Decolonisation without independence

Author(s): A.J. Christopher

Source: GeoJournal, Vol. 56, No. 3 (2002), pp. 213-224
Published by: Springer
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 GeoJournal
56: 213-224,2002.
^ 213
*P^" © 2003 KluwerAcademiePublishers.Printedin theNetherlands.

Decolonisation
withoutindependence

A.J.Christopher
DepartmentofGeography, ofPortElizabeth,P.O. Box 1600,PortElizabeth6000,SouthAfrica
University
(E-mail:ggaajc@upe.ac.za)
Received18 October2002; acceptedin revisedform7 April2003

Keywords:colonies,decolonisation, states
micro-states,
independence,

Abstract
The massivedecolonisationof thepostWorldWarII era resultedin a newpoliticalmap of theworld.The greatmajority
ofthenewindependent stateswereessentially coincidentwiththeformer administrativecolonies.However,in a quarterof
cases theendingofcolonialstatusdidnotresultintheemergence ofa sovereignstate.The colonialpowerssoughttoreduce
thenumber ofsmallandpotentiallyweakstatesbyvariousmechanisms. Thuscolonialmergers tookplace betweenadmin-
unitswithinthesameempire,and onlyoccasionallybetweenunitsin different
istrative empires.Some dependencies were
absorbedbymorepowerful neighbours and others
incorporated intothe structure
political of themetropolitanpower. Prior
to 1960,in termsofpopulationand size,thecolonieswhichfailedto achievestatehood at independenceweresubstantially
smallerthanthosewhichdid.Thereafter therewas littleto distinguishthem.The legacyofthemergedcolonieshas ranged
fromsuccessfulsecessionistmovements to integrated
states.

Introduction own interests'was basic to metropolitan colonialthinking

untilthelate 1950s(Jackson,1990,p. 93). Thisopinionwas
FollowingWorldWarII thenumberof independent states accommodated bytheUnitedNations,whichin theDeclar-
increaseddramatically as thecolonialempiresweredisban- ationon theGranting of Independence to ColonialPeoples
ded andindividual administrativecoloniesweregranted the in 1960, providedthreeroutesto decolonisation, namely
statusof separatesovereignstates.Since 1945 a totalof independence,mergers,and freeassociationagreements
96 new stateshas been createdas a resultof theprocess (Groom,2000).
1 of those colonies which were not
ofdecolonisation (Christopher, 1999). Thusapproximately The identification
halfthesovereign statesin beingat presentemergedbythis destinedto achievesovereignindependence was thesubject
means.However,in thesameperiodanother 32 colonialde- of intensedebateas thedecolonisation processproceeded.
pendencies,whichweredecolonised,failedto achievethe The vulnerability of a numberof coloniesto externaltake-
statusof independent states(Table 1, Figure1). The failure overwas a significant factor.These weremainlyrelatively
of a quarterof functioning coloniescompleting theprocess small imperialpossessionsacquiredfortheirstrategicor
of decolonisationto achievesovereignstatehood represents prestigious significance, whichhad subsequently been lost
a significantaberration in the conductof stateformation, withina post-colonialcontext.Nevertheless, international
worthyof investigation. In contrastit may be notedthat and local opinionsand policiesshiftedwithtime,becom-
in thesameperiodfewsovereignstatesmergedwiththeir ing morefavourabletowardsthe optionof independence
neighbours (Christopher, 2001).2 as smallstatesprovedto be capable of survivalwithinthe
At theoutsetit shouldbe notedthattheinternationallyframework oftheColdWar.Alternatively theimperial power
accepted for
criteria statehood, a
namely: permanent popu- might retain the its
colonythrough incorporation intothe
lation,a definedterritory, a government and theabilityto metropolitan statestructures,
buttheconditions forthisout-
conductrelationswithotherstates,place no size restric- comewererarelymet.The issueofmergers was thusdeeply
tionsuponthestatus(Crawford,1979). AfterWorldWar embeddedwithinthedecolonisation process.
II the anti-imperialmomentum maintainedby the United
States,theSovietUnionandtheUnitedNationsensuredthat
eventhesmallestpossessionswereregardedas candidates Decolonisation
fordecolonisation (Kissinger,1994).Thissentiment evoked
thefearon thepartof theEuropeancolonialpowersthat Decolonisationwas not a carefullyplannedand executed
a groupof weak 'quasi-states'wouldemergewhichwould programme and tendedto be forcedupongovernments by
be economicandpoliticalliabilitiesto theinternational sys- pressures exerted by local politiciansin the colonies,the
tem(Harden,1985). The conceptthatan independent state exigenciesof metropolitan politicsand increasingly, in-
shouldbe 'economically viableandcapableofdefending its ternationalrelations(Chamberlain,1998; Darwin, 1999;

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214
Table1. Coloniesfailingto gainindependence
at decolonisation
1947-1999.

