The Role of the Hypothetical Method in the "Phaedo"

Author(s): J. T. Bedu-Addo
Source: Phronesis, Vol. 24, No. 2 (1979), pp. 111-132
Published by: BRILL
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 The role of the hypotheticalmethod
in the Phaedo*
J. T. BEDU-ADDO

Introduction
The hypotheticalmethod is introducedjust before the final proof of the
immortalityof the soul (102a-107a).Of all the variousargumentsadduced
in the Phaedoin supportof the immortalityof the soul, Platoundoubtedly
regardedthe last one as the most satisfactoryand convincing.The argu-
ments in the first two-thirds of the dialogue do indeed have a certain
persuasiveforce; but a searchingobjectionfrom Cebes(86d-88b)seems to
make everythingdoubtful again. Granted that the soul enjoys ante-natal
existence, it has yet to be proved that it is wholly immortaland indes-
tructible.it is only then that one may feel confidentin the face of death:
Anyone who feels confident in the face of death must be a fool, unless he can prove
that the soul is wholly immortaland indestructible(88b).

In his r6sume of Cebes' objection (95b-e), Socrates1 shows a clear

appreciationof the fact that on the basis of the argumentsthus far adduc-
ed, even if his own belief in the immortalityof the soul were true,it would
still fall shortof knowledge:
For, if anyone does not know (686TL) that the soul is immortal,and cannot give an
account of this, it is fitting for him to be afraid, unless he is a fool (95d).

Since Socrates obviously does not consider himself a simpleton, and is

indeed portrayedthroughoutthe dialogue as being quite unperturbedby
the prospect of his own impending death, we may safely assume that he
thinkshe knowsthat the soul is immortal,and can give an accountof this.
Thus it seems quite reasonableto suppose that he intends the final argu-
ment to give precisely the account that will make the immortalityof the

* This paper is a development of a line of thought followed in a section of the introduc-

tory chapter of my Ph. D. thesis, 'Plato'sTheory of Knowledge: A New Interpretationof
the Theaetetus',submitted to the University of London in January, 1969. While ac-
knowledging my own responsibilityfor the many errorswhich are bound to be found in a
paperon this much disputed section of the Phaedo,I should like to thankProfessorsD. M.
Balme and D. W. Hamlyn for their encouragementand valuable criticismof the original
version, and ProfessorKwasi Wiredu for his equally valuable criticismof a draft of this
version.

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soul a matternot merelyof probabilitybut of knowledgein the strictsense
of the word - F'ta?irj, i.e. the mind'sacquaintancewith Formsincluding
the Good as described earlier by Socrates both in the section on the
philosopher's'practiceof death'(65a-66a)and in the sectionon the theory
of recollection(75c-77a).
Now, it has been strenuouslydenied that Socrates''second voyage' has
anything whatever to do with teleology;2and, indeed, the relevance of
Socrates'descriptionof the hypotheticalmethod itself in the Phaedo has
been seriously doubted.3This description of the hypothetical method,
however, is not uncommonlydiscussed and interpretedin complete iso-
lation from the doctrinesof the earliersectionsof the dialogue,namelythe
philosopher's'practiceof death', i.e. the philosopher'suse of pure reason
without the aid of the senses to attain knowledgeof Forms includingthe
Good, and the theoryof recollection.In the followingdiscussion,I propose
to show by a detailedexaminationof the passageon methodthat Socrates'
descriptionof the hypotheticalmethod is, in effect, a descriptionof the
philosopher's'practiceof death',and that it is at once a generalstatement
of method and the descriptionof his 'secondvoyage'in searchof the cause
of generation,existence,and destruction,namely,the Good.

1. iEpya, X6yot and biToObaEtS

Having re-statedCebes' objection,Socratesobserves- aftera long pause
intendedpresumablyto indicateboth the importanceand difficultyof the
final proof - that to answerCebes'objectionis not an easy matter,for he
mustgo into the wholequestionof the cause4 of generationand destruction
(85e). The discussion begins with the well-known 'autobiographical'
passage (96a-99d) in which Socratesrecountshis intellectualpilgrimage
startingfrom his youthfulpreoccupationwith the methodof the physicists
and culminatingin his failureto discoverthe Good whichhe thoughtmust
be the cause of all generation,existence and destruction.Then follows an
accountof his subsequentinventionof a new method for the investigation
of the natureof that cause:
That the Good and the necessarydo truly bind and hold things together they have
no inkling. Now, I would very much like to learn from anybody the truthabout this
sort of cause; but since I was deprivedof it, and could neitherdiscoverit for myself.
nor learn it from anyone else, would you like me, Cebes, to show you how I have
conducted my second voyage in searchof the cause? (99d).

Immediately after this passage, Socrates proceeds to introduce the

hypothetical method as a method of-studying 'the truth of realities'(Ta

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OVTOr)in statementsor propositions(XoyoL) in contrastwith the physicists'
method of studying it in the facts of everydaylife ('Cpya). This method is
introduced here as Socrates' 'second voyage' in search of the cause -
6EVTEpOS rXovs E?'rLTTnVTTjS aXLTL'aS <tl-ToLV(99d).5
Now, before proceedingto describethe hypotheticalmethod, Socrates
says something about phenomenal facts ('Epyo)and statements,accounts,
propositionsetc. (Xoyot)the significanceof which does not seem to have
been fully appreciated.Socratesexplainsthathavingabandonedthe direct
method of studyingrealities(TarIivTa),he took refugein studying'the truth
of realities'in statementsor propositions:
Eb80E 8" .LOL XpijVat EiS TOVSX6yovs XO(TxcpVyOVTrC EV EXELVOLS aXO'rE?V TrV
6v-T'v ' &X'OLaV (99e).
He was afraid of becoming completelyblind in mind if he studied things
(TrpaypraTQ)directly,just as those who look at the sun during an eclipse
instead of looking at its image in wateror in some such mediumruin their
eyes (99d-e). That Socrates is only being ironical here seems clear from
what he proceeds to say:
Perhaps my analogy is not quite accurate,for I do not grant in the least that he who
studies realities ('r&ovTaC)in statements (X6-yoLs)is looking at them in images more
than he who studies them in the facts of everydaylife - EpyoLq(99e- lOOa).

This referenceto images with which Socratesintroduceshis new method

seems to have caused a good deal of misunderstandingpreciselybecauseit
is thought that since the words rar6v5rr and T& Trp&yRaraboth mean
'things',Socrates'use of them here is devoid of any metaphysicalpresup-
positions.Thus, as Hackforth6observes,both expressions'areas vague and
metaphysically non-committal as the word 'things"'.However, readers
who recognize that Plato has all along been thinkingof the separately-
existing Forms as being more real than phenomenal facts will surely
recognize that this can hardly be the case. As Crombie7 sees, Socrates
means that 'physical things are just as much images as are logoi, from
whichit follows that he was reallyturningnot fromrealitiesto theirimages,
but from one kind of image to another.'
Why then, we may ask, does Socratesconsiderthat it is much better to
study 'the truthof realities'in statementsor propositionsthan to studyit in
the facts of everydaylife? I submit that in view of what Socrateshas said
thus far about the philosopher's 'practice of death' and the theory of
recollection,the answermust be this: though all our opinions are derived
initially from sense-experience,and involve notions of realities(and these
opinions may be true or false), it is only by meansof a certaintechniqueof

