Batong Buhay Goldmines Inc vs De la Serna 312 SCRA 22 (1999)

FACTS:

5 February 1987 - Elsie Rosalinda B. Ty, Antonia L. Mendelebar, Ma. Concepcion O. Reyes and 1,247 others filed a complaint against Batong Buhay Gold Mines, Inc.
for:

1. Non-payment of their basic pay and allowances for the period of 6 July 1983 to 5 July 1984, inclusive, under Wage Order No. 2

2. Non-payment of their basic pay and allowances for the period 16 June 1984 to 5 October 1986, inclusive under Wage Order No. 5

3. Non-payment of their salaries for the period 16 March 1986 to the present

4. Non-payment of their 13th month pay for 1985, 1986 and 1987

5. Non-payment of their vacation and sick leave, and the compensatory leaves of mine site employees

6. Non-payment of the salaries of employees who were placed on forced leaves since November, 1985 to the present, if this is not feasible, the affected employees be
awarded corresponding separation pay.

On 27 February 1987, the complainants filed a Motion for the issuance of an inspection authority.

On 13 July 1987, the Labor Standards and Welfare Officers submitted their report recommending that an Order of Compliance be issued directing respondent Batong
Buhay Gold Mines Inc. to pay complainants' Elsie Rosalina Ty, et al. (P4,818,746.40) by way of unpaid salaries of workers from March 16, 1987 to present, unpaid and
ECOLA differentials under Wage Order Nos. 2 and 5 unpaid 13th months pay for 1985 and 1986, and unpaid (sic) vacation/sick/compensatory leave benefits. And on
31 July 1987, the Regional Director adopted the recommendation of the LSWOs and issued an order directing the respondent to pay the complainants of the said
amount

On 31 July 1987, the Regional Director1 adopted the recommendation of the LSWOs and issued an order directing the respondent to pay the complainants

When the respondent failed to post a cash/surety bond, and upon motion for the issuance of a writ of execution by the complainants, the Regional Director, on 14
September 1987 issued a writ of execution appointing Mr. John Espiridion C. Ramos as Special Sheriff and directing him to collect the amount, otherwise he has to
execute this writ by attaching the goods and chattels of BBGMI and not exempt from execution or in case of insufficiency thereof against the real or immovable
property of the respondent.

The Special Sheriff proceeded to execute the appealed Order on 17 September 1987 and seized three (3) units of Peterbuilt trucks and then sold the same by public
auction. Various materials and motor vehicles were also seized on different dates and sold at public auction by said sheriff.

BBGMI appealed the Order dated July 31, 1987 of Regional Director Luna C. Piezas to respondent Undersecretary Dionisio de la Serna, contending that the Regional
Director had no jurisdiction over the case.

ISSUE:

Whether Regional Director has jurisdiction over the complaint filed by the employees of BBGMI.

HELD:

The Regional Director has jurisdiction over the BBGMI employees who are the complainants. The subject labor standards case of the petition arose from the visitorial
and enforcement powers by the Regional Director of Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE). Labor standards refers to the minimum requirements prescribed
by existing laws, rules and regulations relating to wages, hours of work, cost of living allowance and other monetary and welfare benefits, including occupational,
safety and health standards. Labor standards cases are governed by Article 128(b) of the Labor Code.

Art. 128 (b) Visitorial and enforcement powers —

(b) The Minister of Labor or his duly authorized representative shall have the power to order and administer, after due notice and hearing, compliance with the labor
standards provisions of this Code based on the findings of labor regulation officers or industrial safety engineers made in the course of inspection, and to issue writs
of execution to the appropriate authority for the enforcement of their order, except in cases where the employer contests the findings of the labor regulations
officers and raises issues which cannot be resolved without considering evidentiary matters that are not verifiable in the ordinary course of inspection.

Respondent Undersecretary Dionisio C. Dela Serna, on the other hand, upheld the jurisdiction of Regional Director Luna C. Piezas by relying on E.O. 111, to quote:

Considering therefore that there still exists an employer-employee relationship between the parties; that the case involves violations of the labor standard provisions
of the labor code; that the issues therein could be resolved without considering evidentiary matters that are not verifiable in the normal course of inspection; and, if
only to give meaning and not render nugatory and meaningless the visitorial and enforcement powers of the Secretary of Labor and Employment as provided by
Article 128(b) of the Labor Code, as amended by Section 2 of Executive Order No. 111 which states:

The provisions of article 217 of this code to the contrary notwithstanding and in cases where the relationship of employer-employee still exists, the Minister of Labor
and Employment or his duly authorized representative shall have the power to order and administer, after due notice and hearing, compliance with the labor
standards provision of this Code based on the findings of the findings of labor regulation officers or industrial safety engineers made in the course of inspection, and
to issue writs of execution to the appropriate authority for the enforcement of their order, except in cases where the employer contests the findings of the labor
regulations officers and raises issues which cannot be resolved without considering evidentiary matters that are not verifiable in the ordinary course of inspection.
We agree with the complainants that the regional office a quo has jurisdiction to hear and decide the instant labor standard case.

The Court in reinforcing its conclusion that Regional Director has jurisdiction over labor standards cases, treated E.O. 111 as a curative statute, ruling as follows:

E.O. No. 111 was issued on December 24, 1986 or three (3) months after the promulgation of the Secretary of Labor's decision upholding private respondents' salary
differentials and ECOLAs on September 24, 1986. The amendment of the visitorial and enforcement powers of the Regional Director (Article 128(b)) by said E.O. 111
reflects the intention enunciated in Policy Instructions Nos. 6 and 37 to empower the Regional Directors to resolve uncontested money claims in cases where an
employer-employee relationship still exists. This intention must be given weight and entitled to great respect

Republic Act 7730, the law governing the visitorial and enforcement powers of the Labor Secretary and his representatives reads:

Art. 128 (b) Notwithstanding the provisions of Articles 129 and 217 of this Code to the contrary, and in cases where the relationship of employer-employee still exists,
the Secretary of Labor and Employment or his duly authorized representatives shall have the power to issue compliance orders to give effect to the labor standards
provisions of this Code and other labor legislation based on the findings of labor employment and enforcement officers or industrial safety engineers made in the
course of inspection. The Secretary or his duly authorized representative shall issue writs of execution to the appropriate authority for the enforcement of their
orders, except in cases where the employer contests the findings of the labor employment and enforcement officer and raises issues supported by documentary
proofs which were not considered in the course of inspection.

The present law, RA 7730, can be considered a curative statute to reinforce the conclusion that the Regional Director has jurisdiction over the present labor standards
case. Well-settled is the rule that jurisdiction over the subject matter is determined by the law in force when the action was commenced, unless a subsequent statute
provides for its retroactive application, as when it is a curative legislation.

WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED, insofar as the Order dated December 14, 1988 of Undersecretary Dionisio dela Serna is concerned, which Order is SET
ASIDE. The Order of September 16, 1988, upholding the jurisdiction of the Regional Director, is AFFIRMED. No pronouncement as to costs.

JMM Promotion and Management, Inc. vs. CA, G.R. No. 120095, August 5,1996; 260 SCRA 319

Facts

The deployment of female entertainers to Japan was controlled by thegovernment through Department Order No. 3, wherein said entertainers wererequired an
Artist Record Book as a precondition to the processing by the POEAof any contract for overseas employment. Petitioners contends that overseasemployment is a
property right within the meaning of the Constitution and aversthat the alleged deprivation thereof through the onerous requirement of an ARBviolates due process
and constitutes an invalid exercise of police power.

Issue

WON an Artist Record Book is a valid requirement for overseas employment.

Held

Yes. The ARB requirement and the questioned Department order related to itsissuance were issued pursuant to a valid exercise of police power whichconsiders the
welfare of Filipino performing artists, particularly the women.

Calalang vs. Williams G.R. No. 47800 December 2, 1940

Facts:

Maximo Calalang in his capacity as a private citizen and a taxpayer of Manila filed a petition for a writ of prohibition against the respondents.

It is alleged in the petition that the National Traffic Commission, in its resolution of July 17, 1940, resolved to recommend to the Director of the Public Works and to
the Secretary of Public Works and Communications that animal-drawn vehicles be prohibited from passing along Rosario Street extending from Plaza Calderon de la
Barca to Dasmariñas Street from 7:30 Am to 12:30 pm and from 1:30 pm to 530 pm; and along Rizal Avenue extending from the railroad crossing at Antipolo Street
to Echague Street from 7 am to 11pm for a period of one year from the date of the opening of the Colgante Bridge to traffic.

The Chairman of the National Traffic Commission on July 18, 1940 recommended to the Director of Public Works with the approval of the Secretary of Public Works
the adoption of the measure proposed in the resolution aforementioned in pursuance of the provisions of the Commonwealth Act No. 548 which authorizes said
Director with the approval from the Secretary of the Public Works and Communication to promulgate rules and regulations to regulate and control the use of and
traffic on national roads.

On August 2, 1940, the Director recommended to the Secretary the approval of the recommendations made by the Chairman of the National Traffic Commission with
modifications. The Secretary of Public Works approved the recommendations on August 10, 1940.

The Mayor of Manila and the Acting Chief of Police of Manila have enforced and caused to be enforced the rules and regulation. As a consequence, all animal-drawn
vehicles are not allowed to pass and pick up passengers in the places above mentioned to the detriment not only of their owners but of the riding public as well.

Issue:

Whether the rules and regulations promulgated by the respondents pursuant to the provisions of Commonwealth Act NO. 548 constitute an unlawful inference with
legitimate business or trade and abridged the right to personal liberty and freedom of locomotion?

Whether the rules and regulations complained of infringe upon the constitutional precept regarding the promotion of social justice to insure the well-being and
economic security of all the people?
Held:

No. The promulgation of the Act aims to promote safe transit upon and avoid obstructions on national roads in the interest and convenience of the public. In enacting
said law, the National Assembly was prompted by considerations of public convenience and welfare. It was inspired by the desire to relieve congestion of traffic,
which is a menace to the public safety. Public welfare lies at the bottom of the promulgation of the said law and the state in order to promote the general welfare
may interfere with personal liberty, with property, and with business and occupations. Persons and property may be subject to all kinds of restraints and burdens in
order to secure the general comfort, health, and prosperity of the State. To this fundamental aims of the government, the rights of the individual are subordinated.
Liberty is a blessing which should not be made to prevail over authority because society will fall into anarchy. Neither should authority be made to prevail over liberty
because then the individual will fall into slavery. The paradox lies in the fact that the apparent curtailment of liberty is precisely the very means of insuring its
preserving.

No. Social justice means the promotion of the welfare of all the people, the adoption by the Government of measures calculated to insure economic stability of all the
competent elements of society, through the maintenance of a proper economic and social equilibrium in the interrelations of the members of the community,
constitutionally, through the adoption of measures legally justifiable, or extra-constitutionally, through the exercise of powers underlying the existence of all
governments on the time-honored principles of salus populi est suprema lex.

Social justice must be founded on the recognition of the necessity of interdependence among divers and diverse units of a society and of the protection that should
be equally and evenly extended to all groups as a combined force in our social and economic life, consistent with the fundamental and paramount objective of the
state of promoting health, comfort and quiet of all persons, and of bringing about “the greatest good to the greatest number.”

THE PETITION IS DENIED WITH COSTS AGAINST THE PETITIONER.

[G.R. No. 158693 November 17, 2004] VIRGILIO AGABON, et al. v. NLRC
FACTS

Virgilio and Jenny Agabon worked for respondent Riviera Home Improvements, Inc. as gypsum and cornice installers from January 1992 until Feb 1999. Their
employment was terminated when they were dismissed for allegedly abandoning their work. Petitioners Agabon then filed a case of illegal dismissal. /// The LA ruled
in favor of the spouses and ordered Riviera to pay them their money claims. The NLRC reversed the LA, finding that the Agabons were indeed guilty of abandonment.
The CA modified the LA by ruling that there was abandonment but ordering Riviera to pay the Agabons’ money claims.///

The arguments of both parties are as follows:

The Agabons claim, among others that Riviera violated the requirements of notice and hearing when the latter did not send written letters of termination to their
addresses.

Riviera admitted to not sending the Agabons letters of termination to their last known addresses because the same would be futile, as the Agabons do not reside
there anymore. However, it also claims that the Agabons abandoned their work. More than once, they subcontracted installation works for other companies. They
already were warned of termination if the same act was repeated, still, they disregarded the warning.

ISSUES

Whether the Agabons were illegally dismissed

Whether Riviera violated the requirements of notice and hearing

Is the violation of the procedural requirements of notice and hearing for termination of employees a violation of the Constitutional due process?

What are the consequences of violating the procedural requirements of termination?

RULING: Valid dismissal but violation of statutory due process = payment of nominal damages (P30,000) & balance of 13th month pay, etc.

No. There was just cause for their dismissal, i.e., abandonment. Art. 282 specifies the grounds for just dismissal, to wit:

a. Serious misconduct or willful disobedience of the lawful orders of the employer or his duly authorized representative in connection with the employee’s
work

b. Gross and habitual neglect of the by the employee of his duties (includes abandonment)

c. Fraud or willful breach of the trust reposed by the employer or his duly authorized representative to the employee

d. Commission of a crime or offense by the employee against the person of the employer or any member of his immediate family or his duly authorized
representative

e. Any other causes analogous to the foregoing.

To establish abandonment, two elements must be present:

a. The unjustified failure of the employee to report for work

b. A clear intention to sever e-e relationship, manifested by overt acts

Here, the Agabons were frequently absent from work for having performed installation work for another company, despite prior warning given by Riviera. This clearly
establishes an intention to sever the e-e relationship between them, and which constitutes abandonment.

Yes. While the employer has the right to expect good performance, diligence, good conduct and loyalty from its employees, it also has the duty to provide just
compensation to his employees and to observe the procedural requirements of notice and hearing in the termination of his employees.

Procedure of termination (Omnibus Rules Implementing the Labor Code):

a. A written notice to the employee specifying the grounds for termination and giving the employee reasonable opportunity to be heard

b. A hearing where the employee is given the opportunity to respond to the charges against him and present evidence or rebut the evidence presented
against him (if he so requests)

c. A written notice of termination indicating that grounds have been established to justify his termination upon due consideration of all circumstances

In this case, Riviera failed to notify the Agabons of their termination to their last known addresses. Hence, they violated the procedural requirement laid down by the
law in the termination of employees.

No. Constitutional due process is that provided under the Constitution, which involves the protection of the individual against governmental oppression and the
assurance of his rights In civil, criminal and administrative proceedings; statutory due process is that found in the Labor Code and its Implementing Rules and protects
the individual from being unjustly terminated without just or authorized cause after notice and hearing.