Colony state
Incorporating Population(000s) Areakm2 End colonial formstatus

1 Dodecanese Greece 121 2,663 1947 EX

2 Reunion France 330 2,512 1947 ME
3 FrenchGuiana France 34 90,909 1947 ME
4 Guadeloupe France 203 1,705 1947 ME
5 Martinique France 274 1,079 1947 ME
6 Newfoundland Canada 361 370,485 1949 AM
7 PortArthur China 1054 3,740 1950 EX
8 Tripolitania Cyrenaica 768 215,000 1951 TR
9Fezzan Cyrenaica 50 400,000 1951 TR
10 Eritrea Ethiopia 1860 93,679 1952 EX
11 FrenchIndia India 317 492 1954 EX
12 SpanishMorocco Morocco 1082 28,000 1956 TR
13 Tangier Morocco 100 373 1957 TR
14 BritishTogoland Gold Coast 416 33,776 1957 AM
15 Alaska UnitedStates 226 1,477,269 1958 ME
16 Hawaii UnitedStates 633 16,635 1959 ME
17 BritishSomaliland Somalia 700 176,120 1960 TR
18 Senegal Mali 2973 197,161 1960 AM
19 PortugueseIndia India 627 4,305 1961 EX
20 BritishCameroon Cameroon 1032 42,900 1961 TR
2 1 WestNew Guinea Indonesia 700 42 1,981 1963 AM
22 NorthBorneo Malaya 454 73,802 1963 AM
23 Sarawak Malaya 744 124,449 1963 AM
24 Singapore Malaya 1514 641 1963 AM
25Ifni Morocco 52 75 1968 EX
26 FernandoPoo Rio Muni 63 2,034 1969 AM
27Sikkim India 209 7,298 1975 ME
28 SpanishSahara Morocco 76 266,000 1976 EX
29 Timor Indonesia 610 14,925 1976 EX
30 Canal Zone Panama 42 1,676 1979 EX
31 HongKong China 6502 1,091 1997 EX
32 Macau China 416 21 1999 EX
Source:Statistics
extracted
fromStatesman'sYearbooksandcitedsources.
Formof decolonisation:AM - Intra-imperialamalgamation,EX - Externalintervention,
ME - Metropolitan
TR - Inter-imperial
incorporation, amalgamation.

Springhall, 2001). The firstwave of statesachievinginde- eeship territories

and a universalpressingof the issue of
pendenceoccurredin Asia, extending fromTransjordan to decolonisationwas able to influence outcomes.
thePhilippinesin 1946 and includingthe Indiansubcon- The partitionof India in 1947 was thelargestexercise,
tinent,Indonesiaand Indo-Chinaimmediately afterwards. whereofficialpolicywas made as eventsunfolded,in the
Thereafter, theArab statesintensified the struggleforin- lightofGreatBritain'sinability to continueto holdthesub-
dependence.Untilthelate 1950stherewas littleaggressive continent by coercivemeans afterthe end of WorldWar
promotion of independence forAfrica,SouthoftheSahara, II and to Americandiplomaticpressureto freecolonial
exceptat a fairlydistantdate (Fieldhouse,1982; Munene, peoples(Clymer,1995). The complexinterplay of political
1995). The rapiddecolonisation of thatcontinentmostnot- parties,governments and rulersproduceda policy,theout-
ablyin theyear1960 and immediately afterwards,leftonly come of whichfewcould have foreseen(Sukhwal,1971).
thesmaller, mostlyislandcoloniesstillunderEuropeancon- This is particularly so in the case of the Indianprincely
trol,andtheterritorial
scaleofnewstateschangedmarkedly. states,whichhad been subjectedto thedeliberately vague
Decolonisationwas achievedby a mixtureof negotiations conceptof 'paramountcy' as thelinkto theBritishCrown
and conflictuniqueto each empireand thecolonieswithin (Ashton,1982). However,theydid notgain independence
them.The end productwas not ordered,butproducedin upontheBritishwithdrawal, althoughtheirrecognition of
reactionto events.Commonto themall was theinfluence theBritishimperialpositionhad beenundertaken by treaty
of externalpowersand theinternational community, more as nominalequals. The colonialpowerwishedto handover
particularlytheUnitedNations,notablythroughits organ government to the two successordominionsof India and
the Trusteeship Council (Groom,2000). The latterby a Pakistan,not564 independent countries.The stategovern-
process ofthe supervisionoftheadministrationof thetrust- mentswere thereforeforced to agreetoActsofAccessionto

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 215

Figure1. Coloniesfailingto gainindependence

at decolonisation
1947-1999.Fornumerical
key,see Table 1.

eitherIndiaorPakistan.The statusofeventhelargestofthe coloniesto producelarger,and therefore nominallymore

princely states,Hyderabad,with a populationof 16.3 million and
politically economically viable entities.In othercases,
and an area of 213,000 squarekilometres, was settledby powerful neighbours prevented decolonisation frombecom-
Indianmilitary actionas theHyderabadstategovernment,ing independence, through the transfer of territoryand its
undertheMoslemNizam,lackedthebasicpublicsupport of annexation, eitherbythreat ordirectaction.Rarely,a colony
thepredominantly Hindupopulaceto sustainits secession- was incorporated intothe administrative structures of the
istambitions one
(Benichou,2000). Nevertheless, princely metropolitan power.Nevertheless, in four cases the denial
statedidachieveautonomous status.Sikkim,benefitted from ofindependence at decolonisation was onlya postponement
itsstrategicpositionbetweenIndia,ChinaandNepal to ne- withseparatestatehoodwonat a laterdate.The reassertion
a
gotiate protectorate agreement withIndiain 1950 (Karan ofa politicalseparatism defined bytheformer colonialstate
andJenkins, 1963). Subsequently thestatewas occupiedby suggests that the of
expediency resorting to decolonisation
Indianforcesin 1974, to forestallan independence move- withoutthegrantof independence was in somecases mis-
mentby thehereditary Chogyal. Thereafterit was made an taken. The essentialunityof a shared colonialadministration
AssociateStateand finallyin 1975 annexedto theIndian and commonstruggleforindependencewas thuslacking
Union. in themergedstate.3Such a historyof sharedexperiences
Significantlytheend product of theprocess of decolon- has been basic to the emergenceof a unifying sense of
isationwas thusnot a returnto the pre-colonialpolitical nationhoodin manypost-colonial, as other,states(Ander-
structures and patterns,but the reconfiguration and con- son, 1983; Knight,1992; Mikeselland Murphy,1991). Its
solidationof the colonial state(El-Ayouty,1970). It is absence,or thepresenceof an alternative, in thecases con-
noticeablethattherewas no returnto the multiplicity of sideredinthispapertendedtoadd to thepotential instability
pre-colonialstateswhichhadbeenincorporated intothefed- ofthestatesconcerned.4
eralstructuresof empiresuchas Malaya,Nigeria,Uganda, In examiningthisissue, intra-and inter-imperial am-
SouthArabia,orelsewhere, andoftenpreserved as sub-units algamationsare examined,togetherwithannexationsby
within thecolonialstates.Rathertherewas anattempt topre- neighbouring statesandconstitutional incorporations within
servetheunityof territories definedby colonialboundaries themetropolitan polities.The issue of local participationis
in theimmediate pre-independence era. The sovereign unit then considered, followed by an examination of theissues of
at independence was thecolony,notitsconstituent parts. territorial
size andpopulation. Finallysomeconclusionsare
Giventhepressuresto effectrapiddecolonisation, the reachedconcerning statevulnerability.
colonialpowersoccasionallysoughtto amalgamate existing

