FF CRUZ and Co v CA
7; Rollo,
The furniture manufacturing shop of petitioner in Caloocan City was
situated adjacent to the residence of private respondents. Sometime in
August 1971, private respondent Gregorio Mable first approached
Eric Cruz, petitioner's plant manager, to request that a firewall be
constructed between the shop and private respondents' residence. The
request was repeated several times but they fell on deaf ears. In the
early morning of September 6, 1974, fire broke out in petitioner's
shop. Petitioner's employees, who slept in the shop premises, tried to
put out the fire, but their efforts proved futile. The fire spread to
private respondents' house. Both the shop and the house were razed
to the ground. The cause of the conflagration was never discovered.
The National Bureau of Investigation found specimens from the
burned structures negative for the presence of inflammable
substances.
Subsequently, private respondents collected P35,000.00 on the
insurance on their house and the contents thereof.
On January 23, 1975, private respondents filed an action for damages
against petitioner, praying for a judgment in their favor awarding
P150,000.00 as actual damages, P50,000.00 as moral damages,
P25,000.00 as exemplary damages, P20,000.00 as attorney's fees and
costs. The Court of First Instance held for private respondents:
WHEREFORE, the Court hereby renders
judgment, in favor of plaintiffs, and against the
defendant:
1. Ordering the defendant to pay to the plaintiffs
the amount of P80,000.00 for damages suffered
by said plaintiffs for the loss of their house, with
interest of 6% from the date of the filing of the
Complaint on January 23, 1975, until fully paid;
2. Ordering the defendant to pay to the plaintiffs
the sum of P50,000.00 for the loss of plaintiffs'
furnitures, religious images, silverwares,
chinawares, jewelries, books, kitchen utensils,
clothing and other valuables, with interest of 6%
from date of the filing of the Complaint on
January 23, 1975, until fully paid;
3. Ordering the defendant to pay to the plaintiffs
the sum of P5,000.00 as moral damages,
P2,000.00 as exemplary damages, and P5,000.00
as and by way of attorney's fees;
4. With costs against the defendant;
5. Counterclaim is ordered dismissed, for lack of
merit. [CA Decision, pp. 1-2; Rollo, pp. 29-30.]
On appeal, the Court of Appeals, in a decision promulgated on
November 19, 1979, affirmed the decision of the trial court but
reduced the award of damages:
WHEREFORE, the decision declaring the
defendants liable is affirmed. The damages to be
awarded to plaintiff should be reduced to
P70,000.00 for the house and P50,000.00 for the
furniture and other fixtures with legal interest
from the date of the filing of the complaint until
full payment thereof. [CA Decision, p.
p. 35.]
A motion for reconsideration was filed on December 3, 1979 but was
denied in a resolution dated February 18, 1980. Hence, petitioner
filed the instant petition for review on February 22, 1980. After the
comment and reply were filed, the Court resolved to deny the petition
for lack of merit on June 11, 1980.
However, petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration, which was
granted, and the petition was given due course on September 12,
1980. After the parties filed their memoranda, the case was submitted
for decision on January 21, 1981.
Petitioner contends that the Court of Appeals erred:
1. In not deducting the sum of P35,000.00, which private respondents
recovered on the insurance on their house, from the award of
damages.
2. In awarding excessive and/or unproved damages.
3. In applying the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur to the facts of the
instant case.
The pivotal issue in this case is the applicability of the common law
doctrine of res ipsa loquitur, the issue of damages being merely
consequential. In view thereof, the errors assigned by petitioner shall
be discussed in the reverse order.
1. The doctrine of res ipsa loquitur, whose application to the instant
case petitioner objects to, may be stated as follows:
Where the thing which caused the injury
complained of is shown to be under the
management of the defendant or his servants and
the accident is such as in the ordinary course of
things does not happen if those who have its
management or control use proper care, it affords
reasonable evidence, in the absence of
explanation by the defendant, that the accident
arose from want of care. [Africa v. Caltex (Phil.),
Inc., G.R. No. L-12986, March 31, 1966, 16
SCRA 448.]
Thus, in Africa, supra, where fire broke out in a Caltex service
station while gasoline from a tank truck was being unloaded into an
underground storage tank through a hose and the fire spread to and
burned neighboring houses, this Court, applying the doctrine of res
ipsa loquitur, adjudged Caltex liable for the loss.
The facts of the case likewise call for the application of the doctrine,
considering that in the normal course of operations of a furniture
manufacturing shop, combustible material such as wood chips,
sawdust, paint, varnish and fuel and lubricants for machinery may be
found thereon.
It must also be noted that negligence or want of care on the part of
petitioner or its employees was not merely presumed. The Court of
Appeals found that petitioner failed to construct a firewall between its
shop and the residence of private respondents as required by a city
ordinance; that the fire could have been caused by a heated motor or
a lit cigarette; that gasoline and alcohol were used and stored in the
shop; and that workers sometimes smoked inside the shop [CA
Decision, p. 5; Rollo, p. 33.]
Even without applying the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur, petitioner's
failure to construct a firewall in accordance with city ordinances
would suffice to support a finding of negligence.
Even then the fire possibly would not have spread
to the neighboring houses were it not for another
negligent omission on the part of defendants,
namely, their failure to provide a concrete wall
high enough to prevent the flames from leaping
over it. As it was the concrete wall was only 2-
1/2 meters high, and beyond that height it
consisted merely of galvanized iron sheets, which
would predictably crumble and melt when
subjected to intense heat. Defendant's negligence,
therefore, was not only with respect to the cause
of the fire but also with respect to the spread
thereof to the neighboring houses.[Africa v.
Caltex (Phil.), Inc., supra; Emphasis supplied.]
In the instant case, with more reason should petitioner be found guilty
of negligence since it had failed to construct a firewall between its
property and private respondents' residence which sufficiently
complies with the pertinent city ordinances. The failure to comply
with an ordinance providing for safety regulations had been ruled by
the Court as an act of negligence [Teague v. Fernandez, G.R. No. L-
29745, June 4, 1973, 51 SCRA 181.]
The Court of Appeals, therefore, had more than adequate basis to find
petitioner liable for the loss sustained by private respondents.
2. Since the amount of the loss sustained by private respondents
constitutes a finding of fact, such finding by the Court of Appeals
should not be disturbed by this Court [M.D. Transit & Taxi Co., Inc.
v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. L-23882, February 17, 1968, 22 SCRA
559], more so when there is no showing of arbitrariness.
In the instant case, both the CFI and the Court of Appeals were in
agreement as to the value of private respondents' furniture and
fixtures and personal effects lost in the fire (i.e. P50,000.00). With
regard to the house, the Court of Appeals reduced the award to
P70,000.00 from P80,000.00. Such cannot be categorized as arbitrary
considering that the evidence shows that the house was built in 1951
for P40,000.00 and, according to private respondents, its
reconstruction would cost P246,000.00. Considering the appreciation
in value of real estate and the diminution of the real value of the peso,
the valuation of the house at P70,000.00 at the time it was razed
cannot be said to be excessive.
3. While this Court finds that petitioner is liable for damages to
private respondents as found by the Court of Appeals, the fact that
private respondents have been indemnified by their insurer in the
amount of P35,000.00 for the damage caused to their house and its
contents has not escaped the attention of the Court. Hence, the Court
holds that in accordance with Article 2207 of the Civil Code the
amount of P35,000.00 should be deducted from the amount awarded
as damages. Said article provides:
Art. 2207. If the plaintiffs property has been
insured, and he has received indemnity from the
insurance company for the injury or loss arising
out of the wrong or breach of contract
complained of, the insurance company is
subrogated to the rights of the insured against the
wrongdoer or the person who violated the
contract. If the amount paid by the insurance
company does not fully cover the injury or loss,
the aggrieved party shall be entitled to recover
the deficiency from the person causing the loss or
injury. (Emphasis supplied.]
The law is clear and needs no interpretation. Having been
indemnified by their insurer, private respondents are only entitled to
recover the deficiency from petitioner.
On the other hand, the insurer, if it is so minded, may seek
reimbursement of the amount it indemnified private respondents from
petitioner. This is the essence of its right to be subrogated to the
rights of the insured, as expressly provided in Article 2207. Upon
payment of the loss incurred by the insured, the insurer is entitled to
be subrogated pro tanto to any right of action which the insured may
have against the third person whose negligence or wrongful act
caused the loss [Fireman's Fund Insurance Co. v. Jamila & Co., Inc.,
G.R. No. L-27427, April 7, 1976, 70 SCRA 323.]
Under Article 2207, the real party in interest with regard to the
indemnity received by the insured is the insurer [Phil. Air Lines, Inc.
v. Heald Lumber Co., 101 Phil. 1031, (1957).] Whether or not the
insurer should exercise the rights of the insured to which it had been
subrogated lies solely within the former's sound discretion. Since the
insurer is not a party to the case, its identity is not of record and no
claim is made on its behalf, the private respondent's insurer has to
claim his right to reimbursement of the P35,000.00 paid to the
insured.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the decision of the Court of
Appeals is hereby AFFIRMED with the following modifications as to
the damages awarded for the loss of private respondents' house,
considering their receipt of P35,000.00 from their insurer: (1) the
damages awarded for the loss of the house is reduced to P35,000.00;
and (2) the right of the insurer to subrogation and thus seek
reimbursement from petitioner for the P35,000.00 it had paid private
respondents is recognized.
CIPRIANO v CA
This is a petition for review of the decision[1] of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 36045 which affirmed in toto the
decision of Branch 58[2] of the Quezon City Regional Trial Court,
ordering the petitioner to pay P252,155.00 to private respondent for
the loss of the latters vehicle while undergoing rustproofing
and P10,000.00 in attorneys fees.
The facts of the case are as follows:
Petitioner Elias S. Cipriano is the owner of E.S. Cipriano
Enterprises, which is engaged in the rustproofing of vehicles, under
the style Motobilkote. On April 30, 1991, private respondent Maclin
Electronics, Inc., through an employee, brought a 1990 model Kia
Pride Peoples car to petitioners shop for rustproofing. The car had
been purchased the year before from the Integrated Auto Sales, Inc.
for P252,155.00.
The vehicle was received in the shop under Job Order No.
123581,[3] which showed the date it was received for rustproofing as
well its condition at the time. Neither the time of acceptance nor the
hour of release, however, was specified. According to the petitioner,
the car was brought to his shop at 10 oclock in the morning of April
30, 1991 and was ready for release later that afternoon, as it took only
six hours to complete the process of rustproofing.
In the afternoon of May 1, 1991, fire broke out at the Lambat
restaurant, which petitioner also owned, adjoining his Mobilkote
rustproofing shop. The fire destroyed both the shop and the
restaurant, including private respondents Kia Pride. The car had been
kept inside the building, allegedly to protect it from theft. Petitioner
claimed that despite efforts to save the vehicle, there was simply not
enough time to get it out of the building, unlike three other cars
which had been saved because they were parked near the entrance of
the garage.[4]
On May 8 1991, private respondent sent a letter to petitioner,
demanding reimbursement for the value of the Kia Pride. In reply,
petitioner denied liability on the ground that the fire was a fortuitous
event. This prompted private respondent to bring this suit for the
value of its vehicle and for damages against petitioner. Private
respondent alleged that its vehicle was lost due to the negligence and
imprudence of the petitioner, citing petitioners failure to register his
business with the Department of Trade and Industry under P.D. No.
1572 and to insure it as required in the rules implementing the
Decree.[5]
In his Answer, petitioner invoked Art. 1174 of the Civil Code
and denied liability for the loss which he alleged was due to a
fortuitous event. He later testified that he employed an electrician
who regularly inspected the lighting in his restaurant and rustproofing
shop. In addition, he claimed he had installed fire-fighting devices
and that the fire was an accident entirely independent of his will and
devoid of any negligence on his part. He further averred that private
respondents car was ready for release as early as afternoon of April
30, 1991, and that it was private respondents delay in claiming it that
was the cause of the loss.
Petitioner explained that rustproofing involved spraying
asphalt-like materials underneath motor vehicle so that rust will not
corrode its body and that the materials and chemicals used for this
purpose are not inflammable. Therefore, he could not be made to
assume the risk of loss due to fire. He also claimed that he was not
required to register his business with the Department of Trade and
Industry, because he was not covered by P.D. No. 1572.
On the other hand, private respondent argued that petitioner
was liable for the loss of the car even if it was caused by a fortuitous
event. It contended that the nature of petitioners business required
him to assume the risk because under P.D. No. 1572, petitioner was
required to insure his property as well as those of his customers.
The trial court sustained the private respondents contention that
the failure of defendant to comply with P.D. No. 1572 is in effect a
manifest act of negligence which renders defendant [petitioner
herein] liable for the loss of the car even if the same was caused by
fire,[6] even as it ruled that the business of rustproffing is definitely
covered by P.D. No. 1572. Since petitioner did not register his
business and insure it, he must bear the cost of loss of his
customers. As already noted, the court ordered petitioner to pay
private respondent P252,155.00 with interest at 6% per annum from
the filing of the case and attorneys fees in the amount of P10,000.00.
On appeal, the decision was affirmed. The Court of Appeals
ruled that the provisions of the Civil Code relied upon by the
petitioner are not applicable to this case, and that the law applicable
to the case is P.D. No. 1572, the purpose of which is to protect
customers who entrust their properties to service and repair
enterprises. The Court of Appeals held that by virtue of the
provisions of P.D. No. 1572 and its implementing rules and
regulations which require fire insurance coverage prior to
accreditation, owners of service and repair enterprises assume the risk
of loss of their customers property. The appellate court stated:
Defendant-appellant was operating the business of
rustproofing of cars and other motor vehicles illegally
at the time of the fire in question; i.e., without the
necessary accreditation and license from the
Department of Trade and Industry, and it is for this
reason that it did not carry at least a fire insurance
coverage to protect the vehicles entrusted to it by its
customers. Therefore, it must bear the consequences of
such illegal operation, including the risk of losses or
injuries to the vehicles of its customers brought by
unforeseen or fortuitous events like the fire that gutted
its shop and completely burned appellees car while said
vehicle was in its possession.[7]
The Court of Appeals also affirmed the award of attorneys fees,
ruling that although the lower court did not expressly and specifically
state the reason for the award, the basis therefor could be inferred
from the finding that petitioner unjustly refused to pay private
respondents valid and demandable claim. Said the appellate court:
Such wanton, reckless, and illegal operation of
appellants business resulted in appellees lack of
protection from the fire that gutted appellants shop and
which completely burned its car while in appellants
possession for rustproofing. Yet appellant adamantly
and stubbornly refused to pay appellee the value of its
lost car. It was, therefore, correctly ordered by the
court a quo to pay appellee reasonable attorneys fees as
it had unjustly and unreasonably refused to satisfy the
latters plainly valid, just, and demandable claim,
compelling said appellee to file this action to protect its
interest (Art. 2208, pars. (2) and (5), New Civil
Code).[8]
Hence, this appeal. Petitioner contends that the fire which
destroyed private respondents car was a fortuitous event for which he
cannot be held responsible. In support of his argument, he cites the
following provisions of the Civil Code:
ART. 1174. Except in cases expressly specified by the law, or when
it is otherwise declared by stipulation, or when the nature of the
obligation requires the assumption of risk, no person shall be
responsible for those events which could not be foreseen, or which,
though foreseen, were inevitable.
ART. 1262. An obligation which consists in the delivery of a
determinate thing shall be extinguished if it should be lost or
destroyed without the fault of the debtor, and before he has incurred
in delay.
When by law or stipulation, the obligor is liable even for fortuitous
events, the loss of the thing does not extinguish the obligation, and he
shall be responsible for damages. The same rule applies when the
nature of the obligation requires the assumption of risk.
The contention is without merit. The issue in this case is
whether petitioner was required to insure his business and the
vehicles received by him in the course of his business and, if so,
whether his failure to do so constituted negligence, rendering him
liable for loss due to the risk required to be insured against. We hold
that both questions must be answered in the affirmative.
We have already held that violation of a statutory duty is
negligence per se. In F.F. Cruz and Co., Inc. v. Court of
Appeals,[9] we held the owner of a furniture shop liable for the
destruction of the plaintiffs house in a fire which started in his
establishment in view of his failure to comply with an ordinance
which required the construction of a firewall. In Teague v.
Fernandez,[10] we stated that where the very injury which was
intended to be prevented by the ordinance has happened, non-
compliance with the ordinance was not only an act negligence, but
also the proximate cause of the death.
Indeed, the existence of a contract between petitioner and
private respondent does not bar a finding of negligence under the
principles of quasi-delict, as we recently held in Fabre v. Court of
Appeals.[11] Petitioner's negligence is the source of his obligation. He
is not being held liable for breach of his contractual obligation due to
negligence but for his negligence in not complying with a duty
imposed on him by law. It is therefore immaterial that the loss
occasioned to private respondent was due to a fortuitous event, since
it was petitioners negligence in not insuring against the risk which
was the proximate cause of the loss.
Thus, P.D. No. 1572, 1 requires service and repair enterprises
for motor vehicles, like that of petitioners to register with the
Department of Trade and Industry. As condition for such registration
or accreditation, Ministry Order No. 32 requires covered enterprises
to secure insurance coverage. Rule III of this Order provides in
pertinent parts:[12]
1- REQUIREMENTS FOR ACCREDITATION
1) Enterprises applying for original accreditation shall submit the
following:
1.1. List of machineries/equipment/tools in useful
condition;
1.2. List of certified engineers/accredited technicians
mechanics with their personal data;
1.3. Copy of Insurance Policy of the shop covering the
property entrusted by its customer for repair,
service or maintenance together with a copy of the
official receipt covering the full payment of
premium;
1.4. Copy of Bond referred to under Section 7, Rule III of
this Rules and Regulations;
1.5. Written service warranty in the form prescribed by
the Bureau;
1.6. Certificate issued by the Securities and Exchange
Commission and Articles of Incorporation or
Partnership in case of corporation or partnership;
1.7. Such other additional documents which the Director
may require from time to time.
8 - INSURANCE POLICY
The insurance policy for the following risks like theft, pilferage, fire,
flood and loss should cover exclusively the machines, motor
vehicles, heavy equipment, engines, electronics, electrical,
airconditioners, refrigerators, office machines and data processing
equipment, medical and dental equipment, other consumer
mechanical and industrial equipment stored for repair and/or service
in the premises of the applicant.
There is thus a statutory duty imposed on petitioner and it is for
his failure to comply with this duty that he was guilty of negligence
rendering him liable for damages to private respondent. While the
fire in this case may be considered a fortuitous event, [13] this
circumstance cannot exempt petitioner from liability for loss.
We think, however, that the Court of Appeals erred in
sustaining the award of attorneys fees by the lower court. It is now
settled that the reasons or grounds for an award of attorneys fees must
be set forth in the decision of the court.[14] They cannot be left to
inference as the appellate court held in this case. The reason for this
is that it is not sound policy to penalize the right to litigate. An award
of attorneys fees, being an exception to this policy and limited to the
grounds enumerated in the law,[15] must be fully justified in the
decision. It can not simply be inserted as an item of recoverable
damages in the judgment of the court. Since in this case there is no
justification for the award of attorneys fees in the decision of the trial
court, it was error for the Court of Appeals to sustain such award.
WHEREFORE, the decision, dated November 18, 1992, of
the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED, with the modification that the
award of attorneys fees is DELETED.
SO ORDERED.
MARINDUQUE IRON MINES v WCC
The Marinduque Iron Mines Agents Inc. questions by certiorari the
order of the Workmen’s Compensation Commissioner confirming the
referee’s award of compensation to the heirs of Pedro Mamador for
his accidental death.
Only the right to compensation is disputed; chan
roblesvirtualawlibrarynot the amount.
“It appears,” says the award, “that on August 23, 1951, at
6:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary00 a.m. in Bo. Sumangga, Mogpog,
Marinduque, the deceased Mamador together with other laborers of
the Respondent-corporation, (Marinduque Iron Mines Agents Inc.)
boarded a truck belonging to the latter, which was then driven by one
Procopio Macunat, also employed by the corporation, and on its way
to their place of work at the mine camp at Talantunan, while trying to
overtake another truck on the company road, it turned over and hit a
coconut tree, resulting in the death of said Mamador and injury to the
others.”
Procopio Macunat was prosecuted, convicted and sentenced to
indemnify the heirs of the deceased. (Criminal Case No. 1491). He
has paid nothing however, to the latter.
In his first proposition Petitioner challenges the validity of the
proceedings before the Commission, asserting it had not been given
the opportunity to cross-examine the opposing witnesses. According
to Respondents.
“The records show that pursuant to a request made by this
Commission on March 28, 1953 to investigate the above-entitled
case, the Public Defender of Boac, Marinduque,
notified RespondentGeronimo Ma. Coll and the general manager of
the Respondent company, Mr. Eric Lenze, to appear before him in an
investigation, first on May 12, 1953, when neither of them appeared,
and the second on May 29, 1953, when only Mr. Geronimo Ma. Coll.
appeared. The sworn testimony of Mr. Ma. Coll was then taken down
in a question and answer method. On August 18, 1953, thru Referee
Ramon Villaflor, this Commission wrote the Respondent company to
comment on the enclosed copy of the sworn declaration of Ma. Coll.
The Respondent company, thru its Vice President, denied its liability
under the Workmen’s Compensation Act, as amended. In an
investigation conducted on February 8, 1954 by the undersigned
referee, the Respondent company thru Mr. Lenze who was assisted by
counsel, was allowed to examine the records of the case including the
sworn declaration of Ma. Coll and was given all the opportunity to
rebut the same by additional evidence.”
In our opinion, Petitioner’s grievance does not rest on any sound
basis, because it was given notice, and therefore had the chance, to
examine (and cross-examine) the witnesses against it. The statute
even permits the Commissioner (or his referee) to take testimony
without notice (section 48 Act 3428 as amended) provided of course
such ex parte evidence is reduced to writing, and the adverse party is
afforded opportunity to examine and rebut the same which was done
in this instance.
Anyway we are not shown how its failure to cross-examine the
witnesses prejudiced the Petitioner’s position.
In its second proposition, Petitioner maintains that this claim is
barred by section 6 of the Workmen’s Compensation Law, because
(a) Macunat was prosecuted and required to indemnify the heirs of
the deceased and (b) an amicable settlement was concluded between
said heirs and Macunat.
Section 6 provides as follows:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
“Sec. 6. Liability of third parties. — In case an employee suffers an
injury for which compensation is due under this Act by any other
person besides his employer, it shall be optional with such injured
employee either to claim compensation from his employer, under this
Act, or sue such other person for damages, in accordance with
law; chan roblesvirtualawlibraryand in case compensation is claimed
and allowed in accordance with this Act, the employer who paid such
compensation or was found liable to pay the same, shall succeed the
injured employee to the right of recovering from such person what he
paid:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary Provided, That in case the employer
recovers from such third person damages in excess of those paid or
allowed under this Act, such excess shall be delivered to the injured
employee or any other person entitled thereto, after deduction of the