The two are similar in that they both have two aspects: substantive due process and procedural due process. However, they differ in that under the Labor Code, the
first one refers to the valid and authorized causes of employment termination, while the second one refers to the manner of dismissal. A denial of statutory due
process is not the same as a denial of Constitutional due process for reasons enunciated in Serrano v. NLRC.

The dismissal is valid, but Riviera should pay nominal damages to the Agabons in vindication of the latter for violating their right to notice and hearing. The penalty is
in the nature of a penalty or indemnification, the amount dependent on the facts of each case, including the nature of gravity of offense of the employer.

In this case, the Serrano doctrine was re-examined.

First, in the Serrano case, the dismissal was upheld, but it was held to be ineffectual (without legal effect). Hence, Serrano was still entitled to the payment of his
backwages from the time of dismissal until the promulgation of the court of the existence of an authorized cause. Further, he was entitled to his separation pay as
mandated under Art. 283. The ruling is unfair to employers and has the danger of the following consequences:

a. The encouragement of filing frivolous suits even by notorious employees who were justly dismissed but were deprived of statutory due process; they are
rewarded by invoking due process
 b. It would create absurd situations where there is just or authorized cause but a procedural infirmity invalidates the termination, ie an employee who became
a criminal and threatened his co-workers’ lives, who fled and could not be faound

c. It could discourage investments that would generate employment in the economy

Second, the payment of backwages is unjustified as only illegal termination gives the employee the right to be paid full backwages. When the dismissal is valid or
upheld, the employee has no right to backwages.

ADDITIONAL NOTES:

1. Dismissals based on just causes: acts or omissions attributable to the employee; no right to claim backwages or to pay separation pay (separation pay is
subject to exception, ie if termination is not based on serious misconduct or a conduct reflecting the moral depravity of a person, separation pay may be
granted by reason of social justice)

Dismissals based on authorized causes: involve grounds provided under the Labor Code; employee (and DOLE) is entitled the payment of separation pay (redundancy
and installation of labor-saving devices: 1 month pay or 1 month/yr of service, whichever is higher; retrenchment and closure or cessation of business: 1 month pay
or ½ month per year of service, whichever is higher)

Illegal termination: employee is entitled to the payment of full backwages as well as reinstatement without loss of seniority rights and other privileges, inclusive of
allowances and other monetary claims from the time compensation was withheld until reinstatement; if reinstatement is not possible, separation pay shall be given.

G.R. No. 117040. January 27, 2000

RUBEN SERRANO, petitioner, vs. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION and ISETANN DEPARTMENT STORE, respondents.

Facts:

Ruben Serrano was hired by private respondent, Isetann Department Store, as a security checker to apprehend shoplifters and prevent pilferage of merchandise. He
became a regular employee on April 4, 1995 then head of Secuity Checkers Section in 1988.

In 1991, as a cost cutting measure, Isetann decided to phase out the entire security section and engage the services of an independent security agency.

On October 11, 1991, Serrano received a memorandum informing him of his termination which took immediate effect. On December 3, 1991 Serrano filed a
complaint for illegal dismissal, illegal layoff, unfair labor practice, underpayment, and non-payment of salary and overtime.

On April 30, 1993, the Labor Arbiter ruled in favor of Serrano and ordered Isetann to pay backwages, reinstatement, unpaid wages, 13th month pay, attorney’s fees
under the following findings:

failure of Isettan to establish that the retrenchment was to prevent or minimize losses to its business

to accord due process

establish reasonable standards in the termination selection

no showing of inefficiency of employees to justify replacement of security agency

On March 30, 1994, NLRC reversed the decision of the Labor Arbiter and found the termination legal but failed to address the issue of compliance with the notice
requirement. It ordered petitioner to be given separation pay equivalent to one month pay for every year of service, unpaid salary, and proportionate 13th month
pay ruling that:

the phase-out of private respondents security section and the hiring of an independent security agency constituted an exercise by private respondent of "[a]
legitimate business decision

the distinction made by the Labor Arbiter between "retrenchment" and the employment of "cost-saving devices" under Art. 283 of the Labor Code was insignificant

that the rule of "reasonable criteria" in the selection of the employees to be retrenched did not apply because all positions in the security section had been abolished;
and

that the appointment of a safety and security supervisor referred to by petitioner to prove bad faith on private respondents part was of no moment because the
position had long been in existence and was separate from petitioners position as head of the Security Checkers Section.

Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration, but his motion was denied, hence this petition.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the dismissal was legal.

Held:

Yes, the termination of petitioners services was for an authorized cause, i.e., redundancy. Hence, pursuant to Art. 283 of the Labor Code, petitioner should be given
separation pay at the rate of one month pay for every year of service.

Art. 283 also provides that to terminate the employment of an employee for any of the authorized causes the employer must serve "a written notice on the workers
and the Department of Labor and Employment at least one (1) month before the intended date thereof." In the case at bar, petitioner was given a notice of
termination on October 11, 1991 terminating his services on the same day. He was thus denied his right to be given written notice .

The Wenphil rule imposes a fine on an employer who is found to have dismissed an employee for cause without prior notice. This has been found to be ineffective in
deterring employer violations of the notice requirement. Thus the present ruling of the Court is that the dismissal of the employee is merely ineffectual, not void.

The decision in this case, providing for the payment of full backwages for failure of an employer to give notice, seeks to vindicate the employee's right to notice
before he is dismissed or laid off, while recognizing the right of the employer to dismiss for any of the just causes. The remedy is to order the payment to the
employee of full backwages from the time of his dismissal until the court finds that the dismissal was for a just cause. But, otherwise, his dismissal must be upheld
and he should not be reinstated. This is because his dismissal is ineffectual.

The court responds to the arguments of Justice Puno - that the denial of due process makes the decision a nullity; and Justice Panganiban - quoting from a statement
in People vs Bocar that "[w]here the denial of the fundamental right of due process is apparent, a decision rendered in disregard of that right is void for lack of
jurisdiction." The denial of due process by the State does not apply to this case as founded on the following reasons.
Violation by the employer of the notice requirement cannot be considered a denial of due process resulting in the nullity of the employees dismissal or layoff. The
Due Process Clause of the Constitution is a limitation on governmental powers. It does not apply to the exercise of private power.

Notice and hearing are required under the Due Process Clause before the power of organized society are brought to bear upon the individual. The purpose of the 30
day notice is to give him time to prepare for the eventual loss of his job and the DOLE an opportunity to determine whether economic causes do exist justifying the
termination of his employment.

The employer cannot really be expected to be entirely an impartial judge of his own cause.

Thus the Court held, with respect to Art. 283 of the Labor Code, the employers failure to comply with the notice requirement does not constitute a denial of due
process but a mere failure to observe a procedure for the termination of employment which makes the termination of employment merely ineffectual.

Ruling:

The resolution of the National Labor Relations Commission is MODIFIED by ordering private respondent Isetann Department Store, Inc. to pay petitioner separation
pay equivalent to one (1) month pay for every year of service, his unpaid salary, and his proportionate 13th month pay and, in addition, full backwages from the time
his employment was terminated on October 11, 1991 up to the time the decision herein becomes final. For this purpose, this case is REMANDED to the Labor Arbiter
for computation of the separation pay, backwages, and other monetary awards to petitioner.

Duncan Association of Detailman-PTGWO vs. Glaxo Phils. [G.R. No.162994. September 17, 2004]

Facts:

Pedro A. Tecson was hired by Glaxo Wellcome Philippines, Inc.) as medical representative on October 1995, after Tecson had undergone training and orientation.
Tecson signed a contract of employment which stipulates, among others, that he agrees to study and abide by existing company rules; to disclose to management any
existing or future relationship by consanguinity or affinity with co-employees or employees of competing drug companies. The Employee Code of Conduct of Glaxo
similarly provides that if management perceives a conflict of interest or a potential conflict between such relationship and the employee’s employment with the
company, the management and the employee will explore the possibility of a “transfer to another department in a non-counterchecking position” or preparation for
employment outside the company after six months.

Tecson was initially assigned to market Glaxo’s products in the Camarines Sur-Camarines Norte sales area. Subsequently, Tecson entered into a romantic relationship
with Bettsy, an employee of Astra Pharmaceuticals (Astra), a competitor of Glaxo. Bettsy was Astra’s Branch Coordinator in Albay. Despite of warnings, Tecson
married Bettsy. The superiors of Tecson reminded him of the company policy and suggested that either him or Bettsy shall resign from their respective companies.
Tecson requested more time to resolve the issue. In November of 1999, Glaxo transferred Tecson to Mindanao area involving the provinces of Butuan, Surigao and
Agusan del Sur. Tecson did not agree to the reassignment and referred this matter to the grievance committee. It was resolved and was submitted to voluntary
arbitration.

Issue:

Is the policy of a pharmaceutical company prohibiting its employees from marrying employees of any competitor company valid?

Ruling:

Glaxo’s policy prohibiting an employee from having a relationship with an employee of a competitor company is a valid exercise of management prerogative. Glaxo
has a right to guard its trade secrets, manufacturing formulas, marketing strategies and other confidential programs and information from competitors, especially so
that it and Astra are rival companies in the highly competitive pharmaceutical industry.

The prohibition against personal or marital relationships with employees of competitor companies upon Glaxo’s employees is reasonable under the circumstances
because relationships of that nature might compromise the interests of the company. In laying down the assailed company policy, Glaxo only aims to protect its
interests against the possibility that a competitor company will gain access to its secrets and procedures. That Glaxo possesses the right to protect its economic
interests cannot be denied.

No less than the Constitution recognizes the right of enterprises to adopt and enforce such a policy to protect its right to reasonable returns on investments and to
expansion and growth. Indeed, while our laws endeavor to give life to the constitutional policy on social justice and the protection of labor, it does not mean that
every labor dispute will be decided in favor of the workers. The law also recognizes that management has rights which are also entitled to respect and enforcement in
the interest of fair play.

YRASUEGUI vs. PAL G.R. No. 168081; 17 October 2008

FACTS:

Petitioner Armando Yrasuegui was a flight steward of respondent Philippine Airlines who was terminated due to his failure to adhere to the latter’s mandated weight.

According to respondent’s Cabin and Crew Administration Manual, petitioner’s ideal weight is 166lbs. However, he was unable to maintain the required weight.

For 4 years, petitioner was removed from fight duty in order to meet the weight standards, and was even offered the services of the company physician.

Despite the leniency, petitioner still failed to comply with the company policy. Hence, respondent was terminated for the violation of company standards on weight
requirements.

LA – ruled that petitioner was illegally dismissed. NLRC – affirmed ruling. Both found the company standards of respondent on weight requirements to be reasonable.

CA set aside the ruling of NLRC, and held that the failure to adhere to the weight standards is an analogous case for the dismissal of an employee under Art. 282(e) of
the Labor Code in relation to Art. 282(a). The CA also held that the weight standards are a bona fide occupational qualification (BFOQ), and if violated “justifies an
employee’s separation from the service.”

ISSUE:

Whether or not petitioner was discriminated against when he was dismissed by respondent.

HELD: No.

RATIO:

The SC held that petitioner failed to prove his allegations with particularity –i.e., he merely mentioned the names of other cabin crew members that were overweight.
Furthermore, petitioner cannot invoke the equal protection clause guaranty of the Constitution, since such liberty is only addressed to the State or those acting under
its authority. The Bill of Rights is not meant to be invoked against acts of private individuals.
In addition, the SC also held that the company standards/BFOQ of the respondent is valid. Such qualifications are reasonably related or essential to the operation of
the job involved. As a common carrier, respondent is bound to observe extraordinary diligence for the safety of its passengers. Hence, the dismissal of petitioner is
valid. His failure to comply with the weight requirement is a ground for dismissal, as provided in Art. 282(e) of the Labor Code.

Punzal vs. ETSI Technologies [G.R. No. 170384-85. March 9, 2007]

Facts:

Lorna Punzal worked as a department secretary in ETSI. One day, she sent an e-mail to her officemates announcing the holding of a Halloween party that was to be
held in the office the following day. She invited her officemates to bring their kids to the office in their Halloween costumes and to go “trick or treating” in the office.
Her immediate superior advised Punzal to seek the approval of management. Then she learned that Senior Vice President Geisert did not approve of the plan to hold
a party in the office. So, she sent another email to her officemates expressing her disappointment, particularly saying that: He was so unfair…para bang palagi siyang
iniisahan sa trabaho…bakit most of the parents na mag-joined ang anak ay naka-VL naman. Anyway, solohin na lang niya bukas ang office. To those parents who
would like to bring their Kids in Megamall there will be Trick or Treating at Mc Donalds Megamall Bldg. A at 10:00 AM tomorrow and let’s not spoil the fun for our
kids. The management said that she committed an offense under Article IV, No. 5 & 8 Improper conduct or acts of discourtesy or disrespect and Making malicious
statements concerning Company Officer, punishable by suspension to termination depending upon the gravity of the offense/s as specified in our ETSI’s Code of
Conduct and Discipline.

Issue:

Was Punzal validly terminated?

Held:

A scrutiny of petitioner’s second e-mail message shows that her remarks were not merely an expression of her opinion about Geisert’s decision; they were directed
against Geisert. Further, her closing statement even invited her co-workers to join a trick or treating activity at another venue during office hours, encouraging them
to ignore Geisert’s authority. That it has been a tradition in ETSI to celebrate occasions such as Christmas, birthdays, Halloween, and others does not remove Geisert’s
prerogative to approve or disapprove plans to hold such celebrations in office premises and during company time. In the case at bar, the disapproval of the plan to
hold the Halloween party on October 31, 2001 may not be considered to have been actuated by bad faith. As the Labor Arbiter noted: the holding of a trick or treat
party in the office premises of respondent ETSI would certainly affect the operations of the office, since children will be freely roaming around the office premises,
things may get misplaced and the noise in the office will simply be too hard to ignore. Given the reasonableness of Geisert’s decision that provoked petitioner to send
the second e-mail message, the Court of Appeals correctly ruled that "the message x x x resounds of subversion and undermines the authority and credibility of
management” and that petitioner "displayed a tendency to act without management’s approval, and even against management’s will." © 2010 www.pinoylegal.com
Page 2 Moreover, in circulating the second e-mail message, petitioner violated Articles III (8) and IV (5) of ETSI’s Code of Conduct on "making false or malicious
statements concerning the Company, its officers and employees or its products and services" and "improper conduct or acts of discourtesy or disrespect to fellow
employees, visitors, guests, clients, at any time." Nevertheless, the violation of her statutory due process right entitles her to an award of nominal damage, which this
Court fixes at P30,000, pursuant to the ruling in Agabon.