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216

Intra-iinperial
amalgamations independence in 1960 onlySenegaland theFrenchSudan
remainedwithintheFederation. The former withdrew only
Territorial amalgamations were usuallycarriedout within monthsafterindependence as a resultof personalconflicts
theconfinesof singleempires,wherecommonlanguages, overthecontrolof thestructures of thenew entity, which
economicandlegalsystems provideda degreeofuniformity.werethenelaboratedas disagreements overbasic socialand
Thusin 1957 theFederationof Malaya receivedindepend- economicpolicies.
ence fromGreatBritainwiththenineMalay statesultans The finalaccessionof Newfoundland to the Canadian
andrajasacceptinga rotating monarchy betweenthem.The Confederation in 1949 is anothercase relatedto theform-
further Britishmilitary withdrawal fromtheregion,allied ationofthefederalstatesbyoverseasWhitecommunities in
to a perceivedthreatof 'confrontation' fromIndonesialed theBritishEmpire.The briefera of 'independence'in the
theMalayanand Britishgovernments to devisea mutually 1930shad provedto be financially unsustainable and direct
favourable 5
plan (Fisher,1968). Thus a widerFederation colonialrulehad been reimposed(Long, 1999). The eco-
of Malaysiawas createdin 1963 incorporating theseparate nomicsituation was no betterafterWorldWarII, withGreat
coloniesof Singapore,Sarawakand NorthBorneo(Sabah), Britainunableto sustainindefinitely the servicingof the
whichwereregarded as incapableofattaining independence colonial debt incurred in dollars. The optionofjoiningthe
separately.6 The carefully calculateddemographic balance CanadianConfederation, whichhad been rejectedin 1867
betweenChinesedominatedSingaporeand thepotentially was at lastacceptedforeconomicreasons.
Malayassimilablepopulations ofthenorthern Borneocolon- Pre-decolonisation structures suchas thefederations of
ies was intendednot to disturbthe Malay politicaldom- theBritishWestIndiesandRhodesiaandNyasalandandthe
inanceof Malaya in thewidercombinedstructure (Porritt, politicalwingoftheEastAfrican commonservicesadminis-
1997).However,theextensive implications of the projection tration broke up before the formal grantof independence as
ofMalaydominance intotheeconomicspheremadetheplan a resultof themutualsuspicionsof local politiciansforced
unworkable andSingaporesecededtwoyearslater. intostructures by metropolitan politicians.Theytherefore
TheDutchdecolonisation ofTheNetherlands EastIndies soughtthe constitutional advancementof the constituent
in the 1940s was particularly bitterly foughtand constitu- colonies (Dale, 1962; Dikshit,1971). In additionSouth
tionallycomplex. At its conclusion, in 1949, West New Africacontinued todemandtheincorporation ofSouthWest
Guinea was retainedunderdirectcolonial rule as consti- Africa,Basutoland,BechuanalandProtectorate and Swazi-
tuting a distinctive society,separate from the remainder of land until its withdrawal from the Commonwealth in 1961
thearchipelago. The arrangement was disputedand in 1963 (Hyam, 1972). The colonial powers' fostering of larger
Indonesiagainedcontrolaftera briefinterim administrationunitswas thus frequently thwartedby those undergoing
by the United Nations, which had supported the Indone- decolonisation.
sian claim to theunityof thewholeof theformercolony
(Saltford, 2002). Thepromiseofself-determination forWest
New Guineaby 1969 was subverted intoa testofopinionof Inter-imperial amalgamations
1000tribalchiefsfavourable to theIndonesiangovernment.
The decolonisation of FernandoPoo and Rio Muniwas Territorial amalgamations acrossimperialboundarieshave
effected in 1969through themerger oftheSpanishmainland been subject to even more strainsand werecomparatively
the issues raised
and islandcoloniesintoa singleentity, EquatorialGuinea rare,reflecting by harmonising different,
It be noted that the admin- legal, economicand administrative systems and adopting a
(Liniger-Goumaz, 1979). might
istrative betweenthetwocolonieswas of recent common language of administration. The reconstitution of
separation
and that the of the main- Libya andMoroccoin the1950srepresented therestoration
origin following Spanishconquest
land,Rio Muni,thewholehadbeenadministered as a single of unity to countries temporarily in
fragmented thecolonial
unit,SpanishGuinea,until1959,whenthedistinctive nature era for strategic reasons, and therefore followedrarehistoric
of the island societyhad been recognised.Its survivalin precedents. The United States and the SovietUnion after
thepost-independence erahasplacedseverestrainsuponthe 1945 had no desire for the former Italian coloniesto remain
unifiedstate(Cusack,1997). under the control of Great Britain and France,as theformer
German and Turkish territories had done after1918.7The
Nominallyfederalstructures provedto be remarkably
over the fateof theformer
popularwith the colonial powers as a means of redu- complexpost-warnegotiations
Italian colonies therefore resulted in the thwarting ofBritish
cingthecostsof colonialadministration. The efficiency of
thecommonservicesoffered territorial ambitions (Trevaskis,1960).Libya became an in-
by thesuperstructures of the
FrenchWestAfricaandFrenchEquatorialAfricagovernor- dependent state with the aid of the United Nations, without
generalships inclinedtheFrenchto supporttheirretention. anyinterim trusteeship status(UnitedNations,1952). The
theoptionof independence had been offered three zones of Libya into whichthecountryhad been di-
Nevertheless,
at thelevel of theindividualcoloniesin the 1958 referen- vided during World War II, were reunitedwiththe Emir
dumon thenew FifthRepublicconstitution as a resultof of Cyrenaicaeffectively assumingcontrolof theothertwo,
British and Frenchoccupied
pressuresfromAfricanpoliticalleaders.Hence theFrench namely occupiedTripolitania
theFederation ofMali as thesuccessorto French Fezzan.
promoted
WestAfrica(Skurnik, The rise of Arab nationalismand thecomplexcontest
1967).However, bythetimeofformal
overtheMiddleEastforcedtheretreat ofthecolonialpowers

