G.R. No.

L-6791 March 29, 1954

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
QUE PO LAY, defendant-appellant.

Prudencio de Guzman for appellant.

First Assistant Solicitor General Ruperto Kapunan, Jr., and Solicitor Lauro G. Marquez for appellee.

MONTEMAYOR, J.:

Que Po Lay is appealing from the decision of the Court of First Instance of Manila, finding him guilty of violating Central Bank Circular No. 20 in connection with section 34 of
Republic Act No. 265, and sentencing him to suffer six months imprisonment, to pay a fine of P1,000 with subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency, and to pay the costs.

The charge was that the appellant who was in possession of foreign exchange consisting of U.S. dollars, U.S. checks and U.S. money orders amounting to about $7,000 failed to
sell the same to the Central Bank through its agents within one day following the receipt of such foreign exchange as required by Circular No. 20. the appeal is based on the
claim that said circular No. 20 was not published in the Official Gazette prior to the act or omission imputed to the appellant, and that consequently, said circular had no force
and effect. It is contended that Commonwealth Act. No., 638 and Act 2930 both require said circular to be published in the Official Gazette, it being an order or notice of general
applicability. The Solicitor General answering this contention says that Commonwealth Act. No. 638 and 2930 do not require the publication in the Official Gazette of said
circular issued for the implementation of a law in order to have force and effect.

We agree with the Solicitor General that the laws in question do not require the publication of the circulars, regulations and notices therein mentioned in order to become
binding and effective. All that said two laws provide is that laws, resolutions, decisions of the Supreme Court and Court of Appeals, notices and documents required by law to be
of no force and effect. In other words, said two Acts merely enumerate and make a list of what should be published in the Official Gazette, presumably, for the guidance of the
different branches of the Government issuing same, and of the Bureau of Printing.

However, section 11 of the Revised Administrative Code provides that statutes passed by Congress shall, in the absence of special provision, take effect at the beginning of the
fifteenth day after the completion of the publication of the statute in the Official Gazette. Article 2 of the new Civil Code (Republic Act No. 386) equally provides that laws shall
take effect after fifteen days following the completion of their publication in the Official Gazette, unless it is otherwise provided. It is true that Circular No. 20 of the Central Bank
is not a statute or law but being issued for the implementation of the law authorizing its issuance, it has the force and effect of law according to settled jurisprudence. (See
U.S. vs. Tupasi Molina, 29 Phil., 119 and authorities cited therein.) Moreover, as a rule, circulars and regulations especially like the Circular No. 20 of the Central Bank in question
which prescribes a penalty for its violation should be published before becoming effective, this, on the general principle and theory that before the public is bound by its
contents, especially its penal provisions, a law, regulation or circular must first be published and the people officially and specifically informed of said contents and its penalties.

Our Old Civil code, ( Spanish Civil Code of 1889) has a similar provision about the effectivity of laws, (Article 1 thereof), namely, that laws shall be binding twenty days after their
promulgation, and that their promulgation shall be understood as made on the day of the termination of the publication of the laws in the Gazette. Manresa, commenting on
this article is of the opinion that the word "laws" include regulations and circulars issued in accordance with the same. He says:

El Tribunal Supremo, ha interpretado el articulo 1. del codigo Civil en Sentencia de 22 de Junio de 1910, en el sentido de que bajo la denominacion generica de leyes, se
comprenden tambien los Reglamentos, Reales decretos, Instrucciones, Circulares y Reales ordenes dictadas de conformidad con las mismas por el Gobierno en uso de
su potestad. Tambien el poder ejecutivo lo ha venido entendiendo asi, como lo prueba el hecho de que muchas de sus disposiciones contienen la advertencia de que
 empiezan a regir el mismo dia de su publicacion en la Gaceta, advertencia que seria perfectamente inutil si no fuera de aplicacion al caso el articulo 1.o del Codigo Civil.
(Manresa, Codigo Civil Español, Vol. I. p. 52).

In the present case, although circular No. 20 of the Central Bank was issued in the year 1949, it was not published until November 1951, that is, about 3 months after appellant's
conviction of its violation. It is clear that said circular, particularly its penal provision, did not have any legal effect and bound no one until its publication in the Official Gazzette
or after November 1951. In other words, appellant could not be held liable for its violation, for it was not binding at the time he was found to have failed to sell the foreign
exchange in his possession thereof.

But the Solicitor General also contends that this question of non-publication of the Circular is being raised for the first time on appeal in this Court, which cannot be done by
appellant. Ordinarily, one may raise on appeal any question of law or fact that has been raised in the court below and which is within the issues made by the parties in their
pleadings. (Section 19, Rule 48 of the Rules of Court). But the question of non-publication is fundamental and decisive. If as a matter of fact Circular No. 20 had not been
published as required by law before its violation, then in the eyes of the law there was no such circular to be violated and consequently appellant committed no violation of the
circular or committed any offense, and the trial court may be said to have had no jurisdiction. This question may be raised at any stage of the proceeding whether or not raised
in the court below.

In view of the foregoing, we reverse the decision appealed from and acquit the appellant, with costs de oficio.

Paras, C.J., Bengzon, Padilla, Reyes, Bautista Angelo, Labrador, Concepcion and Diokno, JJ., concur.
People vs Que Po Lay
TITLE: People of the Phils v Que Po Lay
CITATION: 94 Phil 640 | GR No. 6791, March 29, 1954

FACTS:

The appellant was in possession of foreign exchange consisting of US dollars, US checks and US money orders amounting to about $7000 but failed to sell the same to the
Central Bank as required under Circular No. 20.

Circular No. 20 was issued in the year 1949 but was published in the Official Gazette only on Nov. 1951 after the act or omission imputed to Que Po Lay.

Que Po Lay appealed from the decision of the lower court finding him guilty of violating Central Bank Circular No. 20 in connection with Sec 34 of RA 265 sentencing him to
suffer 6 months imprisonment, pay fine of P1,000 with subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency, and to pay the costs.

ISSUE: Whether or not publication of Circular 20 in the Official Gazette is needed for it to become effective and subject violators to corresponding penalties.

HELD:

It was held by the Supreme Court, in an en banc decision, that as a rule, circular and regulations of the Central Bank in question prescribing a penalty for its violation should be
published before becoming effective. This is based on the theory that before the public is bound by its contents especially its penal provisions, a law, regulation or circular must
first be published for the people to be officially and specifically informed of such contents including its penalties.

Thus, the Supreme Court reversed the decision appealed from and acquit the appellant, with costs de oficio.
 [G.R. No. 108461. October 21, 1996]
PHILIPPINE INTERNATIONAL TRADING CORPORATION, petitioners, vs. HON PRESIDING JUDGE ZOSIMO Z. ANGELES, BRANCH 58, RTC, MAKATI; REMINGTON INDUSTRIAL SALES
CORPORATION; AND FIRESTONE CERAMIC, INC., respondents.

DECISION
TORRES, JR., J.:
The PHILIPPINE INTERNATIONAL TRADING CORPORATION (PITC, for brevity) filed this Petition for Review on Certiorari, seeking the reversal of the Decision dated January 4,
1993 of public respondent Hon. Zosimo Z. Angeles. Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Makati, Branch 58, in civil Case No.92-158 entitled Remington Industrial Sales
Corporation, et. al. vs. Philippine Industrial Trading Corporation.
The said decision upheld the Petition for Prohibition and Mandamus of REMINGTON INDUSTRIAL SALES CORPORATION (Remington, for brevity) and FIRESTONE CERAMICS,
INC. (Firestone, for brevity), and, in the process, declared as null and void and unconstitutional, PITCs Administrative Order No. SOCPEC 89-08-01 and its appurtenant
regulations. The dispositive portion of the decision reads:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of Petitioner and Intervenor and against the Respondent, as follows:

1) Enjoining the further implementation by the respondent of the following issuances relative to the applications for importation of products from the Peoples Republic of China,
to wit:

a) Administrative Order No. SOCPEC 89-08-01 dated August 30, 1989 (Annex A, Amended petition);

b) Prescribed Export Undertaking Form (Annex B, Id.);

c) Prescribed Importer-Exporter Agreement Form for non-exporter-importer (Annex C, Id.);

d) Memorandum dated April 16, 1990 relative to amendments of Administrative Order NO. SOCPEC 89-08-01 (Annex D, Id.);

e) Memorandum dated May 6, 1991 relative to Revised Schedule of Fees for the processing of import applications (Annexes E, E-1., Ind.);

f) Rules and Regulations relative to liquidation of unfulfilled Undertakings and expired export credits (Annex Z, Supplemental Petition),

the foregoing being all null and void and unconstitutional; and,

2) Commanding respondent to approve forthwith all the pending applications of, and all those that may hereafter be filed by, the petitioner and the Intervenor, free from and
without the requirements prescribed in a the above-mentioned issuance.
IT IS SO ORDERED."
The controversy springs from the issuance by the PITC of Administrative Order No. SOCPEC 89-08-01,[1] under which, applications to the PITC for importation from the Peoples
Republic of China (PROC. for brevity) must be accompanied by a viable and confirmed Export Program of Philippine Products to PROC carried out by the importer himself or
through a tie-up with a legitimate importer in an amount equivalent to the value of the importation from PROC being applied for, or, simply, at one is to one ratio.
Pertinent provisions of the questioned administrative order read:

3. COUNTERPART EXPORTS TO PROC

In addition to existing requirements for the processing of import application for goods and commodities originating from PROC, it is declared that:

3.1 All applications covered by these rules must be accompanied by a viable and confirmed EXPORT PROGRAM of Philippine products to PROC in an amount equivalent to the
value of the importation from PROC being applied for. Such export program must be carried out and completed within six (6) months from date of approval of the Import
Application by PITC. PITC shall reject/deny any application for importation from PROC without the accompanying export program mentioned above.

3.2 The EXPORT PROGRAM may be carried out by any of the following:

a. By the IMPORTER himself if he has the capabilities and facilities to carry out the export of Philippine products to PROC in his own name; or

b. Through a tie-up between the IMPORTER and a legitimate exporter (of Philippine products) who is willing to carry out the export commitments of the IMPORTER under these
rules. The tie-up shall not make the IMPORTER the exporter of the goods but shall merely ensure that the importation sought to be approved is matched one-to-one (1:1) in
value with a corresponding export of Philippine Products to PROC. [2]

3.3 EXPORT PROGRAM DOCUMENTS which are to be submitted by the importer together with his Import Application are as follows:

a) Firm Contract, Sales Invoice or Letter of Credit.

b) Export Performance Guarantee (See Article 4 hereof).

c) IMPORTER-EXPORTER AGREEMENT for non-exporter IMPORTER (PITC Form No. M-1006). This form should be used if IMPORTER has a tie-up with an exporter for the export of
Philippine Products to PROC.

4. EXPORT GUARANTEE

To ensure that the export commitments of the IMPORTER are carried out in accordance with these rules, all IMPORTERS concerned are required to submit an EXPORT
PERFORMANCE GUARANTEE (the Guarantee) at the time of filing of the Import Application. The amount of the guarantee shall be as follows:

For essential commodities: 15% of the value of the imports applied for.

For other commodities: 50% of the value of the imports applied for.
4.1 The guarantee may be in the form of (i) a non-interest bearing cash deposit; (ii) Bank hold-out in favor of PITC (PITC Form No. M-1007) or (iii) a Domestic Letter of Credit
(with all bank opening charges for account of Importer) opened in favor of PITC as beneficiary.

4.2 The guarantee shall be made in favor of PITC and will be automatically forfeited in favor of PITC, fully or partially, if the required export program is not completed by the
importer within six (6) months from date of approval of the Import Application.

4.3 Within the six (6) months period above stated, the IMPORTER is entitled to a (i) refund of the cash deposited without interest; (ii) cancellation of the Bank holdout or (iii)
Cancellation of the Domestic Letter of Credit upon showing that he has completed the export commitment pertaining to his importation and provided further that the following
documents are submitted to PITC:

a) Final Sales Invoice

b) Bill of lading or Airway bill

c) Bank Certificate of Inward remittance

d) PITC EXPORT APPLICATION FOR NO. M-1005

5. MISCELLANEOUS

5.1 All other requirements for importations of goods and commodities from PROC must be complied with in addition to the above.

5.2 PITC shall have the right to disapprove any and all import application not in accordance with the rules and regulations herein prescribed.

5.3 Should the IMPORTER or any of his duly authorized representatives make any false statements or fraudulent misrepresentations in the Import/Export Application, or falsify,
forge or simulate any document required under these rules and regulations, PITC is authorized to reject all pending and future import/export applications of said IMPORTER
and/or disqualify said IMPORTER and/or disqualify said IMPORTER from doing any business with SOCPEC through PITC.
Desiring to make importations from PROC, private respondents Remington and Firestone, both domestic corporations, organized and existing under Philippines laws,
individually applied for authority to import from PROC with the petitioner, They were granted such authority after satisfying the requirements for importers, and after they
executed respective undertakings to balance their importations from PROC with corresponding export of Philippine products to PROC.
Private respondent Remington was allowed to import tools, machineries and other similar goods. Firestones, on the other hand, imported Calcine Vauxite, which it used for
the manufacture of fire bricks, one of its products.
Subsequently, for failing to comply with their undertakings to submit export credits equivalent to the value of their importations, further import applications were withheld
by petitioner PITC from private respondents, such that the latter both barred from importing goods from PROC. [3]
Consequently, Remington filed a Petition for Prohibition and Mandamus, with prayer for issuance of Temporary Restraining Order and/or Writ of Preliminary Injunction
on January 20, 1992, against PITC in the RTC Makati Branch 58.[4] The court issued a Temporary Restraining Order on January 21, 1992, ordering PITC to cease from exercising any
power to process applications of goods from PROC.[5] Hearings on the application for writ of preliminary injunction ensued.
Private respondents Firestones was allowed to intervene in the petition on July 2, 1992,[6] thus joining Remington in the latters charges against PITC. It specifically asserts
that the questioned Administrative Order is an undue restrictions of trade, and hence, unconstitutional.
 Upon trial, it was agreed that the evidence adduced upon the hearing on the Preliminary Injunction was sufficient to completely adjudicate the case, thus, the parties deemed
it proper that the entire case be submitted for decision upon the evidence so far presented.
The court rendered its Decision[7] on January 4, 1992. The court ruled that PITCs authority to process and approve applications for imports from SOCPEC and to issue rules
and regulations pursuant to LOI 444 and P.D. No. 1071, has already been repealed by EO No. 133, issued on February 27, 1987 by President Aquino.
The court observed:

Given such obliteration and/or withdrawal of what used to be PITCs regulatory authority under the Special provisions embodied in LOI 444 from the enumeration of powers that
it could exercise effective February 27, 1987 in virtue of Section 16 (d), EO No. 133, it may now be successfully argued that the PITC can no longer exercise such specific
regulatory power in question conformably with the legal precept expresio unius est exclusio alterius.
Moreover, the court continued, none of the Trade protocols of 1989, 1990 or 1991, has empowered the PITC, expressly or impliedly to formulate or promulgate the assailed
Administrative Order. This fact, makes the continued exercise by PITC of the regulatory powers in question unworthy of judicial approval. Otherwise, it would be sanctioning an
undue exercise of legislative power vested solely in the Congress of the Philippines by Section 1, Article VII of the 1987 Philippine Constitution.
The lower court stated that the subject Administrative Order and other similar issuances by PITC suffer from serious constitutional infirmity, having been promulgated in
pursuance of an international agreement (the Memorandum of Agreement between the Philippine and PROC), which has not been concurred in by at least 2/3 of all the members
of the Philippine Senate as required by Article VII, Section 21, of the 1987 Constitution, and therefore, null and void.

Section 21. No treaty or international agreement shall be valid and effective unless concurred in by at least two-thirds of all the Members of the Senate.
Furthermore, the subject Administrative Order was issued in restraint of trade, in violation of Sections 1 and 19, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution, which reads:

Section 1. The goals of the national economy are a more equitable distribution of opportunities, income and wealth; a sustained increase in the amount of goods and services
produced by the nation for the benefit of the people; and, an expanding productivity as the key to raising the equality of life for all, especially the underprivileged.

Section 19. The State shall regulate or prohibit monopolies when the public interest so requires. No combination is restraint of trade or unfair competition shall be allowed.
Lastly, the court declared the Administrative Order to be null and void, since the same was not published, contrary to Article 2 of the New Civil Code which provides, that:

Article 2. Laws shall take effect fifteen (15) days following the completion of their publication in the Official Gazette, unless the law otherwise provides. xxx
Petitioner now comes to us on a Petition for Review on Certiorari,[8] questioning the courts decision particularly on the propriety of the lower courts declarations on the
validity of Administrative Order No. 89-08-01. The Court directed the respondents to file their respective Comments.
Subsequent events transpired, however, which affect to some extent, the submissions of the parties to the present petition.
Following President Fidel V. Ramos trip to Beijing, Peoples Republic of China (PROC), from April 25 to 30, 1993, a new trade agreement was entered into between
the Philippinesand PROC, encouraging liberalization of trade between the two countries. In line therewith, on April 20, 1993, the President, through Chief Presidential Legal Counsel
Antonio T. Carpio, directed the Department of Trade and Industry and the PITC to cease implementing Administrative Order No. SOCPEC 89-08-01, as amended by PITC Board
Resolution Nos. 92-01-05 and 92-03-08.[9]
In the implementation of such order, PITC President Jose Luis U. Yulo, Jr. issued a corporate Memorandum [10] instructing that all import applications for the PROC filed with
the PITC as of April 20, 1993 shall no longer be covered by the trade balancing program outlined in the Administrative Order.
Forthwith, the PITC allowed the private respondents to import anew from the PROC, without being required to comply anymore with the lifted requirement of balancing its
imports with exports of Philippine products to PROC.[11] In its Constancia[12] filed with the Court on November 22, 1993, Remington expressed its desire to have the present action
declared moot and academic considering the new supervening developments. For its part, respondent Firestone made a Manifestation [13] in lieu of its Memorandum, informing
the court of the aforesaid developments of the new trade program of the Philippines with China, and prayed for the courts early resolution of the action.
To support its submission that the present action is now moot and academic, respondent Remington cites Executive Order No. 244, [14] issued by President Ramos on May 12,
1995. The Executive Order states:

WHEREAS, continued coverage of the Peoples Republic of China by letter of Instructions No. 444 is no longer consistent with the countrys national interest, as coursing Republic
of the Philippines-Peoples Republic of China Trade through the Philippine International Trading Corporation as provided for under Letter of Instructions No. 444 is becoming an
unnecessary barrier to trade;

NOW, THEREFORE, I FIDEL V. RAMOS, President of the Republic of the Philippines, by virtue of the powers vested in me by law, do hereby order:

The Committee on Scientific and Technical Cooperation with Socialist Countries to delete the Peoples Republic of China from the list of countries covered by Letter of
Instructions No. 444.

Done in the City of Manila, this 12th day of May in the year of Our Lord, Nineteen Hundred and Ninety-Five.
PITC filed its own Manifestation[15] on December 15, 1993, wherein it adopted the arguments raised in its Petition as its Memorandum. PITC disagrees with Remington on
the latters submission that the case has become moot and academic as a result of the abrogation of Administrative Order SOCPEC No. 89-08-01, since respondent Remington had
incurred obligations to the petitioner consisting of charges for the 0.5% Counter Export Development Service provided by PITC to Remington, which obligations remain
outstanding.[16]The propriety of such charges must still be resolved, petitioner argues, thereby maintaining the issue of the validity of SOCPEC Order No. 89-08-01, before it was
abrogated by Executive fiat.
There is no question that from April 20, 1993, when trade balancing measures with PROC were lifted by the President, Administrative Order SOCPEC No. 89-08-01 no longer
has force and effect, and respondents are thus entitled anew to apply for authority to import from the PROC, without the trade balancing requirements previously imposed on
proposed importers. Indeed, it appears that since the lifting of the trade balancing measures, Remington had been allowed to import anew from PROC.
There remains, however, the matter of outstanding obligations of the respondents for the charges relating to the 0.5% Counter Export Development Service in favor of PITC,
for the period when the questioned Administrative Order remained in effect. Is the obligation still subsisting, or are the respondents freed from it?
To resolve this issue, we are tasked to consider the constitutionality of Administrative Order No. SOCPEC 89-08-01, based on the arguments set up by the parties in their
Petition and Comment. In so doing, we must inquire into the nature of the functions of the PITC, in the light of present realities.
The PITC is a government owned or controlled corporation created under P.D. No. 252 [17] dated August 6, 1973. P.D. No. 1071,[18] issued on May 9, 1977 which revised the
provisions of P.D. 252. The purposes and powers of said governmental entity were enumerated under Section 5 and 6 thereof.[19]
On August 9, 1976, the late President Marcos issued Letter of Instruction (LOI) No. 444, [20] directing, inter alia, that trade (export or import of all commodities), whether
direct or indirect, between the Philippines and any of the Socialist and other Centrally Planned Economy Countries (SOCPEC), including the Peoples Republic of China (PROC) shall
be undertaken or coursed through the PITC. Under the LOI, PITC was mandated to: 1) participate in all official trade and economic discussions between the Philippines and SOCPEC;
2) adopt such measures and issue such rules and regulations as may be necessary for the effective discharge of its functions under its instructions; and 3) Undertake the processing
and approval of all applications for export to or import from the SOCPEC.
Pertinent provisions of the Letter of Instruction are herein reproduced:

LETTER OF INSTRUCTION 444

xxx
II. CHANNELS OF TRADE

1. The trade, direct or indirect, between the Philippines and any of the Socialist and other centrally-planned economy countries shall upon issuance hereof, be undertaken
by or coursed through the Philippine International Trading Corporation. This shall apply to the export and import of all commodities of products including those specified
for export or import by expressly authorized government agencies.
xxx

4. The Philippine International Trading Corporation shall participate in all official trade and economic discussions between the Philippines and other centrally-planned
economy countries.
xxx

V. SPECIAL PROVISIONS

The Philippine International Trading Corporation shall adopt such measures and issue such rules and regulations as may be necessary for the effective discharge of its
functions under these instructions. In this connection, the processing and approval of applications for export to or import from the Socialist and other centrally-planned
economy countries shall, henceforth, be performed by the said Corporation. (Emphasis ours)
After the EDSA Revolution, or more specifically on February 27, 1987, then President Corazon C. Aquino promulgated Executive Order (EO) No. 133[21] reorganizing the
Department of Trade and Industry (DTI) empowering the said department to be the "primary coordinative, promotive, facilitative and regulatory arm of the government for the
countrys trade, industry and investment activities (Sec. 2, EO 133). The PITC was made one of DTIs line agencies.[22]
The Executive Order reads in part:

EXECUTIVE ORDER NO. 133

XXX

Section 16. Line Corporate Agencies and Government Entities.

The following line corporate agencies and government entities defined in Section 9 (c) of this Executive Order that will perform their specific regulatory functions, particularly
developmental responsibilities and specialized business activities in a manner consonant with the Department mandate, objectives, policies, plans and programs:
xxx

d) Philippine International Trading Corporation. This corporation, which shall be supervised by the Undersecretary for International Trade, shall only engage in both export and
trading on new or non-traditional products and markets not normally pursued by the private business sector; provide a wide range of export oriented auxiliary services to the
private sector; arrange for a establish comprehensive system and physical facilities for handling the collection, processing, and distribution of cargoes and other commodities;
monitor or coordinate risk insurance services for the existing institutions; promote and organize, whenever warranted, production enterprises and industrial establishments and
collaborate or associate in joint venture with any person, association, company or entity, whether domestic or foreign, in the fields of production, marketing, procurement, and
other relate businesses; and provide technical advisory, investigatory, consultancy and management services with respect to any and all of the functions, activities, and
operations of the corporation.
 Sometime in April, 1988, following the State visit of President Aquino to the PROC, the Philippines and PROC entered into a memorandum of Understanding[23] (MOU) wherein
the two countries agreed to make joint efforts within the next five years to expand bilateral trade to US $600 US $800 Million by 1992, and to strive for a steady progress towards
achieving a balance between the value of their imports and exports during the period, agreeing for the purpose that upon the signing of the Memorandum, both sides shall
undertake to establish the necessary steps and procedures to be adopted within the framework of the annual midyear review meeting under the Trade Protocol, in order to
monitor and ensure the implementation of the MOU.
Conformably with the MOU, the Philippines and PROC entered into a Trade Protocol for the years 1989, 1990 and 1991, [24] under which was specified the commodities to be
traded between them. The protocols affirmed their agreement to jointly endeavor to achieve more or less a balance between the values of their imports and exports in their
bilateral trade.
It is allegedly in line with its powers under LOI 444 and in keeping with the MOU and Trade Protocols with PROC that PITC issued its now assailed Administrative Order No.
SOCPEC 89-08-01[25] on August 30, 1989 (amended in March, 1992).
Undoubtedly, President Aquino, in issuing EO 133, is empowered to modify and amend the provisions of LOI 444, which was issued by then President Marcos, both issuances
being executive directives. As observed by us in Philippine Association of Service Exporters , Inc. vs. Torres, [26]

there is no need for legislative delegation of power to the President to revoke the Letter of Instruction by way of an Executive Order. This is notwithstanding the fact that the
subject LOI 1190 was issued by President Marcos, when he was extraordinarily empowered to exercise legislative powers, whereas EO 450 was issued by Pres. Aquino when her
transitional legislative powers have already ceased, since it was found that LOI 1190 was a mere administrative directive, hence, may be repealed, altered, or modified by EO
450.
We do not agree, however, with the trial courts ruling that PITCs authority to issue rules and regulations pursuant to the Special Provisions of LOI 444 and P.D. No. 1071,
have already been repealed by EO 133.
While PITCs power to engage in commercial import and export activities is expressly recognized and allowed under Section 16 (d) of EO 133, the same is now limited only to
new or non-traditional products and markets not normally pursued by the private business sector. There is no indication in the law of the removal of the powers of the PITC to
exercise its regulatory functions in the area of importations from SOCPEC countries. Though it does not mention the grant of regulatory power, EO 133, as worded, is silent as to
the abolition or limitation of such powers, previously granted under P.D. 1071, from the PITC.
Likewise, the general repealing clause in EO 133 stating that all laws, ordinances, rules , and regulations, or other parts thereof, which are inconsistent with the Executive
Order are hereby repealed or modified accordingly, cannot operate to abolish the grant of regulatory powers to the PITC. There can be no repeal of the said powers, absent any
cogency of irreconcilable inconsistency or repugnancy between the issuances, relating to the regulatory power of the PITC.
The President, in promulgating EO 133, had not intended to overhaul the functions of the PITC. The DTI was established, and was given powers and duties including those
previously held by the PITC as an independent government entity, under P.D. 1071 and LOI 444. The PITC was thereby attached to the DTI as an implementing arm of the said
department.
EO 133 established the DTI as the primary coordinative, promotive, facilitative and regulatory arm of government for the countrys trade, industry and investment activities,
which shall act as a catalyst for intensified private sector activity in order to accelerate and sustain economic growth. [27] In furtherance of this mandate, the DTI was empowered,
among others, to plan, implement, and coordinate activities of the government related to trade industry and investments; to formulate and administer policies and guidelines for
the investment priorities plan and the delivery of investment incentives; to formulate country and product export strategies which will guide the export promotion and
development thrust of the government.[28] Corollarily, the Secretary of Trade and Industry is given the power to promulgate rules and regulations necessary to carry out the
departments objectives, policies, plans, programs and projects.
The PITC, on the other hand, was attached as an integral part to the said department as one of its line agencies, [29] and was given the focal task of implementing the
departments programs.[30] The absence of the regulatory power formerly enshrined in the Special Provisions of LOI 444, from Section 16 of EO 133, and the limitation of its
previously wide range of functions, is noted. This does not mean, however, that PITC has lost the authority to issue the questioned Administrative Order. It is our view that PITC
still holds such authority, and may legally exercise it, as an implementing arm, and under the supervision of, the Department of Trade and Industry.
Furthermore, the lower courts ruling to the effect that the PITCs authority to process and approve applications for imports from SOCPEC and to issue rules and regulations
pursuant to LOI 444 and P.D. 1071 has been repealed by EO 133, is misplaced, and did not consider the import behind the issuance of the later presidential edict.
The President could not have intended to deprive herself of the power to regulate the flow of trade between the Philippines and PROC under the two countries Memorandum
of Understanding, a power which necessarily flows from her office as Chief Executive. In issuing Executive Order 133, the President intended merely to reorganize the Department
of Trade and Industry to cope with the need of streamlined bureaucracy. [31]
Thus, there is no real inconsistency between LOI 444 and EO 133. There is, admittedly, a rearranging of the administrative functions among the administrative bodies affected
by the edict, but not an abolition of executive power. Consistency in statutes as in executive issuances, is of prime importance, and, in the absence of a showing to the contrary,
all laws are presumed to be consistent with each other. Where it is possible to do so, it is the duty of courts, in the construction of statutes, to harmonize and reconcile them, and
to adopt a constructions of a statutory provision which harmonizes and reconciles it with other statutory provisions.[32] The fact that a later enactment may relate to the same
subject matter as that of an earlier statute is not of itself sufficient to cause an implied repeal of the latter, since the law may be cumulative or a continuation of the old one.[33]
Similarly, the grant of quasi-legislative powers in administrative bodies is not unconstitutional. Thus, as a result of the growing complexity of the modern society, it has
become necessary to create more and more administrative bodies to help in the regulation of its ramified activities. Specialized in the particular field assigned to them, they can
deal with the problems thereof with more expertise and dispatch than can be expected from the legislature or the courts of justice. This is the reason for the increasing vesture of
quasi-legislative and quasi-judicial powers in what is now not unreasonably called the fourth department of the government. [34] Evidently, in the exercise of such powers, the
agency concerned must commonly interpret and apply contracts and determine the rights of private parties under such contracts. One thrust of the multiplication of administrative
agencies is that the interpretation of contracts and the determination of private rights thereunder is no longer uniquely judicial function, exercisable only by our regular
courts. (Antipolo Realty Corporation vs. National Housing Authority, G.R. No. L- 50444, August 31, 1987, 153 SCRA 399).
With global trade and business becoming more intricate nay even with new discoveries in technology and electronics notwithstanding, the time has come to grapple with
legislations and even judicial decisions aimed at resolving issues affecting not only individual rights but also activities of which foreign governments or entities may have
interests.Thus, administrative policies and regulations must be devised to suit these changing business needs in a faster rate than to resort to traditional acts of the legislature.
This tendency finds support in a well-stated work on the subject, viz.:

Since legislatures had neither the time nor the knowledge to create detailed rules, however, it was soon clear that new governmental arrangements would be needed to handle
the job of rule-making. The courts, moreover, many of them already congested, would have been swamped if they had to adjudicate all the controversies that the new
legislation was bound to create; and the judges, already obliged to handle a great diversity of cases, would have been hard pressed to acquire the knowledge they needed to
deal intelligently with all the new types of controversy.

So the need to create a large number of specialized administrative agencies and to give them broader powers than administrators had traditionally exercised. These included the
power to issue regulations having the force of law, and the power to hear and decide cases powers that had previously been reserved to the legislatures and the
courts. (Houghteling/Pierce, Lawmaking by Administrative Agencies, p. 166.)
The respondents likewise argue that PITC is not empowered to issue the Administrative Order because no grant of such power was made under the Trade Protocols of 1989,
1990 or 1991. We do not agree. The Trade Protocols aforesaid, are only the enumeration of the products and goods which the signatory countries have agreed to trade. They do
not bestow any regulatory power, for executive power is vested in the Executive Department, [35] and it is for the latter to delegate the exercise of such power among its designated
agencies.
In sum, the PITC was legally empowered to issue Administrative Orders, as a valid exercise of a power ancillary to legislation.
 This does not imply however, that the subject Administrative Order is a valid exercise of such quasi-legislative power. The original Administrative Order issued on August 30,
1989, under which the respondents filed their applications for importations, was not published in the Official Gazette or in a newspaper of general circulation. The questioned
Administrative Order, legally, until it is published, is invalid within the context of Article 2 of Civil Code, which reads:

Article 2. Laws shall take effect after fifteen days following the completion of their publication in the Official Gazette (or in a newspaper of general circulation in the Philippines),
unless it is otherwise provided. xxx
The fact that the amendments to Administrative Order No. SOCPEC 89-08-01 were filed with, and published by the UP Law Center in the National Administrative Register,
does not cure the defect related to the effectivity of the Administrative Order.
This court, in Tanada vs. Tuvera[36] stated, thus:

We hold therefore that all statutes, including those of local application and private laws, shall be published as a condition for their effectivity, which shall begin fifteen days after
publication unless a different effectivity is fixed by the legislature.

Covered by this rule are presidential decrees and executive orders promulgated by the President in the exercise of legislative powers or, at present, directly conferred by the
Constitution. Administrative rules and Regulations must also be published if their purpose is to enforce or implement existing law pursuant also to a valid delegation,

Interpretative regulations and those merely internal in nature, that is, regulating only the personnel of the administrative agency and not the public, need not be
published. Neither is publication required of the so-called letters of instructions issued by administrative superiors concerning the rules or guidelines to be followed by their
subordinates in the performance of their duties.
xxx

We agree that the publication must be in full or it is no publication at all since its purpose is to inform the public of the contents of the laws.
The Administrative Order under consideration is one of those issuances which should be published for its effectivity, since its purpose is to enforce and implement an existing
law pursuant to a valid delegation, i.e., P.D. 1071, in relation to LOI 444 and EO 133.
Thus, even before the trade balancing measures issued by the petitioner were lifted by President Fidel V. Ramos, the same were never legally effective, and private
respondents, therefore, cannot be made subject to them, because Administrative Order 89-08-01 embodying the same was never published, as mandated by law, for its
effectivity. It was only on March 30, 1992 when the amendments to the said Administrative Order were filed in the UP Law Center, and published in the National Administrative
Register as required by the Administrative Code of 1987.
Finally, it is the declared Policy of the Government to develop and strengthen trade relations with the Peoples Republic of China. As declared by the President in EO 244
issued on May 12, 1995, continued coverage of the Peoples Republic of China by Letter of Instructions No. 444 is no longer consistent with the countrys national interest, as
coursing RP-PROC trade through the PITC as provided for under Letter of Instructions No. 444 is becoming an unnecessary barrier to trade. [37]
Conformably with such avowed policy, any remnant of the restrained atmosphere of trading between the Philippines and PROC should be done away with, so as to allow
economic growth and renewed trade relations with our neighbors to flourish and may be encouraged.
ACCORDINGLY, the assailed decision of the lower court is hereby AFFIRMED, to the effect that judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the private respondents, subject to
the following MODIFICATIONS:
1) Enjoining the petitioner:
a) From further charging the petitioners the Counter Export Development Service fee of 0.5% of the total value of the unliquidated or unfulfilled Undertakings of the private
respondents;

b) From further implementing the provisions of Administrative Order No. SOCPEC 89-08-01 and its appurtenant rules; and
2) Requiring petitioner to approve forthwith all the pending applications of, and all those that may hereafter be filed by, the petitioner and the Intervenor, free from
and without complying with the requirements prescribed in the above-stated issuances.
SO ORDERED
Regalado (Chairman), Romero, Puno, and Mendoza, JJ., concur.

[1] [17]
Annex B, Petition, Rollo, p. 47. 69 O.G. No. 32 7035.
[2] [18]
Under PITC Board Resolution No. 92-02-05 (Volume III/I, The National 73 O.G. No. 19 3760.
Administrative Register, p. 113-116), a third means to carry out the Export [19]
Section 5. Purposes of the Corporation. The corporation is hereby authorized.:
Program under provision 3.2. of Administrative Order No. SOCPEC 89-08-01
was allowed, i.e., through the PITC itself, by paying to the PITC a Counter (a) To engage in or handle for Philippine and third country enterprises through
Export Development Service (CEDS) fee of 0.5% of the total value of the methods, systems, devices and facilities intended to achieve economies of
unliquidated or unfulfilled Undertaking by the importer scale and better terms of trade for Philippine business, both foreign
[3] procurement as well as foreign marketing and distribution;
Records, p. 47.
[4] (b) To arrange for or establish comprehensive facilities for handling all phases of
Ibid., p. 1.
warehousing and to develop and operate physical facilities for the
[5]
Ibid., p. 53. collection, processing and distribution of cargoes and other commodities;
[6]
Ibid., p. 459. (c) To obtain or arrange more comprehensive protection for activities undertaken or
[7]
commodities dealt with by monitoring or coordinating risk insurance
Annex A, Petition for Review, Rollo, p. 33.
services for existing institutions or supplementing the same;
[8]
Rollo, p. 2. (d) To employ, utilize, monitor trade promotion services, facilities and activities being
[9]
Ibid., p. 195 undertaken by government or private agencies;
[10]
Ibid., p. 196. (e) To promote or organize, whenever warranted, production enterprises and
industrial establishments and to collaborate or associate in joint venture
[11]
Ibid., p. 200. with any person, association, company or entity, whether domestic or
[12]
Ibid., p. 199. foreign, in the fields of production, marketing, procurement, and such other
related businesses;
[13]
Ibid., p. 209.
(f) To provide technical, advisory, investigatory, consultancy and management
[14]
Ibid., p. 233. services with respect to any or all of the functions, activities and operations
[15] of the corporation; and,
Ibid., p. 213.
[16] (g) In general, to undertake such activities as would be appropriate to an institution
Ibid.
created for the purpose of international trading.
Section 6. Powers of the Corporation. In order to attain its purposes and objectives,
the Corporation shall have the following powers:
(a) To engage in and carry on the business of dealership, brokerage, manufacture and
distribution of commodities, products, goods, wares, merchandise,
machineries, and equipment and in connection therewith to purchase,
borrow, acquire, hold, exchange, sell, distribute, lend, mortgage, pledge, or
otherwise dispose of import or export, process or turn to account in any
lawful manner, commodities, products, goods, wares, merchandise, and
other articles of commerce and interest therein or instrument evidencing
rights to acquire such interest and to guarantee any and all obligations
relating to transactions made on any board of trade, commodities exchange,
commodities, or similar institutions, and to do any and all things which may
be useful in connection with or incidental to the conduct of such business;
(b) To build, make, construct, maintain, purchase, sell, charter, deal in and with, own
lease, pledge, and otherwise dispose of all modes of transportation,
together with all components, tools, machinery and appliance appurtenant
thereto as are utilized in the transport of goods and merchandise by air,
land, or sea;
(c) To carry on the business of public and private warehousing and all business
necessarily or impliedly incidental thereto, and to further carry on the
business of general warehousing in all its several aspects; to construct, hire,
purchase, operate and maintain any means or conveyances for the
transportation to and from storage, by air, land or water, of any and all
products, goods, wares, merchandise or manufactured articles, to issue
certificates, warrants and receipts, negotiable, or otherwise, to persons
warehousing goods with the Corporation, and to make, negotiate, or secure
advances or loans upon the security of such stored merchandise and
products or otherwise to construct, purchase, take or lease, develop,
operate or otherwise acquire any wharf, pier, dock, warehouse, storage
room, or other facilities, rights, franchises premises deemed capable of
being advantageously used in connection with the business of the
Corporation, and to rent, lease, hypothecate, and convey the same, and
generally to carry on and undertake all business activities, transaction or
operation commonly carried on or undertaken by warehousemen;
(d) To act as shipping agent and ship broker, to handle ship husbanding and ship
chandlering, and to engage in any aspect for the business of longshoring,
lighterage, stevedoring, freight forwarding, packing and carting, and
conveying;
(e) To borrow, raise, or obtain funds to support or carry out its objects and purposes
and/or to arrange financing or equipment credit or any kind of financial or
material assistance for its own account or its clients from any financial or
lending institutions, local or foreign, and to secure any or all of the same, to
the extent that may be required such as by any lawful guaranty or counter-
guaranty by pledge, mortgage or deed of trust, or by creating or suffering to
exist a charge, lien or encumbrance, general or special, upon its revenues
and/or assets, and likewise by similar guaranties, pledges, mortgages, liens
and other security arrangements to secure the performance by the
Corporation of any obligation or liability it may undertake for itself or for
other companies or enterprises in which it may be interested. Such loans
obtained under this authority shall be guaranteed by the government in
accordance with existing regulations;
(f) To provide financial accommodations to its clients, and maintain with or for
customers accounts with respect to commodities and/or securities including
margin accounts and to do such things as may be requisite or appropriate or
incidental to the maintenance of such accounts;
(g) To act as agents or brokers in the business of marine, fire, life, accident and fidelity
insurance, in the business of giving protection to principals and employers
and any other kind or class of insurance in all its branches;
(h) To organize and incorporate subsidiaries whose capital stock may be subscribed
in whole or in part by the Corporation; Provided, however, that the
controlling interest of not less than sixty per cent (60%) of the authorized
capital stock of such subsidiaries shall at all times remain with the
corporation; Provided, finally, that the organization and incorporation of
such subsidiaries shall be subject to prior approval of the President of the
Philippines;
(i) To establish, maintain, operate or conduct branch business or offices for the
transaction of business for itself and on behalf of other persons, firms,
corporations, or other entities, either domestic or foreign, and to act as
manufacturers agents, commission merchants, merchandise brokers,
insurance, shipping and transport agents, or in any other representative
capacity for persons, firms corporations or other entities, either domestic or
foreign, for the investment, loan, payment, transmission or collection of
money, commodities or securities and for the purchase, sale improvement,
development and management of property including business concerns and
undertaking and generally to transact and undertake an agency business,
whether in respect of any commercial or financial matters;
(j) To undertake or contract for researchers, studies and surveys on any subject of
interest to the Corporation including but not limited to such matters as
business and economic conditions of various countries, including the
structure of their commodities and financial markets, the institutional
arrangements for mobilizing investments thereat, the legal and tax
constraints and incentives obtaining therein; to promote products overseas
 through holding of trade fairs, exhibits and the like, coordinating with the
Department of Trade in undertaking such activities;
(k) To acquire an interest in or to enter into partnership, amalgamate with or enter
into other arrangements for sharing profits, mutual assistance or
cooperation with any person or company carrying on or about to carry on
or engage in any business transaction, operation or work capable of being
conducted so as to purchase, take or otherwise acquire and hold shares of
stock or other securities of interest in any such company and to sell, hold
and re-issue with or without guaranty or otherwise deal with the same;
(l) Subject to the limitations established by law, to acquire by purchase, subscription,
exchange, assignment, gift, or otherwise, and to sell, assign, transfer,
exchange, mortgage, pledge and deal in and with, and otherwise, to enjoy
and dispose of, any bonds, debentures, promissory notes, shares of capital
stock and/or other securities and/or obligations, created, negotiated, or
issued by any corporation, association, or other entity, foreign or domestic,
and while the owner thereof, to exercise all the rights, power and privileges
of ownership, including the right to receive, collect and dispose of any and
all dividends, interest and income, derive therefrom, and the right to vote
on any shares of the capital stock, and upon any bonds, debentures and/or
other securities, having voting power so owned;
(m) To cause or allow the legal title to or any legal or equitable interest in any
business or any real or personal property acquired or carried on by the
Corporation to remain or be vested or registered in the name of any person
or entity whether upon trust for or as agent nominee of the Corporation or
upon such other terms and conditions which may be determined to be
necessary or expedient by the Board of Directors of the Corporation;
(n) To acquire by purchase or lease, or otherwise, lands and interests in lands and to
own, hold, improve, develop, and manage any real estate so acquired and
to erect or cause to be erected on any lands owned, held or occupied by the
Corporation, buildings or other structures with their appurtenances, and to
rebuild, enlarge, alter or improve any buildings or other structures now or
hereafter erected on any lands so owned or occupied;
(o) To purchase, own, hold or otherwise acquired such machineries, equipments,
tools, materials, supplies, or other parts as may be necessary, convenient or
appropriate for any of the purposes for which the corporation is formed;
(p) To invest and deal with the funds of the Corporation in such manner as may be
deemed proper, in order not to make such funds idle and unproductive
pending their full utilization for the principal objects and purposes for which
the Corporation has been organized;
(q) To apply for, register, purchase or otherwise acquire, or obtain a lien on, or
interest in, any patent, patent rights, licenses, designs, processes,
trademarks, trade names, distinctive marks, inventions, and improvements
thereof, and concessions which may appear likely to be advantageous or
useful to the Corporation or its clients; to use, exercise and to enter into
know-how and data or process feedback agreements, including the use of
computers, as the same may be related to or necessary or appropriate to
carry on the objects and purposes of the Corporation;
(r) To pay for any property or rights acquired or services obtained by the Corporations
either in cash, shares, or other securities of the Corporation, or partly in cash
and partly in shares or other securities, under such terms and conditions as
its Board of Directors shall determine to be reasonable. To enter into any
agreement or contract with any government or any of the agencies and
instrumentalities thereof, or with any person or company on any
undertaking that maybe conducive to the attainment of objectives of the
Corporation or of any of them and to obtain from any such government or
authority, person or company any rights, privileges and concessions which
the Corporation may think desirable;
(s) To established, operate, and maintain its own communication system throughout
the country as may be needed or required by its business operations for
which purpose, the proper franchise is hereby granted; and,
(t) To do all such other things as are incidental or appurtenant to or growing out of
or connected with the aforesaid business or powers of the Corporations or
any part thereof or conducive to the attainment of its corporate purposes
and objects.
[20]
Rollo, p. 70.
[21]
83 O.G. No. 15 1732.
[22]
Section 9 (c) of EO 133 defines a Line Agency, as understood under the said law,
as a government entity or government owned or controlled corporation
under the administrative supervision of the Department, and is deemed to
be an integral part of the Department structure notwithstanding their
organizational form, and which perform a focal and implemental role in the
Departments programs for the development of trade, industry and
investments.
[23]
Rollo, p. 76.
[24]
Ibid., pp.77, 84, 91.
[25]
Ibid., p. 47.
[26]
G.R. No. 98472 August 19, 1993 225 SCRA 417.
[27] [33]
Executive Order 133, Section 2. Valera vs. Tuason. G.R. No. L- 1276, April 30, 1948, 80 Phil 823, citing Crawford,
[28]
Statutory Construction p. 634.
Ibid., Section 3 (a), (I), (m).
[34]
[29]
Solid Homes, Inc. vs. Payawal, G.R. No. 84811, August 29, 1989, 177 SCRA 72.
Ibid., Section 16.
[35]
[30]
Section 1, Article VII, 1987 Constitution.
Ibid., Section 9 (c).
[36]
[31]
G.R. No. L-63915, December 29, 1986, 146 SCRA 446.
Section 17, Article VII, 1987 Constitution.
[37]
[32]
Rollo, p. 233.
People vs. Hon. A. Antillon et al., G.R. No. L-21657, June 29, 1982, 114 SCRA 665.

SYLLABUS
1. POLITICAL LAW; GOVERNMENT; EXECUTIVE BRANCH; EXECUTIVE ORDER 133; DOES NOT REPEAL THE REGULATORY POWER OF THE PHILIPPINE INTERNATIONAL TRADING
CORPORATION (PITC). - While PITC'S power to engage in commercial import and export activities is expressly recognized and allowed under Section 16 (d) of EO 133, the
same is now limited only to new or non-traditional products and markets not normally pursued by the private business sector. There is no indication in the law of the removal
of the powers of the PITC to exercise its regulatory functions in the area of importations from SOCPEC countries. Though it does not mention the grant of regulatory power,
EO 133, as worded, is silent as to the abolition or limitation of such powers, previously granted under P.D. 1071, from the PITC. Likewise, the general repealing clause in EO
133 stating that "all laws, ordinances, rules, and regulations, or other parts thereof, which are inconsistent with the Executive Order are hereby repealed or modified
accordingly, cannot operate to abolish the grant of regulatory powers to the PITC. There can be no repeal of the said powers, absent any cogency of irreconcilable
inconsistency or repugnancy between the issuances, relating to the regulatory power of the PITC. The PITC was attached as an intergral part to the Department of Trade and
Industry as one of its line agencies, and was given the focal task of implementing the department's programs. The absence of the regulatory power formerly enshrined in the
Special Provision of LOI 444, from Section 16 of EO 133, and the limitation of its previously wide range of functions, is noted. This does not mean, however, that PITC has lost
the authority to issue the questioned Administrative Order. It is our view that PITC still holds such authority, and may legally exercise it, as an implementing arm, and under
the supervision of the Department of Trade and Industry.
2. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; THE PURPOSE OF THE PRESIDENT IN PROMULGATING THE ORDER. - The president, in promulgating EO 133, had not intended to overhaul the functions of the
PITC. The Department of Trade and Industry was established, and was given powers and duties including those previously held by the PITC as an independent government
entity, under P.D. 1071 and LOI 444. The PITC was thereby attached to the DTI as an implementing arm of the said department. EO 133 established the DTI as the primary
coordinative, promotive, facilitative and regulatory arm of government for the country's trade, industry and investments activities, which shall act as a catalyst for intensified
private sector activity in order to accelerate and sustain economic growth. In furtherance if this mandate, the DTI was empowered, among others, to plan, implement, and
coordinate activities of the government related to trade industry and investments; to formulate and administer policies and guidelines for the investment priorities plan and
the delivery of investment incentives; to formulate country and product export strategies which will guide the export promotion and development thrusts of the government.
Corollarily, the Secretary of Trade and Industry is given the power to promulgate rules and regulations necessary to carry out the department's objectives, policies, plans,
programs and projects.
3. ID.; ID.; ID.; RATIONALE FOR THE GRANT OF QUASI-LEGISLATIVE AND QUASI-JUDICIAL POWERS IN ADMINISTRATIVE BODIES. - The grant of quasi-legislative powers in
administrative bodies is not unconstitutional. Thus, as a result of the growing complexity of the modern society, it has become necessary to create more and more
administrative bodies to help in the regulation of its ramified activities. Specialized in the particular field assigned to them, they can deal with the problems thereof with
more expertise and dispatch than can be expected from the legislation or the courts of justice. This is the reason for the increasing vesture of quasi-legislative and quasi-
judicial powers in what is now nor unreasonably called the fourth department of the government. Evidently, in the exercise of such powers, the agency concerned must
commonly interpret and apply contracts and determine the rights of private parties under such contracts. One thrust of the multiplication of administrative agencies is that
the interpretation of contracts and the determination of private rights thereunder is no longer uniquely judicial function, exercisable only by our regular courts. (Antipolo
Realty Corporation vs. National Housing Authority, G.R. No. L-50444, August 31, 1987, 153 SCRA 399). With global trade and business becoming more intricate nay even with
new discoveries in technology and electronics notwithstanding, the time has come to grapple with legislations and even decisions aimed at resolving issues affecting not only
 individual rights but also activities of which foreign governments or entities may have interests. Thus, administrative policies and regulations must be devised to suit these
changing business in a faster rate than to resort to traditional acts of the legislature.
4. STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION; STATUTES; ALL LAWS ARE PRESUMED TO BE CPNSISTENT WITH EACH OTHER. - Consistently in statutes as in executive issuances, is of prime
importance, and, in the absence of a showing to the contrary, all laws are presumed to be consistent with each other. Where it is possible to do so, it is the duty of courts, in
the construction of statutes, to harmonize and reconcile them, and to adopt a construction of a statutory provision which harmonizes and reconciles it with other statutory
provisions. The fact that a later enactment may relate to the same subject matter as that of an earlier statute is not itself sufficient to cause an implied repeal to the latter,
since the law may be cumulative or a continuation of the old one.
5. ID.; ID.; PUBLICATION, A REQUIREMENT FOR EFFECTIVITY. - "We hold therefore that all statutes, including those of local application and private laws, shall be published as a
condition for their effectivity, which shall begin fifteen days after publication unless a different effectivity is fixed by the legislature. Covered by this rule are presidential
decrees and executive orders promulgated by the President in the exercise of legislative powers or, at present, directly conferred by the Constitution. Administrative Rules
and Regulations must also be published if their purpose is to enforce or implement existing law pursuant also to a valid delegation. Interpretative regulations and those
merely internal in nature, that is, regulating only the personnel of the administrative agency and not the public, need not be published. Neither is publication required of the
so-called letter of instructions issued by administrative superiors concerning the rules or guidelines to be followed by their subordinates in the performance of their duties. We
agree that the publication must be in full or it is no publication at all since its purpose is to inform the public of the contents of the laws." Taada v. Tuvera, G.R. No. L-
63915, December 29, 1986, 146 SCRA 446.
6. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; ADMINISTRATIVE ORDER NO. SOCPEC 89-08-01; DECLARED INVALID UNTIL IT IS PUBLISHED. - The original Administrative Order issued on August 30,
1989, under which the respondents filed their applications for importation, was not published in the Official Gazette or in a newspaper of general circulation. The questioned
Administrative Order, legally, until it is published, is invalid within the context of Article 2 of the Civil Code. The fact that the amendments to Administrative Order No. SOCPEC
89-08-01 were filed with, and published by the UP Law Center in the National Administrative Register, does not cure the defect related to the effectivity of the Administrative
Order. The Adminstrative Order under consideration is one of those issuances which should be published for its effectivity, since its purpose is to enforce and implement an
existing law pursuant to a valid delegation, i.e., P.D. 1071, in relation to LOI 444 and EO 133.

APPEARANCES OF COUNSEL

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

THIRD DIVISION

G.R. No. L-65894 September 24, 1987

THE MUNICIPAL GOVERNMENT OF CORON, PALAWAN, duly represented by MAYOR RICARDO F. LIM, petitioner,
vs.
JOSE CARINO, VICTORIANO DACULLA, BEN GUMASING, LUCENA CRUZ, HILARIA YALON, PEPITO YAMBAO, RIC GACUTAN, ANDRES DACULLA, FELICISIMA URSAIS, PASTOR
JOSOL, TEDDY ACTANG, CANDIDA MANALO, LETICIA RAMAL, ASSOCIATE JUSTICES PORFIRIO V. SISON, ABDULWAHID A. BIDIN, MARCELINO R. VELOSO and DESIDERIO P.
JURADO, respondents.
GUTIERREZ, JR., J.:

The second paragraph of Section 39, Batas Pambansa Bilang 129 provides that:

No record on appeal shall be required to take an appeal. In lieu thereof, the entire original record shall be transmitted with all the pages prominently numbered
consecutively, together with an index of the contents thereof.

Likewise, Sections 18 and 19(b) of the Interim Rules of Court promulgated on January 11, 1983 provide that:

Sec. 18. The filing of a record on appeal shall be dispensed with, except in the cases referred to in sub-paragraph (b) of paragraph (1) hereof.

No appeal bond shall be required for an appeal.

xxx xxx xxx

Sec. 19 (b) In appeals in special proceedings in accordance with Rule 109 of the Rules of Court and other cases wherein multiple appeals are allowed, the period of appeal
shall be thirty (30) days, a record of appeal being required.

Whether or not the above provisions are applicable to the case at bar is the lone issue in this petition which assails the resolution of the respondent appellate court dated July
29, 1983.

The dispositive part of the questioned resolution reads:

WHEREFORE, notwithstanding the foregoing, in the broader interest of justice and considering that under the present Interim Rules a record on appeal is no longer
necessary for taking an appeal, the Court resolved to order the recall of the records of this case from the Regional Trial Court of Palawan Branch I, Puerto Princess for
further proceedings before this Court. (Rollo, pp. 12-13)

Following are the pertinent facts of the case as culled from the records.