Pascual vs. Board of Examiners, 28 SCRA 344 (1969)

Facts:

Petitioner Arsenio Pascual, Jr. filed an action for prohibition against the Board of Medical Examiners. It was alleged therein that at the initial hearing of an
administrative case for alleged immorality, counsel for complainants announced that he would present as his first witness the petitioner. Thereupon, petitioner,
through counsel, made of record his objection, relying on the constitutional right to be exempt from being a witness against himself. Petitioner then alleged that to
compel him to take the witness stand, the Board of Examiners was guilty, at the very least, of grave abuse of discretion for failure to respect the constitutional right
against self-incrimination.

The answer of respondent Board, while admitting the facts stressed that it could call petitioner to the witness stand and interrogate him, the right against self-
incrimination being available only when a question calling for an incriminating answer is asked of a witness. They likewise alleged that the right against self-
incrimination cannot be availed of in an administrative hearing.

Petitioner was sustained by the lower court in his plea that he could not be compelled to be the first witness of the complainants; he being the party proceeded
against in an administrative charge for malpractice. Hence, this appeal by the respondent Board of Examiners.

Issue:

Whether or Not compelling petitioner to be the first witness of the complainants violates the Self-Incrimination Clause.

DECISION:

Decision of the lower court of August 2, 1965 is affirmed. Petitioner Pascual could not be compelled to the first witness of the complainants.

RATIO:

The Board of Medical examiners cannot, consistently with the self-incriminating clause, compel the person proceeded against to take the witness stand without his
consent. A proceeding for malpractice possesses a criminal or penal aspect in the sense that the respondent would suffer the revocation of his license as a medical
practitioner which is even a greater form of deprivation than forfeiture of property.

While crime should not go unpunished and that the truth must be revealed, such desirable objective should not be accomplished according to means offensive to
high sense of respect accorded to human personality. More and more in line with the democratic creed, the deference accorded to an individual even those
suspected of the most heinous crimes is given due weight.

MANUEL F. CABAL vs. HON. RUPERTO KAPUNAN, JR., and THE CITY FISCAL OF MANILA [G.R. No. L-19052. December 29, 1962.]

FACTS:,

Col. Jose C. Maristela of the Philippine Army filed with the Secretary of National Defense a letter-complaint (Col. Maristela) charging petitioner Manuel F. Cabal, then
Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, with “graft, corrupt practices, unexplained wealth, conduct unbecoming of an officer and gentleman, dictatorial
tendencies, giving false statements of his assets and liabilities in 1958 and other equally reprehensible acts”. The President of the Philippines created a committee of
five (5) members to investigate the charge of unexplained wealth contained in said letter-complaint and submit its report and recommendations as soon as possible.
At the beginning of the investigation, the Committee ordered petitioner herein to take the witness stand and be sworn to as witness for Maristela, in support of his
aforementioned charge of unexplained wealth. Thereupon, petitioner objected, personally and through counsel, to said request of Col. Maristela and to the
aforementioned order of the Committee, invoking his constitutional right against self-incrimination. The Committee insisted that petitioner take the witness stand
and be sworn to, subject to his right to refuse to answer such questions as may be incriminatory. This notwithstanding, petitioner respectfully refused to be sworn to
as a witness or take the witness stand. Hence, in a communication dated the Committee referred the matter to respondent City Fiscal of Manila, for such action as he
may deem proper.
The City Fiscal filed with the CFI of Manila a “charge” praying respondent be summarily adjudged guilty of contempt of the Presidential Committee..”
Respondent filed a motion to quash upon the ground that the Committee had no power to order and require petitioner to take the witness stand and be sworn to,
upon the request of Col. Maristela, as witness for the latter, inasmuch as said order violates petitioner’s constitutional right against self-incrimination.
The judge denied said motion to quash. Hence, petitioner filed a petition for Certiorari and prohibition in the SC.
In their answer, respondents herein allege, inter alia, that the investigation being conducted by the Committee above referred to is administrative, not criminal, in
nature

ISSUE:

Whether or not the proceedings before the aforementioned Committee is civil or criminal in character.

HELD:

CRIMINAL
It seems conceded that the purpose of the charge against petitioner is not seek the removal of petitioner herein as Chief of Staff of the AFP. As a matter of fact he no
longer holds such office. But apply the provisions of the Anti-Graft Law, which authorizes the forfeiture to the State of property of a public officer or employee which
is manifestly out of proportion to his salary as such public officer or employee and his other lawful income and the income from legitimately acquired property. Such
forfeiture has been held, however, to partake of the nature of a penalty.

FORFEITURE OF PROPERTY IN SUBSTANCE IS A CRIMINAL PROCEEDING FOR THE PURPOSE OF PROTECTION OF THE RIGHTS OF THE DEFENDANT AGAINST SELF-
INCRIMINATION; CASE OF BOYD vs. U.S. and THURSTON vs. CLARK, CITED. — In Boyd vs. U.S. (116 U.S. 616, 29 L. ed., 746), it was held that the information, in a
proceeding to declare a forfeiture of certain property because of the evasion of a certain revenue law, “though technically a civil proceeding, is in substance and
effect a criminal one”, and that suits for penalties and forfeitures are within the reason of criminal proceedings for the purposes of that portion of the Fifth
Amendment of the Constitution of the U.S. which declares that no person shall be compelled in a criminal to be a witness against himself. Similarly, a proceeding for
the removal of an officer was held, in Thurston vs. Clark (107 Cal. 285, 40 pp. 435, 437), to be in substance criminal, for said portion of the Fifth Amendment applies
“to all cases in which the action prosecuted is not to establish, recover or redress private and civil rights, but to try and punish persons charged with the commission
of public offenses” and “a criminal case is an action, suit or cause instituted to punish an infraction of the criminal laws, and, with this object in view, it matters not in
what form a statute may clothe it; it is still a criminal case . . . .”

WATEROUS DRUG CORPORATION and MS. EMMA CO, petitioners, vs. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION and ANTONIA MELODIA
CATOLICO, respondents.

Facts:

Antonia Melodia Catolico was hired as a pharmacist by Waterous Drug Corp.

Catolico sold to YSP Inc. 10 bottles of Voren Tablets at P384 per unit. However, the normal selling price is P320 per unit. Catolico overcharged by P64 per unit for a
total of P640. YSP sent a check payable to Catolico as a “refund” for the jacked-up price. It was sent in an envelope addressed to her. Saldana, the clerk of Waterous
Drug Corp. opened the envelope and saw that there was a check for P640 for Catolico.

Waterous Drug Corp. ordered the termination of Catolico for acts of dishonesty.

NLRC: Dismissed the Petition. Evidence of respondents (check from YSP) being rendered inadmissible, by virtue of the constitutional right invoked by complainants.

Petitioners: In the light of the decision in the People v. Marti, the constitutional protection against unreasonable searches and seizures refers to the immunity of
one’s person from interference by government and cannot be extended to acts committed by private individuals so as to bring it within the ambit of alleged unlawful
intrusion by the government.

Issue:

W/N the check is admissible as evidence

Held:

Yes. As regards the constitutional violation upon which the NLRC anchored its decision, we find no reason to revise the doctrine laid down in People vs. Marti that
the Bill of Rights does not protect citizens from unreasonable searches and seizures perpetrated by private individuals. It is not true, as counsel for Catolico claims,
that the citizens have no recourse against such assaults. On the contrary, and as said counsel admits, such an invasion gives rise to both criminal and civil liabilities.

Finally, since it has been determined by the Labor Arbiter that Catolicos reinstatement would not be to the best interest of the parties, he correctly awarded
separation pay to Catolico.Separation pay in lieu of reinstatement is computed at one months salary for every year of service. In this case, however, Labor Arbiter
Lopez computed the separation pay at one-half months salary for every year of service. Catolico did not oppose or raise an objection. As such, we will uphold the
award of separation pay as fixed by the Labor Arbiter.

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby DISMISSED and the challenged decision and resolution of the National Labor Relations Commission dated 30 September
1993 and 2 December 1993, respectively, in NLRC-NCR CA No. 005160-93 are AFFIRMED, except as to its reason for upholding the Labor Arbiters decision, viz., that
the evidence against private respondent was inadmissible for having been obtained in violation of her constitutional rights of privacy of communication and against
unreasonable searches and seizures which is hereby set aside.

Philippine National Bank v. Florence O. Cabansag G.R. 157010, 2005

Facts:

Respondent Cabansag arrived in Singapore as a tourist. She applied for employment with the Singapore Branch of the Philippine National Bank (PNB Singapore), a
private corporation organized and existing under the laws of the Philippines. At the time, the Singapore PNB Branch was under the helm of Ruben Tobias, a lawyer, as
General Manager—with the rank of Vice President of the Bank. At that time too, the Branch Office had two (2) types of employees: (a) expatriates or the regular
employees—hired in Manila and assigned in Singapore and (b) locally (direct) hired. She applied for employment as Branch Credit Officer, at a total monthly package
of SG $ 4,500.00. She was favored by her superiors for her excellent job that even Ruben Tobias recommended her. However, in the evening sometime in April 1999,
when Cabansag was in a flat she rented along with her office mates, she was told that Ruben Tobias has asked them to tell Cabansag to resign from her job. Cabansag
verified the information from Tobias, to which Tobias confirmed, with the explanation that her resignation was imperative to a cost-cutting measure of the Bank. He
also told Cabansag that it will be transformed into a remittance office and that, in either way, she had to resigned from employment. She then asked Tobias that she
be furnished with a ‘Formal Advice’ from the PNB Head Office in Manila. However, Tobias refused. Consequently, Cabansag filed before the LA a complaint for illegal
dismissal, to which the LA ruled her favor. In the Court of Appeals, it ruled that even though Cabansag secured an employment pass from the Singapore Ministry of
Employment, she however did not waive Philippine labor laws—or the local jurisdiction over her complain for illegal dismissal. Hence, this petition.

Issue:
Whether or not the Philippine labor laws has jurisdiction over the case for Cabansag’s failure to waive it at the time of his application in the Singapore Ministry of
Employment which was duly approved by the POEA?

Court Ruling:

First, the Court notes that Labor Arbiters have exclusive and original jurisdiction over claims arising from employer-employee relations, including termination disputes
involving all workers, among whom are Overseas Filipino Workers (OFW). Thus, based on the foregoing provisions, labor arbiters clearly have original and exclusive
jurisdiction over claims arising from employer-employee relations, including termination disputes involving all workers, among whom are OFWs. Respondent in this
case subsequently became a contract worker or OFW who was covered by the Philippine labor laws and policies upon certification by the POEA. The Certificate,
issued on March 1999, declared her a bona fide contract worker for Singapore. Under the Philippine law, this document authorized her working status in a foreign
country and entitled her to all benefits and CASE DIGEST: LABOR LAW REVIEW Topic: NLRC Jurisdiction processes under our statutes. Thus, even assuming arguendo
that she was considered at the start of her employment as a “direct hire”, governed by and subject to the Philippine laws, common practices and customs prevailing
in Singapore she subsequently became a contract worker or an OFW who was covered by Philippine labor law and policies upon certification by the POEA. At the time
her employment was illegally terminated, she already possessed the POEA Employment Certificate. Thus, being a migrant worker or OFW, respondent is given the
option to choose the venue of her complaint against petitioner for illegal dismissal. By mandate of RA 8042, the law gives her two choices: (1) at the Regional
Arbitration Branch (RAB) where she resides or (2) at the RAB where the principal office of her employer is situated.

CARMEN SANTOS vs. ECC G.R. No. 89222; April 7, 1993.

FACTS:

Francisco Santos was employed as welder at Philippine Navy and its Naval Shipyard in 1955. He spent the last 32 years of his life in the government service, the first
year as a welder helper, and the last two years as shipyard assistant.

1986 - Francisco was admitted to Naval Station Hospital in Cavite City, on complaint that he was having epigastric pain (upper abdomen) and been vomiting blood 2
days prior; diagnosed as bleeding Peptic Ulcer disease (PUD), cholelithiasis (presence of gallstones), and diabetes mellitus.

1987 - Francisco died, the cause of which was liver cirrhosis indicated on death certificate.

Carmen Santos, wife, filed claim for death benefit of her husband, per P.D. 626 (Employees Compensation Act).

GSIS: denied claim on ground that upon proofs and evidence submitted, Francisco's ailment cannot be considered an occupational disease.

She sought the help of the Commander of NASCOM who wrote a letter substantiating the claim that the deceased’s welding jobs in compartments of naval vessels
exposed him to heat and inhalation of burning chemical substances and gas fumes from burning electrodes.

GSIS again denied her claim; said that welding jobs would cause lung disease and not cirrhosis.

On appeal to Employees' Compensation Commission (ECC), Commission affirmed the denial of GSIS on petitioner's claim relying that Francisco's illness did not specify
the type of cirrhosis which caused his death. Nevertheless, ECC took cognizance that deceased did not have a previous history of alcoholism, hepatitis which could
have lead to cirrhosis.

ISSUE:

WON liver cirrhosis is compensable in the case. --YES

RULING:

Compensable sickness is any illness definitely accepted as occupational diseases listed by the commission or any illness caused by employment subject to proof that
the risk of contracting the same is increased by the working conditions. For it to be compensable, it must be shown that (1) that it is a result of an occupational
disease listed under Annex A of the Amended Rules on Employees’ Compensation with the conditions set therein satisfied; or (2) if not so listed, that the risk of
contracting the disease is increased by the working conditions

Cirrhosis is not an occupational disease but in Librea v. ECC, it was declared compensable. In Librea, a Division Physical Education Supervisor was declared entitled to
the ECC upon death due to liver cirrhosis. The untold sufferings in his inspection of the barrio schools and the scarcity of food rendered him susceptible to
malnutrition and hence, liver cirrhosis.

As a welder, Francisco was exposed to heat, gas, fumes and chemical substances from welding electrodes which were inhaled by the welder due to work in enclosed
compartments. Research shows that ingestion or inhalation of small amounts of iron over a number of years may lead to siderosis. Acute poisoning brings about
circulatory collapse which may occur rapidly or be delayed to 48 hours with liver failure. Thirty-two years of exposure to these industrial hazards would cause
poisoning and malfunction of the liver.

Leading doctrine of compensability is Raro v. ECC.

“There is a widespread misconception that the poor employee is still arrayed against the might and power of his rich corporate employer. Hence, he must be given all
kinds of favorable presumptions. This is fallacious. It is now the trust fund and not the employer which suffers if benefits are paid to claimants who are not entitled
under the law. The employer joins the employee in trying to have their claims approved. The employer is spared the problem of proving a negative proposition that
the disease was not caused by employment.”

The New Labor Code abolished the presumption of compensability of illness contracted by a worker during employment. Now the worker must present evidence to
prove that the sickness a) was a result of or b) the risk of sickness was aggravated by his work.

However, the above has been abandoned, the liberality of the law in favor of the working man still prevails. The Employee’s Compensation Act is a social legislation to
offer reliefs for the working man and the ECC, tasked with implementing the social justice mandate in the Constitution, should be more liberal in resolving
compensation claims.