expenses of the employer and the costs of the proceedings. The sum
paid by the employer for compensation or the amount of
compensation to which the employee or his dependents are entitled,
shall not be admissible as evidence in any damage suit or action.”
It is the Petitioner’s contention that Criminal Case No. 1491 and its
outcome constituted an election by the employee (or his heirs) to sue
the third person, such election having the effect of releasing the
employer. However, Criminal Case No. 1491 was not a suit for
damages against the third person, it being alleged, without
contradiction that the heirs did not intervene therein and have not so
far received the indemnity ordered by the court. At any rate, we have
already decided in Nava vs. Inchausti Co. 1 that the indemnity
granted the heirs in a criminal prosecution of the “other person” does
not affect the liability of the employer to pay compensation. 2
As to the alleged “amicable settlement,” it consists of an affidavit
wherein, for the sum of 150 pesos, Mamador’s widow promised “to
forgive Macunat for the wrong committed and not to bring him
before the authorities for prosecution.” Upon making such promise
— Petitioner argues — she elected one of the remedies, (against the
third person) and is barred from the other remedy (against the
employer). The contention may not be sustained, inasmuch as all the
widow promised was to forego the offender’s criminal prosecution.
Note further that a question may be raised whether she could bind the
other heirs of the deceased.
The most important aspect of this appeal, is the effect of the
deceased’s having violated the employer’s prohibition against
laborers riding the haulage trucks. Petitioner claims such violation
was the laborer’s “notorious negligence” which, under the law,
precludes recovery. The Commission has not declared that the
prohibition was known to Mamador. Yet the employer does not point
out in the record evidence to that effect. Supposing Mamador knew
the prohibition, said the referee, “can we truthfully say that he
boarded the fatal truck with full apprehension of the existence of the
danger, if any at all, that an ordinary prudent man would try to avoid?
I do not believe so, and even in the presence of doubt, the same must
be resolved in his favor. Unless of course, we can attribute to him a
desire to end his life. Nowhere in the records of this case can we find
the slightest insinuation of that desire.”
There is no doubt that mere riding on haulage truck or stealing a ride
thereon is not negligence, ordinarily. It couldn’t be, because
transportation by truck is not dangerous per se. It is argued that there
was notorious negligence in this particular instance because there was
the employer’s prohibition. Does violation of this order constitute
negligence? Many courts hold that violation of a statute or ordinance
constitutes negligence per se. Others consider the circumstances.
However there is practical unanimity in the proposition that violation
of a rule promulgated by a Commission or board is not negligence
per se; chan roblesvirtualawlibrarybut it may be evidence of
negligence. (C.J.S., Vol. 65, p. 427.)
This order of the employer (prohibition rather) couldn’t be of a
greater obligation than the rule of a Commission or board. And the
referee correctly considered this violation as possible evidence of
negligence; chan roblesvirtualawlibrarybut it declared that under the
circumstance, the laborer could not be declared to have acted with
negligence. Correctly, it is believed, since the prohibition had nothing
to do with personal safety of the riders.
Such finding is virtually a finding of fact which we may not overrule
in this certiorari proceeding.
Nevertheless, even granting there was negligence, it surely was not
“notorious” negligence, which we have interpreted to mean the same
thing as “gross” negligence 3 — implying “conscious indifference to
consequences” “pursuing a course of conduct which would naturally
and probably result in injury” “utter disregard of consequences.” (38
Am. Jur., 691) Getting or accepting a free ride on the company’s
haulage truck couldn’t be gross negligence, because as the referee
found, “no danger or risk was apparent.”
There being no other material point raised in the petition for review,
the award of compensation is hereby affirmed, with costs
against Petitioner.
ANONUEVO v CA
The bicycle provides considerable speed and freedom of movement
to the rider. It derives a certain charm from being unencumbered by
any enclosure, affording the cyclist the perception of relative liberty.
It also carries some obvious risks on the part of the user and has
become the subject of regulation, if not by the government, then by
parental proscription.
The present petition seeks to bar recovery by an injured cyclist of
damages from the driver of the car which had struck him. The
argument is hinged on the cyclist’s failure to install safety devices on
his bicycle. However, the lower courts agreed that the motorist
himself caused the collision with his own negligence. The facts are
deceptively simple, but the resolution entails thorough consideration
of fundamental precepts on negligence.
The present petition raises little issue with the factual findings of the
Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 160, of Pasig City, as affirmed
by the Court of Appeals. Both courts adjudged petitioner, Jonas
Añonuevo ( Añonuevo ), liable for the damages for the injuries
sustained by the cyclist, Jerome Villagracia (Villagracia). Instead, the
petition hinges on a sole legal question, characterized as "novel" by
the petitioner: whether Article 2185 of the New Civil Code, which
presumes the driver of a motor vehicle negligent if he was violating a
traffic regulation at the time of the mishap, should apply by analogy
to non-motorized vehicles.1
As found by the RTC, and affirmed by the Court of Appeals, the
accident in question occurred on 8 February 1989, at around nine in
the evening, at the intersection of Boni Avenue and Barangka Drive
in Mandaluyong (now a city). Villagracia was traveling along Boni
Avenue on his bicycle, while Añonuevo, traversing the opposite lane
was driving his Lancer car with plate number PJJ 359. The car was
owned by Procter and Gamble Inc., the employer of Añonuevo’s
brother, Jonathan. Añonuevo was in the course of making a left turn
towards Libertad Street when the collision occurred. Villagracia
sustained serious injuries as a result, which necessitated his
hospitalization several times in 1989, and forced him to undergo four
(4) operations.
On 26 October 1989, Villagracia instituted an action for damages
against Procter and Gamble Phils., Inc. and Añonuevo before the
RTC.2 He had also filed a criminal complaint against Añonuevo
before the Metropolitan Trial Court of Mandaluyong, but the latter
was subsequently acquitted of the criminal charge.3 Trial on the civil
action ensued, and in a Decision dated 9 March 1990, the RTC
rendered judgment against Procter and Gamble and Añonuevo,
ordering them to pay Villagracia the amounts of One Hundred Fifty
Thousand Pesos (₱150, 000.00). for actual damages, Ten Thousand
Pesos (₱10,000.00) for moral damages, and Twenty Thousand Pesos
(₱20,000.00) for attorney’s fees, as well as legal costs.4 Both
defendants appealed to the Court of Appeals.
In a Decision5 dated 8 May 1997, the Court of Appeals Fourth
Division affirmed the RTC Decision in toto6 . After the Court of
Appeals denied the Motion for Reconsideration in a Resolution7 dated
22 July 1997, Procter and Gamble and Añonuevo filed their
respective petitions for review with this Court. Procter and Gamble’s
petition was denied by this Court in a Resolution dated 24 November
1997. Añonuevo’s petition,8 on the other hand, was given due
course,9 and is the subject of this Decision.
In arriving at the assailed Decision, the Court of Appeals affirmed the
factual findings of the RTC. Among them: that it was Añonuevo’s
vehicle which had struck Villagracia;10 that Añonuevo’s vehicle had
actually hit Villagracia’s left mid-thigh, thus causing a comminuted
fracture;11 that as testified by eyewitness Alfredo Sorsano, witness for
Villagracia, Añonuevo was "umaarangkada," or speeding as he made
the left turn into Libertad;12 that considering Añonuevo’s claim that a
passenger jeepney was obstructing his path as he made the turn.
Añonuevo had enough warning to control his speed;13 and that
Añonuevo failed to exercise the ordinary precaution, care and
diligence required of him in order that the accident could have been
avoided.14 Notably, Añonuevo, in his current petition, does not
dispute the findings of tortious conduct on his part made by the lower
courts, hinging his appeal instead on the alleged negligence of
Villagracia. Añonuevo proffers no exculpatory version of facts on his
part, nor does he dispute the conclusions made by the RTC and the
Court of Appeals. Accordingly, the Court, which is not a trier of
facts,15 is not compelled to review the factual findings of the lower
courts, which following jurisprudence have to be received with
respect and are in fact generally binding.16
Notwithstanding, the present petition presents interesting questions
for resolution. Añonuevo’s arguments are especially fixated on a
particular question of law: whether Article 2185 of the New Civil
Code should apply by analogy to non-motorized vehicles.17 In the
same vein, Añonuevo insists that Villagracia’s own fault and
negligence serves to absolve the former of any liability for damages.
Its is easy to discern why Añonuevo chooses to employ this line of
argument. Añonuevo points out that Villagracia’s bicycle had no
safety gadgets such as a horn or bell, or headlights, as invoked by a
1948 municipal ordinance.18 Nor was it duly registered with the
Office of the Municipal Treasurer, as required by the same ordinance.
Finally, as admitted by Villagracia, his bicycle did not have foot
brakes.19 Before this Court, Villagracia does not dispute these
allegations, which he admitted during the trial, but directs our
attention instead to the findings of Añonuevo’s own
negligence.20 Villagracia also contends that, assuming there was
contributory negligence on his part, such would not exonerate
Añonuevo from payment of damages. The Court of Appeals likewise
acknowledged the lack of safety gadgets on Villagracia’s bicycle, but
characterized the contention as "off-tangent" and insufficient to
obviate the fact that it was Añonuevo’s own negligence that caused
the accident.21
Añonuevo claims that Villagracia violated traffic regulations when he
failed to register his bicycle or install safety gadgets thereon. He
posits that Article 2185 of the New Civil Code applies by analogy.
The provision reads:
Article 2185. Unless there is proof to the contrary, it is presumed that
a person driving a motor vehicle has been negligent if at the time of
the mishap he was violating any traffic regulation.
The provision was introduced for the first time in this jurisdiction
with the adoption in 1950 of the New Civil Code.22Its applicability is
expressly qualified to motor vehicles only, and there is no ground to
presume that the law intended a broader coverage.
Still, Añonuevo hypothesizes that Article 2185 should apply by
analogy to all types of vehicles23 . He points out that modern-day
travel is more complex now than when the Code was enacted, the
number and types of vehicles now in use far more numerous than as
of then. He even suggests that at the time of the enactment of the
Code, the legislators "must have seen that only motor vehicles were
of such public concern that they had to be specifically mentioned,"
yet today, the interaction of vehicles of all types and nature has
"inescapably become matter of public concern" so as to expand the
application of the law to be more responsive to the times.24
What Añonuevo seeks is for the Court to amend the explicit
command of the legislature, as embodied in Article 2185, a task
beyond the pale of judicial power. The Court interprets, and not
creates, the law. However, since the Court is being asked to consider
the matter, it might as well examine whether Article 2185 could be
interpreted to include non-motorized vehicles.
At the time Article 2185 was formulated, there existed a whole array
of non-motorized vehicles ranging from human-powered contraptions
on wheels such as bicycles, scooters, and animal-drawn carts such
as calesas and carromata. These modes of transport were even more
prevalent on the roads of the 1940s and 1950s than they are today, yet
the framers of the New Civil Code chose then to exclude these
alternative modes from the scope of Article 2185 with the use of the
term "motorized vehicles." If Añonuevo seriously contends that the
application of Article 2185 be expanded due to the greater interaction
today of all types of vehicles, such argument contradicts historical
experience. The ratio of motorized vehicles as to non-motorized
vehicles, as it stood in 1950, was significantly lower than as it stands
today. This will be certainly affirmed by statistical data, assuming
such has been compiled, much less confirmed by persons over sixty.
Añonuevo’s characterization of a vibrant intra-road dynamic between
motorized and non-motorized vehicles is more apropos to the past
than to the present.
There is a fundamental flaw in Añonuevo’s analysis of Art. 2185, as
applicable today. He premises that the need for the distinction
between motorized and non-motorized vehicles arises from the
relative mass of number of these vehicles. The more pertinent basis
for the segregate classification is the difference in type of these
vehicles. A motorized vehicle operates by reason of a motor engine
unlike a non-motorized vehicle, which runs as a result of a direct
exertion by man or beast of burden of direct physical force. A
motorized vehicle, unimpeded by the limitations in physical exertion.
is capable of greater speeds and acceleration than non-motorized
vehicles. At the same time, motorized vehicles are more capable in
inflicting greater injury or damage in the event of an accident or
collision. This is due to a combination of factors peculiar to the motor
vehicle, such as the greater speed, its relative greater bulk of mass,
and greater combustability due to the fuels that they use.
There long has been judicial recognition of the peculiar dangers
posed by the motor vehicle. As far back as 1912, in the U.S. v.
Juanillo25 , the Court has recognized that an automobile is capable of
great speed, greater than that of ordinary vehicles hauled by animals,
"and beyond doubt it is highly dangerous when used on country
roads, putting to great hazard the safety and lives of the mass of the
people who travel on such roads."26 In the same case, the Court
emphasized:
A driver of an automobile, under such circumstances, is required to
use a greater degree of care than drivers of animals, for the reason
that the machine is capable of greater destruction, and furthermore, it
is absolutely under the power and control of the driver; whereas, a
horse or other animal can and does to some extent aid in averting an
accident. It is not pleasant to be obliged to slow down automobiles to
accommodate persons riding, driving, or walking. It is probably more
agreeable to send the machine along and let the horse or person get
out of the way in the best manner possible; but it is well to
understand, if this course is adopted and an accident occurs, that the
automobile driver will be called upon to account for his acts. An
automobile driver must at all times use all the care and caution which
a careful and prudent driver would have exercised under the
circumstances.27
American jurisprudence has had occasion to explicitly rule on the
relationship between the motorist and the cyclist. Motorists are
required to exercise ordinary or reasonable care to avoid collision
with bicyclists.28 While the duty of using ordinary care falls alike on
the motorist and the rider or driver of a bicycle, it is obvious, for
reasons growing out of the inherent differences in the two vehicles,
that more is required from the former to fully discharge the duty than
from the latter.29
The Code Commission was cognizant of the difference in the natures
and attached responsibilities of motorized and non-motorized
vehicles. Art. 2185 was not formulated to compel or ensure obeisance
by all to traffic rules and regulations. If such were indeed the evil
sought to be remedied or guarded against, then the framers of the
Code would have expanded the provision to include non-motorized
vehicles or for that matter, pedestrians. Yet, that was not the case;
thus the need arises to ascertain the peculiarities attaching to a
motorized vehicle within the dynamics of road travel. The fact that
there has long existed a higher degree of diligence and care imposed
on motorized vehicles, arising from the special nature of motor
vehicle, leads to the inescapable conclusion that the qualification
under Article 2185 exists precisely to recognize such higher standard.
Simply put, the standards applicable to motor vehicle are not on equal
footing with other types of vehicles.
Thus, we cannot sustain the contention that Art. 2185 should apply to
non-motorized vehicles, even if by analogy. There is factual and legal
basis that necessitates the distinction under Art. 2185, and to adopt
Añonuevo’s thesis would unwisely obviate this distinction.
Even if the legal presumption under Article 2185 should not apply to
Villagracia, this should not preclude any possible finding of
negligence on his part. While the legal argument as formulated by
Añonuevo is erroneous, his core contention that Villagracia was
negligent for failure to comply with traffic regulations warrants
serious consideration, especially since the imputed negligent acts
were admitted by Villagracia himself.
The Civil Code characterizes negligence as the omission of that
diligence which is required by the nature of the obligation and
corresponds with the circumstances of the persons, of the time and of
the place.30 However, the existence of negligence in a given case is
not determined by the personal judgment of the actor in a given
situation, but rather, it is the law which determines what would be
reckless or negligent.31
Añonuevo, asserts that Villagracia was negligent as the latter had
transgressed a municipal ordinance requiring the registration of
bicycles and the installation of safety devices thereon. This view
finds some support if anchored on the long standing principle
of negligence per se.
The generally accepted view is that the violation of a statutory duty
constitutes negligence, negligence as a matter of law, or negligence
per se.32 In Teague vs. Fernandez,33 the Court cited with approval
American authorities elucidating on the rule:
"The mere fact of violation of a statute is not sufficient basis for an
inference that such violation was the proximate cause of the injury
complained. However, if the very injury has happened which was
intended to be prevented by the statute, it has been held that violation
of the statute will be deemed to be the proximate cause of the injury."
(65 C.J.S. 1156)
"The generally accepted view is that violation of a statutory duty
constitutes negligence, negligence as a matter of law, or, according to
the decisions on the question, negligence per se, for the reason that
non-observance of what the legislature has prescribed as a suitable
precaution is failure to observe that care which an ordinarily prudent
man would observe, and, when the state regards certain acts as so
liable to injure others as to justify their absolute prohibition, doing
the forbidden act is a breach of duty with respect to those who may
be injured thereby; or, as it has been otherwise expressed, when the
standard of care is fixed by law, failure to conform to such standard is
negligence, negligence per se or negligence in and of itself, in the
absence of a legal excuse. According to this view it is immaterial,
where a statute has been violated, whether the act or omission
constituting such violation would have been regarded as negligence
in the absence of any statute on the subject or whether there was, as a
matter of fact, any reason to anticipate that injury would result from
such violation. x x x." (65 C.J.S. pp.623-628)
"But the existence of an ordinance changes the situation. If a driver
causes an accident by exceeding the speed limit, for example, we do
not inquire whether his prohibited conduct was unreasonably
dangerous. It is enough that it was prohibited. Violation of an
ordinance intended to promote safety is negligence. If by creating the
hazard which the ordinance was intended to avoid it brings about the
harm which the ordinance was intended to prevent, it is a legal cause
of the harm. This comes only to saying that in such circumstances the
law has no reason to ignore the causal relation which obviously exists
in fact. The law has excellent reason to recognize it, since it is the
very relation which the makers of the ordinance anticipated. This
court has applied these principles to speed limits and other
regulations of the manner of driving." (Ross vs. Hartman, 139 Fed.
2d 14 at 15).
"x x x However, the fact that other happenings causing or
contributing toward an injury intervened between the violation of a
statute or ordinance and the injury does not necessarily make the
result so remote that no action can be maintained. The test is to be
found not in the number of intervening events or agents, but in their
character and in the natural and probable connection between the
wrong done and the injurious consequence. The general principle is
that the violation of a statute or ordinance is not rendered remote as
the cause of an injury by the intervention of another agency if the
occurrence of the accident, in the manner in which it happened, was
the very thing which the statute or ordinance was intended to
prevent." (38 Am Jur 841)34
In Teague, the owner of a vocational school stricken by a fire
resulting in fatalities was found negligent, base on her failure to
provide adequate fire exits in contravention of a Manila city
ordinance.35 In F.F. Cruz and Co., Inc. v. Court of Appeals36 , the
failure of the petitioner to construct a firewall in accordance with city
ordinances sufficed to support a finding of negligence.37 In Cipriano
v. Court of Appeals, 38 the Court found that the failure of the
petitioner to register and insure his auto rustproofing shop in
accordance with the statute constituted negligence per se, thus
holding him liable for the damages for the destruction by fire of a
customer’s vehicle garaged therein.
Should the doctrine of negligence per se apply to Villagracia,
resulting from his violation of an ordinance? It cannot be denied that
the statutory purpose for requiring bicycles to be equipped with
headlights or horns is to promote road safety and to minimize the
occurrence of road accidents involving bicycles. At face value,
Villagracia’s mishap was precisely the danger sought to be guarded
against by the ordinance he violated. Añonuevo argues that
Villagracia’s violation should bar the latter’s recovery of damages,
and a simplistic interpretation of negligence per se might vindicate
such an argument.
But this is by no means a simple case. There is the fact which we
consider as proven, that Añonuevo was speeding as he made the left
turn, and such negligent act was the proximate cause of the accident.
This reckless behavior would have imperiled anyone unlucky enough
within the path of Añonuevo’s car as it turned into the intersection,
whether they are fellow motorists, pedestrians, or cyclists. We are
hard put to conclude that Villagracia would have avoided injury had
his bicycle been up to par with safety regulations, especially
considering that Añonuevo was already speeding as he made the turn,
or before he had seen Villagracia. Even assuming that Añonuevo had
failed to see Villagracia because the bicycle was not equipped with
headlights, such lapse on the cyclist’s part would not have acquitted
the driver of his duty to slow down as he proceeded to make the left
turn.
This court has appreciated that negligence per se, arising from the
mere violation of a traffic statute, need not be sufficient in itself in
establishing liability for damages. In Sanitary Steam Laundry, Inc. v.
Court of Appeals,39 a collision between a truck and a privately-owned
Cimarron van caused the death of three of the van’s passengers. The
petitioner therein, the owner of the truck, argued that the driver of the
Cimarron was committing multiple violations of the Land
Transportation and Traffic Code40 at the time of the accident. Among
these violations: the Cimarron was overloaded at the time of the
accident; the front seat of the van was occupied by four adults,
including the driver; and the van had only one functioning headlight.
Similar as in this case, petitioner therein invoked Article 2185 and
argued that the driver of the Cimarron should be presumed negligent.
The Court, speaking through Justice Mendoza, dismissed these
arguments:
[It] has not been shown how the alleged negligence of the Cimarron
driver contributed to the collision between the vehicles. Indeed,
petitioner has the burden of showing a causal connection between the
injury received and the violation of the Land Transportation and
Traffic Code. He must show that the violation of the statute was the
proximate or legal cause of the injury or that it substantially
contributed thereto. Negligence consisting in whole or in part, of
violation of law, like any other negligence, is without legal
consequence unless it is a contributing cause of the injury. Petitioner
says that "driving an overloaded vehicle with only one functioning
headlight during nighttime certainly increases the risk of accident,"
that because the Cimarron had only one headlight, there was
"decreased visibility," and that the fact that the vehicle was
overloaded and its front seat overcrowded "decreased its
maneuverability." However, mere allegations such as these are not
sufficient to discharge its burden of proving clearly that such alleged
negligence was the contributing cause of the injury.41
Sanitary Steam42 is controlling in this case. The bare fact that
Villagracia was violating a municipal ordinance at the time of the
accident may have sufficiently established some degree of negligence
on his part, but such negligence is without legal consequence unless it
is shown that it was a contributing cause of the injury. If anything at
all, it is but indicative of Villagracia’s failure in fulfilling his
obligation to the municipal government, which would then be the
proper party to initiate corrective action as a result. But such failure
alone is not determinative of Villagracia’s negligence in relation to
the accident. Negligence is relative or comparative, dependent upon
the situation of the parties and the degree of care and vigilance which
the particular circumstances reasonably require.43 To determine if
Villagracia was negligent, it is not sufficient to rely solely on the
violations of the municipal ordinance, but imperative to examine
Villagracia’s behavior in relation to the contemporaneous
circumstances of the accident.
The rule on negligence per se must admit qualifications that may
arise from the logical consequences of the facts leading to the
mishap. The doctrine (and Article 2185, for that matter) is undeniably
useful as a judicial guide in adjudging liability, for it seeks to impute
culpability arising from the failure of the actor to perform up to a
standard established by a legal fiat. But the doctrine should not be
rendered inflexible so as to deny relief when in fact there is no causal
relation between the statutory violation and the injury sustained.