Sometime in 1976, an action was filed by the petitioner before the Court of First Instance of Palawan and Puerto Princess City, Branch IV where it was docketed as Civil Case No.
35. The action sought authority from the court to demolish the structures built by the private respondents alongside the rock causeway of the petitioner's wharf. The complaint
alleged, among others:

that the defendants' houses were constructed more than 3 years before the filing of instant action (par. 2, Complaint),: that on August 19, 1974 the herein defendants
undertook to remove their structures on space where they were then at that time and are presently standing, when it will be needed by the government (par. 3, Ibid);
that the space or area is needed by the plaintiff for the docking or berthing of pumpboats (motorized bancas) and fishing boats and for the loading and unloading of
cargoes along the pier on both sides thereof (par. 4, Ibid); and also to ease the congested traffic along it (par. 10, Ibid); that his Excellency, President Ferdinand E. Marcos
had the Mayor of plaintiff-municipality to demolish and remove all constructions along the pier after giving the defendants one month notice (par. 5, Ibid) and aside from
this directive of the President, the mayor of the plaintiff-municipality is also authorized to remove the defendants' illegal constructions under LOI 19 (par. 7, Ibid); that
despite said mayor's desire to comply immediately with the said presidential directive, the defendants had already been given 3 extensions thereby delaying their
 ejectment therefrom (par. 6, Ibid); that most of the defendants are affluent squatters (par. 9, Ibid); and that for the indigent defendants, a surveyed area has already been
made ready for their relocation (par. 12, Ibid). (Decision CFI, Palawan and Puerto Princess City, Branch IV, p. 2; Reno, p. 15).

On the other hand, the private respondents, in their answer,

counter

-alleged, among others:

that their structures when made were covered by building permits with the approval of the Bureau of Public Highways (par, 2, Answer); that the area where their
structures were located is a foreshore area (Par. 4, Ibid); that a meeting was convened and presided by Governor Socrates at Coron, the same having been attended by
the local representatives of the Philippine Constabulary, the Philippine Coast Guard, the Department (now Ministry) of Social Services and Development, the Sangguniang
Bayan and the defendants and it was agreed in this meeting that the demolition of the defendants' houses will be suspended pending action of the Office of the President
(par. 15, 16, 17, Ibid); and that the Chairman of the National Housing Authority had sent a letter-advice to the mayor of the plaintiff-municipality to suspend the
demolition of the houses of the defendants (par. 18, Ibid). (Rollo, pp. 15-16)

After a series of postponements, the trial court, on January 16, 1979, reset the hearing of the case for the last time for three consecutive dates, March 20, 21, and 22, 1979 with
further warning to the private respondents that no more postponements shall be allowed.

On March 20, 1979, despite proper notice, the private respondents and their counsel failed to appear at the scheduled hearing. Consequently, the petitioner moved that private
respondents' non-appearance be considered as a waiver on their part of their right to cross-examine the petitioner's witnesses and their right to present evidence. The lower
court issued an order granting the petitioner's motion and considered the case submitted for decision.

In view of the above order, the private respondents went to the appellate court on certiorari. On June 9, 1979, the appellate court dismissed for lack of merit CA G.R. SP-09389-R
captioned "Jose Carino, et al., petitioners v. Mayor Ricardo Lim and Hon. Benjamin Vega, Judge CFI, Palawan, Branch IV."

On May 15, 1979, after the main case had been submitted for decision as aforestated, the private respondents filed a notice to take deposition which the lower court
disregarded for being "irrelevant and for other obvious reasons."

On October 10, 1980, the lower court rendered its decision, the dispositive portion of which reads:

IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the plaintiff-municipality of Coron, Palawan and against all the herein defendants as follows:

1. Dismissing the defendants'counterclaim for lack of merit;

2. Confirming the power of plaintiff-municipality and authority of its incumbent mayor to demolish the defendants' structures along the rock causeway or pier of Coron;
and

3. Ordering the said defendants to remove their structures in the area in question within thirty (30) days from receipt of this decision and for their failure to do so,
authorizing the herein plaintiff represented by its incumbent mayor to demolish the said structures at the expense of the said defendants.

Costs against all the defendants. (Rollo, pp. 28-29)

On appeal, the private respondents on February 2, 1982 were required "to submit the forty (40) printed copies of their record on appeal together with the proof of service of
fifteen (15) copies thereof upon the appellee" within fifteen (15) days from receipt of the notice of the appellate court's Acting Clerk of Court regarding their appeal. (Rollo, p.
32)

Upon motion by the private respondents, the appellate court granted an extension of sixty (60) days from April 7, 1982 within which the required printed copies of the record on
appeal may be submitted. However, despite the extended period given, the private respondents were not able to comply with the appellate court's requirement.

In a resolution dated July 19, 1982, the appellate court required the private respondents to show cause why their appeal should not be dismissed for failure to file the printed
copies of the record on appeal.

On August 31, 1982, the appellate court resolved to dismiss the private respondents' appeal docketed as CA G.R. No. 69052-R for failure to file the required record on appeal.

On December 6, 1982, the Acting Clerk of Court of the appellate court, in an Entry of Judgment, certified that the above resolution dismissing the private respondents' appeal
had become final and executory on September 27, 1982.

Accordingly, on February 1, 1983, a writ of execution was issued to enforce the October 10, 1980 decision of the Court of First Instance of Palawan and Puerto Princesa City,
Branch IV.

Before the Provincial Sheriff could proceed with the execution of the judgment, the private respondents, in a motion dated April 12, 1983 asked the appellate court that the
records of the case be recalled from the court of origin. In their supplemental motion, the private respondents argued that since under the present law, printed records on
appeal are no longer required, their right to be heard on appeal must be upheld instead of the rule on technicalities.

In its opposition to the private respondents' motion, the Petitioner pointed out that although the newly promulgated procedural rules invoked by the private respondents may
be given retroactive effect, their applicability only covers pending actions and does not extend to those which had already become final and executory.

As a consequence of the private respondents' motion to recall the records of the case, a temporary restraining order dated April 29, 1983 was issued by the appellate court
directing the Provincial Sheriff of Palawan to desist from executing the October 10, 1980 decision.

On July 29, 1983, the appellate court issued the disputed resolution. The subsequent denial of the petitioner's motion for reconsideration prompted the filing of this petition.

The petitioner maintains that the Interim Rules of Court promulgated on January 11, 1983 to implement the provisions of Batas Pambansa Bilang 29 cannot apply to the case at
bar for the simple reason that to revive or recall appealed cases which had been dismissed or which had become final and executory would cause a great injustice to those in
whose favor these cases had been decided. It is further contended that to allow its application would put no end to those appealed cases which are otherwise considered as
closed ones.

We find merit in the petitioner's contentions.

We have resolved the issue as to the extent of the retroactive application of section 18 of the Interim Rules of Court in Alday v. Camilon (120 SCRA 521). We reiterated the rule
that:

Statutes regulating the procedure of the courts will be construed as applicable to actions pending and undetermined at the time of their passage. Procedural laws are
retrospective in that sense and to that extent. (People vs. Sumilang, 77 Phil. 764 [1946]) Emphasis supplied.
The appellate court should have followed this time-honoured rule instead of issuing its July 29, 1983 resolution seeking to revive a case already long final as evidenced by the
entry of judgment made by its Acting Clerk of Court on December 6, 1982.

The records of the instant case show that despite the 60-day extension period given to the private respondents within which they could file their printed record of appeal as
then required, they still failed to do so. It was only after a writ of execution had been issued on February 1, 1983 that the private respondents responded to the appellate court's
resolution dated July 19, 1982 requiring them to show cause why their appeal should not be dismissed for failure to file the printed record on appeal. They claimed that the
court's resolution must have been a result of oversight because they actually filed a record on appeal.

As a general rule, our policy towards an invocation of the right to appeal has been one of liberality. (Castro vs. Court of Appeals, 123 SCRA 782 citing De Las Alas vs. Court of
Appeals, 83 SCRA 200). This is so because an appeal is an essential part of our judicial system and every party-litigant should be afforded the amplest opportunity for the proper
and just disposition of his cause freed from the constraints of technicalities. (See Siguenza vs. Court of Appeals, 137 SCRA 570). However, it is an equally established doctrine
that the right to appeal is merely a statutory privilege and may be exercised only in the manner and in accordance with the provisions of law. (See United CMC Textile Workers
Union vs. Clave, 137 SCRA 346).

For a proper exercise of their right to appeal, the private respondents should have complied with Section 5, Rule 46 of the Rules of Court, as amended by our resolution en
banc dated September 17, 1974, which partly provides that:

Sec. 5. Duty of Appellant upon Receipt of Notice. — It shall be the duty of the appellant, within fifteen (15) days from the date of the notice referred to in the preceding
section, to pay to the Clerk of the Court of Appeals the fee for the docketing of the appeal, and within sixty (60) days from such notice to submit to the court twelve (12)
printed copies of the record on appeal, or twelve (12) typewritten or mimeographed (on one side of good quality paper, eleven inches in length by eight and a half inches
in width — commonly known as letter size — written double spaced) copies of said record on appeal together with proof of service of two (2) printed, typewritten or
mimeographed copies thereof upon the appellee.

Thus, upon failure of the appellant to comply with the above rule, the Court of Appeals may dismiss his appeal. Said provision implicitly grants the Court of Appeals the power to
do so. (See Pfleider vs. Victoriano, 98 SCRA 491). The private respondents in this case did not submit printed copies of their record on appeal. When the appellate court issued its
July 19, 1982 resolution, it was to afford the private respondents a chance to explain why they failed to comply with the applicable rule. After having failed to submit the
required printed copies of their record on appeal, they cannot now rectify a clear non-compliance with the law by invoking the court's liberality insofar as the application of
remedial laws is concerned. The private respondents even faulted the appellate court as having issued the July 19, 1982 resolution through oversight. They alleged that they had
filed the required record on appeal when in fact what they referred to was the record on appeal from the lower court to the appellate court and not the printed record on
appeal.

Since the private respondents failed to submit the required printed record on appeal, the lower court's judgment in favor of the petitioner became final. and executory as an
eventual result of the dismissal of the appeal. Once a judgment becomes final the prevailing party, the petitioner in the instant case, is entitled as a matter of right to the
execution of the judgment in his favor. For the court, it becomes its ministerial duty to order the execution of said judgment. (Santos, Jr. vs. Court of Appeals, et al., G.R. No.
56614, promulgated July 28, 1987 citing Agricultural and Industrial Marketing, Inc. vs. Court of Appeals, 118 SCRA 49; Balintawak Construction Supply Corporation vs. Valenzuela,
124 SCRA 331; Rizal Commercial Banking Corporation vs. Dayrit, 123 SCRA 203; Gonzales vs. Sayo, 122 SCRA 607).

WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED. The resolution of respondent appellate court dated July 29, 1983 is SET ASIDE. Let the records of this case be remanded to the
court of origin for enforcement of the writ of execution of the judgment. This decision is immediately executory.

SO ORDERED.
Fernan (Chairman), Feliciano and Cortes, JJ., concur.

Bidin, * J., took no part.

Footnotes

* As one of the respondents in the above-entitled case, Justice Bidin took no part.

FIRST DIVISION

G.R. No. L-60316 January 31, 1983

VIOLETA ALDAY and ERNESTO Yu, petitioners,

vs.
HONORABLE SERAFIN E. CAMILON, as Judge temporarily presiding over Branch XXV of the Court of First Instance of Rizal (Pasig), SHERIFF OF PASIG, respondents.

Moises B. Boquia for petitioners.

Acebes, Del Carmen, Cecilio, Cinco & Ferrer Law Office for respondent Aboitiz.

RESOLUTION

MELENCIO-HERRERA, J.:

The issue for resolution is whether or not respondent Judge gravely abused his discretion in issuing a Writ of Execution to enforce the Decision in Civil Case No. 31725 of his
Court for a sum of money entitled Aboitiz & Co Inc. v Violets Alday and Ernesto Yu, notwithstanding the fact that petitioners, as defendants aid the losing party below, had timely
filed a Notice of Appeal and posted a cash appeal bond, but did not submit any Record on Appeal.

There is no question that the Decision of the lower Court adverse to petitioners was rendered on August 13, 1981. Copy thereof was received by them on September 1, 1981.
Within time, petitioners filed on September 4, 1981 a Notice of Appeal and a cash appeal bond, but without a Record on Appeal. On March 25, 1982, respondent Judge issued
the questioned Order granting execution since petitioners had not perfected an appeal within the reglementary period for failure on their part to file a Record on Appeal within
the prescribed period,

Petitioners justify the non-filing of the Record on Appeal by invoking section 39 of the Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980 (Batas Pambansa Blg. 129) providing that "no record
on appeal shall, be required to take an appeal." They claim that the Act was approved on August 14, 1981 and Section 48 thereof specifically provides that it was to take effect
immediately.
Petitioners overlook, however, Section 44 of BP Blg. 129 specifically providing that its provisions were to be immediately carried out in accordance with an Executive Order to be
issued by the President and that the old Courts would continue to function until the completion of the reorganization as declared by the President. Moreover, it will be recalled
that on September 3, 1981, a Petition questioning the constitutionality of that law was instituted before this Court (De la Llana vs. Alba, G.R. No. L-57883). The constitutionality
of that law was upheld in our Decision of March 12, 1982 (112 SCRA 294). Consequently, prior to that date, and before the issuance of Executive Order No. 864, dated January
17, 1983, declaring the completion of the reorganization of the Judiciary, BP Big. 129 could not be said to have been in force and effect. It was prematurely for petitioners to
have invoked that law to justify their stand in not filing a Record on Appeal, and respondent Judge cannot be faulted with grave abuse of discretion for having authorized the
issuance of the Writ of Execution since, for lack of compliance with the procedure for taking an appeal under the former Rules of Court, the lower Court Decision would have
become final.

Nonetheless, in Executive Order No. 864, dated January 17, 1983, the President of the Philippines had declared that the former Courts were deemed automatically abolished as
of 12:00 o'clock midnight of January 17, 1983. The reorganization having been declared to have been completed, BP Blg. 129 is now in full force and effect. A Record on Appeal is
no longer necessary for taking an appeal. The same proviso appears in Section 18 of the Interim Rules aid Guidelines issued by this Court on January 11, 1983. Being procedural
in nature, those provisions may be applied retroactively for the benefit of petitioners, as appellant.

Statutes regulating the procedure of the courts will be construed as applicable to action's pending and undetermined at the time of their passage. Procedural
laws are retrospective in that sense and to that extent (People vs. Sumilang, 77 Phil. 764 [1946]).

ACCORDINGLY, the Order of respondent Judge (now an Associate Justice of the Intermediate Appellate Court) granting the issuance of the Writ of Execution is hereby set aside
and the branch of the Regional Trial Court to whom the case below has been assigned is hereby directed to give due course to petitioners' appeal even without a Record on
Appeal. The temporary Restraining Order heretofore issued by this Tribunal enjoining the enforcement of the Writ of Execution issued by the lower Court is hereby made
permanent.

No costs.

SO ORDERED.

Teehankee (Chairman), Vasquez, Relova and Gutierrez, Jr., JJ., concur.

Plana, J., is on leave.

[G.R. No. 110397. August 14, 1997]

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. ARMANDO BINAMIRA y ALAYON, accused-appellant.

DECISION
PANGANIBAN, J.:
In acquitting the accused, this Court stresses two doctrines: (1) a violation of the accuseds right to retain a counsel of his own choice during custodial investigation renders
his extrajudicial confession inadmissible even where such confession was extracted on October 3, 1985, i.e., before the effectivity of the 1987 Constitution, and (2) to sustain a
conviction anchored on circumstantial evidence, the prosecution must convincingly prove an unbroken chain of events from which only one fair and reasonable conclusion can be
inferred -- that of the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt. Where such circumstances can be the subject of two possibilities, one of which is consistent with innocence
and the other with guilt, then such evidence has not fulfilled the test of moral certainty and the constitutional presumption of innocence must thus be upheld.

Statement of the Case

Appellant Armando Binamira y Alayon[1] appeals the May 5, 1989 Decision[2] of the Regional Trial Court of Makati, Metro Manila, Branch 164, [3] in Criminal Case No. 19504
convicting him of the crime of robbery with homicide, sentencing him to reclusion perpetua and ordering him to pay the heirs of the victim, Jessie Flores y Cledar,[4] P30,000.00 as
indemnity and P25,000.00 as actual or compensatory damages.
On October 7, 1985, an Information,[5] dated October 4, 1985, was filed by Second Assistant Fiscal Dennis M. Villa Ignacio accusing appellant of robbery with homicide
allegedly committed as follows:

That on or about the 2nd day of October, 1985, in the Municipality of Makati, Metro Manila, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named
accused, while armed with a fan knife, with intent to gain and by means of force, violence and intimidation, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously take and
divest from one Jessie Flores y Cledera her 14K Gold Necklace worth P1,000.00 and One (1) Ladys Citizen wrist watch worth P1,000.00 all belonging to Jessie Flores y Cledera in
the total amount of P2,000.00 to the damage and prejudice of the latter in the aforementioned amount of P2,000.00; that on the occasion of said robbery, the accused stabbed
the said Jessie Flores y Cledera on her neck, as a result thereof, the said victim suffered mortal wound which directly caused her death.

Contrary to law.
Arraigned on October 25, 1985, the accused, assisted by Counsel de Oficio Elpidio R. Calis, pleaded not guilty to the charge.[6] Trial ensued in due course.
Based on circumstantial evidence and on Appellant Binamiras extrajudicial confession, the court a quo rendered the assailed Decision, the decretal portion of which reads:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the court finds the accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of robbery with homicide and hereby sentences him to the penalty
of reclusion perpetua; to indemnify the heirs of the victim the amount of P30,000.00 for the death of Jessie Flores and P25,000.00 as actual or compensatory without subsidiary
imprisonment, in case of insolvency.

SO ORDERED.[7]
Aggrieved, appellant interposed this appeal.

The Facts According to the Prosecution

The prosecution presented four witnesses; namely, NBI Medico-Legal Officer Nieto Salvador, who testified on the autopsy results; Nicasio Rosales, a security guard who
testified on the arrest and turnover to the police authorities of Appellant Binamira; Makati Police Officer Wilfredo Cruz, who testified on the custodial investigation and extrajudicial
confession of appellant; and Narciso Flores, the husband of the deceased, Jessie Flores y Cledera. In the appellees brief, the Solicitor General summarized the facts as presented
by the prosecution, thus:

On 02 October 1985, at about 6:50 P.M., in Magallanes Village, Makati, Metro Manila, Security Guard Nicasio Rosales of the RAPSA Security Agency assigned thereat together
with his co-guards were alerted by a report regarding the death of a woman by the name of Jessie Flores y Cledera at No. 68 Margarita St., Magallanes Village, Makati. They
hurried to the scene of the crime where they saw the lifeless body of a woman lying on the ground (pp. 4-6, tsn, February 14, 1986).
They immediately conducted a search of the immediate surroundings hoping to find the person responsible for the killing and they saw a man wearing short pants, walking very
fast. When the guards approached him, the man who turned out to be herein appellant, casually pretended to be urinating. Suspicious, they searched him and found a pair of
pants and undershirt inside his bag soaked with blood (pp. 6-7, id).

Thereupon, the guard brought appellant to the Galleria de Magallanes Hall where he, as well as the bloodied clothings, were turned over to Police Investigator Wilfredo Cruz
whom they had called to respond to said incident. On the same day, appellant was brought to the Criminal Investigation Division (CID) of the Makati Police Station for further
investigation (pp. 7-8. id).

On the following day, 03 October 1985, Cruz conducted an investigation of appellants complicity in the Magallanes robbery-killing incident. Before the investigation proceeded,
Pfc. Cruz first apprised appellant of his constitutional rights while under custodial investigation by explaining to him his right to counsel, his right to remain silent and, that any
statement that he would give during the investigation may be used for or against him in any court of law, and that in case he did not have a lawyer, the State would provide him
with one who will assist him in the investigation. At this juncture, the services of Atty. Romeo P. Parcon of the Citizens Legal Assistance Office (CLAO) of Makati was offered to
which appellant agreed (pp.5-7, tsn, 1986; pp.4-6, tsn, May 14, 1986; pp.84, Record).

While being investigated with the assistance and presence of Atty. Parcon, appellant readily cooperated to give his statements. He admitted that he stabbed the victim in the
neck with a fan knife after divesting her of one (1) wristwatch and a gold necklace. Appellant revealed that he killed the victim when she began screaming for help despite his
instructions to keep silent. Midway during the investigation, Pfc. Cruz showed to appellant a gold necklace and asked him the connection thereof to the investigation to which
appellant, despite being told that he was at liberty not to proceed with the investigation, admitted that the necklace was the same one he took from the victim. After the
investigation, the extrajudicial confession was subscribed and sworn to by appellant (Exh. C to C-2) before the office of the then Fiscal of Makati (pp.84-84, Records; p.10, tsn,
March 21, 1986; p.7, tsn, May 14, 1986).

Dr. Nieto Salvador, the NBI Medico-legal Officer, who conducted an autopsy examination on the body of the victim on October 3, 1985, found as per autopsy report no. N-85-
2078 (Exh. F to F-3) dated December 2, 1985, the following:

'Lips and nailbeds, pale. Abrasions, reddish brown, 1.5 x 0.5. cm. right infraclavicular region.

'Wound stab, 2.0 cm. in size, lower extremity rounded, running downward and medially, edges clean cut; located at the left side of the suprasternal, 1.0 cm. to the left anterior
median line directed backward, downward and laterally, involving skin, underlying soft tissues, cutting carotid artery and vein, approximate depth artery and vein, approximate
depth, 7.0 cm.

Other visceral organs pale.

Stomach is filled up to 2/3 with partially digested food particles.

Dr. Salvador testified that the victims cause of death was due to acute hemorrhage on account of a frontal stab wound she sustained at the base of her neck just above the
subtraclavicular notch. He further opines that the instrument used in the stabbing is a sharp pointed object. Appellants clothings soaked with the victims blood were also
submitted to Dr. Salvador for examination (pp. 6-9, tsn, April 25, 1986).[8]

According to the Defense

 Appellant, as lone defense witness, admitted his presence at Magallanes Village that fateful night but unequivocally denied participation in the crime. The following counter-
statement of facts is narrated in Appellants Brief:

The evidence for the defense eloquently shows that accused-appellant was formerly connected with the National Food Authority (NFA) as messenger from 1983 to 1985. On
October 2, 1985, coming from his work at Baclaran, Paranaque, Metro Manila, at around 7:00 oclock in the evening, more or less, he went to Magallanes Village at the back of
Bulwagang Pilipino for the purpose of taking a merienda which he usually did after office hours. While walking all alone at the vicinity of Magallanes Village, accused-appellant
did not notice any unusual incident nor seen (sic) anybody until the security guards who, without legal and justifiable grounds searched and apprehended him. Accused-
appellant was brought by the security guards at their headquarters where they beat, mauled, maltreated and tied him to the post. They forced him to admit that he was the one
who killed the woman whose body was lying at their guardhouse. But the accused-appellant maintained his innocence.After the lapse of several minutes, the security guards
untied the accused-appellant from the post and they brought them back to their headquarters. The security guards then pointed to accused-appellant a person lying at their
guardhouse. They forced accused-appellant to carry the dead body to be placed inside the funeral car. Helpless, accused-appellant followed their order. After he has placed the
body at the funeral car, the security guards ordered him to take off the clothes he was wearing. Accused-appellant consented. Afterwards, the security guards brought him once
more to their headquarters where accused-appellant saw Pfc. Willy Cruz. From their headquarters, they brought him to the Criminal Investigation Division (CID), Makati Police
Station for interrogation.

At the Makati Police Station, the police investigators assigned that time investigated the accused-appellant relative to the death of a woman at the Magallanes Village, Makati,
Metro-Manila. When the investigation was being conducted by the police investigator, accused-appellant did not see one of his relatives at the police station nor was he
provided a lawyer of his choice. Subsequently, the police investigators blindfolded him. He was thereafter mauled by the police investigators, forcing him to admit the
commission of the crime which happened in Magallanes Village. After maltreating the accused-appellant, they detained him and was made to sign a statement the following
day.

When his wife visited him at the detention cell, accused-appellant told her what the security guards and police officers did to him during the apprehension and investigation. The
wife, due to fear, did not report the maltreatment committed on the accused-appellant to the higher authorities.

Accused-appellant denied having divested Jessie Flores of one gold necklace worth P1,000.00 and Ladyss (sic) Citizen wrist watch also worth P1,000.00 or a total of P2,000.00
and having stabbed Jessie Flores on her neck which resulted to her untimely death. On August 2, 1986, accused-appellant `wrote his lawyer on record reiterating thereto the
mishandling committed by the security guards and police investigator when he denied the killing of a woman whose body was found in Magallanes Village, Metro-Manila. (Exh.
1). (TSN, September 11, 1987, pp. 3-11)[9]

The Issues
In his brief, appellant assigns the following errors allegedly committed by the trial court:
I

The trial court gravely erred in giving full credence to thhe [sic] testimonies of the prosecution witnesses despite of [sic] its improbabilities.
II
The trial court gravely erred in holding that the extrajudicial confession of accused-appellant Armando Binamira is admissible in evidence.
(III)
The trial court gravely erred in totally disregarding the defense interposed by the accused-appellant.
 IV
The trial court gravely erred in convicting the accused-appellant despite failure of the prosecution to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt. [10]
In the ultimate, the foregoing boil down to whether the evidence on record establishes beyond reasonable doubt the guilt of Appellant Binamira. Two points will be addressed:
first, the admissibility of appellants extrajudicial confession; and second, the sufficiency of the circumstantial evidence to sustain appellants guilt.

The Courts Ruling

The appeal is meritorious.

Extrajudicial Confession Inadmissible

Appellant Armando Binamira contends that his extrajudicial confession marked as Exhibit C is inadmissible in evidence because it was improperly taken during the custodial
investigation.[11] He contends that he was not informed of his right to counsel of his own choice nor assisted by counsel of his own choice[12] and that this was evident from
the Pahiwatig of his extrajudicial confession, which reads:[13]

PAHIWATIG: Ikaw ARMANDO BINAMIRA ay nahaharap sa isang pagsisiyasat tungkol sa isang pangyayari na kung saan ang isang babaing biktima ay namatay dahil sa isang
saksak sa kanyang leeg.

Bilang isang malayang mamamayan ng ating bansa, ikaw ay may ilang mga karapatan sa ilalim ng ating bagong umiiral na Saligang Batas gaya ng mga sumusunod;

Na, karapatan mo ang manahimik o ang hindi pagbibigay ng pahayag tungkol sa pagsisiyasat na ito.

Na, karapatan mo ang kumuha ng isang abogado o manananggol na siyang mamamatnubay sa iyo sa pagsisiyasat na ito at kung ikaw ay walang abogado ay bibigyan ka namin ng
isang manananggol o abogado.

Na, karapatan mo rin ang hindi pagsagot sa mga ipagtatanong ko sa iyo na inaakala mo na makasasama sa iyo.

Nais ko rin ipaalam sa iyo na ano mang sasabihin mo sa pagsisiyasat na ito ay maari ring naming gamitin laban sa iyo sa alin mang hukuman dito sa ating bansa.
TANONG: Matapos kong maipaliwanag sa iyo ang ilan sa iyong mga karapatan, ikaw ba ay magbibigay ng isang malayang salaysay sa pagsisiyasat na ito?
SAGOT: Opo. A.B.[14]
T. Dahilan sa ikaw ay walang manananggol o abogado sa pagsisiyasat na ito, ikaw ay bibgyan namin ng isang abogado sa katauhan ni Atty. ROMEO P. PARCON ng
Makati CLAO office na siyang mamamatnubay sa iyo ngayon. Pumapayag ka ba na itong si ATTY. ROMEO P. PARCON ang siyang mamantnubay sa iyo sa
pagsisiyasat na ito?
S. Opo. A.B. [handwritten]
T. Ikaw ba ay magbibigay ng isang malayang salaysay sa harap ni Atty. Romeo P. Parcon? (Underscoring supplied.)
Significant in assessing this contention of the appellant is the Solicitor Generals candid admission that Exhibit C (the extrajudicial confession) does not show that appellant was
informed of his right to have a counsel preferably of his own choice as required under the present Constitution. [15]
The prosecution however justified such failure to inform appellant of his right to counsel of choice and to give him the opportunity to retain one by arguing that the questioned
extrajudicial confession was obtained on October 3, 1985, whereas the 1987 Constitution, which expressly provided for such rights,[16] took effect only on February 2, 1987[17] and
could not be given retroactive effect pursuant to Magtoto vs. Manguera.[18] Thus, the Solicitor General postulates, (a)t the time said confession was made, appellant was not yet
entitled to be informed of the right he is now invoking simply because there was none at the time. The right to counsel preferably of ones own choice during investigation for the
commission of an offense is a new provision.[19]
We do not agree. Article IV, Section 20 of the 1973 Constitution mandated that x x x (a)ny person under investigation for the commission of an offense shall have the right to
remain silent and to counsel, and to be informed of such right. x x x Any confession obtained in violation of this section shall be inadmissible in evidence. Parenthetically, this
constitutional provision was an acceptance of the landmark doctrine laid down by the United States Supreme Court in Miranda vs. Arizona.[20]
Significantly, in Morales, Jr. vs. Enrile[21] promulgated on April 26, 1983, the Philippine Supreme Court, applying said provision of the 1973 Constitution, laid down for the first
time the guidelines to be observed strictly by law enforcers during custodial investigation, [22] and there had occasion to state that x x x No custodial investigation shall be conducted
unless it be in the presence of counsel engaged by the person arrested, by any person on his behalf, or appointed by the court upon petition either of the detainee himself or
anyone on his behalf. x x x[23] (Italics supplied.) This doctrinal pronouncement was reiterated in People vs. Galit,[24] promulgated on March 20, 1985, and other cases. In People vs.
Jimenez[25]promulgated on December 10, 1991 and which dealt with an extrajudicial confession given during a custodial investigation on September 16, 1985, this Court through
then Associate Justice, now Chief Justice, Andres R. Narvasa held that a person being investigated by the police as a suspect in an offense has the right, among others, to have
competent and independent counsel preferably of his own choice and if he cannot afford the services of counsel, he must be provided with one; and that said right cannot be
waived except in writing and in the presence of counsel. x x x In one case, the confession of an accused was rejected there being no showing that the lawyer of the Citizens Legal
Assistance Office (CLAO) called by the National Bureau of Investigation to assist the accused was his counsel of choice. [26]
In its evolution, the right to engage a counsel of choice and its companion rights had been initially a judge-made[27] law, the definitive ruling having been first laid down by
this Court in Morales, reiterated in Galit and subsequent cases and eventually incorporated in the 1987 Constitution. Ineludibly, these rights may not be given retroactive effect
pursuant to Article 4 in relation to Article 8 of the Civil Code and, by parity of reasoning, Magtoto. Consequently, they do not cover extrajudicial confessions made prior to April
26, 1983, the promulgation date of Morales.[28] Since Appellant Binamira executed his extrajudicial confession on October 3, 1985, or after April 26, 1983, he was correct in invoking
the right to be informed of his right to engage a counsel of his own choice and to be afforded the reasonable opportunity to retain one. On this basis, the prosecutions argument,
pointing to our ruling in Magtoto, is flawed. For, clearly, the facts obtaining in the present case do not justify the application of the doctrine on non-retroactivity or prospectivity
of laws, including this Courts interpretation of the same as enunciated in Magtoto.
In addition, the factual antecedents of Magtoto are not on all fours with that of the present case. The former case contemplated a right previously absent under the 1935
Constitution and which was granted for the first time only by the 1973 Constitution. The instant case involved a right which, although not then expressly worded in the 1973
Constitution, already existed as a judge-made law when the incident happened and its application was claimed by the appellant.
Father Joaquin Bernas, a member of the 1986 Constitutional Commission, writes that the brief sentence in the 1973 version was expanded (in the 1987 Constitution) in order
to clarify the scope of the right.[29] Indeed, the present Constitution did not create a new right; it merely affirmed its scope as already explained in existing jurisprudence. The
deliberations of the 1986 Constitutional Commission support this conclusion. Felicitas S. Aquino, another member of the Constitutional Commission, proclaimed that [l]ikewise,
the amendment of incorporating PREFERABLY OF HIS OWN CHOICE reasserts that the freedom to choose and the freedom to refuse belong first to the detainee.[30] This Court had
occasion to explain the rationale of this right as follows:

It is noteworthy that the modifiers competent and independent were terms absent in all organic laws previous to the 1987 Constitution. Their addition in the fundamental law of
1987 was meant to stress the primacy accorded to the voluntariness of the choice, under the uniquely stressful conditions of a custodial investigation, by according the accused,
deprived of normal conditions guaranteeing individual autonomy, an informed judgment based on the choices given to him by a competent and independent lawyer.
Thus, the lawyer called to be present during such investigation should be as far as reasonably possible, the choice of the individual undergoing questioning. If the lawyer were
one furnished in the accused's behalf, it is important that he should be competent and independent, i.e., that he is willing to fully safeguard the constitutional rights of the
accused, as distinguished from one who would merely be giving a routine, peremptory and meaningless recital of the individual's constitutional rights. In People v. Basay, this
Court stressed that an accused's right to be informed of the right to remain silent and to counsel contemplates the transmission of meaningful information rather than just the
ceremonial and perfunctory recitation of an abstract constitutional principle.'

Ideally, therefore, a lawyer engaged for an individual facing custodial investigation (if the latter could not afford one) `should be engaged by the accused (himself), or by the
latter's relative or person authorized by him to engage an attorney or by the court, upon proper petition of the accused or person authorized by the accused to file such
petition. Lawyers engaged by the police, whatever testimonials are given as proof of their probity and supposed independence, are generally suspect; as in many areas, the
relationship between lawyers and law enforcement authorities can be symbiotic."[31]
Clearly, the right to counsel preferably of ones own choice and the right to be informed thereof were extant when Appellant Binamira was investigated by the Makati Police
on October 3, 1985, or more than two years after the promulgation of the judge-made law in Morales.
In the present case, Appellant Binamira was not adequately informed of his constitutional right to engage a counsel of his own choice, much less afforded an opportunity to
exercise such right. This much, we repeat, is admitted by the Solicitor General.
Moreover, the extrajudicial confession itself shows that, in the course of the custodial investigation, Appellant Binamira was not fully apprised of his constitutional
rights. While he was perfunctorily informed of his right to be represented by counsel, it was not explained to him that he may choose that counsel. More important, he was not
given the chance to actually retain such counsel of his choice. Furthermore, he was supposedly informed of these rights through two kilometric sentences punctuated by similarly
two terse answers of Opo initialed by him.[32] It was not demonstrated that appellant understood his constitutional rights; and the Pahiwatig itself, which is obviously of martial
law vintage, shows that the investigating officers did not exert sufficient effort to explain such rights. Verily, the right of a person under custodial investigation to be informed of
his rights contemplates an effective communication that results in an understanding of what is conveyed. Short of this, there is a denial of the right, as it cannot truly be said that
the accused has been informed of his right.[33]
Finally, the CLAO lawyer appointed by the police to assist appellant did not provide effective or adequate legal assistance to the latter. He did not display any measure of zeal
commensurate to the magnitude of his responsibility. Said counsel even failed to object to the apparent illegal arrest and unlawful search on appellant who was simply walking
when arrested by Nicasio Rosales, a security guard, on the sole ground that he looked suspicious. Unquestionably, Rosales did not witness the robbery or the killing and did not
see appellant commit, or about to commit, the crime charged.[34]
The evidence shows that said counsel was present only during the signing of the extrajudicial confession. The record is bereft of any indication that said counsel explained
anything to or advised the appellant of the consequences of his confession. Although it is clear that appellant had been investigated by the police as early as October 2, 1985, the
counsels presence was established by the prosecution only during the actual signing on October 3, and not during the investigation itself. Prosecution Witness Rosales testified
that the Magallanes Village security guards turned over the appellant -- as a suspect in and not as a witness to the killing -- to the Makati Police on the night of October
2. Pfc.[35] Wilfredo Cruz also testified that he investigated appellant on October 2. Appellant himself confirmed that the investigation started as soon as he arrived at the police
station. The extrajudicial confession, however, was signed only on the following day. In spite of appellants allegations of irregularities committed in the course of the
investigation, i.e., before and during the actual signing of the confession, the prosecution miserably failed to present rebuttal evidence. To clarify all these, Atty. Romeo P. Parcon
should have been presented on the stand.Such failure or lapse denigrates the prosecutions cause.
As this Court held in People vs. Deniega, [I]f the lawyers role is reduced to being that of a mere witness to the signing of a pre-prepared document albeit indicating therein
compliance with the accuseds constitutional rights, the constitutional standard x x x is not met.[36] Under the circumstances of this case, appellants extrajudicial confession does
not merit our imprimatur.
The prosecution also hammers on the fact that neither Appellant Binamira nor his wife or other relatives ever reported to the authorities the physical abuse appellant suffered
in the hands of the security guards and the police investigating him. However, such failure does not prove the voluntariness of Binamiras confession. It is not very difficult to
understand the apprehension, even the refusal, of appellant and his wife -- poor folks not highly educated, if at all -- to report these violations of appellants rights, for Binamira
suffered these wrongs from the very same persons who were supposed to protect him. The fact that he was able to divulge these abuses only to his wife and Atty. Calis cannot by
itself destroy the credibility of his claim. Indeed, the Constitution also proscribes the admissibility of any confession or admission from a person under investigation for the
commission of an offense if such admission was obtained through torture, force, violence, threat, intimidation or any other means which vitiates the free will.[37] However, the
Court will not take up appellants allegations that he was tortured and maltreated by the investigating police and the security guards, because such consideration is no longer
necessary in view of our holding on the violation of his right to counsel of choice. Where a confession is extracted contrary to the accuseds Miranda rights, it is ipso
facto inadmissible in evidence. Hence, there is no more need for the appellant to prove duress or intimidation to attain the same objective of outlawing the confession.

Circumstantial Evidence Insufficient

In view of the inadmissibility of appellants extrajudicial confession, the prosecutions case rests purely on circumstantial evidence. Under Rule 133, Section 5 of the Rules of
Court, [c]ircumstantial evidence is sufficient for conviction if: (a) there is more than one circumstance; (b) the facts from which the inferences are derived are proven; and (c) the
combination of all the circumstances is such as to produce a conviction beyond reasonable doubt. The well-entrenched doctrine is that:

x x x a judgment of conviction based on circumstantial evidence can be upheld only if the circumstances proven constitute an unbroken chain which leads to one fair and
reasonable conclusion which points to the accused, to the exclusion of all others, as the guilty person, that is, the circumstances proved must be consistent with each other,
consistent with the hypothesis that the accused is guilty, and at the same time inconsistent with any other hypothesis except that of guilty. [38]
In the case at bar, we find that the totality of circumstantial evidence does not support the conviction of the accused. The only circumstances proven in this case were: (1)
the mortal stabbing of the victim, Jessie Flores; (2) the presence of Appellant Armando Binamira in Magallanes Village where the crime occurred; 3) his arrest by the three RAPSA
security guards, on the ground that he was walking suspiciously fast; and (4) the alleged recovery of bloodied clothes from appellants bag.
The prosecution also pointed out that a necklace belonging to the victim was recovered from the appellant. This is highly dubious. According to the testimony of Police Officer
Cruz, the appellant allegedly surrendered the necklace to a CID personnel at the police station after the investigation had already started.[39] This is incredible, for no such necklace
or any other piece of stolen jewelry was found in appellants possession when he was apprehended and searched by the security guards. Additionally, this Court wonders why
appellant, who would not even hold on to his loot of jewelry, would lug around in his bag bloodied clothes which inexplicably were not presented in evidence during the trial.
All in all, these circumstances do not form an unbroken chain adequate to justify the inference beyond reasonable doubt that appellant was the perpetrator of the
crime. These circumstances can be the subject of two possibilities: one consistent with the guilt of the accused and the other consistent with his innocence. The hornbook principle
is that x x x when the inculpatory facts and circumstances are capable of two or more interpretations, one of which is consistent with the innocence of the accused and the other
or others consistent with his guilt, then the evidence, in view of the constitutional presumption of innocence, has not fulfilled the test of moral certainty and is thus insufficient to
support a conviction.[40]

Sufficiency and Weight of Evidence

In view of appellants admission that he was at the locus criminis when the offense was committed, his defense of denial is admittedly weak. However, it should not be
automatically disregarded either. It may turn out to be true specially in this case where the appellants extrajudicial confession is inadmissible in evidence and the remaining pieces
of circumstantial evidence are sorely insufficient to convict him. In any event, the burden of proof is on the prosecution and unless such burden is discharged properly, the appellant
has no duty to prove his innocence.
In closing, we must stress that mere suspicions and speculations can never be the bases of a conviction in a criminal case. Our Constitution and our laws dearly value individual
life and liberty and require no less than moral certainty or proof beyond reasonable doubt to offset the presumption of innocence. Courts -- both trial and appellate -- are not
called upon to speculate on who committed the crime. The task of courts, rather, is to determine whether the prosecution has submitted sufficient legally admissible evidence
showing beyond reasonable doubt that a crime has been committed, and that the accused committed it. In this case, the prosecution has failed to present adequate proof
demonstrating beyond reasonable doubt that Appellant Armando Binamira y Alayon was the culprit who robbed and killed Jessie Flores y Cledera.
WHEREFORE, the questioned Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Makati, Branch 58, is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Appellant Armando Binamira y Alayon
is ACQUITTED on reasonable doubt. His immediate RELEASE from confinement is ORDERED unless he is detained for some other valid cause.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, C.J., (Chairman), Davide, Jr., Melo, and Francisco, JJ., concur.

[1]
Married, 19 years old, employee of the National Food Authority and resident of xxx xxx xxx.
[17]
ATO Compound, Fort Bonifacio, Makati, Metro Manila, on the date of the Section 27, Article XVIII, 1987 Constitution.
[18]
crime. Records, p. 87. 63 SCRA 4, March 3, 1975.
[2] [19]
Rollo, pp. 19-23. Appellants Brief, p. 21; Rollo, p. 106.
[3] [20]
Judge Zosimo Z. Angeles presiding. People vs. Maqueda, 242 SCRA565, 585, March 22, 1995, per Davide, Jr., J.; citing
[4]
Married, 30 years old, a beautician and resident of Blk. 9, Lot 12, Camella Homes, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
[21]
Alabang I, Muntinlupa, Metro Manila on the date of the crime. 121 SCRA 538, per Concepcion, Jr., J.
[5] [22]
Records, p. 1. See,. Filoteo, Jr vs. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 79543, p. 43, October 16, 1996.
[6] [23]
Ibid., p. 4. Before this Court, however, appellant is represented by the Public People vs. Morales, supra, p. 554. See also People vs. Maqueda, supra, p. 587.
[24]
Attorneys Office. 135 SCRA 465, 472.
[7] [25]
Decision of the Regional Trial Court, p. 5; Rollo, p. 23. 204 SCRA 719.
[8] [26]
Appellees Brief, pp. 3-7; Rollo, pp. 88-92. Ibid; citing People vs. Olvis, 154 SCRA 513, September 30, 1987.
[9] [27]
Appellants Brief, pp. 6-8; Rollo, pp.41-43. People vs. Luvendino, 211 SCRA 36, 49-50, July 3, 1992.
[10] [28]
Ibid., pp. 8-9; Rollo, pp. 43-44. See Filoteo, Jr. vs. Sandiganbayan, supra, pp. 41-44.
[11] [29]
Appellants Brief, p. 15; Rollo, p. 50. Bernas, Joaquin G., The 1987 Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines: A
[12]
Ibid., p. 16; Rollo, p. 51. Commentary, 1996 ed., p. 409.
[13] [30]
Exhibit C, Records, p. 84. Records of the 1986 Constitutional Commission, Vol. I, p. 734.
[14] [31]
Opo. A.B. was handwritten. A.B. allegedly meant Armando Binamira. People vs. Deniega, 251 SCRA 626, 637-638, December 29, 1995, per Kapunan, J.
[15] [32]
Appellees Brief, p. 21; Rollo, p. 106. Records, p. 84.
[16] [33]
Article III, Section 12 of the 1987 Constitution provides: People vs. Newman, 163 SCRA 496, July 26, 1988.
[34]
Sec. 12. (1) Any person under investigation for the commission of an offense shall TSN, pp. 3-4, February 28, 1987.
[35]
have the right to be informed of his right to remain silent and to have Patrolman First Class.
[36]
competent and independent counsel preferably of his own choice. If the Supra, p. 638.
[37]
person cannot afford the services of counsel, he must be provided with Art. III, Sec. 12, pars. 2 and 3, 1987 Constitution.
[38]
one. These rights cannot be waived except in writing and in the presence of People vs. Adofina, 239 SCRA 67, 76-77, December 8, 1994, per Regalado, J.
[39]
counsel. TSN, p. 10, March 21, 1986.
[40]
xxx xxx xxx People vs. Agustin, 246 SCRA 673, 681, July 18, 1995, per Regalado, J.
(3) Any confession or admission obtained in violation of this or Section 17 hereof shall
be inadmissible in evidence against him.
 [G.R. No. 104215. May 8, 1996]
ERECTORS, INC., petitioner, vs. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION, HON. JULIO ANDRES, JR. and FLORENCIO BURGOS, respondents.
SYLLABUS
1. REMEDIAL LAW; JURISDICTION; JURISDICTION OVER THE SUBJECT MATTER, DETERMINED BY LAW IN FORCE AT THE COMMENCEMENT OF ACTION; LABOR ARBITER HAS
JURISDICTION OVER MONEY CLAIMS OF OVERSEAS WORKER FILED ON MARCH 31, 1982. - The rule is that jurisdiction over the subject matter is determined by the law in
force at the time of the commencement of the action. On March 31, 1982, at the time private respondent filed his complaint against the petitioner, the prevailing laws were
Presidential Decree No. 1691 and Presidential Decree No. 1391 which vested the Regional Offices of the Ministry of Labor and the Labor Arbiters with "original and exclusive
jurisdiction over all cases involving employer-employee relations including money claims arising out of any law or contracts involving Filipino workers for overseas
employment." At the time of the filing of the complaint, the Labor Arbiter had clear jurisdiction over the same.
2. LABOR AND SOCIAL LEGISLATION; EXECUTIVE ORDER NO. 797 CREATING THE PHILIPPINE OVERSEAS EMPLOYMENT ADMINISTRATION (POEA); WITHOUT RETROACTIVE
APPLICATION; LABOR ARBITER NOT DIVESTED OF JURISDICTION BY EFFECTIVITY OF E.O. 797. - E.O. No. 797 did not divest the Labor Arbiter's authority to hear and decide
the case filed by private respondent prior to its effectivity. Laws should only be applied prospectively unless the legislative intent to give them retroactive effect is expressly
declared or is necessarily implied from the language used. We fail to perceive in the language of E.O. No. 797 an intention to give it retroactive effect. The law at bar, E.O.
No. 797, is not a curative statute. It was not intended to remedy any defect in the law. It created the POEA to assume the functions of the Overseas Employment Development
Board, the National Seamen Board and the overseas employment functions of the Bureau of Employment Services. Accordingly, it gave the POEA "original and exclusive
jurisdiction over all cases, including money claims, involving employer-employee relations arising out of or by virtue of any law or contract involving Filipino workers for
overseas employment, including seamen." The rule on prospectivity of laws should therefore apply to E.O. No. 797. It should not affect jurisdiction over cases filed prior to
its effectivity.
3. STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION; STATUTES; CURATIVE STATUTE; DEFINED. - A curative statute is enacted to cure defects in a prior law or to validate legal proceedings, instruments
or acts of public authorities which would otherwise be void for want of conformity with certain existing legal requirements.
APPEARANCES OF COUNSEL
Bengzon, Zarraga, Narciso, Ardala, Pecson, Bengzon, and Jimenez for petitioner.
Fabian Gappi for private respondent.

DECISION
PUNO, J.:
Petitioner Erectors, Inc. challenges the jurisdiction of respondent Labor Arbiter Julio F. Andres, Jr. to hear and decide the complaint [1] for underpayment of wages and non-
payment of overtime pay filed by private respondent Florencio Burgos, an overseas contract worker.
The facts are undisputed:
In September 1979, petitioner recruited private respondent to work as service contract driver in Saudi Arabia for a period of twelve (12) months with a salary of US$165.00
and an allowance of US$165.00 per month. They further agreed that private respondent shall be entitled to a bonus of US$ 1,000.00 if after the 12-month period, he renews or
extends his employment contract without availing of his vacation or home leave. Their contract dated September 20, 1979, was duly approved by the Ministry of Labor and
Employment.
The aforesaid contract was not implemented. In December, 1979, petitioner notified private respondent that the position of service driver was no longer available. On
December 14, 1979, they executed another contract which changed the position of private respondent into that of helper/laborer with a salary of US$105.00 and an allowance of
US$105.00 per month. The second contract was not submitted to the Ministry of Labor and Employment for approval.
 On December 18, 1979, private respondent left the country and worked at petitioner's Buraidah Sports Complex project in Saudi Arabia, performing the job of a
helper/laborer. He received a monthly salary and allowance of US$210.00, in accordance with the second contract. Private respondent renewed his contract of employment after
one year. His salary and allowance were increased to US$231.00.
Private respondent returned to the Philippines on August 24, 1981. He then invoked his first employment contract. He demanded from the petitioner the difference between
his salary and allowance as indicated in the said contract, and the amount actually paid to him, plus the contractual bonus which should have been awarded to him for not availing
of his vacation or home leave credits. Petitioner denied private respondent's claim.
On March 31, 1982, private respondent filed with the Labor Arbiter a complaint against the petitioner for underpayment of wages and non-payment of overtime pay and
contractual bonus.
On May 1, 1982, while the case was still in the conciliation stage, Executive Order (E.O.) No. 797 creating the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration (POEA) took
effect.Section 4(a) of E.O. No. 797 vested the POEA with "original and exclusive jurisdiction over all cases, including money claims, involving employer-employee relations arising
out of or by virtue of any law or contract involving Filipino workers for overseas employment. [2]
Despite E.O. No. 797, respondent Labor Arbiter proceeded to try the case on the merits. On September 23, 1983, he rendered a Decision[3] in favor of private respondent,
the dispositive portion of which reads:

"WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered ordering the respondent to pay the complainant as follows:

1. The sum of US$2,496.00 in its peso equivalent on August 25, 1981 as difference between his allowance as Service Driver as against his position as Helper/Laborer;

2. The sum of US$1,000.00 in its peso equivalent as of the same date, as his contractual bonus.

The complaints for non-payment/underpayment of overtime pay and unpaid wages or commission are DISMISSED for lack of merit.[4]
Petitioner appealed to respondent National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC). It questioned the jurisdiction of the Labor Arbiter over the case in view of the enactment of
E.O. No. 797.
In a Resolution dated July 17, 1991,[5] respondent NLRC dismissed the petitioner's appeal and upheld the Labor Arbiter's jurisdiction. It ruled:

"To begin with, the Labor Arbiter has the authority to decide this case. On May 29, 1978, the Labor Arbiters were integrated into the Regional Offices under P.D. 1391. On May 1,
1980, P.D. 1691 was promulgated giving the Regional Offices of the Ministry of Labor and Employment the original and exclusive jurisdiction over all cases arising out of or by
virtue of any law or contract involving Filipino workers for overseas employment. There is no dispute that the Labor Arbiter had the legal authority over the case on hand, which
accrued and was filed when the two above mentioned Presidential Decrees were in force. [6]
Petitioner filed this special civil action for certiorari reiterating the argument that:

"The NLRC committed grave abuse of discretion tantamount to lack of jurisdiction in affirming the Labor Arbiter's void judgment in the case a quo."[7]
It asserts that E.O. No. 797 divested the Labor Arbiter of his authority to try and resolve cases arising from overseas employment contract. Invoking this Court's ruling in Briad
Agro Developinent Corp. vs. Dela Cerna,[8] petitioner argues that E.O. No. 797 applies retroactively to affect pending cases, including the complaint filed by private respondent.
The petition is devoid of merit.
The rule is that jurisdiction over the subject matter is determined by the law in force at the time of the commencement of the action.[9] On March 31, 1982, at the time
private respondent filed his complaint against the petitioner, the prevailing laws were Presidential Decree No. 1691 [10] and Presidential Decree No. 1391[11] which vested the
Regional Offices of the Ministry of Labor and the Labor Arbiters with "original and exclusive jurisdiction over all cases involving employer-employee relations including money
claims arising out of any law or contracts involving Filipino workers for overseas employment."[12] At the time of the filing of the complaint, the Labor Arbiter had clear jurisdiction
over the same.
E.O. No. 797 did not divest the Labor Arbiter's authority to hear and decide the case filed by private respondent prior to its effectivity. Laws should only be applied
prospectively unless the legislative intent to give them retroactive effect is expressly declared or is necessarily implied from the language used.[13] We fail to perceive in the
language of E.O. No. 797 an intention to give it retroactive effect.
The case of Briad Agro Development Corp. vs. Dela Cerna [14] cited by the petitioner is not applicable to the case at bar. In Briad, the Court applied the exception rather than
the general rule. In this case, Briad Agro Development Corp. and L.M. Camus Engineering Corp. challenged the jurisdiction of the Regional Director of the Department of Labor and
Employment over cases involving workers' money claims, since Article 217 of the Labor Code, the law in force at the time of the filing of the complaint, vested in the Labor Arbiters
exclusive jurisdiction over such cases. The Court dismissed the petition in its Decision dated June 29, 1989.[15] It ruled that the enactment of E.O. No. 111, amending Article 217 of
the Labor Code, cured the Regional Director's lack of jurisdiction by giving the Labor Arbiter and the Regional Director concurrent jurisdiction over all cases involving money
claims.However, on November 9,1989, the Court, in a Resolution,[16] reconsidered and set aside its June 29 Decision and referred the case to the Labor Arbiter for proper
proceedings, in view of the promulgation of Republic Act (R.A.) 6715 which divested the Regional Directors of the power to hear money claims. It bears emphasis that the Court
accorded E.O. No. 111 and R.A. 6715 a retroactive application because as curative statutes, they fall under the exceptions to the rule on prospectivity of laws.
E.O. No.111, amended Article 217 of the Labor Code to widen the workers' access to the government for redress of grievances by giving the Regional Directors and Labor
Arbiters concurrent jurisdiction over cases involving money claims. This amendment, however, created a situation where the jurisdiction of the Regional Directors and the Labor
Arbiters overlapped. As a remedy, R.A. 6715 further amended Article 217 by delineating their respective jurisdictions. Under R.A. 6715, the Regional Director has exclusive original
jurisdiction over cases involving money claims provided: (1) the claim is presented by an employer or person employed in domestic or household service, or househelper under
the Code; (2) the claimant, no longer being employed, does not seek reinstatement; and (3) the aggregate money claim of the employee or househelper does not exceed
P5,000.00. All other cases are within the exclusive and original jurisdiction of the Labor Arbiter. E.O. No. 111 and R.A. 6715 are therefore curative statutes. A curative statute is
enacted to cure defects in a prior law or to validate legal proceedings, instruments or acts of public authorities which would otherwise be void for want of conformity with certain
existing legal requirements.
The law at bar, E.O. No. 797, is not a curative statute. It was not intended to remedy any defect in the law. It created the POEA to assume the functions of the Overseas
Employment Development Board, the National Seamen Board and the overseas employment functions of the Bureau of Employment Services. Accordingly, it gave the POEA
"original and exclusive jurisdiction over all cases, including money claims, involving employer-employee relations arising out of or by virtue of any law or contract involving Filipino
workers for overseas employment, including seamen."[17] The rule on prospectivity of laws should therefore apply to E.O. No. 797. It should not affect jurisdiction over cases filed
prior to its effectivity.
Our ruling in Philippine-Singapore Ports Corp. vs. NLRC[18] is more apt to the case at bar. In this case, PSPC hired Jardin to work in Saudi Arabia. Jardin filed a complaint against
PSPC for illegal dismissal and recovery of backwages on January 31, 1979 with the Labor Arbiter. PSPC questioned the jurisdiction of the Labor Arbiter because at that time, the
power to hear and decide cases involving overseas workers was vested in the Bureau of Employment Services. We held:

"When Jardin filed the complaint for illegal dismissal on January 31, 1979, Art. 217 (5) of the Labor Code provided that Labor Arbiters and the NLRC shall have exclusive
jurisdiction to hear and decide all cases arising from employer-employee relations unless expressly excluded by this Code. At that time Art. 15 of the same Code had been
amended by P.D. No. 1412 which took effect on June 9, 1978. The pertinent provision of the said presidential decree states:

Article 15. Bureau of Employment Services. -

(a) x x x x x x x x x
(b) The Bureau shall have the original and exclusive jurisdiction over all matters or cases involving employer-employee relations including money claims, arising out of or by
virtue of any law or contracts involving Filipino workers for overseas employment, except seamen. The decisions of the Bureau shall be final and executory subject to appeal to
the Secretary of Labor whose decision shall be final and inappealable.