This interpretation gives meaning and substance to the liberal and compassionate spirit of the law as embodied in Article 4 of the New Labor Code which states that
“all doubts in the implementation and interpretation of the provisions of the Labor Code including its implementing rules and regulations shall be resolved in favor of
labor.”

The policy is to extend the applicability of PD 626 to a greater number of employees who can avail of the benefits under the law, which is in consonance with the
avowed policy of the state to give maximum aid and protection to labor

DISPOSITION:

ECC Decision Reversed.

National Sugar Refineries Corporation (NASUREFCO) vs. NLRC, NBSR Supervisory Union (PACIWU) TUCP G.R. No. 101761, March 24, 1993

FACTS:

Petitioner National Sugar Refineries Corporation (NASUREFCO), is a corporation wholly owned and controlled by the Government. On June 1, 1988, petitioner
implemented a Job Evaluation (JE) program affecting all employees, from rank-and-file to department heads. The JE program was designed to rationalize the duties
and functions of all positions, reestablish levels of responsibility, and recognize both wage and operational structures.

Ten years prior to the JE program, members of the respondent labor union were treated the same as rank-and-file employees and as such, were entitled to overtime
pay, rest day and holiday pay pursuant to Arts. 87, 93, 94 of the Labor Code as amended. After the JE program was implemented, the following were made (1)
members of respondent labor union were re-classified under levels S5 to S8 which are considered managerial staff for purposes of compensation and benefits, (2)
increase in pay of an average of 50% of their basic pay, (3) longevity pay increased on top of alignment adjustments, (4) increase COLA, (5) grant of PHP 100
allowance for rest day/holiday work. On May 11, 1990, NASUREFCO recognized herein labor union pursuant to RA 6715 allowing supervisory employees to form their
own unions. On June 20, 1990, herein labor union filed a complaint with labor arbiter for non-payment of overtime, rest day and holiday pay. Labor arbiter ruled in
favor of respondent labor union and affirmed by the NLRC.

ISSUE:

Are the members of respondent labor union entitled to overtime, rest day and holiday pay?

RULING:

No, although it is undisputed that under Art. 212 (m) of the Labor Code, members of the respondent labor union are considered supervisors, whose basic function is
to recommend managerial actions (hire, transfer, suspend, lay-off, recall, discharge, assign or discipline employees) if such authority is not merely routinary or clerical
in nature but requires the use of independent judgement. As averred by petitioner, for purposes of determining whether said labor union members are entitled to
overtime, rest and holiday pay, they are considered “officers or members of the managerial staff” as defined under Art. 82 of the Labor Code. The court tips the scales
in favor of petitioner.

It is clear that after the implementation of the JE program, the members of the labor union were no longer considered rank-and-file employees with regards to the
pay and benefits received as aforementioned since they are now exempt from the coverage of Art. 82 of the Labor Code and hence, not entitled to overtime, rest and
holiday pay.

Bonifacio vs. GSIS

The case:

Petition for review on certiorari of the decision of the Employees Compensation Commission affirming the denial by the Government Service Insurance System of
petitioner's claim for benefits under PD No. 626, as amended, for the death of his spouse, Lourdes Bonifacio.

The facts:

1. Lourdes Bonifacio was a classroom teacher assigned to the district of Bagamanoc, Division of Catanduanes, Ministry of Education and Culture from August,
1965 until she contracted carcinoma of the breast with metastases to the gastrointestinal tract and lungs which caused her death on October 5, 1978.

2. a claim for death benefits under P.D. No. 626, as amended, was filed by petitioner with the GSIS

3. The claim was denied on the ground that the decedent's principal ailment, carcinoma of the breast with metastases to gastrointestinal tract and lungs, is
not an occupational disease for her particular work as a teacher, nor is the risk of contracting said disease increased by her working conditions

4. The Employees Compensation Commission, on appeal affirmed the decision of the respondent System.

Issue:

Whether or not the disease of Bonifacio is an occupational disease, subject to death benefits for the heir.

Held:

No. carcinoma of the breast with metastases to gastrointestinal tract and lungs is not an occupational disease listed by the Employees Compensation Commission.
Which is not subject for death benenifts under PD No. 626.

Rationale:

1. Jurisprudence: It is "not necessary to prove that employment was the sole cause of the death or injury suffered by the employee. It is sufficient to show
that the employment had contributed to the aggravation or acceleration of such death or ailment."

2. Workmen's Compensation Law, it is not necessary for the claimant to carry the burden of proof to establish his case to the point of demonstration

3. Under the present Labor Code, the "latitudinarian or expansive application of the Workmen's Compensation Law in favor of the employee or worker" no
longer prevails as the burden of showing proof of causation has shifted back to the employee particularly in cases of sickness or injuries which are not
accepted or listed as occupational by the Employees Compensation Commission.

4. WHEREFORE, the petition is dismissed and the decisions of the GSIS and the Employees Compensation Commission denying the claim are affirmed

PHILIPPINE AIRLINES, INC., petitioner,

vs.
ALBERTO SANTOS, JR., HOUDIEL MAGADIA, GILBERT ANTONIO, REGINO DURAN, PHILIPPINE AIRLINES EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION, and THE NATIONAL LABOR
RELATIONS COMMISSION, respondents.
G.R. No. 77875 February 4, 1993

Facts:

This was an instant petition for certiorari to set aside the decision of NLRC setting aside the suspension of the complaints and directing Philippine Airline to pay
complainants their salaries.

Individual respondents were port stewards of catering sub-department on the passenger services department of petitioner. Their salaries were deducted due to the
mishandling of company’s properties which the respondents resented. On August 27, 1984, represented by the union, individual respondents made a formal notice
regarding the deductions thru Mr. Abad, Manager for care taking who was on vacation leave but no action was taken. They then filed a formal grievance pursuant to
the collective bargaining agreement.

On his return, Mr. Abad on December 7, 1984, he informed the grievants and scheduled meeting. Thereafter, the individual respondents refused to do ramp
inventory thinking that since there was no action taken by Mr. Abad five days after they filed the petition, it shall be resolved in their favor. But Mr. Abad denied the
petition and suspended individual respondents. He also pointed out that it was only proper that employees were charged for the mishandling of company’s property.

Private respondents filed a complaint for illegal suspension to the labor arbiter. The decision was ruled in favor of the petitioner and the complaint was set aside. The
labor arbiter’s decision was appealed to the respondent commission who rendered decision setting aside the labor arbiter’s order of dismissal. Petitioner’s motion for
reconsideration was denied.

Issue:

Whether public respondent NLRC acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction on resolving in favor of individual respondents who believed
that inaction on the petition they filed for grievance would be resolved in their favor in accordance to their collective bargaining agreement ?

Held:

The petition hinges on the interpretation of Sec. 2, Art. IV of the PAL-PALEA Collective Bargaining Agreement about the processing of grievances. Petitioner submits
that since the grievance machinery was made for both labor and management, employees are duty-bound to thresh out first all the remedies before the
management and give them opportunity to act on it. But due to the absence of Mr. Abad the grievance was not acted upon.

The court held that the employees should not bear the dire effects of Mr. Abad’s absence. The management should had someone else to look after the grievance
during his absence. Under the policy of social justice, the law bends over backward to accommodate the interests of the working class on the humane justification
that those with less privileges in life should have more privileges in law.

Ruling:

Petition was denied and the assailed decision of NLRC was affirmed.

Solid Homes v Teresita Payawal

Facts:

On August 31, 1982 Teresita Payawal filed a complaint against Solid Homes Inc., before the Regional Trial Court alleging that they contracted to sell her subdivision lot
in Marikina on June 9, 1975. Subsequently Solid Homes Inc. executed a deed of sale but failed to deliver the corresponding certificate title despite of repeated
demands by Payawal because defendant had mortgaged the property in bad faith to a financing company. Thereafter, Solid Homes Inc moved to dismiss the
complaint on the ground that the court had no jurisdiction this being rested in the National Housing Authority under PD no. 597. The motion was denied, hence, the
petition to reverse said decision of the Court of Appeals in sustaining the jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Court was submitted by Solid Homes Inc. to the Supreme
Court.

Issue:

Whether or not the trial court had jurisdiction over cases involving claims, refund and any other claims filed by subdivision lot or condominium unit buyers against
the project owner,developer,dealer,broker or salesman?

Held:

The Supreme Court ruled that the applicable law is PD No. 957. The National Housing Authority has the jurisdiction. As amended by PD No 1344 entitled “Empowering
the National Housing Authority to issue writs of execution in the enforcement of its decisions under Presidential Decree No 957” Section 1 provides, in the exercise of
its function to regulate the real estate trade and business and in addition to its powers provided for in PD No 957 that the National Housing Authority shall have
exclusive jurisdiction to hear and decide cases of the following nature: a) unsound real estate business practices, b) claims involving refund and any other claims filed
by subdivision lot owners or condo unit buyers against project owner, developer, dealer, broker, or salesman and, c) cases involving specific performance of
contractual statutory obligations filed by buyers of subdivision lot or condominium unit against the owner, developer, dealer, broker or salesman. The challenged
decision of the respondent court was reversed and the decision of RTC is Set Aside without prejudice to the filing of the appropriate complaint before the HLURB.

Philippine Association of Service Exporters, Inc. v. Torres G.R. No. 101279 August 6, 1992

FACTS:

As a result of published stories regarding the abuses suffered by Filipino housemaids employed in Hong Kong, then DOLE Secretary Ruben Torres issued Department
Order No. 16, Series of 1991, temporarily suspending the recruitment by private employment agencies of Filipino domestic helpers going to Hong Kong. The DOLE
itself, through the POEA took over the business of deploying such Hong Kong-bound workers. The POEA Administrator also issued Memorandum Circular No. 37,
Series of 1991, on the processing of employment contracts of domestic workers for Hong Kong.

PASEI filed a petition for prohibition to annul the aforementioned DOLE and POEA circulars and to prohibit their implementation on the grounds that DOLE and POEA
acted with grave abuse of discretion and/or in excess of their rule-making authority in issuing said circulars; that the assailed DOLE and POEA circulars are contrary to
the Constitution, are unreasonable, unfair and oppressive; and that the requirements of publication and filing with the Office of the National Administrative Register
were not complied with.

HELD:

The second and first grounds are unmeritorious. Article 36 of the Labor Code grants the Labor Secretary the power to restrict and regulate recruitment and
placement activities. It reads: “The Secretary of Labor shall have the power to restrict and regulate the recruitment and placement activities of all agencies within the
coverage of this title [Regulation of Recruitment and Placement Activities] and is hereby authorized to issue orders and promulgate rules and regulations to carry out
the objectives and implement the provisions of this title.” On the other hand, the scope of the regulatory authority of the POEA, which was created by Executive
Order No. 797 to take over the functions of the Overseas Employment Development Board, the National Seamen Board, and the overseas employment functions of
the Bureau of Employment Services, is broad and far-ranging for among the functions inherited by the POEA from the defunct Bureau of Employment Services was
the power and duty to establish and maintain a registration and/or licensing system to regulate private sector participation in the recruitment and placement of
workers, locally and overseas; it assumed from the defunct Overseas Employment Development Board the power and duty to recruit and place workers for overseas
employment of Filipino contract workers on a government to government arrangement and in such other sectors as policy may dictate; and from the National
Seamen Board, the POEA took over to regulate and supervise the activities of agents or representatives of shipping companies in the hiring of seamen for overseas
employment; and secure the best possible terms of employment for contract seamen workers and secure compliance therewith.

Said administrative issuances merely restricted the scope or area of PASEI’s business operations by excluding therefrom recruitment and deployment of domestic
helpers for Hong Kong till after the establishment of the “mechanisms” that will enhance the protection of Filipino domestic helpers going to Hong Kong. In fine,
other than the recruitment and deployment of Filipino domestic helpers for Hong Kong, PASEI may still deploy other class of Filipino workers either for Hong Kong
and other countries and all other classes of Filipino workers for other countries. Said administrative issuances, are intended to curtail, if not to end, rampant
violations of the rule against excessive collections of placement and documentation fees, travel fees and other charges committed by private employment agencies
recruiting and deploying domestic helpers to Hong Kong. They are reasonable, valid and justified under the general welfare clause of the Constitution, since the
recruitment and deployment business, as it is conducted today, is affected with public interest.

Nevertheless, they are legally invalid, defective and unenforceable for lack of power publication and filing in the Office of the National Administrative Register. As
announced in Tañada vs. Tuvera,

“All statutes, including those of local application and private laws, shall be published as a condition for their effectivity, which shall begin fifteen days after publication
unless a different effectivity date is fixed by the legislature.

Covered by this rule are presidential decrees and executive orders promulgated by the President in the exercise of legislative powers whenever the same are validly
delegated by the legislature or, at present, directly conferred by the Constitution: Administrative rules and regulations must also be published if their purpose is to
enforce or implement existing law pursuant to a valid delegation.

Interpretative regulations and those merely internal in nature, that is, regulating only the personnel of the administrative agency and the public, need not be
published. Neither is publication required of the so-called letter of instructions issued by the administrative superiors concerning the rules or guidelines to be
followed by their subordinates in the performance of their duties.”

SOCIAL SECURITY SYSTEM EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION (SSSEA), DIONISION T. BAYLON, RAMON MODESTO, JUANITO MADURA, REUBEN ZAMORA, VIRGILIO DE
ALDAY, SERGIO ARANETA, PLACIDO AGUSTIN, VIRGILIO MAGPAYO, petitioner,
vs.
THE COURT OF APPEALS, SOCIAL SECURITY SYSTEM (SSS), HON. CEZAR C. PERALEJO, RTC, BRANCH 98, QUEZON CITY, respondents. G.R. No. 85279 July 28, 1989

Facts:

On June 11, 1987, the SSS filed with the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City a complaint for damages with a prayer for a writ of preliminary injunction against
petitioners, alleging that on June 9, 1987, the officers and members of SSSEA staged an illegal strike and baricaded the entrances to the SSS Building, preventing non-
striking employees from reporting for work and SSS members from transacting business with the SSS; that the strike was reported to the Public Sector Labor -
Management Council, which ordered the strikers to return to work; that the strikers refused to return to work; and that the SSS suffered damages as a result of the
strike. The complaint prayed that a writ of preliminary injunction be issued to enjoin the strike and that the strikers be ordered to return to work; that the defendants
(petitioners herein) be ordered to pay damages; and that the strike be declared illegal.

It appears that the SSSEA went on strike after the SSS failed to act on the union's demands, which included: implementation of the provisions of the old SSS-SSSEA
collective bargaining agreement (CBA) on check-off of union dues; payment of accrued overtime pay, night differential pay and holiday pay; conversion of temporary
or contractual employees with six (6) months or more of service into regular and permanent employees and their entitlement to the same salaries, allowances and
benefits given to other regular employees of the SSS; and payment of the children's allowance of P30.00, and after the SSS deducted certain amounts from the
salaries of the employees and allegedly committed acts of discrimination and unfair labor practices.

