 Republic of the Philippines
 SUPREME COURT
 Manila
 
 
 FIRST DIVISION
 



 PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,
 Petitioner,
 
 
 - versus -
 
 
 RODOLFO GALLO

y GADOT,
 Accused-Appellant,
 
 FIDES PACARDO y JUNGCO and PILAR MANTA y
DUNGO,
 Accused.
 
 
 
 G.R. No. 187730
 
 Present:
 
 CORONA, C.J.,
Chairperson,
 VELASCO, JR.,
 LEONARDO-DE CASTRO,
 DEL CASTILLO,
and
 PEREZ, JJ.
 
 Promulgated:
 June 29, 2010
 x----------------------------------------------
-------------------------------------------x
 
 
 D E C I S I O N
 
 
 VELASCO, JR., J.:
 


 The Case
 
 This is an appeal from the Decision[1] dated December 24, 2008 of the
Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 02764 entitled People of the Philippines
v. Rodolfo Gallo y Gadot (accused-appellant), Fides Pacardo y Jungco and Pilar Manta
y Dungo (accused), which affirmed the Decision[2] dated March 15, 2007 of the
Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 30 in Manila which convicted the accused-appellant
Rodolfo Gallo y Gadot (accused-appellant) of syndicated illegal recruitment in Criminal
Case No. 02-206293 and estafa in Criminal Case No. 02-206297.
 
 The
Facts
 
 Originally, accused-appellant Gallo and accused Fides Pacardo (Pacardo) and
Pilar Manta (Manta), together with Mardeolyn Martir (Mardeolyn) and nine (9) others,
were charged with syndicated illegal recruitment and eighteen (18) counts of estafa
committed against eighteen complainants, including Edgardo V. Dela Caza (Dela Caza),
Sandy Guantero (Guantero) and Danilo Sare (Sare). The cases were respectively
docketed as Criminal Case Nos. 02-2062936 to 02-206311. However, records reveal
that only Criminal Case No. 02-206293, which was filed against accused-appellant
Gallo, Pacardo and Manta for syndicated illegal recruitment, and Criminal Case Nos. 02-
206297, 02-206300 and 02-206308, which were filed against accused-appellant Gallo,
Pacardo and Manta for estafa, proceeded to trial due to the fact that the rest of the
accused remained at large. Further, the other cases, Criminal Case Nos. 02-206294 to
02-206296, 02-206298 to 02-206299, 02-206301 to 02-206307 and 02-206309 to 02-
206311 were likewise provisionally dismissed upon motion of Pacardo, Manta and
accused-appellant for failure of the respective complainants in said cases to appear and
testify during trial.
 
 It should also be noted that after trial, Pacardo and Manta were
acquitted in Criminal Case Nos. 02-206293, 02-206297, 02-206300 and 02-206308 for
insufficiency of evidence. Likewise, accused-appellant Gallo was similarly acquitted in
Criminal Case Nos. 02-206300, the case filed by Guantero, and 02-206308, the case
filed by Sare. However, accused-appellant was found guilty beyond reasonable doubt in
Criminal Case Nos. 02-206293 and 02-206297, both filed by Dela Caza, for syndicated
illegal recruitment and estafa, respectively.
 
 Thus, the present appeal concerns solely
accused-appellants conviction for syndicated illegal recruitment in Criminal Case No. 02-
206293 and for estafa in Criminal Case No. 02-206297.
 
 In Criminal Case No. 02-
206293, the information charges the accused-appellant, together with the others, as
follows:
 
 The undersigned accuses MARDEOLYN MARTIR, ISMAEL GALANZA,
NELMAR MARTIR, MARCELINO MARTIR, NORMAN MARTIR, NELSON MARTIR, MA.
CECILIA M. RAMOS, LULU MENDANES, FIDES PACARDO y JUNGCO, RODOLFO
GALLO y GADOT, PILAR MANTA y DUNGO, ELEONOR PANUNCIO and YEO SIN
UNG of a violation of Section 6(a), (l) and (m) of Republic Act 8042, otherwise known as
the Migrant Workers and Overseas Filipino Workers Act of 1995, committed by a
syndicate and in large scale, as follows:
 
 That in or about and during the period
comprised between November 2000 and December, 2001, inclusive, in the City of
Manila, Philippines, the said accused conspiring and confederating together and helping
with one another, representing themselves to have the capacity to contract, enlist and
transport Filipino workers for employment abroad, did then and there willfully and
unlawfully, for a fee, recruit and promise employment/job placement abroad to
FERDINAND ASISTIN, ENTICE BRENDO, REYMOND G. CENA, EDGARDO V. DELA
CAZA, RAYMUND EDAYA, SANDY O. GUANTENO, RENATO V. HUFALAR, ELENA
JUBICO, LUPO A. MANALO, ALMA V. MENOR, ROGELIO S. MORON, FEDILA G.
NAIPA, OSCAR RAMIREZ, MARISOL L. SABALDAN, DANILO SARE, MARY BETH
SARDON, JOHNNY SOLATORIO and JOEL TINIO in Korea as factory workers and
charge or accept directly or indirectly from said FERDINAND ASISTIN the amount of
P45,000.00; ENTICE BRENDO P35,000.00; REYMOND G. CENA P30,000.00;
EDGARDO V. DELA CAZA P45,000.00; RAYMUND EDAYA P100,000.00; SANDY O.
GUANTENO P35,000.00; RENATO V. HUFALAR P70,000.00; ELENA JUBICO
P30,000.00; LUPO A. MANALO P75,000.00; ALMA V. MENOR P45,000.00; ROGELIO
S. MORON P70,000.00; FEDILA G. NAIPA P45,000.00; OSCAR RAMIREZ P45,000.00;
MARISOL L. SABALDAN P75,000.00; DANILO SARE P100,000.00; MARY BETH
SARDON P25,000.00; JOHNNY SOLATORIO P35,000.00; and JOEL TINIO
P120,000.00 as placement fees in connection with their overseas employment, which
amounts are in excess of or greater than those specified in the schedule of allowable
fees prescribed by the POEA Board Resolution No. 02, Series 1998, and without valid
reasons and without the fault of the said complainants failed to actually deploy them and
failed to reimburse the expenses incurred by the said complainants in connection with
their documentation and processing for purposes of their deployment.[3] (Emphasis
supplied)
 
 In Criminal Case No. 02-206297, the information reads:
 
 That on or about
May 28, 2001, in the City of Manila, Philippines, the said accused conspiring and
confederating together and helping with [sic] one another, did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously defraud EDGARDO V. DELA CAZA, in the following manner,
to wit: the said accused by means of false manifestations and fraudulent representations
which they made to the latter, prior to and even simultaneous with the commission of the
fraud, to the effect that they had the power and capacity to recruit and employ said
EDGARDO V. DELA CAZA in Korea as factory worker and could facilitate the
processing of the pertinent papers if given the necessary amount to meet the
requirements thereof; induced and succeeded in inducing said EDGARDO V. DELA
CAZA to give and deliver, as in fact, he gave and delivered to said accused the amount
of P45,000.00 on the strength of said manifestations and representations, said accused
well knowing that the same were false and untrue and were made [solely] for the
purpose of obtaining, as in fact they did obtain the said amount of P45,000.00 which
amount once in their possession, with intent to defraud said [EDGARDO] V. DELA
CAZA, they willfully, unlawfully and feloniously misappropriated, misapplied and
converted the said amount of P45,000.00 to their own personal use and benefit, to the
damage and prejudice of the said EDGARDO V. DELA CAZA in the aforesaid amount of
P45,000.00, Philippine currency.
 
 CONTRARY TO LAW.[4]
 
 When arraigned on
January 19, 2004, accused-appellant Gallo entered a plea of not guilty to all
charges.
 
 On March 3, 2004, the pre-trial was terminated and trial ensued,
thereafter.
 
 During the trial, the prosecution presented as their witnesses, Armando
Albines Roa, the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration (POEA)
representative and private complainants Dela Caza, Guanteno and Sare. On the other
hand, the defense presented as its witnesses, accused-appellant Gallo, Pacardo and
Manta.
 
 Version of the Prosecution
 
 On May 22, 2001, Dela Caza was introduced by
Eleanor Panuncio to accused-appellant Gallo, Pacardo, Manta, Mardeolyn, Lulu
Mendanes, Yeo Sin Ung and another Korean national at the office of MPM International
Recruitment and Promotion Agency (MPM Agency) located in Malate, Manila.
 
 Dela
Caza was told that Mardeolyn was the President of MPM Agency, while Nelmar Martir
was one of the incorporators. Also, that Marcelino Martir, Norman Martir, Nelson Martir
and Ma. Cecilia Ramos were its board members. Lulu Mendanes acted as the cashier
and accountant, while Pacardo acted as the agencys employee who was in charge of
the records of the applicants. Manta, on the other hand, was also an employee who was
tasked to deliver documents to the Korean embassy.
 
 Accused-appellant Gallo then
introduced himself as a relative of Mardeolyn and informed Dela Caza that the agency
was able to send many workers abroad. Together with Pacardo and Manta, he also told
Dela Caza about the placement fee of One Hundred Fifty Thousand Pesos (PhP
150,000) with a down payment of Forty-Five Thousand Pesos (PhP 45,000) and the
balance to be paid through salary deduction.
 
 Dela Caza, together with the other
applicants, were briefed by Mardeolyn about the processing of their application papers
for job placement in Korea as a factory worker and their possible salary. Accused Yeo
Sin Ung also gave a briefing about the business and what to expect from the company
and the salary.
 
 With accused-appellants assurance that many workers have been
sent abroad, as well as the presence of the two (2) Korean nationals and upon being
shown the visas procured for the deployed workers, Dela Caza was convinced to part
with his money. Thus, on May 29, 2001, he paid Forty-Five Thousand Pesos (PhP
45,000) to MPM Agency through accused-appellant Gallo who, while in the presence of
Pacardo, Manta and Mardeolyn, issued and signed Official Receipt No. 401.
 
 Two (2)
weeks after paying MPM Agency, Dela Caza went back to the agencys office in Malate,
Manila only to discover that the office had moved to a new location at Batangas Street,
Brgy. San Isidro, Makati. He proceeded to the new address and found out that the
agency was renamed to New Filipino Manpower Development & Services, Inc. (New
Filipino). At the new office, he talked to Pacardo, Manta, Mardeolyn, Lulu Mendanes and
accused-appellant Gallo. He was informed that the transfer was done for easy
accessibility to clients and for the purpose of changing the name of the agency.
 
 Dela
Caza decided to withdraw his application and recover the amount he paid but
Mardeolyn, Pacardo, Manta and Lulu Mendanes talked him out from pursuing his
decision. On the other hand, accused-appellant Gallo even denied any knowledge about
the money.
 
 After two (2) more months of waiting in vain to be deployed, Dela Caza
and the other applicants decided to take action. The first attempt was unsuccessful
because the agency again moved to another place. However, with the help of the Office
of Ambassador Seeres and the Western Police District, they were able to locate the new
address at 500 Prudential Building, Carriedo, Manila. The agency explained that it had to
move in order to separate those who are applying as entertainers from those applying as
factory workers. Accused-appellant Gallo, together with Pacardo and Manta, were then
arrested.
 
 The testimony of prosecution witness Armando Albines Roa, a POEA
employee, was dispensed with after the prosecution and defense stipulated and
admitted to the existence of the following documents:
 
 1. Certification issued by
Felicitas Q. Bay, Director II, Licensing Branch of the POEA to the effect that New Filipino
Manpower Development & Services, Inc., with office address at 1256 Batangas St.,
Brgy. San Isidro, Makati City, was a licensed landbased agency whose license expired
on December 10, 2001 and was delisted from the roster of licensed agencies on
December 14, 2001. It further certified that Fides J. Pacardo was the agencys
Recruitment Officer;
 
 2. Certification issued by Felicitas Q. Bay of the POEA to the
effect that MPM International Recruitment and Promotion is not licensed by the POEA to
recruit workers for overseas employment;
 
 3. Certified copy of POEA Memorandum
Circular No. 14, Series of 1999 regarding placement fee ceiling for landbased
workers.
 