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employinglogoi - 'TrEpirTOVSXoyovS TEXV'q (90b), that our minds can form
trueopinionsand subsequentlyconvertthese trueopinionsinto knowledge
by completelyrecollectingthe Forms involved in a particulardialectical
enquiry.8
This techniqueof employinglogoi is to be identified,tojudge fromwhat
follows,with the hypotheticalmethod. Since Socratessuggests that p-pyx
and Xoyotare both alike imagesof realities,it would seem that these X6yoL
are, in effect, opinions (whetherthey are definitions,accountsor theories)
involving notions or conceptions of Forms initially derived from sense-
experience,and expressiblein propositionsor statements.9These X6yoL
becomeV'TrO0OEE L when they areprovisionally assumedto be true.At lOOa4,
Socrates actually says he hypothesizes a logos - &ro06[avosX6yov.. . , that
is to say, the logos now becomes a hypothesis.12
Commentingon this passageRoss"1says: 'Socratesis hardlyfair to his
predecessorsin contrastinghis methodwith theirsas the studyof things 'v
?pyOLs. For what they did was not simply,as he suggests,to use theirsenses
and writedown what these reported.'I think the PlatonicSocratesis very
much aware of the fact that the Presocraticshad theirX6yoL.The trouble
with them,presumably,is that they did not, in Plato'sview treattheirX6yoL
(which like all other X6yOLmust initially be regarded as opinions to be
establishedor refuted) as V(TO0EOELS.Plato presumablyconsiders that the
Presocraticssimply took their XoyoLfor granted as constitutingpieces of
knowledge, and hence that they were quite innocent of the %Epi TOVS Xoyovs
TEXVTq which alone can lead the mind to the attainment of knowledge
properlyso called. They certainlydeducedconsequencesfrom theirX6yoL
as Ross rightlypoints out,12 but Plato presumablyconsidersthat they did
not treattheirX6yOL consciouslyas vnoOEaiEs.This indeed is preciselywhat
Plato finds wrong with dianoietic mathematicsin the Republic.Like the
Presocratics,the dianoieticmathematicianstreatingwhat should properly
be regardedas VisIo?ELS as if they constitutedpieces of knowledge- the
indubitablepremissesof their demonstrations,do not feel called upon to
go beyond them, and thus be able to 'give account' of these premisses.
Hence they are quite unable to attain knowledgeproperlyso called13. As
we shall see, here in the Phaedo, as in the Republic,Plato means us to
understand that only the 'true philosopher' can go beyond his VioOmtLs to
attaincompleterecollectionof Formsincludingthe Good.

2. Phaedo JOOa-JOJc
Havingexplainedthathe gave up studyingrealitiesin the factsof everyday

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life and took refuge in studying 'the truth of realities'in logoi, Socrates
says:
Hypothesizing on each occasion (ix&oTorE)the logos I judge the strongest,I posit as
true whatever seems to me to accord (av[tpwpvd)with it, and as not true whatever
seems not to, both in relation to cause and in relationto all other realities(lOOa).

Now, Socrates hypothesizes on each occasion the logos he judges the

strongest;that is to say, what he judges to be the strongestlogos for one
dialectical enquiry need not be his strongestlogos for other dialectical
enquiries.14Judging from what immediatelyfollows, Socrates'own initial
hypothesis for his 'second voyage', describedhere as the 'strongestlogos',
and later referredto as 'that safe hypothesis'(10id), is a general explan-
ation or account of generation,existence and destructionin terms of the
participationof particularsin Forms. This hypothesisis later formulated
clearlythus:
Each of the Forms exists, and it is in virtue of participatingin them that other things
are named after them (102a).

Thus Socrates' initial hypothesis for the enquiry into the nature of the
cause of generation, existence and destruction is the theory of Forms
itself.15
It is importantto recognizehere that since an hypothesisis an opinion,it
does not constituteknowledgehoweverstrongit may be. Thus we are not
supposedto thinkthat Socratesis merelytakingfor grantedthe truthof the
theoryof Forms on which the final proof of the immortalityof the soul is
based. At this stage the theory of Forms is only an opinion. Socrates
believes,or ratherthinkshe knowsthat Formsdo exist;but for the moment
we are to regardhis explanationof generation,existenceand destructionin
terms of the theory of Forms only as an assumption.16He chooses the
theoryof Formsas his strongestlogos here preciselybecause(1) the quarry
for this particularenquiry is the cause of all generation,existence and
destruction,(2) that theoryitself has alreadybeen shownto the satisfaction
of his interlocutorsto be plausibleby the argumentsadducedin supportof
the theoryof recollection(72e-78b).
Significantly, Socrates explains in this passage that his new method
follows the same procedure'whetherthe question is about cause or about
any of the other realities'.As his 'secondvoyage'is in searchof the cause of
generation,existence and destruction,Socrateschooses a general explan-
ation of all generation,existence and destructionwhich he considersto be
least likely to be found wantingas his initialhypothesis.When the question
is about 'any of the other realities'we should naturallyexpect the initial

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hypothesis to be a general definition of the reality in question which he
considers to be least likely to be found wanting.'7 Now the phrase xod 'rrEpi
xxiLITrpiTrGv \XX&v&Trarvrwv
XLTLaOS -rCv6O'VTrV
is not uncommonly translated
thus: (whether the question is) about cause or anything else. It is then
argued that this suggests that we are meant to understand that the
hypothetical method 'does not derive its virtues from its association with
cause, whether in terms of Forms or not','8 quite as if Socrates is still
concerned with the investigation of phenomenal facts rather than with
studying 'the truth of realities'in logoi. However, granted that 'about cause
or anything else' is quite an innocuous rendering of xoxiipspi oLTLt xai 'TEpi
'
T'CV&XXWV a'r&tVTWVTSCViO'VT'V, we are notjustifiedin thinkingthat Socrates
excludes the Good from 'cause or anything else', especially as he
specifically mentions the Good as one of the Forms of his 'second voyage'
(lOOb6).'9 As Socrates says at the end of his description of the hypothetical
method, systematically followed the method can lead one to discover
realities:
&ptO 8' OVX O&VCPA)OLO (O'ITEp OLcVTLXOyLXOi . . . EL'rEp POV\XOL6 TrL
'rJovOVT&V
eVprlv (10 1e).
This would seem to suggest that the aim of the method is the attainment of
knowledge of Forms.20
Having chosen the initial hypothesis, Socrates says he posits as true
whatever seems to him to 'accord' (cav[Lpwvct) with it, and as not true
whatever seems not to. The interpretation of this statement (which is
decidedly loose) is one of the main problems connected with Socrates'
discussion of the hypothetical method in the Phaedo. As Robinson
argues:2' if by the metaphor of 'accord and disaccord' here Plato means
'consistent with and inconsistent with', then he is making Socrates say that
he takes every proposition for true only if it is consistent with his
hypothesis, which is a rash and quite unwarrantable procedure; for we are
not justified in adopting every proposition that is not contradicted by our
hypothesis. If on the other hand what he means is 'deducible from -
entailed by, and not deducible from - not entailed by', then he is making
Socrates say that whenever he finds a proposition not deducible from his
hypothesis, he sets it down as false. Robinson concludes his discussion of
the metahor of accord at lOOathus: 'The whole idea in his mind is that that
which follows from the hypothesis is to be set down as true, and that whose
contradictory follows from the hypothesis is to be set down as false . . . The
two things he really has in mind, namely deducibility and inconsistency,
cannot be neatly expressed by a single verb and its negative, because they
are not contradictories but contraries. So he drops something of his