Issue:

Whether or not employees of the Social Security System (SSS) have the right to strike.

Held:

The 1987 Constitution, in the Article on Social Justice and Human Rights, provides that the State "shall guarantee the rights of all workers to self-organization,
collective bargaining and negotiations, and peaceful concerted activities, including the right to strike in accordance with law" [Art. XIII, Sec. 31].
Resort to the intent of the framers of the organic law becomes helpful in understanding the meaning of these provisions. A reading of the proceedings of the
Constitutional Commission that drafted the 1987 Constitution would show that in recognizing the right of government employees to organize, the commissioners
intended to limit the right to the formation of unions or associations only, without including the right to strike.

Considering that under the 1987 Constitution "the civil service embraces all branches, subdivisions, instrumentalities, and agencies of the Government, including
government-owned or controlled corporations with original charters" [Art. IX(B), Sec. .2(l) see also Sec. 1 of E.O. No. 180 where the employees in the civil service are
denominated as "government employees"] and that the SSS is one such government-controlled corporation with an original charter, having been created under R.A.
No. 1161, its employees are part of the civil service [NASECO v. NLRC, G.R. Nos. 69870 & 70295, November 24,1988] and are covered by the Civil Service
Commission's memorandum prohibiting strikes. This being the case, the strike staged by the employees of the SSS was illegal.

[G.R. No. 166365 September 30, 2005]

DUTY FREE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner, vs. ROSSANO J. MOJICA, Respondent

FACTS

The Discipline Committee of petitioner Duty Free rendered a decision finding respondent Mojica guilty Neglect of Duty by causing considerable damage to or loss of
materials, assets and property of Duty Free. Thus, Mojica was considered forcibly resigned from the service with forfeiture of all benefits except his salary and the
monetary value of the accrued leave credits.

Mojica was formally informed of his forced resignation and thereupon, he filed a complaint for illegal dismissal with prayer for reinstatement, payment of full back
wages, damages, and attorney’s fees, against DFP before the NLRC.

ISSUE

Whether or not NLRC has jurisdiction over the controversy.

HELD

The SC held that respondent Mojica is a civil service employee; therefore, jurisdiction is lodged not with the NLRC, but with the Civil Service Commission.

Duty Free was created under Executive Order No. 46 on September 4, 1986 primarily to augment the service facilities for tourists and to generate foreign exchange
and revenue for the government. In order for the government to exercise direct and effective control and regulation over the tax and duty free shops, their
establishment and operation was vested in the Ministry, now Department of Tourism, through its implementing arm, the Philippine Tourism Authority (PTA). All the
net profits from the merchandising operations of the shops accrued to the DOT.

As provided under Presidential Decree (PD) No. 564, PTA is a corporate body attached to the DOT. As an attached agency, the recruitment, transfer, promotion and
dismissal of all its personnel was governed by a merit system established in accordance with the civil service rules. In fact, all PTA officials and employees are subject
to the Civil Service rules and regulations.
Accordingly, since Duty Free is under the exclusive authority of the PTA, it follows that its officials and employees are likewise subject to the Civil Service rules and
regulations. Clearly then, Mojica’s recourse to the Labor Arbiter was not proper. He should have followed the procedure laid down in Duty Free’s merit system and
the Civil Service rules and regulations.

The decision of the CA was set aside.

Paloma vs. Philippine Airlines [G.R. No. 148415, G.R. No. 156764, July 14, 2008]

Facts:

Paloma worked with PAL for 35 years. PAL had become privatized before Paloma retired. PAL paid separation/retirement gratuity and accrued vacation leave pay,
evidenced by the “Release and Quitclaim”. Paloma claims that PAL excluded his 450-day accrued sick leave credits. He based his claim on EO 1077, which allows
retiring government employees to commute, without limit, all his accrued vacation and sick leave credits. According to him, only 58 days of the 450-day credit, he had
commuted only 58 days, leaving him a balance of 392 days of accrued sick leave credits for commutation.

Issue:

Considering that PAL has been privatized before his retirement, is EO 1077 applicable to Paloma?

Held:

PAL never ceased to be operated as a private corporation, and was not subjected to the Civil Service Law. The Court can allow that PAL, during the period material,
was a government-controlled corporation in the sense that the GSIS owned a controlling interest over its stocks. One stubborn fact, however, remains: Through the
years, PAL functioned as a private corporation and managed as such for profit. Their personnel were never considered government employees. It may perhaps not be
amiss for the Court to take judicial notice of the fact that the civil service law and rules and regulations have not actually been made to apply to PAL and its
employees. Of governing application to them was the Labor Code. However, what governs Paloma’s entitlement to sick leave benefits and the computation and
commutation of creditable benefits is not EO 1077, but PAL’s company policy on the matter which, took effect in 1990.

SEAFDEC VS. NLRC G.R. Nos. 97468-70, September 2 1993, 241 SCRA 580

FACTS:

Two labor cases were filed by the herein private respondents against the petitioner, Southeast Asian Fisheries Development Center (SEAFDEC), before the National
Labor Relations Commission (NLRC), Regional Arbitration Branch, Iloilo City. In these cases, the private respondents claim having been wrongfully terminated from
their employment by the petitioner.

The petitioner, who claims to be an international inter-government organization composed of various Southeast Asian countries, filed a Motion to Dismiss, challenged
the jurisdiction of the public respondent in taking cognizance of the above cases.

The private respondents, as well as respondent labor arbiter, allege that the petitioner is not immune from suit and assuming that if, indeed, it is an international
organization, it has, however, impliedly, if not expressly, waived its immunity by belatedly raising the issue of jurisdiction.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the petitioner is immune from suit.

RULING:

The Court ruled for the petitioner. It is beyond question that petitioner SEAFDEC is an international agency enjoying diplomatic immunity. It has already been held in
Southeast Asian Fisheries Development Center-Aquaculture Department vs. National Labor Relations Commission (G.R. No. 86773, 206 SCRA 283/1992). Petitioner
Southeast Asian Fisheries Development Center-Aquaculture Department (SEAFDEC-AQD) is an international agency beyond the jurisdiction of public respondent
NLRC.

Being an intergovernmental organization, SEAFDEC including its Departments (AQD), enjoys functional independence and freedom from control of the state in whose
territory its office is located. One of the basic immunities of an international organization is immunity from local jurisdiction, i.e., that it is immune from the legal writs
and processes issued by the tribunals of the country where it is found. The obvious reason for this is that the subjection of such an organization to the authority of the
local courts would afford a convenient medium thru which the host government may interfere in their operations or even influence or control its policies and
decisions of the organization; besides, such objection to local jurisdiction would impair the capacity of such body to discharge its responsibilities impartially on behalf
of its member-states.

MATLING INDUSTRIAL vs. RICARDO R. COROS G.R. No. 157802; October 13, 2010

Facts:

Respondent was occupying the position of Vice President for Finance and Administration and at the same time was a Member of the Board of Directors of Matling.
After his dismissal by Matling as its Vice President for Finance and Administration, the respondent filed a complaint for illegal suspension and illegal dismissal against
Matling and some of its corporate officers in the NLRC.

Upon the instance of the petitioner, the case was dismissed by the Labor Arbiter on the ground that the controversy is an intra-corporate dispute considering that the
respondent is a corporate officer of the corporation, hence, it is properly cognizable by the SEC. On appeal, the NLRC ruled that respondent was not a corporate
officer by virtue of his position in Matling, albeit high ranking and managerial, not being among the positions listed in Matling’s Constitution and By-Laws. The CA also
affirmed the decision of the NLRC.

ISSUES AND RULINGS:

I: Whether or not offices not expressly mentioned in the By-Laws of the corporatio but were created pursuant to a By-Law enabling provision, like the office of the
herein respondent, were also considered corporate offices.

“Section 25. Corporate officers, quorum.--Immediately after their election, the directors of a corporation must formally organize by the election of a president, who
shall be a director, a treasurer who may or may not be a director, a secretary who shall be a resident and citizen of the Philippines, and such other officers as may be
provided for in the by-laws. Any two (2) or more positions may be held concurrently by the same person, except that no one shall act as president and secretary or as
president and treasurer at the same time.”

Conformably with Section 25, a position must be expressly mentioned in the By-Laws in order to be considered as a corporate office. Thus, the creation of an office
pursuant to or under a By-Law enabling provision is not enough to make a position a corporate office. The only officers of a corporation were those given that
character either by the Corporation Code or by the By-Laws; the rest of the corporate officers could be considered only as employees or subordinate officials.
An "office" is created by the charter of the corporation and the officer is elected by the directors or stockholders. On the other hand, an employee occupies no office
and generally is employed not by the action of the directors or stockholders but by the managing officer of the corporation who also determines the compensation to
be paid to such employee.

Thus, pursuant to the above provision (Section 25 of the Corporation Code), whoever are the corporate officers enumerated in the by-laws are the exclusive Officers
of the corporation and the Board has no power to create other Offices without amending first the corporate By-laws. However, the Board may create appointive
positions other than the positions of corporate Officers, but the persons occupying such positions are not considered as corporate officers within the meaning of
Section 25 of the Corporation Code and are not empowered to exercise the functions of the corporate Officers, except those functions lawfully delegated to them.
Their functions and duties are to be determined by the Board of Directors/Trustees.

Moreover, the Board of Directors of Matling could not validly delegate the power to create a corporate office to the President, in light of Section 25 of the
Corporation Code requiring the Board of Directors itself to elect the corporate officers. Verily, the power to elect the corporate officers was a discretionary power
that the law exclusively vested in the Board of Directors, and could not be delegated to subordinate officers or agents.22 The office of Vice President for Finance and
Administration created by Matling’s President pursuant to By Law No. V was an ordinary, not a corporate, office.

II: Whether or not respondent’s status as director and stockholder automatically convert his dismissal into an Intra-Corporate Dispute.

NO: The fact that the parties involved in the controversy are all stockholders or that the parties involved are the stockholders and the corporation does not
necessarily place the dispute within the ambit of the jurisdiction of SEC. The better policy to be followed in determining jurisdiction over a case should be to consider
concurrent factors such as the status or relationship of the parties or the nature of the question that is the subject of their controversy.

Respondent’s status as Director/stockholder had no relation to his appointment and subsequent dismissal as Vice President for Finance and Administration. Besides,
his status of Director/stockholder was unaffected by his dismissal from employment as Vice President for Finance and Administration. Hence, the case does not
involve intra-corporate dispute.

EASTERN SHIPPING LINES V POEA G.R. No. 76633 October 18, 1988
FACTS:
A Chief Officer of a ship was killed in an accident in Japan. The widow filed a complaint for charges against the Eastern Shipping Lines with POEA, based on a
Memorandum Circular No. 2, issued by the POEA which stipulated death benefits and burial for the family of overseas workers. ESL questioned the validity of the
memorandum circular as violative of the principle of non-delegation of legislative power. It contends that no authority had been given the POEA to promulgate the
said regulation; and even with such authorization, the regulation represents an exercise of legislative discretion which, under the principle, is not subject to
delegation. Nevertheless, POEA assumed jurisdiction and decided the case.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the Issuance of Memorandum Circular No. 2 is a violation of non-delegation of powers.

RULING:
No. SC held that there was a valid delegation of powers.
The authority to issue the said regulation is clearly provided in Section 4(a) of Executive Order No. 797. ... "The governing Board of the Administration (POEA), as
hereunder provided shall promulgate the necessary rules and regulations to govern the exercise of the adjudicatory functions of the Administration (POEA)."

It is true that legislative discretion as to the substantive contents of the law cannot be delegated. What can be delegated is the discretion to determine how the law
may be enforced, not what the law shall be. The ascertainment of the latter subject is a prerogative of the legislature. This prerogative cannot be abdicated or
surrendered by the legislature to the delegate.

The reasons given above for the delegation of legislative powers in general are particularly applicable to administrative bodies. With the proliferation of specialized
activities and their attendant peculiar problems, the national legislature has found it more and more necessary to entrust to administrative agencies the authority to
issue rules to carry out the general provisions of the statute. This is called the "power of subordinate legislation."

With this power, administrative bodies may implement the broad policies laid down in a statute by "filling in' the details which the Congress may not have the
opportunity or competence to provide. This is effected by their promulgation of what are known as supplementary regulations, such as the implementing rules issued
by the Department of Labor on the new Labor Code. These regulations have the force and effect of law.

There are two accepted tests to determine whether or not there is a valid delegation of legislative power:
1. Completeness test - the law must be complete in all its terms and conditions when it leaves the legislature such that when it reaches the delegate the only thing
he will have to do is enforce it.
2. Sufficient standard test - there must be adequate guidelines or stations in the law to map out the boundaries of the delegate's authority and prevent the
delegation from running riot.

Both tests are intended to prevent a total transference of legislative authority to the delegate, who is not allowed to step into the shoes of the legislature and
exercise a power essentially legislative.

[G.R. No. 189262. July 6, 2015.] GBMLT MANPOWER SERVICES, INC., petitioner, vs. MA. VICTORIA H. MALINAO, respondent.

Nature: Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court assailing the CA Decision.

The CA found grave abuse of discretion on the part of NLRC when the latter reversed the decision of the LA, which granted respondent's money claims under her
complaint for illegal dismissal against petitioner. The CA Resolution denied petitioner's MR.

FACTS:

In May 2005, respondent applied to petitioner for a job as teacher for deployment abroad. She was interviewed by an Ethiopian university president and endorsed
for the post of accounting lecturer with a monthly salary of USD 900.

Respondent paid petitioner the required fees, signed a POEA-approved Contract of Employment for Foreign Academic Personnel covering a period of two academic
years. Upon arrival in Ethiopia in December 2005, she was informed that her credentials have to be re-evaluated because it appeared that she did not have a master's
degree. Respondent was given a new contract which she refused to sign at first but upon reading it as a duplicate of the original contract signed the same.

Respondent was assigned to teach at the Alemaya University but she decided on January 10, 2006 to discontinue teaching the cooperative accounting course
assigned to her saying that auditing, not accounting, was her specialization. Another lecturer took over the course and she spent the rest of the semester without a
teaching load.

Alemaya University VP Alamirew circulated a memo on the Ministry of Education requirement to evaluate the credentials of the Filipino teaching staff and suggest an
academic rank for them pursuant to the national norm. Another memo was issued lowering the ranks of most of the Filipino teaching staff and asking them to sign a
new contract reflecting a change in rank and salary. Respondent's designation was lowered from lecturer to assistant lecturer with a USD 600 monthly salary.
Respondent refused to sign a new contract and together with affected Filipino colleagues, she went to the Ministry of Education to protest the re-ranking. She later
requested in a letter to the VP to issue a notice of termination to her "in order not to prolong [her] agony" after a misunderstanding with the VP during a meeting
following the protest.

