing an
upward shift of the market demand curve, the supply side situ-
ation is likely to increasingly tighten for two reasons. These
are, one, the exhaustibility of oil as a non-renewable resource
and, two, the increasing oligopolistic control of supply by the
Organisation of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC).
India’s domestic production of crude oil has been at a pla-
teau from 1995 onwards. Its dependence on oil imports has in-
creased over time and it is projected to go up to 90% by 2031-
32, according to long-term projections of the Planning Com-
mission. As far as global oil supply is concerned, there have
been many instances in the past where a shortfall in availabil-
ity from some oil-exporting nations because of factors such as
war, social unrest or political instability have been compen-
sated by an increase in production by other oil-exporting
countries. However, the optimistic view held by several experts
that there will be abundant oil in the near future to sustain the
current high level of global oil consumption is increasingly be-
ing contested. The proponents of Hubbert’s peak theory warn
of a not too distant future in which the supply of oil will shrink
and there will be growing uncertainty about international oil
markets. This also implies that in future, that is, beyond the
year of the peak, the marginal cost of supply is likely to rise or
shift upwards as it will be increasingly difficult to access depos-
its that will have to be exploited for meeting demand.
Oligopolistic Global Market
The uneven geographic distribution of oil reserves across
countries has been also responsible for the global oil market
becoming far from competitive and mostly oligopolistic in
character, resulting in a monopolistic contraction in supply and
prices being in excess of marginal cost. At the beginning of
2010, the proportion of balance of ultimate recoverable reserves
was as high as 68% in west Asia and the former Soviet Union
countries while it was only 17% in North America. Of the 2.5
trillion barrels of ultimately recoverable oil reserves, these two
regions have a share of almost 2 trillion barrels, that is, 80% of
the world’s oil resources (IEA 2010b). Such a skew in the re-
gional distribution of oil has given rise to not only market im-
perfections resulting in welfare losses to societies, but also ge-
opolitics and uncertainty, further influencing prices and com-
plicating the supply behaviour of the market. The recent oil
price rise was thus considered not just to be a phenomenon of
mere short-run significance but of long-run importance as the
tendency of rising oil prices is going to stay. It poses a challenge
that the Indian economy and its polity have to address.
67
SPECIAL ARTICLE
Against this backdrop, the search for an alternative automo-
tive fuel has become a matter of serious policy concern for India.
The use of biotic resources such as non-edible oilseeds like jat-
ropha as a substitute for diesel and ethanol from sugar cane for
petrol have been seriously considered by India’s energy policy-
makers. Biofuels have several socio-economic and environ-
mental benefits, which have been the motivating factors behind
promoting them in both developed and developing countries:
Economic: Foreign exchange is saved by reducing the depend-
ence on imports for petroleum products, thus contributing to a
nation’s energy security.
Environmental: The problems of local air pollution and reduc-
ing carbon dioxide (CO2) emissions that cause climate change
are addressed because biofuels are considered carbon neutral.
Social: Employment opportunities are created and rural deve-
lopment is promoted through cultivation and making oil pro-
duction an agro-based industry that partially replaces petroleum.
However, the production of feedstock for these biofuels
would put additional pressure on agricultural resources such
as land, water and so on. It is, therefore, quite important that
policies, plans and strategies for energy security do not con-
flict with other aspects of critical national importance like
food security or of non-cereal agricultural supplies like cotton.
National Policy on Biofuels
A national policy on biofuels, which was evolved by the Govern-
ment of India, was announced in December 2009. The policy
aims at mainstreaming the use of biofuels – bioethanol and
biodiesel – in the Indian transport sector by targeting a 20%
blending of these two fuels with petrol and HSD by 2017 (GOI
2009). As per the policy, biodiesel is to be derived from the non-
edible jatropha oilseed and bioethanol is to be produced from
molasses, a by-product of the sugar-making process. The produc-
tion of jatropha oilseeds for bio-refineries will require jatropha
plantations and bioethanol plants will require more sugar cane
cultivation. Both of these will cause some diversion of land use
from other agricultural crops. As far as biodiesel is concerned,
the policy aims to resolve possible food versus fuel conflicts by
promoting plantations of non-edible oilseeds like jatropha on
wastelands. In the case of bioethanol production, molasses
may have to be diverted from other uses such as the alcohol or
pharmaceutical industries. If there is pressure in the molasses
market for other end-uses as well, the area under sugar cane
will have to expand at the cost of other crops. The Commission
for Agricultural Costs and Prices (CACP) recommends the use
of excess sugar cane juice for making ethanol only in a situa-
tion where there is an excess supply of sugar cane in the mar-
ket. The issue that arises here is how to ensure regulation of
land use in a regime where a private owner of land or cultiva-
tor has the liberty to take his or her decision. In a free-market
regime of agricultural products, including the feedstock for
energy cultivation, it may be very difficult to exercise such
regulation. Besides, there is the basic question of whether
there is adequate wasteland available for jatropha cultivation.
Since the energy-saving potential of freight traffic is substan-
tially more than passenger traffic and since freight traffic is
68
entirely dependent on HSD, we analyse the biofuel policy
issues related to jatropha-based biofuel development in India
and its economic implications with respect to land use and
food and agricultural security. We discuss the issue of availa-
bility of wasteland for jatropha in the third section of the paper
and then analyse the competitiveness of jatropha vis-à-vis
other crop cultivation, mainly food crops. We have used alter-
native criteria that influence land use and arrived at results of
comparative competitiveness. In a liberalised regime, the
international price of diesel would have a determining influence
on biodiesel and jatropha prices and thereby on the GR for
such land use. The paper, as already mentioned, also gives
the critical import parity ex-refinery gate HSD price, which,
if exceeded, will enable jatropha cultivation to push out other
crops, particularly in terms of GR, which represents the
economic return from the use of land.
In the Indian situation, the choice of land use depends on the
tenancy status and economic and financial condition of the
peasant cultivator. For a peasant cultivator who has leased-in
land, the paid-out cost or profitability in the sense of the gross
value of output (GVO) sold to paid-out cost incurred would be the
deciding criterion. A farmer without much access to credit –
formal or informal – would mainly go by cost minimisation
per acre of cultivation. However, a peasant cultivator working
on leased and/or own land has a mixed income, which is the
difference between the GVO and all paid-out costs. Thus, the
mixed income would comprise imputed wage income from the
family labour engaged, interest on the value of owned fixed
capital (other than land) and the GR on own land, if any. The
ratio of GVO to paid-out costs of all kinds gives a factor of
return from all kinds of resources owned and engaged with
reference to the outflow of paid-out cost per hectare and is
often used by the peasant cultivator as the criterion for land
use. Again a landowner peasant who does not himself cultivate,
or provide any fixed or circulating capital or any other asset,
would lease out land for the use that will earn maximum GR
and this would indicate the economically rational choice from
the optimum resource allocation point of view.
We have examined the competitiveness of jatropha land use
vis-à-vis other crop cultivation in accordance with the three
criteria explained above. While only the paid-out cost is the
deciding factor for the first criterion, the second and third cri-
teria will require the assumption of a jatropha oilseed price.
The pricing of jatropha oilseeds will therefore be an important
policy issue that influences land use for feedstock cultivation
for biodiesel. However, if globalisation liberalises agriculture,
the jatropha oilseed price will be determined by market forces
and equated with the marginal value productivity of jatropha
oilseeds in biodiesel production and therefore with the biodiesel
price. If the biodiesel market is integrated with the international
HSD market, the price of biodiesel will be the import parity price
of HSD linked with the import parity price of HSD appropriately
adjusted for the fuel efficiency differential for providing auto-
motive energy services. In such a situation, the global oil market
behaviour may have an impact on profitability and the GR for
land use for jatropha cultivation, which may affect the agricultural
october 6, 2012 vol xlviI no 40 EPW Economic & Political Weekly
 SPECIAL ARTICLE

supply pattern of an individual country and its food security. in the recent past, and the index numbers of both yield per
This paper considers the competitiveness of jatropha vis-à-vis hectare and of total foodgrain and non-foodgrain production
selected major crops in different states of India, the selection have been declining quite sharply. Even with a growing popu-
depending on the agro-climatic conditions in different states. lation, per capita foodgrain availability has declined over the
We describe the scope of the empirical analysis of choice of Table 2: Availability and Suitability of Wastelands for Jatropha
land use in the context of energy and non-energy cultivation, Plantations in India
Categories of Wastelands In Million Hectares
the definition and methodology of calculation of various costs
1 Gullied and/or ravenous land* 1.9
and return categories, and the data sources in Section 4. We
2 Land with or without scrub* 18.79
then present the results of a competitive price for jatropha 3 Waterlogged and marshy land 0.97
oilseeds and also the critical HSD price in the international 4 Land affected by salinity/alkalinity 1.2
market, which, if exceeded, will make jatropha cultivation 5 Shifting cultivation* 1.88
more attractive than other crops. In the final section, we discuss 6 Underutilised/degraded notified forestland* 12.66
the policy implications of the results. 7 Degraded pastures/grazing land* 1.93
8 Degraded land under plantation crops* 0.21
3 Land Availability 9 Sands (riverine/coastal/desert) 3.4
If the state is serious about not risking food security and regu- 10 Mining and industrial wasteland 0.2
11 Barren rocky areas 5.77
lating land use by restricting jatropha plantations to waste-
12 Steep sloping areas 0.91
lands, the question is if there is enough wasteland in the country
13 Snow covered and/or glacial areas 5.43
to meet the projected future demand of land for this purpose.
Total wastelands 55.27
According to projections of the demand for crude oil, based on Wastelands suitable for jatropha cultivation 37.38*
the sustained growth of the Indian economy at 8% up to 2031-32 The categories with an asterisk are suitable for jatropha cultivation.
(GOI 2006a), and the demand for diesel (GOI 2003), India’s HSD Source: GOI (2005a); TERI (2005) and Biswas et al (2010).

requirement will grow from 52.3 mt in 2006-07 to 190.2 mt in last decade. Such a decline in per capita availability is either
2031-32. As per the government’s biofuel policy, which targets due to supply-side constraints or due to increasing impover-
a 20% blending of biodiesel in HSD for automotive fuel use, the ishment of the common people. In either case, if the state
demand for biodiesel will grow from 13 mt in 2011-12 to 38 mt wants to eradicate poverty and hunger, the priority will be to
in 2031-32. According to the biofuel committee’s norms of per use more land for foodgrain production and this may extend
hectare yield of jatropha oilseeds, the biodiesel yield of jat- to the use of developed wastelands. Even if the reclaimed and
ropha oilseeds and the specific gravity of biodiesel, the total developed wastelands may not be suitable for other uses,
land requirement works out to 31.7 million hectares (Table 1). there would remain an institutional or regulatory issue of
Table 1: Projected Crude Oil, Diesel and Biodiesel Demand for India how to regulate the behaviour of peasants in land use when
and Estimated Land Requirement for Biodiesel Production free-market forces drive it unless there is an end-use-based
Period Crude Oil Crude Oil Diesel Biodiesel 20% Land Requirement
(mtoe) (mt) (mt) (mt) (million hectares) land tax or jatropha oilseed prices are regulated as a way of
2006-07 134.9 132.0 52.3 10.5 8.7 controlling the market. Either way, given the political and
2011-12 166.0 162.4 65.0 13.0 10.8 economic situation in the country, the practicability of these
2021-22 278.0 272.0 108.8 21.8 18.1
would be questioned.
2031-32 486.0 475.5 190.2 38.0 31.7
Mtoe is million tonnes of oil equivalent.
Source: Authors’ calculations based on GOI (2003, 2006). 4 Definition, Methodology and Data Sources
As already mentioned, the biofuel policy aims to resolve any We divide the principal crops of India into five categories:
possible food versus fuel conflict by encouraging production of (a) cereals (paddy, wheat, jowar, bajra, maize, ragi and barley);
jatropha oilseeds for biodiesel production only on wastelands. (b) pulses (gram, arhar, urad, moong and masur); (c) oilseeds
The government describes wasteland as (groundnut, rapeseed and mustard, soybean, sunflower,
degraded land which can be brought under vegetative cover with rea- safflower, sesamum and niger seed); (d) fibres (cotton and jute);
sonable effort, and which is currently underutilised and/or land and (e) miscellaneous such as sugar cane and VFC tobacco.
which is deteriorating for lack of appropriate water and soil manage-
Thus, most of the crop items fall under the category of food.
ment or on account of natural causes. Wastelands can result from in-
herent/imposed disabilities such as by location, environment, chemi- We confine ourselves to the 19 major states in India – Andhra
cal and physical properties of the soil or financial or management Pradesh, Assam, Bihar, Chhattisgarh, Gujarat, Haryana, Himachal
constraints (GOI 2005a: 3). Pradesh, Jharkhand, Karnataka, Kerala, Madhya Pradesh,
The total wasteland ascertained in accordance with this Maharashtra, Orissa, Punjab, Rajasthan, Tamil Nadu, Uttar
definition has been classified into 13 subcategories, adding to Pradesh, Uttarakhand and West Bengal. The consideration of
a total of 55.27 million hectares (GOI 2005a). Of these 13 cate- the crop mix varies from state to state depending on the avail-
gories, the expert group considers only six subcategories to be ability of data. Further, to assess the competitiveness of the
suitable for jatropha cultivation, which gives a total availabili- crops according to the different criteria, the data and informa-
ty of 37.38 million hectares for the purpose (Table 2). tion on costs and GVO were obtained from a government study
There would still arise two problematic issues. The overall on the costs of cultivation (GOI 2008). The latest estimates
area under foodgrain has remained static, if not mildly declined, available are for 2004-05.
Economic & Political Weekly EPW october 6, 2012 vol xlviI no 40 69
SPECIAL ARTICLE
According to the cost of cultivation worked out by govern-
ment agencies, all service and input costs other than that of
land, fixed capital and family labour constitute the basic Cost
A 1. Cost A 1 thus comprises the cost of hired human labour and
values of animal and machine labour, machine hiring charges,
the cost of seed, water and irrigation charges, the cost of ferti-
lisers, manure and pesticides and capital depreciation, govern-
ment taxes, duties and cess and miscellaneous expenses. If the
cost of leasing in land is the rental charges paid, the total paid-
out (Cost A 2) cost of cultivation for any crop would turn out to
be the sum of Cost A 1 and the rent paid for leased-in land. The
full cost of cultivation of a crop, Cost C1, would be equal to the
total of Cost A 2, the interest on owned fixed capital and the
imputed value of family labour. The ratio of total output to
paid-out cost, that is, GVO to Cost A 2, will indicate the factors of
returns from all own resources engaged to total paid-out cost
or the profitability of land use. Thus, Cost C1 is the total cost of
production using all inputs other than the service of land, but
including the cost of all capital employed, irrespective of owner-
ship and own family labour (Sen and Bhatia 2004). The difference
between GVO and Cost C1 would thus yield the GR of land.
While Cost A 2 and Cost C1 are measured per unit of land, the
profit margin (or profitability ratio) from the own resources
engaged is a ratio independent of the choice of land unit.
In the case of jatropha, which is a plantation crop unlike
other annual crops, we had to work out the cash flow over the
life of a plantation for the different component items and work
out the total amortised or annualised cost per unit of land use,
the profitability as the ratio of annualised GVO to annualised
cash outflow of cost, and the GR as the annualised equivalent
rent earning calculated as the difference between GVO and
Cost C1. We assumed Cost C1 and Cost A2 to be the same partly
because of the cost and market structure of input and partly
due to the lack of reliable information. Besides, in view of a
lack of adequate region-wise data, we have been constrained
to use these same estimates of the cost of jatropha cultivation
for evaluating its competitiveness in all the states concerned.
The cost of cultivation of jatropha curcas has been estimated
on the basis of the information obtained from Paramathma et al
(2004). The bio-refinery cost of producing biodiesel from
jatropha oilseeds has been obtained from an assessment by
the department of science and technology (GOI 2006b).
Further, information about the ex-refinery gate price (or
storage point price) for HSD has been obtained from the Ministry
of Petroleum and Natural Gas. The results of the study on the
paid-out cost, profit margin and GR earnings of each of the
principal crops across the states under consideration with
which jatropha cultivation would compete are discussed in the
following section.
5 Competitiveness of Jatropha Cultivation
A market for jatropha oilseeds has not emerged in the country
and the government has announced support prices to incentiv-
ise the cultivation of jatropha on wastelands. We have, there-
fore, assumed a range of prices for jatropha for working out its
profitability and GR earnings. The paid-out cost, profitability
70
ratio and GR for jatropha are obtained using a discount rate of
12.5% (Table 3).
5.1 Paid-out Cost and Profitability
The paid-out cost of cultivating various cereals (except paddy
in Karnataka), pulses and oilseeds across the states is found to
be lower than the cost of cultivating jatropha (Rs 19,725 per
hectare). In the case of oilseeds, the highest cost is incurred for
groundnut cultivation in Tamil Nadu (Rs 16,221 per hectare).
Of the nine states compared Table 3: Paid-out Cost, Profit Margin
for cotton cultivation, only and Ground Rent Earnings from
Jatropha Cultivation
in Andhra Pradesh do farm- Value of Paid-out Profitability Ground Rent
ers incur costs higher than Jatropha Cost Ratio (Rs per
Oilseeds (Rs per hectare)
that for jatropha cultivation (in Rs/kg) hectare)
(Rs 21,183 per hectare). In 9 19,725 4.56 70,275
jute cultivation, the highest 7 19,725 3.55 50,275
expense is in West Bengal 6 19,725 3.04 40,275
(Rs 12,832 per hectare). How- 5 19,725 2.53 30,275
ever, in sharp contrast, the 4 19,725 2.03 20,275
Source: Authors’ calculations.
paid-out cost incurred in four
of the seven major sugar cane cultivating states, Maharashtra
(Rs 45,536 per hectare), Tamil Nadu (Rs 37,700), Karnataka
(Rs 33,136), and Andhra Pradesh (Rs 29,185), is higher than
that for jatropha cultivation. The cost of cultivating VFC tobacco
in Andhra Pradesh is Rs 38,145 per hectare. Jatropha cultiva-
tion thus involves a higher cost when compared with food
crops, but a comparatively low cost compared with cash crops
other than jute. So, jatropha cultivation would require more
working capital and access to credit. Poor farmers cannot engage
in it and get a higher profit margin.
When jatropha oilseeds are valued at Rs 5 per kg, the profit
margin is estimated to be 2.53, which is higher than those of
cereals in the range of 0.89 (ragi cultivation) to 2.57 (barley
cultivation). When valued at Rs 6 per kg, the estimated profit
margin from jatropha turns out to be 3.04. Even at such valua-
tions, the cultivation of pulses like gram in Uttar Pradesh and
Bihar, tur in Uttar Pradesh and Madhya Pradesh, and masur in
Madhya Pradesh and Bihar are found to be more promising.
The pulses, however, lose competitiveness for higher valuations
of jatropha oilseeds at Rs 7 or Rs 9 per kg. In the case of oilseeds,
only the cultivation of rapeseed and mustard (in Rajasthan
and Madhya Pradesh) and sesamum (in Madhya Pradesh, Uttar
Pradesh and Rajasthan) compete with jatropha when the
seeds are valued at Rs 5 per kg. Among cash crops, jatropha
cultivation does better than cotton (except for Rajasthan and
Haryana) and jute cultivation in terms of profit margin when
valued at Rs 5 per kg. In sharp contrast, sugar cane cultivation
in Karnataka (2.80), Uttarakhand (3.62), Uttar Pradesh (3.87)
and Haryana (4.40) fares better in terms of profitability ratio
when compared to jatropha. Even at a higher valuation of Rs 6
per kg, sugar cane cultivation in Uttarakhand, Uttar Pradesh
and Haryana promises a higher profit margin. Thus, jatropha
cultivation when assessed in terms of profitability is found to
be competitive against cereals and pulses, though at a higher
valuation. Barring sugar cane, jatropha does better than cash
crops such as cotton, jute and VFC tobacco.
october 6, 2012 vol xlviI no 40 EPW Economic & Political Weekly
 SPECIAL ARTICLE