Considering that private respondent Jardin's claims undeniably arose out of an employer-employee relationship with petitioner PSPC and that private respondent worked
overseas or in Saudi Arabia, the Bureau of Employment Services and not the Labor Arbiter had jurisdiction over the case. x x x

Art. 15 was further amended by P.D. No. 1691 which took effect on May 1, 1990. Such amendment qualifies the jurisdiction of the Bureau of Employment Services as follows:

(b) The regional offices of the Ministry of Labor shall have the original and exclusive jurisdiction over all matters or cases involving employer-employee relations including money
claims, arising out of or by virtue of any law or contracts involving Filipino workers for overseas employment except seamen: Provided that the Bureau of Employment Services
may, in the case of the National Capital Region, exercise such power, whenever the Minister of Labor deems it appropriate. The decisions of the regional offices or the Bureau of
Employment Services if so authorized by the Minister of Labor as provided in this Article, shall be appealable to the National Labor Relations Commission upon the same grounds
provided in Article 223 hereof. The decisions of the National Labor Relations Commission shall be final and inappealable.

Hence, as further amended, Art. 15 provided for concurrent jurisdiction between the regional offices of the then Ministry of Labor and Bureau of Employment Services in the
National Capital Region. It is noteworthy that P.D. No. 1691, while likewise amending Art. 217 of the Labor Code, did not alter the provision that Labor Arbiters shall have
jurisdiction over all claims arising from employer-employee relations unless expressly excluded by this Code.
The functions of the Bureau of Employment Services were subsequently assumed by the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration (POEA) on May 1, 1982 by virtue
of Executive Order No. 797 by granting the POEA original and exclusive jurisdiction over all cases, including money claims, involving employer-employee relations arising out
of or by virtue of any law or contract involving Filipino workers for overseas employment, including seamen. (Sec. 4 (a); Eastern Shipping Lines v. Philippine Overseas Employment
Administration [POEA], 200 SCRA 663 [1991]). This development showed the legislative authority's continuing intent to exclude from the Labor Arbiter's jurisdiction claims arising
from overseas employment.
These amendments notwithstanding, when the complaint for illegal dismissal was filed on January 31, 1979, under Art. 15, as amended by P.D. No. 1412, it was the
Bureau of Employment Services which had jurisdiction over the case and not the Labor Arbiters. It is a settled rule that jurisdiction is determined by the statute in force at the
time of the commencement of the action (Municipality of Sogod v. Rosal, 201 SCRA 632, 637 [1991]). P.D. 1691 which gave the regional offices of the Ministry of Labor concurrent
jurisdiction with the Bureau of Employment Services, was promulgated more than a year after the complaint was filed. (Italics supplied)
In sum, we hold that respondent NLRC did not commit grave abuse of discretion in upholding the jurisdiction of respondent Labor Arbiter over the complaint filed by private
respondent against the petitioner.
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the Petition is DISMISSED. Costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
Regalado (Chairman), Romero, Mendoza, and Torres, Jr., JJ., concur.

[1]
Docketed as NLRC-NCR-3-3142-82.
[2]
Official Gazette, Vol. 78, No. 21, May 24, 1982, pp. 2368-7 - 2638-13.
[3]
Rollo, pp. 13-23.
[4]
Rollo, p. 23.
[5]
Rollo, pp. 26-30.
[6]
Rollo, p. 28.
[7]
Rollo, p. 7.
[8]
179 SCRA 269, November 9, 1989.
[9]
Tiongson vs. Court of Appeals, 214 SCRA 197 (1992).
[10]
Took effect on May 1, 1980.
[11]
Took effect on May 29, 1978.
[12]
Article 15 (b) of the Labor Code, as amended by P.D. 1691 and P.D. 1391.
[13]
Article 4, New Civil Code; Gailardo vs. Borromeo, 161 SCRA 500 (1988); Nilo vs. Court of Appeals, 128 SCRA 519 (1984).
[14]
179 SCRA 269 (November 9, 1989).
[15]
174 SCRA 525.
[16]
179 SCRA 269.
[17]
Section 4 of Executive Order No. 797.
[18]
218 SCRA 77 (1993).

Erectors, Inc., v. NLRC

Facts:
In September 1979, Erectors recruited Florencio Burgos to work as Service Contract Driver in Saudi Arabia for 12 months with a salary of $165 and an allowance of $165 per
month. Burgos will also be entitled a bonus of $1ooo if after the 12-month period, he renews/extends his contract without availing his vacation or home leave His contract was
approved by the Ministry of Labor and Employment.
However, the contract was not implemented. In December 1979, Erectors notified Burgos that the position of Service Driver was no longer available. On December 14, 1979,
they executed another contract changing his position from driver to laborer with a salary of $105 and an allowance of $105 per month. This contract was not submitted to the
MLE.
On December 1979, Burgos left the country and worked at Erectors Buraidah Sports Complex project in Saudi Arabia as a laborer. He received a monthly salary and allowance of
$210. Burgos renewed his contract after one year and his salary and allowance were increased to $231.
Burgos returned to Philippines on August 1981. He then invoked his first employment contract. He demanded the difference between his salary and allowance in teh said
contract and the amount paid to him.
On March 1982, Burgos filed wiht the Labor Arbiter a complaint for underpayment of wages and non-payment of overtime pay and bonus.
While his case was still in conciliation stage, EO 797 creating POEA was established Sec 4(a) of E) 797 vested the POEA with "original and exclusive jurisdiction over all cases
including money claims, involving employer-employee relationship arising out of or by virtue of any law or contract involving Filipino workers for overseas employment."
Despite EO 797, Labor Arbiter proceeded to try the case and rendered judgement in favor of Burgos. In view of EO 797, Erectors questioned the jurisdiction of the LA in NLRC.
NLRC dismissed the petitioner's appeal and upheld the LA's jurisdiction.

Issue:
Whether or not EO 797 applies retroactively to affect pending cases, including the complaint filed by Burgos.

Held:
No. The rule is that jurisdiction over the subject matter is determined by the law in force at the time of the commencement of the action. On March 31, 1982, at the time
private respondent filed his complaint against the petitioner, the prevailing laws were Presidential Decree No. 1691 and Presidential Decree No. 1391 which vested the Regional
Offices of the Ministry of Labor and the Labor Arbiters with "original and exclusive jurisdiction over all cases involving employer-employee relations including money claims
arising out of any law or contracts involving Filipino workers for overseas employment." At the time of the filing of the complaint, the Labor Arbiter had clear jurisdiction over
the same.
 FIRST DIVISION

ESTRELLITA JULIANO-LLAVE, G.R. No. 169766

Petitioner,

Present:

- versus - CORONA, C. J., Chairperson,

VELASCO, JR.,
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO,
DEL CASTILLO, and
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, PEREZ, JJ.
HAJA PUTRI ZORAYDA A. TAMANO and ADIB AHMAD A.
TAMANO, Promulgated:
Respondents. March 30, 2011
x--------------------------------------------------------x

DECISION

DEL CASTILLO, J.:

A new law ought to affect the future, not what is past. Hence, in the case of subsequent marriage laws, no vested rights shall be impaired that pertain to the protection of the legitimate
union of a married couple.

This petition for review on certiorari assails the Decision[1] dated August 17, 2004 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 61762 and its subsequent Resolution[2]dated September 13,
2005, which affirmed the Decision of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Quezon City, Branch 89 declaring petitioner Estrellita Juliano-Llaves (Estrellita) marriage to Sen. Mamintal A.J. Tamano (Sen.
Tamano) as void ab initio.

Factual Antecedents

Around 11 months before his death, Sen. Tamano married Estrellita twice initially under the Islamic laws and tradition on May 27, 1993 in Cotabato City[3] and, subsequently, under a civil
ceremony officiated by an RTC Judge at Malabang, Lanao del Sur on June 2, 1993.[4] In their marriage contracts, Sen. Tamanos civil status was indicated as divorced.

Since then, Estrellita has been representing herself to the whole world as Sen. Tamanos wife, and upon his death, his widow.

On November 23, 1994, private respondents Haja Putri Zorayda A. Tamano (Zorayda) and her son Adib Ahmad A. Tamano (Adib), in their own behalf and in behalf of the rest of Sen.
Tamanos legitimate children with Zorayda,[5] filed a complaint with the RTC of Quezon City for the declaration of nullity of marriage between Estrellita and Sen. Tamano for being bigamous. The
complaint[6] alleged, inter alia, that Sen. Tamano married Zorayda on May 31, 1958 under civil rites, and that this marriage remained subsisting when he married Estrellita in 1993. The complaint
likewise averred that:
 11. The marriage of the deceased and Complainant Zorayda, having been celebrated under the New Civil Code, is therefore governed by this law. Based on Article 35
(4) of the Family Code, the subsequent marriage entered into by deceased Mamintal with Defendant Llave is void ab initio because he contracted the same while his prior marriage
to Complainant Zorayda was still subsisting, and his status being declared as divorced has no factual or legal basis, because the deceased never divorced Complainant Zorayda in
his lifetime, and he could not have validly done so because divorce is not allowed under the New Civil Code;

11.1 Moreover, the deceased did not and could not have divorced Complainant Zorayda by invoking the provision of P.D. 1083, otherwise known as the Code
of Muslim Personal Laws, for the simple reason that the marriage of the deceased with Complainant Zorayda was never deemed, legally and factually, to have been one contracted
under Muslim law as provided under Art. 186 (2) of P.D. 1083, since they (deceased and Complainant Zorayda) did not register their mutual desire to be thus covered by this law;[7]

Summons was then served on Estrellita on December 19, 1994. She then asked from the court for an extension of 30 days to file her answer to be counted from January 4, 1995,[8] and
again, another 15 days[9] or until February 18, 1995, both of which the court granted.[10]

Instead of submitting her answer, however, Estrellita filed a Motion to Dismiss[11] on February 20, 1995 where she declared that Sen. Tamano and Zorayda are both Muslims who were
married under the Muslim rites, as had been averred in the latters disbarment complaint against Sen. Tamano.[12] Estrellita argued that the RTC has no jurisdiction to take cognizance of the case
because under Presidential Decree (PD) No. 1083, or the Code of Muslim Personal Laws of the Philippines (Muslim Code), questions and issues involving Muslim marriages and divorce fall under the
exclusive jurisdiction of sharia courts.

The trial court denied Estrellitas motion and asserted its jurisdiction over the case for declaration of nullity.[13] Thus, Estrellita filed in November 1995 a certiorari petition with this Court
questioning the denial of her Motion to Dismiss. On December 15, 1995, we referred the petition to the CA[14] which was docketed thereat as CA-G.R. SP No. 39656.

During the pendency of CA-G.R. SP No. 39656, the RTC continued to try the case since there can be no default in cases of declaration of nullity of marriage even if the respondent failed to
file an answer. Estrellita was allowed to participate in the trial while her opposing parties presented their evidence. When it was Estrellitas turn to adduce evidence, the hearings set for such
purpose[15] were postponed mostly at her instance until the trial court, on March 22, 1996, suspended the proceedings[16] in view of the CAs temporary restraining order issued on February 29, 1996,
enjoining it from hearing the case.[17]

Eventually, however, the CA resolved the petition adverse to Estrellita in its Decision dated September 30, 1996.[18] Estrellita then elevated the appellate courts judgment to this Court by
way of a petition for review on certiorari docketed as G.R. No. 126603.[19]

Subsequent to the promulgation of the CA Decision, the RTC ordered Estrellita to present her evidence on June 26, 1997.[20] As Estrellita was indisposed on that day, the hearing was reset
to July 9, 1997.[21] The day before this scheduled hearing, Estrellita again asked for a postponement.[22]

Unhappy with the delays in the resolution of their case, Zorayda and Adib moved to submit the case for decision,[23] reasoning that Estrellita had long been delaying the case.Estrellita
opposed, on the ground that she has not yet filed her answer as she still awaits the outcome of G.R. No. 126603.[24]

On June 29, 1998, we upheld the jurisdiction of the RTC of Quezon City,[25] stating as one of the reasons that as sharia courts are not vested with original and exclusive jurisdiction in cases
of marriages celebrated under both the Civil Code and PD 1083, the RTC, as a court of general jurisdiction, is not precluded from assuming jurisdiction over such cases. In our Resolution dated August
24, 1998,[26] we denied Estrellitas motion for reconsideration[27] with finality.

A few days before this resolution, or on August 18, 1998, the RTC rendered the aforementioned judgment declaring Estrellitas marriage with Sen. Tamano as void ab initio.[28]
Ruling of the Regional Trial Court

The RTC, finding that the marital ties of Sen. Tamano and Zorayda were never severed, declared Sen. Tamanos subsequent marriage to Estrellita as void ab initio for being bigamous under
Article 35 of the Family Code of the Philippines and under Article 83 of the Civil Code of the Philippines.[29] The court said:
 A comparison between Exhibits A and B (supra) immediately shows that the second marriage of the late Senator with [Estrellita] was entered into during the subsistence of his
first marriage with [Zorayda]. This renders the subsequent marriage void from the very beginning. The fact that the late Senator declared his civil status as divorced will not in any
way affect the void character of the second marriage because, in this jurisdiction, divorce obtained by the Filipino spouse is not an acceptable method of terminating the effects
of a previous marriage, especially, where the subsequent marriage was solemnized under the Civil Code or Family Code.[30]

Ruling of the Court of Appeals

In her appeal,[31] Estrellita argued that she was denied her right to be heard as
the RTC rendered its judgment even without waiting for the finality of the Decision of the Supreme Court in G.R. No. 126603. She claimed that the RTC should have required her to file her answer
after the denial of her motion to dismiss. She maintained that Sen. Tamano is capacitated to marry her as his marriage and subsequent divorce with Zorayda is governed by the Muslim Code. Lastly,
she highlighted Zoraydas lack of legal standing to question the validity of her marriage to the deceased.

In dismissing the appeal in its Decision dated August 17, 2004,[32] the CA held that Estrellita can no longer be allowed to file her answer as she was given ample opportunity to be heard but
simply ignored it by asking for numerous postponements. She never filed her answer despite the lapse of around 60 days, a period longer than what was prescribed by the rules. It also ruled that
Estrellita cannot rely on her pending petition for certiorari with the higher courts since, as an independent and original action, it does not interrupt the proceedings in the trial court.

As to the substantive merit of the case, the CA adjudged that Estrellitas marriage to Sen. Tamano is void ab initio for being bigamous, reasoning that the marriage of Zorayda and Sen.
Tamano is governed by the Civil Code, which does not provide for an absolute divorce. It noted that their first nuptial celebration was under civil rites, while the subsequent Muslim celebration was
only ceremonial. Zorayda then, according to the CA, had the legal standing to file the action as she is Sen. Tamanos wife and, hence, the injured party in the senators subsequent bigamous marriage
with Estrellita.

In its September 13, 2005 Resolution,[33] the CA denied Estrellitas Motion for Reconsideration/Supplemental Motion for Reconsideration where it debunked the additional errors she
raised. The CA noted that the allegation of lack of the public prosecutors report on the existence of collusion in violation of both Rule 9, Section 3(e) of the Rules of Court[34] and Article 48 of the Family
Code[35] will not invalidate the trial courts judgment as the proceedings between the parties had been adversarial, negating the existence of collusion. Assuming that the issues have not been joined
before the RTC, the same is attributable to Estrellitas refusal to file an answer. Lastly, the CA disregarded Estrellitas allegation that the trial court erroneously rendered its judgment way prior to our
remand to the RTC of the records of the case ratiocinating that G.R. No. 126603 pertains to the issue on the denial of the Motion to Dismiss, and not to the issue of the validity of Estrellitas marriage
to Sen. Tamano.

The Parties Respective Arguments

Reiterating her arguments before the court a quo, Estrellita now argues that the CA erred in upholding the RTC judgment as the latter was prematurely issued, depriving her of the
opportunity to file an answer and to present her evidence to dispute the allegations against the validity of her marriage. She claims that Judge Macias v. Macias[36] laid down the rule that the filing of
a motion to dismiss instead of an answer suspends the period to file an answer and, consequently, the trial court is obliged to suspend proceedings while her motion to dismiss on the ground of lack
of jurisdiction has not yet been resolved with finality. She maintains that she merely participated in the RTC hearings because of the trial courts assurance that the proceedings will be without
prejudice to whatever action the High Court will take on her petition questioning the RTCs jurisdiction and yet, the RTC violated this commitment as it rendered an adverse judgment on August 18,
1998, months before the records of G.R. No. 126603 were remanded to the CA on November 11, 1998.[37] She also questions the lack of a report of the public prosecutor anent a finding of whether
there was collusion, this being a prerequisite before further proceeding could be held when a party has failed to file an answer in a suit for declaration of nullity of marriage.

Estrellita is also steadfast in her belief that her marriage with the late senator is valid as the latter was already divorced under the Muslim Code at the time he married her. She asserts that
such law automatically applies to the marriage of Zorayda and the deceased without need of registering their consent to be covered by it, as both parties are Muslims whose marriage was solemnized
under Muslim law. She pointed out that Sen. Tamano married all his wives under Muslim rites, as attested to by the affidavits of the siblings of the deceased.[38]
 Lastly, Estrellita argues that Zorayda and Adib have no legal standing to file suit because only the husband or the wife can file a complaint for the declaration of nullity of marriage under
Supreme Court Resolution A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC.[39]

Refuting the arguments, the Solicitor General (Sol Gen) defends the CAs reasoning and stresses that Estrellita was never deprived of her right to be heard; and, that filing an original action
for certiorari does not stay the proceedings of the main action before the RTC.

As regards the alleged lack of report of the public prosecutor if there is collusion, the Sol Gen says that this is no longer essential considering the vigorous opposition of Estrellita in the suit
that obviously shows the lack of collusion. The Sol Gen also supports private respondents legal standing to challenge the validity of Estrellitas purported marriage with Sen. Tamano, reasoning that
any proper interested party may attack directly or collaterally a void marriage, and Zorayda and Adib have such right to file the action as they are the ones prejudiced by the marital union.

Zorayda and Adib, on the other hand, did not file any comment.
Issues

The issues that must be resolved are the following:

1. Whether the CA erred in affirming the trial courts judgment, even though the latter was rendered prematurely because: a) the judgment was rendered without waiting for the Supreme
Courts final resolution of her certiorari petition, i.e., G.R. No. 126603; b) she has not yet filed her answer and thus was denied due process; and c) the public prosecutor did not even conduct an
investigation whether there was collusion;

2. Whether the marriage between Estrellita and the late Sen. Tamano was bigamous; and

3. Whether Zorayda and Adib have the legal standing to have Estrellitas marriage declared void ab initio.
Our Ruling

Estrellitas refusal to file an answer eventually led to the loss of her right to answer; and her pending petition for certiorari/review on certiorari
questioning the denial of the motion to dismiss before the higher courts does not at all suspend the trial proceedings of the principal suit
before the RTC of Quezon City.

Firstly, it can never be argued that Estrellita was deprived of her right to due process. She was never declared in default, and she even actively participated in the trial to defend her interest.

Estrellita invokes Judge Macias v. Macias[40] to justify the suspension of the period to file an answer and of the proceedings in the trial court until her petition for certiorariquestioning the
validity of the denial of her Motion to Dismiss has been decided by this Court. In said case, we affirmed the following reasoning of the CA which, apparently, is Estrellitas basis for her argument, to
wit:

However, she opted to file, on April 10, 2001, a Motion to Dismiss, instead of filing an Answer to the complaint. The filing of said motion suspended the period for her to file
her Answer to the complaint. Until said motion is resolved by the Respondent Court with finality, it behooved the Respondent Court to suspend the hearings of the case on
the merits. The Respondent Court, on April 19, 2001, issued its Order denying the Motion to Dismiss of the Petitioner. Under Section 6, Rule 16 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure
[now Section 4], the Petitioner had the balance of the period provided for in Rule 11 of the said Rules but in no case less than five (5) days computed from service on her of the
aforesaid Order of the Respondent Court within which to file her Answer to the complaint: x x x[41] (Emphasis supplied.)

Estrellita obviously misappreciated Macias. All we pronounced therein is that the trial court is mandated to suspend trial until it finally resolves the motion to dismiss that is filed before
it. Nothing in the above excerpt states that the trial court should suspend its proceedings should the issue of the propriety or impropriety of the motion to dismiss be raised before the appellate
courts. In Macias, the trial court failed to observe due process in the course of the proceeding of the case because after it denied the wifes motion to dismiss, it immediately proceeded to allow the
husband to present evidence ex parte and resolved the case with undue haste even when, under the rules of procedure, the wife still had time to file an answer. In the instant case, Estrellita had no
time left for filing an answer, as she filed the motion to dismiss beyond the extended period earlier granted by the trial court after she filed motions for extension of time to file an answer.
Estrellita argues that the trial court prematurely issued its judgment, as it should have waited first for the resolution of her Motion to Dismiss before the CA and, subsequently, before this
Court. However, in upholding the RTC, the CA correctly ruled that the pendency of a petition for certiorari does not suspend the proceedings before the trial court. An application for certiorari is an
independent action which is not part or a continuation of the trial which resulted in the rendition of the judgment complained of.[42] Rule 65 of the Rules of Court is explicit in stating that [t]he petition
shall not interrupt the course of the principal case unless a temporary restraining order or a writ of preliminary injunction has been issued against the public respondent from further proceeding in
the case.[43] In fact, the trial court respected the CAs temporary restraining order and only after the CA rendered judgment did the RTC again require Estrellita to present her evidence.

Notably, when the CA judgment was elevated to us by way of Rule 45, we never issued any order precluding the trial court from proceeding with the principal action. With her numerous
requests for postponements, Estrellita remained obstinate in refusing to file an answer or to present her evidence when it was her turn to do so, insisting that the trial court should wait first for our
decision in G.R. No. 126603. Her failure to file an answer and her refusal to present her evidence were attributable only to herself and she should not be allowed to benefit from her own dilatory
tactics to the prejudice of the other party. Sans her answer, the trial court correctly proceeded with the trial and rendered its Decision after it deemed Estrellita to have waived her right to present
her side of the story. Neither should the lower court wait for the decision in G.R. No. 126603 to become final and executory, nor should it wait for its records to be remanded back to it because G.R.
No. 126603 involves strictly the propriety of the Motion to Dismiss and not the issue of validity of marriage.

The Public Prosecutor issued a report as

to the non-existence of collusion.

Aside from Article 48 of the Family Code and Rule 9, Section 3(e) of the Rules of Court, the Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of Voidable Marriages
(A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC)[44] also requries the participation of the public prosecutor in cases involving void marriages. It specifically mandates the prosecutor to submit his investigation report to
determine whether there is collusion between the parties:

Sec. 9. Investigation report of public prosecutor.(1) Within one month after receipt of the court order mentioned in paragraph (3) of Section 8 above, the public
prosecutor shall submit a report to the court stating whether the parties are in collusion and serve copies thereof on the parties and their respective counsels, if any.

(2) If the public prosecutor finds that collusion exists, he shall state the basis thereof in his report. The parties shall file their respective comments on the finding of
collusion within ten days from receipt of a copy of the report. The court shall set the report for hearing and if convinced that the parties are in collusion, it shall dismiss the petition.

(3) If the public prosecutor reports that no collusion exists, the court shall set the case for pre-trial. It shall be the duty of the public prosecutor to appear for the State at
the pre-trial.

Records show that the trial court immediately directed the public prosecutor to submit the required report,[45] which we find to have been sufficiently complied with by Assistant City
Prosecutor Edgardo T. Paragua in his Manifestation dated March 30, 1995,[46] wherein he attested that there could be no collusion between the parties and no fabrication of evidence because
Estrellita is not the spouse of any of the private respondents.

Furthermore, the lack of collusion is evident in the case at bar. Even assuming that there is a lack of report of collusion or a lack of participation by the public prosecutor, just as we held
in Tuason v. Court of Appeals,[47] the lack of participation of a fiscal does not invalidate the proceedings in the trial court:

The role of the prosecuting attorney or fiscal in annulment of marriage and legal separation proceedings is to determine whether collusion exists between the parties
and to take care that the evidence is not suppressed or fabricated. Petitioner's vehement opposition to the annulment proceedings negates the conclusion that collusion existed
 between the parties. There is no allegation by the petitioner that evidence was suppressed or fabricated by any of the parties. Under these circumstances, we are convinced that
the non-intervention of a prosecuting attorney to assure lack of collusion between the contending parties is not fatal to the validity of the proceedings in the trial court.[48]

The Civil Code governs the marriage of Zorayda and the late Sen. Tamano; their marriage was never invalidated by PD 1083. Sen. Tamanos
subsequent marriage to Estrellita is void ab initio.

The marriage between the late Sen. Tamano and Zorayda was celebrated in 1958, solemnized under civil and Muslim rites.[49] The only law in force governing marriage relationships between
Muslims and non-Muslims alike was the Civil Code of 1950, under the provisions of which only one marriage can exist at any given time.[50] Under the marriage provisions of the Civil Code, divorce is
not recognized except during the effectivity of Republic Act No. 394[51] which was not availed of during its effectivity.

As far as Estrellita is concerned, Sen. Tamanos prior marriage to Zorayda has been severed by way of divorce under PD 1083,[52] the law that codified Muslim personal laws.However, PD
1083 cannot benefit Estrellita. Firstly, Article 13(1) thereof provides that the law applies to marriage and divorce wherein both parties are Muslims, or wherein only the male party is a Muslim and
the marriage is solemnized in accordance with Muslim law or this Code in any part of the Philippines. But we already ruled in G.R. No. 126603 that Article 13 of PD 1083 does not provide for a situation
where the parties were married both in civil and Muslim rites.[53]

Moreover, the Muslim Code took effect only on February 4, 1977, and this law cannot retroactively override the Civil Code which already bestowed certain rights on the marriage of Sen.
Tamano and Zorayda. The former explicitly provided for the prospective application of its provisions unless otherwise provided:

Art. 186 (1). Effect of code on past acts. Acts executed prior to the effectivity of this Code shall be governed by the laws in force at the time of their execution, and nothing
herein except as otherwise specifically provided, shall affect their validity or legality or operate to extinguish any right acquired or liability incurred thereby.

It has been held that:

The foregoing provisions are consistent with the principle that all laws operate prospectively, unless the contrary appears or is clearly, plainly and unequivocably
expressed or necessarily implied; accordingly, every case of doubt will be resolved against the retroactive operation of laws. Article 186 aforecited enunciates the general rule of
the Muslim Code to have its provisions applied prospectively, and implicitly upholds the force and effect of a pre-existing body of law, specifically, the Civil Code in respect of civil
acts that took place before the Muslim Codes enactment.[54]

An instance of retroactive application of the Muslim Code is Article 186(2) which states:

A marriage contracted by a Muslim male prior to the effectivity of this Code in accordance with non-Muslim law shall be considered as one contracted under Muslim
law provided the spouses register their mutual desire to this effect.

Even granting that there was registration of mutual consent for the marriage to be considered as one contracted under the Muslim law, the registration of mutual consent between Zorayda
and Sen. Tamano will still be ineffective, as both are Muslims whose marriage was celebrated under both civil and Muslim laws. Besides, as we have already settled, the Civil Code governs their
personal status since this was in effect at the time of the celebration of their marriage. In view of Sen. Tamanos prior marriage which subsisted at the time Estrellita married him, their subsequent
marriage is correctly adjudged by the CA as void ab initio.
Zorayda and Adib, as the injured parties, have the legal personalities to file the declaration of nullity of marriage. A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC,
which limits to only the husband or the wife the filing of a petition for nullity is prospective in application and does not shut out the prior
spouse from filing suit if the ground is a bigamous subsequent marriage.
Her marriage covered by the Family Code of the Philippines,[55] Estrellita relies on A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC which took effect on March 15, 2003 claiming that under Section 2(a)[56] thereof,
only the husband or the wife, to the exclusion of others, may file a petition for declaration of absolute nullity, therefore only she and Sen. Tamano may directly attack the validity of their own marriage.

Estrellita claims that only the husband or the wife in a void marriage can file a petition for declaration of nullity of marriage. However, this interpretation does not apply if the reason behind
the petition is bigamy.

In explaining why under A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC only the spouses may file the petition to the exclusion of compulsory or intestate heirs, we said:

The Rationale of the Rules on Annulment of Voidable Marriages and Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages, Legal Separation and Provisional Orders explicates
on Section 2(a) in the following manner, viz:

(1) Only an aggrieved or injured spouse may file petitions for annulment of voidable marriages and declaration of absolute nullity of void
marriages. Such petitions cannot be filed by the compulsory or intestate heirs of the spouses or by the State. [Section 2; Section 3, paragraph a]

Only an aggrieved or injured spouse may file a petition for annulment of voidable marriages or declaration of absolute nullity of void marriages. Such
petition cannot be filed by compulsory or intestate heirs of the spouses or by the State. The Committee is of the belief that they do not have a legal right to file
the petition. Compulsory or intestate heirs have only inchoate rights prior to the death of their predecessor, and hence can only question the validity of the
marriage of the spouses upon the death of a spouse in a proceeding for the settlement of the estate of the deceased spouse filed in the regular courts. On the
other hand, the concern of the State is to preserve marriage and not to seek its dissolution.[57]

Note that the Rationale makes it clear that Section 2(a) of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC refers to the aggrieved or injured spouse. If Estrellitas interpretation is employed, the prior spouse is unjustly
precluded from filing an action. Surely, this is not what the Rule contemplated.

The subsequent spouse may only be expected to take action if he or she had only discovered during the connubial period that the marriage was bigamous, and especially if the conjugal
bliss had already vanished. Should parties in a subsequent marriage benefit from the bigamous marriage, it would not be expected that they would file an action to declare the marriage void and
thus, in such circumstance, the injured spouse who should be given a legal remedy is the one in a subsisting previous marriage. The latter is clearly the aggrieved party as the bigamous marriage not
only threatens the financial and the property ownership aspect of the prior marriage but most of all, it causes an emotional burden to the prior spouse. The subsequent marriage will always be a
reminder of the infidelity of the spouse and the disregard of the prior marriage which sanctity is protected by the Constitution.

Indeed, Section 2(a) of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC precludes the son from impugning the subsequent marriage. But in the case at bar, both Zorayda and Adib have legal personalities to file an
action for nullity. Albeit the Supreme Court Resolution governs marriages celebrated under the Family Code, such is prospective in application and does not apply to cases already commenced before
March 15, 2003.[58]

Zorayda and Adib filed the case for declaration of nullity of Estrellitas marriage in November 1994. While the Family Code is silent with respect to the proper party who can file a petition for
declaration of nullity of marriage prior to A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC, it has been held that in a void marriage, in which no marriage has taken place and cannot be the source of rights, any interested party
may attack the marriage directly or collaterally without prescription, which may be filed even beyond the lifetime of the parties to the marriage.[59] Since A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC does not apply, Adib,
as one of the children of the deceased who has property rights as an heir, is likewise considered to be the real party in interest in the suit he and his mother had filed since both of them stand to be
benefited or injured by the judgment in the suit.[60]
 Since our Philippine laws protect the marital union of a couple, they should be interpreted in a way that would preserve their respective rights which include striking down bigamous
marriages. We thus find the CA Decision correctly rendered.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The assailed August 17, 2004 Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 61762, as well as its subsequent Resolution issued on September 13,
2005, are hereby AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.

MARIANO C. DEL CASTILLO

Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

RENATO C. CORONA
Chief Justice
Chairperson

PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR. TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO

Associate Justice Associate Justice

JOSE PORTUGAL PEREZ

Associate Justice

CERTIFICATION

Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, it is hereby certified that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the
writer of the opinion of the Courts Division.

RENATO C. CORONA
Chief Justice

[1] [3]
CA rollo, pp. 129-142; penned by Associate Justice Aurora Santiago-Lagman and Records, p. 103.
[4]
concurred in by Associate Justices Portia Alio-Hormachuelos and Rebecca de Id. at 13.
[5]
Guia-Salvador. Namely Jamila, Jacob, Amina, Macapanton, Ysmael, Soraya, Adel and Aquil.
[2] [6]
Id. at 205-210. Rollo, pp. 54-60.
[7]
Id. at 57. no collusion, to intervene for the State in order to see to it that the evidence
[8]
Records, pp. 14-15, 25-26. submitted is not fabricated.
[9] [35]
Id. at 25-26. FAMILY CODE, Article 48. In all cases of annulment or declaration of absolute
[10]
Id. at 17, 29. nullity of marriage, the Court shall order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal
[11]
Id. at 32-38. assigned to it to appear on behalf of the State to take steps to prevent collusion
[12]
Id. at 38-40. between the parties and to take care that evidence is not fabricated or
[13]
Id. at 109-111, 123. suppressed.
[14]
Id. at 143. In the cases referred to in the preceding paragraph, no judgment shall be
[15]
Id. at 151, 153, 173, 174. based upon a stipulation of facts or confession of judgment.
[16] [36]
Id. at 213. 457 Phil 463 (2003).
[17] [37]
Id. at 176. Rollo, p. 217.
[18] [38]
Id. at 230-236. Id. at 133, 135.
[19] [39]
Tamano v. Hon. Ortiz, 353 Phil. 775 (1998). Inadvertently referred to as A.M. No. 00-11-01-SC.
[20] [40]
Records, p. 237. The trial court erred in stating that let reception of plaintiffs Supra note 36.
[41]
evidence herein be set on June 26, 1997 x x x when in fact, it was already Id. at 468.
[42]
defendants turn. Sps. Diaz v. Diaz, 387 Phil 314, 334 (2000).
[21] [43]
Id. at 240. RULES OF COURT, Rule 65, Section 7.
[22] [44]
Id. at 242-244. Dated March 4, 2003, with an effectivity date of March 15, 2003.
[23] [45]
Id. at 315-318. Records, p. 30.
[24] [46]
Id. at 319-322. Id. at 56.
[25] [47]
Rollo, pp. 69-76. 326 Phil 169 (1996).
[26] [48]
Records, p. 367. Id. at 181.
[27] [49]
Id. at 354-362. Supra note 12, where Zoraydas disbarment complaint stated that the marriage
[28]
Rollo, pp. 77-82; penned by Judge Elsa de Guzman. was conducted under both rites.
[29] [50]
FAMILY CODE, Article 35. The following marriages shall be void from the Malang v. Judge Moson, 398 Phil. 41 (2000).
[51]
beginning: An Act Authorizing For A Period Of Twenty Years Divorce Among Moslems
xxxx Residing In Non-Christian Provinces In Accordance With Moslem Customs and
(4) Those bigamous or polygamous marriages not falling under Article Practices (approved on June 18, 1949), Section 1 of which provides:
41; Section 1. For a period of twenty years from the date of the approval of this
xxxx Act, divorce among Moslems residing in non-Christian provinces shall be
NEW CIVIL CODE, Article 83. Any marriage subsequently contracted by any recognized and be governed by Moslem customs and practices.
[52]
person during the lifetime of the first spouse of such person with any person Under Articles 45-57.
[53]
other than such first spouse shall be illegal and void from its performance, Tamano v. Hon. Ortiz, supra note 19 at 781.
[54]
unless: Malang v. Judge Moson, supra note 50 at 57.
[55]
(1) The first marriage was annulled or dissolved; EXECUTIVE ORDER NO. 209, which took effect on August 3, 1988.
[56]
xxxx Sec. 2. Petition for declaration of absolute nullity of void marriages.
[30]
Rollo, p. 80. (a) Who may file.A petition for declaration of absolute nullity of void
[31]
CA rollo, pp. 17-41. marriage may be filed solely by the husband or the wife.
[32] [57]
Rollo, pp. 34-46. Enrico v. Heirs of Sps. Eulogio B. Medinaceli and Trinidad Catli-Medinaceli, G.R. No.
[33]
Id. at 48-53. 173614, September 28, 2007, 534 SCRA 418, 429, citing Rationale of the Rules
[34]
RULES OF COURT, Rule 9, Section 3(e) Where no defaults allowed. If the defending on Annulment of Voidable Marriages and Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void
party in an action for annulment or declaration of nullity of marriage or for legal Marriages, Legal Separation and Provisional Orders.
separation fails to answer, the court shall order the prosecuting attorney to
investigate whether or not a collusion between the parties exists, and if there is
[58] [59]
Carlos v. Sandoval, G.R. No. 179922, December 16, 2008, 574 SCRA 116, 132 Nial v. Bayadog, 384 Phil 661, 673 (2000).
[60]
citing Enrico v. Heirs of Sps. Eulogio B. Medinaceli and Trinidad Catli-Medinaceli, RULES OF COURT, Rule 3, Section 2.
supra note 57 at 428.

EN BANC

G.R. No. L-29192 February 22, 1971

GERTRUDES DE LOS SANTOS, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
MAXIMO DE LA CRUZ, defendant-appellant.

Benjamin Pineda for plaintiff-appellee.

Ceasar R. Monteclaros for defendant-appellant.

VILLAMOR, J.:

Direct appeal to this Court on questions of law from the judgment of the Court of First Instance of Rizal, Branch IX, in its Civil Case No. Q-8792.

From the record of this case, we cull the following salient facts: On May 21, 1965, Gertrudes de los Santos filed a complaint for specific performance against Maximo de la Cruz,
alleging, among others, that on August 24, 1963, she and several co-heirs, including the defendant, executed an extrajudicial partition agreement (a copy of which was attached
to the complaint) over a certain portion of land with an area of around 20,000 sq. m.; that the parties thereto had agreed to adjudicate three (3) lots to the defendant, in
addition to his corresponding share, on condition that the latter would undertake the development and subdivision of the estate which was the subject matter of the
agreement, all expenses in connection therewith to be defrayed from the proceeds of the sale of the aforementioned three (3) lots; that in spite of demands by the plaintiff, by
the co-heirs, and by the residents of the subdivision, the defendant refused to perform his aforesaid obligation although he had already sold the aforesaid lots. The plaintiff
prayed the court to order the defendant to comply with his obligation under the extrajudicial partition agreement and to pay the sum of P1,000.00 as attorney's fees and costs.

In his answer, the defendant admitted the due execution of the extrajudicial partition agreement, but set up the affirmative defenses that the plaintiff had no cause of action
against him because the said agreement was void with respect to her, for the reason that the plaintiff was not an heir of Pelagia de la Cruz, deceased owner of the property, and
was included in the extrajudicial partition agreement by mistake; and that although he had disposed of the three lots adjudicated to him, nevertheless the proceeds of the sale
were not sufficient to develop and improve properly the subdivided estate. The answer contained a counterclaim wherein the defendant alleged that the plaintiff had likewise
sold her share in the estate for P10,000.00, and that the extrajudicial partition agreement being void insofar as the latter was concerned, he was entitled to one-fourth (1/4) of
the proceeds as his share by way of reversion. The defendant prayed that the complaint be dismissed; that the extrajudicial partition agreement be declared void with respect to
the plaintiff; and, on his counterclaim, that the plaintiff be ordered to pay him the sum of P2,500.00.

On motion of the defendant, the court below entered an order on July 19, 1965, declaring the plaintiff in default for not having answered the counterclaim.
On July 6, 1966, the case was submitted for decision on the following stipulation of facts:

1. That the parties admit the existence and execution of the "Extra-Judicial Partition Agreement" dated August 24, 1963, which was marked as Exhibit "A" for the
plaintiff, and Exhibit "I" for the defendant, which partition agreement was marked as Annex "A" in the complaint;

2. That the parties agree that the original purpose of the above-mentioned Extra-Judicial Partition Agreement was for the distribution of the in question for the heirs of
Pelagia de la Cruz; however the parties further agree that several lots in the said land have been sold by some of the co-heirs, and there are houses several houses
constructed therein and residents therein;

3. That the parties agree that the defendant is the appointed Administrator and In-charge of the development and subdivision of the land in question, as provided for in
the aforementioned extrajudicial partition agreement;

4. That parties agree that Lots 1, 2 and 3 as described on page 3, 3rd paragraph to the last of said partition agreement have been sold by the defendant herein; and
parties further agree that there are no properly constructed roads, nor proper light and water facilities;

5. That the parties agree that the defendant is the nephew of the deceased Pelagia de la Cruz aforementioned, who was the owner and predecessor in interest of the
land which was the subject matter of the extra-judicial partition agreement;

6. That the parties agree that the plaintiff is the grandniece of the said Pelagia de la Cruz;

7. That Pelagia de la Cruz died intestate and without issue on October 16, 1962, as evidenced by a death certificate, which is marked as Exhibit "2" for tap defendant;
and

8. That Marciana de la Cruz is the mother of the plaintiff and the niece of the said Pelagia de la Cruz, and that the said Marciana de la Cruz died on September 22, 1935,
as evidenced by Exhibit "3" for the defendant.

In its decision dated November 3, 1966, the court a quo held that the defendant, being a party to the extrajudicial partition agreement, was estopped from raising in issue the
right of the plaintiff to inherit from the decedent Pelagia de la Cruz; hence, he must abide by the terms of the agreement. The court ordered the defendant "to perform his
obligations to develop Lots 1, 2 and 3 of (LRC) Psd-29561 as described on page 2 of the Extrajudicial Partition Agreement" (meaning, apparently, that the defendant should
develop the subdivision because said Lots 1, 2 and 3 were intended to be sold for this purpose), and to pay the plaintiff the sum of P2,000.00 as actual damages, the sum of
P500.00 as attorney's fees, and the costs. No disposition was made of defendant's counterclaim. The defendant filed a "Motion for New Trial" but the same was denied. Hence,
this appeal.

The seven (7) errors assigned by defendant-appellant in his brief boil down to the following:

1. The court a quo erred in not holding that the extrajudicial partition agreement is null and void with respect to plaintiff-appellee, and, consequently, that plaintiff-
appellee has no cause of action against defendant-appellant.

2. The court a quo erred in holding that defendant-appellant is estopped from questioning plaintiff-appellee's right to have the agreement enforced.

3. The court a quo erred in ordering defendant-appellant to pay actual damages to plaintiff-appellee, and, on the other hand, in not granting the relief prayed for by
defendant-appellant in his counterclaim.
We shall discuss seriatim these errors as thus condensed.

1. In the stipulation of facts submitted to the court below, the parties admit that the owner of the estate, subject matter of the extrajudicial partition agreement, was Pelagia de
la Cruz, who died intestate on October 16, 1962; that defendant-appellant is a nephew of the said decedent; that plaintiff-appellee is a grandniece of Pelagia de la Cruz, her
mother, Marciana de la Cruz, being a niece of the said Pelagia de la Cruz; that plaintiff-appellee's mother died on September 22, 1935, thus predeceasing Pelagia de la Cruz; and
that the purpose of the extrajudicial partition agreement was to divide and distribute the estate among the heirs of Pelagia de la Cruz.

The pivotal question is whether, in the premises, plaintiff-appellee is a heir of the decedent. We are convinced that she is not. Plaintiff-appellee being a mere grandniece of
Pelagia de la Cruz, she could not inherit from the latter by right of representation.

ART. 972. The right of representation takes place in the direct descending line, but never in the ascending.

In the collateral line, it takes place only in favor of the children of brothers or sisters, whether they be of the full or half blood.

Much less could plaintiff-appellee inherit in her own right.

ART. 962. In every inheritance, the relative nearest in degree excludes the more distant ones, saving the right of representation when it properly takes place. ... .

Applying these two (2) provisions, this Court, in Linart y Pavia vs. Ugarte y Iturralde, 5 Phil., 176 (1905), said,

... [I]n an intestate succession a grandniece of the deceased and not participate with a niece in the inheritance, because the latter being a nearer relative, the more
distant grandniece is excluded. In the collateral line the right of representation does not obtain beyond sons and daughters of the brothers and sisters, which would
have been the case if Pablo Linart, the father of the plaintiff, had survived his deceased uncle.

In the present case, the relatives "nearest in degree" to Pelagia de la Cruz are her nephews and nieces, one of whom is defendant-appellant. Necessarily, plaintiff-appellee, a
grandniece is excluded by law from the inheritance.

But what is the legal effect of plaintiff-appellee's inclusion and participation in the extrajudicial partition agreement insofar as her right to bring the present action is concerned?
They did not confer upon her the right to institute this action. The express purpose of the extrajudicial partition agreement, as admitted by the parties in the stipulation of facts,
was to divide the estate among the heirs of Pelagia de la Cruz. Indeed, the said agreement itself states that plaintiff-appellee was participating therein in representation of her
deceased mother. The pertinent portion of the agreement is herein quoted, thus:

NOW, THEREFORE, we ... and Diego de los Santos, married to Anastasia de la Cruz; Mariano delos Santos married to Andrea Ramoy; Gertrudes delos Santos, married to
Pascual Acuna; Alejo delos Santos, married to Leonila David; and Sotera delos Santos, married to Narciso Ramota; all in representation of our mother, MARCIANA DELA
CRUZ, ..., do hereby by these presents, mutually, voluntarily and amicably agree among ourselves to equitably divide the property left by the deceased PELAGIA DELA
CRUZ, and adjudicate unto ourselves definite and independent portions of the estate in the following manner ... .

It is quite apparent that in executing the partition agreement, the parties thereto were laboring under the erroneous belief that plaintiff-appellee was one of the legal heirs of
Pelagia de la Cruz. Plaintiff-appellee not being such a heir, the partition is void with respect to her, pursuant to Article 1105 of the Civil Code, which reads:

ART. 1105. A partition which includes a person believed to be a heir, but who is not, shall be void only with respect to such person.
Partition of property affected between a person entitled to inherit from the deceased owner thereof and another person who thought he was an heir, when he was not really
and lawfully such, to the prejudice of the rights of the true heir designated by law to succeed the deceased, is null and void (De Torres vs. De Torres, et al., 28 Phil. 49). A fortiori,
plaintiff-appellee could hardly derive from the agreement the right to have its terms enforced.

2. The extrajudicial partition agreement being void with respect to

plaintiff-appellee, she may not be heard to assert estoppel against defendant-appellant. Estoppel cannot be predicated on a void contract (17 Am. Jur. 605), or on acts which are
prohibited by law or are against public policy (Baltazar vs. Lingayen Gulf Electric Power Co., et al., G.R. Nos. 16236-38, June 30, 1965 [14 SCRA 5221). In Ramiro vs. Graño, et al.,
54 Phil., 744 (1930), this Court held:

No estoppel arises where the representation or conduct the party sought to be estopped is due to ignorance founded upon a mistake. And which there is authority to
the contrary, the weight of authority is that the acts and declarations of a party based upon an innocent mistake as to his legal rights will not estop him to assert the
same, especially where every fact known to the party sought to be estopped is equally well known to the party setting up the estoppel. (21 C.J., 1125, 1126.)

And in Capili, et al. vs. Court of Appeals, et al., G.R. No. L-18148, February 28, 1963 (7 SCRA 367), this Court said:

Finally, petitioners-appellants claim that appellees are estopped to raise the question of ownership of the properties involved because the widow herself, during her
lifetime, not only did not object to the inclusion of these properties in the inventory of the assets of her deceased husband, but also signed an extra-judicial partition of
those inventoried properties. But the very authorities cited by appellants require that to constitute estoppel, the actor must have knowledge of the facts and be
apprised of his rights at the time he performs the act constituting estoppel, because silence without knowledge works no estoppel. ... .

3. The award of actual damages in favor of plaintiff-appellee cannot be sustained in view of the conclusion we have arrived at above. Furthermore, actual or compensatory
damages must be duly proved (Article 2199, Civil Code). Here, no proof of such damages was presented inasmuch as the case was decided on a stipulation of facts and no
evidence was adduced before the trial court.

We now come to defendant-appellant's counterclaim, in which he alleged that plaintiff-appelee sold her share to a certain person for the price of P10,000.00, and claims that he
is entitled to one-fourth (1/4) of the proceeds by right of reversion. It will be noted that plaintiff-appellee had been declared in default on defendant-appellant's counterclaim;
but the latter did not present any evidence to prove the material allegation therein — more specifically, the alleged sale of the former's share for the sum of P10,000.00. That no
such evidence had been adduced is understandable, for the parties expressly submitted the case for the resolution of the court upon their stipulation of facts which,
unfortunately, did not make any mention of the alleged sale; and neither had defendant made any offer or move to introduce the necessary evidence to that effect for the
consideration and evaluation by the trial court.

Defendant-appellant contends, however, that in view of plaintiff-appellee's having been declared in default, the latter must be deemed to have admitted all the allegations in his
counterclaim, so that the court a quo should have granted the relief prayed for by him. We find no merit in this contention.

Section 1, Rule 18 of the Revised Rules of Court, reads:

SECTION 1. Judgment by default.—if the defendant fails to answer within the time specified in these rules, the court shall, upon motion of the plaintiff and proof of such
failure, declare the defendant in default. Thereupon the court shall proceed to receive the plaintiff's evidence and render judgment granting him such relief as the
complaint and the facts proven may warrant. This provision applies where no answer is made to a counterclaim, crossclaim or third-party complaint within the period
provided in this rule.

The abovequoted rule was taken from Sections 128 and 129 of the Code of Civil Procedure. In Macondray & Co. vs. Eustaquio, 64 Phil., 446 (1937), this Court said:
 Under section 128 of our Code of Civil Procedure, the judgment by default against a defendant who has neither appeared nor filed his answer does not imply a waiver
of rights except that of being heard and of presenting evidence in his favor. It does not imply admission by the defendant of the facts and causes of action of the
plaintiff, because the codal section requires the latter to adduce his evidence in support of his allegations as an indispensable condition before final judgment could be
given in his favor. Nor could it be interpreted as an admission by the defendant that the plaintiff's causes of action find support in the law or that the latter is entitled to
the relief prayed for. ... .

Nevertheless, the basic fact appears in the stipulation submitted by the parties that said plaintiff-appellee admitted having received a portion of the estate by virtue of the
extrajudicial partition agreement dated August 24, 1963, to wit:

(9). Lot 9, (LRC) Psd-29561, containing an area of 1,691 sq. m. as described in the Technical Description to be adjudicated to Diego delos Santos, married to Anastacia
dela Cruz; Mariano delos Santos, married to Regina Baluyot; Hilario delos Santos, married to Andrea Ramoy; Gertrudes delos Santos, married to Pascual Acuna; Alejo
delos Santos, married to Leonila David; and Sotera delos Santos, married to Narciso Ramota, in co-ownership, share and share alike.

Such being the case, defendant-appellant is apparently correct in his contention that the lower court erred in not passing on his counterclaim and, consequently, in not
sentencing appellee to turn over to him his corresponding share of said portion received by appellee under the void partition. Remote relatives or unrelated person who unduly
received and took possession of the property of a deceased person without any right, by virtue of a null and void partition, must restore it to the legitimate successor in the
inheritance (De Torres vs. De Torres, et al., supra). Of course, if such share has already been disposed of by appellee to a bona fide purchaser, as seems to be indicated in the
unproven allegations of the counterclaim, We cannot render judgment awarding any specific amount to defendant-appellant as his proportionate share of the proceeds of such
sale for the reason that, as already stated above, this aspect of the counterclaim has not been touched upon in the stipulation of facts nor has it been supported by evidence
which appellant should have presented in the lower court but did not.

IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING CONSIDERATIONS, the judgment appealed from is hereby reversed and set aside; the defendant-appellant is absolved from any ability to and in
favor of plaintiff-appellee; and, on appellant's counterclaim, appellee is hereby sentenced to restore or reconvey to him his corresponding share of the property she has received
under the extrajudicial partition hereinbefore mentioned if the same has not already been disposed of as alleged. Costs in both instance against plaintiff-appellee.

Concepcion, C.J., Reyes, J.B.L., Dizon, Makalintal, Zaldivar Castro, Fernando, Teehankee, Barredo and Makasiar, JJ., concur.

De los Santos v. De la Cruz, G.R. No. L-29192, 22 February 1971

02
OCT
[VILLAMOR, J.]

FACTS

The parties admit that the owner of the estate, subject matter of the extrajudicial partition agreement, was Pelagia de la Cruz, who died intestate; that defendant-appellant (De
la Cruz)is a nephew of the said decedent; that plaintiff-appellee (De los Santos) is a grandniece of Pelagia de la Cruz, her mother, Marciana de la Cruz, being a niece who
predeceased said Pelagia de la Cruz; and that the purpose of the extrajudicial partition agreement was to divide and distribute the estate among the heirs of Pelagia de la Cruz.

ISSUE
What is the effect of an extra-judicial partition which included a person who is not an heir of the deceased?

RULING
The extrajudicial partition agreement is void with respect to plaintiff-appellee.

Article 1105 of the Civil Code provides: “A partition which includes a person believed to be a heir, but who is not, shall be void only with respect to such person.” Partition of
property affected between a person entitled to inherit from the deceased owner thereof and another person who thought he was an heir, when he was not really and lawfully
such, to the prejudice of the rights of the true heir designated by law to succeed the deceased, is null and void. A fortiori, plaintiff-appellee could hardly derive from the
agreement the right to have its terms enforced.