Respondent was again replaced by another instructor in Auditing II and left idle due to a students' petition. Dean Kassa of the University questioned her qualification
alluding to her bachelor's degree. Respondent was offended insisted she was a CPA and law graduate. Her response stated that in the Philippines, a person with a
law degree and who passed the bar examinations has a degree more than a master's, but less than a doctorate. She recognized the university’s right to terminate her
at any time, but insisted there was no need to discredit her.

On 6 April 2006, VP Alamirew issued the notice of termination to respondent. The notice alluded to the two instances when the Department of Accounting had to
replace respondent in her course assignments. She was said to be incompetent and have insulted students, the staff and the management in particular and Ethiopians
in general in the class. She was given three months advance notice as regards the contract termination.

Respondent replied with a letter stating that the last sentence on the notice of termination is provocative, malicious and defamatory. While waiting for the three-
month period to expire, respondent was offered a post at the Internal Audit Department by the University President which she accepted the job through a
letter. However, she changed her mind and through a letter dated 27 April 2006 addressed to the President, respondent rejected the offer stating that she was
treated rudely and assigned to work under the acting head, a mere diploma holder making her feel insulted.

Respondent was repatriated on 27 June 2006. She later signed a Quitclaim and Release dated 5 July 2006 in favor of petitioner.

On 18 July 2006, respondent filed a complaint before the LA against petitioner as local agency and Alemaya University as foreign principal seeking full payment of the
unexpired portion of the two-year contract, moral and exemplary damages, and attorney's fees.

Ruling of the Labor Arbiter

The LA found respondent to have been unduly repatriated in breach of the employment contract. Petitioner and Alemaya University were ordered to pay her in
solidum the amounts of USD 4,500 as unrealized income - from which the amount paid to her under the Quitclaim and Release had already been deducted - Php
30,000 as moral damages, Php 20,000 as exemplary damages, plus costs.

Respondent did not hide that she had no master's degree because she was a holder of a bachelor of laws degree. Alemaya University should have allowed respondent
to finish her two-year employment contract instead of forcing her to sign a new contract with lower pay, just because she did not have a master's degree.

The labor arbiter found that respondent had been constructively dismissed. She was supposedly forced to quit because continued employment became unbearable,
not only due to demotion in rank and diminution in pay, but also due to the discrimination and disdain on the part of her employer. No procedural due process was
accorded to respondent because no panel of her peers was ever formed to review her performance. The only basis for the charge of unsatisfactory teaching was the
alleged students' petition, which was found to be questionable.

Ruling of the NLRC

The NLRC issued a Decision dated 30 July 2008 dismissing respondent's complaint, because her claims had been the subject of a valid release, waiver and quitclaim.

The NLRC ruled that respondent could no longer question the termination of her contract of employment after her acceptance of the new offer of President Kassa to
work at the Internal Audit Department. When respondent later wrote to President Kassa that she did not want the new post after all and requested to be repatriated,
it was she who terminated the contract. Contrary to the LA’s ruling, respondent was not constructively dismissed.

The NLRC also sustained the validity of the Quitclaim and Release. It held that respondent was a certified public accountant and bachelor of laws graduate who could
hardly be "duped into signing any document that would be detrimental to her cause, if she was not willing [to agree] to the terms and conditions [provided in] what
she was signing [or] entering into."

After her MR was denied, respondent filed a petition before the CA ascribing grave abuse of discretion on the part of the NLRC.

Ruling of the CA

The CA reinstated the LA’s Decision with modifications. The appellate court ordered petitioner and Alemaya University to reimburse respondent for the full amount
of the placement fee she had paid, with interest at the rate of 12% per annum, as well as her airfare from Dire Dawa to Addis Ababa in Ethiopia. The awards of moral
and exemplary damages were both increased to Php 50,000, plus attorney's fees equivalent to 10% of the monetary award.

The appellate court observed that while respondent accepted the offer of President Kassa to work at the Internal Audit Department, such arrangement was in the
purview of a new contract of employment. A new contract was invalid without the approval of the POEA.

After its MR was denied, petitioner filed the instant petition.

ISSUES:

1. Whether respondent was illegally dismissed

2. Whether the Quitclaim and Release was valid

RULING:

1. NO. Respondent was not illegally dismissed.

Under Section 10 of R.A. 8042, workers who are illegally terminated are entitled to their salaries for the unexpired portion of their employment contracts or for three
months for every year of the unexpired term, whichever is less, in addition to the reimbursement of their placement fee with interest at the rate of 12% per annum.

This applies only to an illegally dismissed overseas contract worker or a worker dismissed from overseas employment without just, valid or authorized cause as
defined by law or contract. Respondent was not illegally dismissed.

Article X of the POEA-approved Contract of Employment, as well as the second contract given to respondent for signing upon her arrival in Ethiopia, provides: “This
contract may be terminated by either party, at any time and for no cause by giving three months notice to the other party. In such an event[,] the Employee shall
be entitled to his/her salary and allowances only up to the date of termination specified in the said notice of termination. However, the employee shall be fully
engaged in his/her duty in the period notified and up to the last date of termination.”

Based on the provision, the Contract of Employment may be terminated by either party for cause or at any time for no cause, as long as a three-month notice is given
to the other party. Stipulations providing that either party may terminate a contract even without cause are legitimate if exercised in good faith.
The misunderstanding on respondent’s master’s degree was not the result of bad faith on the part of either party. The demotion did not materialize, and respondent
maintained her salary and benefits until she was repatriated.

The Court did not impute bad faith on the part of Alemaya University in the exercise of its right to terminate the Contract of Employment at will.

It is well to note that the right to terminate the Contract of Employment at will was also available to respondent, who exercised that right when she signified her
change of mind and rejected the job at the Internal Audit Department.

The NLRC was correct in finding that the logical conclusion is that the parties had agreed to let her employment continue in the university under the Contract of
Employment in a different capacity. When respondent later decided that she did not want the new job for personal reasons, she exercised her right to terminate the
Contract of Employment.

2. YES. The Quitclaim and Release is valid.

Where a person executing a waiver or quitclaim has done so voluntarily with a full understanding of its terms and conditions, coupled with the other person's
payment of credible and reasonable consideration, the transaction is valid and binding.

Respondent admits that she had a full understanding of the terms and conditions of the Quitclaim and Release and voluntarily signed it. The bone of contention is the
reasonableness of the amount of USD 900 as consideration for the waiver of all other purported claims against petitioner. Since respondent was not illegally
dismissed, she is not entitled to salaries in excess of the amount given.

CA decision and resolution were revered and set aside. NLRC decision reinstated.

MA. CONSOLACION NAHAS, doing business under the name and style PERSONNEL

EMPLOYMENT AND TECHNICAL RECRUITMENT AGENCY vs. JUANITA L. OLARTE G.R. No. 169247; June 2, 2014

FACTS:

Olarte was deployed as a domestic helper to Hail, Saudi Arabia for a contract term of two years. On the hands of her foreign employer, she was maltreated, deprived
of her salaries, and contracted an illness for which no medical attention was not even provided. Not able to endure the suffering much longer, she found an
opportunity to escape, sought refuge at the Philippine Embassy, and was eventually brought home to the Philippines. She filed a complaint for illegal dismissal,
damages, attorney’s fees and refund of placement fees against Fahad and Nahas/PETRA/Royal Dream (the recruitment agency). Olarte alleged that she went to the
office of PETRA/Royal Dream where she was met and interviewed by Nahas, the manager and owner of said agencies, who instructed her to sign what appeared to be
a contract of employment. Nahas denies Olarte’s allegations.

The Labor Arbiter ruled against PETRA/Royal Dream/Nahas. On appeal to the NRLC, Nahas, to further avoid personal liability, made a new allegation that if at all, her
only involvement was that she interviewed Olarte when she was still connected with Royal Dream as a mere employee. The NLRC was not persuaded and disposed of
the case. Advancing the same arguments she raised before the labor tribunals, Nahas went to the CA, but to no avail. The CA ruled in part: “While Nahas claims that
she is neither the proprietress nor one of the officers of ROYAL at that time, her role or position with ROYAL was undeniably significant considering that she took
charge of interviewing Olarte and eventually made her sign the Contract of Employment. xxx We xxx thus affirm Nahas’ liability in accordance with Section 64 of the
Omnibus Rules and Regulations Implementing the Migrant Workers and Overseas Filipino Act of 1995 (RA 9042), to wit: ‘Section 64. Solidary Liability - The liability of
the principal/employer and the recruitment placement agency on any and all claims under this Rule shall be joint and solidary. If the recruitment/placement agency is
a juridical being, the corporate officers and directors and partners as the case may be, shall themselves be jointly and solidarily liable with the corporation or
partnership for the aforesaid claims and damages xxx.”

ISSUE:

WON Nahas is solidarily liable with the recruitment agency for Olarte’s claims

RULING:

YES. It must be stressed, at the outset, that the Court is not a trier of facts. Factual findings of the labor tribunals, when affirmed by the CA, are generally accorded
not only respect, but even finality, and are binding on this Court. In this case, the LA, the NLRC, and the CA are one in their factual conclusion that Nahas, acting for
and in bhelaf of PETRA and Royal Dream, interviewed Olarte, caused her to sign an employment contract, and facilitated and made possible her deployment abroad.
The Court is, therefore, not duty-bound to inquire into the accuracy of this factual finding, particularly in this case where there is no showing that it was arbitrary and
bereft of any rational basis.

As a final note, it is worth stating that recruitment agencies, as part of their bounded duty to protect the welfare of the Filipino workers sent abroad from whom they
take their profit, should in conscience not add to the misery of maltreated and abused Filipino workers by denying them the reparation to which they are entitled.
Instead, they must “faithfully comply with their government prescribed responsibilities” and be the first to ensure the welfare of the very people upon whose
patronage their industry thrives.

People vs. Panis, 142 SCRA 664 G.R. Nos. L-58674-77 July 11, 1990

FACTS:

Serapio Abug was charged with illegal recruitment. His defense was that the informations filed against him did not constitute an offense because in each of the four
informations filed against him, each denote that he was only recruiting one person whereas the statute requires “two or more persons”

ISSUE:

Determination of the proper interpretationof Art 13(b) of PD 442/ Labor Code:

b) Recruitment and placement' refers to any act of canvassing, enlisting, contracting, transporting, hiring, or procuring workers, and includes referrals, contract
services, promising or advertising for employment, locally or abroad, whether for profit or not: Provided, That any person or entity which, in any manner, offers or
promises for a fee employment to two or more persons shall be deemed engaged in recruitment and placement.

HELD:

The specification of two or more persons is not to create a condition prior to filing but rather it states a presumption that the individual is engaged in recruitment in
consideration of a fee, however the number of persons is not an essential ingredient to the act of recruitment or placement, and it will still qualify even if only one
person has been involved.

G.R. No. 113161, August 29, 1995 People of the Phil., plaintiff-appellee vs Loma Goce, et. al., accused-appellant

Facts:
On January 1988, an information for illegal recruitment committed by a syndicate nd in large scale, punishable under Articles 38 and 39 of the labor code as amended
by PD 2018, filed against Dan and Loma Goce and Nelly Agustin in the RTC of Manila, alleging that in or about during the period comprised between May 1986 and
June 25, 1987, both dates inclusive in the City of Manila, the accused conspired and represent themsleves to have the capacity to recruit Filipino workers for
employment abroad.

January 1987, a warrant of arrest was issued against the 3 accused bot none of them was arrested. Hence, on February 1989, the RTC prdered the case archived but
issued a standing warrant os arrest against the accused.

Thereafter, knowing the whereabouts of the accused, Rogelio Salado requested for a copy of the warrant of arrest and eventually Nelly Agustin was apprehended by
the Paranaque Police. Agustin's counsel filed a motion to revive the case and requested to set a hearing for purpose of due process and for accused to immediately
have her day in court. On the arraignment, Agustin pleaded not guilty and the trial went on with four complainants testified for the prosecution and reciepts of the
processing fees they paid.

Agustin for the defense asserted that Goce couple were licensed recruiters but denied her participation in the recruitment and denied knowledge of the receipts as
well.

On November 1993, trial court rendered judgment finding that Agustin as a principal in the crime of illegal recruitment in large scale with sentence of life
imprisonment and pay P100,000.00.

Issues:

Agustin appealed witht the follwing arguments: (1) her act of introducing the complainants to the couple does not fall within the meaning of illegal recruitment and
placement under Article 13 in relation to Article 34 of the labor code; (2) there is no proof of conspiracy and (3) there is no proof that appellant offered/promised
overseas employment to the complainants.

Ruling:

The testimonial evidence shows that Agustin indeed further committted acts constitutive of illegal recruitment because, the complainants had a previous interview
with Agustin (as employee of the Goce couple) about fees and papers to submit that may constitute as referral. Agustin collected the payments of the complainants
as well as their passports, trainning fees, medical tests and other expenses.On the issue of proof, the court held that the receipts exhibited by the claimants are clear
enough to prove the payments and transaction made.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Domingo is guilty of illegal recruitment in a large scale.

LAWS INVOLVED:

Articles 13 (b) and 38 of the Labor Code.

RULING:

The Court finds that the prosecution ably discharged its onus of proving the guilt beyond reasonable doubt of appellant of the crimes of illegal recruitment in a large
scale. That no receipt or document in which appellant acknowledged receipt of money for the promised jobs was adduced in evidence does not free him of liability.
For even if at the time appellant was promising employment no cash was given to him, he is still considered as having been engaged in recruitment activities, since
Article 13(b) of the Labor Code states that the act of recruitment may be for profit or not. It suffices that appellant promised or offered employment for a fee to the
complaining witnesses to warrant his conviction for illegal recruitment.

G.R. No. 179934 People vs. Abordo May 21, 2009

FACTS:

From February to December 1994 at Brgy. Poblacion, Villasis, Pangasinan, accused Erlinda Abordo and Vina Cabanlong recruited Jesus Rayray, Jaime Fernandez,
Exequiel Mendoza and Esmenia Carino for employment abroad without first securing the requisite license or authority from DOLE. The complainants filed separate
informations.

ISSUE:

Whether Abordo guilty of simple illegal recruitment or in a large scale.

LAW INVOLVED:

Article 13 (b) of the Labor Code.

RULING:

Since, the accused were prosecuted under several information for different complainants, the penalty imposed should be for each information charged. To
convict the accused for illegal recruitment in large scale, there must be one information that must include all the complainants. Hence, the accused were guilty of
simple illegal recruitment.