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meaning, trusting it to be 'divined', and takes consistencyand inconsis-
tency,which are contradictoriesand can thus be compactlyexpressed.'22
Fortunately,however,Platosaves us the need for muchspeculationas to
what he means by 'accord'in this passage by actually making Socrates
illustratethis partof the methodat lOOc-lOlcwhereSocratesundertakesto
clarify his statement. Indeed, this happens to be the only part of the
hypotheticalmethod illustratedin Socrates'descriptionof the method.It is
thus rather unfortunate that the passage is often regardedas a sort of
digression,and as being quite irrelevantfor the properunderstandingof
the hypotheticalmethod.23The passageseems to makeit clearthatPlatois
not really contemplating 'an ideal of propositionalanalysis'.24What he
seems to have in mind is that the initialhypothesismustalwaysbe a general
account, definition or principle. Thus, if, as in the case of the present
enquiry, our quarryis the cause of generation,existenceand destruction,
our hypothesismust be a generalexplanationof generation,existenceand
destructionwhich we considerto be the most plausibleor reliable.Having
chosen the hypothesis,we are to posit as truethe explanationsofparticular
cases of generation,existenceand destructionwhich areconsistentwith it,
and as false those that are not consistentwith it. The entire procedureis
avowedlyhypotheticalin the sense that since the initialhypothesisis only
an opinion provisionallyassumedto be true,whateveris consistentwith it
is provisionally assumed to be true. The retention of Socrates' initial
hypothesis will depend on how successfullyit is consideredto have ex-
plained particular cases of generation existence and destruction in
comparison with other explanations that are not consistent with his
hypothesis.The procedureis, in effect, a test of the hypothesis.25
That this is what Plato has in mind is indicatedby the fact that when he
makes Socratesundertaketo explain this statementmoreclearly(lOOb-c),
what he does is to make him state his generalexplanationof the cause of
generation,existence and destruction,namely, the theory of Forms, and
then proceed to posit as true the explanations of particularcases of
generation,existence and destructionwhich are consistentwith it, and as
false those that are not consistentwith it, namely,all mechanisticexplan-
ations of generation,existenceand destruction(lOOc-lOlc).Here,Socrates
seems clearly to consider that whereasthe applicationsof his principleto
particularcases are consistentlytenable,the corresponding explanationsof
the physicistslead to conflictingconsequences.Socratesmaintainsthat we
can account for generation,existence and destructionconsistentlyonly if
we assume that particularsparticipatein Forms:T xIxXJ TO: xaaX xaXa,
etc. We should not say that 'the head'is the cause of A's beingtallerthan B,

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because if we do, there will always be the danger of an inconsistency
(E'V'VTCOS X6yos) arising; for 'the head' might just as well be said to be the
cause of B's being shorter than A; and again it might be said that the larger
is larger because of something, i.e. 'the head', which is itself small.
Similarly, if we allege addition or division as the cause of one thing's
becoming two, the same inconsistency arises. The only cause of two is
participation in Duality, and participation in Unity is the only cause of
one.26
Now, it is easy to be deceived by Socrates procedure here, and hence be
misled as regards the purpose of this illustrative example of this part of the
hypothetical method, if it is not recognized that Socrates does not really
intend to prove the immortality of the soul on the mere assumption of the
truth of the theory of Forms. As I have argued, we are meant to understand
that at this stage the theory of Forms is only an hypothesis. Socrates'
purpose here is to establish that the theory of Forms explains generation,
existence and destruction without leading to conflicting consequences as in
the case of the mechanistic explanations, and hence that it is a reliable
opinion. Hackforth, who does not seem to recognize this, wonders why
there should be a plurality of propositions arrived at, and observes: 'Surely
the purpose of the method is to establish the truth of a single proposition:
in the example, the proposition that the soul is immortal.'27This, in effect,
is also the view expressed by Robinson when, in considering the question
how far the hypothetical method as Socrates describes it is practised in the
Phaedo, he observes: 'The main proposition hypothesized is the theory of
Ideas, and the main conclusion deduced therefrom, by three different
routes, is that the soul is immortal.'28That is to say, the final proof of the
immortality of the soul is meant to be merely hypothetical, and not really
based on knowledge as we have been led to expect. In fact, however, this
presupposition which not unnaturally leads to the view that the
hypothetical method as described in the Phaedo 'seems a mere ex-
crescence', and that its connection with what precedes and what follows it
'seems perfectly accidental',29 as we shall see, completely misrepresents
what Plato is doing in this section of the Phaedo. Here, surely, Socrates is
not really concerned with the proof of the immortality of the soul.
At the beginning of his illustrative example of this part of the method,
Socrates says, if it is granted that Forms exist, he hopes to be able'to exhibit
the cause from them', and prove that the soul is immortal:
& E-L LOL8L& TE XtL aVyXWpELS EIVct TOVTEt, E'XTrLW(7OL L?X TOVTWV TTnV (LTLAV
ETL&tELELV XEXi &VEVpLOELV
'S &0&VYTOV n ,vXi(lOOb7-9).
In his description of the hypothetical method (lOOa-102a), Socrates is

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surelyengaged in describinghis 'second voyage' in searchof the cause of
generation,existence and destruction;he is not engaged in demonstrating
the immortalityof the soul. That proof comes later. That is to say, the
method which Socratesis describinghere as his 'secondvoyage' in search
of the cause of generation, existence and destruction is the method
wherebyhe attainedknowledgeof that cause; it is not a processof proof.
Indeed,the proof of the immortalityof the soul whichimmediatelyfollows
Socrates'descriptionof the hypotheticalmethod(102a-107)is not reallyan
illustrationof the hypotheticalmethod; it is rathermeant to be seen as a
proof based on knowledge of the cause of generation,existence and des-
tructionattainedby means of the hypotheticalmethod.

3. Phaedo IOld
Having demonstratedto his satisfactionand that of his interlocutorsthat
his 'strongestlogos' can solve the puzzling problemsof generation,exis-
tence and destruction,Socratesproceedsto say:
But you, fearingyour own shadow, as the saying goes, and your inexperience,would
answerby hanging on to that safe hypothesis.And if anyone attackedthe hypothesis
itself, you would ignore him, and refuse to answer until, you had considered its
consequences (-r&asr' EXEiLVns6pOiirrva) to see whether they accord or disaccord
with one another (10 Id).

This passageprescribesa furthertest of the hypothesis.In the firstpassage

we areconcernedwith the applicationsof the hypothesisto particularcases
which fall under the subjectmatterof the enquiry,positing as true those
that are consistent with the hypothesis, and as false those that are not
consistentwith it; and from his illustrativeexample, it would seem that
Socrates'aim is to see what would happen if he wereto treatthe resultant
propositionsas true. In effect, his main concernhere is to see whetherthe
generalprincipleseems to workin termsof particularcases.That is to say,
though the resultantpropositionsare all entailed by the generalprinciple,
Socratesis not so much concernedwith merely makingvalid deductions
from the hypothesisas with seeing whetherthe resultantpropositionscan
all be said to be true.30
In this present passage, we are no longer concernedwith propositions
that are not consistentwith our hypothesis;the metaphorof 'accordand
disaccord'here applies to the propositionsthat are consistent with our
hypothesis.Thus we are now concernedwith a test for consistencyamong
the consequences of the hypothesis themselves: we are to consider its
consequences (-r&&as' Extiv'9s O0'p[ VTa) to see whether they accord or