Presumptions in law, while convenient, are not intractable so as to
forbid rebuttal rooted in fact. After all, tort law is remunerative in
spirit, aiming to provide compensation for the harm suffered by those
whose interests have been invaded owing to the conduct of others.44
Under American case law, the failures imputed on Villagracia are not
grievous enough so as to negate monetary relief. In the absence of
statutory requirement, one is not negligent as a matter of law for
failing to equip a horn, bell, or other warning devise onto a
bicycle.45 In most cases, the absence of proper lights on a bicycle
does not constitute negligence as a matter of law46 but is a question
for the jury whether the absence of proper lights played a causal part
in producing a collision with a motorist.47 The absence of proper
lights on a bicycle at night, as required by statute or ordinance, may
constitute negligence barring or diminishing recovery if the bicyclist
is struck by a motorist as long as the absence of such lights was a
proximate cause of the collision;48 however, the absence of such
lights will not preclude or diminish recovery if the scene of the
accident was well illuminated by street lights,49 if substitute lights
were present which clearly rendered the bicyclist visible,50 if the
motorist saw the bicycle in spite of the absence of lights thereon, 51 or
if the motorist would have been unable to see the bicycle even if it
had been equipped with lights.52 A bicycle equipped with defective or
ineffective brakes may support a finding of negligence barring or
diminishing recovery by an injured bicyclist where such condition
was a contributing cause of the accident.53
The above doctrines reveal a common thread. The failure of the
bicycle owner to comply with accepted safety practices, whether or
not imposed by ordinance or statute, is not sufficient to negate or
mitigate recovery unless a causal connection is established between
such failure and the injury sustained. The principle likewise finds
affirmation in Sanitary Steam, wherein we declared that the violation
of a traffic statute must be shown as the proximate cause of the
injury, or that it substantially contributed thereto. 54 Añonuevo had the
burden of clearly proving that the alleged negligence of Villagracia
was the proximate or contributory cause of the latter’s injury.
On this point, the findings of the Court of Appeals are well-worth
citing:
[As] admitted by appellant Añonuevo, he first saw appellee
Villagracia at a distance of about ten (10) meters before the accident.
Corrolarily, therefore, he could have avoided the accident had he
[stopped] alongside with an earlier (sic) jeep which was already at a
full stop giving way to appellee. But according to [eyewitness]
Sorsano, he saw appellant Añonuevo "umaarangkada" and hit the leg
of Villagracia (TSN March 14, 1990 p. 30). This earlier (sic) jeep at a
full stop gave way to Villagracia to proceed but Añonuevo at an
unexpected motion (umarangkada) came out hitting Villagracia (TSN
March 9, 1990 p. 49). Appellant Añonuevo admitted that he did not
blow his horn when he crossed Boni Avenue (TSN March 21, 1990 p.
47).55
By Añonuevo’s own admission, he had seen Villagracia at a good
distance of ten (10) meters. Had he been decelerating, as he should,
as he made the turn, Añonuevo would have had ample opportunity to
avoid hitting Villagracia. Moreover, the fact that Añonuevo had
sighted Villagracia before the accident would negate any possibility
that the absence of lights on the bike contributed to the cause of the
accident.56 A motorist has been held liable for injury to or death of a
bicyclist where the motorist turned suddenly into the bicyclist so as to
cause a collision.57
Neither does Añonuevo attempt before this Court to establish a causal
connection between the safety violations imputed to Villagracia and
the accident itself. Instead, he relied on a putative presumption that
these violations in themselves sufficiently established negligence
appreciable against Villagracia. Since the onus on Añonuevo is to
conclusively prove the link between the violations and the accident,
we can deem him as having failed to discharge his necessary burden
of proving Villagracia’s own liability.
Neither can we can adjudge Villagracia with contributory
negligence.1âwphi1 The leading case in contributory
negligence, Rakes v. Atlantic Gulf58 clarifies that damages may be
mitigated if the claimant "in conjunction with the occurrence,
[contributes] only to his injury."59 To hold a person as having
contributed to his injuries, it must be shown that he performed an act
that brought about his injuries in disregard of warnings or signs of an
impending danger to health and body.60 To prove contributory
negligence, it is still necessary to establish a causal link, although not
proximate, between the negligence of the party and the succeeding
injury. In a legal sense, negligence is contributory only when it
contributes proximately to the injury, and not simply a condition for
its occurrence.61
As between Añonuevo and Villagracia, the lower courts adjudged
Añonuevo as solely responsible for the accident. The petition does
not demonstrate why this finding should be reversed. It is hard to
imagine that the same result would not have occurred even if
Villagracia’s bicycle had been equipped with safety equipment.
Añonuevo himself admitted having seen Villagracia from ten (10)
meters away, thus he could no longer claim not having been
sufficiently warned either by headlights or safety horns. The fact that
Añonuevo was recklessly speeding as he made the turn likewise leads
us to believe that even if Villagracia’s bicycle had been equipped
with the proper brakes, the cyclist would not have had opportunity to
brake in time to avoid the speeding car. Moreover, it was incumbent
on Añonuevo to have established that Villagracia’s failure to have
installed the proper brakes contributed to his own injury. The fact that
Añonuevo failed to adduce proof to that effect leads us to consider
such causal connection as not proven.
All told, there is no reason to disturb the assailed judgment.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED. The Decision of the Court
of Appeals is AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioner.
YAMADA v MANILA RAILROAD
The three cases dealt with in this decision differ in their facts only
with respect to the injury suffered by the respective plaintiffs. The
law applicable to them is the same and, at the request of counsel, they
will be decided at the same time. Plaintiffs claim damages against
both the railroad and the garage company because of injuries suffered
by them in a collision between a train owned by and operated over
tracks belonging to the railroad company and an automobile the
property of the Bachrach Garage & Taxicab
Co.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
On January 2, 1913, the plaintiffs, together with three companions,
hired an automobile from the defendant taxicab company for a trip to
Cavite Viejo. The automobile was secured at a certain price hour and
was driven and controlled by a chauffeur supplied by the taxicab
company. The journey to Cavite Viejo was made without incident
but, on the return trip, while crossing the tracks of defendant railroad
company in the barrio of San Juan, municipality of Cavite Viejo, the
automobile was struck by a train and the plaintiffs
injured.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
The trial court dismissed the complaint on the merits as to the Manila
Railroad Company and held the defendant taxicab company liable for
damages to the plaintiffs in various amounts. The taxicab company
appealed.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
It appears from the record, and was found by the trial court, that the
driver of the automobile drove his machine upon the railroad tracks
without observing the precautions which ordinary care and prudence
would require, without reducing speed and without taking any
precaution looking to determining whether there was danger from a
train or locomotive. The trial court accordingly found that the driver
was guilty of gross negligence and that said negligence was the
proximate cause of the accident. It also found that the driver had
been, in effect, instructed by the taxicab company to approach and
pass over railroad tracks in the manner and form followed and
observed on the occasion in question, and that, for that reason, the
taxicab company was liable for the damages
caused.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
Several errors are assigned by the appellant. The first one relates to
the finding of the trial court: "That the driver of the automobile did
not slacken speed, which was fast, upon approaching the railroad
crossing, which was clearly visible and had to be approached on an
upward grade, or take any other precaution to avert accident. ... and I
can but conclude that the driver of the automobile was grossly
negligent and careless in not taking such precaution as would have
notified him of the coming of the train. On the contrary, he proceeded
with reckless speed and regardless of possible or threatened danger.
If he had been driving the automobile at a proper rate of speed for
going over railroad crossing he could easily have stopped before
going over the railroad crossing after seeing the train."chanrobles
virtual law library
The argument of the appellant which is devoted to this findings
seems to admit impliedly at least that the driver of the automobile
maintained his rate of speed as he approached and went upon the
railroad crossing; and that he took no precaution to ascertain the
approach of a train.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law
library
The appellant contended on the trial and offered evidence to prove
that, on approaching the railroad crossing from the direction in which
the automobile was travelling at the time, the view of the railroad
tracks in both directions was obstructed by bushes and trees growing
alongside thereof, and that it was impossible for a person
approaching the crossing even though on guard, to detect by sight the
approach of a train. If that were the case, it was clearly the duty of the
driver to reduce the speed of his car and the noise thereof to such an
extent that he would be able to determine from the unrestricted and
uninterrupted use of all his faculties whether or not a train was near.
It is the law that a person must use ordinary care and prudence in
passing over a railroad crossing. While we are not prepared to lay
down any absolute rule as to what precise acts of precaution are
necessary to be done or left undone by a person who may have need
to pass over a railroad crossing, we may say that it is always
incumbent on him to use ordinary care and diligence. What acts are
necessary to constitute such care and diligence must depend on the
circumstances of each particular case. The degree of care differs in
different cases. Greater care is necessary in crossing a road where the
cars are running at a high rate of speed and close together than where
they are running at less speed and remote from one another. But in
every case due care should be exercised. It is very possible that
where, on approaching a crossing, the view of the tracks in both
directions is unobstructed for such a distance as to render it perfectly
safe to pass over without the use of any other faculty than sight, such
use alone is sufficient and it is not necessary to stop or even to
slacken speed or listen. On the other hand, where the view of the
tracks is obstructed, them it is driver's duty to slacken speed, to
reduce the noise, if any, of the vehicle, to look and to listen, if
necessary, or do any other act necessary to determine that a train is
not in dangerous proximity to the
crossing.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
In the case at bar the appellant's own showing is to the effect that the
view of the track in the direction from which the train was coming
was obstructed in such manner that neither the track nor a train could
be seen as a traveler approached the crossing; and yet, in spite of that
fact, the chauffeur drove upon the tracks without investigation or
precaution of any kind. The very fact that a train was approaching
and was so near as to collide with the automobile is strong evidence
of the fact that no precautions were taken to determine that fact. It is
undoubted that if the driver had taken the simplest means of
permitting his own faculties to exercise themselves fairly, there
would have been no accident, as the presence of the train would have
been discovered in an instant; but he chose, rather, to give his senses
no opportunity to protect him or his passengers and drove on the
track at full speed with all the noise which an automobile produces at
such speed on an upgrade and the sense of hearing impaired by the
rush of the wind. Railroad trains rarely pass over tracks without noise
and their presence, generally speaking, is easily detected by persons
who take ordinary precautions.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles
virtual law library
Under this assignment the appellant's main effort is being to the
demonstration of the fact that there was a custom established among
automobile drivers of Manila by which they habitually drove their
cars over railroad crossings in the manner in which the automobile
was driven by defendant's servant on the occasion in controversy. To
prove that custom counsel presents the evidence of the president of
the defendant company, Mr. Bachrach, who testified on the trial that
all of his drivers, including the one in charge of the car on the night
of the accident, operated cars in that manner and that it was the
custom among automobile drivers generally. Counsel also cites the
testimony of the witness Palido, living near the scene of the accident,
who testified that, as a general rule, automobiles passed over the
railroad crossing without changing speed. This testimony was
corroborated by the defendant company's driver who had the
automobile in charge at the time of the occurrence. Basing himself on
this alleged custom counsel contends that "When a person does what
is usual and customary, i. e., proceeds as he and others engaged in a
like occupation have been accustomed to proceed, the action cannot
be characterized as reckless, nor, strictly speaking as negligent." To
this the obvious reply may be made, for the moment admitting the
existence of the custom, that a practice which is dangerous to human
life cannot ripen into a custom which will protect anyone who
follows it. To go upon a railroad crossing without making any effort
to ascertain the approach of a train is so hazardous an act and one so
dangerous to life, that no one may be permitted to excuse himself
who does it, provided injury result. One who performs an act so
inherently dangerous cannot, when an accident occurs, take refuge
behind the plea that others have performed the same act
safely.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
Under the second error assigned, the appellant contends with much
vigor that the plaintiffs cannot recover for the reason that the
negligence of the driver of the automobile, if any, was imputable to
them, they having permitted the driver to approach and pass over the
railroad crossing without the use of ordinary care and diligence to
determine the proximity of a train or locomotive, and having made no
effort to caution or instruct him or compel him to take reasonable
care in making the crossing. With this contention we cannot agree.
We think the better rule, and one more consonant with the weight of
authority, is that a person who hires a public automobile and gives
the driver direction as to the place to which he wishes to be
conveyed, but exercise no other control over the conduct of the
driver, is not responsible for acts of negligence of the latter or
prevented from recovering for injuries suffered from a collision
between the automobile and a train, caused by the negligence either
of the locomotive engineer or the automobile driver. (Little vs.
Hackett, 116 U.S., 366.) The theory on which the negligence of the
driver has in some instances been imputed to the occupant of the
vehicle is that, having trusted the driver by selecting the particular
conveyance, the plaintiff so far identified himself with the owner and
his servants that, in case of injury resulting from their negligence, he
was considered a party thereto. This was the theory upon which the
case of Thorogood vs. Bryan (8 C.B., 115) was decided, which is the
leading case in favor of the principle contended for by appellant. The
Supreme Court of the United States, however, in Little vs. Hackett
(116 U.S., 366), had this to say concerning the ground on which the
Thorogood case was decided: "The truth is, the decision in
Thorogood vs. Bryan rests upon indefensible ground. The
identification of the passenger with the negligent driver or the owner,
without his personal cooperation or encouragement, is a gratuitous
assumption. There is no such identity. The parties are not in the same
position. The owner of public conveyance is a carrier, and the driver
or the servant of the passenger, and his asserted identity with them is
contradicted by the daily experience of the world."chanrobles virtual
law library
Further discussing the same question the court said: "There is no
distinction in principle whether the passenger be on public
conveyance like a railroad train or an omnibus, or be on a hack hired
from a public stand in the street for a drive. Those on a hack do not
become responsible for the negligence of the driver if they exercise
no control over him further than to indicate the route they wish to
travel or the places to which they wish to go. If he is their agent so
that his negligence can be imputed to them to prevent their recovery
against a third party, he must be their agent in all other respects, so
far as the management of the carriage is concerned, and responsibility
to third parties would attach to them for injuries caused by his
negligence in the course of his employment. But, as we have already
stated, responsibility cannot, within any recognized rules of law, be
fastened upon one who has in no way interfered with and the with
and controlled in the matter causing the injury. From the simple fact
of hiring the carriage or riding in it no such liability can arise. The
party hiring or riding must in some way have cooperated in
producing the injury complained of before he incur any liability for it.
'If the law were otherwise,' as said by Mr. Justice Depue in his
elaborate opinion in the latest case in New Jersey, 'not only the hirer
of the coach but also all the passengers in it would be under a
constraint to mount the box and superintend the conduct of the driver
in the management and control of his team, or be put for remedy
exclusively to an action against the irresponsible driver or equally
irresponsible owner of a coach taken, it may be, from a coach stand,
for the consequences of an injury which was the product of the
cooperating wrongful acts of the driver and of a third person, and that
too, though the passengers were ignorant of the character of the
driver, and of the responsibility of the owner of the team, and
strangers to the route over which they were to be carried.' (New
York, Lake Erie & Western Railroad vs. Steinbrenner, 47 N.J.L. [18
Vroom], 161, 171.)"chanrobles virtual law library
We are of the opinion, therefore, that the rule is as we have stated it.
Ordinarily where one rides in public vehicle with the driver thereof
and is injured by the negligence of a third person, to which
negligence that of the driver contributes his contributory negligence
is not imputable to the passenger unless said passenger has or is in
the position to have and exercise some control over the driver with
reference to the matter wherein he was negligent. Whether the person
injured exercises any control over the conduct of the driver further
than to indicate the place to which he wishes to drive is a question of
fact to be determined by the trial court on all of the evidence in the
case. (Duval vs. Railroad Co., 134 N. C., 331; Hampel vs. Detroit etc.
R. R. Co., 110 Am. St. Rep., 275; Cottonvs. Willmar etc. R. R. Co.,
99 Minn., 366; Shultz vs. Old Colony Street Ry. Co., 193 Mass., 309;
Wilson vs. Puget Sound Elec. Ry. Co., 52 Wash., 522; Johnson vs.
Coey, 237 Ill., 88; Hindu vs. Steere, 209 Mass. 442.)chanrobles
virtual law library
The appellant assigns as the third error the finding of the trial court
"that the defendant Manila Railroad Company was not guilty of
negligence which contributed to the causing of the accident
complained of."chanrobles virtual law library
In this connection it appears that, prior to the beginning of the action
now before us, two actions were instituted, both growing out of the
accident which forms the basis of the actions before us: (1) A
criminal action against the engineer of the train, in which the
engineer was acquitted; and (2) a civil action for damages by the
garage and taxicab company, the appellant herein, against the
defendant railroad company, for damages to the automobile which
was destroyed as a result of the accident, in which judgment was for
defendant. There is evidence in the record showing that the
locomotive engineer gave due and timely signals on approaching the
crossing in question. The trial court found that the employees of the
railroad company fully performed their duty as the train approached
the crossing on the night in question and that, therefore, the railroad
company in nowise contributed to the accident. We do not believe
that the record will justify us in a reversal of this finding. There is
abundant evidence to support it and we have nothing before us by
which that evidence may be impeached. That the bell was rung and
the whistle was blown on nearing the crossing, giving due and timely
warning to all persons approaching, was testified to not only by
servants of the corporation but by passengers on the train. We find
nothing in the record which materially impairs the credibility of these
witnesses or to show that their evidence is improbable or
unreasonable; and we would be going far under such circumstances
in discarding it and reversing a judgment based
thereon.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
The appellant under this assignment of error presents other facts
which he claims show necessarily that the company was negligent.
He asserts: "(1) That this accident occurred in the heart of the barrio
of San Juan (Cavite Viejo), within approximately one hundred meters
of the railroad station, that is, in a populous community; (2) that the
railroad company did not maintain either a flagman or protecting
gates at the grade crossing where the accident occurred, while the
sign "Railroad Crossing" was broken on the side toward the road; (3)
that trees and undergrowth had been permitted to grow on and
adjoining the right of way and houses were constructed thereon, in
such manner as to obstruct the view of persons approaching the
railroad track until within a few meters thereof; and (4) that the
approach to the crossing is twisting, and on either side thereof are
ditches about two meters deep."chanrobles virtual law library
With respect to the existence of trees and undergrowth on the railroad
company's right of way, the evidence is conflicting, plaintiff
maintaining and attempting to prove that such trees and undergrowth
existed, while defendant company contended and offered evidence to
show that no such growth existed at the time of the accident. On this
conflict of evidence the trial court found: "Evidence on the part of the
defendant Bachrach Garage & Taxicab Co. is to the effect that the
view from the crossing along the track towards Manila was
obstructed by bushes growing on the railroad right to way along the
track, while the preponderance of the evidence discloses that for a
distance of twelve or fifteen meters from the a view of the track for a
considerable distance is wholly unobstructed, and I can but conclude
that the driver of the unobstructed, and I can but conclude that the
driver of the automobile was grossly negligent and careless in not
taking such precaution as would have notified him of the coming of
the train. On the contrary, he proceeded with reckless speed and
regardless of possible or threatened danger."chanrobles virtual law
library
Here again we are met with a contradiction in the evidence of
witnesses who, so far as appears, are equally entitled to credit, which
conflict has been resolved by the trial court in favor of the witnesses
for the defendant railroad company. Counsel for appellant has failed
to give any reason why we should we should accept the testimony of
appellant's witnesses rather than those of the railroad company and he
has also neglected to point out any error committed by the trial court
in making its finding in this regard. A careful examination of the
record discloses no reason why the judgment of the trial court on this
point should be disturbed, there appearing nothing on which we could
base a judgment declaring that the trial court erred in making its
decision.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
As to the other facts set forth on which appellant predicates
negligence on the part of the railroad company, we find them, even if
admitted, to be insufficient to establish negligence. It is not
negligence on the part of the railroad company to maintain grade
crossing, even in populous district; nor is it negligence not to
maintain a flagman at such crossing. It is true that a railroad company
is held to greater caution in the more thronged streets of the densely
populated portions of the city than in the less frequented streets in
suburban parts or in towns; but this does not mean that it is
negligence to maintain grade crossing in such densely populated
portions or that it is negligence not to maintain a flagman at crossings
located in such districts. It simply means that the company in
operating its trains over such crossings must exercise care
commensurate with the use of crossings in any given
locality.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
The main contention of the appellant is based on the claim that, even
admitting as proved all of the facts alleged by the plaintiffs, the
appellant is not liable. It is maintained that up to the time the accident
occurred the defendant taxicab company had fully performed its duty
to the public, it being undisputed in the record that the driver was
competent and had a long and satisfactory record, having driven cars
for the defendant for 5 or 6 years without accident or misadventure,
and that his negligence, if any, in attempting to pass over the crossing
on the occasion before us, cannot legally be imputed to the taxicab
company so as to make it liable for the damages resulting therefrom.
In supporting of this argument the case of Johnson vs. David (5 Phil.,
Rep., 663), is cited as determinative of the question under
consideration. The appellant, however, having denied the fact of
negligence, we might, before entering on a discussion of the
applicability of the principles enunciated in Johnson vs. David to the
facts before us, repeat what we have already said, that it appears from
the record, and was found by the trial court, that the driver of the
automobile drove his machine upon the railroad tracks without
observing the precautions which ordinary care and prudence would
have required. He made substantially no effort toward ascertaining
whether there was danger from a train or locomotive. The trial court
found, as was quite necessary under the facts, that the driver was
guilty of gross negligence and that such negligence was the
