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Castro vs.

Miat (MJ)
Romeo but bought it anyway on the assurance of Moises that he’d be
able to retrieve it
Syllabus Subtopic : Marriages before FC
from his son.

FACTS :
Romeo files in the
RTC action to nullify sale and compel Moises and Alexander to execute
Father of two children, Moises, widower (wife died in 1978), originally
intended his two deed of
conveyance/assignment. RTC ordered (1) Alexander to pay the remaining balance
properties, one in Paco and the other in Paranaque for his offspring
but reverted to
due his brother, (2) Romeo to recognize sale made by Moises, (3) dismissal of defen
dant’s
keeping the latter for himself while in Dubai, UAE. He modified the
original agreement counterclaim and (4) defendants to pay the
costs of suit.
upon return to the Philippines in 1984.

Both parties appealed to the CA which modified the decision by saying


that: (1) the deed
Proof of this was given by Moises’ brother, Cerefino Miat, who
said testified the original of sale was nullified, (2) Moises
and Alexander had to execute a deed of conveyance, and
agreement that Paco property would go to Moises’ sons. This
was reiterated at the death (3) for defendants to pay cost of
suit (as applied for by the petitioner). Virgilio
bed of Moises’ wife and affirmed upon Moises’ return to the Philippines.
subsequently brings the action to the SC

The Paco property, being the land in dispute, was paid for on an
installment basis from ISSUE :
May 17, 1977 to December 14, 1984. Full payment was made on the
latter date and title 1. Whether the Paco property is conjugal
or capital (TOPIC)
was secured under Moises name as widower.
2. Whether valid oral partition between Moises and
his sons involving the said property is

valid.
Romeo and Alexander, sons of Moises, lived on the Paco property with
their wives and 3. Whether Castro spouses were buyers in good
faith.
paid
its realty taxes and fire insurance premiums. Alexander and his wife, however, left
the
property in August 1985 for personal reasons.
RATIO / HELD :

1. Conjugal property
. Although petitioners allege that property was paid for by Moises and
February 1988, Romeo learned from his godmother in his wedding, Mrs. Rosalina
Castro, at the time it was paid, his wife
had long been dead, the SC disagrees on the grounds of
mother of petitioner Virgilio Castro, that she had given Moises
P30,000.00 as the new Civil Code, which was
applicable because marriage was celebrated before FC:
downpayment for the sale by Moises of the Paco property to her son Virgilio.

Art 153 (1) “The following are conjugal partnership property: (1)
Those acquired by onerous
April 1988, Alexander agrees to sell his share of the Paco property for P42,750.00;
a partial title during the marriage at the
expense of the common fund, whether the acquisition be for
payment was made in the sum of
P6,000 by Romeo but Alexander did not execute a deed
the partnership, or for only one of the spouses;
of assignment in favor of his brother because
“he had lots of work to do and the title was
already in Romeo’s possession.”
Records show that property was acquired by onerous title during the
marriage out of the

common fund. It is clearly conjugal property.


Romeo had possession of the title of the Paco property
because he borrowed it from his
father when he mortgaged the land to his friend Lorenzo. But when
Moises ran into Petitioners also overlook Article
160 of the New Civil Code. It provides that “all property of
financial difficulties, he mortgaged for P30,000.00 the Paco property to
parents of the marriage is presumed to
belong to the conjugal partnership, unless it be proved that it
petitioner.
pertains exclusively to the husband
or to the wife.” This article does not require proof that

the property was acquired with funds of the partnership. The presumption
applies even
December 1, 1988, Romeo and petitioner Virgilio met in MTC Manila to
discuss status of when the manner in which the property was
acquired does not appear.
Paco property. On the 16th, a letter from petitioner’s lawyer informed Romeo that t
he Paco
property had been sold to
Virgilio by Moises by virtue of a deed of sale dated Dec. 5, 1988
In the case at bar (as opposed to petitioner’s
reliance on Lorenzo v. Nicolas), Moises and
for P95,000.00. Buyer, petitioner, Virgilio admitted that the title of
the property was with Concordia bought the Paco property
during their marriage — Moises did not bring it into

their marriage, hence it has to be considered as conjugal.