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disaccord with one another (10id). It is clear that the propositions which
are obtained as a result of the application of the hypothesis to particular
cases are all consequences of the hypothesis. it would seem then that Plato
now envisages further deductions from the hypothesis without reference to
particular cases.31 We are, in effect, to ensure that the consequences of the
hypothesis - whether they are purely logical consequences or the results of
its applications to particular cases - are all consistently tenable; that is to
say, we are to test the hypothesis by means of the Socratic elenchus in much
the same manner as Simmias' logos, namely, that 'the soul is an attune-
ment' is tested at 92a-94e. If the hypothesis leads to conflicting or absurd
consequences, as in the case of Simmias' logos, we should naturally
abandon it and start all over again with another hypothesis; for the first has
been refuted.32
It has often been suggested that Socrates' statement of the method here
involves a logical impossibility, for the notion that a hypothesis can itself
entail consequences that contradict one another is logically absurd, since
any propositions that follow from a given proposition are necessarily con-
sistent with one another. This problem arises if we assume that the con-
sequences referred to here are all logical consequences. In that case the
initial hypothesis may give rise to contradictory consequences if it happens
to be a latently complex proposition. But it seems clear from Socrates' own
illustrative example that some of these consequences are the results of the
application of the general principle to particular cases. As Robinson says,
an hypothesis "may have conflicting consequences on our standing
assumptions, that is, when combined with some of our permanent be-
liefs."33Socrates abandons the study of realities in the facts of everyday life
and takes refuge in 'studying the truth of realities in logoi', but he
apparently knows that situated as we are, it is impossible for us to turn our
backs completely on the facts of everyday life in the process of attaining
knowledge. For neither the choice of an initial hypothesis nor the testing of
it is possible without previous experience of facts of everyday life. As I
have argued, we are meant to understand that X6yoL are all opinions
derived initially from sense-experience, and that they involve notions of
Forms. The hypothetical method is said to proceed without the use of the
senses, precisely because Plato assumes that by the time one embarks on
philosophic dialectic one must have acquired the necessary sense-ex-
perience to guide one's progress towards the attainment of knowledge of
Forms.34 This may sound rather strange to anyone who considers that the
doctrines of the earlier sections of the dialogue, namely, the philosopher's
practice of death and the theory of recollection are not meant to apply in

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this section of the dialogue. However,if it is recognizedthat Platobelieves
that (1) knowledgeis recollectionof Forms, (2) we acquireall our notions
of Forms throughsense-experience,(3) our opinions, expressiblein state-
ments or propositions,involve notions of these Forms,it is not difficultto
see why he thought that the hypothetical method can be successfully
employedwithoutrecourseto sensibleobservation.As the methodinvolves
the examinationof relevantbeliefs about the subjectmatterunder inves-
tigation, he hopes the persistent application of the elenchus to the
hypothesis can lead to the formationof true opinions about the subject
matter.

4.Phaedo JOld-102a
Now, if the hypothesisis able to survivethe elenchus,as we are meant to
understandSocrates'hypothesis has, we are to retain it. But, as I have
argued,however strong the hypothesis may be, it does not yet constitute
knowledge properly so called; Socrates obviously regards it as a true
opinion which has yet to be convertedinto knowledge- and this involves
the ability 'to give account'(8LBOVaLXoyov)of the hypothesisitself. Thus
Socratesproceedsto explain:
(a) And when you should have to give an account of the hypothesis itself, you
would do so in the same manner(Wucavvrws) hypothesizinganotherhypothesiswhich
seemed best of those above, until you came to something adequate (ri txcxv6v).
(b) And you will not mix things up as quibbling disputants (av'rLXoyLxoi)do,
discussingthe beginning(&pXis) and its consequences (T@VEt EXE;ivS W'pJRVWv)at
the same time, ifyou wantedto discoverany of the realities(e'6eTp O1AoL6 rv OVT(AV
TLrC
E)pE!v). They perhaps, have neither one account of this matter nor do they give it
any thought. Their cleverness enables them to mix everything up and yet be well
pleased with themselves. But I think that since you are one of the philosophers,you
will do as I have said (10 ld-102a).

Thus ends Socrates'accountof his 'secondvoyage' in searchof the cause.

Both Simmiasand Cebes are convinced of the truthof what Socrateshas
just said; and here, Echecratesintervenesto observe that Socrates"made
those mattersastonishinglyclear even to a man of very little intelligence"
(102a).35
The correctinterpretationof this crucial passage which I have divided
into two sections,(a) and (b), is importantfor a properappreciationof the
purposeof the hypotheticalmethod generally,as well as of its role in this
sectionof the Phaedo.Many scholarsdo indeed recognizethe resemblance
of (a) to the 'upwardpath'of dialecticin the Republic,but stillconsiderthat
by 'somethingadequate' here, Plato is thinking merely of a proposition

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acceptable to an objector, despite the fact that (b) explicitly tells us that
systematically followed, the method is capable of leading the mind to the
discovery of realities. Thus Robinson argues: the "something adequate is
'adequate to satisfy your objector, and thus prove, as far as you and he are
concerned the conclusion you set out to prove'. It is not 'adequate to satisfy
yourself; for you were already satisfied with the first hypothesis."36This
being the case, "epistemology does not enter into the matter at all;"37 and
Robinson is naturally led to the rather paradoxical conclusion that the
'upward path' here "is wholly extrinsic" to the method.38 Indeed,
throughout his interpretation, Robinson considers that Socrates' statement
at lOOa,namely that having hypothesized the 'strongest logos' on each
occasion, he proceeds to posit as true whatever accords with it, and as not
true whatever does not, (i.e. the statement which, as I have argued, really
describes the first test of the hypothesis) as the proper statement of the
hypothetical method. As he says the procedure described at lOOa"is the
proper aim of the hypothetical method, namely, draw the consequences of
the hypothesis and posit them as true."39
Now, the initial hypothesis which must be a general account or definition
is to be tested by the elenchus to ensure that its consequences -whether
they are the results of its application to particular cases or deductions from
the hypothesis - are all consistently tenable; and this means that the initial
hypothesis is not necessarily a premiss, on the contrary it is essentially a
refutand. If it survives the elenchus -and we are meant to understand that
Socrates' own initial hypothesis for the enquiry into the cause of
generation,' existence and destruction, namely the theory of Forms, can
survive the elenchus, we are to retain it; but this is not the end of the story.
We are to establish it in the same manner (Wa>Xrws) with reference to a
prior or 'higher' hypotheses in the light of which the truth of this hypothesis
might be explained; that is to say, the 'safe hypothesis' is now to be treated
as a demonstrand. This process of choosing 'higher' hypotheses continues
until that 'something adequate' is reached. Plato naturally employs this
'upward' metaphor to describe this process presumably because (1) he
believes in the existence of 'higher' realities, namely Forms, and (2) he
thinks of this process itself as the process whereby these 'higher' realities
might be completely recollected. That is to say, the 'upward path' of the
hypothetical method is precisely that process of converting 'true opinions'
into knowledge properly so called - the lying down of 'true opinions' by
'reasoning out the cause' (aLTLra3Xo-yLaL) which in the Meno, the dialogue
in which Plato first introduces the hypothetical method and the theory of
recollection, is explicitly linked with recollection.40