proximate cause of the accident. It also found that the taxicab
company had permitted its drivers to approach and pass over railroad
tracks in the manner and form followed and observed on the occasion
in question until it had become a custom among its drivers, known
and sanctioned by the company; and that, for that reason, the taxicab
company was liable for the damages caused. We are of the opinion
that the trial court is fully supported in the finding that the conduct of
the officials of the taxicab company, and notably the president
thereof, amounted, in law, to a sanction of the custom established
among its automobile drivers in passing over railroad crossings.
Counsel is met, therefore, at the opening of his discussion on this
branch of the case, with the question: Did the defendant taxicab
company fully discharge its duty when it furnished a suitable and
proper car and selected driver who had been with the company for 5
or 6 years and who had not had an accident or misadventure before?
We think not. It was the duty of the company not only to furnish a
suitable and proper car and select a competent operator, but also to
supervise and, where necessary, instruct him
properly.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
Returning now to the applicability of the case of Johnson vs. David to
the facts before us:chanrobles virtual law library
The Civil Code, in dealing with the liability of a master for the
negligent acts of his servant, makes a distinction between private
individuals and public enterprises. (Art. 1903, Civil Code.) That
article, together with the preceding article, is as follows:
ART 1902. A person who by an act or omission causes damage to
another when there is fault or negligence shall be obliged to repair the
damage so done.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law
library
ART. 1903. The obligation imposed by the preceding article is
demandable, not only for personal acts and omissions, but also for the
persons for whom they should be
responsible.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
The father, and on his death or incapacity the mother is liable for the
damages caused by the minors who live with
them.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
Guardians are liable for the damages caused by minors or
incapacitated persons who are under their authority and live with
them.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
Owners or directors of an establishment or enterprise are equally
liable for the damages caused by their employees in the service of the
branches in which the latter may be employed or on account of their
duties.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
The State is liable in this sense when it acts through a special agent,
but not when the damage should have been caused by the official to
whom properly it pertained to do the act performed, in which case the
provisions of the proceeding article shall be
applicable.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
Finally, master or directors of arts and trades are liable for the
damages caused by their pupils or apprentices while they are under
their custody.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law
library
The liability referred to in this articles shall cease when the persons
mentioned therein prove that they employed all the diligence of a
good father of a family to avoid the damage.
These two articles are found under chapter 2, title 16, of the Civil
Code, dealing with "obligations which arise from fault or
negligence;" and set out the cases, generally speaking, in which the
master is liable for the acts of his servant. That chapter also contains
articles providing for liability for negligent acts of servants in special
cases, among them 1905, which provides that "the possessor of an
animal, or the one who uses it, is liable for the damages it may cause
even when said animal escapes from him or strays," but that this
liability shall cease "in the case the damage should arise from force
majeure or from the fault of the person who may have suffered it;"
1906, which declares that "the owner of a game preserve shall be
liable for damages caused by the game to neighboring estates, should
he not have done what may have been necessary to avoid increase of
the same or should he have hindered the efforts of the owners of said
estates to hunt;" 1907, which provides for the liability of the owner of
a building "for damages which may result from the collapse of the
whole or a part thereof, if it should occur through the absence of
necessary repairs;" 1908, which states that "owners shall be liable for
damages caused by the explosion of machines which may not have
been cared for with due diligence, and been placed in a safe and
proper place;" "by excessive smoke, which may be noxious to
persons of property;" "by the fall of trees, located in places of transit,
when not caused by force majeure;" "by the emanations of sewers or
deposits of infectious matters, when constructed without precautions
proper for the place where they are located;" and "the head of a
family who dwells in a house, or in a part of the same, is liable for the
damages by the things which may be thrown or which may fall
therefrom."chanrobles virtual law library
These are the only cases under the Civil Code in which damages may
be recovered from the master for the negligent of his servant. As is
seen from a reading of article 1903, a person being driven about by
his servant's negligent acts except under certain circumstances.
(Chapmanvs. Underwood, 27 Phil., Rep., 374; Johnson vs.
David, supra.) On the other hand, the master is liable for the
negligent acts of his servant where he is the owner or director of a
business or enterprise and the negligent acts are committed while the
servant is engaged in his master's employment as such
owner.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
The distinction made in the Code has been observed, as would
naturally be expected, by the decisions of this court. In the case of
Johnson vs. David, supra, we held that the defendant was not liable
for the acts of his servant in negligently driving a horse and carriage
against plaintiff, who was at the time riding a bicycle in the streets of
Manila, throwing him to the ground and injuring him and his bicycle.
It appeared in that case that the vehicle was owned by the defendant,
that it was being driven by the defendant's coachman on the private
affairs of the owner, that it was not a public conveyance driven for
hire or as a part of a business or enterprise. In that case we said: "It
would seem, from an examination of these various provisions, that
the obligation to respond for the negligent acts of another was limited
to the particular cases mentioned; in other words, we are of the
opinion and so hold that it was the intention of the legislature in
enacting said chapter 2 to enumerate all the persons for whose
negligent acts third persons are responsible. Article 1902 provides
when a person himself is liable for negligence. Articles 1903, 1904,
1905, 1906, 1907, 1908, and 1910 provide when a person shall be
liable for injuries caused, not by his own negligence but by the
negligence of other persons or things.
xxx xxx xxx
These sections do not include a liability on the part of the plaintiff for
injuries resulting from acts of negligence such as are complained of
in the present cause . . . ."chanrobles virtual law library
These case of Chapman vs. Underwood, (27 Phil., Rep., 374) was
similar in its facts and the principles governing it, to that of
Johnson vs. David. In that case the plaintiff, while about to board a
street car, was struck by an automobile which, at the time, was being
driven on the wrong side of the street. The automobile was in charge
of the servant of the owner, who was present in the automobile at the
time the accident occurred. The automobile was not a part of
defendant's business nor was it being used at the time as a part or
adjunct of any business or enterprise owned or conducted by him.
Although the act of the driver was negligent, and was so declared by
this court, it was, nevertheless, held that the master was not liable for
the results of the act. We said:
The defendant, however, is not responsible for the negligence of his
driver, under the facts and circumstances of this case. As we have
said in the case of Johnson vs. David (5 Phil., Rep., 663), the driver
does not fall within the list of person in article 1903 of the Civil Code
for whose acts the defendant would be
responsible.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
Although in the David case the owner of the vehicle was not present
at the time the alleged negligent acts were committed by the driver,
the same rule applies where the owner is present, unless the negligent
acts of the driver are continued for such a length of time as to give
the owner a reasonable opportunity to observe them and to direct his
driver to desist therefrom. An owner who sits in his automobile, or
other vehicle, and permits his driver to continue in a violation of the
law by the performance of negligent acts, after he has had a
reasonable opportunity to observe them and to direct that the driver,
becomes himself responsible for such acts. The owner of an
automobile who permits his chauffeur to drive up the Escolta, for
example, at a speed of 60 miles an hour, without any effort to stop
him, although he has had a reasonable opportunity to do so, becomes
himself responsible, both criminally and civilly, for the results
produced by the acts of his chauffeur. On the other hand, if the driver,
by a sudden act of negligence, and without the owner having a
reasonable opportunity to prevent the act or its continuance, injures a
person or violates the criminal law, the owner of the automobile,
although present therein at the time the act was committed, is not
responsible, either civilly or criminally, therefor. The act complained
of must be continued in the presence of the owner for such a length of
time that the owner, by his acquiescence, makes his driver's act his
own.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
In the case before us it does not appear from the record that, from the
time the automobile took the wrong side of the road to the
commission of the injury, sufficient time intervened to afford the
defendant an opportunity correct the act of his driver. Instead, it
appears with fair clearness that the interval between the turning out to
meet and pass the street car and the happening of the accident was so
short as not to be sufficient to charge defendant with the negligence
of the driver.
The case of Bahia vs. Litonjua and Leynes (30 Phil., Rep., 624), was
a case of a different character. There an automobile was being
operated by the defendant as a public vehicle carrying passengers
from Balayan to Tuy (Province of Batangas) and return for hire. On
one to the trips, the machine, by reason of a defect in the steering
gear, refused to respond to the guidance of the driver and, as a result
a child was run over and killed. That case, as is seem at a glance, is
quite different from the case of Johnson vs. David and that of
Chapman vs. Underwood, in that the automobile was operated as a
business or enterprise on which the defendant had entered for gain;
and this is the particular distinction which is made in article 1903 of
the Civil Code which holds the masters responsible for the negligent
acts of the servant when the master is the owner "of an establishment
or enterprise," and the acts complained of are committed within the
scope of the servant's employment in such business. In the case under
discussion we held that, in addition to the requirement to furnish and
use proper and safe machines, it was the duty of a person or
corporation operating automobiles for hire to exercise ordinary care
and diligence in the selection of the drivers of his or its automobiles
and in supervision over them while in his or its employ, including the
promulgation of proper rules and regulations and the formulation and
due publication of proper instructions for their guidance in cases
where such rules, regulations and the formulation and due publication
of proper instructions for their guidance in cases where such rules,
regulations and instruction are necessary. Discussion article 1903 of
the Civil Code, which, as we have seen, not only established liability
in case of negligence but also provides when that liability ceases, the
court in that case said:
From this article two things are apparent: (1) That when an injury is
caused by the negligence of a servant or employee there instantly
arises a presumption of law that there was negligence on the part of
the master or employer either in the selection of the selection of the
servant or employee or in supervision over him after the selection, or
both; and (2) that that presumption is juris tantum and not juris et de
jure and consequently may be rebutted. It follows necessarily that if
the employer shows to the satisfaction of the court that in selection
and supervision he has exercised the care and diligence of a good
father of a family, the presumption is overcome and he is relieved
from liability.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law
library
This theory bases the responsibility of the master ultimately on
his own negligence and not on that of his servant. This is the notable
peculiarity of the Spanish law of negligence. It is, of course, in
striking contrast to the American doctrine that, in relations with
strangers, the negligence of the servant is conclusively the negligence
of the master.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law
library
In the case before us the death of the child caused by a defect in the
steering gear of the automobile immediately raised the presumption
that Leynes was negligent in selecting a defective automobile or in
his failure to maintain it in good condition after selection and the
burden of proof was on him to show that he had exercised the care of
a good father of a family.
In that case we further said: "From the commencement of the use of
the machine until the accident occurred sufficient time had not
elapsed to require an examination of the machine by the defendant as
a part of his duty of inspection and supervision. While it does not
appear that the defendant formulated rules and regulations for the
guidance of the drivers and gave them proper instructions, designed
for the protection of the public and the passengers, the evidence
shows, as we have seen, that the death of the child was not caused by
a failure to promulgate rules and regulations. It was caused by a
defect in the machine as to which the defendant has shown himself
free from responsibility."chanrobles virtual law library
We, therefore, see that taxicab company did not perform its full duty
when it furnished a safe and proper car and a driver with a long and
satisfactory record. It failed to comply with one of the essential
requirements of the law of negligence in this jurisdiction, that of
supervision and instruction, including the promulgation of proper
rules and regulations and the formulation and publication of proper
instructions for their guidance in cases where such rules and
regulations and instructions are necessary. To repeat, it was found by
the trial court, and that finding is fully sustained by the record, that it
was the custom of the driver who operated the machine on the night
of the accident, to approach and pass over railroad crossings without
adequate precautions, and that such custom was known to and had
been sanctioned by the officials of the taxicab company, the president
of the company testifying that none of its drivers, especially the one
who operated the car on the night of the accident, were accustomed to
stop or even reduce speed or take any other precaution in
approaching and passing over railroad crossings, no matter of what
nature, unless they heard "the signal of a car." He testified that he
himself had ridden behind several of his drivers, among them the one
who handled the automobile on the night of the accident, and that it
was settled practice, to which he made no objection and as to which
he gave no instructions, to approach and pass over railroad crossings
without any effort to ascertain the proximity of a train. These facts
and circumstances bring the case within the doctrine enunciated in
the Litonjua case to which reference has already been made, and, at
the same time, remove it from that class of cases governed by
Johnson vs. David. Not only has the defendant taxicab company
failed to rebut the presumption of negligence arising from the
carelessness of its servant, but it has, in effect, made those negligent
acts its own by having observed and known the custom of its drivers
without disapproving it and without issuing instructions designed to
supersede it.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
We are of the opinion that the trial court erred in fixing the amount of
damages which the plaintiffs suffered. Under the law, each of the
plaintiffs, is entitled to recover the time, doctors' bills and hospital
bills and hospital bills and medicines, and any other item of expense
which it was found necessary to undergo by reason of the damages
sustained.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
The plaintiff Butaro Yamada is entitled to be reimbursed for his
hospital bill of P49, for the P50 which he paid to Dr. Strahan, and for
the loss of time which he suffered at the rate of P100 a month. The
trial court allowed him for certain alleged fees of doctors and
expenses in hospitals and at hot springs in Japan. He was also
allowed P150 alleged by him to have been paid to a Japanese doctor
in Manila. We do not believe that the record warrants these
allowances. As to the expenses in Japan, we may say that the injury
occurred to plaintiff on the 2nd of January and he remained in Manila
for nearly 6 months before going to Japan. According to the
testimony of Dr. Strahan the plaintiff was in good physical condition
long before he left this country for Japan. His testimony is to the
effect that the plaintiff suffered no permanent injuries, the damage
being limited to temporary shocks and bruises, and that he would be
ready for his usual occupation in about 3 months. According to
plaintiff's own testimony he went back to work 2 months after the
injury, but, claiming he still felt pains, went to Japan. We do not
believe that we ought to accept the plaintiff's bare statement as to his
physical condition after leaving the Philippine Islands in defiance of
the testimony of Dr. Strahan as to his physical condition 3 months
after the injury was received and particularly in view of the fact that
he returned to work at the end of 2 months. As to the P150 alleged to
have been paid to a Japanese doctor in Manila, we have grave doubts
whether he had sufficiently proved that item of expenditure. He does
not give the name of the physician to whom he paid the money and
he presents no receipt or voucher from the person whom he paid. He
made no memorandum of the payment at the time or of the person to
whom he paid it or of the date on which it was paid. All of his
testimony relating to the items which constitute his damage was
based on a memorandum made from memory on the morning of the
trial. It seems to us that where the sources of knowledge are to so
large an extent within the knowledge and control of the person who
presents the evidence, he should be held rather strictly to presenting
the best evidence that the circumstances permit. If he had offered the
Japanese doctor as a witness or if he had even produced receipts from
him, the matter would have borne quite a different
aspect.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
We are accordingly of the opinion that the judgment in favor of this
plaintiff should consist simply of the loss of time, amounting to 2
months at P100 a month, his hospital bill of P49 and his doctor's bill
of P50, in all P299, with costs.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles
virtual law library
With respect to the plaintiff Takutaru Uyehara, the judgment in his
favor must be also modified. Concerning his condition we have
substantially the same testimony by the same doctor that we had in
the case of Yamada. There were no permanent injuries. The plaintiff
suffered merely from shock and bruises. He was quite recovered in 3
months. It appears that he was earning P200 a month at the time of
his injury and that his hospital expense, including attendance of a
physician, was P350. We are satisfied from the record that he is
entitled to P600 for 3 months' loss of wages and to P350 for hospital
expenses and medical attendance. As to the claim for P150 paid to a
Japanese doctor, we have in substance the same circumstances found
in connection with the claim of the plaintiff Yamada, - no name, no
date, no memorandum, no receipt; nothing but the testimony of the
plaintiff himself based upon date prepared from memory. It is worthy
of note also that both this plaintiff and plaintiff Yamada claim to have
paid exactly the same amount to Japanese doctors in
Manila.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
Judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the plaintiff Takutaru
Uyehara for the sum of P950, and
costs.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
With respect to the judgment in favor of the plaintiff Kenjiro
Karabayashi, we are clear that it must be reduced in amount. This
plaintiff was able, immediately after the accident occurred, to move
about readily an to assist his injured companions. He did not go to a
hospital, or, so far as appeared, consult a physician until some time
after the accident. He alleges that he paid to Japanese doctors P310
and to massage doctors P130, and that he paid P365 for medicines.
The injury was received on the 2d of January, 1913, and this caution
was commenced in October of the same year. It seem to us incredible
that the plaintiff, who suffered and suffers from no physical injury
testified to by any physician, should have paid out during that time
more than P800 for medicines and doctors. That sum exceeds the
sums claimed to have been paid out by the other plaintiffs, who were
so badly injured that they were carried in a semiconscious condition
to the hospital and were unable to move without assistance for some
days.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
This plaintiff complains of loss of memory as the only result of his
injuries and claims that he is unable to obtain a salary equivalent to
that which he was receiving before the accident. He presents no
evidence of such loss of memory except his own statement, his
physical condition at the time of the trial being apparently perfect and
there being at that time no evidence, as he himself admitted, of loss
of memory. He presented no doctor to testify as to services rendered,
indeed, he does not even furnish the name of the person to whom the
money was paid, and he shows no receipts and produces no evidence
except his own statement with respect to the amount paid out for
medicines. We believe that, under this testimony, no damages should
be allowed to this plaintiff except possibly salary for the short period
during which, by reason of shock, he may have been unable to render
active service. He testified that he lost two and one-half months' time,
during which he did not work at all, and that his services were worth
P160 a month.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law
library
The judgment of the Court of First Instance with respect to this
plaintiff, Kenjiro Karabayashi, is modified and judgment in his favor
and against the Bachrach Garage & Taxicab Co. for P400 is hereby
decreed, with costs.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law
library
It may be urged that the reductions in the amounts allowed the
several plaintiffs by the trial court are arbitrary, the evidence as to the
damages sustained being uncontradicted and the trial court having
based its judgment thereon. It is clear, however, that we are in no way
interfering with the rule so many times laid down by this court that
we will not interfere with the judgment of the trial court as to the
credibility of witnesses except where it appears that the court
overlooked or misapplied facts or circumstances of weight and
influence appearing in the case. Here the trial court seems to have
overlooked those facts and circumstances top which we have
adverted and which we have made the basis of the modification. It
nowhere appears in the decision of the trial court or elsewhere in the
record that it took any of those facts and circumstances into
consideration. So ordered.
MARTINEZ v VAN BUSKIRK
The facts found by the trial court are undisputed by either party in
this case. They are —
That on the 11th day of September, 1908, the plaintiff, Carmen Ong
de Martinez, was riding in a carromata on Calle Real, district of
Ermita, city of Manila, P.I., along the left-hand side of the street as
she was going, when a delivery wagon belonging to the defendant
used for the purpose of transportation of fodder by the defendant, and
to which was attached a pair of horses, came along the street in the
opposite direction to that the in which said plaintiff was proceeding,
and that thereupon the driver of the said plaintiff's carromata,
observing that the delivery wagon of the defendant was coming at
great speed, crowded close to the sidewalk on the left-hand side of
the street and stopped, in order to give defendant's delivery wagon an
opportunity to pass by, but that instead of passing by the defendant's
wagon and horses ran into the carromata occupied by said plaintiff
with her child and overturned it, severely wounding said plaintiff by
making a serious cut upon her head, and also injuring the carromata
itself and the harness upon the horse which was drawing it.
xxx xxx xxx
These facts are not dispute, but the defendant presented evidence to
the effect that the cochero, who was driving his delivery wagon at the
time the accident occurred, was a good servant and was considered a
safe and reliable cochero; that the delivery wagon had sent to deliver
some forage at Paco Livery Stable on Calle Herran, and that for the
purpose of delivery thereof the cochero driving the team as
defendant's employee tied the driving lines of the horses to the front
end of the delivery wagon and then went back inside of the wagon for
the purpose of unloading the forage to be delivered; that while
unloading the forage and in the act of carrying some of it out, another
vehicle drove by, the driver of which cracked a whip and made some
other noises, which frightened the horses attached to the delivery
wagon and they ran away, and the driver was thrown from the inside
of the wagon out through the rear upon the ground and was unable to
stop the horses; that the horses then ran up and on which street they
came into collision with the carromata in which the plaintiff, Carmen
Ong de Martinez, was riding.
The defendant himself was not with the vehicle on the day in
question.
Upon these facts the court below found the defendant guilty of
negligence and gave judgment against him for P442.50, with interest
thereon at the rate of 6 per cent per annum from the 17th day of
October, 1908, and for the costs of the action. The case is before us
on an appeal from that judgment.
There is no general law of negligence in the Philippine Islands except
that embodied in the Civil Code. The provisions of that code
pertinent to this case are —
Art. 1902. A person who by an act or omission causes damage to
another when there is fault or negligence shall be obliged to repair the
damage so done.
Art. 1903. The obligation imposed by preceding article is