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 217

in theregion.The nominalauthority of theSultanof Mo- its substitution by a centralised constitution (Koningsand

rocco had been preservedduringthe colonial era in the Nyamnjoh,1997). In contrastto Cameroon,the division
varioussectorsintowhichthecountrywas divided(Park, of Togo was perpetuated withtheBritishzone attachedto
1996).Thusthegrantofindependence toMoroccoinMarch Gold Coast and subsequently to Ghana at independence
1956 by the Frenchimmediately necessitatedthe hurried (Hodder,1968). In bothcases theBritishzones had been
endingof theSpanishprotectorate in thenorthin August administered as partof theadjacentBritishcolonyduring
and thewinding-up of theInternational regimein Tangier thepostFirstWorldWarperiodunderLeague of Nations
thefollowing January. The southern Spanishzone was only and subsequently UnitedNationssupervision.
evacuatedin April1958. The different colonialzones were
reunited,thereby reconstructing a unityonlylostonpartition
in 1912. Externalintervention
FromtheMoroccanpointof view thiswas onlya par-
tialrestoration of thekingdom.Claimswereraisedto a far In a numberof cases decolonisation involvedtheincorpor-
moreextensive region,including Mauritania andtheSpanish ation of the colony into a powerful neighbour, usuallyon
beenunderMoroccansover- the of
grounds reestablishing national unity violated by co-
Sahara,whichhadhistorically
of theSpanish lonialism. The most significant cases were related to China
eigntybeforethecolonialera. The transfer
enclaveat Ifnifollowedin 1968.Although ithad onlybeen and India. China had been subject to colonial intervention
in the colonial titledated resulting inthedetachment ofsmall,butstrategic portions of
partiallyoccupiedby Spain 1934,
whether as colonies or concessions. By the end of
back to medievaltimes,and confirmed by treatyin 1860, territory,
thefinalpartition ofMorocco.Ultimately in 1976 World War II only three remained extant: Port Arthur, Hong
predating
theSpanishSaharawas cededtoMorocco(andbriefly, until Kong and Macau. The Soviet occupationof theformerly
base at PortArthur in 1945 was followedby the
1979,also a portionto Mauritania)on thegroundsof these Japanese
historicclaims.In thelattercase, theincorporation was res- Sino-Soviet treaty of 1950 which providedforthe return
istedby theindigenousinhabitants, who had expectedthe of all the facilities to China as an exampleof commun-
result- ist anti-colonial solidarity.10 The last Soviettroopsleftthe
formation of a separatestateupon decolonisation,
base in 1955. Later the ending of British and Portuguese
ingin a continuing insurgency in theformer colony.It was
rule in HongKong and Macau respectively resulted in their
notedthatthedelayin thetransfer of theSpanishSahara
movement underthe re-incorporation into China.11 No other option was avail-
allowedtheemergence of a separatist
able to the local politicians as their status was restricted by
separateadministration, whereone had notexistedbefore-
of reversionary treatiesbetweenChina and the two colonial
hand(Slowe, 1990). Althoughtheinitialreconstitution
The highlyrestricted of
Morocco was supportedby the international community,powers(Buckley,1997). territory
the rump Crown of
Colony Hong Kong, which would have
theincorporation of theSpanishSaharawas rejected,res-
been leftafterthereturnof the leased New Territories in
ulting in a continuing internationalinterest in the struggle.
1997, was clearly not viable as a separateentity. Thus the
Thiswas exacerbated bytheOrganisation ofAfrican Unity's
in and the sub- offerof the statusof Special Administrative Areas within
recognition of the Saharan Republic 1982
and the Chinese PeoplesRepublic had to be accepted,involving
sequentMoroccanwithdrawal fromtheOrganisation,
in 2002. only thetemporary recognition of different economicand
henceexclusion from the African Union launched
The return of Macau to China in Decem-
The success of the Libyan and Moroccan mergers politicalsystems.
ber 1999 was a highlysymbolic conclusion to the colonial
encouragedothermovements,notablyin Somalia and
Cameroon.The unionof BritishSomalilandand Italian era the
marking beginning of the new millennium, endinga
of the Portuguese colonial of
presence nearly years.450
Somaliain 1960 was a partof a proposedreuniting
Somalipeoplesdividedbetweenfivejurisdictions atthetime SimilarlytheFrenchand Portuguesecoloniesin India
entitiesonce BritishIndiahad
of thedrawingof thecolonialboundariesin the 1890s and couldnotsurviveas separate
1900s (Laitinand Samatar,1987).8The politicaland eco- attained independence. populationsof thefiveFrench
The
Indian settlements demonstrated a populardemandforin-
nomicproblems encountered bythemergedstatemeantthat in
theinhabitants ofFrenchSomaliland,nowDjibouti,didnot corporation. In 1949 the settlement of Chandernagore,
in 1977.Indeeditis not- greater Calcutta, voted tojoin India and the outcome was ac-
followtheexampleatindependence
able thattheFrenchauthorities had removedthereference ceptedbytheFrenchgovernment. Thefourothersettlements
to Somalisfromthecolonialtitlea decade earlier.9Even followed in 1954. In contrast the Portuguesegovernment
thelimited of unification has been resolutely resistedtheprocessof decolonisation throughout
experiment cross-imperial
ended with the establishment of a but un- itsempireuntiltherevolution of 1974. Thustheenclaveof
effectively stable,
recognised,SomalilandRepublicin 1992, independent of Dadra andNagarHaveliwas occupiedbyIndiain 1955 and
thecoastalsettlements, ofGoa, DamanandDui, wereoccu-
Mogadishu(Huliaras,2002).
The merger ofthesouthern sectionofBritishCameroon pied by Indian military forcesin 1961. The decentralised
withtheFrenchCameroonwas designedto reconstitute the nature of the Indian Union offereda degreeof autonomy
of statehood, thereby accommodating thedifferent heritages
pre-1914GermanKameruncolony.Subsequentlythe in-
terestsof thetworegionsare seen to diverge,particularlybequeathedby the different colonial powers.
afterthe abrogationof the federalstructure in 1972 and The samecircumstances holdfortheincorporation ofthe
former ItalianruledDodecaneseIslandsintoGreecein 1947