5.2 Ground Rent Earnings and Competing Jatropha could make jatropha cultivation competitive with major agri-
Oilseeds Price cultural crops. This issue is important not only for incentivis-
Jatropha cultivation promises a GR earning of Rs 30,725 per ing farmers to use land for jatropha plantation, but also for
hectare when the oilseeds are valued at Rs 5 per kg and it in- being aware of the range of jatropha oilseed prices that could
creases with higher valuations (Table 3). The GR earnings for drive out food crops, raising the problem of food security. We
the principal crops under consideration have been classified discuss this competitiveness with reference to the GR criterion
under four ranges (Table 4). Compared to jatropha cultivation, for land use allocation among alternative uses.
the highest GR earning among cereals is estimated to be The jatropha oilseeds price that is competitive to a principal
Rs 23,863 per hectare from paddy cultivation in Punjab. In the crop would refer to the price level at which the per hectare GR
case of paddy, wheat, ragi, bajra, jowar and maize, the GR earnings from jatropha, if sown on the same piece of land, will
earnings are negative in a large number of states. Further, in be equal to the earnings from the principal crop it is to replace. The
pulses and oilseeds, the GR earnings are in the range of zero to competing jatropha oilseeds price vis-à-vis every principal
less than Rs 15,000 per hectare. In some states, farmers even crop in a state is to be estimated as covering the opportunity
incur losses. Thus, jatropha cultivation fares much better in cost of cultivating jatropha, replacing a specific crop. Such an
terms of GR earnings compared to cereals, pulses and oilseeds. opportunity cost-based price would be derived from the cost of
Even in the case of cash crops such as cotton, jute and VFC cultivation (Cost C1) of jatropha plus the GR of the crop replaced
tobacco, jatropha promises much higher GR earnings. But farm- in the state concerned. The competing GVO for jatropha (in
ers can earn much higher GR earnings from sugar cane cultiva- rupees per hectare) against ith principal crop in jth state would
tion compared to jatropha and the other principal crops studied. thus be equal to the Cost C1 of cultivating jatropha curcas
Table 4: Ground Rent Earnings for Principal Crops for 2004-05 (Rs per hectare)
Category Item Ground Rent Earnings (Rs per hectare)
Less than 0 0 to <15,000 15,000 to < 30,000 30,000 and above
Cereals Paddy MP, Jharkhand, Kerala, Assam TN, UP, Orissa, Chhattisgarh,WB, Uttarakhand, Karnataka, Punjab
Bihar, Haryana, AP
Wheat Chhattisgarh, Jharkhand, WB UP, MP, Uttarakhand, Bihar, HP, Haryana, Gujarat,
Rajasthan, Punjab
Ragi Karnataka TN
Bajra Haryana, UP, Maharashtra,
Gujarat, Rajasthan, Punjab
Barley UP, Rajasthan
Jowar TN, MP, Maharashtra, AP, Rajasthan Karnataka
Maize UP, MP, Rajasthan, Uttarakhand, AP, Chhattisgarh, Karnataka, Bihar
Jharkhand, HP
Pulses Gram Maharashtra, Rajasthan, Chhattisgarh, Jharkhand,
UP, MP, AP, Bihar
Tur Orissa Gujarat, Karnataka, UP, MP, Maharashtra, AP
Urad Maharashtra TN, UP, Orissa, MP, Rajasthan, Chhattisgarh, AP
Moong Maharashtra Orissa, AP, Rajasthan
Masur UP, Jharkhand, Bihar, MP
Oilseeds Groundnut Maharashtra Gujarat, AP, Karnataka, TN
Rapeseed and mustard Assam Haryana, UP, WB, MP, Gujarat, Rajasthan
Soybean MP, Maharashtra, Chhattisgarh, Rajasthan
Sunflower Maharashtra, AP, Karnataka
Safflower Maharashtra
Sesamum Orissa TN, UP, MP, Gujarat, Rajasthan
Nigerseed Orissa Chhattisgarh
Fibres Cotton TN, MP Maharashtra, Karnataka, Haryana, Gujarat, AP, Rajasthan Punjab
Jute Assam, WB Orissa
Misc Sugar cane AP TN, UP,
Uttarakhand,
Maharashtra,
Haryana,
Karnataka
VFC Tobacco AP
Source: Authors’ calculations based on GOI (2008).