 4. Certified copy of POEA Memorandum Circular No. 09, Series of 1998
on the placement fee ceiling for Taiwan and Korean markets, and
 
 5. Certified copy
of POEA Governing Board Resolution No. 02, series of 1998.
 
 Version of the
Defense
 
 For his defense, accused-appellant denied having any part in the recruitment
of Dela Caza. In fact, he testified that he also applied with MPM Agency for deployment
to Korea as a factory worker. According to him, he gave his application directly with
Mardeolyn because she was his town mate and he was allowed to pay only Ten
Thousand Pesos (PhP 10,000) as processing fee. Further, in order to facilitate the
processing of his papers, he agreed to perform some tasks for the agency, such as
taking photographs of the visa and passport of applicants, running errands and
performing such other tasks assigned to him, without salary except for some allowance.
He said that he only saw Dela Caza one or twice at the agencys office when he applied
for work abroad. Lastly, that he was also promised deployment abroad but it never
materialized.
 
 Ruling of the Trial Court
 
 On March 15, 2007, the RTC rendered its
Decision convicting the accused of syndicated illegal recruitment and estafa. The
dispositive portion reads:
 
 WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered as
follows:
 
 I. Accused FIDES PACARDO y JUNGO and PILAR MANTA y
DUNGO are hereby ACQUITTED of the crimes charged in Criminal Cases Nos. 02-
206293, 02-206297, 02-206300 and 02-206308;
 
 II. Accused RODOLFO
GALLO y GADOT is found guilty beyond reasonable doubt in Criminal Case No. 02-
206293 of the crime of Illegal Recruitment committed by a syndicate and is hereby
sentenced to suffer the penalty of life imprisonment and to pay a fine of ONE MILLION
(Php1,000,000.00) PESOS. He is also ordered to indemnify EDGARDO DELA CAZA of
the sum of FORTY-FIVE THOUSAND (Php45,000.00) PESOS with legal interest from
the filing of the information on September 18, 2002 until fully paid.
 
 III.
Accused RODOLFO GALLO y GADOT in Criminal Case No. 02-206297 is likewise
found guilty and is hereby sentenced to suffer the indeterminate penalty of FOUR (4)
years of prision correccional as minimum to NINE (9) years of prision mayor as
maximum.
 
 IV. Accused RODOLFO GALLO y GADOT is hereby ACQUITTED
of the crime charged in Criminal Cases Nos. 02-206300 and 02-206308.
 
 Let alias
warrants for the arrest of the other accused be issued anew in all the criminal cases.
Pending their arrest, the cases are sent to the archives.
 
 The immediate release of
accused Fides Pacardo and Pilar Manta is hereby ordered unless detained for other
lawful cause or charge.
 
 SO ORDERED.[5]
 
 Ruling of the Appellate Court
 
 On
appeal, the CA, in its Decision dated December 24, 2008, disposed of the case as
follows:
 
 WHEREFORE, the appealed Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Manila,
Branch 30, in Criminal Cases Nos. 02-206293 and 02-206297, dated March 15, 2007, is
AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION that in Criminal Case No. 02-206297, for estafa,
appellant is sentenced to four (4) years of prision correccional to ten (10) years of prision
mayor.
 
 SO ORDERED.[6]
 
 The CA held the totality of the prosecutions evidence
showed that the accused-appellant, together with others, engaged in the recruitment of
Dela Caza. His actions and representations to Dela Caza can hardly be construed as the
actions of a mere errand boy.
 
 As determined by the appellate court, the offense is
considered economic sabotage having been committed by more than three (3) persons,
namely, accused-appellant Gallo, Mardeolyn, Eleonor Panuncio and Yeo Sin Ung. More
importantly, a personal found guilty of illegal recruitment may also be convicted of
estafa.[7] The same evidence proving accused-appellants commission of the crime of
illegal recruitment in large scale also establishes his liability for estafa under paragragh
2(a) of Article 315 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC).
 
 On January 15, 2009, the
accused-appellant filed a timely appeal before this Court.
 
 The Issues
 
 Accused-
appellant interposes in the present appeal the following assignment of errors:
 
 I
 The
court a quo gravely erred in finding the accused-appellant guilty of illegal recruitment
committed by a syndicate despite the failure of the prosecution to prove the same
beyond reasonable doubt.
 
 II
 The court a quo gravely erred in finding the accused-
appellant guilty of estafa despite the failure of the prosecution to prove the same beyond
reasonable doubt.
 
 
 Our Ruling
 
 The appeal has no merit.
 
 Evidence supports
conviction of the crime of Syndicated Illegal Recruitment
 
 Accused-appellant avers that
he cannot be held criminally liable for illegal recruitment because he was neither an
officer nor an employee of the recruitment agency. He alleges that the trial court erred in
adopting the asseveration of the private complainant that he was indeed an employee
because such was not duly supported by competent evidence. According to him, even
assuming that he was an employee, such cannot warrant his outright conviction sans
evidence that he acted in conspiracy with the officers of the agency.
 
 We
disagree.
 
 To commit syndicated illegal recruitment, three elements must be
established: (1) the offender undertakes either any activity within the meaning of
recruitment and placement defined under Article 13(b), or any of the prohibited practices
enumerated under Art. 34 of the Labor Code; (2) he has no valid license or authority
required by law to enable one to lawfully engage in recruitment and placement of
workers;[8] and (3) the illegal recruitment is committed by a group of three (3) or more
persons conspiring or confederating with one another.[9] When illegal recruitment is
committed by a syndicate or in large scale, i.e., if it is committed against three (3) or
more persons individually or as a group, it is considered an offense involving economic
sabotage.[10]
 
 Under Art. 13(b) of the Labor Code, recruitment and placement refers
to any act of canvassing, enlisting, contracting, transporting, utilizing, hiring or procuring
workers, and includes referrals, contract services, promising or advertising for
employment, locally or abroad, whether for profit or not.
 
 After a thorough review of the
records, we believe that the prosecution was able to establish the elements of the
offense sufficiently. The evidence readily reveals that MPM Agency was never licensed
by the POEA to recruit workers for overseas employment.
 
 Even with a license,
however, illegal recruitment could still be committed under Section 6 of Republic Act No.
8042 (R.A. 8042), otherwise known as the Migrants and Overseas Filipinos Act of 1995,
viz:
 
 Sec. 6. Definition. For purposes of this Act, illegal recruitment shall mean any act
of canvassing, enlisting, contracting, transporting, utilizing, hiring, or procuring workers
and includes referring, contract services, promising or advertising for employment
abroad, whether for profit or not, when undertaken by a non-licensee or non-holder of
authority contemplated under Article 13(f) of Presidential Decree No. 442, as amended,
otherwise known as the Labor Code of the Philippines: Provided, That any such non-
licensee or non-holder who, in any manner, offers or promises for a fee employment
abroad to two or more persons shall be deemed so engaged. It shall, likewise, include
the following act, whether committed by any person, whether a non-licensee, non-holder,
licensee or holder of authority:
 
 (a) To charge or accept directly or indirectly any
amount greater than that specified in the schedule of allowable fees prescribed by the
Secretary of Labor and Employment, or to make a worker pay any amount greater than
that actually received by him as a loan or advance;
 
 x x x x
 
 (l) Failure to actually
deploy without valid reason as determined by the Department of Labor and Employment;
and
 
 (m) Failure to reimburse expenses incurred by the worker in connection with his
documentation and processing for purposes of deployment and processing for purposes
of deployment, in cases where the deployment does not actually take place without the
workers fault. Illegal recruitment when committed by a syndicate or in large scale shall
be considered an offense involving economic sabotage.
 
 Illegal recruitment is deemed
committed by a syndicate if carried out by a group of three (3) or more persons
conspiring or confederating with one another. It is deemed committed in large scale if
committed against three (3) or more persons individually or as a group.
 
 The persons
criminally liable for the above offenses are the principals, accomplices and accessories.
In case of juridical persons, the officers having control, management or direction of their
business shall be liable.
 
 In the instant case, accused-appellant committed the acts
enumerated in Sec. 6 of R.A. 8042. Testimonial evidence presented by the prosecution
clearly shows that, in consideration of a promise of foreign employment, accused-
appellant received the amount of Php 45,000.00 from Dela Caza. When accused-
appellant made misrepresentations concerning the agencys purported power and
authority to recruit for overseas employment, and in the process, collected money in the
guise of placement fees, the former clearly committed acts constitutive of illegal
recruitment.[11] Such acts were accurately described in the testimony of prosecution
witness, Dela Caza, to wit:
 
 PROS. MAGABLIN
 
 Q: How about this Rodolfo
Gallo?
 
 A: He was the one who received my money.
 
 Q: Aside from receiving your
money, was there any other representations or acts made by Rodolfo Gallo?
 
 A: He
introduced himself to me as relative of Mardeolyn Martir and he even intimated to me
that their agency has sent so many workers abroad.
 
 x x x x
 
 PROS.
MAGABLIN
 
 Q: Mr. Witness, as you claimed you tried to withdraw your application at
the agency. Was there any instance that you were able to talk to Fides Pacardo, Rodolfo
Gallo and Pilar Manta?
 
 A: Yes, maam.
 
 Q: What was the conversation that
transpired among you before you demanded the return of your money and
documents?
 
 A: When I tried to withdraw my application as well as my money, Mr.
Gallo told me I know nothing about your money while Pilar Manta and Fides Pacardo
told me, why should I withdraw my application and my money when I was about to be
[deployed] or I was about to leave.
 
 x x x x
 
 Q: And what transpired at that office
after this Panuncio introduced you to those persons whom you just mentioned?
 
 A:
The three of them including Rodolfo Gallo told me that the placement fee in that agency
is Php 150,000.00 and then I should deposit the amount of Php 45,000.00. After I have
deposited said amount, I would just wait for few days
 
 x x x x
 
 Q: They were the one
(sic) who told you that you have to pay Php 45,000.00 for deposit only?
 
 A: Yes,
maam, I was told by them to deposit Php 45,000.00 and then I would pay the remaining
balance of Php105,000.00, payment of it would be through salary deduction.
 
 Q: That
is for what Mr. Witness again?
 
 A: For placement fee.
 
 Q: Now did you believe to
(sic) them?
 
 A: Yes, maam.
 
 Q: Why, why did you believe?
 
 A: Because of the
presence of the two Korean nationals and they keep on telling me that they have sent
abroad several workers and they even showed visas of the records that they have
already deployed abroad.
 
 Q: Aside from that, was there any other representations
which have been made upon you or make you believe that they can deploy you?
 
 A: At
first I was adamant but they told me If you do not want to believe us, then we could do
nothing. But once they showed me the [visas] of the people whom they have deployed
abroad, that was the time I believe them.
 
 Q: So after believing on the representations,
what did you do next Mr. Witness?
 
 A: That was the time that I decided to give the
money.
 
 x x x x
 
 PROS. MAGABLIN
 
 Q: Do you have proof that you gave the
money?
 
 A: Yes, maam.
 
 Q: Where is your proof that you gave the money?
 
 A: I
have it here.
 
 PROS. MAGABLIN:
 
 Witness is producing to this court a Receipt
dated May 28, 2001 in the amount of Php45,000.00 which for purposes of record Your
Honor, may I request that the same be marked in the evidence as our Exhibit F.
 
 x x x
x
 
 PROS. MAGABLIN
 
 Q: There appears a signature appearing at the left bottom
portion of this receipt. Do you know whose signature is this?
 
 A: Yes, maam, signature
of Rodolfo Gallo.
 
 PROS. MAGABLIN
 
 Q: Why do you say that that is his
signature?
 
 A: Rodolfo Gallos signature Your Honor because he was the one who
received the money and he was the one who filled up this O.R. and while he was doing
it, he was flanked by Fides Pacardo, Pilar Manta and Mardeolyn Martir.
 
 x x x x
 
 Q:
So it was Gallo who received your money?
 
 A: Yes, maam.
 
 
 
 
 
 PROS.
MAGABLIN
 
 Q: And after that, what did this Gallo do after he received your
money?
 
 A: They told me maam just to call up and make a follow up with our
agency.
 
 x x x x
 
 Q: Now Mr. Witness, after you gave your money to the accused,
what happened with the application, with the promise of employment that he
promised?
 
 A: Two (2) weeks after giving them the money, they moved to a new office
in Makati, Brgy. San Isidro.
 
 x x x x
 
 Q: And were they able to deploy you as
promised by them?
 