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2. Yes. The validity of the agreement is
apparent in (a) latter of the father to his sons (the
one which stated that he didn’t favor any of his sons), (b) the
testimony (see above) of
Moises’ brother, Ceferino, and the oral agreement between the brothers
to divide the
property between themselves (attested to by extended Family members).

Oral partition between Romeo and Alexander is not


covered by the Statute of Frauds. It is
enforceable for two reasons. Firstly, Alexander accepted the six thousand
(P6,000.00)
pesos given by Romeo as downpayment for the purchase of his share in
the Paco
property. Secondly, Romeo and his witnesses, Ceferino Miat and Pedro
Miranda, who
testified regarding the sale of Alexander’s share to Romeo, were
intensely questioned by
petitioners’ counsel.

3. No. In the case at bench,


the said spouses have actual knowledge of the adverse claim
of plaintiff-appellant. The most protuberant index that they
are not buyers in good faith is
that before the sale, Virgilio Castro talked
with Romeo Miat on the supposed sale. Virgilio
testified that together with Romeo, Alexander and Moses Miat, they went
to Judge
Anunciacion of Manila in order to find out if Romeo has a
right over the property. Romeo
told Virgilio in that meeting that Romeo has a right over
the Paco property by virtue of an
oral partition and assignment. Virgilio even admitted that he knew Romeo
was in
possession of the title and Romeo then insisted that he is the owner of the
property.

Virgilio Castro is further aware that plaintiff is in possession of the


property, they being
neighbors. A purchaser who was fully aware of another
person’s possession of the lot he
purchased cannot successfully pretend to be an innocent purchaser for value.”

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Plata v. Yatco (MJ)
law she holds and administers independently, and which she may even
encumber or
Syllabus Subtopic : Acquired by redemption/exchange
alienate without his knowledge or consent.

FACTS :
The writ of certiorari prayed for is granted, and the order of the
lower court, dated 4
● 1954 - Amalia Plata (petitioner), who was single at the time,
purchased a parcel January 1963, is annulled and set aside. The
preliminary injunction is made permanent,
of land in Caloocan Rizal.
with costs against private respondents Villanueva.
● February 13, 1958 - petitioner sold the property to Celso Saldaña.

● September 24 1958 - Saldaña


resold the property to Plata, who was now married
to Gaudencio Begosa. On the same date, Plata mortgaged the
property to
Cesarea Villanueva in consideration of a loan of P3,000.
Plata’s husband,
Begosa, signed the mortgage as a co-mortgator.
● April 12, 1960 - For failure to pay the mortgage, the property
was extrajudicially
foreclosed to the mortgagee as the highest bidder.
● Subsequently, respondent Villanueva sued Gaudencio Begosa alone for
illegal
detainer in the case in Case No. Q-
6250, and obtained final judgment against him
in the court of first instance.
● A
writ of execution was duly issued, but Plata resisted all efforts to eject her from
the property claiming ownership of the said property.
● Upon motion
of the judgment creditors, the court cited both Plata and Begosa for
contempt for refusing to vacate the said property.

ISSUE : whether the petitioner, Amalia Plata, is bound by the detainer


judgment against
Gaudencio Begosa in Civil Case No. Q-6250.

HELD : NO. The respondents Villanueva could


not ignore the paraphernal character of the
property in question, which had been unquestionably acquired by Plata
while still single.
The subsequent conveyance thereof to Celso Saldaña, and the reconveyance
of her
several months afterward of the same property, did not transform it
from paraphernal to
conjugal property, there being no proof that the money paid to Saldaña
came from
common or conjugal funds.

Although Gaudencio Begosa signed the mortgage as a co-mortgagor,


by itself alone, that
circumstance would not suffice to convert the land into conjugal
property, considering
that it was paraphernal in origin.

Since the property was paraphernal, and the creditors and purchasers were aware of
it, the
fact being clearly spread on the land
records, it is plain that Plata's possession, therefore,
was not derived from Gaudencio Begosa. The illegal detainer judgment
against the
husband alone cannot bind nor affect the wife's possession of
her paraphernal, which by

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