PEOPLE VS.

MARIANOGR L-40527 JUNE 30, 1976Facts:

Hermogenes Mariano, the appointed liaison officer of a municipality inthe Province of Bulacan was charged with
estafa of goods amountingto no more than 6,000 pesos. Mariano then filed with the court amotion to quash all
information. The respondent judge then grantedthe motion on the basis that the court indeed had no jurisdiction
overthe case, citing that a military commission had already ruled on amalversation case against Mayor Nolasco
involving the sameproperties questioned at bar. The respondent judge noted that casehaving been heard and
decided by a competent tribunal gives no jurisdiction to his court to pass anew judgment on the same subjectmatter.
The PEOPLE then appealed and the Supreme Court havingciting the Judicial Act of 1948 and the fact that Estafa and
Malversationare 2 different and distinct offense and that the military commissionhas no authority over the charges
placed on Mariano, decided thatlower court committed a grave error in saying that they had no jurisdiction over the
matter. As so ordered by the Supreme Court therespondent judge was to continue the criminal case against
Mariano.

The issues presented:

Does the civil court & military commissions exercise concurrent jurisdiction over the case of the estafa of goods
amounting to notmore than 6,000 Pesos.

The Ruling:

Military commissions have no authority over estafa cases and the courtof first instance has original jurisdiction as so
implied by the JudicialAct of 1948.

Ratio:

The Judicial act of 1948 sec. 44 states that the Court of First Instanceshall have original jurisdiction in all criminal
cases in which the penaltyprovided by the law is imprisonment for more than six months or afine of over 200 pesos.
Estafa more than meets with requirementsneeded for the Court of First Instance to acquire original jurisdiction.

COLINARES VS. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES

Facts:

Arnel Colinares was charged and found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of frustrated homicide by the RTC of
Camarines Sur. He was sentenced to suffer imprisonment from two years and four months of prison correccional, as
minimum, to six years and one day of prison mayor, as maximum. Since the maximum probationable imprisonment
under the law was only up to six years, Arnel did not qualify for probation. On appeal by Colinares, the Court of
Appeals sustained the RTC’s decision. Unsatisfied with the Court of Appeal’s decision, petitioner then appealed to
the Supreme Court and took the position that he should be entitled to apply for probation in case the Court metes
out a new penalty on him that makes his offense probationable, which was strongly opposed by the Solicitor General
reiterating that under the Probation Law, no application for probation can be entertained once the accused has
perfected his appeal from the judgment of conviction. The Supreme Court, however, found that Colinares is guilty of
attempted homicide and not of frustrated homicide.

Issue:

Whether or not Arnel Colinares may still apply for probation on remand of the case to the trial court

Ruling:

Yes, The Supreme Court ruled that Colinares may apply for probation upon remand of his case to the RTC. Ordinarily,
an accused would no longer be entitled to apply for probation, he having appealed from the judgment of the RTC
convicting him for frustrated homicide. But in this case the Supreme Court ruled to set aside the judgment of the RTC
and found him only liable for attempted homicide, if the Supreme Court follows the established rule that no accused
can apply for probation on appeal, the accused would suffer from the erroneous judgment of the RTC with no fault
of his own, therefore defying fairness and equity.

US V. AH CHONG GR NO. L-5272, MARCH 19, 1910FACTS:

The defendant, Ah Chong, was employed as a cook in one of the Officers’

quarters at Fort McKinley, Rizal Province. Together living with him in the said quarters was thedeceased, Pascual
Gualberto, who was employed as a houseboy. There had been severalrobberies in Fort McKinley prior to the incident
thus prompting the defendant and his roommateto reinforce the flimsy hook used to lock the door of their room by
placing a chair against it. Thedefendant and the deceased had an understanding that when either returned at night,
he shouldknock on the door and say his name. On the night of Aug. 14, 1908, Ah Chong, who was alonein his room,
was awakened by someone trying to force open the door of the room. Thedefendant called out twice, asking the
identity of the person but heard no answer. Fearing thatthe intruder was a robber or a thief, the defendant called
out that he would kill the intruder if hetried to enter. At that moment, the door was forced open and the defendant
was struck firstabove the knee by the edge of the chair. Because of the darkness of the room, the defendantthought
he was being hit by the intruder and tried to defend himself by striking wildly at theintruder using a common kitchen
knife which he kept under his pillow. It turned out that the said

intruder was actually the defendant’s roommate, Pascual Gualberto. The roommate was

brought to the military hospital where he died from the effects of the wound the following day.

Issue:

WON the defendant was criminally liable for committing a felony.

Held:

Defendant was not criminally liable and exonerated.In order for mistake of fact to be held as a valid defense, there
has to be several requisites.One, that the act done would have been lawful had the facts been as the accused
believedthem to be. Two, that the intention of the accused in performing the act should be lawful, andlastly, that the
mistake must be without fault or carelessness on the part of the accused.In the case at bar, had the intruder been a
robber as the defendant believed him to be, then AhChong acted in good faith, without malice or criminal intent,
and would have been whollyexempt from criminal liability and that he cannot be said to have been guilty of
negligence orrecklessness

L-42288 THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, plaintiff-appellee, vs. CORNELIO BAYONA, defendant-appellant.