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee vs. CAROL M. DELA PIEDRA, accused-appellant G.R. No. 121777 (350 SCRA 163) January 24, 2001

FACTS:

On the afternoon of January 30, 1994, Maria Lourdes Modesto and Nancy Araneta together with her friends Jennelyn Baez, and Sandra Aquino went to the house of
Jasmine Alejandro, after having learned that a woman is there to recruit job applicants for Singapore. Carol dela Piedra was already briefing some people when they
arrived. Jasmine, on the other hand, welcomed and asked them to sit down.

They listened to the “recruiter” who was then talking about the breakdown of the fees involved: P30,000 for the visa and the round trip ticket, and P5,000 as
placement fee and for the processing of the papers. The initial payment was P2,000, while P30,000 will be by salary deduction. The recruiter said that she was
“recruiting” nurses for Singapore.

Araneta, her friends and Lourdes then filled up bio-data forms and were required to submit pictures and a transcript of records. After the interview, Lourdes gave the
initial payment of P2,000 to Jasmine, who assured her that she was authorized to receive the money.

Meanwhile, in the morning of the said date, Erlie Ramos, Attorney II of the Philippine Overseas Employment Agency (POEA), received a telephone call from an
unidentified woman inquiring about the legitimacy of the recruitment conducted by a certain Mrs. Carol Figueroa. Ramos, whose duties include the surveillance of
suspected illegal recruiters, immediately contacted a friend, a certain Mayeth Bellotindos, so they could both go the place where the recruitment was reportedly
being undertaken. Upon arriving at the reported area at around 4:00 p.m., Bellotindos entered the house and pretended to be an applicant. Ramos remained outside
and stood on the pavement, from where he was able to see around six (6) persons in the sala. Ramos even heard a woman, identified as Carol Figueroa, talk about
the possible employment she has to provide in Singapore and the documents that the applicants have to comply with. Fifteen (15) minutes later, Bellotindos came
out with a bio-data form in hand.

Thereafter, Ramos conferred with a certain Capt. Mendoza of the Criminal Investigation Service (CIS) to organize the arrest of the alleged illegal recruiter. A
surveillance team was then organized to confirm the report. After which, a raid was executed. Consequently, Carol was charged and convicted by the trial court of
illegal recruitment. Upon appeal, accused questions her conviction for illegal recruitment in large scale and assails, as well, the constitutionality of the law defining
and penalizing said crime. First, accused submits that Article 13 (b) of the Labor Code defining “recruitment and placement” is void for vagueness and, thus, violates
the due process clause.

The provision in question reads:

ART. 13. Definitions.—(a) x x x.

(b) “Recruitment and placement” refers to any act of canvassing, enlisting, contracting, transporting, utilizing, hiring or procuring workers,
and includes referrals, contract services, promising or advertising for employment, locally or abroad, whether for profit or not:
Provided, That any person or entity which, in any manner, offers or promises for a fee employment to two or more persons shall be
deemed engaged in recruitment and placement.

ISSUES:

(1) Whether or not sec. 13 (b) of P.D. 442, as amended, otherwise known as the illegal recruitment law is unconstitutional as it violates the due process clause. (2)
Whether or not accused was denied equal protection and therefore should be exculpated

HELD:

(1) For the First issue, dela Piedra submits that Article 13 (b) of the Labor Code defining “recruitment and placement” is void for vagueness and, thus,
violates the due process clause.

Due process requires that the terms of a penal statute must be sufficiently explicit to inform those who are subject to it what conduct on their part will render them
liable to its penalties.

In support of her submission, dela Piedra invokes People vs. Panis, where the Supreme Court “criticized” the definition of “recruitment and placement.”

The Court ruled, however, that her reliance on the said case was misplaced.

The issue in Panis was whether, under the proviso of Article 13 (b), the crime of illegal recruitment could be committed only “whenever two or more persons are in
any manner promised or offered any employment for a fee.” In this case, the Court merely bemoaned the lack of records that would help shed light on the meaning
of the proviso. The absence of such records notwithstanding, the Court was able to arrive at a reasonable interpretation of the proviso by applying principles in
criminal law and drawing from the language and intent of the law itself. Section 13 (b), therefore, is not a “perfectly vague act” whose obscurity is evident on its face.
If at all, the proviso therein is merely couched in imprecise language that was salvaged by proper construction. It is not void for vagueness.

Dela Piedra further argues that the acts that constitute “recruitment and placement” suffer from overbreadth since by merely “referring” a person for
employment, a person may be convicted of illegal recruitment.

That Section 13 (b) encompasses what appellant apparently considers as customary and harmless acts such as “labor or employment referral” (“referring” an
applicant, according to appellant, for employment to a prospective employer) does not render the law overbroad. Evidently, Dela Piedra misapprehends concept of
overbreadth.

A statute may be said to be overbroad where it operates to inhibit the exercise of individual freedoms affirmatively guaranteed by the Constitution, such as the
freedom of speech or religion. A generally worded statute, when construed to punish conduct which cannot be constitutionally punished is unconstitutionally vague
to the extent that it fails to give adequate warning of the boundary between the constitutionally permissible and the constitutionally impermissible applications of
the statute.

(2) Anent the second issue, Dela Piedra invokes the equal protection clause in her defense. She points out that although the evidence purportedly shows
that Jasmine Alejandro handed out application forms and even received Lourdes Modesto’s payment, appellant was the only one criminally charged.
Alejandro, on the other hand, remained scot-free. From this, she concludes that the prosecution discriminated against her on grounds of regional
origins. Appellant is a Cebuana while Alejandro is a Zamboangueña, and the alleged crime took place in Zamboanga City.

The Supreme Court held that the argument has no merit.

The prosecution of one guilty person while others equally guilty are not prosecuted, is not, by itself, a denial of the equal protection of the laws. The unlawful
administration by officers of a statute fair on its face, resulting in its unequal application to those who are entitled to be treated alike, is not a denial of equal
protection unless there is shown to be present in it an element of intentional or purposeful discrimination. But a discriminatory purpose is not presumed, there must
be a showing of “clear and intentional discrimination.”

In the case at bar, Dela Piedra has failed to show that, in charging her, there was a “clear and intentional discrimination” on the part of the prosecuting officials.

Furthermore, the presumption is that the prosecuting officers regularly performed their duties, and this presumption can be overcome only by proof to the contrary,
not by mere speculation. As said earlier, accused has not presented any evidence to overcome this presumption. The mere allegation that dela Piedra, a Cebuana,
was charged with the commission of a crime, while a Zamboangueña, the guilty party in appellant’s eyes, was not, is insufficient to support a conclusion that the
prosecution officers denied appellant equal protection of the laws.

WALLEM PHILIPPINES SHIPPING, INC. v. MINISTER OF LABOR, et al. G.R. Nos. L-50734-37, 20 February 1981

Private respondents were hired by Wallem sometime in May 1975 to work as seamen for a period of ten months on board the M/V Woermann Sanaga, a Dutch
vessel owned and operated by Wallem’s European principals. While their employment contracts were still in force, private respondents were dismissed by Wallem
and were discharged from the ship on charges that they instigated the International Transport Federation (ITF) to demand the application of worldwide ITF seamen's
rates to their crew.
When the private respondents filed a complaint for illegal dismissal, the hearing Officer of the Secretariat found private respondents to have violated their contract of
employment when they accepted salary rates different from their contract verified and approved by the National Seamen Board and that Wallem violated the
contract when its representative signed the Special Agreement and he signed the same at his own risk and must bear the consequence of such act. Under the
circumstances, the Board fixed the amount due private respondents at their 3 months' salary equivalent without qualifications or deduction.

ISSUE:

Is Wallem liable to the private respondents when it ordered the dismissal of the private respondents before the expiration of their respective employment contracts?

RULING:

Yes. Wallem claims that the dismissal of private respondents was justified because the latter threatened the ship authorities in acceeding to their demands, and this
constitutes serious misconduct as contemplated by the Labor Code. This contention is not well-taken. The records fail to establish clearly the commission of any
threat. But even if there had been such a threat, respondents' behavior should not be censured because it is but natural for them to employ some means of pressing
their demands for Wallem, who refused to abide with the terms of the Special Agreement, to honor and respect the same. They were only acting in the exercise of
their rights, and to deprive them of their freedom of expression is contrary to law and public policy. There is no serious misconduct to speak of in the case at bar
which would justify respondents' dismissal just because of their firmness in their demand for the fulfillment by Wallem of its obligation it entered into without any
coercion, especially on the part of private respondents.

On the other hand, it is petitioner who is guilty of breach of contract when they dismissed the respondents without just cause and prior to the expiration of the
employment contracts. As the records clearly show, Wallem voluntarily entered into the Special Agreement with ITF and by virtue thereof the crew men were actually
given their salary differentials in view of the new rates. It cannot be said that it was because of respondents' fault that Wallem made a sudden turn-about and refused
to honor the special agreement.

VirJen Shipping and Marine Services vs. NLRC 125 SCRA 577 (1983)

Facts:

Certain seamen entered into a contract of employment for a 12-month period. Some three months after the commencement of their employment, the seamen
demanded a 50% increase of their salaries and benefits. The seamen demanded this increase while their vessel was on route to a port in Australia controlled by the
International Transport Federation (ITP) where the ITF could detain the vessels unless it paid its season ITF rates.

The agent of the owner of the vessel agreed to a 25% increase, but when the vessel arrived in Japan shortly afterwards, the seamen were repatriated to Manila and
their contract terminated.

Two motions for reconsideration filed with Second Division were denied by said Division. Another motion for reconsideration was filed with the Supreme Court en
banc which gave its due course, after finding that there was a need to reconcile the decision of the Second Division with that of the First Division with the Wallen
Decision. In that decision, the First Division had ruled that the termination of the seamen was illegal.

Issue:

Whether or not the termination of the seamen was illegal.

Held:

The termination of the contract of the seamen was illegal. A manning contract involves the interests not only of the signatories thereto, such as the local Filipino
recruiting agent, the foreign owner of vessel and the Filipino seamen in general as well as the country itself. Conformably to the power vested in the NSB, the law
requires that all manning contracts shall be approved by said agency. The stringent rules governing Filipino seamen abroad foreign ships are dictated by national
interest.

SUNACE INTERNATIONAL MANAGEMENT SERVICES, INC. v. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION et al. 480 SCRA 146 (2006)

FACTS:

Respondent Divina Montehermozo is a domestic helper deployed to Taiwan by Sunace International Management Services (Sunace) under a 12-month contract. Such
employment was made with the assistance of Taiwanese broker Edmund Wang. After the expiration of the contract, Montehermozo continued her employment with
her Taiwanese employer for another 2 years.

When Montehermozo returned to the Philippines, she filed a complaint against Sunace, Wang, and her Taiwanese employer before the National Labor Relations
Commission (NLRC). She alleges that she was underpaid and was jailed for three months in Taiwan. She further alleges that the 2-year extension of her employment
contract was with the consent and knowledge of Sunace. Sunace, on the other hand, denied all the allegations.

The Labor Arbiter ruled in favor of Montehermozo and found Sunace liable thereof. The National Labor Relations Commission and Court of Appeals affirmed the labor
arbiter’s decision. Hence, the filing of this appeal.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the 2-year extension of Montehermozo’s employment was made with the knowledge and consent of Sunace

HELD:

There is an implied revocation of an agency relationship when after the termination of the original employment contract, the foreign principal directly negotiated with
the employee and entered into a new and separate employment contract.

Contrary to the Court of Appeals finding, the alleged continuous communication was with the Taiwanese broker Wang, not with the foreign employer.

The finding of the Court of Appeals solely on the basis of the telefax message written by Wang to Sunace, that Sunace continually communicated with the foreign
"principal" (sic) and therefore was aware of and had consented to the execution of the extension of the contract is misplaced. The message does not provide
evidence that Sunace was privy to the new contract executed after the expiration on February 1, 1998 of the original contract. That Sunace and the Taiwanese broker
communicated regarding Montehermozo’s allegedly withheld savings does not necessarily mean that Sunace ratified the extension of the contract.

As can be seen from that letter communication, it was just an information given to Sunace that Montehermozo had taken already her savings from her foreign
employer and that no deduction was made on her salary. It contains nothing about the extension or Sunace’s consent thereto.

Parenthetically, since the telefax message is dated February 21, 2000, it is safe to assume that it was sent to enlighten Sunace who had been directed, by Summons
issued on February 15, 2000, to appear on February 28, 2000 for a mandatory conference following Montehermozo’s filing of the complaint on February 14, 2000.
Respecting the decision of Court of Appeals following as agent of its foreign principal, [Sunace] cannot profess ignorance of such an extension as obviously, the act of
its principal extending [Montehermozo’s] employment contract necessarily bound it, it too is a misapplication, a misapplication of the theory of imputed knowledge.

The theory of imputed knowledge ascribes the knowledge of the agent, Sunace, to the principal, employer, not the other way around. The knowledge of the principal-
foreign employer cannot, therefore, be imputed to its agent Sunace.

There being no substantial proof that Sunace knew of and consented to be bound under the 2-year employment contract extension, it cannot be said to be privy
thereto. As such, it and its "owner" cannot be held solidarily liable for any of Montehermozo’s claims arising from the 2-year employment extension. As the New Civil
Code provides, Contracts take effect only between the parties, their assigns, and heirs, except in case where the rights and obligations arising from the contract are
not transmissible by their nature, or by stipulation or by provision of law. Furthermore, as Sunace correctly points out, there was an implied revocation of its agency
relationship with its foreign principal when, after the termination of the original employment contract, the foreign principal directly negotiated with Montehermozo
and entered into a new and separate employment contract in Taiwan. Article 1924 of the New Civil Code states that the agency is revoked if the principal directly
manages the business entrusted to the agent, dealing directly with third persons.

SERRANO v. GALLANT MARITIME SERVICES INC. & MARLOWE NAVIGATION CO., INC. G.R. No. 167614. March 24, 2009

Facts:

Petitioner was hired by Gallant Maritime Services, Inc. and Marlow Navigation Co., Ltd. (respondents) under a POEA-approved Contract of Employment. On March 19,
1998, the date of his departure, petitioner was constrained to accept a downgraded employment contract for the position of Second Officer with a monthly salary of
US$1,000.00, upon the assurance and representation of respondents that he would be made Chief Officer by the end of April. However, respondents did not deliver
on their promise to make petitioner Chief Officer. Hence, petitioner refused to stay on as Second Officer and was repatriated to the Philippines on May.

Petitioner's employment contract was for a period of 12 months or from March 19, 1998 up to March 19, 1999, but at the time of his repatriation on May 26, 1998,
he had served only two (2) months and seven (7) days of his contract, leaving an unexpired portion of nine (9) months and twenty-three (23) days.

Petitioner filed with the Labor Arbiter (LA) a Complaint against respondents for constructive dismissal and for payment of his money claims. LA rendered the
dismissal of petitioner illegal and awarding him monetary benefits. Respondents appealed to the NLRC to question the finding of the LA. Likewise, petitioner also
appealed to the NLRC on the sole issue that the LA erred in not applying the ruling of the Court in Triple Integrated Services, Inc. v. National Labor Relations
Commission that in case of illegal dismissal, OFWs are entitled to their salaries for the unexpired portion of their contracts.