Barring Andhra Pradesh, sugar cane cultivation in all the other
states promises a GR in the range of Rs 30,489 per hectare in
Uttar Pradesh to Rs 52,934 per hectare in Karnataka. However,
at higher valuations of jatropha oilseeds such as Rs 7 per kg,
sugar cane cultivation remains competitive only in Karnataka.
As the jatropha oilseeds market in India is still in its infancy,
one of the concerns of policymakers is the oilseeds price which
Economic & Political Weekly EPW october 6, 2012 vol xlviI no 40
plus GR (or opportunity cost of land use) from an ith principal
crop in jth state. Using the above estimated competing GVO for
jatropha oilseeds, we find the corresponding value of one kilo-
gram of jatropha oilseeds, assuming 10 tonnes per hectare to be
the yield of jatropha oilseeds, based on the yield pattern reported
in Paramathma et al (2004), and considering a time horizon of
14 years with the yield stabilising at the level attained in the fifth
71
SPECIAL ARTICLE
Table 5: Competing Jatropha Oilseeds Price (Rs per kg) to cover the opportunity cost of diverting land from cultivat-
Crops No of Competing Jatropha Median Competing ing a principal crop to jatropha cultivation. A farmer will be
States Seed Price Range Jatropha Seed Price
Cereals Paddy 15 1.76 - 4.36 2.10 induced to divert his land for cultivating jatropha if the ex-re-
Wheat 12 1.59 - 3.33 2.28 finery gate price of biodiesel exceeds this critical price level.
Maize 10 1.58 - 2.61 1.89 On an energy parity basis, the corresponding critical import
Jowar 6 1.72 - 2.00 1.86
parity ex-refinery gate HSD prices have also been calculated,
Bajra 5 1.84 - 1.95 1.87
Ragi 2 1.55 - 2.04 1.80
which again reflect the minimum price of HSD, which, if ex-
Barley 2 2.05 - 2.61 2.33 ceeded, would make the cultivation of jatropha attractive.
Pulses Gram 8 2.09 - 2.91 2.52 On the basis of the GR earnings for principal crops and a range
Tur 7 1.97 - 2.92 2.52 of jatropha oilseed prices, we have calculated the median com-
Masur 4 2.19 - 3.03 2.52
peting jatropha oilseeds price for each principal crop (Table 5).
Urad 8 1.70 - 2.56 2.11
Moong 4 1.73 - 2.27 2.01 However, the choice of the crop sown depends on the agricul-
Oilseeds Groundnut 5 1.64 - 2.61 2.31 tural season, whether it is the rabi or kharif season. As a result, a
Rapeseed and mustard 7 1.89 - 3.21 2.77 farmer may grow more than one crop in an agricultural year.
Soybean 4 2.08 - 2.51 2.29
However, for estimating the GR earnings for principal crops we
Sesamum 6 1.94 - 2.66 2.35
Sunflower 3 2.03 - 2.17 2.14 have assumed that farmers cultivate only one principal crop a year.
Nigerseed 2 1.97 - 2.18 2.07
Safflower 1 2.16 - 5.3 Critical HSD Linked Biodiesel Prices
Fibres Cotton 9 1.49 - 3.62 3.06 The market demand for jatropha would depend on the marginal
Jute 3 1.86 - 2.04 2.04
value productivity of jatropha oilseeds in biodiesel production.
Miscellaneous Sugar cane 7 4.91 - 7.27 5.49
VFC tobacco 1 2.43 - In the transport sector, biodiesel will be used for blending or as
Source: Authors’ calculations. a substitute for HSD. In such a situation, the biodiesel price will
year of the plantation. The estimated crop-wise jatropha oilseeds be determined on an energy parity basis vis-à-vis HSD. In other
value, if fixed, will thus be sufficient to cover the opportunity words, the value that will be offered for jatropha oilseeds will
cost of diverting the agricultural land for jatropha cultivation. ultimately depend on the HSD price, which will further influ-
Further, the estimated value of one kg of jatropha oilseeds ence the biodiesel price. In this section, we analyse what the
corresponding to a specific crop and the cost of conversion of raw critical biodiesel and HSD prices are, estimated on the basis of
jatropha oil into biodiesel taken together gives us an estimate crop-wise competing jatropha oilseed prices.
of the critical biodiesel price that would induce a reallocation The critical biodiesel price for a particular agricultural crop is
of resource in agriculture. The bio-refinery cost of producing estimated taking into account the competing jatropha seed price
biodiesel from raw jatropha oil (excluding the cost of raw mate- corresponding to that crop and the bio-refinery cost of producing
rial) is estimated to be Rs 9.50 per kg of biodiesel (GOI 2006b). biodiesel from raw jatropha oil. The amount of jatropha seeds
Note that the critical biodiesel price calculated is the minimum required for producing one kg of biodiesel is estimated to be
price of biodiesel for which returns to a farmer are just sufficient 3.28 kg. Thus, adding the cost of raw material and the bio-
Table 6: Critical Biodiesel and HSD Prices (Rs per Litre) refinery cost gives us an estimate of the value of
Crops No of Critical Biodiesel Median Critical Critical HSD Median Critical one kg of biodiesel. Using the conversion factor
States Price Range Biodiesel Price Price Range HSD Price
Cereals Paddy 15 12.24-19.06 13.12 13.15-20.47 14.09
of one kg of biodiesel being equal to 1.2486
Wheat 12 11.78-16.35 13.59 12.65-17.56 14.60 litres of biodiesel, we determine the value of
Maize 10 11.77-14.47 12.59 12.64-15.54 13.52 biodiesel in rupees per litre. On an energy
Jowar 6 12.12-12.86 12.51 13.02-13.81 13.43 parity basis, we estimate the corresponding
Bajra 5 12.45-12.73 12.53 13.37-13.67 13.45
critical HSD price. The conversion factor used
Ragi 2 11.68-12.97 12.33 12.55-13.92 13.24
Barley 2 12.49-14.46 13.73 13.95-15.53 14.74 is based on the calorific value of HSD and bio-
Pulses Gram 8 13.10-15.26 14.24 14.07-16.39 15.29 diesel. One kg of HSD is equal to 10,170 kilo-
Tur 7 12.77-15.27 14.24 13.72-16.40 15.29 calories and one kg of biodiesel is equal to
Masur 4 13.36-15.58 14.34 14.35-16.73 15.40
9,470 kilocalories. The critical HSD-linked bio-
Urad 8 12.08-14.32 13.15 12.97-15.38 14.12
Moong 4 12.15-13.56 12.88 13.04-14.56 13.84 diesel price range for all the principal crops,
Oilseeds Groundnut 5 11.93-14.46 13.66 12.81-15.53 14.67 which, if exceeded, will make jatropha culti-
Rapeseed and mustard 7 12.58-16.04 14.90 13.51-17.23 16.00 vation competitive, are calculated (Table 6).
Soybean 4 13.08-14.19 13.62 14.04-15.24 14.62 The HSD domestic storage point price was
Sesamum 6 12.69-14.60 13.80 13.63-15.68 14.82
Sunflower 3 12.94-13.32 13.22 13.90-14.30 14.20
Rs 26.16 per litre on 30 September 2008 and
Nigerseed 2 12.78-13.32 13.05 13.72-14.31 14.02 this declined to Rs 22.61 per litre on 1 May
Safflower 1 13.29 13.29 14.28 14.28 2009, on account of fluctuations in crude oil
Fibres Cotton 9 11.53-17.11 15.66 12.39-18.37 16.82 prices. In comparison to these HSD storage
Jute 3 12.34-12.98 12.48 13.26-13.94 13.41
point price levels, our estimated critical HSD
Miscellaneous Sugar cane 7 20.52-26.70 22.02 22.04-28.63 23.65
VFC Tobacco 1 13.99 – 15.02 – prices are on a much lower side. We have also
Source: Authors’ calculations. calculated the median critical HSD price against
72 october 6, 2012 vol xlviI no 40 EPW Economic & Political Weekly
 SPECIAL ARTICLE
Table 7: Coefficient of Variation (CV) for Critical Bio-diesel and HSD Prices estimated critical biodiesel and HSD prices for the principal crops
States No of Average Critical Biodiesel CV Average Critical HSD Price CV respectively (Table 7). A lower CV makes food or other agro-
Crops Price (Rs per litre) (Rs per litre)
Kerala 1 12.75 - 13.69 - products vulnerable to a competitive threat from energy culti-
Orissa 7 12.88 1.01 13.83 1.01 vation if the imputed critical prices of biodiesel or HSD are lower
HP 2 12.69 1.17 13.63 1.19 than the actual prevailing one.
Assam 3 12.52 1.30 13.45 1.28
As expected, there is only a marginal difference between
Chhattisgarh 7 13.21 3.50 14.19 3.49
Bihar 5 14.30 6.91 15.36 6.93
the CV for critical biodiesel prices and critical HSD prices. Note
Jharkhand 5 12.81 7.13 13.76 7.12 that Kerala is the only state for which we could not estimate
Gujarat 7 14.35 7.85 15.41 7.86 the CV because paddy is the only crop considered. In states
Punjab 3 17.51 7.98 18.80 7.99 such as Orissa, Himachal Pradesh and Assam, the estimated
West Bengal 4 13.07 8.91 14.03 8.89
CV for the critical HSD prices is found to be close to 1%. In the
MP 12 13.59 9.55 14.59 9.54
Rajasthan 12 13.92 10.05 14.95 10.06
case of Orissa, seven principal crops have been taken into con-
AP 12 14.75 14.24 15.85 14.25 sideration. This implies that there is a greater threat to the cul-
UP 12 14.26 15.63 15.31 15.64 tivation of these crops as farmers will be more attracted to the
Tamil Nadu 8 14.14 19.81 15.19 19.83 cultivation of jatropha curcas. In Chhattisgarh too, seven crops
Maharashtra 12 13.80 25.02 14.82 25.01
have been taken into account and the CV is estimated to be
Haryana 6 16.86 27.07 18.10 27.07
Uttarakhand 4 15.04 31.18 16.15 31.19
3.49% for the critical HSD prices. Further, the CV is estimated
Karnataka 9 14.64 31.27 15.72 31.26 to be less that 10% in Bihar, Jharkhand, Gujarat, Punjab, West
Source: Authors’ calculations. Bengal and Madhya Pradesh, implying the greater attractive-
each crop. Except sugar cane, the highest estimated median ness of jatropha cultivation in these states. On the other hand,
critical HSD price is Rs 16.82 per litre for cotton cultivation and in Haryana, Uttarakhand and Karnataka, the CV is found to be
the lowest median price is Rs 13.24 per litre for ragi cultivation. 27%, 31% and 31% respectively. This in itself reflects the much
Sugar cane is the only crop where the estimated median criti- lower attractiveness of jatropha cultivation in these states.
cal HSD price is Rs 23.65 per litre.
To promote the use of biodiesel as a transport fuel across 6 Conclusions
states, the government announced its biodiesel purchase policy The study finds that jatropha plantations will involve higher
on 9 October 2005 and fixed the price of biodiesel at Rs 25 per paid-out expenses to be incurred by Indian farmers, thus re-
litre for the oil marketing companies. The highest estimated stricting the potential benefits of the development of an agro-
median critical biodiesel price is Rs 15.66 per litre for cotton based energy producing industry to only a section of the farm-
cultivation and the lowest Rs 12.33 per litre for ragi cultivation. ing community having access to credit at a reasonable cost.
However, in the case of sugar cane cultivation, the median Given the assumptions and the criteria used in the study, jat-
biodiesel price is Rs 22.02 per litre. ropha cultivation fares better in terms of profit margin and GR
These low estimates of critical biodiesel and HSD prices are of earnings in comparison to a variety of food and non-food agri-
great significance because of the growing uncertainty over the cultural crops with the exception of sugar cane.
availability of low-cost crude oil reserves in the near future. Thus, On account of the overall competitiveness of sugar cane and
a rising trend in the price of crude oil and petroleum products such jatropha cultivation on the one hand and the volatility of crude
as HSD cannot be ruled out. It may be noted that higher prices for oil prices on the other, a major thrust on the development of bi-
petroleum-based fuels such as HSD will promote the cultivation ofuels as alternative fuels for the Indian transport sector can pose a
of energy feedstock and this may put constraints on the availabil- challenge to the security of food and non-food agricultural sup-
ity of the agricultural land for the cultivation of principal crops. plies. In addition, the low estimate of the CV of critical HSD
Further, to assess the vulnerability of cultivation of principal prices, making jatropha oilseeds competitive vis-à-vis other ag-
crops because of low critical HSD and biodiesel prices, we have ricultural products, reinforces the seriousness of the challenge
estimated the coefficient of variation (CV) for each state using the of energy versus food and agricultural supply security.

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(2004): Jatropha Curcas (Coimbatore: Tamil
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Economic & Political Weekly EPW october 6, 2012 vol xlviI no 40 73


Engendering Social
Protection Strategies
Nupur Joshi
N
aila Kabeer’s main aim in this
book is to investigate the con-
straints that face women located
mainly in the informal economies. The
book makes several strategy and policy
suggestions in this regard. In particular,
the women from low-income households
are considered, those who are engaged
in casual, poorly paid and irregular ac-
tivities that lie largely outside the formal
social security and protective legisla-
tion. She also examines why such a vast
majority of women are engaged in these
forms of work and what implications this
has for their ability to provide for them-
selves and families and what could be
done to cope with their insecurity. An
attempt is made here to evolve an analy-
tical framework, one that blends gender,
life course and livelihoods perspectives,
traversing the interactions between gen-
der inequality, household poverty and
labour market forces that help produce
gender-differentiated experiences of risk
and vulnerability suffered mainly by the
working poor.
The book draws on practical experi-
ences and using this framework high-
lights the relevance of a gender-analyti-
cal approach in the designing and evalu-
ation of a range of social protection
measures that are extremely useful to
women at different stages of their lives.
Some of these include conditional and un-
conditional social transfers to mitigate
child labour, promoting their education,
providing childcare support for working
Economic & Political Weekly EPW october 6, 2012
Gender & Social Protection Strategies in the
Informal Economy by Naila Kabeer (Routledge,
London: Commonwealth Secretariat), 2010; pp xviii + 385,
Rs 795.
women, ensuring financial services for the
poor, employment generation through
public works as well as appropriate meas-
ures for old age security.
An important issue that the book
deals with is the value of an organised
voice for working women if they are to
make sure that employers, trade unions
and governments respond effectively to
their need for socio-economic security.
The crucial lessons that emerge from the
discussion and the linkages between
social protection strategies and the
broader macroeconomic framework are
put together here.
Global Forces
The Introduction points out that a major
restructuring of the global economy
took place in the 20th century with pro-
found implications for lives and liveli-
hoods of people across the world. It be-
gan with an international division of
labour and pattern of trade largely shaped
by colonial interests. Poorer countries
produced and exported primary com-
modities to the rich while the latter spe-
cialised in the production and export of
manufactured goods. The period after the
second world war was characterised by
high rates of economic growth and full
employment in advanced industrialised
vol xlvii no 40
BOOK REVIEW
countries. An important phenomenon,
which occurred, was the deregulation of
labour markets across the world, which
was further accompanied by reductions
in social security provisions. “This resulted
in labour markets becoming increasingly
informal and labour turned into an ex-
tremely flexible resource that could be
hired and fired in response to the market
signals”, the author observes. The scale
of integration into the global economy
exposed many countries to the vagaries
of the global capital markets. This crisis
played a major role in drawing attention
to various risks associated with globali-
sation and most importantly, the need
to rethink about the nature of social
protection in order to tackle the changing
nature of employment. The book attempts
to introduce a gender perspective into
these efforts.
Within such a context, Chapter 1 deals
with the core concepts in current think-
ing about social protection and the
approaches taken by different actors
within the development community in
defining its content and boundaries.
The chapter focuses on risk, vulnera-
bility and social protection. These con-
cepts bring forth the fact that although
poverty measures have captured the
state of deprivation at a particular point
in time, the problem for the poor also
relates to their insecurity, vulnerability
and fluctuations in ability to meet basic
needs. As the book notes,
Social protection is a response to this more
dynamic understanding of poverty. As a
broad analysis framework, it refers to the
full range of interventions undertaken by
public, private and voluntary organisations
and informal networks to support individuals,
households and communities in efforts to pre-
vent and overcome risks and vulnerabilities.
The key concern of this book is with
social protection as public policy. Social
37
BOOK REVIEW

protection refers to particular policy
approaches and instruments that deal
with the problems of risk and vulnera-
bility, encompassing various forms of
social insurance and assistance that
traditionally made the social security
agenda associated with formal employ-
ment. It also considers public works and
income generating programmes thro-
ugh which poorer countries have tried
reducing poverty.
Although there is some convergence
on possible instruments of social pro-
tection and consensus about the broad
approach, significant differences in philo-
sophy and interpretation exist. Hence
Chapter 1 compares the World Bank
approach to social protection with the
International Labour Organisation app-
roach to clarify some of these differences.
Crucial New Players
In a nutshell, various changes in global
environment where the crucial players
include new technologies, economic
liberalisation, demographic changes and
the deregulation of labour markets eluci-
date the increased attention to risk,
vulnerability and social protection in the
overall international policy discourse.
Chapter 2 examines these changing
dynamical trends in the labour force and
implications for labour market vulnera-
bility. It delineates the factors that lead
to the growing involvement of women
with the labour market and their con-
centration in informal forms of work. It
then provides a sketch of the evolving
patterns of female economic activity in
the global economy focusing on the
growing feminisation of the labour force
and the concentration of women work-
ers in informal categories.
An analytical framework to explore
this dual phenomenon is developed in
Chapter 3. This is examined from a micro-
perspective. Consequently it lays the
groundwork for the analysis of social
protection measures, exploring the insti-
tutional framework to add to the under-
standing of the wider social context of
the household’s search for survival and
security. The book highlights the fact
that, this search is not governed by
purely individual motivations but is
carried out through cooperation between
individuals in different spheres of the
society (p 52). The analytical framework
developed here suggests that women
may also face certain additional gender-
related constraints on ability to participate.
The author points out,
The rationale for a gender-analytic ap-
proach to social protection essentially rests
on gendered interdependencies within the
household, particularly the interdependence
between women’s work and children’s well-
being (p 94).
Social Protection Framework
Chapter 4 is devoted to the youngest work-
ers in an informal economy, namely,
children. The author stresses, “The over-
all aim of social protection measures
should be the removal of working chil-
dren from the labour force and the pro-
motion of their educational attainment”
(p 102). The crux of this chapter implies
that to break the intergenerational cycle
of poverty, these measures need to go
beyond simple bans on child labour or
declarations about right to education.
The urgent need is to address the under-
lying factors that push children into the