[G.R. No. 124290. January 16, 1998]

ALLIED BANKING CORPORATION, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS, HON. JOSE C. DE GUZMAN, OSCAR D. TANQUECO, LUCIA D. TANQUECO-MATIAS, RUBEN D. TANQUECO
and NESTOR D. TANQUECO, respondents

DECISION
BELLOSILLO, J .:
There are two (2) main issues in this petition for review: namely, (a) whether a stipulation in a contract of lease to the effect that the contract "may be renewed for a like
term at the option of the lessee" is void for being potestative or violative of the principle of mutuality of contracts under Art. 1308 of the Civil Code and, corollarily, what is the
meaning of the clause "may be renewed for a like term at the option of the lessee;" and, (b) whether a lessee has the legal personality to assail the validity of a deed of donation
executed by the lessor over the leased premises.
Spouses Filemon Tanqueco and Lucia Domingo-Tanqueco owned a 512-square meter lot located at No. 2 Sarmiento Street corner Quirino Highway, Novaliches, Quezon City,
covered by TCT No. 136779 in their name. On 30 June 1978 they leased the property to petitioner Allied Banking Corporation (ALLIED) for a monthly rental of P1,000.00 for the
first three (3) years, adjustable by 25% every three (3) years thereafter.[1] The lease contract specifically states in its Provision No. 1 that "the term of this lease shall be fourteen
(14) years commencing from April 1, 1978 and may be renewed for a like term at the option of the lessee."
Pursuant to their lease agreement, ALLIED introduced an improvement on the property consisting of a concrete building with a floor area of 340-square meters which it used
as a branch office. As stipulated, the ownership of the building would be transferred to the lessors upon the expiration of the original term of the lease.
Sometime in February 1988 the Tanqueco spouses executed a deed of donation over the subject property in favor of their four (4) children, namely, private respondents
herein Oscar D. Tanqueco, Lucia Tanqueco-Matias, Ruben D. Tanqueco and Nestor D. Tanqueco, who accepted the donation in the same public instrument.
On 13 February 1991, a year before the expiration of the contract of lease, the Tanquecos notified petitioner ALLIED that they were no longer interested in renewing the
lease.[2]ALLIED replied that it was exercising its option to renew their lease under the same terms with additional proposals. [3] Respondent Ruben D. Tanqueco, acting in behalf of
all the donee-lessors, made a counter-proposal.[4] ALLIED however rejected the counter-proposal and insisted on Provision No. 1 of their lease contract.
When the lease contract expired in 1992 private respondents demanded that ALLIED vacate the premises. But the latter asserted its sole option to renew the lease and
enclosed in its reply letter a cashiers check in the amount of P68,400.00 representing the advance rental payments for six (6) months taking into account the escalation
clause. Private respondents however returned the check to ALLIED, prompting the latter to consign the amount in court.
An action for ejectment was commenced before the Metropolitan Trial Court of Quezon City. After trial, the MeTC-Br. 33 declared Provision No. 1 of the lease contract void
for being violative of Art. 1308 of the Civil Code thus -
x x x but such provision [in the lease contract], to the mind of the Court, does not add luster to defendants cause nor constitutes as an unbridled or unlimited license or
sanctuary of the defendant to perpetuate its occupancy on the subject property. The basic intention of the law in any contract is mutuality and equality. In other words, the
validity of a contract cannot be left at (sic) the will of one of the contracting parties. Otherwise, it infringes (upon) Article 1308 of the New Civil Code, which provides: The
contract must bind both contracting parties; its validity or compliance cannot be left to the will of one of them x x x x Using the principle laid down in the case of Garcia v.
Legarda as cornerstone, it is evident that the renewal of the lease in this case cannot be left at the sole option or will of the defendant notwithstanding provision no. 1 of their
expired contract. For that would amount to a situation where the continuance and effectivity of a contract will depend only upon the sole will or power of the lessee, which is
repugnant to the very spirit envisioned under Article 1308 of the New Civil Code x x x x the theory adopted by this Court in the case at bar finds ample affirmation from the
principle echoed by the Supreme Court in the case of Lao Lim v. CA, 191 SCRA 150, 154, 155.
On appeal to the Regional Trial Court, and later to the Court of Appeals, the assailed decision was affirmed.[5]
On 20 February 1993, while the case was pending in the Court of Appeals, ALLIED vacated the leased premises by reason of the controversy.[6]
ALLIED insists before us that Provision No. 1 of the lease contract was mutually agreed upon hence valid and binding on both parties, and the exercise by petitioner of its
option to renew the contract was part of their agreement and in pursuance thereof.
We agree with petitioner. Article 1308 of the Civil Code expresses what is known in law as the principle of mutuality of contracts. It provides that "the contract must bind
both the contracting parties; its validity or compliance cannot be left to the will of one of them." This binding effect of a contract on both parties is based on
the principle that the obligations arising from contracts have the force of law between the contracting parties, and there must be mutuality between them based essentially on
their equality under which it is repugnant to have one party bound by the contract while leaving the other free therefrom. The ultimate purpose is to render void a contract
containing a condition which makes its fulfillment dependent solely upon the uncontrolled will of one of the contracting parties.
An express agreement which gives the lessee the sole option to renew the lease is frequent and subject to statutory restrictions, valid and binding on the parties. This option,
which is provided in the same lease agreement, is fundamentally part of the consideration in the contract and is no different from any other provision of the lease carrying an
undertaking on the part of the lessor to act conditioned on the performance by the lessee. It is a purely executory contract and at most confers a right to obtain a renewal if there
is compliance with the conditions on which the right is made to depend. The right of renewal constitutes a part of the lessees interest in the land and forms a substantial and
integral part of the agreement.
The fact that such option is binding only on the lessor and can be exercised only by the lessee does not render it void for lack of mutuality. After all, the lessor is free to give
or not to give the option to the lessee. And while the lessee has a right to elect whether to continue with the lease or not, once he exercises his option to continue and the lessor
accepts, both parties are thereafter bound by the new lease agreement. Their rights and obligations become mutually fixed, and the lessee is entitled to retain possession of the
property for the duration of the new lease, and the lessor may hold him liable for the rent therefor. The lessee cannot thereafter escape liability even if he
should subsequently decide to abandon the premises. Mutuality obtains in such a contract and equality exists between the lessor and the lessee since they remain with the same
faculties in respect to fulfillment.[7]
The case of Lao Lim v. Court of Appeals[8] relied upon by the trial court is not applicable here. In that case, the stipulation in the disputed compromise agreement was to the
effect that the lessee would be allowed to stay in the premises "as long as he needs it and can pay the rents." In the present case, the questioned provision states that the
lease "may be renewed for a like term at the option of the lessee." The lessor is bound by the option he has conceded to the lessee. The lessee likewise becomes bound only when
he exercises his option and the lessor cannot thereafter be excused from performing his part of the agreement.
Likewise, reliance by the trial court on the 1967 case of Garcia v. Rita Legarda, Inc.,[9] is misplaced. In that case, what was involved was a contract to sell involving residential
lots, which gave the vendor the right to declare the contract cancelled and of no effect upon the failure of the vendee to fulfill any of the conditions therein set forth. In the instant
case, we are dealing with a contract of lease which gives the lessee the right to renew the same.
With respect to the meaning of the clause "may be renewed for a like term at the option of the lessee," we sustain petitioner's contention that its exercise of the option
resulted in the automatic extension of the contract of lease under the same terms and conditions. The subject contract simply provides that "the term of this lease shall be fourteen
(14) years and may be renewed for a like term at the option of the lessee." As we see it, the only term on which there has been a clear agreement is the period of the new contract,
i.e., fourteen (14) years, which is evident from the clause "may be renewed for a like term at the option of the lessee," the phrase "for a like term" referring to the period. It is
silent as to what the specific terms and conditions of the renewed lease shall be. Shall it be the same terms and conditions as in the original contract, or shall it be under the terms
and conditions as may be mutually agreed upon by the parties after the expiration of the existing lease?
In Ledesma v. Javellana[10] this Court was confronted with a similar problem. In that case the lessee was given the sole option to renew the lease, but the contract failed to
specify the terms and conditions that would govern the new contract. When the lease expired, the lessee demanded an extension under the same terms and conditions. The lessor
expressed conformity to the renewal of the contract but refused to accede to the claim of the lessee that the renewal should be under the same terms and conditions as the
original contract. In sustaining the lessee, this Court made the following pronouncement:

x x x in the case of Hicks v. Manila Hotel Company, a similar issue was resolved by this Court. It was held that 'such a clause relates to the very contract in which it is placed, and
does not permit the defendant upon the renewal of the contract in which the clause is found, to insist upon different terms than those embraced in the contract to be renewed;'
and that 'a stipulation to renew always relates to the contract in which it is found and the rights granted thereunder, unless it expressly provides for variations in the terms of
the contract to be renewed.'

The same principle is upheld in American Law regarding the renewal of lease contracts. In 50 Am. Jur. 2d, Sec. 1159, at p. 45, we find the following citations: 'The rule is well-
established that a general covenant to renew or extend a lease which makes no provision as to the terms of a renewal or extension implies a renewal or extension upon the
same terms as provided in the original lease.'

In the lease contract under consideration, there is no provision to indicate that the renewal will be subject to new terms and conditions that the parties may yet agree upon. It is
to renewal provisions of lease contracts of the kind presently considered that the principles stated above squarely apply. We do not agree with the contention of the appellants
that if it was intended by the parties to renew the contract under the same terms and conditions stipulated in the contract of lease, such should have expressly so
stated in the contract itself.The same argument could easily be interposed by the appellee who could likewise contend that if the intention was to renew the contract of lease
under such new terms and conditions that the parties may agree upon, the contract should have so specified. Between the two assertions, there is more logic in the latter.

The settled rule is that in case of uncertainty as to the meaning of a provision granting extension to a contract of lease, the tenant is the one favored and not the landlord. 'As a
general rule, in construing provisions relating to renewals or extensions, where there is any uncertainty, the tenant is favored, and not the landlord, because the latter, having
the power of stipulating in his own favor, has neglected to do so; and also upon the principle that every man's grant is to be taken most strongly against himself (50 Am Jur. 2d,
Sec. 1162, p. 48; see also 51 C.J.S. 599).'
Besides, if we were to adopt the contrary theory that the terms and conditions to be embodied in the renewed contract were still subject to mutual agreement by and
between the parties, then the option - which is an integral part of the consideration for the contract - would be rendered worthless. For then, the lessor could easily defeat the
lessee's right of renewal by simply imposing unreasonable and onerous conditions to prevent the parties from reaching an agreement, as in the case at bar. As in a statute no
word, clause, sentence, provision or part of a contract shall be considered surplusage or superfluous, meaningless, void, insignificant or nugatory, if that can be reasonably avoided.
To this end, a construction which will render every word operative is to be preferred over that which would make some words idle and nugatory. [11]
Fortunately for respondent lessors, ALLIED vacated the premises on 20 February 1993 indicating its abandonment of whatever rights it had under the renewal
clause.Consequently, what remains to be done is for ALLIED to pay rentals for the continued use of the premises until it vacated the same, computed from the expiration of the
original term of the contract on 31 March 1992 to the time it actually left the premises on 20 February 1993, deducting therefrom the amount of P68,400.00 consigned in court
by ALLIED and any other amount which it may have deposited or advanced in conection with the lease. Since the old lease contract was deemed renewed under the same terms
and conditions upon the exercise by ALLIED of its option, the basis of the computation of rentals should be the rental rate provided for in the existing contract.
Finally, ALLIED cannot assail the validity of the deed of donation, not being a party thereto. A person who is not principally or subsidiarily bound has no legal capacity to
challenge the validity of the contract.[12] He must first have an interest in it. "Interest" within the meaning of the term means material interest, an interest to be affected by the
deed, as distinguished from a mere incidental interest. Hence, a person who is not a party to a contract and for whose benefit it was not expressly made cannot maintain an action
on it, even if the contract, if performed by the parties thereto would incidentally affect him, [13] except when he is prejudiced in his rights with respect to one of the contracting
parties and can show the detriment which could positively result to him from the contract in which he had no intervention. [14] We find none in the instant case.
WHEREFORE, the Decision of the Court of Appeals is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Considering that petitioner ALLIED BANKING CORPORATION already vacated the leased
premises as of 20 February 1993, the renewed lease contract is deemed terminated as of that date. However, petitioner is required to pay rentals to respondent lessors at the
rate provided in their existing contract, subject to computation in view of the consignment in court of P68,400.00 by petitioner, and of such other amounts it may have deposited
or advanced in connection with the lease.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., (Chairman), Vitug, and Kapunan, JJ., concur.

[12]
[1]
Astudillo v. The Board of Directors of PHHC, No. L- 28066, 22 September 1976,
Records, p. 45.
73 SCRA 15. See also Article 1397, Civil Code.
[13]
[2]
Records, p. 11; Exh. C. House International Building Tenants Association, Inc. v. Intermediate
Appellate Court, G.R. No. 75287, 30 June 1987, 151 SCRA 703.
[3]
ALLIED proposed the following terms for the extension of the lease: (1) Term [14]
Teves v. The People's Homesite and Housing Corporation, et al., No. L-21498,
of Lease: ten (10) years; (2) Escalation Rate: 10% per annum starting on the 27 June 1968, 23 SCRA 1141.
second year; (3) Monthly Rental: P8,000/month on the first year; and, (4)
Advance Rental: Six (6) months to be applied to the first six (6) months of the ALLIED BANK VS CA (1998)
lease. 2 Dec 2017
[4]
The counter-proposal: (1) Term: Two (2) years subject to renewal at the sole [248 scra 357; G.R. No. 124290; January 16, 1998] Civil Law| Obligation and
option of the lessor; (2) Rent: a) at P80,000 a month payable within the first five Contracts
(5) days of each month commencing from the date the lease contract is ALLIED BANKING CORPORATION vs. COURT OF APPEALS , HON. JOSE C. DE
executed; b) Twelve (12) months rental payable in advance upon signing of the GUZMAN, OSCAR D. TAN-QUECO, LUCIA D. TANQUECO-MATIAS, RUBEN D.
lease contract; (3) Deposit: P80,000 to answer for any unpaid obligations of the TANQUECO and NESTOR D. TANQUECO.
lessee, payable upon signing of the lease contract and refundable upon the FACTS:
termination of the lease (net of any amount applied to the payment of any such Petitioner Allied Banking Corporation (ALLIED) leased a property owned by Spouses
unpaid obligations). Filemon and Lucia Tanqueco. The lease contract states that, “the term of the lease
shall be fourteen (14) years commencing from April 1, 1978 and may be renewed
[5]
Decision penned by Judge Jose C. de Guzman, RTC-Br. 93, Quezon City; for a like term at the option of the lessee.”
Decision of the Court of Appeals penned by Justice Jesus M. Elbinias, concurred In 1988, the Tanqueco spouses executed a deed of donation over the subject
in by Justices Ramon U. Mabutas, Jr., and Salvador J. Valdez, Jr., CA-G.R. SP. Case property in favor of their four (4) children.
No. 30162. In 1991, a year before the expiration of the contract of lease, the heirs of
[6] Tanquecos notified petitioner ALLIED that they were no longer interested in
Rollo, p. 12.
renewing the lease.
[7]
8 Manresa 627. ALLIED, on the other hand, replied that it was exercising its option to renew their
lease under the same terms as was agreed with the original lease of contract with
[8]
G.R. No. 87047, 31 October 1990, 191 SCRA 156. additional proposals, however, petitioner rejected the proposal. When the lease
[9]
No. L-20175, 30 October 1976, 21 SCRA 555. contract expired in 1992, the heirs demanded that ALLIED vacate the premises. An
action for ejectment was commenced before the MeTC of Quezon City.
[10]
G.R. No. 55187, 28 April 1983, 121 SCRA 794. ISSUE:
[11] Whether a stipulation in a contract of lease stating “may be renewed for a like term
Shimonek v. Tillanan, 1 P. 2d., 154.
at the option of the lessee” is violative of the principle of mutuality of contract.
HELD:
No, the lease contract was mutually agreed upon hence valid and binding on both
parties, and the exercise by petitioner of its option to renew the contract was part
of their agreement and in pursuance thereof.
The principle of mutuality of contracts provides that “the contract must bind both
the contracting parties; its validity or compliance cannot be left to the will of one of
them.” This binding effect of a contract on both parties is based on the principle
that the obligations arising from the contracts have the force of law between the
contracting parties, and there must be mutuality between them based essentially
on their equality under which it is repugnant to have one party bound by the
contract while leaving the other free therefrom. The ultimate purpose is to render
void a contract containing a condition which makes its fulfillment dependent solely
upon the uncontrolled will of one of the contracting parties.

[G.R. No. 144037. September 26, 2003]

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. NOEL TUDTUD y PAYPA and DINDO BOLONG y NARET, accused-appellants.

DECISION
TINGA, J.:

. It is desirable that criminals should be detected, and to that end that all available evidence should be used. It also is desirable that the government should not itself foster and
pay for other crimes, when they are the means by which the evidence is to be obtained. If it pays its officers for having got evidence by crime, I do not see why it may not as well
pay them for getting it in the same way, and I can attach no importance to protestations of disapproval if it knowingly accepts and pays and announces that it will pay for the
fruits. We have to choose, and for my part I think it a less evil that some criminals should escape than that the government should play an ignoble part.
So wrote Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes in Olmstead v. U.S.[1] On this occasion, this Court is made to choose between letting suspected criminals escape or letting the
government play an ignoble part.
Sometime during the months of July and August 1999, the Toril Police Station, Davao City received a report from a civilian asset named Bobong Solier about a certain Noel
Tudtud.[2] Solier related that his neighbors have been complaining about Tudtud, who was allegedly responsible for the proliferation of marijuana in their area.[3]
Reacting to the report, PO1 Ronald Desierto, PO1 Ramil Floreta and their superior, SPO1 Villalonghan, [4] all members of the Intelligence Section of the Toril Police Station,
conducted surveillance in Soliers neighborhood in Sapa, Toril, Davao City. [5] For five days, they gathered information and learned that Tudtud was involved in illegal
drugs.[6] According to his neighbors, Tudtud was engaged in selling marijuana. [7]
On August 1, 1999, Solier informed the police that Tudtud had headed to Cotabato and would be back later that day with new stocks of marijuana.[8] Solier described Tudtud
as big-bodied and short, and usually wore a hat.[9] At around 4:00 in the afternoon that same day, a team composed of PO1 Desierto, PO1 Floreta and SPO1 Villalonghan posted
themselves at the corner of Saipon and McArthur Highway to await Tudtuds arrival. [10] All wore civilian clothes.[11]
About 8:00 later that evening, two men disembarked from a bus and helped each other carry a carton [12] marked King Flakes.[13] Standing some five feet away from the men,
PO1 Desierto and PO1 Floreta observed that one of the men fit Tudtuds description. [14] The same man also toted a plastic bag.[15]
PO1 Floreta and PO1 Desierto then approached the suspects and identified themselves as police officers. [16] PO1 Desierto informed them that the police had received
information that stocks of illegal drugs would be arriving that night.[17] The man who resembled Tudtuds description denied that he was carrying any drugs.[18] PO1 Desierto asked
him if he could see the contents of the box.[19] Tudtud obliged, saying, it was alright.[20] Tudtud opened the box himself as his companion looked on. [21]
The box yielded pieces of dried fish, beneath which were two bundles, one wrapped in a striped plastic bag [22] and another in newspapers.[23] PO1 Desierto asked Tudtud to
unwrap the packages.[24] They contained what seemed to the police officers as marijuana leaves. [25]
 The police thus arrested Tudtud and his companion, informed them of their rights and brought them to the police station. [26] The two did not resist.[27]
The confiscated items were turned over to the Philippine National Police (PNP) Crime Laboratory for examination. [28] Forensic tests conducted by Police Chief Inspector Noemi
Austero, forensic chemist of the PNP Crime Laboratory, Region XI, on specimens taken from the confiscated items confirmed the police officers suspicion. The plastic bag contained
3,200 grams of marijuana leaves while the newspapers contained another 890 grams.[29] Police Chief Inspector Austero reduced her findings in her report, Physical Sciences Report
No. D-220-99 dated 2 August 1999.[30]
Noel Tudtud and his companion, Dindo Bulong, were subsequently charged [31] before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Davao City with illegal possession of prohibited
drugs.[32]Upon arraignment, both accused pleaded not guilty. [33] The defense, however, reserved their right to question the validity of their arrest and the seizure of the evidence
against them.[34]
Trial ensued thereafter.
The prosecution presented five witnesses, namely, arresting officers PO1 Desierto and PO1 Floreta, their civilian informant Bobong Solier, forensic chemist Police Chief
Inspector Noemi Austero, and SPO3 Nicolas Algabre, exhibit custodian of the PNP Crime Laboratory. Said witnesses testified to the foregoing narration of facts.
The accused, denying the charges against them, cried frame-up.
Noel Tudtud recalled that on August 1, 1999 he had gone to Kabacan, North Cotabato to sell pairs of Levis pants, which was his sideline.[35] At about 5:00 in the afternoon,
he returned to Davao City by bus.[36] Upon reaching Toril, Tudtud, along with less than ten passengers, got down the bus.[37]
Suddenly, a man who identified himself as a police officer approached him, pointing a .38 caliber revolver. [38] The man told him not to run.[39] Tudtud raised his arms and
asked, Sir, what is this about?[40] The man answered that he would like to inspect the plastic bag Tudtud was carrying, and instructed Tudtud to open the bag, which revealed
several pairs of Levis pants.[41]
The man then directed Tudtud to open a carton box some two meters away. [42] According to Tudtud, the box was already there when he disembarked the bus. [43] Tudtud told
the man the box was not his, but proceeded to open it out of fear after the man again pointed his revolver at him. [44] Tudtud discovered pieces of dried fish, underneath which
was something wrapped in cellophane.[45]
What is that? the man asked.[46] Tudtud replied that he did not know.[47] Without even unwrapping the cellophane, the man said it was marijuana and abruptly handcuffed
Tudtud.[48]
Simultaneously, another man was pointing a firearm at Dindo Bolong at the other side of the street, some eight meters from Tudtud.[49]
Bolong recounted that he was on his way to a relative in Daliao after attending a cousins wedding in Hagonoy, Davao del Sur when he was accosted.[50] After alighting the
bus, Bolong crossed the street.[51] Someone then approached him and pointed a gun at him. [52] The man ordered him not to move and handcuffed him. [53] Bolong asked why he
was being arrested but the man just told him to go with them. [54]
The suspects were then taken to the police station where, they would later claim, they met each other for the first time.[55]
Assailing the credibility of informant Bobong Solier, the defense offered the testimonies of Felicia Julaton, [56] Branch 3 Clerk of Court, Claudio Bohevia,[57] Branch 7 Clerk of
Court, and Mercedita Abunda,[58] Branch 9 Utility Clerk, all of the Davao City Municipal Trial Circuit Court. They testified and presented court documents showing that one Bobo
or Bobong Ramirez was charged in their respective branches with various crimes, specifically, light threats, less serious physical injuries and robbery. The defense asserted that
the Bobo or Bobong Ramirez accused in these cases is the same person as the informant Bobong Solier.[59]
Swayed by the prosecutions evidence beyond reasonable doubt, the RTC rendered judgment convicting both accused as charged and sentencing them to suffer the penalty
of reclusion perpetua and to pay a fine of P500,000.00.[60]
On appeal, Noel Tudtud and Dindo Bolong assign, among other errors, the admission in evidence of the marijuana leaves, which they claim were seized in violation of their
right against unreasonable searches and seizures.
 The right against unreasonable searches and seizures is secured by Section 2, Article III of the Constitution, which states:

SEC. 2. The right of the people to be secured in their persons, houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose
shall be inviolable, and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined personally by the judge after examination under oath or
affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the places to be searched and the persons or things to be seized.
The rule is that a search and seizure must be carried out through or with a judicial warrant; otherwise, such search and seizure becomes unreasonable within the meaning of
the above-quoted constitutional provision, and any evidence secured thereby, will be inadmissible in evidence for any purpose in any proceeding.[61] Section 3 (2), Article III of the
Constitution explicitly provides:

(2) Any evidence obtained in violation of the preceding section shall be inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding.
The proscription in Section 2, Article III, however, covers only unreasonable searches and seizures. The following instances are not deemed unreasonable even in the absence
of a warrant:

1. Warrantless search incidental to a lawful arrest. (Sec. 12, Rule 126 of the Rules of Court and prevailing jurisprudence);

2. Search of evidence in plain view. The elements are: (a) a prior valid intrusion based on the valid warrantless arrest in which the police are legally present in the pursuit of their
official duties; (b) the evidence was inadvertently discovered by the police who have the right to be where they are; (c) the evidence must be immediately apparent; (d) plain
view justified mere seizure of evidence without further search;

3. Search of a moving vehicle. Highly regulated by the government, the vehicles inherent mobility reduces expectation of privacy especially when its transit in public
thoroughfares furnishes a highly reasonable suspicion amounting to probable cause that the occupant committed a criminal activity;

4. Consented warrantless search;

5. Customs search;

6. Stop and Frisk; and

7. Exigent and emergency circumstances.[62]

The RTC justified the warrantless search of appellants belongings under the first exception, as a search incident to a lawful arrest. It cited as authorities this Courts rulings
in People v. Claudio,[63] People v. Tangliben,[64] People v. Montilla,[65] and People v. Valdez.[66] The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), in arguing for the affirmance of the appealed
decision, invokes the cases of People v. Maspil, Jr.,[67] People v. Malmstedt,[68] and People v. Bagista.[69]
A search incidental to a lawful arrest is sanctioned by the Rules of Court. Prior to its revision in 2000, Section 12,[70] Rule 126 of said Rules read as follows:

SEC. 12. Search incident to lawful arrest. A person lawfully arrested may be searched for dangerous weapons or anything which may be used as proof of the commission of an
offense, without a search warrant.

Section 5 (a), Rule 113 of the Rules, in turn, allows warrantless arrests:

SEC. 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful. A peace officer or a private person may, without a warrant, arrest a person:
(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense;

.
It is significant to note that the search in question preceded the arrest. Recent jurisprudence holds that the arrest must precede the search; the process cannot be
reversed.[71]Nevertheless, a search substantially contemporaneous with an arrest can precede the arrest if the police have probable cause to make the arrest at the outset of the
search.[72] The question, therefore, is whether the police in this case had probable cause to arrest appellants. Probable cause has been defined as:

an actual belief or reasonable grounds of suspicion. The grounds of suspicion are reasonable when, in the absence of actual belief of the arresting officers, the suspicion that the
person to be arrested is probably guilty of committing the offense, is based on actual facts, i.e., supported by circumstances sufficiently strong in themselves to create the
probable cause of guilt of the person to be arrested. A reasonable suspicion therefore must be founded on probable cause, coupled with good faith of the peace officers making
the arrest.[73]
The long-standing rule in this jurisdiction, applied with a great degree of consistency, is that reliable information alone is not sufficient to justify a warrantless arrest under
Section 5 (a), Rule 113. The rule requires, in addition, that the accused perform some overt act that would indicate that he has committed, is actually committing, or is attempting
to commit an offense.
In the leading case of People v. Burgos,[74] this Court held that the officer arresting a person who has just committed, is committing, or is about to commit an offense must
have personal knowledge of that fact. The offense must also be committed in his presence or within his view.[75] In Burgos, the authorities obtained information that the accused
had forcibly recruited one Cesar Masamlok as member of the New Peoples Army, threatening the latter with a firearm. Upon finding the accused, the arresting team searched his
house and discovered a gun as well as purportedly subversive documents. This Court, in declaring then Section 6 (a), Rule 113 of the Rules of Court inapplicable, ruled that:

There is no such personal knowledge in this case. Whatever knowledge was possessed by the arresting officers, it came in its entirety from the information furnished by Cesar
Masamlok. The location of the firearm was given by the appellants wife.

At the time of the appellants arrest, he was not in actual possession of any firearm or subversive document. Neither was he committing any act which could be described as
subversive. He was, in fact, plowing his field at the time of the arrest.

The right of a person to be secure against any unreasonable seizure of his body and any deprivation of his liberty is a most basic and fundamental one. The statute or rule which
allows exceptions to the requirement of warrants of arrest is strictly construed. Any exception must clearly fall within the situations when securing a warrant would be absurd or
is manifestly unnecessary as provided by the Rule. We cannot liberally construe the rule on arrests without warrant or extend its application beyond the cases specifically
provided by law. To do so would infringe upon personal liberty and set back a basic right so often violated and so deserving of full protection.[76]
Consequently, the items seized were held inadmissible, having been obtained in violation of the accuseds constitutional rights against unreasonable searches and seizures.
In People v. Aminnudin,[77] this Court likewise held the warrantless arrest and subsequent search of appellant therein illegal, given the following circumstances:

the accused-appellant was not, at the moment of his arrest, committing a crime nor was it shown that he was about to do so or that he had just done so. What he was doing was
descending the gangplank of the M/V Wilcon 9 and there was no outward indication that he called for his arrest. To all appearances, he was like any of the other passengers
innocently disembarking from the vessel. It was only when the informer pointed to him as the carrier of the marijuana that he suddenly became suspect and so subject to
apprehension. It was the furtive finger that triggered his arrest. The identification by the informer was the probable cause as determined by the officers (and not a judge) that
authorized them to pounce upon Aminnudin and immediately arrest him. [78]
Thus, notwithstanding tips from confidential informants and regardless of the fact that the search yielded contraband, the mere act of looking from side to side while holding
ones abdomen,[79] or of standing on a corner with ones eyes moving very fast, looking at every person who came near, [80] does not justify a warrantless arrest under said Section
5 (a).Neither does putting something in ones pocket,[81] handing over ones baggage,[82] riding a motorcycle,[83] nor does holding a bag on board a trisikad[84]sanction State
intrusion. The same rule applies to crossing the street per se.[85]
Personal knowledge was also required in the case of People v. Doria.[86] Recently, in People v. Binad Sy Chua,[87] this Court declared invalid the arrest of the accused, who was
walking towards a hotel clutching a sealed Zest-O juice box. For the exception in Section 5 (a), Rule 113 to apply, this Court ruled, two elements must concur: (1) the person to be
arrested must execute an overt act indicating he has just committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit a crime; and (2) such overt act is done in the presence or
within the view of the arresting officer. Reliable information alone is insufficient.
In the following cases, the search was held to be incidental to a lawful arrest because of suspicious circumstances: People v. Tangliben[88] (accused was acting
suspiciously), People v. Malmstedt[89] (a bulge on the accuseds waist), and People v. de Guzman[90] (likewise a bulge on the waist of the accused, who was wearing tight-fitting
clothes).
There is, however, another set of jurisprudence that deems reliable information sufficient to justify a search incident to a warrantless arrest under Section 5 (a), Rule 113,
thus deviating from Burgos. To this class of cases belong People v. Maspil, Jr.,[91] People v. Bagista,[92] People v. Balingan,[93] People v. Lising,[94] People v. Montilla,[95] People v.
Valdez,[96]and People v. Gonzales.[97] In these cases, the arresting authorities were acting on information regarding an offense but there were no overt acts or suspicious
circumstances that would indicate that the accused has committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit the same. Significantly, these cases, except the last two,
come under some other exception to the rule against warrantless searches. Thus, Maspil, Jr. involved a checkpoint search, Balingan was a search of a moving vehicle, Bagista was
both, and Lising and Montilla were consented searches.
Nevertheless, the great majority of cases conforms to the rule in Burgos, which, in turn, more faithfully adheres to the letter of Section 5(a), Rule 113. Note the phrase in his
presence therein, connoting personal knowledge on the part of the arresting officer. The right of the accused to be secure against any unreasonable searches on and seizure of his
own body and any deprivation of his liberty being a most basic and fundamental one, the statute or rule that allows exception to the requirement of a warrant of arrest is strictly
construed. Its application cannot be extended beyond the cases specifically provided by law. [98]
The cases invoked by the RTC and the OSG are, therefore, gravely misplaced. In Claudio,[99] the accused, who was seated aboard a bus in front of the arresting officer, put her
bag behind the latter, thus arousing the latters suspicion. In Tangliben and Malmstedt, the accused had also acted suspiciously.
As noted earlier, Maspil, Jr., Bagista and Montilla were justified by other exceptions to the rule against warrantless searches. Montilla, moreover, was not without its
critics. There, majority of the Court held:

Appellant insists that the mere fact of seeing a person carrying a traveling bag and a carton box should not elicit the slightest suspicion of the commission of any crime since that
is normal. But precisely, it is in the ordinary nature of things that drugs being illegally transported are necessarily hidden in containers and concealed from view. Thus, the
officers could reasonably assume, and not merely on a hollow suspicion since the informant was by their side and had so informed them, that the drugs were in appellants
luggage. It would obviously have been irresponsible, if now downright absurd under the circumstances, to require the constable to adopt a wait and see attitude at the risk of
eventually losing the quarry.

Here, there were sufficient facts antecedent to the search and seizure that, at the point prior to the search were already constitutive of probable cause, and which by
themselves could properly create in the minds of the officers a well-grounded and reasonable belief that appellant was in the act of violating the law. The search yielded
affirmance both of that probable cause and the actuality that appellant was then actually committing a crime by illegally transporting prohibited drugs. With these attendant
facts, it is ineluctable that appellant was caught in flagrante delicto, hence his arrest and the search of his belongings without the requisite warrant were both justified. [100]
While concurring with the majority, Mr. Justice Vitug reserved his vote on the discussion on the warrantless search being incidental to a lawful arrest. Mr. Justice Panganiban,
joined by Messrs. Justices Melo and Puno, filed a Separate Opinion.
Although likewise concurring in the majoritys ruling that appellant consented to the inspection of his baggage, Justice Panganiban disagreed with the conclusion that the
warrantless search was incidental to a lawful arrest. He argued that jurisprudence required personal knowledge on the part of the officers making the in flagrante
delicto arrest. In Montilla, the appellant did not exhibit any overt act or strange conduct that would reasonably arouse in their minds suspicion that he was embarking on some
felonious enterprise.

Law and jurisprudence in fact require stricter grounds for valid arrests and searches without warrant than for the issuance of warrants therefore. In the former, the arresting
person must have actually witnessed the crime being committed or attempted by the person sought to be arrested; or he must have personal knowledge of facts indicating that
the person to be arrested perpetrated the crime that had just occurred. In the latter case, the judge simply determines personally from testimonies of witnesses that there exists
reasonable grounds to believe that a crime was committed by the accused.

To say that reliable tips constitute probable cause for a warrantless arrest or search is in my opinion, a dangerous precedent and places in great jeopardy the doctrines laid down
in many decisions made by this Court, in its effort to zealously guard and protect the sacred constitutional right against unreasonable arrests, searches and seizures. Everyone
would be practically at the mercy of so-called informants, reminiscent of the makapilis during the Japanese occupation. Any one whom they point out to a police officer as a
possible violator of the law could then be subject to search and possible arrest. This is placing limitless power upon informants who will no longer be required to affirm under
oath their accusations, for they can always delay their giving of tips in order to justify warrantless arrests and searches. Even law enforcers can use this as an oppressive tool to
conduct searches without warrants, for they can always claim that they received raw intelligence information only on the day or afternoon before. This would clearly be a
circumvention of the legal requisites for validly effecting an arrest or conducting a search and seizure. Indeed the majoritys ruling would open loopholes that would allow
unreasonable arrests, searches and seizures.[101]
Montilla would shortly find mention in Justice Panganibans concurring opinion in People v. Doria, supra, where this Court ruled:

Accused-Appellant Gaddao was arrested solely on the basis of the alleged identification made by her co-accused. PO3 Manlangit, however, declared in his direct examination
that appellant Doria named his co-accused in response to his (PO3 Manlangits) query as to where the marked money was. Appellant Doria did not point to appellant Gaddao as
his associate in the drug business, but as the person with whom he left the marked bills. This identification does not necessarily lead to the conclusion that appellant Gaddao
conspired with her co-accused in pushing drugs. Appellant Doria may have left the money in her house, with or without any conspiracy. Save for accused-appellant Dorias word,
the Narcom agents had no showing that the person who affected the warantless arrest had, in his own right, knowledge of facts implicating the person arrested to the
perpetration of a criminal offense, the arrest is legally objectionable. [102] [Italics in the original.]
Expressing his accord with Mr. Justice Punos ponencia, Justice Panganiban said that Doria rightfully brings the Court back to well-settled doctrines on warrantless arrests and
searches, which have seemingly been modified through an obiter in People v. Ruben Montilla.[103]
Montilla, therefore, has been seemingly discredited insofar as it sanctions searches incidental to lawful arrest under similar circumstances. At any rate, Montilla was a
consented search. As will be demonstrated later, the same could not be said of this case.
That leaves the prosecution with People v. Valdez, which, however, involved an on-the-spot information. The urgency of the circumstances, an element not present in this
case, prevented the arresting officer therein from obtaining a warrant.
Appellants in this case were neither performing any overt act or acting in a suspicious manner that would hint that a crime has been, was being, or was about to be,
committed. If the arresting officers testimonies are to be believed, appellants were merely helping each other carry a carton box. Although appellant Tudtud did appear afraid and
perspiring,[104]pale[105] and trembling,[106] this was only after, not before, he was asked to open the said box.
In no sense can the knowledge of the herein arresting officers that appellant Tudtud was in possession of marijuana be described as personal, having learned the same only
from their informant Solier. Solier, for his part, testified that he obtained his information only from his neighbors and the friends of appellant Tudtud:
Q What was your basis in your report to the police that Tudtud is going to Cotabato and get stocks of marijuana?
 A Because of the protest of my neighbors who were saying who will be the person whou [sic] would point to him because he had been giving trouble to the
neighborhood because according to them there are [sic] proliferation of marijuana in our place. That was the complained [sic] of our neighbors.
Q Insofar as the accused Tudtud is concerned what was your basis in reporting him particularly?
A His friends were the once who told me about it.
Q For how long have you know [sic] this fact of alleged activity of Tudtud in proliferation of marijuana?
A About a month.
.
Q Regarding the report that Tudtud went to Cotabato to get stocks of marijuana which led to his apprehension sometime in the evening of August 1 and according to
the report [which] is based on your report my question is, how did you know that Tudtud will be bringing along with him marijuana stocks on August 1, 1999?
.
A Because of the information of his neighbor.[107]
In other words, Soliers information itself is hearsay. He did not even elaborate on how his neighbors or Tudtuds friends acquired their information that Tudtud was responsible
for the proliferation of drugs in their neighborhood.
Indeed, it appears that PO1 Floreta himself doubted the reliablility of their informant. He testified on cross-examination:
Q You mean to say that Bobot Solier, is not reliable?
A He is trustworthy.
Q Why [did] you not consider his information not reliable if he is reliable?
A (witness did not answer).
ATTY. CAETE:
Never mind, do not answer anymore. Thats all.[108]
The prosecution, on re-direct examination, did not attempt to extract any explanation from PO1 Floreta for his telling silence.
Confronted with such a dubious informant, the police perhaps felt it necessary to conduct their own surveillance. This surveillance, it turns out, did not actually consist of
staking out appellant Tudtud to catch him in the act of plying his illegal trade, but of a mere gather[ing] of information from the assets there.[109] The police officers who conducted
such surveillance did not identify who these assets were or the basis of the latters information. Clearly, such information is also hearsay, not of personal knowledge.
Neither were the arresting officers impelled by any urgency that would allow them to do away with the requisite warrant, PO1 Desiertos assertions of lack of
time[110]notwithstanding. Records show that the police had ample opportunity to apply for a warrant, having received Soliers information at around 9:00 in the morning; Tudtud,
however, was expected to arrive at around 6:00 in the evening of the same day. [111] In People v. Encinada, supra, the Court ruled that there was sufficient time to procure a warrant
where the police officers received at 4:00 in the afternoon an intelligence report that the accused, who was supposedly carrying marijuana, would arrive the next morning at 7:00
a.m.:

Even if the information was received by Bolonia about 4:00 p.m. of May 20, 1992 at his house, there was sufficient time to secure a warrant of arrest, as the M/V Sweet Pearl
was not expected to dock until 7:00 a.m. the following day. Administrative Circular No. 13 allows application for search warrants even after office hours:
3. Raffling shall be strictly enforced, except only in case where an application for search warrant may be filed directly with any judge whose jurisdiction the place to be searched
is located, after office hours, or during Saturdays, Sundays, and legal holidays, in which case the applicant is required to certify under oath the urgency of the issuance thereof
after office hours, or during Saturdays, Sundays and legal holidays; . . ..

The same procedural dispatch finds validation and reiteration in Circular No. 19, series of 1987, entitled Amended Guidelines and Procedures on Application for search warrants
for Illegal Possession of Firearms and Other Serious Crimes Filed in Metro Manila Courts and Other Courts with Multiple Salas:

This Court has received reports of delay while awaiting raffle, in acting on applications for search warrants in the campaign against loose firearms and other serious crimes
affecting peace and order.There is a need for prompt action on such applications for search warrant. Accordingly, these amended guidelines in the issuance of a search warrant
are issued:

1. All applications for search warrants relating to violation of the Anti-subversion Act, crimes against public order as defined in the Revised Penal Code, as amended, illegal
possession of firearms and/or ammunition and violations of the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972, as amended, shall no longer be raffled and shall immediately be taken cognizance
of and acted upon by the Executive Judge of the Regional Trial Court, Metropolitan Trial Court, and Municipal Trial Court under whose jurisdiction the place to be searched is
located.

2. In the absence of the Executive Judge, the Vice-Executive Judge shall take cognizance of and personally act on the same. In the absence of the Executive Judge or Vice-
Executive Judge, the application may be taken cognizance of and acted upon by any judge of the Court where application is filed.

3. Applications filed after office hours, during Saturdays, Sundays and holidays, shall likewise be taken cognizance of and acted upon by any judge of the Court having jurisdiction
of the place to be searched, but in such cases the applicant shall certify and state the facts under oath, to the satisfaction of the judge, that its issuance is urgent.

4. Any judge acting on such application shall immediately and without delay personally conduct the examination of the applicant and his witnesses to prevent the possible
leakage of information. He shall observe the procedures, safeguards, and guidelines for the issuance of search warrants provided for in this Courts Administrative Circular No.
13, dated October 1, 1985.[112] [Italics in the original.]
Given that the police had adequate time to obtain the warrant, PO1 Floretas testimony that the real reason for their omission was their belief that they lacked sufficient basis
to obtain the same assumes greater significance. This was PO1 Floretas familiar refrain:
Q When Solier reported to you that fact, that Tudtud will be coming from Cotabato to get that (sic) stocks, you did not go to court to get a search warrant on the basis
of the report of Bobot Solier?
A No.
Q Why?
A Because we have no real basis to secure the search warrant.
Q When you have no real basis to secure a search warrant, you have also no real basis to search Tudtud and Bulong at that time?
A Yes, sir.
.
Q And Bobot Solier told you that Tudtud, that he would already bring marijuana?
A Yes, sir.
 Q And this was 9:00 a.m.?
A Yes, sir.
Q The arrival of Tudtud was expected at 6:00 p.m.?
A Yes, sir.
Q Toril is just 16 kilometers from Davao City?
A Yes, sir.
Q And the Office of the Regional Trial Court is only about 16 kilometers, is that correct?
A Yes, sir.
Q And it can be negotiated by thirty minutes by a jeep ride?
A Yes, sir.
Q And you can asked [sic] the assistance of any prosecutor to apply for the search warrant or the prosecutor do [sic] not assist?
A They help.
Q But you did not come to Davao City, to asked [sic] for a search warrant?
A As I said, we do not have sufficient basis.[113]
It may be conceded that the mere subjective conclusions of a police officer concerning the existence of probable cause is not binding on [the courts] which must independently
scrutinize the objective facts to determine the existence of probable cause and that a court may also find probable cause in spite of an officers judgment that none
exists.[114] However, the fact that the arresting officers felt that they did not have sufficient basis to obtain a warrant, despite their own information-gathering efforts, raises serious
questions whether such surveillance actually yielded any pertinent information and even whether they actually conducted any information-gathering at all, thereby eroding any
claim to personal knowledge.
Finally, there is an effective waiver of rights against unreasonable searches and seizures if the following requisites are present:
1. It must appear that the rights exist;
2. The person involved had knowledge, actual or constructive, of the existence of such right;
3. Said person had an actual intention to relinquish the right. [115]
Here, the prosecution failed to establish the second and third requisites. Records disclose that when the police officers introduced themselves as such and requested appellant
that they see the contents of the carton box supposedly containing the marijuana, appellant Tudtud said it was alright. He did not resist and opened the box himself.
The fundamental law and jurisprudence require more than the presence of these circumstances to constitute a valid waiver of the constitutional right against unreasonable
searches and seizures. Courts indulge every reasonable presumption against waiver of fundamental constitutional rights; acquiescence in the loss of fundamental rights is not to
be presumed.[116] The fact that a person failed to object to a search does not amount to permission thereto.

. As the constitutional guaranty is not dependent upon any affirmative act of the citizen, the courts do not place the citizen in the position of either contesting an officers
authority by force, or waiving his constitutional rights; but instead they hold that a peaceful submission to a search or seizure is not a consent or an invitation thereto, but is
merely a demonstration of regard for the supremacy of the law.[117] [Underscoring supplied.]
 Thus, even in cases where the accused voluntarily handed her bag[118] or the chairs[119] containing marijuana to the arresting officer, this Court held there was no valid consent
to the search.
On the other hand, because a warrantless search is in derogation of a constitutional right, peace officers who conduct it cannot invoke regularity in the performance of official
functions and shift to the accused the burden of proving that the search was unconsented. [120]
In any case, any presumption in favor of regularity would be severely diminished by the allegation of appellants in this case that the arresting officers pointed a gun at them
before asking them to open the subject box. Appellant Tudtud testified as follows:
Q This person who approached you according to you pointed something at you[.] [What] was that something?
A A 38 cal. Revolver.
Q How did he point it at you?
A Like this (Witness demonstrating as if pointing with his two arms holding something towards somebody).
Q This man[,] what did he tell you when he pointed a gun at you?
A He said do not run.
Q What did you do?
A I raised my hands and said Sir, what is this about?
Q Why did you call him Sir?
A I was afraid because when somebody is holding a gun, I am afraid.
Q Precisely, why did you address him as Sir?
A Because he was holding a gun and I believed that somebody who is carrying a gun is a policeman.
Q When you asked him what is this? What did he say?
A He said I would like to inspect what you are carrying.[]
Q What did you say when you were asked to open that carton box?
A I told him that is not mine.
Q What did this man say?
A He again pointed to me his revolver and again said to open.
Q What did you do?
A So I proceeded to open for fear of being shot.[121]
Appellants implied acquiescence, if at all, could not have been more than mere passive conformity given under coercive or intimidating circumstances and is, thus, considered
no consent at all within the purview of the constitutional guarantee. [122] Consequently, appellants lack of objection to the search and seizure is not tantamount to a waiver of his
constitutional right or a voluntary submission to the warrantless search and seizure. [123]
 As the search of appellants box does not come under the recognized exceptions to a valid warrantless search, the marijuana leaves obtained thereby are inadmissible in
evidence. And as there is no evidence other than the hearsay testimony of the arresting officers and their informant, the conviction of appellants cannot be sustained.
The Bill of Rights is the bedrock of constitutional government. If people are stripped naked of their rights as human beings, democracy cannot survive and government
becomes meaningless. This explains why the Bill of Rights, contained as it is in Article III of the Constitution, occupies a position of primacy in the fundamental law way above the
articles on governmental power.[124]
The right against unreasonable search and seizure in turn is at the top of the hierarchy of rights, [125] next only to, if not on the same plane as, the right to life, liberty and
property, which is protected by the due process clause.[126] This is as it should be for, as stressed by a couple of noted freedom advocates,[127] the right to personal security which,
along with the right to privacy, is the foundation of the right against unreasonable search and seizure includes the right to exist, and the right to enjoyment of life while existing.
Emphasizing such right, this Court declared in People v. Aruta:

Unreasonable searches and seizures are the menace against which the constitutional guarantees afford full protection. While the power to search and seize may at times be
necessary to the public welfare, still it may be exercised and the law enforced without transgressing the constitutional rights of the citizens, for the enforcement of no statute is
of sufficient importance to justify indifference to the basic principles of government.

Those who are supposed to enforce the law are not justified in disregarding the rights of the individual in the name of order. Order is too high a price to pay for the loss of
liberty. As Justice Holmes declared: I think it is less evil that some criminals escape than that the government should play an ignoble part. It is simply not allowed in free society
to violate a law to enforce another, especially if the law violated is the Constitution itself.[128]
Thus, given a choice between letting suspected criminals escape or letting the government play an ignoble part, the answer, to this Court, is clear and ineluctable.
WHEREFORE, the Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Davao City is REVERSED. Appellants Noel Tudtud y Paypa and Dindo Bolong y Naret are hereby ACQUITTED for
insufficiency of evidence. The Director of the Bureau of Prisons is ordered to cause the immediate release of appellants from confinement, unless they are being held for some
other lawful cause, and to report to this Court compliance herewith within five (5) days from receipt hereof.
SO ORDERED.
Bellosillo, (Chairman), Austria-Martinez, and Callejo, Sr., JJ., concur.
Quisumbing, J., please see dissenting opinion.

[1] [14]
277 U.S. 438, 470 (1927); 72 L. Ed. 944. Id., at 9.
[2] [15]
TSN, 15 November 1999, p. 5. Ibid.
[3] [16]
TSN, 28 January 2000, p. 3. TSN, 15 November 1999, p. 11.
[4] [17]
Also appears SPO2 Villalongja in the Records. Ibid.; TSN, 16 November 1999, p. 10.
[5] [18]
TSN, 15 November 1999, p. 7; TSN, 16 November 1999. TSN, 16 November 1999, p. 10.
[6] [19]
Id., at 7-8. TSN, 15 November 1999, p. 11; TSN, 16 November 1999, pp. 10-11.
[7] [20]
Id., at 8; TSN, 16 November 1999, p. 6. Ibid.; id., at 11.
[8] [21]
Ibid; id., at 7. Ibid.; ibid.
[9] [22]
Ibid; id., at 8-9. Exhibit B.
[10] [23]
TSN, 15 November 1999, p. 9; id., at 7. TSN, 15 November 1999, pp. 11-12; TSN, 16 November 1999, p. 12.
[11] [24]
Ibid. TSN, 16 November 1999, p. 13.
[12] [25]
Exhibit A. TSN, 15 November 1999, p. 12; TSN, 16 November 1999, p. 13.
[13] [26]
TSN, 15 November 1999, pp. 9-10. Id., at 13; id., at 14.
[27]
Ibid. amended by Republic Act 7659, Sec. 20[,] Art. 4, without any aggravating
[28]
TSN, 15 November 1999, pp. 13-14; TSN, 16 November 1999, p. 14. nor mitigating circumstances attendant in the commission of the offense
[29]
TSN, 12 November 1999, pp. 6-7. charged, both above-named accused, Noel Tudtud [y] Paypa and Dindo
[30]
Exhibit E. Bolong [y] Naret, are sentenced to suffer an [sic] imprisonment of reclusion
[31]
The Information (Records, p. 1) against the accused reads: perpetua, together with all accessory penalty [sic] as provided for by law
That on or about August 1, 1999, in the City of Davao, Philippines, and within the and to pay a fine of P500,000.00 in favor of the government.
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-mentioned accused, The confiscated subject marijuana dried leaves, placed in a carton box with brand
conspiring, confederating together and helping one another, willfully, name King Flakes marked Exh. A and B for the prosecution, are ordered
unlawfully and feloniously had in their possession two (2) packages of confiscated in favor of the government, and are turn-over [sic] to the Office
Marijuana leaves and stems with leaves, weighing 890 grams and 3.2 kgs. of the Narcotics Command, Davao City, for its immediate destruction
more or less, respectively, which are prohibited drugs. through burning, as the circumstances, will warrant.
Contrary to law. SO ORDERED.
[32] [61]
Rep. Act No. 6425 (1972), sec. 8. People v. Barros, G.R. No. 90640, 29 March 1994, 231 SCRA 557.
[33] [62]
TSN, 29 October 1999, p. 2; Records, pp. 17-18. People v. Bolasa, 378 Phil. 1073, 1078-1079 (1999).
[34] [63]
Ibid. G.R. No. L-72564, 15 April 1988, 160 SCRA 646 (1988).
[35] [64]
TSN, 4 February 2000, p. 2. G.R. No. 63630, 6 April 1990, 184 SCRA 220 (1990).
[36] [65]
Ibid. G.R. No. 123872, 30 January 1998, 285 SCRA 703 (1998).
[37] [66]
TSN, 4 February 2000, pp. 2-3. 363 Phil. 481 (1999).
[38] [67]
Id., at 4. G.R. No. 85177, 20 August 1990, 188 SCRA 751 (1990).
[39] [68]
Ibid. G.R. No. 91107, 19 June 1991, 198 SCRA 401 (1991).
[40] [69]
Ibid. G.R. No. 86218, 12 September 1992, 214 SCRA 63 (1992).
[41] [70]
Ibid. Now Section 13, as amended.
[42] [71]
TSN, 4 February 2000, pp. 5-10. People v. Chua Ho San, 367 Phil. 703 (1999), citing Malacat v. Court of Appeals,
[43]
Id., at 10. 347 Phil. 462 (1997).
[44] [72]
Id., at 5. 68 Am Jur 2d, Search and Seizure 114.
[45] [73]
Id., at 5, 10. People v. Molina, G.R. No. 133917, 19 February 2001, 352 SCRA 174.
[46] [74]
Id., at 5, 10. 228 Phil. 1 (1986).
[47] [75]
Id., at 5, 10. Id., at 15.
[48] [76]
Id., at 5, 10. Ibid.
[49] [77]
Id., at 5. G.R. No. L-74869, 6 July 1988, 163 SCRA 402 (1988). Grio-Aquino, J., dissented.
[50] [78]
TSN, 8 February 2000, p. 4. Id., at 409-410.
[51] [79]
Id., at 5. People v. Mengote, G.R. No. 87059, 22 June 1992, 210 SCRA 174 (1992).
[52] [80]
Ibid. Malacat v. Court of Appeals, 347 Phil. 462 (1997).
[53] [81]
Ibid. People v. Rodriguez, G.R. No. 79965, 25 May 1994, 232 SCRA 498 (1994).
[54] [82]
TSN, 8 February 2000, p. 15. People v. Cuizon, 326 Phil. 345 (1996).
[55] [83]
Id., at 7, 14. People v. Encinada, 345 Phil. 301(1997).
[56] [84]
Id., at 19-21. People v. Molina, supra, note 72.
[57] [85]
Id., at 23. People v. Aruta, 351 Phil. 868 (1998).
[58] [86]
Id., at 26-27. 361 Phil. 595 (1999).
[59] [87]
TSN, 4 February 2000, pp. 6-7. G.R. Nos. 136066-67, 4 February 2003.
[60] [88]
Records, p. 148. The dispositive portion of the Decision dated 8 March 2000 reads: G.R. No. 63630, 6 April 1990, 184 SCRA 220.
[89]
WHEREFORE, finding the evidence of prosecution more than sufficient to prove the Supra, note 68. Fernan, C.J., Narvasa, Cruz, Gutierrez and Gancayco, JJ., dissented.
[90]
guilt of both accused of the offense charged beyond reasonable doubt, G.R. Nos. 117952-53, 14 February 2001, 351 SCRA 573. In De Guzman, however,
pursuant to the provision of Sec. 8[,] Art. 11 of the Republic Act 6575, as the narration of facts do not indicate how the arresting officer learned that
 [111]
the accused was engaged in the sale of drugs, whether from personal TSN, 16 November 1999, p. 17.
[112]
knowledge or through an informant. People v. Encinada, supra, note 83, at 319-321.
[91] [113]
Supra, note 67. Id., at 17, 28. Underscoring supplied.
[92] [114]
Supra, note 69. United States ex rel. Senk v. Brierly, 381 F.Supp. 447, 463 (1974).
[93] [115]
311 Phil. 290 (1995). Padilla, J., dissented, People v. Burgos, supra; note 74; People v. Salangga, supra; note 98;
People v. Aruta, supra, note 85.
[94] [116]
341 Phil. 801 (1997). Ibid.; ibid.; ibid.
[95] [117]
Supra, note 65. Ibid.; People v. Aruta, supra, note 85.
[96] [118]
Supra, note 66. People v. Aruta, supra, note 85.
[97] [119]
417 Phil. 342 (2001). People v. Encinada, supra, note 83.
[98] [120]
People v. Salangga, G.R. No. 100910, 25 July 1994, 234 SCRA 407. People v. Cubcubin, 413 Phil. 249 (2001). See also People v. Salanguit, G.R. No.
[99]
Claudio involved information provided by the arresting office himself and, hence, 133254-55, 19 April 2001, 356 SCRA 683 (2001); People v. Encinada, supra,
is not included in the above survey of cases. note 83.
[100] [121]
People v. Montilla, supra, note 65, at 721-722. TSN, February 4, 2000, pp. 4-5. See also Id., at 8, and TSN, 8 February 2000, p. 5.
[101] [122]
Id., at 733-734. People v. Compacion, 414 Phil. 68 (2001).
[102] [123]
People v. Doria, supra, note 86, at 632-633. Ibid.
[103] [124]
Id., at 642-643. C.f. Constitution, Arts. VI (Legislative Department), VII (Executive Department),
[104]
TSN, 16 November 1999, p. 18. VIII (Judicial Department), IX (Constitutional Commissions) and X (Local
[105]
Id., at 24. Government).
[106] [125]
Ibid. See CONST., art. III, sec. 2.
[107] [126]
TSN, 28 January 2000, p. 3. Id., sec. 1.
[108] [127]
TSN, 16 November 1999, p. 29. Underscoring supplied. D. SANDIFER AND L. SCHEMAN, THE FOUNDATION OF FREEDOM 44-45 (1966).
[109] [128]
TSN, 15 November 1999, p. 7. People v. Aruta, supra, note 85, at 895.
[110]
Id., at 14.