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 The fundamentalpresuppositionof Robinson'sinterpretationis thatthe
hypotheticalmethod is primarilya processof proof employed'in orderto
reach a desired conclusion',41 rather than a method to be employed
wheneverone 'wantsto discoverany of the realities'- E'LrEp 0oVOLO6 TLTLIV
OVTrV.wpElV (10le). Plato says that in choosing the 'higher'hypotheseswe
should proceed in the same manner ( OalTvW) 'hypothesizinganother
hypothesiswhich seemed best of those above' preciselybecause the initial
hypothesis as well as all the 'higher' hypotheses are obtained not by
deductive reasoning, but ratherby inductive reasoning; and Plato, as I
have argued,considersthat this processis guided by recollection.Indeed,
the use of 'OavsTW in this passage suggests strongly that the 'higher'
hypotheses must all be tested by the elenchus until that 'something
adequate'is reached.42The 'higher'hypothesis,it would seem, mustalways
be the limitingconditionfor the truth of the 'lower'hypothesis.Thus, it
may, but need not, entail the 'lower'hypothesis.43
Plato then, seems to have hoped that the 'upward path' of the
hypotheticalmethod involves the gradual recollectionof the realities or
Forms involved in the particulardialectical enquiry undertaken, it is
important to note, by philosophers and not v'WLXoyLxoL, i.e. eristic dis-
putants,sophists,public oratorsetc. The 'somethingadequate'then would
be a proposition that is adequate in the sense that it cannot itself be
established by a 'higher' hypothesis within the limits of the particular
dialectical enquiry. This final proposition is what is described as the
beginning'(&pxiq)in this passage.44
Now, Socrates'descriptionof the hypotheticalmethodin the Phaedo,as
I have tried to show, is at once a general statementof the method and his
'second voyage' in search of the cause of generation,existence and des-
truction. The fundamental fault of the current interpretationsof this
'second voyage' is that they make no attempt whatever to apply the
'upwardpath' to Socrates'own hypothesis, namely the theory of Forms;
hence it is thought that the theory of Forms remainsan hypothesisin the
Phaedo.
In this particularenquiry into the cause of generation, existence and
destruction,where Socrates'hypothesisis the theory of Forms itself - a
theory which has been shown to be a 'safe hypothesis'both by the argu-
ments adduced in support of the theory of 'recollection'and by its suc-
cessful employment for the solution of the puzzling problems of
generation,existenceand destruction- the 'upwardpath'will necessarily
culminate in the realization that there is an ultimate or final cause
responsiblefor the participationof phenomenalfacts in Forms,and in the

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context of this enquiry,in the 'adequate'propositionthat the Good is the
causeof the participationof phenomenalfactsin Forms.Thatis to say, the
Good is the ultimate or final cause of all generation,existenceand des-
truction.45Indeed, this is the only conceivable'upward'step in this parti-
culardialecticalenquiry.If Platodoes not explicitlysay so in the Phaedo,it
is surely no positive evidence for the view that at the time of writingthe
Phaedo,he thoughtthat the hypotheticalmethodcould not lead the mind
to knowledge of the Good, any more than is the fact that Plato does not
explicitlydescribethe Forms as separately-existingin the Meno,nor con-
nect axlt'asXWoyLops with the hypotheticalmethodearlierdescribedin that
dialogue a positive evidence for the view that at the time of writing the
Meno Plato did not believe in the existenceof supra-sensibleentitiesas the
proper objects of knowledge.46These omissions are probablydue to his
own conception of the nature of philosophicalwriting. Plato shows his
usual sense of humour- which can be ratherirritatingat times- when, at
the end of this descriptionof the hypotheticalmethod, he makes Eche-
crates intervene to say that Socrates 'made those mattersastonishingly
clear even to a man of very little intelligence' (102a).47

5. Conclusion
At the beginningof this paper, I suggestedthat the final argumentfor the
immortalityof the soul is intended to give an account that will make the
soul's immortalitya matternot merelyof probabilitybut of knowledgein
the strictsense - F'rrr'[. If my interpretationof the hypotheticalmethod
as describedin the Phaedohas been sound, Platois tellingus, in effect,that
Socrates'final proof of the immortalityof the soul, which immediately
follows his description of the method, is based not indeed on the
assumption, however plausible it may be, of the participationof phe-
nomenal factsin Forms,but ratheron knowledgeof theseFormsincluding
the Good, the final cause of all generation,existenceand destruction.Thus
the final proof based as it is on the participationof particularsin Forms,
and the 'admission'or 'non-admission'of opposites,like the 'downward
path' of dialectic described in the Republic,is meant to be seen as a
non-hypotheticalproof.48
It is, however,not uncommonlymaintainedthatPlatohimselfexpresses
doubt in this dialogue about the possibilityof attainingcertaintyby the
hypotheticalmethod.As Gulley putsit: "Platorecognizes.. . the limitation
of the method of hypothesis, and of human argumentin general, as a
means of establishingwith certaintythe truth of any postulate.Short of

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'divine inspiration',the method of hypothesisis, for Plato, the best philo-
sophical method for attainingknowledge, but he acknowledgesthat cer-
taintyis eitherimpossibleor extremelydifficultto attainby any methodof
human argument (85c-d, 107b)."49I shall now proceed to show, by an
examinationof the relevantpasages,that what Plato acknowledgeshere in
the Phaedois not so much the limitationsof the hypotheticalmethoditself,
nor of 'human arguments'in general as the limitationsof the majorityof
mankind who, unlike 'true philosophers',are not in the right state or
conditionof mind for philosophicaldialectic.(i) At 85c-d,Simmias,before
putting forward the view that the soul is an attunement in deliberate
oppositionto Socrates'view of the natureof the soul (78b-84b),expresses
doubt - which he hopes is also sharedby Socrates- about the possibility
of attaining clear knowledge about matters concerning the soul in our
presentlife. He considers,however,that it is the markof a very soft man
not to test (?XiyXELv)what is said about them by all means at his disposal,
and refuse to give up until he has thoroughlyand exhaustivelyexamined
them. For one has to achieve one or the other of these thingsabout them:
either learn from another or discover the truth about these matters for
oneself; or, if that is impossible, at least get hold of the best of human
arguments, the hardest to refute (8vuaFEXcyx6TaTov) and voyage through
life, unless one could do so with less dangerand riskon a steadiervessel -
some divine account.50
Now, before subjectingSimmias'theoryof the natureof the soul to the
elenchus,Socratestakesthe opportunityto commenton the view expressed
by Simmiason knowledgeand humanarguments.Socratesfirstadviseshis
interlocutorsto guardagainstthe dangerof becomingmisologistsor haters
of arguments(JILo6XoyoL) just as some people become misanthropists;for
misology and misanthropyarise from similarcauses. Misanthropyarises
from putting complete confidence in someone without having under-
standingof human nature.You suppose that the fellow is absolutelytrue,
sound and trustworthy;and afterwardsyou find him false, base and un-
trustworthy.When this happensto a man a numberof times,he ends up by
hating all and sundry,and thinkingthat there is nothing sound in anyone
at all. In much the same way misology ariseswhen a man withoutproper
knowledgeof the technique of arguing(&.vrv TpS ITrrpi TOVS XOyovs TEXVTS)
has confidencein the truthof an argument,and then afterwardsthinksthat
it is false - thatsometimesit is, and sometimesit isn't;and again the same
thing happens with another argumentand yet another. Such people, es-
peciallythose who have spent their time in eristicdisputations(ol 1T?p'i TOVS
&VTLXOyLXOVS X6yoVS &aTpL'cVTrs) invariably end up by considering

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themselvesthe wisestof men believingthatthey alone have discoveredthat
there is nothingsound or reliablein anythingor in any argument,and that
all things go up and down like the tide in the Euripus,and nothingremains
stable for a single moment (89c-90c).
Socratescontinuesto explainthat if thereis any argumentwhich is true
and reliableand can be learnt,it would be a sad thingif a man,becausehe
happens to have come up againstsome of those argumentswhichseem to
be sometimestrue and sometimesfalse, should then not blame himselfor
his own lack of skill, but should end up, in his distress,by blaming the
arguments,hating and abusing them for the restof his life, deprivedof the
truth and knowledge of reality (d ... -rexti
rCv oivmwvrrs &OX0LCots tLO-

irrIs a piiOeq)90d:
Let us thereforebe on our guard against this, and let us not admit into our souls the
notion that there is no soundness in argumentsat all. Let us far ratherassume that
we ourselvesare not yet in sound condition (uLETSoiSiru yWs Exo-v), and that we
must strivehard to become sound, you and the others for the sake of the restof your
lives, and I because of my impending death (90d-9Ia).