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38 october 6, 2012 vol xlvii no 40 EPW Economic & Political Weekly


labour force keeping them out of school.
An interesting point portrayed through
this chapter is, in situations where dis-
crimination exists, it might be essential
to design gender-differentiated schemes
or add design features that provide
parents with the incentive needed to
cooperate with programme objectives.
Hence the chapter brings forth the fact,
that instruments are not a substitute for
a coherent strategy for social protection
and that such a strategy can only be ef-
fective when it is part of a broad policy
environment into which economic and
social goals have been integrated.
Programmes that seek to promote
waged or salaried employment opportu-
nities for economically active members
of the adult population are discussed in
Chapter 5. It deals with schemes rele-
vant to those sections of informal labour
force that are willing to undertake
waged employment. An important im-
plication is that employment generation
schemes may contribute to survival and
some degree of security, but at less than
market wages and hence cannot substi-
tute for wider economic and social poli-
cies addressing the need for sustainable
generation of employment and the terms
on which poor are able to access these
opportunities (p 185).
Chapter 6 discusses financial services
available to women in the informal eco-
nomy and focuses on microfinance as a
highly versatile policy instrument lend-
ing itself to promotion of livelihoods and
managing risk and coping with crisis,
transforming gender asymmetries with-
in the household and market domains.
The author avers that microfinance is of
special relevance to sections of the
working poor, which are less likely
to benefit from waged opportunities
offered by public works schemes. The
extent to which microfinance reaches
women in low-income households and
its role in protecting and promoting
their livelihood efforts is examined and
analysed. A crucial lesson emerges out
of the studies of microfinance services
around the world, namely, the design of
these services – their appropriateness
to the needs of their clientele and to
the context in which they are located –
have an important influence on their
Economic & Political Weekly EPW october 6, 2012
outcomes (p 229). This chapter also
points out limitations of microfinance
and the author emphasises, “One reason
why microfinance has not generated sus-
tained movements out of poverty has
been found to relate to the segmented
nature of livelihood opportunities for
the poor and poor women in particu-
lar” (p 231). She stresses that majority
of the programmes fail to tackle the
gender constraints that confine women
entrepreneurs to narrower and less
profitable forms of trade and business,
and that the major limitation of micro-
finance services on offer to the poor is
self-exclusion of the very poor. The
chapter concludes by explaining that
microfinance certainly has an impor-
tant role, but in the context of a com-
prehensive system of social protection,
which can underwrite the risks faced
by different sections of the poor and
provide them with the ladders they
need to climb out of poverty.
Chapter 7 surveys various approaches
for addressing the vulnerability of the
economically inactive or less active poor,
using the elderly as the prime example.
It focuses on pensions and transfers as
social protection for the elderly and
indigent. Contributory pension schemes
such as the pay-as-you-go (PAYGO) entail
intergenerational funding, so the con-
tributions of the currently active genera-
tion finance the pensions of the currently
retired. The author points out that expe-
riences with social pensions and cash
transfers for the elderly, the disabled and
the widowed have yielded important les-
sons, both gender specific and general.
The Voice of Women
Chapter 8 emphasises the indispensa-
bility of the voice of working women. It
emphasises the importance of an organ-
ised voice and explains how such a
voice can go a long way in influencing
critical decision-making processes that
affect their lives. As the ILO puts it,
“People in informal work represent the
largest concentration of needs without
voice, the silent majority of the world
economy” (p 264). It is precisely in
this sense that “voice” has to be seen as
a fundamental dimension of social
protection for this vulnerable majority.
vol xlvii no 40
BOOK REVIEW
The author explains that the exercise
of organised rather than individual voice
is of crucial importance to the collective
bargaining capacity of the working
poor in relation to other market players
and is essential to ensure the represen-
tation of their needs and interests in
policy discourse.
The chapter points out that the ab-
sence of such a voice from the design
and implementation of social protec-
tion measures many a times results in
the exclusion of these groups (p 264).
Finally Chapter 9 works towards a
“generative” model of social protection.
As the author points out, the gist is that
social protection strategies, however
well designed, cannot substitute for wider
economic and social policies for the sus-
tained generation of livelihood opportu-
nities (p 315). More importantly, this
model is based on increasing evidence
that social protection measures can in
fact contribute simultaneously, both to
the greater security of livelihoods of vul-
nerable groups and to the mainstream
goals of development, including eco-
nomic growth, human development and
good governance. The idea that social
protection can yield these “double divi-
dends” is gaining increasing recognition
within the development community.
Such findings suggest that social protec-
tion measures need to be analysed by
their impacts as well as by their objec-
tives (p 330).
Kabeer’s book is a logical continuation
of her previous work, Mainstreaming
Gender in Social Protection for Informal
Economy (2008) and is a must read for
policymakers, women’s studies scholars,
trade union workers, development econo-
mists, social activists, and gender experts.
It is a book that can be an inspirational
source for a wide audience and it builds
hope for fruitful results in the future.
Nupur Joshi (nupur.joshi@yahoo.com) has
done her masters in economics from Mumbai
University.
Subscription Numbers
Subscribers are requested to note their Subscription
Numbers mentioned on the wrappers and quote
these numbers when corresponding with the
circulation department.
39
EDITORIALS
Mining Violations
The Shah Commission’s report on illegal mining in Goa has a message for all states.
C
ommissions come and go with regularity. For the most
part, governments ignore their recommendations. Even
if they are not rejected outright, implementation is
delayed to the point of becoming meaningless. One suspects
this could be the fate of the groundbreaking report of the
Justice M B Shah Commission on the illegal iron ore mining in
Goa that was finally tabled in Parliament on 7 September after
a six-month delay. The 400-page report has recorded in
impressive detail not just the manner in which the state gov-
ernment, and in particular the department of mines, allowed
illegal mining to flourish under its watch, but also the ease with
which these mines got environmental clearances. As a result,
not only has the state lost Rs 35,000 crore in revenue between
2006 and 2011, but its environment has been grievously, and
probably irretrievably, damaged from the operation of mines
in ecologically fragile zones.
The commission’s report documents the many ways in which
governments break the law. For instance, successive Bharatiya
Janata Party (BJP) and Congress state governments conveniently
ignored applications for renewal of leases to the iron ore mines
knowing full well that there was a provision that would permit
mining to continue indefinitely under a “deemed extension”. In
other words, as long as the government did not reject the appli-
cation for renewal, the mines could continue to function. The
Shah Commission has rightly recommended a time limit of one
year for such deemed extension as otherwise the idea of limited
leases is pointless. However, the Union Ministry of Mines has
rejected this recommendation arguing that there would be
more avenues for corruption if mines face the threat of having
to close down and then restart. Given that the indefinite delay
in renewing licences was the real act of corruption, this is a
strange response to the commission’s recommendation. Yet it
comes as no surprise as it will help let off the hook former
Congress chief minister Digambar Kamat, who held the mines
portfolio from 2000 to 2012 during which time he switched
from the BJP to the Congress. If there is no time limit for renew-
ing licences, then a deemed extension will not be illegal and
Kamat can argue he was acting within the law.
Environmental clearances were another, and equally blatant,
violation of law where both the central and the state govern-
ments were involved. Unauthorised personnel, such as a chief
wildlife warden, were allowed to pass the environmental
clearances. As a result, not only were many hectares of forest-
land encroached upon and mined but even more were destroyed
8 october 6, 2012
by the dumping of ore. Water bodies were affected by the run-
off from the mines, yet this was not taken into account. And
mining was permitted dangerously close to areas known to be
biodiversity hotspots.
The BJP government in Goa is trying to demonstrate that it
has taken the Shah Commission recommendations seriously. The
leases to all 93 iron ore mines have been temporarily suspended
and the government is threatening to file first information reports
against the previous two Congress chief ministers and several
officials. However, the mine owners have been permitted to
transport and export the ore that has already been mined. In
other words, even though the ore mined was “illegal”, the state
government believes that mine owners, who have already
made crores of rupees by the illegality, should not be prevented
from making more money.
The Union Ministry of Environment and Forests (MoEF) does
not want to be left behind. Despite being roundly ticked off by
the Shah Commission for the manner in which environmental
clearances (ECs) were granted, it has quickly cancelled ECs
of all the mines. It has accused the BJP state government of
skirting the real issue by only temporarily suspending mining
operations. But in what way is the MoEF also not skirting issues?
Instead of simply cancelling the ECs, should it not investigate
how and why these clearances were given in the first place
and hold people responsible? The rot is so deep in the system
that unless it is rooted out, such blatant violations of standing
environmental laws and procedures will continue to repeat
themselves elsewhere.
Fortunately, despite the one-upmanship between the BJP and
the Congress Party, Goa has a vigilant civic society that will
not allow the recommendations of the Shah Commission to be
easily forgotten. The Goa Foundation has already filed a public
interest litigation (PIL) in the Supreme Court demanding that
the ore already mined should not be transported or traded. It
has also suggested the setting up of an independent authority
to supervise and regulate mining operations. If such an author-
ity ever becomes a reality, it could set an important precedent
for the way in which natural resources are managed in the
country. The Shah Commission report is significant not just for
Goa; it holds out lessons for many other states where natural
resources are being over-mined for the benefit of the few and at
the cost of the local people and the environment. We simply
cannot afford to allow it to gather dust and be forgotten like so
many others of its kind.
vol xlviI no 40 EPW Economic & Political Weekly
COMMENTARY

(Jha et al 2009, 2012a for employment,

NREGS: Interpreting the Jha et al 2011a for nutritional impact and
Jha et al 2012b for net transfers).1 The
Official Statistics second issue can only be addressed us-
ing household-level panel data to track
the movement of workers in and out of
Raghbendra Jha, Raghav Gaiha employment in the NREGS. Jha et al
(2011b) provide some evidence on this
The performance of the National 1 Introduction using household-level panel data for

Rural Employment Guarantee
Scheme, even as revealed by
government statistics, has been
disappointing and, if anything,
has deteriorated over time.
Using official data, this article
evaluates the NREGS according
to the average number of days
of employment per household,
the percentage of households
completing 100 days of
employment, the percentage
of expenditure against total
available funds, and the
percentage of work completed.
The performance across the
first two criteria has been
disappointing and the average
number of days of employment
per household has declined
over time. The percentage
of expenditure against total
available funds has risen sharply,
T
he National Rural Employment
Guarantee Scheme (NREGS) has
been hailed as India’s most ambi-
tious anti-poverty intervention. The leg-
islation for the job guarantee scheme
was enacted on 25 August 2005 and it
was launched on 2 February 2006. It
guarantees 100 days of employment a
year to at least one member of any rural
household who is willing to perform
unskilled labour for the minimum wage.
By combining rural development with
livelihood protection, the work is de-
signed to develop infrastructure such as
roads, irrigation and flood protection
measures. Beginning with the poorest
200 districts, the NREGS became a
nationwide programme in April 2008. It
was expected to generate two billion
days of employment in its first year of
operation. The NREGS’ performance is
crucial to the success of the Millennium
Development Goal of halving poverty
between 1990 and 2015. Figure 1: Median across States of Actual Expenditure as
In the budget of 2012-13, the aStates
Percentage of Planned Expenditure vs Median across
of Work Completed
amount set aside for the NREGS 100
was Rs 40,000 crore. Although 80
there has been earmarking of
the class of projects that can be
60
Rajasthan. This article addresses the third
question. In doing so, we rely on the gov-
ernment’s own reports on the NREGS
(GoI 2012a) for 2009-10 and 2011-12. The
2009-10 report contains data from April
2009 to December 2010 and the 2011-12
report contains data from April 2011 to
December 2011. We also use data reported
by the Ministry of Rural Development
for 2006-07 to 2011-12 (GoI 2012b).
We analyse the results according to
four criteria (1) the average number of
days of employment per household;
(2) the percentage of households com-
pleting 100 days of employment under
the NREGS; (3) the percentage of expen-
diture against total available funds; and
(4) the percentage of work completed.
The first two criteria are addressed
using data from the Ministry of Rural
Development’s “Report to the People”
(GoI 2012a), whereas the third and
fourth criteria are addressed using data

particularly since 2010-11, and has
been consistently higher than the
work completed as a percentage
of the work planned.
We are grateful to EPW for helpful comments
on an earlier draft and Manoj Pandey for
statistical assistance. The usual caveat applies.
Raghbendra Jha (r.jha@anu.edu.au) is with
the Australian National University, Canberra,
and Raghav Gaiha is with MIT and Australian
National University.
18
taken up by NREGS workers, it 40 Median expenditure against total
has never been made clear how 20
Median work completed
the results of the work will be
0
2006-07 2007-08 2008-09 2009-10 2010-11 2011-12
assessed. No cost-benefit analy-
sis or impact assessment has been done from another report by the same mini-
so far. stry (GoI 2012b). In Section 2 we report
Against this backdrop, it is important on the results and Section 3 concludes
to ask three key questions (a) how much with some policy recommendations.
benefit has accrued from this pro-
gramme to eligible workers; (b) have 2 Results
these benefits persisted over time; and Despite rapid economic growth in recent
(c) how much, and what type of, work years, India’s unemployment problem
has been completed using NREGS labour remains well-entrenched. The National
and how useful it has been? Sample Survey estimated aggregate un-
The first issue can be addressed using employment at 8.28% on a current daily
household-level cross section data and status (CDS) basis for 2004-05 but the first
some dimensions have been addressed survey on employment and unemployment
in a series of papers for selected states (GoI 2010) estimated unemployment in
october 6, 2012 vol xlviI no 40 EPW Economic & Political Weekly
 COMMENTARY

the economy as a whole at 9.4% in and 2011-12. Table 1 indicates the aver- Data on the percentage of households
2009-10, with 7.3% in urban areas and a age person days of employment under completing 100 days of employment are
staggering 10.1% in rural areas. In addi- the NREGS per household in India as a available only for nine months (April to
tion, a large part of the Indian labour whole and various states in 2009-10 and December) of 2009-10 and 2011-12.2
force is underemployed. So, if imple- 2011-12. The data are arranged in Table 2 shows that the percentage of
mented properly, the NREGS should help ascending order. households completing 100 days of em-
meet a basic need in rural India. For the country as a whole, average ployment went up sharply from 7.08 in
However, the performance of the NREGS, person days of employment fell from 2009-10 to 32 in 2011-12. However,
even as revealed by government statistics, 46.83 in 2009-10 to 32 in 2011-12. Across across the states, the median was only
has been disappointing and, if anything, the states of India, the median, mode slightly higher at 2.15, whereas there
deteriorated over time. Data on the and standard deviation were all lower was a sharp fall in the standard devia-
average number of days of employment in 2011-12. The lowest (highest) number tion. The mode was 0% in both years.
per household are available only for nine of days of employment was 14 (68) in Since agriculture is a seasonal opera-
months (April to December) of 2009-10 2009-10 and 6 (55) in 2011-12. tion, the results based on data for nine
Table 1: Average Person Days of Employment under NREGS Table 2: Percentage of Households Completing 100 Days of Employment
Per Household under NREGS
2009-10 2011-12 2009-10 (for Nine Months 2011-12 (for Nine Months
(for Nine Months Ending (for Nine Months Ending Ending December 2009) Ending December 2011)
December 2009) December 2011)
Arunachal Pradesh 0 Arunachal Pradesh 6
Arunachal Pradesh 14 Arunachal Pradesh 6
Kerala 0 West Bengal 14
Puducherry 20 West Bengal 14
Manipur 0 Puducherry 20
Goa 21 Puducherry 20
Meghalaya 0 Assam 21
Kerala 22 Assam 21
Mizoram 0 Punjab 22
Andaman and Nicobar 22 Punjab 22
Nagaland 0 Manipur 23
Dadra and Nagar Haveli 22 Manipur 23
Punjab 0 Goa 26
Punjab 25 Goa 26
Uttarakhand 0 Kerala 28
Lakshwadeep 26 Kerala 28
West Bengal 0 Odisha 29
West Bengal 28 Odisha 29
Andaman and Nicobar 0 Andaman and Nicobar 29
Gujarat 29 Andaman and Nicobar 29
Dadra and Nagar Haveli 0 Karnataka 30
Assam 30 Karnataka 30
Goa 0 Uttar Pradesh 30
Haryana 32 Uttar Pradesh 30
Lakshwadeep 0 Bihar 31
Odisha 32 Bihar 31
Tripura 1 Haryana 31
Uttarakhand 32 Haryana 31
Puducherry 1 Jammu and Kashmir 31
Jammu and Kashmir 35 Jammu and Kashmir 31
Odisha 2 Meghalaya 31
Meghalaya 38 Meghalaya 31
Sikkim 2 Uttarakhand 31
Maharashtra 41 Uttarakhand 31
Assam 3 Jharkhand 32
Sikkim 45 Jharkhand 32
Chhattisgarh 3 India 32
Chhattisgarh 46 India 32
Haryana 3 Gujarat 33
Himachal Pradesh 46 Gujarat 33
Himachal Pradesh 3 Madhya Pradesh 33
Tripura 46 Madhya Pradesh 33
Maharashtra 3 Chhattisgarh 34
India 46.83 Chhattisgarh 34
Gujarat 4 Tamil Nadu 34
Jharkhand 49 Tamil Nadu 34
Jharkhand 5 Maharashtra 35
Karnataka 50 Maharashtra 35
Tamil Nadu 5 Lakshwadeep 35
Madhya Pradesh 50 Lakshwadeep 35
Jammu and Kashmir 6 Rajasthan 36
Andhra Pradesh 51 Rajasthan 36
Madhya Pradesh 7 Mizoram 37
Uttar Pradesh 51 Mizoram 37
Uttar Pradesh 7 Himachal Pradesh 40
Manipur 55 Himachal Pradesh 40
India 7.08 Andhra Pradesh 41
Tamil Nadu 58 Andhra Pradesh 41
Karnataka 9 Sikkim 41
Mizoram 62 Sikkim 41
Andhra Pradesh 14 Tripura 55
Rajasthan 65 Tripura 55
Rajasthan 15 Nagaland NR
Nagaland 68 Nagaland NR
Daman and Diu NR Dadra and Nagar Haveli NR
Daman and Diu NR Dadra and Nagar Haveli NR
Chandigarh NR Daman and Diu NR
Chandigarh NR Daman and Diu NR
Bihar NR Chandigarh NR
Bihar NR Chandigarh
2009 (Summary statistics across states) 2011 (Summary statistics across states)
2009 (Summary statistics across states) 2011 (Summary statistics across states)
Mean = 3 Mean = 3
Mean = 39.06 Mean = 30.63
Median = 2 Median = 2.15
Median = 38 Median = 31
Standard deviation = 14.7 Standard deviation = 8.89 Standard deviation = 3.99 Standard deviation = 1.94
Mode = 46 Mode = 31 Mode = 0 Mode = 0
NR = not reported. NR = not reported.
Source: NREGA website, Ministry of Rural Development. Source: NREGA website, Ministry of Rural Development.