[G.R. No. 122906. February 7, 2002]

DINAH B. TONOG, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and EDGAR V. DAGUIMOL, respondents.

DECISION
DE LEON, JR., J.:
Before us is a petition for review on certiorari seeking the reversal of two (2) Resolutions dated August 29, 1995 and November 29, 1995 issued by the former Second
Division[1] of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 35971. The first resolution modified the appellate courts decision promulgated in the said case, and granted custody of the
minor, Gardin Faith Belarde Tonog, to private respondent. The second resolution denied petitioners motion for reconsideration.
The pertinent facts are:
On September 23, 1989, petitioner Dinah B. Tonog gave birth[2] to Gardin Faith Belarde Tonog, her illegitimate daughter with private respondent Edgar V. Daguimol. Petitioner
was then a nursing student while private respondent was a licensed physician. They cohabited for a time and lived with private respondents parents and sister in the latters house
in Quezon City where the infant, Gardin Faith, was a welcome addition to the family.
 A year after the birth of Gardin Faith, petitioner left for the United States of America where she found work as a registered nurse. Gardin Faith was left in the care of her
father (private respondent herein) and paternal grandparents.
On January 10, 1992, private respondent filed a petition for guardianship over Gardin Faith, docketed as Sp. Proc. No. Q-92-11053, in the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City.
On March 9, 1992, the trial court rendered judgment appointing private respondent as legal guardian of the minor, Gardin Faith.
Petitioner avers that she learned of the judgment of the trial court rendered in Sp. Proc. No. Q-92-11053 only on April 1, 1992. Accordingly, on May 27, 1992, she filed a
petition for relief from judgment. In a resolution dated September 15, 1992, the trial court set aside its original judgment and allowed petitioner to file her opposition to private
respondents petition.The latter, in turn, filed a motion for reconsideration. In a related incident, petitioner filed on October 4, 1993, a motion to remand custody of Gardin Faith
to her.
On November 18, 1994, the trial court issued a resolution denying private respondents motion for reconsideration and granting petitioners motion for custody of their child,
Gardin. Petitioner moved for immediate execution of the said resolution.
Due to the adverse turn of events, private respondent filed a petition for certiorari before the Court of Appeals, docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 35971, questioning the actuations
of the trial court. On March 21, 1995, the appellate court dismissed the petition on the ground of lack of merit. However, after private respondent filed a motion for
reconsideration, the appellate court issued a Resolution[3] dated August 29, 1995 modifying its decision, as follows:

Although We do find the Petition dismissible, insofar as it assails the September 15, 1993 Resolution of the respondent Court, giving due course to private respondents Petition
for Relief from Judgment, and the November 18, 1995 Resolution denying his Motion for Reconsideration, We discern a good ground to let physical custody of subject child,
Gardin Faith Belarde Tonog, continue under the petitioner, with whom the said child had been living, since birth.

While it is understandable for private respondent, as mother, to assert and seek enforcement of her legal and natural rights as the natural guardian of her child, the emotional
and psychological effects upon the latter of a change in custody should be considered. To be sure, transfer of custody of the child from petitioner to private respondent will be
painful for the child who, all her life, has been in the company of petitioner and her paternal grandparents.

Now, inasmuch as the issue of guardianship and custody over the same child is still pending determination before the respondent Court, the possibility of petitioners
appointment as the guardian cannot be discounted. It would certainly wreak havoc on the childs psychological make-up to give her to the custody of private respondent, only to
return her to petitioner should the latter prevail in the main case. Subjecting the child to emotional seesaw should be avoided. It is thus more prudent to let physical custody of
the child in question be with petitioner until the matter of her custody shall have been determined by final judgment.

WHEREFORE, the Decision, promulgated here on March 21, 1995 is accordingly MODIFIED, and status quo with respect to the physical custody of the child, Gardin Faith Belarde
Tonog, is ordered.It is understood that the latter shall remain with petitioner until otherwise adjudged.
Petitioner thus interposed the instant appeal after the appellate court denied her motion for reconsideration in its Resolution [4] dated November 29, 1995.
Petitioner contends that she is entitled to the custody of the minor, Gardin Faith, as a matter of law. First, as the mother of Gardin Faith, the law confers parental authority
upon her as the mother of the illegitimate minor. Second, Gardin Faith cannot be separated from her since she had not, as of then, attained the age of seven. Employing simple
arithmetic however, it appears that Gardin Faith is now twelve years old.
In custody disputes, it is axiomatic that the paramount criterion is the welfare and well-being of the child.[5] In arriving at its decision as to whom custody of the minor should
be given, the court must take into account the respective resources and social and moral situations of the contending parents.[6]
In turn, the parents right to custody over their children is enshrined in law. Article 220 of the Family Code thus provides that parents and individuals exercising parental
authority over their unemancipated children are entitled, among other rights, to keep them in their company. In legal contemplation, the true nature of the parent-child
relationship encompasses much more than the implication of ascendancy of one and obedience by the other. We explained this in Santos, Sr. v. Court of Appeals: [7]
The right of custody accorded to parents springs from the exercise of parental authority. Parental authority or patria potestas in Roman Law is the juridical institution whereby
parents rightfully assume control and protection of their unemancipated children to the extent required by the latters needs. It is a mass of rights and obligations which the law
grants to parents for the purpose of the childrens physical preservation and development, as well as the cultivation of their intellect and the education of their heart and
senses. As regards parental authority, there is no power, but a task; no complex of rights, but a sum of duties; no sovereignty but a sacred trust for the welfare of the minor.

Parental authority and responsibility are inalienable and may not be transferred or renounced except in cases authorized by law. The right attached to parental authority, being
purely personal, the law allows a waiver of parental authority only in cases of adoption, guardianship and surrender to a childrens home or an orphan institution. When a parent
entrusts the custody of a minor to another, such as a friend or godfather, even in a document, what is given is merely temporary custody and it does not constitute a
renunciation of parental authority. Even if a definite renunciation is manifest, the law still disallows the same.
Statute sets certain rules to assist the court in making an informed decision. Insofar as illegitimate children are concerned, Article 176 of the Family Code provides that
illegitimate children shall be under the parental authority of their mother. Likewise, Article 213 of the Family Code provides that [n]o child under seven years of age shall be
separated from the mother, unless the court finds compelling reasons to order otherwise. It will be observed that in both provisions, a strong bias is created in favor of the
mother. This is specially evident in Article 213 where it may be said that the law presumes that the mother is the best custodian. As explained by the Code Commission:

The general rule is recommended in order to avoid many a tragedy where a mother has seen her baby torn away from her. No man can sound the deep sorrows of a mother
who is deprived of her child of tender age. The exception allowed by the rule has to be for compelling reasons for the good of the child; those cases must indeed be rare, if the
mothers heart is not to be unduly hurt. If she has erred, as in cases of adultery, the penalty of imprisonment and the divorce decree (relative divorce) will ordinarily be sufficient
punishment for her. Moreover, moral dereliction will not have any effect upon the baby who is as yet unable to understand her situation. [8]
This is not intended, however, to denigrate the important role fathers play in the upbringing of their children. Indeed, we have recognized that both parents complement each
other in giving nurture and providing that holistic care which takes into account the physical, emotional, psychological, mental, social and spiritual needs of the child.[9] Neither
does the law nor jurisprudence intend to downplay a fathers sense of loss when he is separated from his child:

While the bonds between a mother and her small child are special in nature, either parent, whether father or mother, is bound to suffer agony and pain if deprived of
custody. One cannot say that his or her suffering is greater than that of the other parent. It is not so much the suffering, pride, and other feelings of either parent but the welfare
of the child which is the paramount consideration.[10]
For these reasons, even a mother may be deprived of the custody of her child who is below seven years of age for compelling reasons. Instances of unsuitability are neglect,
abandonment, unemployment and immorality, habitual drunkenness, drug addiction, maltreatment of the child, insanity, and affliction with a communicable illness.[11] If older
than seven years of age, a child is allowed to state his preference, but the court is not bound by that choice. The court may exercise its discretion by disregarding the childs
preference should the parent chosen be found to be unfit, in which instance, custody may be given to the other parent, or even to a third person. [12]
In the case at bar, we are being asked to rule on the temporary custody of the minor, Gardin Faith, since it appears that the proceedings for guardianship before the trial
court have not been terminated, and no pronouncement has been made as to who should have final custody of the minor. Bearing in mind that the welfare of the said minor as
the controlling factor, we find that the appellate court did not err in allowing her father (private respondent herein) to retain in the meantime parental custody over
her. Meanwhile, the child should not be wrenched from her familiar surroundings, and thrust into a strange environment away from the people and places to which she had
apparently formed an attachment.
Moreover, whether a mother is a fit parent for her child is a question of fact to be properly entertained in the special proceedings before the trial court. [13] It should be
recalled that in a petition for review on certiorari, we rule only on questions of law. We are not in the best position to assess the parties respective merits vis--vis their opposing
claims for custody.Yet another sound reason is that inasmuch as the age of the minor, Gardin Faith, has now exceeded the statutory bar of seven years, a fortiori, her preference
and opinion must first be sought in the choice of which parent should have the custody over her person.
A word of caution: our pronouncement here should not be interpreted to imply a preference toward the father (herein private respondent) relative to the final custody of
the minor, Gardin Faith. Nor should it be taken to mean as a statement against petitioners fitness to have final custody of her said minor daughter. It shall be only understood
that, for the present and until finally adjudged, temporary custody of the subject minor should remain with her father, the private respondent herein pending final judgment of
the trial court in Sp. Proc. No. Q-92-11053.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby DENIED. The trial court is directed to immediately proceed with hearing Sp. Proc. No. Q-92-11053 upon notice of this decision. No
pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
Bellosillo, (Chairman), Mendoza, and Buena, JJ., concur.
Quisumbing, J., abroad, on official leave.

[1] [7]
Justice Fidel P. Purisima, ponente; Justice Salome A. Montoya and Justice Godardo 242 SCRA 407, 411 (1995).
[8]
A. Jacinto, concurring. Report of the Code Commission, p. 12, as cited in A. Sempio-Diy, Handbook on the
[2]
Birth Certificate, Annex 9, Private Respondents Comment; Rollo, p. 73. Family Code of the Philippines 297 (1988).
[3] [9]
Rollo, pp. 30-32. Perez v. Court of Appeals, 255 SCRA 661, 665 (1996).
[4] [10]
Rollo, pp. 34-35. Espiritu v. Court of Appeals, 242 SCRA 362, 368 (1995).
[5] [11]
Silva v. Court of Appeals, 275 SCRA 604, 609 (1997); Cervantes v. Fajardo, 169 SCRA Perez v. Court of Appeals, supra, at 668.
[12]
575, 578 (1989). Espiritu v. Court of Appeals, supra, at 368.
[6] [13]
Unson III v. Navarro, 101 SCRA 183, 189 (1980). Cf. Hontiveros, Jr. v. Intermediate Appellate Court, 132 SCRA 745, 754 (1984).

FIRST DIVISION

G.R. No. L-45355 January 12, 1990

THE PROVINCE OF MISAMIS ORIENTAL, represented by its PROVINCIAL TREASURER, petitioner,

vs.
CAGAYAN ELECTRIC POWER AND LIGHT COMPANY, INC. (CEPALCO), respondent.

Jaime A. Chaves for petitioner.

Quiason, Makalintal, Barot & Torres for respondent.

GRIÑO-AQUINO, J.:

The issue in this case is a legal one: whether or not a corporation whose franchise expressly provides that the payment of the "franchise tax of three per centum of the gross
earnings shall be in lieu of all taxes and assessments of whatever authority upon privileges, earnings, income, franchise, and poles, wires, transformers, and insulators of the
grantee." (p. 20, Rollo), is exempt from paying a provincial franchise tax.

Cagayan Electric Power and Light Company, Inc. (CEPALCO for short) was granted a franchise on June 17, 1961 under Republic Act No. 3247 to install, operate and maintain an
electric light, heat and power system in the City of Cagayan de Oro and its suburbs. Said franchise was amended on June 21, 1963 by R.A. No. 3570 which added the
municipalities of Tagoloan and Opol to CEPALCO's sphere of operation, and was further amended on August 4, 1969 by R.A. No. 6020 which extended its field of operation to the
municipalities of Villanueva and Jasaan.

R.A. Nos. 3247, 3570 and 6020 uniformly provide that:

Sec. 3. In consideration of the franchise and rights hereby granted, the grantee shall pay a franchise tax equal to three per centum of the gross earnings for electric
current sold under this franchise, of which two per centum goes into the National Treasury and one per centum goes into the treasury of the Municipalities of Tagoloan,
Opol, Villanueva and Jasaan and Cagayan de Oro City, as the case may be: Provided, That the said franchise tax of three per centum of the gross earnings shall be in lieu
of all taxes and assessments of whatever authority upon privileges earnings, income, franchise, and poles, wires, transformers, and insulators of the grantee from which
taxes and assessments the grantee is hereby expressly exempted. (Emphasis supplied.)

On June 28, 1973, the Local Tax Code (P.D. No. 231) was promulgated, Section 9 of which provides:

Sec. 9. Franchise Tax.—Any provision of special laws to the contrary notwithstanding, the province may impose a tax on businesses enjoying franchise, based on the
gross receipts realized within its territorial jurisdiction, at the rate of not exceeding one-half of one per cent of the gross annual receipts for the preceding calendar
year.

In the case of newly started business, the rate shall not exceed three thousand pesos per year. Sixty per cent of the proceeds of the tax shall accrue to the general fund
of the province and forty per cent to the general fund of the municipalities serviced by the business on the basis of the gross annual receipts derived therefrom by the
franchise holder. In the case of a newly started business, forty per cent of the proceeds of the tax shall be divided equally among the municipalities serviced by the
business. (Emphasis supplied.)

Pursuant thereto, the Province of Misamis Oriental (herein petitioner) enacted Provincial Revenue Ordinance No. 19, whose Section 12 reads:

Sec. 12. Franchise Tax.—There shall be levied, collected and paid on businesses enjoying franchise tax of one-half of one per cent of their gross annual receipts for the
preceding calendar year realized within the territorial jurisdiction of the province of Misamis Oriental. (p. 27, Rollo.)

The Provincial Treasurer of Misamis Oriental demanded payment of the provincial franchise tax from CEPALCO. The company refused to pay, alleging that it is exempt from all
taxes except the franchise tax required by R.A. No. 6020. Nevertheless, in view of the opinion rendered by the Provincial Fiscal, upon CEPALCO's request, upholding the legality
of the Revenue Ordinance, CEPALCO paid under protest on May 27, 1974 the sum of P 4,276.28 and appealed the fiscal's ruling to the Secretary of Justice who reversed it and
ruled in favor of CEPALCO.

On June 26, 1976, the Secretary of Finance issued Local Tax Regulation No. 3-75 adopting entirely the opinion of the Secretary of Justice.

On February 16, 1976, the Province filed in the Court of First Instance of Misamis Oriental a complaint for declaratory relief praying, among others, that the Court exercise its
power to construe P.D. No. 231 in relation to the franchise of CEPALCO (R.A. No. 6020), and to declare the franchise as having been amended by P.D. No. 231. The Court
dismissed the complaint and ordered the Province to return to CEPALCO the sum of P4,276.28 paid under protest.

The Province has appealed to this Court, alleging that the lower court erred in holding that:

1) CEPALCO's tax exemption under Section 3 of Republic Act No. 6020 was not amended or repealed by P.D. No. 231;
2) the imposition of the provincial franchise tax on CEPALCO would subvert the purpose of P.D. No. 231;

3) CEPALCO is exempt from paying the provincial franchise tax; and

4) petitioner should refund CEPALCO's tax payment of P4,276.28.

We find no merit in the petition for review.

There is no provision in P.D. No. 231 expressly or impliedly amending or repealing Section 3 of R.A. No. 6020. The perceived repugnancy between the two statutes should be
very clear before the Court may hold that the prior one has been repealed by the later, since there is no express provision to that effect (Manila Railroad Co. vs. Rafferty, 40 Phil.
224). The rule is that a special and local statute applicable to a particular case is not repealed by a later statute which is general in its terms, provisions and application even if
the terms of the general act are broad enough to include the cases in the special law (id.) unless there is manifest intent to repeal or alter the special law.

Republic Acts Nos. 3247, 3570 and 6020 are special laws applicable only to CEPALCO, while P.D. No. 231 is a general tax law. The presumption is that the special statutes are
exceptions to the general law (P.D. No. 231) because they pertain to a special charter granted to meet a particular set of conditions and circumstances.

The franchise of respondent CEPALCO expressly exempts it from payment of "all taxes of whatever authority" except the three per centum (3%) tax on its gross earnings.

In an earlier case, the phrase "shall be in lieu of all taxes and at any time levied, established by, or collected by any authority" found in the franchise of the Visayan Electric
Company was held to exempt the company from payment of the 5% tax on corporate franchise provided in Section 259 of the Internal Revenue Code (Visayan Electric Co. vs.
David, 49 O.G. [No. 4] 1385).

Similarly, we ruled that the provision: "shall be in lieu of all taxes of every name and nature" in the franchise of the Manila Railroad (Subsection 12, Section 1, Act No. 1510)
exempts the Manila Railroad from payment of internal revenue tax for its importations of coal and oil under Act No. 2432 and the Amendatory Acts of the Philippine Legislature
(Manila Railroad vs. Rafferty, 40 Phil. 224).

The same phrase found in the franchise of the Philippine Railway Co. (Sec. 13, Act No. 1497) justified the exemption of the Philippine Railway Company from payment of the tax
on its corporate franchise under Section 259 of the Internal Revenue Code, as amended by R.A. No. 39 (Philippine Railway Co. vs. Collector of Internal Revenue, 91 Phil. 35).

Those magic words: "shall be in lieu of all taxes" also excused the Cotabato Light and Ice Plant Company from the payment of the tax imposed by Ordinance No. 7 of the City of
Cotabato (Cotabato Light and Power Co. vs. City of Cotabato, 32 SCRA 231).

So was the exemption upheld in favor of the Carcar Electric and Ice Plant Company when it was required to pay the corporate franchise tax under Section 259 of the Internal
Revenue Code, as amended by R.A. No. 39 (Carcar Electric & Ice Plant vs. Collector of Internal Revenue, 53 O.G. [No. 4] 1068). This Court pointed out that such exemption is part
of the inducement for the acceptance of the franchise and the rendition of public service by the grantee. As a charter is in the nature of a private contract, the imposition of
another franchise tax on the corporation by the local authority would constitute an impairment of the contract between the government and the corporation.

Recently, this Court ruled that the franchise (R.A. No. 3843) of the Lingayen Gulf Electric Power Company which provided that the company shall pay:

tax equal to 2% per annum of the gross receipts . . . and shall be in lieu of any and all taxes . . . now or in the future . . . from which taxes . . . the grantee is hereby
expressly exempted and . . . no other tax . . . other than the franchise tax of 2% on the gross receipts as provided for in the original franchise shall be collected.
exempts the company from paying the franchise tax under Section 259 of the National Internal Revenue Code (Commissioner of Internal Revenue vs. Lingayen Gulf Electric
Power Co., Inc., G.R. No. 23771, August 4, 1988).

On the other hand, the Balanga Power Plant Company, Imus Electric Company, Inc., Guagua Electric Company, Inc. were subjected to the 5% tax on corporate franchise under
Section 259 of the Internal Revenue Code, as amended, because Act No. 667 of the Philippine Commission and the ordinance or resolutions granting their respective franchises
did not contain the "in-lieu-of-all-taxes" clause (Balanga Power Plant Co. vs. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, G.R. No. L-20499, June 30, 1965; Imus Electric Co. vs. Court of Tax
Appeals, G.R. No. L-22421, March 18, 1967; Guagua Electric Light vs. Collector of Internal Revenue, G.R. No. L-23611, April 24, 1967).

Local Tax Regulation No. 3-75 issued by the Secretary of Finance on June 26, 1976, has made it crystal clear that the franchise tax provided in the Local Tax Code (P.D. No. 231,
Sec. 9) may only be imposed on companies with franchises that do not contain the exempting clause. Thus it provides:

The franchise tax imposed under local tax ordinance pursuant to Section 9 of the Local Tax Code, as amended, shall be collected from businesses holding franchise but
not from business establishments whose franchise contain the "in-lieu-of-all-taxes-proviso".

Manila Electric Company vs. Vera, 67 SCRA 351, cited by the petitioner, is not applicable here because what the Government sought to impose on Meralco in that case was not a
franchise tax but a compensating tax on the poles, wires, transformers and insulators which it imported for its use.

WHEREFORE, the petition for review is denied, and the decision of the Court of First Instance is hereby affirmed in toto. No costs.

SO ORDERED.

Narvasa, Cruz, Gancayco and Medialdea, JJ., concur.

Misamis Oriental vs Cagayan Electric (1990)

February 15, 2013 markerwins Tax Law

Facts: Cagayan Electric Power and light Co, Inc. (CEPALCO) was granted a franchise in 1961 under RA 3247 to install, operate and maintain an electric light, heat and power
system in Cagayan de Oro and its suburbs. In 1973, the Local Tax Code (PD 231) was promulgated, where Section 9 thereof providing for a franchise tax. Pursuant thereto, the
province of Misamis Oriental enacted Provincial Revenue Ordinance 19, whose Section 12 also provides for a franchise tax. The Provincial Treasurer demanded payment of the
provincial franchise tax from CEPALCO. CEPALCO paid under protest.

Issue: Whether CEPALCO is exempt from the provincial franchise tax.

Held: Local Tax Regulation 3-75 issued by the Secretary of Finance in 1976 made it clear that the franchise tax provided in the Local Tax Code may only be imposed on companies
with franchise that do not contain the exempting clause, i.e. “in-lieu-of-all-taxes-proviso.” CEPALCO’s franchise i.e. RA 3247, 3571 and 6020 (Section 3 thereof), uniformly
provides that “in consideration of the franchise and rights hereby granted, the grantee shall pay a franchise tax equal to 3% of the gross earnings for electric current sold under
the franchise, of which 2% goes to the national Treasury and 1% goes into the treasury of the municipalities of Tagoloan, Opol, Villanueva, Jasaan, and Cagayan de Oro, as the
case may be: Provided, that the said franchise tax of 3% of the gross earnings shall be in lieu of all taxes and assessments of whatever authority upon privileges, earnings,
income, franchise and poles, wires, transformers, and insulators of the grantee from which taxes and assessments the grantee is hereby expressly exempted.

THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 192531 November 12, 2014

BERNARDINA P. BARTOLOME, Petitioner,

vs.
SOCIAL SECURITY SYSTEM and SCANMAR MARITIME SERVICES, INC., Respondents.

DECISION

VELASCO, JR., J.:

Nature of the Case

This Appeal, filed under Rule 43 of the Rules of Court, seeks to annul the March 17, 2010 Decision1 of the Employees Compensation Commission (ECC) in ECC Case No. SL-18483-
0218-10, entitled Bernardina P. Bartolome v. Social Security System (SSS) [Scanmar Maritime Services, Inc.}, declaring that petitioner is not a beneficiary of the deceased
employee under Presidential Decree No. (PD) 442, otherwise known as the Labor Code of the Philippines, as amended by PD 626. 2

The Facts

John Colcol (John), born on June 9, 1983, was employed as electrician by Scanmar Maritime Services, Inc., on board the vessel Maersk Danville, since February 2008. As such, he
was enrolled under the government's Employees' Compensation Program (ECP). 3 Unfortunately, on June 2, 2008, an accident occurred on board the vessel whereby steel plates
fell on John, which led to his untimely death the following day. 4

John was, at the time of his death, childless and unmarried. Thus, petitioner Bernardina P. Bartolome, John’s biological mother and, allegedly, sole remaining beneficiary, filed a
claim for death benefits under PD 626 with the Social Security System (SSS) at San Fernando City, La Union. However, the SSS La Union office, in a letter dated June 10,
20095 addressed to petitioner, denied the claim, stating:

We regret to inform you that wecannot give due course to your claim because you are no longer considered as the parent of JOHN COLCOL as he was legally adopted by
CORNELIO COLCOL based on documents you submitted to us.

The denial was appealed tothe Employees’ Compensation Commission (ECC), which affirmed the ruling of the SSS La Union Branch through the assailed Decision, the dispositive
portion of which reads:

WHEREFORE, the appealed decision is AFFIRMED and the claim is hereby dismissed for lack of merit.

SO ORDERED.6

In denying the claim, both the SSS La Union branch and the ECC ruled against petitioner’s entitlement to the death benefits sought after under PD 626 on the ground she can no
longer be considered John’s primary beneficiary. As culled from the records, John and his sister Elizabeth were adopted by their great grandfather, petitioner’s grandfather,
Cornelio Colcol (Cornelio), by virtue of the Decision7 in Spec. Proc. No. 8220-XII of the Regional Trial Court in Laoag City dated February 4, 1985, which decree of adoption
attained finality.8 Consequently, as argued by the agencies, it is Cornelio who qualifies as John’s primary beneficiary, not petitioner. Neither, the ECC reasoned, would petitioner
qualify as John’s secondary beneficiary even if it wereproven that Cornelio has already passed away. As the ECC ratiocinated:
Under Article 167 (j) of P.D. 626, as amended, provides (sic) that beneficiaries are the "dependent spouse until he remarries and dependent children, who are the primary
beneficiaries. In their absence, the dependent parentsand subject to the restrictions imposed on dependent children, the illegitimate children and legitimate descendants who
are the secondary beneficiaries; Provided; that the dependent acknowledged natural child shall be considered as a primary beneficiary when there are no other dependent
children who are qualified and eligible for monthly income benefit."

The dependent parent referred to by the above provision relates to the legitimate parent of the covered member, as provided for by Rule XV, Section 1 (c) (1) of the Amended
Rules on Employees’ Compensation. This Commission believes that the appellant is not considered a legitimate parent of the deceased, having given up the latter for adoption to
Mr. Cornelio C. Colcol. Thus, in effect, the adoption divested her of the statusas the legitimate parent of the deceased.

xxxx

In effect, the rights which previously belong [sic] to the biological parent of the adopted child shall now be upon the adopting parent. Hence, in this case, the legal parent
referred to by P.D. 626, as amended, as the beneficiary, who has the right to file the claim, is the adoptive father of the deceased and not herein appellant. 9 (Emphasis supplied)

Aggrieved, petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration, which was likewise denied by the ECC. 10 Hence, the instant petition.

The Issues

Petitioner raises the following issues in the petition:

ASSIGNMENT OF ERRORS

I. The Honorable ECC’s Decision is contrary to evidence on record.

II. The Honorable ECC committed grave abuse in denying the just, due and lawful claims of the petitioner as a lawful beneficiary of her deceased biological son.

III. The Honorable ECC committed grave abuse of discretion in not giving due course/denying petitioner’s otherwise meritorious motion for reconsideration.11

In resolving the case, the pivotal issue is this: Are the biological parents of the covered, but legally adopted, employee considered secondary beneficiaries and, thus, entitled, in
appropriate cases, to receive the benefits under the ECP?

The Court's Ruling

The petition is meritorious.

The ECC’s factual findings are not consistent with the evidence on record

To recall, one of the primary reasons why the ECC denied petitioner’s claim for death benefits is that eventhough she is John’s biological mother, it was allegedly not proven that
his adoptive parent, Cornelio, was no longer alive. As intimated by the ECC:
Moreover, there had been no allegation in the records as to whether the legally adoptive parent, Mr. Colcol, is dead, which would immediately qualify the appellant [petitioner]
for Social Security benefits. Hence, absent such proof of death of the adoptive father, this Commission will presume him to be alive and well, and as such, is the one entitled to
claim the benefit being the primary beneficiary of the deaceased. Thus, assuming that appellant is indeed a qualified beneficiary under the Social Security law, in view of her
status as other beneficiary, she cannot claim the benefit legally provided by law to the primary beneficiary, in this case the adoptive father since he is still alive.

We disagree with the factual finding of the ECC on this point.

Generally, findings of fact by administrative agencies are generally accorded great respect, if not finality, by the courts by reason of the special knowledge and expertise of said
administrative agenciesover matters falling under their jurisdiction. 12 However, in the extant case, the ECC had overlooked a crucial piece of evidence offered by the petitioner –
Cornelio’s death certificate.13

Based on Cornelio’s death certificate, it appears that John’s adoptive father died on October 26, 1987, 14 or only less than three (3) years since the decree of adoption on
February 4, 1985, which attained finality.15 As such, it was error for the ECC to have ruled that it was not duly proven that the adoptive parent, Cornelio, has already passed
away.

The rule limiting death benefits claims to the legitimate parents is contrary to law

This brings us to the question of whether or not petitioner is entitled to the death benefits claim in view of John’s work-related demise. The pertinent provision, in this regard, is
Article 167 (j) of the Labor Code, as amended, which reads:

ART. 167. Definition of terms. - Asused in this Title unless the context indicates otherwise:

xxxx

(j) 'Beneficiaries' means the dependent spouse until he remarries and dependent children, who are the primary beneficiaries. In their absence, the dependent parents and
subject to the restrictions imposed on dependent children, the illegitimate children and legitimate descendants who are the secondary beneficiaries; Provided, that the
dependent acknowledged natural child shall be considered as a primary beneficiary when there are no other dependent children who are qualified and eligible for monthly
income benefit. (Emphasis supplied)

Concurrently, pursuant to the succeeding Article 177(c) supervising the ECC "[T]o approve rules and regulations governing the processing of claims and the settlement of
disputes arising therefrom as prescribed by the System," the ECC has issued the Amended Rules on Employees’ Compensation, interpreting the above-cited provision as follows:

RULE XV – BENEFICIARIES

SECTION 1. Definition. (a) Beneficiaries shall be either primary or secondary, and determined atthe time of employee’s death.

(b) The following beneficiaries shall be considered primary:

(1) The legitimate spouse living with the employee at the time of the employee’s death until he remarries; and

(2) Legitimate, legitimated, legally adopted or acknowledged natural children, who are unmarried not gainfully employed, not over 21 years of age, or over 21
years of age provided that he is incapacitated and incapable of self - support due to physicalor mental defect which is congenital or acquired during minority;
 Provided, further, that a dependent acknowledged natural child shall be considered as a primary beneficiary only when there are no other dependent children
who are qualified and eligible for monthly income benefit; provided finally, that if there are two or more acknowledged natural children, they shall be counted
from the youngest and without substitution, but not exceeding five.

(c) The following beneficiaries shall be considered secondary:

(1) The legitimate parentswholly dependent upon the employee for regular support;

(2) The legitimate descendants and illegitimate children who are unmarried, not gainfully employed, and not over 21 years of age, or over 21 years of age
providedthat he is incapacitated and incapable of self - support dueto physical or mental defect which is congenital or acquired during minority. (Emphasis
supplied)

Guilty of reiteration, the ECC denied petitioner’s claim on the ground that she is no longer the deceased’s legitimate parent, as required by the implementing rules. As held by
the ECC, the adoption decree severed the relation between John and petitioner, effectively divesting her of the status of a legitimate parent, and, consequently, that of being a
secondary beneficiary.

We disagree.

a. Rule XV, Sec. 1(c)(1) of the Amended Rules on Employees’ Compensation deviates from the clear language of Art. 167 (j) of the Labor Code, as amended

Examining the Amended Rules on Employees’ Compensation in light of the Labor Code, as amended, it is at once apparent that the ECC indulged in an unauthorized
administrative legislation. In net effect, the ECC read into Art. 167 of the Code an interpretation not contemplated by the provision. Pertinent in elucidating on this point isArticle
7 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, which reads:

Article 7. Laws are repealed only by subsequent ones, and their violation or non-observance shall not beexcused by disuse, or custom or practice to the contrary.

When the courts declared a law to be inconsistent with the Constitution, the former shall be void and the latter shall govern.

Administrative or executive acts, orders and regulations shall be valid only when they are not contrary to the laws or the Constitution.(Emphasis supplied)

As applied, this Court held in Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Fortune Tobacco Corporation 16 that:

As we have previously declared, rule-making power must be confined to details for regulating the mode or proceedings in order to carry into effect the law as it has been
enacted, and it cannot be extended to amend or expand the statutory requirements or to embrace matters not covered by the statute. Administrative regulations must always
be in harmony with the provisions of the law because any resulting discrepancy between the two will always be resolved in favor of the basic law. (Emphasis supplied)

Guided by this doctrine, We find that Rule XV of the Amended Rules on Employees’ Compensation is patently a wayward restriction of and a substantial deviation from Article
167 (j) of the Labor Code when it interpreted the phrase "dependent parents" to refer to "legitimate parents."

It bears stressing that a similar issue in statutory construction was resolved by this Court in Diaz v. Intermediate Appellate Court17 in this wise:

It is Our shared view that the word "relatives" should be construed in its general acceptation. Amicus curiae Prof. Ruben Balane has this to say:
The term relatives, although used many times in the Code, is not defined by it. In accordancetherefore with the canons of statutory interpretation, it should beunderstood to
have a general and inclusive scope, inasmuch as the term is a general one. Generalia verba sunt generaliter intelligenda. That the law does not make a distinction prevents us
from making one: Ubi lex non distinguit, nec nos distinguera debemus. xxx

According to Prof. Balane, to interpret the term relatives in Article 992 in a more restrictive sense thanit is used and intended is not warranted by any rule ofinterpretation.
Besides, he further states that when the law intends to use the termin a more restrictive sense, it qualifies the term with the word collateral, as in Articles 1003 and 1009 of the
New Civil Code.

Thus, the word "relatives" is a general term and when used in a statute it embraces not only collateral relatives but also all the kindred of the person spoken of, unless the
context indicates that it was used in a more restrictive or limited sense — which as already discussed earlier, is not so in the case at bar. (Emphasis supplied)

In the same vein, the term "parents" in the phrase "dependent parents" in the afore-quoted Article 167 (j) of the Labor Code is usedand ought to be taken in its general sense
and cannot be unduly limited to "legitimate parents" as what the ECC did. The phrase "dependent parents" should, therefore, include all parents, whether legitimate or
illegitimate and whether by nature or by adoption. When the law does not distinguish, one should not distinguish. Plainly, "dependent parents" are parents, whether legitimate
or illegitimate, biological or by adoption,who are in need of support or assistance.

Moreover, the same Article 167 (j),as couched, clearly shows that Congress did not intend to limit the phrase "dependent parents" to solely legitimate parents. At the risk of
being repetitive, Article 167 provides that "in their absence, the dependent parents and subject to the restrictions imposed on dependent children, the illegitimate children and
legitimate descendants who are secondary beneficiaries." Had the lawmakers contemplated "dependent parents" to mean legitimate parents, then it would have simply said
descendants and not "legitimate descendants." The manner by which the provision in question was crafted undeniably show that the phrase "dependent parents" was intended
to cover all parents – legitimate, illegitimate or parents by nature or adoption.

b. Rule XV, Section 1(c)(1) of the Amended Rules on Employees’ Compensation is in contravention of the equal protection clause

To insist that the ECC validly interpreted the Labor Code provision is an affront to the Constitutional guarantee of equal protection under the laws for the rule, as worded,
prevents the parents of an illegitimate child from claiming benefits under Art. 167 (j) of the Labor Code, as amended by PD 626. To Our mind, such postulation cannot be
countenanced.

As jurisprudence elucidates, equal protection simply requires that all persons or things similarly situated should be treated alike, both as to rights conferred and responsibilities
imposed. It requires public bodies and institutions to treat similarly situated individuals in a similar manner. 18 In other words, the concept of equal justice under the law requires
the state to govern impartially, and it may not drawdistinctions between individuals solely on differences that are irrelevant to a legitimate governmental objective.19

The concept of equal protection, however, does not require the universal application of the laws to all persons or things without distinction. What it simply requires isequality
among equals as determined according to a valid classification. Indeed, the equal protection clause permits classification. Such classification, however, to be valid must pass the
test of reasonableness. The test has four requisites: (1) The classification rests on substantial distinctions; (2) It is germane tothe purpose of the law; (3) It is not limited to
existing conditions only; and (4) It applies equally to all members of the same class. "Superficial differences do not make for a valid classification." 20

In the instant case, there is no compelling reasonable basis to discriminate against illegitimate parents. Simply put, the above-cited rule promulgated by the ECC that limits the
claim of benefits to the legitimate parents miserably failed the test of reasonableness since the classification is not germane to the law being implemented. We see no pressing
government concern or interest that requires protection so as to warrant balancing the rights of unmarried parents on one hand and the rationale behind the law on the other.
On the contrary, the SSS can better fulfill its mandate, and the policy of PD 626 – that employees and their dependents may promptly secure adequate benefits in the event of
work-connected disability or death - will be better served if Article 167 (j) of the Labor Code is not so narrowly interpreted.
There being no justification for limiting secondary parent beneficiaries to the legitimate ones, there can be no other course of action to take other than to strikedown as
unconstitutional the phrase "illegitimate" as appearing in Rule XV, Section 1(c)(1) of the Amended Rules on Employees’ Compensation.

Petitioner qualifies as John’s dependent parent

In attempting to cure the glaring constitutional violation of the adverted rule, the ECC extended illegitimate parents an opportunity to file claims for and receive death
benefitsby equating dependency and legitimacy to the exercise of parental authority. Thus, as insinuated by the ECC in its assailed Decision, had petitioner not given up John for
adoption, she could have still claimed death benefits under the law.

To begin with, nowhere in the law nor in the rules does it say that "legitimate parents" pertain to those who exercise parental authority over the employee enrolled under the
ECP. Itwas only in the assailed Decision wherein such qualification was made. In addition, assuming arguendothat the ECC did not overstep its boundaries in limiting the
adverted Labor Code provision to the deceased’s legitimate parents, and that the commission properly equated legitimacy to parental authority, petitioner can still qualify as
John’s secondary beneficiary.

True, when Cornelio, in 1985, adoptedJohn, then about two (2) years old, petitioner’s parental authority over John was severed. However, lest it be overlooked, one key detail
the ECC missed, aside from Cornelio’s death, was that when the adoptive parent died less than three (3) years after the adoption decree, John was still a minor, at about four (4)
years of age.

John’s minority at the time of his adopter’s death is a significant factor in the case at bar. Under such circumstance, parental authority should be deemed to have reverted in
favor of the biological parents. Otherwise, taking into account Our consistent ruling that adoption is a personal relationship and that there are no collateral relatives by virtue of
adoption,21 who was then left to care for the minor adopted child if the adopter passed away?

To be sure, reversion of parental authority and legal custody in favor of the biological parents is not a novel concept. Section 20 of Republic Act No. 855222 (RA 8552), otherwise
known as the Domestic Adoption Act, provides:

Section 20. Effects of Rescission.– If the petition [for rescission of adoption] is granted, the parental authority of the adoptee's biological parent(s), if known, or the legal custody
of the Department shall be restored if the adoptee is still a minoror incapacitated. The reciprocal rights and obligations of the adopter(s) and the adoptee to each other shall be
extinguished. (emphasis added)

The provision adverted to is applicable herein by analogy insofar as the restoration of custody is concerned.1âwphi1 The manner herein of terminating the adopter’s parental
authority, unlike the grounds for rescission,23 justifies the retention of vested rights and obligations between the adopter and the adoptee, while the consequent restoration of
parental authority in favor of the biological parents, simultaneously, ensures that the adoptee, who is still a minor, is not left to fend for himself at such a tender age.

To emphasize, We can only apply the rule by analogy, especially since RA 8552 was enacted after Cornelio’s death. Truth be told, there is a lacuna in the law as to which
provision shall govern contingencies in all fours with the factual milieu of the instant petition. Nevertheless, We are guided by the catena of cases and the state policies behind
RA 855224 wherein the paramount consideration is the best interest of the child, which We invoke to justify this disposition. It is, after all, for the best interest of the child that
someone will remain charged for his welfare and upbringing should his or her adopter fail or is rendered incapacitated to perform his duties as a parent at a time the adoptee
isstill in his formative years, and, to Our mind, in the absence or, as in this case, death of the adopter, no one else could reasonably be expected to perform the role of a parent
other than the adoptee’s biological one.

Moreover, this ruling finds support on the fact that even though parental authority is severed by virtue of adoption, the ties between the adoptee and the biological parents are
not entirely eliminated. To demonstrate, the biological parents, insome instances, are able to inherit from the adopted, as can be gleaned from Art. 190 of the Family Code:
Art. 190. Legal or intestate succession to the estate of the adopted shall be governed by the following rules:

xxx

(2) When the parents, legitimate or illegitimate, or the legitimate ascendants of the adopted concur withthe adopter, they shall divide the entire estate, one-half tobe inherited
by the parents or ascendants and the other half, by the adopters;

xxx

(6) When only collateral blood relatives of the adopted survive, then the ordinary rules of legal or intestate succession shall apply.

Similarly, at the time of Cornelio Colcol’s death, which was prior to the effectivity of the Family Code, the governing provision is Art. 984 of the New Civil Code, which provides:

Art. 984. In case of the death of an adopted child, leaving no children or descendants, his parents and relatives by consanguinity and not by adoption, shall be his legal heirs.

From the foregoing, it is apparent that the biological parents retain their rights of succession tothe estate of their child who was the subject of adoption. While the benefits
arising from the death of an SSS covered employee do not form part of the estateof the adopted child, the pertinent provision on legal or intestate succession at least reveals
the policy on the rights of the biological parents and those by adoption vis-à-vis the right to receive benefits from the adopted. In the same way that certain rights still attach by
virtue of the blood relation, so too should certain obligations, which, We rule, include the exercise of parental authority, in the event of the untimely passing of their minor
offspring’s adoptive parent. We cannot leave undetermined the fate of a minor child whose second chance ata better life under the care of the adoptive parents was snatched
from him by death’s cruel grasp. Otherwise, the adopted child’s quality of life might have been better off not being adopted at all if he would only find himself orphaned in the
end. Thus, We hold that Cornelio’s death at the time of John’sminority resulted in the restoration of petitioner’s parental authority over the adopted child.

On top of this restoration of parental authority, the fact of petitioner’s dependence on John can be established from the documentary evidence submitted to the ECC. As it
appears in the records, petitioner, prior to John’s adoption, was a housekeeper. Her late husband died in 1984, leaving her to care for their seven (7) children. But since she was
unable to "give a bright future to her growing children" as a housekeeper, she consented to Cornelio’s adoption of Johnand Elizabeth in 1985.

Following Cornelio’s death in 1987, so records reveal, both petitioner and John repeatedly reported "Brgy. Capurictan, Solsona, Ilocos Norte" as their residence. In fact, this
veryaddress was used in John’s Death Certificate25 executed in Brazil, and in the Report of Personal Injury or Loss of Life accomplished by the master of the vessel boarded by
John.26 Likewise, this is John’s known address as per the ECC’s assailed Decision. 27Similarly, this same address was used by petitioner in filing her claim before the SSS La Union
branch and, thereafter, in her appeal with the ECC. Hence, it can be assumed that aside from having been restored parental authority over John, petitioner indeed actually
execised the same, and that they lived together under one roof.

Moreover, John, in his SSS application,28 named petitioner as one of his beneficiaries for his benefits under RA 8282, otherwise known as the "Social Security Law." While RA
8282 does not cover compensation for work-related deaths or injury and expressly allows the designation of beneficiaries who are not related by blood to the member unlike in
PD 626, John’s deliberate act of indicating petitioner as his beneficiary at least evinces that he, in a way, considered petitioner as his dependent. Consequently, the confluence of
circumstances – from Cornelio’s death during John’s minority, the restoration ofpetitioner’s parental authority, the documents showing singularity of address, and John’s clear
intention to designate petitioner as a beneficiary - effectively made petitioner, to Our mind, entitled to death benefit claims as a secondary beneficiary under PD 626 as a
dependent parent.
All told, the Decision of the ECC dated March 17, 2010 is bereft of legal basis. Cornelio’s adoption of John, without more, does not deprive petitioner of the right to receive the
benefits stemming from John’s death as a dependent parent given Cornelio’s untimely demise during John’s minority. Since the parent by adoption already died, then the death
benefits under the Employees' Compensation Program shall accrue solely to herein petitioner, John's sole remaining beneficiary.

WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED. The March 17, 2010 Decision of the Employees' Compensation Commission, in ECC Case No. SL-18483-0218-10, is REVERSED and
SET ASIDE. The ECC is hereby directed to release the benefits due to a secondary beneficiary of the deceased covered employee John Colcol to petitioner Bernardina P.
Bartolome.

No costs.

SO ORDERED.

PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.

Associate Justice

MARTIN S. VILLARAMA, JR.

Associate Justice
BIENVENIDO L. REYES ESTELA M. PERLAS-BERNABE*
Associate Justice Associate Justice

FRANCIS F. JARDELEZA
Associate Justice

ATTESTATION

I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court's Division.

PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.

Associate Justice
Chairperson

CERTIFICATION

Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution and the Division Chairperson's Attestation, I certify that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in
consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court's Division.

ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Acting Chief Justice
Footnotes
24
* Acting Member per Special Order No. 1866 dated November 4, 2014. Section 2. Declaration of Policies.– (a) It is hereby declared the policy of
1
Rollo, pp. 59-64. the State to ensure that every child remains under the care and custody of
2
Further amending certain articles of Presidential Decree No. 442 entitled his/her parent(s) and be provided with love, care, understanding and
"Labor Code of the Philippines" security towards the full and harmonious development of his/her
3
Rollo, p. 59. personality. Only when such efforts prove insufficient and no appropriate
4
Id. at 60. placement or adoption within the child's extended family is available shall
5
Id. at 53. adoption by an unrelated person be considered.
6
Id. at 64. (b) In all matters relating to the care, custody and adoption of a
7
Id. at 31. child, his/her interest shall be the paramount consideration in
8
Id. at 34. accordance with the tenets set forth in the United Nations (UN)
9
Id. at 62-64. Convention on the Rights of the Child; UN Declaration on Social
10
Id. at 73. and Legal Principles Relating to the Protection and Welfare of
11
Id. at 15-16. Children with Special Reference to Foster Placement and
12
Hipolito, Jr. vs. Cinco, G.R. No. 174143, November 28, 2011, 661 SCRA Adoption, Nationally and Internationally; and the Hague
211, 326-327. Convention on the Protection of Children and Cooperation in
13
Rollo, p. 74. Respect of Intercountry Adoption. Toward this end, the State shall
14
Id. at 37. provide alternative protection and assistance through foster care
15
Id. at 34. or adoption for every child who is neglected, orphaned, or
16
G.R. Nos. 167274-75, July 21, 2008, 559 SCRA 160, 179. abandoned.
17
G.R. No. L-66574, February 21, 1990, 182 SCRA 427, 435. (c) It shall also be a State policy to:
18
Biraogo v. The Philippine Truth Commission of 2010, G.R. Nos. 192935 xxx
and 193036, December 7, 2010, 637 SCRA 78, 167. (ii) Prevent the child from unnecessary separation from his/her
19
Id. biological parent(s);
20 25
Id. at 168. Rollo, p. 41.
21 26
Johnston vs. Republic, No. L-18284, April 30, 1963, 7 SCRA 1040, 1042. Id at 44.
22 27
An act establishing the rules and policies on the domestic adoption of Id at 59.
28
Filipino children and for other purposes Id at 40.
23
Sec. 19, RA 8552

BERNARDINA P. BARTOLOME, Petitioner,

vs.

SOCIAL SECURITY SYSTEM and SCANMAR MARITIME SERVICES, INC., Respondents.

G.R. No. 192531 November 12, 2014

PONENTE: Velasco, Jr.

 TOPIC: Civil status of adopted upon death of adopter, biological parent of adoptee as beneficiary

FACTS:

John Colcol was employed as electrician by Scanmar Maritime Services, Inc. He was enrolled under the government’s Employees’ Compensation Program (ECP). He died
due to an accident while on board the vessel. John was, at the time of his death, childless and unmarried. Thus, petitioner Bernardina P. Bartolome, John’s biological mother and,
allegedly, sole remaining beneficiary, filed a claim for death benefits.

SSS denied the claim on the ground that Bernardina was no longer considered as the parent of John since the latter was legally adopted by Cornelio Colcol. As such, it is
Cornelio who qualifies as John’s primary beneficiary, not petitioner.

According to the records, Cornelio died during John’s minority.

ISSUES:

1. Whether or not the death of the adopter during the adoptee’s minority results to the restoration of the parental authority to the biological parents of the latter.
2. Whether or not Bernardina is considered as a legal beneficiary of John.

HELD:

FIRST ISSUE: Yes.

The Court ruled that John’s minority at the time of his adopter’s death is a significant factor in the case at bar. Under such circumstance, parental authority should be
deemed to have reverted in favor of the biological parents. Otherwise, taking into account Our consistent ruling that adoption is a personal relationship and that there are no
collateral relatives by virtue of adoption, who was then left to care for the minor adopted child if the adopter passed away?

The Court also applied by analogy, insofar as the restoration of custody is concerned, the provisions of law on rescission of adoption wherein if said petition is granted,
the parental authority of the adoptee’s biological parents shall be restored if the adoptee is still a minor or incapacitated.

The manner herein of terminating the adopter’s parental authority, unlike the grounds for rescission, justifies the retention of vested rights and obligations between the
adopter and the adoptee, while the consequent restoration of parental authority in favor of the biological parents, simultaneously, ensures that the adoptee, who is still a minor,
is not left to fend for himself at such a tender age.

From the foregoing, it is apparent that the biological parents retain their rights of succession tothe estate of their child who was the subject of adoption. While the benefits
arising from the death of an SSS covered employee do not form part of the estate of the adopted child, the pertinent provision on legal or intestate succession at least reveals the
policy on the rights of the biological parents and those by adoption vis-à-vis the right to receive benefits from the adopted. In the same way that certain rights still attach by virtue
of the blood relation, so too should certain obligations, which, the Court ruled, include the exercise of parental authority, in the event of the untimely passing of their minor
offspring’s adoptive parent.

SECOND ISSUE: Yes.

The Court held that Cornelio’s adoption of John, without more, does not deprive petitioner of the right to receive the benefits stemming from John’s death as a dependent
parent given Cornelio’s untimely demise during John’s minority. Since the parent by adoption already died, then the death benefits under the Employees’ Compensation Program
shall accrue solely to herein petitioner, John’s sole remaining beneficiary.

SECOND DIVISION

G.R. No. L-30061 February 27, 1974

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellees,

vs.
JOSE JABINAL Y CARMEN, defendant-appellant.

Office of the Solicitor General Felix V. Makasiar and Solicitor Antonio M. Martinez for plaintiff-appellee.

Pedro Panganiban y Tolentino for defendant-appellant.

ANTONIO, J.:p

Appeal from the judgment of the Municipal Court of Batangas (provincial capital), Batangas, in Criminal Case No. 889, finding the accused guilty of the crime of Illegal Possession
of Firearm and Ammunition and sentencing him to suffer an indeterminate penalty ranging from one (1) year and one (1) day to two (2) years imprisonment, with the
accessories provided by law, which raises in issue the validity of his conviction based on a retroactive application of Our ruling in People v. Mapa.1

The complaint filed against the accused reads:

That on or about 9:00 o'clock, p.m., the 5th day of September, 1964, in the poblacion, Municipality of Batangas, Province of Batangas, Philippines, and within
the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, a person not authorized by law, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously keep
in his possession, custody and direct control a revolver Cal. .22, RG8 German Made with one (1) live ammunition and four (4) empty shells without first
securing the necessary permit or license to possess the same.

At the arraignment on September 11, 1964, the accused entered a plea of not guilty, after which trial was accordingly held.

The accused admitted that on September 5, 1964, he was in possession of the revolver and the ammunition described in the complaint, without the requisite license or permit.
He, however, claimed to be entitled to exoneration because, although he had no license or permit, he had an appointment as Secret Agent from the Provincial Governor of
Batangas and an appointment as Confidential Agent from the PC Provincial Commander, and the said appointments expressly carried with them the authority to possess and
carry the firearm in question.

Indeed, the accused had appointments from the above-mentioned officials as claimed by him. His appointment from Governor Feliciano Leviste, dated December 10, 1962,
reads:

Reposing special trust and confidence in your civic spirit, and trusting that you will be an effective agent in the detection of crimes and in the preservation of
peace and order in the province of Batangas, especially with respect to the suppression of trafficking in explosives, jueteng, illegal cockfighting, cattle rustling,
robbery and the detection of unlicensed firearms, you are hereby appointed a SECRET AGENT of the undersigned, the appointment to take effect immediately,
or as soon as you have qualified for the position. As such Secret Agent, your duties shall be those generally of a peace officer and particularly to help in the
preservation of peace and order in this province and to make reports thereon to me once or twice a month. It should be clearly understood that any abuse of
authority on your part shall be considered sufficient ground for the automatic cancellation of your appointment and immediate separation from the service. In
accordance with the decision of the Supreme Court in G.R. No. L-12088 dated December 23, 1959, you will have the right to bear a firearm, particularly
described below, for use in connection with the performance of your duties.