demandable, not only for personal acts and omissions, but also for
those of the persons for whom they should be responsible.
The father, and on his death or incapacity the mother, is liable for the
damages caused by the minors who live with them.
Guardians are liable for the damages caused by minors or
incapacitated persons who are under their authority and live with
them.
Owners of directors of an establishment or enterprise are equally
liable for the damages caused by the employees in the service of the
branches in which the latter may be employed or on account of their
duties.
The State is liable in this sense when it acts through a special agent,
but not when the damages should have been caused by the official to
whom properly it pertained to do the act performed, in which case the
provisions of the preceding article shall be applicable.
Finally, masters or directors of arts and trades are liable for the
damages caused by their pupils or apprentices while they are under
their custody.
The liability referred to in this article shall cease when the persons
mentioned therein prove that they employed all the diligence of a
good father of a family to avoid the damage.
Passing the question whether or not an employer who has furnished a
gentle and tractable team and a trusty and capable driver is, under the
last paragraph of the above provisions, liable for the negligence of
such driver in handling the team, we are of the opinion that the
judgment must be reversed upon the ground that the evidence does
not disclose that the cochero was negligent.
While the law relating to negligence in this jurisdiction may possibly
be some what different from that in Anglo-Saxon countries, a
question we do not now discuss, the rules under which the fact of
negligence is determined are, nevertheless, generally the same. That
is to say, while the law designating the person responsible for a
negligent act may not be the same here as in many jurisdictions, the
law determining what is a negligent act is the same here, generally
speaking, as elsewhere. (Supreme court of Spain, 4 December, 1903;
16 May, 1893; 27 June, 1894; 9 April, 1896; 14 March, 1901; 2
March, 1904; 7 February, 1905; 16 June, 1905; 23 June, 1905; 13
April, 1903; 7 March, 1902; 12 June, 1900; 2 March, 1907; 18
March, 1898; 3 June, 1901.)
It appears from the undisputed evidence that the horses which caused
the damage were gentle and tractable; that the cochero was
experienced and capable; that he had driven one of the horses several
years and the other five or six months; that he had been in the habit,
during all that time, of leaving them in the condition in which they
were left on the day of the accident; that they had never run away up
to that time and there had been, therefore, no accident due to such
practice; that to leave the horses and assist in unloading the
merchandise in the manner described on the day of the accident was
the custom of all cochero who delivered merchandise of the character
of that which was being delivered by the cochero of the defendant on
the day in question, which custom was sanctioned by their employers.
In our judgment, the cochero of the defendant was not negligent in
leaving the horses in the manner described by the evidence in this
case, either under Spanish or American jurisprudence.
(Lynch vs. Nurdin, 1 Q. B., 422; Rumsey vs. Nelson, 58 Vt., 590;
Drake vs. Mount, 33 N. J. L., 442; Hoboken Land and Improvement
Co. vs. Lally, 48 N. J. L., 604; Wasmer vs. D. L. & W. R. R. Co., 80
N. Y., 212.) lawphi1.net
In the case of Hayman vs. Hewitt (Peake N. P. Cas., pt. 2, p. 170),
Lord Kenyon said:
He was performing his duty while removing the goods into the house,
and, if every person who suffered a cart to remain in the street while
he took goods out of it was obliged to employ another to look after
the horses, it would be impossible for the business of the metropolis
to go on.
In the case of Griggs vs. Fleckenstein (14 Minn., 81), the court said:
The degree of care required of the plaintiff, or those in charged of his
horse, at the time of the injury, is that which would be exercised by a
person of ordinary care and prudence under like circumstances. It can
not be said that the fact of leaving the horse unhitched is in itself
negligence. Whether it is negligence to leave a horse unhitched must
be depend upon the disposition of the horse; whether he was under
the observation and control of some person all the time, and many
other circumstances; and is a question to be determined by the jury
from the facts of each case.
In the case of Belles vs. Kellner (67 N. J. L., 255), it was held that it
was error on the part of the trial court to refuse to charge that "it is
not negligence for the driver of a quite, gentle horse to leave him
unhitched and otherwise unattended on the side of a public highways
while the driver is upon the sidewalk loading goods on the wagon."
The said court closed its opinion with these words:
There was evidence which could have fully justified the jury in
finding that the horse was quite and gentle, and that the driver was
upon the sidewalk loading goods on the wagon, at time of the alleged
injury, and that the horse had been used for years in that way without
accident. The refusal of the trial court to charge as requested left the
jury free to find was verdict against the defendant, although the jury
was convinced that these facts were proven.lawphil.net
In the case of Southworth vs. Ry. Co. (105 Mass., 342), it was held:
That evidence that a servant, whom traders employed to deliver
goods, upon stopping with his horse and wagon to deliver a parcel at
a house from fifty to a hundred rods from a railroad crossing, left the
horse unfastened for four or five minutes while he was in the house,
knowing that it was not afraid of cars, and having used it for three or
four months without ever hitching it or knowing it to start, is not
conclusive, as a matter of law, of a want of due care on his part.
The duty, a violation of which is claimed to be negligence in the
respect in question, is to exercise reasonable care and prudence.
Where reasonable care is employed in doing an act not itself illegal or
inherently likely to produce damage to others, there will be no
liability, although damage in fact ensues. (Milwaukee Ry.
Co. vs. Arms, 91 U. S., 489; Parrott vs. Wells, 15 Wall., 524;
Brown vs. Kendall, 6 Cushing, 292; Jackson Architectural Iron
Works vs.Hurlbut, 158 N. Y., 34 Westerfield vs. Levis, 43 La. An.,
63; Niosi vs. Empire Steam Laundry, 117 Cal., 257.)
The act of defendant's driver in leaving the horses in the manner
proved was not unreasonable or imprudent. Acts the performance of
which has not proved destructive or injurious and which have,
therefore, been acquiesced in by society for so long a time that they
have ripened into custom, can not be held to be themselves
unreasonable or imprudent. Indeed the very reason why they have
been permitted by society is that they beneficial rather than
prejudicial.itc-alf Accidents sometimes happen and injuries result
from the most ordinary acts of life. But such are not their natural or
customary results. To hold that, because such an act once resulted in
accident or injury, the actor is necessarily negligent, is to go far. The
fact that the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur is sometimes successfully
invoked in such a case, does not in any sense militate against the
reasoning presented. That maxim at most only creates aprima
facie case, and that only in the absence of proof of the circumstances
under which the act complained of was performed. It is something
invoked in favor of the plaintiff before defendant's case showing the
conditions and circumstances under which the injury occurred, the
creative reason for the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur disappears. This
is demonstrated by the case of Inland and Seaboard Costing Co. vs.
Tolson (139 U.S., 551), where the court said (p. 554):
. . . The whole effect of the instruction in question, as applied to the
case before the jury, was that if the steamboat, on a calm day and in
smooth water, was thrown with such force against a wharf properly
built, as to tear up some of the planks of the flooring, this would
be prima facie evidence of negligence on the part of the defendant's
agent in making the landing, unless upon the whole evidence in the
case this prima facie evidence was rebutted. As such damage to a
wharf is not ordinarily done by a steamboat under control of her
officers and carefully managed by them, evidence that such damage
was done in this case was prima facie, and, if unexplained, sufficient
evidence of negligence on their part, and the jury might properly be
so instructed.
There was presented in this case, and by the plaintiffs themselves, not
only the fact of the runway and the accident resulting therefrom, but
also the conditions under which the runaway occurred. Those
conditions showing of themselves that the defendant's cochero was
not negligent in the management of the horse, the prima facie case in
plaintiffs' favor, if any, was destroyed as soon as made.
It is a matter of common knowledge as well as proof that it is the
universal practice of merchants to deliver merchandise of the kind of
that being delivered at the time of the injury, in the manner in which
that was then being delivered; and that it is the universal practice to
leave the horses in the manner in which they were left at the time of
the accident. This is the custom in all cities. It has not been
productive of accidents or injuries. The public, finding itself
unprejudiced by such practice, has acquiesced for years without
objection. Ought the public now, through the courts, without prior
objection or notice, to be permitted to reverse the practice of decades
and thereby make culpable and guilty one who had every reason and
assurance to believe that he was acting under the sanction of the
strongest of all civil forces, the custom of a people? We think not.
The judgement is reversed, without special finding as to costs. So
ordered.
PEOPLE v VISTAN
The appellant was prosecuted in the Court of First Instance of Manila
for the crime of serious physical injuries through reckless imprudence
and sentenced to imprisonment for three months of arresto mayor,
with the corresponding accessory penalties and to pay the costs.
The complaint is as follows:
That on or about the 10th day of April, 1920, in the city of Manila,
Philippine Islands, while street car No. 203 of the Manila Electric
Railroad and Light Co. was receiving passengers at the intersection
of M. H. del Pilar and Isaac Peral Streets of this city, said accused,
who was then and there the conductor in charge of said street car, did
then and there wilfully, unlawfully, and feloniously and with reckless
imprudence signal the motorman to go ahead without minding and
without taking into account that one Hugo Borromeo, whom he could
then see was at that very moment about to board the car with one foot
on the running board, thereby causing the said Hugo Borromeo to be
thrown down by the jerk of the moving car and his foot overrun by
the rear wheels of said car No. 203 upon falling on the ground, with
the result that his left foot was crushed and injured to such an extent
as to require medical attendance and prevent the said offended party
from engaging in his habitual work for a period of more than ninety
days; that due to said accident Hugo Borromeo lost his left foot
which had to be amputated. Contrary to law.
It appears from the record that on April 10, 1920, after two sons of
the offended the street car No. 203 which had stopped at the
intersection of M. H. del Pilar and Isaac Peral Streets of this city, and
also in attempting to board the same car, the said Hugo Borromeo
with his right hand took a hold of the iron bar on the right side of the
only entrance door, and with the left the iron bar in the middle of the
entrance. When he had his right foot on the platform, the conductor in
charge of the car, the accused herein, gave the signal to start.
Thereupon the car suddenly moved forward with a jerk thus causing
his left hand to slip off while the right one was pinioned between the
iron bar and the woodwork upon which it was fixed and he was
unable to draw it out immediately due to the speed of the car. In the
meantime he was momentarily dragged along and when his knees
were touching the ground, he felt that his left foot had become numb,
unaware that his foot was overrun by the wheel, until he was on the
ground about 10 meters, more or less, from the place where the car
had started.
The defense tried to prove that the street car being in motion, the
offended party ran after it and attempted to board it, but unfortunately
missed the running board and upon falling down one of his feet was
caught by the wheels of the car. The witnesses who testified to this
fact undoubtedly referred to the fact related by the aggrieved party
himself when he gave the tails as to how he was for a time dragged
by the car. It was not necessary for the offended party to run after the
car in order to board it, as it was stopped when his two sons entered
it, behind whom he was with his hands holding the bars of the car,
and was then placing his right foot on the running board when the car
started in response to the signal to start given at that very moment by
the accused. The fact is that due probably to the abrupt motion of the
car in starting, the left hand of the offended party slipped off and his
right hand was caught between the iron bar and woodwork upon
which it was attached and having lost the equilibrium he was dragged
along for a short distance until his left foot was caught by the wheels
of the car. This fact, which was seen by the witness Lawson who was
some distance behind the car, might cause the impression that the
offended party was running after the car when he fell down, and, we
believe, the witness testified under this impression.
We believe it to be clear that at the time of boarding the car, the
offended party was watching the man who gave the signal to start,
that is, the conductor, and the latter, who, had his eyes toward the
door, seeing the nobody was alighting or boarding the car, rang the
bell, whereupon the car started. It is not improbable that when the
accused saw the last passenger with both hands clinging to the
holding device of the car and one foot on the running board, he
thought that the passenger had completely boarded the car and that is
why he gave the signal to start. The question that present itself is
whether or not the accused acted with reckless negligence as alleged
in the information.
In the case of U.S. vs. Gomez (R. G. No. 14068), 1 the accused was
convicted of the crime of homicide through reckless negligence. The
accused was the motorman of a street car that collided with a carabao
cart at the intersection of Concepcion and Arroceros Streets of the
city of Manila. As a result of the collision, one of the occupants of the
cart, Santos Alcartado, was thrown under the car and killed. In
discussing the responsibility of the accused, this court, among other
things, said:
Upon the other point, whether the negligence or imprudence of the
accused can properly be denominated rash it is to be observed that the
amount of care and diligence which a man is required to use in a
particular situation in order to avoid the imputation of negligence
varies with the obviousness of the risk. If the danger of doing injury
to the person or property of another by the pursuance of a certain line
of conduct is great, the individual who proposes to pursue that
particular course is bound to use great care in order to avoid the
foreseeable harm. On the other hand, if the danger is slight, only a
slight amount of care is required. It is thus seen that there are infinite
shades of care or diligence, from the slightest momentary thought or
transient glance of attention to the most vigilant anxiety and
solicitude, and whether a person is bound to use a high or a low
degree of care depends upon the situation presented in the particular
case. Now the term negligence is used to indicate the legal
delinquency which results wherever a man fails to exhibit the care
which he ought to exhibit, whether it be slight, ordinary or great; and
it is clear that in a situation where immediate danger to an individual
is indicated the requirement for the exercise of a high degree of care
is more exigent than where nothing more than possible harm to
inanimate things is concerned. As experience only too well teaches
collisions between cars and vehicles carrying people in the streets are
fraught with a high degree of danger to the passengers, and it results
that a high degree of care is required of those who have control of the
agencies involving such danger. The failure to use the requisite care
in such cases is properly denominated gross negligence or rash
imprudence if the actor, having at his command the means of
avoiding the harm, fails to avail himself of it.
The term "rash imprudence," as used in the Spanish Code, would
seem to be approximately equivalent to the "gross negligence" of the
common law; and as was once observed by a brilliant English judge,
gross negligence is only negligence with a vituperative epithet (Rolfe,
B., in Wilson vs. Brett [1843], Mees. and Wels., 113). The same may
substantially be said of the term "rash imprudence" in Spanish law. It
is imprudence with a vituperative epithet. In common usage the word
"rash" seems sometimes to imply a wanton disregard of
consequences, indicative of a state of mind bordering upon deliberate
intention to inflict a positive injury. The legal import of the
expression is in our opinion of somewhat greater latitude, since it
wholly excludes the idea of malice and under conditions more readily
felt than defined is satisfied by proof of mere lack of foresight.
"Reckless imprudence consists in doing or not doing voluntarily, but
without malice, an act, from which material injury results due to lack
of foresight, unexcusable on the part of the person executing or
omitting to do it." (Decision of the supreme court of Spain, May 14,
1904, referred to by Viada in his Commentaries, 5 Supp., 457.)
"Reckless imprudence, punishable as crime, consists in the lack of
prevision and rational precaution with which all acts must be
executed, from which probable injury or damage may easily result."
(Decision of the supreme court of Spain, March 16, 1905, referred to
by Viada in his Commentaries, 5 Supp., 461.)
The distinction between simple imprudence, which is a constitutive
element of a misdemeanor under article 590 of the Penal Code, and
rash imprudence, which is a constitutive element of the offense
punishable under article 580 of the same Code, is not clearly
indicated in the books; but we think the weight of authority will be
found to support the proposition that where immediate personal harm,
preventable in the exercise of reasonable care, is threatened to a
human being by reason of a course of conduct which is being pursued
by another, and the danger is visible and consciously appreciated by
the actor, the failure to use reasonable care to prevent the threatened
injury constitutes reckless negligence.
Simple imprudence, on the other hand, is a mere lack of prevision in
a situation where either the threatened harm is not immediate or the
danger is not openly visible. The following is cited in Viada as a case
of simple imprudence: A man goes hunting and raises his gun to
shoot at a bird. Upon lowering the gun without firing, he negligently
fails to lower the hammer; and while the gun is being thus carried
cocked, it is accidentally discharged with the result that a person
casually in range of the gun is wounded. As will be seen in this case,
although there is imprudence on the part of the hunter, there is not a
conscious advertance to the danger to which the other person is being
subjected. Said the court:
"The fact set forth as proved in the first finding of the court below is
not sufficiently such as would indicate real reckless imprudence on
the part of Cecilio Mogarra, inasmuch as the act of lowering his gun
ad putting it under his arm without lowering the hammer, which
constitute negligence, does not show grave fault, but only mere lack
of foresight chargeable as simple imprudence." (Decision of the
supreme court of Spain, March 12, 1904, referred to by Viada in his
Commentaries, 5 Supp., 457.)
Taking into consideration all the circumstances of the case at bar, we
are of the opinion that the act of the accused in giving the order to
start the car, when the offended party had his hands already on the
holding devices of the car and his foot on the running board,
constitutes carelessness or negligence, but does not show grave fault
amounting to reckless imprudence and the accused having acted with
simple imprudence or negligence, has incurred the penalty provided
by article 590, case No. 4, of the Penal Code.
The judgment appealed from is modified, and the accused and
appellant is sentenced to pay a fine of 60 pesetas and to suffer the
corresponding subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency and to
censure, with the costs of this instance de oficio. So ordered.
NEGROS NAVIGATION v CA
This is a petition for review on certiorari of the decision of the Court
of Appeals affirming with modification the Regional Trial Court's
award of damages to private respondents for the death of relatives as
a result of the sinking of petitioner's vessel.
In April of 1980, private respondent Ramon Miranda purchased from
the Negros Navigation Co., Inc. four special cabin tickets (#74411,
74412, 74413 and 74414) for his wife, daughter, son and niece who
were going to Bacolod City to attend a family reunion. The tickets
were for Voyage No. 457-A of the M/V Don Juan, leaving Manila at
1:00 p.m. on April 22, 1980.
The ship sailed from the port of Manila on schedule.
At about 10:30 in the evening of April 22, 1980, the Don
Juan collided off the Tablas Strait in Mindoro, with the
M/T Tacloban City, an oil tanker owned by the Philippine National
Oil Company (PNOC) and the PNOC Shipping and Transport
Corporation (PNOC/STC). As a result, the M/V Don Juan sank.
Several of her passengers perished in the sea tragedy. The bodies of
some of the victims were found and brought to shore, but the four
members of private respondents' families were never found.
Private respondents filed a complaint on July 16, 1980 in the
Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 34, against the Negros
Navigation, the Philippine National Oil Company (PNOC), and the
PNOC Shipping and Transport Corporation (PNOC/STC), seeking
damages for the death of Ardita de la Victoria Miranda, 48, Rosario
V. Miranda, 19, Ramon V. Miranda, Jr., 16, and Elfreda de la
Victoria, 26.
In its answer, petitioner admitted that private respondents purchased
ticket numbers 74411, 74412, 74413 and 74414; that the ticket
numbers were listed in the passenger manifest; and that the Don
Juan left Pier 2, North Harbor, Manila on April 22, 1980 and sank
that night after being rammed by the oil tanker M/T Tacloban City,
and that, as a result of the collision, some of the passengers of the
M/V Don Juan died. Petitioner, however, denied that the four
relatives of private respondents actually boarded the vessel as shown
by the fact that their bodies were never recovered. Petitioner further
averred that the Don Juan was seaworthy and manned by a full and
competent crew, and that the collision was entirely due to the fault of
the crew of the M/T Tacloban City.
On January 20, 1986, the PNOC and petitioner Negros Navigation
Co., Inc. entered into a compromise agreement whereby petitioner
assumed full responsibility for the payment and satisfaction of all
claims arising out of or in connection with the collision and releasing
the PNOC and the PNOC/STC from any liability to it. The agreement
was subsequently held by the trial court to be binding upon petitioner,
PNOC and PNOC/STC. Private respondents did not join in the
agreement.
After trial, the court rendered judgment on February 21, 1991, the
dispositive portion of which leads as follows:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, judgment is hereby
rendered in favor of the plaintiffs, ordering all the defendants to pay
jointly and severally to the plaintiffs damages as follows:
To Ramon Miranda:
P42,025.00 for actual damages;
P152,654.55 as compensatory damages for loss of
earning capacity of his wife;
P90,000.00 as compensatory damages for wrongful
death of three (3) victims;
P300,000.00 as moral damages;
P50,000.00 as exemplary damages, all in the total
amount of P634,679.55; and
P40,000.00 as attorney's fees.
To Spouses Ricardo and Virginia de la Victoria:
P12,000.00 for actual damages;
P158,899.00 as compensatory damages for loss of
earning capacity;
P30,000.00 as compensatory damages for wrongful
death;
P100,000.00 as moral damages;
P20,000.00 as exemplary damages, all in the total
amount of P320,899.00; and
P15,000.00 as attorney's fees.
On appeal, the Court of Appeals1 affirmed the decision of the
Regional Trial Court with modification —
1. Ordering and sentencing defendants-appellants, jointly and
severally, to pay plaintiff-appellee Ramon Miranda the amount of
P23,075.00 as actual damages instead of P42,025.00;
2. Ordering and sentencing defendants-appellants, jointly and
severally, to pay plaintiff-appellee Ramon Miranda the amount of
P150,000.00, instead of P90,000.00, as compensatory damages for
the death of his wife and two children;
3. Ordering and sentencing defendants-appellants, jointly and
severally, to pay plaintiffs-appellees Dela Victoria spouses the
amount of P50,000.00, instead of P30,000.00, as compensatory
damages for the death of their daughter Elfreda Dela Victoria;
Hence this petition, raising the following issues:
(1) whether the members of private respondents' families were
actually passengers of the Don Juan;
(2) whether the ruling in Mecenas v. Court of Appeals,2 finding the
crew members of petitioner to be grossly negligent in the
performance of their duties, is binding in this case;
(3) whether the total loss of the M/V Don Juan extinguished
petitioner's liability; and
(4) whether the damages awarded by the appellate court are
excessive, unreasonable and unwarranted.
First. The trial court held that the fact that the victims were
passengers of the M/V Don Juan was sufficiently proven by private
respondent Ramon Miranda, who testified that he purchased tickets
numbered 74411, 74412, 74413, and 74414 at P131.30 each from the
Makati office of petitioner for Voyage No. 47-A of the M/V Don
Juan, which was leaving Manila on April 22, 1980. This was
corroborated by the passenger manifest (Exh. E) on which the
numbers of the tickets and the names of Ardita Miranda and her
children and Elfreda de la Victoria appear.
Petitioner contends that the purchase of the tickets does not
necessarily mean that the alleged victims actually took the trip.
Petitioner asserts that it is common knowledge that passengers
purchase tickets in advance but do not actually use them. Hence,
private respondent should also prove the presence of the victims on
the ship. The witnesses who affirmed that the victims were on the
ship were biased and unreliable.
This contention is without merit. Private respondent Ramon Miranda
testified that he personally took his family and his niece to the vessel
on the day of the voyage and stayed with them on the ship until it was
time for it to leave. There is no reason he should claim members of
his family to have perished in the accident just to maintain an action.
People do not normally lie about so grave a matter as the loss of dear
ones. It would be more difficult for private respondents to keep the