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218

on thebasis of nationalunification, deniedby theItalian Statusof territories to fullstatehoodin theUnitedStatesis

occupationof theislandsin 1912 (Divani and Constanto- another exampleof successfulincorporation.
poulou, 1997). The returnof the Panama Canal Zone to The survivingcolonies have not changedtheirbasic
Panamain 1979was a similarevent,prompted byan Amer- status,although theyarealmostuniversally calleddependen-
ican anti-colonialist administration seekingto rid itselfof cies,commonwealths, territoriesor someothereuphemism.
the embarrassment of receivinginternational criticismfor This was particularly noticeablein the 1960s and 1970s
continuing to holdcolonialpossessions(Major,1993). Sig- whenthecoloniesof Spain and Portugalweredesignated
nificantly in noneofthesecases was thereanydevelopment overseasprovinces, whichdidlittletoaltertheirstatusunder
ofa distinctive colonialbasednationalism separatefromthat metropolitan dictatorships. Malta votedforconstitutional
oftheincorporating power. integration withinthe UnitedKingdomin 1956, but the
In othercases powerful neighbours, althoughable to se- subsequentnegotiations foundered and thesize criteriafor
cureincorporation, foundtheirnewacquisitionsdifficult to independence changed (Austin, 1971). The Dutchinclusion
hold.ThusEthiopiaacquiredEritrea,aftera superficial test of Surinameand theNetherlands Antillesin theStatuteof
of acceptability undertheBritishinterim administration in theKingdomin 1954 did noteffectfullpoliticaland eco-
1952,withina quasi-federal structure, whichwas abolished nomicintegration intothemetropolitan state.Similarlythe
tenyearslater.Ethiopiawas aidedby diplomaticand milit- offerof 'associatedstatehood'to severalBritishWestIn-
arysupport fromtheUnitedStatesanxiousto boostAfrican dian islandsin the 1960s,provedto onlybe a transition to
independent statespre-empting theSovietbackingforde- sovereignindependence. The UnitedStatesgrantof 'com-
colonisation (Marcus,1983).The resulting warofsecession monwealth'statusto theNorthern Mariannasin 1986,was
was onlyformally concludedin 1993withtheestablishmentacceptedas endingthedependent UnitedNationstrusteeship
of an independent Eritrea(Iyob,1995). SimilarlyIndonesia statusin termsof the organisation's decolonisationprin-
invadedTimorin 1976 as thePortuguesecolonialgovern- ciples. Nevertheless, the Northern Mariannastechnically
menthadappearedlikelytograntindependence toa political remainsa dependencyby anothername,havingno direct
movement, Fretilin,regardedas hostileto thegovernment representation in theAmericanCongress.
in Jakarta(Jardine,1996). The resultinginsurgency was
onlyconcludedwiththeintervention of theUnitedNations
forcesand thegrantof independence in 2002 (Hainsworth Local participation
and McCloskey,2000). The international responseto these
twocases is instructive and contradictory. In Africathein- The degreeofdemocratic participation in theprocessofde-
ternational colonisation was significant in the origins,implementation
community, notablytheUnitedNationsand the
of African the and finallythesustainability of themergers.It variedsub-
Organisation Unity,accepted incorporation
and rejectedthelegitimacy of theEritreanstruggle, while stantially,rangingfromnoneto freeand fairplebiscites.In
a (11) of the32 cases surveyedin thispaperthe
in Asia thereremaineda residualinternational legalinterest minority
colonies were transferred solelyas a resultof international
followingthePortuguesewithdrawal and henceassistance
fortheindependence movement. agreements. In addition four tookplace as a resultof mil-
finally
More colonieswere subjectto claims forinclusionby itary action or the threat of military action.The Chinese,
Whether theclaimto theSudanby Indian, Moroccan or Indonesian authorities didnotconsider
independent neighbours.
a testof publicopinionnecessary as the territories
aboutto
Egypt,BritishHondurasby Guatemala,or Kuwaitby Iraq,
the courseof independence was conditioned be incorporated were considered to be legallyalreadypart
negotiations
external forces. The number of losses to the ofthehomeland.Electionsofvarying degrees oflegitimacy
by potential
international took place afterwards as confirmation of annexation.
systembythismeanscouldhavebeengreater.
Sometimeslimitedtests of acceptability, as nominal
deference to theprincipleofdemocracy, wereheavilycom-
Metropolitanincorporation promisedin favourof theoutcome.Eritrea'sandWestNew
Guinea'stestsofacceptability conductedamongdesignated
The optionof decolonisation the of
through incorporation community leaders clearly werelimitedinextentandbiased
colonialterritoriesintotheadministrative andpoliticalstruc- towardsthedesiredoutcome.In Timorno choiceof inde-
turesof the metropolitan power was rarelytaken. The pendencewas givenin electionsonce theIndonesianarmy
fouroverseasdepartments of Franceare some of the few was incontrol.In somereferenda theresultswereonlytaken
of
examples completemergers into the metropolitan admin- as guidelinesby the In
negotiators. FernandoPoo theunion
istrativestructure, the
indicating earlyadoption ofan altern- with the mainland had beenagreedbythepoliticiansbefore
ativeto thecreationof micro-states (Deville and Georges, theplebiscite, thusleadingto a rejectionofthepopularvote;
1996).Theyrepresent one ofthefewcases ofthesuccessful thecolonialpowerbeinganxiousto departwitha minimum
creationof overseascommunities in theimageof themet- oftrouble. The initialtestsofopinion,as inthecase ofNorth
ropolitan power, which sought the benefits of metropolitan Borneo and Sarawakin 1961producedvagueendorsements,
administration and services.The lack of successin thesim- tobackup thecontention thattheproposedFederation was a
ilarattempt attheincorporation ofAlgeriaintometropolitan 'desirableaimintheinterests ofthepeoplesoftheterritories
Francemightbe notedas a particularly disastrous butlong concerned'(Keesings,1961,p. 18463). Later,in 1962 and
termproject.The raisingof Hawaii and Alaska fromthe 1963,indirect electionsproduceda morefavourable result,