Economic & Political Weekly EPW october 6, 2012 vol xlviI no 40 19

COMMENTARY

Figure 2: Average across States and India of Actual Expenditure as a Percentage of Planned years – 2006-07 to 2011-12 – by various
Expenditure vs Average across States of Work Completed
states and the country as a whole. Also
(%)
120 presented are the values3 of the mean,
Expenditure as (%) of Average expenditure
planned expenditure (India) against total median and standard deviation across
100
states for each year as well as for each
80
state and India for the period 2006-12.
Average work Table 4 (p 21) reports similar statistics
completed
60 on completed work against planned
work over the six years (2006-12) in var-
40
Work completed as % ious states and the country as a whole.
of planned (India)
20 The key aspects of Tables 3 and 4
are summarised in Figure 1 (p 18) and
0 Figure 2.
2006-07 2007-08 2008-09 2009-10 2010-11 2011-12
Figure 1 shows the median percentage
Table 3: Actual Expenditure (Percentage) against Planned Expenditure
2006-07 2007-08 2008-09 2009-10 2010-11 2011-12 Mean Median SD
across states of actual expenditure as a
(2006-12) (2006-12) (2006-12) percentage of planned expenditure ver-
Andhra Pradesh 59.55 90.87 82.87 93.65 59.81 1472.94 309.95 86.87 569.94 sus the median percentage across states
Arunachal Pradesh 18.27 81.59 105.37 78.38 95.62 1.36 63.43 79.98 42.99 of work completed. Whereas the median
Assam 83.73 68.12 72.13 78.78 72.84 89.21 77.47 75.81 7.95 actual expenditure rose steadily (except
Bihar 59.84 69.02 62.79 82.08 81.46 93.63 74.80 75.24 13.07 for 2008-09 when it fell marginally per-
Gujarat 69.38 64.54 69.69 78.21 62.09 70.13 69.01 69.53 5.56
haps in response to the budgetary pres-
Haryana 77.26 90.22 68.61 75.82 89.40 115.27 86.10 83.33 16.55
sures emanating from the global finan-
Himachal Pradesh 68.89 77.80 66.34 92.33 69.53 81.04 75.99 73.67 9.81
Jammu and Kashmir 68.92 63.76 60.01 88.97 88.92 39.66 68.37 66.34 18.77
cial crisis), the median work completed
Karnataka 72.75 54.16 55.70 120.39 109.84 114.12 87.83 91.29 30.43 has always been lower than the median
Kerala 57.70 83.59 75.42 79.76 83.52 96.10 79.35 81.64 12.65 expenditure. Further, the median work
Madhya Pradesh 87.30 87.93 73.38 66.84 70.78 69.60 75.97 72.08 9.26 completed fell sharply between 2010-11
Maharashtra 35.86 37.98 56.80 52.91 60.14 109.70 58.90 54.86 26.80 and 2011-12, indicating a divergence of
Punjab 65.12 59.76 63.00 71.69 73.09 79.64 68.72 68.41 7.39 the two trends.
Rajasthan 80.95 102.54 88.65 78.73 53.62 72.76 79.54 79.84 16.32 These basic trends in Figure 1 are con-
Sikkim 57.37 82.78 88.87 62.49 102.13 64.38 76.34 73.58 17.66 firmed in Figure 2, which shows the mean
Tamil Nadu 60.15 73.65 55.95 73.04 82.67 81.39 71.14 73.35 10.95 percentage across states and India of actual
Tripura 90.56 95.47 95.48 75.82 99.04 93.74 91.68 94.61 8.25
expenditure as a percentage of planned
Uttar Pradesh 75.79 85.23 77.70 86.50 81.59 81.33 81.36 81.46 4.14
expenditure versus the mean percent-
West Bengal 62.62 75.43 73.51 90.71 91.44 97.34 81.84 83.07 13.35
Chhattisgarh 79.53 92.37 72.68 81.79 73.17 81.60 80.19 80.57 7.20
age across states and India of work com-
Jharkhand 72.44 84.69 57.14 72.00 78.40 70.64 72.55 72.22 9.20 pleted. Once again, there has been a di-
Uttarakhand 68.25 62.50 77.44 81.16 93.79 89.17 78.72 79.30 11.97 vergence in the trends of the two series.
Manipur 99.41 97.83 109.85 98.82 97.04 38.62 90.26 98.33 25.73 The jump in the mean expenditure
Meghalaya 81.74 79.68 75.28 84.38 95.82 82.39 83.21 82.06 6.91 across states is further confirmed in Fig-
Mizoram 63.24 91.41 94.43 97.47 95.69 52.45 82.45 92.92 19.46 ure 3 (p 21), which plots the standard
Nagaland 91.33 99.28 101.88 98.23 95.23 65.83 91.96 96.73 13.31 deviation of expenditure across states
Odisha 82.39 71.74 64.52 93.93 85.65 75.20 78.91 78.80 10.54 against the standard deviation of work
Puducherry NR NR 17.16 72.66 35.44 51.13 44.10 43.28 23.56 completed across states. Whereas the
Andaman and Nicobar NR NR 20.94 80.90 75.39 80.43 64.42 77.91 29.09
standard deviation of work completed as
Lakshwadeep NR NR 41.06 76.87 66.29 65.08 62.32 65.69 15.13
a share of total work has remained rela-
Dadra and Nagar Haveli NR NR 65.61 67.97 96.84 0.00 57.60 66.79 40.94
Goa NR NR 20.57 39.14 61.71 76.65 49.52 50.43 24.70
tively unchanged, there has been a sharp
Mean 70.01 78.66 69.088 80.38 80.56 117.26 82.66 79.52 17.703 jump in the standard deviation of actual
Median 69.38 81.59 70.91 79.27 82.13 80.035 77.21 79.65 5.59 expenditure against planned expenditure.
SD 16.89 15.28 22.46 14.73 16.57 248.79 55.79 16.73 94.59 The latter has been dominated essentially
India 73.08 82.26 75.07 82.99 74.79 90.34 79.75 78.66 6.63 by Andhra Pradesh, where actual expend-
NR = not reported. iture as a percentage of total expenditure
Source: Computed from NREGA website, Ministry of Rural Development.
was exceptionally high in 2011-12.
months in Tables 1 and 2 cannot be of days worked per household and the
extrapolated to cover 12 months. How- percentage of households working for 3 Conclusions
ever, the National Rural Employment the full 100 days in a year. This article has assessed India’s NREGS
Guarantee Act (NREGA) website does not In Table 3 we report on the percentage according to four criteria (1) the average
give information on the average number of expenditure of funds set aside for six number of days worked per household;
20 october 6, 2012 vol xlviI no 40 EPW Economic & Political Weekly
 COMMENTARY

Figure 3: Standard Deviation across States of Actual Expenditure as a Percentage of Planned crore, and the petroleum subsidy was
Expenditure vs Standard Deviation across States of Work Completed
250 38,371.32 crore. When these figures are
juxtaposed against the nearly Rs 17,000
200 crore that was the unspent amount in the
Standard deviation
(expenditure against total) NREGS budget in 2011-12 (Economic Times
150 2011), it is evident that this alone amount-
ed to almost 44% of the fuel subsidy. This
100
Standard deviation is a stark manifestation of the failure in
(work completed) designing and implementing projects
50
that are appropriate and likely to have a
0 substantial impact on the village econo-
2006-07 2007-08 2008-09 2009-10 2010-11 2011-12 my. Another serious failure is the tiny
Table 4: Completed Work (Percentage) against Planned Work fraction of households availing them-
2006-07 2007-08 2008-09 2009-10 2010-11 2011-12 Mean Median SD selves of the mandated 100 days of work
(2006-12) (2006-12) (2006-12)
despite an attractive wage rate, far in ex-
Andhra Pradesh 39.57 38.63 31.24 51.96 67.25 2.15 38.47 39.10 21.83
Arunachal Pradesh 80.04 94.35 33.13 44.58 37.73 0.00 48.31 41.16 34.11 cess of prevailing agricultural wage rates.
Assam 61.78 53.47 41.73 41.99 34.20 17.05 41.70 41.86 15.53 Reports abound of corruption at all
Bihar 48.09 51.40 50.82 45.73 40.68 0.23 39.49 46.91 19.63 stages with participants obtaining wag-
Gujarat 37.22 67.48 69.72 88.86 53.07 29.12 57.58 60.28 22.22 es, often long delayed, unrelated to the
Haryana 59.62 59.77 55.70 52.73 58.75 70.09 59.44 59.19 5.88 work done. Project activity is dull or
Himachal Pradesh 54.11 47.04 48.91 57.46 54.58 44.76 51.14 51.51 4.96
highly uneven with earmarked funds
Jammu and Kashmir 36.87 45.49 54.95 63.42 65.12 3.77 44.94 50.22 22.84
Karnataka 59.03 68.91 60.90 22.86 20.93 19.61 42.04 40.94 23.16 being siphoned off. Village panchayats
Kerala 82.80 88.30 51.52 71.04 92.38 77.21 82.80 16.45 and local officials are not silent or help-
Madhya Pradesh 48.80 39.82 40.36 44.05 42.38 14.56 38.33 41.37 12.09 less observers of the gravy train, but key
Maharashtra 48.88 34.88 42.96 42.58 38.02 2.52 34.97 40.30 16.60 to keeping it going. Even though official
Punjab 56.40 24.76 26.40 53.28 45.47 40.13 41.07 42.80 13.31
claims of higher agricultural wage rates
Rajasthan 39.78 28.61 42.54 45.39 26.25 7.79 31.72 34.19 14.01
Sikkim 65.19 39.11 47.16 67.01 66.29 18.38 50.52 56.17 19.55
and lower migration are mostly exag-
Tamil Nadu 32.94 45.05 32.58 38.71 45.16 19.82 35.71 35.83 9.54 gerated, if not fabricated, field reports
Tripura 82.60 88.72 91.93 26.61 90.98 73.53 75.73 85.66 25.02 suggest a growing sense of entitlement
Uttar Pradesh 65.34 69.09 61.23 65.86 59.59 36.31 59.57 63.28 11.89 among the deprived. For this reason
West Bengal 56.39 47.95 54.49 66.41 58.12 40.44 53.97 55.44 8.91 alone, the temptation to scrap NREGS
Chhattisgarh 49.61 64.05 53.43 56.39 57.15 29.33 51.66 54.91 11.93
must be resisted. Instead, a solution lies
Jharkhand 37.68 31.08 40.85 47.11 20.26 17.32 32.38 34.38 11.77
Uttarakhand 61.02 57.49 51.03 66.74 70.49 17.15 53.99 59.26 19.30 in a drastic overhaul of this scheme with
Manipur 55.79 9.37 74.56 81.26 89.62 0.00 51.77 65.17 38.25 greater transparency and accountability
Meghalaya 29.07 50.22 48.83 62.77 55.25 19.74 44.31 49.53 16.44 through social audits. The new guide-
Mizoram 82.13 45.36 73.31 82.10 85.34 8.48 62.79 77.71 30.40 lines announced by the Ministry of Rural
Nagaland 96.88 36.87 83.20 63.44 84.86 7.78 62.17 73.32 33.95 Development are a substantive response
Odisha 36.50 30.51 7.04 12.53 26.83 32.09 24.25 28.67 11.76
to these concerns. But whether the
Puducherry NR NR 100.00 97.27 0.15 4.99 50.60 51.13 55.51
Andaman and Nicobar NR NR 47.14 69.28 65.91 59.67 60.50 62.79 9.75 impact on the poor will be much greater,
Lakshwadeep NR NR 23.45 79.61 0.00 0.00 25.76 11.73 37.56 in particular to justify the expenditure
Dadra and Nagar Haveli NR NR 0.00 47.83 22.58 NR 23.47 22.58 23.93 on the programme, time alone will tell.
Goa NR NR NR 63.83 73.55 32.18 56.52 63.83 21.63
Mean 54.66 50.08 50.89 56.28 50.86 24.56 47.88 50.87 11.68
Notes
Median 54.95 47.04 48.91 54.83 54.91 18.38 46.50 51.87 14.20
1 Shankar and Gaiha (2012) blend economic and
SD 17.06 19.85 22.79 18.59 23.95 23.73 20.99 21.32 2.893
ethnographic arguments to provide further ev-
India 47.15 46.04 43.76 48.94 50.88 20.25 42.83 46.59 11.33 idence on the impact of the NREGS on the poor.
NR = not reported. 2 Data for the intermediate year 2010-11 is not
Source: Computed from NREGA website, Ministry of Rural Development. available for the variables discussed in Tables 1
and 2 on this website.
(2) the percentage of households com- It is difficult to escape the conclusion 3 Values for the mean, median and standard
pleting 100 days of employment; (3) the that the NREGS has not performed well. deviation are each unweighted corresponding
magnitudes across states.
percentage of allocated funds spent; and In these days of very high fiscal and
(4) the percentage of work completed. current account deficits, it is difficult to
The performance across all four criteria rationalise providing more funds to this References
has been disappointing and, except for initiative. Documents of the 2012-13 Economic Times (2011): “NREG Frees Funds for Health,
the percentage of households completing budget (GoI 2012) reveal that in 2011-12 Education”, http://articles.economictimes.in-
diatimes.com/2011-03-05/news/28657212_1_
100 days of employment, has deteriorat- the fertiliser subsidy was Rs 62,301.21 f lagship-schemes-unspent-funds-mgnrega,
ed over time. crore, the food subsidy was Rs 63,843.79 accessed on 26 July 2012.