The facts are as follows: The defendant, who was a special agent of the Philippine Constabulary, contends that he
stopped his automobile in front of the municipal building of Pilar for the purpose of delivering to Major Agdamag a
revolver that the defendant had taken that day from one Tomas de Martin, who had no license therefor; that he did
not know there was a polling place near where he parked his motor car; that he was sixty-three meters from the
electoral college when the revolver was taken from him by Jose E. Desiderio, a representative of the Secretary of the
Interior. The evidence shows, however, that the defendant was only ten or twelve meters from the polling place
when he was found standing near his automobile with a revolver in his belt, and that the municipal building could
not be seen from the polling place; that the defendant was at the time employed as a chauffeur by a senator for that
district, and that he had been sent to Pontevedra, a municipality adjoining Pilar. The defendant did not arrest Tomas
de Martin, nor does it appear that he caused him to be prosecuted. Tomas de Martin was not called as a witness in
this case. Furthermore there is one other fact of record which completely discredits the testimony of the defendant.
Major Agdamag, to whom the defendant claims he intended to deliver the revolver, was not the provincial
commander of Capiz, but an officer sent from Cebu to Capiz for the purpose of supervising the elections in that
province; and taking into consideration the intelligence of the defendant and the nature of his employment.

Issue: Whether or not appellant’s intent should be taken into consideration in the instant case.

Held: No. Appeal is denied. The court does not believe that appellant did not know the location of the polling place
in question. The law which the defendant violated is a statutory provision, and the intent with which he violated it is
immaterial. The act prohibited by the Election Law was complete. The intention to intimidate the voters or to
interfere otherwise with the election is not made an essential element of the offense. The rule is that in acts mala in
se there must be a criminal intent, but in those mala prohibita it is sufficient if the prohibited act was intentionally
done

PEOPLE V. EUGENIO LAGARTO Y GETALADO, GR NO. 65833, 1991-05-06

Facts:
Issues:
whether or not the trial court correctly appreciated the existence of recidivism and the qualifying
circumstances of evident premeditation and treachery.
Ruling:
We find, as the trial court found, that the accused is a recidivist. A recidivist is one who, at the time of
his trial for one crime, shall have been previously convicted by final judgment of another crime
embraced in the same title of the Revised Penal Code. Herein... accused had been convicted of the
crime of homicide in Criminal Case No. 1473 before the trial of the present Criminal Case No. 1566.
The former counsel de oficio is of the opinion that "the time of trial" is to be reckoned with the date of
the arraignment. The phrase "at the time of his trial" should not be restrictively construed as to mean
the date of arraignment.
We declared in People vs. Enriquez, 90 Phil. 428, that the phrase "at the time of his trial for an offense"
is employed in its general sense, including the rendering of the judgment. In US vs. Karelsen, 3 Phil.
23, We held that the phrase "at the trial" is... meant to include everything that is done in the course of
the trial, from arraignment until after sentence is announced by the judge in open court.
In the case at bar, the accused was convicted of homicide in Criminal Case No. 1473 on September
15, 1983. There being... no appeal, the judgment therein became final on October 11, 1983. The
second conviction was rendered on October 26, 1983 for Murder. Hence, it is crystal clear that the
accused is a recidivist: the accused had been convicted by final judgment at the time of the... rendition
of the judgment for the second offense.
People v. Lopez

THE FACTS
Defendant approached car owner and offered to sell him a watch, later pulling out a gun and telling owner to get out of
the car. Owner got out of the car and left the keys in the ignition. Defendant then got in the car and placed his
backpack in the vehicle. Owner soon realized the gun was an air gun and attempted to get back in the vehicle to
retrieve his checks. Defendant attempted to shoot owner with the air gun, but then fled when it misfired
twice. Defendant argued at trial that because he had not started the car, nor moved it, he was not guilty of carjacking.

THE ISSUE
Does the element of “taking” required of a crime such as carjacking or robbery require “asportation” or “movement” of
the car?

THE HOLDING/REASONING
No. There is no evidence that the California legislature intended the “taking” requirement to differ from other theft
crimes. The intent of the legislation was to sustain convictions of those who with the temporarily dispossess a
vehicle. The legislature is silent on exempting the asportation requirement of carjacking. Such silence along with the
plain meaning of the statutes displays the legislative intent that asportation be a necessary element of carjacking
crimes.

Hicks v. United States

Brief Fact Summary. The Defendant, Hicks (Defendant), was jointly indicted with another man on one
count of murder. Defendant had been present when his companion (co-defendant) shot and killed a man at
the conclusion of a discussion. Defendant then rode off on horseback with co-defendant after the shooting.
Defendant was subsequently captured and convicted of murder.
Defendant was present while co-defendant fatally shot another person and left the crime scene with co-
defendant after the shooting. Defendant did not render assistance in actually completing the crime, but
merely acted in the capacity of a witness. There was testimony from witnesses further away that Defendant
took off his own hat and told the victim to “take off your hat and die like a man” immediately before his co-
defendant fired his gun.

Issue. Is a person an accomplice to the crime of murder merely by his presence at the crime scene when
the killing takes place, though he does not render assistance in completing the crime and there is no
evidence of a prior agreement to render assistance?

Synopsis of Rule of Law. The presence of another person at the scene of a murder who does not
assist in carrying out the murder is not sufficient to implicate that person as an accomplice in the
absence of evidence of a prior agreement to render assistance in the crime.