existence of their relatives if indeed they are alive than it is for
petitioner to show the contrary. Petitioner's only proof is that the
bodies of the supposed victims were not among those recovered from
the site of the mishap. But so were the bodies of the other passengers
reported missing not recovered, as this Court noted in
the Mecenas3 case.
Private respondent Miranda's testimony was corroborated by Edgardo
Ramirez. Ramirez was a seminarian and one of the survivors of the
collision. He testified that he saw Mrs. Miranda and Elfreda de la
Victoria on the ship and that he talked with them. He knew Mrs.
Miranda who was his teacher in the grade school. He also knew
Elfreda who was his childhood friend and townmate. Ramirez said he
was with Mrs. Miranda and her children and niece from 7:00 p.m.
until 10:00 p.m. when the collision happened and that he in fact had
dinner with them. Ramirez said he and Elfreda stayed on the deck
after dinner and it was there where they were jolted by the collision
of the two vessels. Recounting the moments after the collision,
Ramirez testified that Elfreda ran to fetch Mrs. Miranda. He escorted
her to the room and then tried to go back to the deck when the lights
went out. He tried to return to the cabin but was not able to do so
because it was dark and there was a stampede of passengers from the
deck.
Petitioner casts doubt on Ramirez' testimony, claiming that Ramirez
could not have talked with the victims for about three hours and not
run out of stories to tell, unless Ramirez had a "storehouse" of stories.
But what is incredible about acquaintances thrown together on a long
journey staying together for hours on end, in idle conversation
precisely to while the hours away?
Petitioner also points out that it took Ramirez three (3) days before he
finally contacted private respondent Ramon Miranda to tell him about
the fate of his family. But it is not improbable that it took Ramirez
three days before calling on private respondent Miranda to tell him
about the last hours of Mrs. Miranda and her children and niece, in
view of the confusion in the days following the collision as rescue
teams and relatives searched for survivors.
Indeed, given the facts of this case, it is improper for petitioner to
even suggest that private respondents' relatives did not board the ill-
fated vessel and perish in the accident simply because their bodies
were not recovered.
Second. In finding petitioner guilty of negligence and in failing to
exercise the extraordinary diligence required of it in the carriage of
passengers, both the trial court and the appellate court relied on the
findings of this Court in Mecenas v. Intermediate Appellate
Court,4 which case was brought for the death of other passengers. In
that case it was found that although the proximate cause of the
mishap was the negligence of the crew of the M/T Tacloban City, the
crew of the Don Juan was equally negligent as it found that the
latter's master, Capt. Rogelio Santisteban, was playing mahjong at the
time of collision, and the officer on watch, Senior Third Mate
Rogelio De Vera, admitted that he failed to call the attention of
Santisteban to the imminent danger facing them. This Court found
that Capt. Santisteban and the crew of the M/V Don Juan failed to
take steps to prevent the collision or at least delay the sinking of the
ship and supervise the abandoning of the ship.
Petitioner Negros Navigation was found equally negligent in
tolerating the playing of mahjong by the ship captain and other crew
members while on board the ship and failing to keep the M/V Don
Juan seaworthy so much so that the ship sank within 10 to 15
minutes of its impact with the M/T Tacloban City.
In addition, the Court found that the Don Juan was overloaded. The
Certificate of Inspection, dated August 27, 1979, issued by the
Philippine Coast Guard Commander at Iloilo City stated that the total
number of persons allowed on the ship was 864, of whom 810 are
passengers, but there were actually 1,004 on board the vessel when it
sank, 140 persons more than the maximum number that could be
safely carried by it.
Taking these circumstances together, and the fact that the M/V Don
Juan, as the faster and better-equipped vessel, could have avoided a
collision with the PNOC tanker, this Court held that even if
the Tacloban City had been at fault for failing to observe an
internationally-recognized rule of navigation, the Don Juan was
guilty of contributory negligence. Through Justice Feliciano, this
Court held:
The grossness of the negligence of the "Don Juan" is underscored
when one considers the foregoing circumstances in the context of the
following facts: Firstly, the "Don Juan" was more than twice as fast
as the "Tacloban City." The "Don Juan's" top speed was 17 knots;
while that of the "Tacloban City" was 6.3. knots. Secondly, the "Don
Juan" carried the full complement of officers and crew members
specified for a passenger vessel of her class. Thirdly, the "Don Juan"
was equipped with radar which was functioning that night. Fourthly,
the "Don Juan's officer on-watch had sighted the "Tacloban City" on
his radar screen while the latter was still four (4) nautical miles away.
Visual confirmation of radar contact was established by the "Don
Juan" while the "Tacloban City" was still 2.7 miles away. In the total
set of circumstances which existed in the instant case, the "Don
Juan," had it taken seriously its duty of extraordinary diligence, could
have easily avoided the collision with the "Tacloban City." Indeed,
the "Don Juan" might well have avoided the collision even if it had
exercised ordinary diligence merely.
It is true that the "Tacloban City" failed to follow Rule 18 of the
International Rules of the Road which requires two (2) power-driven
vessels meeting end on or nearly end on each to alter her course to
starboard (right) so that each vessel may pass on the port side (left) of
the other. The "Tacloban City," when the two (2) vessels were only
three-tenths (0.3) of a mile apart, turned (for the second time) 15° to
port side while the "Don Juan" veered hard to starboard. . . . [But]
"route observance" of the International Rules of the Road will not
relieve a vessel from responsibility if the collision could have been
avoided by proper care and skill on her part or even by a departure
from the rules.
In the petition at bar, the "Don Juan" having sighted the "Tacloban
City" when it was still a long way off was negligent in failing to take
early preventive action and in allowing the two (2) vessels to come to
such close quarters as to render the collision inevitable when there
was no necessity for passing so near to the "Tacloban City" as to
create that hazard or inevitability, for the "Don Juan" could choose its
own distance. It is noteworthy that the "Tacloban City," upon turning
hard to port shortly before the moment of collision, signalled its
intention to do so by giving two (2) short blasts with its horn. The
"Don Juan" gave no answering horn blast to signal its own intention
and proceeded to turn hard to starboard.
We conclude that Capt. Santisteban and Negros Navigation are
properly held liable for gross negligence in connection with the
collision of the "Don Juan" and "Tacloban City" and the sinking of
the "Don Juan" leading to the death of hundreds of passengers. . . . 5
Petitioner criticizes the lower court's reliance on the Mecenas case,
arguing that, although this case arose out of the same incident as that
involved in Mecenas, the parties are different and trial was conducted
separately. Petitioner contends that the decision in this case should be
based on the allegations and defenses pleaded and evidence adduced
in it or, in short, on the record of this case.
The contention is without merit. What petitioner contends may be
true with respect to the merits of the individual claims against
petitioner but not as to the cause of the sinking of its ship on April 22,
1980 and its liability for such accident, of which there can only be
one truth. Otherwise, one would be subscribing to the sophistry: truth
on one side of the Pyrenees, falsehood on the other!
Adherence to the Mecenas case is dictated by this Court's policy of
maintaining stability in jurisprudence in accordance with the legal
maxim "stare decisis et non quieta movere" (Follow past precedents
and do not disturb what has been settled.) Where, as in this case, the
same questions relating to the same event have been put forward by
parties similarly situated as in a previous case litigated and decided
by a competent court, the rule of stare decisis is a bar to any attempt
to relitigate the same issue.6 In Woulfe v. Associated Realties
Corporation,7 the Supreme Court of New Jersey held that where
substantially similar cases to the pending case were presented and
applicable principles declared in prior decisions, the court was bound
by the principle of stare decisis. Similarly, in State ex rel. Tollinger
v. Gill,8 it was held that under the doctrine of stare decisis a ruling is
final even as to parties who are strangers to the original proceeding
and not bound by the judgment under the res judicata doctrine. The
Philadelphia court expressed itself in this wise: "Stare decisis simply
declares that, for the sake of certainty, a conclusion reached in one
case should be applied to those which follow, if the facts are
substantially the same, even though the parties may be
different."9 Thus, in J.M. Tuason v. Mariano, supra, this Court relied
on its rulings in other cases involving different parties in sustaining
the validity of a land title on the principle of "stare decisis et non
quieta movere."
Indeed, the evidence presented in this case was the same as those
presented in the Mecenas case, to wit:
Document Mecenas case This case
Decision of Commandant, Exh. 10 10 Exh. 11-B-NN/X
Phil. Coast Guard
in BMI Case No.
415-80 dated 3/26/81
Decision of the Minister Exh. 11 11 Exh. ZZ
of National Defense
dated 3/12/82
Resolution on the Exh. 13 12 Exh. AAA
motion for reconsideration (private
of the decision of the respondents)
Minister of National
defense dated 7/27/84
Certificate of Exh. 1-A 13 Exh. 19-NN
inspection dated
8/27/79
Certificate of Stability Exh. 6-A 14 Exh. 19-D-NN
dated 12/16/76
Nor is it true that the trial court merely based its decision on
the Mecenas case. The trial court made its own independent findings
on the basis of the testimonies of witnesses, such as Senior Third
Mate Rogelio de Vera, who incidentally gave substantially the same
testimony on petitioner's behalf before the Board of Marine Inquiry.
The trial court agreed with the conclusions of the then Minister of
National Defense finding both vessels to be negligent.
Third. The next issue is whether petitioner is liable to pay damages
notwithstanding the total loss of its ship. The issue is not one of first
impression. The rule is well-entrenched in our jurisprudence that a
shipowner may be held liable for injuries to passengers
notwithstanding the exclusively real and hypothecary nature of
maritime law if fault can be attributed to the shipowner. 15
In Mecenas, this Court found petitioner guilty of negligence in (1)
allowing or tolerating the ship captain and crew members in playing
mahjong during the voyage, (2) in failing to maintain the vessel
seaworthy and (3) in allowing the ship to carry more passengers than
it was allowed to carry. Petitioner is, therefore, clearly liable for
damages to the full extent.
Fourth. Petitioner contends that, assuming that the Mecenas case
applies, private respondents should be allowed to claim only
P43,857.14 each as moral damages because in the Mecenas case, the
amount of P307,500.00 was awarded to the seven children of the
Mecenas couple. Under petitioner's formula, Ramon Miranda should
receive P43,857.14, while the De la Victoria spouses should receive
P97,714.28.
Here is where the principle of stare decisis does not apply in view of
differences in the personal circumstances of the victims. For that
matter, differentiation would be justified even if private respondents
had joined the private respondents in the Mecenas case. The doctrine
of stare decisis works as a bar only against issues litigated in a
previous case. Where the issue involved was not raised nor presented
to the court and not passed upon by the court in the previous case, the
decision in the previous case is not stare decisis of the question
presently presented. 16 The decision in the Mecenas case relates to
damages for which petitioner was liable to the claimants in that case.
In the case at bar, the award of P300,000.00 for moral damages is
reasonable considering the grief petitioner Ramon Miranda suffered
as a result of the loss of his entire family. As a matter of fact, three
months after the collision, he developed a heart condition
undoubtedly caused by the strain of the loss of his family. The
P100,000.00 given to Mr. and Mrs. de la Victoria is likewise
reasonable and should be affirmed.
As for the amount of civil indemnity awarded to private respondents,
the appellate court's award of P50,000.00 per victim should be
sustained. The amount of P30,000.00 formerly set in De Lima
v. Laguna Tayabas Co., 17 Heirs of Amparo delos Santos v. Court of
Appeals, 18 and Philippine Rabbit Bus Lines, Inc. v. Intermediate
Appellate Court 19as benchmark was subsequently increased to
P50,000.00 in the case of Sulpicio Lines, Inc. v. Court of
Appeals, 20which involved the sinking of another interisland ship on
October 24, 1988.
We now turn to the determination of the earning capacity of the
victims. With respect to Ardita Miranda, the trial court awarded
damages computed as follows: 21
In the case of victim Ardita V. Miranda whose age at the time of the
accident was 48 years, her life expectancy was computed to be 21.33
years, and therefore, she could have lived up to almost 70 years old.
Her gross earnings for 21.33 years based on P10,224.00 per annum,
would be P218,077.92. Deducting therefrom 30% as her living
expenses, her net earnings would be P152,654.55, to which plaintiff
Ramon Miranda is entitled to compensatory damages for the loss of
earning capacity of his wife. In considering 30% as the living
expenses of Ardita Miranda, the Court takes into account the fact that
plaintiff and his wife were supporting their daughter and son who
were both college students taking Medicine and Law respectively.
In accordance with the ruling in Villa-Rey Transit, Inc. v. Court of
Appeals, 22 we think the life expectancy of Ardita Miranda was
correctly determined to be 21.33 years, or up to age 69. Petitioner
contends, however, that Mrs. Miranda would have retired from her
job as a public school teacher at 65, hence her loss of earning
capacity should be reckoned up to 17.33 years only.
The accepted formula for determining life expectancy is 2/3
multiplied by (80 minus the age of the deceased). It may be that in
the Philippines the age of retirement generally is 65 but, in
calculating the life expectancy of individuals for the purpose of
determining loss of earning capacity under Art. 2206(1) of the Civil
Code, it is assumed that the deceased would have earned income even
after retirement from a particular job. In this case, the trial court took
into account the fact that Mrs. Miranda had a master's degree and a
good prospect of becoming principal of the school in which she was
teaching. There was reason to believe that her income would have
increased through the years and she could still earn more after her
retirement, e.g., by becoming a consultant, had she not died. The
gross earnings which Mrs. Miranda could reasonably be expected to
earn were it not for her untimely death was, therefore, correctly
computed by the trial court to be P218,077.92 (given a gross annual
income of P10,224.00 and life expectancy of 21.33 years).
Petitioner contends that from the amount of gross earnings, 60%
should be deducted as necessary living expenses, not merely 30% as
the trial court allowed. Petitioner contends that 30% is unrealistic,
considering that Mrs. Miranda's earnings would have been subject to
taxes, social security deductions and inflation.
We agree with this contention. In Villa-Rey Transit, Inc. v. Court of
Appeals, 23 the Court allowed a deduction of P1,184.00 for living
expenses from the P2,184.00 annual salary of the victim, which is
roughly 54.2% thereof. The deceased was 29 years old and a training
assistant in the Bacnotan Cement Industries. In People
v. Quilation, 24 the deceased was a 26-year old laborer earning a daily
wage. The court allowed a deduction of P120,000.00 which was
51.3% of his annual gross earnings of P234,000.00. In People
v. Teehankee, 25 the court allowed a deduction of P19,800.00, roughly
42.4% thereof from the deceased's annual salary of P46,659.21. The
deceased, Maureen Hultman, was 17 years old and had just received
her first paycheck as a secretary. In the case at bar, we hold that a
deduction of 50% from Mrs. Miranda's gross earnings (P218,077.92)
would be reasonable, so that her net earning capacity should be
P109,038.96. There is no basis for supposing that her living expenses
constituted a smaller percentage of her gross income than the living
expenses in the decided cases. To hold that she would have used only
a small part of her income for herself, a larger part going to the
support of her children would be conjectural and unreasonable.
As for Elfreda de la Victoria, the trial court found that, at the time of
her death, she was 26 years old, a teacher in a private school in
Malolos, Bulacan, earning P6,192.00 per annum. Although a
probationary employee, she had already been working in the school
for two years at the time of her death and she had a general efficiency
rating of 92.85% and it can be presumed that, if not for her untimely
death, she would have become a regular teacher. Hence, her loss of
earning capacity is P111,456.00, computed as follows:
net earning = life x gross less reasonable
capacity (x) expectancy annual & necessary
income living expenses
(50%)
x = [2(80-26)] x [P6,192.00 - P3,096.00]
————
3 Philippines, is the safe and reliable carriage of people and goods by
= 36 x 3,096.00
= P111,456.00
On the other hand, the award of actual damages in the amount of
P23,075.00 was determined by the Court of Appeals on the basis
receipts submitted by private respondents. This amount is reasonable
considering the expenses incurred by private respondent Miranda in
organizing three search teams to look for his family, spending for
transportation in going to places such as Batangas City and Iloilo,
where survivors and the bodies of other victims were found, making
long distance calls, erecting a monument in honor of the four victims,
spending for obituaries in the Bulletin Today and for food, masses
and novenas.
Petitioner's contention that the expenses for the erection of a
monument and other expenses for memorial services for the victims
should be considered included in the indemnity for death awarded to
private respondents is without merit. Indemnity for death is given to
compensate for violation of the rights of the deceased, i.e., his right to
life and physical integrity. 26 On the other hand, damages incidental
to or arising out of such death are for pecuniary losses of the
beneficiaries of the deceased.
As for the award of attorney's fees, we agree with the Court of
Appeals that the amount of P40,000.00 for private respondent Ramon
Miranda and P15,000.00 for the de la Victoria spouses is justified.
The appellate court correctly held:
The Mecenas case cannot be made the basis for determining the
award for attorney's fees. The award would naturally vary or differ in
each case. While it is admitted that plaintiff-appellee Ramon Miranda
who is himself a lawyer, represented also plaintiffs-appellees Dela
Victoria spouses, we note that separate testimonial evidence were
adduced by plaintiff-appellee Ramon Miranda (TSN, February 26,
1982, p. 6) and plaintiffs-appellees spouses Dela Victoria (TSN,
August 13, 1981, p. 43). Considering the amount of work and effort
put into the case as indicated by the voluminous transcripts of
stenographic notes, we find no reason to disturb the award of
P40,000.00 for plaintiff-appellee Ramon Miranda and P15,000.00 for
plaintiffs-appellees Dela Victoria spouses. 27
The award of exemplary damages should be increased to
P300,000.00 for Ramon Miranda and P100,000.00 for the de la
Victoria spouses in accordance with our ruling in the Mecenas case:
Exemplary damages are designed by our civil law to permit the
courts to reshape behaviour that is socially deleterious in its
consequence by creating negative incentives or deterrents against
such behaviour. In requiring compliance with the standard of
extraordinary diligence, a standard which is in fact that of the highest
possible degree of diligence, from common carriers and in creating a
presumption of negligence against them, the law seeks to compel
them to control their employees, to tame their reckless instincts and
to force them to take adequate care of human beings and their
property. The Court will take judicial notice of the dreadful regularity
with which grievous maritime disasters occur in our waters with
massive loss of life. The bulk of our population is too poor to afford
domestic air transportation. So it is that notwithstanding the frequent
sinking of passenger vessels in our waters, crowds of people continue
to travel by sea. This Court is prepared to use the instruments given
to it by the law for securing the ends of law and public policy. One of
those instruments is the institution of exemplary damages; one of
those ends, of special importance in an archipelagic state like the
sea. 28
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED
with modification and petitioner is ORDERED to pay private
respondents damages as follows:
To private respondent Ramon Miranda:
P23,075.00 for actual damages;
P109,038.96 as compensatory damages for loss of
earning capacity of his wife;
P150,000.00 as compensatory damages for wrongful
death of three (3) victims;
P300,000.00 as moral damages;
P300,000.00 as exemplary damages, all in the total
amount of P882,113.96; and
P40,000.00 as attorney's fees.
To private respondents Spouses Ricardo and Virginia de la Victoria:
P12,000.00 for actual damages;
P111,456.00 as compensatory damages for loss of
earning capacity;
P50,000.00 as compensatory damages for wrongful
death;
P100,000.00 as moral damages;
P100,000.00 as exemplary damages, all in the total
amount of P373,456.00; and
P15,000.00 as attorney's fees.
Petitioners are further ordered to pay costs of suit.
In the event the Philippine National Oil Company and/or the PNOC
Shipping and Transport Corporation pay or are required to pay all or
a portion of the amounts adjudged, petitioner Negros Navigation Co.,
Inc. shall reimburse either of them such amount or amounts as either
may have paid, and in the event of failure of Negros Navigation Co.,
Inc., to make the necessary reimbursement, PNOC and/or
PNOC/STC shall be entitled to a writ of execution without need of
filing another action.
CANG v CULLEN
Before this Court is a Petition for Review under Rule 45 of the Rules
of Court assailing the Decision[1] dated December 2, 2002 and the
Resolution[2] dated February 23, 2004 of the Court of Appeals (CA)
in CA-G.R. CV No. 69841. In the assailed Decision, the CA reversed
and set aside the Decision[3] of the Regional Trial Court (RTC)
of Cebu, Branch 22, in Civil Case No. CEB-20504, an action for
damages.
The claim for damages was precipitated by a vehicular accident
involving a taxicab bearing Plate No. GVG-672, owned by petitioner
Stephen Cang and driven by petitioner George Nardo, and a
motorcycle owned by respondent Herminia Cullen and driven by
Guillermo Saycon.
On October 29, 1996, at about 3:10 p.m., Saycon was driving the
Honda motorcycle, with Plate No. LLC-A-4589, along P. del Rosario
Street, Cebu City, occupying the middle portion of the outer
lane. The taxi, on the other hand, was traveling on the inner lane and
slightly behind, but to the left of, the motorcycle. Respondent alleged
that between Sikatuna and D. Jakosalem Streets, the taxi veered to
the right and sideswiped the motorcycle, then attempted to speed
away. Peace officers near the scene flagged down the taxi. As a result
of the collision, Saycon was seriously injured.[4]
Petitioners, meanwhile, claimed that it was the motorcycle that
bumped into the taxi. Nardo narrated that he was driving the taxi on
the inner lane (near the center island) along P. del Rosario St.,
moving towards the intersection of D. Jakosalem St. When the
caution signal of the traffic light flashed, he immediately slowed
down. It was at that point that the motorcycle bumped into the taxis
rear.[5]
Respondent, as employer, out of compassion, paid all of Saycons
hospital and medical expenses amounting to P185,091.00.[6] She also
alleged that due to the injuries Saycon sustained, he was unable to
work. For humanitarian reasons, respondent had given Saycon an
amount equivalent to his wages from October 31, 1996 to May 30,
1997. She also gave Saycon P2,000.00 per month from June 1997
until he was able to return to work.[7]
On July 3, 1997, respondent filed a Complaint for damages against
petitioners praying that judgment be rendered ordering the latter to
pay, jointly and severally, P205,091.00 in actual damages; P2,000.00
per month from June 1997 up to the time Saycon would be able to
return to work, with 6% per annum interest from the date of
extrajudicial demand; P50,000.00 as exemplary damages; 20% of the
total amount by way of attorneys fees; P10,000.00 as acceptance
fee; P500.00 per court appearance, as appearance fee; P20,000.00 as
litigation expenses; and the cost of the suit.[8]
Petitioner Cang filed a Motion to Dismiss contending that the
complaint violated Presidential Decree No. 1508, or the Katarungang
Pambarangay Law. The motion was dismissed on September 24,
1997.[9]
Subsequently, petitioners filed their Answer with Counterclaims.
Cang averred that Nardo was not driving the taxi as the formers
employee, but that Nardo was leasing the taxi from
him.[10] Petitioners also claimed that Nardo did not sideswipe the
motorcycle driven by Saycon, nor did the latter speed away after the
incident. They maintained that, at the time of the impact, Nardos taxi
was on its proper lane and that it was the motorcycle that veered into
Nardos lane and bumped the taxi.[11] Further, they alleged that after
the impact, Nardo drove the taxi backward to where Saycon and the
motorcycle were slumped on the road. He then alighted from the taxi.
Meanwhile, two traffic enforcers had crossed the street. After
examining Saycons injuries, one of the enforcers ordered Nardo to
bring the former to a hospital. Nardo hesitated for a moment because
he wanted the enforcers to make a sketch of the accident first, to
show the exact positions of the vehicles at the time of the
accident. However, he was prevailed upon by the traffic enforcers to
bring Saycon to the hospital. Hence, it was not true that Nardo
attempted to speed away from the scene of the accident. Petitioner
Cang also claimed that Saycon was driving the motorcycle without
any protective headgear and that the latter was not authorized to drive
the motorcycle since he only had a students permit.[12] Petitioner
Cang prayed that the complaint be dismissed for lack of merit, for
lack of cause of action and for lack of legal capacity. He also prayed
for the award of P50,000.00 as moral damages, P20,000.00 as
exemplary damages, P10,000.00 as acceptance fee, P30,000.00 as
attorneys fees, P20,000.00 as litigation expenses, and P1,000.00 per
court appearance.[13]
After trial, the RTC ruled in petitioners favor. In its Decision[14] dated
January 31, 2000, the trial court disposed:

WHEREFORE, based upon the foregoing, judgment is hereby
rendered in favor of the defendants. Plaintiffs (sic) complaint is
hereby dismissed.
Defendants counterclaims are likewise denied.
No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.[15]
Respondent appealed the RTC Decision to the CA. On December 2,
2002, the CA promulgated the assailed Decision,[16] reversing the
RTC Decision, to wit:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the appealed decision dated
January 31, 2000 of the Regional Trial Court of Cebu, Branch 22 is
hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Defendants-appellees are
hereby ordered to pay plaintiff-appellant, jointly and severally[,] the
following:
1.) The sum of P166,197.08 as actual damages which were incurred
for the hospitalization and other medical expenses of plaintiff-
appellants driver Guillermo Saycon; and
`2.) The sum of P20,000.00 as exemplary damages.
SO ORDERED.[17]
Petitioners are now before this Court on Petition for Review seeking
the reversal of the CA Decision and its Resolution denying their
Motion for Reconsideration. They argue that the CA erred in
reversing the judgment rendered by the trial court; in giving credence
to the eyewitness testimony of Ike Aldemita, that petitioner Nardo
had overtaken the motorcycle driven by Saycon and, therefore, was
the negligent party; and in awarding damages to respondent. [18]
The petition is meritorious.
We note that the present Petition raises questions of fact. Whether a
person is negligent or not is a question of fact which we cannot
ordinarily pass upon in a petition for review on certiorari, as our
jurisdiction is limited to reviewing errors of law.[19]
However, although findings of fact of the CA are generally
conclusive on this Court, this rule admits of the following
exceptions:[20]
(1) the factual findings of the Court of Appeals and the trial court are
contradictory;
(2) the findings are grounded entirely on speculation, surmises or
conjectures;
(3) the inference made by the Court of Appeals from its findings of
fact is mainly mistaken, absurd or impossible;
(4) there is grave abuse of discretion in the appreciation of facts;
(5) the appellate court, in making its findings, goes beyond the issues
of the case and such findings are contrary to the admissions of both
appellant and appellee;
(6) the judgment of the Court of Appeals is premised on a
misapprehension of facts;
(7) the Court of Appeals fails to notice certain relevant facts which, if
properly considered, will justify a different conclusion; and
(8) the findings of fact of the Court of Appeals are contrary to
those of the trial court or are mere conclusions without citation of
specific evidence, or where the facts set forth by the petitioner are not
disputed by respondent, or where the findings of fact of the Court of
Appeals are premised on the absence of evidence but are contradicted
by the evidence on record.
Thus, when there are conflicting findings of fact by the CA on one
hand and by the trial court on the other, as in this case,[21] the Court
may give due course to petitions raising factual issues by way of
exception and only in the presence of extremely meritorious
circumstances.[22]
Contrary to the CAs ruling, we find that the RTC correctly
disregarded Aldemitas testimony. Between the RTC and the CA, it is
the formers assessment of the witnesses credibility that should
control.[23]
The trial court gave little credence to Aldemitas testimony, upon its
finding that:
On the other hand, multicab driver Aldemita contended that he saw
everything. He said that the motorcycle and the taxi overtook him. He
told the court during his testimony that the motorcycle was ahead of
the taxi. He further said that the motorcycle was nearer him (TSN,
February 13, 1998, Savellon, p. 4). The court finds him inconsistent.
If both were ahead of him and the motorcycle was ahead of the taxi,
then, the motorcycle could not be nearer him. Because if the
motorcycle was indeed nearer him, then, it could not have been ahead
of the taxi. But rather, the taxi was ahead of the motorcycle. But in a
later testimony, he said that they were beside each other (TSN, Feb.
12, 1998, Savellon, p. 17).
He also said that both tried to pass the lane which would fit only two
vehicles. He told the court that both vehicles were running fast at a
speed of more than 30 kph when the motorcycle was hit by the taxi. It
would seem to the court that both vehicles were racing each other.
Aldemita further said that in trying to pass the motorcycle, the taxi hit
the left handle bar of the motorcycle. The handle bar was twisted and
the motorcycle fell down to the left side. But if the taxi was indeed to
the left of the motorcycle and if it really swerved to the right and hit
the motorcycle the law of force would tell us that the motorcycle
would fall to the right after impact. It is the most logical direction for
the motorcycle to fall. If the taxi was indeed traveling at a fast speed
when it hit the motorcycle, the impact would not have only caused a
mere twisted handle and the motorcycle would not have only fallen
on its side as claimed by Aldemita. High speed impact would have
caused the motorcycle and its driver greater damage and would have
dislocated them much farther away than where it fell in this case.
He claimed that he was more or less ten (10) meters from the site of
the accident when it happened (TSN, Feb. 12, 1998, p. 12). The court
can, therefore, say that he was also quite far from the scene of the
accident and could not be that certain as to what really happened.
Aldemita also said that he signaled the taxi driver to stop (TSN, Feb.
12, 1998, Savellon, p. 6). However, later when asked, he said he
signaled the policeman to stop the taxi driver or not (sic). He also
claimed that he was near (sic) the motorcyclist than the policemen.
He further claimed that he was there at the scene of the accident to
help but later said he never saw the driver of the taxi (TSN, Feb. 12,
1998, Savellon, p. 17). The court finds this highly unusual for
somebody who claimed to be at the scene of the accident not to see
the driver who came out of his vehicle to reason out with the
responding enforcers. He said he was the one who removed the
motorcycle which pinned its driver and then helped carried (sic) the
driver to the taxi as told by the policeman (TSN, Feb. 12, 1998,
Savellon p. 7). But later, he said that somebody took his place in
carrying the victim because there were already many people (TSN,
Feb. 12, 1998, Savellon, p. 17). x x x.
xxxx
The court also cannot fail to notice the uncontroverted allegation of
Nardo during his testimony that Aldemita was not the person (the
multicab driver) he saw during the time of the accident. He claimed
that the person who testified in court last February 12, 1998, was not
the driver of the multicab who was at the scene of the accident that
fateful night (sic) of October 29, 1996 (TSN, Aug. 24, 1998, Pieras,
p. 12). Allegations and claims like this when not countered and
disproved would certainly cast doubt on the credibility of the subject
person and consequently, on his testimonies, too.
Based on the points, the court cannot help but find Aldemitas
testimony as uncertain and filled with so many inconsistencies. They
contradicted with each other at many instances. The court believes in
either of the two possibilities -- Aldemita did not really actually and
exactly see the whole incident or he was lying through his teeth.
Thus, the court cannot give so much weight to his testimony. [24]
The CA failed to refute the trial courts detailed analysis of the events
leading to the accident and what transpired thereafter. It merely said
that the lower court should have considered Aldemitas eyewitness
testimony.[25] The CA based its findings of the accident only on
Aldemitas account. It failed to consider all the other testimonial and
documentary evidence analyzed by the trial court, which substantially
controverted Aldemitas testimony.
In contrast, the trial court found Nardo more credible on the witness
stand. Thus:
During his testimonies, Nardo appeared to be consistent, sincere and
certain in his statements. He appeared to be acknowledgeable (sic) in
his work as a driver. He conveyed a definite degree of credibility
when he testified. The Court has decided to give more appreciation to
his testimonies.[26]
We are inclined to give greater weight to the trial courts assessment
of the two witnesses.
The findings of the trial court on the credibility of witnesses are
accorded great weight and respect even considered as conclusive and
binding on this Court[27] since the trial judge had the unique
opportunity to observe the witness firsthand and note his demeanor,
conduct and attitude under grueling examination.[28] Only the trial
judge can observe the furtive glance, blush of conscious shame,
hesitation, flippant or sneering tone, calmness, sigh of a witness, or
his scant or full realization of an oath all of which are useful aids for
an accurate determination of a witness honesty and sincerity. [29] He
can thus be expected to determine with reasonable discretion which
testimony is acceptable and which witness is worthy of belief.[30]
Absent any showing that the trial courts calibration of the credibility
of the witnesses was flawed, we are bound by its assessment. [31] This
Court will sustain such findings unless it can be shown that the trial
court ignored,[32] overlooked, misunderstood,[33] misappreciated,[34] or
misapplied[35] substantial facts and circumstances, which, if
considered, would materially affect the result of the case. [36]
We find no such circumstances in this case. The trial courts
meticulous and dispassionate analysis of the facts of the case is
noteworthy. It succeeded in presenting a clear and logical picture of
the events even as it admitted that the resolution of the case was
made more difficult by the inefficiencies, indifference, ineptitude,
and dishonesty of the local law enforcers, and the litigants, [37] which
left the court without an official sketch of the accident,[38] with no
photographs or any other proof of the damage to the respondents
motorcycle,[39] with an altered police report,[40] and with the baffling
matter of the victims drivers license being issued two days after the
accident took place when the victim was supposed to be in the
hospital.[41]
These handicaps notwithstanding, the trial court methodically related
in detail all the testimonial and documentary evidence presented, and
made the most rational analysis of what truly happened on the day of
the incident.
The trial court categorically found that it was not the taxi that
bumped the motorcycle. It concluded that based on the evidence
presented before the court, it was the motorcycle that bumped the
taxi.[42] It also found that at the time of the accident, Saycon, the
driver of the motorcycle, did not have a license but only had a student
drivers permit. Further, Saycon was not wearing the proper protective
headgear and was speeding.[43] Hence, the trial court concluded:
It was really pitiful that Saycon suffered for what he did. But then, he
has only himself to blame for his sad plight. He had been careless in
driving the motorcycle without a helmet. For speeding. (sic) For
driving alone with only a student permit. (sic) For causing the
accident. (sic) If the driver was found violating traffic rules, a legal
presumption that he was negligent arises.[44]
Section 30 of Republic Act No. 4136, or the Land Transportation and
Traffic Code, provides:
Sec. 30. Student-drivers permit Upon proper application and the
payment of the fee prescribed in accordance with law, the Director or
his deputies may issue student-drivers permits, valid for one year to
persons not under sixteen years of age, who desire to learn to operate
motor vehicles.
A student-driver who fails in the examination on a professional or
non-professional license shall continue as a student-driver and shall
not be allowed to take another examination at least one month
thereafter. No student-driver shall operate a motor vehicle, unless
possessed of a valid student-drivers permit and accompanied by a
duly licensed driver.
The licensed driver duly accredited by the Bureau, acting as
instructor to the student driver, shall be equally responsible and liable
as the latter for any violation of the provisions of this Act and for any
injury or damage done by the motor vehicle on account or as a result
of its operation by a student-driver under his direction.[45]
Saycon was in clear violation of this provision at the time of the
accident. Corollarily, Article 2185 of the Civil Code states:
Art. 2185. Unless there is proof to the contrary, it is presumed that a
person driving a motor vehicle has been negligent if at the time of the
mishap, he was violating any traffic regulation.
The Civil Code characterizes negligence as the omission of that
diligence required by the nature of the obligation and corresponds
with the circumstances of the persons, of the time and of the
place.[46] Negligence, as it is commonly understood, is conduct that
creates an undue risk of harm to others. It is the failure to observe
that degree of care, precaution and vigilance that the circumstances
justly demand.[47] It is the omission to do something which a
reasonable man, guided by considerations that ordinarily regulate the
conduct of human affairs, would do, or doing something that a
prudent and reasonable man would not do.[48]
To determine whether there is negligence in a given situation, this
Court laid down this test: Did defendant, in doing the alleged
negligent act, use that reasonable care and caution which an
ordinarily prudent person would have used in the same situation? If
not, the person is guilty of negligence.[49]
Based on the foregoing test, we can conclude that Saycon was
negligent. In the first place, he should not have been driving alone.
The law clearly requires that the holder of a student-drivers permit
should be accompanied by a duly licensed driver when operating a
motor vehicle. Further, there is the matter of not wearing a helmet
and the fact that he was speeding. All these prove that he was
negligent.
Under Article 2179 of the Civil Code,
[w]hen the plaintiffs own negligence was the immediate and
proximate cause of his injury, he cannot recover damages. But if his
negligence was only contributory, the immediate and proximate
cause of the injury being the defendants lack of due care, the plaintiff
may recover damages, but the courts shall mitigate the damages to be
awarded.
The trial court gave more credence to Nardos version of the accident
that he was on his proper lane, that he was not speeding, and that it
was the motorcycle that bumped into his taxi. The trial court
established that the accident was caused wholly by Saycons
negligence. It held that the injuries and damages suffered by plaintiff
(respondent) and Saycon were not due to the acts of defendants
(petitioners) but due to their own negligence and recklessness.[50]
Considering that Saycon was the negligent party, he would not have
been entitled to recover damages from petitioners had he instituted
his own action. Consequently, respondent, as his employer, would
likewise not be entitled to claim for damages.
Further militating against respondents claim is the fact that she
herself was negligent in the selection and supervision of her
employee. Article 2180 of the Civil Code states:
Art. 2180. The obligation imposed by Article 2176 is demandable not
only for ones own acts or omissions, but also for those of persons for
whom one is responsible.
The father and, in case of his death or incapacity, the mother, are
responsible for the damages caused by the minor children who live in
their company.
Guardians are liable for damages caused by the minors or
incapacitated persons who are under their authority and live in their
company.