Economic & Political Weekly EPW october 6, 2012 vol xlviI no 40 21

COMMENTARY
GoI (2010): Report on Employment and Unemployment
Survey (2009-10), Labour Bureau, Ministry of La-
bour and Employment, Government of India.
– (2012): Budget Documents for 2012-13, Ministry
of Finance, Government of India.
– (2012a): “Report to the People”, Ministry of
Labour and Employment, Government of India,
http://nrega.nic.in/circular/People_Report.html,
accessed on 26 July 2012.
– (2012b): “The Mahatma Gandhi National Rural
Employment Guarantee Act 2005”, Ministry of
Labour and Employment, Government of India,
http: //nrega.nic.in/netnrega/home.aspx, ac-
cessed on 15 August 2012.
22
Jha, R, S Bhattacharyya, R Gaiha and S Shankar
(2009): “Capture of Anti-Poverty Programs:
The National Rural Employment Guarantee
Programme in India”, Journal of Asian Economics,
Vol 20, pp 456-64.
Jha, R, B Bhattacharyya and R Gaiha (2011a): “So-
cial Safety Nets and Nutrient Deprivation: An
Analysis of the National Rural Employment
Guarantee Program and the Public Distribu-
tion System in India”, Journal of Asian Econom-
ics, Vol 22, pp 189-201.
Jha, R, R Gaiha, M Pandey and S Shankar (2011b):
“Switches In and Out of NREGS – A Panel Data
Analysis for Rajasthan”, ASARC Working
october 6, 2012
Paper 2011/02, Australian National University,
Canberra.
Jha, R, R Gaiha, S Shankar and M Pandey (2012a):
“Targeting Accuracy of the NREG: Evidence
from Madhya Pradesh and Tamil Nadu”, Euro-
pean Journal of Development Research, forth-
coming.
Jha, R, R Gaiha and M Pandey (2012b): “Net Trans-
fer Benefits under India’s National Rural Em-
ployment Guarantee Scheme”, Journal of Policy
Modeling, Vol 34, pp 296-311.
Shankar, S and R Gaiha (2012): Battling Corruption:
Has NREGA Reached India’s Rural Poor? (New
Delhi: Oxford University Press), forthcoming.
vol xlviI no 40 EPW Economic & Political Weekly
 october 6, 2012
‘On the Move Again’, It Seems
With the death of principled politics, big business has the last laugh.
T
he international credit rating agencies were threatening
to downgrade the country’s sovereign credit rating. A
piece in The Washington Post had described Prime Minister
Manmohan Singh as “a dithering, ineffectual bureaucrat presid-
ing over a deeply corrupt government”. Coalgate had created
the impression that the manner in which the coal blocks were
allotted were designed to benefit the private sector companies
which must have greased the palms of those who made the
awards, and the prime minister, instead of clarifying as to how
the allotments had been made when the coal ministry was under
his charge, chose to find fault with the Comptroller and Auditor
General’s report. Besides, day in and day out, the commercial
media had been flogging the “policy paralysis” story. How
should the government have extricated itself from this trap of
its own making? What better remedy than economic “shock
therapy”, which came on 13 September with the double-digit
percentage rise in diesel prices and the drastic cut in the subsidy
on liquefied petroleum gas. A second dose of the thunderbolt
was administered the very next day – allowing multinational
retail giants like Wal-Mart, Carrefour and Tesco to gain
management control in the business of multi-brand retail and
international airlines to acquire up to 49% of the equity capital
of domestic air carriers, and raising the limit to which foreign
investment can be made in domestic broadcasters from 49% to
74% of their paid-up equity capital. Moreover, not satisfied with
the estimated saving of Rs 60,000 crore in the subsidy bill on
petroleum products, the union government decided on a large
sale of its equity holdings in some public sector undertakings.
Big business and the commercial media were euphoric; the
prime minister had at last restored the country’s image amidst
foreign investors. Indeed, “India is on the move again” and other
such evocative expressions of elation found their way in repeated
broadcasts on this “big bang Friday” (14 September) and in print
the next day. Barack Obama would no doubt have been immensely
pleased, for the business prospects of the likes of Wal-Mart for
whom he had made a pitch in July were now bright once more.
For the people, the Congress Party, which leads the United
Progressive Alliance (UPA) government, could not have cared
less – you do not need to be an economist to know that the
steep rise in fuel prices were soon going to result in a further
increase in food prices (the people already burdened on that
Economic & Political Weekly EPW october 6, 2012 vol xlviI no 40
score since 2008) and a hike in public transport fares. The
Trinamool Congress (TMC), whose 2009 election manifesto
supported the entry of the likes of Wal-Mart and Carrefour in
multi-brand retail, sensed the alarm of the tens of millions of
small shop owners and threatened to withdraw support by its
19 Members of Parliament (MPs). This time it actually did so.
The segmented opposition, the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP)
and its National Democratic Alliance (NDA) partners on the
one hand, and the Left Front and its opportunist allies – the
Samajwadi Party (SP), the Biju Janata Dal, the Janata Dal (Secular)
and the Telugu Desam – on the other, correctly sensed the public
mood. They separately called a bandh on 20 September to protest
against the government’s shock therapy.
The public, of course, recalls that the BJP-led NDA had during
1998-2004 administered its own version of shock therapy in-
cluding big-bang privatisation, the agenda of big business.
Hence the principal opposition party’s credibility is low, but so
is the case of the parties with which the Left Front jointly issued
the call for the bandh, these outfits having all been BJP and/or
Congress allies at one time or the other since 1998. And, the
Left Front’s record of favouring big business in West Bengal
when it was in power there does not evoke any significant public
affinity for it either. Nevertheless, the bandh was fairly success-
ful in the states ruled by the opposition parties and in West
Bengal, given the strength of the Confederation of All India
Traders and other such associations which pledged support.
Indeed, Sitaram Yechury and A B Bardhan of the Communist
Party of India (Marxist) and the CPI respectively did not seem
to be ill at ease in the company of the BJP’s Murli Manohar
Joshi and Nitin Gadkari on the platform of a rally of traders in
Delhi on the day of the bandh.
With the withdrawal of TMC support, the Congress-led UPA
government is now in a minority, but with the assurance of
outside support from the Bahujan Samaj Party and the SP, and
with big business at its side, its stability is not in doubt. The
government has notified foreign direct investment in retail,
signalling that it is not going to back down. Indeed, the day
after the bandh the prime minister made a televised address to
the nation justifying the shock therapy in the national interest.
So brazen is the mood of those on the side of big business that
one editorial advised the government that its very survival
7
EDITORIALS

depended on the pace with which it went ahead with its pro-
investor policies. The government, of course, has no reason to
baulk at this point in time, given that Mulayam Singh Yadav,
the SP’s chief, was seen hobnobbing with Left Front leaders
on the day of the bandh and the very next day he came to the
rescue of the government on the plea of keeping “communal
forces” (the BJP) at bay. Principled politics is by now dead and
buried. Yet the Left Front plods on like Vladimir and Estragon,
endlessly and in vain, “Waiting for Godot” – over here waiting
for “democratic and secular” allies.

8 october 6, 2012 vol xlviI no 40 EPW Economic & Political Weekly

 LETTERS
Issn 0012-9976
Ever since the first issue in 1966,
EPW has been India’s premier journal for Role of CAG Proceeding a bit further, let me sub-
comment on current affairs mit the following proposition for general
and research in the social sciences.
It succeeded Economic Weekly (1949-1965),
which was launched and shepherded
by Sachin Chaudhuri,
who was also the founder-editor of EPW.
I must thank B P Mathur for writing an
excellent article on the attacks on the
Comptroller and Auditor General (CAG)
consideration and reflection. In the normal
course, there are three organs of state:
executive, legislature and judiciary. In
As editor for thirty-five years (1969-2004) (“The Meaning of the Attack on the India, we cannot subsume the CAG and the
Krishna Raj
gave EPW the reputation it now enjoys. CAG”, EPW, 15 September 2012). I would Election Commission under one of those
editor
like to add a footnote to the article. three categories. They are separately
C Rammanohar Reddy In my view, the CAG of India is unique – specified in the Constitution, in the same
Deputy Editor somewhat different from the CAG of the way as the executive, the legislature and
Bernard D’Mello United Kingdom (UK) and the Comptroller the judiciary. I venture to suggest that
web Editor
subhash rai General (CG) of the United States (US) – under the Indian Constitution we have
chief copy editor for three interrelated reasons. five organs of state: executive, legislature,
roger alexander First, the UK has no written constitu- judiciary, CAG and Election Commission.
Senior Assistant Editors tion, and so the concept of a constitu- That may seem a novel and radical prop-
Lina Mathias
aniket Alam tional authority as distinguished from osition, but I would request readers to
Srinivasan ramani a statutory authority has no application reflect on it.
ashima sood
Bharati Bhargava to that country. The CAG of the UK is Ramaswamy Iyer
copy editors an institution established by an Act of New Delhi
Prabha Pillai parliament. The US does have a written
jyoti shetty
Assistant editor
Constitution, but it does not mention NABARD and RBI
P S Leela the CG. That institution again is the cre-
editorial Assistant
lubna duggal
production
ation of an Act of the US Congress. The
CAG of India, on the other hand, is an
institution expressly created by the
P S Rao’s article (“NABARD and RBI: A
30-Year Legacy Being Upturned”,
EPW, 22 September 2012) has indeed
u raghunathan
s lesline corera Constitution of India. made a strong case for the Government
suneethi nair Second, the UK is not a federal or quasi- of India (GOI) not going forward with the
Circulation federal system (though it seems to be amendments proposed by the National
Gauraang Pradhan Manager
B S Sharma slowly moving in that direction) and there- Bank for Agriculture and Rural Deve-
Advertisement Manager fore the CAG is the supreme audit institu- lopment (Amendment) Bill, 2012 that
Kamal G Fanibanda tion (SAI) of the (unitary) UK government. would have the effect of eliminating, in
General Manager & Publisher The US is a federation, but the CG of the US one way or the other, the financial and
K Vijayakumar
editorial
is only the SAI of the federal government, operational links between the Reserve
edit@epw.in and not of the states. On the other hand, Bank of India (RBI) and National Bank
Circulation the CAG of India is the CAG for both the for Agriculture and Rural Development
circulation@epw.in
Advertising
union and the states. The federalism or (NABARD) and subverting the autonomy
advt@epw.in quasi-federalism of India is sui generis. of NABARD’s board of directors by mak-
Economic and Political Weekly Among the special features of the Indian ing its decisions subject to GOI approval.
320-321, A to Z Industrial Estate system are a common judiciary, a common I would broadly endorse Rao’s conclu-
Ganpatrao Kadam Marg, Lower Parel
Mumbai 400 013 CAG, and all-India services. sions, but for different reasons and in
Phone: (022) 4063 8282 Third, it follows from the above that the context of financial sector reforms
FAX: (022) 2493 4515
while the CAG of the UK is an officer of that is underway in India and the rest of
EPW Research Foundation parliament, and the CG of the US is part the world, including in another sizeable
EPW Research Foundation, established in 1993, conducts of the legislative branch, the CAG of India economy, China.
research on financial and macro-economic issues in India.
is not and cannot be an officer of parlia- RBI’s role in rural credit has already
Director
k kanagasabapathy
ment, for the simple reason that an of- undergone important changes since the
C 212, Akurli Industrial Estate ficer of parliament cannot be the CAG of establishment of NABARD, with many
Kandivali (East), Mumbai 400 101
Phones: (022) 2887 3038/41
the states. of its day-to-day functions transferred
Fax: (022) 2887 3038 Of course the duties, powers and con- to the latter. RBI’s residuary functions
epwrf@vsnl.com ditions of service of the CAG as well as mainly include the sanctioning of a
Printed by K Vijayakumar at Modern Arts and Industries,
151, A-Z Industrial Estate, Ganpatrao Kadam Marg,
those of the Chief Election Commissioner general line of credit to NABARD and an-
Lower Parel, Mumbai-400 013 and (and the other election commissioners) are nual allocations from its profits to the
published by him on behalf of Sameeksha Trust
from 320-321, A-Z Industrial Estate,
spelt out in laws enacted by parliament, two statutory funds now maintained by
Ganpatrao Kadam Marg, Lower Parel, Mumbai-400 013. but that does not make them officers NABARD. RBI, in its role as the central
Editor: C Rammanohar Reddy.
of parliament. bank, remains active in the spheres of
4 october 6, 2012 vol xlviI no 40 EPW Economic & Political Weekly