 A: No, maam, they were not able to send us abroad.[12]
 


 
 Essentially, Dela Caza appeared very firm and consistent in positively identifying
accused-appellant as one of those who induced him and the other applicants to part with
their money. His testimony showed that accused-appellant made false
misrepresentations and promises in assuring them that after they paid the placement
fee, jobs in Korea as factory workers were waiting for them and that they would be
deployed soon. In fact, Dela Caza personally talked to accused-appellant and gave him
the money and saw him sign and issue an official receipt as proof of his payment.
Without a doubt, accused-appellants actions constituted illegal
recruitment.
 
 Additionally, accused-appellant cannot argue that the trial court erred in
finding that he was indeed an employee of the recruitment agency. On the contrary, his
active participation in the illegal recruitment is unmistakable. The fact that he was the
one who issued and signed the official receipt belies his profession of innocence.
 
 This
Court likewise finds the existence of a conspiracy between the accused-appellant and
the other persons in the agency who are currently at large, resulting in the commission
of the crime of syndicated illegal recruitment.
 
 In this case, it cannot be denied that the
accused-appellent together with Mardeolyn and the rest of the officers and employees of
MPM Agency participated in a network of deception. Verily, the active involvement of
each in the recruitment scam was directed at one single purpose to divest complainants
with their money on the pretext of guaranteed employment abroad. The prosecution
evidence shows that complainants were briefed by Mardeolyn about the processing of
their papers for a possible job opportunity in Korea, as well as their possible salary.
Likewise, Yeo Sin Ung, a Korean national, gave a briefing about the business and what
to expect from the company. Then, here comes accused-appellant who introduced
himself as Mardeolyns relative and specifically told Dela Caza of the fact that the agency
was able to send many workers abroad. Dela Caza was even showed several workers
visas who were already allegedly deployed abroad. Later on, accused-appellant signed
and issued an official receipt acknowledging the down payment of Dela Caza. Without a
doubt, the nature and extent of the actions of accused-appellant, as well as with the
other persons in MPM Agency clearly show unity of action towards a common
undertaking. Hence, conspiracy is evidently present.
 
 In People v. Gamboa,[13] this
Court discussed the nature of conspiracy in the context of illegal recruitment, viz:
 


 Conspiracy to defraud aspiring overseas contract workers was evident from the acts of
the malefactors whose conduct before, during and after the commission of the crime
clearly indicated that they were one in purpose and united in its execution. Direct proof
of previous agreement to commit a crime is not necessary as it may be deduced from
the mode and manner in which the offense was perpetrated or inferred from the acts of
the accused pointing to a joint purpose and design, concerted action and community of
interest. As such, all the accused, including accused-appellant, are equally guilty of the
crime of illegal recruitment since in a conspiracy the act of one is the act of all.
 
 


 To reiterate, in establishing conspiracy, it is not essential that there be actual proof that
all the conspirators took a direct part in every act. It is sufficient that they acted in
concert pursuant to the same objective.[14]
 
 Estafa
 
 The prosecution likewise
established that accused-appellant is guilty of the crime of estafa as defined under
Article 315 paragraph 2(a) of the Revised Penal Code, viz:
 
 Art. 315. Swindling
(estafa). Any person who shall defraud another by any means mentioned
hereinbelow
 
 x x x x
 
 2. By means of any of the following false pretenses or
fraudulent acts executed prior to or simultaneously with the commission of the
fraud:
 
 (a) By using fictitious name, or falsely pretending to possess power, influence,
qualifications, property, credit, agency, business or imaginary transactions; or by means
of other similar deceits.
 
 
 
 The elements of estafa in general are: (1) that the
accused defrauded another (a) by abuse of confidence, or (b) by means of deceit; and
(2) that damage or prejudice capable of pecuniary estimation is caused to the offended
party or third person.[15] Deceit is the false representation of a matter of fact, whether by
words or conduct, by false or misleading allegations, or by concealment of that which
should have been disclosed; and which deceives or is intended to deceive another so
that he shall act upon it, to his legal injury.
 
 All these elements are present in the
instant case: the accused-appellant, together with the other accused at large, deceived
the complainants into believing that the agency had the power and capability to send
them abroad for employment; that there were available jobs for them in Korea as factory
workers; that by reason or on the strength of such assurance, the complainants parted
with their money in payment of the placement fees; that after receiving the money,
accused-appellant and his co-accused went into hiding by changing their office locations
without informing complainants; and that complainants were never deployed abroad. As
all these representations of the accused-appellant proved false, paragraph 2(a), Article
315 of the Revised Penal Code is thus applicable.
 
 Defense of Denial Cannot
Prevail
 over Positive Identification
 
 
 Indubitably, accused-appellants denial of the
crimes charged crumbles in the face of the positive identification made by Dela Caza
and his co-complainants as one of the perpetrators of the crimes charged. As
enunciated by this Court in People v. Abolidor,[16] [p]ositive identification where
categorical and consistent and not attended by any showing of ill motive on the part of
the eyewitnesses on the matter prevails over alibi and denial.
 
 The defense has
miserably failed to show any evidence of ill motive on the part of the prosecution
witnesses as to falsely testify against him.
 
 Therefore, between the categorical
statements of the prosecution witnesses, on the one hand, and bare denials of the
accused, on the other hand, the former must prevail.[17]
 
 Moreover, this Court accords
the trial courts findings with the probative weight it deserves in the absence of any
compelling reason to discredit the same. It is a fundamental judicial dictum that the
findings of fact of the trial court are not disturbed on appeal except when it overlooked,
misunderstood or misapplied some facts or circumstances of weight and substance that
would have materially affected the outcome of the case. We find that the trial court did
not err in convicting the accused-appellant.
 
 
 WHEREFORE, the appeal is DENIED
for failure to sufficiently show reversible error in the assailed decision. The Decision
dated December 24, 2008 of the CA in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 02764 is
AFFIRMED.
 
 No costs.
 
 SO ORDERED.
 
 PRESBITERO J. VELASCO,
JR.
 Associate Justice
 
 
 WE CONCUR:
 
 
 
 
 RENATO C. CORONA
 Chief
Justice
 Chairperson
 
 
 
 
 TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO MARIANO C.
DEL CASTILLO
 Associate Justice Associate Justice
 
 
 
 
 JOSE PORTUGAL
PEREZ
 Associate Justice
 
 
 
 
 
 C E R T I F I C A T I O N
 
 
 Pursuant to
Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, I certify that the conclusions in the above
Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of
the opinion of the Courts Division.
 
 
 
 
 RENATO C. CORONA
 Chief Justice
 
 [1]
Rollo, pp. 2-19. Penned by Associate Justice Ricardo R. Rosario and concurred in by
Associate Justices Rebecca De Guia-Salvador and Vicente S.E. Veloso.
 [2] Id. at 15-
35. Penned by Judge Lucia Pea Purugganan.
 [3] CA rollo, p. 16.
 [4] Rollo, pp. 5-6.
 [5]
CA rollo, pp. 34-35.
 [6] Rollo, pp. 18-19.
 [7] People v. Alona Buli-e, et al., G.R. No.
123146, June 17, 2003; People v. Spouses Ganaden, et al., G.R. No. 125441,
November 27, 1998.
 [8] People v. Soliven, G.R. No. 125081, October 3, 2001.
 [9] See
Sec. 6, R.A. 8042; See also People v. Buli-e, et al., G.R. No. 123146, June 17,
2003.
 [10] Sec. 6 (m), R.A. 8042.
 [11] People v. Ong, G.R. No. 119594, January 18,
2000.
 [12] TSN, August 12, 2004, pp. 15-23.
 [13] G.R. No. 135382, September 29,
2000, 341 SCRA 451.
 [14] Fortuna v. People, G.R. No. 135784, December 15,
2000.
 [15] People v. Soliven, G.R. No. 125081, October 3, 2001.
 [16] G.R. No.
147231, February 18, 2004, 423 SCRA 260.
 [17] People v. Carizo, G.R. No. 96510,
July 6, 1994, 233 SCRA 687; People v. Miranda, 235 SCRA 202; People v. Bello, G.R.
No. 92597, October 4, 1994, 237 SCRA 347.
Republic of the Philippines
Supreme Court
Manila

SECOND DIVISION

CLAUDIO S. YAP,
Petitioner,

- versus -

THENAMARIS SHIPS MANAGEMENT

and INTERMARE MARITIME AGENCIES, INC.,
Respondents.
G.R. No. 179532
Present:

CARPIO, J.,
Chairperson,
NACHURA,
PERALTA,
ABAD, and
MENDOZA, JJ.
Promulgated:
May 30, 2011
x------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x

DECISION

NACHURA, J.:

Before this Court is a Petition for Review on Certiorari[1] under Rule 45 of the Rules of
Civil Procedure, seeking the reversal of the Court of Appeals (CA) Decision[2] dated
February 28, 2007, which affirmed with modification the National Labor Relations
Commission (NLRC) resolution[3] dated April 20, 2005.

The undisputed facts, as found by the CA, are as follows:

[Petitioner] Claudio S. Yap was employed as electrician of the vessel, M/T SEASCOUT
on 14 August 2001 by Intermare Maritime Agencies, Inc. in behalf of its principal, Vulture
Shipping Limited. The contract of employment entered into by Yap and Capt. Francisco
B. Adviento, the General Manager of Intermare, was for a duration of 12 months. On 23
August 2001, Yap boarded M/T SEASCOUT and commenced his job as electrician.
However, on or about 08 November 2001, the vessel was sold. The Philippine Overseas
Employment Administration (POEA) was informed about the sale on 06 December 2001
in a letter signed by Capt. Adviento. Yap, along with the other crewmembers, was
informed by the Master of their vessel that the same was sold and will be scrapped.
They were also informed about the Advisory sent by Capt. Constatinou, which states,
among others:

PLEASE ASK YR OFFICERS AND RATINGS IF THEY WISH TO BE TRANSFERRED

TO OTHER VESSELS AFTER VESSEL S DELIVERY (GREEK VIA ATHENS-
PHILIPINOS VIA MANILA
FOR CREW NOT WISH TRANSFER TO DECLARE THEIR PROSPECTED TIME FOR
REEMBARKATION IN ORDER TO SCHEDULE THEM ACCLY

Yap received his seniority bonus, vacation bonus, extra bonus along with the scrapping
bonus. However, with respect to the payment of his wage, he refused to accept the
payment of one-month basic wage. He insisted that he was entitled to the payment of
the unexpired portion of his contract since he was illegally dismissed from employment.
He alleged that he opted for immediate transfer but none was made.

[Respondents], for their part, contended that Yap was not illegally dismissed. They
alleged that following the sale of the M/T SEASCOUT, Yap signed off from the vessel on
10 November 2001 and was paid his wages corresponding to the months he worked or
until 10 November 2001 plus his seniority bonus, vacation bonus and extra bonus. They
further alleged that Yaps employment contract was validly terminated due to the sale of
the vessel and no arrangement was made for Yaps transfer to Thenamaris other
vessels.[4]

Thus, Claudio S. Yap (petitioner) filed a complaint for Illegal Dismissal with Damages
and Attorneys Fees before the Labor Arbiter (LA). Petitioner claimed that he was entitled
to the salaries corresponding to the unexpired portion of his contract. Subsequently, he
filed an amended complaint, impleading Captain Francisco Adviento of respondents
Intermare Maritime Agencies, Inc. (Intermare) and Thenamaris Ships Management
(respondents), together with C.J. Martionos, Interseas Trading and Financing
Corporation, and Vulture Shipping Limited/Stejo Shipping Limited.

On July 26, 2004, the LA rendered a decision[5] in favor of petitioner, finding the latter to
have been constructively and illegally dismissed by respondents. Moreover, the LA
found that respondents acted in bad faith when they assured petitioner of re-
embarkation and required him to produce an electrician certificate during the period of
his contract, but actually he was not able to board one despite of respondents numerous
vessels. Petitioner made several follow-ups for his re-embarkation but respondents
failed to heed his plea; thus, petitioner was forced to litigate in order to vindicate his
rights. Lastly, the LA opined that since the unexpired portion of petitioners contract was
less than one year, petitioner was entitled to his salaries for the unexpired portion of his
contract for a period of nine months. The LA disposed, as follows:

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, a decision is hereby rendered declaring

complainant to have been constructively dismissed. Accordingly, respondents Intermare
Maritime Agency Incorporated, Thenamaris Ships Mgt., and Vulture Shipping Limited are
ordered to pay jointly and severally complainant Claudio S. Yap the sum of $12,870.00
or its peso equivalent at the time of payment. In addition, moral damages of ONE
HUNDRED THOUSAND PESOS (P100,000.00) and exemplary damages of FIFTY
THOUSAND PESOS (P50,000.00) are awarded plus ten percent (10%) of the total
award as attorneys fees.