By virtue hereof, you may qualify and enter upon the performance of your duties by taking your oath of office and filing the original thereof with us.

Very truly yours,

(Sgd.) FELICIANO LEVISTE

Provincial Governor

FIREARM AUTHORIZED TO CARRY:

Kind: — ROHM-Revolver

Make: — German

SN: — 64

Cal:— .22

On March 15, 1964, the accused was also appointed by the PC Provincial Commander of Batangas as Confidential Agent with duties to furnish information regarding smuggling
activities, wanted persons, loose firearms, subversives and other similar subjects that might affect the peace and order condition in Batangas province, and in connection with
these duties he was temporarily authorized to possess a ROHM revolver, Cal. .22 RG-8 SN-64, for his personal protection while in the performance of his duties.

The accused contended before the court a quo that in view of his above-mentioned appointments as Secret Agent and Confidential Agent, with authority to possess the firearm
subject matter of the prosecution, he was entitled to acquittal on the basis of the Supreme Court's decision in People vs. Macarandang2 and People vs. Lucero.3 The trial court,
while conceding on the basis of the evidence of record the accused had really been appointed Secret Agent and Confidential Agent by the Provincial Governor and the PC
Provincial Commander of Batangas, respectively, with authority to possess and carry the firearm described in the complaint, nevertheless held the accused in its decision dated
December 27, 1968, criminally liable for illegal possession of a firearm and ammunition on the ground that the rulings of the Supreme Court in the cases
of Macarandang and Lucero were reversed and abandoned in People vs. Mapa, supra. The court considered as mitigating circumstances the appointments of the accused as
Secret Agent and Confidential Agent.

Let us advert to Our decisions in People v. Macarandang, supra, People v. Lucero, supra, and People v. Mapa, supra. In Macarandang, We reversed the trial court's judgment of
conviction against the accused because it was shown that at the time he was found to possess a certain firearm and ammunition without license or permit, he had an
appointment from the Provincial Governor as Secret Agent to assist in the maintenance of peace and order and in the detection of crimes, with authority to hold and carry the
said firearm and ammunition. We therefore held that while it is true that the Governor has no authority to issue any firearm license or permit, nevertheless, section 879 of the
Revised Administrative Code provides that "peace officers" are exempted from the requirements relating to the issuance of license to possess firearms; and Macarandang's
appointment as Secret Agent to assist in the maintenance of peace and order and detection of crimes, sufficiently placed him in the category of a "peace officer" equivalent even
to a member of the municipal police who under section 879 of the Revised Administrative Code are exempted from the requirements relating to the issuance of license to
possess firearms. In Lucero, We held that under the circumstances of the case, the granting of the temporary use of the firearm to the accused was a necessary means to carry
out the lawful purpose of the batallion commander to effect the capture of a Huk leader. In Mapa, expressly abandoning the doctrine in Macarandang, and by implication, that
in Lucero, We sustained the judgment of conviction on the following ground:

The law is explicit that except as thereafter specifically allowed, "it shall be unlawful for any person to ... possess any firearm, detached parts of firearms or
ammunition therefor, or any instrument or implement used or intended to be used in the manufacture of firearms, parts of firearms, or ammunition." (Sec.
878, as amended by Republic Act No. 4, Revised Administrative Code.) The next section provides that "firearms and ammunition regularly and lawfully issued
to officers, soldiers, sailors, or marines [of the Armed Forces of the Philippines], the Philippine Constabulary, guards in the employment of the Bureau of
Prisons, municipal police, provincial governors, lieutenant governors, provincial treasurers, municipal treasurers, municipal mayors, and guards of provincial
prisoners and jails," are not covered "when such firearms are in possession of such officials and public servants for use in the performance of their official
duties." (Sec. 879, Revised Administrative Code.)

The law cannot be any clearer. No provision is made for a secret agent. As such he is not exempt. ... .

It will be noted that when appellant was appointed Secret Agent by the Provincial Government in 1962, and Confidential Agent by the Provincial Commander in 1964, the
prevailing doctrine on the matter was that laid down by Us in People v. Macarandang (1959) and People v. Lucero (1958). Our decision in People v. Mapa reversing the aforesaid
doctrine came only in 1967. The sole question in this appeal is: Should appellant be acquitted on the basis of Our rulings in Macarandang and Lucero, or should his conviction
stand in view of the complete reversal of the Macarandang and Lucero doctrine in Mapa? The Solicitor General is of the first view, and he accordingly recommends reversal of
the appealed judgment.

Decisions of this Court, although in themselves not laws, are nevertheless evidence of what the laws mean, and this is the reason why under Article 8 of the New Civil Code
"Judicial decisions applying or interpreting the laws or the Constitution shall form a part of the legal system ... ." The interpretation upon a law by this Court constitutes, in a way,
a part of the law as of the date that law originally passed, since this Court's construction merely establishes the contemporaneous legislative intent that law thus construed
intends to effectuate. The settled rule supported by numerous authorities is a restatement of legal maxim "legis interpretatio legis vim obtinet" — the interpretation placed
upon the written law by a competent court has the force of law. The doctrine laid down in Lucero and Macarandang was part of the jurisprudence, hence of the law, of the land,
at the time appellant was found in possession of the firearm in question and when he arraigned by the trial court. It is true that the doctrine was overruled in the Mapa case in
1967, but when a doctrine of this Court is overruled and a different view is adopted, the new doctrine should be applied prospectively, and should not apply to parties who had
relied on the old doctrine and acted on the faith thereof. This is especially true in the construction and application of criminal laws, where it is necessary that the punishability of
an act be reasonably foreseen for the guidance of society.

It follows, therefore, that considering that appellant conferred his appointments as Secret Agent and Confidential Agent and authorized to possess a firearm pursuant to the
prevailing doctrine enunciated in Macarandang and Lucero, under which no criminal liability would attach to his possession of said firearm in spite of the absence of a license
and permit therefor, appellant must be absolved. Certainly, appellant may not be punished for an act which at the time it was done was held not to be punishable.
WHEREFORE, the judgment appealed from is hereby reversed, and appellant is acquitted, with costs de oficio.

Zaldivar (Chairman), Barredo, Fernandez and Aquino, JJ., concur.

Fernando, J., took no part.

Footnotes

1 L-22301, August 30, 1967, 20 SCRA 1164.

2 106 Phil. (1959), 713.

3 103 Phil. (1958), 500.

People vs. Jabinal

February 27, 1974

Facts:

On September 5, 1964, the accused was found to be in possession of a revolver without the requisite license or permit. He claimed to be entitled to
exoneration because, although he had no license or permit, he had appointments as Secret Agent from the Provincial Governor of Batangas and as
Confidential Agent from the PC Provincial Commander, and the said appointments expressly carried with them the authority to possess and carry the
said firearm. The accused further contended that in view of his appointments, he was entitled to acquittal on the basis of the Supreme Court’s
decisions in People vs. Macarandang and in People vs. Lucero. The trial court found the accused criminally liable for illegal possession of firearm and
ammunition on the ground that the rulings in Macarandang* and in Lucero* were reversed and abandoned in People vs. Mapa**. The case was
elevated to the Supreme Court.

Issue:
Whether or not the appellant should be acquitted on the basis of the Supreme Court’srulings in the cases of Macarandang and of Lucero.

Ruling:

The appellant was acquitted.

Decisions of the Supreme Court, although in themselves not laws, are nevertheless evidence of what the law means; this is the reason why Article 8 of the New Civil Code
provides that, “Judicial decisions applying and interpreting the laws or the constitution shall form part of the legal system.” The interpretation upon a law by the Supreme Court
constitutes in a way a part of the law as of the date the law was originally passed, since the court’s construction merely establishes the contemporaneous legislative intent that
the law thus construed intends to effectuate. The settled rule supported by numerous authorities is a restatement of the legal maxim “legis interpretatio legis vim obtinet”— the
interpretation placed upon the written law by a competent court has the force of law. The doctrine laid down in Lucero and in Macarandang was part of the jurisprudence,
hence, of the law of the land, at the time appellant was found in possession of the firearm and when he was arraigned by the trial court. It is true that the doctrine was overruled
in Mapa case in 1967, but when a doctrine of the Supreme Court is overruled and a different view is adopted, the new doctrine should be applied prospectively, and should not
apply to parties who had relied on the old doctrine and acted on the faith thereof.

Considering that the appellant possessed a firearm pursuant to the prevailing doctrine enunciated in Macarandang and in Lucero,
under which no criminal liability would attach to his possession of said firearm, the appellant should be absolved. The appellant
may not be punished for an act which at the time it was done was held not to be punishable.

*The accused were acquitted for through their appointment as confidential/secret agent they were deemed to be “peace officers”. Peace officers had the privilege of carrying
firearms without license.

**Mapa was convicted although he was a secret/confidential agent. The court ruled that the law did not explicitly provide that secret/confidential agents are among those who
are exempted from acquiring a license to carry a firearm.

People vs. Jabinal

55 SCRA 607 27 February 1974
Antonio J.
Facts:
The instant case was an appeal form the judgment of the Municipal Court of Batangas finding the accused guilty of the crime of illegal possession of firearm and
ammunition. The validity of the conviction was based upon a retroactive application of the Supreme Court’s ruling in People vs. Mapa.
As to the facts, a determined by the trial court, the accused admitted that on September 5, 1964, he was in possession of the revolver and the ammunition described in the
complaint was without the requisite license a permit. He however, contended that he was a SECRET AGENT appointed by the governor, and was likewise subsequently appended
as Confidential Agent, which granted him the authority to possess fire arm in the performance of his official duties as peace officer. Relying on the Supreme Court’s decision in
People vs. Macarandang and People vs. Lucero, the accused sought for his aquittal.
Noting and agreeing to the evidence presented by the accused, the trial court nonetheless decided otherwise, citing that People vs. Macarandang and People vs. Lucero were
reversed and subsequently abandoned in people vs. mapa.
Issue:
Should appellant be acquitted on the bases of Supreme Court rulings in Macarandana and Lucero, or should his conviction stand in view of the completer reversal of
Macarandang and Lucero doctrine in Mapa?
Ruling:
The judgment appealed was reversed, and the appellant was acquitted.
Reason:
The doctrine laid down in lucero and Macarandang was part of the jurisprudence, hence, of the law, at the time appellant was found in possession of fire arm in question and he
was arraigned by the trial court. It is true that the doctrine was overruled in Mapa case in 1967, but when a doctrine of the Supreme Court is overruled and a new one is
adopted, the new doctrine should be applied prospectively, and should not apply to partres who had relied on the old doctrine and acted on the faith thereof.

TUNG CHIN HUI, petitioner, vs. RUFUS B. RODRIGUEZ, Commissioner of Immigration; and the BOARD OF COMMISSIONERS, Bureau of Immigration and
Deportation, respondents.

DECISION
PANGANIBAN, J.:
 Provisions that were not reproduced in the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure are deemed repealed. Hence, having been omitted from the 1997 Rules, deemed already repealed
is Section 18, Rule 41 of the pre-1997 Rules of Court, which had theretofore provided for a 48-hour reglementary period within which to appeal habeas corpus cases. Accordingly,
the period for perfecting appeals in said cases and ordinary civil actions is now uniform -- 15 days from notice of the judgment or order.

The Case

Before us is a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, assailing the March 2, 1999 Order[1]of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila (Branch 26) in Special
Proceedings No. 98-92014. The challenged Order reads in full as follows:[2]

For resolution is a Motion For Reconsideration filed by petitioner thru counsel with comment/opposition thereto filed by respondents thru counsel.

After careful consideration of the grounds relied upon by both parties, this Court finds for the respondents. The Notice of Appeal filed by the respondents is actually fo[r] the
Court Decision dated January 7, 1999 and not for [the] Court Order dated January 29, 1999.

In view of the foregoing, the Motion for Reconsideration filed by petitioner is hereby DENIED for lack of merit.

Meanwhile, the Branch Clerk of Court is hereby ordered to immediately transmit the record of the instant case to the Honorable Court of Appeals within ten (10) days from
today.

The Facts

From the records and the pleadings of the parties, the following facts appear undisputed.
After obtaining a visa at the Philippine Embassy in Singapore, petitioner, a Taiwanese citizen, [3] arrived in this country on November 5, 1998.
On November 15, 1998, he was arrested by several policemen, who subsequently turned him over to the Bureau of Immigration and Deportation (BID). Thereafter, on
November 25, 1998, the BID Board of Commissioners, after finding him guilty of possessing a tampered passport earlier canceled by Taiwanese authorities, ordered his summary
deportation.
On December 11, 1998, petitioner filed before the RTC of Manila a Petition for Habeas Corpus on the ground that his detention was illegal. After respondents filed a Return
of Writ controverting his claim, the trial court issued a Decision dated January 7, 1999, granting his Petition and ordering his release from custody.
On January 11, 1999, respondents filed a Motion for Reconsideration, which was denied by the trial court in an Order dated January 29, 1999.
Respondents then filed a [N]otice of [A]ppeal from the judgment of the Honorable Court in the above-stated case, dated January 29, 1999, a copy of which was received by
the Bureau on February 11, 1999 and was received by the undersigned counsel on February 15, 1999 x x x. [4] Dated February 15, 1999, it was received by the RTC on February 16,
1999 at 9:45 a.m.
Petitioner filed an Opposition, claiming that the Notice had been filed beyond the 48-hour reglementary period for filing appeals in habeas corpus cases as prescribed by the
pre-1997 Rules of Court. Although respondents alleged that they had received the said Order on February 15, 1999, petitioner contended that they had in fact received it on
February 11, 1999, as evidenced by the receipt of the service thereof and by the Sheriffs Return. [5]
In an Order dated February 18, 1999, the RTC rejected petitioners contention and granted due course to the Notice of Appeal.
 Petitioner then filed a Motion for Reconsideration, arguing this time that the Notice should be rejected because it had referred not to the RTC Decision but to the January
29, 1999 Order denying reconsideration. In its assailed March 2, 1999 Order, the trial court denied his Motion.
Hence, this Petition raising pure questions of law.[6] In a Resolution dated March 22, 1999, this Court issued a Temporary Restraining Order directing the respondents to cease
and desist from deporting the petitioner x x x until further orders. [7]

The Issues

Petitioner submits the following issues for our consideration:[8]

(a) Is the reglementary period to appeal [a] habeas corpus [case] now 15 days from notice of judgment as contended by [the] lower court?

(b) Is the reglementary period to appeal [a] habeas corpus [case] still 48 hours from notice of judgment as provided for in Section 18, Rule 41 of the Revised Rules of Court? or

(c) Is the provision of Sec. 1, sub-paragraph (a) of Rule 41 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure -- prohibiting appeal from an Order denying a motion for reconsideration -
mandatory or merely discretionary on the part of the lower courts?

(d) Are petitions for writs of habeas corpus already brought down to the level of ordinary cases despite the fact that in habeas corpus the liberty of persons illegally detained is
involved?
In the main, the Court will resolve whether the Notice of Appeal was seasonably filed. In the process, it will determine the applicable reglementary period for filing an appeal
in habeas corpus cases.
The Courts Ruling

The Petition is not meritorious.

Main Issue: Reglementary Period for Appealing
Habeas Corpus Cases

Petitioner contends that the Notice of Appeal was late because respondents filed it only on February 16, 1999, five days after they had received the Order denying the Motion
for Reconsideration on February 11, 1999.[9] He argues that the reglementary period for filing an appeal is 48 hours, as prescribed in Section 18 of Rule 41 of the pre-1997 Rules
of Court, which reads as follows:

SEC. 18. Appeal in habeas corpus cases, how taken. - An appeal in habeas corpus cases shall be perfected by filing with the clerk of court or the judge who rendered the
judgment, within forty-eight (48) hours from notice of such judgment, a statement that the person making it appeals therefrom.
The argument is devoid of merit, because the foregoing provision was omitted from and thereby repealed by the 1997 Revised Rules of Court, which completely replaced
Rules 1 to 71. The well-settled rule of statutory construction is that provisions of an old law that were not reproduced in the revision thereof covering the same subject are deemed
repealed and discarded.[10] The omission shows the intention of the rule-making body, the Supreme Court in this case,[11] to abrogate those provisions of the old laws that are not
reproduced in the revised statute or code.[12]
 Clearly then, the reglementary period for filing an appeal in a habeas corpus case is now similar to that in ordinary civil actions[13] and is governed by Section 3, Rule 41 of the
1997 Rules of Court, which provides:

SEC. 3. Period of ordinary appeal. -- The appeal shall be taken within fifteen (15) days from notice of the judgment or final order appealed from. Where a record on appeal is
required, the appellant shall file a notice of appeal and a record on appeal within thirty (30) days from notice of the judgment or final order.

The period of appeal shall be interrupted by a timely motion for new trial or reconsideration. No motion for extension of time to file a motion for new trial or reconsideration
shall be allowed.
In this light, the appeal was seasonably filed within the 15-day reglementary period.

Stare Decisis

Petitioner insists, however, that the application of Section 18, Rule 41 under the Revised Rules of Court must be maintained under the doctrine of stare decisis.[14], Thus he
urges the Court to apply precedents that held that the 48-hour period for perfecting an appeal was mandatory and jurisdictional. He specifically cites Saulo v. Cruz,[15] Garcia v.
Echiverri[16]and Elepante v. Madayag.[17]
The principle cited by petitioner is an abbreviated form of the maxim Stare decisis, et non quieta movere.[18] That is, When the court has once laid down a principle of law as
applicable to a certain state of facts, it will adhere to that principle and apply it to all future cases where the facts are substantially the same.[19] This principle assures certainty
and stability in our legal system.[20] It should be stressed that stare decisis presupposes that the facts of the precedent and the case to which it is applied are substantially the
same. In this case, there is one crucial difference. All the incidents of the present controversy occurred when the 1997 Revised Rules of Court was already in effect. On the other
hand, all the cited precedents had been resolved under the pre-1997 Rules. Accordingly, stare decisis cannot compel this Court to apply to the present case the alleged precedents
decided during the regime of the pre-1997 Rules. The cited cases applied a specific provision of the Rules in effect at the time. But because that provision had already been repealed
when the facts under present consideration occurred, the Court can no longer rely on those cases. Indeed, to rule otherwise is to bar the effectivity of the 1997 amendments,
which conflict with jurisprudence decided under an old and repealed rule. Verily, petitioners contention effectively precludes changes and freezes our procedural rules.

Subject of the Notice of Appeal

As earlier observed, the Notice of Appeal referred to the judgment of the Honorable Court in the above-stated case, dated January 29, 1999. Petitioner now argues that the
Notice was improper because it referred to the Order denying respondents Motion for Reconsideration, not the Decision itself which was dated January 7, 1999. He cites Section
1 of Rule 41 of the 1997 Rules, which provides that an order denying a motion for a new trial or a reconsideration may not be appealed.[21]
Respondents, on the other hand, claim that because the Notice of Appeal contained the word judgment, their clear intent was to appeal the Decision.
We agree with respondents. In referring to the trial courts judgment, respondents were clearly appealing the January 7, 1999 Decision. Had they thought otherwise, they
would have referred to the Order. Indeed, judgment is normally synonymous with decision.[22] Furthermore, the wrong date of the appealed judgment may be attributed merely
to inadvertence. Such error should not, by itself, deprive respondents of their right to appeal. Time and time again, it has been held that courts should proceed with caution so as
not to deprive a party of this right.[23] They are encouraged to hear the merits of appealed cases; hence, the dismissal of an appeal on grounds of technicality is generally frowned
upon.[24]Indeed, the postulates of justice and fairness demand that all litigants be afforded the opportunity for a full disposition of their disputes, free as much as legally possible
from the constraints of technicalities.[25] To rule otherwise is to let technicality triumph over substantial justice. Indeed, the real essence of justice does not emanate from
quibblings over patchwork legal technicality.[26]
Other Matters

Petitioner insists that the Order deporting him is invalid, as he was not given notice or hearing. [27] We reject this argument because it properly pertains to the appeal before
the CA, not in these proceedings instituted merely to determine the timeliness of the Notice of Appeal.
Likewise, we reject the submission of the Office of the Solicitor General that the promulgation of the CA Decision resolving the appeal rendered the present case moot and
academic.[28] It should be stressed that the validity of the proceedings before the appellate court ultimately hinges on the issue before us: whether the Notice of Appeal was
seasonably filed.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED and the assailed Order AFFIRMED. The Temporary Restraining Order issued by the Court is hereby immediately LIFTED. No
pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
Melo, (Chairman), Vitug, Purisima, and Gonzaga-Reyes, JJ., concur.

[1] [15]
Written by Judge Guillermo L. Loja Sr. 109 Phil. 379, August 31, 1960.
[2] [16]
Rollo, p. 17. 132 SCRA 631, October 23, 1984.
[3] [17]
Quoted from Petition, p. 2; rollo, p. 4. 196 SCRA 399, April 26, 1991.
[4] [18]
Rollo, p. 52. It is best to adhere to decisions and not to disturb questions put at rest. R.S.
[5]
Opposition to the Notice of Appeal, p. 2; rollo, p. 54. Vasan, Latin Words and Phrases for Lawyers, p. 227.
[6] [19]
The case was deemed submitted for resolution on August 21, 2000, upon receipt Republic v. Sandiganbayan, 269 SCRA 316, March 7, 1997, per Panganiban, J. See
by this Court of the petitioners Reply signed by Atty. Marciano J. also Alura v. CA, 305 SCRA 303, March 25, 1999; Tala Realty Services
Cagatan. Respondents Comment was signed by Assistant Solicitor General Carlos N. Corporation v. Banco Filipino Savings and Mortgage Bank, GR No. 137980, June 20,
Ortega, Assistant Solicitor General Magdangal M. de Leon and Solicitor Procolo M. 2000.
[20]
Olaivar. The Court resolved to give due course to this case without requiring the See Negros Navigation v. CA, 281 SCRA 534, November 7, 1997.
[21]
submission of memoranda. Petition, pp. 6-7; rollo, pp. 8-9.
[7] [22]
Rollo, p. 74. Moreno, Philippine Law Dictionary, 2nd ed., pp. 325-326.
[8] [23]
Petition, p. 10; rollo, p. 12. Growth Link v. CA, 273 SCRA 419, June 13, 1997. See also Ramos v. CA, 275 SCRA
[9]
Petition, p. 6; rollo, p. 8. See also Reply, pp. 3-4; rollo, pp. 155-156. 167, July 7, 1997.
[10] [24]
People v. Binuya, 61 Phil. 208, February 27, 1935; Joaquin v. Navarro, 81 Phil. 373, See Magsaysay Lines et al. v. CA, 260 SCRA 513, August 12, 1996; Director of Lands
August 4, 1948. v. Romamban, 131 SCRA 431, August 28, 1984; Olangco v. CFI, 121 SCRA 338, March
[11]
5 (5), Article Binuya, VIII of the Constitution, provides that the Supreme Court has 28, 1983.24
[25]
the power to [p]romulgate rules concerning x x x pleadings, practice, and procedure Delgado vda. Dela Rosa v. CA, 280 SCRA 444, October 10, 1997.
[26]
in all courts x x x. Frivaldo v. Comelec, 257 SCRA 727, June 28, 1996, per Panganiban, J.
[12] [27]
Agpalo, Statutory Construction, 1990 ed., p. 284. See also 73 Am Jur 2d, Statutes, Reply, p. 5; rollo, p. 157.
[28]
411; 82 C.J.S. Statutes, 293. Respondents Manifestation and Motion, pp. 1-2; rollo, pp. 111-112. Petitioner
[13]
Regalado, Remedial Law Compendium, 7th revised ed. (1999), p. 514. avers that he filed a Motion for Reconsideration to the CA Decision. (Petitioners
[14]
Petition, p. 8; rollo, p. 10. Comment/Opposition to the Manifestation and Motion, pp. 1-3; rollo, pp. 126-128.)
 EN BANC

G.R. No. L-57184-85 November 14, 1986

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
EUGENIA ABANO, ELISEO CABAÑA alias LUCIO CABAÑA and PABLO CABAÑA alias TEOFILO CABAÑA, defendants-appellants.

FERNAN, J.:

Before Us on automatic review is the decision of the Cebu-Bohol Circuit Criminal Court in Criminal Cases Nos. CCC-XIV-2147 and CCC-XIV-2148, which found Eugenia Abano guilty
of the crimes of parricide and murder, and Eliseo and Teofilo, both surnamed Cabana, of two murders. Two death penalties were imposed on each of the accused.

The information dated May 7, 1980 in Criminal Case No. CCC-XIV-2147 for parricide and murder alleges:

That on or about the 7th day of February, 1980 at 11:30 o'clock in the evening, more or less, in Sitio Tunga, Barangay Cantuod, Municipality of Balamban, Province of
Cebu, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused Eugenia Abano, then united in lawful wedlock with Agripino Abano,
and conspiring, confederating and mutually helping one another with Eliseo Cabana alias Lucio Cabana and Pablo Cabana alias Teofilo Cabana, armed with sharp bladed
weapons, with evident premeditation and treachery and in consideration of a prize or reward for the accomplishment of their criminal purposes, with deliberate intent
to kill, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully, and feloniously attack, assault and stab the said Agripino Abano with the weapons aforecited thereby inflicting upon the
latter multiple wounds on the vital parts of the body which injuries caused, as a consequence, the instantaneous death of the victim.

In addition to the above qualifying circumstances, the offense was committed with the aid of armed men; superior strength and arms; nighttime; in consideration of the
prize or reward and perpetrated in the dwelling of the victim.

Except for the difference in the name of the accused, the absence of the allegation on the accused's relationship to the victim and the fact that Bienvenida Cumad is Identified as
the victim, the information for murder in Criminal Case No. CCC-XIV-2148 is also dated May 7, 1980 and couched in basically the same language.

The prosecution's version of the crimes is as follows:

Eugenia Tolero Abano and Agripino Abano were married in 1948. 1 At the time of the commission of the crimes in February, 1980, they had been separated for three years.
Eugenia, who was then 57 years old, stayed in the conjugal home in Cumbado, Balamban, Cebu with two of their children, one of whom was mentally incapacitated. To support
her dependents, Eugenia worked as copra-maker earning eight pesos a day.

Agripino, 55 years old, lived with another woman, 50-year old widow Bienvenida Cumad, at the Abanos' hut some 400 meters away from the conjugal home. Only a bridge
separated the Abanos' conjugal home from the hut which was actually located in Tunga, Cantuod, Balamban, Cebu.

Behind Eugenia's house was another hut which used to be a pig pen. Elevated from the ground by about two feet, only a sack served as its door. It was occupied by Rodolfo
Abano, a son of Eugenia and Agripino, and his family.
At around 7:00 o'clock in the evening of February 7, 1980, Rodolfo's wife, Concordia, saw Eugenia partaking of supper with Eliseo Cabana and Teofilo Cabana at the former's
house. Concordia knew Eliseo and Teofilo because they were medicine men or quack doctors who frequented Cumbado to treat sick persons.

Just before midnight or at around 11:30 o'clock that night, Concordia was sleeping near the door of their hut, with her four children lying between her and her husband, when
she was awakened by someone pulling her hair. As the hut was lighted by a kerosene lamp, she recognized the man pulling her hair to be Eliseo. With Eliseo was his son, Teofilo.
Eliseo was standing on the ground but he was able to reach for her hair use of her position near the door.

Eliseo tried to cover her mouth and cautioned her not to make any noise. Afraid of what he might do to her with the bolo [pinuti] she noticed he was carrying, Concordia jumped
out of the hut. Eliseo then ordered her to accompany him to her father-in-law, Agripino. Along the way, Eliseo and Teofilo instructed her to tell Agripino that his son Rodolfo
[Concordia's husband] was suffering from a stomach ache and that he should be brought to a doctor.

Upon reaching Agripino's hut, Concordia called him saying, "Tay, Tay, wake up, bring Rudy to the doctor because he is suffering stomach ache." 2 Agripino answered by asking
her why Rudy had stomach ache. Concordia told him that Rudy had eaten something raw.

Eliseo then dragged Concordia towards the road, pointed the bolo at her and said, "You run now, but do not tell your husband about this because if you will tell him I win kill
your husband and all the members of your family." 3 Concordia ran and hid for some time under the big stove between Eugenia's house and her hut before proceeding home.

Delia Cumad, the 15-year-old daughter of Bienvenida, who was then sleeping in one of the two rooms of Agripino's hut was likewise awakened by Concordia's voice. She heard
Concordia telling Agripino that Rudy was sick because he ate something raw. Then she noticed Agripino pass by her on his way to the hut's door. When Agripino was already
downstairs, Delia heard an impact the sound of which resembled that of the hacking of a banana trunk. 4Then she heard Agripino calling out, "Day, help Day, I am hacked." Delia
tried to prevent her mother Bienvenida from going down the hut but the latter persisted. Bienvenida brought along a kerosene lamp. Because she was afraid, Delia did not even
try to peep through the window to see what was happening. Neither did she hear Bienvenida and Agripino mention any names while they were outside the hut. 5

Almost an hour later, Delia came down the hut. She looked for Agripino and Bienvenida but failed to find them. Scared, she ran to the house of Rosario Montero. On the way,
Delia met Rudy and Concordia Abano. Rudy asked her where she was going. Delia replied that she was going to the house of Rosario Montero. She did not tell them what
happened to Agripino and Bienvenida.

As it was too quiet in Rosario's house, Delia proceeded to the house of Pesing Baynas to whom she related what had transpired at their hut. Pesing accompanied her back to
their hut. Four meters from that hut, they found the lifeless body of Bienvenida.

Rodolfo Abano was awakened by his mother Eugenia at around midnight. She asked him to transport Eliseo and Teofilo Cabana to Matab-ang, Toledo City in his motorized
tricycle. When Rodolfo said that he would rather transport them in the morning, Eugenia told him that Eliseo and Teofilo were in a hurry.

At that time, Concordia was feeding her baby but she accompanied Rodolfo to the garage to get the motorized tricycle. It was on the way to the garage that they met Delia
Cumad.

From the garage, Rodolfo went back to his hut where, after Concordia had alighted from the tricycle, Eugenia boarded it. Near her house, Eugenia got off and Eliseo and Teofilo
boarded the tricycle. As he was ferrying them to Matab-ang, Rodolfo noticed that they were carrying a piece of sack that was rolled over a two-feet-long object. From Matab-
ang, Rodolfo went back to Cantuod. There he met Bernie Verdeflor who told him that his father and his common-law wife were dead.
Bienvenida D. Cumad died of cardio-respiratory arrest secondary to shock and hemorrhage due to multiple wounds on the neck [head], trunk and extremities." 6 In the medico-
legal necropsy report, she is Identified as Bienvenida Delfin Abano. 7 Actually, her maiden name was Bienvenida Mancia Delfin but she was mistaken for the legal wife of Agripino
by Doctor Ladislao V. Diola, Jr. who conducted the autopsy on the two victims. 8

Bienvenida sustained an avulsion which penetrated her skull and four lacerated wounds in the anterior portion of the neck, the right lumbar region, the right iliac region and the
right wrist. The inferior vena cava on both sides of her neck and the left carotid arteries were lacerated. 9

Agripino Albano also died of "cardio-respiratory arrest secondary to shock and hemorrhage due to multiple wounds on the head, trunk and extremeties." 10 He sustained twelve
lacerated wounds and an abrasion on the head and neck, and twenty-one lacerated wounds, five stab wounds and an avulsion in his trunk and extremities. He had a half-moon
fracture in his cranium extending from the left to the right temporal bone and other fractures in his orbital and ethmoidal bones, third cervical vertebra, seventh rib and left
elbow joint. He also suffered a subarachnoidal hemorrhage of the brain, and laceration in his upper lobe left lung, middle lobe right lung, septum, right ventricle and right
kidney. 11

In the course of the investigation conducted by the police, Delia Cumad, Rodolfo Abano, Concordia Abano, Eugenia Abano, Eliseo Cabana and Pablo [Teofilo] Cabana were
interrogated. Significantly, only the interrogations of Rodolfo and Delia were reduced to writing. 12

In his sworn statement, 13 Rodolfo narrated that at about twelve noon of February 9, 1980, his mother, Eugenia, revealed to him that she hired Eliseo and Pablo [Teofilo] Cabana
to kill Agripino and his common-law wife.

Because of that statement, Vicente S. Cabahug, the substation commander of the Balamban Police Force, interrogated Eugenia. At the trial court, Cabahug related how he
investigated Eugenia. He testified thus:

Q. After the revelation of Rodolfo Abano that it was her mother who hired the other two accused to kill the deceased Agripino Abano and Bienvenida Cumad, what else
did you do?

A. After the revelation of the said Rodolfo Abano of the killing of the father and the common-law wife, I investigated Eugenia Abano as she was made to stay around,
then at about 11:00 o'clock on February 11 in the morning, 1980, she admitted and confirmed the revelation of her son, Rodolfo Abano.

COURT [To the witness]:

Q. But what did she admit?

A. She admitted and she narrated to me that she even burst into tears telling me of the agony that she suffered for the last three years her husband was living in the
house with a girl aside from her and they were living 200 meters away where she lives and she confided and confessed that she was forced to hire the two accused,
these Eliseo and Teofilo Cabana to kill her husband and common-law wife. 14

xxx xxx xxx

ATTY. VELOSO:

Q. According to you, Eugenia Abano admitted hiring the present two accused who appeared to be father and son.
 A. Yes.

Q. Now. You asked her what was the prize or reward?

A. Yes, I asked her.

Q. What did she say?

A. According to Eugenia Abano she told the two accused, Teofilo and Eliseo Cabana that the consideration was the proceeds of the passenger tricycle that she was going
to sell after the killing of her husband and the paramour.

Q. In other words, she promised to pay the consideration after the act of killing has already taken place?

A. Yes.

Q. Did she tell you what guarantee she issued in order that the father and son Cabanas would really execute the act?

A. She did not give any guarantee.

Q. So that was only the promise?

A. According to her only the promise. 15

According to Cabahug, he reduced Eugenia's statement in writing but he did not bring his notes in court because they were "just more or less [a] scratch." 16

On the strength of those confessions, Cabahug filed on February 11, 1980, a complaint for parricide with murder and double murder against Eugenia and "Eliseo Doe and Pablo
Doe" before the municipal circuit court of Balamban-Asturias. Said complaint was amended three times: first, to fill in the full names of Eliseo and Teofilo; second, to include
"Cording Abano" as one of the accused; and third, to reflect Concordia's full name.

On February 14, 1980, the municipal circuit judge issued a warrant for the arrest of Eugenia, Concordia, Eliseo and "Pablo." 17 Eugenia and Concordia voluntarily surrendered to
the police. 18 Eliseo was arrested in Toledo City while he and his wife were selling mangoes. 19He led the arresting officers to Pinamungahan, Cebu, where his son Teofilo [Pablo]
was also arrested.20 After their arrest Eliseo and Teofilo were interrogated by Cabahug thus:

Q. Having arrested both Eliseo and Teofilo Cabana, did you investigate them?

A. No. Because we brought along with us Eliseo Cabana to Pinamungahan and put him in jail when we went up the mountain to arrest Eliseo [sic] Cabana. When Teofilo
Cabana arrived after his arrest we confronted [sic] them to the Pinamungahan Police Station. When they were confronted by us they admitted that they were the ones
who killed Agripino Abano and Bienvenida Cumad. Eliseo Cabana admitted that he was the one who killed Agripino Abano while the other one, Teofilo Cabana admitted
that he was the one who killed Bienvenida Cumad.

Q. Who was present when you interrogated Eliseo and Teofilo Cabana?
 A. We were plenty. We have T/Sgt. Paddy. Baron, Pat. Kiyamko, Pat. Cabanero, then we have Pat. Leonor Dagohoy of the Pinamungahan Police Station and Antonio
Mahinay also of the Pinamungahan Police Station were present when we confronted Eliseo and Teofilo Cabana at the Pinamungahan Police Station

Q. In your investigation of the accused Eliseo Cabana and Teofilo Cabana did you come to know what weapons were used by them in the commission of the crime?

A. We asked them the weapon that they used.

Q. What was their answer?

A. Eliseo Cabana said he used a bolo, locally known as pinuti and Teofilo Cabana admitted also that he used a bolo, locally known as pinuti. 21

The municipal circuit judge set the preliminary investigation of the case on February 9, 1980. On that date, all the accused appeared in court but they were not assisted by
counsel. Eugenia and Concordia manifested that they wanted the investigation postponed to February 28. Notwithstanding, the investigating judge assigned one Atty. Sarmiento
as counsel for Concordia who was thereafter investigated. 22

Eliseo and Teofilo Cabana waived their right to present evidence in the preliminary investigation. Eugenia also waived her right to further preliminary investigation. 23 Those
waivers were the subject of two orders both dated February 28, 1980.24

At the continuation of the investigation on March 4, 1980, Atty. Cosme Montesclaros, who "appeared for the accused" but who was actually appearing only for Concordia,
presented Eugenia as a witness. She testified that on February 3, 1980, she forged an agreement with Eliseo and Teofilo to kin Agripino and Bienvenida as she herself could not
"do it" because she is a woman and that on the night of February 7, she was with Eliseo and Teofilo when they threatened and pulled the hair of Concordia although she did not
proceed to the latter's hut. 25

In view of Eugenia's admissions, Atty. Montesclaros moved to dismiss the charge against Concordia on the ground that she was threatened at that time. 26 Said counsel then filed
a memorandum in support of said motion to dismiss. 27 The prosecution opposed it alleging that Concordia's defense of duress was incredible and fabricated because she was a
"principal by direct participation and indispensable cooperation." 28

Nevertheless, on March 13, 1980, the investigating judge issued an order discharging Concordia as an accused and forwarding the records of the case to the Court of First
Instance for trial on the merits. In ordering Concordia's discharge the investigating judge noted that she was a mother of four children the youngest of whom was still being
breastfed for which reason she should not be made "to undergo the travails of confinement in jail pending termination" of the case for humanitarian considerations. 29

Thereafter, the assistant provincial fiscal filed the two informations quoted and mentioned earlier. At their arraignment, the three accused pleaded not guilty. 30

They interposed alibi as their defense. Eugenia testified that on February 7, 1980, she was making copra in Singing, Balamban until 5:00 o'clock in the afternoon when she
returned home. She did not entertain any visitors and was in bed at 8:00 o'clock. She was awakened at 4:00 o'clock the following morning by Rodolfo who informed her that his
Papa had been killed. 31

Eugenia narrated that when she asked Rodolfo who killed his father, Rodolfo answered that he did not know. She told him to report the killing to the municipal authorities but
she herself was detained and investigated by the police on suspicion that she "caused the death" of her husband. 32 On her detention and investigation, Eugenia testified thus:

COURT [To witness]:

Q. You were detained ahead of Concordia Abano?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. COURT. Proceed.

A. ATTY. DE LA VICTORIA —

Q. How about your co-accused , did you see them in that detention cell where you and Concordia Abano were detained?

A. Yes, after they were arrested.

Q. By the way, where did the police actually place you?

A. In the office of the Chief of Police.

Q. Do you mean to say you were not actually placed inside the cell?

A. That is right.

Q. Concordia Abano testified before this Court that sometime on February 14, 1980 you confided to her that you were the one who instigated the two accused to kill
your husband in consideration of a reward in concept of the proceeds of the motorcycle which was in the possession of your husband, what can you say to that?

A. That is not true.

Q. What is the truth then?

A. I never told Concordia that I was the one who instigated the two accused to kill my husband and give them rewards out of the proceeds of the motorcycle in the
possession of my husband because I do not have possession of the motorcycle. After my husband lived with another woman he brought the motorcycle and it was my
son who drove that motorcycle in conducting passengers.

Q. Who is that son?

Q. Rodolfo Abano.

A. Rodolfo Abano testified that on February 9, 1980 he went to your house and there you confessed to him that you were the one who induced the two accused in
consideration of a reward to kill your husband and his paramour, what can you say to this testimony?

Q. That is not true.

A. What is the truth?

 Q. I did not tell him that I instigated the killing of my husband. I never had any ire against my husband.

A. Do you know Lt. Vicente Cabahug

Q. Yes, sir.

A. Lt. Cabahug testified that you told him that you were the one who induced the two other accused to kin your husband and his paramour in consideration of a reward,
what can you say about this?

Q. It was Vicente Cabahug who told me to admit everything so that my daughter-in-law will not be implicated and that I will not be included in the case, instead I will be
made a witness for the prosecution

A. Can you give any reason why Concordia Abano and Rudy Abano would testify against you in these cases?

Q. Yes, sir, it is because the police had requested Rudy to ask me to admit so that Concordia will be dropped from the case because she has many children and I will not
be included and instead I will be made a witness.

COURT [To witness]:

Q. Do you mean to say that you admit the crime only for this reason?

A. I was compelled to tell statements against myself because the Chief of Police told me that I will not be included in this case. 33

Eugenia acknowledged that she had a lawyer during the preliminary investigation but her lawyer, Atty. Rafael de la Victoria, was absent during its continuation on March 4,
1981. She testified further:

Q. Do you know the reason why the Court proceeded with the preliminary investigation in the absence of your lawyer?

FISCAL —

The witness is incompetent.

COURT —

May answer.

WITNESS-

A. Yes, I know.

ATTY. DE LA VICTORIA —
Q. What was the purpose?

A. So that Concordia Abano will be released.

Q. Were you able to testify in that preliminary investigation which was conducted on March 4, 1980 by the Municipal Court of Balamban?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. Who presented you there since you were not represented by a lawyer?

A. They forced me to testify so that Concordia will be released.

Q. Who forced you?

A. The Chief of Police.

Q. Can you tell the court what have you testified in that proceeding.?

A. I testified there against myself because I cannot bear looking at my grandchildren, the children of Concordia Abano who were small and who were in jail with
Concordia and who were crying all the time and Concordia requested me to own everything in this case so she will be released.

Q. What was the result of that hearing on preliminary investigation on March 4, 1980?

A. Concordia was released,

COURT [To witness]:

Q. You said that you were unable to bear the sight of your grandchildren in jail and so you managed to have Concordia Abano released, what did you testify to in the
preliminary investigation that caused Concordia Abano to be released?

A. I testified there that I was the one who ordered because I was confused that time.

Q. Order to what?

A. I was the one who ordered the killing.

Q. Whom?

A. My husband.

Q. What was your reason for being confused. That is not a reason for ordering the killing?
 A. I was confused of the sorrows I felt that I was suspected of ordering the killing of my husband. I did not do it.

Q. Did you not state for the reason of the killing the fact that your husband was living with another woman?

A. That is not true, because, although my husband was living with that woman for three years I never did anything against him because I have no ill-reefing against my
husband.

ATTY. DE LA VICTORIA —

I want to make of record that the witness is crying in the course of her testimony on that point.

COURT —

Make it of record. 34

On cross-examination, Eugenia disclosed that she allowed Agripino and Bienvenida to live in their conjugal hut on the land of

Mendoza which she and Agripino used to till as tenants therein, because Agripino was "brave" and he used to box and maltreat her whenever she expressed her objection to
Agripino's cohabitation with Bienvenida. Eugenia surmised that it was his paramour who induced her husband to maltreat her so that she would die and Agripino and Bienvenida
would Eugenia also admitted that she knew be free to live together. 35 Eliseo and "Pablo" Cabana because as quack doctors, they treated the children of Rodolfo. 36

According to Eugenia, she voluntarily went to the municipal building on February 11, 1980 to seek protection after she heard rumors that Agripino's brothers and sisters were
threatening to kill her. 37 In the municipal building, Rodolfo requested her to admit the crimes so that his wife could be released and then, he apologized to her for the
statements against her that he had given the police. 38 Eugenia insisted that she admitted participation in the crimes because of the request of her son. 39

To establish the whereabouts of Eliseo Cabana when the crimes were committed, the defense presented in court his wife, Patricia. She testified that on the night of February 7,
her husband was at home in Bairan, Toledo City and that when she woke up at 4:00 o'clock in the morning, Eliseo was still asleep. 40 She stated that her husband did not use
Lucio as an alias because he was known as either Li or Eli among his friends and neighbors. 41

Eliseo himself admitted that he was familiarly known as Eli. 42 He was a farmer who was also engaged in mending pots and pans and in making handles or scabbards of bolos. He
denied being a quack doctor. 43

After he and his son Teofilo were arrested on February 14, 1980 in Toledo City and Pinamungahan, respectively, they were detained at the Balamban jail, where they were
handcuffed the whole night. When their handcuffs were removed in the morning, a policeman told them that two deaths had occurred in Cantuod and, with a gun pointed at
them, that policeman told them to admit the killings otherwise he would break their heads. Eliseo was not able to say a thing but he took cover behind a cemented wall. Later, a
policeman named Boy Rosario told them to affix their thumbmarks to a document the contents of which were not read to them.44

It was Rodolfo Abano or Rudy who categorically told them to admit having perpetrated the killings and to produce two bolos so they could be exonerated. 45 One of the bolos
thus presented was owned by Ambrosio Pilapil.46 Eliseo told the police about it and the latter took it from Pilapil sometime in February, 1980. Pilapil had delivered it to Eliseo in
order that a scabbard could be made for it and Eliseo returned it to Pilapil on February 25, 1980.47
The other bolo, Exhibit B, was recovered in Eliseo's house by the police. According to Eliseo, Rudy Abano left it with him early in the morning of February 8, 1980 with the
intention of bartering it with one chicken which Rudy needed for his daughter's birthday. 48

Eliseo expressed his belief that Rodolfo and Concordia Abano were involved in the killings but that they pointed to other persons indiscriminately so that they could extricate
themselves from the charges. 49 Although he admitted having been convicted of homicide in another case, Eliseo denied involvement in the murders of Agripino and
Bienvenida.50

For his part, Teofilo Cabana, a farmer and coconut-gatherer, testified that on February 7 and 8, 1980, he was in his house in Binabag, Pinamungahan, Cebu. 51 He denied having
participated in the murders of Agripino and Bienvenida.52 He stated that he did not use Pablo as an alias and labelled as lies the prosecution's allegation that he and his father
were quack doctors.

Special counsel Gabriel Trocio, Jr. testified that on February 27, 1980, he administered the oath of Rodolfo Abano who retracted his statement implicating his own mother. In his
sworn retraction, Rodolfo stated that he was forced to make said statement because he wanted his wife to be released as he and his wife were in a "difficult and bitter situation"
inasmuch as his pregnant wife had to breastfeed their youngest child in jail. 53

Defense counsel Rafael de la Victoria testified that on February 18, 1980, Rodolfo Abano sought the help of the Citizens Legal Assistance Office in behalf of his wife and
mother. 54 He asserted that contrary to Rodolfo's allegation, the latter voluntarily executed his affidavit of retraction. 55 According to Atty. De la Victoria, he filed before the
investigating judge a motion to postpone the preliminary investigation on February 28, 1980 to March 6, 1980 56 but it was not acted upon. When he learned that Eugenia
confessed during the continuation of the preliminary investigation on March 4, 1980 while he, as her counsel could not appear in court, Atty. De la Victoria confronted Eugenia
who told him that she was "constrained" to make self-incriminating statements during that hearing. 57 Consequently, on March 8, 1980, Eugenio executed a sworn statement
professing innocence of the crimes charged against her and stating that she made self-incriminating statements because of her confused mind and her pity for Concordia whom
she wanted released from jail because she was breastfeeding a child and her other children were all crying inside the jail. 58

The prosecution did not present any rebuttal witnesses.

On January 27, 1981, the lower court rendered the decision under consideration. The lower court stated that the "web of circumstantial evidence" produced "beyond all doubt,
complete proof of the guilt" of Eugenia Abano as principal by inducement and Eliseo and Teofilo Cabana as principals by direct and actual participation. 59 It considered as
"evidence of high caliber and of great persuasive value" Eugenia's confession which, it believed, "was not extracted from her under custodial interrogation by police
authorities." 60

In the instant mandatory review, Eugenia Abano, through her counsel de oficio, contends that the lower court erred in: [a] appreciating against her, her alleged verbal
extrajudicial confession and her inculpatory statements during the preliminary investigation on March 4, 1980 after she had waived her right to such investigation, in the
absence of her counsel and without her being informed of her rights under Section 20, Article IV of the Constitution, and [b] failing to acquit her in both cases on the ground that
the prosecution failed to prove her guilt beyond reasonable doubt.

For Eliseo and Teofilo Cabana, the same counsel de oficio avers that the lower court erred in: [a] appreciating against them their alleged extrajudicial confession and that of their
co-accused, Eugenia Abano, as well as the latter's confession during the preliminary investigation; [b] giving fun faith and credit to the testimony of Concordia Abano and [c]
failing to acquit the accused on grounds of reasonable doubt.

In view of the absence of eyewitnesses to the killings, the confessions of the accused are of great importance in the disposition of these cases. Understandably, the appellant's
assignments of errors are focused on the issue of whether the rights of the accused had been properly protected when they made self-incriminating statements. The
Constitutional provision involved states thus:
 SEC. 20. No person shall be compelled to be a witness against himself. Any person under investigation for the commission of an offense shall have the right to remain
silent and to counsel, and to be informed of such right. No force, violence, threat, intimidation, or any other means which vitiates the free will shall be used against him.
Any confession obtained in violation of this section shall be inadmissible in evidence. [Art. IV]

As the confessions in question were taken during the effectivity of the 1973 Constitution" the aforequoted constitutional provision is applicable in this case. 61

In People vs. Duero, G.R. No. 52016, May 13, 1981, 104 SCRA 379, this Court discussed extensively the procedural safeguards for in-custody interrogation of accused persons. In
that case, wherein no eyewitnesses testified to the brutal killing of an octogenarian, the chief of police, corroborated by the sworn statements of two other policemen, testified
that the accused voluntarily confessed to the killing. In ruling against the admissibility of the alleged oral confession, this Court stressed the fact that the prosecution failed to
prove that before the accused made his alleged oral confession, he was informed of his rights to remain silent and to have counsel as there was no proof that he knowingly and
intelligently waived those rights. The Duero ruling is applicable in this case.

While Eugenia Abano was free to go home from February 8, 1980 when she was first "invited" for questioning by Chief of Police Cabahug until the time she confessed on
February 11, 1980, she was in fact in the custody of the police notwithstanding Cabahug's assertion that she was "not exactly placed in jail." 62

Concededly, Cabahug informed Eugenia that she needed a lawyer. But there is no proof that Cabahug offered to secure one of her at the instance of the State especially after
she had manifested that she could not afford to hire her own counsel. 63 Cabahug's omission to make such offer is a grave one. It rendered her alleged confession inadmissible. 64

Similarly, there is no evidence that Eugenia was informed of her right to remain silent. Neither is there proof that she had voluntarily, knowingly and intelligently waived that
right. 65

Moreover, as the unchallenged testimony of Eugenia reveals, she made the confession because the chief of police promised that she would "not be included in the case" as she
would be discharged as a prosecution witness. Considering her emotional and mental state at that time, that promise must have overcome Eugenia's better judgment. It became
a factor which contributed to the inadmissibility of her confession. 66

Chief of police Cabahug's uncorroborated testimony on the confessions of Eliseo and Teofilo Cabana is likewise bereft of indications that he had observed the procedural
safeguards mandated by the Constitution to which the Cabanas are entitled as a matter of right. In fact, from Eliseo's unrebutted testimony, use of threats to extract their
alleged confessions is evident. 67

We agree with the Solicitor General that the municipal judge who conducted the preliminary investigation need not apprise Eugenia of the nature and gravity of the charges
against her and the consequences of her admission thereof when she appeared as witness for Concordia Abano. During that investigation, all that was needed was for the
investigating judge to remind her that she was under oath and that she should "ten the truth and nothing but the truth."

But the Solicitor General overlooked an aspect in the presentation of Eugenia as her daughter-in-law's witness which cannot pass the test of fundamental fairness. She was
presented as such witness after she had waived her right to preliminary investigation and at a time when she was unassisted by counsel. As it were, Eugenia, an unschooled
copra-maker, was left to fend for herself in a proceeding wherein she herself was the accused.

What added gall to her bitter predicament was the fact that she was presented as a witness to forestall the further detention of her daughter-in-law and insure the latter's
discharge as her co-accused only to find herself in the precarious situation of answering questions the implications of which may have been beyond her comprehension.
Ironically, the investigating judge cited "human considerations" as a reason for discharging Concordia as an accused, unmindful of the fact that in allowing Eugenia to incriminate
herself, he was trampling on her rights as an accused.
As this Court enunciated in Chavez vs. Court of Appeals, L-29169, August 19, 1968, 24 SCRA 663, 680 and inBermudez vs. Castillo, 64 Phil. 483, 488, the rule against self-
incrimination positively intends to avoid and prohibit the certainly inhuman procedure of compelling a person "to furnish the missing evidence necessary for his conviction." In
the Chavez case, we express the view that the rule may apply even to a co-defendant in a joint trial

The situation would have been different had Eugenia been assisted by counsel during the preliminary investigation For the- she could have availed herself of legal advice on
when to refrain from answering incriminating questions.

We consider the absence of Eugenia's counsel when she appeared as witness during the preliminary investigation as an irreparable damage which rendered inadmissible her
alleged confession.

The inadmissibility in evidence of the accused's extrajudicial confession, notwithstanding, We find the "web of circumstantial evidence" which the trial court found sufficient for
conviction, to have remained unimpaired. Under Section 5 of Rule 133, circumstantial evidence is sufficient for conviction if: [a] there is more than one circumstance; [b] the
facts from which the inferences are derived are proven; and [c] the combination of all the circumstances is such as to produce a conviction beyond a reasonable doubt. These
requirements have been satisfied in the case at bar.

Concordia testified that she saw Eugenia Abano with her co-accused, Eliseo and Teofilo Cabana, taking supper together at the former's house hours before the commission of
the crimes; that Eliseo and Teofilo forced her [Concordia] to accompany them to Agripino's hut and in order to draw Agripino out of said hut, instructed her to say that her
husband Rodolfo needed to be brought to a doctor because of a stomach ache; and that after she returned to her hut, Eugenia woke Rodolfo to ask him to bring Eliseo and
Teofilo in his motorized tricycle to Matab-ang, Toledo City. This testimony was not rebutted, but in fact corroborated in part by Delia Cumad, who testified to hearing Concordia
calling to Agripino to bring Rodolfo to a doctor as he was suffering from a stomach ache; and by Rodolfo himself, who testified to his being roused from sleep by his mother
Eugenia with the request to bring the Cabanas to Matab-ang, Toledo City. Noteworthy is the fact that her request came shortly after the victims were hacked to death as it was
while Rodolfo and Concordia were on their way to get the tricycle from the garage that they met Delia, who was then on her way to a neighbor's house to seek help.

Rodolfo testified that from the garage, he went back to his hut, where after Concordia had alighted from the tricycle, Eugenia, boarded it up to a place near the latter's hut
where she got off and the Cabanas in turn boarded it. Rodolfo likewise stated that he noticed the Cabanas carrying a piece of sack rolled over a two-foot object.

The events narrated by Concordia, Delia and Rodolfo constitute an unbroken chain of natural and rational circumstances, which corroborate each other and point beyond
reasonable doubt to the complicity of the accused in the crimes.