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 219

butstillfellshortof democratic participation and theoffer However,thedisputeovertheidentification of thepeople

of separatesovereignstatehood.Inevitablymovements to entitled tovoteeffectively reducedtheprojectedreferendum
revisitthequestionhavebeenresistedas thefederalgovern- to a contestof electoralroles,resulting in a UnitedNations
mentpursuesan assimilationist programme (Jawan,1991; withdrawal in 2002 without theresolution oftheissue.
Noble,1977). Local participation was oftenrestricted tolittlemorethan
In a thirdoftheterritories generalelectionswereheldto endorsingtheplans of the colonialpowersor the United
testopinionon thesubjectpriortothemerger. In somecases Nations.It was the international community whichoften
regularelectionscontinuedthereafter and the population exerteda decisiveinfluence on theoutcomes.Particularly in
was absorbedintothepoliticalcultureof themainbodyof theCold Warera,thealliesoftheWestern powerswereable
thestate,withgeneralelectionsdominated bycountry-widetoachieveterritorial gainsthrough identifying thebenefits to
parties and issues. Hawaii or Guadeloupe have effectively the Western alliances of a particular course of action. Thus
been integrated intothe body politicof the formercolo- successivekingsof Moroccowereable to enlistAmerican
nialpower,evento theextentof thelocal populationbeing supportfortheirprogrammes of territorial aggrandisement.
submerged by migrants from the metropole or elsewhere Indonesia, regarded by the British andAmericansas a threat
(Kuykendall andDay, 1961).In Hawaiiforexampleby 1950 tobe countered in theearly1960shadbecomean allybythe
only 17% of thepopulation was of indigenous origin. Assim- mid 1970s enablingit to invadeand annexTimor,without
ilationand internal migration policies have been integral to local consultation. Similarlytheemperorof Ethiopiacould
severalmergerschemesin orderto effecttheirpermanence enlistthe supportof successiveAmericanadministrations
andultimate acceptability. againstGreatBritainin his questto gain and keep control
Onlyrarely were single issue plebiscites held to determ- of Eritrea.The global politicalsituationwas a significant
inethefuture oftheterritory. Theresultsofsomeplebiscites elementin determining thesurvivalof thesmallercolonies
wereremarkably close,indicating theelectorate's as
ambiguity separate entities.
aboutloosinga separateidentity. Thus theNewfoundland
electorate in 1948 in thefirstroundof votingoptedforthe
restoration ofresponsible independent government, butwith Issues ofsize and population
only45% of thevote,comparedwith41% cast forjoining
Canadaand 14 percentformaintaining thestatusquo, there The international community has been ambivalent concern-
In thesecondroundofvotingthema- ing the status of micro-states (Benedict, 1967). Some of
was no clearmajority.
the activities of the governments and inhabitants of the
jority(52%) supported joiningtheCanadianConfederation.
On sucha narrowmarginthefutureof thecolonywas de- Europeanmicro-states wereviewedwitha highdegreeof
cided(Hiller,1998). Generallythecolonieswereregarded suspicionby their neighbours (Catudal,1975).Furthermore,
were deemed to make no positivecontribution to the
as unitsfortheconductof electionsand plebiscites.Thus they
of the international community. For thisreason
in BritishTogoland,despitetheclearregionalsplitbetween functioning
Northand South,the territory as a whole was incorpor- theLeague of Nationshad turneddowntheapplicationby
Liechtenstein formembership in 1920 on thegroundsthat
atedintoGhana.12The subsequent plebiscitesin theBritish
Cameroonsrecognisedthatthereweretwodistinct regions
'could not discharge all the international obligationswhich
would be imposedupon her by the Covenant' (Duursma,
andalloweda territorial splitwiththeNorthern regionopting
tojoinNigeriaandtheSouthern regiontojoin theCameroon
1996, p. 171). The United Nations upheld that opinionat
statewas its foundation in 1945, when membership was deemed to
Republic.No optionof a separateindependent The attitude to small
offered to theelectorate. involve military obligations. postwar
In manycases local participative democracy did not sur- stateswas summedup in theBritishgovernment's reporton
the future of Eritrea in 1950, which stated: 'the establish-
vivetheinitialchoice,anditsrevivalin the1990shas raised
seriousissuesofnationalintegration as regionalpartieshave mentof an independent EritreanStatewas nota practical
thebasis of themergers. Secessionismhowever, proposition, as the territory wasnoteconomically viableand
questioned
hasbeeninternationally as theinternational or- did not possess national, religious, racial, linguistic or geo-
unacceptable
seektomaintain thestatusquo. Therevisiting of graphicalunity'(Keesings,1950, p. 10841). The onset of
ganisations
a decisiontakenatone stageis thusdeemedincapableofbe- the Cold War confirmed the opinion of Western politicians
undone in another. In thismanner secessionism assumed thatsmall,poor stateswould onlybe able 'to levyblack-
ing
the level of a moralquestionforthe maintenance of the mail on one groupin theUnitedNationsbythreatening to
of thepost-colonial state(Buchanan,1991). Nev- sell their votes to the other' in order to survive (Carring-
integrity
a second chance has been offered. ton, 1962, p. 31). Yetitremainedcentralto UnitedNations
ertheless,occasionally
Thusthepopulation ofTimorwas able tovoteforindepend- policythatall colonies,eventheverysmallestshouldreceive
ence in 1999, duringa briefperiodof opportunity offered politicalfreedom (de Smith,1970).Forthesmallercolonies
in Indonesia.The subsequent stability and freedom mightbe achievedthroughmergers
bythechangeof government
warfollowedbyUnitedNationsintervention andadministra- with existing states or amalgamation intolargerunits.
tionsecuredindependence in 2002. Similarcircumstances As a result no micro- states were grantedindependence
to be offered in Western Sahara with the United untilthe 1960s. Nevertheless, in 1960 thefirststatessince
appeared
Nationsestablishment ofa missiontooverseea referendum.WorldWarII withless thana millioninhabitants, withthe
of
exception Transjordan in 1946, received independence