Other money claims are DISMISSED for lack of merit.

SO ORDERED.[6]

Aggrieved, respondents sought recourse from the NLRC.

In its decision[7] dated January 14, 2005, the NLRC affirmed the LAs findings that
petitioner was indeed constructively and illegally dismissed; that respondents bad faith
was evident on their wilful failure to transfer petitioner to another vessel; and that the
award of attorneys fees was warranted. However, the NLRC held that instead of an
award of salaries corresponding to nine months, petitioner was only entitled to salaries
for three months as provided under Section 10[8] of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 8042,[9] as
enunciated in our ruling in Marsaman Manning Agency, Inc. v. National Labor Relations
Commission.[10] Hence, the NLRC ruled in this wise:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the decision of the Labor Arbiter finding the
termination of complainant illegal is hereby AFFIRMED with a MODIFICATION.
Complainant[s] salary for the unexpired portion of his contract should only be limited to
three (3) months basic salary.

Respondents Intermare Maritime Agency, Inc.[,] Vulture Shipping Limited and

Thenamaris Ship Management are hereby ordered to jointly and severally pay
complainant, the following:

1. Three (3) months basic salary US$4,290.00 or its peso equivalent at the time of
actual payment.
2. Moral damages P100,000.00
3. Exemplary damages P50,000.00
4. Attorneys fees equivalent to 10% of the total monetary award.

SO ORDERED.[11]

Respondents filed a Motion for Partial Reconsideration,[12] praying for the reversal and
setting aside of the NLRC decision, and that a new one be rendered dismissing the
complaint. Petitioner, on the other hand, filed his own Motion for Partial
Reconsideration,[13] praying that he be paid the nine (9)-month basic salary, as
awarded by the LA.

On April 20, 2005, a resolution[14] was rendered by the NLRC, affirming the findings of
Illegal Dismissal and respondents failure to transfer petitioner to another vessel.
However, finding merit in petitioners arguments, the NLRC reversed its earlier Decision,
holding that there can be no choice to grant only three (3) months salary for every year
of the unexpired term because there is no full year of unexpired term which this can be
applied. Hence

WHEREFORE, premises considered, complainants Motion for Partial Reconsideration is

hereby granted. The award of three (3) months basic salary in the sum of US$4,290.00
is hereby modified in that complainant is entitled to his salary for the unexpired portion of
employment contract in the sum of US$12,870.00 or its peso equivalent at the time of
actual payment.
All aspect of our January 14, 2005 Decision STANDS.

SO ORDERED.[15]

Respondents filed a Motion for Reconsideration, which the NLRC denied.

Undaunted, respondents filed a petition for certiorari[16] under Rule 65 of the Rules of
Civil Procedure before the CA. On February 28, 2007, the CA affirmed the findings and
ruling of the LA and the NLRC that petitioner was constructively and illegally dismissed.
The CA held that respondents failed to show that the NLRC acted without statutory
authority and that its findings were not supported by law, jurisprudence, and evidence on
record. Likewise, the CA affirmed the lower agencies findings that the advisory of
Captain Constantinou, taken together with the other documents and additional
requirements imposed on petitioner, only meant that the latter should have been re-
embarked. In the same token, the CA upheld the lower agencies unanimous finding of
bad faith, warranting the imposition of moral and exemplary damages and attorneys
fees. However, the CA ruled that the NLRC erred in sustaining the LAs interpretation of
Section 10 of R.A. No. 8042. In this regard, the CA relied on the clause or for three
months for every year of the unexpired term, whichever is less provided in the 5th
paragraph of Section 10 of R.A. No. 8042 and held:

In the present case, the employment contract concerned has a term of one year or 12
months which commenced on August 14, 2001. However, it was preterminated without a
valid cause. [Petitioner] was paid his wages for the corresponding months he worked
until the 10th of November. Pursuant to the provisions of Sec. 10, [R.A. No.] 8042,
therefore, the option of three months for every year of the unexpired term is
applicable.[17]

Thus, the CA provided, to wit:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, this Petition for Certiorari is DENIED. The

Decision dated January 14, 2005, and Resolutions, dated April 20, 2005 and July 29,
2005, respectively, of public respondent National Labor Relations Commission-Fourth
Division, Cebu City, in NLRC No. V-000038-04 (RAB VIII (OFW)-04-01-0006) are hereby
AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION that private respondent is entitled to three (3)
months of basic salary computed at US$4,290.00 or its peso equivalent at the time of
actual payment.

Costs against Petitioners.[18]

Both parties filed their respective motions for reconsideration, which the CA, however,
denied in its Resolution[19] dated August 30, 2007.
Unyielding, petitioner filed this petition, raising the following issues:

1) Whether or not Section 10 of R.A. [No.] 8042, to the extent that it affords an
illegally dismissed migrant worker the lesser benefit of salaries for [the] unexpired
portion of his employment contract or for three (3) months for every year of the
unexpired term, whichever is less is constitutional; and

2) Assuming that it is, whether or not the Court of Appeals gravely erred in
granting petitioner only three (3) months backwages when his unexpired term of 9
months is far short of the every year of the unexpired term threshold.[20]

In the meantime, while this case was pending before this Court, we declared as
unconstitutional the clause or for three months for every year of the unexpired term,
whichever is less provided in the 5th paragraph of Section 10 of R.A. No. 8042 in the
case of Serrano v. Gallant Maritime Services, Inc.[21] on March 24, 2009.

Apparently, unaware of our ruling in Serrano, petitioner claims that the 5th paragraph of
Section 10, R.A. No. 8042, is violative of Section 1,[22] Article III and Section 3,[23]
Article XIII of the Constitution to the extent that it gives an erring employer the option to
pay an illegally dismissed migrant worker only three months for every year of the
unexpired term of his contract; that said provision of law has long been a source of
abuse by callous employers against migrant workers; and that said provision violates the
equal protection clause under the Constitution because, while illegally dismissed local
workers are guaranteed under the Labor Code of reinstatement with full backwages
computed from the time compensation was withheld from them up to their actual
reinstatement, migrant workers, by virtue of Section 10 of R.A. No. 8042, have to waive
nine months of their collectible backwages every time they have a year of unexpired
term of contract to reckon with. Finally, petitioner posits that, assuming said provision of
law is constitutional, the CA gravely abused its discretion when it reduced petitioners
backwages from nine months to three months as his nine-month unexpired term cannot
accommodate the lesser relief of three months for every year of the unexpired term.[24]

On the other hand, respondents, aware of our ruling in Serrano, aver that our
pronouncement of unconstitutionality of the clause or for three months for every year of
the unexpired term, whichever is less provided in the 5th paragraph of Section 10 of R.A.
No. 8042 in Serrano should not apply in this case because Section 10 of R.A. No. 8042
is a substantive law that deals with the rights and obligations of the parties in case of
Illegal Dismissal of a migrant worker and is not merely procedural in character. Thus,
pursuant to the Civil Code, there should be no retroactive application of the law in this
case. Moreover, respondents asseverate that petitioners tanker allowance of US$130.00
should not be included in the computation of the award as petitioners basic salary, as
provided under his contract, was only US$1,300.00. Respondents submit that the CA
erred in its computation since it included the said tanker allowance. Respondents opine
that petitioner should be entitled only to US$3,900.00 and not to US$4,290.00, as
granted by the CA. Invoking Serrano, respondents claim that the tanker allowance
should be excluded from the definition of the term salary. Also, respondents manifest
that the full sum of P878,914.47 in Intermares bank account was garnished and
subsequently withdrawn and deposited with the NLRC Cashier of Tacloban City on
February 14, 2007. On February 16, 2007, while this case was pending before the CA,
the LA issued an Order releasing the amount of P781,870.03 to petitioner as his award,
together with the sum of P86,744.44 to petitioners former lawyer as attorneys fees, and
the amount of P3,570.00 as execution and deposit fees. Thus, respondents pray that the
instant petition be denied and that petitioner be directed to return to Intermare the sum of
US$8,970.00 or its peso equivalent.[25]

On this note, petitioner counters that this new issue as to the inclusion of the tanker
allowance in the computation of the award was not raised by respondents before the LA,
the NLRC and the CA, nor was it raised in respondents pleadings other than in their
Memorandum before this Court, which should not be allowed under the
circumstances.[26]
The petition is impressed with merit.

Prefatorily, it bears emphasis that the unanimous finding of the LA, the NLRC and the
CA that the dismissal of petitioner was illegal is not disputed. Likewise not disputed is
the tribunals unanimous finding of bad faith on the part of respondents, thus, warranting
the award of moral and exemplary damages and attorneys fees. What remains in issue,
therefore, is the constitutionality of the 5th paragraph of Section 10 of R.A. No. 8042
and, necessarily, the proper computation of the lump-sum salary to be awarded to
petitioner by reason of his illegal dismissal.

Verily, we have already declared in Serrano that the clause or for three months for every
year of the unexpired term, whichever is less provided in the 5th paragraph of Section 10
of R.A. No. 8042 is unconstitutional for being violative of the rights of Overseas Filipino
Workers (OFWs) to equal protection of the laws. In an exhaustive discussion of the
intricacies and ramifications of the said clause, this Court, in Serrano, pertinently held:

The Court concludes that the subject clause contains a suspect classification in that, in
the computation of the monetary benefits of fixed-term employees who are illegally
discharged, it imposes a 3-month cap on the claim of OFWs with an unexpired portion of
one year or more in their contracts, but none on the claims of other OFWs or local
workers with fixed-term employment. The subject clause singles out one classification of
OFWs and burdens it with a peculiar disadvantage.[27]

Moreover, this Court held therein that the subject clause does not state or imply any
definitive governmental purpose; hence, the same violates not just therein petitioners
right to equal protection, but also his right to substantive due process under Section 1,
Article III of the Constitution.[28] Consequently, petitioner therein was accorded his
salaries for the entire unexpired period of nine months and 23 days of his employment
contract, pursuant to law and jurisprudence prior to the enactment of R.A. No. 8042.

We have already spoken. Thus, this case should not be different from Serrano.

As a general rule, an unconstitutional act is not a law; it confers no rights; it imposes no

duties; it affords no protection; it creates no office; it is inoperative as if it has not been
passed at all. The general rule is supported by Article 7 of the Civil Code, which
provides:

Art. 7. Laws are repealed only by subsequent ones, and their violation or non-
observance shall not be excused by disuse or custom or practice to the contrary.

The doctrine of operative fact serves as an exception to the aforementioned general

rule. In Planters Products, Inc. v. Fertiphil Corporation,[29] we held:

The doctrine of operative fact, as an exception to the general rule, only applies as a
matter of equity and fair play. It nullifies the effects of an unconstitutional law by
recognizing that the existence of a statute prior to a determination of unconstitutionality
is an operative fact and may have consequences which cannot always be ignored. The
past cannot always be erased by a new judicial declaration.
The doctrine is applicable when a declaration of unconstitutionality will impose an undue
burden on those who have relied on the invalid law. Thus, it was applied to a criminal
case when a declaration of unconstitutionality would put the accused in double jeopardy
or would put in limbo the acts done by a municipality in reliance upon a law creating
it.[30]

Following Serrano, we hold that this case should not be included in the aforementioned
exception. After all, it was not the fault of petitioner that he lost his job due to an act of
illegal dismissal committed by respondents. To rule otherwise would be iniquitous to
petitioner and other OFWs, and would, in effect, send a wrong signal that
principals/employers and recruitment/manning agencies may violate an OFWs security
of tenure which an employment contract embodies and actually profit from such violation
based on an unconstitutional provision of law.

In the same vein, we cannot subscribe to respondents postulation that the tanker
allowance of US$130.00 should not be included in the computation of the lump-sum
salary to be awarded to petitioner.