In all this, the PlatonicSocrates,far fromendorsingSimmias'doubtsabout

human argumentsin general as a means of attainingclear and certain
knowledge,is tryingto disabusehis mind of such doubts: therereallyis a
method of arguingwhich can lead the mind to the attainmentof truthand
knowledgeof reality,but this methodcan be successfullyemployedonly by
those who attain the rightstate or conditionof mind.51
(ii) At the end of Socrates'final proof of the immortalityof the soul,
Cebes observes that "it is perfectly clear that the soul is immortaland
indestructible,and our souls really will exist in the other world"(107a).
Simmias,however,while confessingthathe findsthe proofconvincing,still
expresseshis misgivingsabout the reliabilityof human arguments:
I have no ground for doubt either as far as the argumentgoes; but in view of the
weightiness of the subject, and my poor opinion of human frailty, I cannot help
having some doubt in my own mind about what has been said (107a-b).
Socratesthen advisesthem to examinethe firstassumptions(T&sv'rroOaeLs
TrS 'UrpwTars)still more thoroughly,even if they seem to them to be certain:

And if you analyse them thoroughly,you will, I think, follow the argumentas far as
it is possible for man to do so.52And if this becomes clear,you will not seek beyond
that - oVbEv qTd E aepcwripw (107b).

Here again, Socratesis not reallyendorsingSimmias'doubtsabout human

arguments.On the contrary,he seemsto considerthatwhilsthe himselfhas
attained knowledge of these matters, his interlocutorshave only 'true

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opinions'about them at this stage.He thereforeadvisesthem to re-examine
theirfirstassumptions(nprxm v'no&weats) morethoroughly,analysingthem
carefully, even if they seem to them to be certain now, and follow the
argumentto the best of their ability. But what preciselyare these IfTIXPYL
uroOF"aeLs? I have arguedthat the initial hypothesisof a dialecticalenquiry
is a reliableopinion about the subjectunderdiscussion,and thatit mustbe
a general account, principle or definition. In this particular enquiry,
Socrates'initial hypothesisis, in effect, the theoryof Formsitself- a vastly
complex hypothesisincludinga numberof equallyvast assumptionsabout
the nature of the soul, the doctrineof recollectionas well as the natureof
the individual Forms, themselves.53These assumptions,I submit, are the
'rp(YrmVxrO0eutaS which should be thoroughly examined by Cebes and
Simmias. Socrates does not suggest that this furtherexaminationof the
basic assumptionswill necessarilyenable them to attainknowledgeprop-
erly so called about the subject. He suggests, however, that the present
argumentis the best of human argumentson the subject,and that if they
follow it, and the correctnessof the argumentbecomesclear to them, they
will not need to seek any further;that is to say, even if they cannot attain
knowledge of the subject they will have strengthenedtheir 'true opinion'
about it, and this should serve them equally well throughouttheir lives.
The hypotheticalmethod is the method for attainingcertainknowledgeof
reality;but the complete recollectionof Formswhich should superveneat
the end of the 'upwardpath' of dialectic to guaranteethe truth of pro-
positions is a matter of personalexperiencerestrictedto 'true philosoph-
ers',who by assiduouspracticein philosophicdialectic- the philosopher's
'practiceof death' -have attainedthe requisitestate or conditionof mind
for such experience.We are meant to understandthatSocratesis one such
philosopher.
It would seem then that in describingthe hypotheticalmethodwherehe
does in the Phaedo, Plato has threemain aims in view: (1) to describethe
method whereby the mind can form true opinions about the natureof the
things it perceivesthroughthe senses,and subsequentlyconvertthese true
opinions into knowledge properly so called, (2) to describe Socrates'
'second voyage' in search of the cause of generation,existence and des-
truction,namely the Good, and finally (3) to indicate, as we were led to
expect, that Socrates' final argument for the immortalityof the soul is
based not on probability,but ratheron knowledge properlyso called -

University of Cape Coast, Ghana

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1 Throughout this paper I shall be using 'Socrates'to mean the Platonic Socrates.
2
See especially P. Shorey, What Plato Said (Chicago, 1933), 534; N. Murphy, The
Interpretation of Plato's Republic (Oxford, 1951), 146; R. Robinson, Plato's Earlier
Dialectic (Oxford, 1953), 142-144;Pamela Huby, 'Phaedo99D-102A', Phronesis4 (1959)
12-14; G. Vlastos, 'Reasonsand Causes in the Phaedo',Phil. Rev. 78 (1969) 297-289, note
15; Evan L. Burge, 'The Ideas as Aitiai in the Phaedo Phronesis16, (1971) 1-2, note 2;
and Charlotte L. Stough, 'Forms and Explanationsin the Phaedo' Phronesis21, (1976-
13-14, note 18.
3 Cf R. Robinson, op. cit., 143; and N. Gulley, Plato's Theoryof Knowledge(London,

1962), 43.
4 6X& ytp 5ri ?pi yrVioEus xni Oop&S T1V tiTlnV 6s'rrpxyCYVusTo.aa0XL (95e 9). Note the
singular riv OtLTtIYV in contrastwith the plural T&s O'LTLOSof the physicists (96a 9) which
together with 6Xusstronglysuggeststhat Socratesis concerned not with individual cases
of generation, existence and destruction, but rather with the cause of all generation,
existence and destruction.
5 Note that the Socrateswho is talking about a 'second voyage' in search of the cause is

Socratesthe 'truephilosopher'who hasjust discussedthe philosopher's'practiceof death'

and the theory of recollection, and not the youthful Socrates who was deprived of
knowledge of the Good. Plato is surely being ironical here when he describes Socrates'
method as a 6VTEpOS 1TXoVi,for thereis not the slightestevidence in the Phaedothat at the
time of writing it he thought there was any direct method or short cut leading to the
attainment of knowledge of any Form. As R. S. Bluck (Plato's Phaedo, London, 1955,
200) rightlysays, the expression86EVipOSITXOVSE&riTV T S Mt'Tr(S NT'qaLV "suggests,surely,
that we are concernedwith a differentkind of approach,not a different kind of cause."
6 R. Hackforth,Plato's Phaedo(Cambridge, 1955), 137.
7 I. M. Crombie, An Examination of Plato's Doctrines (London, 1963), Vol. 2, 157.