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220

(Congo,Gabon,MauritaniaandCyprus).13 In thefirst three Conclusion

cases theirterritorial extents,each in excess of 250,000
km2,wereconsidered toneutralise thepoverty oftheirsmall In thecourseof theprocessof decolonisation afterWorld
populations.The independence of Cypruswas theresultof War II the criteriaadoptedforwhatconstituted an inde-
an expedientpoliticalcompromisebetweenGreatBritain, pendentstateweresubjectto change.The initialattempt to
TurkeyandGreece,whichcouldbe heldto be a specialcir- transform thecolonialempiresintoa smallnumberof me-
cumstance, denyingtheisland'sunionwiththelatterstate, diumto largestatesgave way to an acceptancethatmost
and guaranteed by international treaty. It was onlyin 1962 successorstateswould be small and weak. Thus thepre-
withtheindependence of theformer UnitedNationstrust- 19608schemesof merging smallunitsintolargeronesgave
eeshipterritory of WesternSamoa, thatsmallstatesbegan way to a recognition of mostof theremaining coloniesas
to dominatetheindependence celebrations. The movements separateindependent entities.The overalllack of territorial
promoting independence weresuchthatthecolonialpowers' coincidencebetweendependent coloniesandsubsequent in-
resistanceto theemergenceof quasi-stateswas no longer dependentstateswas therefore not great.However,some
feasible.14
politically rearrangement ofthepoliticalmapdidtakeplaceas colonial
The international community'sambiguityconcerning powerssoughtto 'tidy'theemerging statesystemwiththe
such stateswas demonstrated by thefactthatit was only merging ofapproximately a quarter ofthecoloniesachieving
in 1975 thatWesternSamoa was admittedto the United decolonisation intootherentities.
Nationsas a fully-fledged memberoftheinternational com- The 32 coloniesidentified in thispaperwerevulnerable
munity. In 1962 WesternSamoa had been informed thatit to mergers as theyweregenerally onlyofterritorial signific-
might join theUnitedNationswhen'its wealthandpopula- ance withintheconfinesof thecolonialempireswhichhad
tionhad increased'(Keesings,1962,p. 18524). Withonly createdthem,whether forstrategic or prestigereasons.On
114,000inhabitants andan areaof2,842km2itdidnotmeet the one hand,theywere susceptibleto theclaimsforthe
thetestoffullstatehood, as thenapplicable.As moresmall reunification ofnationalterritories andtherecreation ofpre-
statesachievedindependence, so thepressureto amalgam- colonialorearlycolonialentities, subsequently torn asunder.
ate smallcoloniesfacingdecolonisation declinedresulting In mostoftheamalgamations thereweretheelementsofre-
in a markedreductionin therateof mergers.Indeedafter constitution andrestoration ofnationalunity, beginning with
1963,withone exception,FernandoPoo, theonlymergers the Greekreclamationof the Dodecanese Islands, which
to takeplace werethosewhichdictatedby thedemandsof had previously last been partof a Greek(Byzantine)state
neighbouring states.Nevertheless, some of the very small in medieval times,and concludingwiththereturn of Ma-
coloniesfailedtoachieveeitherindependence orintegrationcau to China, wherethe linkswere moredirect,and the
andremainina dependent constitutional statusandeconom- timespansomewhat shorter. Reconstitution was also applied
ically dependentupon metropolitan financial aid (Aldrich to national populations such as Somalia, where no former
andConnell,1998). politicalunity had existed.Even the restoration of earlierco-
After1960 therewas littleto distinguish thosecolon- lonialentities was invoked, notably in the cases of West New
ies whichfailedto attainindependence fromsomeof those GuineaandCameroon.On theotherhand,thosecoloniesin-
whichdid do so. However,only seven, of the 32 under corporated intothemetropolitan administrative structures of
discussionforthe entireperiod,possessedpopulationsin thecolonialpowersrepresented therecognition of thenew,
excess of a millioninhabitants at the timeof decolonisa- moreextensive,nationalrelationships of the late colonial
tion,indeedthe majoritypossessedunderhalf a million era,whichcouldbe carriedintothepost-colonial era.
inhabitants. Severalwereextensiveterritories witha range In generalthemergers havesurvived, withonlyfourin-
ofnaturalresources.Significantly threeof thefourterritor-ternationally recognised'resurrections' of formercolonial
ies whichsubsequently secededandachievedindependence jurisdictions. However, the reconstitution or attempted re-
possessedpopulations of over a million. Three of the other constitution of colonial entities has been an issue which
four'millionaire'territories wereHong Kong,PortArthur has facedtheinternational community, whichhas generally
andSpanishMorocco,noneofwhichrepresent potential se- been hostile to secessionist movements. Peacefulpartings
cessionistthreats.The other,theformer BritishCameroons, wererareand confined to Senegaland Singaporeafteronly
does possessthatpotential, as regionaleconomicand social shortperiodsof unification. The successfulstrugglesfor
disparitieswithin the unified state become a matter of con- independence by Eritrea and Timor werelongandhighlyde-
testedinternal politics.On theother hand the relativelysmall structive,where the coercive of
power theincorporating state
population of theformer Spanish Sahara represents one of appeared to be and
overwhelming widely backed by the in-
the mostpersistent and militantmovementsstruggling to ternational community, which a
rejected post-independence
annula forcedunion,raisingsignificant questionsconcern- change of borders.Parallel strugglesfor separatestate-
ingthenatureof thepost-colonial statein international law hood are underwayin theWesternSahara and Somaliland
(Castellino,2000). whichraise similarquestionsas to theexpediencyof dis-
regarding therightsof colonialpeoples in theinterests of
speedy decolonisation. More may be on the horizon as in
an age of reviveddemocracy, regionalinterests are revived
and economicand social disparitiesbecomeapparentand