The defense attempted to discredit Concordia by turning the tables on her. No reason nor motive was however proferred why Concordia would commit the crimes or why she
would falsely accuse her own mother-in-law and the Cabanas, who were virtual strangers and against whom she held no grudge, of crimes so grave. On the other hand, among
the persons implicated, it was Eugenia Abano who had the motive to order the killing of her husband and his paramour. Her initial protestation that she harbored no ill-feelings
toward her husband and his common-law wife was totally negated by her very own testimony that Agripino used to box and maltreat her every time she objected to his
cohabitation with Bienvenida and the suspicion she expressed that it was Bienvenida who induced her husband to maltreat her so that she would die and they would be free to
live together. Because her husband was "brave" she could not do anything openly about the situation and she merely kept her resentment concealed within her. Human nature
as it is, the tendency is for pent-up emotions to grow and magnify, rather than diminish and disappear, particularly where the cause thereof is constantly present, as in the case
at bar, and it is not uncommon in the realm of human experience for such emotions to burst and translate themselves into violence-thus, the so-called crimes of passion.

The Court sympathizes with the most pitiful plight of Eugenia Abano. How she must have suffered during the three years that her husband lived with his paramour. The wound
in her heart, occasioned by the separation, never had a chance to heal, but was kept raw and bleeding by the brazen and cruel behavior of her husband maintaining a love nest
so near the abandoned wife. Four hundred meters in an urban area may seem a long distance, but not so in a rural community where the next-door neighbor may be housed at
an even greater distance. It is indeed in cases like this, that the bounden duty of the court to apply the law becomes a painful task and the maxim "dura lex, sed lex" makes its
full impact felt. In view of the exceptional circumstances obtaining in the case at bar, the Court recommends executive clemency for accused-appellant Eugenia Abano.
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Cebu-Bohol Circuit Criminal Court in Criminal Cases Nos. CCC-XIV-2147 and CCC-XIV-2148, is hereby affirmed with the modification that the civil
indemnities for the heirs of the deceased Agripino Abano and the heirs of the deceased Bienvenida Cumad are hereby increased to P30,000.00 each. For lack of necessary votes,
the two death penalties imposed on each of the accused are hereby commuted to reclusion perpetua. Let copies of this decision be furnished the Minister of Justice.

SO ORDERED.

Teehankee, C.J., Feria, Yap, Narvasa Alampay, Gutierrez, Jr., Cruz and Paras, JJ., concur.

Feliciano, J., is on leave.

Separate Opinions

MELENCIO-HERRERA, J., concurring:

I believe that if executive clemency is recommended for the principal by inducement, it should also be recommended for the other two accused who, without such inducement,
would not have committed the crime. Their is a collective criminal responsibility.

Footnotes
1 Exhibit F. 25 Exhibit I, pp. 25 to 28; Folder of Exhibits, 49 TSN, supra p. 25.
2 TSN, October 21, 1980, p. 15. pp. 36 to 39. 50 TSN, January 21, 1981, pp. 19 & 25.
3 TSN, supra. 26 Exhibit I, p. 35; Folder of Exhibits p. 46. 51 TSN, January 26, 1981, pp. 4-5.
4 TSN, October 21, 1980, p. 4. 27 Record, p. 17. 52 TSN, supra, p. 6.
5 TSN, October 21, 1980, p. 11. 28 Record, pp. 21-22. 53 Exhibit 2-Abano; Folder of Exhibits, p. 98.
6 Exhibits D & H. 29 Exhibit 2-Cabana; Folder of Exhibits, p. 93. 54 Exhibit 5.
7 Exhibit D. 30 Record, p. 39. 55 TSN, January 22, 1981, p. 29.
8 TSN, December 4, 1980, p. 7 and 31 TSN, January 20, 1981, p. 3. 56 Exhibit 3-Abano; Folder of Exhibits, p.
November 18, 1980, pp. 2-3. 32 TSN, supra, p. 4. 102.
9 Exhibit D. 33 TSN, supra, pp. 5-6. 57 TSN, supra, p. 32.
10 Exhibits E & G. 34 TSN, supra, pp. 7-8. 58 Exhibit 4; Folder of Exhibits, p. 105.
11 Exhibit E. 35 TSN, supra, p. 11. 59 Decision, pp. 23-24; Record. pp. 206-207.
12 Exhibit C and Record, p. 5. 36 TSN, supra. 60 Decision, pp. 25-26; Record, pp. 208-209.
13 Exhibit C. 37 TSN, supra, p. 13. 61 Magtoto vs. Manguera, L-37201-02,
14 TSN, December 4, 1980, p. 3. 38 TSN, supra, p. 14. March 3, 1975, 63 SCRA 4.
15 TSN, December 4, 1980, p. 1 0. 39 TSN, supra p. 15. 62 TSN, December 4, 1980, pp. 20-21.
16 TSN, December 4, 1980, p. 18. 40 TSN, January 21, 1981, pp. 4 & 6. 63 TSN, supra, p. 24.
17 Record, p. 7. 41 TSN, supra, pp. 6 & 7. 64 People vs. Pascual Jr., G.R. No. 53403,
18 Record, p. 10. 42 TSN, January 21, 1981, p. 1 1. November 12, 1981, 09 SCRA 197, 205.
19 TSN, January 21, 1981, p. 6. 43 TSN, supra; p. 21. 65 People vs. Matilla, G.R. No. 53570, July
20 TSN, supra, p. 15. 44 TSN, supra, p. 16. 24, 1981, 105 SCRA 768, 772.
21 TSN, December 4, 1980, pp. 4-5. 45 TSN, supra, p. 17. 66 People vs. Alto, L-18660, November 29,
22 Exhibit 1, p. 2; Folder of Exhibits, p. 13. 46 Exhibit A. 1968, 26 SCRA 342, 364.
23 Exhibit 6. 47 TSN, January 20, 1981, p. 17. 67 TSN, January 21, 1981, p. 16.
24 Record, pp. 15-16. 48 TSN, January 21, 1981, p. 20.
 [G.R. No. 143989. July 14, 2003]
ISABELITA S. LAHOM, petitioner, vs. JOSE MELVIN SIBULO (previously referred to as DR. MELVIN S. LAHOM), respondent.

DECISION
VITUG, J.:
The bliss of marriage and family would be to most less than complete without children. The realization could have likely prodded the spouses Dr. Diosdado Lahom and
Isabelita Lahom to take into their care Isabelitas nephew Jose Melvin Sibulo and to bring him up as their own. At the tender age of two, Jose Melvin enjoyed the warmth, love and
support of the couple who treated the child like their own. Indeed, for years, Dr. and Mrs. Lahom fancied on legally adopting Jose Melvin. Finally, in 1971, the couple decided to
file a petition for adoption. On 05 May 1972, an order granting the petition was issued that made all the more intense than before the feeling of affection of the spouses for
Melvin. In keeping with the court order, the Civil Registrar of Naga City changed the name Jose Melvin Sibulo to Jose Melvin Lahom.
A sad turn of events came many years later. Eventually, in December of 1999, Mrs. Lahom commenced a petition to rescind the decree of adoption before the Regional Trial
Court (RTC), Branch 22, of Naga City. In her petition, she averred -

7. That x x x despite the proddings and pleadings of said spouses, respondent refused to change his surname from Sibulo to Lahom, to the frustrations of petitioner particularly
her husband until the latter died, and even before his death he had made known his desire to revoke respondents adoption, but was prevented by petitioners supplication,
however with his further request upon petitioner to give to charity whatever properties or interest may pertain to respondent in the future.
xxxxxxxxx

10. That respondent continued using his surname Sibulo to the utter disregard of the feelings of herein petitioner, and his records with the Professional Regulation Commission
showed his name as Jose Melvin M. Sibulo originally issued in 1978 until the present, and in all his dealings and activities in connection with his practice of his profession, he is
Jose Melvin M. Sibulo.
xxxxxxxxx

13. That herein petitioner being a widow, and living alone in this city with only her household helps to attend to her, has yearned for the care and show of concern from a son,
but respondent remained indifferent and would only come to Naga to see her once a year.

14. That for the last three or four years, the medical check-up of petitioner in Manila became more frequent in view of a leg ailment, and those were the times when petitioner
would need most the care and support from a love one, but respondent all the more remained callous and utterly indifferent towards petitioner which is not expected of a son.

15. That herein respondent has recently been jealous of petitioners nephews and nieces whenever they would find time to visit her, respondent alleging that they were only
motivated by their desire for some material benefits from petitioner.

16. That in view of respondents insensible attitude resulting in a strained and uncomfortable relationship between him and petitioner, the latter has suffered wounded feelings,
knowing that after all respondents only motive to his adoption is his expectancy of his alleged rights over the properties of herein petitioner and her late husband, clearly shown
by his recent filing of Civil Case No. 99-4463 for partition against petitioner, thereby totally eroding her love and affection towards respondent, rendering the decree of adoption,
considering respondent to be the child of petitioner, for all legal purposes, has been negated for which reason there is no more basis for its existence, hence this petition for
revocation.[1]
Prior to the institution of the case, specifically on 22 March 1998, Republic Act (R.A.) No. 8552, also known as the Domestic Adoption Act, went into effect. The new statute
deleted from the law the right of adopters to rescind a decree of adoption.
Section 19 of Article VI of R.A. No. 8552 now reads:

SEC. 19. Grounds for Rescission of Adoption. Upon petition of the adoptee, with the assistance of the Department if a minor or if over eighteen (18) years of age but is
incapacitated, as guardian/counsel, the adoption may be rescinded on any of the following grounds committed by the adopter(s): (a) repeated physical and verbal maltreatment
by the adopter(s) despite having undergone counseling; (b) attempt on the life of the adoptee; (c) sexual assault or violence; or (d) abandonment and failure to comply with
parental obligations.

Adoption, being in the best interest of the child, shall not be subject to rescission by the adopter(s). However, the adopter(s) may disinherit the adoptee for causes provided
in Article 919 of the Civil Code. (emphasis supplied)
Jose Melvin moved for the dismissal of the petition, contending principally (a) that the trial court had no jurisdiction over the case and (b) that the petitioner had no cause of
action in view of the aforequoted provisions of R.A. No. 8552. Petitioner asseverated, by way of opposition, that the proscription in R.A. No. 8552 should not retroactively
apply, i.e., to cases where the ground for rescission of the adoption vested under the regime of then Article 348 [2] of the Civil Code and Article 192[3] of the Family Code.
In an order, dated 28 April 2000, the trial court held thusly:

On the issue of jurisdiction over the subject matter of the suit, Section 5(c) of R.A. No. 8369 confers jurisdiction to this Court, having been designated Family Court in A.M. No.
99-11-07 SC.

On the matter of no cause of action, the test on the sufficiency of the facts alleged in the complaint, is whether or not, admitting the facts alleged, the Court could render a valid
judgment in accordance with the prayer of said complaint (De Jesus, et al. vs. Belarmino, et al., 95 Phil. 365).

Admittedly, Section 19, Article VI of R.A. No. 8552 deleted the right of an adopter to rescind an adoption earlier granted under the Family Code. Conformably, on the face of the
petition, indeed there is lack of cause of action.

Petitioner however, insists that her right to rescind long acquired under the provisions of the Family Code should be respected. Assuming for the sake of argument, that
petitioner is entitled to rescind the adoption of respondent granted on May 5, 1972, said right should have been exercised within the period allowed by the Rules. From the
averments in the petition, it appears clear that the legal grounds for the petition have been discovered and known to petitioner for more than five (5) years, prior to the filing of
the instant petition on December 1, 1999, hence, the action if any, had already prescribed. (Sec. 5, Rule 100 Revised Rules of Court)

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing consideration, the petition is ordered dismissed. [4]
Via a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Court, petitioner raises the following questions; viz:
1. May the subject adoption, decreed on 05 May 1972, still be revoked or rescinded by an adopter after the effectivity of R.A. No. 8552?
2. In the affirmative, has the adopters action prescribed?
 A brief background on the law and its origins could provide some insights on the subject. In ancient times, the Romans undertook adoption to assure male heirs in the
family.[5] The continuity of the adopters family was the primary purpose of adoption and all matters relating to it basically focused on the rights of the adopter. There was hardly
any mention about the rights of the adopted.[6] Countries, like Greece, France, Spain and England, in an effort to preserve inheritance within the family, neither allowed nor
recognized adoption.[7] It was only much later when adoption was given an impetus in law and still later when the welfare of the child became a paramount concern. [8] Spain itself
which previously disfavored adoption ultimately relented and accepted the Roman law concept of adoption which, subsequently, was to find its way to the archipelago. The
Americans came and introduced their own ideas on adoption which, unlike most countries in Europe, made the interests of the child an overriding consideration.[9] In the early
part of the century just passed, the rights of children invited universal attention; the Geneva Declaration of Rights of the Child of 1924 and the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights of 1948,[10] followed by the United Nations Declarations of the Rights of the Child, [11] were written instruments that would also protect and safeguard the rights of adopted
children. The Civil Code of the Philippines[12] of 1950 on adoption, later modified by the Child and Youth Welfare Code [13] and then by the Family Code of the Philippines, [14] gave
immediate statutory acknowledgment to the rights of the adopted. In 1989, the United Nations initiated the Convention of the Rights of the Child. The Philippines, a State Party
to the Convention, accepted the principle that adoption was impressed with social and moral responsibility, and that its underlying intent was geared to favor the adopted
child. R.A. No. 8552 secured these rights and privileges for the adopted.Most importantly, it affirmed the legitimate status of the adopted child, not only in his new family but also
in the society as well. The new law withdrew the right of an adopter to rescind the adoption decree and gave to the adopted child the sole right to sever the legal ties created by
adoption.
Petitioner, however, would insist that R.A. No. 8552 should not adversely affect her right to annul the adoption decree, nor deprive the trial court of its jurisdiction to hear
the case, both being vested under the Civil Code and the Family Code, the laws then in force.
The concept of vested right is a consequence of the constitutional guaranty of due process [15] that expresses a present fixed interest which in right reason and natural justice
is protected against arbitrary state action;[16] it includes not only legal or equitable title to the enforcement of a demand but also exemptions from new obligations created after
the right has become vested.[17] Rights are considered vested when the right to enjoyment is a present interest,[18] absolute, unconditional, and perfect[19] or fixed and irrefutable.
In Republic vs. Court of Appeals,[20] a petition to adopt Jason Condat was filed by Zenaida C. Bobiles on 02 February 1988 when the Child and Youth Welfare Code (Presidential
Decree No. 603) allowed an adoption to be sought by either spouse or both of them. After the trial court had rendered its decision and while the case was still pending on appeal,
the Family Code of the Philippines (Executive Order No. 209), mandating joint adoption by the husband and wife, took effect. Petitioner Republic argued that the case should be
dismissed for having been filed by Mrs. Bobiles alone and without being joined by the husband. The Court concluded that the jurisdiction of the court is determined by the statute
in force at the time of the commencement of the action. The petition to adopt Jason, having been filed with the court at the time when P.D. No. 603 was still in effect, the right
of Mrs. Bobiles to file the petition, without being joined by her husband, according to the Court had become vested. In Republic vs. Miller,[21] spouses Claude and Jumrus Miller,
both aliens, sought to adopt Michael Madayag. On 29 July 1988, the couple filed a petition to formalize Michaels adoption having theretofore been taken into their care. At the
time the action was commenced, P.D. No. 603 allowed aliens to adopt. After the decree of adoption and while on appeal before the Court of Appeals, the Family Code was enacted
into law on 08 August 1988 disqualifying aliens from adopting Filipino children. The Republic then prayed for the withdrawal of the adoption decree. In discarding the argument
posed by the Republic, the Supreme Court ruled that the controversy should be resolved in the light of the law governing at the time the petition was filed.
It was months after the effectivity of R.A. No. 8552 that herein petitioner filed an action to revoke the decree of adoption granted in 1975. By then, the new law,[22] had
already abrogated and repealed the right of an adopter under the Civil Code and the Family Code to rescind a decree of adoption. Consistently with its earlier pronouncements,
the Court should now hold that the action for rescission of the adoption decree, having been initiated by petitioner after R.A. No. 8552 had come into force, no longer could be
pursued.
Interestingly, even before the passage of the statute, an action to set aside the adoption is subject to the fiveyear bar rule under Rule 100[23] of the Rules of Court and that
the adopter would lose the right to revoke the adoption decree after the lapse of that period. The exercise of the right within a prescriptive period is a condition that could not
fulfill the requirements of a vested right entitled to protection. It must also be acknowledged that a person has no vested right in statutory privileges. [24] While adoption has often
been referred to in the context of a right, the privilege to adopt is itself not naturally innate or fundamental but rather a right merely created by statute.[25] It is a privilege that is
governed by the states determination on what it may deem to be for the best interest and welfare of the child. [26] Matters relating to adoption, including the withdrawal of the
right of an adopter to nullify the adoption decree, are subject to regulation by the State. [27] Concomitantly, a right of action given by statute may be taken away at anytime before
it has been exercised.[28]
 While R.A. No. 8552 has unqualifiedly withdrawn from an adopter a consequential right to rescind the adoption decree even in cases where the adoption might clearly turn
out to be undesirable, it remains, nevertheless, the bounden duty of the Court to apply the law. Dura lex sed lex would be the hackneyed truism that those caught in the law have
to live with.It is still noteworthy, however, that an adopter, while barred from severing the legal ties of adoption, can always for valid reasons cause the forfeiture of certain
benefits otherwise accruing to an undeserving child. For instance, upon the grounds recognized by law, an adopter may deny to an adopted child his legitime and, by a will and
testament, may freely exclude him from having a share in the disposable portion of his estate.
WHEREFORE, the assailed judgment of the court a quo is AFFIRMED. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C.J., (Chairman), Ynares-Santiago, Carpio, and Azcuna, JJ., concur.

[1] [16]
Rollo, pp. 25-26. Ayog vs. Cusi, Jr. G.R. No. L-46729, 19 November 1982 (118 SCRA 492).
[2] [17]
Art. 348. The adopter may petition the court for revocation of the adoption in any 16 Am. Jur. 2d, Constitutional Law, p.651.
[18]
of these cases: Benquet Consolidated Mining Co. vs. Pineda, No. L-7231, 28 March 1956 (98 Phil.
(1) If the adopted person has attempted against the life of the adopter; 711) quoting Pearsall vs. Great Northern R. Co., 161 U.S. 646.
[19]
(2) When the adopted minor has abandoned the home of the adopter for more than Reyes vs. Commission on Audit, G.R. No. 125129, 29 March 1999 (305 SCRA 512)
three years; as cited in Bernabe vs. Alejo, G.R. No. 140500, 21 January 2002 (374 SCRA
(3) When by other acts the adopted person has definitely repudiated the 180).
[20]
adoption. (n) G.R. No. 92326, 24 January 1992 (205 SCRA 356).
[3] [21]
Art. 192. The adopters may petition the court for the judicial rescission of the G.R. No. 125932, 21 April 1999 (306 SCRA 183).
[22]
adoption in any of the following cases: Section 26. Repealing Clause. Any law, presidential decree or issuance, executive
(1) If the adopted has committed any act constituting a ground for disinheriting a order, letter of instruction, administrative order, rule, or regulation contrary
descendant; or to, or inconsistent with the provisions of this Act is hereby repealed, or
(2) When the adopted has abandoned the home of the adopters during minority for modified, or amended accordingly.
[23]
at least one year, or, by some other acts, has definitely repudiated the SEC. 5. Time within which to file petition.- A minor or other incapacitated person
adoption. (41a, P.D. No. 603) must file the petition for rescission or revocation of adoption within the five
[4]
Rollo, pp. 33-34. years following his majority, or if he was incompetent at the time of the
[5]
The Law of Adoption, Morton L. Leavy & Rey Weinbey, 4th Edition (1979). adoption, within the five (5) years following the recovery from such
[6]
The Law on Adoption and Surrogate Parenting, Irving J. Sloan (1988). incompetency.
[7]
Ibid., p.7. The adopter must also file the petition to set aside the adoption within five (5) years
[8]
Id. The earliest adoption statute was reported in Mississippi in 1846. In 1850, Texas from the time the cause or causes giving rise to the rescission or revocation
and Vermont, USA passed their general adoption statutes, followed by of the same took place. (emphasis supplied)
[24]
Massachusetts and New York in 1851. Id. at 24, citing Brearly School vs. Ward, 210 NY 358, 40 LRA NS. 1215; also, Cooley,
[9]
A Comparative Study of the Adoption Law under the Spanish Civil Code and the Constitutional Limitations, 7th Ed. p. 546.
[25]
Code of Civil Procedure, 4 Phil. L.J. 313-323 (1918). Martin vs. Putman (Miss) 427 So 2d 1373; There is no right of adoption. It is the
[10]
United Nation General Assembly, Resolution dated 10 December 1948. extension of a privilege. Eggleston vs. Landrum 210 Miss 645, 50 So 2d 364,
[11]
United Nation General Assembly/ 44/ 49 (1989). 23 ALR2d 696.
[12] [26]
Presidential Decree No. 386. Browder vs. Harmeyer (Ind App) as cited in AmJur, 2d, Vol. 2.
[13] [27]
Presidential Decree No. 603 (10 June 1975), as amended by P.D. No. 1175 (15 Adoption has also been characterized as a status created by the state acting
August 1977). as parens patriae, the sovereign parent. Douglas vs. Harrelson (Ala App) 454
[14]
Executive Order 209 (03 August 1988). So 2d 984.
[15] [28]
16 CJS citing City of Los Angeles vs. Oliver, 283 P. 298, 102 Cal. App. 299. 16 CJS citing Robinsons vs. Mchugh, 291 P. 330, 158 Wash. 157.
LAHOM VS SIBULO
G.R. No. 143989 July 14, 2003

FACTS:
A childless couple adopted the wife's nephew and brought him up as their own. In 1972, the trial court granted the petition for adoption, and ordered the Civil Registrar to
change the name Jose Melvin Sibulo to Jose Melvin Lahom. Mrs. Lahom commenced a petition to rescind the decree of adoption, in which she averred, that, despite the her
pleas and that of her husband, their adopted son refused to use their surname Lahom and continue to use Sibulo in all his dealing and activities. Prior to the institution of the
case, in 1998, RA No. 8552 went into effect. The new statute deleted from the law the right of adopters to rescind a decree of adoption (Section 19 of Article VI).
These turn of events revealing Jose's callous indifference, ingratitude and lack of care and concern prompted Lahom to file a petition in Court in December 1999 to rescind the
decree of adoption previously issued way back on May 5, 1972. When Lahom filed said petition there was already a new law on adoption, specifically R.A. 8552 also known as
the Domestic Adoption Act passed on March 22,1998, wherein it was provided that: "Adoption, being in the interest of the child, shall not be subject to rescission by the
adopter(s). However the adopter(s) may disinherit the adoptee for causes provided in Article 919 of the Civil Code" (Section 19).
ISSUE:
Whether or not the subject adoption still be revoked or rescinded by an adopter after the effectivity of R.A. No. 8552, and if in the affirmative, whether or not the adopter’s
action prescribed.
RULING:
Jurisdiction of the court is determined by the statute in force at the time of the commencement of the action. The controversy should be resolved in the light of the law
governing at the time the petition was filed. In this case, it was months after the effectivity of RA 8552 that Lahom filed an action to revoke the decree of adoption granted in
1972. By then the new law had already abrogated and repealed the right of the adopter under the Civil Code and the family Code to rescind a decree of adoption. So the
rescission of the adoption decree, having been initiated by Lahom after RA 8552 had come into force, could no longer be pursued.
Besides, even before the passage of RA8552, an action to set aside the adoption is subject to the five year bar rule under Rule 100 of the Rules of Court and that the adopter
would lose the right to revoke the adoption decree after the lapse of that period. The exercise of the right within a prescriptive period is a condition that could not fulfill the
requirements of a vested right entitled to protection. Rights are considered vested when the right to the enjoyment is a present interest, absolute, unconditional and perfect or
fixed and irrefutable. The concept of a "vested right" is a consequence of the constitutional guarantee of due process that expresses a present fixed interest which in right
reason and natural justice is protected against arbitrary state action. While adoption has often been referred to in the context of a "right", it is not naturally innate or
fundamental but rather a right merely created by statute. It is more of a privilege that is governed by the state's determination on what it may deem to be for the best interest
and welfare of the child. Matters relating to adoption, including the withdrawal of the right of the adopter to nullify the adoption decree, are subject to State regulation.
Concomitantly, a right of action given by a statute may be taken away at any time before it has been exercised.
But an adopter, while barred from severing the legal ties of adoption, can always for valid reasons cause the forfeiture of certain benefits otherwise accruing to an undeserving
child, like denying him his legitime, and by will and testament, may expressly exclude him from having a share in the disposable portion of his estate.

[G.R. No. 148311. March 31, 2005]

IN THE MATTER OF THE ADOPTION OF STEPHANIE NATHY ASTORGA GARCIA
HONORATO B. CATINDIG, petitioner.

DECISION
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J.:
May an illegitimate child, upon adoption by her natural father, use the surname of her natural mother as her middle name? This is the issue raised in the instant case.
 The facts are undisputed.
On August 31, 2000, Honorato B. Catindig, herein petitioner, filed a petition[1] to adopt his minor illegitimate child Stephanie Nathy Astorga Garcia. He alleged therein,
among others, that Stephanie was born on June 26, 1994;[2] that her mother is Gemma Astorga Garcia; that Stephanie has been using her mothers middle name and surname;
and that he is now a widower and qualified to be her adopting parent. He prayed that Stephanies middle name Astorga be changed to Garcia, her mothers surname, and that her
surname Garciabe changed to Catindig, his surname.
On March 23, 2001,[3] the trial court rendered the assailed Decision granting the adoption, thus:

After a careful consideration of the evidence presented by the petitioner, and in the absence of any opposition to the petition, this Court finds that the petitioner possesses all
the qualifications and none of the disqualification provided for by law as an adoptive parent, and that as such he is qualified to maintain, care for and educate the child to be
adopted; that the grant of this petition would redound to the best interest and welfare of the minor Stephanie Nathy Astorga Garcia. The Court further holds that the petitioners
care and custody of the child since her birth up to the present constitute more than enough compliance with the requirement of Article 35 of Presidential Decree No. 603.

WHEREFORE, finding the petition to be meritorious, the same is GRANTED. Henceforth, Stephanie Nathy Astorga Garcia is hereby freed from all obligations of obedience and
maintenance with respect to her natural mother, and for civil purposes, shall henceforth be the petitioners legitimate child and legal heir. Pursuant to Article 189 of the Family
Code of the Philippines, the minor shall be known as STEPHANIE NATHY CATINDIG.

Upon finality of this Decision, let the same be entered in the Local Civil Registrar concerned pursuant to Rule 99 of the Rules of Court.

Let copy of this Decision be furnished the National Statistics Office for record purposes.

SO ORDERED.[4]
On April 20, 2001, petitioner filed a motion for clarification and/or reconsideration [5] praying that Stephanie should be allowed to use the surname of her natural mother
(GARCIA) as her middle name.
On May 28, 2001,[6] the trial court denied petitioners motion for reconsideration holding that there is no law or jurisprudence allowing an adopted child to use the surname
of his biological mother as his middle name.
Hence, the present petition raising the issue of whether an illegitimate child may use the surname of her mother as her middle name when she is subsequently adopted by
her natural father.
Petitioner submits that the trial court erred in depriving Stephanie of a middle name as a consequence of adoption because: (1) there is no law prohibiting an adopted child
from having a middle name in case there is only one adopting parent; (2) it is customary for every Filipino to have as middle name the surname of the mother; (3) the middle name
or initial is a part of the name of a person; (4) adoption is for the benefit and best interest of the adopted child, hence, her right to bear a proper name should not be violated; (5)
permitting Stephanie to use the middle name Garcia (her mothers surname) avoids the stigma of her illegitimacy; and; (6) her continued use of Garcia as her middle name is not
opposed by either the Catindig or Garcia families.
The Republic, through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), agrees with petitioner that Stephanie should be permitted to use, as her middle name, the surname of her
natural mother for the following reasons:
First, it is necessary to preserve and maintain Stephanies filiation with her natural mother because under Article 189 of the Family Code, she remains to be an intestate heir
of the latter. Thus, to prevent any confusion and needless hardship in the future, her relationship or proof of that relationship with her natural mother should be maintained.
Second, there is no law expressly prohibiting Stephanie to use the surname of her natural mother as her middle name. What the law does not prohibit, it allows.
 Last, it is customary for every Filipino to have a middle name, which is ordinarily the surname of the mother. This custom has been recognized by the Civil Code and Family
Code. In fact, the Family Law Committees agreed that the initial or surname of the mother should immediately precede the surname of the father so that the second name, if any,
will be before the surname of the mother.[7]
We find merit in the petition.

Use Of Surname Is Fixed By Law

For all practical and legal purposes, a man's name is the designation by which he is known and called in the community in which he lives and is best known. It is defined as
the word or combination of words by which a person is distinguished from other individuals and, also, as the label or appellation which he bears for the convenience of the world
at large addressing him, or in speaking of or dealing with him.[8] It is both of personal as well as public interest that every person must have a name.
The name of an individual has two parts: (1) the given or proper name and (2) the surname or family name. The given or proper name is that which is given to the individual
at birth or at baptism, to distinguish him from other individuals. The surname or family name is that which identifies the family to which he belongs and is continued from parent
to child. The given name may be freely selected by the parents for the child, but the surname to which the child is entitled is fixed by law.[9]
Thus, Articles 364 to 380 of the Civil Code provides the substantive rules which regulate the use of surname[10] of an individual whatever may be his status in life, i.e., whether
he may be legitimate or illegitimate, an adopted child, a married woman or a previously married woman, or a widow, thus:

Art. 364. Legitimate and legitimated children shall principally use the surname of the father.

Art. 365. An adopted child shall bear the surname of the adopter.

xxx

Art. 369. Children conceived before the decree annulling a voidable marriage shall principally use the surname of the father.

Art. 370. A married woman may use:

(1) Her maiden first name and surname and add her husband's surname, or

(2) Her maiden first name and her husband's surname or

(3) Her husband's full name, but prefixing a word indicating that she is his wife, such as Mrs.

Art. 371. In case of annulment of marriage, and the wife is the guilty party, she shall resume her maiden name and surname. If she is the innocent spouse, she may resume her
maiden name and surname. However, she may choose to continue employing her former husband's surname, unless:

(1) The court decrees otherwise, or

(2) She or the former husband is married again to another person.

Art. 372. When legal separation has been granted, the wife shall continue using her name and surname employed before the legal separation.

Art. 373. A widow may use the deceased husband's surname as though he were still living, in accordance with Article 370.

Art. 374. In case of identity of names and surnames, the younger person shall be obliged to use such additional name or surname as will avoid confusion.

Art. 375. In case of identity of names and surnames between ascendants and descendants, the word Junior can be used only by a son. Grandsons and other direct male
descendants shall either:

(1) Add a middle name or the mother's surname,

(2) Add the Roman numerals II, III, and so on.

xxx
Law Is Silent As To The Use Of
Middle Name
As correctly submitted by both parties, there is no law regulating the use of a middle name. Even Article 176 [11] of the Family Code, as amended by Republic Act No. 9255,
otherwise known as An Act Allowing Illegitimate Children To Use The Surname Of Their Father, is silent as to what middle name a child may use.
The middle name or the mothers surname is only considered in Article 375(1), quoted above, in case there is identity of names and surnames between ascendants and
descendants, in which case, the middle name or the mothers surname shall be added.
Notably, the law is likewise silent as to what middle name an adoptee may use. Article 365 of the Civil Code merely provides that an adopted child shall bear the surname
of the adopter. Also, Article 189 of the Family Code, enumerating the legal effects of adoption, is likewise silent on the matter, thus:

"(1) For civil purposes, the adopted shall be deemed to be a legitimate child of the adopters and both shall acquire the reciprocal rights and obligations arising from the
relationship of parent and child, including the right of the adopted to use the surname of the adopters;

xxx
However, as correctly pointed out by the OSG, the members of the Civil Code and Family Law Committees that drafted the Family Code recognized the Filipino custom of
adding the surname of the childs mother as his middle name. In the Minutes of the Joint Meeting of the Civil Code and Family Law Committees, the members approved the
suggestion that the initial or surname of the mother should immediately precede the surname of the father, thus

Justice Caguioa commented that there is a difference between the use by the wife of the surname and that of the child because the fathers surname indicates the family to
which he belongs, for which reason he would insist on the use of the fathers surname by the child but that, if he wants to, the child may also use the surname of the mother.

Justice Puno posed the question: If the child chooses to use the surname of the mother, how will his name be written? Justice Caguioa replied that it is up to him but that his
point is that it should be mandatory that the child uses the surname of the father and permissive in the case of the surname of the mother.

Prof. Baviera remarked that Justice Caguioas point is covered by the present Article 364, which reads:

Legitimate and legitimated children shall principally use the surname of the father.
Justice Puno pointed out that many names change through no choice of the person himself precisely because of this misunderstanding. He then cited the following example:
Alfonso Ponce Enriles correct surname is Ponce since the mothers surname is Enrile but everybody calls him Atty. Enrile. Justice Jose Gutierrez Davids family name is Gutierrez
and his mothers surname is David but they all call him Justice David.

Justice Caguioa suggested that the proposed Article (12) be modified to the effect that it shall be mandatory on the child to use the surname of the father but he may use the
surname of the mother by way of an initial or a middle name. Prof. Balane stated that they take note of this for inclusion in the Chapter on Use of Surnames since in the
proposed Article (10) they are just enumerating the rights of legitimate children so that the details can be covered in the appropriate chapter.

xxx

Justice Puno remarked that there is logic in the simplification suggested by Justice Caguioa that the surname of the father should always be last because there are so many
traditions like the American tradition where they like to use their second given name and the Latin tradition, which is also followed by the Chinese wherein they even include the
Clan name.

xxx

Justice Puno suggested that they agree in principle that in the Chapter on the Use of Surnames, they should say that initial or surname of the mother should immediately
precede the surname of the father so that the second name, if any, will be before the surname of the mother. Prof. Balane added that this is really the Filipino way. The
Committee approved the suggestion.[12] (Emphasis supplied)
In the case of an adopted child, the law provides that the adopted shall bear the surname of the adopters. [13] Again, it is silent whether he can use a middle name. What it
only expressly allows, as a matter of right and obligation, is for the adoptee to bear the surname of the adopter, upon issuance of the decree of adoption.[14]
The Underlying Intent of
Adoption Is In Favor of the
Adopted Child
Adoption is defined as the process of making a child, whether related or not to the adopter, possess in general, the rights accorded to a legitimate child.[15] It is a juridical act,
a proceeding in rem which creates between two persons a relationship similar to that which results from legitimate paternity and filiation.[16] The modern trend is to consider
adoption not merely as an act to establish a relationship of paternity and filiation, but also as an act which endows the child with a legitimate status.[17] This was, indeed, confirmed
in 1989, when the Philippines, as a State Party to the Convention of the Rights of the Child initiated by the United Nations, accepted the principle that adoption is impressed
with social and moral responsibility, and that its underlying intent is geared to favor the adopted child.[18] Republic Act No. 8552, otherwise known as the Domestic Adoption
Act of 1998,[19] secures these rights and privileges for the adopted.[20]
One of the effects of adoption is that the adopted is deemed to be a legitimate child of the adopter for all intents and purposes pursuant to Article 189[21] of the Family Code
and Section 17[22] Article V of RA 8552.[23]
Being a legitimate child by virtue of her adoption, it follows that Stephanie is entitled to all the rights provided by law to a legitimate child without discrimination of any
kind, including the right to bear the surname of her father and her mother, as discussed above. This is consistent with the intention of the members of the Civil Code and Family
Law Committees as earlier discussed. In fact, it is a Filipino custom that the initial or surname of the mother should immediately precede the surname of the father.
Additionally, as aptly stated by both parties, Stephanies continued use of her mothers surname (Garcia) as her middle name will maintain her maternal lineage. It is to be
noted that Article 189(3) of the Family Code and Section 18[24], Article V of RA 8552 (law on adoption) provide that the adoptee remains an intestate heir of his/her biological
parent. Hence, Stephanie can well assert or claim her hereditary rights from her natural mother in the future.
 Moreover, records show that Stephanie and her mother are living together in the house built by petitioner for them at 390 Tumana, San Jose, Baliuag, Bulacan. Petitioner
provides for all their needs. Stephanie is closely attached to both her mother and father. She calls them Mama and Papa. Indeed, they are one normal happy family. Hence, to
allow Stephanie to use her mothers surname as her middle name will not only sustain her continued loving relationship with her mother but will also eliminate the stigma of her
illegitimacy.
Liberal Construction of
Adoption Statutes In Favor Of
Adoption
It is a settled rule that adoption statutes, being humane and salutary, should be liberally construed to carry out the beneficent purposes of adoption. [25] The interests and
welfare of the adopted child are of primary and paramount consideration,[26] hence, every reasonable intendment should be sustained to promote and fulfill these noble and
compassionate objectives of the law.[27]
Lastly, Art. 10 of the New Civil Code provides that:

In case of doubt in the interpretation or application of laws, it is presumed that the lawmaking body intended right and justice to prevail.
This provision, according to the Code Commission, is necessary so that it may tip the scales in favor of right and justice when the law is doubtful or obscure. It will strengthen
the determination of the courts to avoid an injustice which may apparently be authorized by some way of interpreting the law. [28]
Hence, since there is no law prohibiting an illegitimate child adopted by her natural father, like Stephanie, to use, as middle name her mothers surname, we find no reason
why she should not be allowed to do so.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed Decision is partly MODIFIED in the sense that Stephanie should be allowed to use her mothers surname GARCIA as her
middle name.
Let the corresponding entry of her correct and complete name be entered in the decree of adoption.
SO ORDERED.
Panganiban, (Chairman), Corona, Carpio-Morales, and Garcia, JJ., concur.

[1] [11]
Rollo at 34-36. Art. 176. Illegitimate children shall use the surname and shall be under the
[2]
Annex C, id. at 33. parental authority of their mother, and shall be entitled to support in
[3]
Annex F, id. at 41-43. conformity with this Code. However, illegitimate children may use the
[4]
Rollo at 42-43. surname of their father if their filiation has been expressly recognized by the
[5]
Annex G, id. at 44-48. father through the record of birth appearing in the civil register, or when an
[6]
Annex H, id. at 49. admission in a public document or private handwritten instrument is made
[7]
Minutes of the Joint Meeting of the Civil Code and Family Law Committees, August by the father. Provided, the father has the right to institute an action before
10, 1985, p. 8. the regular courts to prove non-filiation during his lifetime. The legitime of
[8]
Republic vs. Court of Appeals and Maximo Wong, G.R. No. 97906, May 21, 1992, each illegitimate child shall consist of one-half of the legitime of a legitimate
209 SCRA 189, citing 38 Am Jur, Name 594-595. child.
[9] [12]
Republic vs. Hon. Hernandez, et al., G.R. No. 117209, February 9, 1996, 253 SCRA Minutes of the Joint Meeting of the Civil Code and Family law Committees, August
509, citing Tolentino, A.M., Civil Code of the Philippines, Commentaries and 10, 1985, pp. 16-18.
[13]
Jurisprudence, Vol. I, 1993 ed., 672. Article 365 of the New Civil Code.
[10]
Republic vs. Court of Appeals and Maximo Wong, supra.
[14]
Republic vs. Hon. Hernandez, et al., supra; Republic vs. Court of Appeals and obligations arising from the relationship of parent and child, including
Maximo Wong, supra. the right of the adopted to use the surname of the adopters;
[15] [22]
Paras, Civil Code of the Philippines Annotated, Vol. I, Fifteenth Edition, 2002, p. Supra.
[23]
685. Domestic Adoption Act of 1998.
[16] [24]
Pineda, The Family Code of the Philippines Annotated, 1989 Edition, p. 272-273, Sec. 18. Succession. In legal and intestate succession, the adopter(s) and the
citing 4 Valverde, 473. adoptee shall have reciprocal rights of succession without distinction from
[17]
Paras, supra, citing Prasnick vs. Republic, 98 Phil. 665. legitimate filiation. However, if the adoptee and his/her biological parent(s)
[18]
Lahom vs. Sibulo, G.R. No. 143989, July 14, 2003, 406 SCRA 135, citing United had left a will, the law on testamentary succession shall govern.
[25]
Nation General Assembly/44/49 (1989). Republic of the Philippines vs. Court of Appeals, et al., G.R. No. 92326, January 24,
[19]
Sec. 17. Legitimacy. The adoptee shall be considered the legitimate son/daughter 1992, 205 SCRA 356, citing 2 Am Jur 2d, Adoption, 865.
[26]
of the adopter(s) for all intents and purposes and as such is entitled to all Republic of the Philippines vs. Court of Appeals, et al., id., citing 2 Am Jur 2d,
the rights and obligations provided by law to legitimate sons/daughters born Adoption, 910.
[27]
to them without discrimination of any kind. To this end, the adoptee is Republic of the Philippines vs. Court of Appeals, et al., id., citing Bobanovic, et al.
entitled to love, guidance and support in keeping with the means of the vs. Montes, etc., et al., 142 SCRA 485 (1986).
[28]
family. Paras, supra, p. 91.
[20]
Id.
[21]
Art. 189. (1) For civil purposes, the adopted shall be deemed to be a legitimate
child of the adopters and both shall acquire the reciprocal rights and

IN THE MATTER OF THE ADOPTION OF STEPHANIE NATHY ASTORGA GARCIA

HONORATO B. CATINDIG, petitioner.
G.R. No. 148311. March 31, 2005

FACTS:
Honorato Catindig filed a petition to adopt his minor illegitimate child Stephanie Nathy Astorga Garcia. He prayed that the child's middle name Astorga be changed to Garcia, her
mother's surname, and that her surname Garcia be changed to Catindig, his surname.
Trial court granted the petition and declared Stephanie as his legitimate child and heir, and pursuant to Art. 189 of the Family Code, she is now known as Stephanie Nathy
Catindig.
Honorato filed a motion for clarification and/or reconsideration that Stephanie should be allowed to use the surname Garcia as her middle name.
The Republic, through the OSG, agreed with Honorato for her relationship with her natural mother should be maintained and preserved, to prevent any confusion and hardship
in the future, and under Article 189 she remains to be an intestate heir of her mother.
ISSUE:
Whether or not an illegitimate child, upon adoption by her natural father, use the surname of her natural mother as her middle name.
RULING:
Yes. there is no law prohibiting an illegitimate child adopted by her natural father, like Stephanie, to use, as middle name her mother’s surname, we find no reason why she
should not be allowed to do so.
Article 176 of the Family Code, as amended by Republic Act No. 9255, (An Act Allowing Illegitimate Children To Use The Surname Of Their Father) is silent as to what middle
name a child may use. Article 365 of the CC merely provides that “an adopted child shall bear the surname of the adopter.” Article 189 of the Family Code, enumerating the legal
effects of adoption, is likewise silent on the matter.

Republic Act No. 8552, (Domestic Adoption Act of 1998) an legitimate child by virtue of her adoption, Stephanie is entitled to all the rights provided by law to a legitimate child
without discrimination of any kind, including the right to bear the surname of her father and her mother.
 FIRST DIVISION

G.R. No. L-38006 May 16, 1978

NATALIA DE LAS ALAS, assisted by her husband, AURELIO PANGANIBAN, AVELINA DE LAS ALAS, assisted by her husband, FRANCISCO SALAZAR, NORMA DE LAS ALAS,
PEREGRINA DE LAS ALAS, assisted by her husband, HERNANDO GANAC, BIENVENIDO DE LAS ALAS, and NARCISO PANGANIBAN, petitioners,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, HONORABLE BENJAMIN RELOVA, in his capacity as Judge, Court of First Instance of Batangas (Lipa City Branch), EUGENIO DE LAS ALAS, PABLO DE LAS
ALAS, PERSEVERANDA DE LAS ALAS, FELISA DE LAS ALAS, assisted by her husband, ABUNDIO ROJALES ARSENIO PEÑAFLORIDA, ISABEL PEÑAFLORIDA, PACITA PEÑAFLORIDA,
ANGELA PEÑAFLORIDA, MARINO SOBERANO, TEODORO SOBERANO, MERCEDES SOBERANO, assisted by her husband, JULIANO BULANADE, PETRONILA SOBERANO, assisted
by her husband, BENJAMIN ILAGAN, JOSEFA SOBERANO, ORENCIO SOBERANO, MILAGROS SOBERANO, assisted by her husband, DOMINGO JAMIR, JOSE SOBERANO, JR.,
PURIFICACION SOBERANO, assisted by her husband, ANTONIO FABIO, and NATIVIDAD SOBERANO, assisted by her husband, CARLOS BALINGIT, respondents.

Calixto O. Zaldivar and Ceferino S. Gaddi for petitioners.

Jorge A. Dolorfino for private respondents.

MAKASIAR, J.:

This is an appeal by certiorari from a decision of the Court of Appeals dismissing the petition for mandamus filed by petitioners to compel the respondent Judge of the Court of
First Instance of Batangas (Lipa City Branch) to approve and certify the appeal taken by petitioners from the decision in Civil Case No. 2117 of the said court.

It appears that the respondent lower court judge rendered a decision on August 7, 1972 in the aforementioned Civil Case No. 2117; that copy of the said decision was received
by petitioners' counsel on September 9, 1972; that on September 28, 1972, petitioners' counsel filed an urgent motion for extension of fifteen (15) days from October 9, 1972 —
the last day for filing a motion for reconsideration and/or perfecting the appeal — within which to file a motion for reconsideration of the aforementioned decision of August 7,
1972; that this motion for extension was granted as prayed for; that on October 7, 1972, petitioners filed their motion for reconsideration; that on November 9, 1972, the
respondent lower court judge denied the motion for reconsideration and a copy of the order of denial was furnished petitioners' counsel on November 16, 1972; that on
November 20, 1972, petitioners sent by registered mail their notice of appeal and an appeal bond, serving a copy thereof upon private respondents' counsel also by registered
mall that on the same day, November 20, 1972, petitioners filed a motion for extension of twenty (20) days within which to file their record on appeal, which motion for
extension was granted; that under this extension the record on appeal was due for filing on December 25, 1972; that on December 8, 1972, petitioners filed their record on
appeal; that on December 9, 1972, private respondents filed a motion to dismiss the appeal and to disapprove the record on appeal on the ground that the notice of appeal, the
appeal bond and the record on appeal were filed out of time; that on December 20, 1972, herein petitioners filed their opposition to said motion to dismiss appeal and to
disapprove record on appeal; that on January 26, 1973, the respondent lower court judge granted the d motion to dismiss and petitioners received a copy of the said order on
February 9, 1973; that on March 9, 1973, petitioners filed a motion for extension of fifteen (15) days from March 11, 1973, within which to submit a motion for reconsideration;
that on the same date. March 11, 1973, private respondents filed a motion for the execution of the decision of the respondent lower court judge dated August 7, 1972; and that
on March 21, 1973, petitioners filed their motion for reconsideration of the order of the respondent lower court judge dated January 26, 1973, which motion for reconsideration
was denied on June 18, 1973.

It should be noted that in their opposition to the motion to dismiss appeal and to disapprove the record on appeal, petitioners stressed that they had until October 9, 1972
within which to perfect their appeal; that this period was suspended on October 7, 1972 when they filed a motion for reconsideration; that they had still three more days within
which to perfect their appeal and the remaining three days started to run anew on November 17, 1972 and expired on November 19, 1972; that since November 19, 1972 fags
on a Sunday, petitioners had until November 20, 1972 within which to perfect their appeal. and that, having filed their notice of appeal, appeal bond and motion for extension of
time to file record on appeal on November 20, 1972, their appeal was timely.

On July 3, 1973, petitioners filed a petition for certiorari and mandamus with preliminary injunction before the respondent Court of Appeals.

After private respondents filed their answer to the aforesaid petition, the respondent Court of Appeals rendered on September 12, 1973 a decision dismissing the petition as
follows:

After a careful review of the record and of the arguments of opposing counsel we are constrained to uphold the contention of the private respondents (there,
plaintiffs). The order of October 2, 1972 granting the petitioners-defendants fifteen days within which to file a motion for reconsideration of the decision of August 7,
1972 is clear and unequivocal. It is for the filing of a motion for reconsideration of the decision of August 7, 1972 and not for perfecting the appeal. Consequently, when
petitioners-defendants filed the motion for reconsideration on October 7, 1972 within the original period, they did not avail of the extension. Such act on their part
amounted to a waiver of the extension, hence, the order of October 2, 1972 granting the extension became functus officio. Besides, there is nothing in the law or rules
which prohibits a party from waiving the right or privilege of the extension. And this brings Us to the second issue of whether or not from petitioners-defendants'
receipt of the order of November 9, 1972 on November 16, 1972, they had only two days within which to perfect the appeal. We think the contention of the private
respondent is correct. This follows from Our view that the extension of fifteen days for filing the motion for reconsideration granted to the petitioners-defendants did
not extend the period of appeal From September 9, 1972 when they received a copy of the decision of August 7, 1972 to October 7, 1972 when they filed their motion
for reconsideration, twenty-eight (28) days had elapsed So, on November 16, when they received a copy of the order of November 9, 1972 denying the motion for
reconsideration, they had only two days within which to perfect their appeal. The reglementary period of thirdly days for perfecting appeal thus expired on November
18, 1972. Thus, the filing on November 20, 1972 of the record on appeal bond and the motion for extension of twenty days for presenting the record on appeal, was
beyond the said period. It follows from this that the granting of the extension of twenty days for presenting the record on appeal and the filing of the said record on
appeal on December 8, 1972 within the extended period are null and void, for the respondent court had lost jurisdiction to grant the same and to approve the record
on appeal.

The filing of the notice of appeal, appeal bond and record on appeal within the reglementary period of thirty days from notice of the decision is not only mandatory but
jurisdictional-I and the provisions of the Rules of Court must be complied with strictly. Thus, an extension of time granted to amend a record on appeal does not carry
with t an extension of the reglementary period for the filing of the appeal bond (Salva vs. Palacio, et al., 52 Off. Gaz., p. 3089). Similarly, an extension granted for the
filing of the record on appeal does not carry with it an extension for the filing of the notice of appeal and appeal bond. (Altavas Conlu vs. Court of Appeals, et al., 106
Phil 940). The ratio decidendi of said cases applies to the case at bar. The extension of time for the filing of the motion for reconsideration of the decision of August 7,
1972 does not carry with it the extension for the filing of the notice of appeal bond and record on appeal.

It follows from the foregoing discussion that the respondent Judge did not commit any grave abuse of discretion in disapproving the record on appeal and in dismissing
the appeal and that, therefore, mandamus does not lie annex A; pp. 50-53, Idem.).

Under date of October 19, 1973, petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration of the said decision, alleging, among other things, that:

... the Honorable Court of Appeal was in error in holding that Petitioners 'had only two days within which to perfect their appeal' when on Oct. 7, 1972 they received a
copy of the respondent Courts decision dated Aug. 7, 1972; in holding that the reglementary period of appeal expired on Nov. 18, 1972; and in holding that the notice
of appeal bond and the motion for extension of twenty days for presenting the record on appeal were filed beyond the d period.

With all due respect, petitioners humbly contend that, as argued and claimed in the opposition to the motion to dismiss and to disapprove the record on appeal dated
Dec. 20, 1972, quoted above, they still had three more days unused of their period of appeal as of the filing of their motion for reconsideration on October 7, 1972, which
unused period was interrupted and suspended on this date, and started to run anew on November 17, 1972, the day after November 16, 1972, when they received the
 respondent court's order of November 9, 1972 denying said motion for reconsideration Therefore, petitioners still had up to November 19, 1972, within which to
perfect their appeal This last day being a Sunday, 'this period was extended to the first working day immediately following their,' i.e. November 20, 1972 Mintu v. Court
of Appeals, G.R. No. L-36845, Sept. 19, 1973,53 SCRA 114,117-118, citing Meralco v. PSC, 18 SCRA 651; Sec. 31, Rev. Administrative Code; emphasis supplied).

xxx xxx xxx

In fine, petitioners' appeal was improperly dismissed and the herein petition should have been granted" (Annex D, pp. 110-111, 116, Idem).

On November 7, 1973, the private respondents filed their opposition to the motion for reconsideration (Annex E, pp. 120-139, Idem).

On November 20, 1973, petitioners filed a reply to private respondents opposition (Annex F, pp. 134-151, Idem).

On December 13, 1973, the Court of Appeals rendered a resolution denying petitioners' motion for reconsideration (Annex G, pp. 152- 157 Idem).

Hence, on January 17, 1974, petitioners filed the instant petition.

The pivotal issue in this petition is whether or not the appeal interposed by petitioners from the decision of the respondent judge of the Court of First instance dated August 7,
1972, was perfected on time. The resolution of this issue hinges solely on how many more days were left of the 30-day reglementary period of appeal as of the day petitioners
filed their motion for reconsideration on October 7, 1972.

Petitioners maintain that they still had three (3) more days left of the period of appeal as of the day they filed their motion for reconsideration October 7, 1972, and this period
was interrupted and suspended upon such filing, and started to name anew on November 17, 1972, the next day after November 16, 1972, when they received the respondent
lower court Judge's order of November 9, 1972 denying their said motion for reconsideration. Consequently, petitioners claim that they had up to November 20, 1972 within
which to perfect their appeal, since November 19,1972, was a Sunday.

On the other hand, respondents contend that when petitioners filed their motion for reconsideration on October 7, 1972, they had only two (2) days left of their period of
appeal after receipt of the order denying the Motion for reconsideration, and hence the filing of the notice of appeal, appeal bond, and the motion for extension to file record
on appeal on November 20, 1972, was beyond the reglementary period, invoking the rule embodied in the last paragraph of Article 13 of the New Civil Code which provides that
in "computing a period, the first day should be excluded and the last day included. "

It is discernible from the questioned decision that the respondent Court of Appeals followed the doctrine laid down in Federal Films vs. Gutierrez David (78 Phil. 472, 44, O.G.
3813), which overruled much of the Taroma case as included the date of the filing of the motion for new trial and the date the movant was notified of the order of denial in the
time- consumed by the court in considering the said motion for new trial and deducted from the 30- day period for perfecting the appeal.

Said ruling in the Federal Films case, however, had ceased to be a precedent with the promulgation of Lloren vs. De Vera (4 SCRA 637), wherein this Court formulated a
computation which, in the words of Chief Justice Moran "settles authoritatively the computation of appeal periods, which had hitherto given rise to divergent decisions of the
Supreme Court" (2 Moran, Rules of Court, 1970 ed. 414; 2 Martin, Rules of Court, 1969 ed. 472).

It should be noted that in deciding the Lloren case this Court not consider but disregarded the Taroma and the Federal Films cases and adhered strictly to the rule of
computation embodied in Section 1, Rule 28 of the Old Rules of Court. Thus, in the Lloren case, WE held —

The question that now arised is: Was the appeal perfected outside of the reglementary period of 15 days? 'Section 17, Rule 41, Rules of Court).
 It is contended by petitioner Lloren that from March 18, 1958 to April 2, 1958 there is an intervening period of 15 days, and having filed his motion for reconsideration
on April 2, the exact number of days that has actually elapsed was only 14 days, because he filed his motion for reconsideration on exactly the 15th day. This day was
interrupted and so when he received copy of the order denying his motion for reconsideration he was entitled to at least 1 more day within which to appeal. Applying
the rule of computation prescribed in Rule 28 that the first day should be excluded and the last included, it follows that when he filed his notice of appeal bond on April
17, 1958, the same were filed exactly within the reglementary period of 15 days.