First. It is only at this late stage, more particularly in their Memorandum, that
respondents are raising this issue. It was not raised before the LA, the NLRC, and the
CA. They did not even assail the award accorded by the CA, which computed the lump-
sum salary of petitioner at the basic salary of US$1,430.00, and which clearly included
the US$130.00 tanker allowance. Hence, fair play, justice, and due process dictate that
this Court cannot now, for the first time on appeal, pass upon this question. Matters not
taken up below cannot be raised for the first time on appeal. They must be raised
seasonably in the proceedings before the lower tribunals. Questions raised on appeal
must be within the issues framed by the parties; consequently, issues not raised before
the lower tribunals cannot be raised for the first time on appeal.[31]

Second. Respondents invocation of Serrano is unavailing. Indeed, we made the

following pronouncements in Serrano, to wit:

The word salaries in Section 10(5) does not include overtime and leave pay. For
seafarers like petitioner, DOLE Department Order No. 33, series 1996, provides a
Standard Employment Contract of Seafarers, in which salary is understood as the basic
wage, exclusive of overtime, leave pay and other bonuses; whereas overtime pay is
compensation for all work performed in excess of the regular eight hours, and holiday
pay is compensation for any work performed on designated rest days and holidays.[32]

A close perusal of the contract reveals that the tanker allowance of US$130.00 was not
categorized as a bonus but was rather encapsulated in the basic salary clause, hence,
forming part of the basic salary of petitioner. Respondents themselves in their petition for
certiorari before the CA averred that petitioners basic salary, pursuant to the contract,
was US$1,300.00 + US$130.00 tanker allowance.[33] If respondents intended it
differently, the contract per se should have indicated that said allowance does not form
part of the basic salary or, simply, the contract should have separated it from the basic
salary clause.

A final note.

We ought to be reminded of the plight and sacrifices of our OFWs. In Olarte v.

Nayona,[34] this Court held that:

Our overseas workers belong to a disadvantaged class. Most of them come from the
poorest sector of our society. Their profile shows they live in suffocating slums, trapped
in an environment of crimes. Hardly literate and in ill health, their only hope lies in jobs
they find with difficulty in our country. Their unfortunate circumstance makes them easy
prey to avaricious employers. They will climb mountains, cross the seas, endure slave
treatment in foreign lands just to survive. Out of despondence, they will work under sub-
human conditions and accept salaries below the minimum. The least we can do is to
protect them with our laws.

WHEREFORE, the Petition is GRANTED. The Court of Appeals Decision dated

February 28, 2007 and Resolution dated August 30, 2007 are hereby MODIFIED to the
effect that petitioner is AWARDED his salaries for the entire unexpired portion of his
employment contract consisting of nine months computed at the rate of US$1,430.00 per
month. All other awards are hereby AFFIRMED. No costs.

SO ORDERED.

ANTONIO EDUARDO B. NACHURA

Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice
Chairperson

DIOSDADO M. PERALTA
Associate Justice
ROBERTO A. ABAD
Associate Justice

JOSE CATRAL MENDOZA

Associate Justice

ATTESTATION

I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation
before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Courts Division.

ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice
Chairperson, Second Division
CERTIFICATION

Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution and the Division Chairperson's
Attestation, I certify that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in
consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Courts
Division.

RENATO C. CORONA
Chief Justice

[1] Rollo, pp. 33-56.

[2] Penned by Associate Justice Antonio L. Villamor, with Associate Justices Pampio A.
Abarintos and Stephen C. Cruz, concurring; id. at 60-73.
[3] Id. at 166-170.
[4] Supra note 2, at 63-65.
[5] Rollo, pp. 121-129.
[6] Id. at 129.
[7] Id. at 130-149.
[8] The last clause in the 5th paragraph of Section 10, R.A. No. 8042, provides to wit:
Sec. 10. MONEY CLAIMS. x x x.
In case of termination of overseas employment without just, valid or authorized cause as
defined by law or contract, the workers shall be entitled to the full reimbursement of his
placement fee with interest of twelve percent (12%) per annum, plus his salaries for the
unexpired portion of his employment contract or for three (3) months for every year of
the unexpired term, whichever is less. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied.)
[9] The Migrant Workers and Overseas Filipinos Act of 1995, effective July 15, 1995.
[10] 371 Phil. 827 (1999).
[11] Supra note 7, at 148-149.
[12] Rollo, pp. 157-163.
[13] Id. at 150-156.
[14] Id. at 166-170.
[15] Id. at 170.
[16] Id. at 171-196.
[17] Supra note 2, at 70.
[18] Id. at 72-73.
[19] Rollo, pp. 96-99.
[20] Supra note 1, at 44-45.
[21] G.R. No. 167614, March 24, 2009, 582 SCRA 254.
[22] Section 1, Article III of the Constitution provides:
 Section 1. No person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of
law, nor shall any person be denied the equal protection of the laws.
[23] Section 3, Article XIII of the Constitution pertinently provides:
Sec. 3. The State shall afford full protection to labor, local and overseas, organized and
unorganized, and promote full employment and equality of employment opportunities for
all.
[24] Rollo, pp. 312-331.
[25] Id. at 290-303.
[26] Supra note 24.
[27] Supra note 21, at 295.
[28] Id. at 303.
[29] G.R. No. 166006, March 14, 2008, 548 SCRA 485.
[30] Id. at 516-517. (Citations omitted.)
[31] Ayson v. Vda. De Carpio, 476 Phil. 525, 535 (2004).
[32] Supra note 21, at 303. (Emphasis supplied.)
[33] Supra note 16, at 173.
[34] 461 Phil. 429, 431 (2003)


FIRST DIVISION

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, G.R. No. 167639

represented by the ADMINISTRATOR
OF THE PHILIPPINE OVERSEAS
EMPLOYMENT ADMINISTRATION
(POEA),
Petitioner, Present:
Panganiban, C.J. (Chairperson),
- versus - Ynares-Santiago,
Austria-Martinez,
Callejo, Sr., and
Chico-Nazario, JJ.
PRINCIPALIA MANAGEMENT AND
PERSONNEL CONSULTANTS, Promulgated:
INCORPORATED,
Respondent. April 19, 2006

x ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- x

DECISION
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:

Petitioner assails the September 20, 2004 Resolution[1] of the Court of Appeals in CA-
G.R. SP No. 86170, dismissing outright the petition for certiorari for failure to attach
copies of all relevant pleadings and transcripts of the hearings, as well as the March 29,
2005 Resolution[2] denying the motion for reconsideration.

This case stemmed from two separate complaints filed before the Philippine Overseas
Employment Administration (POEA) against Principalia Management and Personnel
Consultants, Incorporated (Principalia) for violation of the 2002 POEA Rules and
Regulations. The first complaint dated July 16, 2003 filed by Ruth Yasmin Concha
(Concha) was docketed as POEA Case No. RV 03-07-1497. The second complaint
dated October 14, 2003 filed by Rafael E. Baldoza (Baldoza) was docketed as POEA
Case No. RV 03-07-1453.

In the first complaint, Concha alleged that in August 2002, she applied with Principalia
for placement and employment as caregiver or physical therapist in the USA or Canada.
Despite paying P20,000.00 out of the P150,000.00 fee required by Principalia which was
not properly receipted, Principalia failed to deploy Concha for employment abroad.[3]

In its March 15, 2004 Order,[4] the Adjudication Office of the POEA found Principalia
liable for violations of the 2002 POEA Rules and Regulations, particularly for collecting a
fee from the applicant before employment was obtained; for non-issuance of official
receipt; and for misrepresenting that it was able to secure employment for Concha. For
these infractions, Principalias license was ordered suspended for 12 months or in lieu
thereof, Pricipalia is ordered to pay a fine of P120,000.00 and to refund Conchas
placement fee of P20,000.00.

Baldoza initiated the second complaint on October 14, 2003[5] alleging that Principalia
assured him of employment in Doha, Qatar as a machine operator with a monthly salary
of $450.00. After paying P20,000.00 as placement fee, he departed for Doha, Qatar on
May 31, 2003 but when he arrived at the jobsite, he was made to work as welder, a job
which he had no skills. He insisted that he was hired as machine operator but the
alternative position offered to him was that of helper, which he refused. Thus, he was
repatriated on July 5, 2003.

On November 12, 2003, Baldoza and Principalia entered into a compromise agreement
with quitclaim and release whereby the latter agreed to redeploy Baldoza for
employment abroad. Principalia, however, failed to deploy Baldoza as agreed hence, in
an Order dated April 29, 2004,[6] the POEA suspended Principalias documentary
processing.
Principalia moved for reconsideration which the POEA granted on June 25, 2004.[7] The
latter lifted its order suspending the documentary processing by Principalia after noting
that it exerted efforts to obtain overseas employment for Baldoza within the period
stipulated in the settlement agreement but due to Baldozas lack of qualification, his
application was declined by its foreign principal.

Meanwhile, on June 14, 2004, or before the promulgation of POEAs order lifting the
suspension, Principalia filed a Complaint[8] (Complaint) against Rosalinda D. Baldoz in
her capacity as Administrator of POEA and Atty. Jovencio R. Abara in his capacity as
POEA Conciliator, before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Mandaluyong City for
Annulment of Order for Suspension of Documentation Processing with Damages and
Application for Issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order and/or Writ of Preliminary
Injunction, and a Writ of Preliminary Mandatory Injunction. Principalia claimed that the
suspension of its documentary processing would ruin its reputation and goodwill and
would cause the loss of its applicants, employers and principals. Thus, a writ of
preliminary injunction and a writ of mandatory injunction must be issued to prevent
serious and irreparable damage to it.

On June 14, 2004,[9] Judge Paulita B. Acosta-Villarante of the RTC of Mandaluyong

City, Branch 211, granted a 72-hour restraining order enjoining Administrator Baldoz and
Atty. Abara to refrain from imposing the suspension orders before the matter can be
heard in full. On June 17, 2004,[10] Judge Rizalina T. Capco-Umali, RTC of
Mandaluyong City, Branch 212, held thus:

WHEREFORE, in order to preserve status quo ANTE, the prayer for a Temporary
Restraining Order is hereby GRANTED enjoining the defendant[s] ROSALINDA D.
BALDOZ and ATTY. JOVENCIO ABARA, other officers of Philippine Overseas
Employment Administration, their subordinates, agents, representatives and all other
persons acting for and in their behalf, for (sic) implementing the Orders of Suspension
under VC No. LRD 03-100-95 and POEA Case No. RV-03-07-1497.

Let the hearing on Preliminary Injunction and Preliminary Mandatory Injunction be set on
June 22, 2004 at 1:30 oclock in the afternoon.

SO ORDERED.[11]

After the hearing on the preliminary injunction, Administrator Baldoz and Atty. Abara
submitted their Memorandum (Memorandum).[12] In an Order dated July 2, 2004,[13]
the trial court held that the issue on the application for preliminary mandatory injunction
has become moot because POEA had already released the renewal of license of
Principalia. However, on the issue against the implementation of the order of
suspension, the trial court resolved, to wit:
Accordingly, the only issue left for the resolution of this Court is whether or not a Writ of
Preliminary Prohibitory Injunction will lie against the immediate implementation of the
Order of Suspension of License of the Plaintiff dated March 15, 2004 under POEA case
No. RV-03-07-1497, issued by the POEA Administrator Rosalinda D. Baldoz.

In support of its Application for a Writ of Preliminary Prohibitory Injunction, Plaintiff

presented evidence to prove the following:

(1) that it has a license,

(2) that the said license was renewed,
(3) the existence of the two (2) suspension orders subject of this case;
(4) the irreparable damages to the Plaintiff.

The defendants on the other hand did not present evidence to controvert the evidence of
the plaintiff. Instead, defendants submitted a Memorandum.

Upon a careful evaluation and assessment of the evidence by the plaintiff and their
respective memoranda of the parties, this Court finds the need to issue the Writ of
Preliminary Prohibitory Injunction prayed for by the plaintiff.

It bears stressing that the Order of Suspension dated March 15, 2004 is still pending
appeal before the Office of the Secretary of Labor and Employment.

It is likewise significant to point out that the said Order dated March 15, 2004 does not
categorically state that the suspension of Plaintiffs License is immediately executory
contrary to the contention of the defendants.

Counsel for POEA argued that the basis for the immediate implementation thereof is
Section 5, Rule V, Part VI of the 2002 POEA Rules and Regulation, which is quoted
hereunder, as follows:

Section 5. Stay of Execution. The decision of the Administration shall be stayed during
the pendency of the appeal; Provided that where the penalty imposed carried the
maximum penalty of twelve (12) months suspension o[r] cancellation of license, the
decision shall be immediately executory despite pendency of the appeal.