Petitioner also appealed to the NLRC on the sole issue that the LA erred in not applying the ruling of the Court in Triple Integrated Services, Inc. v. National Labor
Relations Commission that in case of illegal dismissal, OFWs are entitled to their salaries for the unexpired portion of their contracts. Petitioner filed a Motion for
Partial Reconsideration; he questioned the constitutionality of the subject clause. Petitioner filed a Petition for Certiorari with the CA, reiterating the constitutional
challenge against the subject clause. CA affirmed the NLRC ruling on the reduction of the applicable salary rate; however, the CA skirted the constitutional issue raised
by petitioner.

The last clause in the 5th paragraph of Section 10, Republic Act (R.A.) No. 8042, to wit:

Sec. 10. Money Claims. - x x x In case of termination of overseas employment without just, valid or authorized cause as defined by law or contract, the workers shall
be entitled to the full reimbursement of his placement fee with interest of twelve percent (12%) per annum, plus his salaries for the unexpired portion of his
employment contract or for three (3) months for every year of the unexpired term, whichever is less.

Applying the subject clause, the NLRC and the CA computed the lump-sum salary of petitioner at the monthly rate of US$1,400.00 covering the period of three
months out of the unexpired portion of nine months and 23 days of his employment contract or a total of US$4,200.00.

Impugning the constitutionality of the subject clause, petitioner contends that, in addition to the US$4,200.00 awarded by the NLRC and the CA, he is entitled to
US$21,182.23 more or a total of US$25,382.23, equivalent to his salaries for the entire nine months and 23 days left of his employment contract, computed at the
monthly rate of US$2,590.00

Issue:

1.) Is petitioner entitled to his monetary claim which is the lump-sum salary for the entire unexpired portion of his 12-month employment contract, and
not just for a period of three months?

2.) Should petitioner’s overtime and leave pay form part of the salary basis in the computation of his monetary award, because these are fixed benefits
that have been stipulated into his contract?

Held:

1.) Yes. Petitioner is awarded his salaries for the entire unexpired portion of his employment contract consisting of nine months and 23 days computed at the rate of
US$1,400.00 per month. The subject clause “or for three months for every year of the unexpired term, whichever is less” in the 5th paragraph of Section 10 of
Republic Act No. 8042 is declared unconstitutional.

In sum, prior to R.A. No. 8042, OFWs and local workers with fixed-term employment who were illegally discharged were treated alike in terms of the computation of
their money claims: they were uniformly entitled to their salaries for the entire unexpired portions of their contracts. But with the enactment of R.A. No. 8042,
specifically the adoption of the subject clause, illegally dismissed OFWs with an unexpired portion of one year or more in their employment contract have since been
differently treated in that their money claims are subject to a 3-month cap, whereas no such limitation is imposed on local workers with fixed-term employment.

The Court concludes that the subject clause contains a suspect classification in that, in the computation of the monetary benefits of fixed-term employees who are
illegally discharged, it imposes a 3-month cap on the claim of OFWs with an unexpired portion of one year or more in their contracts, but none on the claims of
other OFWs or local workers with fixed-term employment. The subject clause singles out one classification of OFWs and burdens it with a peculiar disadvantage.

The Court further holds that the subject clause violates petitioner's right to substantive due process, for it deprives him of property, consisting of monetary benefits,
without any existing valid governmental purpose. The subject clause being unconstitutional, petitioner is entitled to his salaries for the entire unexpired period of
nine months and 23 days of his employment contract, pursuant to law and jurisprudence prior to the enactment of R.A. No. 8042.

2.) No. The word salaries in Section 10(5) does not include overtime and leave pay. For seafarers like petitioner, DOLE Department Order No. 33, series 1996,
provides a Standard Employment Contract of Seafarers, in which salary is understood as the basic wage, exclusive of overtime, leave pay and other bonuses; whereas
overtime pay is compensation for all work “performed” in excess of the regular eight hours, and holiday pay is compensation for any work “performed” on designated
rest days and holidays.

By the foregoing definition alone, there is no basis for the automatic inclusion of overtime and holiday pay in the computation of petitioner's monetary award; unless
there is evidence that he performed work during those periods.

CLAUDIO S. YAP, Petitioner, vs. THENAMARIS SHIP'S MANAGEMENT and INTERMARE MARITIME AGENCIES, INC., Respondents. G.R. No. 179532, May 30, 2011
Facts:

Claudio S. Yap was employed as electrician of the vessel, M/T SEASCOUT on 14 August 2001 by Intermare Maritime Agencies, Inc. in behalf of its principal, Vulture
Shipping Limited. for a duration of 12 months. On 23 August 2001, Yap boarded M/T SEASCOUT and commenced his job as electrician. However, on or about 08
November 2001, the vessel was sold. Yap, along with the other crewmembers, was informed by the Master of their vessel that the same was sold and will be
scrapped.

Yap received his seniority bonus, vacation bonus, extra bonus along with the scrapping bonus. However, with respect to the payment of his wage, he refused to
accept the payment of one-month basic wage. He insisted that he was entitled to the payment of the unexpired portion of his contract since he was illegally
dismissed from employment. He alleged that he opted for immediate transfer but none was made.

The Labor Arbiter

Thus, Claudio S. Yap (petitioner) filed a complaint for Illegal Dismissal with Damages and Attorney’s Fees before the Labor Arbiter (LA). On July 26, 2004, the LA
rendered a decision in favor of petitioner, finding the latter to have been constructively and illegally dismissed by respondents. LA opined that since the unexpired
portion of petitioner’s contract was less than one year, petitioner was entitled to his salaries for the unexpired portion of his contract for a period of nine months.

The NLRC

Aggrieved, respondents sought recourse from the NLRC. The NLRC affirmed the LA’s findings that petitioner was indeed constructively and illegally dismissed.
However, the NLRC held that instead of an award of salaries corresponding to nine months, petitioner was only entitled to salaries for three months as provided
under Section 108 of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 8042,9 as enunciated in our ruling in Marsaman Manning Agency, Inc. v. National Labor Relations Commission.

Respondents filed a Motion for Partial Reconsideration. Finding merit in petitioner’s arguments, the NLRC reversed its earlier Decision, holding that "there can be no
choice to grant only three (3) months salary for every year of the unexpired term because there is no full year of unexpired term which this can be applied."

The Court of Appeals

The CA affirmed the findings and ruling of the LA and the NLRC that petitioner was constructively and illegally dismissed. However, the CA ruled that the NLRC erred
in sustaining the LA’s interpretation of Section 10 of R.A. No. 8042. In this regard, the CA relied on the clause "or for three months for every year of the unexpired
term, whichever is less" provided in the 5th paragraph of Section 10 of R.A. No. 8042.

Issue:

Whether or not Section 10 of R.A. [No.] 8042, to the extent that it affords an illegally dismissed migrant worker the lesser benefit of – "salaries for [the] unexpired
portion of his employment contract or for three (3) months for every year of the unexpired term, whichever is less" – is unconstitutional. –YES

Whether or not the Court of Appeals gravely erred in granting petitioner only three (3) months backwages when his unexpired term of 9 months is far short of the
"every year of the unexpired term" threshold. -YES

The Supreme Court

In the meantime, while this case was pending before this Court, we declared as unconstitutional the clause "or for three months for every year of the unexpired
term, whichever is less" provided in the 5th paragraph of Section 10 of R.A. No. 8042 in the case of Serrano v. Gallant Maritime Services, Inc. on March 24, 2009. This
case should not be different from Serrano.

The said provision of law has long been a source of abuse by callous employers against migrant workers; and that said provision violates the equal protection clause
under the Constitution because, while illegally dismissed local workers are guaranteed under the Labor Code of reinstatement with full backwages computed from
the time compensation was withheld from them up to their actual reinstatement. It imposes a 3-month cap on the claim of OFWs with an unexpired portion of one
year or more in their contracts, but none on the claims of other OFWs or local workers with fixed-term employment.

Respondents, aware of our ruling in Serrano, aver that our pronouncement of unconstitutionality should not apply in this case because Section 10 of R.A. No. 8042 is
a substantive law that deals with the rights and obligations of the parties in case of Illegal Dismissal of a migrant worker and is not merely procedural in character.
Thus, pursuant to the Civil Code, there should be no retroactive application of the law in this case.

As a general rule, an unconstitutional act is not a law; it confers no rights; it imposes no duties; it affords no protection; it creates no office; it is inoperative as if it has
not been passed at all. The doctrine of operative fact serves as an exception to the aforementioned general rule.

The doctrine of operative fact, as an exception to the general rule, only applies as a matter of equity and fair play. It nullifies the effects of an unconstitutional law by
recognizing that the existence of a statute prior to a determination of unconstitutionality is an operative fact and may have consequences which cannot always be
ignored. The past cannot always be erased by a new judicial declaration. The doctrine is applicable when a declaration of unconstitutionality will impose an undue
burden on those who have relied on the invalid law.

Following Serrano, we hold that this case should not be included in the aforementioned exception. To rule otherwise would be iniquitous to petitioner and other
OFWs, and would, in effect, send a wrong signal that principals/employers and recruitment/manning agencies may violate an OFW’s security of tenure which an
employment contract embodies and actually profit from such violation based on an unconstitutional provision of law.

Invoking Serrano, respondents claim that the tanker allowance should be excluded from the definition of the term "salary."

Fair play, justice, and due process dictate that this Court cannot now, for the first time on appeal, pass upon this question. Matters not taken up below cannot be
raised for the first time on appeal. A close perusal of the contract reveals that the tanker allowance of US$130.00 was not categorized as a bonus but was rather
encapsulated in the basic salary clause, hence, forming part of the basic salary of petitioner.

A final note.

We ought to be reminded of the plight and sacrifices of our OFWs. In Olarte v. Nayona, this Court held that:

Our overseas workers belong to a disadvantaged class. Most of them come from the poorest sector of our society. Their profile shows they live in suffocating slums,
trapped in an environment of crimes. Hardly literate and in ill health, their only hope lies in jobs they find with difficulty in our country. Their unfortunate circumstance
makes them easy prey to avaricious employers. They will climb mountains, cross the seas, endure slave treatment in foreign lands just to survive. Out of despondence,
they will work under sub-human conditions and accept salaries below the minimum. The least we can do is to protect them with our laws.

WHEREFORE, the Petition is GRANTED.

General Milling Corporation vs. Torres G.R No. 9366, April 22, 1991

FACTS:
Earl Timothy Cone is a US citizen, who was hired by General Milling as a sports consultant and assistant coach. He possessed an alien employment permit which was
changed to pre-arranged employee by the Board of Special Inquiry of the Commission on Immigration and Deportation. GMC requested that Cone’s employment
permit be changed to a full-fledged coach, which was contested by The Basketball Coaches Association of the Philippines. Alleging that GMC failed to show that there
is no competent person in the Philippines to do the coaching job. Secretary of Labor cancelled Cone’s employment permit.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the Secretary of Labor act with grave abuse of discretion in revoking Cone’s Alien Employment Permit?

HELD:

The Secretary of Labor did not act with grave abuse of discretion in revoking Cone’s Alien Employment Permit. GMC’s claim that hiring of a foreign coach is an
employer’s prerogative has no legal basis. Under Section 40 of the Labor Code, an employer seeking employment of an alien must first obtain an employment permit
from the Department of labor. GMC’s right to choose whom to employ is limited by the statutory requirement of an employment permit.

The Labor Code empowers the Labor Secretary to determine as to the availability of the services of a “person in the Philippines who is competent, able and willing at
the time of the application to perform the services for which an alien is desired.”

People v. Hu GR No. 182232 6 October 2008

FACTS:

Nenita Hu is the President of Brighturn International Services, Inc. a land-based recruitment agency duly licensed by the POEA to engage in the business of
recruitment and placement of workers abroad. Ethel Genoves, on the other hand, worked as a consultant and marketing officer of Brighturn. Aside from her stint at
Brighturn, she was also connected with Riverland Consultancy Service, another recruitment agency. Brighturn was authorized to recruit, process, and deploy land-
based workers for the period of 18 December 1999 to 17 December 2001.

Genoves and Hu were charged with Illegal Recruitment in Large Scale following the complaint from 6 people that they promised the latter employment/job
placement abroad and collected fees from them. However, when the job placements never materialized, the complainants demanded that the money they gave as
placement fees be returned to them. Hu was not able to refund the same.

Four of these complainants were promised employment during the validity of Brighturn’s license. Garcia applied on April 2002, when Brighturn’s license had already
expired. She was referred to Best One, another recruitment agency, but her placement fee was paid with Brighturn.

For her defense, Hu cited that the receipts that the complainants showed her were issued by Riverland. She denied knowing Genoves.

ISSUE:

W/N Hu was engaged in recruitment in large scale.

RULING:

NO. A conviction for large scale illegal recruitment must be based on a finding in each case of illegal recruitment of three or more persons whether individually or as a
group. While it is true that the law does not require that at least three victims testify at the trial, nevertheless, it is necessary that there is a sufficient evidence
proving that the offense was committed against three or more persons. In the case at bar, the prosecution failed to adduce sufficient evidence to prove that illegal
recruitment was committed against three or more persons. The illegal recruitment was committed against only one person: Garcia, because Hu referred Garcia to
another agency without the license or authority to do so. Illegal recruitment cannot successfully attach to the allegations of the others since they testified that they
accomplished their pre-employment requirements through Brighturn from June 2001 up to October of the same year, a period wherein Brighturn’s license to engage
in recruitment and placement was still in full force and effect.

However, failure of the prosecution to prove the guilt of Hu beyond reasonable doubt does not absolve her of her civil obligation to return the money she collected
from the complainants. Neither does her acquittal herein exempt her from subsequent criminal prosecution for estafa provided that deceit, which is an essential
element of estafa, be proven by the prosecution. Illegal recruitment is committed when two elements concur: (1) the offender has no valid license or authority
required by law to enable him to lawfully engage in the recruitment and placement of workers; and (2) he undertakes any activity within the meaning of “recruitment
and placement” defined under Article 13(b) of the Labor Code. The crime becomes Illegal Recruitment in Large Scale when the foregoing two elements concur, with
the addition of a third element—the recruiter committed the same against three or more persons, individually or as a group.

The act of referral, which means the act of passing along or forwarding an applicant after an initial interview to a selected employer, placement or bureau, is included
in recruitment.

The absence of receipts in the case of illegal recruitment does not warrant the acquittal of the appellant and is not fatal to the prosecution’s case. As long as the
prosecution is able to establish through credible and testimonial evidence that the appellant had engaged in illegal recruitment, a conviction for the offense can be
very well justified.