formulation of rural credit policy, follow-
up on priority sector lending by com-
mercial banks, and interaction with GOI
and NABARD on issues concerning rural
credit. It is expected that RBI would
continue to play this role and not dilute
it simply because it would no longer have
an ownership interest in NABARD.
In this context, the transfer of RBI-
held share in the capital of NABARD to
GOI seems to be consistent with the goals
of financial (banking) sector reforms
that are being implemented by the GOI
since 1994. One of the reforms envisages
that RBI should limit its functions to
traditional central banking allowing
retail financial institutions to increasingly
operate in a market-oriented, autono-
mous, competitive environment backed
by a regime of deregulated interest rates,
profitable financial intermediation and
self-regulation, supplemented by RBI’s
enhanced prudential supervision. While
NABARD is designed as a refinancing
agency (for all eligible banks), a regulatory
agency (for cooperative banks except
urban banks) under powers delegated
by RBI, and not as a retail commercial
bank, the ending of RBI’s ownership
interest in NABARD is in line with the
thrust of India’s broader financial sector
reforms. These will help eliminate any
conflict of interest situations in RBI’s role
as a central bank in the areas of mone-
tary policy and bank regulation vs the
shareholder of NABARD which substan-
tially depends on fiscal funding and deals
with retail banks including commercial
and urban banks that are supervised
by RBI.
I completely agree with Rao’s emphasis
that the government ownership of NABARD
does not mean that the Ministry of
Finance (MOF) should regulate or inter-
fere in its day-to-day operations or require
its (MOF’s) approval of the decisions taken
by its board of directors. Subjecting
NABARD board decisions to MOF approval
or MOF’s interference in day-to-day affairs
of NABARD will be clearly inconsistent
with India’s ongoing reforms. While by its
self-standing law, NABARD has a man-
date which MOF as a representative of
GOI (the owner) and executor of the
national budget should review and clarify
from time to time based on laws and
Economic & Political Weekly EPW october 6, 2012
resolutions passed by Parliament, it is
NABARD’s board of directors that is
responsible and accountable for imple-
menting this mandate.
It may be worth noting that like
India, China too has a large state-owned
banking system. Although China has a
long socialistic history and a strong
demonstrated commitment to ensuring
citizens’ welfare, it has either introduced
or is in the process of introducing major
reforms in the ownership and manage-
ment of individual state-owned banks.
The proposed reform agenda for state-
owned banks in China, similar to that in
India, involves a range of initiatives. These
include injection of private domestic
and foreign equity, diversification in the
composition of the board of directors to
bring in skills required, development of
annual business strategies and plans and
undertaking performance monitoring,
and above all providing autonomy to day-
to-day operations to allow government-
owned banks to operate as genuinely
commercial businesses.
NABARD is currently playing a major
role in developing viable rural financial
markets across the country, with a focus
on inclusion but it will not be able to
sustain this effort if it is not run as a
vibrant, viable, independent and account-
able financial institution with clearly-
defined business goals and without undue
regulation and interference by GOI.
Ramesh Deshpande
Arrest of Punjabi Publishers
and Editors
T he arrest of two Punjabi publishers
and two editors for reprinting books
of poet Babu Rajab Ali which allegedly
contained some then-used caste names
under the Scheduled Castes and Sched-
uled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act
is a thoughtless, callous and ruthless
action taken by the Punjab government.
We understand that Amit Mittar of
Tark Bharti Prakashan and Ashok Garg
of Sangam and editors Jagjeet Singh
Sahoke from Moga and Swatantar from
Samana, were arrested by the police on
15 September.
Babu Rajab Ali (1894-1979) was a
popular poet of Punjab. His poetry,
vol xlviI no 40
LETTERS
published much before Independence,
included qissas of Punjabi folktales like
Heer Ranjha, Dulla Bhatti, Mirza Sahiban,
and Bhagat Singh. His works have been
published by the Language Department
of the Government of Punjab, besides
various other publishers. A reprint of those
works cannot by any stretch of imagina-
tion be considered a criminal offence.
His works and the mention of the then-
used caste names in his poetry have to
be understood in a historical context.
Making a reference to traditional caste
names in academic works cannot be
construed as name-calling. Some schol-
ars make it clear in the beginning of
their works that references to historical
caste names are just for interpretation
of the context.
The Punjab government, in its over-
zealous thoughtlessness, has entered
controversial territory, as this is not the
only text containing traditional caste
names. Such a cleansing will need doing
away with all the classical Punjabi litera-
ture containing traditional caste names.
This includes not just poetry by the likes
of Bhai Gurdas, Waris Shah, Shah Hussain
and Dhani Ram Chatrik, who are regu-
larly published by various state depart-
ments and universities run by the Punjab
government, but, the sacred text of Guru
Granth Sahib too.
Also, the government should have
inquired from its agencies whether
these publishers and writers are really
against dalits or not. These publishers and
editors are known for producing pro-
dalit and pro-working class literature at
affordable prices.
We appeal to the people, whose feel-
ings have been hurt by these books, that
they look at these texts in a broader
context. This act of the Punjab government
is not only against freedom of expression
but also constitutes abuse of the law
and this is not what this law is meant
for. We condemn the government’s move
and demand immediate release of all
publishers and editors booked under
the SC/ST Act.
Pritam Singh, Harish Puri,
Amarjit Chandan,
Meena Dhanda,
Ronki Ram, Parmod Kumar
and others
5

Syria’s Tragedy
A popular uprising for democracy has ended up militarised and kidnapped by reaction.
M
ore than a year and half back, on 15 March 2011, when
the world was being turned upside down with what
was called the “Arab Spring”, many citizens and or-
ganisations of Syria called for a “Day of Dignity” to protest the
lack of fundamental freedoms and political rights. The call saw
hundreds of thousands of people coming out to demand their
rights from the government of Bashar al-Assad. Even before this
protest had taken place, the Syrian police had started arresting
the “leaders” and putting curbs on people to prevent them from
participating in the demonstrations. The protest itself was met
with harsh police measures but did not die down. As with most
other protests of the Arab Spring, it spread from city to city and
each day saw ever-increasing participation of people who would
normally stay away from “politics” in these countries.
True to its character, the only response of the Syrian regime
was to use its police, security and intelligence services to break
up the protests by arresting its leaders and creating conditions
that were meant to scare people away from participation. By
April the military was out in the streets shooting the protestors
and arresting hundreds all over the country. Syria has been
under emergency laws since 1963 and since 1971 has been
under the dictatorship of the Assads – of the father Hafez till
2000 and since then of his son, Bashar – and their Ba’ath party.
There have been no legitimate elections and political parties
which oppose the regime are not allowed. The ruling Ba’ath
party is in a formal alliance with a number of smaller parties,
including the two communist parties of Syria, but there is no
space for independent political opinion. In a context where
political opposition is criminalised and even political platforms
identified with popular protests are co-opted within the ruling
power structures, people had no legitimate space to express
their dissatisfaction and differences. Added to this was the
Assad regime’s political brinkmanship in the region and its
economic policies which engendered a strange formation of
crony state capitalism. Like with so many other tyrannical and
anti-democratic regimes of the region, Syria has been sitting
on a volcano of public anger that has been held down by
increasing oppression by the state.
Economic & Political Weekly EPW october 6, 2012 vol xlviI no 40
EDITORIALS
Even when faced with the widespread anger of the Syrian people,
Bashar-al Assad refused to find a democratic solution. Instead of
accommodating popular demands for political representation and
freedoms, he tried to browbeat the people into submission. The
increasing use of military force – including the shelling of citizens by
artillery units of the Syrian army – against unarmed and non-violent
protests not only helped the rise of armed opposition, it also made
the distance between the rulers and the ruled unbridgeable. The
military response of the Syrian regime has closed the possibility of
any democratic solution to the crisis and opened up space for the
entry of forces like the United States (US) and Saudi Arabia who
have used this opportunity to fund and supply the armed opposition.
Over this year and a half of a terrible civil war which has
claimed thousands of lives and reduced large parts of Syria’s
cities to rubble, the opposition now seems to be entirely subverted
by the imperialist do-gooders. The people of Syria, who have faced
one form of dictatorship after the other since their independence,
are today caught between two warring camps, one backed by Iran
and Russia and the other funded and armed by the US and Islamic
fundamentalists. It is a sad testament of our times that popular
movements for freedom often become geopolitical fodder, as we
have seen in Libya, Bahrain, Yemen and Syria.
The Government of India has thankfully adopted a sensible
position on this conflict. It has taken a stand against foreign
military intervention while asking for a non-violent and demo-
cratic resolution to the conflict based on negotiations between the
domestic players. While correct in its stance, this has little chance
of success given the level of violence in the conflict and the entry of
the major global and regional players. After more than a year of a
stalemate in the military standoff between the Assad military and
the “Free Syria Army”, it appears that the latter is slowly gaining
ground, helped no doubt by the external funding and massive
military and intelligence support they have received as also the
entrenched resentment of the Syrian people against the Assad
regime. Unfortunately, it appears that freedom from Assad and his
tyranny will only mean the coming to power of a regime that will be
dependent on the US and Saudi Arabia and will also be influenced
by Islamic fundamentalists who have already gained ground.
9
COMMENTARY
Where Do India’s Billionaires
Get Their Wealth?
Aditi Gandhi, Michael Walton
Out of India’s 46 billionaires in
2012, 20 had drawn their primary
source of wealth (at least
originally) from sectors that can
be classified as “rent-thick”
(real estate, construction,
infrastructure or ports sectors,
media, cement, and mining). The
remaining 26 billionaires had
drawn their primary source of
wealth from “other” sectors
(IT/software, pharmaceuticals
and biotech, finance, liquor and
automotives, etc). Overall, 43%
of the total number of billionaires,
accounting for 60% of billionaire
wealth in India, had their
primary sources of wealth from
rent-thick sectors. Indian
capitalism seems to have two
faces. Does international
experience provide a guide?
Aditi Gandhi (gandhi.aditi@gmail.com) is at
the Centre for Policy Research, New Delhi.
Michael Walton (Michael_Walton@harvard.edu)
is at the Kennedy School of Government,
Harvard University and the CPR.
10
O
ne of the most striking features
of India’s growth since the
1990s has been the sharp rise in
extreme wealth. Since the early 1990s,
the number and wealth of India’s billion-
aires has risen dramatically, in relation
to India’s own growth and in relation to
other countries. India is now an outlier
with respect to the size of billionaire
wealth relative to the size of her economy,
especially for a relatively poor country.
We present here some of the facts on
India’s billionaire wealth, over time and
in the international context. We also
look at the primary sources of the wealth
of billionaires. A tentative categorisation
suggests this is often from sectors in
which there is significant connectivity
with the state and potentially thick with
“economic rents”.
The extent of wealth raises questions
for India’s economy and polity. It might
be a sign of the dynamism of India’s cor-
porate sector. Or it could be problematic
to have such extreme wealth amidst both
continued poverty and a clearly corrupt-
ible state. Indeed, it has become increas-
ingly common to compare India today
with the United States’ “Gilded Age” of
the late 19th century Robber Barons.
Data
We have used data from the annual
billionaires list compiled by Forbes,
publicly available on forbes.com, and
based on research by Forbes staff. It aims
to include all sources of individual or
family wealth. There are many caveats:
it only includes disclosed wealth, and
wealthy individuals may well under-re-
port. However, it seeks to apply a con-
sistent methodology across countries
and over time, and we believe it is of
value in making comparisons.
The database includes information on
whether billionaires are self-made or
october 6, 2012
inherited, their nationality and country
of residence and main sectoral source of
wealth. We have classified billionaires
by their country of residence, excluding
Indian billionaires not resident in India,
such as Lakshmi Mittal.
There were two billionaires in India in
the mid-1990s, worth a combined total
of $3.2 billion. By 2012, there were 46,
with a total net worth of $176.3 billion.
Mukesh Ambani (Reliance Industries)
with a net worth of $22.3 billion was the
richest individual in India for the sixth
year in a row. Two billionaires, Azim
Premji (Wipro) and Savitri Jindal and
family (Jindal Steel) had wealth over
$10 billion, eight had wealth between $5
billion and $10 billion and the rest had
less than $5 billion.
The fortunes of billionaires move
closely with economic growth and the
stock market, which accounts for a large
part of their wealth. Billionaire wealth
soared with the stock market boom of
the mid-2000s, and then dropped sharply
(by almost 70%) when the stock market
crashed (by some 60%) in the wake of
the international financial crisis. By 2011,
total net worth was way above 2007
levels, if still below the 2008 high,
then fell below 2010 levels in 2012 as
stock market valuations and the overall
economy weakened (Figure 1, p 11).
How does growth of extreme wealth
compare with India’s overall growth?
Total billionaire wealth to gross domestic
product (GDP) provides a proxy (Figure 2,
p 11).1 This ratio rose from around 1% in
the mid-1990s to 22% at the peak of the
boom in 2008, and was still 10% of GDP
in 2012, reflecting both new entrants and
increased wealth of existing billionaires.
Figure 3 (p 11) then shows India’s bil-
lionaire wealth to GDP ratio in the inter-
national context for 1996 and 2012. In
1996, China and India had very low ratios.
Among the rich countries, the United
States (US) and the United Kingdom (UK)
had ratios in the range of 4% to 6% of GDP;
Japan was significantly lower. Oil-rich
Kuwait and Saudi Arabia had higher ratios.
Indonesia, Korea, Malaysia, Singapore
and Thailand had mostly higher ratios
than Brazil, Chile, Colombia and Mexico,
vol xlviI no 40 EPW Economic & Political Weekly
 COMMENTARY

Figure 1: Net Worth of Billionaires and the Stock Market Sources of Wealth
25,000 300
We turn now to the sources of wealth of
250
India’s billionaires from two perspectives:
20,000 Aggregate Net Worth (RHS)
inheritance and sector of origin.
200

Net Worth ($ bn)

Sensex (High)

15,000 Inherited and Self-made Wealth: Morck,

150 Wolfenzon and Yeung (2005) note an
10,000 interesting pattern across countries:
100
they find a positive association between
Sensex (LHS)
5,000
50 growth and self-made billionaire wealth,
but a negative one with inherited wealth.
0 0 While no causality can be inferred, this is
1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012
aligned with the view that self-made
Source: BSE database and Forbes.com
wealth is more likely to be associated with
Figure 2: The Ratio of Billionaire Wealth to GDP, 1996-2012 (%)
aggregate economic dynamism.
25
22.2
In addition to self-made and inherited,
Forbes also has a category of “inherited and
20
growing”, for billionaires who inherited
their wealth but subsequently experienced
15
substantial growth in wealth.3 Figure 4
12.1
11.4 11.9 (p 12) shows that while the largest number
9.9
10 of Indian billionaires (21) is “self-made”,
6.6 6.8 some 40% of total billionaire wealth is
4.6 in the “inherited and growing” category,
5
2.9 3.3 3.5
1.6
2.5
1.8 including, for example, Mukesh and
0.9 0.9 0.4
0 Anil Ambani.
1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 Caste origins are also of interest for
Source: Forbes.com and World Economic Outlook, IMF.
India. Damodaran (2008) has documented
countries notorious for their extreme levels Figure 3: Billionaire Wealth as a Proportion of GDP across Economies, Over Time
of inequality.2 East Asian countries have
Aggregate Net Worth as a % Share of GDP in 1996
often been characterised as paragons of 30
“shared growth” (World Bank 1993). SGP
25
There were indeed sharp reductions in
poverty incidence, but there was also 20
MYS
accumulation of extreme wealth by busi-
15
ness families in their growth process.
IDN THA
SAU
The picture changed dramatically by 10
CHL KOR KWT
the 2000s. Billionaire wealth as a pro- ECU
MEX
GBR
5
portion of GDP had fallen sharply in COL VEN ISR USA
IND BRA ARG JPN
Indonesia, Korea and Thailand in the 0 CHN RUS

wake of the 1997-98 east Asian crisis – 0 5,000 10,000 15,000 20,000 25,000 30,000 35,000 40,000
GDP Per Capita PPP
amidst a newly discovered concern with
“crony capitalism”. By contrast, wealth Aggregate Net Worth as a % Share of GDP in 2012
in Chile, Mexico and Russia rose sub-
20
stantially; Saudi Arabia and Kuwait ex- RUS
perienced some decline. Chile has a ISR
CHL
small number of very rich families in a 15
relatively small country that has experi-
IND USA
enced rapid growth. Mexico is renowned 10
MEX MYS
SAU
for its billionaires, many of whom were GBR SGP
COL
created in the era of privatisations in the THA BRA
5
early 1990s; this in particular helped the IDN CHN
VEN KOR KWT
ARG
business career of the world’s richest JPN
ECU
man Carlos Slim Helú. India is in inter- 0
0 10,000 20,000 30,000 40,000 50,000 60,000 70,000
esting company. The ratio also rose in GDP Per Capita PPP
China, but much less than in India. Source: Forbes.com and World Economic Outlook, IMF.