The Order dated March 15, 2004 decreed Plaintiff as having violated Section 2 (a) (d)
and (e) of Rule I, Part VI of the POEA Rules and Regulations and the Plaintiffs was
imposed the penalty of twelve (12) months suspension of license (or in lieu, to pay fine
of P120,000, it being it[s] first offense).

Violation of Section 2 (a) (d) and (e) Rule I, Part VI of POEA Rules and Regulations
imposes a penalty of two (2) months to six (6) months suspension of license for the
FIRST offender (sic). And in the absence of mitigating or aggravating circumstance, the
medium range of the imposable penalty which is four (4) months shall be meted out.
Being a first offender, the plaintiff was imposed suspension of license for four (4) months
for each violation or an aggregate period of suspension for twelve (12) months for the
three (3) violations.

It was not however made clear in the Order of Suspension dated March 15, 2004 that
the Plaintiffs case falls under the EXCEPTION under Section 5 Rule V, Part VI of the
2002 POEA Rules and Regulation, warranting the immediate implementation thereof
even if an appeal is pending with the POEA.

The Plaintiff had established that even if it has been granted a renewal license, but if the
same is suspended under the March 15, 2004 Order in POEA case No. RV-03-07-1497,
it could not use the license to do business. As earlier mentioned, the said Order is still
pending appeal.

In the meantime that the appeal has not been resolved, Plaintiffs clients/principals will
have to look for other agencies here and abroad, to supply their needs for employees
and workers. The end result would be a tremendous loss and even closure of its
business. More importantly, Plaintiffs reputation would be tarnished and it would be
difficult, if not impossible for it to regain its existing clientele if the immediate
implementation of the suspension of its license continues.

The defendants and even the POEA, upon the other hand, will not suffer any damage, if
the immediate implementation of the suspension of plaintiffs license as decreed in the
March 15, 2004 Order, is enjoined.

WHEREFORE, as prayed for by the Plaintiff, the application for the issuance of the Writ
of Preliminary Prohibitory Injunction is hereby GRANTED, upon posting of a bond in the
amount of FIVE HUNDRED THOUSAND PESOS (Php 500,000.00), enjoining and
restraining the Defendants ROSALINDA D. BALDOZ and Atty. Jovencio Abarra (sic),
other officers of the POEA, their subordinates, agents, representative, and all other
persons acting for and in their behalf, from immediately implementing the Order of
Suspension dated March 15, 2004 under POEA Case No. RV-03-07-1497.

The Writ of Preliminary Prohibitory Injunction shall be in full force and effect immediately
upon receipt thereof and to be carried out on subsequent days thereafter pending the
termination of this case and/or unless a contrary Order is issued by this court.[14]
(Emphasis supplied)

The trial court stressed that it issued the injunctive writ because the order of suspension
dated March 15, 2004 is still pending appeal before the Office of the Secretary of Labor
and Employment; that there is a possibility that Principalia will suffer tremendous losses
and even closure of business pending appeal; that POEA will not suffer any damage if
the immediate implementation of the suspension of Principalia is enjoined; that the order
does not categorically state that the suspension of the license is immediately executory.

POEA appealed to the Court of Appeals which was dismissed[15] outright for failure of
POEA to attach copies of its Memorandum dated June 30, 2004, as well as the
transcripts of the hearings conducted on June 22, 2004 and June 29, 2004 as required
under Section 3 of Rule 46 of the Rules of Court. POEAs motion for reconsideration was
denied[16] hence, this petition on the following grounds:

I
SECTION 1, RULE 65 OF THE REVISED RULES OF COURT REQUIRES ONLY THAT
THE PETITION SHOULD BE ACCOMPANIED BY CERTIFIED TRUE COPIES OF THE
JUDGMENT, ORDER OR RESOLUTION SUBJECT THEREOF AND OTHER
DOCUMENTS RELEVANT AND PERTINENT THERETO. PETITIONER ATTACHED
ALL THE DOCUMENTS PERTINENT TO THE PETITION FILED WITH THE COURT
OF APPEALS.

II
THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ABUSED ITS DISCRETION WHEN IT
GRANTED RESPONDENT PRICIPALIAS APPLICATION FOR A WRIT OF
PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION DESPITE THE ABSENCE OF A CLEAR AND
CONVINCING RIGHT TO THE RELIEF DEMANDED.

III
THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION
WHEN IT GRANTED RESPONDENT PRINCIPALIAS APPLICATION DESPITE THE
ABSENCE OF PROOF OF IRREPARABLE DAMAGE AS REQUIRED UNDER THE
RULES OF COURT.

IV
THE INJUNCTIVE WRIT ISSUED BY THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT DOES NOT LIE
TO ENJOIN AN ACCOMPLISHED ACT.

V
THE ISSUANCE OF AN INJUNCTIVE WRIT BY THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT IS
TANTAMOUNT TO THE REVERSAL OF THE PRESUMPTION OF REGULARITY OF
AN OFFICIAL ACT.[17]

The core issues for resolution are as follows: (1) whether the Court of Appeals erred in
dismissing the Petition for Certiorari based on purely technical grounds; and (2) whether
the trial court erred in issuing the writ of preliminary injunction.
POEA avers that the Court of Appeals Resolution dismissing outright the petition for
certiorari is not valid because the documents attached to the petition substantially
informed the Court of Appeals that the trial court gravely abused its discretion in granting
the preliminary injunction. Thus, the attached documents were sufficient to render an
independent assessment of its improvident issuance.

We disagree.

The Court of Appeals dismissed the petition for certiorari due to POEAs failure to comply
with Section 3, Rule 46 and Section 1, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court which read as
follows:

RULE 46

SEC. 3. Contents and filing of petition; effect of non-compliance with requirements. -

The petition shall contain the full names and actual addresses of all the petitioners and
respondents, a concise statement of the matters involved, the factual background of the
case, and the grounds relied upon for the relief prayed for.

In actions filed under Rule 65, the petition shall further indicate the material dates
showing when notice of the judgment or final order or resolution subject thereof was
received, when a motion for new trial or reconsideration, if any, was filed and when
notice of the denial thereof was received.

It shall be filed in seven (7) clearly legible copies together with proof of service thereof
on the respondent with the original copy intended for the court indicated as such by the
petitioner, and shall be accompanied by a clearly legible duplicate original or certified
true copy of the judgment, order, resolution, or ruling subject thereof, such material
portions of the record as are referred to therein, and other documents relevant or
pertinent thereto. The certification shall be accomplished by the proper clerk of court or
by his duly authorized representative, or by the proper officer of the court, tribunal,
agency or office involved or by his duly authorized representative. The other requisite
number of copies of the petition shall be accompanied by clearly legible plain copies of
all documents attached to the original.

xxxx

The failure of the petitioner to comply with any of the foregoing requirements shall be
sufficient ground for the dismissal of the petition. (Emphasis supplied)

RULE 65

SECTION. 1. Petition for certiorari. When any tribunal, board or officer exercising judicial
or quasi-judicial functions has acted without or in excess of its or his jurisdiction, or with
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, and there is no
appeal, nor any plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law, a
person aggrieved thereby may file a verified petition in the proper court, alleging the
facts with certainty and praying that judgment be rendered annulling or modifying the
proceedings of such tribunal, board or officer, and granting such incidental reliefs as law
and justice may require.

The petition shall be accompanied by a certified true copy of the judgment, order or
resolution subject thereof, copies of all pleadings and documents relevant and pertinent
thereto, and a sworn certification of non-forum shopping as provided in the third
paragraph of Section 3, Rule 46.

In the case at bar, the Court of Appeals dismissed the petition for certiorari due to
POEAs failure to attach the following relevant documents: (1) the Memorandum filed by
POEA in the trial court to oppose the Complaint; and (2) the transcripts of stenographic
notes (TSN) of the hearings conducted by the trial court on June 22, 2004 and June 29,
2004. In its motion for reconsideration dated October 13, 2004,[18] POEA only attached
the TSN dated June 30, 2004,[19] with the explanation that the trial court did not furnish
it with copies of the other hearings. However, we note that POEA still failed to attach a
copy of the Memorandum which the Court of Appeals deemed essential in its
determination of the propriety of the trial courts issuance of the writ of preliminary
prohibitory injunction.

The allowance of the petition on the ground of substantial compliance with the Rules is
not a novel occurrence in our jurisdiction.[20] Indeed, if we apply the Rules strictly, we
cannot fault the Court of Appeals for dismissing the petition[21] because the POEA did
not demonstrate willingness to comply with the requirements set by the rules and to
submit the necessary documents which the Court of Appeals need to have a proper
perspective of the case.

POEA avers that the trial court gravely abused its discretion in granting the writ of
preliminary prohibitory injunction when the requirements to issue the same have not
been met. It asserts that Principalia had no clear and convincing right to the relief
demanded as it had no proof of irreparable damage as required under the Rules of
Court.

We do not agree.

The trial court did not decree that the POEA, as the granting authority of Principalias
license to recruit, is not allowed to determine Principalias compliance with the conditions
for the grant, as POEA would have us believe. For all intents and purposes, POEA can
determine whether the licensee has complied with the requirements. In this instance, the
trial court observed that the Order of Suspension dated March 15, 2004 was pending
appeal with the Secretary of the Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE). Thus,
until such time that the appeal is resolved with finality by the DOLE, Principalia has a
clear and convincing right to operate as a recruitment agency.

Furthermore, irreparable damage was duly proven by Principalia. Suspension of its

license is not easily quantifiable nor is it susceptible to simple mathematical
computation, as alleged by POEA. The trial court in its Order stated, thus:

In the meantime that the appeal has not been resolved, Plaintiffs clients/principals will
have to look for other agencies here and abroad, to supply their needs for employees
and workers. The end result would be a tremendous loss and even closure of its
business. More importantly, Plaintiffs reputation would be tarnished and it would be
difficult, if not impossible for it to regain its existing clientele if the immediate
implementation of the suspension of its license continues.[22]

If the injunctive writ was not granted, Principalia would have been labeled as an
untrustworthy recruitment agency before there could be any final adjudication of its case
by the DOLE. It would have lost both its employer-clients and its prospective Filipino-
applicants. Loss of the former due to a tarnished reputation is not quantifiable.

Moreover, POEA would have no authority to exercise its regulatory functions over
Principalia because the matter had already been brought to the jurisdiction of the DOLE.
Principalia has been granted the license to recruit and process documents for Filipinos
interested to work abroad. Thus, POEAs action of suspending Principalias license before
final adjudication by the DOLE would be premature and would amount to a violation of
the latters right to recruit and deploy workers.

Finally, the presumption of regular performance of duty by the POEA under Section 3
(m), Rule 131 of the Rules of Court, finds no application in the case at bar, as it applies
only where a duty is imposed on an official to act in a certain way, and assumes that the
law tells him what his duties are. Therefore the presumption that an officer will discharge
his duties according to law does not apply where his duties are not specified by law and
he is given unlimited discretion.[23] The issue threshed out before the trial court was
whether the order of suspension should be implemented pending appeal. It did not
correct a ministerial duty of the POEA. As such, the presumption on the regularity of
performance of duty does not apply.

WHEREFORE, in light of the foregoing, the petition is DENIED for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.

CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:

ARTEMIO V. PANGANIBAN
Chief Justice
Chairperson

MA. ALICIA AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ ROMEO J. CALLEJO, SR.

Associate Justice Associate Justice

MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIO
Associate Justice

CERTIFICATION

Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, it is hereby certified that the
conclusions in the above Decision were reached in consultation before the case was
assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Courts Division.

ARTEMIO V. PANGANIBAN
Chief Justice

[1] Rollo, pp. 43-44. Penned by Associate Justice Hakim S. Abdulwahid and concurred
in by Associate Justices Cancio C. Garcia (now a Supreme Court Justice) and
Remedios A. Salazar-Fernando.
[2] Id. at 45-46. Penned by Associate Justice Hakim S. Abdulwahid and concurred in by
Associate Justices Remedios A. Salazar-Fernando and Rosalinda Asuncion-Vicente.
 [3] Id. at 105-106.
[4] Id. at 110-113.
[5] Id. at 107-108.
[6] Id. at 131.
[7] Id. at 132.
[8] Id. at 133-154.
[9] Id. at 155.
[10] Id. at 156-160.
[11] Id. at 159.
[12] Id. at 161-177.
[13] Id. at 185-188.
[14] Id. at 185-187.
[15] Id. at 43-44.
[16] Id. at 45-46.
[17] Id. at 24-25.
[18] Id. at 69-73.
[19] Id. at 74-104.
[20] Reyes v. Court of Appeals, 456 Phil. 520, 532 (2003).
[21] Security Bank Corporation v. Indiana Aerospace University, G.R. No. 146197, June
27, 2005, 461 SCRA 260, 268.
[22] Rollo, p. 187.
 [23] R. Francisco, Basic Evidence, 39 (2nd ed., 1999).