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 221

Table2. Statesachievingindependence decolonisation

through since1945.

State Populationat independence

(000s) Area(km2) Date ofindependence

Transjordan 400 91,880 1946

Philippines 19067 299,400 1946
Pakistan 72206 947,940 1947
India 338727 3,287,590 1947
Burma 18119 678,500 1948
Ceylon 7109 65,610 1948
Israel 1940 20,770 1948
SouthKorea 20000 98,480 1948
NorthKorea 9000 120,540 1948
Vietnam 20000 329,560 1949
Laos 2000 236,800 1949
Cambodia 3960 181,040 1949
Indonesia 74800 1,919,440 1949
Libya 1257 1,759,540 1951
Sudan 11146 2,505,810 1956
Morocco 8620 446,550 1956
Tunisia 3782 163,610 1956
Ghana 4836 238,540 1957
Malaya 6290 131,884 1957
Guinea 2896 245,860 1958
Cameroon 4700 431,203 1960
Togo 1440 56,790 1960
Mali 7250 1,400,000 1960
Madagascar 5393 587,040 1960
Congo (Kinshasa) 14139 2,345,410 1960
Somalia 2010 637,660 1960
Dahomey 2050 112,620 1960
Niger 2876 1,267,000 1960
UpperVolta 4340 274,200 1960
IvoryCoast 3230 322,460 1960
Chad 3070 1,284,000 1960
CentralAfricanRepublic 1230 622,980 1960
Congo(Brazzaville) 773 342,000 1960
Cyprus 573 9,250 1960
Gabon 446 267,670 1960
Nigeria 52000 876,950 1960
Mauritania 970 1,030,700 1960
SierraLeone 2276 71,740 1961
Kuwait 322 17,820 1961
Tanganyika 9421 943,430 1961
Western Samoa 117 2,860 1962
Burundi 3025 27,830 1962
Rwanda 2840 26,340 1962
Algeria 11206 2,381,740 1962
Jamaica 1661 10,990 1962
TrinidadandTobago 893 5,130 1962
Uganda 7016 236,040 1962
Kenya 8847 582,650 1963
Zanzibar 329 1,660 1963
Malawi 3845 118,480 1964
Malta 324 320 1964
Zambia 3600 752,610 1964
Gambia 330 11,300 1965
Maldives 98 300 1965
Guyana 662 214,970 1966
Botswana 580 600,370 1966

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222
Table2. Continued.

State Populationat independence

(000s) Area(km2) Date ofindependence

Lesotho 865 30,350 1966

Barbados 245 430 1966
SouthYemen 1180 290,000 1967
Nauru 6 21 1968
Mauritius 787 1,860 1968
Swaziland 395 17,360 1968
EquitorialGuinea 281 28,050 1968
Tonga 87 748 1970
Fiji 520 18,270 1970
Bahrain 220 620 1971
Qatar 81 11,000 1971
UnitedArabEmirates 197 83,600 1971
Bahamas 193 13,940 1973
Grenada 96 340 1974
Guinea-Bissau 517 36,120 1974
Mozambique 9239 801,590 1975
Cape Verde 294 4,030 1975
Sao TomeandPrincipe 80 960 1975
PapuaNew Guinea 2756 461,690 1975
Angola 6260 1,246,700 1975
Suriname 422 163,270 1975
Comoros 306 2,170 1975
Seychelles 59 455 1976
Dijbouti 111 22,000 1977
SolomonIslands 215 28,450 1978
Tuvala 7 26 1978
Dominica 81 750 1978
St Lucia 113 620 1979
Kiribati 58 717 1979
St Vincent 97 340 1979
Zimbabwe 7360 390,580 1980
Vanuatu 109 14,760 1980
Belize 162 22,960 1981
Antigua 75 440 1981
St KittsandNevis 44 269 1983
Brunei 269 5,770 1984
MarshallIslands 40 181 1986
Micronesia 98 702 1986
Namibia 1781 824,290 1990
Palau 47 458 1994

Source:Statesman's
Yearbooksandareastatistics.

are occasionallyrecognisedas productsof relictcolonial Notes

boundaries.
*Forcomparative purposesa tableoftherelevantstatesfol-
lows (Table2).
Acknowledgements 2The onlyformer coloniesto mergewiththeirneighbours
aftera periodof independence wereZanzibar(1963-1964)
The financialassistanceof theNationalResearchFounda- and SouthYemen(1967-1990). In thesecases revolution-
tiontowardsthisresearchis herebyacknowledged. Opinions arychangesof government themergers
facilitated (Dresch,
expressedand conclusionsarrivedat are thoseof the au- 2001; Mapuri,1996).
thorand arenotnecessarily to theNational 3Colonies developseparateidentities,whichmay survive
to be attributed
ResearchFoundation. theiradministrative demise. Momentosof separateexist-
ence survivein theiconography of empire.Thus of the32
coloniesand dependenciesdiscussedin thispaper,all but
two,AlaskaandSikkim,issuedtheirowndistinctive postage

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 223

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