Commenting on this passages,R. S. Bluck,op. cit. 167-168,note 1, says: "Socratesseems

simply to mean that X6yoLare at least as importantand real as the physical phenomena
with which they correspond (the word 'image' being liable to suggest a certain in-
feriority); but Plato when he wrote this was probably thinking too of his own view of
X6-yoL(and 'Epya)as images or reflectionsof separately-existingForms ... His own views
have coloured the simile."This attemptto distinguishthe views of the historicalSocrates
from Plato's in this dialogue involves Bluck in a number of difficulties. See pp. 160 ff.
where he argues that the X6yoLof 100a are Socraticr'8ij, whereas the V1souaas of 101d.
are our notions of Platonic separately-existing ?'&l. See also his Plato's Meno
(Cambridge, 1964) 103, note 1, where commenting on the view that the hypothetical
method is explicitlydissociatedat 99 c-d from the searchfor the Good, he observes:"This
may be Socrates,not Plato".
Hereafter,I shall referto Bluck'sPlato'sPhaedoas Bluck(1), and to his Plato'sMeno as
Bluck (2).
8 Note that while we are told at 75a that we derive all our conceptions of Forms from no
other source than from sense-experience, at 76b we are explicitly told that having
knowledge properlyso called impliesthe abilityto 'give account'of what one knows.That
is to say, as in the Meno, Platohere distinguishesbetween knowledge and opinion. But see
N. Gulley, op. cit. 34-40 and his 'Plato'sTheory of Recollection'C.Q. n.s. 4 (1954) p. 198,
for the view that what appearsto be envisaged in the Phaedois "an immediate transition
from the sensible to the intelligible world." Cf also Ovidia Hansing, 'The Theory of
Recollection in Plato's Dialogues', Monist,38 (1928) 237.

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9 Plato, of course, is here concerned primarily with statements expressing necessary
truths,but he means that even contingent statementsinvolve notions of Forms.
10Notethat Simmias' view that 'the soul is an attunement'is referredto at 92c as a logos,
and at 93c and 94b as an hypothesis.
1 David Ross, Plato's Theoryof Ideas (Oxford, 1951),27.
12Loc.cit. 27.
13 Rep. 510b ff. See my 'A Theory of Mental Development: Plato'sRepublicV-VII', Part

I, Platon, XXVIII, 1976, p. 296 ff. where I have argued that the state of mind or level of
thought of these dianoietic mathematiciansis the same as that of the WLXOOe&aLOVEs etc. of
Rep. 476a ff. On this view, Plato would regardthe Presocraticsas qLXo6e&povcs who as J.
Gosling ('Republic Book V: Tar 'rroXX&xaX& XrT', Phronesis 5 (1960) 120-121) rightly
points out, are not really ordinary men, but men of learning who are quite likely to be
mistaken for 'true philosophers'by the ordinaryman.
14 This seems to make it clear that Socrates'statement is meant to be a generalstatement
of method. It is thus rather puzzling that R. S. Bluck ((1), 164), who sees that the clause
'taking as my starting-pinton each occasion'is indefinite, and that there is no suggestion
that any one particular 'strongest X6yos' is meant, still maintains that "there is no
indication "that a general statement described at IOOAis ... applied at 1OB". As we shall
see, it is applied at IOOb-101c.
15 It is not uncommonly supposed that Socrates' own 'strongestlogos' for the enquiry
into the nature of the cause of generation,existence and destruction,which he describes
at 101d as 'that safe hypothesis', is the hypothesis that 'Forms exist', or even that 'Forms
are causes'. It is true that at 100b Socrateshypothesizes that the Beautiful,the Good etc.
do exist; but it is not the case that 'the existence of Forms simpliciter is the hypothesis
'judged strongest"'(K. M. Sayre, op. cit. 13).The 'safe hypothesis'whichpresupposesthe
existence of Forms, is that 'participationof particularsin Forms is the cause of sensible
characteristics'.
16 R. S. Bluck ((1) 161) considersthat Socrates'own hypothesishere cannot be the theory
of Forms itself, since "if. . . the 'safe' vi,n6Orts
envisaged were indeed the theoryof Forms
itself, it is impossible to see what the 'higher'(Y!oTkOLS could be by means of one of which
the theory of Forms might have to be explained." As we shall see, this view reckons
without the cause of the participationof particularsin Forms.
17 If, for instance, the quarryis 'justice',the initial hypothesis may well be 'justicemeans
paying one's debts'.
18 N. Gulley, op. cit. 41.
19 If the phrase is translated as I have done above, i.e. 'whether the question is about
cause or any of the other realities',we can detect a hint here that the 'cause'of Socrates'
second voyage' is really one of the ovTa. Why else should Socratessay 'aboutcause or any
of (or all of) the other realities'- Xvi TTEpiotTlras XaXi ?Epi TV&T'IVThOV
T w trwV OV'06.rV,
and not 'about cause and realities'- TEpI otirics XcX? 'TEpi TI;) OVTrwv?
20 As R. S. Bluck ((2) 102) says "the words r'L'rEpI3o0XoL6 TLrCv 6vrwv EiVpeEvmust surely
mean 'if you wanted to discover any real thing', that is, the nature of any Form". It is
however not necessary to maintain, as Bluck does that Socrates' X6yoLare about 'in-
dividual 6VTro'(Ibid. p. 102), nor that the vMro0imo&s
are 'provisionalnotions of Forms' or
'provisional mental images' (Bluck (2) 162-163) if, as I have argued, all hypotheses are
opinions involving notions or conceptions of forms derived from sense-experience.
21 R. Robinson, op. cit. 126-127. See also David ross, op. cit. 28.
22 Ibid. 128-129.

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23 R. S. Bluck (2), 103, rightly says that "the passage as a whole cannot be primarily
concernedwith general logic, for it would be irrelevantto its context if its theme were not
the causesof generationand decay". K. M. Sayre (Plato'sAnalytic Method,Chicago and
London, 1969,7-14) recognizesthat the passageis meant to be a clarificationof lOOa;but
he does not seem to see clearlyhow it illustratesthe statement,for he proceedsto discuss
Greek geometricalanalysis at length in connection with the metaphorof accord (15-28),
and claims that "if we think of the relationshipof agreementat IOOAas holding between
convertiblepropositions,then the difficulties .. . disappear,and Socrates'comments on
method become perfectly lucid" (21). But surely. propositions like 'Participation in
Beauty is the cause of beautiful things' and 'Participationin Duality is the cause of two'
whichaccordwith Socrates''safe hypothesis'can hardlybe said to be mutuallydeducible,
or convertible.
24 See N. Gulley, Plato's Theoryof Knowledge,loc. cit. 41.
25 Accordingto Robinson (op. cit. 134)however, "To Plato an hypothesiswas primarilya

premissand not a demonstrand,a proposition posited in order to prove something else

and not in orderto be establishedor refuted.The originalstatementof the method makes
the hypothesis unequivocally a premiss (IOOA).The employment of the method in the
dialogue is equally unequivocal.The hypothesischosen is the theoryof Ideas.There is no
questionof testingor recommendingthis theory in any way; but it is used as a premissfor
inferringanother proposition,namely that the soul is immortal. . ." As we shall see, this
completely misrepresents what Plato is doing in this section of the Phaedo. For
Robinson'sviews on hypotheses in Plato, see especially 111-112.
26 In this passage we have Socrates'explanation of particularcases of generation, exis-
tence and destructionin termsof the participationof particularsin Forms,and this is also
his solution to the puzzles at Phaedo96c-97b. It is howeverimportantto recognizethat its
relevance to its context lies precisely in the fact that it illustrates the first part of the
hypotheticalmethod described at 1OOa. A discussion of Socrates'account of causation is
beyond the scope of this paper. However, it seems clear from Socrates'treatmentof the
mechanistic explanations of the physicists that he considers that a 'cause' properly so
called must be both necessaryand sufficient. For some recent discussionsof this section
of the Phaedosee note 2.
27 R. Hackforth,op. cit., 139.
28 R. Robinson, op. cit., 142.
29 R. Robinson, ibid., 143.
30 In this particulardialecticalenquiry this is obscured by the metaphysicalnatureof the

initialhypothesis.But this need not be the case in every dialecticalenquiry.That Socrates

is here concernedwith the truthof the propositionsseems to be clearly indicated by the
fact that he takes the trouble to explain why he thinks the propositions which are
inconsistentwith his hypothesisare false.
31 As Robinson rightly says "there appears to be no place in Plato where Op[ti1Oiv'rc
means logical consequences as technically and unmistakablyas avu,BXivov'Tscan". The
phraseT& &'rT' in fact, is vague enough to suggest not only the deduction
exriv9s O'psiaOivra,
of consequences from the hypothesis but also the results of its application to particular
cases.
32 Socratesdoes not mention the elenchus in his descriptionof the hypotheticalmethod.
Since, however, he envisages the possibilityof making the hypothesis lead to conflicting
or absurdconsequences,it seems reasonableto suppose that he has the elenchus in mind.
33 R. Robinson,op. cit., 33. Far from being an ideal of propositionalanalysisor primarily