Counsel for respondent, however, sustains the contrary view. He argues: 'By mathematical operation, we find that from March 18 (when petitioner received a copy of
decision) to April 17, 1958 (when he filed his notice of appeal and appeal bond) there were actually 30 days, March 18 being excluded and April 17 being included in the
counting. In the same manner, we find that from April 2, 1968 (when petitioner filed his motion for reconsideration) to April 16, 1958 (when he received a copy of the
order denying his motion for reconsideration) there are actually 14 days, April 2 being excluded, and April 16 in the counting. Deducting, therefore, 14 days from 30
days the reset is 16 days. This means that petitioner (respondent below) filed his notice of appeal and appeal bond on the 16th day or one day late, tardiness which is
sufficient to bar the appeal' This method of computation is in accordance with the rule followed by this Court in the case of Federal Films, Inc. v. Judge of the First
Instance of Manila, 78 Phil. 472, which expressly modified the method of computation adopted in the case of Taroma v. Cruz and Galinato 68 Phil., 281.

After a mature deliberation, where the members of the Court delved once more into the methods of computation discussed in the cases mentioned by counsel for
respondent, the Court resolved not to follow the ruling in either of them and to adhere strictly to the rule of computation embodied in Rule 28 of our rules. The Idea
that prevailed is that since petitioner Lloren filed his motion for reconsideration on the 15th day of the period within which he may perfect his appeal that day should
be excluded so that when he received copy of the order denying his motion for reconsideration he had still 1 day within which to perfect his appeal. This period of one
day should be computed again in accordance with the rule above cited by excluding the day of receipt and including the next day, which in this case is April 17, 1958.
Hence, the Court concluded that the appeal interposed by petitioner Lloren was still within the reglementary period (Lloren vs. De Veyra, supra).

A meticulous comparative analysis of the three cases — Taroma, Federal Films and Lloren — shows that Lloren is a virtual revival of or reversion to the doctrine WE laid down in
Taroma, earlier referred to in this opinion, wherein this Court observed:

The pertinent facts related to the issue and not disputed by the parties are the following-. The petitioner received on April 5, 1938 a copy of the decision which the
respondent judge had rendered in the aforementioned land registration case; and filed his motion for new trial as a formal requisite to perfect his appeal on May 3,
1938, and his by of exceptions on the twenty-first of the same month and year, which was three days after he was notified of the order which denied his motion for
new trial.

Relying upon the foregoing facts, petitioner maintains that he perfected his appeal within the period of thirty days, inasmuch as he makes the following computation:
From April 5 to May 3, 1938, both dates excluded, only twenty-seven days elapsed from May 3, when he filed his motion for new trial to May 18, 1938 when he was
notified of the order of the respondent judge denying it, both dates included, 16 days passed, which period, petitioner contends, should not be counted against him, in
view of the rule established and sanctioned several times by this court in the cases of Paez vs. Berenguer (6 Phil., 521); Lavitoria vs. Court of First Instance of
Tayabas (32 Phil, 204); Roman Catholic Bishop of Tuguegarao vs. Director of Lands (34 Phil., 623); Estate of Cordoba and Zarate vs. Alabado (34 Phil, 920); Roman
Catholic Archbishop of Manila vs. Ruiz and Catli (36 Phil., 279); Bermudez vs. Director of Lands (36 Phil, 774); Director of Lands vs. Maurera and Tiongson (37 Phil,
410); Layda vs. Legazpi (39 Phil, 83); Director of Lands vs. Sanz (45 Phil, 117); and from the aforementioned date of May 18, 1938 to the twenty-first of the same month
and year, the first date excluded, following the rule of computation provided by section 4 of Act No. 190, no more than three days elapsed which is equivalent to saying
that, according to his computation, petitioner perfected his appeal within the prescribed period.

The respondent judge, in turn, maintains that the bill of exceptions in question was filed by the petitioner thirty-one days after the decision from which he desired to
appeal had been promulgated, and computes the time that has elapsed as follows: From April 5 to May 3, 1938, excluding the first and including the 1st day there were
twenty-eight days; from the eighteenth to the twenty-first of the same month and year, also excluding the first and including the last day, there were three days, to
 arrive later at the conclusion that, excluding the time during which petitioner's motion for new trial was under the respondent judge's consideration until petitioner was
notified of the order denying it, or from May 4 to May 18, 1938, thirty-one days elapsed or one day more than the thirty days fixed by law.

In other words, the same facts and the same question may be thus expressed: From April 5 to May 21, 1938, according to the theory of both petitioner and
respondents, after the first day is excluded and the last day is included, there were forty-six days. After deducting from these forty-six days the sixteen days which the
respondent judge spent in considering the petitioner's motion for new trial plus the time which elapsed since then until the latter was notified of the order denying his
motion referred to, there are no more than thirty days. Petitioner then argues that his bill of exceptions was filed within that time. The respondent judge does not
admit that there are sixteen days which must be deducted from the forty-six which elapsed from April 5 to May 21, 1938, the first day exclude because he contends that
there is and there should be no more than one rule of computation applicable both to himself and the petitioner, and that is the one provided in section 4 of Act No.
190, restated in section 13 of the Administrative Code. The rule aforementioned really says:

Unless otherwise specially provided, the time within which an act is required by law to be done shall be computed by excluding the first day and including the
last; and if the last be Sunday or a legal holiday it shall be excluded.

It is true, however, that the rule which has been almost invariably followed and observed in this jurisdiction, at least since the case of Paez vs. Berenguer, supra, is that
the time employed by the court in deciding motions for new trial of a party desiring to appeal from an adverse judgment should not be counted against him because it
is not within his power to avoid it, nor hasten their resolution, except perhaps by motions when there are substantial grounds therefor. It is not amiss to repeat at this
point what this court already said in this same case in its resolution of September 27, 1938 because it squarely resolves the question:

If the rule of computation provided by section 4 of the Code of Civil Procedure be applied with rigorous technicality, it is clear that the bill of exceptions was
filed out of time because from April 5 to May 3, twenty-eight days elapsed, and from the eighteenth to the twenty-first of the same month another three days
passed, making a total of thirty-one days. But, as we have already said, it is not here attempted to so compute the period of thirty days, but to apply the rule
which have uniformly held in the sense that the time which the court employs in considering the motion for new trial should be excluded. It is admitted that
May 3, being the date on which the motion for new trial was filed, should be excluded, but in the computation of the thirty days, section 4 of the Code of Civil
Procedure is intended to be applied and May 3 is sought to be included in the counting so that until said date twenty-eight days had already elapsed. This
procedure entirely nullifies the rule of exclusion which we had laid down and which now constitutes a precedent in procedural law. There is neither logic nor
sense in this procedure which amounts to the exclusion of May 3 only to be included later on. It is either counted or dropped out. The latter excludes the
former, no two antithetical ideas may be harmonized or given effect (Taroma vs. Cruz, et al., supra emphasis supplied).

Applying now the doctrine in Lloren to the case at bar, WE agree with petitioners. They had up to October 9, 1972, within which to perfect their appeal. Their motion for
reconsideration was filed on October 7, 1972, and, if this date of filing must be added to the remainder of the period of appeal, petitioners clearly had three (3) more days left of
their period of appeal October 7, 8 and 9, 1972. Therefore, if petitioners received the order denying their motion for reconsideration on November 16, 1972, which day should
also be excluded from the period of appeal in him with the Lloren doctrine, perforce their period of appeal extended up to November 19, 1972, But November 19, 1972, is a
Sunday. Hence, petitioners' period to perfect their appeal was extended ipso jure to the first working day immediately following thereafter, i.e., November 20, 1972. Having filed
their notice of appeal and appeal bond on November 20, 1972, and their record on appeal within the period extended by respondent lower court judge, it follows that
petitioners perfected their appeal within the legal period.

Furthermore, there should not be any dispute that from September 9, 1972, the date the decision was received, to November 16, 1972, the date petitioners received the order
of denial of their motion for reconsideration, there are actually 68 days, using the exclude the- first and include-the-last method for computing any period of time. But, We have
to consider also the express provision of' the Revised Rules of Court, thus —
 SEC. 3. How appeal is taken.-Appeal may be taken by serving upon the adverse party and filing with the trial court within thirty (30) days from notice of order or
judgment, a notice on appeal. The time during which a motion to set aside the judgment or order or for a new to has been pending shall be deducted unless such motion
fails to satisfy the requirements of Rule 37 (Rule 41, Sec. 3, Revised Rules of Court; emphasis supplied).

under which "the time during which a motion to set aside the judgment or order or for a new trial has been pending shall be deducted" in reckoning the thirty-day period within
which appeal may be taken.

The record shows that the motion for reconsideration has been pending since October 7, 1972, the date of its filing and remained so until November 16, 1972, when petitioners
received the order of denial of their motion for reconsideration. Therefore, the motion for reconsideration has been pending for a period of 41 days — 25 days in October and
16 days in November of 1972. October 7, the date of filing of the motion for reconsideration, should not be excluded in the computation of the period during which the motion
for reconsideration was pending since it will be in violation of the express provision of the aforequoted provision of the Revised Rules of Court. To emphasize, the motion for
reconsideration was pending from its filing on October 7, 1972, not from October 8, 1972, the day after it was filed on October 7, 1972; because it was already pending
consideration by the trial court during the remaining hours of the 24 hours of October 7, 1972, the day it was filed. October 7, 1972 did not (ipso facto) terminate or end upon
the filing of said motion, much less automatically usher in the following day, October 8, 1972. Deducting 41 days from 68 days WE have 27 days.

WE, therefore, agree with petitioners that, on November 16, 1972, when they received the trial court's order denying their motion for reconsideration, they still had THREE (3)
days more within which to perfect their appeal.

Private respondents contend that the doctrine laid down in Lloren applies only to motions for reconsideration filed on the last day of the period of appeal. WE do not agree. The
Lloren doctrine must be applied to all cases whether the motion for reconsideration is filed before or on the last day of the appeal period. A perusal of Lloren shows that, in a
criminal cases, petitioner filed his motion for reconsideration on April 2, 1958, after receipt of the questioned decision on March 18, 1958. He received the order denying his
motion for reconsideration on April 16, 1958, and perfected his appeal on April 17, 1958. This court ruled that petitioner's appeal was timely filed, because from April 2, 1958,
the date of filing up to and including April 16, 1958, the date of receipt of the order of denial, there are actually 15 days, and deducting these 15 days from the 30-day Period
from March 18 to April 17, 1958, there are 15 days. Hence. the appeal was filed on time.

WE repeat, the decision in Lloren did not expressly or impliedly t its application to cases where the motion for reconsideration is filed on the last day of the period of appeal. WE
want to emphasize here that, for purposes of appeal, the time during which a motion to set aside the judgment or order or for a new trial has been pending shall be deducted
from the reglementary period of appeal, unless such motion fails to satisfy the requirements of Rule 37. To limit the application of the Lloren case to motions for reconsideration
filed on the last day of the appeal period would be giving premium to laziness and punishing industry or punctuality if a grace period of one day would be given to a party who
files his motion for reconsideration on the last day of the period of appeal and the same grace period is denied to a party who filed it before the last day. Stated differently, to
deny application of the Lloren doctrine to the case at bar, would be to favor the filing of a motion on the very last day of the reglementary period and to penalize the filing of the
same motion several days before the expiration of such a period.

In holding that the Lloren doctrine is not applicable to the petitioners' case, the respondent Court of Appeals observed in its resolution of December 13, 1973, denying
petitioners' motion for reconsideration, that the Revised Rules of Court has not incorporated Section I of Rule 28 of the Old Rules of Court, but merely incorporated the Lloren
doctrine in the second paragraph of Section 3 of Rule 41 of the Revised Rules of Court, and from this is concluded that the computation of time based on Section 1, Rule 28, of
the Old Rules of Court is no longer tenable. This view is incorrect; because the non-incorporation potation of Section 1, Rule 28, of the Old Rules of Court, in the Revised Rules of
Court, does not change the rule on the computation of periods for filing pleadings as the very same provision is already embodied in Article 13 of the New Civil Code and in
Section 13 of the Revised Administrative Code, which legal provisions are superior to a rule of court, aside from the fact that its incorporation into the Revised Rules of Court
would be a mere superfluity.
Regardless, however, of the above findings and even assuming that respondents' position were correct, WE find that a one-day delay does not justify the dismissal of the appeal
under the circumstances obtaining in this case. The real purpose behind the station of the period of appeal is to foregoing or avoid an unreasonable delay in the administration
of justice and to put an end to controversies (Dy Chay vs. Crossfield, 38 Phil. 521-526).

In resolving the instant case, WE must also bear in mind the prevailing atmosphere of liberality which has swept this Court in similar matters since the case of Berkenkotter vs.
Court of Appeals (L-36629, Sept. 28, 1973, 53 SCRA 228), followed by Pimentel et al. vs. Court of Appeals (L-39423 and L-39684, June 27, 1975, 64 SCRA 476), then by Maqui and
Maqui vs. Court of Appeals, et al. (L-41609, Feb. 24, 1976, 69 SCRA 368), and lately by Lopez, et al. vs. Court of Appeals, et al. (L-43767, Feb. 28, 1977, 75 SCRA 401), wherein WE
said:

... the provision of section 1, Rule 50 of the Revised Rules of Court which provides specific grounds for dismissal of appeal 'manifestly confers a power and does not
impose a duty. What is more, it is directory, not mandatory.' Hence, it should be exercised with a great deal of circumspection, considering all the attendant
circumstances.

Furthermore, WE note from the records the absence or lack of the element of intent to delay the administration of justice on the part of petitioners in this case. On the contrary,
petitioners' counsel have demonstrated cautiousness, concern and punctuality in the prosecution of the appeal. They filed their motion for reconsideration October 7, 1972,
even if the respondent lower court judge had given them an extension up to October 24, 1972, within which to file the said motion. Petitioners had up to December 25, 1972,
within which to submit their record on appeal, yet they filed their record on appeal on December 8, 1972, or 17 days before the deadline.

Also, even assuming further that petitioners' counsel committed a mistake in the computation of the period of appeal this error is clearly not attributable to negligence or bad
faith and should not be counted against petitioners. On a doubtful and controversial question of law such as the one before Us in this case, the benefit of the doubt must be
given to petitioners. Mistake upon a doubtful or difficult question of law may be the basis of good faith" (Last par., Art. 526, New Civil Code).

Lastly, litigations should, as much as possible, be decided on their merits and not on technicality, and under the circumstances obtaining in this case, WE are responded of what
WE said in the case of Gregorio vs. Court of Appeals (L-43511, July 28, 1976, 72 SCRA 120, 126), thus —

... Dismissal of appeals purely on technical grounds is frowned upon where the policy of the courts is to encourage hearings of appeals on their merits. The rules of
procedure ought not to be applied in a very rigid, technical sense; rules of procedure are used only to help secure, not override, substantial justice. If a technical and
rigid enforcement of the rules is made, their aim would be defeated.

Once again, the teaching of Alonso vs. Villamor becomes imperative:

... A litigation is not a game of technicalities in which one, more deeply schooled and skilled in the subtle art of movement and position entraps and destroys the other,
It is, rather, a contest in which each contending party fully and fairly lays before the court the facts in issue and then, brushing aside as wholly trivial and indecisive all
imperfections of form and technicalities of procedure, asks that justice be done upon the merits. Lawsuits, unlike duels, are not to be won by a rapiers thrust.
Technicality, when it deserts its proper office as an aid to justice and becomes its great hindrance and chief enemy, deserves scant consideration from courts. There
should be no vested rights in technicalities. . . . (Vol. 16 Phil 315, 321-322).

WHEREFORE, THE DECISION OF THE RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS, PROMULGATED ON SEPTEMBER 12, 1973, AND ITS RESOLUTION DENYING THE MOTION FOR
RECONSIDERATION, DATED DECEMBER 13,1973, ARE HEREBY REVERSED AND SET ASIDE. THE RESPONDENT TRIAL COURT IS HEREBY DIRECTED TO APPROVE PETITIONERS' BOND
AND RECORD ON APPEAL AND TO CERTIFY THE SAID APPEAL TO RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS, FOR THE RESOLUTION OF THE CASE ON ITS MERITS. NO COSTS.

Teehankee (Chairman), Santos, Fernandez, and Guerrero, JJ., concur.

 SECOND DIVISION

G.R. No. 74122 March 15, 1988

GUILLERMO NACTOR, SPS. ANSELMO & ELENA NACTOR, PRECILIANO NACTOR, JOSE NACTOR & GLORIA NACTOR assisted by her husband MANUEL CLAYTOS, petitioners,
vs.
INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT, * HON. NICOLAS A. GEROCHI, JR., Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Makati, Branch 139 & SPS. CLARO & MAGDALENA
MELCHOR respondents.

PARAS, J.:

This is a petition for review on certiorari seeking to set aside or reverse the decision of the Intermediate Appellate Court ***(now Court of Appeals) dated January 30,1986 in
ACG.R. SPNo.07595 entitled Guillermo Nactor, et al. vs. Nicolas A. Gerochi, Jr. affirming the decision of the Regional Trial Court, National Capital Region, Br. 139 in Civil Case No.
9307 on June 4,1985, which in turn affirmed in toto the appealed decision of the Metropolitan Trial Court in Civil Case No. 25607 dated September 5,1984. Respondent Court of
appeals dismissed the petition seeking to set aside the Omnibus Order of the Regional Trial Court not only because the decision of the said court had already become final but
also because on the merits of said decision, the affirmance thereof was in complete accord both with the facts and the law on the matter.

The antecedent facts of this case as found by the Metropolitan Trial Court are as follows:

Sometime in 1962, the herein plaintiffs-respondents (Spouses Melchor) allowed Guillermo Nactor (one of the defendants-petitioners) to build a shanty on their property as at
that time they were intending to go abroad. Guillermo Nactor occupied the premises without any contract and without any rental, but with the understanding that he would
watch over the property of the plaintiffs so as to prevent squatters from entering the said property. Instead of complying with the said agreement, Guillermo Nactor allowed his
relatives to build houses inside the said property without the knowledge and consent of the Melchor spouses, so that when the latter returned to the Philippines, they
discovered that many people were squatting inside their property. Hence, they lost no time in demanding that Guillermo Nactor and his group vacate the property in question.
When petitioners refused to vacate the premises, the Melchor spouses filed a complaint with the Barangay, which was later elevated to the Metropolitan Trial Court, Branch 64,
Makati, Metro Manila. The trial court decided the case in favor of the Melchor spouses on September 5, 1984, the dispositive portion of the decision reading as follows:

WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered ordering the defendants and any and all persons claiming right/title under them to vacate the lot at 7713 St. Paul Street,
Barangay San Antonio Village, Makati, Metro Manila and surrender peaceful occupation and possession thereof to plaintiffs and to pay jointly and severally to the latter
a monthly rental of P100.00 from the date of the filing of the complaint on 30 August 1983 until they finally vacate the premises and to demolish and/or transfer all the
improvements they have introduced thereon. Defendants are likewise ordered to pay the Plaintiffs P2,000.00 as attorney's fees and litigation expenses plus costs of
suit. (Rollo, p. 17)

On appeal, the Regional Trial Court of Makati affirmed in toto the decision of the Metropolitan Trial Court on June 4,1985, with the following observations and
conclusions:

After a careful perusal of the evidence on record and the supporting arguments proffered by plaintiffs-appellees in their memorandum, this court finds no cogent
reason to disturb the decision of the Court a quo, to which reference is hereby made.

Furthermore, as admitted by the defendants, particularly, defendant-appellant Guillermo Nactor, that his occupancy of the said land was by mere tolerance and
generosity of plaintiffs-appellees, allowing him to have a temporary place to build his abode, while the couple-plaintiffs-appellees--were still abroad.
 Evidently, while the actual physical possession might have been temporarily transferred to defendant-appellant Guillermo Nactor as a caretaker thereof for almost 20
years, the legal and juridical possession thereof remains in the hands of plaintiffs-appellees, more especially so that the land in question of within the protective mantle
of indefeasibility of the torrens system.

Acts merely tolerated, and those executed clandestinely and without the knowledge of the possessor of a thing or by violence, do not affect possession (Art. 537, New
Civil Code; Mercedes vs. Go Bio, et al., 78 Phil. 279).

Acts of possessory character executed in virtue of license or by mere tolerance of the owner shall not be available for the purpose of possession.' (Art. 1119, New Civil
Code) (Emphasis supplied)

To deny plaintiffs-appellees of their right to physically repossess the said land as uncontested and uncontroverted lawful owners thereof, would be tantamount to
extending premium, if not license, to a pretender of lawful possession' arising only from the charity and benevolence of its owners.

This Court, both in law and equity, under these antecedents, and after having extended benevolence to defendants-appellants for so long, should now allow plaintiffs
the full enjoyment and use of their property.

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, decision appealed from is hereby AFFIRMED IN TOTO, with costs against defendants-appellants. (pp. 17-18, Rollo).

The defendants-petitioners moved for reconsideration on June 24,1985, which motion was denied by respondent Judge, in an Omnibus Order dated October 22,1985, for having
been filed after the decision had become final and executory. Simultaneously, on motion of plaintiffs-appellees, a writ of execution was issued.

The motion for reconsideration having been denied, defendants-petitioners filed a petition for review on certiorari on October 31, 1985 with the Court of Appeals.

On January 30, 1986, the Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the Regional Trial Court, the pertinent portion of the affirmance reading:

The petition is thus without merit. Not only had the respondent Judge's decision become final, and beyond the respondent Judge's competence to vary, set aside or
modify, but that on the merits of the said decision, the affirmance thereof by the respondent Judge is in complete accord both with the facts and the law applicable on
the matter. No reversible error has, therefore, been committed.

WHEREFORE, the petition for review is hereby DISMISSED, with costs."

The defendant-petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration dated February 22,1986 which motion was denied on March 21, 1986 for lack of merit.

Hence, this petition.

In the resolution dated June 11, 1986, the Second Division of this Court, before acting on the petition, required the petitioners to comply with the rules by submitting to the
court proof of service of the petition on the Intermediate Appellate Court and the adverse party and to sign the petition, the verification and the jurat (Rollo, p. 22). However,
before petitioners could comply with said requirement which were filed on August 26, 1986, (Rollo, pp. 40-47; 56) respondents filed their comment dated June 30,1986 (Rollo, p.
23). In the Resolution of October 15,1986, the court required the petitioners to file a reply to the comment of counsel for respondent (Rollo, p. 58). On October 28, 1986,
respondents filed an urgent Motion for Exigent Resolution and Refutal to the Petition for Review on certiorari (Rollo, p. 59).
The resolution of November 10, 1986, gave due course to the petition and required both parties to file their respective memoranda (Rollo, p. 67). On that same date, however,
the petitioners thru counsel filed their manifestations/explanation (Rollo, p. 68) stating that they are therewith submitting the attached Supplemental Reply to the comment of
counsel for the respondents (Rollo, p. 78, Annex "D"). Respondents filed their memorandum on December 15, 1986 (Rollo, p. 91), and a motion for early conclusive resolution
and/or final resolution on February 19, 1987 (Rollo, p. 98), followed by another motion reiterating early conclusive resolution and/or final decision by the same respondents on
March 23, 1987 (Rollo, p. 100).

On April 8,1987, petitioners filed their comment on the motion for early resolution while respondents filed their urgent ex-parte motion to withdraw deposit and [rayed that the
amount be released through their authorized representative and attorney-in-fact (Rollo, p. 107). A special power of attorney was attached thereto (Rollo, p. 110). In the
resolution of June 3,1987, the court required the private respondents to file a reply to the comments on the motion for early resolution filed by counsel for petitioners and
petitioners to comment on the urgent ex-parte motion of private respondents to withdraw deposit. The latter was filed on July 3,1987 (Rollo, p. 114).

Petitioners raised the following assignments of error:

THE DECISION ERRED IN RULING THAT THE MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION FILED ON THE 24 OF JUNE 1985 IS ALREADY LATE BY ONE DAY, THE PRECEDING DAY, JUNE
23 BEING A SUNDAY.

II

THE DECISION ERRED IN BINDING THEREIN THE DEFENDANTS IN THE FORCIBLE ENTRY CASE WHICH WAS PREVIOUSLY DISMISSED.

III

THE DECISION ERRED IN NOT DISMISSING THE CASE FOR WANT OF JURISDICTION.

Otherwise stated, the issues raised in this case are two fold: (1) as regards the timeliness of the motion for reconsideration filed and (2) the lack of cause of action on the part of
the complainants and lack of jurisdiction to try the case on the part of the court a quo.

Petitioners contend that the motion for reconsideration was filed on time with the Regional Trial Court on June 24, 1985 because the fifteenth day, June 23, 1985 is a Sunday.
There is merit in this contention.

Pertinent thereto, Section 39 of the Judiciary Reorganization Act, B.P. 129 provides:

The period for appeal from final orders, resolutions, awards judgments, or decisions of any court in all cases shall be fifteen (15) days counted from the notice of the
final order, resolution, award judgment or decision appealed from: ...

On the other hand, the rule on the computation of periods for filing of pleadings is now embodied in Article 13 of the Civil Code of the Philippines which provides:

Art. 13. ...

In computing a period, the first day shall be excluded, and the last day included.
and also in the Revised Administrative Code which likewise provides:

Section 13. Computation of time in computing any fixed period-of time, with reference to the performance of an act required by law or contract to be done at a certain
time or within a certain limit of time, the day or date, or day from which the time is reckoned, is to be excluded and the date of performance, included, unless otherwise
provided.

However, in case the last day is a Sunday or a legal holiday, it is understood that where the time refers to a period prescribed or allowed by the Rules of Court, by an order of the
court, or by any other applicable statute, the last day should really be the next day, provided said day is neither a Sunday nor a legal holiday. The law cannot require compliance
on a day when entities supposed to receive pleadings or documents are closed in view of the holiday.

Thus, as authoritatively formulated by this Court, the computation of the appeal periods is to the effect that the first day shall be excluded but the last day of the period so
computed is to be included unless it is a Sunday or a legal holiday in which event the time shall run until the end of the next day which is neither a Sunday nor a holiday
(Kabigting v. Acting Director of Prisons, 6 SCRA 281 [1962]; De las Alas v. Court of Appeals, 83 SCRA 200 [1978]. Accordingly, in said cases, the period to perfect an appeal is
extended ipso jure to the first working day immediately following.

It will be noted, however, that petitioners' motion for reconsideration was denied by the Regional Trial Court in its Omnibus Order, not only because said motion was
purportedly filed late but also for lack of merit. Thus, in said Order, the Court ruled as follows:

In passing though, even a careful consideration of the grounds relied upon by defendants-appellants in their Motion for Reconsideration as well as the opposition
thereto by plaintiffs-appellees, thru counsel, this Court finds no cogent reason to alter its aforesaid decision sought to be reconsidered, as the main grounds relied upon
by defendants-appellants had been amply discussed in the decision of this Court in affirmance of the one rendered by the court a quo." (Original Records, p. 20).

On review, the Court of Appeals was even more specific in denying the petition which seeks, to set aside aforesaid Order, not only because the decision of the Regional Trial
Court has ostensibly become final but for lack of merit.

All these notwithstanding, petitioners would have this Court review the findings and conclusions of the court a quo which have been affirmed in toto not only by the Regional
Trial Court but also by the Court of Appeals, on the basis of technicalities obviously resorted to only for purposes of delay.

Petitioners allege that it is only Guillermo Nactor whose entrance into the premises was with the knowledge and consent of the plaintiffs who can be bound by the judgment in
the unlawful detainer case but not the rest of the defendants whose occupancy was termed by the plaintiffs as unlawful and/or illegal, without any written consent and/or
authority from them. They claim that such defendants should therefore be charged with forcible entry, but without compliance with the Rules on Forcible Entry cases among
which are, a written demand to vacate which must be definite, petitioners claim that the complaint is devoid of a sufficient cause of action and invests upon the court no
jurisdiction to try and decide the case (Rollo, pp. 10-11).

Such allegation is untenable.

Aside from the findings of the trial court itself, that there is no contract at all between the plaintiffs and defendants and that the occupation of the property by the latter was
only by tolerance of the former, such fact was confirmed by the testimony of the principal defendant Guillermo Nactor, whose testimony was quoted in the decision of the court
a quo as follows:

Q. You mean to tell the Honorable Court all the defendants in this case were allowed to silly in this place?
 A. Yes, Sir, spouses Melchor told us that we can stay there so that nobody will stay in the place. (TSN dated May 9, 1984):

It will likewise be noted that defendants, all surnamed Nactor are the relatives of Guillermo Nactor who was the caretaker thereof. It is obvious that they gained access to the
property through him and occupied the same under his responsibility. Consequently, if Guillermo Nactor has admittedly lost the right to stay on or occupy the property in
question, with all the more reason have the rest of the defendants who are only occupying the property under him, no right to stay on the premises.

Thus, the trial court in unmistakable language, in ordering that the property be vacated and possession thereof surrendered peacefully to the plaintiffs, included all the
defendants and any and all persons claiming right/title under Guillermo Nactor.

While it is true that the instant case was tried by the court a quo on the basis of the unlawful detainer charge instead of forcible entry for the rest of the defendants excluding
Guillermo, it is an elementary rule of procedure that what is controlling is not the caption of the case which does not materially alter the situation but the allegations therein
that determine the nature of the action and even without the prayer for a specific remedy, proper relief may nevertheless be granted by the court if the facts alleged in the
complaint and the evidence introduced so warrant (Ras v. Sua, 25 SCRA 155-159 [1968]). Besides since the rest of the petitioners were on the property under the apparent
protection of Guillermo, an unlawful detainer case (and not necessarily one of forcible entry) may properly be used against them.

Still further, petitioners claim that they fall within the protective mantle of P.D. No. 1517 "Urban Land Reform" as per Proclamation Nos. 1767 and 1967, as amended by
Proclamation No. 2284, However, the records show that the property in question is outside the DECLARED URBAN LAND REFORM ZONE" (ULRZ), and situated on the northeast
side along Saint Paul Road, has never been within the areas covered by "BOUNDARY DESCRIPTION PURSUANT TO PROCLAMATION NO. 1967," as certified by the Human
Settlements Regulation Commission. (Annexes "A" and "A-l," Rollo, pp. 28 & 29).

In resume, petitioners did not dispute the fact that private respondents are the lawful owners of the property in question, that Guillermo Nactor and the rest of the defendants
are occupying the property only by tolerance of the owners and that under whatever remedy private respondents may avail themselves of, to enforce their rights, petitioners
have to vacate the property because they have no right to stay therein. The main thrust therefore, of their objection is not on the merits of their claim but on the technicality
that the nature of the action taken by the private respondents is erroneous. That the position of petitioners is totally devoid of merit, is shown by the fact that the end result
would be the same.

PREMISES CONSIDERED, the assailed decision of the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED.

This Decision is immediately executory.

SO ORDERED.

Yap (Chairman), Melencio-Herrera, Padilla and Sarmiento, JJ., concur.

Footnotes
** Said Appellate Court is hereby ordered impleaded.
*** Penned by CA Justice Nathanael P. De Pano Jr., concurred in by Justices Jose A.R. Melo and Rizalina S. Bonifacio-Vera

FIRST DIVISION

G.R. No. L-68470 October 8, 1985

ALICE REYES VAN DORN, petitioner,
vs.
HON. MANUEL V. ROMILLO, JR., as Presiding Judge of Branch CX, Regional Trial Court of the National Capital Region Pasay City and RICHARD UPTON respondents.

MELENCIO-HERRERA, J.:\

In this Petition for certiorari and Prohibition, petitioner Alice Reyes Van Dorn seeks to set aside the Orders, dated September 15, 1983 and August 3, 1984, in Civil Case No. 1075-
P, issued by respondent Judge, which denied her Motion to Dismiss said case, and her Motion for Reconsideration of the Dismissal Order, respectively.

The basic background facts are that petitioner is a citizen of the Philippines while private respondent is a citizen of the United States; that they were married in Hongkong in
1972; that, after the marriage, they established their residence in the Philippines; that they begot two children born on April 4, 1973 and December 18, 1975, respectively; that
the parties were divorced in Nevada, United States, in 1982; and that petitioner has re-married also in Nevada, this time to Theodore Van Dorn.

Dated June 8, 1983, private respondent filed suit against petitioner in Civil Case No. 1075-P of the Regional Trial Court, Branch CXV, in Pasay City, stating that petitioner's
business in Ermita, Manila, (the Galleon Shop, for short), is conjugal property of the parties, and asking that petitioner be ordered to render an accounting of that business, and
that private respondent be declared with right to manage the conjugal property. Petitioner moved to dismiss the case on the ground that the cause of action is barred by
previous judgment in the divorce proceedings before the Nevada Court wherein respondent had acknowledged that he and petitioner had "no community property" as of June
11, 1982. The Court below denied the Motion to Dismiss in the mentioned case on the ground that the property involved is located in the Philippines so that the Divorce Decree
has no bearing in the case. The denial is now the subject of this certiorari proceeding.

Generally, the denial of a Motion to Dismiss in a civil case is interlocutory and is not subject to appeal. certiorari and Prohibition are neither the remedies to question the
propriety of an interlocutory order of the trial Court. However, when a grave abuse of discretion was patently committed, or the lower Court acted capriciously and whimsically,
then it devolves upon this Court in a certiorari proceeding to exercise its supervisory authority and to correct the error committed which, in such a case, is equivalent to lack of
jurisdiction. 1 Prohibition would then lie since it would be useless and a waste of time to go ahead with the proceedings. 2 Weconsider the petition filed in this case within the
exception, and we have given it due course.

For resolution is the effect of the foreign divorce on the parties and their alleged conjugal property in the Philippines.

Petitioner contends that respondent is estopped from laying claim on the alleged conjugal property because of the representation he made in the divorce proceedings before
the American Court that they had no community of property; that the Galleon Shop was not established through conjugal funds, and that respondent's claim is barred by prior
judgment.

For his part, respondent avers that the Divorce Decree issued by the Nevada Court cannot prevail over the prohibitive laws of the Philippines and its declared national policy;
that the acts and declaration of a foreign Court cannot, especially if the same is contrary to public policy, divest Philippine Courts of jurisdiction to entertain matters within its
jurisdiction.

For the resolution of this case, it is not necessary to determine whether the property relations between petitioner and private respondent, after their marriage, were upon
absolute or relative community property, upon complete separation of property, or upon any other regime. The pivotal fact in this case is the Nevada divorce of the parties.

The Nevada District Court, which decreed the divorce, had obtained jurisdiction over petitioner who appeared in person before the Court during the trial of the case. It also
obtained jurisdiction over private respondent who, giving his address as No. 381 Bush Street, San Francisco, California, authorized his attorneys in the divorce case, Karp & Gradt
Ltd., to agree to the divorce on the ground of incompatibility in the understanding that there were neither community property nor community obligations. 3 As explicitly stated
in the Power of Attorney he executed in favor of the law firm of KARP & GRAD LTD., 336 W. Liberty, Reno, Nevada, to represent him in the divorce proceedings:

xxx xxx xxx

You are hereby authorized to accept service of Summons, to file an Answer, appear on my behalf and do an things necessary and proper to represent me, without
further contesting, subject to the following:

1. That my spouse seeks a divorce on the ground of incompatibility.

2. That there is no community of property to be adjudicated by the Court.

3. 'I'hat there are no community obligations to be adjudicated by the court.

xxx xxx xxx 4

There can be no question as to the validity of that Nevada divorce in any of the States of the United States. The decree is binding on private respondent as an American citizen.
For instance, private respondent cannot sue petitioner, as her husband, in any State of the Union. What he is contending in this case is that the divorce is not valid and binding in
this jurisdiction, the same being contrary to local law and public policy.

It is true that owing to the nationality principle embodied in Article 15 of the Civil Code, 5 only Philippine nationals are covered by the policy against absolute divorces the same
being considered contrary to our concept of public police and morality. However, aliens may obtain divorces abroad, which may be recognized in the Philippines, provided they
are valid according to their national law. 6 In this case, the divorce in Nevada released private respondent from the marriage from the standards of American law, under
which divorce dissolves the marriage. As stated by the Federal Supreme Court of the United States in Atherton vs. Atherton, 45 L. Ed. 794, 799:

The purpose and effect of a decree of divorce from the bond of matrimony by a court of competent jurisdiction are to change the existing status or domestic relation of
husband and wife, and to free them both from the bond. The marriage tie when thus severed as to one party, ceases to bind either. A husband without a wife, or a wife
without a husband, is unknown to the law. When the law provides, in the nature of a penalty. that the guilty party shall not marry again, that party, as well as the other,
is still absolutely freed from the bond of the former marriage.

Thus, pursuant to his national law, private respondent is no longer the husband of petitioner. He would have no standing to sue in the case below as petitioner's husband
entitled to exercise control over conjugal assets. As he is bound by the Decision of his own country's Court, which validly exercised jurisdiction over him, and whose decision he
does not repudiate, he is estopped by his own representation before said Court from asserting his right over the alleged conjugal property.

To maintain, as private respondent does, that, under our laws, petitioner has to be considered still married to private respondent and still subject to a wife's obligations under
Article 109, et. seq. of the Civil Code cannot be just. Petitioner should not be obliged to live together with, observe respect and fidelity, and render support to private
respondent. The latter should not continue to be one of her heirs with possible rights to conjugal property. She should not be discriminated against in her own country if the
ends of justice are to be served.

WHEREFORE, the Petition is granted, and respondent Judge is hereby ordered to dismiss the Complaint filed in Civil Case No. 1075-P of his Court.

Without costs.
SO ORDERED.

Teehankee (Chairman), Plana, Relova, Gutierrez, Jr., De la Fuente and Patajo, JJ., concur.

Footnotes
1 Sanchez vs. Zosa, 68 SCRA 171 (1975); Malit vs. People, 114 SCRA 348 (1982).
2 U.S.T. vs. Hon. Villanueva, et al., 106 Phil. 439 (1959).
3 Annex "Y", Petition for Certiorari.
4 p. 98, Rollo.
5 "Art. 15. Laws relating to family rights and duties or to the status, condition and legal capacity of persons are binding upon citizens of the Philippines, even though
living abroad.
6 cf. Recto vs. Harden, 100 Phil. 427 [1956]; Paras, Civil Code, 1971 ed., Vol. I, p. 52; Salonga, Private International Law, 1979 ed., p. 231."

VAN DORN vs. ROMILLO, G.R. No. L-68470 October 8, 1985

ALICE REYES VAN DORN, petitioner, VS. HON. MANUEL ROMILLO JR., as Presiding Judge of
Branch CX, Regional Trial Court of the National Capital Region Pasay City and RICHARD
UPTON, respondents
October 8, 1985

FACTS:
Alice Reyes, the petitioner is a citizen of the Philippines while private respondent Richard Upton is a citizen of the United States. They were married in Hong Kong in 1972 and
they established residence in the Philippines. They had two children and they were divorced in Nevada, USA in 1982. The petitioner remarried in Nevada to Theodore Van Dorn.
The private responded filed against petitioner stating that the petitioner’s business is a conjugal property of the parties and that respondent is declared with right to manage the
conjugal property. Petitioner moved to dismiss the case on the ground that the cause of action is barred by previous judgment in the divorce proceedings before the Nevada
Court, where respondent acknowledged that they had no community property as of June 11, 1982.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the private respondent as petitioner’s husband is entitled to exercise control over conjugal assets?

RULING:
The petition is granted. Complaint is dismissed.
The policy against absolute divorce cover only Philippine nationals. However, aliens may obtain divorce abroad, which may be recognized in the Philippines provided they are
valid according to their national law.
From the standards of American law, under which divorce dissolves marriage, the divorce in Nevada released private respondent from the marriage between them with the
petitioner. Thus, pursuant to his national law, private respondent is no longer the husband of petitioner. He would have no standing to sue in the case as petitioner’s husband
entitled to exercise control over conjugal assets. He is estopped by his own representation before said court from asserting his right over the alleged conjugal property.

WOLFGANG O. ROEHR, petitioner, vs. MARIA CARMEN D. RODRIGUEZ, HON. JUDGE JOSEFINA GUEVARA-SALONGA, Presiding Judge of Makati RTC, Branch 149, respondents.
G.R. No. 142820 | 2003-06-20
DECISION

QUISUMBING, J.:

At the core of the present controversy are issues of (a) grave abuse of discretion allegedly committed by public respondent and (b) lack of jurisdiction of the regional trial court,
in matters that spring from a divorce decree obtained abroad by petitioner.

In this special civil action for certiorari, petitioner assails (a) the order[1] dated September 30, 1999 of public respondent Judge Josefina Guevara-Salonga, Presiding Judge of
Makati Regional Trial Court,[2] Branch 149, in Civil Case No. 96-1389 for declaration of nullity of marriage, and (b) the order[3] dated March 31, 2000 denying his motion for
reconsideration. The assailed orders partially set aside the trial court's order dismissing Civil Case No. 96-1389, for the purpose of resolving issues relating to the property
settlement of the spouses and the custody of their children.

Petitioner Wolfgang O. Roehr, a German citizen and resident of Germany, married private respondent Carmen Rodriguez, a Filipina, on December 11, 1980 in Hamburg,
Germany. Their marriage was subsequently ratified on February 14, 1981 in Tayasan, Negros Oriental.[4] Out of their union were born Carolynne and Alexandra Kristine on
November 18, 1981 and October 25, 1987, respectively.

On August 28, 1996, private respondent filed a petition[5] for declaration of nullity of marriage before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Makati City. On February 6, 1997,
petitioner filed a motion to dismiss,[6] but it was denied by the trial court in its order[7] dated May 28, 1997.

On June 5, 1997, petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration, but was also denied in an order[8] dated August 13, 1997. On September 5, 1997, petitioner filed a petition for
certiorari with the Court of Appeals. On November 27, 1998, the appellate court denied the petition and remanded the case to the RTC.

Meanwhile, petitioner obtained a decree of divorce from the Court of First Instance of Hamburg-Blankenese, promulgated on December 16, 1997. The decree provides in part:

[T]he Court of First Instance, Hamburg-Blankenese, Branch 513, has ruled through Judge van Buiren of the Court of First Instance on the basis of the oral proceedings held on 4
Nov. 1997:

The marriage of the Parties contracted on 11 December 1980 before the Civil Registrar of Hamburg-Altona is hereby dissolved.

The parental custody for the children

Carolynne Roehr, born 18 November 1981

Alexandra Kristine Roehr, born on 25 October 1987

is granted to the father.

The litigation expenses shall be assumed by the Parties.[9]

In view of said decree, petitioner filed a Second Motion to Dismiss on May 20, 1999 on the ground that the trial court had no jurisdiction over the subject matter of the action or
suit as a decree of divorce had already been promulgated dissolving the marriage of petitioner and private respondent.

On July 14, 1999, Judge Guevara-Salonga issued an order granting petitioner's motion to dismiss. Private respondent filed a Motion for Partial Reconsideration, with a prayer
that the case proceed for the purpose of determining the issues of custody of children and the distribution of the properties between petitioner and private respondent.
On August 18, 1999, an Opposition to the Motion for Partial Reconsideration was filed by the petitioner on the ground that there is nothing to be done anymore in the instant
case as the marital tie between petitioner Wolfgang Roehr and respondent Ma. Carmen D. Rodriguez had already been severed by the decree of divorce promulgated by the
Court of First Instance of Hamburg, Germany on December 16, 1997 and in view of the fact that said decree of divorce had already been recognized by the RTC in its order of July
14, 1999, through the implementation of the mandate of Article 26 of the Family Code,[10] endowing the petitioner with the capacity to remarry under the Philippine law.

On September 30, 1999, respondent judge issued the assailed order partially setting aside her order dated July 14, 1999 for the purpose of tackling the issues of property
relations of the spouses as well as support and custody of their children. The pertinent portion of said order provides:

Acting on the Motion for Partial Reconsideration of the Order dated July 14, 1999 filed by petitioner thru counsel which was opposed by respondent and considering that the
second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code was included as an amendment thru Executive Order 227, to avoid the absurd situation of a Filipino as being still married to
his or her alien spouse though the latter is no longer married to the Filipino spouse because he/she had obtained a divorce abroad which is recognized by his/her national law,
and considering further the effects of the termination of the marriage under Article 43 in relation to Article 50 and 52 of the same Code, which include the dissolution of the
property relations of the spouses, and the support and custody of their children, the Order dismissing this case is partially set aside with respect to these matters which may be
ventilated in this Court.

SO ORDERED.[11] (Emphasis supplied.)

Petitioner filed a timely motion for reconsideration on October 19, 1999, which was denied by respondent judge in an order dated March 31, 2000.[12]

Petitioner ascribes lack of jurisdiction of the trial court and grave abuse of discretion on the part of respondent judge. He cites as grounds for his petition the following:

1. Partially setting aside the order dated July 14, 1999 dismissing the instant case is not allowed by 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.[13]

2. Respondent Maria Carmen Rodriguez by her motion for Partial Reconsideration had recognized and admitted the Divorce Decision obtained by her ex-husband in Hamburg,
Germany.[14]

3. There is nothing left to be tackled by the Honorable Court as there are no conjugal assets alleged in the Petition for Annulment of Marriage and in the Divorce petition, and
the custody of the children had already been awarded to Petitioner Wolfgang Roehr.[15]

Pertinent in this case before us are the following issues:

1. Whether or not respondent judge gravely abused her discretion in issuing her order dated September 30, 1999, which partially modified her order dated July 14, 1999; and

2. Whether or not respondent judge gravely abused her discretion when she assumed and retained jurisdiction over the present case despite the fact that petitioner has already
obtained a divorce decree from a German court.

On the first issue, petitioner asserts that the assailed order of respondent judge is completely inconsistent with her previous order and is contrary to Section 3, Rule 16, Rules of
Civil Procedure, which provides:

Sec. 3. Resolution of motion - After the hearing, the court may dismiss the action or claim, deny the motion, or order the amendment of the pleading.

The court shall not defer the resolution of the motion for the reason that the ground relied upon is not indubitable.
In every case, the resolution shall state clearly and distinctly the reasons therefor. (Emphasis supplied.)

Petitioner avers that a court's action on a motion is limited to dismissing the action or claim, denying the motion, or ordering the amendment of the pleading.

Private respondent, on her part, argues that the RTC can validly reconsider its order dated July 14, 1999 because it had not yet attained finality, given the timely filing of
respondent's motion for reconsideration.

Pertinent to this issue is Section 3 in relation to Section 7, Rule 37 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, which provides:

Sec. 3. Action upon motion for new trial or reconsideration.-The trial court may set aside the judgment or final order and grant a new trial, upon such terms as may be just, or
may deny the motion. If the court finds that excessive damages have been awarded or that the judgment or final order is contrary to the evidence or law, it may amend such
judgment or final order accordingly.

Sec. 7. Partial new trial or reconsideration.-If the grounds for a motion under this Rule appear to the court to affect the issues as to only a part, or less than all of the matters in
controversy, or only one, or less than all, of the parties to it, the court may order a new trial or grant reconsideration as to such issues if severable without interfering with the
judgment or final order upon the rest. (Emphasis supplied.)

It is clear from the foregoing rules that a judge can order a partial reconsideration of a case that has not yet attained finality. Considering that private respondent filed a motion
for reconsideration within the reglementary period, the trial court's decision of July 14, 1999 can still be modified. Moreover, in Sañado v. Court of Appeals,[16] we held that the
court could modify or alter a judgment even after the same has become executory whenever circumstances transpire rendering its decision unjust and inequitable, as where
certain facts and circumstances justifying or requiring such modification or alteration transpired after the judgment has become final and executory[17] and when it becomes
imperative in the higher interest of justice or when supervening events warrant it.[18] In our view, there are even more compelling reasons to do so when, as in this case,
judgment has not yet attained finality.

Anent the second issue, petitioner claims that respondent judge committed grave abuse of discretion when she partially set aside her order dated July 14, 1999, despite the fact
that petitioner has already obtained a divorce decree from the Court of First Instance of Hamburg, Germany.

In Garcia v. Recio,[19] Van Dorn v. Romillo, Jr.,[20] and Llorente v. Court of Appeals,[21] we consistently held that a divorce obtained abroad by an alien may be recognized in
our jurisdiction, provided such decree is valid according to the national law of the foreigner. Relevant to the present case is Pilapil v. Ibay-Somera,[22] where this Court
specifically recognized the validity of a divorce obtained by a German citizen in his country, the Federal Republic of Germany. We held in Pilapil that a foreign divorce and its
legal effects may be recognized in the Philippines insofar as respondent is concerned in view of the nationality principle in our civil law on the status of persons.

In this case, the divorce decree issued by the German court dated December 16, 1997 has not been challenged by either of the parties. In fact, save for the issue of parental
custody, even the trial court recognized said decree to be valid and binding, thereby endowing private respondent the capacity to remarry. Thus, the present controversy mainly
relates to the award of the custody of their two children, Carolynne and Alexandra Kristine, to petitioner.

As a general rule, divorce decrees obtained by foreigners in other countries are recognizable in our jurisdiction, but the legal effects thereof, e.g. on custody, care and support of
the children, must still be determined by our courts.[23] Before our courts can give the effect of res judicata to a foreign judgment, such as the award of custody to petitioner by
the German court, it must be shown that the parties opposed to the judgment had been given ample opportunity to do so on grounds allowed under Rule 39, Section 50 of the
Rules of Court (now Rule 39, Section 48, 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure), to wit:

SEC. 50. Effect of foreign judgments. - The effect of a judgment of a tribunal of a foreign country, having jurisdiction to pronounce the judgment is as follows:

(a) In case of a judgment upon a specific thing, the judgment is conclusive upon the title to the thing;
(b) In case of a judgment against a person, the judgment is presumptive evidence of a right as between the parties and their successors in interest by a subsequent title; but the
judgment may be repelled by evidence of a want of jurisdiction, want of notice to the party, collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of law or fact.

It is essential that there should be an opportunity to challenge the foreign judgment, in order for the court in this jurisdiction to properly determine its efficacy. In this
jurisdiction, our Rules of Court clearly provide that with respect to actions in personam, as distinguished from actions in rem, a foreign judgment merely constitutes prima facie
evidence of the justness of the claim of a party and, as such, is subject to proof to the contrary.[24]

In the present case, it cannot be said that private respondent was given the opportunity to challenge the judgment of the German court so that there is basis for declaring that
judgment as res judicata with regard to the rights of petitioner to have parental custody of their two children. The proceedings in the German court were summary. As to what
was the extent of private respondent's participation in the proceedings in the German court, the records remain unclear. The divorce decree itself states that neither has she
commented on the proceedings[25] nor has she given her opinion to the Social Services Office.[26] Unlike petitioner who was represented by two lawyers, private respondent
had no counsel to assist her in said proceedings.[27] More importantly, the divorce judgment was issued to petitioner by virtue of the German Civil Code provision to the effect
that when a couple lived separately for three years, the marriage is deemed irrefutably dissolved. The decree did not touch on the issue as to who the offending spouse was.
Absent any finding that private respondent is unfit to obtain custody of the children, the trial court was correct in setting the issue for hearing to determine the issue of parental
custody, care, support and education mindful of the best interests of the children. This is in consonance with the provision in the Child and Youth Welfare Code that the child's
welfare is always the paramount consideration in all questions concerning his care and custody. [28]

On the matter of property relations, petitioner asserts that public respondent exceeded the bounds of her jurisdiction when she claimed cognizance of the issue concerning
property relations between petitioner and private respondent. Private respondent herself has admitted in Par. 14 of her petition for declaration of nullity of marriage dated
August 26, 1996 filed with the RTC of Makati, subject of this case, that: "[p]etitioner and respondent have not acquired any conjugal or community property nor have they
incurred any debts during their marriage."[29] Herein petitioner did not contest this averment. Basic is the rule that a court shall grant relief warranted by the allegations and
the proof.[30] Given the factual admission by the parties in their pleadings that there is no property to be accounted for, respondent judge has no basis to assert jurisdiction in
this case to resolve a matter no longer deemed in controversy.

In sum, we find that respondent judge may proceed to determine the issue regarding the custody of the two children born of the union between petitioner and private
respondent. Private respondent erred, however, in claiming cognizance to settle the matter of property relations of the parties, which is not at issue.

WHEREFORE, the orders of the Regional Trial Court of Makati, Branch 149, issued on September 30, 1999 and March 31, 2000 are AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION. We hereby
declare that the trial court has jurisdiction over the issue between the parties as to who has parental custody, including the care, support and education of the children, namely
Carolynne and Alexandra Kristine Roehr. Let the records of this case be remanded promptly to the trial court for continuation of appropriate proceedings. No pronouncement as
to costs.

SO ORDERED.

Bellosillo, (Chairman), and Callejo, Sr., JJ., concur.

Austria-Martinez, J., on official leave.

[5] Id. at 1-4.
[1] Rollo, p. 15. [6] Id. at 19-28.
[2] Judge Josefina Guevara-Salonga signed as Executive Judge. [7] Id. at 147.
[3] Rollo, p. 16. [8] Id. at 165.
[4] Records, pp. 5-6. [9] Rollo, p. 33.
[10] Art. 26. All marriages solemnized outside the Philippines, in accordance with
the laws in force in the country where they were solemnized, and valid there as
such, shall also be valid in this country, except those prohibited under Articles 35
(1), (4), (5) and (6), 36, 37 and 38.
Where a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner is validly celebrated
and a divorce is thereafter validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating
him or her to remarry, the Filipino spouse shall likewise have capacity to remarry
under Philippine law. (As amended by E. O. No. 227, dated July 17, 1987.)
[11] Supra, note 1.
[12] Supra, note 3.
[13] Rollo, p. 6.
[14] Id. at 8.
[15] Ibid.
[16] G.R. No. 108338, 17 April 2001, 356 SCRA 546, 561.
[17] David v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 115821, 13 October 1999, 316 SCRA 710,
719.
[18] People v. Gallo, G.R. No. 124736, 29 September 1999, 315 SCRA 461, 463.
[19] G.R. No. 138322, 2 October 2001, 366 SCRA 437, 447.
[20] No. L-68470, 8 October 1985, 139 SCRA 139, 143.
[21] G.R. No. 124371, 23 November 2000, 345 SCRA 592, 601.
[22] G.R. No. 80116, 30 June 1989, 174 SCRA 653, 663.
[23] Llorente v. Court of Appeals, supra at 602.
[24] Philsec Investment Corporation v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 103493, 19 June
1997, 274 SCRA 102, 110.
[25] Rollo, p. 57.
[26] Ibid.
[27] Id. at 55-56.
[28] Sagala-Eslao v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 116773, 16 January 1997, 266 SCRA
317, 321, citing Art. 8, P.D. No. 603, The Child and Youth Welfare Code-
Art. 8. Child's Welfare Paramount. - In all questions regarding the care, custody,
education and property of the child, his welfare shall be the paramount
consideration.
[29] Rollo, p. 19.
[30] JG Summit Holdings, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 124293, 20 November
2000, 345 SCRA 143, 154.