Today is Thursday, January 14, 2016

search

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

FIRST DIVISION

G.R. No. 156029 November 14, 2008

SANTOSA B. DATUMAN, petitioner,

vs.
FIRST COSMOPOLITAN MANPOWER AND PROMOTION SERVICES, INC.,
respondent.

DECISION

LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.:

Before us is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure, as amended, assailing the Court of Appeals (CA) Decision1 dated August 7,
2002, in CA-G.R. SP No. 59825, setting aside the Decision of the National Labor
Relations Commission (NLRC).

The facts are as follows:

Sometime in 1989, respondent First Cosmopolitan Manpower & Promotion Services, Inc.
recruited petitioner Santosa B. Datuman to work abroad under the following terms and
conditions:

Site of employment

Bahrain

Employees Classification/Position/Grade

Saleslady

Basic Monthly Salary

US$370.00

Duration of Contract

One (1) year

Foreign Employer

Mohammed Sharif Abbas Ghulam Hussain2

On April 17, 1989, petitioner was deployed to Bahrain after paying the required
placement fee. However, her employer Mohammed Hussain took her passport when she
arrived there; and instead of working as a saleslady, she was forced to work as a
domestic helper with a salary of Forty Bahrain Dinar (BD40.00), equivalent only to One
Hundred US Dollars (US$100.00). This was contrary to the agreed salary of US$370.00
indicated in her Contract of Employment signed in the Philippines and approved by the
Philippine Overseas Employment Administration (POEA).3

On September 1, 1989, her employer compelled her to sign another contract,

transferring her to another employer as housemaid with a salary of BD40.00 for the
duration of two (2) years.4 She pleaded with him to give her a release paper and to
return her passport but her pleas were unheeded. Left with no choice, she continued
working against her will. Worse, she even worked without compensation from
September 1991 to April 1993 because of her employer's continued failure and refusal to
pay her salary despite demand. In May 1993, she was able to finally return to the
Philippines through the help of the Bahrain Passport and Immigration Department.5

In May 1995, petitioner filed a complaint before the POEA Adjudication Office against
respondent for underpayment and nonpayment of salary, vacation leave pay and refund
of her plane fare, docketed as Case No. POEA ADJ. (L) 95-05-1586.6 While the case
was pending, she filed the instant case before the NLRC for underpayment of salary for
a period of one year and six months, nonpayment of vacation pay and reimbursement of
return airfare.

When the parties failed to arrive at an amicable settlement before the Labor Arbiter, they
were required to file their respective position papers, subsequent pleadings and
documentary exhibits.

In its Position Paper,7 respondent countered that petitioner actually agreed to work in
Bahrain as a housemaid for one (1) year because it was the only position available then.
However, since such position was not yet allowed by the POEA at that time, they
mutually agreed to submit the contract to the POEA indicating petitioner's position as
saleslady. Respondent added that it was actually petitioner herself who violated the
terms of their contract when she allegedly transferred to another employer without
respondent's knowledge and approval. Lastly, respondent raised the defense of
prescription of cause of action since the claim was filed beyond the three (3)-year period
from the time the right accrued, reckoned from either 1990 or 1991.8

On April 29, 1998, Labor Arbiter Jovencio Mayor, Jr. rendered a Decision finding
respondent liable for violating the terms of the Employment Contract and ordering it to
pay petitioner: (a) the amount of US$4,050.00, or its equivalent rate prevailing at the
time of payment, representing her salary differentials for fifteen (15) months; and, (b) the
amount of BD 180.00 or its equivalent rate prevailing at the time of payment,
representing the refund of plane ticket, thus:

From the foregoing factual backdrop, the only crucial issue for us to resolve in this case
is whether or not complainant is entitled to her monetary claims.
xxx

In the instant case, from the facts and circumstances laid down, it is thus self-evident
that the relationship of the complainant and respondent agency is governed by the
Contract of Employment, the basic terms a covenants of which provided for the position
of saleslady, monthly compensation of US$370.00 and duration of contract for one (1)
year. As it is, when the parties - complainant and respondent Agency - signed and
executed the POEA - approved Contract of Employment, this agreement is the law that
governs them. Thus, when respondent agency deviated from the terms of the contract
by assigning the position of a housemaid to complainant instead of a saleslady as
agreed upon in the POEA-approved Contract of Employment, respondent Agency
committed a breach of said Employment Contract. Worthy of mention is the fact that
respondent agency in their Position Paper paragraph 2, Brief Statement of the Facts and
of the Case - admitted that it had entered into an illegal contract with complainant by
proposing the position of a housemaid which said position was then not allowed by the
POEA, by making it appear in the Employment Contract that the position being applied
for is the position of a saleslady. As it is, we find indubitably clear that the foreign
employer had took advantage to the herein hopeless complainant and because of this
ordeal, the same obviously rendered complainant's continuous employment
unreasonable if not downright impossible. The facts and surrounding circumstances of
her ordeal was convincingly laid down by the complainant in her Position Paper, from
which we find no flaws material enough to disregard the same. Complainant had clearly
made out her case and no amount of persuasion can convince us to tilt the scales of
justice in favor of respondents whose defense was anchored solely on the flimsy
allegations that for a period of more than five (5) years - from 1989 until 1995 - nothing
was heard from her or from her relatives, presuming then that complainant had no
problem with her employment abroad. We also find that the pleadings and the annexes
filed by the parties reveal a total lapse on the part of respondent First Cosmopolitan
Manpower and Promotions - their failure to support with substantial evidence their
contention that complainant transferred from one employer to another without knowledge
and approval of respondent agency in contravention of the terms of the POEA approved
Employment Contract. Obviously, respondent Agency anchored its disquisition on the
alleged "contracts" signed by the complainant that she agreed with the terms of said
contracts - one (1) year duration only and as a housemaid - to support its contention that
complainant violated the contract agreement by transferring from one employer to
another on her own volition without the knowledge and consent of respondent agency.
To us, this posture of respondent agency is unavailing. These "documents" are self-
serving. We could not but rule that the same were fabricated to tailor-fit their defense
that complainant was guilty of violating the terms of the Employment Contract.
Consequently, we could not avoid the inference of a more logical conclusion that
complainant was forced against her will to continue with her employment
notwithstanding the fact that it was in violation of the original Employment Contract
including the illegal withholding of her passport.
With the foregoing, we find and so rule that respondent Agency failed to discharge the
burden of proving with substantial evidence that complainant violated the terms of the
Employment Contract, thus negating respondent Agency's liability for complainant's
money claims. All the more, the record is bereft of any evidence to show that
complainant Datuman is either not entitled to her wage differentials or have already
received the same from respondent. As such, we are perforce constrained to grant
complainant's prayer for payment of salary differentials computed as follows:

January 1992 April 1993 (15 months)

US$370.00 agreed salary

US$100.00 actual paid salary

US$270.00 balance

US$270.00 x 15 months = US$4050.00

We are also inclined to grant complainant's entitlement to a refund of her plane ticket in
the amount of BD 180 Bahrain Dinar or the equivalent in Philippine Currency at the rate
of exchange prevailing at the time of payment.

Anent complainant's claim for vacation leave pay and overtime pay, we cannot, however,
grant the same for failure on the part of complainant to prove with particularity the
months that she was not granted vacation leave and the day wherein she did render
overtime work.

Also, we could not grant complainant's prayer for award of damages and attorney's fees
for lack of factual and legal basis.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered, finding respondent

Agency liable for violating the term of Employment Contract and respondent First
Cosmopolitan Manpower and Promotions is hereby ordered:

To pay complainant the amount of US$ FOUR THOUSAND AND FIFTY (US$4,050.00),
or its equivalent rate prevailing at the time of payment, representing her salary
differentials for fifteen (15) months;

To pay complainant the amount of BD 180.00 or its equivalent rate prevailing at the time
of payment, representing the refund of plane ticket;

All other claims are hereby dismissed for lack of merit.

SO ORDERED.9 (emphasis supplied)

On appeal, the NLRC, Second Division, issued a Decision10 affirming with modification
the Decision of Labor Arbiter Mayor, Jr., by reducing the award of salary differentials
from US$4,050.00 to US$2,970.00 ratiocinating as follows:

Accordingly, we find that the claims for salary differentials accruing earlier than April of
1993 had indeed prescribed. This is so as complainant had filed her complaint on May
31, 1995 when she arrived from the jobsite in April 1993. Since the cause of action for
salary differential accrues at the time when it falls due, it is clear that only the claims for
the months of May 1993 to April 1994 have not yet prescribed. With an approved salary
rate of US$370.00 vis-à-vis the amount of salary received which was $100.00,
complainant is entitled to the salary differential for the said period in the amount of
$2,970.00.

xxx

WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered MODIFYING the

assailed Decision by reducing the award of salary differentials to $2,970.00 to the
complainant.

The rest of the disposition is AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.11

On July 21, 2000, respondent elevated the matter to the CA through a petition for
certiorari under Rule 65.

On August 2, 2000,12 the CA dismissed the petition for being insufficient in form
pursuant to the last paragraph of Section 3, Rule 42 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure, as amended.

On October 20, 2000,13 however, the CA reinstated the petition upon respondent's
motion for reconsideration.14

On August 7, 2002, the CA issued the assailed Decision15 granting the petition and
reversing the NLRC and the Labor Arbiter, thus:

Under Section 1 (f), Rule II, Book II of the 1991 POEA Rules and Regulations, the local
agency shall assume joint and solidary liability with the employer for all claims and
liabilities which may arise in connection with the implementation of the contract,
including but not limited to payment of wages, health and disability compensation and
repatriation.
Respondent Commission was correct in declaring that claims of private respondent "for
salary differentials accruing earlier than April of 1993 had indeed prescribed." It must be
noted that petitioner company is privy only to the first contract. Granting arguendo that
its liability extends to the acts of its foreign principal, the Towering Recruiting Services,
which appears to have a hand in the execution of the second contract, it is Our
considered opinion that the same would, at the most, extend only up to the expiration of
the second contract or until 01 September 1991. Clearly, the money claims subject of
the complaint filed in 1995 had prescribed.

However, this Court declares respondent Commission as not only having abused its
discretion, but as being without jurisdiction at all, in declaring private respondent entitled
to salary differentials. After decreeing the money claims accruing before April 1993 as
having prescribed, it has no more jurisdiction to hold petitioner company for salary
differentials after that period. To reiterate, the local agency shall assume joint and
solidary liability with the employer for all claims and liabilities which may arise in
connection with the implementation of the contract. Which contract? Upon a judicious
consideration, we so hold that it is only in connection with the first contract. The
provisions in number 2, Section 10 (a), Rule V, Book I of the Omnibus Rules
Implementing the Labor Code Section 1 (f), Rule II, Book II of the 1991 POEA Rules and
Regulations were not made to make the local agency a perpetual insurer against all
untoward acts that may be done by the foreign principal or the direct employer abroad. It
is only as regards the principal contract to which it is privy shall its liability extend. In
Catan v. National Labor Relations Commission, 160 SCRA 691 (1988), it was held that
the responsibilities of the local agent and the foreign principal towards the contracted
employees under the recruitment agreement extends up to and until the expiration of the
employment contracts of the employees recruited and employed pursuant to the said
recruitment agreement.

xxx

Foregoing considered, the assailed Decision dated 24 February 2000 and the Resolution
dated 23 June 2000 of respondent Commission in NLRC NCR CA 016354-98 are
hereby SET ASIDE.

SO ORDERED.16

Petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration17 thereon was denied in the assailed

Resolution18 dated November 14, 2002.

Hence, the present petition based on the following grounds:

I.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED A REVERSIBLE ERROR
WHEN IT ABANDONED THE FACTUAL FINDINGS OF THE LABOR ARBITER AS
AFFIRMED BY THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION.