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concerned with logic, the method thus fardescribedis ratherakin to scientificmethod.As
R. M. Hare has pointed out, the analogy with scientific method "may show (however
reluctantPlato would have been to admit it) that there is after all an empiricalelement in
the elenchus: are we not in practisingit looking for possible falsificationsof the empirical
hypothesis that, in their ordinarydiscourse, people use a word in a certainway." ('Plato
and the Mathematicians'in New Essays on Plato and Aristotle, Ed. by R. Bambrough,
london, 1965, 34). Indeed, thus far, we may compare the method with ProfessorPopper's
view that scientists never prove their hypotheses but only fail, after tryinghard to falsify
them (The Logic of Scientificdiscovery,London, 1956,esp. 32 ff.), in spite of Plato'sview
that the method proceeds without the aid of the senses.
34 See 75a. F. M. Cornford (Plato's Theoryof Knowledge,London, 1935, 6) thinks that
"the fact that sensible experience may be the occasion of Recollectionis lost sightof". But
see Bluck (1) 149.
35 It is clear from the Meno, as Bluck sees, that Plato is indebted to the mathematicians
"for his own conscious practice and development of a 'hypotheticalmethod"'(Bluck (2)
85). This applies to the search for 'higher' hypothesis, i.e. the 'upward path' of the
method. Socrates' interlocutors,Cebes and Simmias as well as Echecratesin the 'outer
dialogue' are all Pythagoreans and may reasonably be expected to listen to the
description of the hypothetical method with a familiarear.
36 R. Robinson, op. cit. 137.
37 Ibid. 138.
38 Ibid. 135.
39 Ibid. 134. Indeed, Robinson considers that lOOa"is not primarilyconcerned with the

truth of the hypothesis", and that for this reason it is "intrinsicto the method". He
describes the 'upward path' as being wholly extrinsic: "It is nothing but a test of the
hypothesis, and tests are not the purpose of the method"(135).
40 See Meno. 98a.
41 See op. cit. 134.
42 The use of the elenchus is also envisaged in the 'upward path' of dialectic in
the
Republic: W(07Ep EV.Xn1 &Lc 1TrXVTWVi'XiYXLv,v 8LEEL(V, iRh XO(Ta 6Eav &XX& xxr' o'vaCxv
TpOO10VR>EVOS EXEYXELV (Rep. 534c).
43 For a good discussion of this part of the hypotheticalmethod and Greek geometrical
analysis, see R. S. Bluck (2) 76-85.
44 The view that the 'upwardpath' describedhere is for the benefit of the 'objector'or the
'outsider' is untenable if only because on this view 'drawing the consequences of an
hypothesis to see whether they accord with one anotheror not', becomes necessaryonly
when the initial hypothesis is 'attacked'.Surely, Plato is only using the language of the
'dialectical process of questioning and answering' (Phd. 75d); aild 'objectors'are not
ruled out in the description of dialectic in the Republiceither.
45 Thus the 'something adequate' is an 'unhypothesized'beginning - the aViTO6OCTOS
&pxi,of the Republic,and not a mere o'RoXo-yo~RF4vov. Here it is a propositionabout the
Good, but this need not be the case in all dialectical enquiries. In a subsequent paper, I
propose to discuss the methods of &&voLs,and v6iits in the Republic. I shall argue that the
widely accepted view that the &vviT60EToSaip reached at the end of every dialectical
enquiry is the Good or a propositionabout the Good, is mistaken.Cf. K. M. Sayre,op. cit.
46 ff.
46 Commenting on the r6le of recollectionin the hypotheticalmethod, R. S. Bluck(2) 92,

observes: "The recollection which consists in or achieves an aoTlias XoyLaoi6s

(98a3-4) and

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thereby resultsin perfect knowledge is not associated in the Meno with the hypothetical
method . . . but it is apparentlybrought in relationwith it in the Republic." I think in his
descriptionof the hypotheticalmethod in the RepublicPlato has the theoryof recollection
at the back of his mind; but it is importantto note that he does not make mention of it
there.
47 If my interpretationhas been sound, Aristotle presumably did not understand the

passage. See his criticismof the Phaedo'sexplanation of 'coming-to-be'in his de Gen.et

Corr. 335 b 7 ff., and also Metaphysics988 a 8, where Aristotle maintains that Plato
recognizesneitherefficient nor final causes; and see David Ross'comment on this (op. cit.
234).
48 It is perhaps worthwhile to note here that at 436d in the Cratylus Plato shows his
appreciationof the fact that even if all the consequences of an hypothesis are consistent
with each other and with the hypothesisitself, they may still be false preciselybecause the
hypothesisitself is false. And again, at 533c in the Republic,he makes Socratesask: "For
where the beginning (&pXi)is something one does not know, and the conclusion and all
that intervenes are constructedout of what one does not know, what possibility is there
that consistencyin such cases can ever become knowledge?"I find no evidence whatever
in the Phaedoto suggest that at the time of writing it, Plato was unaware of this. For this
final proof of the immortalityof the soul Plato is clearly aiming at nothing short of what
he considersto be absolute incorrigibleknowledge, and not mere consistency.It is thus a
misunderstandingto say with Robinson that "Plato'smethodology in the Phaedo is at
variancewith his epistemology as stated in the Republic"(op. cit. 146).
49 N. Gulley, Plato's Theoryof Knowledge,loc. cit. 43.
50 1 suspect that this divine account is one based on actual knowledge of, as opposed to
mere belief in, Forms including the Good. Those who possess such knowledge are
virtually divine. Cf Timaeus51d-e. Perhaps it is worth mentioning that the views ex-
pressedhere are Simmias'and not Socrates'.Scholarsseem to have been so bemused by
these views that they have sometimes assumed that they are actually expressed by
Socrates himself. Thus R. S. Bluck (2), 100, says: "At Phaedo 85c-d Socrates says in
mattersconcerningthe soul knowledge is difficult to attain during life . . ."
51 This is the level of thought or state of mind of the 'true philosopher'described in the
Republic as V&q0LS. See my article, loc. cit., especially pp. 296-300.
52 There seems to be a hint here that both Simmias and Cebes are not really in the right
condition of mind for the attainment of knowledge properly so called, though being
Pythagoreansthey can follow the argument.See above note 35.
53 It is not necessary, for this reason, to suppose that hypotheses are 'notions' or 'con-
ceptions' of Forms, nor that they are all 'concernedwith individual Forms'.See note 20.

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