Economic & Political Weekly EPW october 6, 2012 vol xlviI no 40 11

COMMENTARY
the importance of the route from India’s
merchant castes to modern business
wealth, but also found increasing entry
into business activity from other groups:
from brahmin and other upper castes
Figure 4: The Distribution of the Number and
Wealth of Billionaires in Terms of ‘Inherited’,
‘Inherited and Growing’ and ‘Self-made’
(in %)
50
Proportion
Proportion of wealth of wealth
40
Number of Billionaires
Number of Billionaires (RHS) (RHS)
30
20
10
0 0
Inherited Inherited and Growing Self-made
Source: Author’s estimates from Forbes.com
(from “Office to Factory”) and from
Other Backward Classes (from “Field to
Factory”). This is evident in the billion-
aire list: 28 of the 46 billionaires in 2012
are from traditional merchant classes –
Banias (including Marwaris), Parsis and
Sindhis. A number belong to upper caste
communities, including brahmins (Mallya,
Murthy) and Khatris (Thapar, Munjal,
Mahindra). A smaller group comes from
other backward and lower castes such
as Nadar, Jat and Reddy. There is one
Muslim and no dalit.
Sectoral Sources of Wealth and ‘Eco-
nomic Rents’: All of India’s billionaires
are linked to corporate activity. There is
an array of sectoral sources, including
mining, energy, petrochemicals, phar-
maceuticals, information technology,
construction, real estate and finance.
This allows us to explore whether
wealth had its origins in domains with
extensive “economic rents” and links
with government.
By economic rent we mean a return to a
factor of production in excess of what
could be obtained from an alternative use
in a fully competitive activity. Economic
rents often flow from monopolistic eco-
nomic power or from the need to get
licences from government. Natural re-
sources, land, and the spectrum have
intrinsic economic rents, and typically high
levels of state control, as do a range of
activities involving government contracts.
There are also “Schumpeterian” economic
rents associated with discovery and cre-
ation of new products. India’s information
12
technology revolution is often put in
this category. The broader debate over
whether India’s capitalism is heading
towards oligarchic or competitive struc-
tures is closely linked to what kind of
economic rents are driving business
activity.4 In the rest of this article we use
rents to refer to the former category,
25 associated with market power, influence
20
or preferential access to licensing.
As a highly tentative exploration of
15
patterns, we draw a distinction between
10
activities in “rent-thick” sectors and
5 “others” – even if they involve some inter-
action with the state. The classification
should be considered as a cautious first
step. This draws on a survey of business
views on corruption by KPGM (2011), an-
ecdotal evidence on regulatory intensity,
and reports of alleged scams.
‘Rent-thick’: Sectors such as real estate,
infrastructure, construction, mining, tele-
com, cement and media have been clas-
sified as “rent-thick”, because of the per-
vasive role of the state in giving licences,
reputations of illegality, or information
on monopolistic practices. The real estate
sector is well known for the large
number of “black” transactions, and the
nexus between politicians and realtors
has been documented in recent scams
(e g, the Adarsh housing scam). Accord-
ing to the KPMG study, the real estate
sector is perceived to be the most corrupt
in India.5
Infrastructure projects, mining and
spectrum licence allocations are typically
granted through invitation of bids by the
government. Decisions have often been
disputed on grounds of transgressions,
such as the award of tenders for building
airports at Mumbai and Delhi6 or the fa-
mous 2G telecom spectrum allocation,
now the subject of trial over bribes.
Cement manufacturers have allegedly
been involved in a cartel for almost two
decades. In 2007 the Monopolies and
Restrictive Trade Practices Commission
initiated an investigation and a fine was
eventually imposed in 2012.7 Indian print
media is deeply embroiled in the paid
news scandal, and the Press Commission
of India launched an investigation after
the 2009 elections. It is alleged that the
released version of the report omitted the
names of the implicated companies.8
october 6, 2012
‘Others’: This category covers sectors
where the interaction with the state is
more limited, the regulator has a good
reputation and there is little anecdotal
evidence of scams. Sectors include IT/soft-
ware, engineering sector firms, pharma-
ceuticals, finance and banking. Many
corporations in this category do have some
form of agreement with the government.
For example, technology firms (Wipro,
HCL and Infosys) have been involved in
various state and central government
projects under the National e-Governance
Plan. Engineering firms often provide
equipment to government departments
or public sector units. Two firms, Torrent
Group and RPG Group, have diversified
business activities into power and have
supply agreements with government.
Another company, Serum Institute has a
vaccine supply agreement with govern-
ment (and is also involved in liquor). Yet
the core business of these firms is not
driven by government contracts.
Also included in “others” are pharma-
ceuticals, chemicals, light engineering
and finance and banking firms. Pharma-
ceutical companies are often in legal
battles with one another, but interac-
tions with government are more infre-
quent. Despite cases of accounting or
trading violations, the financial sector is
generally thought to be tightly regulated
by the Securities and Exchange Board of
India (SEBI) or the Reserve Bank of India.
Other manufacturing firms also now
require fewer permissions from the state;
we include in this category automobiles,
the leading paints manufacturer Asian
Paints and the conglomerate Spice group
with operations in various sectors includ-
ing mobile, retail, etc.
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Articles Published in EPW
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should be reproduced in any form without
prior permission of the author(s).
A soft/hard copy of the author(s)’s approval
should be sent to EPW.
In cases where the email address of the
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with the articles, EPW can be contacted
for help.
vol xlviI no 40 EPW Economic & Political Weekly

Patterns
The above, preliminary and tentative,
categorisation generates the following
pattern in 2012 (details available from
the authors on request):
● Twenty billionaires had their primary
source of wealth (at least originally) from
sectors classified as “rent-thick”: seven
from the real estate, construction, infra-
structure or ports sectors, three from media
and the rest from cement and mining.
● Twenty-six billionaires had their
primary source of wealth from “other”
sectors: six from IT/software industry,
eight from pharmaceuticals and biotech,
two from finance or banking, one from
liquor and nine from manufacturing
(automotives, FMCG, mobiles, electronics,
paints, etc).
Overall, 43% of the total number of
billionaires, accounting for 60% of billion-
aire wealth, had their primary sources of
wealth from rent-thick sectors (Figure 5).
Figure 5: Proportion of Billionaires and
Total Billionaire Wealth by ‘Rent-Thick’ or
Otherwise in 2012
Number of Billionaires Wealth of Billionaires
Rent thick
43% Others
57% Rent thick
60%
Source: Forbes.com and author’s calculations.
We also looked at changes over time: in
the early 2000s, the proportion of wealth
from the sectors classified as “others” rose,
while wealth from billionaires in “rent-
thick” sectors shifted back to dominance
in the second half of the 2000s (Figure 6).
There are many caveats around this
exercise, both in the allocation of sectors
and of billionaires to sectors. Classifica-
tion in a rent-thick sector does not nec-
essarily mean that wealth was acquired
through the (legal or illegal) exercise of
influence. However, it is notable that
impressive wealth creation occurred in
sectors with substantial potential for
rent-extraction and rent-sharing between
private and government players.
Business Dynamism or Oligarchy?
Does the rise in the billionaire class
herald enhanced business dynamism or
a business oligarchy? Do these results
Economic & Political Weekly EPW october 6, 2012
Figure 6: Distribution of Wealth of Billionaires by Sources of Wealth between 1996 and 2012
100
80
Others
60
40
20
0
1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012
Source: Author’s estimates from Forbes.com
have a larger significance? In particular,
did the opening of the economy contribute
to the entrenchment of incumbents in
the Indian business sector or unleash
dynamic, competitive forces? There is a
case for both.
The corporate sector has clearly
played a critical role in India’s economic
growth. The share of investment in GDP
rose from around 25% in 2000 to around
35% in 2010, with a substantial rise in
the share of the private corporate sector.
Mody, Nath and Walton (2011) provide
empirical evidence to support the view
Others
that profit behaviour of listed firms in
40% the corporate sector – including the
large business houses – is more typical
of competitive behaviour than of the ex-
ercise of market power.
On the other hand, the recent string of
scams points to widespread existence of
corruption, with anecdotal evidence sug-
gesting that the links between the govern-
ment and the business sector remain
strong. Indian capitalism seems to have
two faces. Does international experience
provide a guide?
We saw above that east Asian miracle
countries also experienced a combination
of corporate dynamism, accusations of
cronyism and concentrations of extreme
wealth. This mix was viable for a while –
though these countries did a much better
job than India in channelling the gains
from growth into broad-based service
provision and employment growth. How-
ever, the cronyism was a rising source of
distortion and contributed to the east
Asian crisis.
Mexico, amongst Latin American
countries, is a classic case of tight state-
corporate links creating extreme business
vol xlviI no 40
COMMENTARY
Rent thick
wealth. The Mexican business sector is
much more oligopolistic than India’s,
but the influence of big business over the
Mexican state is a salutary lesson. It, in
particular, shows how high domestic
rents and market power can be consistent
with internationally competitive compa-
nies: Mexican firms in telecoms and
cement are also efficient global players,
pushing for competition abroad and
resisting it at home.
The Robber Barons of the US gilded
age were eventually brought under a
degree of economic control via the anti-
trust movement – though not before they
had become enormously wealthy. This
movement involved an effective alliance
between a populist political movement
and a strong executive, supported by
action of the judiciary. India certainly
has popular mobilisation against corrup-
tion, but it is not at all clear that the state
has the capacity to manage the econom-
ic power of a rising corporate sector.
Conclusions
The interaction between the corporate
sector and the state is an unavoidable
feature of capitalism. In the past two
to three decades this has bred both
impressive business dynamism and even
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COMMENTARY

more impressive accumulation of extreme
wealth in India. There is a real question
as to whether an oligarchic business
structure and a corruptible state will
lead to the propagation of inequality and
create distortions that hurt the growth
process. This is not necessary, as illus-
trated by the US reform experience in
the first part of the last century – though
the more recent US experience with the
financial crisis shows that the effective
regulation of capitalism continues to be a
major issue. The rise of India’s businesses
on the global stage can be consistent
with a murky domestic scene. Which
path India follows will have a powerful
influence on growth, inequality and the
nature of the state.
Notes
1 This is a ratio of a stock (of wealth) to a flow (of
national income). Changes in this ratio will
move with the underlying ratio of the share of
billionaire to total Indian wealth, to the extent
that aggregate income to wealth ratio remains
constant, or changes slowly.
2 Measures of income or expenditure inequality
from household surveys are generally higher in
these Latin American countries than in the
Asian counterparts.
3 The classification is taken from the latest avail-
able list. For example, if a billionaire featured
in the 2008 list prior to the 2012 list, 2008 clas-
sification has been used. Classification for two
billionaires was not available. The classification
has been done subjectively based on trends.
4 See Walton (2012).
5 http://www.kpmg.com/IN/en/IssuesAndInsights/
ArticlesPublications/Documents/KPMG_Brib-
ery_Survey_Report_new.pdf
6 http://www.outlookindia.com/article.aspx?
230152
7 http://www.outlookindia.com/article.aspx?
235287
8 http://www.outlookindia.com/article.aspx?
266542
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Bombay Stock Exchange (2011): BSE database
(http://www.bseindia.com/stockinfo/indices.
aspx).
Damodaran, Harish (2008): India’s New Capitalists
– Caste, Business and Industry in a Modern
Nation (New Delhi: Permanent Black).
Forbes (2012): “The World’s Billionaires”, downloaded
on April 2012 (http://www.forbes.com/billion-
aires/list/).
KPMG (2011): Corruption and Bribery Survey 2011:
Impact on Economy and Business Environment,
KPMG.
Mody, Ashoka, Anusha Nath and Michael Walton
(2011): “Sources of Corporate Profits in India:
Business Dynamism or Advantages of Entrench-
ment?” in Suman Bery, Barry Bosworth and
Arvind Panagariya (ed.), India Policy Forum
2010-11 Volume 7 (New Delhi: Sage).
Morck, Randall, Daniel Wolfenzon and Bernard
Yeung (2005): “Corporate Governance, Eco-
nomic Entrenchment and Growth”, Journal of
Economic Literature, 43: 657-722
Roy, Saumya (2006): “The Tarmac Is Grey”, Out-
lookindia.com (13 February), viewed on 2 Sep-
tember 2011 (http://www.outlookindia.com/
article.aspx?230152).
Srivastava, Shuchi (2007): “Shots or Mortar”, Out-
lookindia.com (13 August), viewed on 5 Sep-
tember 2011 (http://www.outlookindia.com/
article.aspx?235287).
Thakurta, Paranjoy Guha and K Sreenivas Reddy
(2010): “ ‘Paid News’: The Buried Report”,
Outlookindia.com (6 August), viewed on 5 Sept-
ember 2011 (http://www.outlookindia.com/
article.aspx?266542).
Walton, Michael (2012): Inequality, Rents and the
Long-run Transformation of India (Bangalore:
Institute for Social and Economic Change).
World Bank (1993): The East Asian Miracle, World
Bank, Washington DC.

EPW Research Foundation

Explore EPWRF’s Online Database on Indian Economy: Experience the Difference!
AVAILABLE IN FULL AT NOMINAL RATES FOR ONE MONTH
We are offering full access to our website, www.epwrfits.in, for a limited period of one month at a very moderate and uniform
retention fee of Rs. 2,500 per individual/institutional user in India (against the current annual subscription ranging from Rs. 24,000
for students to Rs.1,26,000 for institutions with multiple users).
At present, only the demo version is accessible freely for the registered users.
Our objective is to provide potential subscribers hands-on experience with all data modules. The subscription to this facility will
be open from 20th September to 20th November 2012.
(i) Financial Markets (v) Agricultural Statistics (ix) Combined Government Finances
(ii) Banking Statistics (vi) Power Sector (x) National Accounts Statistics
(iii) Domestic Product of States of India (vii) Industrial Production (xi) Annual Survey of Industries
(iv) Price Indices (viii) Finances of State Governments (xii) External Sector
(xiii) Finances of Government of India
Key Online Database Features
Salient Features Compilation and disseminating data in time-series format.
Covers various periodicities and trends.
Interactive and Ease in identifying the variables.
User-friendly Versatility in selecting data variable/series as per requirement and download at ease as designed to
facilitate electronic processing.
Convenience of exporting the required data-set to Excel files.
Instantly compare and analyze different data in relation to each other and if required can print the data.
Enhancing Research Enabling instant comparison, plotting in a graphical format using charts in different styles like line, point,
range, column etc. & analysing different data variable/series in relation to each other.
Availability of ‘Meta Data’ at a click providing information on the sources of data, concepts, coverage
and changes therein.
Periodic updating of the database depending upon the availability and frequency of data.
For any further details or clarifications, please contact:
The Director,
EPW Research Foundation,
C-212, Akurli Industrial Estate, Akurli Road, Kandivli (East), Mumbai - 400 101.
(Phone: +91-22-2885 4995/4996) or mail to: epwrf@vsnl.com www.epwrfits.in

14 october 6, 2012 vol xlviI no 40 EPW Economic & Political Weekly