The owners and managers of an establishment or enterprise are

likewise responsible for damages caused by their employees in the
service of the branches in which the latter are employed or on the
occasion of their functions.

Employers shall be liable for the damages caused by their

employees and household helpers acting within the scope of their
assigned tasks, even though the former are not engaged in any
business or industry.

The State is responsible in like manner when it acts through a special

agent; but not when the damage has been caused by the official to
whom the task done properly pertains, in which case what is provided
in Article 2176 shall be applicable.

Lastly, teachers or heads of establishments of arts and trades shall be

liable for damages caused by their pupils and students or apprentices,
so long as they remain in their custody.

The responsibility treated of in this article shall cease when the

persons herein mentioned prove that they observed all the
diligence of a good father of a family to prevent damage.[51]

When an employee causes damage due to his own negligence while

performing his own duties, there arises the juris tantum presumption
that his employer is negligent, rebuttable only by proof of observance
of the diligence of a good father of a family.[52] Thus, in the selection
of prospective employees, employers are required to examine them as
to their qualifications, experience and service records. With respect
to the supervision of employees, employers must formulate standard
operating procedures, monitor their implementation and impose
disciplinary measures for breaches thereof. These facts must be
shown by concrete proof, including documentary evidence. [53]

The fact that Saycon was driving alone with only a students permit is,
to our minds, proof enough that Cullen was negligent either she did
not know that he only had a students permit or she allowed him to
drive alone knowing this deficiency. Whichever way we look at it,
we arrive at the same conclusion: that she failed to exercise the due
diligence required of her as an employer in supervising her employee.
Thus, the trial court properly denied her claim for damages. One who
seeks equity and justice must come to this Court with clean hands.[54]

In sum, we hold that the trial court correctly found that it was Saycon
who caused the accident and, as such, he cannot recover indemnity
for his injury. On the other hand, respondent, as Saycons employer,
was also negligent and failed to exercise the degree of diligence
required in supervising her employee. Consequently, she cannot
recover from petitioners what she had paid for the treatment of her
employees injuries.

WHEREFORE, the foregoing premises considered, the Petition

is GRANTED. The Decision dated December 2, 2002 and the
Resolution dated February 23, 2004 of the Court of Appeals in CA-
G.R. CV No. 69841 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The
Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Cebu, Branch 22, in Civil
Case No. CEB-20504 is hereby REINSTATED. No pronouncement
as to costs.