II.

THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS PATENTLY ERRED IN HOLDING THAT

THE RESPONDENT AGENCY IS ONLY A [sic] PRIVY AND LIABLE TO THE
PRINCIPAL CONTRACT.

III.

THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE

CAUSE OF ACTION OF THE PETITIONER ALREADY PRESCRIBED.

The respondent counters in its Comment that the CA is correct in ruling that it is not
liable for the monetary claims of petitioner as the claim had already prescribed and had
no factual basis.

Simply put, the issues boil down to whether the CA erred in not holding respondent liable
for petitioner's money claims pursuant to their Contract of Employment.

We grant the petition.

On whether respondent is solidarily liable for petitioner's monetary claims

Section 1 of Rule II of the POEA Rules and Regulations states that:

Section 1. Requirements for Issuance of License. - Every applicant for license to operate
a private employment agency or manning agency shall submit a written application
together with the following requirements:

xxx

f. A verified undertaking stating that the applicant:

xxx

(3) Shall assume joint and solidary liability with the employer for all claims and liabilities
which may arise in connection with the implementation of the contract; including but not
limited to payment of wages, death and disability compensation and repatriation.
(emphasis supplied)
The above provisions are clear that the private employment agency shall assume joint
and solidary liability with the employer.19 This Court has, time and again, ruled that
private employment agencies are held jointly and severally liable with the foreign-based
employer for any violation of the recruitment agreement or contract of employment.20
This joint and solidary liability imposed by law against recruitment agencies and foreign
employers is meant to assure the aggrieved worker of immediate and sufficient payment
of what is due him.21 This is in line with the policy of the state to protect and alleviate
the plight of the working class.

In the assailed Decision, the CA disregarded the aforecited provision of the law and the
policy of the state when it reversed the findings of the NLRC and the Labor Arbiter. As
the agency which recruited petitioner, respondent is jointly and solidarily liable with the
latter's principal employer abroad for her (petitioner's) money claims. Respondent
cannot, therefore, exempt itself from all the claims and liabilities arising from the
implementation of their POEA-approved Contract of Employment.

We cannot agree with the view of the CA that the solidary liability of respondent extends
only to the first contract (i.e. the original, POEA-approved contract which had a term of
until April 1990). The signing of the "substitute" contracts with the foreign
employer/principal before the expiration of the POEA-approved contract and any
continuation of petitioner's employment beyond the original one-year term, against the
will of petitioner, are continuing breaches of the original POEA-approved contract. To
accept the CA's reasoning will open the floodgates to even more abuse of our overseas
workers at the hands of their foreign employers and local recruiters, since the
recruitment agency could easily escape its mandated solidary liability for breaches of the
POEA-approved contract by colluding with their foreign principals in substituting the
approved contract with another upon the worker's arrival in the country of employment.
Such outcome is certainly contrary to the State's policy of extending protection and
support to our overseas workers. To be sure, Republic Act No. 8042 explicitly prohibits
the substitution or alteration to the prejudice of the worker of employment contracts
already approved and verified by the Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE)
from the time of actual signing thereof by the parties up to and including the period of the
expiration of the same without the approval of the DOLE.22

Respondent's contention that it was petitioner herself who violated their Contract of
Employment when she signed another contract in Bahrain deserves scant consideration.
It is the finding of both the Labor Arbiter and the NLRC - which, significantly, the CA did
not disturb - that petitioner was forced to work long after the term of her original POEA-
approved contract, through the illegal acts of the foreign employer.

In Placewell International Services Corporation v. Camote,23 we held that the

subsequently executed side agreement of an overseas contract worker with her foreign
employer which reduced his salary below the amount approved by the POEA is void
because it is against our existing laws, morals and public policy. The said side
agreement cannot supersede the terms of the standard employment contract approved
by the POEA.

Hence, in the present case, the diminution in the salary of petitioner from US$370.00 to
US$100 (BD 40.00) per month is void for violating the POEA-approved contract which
set the minimum standards, terms, and conditions of her employment. Consequently, the
solidary liability of respondent with petitioner's foreign employer for petitioner's money
claims continues although she was forced to sign another contract in Bahrain. It is the
terms of the original POEA-approved employment contract that shall govern the
relationship of petitioner with the respondent recruitment agency and the foreign
employer. We agree with the Labor Arbiter and the NLRC that the precepts of justice
and fairness dictate that petitioner must be compensated for all months worked
regardless of the supposed termination of the original contract in April 1990. It is
undisputed that petitioner was compelled to render service until April 1993 and for the
entire period that she worked for the foreign employer or his unilaterally appointed
successor, she should have been paid US$370/month for every month worked in
accordance with her original contract.

Respondent cannot disclaim liability for the acts of the foreign employer which forced
petitioner to remain employed in violation of our laws and under the most oppressive
conditions on the allegation that it purportedly had no knowledge of, or participation in,
the contract unwillingly signed by petitioner abroad. We cannot give credence to this
claim considering that respondent by its own allegations knew from the outset that the
contract submitted to the POEA for approval was not to be the "real" contract.
Respondent blithely admitted to submitting to the POEA a contract stating that the
position to be filled by petitioner is that of "Saleslady" although she was to be employed
as a domestic helper since the latter position was not approved for deployment by the
POEA at that time. Respondent's evident bad faith and admitted circumvention of the
laws and regulations on migrant workers belie its protestations of innocence and put
petitioner in a position where she could be exploited and taken advantage of overseas,
as what indeed happened to her in this case.

We look upon with great disfavor the unsubstantiated actuations of innocence or

ignorance on the part of local recruitment agencies of acts of their foreign principals, as if
the agencies' responsibility ends with the deployment of the worker. In the light of the
recruitment agency's legally mandated joint and several liability with the foreign
employer for all claims in connection with the implementation of the contract, it is the
recruitment agency's responsibility to ensure that the terms and conditions of the
employment contract, as approved by the POEA, are faithfully complied with and
implemented properly by its foreign client/principal. Indeed, it is in its best interest to do
so to avoid being haled to the courts or labor tribunals and defend itself from suits for
acts of its foreign principal.

On whether petitioner's claims for underpaid salaries have prescribed

It should be recalled that the Labor Arbiter and the NLRC similarly found that petitioner is
entitled to underpaid salaries, albeit they differed in the number of months for which
salary differentials should be paid. The CA, on the other hand, held that all of petitioner's
monetary claims have prescribed pursuant to Article 291 of the Labor Code which
provides that:

Art. 291. Money Claims. - All money claims arising from employer-employee relations
accruing during the effectivity of this Code shall be filed within three years from the time
that cause of action accrued; otherwise, they shall be forever barred. (emphasis
supplied)

We do not agree with the CA when it held that the cause of action of petitioner had
already prescribed as the three-year prescriptive period should be reckoned from
September 1, 1989 when petitioner was forced to sign another contract against her will.
As stated in the complaint, one of petitioner's causes of action was for underpayment of
salaries. The NLRC correctly ruled the right to claim unpaid salaries (or in this case,
unpaid salary differentials) accrue as they fall due.24 Thus, petitioner's cause of action
to claim salary differential for October 1989 only accrued after she had rendered service
for that month (or at the end of October 1989). Her right to claim salary differential for
November 1989 only accrued at the end of November 1989, and so on and so forth.

Both the Labor Arbiter and the NLRC found that petitioner was forced to work until April
1993. Interestingly, the CA did not disturb this finding but held only that the extent of
respondent's liability was limited to the term under the original contract or, at most, to the
term of the subsequent contract entered into with the participation of respondent's
foreign principal, i.e. 1991. We have discussed previously the reasons why (a) the CA's
theory of limited liability on the part of respondent is untenable and (b) the petitioner has
a right to be compensated for all months she, in fact, was forced to work. To determine
for which months petitioner's right to claim salary differentials has not prescribed, we
must count three years prior to the filing of the complaint on May 31, 1995. Thus, only
claims accruing prior to May 31, 1992 have prescribed when the complaint was filed on
May 31, 1995. Petitioner is entitled to her claims for salary differentials for the period
May 31, 1992 to April 1993, or approximately eleven (11) months.25

We find that the NLRC correctly computed the salary differential due to petitioner at
US$2,970.00 (US$370.00 as approved salary rate - US$100.00 as salary received =
US$290 as underpaid salary per month x 11 months). However, it should be for the
period May 31, 1992 to April 1993 and not May 1993 to April 1994 as erroneously stated
in the NLRC's Decision.

A final note
This Court reminds local recruitment agencies that it is their bounden duty to guarantee
our overseas workers that they are being recruited for bona fide jobs with bona fide
employers. Local agencies should never allow themselves to be instruments of
exploitation or oppression of their compatriots at the hands of foreign employers. Indeed,
being the ones who profit most from the exodus of Filipino workers to find greener
pastures abroad, recruiters should be first to ensure the welfare of the very people that
keep their industry alive.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed Decision of the Court of Appeals
dated August 7, 2002 and Resolution dated November 14, 2002 in CA-G.R. SP No.
59825 are REVERSED AND SET ASIDE. The Decision of the National Labor Relations
Commission dated February 24, 2000 is REINSTATED with a qualification with respect
to the award of salary differentials, which should be granted for the period May 31, 1992
to April 1993 and not May 1993 to April 1994.

SO ORDERED.

TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO

Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

**ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice
Acting Chairperson

***MA. ALICIA AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ

Associate Justice

RENATO C. CORONA
Associate Justice

CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES

Associate Justice

ATTESTATION

I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation
before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court's Division.

ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice
Acting Chairperson, First Division

CERTIFICATION

Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, I certify that the conclusions in the
above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the
writer of the opinion of the Court's Division.

LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING
Acting Chief Justice

Footnotes

* On Official Leave.

** Acting Chairperson of the First Division as per Special Order No. 534.

*** Additional Member as per Special Order No. 535.

1 Penned by then Associate Justice Romeo A. Brawner and concurred in by Associate

Justices Jose L. Sabio, Jr. and Mario L. Guarina III.

2 Annexes B - B-2, Court of Appeals (CA) Rollo at 79-81.

3 Id.

4 Annex "A," CA Rollo at 77.

5 Petition for Review in the CA, CA Rollo.

6 Rollo at 86.

7 CA Petition-Annex "H," CA Rollo.

8 Id., at 97-98.

9 Rollo at 108-113.

10 Promulgated on February 24, 2000, penned by Commissioner Victoriano R. Calaycay

and concurred in by Presiding Commissioner Raul Aquino and Commissioner Angelita
Gacutan.
11 Rollo at 161.

12 CA Rollo at 45.

13 Id., at 91.

14 Id., at 91-92.

15 Id., at 37-43.

16 Rollo at 41-42.

17 CA Rollo at 121-133.

18 Id., at 46-47.

19 Skippers United Pacific, Inc. and J.P. Samartzsis Maritime Enterprises Co., S.A. v.
Jerry Maguad and Porferio Ceudadano, G.R. No. 166363, August 15, 2006, 498 SCRA
639, 668.

20 Hellenic Philippine Shipping, Inc. v. Siete, G.R. No. 84082, March 13, 1991, 195
SCRA 179, 186; Empire Insurance Company v. NLRC, G.R. 121879, August 14, 1998,
294 SCRA 263, 271-272.

21 P.I. Manpower Placements, Inc. v. NLRC (Second Division), G.R. No. 97369, July 31,
1997, 276 SCRA 451, 461.

22 Placewell International Services Corporation v. Camote, G.R. No. 169973, June 26,
2006, 492 SCRA 761.

23 Id., citing Chavez v. Bonto-Perez, G.R. No. 109808, March 1, 1995, 242 SCRA 73.

24 NLRC Decision, Rollo at 160.

25 As an aside, this Court notes that in petitioner's complaint filed with the Labor Arbiter,
she only claims underpayment of salaries and did not include nonpayment of salaries as
one of her causes of action. Subsequently, in her position paper and other pleadings,
petitioner asserts that she was not paid any salary at all from September 1991 to April
1993. However, under the NLRC Rules of Procedure, parties are barred from alleging or
proving causes of action in the position paper that are not found/alleged in the complaint.
Thus, the Labor Arbiter and the NLRC only granted petitioner salary differentials as she
herself prayed for in her complaint.
 The Lawphil Project - Arellano Law Foundation